

# Cultural and Material Life-Style Differentiation in Eastern Europe

## A Study on the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequalities in Five Former Socialist Societies

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### Introduction

In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, over forty years of official governmental policy was designed to reduce social inequality. De-stratification measures like the abolition of private property and limited access to schooling for children from bourgeois backgrounds, were implemented. As a consequence, parents' options for providing their children with favorable conditions for success in life were believed to have been reduced. However, the persistence of social and economic inequality in Eastern Europe has been widely acknowledged (Machonin 1970; Konrad and Szelényi 1979).

In this article, we elaborate on the processes generating one specific aspect of social inequality, life-style differentiation. We distinguish between cultural and material life-style fields (Bourdieu 1984). Our survey focused on five Eastern European nations (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) in 1993. In these former socialist countries, there were clear differences with respect to participation in high cultural activities and material wealth (Machonin 1970; Robert and Sagi 1996). These distinctions were clear and visible expressions of social inequality. Internally a shared life-style gives the members of a status group a sense of solidarity (horizontal connection), and externally a specific life-style reveals the differentiation between the status groups in society (vertical distinction) (DiMaggio 1994). Distinguishing the cultural and material life-style domains corresponds with Bourdieu's two-dimensional approach to stratification (Bourdieu 1984); some people choose to express their social position in a material way, by consuming luxury durables, whereas others proclaim their status in a cultural way by participating in high cultural activities.

To study the causes of cultural and material life-style differentiation in Eastern Europe, we have devoted particular attention to the relative importance of individual resources and parental background characteristics. Several earlier studies have documented the role of these concepts in the stratification process, but they had certain shortcomings. Traditional research on life-style differentiation predominantly concentrated on the importance of an individual's education, financial resources and occupational characteristics for his life-style choices. So far, very few studies have applied notions of parental background to explain differences in cultural and material life-styles. As a result, in this type of research the role of the intergenerational reproduction of inequality has been disregarded. In addition, stratification

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and mobility research generally narrowed the scope of parental background to the effect on schooling and occupational status. Consequently, meaningful aspects of inequality in society, material consumption and cultural participation, have been overlooked. By examining the effect of individual resources and parental background on life-style differentiation simultaneously, in this article we aim to improve upon these earlier studies.

Moreover, research on the effects of individual and parental background characteristics on cultural and material life-style differentiation is of special interest with respect to the former socialist nations of Eastern Europe. It is generally believed that the egalitarian policy measures taken there weakened parents' opportunities to provide their children with capacities and skills that would enhance social inequality (Ganzeboom et al. 1990). Consequently, in the former socialist societies the impact of parental background on social life-style differentiation was thought to have been reduced. As was the case, the Marxist governments in all the Eastern European countries underlined the importance of a 'just' and 'equal' allocation of material wealth and living conditions. To achieve this egalitarian distribution, several de-stratifying policy measures, such as income re-distribution, limited access to higher education for the bourgeoisie, and expropriating the property of farmers and the nobility were implemented. Studying life-style differentiation in Eastern Europe has therefore given us an opportunity to examine whether the communist de-stratification policy with respect to cultural participation and material wealth was successful, and whether the consequences were still visible years later.

Another good reason to study the causes of life-style differentiation in Eastern Europe was that in all the nations in our survey, a specific application of political power played an important role in the re-distribution process. Nearly all the re-allocation of income, goods and power took place as a result of the dominant position of the ruling Communist Party. In this re-distribution operation, individuals who were affiliated to the Communist Party are believed to have provided themselves with more goods and privileges than non-members (Morrison 1984). As a result, social differentiation in cultural participation and material consumption must at least partly be explained by individual differences in political resources (Communist Party member), maybe even after the collapse of the communist state systems in the late 1980's. Hence, our five Eastern European countries are good examples to study the impact of political resources on life-style differentiation, and the impact of the intergenerational transmission of inequalities therein (Konrad and Széleányi 1979; Széleányi 1987).

In addition, studying the effects of parental background on cultural and material life-style differentiation in Eastern Europe is of interest because it can provide information about how non-political elites reacted to the strong re-distribution policies in their countries. Several scholars have assumed that in societies where, either due to state intervention or processes of modernization, the display or use of economic resources decline, elites start to use new compensating types of intergenerational social reproduction strategies. So, in socialist countries, people in higher positions can be assumed to emphasize alternative strategies. For example, it is suggested that elites have increasingly provided their children with better chances by means of cultural socialization, instilling cultural values, codes and capital, that help them attain success in life (Bourdieu 1984). Hence, by examining the effects of parental social and cultural characteristics, we examine the extent to which alternative strategies for intergenerational reproduction have been applied.

Two research questions are addressed in this article. The first question is on the relative strength of the three concepts presumed to explain differences in life-style, and reads as


*follows: To what extent was there social differentiation in cultural participation and material consumption in five Eastern European countries (in 1993), and to what extent can differences be explained by differing individual resources, parental social origin and parental cultural capital? To broaden this issue and subsequently gain greater insight into the process of transmitting social inequality over generations, our second research question reads: To what extent was the transmission of inequality over generations due to the direct or indirect effects of parental social origin and parental cultural capital on social differentiation in cultural participation and material consumption in five Eastern European countries (in 1993)?* The answers to these two research questions illuminate the mechanisms in the process of the intergenerational transmission of social inequality with respect to life-style differentiation in general and in former socialist countries in particular.

### **Life-Style Differentiation: Theoretical Perspective**

To study the relative impact of individual resources and family background characteristics on life-style differentiation in Eastern Europe, we linked three traditions in sociological research on social inequality. First, questions on the cultural and material consequences of inequality are generally dealt with in a tradition of life-style research. Classical literature on life-style differentiation treats taste and preference decisions as being dependent on an individual's status position (Sobel 1981; Bourdieu 1984). The focus on the association between individual resources and life-style choices implies that most studies on life-style differentiation have not focused on the reproduction of inequality between parents and their offspring. In contrast, a second line of research regards intergenerational mobility as an essential topic. In this tradition, differences in people's parental social origin are believed to be important in generating social inequalities (Blau and Duncan 1967). The transmission of inequality between generations is commonly referred to as social reproduction. A third tradition theorizes that a specific cultural environment at home can account for the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Socialization in cultural elite preferences is indicative of processes of cumulative advantages, sometimes referred to as cultural reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970).

In Figure 1, the associations predicted by the theoretical traditions discussed above are clarified in an explanatory model. According to our model, differences in life-style are presumed to be explained by three concepts, (A) individual resources, (B) parental social origin and (C) parental cultural resources. The relative contribution of these concepts to the explanation of life-style differentiation is relevant to the first research question. We see from the explanatory model that for influences of family background on life-style differentiation, it is important to deal with direct and indirect effects. This is what is referred to in our second research question.

Figure 1. Model explaining cultural and material life-style differentiation



- A. Effects of Individual Resources
- B. Social Reproduction
- C. Cultural Reproduction

#### Individual resources and life-style differentiation

The first theoretical tradition addressed in our article concerns conventional research on life-style differentiation. In these studies, individual differences in life-style are usually associated with variations in social status. Bourdieu (1984) held that individuals with different status positions distinguish themselves in all the life-style domains by the distinctions they draw between the beautiful and the ugly. Furthermore, DiMaggio (1994) noted that almost every aspect of human experience correlates with social rank. As a consequence, empirical research in this tradition has primarily dealt with the consequences of social position with regard to life-style choices (Machonin 1970; Wesolowski and Slomczynski 1978; Sobel 1981; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989; Robert and Sagi 1996).

In this tradition of life-style research, status position is believed to be important for two reasons. To begin with, a high status position is often accompanied by financial and cognitive qualities that enable a person to participate in high cultural activities and obtain material wealth. For example, high status professionals earn enough money to purchase scarce luxury goods, and well educated people have the competence and skills to appreciate expressions of high culture. It is essential that life-style choices should serve as a sign of a person's status. Although restricted by financial and cognitive thresholds, all life-style choices are assumed to

be motivated by a need for distinction (Bourdieu 1984; DiMaggio 1994). Knowledge on and the use of exclusive life-style symbols commonly shared within a status group provide group members with a means to distinguish themselves from other status groups and to express their status position (Veblen 1899; Ganzeboom 1982; DiMaggio 1987).

In empirical life-style research, several personal qualities have been held responsible for the differentiation in life-style. Economic and market researchers, usually with a uni-dimensional approach, consider income a single explanatory factor for the variation in life-style (Sobel 1981). This is mainly because in this type of research, the consumption of commodities and luxury goods is the only focus of attention. In contrast, sociological research supposes all expressions of taste to be part of a person's life-style, and therefore advocates a multi-dimensional approach. In this tradition, in addition to economic features, cultural and political resources are also assumed to be relevant to social differentiation in life-style (Sorokin 1927; Weber 1966; Bourdieu 1984). In this article, we take the multi-dimensional approach. Four characteristics are assumed to embody separate dimensions of an individual's resources. In Figure 1, we assume these characteristics to represent a direct influence on life-style choices (arrow A). These characteristics are education, occupational status, personal income and political party membership.

