

The United States and decolonization, 1945-1949

The 17th of August, 1945, two days after the Japanese capitulation, the nationalist movement in Indonesia unilaterally declared the Republic of Indonesia to be independent. Hardly three weeks later on the third of September, 1945, French sovereignty was no longer acknowledged by Vietnamese nationalists, who proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The nationalist revolutions had much in common: 1) since the nineteenth century, both countries had experienced a long period of colonial rule, exploitation and foreign administration; 2) a revolutionary intellectual elite and mobilized parts of the peasant force were the basis of both nationalist revolutions; and 3) both had experienced military and moral defeat of the colonial powers and a period of Japanese occupation.

Also similar were French and Dutch reactions: they did not accept the '*fait accompli*', but instead increased the military pressure on the radical nationalist movements and created moderate alternatives, which were ready to collaborate with the European powers. French and Dutch policies were both clear failures. (1)

The U.S. faced the dilemma of how to reconcile its ideological, economic and political interests in decolonization with its interests in not antagonizing the European powers and in containing communism. A policy paper on South East Asian conditions and on U.S. objectives and policies, formulated in June 1945, states that:

...a problem for the U.S. is to harmonize its policies in regard to two objectives: increased political freedom for the Far-East and the maintenance of the

unity of the leading United Nations in meeting the problem (2).

With regard to the Indonesian independence struggle, the American government pointed out in 1949 :

...that the use of force (by the Dutch) in this situation makes the solution far more complex and difficult. The Republican movement of Indonesia represents the largest single political factor. The Republic has a two-fold nature: first it is a political entity; secondly it is the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter attribute cannot be eliminated by any amount of military force... Real peace in Indonesia can be expected only if there is a settlement of the political issues. (3)

This evaluation had already in 1948 led the U.S. to take an Indonesian pro-nationalist stand and to put great diplomatic and economic pressure on the Netherlands to make further concessions to Indonesian nationalism. A similar evaluation could have been made in the case of Vietnam. And yet, the Truman Administration decided at the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950 to support the French colonial "solution", recognizing the ineffective Bao Dai regime and aiding the French financially in their military effort against the Vietminh. Why did the U.S. not make the same evaluation in the case of Vietnam as in the case of Indonesia?

The period during 1949-50 was one of great change; it required a rapid reformulation of policy on the part of the U.S. in answer to rapidly changing situations. The broad and, to a large extent, still valid, concept of world order with its security and ideological aspects was formulated in this period. The United States' "rise to globalism" was a direct consequence of the Second World War. Intervention on a global scale was potentially possible and involvement was dictated by an expanded interpretation of security. The Truman Doctrine identified the physical security of the U.S. with the security of the whole non-communist world, saying:

This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect oppression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. (4)

Several theories have been put forward to explain the U.S.' attitude towards decolonization and its involvement in the third

world after the Second World War in general: whether stressing the ideological aspect (U.S. defense of a pluralist society), the security aspect (involvement can be explained in terms of containment or balance of power), or the economic interest (the U.S. has to maintain an international order of dependent relations to safeguard American corporate profits). (5)

None of these factors can be considered as all-explanatory. The form that U.S. involvement took in actual situations can only be explained by an analysis of specific conditions. This justifies and necessitates an empirical comparative approach. To test whether and why ideology, security or economic interests were decisive in the formation of policy in these cases is of an explanatory character, which transcends the case studies and the time limitations - it says something about the contradictions and determinants of American foreign policy in general.

This study compares the cases of Vietnam and Indonesia; they are well comparable in regard to geography and time period. The diverging policies of the U.S. toward the two cases asks for a satisfactory explanation. The aim of the analysis is thus to determine under what incentives American policy developed toward the Indonesian and Vietnamese issues, and to link the development of American foreign policy towards the specific cases to developments internationally, i.e. the deepening of the cold war. How did anti-colonialism as a U.S. commitment and source of political conduct develop in the period 1945-1949?

The beginning of Colonial conflicts in Indonesia and Vietnam and U.S. policies of non-involvement, 1945-1947

Roosevelt's death and the fact that Truman became president had important ramifications for American foreign policy. Roosevelt had failed to create a solid institutional base for his policies. Many leading figures within the Administration and the State Department did not share his specific preoccupation with anti-colonialism nor his optimism concerning the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war (6). The results of this change were reinforced by the fact that they occurred at a historical "watershed" in American foreign policy. The Second World War affected power politics to an unforeseeable degree. Changes of such magnitude had not occurred since the Napoleonic wars.

The change of President and the shift in objective conditions had their effect on the U.S. position on two major issues: anti-colonialism and U.S.-Soviet relations.

Roosevelt himself had been the strongest protagonist of anti-colonialism and trusteeship plans for French Indochina. Truman did not attach such a personal significance to anti-colonialism. Apart from this, it should be noted that anti-colonialism was largely a U.S. response to pre-world war preoccupations. After the War it seemed possible to secure economic "open door" policies without an absolute termination of colonialism. As far as the British Empire was concerned, decolonization took place at a much quicker pace than expected. War had weakened the power of France and the Netherlands to such an extent that it did not seem to be in the interest of stability to impair their position any further by insisting on anti-colonialist policies.(7)

Roosevelt's failure to provide an institutional base for his policies, possibly out of confidence that he could steer events himself, also had serious consequences for American relations with the Soviet Union.

His concept of a postwar world was based on leadership of the U.S. and on a cooperation between the superpowers. He believed the U.S. could deal with the Soviet Union as a traditional world power. Therefore the U.S. should be prepared to accommodate Russia's security interests. Yalta was based on a recognition of these needs and, hence, the division of Europe in spheres of influence was agreed upon. Roosevelt's pragmatism as far as relations with the Soviet Union were concerned went together with his idealism concerning the U.N. and anti-colonialism.(8)

The Truman Administration developed a concept of Soviet politics that was much more "ideologized": one would never be able to cooperate with the Soviet Union on friendly terms since it was the absolute anti-model of American society. Soviet totalitarianism translated itself into an aggressive foreign policy, and the division of the world in spheres of influence was immoral and objectionable. At a time when U.S. foreign policy was undergoing a general reappraisal, the State War Navy Coordinating Committee asked the State Department for a clarification of the American position on Indochina.

