

## The importance of benchmarking and impact assessment in CSDP operations

Rodt, Annemarie Peen

*Published in:*  
Handbook on CSDP missions and operations

*Publication date:*  
2015

*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

*Citation for published version (APA):*  
Rodt, A. P. (2015). The importance of benchmarking and impact assessment in CSDP operations. In J. Rerhl, & G. Glume (Eds.), *Handbook on CSDP missions and operations: the common security defence policy of the European Union* (pp. 181-185). Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria.  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/european-security-defence-college/pdf/handbook/final\\_-\\_handbook\\_on\\_csdp\\_missions\\_and\\_operations.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/european-security-defence-college/pdf/handbook/final_-_handbook_on_csdp_missions_and_operations.pdf)

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# HANDBOOK



## MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY  
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION



**HANDBOOK ON  
CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS**  
**THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

edited by  
Jochen Rehl and Galia Glume

with forewords by

**H. E. Federica Mogherini**  
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  
and Vice-President of the Commission  
and  
**H. E. Gerald Klug**  
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria



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### Imprint:

Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Editors: Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume

Published by: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria  
Rossauer Lände 1, 1090 Vienna/Austria

Photo credits for the front page: European Union/EUTM Somalia, European Union/EUCAP Nestor, European Union/EUPM, European Union/EUNAVFOR Somalia, European Union/EUFOR Althea, Sonia Khoudja

Layout: Axel Scala, Armed Forces Printing Centre

Printed and bound by:  
Armed Forces Printing Centre, Vienna/Austria, 2015  
BMLVS 15-9999



Printed according to the Austrian Ecolabel for printed matter,  
Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports/  
Armed Forces Printing Centre, UW-Nr. 943

ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4

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# FOREWORD

Peace and stability, respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law are the cornerstones of our society. They are the foundations upon which our Union is built. Today, more than ever, we are aware that we cannot take peace on our continent for granted. We need to live up to our commitment to be a provider of security. A Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an essential prerequisite to achieving this aim. No one country alone can tackle the immense challenge we face. Together we can make a difference.

The European Union has a unique contribution to make in confronting new and complex threats. Today, the distinction between internal and external threats has become ever more blurred. This is why our common security and defence policy is deeply integrated with other aspects of our external relations. We provide security by stabilising crises around Europe, promoting human rights and democracy, as well as assisting countries in need.

Since 2003 more than 30 CSDP missions and operations have been conducted in three continents, advancing peace and stability, not only in the host country, but often for the wider region in question. The innovative forms of EU engagement – training and advisory missions and institution building – have become trademarks that are valued around the world. What is more, demand from our partner countries to work hand in hand with our missions keeps growing.

This is an important year for the CSDP. As the world around us is changing rapidly, we also need to change. That is why I have launched a reflection process to take a fresh look at what the changed global environment means for how we approach security challenges in the future. These reflections will involve Member States, national parliaments, the European Parliament and think tanks and



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will go hand in hand with concrete steps we can take to step up our common response to security threats.

Terrorism, cyber threats and piracy cannot be countered without state-of-the-art equipment. Working more closely together on defence will allow us to invest in the modern technology and well-equipped forces we urgently need to react rapidly and effectively to the threats before us.

For 10 years, the European Security and Defence College has been a crucial partner in this aim, providing first-class training. Thanks to the hard work of the College, our forces are not only better prepared for the challenges they face, they are also developing a common European security culture.

This handbook makes an important contribution to explaining the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. Apart from being an invaluable resource for trainers and trainees of the European Security and Defence College, it is a one-stop shop for anyone in search of a full picture of the EU's security and defence policy.

## **Federica Mogherini**

High Representative of the Union  
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  
and Vice-President of the Commission

# FOREWORD

We need to recognise that new international security crises are characterised by increasingly complex dynamics in terms of their drivers, stakeholders and scope. In addition, they unfold with little warning, at great speed and, more often than not, concurrently.

The EU commands a broad range of tools and instruments to prevent and manage crises. The Union is therefore well equipped to provide coordinated and comprehensive responses across the civilian and military spectrum. In fact, the potential of this comprehensive approach is the unique selling point of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

For the CSDP success story to continue, it needs to be backed by the capacity to anticipate future developments and crises, by decision-making structures that can match the pace of international events, by capabilities that are ready and available, by clear financial commitments, and by the political willingness of the EU Member States to incur the risks and costs of contributing to missions and operations.

Since 2003, the European Union has been ready to go abroad within the framework of the CSDP and make its contribution to security and stability worldwide. In more than 30 missions and operations, some 150 000 personnel have been deployed, serving under the European banner.

A strong Europe needs a common identity. In order to strengthen this identity in the area of CSDP, a common security culture is needed. This includes developing a common perception of threats, a common approach to solving conflicts, and a common understanding of solidarity. It therefore requires a “European mind-set”, which can only be achieved through education and training and which, once established, will guar-



Direction of the Austrian Parliament/Wilke

antee the efficient implementation of CSDP tasks and challenges.

This year, the European Security and Defence College is celebrating its tenth anniversary. The college provides basic, advanced, pre-deployment and in-mission training for personnel to be deployed in crisis management areas. It relies on the institutional knowledge held by the EU institutions, in particular the EEAS, the EU Member States and various international partners. Through their training work, the college and the more than 80 partners in its network make a real contribution to making the EU more operational and coherent in its approach to conflict prevention and crisis management.

I feel honoured to present another contribution from the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports to achieving this mission objective. This handbook is the latest in a series of training materials. I am convinced that it will assist future mission personnel and staff at headquarters. It will also contribute to enhancing the common European security culture.

**Gerald Klug**

Federal Minister of Defence and Sports  
of the Republic of Austria

# FOREWORD BY THE EDITORS

The European Security Strategy of 2003 states that

*“Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”*

In the light of the current circumstances – the aftermath of the Arab Spring, in particular the difficult situation in Libya, the Syrian crisis and the rise of ISIL/ISIS, the Ukrainian conflict and the resulting frictions with Russia – do we now have to admit that we have failed in our efforts to achieve our strategic objectives?

The present handbook was put together at a time of geopolitical tsunamis in Europe and on its doorstep, including the ongoing terrorist threat, financial austerity in the EU Member States and global health crises (e.g. Ebola). Each generation faces its own challenges, and we can only confront those challenges by keeping our feet firmly on the ground, accepting cultural differences, following a step-by-step approach, and strongly engaging with each other in a spirit of “solidarity”. The CSDP and the other EU crisis management instruments have a crucial role to play in tackling crises and conflicts; together they can provide the key, in the context of the EU’s long-term endeavour to promote peace, stability and security, to finding solutions in a way that is collaborative, fitted to the circumstances and comprehensive.

In mid-2014, when we launched the process that culminated in the publication of this handbook, we were able to call upon a wide range of able and willing contributors from the EU institutions and academia. Over time, we increased the number of articles and authors so as to provide an even more comprehensive and up-to-date overview and, as a result, we have ended up with 57 contributions from 54 different experts (33 male and 21 female). Owing to their different professional backgrounds, we were able to cover topics such as counter-terrorism, hybrid warfare, strategic communications and maritime security, all issues which are currently on the agendas of high-level meetings.

Specific emphasis has been placed on operational aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy, which will ensure added value for our colleagues working in theatre. Such work would not be possible without the help and assistance of many individuals and departments working behind the scenes: We are therefore delighted to be able to publicly thank the following for their support:

- the English editing service of the General Secretariat of the Council for providing us with editorial suggestions and for carrying out a final linguistic check on the text, in particular Shauna Doherty, Serena Dyer-Meenenga, Sophie Etse, Andy Flower, Roger Greenwood, Maurice Hannon, Michael Harris, Laura Hayes, Jane Keates, Tim Nicolas, Úna O’Connor, Melanie Saville, and William Spurgeon;

- the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, in particular the Directorate for Security Policy headed by Brigadier Dr. Johann Frank;
  - the Austrian Armed Forces Printing Centre for its continued support in relation to layout and administration, especially Mr Axel Scala and Ms Eva Kutika;
  - our colleagues at the European Security and Defence College, in particular Charlotta Ahlmark, Pavlina Gorenc, Mario Marmo, Valentina Reynoso, Petteri Taitto, Symeon Zambas, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth (outgoing Head of the ESDC) and Dirk Dubois (incoming Head of the ESDC);
  - all other colleagues who, through their advice and support, made this project possible – both from the field and at headquarters, especially Oliver Rentschler, Bert Versmessen, Laura Di Rosa, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, Thomas Fronck, Walter Matyas, Alin Bodescu, Mercedes Garcia-Perez, Birgit Loeser, Gilles Janvier and Kęstutis Jankauskas;
  - finally our families, in particular Bernadeta, Julia and Maximilian.
- We hope that this handbook will help spread the word about the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union and thereby contribute to deepening our common European security culture.



Photo: Harald Minich/Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports

**Jochen Rehr**  
National Expert at the  
European Security and Defence College



Photo: Mathieu Paternoster/Laboriter

**Galia Glume**  
Reporting Officer in the  
EU's Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability





# 1 BACKGROUND

# 1.1. THE RATIONALE FOR CSDP

## 1.1.1. Development of CFSP/CSDP

by Jochen Rehr

To write about history is always difficult, particularly when it comes to finding the right entry and exit points. One must, of course, mention important politicians, thinkers and visionaries such as Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan Willem Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and Altiero Spinelli. One of their visions was an “ever closer Union”, which would include security and defence aspects. This idea was manifested in the plan to establish a “European Defence Community” (EDC), which failed in 1954.

Nevertheless, the development of an economic, financial, political and security community in Europe was driven by

- a step-by-step approach, taking into account national sensitivities;
- a process of continuous enlargement;
- the geopolitical environment with its obstacles, challenges and windows of opportunity;
- the political will of the EU Member States.

Another milestone in the development of a common foreign and security policy was the so-called Davignon report of the late 60s. The report, which was written by a council chaired by Étienne Davignon of the Belgian Foreign Office, included proposals on political cooperation between the Member States. The recommendations stated that the Member States should “*try to speak with a single voice on international problems*”. Nowadays this paradigm has slightly shifted and the focus is on “*delivering one message*”.

In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) codified European Political Cooperation. That cooperation was the forerunner of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which entered into force through the Treaty of Maastricht on 1 November 1993. With this treaty, the goal proclaimed in 1957 of an “*ever closer Union*” was achieved, although not entirely as envisaged by the founding fathers, whose model of European Integration was more supranational.

With the Treaty of Maastricht, both the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and “Justice and Home Affairs” remained intergovernmental, hence led by the Member States. In the foreign and security policy, reality on the ground – in this case the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration – was the driving force that deepened cooperation. In 1997, the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, an exemplary list of possible mission scenarios, were incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty. But at that time, the underlying idea was still to rely on the Western European Union (WEU) to further develop a common security and defence policy. Mutual assistance was to be “granted” via the obligation resulting from the NATO Treaty.

Amsterdam also created a very important and forward-looking position, which would be instrumental in the development of security and defence policy: The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Javier Solana, former Spanish minister for Foreign Affairs and former Secretary General of NATO, held this post from 18 October 1999 until 1 December 2009 (when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force).



Photo: Austrian Armed Forces

In October 1998 at the informal European Council in Pörschach/Austria, the then new UK Prime Minister Tony Blair made a first official statement favoring a European Security and Defence Policy. In the picture, 1<sup>st</sup> row: Antonio Guterres (PT), Tony Blair (UK), Jacques Santer (EU), Martti Ahtisaari (FI), Viktor Klima (AT), Jacques Chirac (FR), Gerhard Schröder (DE), Paavo Lipponen (FI), Lionel Jospin (FR); 2<sup>nd</sup> row: Jean-Claude Juncker (LU), Bertie Ahern (IE), Constantine Simitis (GR), José Maria Aznar (ES), Göran Persson (SE), Jean-Luc Dehaene (BE), Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (DK), Massimo D'Alema (IT), Wim Kok (NL)

After the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1998 (Kosovo crisis) and facilitated by a political change in the United Kingdom, the EU Member States decided to establish an independent “Common European Security and Defence Policy” (known at the time by the acronym ESDP, which changed to CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty). At a NATO summit in 1998, the then US Secretary of State, Ms Madeleine Albright, contributed to the discussion about an autonomous European security and defence policy with her famous “three D’s”: no diminution of NATO, no discrimination and no duplication; the latter was understood by the Europeans as no “unnecessary” duplication, as clearly stated in the Helsinki Conclusions of 1999.

Nevertheless, during the Austrian EU Presidency in the second half of 1998, the informal European Council in Pörschach, Southern Austria, on 24 and 25 October gave the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair the possibility to state Britain’s new

position on this subject, which was summarised in a press conference after the meeting as follows:

*“...in respect of common foreign and security policy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role. This will arise particularly because we are going to be appointing two people to common foreign and security positions in the European Union in the next few months so it is something that is very much on our minds but we are all agreed it was important that Europe should be able to play a better, more unified part in foreign and security policy decisions ... A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I think it is important that we do that.”*





Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting in Vienna, 3-4 November 1998

In the picture, 1<sup>st</sup> row: José da Veiga Simão (PT), Eduardo Serra Rexach (ES), Frank de Grave (NL), Anneli Taina (FI), José Cutileiro (Secretary-General WEU), Werner Fasslabend (AT), Carlo Scognamiglio Pasini (IT), Alex Bodry (LU), George Robertson (UK); 2<sup>nd</sup> row: Michael Smith (IE), Jean-Pol Poncelet (BE), Rudolf Scharping (DE), Hans Hækkerup (DK), Akis Tsochatzopoulos (GR), Alain Richard (FR), Björn von Sydow (SE)

Only one week later, on 3 and 4 November, the defence ministers of the European Union convened for an informal meeting in Vienna. Both events paved the way for the bilateral meeting of France and Britain in Saint Malo, which is seen by many scholars as the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy.

Various European Council meetings after the turbulent second half of 1998 started to establish the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The first meeting with clear guidance on ESDP was held on 3 and 4 June 1999 in Cologne. In the Council conclusions, emphasis was given to the “*the Union’s and Member States’ non-military crisis response tools*” besides the military aspects.

On 10 and 11 December 1999, the European Council in Helsinki underlined the – still valid – basic principles underpinning the European understanding of an autonomous security and defence policy for the EU:

- comprehensive: “*military and non-military crisis management capability*”;
- based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and recognising the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council;
- autonomous capacity to take decisions and to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.

The latter was modified from a reactive measure (“in response”) to a preventive tool through the European Security Strategy in 2003. The magic sentence for describing the relationship between EU’s autonomous military capabilities and NATO’s crisis management ambitions concluded “*where NATO as a whole is not engaged*”. But to date, cooperation between the CSDP and NATO structures has been limited – although not so much between their respective staff, but more on a political level.



Photo: Frédéric de La Nuyse/Ministry for Foreign Affairs, France

Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin during a press conference in the margins of the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo, 3-4 December 1998

The European Council in Helsinki also stated a level of ambition for the military aspects, namely *“to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”*.

These capabilities should be ready to use by 2003. The European Council further agreed that *“new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council”*.

And finally, new emphasis was given to the non-military crisis management in order *“to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources [...] at the disposal of the Union and the Member States”*.

On 19 and 20 June 2000, the European Council in Feira set four priority areas for the civilian aspects of the EU’s crisis management: (1) Police, (2) Rule of Law, (3) Civil Administration and (4) Civil Protection. Later, these four areas were supplemented by (5) Monitoring and (6) Support to EU Special Representatives. Feira also formulated

a level of ambition for the civilian side of crisis management, focussing on police capabilities: by 2003, the EU Member States should be able *“to provide up to 5 000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations [...] and] to be able to identify and deploy up to 1 000 police officers within 30 days”*.

The Nice Treaty of 2000 legitimised the newly established crisis management structures within the Council, in particular the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. Additionally, the former WEU agencies were transformed via Council Joint Actions in 2001 into EU agencies: EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and EU Satellite Centre in Torrejon. In 2004, the European Defence Agency in Brussels was created in order to facilitate the process of developing military capability. This completed the structure of agencies currently in place to support the Common Security and Defence Policy.





NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (left) and Dr. Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, announcing the Berlin plus arrangement in late 2002

During the Laeken Summit from 14 to 15 December 2001, the Heads of State or Government declared that

*“the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations.”*

However, the launch of the first ESDP mission (EU Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) took another year and the military had to wait until the Berlin plus arrangement with NATO was finalised on 17 March 2003.

In the same year, the US administration, specifically the then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, tried to separate the Europeans by dividing them into a new and an old Europe. The trigger was the dispute over the invasion of Iraq, which was not UN-mandated and was disapproved of in particular by Germany and France. In the US’ view, the old Europe was represented by the countries against the war and the new Europe constituted by the supporters of the US intervention.

Faced with what was a severe strategic dispute

between the EU Member States, Javier Solana took the initiative to reunite the European countries by providing a European Security Strategy. The ESS was first presented and discussed at the Council meeting in Thessaloniki during Greece’s EU presidency. In December 2003, the document was agreed by all EU Member States. In 2008, a “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” with the subtitle “Providing Security in a Changing World” updated the ESS to a certain extent, but did not replace or revise it. The report mentioned new threats such as piracy and cybercrime, complementing the strategic basis for the EU’s activities.

During the disputes in 2003, four EU Member States (Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg) met and discussed options to further improve the functioning of the European Union. One famous outcome was the discussion on an “EU military Headquarters” in Tervuren, Belgium. This plan was immediately rejected by the United Kingdom and a few other countries. Nev-



Photo: European Communities, 2009/ Georges Pouligouris

# 29-30 Agosto 2014



Photo: European Union

The three High Representatives: Javier Solana 1999-2009; Catherine Ashton 2009-2014; Federica Mogherini since 2014

ertheless, as a compromise, an operations centre was created within the EU Military Staff, which could grow into a fully fledged OHQ if agreed unanimously among EU Member States. Another point for consideration was the establishment of a European Security and Defence College, which actually happened in July 2005.

In 2004, the work on a “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” was finalised and the EU Member States signed the document on 29 October 2004 in Rome. This document brought with it some important new elements for CFSP/CSDP, including a “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” and a “mutual assistance clause”.

However, the Treaty was rejected by France and the Netherlands; hence, it was never ratified and never entered into force. The “mutual assistance clause” survived unchanged the following debates, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” was renamed “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.

The failure to ratify the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” was followed by a long period of reflection, which only came to an end in 2009. During this time, there was little movement on the foreign and security policy. But thanks to the personal engagement of the High Representative, the security and defence policy became a priority area within the second pillar. Several successful missions around the world proved that the EU’s crisis management was not only able to show

flag, but also genuinely effective in managing crises. Several new headline goals, an improved capability development plan for both the military and the civilian side, the creation of a civilian headquarters (CPCC) in August 2007 and the establishment of a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in 2009 showed that innovation and speed can – to a certain extent – overcome a political deadlock.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the ten-year-era of Javier Solana ended and the five-year-era of Catherine Ashton started. She was the first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and at the same time Vice-President of the Commission. With the European External Action Service, she had a valuable and competent tool at her disposal to significantly enhance the coherence and consistency of the EU’s foreign affairs and security policy work.

To date, the European Union counts around 140 EU Delegations, around 35 terminated or ongoing CSDP missions and operations, working structures, good policy frameworks (e.g. the comprehensive approach), various partnerships and useful intra- und inter-institutional communication with some room for improvement. Federica Mogherini took office in 2014 as the new High Representative and Vice President. With a new head, a good staff and functioning structures, new and positive developments in the area of CFSP and CSDP lie ahead of us.



## 1.1.2. Je parle donc je suis? The raison d'être of the CSDP

by Sven Biscop

Does anyone remember the original reason why the European, now Common Security and Defence Policy (first ESDP, now CSDP) was created?

It was certainly not so that the European Union (EU) could have just one or two battlegroups on stand-by. Ever since the battlegroup scheme was launched, it has been a dominant theme in the deliberations on the CSDP. And it risks remaining so for a long time, for it presents a problem that cannot be solved. No matter how much the EU tries to perfect the scheme, the actual deployment of a battlegroup will always be a matter of coincidence: when a crisis occurs, does it fit the interests and political will of the Member States whose forces happen to be on stand-by? Unless command authority over the battlegroups on stand-by is transferred to the Council, which could then decide on deployment by a majority vote, this is an insoluble conundrum. And thus the debate can go on and on – the perfect excuse not to have to talk about the actual objective of the CSDP.

At the inception of the CSDP, Member States were much more ambitious. “To develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”: this was the purpose agreed upon by the European Council in Helsinki in 1999. The definition of the “Petersberg Tasks” in the Treaty on European Union made clear that this included peace enforcement, i.e. war, alongside classic peacekeeping, military assistance, evacuation, and humanitarian support. To this

end, the European Council defined the Headline Goal: the ambition to deploy up to a corps-size formation (50 000 to 60 000 troops), within one or two months, and to sustain it for at least one year. However, the Headline Goal was last heard of during the 2008 French EU Presidency and has been completely overshadowed by the battlegroups. But even if the battlegroup scheme worked as desired, would that really greatly increase the EU’s capacity to act? In which of the crises going on at the time of writing (Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Mali ...) would deploying a battalion-size battlegroup make a difference?

Clearly, the original *raison d'être* of the CSDP needs to be brought back to the attention of today’s political, diplomatic and military decision-makers.

Unfortunately, ambiguity about the *raison d'être* was precisely the mechanism that made the CSDP possible in the first place. The CSDP is a Franco-British creation (something which the latter need to be reminded of more than the former). In 1998, at their annual bilateral meeting, held that year in Saint-Malo, the UK and France agreed to try and stimulate capability development by launching a European scheme. For Britain, the primary framework in which strategy would be set and decisions made on when and where to use those capabilities, remained NATO. France believed that European capability development should also lead to autonomous European operations, outside the framework of NATO.

Rather than eventually resolving itself, that fundamental ambiguity has continued to handi-

cap the CSDP, which has never enjoyed the full support of all Member States. The end result is that it has never reached its full potential in either dimension: capability development or operations.

An elaborate process was conceived to fulfil the Headline Goal, and the European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up to urge Member States to invest in collective solutions for the priority shortfalls. But by depriving the EDA of the budget to initiate projects itself, capitals have ensured that capability development remains an almost entirely bottom-up process, nearly completely reliant on national initiative and hence protective of national industrial interests. Even so, the CSDP remains the most promising avenue for collective European capability development. The European Commission can be increasingly involved, certainly in research but even in actual (dual-use) projects. Today though that is evident more because nations' performance in other frameworks is even more meagre than because of the CSDP's own achievements. Collective capability development has never been NATO's forte. Instead, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) generates national targets, while the organisation's *Smart Defence* initiative never really took off. *Pooling and Sharing* between Member States in regional clusters complements but cannot replace the EDA's efforts, for no cluster can achieve the critical mass required to develop strategic enablers. EDA projects have started (on air-to-air refuelling, satellite communication, drones and cyber defence), but for these to produce new platforms and more capability, many more Member States will have to invest a lot more money – and these are just some of the priority shortfalls.

Elaborate institutions were also established to allow the EU to launch military operations and civilian missions – but not an operational headquarters, hence command and control of the military operations has to be outsourced to either NATO or a Member State. Nor has the EU been endowed with even sufficient planning capacity for the permanent prudent planning that would

be needed to translate excellent intelligence and awareness into policy options for the full range of EU external action, civilian and military. The result is a decision-making structure that certainly works for operations planned long in advance and even, if Member States want it to, for rapid reaction. But that structure's lack of planning capacity means that it is not in itself systematically proactive enough to make the EU the platform of choice for addressing urgent security crises. Indeed, when force has to be used, Member States, even those who regularly stress that the CSDP covers the full spectrum of military operations, rarely choose to deploy under the EU flag, but systematically opt for NATO or coalitions of the willing when fighting is expected.

In the end, it boils down again to the issue of the *raison d'être*: What do the nations of Europe really want to be able to do in security and defence? And how much of that do they want to do through the CSDP?

While Europeans themselves may remain undecided, the United States does not. Seen from Washington, there is only one potential strategic competitor for the US: China. Hence the “pivot” of American strategy. That pivot hinges on Europe: the more Europeans can take care of their own business, the more confidently the US can focus on Asia. And there is no want of business, as both Europe's eastern and southern neighbourhood are in turmoil. Therefore the US does not only want Europeans to contribute to conventional deterrence under NATO's Article 5 and to American-led crisis management operations. In non-Article 5 scenarios around Europe, Washington expects Europeans themselves to initiate and lead crisis management in their periphery, preferably at an early stage, when a crisis has not yet escalated and can still be contained without relying too heavily on American assets. In other words, those Member States that are still seeking to please the US by curbing the development of the CSDP would be well advised to note that Washington is now actively promoting European strategic autonomy, i.e. crisis management without the US. Under

which flag they do it, the US doesn't care, as long as they do it. So whether it be NATO, the CSDP or an ad hoc coalition that takes charge, it will increasingly have to be Europeans who take the initiative.

The strategic situation thus ought to compel Europeans to revive their original ambition for autonomy and to reassess the role of the various foundations of the European security architecture: the EU and its CSDP, NATO, and the nations. Ultimately there is only one security architecture and the issue is not which part of it does what, but whether what has to be done gets done, with maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

The EU is best placed to answer the big strategic question: which responsibilities does Europe want to assume as a security actor outside its borders? For that is a function of overall foreign policy, including trade, development and diplomacy as well as defence, which only the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in close coordination with the Commission, covers in a comprehensive manner. This much is certain: Europeans must take the lead in stabilising their own broad neighbourhood, stretching out into the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and even the Gulf, and into the Caucasus and perhaps Central Asia – for if they don't, nobody else is likely to do it for them. That includes their maritime borders, but as a global trading power Europe must also contribute to global maritime security, notably in Asia. And as a defender of rules-based international order, it must contribute when the United Nations decide to act if the rules are broken. For the same reason – the comprehensiveness of its external action – the EU ought to be the default platform for crisis management in an actual contingency: to assess what is happening, to decide how important it is, to settle what has to be done,

and to forge the coalition that can do it. When military action is decided upon, more often than not the NATO command structure will then be called for to conduct the operation.

The military capabilities which these responsibilities for non-Article 5 scenarios require should also be defined by the EU. The CSDP mechanisms are more than fit for that purpose. At the very least, Europeans ought to be able to achieve the Headline Goal autonomously within their neighbourhood, i.e. to be able to deploy up to a corps relying on European enablers only. Incorporating this European level of ambition into the NDPP will allow the European Allies and partners/EU Member States to design a capability mix that enables them to meet both their collective defence obligations and their expeditionary requirements. These capabilities can be developed and acquired through collective European projects under the aegis of the EDA (certainly for the strategic enablers, which will in turn enable a viable European defence industry) in combination with radical pooling of assets in regional clusters so as to eliminate all redundancies. Ensuring operability among Europeans and between European and other Allies and partners through manoeuvres is again a task for NATO.

Finally, NATO's collective defence of course remains the ultimate guarantee of Europe's security. But it should be seen as such: an ultimate guarantee. Before considering what reassurance they can seek from the US, Europeans ought first to think of what contribution they can make to global security. All of this will require a profound strategic debate among Europeans. But the world will not stop while they deliberate. Ultimately, the *raison d'être* of the European security architecture and of the CSDP in particular is not its ability to talk about security, but to deliver security.

## 1.2. CSDP STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES

### 1.2.1. Crisis management structures

by Jochen Rehr and Galia Glume

Since the European Union was declared operational at the Laeken Council in 2001, crisis management structures in support of the Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) have developed significantly. The increasing recourse to CSDP missions and operations – 34 were launched since 2003 – demanded further institutional development, to support the planning and conduct of missions and operations, but also to support decision-making at the political and strategic level. The structures initially provided at the outset of CSDP (namely the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee – but also the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management) were complemented by the establishment of advisory bodies and Council working groups, integrated strategic planning, and further command and control options – including a permanent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions. The establishment of the European External Action Service in 2011 gave greater coherence to the EU's external action, both by bringing together these structures and by linking them to EU external policies – notably through the thematic and geographic managing directorates. One key feature is that when it comes to CSDP missions and operations, the final word rests with Member States. They define the general orientations of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and exercise political control and set the strategic direction of CSDP missions and operations.

The crisis management structures of the EU rely on both:

- bodies composed of representatives from the EU Member States, and
- CSDP structures and other entities within the EU organisation.

#### **BODIES COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM EU MEMBER STATES**

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States and defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. It is chaired by a president who is elected for 2.5 years. Mr Donald Tusk, former prime minister of Poland, currently holds the post, having succeeded Mr Herman Van Rompuy, former prime minister of Belgium.

In December 2013, the European Council met to discuss specifically on security and defence issues and a follow up is envisaged for June 2015.

Legally, there is only one Council. Nevertheless, there are ten different Council configurations depending on the subject to be discussed. These are referred to as the Council of the European Union and are where the Member States' government representatives sit (in general at ministerial level).





Photo: Council of the EU/Mario Salerno

EU Heads of State and Government meet at the European Council on 12 January 2015, in Brussels. The main topics are the conflict in Ukraine, counter terrorism and the economic situation

The “Foreign Affairs Council” (FAC) is specifically relevant for CFSP and CSDP. This Council configuration has two distinguishing features compared to the other nine: a) The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs it; and b) Only the FAC and the General Affairs Council are explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Foreign Affairs Council can meet in the format of ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and/or Development. These ministers attend meetings to discuss foreign policy, trade, security, defence and development matters, meeting on a monthly basis and as the international situation demands.

Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Council is a single EU institution, all Council configurations can decide on all issues. For example, in 2003 the military CSDP operation ARTEMIS was formally decided (adopted as a Joint Action) by the ministers of justice in their Council configuration “Justice and Home Affairs” (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003).

In preparation for Council meetings, Member States’ ambassadors meet in the Permanent Representatives Committee (or Coreper, for Comité des représentants permanents), which convenes in two formats. The one relevant for the Common Security and Defence Policy is Coreper II.

Coreper divides the ministerial agenda into three categories:

- “I” points which are for information and no ministerial decision is needed;
- “A” points, where the decision can be made without debate;
- “B” points where debate is needed and the decision may not be known in advance.

Council Decisions related to CSDP missions and operations are – in general – categorised as “A” points.

The *Political and Security Committee (PSC)*, which usually meets twice a week at ambassadorial level, is the highest Council body to prepare decisions on CFSP/CSDP.

The Committee monitors the international situation in the areas covered by CFSP and contributes to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council. It also monitors the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. It exercises political control and strategic direction of the EU’s crisis management operations, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative. The PSC plays a key role for CSDP by adopting relevant conclusions, recommendations and decisions<sup>1</sup>. Missions and operations are discussed in particular when their six-monthly reports are



Photo: European Union/Christos Dogas

Federica Mogherini and EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs meet on 9 February 2015, in Brussels, to discuss Ukraine, EU-Africa relations and counter-terrorism

issued, when their strategic reviews are conducted, and when the Head of Mission/Operation Commander is to be appointed. The PSC also plays a key role in preparing a coherent EU response to crises and prompting discussion with the relevant EEAS crisis management bodies, when deemed necessary or the situation so demands. The PSC is chaired by an EEAS representative.

Three advisory bodies are responsible for giving advice and recommendations to the ambassadors in the PSC, particularly in relation to CSDP missions and operations:

The *European Union Military Committee (EUMC)* is the highest military body within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are represented by their permanent military representatives. They

provide advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC monitors the proper execution of the military missions/operations.

The Chairperson of the EUMC acts as the primary point of contact with the EU Missions/Operations Commander.

The *Politico-Military Group (PMG)* is a civilian/military meeting format that prepares and supports the work of the PSC. It covers the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, prepares Council conclusions, provides recommendations for the PSC, contributes to the development of (horizontal) policy and facilitates exchanges of information. The PMG is chaired by an EEAS representative.

1 According to Article 38 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, “the Council may authorise the PSC, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation”.



Photo: Council of the EU/Mario Salerno

The EU Military Committee is the highest military body within the Council (in the picture: the Austrian Military Representative to the EU, Lieutenant General Günter Höfler, and the Chief of Defence Staff, General Othmar Commenda)

On the civilian side, the *Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)* takes responsibility for formulating recommendations and giving advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC. In particular, it exercises its role with regards to civilian CSDP missions' planning and periodic reports as well as the development of concepts for civilian crisis management. The Committee helps ensure a high degree of coherence in the civilian aspects of EU crisis management, and promotes improvements in the crisis response capabilities of the EU. The CIVCOM is chaired by an EEAS representative.

In addition, the *Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX)* is responsible for discussing the legal and financial aspects of CFSP and all of its instruments, including CSDP. As part of this work, it considers the institutional, legal, logistical and budgetary dimensions of CSDP missions and operations.

It prepares the Council Decisions and related financial instruments allowing the deployment of CSDP engagements before submitting them to the Council for adoption. This is done in close cooperation with the *Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI)* – the Commission service implementing the CFSP budget working under the authority of the High Representative. RELEX is chaired by a representative of the rotating presidency of the Council.


## ENTITIES WITHIN THE EU STRUCTURES

The *European External Action Service (EEAS)* was created with the Treaty of Lisbon. One of the key tasks of the EEAS is to ensure that all the different activities and policies that the EU conducts abroad – the EU's external action – are consistent and effective. This is particularly impor-



tant because while there is one external action, many of the EU's external policies are organised across the EEAS and different divisions of the European Commission. Since late 2014, Federica Mogherini has headed the European External Action Service. She succeeded Catherine Ashton, who was the first High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Within her service, there are specific entities responsible for crisis management, called "Security Policy and CSDP structures". The European Parliament has the right to scrutinise the CSDP and to take the initiative of addressing the HR/VP and the Council on it, in addition to exercising authority over the CFSP budget<sup>2</sup>.

### Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)



The *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)* is in charge of strategic, integrated civilian-military planning within the EEAS. It ensures coherence and effectiveness of the CSDP missions and operations as part of the EU's comprehensive approach. This work is conducted through both the strategic planning of new CSDP missions and operations and the strategic review of existing ones – which results in the Member States'

decision to refocus, extend or terminate a given mandate. The CMPD is also in charge of developing partnerships, policies, concepts, capabilities and training for both civilian and military missions and operations. It works under the political control and strategic direction of the Member States in the PSC, acting under the responsibility of the Council of the EU and of the High Representative.

The *EU Military Staff (EUMS)* is the source of collective military expertise within the EEAS. It works under the direction of the Chair of EUMC and under the authority of the High Representative. The EUMS coordinates the military instrument as part of the EU comprehensive approach, with a particular focus on military missions and operations, as well as the creation of military capabilities. Its enabling activity includes early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning, communications and information systems, concept development, training and education, and support to partnerships through military-to-military relationships.

### EU Military Staff (EUMS)




<sup>2</sup> Twice a year, the European Parliament holds debates on progress in implementing the CFSP and the CSDP, and adopts reports: one on the CFSP, drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and including elements relating to the CSDP where necessary; and one on the CSDP, drafted by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Members of the European Parliament also play an external role by conducting visits and fact finding missions, and in relation to election observation missions.



The *Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)*, the permanent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions, assists the Civilian Operations Commander (COPCC director) in the operational planning and conduct of civilian CSDP missions. The CivOpsCdr is mandated by Member States to exercise command and control at strategic level for all civilian CSDP missions, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the High Representative. Assisted by the Chief of Staff, who is also deputy CivOpsCdr for the purposes of maintaining continuity of command and control, he/she is the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Mission and has a duty of care to the personnel deployed in the field. CPCC supports CSDP advance planning, in cooperation with CMPD, and leads the operational planning of civilian missions. It also ensures adequate support is provided to the missions and supervises mandate implementation and mandate delivery.

*Other entities* within the EEAS which are relevant for crisis management and CSDP include the



EEAS Crisis Management Board, geographical, multilateral and global EEAS managing directorates, the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate (Dir K), the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) and the European Union Operations Centre (EU OPCEN) supported by the EUMS.

## CFSP AGENCIES

Additionally, three CFSP agencies support the Common Security and Defence Policy.

- The EU Satellite Centre, whose tasks include supporting CSDP operations, Member States and external partners with imagery analysis and other products;
- The EU Institute for Security Studies, providing analyses and policy recommendations to contribute to the wider public debate on foreign affairs, security and defence matters;
- The European Defence Agency, supporting the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the Common Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future.

Within this intergovernmental structure, the European Security and Defence College has a very specific task, which is to facilitate the creation of a European security culture.



Informal Defence ministers meeting in Riga, March 2015

## 1.2.2. Crisis response system and management procedures

by Jochen Rehr

In crisis management, in which the management principle of “learning by doing” should be avoided, the planning processes must be standardised and harmonised; however, the procedure should also remain flexible enough to be adapted to the specific situation and environment.

In the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union established the EU’s crisis response system. This system takes into account the main task of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice-President, Federica Mogherini, “*to make external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic*”. When it comes to CSDP action, the crisis management procedures developed suggestions and guidelines which facilitate the planning processes.

Systems and procedures are put in place in order to facilitate a common understanding and agreement on how things should be done. With regard to the crisis management toolbox, systems and procedures ensure that the right tool is used, the best instruments applied and the most efficient political message sent. The toolbox of the Union includes diplomatic, political, financial, development, military and civilian tools.

The EEAS crisis response system covers crises which may affect EU security and interests occurring outside the EU, including those which have an impact on EU Delegations or any other EU asset or citizen in a third country. It also covers crises occurring inside the EU if they have an external dimension. [The EU crisis platform has a coordination function and provides the EEAS and the Commission services with clear political and/or strategic advice for the management of a given crisis.]


### DECISIONS IN A LIFECYCLE OF MISSIONS/OPERATIONS

Within the crisis management system and procedures, there are four decisive points:

- a) Decision on which tools/instruments of the crisis management toolbox should be used; [involves a number of decision-making bodies, including relevant Commissioners, Member States and the High Representative]
- b) Decision to establish a mission/operation; [Council through PSC]
- c) Decision to launch a mission/operation; [Council through PSC]
- d) Decision to extend, refocus or terminate a mission/operation. [Council through PSC]

These decisions build upon a broad and comprehensive understanding of the crisis/conflict/disaster, including short-, mid- and long-term perspectives; hence, an overall EU approach to the crisis. The decisions should be based on a common understanding, shared situational awareness, and early and indicative coordinated transition. The above-mentioned points (b), (c) and (d) are specific decisions to be taken in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy. They will only apply if CSDP is chosen as the or one of the options to address a crisis.

The common understanding of a crisis or a conflict environment is again important when it comes to decision-making in the margins of CFSP/CSDP. CSDP remains an intergovernmental policy, which means that decisions must be taken unanimously, i.e. by consensus. This consensus can be reached positively (‘who is in favour’) or negatively (‘is anyone against’). The Treaty also provides for the possibility for “con-



Graphic: Jochem Rehr

EU's options for the Political Framework for Crisis Approach ("EU's CA-flower")

structive abstention". Constructive abstention is the provision which allows a Member State to abstain on a vote in Council under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), without blocking a unanimous decision. If abstention is accompanied by a formal declaration, the Member State in question is not obliged to apply the decision but must accept that it commits the Union. The Member State must then refrain from any action that might conflict with the Union action based on that decision. In this case, the Member State does not have to contribute financially to the CSDP action.

### DECISION ON THE OVERALL EU APPROACH

The Political Framework Crisis Approach (PFCA), which builds the basis for an overall EU approach, assesses the tools/instruments which can be used to prevent or resolve a crisis situation. It is preceded by a continuous monitoring and analysis of the various situations in the world, which contributes to early warning. This con-

stant monitoring influences the advance planning within the security policy structures of the EEAS (CMPD, EUMS, CPCC).

When a crisis occurs, the PFCA should help visualise clear political and/or strategic guidance. Relevant EEAS (the geographic desks being in the lead) and Commission services, together with other available expertise, draft this comprehensive document. The outcome of the PFCA is a broad range of options available to the EU on how to tackle a given crisis situation. The options can include financial aid, development assistance, diplomatic means, sanctions and civilian/police/military actions within the Common Security and Defence Policy.

As soon as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) considers that "CSDP action may be appropriate" (= starting point for CSDP planning), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) prepares the Crisis Management Concept (CMC). This document will analyse and propose strategic policy options. The other crisis management structures (CPCC, EUMS, DepK) as well as the Commission are involved in the whole planning process. Based on the recommendations of the PSC, the Council adopts a decision to establish the CSDP mission/operation.

Simultaneously, the informal force sensing starts. At this point, Member States are informally asked for indicative offers which do not represent formal commitments.

### DECISION TO ESTABLISH A MISSION/ OPERATION

On the basis of the Council Decision (legal act), negotiations start on the Status of Forces Agreement (military SOFA) and/or the Status of Mission Agreement (civilian SOMA). Additionally, a list of countries that could be invited to contribute to the EU-led crisis will be prepared by CMPD. When the invited third country has not yet signed a "Framework Document" for par-

participation in EU-led crisis management missions/operations”, arrangements for their participation will be defined in a participation agreement.

This decision is also the starting point for the strategic-operational planning, in which the crisis management structures within the EEAS may draft option papers. These papers illustrate the various military, civilian or police options, how best the mission can be accomplished. At that stage, the military Operation Commander should be appointed and integrated into the planning process.

Due to the permanent function of the CPCC as the operational headquarters for all civilian missions, no specific appointment needs to take place. The CPCC director is the Civilian Operations Commander.

In this regard, the civilian side has a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the military side, because civilian missions have their permanent command and control structures within the CPCC (although with a limited number of planners needed at the operational stage of planning). On the military side, this task is somehow more difficult as the EU has various leadership options; they can make use of the five available national headquarters from France, Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom or Italy. Under the Berlin+ arrangements, the EU bodies can also make use of the permanent NATO headquarters in Mons/Belgium. Another two options include the activation of the Operation Centre within the EUMS or the merger of Operation HQ with the Force HQ to a Mission HQ, as happened with both training missions in Mali and Somalia.

The Operation Commander establishes the concept of operations (CONOPS) and develops an operation plan (OPLAN), keeping the Head of Mission/Force Commander closely involved. The military operation plan will also include the request for defined “rules of engagements” (RoE). The same procedure applies to the civilian mission-specific rules on the use of force (RUoF), if need be, which will be an integral part of the OPLAN.

In order to facilitate the process for the development of an operation plan, the EU Military

Staff, directed and approved by the EUMC, will provide an “Initiating Military Directive”, which gives the Operation Commander clear guidelines concerning the conduct of the operation. The operation plan, which describes in detail the intent, conduct, strength and organisation of the mission or operation, is approved by the Council (the RoE and RUoF are thereby authorised), and the decision to launch the mission/operation is taken by the Council. Between these two Council Decisions, a “core team” or “initial mission capacity” may be sent to the theatre to prepare the ground for the deployment of the full mission/operation.

## DECISION TO LAUNCH A MISSION/OPERATION

As soon as the mission/operation is launched, the deployment can start. Ideally well in advance, the force generation (same expression for both civilian and military) process will have been conducted. In this process, Member States and partner countries are involved in filling personnel and capability gaps/requirements. On the military side, one or more force generation conferences will be held by the Operation Headquarters selected. The process of filling the posts in the headquarters is called “force manning”. On the civilian side, the force generation is conducted via “calls for contributions”. This mechanism was created for advertising and requesting applications for mission posts from EU Member States and partner countries.

Under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the Political and Security Committee exercises political control and strategic direction of the CSDP mission/operation. The comprehensive approach is implemented via regular contacts and cooperation. On the military side, the Chairman of the EUMC acts as the primary point of contact with the EU Mission/Operation Commander.





The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate plays a crucial role in drafting the crisis management concept (in the picture: HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Director CMPD, Gabor Iklódy)

During the conduct phase of a mission and operation, the CSDP engagement will be constantly assessed. Reporting systems allow a situational awareness at all times and at all levels; lessons learnt processes are put in place and strategic reviews ensure the timely re-focus or even termination of CSDP missions/operations. This review is conducted when the strategic context of the mission/operation changes, halfway through the mandate or when the mandate is nearing its end. Member States remain in the lead and therefore have the final word. The process is led by the crisis management structures. The CSDP missions and operations are assessed in relation to the whole EU engagement in the country or region, in line with the comprehensive approach.

### DECISION TO REFOCUS OR TERMINATE A MISSION/OPERATION

Any change in the mission mandate requires a new Council Decision. A mission can be terminated through a Council Decision or when the mandate expires and is not extended.

This political decision is taken on the basis of the strategic review and bearing in mind possible transition strategies.

	Artemis	Althea (Berlin +)	EUFOR RD Congo	EUNAVFOR Atalanta	EUCAP NESTOR	EUAM Ukraine	EUCAP Sahel Mali
PFCA						✓	✓
CMC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MSOD CSOD		✓		✓			
IMD		✓	✓	✓			
CONOPS		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
OPLAN/ ROE-RUoF	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	3 weeks	9 months		5 months		6 months	10 months

Graphic: European External Action Service

Planning in Reality

**The  
“Suggestions for procedures  
for coherent, comprehensive  
EU crisis management”  
distinguish five phases:**

Phase 1: Identification of a crisis and development of an overall EU approach

Phase 2: Development of the CMC and establishment of the mission or operation

Phase 3: Operation planning of the CSDP mission or operation and decision to launch

Phase 4: Deployment of the CSDP mission or operation

Phase 5: Strategic review of the CSDP mission or operation – extension, refocusing and/or termination

An optional fast-track procedure for rapid deployment makes it possible to speed up the process during phases 1–3, with the minimal decision-making steps, specifically:

- the approval of the CMC,
- the Initiating Military Directive for the military,
- the adoption of the Council Decision establishing the mission/operation and
- the approval of the OPLAN.

For more details, see Yves de Kermabon: Crisis Management Procedures.

In: Rehl (ed.): Handbook for Decision Makers. 2014. pp 43–47.

## ADEQUATE, FLEXIBLE, COHERENT AND ITERATIVE

Although the crisis management system and procedure seem – at first glance – bureaucratic and slow, they have proven to be adequate, flexible, coherent and iterative.

- a) Adequate: the crisis management procedures in the margins of the CSDP conclude by deploying civilian or military forces abroad. Therefore, an adequate procedure was established which compensates the democratic deficit within the intergovernmental structures of the European Union.
- b) Flexible: the system and the procedure remain as flexible as possible. “Fast Tracks”, merger of documents and adjustable meeting formats enable rapid reaction as soon as the political will exists.
- c) Coherent: in order to keep the planning process consistent and coherent, a core planning team will follow the process from the beginning (PFCA) to the end (operation plan). This small team will be reinforced by other experts from the relevant levels (strategic/operational/tactical).
- d) Iterative: the process follows a logical step-by-step approach. An equilibrium must be found between political will and what is feasible in practical terms, between the intergovernmental (‘secure the national interest’) and functional logic (‘achieve the mission’), between political ambition and the budgetary/personnel resources.

With regard to more than ten years of experience in the field of crisis management planning, and bearing in mind the new institutional setting after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is well equipped to face the challenges of tomorrow. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the political will is the most important factor in all phases of planning.

### 1.2.3. Chain of command – command and control for CSDP engagement

by Galia Glume

Member States in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercise the political control and strategic direction of both civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative. They are on top of the chain of command.

The *chain of command* is the structure through which command instructions flow down from the political to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and through which control is exercised by specified procedures and feedback. In particular, *command and control (C2)* structures define the authority, responsibilities and activities of Heads of Mission/Military Commanders in the direction and coordination of personnel/forces and in the execution of their respective mandates.

Although the EU has developed several options for command and control of CSDP missions and operations, each has a single and identifiable chain of command for its safe and efficient conduct.

In the field, the *Force/Mission Commander* (for military operations/missions) and the *Head of Mission* (for civilian missions) exercise command and control at theatre level. The Head of Mission (HoM) is directly responsible to the Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr). The HoM assumes responsibility and leadership of the mission, which he/she represents, in theatre; they exercise command and control over personnel, teams and units from contributing States as assigned by the CivOpsCdr. They also have administrative and logistical responsibility for the assets, resources and information put at the disposal of the mission. For military operations/missions, the Chairman of the EU Military Committee acts as the primary point of contact.

Since 2007, the *Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)* has been the permanent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions. The CPCC comprises about 70 staff, mostly EU civil servants and Seconded National Experts from EU Member States. The CPCC director is the CivOpsCdr, and is therefore mandated by the Council to exercise command and control at strategic level for the operational planning (Concept of Operations and Operation Plan) and conduct of all civilian CSDP missions, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the High Representative. Assisted by the Chief of Staff, who is also deputy CivOpsCdr for the purposes of maintaining continuity of command and control, he/she is the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Mission and has a duty of care to the personnel deployed in the field.

As the permanent Operations Headquarters (OHQ), the CPCC plays a crucial role in carrying out operational planning to conceive and set up civilian CSDP missions up to initial operational capability. It later provides continued support and follows up on mandate delivery, including by carrying out assessments and making any readjustments required at mission level. In practice, desk officers in the Conduct of Operations Division are the first point of contact for the ongoing missions and the first recipients of their reporting products; they act as a focal point for the mission in Brussels and assist and advise the CivOpsCdr in the oversight of the day-to-day conduct of civilian CSDP missions. The CPCC Mission Support Division ensures the missions are provided with appropriate support in their human resources, procurement, financial, legal and logistics aspects; the CPCC pre-

prepares the draft mission budget in coordination with the Commission (Foreign Policy Instrument) and is associated to related debates in RELEX Working Group. The CPCC also assists the CivOpsCdr in preparing instructions for issuance to the HoMs, and supports the standardisation of civilian CSDP operational procedures through the preparation of operational guidelines, concepts and methodologies to facilitate the planning and conduct of the missions at HQ and field level.

The CPCC ensures the mission reporting to Member States (and third contributing States) and coordination with the EEAS management (and other stakeholders as appropriate) for the purposes of CSDP civilian missions, and supervises the implementation of political and operational guidance. While this demands constant liaison with the Member States in CivCom, RELEX and other regional working parties of the Council, it is the CivOpsCdr and Head of Mission who report to the PSC, at regular intervals, regarding progress towards mission objectives.

For *military operations*, in the absence of a permanent Operations HQ (OHQ, at strategic level), there are *four options for command and control*.

First, if a military operation uses NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus arrangements, the preferred option is to establish a EU Operations Headquarter in the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) at SHAPE (Mons, Belgium). This is for instance the case of EUFOR Althea.

The second option relies on the Member States' assets and capabilities and their commitment to provide a suitable EU OHQ: an existing national HQ is "multinationalised" to plan and command the EU-led military operation. Five Member States have declared that their national OHQs are available for an autonomous EU operation – France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK. Respectively located in Paris, Potsdam, Larissa, Rome and Northwood, they can provide the EU with the necessary premises and technical infrastructure to run a military operation with a fully multinational staff.



Walter Stevens, Chair of the Political and Security Committee, and Patrick de Roussier, Chair of the EU Military Committee, in Riga/Latvia, February 2015

A third option can be activated when the EU decides to draw on the collective capacity of the EU Military Staff: it is the activation of the EU 'Operations Centre' in the EU Military Staff to plan and conduct an autonomous EU operation, in particular for an operation which requires a civilian as well as a military response and where no national OHQ has been identified. The permanent facilities in Brussels (premises and equipment, staffed by a small core team of eight officers) are designed to enable the Council to establish, at very short notice, a fully-fledged Operations Centre for a particular operation. Like other OHQs, the military component of the EU OPSCEN will be organised in divisions (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications, training, finance, CIMIC and medical support), which will conduct planning under the authority of the Operation Commander.

The fourth option was chosen for the two training missions in Africa (EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali). In these specific cases, the OHQ and Force Headquarters (FHQ) were merged to form a "mission headquarters" located in theatre. This option means that the Mission Commander must shoulder the additional burden of covering both strategic and operational/tactical aspects.





Graphic: Jochen Rehr

Civilian and military Command and Control Options

The military OHQ is chosen by a PSC decision: Member States in the PSC identify both the future military OHQ and the Operation Commander. The OHQ directs the Force Headquarters (FHQ, operational level) provided by a Member State, which carries out the operation

on the ground. Each of the five military OHQ have been activated to date: Potsdam (EUFOR RDC), Mont Valerien (EUFOR Tchad-RCA), Rome (EUFOR Libya<sup>1</sup>), Northwood (EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta) and Larissa (EUFOR RCA).

EU Special Representatives (if appointed) and Heads of EU Delegations are not in the chain of command of CSDP missions and operations; however, HoMs can receive from them – without prejudice to the chain of command – *local political guidance*, especially for the matters in which EUSRs have a particular or stated role. The Head of EU Delegation represents the EU in country, and promotes overall EU political coordination and helps ensure the coordination and coherence of the EU instruments in theatre to attain the political objectives set out by the Council. In some rare cases, especially at the outset of CSDP, EUSRs have been integrated in the Chain of Command until Member States agreed on establishing a permanent OHQ for civilian CSDP missions.



Photo: European Union

Videoconference with all ongoing CSDP missions and operations on 18 December 2014 (l.t.r: Kenneth Deane, Civilian Operations Commander; Federica Mogherini, HR/VP of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; General Patrick De Rousiers, Chair of the EUMC)

1 In this particular case, the Council decided on a military operation in support of humanitarian assistance in Libya in April 2011 and OHQ was activated but not implemented.

## 1.2.4. EU Conflict Early Warning System

Compilation of EU open source<sup>1</sup>

The 2011 Council conclusions on conflict prevention building on the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 21c) have provided the strongest mandate yet for the EU to engage in conflict prevention.

A shift in emphasis away from reacting to crises towards conflict prevention preserves lives and livelihoods that might otherwise be destroyed when violent conflict erupts. As well as the severe human costs of violent conflict, the World Bank 2011 World Development Report showed that civil wars destroy decades of gross domestic product (GDP) growth on average and it takes countries years to get back on to a sustainable growth path.

In order to prevent the emergence, re-emergence or escalation of violent conflict, early warning is indispensable. It is about systematically providing the right information to the right people at the right time – connecting the dots between relevant actors in the field and at headquarters.

It encompasses the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from a variety of sources in order to identify and understand the risks of violent conflict in a country and to develop strategic responses to mitigate those risks.

### EU APPROACH TO EARLY WARNING FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

The EU Conflict Early Warning System (EWS) is a tool for EU decision-makers to *manage risk* factors and *prioritise resources* accordingly. *The goal is not 'prediction'*. It will always be difficult to pinpoint the exact trigger for the eruption of violence in the future. What we do know is that there are certain factors and indicators that frequently correlate with violent conflict. If we can identify these and assess the *structural, underlying risks of violent conflict* in a country, we can more easily pursue early preventive actions before situations escalate into crises.

This is, in essence, *upstream conflict prevention*. Moreover, country-risk assessments enable decision-makers to take decisions on prevention (and crisis response) based on evidence and a deeper understanding of the underlying causes and dynamics of violence in countries and regions. The resulting system has been designed to operationalise this approach using a methodology and analysis tools tailored to the EU institutional context and the needs of EU decision-makers.

#### The EWS

- ▶ puts early, upstream conflict prevention on the **EU political agenda**
- ▶ strengthens overall **EU coherence** on conflict prevention actions
- ▶ contributes to strategic **planning & programming** across the EU
- ▶ provides an **evidence-base** for EU-wide external action in “at risk” countries
- ▶ facilitates **risk management** for EU in conflict affected countries
- ▶ stimulates **creative thinking** on potential EU preventive actions
- ▶ **promotes relations** between EU staff working in and on the countries

<sup>1</sup> Source: [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict\\_prevention/docs/201409\\_factsheet\\_conflict\\_earth\\_warning\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf)

The EWS methodology exemplifies the EU comprehensive approach to External Conflict and Crises (2013). It involves the EU External Action Service, the European Commission, Member States and civil society organisations; including those in-country and in headquarters.

### WHY DEVELOP AN EU CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEM?

The Early Warning System seeks to address the warning-response gap that is often observed. Therefore, the emphasis has been firmly placed on operationalising analysis for more effective preventive responses.

### HOW DOES IT WORK?

It focuses on the highest global conflict risks, ongoing extremely violent situations over a 4-year time frame; communicates the risks or peacebuilding opportunities, and generates comprehensive options for EU-wide actions, which are monitored as part of the system's bi-annual cycle.

The methodology was designed for the complex context of EU external action, which comprises a number of institutions and services. Moreover, it builds on and reinforces existing EU tools, for example the InfoRM index for humanitarian and disaster risk supported by DG ECHO, which enhances synergies between the two models.

The development of the EWS has engaged academics, analysts, civil society organisations, as well as country and conflict experts from Member States and from across the world. This collaboration has generated innovations such as increasing the focus on changes over time, and trend directions, rather than purely static risk. The result is a system that builds on existing knowledge and good practice in the early-warning community.

### EWS PROCESS

Step One scans for high risk and deteriorating situations globally combining a quantitative index developed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre and qualitative input from an EU staff review and expert country analysis.

Step Two identifies 'at risk' countries that require further EU analysis and action for prevention or to capitalise on peacebuilding opportunities, through inter-service meetings of decision-makers as well as input from Member States.


Step Three consists of analysis (see also separate Factsheet on Conflict Analysis) that aims to combine input from EU staff in the field and at headquarters. This step includes setting explicit objectives in preparation for early preventive or peacebuilding actions.

Step Four monitors the resulting actions in terms of their impact on the identified conflict risks or peacebuilding opportunities and feeds into the next cycle of assessment and analysis.

The EWS also directly responds to the European Parliament's calls for the EU to move away from predominantly reactive responses to crises towards earlier conflict prevention and to present a sound basis for decision-making on complex conflict situations.

### ADDED VALUE FOR EU EXTERNAL ACTION

The EWS is designed to close the gap between early warning and early action by engaging EU staff in a shared assessment and analysis process that is tied to follow-up action. It supports evidence-based decision-making on resource allocation and other prevention and peacebuilding tools for staff working in and on countries at risk of violent conflict. It has been pilot-tested in two regions so far. As a result, diplomatic initiatives as well as thematic projects and conflict analysis have been carried out in these countries according to the identified risks. The EWS is being rolled out on a global scale.



Visualisation of the four steps of the EU Conflict Early Warning System

### COMPLEMENTARY EU-FUNDED EARLY WARNING ACTIVITIES: CIVIL SOCIETY

Through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the EU is supporting early-warning capabilities of civil society actors around the world.

*‘Strengthening Early Warning and Mobilising Early Action’* – International Crisis Group in partnership with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

This project aims to strengthen the links between early warning, conflict analysis and early response with a view to contributing to better conflict analysis and early warning combined with creative but practical recommendations and a more coherent and systematic use of information.

*‘Capacities for Peace’* – Saferworld in partnership with Conciliation Resources

This project aims to enhance in-country actors’ capacity and opportunity to engage effectively in the whole ‘chain’ of early warning. In particular, by strengthening in-country actors’ skills in con-

flict analysis and the development of response strategies; nurturing collaborative relationships among in-country actors engaged in early warning; promoting the generation and use of early warning information by in-country actors; and by disseminating lessons learnt on early warning capacity and processes.

*“The costs of not preventing war are enormous. The human costs of war includes not only the visible and immediate – death, injury, destruction, displacement – but also the distant and indirect repercussions for families, communities, local and national institutions and economies, and neighbouring countries.”*

Kofi A. Annan  
Prevention of Armed Conflict  
Report of the Secretary-General  
February 2002, United Nations

## OVERVIEW: OTHER SYSTEMS

Since 2007, the EU has cooperated with regional partners on the development of crisis response and early warning as part of EU external action. For example, in 2007, cooperation began with the African Union to enhance the Continental Early Warning System based in Addis Ababa, followed in 2010 by cooperation with the League of the Arab States (LAS) on developing a Regional Crisis Response Centre in Cairo, which was inaugurated by High Representative/Vice-President Catherine Ashton in November 2012.

Support has also been provided to the Organisation of American States (OAS), ASEAN, and will soon be extended to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These activities have been financed under the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

### African Union (AU)

The Continental Early Warning System of the AU is designed to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa. It consists of an observation and monitoring centre, also called 'the Situation Room' as well as Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution units.

(<http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28-continental-early-warning-system-cews>)

### Southern African Development Community (SADC)

In July 2010, SADC launched its Regional Early Warning Centre. The centre is designed to strengthen the SADC mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. It does so by compiling strategic assessment and analysis of data collected at regional level, sharing information on threats to the security and stability of the region and proposes ways to deal with such threats. It is expected to link up with National Early Warning Centres in all SADC Member States and the Continental Early Warning Centre at the African Union.

(<http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/services-centres/regional-early-warning-centre/>)

### Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

In the framework of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security ECOWAS has established its own Early Warning System. It consists of the Observation and Monitoring Centre at the Commission as well as four Zonal Bureaus located in Member States. Based on open-source information, the system is responsible for observing and monitoring sub-regional peace and security indicators, providing timely reports with recommendations to the Office of the President. ([http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/stand.php?id=h\\_h2\\_brief&](http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/stand.php?id=h_h2_brief&))

### European Commission and Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task team for Preparedness and Resilience Index for Risk Management – InfoRM

InfoRM presents the first global, objective and transparent tool for understanding the risk of humanitarian crises and disasters. The Index identifies countries that are at very high, high, medium and low levels of risk with regard to emergencies and disasters and explains the underlying factors causing this risk, based on three dimensions: hazard and exposure;



vulnerability; and lack of coping capacity. It is a collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and Resilience and the European Commission led by ECHO and JRC, but developed in a wide partnership, including OCHA, DFID, WFP, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, UNISDR, World Bank and others. The index provides a common data set that can be used as a wider support tool across the disaster management field for disaster risk reduction and resilience, as well as for emergency response actions, civil protection activities and potentially for other areas such as development and climate adaptation (<http://inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>).

#### **Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**

The Early Warning Mechanism of the OSCE is built into the Conflict Prevention Centre, created in 1990 to help reduce the risk of conflict. It collects and analyses information from different sources and offers advice to the Secretary-General and the Chairmanship on possible responses to emerging crises. (<http://www.osce.org/secretariat/107485>)

#### **League of Arab States (LAS)**

The headquarters of the LAS in Cairo is equipped with a crisis room, which extends training to Arab diplomats from the General Secretariat of the LAS as well as those from Member States. The crisis room is also intended to contribute to an anticipated pan-Arab Early Warning System. (<http://lasportal.org/wps/wcm/connect/62fb54804d6d38338bf29f4eaeef6d81/EU-LAS+Cooperation.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>)

This project aims to strengthen the links between early warning, conflict analysis and early response with a view to contributing to better conflict analysis and early warning combined with creative but practical recommendations and a more coherent and systematic use of information.

#### **‘Capacities for Peace’ – Saferworld in partnership with Conciliation Resources**

This project aims to enhance in-country actors’ capacity and opportunity to engage effectively in the whole ‘chain’ of early warning. In particular, by strengthening in-country actors’ skills in conflict analysis and the development of response strategies; nurturing collaborative relationships among in-country actors engaged in early warning; promoting the generation and use of early warning information by in-country actors; and by disseminating lessons learnt on early warning capacity and processes.

## 1.2.5. The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity within the European Union

by Józef Kozłowski and Jose-Miguel Palacios-Coronel

Strategic intelligence focuses on issues at the macro level, while retaining links to tactical and operational issues and outcomes. It is, first of all, a manager's tool. It is all about decision-making on important and overarching issues. No leader or manager can be expected to be fully effective without factual data. No-one can hope to properly progress further ideas and projects without a high degree of understanding of relevant issues. Strategic intelligence is key to providing this enhanced level of understanding. Strategic intelligence, intelligence at tactical and operational levels are all complementary – not competitive. They need to closely interact and preferably, where circumstances permit, integrate.

### EU INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES

The European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate (EUMS INT) and European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INT-CEN) are the only European External Action Service (EEAS) bodies capable of delivering all-source intelligence. Their production processes are based mainly on the support provided by the Member States (MS) Civilian Intelligence / Security Services and Defence Intelligence Organisations (DIO), which allows both the civilian and military dimensions to be covered.

EUMS INT provides intelligence input to early warning and situation assessment. It contributes to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) planning through the provision of intelligence and intelligence planning expertise. In addition, EUMS INT provides



the intelligence input to crisis response planning and assessment for EU military operations, civilian missions and exercises worldwide.

The EUMS INT Directorate is organised into three branches: Policy, Support and Production. This structure was adopted from the very beginning of its existence. The Policy Branch is responsible for developing intelligence-related concepts in close coordination with relevant EU civilian bodies. It also contributes to the planning of EU military operations/civilian missions and prepares scenarios and intelligence specifications for exercises.

Intelligence Support Branch is in charge of fostering relations with EU Member States' DIOs. It also manages the flow of information and intelligence between EUMS INT and DIOs, cooperates with the EU Satellite Centre (EU SATCEN), and performs a coordinating role for future developments in the domain of intelligence.

Production Branch is the key component of EUMS INT. Analysts working in this branch are grouped into thematic and regional sections. This entity works in close cooperation with EU INT-CEN within the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) framework to develop together joint, all-source intelligence products.

The SIAC is an internal EEAS arrangement between the EU INTCEN and EUMS INT to bring together the EEAS intelligence analysis capacity into a single functional arrangement (see graphic). EU INTCEN is the most recent name for an entity that was created in 2002 as the EU Joint Situation Centre. It monitors events in order to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative/Vice-President. It focuses particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats.


EU INTCEN is currently composed of two divisions. The Analysis Division – divided into sections – provides strategic analysis based on input from the security and intelligence services of the EU Member States. The General and External Relations Division deals with legal, administrative and Information Technology (IT) issues and provides open-source support.

## EEAS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ARCHITECTURE

In parallel with the establishment of the EEAS and against the existing environment, EU intelligence elements have initiated the development of guidelines for intelligence support for the EEAS. The idea was to take into account all relevant developments and design an intelligence support package:

- to define responsibilities;
- to provide direction and guidance;
- to create provisions for effective production and fast, secure and reliable dissemination of intelligence products.

The outcome of this whole process was the HR/VP Decision from 2012 establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS Intelligence Support Architecture (ISA). The ISA also includes provisions on coordination and liaison with the MS intelligence organisations, the European Commission and international organisations.



General EU Intelligence Landscape

The above-mentioned HR/VP Decision defines “intelligence” as information that has been collected, processed and disseminated for use by decision-makers and other customers and ISA as structures, processes and activities related to intelligence. It aims to optimise the intelligence function within the EEAS and encourages close cooperation and coordination across EU institutions and between intelligence stakeholders.

The ISA includes two central structures – the Intelligence Steering Board (ISB) and Intelligence Working Group (IWG). The Secretariat function for both ISB and IWG is provided jointly by EU INTCEN and EUMS INT. The ISB defines intelligence requirements and priorities at the strategic level and endorses structural, organisational and policy measures required to improve the Architecture. It also provides guidance to address deficiencies in the field of security. The Board is chaired by the HR/VP or the EEAS Executive Secretary-General (ESG).

The IWG further defines, specifies and adjusts EEAS intelligence requirements and priorities. In particular, it proposes the strategic intelligence direction and Prioritised Intelligence Requirements (PIR) for the intelligence. The IWG synchronises the tasking of the Single Intelligence

Analysis Capacity (SIAC), defines SIAC product range, and develops and monitors a feedback mechanism. The IWG is co-chaired by the Director EU INTCEN and Director EUMS INT.

## **INTELLIGENCE DIMENSION OF THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

In 2006, based on the framework of the follow-up to the Hampton Court process, the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR), Javier Solana, proposed the establishment of a more effective situation and risk assessment capacity. The idea at that time was to bring together, in a functional way, analytical capacities from both the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN, now renamed EU INTCEN) and EUMS INT, thus benefiting from a wide EU knowledge base for producing enhanced and reliable intelligence. This resulted in the SIAC arrangement initiated by directors of EUMS and EU SITCEN at the beginning of 2007. In addition, and in line with the comprehensive approach concept, the EU intelligence community intensified its efforts to widen the scope of access to and utilisation of all the information and data already available within the EU.

In this way, EU INTCEN and EUMS INT embarked on a comprehensive approach at a very early stage. They have become one of the EU forerunners in the field of producing synergies by a joint civilian-military approach. However, it is necessary to note that irrespective of internal arrangements, the quality of the SIAC products still depends predominantly on the value of the contributions from Member States. Although some hurdles have yet to be overcome, the enhanced effect of the SIAC approach to intelligence has already been widely recognised by most actors within the EU.

Between 2007 and 2010 production was relatively stable and EU INTCEN and EUMS INT worked in close cooperation to generate together the whole range of all-source intelligence products.

However, since the end of 2010 and the transfer of EU SITCEN and EUMS to EEAS, production has grown by about 40 % annually. This can be attributed to an increase in the number of intelligence customers and a continued increase in the demand for intelligence products.

## **WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR EU INTELLIGENCE**

With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, new challenges emerged for the EU intelligence community. New organisational structures, new actors and new customer requirements must take into account a re-focused intelligence support. In a rapidly changing strategic environment, the need for accurate and timely intelligence products has also become even more visible.

To meet all these challenges, further systemic transformation is needed. At this stage, it is essential to revise and optimise processes, change the information-sharing intelligence culture within the EU, adopt suitable technology and adjust the conceptual approach to the intelligence support function. In short, promote intelligence within the EU, as well as produce intelligence for the EEAS with a more operational and dynamic approach.

To this end, the enhancement of cooperation between EU INTCEN and EUMS INT will be constantly examined and focused on streamlining/harmonising working processes, and providing additional synergetic effects. This also comprises the development and implementation of a future secure EU intelligence domain within the wider EEAS IT systems support architecture as a vital prerequisite for exploiting fully the potential of enhanced intelligence support.

## 1.3. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

### 1.3.1. The EU comprehensive approach

by Jean-Philippe Scherer

For decades the European Union and Member States have been working together on solutions for major crises over the world. The EU is the largest economy on earth and a area where people have been living in peace for 70 years. But it is also the largest *donor of development aid, actively engaged in supporting countries in trouble*. EU external action, based on the vision of 28 nations, encompasses a wide range of activities in the area of diplomacy, humanitarian aid, cooperation and security and defence.

Despite Europe's significant resources and extensive experience, supporting fragile states remains a very tough challenge. Poverty, criminality, corruption, famine and violence, amongst many other factors, are often interlaced in modern crises. It is increasingly difficult to address each problem separately, and the EU is gradually trying to synchronise all civilian and military instruments in a single inclusive approach.

This combined effort, also called the *comprehensive approach*, aims to increase the efficiency of our response to the complexity of crises. The concept is continuously being improved and now promotes a better integration of local capacities and the early involvement of regional actors in the pursuit of solutions.

#### **EXPLOSIVE CRISES NEED LONG-TERM THERAPIES**

Crisis come fast, but they may last a long time. The conflict in Somalia, which began three dec-

ades ago, is a glaring example of today's crises. The EU is still actively supporting the new federal government on the road to recovery, after several wars and crises. The events in Ukraine in 2014 also reminded the EU how a fragile situation can rapidly turn into violent conflict, right on its borders. One year later, Europe is still engaged in difficult mediation to reach an agreement between the parties. Nevertheless, the wounds left by the conflict will have serious consequences and deserve special attention in the future.