At first, *education* is assumed to be closely related to a person's life chances, and thereby to the differentiation in cultural and material life-style. Like Hyman et al. (1975), we believe that education increases knowledge, deepens receptivity and stimulates the active pursuit of new information. Accordingly, a higher education directly enhances a person's competence to appreciate high cultural expressions, like literary books, plays and art exhibitions (Ganzeboom 1982). It also increases an individual's capacities to attain material wealth. Additionally, participation in cultural activities and owning luxury goods gives well-educated people opportunities to demonstrate their intellectual superiority in 'good' taste (Bourdieu 1984). The relevance of education to the explanation of differentiation in life-style has been made clear in various empirical studies, in Western as well as Eastern European countries (DiMaggio and Useem 1978; Marsden et al. 1982; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989; Robert and Sagi 1996). In general, education is the most important factor with respect to high cultural activities. Especially in Eastern Europe, well-educated people went to theaters and museums more often, and spent more time reading than people who were less well-educated (Machonin 1970; Wnuk-Lipinski 1983; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989). In the material field schooling has also proved to be a relevant asset. With respect to consumer durables and housing quality, well-educated people are overrepresented in Eastern Europe among the most privileged, even if income and parental background characteristics are accounted for (Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989; Ganzeboom et al. 1990).

Secondly, *occupational status* was presumed to be a relevant predictor of life-style differentiation. Occupational position is believed to be important because the kind of work a person does is a relevant indicator of his financial and cultural capabilities (Bourdieu 1984; Treiman and Peng 1989). Occupational status also says something about a person's values and tastes and is an indicator of his prestige in the community (Treiman 1977). Persons with high occupational status positions can thus be assumed to have an exclusive cultural and material life-style. Although empirical research has demonstrated that occupational status is a weaker predictor than educational attainment (Davis 1982; De Graaf et al. 1989), its role in life-style differences has often been confirmed in studies on Eastern European and other nations (Bourdieu 1984; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989; Robert and Sagi 1996). In Eastern Europe, minor but not insignificant positive effects of belonging to higher occupational

classes have been observed for high cultural participation and owning consumer durables (Wnuk-Lipinski 1983; Beskid and Kolosi 1983; Beskidove and Tucek 1990; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989; Robert and Sagi 1996).

Thirdly, differences in *income position* were considered essential to divisions pertaining to cultural and material life-style. A person's income simply indicates his the financial capabilities and thresholds. A high income can generally be assumed to lead to more opportunities for exposure to the material and cultural field than a low income. Exclusive 'conspicuous consumption', as regards consumer goods, housing quality or high culture give the rich an opportunity to exhibit their 'elite' position (Veblen, 1899; Sobel 1981). Empirical research has demonstrated that in Eastern Europe, higher income groups are more likely to show off a high position by having an exclusive life-style. However, they are more likely to do so by way of luxurious material consumption than by way of high cultural participation (Beskid and Kolosi 1983; Ganzeboom et al. 1990; DeGraaf 1991; Robert and Sagi 1996). Surprisingly, in some studies substantive positive effects of income on high cultural participation were observed even if educational attainment and parental background were taken into account (Kolosi 1989; Ganzeboom et al. 1990).

Fourthly, in the former socialist countries we might expect previous *political (communist) party membership* to exert a substantial influence. In communist Eastern Europe, much the redistribution took place under the auspices of the ruling Communist Party. As a consequence, party members can be assumed to have had better opportunities to provide themselves with scarce goods and privileges (Konrad and Szelényi 1979; Connor 1979). Consequently, even after the major transitions of the late 1980s, material wealth and cultural participation differences were still related to the residual influence of communist political power. Previous party members were probably able to convert their political resources into material and cultural assets. The scarce empirical research has demonstrated that in the communist period, party membership could provide a person with certain advantages in terms of income, occupational position and children's educational attainment (Machonin 1970; Yanovitch 1977; Morrison 1984; Ganzeboom and Nieuwebeerta 1995; Böröcz and Southworth 1996). With respect to life-style differentiation, Robert and Sagi (1996) showed the minor but significant advantages of previous Communist Party affiliation for high cultural participation and material wealth (consumer durables) in Bulgaria and Slovakia (but not in Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland).

#### *Parental social origin and life-style differentiation: social reproduction*

In the second theoretical tradition we build on, parental background characteristics are taken to be of particular importance for social differentiation in life-style. The question of whether and how parents succeed in increasing their children's life chances has been the main topic in social stratification and mobility research (Kurz and Muller 1987; Ganzeboom et al. 1991). This tradition has it that due to ascriptive forces in society, social inequality is transmitted from one generation to the next. Classical mobility research has addressed social reproduction in the framework of a wide variety of subjects. For example, the transmission of inequality in educational and occupational attainment has been studied (Blau and Duncan 1967), and so have the intergenerational mobility processes in housing conditions, material consumption and cultural participation (for a review see: Ganzeboom et al. 1991). However, in recent studies the scope of this tradition has been narrowed down to the relation between social origin and educational and occupational attainment (Shavit and Blossfeld 1990; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Accordingly, research questions on the links between parental social origin and life-style expressions have almost vanished from the agenda of stratification research.

Differences in cultural and material life-style could nonetheless be assumed to be at least partly linked to social reproduction. Parents from the higher strata provided their children with competence and skills, that made them better qualified to obtain high status positions later in life. More specifically, social inequality was believed to be transmitted by entitlement, the direct transfer of possessions, legal discrimination and socialization (Ganzeboom et al. 1990). Accordingly, children from high status backgrounds were better prepared to achieve high positions in the various life-style fields. They were equipped to graduate from colleges and universities and they were qualified and socialized to have a proper taste regarding high culture and material wealth. Therefore, in addition to the variation in individual resources, we believe that social differentiation in life-style was directly associated with ascribed features of social origin such as parental education, parental status and parental Communist Party membership (arrow B, in Figure 1).

In addition, parental social origin was presumed to affect life-style differentiation indirectly through an individual's resources. Social origin then was assumed to be effective in two steps. Initially, differences in parental background led to differences in individual resources. Subsequently, this variation in individual resources was to lead to differences in life-style (arrows BA\*A, in Figure 1). Additionally, a person's social background influenced life-style differentiation by means of cultural reproduction (arrows BC\*C, and BC\*CA\*A, in Figure 1). High status parents were more culturally active, and by bringing their offspring into contact with high culture, they provided their children with better opportunities to obtain high status positions and a favorable life-style.

Although several studies have focused on the relation between parental background and social position (e.g. Wong 1996), only a few studies on life style differentiation accounted for inequalities due to parental social origin. However, the research that has been conducted, clearly illustrated the importance of intergenerational transmission of inequality with respect to life-style, also in Eastern Europe (Wnuk-Lipinski 1983; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989; Kolosi 1989, 1990; Gabal 1990). All these studies showed that social origin (measured by parental education, income, or occupational status) directly determines cultural as well as material life-style differentiation. Next, indirect social reproduction was shown to be of importance. This was especially the case through intervening features such as education and income.

#### *Parental cultural capital and life-style differentiation: cultural reproduction*

A third theoretical tradition pertains to the influence of cultural socialization on differentiation in life-style. As a critique on traditional stratification research, several authors suggested that cultural factors might constitute an alternative reason for the inheritance of social inequality (Collins 1971; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970; DiMaggio 1982; DeGraaf 1986). According to these authors, a specific cultural environment at home could make for inequalities. More specifically, children from a high status background were more often exposed to high brow cultural values and activities at home, and thus acquired cultural capital. Cultural capital was believed to be an asset in life because it enhanced a person's capacities to master academic material, and develop a taste for learning abstract and intellectual concepts (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970; Ganzeboom et al. 1990). Children from high cultural background were consequently more likely to reach higher levels of education. Most empirical research has underscored the reproducing role of cultural capital for educational attainment (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; DeGraaf 1986; Robert 1991; Mateju 1990; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996).

A culturally favorable home climate can also be linked to life-style differences. As Mohr and DiMaggio (1995) illustrated, features of the cultural climate at home were largely responsible

for the accumulation of cultural interest. As a consequence, individuals raised in visually or musically sophisticated families were highly advantaged to prefer high cultural expressions themselves (DiMaggio and Useem 1978; Ganzeboom 1982). In addition, cultural socialization increased a person's life chances in general; it taught a high status group a way of living. Cultural reproduction with respect to non-cultural life-style expressions could thus also be expected; for instance, a person who had had a favorable home climate would prefer cultural resources and be more apt to accumulate material wealth. Cultural socialization at home was thus of direct importance to the differentiation in life-style (arrow C, in Figure 1).

Cultural reproduction also could be indirectly (via individual resources) responsible for inequalities in life-style (arrows CA\*A, in Figure 1). If parents had been culturally active during their children's childhood, these children would have better chances of reaching a high level of education and occupational and political status. Subsequently, these individual resources provided them with opportunities to accumulate material wealth and a high cultural life-style.

Previous research has made this reasoning about direct and indirect cultural reproduction likely. Some studies conducted in the United States and Western Europe have underscored the importance of cultural capital for differentiation in life-style patterns (Mohr and Dimaggio 1995). In addition, Ganzeboom et al. (1990) observed an impressive resemblance in cultural life-style in Hungary. Even after relevant individual resources were taken into account, a significant positive effect of parental cultural capital on a person's cultural participation remained, illustrating the intergenerational transmission of cultural interest. There was also a small but significant resemblance effect for housing quality.

In the previous paragraphs, we assumed that individual resources, parental social origin, and parental cultural capital were meaningful in explaining cultural and material life-style differentiation. However, we did not include any statements on the relative importance of the concepts, or the direct-indirect ratio of the intergenerational transmission of inequality. It was difficult to formulate hypotheses on these specific issues, because earlier research in Eastern Europe barely addressed these topics. However, based on more or less common knowledge, certain expectations could be derived. With respect to our first research question, we believe that an individual's characteristics are the most important aspects in both of the fields. Life-style choices are predominantly determined by an individual's own personal qualities. Due to de-stratification processes in Eastern Europe, in addition to social reproduction, cultural reproduction became an important alternative path for the intergenerational transmission of inequality. As a consequence, cultural socialization in the parental home could be expected to be the most relevant aspect of intergenerational reproduction as regards the cultural as well as the material life-style. Our second research question dealt with the fact that the transmission of inequality not only ran directly but also indirectly through a person's individual characteristics. We assumed the reproduction effects to be predominantly indirect. After all, as a result of the de-stratifying policy of governments in Eastern Europe, the direct pathways for the transmission of inequalities were restricted.