In April, May, and June of 1945, a discussion with the State Department took place which would be decisive for the next few years. The tone was set by the following arguments, expressed in an early stage in a report by the Office of Strategic Services: (1) the Soviet Union had become the strongest nation in Europe and Asia and might be expansionist; (2) the United States should check the spread of Russian control and influence; (3) first priority of the U.S. should be the creation of a European

American bloc; (4) more specifically, France should be restored as a "great power". The report linked the recovery of European nations to the maintenance of European empires in Asia, saying that the U.S. encouraged the European powers to liberate their rule thereby helping to check "Soviet influence in the stimulation of colonial revolt". (9) This is an old theme. The interest of the U.S. is to promote evolutionary development toward stable democratic societies in the Third World, cooperating in an international concert with the West. The report went further, arguing that it was not in the interest of the U.S. to

champion schemes of international trusteeship which may provoke unrest and result in colonial desintegration, and may at the same time alienate us from the European states whose help we need to balance the Soviet power. (10)

The need to formulate a new policy toward the Far East triggered a vehement discussion within the State Department, particularly between the Office of European Affairs and the Far Eastern Offices. The so-called Europeanists argued that the "negative" policy the Roosevelt administration had followed on Indochina had aroused French suspicions and severely damaged American relations with France. Asianists, mostly from the Division of S.E. Asian Affairs, warned against French restoration in Indochina, since the refusal of France to make significant concessions to Indochinese nationalism could provoke a blood bath which would imperil the stability of S.E. Asia or even stimulate a Pan Asiatic movement directed against Western powers.

The Asianists did not have a different assessment of the final aims of American foreign policy, namely a stable S.E. Asia and an evolutionary development, but they differed in opinion on the way to secure these aims: the U.S. should not retreat too much from its anti-colonialist commitment and should use its influence on the French and the Dutch to a maximum to make them follow a more liberal policy. To these Asianists, preoccupied with the nationalists' demands in the Far East and identifying themselves more with the Roosevelt tradition of self determination, it did not seem right to sacrifice Indochinese demands to acquire French support elsewhere in the world. Originally a compromise was worked out which required from the French a full statement of their intentions for Indochina and would specifically inquire as to their plans for self rule and the treatment of foreign commerce.

However, some developments made the policy shift more toward the Europeanist point of view, i.e. an unconditional support of the French and

their restoration in Indochina and only vague declarations of the desirability of a reformist policy to be followed in Indochina. At the U.N. conference in San Francisco, French support was needed, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bidault, made clear to his American colleague, Stettenius, that he dismissed American condemnations of French colonialism and that although France had "no intention to place Indochina under the trusteeship system" they had committed themselves to give the Indochinese people greater participation in their government. (11)

By April 4th, 1945, actions taken by the French Resistance in Indochina against the Japanese were supported by American air forces in China, contrary to the original American policy. James Dunn, a senior official of the European division declared to Bidault that "no official policy statement of this government has ever questioned even by implication French sovereignty over Indochina" This was regarded as an official statement of policy. In exchange for the recognition of French claims, the U.S. did not ask for any explicit reforms concerning Indochina; French cooperation was considered to be more important than colonial reform. (12)

A third step in American policy changes with regard to the issue was the inclusion of French forces in SEAC; although of little practical implication because of the limited size of French forces, it was to the French of extreme importance to strengthen their claim on Indochina. When De Gaulle asked Truman in May 1945 for French military participation in the liberation of Indochina, Truman expressed his appreciation of France's offer of assistance and his general approval to French military association with the U.S. in that theater, making an implementation only dependent on the approval of the military authorities. (13)

Before the end of the war against Japan, a policy paper was formulated, June 22, 1945, on the conditions in Japanese occupied territories and the objectives and policies of the U.S. The opening words are somehow symbolic for the American position and eventual intervention and involvement in the following years:

When V day comes in the Far East and the Pacific, it will be the result in largest measure of the military might and sacrifices of the U.S. In return the American people ask for a reasonable assurance of peace and security in this great area and economic welfare. (14)

Explicitly the paper describes the basic dilemma of U.S. policy in the decolonization of Indonesia and Indochina, which is that of harmonizing

its policies with regard to two objectives: increased political freedom for the Far East, and the maintenance of the unity of the leading United Nations in meeting this problem. The U.S. should uphold the principles stated in the Atlantic Charter, but at the same time "avoid any course of action which could seriously impair the unity of the major United Nations". (15)

Regarding Indochina, the policy paper anticipated serious difficulties for the French to restore order; the independence sentiment was believed to be increasingly strong in the area. The paper noted that the French showed little intention of giving the Indochinese self-government and that nevertheless an increased measure of self-government would seem essential if the Indochinese are to be reconciled to continued French control.(16) In contrast to the difficulties expected between the French and the Indochinese, the policy paper did not expect serious difficulties with the restoration of the Dutch rule in Indonesia:

At the conclusion of the war there will probably be a generally quiescent period in the relations between the Dutch and the native population of the Netherlandse East Indies...The great mass of the natives will welcome the expulsion of the Japanese and the return of the Dutch to control. Only in some areas, as in sections of Sumatra, will the Dutch face a difficult problem because of anti-Dutch sentiment and the shortage of Dutch manpower. (17)

The Indonesian independence movement was seriously underestimated. The State Department paper expected a political discussion on reforms to take place among The Hague, The Dutch in the East Indies, and the Indonesians. Such a discussion, however, was expected not to arise until the Imperial Constitutional Conference, which was promised by the Dutch Government. From this, it was anticipated that Indonesia would emerge with essentially a dominion status in the Dutch Commonwealth.

