THE CHANING CONTEXT OF BLACK OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

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In recent years the challenges mounted by black opposition and resistance groupings to the South African apartheid state have repeatedly become the focus of national and international attention. There is something baffling about these occasions. Time and again - with Sharpeville as the culmination in 1960 of the Defiance Campaigns over the previous decade, again with the eruption of Soweto in 1976, and most recently with the widespread and sustained insurrections in the black townships during 1984-86 - both casual and seasoned observers have been led to expect the imminent and inevitable collapse of minority white rule and of the apartheid state. Yet somehow the inevitable and imminent collapse does not take place and the South African state manages to stretch the receding horizon of short term survival into the very long term indeed. Clearly the substance and strenght of black opposition and resistance relative to the power of the state have been overestimated in the past. But this could easily lead to a contrary misjudgement, to think that nothing has changed and that the current balance of forces is essentially the same as that of 1976 or 1960.

In fact there have been major substantive and structural changes in the *context* of the South African conflict over this time. This paper attempts to sketch in broad outline some of the main contextual changes which are essential to a proper assessment of the prospects for black opposition and resistance at the present time. It will not attempt to add in any way to the many important detailed studies of black political movements since the Second World War, e.g. *Black Politics since 1945* by Tom Lodge, or to the literature on 1976 and the current South African crisis. Instead it will stand back and attempt to locate these more specific developments within a larger structural and dynamic context as this changed over the period from 1960 to the present. In this way it may then appear how unlike the

present situation is to that of 1976 and 1960 despite the superficial similarities.

The impact of world pressure and the internationalisation of Southern African policies

In the 25 years following World War II the consolidation of white minority rule and of the apartheid order meant that South Africa began to diverge sharply from internationally accepted public norms. The earlier tradition of segregation had not been fundamentally out of line with Western norms at the time, and South Africa could still participate in international forums abroad and pursue domestic policies without interference at home. But while the post-war world under the traumatic impact of the Holocaust in Europe, of decolonisation in Africa and Asia and of the civil rights movement in the United States came to regard any public recognition of racial inequality as anathema, the National Party government after 1948 set about the statutory enactment of racial differentiations in every sphere of the economy, society and politics. At first though, international reaction remained confined to moral criticism and diplomatic protests and this did not interfere with the internal consolidation of the apartheid state. After the initial scare of Sharpeville, foreign capital flowed in again to ensure record levels of growth during the 1960s. From the mid-1970s this changed. The collapse of the Portugese colonies in Mozambique and Angola in 1974, and the end of Rhodesian UDI a few years later, removed the cordon sanitaire which had sheltered South Africa from guerilla insurgency and brought external pressures to our own borders. The Soweto rising of June 1976 and the spread of civil unrest throughout the country during the following months focussed international attention on South Africa's internal policies and led to the adoption of a mandatory arms ban at the United Nations. More importantly, from the second half of the 1970s new foreign investment in South Africa began to dry up, due both to the declining profitability of multinational companies operating here and to perceptions of increasing political risks.

Without this crucial input, earlier levels of economic growth could no longer be sustained. The open nature of the South African economy was further demonstrated by such events as the oil crisis following the fall of Iran, the severe balance of payments problems in the late 1970s, the impact of changes in the price of gold, the international debt crisis following the sharp changes in currency exchange rates in the mid-1980s etcetera. In turn, the upsurge of internal unrest in 1984-6 fuelled the international campaigns for economic sanctions and disinvestment and greatly facilitated the exiled ANC in gaining a growing measure of international recognition.

At the same time Southern African politics became increasingly internationalised. The ongoing diplomatic dispute over South West Africa/Namibia continued to involve outside agents and forums as well (the United Nations, the Western Contact-group, United States State Department initiatives, the EPG-initiative etcetera). The efforts of SWAPO and the ANC to mount guerilla raids from external bases in neighbouring territories have brought South Africa into complex conflicts with these "Frontline" states. Following its military invasion of Angola during the civil war in 1975 South Africa has increasingly come to act as a kind of regional super power whose security objectives transcend national boundaries. In turn this has brought about the active involvement in the region of the international super powers (United States' "constructive engagement") and/or their proxies (the Cuban forces in Angola).

In the decade following 1975 it has thus become increasingly clear that South Africa is not insulated against the trends and pressures of the Western world and of Africa. Moreover, it cannot afford to maintain apartheid in defiance of this outside world and at the same time hope to sustain the growth rate of more than five per cent, needed to provide enough jobs for its rapidly growing population. Apartheid has become a highly politicised issue internationally in a wide range of organisational contexts, while South Africa's own actions in the sub-continent have consistently undermined the traditional defence that outside interference in its internal affairs is unwarranted.