Nowadays there is remote contamination between fragile countries, as crises are spreading fast through media and social networks. The expansion of Da'esh in Iraq has invigorated supporters of radical Islam elsewhere, and has also stimulated other extremist organisations in the Horn of Africa or in the Sahel. This spill-over has a concrete impact on societies. External and internal factors of instability are now dynamically connected through the internet, causing or nourishing new crises. Today's threats are much more diffuse, unpredictable and difficult to contain than in the past.

Therefore a continuous analysis of crises and conflicts is essential to understand the problems and identify options for action. The *comprehensive approach* addresses four essential questions: What precisely is this crisis? What should we do? Do we have the response capacity? How can we do it successfully? Of course, any answer has to be realistic, meaning that the EU and its partners should have sufficient resources and the ability to ensure implementation.



## THE FULL RANGE OF EU INSTRUMENTS


Over years, the EU has adopted essential tools to support fragile states and tackle conflicts and crises around the world. The European Development Fund (EDF) was established under the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and has continuously improved so that the EU is today the world's largest donor of development aid. European development policy has also undergone important reforms since 2000 to more effectively reduce poverty worldwide.

The EU is also widely engaged in emergency assistance through its Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (DG ECHO) established in 1992. Funding from the office reaches over 120 million people in 90 countries. ECHO spends EUR 800 million a year of its initial budget on humanitarian projects through over 200 partners such as the Red Cross, NGOs or UN agencies.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is another very important element of EU external action. In 2000, the EU officially created civilian and military crisis management

structures, and the first missions and operations were launched in 2003. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 was also a decisive step. It established the External Action Service (EEAS) and gave greater resources and coherence to CSDP through a new institutional framework. The EU now acts as a global political player to maintain international security through diplomatic, political, economic, civilian and military operational actions with an across-the-board approach to crises. Since 2003, CSDP has deployed 35 missions and operations all over the world; 17 are currently active in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe.

EU external action is not limited to development, humanitarian aid and security. The European Commission and the various European agencies are also engaged in international cooperation in various domains such as environment, trade, migration, justice, fishery, or research. All these external activities receive the active support of European diplomacy through the EEAS directorates, the EU Special Representatives in priority regions and a remarkable network of 140 Delegations all over the world.



Current EU engagement in the Horn of Africa (€m)

Graphic: Jean-Philippe Scherer

Today, the EU is probably the most inclusive organisation in terms of instruments and capacity, so it is comprehensive by nature. As an example, it is currently funding over 150 different activities in the Horn of Africa, covering all identified areas of fragility.

The EU is continuously improving its instruments to meet the challenge of fast-moving crises. In the last few years the EEAS has created several early warning and response systems to better anticipate and manage the risks, while the European Commission has developed sophisticated tools to better assess and evaluate the progress of beneficiaries.

The *comprehensive approach* also means that there is no discontinuity in the proposed solutions, and most EU structures are combining both geographic and thematic branches to cover both the specific elements and the horizontal issues of a crisis. Ultimately, the full range of instruments provides the EU with a unique external capacity, but of course these numerous lines of development and the players involved need permanent coordination.

## WE DO BETTER IN CONCERT

Like in an orchestra, each EU instrument has its own operation and technique. As the score drives the music, strategy and plans usually provide consistency to the EU approach. But this is not enough, and coordination between the different players is necessary to achieve a rounded performance.


Typically, there are four levels of internal coordination (tactical, operational, strategic and political) and three levels of external coordination (local, regional and international). The number of EU actors and partners in a theatre can be very large, so it is always extremely complex to synchronise all the activities of all stakeholders at all levels.

The EU measures the challenge daily through operating many instruments and coordinating

their actions. One of the priorities is to maximise civilian-military synergies. In the field of information, the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) combines civilian intelligence (EU INT-CEN) and military intelligence (EUMS Intelligence Directorate) and has been producing joint assessments since 2007. In 2012, Member States also activated the EU Operations Centre in the Horn of Africa to support CSDP missions and to facilitate better interaction with the Commission. Its mandate has been extended to the Sahel region and two liaison officers are currently deployed in DG DEVCO to enhance the exchange of information and establish synchronisation mechanisms between CSDP and development activities. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) has affirmed the intention to reduce the gap between short- and long-term instruments, including CSDP and development or humanitarian aid, through more effective cooperation between services.

A second priority for the EU is to integrate its action in the local, regional and international efforts. This hard work applies mainly to the EU diplomacy efforts through the different contact groups, meetings, and conferences. Mobilising international partners and empowering regional or local actors is paramount to engendering effective third parties' commitment to work in concert with the EU's initiatives. The EU is already working closely in this direction with partners such as the UN, NATO or the African Union – and national civil societies.

Both internal and external coordination efforts need to be actively supported by a joint communication plan, with the objective of explaining the role of each actor in the *comprehensive approach*. Implementing organisations work better when their contribution is clearly defined and acknowledged by others. Communication is also essential in order to convince all EU actors and their partners that the collective result critically depends on all individual efforts, and that each instrument plays a key role in the overall crisis resolution process.



The EU comprehensive approach to the Horn of Africa

## MANAGING PRIORITIES IS THE KEY

A paradox of the *comprehensive approach*, and probably one of the major challenges, is to be inclusive and selective at the same time. The multiplicity of instruments inevitably raises the sensitive question of priorities. Each crisis has a specific profile and requires a well-planned and tailored response over time. Violent phases typically require short-term actions in the form of CSDP missions/operations or humanitarian aid, while periods of relative calm usually present the best opportunities to develop long-term activities such as cooperation or education.

However, the reality is usually more complex, because the combination of instruments can create an induced effect, and there are always many possible dosages of efforts throughout a crisis.


Tailored solutions are never easy to implement and require a solid plan. Although the origin of a crisis is often related to poverty and corruption,

cooperation can hardly address these two problems before the violence is reduced to a certain level. In contrast, military action cannot stabilise a situation for long if the root causes of a conflict or a crisis have not been addressed.

In other words, all instruments are interdependent. They must be implemented simultaneously but in harmonised plans of action.

Short- and long-term activities are also interactive because they operate in the same environment at the same time. However their duration and start and end dates are not identical, so synchronisation and transition between activities is essential for the coherence and efficiency of the EU's external action.

The continuity of actions ensures consistency and is a key factor for success. The course of events should not totally jeopardise the EU's strategy, but ignoring some changes can challenge its activities. The real difficulty is to maintain a balance between the reaction to events and a coherent plan. Crisis management structures are perfectly aware of this



EU efforts throughout a crisis

and breaking news will inevitably generate new pressures.

A possible response to fast-changing situations is to secure key activities but also to adjust priorities and budget allocations more frequently. In any case, strategic and operational planners must keep in mind that modern crises are usually lengthy, and sacrificing long-term activities to short-term reaction will usually degrade the final result.


Today the EU is considered to use soft power, as it usually favours long-term effort. Some may consider this approach to show a lack of reaction, but they should also recognise the EU's perseverance and stability of commitment in tough situations. The EU has made notable progress in adapting its procedures, inter alia by transferring funds from cooperation to humanitarian aid in the event of emergencies, for example in the Sahel region in response to the dramatic impact of Boko Haram.

A rapid response is sometimes necessary in the face of an explosive situation, but it rarely offers

durable solutions. This is why both short- and long-term instruments are necessary and the EU must implement them simultaneously throughout the spectrum of a crisis. Patience, pugnacity and adaptability are usually the three fundamental factors in crisis management.

## LEARNING AND IMPROVING

The EU is facing a changing international environment and has to adapt its instruments on a continual basis. Financial and management optimisation is always sought, and each structure is regularly required to do better with less. This exercise is necessary but it also has some limits, and carried to excess it could degrade the efficiency of EU as a whole. An alternative is to optimise the coordination between structures in order to identify and use synergies. This principle is not new and is applied every day in team sports such as football or rugby.



Improving the EU comprehensive approach

It is not easy to apply it to large organisations for many reasons. The number of EU actors is much higher than in a sports team, the objective is not as simple as to score a goal and there is not a unique coach or captain to drive the players. The more complex EU decision mechanisms become and leadership is diluted, the more internal coordination will be essential.

The EU still has significant room for improvement in many directions. The first area of progress concerns shared analysis, common strategic vision and joint planning. These factors have been seriously improved in recent years and the effort is ongoing and accelerating. Today the EU institutions are using common strategic frameworks for their external actions. During planning phases, consultation between EU services has become the rule to foster common understanding (of the crisis, of the course of action proposed) from the starting phase of a crisis or in view of preventing it. New crisis management procedures in 2013 have supported this process, with for instance the introduction of the ‘Political Framework for Crisis Approach’ – an inter-service endeavour contributing to the enhancement of shared analysis. Planning documents integrate more detailed provisions about coordination and mutual support.

One of the most important challenges for the *comprehensive approach* today is probably to plan and to manage the transition between short-term and long-term instruments, but here, too, progress is ongoing. Transition strategies for CSDP missions

and operations are sensibly benefiting economic cooperation and development programmes. As an example, piracy has been dramatically reduced in the Indian Ocean thanks to the combined efforts of civilian and military commitment including the operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the civilian CSDP mission EUCAP Nestor. But in order to address the root causes of piracy in Somalia, the EU is investigating how to secure positive results by promoting the fishing economy and eradicating poverty along the Somali coast.

The EU is currently making significant progress on synergies and synchronisation across its external action instruments. The increasing number of initiatives between the EEAS and the European Commission agencies, but also between the EU and its Member States, is a positive sign. Wide consultations, comprehensive platforms and workshops, common key leader engagement at regional level, coordination meetings in Delegations, and the appointment of coordinators or liaison officers – joint programming efforts are positive elements contributing to the improvement and optimisation of EU efforts to tackle crises and conflicts worldwide. This effort will undeniably continue in the future with a common information strategy and more cross-fertilisation between EU actors. In the same logic, the EU has recently defined the “Train & Equip” concept, with the aim of better synchronising the training and capacity-building efforts of CSDP missions with Commission-sponsored projects and the equipment provided



by donors in order to maximise the effects for beneficiary countries. This initiative is to result in a *comprehensive approach* to capacity-building.

It is also anticipated that this modernisation will grow further through the restructuring of the EEAS in 2016-2017. In the spirit of the *comprehensive approach*, crisis management structures should be strengthened and simplified in order to become more efficient. The aim will not only be to become more responsive, but will also focus on prevention whenever possible.

## CONCLUSION

The *EU comprehensive approach* is a way of understanding the requirements of fragile countries, crises and conflicts, proposing realistic solutions and coordinating actions for better results. The large number of European instruments and actors make this synchronisation a complex exercise, but it is also a fantastic opportunity for the development of synergies and innovative solutions.

In terms of policy, the basic principles of the *comprehensive approach* remain clear – it is about working better together, and enhancing the coherence, effectiveness and impact of the EU's policy and external action, in particular in crisis and con-



Photo: EEAS/EUFOR RCA

flict situations. However it does not dictate any particular approach for specific areas or regions, and respects the methodology and imperatives of the different actors.

The EU instruments have been improving over the years with just one objective: doing more, doing it right, and doing it better. In practice this effort is reflected in greater information-sharing, a joint consultation before planning and increasingly, a culture of coordination. The ongoing work on the operationalisation of the *comprehensive approach* will further support the optimisation of the EU's – and Member States' – engagements in favour of peace and security worldwide.

### Key steps towards the comprehensive approach

In December 2013, the High Representative and the European Commission presented a new policy paper on the EU comprehensive approach in the form of a Joint Communication: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 11.12.2013 JOIN(2013).

In the spring of 2014, these policies and priorities were discussed with EU Member States, following consultations with a broad spectrum of Council stakeholders from the political, development, military and humanitarian domains.

In May 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council gave its full support to this concept and agreed a set of ambitious Council conclusions on the subject matter, including on the way forward. See the Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014.

### 1.3.2. CSDP/FSJ link

by Michał Narojek



Photo: EUROPOL, Alun John

Europol's Operations Centre – experts supporting an international investigation in real time, November 2012

#### STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE – KEY EU DOCUMENTS

Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are distinct policy areas governed by different rules and implemented by different EU entities. However, it is clear that strong links between the two are necessary, as key security problems faced by the EU are of a global nature. Proper coordination and the coherent use of tools available in both areas seem indispensable.

Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union explicitly states that both the Union's security and the rule of law need to be safeguarded and supported by external actions.

The links between the two spheres are reflected in many strategic EU documents:

European Security Strategy (*“Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension”*).

Council conclusions on possible cooperation mechanisms between civilian ESDP missions and Europol as regards the mutual exchange of information (*“Exchanges of information, which ensure continuity in the fight against organised crime, can help to reinforce security and stability, both in the areas where ESDP missions are deployed, in accordance with their role, and in the EU”*).

Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions (*“When planning ESDP police missions, consideration should be given in each case to inclusion in the mandate of the operations, from the outset, of assistance to the host country in fighting Organised Crime, in particular when the organised crime is originating from or transiting through that host country affects the EU Member States.”*)

Internal Security Strategy (*“A concept of internal security cannot exist without an external dimension, since internal security increasingly depends to a large extent on external security”*.)

Commission Communication on the latter Strategy (*“Internal security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world, and it is therefore important to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal and external aspects of EU security”*.)

Europol too, in the conclusions and future strategic considerations of its EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011, stated that *“the distinction between the external and internal security of the EU has been blurred”*.

The Council, in its conclusions on setting the EU's priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and 2017,



Photo: Kristian Berlin, Sweden

stresses that *“the external dimension of internal security (...) ought to be taken into account in implementing the Council priorities and the EU policy cycle.”*

The Council instructs COSI<sup>1</sup> to *“liaise with the relevant Council preparatory bodies to ensure that the implementation of these crime priorities is coordinated with other policy areas, particularly in the Union’s external action”.*

The Communication on the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises mentions a number of global challenges that affect the EU’s internal security, such as illicit trafficking, cyber security, maritime security, radicalisation and terrorism. It calls for shared analysis and proposes, inter alia, the following action:

*“Strengthen early, pro-active, transparent and regular information-sharing, co-ordination and team-work among all those responsible in the EU’s Brussels headquarters and in the field (including EU Delegations, CSDP missions and operations, Member States and EU Special Representatives, EU agencies as appropriate).”*

It also calls for linking policies and internal and external action, stating that

*“the emergence beyond Europe’s borders of organised crime, terrorism, or mass migration associated with violent conflict can have a direct impact on the security, stability and interests of the EU, its Member States and EU citizens”.*

The document gives a specific example of al-Qaeda destabilising Somalia and states that

*“terrorist organisations can act to transmit the terrorist threat directly back into the EU”.*

It also calls for

*“better use of the diplomatic and external relations means at the disposal of the EU project and defend its interests linked to internal policies and global issues.”*

Another measure provided for is to

*“seek to identify and raise awareness of policies and instruments that have both an internal and external dimension and highlight potential in both directions.”*

The Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS made the following suggestions for crisis manage-

1 Standing Committee on Internal Security established under Article 71 TFEU.



ment procedures for CSDP crisis management operations to the PSC:

*“CSDP advance planning by CMPD, supported by CPCC and EUMS, will engage with other Services, such as Geographic, Conflict Prevention/Peace-building/Mediation, EEAS Security, Human Rights and Democracy, EU Delegations, the Commission (FPI, ECHO, DEVCO, HOME, ELARG), EU Agencies (EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EUROJUST), Member States embassies, and NGOs as required. Where appropriate the EEAS will consult with international organisations (UN, AU, NATO etc.), and third states that may have a role/interest in the resolution of the crisis.”*

Communication of the Commission *“An open and secure Europe: making it happen”* also indicates close links between external and internal security aspects. It states the following:

*“In an ever increasingly interdependent world, Home Affairs issues need to be embedded in the EU’s overall external policy, allowing for reinforced dialogue and cooperation with third countries. Consistency and coherence with the external policy will help in anticipating challenges, better reaching the EU’s objectives (...).”*

Moreover, in a subchapter entitled *“Building internal security in a global context”* it states that

*“European internal security also means acting beyond EU borders and in cooperation with third country partners. Radicalisation, fight against trafficking of human beings and fight against drug trafficking for example require such cooperation”.*

The European Council in its conclusions of 26/27 June 2014 stated the following:

*“The answer to many of the challenges in the area of freedom, security and justice lies in relations with third countries, which calls for improving the link between the EU’s internal and external policies.”*

The Justice and Home Affairs Council in its Conclusions on the development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy adopted on 4 December 2014 builds on the above-mentioned guidelines of the European Council and emphasises the need to forge a proper link between exter-

nal and internal security. The document provides a good explanation of the EU’s policy and gives valuable guidelines for future action:

*“(...)The interdependence between internal and external security is constantly growing and the renewed EU’s Internal Security Strategy should take into account the external security dimension, and vice versa, the Union’s external and development policies should take into account the relevant principles of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy.*

*a) Internal security should be more systematically addressed as part of the EU external relations policies, and strong coherence should be ensured in any foreign policy with regard to security-related issues. Migration and refugee policies and cooperation with third countries in tackling criminal phenomena, including facilitating illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings, should be seen as an integral part of the Union’s external and development policies. Special attention should be placed on establishing an effective common return policy and enforcing readmission obligations in agreements with third countries.*

*b) Relations with third countries should enhance cooperation, including operational cooperation, on the EU policy cycle’s current and future priorities as well as cooperation on addressing radicalisation, and recruitment to terrorism and foreign fighters and returnees phenomena. (...) The European External Action Service is invited to play a strong role in ensuring links between EU internal and external security are recognised and acted upon.*

*c) When developing external relations strategies, due consideration should be given to the principles of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy.*

*d) The cooperation between all actors involved in internal and external security in combating the challenges identified above calls for stronger coordination on security issues, in particular between EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies. Particular emphasis should be given to the better use of and interconnection between EU agencies, and with regard to their role in external*

*relations. Specific efforts are required to enhance coherence of action between civilian missions with a security related mandate, EC instruments and Member States' bilateral initiatives. The principles contained in the CSDP/FSJ road map on strengthening ties between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ) need to be implemented and fully exploited."*

The need for stronger links between external and internal security was clearly expressed by High Representative/Vice-President (HRVP) Federica Mogherini in her remarks made after the Foreign Affairs Council of 19 January 2015.

*"As you know, we started our work with the point on terrorism, reacting not only to what happened in Paris earlier this month but also to a common threat that is there not only for Europeans but also countries and people in the Arab world, in Africa, in Asia. I have to say that, probably for the first time, there was a real deep awareness of the need to work together and – I was surprised to know for the first time – the Foreign Affairs Council had a discussion with our EU Counter terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove."*

In her remarks, the HRVP also stated that the EU plans

*"to have security attachés in the European Union Delegations in relevant countries. This means regular contact among professionals on our side and on the country that is hosting the Delegation's side to develop cooperation on security issues and counterterrorist issues."*

This must be seen as a very practical step towards a more coherent security policy and stronger operational links between FSJ and external action.

## OPERATIONAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Strengthening ties between FSJ and CSDP is a gradual process as the services involved have different competences and objectives. They are governed by different stakeholders (military, diplomatic or



Photo: Marcin Kwarcia, Poland

home affairs) and act under different legal regimes. Cultural differences and traditional separation of competences also play a role. Still, good progress is being made. Regular joint meetings of the two main committees dealing respectively with external and internal security (Political and Security Committee (PSC) and Standing Committee on Internal Security, (COSI)) that started in June 2011 mark the strengthening of institutional and operational links between the two areas.

The EEAS, in order to translate strategic concepts into concrete actions, developed a document "Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ – Draft Road Map" that covers, amongst other things, planning and information exchange. It supports closer cooperation between CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice actors, Europol and Frontex in particular.

Numerous examples of operational cooperation could be given. Frontex cooperated closely with the EEAS on the use of space imagery, via the EU Satellite Centre, under the Copernicus framework.

The agency contributed to the strategic and operational planning of the EU-led Border Assistance



### Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA)

SIENA is a state-of-the-art tool designed to enable swift, secure and user-friendly communication and exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information and intelligence, including classified information.

More than 600 000 SIENA messages were exchanged in 2014. Currently there are approximately 4 700 users in 573 competent authorities.

Mission in Libya (EUBAM). This may serve as an example of the EU effectively using an agency's unique expertise for designing a CSDP mission.

Many CSDP missions deal with law enforcement and thus have access to valuable law enforcement information relevant to the EU's internal security. In exceptional cases, such as EULEX Kosovo, missions have executive powers, and hence gather highly relevant operational intelligence that could be used at the EU level, in particular by Europol. Cooperation between Europol and EULEX is based on an agreed procedure which defines details of the information exchange and identifies Member States which volunteered to facilitate communication, namely the Europol National Units of Finland, Sweden and the UK. In practice, however, the information exchange is facilitated by Sweden only. Europol's secure communication system SIENA<sup>2</sup> is used for the exchange of operational information.

Since October 2011 when the procedure was implemented, about 700 SIENA messages have been exchanged. A steady increase in the number of messages exchanged can be observed.

Europol also supports EULEX' witness protection programme, facilitating the necessary cooperation with Member States' services.

Atalanta, the EU mission against piracy off the Somali coast, offers another example showing the

need for close CSDP-FSJ cooperation. The mission, although conducted with military means, has obvious police functions and fights piracy, which is a criminal activity. It collects personal data "with a view to prosecution". In accordance with its mandate, the mission forwards personal data of suspects to Interpol. For many years there were no equivalent provisions facilitating the exchange of information between the mission and Europol, although the agency has a dedicated team of experts dealing with piracy, and it supported an international joint investigative team tackling this very phenomenon. This was partially supplemented by an indirect exchange of information facilitated by the UK, which acted as a voluntary intermediary, as well as by Interpol. From the operational perspective, where timing is essential, this was not an optimal solution. This was changed by Council Decision 2008/851/CFSP of 21 November 2014, which explicitly mentions Europol as a recipient of Atalanta's data.

Cooperation in strategic analysis is also an area of importance. The EEAS' INTCEN already cooperates with Europol on counter-terrorism issues and both entities contribute to each other's reports and assessments. Europol's annual TE-SAT<sup>3</sup> may serve as an example. This cooperation should develop further – a comprehensive picture of threats, based on different points of view (military, intelligence, police) could greatly contribute to a better, more consistent response.

The links and the need for greater consistency between FSJ and CSDP are well reflected in numerous EU strategic documents, which rightly identify many areas that require cooperation, such as planning, information exchange and strategic analysis. While there are good examples of working level cooperation between FSJ and CSDP actors, much remains to be done. As the general strategic framework is in place, much depends on the pro-activeness and initiative of the experts involved, including the readers of this handbook.

<sup>2</sup> Secure Information Exchange Network Application.

<sup>3</sup> EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.

## The policy cycle

In 2010, the EU established a multi-annual policy cycle. Its aim is to ensure that the fight against serious international and organised crime is coherent and properly coordinated. The Council selects priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime based on Europol's EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA).

The following priorities were chosen for the period between 2014 and 2017:

- To disrupt organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in the facilitation of illegal immigration and operating in the source countries at the main entry points to the EU on the main routes and, where evidence-based, on alternative routes. To reduce OCGs' abuse of legal channels for migration, including the use of fraudulent documents as a means of facilitating illegal immigration.
- To disrupt OCGs involved in intra-EU human trafficking and human trafficking from the most prevalent external source countries for the purposes of labour exploitation and sexual exploitation; this includes those groups using legal business structures to facilitate or disguise their criminal activities.
- To disrupt OCGs involved in the production and distribution of counterfeit goods violating health, safety and food regulations and those producing sub-standard goods.
- To disrupt the capacity of OCGs and specialists involved in excise fraud and Missing Trader Intra Community (MTIC) fraud.
- To reduce the production of synthetic drugs in the EU and to disrupt the OCGs involved in synthetic drugs trafficking.
- To reduce cocaine and heroin trafficking to the EU and to disrupt the OCGs facilitating the distribution in the EU.
- To combat cybercrimes committed by OCGs which generate substantial criminal profits, e.g. online and payment card fraud, cybercrimes which cause serious harm to their victims such as online child sexual exploitation, and cyber-attacks which affect critical infrastructure and information systems in the EU.
- To reduce the risk posed by firearms to the public, including combating illicit trafficking in firearms.
- To combat organised property crime committed by mobile organised crime groups.

Member States are also encouraged to take into account, among other factors, regional dimensions such as the Western Balkans and West Africa, money laundering and asset recovery.

It is important to underline that these are EU priorities: they are not restricted merely to home affairs. Thus, they should be taken into account in other policy areas too.

The EEAS is a relevant actor in a number of priority areas, in particular illegal migration, counterfeit goods, trafficking in human beings (THB), synthetic drugs, cocaine and heroin and firearms. The service participated in the drafting of certain operational action plans that translate strategic priorities into concrete actions.

The EEAS is considered to have unique expertise and resources that can be shared and utilised, for example in the fight against THB. EEAS' active contribution would also be sought in cases that require engagement with key third states. The above-mentioned priorities should also be considered when planning and designing CSDP missions so that they address key criminal threats faced by the EU.

### 1.3.3. Fragility, development and security


Compiled from the EU staff handbook:  
Operating in situations of conflict and fragility, December 2014<sup>1</sup>

The European Union (EU) engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility.

- The EU has Delegations in the 50 or so countries that can be considered in situations of conflict or fragility. Beyond the Delegations, there are 12 EU Special Representatives (as of January 2014). Nearly all Special Representatives work in fragile and conflict-affected countries or regions, or on fragility-related themes.
- The EU’s engagement in situations of conflict and fragility spans a wide range of interventions (see graphic). The engagement also involves other issues that can directly affect fragility and

conflict, such as trade, investment, global economic governance and financial regulation, energy, the environment and regional integration.

- In 2012, the EU’s development cooperation with countries in situations of conflict and fragility represented EUR 4.9 billion (a budget managed by the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation), or 59 % of total EU assistance. This makes EU institutions the second-largest provider of assistance in situations of conflict and fragility – after the United States and before the World Bank. The top three recipients of such assistance in 2012 were



Note: CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy;  
LRRD = linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

A wide range of interventions

<sup>1</sup> European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. An EU staff handbook. Tools and Methods Series. Reference Document No 17. December 2014. To be found on <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook>

Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking a longer view, over 2000-2012, the top three recipients were the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan and Ethiopia.

- The EU is also engaged in situations of conflict and fragility through electoral observation missions and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. There were 16 CSDP missions in July 2014, civilian and military, representing over 7 000 personnel.

There are distinguishable types of situations of conflict and fragility, each calling for a different set of responses. There are many ways to distinguish between such types of situation, but one of the most useful is the security-capacity-legitimacy model proposed by Charles Call (2010), which classifies country fragility according to deficiencies or gaps involving three sets of issues.

- Security issues. The state has a good degree of capacity and legitimacy, but has limited reach and suffers from illegal trafficking and/or chronic violence;
- Capacity issues. The state has legitimacy (e.g. through regular elections), but low capacity to deliver services;
- Legitimacy issues. The state has some capacity to deliver services but suffers from weak legitimacy, resulting from, for example, the violation of agreed rules, poor public service delivery, beliefs shaped by tradition and religion, or international action undermining national sovereignty.

Countries can have gaps in one, two or all of these areas.

Besides countries, sub-national and transnational areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected situations. Some countries that are not usually thought of as being fragile contain large swaths of territory that exhibit all the attributes of fragility; examples include Northern Uganda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, Mindanao in the Philippines, North-East Nigeria and Southern Thailand. In Asia, sub-national conflict is considered the most deadly, widespread and enduring form

of violent conflict, affecting more than 131 million people.


Fragility and conflict can also affect territories beyond national borders – for example, the belt of instability that stretches from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel, due to al-Qaeda, al-Shabab and related groups.

Situations of conflict and fragility are influenced by local, national and global factors. Local factors of conflict and fragility include weak or exclusionary local governance, limited or unequal access to land and water, etc. National factors include tense social relations, unequal access to jobs and services; and weak rule of law, etc. Global factors include the following:

- international trade (e.g. barriers to exports and vulnerability to shocks);
- transnational organised crime and illicit trade;
- the existence of a global and poorly regulated market for private security services;
- economic and financial liberalisation processes;
- migration to and from fragile states and the spread of radicalism through new technologies;
- internationally networked non-state armed groups;
- climate change.

These global factors are often ignored in political economy analysis, yet globalisation makes them a central set of forces to take account of – especially in contexts of weak institutions, high poverty, high levels of violence and structural exclusion. Additionally, local, national and global factors interact, as the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the explosion of drug-related violence in several Central American countries illustrate.

The EU has a track record of contributing to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. For example, it has made ‘significant contributions to development, peace and stability’ in Ethiopia (2012); it has ‘succeeded in implementing the support to the Palestinian Authority in difficult circumstances’ (2013); and in the East and South Neighbourhood Policy Regions, ‘EU support stimulated regional policy



Source: Adapted from Call (2010), as cited in Gravingrot, Ziaja and Kreibbaum (2012).

Three dimensions of fragility and country examples from 2010

dialogue and contributed to stability' (2013). Regarding justice and security reform, the EU 'has substantially increased its engagement globally though funding, development of its concept and utilisation of a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments' (2011). With regard to integrated border management and organised crime, one of the EU's 'major successes was the contribution to fostering international border management policy exchange and inclusive cooperation between countries that until recently had been involved in conflict or dispute' (2013). And, in the EU's support of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 'evidence of results and positive impacts has been identified in relation to both the promotion and protection of human rights' (2011).

Evaluations point to recurrent strengths arising from the EU's comparative advantages, but also to areas for improvement. These strengths include the high relevance of EU support, respect for national ownership and a multi-sector/holistic approach. The EU's comparative advantages include (i) its long-standing presence, making it a reliable partner, (ii) its critical mass in terms of financial support, (iii) its wide range of instruments and (iv) its recognised thematic experience in sectors. However, evaluations also point to areas for improvement — notably increasing low efficiency, improving the quality of political dialogue and setting more realistic time frames.

## RELEVANCE OF EU SUPPORT

Evaluations generally find EU support as being highly relevant to situations of conflict and fragility, with high respect for national ownership. The EU is recognised as having made a positive contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in countries including Angola, Bolivia, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

EU support is most relevant when objectives are realistic and shared across actors. Defining what is meant by 'success' in situations of conflict and fragility helps to ensure that the goals of EU support, and its modalities, are suitable for the purpose.

Evaluations of both the EU and other major actors that engage in situations of conflict and fragility almost always find that objectives were overly ambitious in too short a time frame. Objectives and time horizons are better defined in conjunction with the local stakeholders – state, non-state, national and local, and when societies are divided, preferably all of these if possible – and with other international actors. It is also best to factor in from the start the constraints associated with fragility and conflict – notably security, which limits fieldwork and adds to overhead costs – and limited national capacities. Expectations regarding timeliness and disbursement of funds need to be realistic.




## EFFECTIVENESS OF EU SUPPORT

EU support is most effective when it is tailored to the specific context, the analysis of which can be continuous. Pathways to recovery are rarely obvious, especially when the context is fast changing. For example, there are often trade-offs between the need to manage the effects of an ongoing crisis and the need to address the root causes of conflict: doing both can prove difficult when security, capacity and trust are in short supply. There are cases, however, where the EU has managed to do both. For instance, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, evaluations indicate that stakeholders generally recognised that on top of providing life-saving humanitarian assistance, the EU made the right choice of priorities to support towards preparing a two-state solution (2006) and that its contribution had been critical. Where the EU has been able to foresee crisis situations, it has been able to undertake analysis in advance.

In this way, when the time came for action, it was ready – for example, in Niger in 2012 where fighters from Libya threatened to destabilise large parts of the country. Analysis does not need to hinder action if it is continuous from design to implementation. On the contrary, monitoring can serve as a management tool to correct the course as and when needed. Analysis that feeds into programme implementation is particularly important in the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, which remains a challenge for the EU.

EU support is also most effective when it is rooted in a comprehensive approach, integrating different activities, actors, timing and geographical dimensions. The EU increasingly applies it, for example, in supporting the Occupied Palestinian Territories where efforts were made to continuously adjust approaches according to the latest information on the conflict situation, implement support through a multi-sector approach, involve all the major actors concerned and target geographically vulnerable areas. The EU has also made progress in taking a systemic approach to



Comprehensive approach to support situations of conflict and fragility

conflict prevention and peacebuilding, justice and security, and human rights, working through multiple sectors, with state and non-state actors, and using a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments.

EU programmes increasingly focus on the security and justice system as a whole, rather than supporting individual parts, and increasingly anchor them in national security and justice strategies. Commission assistance helped in many cases to enhance institutional capacities within state security and justice bodies to deliver public services. For instance, the Commission's support to the criminal justice reform process in Georgia through the Sector Policy Support Programme (2009–2013) has contributed to a shift in Georgia's criminal system from a punitive to a more liberal one. These and other experiences, however, reveal two issues that need constant attention.

- Planning: coordination between actors needs to go beyond the exchange of information and begin at the planning stage: What are the shared goals? What are the unique strengths of each actor?
- Programming and implementation: the concept of a comprehensive approach can easily get lost in operational translation: What are the activities best carried out jointly? Independen-

dently? What level of operational coordination is required?

While in some cases, the costs of operational coordination can outweigh its benefits (for example if it slows down the response to an emergency situation), coordination at the planning stage is essential to effectiveness.

## EFFICIENCY OF EU SUPPORT

EU support is most efficient when it builds on pro-activity, creativity and coordination. Evaluations generally rate the efficiency of EU support in situations of conflict and fragility as low, with much room for improvement. Improving support efficiency requires first and foremost a recognition that each situation is different. Also, creativity is needed in seeking solutions. A good starting point is for staff to put coordination arrangements in place that bridge the fragmented responsibilities among donors – and even within EU institutions – in responding to fragility and conflict. Situations of conflict and fragility also demand thinking ‘outside of the box’; in this regard, good practices among EU Delegations note the following.

Harnessing both financial and non-financial support (e.g. political and policy dialogue; technical assistance) can be valuable.

There is value in engaging at different geographical levels of intervention (local, national, regional) – sometimes, the best entry points are not necessarily within the central government.

Engaging with both state and non-state actors, preferably together, can provide opportunities for change.


Situations of conflict and fragility require additional resources and continuous development of more appropriate tools for support. The EU at Headquarters is investing in knowledge management, notably through training and Capacity4dev. It is also developing monitoring frameworks with indicators for operating in fragile contexts.

EU support is most efficient when it leverages the EU’s recognised comparative advantages. The

EU’s comparative advantages enable it to add value to the efforts of others by drawing on its:

- credibility as an intergovernmental entity, with a negligible political profile and no ties to national interests;
- reliability, in terms of its continued presence and capacity to establish long-term partnerships;
- representation of a critical mass of financial support;
- wide array of policies and instruments, including its position as a major trading partner with many fragile states;
- in-depth thematic experience in a range of fields that are pertinent to fragility and conflict-related issues.

The EU can add considerable value by emphasising these strengths, notably by playing a greater role than currently as a convener or co-convener in liaising with Member States to engage with one voice in political and policy dialogue with government, setting the policy agenda and/or coordinating priority sectors.



## WHAT IS THE EU APPROACH?

The 2007 Lisbon Treaty and the 2011 Agenda for Change (EC, 2011) sharpened the EU's focus on situations of conflict and fragility. The Lisbon Treaty directs the EU to 'preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security'. The Agenda for Change charges it to 'allocate more funds than in the past to the countries most in need, including fragile states'. And a 2013 communication sets out the case for a comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and High Representative, 2013). In response to this guidance, and based on the lessons learnt, the EU has fashioned a successful and cogent approach to

engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, the key elements of which are summarised here:

- Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appropriately to ensure a comprehensive response.
- Enhance resilience.
- Use the right mix of financial instruments and tools.
- Develop, safeguard and support human resources.
- Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters support.
- Make best use of EU comparative advantages.

**EU Council and EEAS**

Leads EU policy and security and peacekeeping efforts

<b>Overall policy direction</b>
<p><i>Council and Political Affairs Dept</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Define policies</li> <li>Exercise political control of civilian crisis management and CSDP military operations</li> </ul>
<b>Crisis response</b>
<p><i>MD VII</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activates and harmonises EU crisis response activities</li> <li>Provides global monitoring and current situation awareness</li> </ul>
<b>Intelligence analysis</b>
<p><i>INTCEN</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides intelligence analysis, early warning, situational awareness</li> </ul>
<b>Security policy and conflict prevention</b>
<p><i>Security and CSDP structures</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enhance security policy consistency and liaise with appropriate services: (i) EU policies in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control; (ii) operational support, promotion of mediation, coordination of SSR policy, and programming of IcSP; (iii) focal point on external security threats and sanctions</li> </ul>
<b>Crisis management</b>
<p><i>Council &amp; Security &amp; CSDP structures</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct military activities (EUMC)</li> <li>Coord. military instrument (EUMS)</li> <li>Plan &amp; follow up on civilian &amp; military CSDP operations (CMPD)</li> <li>Civilian CSDP crisis management operations (CPCC)</li> </ul>
<b>Coordination</b>
<p><i>MD VI and MD II</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EEAS contact point for development policy matters</li> <li>JAES strategic political objectives</li> </ul>

**DEVCO**

Leads EU development programming and implementation efforts

<b>Policy framework and tools for fragile or crisis situations</b>
<p><i>Fragility &amp; Crisis Management Unit</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formulates EU development policy on situations of conflict and fragility</li> <li>Contributes to knowledge management</li> <li>Develops guidance and tools</li> <li>Focal point in DEVCO</li> </ul>
<b>Policy, management and guidance (thematic)</b>
<p><i>Directorates B &amp; C</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formulate sectoral policies in various fields (e.g. governance, gender, food security, climate change, etc.)</li> <li>Manage EIDHR, IcSP, food security &amp; food facility programmes</li> <li>Ensure quality support, policy coherence and elaborate tools</li> </ul>
<b>Policy, management and guidance (geographic)</b>
<p><i>Directorates D, E, F, G &amp; H</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide guidance on definition of policy framework for cooperation with countries in fragile or crisis situations and on tools to effectively and coherently manage major crisis situations</li> <li>Strengthen analysis and follow-up by country and region</li> </ul>

**FPI**

Bridges EC and Council/EEAS Works alongside EEAS

<b>Operations management</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Handles financial management &amp; implementation of operational budgets for CFSP, IcSP &amp; Election Observation Mission</li> <li>Implements sanctions and Kimberley Process</li> </ul>

**ECHO**

Leads EU humanitarian assistance efforts

<b>Humanitarian assistance and civil protection</b>
<p><i>Directorates A (Strategy, Policy and International Co-operation) &amp; B (Humanitarian and Civil Protection Operations)</i></p> <p><b>Humanitarian aid</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide humanitarian aid</li> <li>Develop and implement policy frameworks</li> </ul> <p><b>Civil protection</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encourage cooperation between the 31 states participating in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism</li> <li>Ensure disaster response and enhance disaster prevention and preparedness</li> </ul>

**Council Entity**

EUMC: EU Military Committee

**EEAS Entities**

CMPD: Crisis Management and Planning Directorate  
 CPCC: Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability  
 EUMS: EU Military Staff  
 INTCEN: Intelligence Analysis Centre  
 JAES: Joint Africa-EU Strategy  
 MD II: Africa Department  
 MD VI: Global and Multilateral Issues Department  
 MD VII: Crisis Response & Operational Coordination Department

**DEVCO Directorates**

B: Human and Society Development  
 C: Sustainable Growth and Development  
 D: East and Southern Africa ACP Coordination  
 E: West and Central Africa  
 F: Neighbourhood  
 G: Latin America and Caribbean  
 H: Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/ Gulf and Pacific

Source: ADE (2014); organisation is as of 15 September 2014.

Who does what at EU Headquarters on operating in situations of conflict and fragility?

### 1.3.4. CSDP and partners

by Helena Bogusławska

Common challenges call for shared responsibility in addressing them. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been an open project from the outset. As early as 2003, the European Security Strategy recognised that little can be achieved alone, and this is all the more true now. A comprehensive approach means not only drawing on all EU strengths, but also working closely with international and regional organisations, such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the African Union and ASEAN, as well as with non-EU countries. The EU and these partners can reciprocally benefit from each other's knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities. This draws partners closer to the EU.

The European Union is developing CSDP partnerships in four main areas:

1. International organisations and regional and international fora
2. Participation in CSDP missions and operations
3. Security and defence (CSDP) dialogues
4. Capacity building

The EU cooperation with the United Nations has become a “way of life” as put by UN Under-Secretary General Herve Ladsous. Operational cooperation in crisis areas – such as in Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan – includes ‘bridging operations’ (as in Central African Republic where the EU deployed a mission first and the UN subsequently took over), parallel complementary deployment, or support to the other organisation's activities. Operational cooperation is accompanied by a regular high level dia-



Signature of Framework Agreement for participation of Colombia in EU crisis management operations, August 2014

logue, including the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management twice a year, regular visits of Ambassadors from the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to New York, the participation of the UN Under-Secretary General in charge of Peacekeeping Operations in high level meetings of the EU Member States (informal Defence Ministerial, Political and Security Committee and Chiefs of Defence). The EU Action Plan in support of UN Peacekeeping launched in 2012 came to an end in December 2014. It allowed, inter alia, for the establishment of modalities for coordination on planning procedures, concepts, training and exercises and lessons learnt between the two organisations. A follow-up initiative is planned to define future strategic priorities and keep the excellent momentum going.



The strong transatlantic relationship remains of fundamental importance to Europe. The practical cooperation between the EU and NATO has expanded significantly in the past few years, within the agreed framework of their strategic partnership and respecting the decision-making autonomy of each organisation. Apart from the already on-going operational cooperation and coordination (e.g. in Kosovo, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan), there is potential for strengthened interaction on maritime security, defence and security capacity building and cyber security. The “intertwining summits” – from December 2013 (European Council discussion on CSDP), through the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the June 2015 European Council up to the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw – bring additional

dynamics, fostering further complementary and mutually reinforcing actions, for example on military capability development. Both the EU and NATO share the assessment that the crisis in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods significantly altered the security reality for Europe and the broader transatlantic community. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis the good cooperation and coordination with NATO and the OSCE has proved invaluable.

Following the establishment of the African Union and the prospect of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the EU established the African Peace Facility in 2004 in order to financially support (logistics, transportation, medical, communication and personnel costs) the deployment of African-led peace support operations (e.g. AMIS, AMISOM, MISCA, AFISMA). The EU also supports APSA in terms of logistics, planning, and operational training (e.g. the AMANI Africa training cycle for the operationalisation of the African Standby Force). This relationship was put on a new strategic footing with the signing in 2007 of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy which made peace and security a priority among the eight thematic partnerships that the EU and Africa should develop in a comprehensive manner. In parallel, at the UN’s request, the EU started deploying its own crisis management operations under CSDP in Africa. Of the 31 completed or still ongoing CSDP missions and operations since 2003, 16 have been deployed on the African continent.

The current EU Chairmanship of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Somali coast provides ample opportunities for global engagement. The EU took over this role from the US in 2014 and will continue in 2015 until a new Chair has been selected. It involves coordinating the work of more than 80 stakeholders: sovereign States, international organisations, the private sector and NGOs. The EU Maritime Security Strategy and the Maritime Security Action Plan, both adopted in 2014, provide further incentives for reaching out to non-EU partners.



Photo: European Union

Chilean soldier in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina

### Treaty on European Union

Art. 21: *“The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.”*

### European Council, December 2013

*“The Union remains fully committed to working in close collaboration with its global, transatlantic and regional partners. Such collaboration should be further developed in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and complementarity.”*

### European Council, November 2013

The Council *“stresses the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, and African Union, as well as strategic partners and partner countries in its neighbourhood, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU.”*

In November 2013, the European Council adopted a comprehensive set of conclusions on CSDP partnerships in which it fostered *“contributing partners support to CSDP, with a focus on non-EU NATO Allies, strategic partners, partner countries in the neighbourhood, notably the Mediterranean and Eastern partners (...) and other individual partner countries”*. The Council also noted that *“priority should be given to cooperation with partners who share with the EU common values and principles and are able and willing to support EU crisis management efforts”*.

The EU concludes Framework Participation Agreements with selected partner countries to facilitate their participation in CSDP missions and operations and foster long-term cooperation. Until now 16 such legally binding international agreements have been signed, notably with: Albania, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia,

Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA. Non-EU NATO allies and candidate countries are amongst the most active contributors to CSDP activities, and were the first to develop close cooperation with the EU in this respect.

The Union regularly invites third countries to participate in specific missions and operations. To give a practical example – recently launched CSDP missions and operations enjoyed wide political and practical support from several partners. In 2014 Georgia joined EUFOR RCA with a light infantry company as the second largest contributor; Turkey and Serbia also contributed to this mission; Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Switzerland and Serbia participate in EUTM Mali; Australia joined EUCAP Nestor (for the first time participating in a CSDP mission); Ukraine supported EUNAVFOR Atalanta



Photo: European Union

Ukrainian frigate heading home after having completed its tour of duty with EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta

with a frigate (the largest Ukrainian contribution ever) and New Zealand contributed a reconnaissance aircraft. All this was in addition to continued participation in other CSDP missions and operations. Altogether in 2014, fifteen partner countries (Australia, Albania, Canada, Chile, FYROM, Georgia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the US) contributed to ten CSDP missions and operations, accounting for approximately 8 % of the total personnel deployed.

In parallel, the EU explores innovative ways of cooperation that do not require a legally binding agreement. For example: support from China in the escort of World Food Programme vessels off the Somali coast, sharing the burden with the EU naval operation Atalanta; financial support from Japan for specific projects in Niger, in line with EUCAP Sahel Niger objectives. It is now regularly possible for new CSDP missions and operations to establish project cells in order to gather parallel support from potential donors among Member States and partner countries, following excellent

experience with Canada's financing of a project run by EUTM Mali. Beyond US participation in CSDP missions in Kosovo and DRC, flexible informal cooperation with the US continues in the Horn of Africa/Somalia, and at the military-to-military level with EUCOM and AFRICOM. Some partners are also joining the Battlegroups (FYROM, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine) and train with the EU (China and Japan held naval exercises with Atalanta).

In 2013-2014, network of CSDP partnerships further expanded to Asia and Latin America with the signature of Framework Agreements on participation in EU-led crisis management operations with Chile and Colombia (the first partners in Latin America) and the Republic of Korea (the first in Asia, and the second in Asia-Pacific after New Zealand). Entry into force of those agreements will open new avenues for dialogue and concrete operational cooperation. The EU's willingness to step up cooperation with its Asian partners also translates into multilateral activities, for example within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): from autumn





Photo: European Union

Turkish Infantry Company takes part in Field Training Exercise of EUFOR Althea

2013 until spring 2014 the EU co-chaired with Myanmar the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy and the related Defence Officials Dialogue. The EU also regularly participates in ARF-driven exercises in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief and workshops on issues such as Maritime Security and Mediation.

In the East, the CSDP Partnership with Eastern Partners dates back several years – to 2004 with Ukraine and to 2012–2013 with, increasingly, Georgia, Moldova and other Eastern Partners. Georgia and Ukraine are both contributors to CSDP operational activities, while at the same time hosting EU missions (EUMM Georgia and EUAM Ukraine respectively). The multilateral cooperation under the Eastern Partnership CSDP Panel, launched in 2013, complements bilateral relations and allows the involvement of all six Eastern Partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) in numerous workshops, seminars, field visits and training activities through this multilateral platform.

In the South the EU remains forthcoming, inter alia in CSDP contacts with Morocco, Jordan and the League of Arab States.

The EU has developed regular dialogues in the field of CSDP with several countries and organisations. As “one size does not fit all”, their level, frequency, topics and format are adapted to EU’s and partners’ respective expectations and interests. Beyond dialogue and operational cooperation, it is worth underlining the role of the European Security and Defence College in highly appreciated training provided to and undertaken with partner countries.

Security challenges have to be tackled by those and with those most affected, in a spirit of partnership. The EU is therefore increasingly engaged in building capacities of partner countries and organisations in volatile regions. The long-term objective is to enable them to take responsibility for their own security so that they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves. It is in that context that the flagship initiative of ‘Train and equip’ was initiated.

### 1.3.5. Transition strategies

by Snowy Lintern

Whilst the clear focus at the operational level will be delivery of effect in-theatre, it is important to keep in mind how you will eventually transition away from the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This chapter will cover the concept of how this is done in Headquarters, how the Head of Mission contributes, and the options that can be considered for transition.

The European Union uses the term “transition strategy” rather than “exit strategy” as the end of CSDP action will not be the end of the EU’s involvement in the host country. By using “exit strategies” the EU can inadvertently give the impression to the host country that the Union is ending its support. Clearly that will not be the case; ending CSDP engagement is not the same as ending EU involvement.

Transition strategies are important when considering that CSDP is not designed to be a long-term instrument; it is a crisis management tool that can be fundamental in providing short- to medium-term activity in order to assist in stabilising a situation. Development, particularly in fragile states, is a generational endeavour; this allows time for specialisation and focus, and it allows for longer interventions, with less variance and more adaptation, monitoring and feedback. Development instruments are also funded to allow for long-term interventions. This is clearly demonstrated by the

size of development budgets compared to CSDP: for the time period 2014–2020 the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, including the civilian CSDP budget, is EUR 2 338 million, compared to the International Cooperation and Development DG DEVCO (EuropeAid) budget of EUR 74 217 million<sup>1</sup>.

In particular, when launching CSDP in a crisis management situation, the EU is dealing with complex environments, and fragile states are usually wicked problems<sup>2</sup>. The 28 EU Member States will launch a mission to deal with a problem that may not be well understood, with incomplete information, and with a clear need for multi-dimensional cooperation. Common experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – going far beyond EU action – highlight the challenges of bringing together different actors in the planning process, particularly in situations which are highly political. Synchronisation of CSDP planning with the programming of development and other cooperation instruments is difficult, given that they usually pursue different primary objectives and are subject to different approval mechanisms. This also relates to both EU institutions and EU Member State development processes. Timing and early engagement/agreement of all relevant actors is key for any option to transition from/to CSDP activity.

1 DG DEVCO budget is broken down into: Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) of EUR 19 662 million, European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) of EUR 15 433 million, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) of EUR 7 058 million, European Development Fund (EDF) of EUR 30 506 million, EU Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) of EUR 1 333 million, and the instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSC) of EUR 225 million. Source: <http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/programmes/>

2 Conklin, Jeff; *Wicked Problems & Social Complexity*, Chapter 1 of *Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems*, Wiley, November 2005.





Transition strategies are important when considering that CSDP is not designed to be a long-term instrument (in the picture: Handover ceremony in Tchad from the EU to the UN)

Once launched, the regular review of CSDP missions through the Strategic Review process will allow a reflection on whether we are doing the right things and whether those things are being done well. This not only gives the opportunity to refocus a CSDP mission, but also provides an indication of when transition could be considered likely. The Head of Mission, inputting through the Civilian Operations Commander, has an important role to play. Their assessment of how they are delivering against their mandate, an indication of time likely to be required to complete the mandated tasks, and their opinion as to what the future of the mission is likely to be, are all fundamental to the review process.

While other EU instruments may not need to “take over” the task of a CSDP mission or operation in the classical sense of “transition”, CSDP activity can very well be an enabler for future work under other instruments. Similarly, CSDP tasks can benefit and help reinforce ongoing activities managed under other EU instruments.

A good example of this is Niger, where the Commission-funded national programme of Counter Terrorism-Sahel ceased, and elements of that programme were “taken over” by the CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel. Adaptability must be both ways in order to achieve a “win-win” situation.

Transition from CFSP/CSDP to support from Development or other EU cooperation instruments also requires a fundamental change in mind-set, notably as we will be moving from a primarily foreign and security policy objective (e.g. crisis management) towards a developmental or other EU cooperation objective (e.g. long-term institution building). It must be clear that one EU instrument cannot “replace” another; each instrument has its own clearly-defined purpose, but an instrument could be used to sustain elements of success achieved by another. In particular, the transition from a military CSDP operation to non-military instruments can, however, be especially problematic. It has to be recognised that political control, strategic direction, and the deci-

sion-making process must also transition from CSDP to another internal EU-lead so that there is no ‘impingement’ on CFSP competences, or vice versa, as mandated by Article 40 TEU.

Transition strategies have to consider, in addition:

- the full, inclusive and transparent participation of all actors (EU institutions and Member States) on the ground and in Brussels, with particular emphasis on the need for a strong role for the EU Delegation;
- the existence of coordination mechanisms aligned with the strategic vision and objectives;
- the ownership of the partner country, underpinned by the political and policy dialogue;
- output, performance and impact indicators and the necessary processes to measure the progress on mandate delivery, in order to better guide the transition.

Last but not least, transition must be understood as a two sided process, and not a “translation” or linear succession of CSDP to other instrument. The process of the Strategic Review is a key step when adjustments may need to be made to allow better synergies and coordination with other instruments.

### OPTIONS FOR TRANSITION FROM CSDP

- a. No transition is required or possible. There are circumstances, especially related to confidence building, where there is no requirement or possibility to transition to other means. Examples could include EUMM Georgia and EUBAM Rafah. For EUMM Georgia, the monitoring of a ceasefire agreement is specifically a CSDP task (Art. 43(1)). For EUBAM Rafah, if the mission is unable to monitor the border crossing point at Rafah (as agreed in the Agreement on Movement and Access of 2005) due to broader political constraints, then it will be likely that no other instrument would be able to do that. However, this may not mean a sudden drawdown or closure; adaption of the mission in its final stages could be considered.
- b. Transition to host country. The ideal, and desired, transition where possible. This is currently (early 2015) being considered for EUTM Mali, where the host country is foreseen as being able to conduct the majority of tasks that are being undertaken by the mission. This is also partly anticipated in the cases of EUSEC and EUPOL RDC. As there may be concerns that the host country is not ready to sustain the progress made by the CSDP mission, impact assessments and evaluations should support this option. DG DEVCO’s experience with aid effectiveness principles (including the New Deal for working in fragile and conflict-affected states) and how national capacity can be supported and built in order to support such a transition can be very useful with this option.
- c. Transition to a third party (the United Nations, African Union, etc.). This is where CSDP activity is designed as a “bridging” capability and partners are prepared or preparing to sustain the CSDP role. Two examples are EUFOR Tchad/RCA and, more recently, the Central African Republic, where it is envisaged that the operation will transition to the UN. Transition to the UN (UNIOGBIS) was also explored for the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau mission.
- d. Transition to Member States’ bilateral activity or to another EU instrument. Transition to Member States’ bilateral activity was an avenue explored for the transition of EUAVSEC South Sudan and EUPOL and EUSEC RDC. It remains a critical area for development, including with third parties. Transition to another EU instrument has historically been the most common transition strategy, and examples include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and DRC. A range of options is available, principally development programmes, but this could also include other forms of CFSP support, possibly used under Article 28 (including through Member States funding), dedicated teams within the EU Special Representative (EUSR)





Photo: EEAS

HRVP Federica Mogherini with Prime Ministers Aleksandar Vučić and Isa Mustafa on 10 February 2015 in Brussels, finalising the agreement on justice. Facilitated by the EU since October 2012, this high-level dialogue aims at normalising relations and promoting cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina

office, and/or strengthening either the local Delegation or EUSR with relevant expertise. Agreement has to be reached with the other EU instrument that they will take on the transition activity, and a clear coherent strategy from the outset can be instrumental in this. Understanding, and agreement, as regards likely CFSP timelines and objectives must be provided, noting that this may impinge on Member States' desire to have very broad objectives and short, politically driven, timelines. The failure of transition in EUAVSEC South Sudan has provided a clear lesson in this regard.

In practice, there are a number ways to facilitate transition, and in reality CSDP transition strategies will often include elements of more than one of these options.

a. A mix of short-term extension and progressive reduction of CSDP activity. If the CSDP mission is close to transition but there remains a concern about closing the mission fully, there

is an option to significantly draw down the mission in the country and retain a small cell to assess/monitor the situation and surge capacity into the country if required. The funding for this would come from the CSDP budget as the mission would either not close or it would be reconstituted as a small CSDP monitoring mission.

b. Short-term bridging capability. If, as happened with DRC, the planning assumption for transition changes due to events on the ground, then Article 28 could be considered so as to guarantee sustainment whilst development programmes are finalised and put into place. The practical difficulty of ensuring that the transition starts while development activity may not be fully planned is recognised, and using Article 28 (in this case as both short-term and clearly focussed) could prove useful if the political decision to close the mission has been taken.

## HOW WE PLAN FOR TRANSITION

Steps have been taken to improve our collective planning methodology, and these should have ensured that the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) – the bedrock of further planning – has transition strategies articulated very early in the planning process:

- A coherent strategy, such as using a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), agreed through a consultative process between the Commission, the External Action Service, and Member States, enhances understanding and collaboration between different EU actors. Overarching EU strategy documents, such as Joint Framework Documents or regional strategies, can greatly assist in providing a common vision for EU action. Shared conflict analysis helps enhance such understanding and collaboration;
- Collaborative planning before CSDP mission launch between EEAS and relevant Commission services is instrumental as it may provide better understanding of the (collective) tasks to be achieved. To make this fully effective, an agreement on the EU's objectives and instruments should be in place in the PFCA, so that CSDP planners and development programmers already have senior-level agreement on likely tasking and could start parallel planning. In concrete terms this results in the following:
  1. for CSDP: a planning process that attempts to link the CSDP effort to what is already planned and/or ongoing by EU or other partners. This should also allow “tighter” and clearly focussed objectives for CSDP;
  2. for EU actors managing other instruments: to agree as part of the CSDP planning process how they may adjust implementation of ongoing work in view of the CSDP action and what the timelines are for possible adjustment of their future planning to the new situation created by the CSDP effort. This could relate to new activities in parallel to the CSDP action still ongoing (to support or complement or take advantage of it) and activities foreseen after closure of the mission/operation. Such timelines can then be incorporated in CSDP planning and review processes.
- Collaborative planning should have continued at the CMC stage, in particular between the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the EEAS geographical desks, and relevant actors in the European Commission as it may provide a better understanding of what, how and when CSDP will deliver, and more realistic mandate durations required for CSDP activity, if we seek to transition to development means. Planners/programmers will also require an understanding of Member States' bilateral activity (active and planned) to make this coherent. This will also be key during operational planning by the Civil or Military Operation Commanders;
- At the Strategic Review stage, and as we get closer to understanding when CSDP objectives are likely to be achieved, then a Transition Road Map prepared in coordination with all relevant actors can be a useful tool for joint planning and programming. A dedicated Task Force might usefully be established for that purpose. This was utilised for DRC and EULEX Kosovo and proved to be of great value.

Thus, we have in place the conceptual and planning methodology to allow early and broad discussion on transition. This will remain a live topic throughout the life cycle of a mission; and the operational level has both the ability and the mechanisms to input.

## 1.4. EU CRISIS PREVENTION/ MANAGEMENT TOOLS

### 1.4.1. The EU's diplomatic engagement

by Simon Duke

First of all, the fundamental distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy is worth noting. Foreign policy is the political process of deciding upon priorities and interests and, as such, is distinct from diplomacy, which concerns itself with implementing foreign and security policy. The two are obviously related in the sense that foreign policy decisions will lay out the parameters and mandates for any diplomatic engagement. Beyond this, the actors involved in the making of foreign policy and its implementation are often different. The former aspects are addressed elsewhere in this volume, while the latter are of primary concern here.


The EU's diplomatic engagement is not prescriptive. The actual tools employed depend very much upon the specifics of any given crisis scenario. The range of diplomatic tools that can be employed is extensive. On the crisis prevention side (which has been a 'fixed priority' for the EU since 2001) this might involve exchanges with the pertinent interlocutors, either for fact-finding or aimed at mediation and/or crisis resolution. Various incentives can also be brought to bear in support of such diplomatic efforts, more often than not in the form of economic 'carrots' that may be tied to development aid and assistance or trade preferences, or even both. Persuasion can also take the form of 'sticks', including the application of economic sanctions.

The same broad observation applies to any diplomatic engagement in crisis management situations, with a similar mix of people and instruments being employed. In this context the timeframe is likely to be appreciably shorter but, like crisis prevention, diplomatic engagement is

likely to be part of a wider tapestry of crisis management tools (civilian and military).

Diplomatic engagement is therefore an integral part of any crisis prevention/management process where the primary objective is to bring a peaceful end to a dispute with the aim of contributing to longer-term stabilisation. Different forms of diplomatic engagement are likely to be present throughout the crisis cycle, with some stages (mediation or the negotiation of agreements) being more intensive than others. In addition to these more obvious aspects, diplomatic engagement will also involve extensive coordination efforts with the local actors (including EU members), regional actors (like the AU or OSCE) and often international organisations such as the UN.

Given the scenario-dependent nature of the EU's diplomatic engagement, the sections that follow aim to give a broad overview of the mix of actors and the types of activity that could be involved in support of the Union's foreign and security policy goals, which provide the parameters for any diplomatic engagement.



The EU's 140 Delegations are at the forefront of the EU's diplomatic engagement



## ANALYSIS AND TASK FORCES

Any diplomatic overtures will initially be based on the available analysis of information derived from multiple sources, such as the analysis of intelligence derived from civilian and military sources. As a supplement to the available analysis the EU may also dispatch a task force in order to provide on-the-ground reporting. This stage therefore belongs more in the realm of foreign policy, although it may involve key diplomatic actors, such as personnel from the proximate EU Delegation, the Special Representative, the local diplomatic representation of EU Member States, experts from the relevant parts of the EU headquarters and other EU institutions, in particular the European Commission, where many of the relevant funding instruments are to be found. This stage will also give those involved in any foreseeable diplomatic engagement the chance to study their potential interlocutors.

## THE HR/VP

The HR/VP is at the pyramid of any diplomatic response. She will be thoroughly briefed on developments and, in turn, will ensure that the national foreign ministers are also briefed via the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The HR/VP will also chair the Crisis Platform, an ad hoc body created specifically in response to an external crisis. The Crisis Platform draws together all those involved in the crisis response cycle, including non-EU countries where relevant. Although relatively new, the Platform has an important role bearing in mind the HR/VP's obligation to ensure 'the consistency of the Union's external action'. Under the Juncker Commission, the HR/VP (in her latter capacity) is also responsible for coordinating and steering the project team 'Europe in the World' (including, but not limited to, the Commissioners for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Trade, International Cooperation and Develop-

ment, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management).

The principal role of the HR/VP is therefore that of coordination and ensuring the consistency of the EU's external policies. She may, however, choose to involve herself directly in the negotiations (as in the case of Kosovo, Serbia and Iran) as the key EU diplomatic actor. If the HR/VP is not involved directly, she will certainly remain abreast of all developments and will steer accordingly.

## SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

The EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) support the work of the HR/VP. They are appointed with a specific mandate relating to a crisis-prone or post-crisis country or region (in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean). There are ten at the time of writing. Their individual mandates will differ according to the specific country or regional dynamics, but they share the common tasks of being a key coordination point for the EU representatives on the ground, as well as other international partners. Many former SRs were senior national diplomats, while the tendency more recently has been to appoint senior EEAS staff. The role of the EUSRs as the 'face and voice' of the EU obviously has to be exercised sensitively, especially with regard to the EU's Delegations and other EU staff present on the ground.

The SRs may also play an important role in mediation and negotiation, supported by the applicable EU Delegation and with a detailed mandate provided via the headquarters. This often demands considerable diplomatic tact and discretion from the SR, as well as support from the applicable Delegation, the headquarters and other interested third parties. The question of the longer-term utility of the SRs remains open, especially since Heads of Delegation and Delegation staff could potentially assume many of the tasks currently performed by SRs.

## THE EEAS AND THE DELEGATIONS

The headquarters plays a significant role in assisting the HR/VP as well as the other principal EU actors. The Service also includes many of the relevant crisis management response bodies (civilian and military) as well as the Crisis Platform (see above). The EU's 140 Delegations, which are part of the EEAS, are at the forefront of the EU's diplomatic engagement. They are often best placed to assess the local conditions and they also share information with the diplomatic representations of the EU Member States. The number of Delegation staff varies considerably from country to country but may swell considerably in crisis-torn countries, especially those hosting crisis management missions (for example the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Tanzania).

The transition from Commission Delegations (pre-Lisbon) to EU Delegations (post-Lisbon) has put far more emphasis on diplomatic engagement for a wide variety of foreign and security issues. One of the early challenges for the new-style Delegations involved the general quality of the political reporting to support the early warning role, although national diplomats temporarily assigned to the Delegations have greatly boosted the quality, as have the growing confidence and experience of the Delegation staff in foreign and security policy matters. A further challenge was the frequent absence of specialist security knowledge in Delegations to bolster diplomatic efforts on the ground. In many cases this has been resolved by the temporary placement of EU Military Staff personnel in Delegations where there is a demand for specific skills and advice (often those in the early stages of a CSDP mission or those with one underway) or regional security advisers. The need for security specialists in Delegations is now widely recognised, but has to be balanced against practical considerations, such as the available budget and human resources.

The Delegations are at the forefront of dialogue with the host government (there are often mul-

multiple dialogues spread across all policy sectors) as well as other important local actors (such as civil society organisations). The Delegations are also the source of information about the EU's positions for the host country or region – this information is provided in regular 'lines-to-take' briefings sent from Brussels on a daily basis. The overall emphasis is on offering a coordinated and 'comprehensive' approach to any given crisis.

## THE MEMBER STATES

The Member States have already been mentioned on a number of occasions, thus already indicating their important role. Much of their diplomatic engagement occurs at the initial stages of the crisis response cycle, with intensive engagement within and between the national capitals in order to ensure the necessary consensus on a course of action at EU level.

Most effective crisis responses, especially in a crisis management context, rely on Member State support (in order to secure the necessary agreement to legitimise crisis intervention) and, more often than not, the necessary resources and manpower. Hence, it is vital that Member State 'buy in' is present from the very earliest stages. Under the treaties, the Union and the Member States must observe the 'principle of sincere cooperation' – this includes refraining from any action which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.

The Member States are involved at multiple levels. The analytical and fact-finding stages have already been mentioned. The relevant working groups in Brussels will also be actively involved and much of the drafting for any crisis management mission will be done in this context. There will be strong coordination with the national capitals via the European Correspondents, who will also liaise with the PSC, the working groups and other EU institutions such as the Commission. A dedicated group of External Relations (RELEX) advisers will prepare the legal, institutional and

financial aspects of decisions to be made in the CFSP/CSDP area. At the ambassadorial level, both the PSC and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, based in the various permanent representations in Brussels, will also be involved. Formal decisions on any CSDP mission are made at the level of foreign ministers.

It is also worth noting that the Member States are heavily involved in the work of the EU's Delegations, with around 45 % of the administrative-level officials comprising national diplomats on temporary assignment. Their diplomatic experience (many of the political advisers are national diplomats) is of particular relevance for crisis response.

## THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission is an essential actor when it comes to wider conflict prevention or post-conflict stabilisation. Very few crises are unidimensional and many will require the use of multiple tools and instruments over a period of time to address the crisis. This often involves thinking through the links between the crisis management aspects and the development-oriented ones (although progress has been made, the security-development nexus remains one of the most challenging in terms of linking together the different aspects, ensuring there are smooth hand-over mechanisms and the fundamental goals are understood and observed consistently). The Horn of Africa and the Sahel are often quoted as examples of early application of the comprehensive approach.

Generally speaking, CFSP/CSDP measures are often aimed at shorter-term crisis avoidance or stabilisation, while the Commission's expertise and instruments are employed for longer-term stability. This may involve measures such as Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

What does this mean in diplomatic terms? The implications are twofold. First, any diplomatic engagement should consider the full spectrum of tools and resources available for the crisis response cycle, with the objective of addressing the root causes of conflict. Second, successful coordination and streamlining at all stages of the crisis response cycle must underpin any diplomatic engagement. If resources or expertise are not available when required, the legitimacy of any diplomatic engagement may be undermined.

## STOCKTAKING AND PROSPECTS

The EU has acquired considerable experience in various facets of crisis prevention and management over the last few decades. As we look to the future and to ways of enhancing the Union's diplomatic engagement, it is evident that clearer strategic guidance is needed in order to ascertain more clearly when and whether to intervene and how any intervention would serve the EU's broader values and interests, especially with finite resources. The EU is often criticised, with some justification, for being cacophonous and slow. Diplomatic efforts may be complicated by the inability to bring some financial instruments to bear in a timely manner, and by internal coordination issues within and between the EU's institutions. The recent emphasis on the 'comprehensive approach' has the benefit of focusing attention on how to join up the three Ds (diplomacy, development and defence) more effectively. Finally, introspection can also be helpful for diplomats and others alike. In this regard there is a need to ensure that the 'lessons learned' at the end of any EU crisis involvement are properly extracted and assimilated into a modified or refined crisis response cycle. Although these suggestions would benefit the EU's crisis response capacities more effectively in general, they would also strengthen its diplomatic engagement.

## 1.4.2. Conflict prevention

by Andrew Byrne and Joëlle Jenny

Conflict prevention – by facilitating the resolution of underlying tensions and disputes – can save lives, reduce suffering, and avoid the destruction of infrastructure and the economy. Peace-building – itself a core tenet of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions – provides an important foundation to enable fragile and conflict-affected countries to progress towards wider development goals. Mediation and dialogue facilitation can be an effective and cost-efficient means of preventing, transforming or resolving violent conflict.

The importance of these aspects, therefore, is enshrined in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty which – for the first time at Treaty level – includes the goal *‘to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’* among the objectives of the EU’s external action. The general references in Article 21 were further developed in the 2011 Council conclusions on conflict prevention. In addition, the 2009 EU Concept on Mediation and Dialogue Capacities advocates the use of mediation as a tool of first response to emerging or on-going crisis.

More generally, further strengthening of the EU’s comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises in third countries is increasingly high on the political agenda. Conflict prevention and mitigation efforts (notably, robust and perceptive early warning systems; sound and systematic conflict analysis; flexible mediation support capacities; and identifying EU early responses) constitute the bed-rock of such a broad approach – which in fact comprises a wide range of mechanisms and tools (including CSDP missions, as one among other diplomatic, political dialogue, trade, and external assistance measures).

Within the EEAS, the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments (within the Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention) supports the geographical services and Delegations, crisis response/management services, as well as EEAS senior management, in taking real-time decisions in the pursuit of peace and in anticipation of crises and prevention of conflict. The division increasingly supports CSDP missions and operations, for example through conflict analysis, as a basis for the development of a Political Framework for Crisis Approach. Close cooperation with the European Commission on these issues is also ensured (notably, with the DEVCO Unit on Fragility and Crisis Management and the Stability Instrument Operations Unit in the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments).