A few elements are of particular interest in this policy paper: (1) the emphasis on Western cooperation--not only would an obstruction of European policies in the East prevent an effective cooperation with these countries in Europe, but their presence in the Far East is now re-evaluated as a source of relative stability; (2) independence or the right of self-determination is not mentioned anymore--one speaks about "the opportunity for dependent communities to achieve an increasing measure of self-government", an objective vague enough to receive approval by the French

and the Dutch; and (3) the U.S. policy recommended is one of non-intervention in the affairs of both Indonesia and Indochina. (18)

In the context of this shift in policy, one should look at the military decisions taken at Potsdam. The area of Indonesia and Vietnam were originally under American command, and would be liberated by American troops. At Potsdam the decision was taken that British forces under Lord Mountbatten would be responsible for the liberation and occupation of Indonesia. Indochina was to be occupied by British troops below the 16th. parallel, while Chinese troops would occupy the northern part of the country. (19) Moreover, U.S. military endorsed formally French military participation in the war against Japan and agreed that French troops would best be employed in Indochina. An American liberation in Indochina would have created serious problems for the U.S., which had the dilemma of maintaining positive relations with both the French and the Indochinese each having diverging goals. (20) Thus, in the spring of 1945 the basis was laid for American policy to be followed with respect to the Indonesian and Indochinese issues in the immediate postwar period. Finally, the Truman Administration agreed upon the recognition of French sovereignty over Indochina, a liberation and occupation by British and Chinese troops, instead of by Americans, and an U.S. policy of non-intervention.

U.S. foreign policy in 1945 was marked by changes in objective conditions as well as by personnel changes, which explain a gradual shift from anti-colonialism as a political preoccupation toward a strong preoccupation with the economic and political recovery of Europe. The creation of a strong Western Europe, made up of viable democratic states which would form a buffer against the Soviet Union, became one of the most important objectives of American foreign policy, if not the most important one. Support of Europe was considered to be indivisible in the sense that one could not build up a strong Western Europe and at the same time challenge its aspirations elsewhere in the world. It is remarkable that this concept as a premise of foreign policy was hardly ever seriously disputed. (21) This led the U.S. to abide with French and Dutch colonial aspirations in S.E. Asia. These were "merely" of a restorative nature, aimed at continuing to perform the role of the colonial power they had played before the war in the area, at restoring their influence, and at reimposing their rule. Apart from the economic, political and strategic interests France and Holland had in restoring their empires, these issues had a strong psychological and moral aspect. Having been defeated in World War II, France and Holland felt a

strong need to recover their self confidence and prestige. For France, conscious of a glorious past and sensitive about its international prestige, this argument was unquestionably more important than for the Netherlands.(22) Morally, colonialism had always been defended with the argument that a task had to be completed, and after the war this was interpreted as leading to a moral responsibility toward Asian subjects to participate in the shaping of their societies. It would be immoral not to bear these responsibilities and to "abandon" the colonial possession.

France's position was crucial in a Europe which had to be restored after World War II. This was an essential leverage France had versus the U.S. It was De Gaulle's achievement to exploit this leverage to a maximum. At a time when France was relatively weak and dependent on the U.S. for its military and economic supplies, it did not have as a consequence a proportional dependence in terms of foreign policy.(23) Independence for France was not only an aim in itself, but it was a means to maximize its bearing on international politics and to use its leverage fully. The French-Soviet treaty concluded in December 1944 was in this sense an extraordinary piece of "realpolitik", as were French political and military tactics at Val d'Aosta and Stuttgart in the spring of 1945. (24)

The Gaullist experience did not remain an isolate one, since it succeeded in rallying political opinion around a basic consensus on French foreign policy. As Grosser describes it:

...l'essentiel de l'heritage gaulliste, c'est la volonte de refaire de la France une des grandes puissances mondiales et de lui assurer une independence sourcilieuse a l'egard des autres grands. (25)

France's aspirations to pursue an independent foreign policy frequently challenged American policies, but there were some strong motivations on the side of the U.S. not to obstruct them. (26) The domestic political constellation in France increased France's leverage with the U.S. The French Communists came out of the war as the biggest party; at the elections of 1945 they received more than 25% of the votes. Moreover, the party had one million members and the significant support of the labour union, the CGT and its five and a half million members. It was traditionally the best organized party and had an enormous prestige at the end of the war because of its role in the resistance. Some writers, such as Elgey, describe the situation in 1945 as a revolutionary one. According to them only three elements kept the Communists from launching a revolution: the presence of

American troops, the fact that part of the PCF's sympathizers would not support a revolution, and the fact that Moscow did not want a revolution to take place in France, but rather preferred a popular front alternative. (27) According to Elgey, France counted only two real forces at the beginning of 1946: the Communist Party and General de Gaulle. De Gaulle would some years later declare in a rather dramatic way: "J'avais les mains nues, et cependant, j'ai empêché la dictature communiste de s'établir dans le pays" (28)

Taking into account that the Socialist Party in France, the SFIO, and the Catholic MRP each had a few less seats in the Assembly than the communists, the strength of the Communists in 1945-46 should not be exaggerated. With the formation of a tripartite government, the Communists, as the biggest party, asked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, or Defence. De Gaulle refused to allow the PCF to occupy any of these ministries, arguing that this would not conform to France's nonaligned foreign policy. De Gaulle got his way, remarkably enough, and the Communists entered the government receiving only part of the Defence Ministry. (29)

The fact remains that the PCF was a major force in France in 1945-46. Its strength immediately increased the leverage the parties had vis-a-vis the U.S. In Washington it also increased the awareness of the possible consequences which American policy might have on France's internal political constellation. A policy which would obstruct France's imperial aspirations would risk causing a swing in French public opinion away from those parties that had aligned themselves with Washington. The State Department feared that any active involvement by the U.S. would result in resentment by the French public, which would favour the Communist Party. This fear was expressed by some influential State Department officials, discussing a U.S. offer of "good offices". They worried that such an offer might have added to the difficulties of the present French government and would be seized upon by the French Communists as a means of embarrassing the government. In addition: "We noted that the French press is now harping upon the danger of 'foreign intervention' in Indochina". (30) In general the PCF kept a low profile on the issue of Indochina in order not to alienate domestic opinion and to remain an acceptable coalition partner.

Apart from the general concern about keeping good relations with its European allies, this factor meant a further restraint on U.S. political behaviour. A neutralist policy toward Indonesian and Indochinese colonial conflicts seemed best to serve contradictory American interests. Ideally,

a liberal reformist policy by the French and the Dutch and a moderate stand by the nationalist movements would lead to successful negotiations that would lead, in turn, to a solution, analogous to the Philippines model. The Truman Administration perceived its interests to the best served in the region not by an absolute termination of colonial rule, but by the cooperation between Europeans and Asians within a commonwealth framework. Such a settlement would ensure the maintenance of Western influence, which was perceived to be a factor of stability. Moreover, keeping an economic stake in S.E. Asia would buttress Europe's economic recovery.