## Data, Method and Measurement

### Data

To test our expectations with respect to life-style differentiation in Eastern Europe, we analyzed data from five large scale surveys held in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,

and Slovakia in 1993. The surveys were organized within the project 'Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989' (SSEE), supervised by Donald Treiman and Ivan Szelenyi from UCLA in conjunction with researchers from the countries in the survey (Treiman and Szelenyi 1993a; 1993b). In all five countries, the SSEE data referred to a national random probability sample of the population. Since exactly the same questions were asked in all five countries, and similar sample designs were used, the data were highly cross-nationally comparable. The SSEE data enabled us to include Bulgaria in this study, a country we knew little about with respect to life-style differentiation. In order to avoid misspecification, we limited our analyses to adult men and women between 25 and 70 years of age, with valid information on all of the relevant variables. This left us with a total of 3,542 respondents in Bulgaria (22.1% excluded), 4,662 in the Czech Republic (9.7% excluded), 3,339 in Hungary (11.5% excluded), 2,635 in Poland (13.5% excluded), and 3,777 in Slovakia (15.0% excluded).

The SSEE data went far beyond the usual stratification and life-style surveys in several ways. Firstly, their quality lay in the fact that the SSEE data contained explicit measurements of the relevant theoretical concepts, for the respondents as well as for their parents. In particular, the cultural environment in the parental home during childhood (around age 15) was extensively measured. Moreover, this information on parental cultural capital was highly comparable with information on the respondents' present cultural behavior. Second, the SSEE data were not only comparable between generations, but also between nations. In all five Eastern European countries, questions were asked in the same fashion. Earlier cross-national life-style research often did not make it clear whether the variation between countries was due to real differentiation, or to contrasting measurements (Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp 1989). The SSEE data, however, made it possible to replicate tests for the five Eastern European countries. This five-country design could provide stronger evidence on the tenability of the three explanatory mechanisms, than a single-country design.

The SSEE data were unique in providing information on the questions at hand in this article. One drawback, however, was the lack of information on the financial and material assets of the parents. Due to this limitation, the direct transmission of material resources could not be investigated. Although parental financial resources can be important in predicting educational and occupational attainment, the study by Ganzeboom et al. (1990) on Hungary showed that the direct transmission of material assets was rather limited. Therefore, we assumed that our estimates of the effects of parental characteristics on material consumption and high cultural participation were barely biased.

### Measurement: dependent variables

In line with Bourdieu (1984), we assumed that cultural and material life-style differentiation could be described by looking at high cultural participation, and at the possession of durables in combination with housing quality. To measure *high cultural participation*, our respondents were asked how often they went to museums (in a year), plays (in a year), and listened to classical music at home (in a year). In addition to these activities, high cultural participation is believed to be related to two aspects of reading, namely the number of serious (literature/science) books one reads (in a year), and the number of times he goes to a public library (in a year). All five indicators for high cultural participation had six answering categories, ranging from never to more than once a week. For reasons of presentation, we recoded the six categories in terms of a year score, resulting in an ordinal scale, ranging from

0 to 52 times a year'. Furthermore, *material consumption* was believed to be indicated by the ownership of eight consumer durables (0/1), a washing machine, VCR, satellite-dish, microwave, freezer, computer, lavatory, and bathroom. We measured the housing quality by the number of rooms and the absolute size (in m<sup>2</sup>) of a respondent's house.

In Appendix A1, we give the means and standard deviations for the distinct indicators. On the average, the figures reveal a similarity among the Eastern European nations, but a remarkable variation on the two life-style domains can be observed. In the case of high cultural participation, the Czech and Slovakian people most often went to theaters, museums, and public libraries, especially compared with Poles, and Bulgarians. The Czechs went to a theater 2.23 times a year, and 3.93 times to a library. In contrast, the Poles only went to plays 1.21 times, and to a library 2.47 times a year. The Czechs were also the most avid readers; they read approximately 15 books a year, while the Hungarians, and Poles read no more than an average of 10 books. However, in general we observed more similarities than contrasts among the countries with respect to high status culture.

Of the five Eastern European countries, clearly the Bulgarians had the lowest standard of living with respect to material consumption. Only 35% of the Bulgarians had a washing machine, as compared to more than 60% of the Poles and Czechs. And only 6% of the Bulgarians owned a freezer. In contrast, in Hungary and the Czech Republic more than 60% of the people did have a freezer. Moreover, the homes in Poland on the average were the smallest in size as well as with respect to the number of rooms.

In this study we were not primarily interested in differences between separate life-style indicators. Our main concern was in the explanatory potential of the three theoretical concepts for differentiation in high cultural participation and material consumption. Therefore, we used the unweighted standardized average of scores on the indicators as an index for cultural participation and material wealth. The reliability of the resulting scales is reported in Appendix A2. In general, the reliability was not extremely high (all but one over  $\alpha = .60$ ), but it was satisfactory for a scaling procedure in which items represented a broad range of topics. Since our aim was to explain the variation in the life-style domains within each nation, we constructed scales for the five Eastern European countries separately. Moreover, since we were interested in cultural behavior and material wealth as positional goods, it was important to study them relatively to other people's cultural behavior and material wealth. In other words, a person's life-style needs to be valued by comparing it with life-style choices of other people in the same country. Instead of using the raw average scores of the scales as dependent variables we therefore computed percentile scores: respondents were ranked on the basis of their score on the scale for cultural participation and material consumption, and each respondent was given a related percentile score. The ultimate scales then ranged from 0 to 100, with a mean in each nation of 50 (see Appendix A1). Subsequently, a position of 35 on a high cultural participation scale meant that in a country 34% of the population was less culturally, and 65% more culturally active.

#### *Measurement: independent variables*

The main question in our study was to what extent the individual resources and social and cultural characteristics of a person's parents influenced choices in two life-style fields. Several

<sup>1</sup> For all five indicators of high culture participation: never refers to 0, less than once a year to 1, once or twice a year to 2, a few times a year to 6, around once a month to 12, several times monthly/once a week to 26, and more often than once a week refers to 52.

indicators of these concepts were used in our analyses as explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Appendix A3. Individual resources were measured by *educational attainment* (in years of schooling), *monthly (household) income per capita* (percentile scores), *occupational prestige* (current or last occupation in prestige points' (Treiman 1977)), and former *membership in Communist Party* (0/1). According to the common consensus, the general level of schooling was highest in the Czech Republic (11.9 years) and Slovakia (11.8 years), and lowest in Bulgaria (9.7 years). For occupational prestige, we observed a similar pattern. With respect to party membership in all the countries, between 10% and 16% of our respondents were once affiliated to a Communist Party. Income was measured with percentile scores for each country separately. As a consequence, no meaningful comparisons could be drawn between the various nations.

Parental social origin was indicated by *parental education* (mean of father's and mother's education in years of schooling), *parental occupational prestige* (average score of father's and mother's occupational prestige at age 14), and former *membership in a Communist Party* of at least one of the parents (no/yes). As expected, given the results at the respondent level, the average education of the parents in Bulgaria was the lowest (5.33 years), and in the Czech Republic the highest (9.57 years). With respect to occupational prestige, a contra-intuitive pattern was revealed; in Bulgaria the average prestige score for the parents was the highest. This outcome could be explained by an over-representation of Bulgarian parents in the agricultural sector, probably because of a fairly late industrialization<sup>2</sup>. In the case of parental party affiliation, cross-national differences were also observed; in the Czech Republic no fewer than 28% of all the parents had reported once been a member of the Communists Party. In the other Eastern European countries, parental association with the Communist Party fluctuated between 15% and 18%.

To measure *parental cultural capital*, retrospective questions were asked in exactly the same fashion as the questions to the respondents on high cultural participation. The questions referred to the parental cultural behavior and reading activities during the period when the respondents were growing up, i.e. around 14 years of age. Thus, with respect to parental cultural capital, the respondents were asked how often their parents went to museums (in a year), how often they went to plays (in a year), listened to classical music at home (in a year), how many serious (literature/science) books they read (in a year), and how often they went to a public library (in a year). Again, these indicators had six answering categories, ranging from never to more than once a week, and were rearranged in terms of a year score. Descriptions of these indicators are presented in Appendix A3. A comparison of the means clearly shows that the Czech parents were the most active cultural participants, in contrast with the Polish and Bulgarian parents, who had the least cultural interest. Using the same procedure as for the respondents, scales for parental cultural capital were constructed by calculating the unweighted standardized average of scores on the subsequent indicators (in all the countries, the reliability coefficients were above  $\alpha = .65$ ). Again, for each parental home the relative position with respect to cultural capital, measured by a percentile score, was computed. A score of 60 on the parental cultural capital scale indicated that in a country, 59% of the parents were less cultural and 40% of the parents were more cultural.

<sup>2</sup> In the event that a respondent reported no last occupation, the value of the spouse's last occupation or the value related to the first occupation was used.

<sup>3</sup> To check for an overvaluation of agricultural labor, we also gave agricultural workers in all the countries a substantially lower prestige score. This correction virtually did not alter the results of our regression analyses. We therefore chose to use the original coding of the SSEE data.