From the point of view of the internal opposition and resistance movements the results remain somewhat ambiguous. In general the increase of international pressures and outside involvement have provided much needed support to various internal opposition groupings or desegregating objects, thus hastening the dismantling of apartheid structures. On the other hand it is exceedingly difficult to target large-scale outside interventions at all successfully, and international boycotts, sanctions and disinvestment campaigns may also have profound, unintended and counterproductive consequences. Short of direct involvement by the super powers, which could lead to a fatal escalation of military conflict, it is difficult to see how external support can bring about an effective challenge to the continuing power of the South African state.

Demographic changes and socio-economic relations

Until the middle of the twentieth century white minority rule in South Africa was parallelled by a virtual white monopoly of the strategic positions in the economy, the administrative apparatus and the educational system. Land and capital was overwhelmingly in the hands of whites, who also supplied the skilled (and much of the semi-skilled) workers in the economy as well as the personnel for the middle and senior ranks of the state bureaucracies and the security apparatus. Substantial numbers of (Afrikaans-speaking) whites had been poor, with little education or skills, but this was redressed through Afrikaner-Nationalist control of the state. While the vast majority of Africans remained unskilled and semi- or illiterate, compulsory education for whites, the job colour bar in the labour market and protected employment opportunities in the expanding civil service provided many poor whites with the means for upward social mobility.

As South Africa entered the second half of the twentieth century the basic demographic ratio's began to change. Before 1960 whites constituted 20 per cent of the total population; this has now decreased to less than 15 per cent and it is expected to

shrink further to a proportion approaching 10 per cent at the outset of the twentyfirst century. It had been precisely these trends, and their inherent implications for white rule, which the policy of separate development attempted to undo by excluding blacks from political rights except in "separate states", by turning the growing tide of black urbanisation through rigorous influx control and migrant labour, and by the resettlement of millions of people from "black spots" and the white farms in the homelands.

However, from the mid-1970s public policy makers began to realise that these demographic trends, coupled with the needs of the economy, required not the excorporation, but instead the socio-economic incorporation of substantial numbers of blacks. Since the proportionately declining number of whites could no longer supply the demand for semi-skilled and skilled labour these would now have to be drawn from other population groups. This was recognised by the Wiehahn-Riekert reforms of labour policy which granted significant labour and trade union rights to blacks. Already the composition of the skilled labour force is changing. Studies show that while whites still fill more than 90 per cent of all the senior administrative and management positions, the white proportion in medium-level manpower dropped substantially from 82 per cent in 1965 to 65 per cent in 1981. Projections suggest that by the end of the twentieth century blacks will constitute an absolute majority of skilled manpower.

Partly in anticipation of these developments black secondary and higher education began to expand rapidly from the early 1970s. The enrollment figures in African secondary education increased sharply from a base of 122.000 in 1970 to 318.000 in 1975 and upwards of 1 million in 1984, with the number of African matriculants going from less than 3.000 in 1970 to 9.000 in 1975 and more than 86.000 in 1984. (Over the same period the number of university students increased from less than 5.000 to more than 36.000). With a continuation of present trends blacks will thus constitute absolute majorities in the number of matriculants and of the skilled labour force within the next decade.

The last decade has thus produced significant changes in the social composition and power of major population groups. Labour reforms have spawned a burgeoning black labour and trade union movement, though there is as yet little sign of any substantial "black middle class" (leaving aside the special case of the Asians). At the same time the power and influence of the white working class has sharply declined, while increasingly new generations of professionals, technocrats, academics and entrepreneurs (who now constitute a significant proportion of Afrikaners as well) no longer feel the need for special protective policies on the part of the state.

In some senses these changes have dramatically closed many of the educational, social and cultural gaps between the different population groups. At the same time they also intensify the profound grievances focussed on the structures of exclusion and inequality. It is no accident that black students and high school pupils have taken the lead in the boycotts, protests and riots in the urban townships in 1976-7 and again in 1984-6, or that the black schools and universities have become such pervasive sites of turmoil and conflict. Moreover, there must be serious question marks regarding both the quality and the kind of secundary education provided to blacks within a segregated system and under these circumstances. It remains to be seen to what extent the economy will in fact be able to absorb them. The expansion of black secondary education took place in the context of an economy which could no longer sustain earlier levels of growth, leading to spiralling black unemployment. The dramatic increase in the number of African matriculants may thus in effect generate a fast growing group of highly politicized urban unemployed with little prospect of finding in the market place the kind of employment associated with their educational qualifications. Unless the state is prepared to change the character of the civil service and of the security forces by opening up their middle and eventually senior ranks to a rapidly increasing number of blacks they will provide the potential cadres for more militant and violent political movements, capable of disrupting social reform and political settlements.