Some major differences existed between the Vietnamese and Indonesian cases. The communist tendencies of the Vietminh distinguish this movement from the Indonesian nationalist movement. Continuous third party involvement strongly linked to a relative military and political weakness of Holland, as opposed to France, marked the Indonesian case. This was at the root of a development towards internationalization that would prove to be essential for the success of the Indonesian decolonization. Involvement of Britain would lead eventually to an internationalization of the Indonesian issue in a U.N. context. In the international arena the Republic of Indonesia had acquired strong support among Arab countries, India and Australia. This was an aspect of some importance in the trend towards internationalization. In glaring contrast, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam failed to attain international status and the Indochinese issue remained an exclusive French concern.

These developments may be essential to understanding diverging developments; This should not prevent us from observing that the Vietnamese and Indonesian revolutions were structurally similar. Primarily nationalist, they had strong social overtones. In terms of the roots of the revolution and the dynamics of the struggles, as well as the role of the French and the Dutch, both issues are comparable. (31) In the context of the dynamics of decolonization--that is to say, focusing on the relation between colonial power and colonized people,-the communist character of the Vietminh was not a structural element that distinguished the Vietnamese from the Indonesian case. The radical demands of the Vietminh were reason why France could not come to an agreement with the Vietminh, not the communist inclination of the movement. The communist character of the Vietminh was, however, an element which increased the leverage of France vis-a-vis the U.S.

U.S. diplomatic correspondence shows that American policymakers were already concerned in 1945-46 about the question of the extent to which

Vietnamese nationalists were leftists, communists or Moscow marionettes. Acheson reminded Abbot Kow Moffat, director of the S.E. Asian Office, who went on a mission to Vietnam in December 1946, of

Ho's clear record as an agent of international communism, the confused political situation in France and the support Ho was receiving from the French Communist Party. (32)

This concern on the part of the State Department led Gabriel Kolko to argue that U.S. policymakers were already in 1945-46 repelled by the communist character of the Vietminh and that this, in fact, assured American support for the French restoration in Indochina. Whatever the merits of Kolko's main thesis (according to Kolko, the capitalist system dictated an opposition to the left on a global scale), the material discussed above concerning American involvement in the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases does not provide sufficient evidence for his argument that it was the American perception of the communist nature of the Vietminh which determined U.S. policies towards Vietnam in this period. (33) In spite of the fact that the Republic movement in Indonesia was not communist-dominated, American policy did not actively oppose Dutch colonial policies of restoration. The reason for this was that cooperation with the Netherlands and European recovery in general was considered to be a first objective of American foreign policy in the period 1945-46. Because of the importance of France, this factor must have counted even more heavily in defining American foreign policy towards Vietnam. The priority given to European cooperation determined American foreign policy towards both disputes in these years, at least as much as did the perception of the nationalist movements in Indonesia and Vietnam. (34)

Looking at the development of both issues and the role of the respective actors in the conflicts, the period 1945-46 is distinguished from the subsequent period 1947-48 with respect to the intensity of the conflict. The French and the Dutch had not yet engaged in a full scale war with the Vietnamese and the Indonesians, and negotiations were going on in 1945-46. In December 1946, war broke out between France and the Vietminh, and in July 1947, war broke out between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republicans. These events opened a new phase in the conflicts, marked by growing resentment and radicalizing tendencies, which impaired the possibilities of reaching a true solution. During the years 1945 and 1946 the Vietminh seems to have been not yet as radicalized in political terms as it would become in later years. Internationally, tensions were increasing over this period, but the

situation would deteriorate seriously in 1947. The U.S.' attitude towards the Vietminh in 1945-46 was an ambiguous and an especially exploratory one. In short, the positions were not yet fixed.(35) This period was marked by a certain "fluidity", which offered potentially many opportunities to reach a compromise. Because of its power, the U.S. could have played an important role in reaching such compromises. It was prevented from doing so, due to the fact that it was preoccupied with European recovery and underestimated the importance of the developments in S.E. Asia. This led to a policy of non-involvement in respect to the conflicts. The U.S. could have tried to establish a harmonious relationship with the principal forces of Indonesian and Vietnamese nationalism. It did not, and consequently the movements became more polarized. This leads to the conclusion that in the period 1945-46 propitious opportunities were missed by American foreign policy.

Voices of dissent, including that of John Carter Vincent, who was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, were heard but did not lead to a more active U.S. role in Indochina. Whether U.S. involvement would have been able to give a decisive turn to events is difficult to determine. Yet it is alluring to think of the possible consequences of implementation of Vincent's September 1945 recommendation to Acheson. This suggested an international investigatory commission and negotiations involving the U.S., Britain, China, France and the Vietnamese concerning the Indochinese issue. It would have been meant an attempt to internationalize negotiations and could possibly have prevented the internationalization of war, which would take place only three years later.

Towards involvement in a period of polarization, 1947-1949

The international situation and the internal Indonesian and Vietnamese situations underwent drastic changes in the period 1945-49. Internally there was a tendency towards polarization and radicalization, which seriously impeded the chances for a peaceful solution between the European powers and the revolutionary movements in the colonies. Internationally, relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly. Within the U.S. the foreign policy debate centered on the policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, while Europe remained the main theatre of superpower contest. Looking at Asian developments from an American perspective one should remember that the years 1947-48 were heavily dominated by the beginning of the Marshall Plan and NATO, the crises in Greece, Turkey in 1946, Czechoslovakia and Berlin in 1948.

Because of the "primacy of Europe", policymakers were inclined to underestimate developments in S.E. Asia and subordinated S.E. Asian policies to American objectives in Europe. Policies concerning Indonesia and Vietnam were in general dealt with by mild-level officials in the State Department, who received occasional guidelines from Secretary of State Marshall and his successor Acheson. (36) Within American foreign policy, emphasis remained largely on Europe until communists took power in China and war broke out in Korea. As is well known, these events led to an outcry of public opinion and to focusing of political attention on Asia. A relative shift in American foreign policy from a preoccupation with European affairs to more global concerns in the period 1947-49 anticipated the major political swing in 1949-50.