Table 1. Mean values of high culture participation and material consumption by explanatory variables in five Eastern European countries in 1993

Variables (range)	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>
<b>Individual Resources</b>										
Education (years)										
0 to 8 years	34	38	39	32	33	34	30	35	35	30
9 to 13 years	59	58	47	50	52	53	50	52	48	51
14+ years	78	68	66	59	74	69	73	62	66	63
Income (percentiles)										
lowest tertil	42	41	48	37	40	35	42	37	47	37
middle tertil	49	48	49	53	49	51	49	49	47	50
highest tertil	59	61	53	61	61	65	59	63	56	63
Occupational prestige (0-100)										
0 to 30 prestige points	44	45	44	42	38	36	43	41	40	39
30 to 40 prestige points	43	44	43	49	45	49	41	46	44	46
40 to 100 prestige points	67	64	60	56	65	62	65	59	60	59
Member Communist Party										
no member	48	48	49	50	49	49	49	49	49	49
member	62	61	55	51	61	58	55	54	54	57

Table 1. continued

Variables (range)	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>
<b>Parental Social Origin</b>										
Education parents (years)										
0 to 8 years	45	46	46	42	43	45	43	46	44	44
9 to 13 years	72	67	51	53	62	60	61	58	56	56
14+ years	82	72	68	60	82	72	76	67	66	68
Occupational prestige parents (0-100)										
0 to 30 prestige points	47	46	47	42	42	43	48	45	45	45
30 to 40 prestige points	46	47	47	49	47	48	46	48	47	48
40 to 100 prestige points	69	64	57	56	65	62	63	61	59	58
Member Communist Party parents										
no member	47	48	49	49	48	49	48	48	49	49
member	66	61	52	53	61	57	59	57	56	57
<b>Parental Cultural Resources</b>										
Cultural capital parents (percentiles)										
no	37	43	32	43	35	41	37	43	34	41
0 to 80 percent	60	58	48	50	57	55	58	54	51	52
80 to 100 percent	79	66	71	55	74	61	72	61	71	58
Total Number of Respondents	3542		4662		3339		2635		3777	

Source Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993

Notes 1 Refers to mean values for high cultural participation

2 Refers to mean values for material consumption

Finally, although the impact of individual resources and parental characteristics was our main concern, we also took relevant demographic background features into account. To begin with, a person's position in the life-cycle was assumed to be relevant, since these differences could determine specific financial and time-budget restrictions. Therefore, we included *age* (in years), *marital status* (0/1 (married, or living together was coded 1)), and *employment situation* (0/1 (employed full-time was coded 1)). We also accounted for restrictions due to children living at home who needed parenting. A distinction was drawn between *children under the age of 6* (total number), and *children over the age of 6* (total number). In addition, we controlled for *sex* of the respondents (0/1 (woman was coded as 1)). Finally, in Eastern Europe the *degree of urbanization* of a person's residence was believed to be important. Especially in the case of high culture, but of material wealth as well, variations in consumption patterns could be due to supply-side features. This was because rural regions generally had fewer cultural provisions than urban areas. Urbanization was measured in five categories, ranging from rural area (1) to capital city (5).

### Bi-Variate Analyses

We began by describing how differences in high cultural participation and material consumption related to individual resources and parental background characteristics. By doing so, we gave a preliminary answer to our first research question. In Table 1, the mean percentile scores for the two life-style choices were related to indicators of our three explanatory concepts. All the independent variables were rearranged in such a way that, if possible, they referred to about a third of the research population. The mean percentile scores for high cultural participation and material consumption showed the differentiation based on these features. Percentile scores, by definition, range from 0 to 100, with a mean of 50. So if there is no association between an independent variable and material consumption, for example, a mean percentile score of 50 would be expected for each category of the independent variable. If there is an association between material consumption and an independent variable, the mean percentile scores would be more dispersed over the range between 0 and 100<sup>4</sup>.

Table 1 reveals indisputable differences East European life-styles, among the various categories of the selected independent characteristics. In all five countries, the patterns of social differentiation in life-style were surprisingly alike. For high cultural participation, the variation regarding individual resources was most clear. Bulgarians with less than 9 years of school had a mean percentile score of 34. This implies that in general, 65% of the Bulgarian population was culturally more active. Respondents in Bulgaria with more than 14 years of school had a mean score of 78 on the high cultural participation scale, which shows that on the average, 77% of them were less culturally interested. As was expected, for all the countries it can be stated that variation in education is especially relevant to the cultural field, whereas variation in income is most relevant to material consumption. In all the Eastern European countries, the impact of occupational prestige was also comparable; people from the most prestigious occupations (over 40 prestige points) differed from the less highly qualified professionals in the cultural field as well as in the material one. With respect to former Communist Party membership, there was substantial variation. Especially in Bulgaria and Hungary, affiliation paid off in terms of cultural interest and material luxury. In Hungary,

<sup>4</sup> The distribution depends on the association between dependent and independent variables, and the number of respondents in a category. If, as is the case for income, an equal number of respondents is located in each category, no association is represented by a mean score of 50 in each tertile. An association of 1 is represented by a percentile score of 16.66 in the first tertile, 50 in the second, and 83.33 in the third tertile for income.

57% of the respondents were lower on the material consumption scale than the average former Communist Party member.

Likewise, with respect to parental social origin, there were relevant differences in the positioning on the high cultural participation and material consumption ladder. Even more than on the respondents' level, variation in education was important. In Hungary, respondents with well-educated parents (having on the average more than 14 years of school) had a score for high cultural participation of 82. This implies that on the average, 81% of the Hungarians were lower in the cultural field than the respondents with such well-educated parents. For the differentiation in the material field, parental education was also important (i.e. compared to parental occupational prestige and party membership). Variation in occupational prestige predominantly pertained to differences between people whose parents had a prestige higher than 40 points, and those whose parents had less than 40 prestige points. In addition, Communist Party affiliation of the parents was relevant as well. Especially, in Bulgaria and Hungary, the variation was striking.

Finally, as was expected, differences due to parental cultural socialization were primarily relevant in the cultural field. In the Czech Republic, respondents with culturally active parents (category 80 to 100 percent) had a score of 71 on the high cultural participation scale. Perhaps even more surprisingly was the fact that the positioning of a respondent in the material field was also related to a cultural socialization. Apparently, culturally interested parents gave their children better qualities to do well in the material field, than parents who were not active cultural participants.

In sum, our findings have revealed equal patterns of social differentiation in the two life-style fields in all five Eastern European countries. In addition, there were substantial differences for all the independent characteristics with respect to high cultural participation and material consumption. However, all the variation pertained to bi-variate associations without controlling other relevant aspects. The question thus arises: To what extent can social differentiation in the cultural and material life-style fields be explained by variation in individual resources, parental social origin, and parental cultural capital studied in a multi-variate research design?

### Multi-Variate Analyses

#### *Relative importance of individual resources, parental social origin and parental cultural capital for life-style differentiation*

Our first research question dealt with the relative importance of individual resources and parental background characteristics for differentiation in the cultural and material life-style fields in five Eastern European countries. To answer this question, we have presented estimates of a multi-variate OLS-regression model in Table 2 for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The coefficients we reported were directly standardized and unstandardized effects of the independent factors on high cultural participation and material consumption (i.e. arrows A, B and C in Figure 1). In Table 2, standardized regression coefficients (b) provide an indication of the relative strength of the explanatory variables predicting differences in cultural participation and material wealth. Furthermore, unstandardized coefficients (b) signify specific changes in the relative position of an individual, on a 0 to 100 ranking of a certain life-style field in a country.



The coefficients in Table 2, however, only involve the effects of separate indicators, whereas our research question pertained to the relative contribution of three explanatory concepts (individual resources, parental social origin and parental cultural capital). Therefore, in Table 3, we have reported changes in explained variance ( $\Delta R^2$ ) if a distinguished group of variables was omitted from our regression model. A significance test (F-test) related to excluding each of the concepts has also been presented. Table 3 further indicates the relative impact of a theoretical concept in the explanation, relating the change in explained variance with certain variables excluded to the explained variance of a full model ( $\Delta R^2/R^2$ ). Thus, the figures in Table 3 directly answer our research question with respect to the relative contribution of the theoretical concepts to the explanation of differentiation in high cultural participation and material consumption.

In describing our explanatory analyses, we first discuss the results related to high cultural participation, and then comment on the results with respect to material consumption.

#### Differentiation in high cultural participation

Although our research question dealt with the relative importance of three theoretical concepts, we began by discussing the results for the *demographic background* in explaining high cultural participation. Our regression models in Table 2 show that in all five countries, women were culturally more active than men. Especially in the former Czechoslovakia, women scored more than 8 percentile points higher on our high culture ranking between 0 and 100 than men. The degree of urbanization in most Eastern European countries was also relevant to cultural participation. Especially in the relatively less developed countries like Bulgaria and Poland, people who lived in cities appeared to be more active in the cultural field than rural people. Table 2 further indicates that of the time-restricting aspects, the number of small children was the most meaningful. In the Czech Republic, each child under 6 years of age meant 3.8 percentile points less on our cultural participation scale. It was also striking that in three countries, marriage significantly decreased a person's cultural behavior (in Hungary by 3.5 percentile points).

With respect to the more theoretically interesting aspects, as was expected Table 3 shows our expectations that *individual resources* were highly relevant in explaining differentiation in high cultural participation. On the average, excluding certain features that measured individual characteristics from a model for cultural participation ( $\Delta R^2$ ) yielded a significant reduction in the total explained variance of between 5.5% (in the Czech Republic) and 10.5% (in Poland). If we relate this reduction in variance to the total explained variance in the full model ( $\Delta R^2/R^2$ ), it gives rise to the conclusion that between 11.5% (in Bulgaria) and 23.6% (in Poland) of the explained variance can be attributed exclusively to differences in individual resources. More specifically, our findings indicated that in Hungary and Poland, individual characteristics were the most important predictors of differences in high cultural participation.

