

The Quest for Development Alternatives in Africa:

**Questioning development assumptions of
AAF-SAP & NEPAD**

By

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Acronyms

AAF-SAP -	African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio Economic Recovery and Transformation
APPER -	Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery
AU -	African Union
CDS/A -	Critical Discourse Studies/ Analysis
IMF -	International Monetary Fund
MAP -	Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program
NEPAD -	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU -	Organization of African Unity
SAPs -	Structural Adjustment Programs
UNECA -	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN -	United Nations
UN-PAAERD -	United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development
WB -	World Bank

Abstract

Development is a social endeavor and a phenomenon which is not limited to technical and managerial aspects. The complex features of development emanate from the epistemic position of the perspectives employed, the power position of the actors involved, and the context and structural parameters that influence the endeavor either positively or negatively. The last three decades have witnessed an extensive engagement by various actors to address the developmental questions of Africa. The African political economic élite have been one of the major actors with this regard. The political endeavor of problematizing Africa's developmental question and influencing the discourse and practice of development has hardly been an easy task. The AAF-SAP and NEPAD came into existence with the intention of winning the game of the determining Africa's course of action. But the ideas informing the two documents, their conformity with or deviance from the mainstream discourse of development, their priority in setting the agenda and their impact differs diametrically. The research shows how the conceptualization of 'development' is heavily influenced by ideology, power and above all the knowledge framework of implicit and explicit actors.

Key words: Development, AAF-SAP, NEPAD, African political economy,

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Chapter One

Introduction

Background

'Development' is one of the most prominent concepts that emerged after the Second 'World War'. The newly established world order with international institutions like the UN has incorporated this concept into the institutional structure and it continued to be at the center of international political economy discourse. There has been more than half a century long endeavor by various actors attempting to realize a range of developmental objectives. These efforts have been changing across the historical line in-tandem with the dynamic international political economy and the core ideas that inform its knowledge and practices. Historically speaking, modernization theory is the core point of departure in analyzing the development discourse in the above mention period. The assumption that upholds the progress oriented step-by-step achievement of economic growth associated with the changing values and norms of societies had a prominent role in the 1950s and early 60s. The subsequent explanations and theoretical insights forwarded both as a critique and a new paradigm have more or less the same kind of conception of development similar to modernization theory, either implicitly or explicitly.

The complexities in the practice of development can be associated with the fact that it is not a technical endeavor (like development management) rather a process that can hardly exist beyond the core political sphere. The highly political nature of development both in domestic and international sphere has an impact in mobilizing the necessary financial and technical support as well as justifying its premises. With this regard, the impact of the bi-polar world during the 'Cold War' period and its impact in the development agenda of many countries in the global south can be noted. The political nature of the development endeavor has also a direct impact in setting the priorities, contextualizing the situation as well as in defining the necessary action and the actors involved in the execution. This process of conceptualizing development and setting the priorities and the leading actors is not a neutral process rather mediated by power and power relations among the actors involved.

With regard to Africa, the emergence of the continent as a political entity, by transcending its mere geographical presence have become apparent after the establishment of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963. Since then, African political economic elite have been engaged in pursuing development and the mission seems to be a non-ending one. The interaction with the external world along the common agenda of development has its own course of history that may be associated with the historical relations of the region with the West which dates back to more than five centuries. There are also home grown, ‘African initiated’ development endeavors which are not, of course, necessarily detached from the development orientation of the external world. These initiatives which claim being ‘African’ has their own commonalities that may trigger further analytical questions.

One of the core factors that prompted the crafting of an ‘African oriented’ development path and endeavor is the commonly agreed notion that Africa, as a region is not doing well in the development business. This assertion is backed by well situated empirical researches as well as rhetoric and helps to draw a simple observation on the balance of power in the global political economic order. The purpose of this thesis lies in the course of examining the attempt of crafting a different development path for Africa in the last two decades. By taking two seemingly authoritative development documents as a case study, the thesis tries to critically analyze the claims of these development documents in providing a different development paradigm. The documents that are taken as a case study are the **‘The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)’** of 1989 and the **‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’** of 2001.

Both AAF-SAP and NEPAD have a continental wide agenda of realizing development in Africa by addressing the ‘root’ causes that hampered Africa’s fate of being ‘developed’. Though the historical facts that are taken into consideration in both documents are exactly the same, the image of reality they build, the problematization of the context and the conceptualization of development varies significantly. And yet, both are ambitious enough to envision the achievement of ‘self-reliant and sustained development’ in Africa. Questioning the assumptions of development in these documents and their reading of the African political economy is the major point of focus in this thesis. There is a conscious attempt to avoid an evaluative approach towards the strategies and detail implementation programs of the documents. The main purpose of the thesis is to critically examine how differently these two documents conceptualized development in African context and what

makes them 'alternative' or 'new' as they claim in their name. Hence, there is no empirical analysis about the success and failure of their implementation in this thesis rather a discursive analysis of the concept of development in the documents.

Problem Statement

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the 'Cold War' convinced Francis Fukuyama to call for the idea of *'the End of History'* (1992). According to Fukuyama and probably for most others, the triumph of the neo-liberal paradigm is unconditional in the post-Cold War period. Not surprisingly, most African countries were already in the course of embracing the market led economic system since the 1980s which has become a dominant framework of 'development'. With the specific time limited focus of the research (1989-2009), one can mention the various initiatives towards achieving 'development' in Africa. For the sake of simplicity, they can be categorized as *'initiatives from inside'* and *'initiatives from outside'*. In the first category the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP) of 1989, the Abuja Treaty of 1991, the Cairo Agenda of Action of 1995, and the NEPAD & APRM initiatives of 2001 can be considered. Moreover, the change and transformation of the continental institution from OAU to AU in 2002 can be taken as the most crucial initiative from inside. On the other hand, there are many other initiatives from institutions, countries, regional blocs and even individuals towards addressing the 'development' need of Africa as a region. To mention few, the Long Term Perspective Study by WB (1992), Tokyo International Conference on African Development – TICAD (1993) by Japan and UN/UNDP, Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by the US (2000), the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (2000), the Summit of Heads of State of Africa and France by France, The G8 Africa Action Plan (2002), The Blair Commission (2004) by Tony Blair, and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) by the EU. Almost all of these initiatives share the mainstream idea of development which is highly influenced by neo-classical economics. This mainstream perspective of 'development' conceptualizes the issues of societal relations, processes and outcomes '... as the sum of discrete, intentional acts by autonomous actors who are pre-constituted rather than defined through relations with others' (Eyben, 2006: 203). Likewise, 'development' can be achieved only if the profit maximization and rationally oriented 'natural' intention of individuals in pursuing their 'stable preferences' is attained within a naturally coordinated market environment (Johnson, 2009: 5). Hence, privatization,

deregulation and liberalization continued to be the dogma of the day and most initiatives were framed within the framework of these principles.

These set of principles have become the mainstream development paradigm particularly after the 1980s and began to be institutionalized through the stabilization and structural adjustment programs. In African context, many countries were subjected to the implementation of these principles and policy prescriptions into their economies for the sake of securing financial support to deal with the economic crisis of 1980s. Many scholars have argued that the imposition of the SAPs on African countries resulted more damage than the intended positive effect of ‘development’ and ‘social transformation’. As some reports argue, in spite of the fact that the adjustment programmes were initially introduced as medium-term and emergency majors to tackle the economic crisis in the 1980s, their execution turned out to be a long term and above all a one-size-fits-all process (SAPRI¹, 2004, p.2).

The development assumptions that inform the formulation and execution of the SAPs constituted the mainstream development paradigm. Indeed, many actors including the WB have admitted the shortcomings of the SAPs and its failure to achieve the intended goal and its role in exacerbating the situation in many African countries (WB, 1988). But how did the African political economic elite react to it? How differently could they conceptualize development in African context?

Theoretically, the postcolonial school of thought offers a different reading of the world political economy and historical narratives which contributed to the emergence of the mainstream thinking of development. This ‘alternative’ school of thought can be considered as a counter-narrative in its uniquely located focus of deliberation. What we have at hand for analysis is not a theoretical narrative but rather a pragmatic attempt of winning the development discourse of the continent into the hands of Africans. Starting from the labeling of the documents, being ‘*Alternative*’ and ‘*New*’, has a connotation which implicitly positions the documents against the ‘*mainstream*’ and/or the ‘*old*’. The underlying purpose and objective of the thesis is to give a nuanced view on these two documents. The historical material conditions, the interest and willingness of the political economic elite that facilitated the emergence of these documents is thoroughly discussed and analyzed. The core line of analysis that informs the inquiry is how differently the documents could conceptualize the equation

¹ The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network

of development in Africa's context? What issues are prioritized in addressing the development need? By juxtaposing these conceptualizations and problematizations against the mainstream development discourse, the 'alternative-ness' and 'new-ness' of the AAF-SAP and NEPAD will be examined.

Research Objective and Questions

Research Objective

- To critically analyze the AAF-SAPs and NEPAD in their origin and capacity to conceptualize the development need of Africa differently than previous initiatives
- To identify and explain the continuities and discontinuities of governing ideas in conceptualizing development in the African political economy in post Cold War Africa

Research Questions

- How differently could the African political economic elite have drafted the 'development' endeavor of the continent from the mainstream ideas?

Sub Questions

- What makes the AAF-SAP an 'Alternative' to SAP?
- What makes NEPAD 'New' in the 21st Century political economy?

Research Methodology

The theoretical framework within which the research question is being examined problematizes the notion of 'development' at various levels. The concept of development is analyzed as a theoretical orientation, as a discursive practice, as an ideological tool and above all as a knowledge framework. For the sake of dwelling into this analysis and setting both an exploratory and explanatory analytical framework, critical discourse studies will be used as the main 'perspective' guiding the research. One of the main proponents of critical discourse analysis/studies, Van Dijk, argues that, this critical approach is beyond a critical analysis but also involves critical 'theory' and critical 'application' and it is misleading to take it as a method (Van Dijk, 2009: 62). Rather he insisted that it is a '... critical perspective, position or attitude' which constitute part of the multidisciplinary discipline of

Discourse Studies (ibid). Hence, Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) is a better description than Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Furthermore, he contends that the core point of interest for CDS is to identify the way in which ‘discourse (re)produces social domination’ (ibid, 63). The exercise and relations of power which resulted domination and subordination, contestation and resistance among social actors are the core issues of focus for CDS.

A discourse can be understood as ‘... an interwoven set of language and practice – *discursive practice* ...’ with actors and owners (proponents of the discourse) making a claim, a meaning, producing knowledge(s), setting intellectual framework and influencing (Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, 4) Within the perspectives of CDS, the abstract notions and manifestations of power and power relations are located in the *text* and *context* of a discourse. A text is taken as a manifestation of “... social action which again is widely determined by social structure” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10). The leading scholars of CDS claim that, adopting CDS as a tool needs an “... interdisciplinary work in order to gain proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or exercising power” (ibid: 7). Moreover, in asserting the feature of CDS, it is not about making an abstract description of a text and a discourse rather to analytically explain how language is being used in the social and political context, how its use is extended into the realm of producing knowledge and explaining power relations (domination and resistance) (Van Dijk, 2009). And this can be done only if the ‘intricate relationships between text and context’, is aptly theorized (ibid).

One of the basic features of CDS is the explicit position of the researcher in analyzing and studying both the text and the context. Almost all the scholars of CDS agree that ‘[T] here is no as such an ‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by the ‘subjectivity’ of the analyst’ (Fairclough 2003: 14-15, as quoted in Flowerdew (2008)). But there is no consensus whether CDS(A) should be considered as an approach, a theory or a method. Scholars like Wodak and Meyer emphasize on the methodical contribution of CDS, whereas Fairclough argues that it is also a theory that connects the social with the linguistic. On the other hand, Van Dijk differs in introducing the elements from social psychology into the foreground and talks about ‘socio-cognitive approach’ where the interplay between texts and contexts determines how individuals interact and communicate (ibid).

CDS will enable the research to have a simultaneous focus in addressing the research problem while focusing on the two documents (AAF-SAP and NEPAD). First of all, it will help to have an in-depth understanding of the documents, the stated and unstated assumptions, categorization and identification of the “development” problems of the continent, the priorities and the neglect of facts and realities within the continent and above all the conceptualization of “development” both as a discourse, ideology and practice. In addition to that, CDS will also help to situate the production of the *texts* within a *context* which is structural and ideological with several un-equal actors assuming different roles and commanding power of ‘domination and resistance’. By doing so, the material and ideational factors that triggered, initiated and influenced the realization of the documents in their present form, the inter-play among different actors in the process of producing the documents, and the assumed and assigned roles they have will be addressed.