Another factor was the evolution of American geopolitical thinking, and the U.S.' concept of security in particular. These underwent basic modifications just after the war until they merged into a relatively clearly defined concept of national security at the end of the forties. Europe as a security concern of the U.S. was the main motivation behind the Truman Doctrine, but the commitments the Doctrine made had global implications.(37) Every local crisis was linked to Soviet strategy and was perceived as a potential challenge in an East-West context. U.S. national security postulated the interrelatedness of so many different political, economic and military factors that developments half-way around the globe were seen to have an automatic and direct impact on America's core interests. The increased sense of insecurity in the U.S. was the result of a rapidly changing world situation in which the U.S. underwent a rapid transition from a relative isolationist posture to major international involvement. The experience of German and Japanese aggression seemed to dictate a policy of firmness and inspired the domino theory, which, applied to Asia, assumed that the acceptance of a communist Vietnam would inevitably lead to a further expansion of communism in S.E. Asia. Acceptance of a communist regime in Vietnam was in principle objectionable because it was interpreted as yielding to foreign aggression, and politically and economically it would be a blow to American interests.

U.S. policies between 1947-49 demonstrated, however, that the Administration was aware of the limited means it had at its disposal to respond to these challenges. A direct military intervention in China was avoided because the U.S. government acknowledged its resources to be limited. A policy Planning Staff paper, completed in June 1947, noted that

the extent of the calls on this country is so great in relation to our resources that we could not contemplate assistance to others on any universal basis, even if this were desirable.

A beginning would have to be made somewhere and the best place for a beginning is obviously in Europe. (38)

Within Asia, Indonesia and Indochina were clearly considered to be of secondary importance to the U.S., after Japan and China.

In basic trends Dutch and French colonial politics were similar. On to one hand, both powers negotiated with and exerted political and military pressure on the radical nationalist movements, which they faced while, on the other hand, they attempted to set up moderate nationalist movements as alternatives. Looking at the colonial powers' attitudes towards the radical nationalist movements, we discern two approaches. One approach, recognizing in the Vietminh and the Republic the strongest forces of nationalism, favored negotiations. The argument was that a long-term settlement would only be possible by reaching an agreement with these movements. The second approach aimed at the exclusion of the radical movements and at negotiation with moderate nationalists. It also intended to destroy the radicals, both military and politically.

The hard line prevailed in Indochina when on December 7th, 1947, France signed a first agreement with Bao Dai and instructed Bollaert, its High Representative, a few weeks later

to carry on, outside the Ho government, all activities and negotiations necessary for the restoration of peace and freedom in the Vietnamese countries. (39)

France would no longer seek a settlement by negotiating with Ho Chi Minh.

Internationalization was the primary factor distinguishing developments in the Netherlands East Indies from those in French Indochina. Although the Good Offices Committee could not prevent the Dutch from launching a second military action against the republic in December 1948, internationalization was among the main reasons why the Netherlands had finally to capitulate politically. A defiance of the opinions of the G.O.C. and the U.S. backfired on the Dutch in the spring of 1949 when they found themselves totally isolated and partially cut off from Marshall aid. Relinquishing its hard line and returning to a policy of negotiation was effectively imposed on the Dutch. (40)

Internationalization as a constraining factor was absent in the case of

French Indochina. Mediation could have led to serious negotiations between the French and the Vietminh, possibly to reforms and to more moderate stand on the part of the latter. This would have meant "pacification through internationalization" as happened in Indonesia. (Had there been no internationalization, the Dutch probably would have tried to crush the Republic in 1947, with consequences analogous to those in Vietnam; that is, a deepening guerilla war, a puppet regime, and a radicalization of the nationalist movement.) It is difficult to say what could have been the effects of mediation and pacification on the ideological and political position of the Vietminh. Differences existed between the political and ideological leanings of the Vietminh and the Republic of Indonesia, and whether the mediation of a third party could have helped moderate the political position of the Vietnamese nationalists remains open to speculation.

Potentially the U.S. was in a position in 1947-49 to play a decisive role in developments in S.E. Asia. The actors in the Indonesian and Vietnamese colonial conflicts were aware of this. (41) The U.S. did not prevent France from implementing hard line policies during the period 1947-49 and eventually support a French colonial solution that was based on the exclusion of the main force of nationalism. It obstructed similar Dutch policies. This seeming contradiction justifies asking the question whether American policies vis-a-vis Indonesia and Vietnam were consistent.

Arguments may be for both responses. First, we consider the negative answer, based on the judgment that the U.S. drew different conclusions out of similar observations made in Indonesia and Vietnam. In the Indonesian case the American Government correctly pointed out that:

...the use of force (by the Dutch) in this situation makes the solution far more complex and difficult. The Republic of Indonesia represents the largest single political factor...The Republic has a two-fold nature. First it is a political entity; secondly it is at the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter attribute can not be eliminated by any amount of military force...Real peace in Indonesia can be expected only if there is a settlement of the political issues. (42)

U.S. policy makers might well have arrived at similar conclusions in the case of Vietnam. They (implicitly) admitted as much in granting that the Vietminh was the strongest force of nationalism and French Bao Dai policies were a factor of uncertain outcome. Yet by 1948-49 the Truman Administration

had concluded that the Vietminh was to be excluded as a negotiating partner and reluctantly prepared the ground for a more active support in favour of the unrepresentative and ineffective Bao Dai regime. (43)

Whether inconsistency can be imputed to American foreign policy in South East Asia depends upon one's perspective. Atlantic cooperation and the political and economic recovery of Europe were such high foreign policy priorities for the U.S. that it is difficult to overestimate these factors in shaping American foreign policy in S.E. Asia.

Regarding Indonesia, an American policy paper of September, 1948, stated explicitly that the U.S.:

immediate interest in maintaining in power a friendly French government to assist in the furtherance of our aims in Europe had taken precedence over active steps looking toward the realization of our objectives in Indochina. (44)

Concerning Indonesia Marshall stressed in June, 1948, that it had been and still was the aim of the U.S. to

permit the Netherlands to regain and rehabilitate its economic interests in the Netherlands East Indies as well as to provide stability as a requisite to the resumption of normal international trade, which incidentally would facilitate the U.S. program for E.R.P.. (45)

Concerning this, it could be concluded that the "European factor" was a strong component determining the U.S.' attitude towards both colonial issues.

A U.S. perception of the political and ideological character of the nationalist movements in 1947-48 led, in the case of French Indochina, to the "non-acceptance" in principle of the Vietminh, and, in the case of Indonesia, to the "acceptance" in principle of the Republic as a party to deal with. On the other hand, an evaluation of French and Dutch colonial politics had led the U.S. to reject these in general as anachronistic, as playing into the hands of communism and consequently damaging the U.S. interests.