In Table 2, coefficients regarding individual resources are presented. It seems clear that education was the most meaningful component of the individual characteristics. In all five countries, each extra year of school roughly meant a score of 2 percentile points higher on our cultural participation scale. In Bulgaria ( $b=.282$ ) and Poland ( $b=.348$ ) the effects of education were the most profound. Income differences seemed to be of little weight as regards cultural participation. Choices in the cultural field were only marginally determined by financial restrictions.

Table 2a. Regression (unstandardized (b) and standardized (b) coefficients) of high culture participation on individual resources, parental social origin, and parental cultural resources for five Eastern European countries in 1993

Variables (range)	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia						
	b (se)	B (sig)	b (se)	B (sig)	b (se)	B (sig)	b (se)	B (sig)	b (se)	B (sig)					
<b>HIGH CULTURE PARTICIPATION</b>															
<b>Demographic Background</b>															
Woman	1.663	(.675)	.029 *	8.827	(.751)	1.53 ***	6.001	(.765)	.105 ***	5.578	(.867)	.098 ***	8.032	(.825)	.139 ***
Age (25 = 0)	-.163	(.113)	.072	.440	(.127)	1.88 **	.055	(.128)	.024	-.034	(.155)	-.014	.173	(.144)	.071
Age <sup>2</sup>	-.003	(.002)	-.068	-.003	(.003)	-.055	-.001	(.003)	-.003	-.003	(.004)	.062	-.001	(.003)	-.013
Degree of urbanisation (1 = 0)	2.340	(.269)	1.17 ***	1.040	(.275)	.049 **	1.934	(.281)	.098 ***	2.305	(.352)	.109 ***	1.009	(.372)	.045 **
Married	-.350	(.382)	-.005	-2.465	(1.079)	-.034 *	-3.480	(1.103)	-.049 **	-.869	(1.221)	-.012	-2.522	(1.166)	-.036 *
Employed full-time	1.926	(.790)	.033 *	-2.804	(.995)	-.046 **	-.283	(.903)	-.005	1.957	(1.012)	.033	1.275	(.937)	.022
# children under 6 years old	-1.525	(.725)	-.028 *	-3.830	(.908)	-.060 ***	-3.476	(.871)	-.059 ***	-2.120	(.697)	-.050 **	-3.167	(.880)	-.057 **
# children over 6 years old	-1.015	(.404)	-.034 *	-.561	(.414)	-.020	-.672	(.446)	-.023	-.665	(.427)	-.026	-.975	(.410)	-.038 *
<b>Individual Resources</b>															
Education (12 = 0)	2.268	(.140)	.282 ***	2.098	(.167)	.210 ***	2.155	(.163)	.263 ***	2.912	(.178)	.348 ***	1.772	(.172)	.200 ***
Income (50 = 0)	.025	(.014)	.026	.019	(.017)	.019	-.104	(.018)	-.105 ***	-.026	(.019)	-.026	.044	(.018)	.044 *
Occupational prestige (40 = 0)	.082	(.029)	.039 **	.211	(.036)	.089 ***	-.193	(.037)	-.085 ***	.187	(.043)	.077 ***	.204	(.040)	.089 ***
Member Communist Party	4.072	(.996)	.951 ***	1.591	(1.079)	.026	2.326	(1.226)	.026	2.245	(1.340)	.026	2.823	(1.132)	.036 *
<b>Parental Social Origin</b>															
Education parents (12 = 0)	.680	(.125)	.096 ***	-.259	(.236)	-.018	.403	(.180)	.042 *	.304	(.176)	.035	-.503	(.244)	-.039 *
Occupational prestige parents (40 = 0)	-.095	(.035)	-.035 **	-.098	(.036)	-.039 **	-.036	(.035)	-.015	-.057	(.044)	-.021	-.051	(.039)	-.021
Member Communist Party parent	2.272	(.935)	.931 *	-.984	(.812)	-.015	2.030	(1.058)	.026	.281	(1.140)	.004	-.826	(1.078)	-.011
<b>Parental Cultural Resources</b>															
Cultural capital parents (50 = 0)	.388	(.017)	.346 ***	.415	(.014)	.414 ***	.347	(.0172)	.331 ***	.318	(.018)	.299 ***	.419	(.016)	.415 ***
Constant	53.165	(1.738)		40.522	(1.921)		50.901	(1.839)		46.929	(2.076)		42.814	(1.935)	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (percentage)	51.3%			32.5%			45.4%			44.3%			31.6%		
Total Number of Respondents	3542			4662			3339			2635			3777		

Source: Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe, 1993.  
Note: \* - significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* - significant at  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* - significant at  $p < .001$ .

Table 2b. Regression (unstandardized (b) and standardized (β) coefficients) of material consumption on individual resources, parental social origin, and parental cultural resources for five Eastern European countries in 1993

Variables (range)	Bulgaria			Czech Republic			Hungary			Poland			Slovakia		
	b (se)	β (sig)		b (se)	β (sig)		b (se)	β (sig)		b (se)	β (sig)		b (se)	β (sig)	
<b>MATERIAL CONSUMPTION</b>															
<b>Demographic Background</b>															
Woman	.206 (.834)	.004		.499 (.806)	.009		2.927 (.835)	.051 ***		1.231 (1.008)	.021		1.862 (.858)	.032 *	
Age (25 = 0)	.445 (.140)	.192 **		.293 (.137)	.125 *		.383 (.140)	.164 **		.173 (.180)	.072		.362 (.150)	.150 *	
Age <sup>2</sup>	-.008 (.003)	-.154 *		-.013 (.003)	-.013 ***		-.008 (.003)	-.157 *		-.008 (.004)	-.146 *		-.011 (.003)	-.206 **	
Degree of urbanisation (1 = 0)	3.212 (.333)	.157 ***		-1.913 (.296)	-.090 ***		-1.31 (.307)	-.007		.909 (.410)	.042 *		-1.010 (.335)	-.045 **	
Married	6.756 (1.214)	.088 ***		9.213 (1.157)	.125 ***		8.597 (1.205)	.119 ***		5.907 (1.420)	.082 ***		7.554 (1.212)	.109 ***	
Employed full-time	.741 (.977)	.013		2.687 (1.067)	.045 *		5.638 (.987)	.097 ***		.544 (1.177)	.009		3.465 (.996)	.057 **	
# children under 6 years old	1.054 (.896)	.019		-.541 (.974)	-.009		-.630 (.952)	-.011		-.038 (.811)	-.001		-1.566 (.916)	-.028	
# children over 6 years old	2.739 (.500)	.090 ***		2.830 (.445)	.099 ***		3.172 (.487)	.107 ***		3.093 (.497)	.122 ***		2.216 (.426)	.087 ***	
<b>Individual Resources</b>															
Education (12 = 0)	1.441 (.173)	.176 ***		.837 (.179)	.084 ***		1.635 (.178)	.198 ***		1.048 (.207)	.124 ***		1.139 (.179)	.129 ***	
Income (50 = 0)	.088 (.018)	.088 ***		.146 (.018)	.146 ***		.184 (.019)	.184 ***		.242 (.022)	.242 ***		.185 (.019)	.185 ***	
Occupational prestige (40 = 0)	.059 (.036)	.027		.159 (.039)	.067 ***		.179 (.041)	.078 ***		.135 (.050)	.055 **		.233 (.041)	.102 ***	
Member Communist Party	4.028 (1.231)	.050 **		-1.677 (1.075)	-.022		1.909 (1.340)	.021		.920 (1.559)	.011		2.836 (1.177)	.036 *	
<b>Parental Social Origin</b>															
Education parents (12 = 0)	1.121 (.154)	.155 ***		.913 (.253)	.062 **		1.229 (.196)	.126 ***		.672 (.205)	.077 **		1.254 (.253)	.097 ***	
Occupational prestige parents (40 = 0)	.032 (.043)	.011		.079 (.039)	.031 *		.028 (.039)	.012		.058 (.051)	.021		.015 (.041)	.006	
Member Communist Party parent	1.077 (1.156)	.014		-1.837 (.871)	-.028 *		.223 (1.156)	.003		1.261 (1.326)	.017		.423 (1.121)	.006	
<b>Parental Cultural Resources</b>															
Cultural capital parents (50 = 0)	.094 (.021)	.083 ***		.038 (.014)	.038 **		.041 (.019)	.039 *		.067 (.022)	.062 **		.051 (.017)	.050 **	
Constant	41.604 (2.149)			45.993 (2.060)			40.822 (2.010)			43.881 (2.415)			42.585 (2.014)		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (percentage)	28.3%			22.3%			35.7%			26.3%			26.0%		
Total Number of Respondents	3542			4662			3339			2635			3777		

Source Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993  
 Note \* - significant at p < .05; \*\* - significant at p < .01; \*\*\* - significant p < .001.