Scope of the Study

This study is entirely based on secondary data. Nearly six months of archival research at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Union (AU) libraries in Addis Ababa was conducted. An attempt to interview key officials that have had influential role both at the AU and UNECA was not successful. But by limiting the scope of the research and the research question to the analysis of the text and the context helped to adjust the balance of the research. Hence, initial research questions which were intended to be answered by leading officials are dropped and the focus remained on the texts and the context.

The other main scope of the study is related to the purpose of the research. Though a lot can be said about the effectiveness of the two development documents and the implementation strategies, programs and practices; the objective of the research is specifically on the conceptualization of development in the documents. It is totally beyond the purpose of this specific research to evaluate the impact of either AAF-SAP or NEPAD in addressing the development needs of Africa. Rather it is a genuine attempt of critically examining the discursive and rhetorical claim of these two documents in providing a unique development perspective for Africa’s pursuit of development. In doing so, an attempt is made to avoid a policy evaluation approach by focusing on the ideas and arguments that build the documents’ central features.

Chapter Two

The Notion of '*Development*'

Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical orientations that inform the entire analysis and arguments in the thesis through a brief literature review. Since the thesis is mainly concerned with the idea of '*development*' and how it has been conceptualized and operationalized in the political economy of the continent from 1989-2009, the theoretical underpinnings that have influenced the 'development' policies & practices will be presented and analyzed. Moreover the thesis has also an exploratory nature in identifying the possible alternative theoretical insights towards conceptualizing 'development'. Hence, the alternative theoretical arguments and the related literatures will be presented and reviewed appropriately.

The core point of departure and analysis is the concept of '*development*', which has been one of the most contentious concepts in the field of social science. The theorization of development, the perspectives being employed in theorizing, the ontological and epistemological positions assumed in theorizing, the implicit and explicit influence of these positions in informing the practice of development at the ground level are major entry points in making a nuance. The priorities that are taken into consideration in the discourse of achieving development, the different levels of problematizing the situation at hand and the remedies forwarded with respect to realizing the 'development need' will be discussed. This is therefore an attempt to shade light on these issues in a way that sets a valid ground to locate the subsequent chapters.

2.1 Conceptualizing and Theorizing Development

Asking 'what is development?' certainly instigates a very complicated response. However, the concept is apparently present almost in all social science fields. In an attempt of showing the broader insights of understanding theories of 'development', Preston (1996) depicted the foundational points of social theorizing from the philosophical point of view. According to his argument, every attempt of social theorizing is a combination of understanding the nature of the social world (*ontology*),

enquiring the knowledge with respect to the social world (*epistemology*), implementing certain means of pursuing this knowledge (*methodology*) and finally to use this knowledge about the social world through a practical action (*practice*) of agents (Preston 1996, p. 3-4). The combination of these four strands of social theorizing is very helpful in demystifying the broader frameworks that inform the intellectual exercise in producing ideas. According to Preston, the ontological position that one assumes has a direct impact in determining the subsequent epistemological and methodological positions. With regard to the social world, as it is mostly argued, there are two distinct spheres where the ontological ground of social theorists is located. These are: 'the realm of material causes' and 'the realm of meanings and understanding' (ibid, p. 4). The earlier position denotes that the social world can be studied and examined like the natural science method through '... naturalistic description and explanation of observable human behavior'. On the contrary, the other realm argues that the best way to grasp the nature of the social world is through interpretation of meanings of social world and understanding the immensely diversified nature of humanity. With regard to the naturalistic intention of examining the social world, the knowledge enquiry (the *epistemology*) process is value-free and objective where the 'social scientific observer' is expected to be significantly detached from context. Unlike the former one, the pursuit of knowledge within the second realm is interpretative, open to subjective maneuver and explanations to make a critical reflection and from a value-laden position. From the philosophical point of view, these two epistemological commitments and positions are called 'empiricism' and 'rationalism'. Empiricism is a philosophical disposition which argues that knowledge is fundamentally acquired through experience whereas rationalism gives unprecedented priority for thought as a fundamental source of knowledge. Of course, most of the philosophical explanations about the social world are a combination of the two positions (ibid, p. 4-8).

Taking these 'basic' philosophical arguments as a starting point will help us to show the underlying and somehow implicit inclination of the various theoretical orientations towards the core concept, and indeed controversial, of the thesis, '*development*'. One of the embedded notions within the concept of development is the inevitability of 'social change'. And the critical question to put forward is about the nature of the social change, the elements being considered in realizing the social change and in general the 'ethics of social change' as well as the 'meanings of social change'. Since ideas are produced and implemented within the frequently changing social realm, the 'ethics' and

‘meaning’ of the social change (development) have been also changing across time. This change also entails the change in the actors and the methods being used in materializing the ideas.

According to some scholars, the post ‘WWII’ era is the period where the present notions of ‘development’ become both a political and intellectual agenda in the social world (Escobar, 1995; Nederveen, 2001). The power position of the actors who had influenced the notion of ‘development’ at that point of time, the continuing influence and counter balancing of the influence by different actors makes the theoretical attempts of explaining development very complex. Indeed, a certain point of ontological position is needed to conceptualize development one way or the other and the epistemological, methodological positions will follow to inform the practice. But all these things are not happening within a vacuum. The epistemological position adopted to make sense of the reality of the social world does not only echoes or reflect the reality but also constructs and shapes reality (Nederveen, 2001, p.2). The political nature of knowledge in shaping, determining and influencing perceptions, policies and agendas at all levels is used as a premise to argue that development theory is an ideology and a ‘... by-product of political process and not an intellectual process...’ (ibid, p.3) Of course, it does not make sense to disentangle the theory and practice of development from political process but as the same time it is not analytically convincing to reduce it to a mere political ideology. According to Nederveen and Corbridge, development theory and practice is influenced by both politics and intellectual engagement in different contexts (ibid). Reinforcing the implicit notion of ‘social change’ within this debate, what constitutes change which is assumed to be a ‘positive change’ and its appropriateness significantly varies according to class, culture, historical context and relations of power (ibid).

Within the social sciences, knowledge, power, theory and ideology can hardly be isolated in analyzing the social world. And the concept of ‘*development*’ is also not an exception with this regard. The subsequent sections will attempt to show the conundrum of ‘*development*’ at four levels and how it has been treated in the intellectual arena in terms of theoretical orientations, and how this orientations and conceptualization has been influencing practices of development both as an ideology and as a discourse.

The notion of development can be analyzed within a broad *meta-theoretical* framework. Starting from such level helps to grasp ‘the foundational and ethical assumptions’ (Johnson, 2009, p.4) that will

help to analyze the social world. According to Johnson, '*Meta-theory*' is 'theory about theory' where the ontological and epistemological questions are given more focus (ibid). As it is argued earlier, the ontological and epistemological dispositions have an immense influence in pre-determining the ideas we base our insight at the formative stage of our perspectives. On the other hand, '*theory*' can be understood as a 'coherent body of generalizations and principles associated with the practice of a field of inquiry' (Chilcote 1994: 367, as quoted in Johnson, 2009). Theories on the other hand do not stand alone rather create a certain kind of perspective which is used as an entry point towards addressing the social inquiry. And this process of enquiry has its own subjects and objects which are produced through the practice. In such cases, according to Foucault, '*discourse or discursive practices*' are created as '... (a) historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects' (Foucault 1972: 49). In other words, discourse is a result of certain systems of social interactions and practices involving different actors which usually adhere to specific purpose and interests, henceforth, the construction and practice of discourse is inherently an exercise and relation of power (Howarth 2000: 9). Moreover, '*ideology*' can be understood as a 'coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society and provides a program for social and political action,' (Ball and Dagger 2004: 4, as quoted in Johnson 2009).

At this point, analyzing the concept of '*development*' in terms of these four levels, does not mean that they are mutually exclusive rather the main intention is to show how one is the integral and constitutive part of the other in different contexts and to illuminate on the complex web of interaction both at the idea and practice level. The changing features of '*development*' across time, the different agents assuming leading role in constructing knowledge, materializing the theories, ideologies and discourses, and the interaction and contestation among various actors makes the explanation and description of '*development*' a difficult task.

2.2 The Complexities and Dilemmas of '*Development*'

2.2.1 Modernization and Dependency Theories

In many academic literatures about 'development', W.W.Rostow's work by the title *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) is mentioned as an influential point of reference both for

the mainstream and critical reflections on the history of theories about development. The work of Rostow comes into the scene in the 'post WWII' era where the ideals of modernization theory were the influential narratives of development. In the political economic sphere, the US was assuming hegemonic status. It is also a period where structural functionalism has become the mantra of the intellectual discourse. Structural functionalism asserts that societies all over the world are essentially the same in their functions but differ in terms of which structures within society perform these functions (Hyden, 1994, p. 315). Hence, for the sake of achieving modernity, non-Western societies need to abandon the structures and value systems they have and replace them with structures and value systems of the 'Advanced Capitalist Countries' (Chambua, 1994,, p. 37) The nature of the world was understood from a very empiricist point of view where the intellectuals of that time were applauded for their 'value-free' interpretation of the social context and the remedies they provided in addressing the challenges. As it is argued in the work of Rostow, development is a linear process of evolution to be realized stage-by-stage (1960). It is taken for granted that once the ideas and practices of the Western world are transplanted into any kind of non-Western context, the final stage of growth will be attained ultimately (ibid). At the same time, this is the foundational period where development was solely interpreted within the context of economic growth. With regard to the ethics of social change, the 'Western' ethics was taken as superior, and anything 'traditional' was regarded as 'backward'. Moreover, the meaning attached to 'development' was a process of 'catching up', 'an uphill ladder', a notion of progress and modernization.

In terms of Nederveen's conceptualization of 'dimensions of development theories' (Nederveen, 2001, p.8), the historical and political *context* of the Cold War period which also witnessed the other universalist mission of Marxist theory from the east is a crucial element in considering the dominant assertions of the period. And the basic *explanation* (assumption) being considered is the notion that achieving economic growth will ultimately benefits everyone given the growth will 'trickle down'. Within this context, the central government is given a leading role in achieving the aspired level of 'development' and modernization. The *epistemological* and *methodological* position assumed is clearly empiricist given that the social world is treated from a naturalistic and deterministic stand point where there is no room for a different interpretation rather to follow a linear trajectory. Depicting '*development*' in such framework has also a clear, sometimes subtle, action of *representation* where the 'Western' ethic, political and economic structure and ideas were privileged against the backdrop of

the non-Western whose 'traditional' values and norms were blamed for its 'backwardness'. By sticking to this representation of the 'other', the *imagination* that was intended to be achieved through the desired social change was a changing societal structure in which the malaise of 'underdevelopment' are addressed with the *future* looking so bright. The strategies forwarded include policies of industrialization, social projects on education and health, and mechanization of agriculture by a centralized government.

The structural functionalism inspired project of achieving 'development' and modernization at the same time failed to materialize its promises for various reasons. And during the mid-60s, it was seriously challenged by the criticism from every angle. Among these, Eurocentric disposition of the modernization theory was the major critique which shapes the 'one size fits all' prescription of the theory towards the modernization and 'development'. Among the major critics of the modernization theory include scholars like Andre Gunder Frank and his school of thought, 'the Dependency Theory', which argued that the nature of relationship and interaction among countries in the world as the main cause of not achieving 'development'.

By adopting a neo-Marxian analytical framework, Dependency theory located the problem of development within the global context of the relation between 'the core and the periphery'. In the words of the main proponents, Castells and Laserna (1989, 535), 'Dependency refers to an asymmetrical, structural relationship between social formations, such that the dependent society (ies) is shaped to a large extent by the social dynamics and interests generated in the dominant society (ies).' The *dependentista* school of thought emerged in the context of critiquing the earlier attempts of achieving development, economic growth (Import Substitution Industrialization –ISI) and modernization. Some scholars like Ilan Kapoor even argue that it is '...counter –modernist and critical of Western liberalism', which questions the explanation of the rest of the world by centering Europe and North America as departure point (2008, 9). The core arguments of this school of thought can be summarized with its main assertions that the process of bringing 'development' at the core is achieved at the expenses of maintaining 'underdevelopment' of the periphery (Frank, 1967; Rodney, 1973). Development does not take place in a predetermined framework and hence not in a single direction. For the sake of achieving development countries at the periphery (Latin America and Africa) need to 'delink' from the political economic system of the world which is unequally structured to the advantage of countries at the core (Western Europe and North America)

(Castells and Laserna, 1989). Indeed, some argue that the insight from the *Dependentistas* is used as an additional factor to establish a command and state led economy under the ideology of socialism.