Changes in the relation of state and society

The two decades before 1975 saw a significant expansion of the state in its relation to South African society through the massive growth of a number of important state bureaucracies. In particular the various departments and agencies administering black affairs grew into a virtual "state within a state", with comprehensive control over almost every aspect of Africans' lives: their movement, employment, housing, education etcetera. Towards the end of the 1960s the number of arrests of Africans under the pass laws and influx control regulations had gone up to nearly 700.000 arrests per year (compared to an average of 130.000 arrests per year in the 1930s). Similarly, the powerful bureaucracy of Community Development, implementing group areas, actually moved a total of no less than 120.000 Coloured and Asian families from their homes. To combat internal and external threats to white rule the security forces, intelligence agencies and the military apparatus were greatly expanded in the post-Sharpeville period, backed up by drastic new security legislation. Through the SABC, the Department of Information and censorship agencies, the state also gained increasing control over the media, while launching its own overt and covert propaganda campaigns.

This growth of the state apparatus had a number of different dimensions and consequences: it greatly enhanced the ability of central government to structure social and economic relations and to maintain political control; it increasingly centralised political power and decision-making, thereby diminishing the significance of local and regional authorities; it provided stable and protected employment to significant numbers of whites, giving them a vested interest in the perpetuation of the apartheid structures they administered; and it increasingly led to internal conflicts and tensions between rival bureaucracies within the state apparatus itself.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s this growth of the state in relation to society came up against its limits in various ways. In a number of cases the state bureaucracies which had to

administer influx control, migrant labour and resettlement schemes met with intractable resistance from the communities involved, sometimes assisted by local organisations with the resources to provide legal counsel as well as national and international publicity (Crossroads, etc.) . More generally these agencies proved increasingly ineffective in coping with the pervasive and overwhelming pressures of black urbanisation and the de facto emergence of vast peri-urban shack settlements. By 1984 the officials directly responsible for influx control in the Western Cape, the area where the state had most adamantly persisted in the demolition of shacks and the prosecution and removal of people to the Ciskei and Transkei, admitted that these efforts had in practice proved a failure. The total number of pass law arrests decreased from 700.000 in 1969 to 160.000 in 1984, and in 1985 the government announced that influx control would be replaced with a policy of orderly urbanisation. In the case of group areas the partial reversal of official efforts has been less momentous. Partly in response to the growing importance of the black consumer market, many of the requirements of statutory segregation could no longer be effectively enforced in central business districts, a de facto situation only belatedly and tardily recognised by official policy changes in the mid-1980s. Contrary to statutory group areas, considerable numbers of Asians and Coloureds also moved into apartment blocks in the inner city metropolitan areas of Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg with officials unwilling or unable to do much about this. In part due to the independent imperatives and initiatives of these bodies, the state also had to relax its earlier efforts to impose direct and wholesale racial exclusion on universities, cultural institutions and professional organisations. However, the basic pattern of residential and educational segregation had already been too well established for such developments to amount to more than minor exceptions to the previous state-imposed social structures.

At another level the fitful and stagnant economy of the last decade brought it home that there are definite limits to the resources which the state could harness. The expansion of black

education and the concomitant needs for housing and welfare services coupled to the existing public expenditures on the apartheid bureaucracies, uneconomic decentralization policies, subsidies to white interest groups and escalating defence budgets, created a fiscal crisis for the state. Given the relatively small scale and law growth rates of the South African economy there were evident limits to further increases in public spending and thus to the growth of state bureaucracies. Accordingly, government began to adopt a more co-operative stance to the private sector, publicly affirmed with the historic rapprochement between the National Party leadership and organised business at the Carlton and Good Hope conferences, and neo-liberal "free marketeering" ideas gained some influence in public policy. In part due to the internal bureaucratic rivalries and conflicts which had come into the open with the "Information Scandal" in the late 1970s the new P.W. Botha-administration also set itself the goal of a comprehensive "rationalisation" of the mushrooming state bureaucracies. However, despite considerable organisational reshuffling and much talk of the concentration of power under the aegis of the State Security Council, it would not appear that the existing bureaucracies have been either much diminished or revitalised. Instead, the new tricameral parliament of 1984 has brought a renewed proliferation of "own affairs" bureaucracies in its wake, while for political reasons the National Party government continues to buy off the middle and senior ranks of white civil servants with substantial salary increases, housing subsidies etcetera.