Table 3. Results of F-test for changes in R<sup>2</sup> excluding explanatory variables (demographic background, individual resources, parental social origin, parental cultural resources) from the regression models (Table 2) for high culture participation and material consumption in five Eastern European countries in 1993

Explanatory Variables (df) <sup>1</sup>	Bulgaria			Czech Republic			Hungary			Poland			Slovakia		
	ΔR <sup>2</sup>	ΔR <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	F (sig)	ΔR <sup>2</sup>	ΔR <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	F (sig)	ΔR <sup>2</sup>	ΔR <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	F (sig)	ΔR <sup>2</sup>	ΔR <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	F (sig)	ΔR <sup>2</sup>	R <sup>2</sup> /R <sup>2</sup>	F (sig)
<b>HIGH CULTURE PARTICIPATION</b>															
Demographic background (8)	1.5%	2.9%	13.45	5.8%	18.0%	50.37	3.1%	6.8%	23.41	2.9%	6.6%	17.20	3.1%	9.9%	21.48
Individual resources (4)	5.9%	11.5%	107.44	5.5%	16.9%	94.71	8.4%	18.6%	128.73	10.5%	23.6%	123.64	5.6%	17.6%	76.82
Parental social origin (3)	.6%	1.1%	13.69	.2%	0.7%	5.00--	.2%	.3%	3.12---	.1%	.2%	1.31----	.2%	.6%	3.44---
Parental cultural resources (1)	7.3%	14.3%	532.51	13.5%	41.4%	928.20	6.7%	14.7%	407.90	6.1%	13.7%	287.06	12.6%	39.8%	693.98
Total Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (percentage)	51.3%			32.5%			45.5%			44.3%			31.6%		
<b>MATERIAL CONSUMPTION</b>															
Demographic background (8)	3.9%	13.8%	23.79	6.1%	27.2%	45.38	4.2%	11.8%	27.35	3.7%	14.0%	16.41	3.8%	14.7%	24.39
Individual resources (4)	3.4%	12.0%	42.20	3.0%	13.4%	44.66	7.8%	21.8%	100.98	7.0%	26.5%	62.30	6.6%	25.4%	84.12
Parental social origin (3)	1.3%	4.4%	20.67	.5%	2.0%	9.01	.9%	2.6%	15.94	.5%	1.8%	5.64	.6%	2.3%	10.16
Parental cultural resources (1)	.4%	1.5%	20.59	.1%	.5%	6.76--	.1%	.3%	4.75---	.3%	1.0%	9.37--	.2%	.7%	9.37--
Total Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (percentage)	28.3%			22.3%			35.7%			26.3%			26.0%		
Total Number of Respondents	3542			4662			3339			2635			3777		

Source Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993  
 Notes -- NOT significant at p < .001; --- NOT significant at p < .01; ---- NOT significant at p < .05.  
 1 Refers to the number of variables excluded from the model.

Only in Hungary ( $b=.104$ ) and Slovakia ( $b=.044$ ) could significant effects of income on cultural behavior be detected. On the other hand, occupational prestige affected high cultural participation in the sense that people in more prestigious professions were more culturally active. A fascinating result was discovered for having been a member of a Communist Party. In Bulgaria, former communists scored 4 percentile points higher on our cultural participation scale than non-members, and in Slovakia the difference was 2.8. These figures clearly illustrate the lasting influence of individual resources in former socialist societies with respect to high cultural participation.

*Parental social origin* proved to be of little relevance to differentiation in cultural participation. Table 3 indicates that only in Bulgaria did omitting family origin factors result in a significantly worse model; the explained variance then decreased by 0.6%. In all the other Eastern European countries, family origin did not make a significant contribution to the explanation of differences in high culture. Clearly, in relation to the two other theoretical concepts, in all the countries family origin was the least important. An examination of Table 2 also leads to this conclusion. Only for Bulgaria were clearly significant coefficients revealed for the education of a person's parents. Another interesting result pertained to parental communist affiliation in Bulgaria. Although the effect was only small, formerly communist parents significantly provided their offspring with more qualities in the cultural field than non-members; respondents whose parents once were members of the party scored 2.3 percentile points higher on cultural behavior.

Although family background was of little relevance in predicting cultural behavior, the amount of *parental cultural capital* was extremely important. If we exclude cultural capital from our regression model, the variance explained declines by 6.1% (in Poland) to 13.5% (in the Czech Republic). This implies that anywhere from 13.7% (in Poland) to even 41.4% (in the Czech Republic) of the variance could solely be attributed to cultural capital features. A comparison between the theoretical concepts leads us to conclude that in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, aspects of parental cultural capital were even more important than individual qualities. The coefficients in Table 2 also illustrate the importance of cultural socialization for high cultural participation. In all countries, the effects of parental cultural capital were highly significant. In general, a change of 10 percentile points of cultural capital resulted in between 3.1 (Poland) and 4.2 (Slovakia) percentile points change on our cultural participation scale. Cultural socialization at home obviously enlarged a person's capacities in the cultural field. In this respect, cultural resemblance seems to be a proper expression.

In sum, our findings give rise to some general conclusions. First, in order to explain the differences in high cultural participation in five former socialist countries, parental cultural capital and individual resources were the most important. Parental social origin did not greatly influence the differences in cultural participation. Second, with respect to the intergenerational transmission of inequality, our expectations were apparently confirmed. Probably because of the various de-stratification measures employed in the former socialist countries, cultural reproduction seems to have become a major alternative route for the intergenerational transmission of inequality.

#### *Differentiation in material consumption*

For material consumption as well, we began by describing the effects of *demographic background characteristics*. As was expected, in Table 2, age is an important feature with respect to material wealth; during their lifetime people accumulate valuable durables and

possessions. In Bulgaria every ten years a respondent would gain 4.5 percentile points on our material consumption scale. The significant negative effects for 'age' indicated that after a certain age, no more material wealth was accumulated. The degree of urbanization affected material consumption in a country specific way. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, people from the rural areas were the wealthiest, whereas in Bulgaria and Poland city dwellers were higher on material consumption. These differences probably relate to the general economic situations in the various countries, in combination with the specific housing conditions. Again as was expected, in Table 2, married respondents were higher on our material consumption scale than unmarried ones. These effects were probably related to an accumulation of wealth and income over the life-course. The same explanation probably also holds true for the effects of the number of children over the age of 6.

With respect to the differences in material wealth, as was expected Table 3 shows that the effects of *individual resources* were pronounced. If we omit individual characteristics from our model ( $\Delta R^2$ ), we get reduction in explained variance of between 3.0% (in the Czech Republic) and 7.8% (in Hungary). More specifically, the reduction in variance related to the total explained variance in the full model ( $\Delta R^2/R^2$ ) gives rise to the conclusion that between 12.0% (in Bulgaria) and 26.5% (in Poland) of the total explained variance could be solely ascribed to differences in individual characteristics. Moreover, our findings indicate that of our three theoretical concepts in all the countries except Bulgaria, individual features were the most meaningful predictors of inequality in material wealth.

Table 2 presents the effects of the four individual resource indicators on material consumption. In all five of the Eastern European countries, education appears to be a major factor generating differences in material wealth. Surprisingly, in Bulgaria ( $b=.176$ ) and Hungary ( $b=.198$ ), schooling was even the most important individual factor explaining differentiation in material consumption. In these countries, each year of school increased a person's material wealth position by roughly 1.5 percentile points. The table furthermore confirms our expectation that income was one of the most meaningful individual factors in predicting material consumption. In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, for every 10 percentile points income a person gains around 2 percentile points on the material consumption ladder. In addition, people in more prestigious occupations acquire more material wealth. A major exception in this respect was Bulgaria. In this country, occupational prestige did not account for accumulation on the material consumption ladder. However, former Communist Party membership did. A person who had once been in the Bulgarian Communist Party gained 4.0 percentile points on the material consumption scale. So even years after the major political transformations in Bulgaria, former political resources were still paying off in terms of material offsets.

In addition, *parental social origin* was of significant but of modest importance for material consumption. An examination of Table 3 shows that in all the countries except Poland, excluding family origin factors from the model led to a significant decrease in explained variance (i.e. between 0.5% in Poland and the Czech Republic and 1.3% in Bulgaria). Generally, in all the Eastern European countries, family origin made a moderate but unique contribution to the total explained variance (never more than 4.4%). However, in relation to the two other theoretical concepts, in all the countries except Bulgaria social origin features were more meaningful than the cultural capital aspects of the family background. Table 2 also makes this clear. Significant coefficients for parental educational attainment were shown in all five of the Eastern European countries; higher educated parents succeeded in reproducing material inequalities over the generations. Especially in Bulgaria ( $b=.155$ ) and Hungary ( $b=.126$ ), respondents did better in the material field due to parental educational references. In

contrast, occupational prestige and parental membership in the Communist Party were not important in predicting a person's position in the material field.

Finally, a person's *parental cultural capital* did little to explain the differentiation in material consumption. Only in Bulgaria did omitting cultural capital from the model substantially reduce the explained variance substantially (by 3.9%). In this respect, Bulgaria differs from the other Eastern European countries. In Bulgaria, cultural capital is the most important of the three theoretical concepts, whereas in all the other countries cultural capital is the least important factor explaining material wealth. Table 2 also confirms that parental cultural capital is of significant but minor relevance for material consumption. In all Eastern European countries, parents who were culturally active provided their children with certain qualities for material success.

Our findings with respect to material life-style differences can be summarized as follows. With respect to the relative contributions of the three concepts to the explanation of material wealth, as was expected, individual characteristics were the most relevant. In all the Eastern European countries except Bulgaria, individual features were almost ten times as important as parental background aspects. Furthermore, we found that the direct impact of cultural and social reproduction on material consumption differentiation is limited. Only in Bulgaria did parental cultural capital play a prominent role in explaining material wealth differentiation. The general conclusion can thus be drawn that socialist regimes seem to have been successful in reducing the direct intergenerational transmission of inequalities regarding economic aspects, in any case much more so than regarding cultural aspects.

#### Relative Importance of Direct and Indirect Intergenerational Transmission of Inequalities for Life-Style Differentiation

In all five of the countries, the former socialist situation led to experiments in de-stratification processes. Efforts were made to reduce parents' options to provide their offspring with favorable conditions for success. As a consequence, the direct influences of social background characteristics on various life-chances are believed to have been reduced. This expectation was confirmed in the foregoing section.