Specific tools of relevance for CSDP missions and operations are introduced below:

- Early Warning System,
- Conflict Analysis and
- Justice and Security Sector Reform Support.

### THE EU CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

The EU’s Conflict Early Warning System is part of a shift in emphasis away from reacting to crises towards conflict prevention. The aim is to preserve lives and livelihoods that might otherwise be destroyed when violent conflict erupts. As well as the severe human costs of violent conflict, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report showed that civil wars destroy decades of gross domestic product (GDP) growth on aver-

age and it takes countries years to get back onto a sustainable growth path.

In order to prevent the emergence, re-emergence or escalation of violent conflict, early warning is indispensable. It is about systematically providing the right information to the right people at the right time – connecting the dots across relevant actors in the field and at headquarters. It encompasses the systematic collection and analysis of information from a variety of sources,

1. in order to identify and understand the risks for violent conflict in a country, and
2. in order to develop strategic responses to mitigate those risks.

In the EU's approach to early warning for conflict prevention the goal is not 'prediction'. It will always be difficult to pinpoint the exact trigger for the eruption of violence in the future. What we do know is that there are certain factors and indicators that frequently correlate with the emergence of violent conflict. If we can bring together information and analysis to better identify and assess these structural, underlying risks for violent conflict, we can more easily pursue early preventive actions before situations escalate into crises. This is upstream conflict prevention in essence. Moreover, country risk assessments enable decision-makers to take decisions on prevention (and crisis response) based on evidence and a deeper understanding of the underlying causes and dynamics of violence in countries and regions.

The Early Warning System is a consultative process that in Brussels involves the EEAS, including CSDP actors, relevant services of the Commission and Member States through the Political and Security Committee and geographical working groups. At country level, EU Delegations, CSDP missions and operations, EUSR teams and Member State embassies are involved. The process broadly consists of two parts:

1. the EU 'early warning' = a scan of conflict risk around the world, leading to an EU prioritisation of countries/regions where there is a significant risk of escalation and where the EU has

an interest and ability to take additional action, and

2. the EU early response = the development of concrete early action proposals and subsequent monitoring of the various EU actions taken forward for implementation.


## CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSE OPTIONS

Past evaluations of EU assistance, as well as lessons learnt from CSDP missions, have shown that the EU has been investing heavily in conflict contexts. Yet with insufficient conflict analysis to inform its strategy development and programming, the EU's impact on addressing the causes and consequences of conflict has been limited. Conflicts (and not only violent conflicts) are often complex and multifaceted, involving local populations, warring factions, state armies, rebel movements, and regional and international players. This constantly changing, complex web of causes and actors, their interests, agendas, and actions can make it difficult for decision makers and implementers to understand how, where and when to intervene.

To address this challenge, the EU has developed a systematic approach to conflict analysis. It can be used by decision makers, practitioners and diplomats to make strategic and operational decisions. It is in line with the comprehensive approach, which calls for a 'common methodology to conflict and crisis analysis.'

Conflict analysis is not only a product but also a process. This is important as it needs to be carried out, and shared, by those who need to apply the results in their own work. The EU's comprehensive approach sets this out clearly: *'A shared analysis should set out the EU's understanding about the causes of a potential conflict or crisis, identify the key people and groups involved, review the dynamics of the situation and assess the potential risks of action, or non-action.'*





Elements of EU conflict analysis

Conflict analysis is a structured approach, addressing different elements of a conflict in turn. This is needed to complement the daily monitoring of events and political developments and gain a deeper understanding of underlying issues and dynamics.

The diagram above shows the different elements of conflict analysis. It shows that in the EU approach, analysis goes beyond understanding what is going on and why, also assessing what could happen (scenario building) and what has been and is being done to help prevent or resolve the conflict (responses). On this basis, the analysis process concludes by identifying specific objectives or strategies to address key drivers of conflict and specific options for how the EU could contribute to these objectives.

In concrete terms, conflict analysis can take many forms, ranging from an in-depth field assessment or conflict-sensitive political economy analysis to a two-day workshop that gathers the

right mix of people, combining the necessary knowledge with those that need to 'own' the analysis when they take it forward in their own work. Relevant outside experts may provide external perspectives and help avoid 'group-think'. This latter approach, called 'light touch' conflict analysis has proven to be very useful for responsive and flexible use within the EU (and where necessary followed up by deeper/continued analysis). Such conflict analysis workshops are particularly pertinent in conflict-affected settings characterised by rapidly-moving developments, and they have already been organised in a number of conflict situations (Mali, DRC, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria). They result in short and structured conflict analysis reports which combine analysis with a set of options to address the core conflict issues that were identified. As such, the results can serve as a common point of departure to explore options to use the wide range of EU tools available in an effective



Photo: EUMM Georgia

The Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the Special Representative of the OSCE chairmanship co-facilitate the 52<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in Ergneti, on 27 February 2015

way – thereby ensuring a solid basis for a comprehensive approach. The EEAS Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments Division, often in partnership with DEVCO's Fragility and Crisis Management Unit can help organise and facilitate these events upon request.

### **JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (JSSR)**

The Arab Spring up risings – as well as recent events in a number of African countries – have underlined the continuing challenge faced by many countries regarding the provision of effective, legitimate and accountable justice and security services. The EU has long supported JSSR programmes, through a wide range of diplomatic, crisis response, development and security mechanisms. The EU, over the period 2001-2009, disbursed approximately EUR 1 billion in funds for development cooperation, targeting JSSR in more

than 100 countries. Moreover, CSDP missions are currently supporting justice and security institutions in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, DRC, Mali and Somalia.

An integrated EU approach to programming, designing and implementing JSSR programmes will be crucial to cope with these challenges and the growing need for support. An EU Informal Inter-service Group on Security Sector Reform – managed by the Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments Division, in close association with relevant geographical and crisis management services from the EEAS and the Commission (DG DEVCO) – aims to facilitate such an approach.

This forum primarily aims to exchange information between CSDP missions, crisis response actions and governance/development programmes, on planned JSSR interventions from the early stages onwards. It also promotes joint analysis as a basis for effective response and implementation.

### 1.4.3 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

by Martin Albani

#### THE INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE IN A NUTSHELL

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), with EUR 2.3 billion of funds in the period 2014-2020, is one of the key external assistance instruments that enable the EU to take a lead in helping to prevent and respond to actual or emerging crises around the world. The European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), working in close collaboration with other services of the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), mobilises the IcSP to provide for:

- urgent short-term actions in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis (Article 3, with 70 % of overall IcSP funds dedicated to these actions); and
- longer-term capacity building of organisations engaged in conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness (Article 4, corresponding to 9 % of overall IcSP funding).

In addition, Article 5 of the IcSP, which is managed by DG DEVCO, enables the EU to help build long-term international, regional and national capacity to address global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats.


There are three main characteristics that set the IcSP apart from most of the other external financial instruments the EU has in its toolbox. First of all, the crisis response measures (Art. 3) are not programmed but decided quickly in reaction to developments on the ground, hence enabling

the EU to intervene rapidly before the traditional programmable instruments can be mobilised. Secondly, the IcSP is a global instrument that is not limited to bilateral or regional approaches but can also implement multi-country and trans-regional actions worldwide. Thirdly, the IcSP is not bound by the criteria for Official Development Assistance as laid down by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The only areas of action explicitly excluded under the IcSP are humanitarian aid and actions of a military nature.

The choice of making use of the IcSP is determined by three main criteria: to begin with, it must be politically appropriate and a priority for the EU to intervene in a particular crisis or peace-building context. Secondly, the area of intervention must be eligible within the legal and thematic scope set out in the IcSP Regulation. And finally, deployment of the IcSP must be feasible, which means in particular that suitable implementing bodies must be available, and the required duration of intervention must be within the limits of what is possible under the IcSP. Continuity of the EU engagement through other instruments should also be ensured where appropriate.

As demonstrated in the map below, the IcSP and its predecessor, the IfS (Instrument for Stability), have been used to finance a large number of crisis response and capacity-building projects worldwide. To date, the largest share of funds was directed at projects in Africa and the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> IcSP actions are also often implemented in the same crisis context as CSDP missions and

<sup>1</sup> From 2007 to 2013, the geographic distribution of funds allocated under the IfS Crisis Response envelope (Art. 3) was 34 % to Africa, 34 % to Middle East and North Africa, 17 % to Asia and Pacific, 9 % to Latin America and the Caribbean, 5 % to Central Asia and South Caucasus, and 1 % to Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.



EU Instrument for Stability Measures in 2013 (also indicating locations of EU CSDP operations)

operations. Cooperation between the latter and the IcSP has included hands-on cooperation in the field, such as the IcSP running reconciliation projects between communities in the very sectors of Bangui where the EUFOR mission in CAR was maintaining order. It has also included provision of non-military equipment to beneficiaries of CSDP operations ('train and equip') – but of course not to CSDP operations themselves.

The IcSP was established by Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. It has a budget of EUR 2.3 billion, which amounts to 2.5 % of the EU's entire external action portfolio (Heading IV of the EU budget) for the period 2014-2020. This financial envelope is at the same level as that available for CSDP and marks a considerable increase from the EUR 1.6 billion allocated to its predecessor, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which was in force from 2007 until the end of 2013.

### CRISIS RESPONSE UNDER THE ICSP (ART. 3)

Under Article 3 the IcSP can provide assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts on a wide range of issues such as: support for mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, security sector reform and strengthening the rule of law, measures to combat the illicit use of and access to firearms, small arms and light weapons, demining, reintegration measures for former combatants, threats to public health linked to pandemics, transitional justice or the role of natural resources in conflict.

Even though crisis response measures account for 70 % of all IcSP funding, Article 3 is still a relatively small but rapidly accessible and targeted envelope that is mobilised when other EU instruments cannot be deployed for reasons of timing or the nature of the crisis. Crisis response measures



**CASE STUDY****IcSP Crisis Response Measure  
in support of Police Reform in Myanmar**

This crisis response measure was initiated following a request by the Government of Myanmar and the opposition (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) to the EU and the findings of an inter-service EU fact-finding mission. Its objective is to help prevent and reduce escalation of communal, inter-religious, and political conflict into violence by providing support to the reform of the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) in the priority areas of community policing and crowd management, including capacity building on updating the corresponding legal framework and police vision, doctrine and manuals as well as improving police accountability towards the Parliament, civil society and the media. This project is funded with EUR 9.5 million and is being implemented by a consortium of European agencies from 2013 to 2015. Trainers and experts on the ground include a mix of civilians and serving and retired police officers from several EU Member States.

Implementation of the project has largely been successful so far, with strong buy-in from government authorities, the main opposition party in Parliament and civil society. More than 4 300 police officers have already been trained in best international practice in crowd management and an equal number of personal protective equipment sets have been delivered, which has led to observable partial change in the behaviour of the MPF in public order situations. In parallel more than 750 officers have been trained in community policing with a strong focus on 'train-the-trainers' and, due to its success, an extension of the community policing pilot to three additional areas. Progress on drafting a new police vision and guidance manual has also been made. Despite profound initial reluctance on all sides, the first joint MPF-civil society and MPF-media workshops have been successfully implemented, helping to nurture a fragile trust-building process. In order to ensure the continuity of the EU engagement, a longer-term police reform support project is being developed under the geographic programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument.

usually act as a catalyst to prepare the ground for more sustained, long-term assistance and development programmes of the EU, its Member States or other donors. In the context of the EU's comprehensive approach, the IcSP therefore complements but does not replace humanitarian aid or longer-term instruments.

The key advantage of IcSP crisis response measures is their speed and flexibility. As Article 3 is non-programmable, crisis response measures do not require formal approval via standard EU 'comitology' procedures. Instead they are presented for information to the Political and Security Committee of the Council, principally





Photo: EUPST

The EU's Police Services Training Programme is part of the Peace-building Partnership of the IcSP

to ensure complementarity and consistency with CFSP measures. The European Parliament is also informed. This and other special 'fast-track' decision-making provisions applicable to IcSP crisis response measures enable the Commission to respond to situations of crisis usually within a period of two to three months from the first request to the start of implementation on the ground. In exceptional cases of extreme urgency, this response time may be further shortened.

However this speed comes at a price: crisis response measures are limited to a maximum duration of 18 months and a maximum amount of EUR 20 million. In the event of unforeseen and objective obstacles to implementation, they can be extended by a further six months. In cases of protracted crisis and conflict, a second measure can be put in place, which may extend the maximum duration to 36 months. In situations where further support is needed, a so-called Interim Response Programme (IRP) can be financed under Article 3. However, IRPs do not benefit from any special fast-track provisions and must be subject to standard 'comitology' decision-making procedures.

Once IcSP crisis response actions have been planned, designed and politically agreed at head-

quarters level, project management is typically devolved to EU Delegations located in the third countries concerned. FPI therefore has, in addition to its headquarters-based team of Crisis Response Planners and Programme Managers, dedicated IcSP personnel posted to EU Delegations worldwide to provide key support during real-time crises and to oversee and monitor implementation of crisis response measures. They work closely together with IcSP implementing partners on the ground, which include NGOs, the UN and other international organisations, EU Member State agencies and regional and sub-regional organisations.

## THE PEACE-BUILDING PARTNERSHIP OF THE ICSP (ART. 4)

The 'Peace-building Partnership' of the IcSP (PbP, Article 4) was established to build and strengthen the civilian expertise of the EU and its partners in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness. The PbP addresses, in particular, civil society organisations and think-tanks as well as international, regional and sub-regional organisations alongside agencies in EU Member States. It also serves to deepen the dialogue between civil society and EU institutions.

As PbP measures are meant to provide more long-term capacity building, they do not benefit from the special "fast-track" procedures of IcSP crisis response measures under Article 3 (see above).

They are subject to the standard programming cycle of EU external financial instruments and, as such, are not bound by specific time or funding limitations.

Two areas of particular interest in the CSDP context are the PbP programmes to build the capacity of civilians and police to take part in international crisis management missions, including CSDP missions and operations: ENTRi and EUPST.

## CASE STUDY

### The IcSP's Peace-building Partnership in support of International Crisis Management Missions – ENTRi and EUPST

**Europe's New Training Initiative (ENTRi)** is an innovative programme to build the capacities of civilian experts to participate in civilian stabilisation missions of the EU, the UN and other international organisations.



With a budget of EUR 3.3 million its current cycle runs from 2013 to 2016 and it is implemented by a consortium of 15 European Training Providers. ENTRi offers pre-deployment courses for specific country contexts, in-country training for local staff of international missions as well as specialised courses on a wide area of subjects such as human rights, gender, rule of law or mission administration. In addition, ENTRi certifies EU civilian crisis management courses, has produced a handbook for civilian experts working in missions, and is currently developing e-learning possibilities.

The **European Union's Police Services Training Programme (EUPST)** is currently entering its third phase, which will run from 2015 to 2018 with an overall budget of EUR 6.25 million. It is again planned to be implemented by the EUPST consortium, which is made up of police and gendarmerie services of several EU Member States. Like its predecessors, EUPST aims to build up the capacity of police officers from the EU, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions, as well as African Union countries taking part in international crisis management missions and projects with a police component. In line with the evolving mission reality on the ground, EUPST will aim to include more strengthening elements in both training and practical exercises.

EUPST added value is threefold:

- i) an international learning context and the possibility to integrate operational and command-post elements into operational training and comprehensive live exercises, closely shadowing mission and project reality;
- ii) a focus on inter-operability, best practices and harmonisation of training approaches and the formulation of the resulting lessons learned, in close cooperation with the European Police College; and
- iii) stimulation of international linkages and exchange of best practices in international policing with partners outside the EU.

## 1.4.4. Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

by Florika Fink-Hooijer

### INTRODUCTION

EU humanitarian aid and civil protection are not crisis management or crisis prevention tools as such, but very *visible expressions of EU's solidarity* (and sometimes even soft power) within the field of its external action. In 2014 the world faced four crises of very wide scope and extreme severity in Syria, CAR, South Sudan and Iraq, alongside the various challenges posed by Ebola in West Africa. In 2015, 78 million people in 22 countries require urgent humanitarian assistance. Headquartered in Brussels with a global network of field offices, the European Commission's department for humanitarian aid and civil protection (better known as ECHO) ensures rapid and effective delivery of EU relief assistance. Since bringing its *two main instruments, humanitarian aid and civil protection*, under one roof in 2010, the Commission has built up a robust and effective European mechanism for crisis response both inside and outside the EU.

The core mandate of ECHO is to *save and preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering* and safeguard the integrity and dignity of populations affected by natural disasters and man-made crises. ECHO acts for the EU as one of the biggest global humanitarian donors. Via policy development and quality standard-setting ECHO also makes the EU a reference donor. In civil protection and disaster risk management ECHO acts as a coordinator of Member States' response action in situations where a natural or man-made disaster overwhelms the national capacity or where it offers important cost or network advantages, including in the fields of prevention and prepar-

edness. While the main thrust of civil protection is within the European Union, for the purposes of this handbook – which focusses on external action – this chapter will only discuss civil protection operations outside of the EU. In that context, the two instruments follow the same principles and integrate into a wider, UN-coordinated international system.

### CIVIL PROTECTION

Civil protection assistance is deployed at the acute emergency phase of a crisis and tends to be of short duration, typically not lasting more than a few weeks. It is delivered by government in the immediate aftermath of a disaster or, increasingly, as support for disaster risk reduction and preparedness. It may take the form of in-kind assistance, deployment of specially equipped teams, or assessment and coordination by experts sent to the field.

The European Union plays a supporting and coordinating role in civil protection via the *Union Civil Protection Mechanism* which was created in 2001 and substantially reinforced in 2014 with the aim to foster cooperation among national civil protection authorities across Europe. Participating States<sup>1</sup>, much like in CSDP, remain in command and control of the assets deployed. All assets and in-kind assistance are owned and offered by the participating states on a voluntary basis.

A well-coordinated response at European level avoids duplication of relief efforts and ensures that assistance meets the real needs of the affected region. The European added value of civil pro-

1 EU Member States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Norway.



Photo: EU/ECHO Hua Hin, Thailand

Thailand: ECHO's Vera Mazza watches an Asian Civil Protection exercise involving the use of helicopters to evacuate victims of a natural disaster

tection assistance deployed outside of the EU therefore lies in coordination, co-financing, needs assessment and greater interoperability of the assistance provided by participating states. The Mechanism covers prevention (e.g. early warning tools such as the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System – GDACS<sup>2</sup>), preparation (through extensive exercises and training programmes) and response. Its core element is the *European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)*, which monitors and coordinates emergencies on a 24/7 basis. The Mechanism has established a voluntary pool of wide-range response capacities and experts, available for immediate deployment as part of a European operation. In addition to the coordination role and in-kind assistance to the participating states, a limited budget is also available, which can be used, inter alia, to co-finance (up to 85 %) the transporting of assistance.

## HUMANITARIAN AID

In 2013, the EU alone provided relief assistance to more than 124 million people in 90 countries outside the EU with a combined value of EUR 1.35 billion. EU humanitarian aid is a “shared parallel competence”: this means that the Union conducts an autonomous policy, which neither prevents the Member States from exercising their competences nor makes the Union’s policy merely “complementary” to those of the Member States. EU humanitarian aid is mandated<sup>3</sup> to provide assistance mostly at the peak of a crisis, but it can also provide aid before and after the immediate crisis through preparedness and short-term rehabilitation. This is carried out with an annual budget of around EUR 1 billion, amounting to less than 1 % of the EU budget.

2 <http://www.gdacs.org>

3 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31996R1257>





Photo: EU/ECHO Jean-Pierre Mustin

The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) has organised much needed life-saving humanitarian cargo from Europe to Bangui, the capital of Central African Republic

The Commission does not implement the EU's humanitarian aid itself but through pre-selected *implementing partners*: around 200 organisations, ranging from humanitarian NGOs to the Red Cross/Red Crescent and the UN system, along with a number of Member States' specialised agencies, such as the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). However, ECHO is also directly engaged in the field, thanks to its global network of technical field experts. This field network provides ECHO with real time situational awareness and humanitarian needs assessments and it also monitors closely the implementation of ECHO-funded projects. In addition, ECHO has developed sound humanitarian *sector policies* (e.g. food security, nutrition, water and sanitation, gender) that allow it to influence and often lead the international humanitarian system.

According to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, to which all Member States and EU institutions have subscribed, EU assistance is given on the basis of needs, in line with the humanitarian principles of *humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence*. It is therefore *not a crisis management tool*. Needs are assessed through an evidence-based, rigorous methodology, which also enables ECHO to compare needs with funding from other sources and establish a list of "forgotten

crises" – situations where the affected populations are not receiving international attention and assistance. Besides its own engagement in such cases, ECHO also uses its leverage in international fora to raise the profiles of these crises and trigger more funding from other donors.

## RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL ACTION OF THE EU – THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The statements that EU humanitarian aid is independent of political, military or economic objectives of the Union and that it is not a crisis management tool often cause consternation among other EU actors that engage in external action. Is it not naïve in a 21<sup>st</sup> century world with complex international relations to make such claims? Is it not hypocritical? What does it mean for EU foreign policy?

The *principled approach* is derived from the Geneva conventions and is enshrined in the EU Treaty as well as in the above-mentioned European Consensus. It is also grounded in operational necessity and logic, particularly in *complex emergencies*. *In such situations, especially in conflicts, access to the most vulnerable people depends on there not being an association of EU humanitarian aid with military or political interests on the ground*, not taking sides in a conflict and helping all those in need, irrespective of their political views, religious beliefs or other persuasion. This independence and neutrality are also crucial for the *safety and security of ECHO's own staff and implementing partners*. In other words, humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by a party to the conflict would not be possible if the EU logo coming with it were associated with another party in the conflict, or even merely with vested interests.


In 2013, 454 humanitarian relief workers were assaulted in a *record number of attacks* (see graphic) and more than a third (155) were killed. For these reasons the humanitarian community has to take care to avoid misperceptions and strengthen its independent, neutral and impartial

role. The humanitarian community thus invests in *being accepted*, which requires presence, time, and sustained engagement with all relevant parties, including non-state actors as well as influential political, military, or religious leaders on all sides of a conflict. This is why ECHO as a donor has an important role in maintaining dialogue and the perception that its actions are principled.

In short, the principled approach encompassed in humanitarian aid makes possible an EU presence in cases where other relations are impossible. Yet ECHO does not operate in a vacuum, but is part of a broader EU structure. ECHO therefore works closely with other Commission services (e.g. with DG DEVCO on resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation and development and solutions to protracted displacement) as well as the EEAS and other CFSP actors.

As to *information sharing*, ECHO does provide selected information to help shape other policies, but in such a way as to ensure it does not compromise operational security and access of ECHO staff and partners. For instance, regular situation updates in the Council working groups bring Member States up to speed on assessments from the field. An ECHO presence at the Crisis Platform ensures that EU deliberations on EU foreign policy are given a humanitarian reality check. Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) and CSDP planning documents also benefit from relevant ECHO input. Conversely, ECHO also informs CFSP colleagues of situations that require stronger political or military attention – such as compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and protection of civilians – and may also plead for action as need be.

For similar reasons, in the vast majority of cases, civil protection as a form of governmental assistance is provided in non-conflict environments. The rules for the deployment of civil protection are laid down



In 2013, 454 humanitarian relief workers were assaulted in a record number of 247 attacks and more than a third (155) were killed

in internationally accepted guidelines<sup>4</sup> and Host Nation Support agreements. Specific internal EU documents approved by the PSC<sup>5</sup> and further elaborated between the EU Military Staff and ECHO apply when ECHO draws on military support in civil protection operations, which remain civilian in nature irrespective of the means deployed.

In short, ECHO is “*in but out*” of the EU comprehensive approach. It is *in* to assess situations and ring alarm bells; to help formulate key messages on issues like IHL; to help mobilise political, development or military action when needed. There is also cooperation between civil protection and military assets when needed. But it is also *out*, as humanitarian aid cannot be put under any political, military or economic objective or command. It needs to retain neutrality, impartiality and independence to be able to operate in conflict situations. The careful judgement call as to how best to apply the “*in-but-out*” approach in each crisis is the role of civil-military relations within ECHO. ECHO therefore maintains close links with the crisis management structures within the EEAS to allow ECHO to be “*in*” as much as possible without compromising its independence.

4 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” - Rev. 1.1 (November 2007).

5 General Framework for the use of Member States’ military or military chartered Transportation Assets and ESDP Coordination tools in Support of EU Disaster Response; Military support to EU disaster response: Identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities.

## Central African Republic

### In

**CSDP planning:** ECHO contribution on exactions, vulnerable population, criminality; biweekly calls with OHQ (Larissa).

**CSDP mandate:** Providing safe and secure environment, protecting Civilians, external security to IDP camps, training on IHL and protection of civilians.

**Input:** Advising on communication to ensure acceptance.



### But Out

Careful contacts in Bangui, mindful of perceptions (CMCoord).

**CSDP mandate:** No direct assistance to humanitarian aid (except as last resort), not protecting humanitarians (but civilians), no internal role in IDP camps, even

at M'Poko airport, no "quick impact projects".

Exit criteria not on humanitarian grounds (e.g. number of IDPs returning).

No communication about humanitarian effects of operation.

## THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN PRACTICE

Taking into account the prevailing parameters in a given emergency or crisis situation and through an appropriate coordination mechanism and smart, context-dependent actions, the EU's humanitarian and civil protection actions make an important contribution to the EU's successful comprehensive external action.

In the field, this translates into *context-dependent relations* between EU humanitarian aid and EU CSDP operations and missions, if present. With the help of UN OCHA, the humanitarian community carefully assesses the potential influence that closer relations with armed actors would have on its perceived independence. Frequently, country-specific

guidelines are drawn up which describe the relationship between armed counterparts, including EU CSDP operations, and humanitarians: does the security situation warrant the use of armed escorts from UN or EU military forces? If so, how does that affect humanitarian access in areas controlled by the other forces? What is the division of labour in protecting the population (humanitarian protection/protection of civilians)? Can military forces attend humanitarian protection cluster meetings? There is no general yes-or-no answer to these questions, as the situation will be different in each crisis, and humanitarians have to take into consideration longer-term implications for how they are perceived and accepted. The extent of "in" and "out" will therefore vary with each CSDP mission and operation.

### 1.4.5. Election Observation

by Emanuele Giaufret and Radek Khol



The EU Election Observation Mission in Senegal on 26 February 2012

Election Observation Missions (EOM) are a key tool at the service of a fundamental objective of the EU's external action: the promotion of democratisation processes and respect for human rights across the world. The immediate goal is to strengthen transparency, and hence confidence in the elections, deter fraud, and provide an informed and factual assessment of the election process that can also contribute to shaping the EU political reaction to the process. The long-term objective, however, is to improve the overall election framework via the recommendations issued by the EOMs which must be followed up by both EU and domestic actors, hence promoting their ownership of the process.

The EU deploys every year on average ten EOMs across the world, with the exception of the OSCE region where the OSCE/ODIHR remains responsible for deploying EOMs. The EU has become one of the main players in election observation and enjoys high credibility.

EU EOMs can, under certain circumstances, also assist partner countries in overcoming crisis situations and facilitate democratic and/or post-conflict transitions. A genuine and democratic election process can contribute to ensur-

ing sustainable peace and stability. Elections provide groups of citizens with an opportunity to express their political voice in competition with their opponents without resorting to violence, and thus enable the peaceful transfer of political power. In this regard, election observation activities conducted by the EU can complement and enhance other EU crisis management and peace-building initiatives in partner countries. EU election observation activities can thus contribute towards conflict prevention or resolution.

In some cases EU election observation activities will be taking place in the partner country where CSDP Missions or Operations are also deployed at the same time, as was most recently the case in Mali, Kosovo and Afghanistan (see box). While each EU instrument has its own distinct objective, they are all deployed in the spirit of the EU's comprehensive approach, allowing for synergies of effort as they often impact the wider good governance and rule of law areas.

EOMs are not CSDP actions but rather a joint endeavour of EU institutions and Member States, acting under the High Representative's (HR) political guidance and in line with the political



## Afghanistan 2014

The EU decided in 2014 to deploy EU Election Assessment Team (EAT) to Afghanistan to assess the Presidential election which was seen as a crucial step in historic, first-ever peaceful transition of power.

In this context, preparations of EU EAT resulted in an increase in contacts with EUPOL Afghanistan, including its logistical support for Exploratory Mission deployed outside Kabul, to Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

The second round of 14 June was contested and eventually both Presidential candidates, Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Dr Ashraf Ghani, agreed on 12 July to a comprehensive audit of the results in order to determine the will of the voters.

The unprecedented full-scale audit of more than 22 000 ballot boxes presented unique challenges to all actors involved, including international observers and thus also the EU.

In response to the urgent need to mobilise EU staff already in theatre the PSC agreed on 16 July that EUPOL Afghanistan mission members can participate on a voluntary basis in the observation of the audit, under the auspices of the EU EAT.

Forty-three EUPOL mission members (both civilian and police) who volunteered were subsequently trained by the EU EAT, accredited by the Independent Election Commission and acted as Locally Recruited Short Term Observers (LSTOs), bound by the Code of Conduct in accordance with the UN 'Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation'.

EUPOL mission staff filled in an important gap prior to the mobilisation and deployment of 100 EU Long Term Observers arriving from Europe. They were deployed together with their vehicles and Close Protection Officers (CPO), retaining their chain of command.

EUPOL was able to sustain its contribution to the audit observation efforts throughout the process, which altogether lasted a month and half.

EU EAT commended EUPOL staff acting as LSTOs for the high quality and consistency of the reports submitted.

priorities of the EU. The policy framework for election observation missions was established together with Member States and the European Parliament (EP) in 2000-2001; the methodology applied is inspired by the one used by OSCE/ODIHR and is based on the principles of long-term presence, wide geographical coverage and independence. Consistent application of the election observation methodology is key to preserving EU credibility in election observation, as inconsistencies and short-term political considerations could undermine it.

To respond with flexibility to political priorities, the observation approach has been developed and there are now several instruments in the EU's toolbox:

- **The Election Observation Mission (EOM)** is the standard and most complete tool. Prepared by an Exploratory Mission that assesses if conditions exist for meaningful elections and if security allows for the deployment of an EOM which is deployed usually six weeks before election day and consists of a Core Team, with long and short-term observers and is led by a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) as Chief Observer. EOM has high visibility and the Chief Observer makes public comments, issues a preliminary statement after election day and publishes a final report. The average cost is EUR 3.5 million.
- **The Election Assessment Team (EAT)** is a reduced format, mainly used when security conditions do not allow a wide deployment of observers. Prepared by an Exploratory Mission and deployed usually six weeks before the election, EAT consists of a team of experts, if possible deployed also outside the capital. No short-term observers are deployed. EAT may be, when advisable, led by an MEP as Chief Observer. The latter makes public comments, issues a preliminary statement and publishes a report. The EU deployed an EAT in Libya (2012) and Afghanistan (2014), to give two examples. The cost is similar to an EOM, but varies because of security requirements.



Photo: EU EOM Mali / Ezequiel Scagnetti

An European Union Observer monitors a polling station during election day. Bamako/Mali, 15 December 2013

- **Election Expert Mission (EEM)** is the less costly option (maximum EUR 300 000), and is deployed in countries that are not regarded as among the main election priorities or when security conditions allow only a very limited deployment. Consisting of two or more experts they have very limited visibility and issue no public statement. The report is shared with the authorities and sometimes published on a case-by-case basis. The EU deploys several EEM a year, such as recently in Thailand and Algeria (2014).
- Following the creation of the EEAS, Member States no longer participate in Exploratory Missions;
- The HR alone takes the decision, following the Exploratory Mission, on whether or not to deploy an EOM;
- The HR decides on the appointment of the Chief Observer without consulting Member States, whilst the EP, following the Declaration of Political Accountability, has increased its prerogatives and is now consulted on the selection of the Chief Observer.

A decision to deploy an EAT or an EEM does not automatically represent a negative judgment on the pre-election situation, and they are therefore politically neutral.

The system has also evolved following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty with a stronger role of the HR. The main post-Lisbon innovations are:



- The HR has more leeway in setting the election priorities, while consulting Member States and the European Parliament;

Nevertheless, Member States are closely associated with the various phases of the EOMs. The Political and Security Committee is consulted twice a year on the identification of election priorities and it is often briefed by Chief Observer for the countries that regularly feature on its agenda. The views of Heads of Missions (HoMs) are an integral part of the Exploratory Mission report and once an EOM is decided on, the Council Working Parties and HoMs on the ground are regularly briefed. EOMs produce internal interim reports

that are shared with Member States and the EP Democracy and Election Group.

There is indeed a variety of actors involved in setting up EOMs. Like the Member States, the EP is also consulted on the selection of election priorities; the Chief Observer is an MEP; Member States identify the long and short-term observers; the Commission is responsible for the budgetary, security and logistical aspects; Delegations on the ground are fully involved during the various stages; and the EEAS steers the whole process.

EOMs issue a final report containing a set of recommendations to improve the election framework before the next election cycle. To ensure a lasting impact on democratisation it is essential that the EU Delegations, the EEAS, the European Commission, the EP and Member States follow up systematically on those recommendations through political dialogue and financial assistance and promote local ownership in their dialogue with the authorities, political parties and civil society. The systematic follow-up of EU and OSCE/ODIHR EOMs recommendations has been included as a key action in the EU Action Plan for Democracy and Human Rights.





## 1.4.6. EU support for mediation and dialogue

by Eldridge Adolfo and Canan Gündüz

Mediation efforts are an inescapable feature of contemporary peacemaking. Since the end of the Cold War, the use of mediation as a way to reach peace settlements between warring parties has become a standard tool for the international community. Recognising the EU's ambition and capacity in this area, the EU Concept for Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, adopted by the Council in November 2009, states that mediation is to be established "as a tool of first response to emerging or ongoing crisis situations".<sup>1</sup> It constitutes the policy basis for the EU's involvement in international peace mediation.

The post-Lisbon EU institutional set-up has given further visibility to the EU's role as an international mediator. In particular, the creation of the position of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and, within the EEAS, the creation of the Mediation Support Team (MST) in the Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments Division have enhanced the EU's capability to conduct and support mediation and dialogue. However, the extent to which the EU is engaged in mediation is not yet fully recognised, even within the EU institutions.<sup>2</sup>

As a peace project itself, the EU has mediation, dialogue and negotiation as an integral part of its internal makeup: it has a long history and rich experience of mediation and dialogue within its own borders. As part of its foreign policy foot-

print, the EU has displayed this practice in its role as a third-party mediator. This is evident in the EU's recent high-level mediation work in Kosovo-Serbia, Mali, South Sudan and Georgia, to name a few cases. The EU has also engaged in supporting mediation and dialogue work at different levels, including grassroots, in the Philippines, Colombia, Syria and Libya, for example. Currently, the EU is actively engaged in either conducting or supporting mediation and dialogue in most regions of the world.<sup>3</sup>

### WHAT ARE MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE?

In the 2009 Concept, mediation is defined in a broad sense, reflecting the great variety of ways in which the EU uses this tool at different levels and through different activities, including directly mediating and facilitating; funding or providing political and financial leverage; providing technical support; and promoting the wider use of mediation and dialogue by national and international actors.

In practical terms, mediation is only one aspect<sup>4</sup> of conflict prevention, management, resolution or transformation, where the parties to a conflict request the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, a third party (an individual, organisation, group, or state), to help them find a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict, without

1 Council of the European Union (2009), Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, 15779/09.

2 Sherriff, A., Hauck, V. (2012), Glass Half Full: Study on EU Lessons Learnt in Mediation and Dialogue, ECDPM.

3 Ibid.

4 Mediation is only one tool for conflict resolution. Mediation is best seen as one part (albeit a very important part) of a larger peace process that starts before and continues after the signing of a peace agreement.



resorting to violence or physical force or invoking the authority of law. The third party (mediator) should be impartial and accepted by the parties to lead them through a fair and impartial process of dialogue. The role of the mediator is to bring ideas, knowledge, resources and authority, and ideally to orchestrate the multitude of actors, interests and interventions involved in a peace process.<sup>5</sup>

Mediation is an appealing conflict resolution mechanism because it is voluntary, which makes it less threatening for parties to a conflict than other possible options, such as arbitration or the use of force. Mediation ultimately leaves the final decisions of any outcomes to the conflicting parties themselves. Furthermore, peace mediation has nowadays largely moved away from negotiating fairly limited ceasefire agreements, offering scope for more complex, multi-issue, multi-stakeholder, long-term transition processes.<sup>6</sup> Mediation today has the ambition to address the root causes of conflicts and reduce the chances of any relapse into violence in the long run.

## THE CONDUCT OF MEDIATION

### Who mediates in the EU? What relevance for CSDP missions?

The principal and most visible EU mediator is the HR/VP, who in turn appoints EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) and Special Envoys, who are empowered to mediate on the HR/VP's behalf in specific conflicts. Due to the nature of their work, Heads of Delegations (HoDs) and Heads of Missions (HoMs) frequently find themselves mediating in the course of their daily work, playing different formal and informal roles in the course of a wider peace process.

In most contexts where CSDP missions are deployed, mediated peace processes will either be ongoing, or just concluded, or the CSDP mission will form a part of efforts to lay the ground for peaceful settlement, or may even directly oversee or implement parts of a peace agreement. Either way, these dynamics form a critical part of the context in which a CSDP mission is designed and planned and in which it operates. Mediation and dialogue skills are also seen as critical by CSDP mission staff in their day-to-day work. Many missions engage in informal dialogue and sometimes dispute resolution at the working level.<sup>7</sup> When engaged in mediation, the EU uses a range of strategies that derive from the examples below:

**Communication facilitation strategies** allow the mediator to adopt a fairly passive role, channelling information to the parties and facilitating cooperation, where she/he does not have control over the more formal process or substance of mediation. This role can be effective in conflicts where the parties do not have direct channels of communication. An example is Aceh, where the EU gave financial support to the facilitation of the peace process by a Finnish NGO that had little leverage over the parties or the outcome.<sup>8</sup>

**Procedural strategies** enable the mediator to structure the mediation process and bring the parties together in a neutral environment, where the mediator exerts some control over the mediation process. The mediator may exercise control over timing, issues on the agenda, meeting place, frequency, media relations, and the formality or flexibility of the meetings. This is significant for parties to a conflict who may not have had an opportunity to interact constructively. Former HR/VP Catherine Ashton's conduct of the Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue is a classic example of this way of working.

5 Lanz, D. and Gasser, R. (2013), *A Crowded Field: competition and coordination in international peace mediation*, Centre for Mediation in Africa, Mediation Arguments, no. 2.

6 Papagianni (2014), *National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions*, Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper No.3, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office.

7 Gourlay, C. (2010), *Mediation and Dialogue as Tools for EU CSDP Missions*, Initiative for Peacebuilding.

8 Herrberg, A. (2008), 'The Brussels Backstage to the Aceh Peace Process', in Aguswandi and Large, J. (eds.), *Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia Aceh Peace Process Accord Series*, Conciliation Resources.

**Directive strategies** are the most intrusive form of intervention. The mediator actively shapes the content and nature of the final outcome by offering the parties incentives, promises of support, threats of diplomatic or economic sanctions or even the use of force by outside parties. The mediator confronts the parties with new resources or the prospect of losing resources, if certain agreements are not made or actions are not taken. The idea is that this may change their incentive structure, and induce them to reach a resolution. In the strictest sense, directive strategies leave the remit of mediation, and go more in the direction of power diplomacy. Yet they are often utilised in the context of peace processes as part of the ‘mediation repertoire’, especially when conflicts are highly escalated, and directly threaten the interests of outside third parties, including the mediator(s).<sup>9</sup>

## AN INCLUSIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The 2009 Concept explicitly builds ‘multi-track’ approaches into the EU’s understanding of mediation, exemplifying the idea that peace processes cannot be limited to top-level leaders, but need to reach deep and wide into the fabric of a society affected by violent conflict.

**Track One** refers to the official government decision-making bodies or elite. **Track Two** refers to mid-level elites who are influential and linked to decision-makers; these include civil society organisations, think-tanks, religious leaders, etc. **Track three** refers to grassroots/community based stakeholders. There is also the increasing distinction of a **Track One-and-a-half**, which focuses primarily on dialogue with influential individuals, including current and

former government representatives, acting in a personal capacity.

The outcomes of the various dialogues on the different tracks are non-binding. However, they are channels used to explore options and build networks. Coherence between the different tracks (and particularly linking them all to the track 1 level) is crucial to their effectiveness.

Working with the multi-track systems by default ensures that the mediation process is inclusive and works with multiple stakeholders. It also allows the process to address the root causes of conflict, which is consistent with the EU’s comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, special efforts must be made to bring in specific stakeholders usually marginalised in conflict contexts, such as women and youth. Other inclusive mechanisms include National Dialogue processes that try to engage the country as a whole in a more informal but reconciliatory process. For instance, the EU supported the National Dialogue in Yemen between 2013 and 2014, inter alia by playing an important role in advocating and supporting the inclusion of youth, women, and groups from outside the capital.

## EU INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR DIALOGUE AND MEDIATION

In an effort to optimise the effectiveness and professionalisation of mediation<sup>10</sup>, mediation support aims to improve mediation practice and policy more widely, through various activities that include training, research, policy development and networking.

The hub for EU mediation support is the EEAS Mediation Support Team (MST), which provides ongoing and real-time technical advice to EUSRs, Special Envoys, EU Delegations and Brussels-based EU staff, as well as to third parties outside the EU.

9 The strategies discussed above derive from Bercovitch’s work on intractable conflicts. See Bercovitch, J. (2004), ‘International Mediation and Intractable Conflict’, in *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder.

10 See Lehman Larsen, S. (2014), *Effectively Supporting Mediation: Developments, Challenges and Requirements*, Oslo Forum Paper, HD Centre.

Support is provided on specific and relevant thematic topics and through deployment to the field, including scoping missions. Complementary support is provided by colleagues across the institutions, including the geographical Desks, Foreign Policy Instrument<sup>11</sup>, DEVCO and the Delegations. The activities of the MST are as follows:

**Operational support:** The EU provides support for ongoing operations by deploying both internal and external technical experts to support mediation processes around the world. Experts are deployed to help design and run processes, advise the conflicting parties and mediators on a range of thematic topics such as constitutional reform, ceasefire arrangements, power-sharing, human rights and gender issues. The EEAS has access, through framework agreements, to two consortia which include ten of the most prominent mediation and dialogue organisations in Europe and beyond. The MST can deploy experts to the field at relatively short notice, even within two days.

**Mediation training and coaching:** Training in mediation and dialogue is available to all EU staff, as well as external mediators and parties to conflicts. The MST provides two types of training for mediators: personal one-to-one peer coaching for senior members of staff engaged in mediation and dialogue (EUSRs, Special Envoys, HoDs and HoMs). This is conducted by external experts who are often experienced mediators themselves in confidential sessions. The second type of training is an interactive workshop based methodology, where mediation and negotiation skills are taught, through role plays and scenarios.

**Knowledge management:** In an effort to improve and professionalise the practice of mediation, the MST captures lessons learnt from peace efforts by debriefing EU mediators, commissions studies and produces fact-sheets and guidance notes on

specific topics. These are available to the general public via the EEAS website.

**Partnerships:** The EEAS has built close and constructive partnerships with key international organisations – including the UN, the AU, ASEAN, the OSCE – dealing with mediation and dialogue, in order to create synergies and foster cooperation. Outreach to Member States also forms part of this work.

## CONCLUSIONS

International peace mediation is an evolving field. Most conflicts today are internal/civil wars, with multiple conflicting parties, which make them more complex, with a greater need to reconcile the parties and affected populations that will need to continue to co-exist side by side after the violence ends. This has brought about a greater realisation that international third parties may be best placed to support – but never replace – the critical, long-term peace work of local and national individuals and groups. Furthermore, this changing landscape means that a reliance on mono conflict resolution strategies, including classical diplomacy, is seldom the only answer. Instead, multiple efforts, with better links between a range of stakeholders on multiple tracks – crucially also non-state actors – are required to tackle contemporary crisis and conflicts. Given these trends and needs, mediation is gaining more visibility and traction as a key conflict resolution mechanism, involving more funding, actors and tools than a decade ago. The EU's commitment to conflict prevention, as well as to the professionalisation and systematisation of its own, and others', mediation work, gives it a growing capacity and confidence in mediating conflicts. This positive trend can be expected to continue as the EU mainstreams its comprehensive approach to crises and conflict.

<sup>11</sup> The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace works with the MST technical experts to provide mediation support through its European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) programme.

## 1.4.7. Sanctions

by Kees Smit Sibinga

Sanctions, also referred to as restrictive measures, against third countries, individuals or entities are an essential foreign policy tool of the EU for pursuing its objectives in accordance with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certain EU measures are imposed in implementation of Resolutions by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The EU may however decide to apply autonomous measures that are more restrictive in addition to the UN's measures or, when adoption in the framework of the UN is not possible, adopt restrictive measures autonomously.

In general terms, the EU's restrictive measures are imposed to bring about a change in policy or activity by the targeted country, part of a country, government, entities or individuals. They are a preventive, non-punitive, instrument which should allow the EU to respond swiftly to political challenges and developments. Sanctions should be used as part of an integrated and comprehensive policy approach, in the framework of the European Union's overall foreign policy strategies, involving political dialogue, complementary efforts and other instruments. The EU and its Member States should actively and systematically communicate on EU sanctions, including with the targeted country and its population.

The measures should target the policies or actions that have prompted the EU's decision to impose sanctions and the means to conduct them and those identified as responsible for these policies or actions. Such targeted measures should minimise adverse consequences for those

not responsible for such policies and actions, in particular the local civilian population, or regarding legitimate activities in or with the country concerned. The political objectives and criteria of the restrictive measures should be clearly defined in the legal acts. The types of measure will vary depending on their objectives and their expected effectiveness in achieving these objectives under the particular circumstances, reflecting the EU's targeted and differentiated approach.

Restrictive measures must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular due process and the right to an effective remedy in full conformity with the case-law of the EU Courts. The measures imposed must be proportionate to their objectives.

The uniform and consistent interpretation and effective implementation of the restrictive measures is essential to ensure their effectiveness in achieving the desired political objective.

### HOW ARE MEASURES ADOPTED?

Sanctions measures can for example include export and import restrictions, including on arms ('arms embargo'), oil and gas and other goods and items, restrictions on support for trade, measures concerning the financial sector, measures regarding the transport sector and listings (for listings, see below). Proposals for restrictive measures, including proposals for listings or de-listings, in respect of country-specific EU autonomous sanctions should be submitted by the Member States




or by the EEAS. The political aspects and broader parameters of the proposals should then be discussed in the relevant regional working party, assisted by sanctions experts from the EEAS and experts from the Commission and the Council Legal Service. Where appropriate, the Political and Security Committee will discuss the proposals and provide political guidance to the working parties concerned, notably on the type of measures selected for further proceedings.

The Heads of Missions (HoMs) located in the country(ies) concerned will be invited to provide, where appropriate, their advice on proposals for restrictive measures or additional designations. Equally, the Commission services will be invited to provide, where appropriate, their advice on specific measures which would fall within the remit of the Union.

All the legal, technical and horizontal aspects of the proposed restrictive measures should be discussed in RELEX. The legal acts usually consist of a Council Decision introducing the restrictive measures and a Council Regulation defining the specific measures falling within the remit of the Union, in effect economic and financial measures such as asset freezes and export bans. These will be presented in RELEX for discussion, by the EEAS and the Commission respectively.

Preferably, the two legal acts should subsequently be submitted to COREPER and formally adopted by the Council at the same time, or with minimum time delay between the two instruments. The Decisions concerning sanctions are adopted by the Council, consisting of the Member States, on the basis of unanimity (Articles 29 and 31 TEU).

Upon adoption, the legal acts giving effect to the sanctions are published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Official Journal is the only legally binding official record of the EU legal acts in force. To access the Official Journal please consult <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do> or <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>. It is noted that the Regulation is directly binding on EU citizens and businesses.



## PROPOSALS FOR LISTING

Subjecting certain targeted persons and entities responsible for the policies or actions that prompted the EU decision to impose sanctions to a travel ban and asset freeze ('listing') is an instrument often used in sanctions. Proposals for autonomous listings should be clear and unequivocal. In particular, they must aim to include sufficient details (identifiers) so that the listing decision, once it has entered into effect, can be effectively implemented by economic operators and national authorities (e.g. banks, consulates). Identifying information is also crucial to ensure that restrictive measures do not affect non-targeted persons and entities.

Proposals for autonomous listings should furthermore include individual and specific reasons for each listing. The purpose of the reasons is to state, as concretely as possible, why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that the person, group or entity concerned falls under the designation criteria defined by the relevant legal act, taking into consideration the objectives of the measures as expressed in its introductory paragraphs.

It is primarily the responsibility of those submitting the proposal to provide such reasons. Other Delegations should contribute to this process. Input from the HoMs located in the country(ies) concerned will be requested, where appropriate.

The reasons for listings will be finalised by the RELEX working party on the basis of the elements discussed in the regional working party. If needed, RELEX may request additional information from the regional working party in order to ensure that listings are legally sound and properly substantiated.

As the legal act adopting the designations will be published in the Official Journal, it should be possible to make these reasons public. In exceptional cases, where it is considered that the reasons for the listing are not suitable for publication because of privacy and security considerations, the reasons will need to be addressed separately to the person, group or entity concerned.

## NOTIFICATION OF LISTING

The EU attaches much importance to ensuring that the listing of targeted persons and entities respects fundamental rights. In particular, due process rights must be guaranteed in full conformity with the case-law of the Court of Justice, including with regard to the rights of the defence and the principle of effective judicial protection.

To this end, proper notification of the decision and of the reasons justifying the listing must be ensured. This is achieved by means of a letter, where appropriate, or through the publication of a notice in the Official Journal (C series) on the same day as the publication of the legal act in question indicating that the Council will communicate the reasons for listing on request. The notification will inform the persons, groups and entities concerned of their right to present observations and to request a review of the decision taken by the Council, as well as of their right to challenge the Council's decision before the General Court in accordance with the relevant provisions in the EU treaties.

## REVIEW OF THE MEASURES

The review of EU autonomous sanctions or EU additions to UN sanctions should take place at regular intervals and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant legal acts. Regular assessments of sanctions regimes by the relevant working party and RELEX, assisted by the EEAS, the Commission and HoMs, should permit the adjustment of the measures, as needed, depending on developments with regard to the stated objectives and the effectiveness of the measures in that respect.

## IMPLEMENTATION AND APPLICATION OF MEASURES

The uniform and consistent interpretation and effective implementation of the restrictive measures is an essential element ensures their effectiveness in achieving the desired political objectives. Member States must inform each other of the measures taken under the relevant legal acts and supply each other with any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with these acts, in particular information in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments of national courts. With regard to the measures within the remit of the Community, the Commission oversees the implementation of the measures by the Member States. At the EU level, the Commission is also responsible for contacts with the private sector on issues of proper implementation of sanctions. Enforcement of the sanctions is entirely the responsibility of the Member States.

By their very nature, sanctions are designed to have political effects in third countries. Nevertheless, EU restrictive measures only apply within the jurisdiction of the EU.

## OUTREACH AND COMMUNICATION

The effectiveness of restrictive measures is directly related to the adoption of similar measures by third countries. In principle, therefore, it is preferable for sanctions to be adopted in the framework of the UN. Where this is not possible, the aim should be to bring as much as possible of the international community to exert pressure on the targeted country.

When adopting autonomous sanctions, the EU should, through outreach, actively seek cooperation and, if possible, the adoption of similar measures by relevant third countries in order to minimise substitution effects and strengthen the impact of restrictive measures. In particular, candidate countries should be systematically invited to align themselves with the measures imposed

by the EU. In addition, the issue of uniform and consistent interpretation and effective implementation of UN sanctions regimes should regularly be included in consultations with key partners. EU Delegations should be fully involved in this process.

The EU and its Member States should actively and systematically communicate on EU sanctions, in order to give them visibility and avoid any misconceptions, in particular on the part of the local civilian population. Such communication will also ensure that the measures have maximum political impact. Common messages should be discussed in the relevant geographical working party in consultation with the RELEX working party with regard to the legal, technical and horizontal consequences of the measures.

## ANNEX

## EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN FORCE

(February 2015)

The list of restrictive measures in force includes both measures applied in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions and measures applied by the EU autonomously.

## AFGHANISTAN (Taliban)

restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in view of the situation in Afghanistan

## AL-QAEDA

restrictive measures against members of the al-Qaeda organisation and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them

## BELARUS

restrictive measures against Belarus

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

restrictive measures in view of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

restrictive measures against the Central African Republic

## CHINA

Madrid European Council Declaration, 27.6.1989

## CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL

restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo

## COTE D'IVOIRE

restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire

## EGYPT

restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt

## ERITREA

restrictive measures against Eritrea

## REPUBLIC OF GUINEA (CONAKRY)

restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea

## GUINEA-BISSAU

restrictive measures directed at certain persons, entities and bodies threatening the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

## HAITI

prohibition to satisfy certain claims in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No 917(1994)

## IRAN

restrictive measures against Iran

## IRAN

restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran

## IRAQ

restrictive measures on Iraq

## DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea



## LEBANON

prohibition on the sale or supply of arms and related material and on the provision of related services to entities or individuals in Lebanon in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1701 (2006)

## LEBANON

specific restrictive measures against certain persons suspected of involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri

## LIBERIA

restrictive measures imposed against Liberia

## LIBYA

restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya

## MOLDOVA

restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova

## MYANMAR (BURMA)

restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma

## RUSSIAN FEDERATION

restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine

## SOMALIA

restrictive measures against Somalia

## SOUTH SUDAN

restrictive measures in view of the situation in South Sudan

## SUDAN

restrictive measures in view of the situation in Sudan

## SYRIA

restrictive measures against Syria

## TERRORIST GROUPS

## (FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS)

application of specific measures to combat terrorism

## TUNISIA

restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia

## UKRAINE

restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

## UKRAINE

restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine

## USA (extraterritoriality)

measures protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom

## YEMEN

restrictive measures in view of the situation in Yemen

## ZIMBABWE

restrictive measures against Zimbabwe

# **2** CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

## 2.1. FROM EUPM BOSNIA TO EUMAM RCA

### Snapshot of ongoing and past CSDP missions and operations

by Arnold Kammel

At the summit of Saint-Malo in 1998, France and the United Kingdom insisted that the EU *“must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”*.

At that time the focus was on military crisis management, but the argument has since been applied to both the military and the civilian dimensions of CSDP. In December 2001, the European Council of Laeken declared the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, nowadays CSDP) operational, with some nuances in the various language versions

*“the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations” versus “l’Union est désormais capable de conduire des opérations de gestion de crise”*.

Pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

*“[T]he common security and defence policy [...] shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”*.

The missions are defined in Article 43 TEU in a non-exhaustive list. The CSDP task catalogue

*“shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation”* and may *“contribute to the*

*fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”*.

The first CSDP mission, EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina, was deployed in 2003. Since then the EU has so far launched 35 civilian missions and military operations. Despite the tendency of military operations to attract more attention, the majority of CSDP interventions are civilian missions. From a geographical perspective three regions can be identified as main theatres for CSDP action: Europe and Eurasia, Africa and the Middle East/Asia.

#### EUROPE AND EURASIA

The Western Balkans and Eurasia have been focal points of EU external activities for different reasons: geographical proximity, historical links and the perspective of European integration for the states in the region as well as the self-interest of having stability in its neighbourhood.

#### Ongoing missions/operations in Europe and Eurasia

Launched in 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been the largest ever EU civilian rule of law mission that trains police, judges, customs officials, and civil administrators in Kosovo.

EUFOR Althea is a post-conflict stabilisation operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was launched in December 2004 and conducted under



Photo: EUCS

EUTM Somalia's Security Support Element, 28 September 2014

the Berlin Plus agreement. Althea took over responsibility for stabilisation in BiH when NATO concluded the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operation.

Following the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was launched and from 2009 it became the only international monitoring presence in Georgia. This civilian mission is tasked with monitoring the parties' compliance with the ceasefire agreement and its implementing measures, to contribute to stability, normalisation, and confidence-building through facilitating communication between parties on the ground.

In 2005, the EU launched EUBAM<sup>1</sup>, which aims to provide technical assistance and advice to improve security and customs operations along the Ukraine-Moldova border, thereby facilitating the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.

The latest mission launched in the Eurasian region is EUAM Ukraine to assist the country in the reform of the civilian security sector, including police and the rule of law, established in July 2014.

## Completed missions/operations in Europe and Eurasia

The first-ever CSDP mission was a civilian police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was launched in 2003 and focused on training and Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA). EUPM concluded at the end of June 2012.

The EU conducted three CSDP missions in FYROM. The EU's first military mission, Concordia, was a military support and peacekeeping operation under Berlin Plus, conducted in 2003 after the EU took over responsibility from the NATO mission Allied Harmony (2001-2003). Concordia was succeeded by a police training mission (EUPOL Proxima) from 2003 to 2005, followed by a police advisory team (EUPAT) operation in 2005 and 2006.

In 2004-2005, the EU carried out a rule of law mission in Georgia, EUJUST Themis, at the request of the Georgian government. The EU's first ever rule of law mission supported the Geor-

<sup>1</sup> EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova was nevertheless not launched under the CSDP.





Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan

Former Head of Mission Karl Ake Roghe greets the elders during visits to villages near EUPOL HQ, August 2013

gian authorities with a view to reforming Georgia's criminal legislation and justice process.

## AFRICA

Half of CSDP missions and operations have so far taken place in Africa. The EU's interest is mainly linked to humanitarian aspects, geographical proximity and the potential spill-over effects of regional instability as well as the historical links between Europe and Africa.

### Ongoing missions/operations in Africa

Established in April 2014, EUCAP Sahel Mali is an operational EU contribution to supporting stability, institutional reform and the full restoration of state authority throughout the country. In February 2013, the EU had already launched

a military training mission (EUTM Mali) in the context of a French military operation fighting Islamist rebel groups in northern Mali. The objective of the EUTM mission is to train and advise Malian armed forces in order to help restore nationwide law and order under constitutional, democratic authorities. EUCAP is advising on internal security aspects.

In 2014, the EU decided to deploy a military operation to contribute to a secure environment in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA). The aim was to provide temporary support in achieving a safe and secure environment in the Bangui area by contributing to the international efforts to protect the populations most at risk and also creating the conditions necessary to enable the provision of humanitarian aid. The operation was to be succeeded by a UN peacekeeping operation.

Another CSDP mission was established in February 2015 in the country, the EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic, EUMAM RCA.

On 22 May 2013, the EU decided to launch EUBAM Libya to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing their border management capacities, and hence the security of the country's borders.

The EU also launched a civilian training mission called EUCAP Sahel Niger in July 2012 to enhance the capacity of the Nigerien police and security forces to combat terrorism and organised crime, with the broader objective of reinforcing political stability, governance, and security in Niger and the Sahel region.

European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia (Operation Atalanta) is an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, which began in 2008. Operation Atalanta is complemented by two additional CSDP operations. In 2010, the EU launched EUTM Somalia, a military training mission for Somali security forces. In July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP NESTOR, a new civilian CSDP mission that aimed to help build the maritime capacity of five countries in the region (Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles, and Tanzania) with a focus on the fight against piracy, through training, advising, and encouraging regional cooperation in the area of maritime security and to train a Somali coastal police force.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EU launched a security sector reform operation in the area of defence (EUSEC RD Congo) in June 2005, which gives advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities regarding reform and modernisation of the Congolese army.

### Completed missions/operations in Africa

The EU has concluded four missions in DRC. Operation Artemis was the first military CSDP operation outside Europe. It took place between June and September 2003 and sought to stabilise the security situation and improve humanitarian conditions in Bunia and the surrounding region,



Palestine policewomen performing special drills in the Palestine Academy for Police Sciences, Jericho in March 2014

allowing time for the UN to strengthen its own peacekeeping force, the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC). EUFOR RD Congo was a military operation conducted in the second half of 2006 and also supported the MONUC in securing the country during the elections. Furthermore two police missions, namely EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo were conducted in the country. EUPOL RD Congo, launched in 2007, was a follow-on mission from EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU's first civilian CSDP mission in Africa. While EUPOL Kinshasa focused on supporting the Integrated Police Unit of the Congolese National Police in Kinshasa, EUPOL RDC then supported the efforts of Congolese authorities to reform the national police and enhance cooperation with the justice sector. It was completed in 2014.

EUFOR Tchad-RCA was a military operation launched in January 2008 to stabilise the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic. EUFOR Tchad-RCA was a temporary 'bridging mission' ahead of the deployment of the UN-led mission MINURCAT, which assumed responsibility in early 2009. EUFOR Tchad-RCA was the largest CSDP military operation in Africa to date.

From 2005 to 2007, the EU conducted a small hybrid civilian-military mission in support



Photo: Jean François d'Arcangues/EUFOR Tchad/RCA

Polish convoy during the operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2009

of the African Union's mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS). This support included the deployment of military observers, assistance with planning and equipment and technical and financial support to the AMIS. It also helped with tactical and strategic transportation, as well as training of African troops. The mission also included civilian police training and assistance. In 2007 AMIS transferred responsibility to the new AU/UN joint operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition, the EU conducted a civilian CSDP mission to strengthen airport security in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) from September 2012 to January 2014.

From 2008 to 2010, the EU helped local authorities in Guinea-Bissau to reform legal frameworks related to the military, police, and justice system by deploying a security sector reform mission (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau).

## MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

The EU has launched a number of missions to foster peace and stability in the Middle East and Asia, namely in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in the Palestinian Territories, as well as in Indonesia.

## Ongoing missions in the Middle East and Asia

The EU runs a police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) that has been mentoring and training the Afghan National Police (ANP). The mission, launched in June 2007, continues supporting the professionalisation of the ANP, but also aims at enhancing the institutional reform and capacities within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) relevant for advancing civilian policing. Its rule of law component assists the Afghan authorities in developing justice-police cooperation and to reform police-related and criminal legislation. The EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) has been deployed since 2006 to improve the law enforcement capacity of the Palestinian Civil Police. The aim of the mission is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing and criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership. In 2005, the EU has launched a small border assistance mission to provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point and monitor the Palestinian Authority at the Terminal between Gaza and Egypt (EUBAM Rafah). The mission has suspended most of its activities since the 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas and remains on standby; it continues to contribute to capacity-building for the Palestinian Authority in the field of border management.

## Completed missions in the Middle East and Asia

The EU deployed an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX Iraq) between 2005 and 2013 in order to train Iraqi police, prison officials, and judges. In 2005-2006, the EU deployed a civilian monitoring mission to Aceh-Indonesia (AMM). The mission helped to monitor the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement, including weapons decommissioning, military and police force relocation, and the human rights situation.



# Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union

April 2015



## Further Information

For each operational activity, detailed and updated information, including video presentations, can be found on the website of the European External Action Service:

[http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/mission-and-operations/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/mission-and-operations/index_en.htm)



## 2.2. BASIC PRINCIPLES, CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

### 2.2.1. Peaceful resolution of conflicts

by Eva Gross

The peaceful resolution of conflicts constitutes a fundamental principle underlying the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – but also represents the focal point of the EU’s overall commitment to peace and security.

Brussels has made operational contributions to this end through various CSDP missions and operations over the past decade. The varied nature of these contributions in terms of their tasks but also their civilian and military nature reflects the fact that the means of peaceful resolution of conflicts are inherently multifaceted – but also that operational contributions have evolved in response to a changing international security environment. Thus, CSDP missions and operations provide assistance in the implementation of conflict settlements and deterrence of renewed violence, but also engage in capacity-building and training of security forces in weak state settings where regional conflict and non-state actors pose challenges for government capacities to provide security to citizens. The latter in particular reflects current trends in international security that call for European action in settings as diverse as Ukraine, the Levant and sub-Saharan Africa.

#### AN EVOLVING STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The EU’s commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts is underpinned by a number of strategic documents. These reflect an adjustment to a changing global security environment but also the EU’s changing institutional set-up and

capacities, including CSDP. Finally, the EU’s strategic guidelines, whether general or focused on specific geographical regions, emphasise the link between the EU’s values, which include human rights, democracy and the rule of law, on the one hand, and the prevention and resolution of conflicts, by means including regional integration, on the other.

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies regional conflict and state failure as key threats that both lead to and magnify the threat posed by extremism and organised crime. This makes conflict intervention and contributing to effective and long-term conflict resolution both a strategic and an operational objective. The 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS also highlights the need to engage in conflict resolution. Given the increasing urgency – due not only to the increasing geographical proximity of conflict but also the ongoing occurrence of state fragility, as well as the root causes of these phenomena – the report also focuses on the security/development nexus and the need for a coherent and comprehensive approach to tackling conflict.

Finally, the 2011 regional strategy for security and development in the Sahel mentions conflict resolution as a specific challenge for the region, and its implementation roadmap includes specific lines of action in pursuit of conflict resolution, including mitigating internal tensions. The strategy also outlines the EU’s contribution, namely encouragement and support for internal political dialogue in order to make possible sustainable home-grown solutions to remaining social, political and ethnic tensions; a focus on transparent



Photo: EEAS/EUFOR RCA

Community members of District 3 and 5 meet with EUFOR RCA to discuss reconciliation, security and development

and locally accountable governance, the promotion of institutional capacity; and efforts to re-establish and/or reinforce the administrative presence of the state, particularly in the north of Niger and Mali. While focusing on a specific region, the 2011 Sahel strategy does reflect the increasingly diffuse nature of contemporary security threats, the inextricable linkages between security, development and fragility and the merging of internal and external security.

### **OPERATIONAL TASKS IN A CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

When it comes to operational contributions, the principles of EU engagement through the military aspect of CSDP are enshrined in the ‘Petersberg tasks’, which both contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and help avoid their re-emergence. This applies in particular to conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

By contrast, the contributions to conflict resolution of civilian CSDP include police, rule of law and civilian administration – all designed to complement a focus on physical (military) security with long-term state capacities to provide law and order so as to make conflict resolution sustainable.

In practice, CSDP missions have supported police, judiciary and customs reforms and engaged in capacity-building. In more immediate connection to conflict resolution, CSDP missions have also ensured compliance with peace agreements and have helped stabilise conflict and/or fragile environments, in efforts to ensure the security of civilians.

In addition to these specific tasks, CSDP also lends visibility to the contributions of EU Member States. This signals both EU ownership of operational contributions and their link to the EU’s collective political and developmental engagements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has adjusted the role of CSDP in the broader institutional architecture and placed a renewed focus on the coher-



Photo: Gaila Glume

EUMM Georgia monitors parties' compliance with the 2008 ceasefire agreement between Georgia and the Russian Federation. It contributes to stabilisation, normalisation, confidence-building, and to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia

ence of various EU instruments. In view of the financial crisis and its effect on defence spending as well as waning commitments to CSDP, the EU and its Member States have begun to engage in a process to strengthen the policy and to make CSDP missions and operations more effective and visible in the process.

The conclusions of the December 2013 Council on Defence accordingly link CSDP to other tools but also revisit the theme of sufficient and appropriately trained capabilities and personnel. The ongoing process aiming towards a more active, capable and coherent CSDP is part of a larger debate over integrating CSDP inside the comprehensive approach that connects all facets of EU external action.

The EU's intention to more effectively invest in the comprehensive approach and to strengthen its ability to deploy the right civilian and military personnel on the whole spectrum of crisis management operations also reflects its ongoing commitment to conflict resolution, in recognition of the changing nature of conflicts and threats to peace and stability in the EU's neighbourhood and beyond.

## SPECIFIC CSDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the strategic and institutional developments sketched above, the EU's track record when it comes to CSDP missions launched in pursuit of conflict resolution to date reflects variations in task, mission size, and length of commitment. While this may not lend itself to a neat typology of tasks, it does attest to the EU's flexibility in responding to various geographical and operational needs and requirements along the continuum of conflict resolution. Individual CSDP missions and operations since the launch of the first missions in 2003 also reflect the changing institutional landscape in which missions operate as well as the circumstances to which they are asked to respond.

When it comes to intervening in an *immediate post-crisis environment*, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia made an important contribution to the stabilisation of the situation following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Its mandate included the monitoring of the conflicting parties' actions, including full compliance with the six-point agreement of 12 August; cooperation with partners, including the UN and OSCE; immediate stabilisation and long-term stability; normalisation, confidence-building and reporting. The EU, with a predominately civilian and European, as opposed to transatlantic, identity and membership, was well placed to engage in this particular contribution to conflict resolution.

The EU contributed through civilian as well as military operations to the *monitoring of peace agreements and assistance in their implementation* beyond EUMM Georgia. In Aceh, Indonesia, the 2005 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) contributed to monitoring the demobilisation and reintegration of GAM as well as redeployment of TNI, human rights, legislative change, violation of MOU but also to maintaining cooperation between the parties. Its identity as a niche – and, more importantly, neutral – actor

in this setting enabled the EU to take up this particular task. On the other hand, EU engagement in FYROM in 2003 through Operation Concordia was made not only possible but also necessary by the evolving enlargement prospects of the countries of the western Balkans. The EU operation, through its mandate to contribute to a stable, secure environment in which to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement, thus made possible a transition from military to civilian assistance – and the eventual termination of CSDP engagement in favour of economic and, more importantly, accession instruments.

CSDP operations intervening in active conflict or settings of insecurity have contributed to *achieving a safe and secure environment, the protection of refugees and UN personnel* with the aim of handing over to other institutional partners – be they the African Union (AU) or the United Nations (UN), as in the case of EUFOR RCA in Central African Republic since 2014 and following 2003's operation Artemis. These operations can help lay the groundwork, or contribute to such groundwork, for further efforts in conflict resolution undertaken by the EU or its partners.

The EU is further engaged in *training, advising and mentoring* of police and military forces in some post-conflict settings, and also in some settings where conflict is still ongoing or where conditions of regional fragility obtain. This includes EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali, where CSDP missions contribute to assisting governments in extending their reach (and presumably also services to their populations, including the provision of security) throughout their territories. As to civilian efforts, EUPOL Afghanistan as part of a broader international stabilisation effort focuses on the professionalisation of the police force, police-justice links and advising on reforms of the Mol. Similarly, the EU's engagement through EULEX Kosovo, although with an executive mandate and an overall EU political lead in the region, forms an approach to conflict resolution through its contribution to multi-ethnic institutions and anti-corruption initiatives;

but it also has a role in the reform of the judiciary and in war crime investigations.

But the EU has also engaged in *comprehensive conflict resolution* through its CSDP operations in conjunction with broader political approaches. In the Western Balkans, present and former CSDP operations are and have been deployed with a view to the eventual accession of individual countries. That said, deterrence and the provision of a secure environment, and training activities, are also still aspects of the EU's policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, through Operation EUFOR Althea, which two decades after Dayton remains mired in a post-conflict setting.

## BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES

The peaceful resolution of conflicts remains part and parcel of the EU's engagement in international security, including through its CSDP. In institutional terms, the creation of the EEAS and, particularly, the upgrading of EU Delegations in the field have given the EU a stronger framework in terms of concurrent political and development commitments. As Brussels moves, together with Member States capitals, to consolidate its CSDP and comprehensive approach, revisits its strategic orientation and reformulates its strategic priorities, the peaceful resolution of conflicts stands to remain at the centre of CSDP activities. But a changing global security environment – which is more diffuse, while insecurity and instability are moving ever closer to the EU's Eastern and Southern borders – makes the persistence of this particular basic principle not a luxury nor an option, but a fundamental requirement.



## 2.2.2. Human rights and rule of law

by Richard Winkelhofer

*“The European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (...). The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples (...). In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values (...). It shall contribute to peace, security (...) (and) the protection of human rights (...). The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation (...) and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, (and) the universality and indivisibility of human rights (...). The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for (...) cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to (...) support democracy, the rule of law, (and) human rights (...).”<sup>1</sup>*

Respect for human rights and upholding the rule of law have a twofold effect on the EU: As foundational and common values (internal dimension), and as guiding principles for international action (external dimension). These dimensions are, however, inseparably intertwined: this is becoming most obvious in the nexus between internal and external security, with the most worrying example being that of armed conflicts outside Europe setting the scene for radicalisation and terrorist

strikes at home. Or, in the words of the European Security Strategy (ESS):

*“The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening international order.”*

### HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are the basic rights and freedoms to which all people everywhere are considered to be entitled, protecting them from severe political, legal and social abuses. They commonly include civil and political rights (such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of thought and expression, and the rights of women, minorities and groups to be free from discrimination), economic, environmental, social and cultural rights. Human rights norms are mainly enshrined in a number of international treaties and conventions<sup>2</sup>, and in customary international law. A good many of them are reaffirmed by the binding provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as annexed to the EU treaties, specifically addressing the EU’s and – when implementing EU law – its Member States’ actions, including external actions.

<sup>1</sup> Articles 2, 3 (1) and (5), and 21 (1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (TEU) (emphasis added).

<sup>2</sup> Amongst them the rights conferred by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, established within the framework of the Council of Europe, which “shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law” (Art 6 [3] TEU).



EULEX Kosovo/Enisa Reshianin Kasemi

An EULEX Kosovo presiding judge during the initial hearing of a case held at Pristina Basic Court (2013)

### EU PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Over the last 10 years, numerous concepts have been developed to address priority areas of the EU's human rights policies in the CSDP domain: on the protection of civilians, particularly children, in armed conflicts, on international humanitarian law, on human rights defenders, on mainstreaming of human rights and gender in the CSDP mission/operation cycle, on gender equality, women and security, on generic standards of behaviour and disciplinary procedures for mission/operation personnel, and on transitional justice.<sup>3</sup>

Amongst the main imperatives for the design,

planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, as developed in these concepts, are: ensuring human rights expertise and gender balance in the missions/operations, awareness training for their personnel, reporting mechanisms for human rights issues and violations; improving child protection; developing instruments for conflict prevention; cooperation and coordination with other EU instruments and actors, international partners, and civil society organisations; supporting host countries in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), in revising their legislation, encouraging the ratification of relevant international instruments, promoting respect for human rights defenders, and political dialogue and public outreach.

<sup>3</sup> Inter alia, 'Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into ESDP – Compilation of relevant documents' ([*Council of the EU; further quotations also referring to Council documents*] 11359/07), 'Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other policies' (10076/06), 'Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP' (11936/4/06), 'Human Rights and Democracy: EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan' (11855/12), and instruments relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security (11932/2/05, 12068/06, 15671/1/08, 7109/12).



Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan/Christiane Buck

EUPOL Afghanistan advising on Community Policing in Mazar-e Sharif

## RULE OF LAW

Rule of law is a principle of governance whereby all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.<sup>4</sup>

In essence, this principle has evolved as opposed to the ‘rule of man’ (of an absolute ruler

being above the law), with the aim that all violators of the law be held accountable, even the state itself. It is deeply linked to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs.

Against the backdrop of the link between the ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ (the latter also being applied in the sense of ‘justice system/judiciary’, or referring to the ‘justice chain’ – police, courts, prosecution services and the penitentiary), these terms have at times been used as synonyms.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the initial emphasis within the rule of law area was on justice, to address war crimes and corruption that threatened the stability of countries emerging from conflict. With an independent judiciary still being at the heart of delivering that justice, the modern – broader – concept of the rule of law, as defined above, also encompasses the executive (mainly police) and the legislative branch of a state’s authority.

Of the manifold elements and obligations covered by the overarching principle of the rule of law, a great many are set out by the above-mentioned international treaties and conventions on human rights: for instance, standards for judicial procedures to substantiate and guarantee the right to a fair trial. They are also set out by a large number of resolutions and declarations of international organisations and bodies, including the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the OECD, and by international case law, in particular that of the International Court of Justice,

<sup>4</sup> See the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ 18173/10, adopting this definition of the rule of law as set out by the UN Secretary-General in his report ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ (2004).

<sup>5</sup> This was done by the EU, too, with the early ‘Comprehensive EU concept for *missions in the field of Rule of Law* in crisis management, including annexes’ (14315/02 and 9792/03), actually addressing justice missions (only). This concept’s revised and reviewed version was then named ‘EU Concept for *CSDP Justice Missions* (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ (18173/10). Likewise, at the Feira European Council 2000 ‘*Rule of Law*’ was identified as one of four priority areas for civilian crisis management (alongside police, civilian administration, and civil protection), effectively equalling ‘*justice reform*’ in recent terminology.

<sup>6</sup> See also the Council conclusions on fundamental rights and rule of law 10168/13, and on Ensuring Respect for the Rule of Law 16682/14: “(...) respecting the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental rights”.

the European Court of Justice and the European Court on Human Rights.

As to the relationship between human rights and the rule of law, while human rights have to do with the substance of rights and freedoms, the rule of law has to do with their just and effective protection and promotion. Or, as stated in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, “*human rights should be protected by the rule of law.*”<sup>6</sup>

### **EU PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS RELATING TO THE RULE OF LAW IN CSDP MISSIONS**

EU concepts for CSDP missions cover diverse state functions and policy fields in the broader rule of law area, such as police and justice, civilian administration, customs, border management, anti-corruption, human rights and gender. The ‘core concepts’, to be read in conjunction with each other, comprise the above-mentioned concept relating to CSDP justice missions, the ‘Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions (Interface with Broader Rule of Law)’, the ‘Comprehensive Concept for Police Substitution Missions – Revised Version’, and the ‘EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)’.<sup>7</sup>

Amongst the main imperatives for the design, planning and conduct of CSDP missions, as laid down in these concepts are: ensuring sustainable, transparent, effective and accountable institutions in the host countries, set up in a democratic fashion, being free from corruption, upholding human rights, in particular the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups, operating within a coherent legal framework, developed via due legislative process, and in line with international norms and standards.

These institutions should include an independ-

ent and impartial justice system, with unhindered access to, capable of dealing – without impunity – with the legacies of the past and the needs of the present, in coexistence with informal or alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and comprehensive approach under local ownership, and with a shared vision, in coordination with EU institutions and actors, and with the international community, in particular the UN, OSCE, AU and NATO, subject to regular reporting, measuring, assessment and adjustment procedures, with a proactive communication strategy vis-à-vis civil society in the host countries, and a clearly defined end-state and transition strategy.

These imperatives apply equally to the two generic types of CSDP missions in the area of rule of law: strengthening missions, supporting host countries by means of monitoring, mentoring, advising and training activities, and executive/substitution missions, delivering public services to (temporarily) replace dysfunctional local structures. Depending on their mandates, missions may take on a combination of these generic types, and may address a variety of the state functions and policy fields outlined above. Under the current concepts, executive/substitution missions would never stand alone, but always be complemented by strengthening activities – see the example of EULEX Kosovo, the only current CSDP mission whose mandate includes executive functions.

Promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law in implementing their mandates, these missions are at the heart of the EU’s contribution to restoring and maintaining international order beyond its borders, in ever closer coordination with the UN as its principal partner. As the ESS says: “*(...) establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening international order*”. The EU stands ready to play a vital part.

<sup>7</sup> 18173/10; 15031/09; 8655/5/02; 12566/4/05.



## 2.2.3. Strategic Communication – Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA)

by Vicente Diaz de Villegas

The EU comprehensive approach to crisis management intends to foster a culture of coordination amongst EU actors to ensure overall coherence in the EU's response. It also emphasises the need to work closely with partners. In modern information societies, the factor 'information' has evolved to become a decisive element for any security-related activity. Each and every action may affect the information environment.

### WHAT IS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION?

There are many and varied definitions of what Strategic Communication is; the following are just some definitions:

**NATO** defines Strategic Communication<sup>1</sup> as *“the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs (MPA), Information Operations (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims”*.

According to one of the *United States of America's* official definitions:

*“Strategic Communication<sup>2</sup> is the synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences.”*

According to the Multinational Experiment 6<sup>3</sup>, Strategic Communication consists of

*“focused [coalition] efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of [coalition] interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all [coalition partner].”*

Another definition for Strategic Communication<sup>4</sup> is

*“a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour.”*

1 NATO Strategic Communications policy PO (2009)0141, 29 September 2009.

2 Strategic Communication National Framework for Strategic Communication, March 2010.

3 Multinational Experiment (MNE) is a forum led by the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). MNE 6 was conducted with 18 nations plus the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Command Transformation (ACT). MNE 6 was a two-year multinational and interagency effort to develop and improve coalition capabilities to counter the activities of irregular adversaries and other noncompliant actors while incorporating a whole-of-government, comprehensive approach.

4 Strategic Communication: A Primer, CDR, Steven Tatham, PhD, December 2008.

## EU Strategic Communication (STRATCOM)



The EU does not have a specific definition as such of what Strategic Communication in CSDP is. This does not mean that this domain is not covered; on the contrary, the EU has adopted a more tailored definition when dealing with crisis management, the so called Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA). CRIA are based on the recognition that, while EU actors (Member States, EU Institutions) carry out their respective information activities, increased coordination has to be ensured so that the messages delivered by the different EU actors are coherent. These activities are related to a specific crisis situation and to the response which the EU is considering or indeed conducting, and seek to enlist and maintain support for the EU's aims and objectives in the context of its crisis response. These activities may be simultaneously conducted in the following areas:

- policy/diplomacy;
- economic/humanitarian affairs;
- priority civilian areas (police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection);
- military.

### EU CRISIS RESPONSE INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

All EU information activities related to a specific crisis situation need to be harmonised and synchronised at every level to ensure that the messages delivered are as coherent as possible and, finally, that the comprehensive nature of the EU's effort is adequately understood by all audiences.

The fundamental challenge that must be tackled in order to invigorate this synchronisation is to think strategically in the way the EU communicates. Each crisis situation requires a tailored-made Information Strategy: a real plan conceived at the conceptual stage of any Crisis Management Concept<sup>5</sup> and, ideally, forming an integral part of it.

However, this *custom-made Information Strategy* must fit into a broader one that is in keeping with the overall EU regional approach.

The EU definition of Crisis Response Information Activities has a more reduced scope than STRATCOM, as it is oriented to a specific crisis. Therefore the success of EU Strategic Communi-

<sup>5</sup> Ideally from the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA).

## How are the EU Crisis Response Information Activities coordinated?

For each crisis there is an **“EU comprehensive Information Strategy”** which details:

- EU Information Objectives
- Target Audiences
- Main themes to be developed
- Means to reach them
- Master messages to convey
- Themes to avoid and themes to emphasise

cations derives from the inclusion of those Information Strategies in an overarching strategy.

The particular case of the Horn of Africa (HoA) is a clear example of the need for a comprehensive strategy. Such a complex theatre, with military operations, civilian missions, development projects and EU Delegations working side by side, in addition to the existing conflicts in the area, demands synchronisation of communication to internal and external audiences and of engagement with other stakeholders. Currently, there are separate Information Strategies in place for EUTM SOMALIA, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and EUCAP NESTOR.

The EU Special Representative (EUSR) requested an overall and comprehensive Information Strategy to harmonise all efforts in the area. Accordingly, in a report of 4 May 2012 on key actions for the HoA, the importance of having a clear and comprehensive EU communication and outreach strategy for the HoA region was agreed and the EUSR was invited, in coordination with the EEAS and Commission, to take this forward.

A Crisis Information Strategy should not be initiated as a compilation of master messages, but should consider the EU's broader engagement in the region, the information objectives, themes to

avoid and to emphasise, audiences of concern and the means available to influence or bring about change. Only then, i.e. after that conceptual process, can master messages be drafted with a clear aim.

### SOCIAL MEDIA


Of the different possible scenarios, *hybrid warfare*<sup>6</sup> is one in which *social media* have an enormous impact. It is therefore essential to focus on effects, audiences and influence in order to select the most appropriate and effective social channel.

As observed in several crises, notably in Ukraine and Syria/Iraq, news of any developments, whether accurate or inaccurate, will often spread more rapidly by social media and micro blogging (e.g. 'Facebook' or 'Twitter') than by traditional news outlets.

The EU has long noticed the growing impact of these communication channels. Consequently, efforts are continuously being made to adapt CSDP structures to this new dimension: from Brussels level down to the staff and resources allocated to social media in operations and missions.

<sup>6</sup> Hybrid warfare: where coordinated, overt and covert use of a broad range of instruments, military and civilian, conventional and unconventional are employed ambiguously.

## Build-up Process of an Information Strategy



### THE MILITARY DIMENSION

Military operations affect the information environment, and by doing so they influence the local population's perception and have an impact on whether the conduct of an operation is deemed a success or a failure. As described by General Krukak in the “Three Block War”, tactical incidents can also have strategic effects<sup>7</sup>.

In the case of the EU, having united various information and communication disciplines under the roof of Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA) in line with the comprehensive approach (CA), it is necessary to render seamless cross-echelon support to the mission objectives by actively shaping the information environment on operations. Operations “within the population

and in front of the cameras” are subject to local, regional and worldwide scrutiny. Therefore, there is an exponential importance attached to shaping the information environment, initially to influence first impressions and manage expectations and later to achieve the EU information objectives.

With respect to EU CRIA in the military domain, the Crisis Information Strategy is implemented through Military Public Information/Public Relations<sup>8</sup> (Mil PI/PR) and Military Info Ops<sup>9</sup> (Mil Info Ops).

Mil PR/PI and EU Mil Info Ops are separate but related functions that must remain closely coordinated.

<sup>7</sup> As described with the requested leadership of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ in isolated situations and the effects of his decisions in the upper levels.

<sup>8</sup> EU Mil PI/PR supports the information objectives drawn from the Crisis Information Strategy at each level of the military chain of command, by reporting facts and assessing events in the most appropriate way.

<sup>9</sup> EU military Info Ops is a military function that provides advice and coordination of military activities affecting information and information systems in order to create desired effects in support of the mission-specific Crisis Information Strategy and of the EU’s political and military objectives.



In CSDP military training missions (EUTM) and military advisory (EUMAM) type of missions, information activities play an important role. The advisory, mentoring and training pillars provide a great opportunity to support, in daily interaction, the nucleus of the future security forces in defining their future role, associated capabilities and doctrine and policies.

## ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES

Regional and international organisations, such as NATO<sup>10</sup> and the UN, place a lot of emphasis on the growing domain of STRATCOM.

Examples of this can be found in the documents in which these two organisations define their approach to crisis management.

Within the EU there are different organisations in charge of information activities at EU institutional level (European External Action Service [EEAS] and EU Military Staff [EUMS]), at Member States' level, and finally, at OHQ level:

### ***EEAS: Information Strategy Team (IST)***

To draft an Information Strategy, a comprehensive team (IST) is established. Strategic Communications must be the business not only of a specific EEAS division but of all EEAS bodies involved.

To assist here, relevant expert personnel from each EEAS body (i.e. Regional Desks and Crisis Management Structures) and from other EU instruments (e. g. ECHO, DEVCO) are recognised and selected to create the pillars of an "EU Information Strategy Team".

This group of expert planners meet routinely to draft and review information strategies and master messages and should be in a position to represent their own areas of expertise.

### ***EUMS***

Within the EUMS, the Crisis Response Information Activities are divided into two areas: Military Public Information/Public Relations and Military Info Ops<sup>11</sup>.

### ***EU Member States***

Inside the EU, Member States such as Germany (Operative Kommunikation der Bundeswehr) and Italy (Comunicazione Operativa) are supporting efforts in the area of information activities through investigation, experimentation and further development of capabilities. The United Kingdom is one of the main providers of the foundations on this domain<sup>12</sup>, particularly when it comes to social media, and France also makes valuable contributions in this field. Other Member States are also developing capabilities in this area. In all cases, and as the EUMS does, Member States differentiate between Public Information/Public Relations activities and Information Operations activities.

### ***OHQ***

OHQs from the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and Germany have a permanent part of their nucleus structure dedicated to effects, particularly those related to information and influence.

10 NATO STRATCOM Centre of Excellence (CoE) was inaugurated in Riga in 2014.

11 The EU Mil Info Ops function coordinates a broad range of activities performed by various military capabilities and functions, but it is not limited to them. These capabilities and functions are the following: Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Troop Information programmes, Operations Security (OPSEC), Deception, Physical destruction, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Troop Presence, Posture and Profile.

12 In April 2015 UK Army's 77<sup>th</sup> Brigade will be created to support operating "in the information age" with specialised capabilities for the information activities domain.



High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President Federica Mogherini makes a press statement at the 51st Security Conference in Munich, 8 February 2015

## SUMMARY

The fundamental challenge when it comes to invigorating EEAS Strategic Communications is for the EU to think strategically in the way it communicates. Each crisis situation requires a tailored-made Information Strategy – a real plan from the conceptual stage.

Coordination among actors within the EEAS is essential to achieving a real comprehensive approach between the political and military/operational spheres and convergence between the different levels of decision and action.

A Crisis Information Strategy should not be initiated as a compilation of master messages but must consider the information objectives, themes to avoid and emphasise, audiences of concern and the means available to influence or bring about change.

Only then, i.e. after that conceptual process, can master messages be drafted with a clear aim.

The challenge for the EU is to find the right way to convey its messages to the local audiences at the different theatres. All civilian missions and military operations are dependent on the ability to engage in culturally attuned communication with critical communities in theatre, besides our traditional domestic audiences. This requires capacity to carry out conceptual planning in advance.

The exponential growth of social media cannot be ignored. Member States are using it as a sensor, but it is necessary to analyse its role as an effector. Lessons from the Ukraine crisis and ISIL/Da'esh must be analysed and ways to properly engage with the social media arena must be found.

## 2.2.4. Law of armed conflict and rules of engagement

by Michael Pesendorfer

### INTRODUCTION

The Common Security and Defence Policy provides the EU with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets to be used on missions outside the EU for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Multinational military crisis management operations (CMO) across virtually the entire spectrum specified in Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) are playing an increasingly prominent role in international security policy.

However, the success of a multinational operation depends to a great extent on the ability of its members to work together effectively. In line with this aim, legal support is necessary to meet any future challenge and ensure operations are conducted lawfully under the umbrella of the EU as a “cooperative security provider”. The legal paradigm framing the envisaged joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making<sup>1</sup> and post-conflict stabilisation, is significantly different from that which applies in war.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United States marked the start of a protracted armed

conflict. The brigades crossing into Iraq were not in the least concerned about passports, visas and customs procedures. But when these brigades prepared themselves on other territories on their way to Iraq, these legal issues were key considerations.

All EU crisis management operations since 2003 have differed from war in that the law and jurisdiction of the host nations have not been displaced. In the absence of an agreement with the host nation, the EU-led force and other EU personnel are basically subject to the laws and jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of the host nation and its courts. Political settlement, not victory on the battlefield, is the ultimate measure of success in EU-led military crisis management operations.

Experience of recent EU-led operations and operations conducted by other international organisations has highlighted the increasing number of situations in which legal support is a key factor to ensure that the military action taken complies with the law. EU policymakers and military commanders alike need to understand the legal basis for the mission, the scope of authority for accomplishing the mission and the use of force. They also need to be aware of status of forces agreements, the role of the International Criminal Court, the applicability of international humanitarian law and how human rights are to be safeguarded under the given circumstances.

<sup>1</sup> The existing UN definition of peacemaking, as presented in UNSG's Agenda for Peace, suggests that only diplomatic efforts, such as mediation and negotiation, be undertaken. It is submitted that at the time of Petersberg Declaration the interpretation of 'peacemaking' was closer to what relevant EU and WEU documents call 'peace enforcement' in this context. The term 'peace enforcement' describes the use of force to restore international peace and security in situations of coercive military action.



## LEGAL BASIS FOR EU-LED CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

The legal basis for CMO ultimately begins with the TEU. The TEU provides a framework, resources and procedures for implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Further guidance is provided by the conclusions published after European Council meetings.

CFSP decisions are generally taken unanimously. This means that one Member State can block the adoption of a text. The Treaty, however, includes a number of measures intended to overcome this obstacle.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Charter is the overarching international legal authority for both the use of force and crisis management operations. A fundamental tenet of international law, codified in the UN Charter, is the prohibition against intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states. The use of military forces in 'peace support operations' derives from the Security Council's desire to facilitate the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Following up the principles of the UN Charter and of the OSCE Charter for European Security, as well as the objectives of the EU, as outlined in the TEU, the EU is active in stability promotion, early warning and conflict prevention. It cooperates with the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe and other international organisations in a mutually reinforcing manner.

Legal authorisation of any EU-led military crisis management operation derives from a decision of the Council of the European Union. Established political and military bodies and structures within the Council enable the Union to ensure the CMO is given the necessary political guidance and strategic direction, while respecting the single institutional framework.

A clear understanding of the legal basis promotes the legitimacy of the operation, enabling commanders and crisis management structures to better plan their missions, structure public

statements and ensure their conduct is in keeping with the CFSP. It affects the operation's purpose, scope, timing, use of force, the status of personnel, and the command's relationships with military and non-military organisations. The EU Operation Commander (OpCdr) must have been granted specific authority for each action he or she takes in the course of executing his/her mission. Unless there is a specific prohibition on taking an action, a commander may take the action under his own authority. The OpCdr's national or cultural background and his branch of military service are important factors that influence how he or she approaches the mission. However, the approach of an OpCdr is certainly influenced by factors such as rules of engagement, geographic limitations on the operation, obligations toward refugees and displaced persons, and appropriate relationships with NGOs, international organisations, and contributing third states' contingents.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is one of the most legally important and politically charged issues in CMO. In CMO the military's role, while essential, is most likely a supporting one. EU Operation Commanders and Force Commanders are supported by staff including political and legal advisors who advise them on how to conduct a joint operation in full compliance with the applicable provisions of international law, the EU legal framework and the host nation's law.

Coordination, interaction and liaison need always to be established between the EU-led military force and its contacts in international organisations, civilian authorities, NGOs and the civilian population to make use of synergies to promote the mission.

The point in time when operational control shifts from a state to the commander of the EU led force is a critical juncture for the status of the forces, financial issues, logistics issues, and rules of engagement.



## USE OF FORCE

Generally, the military uses force in two situations: for self-defence and for mission accomplishment. During a CMO, when tactical actions of a single soldier can have ‘strategic consequences’, a proper understanding and application of the rules of engagement (RoE) are vital. This implies that the success or failure of a CMO may hinge on how well the use of force policy and the RoE are conceived, articulated, understood and implemented. Application of the rules of engagement is probably the most visible military-legal issue facing both the commander and soldiers in a CMO.

All use of force – in self-defence and under the RoE – in any CMO must always be in conformity with international standards, especially international law as defined in applicable international agreements, customary international law and the guiding principles of the EU, and limited to what is necessary.

The authorisation of use of force is an essential part of the political guidance and strategic direction for any CMO.

Although use of force is generally understood to encompass armed force only, limitations in international and national law affect all forms of measures taken by military forces that encroach upon the freedoms of individuals. In addition to the use of armed force, measures such as identity checks, searches, detention or retention need to be addressed in comprehensive guidance on the use of force provided by the OpCdr. Such measures should respect human dignity and, as far as possible, local customs. These measures may limit the exercise of individual freedoms guaranteed under fundamental human rights. They therefore need an appropriate legal basis in order to be legitimate.

## RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

RoE are influenced by three considerations: law, policy, and mission. The rationale for any given rule will be influenced by one or more of these considerations, but RoE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions.

RoE may further define the intensity or nature of the force to be used. Depending on the operation and the mission profile this instrument gives the OpCdr maximum flexibility to tailor the potential use of force to his mission.

RoE cannot be viewed separately from the operational planning process. They form a product of that process, which has identified all relevant aspects of the mandate, the mission, the OpCdr’s intent and the means at his disposal. Hence, while the development of generic RoE in the context of contingency planning may be appropriate, each operation will need tailor-made RoE.

RoE are used to ensure that military forces operate in accordance with the political goals set. They provide the OpCdr with the required guidance on behalf of the competent authorities. RoE should take into account the political goals to be achieved, reflect military, political and other relevant capabilities, and conform to the national and international legal requirements applicable to the operation.

During international armed conflict, an adversary will be declared hostile. Elements of that adversary’s forces may be engaged upon identification, without first having to commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent. In CMO, groups are rarely declared hostile. Soldiers may, however, use force in self-defence.

Self-defence is a universally recognised inherent right of individuals to defend themselves using necessary and proportional force against attack or imminent attack. The law in Member States with regard to the use of force in self-defence varies in scope and in nature. However, the general principles that any force used must be necessary and proportional are common to all Member States’ legal systems. Usually terminology is a critical issue in RoE development in multinational crisis

management operations. Therefore all participating national military contingents must share the same understanding of RoE terms.

However, the various national contingents have to reflect these provisions in accordance with their national legal limitations in the RoE cards (“soldier cards”) which they provide to their individual soldiers.

The classification of the RoE for a CMO will be determined by the prevailing political and operational circumstances. Every soldier from each national contingent must have access to and understand the rules. Ideally, this would happen sufficiently early in the CMO to allow the rules to be distributed and training on their use to be provided. The declassification of the RoE shows openness to the population in the mission area but could enable those seeking to frustrate the CMO to place the military at a severe disadvantage.

Past experience has proved that it is often difficult for military forces to withdraw from a complex peace support operation before the political and civilian aspects of the mission are well under way and succeeding. As a result, EU CMO scenarios allow for coordination and cooperation between EU military and civilian components, possibly supported by other international organisations, agencies or non-governmental organisations, to meet the challenge of restoring law and order in the crisis region. This may have an impact on the RoE because the military is involved in supporting the civilian aspects of the operation, possibly through the use of force. The issue to be decided is this: against whom and to what extent will the military be authorised to use force to uphold law and order in an ostensibly sovereign state? Pressing law enforcement and force protection matters typically include interaction with civilian police and civilian police checkpoints, freedom of movement, prevention of crimes by civilians, and the detention of civilians.

The overarching aim is always to protect civilians and ensure unimpeded access to humanitarian aid, not necessarily only in situations of armed conflict. Return and resettlement of refu-

gees and displaced persons is likely to be involved in the civilian part of a CMO. However, commanders will need to know what exactly the military’s obligation is toward refugees and displaced persons, whether the military will be expected to assist in return and resettlement, and if the military is expected to provide protection and other humanitarian assistance to support in the return and resettlement process.

As long as the Rule of Law (RoL) is not working in an area of operations, the military could be asked to contribute to the functional spectrum of policing, management and oversight of public safety and security, thus providing for and maintaining a safe and secure environment. This might require new technologies and the use of less-than-lethal means of crowd control or self-defence. There are new developments in technology that may be very useful in peace operations to control a volatile situation without resorting to deadly force or riot control agents like tear gas.

Finally, the use of information technologies in CMOs raises such issues as whether a “cyber-attack” (non-kinetic attack) constitutes a “use of force” within the meaning of the UN Charter and whether the use of cyber-technology as a weapon constitutes a hostile act. Another category of issues is the use of force against information sources within the operational area. The ‘EU use of force concept’, with its generic compendium of RoE, provides answers adapted to all scenarios.

## **PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY**

The growing number of interreligious and interethnic conflicts has implied not only attacks against civilians but also, in many cases, the destruction of civilian objects, in particular cultural property. Acts of vandalism directed against such objects or their destruction are particularly common in such conflicts, as cultural property can be considered to symbolise the cultural identity and history of the adverse party.

## LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE STATUS OF EU-LED CMO FORCES

There are several international treaties which also may be invoked to protect the military force while in the host nation. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is a subject of immense political, legal, military, and personal concern during a CMO for soldiers, commanders, and governments. The SOFA defines the legal rights, obligations, privileges and immunities of all the parties, and facilitates the accomplishment of the military's mission. A SOFA may be concluded between the host nation and the EU, there may be individual agreements between participating states and the host nation, or both may be the case during an operation. An important aspect of any SOFA for the commander is immunities and jurisdictional waivers. The SOFA should contain provisions on the following:

- scope of application and definitions;
- privileges and immunities;
- claims and legal proceedings for non-contractual liability;
- identification;
- deceased members;
- entry and departure; transport; free and unrestricted passage; exemption from tax and duties;
- legal capacity and payment of taxes;
- local personnel;
- premises, provisions, supplies, services and sanitary arrangements;
- liaison;
- disputes;
- miscellaneous matters.

## CLAIMS

Another important aspect of the SOFA is dispute resolution, or the settlement of claims, between the military and the local population. If handled well, claims settlements can have a very positive effect on public relations, establish goodwill with the local population, and facilitate mission accomplishment.

## INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

The use of force by military personnel does not automatically entail the applicability of the 'law of armed conflict' or international humanitarian law (IHL). Generally, IHL is triggered by international armed conflict and not merely by military operations in which force may be used on a limited basis, as in peace support operations. However, issues involving IHL that arise in either a civil war or an international armed conflict are often carried over to the post-conflict CMO.

While technically IHL may not apply in a CMO, the principles of IHL do: considerations of necessity, proportionality, unnecessary suffering, unnecessary destruction of property, and distinction apply whenever and wherever the military uses force. Furthermore, in CMOs that go beyond traditional peacekeeping,<sup>2</sup> it is anticipated that combat operations or the use of force beyond that employed for immediate self-defence will occur.

It is EU policy that the EU-led force will comply with the applicable provisions of IHL during the conduct of all military operations and related activities in armed conflict. Commanders should also be aware that many other treaties and conventions apply across the entire spectrum of military operations, including CMOs.

2 The words 'traditional peacekeeping' refer to strict Chapter VI-style peacekeeping where there is a high degree of consent among the parties, a ceasefire agreement is in place, the force is small and lightly armed, the use of force is authorised only in self-defence, and there are no enforcement powers.

Aside from the applicability of the various conventions and treaties comprising IHL in CMOs, the commander should be aware of two key issues related to IHL which will almost certainly arise during any CMO. The first relates to civilians. Perhaps the first challenge in dealing with civilians in a peace operation is that of deciding who qualifies as a civilian and, subsequently, whether any civilians receive special status (e.g. refugees). Caution is the key in making this second determination, for the status given to a person can bring with it legal rights and obligations.

Other questions relate to determining the military's legal obligation toward civilians. Issues concerning humanitarian assistance, detainment, and civilian property abound in CMOs. Dealing with civilians is the type of complex legal situation where issues of sovereignty, the legal basis for the operation, the RoE, and the SOFA all converge in a tactical situation involving only a limited number of individuals that could have serious strategic consequences if not handled properly. Commanders are advised to consult extensively with their legal and political advisors and civil affairs officers regarding the designation and treatment of civilians. This is one category of issues that the international media and international organisations watch very closely.

## CONCLUSION

The success of an EU-led force depends to a great extent upon the ability of its contributing states to work together effectively. It almost goes without saying that commanders must know the situations in which significant legal difficulty could be encountered, the issues likely to arise and the questions to ask. There are many national and EU resources – including all the EU Concepts applicable to CMO – for commanders and staff to consult prior to deployment in theatre. Familiarity with the contents of the documents and contact with those who have participated in complex peace support operations can help commanders and staff to prepare for recurring challenges and to be alert to unexpected ones. The complexity and variety of the issues raised by different aspects of any CMO make clear the importance of the law to commanders.



## Rules for the Use of Force

The term Rules of Engagement (RoE) used by the military derives from ‘engagement in combat’, clearly originating from a war-like scenario and thus legally bound by the law of armed conflicts.

On the other hand, civilian CSDP uses the term Rules for the Use of Force (RUoF) and refers to other scenarios: collective self-defence/mission protection and Rule of Law (RoL)/Law Enforcement. For this reason, the legal framework of RUoF consists of the more restrictive provision for the protection of human rights and related international standards for law enforcement.

For security reasons or to perform an executive mandate, civilian CSDP missions may also be armed. In broad terms, RUoF correspond to the ‘Confirmatory RoE’ for the part related to collective self-defence/mission protection. Nonetheless, they may also include authorisation to use force as ‘second responders’ – temporarily assuming an executive role – in support of local police to ensure the maintenance of public order. Finally, when the mission is invested with executive powers, its armed personnel will be bound by the relevant, locally applicable penal legislation (provided that this complies with the principle of respect for human rights). Also in the latter case, the immunities from local jurisdiction of the Status Of Mission Agreement (SOMA) apply.

When civilian CSDP missions are to be armed, specific provisions will accordingly be included in the SOMA and the mission-specific RUoF annex will be an integral part of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) approved by the Council.


The Rules for the UoF (RUoF) are required to provide clear and unequivocal parameters

within which personnel and units deployed with a mission may use force in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, Human Rights, the mandate assigned by the relevant Council Decision and all related principles of International Law.

RUoF have to take into account the political goals to be achieved, reflect the civilian, political and other relevant capabilities and comply with the national and international legal requirements of the mission. They provide the Head of Mission (HoM) and mission personnel with the necessary guidance.

Competent authorities at international, regional and national level must ensure that the UoF policy and the mission-specific RUoF do not jeopardise the execution of the mandate or put lives at risk unnecessarily. On the other hand, the RUoF help to assist the HoM, as appropriate, when pursuing the mission’s objectives in accordance with the assigned mandate.

Luigi Bruno



Graphic: Bruno/Scala

## 2.2.5. International criminal law and transitional justice

by Sari Kouvo and Christian Behrmann

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the adoption of the Rome Statute in 2000 strengthened the international law commitment so that there can be no amnesty for gross human rights violations and war crimes. The Rome Statute confirmed the increasing political consensus that amnesty for those responsible for the worst violations during conflict is not conducive to sustainable peace. However, accountability is not the only way of dealing with legacies of conflict-related violations. Contemporary transitional justice mechanisms also include documentation and truth-seeking, vetting and institutional reform, reparations and symbolic measures, such as memorials. It is also important to mention that Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, in its guidance to authorities after non-international armed conflicts, encourages the broadest possible amnesties. The Additional Protocol II reference to amnesties cannot include grave breaches of international humanitarian law, but it is an important reminder that re-establishing normal relations in life and institutions after conflict also demands reconciliation. Ultimately, the aim of all these measures is to strengthen society's ability to move forward after conflict or other transitions, through bringing those responsible for the worst crimes to justice, acknowledging the suffering of victims and building institutional resilience.

The European Union is a strong supporter of the ICC and of transitional justice. The 2006 concept note on transitional justice and ESDP (10674/06) defined transitional justice as a *“framework for confronting past abuse as a component of a major political transformation – from war to peace or from authoritarian rule to democracy”*. Recognising that political will was often a challenge to transitional justice, the concept note

emphasised the importance of combining justice and reconciliation efforts with *“other public interest objectives, such as the consolidation of peace and democracy and the need for economic development and public security”*. That is, the concept note clearly puts accountability, transitional justice and reconciliation at the heart of what has become CSDP and the EU's comprehensive approach to managing external crisis and conflict.

In practice, very few CSDP missions and operations have dealt directly with ICC- and transitional-justice-related issues. However, through their engagement with security provision in crisis and conflict situations or security sector reform in post-conflict situations, CSDP missions do often find themselves balancing interests of peace and interests of justice: they may find themselves dealing with the challenges of joint patrols with security forces with very different levels of education, mentoring security-sector personnel with records of human rights abuses and violations or training military and police personnel who have gone through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes with very limited focus on accountability or on vetting in human rights terms.

### THE EU AND THE ICC

The ICC, for the purpose of preventing and curbing the commission of the serious crimes falling within its jurisdiction, is an essential means of promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. Based on the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression (Arts. 5-8). The ICC is established

on the basis of the principle of complementarity. The primary responsibility for bringing offenders to justice lies with states themselves in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. The successful implementation of this ‘complementarity principle’ requires both political will and capacity.

The EU provides strong support – politically and diplomatically, and logistically and financially – to the ICC and other criminal tribunals, for instance the ad-hoc international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to steadier action in this area through its emphasis on strict observance and development of international law (Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union).

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 states that one of the strategic objectives of the EU is an international order based on effective multilateralism. Support for the ICC is highlighted as an example of the EU’s commitment to a rule-of-law-based international order. In order to enable Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world, the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS states that the ICC should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. All EU Member States have ratified the Rome Statute and the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court (APIC).

As pledged at the Kampala Review Conference (2010), the EU updated its Common Position 2003/444/CFSP by Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP, adopted on 21 March 2011 (this Decision repealed and replaced Common Position 2003/444/CFSP). The objective of the Council Decision is to advance universal support for the Rome Statute by promoting the widest possible participation in it, to preserve the integrity of the Statute, support the independence of the Court and its effective and efficient functioning, support

cooperation with the Court and support the implementation of the principle of complementarity.

In accordance with the Council Decision, a revised Action Plan was adopted on 12 July 2011. It consists of five sections: (i) coordination of the Union’s activities to implement the objectives of the Decision; (ii) universality and integrity of the Rome Statute; (iii) independence of the Court and its effective and efficient functioning; (iv) cooperation with the Court, and (v) implementation of the principle of complementarity.

Moreover, according to the ‘EU Action Plan to follow up on the Decision on the International Criminal Court of 12 July 2011(12080/11)’ endorsed by the EU Political and Security Committee, the “*EU and its Member States will undertake consistent action to encourage full cooperation of States with the ICC, including the prompt execution of arrest warrants. The EU and its Member States should avoid non-essential contacts with individuals subject to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. They will monitor and address developments that may hamper the ICC’s work.*” The EU’s response to non-cooperation with the ICC by third states focuses particularly on how the EU and its Member States can respond to impending instances of non-cooperation, to persistent or repeated cases of non-cooperation, and when to avoid non-essential contacts with individuals subject to arrest warrants issued by the ICC.

Given states’ primary duty to investigate grave international crimes, the EU is particularly engaged in promoting and contributing to strengthening the capacity of national judicial systems to investigate and prosecute these crimes. The European Commission and the European External Action Service have developed a Joint Working Document on Advancing the Principle of Complementarity. This Complementarity Toolkit aims to provide operational guidance for bridging the gap between international justice and national justice systems, as effective and efficient interaction between national justice systems and the ICC is pivotal to giving full effect to the Rome Statute.



Photo: EEAS/EUCAP NESTOR

EUCAP NESTOR - 'Judicial Protection Training Course' held in Mogadishu

### ACCOUNTABILITY AS PART OF THE BROADER FRAMEWORK OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy (2012–2014) emphasised the EU's commitment to ensuring accountability and its support for the ICC, but it also called for the adoption of an EU policy on transitional justice so as to help societies to deal with the abuses of the past and fight impunity (see action 27). Transitional justice deals, as noted in the ESDP concept, with addressing legacies of violations after conflict in order to strengthen post-conflict institutions and peace. Or, as noted in the 2004 UN Secretary General's report on the rule of law and transitional justice in post-conflict societies, transitional justice includes the *"full range of processes and mechanism associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation"*. Although transitional justice is closely associated with the principles of accountability, the UN definition also emphasises reconciliation. The different mechanisms for

transitional justice developed over the past decades seek equally to promote accountability, build institutional resilience and ensure reconciliation; the ultimate aim is sustainable peace.

Besides mechanisms for accountability promoted through national prosecutions, ad hoc or hybrid tribunals or the ICC, transitional justice mechanisms include:

- acknowledging the suffering of victims, often through memory- or memorial-related initiatives;
- documentation and truth-seeking, mostly promoted through truth commissions;
- criminal prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations;
- vetting and institutional reform, often focused on removing former perpetrators from power and reforming justice and security-sector institutions;
- reparations to victims and victims' families implemented through either individual or collective reparations programmes.

While the ICC and the Rome Statute promote international standards for accountability and limit possibilities for amnesty, transitional justice measures are – and should be – adapted to the



needs of each specific context. The understanding that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to transitional justice is also at the heart of the EEAS's and the European Commission's understanding of conflict analysis, which should be context-specific and victim-centred.<sup>1</sup>

## CSDP, ICC AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

As noted above, apart from the adoption of the ESDP concept on transitional justice in 2006, there has so far been limited overlap between the EU's use of its CSDP tool and its commitment to the ICC and transitional justice. This may seem surprising, as CSDP missions and operations are deployed in several contexts where the ICC has initiated preliminary examinations or even formal investigations, including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Libya, and that most of the countries where CSDP missions are deployed grapple with legacies of past violations and war crimes. The EULEX Kosovo mission is one of the few missions which directly engages with these issues. In the case of EULEX Kosovo, the mission itself draws upon an executive mandate within the Kosovo justice sector, while prosecuting war crimes (related to the Kosovo conflict in 1999) is at the core of its efforts. These efforts are complemented by the mission's role in the establishment of a Specialist Court, which will deal with specific allegations made in a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report of 7 January 2011 against members of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

However, even when CSDP missions are not directly involved in supporting the ICC or transitional justice, they can contribute as part of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis. Support for the ICC or more broadly for transitional justice does not necessarily need to

be part of CSDP missions' core mandates, but it is important that CSDP missions, in their security provision and justice and security sector reform efforts, be aware of and where relevant support other EU efforts that contribute to accountability and justice. This is particularly important when providing strategic advice on security sector reform and when supporting security sector vetting initiatives. For these reasons it will be important to continue operationalising guidance on the ICC and transitional justice with a specific focus on CSDP. This was already foreseen in the 2006 ESDP concept note.

Important elements for CSDP are furthering knowledge about not only the EU's commitment to the ICC, but also the Rome Statute obligation that states parties cooperate with the ICC (Art. 86 Rome Statute). This applies to various types of cooperation with the Court, including the execution of arrest warrants. Non-cooperation by a Rome Statute state party not only undermines the Court but also constitutes a breach of a legal obligation and should be treated as such. Integral to – but also broader than – accountability issues are the EU's commitment to ending sexual violence in conflicts. Gender-based and sexual violence in conflict are Rome Statute crimes, but addressing legacies of gender-based and sexual violence after a conflict also needs victim-centred and institutional responses. These are issues that CSDP missions and operations supporting justice and security sectors are already tackling in several contexts and will need to continue engaging with. Also integral to CSDP missions' engagement in security and justice sector reform is support for vetting processes that are non-discriminatory and that also take account of legacies of human rights violations and war crimes. Civil society consultation is another obvious area for consulting about legacies of conflict and their impact on post-conflict SSR and justice reform or institutional reform more broadly.

<sup>1</sup> EEAS and EU Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action.

## 2.2.6. Protection of civilians

by Vincenzo de Benedictis



Photo: AAF/Peter Lechner.jpg


Protection of civilians in need of basic medical treatment in the margins of EUFOR Tchad/RCA

In this century, civilians continue to suffer as a result of armed groups – state and non-state – failing to abide by national and international law, as we can observe in places such as the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Syria and Ukraine. In contemporary conflicts, civilians have increasingly become the victims of the struggle for power over populations, resources and territory by competing armed groups. Terrorising civilians through such means as sexual and gender-based violence, the threat of violence and/or killing, harassment, enslavement or inflicting serious injuries has become a frequently employed tactic in order to achieve political goals.

Multiple groups of perpetrators have been targeting civilians in many recent and ongoing armed conflicts, as demonstrated by cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, post-conflict revenge,

insurgency, etc. Some of the groups have political, strategic, ethnic, religious or ideological aims; others seek new soldiers (often children) and forced labour (often women) or are organised criminal groups exploiting the lack of state governance. Sometimes they may be proxies of the host government, third-country governments or signatories to a peace agreement. The groups often present a combination of these characteristics, adjusting their behaviour and alliances to the evolving conditions.

Targeted individuals and groups include refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, migrant workers, journalists, healthcare personnel, human rights activists, missionaries (religious or lay), humanitarian aid workers and volunteers, women, children and ethnic and religious minorities. Today the situation is of concern in many



countries where civilians (especially women and children) continue to be subject to various forms of extreme violence, often causing grave humanitarian crises including forced migration.

States have the responsibility to protect their own citizens; lack of political will, capacity or governance mechanisms sometimes render them unable or unwilling to act. Sometimes atrocities may even be state-sponsored.

### IMPORTANCE AND SCOPE OF POC

For the above reasons, protection of civilians (POC), in particular the protection of women and children and the fight against sexual violence in armed conflict, has become increasingly important specifically in the margins of UN peacekeeping operations or CSDP missions and operations. There is no common definition of POC, but there is a general understanding that the entire spectrum of those involved in conflict and post-conflict environments, both military and civilian, has an important role to play in protecting civilians. Nevertheless, the local or host government and its security institutions maintain the primary responsibility.

Protection of civilians is broadly understood as all efforts to reduce the effects of war or violence on civilian life. There are several 'layers' of protection of civilians: physical protection from imminent violence, access to basic necessities (e.g. food, water, medical assistance), enjoyment of human rights (e.g. freedom of speech) and enabling the conditions for the above. The 'protection onion' above, which illustrates these layers, also explains the different conceptual understandings of what protection may entail. It distinguishes between different aspects of the protection agenda that fall under the responsibility of different protection organisations, which include but are not limited to the following (both civilians and military) in a given area of operation: the UN, the EU, the ICRC, other international organisations, humanitarian and human rights organisations, multinational coalition forces (with a clear POC mandate), the host country, and governmental and non-governmental organisations.

In 2010 the UN produced an operational concept on POC for peacekeeping operations, which represents a critical contribution to developing a common understanding of POC. The Concept

describes three non-hierarchical, mutually reinforcing tiers of protection:

- protection through political process;
- providing protection from physical violence; and
- establishing a protective environment.

The Concept serves as a basic organising framework for how multiple lines of activity (at the political, military, and humanitarian and human rights levels, respectively) can support POC. They must be appropriately coordinated, prioritised, resourced and implemented as part of an overarching political strategy. Activities identified in the first tier relate to the facilitation and promotion of a peace process; activities in the second tier focus on preventing and responding to physical violence; and activities in the third tier concern supporting the rights of civilians through humanitarian activity, legal protection and institution building.

The EU has welcomed the UN concept and later that same year, it updated its *'Guidelines on Protection of Civilians in CSDP Missions and Operations'*.

POC may be the objective or an aim of a CSDP operation. Operations contributing to POC may not be limited solely to monitoring and oversight of a ceasefire and respecting all the conditions of a peace agreement: they will usually require a deeper involvement of the EU military forces.

The military will usually contribute to a safe and secure environment (SASE) and they may be mandated to employ military force to provide protection from imminent threats of physical violence towards the local population.

POC is of particular importance due to its moral, political, legal and strategic implications and potential consequences.

However, its significance in any particular operation or mission will depend very much on the extent to which POC is part of the mandate and tasks.

## A COMPREHENSIVE AND LONG-TERM EFFORT

Comprehensive and long-term POC requires attention and action by many national and international non-military organisations (e.g. the host nation (HN), international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGO), who have primary responsibilities and capabilities for many of the actions and efforts necessary to achieve the desired outcome: long-term POC. The military will usually act in support of these organisations, primarily enabling their efforts by maintaining a safe and secure environment (SASE), which is characterised by freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence.

However, SASE achieved through a military contribution is not the end-state, but only a temporary solution. Resurgence of violence will always remain possible, including during transition phases and the handing over of responsibilities between different POC stakeholders. The end-state for POC will be achieved when both the root causes of violence have been addressed and local Rule of Law (RoL) is enforced, enabling the administration to protect its local population. The EU's comprehensive approach can duly contribute to achieving long-term POC.

POC includes both military and non-military aspects. A military operation will have to consider and coordinate these aspects in order to ensure a successful POC effort; this may be viewed as a layered set of issues. POC is inevitably a long-term effort across a broad front, usually requiring the need to:

- protect civilians from physical violence;
- protect human rights;
- contribute to securing the rights of access to essential services and resources;
- contribute to a secure, stable and just environment.



## POC IN EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS

Thus military operations may include many tasks in support of POC, such as: ensuring freedom of movement; providing safe areas, safe zones and safe havens; separating civilians from combatants; ensuring accountability and providing for detention; maintaining law and order; providing a show of force (deterrence); supporting conflict mediation; contributing to the peace process; peace mediation; promoting international humanitarian law and refugee law. The starting point will be the primary need to identify, track and coordinate, early on, with an enormous array of people in the field, which requires the military to be extremely flexible while shifting continuously from kinetic to non-kinetic actions. From this perspective, POC is a relatively new job for the military, fraught with many challenges, grey areas and diverging interests; at the same time, there is little or nothing in the way of military doctrine, education, exercises, training, guidelines or lessons learned.

The above challenges include the following:

- Coordinating with many people in order to try and synergise POC efforts;
- Identifying the groups or individuals to be protected;
- Managing the protection expectations, which the presence of a military operation inevitably increases, by appropriate strategic communications and Military Information Operations;
- Ensuring conflict sensitivity, including the principle of 'Do No Harm', by gaining a deep understanding of the context, including civilian population insecurities/security concerns and implications for the mission, avoiding inadvertent contributions to conflict dynamics and civilian insecurity, planning military efforts so as to build upon existing or pre-conflict civilian and military protection systems;
- Making sure that the armed forces of the host nations, which the military operation will support, do not include elements that pose a threat

to the civilian population that European military forces are mandated to protect;

- Matching the mandated level of ambition with the available resources and capabilities;
- Preventing/avoiding/minimising Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS), as is the case in any military operation, and using an ample range of Less Lethal Capabilities for this purpose, in particular in a military operation where POC is an aim or the objective (CIVCAS could completely delegitimise the military operation, and concurrently other EU objectives).

Failing to ensure POC during an operation could have strategic consequences due to the negative impact of media coverage on public opinion. In turn this could undermine the credibility and ultimate success of a military intervention due to failed expectations and could result in reduced public support.

## CONCLUSIONS

For all of the above reasons, there is a specific need to employ and coordinate an entire set of particular capabilities within the military operation and to coordinate in a timely manner with others involved in protection. Education, training and exercises must include POC in order to raise awareness and spread knowledge.

In 2013, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) felt it was necessary to have a military concept on "POC in EU-led military operations". Adopted in March 2015, this concept provides guidelines for greater focus on the military aspects of POC in all the phases of an EU-led military operation.

## 2.2.7. Anti-corruption

by Raluca Stefanuc

Over the past two decades, considerable efforts have been made worldwide to raise awareness as to the pervasive effects of corruption on economic development and growth, social justice and rule of law. Anti-corruption policies were placed higher on the political agenda by various leaders and organisations and all-encompassing international anti-corruption instruments such as the comprehensive United Nations Convention against Corruption were adopted. Yet the road from declared intentions to actual reality still appears to be a long one. In many countries confronted with endemic corruption affecting the very core of the rule of law and democratic institutions, corruption remains, in spite of massive legislative and institutional changes, a very profitable business and tangible results are not yet in evidence.

While a treasure trove of wisdom has already evolved regarding what worked and what did not work when promoting anti-corruption policies, there are very few examples of countries suffering from systemic corruption where anti-corruption policies could be considered even relatively successful. Therefore, the question of what does it really take to make anti-corruption policies deliver appears to be still valid.

This article presents a brief overview of the main efforts undertaken by the EU to strengthen anti-corruption policies and the instruments at its disposal to achieve this objective. It also reflects on a number of key issues that can indicate whether an anti-corruption policy is sufficiently solid to bring about convincing results.

Mention should be made that in the context of EU policies, *corruption* is defined in a broad sense, as any ‘abuse of power for private gain’. It there-

fore goes beyond the criminal law angle, touching upon a wide range of areas and measures which impact on corruption risks and on the capacity to control corruption.

### EU ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

#### General remarks

Whatever general remarks one may have on corruption, they also apply within the EU as well. Without a doubt, corruption is a complex phenomenon and against many of its trans-national aspects action taken only at national level is not enough. Corruption is distorting the inner structure of licit economies, by facilitating tax evasion, lowering investments levels, reducing competition and increasing the costs of doing business.

For these reasons, corruption has received close attention from the EU for over a decade now, as reflected throughout the main instruments at its disposal: legislation, policies and support programmes/agreements.

#### Legislative framework

Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that the Union “shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security, including through measures to prevent and combat crime”. Pursuant to Article 83 TFEU, corruption is one of the particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension for which minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences

and sanctions may be established. The EU has therefore been vested with the general right to act in the field of anti-corruption within the limits established by the Treaties.

In terms of legal instruments, although the pieces of EU legislation primarily targeting corruption are rather scarce, the EU has taken some very important steps at an early stage in defining active and passive corruption and in requiring EU Member States to ensure an effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties system for certain corruption offences, as well as to introduce the liability of legal persons for certain categories of corruption-related offences. These were reflected in the Protocols to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests<sup>1</sup>, the Convention of 26 May 1997 on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union<sup>2</sup>, and the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector<sup>3</sup>.

In 2008, as an important step towards a stronger EU stance against corruption, the EU joined the most comprehensive international anti-corruption legal instrument: the United Nations Convention against Corruption.<sup>4</sup>

Some other important pieces of legislation with relevance for anti-corruption policies have

recently been adopted at EU level, such as: the reformed Public Procurement Directives<sup>5</sup> which contain strengthened anti-corruption safeguards, including specific provisions on conflict of interest; the Directive on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the EU<sup>6</sup>; the revised Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies<sup>7</sup>, whereby the companies concerned have to disclose information on policies, risks and outcomes as regards, inter alia, anti-corruption matters.

A new Accounting Directive was adopted in June 2013, introducing a new obligation for large extractive and logging companies to report the payments they make to governments (country-by-country reporting-CBCR).<sup>8</sup> Reporting would also be carried out on a project basis, where payments have been attributed to specific projects. The Accounting Directive regulates the information provided in the financial statements of all limited liability companies which are registered in the European Economic Area (EEA). In order to ensure a level playing field between companies, the same disclosure requirements were incorporated in the revised Transparency Directive<sup>9</sup>. This includes all companies which are listed on EU regulated markets even if they are not registered in the EEA and incorporated in a third country.

1 First Protocol of 27 September 1996 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 2). Second Protocol of 19 June 1997 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests (OJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 12).

2 OJ C 195, 25.6.1997, p. 2.

3 OJ L 192, 31.7.2003, p. 54.

4 Council Decision 2008/201/EC of 25 September 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption [Official Journal L 287 of 29.10.2008].

5 Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94/65, 28.03.2014); Directive 2014/25/EU of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94/243, 28.03.2014) and Directive 2014/23/EU of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ L 94/1, 28.03.2014).

6 Directive 2014/42/EU of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ L 127/39, 29.04.2014).

7 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330/1, 15.11.2014).

8 Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182/19, 29.06.2013).

9 Directive 2013/50/EU of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose

The Commission has also recently put forward a number of legislative proposals currently going through the adoption process with the Council and/or European Parliament and which are also relevant in the context of anti-corruption policies, notably in relation to criminal law aspects. These concern: the proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law<sup>10</sup> and the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office<sup>11</sup>.

Mention should also be made of the upcoming new Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (i.e. fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive) and the Regulation on information *accompanying transfers of funds*. In February 2013, the Commission submitted a proposal for the fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive<sup>12</sup> and a proposal for a Regulation on *information accompanying transfers of funds*<sup>13</sup>. On 10 February 2015 the Council approved an agreement with the European Parliament on this package. This approval paves the way for adoption of the directive and regulation at second reading. The package implements the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), but also provides in some areas additional safeguards and higher standards as compared to FATF's requirements. Among other things, the new rules will for the first time oblige EU Member States to main-

tain central registers listing information on the ultimate beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities, as well as trusts. This measure can also serve as an efficient anti-corruption tool.

## Policy initiatives

In terms of anti-corruption policy initiatives, the first Commission Communication in this field<sup>14</sup> was issued in 1997 and was aiming at setting the framework for a number of relevant measures against corruption that would define an EU strategy line. In 2003, the Commission adopted a second far-reaching Communication on a comprehensive EU policy against corruption<sup>15</sup>, calling on the European Council to fully endorse the conclusions and recommendations formulated therein in a number of EU policy areas.

In June 2011 the Commission adopted an anti-corruption package bringing a new approach to addressing corruption at EU level. The anti-corruption package of June 2011 consisted of a Commission Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU<sup>16</sup>, an internal Commission Decision establishing an EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism for periodic assessment ('EU Anti-Corruption Report')<sup>17</sup>, a Report on modalities of participation of the European Union in the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)<sup>18</sup> and a second implementation Report

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securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC (OJ L 294/13, 6.11.2013).

10 COM (2012) 0363 final.

11 COM (2013) 534 final.

12 Proposal of 5 February 2013 for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, COM(2013) 45 final.

13 Proposal of 5 February 2013 for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds; COM (2013) 44 final.

14 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Union policy against corruption, adopted by the Commission on 21 May 1997 COM(97) 192 final.

15 COM(2003) 317 final.

16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee on Fighting Corruption in the EU of 6 June 2011 (COM(2011) 308 final).

17 C(2011) 3673 final.

18 Report from the Commission to the Council on the modalities of the European Union participation in the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (COM(2011) 307 final).



of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector<sup>19</sup>. The main novelty of the anti-corruption package consisted of the setting up of an EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism to assess on a periodic basis EU Member States' efforts against corruption.

The 2011 Commission Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU also calls for a stronger focus on corruption in a range of relevant external EU policies. Thus, it emphasised a reinforced focus on anti-corruption and the rule of law in the EU enlargement process, a strengthening of the efforts to reinforce the capacity of neighbourhood countries to fight corruption, continuous support for strengthening good governance and democratisation in the context of cooperation and development policies, as well as the promotion of specific anti-corruption or transparency-related provisions in free trade agreements.<sup>20</sup> The Commission support for global frameworks aimed at setting up transparent systems for extracting and trading natural resources and raw materials, such as the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, is also mentioned in the 2011 Commission Communication. These have been complemented by the legislative measures mentioned above as regards the Accounting and the Transparency Directives.

## Reporting mechanisms

On 3 February 2014, the Commission adopted its first EU Anti-Corruption Report<sup>21</sup>. Subsequent reports will follow every two years. The EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism does not aim to reinvent the wheel, but rather to streamline the

pool of information available from a wide range of sources, including existing monitoring mechanisms such as GRECO, OECD or UNCAC, as well as civil society, researchers, experts, specialised networks, associations, bodies, agencies and other stakeholders. It also aims to assess the achievements, weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the EU Member States' anti-corruption policies, identify EU trends, stimulate peer learning and exchange of good practices and ultimately help to frame and implement more effective policies against corruption at EU and national level. The key concept underlining the EU Anti-Corruption Report is 'political will' as it is intended to become a tool that can: be useful to all layers of society in the EU Member States, offer an overview of both cross-cutting and country-specific corruption-related issues, look into possible solutions and focus on impacts of both corruption and anti-corruption measures.

The first EU Anti-Corruption Report was aimed at giving a frank assessment of how each EU Member State tackled corruption, how existing laws and policies work in practice, and it suggests how each EU Member States can step up the work against corruption. The first report included: (1) a general part on overall corruption-related trends across the EU (based on the findings of the individual country assessments and a presentation of the results of the most recent Eurobarometer surveys on corruption); (2) a thematic part on selected cross-cutting issues of particular relevance at EU level (in the case of this first Report: corruption in public procurement); (3) 28 country-specific chapters focusing on outstanding issues specific to each EU Member State (not limited to the matters covered by the thematic part). Good practices were also presented all throughout the report.

<sup>19</sup> Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council based on Article 9 of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (COM(2011) 309 final).

<sup>20</sup> COM(2011) 308 final, pages 15-17.

<sup>21</sup> Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – the EU Anti-Corruption Report of 3 February 2014; COM (2014) 38 final.



Photo: IACA

The International Anti-Corruption Academy's mission is to deliver and facilitate anti-corruption education and training for practitioners from all sectors of society and provide technical support and assistance to a wide variety of stakeholders

## WHAT MAKES OR BREAKS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY?

As noted above and also acknowledged by the EU Anti-Corruption Report, major legislative and institutional changes pursued in countries undergoing substantial reforms often failed to deliver the expected tangible results. There is indeed no one-size-fits-all solution, but nevertheless some lessons could be learnt from a variety of anti-corruption reform processes that have been attempted or the few that have been implemented even relatively successfully around the globe.

While most, if not all, the points below have been made before, they only constitute a personal reflection and a modest attempt to present, in a very simple form, aspects that could be looked

into when prompting or assessing anti-corruption reforms. Also, aspects highlighted below would be more appropriate for countries or environments where corruption is widespread and where substantial anti-corruption reforms are required.

Therefore, looking at the types of problems often encountered when implementing anti-corruption policies, one could summarise the following 'must-haves' when promoting a solid anti-corruption policy:

### 1. Genuine political will

It is widely accepted that no anti-corruption policy can be successful without genuine political will. This could only arise in a favourable politi-

cal context where real power to change or reform is present. This would entail, inter alia: stability, peace, unity in decision-making, awareness/recognition of corruption problems at political level, prioritising of resources to enforce anti-corruption policies, high-level tangible commitments, etc.

Other prerequisites are: political accountability (i.e. clear checks and balances and accountability for actions and decisions taken by those in positions of power) and the tone taken at the top (i.e. leaders committed to fighting corruption should promote integrity through their own actions and lead by example).

An important part of political accountability is related to the level of transparency and integrity of the interface between business and politics, including transparency, effective supervision and follow-up of wrongdoing concerning financing of political parties and electoral campaigns, connections between public contracts and political financing, illegal lobbying, revolving doors, etc. Political parties' discipline may also contribute considerably to ensuring political accountability.

In this respect, integrity and anti-corruption should constitute influential elements in the decisions taken within the political parties.

## **2. The right people appointed on their merits to the right positions**

People matter most when starting or implementing a reform process. The legislative and institutional settings are important and indispensable, but with these in place and the wrong people at the top little if any progress can be made. It is therefore worth investing a lot in finding the most capable people with the drive, profile and capability to carry out top assignments and lead key institutions that can propagate a wave of reforms.

Supporting or investing in institutions which appear to have the right legal and administrative setting, but instead have a weak or incapable leadership, would likely achieve little in the way of results.

## **3. A tailor-made and problem-oriented approach that takes account of the specificities of each country, region, sector and context (i.e. no one-size-fits-all)**

Anti-corruption policies should consider the realities of each country, region, sector, and circumstances. Solutions that worked well in one place or context may not work as well in another place or context. This is because corruption is interwoven with a wide spectrum of economic, legal, historical and social aspects which vary greatly from one context to the other, both in place and in time.

## **4. Joint coordinated efforts and effective checks and balances in all policy areas (i.e. no isolated measures)**

As mentioned above, corruption is closely related to a wide range of factors, from economic to social. This entails that an effective anti-corruption policy must reflect an all-encompassing approach and be linked to a range of cross-cutting measures and sector-specific reforms which have a wider scope than anti-corruption. For example, an anti-corruption strategy targeting the healthcare sector cannot work in isolation from or independent of a wider healthcare reform context which exceeds the mere purpose of preventing and combating corruption. Also, within anti-corruption policies themselves, a very effective preventive response by a strengthened criminal justice system cannot on its own address deeply-rooted corruption problems if not complemented by effective prevention policies, as well as internal and external control mechanisms across the board (including external audit bodies and oversight).

A high level of transparency of public spending, including public procurement and implementation of public contracts, as well as of decisions taken by public institutions, including state-owned, state-controlled and state-regu-

lated companies, is also a key factor in ensuring proper accountability levels of those in power, as well as effectiveness of checks and balances in relation to areas or activities most exposed to corruption.

**5. Public pressure from all sides of society (no actual social tolerance for corrupt practices), including access to information, transparency and good quality education**

In the long run, this may produce the most tangible results: i.e. a society that reacts to wrongdoing, abuse of power or ineffective decision-making by leaders and which also has sufficient leverage to make those in power and public services care about their reaction. To arrive at this situation, one needs to ensure proper access to education and proper quality of education; high levels of transparency from decision-makers, including through the opening up of databases containing public interest information in a user-friendly format; ensuring adequate and timely access to information, including through well-informed and easily accessible media (internet access has also an important role to play in this context).

A well-informed and powerful society would be the ultimate guarantee of sustainability of anti-corruption reforms. Any coherent sustained efforts in this regard would be rewarded in the longer term.

Finally, mention should be made that, notably in the context of EU external action, including the EU accession processes, and also in relation to post-accession monitoring of certain EU Member States, external oversight and leverage, also through specific anti-corruption conditionalities linked to various financial, legal or policy instruments, often proved to be beneficial in driving reforms forward. This was particularly valid at times when various reform processes were put at risk, for example through actions of political leaders threatening rule of law fundamentals or undue pressure threatening the existence and functioning of key institutions or legislative measures putting the anti-corruption framework at risk, etc. In such instances, the external leverage acted as an enabler for exerting political will or at least for mitigating damage. There were also situations where leaders whose genuine political will to implement anti-corruption reforms was questionable have nevertheless pursued such reforms given a certain political context or the incentive of instruments or processes with an external dimension. Nevertheless, external leverage cannot work on its own; in order to ensure sustainability of reforms, it must be balanced with responsibility for and ownership of reforms at national level. This could also be achieved through supporting the real national anti-corruption champions and civil society who have the necessary drive and commitment and who can ensure that internal checks and balances are in place and guarantee continuity of reforms from within.



## 2.2.8. Public diplomacy

by Victor Reuter

Over the years the European Union has evolved into a key player on the international security and defence scene. Since the creation in March 2003 of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina by a Council Joint Action, some 30 civilian and military missions and operations have been launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU is constantly improving its crisis management capabilities, both civilian and military.

The CSDP engagement usually takes place in high visibility areas, creating a need for accountability, transparency and trust. This need can be met only if the mission or operation has a well thought-out and thoroughly planned communication strategy and policy. An increasing number of communication officers are therefore being deployed in support of all our missions and operations.

In addition to the general public's ever-growing desire to communicate, new risk prevention measures must be taken into consideration. This leads to new tasks for the communication specialists.

The new communication technologies have not only increased the speed, scale, interactivity and global reach of information flows, but have also opened the door wide to speculation and manipulation. This means that public information analysis has to be considered in a completely new light.

In terms of the information-driven process, the operational level of a mission relies on a constant supply of verified and accurate information to ensure the efficiency of its action. The mission's

local counterparts share that need and are likely to be grateful for any support in meeting it. This new reality results in new tasks for the Press and Public Information Officer.

Since no two scenarios are alike, a "one size fits all" approach is not realistic, although the CSDP has its own philosophy and style that set it apart. Nevertheless, the strategies themselves vary from one mission or operation to another.

### PHRASEOLOGY

A succinct version of the Commission's understanding of public diplomacy was provided as part of a booklet produced for the EU's 50th anniversary celebrations in 2007:

*"Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing. It means clearly explaining the EU's goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media."*<sup>1</sup>

The tasking related to this very general description is found in a mission's organigram as its Press and Public Information Office (PPIO). An analysis of the existing missions' structures shows that the set-up of the individual communication units differs from almost every mission to every other, depending on the mandate and environment.

<sup>1</sup> European Commission, *A glance at EU public diplomacy at work, The EU's 50th anniversary celebrations around the world* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), p.12.



Photo: EU2015.LV

Press statement of HR/VP Mogherini in the margins of the 'Gymnich' meeting in Riga/Latvia, March 2015

### **THE PPIO INSIDE THE MISSION STRUCTURE: A SERVICE PROVIDER**

Usually the communication unit is administratively subordinate to the Chief of Staff and, as such, is part of the Chief of Staff's Office. However, in its daily business it reports directly to the Head of Mission and, in any case, it supports the entire mission staff.

Operationally, the PPIO has a number of internal points of contact that it deals with on a daily basis, particularly the political department and the key operational actors. Information exchange and public information analysis delivery are among its daily tasks.

The support provided to mission staff in general boils down to daily analysis/media monitoring, fact sheets, press lines, logistic support, training etc.

The PPIO coordinates with and takes guidance from the High Representative's Brussels-based strategic communication unit within the EEAS. In the mission area, close coordination with all EU actors – particularly with the local EU Delegation – is mandatory.

### **EARLY DEPLOYMENT**

When designing a mission it is highly recommended to consider all possible communication issues right from scratch, i.e. during the fact finding stage, and to deploy an embryo of the future unit at the start of the planning phase or with the Crisis Response Team, as appropriate. The mission's arrival on site usually generates major interest, commentaries, questions and very early media requests. It is important to shape the mission's

image right from the beginning. When it comes to winning hearts and minds, the first impression matters.

Building a communication structure takes time. Once deployed, the press and public information officer faces a long list of logistical, technical and human resources challenges. The early deployment period is the ideal time to compile the PPIO notebook and make important contacts that will be of inestimable value once the mission is up and running, especially if it becomes necessary to resort to crisis communication at a given moment.

As all other mission departments, the PPIO works in close cooperation first with the Planning and Methodology Section and later on with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Their joint efforts will notably result in the definition of initial master messages and an information strategy to be submitted to Member States in Brussels.

## THE START-UP PHASE

The start-up of a mission is a critical stage for shaping the future communicative action, as that is when the basis is established for the final structures, resources, procedures and tools. It is not only about putting up the flag and creating first awareness for the mission. A number of tasks that will ensure the sustainability of communication have to be performed:

- Exploring the local public information scene (media, social media, public opinion, consumer habits, communication equipment landscape, technological issues and market prospection), and identifying local stakeholders and opinion leaders.
- Contacting any existing EU presences and international community partners, who are reliable sources and generally a great support.
- Giving some thought to the corporate identity of the mission. Visuals (logo and letterhead), the website, the social media presence and the

initial information material (e.g. fact sheets, CVs) have to be developed. Basic working tools (e.g. camera, voice recorder, TV set, flags) have to be provided.

- In terms of planning, the PPIO is involved in drafting the concept of operations (CONOPS), the operation plan (OPLAN) and the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP). At this point the communication policy and the communication strategy have to be finalised, the communication budget has to be established and the first procurement procedures for equipment and visibility support have to be launched. During this very intensive period the HR strategic communication unit and the CPCC expect as much feedback as available.
- Finally, the PPIO dedicates a great deal of time to the first major public event, the official mission launch, which is accompanied by the declaration of initial operational capability.