On the other hand, the Dependency school itself is criticized for maintaining an ‘Orientalist’ mentality in its analysis. This is manifested by taking capitalism as the ultimate framework of analysis rather than the representation of the non-Western societies within the system. The binary opposition which is used as the analytical framework of the theory: ‘core – periphery’, ‘developed – underdeveloped’, ‘metropole – satellite’ are valid attempts of trying to locate the problem of development from the other perspective (‘non-western’) but with limited engagement of deconstructing the power relation that exists, according to Kapoor (2008, 10). Moreover, Immanuel Wallerstein have also expanded on the ideals of dependency theory to build the ‘World System’ theory where he located the emergence of the global capitalist system to the 16th century and the existence of the unequal power relations among the actors which belong to different world systems that co-exist within the broader context (1976).

Modernization theory and dependency school perspectives give us a general insight how the idea of ‘development’ come into being and illustrated with in the historical dynamism of Post “WWII”. The changing features of the dominant narratives, the manner in which the conceptualization differs and the nature of core variables taken into consideration makes the explanation a non-ending attempt. This continued effort of depicting the courses of achieving development continued after these two prior perspectives with greater intensity and depth. And the following sections will briefly discuss these attempts.

2.2.2 The State vs Market Dichotomy

The unique historical phenomena that happened in the 1970s and 80 across the world gave rise to a different orientation towards managing the global political economy. The dominant discourse that came out during this period informing the conceptualization and practice of development is the neoliberal paradigm. In spite of the wide use of the term neoliberalism in the academic world, as many other social science terms, conceptualizing it in a comprehensive manner is not an easy task. Some define it as a theory constituted of different concepts and ideas in managing the economic system, whereas others define it as a set of policies for economic governance. For instance, Harvey defines neoliberalism as ‘... a theory of political economic practices that proposes the human well-

being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade.’ (Harvey, 2005, p.2) Some associate their definition of neoliberalism mainly to the rise of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) in the UK and Ronald Regan (1981-1989) in the US who are believed to play a significant role in influencing the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund policies and programmes. Accordingly, these change of policies and programmes were incorporated into what is known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ to guide the economic policies and development programmes of countries across the world (Harvey, 2005, p.1-4). There are also others who argue that neoliberalism is beyond a theory and a set of policies rather better explained in terms of ideas which are used to define and articulate the social world. It is a response to the crisis on the 70s and 80s by restructuring society and politics by extending the values, principles and relations of the market as a guiding instrument (Gill, 2000, p.4). Andrew Gamble further argues that neoliberalism emerged as hegemonic idea by anchoring itself into the ideals of economic liberalism and refuting the assumptions of Keynesian perspectives of the 50’s and 60s. The remedies it has provided for the high-inflation and unemployment rate in the Western economies through the free-market principles gave it a control in informing both the political economy and political ideologies (Gill, 2000; Gamble, 2001) Hence, its emergence should be seen beyond the people or the institutions *per se* (Gill, 2000). Such kind of understanding neoliberalism as an ideational process can be seen in contrary to the other way understanding its emergence in the world political economy as an inevitable phase of the capitalist system and pursued by the interest of people who benefit from the process (ibid).

Later on, neoliberalism has become a dominant framework of managing the global political economy translated into specific policy recommendations. These policy recommendations are set to be re-organize the relation between labor and capital mainly to the advantage of the later in ensuring the interest of the capitalist elite (Gamble, 2001, p. 75-76). In discussing the practical development policy manifestations of the Washington Consensus, Dani Rodrik puts it in a nutshell that it is about how to ‘... get the macro balances in order, take the state out of business, and give markets free rein. Accordingly, ‘stabilize, privatize and liberalize’ became the mantra of a generation of technocrats...’ (Rodrik 2006, p.973) Almost in the same line of explanation, neoliberalism is often defined in terms of the *state vs. market dichotomy* where the incorporation of neoliberal policy prescriptions is associated with the rolling back of the state from providing public services and

letting the market playing a major role in the entire process under the watchful eyes of the state. Indeed, such kind of understanding neoliberalism in simple dichotomy of the state and the market might cover some other crucial issues that play vital role in maintaining the belief. Hence, the ideas informing the decision of the actors, the interests and expectation of the actors in adhering to certain principles of achieving socio-economic development and political transformation need to be taken into consideration as well. David Harvey's analysis of identifying neoliberalism either as 'utopian or political project' is worth mentioning here. In his analysis, Harvey argues that neoliberalism can be considered as a utopian project of re-establishing and re-organization of the world capitalist system mainly after the economic crisis in the 1970s and 80s. He strongly contends that it is also a political project of restoring the power of certain economic elites by boosting their capital accumulation within the international capitalist system (Harvey, 2005, p.19). Such ways of problematizing the notion of neoliberalism beyond a simple dichotomy of expression in terms of *state vs market* gives more room to maneuver so that its different manifestations and features can be incorporated in its analysis.

2.2.3 The Postcolonial (Decolonial) Critique of Development

The attempt of achieving 'development' following different models, theoretical orientations and practical actions for more than have a century and on the other hand the continuing misery and vicious circle of problem could no longer be accepted to certain group of scholars. Hence, by building up the previously started efforts of the *Critical Thinking* tradition, there has been a continuous challenge on the mainstream epistemological framework that has been informing the theory and practice of 'development'. The challenging position within the *Critical Thinking* tradition significantly differs from other critiques on the orthodox tradition like poststructuralism, postmodernism, existentialism and phenomenology by providing '... politically relevant alternative ... (and) by maintaining a non-dogmatic perspective which is sustained by an interest in emancipation from all forms of oppression ...' (Bronner and Kellner, 1989, 2). The critical reflection is not intended to throw all kinds of attack against all kinds of thoughts in undifferentiated manner or to assume a simplistic relativistic or nihilistic position of reflection rather to seek for '... an emancipatory alternative to the existing order' (ibid).

The central point of departure for the postcolonial (henceforth, decolonial) thinking is interpreting colonialism, modernity, development, and the associated knowledge and exercise of power from the

'Other' perspective (Escobar, 1995; Santos, 2006; Kapoor, 2008; Grosfoguel, 2008). By doing so, it tries to problematize, reinterpret and critically reflect on the relationship that involves the interaction of the colonizer and the colonized, the hegemon and the subaltern, the West and the Third World. Decolonial thinking is also a political action intending to '... disrupt hegemonic power in all its forms' (Kapoor, 2008, xiv). Disrupting the hegemonic power structure with the intention of providing a viable alternative framework requires a higher level of engagement which is at the epistemological level i.e. at the level of producing knowledge. Hence, there is a firm position among decolonial thinkers against a knowledge that has been presented as a 'universal, neutral, value free and objective'. It is argued that, the hegemonic Eurocentric perspectives which have been informing Western philosophical thoughts since the Enlightenment period are construed in such a way that they are universally applicable, viable and objectively true paradigms. On the other hand, according to decolonial thinkers, knowledge is always situated and located within a particular power structure like class, gender, race, geography, spiritual or linguistic which in turn is inherently hierarchical (Grosfoguel, 2008; Mignolo, 2000; Walsh, 2007).

According to Grosfoguel, the hegemonic knowledge framework achieved its status of being universal and value-free by concealing the 'locus of enunciation' from where this knowledge emanates from. The Western philosophical and scientific positions have always a 'non-situated' and 'non-political' subject. By delinking the location of the subject that speaks within the hierarchical power structure (class, gender, geography, spiritual and linguistic), the Western philosophy and science has achieved to create '... a myth about a truthful universal knowledge...' (Grosfoguel, 2008 3). This epistemic position of the hegemon western knowledge is used as a crucial element in creating a hierarchy of knowledge and hence of people within the colonial system. For instance, Grosfoguel argues that the characterization and categorization in the mainstream socio-historical and political features of the world like the 16th century "people without writing" to the 18th and 19th century notion of "people without history", to the 20th century assertion of "people without development" and within the current dominant discourse of the 21st century "people without democracy", is a typical reflection of creating the 'other' from the vantage point of claiming a universalistic knowledge framework (ibid). Nevertheless, questioning the position from which knowledges are produced - the 'epistemic location' and problematizing it within the social structure which is mediated by power - the 'social location' should not lead to a simplistic conclusion that

those who are in the oppressed end of the power relation are always producing knowledges from a different epistemological framework. Rather, it should be noted that one of the manifestations of the power of the hegemon thinking is making the oppressed think within the same epistemological framework as the dominant ones. Hence, it does not necessarily mean that a subordinate ‘social location’ will automatically ensures a critical ‘epistemic location’ to the hegemonic knowledge framework (Grosfoguel, 2008; Fanon, 1967)

The epistemic critique of decolonial thinking is also extended to the basic understanding of world history particularly in terms of *modernity* and *coloniality*. For postcolonial thinkers, coloniality and modernity cannot be disentangled rather one is the constitutive part of the other (Grosfoguel, 2008; Mignolo, 2000). By not differentiating one from the other (modernity from coloniality), they analytically address the power relation that exists in representing the ‘other’ and critically analyzing the narratives of modernity/coloniality not only from the European perspective but also from the ‘other’ perspective. At this point, it is also crucial to understand the concept of *coloniality* which is not equivalent to colonialism. According to the decolonial thinking, decolonization should not be equated with the absence of colonial administration which leads to the idea of the “postcolonial” world. Rather what should be noted is the impact of more than 500 years of power relations and structure at the global level between the West and the ‘other’ which can hardly be removed by a the physical decolonization of Africa roughly 50 years ago and of Latin America a bit earlier. The termination of the physical military presence of the colonizer is the transition from “global colonialism” to “global coloniality”. Global coloniality is mainly manifested in the lingering domination and subordination that exists within the global system of governance and the ‘international division of labor’ (Grosfoguel, 2008; Wallerstein, 1995). Hence, coloniality (coloniality of power) is an analytical concept that helps to articulate the continuity of the colonial forms of power relations after ‘decolonization’ that is manifested through colonial cultures and structures (like the IMF and WB) of the present day global political economy (Grosfoguel, 2008; Mignolo, 2000).

The other vital orientation from the postcolonial perspective that triggers further analytical reflection is the work of Santos (2006), where he asserted the position of other scholars in a plausible manner. Santos argues that,

Neo-liberal globalization is presided over by techno-scientific knowledge, and owes its hegemony to the credible way in which it discredits all rival knowledges, by suggesting that they are not

comparable, in terms of efficiency and coherence, to the scientificity of the market laws. Since neo-liberal globalization is hegemonic, no wonder that it anchors itself in the knowledge, no less hegemonic, of Western-based modern science. (ibid: 13)

The critical examination of Santos in questioning the epistemological superiority of Western perspectives is not limited to the simple denunciation of the hegemon *per se*; rather he illuminated on the features and manifestations of the hegemonic knowledge and the alternatives provided through the *Sociology of Absence*. The central point of Sociology of Absence is its assertion that ‘... what does not exist is in fact actively produced as non-existent, that is – as a non-credible alternative to what exists’ (ibid: 15). Departing from this emancipatory epistemological position, Sociology of absence intends to influence the hegemon knowledge framework by making the invisible and the concealed into visible and viable perspectives. In his analysis of the sociology of absence, Santos identified five monocultures that produce the possible alternative as non-existent by discrediting its viability within the existing modern, techno-scientific and capitalistic world system (ibid: 15-29).²

According to Santos, the ‘most powerful’ system of discrediting any feasible alternative from the scene lies on the monoculture of knowledge which takes modern science the related culture as the sole framework of producing knowledge and aesthetic values. To make itself the only means of acquiring knowledge, it produces the non-existent in the form of ‘ignorance and lack of culture’. The work of Grosfoguel in identifying the Western philosophy/knowledge with its unspoken and unidentified point of enunciation can be associated with this monoculture of superior knowledge which is presented as non-political and ‘sole criteria of truth’. The other logic which asserts that history has a ‘... unique and well-known meaning and direction...’ is presented in the monoculture of linear time. Adherence to such kind of deterministic framework of temporality has been manifested through different conceptions like “pre-modern, underdeveloped, backwardness” and the like. The other critical insight by Santos under the monoculture of capitalist productivity and efficiency contends that the neoliberal world order is nothing but a process of ensuring growth

² The five monocultures are: the monoculture of knowledge and rigor of knowledge, the monoculture of linear time, the monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity and efficiency, the monoculture of the universal and the global and the monoculture of naturalization of differences. According to Santos, each monoculture needs to be changed into an ‘ecology’ which accommodates other epistemological orientations. Hence, he identified five ecologies, corresponding to the monocultures. These are: the ecology of knowledges, the ecology of temporalities, the ecology of productivities, the ecology of trans-scales and the ecology of recognitions (See Santos, 2006)


through market forces. This is realized by controlling the both nature and human labor to the laws of the market and non-stop pursuing of profit (ibid).