The final testing ground for the power of the state lies in its ability to maintain public order. In this respect the last decade saw repeated challenges to state institutions exposing serious limitations to the capabilities of political mechanisms and of the security forces. In 1976-77 boycotts and protest demonstrations by black high school and university students against local educational authorities led to sustained civil unrest in urban black townships throughout the country. The public exposure of the brutal methods adopted by local security forces in the course of the Biko Inquest provided a focus for national

and international pressure. On his accession to power P.W. Botha, with his base in the rival military bureaucracy, responded with the appointment of the Rabie Commission giving it a comprehensive brief regarding security legislation and affairs. In this context such an influential figure in government circles as adv. D.P. de Villiers called for the restoration of the rule of law. In the event, however, the Rabie Commission failed to take on this challenge and local security forces were left with virtually unchecked powers as before. Meanwhile, the state proceeded with its attempts to co-opt collaborative black elites into new structures of local authority. In effect this amounted to a kind of indirect rule, interposing councillors elected with minimal electoral turnouts and with few powers or resources at their disposal to administer unpopular rent increases etcetera. In the renewed unrest of 1984-86, now in many rural townships as well, these community councillors and other agents of the state, such as black policemen and informers, became the main targets of intimidation and of outright violence. Almost across the board the new black local authorities broke down. More generally, the state proved unable to maintain public order in the townships except by means of severely coercive measures. The SADF had to be called in for support, and a state of emergency declared in a number of magisterial districts, followed by the second (national) state of emergency since June 1986.

Outside the townships white rule has not yet been seriously challenged at all, and the present government's control of the state is no doubt secure for the foreseeable future. However, in its present form the state lacks the power to restructure society at large. In particular, the state suffers from a serious crisis of legitimacy as far as urban (and many rural) black communities are concerned, a condition further exacerbated by the often brutally coercive measures adopted by the security forces in the name of law and order. In present circumstances it is difficult to see how this legitimacy crisis can be resolved without allowing blacks to participate in open political processes at local and national levels. The basic contradiction between the increasing socio-economic incorporation of especially urban blacks and their

political excorporation cannot be indefinitely contained by coercive means only.

Ideological changes and restructuring

The 1960s saw the culmination of Afrikaner nationalism as a movement of exclusive ethnic mobilisation coupled with a rigid and systematic racial ideology centered on racial separation in all spheres of social life and the denial of black rights except within the structures of "separate states". Since the National Party had captured political power and was in effective control of the state, this public ideology had a prominent role in the consolidation of the apartheid order.

From the early 1970s a steady and pervasive process of ideological restructuring began to take place. Afrikaner nationalism became somewhat more inclusive, prepared to tolerate a considerable diversity of views within its own ranks and to co-opt former opponents as junior partners. Racial ideology and policy was progressively transformed into a more pragmatic and flexible approach capable of accommodating a variety of desegregatory measures especially in economic and some social contexts. This process of restructuring racial ideology was mediated by the growing prevalence of a technocratic ethos in public decisionmaking. Instead of remaining the exclusive domain of the National Party caucus and the Broederbond, public commissions of inquiry, statutory bodies like the President's Council and research establishments such as the HSRC were increasingly involved in the process of public policymaking. Appeals to rationality with a view to a pragmatic consensus took the place of Verwoerdian ideological rigour. By such means it proved possible to obfuscate specific ideological shibboleths of the past and to extend the range of options on the agenda of public policymaking sufficiently to allow significant changes in official policy positions without too much damage to the National Party's traditional political constituency. In effect the National Party government could thus move in less than a decade from the

policy objective of a (white) South Africa "with no black citizens" to the public acceptance of blacks as in principle citizens of a common country. As yet there does not, however, appear to be any definite form of ideological support among whites for the actual implementation of these principles. While the influence of the earlier nationalist and racial ideologies has waned, both as motivating factors for and as constraints on public policy-making, no definite "reformist" ideology has taken their places. With the coercive clampdown of the second state of emergency in the wake of the widespread insurrections of 1984-6, the "reformist" public stance of the P.W. Botha government for the time being had to give way to security considerations.