As for all other mission components, staffing levels are low in the early days. Recruitment will take place much later. Be aware that at that point the staff selection procedures will take a lot of your time. It is, however, crucial from the outset to have sufficient support from a minimum of trustworthy staff who are native speakers of the local language and are familiar with the environment and customs in the mission area. This will also facilitate 'local ownership'.

## POLICY AND GUIDANCE

The CSDP communication policy looks pretty much the same for every single mission. Basically all missions have a positive, fully transparent relationship with the media and all other public communication actors. Nevertheless, certain procedural rules must be followed:

- Public information is organised under the control of the PPIO, which is to be informed about any public information contact or request addressed to a mission member. It is up to the



PPIO to assess the communication opportunity and to check up on the reliability of the requester.

- General press lines and lines to take in response to general, non-specific information requests are to be made available to every mission member. In all other cases the PPIO has to be contacted and involved directly.
- Conversely, the PPIO depends on information that every staff member can provide, particularly in relation to sensitive issues likely to arouse public interest.
- Finally, every mission must be able to regulate its own and its staff's social media behaviour. The mission's social media user guide addresses all procedures for professional and private use, establishes sanctions and rules, and provides advice.

## THE PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY

The strategic approach varies from mission to mission, although there are general communication rules and principles that apply to all operations in their everyday communication and, to some extent, crisis communication:

- Ensuring accuracy, availability, pro-activity, bottom-up and one-channel communication, and having pre-selected talking heads are measures that can help avoid major trouble.
- The communication action must be coherent and coordinated with all players within and outside the mission.
- The response has to be quick, but not hasty.
- Language and wording play a crucial role in getting a clear message across.
- Do not forget the impact of audio-visual elements, which have become central to consumer habits.

In addition to these general principles, every mission PPIO will have to configure its strategy to fit the local circumstances. Choices have to be made on the balance between direct communication (social media and public relations) and traditional

media (TV, radio, print and web press) which implicitly involve social gate keepers/journalists. Both, however, need to be used. A profound knowledge of the local stakeholders and the habits of information consumers is needed to make the right choices.

The same approach can be followed for the choice of target audiences, although there is also some common ground here among all missions in terms of the EU recipients (mainly the Member States and the institutions). Each mission needs to identify the civil society organisations, opinion leaders, minority groups or other demographic groups it wishes to communicate with. The same applies to international communities, depending on the nations and organisations (for example think tanks and non-governmental organisations) operating in the mission area.

The choice of communication tools is also dependent on the technological environment and consumption patterns in the theatre of operations. It has to be a mix of relevant press elements (e. g. press releases, audio-visual materials, press conferences, interviews, background briefs, op-eds, press visits) and PR/social media activities (campaigns, delocalised events, road shows, billboards, brochures, promo items, advertising, civil society and social events, twitter, Facebook, YouTube, website). Keep in mind that the use of PR elements, in particular, is costly, labour-intensive and requires considerable procurement effort.

## CRISIS COMMUNICATION

Crisis perception varies greatly from mission to mission, depending on the mandate, the physical and psychological environment and the image of the mission. All the above-listed strategic communication principles apply. However, a crisis situation breaks with the normal communication workflow:

- The pressure is much more intense over a prolonged space of time.



- Maximum communication coordination is needed under the guidance of the Head of Mission (HoM) with all mission elements, the local counterparts and the EU actors (mainly the EEAS HR strategic communications and the local EU Delegation communications unit).
- The PPIO is part of the security management board and will be involved 24/7 in order to respond to all calls in a quick but non-hasty manner, along clearly pre-drafted lines. Only facts are to be delivered, no comments. A maximum of care is required for off-the-record information delivery.
- Be prepared to deny rumours and inaccurate information, but make sure that your response is proportionate as regards the content, the publicity, the recipient and the publication tool.
- Intensive live media monitoring and analysis are crucial. It might be necessary to set up a dedicated temporary communication platform, or even to open a crisis media centre.

## INTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Staff come first: make sure that your people are informed ahead of the public. While internal communication is not an exclusive PPIO task, the PPIO contributes extensively to it, mainly in crisis communication situations. Every single mission member is a spokesperson for the mission. Basic press lines and up-to-date lines to take therefore have to be available. The right balance must be struck between transparency and confidentiality: need to know versus nice to know. Typical contents cover the mission mandate, achievements, milestones, etc.

In addition, care should be taken to keep the workforce up to date on the important events within the mission, as well as outside the mission. The periodical in-house newsletter and the daily media monitoring/analysis are excellent tools to handle this challenge. Internal information can be delivered through a range of other formats, including the intranet, bill boarding, social media, social events, HoM visits, town hall meetings, training and team building events. Ensuring the workforce maintains a high level of knowledge which is essential to performance, satisfaction and a good working atmosphere in general.

## 2.2.9. Gender and the UNSCR 1325

### Women, peace and security agenda

by Sari Kouvo



Photo: EUFOR Althea/ Herbert Pencl

Equality and non discrimination are fundamental principles integrated in CSDP missions/operations. Soldiers in EUFOR Althea display their united commitment to the mission (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013)

The European Union (EU) currently deploys Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in fifteen crisis and conflict situations. Most of the missions and operations are engaged in security and justice sector reform efforts or directly in security provision through monitoring or deploying European military forces. Although not a dominant component in CSDP missions, all missions in some way engage with issues of women's participation or with gender issues. The focus on women's participation and on integrating a gender perspective draws on the fundamen-

tal norms of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It also draws on the EU's commitment to integrating UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and several policy frameworks, including the EU's Crisis Management Procedures.

The EU, like other organisations engaging in reform efforts in crisis, conflict and post-conflict situations, has had to realise that there is no one-size-fits-all approach or silver bullet for success-

ful and sustainable reform. This is also true for gender mainstreaming and efforts to implement the women, peace and security agenda. Crisis situations and transitions can provide opportunities for renegotiating gender roles, but they can also result in new challenges such as a rise in domestic violence, a rise in corruption and organised crimes, including sexual exploitation and trafficking in women and children. The influx of international organisations can itself be a poisoned gift for women, as the politically and culturally attuned approaches of local actors are exchanged for sometimes too standardised international approaches on gender and women's issues.

The EU – and its CSDP missions – have over the years developed comprehensive policy frameworks that seek to guide and support practical approaches promoting equality and women's rights. Lessons from CSDP missions provide important guidance for continued work. This article seeks to reflect both policy and practical developments.

## KEY CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS

### Equality and Non-discrimination

Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental principles of international human rights law. They are also fundamental values of the European Union, enshrined in its normative framework (Article 2 Treaty on European Union and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The EU should also seek to uphold and promote its values and interests through its foreign policy (Article 5(3) TEU).

Equality and non-discrimination have internal and external dimensions. EU institutions, including the CSDP structures, should ensure that they have relevant procedures in place to promote equality and provide remedies for discrimination. This includes promoting equal opportunities in

employment and having proper and properly implemented codes of conduct and disciplines.

An important element for the internal dimension is codes of behaviour that forbid discrimination, harassment and exploitation. In 2005 the EU had already adopted *Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP Operations (8373/1/05)* covering both civilian and military missions and seeking to ensure that personnel in CSDP missions and operations hold themselves to the highest possible standards. In addition, all CSDP missions have mission-specific codes of conduct and behaviour and procedures for dealing with complaints. As called for in the EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2012–2014, the EU is currently revising its code of conduct and discipline for civilian missions.

The external dimension involves ensuring that CSDP missions and operations in their programming and activities also promote equal rights between women and men. This is done through an emphasis on integrating a gender perspective (gender mainstreaming) and through seeking to implement UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. These concepts and policy frameworks will be addressed below.

### Gender mainstreaming

The notion of gender refers to the different social roles of women and men, which often dictate what possibilities and constraints women and men have in a given society. By analysing gender roles in a society or an institution, it is possible to identify women's and men's different access to power, influence and resources. That is, to identify the underlying causes of inequalities and discrimination. Gender mainstreaming seeks to ensure that this analysis – and the strategies adopted to counter inequalities and promote non-discrimination – are integrated into all programming and parts of an institution. In the EU and in CSDP missions and operations, gender advisers or focal points ensure that the institution





Promotion of female police officer at Kabul City Police HQ, 2014

has relevant knowledge and understanding about women's rights, equality and non-discrimination issues and, for example, gender-based and sexual violence. Mainstreaming seeks to ensure that the whole institution benefits from this knowledge and promotes equality. Key policy frameworks for gender mainstreaming include:

- *Mainstreaming Gender and Human Rights into ESDP (11936/4/2006)*. This policy document provides guidance for mainstreaming at the mission level.
- *Lessons and Best Practices of Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into CSDP Military Operations and Civilian Missions (17138/1/2010)* follows on the 2006 policy document. Key lessons include: that human rights and gender elements should be reflected throughout the planning, implementation, reporting and review cycle; that the ultimate responsibility for mainstreaming needs to lie with mission management; and that CSDP human rights and gender advisers should be strategically placed within the mission, so that they can provide timely input to mission management. Expertise should also be integrated into the operational aspects of the mission; human rights and gender elements should also be reflected in the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management, including coordination and cooperation between all EU actors on the ground;
- *Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations (7660/2/2013)* integrated some of these lessons, inter alia by emphasising the importance of mainstreaming human rights and gender and by including special headings for human rights in crisis management templates. The human rights headings ensure that human rights information is reflected in all planning documents for CSDP missions.



## UNSCR 1325 (2000) ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

The EU has been a strong promoter of the UN Security Council's thematic resolutions on women, peace and security. It has also sought to integrate especially UNSCR 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security into its crisis management. The women, peace and security agenda developed through the seven thematic Security Council resolutions emphasises women's participation, empowerment and protection. They also include a thematic focus on gender-based and sexual violence and establish a framework for implementation. Important policy documents for implementing the women, peace and security agenda within CSDP include:

- *Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security (15671/1/2008)*, which emphasises women's participation in CSDP missions, that CSDP missions when planning their activities must consult with local women's organisations and ensure that missions include a focus on human rights violations against women, especially conflict-related sexual violence. The EU has also adopted 17 indicators that help monitor the progress made in integrating the women, peace and security agenda; five of the indicators focus specifically on CSDP. The indicators are being revised in 2015.
- *Implementation of UNSCRs on women, peace and security into CSDP mission and operations (7109/2012)* provides further guidance for integration of the 1325 agenda into CSDP.

## ELIMINATION OF GENDER-BASED AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT

Since the early 1990s, the elimination of violence against women has developed into an important sub-theme within the field of equality, non-discrimination and women's rights. Over the years, the focus has shifted from violence against

women to gender-based and sexual violence, recognising that although most victims of, especially, sexual violence are women and girls, sexual violence also affects men and boys. The UK-sponsored Global Campaign for Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict (2014) has also resulted in new EU initiatives to tackle sexual violence in conflict, including its consequences for post-conflict peacebuilding and reforms.

The EU's approach to combating gender-based and sexual violence in conflict aims to be comprehensive, i.e., it engages all EU institutions, including CSDP. It is also based on an understanding that conflict-related sexual violence and its effects do not end when the conflict ends, but that it is important to address issues of sexual violence when engaging in justice and security sector reform and with civil society. Key policy documents include:

- *EU Guidelines on Violence against Women and Girls and Combating all forms of Discrimination against them (16173/1/2008)*
- *Non-Paper on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict – a Guide to Practical Actions at EU Levels (155/2014)*

## WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AND GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

As noted above, the EU does have a very well-developed policy toolbox for gender mainstreaming and integration of UNSCR 1325. How are these policy frameworks implemented in CSDP missions?

An important element in all equality work – whether internal or external – is women's participation. Within CSDP missions a critical mass of women is important for ensuring a positive working environment for women. In many crisis and conflict situations where the EU is present through its CSDP missions and operations, the presence of women is a necessity in order to gain legitimacy from local populations and reach

out to women. Women's participation in CSDP missions and operations has, however, grown only slowly over the years. By January 2015, there had been only two female heads of civilian CSDP missions, and the percentage of female staff in missions has remained at around 20-25 %. There are no regular statistics on women's participation in military operations, but levels are considerably lower.

All current CSDP missions and operations have human rights and/or gender advisers or focal points. The term 'adviser' tends to be used for staff whose full-time occupation it is to deal with human rights and/or gender issues and who have expertise/prior experience of dealing with these issues. The term 'focal point' tends to be used for staff who have been assigned to deal with human rights and/or gender issues in addition to their other tasks and who are not necessarily expected to have specialised knowledge. The advisers and focal points tend to be responsible either for mainstreaming gender into the overall work of the mission or for undertaking specific gender-centred projects. These projects most often focus on women's participation or on supporting institutional structures that seek to ensure women's empowerment or protection.

Some examples of gender-centred activities follow.

The police mission in Afghanistan has been seeking to encourage women to join the Afghan police force. The mission has also, very importantly, sought to establish safe and appropriate working conditions in a context where violence against women is rampant and where women who are working are still viewed with suspicion by much of society. The police mission in the Palestinian Territories has been supporting the adoption of a law prohibiting domestic violence and supporting the establishment of family response units.

In Mali, where the EU has two missions, the focus of the EU Training Mission has been on supporting the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces. Military training includes training on

basic principles of humanitarian law and on the protection of civilians, with components about sexual and gender-based violence as war crimes.

In the Central African Republic, the EU has been deploying an executive military force to ensure some stability and security in the area of the capital. Here the EU force has had to grapple with protection issues, including how to ensure that women's organisations providing basic services to women and children can continue to operate.

## FORWARD-LOOKING STRATEGIES

Through the CSDP tool, the EU has been able to engage in crisis and conflict situations and also to ensure that gender issues are integrated in the post-conflict justice and security sector reforms. The EU by now has strong policies for gender mainstreaming and for integrating UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, and has gained practical experience through the CSDP missions. The key task henceforth will be to ensure that the EU's policies and knowledge are turned into operational guidelines, so that gender and women, peace and security issues are reflected systematically in the planning, implementation and reviewing of CSDP missions, and so that CSDP staff are helped in their everyday work with gender and women, peace and security issues.

The commitment of mission management to gender and women's rights issues is also important, as is gender advisers' and focal points' knowledge of the political and cultural context in which they are working. Contemporary crisis management and post-conflict work is also about cooperation and the ability to coordinate with both international and national actors. An important tenet of the UNSCR 1325 women, peace and security framework is that women need to be represented and that their opinions need to be taken into account in all aspects of this cooperation and coordination.

## 2.2.10. Conflict sensitivity – Why and how do I need to engage differently in a situation of conflict and fragility?

Compiled from the EU staff handbook:  
Operating in situations of conflict and fragility, December 2014<sup>1</sup>

Sensitivity to context is required in all fragile situations, not just crisis situations. The case of Rwanda, where the international community was claiming progress in economic and development terms just months before the 1994 genocide was unleashed, is evidence of the need for greater awareness of the political forces, social dynamics and fundamental beliefs and values that exist in society. As the study on lessons learned from CSDP missions and operations states: ‘Post-conflict settings require political savvy.’ Ethnic-, clan- or regional-based exclusion; gender-based violence and discrimination; and youth exclusion are often acute in situations of conflict and fragility and require special attention.

Although it is easier to infer causal relations in hindsight than to detect them as events unfold, all programming in a fragile or conflict-affected situation needs to be informed by context analysis and anticipation of what might be the impact – intended and unintended – of the programme and its components. This analysis is often readily available in well-documented contexts such as Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When such documentation is not available, various tools exist for rapid ‘light’ analysis.

Sensitivity to context is required in all programmes, not just those involving governance and

security. While it may be tempting to think that only governance and security colleagues need to worry about doing no harm and addressing fragility, roads, food security and agriculture, education and energy programmes also have a direct bearing on fragility and conflict and thus must be programmed with a conflict lens.

Sensitivity to context may require adapting some of the principles of aid effectiveness, notably ownership and alignment, as recognised in the Accra Agenda for Action. As stated in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, endorsed by the EU:

*“Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments – such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds – can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and*

<sup>1</sup> European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. An EU staff handbook. Tools and Methods Series. Reference Document No 17. December 2014. pp 9-12. To be found on <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook>

*seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.” (OECD, 2007)*

A comprehensive approach is more conducive to transformation. In stable contexts, a lack of coherence across policies and related interventions can lead to limited results. In a fragile or conflict-affected situation, lack of coherence can easily lead to no results at all – or even do harm. And a lack of progress in one area – be it political, security, economic or social – risks reversing the whole transition process. For example, in Niger, improving livelihoods in the short term was a condition for restoring security, and at the same time security was needed to improve livelihoods.

By considering all the relevant and interconnected aspects of diplomacy, security, defence, finance, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, a comprehensive approach is conducive to both effectiveness and efficiency. Guidance in adopting a comprehensive approach is available globally and in the EU (see Box), and can be applied to jointly analyse the context, agree on a strategic approach across these policy areas and identify practical coordination mechanisms.

A comprehensive approach does not mean that everything must be done. Critical path thinking is needed. This assessment needs to answer the question of ‘what is a priority when everything is a priority?’ and resist the temptation to overburden national counterparts with too many agendas in the face of limited capacity and narrow political space. Prioritisation and concentration are also in line with EU programming instructions for the 2014-2020 period.

### **Guidance for adopting a comprehensive approach**

- The OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations include the need to ‘recognise the links between political, security and development objectives’ and highlight the fact that ‘there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives’. For example, the urgent need to deliver essential services may trump the important need to develop local capacity to do so; the urgent need to re-establish security can undermine long-term stability, for example, if it requires recourse to non-state armed groups; and there can be a trade-off between focusing on poverty reduction versus addressing inequality, often a root cause of conflict. The 10 principles call for ‘joined-up strategies’ across the departments of each administration while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid.
- Joined-up analysis frameworks and mechanisms facilitate common and coherent understandings of fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations; see, for example, post-conflict needs assessments and post-disaster needs assessments and the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process.
- ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’ sets out several practical steps in carrying out a comprehensive approach:
  - (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on crisis prevention, (iv) mobilise the various strengths and capacities of the EU, (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link policies and internal and external actions, (vii) make better use of EU Delegations and (viii) work in partnership with other international and regional actors.



Transitional results matrices (TRMs) are a tool that can help to identify priorities for the short term (first 12 months), medium term (one to three years) and long term (three years and more). TRMs can be used in the following circumstances.

- If priorities are agreed upon across sectors – diplomacy, defence and development, etc. (see Box).
- If priorities are agreed upon across actors, including among international partners and with national counterparts. In this way, TRMs can (i) serve as a catalyst for harmonisation among donors, allowing for improved donor coordination and articulating a compact between national and international actors; (ii) explicitly help to identify the links between political-security matters and economic-social issues; (iii) articulate a compact between national authorities and the population and provide a framework for demonstrating gains achieved and (iv) provide a management tool for national leadership and international actors to focus on critical actions. The greatest gains are achieved when TRMs are negotiated around the budget planning, voting and execution process; this helps to strengthen domestic accountability (see Box).
- If flexibility is built in to respond to challenges and opportunity. For example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) annually reviews and adjusts its operational plans in countries that are fragile or conflict-affected.

Risk (i.e. the possibility of harm) has to be acknowledged, calculated and managed. Specifically, this entails the following.

- Acknowledging risk. *“Dealing effectively with fragility involves taking risks and requires rapidity and flexibility in adopting political decisions and making them operational in the field, while dealing simultaneously with partner countries’ constraints, often in terms of limited capacities”* (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Risks in situations of conflict and fragility are (i) contextual, ranging from corruption, weak governance and lack of aid absorption ca-

### **Agreeing on priorities across sectors**

Liberia’s Results-Focused Transition Framework identified the full range of essential actions needed to safeguard the transition; for each priority outcome, it identified the critical results required in each time period.

For example, in order to produce government functions implemented through a merit-based public service, the first step was a census of civil servants, followed by public safety and security for government workers in key rural areas, removal of persons absent from the payroll, the development of new regulations and the piloting of a new system of oversight and transparency.

This framework helped in effectively identifying lags in both government action and donor support, facilitating a structural discussion of actions to fix these problems.

### **Agreeing on priorities across actors**

In Timor-Leste’s post-crisis phase, 30 % of the recurrent budget was supported by a multi-donor trust fund that was guided by the Transition Support Programme, a TRM.

Individual donor countries participated fully in review missions; while individual viewpoints and input often differ, stakeholder consensus ensures continuing support even when opinions differ on individual items.

capacity to political and security risks; leading to (ii) programmatic risks (failure to achieve programme goals and the risk of doing harm) and ultimately to (iii) fiduciary and reputational risks for the institution providing support.

- Calculating risk. Situations of conflict and fragility are usually higher risk than more stable contexts, but taking a zero-risk or low-risk approach could lead to strategic failure (zero impact). Rather, the calculation should (i) weigh the risk of action vis-à-vis the risk of inaction and the potential benefits of engaging, and (ii) compare the risks involved with several courses of action. In calculating risk, there is a need for greater realism (most recent evaluations identify overly optimistic objectives and/or timelines for EU support in situations of conflict and fragility) and greater honesty about risk exposure between donors and receiving partners, and within donor administrations between programme managers and financial controllers.
- Managing risk. Risk in situations of conflict

and fragility can be managed by being more pro-active than in more stable contexts. If there is a high fiduciary risk, it might be both safer and have more of an impact to invest in strengthening the financial management of receiving partners than to state conditions that will probably not be met. To cite another example, “combating corruption ought to be done within the framework of broader support to strengthen good governance and democratisation processes” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003).

Risks in situations of conflict and fragility can also be managed through multi-donor efforts, including pooled funding; and/or by using special instruments, such as the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP; formerly the Instrument for Stability, IfS), for which there is higher tolerance (within agreed limits) than for regular instruments if innovation and untested approaches are not fruitful.

## 2.3. SCOPE OF MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

### 2.3.1. Civilian CSDP missions

by Mercedes Garcia-Perez and Galia Glume

Since its inception at the Council of Helsinki in 1999, EU civilian crisis management has become multifaceted. Building on four initial priority areas – policing, civil administration, civil protection and Rule of Law – civilian CSDP has provided the EU with an operational capacity in a diversity of fields, from monitoring to maritime security<sup>1</sup>. With a strong focus on capacity-building, the EU's contributions to conflict prevention and crisis management worldwide have shown Member States' commitment to playing an operational role on the ground in support of EU external action.

While the geographical scope of civilian missions has broadened since the first engagements in the Balkans, CSDP has also seen the very nature of civilian mandates developing in a constant manner. With more than 20 civilian CSDP missions launched since 2003, it has proven to be a flexible instrument, supporting partners in addressing security challenges. The ongoing operationalisation of the EU comprehensive approach has enabled civilian missions to better integrate in and contribute to EU external policies. Drawing on the set-up of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability – the CPCC, permanent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions – and the European External Action Service (EEAS), civilian missions also play a key role in CSDP development. Meanwhile, the increased recourse to civilian CSDP missions calls for the enhancement of civilian capabilities.

#### **FLEXIBILITY OF THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE**

Next to its military engagements, the EU has conducted civilian missions with mandates directly contributing to peacekeeping in the 'classical' sense. The EU-led mission in Aceh, for example, supported the implementation of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement by monitoring, inter alia, the decommissioning of the latter's armaments in 2005-2006. In Georgia, the EUMM has since 2008 been ensuring the civilian monitoring of the parties' compliance with the EU-brokered six-point agreement that put an end to the 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation. Both missions played an important role in stabilising the situation in the aftermath of conflict and in building confidence between security actors on the ground, in support of high-level diplomatic efforts. Also in support of an important EU political engagement, EULEX Kosovo assists the implementation of the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue facilitated by the HRVP, providing constant expertise on the ground that can verify the extent of implementation.

Civilian CSDP engagement has also evolved comprehensively in the field of capacity-building. Starting with police missions focused on monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA), such as EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) which

<sup>1</sup> Civil protection has not been implemented under CSDP; the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the Commission ensures cooperation and coordination across national civil protection agencies among EU Member States and partners (since 2010).



Photo: EUMM Georgia

EUMM Georgia contributes to preventing incidents and defusing tensions along the administrative boundary lines with the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

sought to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership, the scope of mandates has become wider. The support to civilian Security Sector Reform (SSR) and to other structures in the realm of Rule of Law (RoL), such as the judiciary, has increasingly formed part of mission tasks. In Iraq, the CSDP contribution to the country's transition focused on the criminal justice system. Through integrated training activities and the promotion of a culture of respect for human rights, it aimed at a consolidation of security by underpinning the system of RoL. More comprehensive from the outset (2008), EULEX Kosovo has enjoyed a far-reaching mandate, initially covering the police, justice and customs sectors with a view to assisting and supporting the Kosovo authorities in the establishment of a sustainable, accountable and multi-ethnic RoL system.

Recent missions have seen their lines of operations specifically designed to have an impact at strategic level. EUAM, the EU advisory mission in Ukraine, provides strategic advice on civilian SSR in support of the Ukrainian authorities who have embarked on the path of reform. The development of accountability mechanisms for

the benefit of all citizens, be it in Ukraine, in Africa or in the Balkans, is envisaged as a particular, critical contribution to national dialogues and regional stability, among the wider efforts of the international community. Building on the added value of the EU's expertise and standing, missions of very various sizes add to wider peace efforts.

### **SUPPORT TO STATE INSTITUTIONS: TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP**

Missions initially focusing on training and MMA have also adapted, over time, to further their assistance to partners willing to tackle overarching policies and inter-institutional cooperation. The support to the Palestinian Civil Police carried out by EUPOL Copps has shifted, over eight years, from training activities towards advice on institutional sets-ups and legislation in the field of security and justice. Current efforts range from the basic Law on Police to delineation of responsibilities in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior. Another example of such refocusing is EUPOL





Photo: EULEX Kosovo/Enisa Rashidani/Kasem

EULEX Kosovo supports the implementation of the Integrated border/boundary management agreement between Kosovo and Serbia at a crossing point (October 2012)

Afghanistan, henceforth advising not only the Ministry of Interior on institutional reform and capacities for advancing civilian policing, but also the Attorney-General's Office. In both missions, the need to rebuild law enforcement agencies following a conflict situation was furthered by efforts to sustain the professionalisation of police, through accompanying strategic reforms and by addressing the police-justice linkage.

EUPOL RD Congo had a similar mandate assisting reform efforts in the sector of security and justice between 2007 and 2014, in the wake of EUPOL Kinshasa which had previously supported the operationalisation of the Integrated Police Unit of the National Congolese Police. Whenever possible, SSR has framed civilian CSDP actions. The training and mentoring dimension remains an important component of CSDP; regardless of the willingness to engage in broader reforms, they encourage best practices and international standards. Capacity-building missions with a more 'bottom-up' approach also allow for the retention of critical successes for advancing security on the ground. In Niger, the use of scientific evidence in criminal investigations was first implemented by the prosecution office with the support of EUCAP.

The advisory role of many missions has stressed the importance of cooperation, ownership and acceptance of the host States and local stakeholders. Civilian missions are primarily built on invitations by host States or governments, at times backed by a UN Security Council resolution. Missions may carry out executive mandates, one example being EULEX Kosovo, which retains some executive responsibilities in specific areas such as the fight against war crimes, organised crime and corruption. Nevertheless, cooperation has been given precedence over substitution, and capacity-building efforts have also been defined by the level of readiness of partners to engage in reform processes. This participatory approach has given CSDP a longer-term posture, with more sustainable achievements.

### SEEKING SYNERGIES ON THE GROUND: IMPLEMENTING THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Civilian missions have also developed around specific 'niches'. Maritime security and counter-piracy for the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), aviation security in South Sudan (EUAVSEC), and Integrated Border Management (EUBAM) in Libya addressed new needs in the field of international security and in support of regional stability.

Incorporating a regional dimension has been a key aspect of recent mandates, with mission activities set within a more global approach. EUCAP Nestor is often presented as a case study in this respect, sustaining the military endeavours of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia. Assigned a regional mandate, it assists host countries across the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean in enhancing their maritime capacities not only by advising on policy and legal frameworks, training and mentoring, but also by encouraging regional cooperation. The Mission works with national coast guards, civilian coastal police, the navy, and with prosecutors and judges in order to help developing the 'maritime criminal justice system'. Beyond immediate civil-military

efforts to secure maritime routes and tackle piracy, EUCAP Nestor's activities feed into long-term development, governance and regional economic cooperation plans, in line with the EU strategy for the Horn of Africa<sup>2</sup>.

Civilian CSDP, of course, benefits from the growing importance of the EU comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises. While aimed at building EU engagement on a common understanding from the outset at policy level, on the ground the comprehensive approach demands enhanced coordination and shared analysis between missions, other EU instruments, and international stakeholders.

How do these synergies take shape at the operational level? In Niger, talks with the EU Delegation, and also with Luxembourg and Japan, have resulted notably in the external funding of 'joint command posts' in the countries' regions, backed by structures and procedures which the Mission helped to set up. Based on their situational awareness, missions are in a privileged position to work hand in hand with the EU Delegations in identifying the needs of counterparts in their mandated areas. The establishment of the EEAS in 2011 has been facilitating these synergies – while on the ground, the role of Head of Mission has become even more instrumental in reaching out externally, and feeding back into decision-making and policy development at Brussels level.

In the context of the comprehensive approach, an international coordination dimension has been integrated into lines of operation. Early on, EUPOL Copps was mandated to facilitate coordination, providing guidance to match identified needs and donors' readiness with the priorities identified with the Palestinian Civil Police. More recently, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUAM Ukraine and EUCAP Sahel Mali also have a strong coordination mandate. Mission structures have been adapted accordingly and increasingly specific resources have been allocated to coordination. In



Photo: EUCAP Nestor/Sonia Khoudja

Basic training for Somali Coast Guard, Djibouti, May 2014

Mali, the EU civilian mission EUCAP and the MINUSMA exchanged dedicated liaison officers; daily liaison is taking place between EUCAP and the EU military mission EUTM, and EUCAP's coordination unit will support international coordination in the field of internal security. For the Horn of Africa, EUCAP Nestor's coordination and regional outreach efforts have been backed by a new EU structure, the Operations Centre, created in 2013 in support of both civilian and military missions and operations in the region. Also activated for the Sahel region the following year, it provides additional, targeted expertise to the crisis management structures within the EEAS and coordination resources with the Commission (Devco, international cooperation and development DG) in Brussels.

The 'Train and equip' initiative is another attempt to put the EU comprehensive approach into practice. While various CSDP missions are responsible for providing training to partners, the latter are often faced with a lack of adequate equipment in theatre – both for carrying out the training activities (training venues, training material), and also for performing their tasks (vehicles

2 In the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel regions, the Council has adopted global frameworks or strategies to guide the various dimensions of its external action, in partnership with the regions and key international organisations.

and other types of basic equipment). To address this gap and more generally to improve support to partners in the field of capacity-building, following up on the December 2013 European Council and Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 17-18 November 2014, a joint exercise involving the Commission, EEAS and Member States was launched in 2014; in this context several missions and operations were tasked with mapping the equipment needs of the host country in their mandate area. This work is expected to result in a joint policy approach in relation to Train and Equip. From a CSDP point of view, this pilot initiative should help mitigating a recurring challenge to mandate implementation: the provision of equipment, which CSDP missions cannot fully address, is marked by procedural constraints (different programming cycles and timeframes for development and assistance programming versus limited lifetime of missions) and limits in terms of what can be funded through the the European Development Fund (under current Official Development Assistance, military or dual-use equipment can hardly be funded). This ongoing work<sup>3</sup> will contribute to a comprehensive approach to capacity-building in practice, in order to optimise EU efforts dedicated at enabling partners to prevent and manage crises by themselves.

## A CATALYST FOR HORIZONTAL DEBATES

These examples show how reporting is critical to planning – both at operational and at policy level. Civilian CSPD missions constantly have to adapt to changing – or at times protracted – political contexts and operational environments. On a daily basis, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels supervises the conduct of civilian CSDP missions and ensures adequate support, as well as a duty of care, under the

authority of its director, the Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr). The permanent civilian operations headquarters since 2007, CPCC monitors how missions deliver and ensures that the missions' activities and organisational set-ups are best suited to fulfilling mandated tasks. This oversight and support to operational planning require a constant dialogue with the Council and the Political and Security Committee, through which Member States exercise the political control and strategic direction of CSDP missions and operations. Annual or bi-annual strategic reviews under the aegis of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) also play an important role in refocusing mandates, missions' objectives and tasks – within the realm of EU external action and in the wider context.

CPCC is the first point in the Heads of Missions' reporting line to Brussels. The CivOpsCdr, who is the Commander at strategic level, issues regular instructions and advice to the missions in theatre. Concepts and thematic operational guidance also contribute to enhancing mission's efficiency – building on mission expertise and lessons learnt. Mission reporting is instrumental in informing the development of best practices which, in turn, act as enablers for mandate implementation.

The planning phase of EUBAM Libya has prompted debates, at HQ level and among Member States, about integrated border management (IBM) – inter alia resulting in a EU Concept on CSDP support to IBM in 2013. Maritime security is another example, with EUCAP Nestor. The work carried out by EULEX Kosovo to tackle organised crime also contributed to increasing cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and EU agencies in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. When deployed in new areas of security/intervention, missions often function as a catalyst for 'horizontal' debates (i.e. on issues pertaining to missions overall), by putting them on the

<sup>3</sup> A joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council will provide policy options in this respect, considering both the security and development policy areas.



agenda – resulting in conceptual development.

The integration of cross-cutting issues as full objectives within mission mandates, such as the fight against sexual violence or the enhancement of the position of women in national police, has been advanced by missions such as EUPOL RDC and EUPOL Afghanistan. In many instances, non-governmental organisations play a crucial role in raising the alarm, underlining the value of the missions' engagement with civil society actors. A strong dialogue with civil society contributes to bringing CSDP into line with realities on the ground, and to fostering ownership by advocating reforms.

'Cross-fertilisation' also plays an important part in CSDP development. When the project cells started, EUPOL RDC was seeking a project implementation capacity in order to complement its activities in support of the reform of the Congolese National Police and its interaction with the justice sector. The Mission was granted a project cell and dedicated funds under the CFSP budget in 2009, and this instrument was then progressively incorporated in the civilian missions' toolkit as an operational function to identify and implement projects in support of lines of operations.

Project cells are now assigned to most new civilian missions, and in some cases to those already set-up. They have a very different size and budget. EUPOL Afghanistan develops comprehensive projects with a significant budget, which aim at supporting the mission activities, outcomes and the achievement of the mission objectives. This includes, amongst other things, the organisation of workshops and seminars and the provision of training/pedagogical material, such as the police-prosecutor cooperation manual. In Niger, EUCAP has since 2012 carried out small-scale projects, such as the refurbishment of local training facilities and operational centres, the provision of scientific equipment for criminal investigations, or the organisation of workshops on the management of equipment (e.g. vehicle fleet, fuel, maintenance). These supplemented the Mission's capacity-building activities by encouraging local buy-in and sustainability.



Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan/Christiane Buck

A hands-on exercise on crime scene management course at the Crime Management College in Kabul. The Afghan-led programme was monitored by EUPOL Afghanistan

In order to ensure consistency in support of local partners, such operational functions within the missions must complement the wider assistance and development programmes led by the EU Delegations in-country, the work of EU special representatives, EU Member States on the ground, as well as third countries and international organisations in theatre. They also make the case for civilian missions, deployed in environments marked by crises or conflicts, needing a certain degree of flexibility in order to deliver better and in a timely manner.

## LEVEL OF AMBITION AND SUSTAINABILITY

While the evolution of civilian missions and their variety highlight the flexibility of civilian CSDP, they also imply different levels of ambition. Civilian CSDP missions have varied in scope, size, and lifetime. At its height, Kosovo comprised 3 000 staff, compared with 40 for EUAVSEC South Sudan. Nevertheless, the equation between the size of missions and the level of commitment can be misleading; operational engagements have to be understood in relation to





Photo: EUPOL Copps

Addressing the police-justice linkage: strategic-level meeting on police-prosecution cooperation held between the Head of EUPOL Copps, the Palestinian Attorney General and the Chief of the Palestinian Civil Police, August 2014, Ramallah

other EU external policies and the involvement of the international community. ‘Smaller’ missions can bring a decisive added-value when designed to complement concerted efforts of the UN system and of regional organisations such as NATO, the OSCE, the African Union or the ASEAN.

Although mandates are generally set for one or two years initially, many civilian missions have been extended for longer periods in theatre. Since its inception, civilian CSDP has been grounded on the notion of partnership and local ownership. Today, missions are better equipped to increase local absorption capacities and sustainability, but it remains a challenge and gives civilian missions in the medium- or long-term position. This CSDP practice of has stressed the issue of transitioning (to other instruments, actors, or the host country itself) to secure mission achievements. It has also put a strain on resources availability.

Staffing is indeed a key issue for civilian CSDP. The vast majority of the missions’ international staff is seconded by Member States on a voluntary basis, according to national procedures. With tours of duty ranging from six months to several years, thousands of civilian personnel have been seconded since 2003. Third countries have also been supportive of CSDP efforts by contributing to missions with personnel on the ground. In addition, numerous local staff provide a fair share of mission support worldwide. In 2014, this rep-

resented more than 3 000 personnel in the field.

Enhancing capabilities essential to the development of an effective and credible CSDP has been an enduring priority for Member States. Despite the progress made, generating civilian capabilities remains a challenge, especially for EU rapid deployment. Constant investments in the field of training, as well as a series of mechanisms at national and EU level, have improved the readiness and deployability of well-trained personnel at short notice. To mitigate against a relatively high turn-over and to retain expertise, the setting up of pools of experts (for police, justice, SSR) and rosters, and the concept of visiting experts (allowing for short-term reinforcement of missions) have been developed to help meet the staffing requirements stemming from political commitments. Driven by the Civilian Capability Development Plan, discussions on a Shared Service Centre are ongoing, as is the Goalkeeper software project which will facilitate the handling and management of rosters of deployable personnel. Besides the high level of expertise, the diversity of seconded staff is often a guarantee that missions are able to embrace multi-faceted mandates. In this respect, gender balance remains an ongoing endeavour for civilian CSDP.

Missions reflect the core values of the EU on the ground. They often enjoy a significant visibility in the theatres and societies where they are deployed, although their budgets cannot be compared to those of development, external assistance programmes or humanitarian aid. Between 2003 and 2013, CFSP budget was constantly rising. With new missions launched almost every year, and with continued improvements in its implementation, civilian CSDP has gained ground as a privileged operational instrument for the EU and its Member States to work with partners towards security and peace. The diversity of civilian CSDP missions conducted since 2003 has brought added value to the EU – underpinning the EU’s foreign policy with concrete interventions and contributing to make it a credible actor in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention.

## 2.3.2. Military missions and operations

by Giovanni Ramunno

Since the inception of Common Security and Defence Policy<sup>1</sup> (CSDP) interventions in 2003, the European Union has become increasingly active abroad and has undertaken ever more crisis management operations. The EU has progressively become a global political actor and a security provider.

EU operations are undertaken on the basis of a UN mandate, which the EU would normally seek in enforcement situations. On the other hand, EU missions, which are non-executive, are carried out in a non-coercive framework. Over the last year, five missions and operations involving military instruments have been ongoing in two continents— four of them in Africa, one in Europe. In addition, at the time of writing, the Council of the EU established the EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA). The new mission will follow on from the EU military operation EUFOR RCA, which contributed to security in the capital Bangui and ended on 15 March 2015. EUMAM RCA is meant to support the Central African authorities in preparing a reform of the security sector with respect to the management of CAR armed forces.

### MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Conflicts or crises, as multifaceted problems, require a strategically coherent use of the EU's various instruments and policies to effectively address their root causes. They require a “comprehensive

approach” to enable an effective EU response. The European Union comprehensive approach is both a general working method and a set of specific measures and processes to improve how the EU can deliver more coherent and effective policies and actions, drawing on a wide array of existing tools and instruments. The regional strategies developed to date for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel have been valuable in framing the EU's comprehensive response to new political developments and challenges. Policy coherence has also proven highly beneficial for the sustainability of EU engagement transitioning from CSDP operations to other forms of commitment. Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the CSDP planning system is that it constitutes a process for planning civilian as well as military operations. As a matter of fact, on the political-strategic level – at the start of the planning cycle – the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is a jointly drafted ‘civ-mil’ document.

Under CSDP, the EU conducts military missions worldwide. These missions perform a variety of tasks and complement military operations, taking into account confrontational politics and complex development; they are valuable operational instruments within the EU's comprehensive approach. The EU's concept of crisis management has evolved and it has demonstrated its ability to engage in a new type of missions, involving military training and an advisory role. But a precondition for such commitments is that these missions must be launched in countries where hostilities have ceased and where some functioning governance is in place. Over the past ten years, the military have

<sup>1</sup> European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions and operations became Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations through the Lisbon Treaty.

also become a tool contributing to capacity-building and state-building in host countries.

In this light, the EU's crisis management operations have seen the extension of their mandate to feature new tasks, and training missions have morphed to have a new focus on Security Sector Reform; they envisage programmes that take more time to implement.

For example, EUFOR's mandate in BiH was revised in 2005 and increasingly the operation has carried out tasks related to capacity building or an advisory role related to Security Sector Reform programmes.

Another illustration of CSDP evolutions is the succession of EU military missions and operations in CAR. Assigned with a mandate to protect civilians and establish security in a limited area of operation (restricted to the airport in the capital of Bangui, as well as two districts in the city), the EUFOR RCA is intended to serve a bridge function, later handing over military control to the UN peacekeeping operation. Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorises the mission to deploy all necessary means to maintain security. Indeed, amid the precarious security situation in Bangui, EU troops have been required to use force to protect civilians. Following a request by the UN Secretariat and CAR's interim president, Catherine Samba-Panza, Member States extended the EU operation until MINUSCA is expected to be fully operational. The EUMAM, which is a (now typical) advisory mission, will be the successor of EUFOR RCA, representing a new phase of the EU's engagement in CAR under CSDP.

Furthermore, to support the approach adopted in the Sahel and the decisions taken by EU Defence Ministers at a meeting in Luxembourg, which were part of international efforts to stabilise Mali and extend the state's authority there, the EU recently agreed to extend by two years a mission to train the army (EUTM) while sending civilian advisers to train and advise Mali's internal security forces (EUCAP Sahel Mali). EU experts will give advice and training to the three internal security forces in Mali: the police, Gendarmerie and National Guard.

Many missions with an SSR dimension take place in Africa in support of the African security architecture, alongside the EU's cooperation and engagement with the AU and other African regional organisations. This is because the EU endorses the principle of African ownership of solutions to the continent's problems. Therefore, rather than expanding its military presence there, the EU seeks to empower local and regional actors to cope with crisis management and conflict prevention themselves. Training assistance, security sector reform and capacity-building are the cornerstones of this endeavour – they can be conceived as preventive measures, with a view to the long-term stability of the affected region.

Given the EU's commitment to multilateralism and support for the UN and regional organisations like the AU, the EU aims to raise its profile through, *inter alia*, inter-organisational cooperation. Such cooperation is viewed as a means of constructively amplifying the EU's impact.

## PARTNERSHIPS

Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty sets the scene for the EU's cooperation with partner countries and international organisations in crisis management. The EU commitment to multilateral cooperation is based on its history and values. In the framework of military CSDP, this occurs through cooperation with host countries, regional organisations and the United Nations. Partnerships are an important component of CSDP, as shown by cooperation with third countries and regional organisations, but also by CSDP cooperation with the UN in the field of international crisis management – where the EU supports UN peacekeeping efforts through 'bridging operations' and 'stand-by operations'.

Recalling the Conclusions from the European Council of December 2013, the EU is ensuring the greatest possible coherence between the Union's and Member States' actions to support partner countries and regional organisations,





Photo: European Union

Common patrol in Bangui/Central African Republic during the handover phase from EUFOR RCA to MINUSCA, 13 November 2014

including in the context of security sector reform, by providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate.

The participation of different international, regional, and non-governmental organisations towards one peace objective or mission has become a significant feature of contemporary international relations. Pioneering new ways to work together with the US, the UN, and the AU is perhaps the most tangible achievement of EUTM. An effective division of labour has emerged between the EU, the AU, and the US, if we refer to EUTM Somalia, for example. More generally, EU training missions have become well known for their ability to establish enduring cooperation with key stakeholders in the regions where they operate, providing a multilateral dimension to global governance.

The EU focuses on policy frameworks, continental and regional structures, tools and mechanisms to anticipate, prevent, manage, and resolve crises, in line with its own comprehensive

approach. The engagement of the EU in wider peacekeeping efforts is demonstrated by the development of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in which Africa remains a centre of gravity, with 10 missions and operations conducted on the continent to date.

## EU MILITARY OPERATIONS

### EUFOR ALTHEA

The military operation European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched in December 2004. As part of the EU's comprehensive approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Operation Althea provides a military presence to contribute to a safe and secure environment, prevent conditions for a resumption of violence and manage any residual aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (the 1995 Dayton/Paris





Photo: EUFOR ALTHEA/Herbert Penzl

Slovakian contingent in the margins of the exercise “Quick Response 2” of EUFOR ALTHEA

## EUFOR RCA

The European Union operation in the Central African Republic is a typical ‘bridging operation’ which aims to provide the UN with time to mount a new peacekeeping operation or strengthen an existing one. Such a model calls for the rapid deployment of appropriate EU military capabilities and for an agreed duration and end-state of the CSDP operation. It is meant to result, in a limited timeframe, in a handover to the UN force on the ground.

The original authorisation for the operation is contained in paragraph 44 of resolution 2134 (2014).

Determining that the situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council unanimously extended the operation until 15 March 2015 through Resolution 2181 (2014).

The Council acted following receipt of notes from the President of the Transitional Authorities in the Central African Republic and from the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The exit strategy from such an operation is the deployment of a UN force able to take over from the EU force deployed and tailored to the mission. The EU force also provides technical assistance and exchanges information with the UN and the UN troop-contributing countries to facilitate the deployment of the UN forces and the hand-over of responsibilities between the EU and UN forces.

Early deployment of UN troops before the actual handover deprives hostile forces of an opportunity to exploit and facilitates a smooth transition by familiarising the UN force with the tactical situation on the ground, and the EU forces’ course of action. It also allows for the transfer of intelligence.

Agreement). In addition, EUFOR supports the Armed Forces of BiH in the areas of capacity-building and training.

The launch of Operation ALTHEA followed the decision by NATO to conclude its Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operation and the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1575 authorising the deployment of an EU Force (EUFOR) in BiH.

In the framework of Operation Althea, the EU initially deployed 7 000 troops to ensure continued compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH and to contribute to a safe and secure environment. Operation ALTHEA was carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.

According to the EU-UN cooperation framework, this is a typical case of the EU conducting a ‘stand-alone operation’ under a UN mandate<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 7 of ‘EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration’, adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004).

## EUNAVFOR ATALANTA

The Council of the EU launched the European Union Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) on 10 November 2008 to deter and combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Operation Atalanta differs from previous EU crisis management or peacekeeping missions in its naval character. The Council Joint Action set two main objectives: to protect as a priority the vessels of the World Food Programme delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and to protect vulnerable vessels in the area and ensure ‘deterrence, prevention and repression’ of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The military operation was initially scheduled for a period of twelve months (until 13 December 2009) and was extended by the Council<sup>3</sup> until December 2014. On 21 November 2014 the Council of the EU extended the mandate of Operation Atalanta until December 2016. Atalanta is a naval task force typically consisting of three to five ships and two or three patrol aircraft at a time, with the operation headquarters located in Northwood, United Kingdom. Part of the EU comprehensive approach to the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, it contributes to wider efforts by the EU and the international community to tackle piracy at sea and support maritime security.

## EU MILITARY MISSIONS

### EUTM Mali

In February 2013, as part of its comprehensive approach to the Sahel, the EU launched a military training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), with an initial mandate of 15 months. EUTM Mali was undertaken in the context of the French military operation that began in January 2013 to take back



Photo: EEAS/EUNAVFOR Somalia

EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta patrolling Indian Ocean

territory in northern Mali from Islamist rebel groups. The objective of the EU mission is to train and advise Malian armed forces in order to restore nationwide law and order under constitutional, democratic authorities.

Headquartered in the city of Bamako, and with training activities taking place 60 kilometres away in the city of Koulikoro, EUTM Mali consists of approximately 200 instructors plus an additional 300 support staff and force protection personnel. Mission personnel are not intended to take part in combat operations.

The mission is training the sixth *Groupement Tactique Interarmes* (GTIA) of the eight planned before the end of the mandate. Concerning the reform process, the ‘military planning work 2015-2019’ was presented and endorsed by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The document is pending National Assembly approval. The Defence Minister publicly thanked EUTM advisers for their support.

<sup>3</sup> Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP.



Photo: European Union

EUTM Mali, combat training

## EUTM Somalia

On 7 April 2010, the EU launched<sup>4</sup> the Military Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. The mission, which operated in Uganda until December 2013, is now based in Mogadishu (Somalia). It is the EU's first military training mission and is part of a wider, EU comprehensive approach to Somalia, working with the international community.

EUTM trained 3 600 Somali military personnel, in two mandates from its inception to 2013. In its first mandate training was initially focused on infantry techniques at recruit and junior leader level. During the second mandate, the training was extended to full company level. The aim was to achieve well-structured, clan-balanced units, adequately staffed by trained NCOs, Platoon Commanders, Company Staffs and Company Commanders. In addition, emphasis was placed on training-the-trainers programmes to foster sustainability and to increase awareness of mine and IED threats (MIEDA), improve Com-

bat Life Support (CLS), and on Fighting in Built Up Areas (FIBUA) and Communications.

This third mandate implied a significant change of focus for the mission, with the addition of strategic advisory and mentoring activities in addition to specialised training. The mission provides political and strategic advice to the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Defence Forces, advice on security sector development, as well as providing specialised military training and mentoring in the training domain. The new mandate focuses on developing Command and Control, as well as the specialised (such as NCO, Administrative, Military Intelligence, Military Police, Military Nurse) and self-training capacities of the Somali National Security Forces. At the very beginning of 2014 all the training activities moved to Mogadishu. The training of the Somali National Armed Forces is focused on leadership-commander up to battalion and company level, in addition to specialist training in the areas of military police, weapon handling, civilian-military cooperation, intelligence, combat engineering, NCO and Combat Life Saver. Modules on international humanitarian law and human rights, and the protection of civilians, including specific protection needs of women and children, are also delivered.

<sup>4</sup> Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP.



### 2.3.3. Supporting Security Sector Reform

by Victoria Walker

One of the increasingly common examples of how CSDP missions and operations are assisting countries in improving the safety and security of their populations is support to Security Sector Reform (SSR). Security and justice actors in a fragile, post-conflict or transitional country are often more a source of insecurity than a means to make the population feel safe: examples include extra-judicial killings by the police, demands for bribes to pass through border crossing points, inhumane custodial conditions, dysfunctional courts, or mob justice.

Stemming from the now-established understanding that ‘security’ needs to be understood in terms of human security, whereby the security of the individual rather than just the state is placed at the centre of decision-making, SSR refers to the process through which a country seeks to review and enhance the effectiveness and accountability of its security and justice providers towards its citizens. This may involve a wide range of state and non-state security and justice providers and governance institutions, examples of which are illustrated on p. 176. The services they deliver should meet the needs of all sectors of the population (in particular the most vulnerable), whilst operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.

The EU’s policy framework on SSR<sup>1</sup>, developed in 2005-2006, outlines a number of core principles. These have been further enhanced by lessons from EU CSDP missions and operations, support provided by other EU instruments and reflection and analysis from further afield.

SSR should, first and foremost, be *a locally-owned process*. This means that the support provided by missions and operations should be developed and implemented in partnership with the host authorities, be culturally and contextually appropriate, and support their vision and strategies for security and justice. Such an approach allows missions and operations to help build up national capacity in the skills required to develop plans for reform. This means factoring the time and resources needed to build the strategic approach with local partners in the planning process, notably in the Operation Plan, Mission Implementation Plan and other planning documents.

Local ownership does not mean just supporting the political elite, and therefore efforts can be made to support consultation processes to capture and feed in the views of wider sectors of society into the development of policies and their implementation. Participatory and community-based approaches for information capture and analysis are critical. Women are usually not represented at political decision-making levels, and the same is true of minorities and people with disabilities. Deliberate effort needs to be invested in reaching out to them.


Another challenge is that local demands can often focus on unsustainable equipment and infrastructure projects, rather than focusing on institution building. Support carried out by EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories, shown in Box 1, illustrates one approach taken

<sup>1</sup> EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform. Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 October 2005, 12566/4/05 REV 4.

A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 24 May 2006, COM(2006) 153 final.

Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform. 2736<sup>th</sup> General Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.





### Box 1: Local ownership of SSR

The European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) has been mentoring and advising a small team from the Strategy, Development and Planning Unit (SDPU) of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), helping the MoI to develop a series of robust processes to implement the security sector strategy. Part of this involved developing a system to evaluate project proposals from the security services. Higher scores were to be given to projects that could demonstrate relevance, alignment and impact to the nationally-owned security sector strategy, as well as projects that considered sustainability and demonstrated a strong commitment from the agencies' leadership to oversee the project. Projects that targeted specific priority issues such as institutional development, accountability and oversight, human rights and gender were given a relatively higher score. EUPOL COPPS support involved coaching and mentoring the SDPU to apply the criteria, and a series of workshops by the MoI with each of the security services to explain its evaluation of the proposed projects. The entire process was completely led by the MoI and endorsed by the Ministry's leadership, and led to a locally-owned list of 140 projects, ranked according to their relevance to the strategic plan's priorities, and shared with donors in line with their funding interests.

to help the Ministry of Interior to take greater ownership of the development of the Palestinian security sector. Ensuring local ownership remains a challenging issue.

In order to deliver good quality security and justice services to the population, actors in the security sector need to be both *effective and accountable*. If efforts are made solely to build their technical capabilities, there is a risk that the result will be, for example, an army that is more adept at oppressing citizens. If, conversely, all the support provided focuses on accountability, the resulting institution is unlikely to be able to deliver the services needed by the population. However, whilst support is often concentrated on technical training and equipment, improving the accountability of security and justice actors is frequently overlooked, in part because it is more difficult to measure results, harder to find entry points and more likely to meet with resistance amongst the elite. The EUSEC mission in the DRC, shown in Box 2, is a notable example of the potential impact of focusing on issues of governance and the value of a balanced approach to SSR that looks at both accountability and capacity building.

SSR is an inherently *political process*. It touches on the state's sovereignty, monopoly on the use of force, its institutional architecture and societal values such as freedom, security and

human rights. Moreover, many of the challenges in reforming security and justice providers and setting up functioning democratic mechanisms to control them are invariably related to power, relationships and other political questions. This means that CSDP missions and operations need to engage in political dialogue and understand the political ramifications of any technical support they are providing. EUAM Ukraine (Box 3) provides a good snapshot of the importance of the issue. Coordination with the EU Delegation in country and the wider international community is vital to ensure common, coherent messaging, in line with the EU's comprehensive approach.


SSR is a process that involves many different actors and institutions. Even if the mandate for a mission or operation focuses closely on a particular security or justice provider it is nonetheless vital to understand the interconnected nature of the different components within the security and justice sector. As an example, improving the capacity of the police to make arrests without also improving the ability of the courts to process cases, or the accountability of detention facilities, can result in an overall increase in human rights violations. The graphic on p. 178 illustrates the *holistic nature of SSR*, highlighting in addition to the individual sectors the importance of the security and justice needs of the people as the

### **Box 2: Supporting greater accountability**

By supporting a biometric census of all military personnel, EUSEC RD Congo helped to identify how many soldiers are in active duty and should remain on payroll. This exercise in itself uncovered roughly 70 000 ghost soldiers on payroll and helped to determine that the force strength was 120 000 active military personnel rather than the assumed 190 000. In addition, by providing technical assistance to map out the chain of payments for the salary system, and to assess the wage distribution modalities, the Mission was able to significantly reduce corruption within the top management of the DRC military while in turn increasing the real wages of soldiers. The impact could have been extended by long-term support to structural issues surrounding public finance management or human resource management.

**Box 3: The political dimension of SSR**

Established in July 2014, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) is currently fully engaged in the planning phase for supporting the elaboration of revised security strategies and the rapid implementation of reforms. One of the biggest challenges is identifying how to trigger the organisational cultural and behavioural change needed for the Ukrainian security providers to deliver better services, as well as the systems and frameworks to enable that change. This means that the mission needs to work very much through a political lens: analysing and understanding the underlying interests, relationships of power and drivers of behaviour, and engaging with multiple stakeholders. This is evident in the work the Mission is doing to help establish a coordinating centre, in a context where the division of constitutional powers between the President and government is still uncertain, and the concept of human security is still new. The Mission is also working to engage stakeholders at multiple levels by supporting mid-level reform amongst the traffic and patrol police in the Kyiv region, as well as legislative change to develop a more independent and more accountable judiciary.



Holistic nature of SSR

foundation for all reform. States would ideally have a national security strategy that captures these needs and provides a policy framework for the individual institutional reform programmes. Support in this area is very important, involving assisting a range of activities, such as undertaking broad consultations, creating a strategic

framework that is financially realistic, sensitisation and communication processes, and developing mechanisms for enabling successful implementation (including monitoring).

SSR is a *technically complex* process, requiring a wide array of skills. Substantive knowledge and experience is core: deployed experts need to

### Examples of how to support SSR

- Supporting a consultation process and advising on the development of new security and justice laws by national actors
- Building in governance and accountability elements to technical capacity-building
- Working at a political level to facilitate political will and genuine commitment for change at highest government levels
- Dedicating time, resources and capacities to understand the local security system, identifying where “it works” and building on it
- Aiming for realistic goals with long term impact rather than unsustainable quick wins
- Planning based on an understanding of how the system works for women and men across all age groups, where the gaps are and how to close them
- Encouraging and supporting the inclusion of minorities and vulnerable groups in SSR

### Examples of how NOT to support SSR

- Importing laws from a Member State or drafting the laws for the host nation
- Stand-alone training and equipping
- Focusing solely on technical capacity-building
- Introducing SSR models that are not contextually feasible
- Training not adapted to the local context and/or filled with unnecessarily complex language
- Creating parallel structures to those that already exist
- Using measures of parity (quantity) as the main approach for rendering a security system more gender responsive
- Focusing solely on the political elite and just engaging with counterparts nominated by the authorities

have the thematic understanding of how the different functions within the security and justice sector work, such as the judiciary, customs or the military.

However, it is equally important to ensure that the mission or operation encompasses skills in programme management (such as resource management, planning, monitoring and reporting, coordination, etc.), change management processes (such as communications, organisational restructuring, leadership, etc.) and the soft skills of political dialogue, negotiation, and advising.

The ‘Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising’ (MMA) approach used in many CSDP missions<sup>2</sup> outlines a number of basic principles to help translate technical knowledge into capacity building, including flexibility, awareness of the context and culture, communications and coordination.

There is often a tension between the planned short-term nature of CSDP engagements and the timescales required for successful transformation of a security sector, and therefore issues of sustainability for SSR support need to be explicitly explored.

The capacity for the EU to link up its different crisis management and development instruments provides an important bridge, and means that the EU can commit to long-term support. However, this also requires an integrated approach to planning, strong levels of coordination on the ground and a robust monitoring mechanism that tracks the extent to which outcome goals are being met by the missions and operations. In terms of planning sustainable support to national SSR efforts, it is important to think beyond the projected life of the CSDP engagement and build in transition strategies from the start.

<sup>2</sup> Civilian Operations Commander’s Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP missions, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 7 November 2014, 15272/14.



## SSR: Integrated Border Management

In very few conflicts and crises today are borders the line of separation or the frontline between warring parties. Nonetheless, borders are a priority for peace and security and when managed well they allow for state-building and socio-economic growth to take root. Efficient border control curtails unwanted elements which often increase when there is a breakdown in the functioning of the security sector, namely drugs trafficking, trafficking in human beings, weapons proliferation, illegal migration and smuggling of illicit goods. These activities rapidly become organised and when they infiltrate state structures, it can have severe implications for the legitimacy of state authority, rule of law and human security.

Enhanced border control is often called for in order to contain crises and prevent them from gaining a regional, or even international, dimension. Well-managed borders not only have a stabilising effect internally, regionally and internationally, they go further in ensuring profitable relations with neighbours by facilitating trade of goods and the movement of people.

The EU has a distinct expertise in Integrated Border Management (IBM) as exemplified by the establishment of the Schengen area and the 'European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union' (FRONTEX). However, there is not a 'one-size-fits-all' model of IBM and the European model cannot be exported as such to third countries by CSDP missions. There are certain IBM principles, processes and mechanisms that undisputedly improve border control, risk analysis, and crime prevention and detection while at the same time facilitating trade, movement of people and neighbourly relations between countries. These include adopting a holistic approach to border management, ensuring that



EUBAM Libya delivering the 'Introduction to Maritime Search and Rescue Planning' course in Tripoli

the legal and institutional frameworks regulate and support the core functions and interactions of the border agencies, enforcing cross-ministerial preparation and effective communication, building capacity through a proper training system and mainstreaming the protection of human rights throughout all border management functions.

Each mission with a border management element within its mandate has to start by assessing the state of the border security sector in the host country and the apply IBM principles in a way that best fits the host country and which has the full support and buy-in of the local authorities. Individual experts in missions must refer to the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) which sets out their tasks. The *Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Cooperation* (European Commission, 2009) may also come in handy when presenting IBM to local counterparts. For the planning and conduct of CSDP missions, the *EU Concept on CSDP Support to Integrated Border Management* (17868/13, 16 December 2013) translates the principles of IBM into strategic and operational processes. The concept takes into account lessons learned and best practice from previous and current missions with a border management aspect.

Kinga Devenyi

## 2.4. BENCHMARKING AND LESSONS LEARNT

### 2.4.1. The importance of benchmarking and impact assessment in CSDP operations

by Annemarie Peen Rodt

Recent years have seen renewed interest in the potential role of the EU as a security provider. A recurring theme in this debate is whether the EU can play a meaningful part in conflict management beyond its borders. Since the Union established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP – now CSDP) in 1999, its endeavours in military conflict management have developed rapidly. At the time of writing, the EU has launched military operations to help manage conflicts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic.<sup>1</sup> As operations have been undertaken in the field, corresponding case studies have examined their achievements. Despite this interest, a theoretically grounded understanding of how to define and evaluate success in this kind of operation has all too often been missing. This contribution posits, however, that it is important, because in order to achieve success, it is crucial to know what it is. Moreover, to accurately evaluate and explain success in past operations and to predict success in future operations a sound understanding of what constitutes such a success is required. The purpose of this article is to encourage rigour concerning the notion of success in CSDP missions and oper-

ations. This would advance not only the theory but also the practice of such endeavours.

#### STATE OF THE ART

Conceptual discussions of success in EU scholarship are limited at best. We tend to assume that success is obvious. One knows it when one sees it. Consequently, success in EU military conflict management operations has been evaluated on an ad-hoc basis rather than systematically examined according to sound criteria. This article suggests that one evaluation framework for success in EU military conflict management operations should be applied consistently.

In order to accurately evaluate, explain and predict success in EU military conflict management, what is meant by the term success must first be clearly defined. Generally speaking, success means reaching a desirable outcome. The question is: desirable according to whom or what? This issue is at the heart of EU military conflict management, yet it is hardly ever discussed. On the contrary, definitions of success, which are often implicit rather than explicit, vary considerably. The notion of success itself has not been subject to much

<sup>1</sup> This list includes neither the Union's civilian missions nor its maritime or military support, training and assistance operations, which serve different purposes than military conflict management.

consideration. This article suggests that existing knowledge from the study of international peacekeeping, conflict management, military intervention and foreign policy may be helpful in this regard,<sup>2</sup> as the problem of which perspective to adopt when defining success is not confined to the evaluation of EU military conflict management. For example, Pushkina and Baldwin have highlighted ongoing disputes concerning whether to evaluate success from the perspective of the policy actor, the target or according to theoretically defined standards in international peacekeeping or foreign policy analysis, respectively.<sup>3</sup>

## INTERNAL SUCCESS

In practice, a narrow definition of success reflecting the interests and intentions of the policy actor – in our case the EU – is often applied. In the military, operational success is understood as mandate fulfilment.<sup>4</sup> This perspective is shared across the board when evaluating military operations and has to some extent been adopted by the EU, which evaluates success in these operations according to its own aims and objectives. In effect, EU representatives can claim that all the operations to date have been successful – even if they leave no more than a mere pinprick in the conflict country.<sup>5</sup> Although a mandate may include considerations on behalf of the target, this understanding of success is internally defined, in the sense that the

success criteria are decided upon by the EU alone. On the one hand, it is important not to automatically equate self-defined interest with self-interest, but on the other, it is important to recognise that internal success criteria reflect self-selected goals. This notion of success, as defined by the intervener itself, can be referred to as internal success. According to this definition, whether an operation is a success is ultimately assessed according to whether it has reached its stated objectives. This logic suggests that the EU should be judged on its own merits alone and that whether a CSDP military conflict management operation is a success depends simply on whether it fulfils its mandate.

Internal success is an important part of an overall success. However, as a stand-alone definition internal success is problematic for three key reasons. Firstly, it suggests that an operation is successful when its outcome is compatible with the intentions and interests of the intervener, disregarding the fact that these do not necessarily reflect the needs of the target or indeed the overall purpose of this kind of operation. Secondly, assessing the operation solely according to whether it has met its stated objectives is risky, as this logic suggests that success can be ensured by a vague mandate aiming to achieve very little. On its own, this definition of success would mean that an EU military conflict management operation could be declared successful, even if the conflict situation it left behind was less secure than when the operation was launched, as long as

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- 2 See for example Diehl, Paul F. & Druckman, Daniel (2010). *Evaluating peace operations*. London: Lynne Rienner; Freedman, Lawrence (2006). Interventionist strategies and the changing use of force, In: Croker, Chester, A., Osler Hampson, Fen & Aall, Pamela, eds. *Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 309-321; Haas, Richard, N. (2006). Using force: Lessons and choices In: Croker, Chester, A., Osler Hampson, Fen & Aall, Pamela, eds. *Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 295-307; Howard, Lise Morje (2008). *UN peacekeeping in civil wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh (2011). *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Cambridge: Polity; Ross, Mark Howard and Rothman, Jay (1999). *Theory and practice in ethnic conflict management: Theorising success and failure*. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Seybolt, Taylor B. (2008). *Humanitarian military intervention: The conditions for success and failure*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 3 Baldwin, David A. (2000). Success and failure in foreign policy, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3, pp. 167-182; Pushkina, Darya (2006). A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2), pp. 133-149.
- 4 Diehl, Paul F. (1994). *International peacekeeping*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.33-61.
- 5 Solana, Javier (2009). Ten years of European Security and Defence Policy. *ESDP newsletter*. 9. pp. 8-11; Syren, Haakon (2009). ESDP 2009 – The military dimension. *Interparliamentary conference on ESDP*. Stockholm, 9<sup>th</sup> of November.

the operation fulfilled its specific mandate, however narrow that may have been. Although this is common practice, it is not an appropriate way to evaluate success. To illustrate why, it is useful to draw a comparison to medical practice: would it be proper to declare an operation a success, even if, after the operation, the patient was still dying? The absence of outright failure does not necessarily equal success. Finally, the internal definition of success does not sufficiently evaluate the means by which the intervener attempts to reach its goals. It simply suggests that an operation is a success if its implementation went according to plan, without evaluating the plan itself. Returning to the medical analogy, one could then declare an operation a success, if a toe stops hurting, even if this was achieved by amputating the whole leg. It is important to recall that a fundamental premise of the legitimate use of force, according to the Just War doctrine, is that one must:

*“Consider most carefully and honestly whether the good we can reasonably expect to achieve is large enough – and probable enough – to outweigh the inescapable harm in loss of lives, damage and disruption (...) It cannot be right for a leader, responsible for the good of all the people, to undertake – or prolong armed conflict, with all the loss of life or other harm that entails, if there is no reasonable likelihood that this would achieve a better outcome for the people than would result from rejecting or ending combat and simply doing whatever is possible by other means.”<sup>6</sup>*

This principle must be reflected in the understanding of success in EU military conflict management operations, which should include success criteria concerning appropriate implementation as well as goal attainment.

## EXTERNAL SUCCESS

Although internal success is an important part of a broader definition of success, an internal success does not necessarily constitute an overall success. In fact, this article rejects an actor-specific definition of success based exclusively on the internal goals and intentions of the EU.

The alternative to assessing an intervener on its own merits (internal criteria) is typically to define success according to a set of theoretical principles reflecting the perceived interests of the target and/or the purpose of conflict management (external criteria). With regard to military conflict management, the interests of the target are usually associated with sustainable peace, justice and reduction of human suffering.<sup>7</sup>

This suggests that success should be defined according to standards independent of the intervening actor. It is disputed, however, what such external criteria should be. To give but a few examples of external success criteria presented in peacekeeping scholarship, Stedman and Downs have argued that a successful operation must end violence and leave behind a self-sustaining ceasefire. Diehl has suggested that success is when an armed conflict is limited and an operation facilitates conflict resolution.<sup>8</sup> Howard has evaluated the legacy of operations after their departure, incorporating maximalist standards of institution-building and positive peace, although not going so far as to say that all missions that do not result in just societies with stable economies are failures.<sup>9</sup> These quite different examples of external criteria underline the continued difficulty of defining success in military conflict management.


6 Guthrie, Charles & Quinlan, Michael, 2007. *Just war: The just war tradition: Ethics in modern warfare*. London: Bloomsbury, pp.20-21 and p.31.

7 Druckman, Daniel et al (1997). Evaluating peacekeeping missions. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 31(1), pp. 151-165.

8 Diehl, Paul F. (1994). *International peacekeeping*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 33-61.

9 Howard, Lise Morje (2008). *UN peacekeeping in civil wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7.





Graphic: Peen Rodt/Scala

Evaluation framework for military conflict management operations: dimensions, criteria and indicators of 'success'

## EVALUATING SUCCESS

The conceptual problem of defining success causes further problems in the evaluation of success. Depending on which definition one applies, the level of success varies significantly. Where the internal definition arguably asks too little for an operation to succeed, the external perspective often evaluates success according to an ideal state of peace, practically impossible for soldiers to achieve. Both definitions reflect misconceptions about the purpose of military conflict management operations. This causes observers to allocate the forces too much or too little credit – crediting or blaming the intervener for developments in which it is neither the only nor, often, the decisive actor. The internal success criteria often set the bar too low, whereas many external criteria for success make it all but impossible for an operation to succeed. This problem is mirrored in the EU scholarship.