2.3 Problematizing Development: summary and analytical framework

The previous section briefly illuminated on the dynamic nature of the notion of development. The complicated features are associated with the historical political economy, the rise and fall of theoretical orientations, and above all the analytical insights employed in conceptualizing what constitutes ‘development’ and explaining why. The central arguments of the major perspectives briefly presented may seem valid explanations in different time and contexts. But what holds right in a specific context and time is not necessarily related to the validity of the explanation. There are other social and political forces that detect the manner in which certain ideas are positively entertained into the practical world or simply overlooked. Hence, theories and perspectives of ‘development’ do not necessarily inform action and practice no matter how succinctly they explain the features of the social world.

Though the explanations given in each development perspectives differs, the factual elements considered and the final outcome they intend to achieve is fairly similar. It can be also argued that, the manner in which certain elements of the facts in the natural world are taken into consideration at the expense of other facts is a decision involving power. For instance, in the case of modernization theory why do we go for economic growth which will ‘trickle down’, rather than another approach that prioritizes the lower base of the social stratum. In the last three decades, when neoliberalism has become the dogmatic principle of running the political economy, to what extent were the orientations of development intended to ensure addressing inequality as they maintain their conviction to economic growth. It is imperative to bear in mind that, the theoretical explanations, development policy prescriptions and practical executions are not neutral processes. The interest of actors involved in it, the power relation among the actors, the immediate and long-term effect of decisions and the like play indispensable role. And all these interests and roles are mediated by ideologies, discourses and knowledges that the actors employ to interpret the social world, their present situation and the aspired future.

Fig. 2.1. Schematic presentation of the Analytical Framework



Chapter Three

A Brief View on the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)

Introduction

The historical process that has resulted the crafting of the SAPs needs a thorough reflection before examining the central philosophies and assumptions the informed the programs. With this regard, one may refer back to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after the end of the ‘WWII’ and the mandate given for these institutions. These institutions were meant to be the vanguards of the international political economy after the ‘World War II’ and were given all the appropriate mandates mainly by Western powers. According to Harvey, the Bretton Woods institutions including the UN are the embodiment and manifestation of the newly constructed new world order (Harvey, 2005 p.10). Along with these institutions, the Keynesian school of thought informed the political economy of the Post War countries focusing on the achievement of full employment, a state which takes all the responsibilities in ensuring economic growth and welfare for its citizens and above all mandated to intervene into the market system in cases of market failures to adjust them into normal and fair circumstances (ibid). These assumptions and practices fairly coincide with the developmental philosophy of structuralism of the 1950s and 60s which regards the presence of an interventionist state to achieve development and modernization in the so called ‘Third World Countries’.

In African context, it was a period of relative economic growth which barely matches the expectation of the majority after succeeding in overthrowing the yoke of colonialism. And the African states were keen to respond to the aspirations of their people mainly by inducing ‘...investment as a proportion of GDP, more rapid expansion of imports than exports and faster expansion of government spending than revenue’ (Engberg-Pedersen *et al*, 1996, p.6). Such kind of infatuation with the idea of ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ facilitated the continuation of a deep rooted mentality in the minds of the African people in embracing the Western lifestyle through the imports and the facilitation of a state that strives to emulate the political and economic structure of the Western countries. The system dully sponsored the creation of a society that *‘produces what it is not*

consuming and consumes what it is not producing'. Moreover, the balance-of-payment deficit get worse by early 1970s to the extent of halting the state sponsored investments and other intervention programs.

The other phenomenal incident at the international level, however maintained the already existing extravagant system functioning for a while i.e. the availability of abundant petro-dollar in the account of international banks and private creditors after in the aftermath of the first Oil Crisis (1973). The petro-dollar recycling maintained the booming of donor spending in the African countries with the intention of achieving 'development', the expansion of investment in the countries without the necessary cost-benefit analysis of its appropriateness, increase in imports of capital goods, increase in incomes and demands among the society which in general was beyond the capacity of the existing institutions to handle and operate in a decent manner (ibid). This situation would not continue to the early 1980s without the incident of the second Oil crisis (1979-1980) which had another significant impact in the global economy both Western and non-Western countries. According to John Toye, most of the Western countries like the US, UK and West Germany were compelled to introduce their own 'structural adjustment' programs like cutting inflation and other austerity measures in the economy to address their balance-of-payment gap. This had a direct impact on the non-Western countries whose economy is mainly based on producing non-durable consumer products and primary commodities to the global market (1994, p. 20).

The economies of most African countries were already in a very fragile condition of macroeconomic instability and high indebtedness. They were very much outward oriented and import dependent, with weak industries and productive sector, and highly influenced by the availability of the petro-dollar from banks, donors and private creditors, began to crumble step-by step (Engberg-Pedersen *et al*, 1996, p. 4-8, Toye, 1994, p. 18-21). The role of the state in running the agricultural production and market system with its intention of 'modernizing' the production process did not bring the expected outputs, not even to match the subsidy cost to set up central systems of production and distribution. On the other hand, the investment in the industrial sector which was under heavy protection and partially owned by the state and private/foreign investors were also weak and often known for corruption and inefficiency. Moreover, the state was indeed over extended with the huge bureaucratic and civil servants in the semi-efficient public sector (ibid). Hence, both the external and

internal dynamics were considered as unpleasant situations and triggered the execution of certain measures that will address the problems. The decline terms of trade at the global level, the scarcity of foreign exchange at national level which is the result of the decrease in aid and funding contributed to the ineffectiveness of the state to intervene into the agriculture and industry sectors to induce incentives which in turn aggravated the situation in the national economy (ibid).

3.1 Basic Features and Assumptions of the Structural Adjustment Programs

Having the dogma of pursuing and achieving ‘development’ at the center of every intervention and the execution of programs, there happened to be a significant difference in setting the priorities, problematizing the context and putting the ideas into practice among different actors. For instance, the African political economy and its precarious situation as mentioned in the earlier section in the 1970s and early 80s was perceived and interpreted differently among different actors in explaining what is ‘*structural*’ about it. There is an argument which locates the structural problems of African economies of this period into the historical and colonial context where the economic and social imbalances are inherently built into the system and thereby hindering ‘development’ to happen. This deep-rooted challenge is the one which has a ‘*structural*’ impact in the production and distribution system (like export oriented production) and the associated sectors like infrastructures (road) and other social services. Hence, the journey of realizing ‘development’ is a function of ‘... overcoming these structural imbalances (which have a severe impact of) distorting markets, and state intervention is suggested to improve structure and so provide the optimal conditions for private sector participation’ (Engberg-Pedersen *et al*, 1996, p. 3-4).

On the other hand, other actors mainly the international financial institutions (IFIs) articulated the ‘*structural*’ problem of African economies in the context of the market distortion that has been happening because of the state intervention. In this context, the political economic challenge that engulfed the continent is neither the colonial history nor the current integration of the continent into the global context rather the measures taken to redress the situation which in turn resulted the unforeseen structural problem from extensive intervention of the state into the economy (ibid).

This being the glimpse of the difference among the various actors in their effort of addressing the ‘developmental gap’ of Africa, there lies a puzzling inquiry in understanding the founding assumptions of the SAPs. What are the core ideas up on which these policy measures and practices have been considered and executed? John Toye (1994) has made an expounded attempt in identifying the basic assumptions that have influenced the formulation of the SAPs. Toye argued that the basic assumption that structuralism asserts in analyzing the development question in the 1960s and 70s is by differentiating the structures of the so called ‘advanced and developed’ countries from those of ‘Third World countries’. This orientation of sharp contrast and dualism can be taken as a starting point. The intellectual response towards the dualism of structuralism initiated the principles of ‘mono-economics’, ‘an economics that was universally applicable – a unified set of principles from which policy prescriptions could be drawn and successfully applied in advanced and backward countries alike’ (p.22). This principle, in spite of all the criticisms from all sides, championed in establishing the idea of using ‘standard economics’ for policy recommendations and analysis regardless of other crucial factors. Given the identified political economic challenges that happened, the major point of departure in putting to practice the principles of mono-economics was addressing the short-run macroeconomic stabilization. The remedies with this regard were money supply control, fiscal deficit reduction, devaluation and the removing any kind of price control that triggers distortions. In Toye’s argument, the 1980s structural adjustment is a combination of two distinctive categories: ‘... stabilization and structural adjustment in the narrower sense of market liberalization and public sector reform’ (p.23). In synthesizing the relationship between structuralism and mono-economics, Toye argued that structuralism tried to react to the failure of mono-economics which focus on ‘stabilization packages’ without giving due attention to “bottlenecks” and “rigidities” that existed in the economies of “Third World Countries” (like agriculture, foreign trade and government sectors) as it is empirically witnessed in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina (1956-62). Structuralism on the other hand has been proven short of remedies in Chile and Peru with its failure to recognize the ‘... imperatives of short-run stabilization’ by prioritizing ‘... long term structural transformation’ (ibid). The 1980s structural adjustment programs were, according to Toye, ‘... policies precisely directed to removing the bottlenecks and rigidities ...’ (ibid) which were identified by structuralists a few years back. It is based on this assertion that Toye argued, mono-economics is not a simple manifestation of monetarism rather an attempt of recognizing the elements of structuralism in such a way that a policy framework is created from a supposedly sound position.

Hence, ‘... monoeconomics is a parent of the policies called *structural* adjustment...’ (ibid, emphasis in the original).

One of the core assumptions of SAPs is the orientation towards the role of the state in the economy of a given country. This orientation is rightly illustrated in the argument that calls for the elimination of the government from the ‘... functions of production and finance’ (Toye 1994, p.24). At certain point of time the state was praised for its benevolent engagement with its ‘interventionist and modernist’ mission so long as it was committed to economic growth. And in Africa’s context, it was more than a simple notion of economic growth rather a legitimate actor of facilitating the ‘catching up’ process and achieving modernization and ‘development’. However, with the changing situations that happened in the 70’s and early 80s, the image of the state started to be portrayed in a way that shows its obsession in indulging itself in almost every aspect of societal and economic life. The expectation of the people from the state and the reaction of the state in its ‘over-extension’ resulted in the presence of a huge state machine staffed with inefficient and ineffective bureaucratic system (Engberg-Pedersen *et al*, 1996, Himmelstrand *et al*, 1994, Van Der Hoeven *et al*, 1994).

The capacity and intention of the state began to be questioned from different angles. One of the critical comments was by trying to look at the state through its personnel and individuals that have their own interest and priorities to achieve. These interests and priorities are considered having a significant impact in informing the decision of the state at least by not violating the benefits and immediate interests of the individuals that constitute the state machinery. The other entry point that was used by the monoeconomics thought to justify the inefficient role of the state was by following the analysis of neo-Marxism. Neo-Marxists argue that the state has an inherent failure to function and operate to the interest of the wider society, rather, since it is hijacked by the comprador bourgeoisie, it is a system of benefiting the capitalist class and interest groups that have their own agenda. As Toye puts it ‘[T]he state uses economic policy to create rents to appease rent-seeking groups, and in so doing it becomes the cause of distorted incentives, wasted resources and accumulating economic failure’ (Toye, p.24). Such kinds of strong assumptions against the state are used to generalize the features of the ‘bottlenecks’ and ‘rigidities’ that need to be removed in the stabilization and adjustment programs. Hence, the simplest and logical remedy was to ‘roll back’ the

state and create an enabling environment for the private sector for the intended efficiency and effectiveness in the economic sector.

In general terms, the basic assumptions of the structural adjustment programs were operationalized, as Dani Rodrick puts it, in the ‘Stabilize, privatize and liberalize’ conviction of the IMF and the WB (Rodrick 2006, p.973). Most African countries were made to become subscribers to these policy orientations to get financial support from the IMF and the WB to sustain their economy in the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s. The increasing debt crisis that most African countries found themselves triggered the formulation and executions of stabilization measures by the IMF as a condition to lend short-term balance of payment credits for the countries. The stabilization measures mainly include fiscal and monetary policies where the governments were forced to cut back subsidies to various social services and programs. These measures were meant to boost the savings and foreign exchange reserves of the countries so that they would be able to pay back their debts to their creditors. The decisions to follow the stabilization program resulted in various socio-economic and political repercussions because of the unique feature of the African political economic structure which was overlooked by the mono-economics principles of the IMF. It is at this point, according to the SAPRI³ Report, that the WB intervene into the business with the intention of redressing the social chaos by providing funding for the countries on the condition that the countries will carry out long-term changes in the institutional and structural set up of their economies (2004, p.2). The Report further argues that ‘... the structural adjustment policies were designed to open markets and reduce the state’s role in the economy’ (ibid). And the policies include: trade liberalization, privatization of public sectors, marketing boards and state owned enterprises, liberalization of domestic markets and deregulation of investments (ibid). And these policy measures were unquestionably necessary conditions to be fulfilled by the countries so as to access any kind of loan and aid from donors, financial creditors and institutions (ibid, p.4)

The following schematic representation by John Teye clearly describes the components of the structural adjustment programs.