Internationalization of the Indonesian issue had forced the U.S. to leave its policy of non-involvement towards the conflict in 1947, but it was replaced by a strict American neutrality. They gave up this policy of neutrality only in the summer of 1948. The immediate incentive for this policy shift was the threat presented by a polarization within the Indonesian Republic and a communist revolution against the moderate leadership. The perception of an acute communist threat and the belief that an eventual

independent Indonesian state, dominated by the Republic, would be a reliable force for the U.S. in political and economic terms, led the U.S. to support the Republic more actively and to increase its pressure on the Netherlands in the fall of 1948 and in 1949. Moreover, the administration agreed that the realization of its secondary objective, namely, the maintenance of Dutch economic influence in Indonesia, was not necessarily irreconcilable with the establishment of an independent Indonesia led by the Republic (46).

U.S. non-involvement policies towards Indochina, as formulated in 1945, remained basically unchanged in the period 1947-48. Yet objective conditions had changed quite drastically: after December, 1946, French and Vietnamese were involved in a full scale war, and a year later the French abandoned negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. Perceived to be caught between a communist Vietminh and anachronistic French colonial policies, the Administration concluded in 1947 that it had simply "no solution to offer" to the issue. (47) The importance of the developments in U.S. foreign policy in 1947-48 vis-a-vis Indochina was not the U.S. formal political and economic support for the French Bao Dai policies--this support would come only in 1949-- but rather the gradual development of perceptions which prepared the ground for such support. Most important was the assessment that a Vietminh dominated state would pose unacceptable risks for U.S. national security, in spite of indications that such a state would not necessarily become totalitarian and aligned with Moscow.

A non-acceptance of Ho Chi Minh inevitably led the U.S. to follow French colonial policies. In spite of its efforts not to become identified with European colonial rule, the U.S. accepted the essence of Paris' colonial policies, when it accepted the Bao Dai solution and the exclusion of Ho Chi Minh. 1949 was a critical year in the political development of the Vietminh. The movement radicalized drastically: Communists strengthened their control over non-communists groups, laid international links with Chinese communists and declared openly their allegiance to international communism. (48) Recognition by the Soviet Union of the Vietminh as the lawful Vietnamese government in January, 1949, was followed by a recognition on the side of the U.S. of the Bao Dai regime. (49) In endorsing policies which attempted to isolate Ho Chi Minh, and to circumvent him politically, the U.S. made the same mistake the French had made but with more serious consequences.

The U.S. could have attempted to exert a moderating influence on the

Vietminh by imposing mediation and policies of negotiation upon the French. At least this might have resulted in the establishment of good relations between the U.S. and the Vietminh.

A complex of many factors determined U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the decolonization issues of Vietnam and Indonesia: local developments in the specific cases, the importance given to cooperation with France and Holland, realities and perceptions of the nationalist movements. At the same time, U.S. perceptions of local developments were heavily influenced by external realities. First, political developments in the rest of Asia strengthened trends within the U.S. favouring more vigorous anti-communist policies in Asia. Communist uprisings in S.E. Asia in 1948 gave impetus to a shift in American policy in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. As far as American policies towards Vietnam were concerned, "the fall of China" by late 1949 provided momentum for the movement towards early unconditional recognition of the Bao Dai government.

The victory of communists in the Chinese civil war intensified American concern with S.E. Asia. U.S. credibility seemed to be at stake and plans were drawn up to bolster Western governments in Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and Indochina.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Seen in this light, American policies were consistent, even though they led to seemingly contradictory results.

A second "external" element, although of another nature, was the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the resulting formulation of a new U.S. national security concept. When the Truman Administration turned its attention towards S.E. Asia in 1948-49, it was in its perceptions (of the regional developments) seriously biased by the notions it had of Soviet politics and international communism. A cold war frame of mind prevented politicians from looking at the particular contexts of Vietnamese and Indonesian developments. They were inclined to look at Vietnam in 1948-49 as if it were another Prague or Greece. Indian Prime Minister Nehru denounced such an attitude when he spoke in October, 1949, with Acheson about Indochina. The French experiment in Indochina with Bao Dai was hopeless and doomed to failure, according to Nehru, and the only feasible solution was the Vietminh. True enough, Ho Chi Minh was a communist, but "to believe that the communists would use a popular-front government to liquidate their opponents was, he thought, to misapply Eastern European experience to Asian countries".⁽⁵¹⁾ Acheson was not convinced and continued to draw European analogies:

As the experiences of both France and Italy showed, the

attempt to take over would be inevitable and the outcome would depend on the strength of the other side. With the leadership of the nationalist movement already in Ho's hands, the outcome in Indochina would seem pretty clear. (52)

Conclusion

After the war the U.S. found itself entrenched in strategic commitments all over the world. Some Americans were eager to take up international responsibilities to safeguard their ideological, political, and economic interests. The U.S. attempted to establish a new world order. Politically this meant a stable and peaceful world order; economically, capitalism and antiprotectionism; and ideologically, the realization of Wilsonian ideals, i.e. a pluralist democratic environment. In the first place it was challenged in this by the Soviet Union rather than by European colonial powers. (53)

The paradoxical result of global involvement and the perception of Soviet policies was an increased sense of security on the side of the U.S. (54) In the context of these general political developments one should look at the evolution of American ideological commitments, from an anticolonialist into a primarily anticommunist one.

Analysis of American foreign policy towards Vietnam and Indonesia shows more than anything else how much these issues were interconnected in American foreign policy with policies in other parts of the world. The best example of this interconnection is probably the priority given to the build-up of a strong Western European nucleus capable of resisting internal and external threats to its stability, as a factor determining U.S. policies towards Vietnam and Indonesia.

"Primacy of Europe" led to a U.S. policy of "non-involvement" in S.E. Asia. "Non-involvement" was not an indication that the U.S. did not pay attention to S.E. Asian developments, but rather that S.E. Asia as a region was peripheral and rated low among American geographic priorities. (The Netherlands were even rated higher than Indonesia as a strategic area). American perceptions and evaluations evolved under the influence of local developments on the one hand and were a reflection of U.S. general political thinking on the other hand.