In the preceding analyses, however, only the direct effects of social and cultural reproduction were assessed. The analyses did not present the complete picture of intergenerational reproduction because parental features not only directly influence the differentiation in life-style, but also indirectly via an individual's resources. Therefore, our second research question dealt with the mechanisms of the intergenerational transmission of inequality. Given the explanatory model presented in Figure 1, we first addressed the extent to which a high status social origin directly stimulated cultural participation and material wealth (arrow B), or initially produced parental cultural capital and a higher individual status position, and consequently accounted for material wealth and high cultural participation indirectly (arrows BA\*A, BC\*C and arrows BC\*CA\*A). Secondly, we focused on the extent to which parental cultural capital led straight to more material wealth and high cultural behavior (arrow C), or predominantly increased a person's individual resources, and therefore indirectly caused higher levels of cultural participation and material consumption (arrows CA\*A).

Table 4 shows the total effects of three indicators of parental social origin, and one indicator of parental cultural capital on high cultural participation and material consumption. These

total effects are based on the estimates of a number of multi-variate OLS-regression models<sup>4</sup>. Table 4 also presents a decomposition in direct and indirect effects. The direct effects presented in Table 2 are compared with the total effects. For example, in Bulgaria the direct effect of parental education on high cultural participation ( $b=.096$ ) accounted for 25.4% of the total effect ( $b=.377$ ). In these cases, the direct and indirect effects had opposite signs and no decompositions were conducted. Finally, Table 4 indicates the extent to which the indirect effects of the three indicators of parental social origin ran through individual resources (arrows BA\*A), and parental cultural capital (arrows BC\*C and arrows BC\*CA\*A).

#### Differentiation in high cultural participation

With respect to high cultural participation, our results largely confirmed our expectations on the relevance of intergenerational social and cultural reproduction. Table 4 shows that all three indicators of parental social origin had significant total effects on high cultural participation. Parental education was the most relevant in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland (total effects around  $b=.300$ ), and less relevant in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (total effects around  $b=.200$ ). The total effect of parental occupational prestige in most of the countries was significant (except in Bulgaria), although it did not exceed  $b=.060$ , whereas parental party membership only seemed to be of importance in Bulgaria and Hungary. Moreover, our decomposition in Table 4 indicates that in the five Eastern European countries, parental social origin mainly indirectly influenced the variation in high cultural interests. Between 74.6% (in Bulgaria) and 88.2% (in Poland) of the total effect of parental education was indirect. A similar pattern was found for parental party membership; between 58.6% (in Hungary) and 90.2% (in Poland) of the total effect was indirect. Table 4 also shows that the indirect effects of social origin mostly ran through parental cultural capital. Only in Bulgaria did the indirect effect of party membership run more by individual resources than by parental cultural capital. To conclude, parental social origin predominantly influenced cultural life-style patterns in an indirect manner, and in this respect more through parental cultural capital than through an individual's resources. In other words, for high cultural participation social reproduction mainly occurred in an indirect fashion.

In addition, again as was expected, Table 4 shows the impressive total effects of parental cultural capital on high cultural participation (between  $b=.371$  in Poland and  $b=.457$  in Slovakia). Our results also indicate that parental cultural capital predominantly directly increases high cultural behavior. The decomposition in the five Eastern European countries shows that direct effects account for an average of 85% of the total effect of parental cultural capital on cultural participation. Therefore, it can be concluded that in Eastern Europe the direct cultural reproduction determines notable differences in the cultural field.

#### Differentiation in material consumption

For material consumption, a decomposition of the total effects of social and cultural reproduction indicators has also been conducted. Generally, our results show that all three indicators of parental social origin had significant total effects on material consumption. The total effects of parental education were more substantial than of occupational prestige and political party membership. Decomposing the total effects of parental occupational prestige

<sup>4</sup> For social origin, these total effects thus equal:  $B + BA*A + BC*C + BC*CA*A$ , and for parental cultural resources:  $C + CA*A$ . The total effects of the indicators of social origin (and their significance) can also be obtained by estimating their standardized effects in a regression model similar to those reported in Table 2, but excluding measures of individual resources and cultural background. Furthermore, the total effects of parental cultural resources can be obtained in a similar way, but then excluding measures of individual resources.

and party affiliation reveals that to a large extent these features indirectly influenced material wealth (around 70%). In the case of parental education, the ratio between direct and indirect paths was close to equal. More specifically, these indirect effects of parental education ran for about 70% by individual resources, and for only about 30% by parental cultural capital. As a result, direct intergenerational social reproduction has been observed in the case of material consumption, but the children from high status backgrounds primarily attain more material wealth through their own high status position.

Since a high culture climate in the parental home produces socialization in elitist taste, parental cultural capital can also be expected to be of importance for material consumption. The results in Table 4 confirm this expectation. Although the total effects of parental cultural capital on material consumption are considerably smaller than of high cultural participation, the total effects of parental cultural capital are significant and vary between  $b=.062$  (in the Czech Republic) and  $b=.122$  (in Bulgaria). Furthermore, our decomposition shows that parental cultural capital mainly influences a person's wealth directly (around 60%). An exception in this respect was Hungary, where the direct-indirect ratio was the reverse. However, it can be concluded that direct cultural reproduction not only occurs in the cultural field; high status tastes are also reproduced in the material field.

### Conclusion and Discussion

More than forty years of socialist regimes must have inevitably had serious repercussions on the processes that led to social inequality in Eastern Europe. The large-scale de-stratification experiments in these nations are presumed to have had a major impact on the role individual resources and parental resources played in the processes generating social inequalities in life chances. In this article, these determinants of social differentiation in cultural and material life-style patterns in Eastern Europe have been examined. Features of major traditions in the sociology of inequality, i.e. traditional stratification and mobility research and life-style research, were combined into a single explanatory model. More specifically, in this model parental social origin, parental cultural resources and individual resources were related to each other and to levels of cultural participation and material consumption. To test the tenability of our explanation and to answer the research questions, data were analyzed from cross-nationally comparable surveys held in 1993 in five nations in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). This study thus is one of the first to thoroughly examine mechanisms of intergenerational transmission with respect to life-style patterns in a cross-national perspective.

The first question we addressed is: To what extent can differences among people's cultural and material life-styles be explained by variations in their individual resources, parental social origin and parental cultural capital? The main answers with respect to cultural participation were that parental cultural capital and individual resources (especially education) were both important, and parental social origin was of little significance. Furthermore, with respect to material consumption, the foremost individual resources (in particular education and income) were relevant, and parental social origin and parental cultural resources (controlled for individual resources) were of limited significance.

To answer the second question, we focused on the extent to which the effects of social origin and parental cultural capital on differentiation in life-style were direct and indirect in the five East European countries. Our results show that parental cultural resources influenced a person's life-style for about 85 (cultural participation) and 60 percent (material consumption) in a direct way, and for the remaining parts in an indirect manner via individual resources.

Table 4. Decomposition of total effects of social and cultural reproduction on high culture participation and material luxury consumption in five Eastern European nations in 1993

Variables	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>	cul <sup>1</sup>	mat <sup>2</sup>
<b>SOCIAL REPRODUCTION</b>										
<b>Total Effect of Education Parents</b>	.377 ***	.289 ***	.192 ***	.126 ***	.311 ***	.264 ***	.300 ***	.195 ***	.188 ***	.196 ***
Direct	25.4%	53.6%	-	49.5%	13.1%	47.5%	11.8%	39.6%	-	49.4%
Indirect (total)	74.6%	46.4%	-	50.5%	86.9%	52.5%	88.2%	60.4%	-	50.6%
- via individual resources	42.5%	63.1%	34.1%	70.2%	38.1%	68.2%	39.3%	60.2%	30.6%	67.4%
- via cultural reproduction	57.5%	36.9%	65.9%	29.8%	61.9%	31.8%	60.7%	39.8%	69.4%	32.6%
<b>Total Effect of Occupational Prestige Parents</b>	.015	.032	.055 ***	.060 ***	.052 ***	.047 ***	.041 *	.054 **	.062 ***	.047 ***
Direct	-	35.7%	-	52.1%	-	25.0%	-	38.4%	-	12.9%
Indirect (total)	22.5%	64.3%	39.5%	47.9%	40.4%	75.0%	48.0%	71.8%	42.0%	87.1%
- via individual resources	77.5%	42.8%	60.5%	27.4%	59.6%	30.2%	52.0%	28.2%	58.0%	24.1%
- via cultural reproduction	-	57.2%	-	27.4%	-	30.2%	-	28.2%	-	24.1%
<b>Total Effect of Member Communist Party Parents</b>	.089 ***	.048 ***	.013	-.024	.055 ***	.013	.039 *	.035	.028	.030 ***
Direct	34.5%	29.8%	-	-	41.4%	19.6%	9.8%	47.5%	-	18.3%
Indirect (total)	65.5%	70.2%	-	-	58.6%	80.4%	90.2%	52.5%	-	81.7%
- via individual resources	57.4%	77.4%	35.7%	43.2%	13.0%	27.5%	44.7%	69.4%	46.3%	82.5%
- via cultural reproduction	42.6%	22.6%	64.3%	56.8%	87.6%	72.5%	55.3%	20.6%	53.7%	17.5%
<b>CULTURAL REPRODUCTION</b>										
<b>Total Effect of Parental Cultural Resources</b>	.400 ***	.122 ***	.454 ***	.062 ***	.405 ***	.105 ***	.371 ***	.109 ***	.457 ***	.094 ***
Direct	86.7%	67.7%	91.4%	60.8%	81.9%	36.9%	80.6%	57.4%	90.6%	53.4%
Indirect (= via individual resources)	13.3%	32.3%	8.6%	39.2%	18.1%	63.1%	19.4%	42.6%	9.4%	46.6%

Source: Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993.