One should expect an EU military conflict management operation to have a positive impact on the management of a conflict. However, one should not expect EU soldiers to resolve the underlying root causes of that conflict. This is normatively unfair, analytically unsound and practically unproductive. The definition of success must reflect the purpose of military conflict management; namely, to militarily manage the violent aspect of a conflict. Conflict management must not be confused with conflict resolution. The resolution of a conflict is dependent on the actions of domestic, regional and international actors engaged in the conflict and its resolution, not simply the presence of an EU force.<sup>10</sup> This article, therefore, also rejects definitions of success solely based on extensive external criteria. Neither internal nor external success alone constitutes overall success in EU military conflict manage-

<sup>10</sup> Johansen, Robert, C. (1994). UN peacekeeping: How should we measure success? *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), pp. 307-310.

ment operations. The understanding of success must incorporate both internal and external perspectives on success so as to reflect the interests of the intervener (the EU), the target (the conflict) and the purpose of this type of operation (conflict management).

## CONCLUSION

Violent conflict and military conflict management are both complex phenomena. Success in military conflict management operations is a complex issue to define, let alone to evaluate, explain and predict. Because of that complexity, this article proposes that the notion of success in military conflict management operations must be based on a theoretically grounded understanding of success and a sound analytical framework for its evaluation (illustrated in Figure 1),

which incorporates internal and external goal attainment as well as the appropriate implementation thereof. This is particularly important if one seeks to compare the success of several operations or to draw lessons from completed operations to future operations and to the practice of military conflict management more generally. Failure to address these issues appropriately may lead to analytical misunderstanding, misguided policy prescription and, in the worst case, to less than successful operations. The EU has an interest in succeeding in these operations, but it is important to recall that failure in military conflict management has serious implications for the soldiers who implement the operations and for those who live and all too often die in the conflicts they seek to manage. This is why systematic scrutiny of success in EU military conflict management operations is important – not only in theory, but in practice.



Photo: European Union

Systematic scrutiny of success in EU military conflict management operations is important – not only in theory, but in practice (in the picture: Medal parade for EUFOR RCA)

## 2.4.2. Benchmarking and impact assessment for civilian CSDP missions

by Birgit Loeser

Benchmarking was formally introduced into civilian CSDP mission planning and conduct in 2011. However, its main elements were not new; in fact, since the very first mission in 2003, all mission concepts of operations (CONOPS) defined concrete objectives and mission tasks; they also contained definitions of 'end states' and 'criteria for success' based on analysis of risks and opportunities for mission accomplishment; and missions were asked to report regularly and comprehensively on mission progress.

However, prompted *inter alia* by the financial crisis, and in the light of a number of civilian SSR-related missions being prolonged time and again, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Member States requested that the approach to benchmarking and delivery/impact be tightened up.

In this context, the basic consideration was that one of the key objectives of civilian CSDP missions is to facilitate the changes or processes necessary to foster stability in crisis situations. With this goal in mind, a monitoring and reporting mechanism designed to provide objective and timely feedback on progress made was considered essential, among other things to help verify the impact of missions on the ground.

It has to be kept in mind that civilian CSDP missions are but one of the instruments at the disposal of the EU in conflict prevention or post-conflict scenarios, where the EU is not the only actor. In general, they are conceived and designed to operate in a short- to medium-term perspective, focusing on specific aspects of the situation and meant to help in advancing towards a political end-state which the EU is pursuing in the longer term.

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPC) accordingly undertook extensive research and in-depth analysis of existing approaches to the topic, studying other EU, international and research best practice. Benchmarking for the purposes of civilian CSDP was eventually described as

*„a methodology designed to contribute to measuring progress and outcome by comparing a situation (an initial baseline) against its evolution at given points in time using pre-defined indicators. The information obtained from this process is then fed back into the mission chain of command, facilitating tactical, operational and strategic policy adjustments as required”<sup>1</sup>.*

More specifically, the benchmarking methodology agreed in 2011 provides the following:

As benchmarking serves as a tool for measuring change, the starting point is a conflict and situation analysis and assessment of needs that leads to the definition of a 'baseline'. This work is normally done at the stage of Crisis Management Concept (CMC) drafting, later refined and detailed during operational planning with input from the ground.

Whilst the CMC sets out the aims and political-strategic objectives of the envisaged CSDP mission as well as its basic parameters, the further operational planning translates these into mission 'tasks' and 'benchmarks'. The concept of operations thus identifies lines of operations suited to achieving those aims and objectives. Political intent becomes direction and guidance. 'Decisive points' and 'desired outcomes' are defined in this process.

The subsequently developed OPLAN further elaborates the operational details necessary for

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions*, 17110/01, PSC noted in 2011.

the implementation of the chosen lines of operation. It defines specific mission tasks and related benchmarks, including their respective baselines, objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) and means of verification (MVs).

On this basis, the missions are to programme and record in an internal document – the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) – the activities undertaken within each of the assigned tasks. These mission activities are expected to produce specific effects (outcome) leading to the expected task output.

Whilst monthly mission reports provide factual information on mission activities and mission progress, six-monthly mission reports contain more in-depth analysis of mission achievements in comparison to the original baseline.

When this concept was introduced in late 2011, existing missions had to adapt to it – not drastically, as the methodology built on what existed already, but still, terminology changed and the systematic approach and necessary consistency had to be organised. New missions that were established thereafter had a more natural approach to this, as they benefited not least from dedicated CPCC-led induction prior to deployment.

A major lesson since 2011, however, is the observation that the proper handling of benchmarking does require a specific skill set. It includes knowledge of project-based work and also experience in change management. This has led the CPCC to reflect such notions in relevant job descriptions, during recruitment as well as in the standardised mission structure. Training modules too are now receiving a greater emphasis from the CPCC on such required planning skill and project management techniques where possible.

Now, whilst all of the above has greatly improved the mission management, focus and reporting on mission progress, mission evaluation and impact assessment, into which benchmarking naturally feeds, is a distinct function that remains to be further defined.

For these purposes, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed a study undertaken in



EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina was reviewed as a case study during the development of the impact assessment methodology

2012 by the renowned New York based Centre for International Cooperation on a possible methodology for civilian CSDP mission impact assessment. The main constraint identified by the research team was that of the security classification of CSDP planning documents, which makes an impact assessment by external actors impossible. Still, a method was identified that would allow CPCC-led assessment teams to reach the necessary level of objectivity, notably by associating (security-cleared) external participants, from e.g. the EEAS or Commission services or Member States, and by introducing a standardised template for proceeding with such reviews.

This methodology is still being considered and will soon be presented to Member States, which remain keen to be sure about a mission impact. This is for double accountability purposes – that of the already mentioned concern over value for money, but also that of political credibility and the comparative advantages of civilian CSDP as one tool in foreign and security policy. The EU aspiration is to be a global player active in the field of peace and security, with real potential for contributing to sustainable change. Being able to attribute success to its own activities makes these efforts more visible and ultimately more credible.



### 2.4.3. Lessons learnt and best practices

by Giovanni Cremonini

What is a ‘lesson learnt’? This is worth explaining as there are different understandings of the term. In normal speech, a ‘lesson learnt’ is often used as a synonym for ‘experience’ and does not necessarily imply that any action has been taken as a consequence. In daily life, one can note something as a ‘lesson learnt’ and that can be the end of the story.

Lessons specialists, particularly in the military domain, are more precise. They define a ‘lesson’ as any occurrence or finding that has an impact on operational output, which requires further development or monitoring. After proper analysis and validation, a simple ‘lesson observed’ becomes a ‘lesson identified’. At this point remedial action should be taken, which may, for example, consist of modifying concepts, planning documents, training documents, guidelines or standard operating procedures in order to reflect the lesson. After remedial action has been taken, a lesson identified becomes a ‘lesson learnt’. Therefore, a ‘lesson learnt’ is a lesson that has been not only observed and identified but also acted on.

‘Best practice’ is a successful practice that should be replicated. It can be classified as a positive lesson, and in this context replication takes the place of remedial action.

Learning lessons is essential for organisational improvement in any environment. This also applies to the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, and considerable efforts have been made to improve the CSDP lessons system over the last few years. An exhaustive report on CSDP lessons from security sector reform was issued in 2012 and the CSDP lessons system in Brussels was overhauled in 2013. Missions and operations should, of course, also have their own

lessons systems, formal or informal, to take into account what works and what does not work and to improve their performance. What cannot be solved at the level of a mission or operation should be reported to HQ as part of regular reporting. Good feedback on lessons from the field is extremely valuable.

Each of the three CSDP structures at EU HQ (CMPD, CPCC and EUMS) now has its own internal lessons system for recording, analysing and implementing lessons. CMPD collects lessons from political-strategic planning of CSDP missions and operations and from the related strategic reviews. CPCC collects lessons from operational planning, conduct and support of civilian CSDP missions. EUMS collects lessons from advance planning and support to military HQ and from reports from missions and operations. As far as possible, lessons are also collected through visits by officials from Brussels HQ to CSDP missions and operations and through interviews with mission and operation staff and other stakeholders.


Certain lessons identified by CMPD, CPCC or EUMS cannot be implemented by any of those structures on their own. Since 2013, these lessons are discussed in a two-level CSDP Lessons Management Group/Lessons Working Group, which includes not only CMPD, CPCC and EUMS but also all other CSDP stakeholders: INTCEN, Security Policy and Conflict Prevention, MD CR&OC, CivCom, EUMC and PMG chairs, relevant geographic and thematic departments, as well as the Commission’s DG DEVCO, ECHO and FPI. An effective lessons system needs the involvement of the highest level of management, and the CSDP Lessons Management Group

is composed by the heads of these bodies and chaired by a member of the Corporate Board of the EEAS. The CSDP Lessons Working Group has the same composition at expert level and is chaired by an official appointed by the Chair of the Lessons Management Group. It discusses in detail the lessons raised by its members and attempts to produce a shared analysis and joint recommendations.

Every year, the CSDP Lessons Management Group identifies up to five broad, overarching issues or key lessons and submits them to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) for endorsement in an Annual CSDP Lessons Report. This report also includes the input from EU Delegations in countries where missions and operations are deployed. The key lessons of the 2013 Report concerned the implementation of the comprehensive approach, pre-deployment training, local ownership, preparatory measures and the les-

sons system itself.<sup>1</sup> They were accompanied by nineteen specific recommendations for remedial action or replication of good practice. The PSC endorsed these key lessons and recommendations in line with the advice from the relevant Council working groups.

The CSDP Lessons Working Group monitors the implementation of the key lessons and recommendations. In 2014, it found that good progress had been made in all five areas identified in the 2013 Report, although further work was needed, particularly on certain aspects of the comprehensive approach and on pre-deployment training. The lessons work will continue this year and in the years ahead, which should help, in practice, constantly to improve the functioning of the CSDP. Of course lessons are only useful if they are duly recorded, carefully analysed and actually implemented, which requires the commitment and active involvement of all concerned.



<sup>1</sup> A summary of the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report is available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual\\_2013\\_csdp\\_lessons\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual_2013_csdp_lessons_report_en.pdf)

## 2.4.4. The conceptual background for EU crisis management

by Morten Knudsen

Concepts are an important tool in EU crisis management.<sup>1</sup> Military and civilian concepts set out fundamental principles for crisis management missions and operations. Ideally, concepts establish basic parameters and definitions and ensure a common understanding with a view to the planning and execution of missions and operations, both in the civilian and military fields. They also contribute to standardisation where required and applicable. When 28 Member States and the different EU institutions work together, many fundamental issues need to be clearly defined. Precise definitions of operational standards, policing, rule of law, force generation, planning procedures, etc. play an essential role in making CSDP missions and operations as efficient as possible.

Concepts are important for internal reasons, i.e. ensuring that all EU actors have a joint understanding of the issues involved. They are also useful for training purposes and for third States participating in CSDP operations and missions as well as for international organisations with which the EU cooperates, in particular the United Nations.

### MILITARY CONCEPTS

Military concepts are developed by the EUMS (the Concepts & Capability Directorate). The EUMS follows biannual work plans set out in the EU Military Concept Development Implementation Programme (CDIP). The CDIP is revised annually and provides a projection for the next two years of EU military concept develop-

ment and EUMS involvement in civil-military concept development at EU level. The biannual programme comprises over 30 concepts, both updates of already existing concepts and the development of new ones. In addition to operational requirements, the work is driven by the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the work of European Defence Agency, EU presidencies and Member States' initiatives, the work of the Headline Goal Task Force as well as analysis of lessons from operations, missions and exercises, both civil and military, and input from international organisations.

### CIVILIAN CONCEPTS

The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is responsible for keeping the overview of CSDP and CSDP-related concepts and conceptual documents, and for developing concepts. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is active in producing guidelines on various aspects of civilian crisis management. The CMPD has concentrated on developing broad overarching concepts, establishing the foundation for some of the tasks set out by the European Council in Feira in 2000 such as policing and the rule of law. CMPD has also put considerable emphasis on the link between internal and external security, an important item for EU crisis management. Recently, CMPD addressed the issue of border management in CSDP missions at the conceptual level with a view to ensur-

<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of the article, 'concepts' refer both to concepts as such and to guidelines, handbooks and other guidance notes that aim to facilitate the planning and conduct of missions and operations.



Photo: EUPOL-RDC

Concepts and guidelines ensure a common understanding for the planning and execution of CSDP missions, e.g. the Operational Guidelines for Monitoring Mentoring and Advising.

ing that border issues are addressed efficiently in future missions. The CPCC complements this works by developing operational guidelines, for example the guidelines on mission organisation, the benchmarking guidelines, the Use of Force guidelines and the guidelines on Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising.

As regards conceptual developments in 2014, there were 33 military concept development projects ongoing and twelve concepts were successfully completed. In the civilian field, the CPCC finalised Guidelines for the preparation of civilian CSDP mission-specific rules for the use of force, which were agreed by Member States on 18

September. Member States also agreed on Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) in civilian CSDP missions, an issue that is increasingly important in many of the ongoing missions. Both in the military and civilian fields, reflections on how to ensure rapid deployment continued in line with the conclusions of the European Council of December 2013. Some of the issues addressed involved civ/mil cooperation. The EU concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations and Missions may eventually facilitate closer cooperation with EU-led civilian missions as it attempts to address the different options for the execution of logistics functions. The Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations, also adopted in 2014, was drafted on the basis of cooperation between the military and the civilian structures. It aims to provide concise and consistent guidance for the optimal provision of medical support for both civilian missions and military operations.

Good concepts and guidance notes make it easier for newcomers to understand how things work. Colleagues who are involved in crisis management issues, but not on a full-time basis (geographical or thematic desks in the EEAS, Member States' diplomats outside the EU structures, Delegations, Commission services, etc.), often need to familiarise themselves rapidly with issues related to crisis management. In such cases, a clear conceptual foundation can contribute to facilitating the understanding of the issues at stake. Concepts, handbooks and guidance notes should thus continue to play an important role. In a multilateral environment, the need for clear guidance and doctrine is even more important than at national level – when 28 Member States work together, there are many things that cannot be taken for granted. As recalled above, many third States take part in our missions and operations, and we cooperate closely with international organisations. So what we want to do, and how we do it, has to be spelled out clearly. That is, ultimately, the role of concepts and guidance documents.



## 2.5. CHALLENGES

### 2.5.1. Cyber security and defence

by Wolfgang Röhrig



#### INTRODUCTION

For a long time, crises affecting national security or citizens' well-being have had in common that both their roots and impacts were exclusively linked to the physical domains of land, air, sea or space. Over the last two decades a new domain has evolved – 'Cyber Space', which may still rely on and consist of physical assets (server, router, etc.), but which, more importantly, contains a new virtual dimension. The online world has pervaded society as a whole; the increasing number of online services and connectivity (e.g. Internet of Things) has enabled tremendous economic, social and political developments to take place. However, this strength is now also becoming a weakness. Information and communication technologies are a critical enabler for our economic growth and our societies now rely on the internet in many different ways and on many different levels. Cyber security incidents, either intentional or accidental, are increasing at an alarming rate and are impacting in many areas; they could also disrupt essential services such as water, healthcare, electricity or mobile services.

#### THE CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE AND ITS IMPACT ON CSDP

The threat landscape covers everything from internet vandalism to physical and criminal damage. The theft of intellectual property and economic or state-sponsored espionage lies somewhere in-between. The recent attack by the group called 'CyberCaliphate' on the US Central Command indicates that terrorist groups have started to discover the opportunities of using cyber space not only for propaganda and recruitment but also as attack vector. Also, the capacity to destroy or damage physical property represents a strategic shift. Malware targeting industrial control systems (e.g. STUXNET), constitutes one example of this new type of threat. We can anticipate the development of more dangerous tools and, eventually, their use. The European Network and Information Security Agency, ENISA publishes an annual report on the development of the threat landscape reflecting recent technology trends. The picture ENISA paints with their last reports is quite alarming. Targeted attacks through Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) malware will become the most difficult threats to counter.

The cyber threats are:

- Versatile, permanently changing its shape and hiding its origin and motivation;
- Worldwide, ignoring physical boundaries – the territorial ones but also those of specially protected areas (e.g. critical infrastructures, military installations and networks);



Photo: Austrian Armed Forces

The success of conventional military operations in the other domains is enabled by, and dependent on, the assured availability of, and access to, cyberspace

- Ubiquitous, anybody can buy anonymously almost everything – attack kits or services at the online black market;
- Extremely rapid, the reaction time counts in seconds.

***However, what has this virtual world and its threats got to do with CSDP crisis management?***

1. Crisis can be initiated or exacerbated through cyber space. The three-week-long cyber-attack campaign on Estonia in 2007 almost turned into a national crisis, as governmental and vital services for the functioning of Estonian society were affected by a – technically quite simple – Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. The tools for such attacks are nowadays available in any basic hacker kit. That the military and a society can be paralysed through cyber attacks was demonstrated during the Georgia conflict one year later in 2008.
2. Crises or disasters in the physical domains (e.g. power outages) can regionally affect the availability of cyber space. The regional or even widespread unavailability of cyber space can cause tremendous negative economic and societal effects which might exacerbate a crisis or a disaster. For example, one aspect addressed by Finland in its cyber security strategy is the psy-

chological resilience of its citizens in the face of a major cyber crisis.

3. Vital and critical crisis management assets can be affected through cyber attacks. Today effective crisis management relies on modern information and communication systems or services, and equipment with many embedded technology and processors, which often use cyber space.

In the military cyber space is nowadays widely recognized as the 5th operational domain besides land, sea, air and space. The success of conventional military operations in the other domains is enabled by, and dependent on, the assured availability of, and access to, cyber space. Similar enabling conditions and dependencies can be assumed for civilian CSDP missions. The EU rightly prides itself on its ability to deploy civilian and military responses to global crises. All the same, it is important that the EU adopts a common civilian and military approach to self-protection in cyber space. Own vulnerabilities are central in the context of the cyber domain. Hostile actors may exploit these at critical times or during decisive phases of an operation or mission. Thus, the threat landscape must be seen in the context of the following crisis management implications:

- Crisis management activities in the physical domains rely on guaranteed access to cyber space;
- Crisis management is increasingly dependent on civil (critical) infrastructures – both home base and in the deployment area;
- As crisis management becomes increasingly interconnected, using internet technologies, internet vulnerabilities get closer to deployed personnel and their assets.

The impact of cyber attacks can range from simple inconvenience, reputational damage, loss/compromise of information, right up to physical damage and/or loss of life.

In consequence, today's crisis management, be it in a civil mission or on military operations, has to:

- Establish and maintain Cyber Situational Awareness;

- Consider cyber threats as intentional or accidental from the beginning of planning, throughout the mission and until the end of redeployment of all personnel and assets;
- Consider the effects of activities or disasters in the physical domains on cyber space in crisis management;
- Establish a dynamic risk management approach in order to improve the resilience of vital and critical systems and to minimise their vulnerability to attacks.

Since the EU published its “*Cyber Security Strategy – An open, Safe and Secure Cyber-space*” on 7 February 2013 the Strategy has taken, like other national cyber security strategies, a comprehensive approach. It addresses, within the remit of EU's responsibilities, the civil aspects of cyber security as well as Cyber Defence for CSDP. In December 2013 at the EU Council on defence matters, the EU heads of state and government recognised cyber defence as a priority for capability development. An action plan for CSDP was agreed with the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework in November 2014 and plenty of work is in progress for its implementation with the aim of making missions and operations more cyber resilient.

## PRACTICAL TIPS

As a new domain, there is still little understanding of the cyber planning techniques necessary to adequately consider cyber space during planning for crisis management operations and missions and their execution. However, it is essential that civil and military senior decision-makers and their support staffs, including specialised staff like Legal Advisers or Political Advisers, fully understand the environment in which they will operate; that includes the cyber domain and the understanding of the dependency of activities in the traditional domains of land, air, sea and space on the cyber space domain. With



respect to Cyber Situational Awareness, the main focus is to establish and maintain a comprehensive understanding of how actors make use of the cyber domain to pursue their interests in the conflict. A wide range of actors (from ‘hacktivists’ to criminals and terrorists right up to state actors) can be relevant and actors may pursue their interests in a myriad of different ways. The cyber domain provides favourable opportunities for covert activity. In the current epoch, state actors are engaged in asymmetric conflict with various actors including non-state actors. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that trends we see in the physical world, like hybrid warfare, spill over into cyber space as this domain provides a perfect platform for far-reaching impacts from a distance, even from outside of the deployment area, and, compared to a physical presence in a region, the risk is lower as the possibilities for deception are legion. Consequently, identifying both covert and overt actors operating in or through the cyber domain is a precondition for obtaining sufficient cyber situational awareness. Cyber activities of different actors at the different stages of a conflict can serve the following purposes:

- Intelligence gathering to enhance own situational awareness;
- Sabotage to take systems or assets out of operation;
- Fundraising through cyber criminality;
- Positioning in adversary networks from which they can conduct actions later in the course of conflict, and finally;
- Subversion and influence activities.

When planning and executing a crisis management operation or dealing with mission-relevant questions with respect to the cyber domain, aspects which should be considered are:


- How do regional actors and global actors with interests in the deployment region make use of the cyber domain, what are their offensive cyber capabilities, and what are their motivations and thresholds for employing offensive cyber capabilities;



Poster of the “CE2014”, the EU cyber-crisis cooperation pan-European exercise

- How can strategic cyber threats and cyber factors affect the operation or mission;
- Which options help to reduce undesirable consequences of cyber activities;
- What is the applicable legal framework (e.g. Law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law) and which authorisation (e.g. Rules of Engagement) and escalation processes have to be in place;
- How do cyber factors affect own courses of action;
- When and where are cyber assets critical for success, what are their vulnerabilities and how can the risk that these vulnerabilities will be exploited be mitigated;





Source: [http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cybersecurity/cybersec\\_comm\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cybersecurity/cybersec_comm_en.pdf)

To address cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion, activities should span across three key pillars – Network and Information Security (NIS), law enforcement and defence – which also operate within different legal frameworks

- Which cyber defence considerations should be de-conflicted and coordinated with other considerations;
- Which cyber security/defence activities should be synchronised with activities in other domains;
- Who are the relevant internal and external partners that can give support in the case of large-scale incidents (e.g. CERT-EU, national CERTs, contracted service provider);
- Who should have the authority to release cyber defence/security related information to external partners;
- What are the best mechanisms for optimal cyber information-sharing with external partners;
- How should own cyber defence be organised (structure, manning, processes, disposition, equipment)?

During the execution phase of the operation or mission Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Cyber incident response, business continuity and disaster recovery should be established and frequently exercised and tested.

In terms of practical support to military operations, over the last year an initial set of operational concepts and references has been developed. The *“EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led*

*Military Operations”* was agreed in December 2012 and is the EU’s military guideline for operational commanders to create and maintain cyber situational awareness. The Concept outlines the need to adopt a risk-based threat assessment methodology and to create coordinating structures to ensure that national cyber defence capabilities work coherently to protect the Force. An update of the concept is scheduled for 2015. Member States augmented the concept in March 2013 with the ‘EU Cyber Defence Capability Requirements Statement’. Through the participation of the EU in the US-led Multinational Capability Development Campaign since late 2014 additional supporting documents for cyber defence planning for CSDP have become available, with a handbook and guidelines for integrating cyber into operational planning and a guide and specifications for the analysis of the cyber domain. These documents can be obtained either through the EUMS or through the EDA.

For civilian missions, pilot projects have been launched in order to increase cyber security capabilities and as a basis for further implementation and instructions across all civilian CSDP missions. The above documents can serve as initial guidelines for civilian missions until specific guidance covering both missions and operations is developed.

## THE HUMAN FACTOR

The public perception is often that cyber protection primarily is a technological rather than a human issue. Nowadays, all personnel at all levels require an increasingly sophisticated understanding of cyber space and how to operate effectively in cyber space. Competencies and skills have to be developed and maintained. Cyber Security/Defence is not limited to Cyber Security/Defence specialists. ICT users, today that is almost everybody, have a role to play in Cyber Security/Defence. They must have up-to-date knowledge and awareness of the threat environment and how to react in the event of incidents. This awareness should be frequently updated and tested as appropriate. Decision-makers must understand the cyber options and the impact of cyber operations when making decisions.

Cyber modules in general courses and specific cyber security courses are in the inventory of the ESDC and more specific cyber security/defence courses are under development and will be available soon to increase the competencies and skills of the different stakeholder groups. Cyber awareness seminars for staff and deployed personnel have been developed, notably by the EDA, and may be applied for if required. The EDA has also developed a framework of necessary competencies and skills for the different stakeholder groups with respect to cyber defence. Besides the value of the framework for the development of new course curricula, it can serve to augment different job descriptions as necessary with required cyber security/defence competencies.


## CONCLUSIONS

As in the other domains, the success of cyber security/defence in CSDP operations and missions will depend on a balanced combination of competent personnel, connected through well-developed processes and procedures, and applying state-of-the-art technology. However, human beings are, and will continue to be, our most precious cyber security/defence asset. For the time being, humans are the first (users) and the last (cyber security/defence specialists) lines of defence. The competence and expertise of all personnel is a fundamental requirement for successful cyber security/defence in CSDP operations and missions.



# Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide for Internet Infrastructure

## Threat Mind Map



Source: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/evolving-threat-environment/enisa-thematic-landscape-of-the-internet-infrastructure/iti>

CAMPAIGN/ MALWARE NAME	YEAR OF DISCOVERY	TARGET	OBJECTIVE	ATTACK VECTOR	DESCRIPTION
Cyber Caliphate	2015	USCentCom	Propaganda and reputational loss	Defacement	The Cyber Caliphate, a hacker group claiming association with terrorist group ISIS seized control of the @CENTCOM Twitter and YouTube accounts representing U.S. central military command.
Energetic Bear/ DragonFly	2014	Energy and manufacturing sector, research organisations, public sector	unknown	Spear phishing and Watering Hole attacks	Energetic Bear Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaign appears to be a long-term operation which has targeted companies in several countries. 20 000 victim IP addresses. Gathers information about connected industrial control systems.
Unicorn Bug	2014	Any Internet Explorer user	Multiple	Day 1 exploit using drive-by attacks	This significant vulnerability was undetected for some time. The buggy code is at least 19 years old and has been remotely exploitable for the past 18 years. The problem has been present since the original release code of Windows 95.
Dark Hotel	2014	Top managers and senior officials	Espionage	Compromised Wifi infrastructure	Surgical strikes against targeted guests at luxury hotels in Asia and the US infecting victims via spear phishing attacks: e.g. the victim got a pop-up alerting him to a new Adobe software update; when he clicked to accept the download, he got a malicious executable instead. It is assumed that attackers were active for at least 7 years.
Flame	2012	Middle East countries	Espionage	Local Area Network or USB stick	A virus used to attack computer systems that run on Microsoft Windows as their operating system.
Operation Shady Rat	2011	Organisations worldwide incl. the International Olympic Committee, the United Nations, industry and defence contractors	Espionage		An ongoing series of cyber attacks that started in mid-2006. The operation was derived from the common security industry acronym for Remote Access Tool (RAT) and was behind the cyber attack on the 2008 Summer Olympics.
Stuxnet	2010	Nuclear facility in Natanz, Iran	Destruction of uranium enrichment centrifuges	USB stick	The Stuxnet worm destroyed 1 000 nuclear centrifuges at Natanz and is assumed to have set back the country's atomic programme by at least two years. It spread beyond the plant and infected over 60 000 computers around the world.
Operation Orchard	2007	Syrian air defence	Disabling of Syrian air surveillance	unknown	Prior to the bombing of the Syrian nuclear installations at Kibar, it is assumed that Israel had penetrated the Syrian military's computer network, that they could monitor Syrian activities and – more importantly – that they were able to direct their own data streams into the Syrian air-defence network, introducing a false image of a radar screen, misleading Syrian radar operators and thereby effectively turning off Syria's air defence.
Netsky and Sasser computer worm	2004	Multiple	Disabling of computers through buffer overflow	E-mail and vulnerable network port	A German college student unleashed a virus that had resounding effects all around the world. The estimated damage was assumed at USD 500 million. However, experts believed that it could have been more as it disabled the Delta Air Lines computer system and resulted in the cancellation of several transatlantic flights.
Titan Rain	2004	Several computer networks including NASA, Lockheed Martin	Espionage		Considered to be one of the biggest cyber attacks in history, it not only compromised military intelligence and classified data, but also paved the way for other hackers and espionage entities to infiltrate these systems as it left backdoors in the infected machines.

Examples of recent and/or ground-breaking cyber attacks/campaigns (as of March 2015)



## 2.5.2. Private Military and Security Companies in CSDP Missions

by Anne-Marie Buzatu

### INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to support military and security missions has been on the rise.<sup>1</sup> In line with this trend, the EU is increasingly utilising PMSCs in its crisis management operations, including CSDP missions. While these private actors can help to support and supplement security, they can also pose significant challenges. In particular, these challenges include the lack of clear international standards for the provision of private security services as well as inadequate or ineffective oversight mechanisms. As recognised by the European Court of Justice, the EU has legal obligations to ensure respect for human rights and humanitarian law within these operations, which may extend to services provided by PMSCs. Fortunately, there now exists a set of international norms and stand-

ards for clients such as the EU to observe when contracting services with PMSCs which help to ensure respect for human rights and humanitarian law.

### OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS FOR CLIENTS CONTRACTING WITH PMSC

When contracting with PMSCs, clients wield significant power in determining how services will be carried out. These include putting in place procedures and criteria for the selection and contracting of PMSCs, defining and limiting the kinds of services that they will provide, setting out requirements for the manner in which services must be carried out, monitoring compliance and supporting accountability.

#### Definition of PMSCs

The Montreux Document on the use of Private Military and Security Companies defines PMSCs as

*“private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed<sup>2</sup> guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.”*

1 Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, “Regulating Private Security Companies in Europe: Status and Prospects”, (2007), DCAF Policy Paper 20, 1. Also see Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, (Cornell University Press, 2003). 9-11.

2 The International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for Private Security Service Providers recognises that private security services may also be provided by unarmed personnel.

## Procedures for the selection of and contracting with PMSCs

When choosing PMSCs to provide commercial security services, it is important to bear in mind that not all PMSCs are alike. Some have incorporated systems and policies into their operations that substantially lower the risk that they will negatively impact human rights and humanitarian law, while others have not. As the implementation of these systems and policies can often be costly, leading to an increase in the cost of their security services, it is important that clients do not use lowest price as the only criterion for the selection of PMSCs.

Before entering into a contract with a PMSC, clients should conduct a background check on the company for the purpose of obtaining the following information:

- The principal services that the PMSC has provided in the past, including any they have sub-contracted out;
- References from other clients for whom the PMSC has provided services which are similar to the ones the client would like to acquire;
- The PMSC's ownership structure, relationships with subcontractors, subsidiaries and partnerships.<sup>3</sup>

Other important factors to consider when selecting a PMSC are the systems and policies employed by the company to lower the risk of human rights and humanitarian law violations. These include:

- ***Selection and vetting of personnel***  
PMSCs should have established policies and procedures to determine the suitability of personnel to perform private security services, including by conducting checks that they have not been convicted of crimes, been dishonourably discharged from police or military services, or have had their employment terminated by another company for violations of human rights or humanitarian law;

- ***Training of personnel***

PMSCs should provide initial and ongoing training to their personnel in relevant national law and local culture and customs, international human rights and humanitarian law, including on the appropriate use of force, as well as training on any weapons they carry in the course of performing security services.

- ***Management of weapons***

PMSCs' policies for managing weapons should include procedures for secure storage, records documenting to whom and when weapons are issued, identification and accounting of all ammunition, and procedures for proper disposal.

- ***Incident reporting***

PMSCs should require reports for all incidents where their personnel were involved in the use / discharge of a weapon, any escalation of force, injury to persons, criminal acts, damage to property, or traffic accidents.

- ***Grievance mechanisms***

PMSCs should have established grievance procedures for personnel and third parties to report allegations of improper and/or illegal conduct. Such procedures should be accessible, fair and should offer effective remedies to those injured.

- ***Subcontractors***

PMSCs should demonstrate that any subcontractors they use to perform services meet the same requirements as the contracted PMSC. Clients may consider requiring in the contract that PMSCs obtain their approval before any subcontractors are used.

## Assessing risks and determining services

An important way to lower the risk of violations by PMSC is by limiting the services they are contracted to carry out. Using PMSCs to support operations in the context of armed conflicts raises a number particular considerations.

<sup>3</sup> This is taken from the Montreux Document, Good Practices for Contracting States, 17.

As a point of first order, PMSCs should not be contracted to carry out activities that international law explicitly assigns to state agents, such as acting as the officer responsible for prisoner of war or internment camps.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, clients should consider whether a particular activity could involve the direct participation of PMSCs in hostilities. For example, by providing security services for legitimate military targets, such as military convoys or weapons depots, PMSCs are considered to be directly participating in hostilities.

As such, they lose their civilian protection, becoming legitimate military targets themselves.

In all situations, clients should carry out risk and impact assessments of security arrangements to identify both risks to the operation and to the PMSC and its personnel, as well as the potential adverse human rights impacts arising out of the activities. When conducting a risk and impact assessment, clients should include the following elements:

- The operating environment and risks, particularly when operating in areas of weakened governance;
- How PMSCs – both local and international – are viewed by the local population and by public authorities;

- National private security regulation, including any legal requirements and/or shortcomings in national frameworks;
- Where considering using armed private security, assessing the risks against needs/benefits of carrying arms;
- Particular groups or populations which may be at a heightened risk of negative human rights impacts.

The information gained from risk and impact assessments will offer guidance on how PMSCs should be used, helping to inform context-relevant prevention and mitigation strategies that address identified risks. The results from such assessments can offer insights on how best to integrate PMSCs in missions, for example by identifying activities that are better handled by PMSCs versus those that are not, or by providing information on whether using local PMSCs will find greater or less acceptance within the community as opposed to international PMSCs. Such findings will help to provide guidance on the kind of PMSC that is more appropriate to use, set the purpose and objectives of the activities to be contracted, and should provide the basis for the terms of reference for the services provided by PMSCs.

### Rules for the Use of Force by PMSCs

There is an emerging international consensus<sup>5</sup> that the resort to the use of force by PMSCs should be very limited, restricting it to use in self-defence or defence of others – *a right to the use of force that all civilian persons have*. This reaffirms the civilian nature of PMSCs, underlining that they do not have any additional privileges or rights to use coercive force than do other civilians. Furthermore, it reinforces clear differences between PMSCs and state police and military forces, who as state agents typically are authorised to use a greater spectrum of force in order to protect public safety, including powers of arrest, search and seizure.

<sup>4</sup> Please see the Montreux Document, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> See ICoC, para 30-32, ANSI PSC.1, and the commonly accepted standards for the use of force in self-defence under criminal law.

## Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability

When contracting with PMSCs, clients should include mechanisms within the contract to monitor compliance and to ensure accountability. These can include requiring that the PMSC perform their services in compliance with specific instruments of international law, establishing regular meetings with the PMSC to discuss the manner in which it is complying with the terms of the contract, and/or using external actors to carry out monitoring.

Monitoring can be carried out by the security division of the CSDP mission, or by an independent third party, such as the International Code of Conduct Association (see below). In conducting monitoring, performance indicators can be used to ensure that conduct is tied to specific outcomes such as financial rewards or penalties, or even termination of the contract. Disciplinary measures should be sufficient as to provide real deterrence, and should also provide effective remedies to those who were injured. Examples of performance indicators to ensure compliance include: PMSC record of attendance, number of incident reports, complaints (internal, client and third party) alleging violations of international human rights/humanitarian law, national law, or other terms of the contract. Furthermore, procedures should be developed for reporting abuses and violations to local authorities where appropriate.

## ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR CONTRACTING WITH PMSCS

There are a number of international instruments, both conventional as well as 'soft law', that can offer guidance to those contracting with PMSCs:

- The European Convention on Human Rights
- The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
- The Geneva Convention of 1948 and its Additional Protocols
- The Montreux Document on the use of PMSCs
- UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies
- The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
- The American National Standards Institute PSC.1 Standard

### Membership of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA)

Private security service providers who are members in good standing of the ICoCA must demonstrate that they meet international standards for company systems and policies as laid down in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, including selection and vetting of personnel and subcontractors, training in international human rights and humanitarian law, management of weapons, incident reporting and providing effective remedies for those who are damaged or injured by their services. The ICoCA also conducts ongoing monitoring of members, including in the field, and supervises how member companies handle grievances.



**Private Military and Security Companies in CSDP missions**

Security and protection for civilian CSDP missions primarily rely on the host nation, unless an executive mandate is at stake.

In the event of high risk and specific security requirements, the mission may be authorised to use seconded or contracted armed personnel, including a contract with a Private Security Company.

Nonetheless, assuming that a contributing state is willing to provide the required assets, the mission may also have a seconded armed security contingent incorporated into its structure.

Another option would be the development of synergies between civilian and military CSDP engagements, if and when operating in the same theatre. For example, in case of collocation in the same compound and without prejudice to the operational autonomy necessary to implement their mandates, operational and financial benefits could be achieved through a cost/benefit analysis of how to better address the respective civilian/ military security and protection requirements.

Finally, special arrangements might be established, as appropriate, with other organisations e.g. UN, NATO, AU, etc.

Luigi Bruno

### 2.5.3. Local ownership and cooperation with civil society

by Maria Fihl



Ensuring local ownership is a key factor of success when supporting Security Sector Reform. The Head of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration on administrative, social and economic reforms

One of the largest challenges for international efforts in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention, and for civilian CSDP missions, is to ensure that mandates and operations are found which link into the work of the host government the mission is assisting. The involvement and support of civil society with respect to what the mission is trying to achieve is an equally important challenge.

Guidelines and best practices have been developed on a regular basis on engagement with civil society in theatres of operations, notably in relation to the EU Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. As CSDP mis-

sions and operations' mandates are often based on partnerships and ownership (think of training missions, capacity-building), and linked to a culture of change (e.g. the increasing introduction of security and justice sector reform into civilian and military CSDP mandates), it is of key importance for the mission on the ground to build and foster its cooperation with both the authorities it works with, and the civil society at large.

When reforms are at stake, the art of achieving local ownership is not to draft on behalf of the mission interlocutors, but to be willing to spend the necessary time to have a clear under-



Photo: EESAF/EUFOR RCA

Commander of the Spanish Special Forces engages with local leaders of 3rd district



Photo: EUFOR Tchad-RCA

EUFOR Tchad-RCA. Discussing EUFOR's role with the local population, December 2008

standing of what is needed. This can include for instance structural changes to representation in agencies/ministries/courts and similar and ownership across institutions, how institutions should cooperate and how subordination should function, etc.

Only when this is formulated and jointly understood by the local government, the local opposition and not least the wider civil society, is it possible to start efforts to implement the different aspects of the reforms.

A positive example of this is the Kosovan Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (CSP), which laid out the above-mentioned ingredients for a future Kosovan state.

The drafting of the CSP took place over a three-year period with multi stakeholder involvement including the government, opposition, civil society, international community and minorities.

Once the actual implementation took place, there was overall support for legislative change and not least implementation roadmaps of all kinds, from the law on police to the establishment of municipalities, because the principle of common local ownership for the changes had been applied.

Local buy-in is key to such major, extensive developments. Every intervention is different and every situation requires a tailor-made solution. It is important to understand both the history of a place and the entire political and legal framework, so that all contexts and structures are clear to the ones providing support. Members of the mission need to spend time with the interlocutors and form an understanding of their everyday lives, otherwise they will not be able to become close to the people they are working with.

An important part of local ownership rests in supporting accountability mechanisms and the preparation of public discourse for the aspects of reform which a mission is advising on. Civil society is one strong component of this. Civil society can range from very competent democratisation NGOs to human rights-based NGOs, often linked up to strong international and subject-specific organisations such as Freedom House, Transparency International, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc. In addition to this category it is vital to involve the different unions and entrepreneur societies, those who organise the professional groups, to understand their insights, and not least to get their buy-in for the reform process, where changes will not be easy to accept for all.





Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan

Development course for policewomen at the Police Staff College in Kabul, September 2014. The training was delivered under Afghan ownership as part of EUPOL's transition process

It is important to keep oversight civil society actors, who follow and measure progress in public campaigns, on board, and to ensure that they measure the progress of the work to be undertaken, in this sense creating a public barometer for what the government achieves on the basis of the mission's advice.

Such measures allow the population to follow progress. A strategy like this gives the government and its relevant agencies time to implement what needs to be implemented, while progress is communicated to the public and it is clear to the wider world what will be required and what the final end goal will be.

Another advantage of civil society and in particular think tanks is that as they integrate academic research, they are good at inspiring, and at creating town hall meetings, where visions can be shared in public, and later met with the bureaucratic and not least financial obligations which it will be just as necessary to accommodate.

Work with civil society is also part of a long-term strategy for the mission and not least for the authorities the mission is working with. It provides excellent training, in particular for the youth who participate, in how to formulate governmental policies and the limitations and obligations of the government involved. This creates a more informed public, who may be critical towards the government's policies and actions, but will importantly have a strong sense of local ownership.

Local and international NGOs and civil society organisations also efficiently contribute to early warning and prevention, and can feed into the mission's situational awareness and even its operational activities. Liaison with civil society organisations often helps the mission mainstream human rights and gender in its activities, and flag up sensitive areas. These organisations can also contribute to the assessment of a mission's activities and mandate implementation.



## 2.5.4. Public health engagement in CSDP operations and missions – enhancing personnel sustainability

by Bastian Bail and Evert-Jan Slootman


### INTRODUCTION

Historically, in almost all conflicts involving military personnel, only 20 % of all hospital admissions have been from combat injuries. The other 80 % have been from disease and non-battle injuries (DNBIs). These figures do not include vast numbers of soldiers with decreased combat effectiveness due to illnesses not requiring hospital admission.

Most DNBIs can be prevented by public health measures. These measures are simple, common-sense actions which anyone can perform and with which every leader must be familiar in order to contribute to the sustainability of EU personnel in operations and missions.

Commanders are responsible for all aspects of health and sanitation. Only they can make command decisions taking into account the nature of the mission, medical threats and the health condition of deployed personnel.

The Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations deals with all medical and health issues in CSDP operations and missions. The concept sets out medical support principles for the guidance of Commanders/Heads of Mission and their staff. It provides functional direction in order to optimise health and healthcare support on EU-led crisis management missions and operations, to guarantee mission staff best-practice medical treatment in compliance with common EU standards. This EU concept acts as a guide for operational plans, directives and



training for deployment and aims to furnish Commanders and Heads of Mission, as well as their medical advisers, with concise and consistent guidance for the optimal provision of medical support.

Besides this concept, health and medical support planning must always consider the whole spectrum of mission environments with all possible health risks. It must also include detailed measures for the prevention of physical or mental illness and injury of deployed mission personnel or military forces as a key factor of personnel sustainability. These measures are not limited to the period of deployment but must include preparatory measures



Photo: European External Action Service

The EU supports the International Community by coordinating the EU Ebola Virus Disease response (in the picture: High-level international conference on Ebola: from emergency to recovery, Brussels, 3 March 2015)

before deployment (e.g. fitness screening, vaccination, malaria prophylaxis) and follow-up measures after deployment (e.g. psychological support), both within national responsibility.

Medical plans have to be tailored to the mission requirements and need to be based on a specific, detailed health risk assessment to ensure the safety and availability of all deployed personnel, in combination with health promotion measures.

### WHAT IS PUBLIC HEALTH?

The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health as *“a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”*. It is not an absolute concept and it should be noted that there is a continuum of health status, between well-being and ill-health. The WHO concept first articulated in 1948 must, in a military context, be broadened to embrace fitness in addition to well-being.

WHO defines public health as all organised measures (whether public or private) to prevent

disease, promote health and prolong life among the population as a whole. Its activities aim to provide conditions in which people can be healthy, and focus on entire populations, not on individual patients or diseases. Thus, public health is concerned with the whole system and not only the eradication of a particular disease. The three main public health functions are to:

- assess and monitor the health of communities and populations at risk, identifying health problems and priorities;
- formulate public policies designed to solve identified local and national health problems and priorities;
- ensure that all populations have access to appropriate and cost-effective care, including health promotion and disease prevention services.

This highlights that public health practice also involves engagement within areas outside health-care in order to improve the health of the population. In the military, public health refers to all organised measures to prevent disease, promote health, and contribute to the sustainability of the military force.

## PUBLIC HEALTH TODAY

Public health is about populations as opposed to individual patients, and takes a long-term view of events beyond a consultation, clinical intervention or finished consultant episode. It considers a number of directly and indirectly related subjects, in particular health economics, statistics, health psychology, health sociology, health education and promotion and management theory. The gathering and management of health and social information is crucial. It is a rigorous, science-based and evidence-based discipline which assesses health needs before going on to assess the effectiveness of health outcomes through evaluation. Protection from both communicable disease and environmental hazards remains a cornerstone of public health. For example, research has shown that the simple act of hand washing with soap can prevent many contagious diseases. In other cases, treating a disease or controlling a pathogen can be vital to preventing its spread to others, for example during an outbreak of infectious disease, or contamination of food or water supplies.

The core skill and tool of public health is epi-

miology, which can be defined as the study of patterns and determinants of health-related states or events in defined populations, and the application of this study to the control of health problems. The collection and analysis of health data from EU operations and missions is pivotal. It affects policy decisions and evidence-based practice by identifying risk factors for disease and targets for preventive healthcare.

## PUBLIC HEALTH IN CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

The Health and Medical Concept establishes the basis and the framework for effective planning and implementation of combined and joint multinational health and medical support which reflects the pre-defined medical standards within the EU.

Specific health and medical support principles and guidelines are the basis for the planning and execution of health and medical care during any kind of civilian or military mission or operation. They draw on the medical ethics code of medical personnel, the rules of conduct that express the humanitarian conscience of the Member States, and the comprehensive and demanding definition of health by the WHO and the Geneva Conventions. These basic principles and guidelines should always govern the implementation of health and medical care in EU-led missions. One of the basic principles listed in the Health and Medical Concept is *'Preservation of Health and Prevention of Disease'*.

## FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

Force Health Protection (FHP) is the conservation of the working or fighting potential of a force so that it remains healthy, mission/combat capable and available to the Head of Mission or Commander. Force Health Protection focuses on defining and implementing mitigating measures to counter the debilitating effect of lifestyles, envi-

**Going upstream:** Imagine you are standing beside a river and see someone drowning as he floats by. You jump in and pull him ashore. A moment later, another person floats past you, going downstream, and then another and another. Soon you are so exhausted, you know you won't be able to save even one more victim. So you decide to travel upstream to see what the problem is. You find that people are falling into the river because they are stepping through a hole in a bridge. Once this is fixed, people stop falling into the water. When it comes to health, prevention means going upstream and fixing a problem at the source.

Source: Conrad and Kern, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1986, *The Sociology of Health and Illness: Critical Perspectives*

ronmental and occupational health risks, industrial hazards, diseases and selected special weapon systems, and includes preventive measures for personnel, systems, and operational forces of the mission. Such measures will include recommendations on immunisation against biological threats, as well as hygiene measures to reduce the risk of e.g. gastro-intestinal disease. FHP staff should also assess the threats of physical injury, and the effectiveness of measures to reduce associated risk.

FHP is the responsibility of the Commander and the task of FHP staff is to provide timely and accurate information in order to advise Commanders and staff on the management of these risks.

Public health is concerned with the whole system and not only the eradication of a particular disease. Public health/FHP specialists are always looking for new and better ways to prevent disease and injury and enhance sustainability of the force.

## PLANNING PUBLIC HEALTH IN CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

The gathering and management of health and social information is vital. The availability of medical intelligence from the initial planning stage, throughout the operation and during and after redeployment is an essential requirement of medical support. It serves several essential purposes at the strategic and operational levels of planning by Heads of Mission and Commanders and is important for the medical planning, preventive medicine and operational staff. It provides the basis for action throughout the range of medical operations. The intelligence required for medical planning and operations must be comprehensive, rapidly available, accurate and up to date. Medical staff are responsible for developing medical intelligence requirements in order to enable staff to efficiently request, acquire and disseminate the finished intelligence products needed. Therefore, the gathering of medical information is a common and continuous task for all medical personnel in missions and operations.

## HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT

The primary task in preventing diseases and injuries within deployed forces is that of conducting a detailed health risk assessment before the deployment phase. By 'going upstream', a Head of Mission or Mission Commander and the medical planner can exclude or at least minimise health risks for their staff.

Besides the operational intelligence inputs regarding force, capabilities and intent of a possible enemy, the basis for all medical risk assessments is access to comprehensive, rapidly available, accurate and up-to-date medical intelligence, providing detailed information on e.g.:

- geographic factors such as climate, topography, flora and fauna, which may each have specific effects on health;
- epidemiological data on endemic diseases, their types and prevalence; the current prophylactic measures, resistant strains, treatment, etc.;
- outbreaks of diseases;
- hygiene and sanitation;
- special environmental and industrial health hazards (EIHH) such as radiation hazards, toxic industrial hazards (Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC)), pollution, etc.;
- the acquisition, threatened use and/or actual use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defined as chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological (CBNR) materials, by national or other actors (e.g. terrorists);
- medical resources and infrastructure available in the theatre of operation (e.g. availability and possible use of host nation support, IOs and NGOs).

Preventive medicine has a major part to play in any fact-finding mission/information-gathering mission and must be adequately represented in the Force Headquarters or Mission Headquarters.

All this information should be gathered from various sources. In addition to data from open sources such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the EU and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC),





Photo: Evert-Jan Shootman

On 8 August 2014, the WHO declared the Ebola virus disease epidemic to be a public health emergency of international concern

Member States support the Head of Mission/ Force Commander with any medical intelligence requested, in accordance with their capabilities.

Assessing the public health burden of death, diseases, injuries, syndromes or consequences of exposure to environmental or occupational risk factors is a vital mission task. The circumstances in which these occur, and their effect on operational capabilities, must then be identified, as well as any preventive or counter-measures that could be applied. Failure to detect public health incidents or outbreaks, natural or otherwise, may jeopardise the health of EU personnel, EU capacities and missions.

Health risk assessment is a very complex task, given that data from a local population or health system must be transferred to the conditions of European deployed personnel in an uncommon environment under the special conditions of an operation/mission. The optimisation of this process is an ongoing evidence-based task, with the aim of guaranteeing enhanced sustainability and health of our personnel. Even when operations and missions are ongoing, regular health risk

assessments must be conducted, as changing conditions may endanger deployed personnel's health and sustainability, and measures that have already been implemented can still be optimised. It is vital to address these issues as early as possible.

## **PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY CHALLENGES**

Public health emergencies can arise and progress rapidly, leading to widespread health, social, and economic consequences. Commanders and Heads of Mission must be prepared to make timely decisions to protect lives, property, and infrastructure. They should expect a level of uncertainty during the decision-making process, especially during early stages of a public health emergency. Current operations and crises show that Commanders/ Heads of Mission and health professionals have a symbiotic relationship during a disease outbreak. Both play an important role by informing public perceptions and policy makers in their decision-making process.



Photo: Evert-Jan Stoodman

Ebola survivor wall

Three functions have to be performed during health crises: disseminating accurate information to mission personnel, medical professionals and policy makers; acting as the go-between for mission staff, decision makers and health and science experts; monitoring the performance of the public health response. A Commander's goal is to inform his personnel responsibly in order to achieve the public health goals of prevention through raising threat-awareness while minimising panic. The struggle to strike a balance between commanding the unit and protecting the dignity of patients while also conveying the severity of an epidemic is harder in the era of the 24/7 news cycle.

## EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE

On 23 March 2014, the WHO published formal notification of an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Guinea on its website. On 8 August, WHO declared the epidemic to be a *“public health emergency of international concern”*. A thorough

and continuous health risk assessment took place, with interaction between the Commander and the medical adviser. Considering a possible spread of EVD to Mali led to the early development of an infectious disease outbreak management plan and subsequently to the revision and adjustment of the CONOPS for EUTM Mali.

The Mission Commander's intent was to protect the health and security of all mission staff by keeping them regularly informed about EVD and taking a series of protective actions and measures to minimise its impact. He therefore took measures to prepare, train, reinforce and stockpile means and resources requested to fight the disease wherever it threatened the mission. One of the keys to success was the coordination with Malian national authorities and other international partners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to establish an early warning system for EVD outbreaks and developments, in order to implement flexible and comprehensive reactive measures in time.

The CONOPS outlined the tasks and responsibilities of EUTM Mali personnel in terms of reduc-

ing the risk of, or containing, an outbreak of EVD. The plan included public health aspects (preventative measures to reduce exposure to EVD) and briefings to all EUTM Mali personnel. These preventive measures comprised precautions, information distribution, restrictions on freedom of movement, training, stockpiling, temperature controls, isolation of staff in special facilities, repatriation, specialists in enhanced readiness, stopping mission-related tasks, setting the criteria for case definitions, acquisition of medical assets including manpower and supplies, eligibility for treatment, medical waste management, sustainability issues and protection equipment for healthcare workers.

EUTM MALI was prepared and ready to counter this severe threat even before the first case appeared in Mali. This shows the importance of an immediate and coordinated preventive approach to threats like this, based on a functioning information and coordination system to counter the spread of a disease. Regarding the Ebola virus disease, it is clear how infectious diseases can affect the operability of a whole mission and why continuous medical and health surveillance is an absolute necessity.

Without implemented actions the crisis might have had a major impact. A non-military threat might have led to severe consequences, ranging from minor restrictions to mission objectives to the withdrawal of the mission.

## QUALITY ASSURANCE

Prevention or preventive measures are not static and cannot be standardised. Quality management (plan – do – check – act) and lessons identified/lessons learned are essential. Force Health Protection includes all actions, before, during and after an operation or mission, to plan and implement preventive measures (on behalf of the Commander), assess their effectiveness and make adjustments, for better performance and under changing conditions.

Deployment health surveillance is a fundamental component within the overall concept of Force Health Protection and is essential for obtaining a clear picture of personnel health status and the efficacy of measures taken. Medical data collection and analysis from ongoing CSDP operations and missions is pivotal and done by Member States via an informal agreement with the Deployment Health Surveillance Capability, a branch of the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine.

## IMPORTANCE FOR THE COMMANDER/ HEAD OF MISSION

Failing in Force Health Protection measures based on a thorough health risk assessment is not an option. Commanders should encourage all officers to pay close attention to this vital and mission-critical health aspect in all CSDP operations and missions.

Heads of Mission and Commanders have a responsibility to consider all threats and countermeasures in order to fulfil the mission's objectives without jeopardising the sustainability, health and well-being of personnel.

## SUMMARY

The provision of public health resources in EU CSDP missions should be based on health status, health risk assessment and preventability. Providing immunisations, battling disease outbreaks, improving hygiene and knowledge of health measures, and improving the health status of deployed personnel by preventing non-communicable disease are therefore key tasks. Public health or Force Health Protection measures are essential and even if their impact is not easy to measure, a focus on public health will contribute to the sustainability of EU personnel in operations and missions.



## 2.5.5. Counter-terrorism

by Sofie Rafrati



Photo: EEAS/EULEX Kosovo

EULEX Special Police Department exercises counter-terrorism measures

Terrorism is one of the main threats the EU is facing today. The phenomenon has become increasingly diverse and geographically diffuse. When analysing terrorist attacks over the last ten years such as the Madrid bombings, the very recent shootings in Brussels, Paris (Charlie Hebdo) and Copenhagen, together with the devastating regional impact of the attacks from Boko Haram in the Sahel and from ISIL (Da'esh) in Syria and Iraq, it is fair to say that the main terrorist threat today is transnational and cross-border terrorism. The latter has become a growing concern for the EU, its citizens and their policy-makers as it poses a threat to the EU's internal and external security, to the fundamental rights and freedom of its citizens, to economic prosperity and to the democratic values of its societies.

While the EU has become an area of increasing openness, it is facing the emergence of new terrorist groups, new modi operandi (e.g. foreign fighters) and the proximity of their attacks. Upholding democratic values, maintaining public confidence in the Union and the citizens' perception of their own security will greatly depend on the capacity of its policy-makers to taking strategic action and decisions that will guarantee security and stability in Europe. The success of these actions depend on the capacity to follow up on and to adapt existing strategies, to enhance cooperation between EU institutions, its agencies, financial instruments and EU Member States, to deepen partnerships with third countries and to stabilise key fragile regional partners in order to address the root causes of this threat encompassing both an internal and external security dimension.



## WHAT KIND OF STRATEGIES?

Following 9/11, the EU, after having recognised that it equally is subject to the threat of international terrorism as described in the encompassing European Security Strategy in 2003, committed itself to counter-terrorism (CT) in order to provide for the security of its citizens and to pursue its interests within and outside its borders. Accordingly, it produced a binding framework of strategies, action plans, programmes and Council Decisions. This strategic framework supports the development of the EU's concrete CT policy and actions to be taken internally and externally. Within this framework, the EU puts special emphasis on a criminal justice approach to CT while protecting and promoting human rights.

The EU CT strategic framework adopts both defensive and pro-active measures. On the one hand, defensive countermeasures aim at protecting potential targets by trying to make attacks more costly for terrorists and/or by reducing their likelihood of success. Pro-active measures, on the other hand, often mean taking the offensive. Here, governments can directly confront a terrorist group or its supporters and take measures such as destroying the terrorists' resources and equipment, eliminating their safe havens, curbing or freezing their financial assets and even targeting their members.<sup>1</sup>

For the EU, besides the 2003 EU Security Strategy and its implementation report, one of the most important documents that serves as framework for its CT policy is the 'EU Counter Terrorism Strategy of 2005 and revised action plan'<sup>2</sup>. This strategy incorporates both defensive and pro-active measures. It constitutes a comprehensive and pro-

portionate response to the transnational threat of terrorism. It lays the foundation for the common understanding that additional efforts are required at national, European and international level to reduce terrorist threats and the EU's vulnerability. The strategy sets out objectives "to prevent new recruits to terrorism; better protect potential targets, pursue and investigate members of existing networks and improve our capability to respond to and manage consequences of terrorist attacks"<sup>3</sup>. It builds its strategy around the following pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The fifth pillar is concerned with 'international cooperation' which provides the framework for the regional strategies that have progressively been developed (see below). The EU CT strategy addresses both internal and external dimensions of terrorism, promotes key areas of joint cooperation and stresses the increasing necessity to coordinate efforts with a wide array of partners.

This comprehensive and broader EU CT strategy has been complemented and reinforced by additional strategies, some directly integrated as part of the four pillars. To name a few: the 'The European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism and its action plan'<sup>4</sup> published in November 2005 aimed at providing a comprehensive EU response by defining guidelines on how to reduce the threat by disrupting existing terrorists networks and preventing new recruits from joining terrorist groups (*Prevent*). The revised strategy on 'Terrorist Financing', endorsed by the Council in July 2008<sup>5</sup>, highlights the fact that the fight against terrorist financing is a key area of CT and proposes a series of measures in this regard (*Pursue*). The 'Internal Security Strategy for the EU: Towards a European Security model' published in March 2010<sup>6</sup> emphasises the fact

1 Todd Sandler (2015), *Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview*, Oxford Economic Papers, p. 1-20.

2 The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 November 2005.

3 Ibid.

4 The European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV1, 24 November 2005.

5 Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing, 11778/1/08 REV 1, 24/25 July 2008.

6 Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: "Towards a European Security Model", 7120/10, 8 March 2010.



Photo: Austrian Armed Forces

*“All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Art. 43 (1) TEU)*

that a ‘zero risk’ environment does not exist. Yet it is possible to minimise the risk and to create a safer environment by addressing a series of common threats that pose a challenge to the internal security of the EU.

The implementation of these strategies and action plans is documented in reports that assess concrete (joint) cooperation activities and achieved results. The recent reports of July and November 2014 on the ‘Implementation of the EU CT Strategy’ and the ‘Implementation of the Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing’ both show considerable progress.

The strategic framework lays down its activities in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (internal) and in the CFSP (external). It stresses the importance of coordination between the EU and the Member States and the need to exploit all existing tools at national, EU and international level. It further stresses the need to mainstream CT in the EU’s foreign and security policy by strengthening cooperation with international partners as the internal and external dimensions of security are intimately related.

## WHY AN EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF SECURITY?

The external dimension of security is inherently linked to the internal dimension of security. To address them separately will not provide lasting results.

The CT actions taken at international level are twofold. First, they are aimed at tackling the root causes of terrorism in those regions that are subject to underdevelopment, structural poverty, food insecurity, state fragility, flows of refugees and displaced persons, human trafficking or drugs and arms trafficking. These phenomena can cause instability within states which provides opportunities for terrorist groups to flourish and to further recruit and radicalise foreign fighters, for example. Second, these CT actions are aimed at protecting EU’s interests which are geopolitical, strategic and economic in nature, such as securing sources of energy, establishing economic partnerships and expanding trade with various partners. The EU also committed itself to promoting the universally recognised values and human rights

In spring 2015 the Commission will present the **European Agenda on Security** for the period 2015-2020, which will define the strategic priorities to address the threats to internal security of the EU for the next five years. The European Agenda on Security will be a priority for the Commission, and counter-terrorism will be an important part of it.

that are at the heart of its foreign policy. Terrorist groups will often jeopardise those interests.

To ensure the complementarity of all these international actions it is important to have an overall view of the EU's existing tools and to facilitate their coordination. This role is assumed by the Counter-Terrorist Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove. He monitors the implementation of the comprehensive EU CT strategy, coordinates complementarity in the use of all existing EU instruments between the Member States, the Commission and the European External Action Service and promotes international cooperation by mainstreaming CT aspects in external policy dialogues.

## WHAT CONCRETE ACTIONS?

How does the EU manage to organise and formulate its international action? The EEAS is amongst others responsible for drafting regional security strategies which also constitute the framework for CSDP missions and operations. These strategies find their "*raison d'être*" in the fifth pillar of the EU CT strategy (international cooperation) and have been developed gradually. They address those fragile regions of interest for the EU and Member States. Since fragile states and regions raise a multitude of issues, the EU

regional strategies also incorporate the 'development and security nexus', for example: 'the Sahel development and security strategy', 'the EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat', 'the Comprehensive Security Strategy for the Horn of Africa', the EU Pakistan CT security strategy<sup>7</sup>. CSDP missions can be deployed to help implement the EU's regional strategies, as for example is the case for EUCAP Sahel Niger and Mali. They are aimed at supporting capacity building for the security forces in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, enhancing regional coordination of international actors, intelligence sharing and integrated border management, with a security sector reform dimension in the case of EUCAP Sahel Mali.

The Commission is responsible, in a joint effort with the EEAS facilitated by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also Vice-President of the Commission, for identifying the appropriate financial instruments that will be used to facilitate the implementation of those strategies. These tools are aimed at peacebuilding, crisis management, socio-economic development and conflict prevention in which more and more CT is being mainstreamed. One of these instruments is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace; cooperation and development efforts also broadly rely on the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The Commission will also finance EU capacity-building measures and assistance programmes that support CT efforts in third countries and coordination with key partners.

The EU (CTC and EEAS) further supports international cooperation and policy dialogues with third countries aimed at increasing joint efforts and cooperation or strengthening new partnerships in the area of CT such as with the US, Turkey, Russia, Canada, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, North African Countries, Egypt, Middle

<sup>7</sup> EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan, 11045/1/12 REV 1, 21 August 2012.

Eastern countries and Australia. Dialogue is also increased with the United Arab Emirates, AU, UN or relevant regional coordination structures such as the G5 Sahel. The EU supports the UN Global CT strategy, the implementation of a series of related UNSCR, the latest of which are 2170 and 2178, and is an active participant of the Global CT Forum.

### WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS?

Since these threats are cross-border, they must be countered at both national and international level. Following the events of early 2015, the EU reaffirmed its CT commitments through the Council conclusions of 9 February 2015 that also informed the Foreign Affairs Council Decision of 12 February 2015. Terrorist groups are changing their modus operandi while their attacks take place closer to or inside the EU's

borders. The phenomenon of foreign fighters has become an increasing concern to which the EU needs to adapt itself as well as its strategic framework. It will have to continue complementing its actions in the area of justice and home affairs and accompany them with an increased commitment in the countries of the Middle East, the Sahel, the Gulf and North Africa. The EU and Member States will have to put additional emphasis on the fight against ISIL and Boko Haram while making greater efforts to prevent radicalisation, recruitment, and the equipping and financing of terrorism. However, these efforts against terrorism will be efficient only if underlying causes are addressed through a more comprehensive EU approach to security and CT.

#### The phenomenon “terrorism” in the EU treaties

Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222 TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the European Union will face the phenomenon “terrorism” within and outside the EU, preventively or in the form of consequence management.

There are no clear indications whether one rule will be preferred in practice. One could argue that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual assistance clause are designed for the fight against terrorism outside the territory of the EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the rule for the EU territory itself. The fight against terrorism in the sense of preventive engagement remains an open question.

By including the task “fight against terrorism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty which will influence capability development in the EU, the Union made a clear and promising statement that it will be ready and prepared to face the challenge and protect its citizens worldwide against any kind of terrorist threat.

Jochen Rehl



## 2.5.6. Climate security<sup>1</sup>

by Marcus Houben

Climate action is a key priority for the EU. To respond to the challenges and investment needs related to climate change, the EU has agreed that at least 20 % of its budget for 2014-2020 – as much as €180 billion – should be spent on climate-related action. To achieve this increase, mitigation and adaptation actions will be integrated into all major EU spending programmes, in particular cohesion policy, regional development, energy, transport, research and innovation and the Common Agricultural Policy.

However, climate action has not been mainstreamed into the Common Security and Defence Policy. The purpose of this contribution is to reflect on this issue by asking three questions:

1. What climate change challenges do we face?
2. Is climate change a security issue?
3. Should and can CSDP operations and missions contribute to EU climate action?

### WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES DO WE FACE?

Climate change manifests itself in many ways, from extreme weather to rising sea levels, rising temperature, changes in storms and hurricanes, melting ice and ocean acidification to name a few. If we think about climate change in terms of its security implications, the following scenarios come to mind.

**Conflicts over resources.** Reduction of arable land, widespread shortage of water, diminishing food

and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts are already happening in many parts of the world. Climate change will alter rainfall patterns and further reduce available freshwater by as much as 20 to 30 % in certain regions. A drop in agricultural productivity will lead to, or worsen, food insecurity in the least developed countries and bring about an unsustainable increase in food prices across the board.

Water shortage in particular has the potential to cause civil unrest and lead to significant economic losses, even in robust economies. The consequences will be even more intense in areas under strong demographic pressure.

The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised.

**Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure.** Coastal zones are the home of about one fifth of the world's population, a number set to rise in the years ahead. Mega-cities, with their supporting infrastructure, such as port facilities and oil refineries, are often located by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects.

The east coasts of China and India as well as the Caribbean region and Central America would be particularly affected. An increase in disasters and humanitarian crises would put immense pressure on the resources of donor countries, including capacities for emergency relief operations.

<sup>1</sup> This contribution draws heavily on the paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council on 'Climate change and international security' (S113/08), dated 14 March 2008.

**Loss of territory and border disputes.** Receding coastlines and submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. More disputes over land and maritime borders and other territorial rights are likely.

There might be a need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border disputes. A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming.

Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions.

**Environmentally induced migration.** Droughts in southern Africa are contributing to poor harvests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with millions of people expected to face food shortages.

Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify.

In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is expected to have a negative effect on health, in particular due to the spread of vector-borne diseases, further aggravating tensions.

**Situations of fragility and radicalisation.** Sea-level rise may threaten the habitat of millions of people as 40 % of Asia's population (almost 2 billion) lives within 60 km of the coastline. Water stress and loss of agricultural productivity will make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing population, which will additionally be exposed to an increase in infectious diseases.

Changes in the monsoon rains and a decrease in melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than 1 billion people. Conflicts over remaining resources and unmanaged migration will lead to instability in a region that is an important economic partner for

Europe, with factors of production and distribution concentrated along vulnerable coastlines.

**Tension over energy supply.** One of the most significant potential conflicts over resources is likely to arise from intensified competition over access to, and control over, energy resources. Because many of the world's hydrocarbon reserves are in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and because many oil and gas producing states already face significant socio-economic and demographic challenges, instability is likely to increase.

This has the potential to feed back into greater energy insecurity and greater competition for resources.

As previously inaccessible regions open up due to the effects of climate change, the scramble for resources will intensify. Energy corridors, particularly the Black Sea region, are also of increasing strategic interest, as they are critical to the energy security of the EU.

**Pressure on international governance.** Climate change will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for it and those most affected by it.

The impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally.

The potential rift not only divides North and South; there will also be a South-South dimension, particularly as the Chinese and Indian share of global emissions rises. The already burdened international security architecture will be put under increasing pressure.

## IS CLIMATE CHANGE A SECURITY ISSUE?

Taking international reference documents as a point of departure<sup>2</sup>, we can observe that experts agree that climate change and the consequences

<sup>2</sup> Among others: the 2014 National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington,



Photo: Austrian Armed Forces/SOF-AU/CON TCD

Climate change manifests itself in many ways, from extreme weather ...

of climate change can and indeed do have security implications.

***From the US National Security Strategy (2010):***

*“The danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe. (...) we must focus American engagement on (...) forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change” (p. 3);*

*“Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people” (p. 8).*

***From the Communication on Climate Action by the European Commission (2013):***

*“... the extra demands placed on health services and basic infrastructure by climate change and increasing political and security tensions over limited natural resources such as water.”*

***From the Nobel Committee, Oslo (12 October 2007):***

*“By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 to the IPCC and Al Gore, the Norwegian Nobel Committee is seeking to contribute to (...) processes and decisions (...) necessary to protect the world’s future climate, and thereby to reduce the threat to the security of mankind.”*

Underlying these lines of convergent thinking is the notion that climate change is a *threat multiplier* which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. It is stressed that the risks related to climate change are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect national or strategic interests. Moreover, it is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security

<http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report>, retrieved 4 February 2015; 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, Department of Defense, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint.pdf>, retrieved 4 February 2015. Climate action. Building a world we like, with a climate we like, European Union, 2014, <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/climate-action-pbNA0614034/?CatalogCategoryID=sciep2OwkgkAAAE.xjhtLxJz>, retrieved 4 February 2015.