A perception of the Indonesian nationalist movement led the U.S. to believe that the Republican leadership was a Western oriented elite which was not communist and could possibly provide political and economic

stability in the area. In Vietnam such an elite was not available. The Vietminh was Western oriented in the sense that from an Asian perspective it looked to the West, including Moscow, and that its leadership had studied in Europe. It was not Western oriented in the sense that it was ideologically liberal-democratic; it was communist dominated.

The U.S. considered in 1947 the possibility of an independent Vietnam led by the Vietminh. Basing its policies on the worst possible outcome, that it is that such a Vietnamese state would become a satellite of Moscow, the U.S. decided that the Vietminh should be excluded from negotiations. (55) Acceptance of the opinion of a Vietminh dominated state was irreconcilable with the expanded notion the Truman Administration had developed of U.S. national security. The Truman Doctrine had identified the physical security of the U.S. with the security of the whole non-communist world. According to Gaddis, the Doctrine was an example of traditional European "balance of power" politics rather than an initiation of a global containment of communism. The rhetoric served largely to ensure Congressional support for U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey. Gaddis maintains that only events around the Korean War in 1950 would lead to global containment policies by the Truman Administration. (57)

It is true the Doctrine did not lead to a direct shift in American foreign policy vis-a-vis Indonesia and Vietnam. A change in American foreign policy towards the Dutch Indonesian issue took place only in the summer of 1948, and it was a direct consequence of an internal communist threat in Indonesia. The perception of this threat was reinforced by communist revolts in the rest of S.E. Asia in 1948.

In Vietnam the threat that the Vietminh posed to the U.S. national security was not perceived to be large enough to bring about an active American support for the French war effort against them in 1947-48. This leads Gaddis to argue that "the Administration's policies suggest that it did not view the world communist movement as a monolith between 1947 and 1950". (58) I would maintain, however, that the way the Administration viewed the Vietminh, namely as promoting the interest of Moscow and international communism, offers evidence against Gaddis' thesis because this view tends towards a vision of the communist threat as monolithic and of world wide dimensions.

A complex of three factors marked U.S. policy towards the Vietnamese issue during the period 1947-49. First, U.S. perceptions of the Vietminh were based on the worst possible scenario, namely that direct links existed

between the Vietminh and Moscow. Second, the U.S. contributed to Soviet policies in the area aggressive intentions and a high degree of consistency. (59) Third, national security was interpreted in a globalist way. These factors together dictated the exclusion of the Vietminh and led eventually under escalated circumstances to an active U.S. involvement against this nationalist movement.

American observers would later maintain that the strength of the Vietminh was in large measure due to the French failure to transfer real powers to an alternative government under Bao Dai. The argument made was that vigorous reformist French policies would have allowed Bao Dai to build up a strong anticommunist force of nationalism, drawing away support from Ho Chi Minh. The assumption that it would be possible to draw support away from Ho was an unrealistic one. Non-implementation of liberal reforms was only a secondary reason explaining the strength of Vietminh, since that movement had manifested itself already in 1945-1946 as the strongest force of nationalism. In the case of Indonesia, anticolonialism and anticommunism, as ideological commitments, comfortably fused in a U.S. policy of political support for the Republic of Indonesia. It was more difficult to reconcile anticolonialism and anticommunism in U.S. policies versus Vietnam.

While the U.S. saw that Sukarno's Republic was the pivotal actor in Indonesian nationalism and noted that the Vietminh played much the same role in Vietnam, it did not draw the same conclusions out of such similar observations. In Vietnam it refused to admit that only a political agreement with those who held power would allow the realization of a long term settlement. Policies which excluded the Vietminh were at the roots of American policies in the fifties, namely "to refuse the country to the communists". Refusing Vietnam to the Vietminh, or denying the Vietminh a substantial say regarding the future of its country, could be called the hubris of power. The U.S. thought it could dictate its form of society even in a remote area of the globe.

The American government justified its policy of supporting Bao Dai and excluding Ho Chi Minh with the argument that the latter represented only a communist minority and that he misled the majority of Vietnamese by posing as a nationalist rather than a communist. Ho Chi Minh was seen as the Trojan horse which would bring in Moscow imperialism. The logic of the argument was that by its nature the war effort against Ho was essentially nationalist and anti-imperialist.

The argument that the U.S. had to stand up to defend democracy in a third

country, even against a nationalist movement which was recognized as having wide popular support, shows the implicit contradictions of Wilsonian ideology. Under particular conditions Wilsonian idealism linked with an expanded notion of national security could lead to strong imperialist tendencies. It might give a strong impetus to and justification for U.S. involvement in a third country.(60) Inherently U.S. involvement meant not only the defense against totalitarianism but imposing a model of society as well. For example, when the Departement of State formulated a policy statement with respect to Vietnam in September 1948, it stated as its first objective the elimination of communist influence in Indochina and the establishment of a self governing nationalist state which "...will be patterned upon our conception of a democratic state as opposed to totalitarian".(61)

One might observe that a western democratic model of society, representative and pluralistic, was perhaps not feasible in the Indonesian case either.

G.J. van HOLK.

FOOTNOTES.