The significance of ideological changes in black politics remains unclear. Since the mid-70s the coherent thrust of the Black Consciousness Movement among students and youths appears to have been diffused and there has been a revival of "Charterist" orientations. In turn this has been challenged by a more pronounced socialist tendency in former Black Consciousness circles as well as by "Workerists" based on the trade union movement. In general it would appear that the experiences of 1976-7, 1979-80, and 1984-6 have politicised and radicalised urban blacks generally. But this has not yet been translated into definite and coherent ideological positions (despite much loose talk of marxist or socialist alternatives). This could be important for the prospects of future political change in different ways. On the one hand the ideological fluidity of black political thought and the lack of rigid and fixed positions provide considerable scope for alternative political strategies and/or settlements. On the other hand the ideological unstructured radicalisation of many blacks constitutes a volatile and unpredictable political climate in which orderly political processes, and the politics of negotiation in particular, could prove very difficult. In the aftermath of the insurrectionary wave of 1984-6, which failed to mount an effective challenge to the power of the South African state, opposition and resistance groupings generally have been forced to strategic re-alignments, the outcome of which is still unclear.

Constitutional and legal changes

The statutory framework of the apartheid state, from race classification and group areas to segregated education and separate amenities, etcetera, had been virtually completed by the early 1970s. In the decade since 1975 this grand design of separate development was carried further by the granting of constitutional "independence" to Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda as well as additional powers of selfgovernment to other homelands. By and large these rural and underdeveloped regions were thus removed even further from the mainstream of South African politics, significantly adding to the fragmentation of black politics (though in the important case of KwaZulu this "independence option" was resisted with some success and led to the emergence of Inkatha as a black grouping with a significantly different base and strategy).

In other respects the decade saw the beginning of a possible contrary trend. The demise of the Coloured Persons Representative Council eventually led to the introduction of the new tricameral parliament in 1984 restoring a form of parliamentary franchise to Coloureds and bringing Coloured and Asian representatives into parliament for the first time. Though of some symbolic significance in so far as it ostensibly reversed the trend away from a non-racial parliamentary franchise, which had already started in the nineteenth century, the new parliamentary structures were carefully designed to prevent effective alliances or coalitions across racial boundaries and to retain control in the hands of the majority party in the (white) House of Assembly. Despite much talk of moving away from the "Westminster model", as recommended by the Theron Commission in 1976, the introduction of an executive presidency did not provide it with any direct and independent electoral base. The opportunity to move towards a constitutional separation of powers with concommitant checks and balances on federalist lines was thus passed by. In so far as the new tricameral parliament is emphatically premissed on race classification and group areas it has built racial categories into the constitutional structure itself

while the central role of the "own affairs" and "general affairs" differentiation in both legislative and executive-administrative processes amounts to an entrenchment and elaboration of apartheid structures. These constitutional changes have thus actually increased the obstacles in the way of fundamental change away from the apartheid state. At the same time the explicit exclusion of the black majority from the tricameral parliament together with the introduction of the 4:2:1 ratio in the representation of white, coloured and Asian groups have added considerably to the political and constitutional difficulties of the political incorporation of Africans. This was dramatically shown by the rejection and failure of the new local government structures for blacks in 1984 and 1985. Though the National Party government had by 1985 come to accept publicly the need for black participation and representation at all levels of politics as citizens of a common country, it is very difficult to see how it would envisage this except on the basis of the homelands and statutorily defined ethnic and racial groups - that is, on the very basis of imposed ethnicity which has become wholly unacceptable to the majority of politicised urban blacks. The proposed National Statutory Council, as a transitional forum and mechanism for involving representatives of the black majority in some form of consultative or negotiation process, has remained a vague idea which has failed to secure the support even of Buthelezi and Inkatha.

Changes in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political relations

By the early 1970s the National Party had established an overwhelming predominance as an organised political movement in national politics. Within white parliamentary politics the United Party had effectively disintegrated as a potentially alternative government without leaving any credible successor for this role. The National Party, as the political instrument of Afrikaner nationalism, consistently drew 85% - 90% of Afrikaner votes,



Poster for the Annual General Meeting of Soweto Civic Association, December 1 1984 (courtesy of AABN)

which constituted an absolute majority among the electorate. The banning of the ANC and PAC followed by the massive security clampdowns during the 1960s had effectively blunted the challenge of the organised black political and resistance movements. At that time there was no organised black labour movement of any consequence, and organised business had little direct impact on public policy. The main extraparliamentary opposition forces centered on student movements such as NUSAS and church bodies such as the Christian Institute which operated from limited and fragile bases and were no match for a National Party government able to harness the considerable resources of the state and its security apparatus.