Photo: Austrian Armed Forces/Heimo Grassler

... to rising sea levels, rising temperature, changes in storms and hurricanes

are interlinked, requiring comprehensive policy responses. The impact of climate change is thus considered to be multidimensional and a cause for concern across sectors, including security. Climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. Protection of the environment and management of the impacts of climate change are strategic (maritime) security interests. The conclusion is thus clear: climate change is a security issue.

### **SHOULD AND CAN CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE EU CLIMATE ACTION?**

To answer the normative question ('should') we can attempt to draw a parallel with human rights and gender. Both human rights and gender have been mainstreamed into all EU policies including CSDP (each CSDP mission has an appointed human rights officer). This is considered necessary as respect for human rights is a core value the EU

seeks to live by and promote. In other words the EU, as a community of values, wishes to contribute to a world in which respect for human rights is a cornerstone of society. We can view climate change and climate action along similar lines. Climate change shapes the world in which we live. Climate action is needed if we are to manage and adapt to climate change, mitigate its consequences and strengthen our resilience. Human rights and climate change have this 'systemic' quality in common, guiding and aligning our actions as we seek to build a world in which we want to live. The case can thus be made that climate action should also be mainstreamed into CSDP. Firstly because we want to be consistent, and secondly because of its systemic importance: we want to use all of our policies, strategies and instruments to sustain, preserve and improve our world.

To answer the practical question ('can'), let us turn to what is already happening in the field. CSDP missions often take place in countries that are affected by the negative consequences of climate change (e.g. Mali, Niger, Somalia).





Photo: EAS/EUNAVFOR SOMALIA

Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA) was set up to protect the shipments of food aid from the World Food Programme against piracy

Operation Atalanta, for example, was set up as a humanitarian mission to protect the shipments of food aid from the World Food Programme for the population in drought-stricken Somalia. CSDP missions are conducted to mitigate or address a crisis that is the direct result of, or has been exacerbated by, climate change. Consider the capacity building mission in Mali, for example. What would mainstreaming climate action into CSDP mean in practical terms? How would this be translated into practice? Consider the following possible practical consequences:

- the assessment of ‘environmental issues’ as a theme to be addressed in all Crisis Management Concepts and Strategic Reviews of CSDP missions and operations;
- an examination of the security implications of climate change in dialogues with partner/target countries, including through the sharing of analyses;
- the analysis of how mitigation and adaptation measures can have an impact on the overall security situation in the partner/target country;
- the appointment of an Environmental Officer in each CSDP mission and operation to strengthen expertise in this area;
- strengthening of the link between capacity building and local resilience.

In conclusion, the EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development and global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal.

Moreover, the security aspects of climate change play to Europe’s strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, and as a key proponent of effective multilateralism. It would thus be only logical for climate action to be mainstreamed into CSDP.

## 2.5.7. Maritime security

by Marcus Houben and Fredrik Lindblom

The missions and operations conducted under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have been established to address a great variety of crises and conflicts around the world. Amongst other things, they aim to address systemic instability and insecurity (Central African Republic), strengthen border management (EUBAM Libya) and the rule of law (EULEX Kosovo), and fight piracy (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). The purpose of this contribution is to offer a brief reflection on the topic of maritime security and consider seas and oceans ('the global maritime domain') as an arena for CSDP missions and operations. The contribution is divided into two parts: the first part sets out why maritime security matters and why it is likely that crises will manifest themselves in the maritime domain, while the second part looks at maritime security from an operational and mission-oriented perspective. The contribution concludes with a number of observations.

### WHY MARITIME SECURITY MATTERS

The global maritime domain is not only of vital importance to the EU and European citizens, it is of vital importance to all of mankind. 'Planet Ocean' is an enormous ecosystem that sustains life on earth. Seas and oceans are used as a medium to facilitate commerce and international trade, are the breeding grounds for fish stocks and all

types of marine life, are crucial for maintaining the earth's biodiversity and are home to numerous unique and diverse marine ecosystems. The global maritime domain is not only used to feed mankind and construct ports and offshore installations for oil and gas exploration, but also for play, relaxation and tourism. There are as many different users as there are different stakeholders. An increasing number of people live or want to live in cities, and the majority of these large conurbations are located at or near the coast. We call the seas and oceans the 'global maritime commons': they belong to us all. Think of the global maritime domain as a series of crossroads: money, power, influence, people, information, all converge in the coastal zones of the global maritime domain. Seas and oceans have become key arenas where multiple global interests come together. Now consider territorial disputes as a consequence of competing maritime claims, the illegal extension of Exclusive Economic Zones, illegal fishing, irregular migration, trafficking, piracy and maritime terrorism. Combine that with the consequences of climate change (extreme weather, 'climate refugees') and the realisation that climate change acts as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. The point is that maritime risks and threats are multidimensional in nature. The only way to stand a chance of dealing with these types of risks and threats is through a cross-sectoral approach and effective maritime multilateralism: cooperating with international partners.

## WHY IS THE GLOBAL MARITIME DOMAIN AN IMPORTANT ARENA?

An important lesson learned from EUNAVFOR Atalanta was how the strategic relevance of the Gulf of Aden has evolved over the past few years. Its location as a node in the global network of maritime trade routes remains of prime importance, but the simultaneous presence of three naval operations together with independent deployers made the Gulf of Aden an arena for international cooperation. All big players – the United States, India, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, the EU, NATO, the UK, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium – were represented. Furthermore, as successful cooperation at sea often has a positive spin-off in other policy areas, being present in the Gulf of Aden alongside these other nations and having the opportunity to cooperate became a strategic interest. EUNAVFOR Atalanta thus became a ticket for the EU to enter the arena for international cooperation.

A second consideration is that, although maritime security themes have an almost universal relevance (e.g. freedom of navigation, sea control), the regional context and particular characteristics determine to a large extent what maritime security really means for a given region. In Africa for example, maritime security can by and large be framed as a development and governance issue; piracy and armed robbery at sea can be dealt with by addressing governance and development issues ashore. Irregular migrants – although not a maritime security issue – use the maritime domain as a key vector to try to reach Europe. Maritime security in a Latin American context is strongly influenced by organised crime (narco-trafficking) and increasingly by concern for the protection of offshore oil and gas exploration installations. Maritime security in the South-East Asian context is, on the other hand, closely linked to sovereignty issues such as competing territorial claims, the territorial integrity of the state and freedom of navigation, and as a consequence is predominantly framed as a defence and military security issue.

It should not be wildly off the mark to assume that some of the most complex, multifaceted problems and crises the world will witness in the 21st century will manifest themselves in the global maritime domain. As these crises require a cross-sectoral (comprehensive) approach integrating different policy instruments into a single strategic framework, and require us – more than ever before – to work with international partners (public and private), it is clear that CSDP missions and operations are crucial instruments, not only to allow the EU access to this particular domain, but to connect and work together with international partners.

## SOME OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

Over the course of recent years, maritime security has become an important element of several of the EU's CSDP missions. The most well known is probably EUNAVFOR Atalanta, a military mission launched in December 2008 with an executive mandate to fight piracy at sea. Since then, what was once a severe threat to all seafarers in the region has become much less so. In 2011, 176 ships were attacked off the coast of Somalia, but during 2014 only two attacks were reported. Though a military mission like EUNAVFOR may prove instrumental in maintaining security by deterring pirates, it is for civilian missions such as EUCAP Nestor to try and ensure that threats to security are prevented from arising in the first place. It is through capacity building that we can address the root causes of any threat to security – in the case of the Western Indian Ocean, the threat arising from piracy.

In order to help Somalia fight piracy, the EU launched the civilian mission EUCAP Nestor in 2012, working on capacity building in the region. In Somalia itself, the goal is to support the country in finding a long-term solution to the piracy problem. In the East African states of Djibouti and Tanzania, as well as in the island state of Seychelles, the mission aims to help these countries increase and improve their own ability to fight





Photo: EU NAVFOR Atalanta/EU Navy Force Media and Public Information Office

EUNAVFOR Atalanta: Monitoring a commercial vessel under military escort (Off the Somali Coast, 2013)

piracy. EUCAP Nestor works on the entire chain of justice. Legal experts give support in reviewing and drafting legislation so that authorities involved in fighting piracy receive proper legal powers. Maritime experts advise the authorities in charge of maritime security issues on how to improve their operational capacity. For their part, law enforcement experts train maritime police or coast guard officers on how to carry out effective maritime surveillance. All activities are conducted on the basis of international law and European standards, and as proposals for the counterparts to use as a standard in their self-sustainable development of maritime security. There are also CSDP missions whose mandate covers the maritime domain in parallel with other areas. One example would be the border assistance mission in Libya,

EUBAM<sup>1</sup>, which was launched in 2013. Given Libya's location bordering the Mediterranean, the country's borders must be controlled at sea as well as on land. Therefore, the mission in Libya includes expertise on sea border management, with advice and training in fields such as maritime port security, safety at sea, search and rescue, etc. These different civilian tasks are often referred to as coast guard functional activities. Although there is no internationally agreed definition of these activities, the definition used most often is the one proposed by the European Coast Guard Functions Forum, according to which coast guard functions include:

- maritime safety, including vessel traffic management;
- maritime, ship and port security;

<sup>1</sup> At the time of writing, EUBAM Libya is relocated outside Libya due to the political and security situation in the country.





Photo: EUCAP Nestor/Marek Gajdos

EUCAP Nestor aims at enhancing the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and western Indian Ocean, through mentoring, training and advising. Its activities also support regional coordination, Djibouti 2015

- maritime customs activities;
- the prevention and suppression of trafficking and smuggling and connected maritime law enforcement;
- maritime border control;
- maritime monitoring and surveillance;
- maritime environmental protection and response;
- maritime search and rescue;
- ship casualty and maritime assistance service;
- maritime accident and disaster response;
- fisheries inspection and control and
- activities related to the above coast guard functions.

## A NEW DIMENSION FOR CSDP

Though piracy may be the first issue that comes to mind when discussing maritime security, security at sea may be compromised by the same issues as occur on land: smuggling and traf-

ficking, for instance, or violation of environmental regulations – usually the result of a governance deficit.

However, the sea adds a new dimension. Maintaining security at sea does not mean simply putting a customs officer on a boat to combat smuggling.

Rather, crimes occurring at sea require a maritime law enforcement mandate and expertise. Any EU CSDP mission in a country with a coastline will have to take the aspect of maritime governance and security into consideration.

The experience of European experts in the field so far is that the EU has a growing understanding and awareness of the operational aspects of maritime security and maritime law enforcement.

By encompassing the maritime dimension, CSDP missions today are a specific EU contribution to maritime capacity building, fighting maritime crimes and maintaining law and order at sea.

## 2.5.8. Hybrid warfare

by Gabor Iklódy

During the course of the past year, Europe's security environment has changed dramatically, with two key developments dominating security agendas. To the East, Russia's aggression in Ukraine challenges the core principles of international law. Russia's conduct of massive and well-coordinated hybrid warfare targets first and foremost Ukraine's integrity. It also seeks to create uncertainty in the minds of the international community as responses are considered. To the South, the advances of ISIL, a barbaric and well-resourced terrorist group, threatens to turn an entire region into a zone of failed states and terror. ISIL's expansion and aggressive ideology have driven thousands of young Europeans away from traditional European values towards jihad, and these same young people have joined the terrorist group as 'foreign fighters'.

### WHAT IS HYBRID WARFARE/ TACTICS?<sup>1</sup>

Hybrid warfare can be defined as the combined, centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and overt military and non-military means and tactics, ranging from conventional forces, through economic pressure to intelligence. Disinformation campaigns or control of the narrative are an important part of hybrid tactics. The attacker seeks to undermine and destabilise its opponent through applying both coercive and

subversive tactics. The latter can include various forms of sabotage, disrupting communications and energy supplies, working through and empowering proxy insurgent groups. All this is done with the objective of achieving political influence, even dominance over the country, as part of an overall strategy.

A critically important aspect of hybrid warfare is to generate confusion, doubt and ambiguity both in the affected population under attack and in the broader international community about what is actually going on and who may stand behind the attack. Such ambiguity can paralyse the ability of an opponent to react effectively and mobilise defences and also divide the international community, limiting the speed and scope of its response to the aggression.

Another fundamental characteristic of hybrid warfare is that hybrid techniques seek to find and exploit the target country's most important vulnerabilities. The majority of these vulnerabilities are areas that could be addressed by means of EU action, both within and beyond CSDP.

Hybrid tactics are in fact not new, they are as old as war itself. What makes the example seen in Ukraine disturbing is the extremely well-coordinated and highly effective deployment of a large variety of hybrid instruments and techniques. This poses complex challenges to European countries and their organisations, like the EU and NATO.

1 The recently published EUISS paper (Alert 4/2015) on hybrid warfare provides useful additional analysis.

## RESISTING HYBRID ATTACK

Responding to and countering hybrid threats remains first and foremost a national responsibility. However, the EU could play a role in sharing information, coordinating responses and helping to contribute to building resilience. As part of that effort, enhanced coordination and cooperation with NATO are required.


Building resilience to deal with hybrid threats requires Member States to recognise and share their own perceived internal vulnerabilities so that common steps can be taken to reduce the number of possible attack options. Building resilience in critical areas of vulnerability would seem to be the best way of preventing hybrid attacks from succeeding.

With regard to external EU partners, the EU, drawing on its wide array of instruments and expertise, can also play a central role in supporting partner countries, including in areas such as cyber security, border management, the energy sector, or by reducing vulnerabilities associated with the

rule of law, corruption or the funding of political parties.

In response to a wide-scale information warfare, which through denying or distorting facts manipulates large parts of the affected populations, effective strategic communications need to be developed drawing on expertise and instruments available in Member States, the EU and the affected partner countries. Swift decision-making at high political levels will be critical for the success of efforts to prevent and defend against hybrid threats. Given the character of hybrid threats, such decisions may need to be based on assumptions, predictions and trust.

Hybrid threats also require a fundamentally different mind-set, where traditional separation lines between internal and external, defence and homeland security, civil and military, and in some cases public and private, may no longer be sustainable.



Graphic: Jochem Rehr

Elements of hybrid warfare

## 2.5.9 Sustainability: a key factor in ensuring successful results, lasting changes and CSDP credibility

by Sofie Rafrafi

### CONTEXT

Since the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was established, the EU has launched over 30 civilian missions and military operations in several regions of the world. The mandates of civilian CSDP missions mostly address capacity building of security and rule of law actors as well as support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), both through Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) and training. They aim at reforming or reinforcing structures of the host country in order to make them more effective and operational in delivering results in a given area. EUCAP Sahel Niger, for instance, aims at increasing the capacity of the Nigerian security and defence forces in the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

In order to be successful, however, a mission needs to generate a positive and lasting – ‘sustainable’ – change in the modus operandi and capacities of the existing structures and actors of the host country.

The notion of ‘sustainability’ is not unfamiliar to the EU as nearly all mission mandates and planning documents, the Concept of Operation (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN), refer to it. Sustainable results are even often described as a ‘sine qua non’ for the successful implementation of a mission’s mandate and aim to provide a solid basis to ensure their transition and exit strat-

egy. After the closing of a mission one might ask: *“what changes did the mission really generate and how solid are they?”*.

To the public eye and for the international community, tangible and lasting results have increasingly become the benchmark for measuring the EU’s success and mission impact. This success factor is absolutely necessary if the EU wants to maintain public support and its international credibility as a global actor in civilian crisis management.

### THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY<sup>1</sup>

Sustainability literally is the capacity to maintain some entity, outcome or process over time. The term ‘sustainable development’ achieved international public prominence through the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development entitled ‘Our Common Future,’ often called the Brundtland Report<sup>2</sup>. Since then, the concept has shifted, even though for many agencies and organisations it has remained essentially a working definition. The term sustainability has become popular as an expression of what public policies ought to achieve in the domains they are applied to (economic, cultural, social, energy, political, religious etc.). It has generated over time a series of models, each with specific theories aiming at

1 Our aim is not to produce an in-depth analysis of the concept, to analyse the various sustainability models or to couple one or several models with the EU CSDP.

2 Tom Kuhlman and John Farrington (2010), What is Sustainability?, Sustainability, 2, pp. 3436-3448.



achieving enduring results that are pursued or sought to make up for something that is lacking, deficient or insufficient in terms of quantity or in quality.

Sustainability has also become measurable. Over the years, a variety of instruments have been developed in order to assess the progress and the viability of these results on a quantitative or qualitative basis<sup>3</sup>. The metrics used for the measurement of sustainability are evolving: they include, amongst other things, benchmarks, standards and indicators but also assessment, appraisal and other reporting systems<sup>4</sup>.

## THE CASE STUDY OF EUCAP SAHEL NIGER

EUCAP Sahel Niger, launched in July 2012 and part of the European Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel, is a capacity-building mission. The mission aims at reinforcing the Nigerien Security and Defence Forces (NSDF) in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Its activities consist of training, strategic advice and projects (linked to the ‘train and equip’ concept). The mission structure is also the first to have a proper ‘sustainability policies unit’ in the operations department. It shows that the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Brussels-based operations headquarters for civilian CSDP missions and its operational planners are well aware of the importance of and the need for sustainable results. They consistently implement the benchmarking methodology agreed in 2011<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, the EUCAP Sahel Niger OPLAN makes a direct link between the need for successful sustainable results and the implementation of

the ‘exit’ or ‘transition strategy’: sustainability is set as a pre-condition for the CSDP mission to exit theatre and transition to other instruments or local authorities. Yet no specific guidelines are provided on how to achieve sustainable results. EUCAP Sahel Niger has therefore developed its own sustainability strategy and action plan, focusing on training<sup>6</sup>.

The EUCAP Sahel Niger sustainability strategy first of all entailed the creation of a series of operational tools and a legislative framework taking into account the element of local ownership (from the mission, to the NSDF, back to the mission) in order to achieve the following: 1) the capacity to transfer knowledge and methodologies from the mission to the NSDF, 2) the capacity to autonomously reproduce from within the NSDF and 3) the capacity to evaluate and recreate, both by the mission and the NSDF.

The action plan envisaged the following elements/steps:

- the creation of standardised EUCAP training documents, templates and modules, all contained each time in a thematic ‘training kit’ (1);
- the creation of thematic ‘appropriation committees’. This tool was used to ensure the gradual transfer of technical knowledge and skills (training kit) to be officially recognised in the NSDF training programmes (1);
- the creation of a ‘drafting committee’ to draft a consensus-based decree for a “harmonised trainers’ statute” that offers legal support in recognising the appointed Nigerien trainers and their role in ensuring quality transfer of knowledge (1);
- conducting integrated quantitative trainings and qualitative trainings through the ‘training-of-trainers’ (2);

3 Ehrlich, P.R. & Holden, J.P. (1974). “Human Population and the global environment”, in *American Scientist*, 62(3): 282–292.

4 Bell, Simon and Morse, Stephen (2008), *Sustainability Indicators. Measuring the Immeasurable?*, Second ed. London: Earthscan.

5 Cf. Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions, 17110/01, PSC noted in 2011.

6 The main trainings provided in the mission concern forensics, intelligence, border management, intervention techniques, human resources, logistics and civilian crisis management.



Photo: EUCAP Sahel Niger

In Niger, the integrated training courses in pedagogical techniques for trainers of the four security forces (national guard, police, gendarmerie, and Nigerien armed forces) aimed at enhancing sustainability in schools and training centres (Ecole Nationale de Police, Niamey, June 2013)

- the mentoring and monitoring of the trainers afterwards while re-delivering the modules (2);
- the creation of evaluation indicators and tools to establish 'hot' (directly) and 'cold' (six months after) outcome assessments of the generated change in behaviour and attitudes. The assessment is made both by the trainee and the hierarchical superiors (3).

The mission strategy mainstreamed local ownership at all levels of hierarchy by integrating security forces personnel from the lowest to the highest management level in the development and implementation process. This is also a key element of success.

A pilot phase (six months) and a pilot project in the field of forensics, first-level training was conducted during which the action plan was implemented. The result in the field of forensics is that the NSDF are now capable of autonomous training and can increase their capabilities in that area (level I). Moreover, they all integrated and officially recognised the use of the same method-

ologies and techniques, which in turn increased their interoperability and efficiency on the ground by enabling them to work together.

## CHALLENGES AND SUGGESTIONS

There are several challenges ahead when it comes to advancing sustainability across CSDP missions. The first concerns the development of standardised sustainability guidelines. They could offer operational tools that the mission would take into account to achieve sustainable results when planning its activities.

Second, since each host country environment is different, each mission will need to operationalise the guidelines according to local realities. A mission could for example develop its own sustainability strategy and action plan. Missions have to consider not only historical, political, economic or cultural specificities, but also challenges related to a culture of change, change management, local



Photo: EUCAP Sahel Niger

Beyond training and advice, ensuring sustainability is a key factor of success for CSDP missions (in the picture: EUCAP Sahel Niger: certification ceremony at the “Ecole de Police”)

absorption capacity and local buy-in. Once again, local ownership is key.

Third, in the field of capacity building, mission structures are to reflect the need for mainstreaming and implementing sustainability. The latter is a transversal element that needs to be implemented both from within the mission to guide its activities and from the mission to the host countries' actors in creating the capacity to transfer and the capacity to autonomously reproduce, create and maintain.

Fourth, a mission's sustainability strategy and its implementation always need to be closely interlinked with other mission activities such as planning and evaluation. From the outset, strategic as well as operational planning need to take sustainability into account. Evaluation activities should also analyse sustainability.

Fifth, the training and induction of both mission staff and EEAS planners need to encompass a stronger awareness of the need for sustainability. This includes the need to systematically mainstream sustainability into planning documents. For EU mission staff and trainers, this means being aware of the greater, sustainability-oriented framework into which their work will fit. Such training could be delivered by the ESDC, the national EU Member States training institutes and the missions' induction training.

Sixth, in this vein, the ‘comprehensive approach’ efforts must be further pursued as CSDP missions/operations alone cannot deliver on sustainability. Quite the opposite: recent lessons have clearly confirmed that CSDP is but only one tool out of a series normally active in any given theatre. Ideally, all these activities are linked and coordinated so as to allow for the necessary mutual support, reinforcement and sustainability. The EU internally can achieve this if each of the EU actors, in the field and at HQ level, engage in the ‘comprehensive approach’.

Finally, the current work of CPCC on an Impact Assessment methodology that builds on the 2011 benchmarking methodology will help to evaluate the success of all the above in the future. ‘Lessons learning’ is crucial in order to evolve and to generate constant improvement in the planning of missions, and can feed into these processes. Sharing best practices and feedback on experiences among mission staff on the issue of sustainability, through seminars and debriefings organised at CPCC/headquarters level, could further stimulate the discussion and inclusion of sustainability in mandate implementation and assessment.

## CONCLUSIONS

In the years to come, the EU will not only be praised for its capacity to project missions outside its borders and create policy frameworks and strategies in which they operate. It will also increasingly be held accountable, by its citizens and the international community, for its ability to generate or contribute to real and lasting changes to a country or region. Sustainability is one of the key factors in ensuring this success, yet its implementation has been entrusted mainly to mission staff – to understand the concept, analyse it and mainstream it into the missions' activities. The EU has already acknowledged the importance of this aspect, and a series of concrete and pragmatic suggestions have been made to help it move forward.

# 3 CAPABILITIES



# 3.1. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT


## 3.1.1. Military capability development

by Paul van der Heijden

EU military missions and operations should be planned and executed as part of a comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises. In order to be able to conduct the full spectrum of missions and operations envisaged in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), a diversity of capabilities is required. Therefore, military capability development has always been one of the areas of focus of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Within the EU Military Staff, the Force Capability Branch of the Concepts & Capability Directorate is contributing to the capability development process (see fig. below).

### THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

To answer the key question ‘*what do we need, militarily speaking?*’, we have to go back to the basis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). One of the major documents laying the ground in this regard is the European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the European Council in 2003. Entitled ‘*A secure Europe in a better world*’, the strategy identified several interlinked threats and challenges, calling for the development of multidimensional and multilateral responses, as well as for the development of



The European Union Military Staff, March 2015

## HLG 2010: EU Level of Ambition

### 60 000 troops within 60 days for a major operation

*or* planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions of varying scope

- two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations supported by up to 10 000 troops for at least two years
- two rapid response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battlegroups
- an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days)
- a maritime or air interdiction operation
- a civ-mil humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days
- around a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats together with a major mission (up to 3 000 experts) lasting for several years.

#### Headline Goal 2010

capabilities to enable the EU to act. The strategy was re-affirmed in the report on its implementation in 2008 and some threats were added – such as cyber attacks and maritime piracy. EU Member States all agreed that the EU should play a more active role in the field of international security, drawing on civilian and military capacities.

### HEADLINE GOAL & LEVEL OF AMBITION

Since the inception of CSDP, the scope of the role that the EU wanted to play under this policy has framed its capability requirements. Drawing on the definition of the Petersberg tasks (initially defined in 1992 for the Western European Union), EU Member States established a capacity objective, the Headline Goal. The first ‘Headline Goal 2003’ was defined in 1999 at the European Council of Helsinki – the ‘Level of Ambition’ decided upon has not changed since then. The biggest ambition is to be able to deploy a maximum of 60 000 troops within 60 days. This must be possible at thousands of kilometres away from

Europe and for a period of at least one year. Several lesser ambitions were also defined (see fig. above).

In answering the question ‘*what capacities do we need to fulfil this Level of Ambition?*’, it is important to understand the types of situations in which European troops on CSDP missions and operations could be deployed. For this purpose five ‘illustrative scenarios’ were defined (see Fig. next page), in combination with different Strategic Planning Assumptions (SPA) – including reaction time, distance from Europe, the need for rotations, the hypothesis according to which several operations are ongoing at the same time. This led to an extensive list of military requirements in terms of equipment and personnel. This ‘*what do we need?*’ was formalised in 2005, in what is termed the Requirement Catalogue (RC05).

### Military Illustrative Scenarios

Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF)	Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to 3 <sup>rd</sup> Countries (SR)	Conflict Prevention (CP)	Evacuation Operation in a non-permissive environment (EO)	Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tasks of combat forces in crisis management</li> <li>• Peacemaking</li> <li>• Secure Lines of Communications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peacekeeping</li> <li>• Election monitoring</li> <li>• Institution Building</li> <li>• Security Sector Reform</li> <li>• Support 3<sup>rd</sup> Countries in Fight against Terrorism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preventive Engagement</li> <li>• Preventive Deployment</li> <li>• Joint Disarmament Operations</li> <li>• Embargo Operations</li> <li>• Counter Proliferation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-combatant Evacuation Operation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent Atrocities</li> <li>• Consequence Management</li> </ul>

Illustrative Scenarios

### THREE CATALOGUES


With a view to capacity development, Member States were asked what they could potentially make available for the Requirement Catalogue. Their contributions are voluntary and non-binding and cannot be used for Force Generation processes. These voluntary contributions (the answer to the *‘What-do-we-have question’*) are laid down in the Force Catalogue (FC). The FC is regularly updated; the latest update at the time of writing was agreed upon by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in 2014 (FC14). The EUMC is supported in this respect by the EUMC Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), in which all Member States have their subject-matter experts represented.

Unfortunately, there are still differences between the requirement catalogue, the RC05, and the Force Catalogue, the FC14 (i.e. differences between the *‘what we need’* and *‘what we have’*; let’s then call this question: *‘what are we still lacking?’*). These capabilities, which are not potentially made available to achieve the total requirements as defined in the EU Level of Ambition, are called *‘shortfalls’*. All shortfalls are mentioned


in the Progress Catalogue (PC), which was lastly updated in 2014 (PC-14) and agreed upon by the EUMC.

### THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

The European Defence Agency (EDA) plays a crucial role in the whole process of Capability Development. The result of the Headline Goal process (the prioritised capability shortfalls) is the EUMC’s input to EDA’s Capability Development Plan (CDP). This CDP has four Strands. The EUMC input is called Strand A. The other inputs are: Strand B, which covers future requirements, in the long term (e.g. Air-to-Air Refuelling; Cyber Defence; Government SatCom; Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems); Strand C, which covers the Defence Plans of individual Member States (here the Member States can see what others have in their Plans, which could create opportunities for pooling and sharing of – future – capabilities); and Strand D, which deals with lessons identified during missions and operations (see Fig. p. 239).



Capability Development



Capability Development Plan

The whole process of capability development is intense and complicated, but the CDP is very usable for all stakeholders. In order to simplify the process, NATO and the EU agreed to use the same information-gathering tool and the same Capability Codes and Statements (CCS). In addition, the EU Member States who are also NATO members do not have to fill in long questionnaires twice. Finally, in order to prevent

duplication of effort, the EU capability development planning timelines are aligned with those of NATO as much as possible. Using the same language and timelines symbolises the close cooperation in this realm.

The EUMC decided in January 2015 to launch an EU Military Capability Questionnaire (EUMCQ-15).



## Air-to-Air Refuelling



## Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems



## Cyber Defence



## Governmental Satellite Communications



Photos: Eurofighter, Schiebel, Florian Hirzinger, ESA

The European Council 2013 endorsed four major capability programmes:

- Air-to-Air Refuelling, with the objective of establishing a multinational fleet from 2019;
- Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, with the objective of laying the foundations for a European solution in the 2020-2025 timeframe;
- Cyber Defence, with a focus on technology, training and protection of EU assets;
- Governmental Satellite Communication, with the objective of preparing the next generation in the 2025 timeframe.

### CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: A CONTINUED PROCESS

The European Security Strategy was formulated in 2003 and re-affirmed in 2008. Since then significant changes have affected national defence budgets as well as the international security landscape. Technical developments are accelerating (e.g. cyber-warfare and nano-technology) and regional conflicts are getting worse and closer to European borders (e.g. Crimea, eastern Ukraine, developments in the Middle East, North Africa, growing threat of terrorism, hybrid warfare). In 2015 work started on a review of the European Security Strategy, with a view to the European Council of June 2015 on security and defence.

The new European Security Strategy may entail a revised Level of Ambition. The Capability Development mechanism may need some adjustments to realign with political requirements.

#### Military capability development

In December 2013, the European Council identified a number of priority actions built around three axes:

- increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP;
- enhancing the development of capabilities and
- strengthening Europe's defence industry.

### 3.1.2. Civilian capability development

by Nina Antolovic Tovornik

The nature and form of international crises and conflicts have drastically changed over the last decade. Finding the right mix of tools to manage them is far from being an easy task. CSDP is just one facet of the EU's external action. However, it is an essential one and its use is constantly on the rise.

At the time of writing, 11 out of 16 ongoing CSDP missions are civilian. The last two to be launched were EUAM Ukraine and EUCAP Sahel Mali, established after deliberations at the European Council (EC) in December 2013. It was the first time in many years that the heads of state and government sat down to discuss the CSDP. Therefore, the event was seen as an opportunity for the EU to move forward with a joint vision of the capabilities that Europe needs, and to lay the framework for a more efficient CSDP. However, some disappointment was expressed at the imbalance between the civilian and military parts of the EC Conclusions.

The original idea behind CSDP missions was crisis management, mostly understood as a 'quick-fix' intervention focused on priority areas agreed at the Feira European Council in 2000. As crises proliferate and get increasingly complex, so does the need to quickly adapt and be flexible in providing response. Nowadays, our CSDP missions are not discrete actions but are well embedded in overall EU strategies towards a particular region or country, and cover activities from basic,

ground level training, to providing strategic advice to ministers of the interior and justice or mentoring police or judiciary bodies.

The EU has established itself as a global actor and security provider. In early 2015, it deployed around 1500 international experts<sup>1</sup> on three continents for the purpose of civilian CSDP missions. Recent events in the EU's southern and eastern neighbourhoods and developments in Africa and the Middle East are forceful reminders that we will continue to need sufficient civilian capabilities to address crisis management challenges. By civilian capabilities we mean the right number of staff with the right skill-set, but also the adequate policies, procedures and equipment at hand to do the job. And these procedures take time to develop.

The experts in civilian CSDP missions are seconded internationally and hired internationally and locally. Secondment by a Member State is still the main applicable employment regime. This means that the EU relies on voluntary contributions from Member States – usually for periods of one year at a time. There is no one-stop shop to get the right civilian expertise. Police officers, judges, prosecutors and other civilian experts in Member States have to be encouraged to apply, trained, released from their everyday work and replaced during their time of absence, as well as adequately integrated back into the system upon return from a mission. Therefore, the prime

<sup>1</sup> The overall figure decreased due to the downsizing of the largest mission, in Kosovo. In 2014, the closure of EUPOL RDC and the suspension of the EUBAM Libya also impacted the total approved number of staff required.

responsibility for capability development for civilian CSDP missions lies with the Member States. It requires a cross-government approach. Furthermore, Member States have each established different national structures, strategies, policies or other arrangements on how to train, recruit and deploy and pay civilian experts. Civilian CSDP capability planning is multifaceted with many national stakeholders, different layers of decision-making and budget lines.

The fact that international contracted staff in civilian CSDP missions are on the rise and already make up almost one third of the total number of international staff in civilian CSDP missions should also not be neglected.

Despite the progress made, generating civilian capabilities – for EU rapid deployment in particular – remains a challenge, especially due to shortages of well trained personnel in specialised profiles.

In terms of its evolution, Civilian Capability Development<sup>2</sup> followed the example of the military, where there is a long history and tradition of capability development and a well-structured system. It started with the Feira European Council in June 2000, which decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas: police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. The EU ambition to play a role in global security was spelt out in the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. This allowed the EU to pursue, under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the development of crisis management capabilities needed to face the challenges and key threats for the EU. It led to the endorsement by the EC of the two Civilian Headline Goals (CHGs), namely CHG 2008 and CHG 2010. While the former focused strongly on personnel, the latter also recognised other important factors of capability development such as synergies, lessons learnt, concepts, security, equipment and the CSDP-FSJ (Freedom, Security and Justice) nexus. Civilian capability development at

the time was based on scenario-based planning and was detached from the operational reality of civilian CSDP missions. This also led to the crisis management structures we have today, where civilian capability development is not under one unique authority. The same goes for the mission planning process, which is divided between the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

The CHGs have certainly achieved encouraging results but also touched the limits of scenario-based capability planning. In the post-Lisbon set-up and in order to provide further political impetus, in December 2011 the Council called for a multi-annual work programme for civilian capability development. To steer the work, this led to the adoption, in July 2012, of a Civilian Capability Development Plan and the key action-lines for 2012 and 2013, in an additional document.

The Civilian Capability Development Plan sets out four interlinked drivers that in the civilian realm replicate the four strands of the EU's Capability Development Plan (CDP) managed by the European Defence Agency (EDA).

Among the key action-lines were the establishment of a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks and the finalisation of the Goalkeeper project.

The aim of the list of generic civilian CSDP tasks is to present the collation of the operational objectives that can reasonably be expected to occur in CSDP civilian crisis management, expressed in a generic non mission-specific way. It should contribute to the building of a common understanding of the generic civilian CSDP tasks and provide a coherent vision of the extent to which the EU is able to address these tasks as well as the relative weight of shortfalls identified. It will also facilitate work on civilian-military synergies.

The Goalkeeper software environment is a crucial mainstay of EU initiatives to facilitate civil-

2 Developing civilian capabilities for CSDP would be a more suitable term.

ian deployment. It is a web-based information hub that serves Member States, Brussels HQ and CSDP civilian missions by supporting training, recruitment, and the development of national rosters, capability development and institutional memory. In the area of civilian capabilities for CSDP, Goalkeeper bridges the operational and strategic levels as initially planned during the work on the 2010 CHG. It is expected that it will be finalised and become operational in 2015.

The logistic needs of new civilian CSDP missions, in particular during start-up, were better met after the establishment of the permanent CSDP Warehouse, which became operational in June 2013. The Warehouse has the capacity to store strategic equipment primarily for the effective rapid deployment of 200 personnel in the area of operations of a newly-launched mission, within 30 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept. It was used to provide equipment to EUBAM Libya, established in 2013. There is a plan to revise the Warehouse framework, which should be synchronised or streamlined with the ongoing work on establishing a Shared Service Centre to centralise mission support structures.

In recent times, money issues have also become an important planning factor. Finances before were not a major consideration but mostly linked

to rapid deployment and ways to make procedures more flexible. Times have changed. Nowadays, working groups such as the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Political and Military Group (PMG) are discussing ways to make more savings in the CSDP budget without too much of an impact on operational delivery.

These are just a few examples of different work strands with concrete deliverables and impact on civilian capabilities. One should not neglect the work on partnerships, training, lessons learnt and transition strategies, as well as issues beyond CMPD's remit such as the revision of the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP). The main difference remaining between civilian and military capability planning even today is that the former remains fragmented while the latter is better structured. In the absence of a coherent strategy, civilian capability development may seem less viable.

For a successful, efficient and sustainable civilian CSDP, it is essential to step up the work at the Member State and EU levels on mechanisms and procedures to recruit and train civilian personnel, as well as to provide the adequate supporting tools in order to obtain a better impact by EU CSDP missions on the ground.



## 3.2. RAPID REACTION/RESPONSE

### 3.2.1. Military Rapid Response

by Jerónimo Domínguez Barbero and Tomas Abrahamsson

When time for action is considered, politically, as pressing, we refer to such urgency as demanding 'Rapid Response'. A response is measured in time from the moment that the EU considers action as appropriate up to the moment that Forces arrive and are able to operate in the area of operations.

At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid Response (RR) was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member States the objective of being able to make rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. Subsequently the first EU Military Rapid Response Concept (MRRC) was agreed in early 2003.

The operational birth of the EU military response is more often associated with the Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), code-named Artemis, which was launched on 12 June 2013 (seven days after the Council adoption of the Joint Action). It successfully demonstrated the EU's ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6 000 km from Brussels. Accordingly, Operation Artemis became a reference point and model for the development of a Battlegroup-sized Rapid Response capability. Rapid operational assessment, Member States' political support, decision making, planning, force generation, together with Member States' force contributions and deployment, were identified as critical criteria for success in future operations.

The complexity of contemporary crisis situations indicates that the EU needs to have capabilities across all military dimensions in order to be able to act/react in a flexible manner that can be adapted to the uniqueness of each situation and to the tasks that need to be undertaken. Hence, the EU Battlegroups (EU BG) Concept (2006), the EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept (2007) and the EU Air Rapid Response Concept (2007) were conceived, developed and agreed in that order by Member States.

In December 2013, the European Council<sup>1</sup> emphasised the need to further improve the EU Rapid Response (RR) capability, inter alia by increasing the operational usability and deployability of the EU Battlegroups. In this regard, the revision of the *EU Military Rapid Response Concept* was completed and finalised on 17 December 2014<sup>2</sup>: it now also includes the subordinated Land (new), Maritime and Air Rapid Response concepts.

#### RAPID RESPONSE PILLARS

To achieve an overall Rapid Response, both the political reaction and the military response need to be fast and effective. However, the first step to unlocking this capability must be the *EU Member States' political will to use it*. In other words consensus amongst Member States must be inseparably linked to the responsibility to properly resource

<sup>1</sup> European Council 19/20 December 2013 – Conclusions (EUCO 217/13, 20 December 2013).

<sup>2</sup> EU Military Rapid Response Concept (17036/1/14 REV 1, 8 January 2015).



Photo: Austrian Armed Forces/Horst Gorup

Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall military approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in order to enable a decisive military response to a crisis within 30 days

a response during the informal *force sensing*, by those same authorities, to match the degree of urgency agreed by Member States.


In addition to the aforementioned unavoidable requirement for Member States' political will, the development of the overall approach is based on three pillars, which must in all cases be fulfilled in order to enable a swift and decisive EU military response:

- Firstly, there is a need for ***an extremely compressed decision-making process*** in response to a developing crisis. This process follows the crisis management procedures<sup>3</sup>. This decision process is initiated when the PSC analyses the situation and considers whether CSDP action

may be appropriate and invites the EEAS to develop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC). The subsequent key decisions are the following: approval of the CMC by the Council, the Council Decision establishing the mission/operation and the Council Decision to launch the operation/mission.

- Secondly, there is a need to ***finalise all phases of crisis response planning in a very short period of time***. The new Crisis Management Procedures established a special procedure, called the *Fast Track process*, in order to accelerate this process. Concurrent planning activity, the early appointment of the Operation/Mission Commander and Force Commander,

<sup>3</sup> Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (7660/2/13 REV 2, 18 June 2013, public).



Shortcuts after formal Rapid Response decisions  
 Standard Response process is depicted with blue arrows  
 Rapid Response process is depicted with red arrows

and the early designation of Operation/Mission Headquarters (OHQ/MHQ) and Force Headquarters (FHQ) are of utmost importance.

- And thirdly and finally, there is a need to *deploy forces and capabilities already held at a very high state of readiness by Member States*. These rapid elements are made available by Member States and generated through the agreed set of rapid response mechanisms.


### EU RAPID RESPONSE LABEL AND SHORTCUTS

The timeline requirements established for the military rapid response forces and capabilities after the Council Decision to launch the Operation are extremely demanding. Therefore, in order to facilitate their compliance, it is imperative to identify as soon as possible the point at which the EU labels a CSDP mission or operation rapid response.

This early identification should trigger the related rapid response initiation procedures to activate and prepare the forces involved and to better enable their further reaction.

In accordance with the crisis management procedures, the rapid response label is formally decided by either:

- a PSC decision to directly develop a CMC, excluding the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). This option is called *Option for Urgent Response*; or
- a PSC decision to utilise the fast-track process for the operation/mission planning. This process avoids developing the Military Strategic Options (MSO) and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). In addition, the draft Operation Plan (OPLAN) should be drawn up in parallel with the preparation of the draft CMC and draft Initiating Military Directive (IMD). All of this is undertaken with a view to shortening the operation planning time.

Military Rapid Response Timeline<sup>6</sup>

## USE OF EU RAPID RESPONSE

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides the framework for the deployment of military assets on missions outside the Union (peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security). This framework follows the principles of the United Nations Charter. In addition, drawing on the previously agreed *Petersberg tasks*<sup>4</sup>, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for the following possible tasks: joint disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

Key EU documents have further elaborated on or described other possible scenarios, threats or challenges. The 2003 European Security Strat-

egy, the Report on its implementation five years later, the Council conclusions of December 2013, and the Recommendations on EU Battlegroups<sup>5</sup> provide further indications regarding the significance and possible recourse to military rapid reaction. Taking into account that Rapid Response is decided by a PSC decision, it is in the latter's remit to decide the scenario in which the military forces and capabilities will develop the standard generic military tasks in a rapid response format.

## MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE TIME AND REQUIREMENTS


While the Political Reaction Time is the period between a crisis being identified and the point at which the Council takes the decision to launch an operation, the Military Response Time is measured from the point at which the Council takes the decision to launch the operation to the point

<sup>4</sup> The Petersberg tasks were first agreed upon at the June 1992 Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers near Bonn, Germany. Article II.4 of the subsequent ministerial declaration outlined the following three purposes for which military units could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

<sup>5</sup> PMG recommendations on EU Battle Groups (17150/11, 17 November 2011, non-public).

<sup>6</sup> Based on the EU Military Rapid Response Concept.





Modular approach scheme

at which forces start implementing their mission in the Joint Operation Area.

Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall military approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in order to enable a decisive military response to a crisis within 30 days.

Two main military response times have been established (see graphic on p. 247):

1. the generic Military Rapid Response, whereby implementation of the mission starts 25 days after the EU decision to launch the operation;
2. the Express Response Time, whereby implementation of the mission starts 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation (primarily for EU Battlegroups).

In addition, on 23 May 2005 at the General Affairs External Relations Council, Member States also agreed a challenging planning timeline requirement prior to the Council Decision to launch an operation. It was determined that the planning timeline should be completed within five days of the Crisis Management Concept being approved, particularly for operations involving Battlegroups.

## RAPID RESPONSE FORCE GENERATION MECHANISMS

Conceptually, Member States are to offer, on a voluntary basis, such Military Rapid Response forces and capabilities by means of a pre-agreed roster (as in the case of the EU Battlegroups), as well as the Land, Maritime and Air Rapid Response Databases of capabilities, along with the related Rapid Response Force Generation Conference.

For operations and missions using forces and capabilities which are not pre-agreed or committed, it remains a national decision to determine the forces, and their state of readiness, to be offered to the EU for the Military Rapid Response in Force Generation conferences especially dedicated to a specific operation/mission. Finally, under some circumstances, alternate Rapid Response recourse mechanisms could be employed, namely the EU Framework Nation concept and/or Article 44 of the Treaty on the European Union could be used.

At the end of the day, the availability of forces offered by Member States, at the correct state of readiness, will dictate whether a Military Rapid Response is possible.

## MODULAR APPROACH

As directed by the December 2013 European Council, the Military Rapid Response concept includes a package of measures in order to ensure consistency, interconnection, compatibility, interoperability, complementarity and standardisation across the full spectrum of the EU Military Rapid Response concept suite. The newly adopted approach aims at developing a modular approach in order to make the rapid response tools more adaptable to the entire range of possible crises.

In most cases the Military Rapid Response may have to be tailored to the required task. The EU has taken measures to streamline the process of Force Generation, through the Rapid Response mechanisms (EU BG Roster and Rapid Response databases) and has introduced the modular approach.

The development of the modular approach enhances both the EU BG's usability and the flexibility of the Rapid Response, without reducing the level of ambition. This approach uses modules which are most likely to be capability-based (see graphic on p. 249). They may or may not have utility on their own, but are to be used as building blocks for a force designed to tackle all the assigned tasks when responding to a particular crisis.

Member States may commit such modules specifying their durations and readiness levels (preferably matching them to the ones of the EU BGs).

## CONCLUSION

The revised Military Rapid Response Concept, as agreed by the EU Military Committee on 17 December 2014, refined the entire Rapid Response suite and represents a significant step forward and improvement in the overall EU military rapid response capability.

In summary, this revision inter alia identified the decisions that initiate a Rapid Response, established the procedures to be followed and measures to be taken in order to facilitate the timely commitment and generation of Rapid Response forces. It also aligned timelines and developed the modular approach with a view to enabling flexibility and complementarity between the different Rapid Response tools.

There is no doubt that all of this increases both the operational usability and deployability of the EU Battlegroups, and strengthens the complete suite of Rapid Response instruments as called for by the European Council in 2013.

However, such agreed enhancements will be of use only if, from the outset, Member States' political will to respond "rapidly" is supported by their appropriate and timely contributions to carry out the related mission or operation.



The EU Battlegroup concept is based on the experiences and best practices of EUFOR ARTEMIS in 2003

Photo: Council of the European Union

### 3.2.2. Civilian Rapid Reaction/Response

by Birgit Loeser

When, back in 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was introduced as part of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the idea was to obtain 'crisis management' capabilities – a notion clearly indicating rapid response in a post-conflict scenario.

The first Civilian Headline Goal was set in 2000 at the meeting of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal. It identified 'policing', the 'rule of law', 'civil administration' and 'civil protection' as four priority areas for the EU in this context. In the area of policing, the 2000 Feira Council set concrete targets whereby EU Member States would collectively provide up to 5 000 police officers for crisis management operations, with 1 000 officers on high readiness (able to be deployed within 30 days). In the area of justice/rule of law, the 2001 Gothenburg Council subsequently set the following goal: by 2003, the EU was to be able to (i) have 200 judges and prosecutors prepared for crisis management operations in the field of rule of law who could be deployed within 30 days, (ii) establish a pool of experts in the area of civilian administration (including general administrative, social and infrastructure functions), and (iii) provide civil protection teams of up to 2 000 people, all deployable at very short notice. These teams included two to three assessment/coordination teams consisting of 10 experts who could be dispatched within three to seven hours. At the 2004 Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, these targets were declared to have been met (and indeed exceeded).

In parallel to these efforts, the responsible Police Unit within the Council Secretariat developed a number of concepts underpinning the ambitions

regarding rapidity in deployment, including the following:

- guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated Police Units (IPUs) and other police elements in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution mission and interoperability of IPUs and Police Headquarters
- guidelines for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission
- a concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission
- guidelines on standard IPU/FPU structures
- the Crisis Response Team concept, a pool of pre-selected experts.

However, already the very first mission, EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in January 2003, was not so much a mission in 'crisis management', but a longer-term capacity-building mission with tasks including the following:

- support to the police reform process;
- assistance in the fight against organised crime;
- removal of non-compliant BiH police officers.

Also the second mission, EUPOL Kinshasa, and its successor, EUPOL RD Congo, was aimed at training the Congolese police and later to contribute to wider police reforms. EUPOL COPPS, launched in 2005 in support of Palestinian police development, had a similar function.

These three early missions are examples of missions launched with a longer-term perspective of capacity building. As a matter of fact, EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted six years, the Congolese civilian CSDP mission engagement lasted seven years overall and the Palestine mission has so far gone on for eight years.

Having said that, three other civilian CSDP missions were set up within a very short reaction





Photo: EUMM Georgia

EUMM Georgia was deployed in a record time following the war between Georgia and the Russian Federation, in order to monitor the EU-brokered Six-Point Agreement: patrolling activities started two weeks after the Council Decision launching the Mission

time, actually within just 6 to 8 weeks, as follows:

- AMM Aceh in 2005 to support the post-tsunami demobilisation of Aceh rebels;
- EUBAM Rafah in 2005 to provide a third-party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point, to help build relevant Palestinian capacity and to help build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority;
- EUMM Georgia in 2008 to provide civilian monitoring of parties' actions, including full compliance with the six-point Agreement with a view to contributing to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building.

Each of these missions saw the deployment of mission personnel in record time, within a few weeks only from the agreement that 'action was appropriate' and each with a full set of the necessary legal and planning documents in place.

What made them so fast?

There are a number of factors contributing to this:

- First of all, *each of these missions saw rather innovative solutions to problems*, in part even slightly bending the rules: for Georgia, 'preparatory measures' (a financial instrument for the start-up of civilian CSDP missions) were used for the first time, allowing the mission



quicker access to funds for procurement, salaries, rent, cars, etc. EUBAM Rafah, by contrast, still had to obtain unprecedented 'voluntary contributions' from Member States to fill the mission budget quickly and un-bureaucratically. The EU Military Staff assisted in the setting up of EUMM Georgia with what is called the 'Rapid Staging and Onward Movement' capability (RSOM), which was essential to get the promised 200 monitors on time to their respective field offices.

- Secondly, *all three missions were monitoring missions* that do not necessarily require, at least initially, high-profile experts. A monitor who understands his role and who can write reports is all that is needed, at least for a start. By contrast, longer-term capacity-building missions performing mentoring and advisory tasks do require a certain degree of seniority and professionalism, a good sense of conflict awareness and, often, even diplomatic skills. Such experts can only be found through proper recruitment processes that take up to four months.
- Thirdly, *each of these missions met with unequalled, massive and unanimous political will by EU Member States*. Lessons clearly show that, if this is in place, then rules can be adapted and means are available, almost in abundance.

It is worth noting that the latest civilian CSDP missions all focus on longer-term capacity-building and reform support tasks, yet Member States often wish to see them set up rapidly, not least for visibility and credibility reasons. This was for example the case when planning for the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission, but also EUBAM Libya and, most recently, EUAM Ukraine.

Over the past few years, therefore, major show-stoppers in rapid deployment have been addressed, inter alia through the following:

1. the conclusion of *'framework contracts'* that speed up considerably the procurement of critical enabling material such as soft-skin and armoured vehicles, IT and security equipment and similar services;
2. the establishment of *'preparatory measures'*, a

budget for the preparatory phase of a mission, before it is actually set up legally and financially by a Council Decision;

3. the *revision of the applicable procurement rules* that, for now, remain the same as those applicable for development projects, which have no time constraints;
4. the establishment of a *warehouse* near Berlin that stores such assets, readily available for any initial deployments and mission start-up;
5. the *revision of the 2003 crisis management procedures* in 2013 that allow for an earlier appointment and thus also deployment of the Head of Mission and his/her Core team as well as early access to the mission budget which, again, mainly facilitates early procurement;
6. in December 2013 EU Heads of State and Government for the first time in five years dedicated the *European Council Summit to CSDP*. In the run-up to this event, there were a number of Member States' non-papers and proposals on how to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP, including in the field of civilian capabilities and rapid response. The European Council ended up inviting the Commission, the High Representative and Member States *"to ensure that the procedures and rules for civilian missions enable the Union to be more flexible and speed up the deployment of EU civilian missions"*. A *'road map'* was agreed as a follow-up to this, which addressed related financial, logistical, decision-making, planning and other aspects.

The latest civilian CSDP missions planned and set up in 2015 (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM Ukraine) were able to benefit from the above-mentioned steps and the momentum created by the December 2013 Council and saw some real improvements in the speed in which missions can be set up. Yet there is room for improvement and, hence, the following avenues are being pursued to further reduce the timelines:

- The *European Gendarmerie Force* (EGF) has the capacity to deploy speedily and, for example, mount an interim mission Headquarters and show a visible presence on the ground. Whilst



Photo: EUBAM Rafah

Following the conclusion of the Agreement on Movement and Access, EUBAM Rafah was deployed rapidly to provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point. On stand-by since 2007, the mission continues to support the Palestinian Authority in building up their border management capacity with a view to their return to Gaza border crossing

the EGF is not a European Union body, it has offered its services to the EU in the framework of CSDP, and this is now being considered.

- Whilst the *procurement rules* have been adapted over time and made more flexible, what would really help is if the Financial Regulations could be changed in a similar way as was done for ECHO, the EU humanitarian aid and civil protection department.
- A feasibility study for a 'Shared Service Centre' was concluded in 2014 which is now being discussed with Member States. The basic idea consists in centralising certain mission support functions for civilian CSDP missions in Brussels, which should considerably facilitate efficiency and standardisation, and ultimately also the speed in delivering essential services to these missions.

To sum up, the EU has proven that it does have a real capability for rapid response, but there are also limitations, the main one relating to the selection of the right number and quality of mission personnel, which is critical for longer-term capacity-building missions that operate in a crisis environment. These mission personnel need not least to have sound experience in change management, which makes them scarce and not easy to release from their present jobs.

"Where there's a will, there's a way" – this old saying also remains true. Unanimous and strong political will can "move mountains". The main conclusion is that Member States have to set their level of ambition and preparedness. They are the ones to dictate the rhythm and speed of decisions taken in Brussels.

## 3.3. BUILDING HUMAN RESOURCES VIA TRAINING

### 3.3.1. The European Security and Defence College

by Jochen Rehr



2005 saw the establishment of a new institution which would soon become the number one training provider in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy. That institution was the European Security and Defence College, also known by the abbreviation ESDC.

#### **ESDC = FACILITATOR OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CULTURE**

Before the foundation of the ESDC, there was no single entity in the EU devoted to European training and the development of a common European security culture. It was only in 2002 that the

Greek presidency introduced what it called 'Common training' as one of the presidency priorities. The task of common training involved developing a European security culture by providing knowledgeable personnel both in the EU Member States and within the EU institutions.

#### **ESDC = 28 EU MEMBER STATES**

The EU Member States are the political masters of the college. They convene in a steering committee, which is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and which gives political guidance and strategic direction on issues relating to the academic training programme. The programme encompasses all the training activities offered in the course of the academic year, which runs from September to July. A small but efficient international secretariat located in Brussels facilitates the conduct of training activities and the organisation of meetings in various formats.

#### **ESDC = 80 TRAINING PROVIDERS**

The ESDC was created as a network college and therefore relies on certified national training institutes, which provide training on a 'costs lie where they fall' basis.





More than 80 national training providers support the activities of the European Security and Defence College (in the picture: a family photo of the Executive Academic Board)

In general, the courses can be attended cost-free, insofar as the ESDC does not charge tuition fees.

The sending authority covers participants' travel and accommodation costs.

The college is currently composed of around 80 national training institutes with various areas of expertise and backgrounds.

Network members range from national defence academies to peace universities, from police colleges to diplomatic training institutes.

Some of the college's activities are hosted by ministries or permanent representations, others by EU institutions or other EU entities including the European External Action Service.

### **ESDC = EMBEDDED IN THE EEAS**

The structure of the college is as unique as its setting within the EU structures.

The ESDC is embedded in the crisis management structures of the European External Action Service.

It is therefore not a CSDP agency, unlike the European Defence Agency or the Institute for Security Studies in Paris.

It has limited legal capacity and is able to provide first-hand training to meet real-time training needs and requirements.

### **ESDC = 40 DIFFERENT TRAINING COURSES**

Over the years, the ESDC has developed around 40 different training activities, most of them with a regional or horizontal focus. Two of the more general courses are on the Common Foreign and Security Policy itself, at newcomer level in the case of the CSDP Orientation Course and at strategic leadership level in the case of the CSPD High Level Course. The other courses/seminars/conferences focus on horizontal (e.g. peacebuilding) and regional (e.g. Western Balkans) issues. Specific training programmes for partners (e.g. Eastern Partners) complement the academic programme of the college.

### **ESDC = SUPPORT TO EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS**

The latest discussions on CSDP in various Council bodies (inter alia CIVCOM) has put pre-deployment training, in-mission-training and preparatory training on the ESDC agenda. More and more CSDP missions and operations involve a role for the college in providing training for staff. The first such training course was an eLearning course for newcomers in EUNAVFOR Somalia and more recent courses have included an in-mission-training course on Security Sector Reform.



## ESDC = THREE HANDBOOKS AND SEVERAL OTHER PUBLICATIONS


Since 2010, the ESDC has published three handbooks on the Common Security and Defence Policy. A total of about 15 000 copies of these publications have been distributed to date, primarily to facilitate the college's various training activities. The handbooks were as follows:

1. **Handbook on CSDP:** This handbook, published in 2010, was the first in the series of CSDP related handbooks. It gives an overview of procedures, structures and policies. The third edition of the handbook was published in 2015.
2. **Handbook for Decision Makers:** The second handbook was developed for decision makers. It provides comments and analysis on current CFSP/CSDP issues such as sanctions, cyber security and non-proliferation. The first edition was published in 2014.
3. **Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations:** This latest handbook was published in 2015 and focuses on operational aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy.


The three handbooks were published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Other publications, including an electronic newsletter, were issued in the margins of the military Erasmus programme, either by the Polish and Cypriot presidencies or by the ESDC itself. The handbooks and other publications have contributed greatly to both expertise development and brand visibility.

## ESDC = RECOGNISED HIGH QUALITY TRAINING

As a network college, the ESDC has a presence in Brussels and across all 28 EU Member States. Besides the classical national training institutes, ministries and national permanent representations also provide training at EU level.



Available under: <http://goo.gl/T3iLNp>



Available under: <http://goo.gl/1CG3WN>



Available under: <http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc>

In order to guarantee a minimum level of quality, all training delivered under the aegis of the ESDC must follow a standardised curriculum, which is developed by the host country or institute and agreed by all Member States.

These curricula are revised annually by the relevant bodies of the European External Action Service and by the national institutes and other external experts active in the field, amongst others.

### **ESDC = YOUNG OFFICERS EXCHANGE SCHEME**

Since 2008, the college has been actively involved in and leading the young officers exchange scheme. The main goal of this initiative, which is modelled on its civilian counterpart ERASMUS, is to instil European officers with a common security culture and therefore render the armed forces 100 % interoperable.

Within the ESDC framework, military, navy and air academies across the Member States work towards the achievement of this ambitious political goal.

### **ESDC = USING SYNERGIES FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT**

Other initiatives aim at identifying and using synergies between various actors in the field of CFSP and CSDP to support the regional priorities of the EU Member States and the European External Action Service.

Building on these efforts, strong ties have been established between the ESDC and the newly created Directorate General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations (DG NEAR). TAIEX, a European Commission Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument managed by DG NEAR, finances ESDC training activities directed at the implementation and facilitation of accession efforts. The Eastern Partnership platform, also within DG NEAR, provides similar



Photo: European Security and Defence College

The ESDC is embedded in the EEAS structures and supported by the hierarchy (in the picture: former HR/VP Catherine Ashton)

support to ESDC activities for the Eastern Partnership countries. Other Commission directorates also provide support to meet specific training needs. They include DG HOME (counter-terrorism), DG MOVE (maritime security) and DG DEVCO (fragility, security, development).

### **ESDC = NUMBER ONE CFSP/CSDP TRAINING PROVIDER**

The college has several advantages over other training providers:

1. The ESDC is embedded in the EU structures, hence able to quickly identify new training needs and include them in its programming cycle and curricula.



Photo: Ukrainian National Defence University

With regional training programmes, the ESDC supports the Eastern Partnership initiatives and the Western Balkans (in the picture: a training event in Kiev, October 2014)

2. The ESDC provides first-class training, thanks to its network structure, its broad variety of lecturers including practitioners, academics and officials, its use of participants with a wealth of expertise and professional experience as resource persons, its eLearning Management tool and its standardised, annually updated curricula.
3. The ESDC awards its students a certificate, which is signed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and legally recognised by all EU Member States and EU institutions.
4. The ESDC follows an inclusive approach, inviting civilian, police, military and diplomatic staff to its courses, and ensuring that training groups are balanced. This approach allows for exchanges of views on CFSP and CSDP from a variety of vantage points.
5. The ESDC supports the regional policies of the EU by providing tailor-made training for partners such as the Asia Regional Forum and the Arab League.
6. The ESDC evaluates all training events and includes its findings in the annual revision process. This ensures that shortfalls can be limited, good practices can be shared and a high quality of training can be guaranteed for future training activities.



## How to register for an ESDC event

The main ESDC target group is made up of officials from EU Member States and EU institutions/agencies, including CSDP missions and operations.

For registration, the ESDC uses a secure electronic registration system called ENLIST. Each relevant entity nominates a responsible person, who registers and ranks participants from his or her institution.

You will find a complete list of ENLIST nominators on the ESDC website (<http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc>).

The ESDC Secretariat performs the role of ENLIST nominator for candidates from third countries and organisations.

For some courses such as the Senior Mission Leader Course or the Advanced Political Advisor Course, the training host may prefer to use a more personalised registration system. In these cases, candidates are requested to fill in an application form. Based on the data provided, the training host, together with the ESDC Secretariat, performs a selection process to identify the most suitable participants.

Some training courses, include those on classified information require that participants have personal security clearance (PSC).

### ESDC = 8 000 ALUMNI

In 2015, the ESDC can look back on a 10 year success story. More than 8 000 students have been trained in more than 350 training sessions, seminars and conferences.

All EU Member States, institutions and agencies have sent staff to ESDC events. ESDC training is also recognised as an important part of pre-deployment and in-mission training. Thanks to its success, the ESDC is well known by EU partners within and beyond Europe.

Within its current mandate, which is framed by the 2013 Council Decision, and with the unanimous support of all the actors involved, the ESDC is well equipped to provide high-quality training to tackle the challenges of tomorrow's missions and operations.

The ESDC facilitated the development of a European Security Culture over the past 10 years and will build on its efforts in the future.

### Where to find out about courses and seminars:

ESDC courses are advertised

- a. on the ESDC website (<http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc>),
- b. via the Schoolmaster system and
- c. on the EEAS training intranet site (EEASzone).

All EU Member States, institutions and agencies, including CSDP missions and operations are invited to every training event through their nominated points of contact.

Where third States or organisations are invited, course details are sent via their missions, Delegations or other offices in Brussels.



### 3.3.2. Training for the CSDP missions

by Petteri Taitto

Personnel deployed to crisis areas need to be equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge to perform successfully from the start of their tour of duty in the respective CSDP mission or operation. Every mission member should understand the comprehensive crisis management and functioning principles of the Common Security and Defence Policy. They also need to know the roles of different actors in theatre, to possess the necessary communication and negotiation skills, and to understand the importance of human rights. Lastly, they need the basic skills to tackle safety and security risks in the mission area and comply fully with the EU Code of Conduct.


Training can be seen as bridging the gap between required and existing competencies. Most of the competencies can be secured through efficient recruitment focusing on relevant education and work experience. However, working in a multicultural mission environment requires specific skills and knowledge that can be obtained only through relevant training. So training is an essential pre-requisite for anyone being deployed to crisis management missions.

#### TRAINING PATH

Training for the CSDP missions can be provided in various phases, settings and frameworks. There is no comprehensive training system, but the training activities can be classified as basic, advanced, pre-deployment and in-mission training.

The *basic training* provides participants with the basic knowledge and skills required on an international crisis management mission, independently from the specific function they will perform as experts in their own fields. Such training primarily helps participants to acquire the skills and knowledge they will need on the missions, and thus enhance possibilities for successful recruitment.

*Advanced training* enables civilian experts in a particular field to understand how their expertise will need to be adapted for use in crisis areas, and what special considerations may apply to their particular area of work. These training courses can be seen as complementary to the basic training or function-specific preparation provided to the selected experts at the time of deployment.



Graphic: Rehr/Scala

Advanced training may also take the form of complementary training for mission personnel delivered during the tour of duty in the mission area. The ESDC provides, for instance, ‘Senior Mission Leader’, ‘Legal Advisor’, ‘Political Adviser’, ‘Press and Public Information’ and ‘Gender Adviser’ courses.


Nominated/selected personnel receive *pre-deployment training* just before the mission deployment. It aims to harmonise the management culture of CSDP missions and ensure that the persons concerned receive the knowledge and skills they will need to be fully operational from the beginning of their tour of duty. This training also prepares the future mission members to make the most of the field induction training, in order to adapt to the new working environment as quickly as possible.

*Induction training* is given in the mission (area) immediately after deployment and is complementary to the pre-deployment training. This form of training aims to further familiarise the person with the administrative procedures for joining the mission, as well as the security and communication aspects applicable to all mission members.

Some EU Member States have organised debriefings, and Lessons Learned events are also organised, aimed at improving the quality of the seconding authority’s training provision.

## PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

From a legal point of view, and in more general terms, pre-deployment training is part of the employer’s duty of care towards its employees. Hence, seconding authorities and CSDP missions (for contracted personnel) are responsible for preparing their personnel to difficult working conditions so that they are aware of their rights, duties and responsibilities.



Pre-deployment training consists of generic and mission-specific modules and, often, also a security module

A number of surveys<sup>1</sup> and seminars include valuable information on what is needed in terms of the content and delivery of pre-deployment training activities. However, the content and requirements of pre-deployment training have been defined rather loosely in the existing documents.<sup>2</sup>

Based on ‘lessons identified’ and training documents providing guidance on pre-deployment training, pre-deployment training should aim to train personnel so that at the end of their training the participants will:

- understand the EU’s CSDP and how a specific mission is connected to it;
- be familiar with structures and roles of the EU’s civilian crisis management system;
- understand the overall mandate of the specific civilian crisis management mission and its management;
- understand the links between the mission and relevant departments in Brussels-based institutions;
- know about the mandates and activities of other actors on the ground and how they interlink,

1 i.e. Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training report on survey results and elements for the way ahead (2011/ 673853).

2 i.e. Future training needs for personnel in civilian crisis management operations (16849/06), Generic Standards of behaviour (8373/32005), Enhancing civilian crisis management training (15567/2/09).

especially in the context of the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management;

- be familiar with the local culture;
- be able to identify the security risks in the mission area.

Security training requirements, such as eHEST for all missions and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) for the high-risk missions, would ideally be a precursor to attending the pre-deployment training.

## POOLING AND SHARING REQUIRES COORDINATION

According to the Lessons Learned report 2013, a common foundation of pre-deployment training for all CSDP mission staff can greatly enhance mission effectiveness and coherence. The importance of proper pre-deployment training was mentioned as one of the five most important findings. CIVCOM stressed in its conclusions that training in the field of CSDP is principally a Member State competence, and agreed that a common foundation for both seconded national staff and international contracted staff is an important objective.<sup>3</sup>

Already in 2011 it was identified that a large number of mission personnel do not receive pre-deployment training.<sup>4</sup> Primary responsibility for the training of seconded staff lies with Member States, whilst the CSDP mission is responsible for the training of contracted personnel. Many of the Member States have found it difficult to arrange preparatory training for small numbers at the time of deployment. For years, Member States have been encouraged to cooperate in pre-deployment training courses<sup>5</sup>, but little real progress has been made.

Further coordination and pro-active planning is needed among all stakeholders and, in particu-

lar, between the Member States. The first step in such coordination is to standardise the curricula. Pre-deployment and induction training courses are complementary, so the curricula should be developed through close cooperation between the providers and the recipients.

Member States should seek ways to combine resources in order to be more efficient. This has not been successful over the last 10 years owing to the lack of coordination. It has been suggested that pre-deployment training can be arranged in the Member States, whereby certain training institutions would specialise in preparation for certain missions. This solution requires complex logistical arrangements at the time of deployment. Asking all 14 missions to apply the same quality standards at the same time in a range of different locations will be challenging.

The ESDC is the only training actor solely devoted to CSDP training and one of its tasks is to support the management of training in the field of conflict prevention and civilian crisis management. Some progress has been achieved, when ESDC, with its network institutions, has developed a standardised curriculum for 'Preparatory training for CSDP Missions', which is certified by all EU Member States. This training addresses both generic and mission-specific training needs.

In the future, the main challenge will not, however, be the content, but rather the process whereby preparatory training is included as part of the 'in-processing' of CSDP missions. Deployment from home to the pre-deployment training and from the training to the mission area is the most cost-efficient way to include training in the in-processing. So in future pre-deployment training should, where possible, be arranged on a monthly basis at a place that is easily reached by both instructors and participants, preferably in Brussels though also where the institutes involved in the network are located.

<sup>3</sup> Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report 00407/14.

<sup>4</sup> 2011 Comprehensive Annual Report on CSDP and CSDP-related training 17438/11.

<sup>5</sup> Enhancing civilian crisis management training 15567/2/09.

# 4 CONCLUSIONS AND WAY AHEAD



## 4.1. EU-UN COOPERATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: BEYOND THE HORIZON

by Michel Liégeois

In order to look beyond the horizon and try to figure out how the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) could develop over the next decade, let us posit the following:

*With time passing after European troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will face a growing risk of inconsistency if it goes on claiming a commitment to effective multilateralism while excluding the possibility of deploying CSDP capabilities under UN command.*

Since the early stages of the CSDP, the official discourse about the use of military capabilities in support of the EU's foreign policy has largely emphasised multilateral peace operations as a major area of activity. It began in the early nineties with the Petersberg missions and continued thereafter, with the 2003 Security Strategy stating that “[t]he EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security”.

Five years later, in the first report on the implementation of the strategy, the Council confirmed that

*“[t]he UN stands at the apex of the international system” and states further: “Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. (...) We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations”.*

In New York, the EU's Member States tend to express similar views on the evolution of UN peacekeeping; they welcomed the Brahimi report

in 2000, have been key stakeholders in the ‘New Horizon’ dynamic and take a substantive part in the annual debate in the C-34, the special committee on peacekeeping operations. Without denying the importance of this wide range of support and involvement, the unspoken reality behind these statements is that, since the second half of the nineties, the EU's Member States have largely deserted UN peacekeeping operations, in which they used to be very active. For almost 20 years now, UN peacekeeping activity has been staffed mainly by developing countries. The UN Secretary-General has regularly expressed concern about such an obvious imbalance at a time of overstretched UN peacekeeping. At the same time, with the same regularity, the EU has praised itself as a major supporter of international peace and security, both through financial support for UN operations and through the conducting of EU operations mandated by the UN Security Council.