- 1 An interesting analysis which compares the Indonesian and the Vietnamese conflicts and their international aspects is made by Colbert, Evelyn, "The road not taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and Indochina", *Foreign Affairs*, 51(April 1973), pp 608-628.
- 2 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1941, vol 6, pp 556-574 (here after referred to as FRUS)
- 3 Philip Yessup, Dep. U.S. representative to the U.N. security council of 11th of January, 1949; see Ginling John L.S., *America and the Third World: Revolution and Intervention*, Rottleigh and Kegan, Paul, London, (1980, p 144).
- 4 See *FRUS*, 1947, and Gaddis, J.L., "Was the Truman Doctrine a real turning-point?", *Foreign Affairs* (1974).
- 5 See for example Girling and Barnett, Richard J., *Intervention and Revolution: The U.S. in the Third World*, Cleveland: (1968).
- 6 See for example Hull, Cordell, *Memoirs*, (Two volumes), McMillan: N.Y.'48, volume 2 pp159-160, and Yergien, Daniel, *Shattered Peace: The origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, Houghton, Mifflinn, Boston (1978); see part 1 on Roosevelt's policies.
- 7 Herring, George C., "The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina", *Diplomatic History*, 1:2 (1977) pp 97-100
- 8 Yergien emphasizes the pragmatic aspects of Roosevelt's policies strongly; see part 1 on the Roosevelt era. Some of his policies were, however not so pragmatic, for example, towards France on the Vietnam-issue; see Herring, pp 97-100.
- 9 See Herring : pp 97-117.
- 10 Herring : p 101
- 11 Herring : p 104
- 12 Thorn, Christopher, "Indochina and Anglo-American relations, 1942-45", *Pacific Historical Review*, 45:1 (1976), pp 73-96: and *FRUS*, 1945, vol 1 p 37.
- 13 *FRUS*, vol 6 pp, 308-309.
- 14 *FRUS*, vol 6 pp 556.
- 15 *FRUS*, vol 6 pp 558.
- 16 *FRUS*, vol 6 pp 567-568.
- 17 *FRUS*, vol 6 pp 573-574.
- 18 *FRUS*, vol 6 pp 567-568.
- 19 Rose, L.A., *Roots of Tragedy: The U.S. and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1954*, Westport, Conn. (1976), pp 47-50.
- 20 McMahon, Robert J., *Colonialism and Cold War: The U.S. and the Struggle of Indonesian Independence, 1945-49*, Ithaca and London (1981), pp 81-83 and Bank, Jan, *Katholieken en de Indonesische Revolutie*, Baarn (1983), pp 80-81.
- 21 Hornbeck, Stanley K., "The U.S. and the Netherlands East Indies," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no.225 (1948) pp 130-131).
- 22 Irving, Ronald E.M., *The First Indochina War : French and American Policy, 1945-1954*, London (1975).
- 23 Grosser, Alfred, *La IV Republique et sa politique exterieure*, Paris, (1962) pp 33, 35.
- 24 Rose, p 4,5.
- 25 Grosser, p 33.
- 26 See for example the quote in *The Pentagon Papers*, p. J.
- 27 Elgey, Georgette, *La Republique des Illusions, 1945-51*, Fayard, (1965)

- Chap. 1: see pp. 16-27, 29, 30
- 28 Elgey, p 42.
 - 29 Elgey, pp 67-70.
 - 30 *FRUS*, 1946, vol 8, pp 83, 84; see *The Pentagon Papers*, pp 28,29.
 - 31 Quoted in Abertini, Rudolf von , *Dekolonisation: Die Diskussion über Verwaltung und Zukunft der Kolonien, 1919-1960*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1966. p 566.
 - 32 Irving, p. 99.
 - 33 See Kolko, Gabriel, *The Politics of War*, pp 607-610; see also Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, Boston (1969), pp 92-93; as well as Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, New York (1972). On p 36 of *The Limits of Power*, Kolko writes for example: " Washington quietly supported the French return to Indochina because it feared the communist leadership of the Vietminh, but in the Dutch East Indies it saw an opportunistic nationalist leadership ready to open the region to foreign business and it therefore became increasingly 'anticolonialist ' on that controversy".
 - 34 See quote in Irving, p 99 and note 7 on pag112; see also Hess, Gary R. "U.S. Policy and the Origins of the Vietminh War, 1945-46", *Peace and Change*, 3:2 (1975), pp.21-23.
 - 35 In this context it is interesting to observe the development of the position of the Soviet Union; McLane, Charles B., *Soviet strategies in Asia*, Princeton University Press (1956), pp 250-280.
 - 36 Gelb, Leslie H. and Betts, Richard U., *The Irony of Vietnam: The System worked*, Brookings, Washington, D.C. (1979), p 39.
 - 37 See on this discussion Gaddis, John L, "Was the Truman Doctrine a real Turning Point?," *Foreign Affairs*, 1979, and Yergin, part on 1947.
 - 38 See Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a real turning point?" *Foreign Affairs* (1977).
 - 39 For a detailed history of the Vietminh-French war and related French politics see Hammer, Ellen J. *The struggle for Indochina 1940-1945*, Stanford (1954/1966).
 - 40 See for example Jaquet, pp 256-294; or Colbert, p 268; or Ton That Thien, on Indian relations with Ho and Sukarno, pp 121-130, 98-118.
 - 41 See Colbert for example.
 - 42 The American Representative to the U.N., Philip Jessup, in the Security Council, 11 Jan., 1949, quoted in Girling, p 144.
 - 43 See Girling for example, pp 140-144.
 - 44 *FRUS*, 1948, vol 6, p 49.
 - 45 *FRUS*, 1948, vol 6, pp 229-231.
 - 46 See for example *FRUS*, 1948, vol 6, pp 527-529.
 - 47 *FRUS*, 1947, vol 6 pp 67-68.
 - 48 Hammer, pp 247-254; see Cole, Allan B. (ed), *Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions : A Documentary History, 1945-1955*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1956), pp 69-71.
 - 49 Hammer, pp 250-251.
 - 50 *FRUS*, 1948, vol 6 , pp 478-479; Warner, p 383; see for example Poole, Peter A., *The United States and Indochina from FDR to Nixon*, Drysdren Press, Illinois (1973), 17-18.
 - 51 See Gelb, pp 33-34; and Acheson, Dean , *Present at the Creation*, N.Y. (1969), p 673.
 - 52 Acheson , p 335.
 - 53 See Kennan, George F. , "The sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs* (1947), pp. 566-582.
 - 54 See for example Ambrose Stephen E., *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938- 1980*, Penguin Books(1980).

- 55 See above, pp 99-106.
- 56 Message of President Truman to the Congress, March 12, 1947; Recommendations on Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine), *Department of State Bulletin*, Supplement of May 4, 1947 pp 829-832.
- 57 Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a real Turning Point?" pp 386-402, and Gaddis, "Containment, a Reassessment," pp 882-883.
- 58 Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a real Turning Point?" p 392.
- 59 See McLane, pp. 351-475; *FRUS*, 1948 vol 1, pp 638-644; see also Gelb p 34; and Hess, Gary R., "The first American Commitment in Indochina: The Acceptance of the Bao Dai Solution," 1950, *Diplomatic History*, (1978), pp 331- 350.
- 60 See Yergin, pp 404, 405, 409; and also Acheson, pp 672-673.
- 61 *FRUS*, 1948, vol 6, p 44 ; see above pp 111-112.