Notes: 1 Refers to effects on high cultural participation.

2 Refers to effects on material luxury consumption.

- - direct and indirect effects have opposite value; Accordingly, no percentages were calculated.

\* - significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* - significant at  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* - significant at  $p < .001$ .

N.D. All these effects were controlled for demographic background variables.

Furthermore, parental social origin predominantly influenced life-style differences in an indirect way. These indirect effects of social origin on cultural life-style mainly occurred via parental cultural resources, and the ones on material consumption mainly via social reproduction.

Our results clearly illustrate the value of combining features of the traditions of both life-style and stratification research. Obviously, differentiation in material and cultural life-style patterns can only be adequately understood if we take into account the direct and indirect mechanisms of cultural and social reproduction. Especially the intermediating role of parental cultural and individual resources could not have been revealed without taking the effects of all three explanatory concepts into account. Furthermore, the results confirm our idea that the five Eastern Europe countries were a good testing ground for our explanatory model. The strong similarity of our results over the five separate nations was striking. It strongly underlines the tenability of our explanatory model. Our results also confirmed the conclusions of some earlier studies that socialist regimes in Eastern European nations have not been very successful in reducing levels of inequality. With respect to differentiation in life-style patterns, we found significant effects of parental background. Moreover, the idea that political resources generate better life-chances (Djilas 1957; Konrad and Szelényi 1979) was to some extent confirmed. For example, in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, having a parent who had been a member of the Communist Party was shown to increase the levels of cultural participation and material consumption.

The answers given to the research questions in this article raise meaningful questions for future research. First, the results for five Eastern European nations surveyed in 1993 strongly support the tenability of the explanatory model. However, for future studies it would be important to see whether these findings could be replicated for non-socialist industrialized countries, especially in Western Europe, and the United States. Second, an important question to be addressed is whether the effects of parental social and cultural background will change over the next decades in Eastern Europe. The ongoing restructuring of the economies and processes of privatization in these nations might affect the mechanisms of the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Third, questions on the effects of political resources on life-style patterns might be more fully addressed in future studies. They should not only focus on the effect of being a member of a political party, but also on the effects of belonging to the political elite, the 'nomenclature'. In this article, data on the general population barely made any reference to a political leader, but in future studies employing data from elite surveys might provide further information in this connection.

To conclude, these suggestions for future research stress the importance of our findings. In spite of many attempts to de-stratify the distribution processes in socialist Eastern Europe, life-style differentiation in these nations in the 1990s was shown to be largely due to the transmission of inequalities over generations. Differentiation in cultural and material life-style patterns was revealed to be significantly due to social and cultural intergenerational reproduction.

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Appendix

Table A1. Means and standard deviations of dependent variables (high culture participation and material consumption) for five Eastern European countries in 1993

Variables (range)	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	Mean (s.d.)		Mean (s.d.)		Mean (s.d.)		Mean (s.d.)		Mean (s.d.)	
<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>										
<b>High Culture Participation</b>										
High culture participation (percentiles)	50.01	(28.33)	50.01	(28.86)	50.01	(28.67)	50.02	(28.57)	50.01	(28.86)
goes to museum (times a year)	1.42	(4.10)	1.92	(4.60)	2.13	(3.78)	1.39	(3.16)	2.19	(5.22)
goes to theatre (times a year)	1.99	(5.04)	2.23	(5.17)	1.83	(4.46)	1.21	(2.71)	2.10	(5.24)
listens to classical music (times a year)	3.67	(10.78)	6.44	(12.36)	6.45	(9.99)	7.21	(14.28)	8.27	(14.40)
# books read (in a year)	11.41	(17.64)	16.27	(18.43)	9.43	(15.16)	10.39	(16.39)	14.96	(18.08)
goes to library (times a year)	2.89	(9.16)	3.93	(9.43)	2.47	(9.91)	2.48	(8.20)	3.92	(9.95)
<b>Material Consumption</b>										
Material consumption (percentiles)	50.01	(28.87)	50.01	(28.87)	50.01	(28.87)	50.01	(28.87)	50.01	(28.87)
washing machine (0/1)	.35	(.48)	.66	(.47)	.43	(.50)	.61	(.49)	.53	(.50)
VCR (0/1)	.25	(.43)	.24	(.43)	.38	(.49)	.54	(.50)	.23	(.42)
satellite-dish (0/1)	.02	(.14)	.09	(.28)	.21	(.41)	.12	(.33)	.14	(.35)
micro-wave (0/1)	.03	(.16)	.08	(.27)	.16	(.36)	.05	(.23)	.08	(.27)
freezer (0/1)	.06	(.24)	.69	(.46)	.66	(.47)	.46	(.50)	.65	(.48)
computer (0/1)	.02	(.13)	.06	(.24)	.09	(.29)	.14	(.35)	.07	(.26)
# rooms house (1-10)	3.17	(1.41)	3.11	(1.15)	2.66	(1.18)	2.68	(1.25)	3.38	(1.40)
size house in m <sup>2</sup> (0-1000)	76.62	(30.15)	56.13	(26.74)	77.11	(31.38)	50.52	(28.95)	68.21	(50.06)
WC (0/1)	.56	(.50)	.96	(.20)	.85	(.35)	.85	(.36)	.89	(.31)
bathroom (0/1)	.77	(.42)	.97	(.16)	.89	(.32)	.86	(.35)	.96	(.19)
Total Number of Respondents	3542		4662		3339		2635		3777	

Source: Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993



Table A2. Reliability (Cronbach's  $\alpha$ ) of constructed scales for cultural capital parents, high culture participation and material consumption for five Eastern European countries in 1993

Variables	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
	Cronbach's $\alpha$				
Cultural Resources Parents	.78	.66	.74	.69	.67
High Culture Participation	.76	.59	.70	.68	.61
Material Consumption	.62	.60	.74	.72	.62
Total Number of Respondents	3542	4662	3339	2635	3777

Source: Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993

Table A3. Means and standard deviations of independent variables (individual resources, parental social origin, parental cultural resources) for five Eastern European countries in 1993

Variables (range)	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	Mean	(s.d.)	Mean	(s.d.)	Mean	(s.d.)	Mean	(s.d.)	Mean	(s.d.)
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>										
<b>Demographic Background</b>										
Woman (0/1)	.53	(.50)	.53	(.50)	.52	(.50)	.51	(.50)	.52	(.50)
Age (25-70)	46.97	(12.50)	46.89	(12.30)	45.87	(12.32)	43.49	(11.95)	44.66	(11.93)
Degree of urbanisation (1-5)	2.58	(1.42)	2.46	(1.35)	2.74	(1.46)	2.63	(1.35)	2.20	(1.29)
Married (0/1)	.83	(.38)	.81	(.39)	.80	(.40)	.80	(.40)	.78	(.42)
Employed full-time (0/1)	.61	(.49)	.65	(.48)	.55	(.50)	.63	(.48)	.65	(.48)
# children under 6 years old (0-3)	.22	(.52)	.16	(.45)	.20	(.49)	.35	(.67)	.22	(.52)
# children over 6 years old (0-9)	.88	(.95)	.91	(1.01)	.91	(.97)	1.11	(1.14)	1.12	(1.13)
<b>Individual Resources</b>										
Education (years)	9.72	(3.53)	11.90	(2.89)	10.82	(3.50)	11.10	(3.41)	11.83	(3.26)
Income (percentiles)	50.01	(28.86)	50.01	(28.87)	50.01	(28.87)	50.02	(28.87)	50.01	(28.87)
Occupational prestige (0-100)	36.47	(13.36)	38.83	(12.18)	37.46	(12.54)	39.16	(11.81)	39.86	(12.60)
Member Communist Party (0/1)	.15	(.36)	.16	(.37)	.12	(.32)	.13	(.33)	.16	(.37)
<b>Parental Social Origin</b>										
Education parents (years)	5.33	(4.00)	9.57	(1.97)	7.25	(2.97)	7.75	(3.32)	8.79	(2.23)
Occupational prestige parents (0-100)	38.24	(10.37)	37.71	(11.47)	35.60	(12.03)	37.74	(10.49)	37.39	(11.84)
Member Communist Party parent (0/1)	.18	(.38)	.28	(.45)	.15	(.36)	.18	(.38)	.17	(.38)
<b>Parental Cultural Resources</b>										
Cultural capital parents (percentiles)	50.01	(25.30)	50.01	(28.82)	50.01	(27.35)	50.02	(26.87)	50.01	(28.53)
goes to museum (times a year)	.76	(3.26)	1.26	(3.92)	1.01	(3.78)	.69	(2.50)	.96	(3.51)
goes to theatre (times a year)	1.06	(3.89)	2.04	(5.48)	1.24	(4.46)	1.00	(3.56)	1.10	(3.58)
listened to classical music (times a year)	1.32	(6.73)	4.12	(10.88)	2.96	(9.99)	2.76	(9.74)	3.47	(10.03)
# books read (in a year)	5.64	(13.49)	15.67	(18.68)	7.66	(15.16)	7.16	(14.54)	11.38	(16.90)
goes to library (times a year)	2.54	(8.84)	6.70	(12.92)	3.44	(9.91)	2.36	(8.45)	4.14	(10.63)
Total Number of Respondents	3542		4662		3339		2635		3777	

Source: Treiman and Szelenyi, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993