³ The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRI)




Fig. 3.1: 'A Schematic Representation of the Structural Adjustment Policy' adopted from John Toye 1994 (p.23)

Chapter Four

The Attempt of Crafting the ‘Alternative’

4.1 Introduction – AAF-SAP (Historical review and emergence)

The decade of the 1980s was a period of significant historical phenomena in the sphere of international political economy. The continuity of major political economy features that shaped the decade happened in the previous years and carry on influencing and informing the decisions of actors at various levels. The main focus was to address the problem of poverty and realizing ‘development’ particularly in the so called ‘Third World Countries’ by introducing new policy recommendations and remedies to the existing challenges. The practical diagnosis made with this regard followed by the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) with the intention of solving the social, economic and political malaises of these countries.

In Africa’s context, there have been various attempts in the 1980s aiming towards the same end of realizing ‘development’ and addressing the problems of poverty and inequality. One can mention the widely acclaimed Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the subsequent Final Act of Lagos by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) by the OAU, and the United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN – PAAERD). In spite of the intention that these initiatives had in effecting change in the socio-economic and political spheres of the continent, over 30 African countries were in due course of adopting and implementing the ‘stabilization and structural adjustment programs’ as of 1988 (AAF-SAP, 1989). In October 1988, during the mid-term evaluation of the UN-PAAERD there was a recommendation from the UN General Assembly that urged African countries to come up with a ‘...viable conceptual and practical framework for economic structural adjustment programmes in keeping with the long term development objectives and strategies at the regional, sub-regional and national levels’ (UN, 1988). By taking this call as a starting point, the UNECA embarked on a mission to undertake a process which involved almost all stakeholders to come up with a comprehensive development document to address the crisis. An

International Advisory Board composed of 20 African and non-African personalities and higher officials from IMF, WB, UNDP and a total of 25 national consultants were given the responsibility. The main task assigned to the national consultants was to make a detail examination and analysis of the stabilization and structural adjustment programs that have been carried out in their respective countries. They were also requested to provide possible alternative insights to the existing political economic challenges (Adedeji 1990: p.40)

The compiled draft ideas from the study of the national consultants was presented to an international workshop of African and non-African economists in January 1989 which helped to produce the first version of the AAF-SAP. This draft document passed through consecutive consultation conferences of an intergovernmental group of experts of African Ministries of Finance and Central Banks and African Ministers of Finance to incorporate their input into the alternative program (ibid). The consecutive meetings and conferences involved African and non-African high officials from governments and international institutions and organizations, economists, African Ministries of Finance and Ministries of Economic Planning and Development. The final draft of the AAF-SAP was adopted at a joint meeting of African Ministries of Economic Planning and Development and the Ministries of Finance in Addis Ababa, on April 10, 1989. Finally the 25th Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Organization of African Unity adopted the framework as a continental framework on the 25th of July, 1989 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (AAF-SAP, 1989, Adedeji, 1990).

Historically speaking, the lingering political economic structure from the colonial period characterized the feature of most African countries in the period after the 1960s. These political economic features include an export oriented crop production system, small and largely disarticulated industries most of which owned by foreigners, infrastructures (road and rail ways) built mainly to fulfill the export oriented crop production and mineral extraction, and also a state that has relatively wider apparatus of bureaucracy with the intention of achieving ‘development’ with an ‘interventionist-modernizing’ engagement (Engberg-Pedersen *et al*, 1996). These political economic features in-tandem with the changing international political economic order which had a direct impact in the trade balance of the African countries contributed to the creation of a deep rooted socio-economic and political problems that triggered and justified the implementation of SAPs.

The SAPs that have been implemented under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank were initially targeted in addressing the short-term economic challenges of the respective African countries. These short term remedies were introduced from an orthodox or classical economic point of view/assumption where instruments of controlling money supply, exchange and interest rate stabilization, trade liberalization, credit squeeze and the like were taken as appropriate measures (ibid). Moreover, the SAPs can be also understood as a mechanism of reducing the role of the state in the economic sector by allowing the market to be the main means of allocating resources fairly and by implication creating an 'enabling environment' for the private sector (Engberg-Pedersen *et al*, 1996). Most of the initiatives and programs that intended to address the socio-economic and political challenges of African countries were not successful enough in bringing tangible change. For example the World Bank has carried out its own independent study in assessing the outcome and effectiveness of the SAPs it has sponsored and concluded that "improvements in several countries have not been sustained ... budget deficits have been increasing, especially in the highly indebted Sub-Saharan African countries" (WB, 1988). Moreover, the independent study of the Bank has also unequivocally asserted that the unique institutional and structural set up of African political economy was not taken into consideration at adequate level in executing a general prescription of the SAPs which resulted unintended consequences at the end (ibid).

Indeed, the initial criticisms on the central assumptions of the SAPs came from different bodies other than IMF and WB. And these institutions have admitted that many of the reservations towards SAPs were valid and appropriate. The major criticisms for the SAPs were its short-sightedness in addressing the socio-economic challenges of the African countries as well as its 'one size fits all' orientation. Beyond the fierce criticisms, there was also an attempt of addressing the central issue of achieving 'development' in the African context with a different framework of understanding the core challenges at hand. With this regard, the significant contribution was made by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The initiative which started by the UNECA in early 1988 was intended to '... search for an African alternative framework to structural programs that would address simultaneously both adjustment and structural transformation problems of African economies' (AAF-SAP, 1989, p ii).

4.2 Brief Overview of the UNECA and its Mandate

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is established as one of the regional entities of the UN in 1958 by the Economic and Social Council of the UN. The prior mandate of UNECA is ‘...to promote the economic and social development of its member States, foster intra-regional integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development.’⁴ In line with its mandate for the socio-economic development of the continent, UNECA embarked on the mission to address the fundamental causes of social and economic predicaments of the continent in the 1980s. The AAF-SAP is one of its major contributions towards the achieving its goal of addressing the socio-economic challenges of the continent.

4.3 The African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)

As it is mentioned earlier the AAF-SAP was formulated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) through a series of consultations and conferences deliberating on the African political economy structure. The consecutive ministerial meetings in the late 1980s with respect to evaluating the performance of UN- Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) contributed for the emergence of AAF-SAP lately. The UN-PAAERD was implemented under the auspices of the UNECA in partnership with the OAU to achieve a better way of managing the political economy of the continent during the crisis. Realizing the objectives of the UN-PAAERD was highly compromised by the stabilization and structural adjustment programs of the IMF and WB in the late 1980s.

The exertion of producing the alternative framework in handling Africa’s political economy is a reaction to the pervasive socio-economic and political crisis that the continent has been struggling with. This can be also considered as the embodiment of the conviction that some political economic elites have not only in providing a remedy to the situation but also to come up with a viable alternative roadmap of recovery and transformation (ibid). The AAF-SAP tries to understand and analyze the structure of Africa’s Political Economy and sets some different development objectives

⁴ UNECA website accessed on June 21, 2011 (http://www.uneca.org/about_eca/overview_of_eca.htm)

to the continent. There is also a section in which a critical evaluation of the stabilization and structural adjustment programs is made in their success and failure of providing a solution for the continent. Then the document provides the 'alternative framework' with specific policy directions and instruments in-tandem with implementation strategies and monitoring schemes.

4.2.1 The Rationale of the AAF-SAP

The leading mastermind behind the formulation of the AAF-SAP, Professor Adebayo Adedeji mentioned the rationale of producing the AAF-SAP at that point of time in various occasions. From the various explanations given about the purpose of the AAF-SAP two basic elements should come out clearly. The first core issue is whether adjustment is necessary for African economies or not. Alike the other actors that introduced and imposed the SAPs to the African economies, there is a consensus among everyone about the necessity of adjusting the African economic and political structure to the changing international political economy and domestic factors. However, the central point of departure rests on the question, 'what kind of adjustment?' In answering this question, the AAF-SAP started by understanding and analyzing the structural features and paradoxes of African political economy and addressing the challenges within a long-term transformational development program (Adedeji 1990, p.26). Consequently, the other fundamental issue that AAF-SAP tried to portray from the onset is that '... the alternative framework is not a standard program to be applied indiscriminately in all countries under all circumstance' (AAF-SAP 1989, p.iii). It is, rather, a holistic framework of managing the macro-economic decisions, policy orientations, implementation strategies and evaluation of long-term transformation development programs formulated by African countries by taking into account the specific situations they are found in (ibid).

In his speech addressing the Assembly of the OAU which adopted the AAF-SAP, Professor Adedeji raised valid questions in an attempt of taking lessons and experiences from the situation of African political economy in the 1980s. The decade has passed through the stabilization measures of the IMF and structural adjustment funds of the WB. One of the fundamental questions raised was the appropriateness and viability of these measures in bringing the expected results. Policy measures were taken to ensure internal and external financial and monetary balances as short-term remedies of the crisis. These measures were taken without considering the possibility of implementing long-term transformation and development programs. There was a clear dichotomy of setting a short-term

development plan at the expense of long-term development programs. The AAF-SAP was an attempt of incorporating both the long-term and short-term development goals and commitments in a 'holistic manner'. As it is argued, this effort can be operationalized by taking the necessary lessons from the practical lived experiences of the African economies in the 1980s (Adedeji 1990, p. 26-30)

One of the core lessons that need to be seriously considered from the 1980s is the indispensability of winning the decision of what is best for Africa's political economy rather than falling under the direct control of the so called 'development partners'. Africa has to set the development priorities, goals and objectives initially by considering its interest rather than fulfilling the concern of external actors and agencies (Adedeji 1990, p.16). The other crucial lesson in addressing the broader political economy challenges of the continent was 'the need for consistency and persistence so as to deal away with, policy discontinuity' (ibid). There was a clear discrepancy between the stated commitment of African countries in addressing their common problems and the practical actions and measures taken. For instance, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) came into existence with the total consensus of OAU members with the intention of putting into action the practical agreements through the Final Act of Lagos (1980). But in reality, most of the African countries were busy with their crisis management business during the entire decade of the 1980s executing the stabilization measures and adjustment policies under the auspices of the IMF and the WB. Hence, Adedeji was calling for persistence and commitment in practical terms if the real challenges are to be dealt with in the appropriate manner (ibid).

The wise allocation and utilization of resources within the African economies with a demonstrated commitment of meeting the agreed goals and objectives of development was also noted as a lesson. This point squarely addressed the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of most African states in utilizing the physical, human and financial resources for the benefit of the majority. The extravagant nature of the public sector was addressed to avoid the un-productive activities and identified barriers that jeopardize efficient use of resources. Likewise, in the effort of ensuring better productivity and efficient use of resources, the human capacity development issue came into play. It is witnessed in the 1980s that, most of the short-term development programs lack the 'human factor' in their diagnosis and treatment of the African economies. Hence, any development initiative has to anchor its principles from the human dimension if it intends to achieve long-term societal transformation

and development. According to Adedeji's argument, the 'human dimension' has two components to be addressed (ibid p.18). The first one is by building the human capital of societies by ensuring the delivery of quality social services (education and health) so that the previous point of productivity, efficiency and effectiveness is addressed in an adequate manner. The other component of incorporating human dimension into the development perspective is by guarantying the inclusion of vulnerable and disadvantaged social groups in the development endeavor. This guarantee might be maintained within the adjustment program by '... protection of core budget expenditures on social sector programs' (ibid). In a nutshell, while stating the purpose of having a new development framework Adedeji argues:

What we need is not mere grafting of the social aspects to existing structural adjustment programs in order to ameliorate the negative impact of the latter on the fabric of society, ex-post, but a new fundamentally different approach that will put at the forefront of our development effort the human factor (ibid).

Last but not least, the lessons from the 1980s confirmed the timeliness and value of realizing 'regional economic integration'. The actual reality that most African countries share in their common, the colonial history, weak state and production capacity and disintegrated political economic strategies indisputably require a regional integration and cooperation in their effort of mobilizing enough resources to realize development. The presence of harmonious policies and strategies in managing the political economy of the continent is an enabling factor as well as a vital leverage to function in the international forum in areas of trade and investment.