In the course of the last decade this imbalance of forces has changed in substantial ways. The National Party itself became a more diversified and less cohesive political organisation, with serious internal tensions between rival factions. This eventually led to the split of the Treurnicht group in 1982 and the subsequent birth of the Conservative Party, with National Party support among Afrikaner voters in the early 1980s sometimes dropping to less than 60% and to well below 50% among all whites. This has been confirmed by the 1987 election, with the Conservative Party emerging as the official opposition and the National Party increasingly dependent on non-Afrikaner support. The 1970s also saw the resurgence of internal black political militancy led by the Black Consciousness Movement which even after its banning in 1977 was sustained and diffused in a wide variety of community organisations. The Durban strikes of 1973-4 presaged the rapid growth of the black trade union movement from the late 1970s which was consolidated by the formation in 1985 of COSATU as a powerful federation of trade unions representing an organised black labour force already numbering many hundreds of thousands. Meanwhile, Chief Buthelezi had consolidated his initially limited political base by building up Inkatha into a political organisation claiming a membership of upwards of a million. The early 1980s further saw a resurgence in the popularity of the exiled ANC with Mandela becoming a major symbolic leadership figure, while the UDF was launched as a

popular front in protest against the introduction of the new tricameral parliament. Organised business (especially through the Urban Foundation) began to pursue more coherent and specified political initiatives and to articulate more definite public positions in such documents as the Lombard/Du Pisani Assocom memorandum and the FCI Charter in 1985. This higher political profile and preparedness to engage in independent political initiatives even extended to an exploratory mission to the ANC leadership in Lusaka, also in 1985.

By the mid-80s there was thus a much wider range of organised political forces in the parliamentary and extraparliamentary arenas with the potential for possible new alliances that could cut across traditional cleavages. Some actors in the extraparliamentary movement have begun to show an interest in devising a formula for participation in local or national electoral processes, and this has been echoed by efforts like that of Wynand Malan and the NDM to establish contracts across the political no man's land. Ideally, these could be the participants in a new politics of negotiation which might resolve the present crisis of legitimacy. In the course of 1985-6 actual instances of such negotiations at a local level did indeed take place. However, this has been ruled out by the state of emergency with its continuing severe restrictions on open political processes for blacks, the official refusal to unban the ANC, detentions of many political leaders, security actions against the UDF etcetera. Though the extraparliamentary opposition, unlike in the 1960s, has been able to survive politically, their activities and effectiveness are severely curtailed and it remains an open question what the political alignment of the black communities would be if and when such restrictions are relaxed. In the mean time the political role of the trade unions and organised business also remains distorted in significant ways.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the second state of emergency since 1986 it is now clear that those who had anticipated the imminent collapse of the South African state in 1985-6 had once again misjudged the power of that state. However, the current situation is by no means the same as that which followed Sharpeville in the 1960s. If Black
political movements remain organisationally constrained and ideologically fluid to an extent which make it impossible to predict developments with any certainty, it is nevertheless clear that in the present configuration of forces their impact on the emerging new South Africa will be both substantial and growing.

Suggestions for further reading

The literature on modern South Africa is vast. This list is merely a preliminary suggestion to help in following up the ideas in Prof. Du Toit's paper:

Brewer, John, *After Soweto: an unfinished Journey*, (Oxford 1986).
Cobbett W. and R. Cohen (eds), *Popular Struggles in South Africa*, (London 1988).
Davis, Stephen, *Apartheid's Rebels: inside South Africa's hidden War*, (New Haven and London 1987).
Frankel, Philip, Noam Pines and Mark Swilling (eds), *State Resistance and Change in South Africa*, (London 1988).
Friedman, Stephen, Building Tomorrow Today: A History of Mass FOSATU Unions, (Johannesburg 1986).
Grundy, Kenneth, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, (Oxford 1986).
Lodge, Tom, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, (London 1983).
Lonsdale, John, (ed.) *South Africa in Question*, (London 1988).
Stadler, Alf, *The Political Economy of Modern South Africa*, (London 1987).

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Wolpe, Harold, *Race, Class and the Apartheid State*, (UNESCO 1988).

In addition, the *South African Review*, an annual publication of the South African Research Service, Vols I - IV (1984 - 8), contains a wealth of important and informative articles.

The list was compiled by Dr Robert Ross.