### ENHANCING EUROPEAN SUPPORT THROUGH THE CSDP

Let us look at the practical arrangements and available options for the EU to provide military support to UN peacekeeping.

The first option is participation by some EU Member States in a UN operation. As already mentioned, many European countries took a large

part of the burden of UN peacekeeping at its post-cold-war peak. This fairy tale came to a dramatic end with the fatal trilogy: Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, where European Blue Helmets experienced casualties and intense frustration due to the poor match between the mandates and the situations on the ground. From then till now, as far as Europeans are concerned, the UN is no longer the preferred framework for military operations abroad, to say the least. The first significant move away from this reluctance came in 2006 with the reinforcement of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Responding to the call of the UN Secretary-General, a group of EU Member States decided to provide the core of the new UNIFIL. But they did so by imposing their own specific conditions on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Their participation was subject to unusual arrangements regarding heavy weaponry, rules of engagement, staffing of the operational headquarters in Naqura and the creation of a Military Strategic Cell within DPKO in New York.

An evolution of that first option could be the creation of a clearing-house system within CSDP structures, enabling DPKO to deal with a single point of contact – at EU level – for the purpose of UN peacekeeping force generation. The added value of such a system must however be demonstrated. From the DPKO point of view, adding a layer of bureaucracy between their office and the Member States is regarded with scepticism.

The second option is to conduct EU operations in support of the UN. This means the EU deploying military assets under its own command and control system to perform a UN Security Council mandate. As envisaged by the Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management of June 2007, it can apply two models of operations. The Bridging Model consists in using the rapid deployment capacity of the EU to stabilise the situation on the ground and enable the rather slow UN force-generation system to provide the UN troops thereafter. Artemis and EUFOR Chad were implementations of that model. The Standby



European Union Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at UN headquarters, New York, 9 March 2015

Model consists in deploying EU militaries alongside UN troops in order to provide them with robust capabilities on the ground. EUFOR DRC in Kinshasa during the 2006 election process is an example of that model. In December 2008, the UN Secretary General officially requested another EU standby operation in support of the MONUC in Eastern Congo. For lack of willingness on the part of EU Member States, that request was not fulfilled.

The third option consists in providing European military assets to UN operations under DPKO control. That is ‘blue-hatting’ CSDP capabilities. This third option can also unfold in different ways. The first one is envisaged in the above-mentioned Joint Statement. It takes the form of a modular participation of European assets in UN-led operations. One can think about high-tech, specialised or heavy military assets that are usually lacking when the core manning of the UN operations is provided by developing countries. EU Member States could then, in the framework of the CSDP, usefully provide pooled airlift

capabilities, aerial intelligence, Special Forces or helicopter units.

A more ambitious way to implement this third option would be for the EU to provide the core component of a UN mission. This is quite unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, given the restrictions and requirements related to participating in military missions abroad in the majority of EU Member States.

Should this option be considered, it would most likely draw on the provisions used when negotiating the participation of several EU Member States to the reinforced UNIFIL in 2006.

## A JOINT EU-UN OPERATION

There is one final possibility that has never been seriously considered to date, unless theoretically: a joint EU-UN operation. The main added value of that model is that it preserves the integrity of the EU's strategic line of command and control.

Yet this could be a way to escape from the political restrictions that prevent both the majority of Member States and, as a consequence, the EU as such from taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. The conduct of a peace operation by the UN jointly with a regional organisation is not a novelty. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), despite its erroneous nickname 'Hybrid', is indeed a joint UN-AU operation.

One might argue that UNAMID cannot be seen as a prototype of successful operation. Others will add that few among the UNAMID stakeholders express great satisfaction with the UNAMID Hybrid arrangements. What is suggested here is that the difficulties experienced in implementing UNAMID's 'hybridity' resulted from the major imbalance of capabilities between the UN and the AU. This UN-AU asymmetry is obvious in terms of experience, budget, human resources, management, etc. Such an imbalance would not exist in an EU-UN joint operation.

Let us look further in the details of the strategic concept of a joint operation.

An EU-UN joint operation would be a UN-mandated operation in which the EU is the main troop and civilian personnel provider. It would be characterised by the following principles:

- the operation is given international legitimacy through a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution;
- the mandate of the operation is jointly designed by the UNSC and EU Council [*the mandate is actually negotiated during a joint UN-EU Conference and then submitted to the UNSC by the UN Secretary General*];
- the strategic control of the operation is jointly exercised by the UN and the EU;
- an efficient double reporting line (to the EU-identified operation headquarters *and* to DPKO) is ensured by a strong Joint Strategic Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) [*JSCM will be mainly staffed with European civilian and military officers*];
- both civilian and military top management of the joint operation will be jointly appointed by the UNSG and EU Member States in the Council or the Political and Security Committee [*Considering that the EU will be the main troop contributor, the Joint Special Representative (JSR), the Force Commander (FC) and the Police Commissioner should be of EU origin*];
- advanced military planning will be supported by an EU force HQ;
- operational efficiency will be guaranteed by a single chain of command going top-down from the UNSG through the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operation [*traditionally European*] to JSR [EU] and FC [EU];
- the force HQ will be organised and staffed in accordance with EU standards; it will be complemented by additional personnel from other troop-contributing countries;
- the overall management of the operation (including outfits, flags and markings) will be based on United Nations standards, principles and established practices;

- the costs of an EU-UN joint operation will fall under the UN assessed-contributions system [*see the UNAMID precedent*];
- overheads will fall under the EU ‘costs lie where they fall’ system.

For such an option to be considered, it is necessary to demonstrate its added value compared to other existing options. The added value for the UN would consist in the availability of new capabilities, enhancing both geographical diversity and operational performance; access to rapidly deployable forces without using the ‘Bridging Model’ and thus avoiding the sometimes problematic handover procedures; enhanced standardisation and interoperability of the European contingents under the CSDP umbrella.

From the point of view of the EU and its Member States, the added value is also worth considering:

- mutual support and collective management of security issues on the ground;
- gain in common operational experience;
- testing in real operational contexts of new CSDP assets;
- possibility of deploying European troops made available through a CSDP procedure under the UN flag in places where the EU flag would have been less welcome;
- enhanced consistency of the EU discourse on effective multilateralism;
- strengthening of the position of EU (permanent and non-permanent) members of the UNSC;
- CSDP weighted leverage on CFSP in the area of deployment.

It goes without saying that such an option would not be suited for all situations. It is very likely that if it ever sees the light it will be for a very limited number of occurrences. Yet, recent accounts of peace operations show more ad hoc designed concepts of operations rather than the application of unchangeable doctrines. It is therefore especially important to diversify the options available to Member States within the CSDP for cooperating with the UN.

## REVISITING COOPERATION

Such a CSDP involvement in UN peacekeeping activities will also open up ways to bring new ideas into the ongoing debate on the evolution of peace operations. For example, a conceptual breakthrough remains to be made in terms of a regional approach to peacekeeping.

In areas like the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Sahara-Sahel, the UN regional approach remains far too rhetorical and lacks application on the ground. When conflicts are regional, armed groups routinely conduct cross-border operations and States are unable to exercise proper control over thousands of kilometres of remote borders, peace operations can no longer be defined with the same State-centric paradigm that has been applied hitherto.

This regional logic is to a certain extent encompassed in the practice of the CSDP, and this takes the case for the EU’s comprehensive approach one step further. The EU added value could here also take the form of expertise, support and training, e.g. in border management, in UN headquarters as well as within UN peace operations. It could also consist in bold contributions to the ongoing conceptual debate on the future of UN peacekeeping, advocating in favour of regional mandates and cross-border deployments when the situation requires it.

Nonetheless, the political weight and the credibility of such a statement depend heavily upon a future renewed EU commitment in UN peace activities.



## 4.2. EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES

by Gustav Lindstrom

### INTRODUCTION

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has come a long way since its operationalisation in 2003. Three developments stand out. First, CSDP missions have taken on a broader profile. After an initial focus on police and peace-keeping operations, missions and operations now tend to include rule of law, monitoring, security sector reform (SSR), and capacity-building dimensions. Additional elements, such as gender mainstreaming, human rights, and a comprehensive approach are routinely integrated into mission profiles.

Second, numerous mechanisms and bodies have developed to bolster CSDP's effectiveness. Examples include the creation of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability to facilitate command and control for civilian operations and the setting up of a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate to enhance civilian-military planning. Several initiatives have likewise been unveiled to facilitate the execution of CSDP missions and operations. The Athena mechanism, created in early 2004, finances the common costs of military CSDP operations. In early 2007, an EU Watch-keeping Capability was formed within the EU Military Staff to streamline information exchanges and to monitor CSDP missions. Combined, these and other initiatives contribute to a more active CSDP.

Third, policy-makers have developed concepts and procedures to facilitate CSDP planning processes. The EEAS has revised the CSDP crisis management procedures to make faster responses possible when needed. The use of a Political

Framework for Crisis Approach serves to encourage a more coherent use of different instruments.

Taken together, these developments underscore CSDP's evolutionary capability to maximise added value. As a policy tool, CSDP also needs to adapt to changes in the environment, including possible emerging security challenges. The following section highlights emerging challenges that may have implications for CSDP in the future.

### EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES: A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR CSDP?

The future of CSDP is likely to include new types of missions and operations. A starting point to gauge which missions and operations might be most likely in the future is to analyse changes in the security environment over the past decade. The table (see p. 269) provides an overview of some these changes since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003. As shown in the table, it provides an overview of EU-external developments, such as the rise of a more assertive Russia, and intra-EU developments that likewise may include a security dimension – e.g. a growth in radicalisation across several EU Member States.

A couple of conclusions can be drawn from a cursory overview of these security changes. First, the EU is facing a host of new challenges that originate from within or outside the EU. Second,

EU-EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS	INTRA-EU DEVELOPMENTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The rise of a more assertive/confident Russia aiming to uphold its interests in the European neighbourhood</li> <li>• ‘Arab Spring’ and its aftershocks in the Middle East/North Africa region, several with implications for the EU (e.g. illegal migration)</li> <li>• Rise of ‘hybrid’ conflicts that require novel thinking/policies; recent examples include conflict/war in Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza/Israel; also includes new forms of transnational terrorism such as ISIL/ISIS</li> <li>• The return of geopolitics, ranging from territorial disputes in the South China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu) to increased interest in the high north</li> <li>• The gradual securitisation of several issues of concern, including climate, health (as seen during the recent Ebola outbreak), water, cyberspace, and strategic minerals</li> <li>• The continued rise of the ‘East’ in comparison to the ‘West’ – particularly visible in Asia/China; effects can be perceived across economic, demographic, and governance sectors</li> <li>• Enhanced ‘interaction effects’ across formerly distant arenas – e.g. climate change and resource-based conflict, global warming and spread of disease to new areas (including EU Member State territory)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An extended financial crisis since 2008 and its associated implications for resources available to address domestic/international challenges; continued high unemployment in many parts of Europe – especially among youth</li> <li>• A growth in radicalisation across several EU Member States, raising the prospect of more complex social threats and challenges – including home-grown terrorism</li> <li>• Gradual implementation and extension of the Schengen area; while offering many advantages, it also raises prospects of higher volumes of transnational organised crime (including trafficking)</li> <li>• Continued growth in European tourism abroad – raising prospects of EU citizens facing threats and disasters abroad</li> <li>• Growing reliance on information and communications technologies for daily business; in addition, greater interlinkage across critical infrastructures and services resulting in greater vulnerability and possible cascading effects across sectors</li> <li>• Continued demographic trends of concern, including ageing of European society combined with low birth rates across several EU Member States</li> </ul>

Table 1: Examples of contextual security changes post 2003 ESS (in no particular order)

a number of these potential security challenges do not have implications for CSDP. For example, certain demographic trends – such as a rapidly ageing European society – cannot be ameliorated through CSDP. Third, some of these security challenges will require a multi-pronged approach, which could theoretically benefit from a CSDP contribution. At least four areas stand out in particular:

- Addressing a possible rise in illegal immigration to the EU in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and current hybrid conflicts in parts of the Middle East.
- The possibility of significant health security challenges in the EU’s neighbourhood – a case in point being the outbreak of Ebola in several West African countries. The response from the United States, which included military person-



Photo: Austrian Armed Forces

## HOW MIGHT CSDP PROVIDE ADDED VALUE?

As noted earlier, addressing relevant challenges in Table 1 may not require CSDP assets. Indeed, several of these issues – such as a hypothetical evacuation of EU citizens stranded abroad – are likely to be handled at national level by the countries affected. A similar argument could be made for addressing illegal immigration, where the brunt of the challenge is likely to be borne by the recipient countries. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which a more collective response, which could include CSDP assets, could come into play.

For example, under the auspices of a CSDP mission, specific competences such as monitoring, provision of medical equipment, evacuation services, etc., may prove more cost-effective and useful deployed under a CSDP umbrella rather than under individual national umbrellas. Specialised civilian expertise, such as a Crisis Response Team, may also be easier to deploy as part of an EU ‘recovery’ mission rather than as separate national efforts. Further synergies may be envisaged with, for instance, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, operating within the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department.

Concerning homeland security, which could gain greater relevance should illegal immigration and radicalisation challenges arise, the role for CSDP is more difficult to anticipate. Providing homeland security involves a number of stakeholders at all levels of government, ranging from local authorities to national ministries. At national level, consequence management may involve the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, public safety, energy, interior, etc. The complexity of homeland security makes it difficult to envision how CSDP resources might fit into the puzzle. Moreover, homeland security is associated with domestic/internal security as opposed to external security. Thus, under CSDP’s current remit – which focuses on external security – there is apparently no role for CSDP.

There are several factors and trends that suggest that CSDP might become more relevant for EU homeland security

nel, exemplifies how health issues may become ‘securitised’.

- Radicalisation of groups of individuals across several EU Member States. Exacerbating this concern is the possibility that a small subset of these individuals travel to conflict zones, where they gain fighting experience which could then be leveraged within the EU at a later stage.
- Continued growth in European tourism abroad. According to Eurostat, residents from the EU-28 (aged 15 and above), made 1.1 billion tourist trips in 2013. Of this figure, 25 % went to international destinations – many outside the EU. While growth in travel abroad is a positive trend, it could have security implications should a substantial number of EU citizens be caught in a natural or man-made disaster in distant locations.

Nevertheless, there are several factors and trends that suggest that CSDP might become relevant for EU homeland security. To begin with, there is widespread recognition that the boundary between internal and external security is fuzzy in a globalised world. To adequately respond to threats that span the external/internal divide – such as trafficking in arms, drugs, humans, etc. – it is reasonable to consider whether CSDP resources can add value on a case-by-case basis rather than to automatically discard their possible contribution.

A trend to observe is the tools used by EU Member States to address illegal immigration – beyond CSDP capacity-building efforts and long term EU policies which contribute addressing root causes of this phenomenon. At the operational level, the EU has relied on a patchwork of national contributions to provide ships and other assets to curb illegal immigration routes – many of which originate in Western Africa. With the support of FRONTEX, the EU's border security agency, interception operations have been mounted to stem the flow of illegal migrants. As a community agency, FRONTEX is not part of the CSDP toolbox. However, FRONTEX cooperates with agencies at the service of CSDP such as the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC). Among other activities, the EUSC has monitored illegal migration routes and provided imagery with corresponding analysis covering areas of concern.

Another trend to follow is policy-makers' efforts to fight terrorism and provide internal security. Considerable political capital was spent on framing a Solidarity Clause. Although the Solidarity Clause has not been activated to date, it offers a viable option in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack. Under such circumstances, CSDP assets, whether civilian or military, could come into play. A plausible example of such assistance is in the area of consequence management. Presently, there is an EU database listing military assets and capabilities that could be requested by an individual EU Member State in the aftermath of a large-scale event, including the case of disaster response.



Specific competences such as monitoring, provision of medical equipment, evacuation services etc. may prove more cost-effective and useful deployed under a CSDP umbrella rather than under individual national umbrellas (in the picture the flags of the participating countries in MILEX 09 in FHQ Naples)

Another category of CSDP-related contributions might involve the use of maritime and air assets for monitoring and surveillance purposes.

## CONCLUSION

Developments within the EU, coupled with changes in the international security landscape, suggest potential growth in demand for CSDP missions and operations. And while CSDP may only play a partial role in addressing such emerging security challenges (contingent on sufficient political will), the complexity of these issues will require careful analysis of how the EU should prioritise where limited CSDP assets should or could be employed.



## 4.3. THE EU'S UNIQUE STRENGTH IN PREVENTING CONFLICTS AND MANAGING CRISES

by Gabor Iklódy

The world does not stand still; the past year has brought about new, dramatic changes in Europe's security environment. To the East, Russia's aggression in Ukraine and continuing efforts to intimidate the neighbourhood; to the South, the advances of a barbaric terrorist group, ISIL, which represent a genuine threat to international law and to European ideals. Failing States and the spread of violence across borders are features of a deteriorating security landscape. Whether right on Europe's borders or further away, they challenge our security and undermine our interests. Strategic external changes must be matched by strategic internal changes: the EU needs to adapt and evolve both structurally and on policy. There has been much talk, and more non-papers, on the comprehensive approach, a key concept giving the EU unique strength in preventing conflicts and managing crises. The concept is no doubt compelling but its true potential is yet to be unleashed. Below are a few thoughts on how this can be translated into *effect*, building on the key areas for improvement as highlighted in the EEAS/Commission Joint Communication. CSDP, which is part of the EU's extensive toolbox, does have an important supporting role to play in furthering our broad state-building objectives.

### DEVELOP SHARED ANALYSIS – WE MUST UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

Shared analysis should set out what we understand about the causes of a conflict or crisis, the main people and groups involved, the dynamics of the situation and potential risks. It should identify EU interests and our potential role in contributing to peace and stability. We can achieve this by strengthening early, proactive and regular information-sharing and coordination amongst all EU actors in the field and in Brussels (especially Delegations, CSDP missions, EU Special Representatives and Member States). Crises do evolve and therefore from time to time we may have to review and refresh our earlier analysis. To that end, a continuous, open dialogue between CSDP missions/operations and the Brussels-based crisis management structures is required.

In addition we must seek to develop and implement a common conflict/crisis analysis methodology involving all relevant EU actors and institutions, taking into account perspectives on development, humanitarian, political and security from both the field and HQ.

## FOCUS ON PREVENTION

Whenever possible we must seek to prevent conflict before a crisis emerges or violence erupts. We all know that preventing conflict saves lives and reduces suffering, avoids the destruction of homes, businesses, infrastructure and the economy, and makes it easier to resolve underlying tensions and disputes. It also helps protect EU interests and prevent adverse consequences for EU security and prosperity.

We are establishing new EU early-warning systems, and modifying existing ones, to identify emerging conflict and crisis risks and determine joined-up mitigating actions. This may require changes in Brussels, but again, input from colleagues in the field regarding the ‘ground truth’ will be crucial.

This is likely to be augmented by strategic foresight, a new tool under development by the CMPD. It is well established that moving from assessment to action in the crisis cycle is problematic for anything other than reactive crisis management. When we consider conflict prevention measures, we have yet to act proactively by providing CSDP activity, even though Member States increasingly ask us to do so. We have a gap in the crisis cycle that we must fill in order to deliver conflict prevention contributions by CSDP missions. To that end we need to look ahead and plan ahead, implementing the CMPD’s mandate on advance planning. Strategic foresight, if incorporated into long-term planning processes, can have a significant impact on policy-making and decision-making. Horizon-scanning, looking beyond the current challenges and preparing scenario-based possible futures, and thereby improving our understanding and preparation, should, I believe, be an indispensable role of the EEAS. Strategic foresight will ensure that policy options, coupled with proper assessment of risks, resources and support needs, are presented to senior management in sufficient time, with sufficient coordination, and with sufficient analytical rigour to allow early decision-making.

## DEVELOP A COMMON STRATEGIC VISION

Building on shared analysis of a conflict or crisis, the EU should work across institutions and with strategic partners to develop a single, common strategic vision. This will set the overall direction for all EU support.

The EU’s strategic vision for a country or a region can be set out in an overarching EU strategy document, such as the Horn of Africa Strategic Framework and the Sahel Strategy. Today, there is a growing need to develop comprehensive, regional strategies that can be implemented through country-specific action plans. The region affected and/or threatened by ISIL is a case in point – in particular if we want to assess how the EU could help to contain the threat and strengthen the resilience of the societies concerned. In crisis mode we are increasingly seeing the use of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) as a key instrument to allow informed and coherent decision-making.

## MOBILISE THE DIFFERENT STRENGTHS AND CAPACITIES OF THE EU

An effective response should draw on the different strengths, capacities, competencies and relationships of EU institutions and Member States, in support of our common vision and objectives. The ‘train and equip’ concept, which is widely seen as one of the most important deliverables of the June European Council on defence, addresses precisely this issue as it aims to implement the comprehensive concept. It is intended to fill an identified gap by building partner countries’ capacities also in the security and defence sector, which is to be regarded as part of the EU’s broad state-building efforts. CSDP is but one of the instruments in the EU’s extensive toolbox and, despite occasional political temptations, it should not always be regarded as the instrument of first choice.

CSDP missions/operations rely heavily on Member States, and the alignment of potentially disparate Member State activity with a common EU strategy in-country may be problematic. However, the comprehensive approach is not for the EU institutions alone – the role of the Member States has to be harnessed, or at the very least understood, if we are to make this work.

Whilst the importance of partners' capacity-building will likely grow in importance in terms of both preventing and managing crises in the civilian and military fields alike, Member States' expectations vis-à-vis the EU playing a bolder role in protecting them from growing 'hybrid threats' are becoming more pronounced too. In a number of areas the EU can serve as a platform to boost Member States' and partners' national efforts to counter such threats, build resilience against them and thus reduce critical vulnerabilities. Clearly, CSDP can contribute.

## COMMIT TO THE LONG TERM

Addressing the underlying causes of conflict and building peaceful, resilient societies requires long-term engagement in peace-building and state-building. The objective of sustainable peace must be at the core of the EU's response from the outset. CSDP is not in itself a development tool that seeks generational change. CSDP can play a very important practical and political role, but a CSDP mission/operation is not designed for the long term.

The results of short to medium-term CSDP engagement need to endure beyond that lifespan, and we should constantly assess how we can *transition* away from CSDP.

How do we want to leave, with what legacy, and how do we achieve that? The strategic review process will be instrumental in working out options and presenting them to the EEAS hierarchy and to Member States, and your involvement in this will be important.

## LINK INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTION


EU internal actions can have external effects on conflict and crisis situations. Equally, these situations, and our responses to them, can impact on internal EU matters. For example, EU maritime transport policy has a direct impact on Somalia and the Horn of Africa; in other situations the same may apply to fisheries or energy policy. Likewise, the emergence of organised crime, terrorism, or mass migration associated with violent conflict can have a direct impact on individual Member States.

The tragedy of 'Charlie Hebdo' and the growing problem of 'foreign fighters' again remind us that keeping 'internal' and 'external' apart is no longer sustainable. We need to remove the thick walls that have traditionally separated the various aspects of security: internal and external, defence and justice and home affairs, civil and military, and – in areas like cyber security – public and private.

This also requires a fundamental change in our mindset with regard to our missions and operations. And, flowing from this, we need to modernise our understanding of the capabilities we need.

## MAKE BETTER USE OF EU DELEGATIONS

The EU Delegation, supported by an EU Special Representative (EUSR) where appointed, is the focal point of the EU presence and should play a central role in delivering and coordinating action. Their role is pivotal in implementing the comprehensive approach. Their reinforcement, where necessary, with proper security and defence expertise is vital. During the development of detailed CSDP planning, the Delegation's relationship with the crisis management structures will be important.



The tragedy of “Charlie Hebdo” and the growing problem of “foreign fighters” again remind us that keeping “internal” and “external” security apart is no longer sustainable

Once launched, a CSDP mission/operation must maintain and foster close links with the relevant EUSR and EU Delegation. This will not impact on the chain of command, but it should impact on the ability to *deliver enduring effect*. In particular, options for transition may be fostered and enhanced by routine discussion with the EU Delegation.

unmeasurable. But we will ask them to assess, propose modifications, seek greater synergies with other instruments, and adapt. This is the best way, I believe, to ensure that they contribute directly to the desired end-state.

## CONCLUSION

So, what is new? The desire to align multiple lines of activity into a single coherent strategy is very much new. This will result in complex issues being tackled with a range of policy options, and complexity will impact on CSDP missions/operations. The certainties of military or civilian security planning may become less fixed, but conversely this may also allow adaptive and more clearly focussed CSDP activity. We will not ask our missions and operations to do everything, with mandates that are simply unachievable or



## 4.4. THE CHALLENGES OF CSDP COMMAND AND CONTROL

by Wolfgang Wosolsobe

### INTRODUCTION

The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) contain the range of tasks for potential CSDP operations and missions. The successful accomplishment of these tasks, further developed in five illustrative scenarios<sup>1</sup>, requires an appropriate Command and Control (C2) Structure. As the EU does not have a standing military C2 structure, tailored C2 arrangements are needed in order to ensure the successful planning and conduct of EU operations and missions. However, given the continuous development of EU military involvement, in particular through non-executive missions<sup>2</sup>, the current arrangements may need to be revisited to ensure they continue to meet the requirements.

Commander and will report to the PSC at regular intervals. The EU Military Staff (EUMS), being part of the EEAS, provides assistance in its supporting role to the EUMC/CEUMC. At the military level, the C2 arrangements for any operation are laid down on a case-by-case basis. In principle, the EU military chain of command encompasses three levels: Military Strategic (with the activation of an Operational Headquarters – OHQ), Operational (with the activation of a Force Headquarters – FHQ), and Tactical. In some cases (usually for non-executive missions), the Council might appoint an EU Mission Commander who performs the duties of both the Operation Commander and the Force Commander.

### CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES

#### A tailored command structure

The political control and strategic direction of any EU military operation or mission is exercised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative / Vice-President. The Chairman of the Military Committee (CEUMC) will act as a primary point of contact with the EU

#### Command options


Due to the fact that it does not have a standing command structure, the EU establishes the chain of command for EU-led military operations and missions on a case-by-case basis. This is achieved by:

- selection and activation of HQs listed in the Force Catalogue<sup>3</sup>;
- the activation of the EU Operations Centre (EU OPSCEN);

1 Assistance to Humanitarian Operations, Separation of Parties by Force, Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to third countries, Conflict Prevention and Evacuation Operations.

2 A non-executive mission supports the host nation in an advisory and / or training role. *A contrario*, an executive operation is mandated to conduct actions in place of the host nation.

3 France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom have listed an OHQ in the Force Catalogue. France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom have listed an FHQ in the Force Catalogue.



In principle, the EU military chain of command encompasses three levels: military strategic, operational and tactical.

- having recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities and utilising SHAPE as an OHQ under the Berlin+ arrangements.
- using other ad hoc national/multinational OHQs or MHQs tailored to the mission.

To this end, and regardless of the chosen command option, HQs have to be activated, reinforced by staff coming from different EU Member States (MS), and fully integrated in a command structure consisting of a mixture of permanent elements from the relevant HQ and augmentees.

### Augmentation process


Based on advance planning and in discussion with other potential EU HQs and EU bodies, a Member State indicates its willingness to provide an EU OHQ or an EU FHQ for a possible EU-led military operation. The final agreement on the chain of command is formalised by a Council Decision. The designated Parent HQ provides the Key Nucleus Staff of the EU OHQ which is reinforced by the activation of both national (from the Parent Nation) and multinational (from

Other MS) 'augmentees'. Augmentation by other EU MS is achieved using a list of pre-identified personnel (Primary Augmentee Database), and/or through a dedicated Manning Conference. This system is intended to allow the designated EU OHQ to achieve initial operational capacity (IOC) within 5 days.

## CONCEPT VERSUS REALITY

### Development of non-executive missions

Recent developments have witnessed the deployment of non-executive missions rather than the more traditional executive military operations. The command arrangements of these non-executive missions have involved the merging of the military strategic and the operational levels of command into a single Mission Command. The merging of these levels of Command requires the Mission Commander to divide his time and staff resources between the operational level command on his/her mission and the essential strategic level



Military command and control options

requirement to interact personally with Brussels-based stakeholders. As a consequence, the Mission Commander has limited capacity either to spend time in Brussels, interacting with other Brussels-based stakeholders (and thereby jeopardising the prospect of achieving a truly comprehensive approach), or to spend sufficient time in the mission area to maintain the desired level of interaction with local actors or to optimise his/her ability to command the mission. In this respect, the need to support the Mission Commander in areas like Force Generation or Financing has been identified as requiring further examination.

### Challenges presented by the non-permanent nature of EU HQs

The designation of an EU HQ to plan and conduct an operation takes place relatively late in the planning process. The handover of planning responsibility between the EEAS/EUMS (planning at political strategic level) and a newly activated OHQ (planning at military strategic

level) is a critical event in the planning timeline. However, the format in which this handover takes place still needs to be more clearly defined.

As previously mentioned, the activation of an EU HQ requires, among other things, the activation of pre-identified augmentees from MS to plan and conduct military operations<sup>4</sup>. However, the commitments of MS in the Primary Augmentee Database (the list of pre-identified augmentees) are in no way binding. As a result, there is always a doubt as to whether MS will honour their Primary Augmentee database commitments. In the event of an MS failing to meet its commitments, there may be a requirement to conduct a bespoke manning conference or the Parent Nation may have to fill the gaps. Furthermore, the Augmentee database (national and Primary Augmentee) historically tends not to fully address the manning requirements of an OHQ, with approximately 20 % of the posts remaining unfilled. If it is deemed necessary to address this shortfall, a bespoke manning conference might also be required.

In order for an EU HQ to be immediately

<sup>4</sup> The manning of a Mission Headquarters (non-executive missions) is addressed by means of dedicated manning conference(s).

effective on activation, the personnel manning it must be appropriately trained. Several courses are organised and proposed to Member States, and specific requirements are defined in the job descriptions of each post (e.g. knowledge of Operational Planning). However, as the proof of the pudding is in the eating, it is only when an HQ is activated that its effectiveness can be measured.

The EU has developed a lessons process and EU HQs gather on a regular basis as an HQ Community to harmonise work practices and to exchange views on issues of common concern. Nevertheless, the establishment and maintenance of a corporate memory remains a significant challenge, especially in the case of a non-executive mission which cannot rely on a permanent key nucleus staff to maintain its corporate memory. Even with an efficient lessons learned process, the risk of repeating the same mistakes cannot therefore be totally excluded.

## POSSIBLE WAY AHEAD

### Better support for Mission Commanders

As previously stated, the commanders of non-executive missions are stretched between their roles as strategic and operational commanders. Several possible ways of addressing this issue might be explored, such as:

- Strengthening the role of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) or establishing a coordination mechanism in Brussels;
- Using already activated OHQs to support new non-executive missions;
- Appointing one single Commander, based in Brussels, for all non-executive missions.

Of course, any proposal for changes in CSDP structure must be carefully assessed and discussed in order to gain support of all stakeholders, especially the Member States. The upcoming EEAS review might be an opportunity to address this issue.

### Further improving the knowledge of EU HQs and harmonising their work

Work is ongoing in the HQ Community to further develop an all-encompassing planning tool, covering all phases of planning across both the political strategic and military strategic levels, including detailed reflection on the critical hand-over of planning responsibility. Work has also started on further harmonising processes between and within HQs. Finally, EU HQs will be briefed on work ongoing in Brussels which could lead to the activation of an EU HQ.

## CONCLUSIONS

The appetite for the use of military CSDP instruments has not diminished in recent years; on the contrary, several new operations and missions have been launched. For military operations, the C2 challenges posed by the non-permanent nature of EU HQs have been addressed in a manner that is militarily adequate. However, for non-executive EU military missions, the challenges to effective and efficient Command and Control posed by current C2 arrangements are still a cause for some concern. The upcoming EEAS review could, and possibly should, be taken as an opportunity to address this issue.



## 4.5. MISSION DELIVERY

by Kenneth Deane

A number of factors have influenced the issue of mission delivery in recent years:

First of all, and as outlined in the chapter on civilian CSDP missions, these missions have considerably expanded in terms of mandate and geographic scope, in line with the evolving requirements of the EU's foreign policy and changing international realities. From the original police missions in the Balkans, they have evolved into more encompassing rule of law and security sector reform missions – see by way of example EUCAP Sahel Niger and Mali, EUCAP Nestor, EUPOL COPPS, EUAM Ukraine etc.

Their main added value compared to other EU instruments still stems from their recourse to officials in active service from across all 28 Member States, be they police officers, judges, border guards, customs officers or other law enforcement officials, as well as the tight political control and strategic direction the Brussels-based decision making structures are exercising in terms of the chain of command (see earlier chapter on this topic). These two distinct features make CSDP missions and operations a rather powerful tool that is much sought after, complementary to other EU tools.

This leads to the second main factor: the increasing awareness that all these tools are best applied if coordinated such that potential synergies and mutual support can be generated. This debate is not new; in fact, the 2003 crisis management procedures already addressed the issue

of comprehensiveness and cohesiveness. Yet the Lisbon Treaty opened new opportunities in this regard that both the European Commission and the EEAS are actively pursuing.

The EEAS for instance now takes part in the multi-annual financial planning of Commission external relations funds, and Commission services in turn are actively contributing to CSDP mission/operation planning. In the field, this is matched by regular contacts, information exchange and close coordination. Tangible results of this can be observed in many theatres already – see the many positive examples in other chapters of this Handbook of such concerted action ensuring a better outcome.

Linked to this is the discussion on 'sustainability', which is covered in detail in another chapter of this handbook. We came to realise that, whatever we do with whatever tool, it will not necessarily lead us anywhere in terms of effect, unless we ensure the necessary sustainability of our efforts. CSDP and other instruments are too costly and the stakes are too high in terms of regional stability and security to fail to make sure that our investments last. This requires foremost, as indicated by others, a detailed analysis of needs, risks and opportunities. The support activities, in our case CSDP, then have to be calibrated on that basis.

But it does not stop there: those responsible for the different instruments have to continue to coordinate amongst themselves the details of

their respective activities, and working arrangements must be identified and agreed where projects are linked. Most civilian CSDP missions, for instance, have a ‘project cell’ capability that allows missions to provide very limited amounts of equipment to the host countries if and when this directly pertains to the mission mandate and when considered conditional to effective mandate delivery. But as these cells are very limited, projects run by other instruments or bilateral actors could and should usefully complement these.

We have seen in the other Handbook contributions that such an approach is particularly relevant for missions in transition, when exiting a country. This is an area where some lessons are still being learned and conceptual work is being pursued.

The last main factor directly pertaining to mission delivery is the wish by Member States to see ‘value for money’ in times of shrinking public funding and increasing pressure on external and internal security. This has led those working within the CSDP structures in Brussels to revisit our processes and decision-making procedures, examining the way we set up our missions and how we plan, support and conduct them.

As a result of this, the revised crisis management procedures lead us – we believe – to more lean and efficient missions that are better planned, as the Head of Mission and Core team are on the ground when the CPCC develops the operational planning documents, CONOPS and OPLAN, but also, critically, the mission budget. This allows *inter alia* the Core team to sit down with the local authorities and other actors concerned to work towards more detailed, results-based planning that also ensures the necessary management of expectations and early identification of synergies.

The introduction of the notion of ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC) in civilian CSDP missions is a noteworthy new element in this regard: in fact, in accordance with the new crisis management procedures, a mission will only be ‘launched’ once it has reached the necessary capa-

bilities to pursue and fulfil its mandate. This is a very critical step in Member States’ recognition of the link between mission capability and delivery that was previously not as prominent.

As Civilian Operations Commander, I take due note and account of all these strands and evolving thinking. They lead me now to concentrate on two main issues as my own contribution to future effective mission delivery:

The first main effort relates to more effective planning, conduct and support of these missions. In essence, the 28 EU Member States give missions a budget and personnel with which to deliver on a set of agreed objectives and tasks. On this basis, Member States, host nations and partners rightly expect timely and sustainable effect on the ground. My role, together with the missions, and supported by the CPCC, is to make this happen.

With, as we have seen, public funding shrinking over the last few years whilst the number of crises worldwide has increased, we have to achieve that aim with fewer resources. This, plus a number of lessons learned from past experiences, has led us to introduce over time a number of measures that tighten for example the mission internal set up – see our guidelines on a standardised mission organisation that include also specific guidance on management principles.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the ‘comprehensive approach’ and search for synergies, we will more pro-actively engage with other EU actors and international partners to seek synergies. We continue to reinforce our coordination efforts so that we are certain that our actions do not duplicate what is already done by other donors, but rather add value and support national priorities and plans. In some cases, our initiatives are becoming a platform for other donors to invest in the security of our neighbours. The importance of partners advocating the same reform agendas and pooling efforts to achieve sustainable change cannot be understated.

We are also tightening up the force generation

1 ‘Guidelines to design civilian CSDP mission-specific organisational structures’ (11833/12 of 26 June 2012).

and selection procedures so as to help Member States better plan and prepare for their secondment of mission staff. The visiting experts concept<sup>2</sup> has already helped reach out to specialised staff who are increasingly needed in our ever more complex missions.

We will invest more in training with a view to increasing the number and quality of mission staff, who are particularly scarce in the field of civilian CSDP, as explained in the previous chapters.

Operational planning and mission set-up, too, have been considerably improved, not only by the aforementioned revised crisis management procedures, but also through the introduction of the benchmarking methodology that is addressed in an earlier chapter of this handbook, and also revised reporting procedures that the CPCC has issued in 2012.

Logistical and financing/procurement arrangements are constantly being reviewed and gradually rendered more suited to our needs. The warehouse has proved to be a step in the right direction. A Shared Service Centre is being conceived and financial provisions made more flexible.

Furthermore, I am working on a system of internal support review that will allow me to check at regular intervals whether a mission is fit for purpose. Such reviews will look at the operational, support and management functions within a mission which will allow me and the CPCC to address any shortfalls identified, as required.

Finally, the CPCC is currently finalising the impact assessment methodology that seeks to complement the benchmarking methodology

and help us, the services, to evaluate mission impact and effect. As said, we will be measured by delivery and so we ought to know, in the first place, our own perspective on this.

The second major focus of my work will be linked to the security of mission personnel, who operate increasingly in non-benign environments. Despite our already comparatively tight security provisions, we sadly saw, most recently, casualties among our personnel serving in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Djibouti.

I have since reinforced the security expertise within the CPCC and am reconsidering our current security arrangements and protocols. CSDP, by the nature of its purpose, operates in crisis areas. Not deploying at all is not an option. But we can, and have to, do everything in our power to ensure that we operate as safely as possible, even if the environment is not safe. This is another, in the true sense, vital element of mission effect and delivery.

This work requires not only continued procedural and material resources, but also political support and effective situational awareness. Working on this is a top priority at present.

Twelve years of Civilian CSDP in operation has seen many successes with real changes brought on the ground, but these years have also taught us what does not work.

The present Handbook puts together the whole cycle of policy, concepts, training, implementation, and lesson-learning. It clearly illustrates that we will only succeed if we adapt to ever new challenges. My task is to be ready to deliver in whatever circumstances, and I am confident that we, together, as the European Union, will achieve this.

<sup>2</sup> 'Guidelines on the use of Visiting Experts in the context of civilian CSDP Missions' (8551/12 of 4 April 2012).

# ANNEXES



## AUTHORS

(in alphabetic order)

**Lt. Col. Tomas Abrahamsson** has worked at the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as an action officer with responsibility for EU battlegroups since 2011. He started his military training in the Norrbotten Subarctic Infantry Regiment (19th) in Boden. He received his commission in 1985, after studies at the Military Academy in Umeå and Boden. He graduated from the War Academy, Infantry Combat School, in 1990. He graduated from Senior Staff College in 2005. In addition, Lt. Col. Abrahamsson underwent international EOD officer training in 1999. Lt. Col. Abrahamsson has his background in the Subarctic Infantry but in 1990 he transferred from the Army to the Air Force, where he became ground defence officer. His career has included several appointments within the Subarctic Infantry Brigade, from platoon leader to company commander, and he has held similar appointments in the Air Force. After his unit career he served as officer in command of current operations at Swedish International Command (Swedint) and as director of training at the Swedish EOD and Demining Centre (Swedec). Between 2007 and 2011 he was director of the Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) for Nordic Battlegroup 08 (stationed in the UK) and Nordic Battlegroup 11.

**Eldridge Adolfo** is a conflict and mediation adviser at the European External Action Service. Before joining the European Union, he was a conflict researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden, and worked as a conflict adviser at the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). With the UN, he worked on mediation and peacebuilding in several countries in Africa, as well as in Colombia, Georgia, Myanmar and Libya. He holds a master's

degree in politics and international relations from Stockholm University, and has published research on mediation and peacebuilding, peacebuilding in post-modern conflicts, regional security dynamics, and the conflict management challenges facing subregional organisations.

**Martin Albani** is a crisis response planner and project manager at the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI.2). He previously served as head of office for a foreign policy spokesperson at the European Parliament. Other postings include the Russia unit of the Commission's Directorate-General for External Affairs (RELEX), the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the German Federal Parliament and the German Permanent Representation to the United Nations in New York. He has studied international relations at Freie Universität Berlin, Sciences Po Paris and the London School of Economics (M.Sc.).

**Nina Antolovic Tovornik** works as a capability development planner at the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the European External Action Service. She graduated in politics and international relations in 2003 from the University of Ljubljana. She joined the police service in the same year, where she worked in Interpol Section until she was posted for four years as a delegate of the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) to the Permanent Representation of Slovenia to the EU. She joined CMPD in September 2013.

**Lt. Col. Bastian Bail** has worked for the German Ministry of Defence. Currently, he is seconded to the European External Action Service/European Union Military Staff in Brussels. His

previous posts included planner for missions and training and development at the headquarters of the German Joint Medical Services. He has been deployed to missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Mali. He holds a number of doctor's degrees and medical specialisations. His publications focus on medical and military-medical issues.

**Dr Christian Behrmann** is attorney-at-law and policy officer in the Managing Directorate for Global and Multilateral Issues of the European External Action Service. Before joining the diplomatic service, Dr Behrmann practised law privately, at the EU institutions and at the United Nations. He holds a Ph.D. in public international law and lectures at the University of Leuven.

**Prof. Sven Biscop** is director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels and teaches at Ghent University and at the College of Europe in Bruges. He is a member of the Executive Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).

**Helena Bogusławska** is deputy head of division in charge of relations with partner countries on the common security and defence policy (CSDP) in the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the European External Action Service. She previously worked as an action officer in the Planning and Policy Unit of the European Defence Agency (2005-2007) and as first secretary and defence adviser to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassador at the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU (2003-2005). Before moving to Brussels she worked as a Polish civil servant at the Ministry of Defence for seven years. From 2000 to 2003 she headed a European Security and Defence Policy Unit within the Defence Policy Department. She graduated from Warsaw University's Institute for Applied Linguistics. She speaks Polish, English, French, German and Russian.

**Luigi Bruno**, Brigadier of Carabinieri (reserve), is a planner at the European External Action Service /Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). His professional expertise combines 15 years of law enforcement at managerial level with 15 years of international crisis management, having served with the UN, NATO and the EU. He holds three bachelor's degrees: in politics, internal and external security, and international and diplomatic studies. He has drafted a number of major doctrinal documents adopted by the Council in the field of civilian common security and defence policy (CSDP).

**Dr Anne-Marie Buzatu** is Deputy Head of the Operations IV Division (Public-Private Partnerships) at the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Before coming to DCAF, Ms. Buzatu practiced human rights law and worked with human rights and humanitarian organisations on rule of law and human rights issues. A member of the Texas Bar, she began her career working in private international commercial law. She holds a Bachelors of Arts from the University of Texas in Austin, a Juris Doctor in international law from a joint program with Tulane University and Paris II Panthéon-Assass, and an LLM in international humanitarian and human rights law from the Académie de droit humanitaire et droits humains in Geneva, Switzerland.

**Andrew Byrne** is currently Head of the Political Affairs, Press and Information Section at the EU Delegation in Norway. He worked in the Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments Division of the European External Action Service. In previous posts, he was the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN at the European Commission's Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna, and Deputy Permanent Representative at the European Commission's Delegation to the UN Organisations in Rome. Prior to those postings, Mr Byrne worked on transatlantic relations (in particular, agricultural trade aspects) at

the European Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX).

**Giovanni Cremonini** is in charge of lessons learnt at the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the European External Action Service and chairs the CSDP Lessons Working Group. A permanent EU official, in the course of his career he has been posted to the EU Delegations in Russia and in China and has helped coordinate the European neighbourhood policy. He completed his military service in Italy's Alpini mountain troops. He holds degrees in Greek and Latin Classics from Milan Catholic University, in international relations from the London School of Economics and in public sector management from Brussels' Solvay Business School.

**Cdr. Vincenzo De Benedictis** is an Italian navy officer who has worked in the Concept and Capability Directorate of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) since August 2012. His areas of work include China and South-East Asia, maritime security, human rights, gender, women, peace and security, and mass atrocity prevention. He drafted the EUMS concept on the protection of civilians in EU-led military operations. His previous experiences include: (a) command of two Italian military ships, (b) work at NATO (Supreme Allied Command Transformation – Norfolk, VA, USA) in the field of education and training, where he directed the production of joint functional area training guides and (c) team leader, for five years, of the national contributions to both the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and the EU Capability Development Process (CDP), at the Italian Defence General Staff in Rome.

**Kenneth Deane** was appointed EU Civilian Operations Commander and Director of the EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in June 2013. Previous to his current position he was appointed Head of Mission of the Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) on 1 July 2012.

From June 2007 to November 2008, Mr Deane performed the roles of Deputy and Acting Head of Mission in the European Union Police Reform Programme in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), before becoming Head of Operations in the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) Directorate of the European External Action Service. Mr Deane further performed the role of Acting Chief of Staff/Deputy Civilian Operations Commander between May 2010 and September 2011. In 2004, Mr Deane undertook a six-month secondment with the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Basra, Southern Iraq, where he was a senior police adviser to the British Consulate General and mentor to the province's Iraqi Chief of Police. In early 2005 he again assisted the FCO in developing anti-terrorist and public order policing in Macedonia. From June 2006 to June 2007 he was chief police adviser to the British Ambassador in Kabul, which included a six-month spell in Helmand Province and working alongside the Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in assisting US policy development in respect of Afghan national police reform. He joined the Royal Ulster Constabulary in October 1980 and served in a variety of operational, training and staffing roles from Constable to Assistant Chief Constable rank. Mr Deane holds an honours degree in public policy and management from the University of Ulster and a post graduate certificate in education from Canterbury Christ Church University, Kent.

**Kinga Devenyi** holds a permanent position as a training officer at the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) in Finland, a governmental institution and a centre of expertise in civilian crisis management. Currently she is seconded to the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and is stationed at its headquarters in Brussels. Previously she has worked at Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Interior, as well as the EU Monitoring

Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). She holds a master's degree in international relations and a bachelor's degree in business studies.

**Maj. Vicente Díaz de Villegas** works as the information operations subject matter expert in the Current Operations/Crisis Response Planning Branch of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). He graduated from the general staff course at the Spanish Armed Forces Centre for Superior Studies (CESEDEN) and his previous appointment was in the Spanish Armed Forces Joint Operational Command (MOPS). He has an operational background with deployments in the Multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR), twice in Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during Operation Amber Fox, in Iraq during operation Iraqi Freedom and in Lebanon for UNIFIL.

**Lt. Col. Jerónimo Domínguez Barbero** is currently serving as a seconded national expert to the European External Action Service in Brussels, where he is employed as an action officer in the EUMS Concepts Branch with responsibility for EU military rapid response. He has been dealing with CSDP concepts since 2012. He commenced his military career in 1988. Commissioned as an air force officer (fighter pilot), he has served as fighter instructor (23rd Wing, Talavera AB 1990-1993), fighter pilot (151 Sqn, Zaragoza AB 1993-2000), staff officer (Spanish Air Combat Command 2001-2002, 2003-2004), Tactical Leadership Programme (TLP) instructor (Florennes AB 2001-2003), squadron commander (122 Sqn, Torrejón AB 2004-2008) and group commander (23rd Wing, Talavera AB 2009-2012). He attended the ESDP Foundation Training in Potsdam (2007). He also attended the Collège Interarmées de la Défense (CID) in Paris (2008-2009) where he was certified as a management, command and strategy defence expert, and followed the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East studies. He contributed to the Spanish Air force *Catedra Kindelán* seminar (2010) for the development of air concepts and doctrine in operations.

**Simon Duke D.Phil.** is a professor at the European Institute of Public Administration, a senior research fellow at Maastricht University, adjunct fellow at the Federal Executive Institute (Virginia) and co-editor of the *Journal of European Integration*. He has written extensively on EU external actions and security issues. He is also actively involved in designing and providing training programmes for the European External Action Service.

**Maria Fihl** works at the European External Action Service, in the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (Conduct of Operations Division), where she has been working on the daily conduct of European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), and lately the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), since 2011. Previously she worked for 11 years in the Balkans, with assignments such as donor in post-conflict areas, working with the UN, the International Civilian Office contributing to establishing the independence of Kosovo, the EU Special Representative, as well as founding a school – the International Learning Group – in Kosovo.

**Dr Florika Fink-Hooijer** has spent most of her career at the European Commission working on external policy matters, and in particular on crisis management and conflict prevention. She is currently the Director for Strategy, Policy and International Cooperation at the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. Previously she was head of the private office of Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva, who was responsible for humanitarian aid, international cooperation and crisis response. At the Commission, Dr Fink-Hooijer set up the managerial and financial structures for the common foreign and security policy and crisis management and has been directly involved in initiating numerous EU police, rule of law and protection missions in third countries. Her professional experience



includes the design and management of various conflict-prevention schemes such as instruments to counter the financing of terrorism, as well as the EU's sanctions management in general. She has also negotiated for the EU in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to curb the trade in blood diamonds and has been responsible for EU relations with Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. At the Secretariat-General of the Commission, she has gained in-depth experience in external policy coordination, having advised Commissioners Monika Wulf-Mathies and Frits Bolkestein as a member of their private offices on EU external policies at large as well as justice and home affairs/internal market matters. Dr Fink-Hooijer is German. She is a lawyer by training having specialised in intellectual property rights and public international law/foreign policy affairs.

**Mercedes García Pérez** is the Head of the Operations Division of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the body of the European External Action Service in charge of the planning and conduct of civilian CSDP operations under the responsibility of the Civilian Operations Commander. Prior to occupying her current position, she was the Head of the Europe Section of the CPCC, and worked as a member of the planning and methodology section of the CPCC. Ms García has been an EU official since 2003, and has also worked on development and West Africa issues. A lawyer by training, from 1998 to 2002 she worked as a practising attorney in EU law in Brussels. Until 2011, Ms García was a Member of the Academic Council of the Institut Supérieur de Management Public et Politique. She holds a master's degree in European studies from the College of Europe in Bruges and university degrees in law and in Spanish language and literature.

**Emanuele Giaufret** is currently the Head of Division for Democracy and Electoral Observation at the European External Action Service. He previously worked on North Africa and the Middle East at the European External Action Service

headquarters in Brussels. He has served at the EU Delegation to the United Nations in New York and in Israel. He previously worked at the European Commission's Directorate General for External Relations, where he was in charge of election observation. Before joining the EU, Mr Giaufret worked at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Mr Giaufret has a PhD in the history of international relations from the University of Florence and a master's in European affairs from the College of Europe in Bruges.

**Galia Glume** works in the EU's Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels, as a reporting officer for the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). Previously she was seconded by Belgium to EUMM Georgia. Between 2004 and 2011 she worked as an assistant and researcher in the field of international relations at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL). She is an expert member of the Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix (University of Montreal) and associate researcher at the Centre d'étude des crises et des conflits internationaux (CECRI-UCL). She holds a master's degree in international relations (UCL) and a BA in applied communication and journalism (IHECS).

**Eva Gross Ph.D.** works as a senior analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) where she covers CSDP, the Western Balkans, India and AfPak. Prior to joining the EUISS Ms Gross was a fellow at the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung in Berlin, where she worked on a project on Germany in Europe; and senior research fellow at the Institute for European Studies (IES) at the Free University of Brussels.

**Canan Gündüz** is a mediation adviser at the European External Action Service. Before joining the EU, she helped set up the European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue in 2011, where she acted as CEO, partner and board member. She is a qualified mediator, and brings a background of institutional advisory work to

private- and public-sector clients on policies and operations in conflict-affected countries, as well as peacebuilding work in South and South-East Asia. Over the last four years, she has worked on several EU mediation support assignments, including in Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia. Ms Gündüz holds a BA in modern European studies from University College London, a master of science degree in development studies from the London School of Economics, and an MA in mediation from the European University Viadrina. She has published extensively on peacebuilding, conflict analysis and mediation.

**Marcus Houben D.Phil.** works for the European External Action Service as head of the support team for the EU 2014 Chairmanship of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Mr Houben combines strong academic credentials with operational experience as a military officer. Previous assignments include the strategic planning for the regional maritime capacity-building mission EUCAP Nestor.

**Gabor Iklódy** took up his duties as director of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the European External Action Service in June 2014. Until September 2013, Mr Iklódy had served as NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. He joined the NATO International Staff after 27 years of national public service. Before taking up his post at NATO, he worked as political director and state secretary in charge of multilateral and security issues in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and helped prepare his country for its first EU presidency in the first half of 2011. Prior to that, Mr Iklódy served two four-year terms in Scandinavia as Ambassador, first in Norway (1999-2003) and later in Sweden (2005-2009). In Budapest, he was Director General for European Political Cooperation when Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 and headed the Foreign Ministry's NATO and WEU Department when Hungary prepared for and joined the NATO in 1999. His assign-

ments abroad also included working in Vienna at the Hungarian CSCE/OSCE Mission following the fall of the Berlin Wall. He was part of the team that negotiated and implemented the CFE treaty.

**Joëlle Jenny** is Director for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention at the European External Action Service. Prior to joining the European External Action Service she worked successively as a Swiss and a British diplomat, covering international security issues, non-proliferation/arms control, and conflict prevention and peace building, including at the UN. She has worked extensively in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories, and held postings in New York, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. She holds a master's degree in international security from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston, USA.

**Dr Arnold Kammel** is Director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES). He studied law, European studies and politics in Graz, Vienna and Alcalá de Henares (Madrid). His research and publications focus on European foreign, security and defence policy from a legal and political point of view.

**Radek Khol** currently works in the Democracy and Election Observation Division of the European External Action Service. He worked at the Institute of International Relations, Prague, from 1996 until 2006 (including as head of its Centre for Security Analysis from 2001). Since 2006 he has worked in the crisis management structures of the EU institutions, most recently in the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate of the European External Action Service. He graduated from Department of War Studies at King's College London and from Department of International Relations, Charles University Prague. He widely published on CSDP, EU civilian crisis management, NATO enlargement, security policies, civil-military relations and missile defence.

**Morten Knudsen** is a senior policy officer at the European External Action Service. Since 2013 he has worked in the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), in the division for concepts, lessons learned and capacity development. Previously he worked for the European External Action Service's Multilateral Division, and before that for the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Before joining the European Union in 1997, he was a teacher of politics and French language and literature. He has written articles on EU-UN cooperation, international humanitarian law and the European security strategy.

**Dr Sari Kouvo** is a policy officer focusing on human rights and gender at the Partnership Division of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the European External Action Service in Brussels. Prior to joining CMPD, Ms Kouvo served as co-director for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), a field-based policy research organisation focusing on politics and security in Afghanistan and its region. Sari has also worked in several international human rights organisations and taught human rights related subjects at universities in Belgium, Sweden and the UK. She holds an associate professorship and a doctoral degree in international law from Gothenburg University and has published extensively on gender, human rights and Afghanistan.

**Jozef Kozlowski Ph.D.** currently works for the Polish Ministry of National Defence in Warsaw. From 2011 until 2014 he was seconded to the European External Action Service/European Union Military Staff in Brussels. He holds an M.Sc. degree in electronics from the Military Technical University in Warsaw and a Ph.D. in social sciences from the Warsaw's National Defence University. His publications focus on issues of management in the information environment of national and international security/defence structures.

**Prof. Michel Liégeois** teaches international relations, geopolitics and security studies at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL, Belgium). He is also head of the European branch of the research network on peace operations (ROP). His research and publishing activities focus on peace operations and the use of force, the regional dimension of peacekeeping as well as UN security council issues.

**Fredrik Lindblom** is a seconded national maritime expert at the European External Action Service/CPCC. He previously served as country team leader for EUCAP Nestor (a civilian CSDP mission with a focus on maritime security capacity building in the Horn of Africa) in the Seychelles and as liaison officer for the same mission in Tanzania. His position in Sweden is Chief of Staff for the Swedish Coast Guard Air Surveillance Division and he was formerly the Head of Surveillance and Control at the Headquarters of the Swedish Coast Guard. Other earlier postings has been as site commander and project manager for Sweden's contribution to EUNAVFOR's operation ATALANTA and responsibility for Sweden's contribution to different missions within FRONTEX. Mr Lindblom has university degrees in seamanship and maritime security, senior maritime engineering and civilian basic law. He has also has a degree as a law enforcement officer within the coast guard and police structures in Sweden.

**Dr Gustav Lindstrom** is the Head of the Emerging Security Challenges Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Previously, he headed the GCSP's Euro-Atlantic Security Programme and was the Director of the European Training Course. Dr Lindstrom received his doctorate in Policy Analysis from the RAND Graduate School and an MA in international policy studies from Stanford University. Prior to his time at the GCSP, Dr Lindstrom served as a senior research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). His areas of interest and exper-

tise include the European common security and defence policy (CSDP), emerging security challenges, non-proliferation and disarmament, and cyber security.

**Snowy Lintern** has over 25 years professional experience in military operations and crisis management, including service in Iraq and Afghanistan, warship command, and six years at the political strategic level in the EU. Currently he works for the European External Action Service/Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in Brussels. He has developed and written extensively on transition strategies in an EU/CSDP context, ensuring policy development is coherent with the aspirations of other EU Institutions and Member States. He holds two master's degrees in widely differing fields: international relations (King's College London) and applied oceanography (University of Plymouth).

**Birgit Loeser** has been an EU official since 2001. She is currently Deputy Head of Division/Head of the Planning and Methodology Section within the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) of the European External Action Service, in charge of leading all planning efforts for civilian CSDP missions. Before this, she was the CPCC's acting Head of Operations Unit and Head of the Africa Section. Before the setting-up of the CPCC, she was a member of the Police Unit of the former DGE9/EU Council Secretariat. She also worked in DGE8 on military ESDP operations. From 2005 to 2006 she was seconded to the UK Ministry of Defence where she worked on UK policy and defence relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. Before becoming an EU official, Ms Loeser worked for five years in the Political Affairs Division of the Western European Union (WEU). Ms Loeser holds a master's degree in politics from both the Freie Universität Berlin and the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris.

**Michał Narojek** worked for the Polish Ministry of the Interior. He was seconded to Poland's Permanent Representation to the EU where he served as Justice and Home Affairs Counsellor. He also served as a national seconded expert in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In 2010 he joined Europol. He is responsible for the Agency's external relations, including cooperation with the European External Action Service. He holds master's degrees in law and international relations. He is an alumnus of the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies and of the European Security and Defence College.

**José-Miguel Palacios** (ES) has been head of the Analysis Division at the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service in Brussels since September 2011. He joined the EU Situation Centre (renamed EU INTCEN in 2012), which was part of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, as an analyst in 2006. He previously worked for the Spanish government from 1986 in several analytical roles. Mr Palacios holds a Ph.D. in politics and is the author of 'Transición democrática postcomunista: democratización y estatalidad en la Unión Soviética y en Yugoslavia' (Post-Communist democratic transition: democratisation and statehood in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia) (2003). He is fluent in English, French, Russian and Serbian (Croatian, Bosnian).

**Annemarie Peen Rodt Ph.D.** is Associate Professor in Global Studies at Roskilde University in Denmark. Her research appraises the role of regional actors like the European Union in conflict prevention, management and resolution, currently focusing in particular on the protection of civilians, the responsibility to protect, and the prevention of mass atrocities. Her recent monograph, 'The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success', published by Routledge in



2014, proposes measures for benchmarking and impact assessment with regard to CSDP missions and operations.

**Col. Michael Pesendorfer** is the Austrian Defence Attaché to Bosnia and Herzegovina and a career officer. After graduation from the Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt he served as a platoon leader, company commander and chief of staff in an elite mountain battalion of the Austrian Armed Forces. After he finished his law studies at Salzburg University he joined the Army Higher Administrative and Legal Service. He served in the European Union Military Staff in Brussels, in EU civil missions and in several EU and NATO military operations as legal adviser as well as political adviser to the commander.

**Sofie Rafrafi** works as an independent senior consultant in sustainable capacity building activities in the broad area of civilian crisis management. Previously, from 2013-2014 she was seconded by Belgium for two years to the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission, as the head of the Sustainability Policies Unit of the Operations Department. Between 2005 and 2012 she worked for the Egmont Institute, spending five of those years as a senior training programme manager. She has been the President of the Belgian Euro-Atlantic Youth association. She won the prize of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with her thesis and holds a master's degree from the VUB in International Relations.

**Giovanni Ramunno** is a colonel in the Italian Army Aviation where he worked as a helicopter pilot and a press officer. Currently, he is seconded to the European Union Military Committee in Brussels as a military assistant to the Chairman for Public Information/Relations. Giovanni has gained a broad operational experience as a military officer in more than ten years spent abroad working for the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN. In 1998 he was accredited to the Italian Embassy in Belgrade and started the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. His

previous posts included press officer in Iraq and the Balkans. Previously he was Chief of the Air Staff at UNIFIL mission in Lebanon and chief of the press office of EUFOR Althea. He is also a journalist.

**Dr Jochen Rehrl** formerly worked for the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Currently, he is seconded to the European External Action Service/European Security and Defence College in Brussels. His previous posts include political adviser both in Vienna and Brussels. He holds three master's degrees – in economics, international relations and journalism – from the Universities of Salzburg and Vienna and from the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. His publications focus on foreign and security policy from a legal and political point of view.

**Victor Reuter** is spokesperson of the Head of Mission in EUAM Ukraine. Previously, he worked in various media related positions both in missions and capitals. He was 'directeur d'antenne' of RTL Tele Lëtzebuerg, director of ELDORADIO and journalist for the Belgian Press Agency BELGA and RTL radio. He studied journalism and communication.

**Wolfgang Röhrig** is the Programme Manager Cyber Defence of the European Defence Agency (EDA). After completing the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg as MBA he served in several officer positions in the German Navy and Joint Services. Since the mid 1990's he was specialised in communications and information systems. In March 2012 he joined the EDA and became programme manager for cyber defence on the beginning of 2014. Inter alia he is responsible for the identification of cyber defence capability gaps and the development and implementation of solutions.

**Lt. Col. Jean-Philippe Scherer** is Branch Chief in the European Union Operations Centre. He is an active officer in the French Air Force. As a fighter

pilot, he was engaged in major operations in the Middle East, Africa and Central Europe. He has been a flight commander, an evaluator at NATO, experimental test pilot for Rafale and chief of air sensors operations. A War College graduate, he holds a Master of Business Administration (HEC Paris) and an engineering degree in Aeronautics and Space Systems (IS AE-SUPAERO).

**Lt. Col. Evert-Jan Sloodman MD Dr M.Sc.** works for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. Currently, he is seconded, as a medical expert, to the European External Action Service/European Union Military Staff in Brussels. His previous posts included Medical Coordination and Plans Officer and Medical Operations Officer at NATO – SHAPE, Belgium. He holds a master's degree in community medicine and epidemiology. His publications focus on applied research on preventive measures for deployed military personnel.

**Kees Smit Sibinga** has been on a secondment as senior policy officer to the Security Policy and Sanctions Division of the European External Action Service since 2011. He previously worked in various positions at the Dutch Foreign Ministry and Embassies abroad, including as deputy Head of Mission. Mr Smit Sibinga holds a degree in modern history and international law from Leiden University, the Netherlands.

**Raluca Stefanuc** works as anti-corruption policy desk at the European Commission's Support Group for Ukraine. Previously, she was the coordinator of anti-corruption policies within Directorate-General Home Affairs of the European Commission between December 2010 and March 2014. Prior to this, Raluca Stefanuc had worked for two years in the EU Delegation in Skopje, covering the fields of fight against corruption and organised crime. Before taking up the assignment in the EU Delegation in Skopje, she had worked for five years in the Romanian Ministry of Justice, dealing with issues related to judiciary reforms

and fight against corruption. Raluca Stefanuc holds an LL M in European law from King's College London.

**Petteri Taitto** is training manager at the ESDC with the responsibility to lead CSDP mission and operation support and cooperation with other civilian training stakeholders. He has previously worked as project leader and head of training at the Crisis Management Centre Finland, principal instructor at the Emergency Services College and teacher at the National Defence College. He is EU Civil Protection coordination expert and a member of EU Civilian Response Team (CRT). He holds a Master of Education and a General Staff Officer degree.

**Col. Paul van der Heijden** is currently the Chief of the Force Capability Branch of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). He is a colonel of the Royal Netherlands Air Force and has served in several national and international positions, most recently in the Netherlands Air Force HQ as Acting Chief of Cabinet and as Head of Management Development. He was also military assistant to the NATO Secretary General and NATO's Military Liaison Officer to the United Nations in New York. Amongst other assignments he was Commander of the Netherlands Air Force Training and Military Leadership Squadron and he served as a UN military observer.

**Victoria Walker** is the deputy head of DCAF's International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), where she has worked extensively on security and justice development in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South East Asia. Her previous EU experience includes the EU planning team for EULEX Kosovo, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and the EU Monitoring Mission in Albania. She also held a commission in the British Army. Victoria holds master's degrees in Development Management and Social Sciences.

**Dr Richard Winkelhofer** is a rule of law adviser in the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the European External Action Service. He holds a master's degree in Business Administration and a Doctorate degree in Law. He has been working in the Austrian judiciary from 1995, starting full-time practice as a judge in 2000. From 2008 to 2010 he served for the Rule of Law mission EULEX Kosovo, as the President of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters. Prior to joining the European External Action Service in 2014, he was then Head of the Justice Department in the Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU.

**Lt. Gen. Wolfgang Wosolobe** started his military career in 1974. After several assignments as an infantry officer he attended the General Staff Officers Course of the Austrian Armed Forces (1982-1985) followed by a post as defence planner. He completed his education at France's 'École Supérieure de Guerre Interarmées' and the 'Cours Supérieur Interarmées'. In 1991, he joined the Austrian Diplomatic Mission in Geneva as a military adviser on disarmament. His international career continued with his assignment as Defence Attaché to France from 1992 to 1997. After a command period he went on to deal with military policy, which led him to the post of Defence Policy Director in 2006. From there, he joined Brussels as Austrian Military Representative in 2007. In 2012, he was elected to the post of Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as of 28 May 2013.

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A</b>		<b>C</b>	
ACO	Allied Command Operations	C2	Command and Control
ACT	Allied Command Transformation	C34	Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations
ADL	Advanced Distance Learning	CA	Comprehensive approach
AFD	French Development Agency	CAR	Central African Republic
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali	CARICOM	Caribbean Community
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command	CB	Confidence-Building
AIES	Austria Institute for European and Security Policy	CBCR	Country-by-country reporting
AMA	Agreement on Movement and Access	CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
AMANI-Africa	EU training and exercise programme supporting the African Union's capacity to manage and deploy the African Standby Forces	CCS	Capability Codes and Statements
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan	CTC	Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (EU)
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia	CDIP	Concept Development Implementation Programme
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission	CDP	Capability Development Plan
APIC	Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court	CEPOL	European Police College
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture	CERT	Computer Emergency Response Team
APT	Advanced Persistent Threat	CEUMC	Chairman of the Military Committee
ARF	Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations	CfC	Call for Contribution
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ASPR	Austria Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution	CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
AU	African Union	CIVCAS	Civilian Casualties
		CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
		CivOpsCdr	Civilian Operations Commander
		CLS	Combat Life Support
		CMC	Crisis Management Concept
		CMO	Crisis Management Operation
		CMP	Crisis Management Procedures
		CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
		CNO	Computer Network Operations
		CP	Conflict Prevention
BG	Battle Group	CoC	Code of Conduct
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	CoE	Council of Europe
BP	Barcelona Process	CoE	Centre of Excellence
		Col	Colonel
		COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
		CONOPS	Concept of Operations







**H**

HA	Humanitarian assistance
HEAT	Hostile Environment Awareness Training
HEST	Hostile Environment Security Training
HLC	High Level Course
HLG	Headline Goal
HN	Host Nation
HoA	Horn of Africa
HoD	Head of Delegation
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
HRVP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission
HR	Human Resources
HR	Human Rights
HTF	Headline Goal Task Force

**I**

IACA	International Anti-Corruption Academy
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICoC	International Code of Conduct
ICoCA	International Code of Conduct Association (for private security service providers)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IcSP	Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDL	Internet-based Distance Learning
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
InfoOps	Information Operations
INFORM	Index for Risk Management (European Commission)

INTERPOL	International Police Organisation
IO	International Organisation
IOC	Initial Operational Capacity
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
IRB	Interim Response Programme
ISA	Intelligence Support Architecture
ISB	Intelligence Steering Board
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
IST	Information Strategy Team
IT	Information Technology
IWG	Intelligence Working Group

**J**

JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JOA	Joint Operation Area
JRC	Joint Research Centre
JSCM	Joint Strategic Coordination Mechanism
JSR	Joint Special Representative
JSSR	Justice & Security Sector Reform

**K**

KLE	Key Leader Engagement
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**L**

LAS	League of the Arab States
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LSTO	Locally-recruited Short Term Observer
LtCol	Lieutenant Colonel
LtGen	Lieutenant General

**M**

Mag. iur.	Master of Law
MD	Managing Directorate
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MHQ	Mission Headquarters
MIEDA	Mine and IED awareness





SDPU	Strategy, Development and Planning Unit
SEA	Single European Act
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIAC	Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity
SIENA	Secure Information Exchange Network Application
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOPF	Separation of Parties by Force
SOR	Statement of Requirements
SOCTA	Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU)
SR	Stabilisation and Reconstruction
SR	Special Representative
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STRATCOM	Strategic Communication
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
Stuxnet	computer worm (found in 2010)

**T**

TAIEX	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TE-SAT	Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
THW	German Federal Agency for Technical Relief
TIC	Toxic Industrial Chemicals
TNI	Indonesian National Armed Forces
ToA	Transfer of Authority
TRM	Transitional results matrices

**U**

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCAC	UN Convention against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNO	United Nations Organisation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UoF	Use of Force
US(A)	United States (of America)
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command

**V**

VP	Vice President of the European Commission
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**W**

WIO	Western Indian Ocean
WKC	Watch-Keeping Capability
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction





ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4