4.2.2 Understanding the African Political Economy

The initial entry point in crafting the alternative framework was to identify the essential features and characteristics of the African political economy. With this regard, the core structures that needed a meticulous attention in the endeavor of long-term societal transformation and development are the structures of production, consumption, technology, employment and socio-political organization (AAF-SAP 1989, par.1). The faulty nature of these structures is the root cause for the prevalence of '... mass poverty, food shortage, low productivity, weak productive base and backward technology' (ibid). It is argued in the document that there has been a serious misconception of limiting the focus of African political economy crisis to '... inflationary pressures, instability of export earnings,

balance of payment deficits, rising debt burdens...' (par.4) and other exogenous factors. These all concerns being raised as 'structural' problems of African economies are considered as symptoms of other deep rooted causes which are more 'structural' than the earlier ones. These include the inability of structural transformation in the African economies to cope up with the changing global context, the hindering socio-political and physical circumstances that the African economies are functioning in and also the unequal orientation towards the outside world which sustains their dependency (ibid). Articulating the essential characteristics of African economies and identifying the structural features from the pile of problems that the crisis have aggravated helped to cleverly scrutinize the '... enabling and disabling factors – domestic, external, historical and contemporary...' that inform the state of 'Africa's underdevelopment' (par.2).

As it is argued in the AAF-SAP, among the various manifestations that are caused by the problematic nature of the African political economy, the following can be considered as the most important ones (AAF-SAP 1989, p. 2-6):

- (a) The predominance of subsistence and commercial activities, mainly characterized for its outward orientation and simple trading of imports and exports which also influences the same degree of orientation in the service sector like banking and finance
- (b) The narrow, disarticulated production base with ill-adapted technology, mainly identified with weak inter-sectoral linkage, for example, between the agriculture and manufacturing sector. Moreover, the agricultural sector which constitutes the significant majority of the productive force and contributing the lion share to the government revenue suffers from low productivity, unbalanced outward orientation, exclusion of women from the production system as well as weak linkage with the domestic industries
- (c) Neglect of the informal sector, in spite of the fact that the informal sector has an immense contribution in African economies in the sphere of production, distribution, finance and employment, there is a significant neglect and marginalization of the sector in institutional policy frameworks and strategies. The discrimination against the sector

- resulted the failure to harmonize with the supposedly 'modern economic' system, to have low productivity, weak capacity to compete against imported products and limited skill capacity with capital constraints.
- (d) Environmental degradation, caused by natural and human interaction with the environment with serious repercussions to the highly nature dependent economic system in causing natural calamities, conflict, drought and famine.
 - (e) Lopsided Development: unbalanced focus from the state mainly explained in terms of urban bias in providing access to social services, distribution of welfare and availability of infrastructure
 - (f) Fragmentation of the African economy, the challenge to synchronize the African 'product and factor' markets which would contribute to the availability of abundant resource to by pulling resources together and building the capacity to deal with the common problems of African countries. Moreover the nature of the production system, both agriculture and industry, with its unbalanced linkage to the international market makes it more volatile and unsustainable in responding to exogenous factors
 - (g) Openness and external dependence, as argued earlier weak structural and institutional capacity in the production sector which targets the external market made African economies immaturely open to external shocks as well as dependent on the market and trade system totally beyond their control. The core point is not intended to argue for an isolationist policy, which is very unrealistic and inappropriate, but rather to build the domestic capacity first so as to insure the sustainability and viability of the economy to survive in the international sphere. Moreover, intra-African trade can also contribute positively to the economy

- (h) Lack of institutional capability, the capacity either to transform the challenged economic system into a viable entity is fundamentally hindered by either by the absence or inefficiency of appropriate institutions

The AAF-SAP was not limited to analyzing the African political economy and its structural dysfunction rather it attempted to set the 'alternative framework' by including the observable challenges in the socio-political structures of the continent. It is argued that the production system is inevitably linked with and influenced by the broader societal organization of culture, politics and institutions (par.22). In evaluating the impact of the 'development' process that has been happening in the African societies, the AAF-SAP identified the problem associated with 'imitative modernism' which has an impact both on the social structure and economic sphere of African societies. The uncontrolled rate of urbanization followed by urban lifestyle and consumption pattern with the belief of achieving 'modernism' thwarted the economic system in creating an outward oriented domestic demand. In addition to this, the cultural impact of adopting western values into the cultural milieu, the unprecedented preference for foreign expertise, models, standards and goods had a deterrent effect in initiating an '...innovative and self-reliant' development paradigm. In addition to this, democratization and establishing/strengthening the necessary democratic structures and institutions in the political system was also considered as one of the structural challenges to be addressed.

In general terms, the AAF-SAP extensively engaged with the structural features of the African political economy before providing the 'alternative framework' to the already existing mainstream development framework. In doing so, it clearly illustrated that the African political economic structure has an inherent problem of generating crisis from its production and consumption system, as well as acquiring shocks from the external sphere which also squares back to the domestic organization of the political economy. It is this vulnerable and unsustainable pattern of production and consumption that has its own internal and external dynamics which created the crisis and treated by short-sighted policy measures (SAPs) which ended up aggravating and expanding the problem to a further extent.

I. Setting the Development Agenda: Problematizing Africa's Quest

The AAF-SAP set the development objectives that it would like to achieve across the continent through the discourse of a previous continental document which intended to achieve a comprehensive socio-economic and political transformation of the continent, The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980. The development strategy that has been utterly described in the LPA gives a vital focus for 'self-reliant and self-sustaining development'. The LPA is praised for its inward looking and far-sighted attempt of realizing development in the African context. The three core elements constituting the LPA were alleviating mass poverty and improving the living standard of people, ensuring self-sufficiency in food production, consumption and other essential goods and services, and addressing the 'balkanization' of the continent by facilitating a functional interdependence and collective self-reliance of African countries (par.31).

One of the strong points regarded by the AAF-SAP about the LPA is its comprehensiveness in accommodating both long-term developmental and transformational endeavors with short-term actions and policy recommendations. By putting the achievement of 'self-reliant and self-sustaining development' as a broader framework of functioning, the LPA produced sound and viable actions to be carried out in the short-term context. Nevertheless, all the aspirations of the LAP and the practical recommendations illustrated in the Final Act of Lagos (1980) were abandoned when the African economies were trapped by the pick of the economic crisis in mid 1980s. The situation forced the African countries to choose the stabilization measures by the IMF and the adjustment programs by the WB because of the availability of financial support from the institutions to survive the economic turmoil. Hence, the comprehensiveness of the LPA finally turned into a dichotomy of prioritizing the short-term existence at the expense of the long-term transformation. As it is stated in the AAF-SAP, '... many African countries have remained under pressure to cope with only the symptoms of the crisis, such as budgetary and external disequilibria, at the expense of leaving the fundamental structural causes of the crisis unaddressed' (par.33).

The AAF-SAP uniquely explained the structural and institutional development challenges of the continent. This entry point in problematizing the challenges and bottlenecks of the African political

economy used to frame the development objectives in a different framework. As it is argued in the document, the focus of the 'alternative framework' is to embark on a long-term societal transformation and development by addressing the 'root causes' of the economic crisis. In doing so, the development agenda of the AAF-SAP is formulated in line with achieving three broad objectives, achieving human centered development, establishing self-sustaining economic growth and development, and integrating African economies to achieve national and regional collective self-reliance.

The objective of sustaining and improving the living standard of African people and guarantying the overall well-being of citizens is considered as the ideal and the ultimate goal of the entire development endeavor in Africa. In doing so, all the other development objectives were expected to directly or indirectly contribute towards this. The AAF-SAP asserts that, it is not from the 'humanistic or altruistic aspects of development' (par.35) that development needs to be human centered rather from the core principle that it should be a process that is certainly driven by meaningful participation of people. The normative standard set within this framework argues that '[D]evelopment should not be undertaken on behalf of a people; rather it should be the organic outcome of a society's value system, its perceptions, its concerns and its endeavors' (ibid). With this regard one of the core points of ensuring human centered development is ensuring food self-sufficiency of African people. The LPA is also very loud in calling for self-sufficiency in food consumption and production. Such endeavor needs to reshape or maintain the food consumption habit of African people to products that are produced in the continent. Indeed, establishing the necessary institutional and infrastructural set up to is also a vital requirement for the attainment of this goal.

On the other hand, the extensiveness of the actual crisis in the 1980s needed a swift and practical action in line with the long-term objectives. These timely issues that needed immediate action were identified as basic needs of the population, goods and services that ensure the well-being of the people at a minimum standard. This include: 'food, water, shelter, primary health-care and sanitation, education and cheap transport' for the poor (par.37). The practical remedies that are recommended to ensure the accessibility of this minimum standard of living for the poor include: ensuring access to the basic factors of production for the poor, mainly land, facilitating the creation

of employment opportunities that are targeting the majority of the population, and also establishing a fairly improved and enhanced mechanism of reaching the poor through the distribution of national wealth. These actions fall both in the short-term and long-term development objective of realizing a human centered development. They also required the attainment of certain structural transformation in the political economy of African countries so as to ensure their attainment in an effective manner, for example the access to land (par.38).

The second component of development objective pointed out by the AAF-SAP was establishing a self-sustaining economic growth and development. This objective is directly related to the previous objective of improving the living standard of people through a human centered approach. It is argued that, the earlier objective cannot be realized unless there is a self-sustained development. And this self-sustained development objective includes three specific objectives, namely, (a) maintenance of sustained economic growth; (b) transformation of the African economic and social structures; and (c) maintenance of a sustaining strong base (par.39). In the AAF-SAP, the economic growth aspect of development is directly linked to the existing social structure. The social structure which is the constitutive part of the development process is expected to transform into a context where self-sustained development is attainable. The AAF-SAP document clearly stated this in the following manner:

In this context, it is pertinent to emphasize that socio-economic transformation has hitherto tended to be equated with a process of economic and social modernization that tries merely to replicate the patterns of production, consumption and institutions that prevail in the developed countries. This confusion has marred the proper conceptualization, design and implementation of a transformation process whose content and parameters are in resonance with African values and realities. This somber realization points to the necessity for a new African transformation ethic that incorporates, rather than alienates, the present and future African realities – economic, political, social, cultural and environmental (par.40)

This ‘African oriented’ socio-economic transformation is intended to be realized both at the consumption and production level in the long-term development endeavor. In addressing the consumption pattern problem of African countries, the AAF-SAP explicitly mentioned that the existing trend in most urban areas is ‘derivative of the value systems of the developed countries’ (par.41). Hence, the objective of achieving self-sustaining economic growth and development cannot be attained unless this pattern is changed. It is stated that such kind of outward oriented

consumption has a direct impact in the production sector by mentioning the failed attempt of the 1970s where Import Substitution Industrialization in most African countries. At the production level, the structural intervention is intended to transform the kinds of products that Africa is producing the technologies being used in the process. Once again, it is stressed that, meeting the 'critical needs' and attaining 'food self-sufficiency' are the core points (par.42). On the other hand, in relation to the external world, the self-sustaining economic growth and development objective can be achieved only if Africa's unbalanced trend in exporting cheap primary products is changed. This trend makes African economies volatile as well as dependent in the external market. Therefore, the stated objective is to transform Africa from 'trade dependence to trade viability' (par.43). This transformation is expected to boost the interdependence among African countries by focusing on enhancing inter-African trade by diversifying the export items with a primary objective of producing mainly to internal needs.

The other vital element mentioned in the endeavor of achieving self-sustaining economic growth and development is technology. Technological internalization and financial autonomy are major areas of focus that can contribute to the long term objective of achieving an inward looking and structurally balanced development. By way of achieving these, it is expected that Africa's dependence to the external world which contributed immensely to the crisis in the 1980s (foreign exchange and aid dependence, reliance on foreign direct investment, debt accumulation) will be addressed permanently (par.44).

One of the most important development objectives mentioned in the AAF-SAP is the issue of integration. The objective of integrating African economies is stated as a means of realizing 'national and regional collective self-reliance' (par.45). Regional integration is needed to pursue Africa's development objectives as well as a response to the global political economic realities. As it is stated in the document, '... Africa sees self-reliance as both the goal and the means through which the region will eventually finds its true identity, full dignity and historic strength' (par.46). As a strategy, the regional integration contributing to collective self-reliance is identified at three levels: i) the integration of physical, institutional and social infrastructures; ii) the integration of the production structures; and iii) the integration of the African markets. The integration process is clearly intended

towards building a strong interdependence among African countries in the political, economic and social spheres and capitalizing on the domains of convergence (par 47-48).

II. The Alternative Framework

The orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment programs intended to solve the socio-economic crisis of the continent by focusing the use of competitive- domestic and external-market forces. This practice is deeply rooted in the mainstream classical economics assumption where market signals are taken as natural forces determining the demand and supply changes in the economy. In this assumption, the impact of socio-economic and political institutions in influencing the flow of the market is overlooked. The 'African Alternative Framework' centers its argument by asserting that Africa's reality is totally different from the core assumption of the theoretical orientation. It argues that African economies have 'weak production structures and imperfect markets' and the structural and institutional set up of the political economy has direct impact in the crisis of the 1980. Hence, the crisis need to be solved not by focusing on the internal and external financial balances rather by transforming the African political economy structures, institutions and systems in a way that fits to its internal dynamics and the external context (AAF-SAP 1989, p 16-26).

As it is mentioned earlier, the intention of formulating the 'alternative framework' is not to replace the SAPs framework with another general and binding framework. It is rather to set a comprehensive, accommodating and realistic agenda of development for the continent that can inform the practical engagement and policy orientation of respective countries in their context. Hence, the framework is dynamic. It is dynamic in a sense that, it is responsive to the changing situations across time, and adjustable and adaptable to the different realities of African political economies in different countries (par.76-80). With this core characteristic in mind, the 'Alternative Framework' has '**three sets of macro-entities**' which are operationalized in '**three modules**'.

The three sets of macro-entities are: the operative forces, the available resources and the needs to be created for (ibid).

The operative forces: include socio-cultural, political, economic, environmental, scientific and technological issues that play a significant role in informing a development process through their pattern of interaction.

The available resources: include human resources with quality and skill, natural resources (land, water and forests), domestic savings and external financial resources

The needs to be created for: include the 'vital' goods and services produced and the 'ability to acquire them'. This macro-entity squarely emphasized one of the central objectives of the alternative framework in attaining human centered adjustment and transformation.

The dynamic character of the macro-entities both individually and collectively is explained across time and space. A change in the operative forces will necessarily have a spillover impact in the availability of resources, the manner in which they are being used to meet the needs of society. Moreover, the fact that society is also dynamic in its nature will also inform the change in the patterns of needs and the system in which these needs are produced, distributed and acquired by members of society. Hence, the specific point of time in which a specific country is found is a vital element to consider in analyzing the macro-entities identified here.

The above mentioned operative forces, the available resources and the needs that they create when they interact and influence each other at different level, the pattern they say during their interaction and moreover the determining socio-political and economic context is explained in the following three modules, namely, (ibid)

The Production module: explained in terms of the different sets of interactions and relational positions in the process of producing goods and services and generating factor income taking into consideration the degree of efficiency and productivity of allocated resources.

The Distribution module: building on the production module, this module mainly focuses on the distribution of output and forces that determine the level and patterns of allocation of factor income.

The Satisfaction module: constituted the operative forces that determine the production and the distribution modules and the interplay between them in determining the level of

income and income distribution to set the pattern of domestic needs satisfaction and external transactions (exports, imports, debt, aid and other resource flows)

The alternative framework set these macro-entities and modules with an explicit statement that the framework is not intended to be a standard model to be followed or prescribed across countries irrespective of their unique context (par.80). Every country is expected to identify the existing operative forces, the pattern of their interaction in managing the available resources and the degree to of the production and distribution of goods and services meeting both the present and the future needs.

While attempting to justify the different conceptualization of development within the ‘alternative framework’, it is argued that the focus is not only on the structures of production and consumption but also in the pattern of wealth distribution. Furthermore, based on the stated objective of transforming the pattern of consumption, the ‘alternative framework’ aspired to determine the nature of needs as well as the degree of satisfaction. By identifying the nature of interaction among the macro-entities and the modules, the production and consumption matter is expected to structurally transform to meet the material, social and cultural reality of the continent. In filling the identified gaps that SAPs have ignored in the social spheres, the ‘alternative framework’ is intending to redress it through its human-centered development objective. This is achieved by focusing on employment generation to the majority, equitable income distribution and satisfying the ‘essential needs’ of the people.

The ‘alternative framework’ loudly ‘reemphasized’ its significant difference from the mainstream stabilization and structural adjustment programs. By taking the three most important modules as defining pillars of its framework, it criticized the ignorance of the orthodox program in addressing them. For instance, though the mainstream program has a focus in income generation, it overlooked the vital role of domestic demand in the process because of its unbalanced and outward looking production system, mainly primary export commodities. Furthermore, the mainstream program has totally ignored the mechanism of income redistribution which increased the social malaise during the crisis. This negative impact of the mainstream adjustment program is further aggravated by the

narrow objectives of prioritizing 'internal and external balances' without giving the necessary attention to the 'critical needs and services' that need to be met to enhance peoples' lives.

The 'alternative framework' has its own policy direction to materialize the macro-level proposal of structural transformation to the ground level. It is by focusing on strengthening and diversifying the production system, improving incomes generated through the process of production and the maintaining institutional and structural set ups for distribution and finally satisfying identified 'critical needs'. In the words of the lead architect of the framework, Adebayo Adedeji:

...the internal logic is to bring about socio-economic diversification and sustaining development through fundamental changes in socio-economic structures base on the purposeful enhancement of infrastructures and the judicious combination and use of human and natural resources and technological know-how' (Adedeji 1990, p44)

In the following section an attempt will be made to critically examine how differently the AAF-SAP problematized Africa's 'developmental' challenge and conceptualized the issue of 'development' differently.




Figure 3.2: The schematic representation of the AAF-SAP

4.3 How Different is the ‘Alternative’?

The following section re-examines the presentation made so far about the AAF-SAP in understanding the political economic structure of the continent, in setting the development objectives and providing an alternative. By basing the literature review and the critical discourse studies as a tool, the assumptions of the text and the impact of the context in which it is produced will be analyzed. The main question at stake is how differently could the idea of ‘development’ be conceptualized in the AAF-SAP?

4.3.1 The Two Kinds of ‘Structural Adjustments’ & the Development Assumptions

Obviously, the core assumption that drives the notion of ‘development’ during the period of SAPs is heavily influenced by the ideological leanings and theoretical orientations of the 70s and 80s. The history of development theory passed through different stages of explanations since its inception in the post ‘WWII’ period without significant change in its dogma that the ‘Western’ system or socio-economic and political organization is the route that should be followed by non-westerners. Structural functionalism and modernization theory lingered into the supposedly ‘new’ theoretical explanations of ‘development’ in the first four decades between their emergence and the inception of the AAF-SAP. Though John Toye argued that monoeconomics replaced structuralism in informing the policy directions and decisions of the SAPs period, both approaches emanate from the same knowledge framework that describes development in a linear evolution (Toye 1994, p.22-24). Hence, there is no fundamental difference in their initial hypothesis and understanding of the concept of ‘development’.

This being the case, the SAPs problematized the structural and institutional challenges of Africa’s economies from a vantage point that analyzed the developmental mission of societies in a ‘value free’, ‘objective’ and ‘universalistic’ lens. Both monoeconomics and structuralism adhere to this orientation. It is based on this perspective that the recommendations to the ‘western’ political economy context was easily replicated into the African reality without giving due consideration of

the peculiarities and wide range of differentiations. For instance, the mainstream 'development' perspective asserts that the structural impediments that must be changed in the attempt of dealing with the economic crisis are market distortions, the increasing negative balance of payment, deteriorating terms of trade, depletion of external reserve, rising inflation and the like. Based on the principles of monoeconomics, all these macro-economic challenges have the same answer because markets are 'markets' everywhere in the world.

For the AAF-SAP, the structural impediments that needed adjustment in the African economies were deeply embedded into the 'enabling and disabling factors that are domestic and external, historical and contemporary' (par.1). Though the AAF principally agrees with the SAPs on the need of adjustments, the causes/the reasons for adjustment, the objectives of the adjustment and their execution in general differs significantly from the mainstream agenda. Indeed, it is possible to find the characterization of the African socio-economic and political context in terms of 'underdevelopment' and 'backwardness'. This indicates the implicit framework of conceptualizing development across a continuum of 'progress' towards a certain end. On the other hand, there is an explicit attempt of avoiding 'Africa's imitative modernism' by transforming both the production and consumption patterns of African societies as well as by incorporating the values, norms and local orientations of people into the development endeavors.

The principal reason for producing the 'alternative framework' is to set the institutional and structural parameters within the African political economy. This is intended to facilitate the realization of 'structural transformation and sustainable development' in the long-term without necessarily abandoning the short-term concerns of IMF and WB. The failure of the earlier stabilization and structural adjustment programs in achieving the stated objective of managing the economic crisis played a crucial role in setting the material condition for the inception of AAF-SAP. Moreover, the previous African initiatives manifested in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980) has also contributed immensely in informing both the domestic and external material conditions. These material conditions both historically embedded and currently existing include: the lingering systems of production structured during the colonial period, patterns of consumption, international and global relation, internal set up of institutions and the like have enlightened the problematization of Africa's political economic structural challenges. With regard to

the LPA, the ideals of realizing 'self-reliant and self-sustained development' which ultimately requires a new framework of policy and practice can be also considered as one of the ideational ground for the emergence of the AAF-SAP.

The stabilization and structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and their consequences in deteriorating African economies constitute the material condition for the emergence of AAF-SAP. Whereas the ideational drive constitutes the urge to frame Africa's needs and priorities and owning the destiny of the continent. These two causes are used to conceptualize Africa's development endeavor differently in the AAF-SAP. Indeed, both the material conditions and the ideational drives are intertwined, one being constitutive part of the other rather than factors contributing in their own separate spheres. Hence, the reaction towards these causes is also holistic in its nature. For instance, one of the objectives of Africa's development mentioned in the document argues that the way in which development is conceptualized, designed and implemented need to emanate from the lived experiences and realities of the people. It argues that the socio-cultural, political, economic and environmental realities of the African societies need to be the starting points of the development process. By doing so, the 'development' policy and practice can easily settle into peoples' lives rather than alienating them from the process. Achieving this objective requires a distinctive way of looking at the problems of Africa and formulating the remedies. And the AAF-SAP did this rightly so by interpreting the structural problems of the continent across a broad spectrum.

The historical/material causes related to production and consumption which was unwisely outward oriented and the associated infrastructural and institutional set up of countries economies was clearly identified. This anecdote is further extended into the contemporary socio-economic life of people who are very keen in consuming what they do not produce and producing what they do not consume. Such kind of life style was embraced by the majority of mainly urban Africans as a modern lifestyle. People assumed that the value systems of the 'developed countries' are more advanced than theirs. According to the AAF-SAP argument, this scenario makes African economies internally unsustainable and externally dependent. Hence, any intention of 'development' has to take these facts into consideration and intend to transform not only structures of production and consumption but also people's orientation both towards themselves and 'modernity'.

In general, the structural adjustment that the ‘alternative framework’ intended to address is deeply rooted into the historical and contemporary socio-cultural, political and economic system of the continent. And most importantly it was not an effort of adjusting into the existing global political economy and the mainstream ideas rather engaging into a long-term transformational process. Development is conceptualized as a process which is firmly located into the real African political economic context with a thorough understanding both internal and external challenges as well as historical and contemporary contexts.

4.3.2 ‘Human Centered’ Approach to Development

One of the stated objectives of the AAF-SAP clearly states that ‘[T]he ultimate goal of development in Africa is to ensure the overall well-being of the people through a sustained improvement in their living standard’ (par.34). Moreover this, the realization of ‘food self-sufficiency’ is also taken as the most important priority to be met under the ‘alternative framework’. This clearly shows how differently the AAF-SAP could set priorities in the effort of achieving development. The attempt of demystifying the long-term and short-term development plan dichotomy is one of the entry points where the human centered approach weighs in. It is by going further from remedies focusing on ‘re-establishing financial balances’ to policy directions envisioning socio-economic transformation and sustainable development that the human element is embraced.

Furthermore, the human centered element is incorporated as one of the three macro-entities that constituted the ‘alternative framework’, through the ‘needs to be created for’, likewise as one of the three modules, namely, ‘satisfaction of needs’. The distribution module, the call for people’s participation in the development process, the attempt of bringing vulnerable and disadvantaged groups into the forefront of the development discourse all can be considered as the manifestations of the human centered approach of the AAF-SAP. At this point it is wise to reflect on the conceptualization of the assumption of the ‘alternative framework’ in meeting the ‘basic’, ‘essential’ needs of people.

In reconciling the long-term objectives with the short term objectives, the ‘alternative framework’ opted for the actions that are targeting the present levels of poverty and deprivation. Hence, addressing the immediate needs of people to survive with the fulfillment of the basic and minimum

requirements of life is taken as a valid option. In other words, the 'Basic Needs' approach which has been promoted by the World Bank since its report in 1981, *First Thing First: Meeting the Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries* is appropriated by the 'alternative framework'. The 'Basic Needs' approach become part of the development discourse after the notion of 'trickle-down growth' promoted during the modernization theory era failed to fulfill the promises (Kapoor 2008, p.22). The basic needs approach has been challenged by various scholars from different angles. For instance, the attempt of determining the 'basic needs' of people which is most of the time done by policy makers or donors is considered as disempowering and hierarchical. It is argued that the poor people are considered as passive recipients of the help from other actors, either the state or most of the time donors. Furthermore, the basic assumption that irrespective of any differences across time, space, cultural orientations, livelihoods and other peculiarities, the basic needs approach homogenizes people by narrowing down their needs to the 'most basic ones'. By doing so, it is authoritatively decided that food, shelter, water, health and education are the minimum 'basic needs' that need to be fulfilled (ibid). The other string of criticism argues that, by giving too much attention to the basic needs that need to be fulfilled to the 'poor people', most often, the issue of inequality at the broader, global and structural level which might be considered as the cause is neglected. Moreover, fulfilling the basic needs of people does not change their life fundamentally rather has a tendency to make them more dependent and powerless.

Indeed, the criticisms forwarded against the basic needs approach are valid. And the manner in which the concept of basic needs is implicitly included into the 'alternative framework' also needs a critical analysis by relating it to the broader assumptions and arguments of the document, as well as the criticisms forwarded. To start with, the 'alternative framework' mentioned it very explicitly that avoiding the dichotomy between long-term and short-term development programs is one of its purpose. This is intended to be addressed by producing a comprehensive development program that does not take one at the expense of the other. Hence, it is based on this core assumption that the 'basic needs' of the people living in abject poverty is targeted as part of the short-term component of the 'alternative framework'. The attainment of 'food self-sufficiency' is one of the components of the basic needs that was also one of the main objectives of the LPA and continued to be in the AAF-SAP.

The other element of ‘needs’ in the ‘alternative framework’ is one of the three macro-entities mentioned in document. As being one of the core entities that constituted the ‘alternative framework’, it is given broader and higher level of conceptualization than the usual definition. By locating it into the stated purpose and objective of the document, the concept of ‘needs’ is expounded and linked with the wider political economy, production and consumption cycle as well as with one of the modules which ensures the consideration of domestic and external dynamics. It can be argued that, the needs based approach is taken to a higher level within the context of the ‘alternative framework’. In the effort of putting people’s well being at the center of its effort, the ‘alternative framework’ attempts to transform the socio-political structures of African societies in a self-sustaining manner from within. The attempt of ensuring the backward and forward linkage of the production and consumption patterns, the effort of ensuring fair distribution of income and wealth after the production process and the focus given to vulnerable groups makes the ‘needs based’ approach of the ‘alternative framework’ different. It can also answer one of the criticisms towards the narrowness of the approach and how it can contribute to the long-term development objective if it is well anchored into a broader framework. Therefore, the human centered approach of the AAF-SAP can be considered as a mechanism of ensuring the comprehensiveness of the framework. This holistic intention encompasses filling the existing immediate gaps and contributing to the broader objective of socio-economic transformation. The established interlinked feature and the in-ward looking orientation is also a crucial point of strength.

4.3.3 The Role of the State

One of the essential assumptions towards the SAPs and its implementation is the nature of the inefficient and ineffective state. The hardcore neoliberal conception of society explicitly calls for the withdrawal of the state from the main scene and to assume a watchdog role in the free functioning market led economy.

The role of the state was given serious attention in ‘alternative framework’, from the diagnosis of the development problem to the objectives of African development and also to the recommendation of the new development framework. The AAF-SAP does not deny the fact that the existing structural and institutional set up of most African states is problematic and untrustworthy in realizing the

aspired socio-economic transformation. The capacity of the state in handling the economic crisis is contextualized within the broader challenges that it has been functioning.

Historically, the state structure of most African countries is inherited from the colonial era with all its malfunctions and patrimonial structures. And proper functioning in the 1970s and 80s context of differently organized political economy with the same intuitional set up, production and consumption pattern as well as system of governance was implausible. Hence, any diagnosis in the dysfunctional features of the state has to take this into account. On the other hand, one of the remedies forwarded towards treating the inefficient and ineffective system of public administration in the state system was by introducing foreign experts and consultants with a financial support of the IMF and the WB. Such kind of short-sighted treatment of the symptoms of the state inefficiency continued to incapacitate the state at least for two reasons. One, it compromised the possibility of institutional capacity-building by focusing on the individual expertise of foreign professionals who were most of the times unable to grasp the root cause of most the problems they were dealing with. And secondly, it contributed to the indebtedness of the countries, a financial resource that the countries secured to execute a certain program totally outsourced to the foreign experts. Most of the time the conditionality of hiring foreign experts is a must to be fulfilled to access loans and aid from the IMF and the WB. The inherently weak state structure was further incapacitated through the SAPs programs. Hence, the attempt of the 'alternative framework' was to defy both the internal and external challenges of the African state so as to make it a leading player in the self-reliant and self-sustained socio-economic transformation.

With this regard, it is aptly explained in the 'alternative framework' that the main development goal is ensuring the improvement of people's well-being. And the problem of the continent is way beyond those that were taken as pre-texts to the execution of the SAPs. Hence, the state *vs.* market dichotomy is totally out of the equation in addressing the development need. It is rather adjusting the political economic structure of the continent from within in a way that functions appropriately and to the advantage of the continent in the external scene. In the domestic sphere, the state is expected to ensure the synchronization of the operative forces to make the ultimate use of the available resources and satisfy the needs of its citizens. The plan of ensuring the existence of a production system that first targets the domestic market satisfaction, with fair distribution of the

income and ensuring the satisfaction of both the basic needs and the delivery of other essential goods and services necessarily requires a strong state.

When implicitly calling for the role of the state in the realization of the development aspirations, the ‘alternative framework’ is not over emphasizing the capacity of the state and counting on its success unreservedly. It is rather an attempt of counter-balancing the discourse of the neoliberal orientation which romanticizes the role of the market as a fair allocator of resources and benefits. For instance, the AAF-SAP unequivocally denounces the provision of privatization scheme indiscriminately. It argues that the basis used to support the program, the ‘institutional superiority of private over public enterprises’ (par.60[e]) and the readiness and capability of the domestic private sector to own state enterprises is very problematic. According to the AAF-SAP, such pretext is being used as a justification to liberalize the production and service sector to multinational companies which in turn has a horrendous impact in securing the welfare of the wider society. Trading off the social welfare and well-being of people for profitability and effectiveness is totally against the main goal of Africa’s development objectives stated in the document. What the ‘alternative framework’ trying is to strike the delicate balance between the private and the public sector without compromising the long term development objective i.e., to transform the socio-economic system of the continent in a self-sustaining manner. And the state is considered as a vital actor in all this endeavors.

Chapter Conclusions

In relation to the stabilization and structural adjustment programs that have been carried out in African economies, the AAF-SAP took a different route starting from its inception. The initiative to make a thorough examination of SAPs and its impact, the role that African governments have assumed in producing the draft and the final versions of the document, and the political decision taken by the OAU to make it a continentally approved document makes the AAF-SAP different in its nature. The AAF-SAP’s intention to win the decision making role about the political economy of African countries was achieved at least at the document level. At the political level, it tried to balance the lopsided negotiations between individual countries and sponsors/advocates of SAPs which somehow compromised the national sovereignty of African countries. In most cases, national governments had little power in influencing the design, implementation and monitoring of adjustment programs.

On the other hand, the AAF-SAP was also loud enough in addressing the social spheres of development practices. Indeed, there has been a call from the UN, mainly UNICEF, to have 'structural adjustment with a human face'. The AAF-SAP gave unconditional focus to the well-being of the majority, the poor and the vulnerable, both in its problem identification and developmental schemes.

On the other hand, the central idea of counter balancing the externally imposed economic reform programs was also achieved by producing home-grown document. However, there might be some critical concerns against its claim of being a comprehensive framework which may have a similar danger of being 'one size fits all'. This danger of being another home-grown general framework that is blind to the different socio-economic, political and historical realities of African countries would be tasted if the AAF-SAP was fully implemented across the continent⁵. However, what happened to the document particularly after its unanimous adoption by the OAU General Assembly in July 1989 makes it difficult to critically examine its feature with this regard. This is because of the emergence of another authoritative document from the WB, nearly four months later (November, 1989), about the political economy of African countries, namely '*Sub Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth – a long-term perspective study*'. This WB document has become the dominant framework of reference in addressing the developmental questions of African countries.

The WB showed a significant u-turn in its rhetoric in addressing the political economic crisis and the remedies forwarded to African countries. This changed discourse was echoed by the AAF-SAP a bit earlier. The principle of adhering to 'human-centered development', 'giving due emphasis to the unique structural context of African economies', and the focus for 'long term plan of transforming African economies', were only few of the major points mentioned in the new WB document (WB, 1989). Though it is difficult to argue that the WB has appropriated/recognized the ideas of AAF-

⁵ During the field work period, there was an attempt to conduct an extended discussion/interview with some officials at the UNECA. What is observed from the encounter with the officials is that the AAF-SAP document has become totally silenced immediately after its inauguration without being tasted on the ground. There is no any practical attempt both in the diplomatic core and the political elite to refer to the document. What is apparent at this point is to refer every political economic issue within the NEPAD framework (Field note, November 2010)

SAP or fall under the influence of the document, the change of the rhetoric is visible, at least at document level.

The AAF-SAP was a strong reaction to the mainstream understanding of African development problems and prospects. The remedies provided by SAPs to the 1980s crisis were short-sighted and unsustainable. The only power the SAPs had was the sponsors behind the programs and the dominant ideology of the time that initiated the intervention. On the other hand, the AAF-SAP addressed the root causes of the crisis in African economies, the 'structural' predicaments and institutional challenges. While SAPs were mainly obsessed with short-term solutions of the symptoms, the AAF-SAP went further in ensuring the long-term transformation of African economies.

Moreover, the understanding of 'development' in a context of economic growth and quantitative changes is also challenged. The obsession of providing a remedy from a single perspective for a variety of problems is counter-balanced by the attempt of broadly conceptualizing 'development' in the AAF-SAP. Beyond the production and consumption pattern of societies, development is conceptualized as a process that is deeply rooted into the socio-cultural and historical features of societies. The AAF-SAP gave appropriate focus to the other features of societal life without necessarily disregarding the importance of economic growth for development. This attempt of locating development in the intricacies of social life makes the AAF-SAP more appealing than an attempt of fixing the economies at a superficial level. Generally speaking, one can certainly argue that AAF-SAP was a real alternative conceptualization of African development issues especially with regard to the IMF and WB programs of the 1980s.

Chapter Five

Africa's Development in the 21st Century –NEPAD's Effort

5.1 Introduction: Historical Review and Emergence

This chapter presents a discussion of the other widely acclaimed document with regard to African politics and development, i.e. the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In presenting and critically examining this document, the historical, socio-economic and political context both at the continent and global level will be reviewed briefly. In doing so, the triggering factors for the production of the document, the actors involved in it as well as the steps taken in realizing the final version of the document will be discussed.

5.1.1 The Continuation of the Crisis in the 1990s

The economic crisis that aggravated the challenges for African states during the 1980s lingered into the 1990s with a wider impact. In the early years of the 1990s, the SAPs exacerbated the failure of the States to control the situation, either directly or indirectly. Moreover, the changing global order, the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the 'Cold War', the emergence of the US as a prime hegemonic player in the global scene in the 90s, the increasing role of the IMF and WB in determining the fate of countries in the global south can be considered vital elements of the period. As to the internal African context, the impact of the global order was apparent, for instance the so-called wave of democracy that engulfed political systems of some countries, the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the conflict and civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, Burundi, Somalia, Angola, Congo, Liberia, or Sierra Leone. It resulted state collapse (Somalia) and genocide (Rwanda and Burundi): few cases marking the political and socio-economic crisis of the continent in the 90s (Ihonvbere, 1996).

Indeed, the situation in the 1990s needs to be considered in relation to the political economy of the continent in the previous decades. The socio-economic and political predicaments in the 1990s are the results of the crisis that afflicted the continent since the 1960s. Some consider the 1980 is a decade where Africa ended with more complex misery, challenges and deterioration than its status in the beginning of the decade (ibid). Having attempted to address the socio-economic crisis through

the SAPs, the AAF-SAP, the regional initiatives like the Abuja Treaty of 1991 (establishing the African Common Market by 2030) the early years of the decade were not promising enough to escape the label of being a 'lost decade' (Cheru 2002, p. 3).

The parameters of achieving development in the continent have been also changing along with the dynamics of the global context as well as the changing points of priorities among the main actors. With regard to the previous decade, development was mainly associated with ensuring the stable performance of the economic sector and managing the stabilization of macro-economy along certain indicators. And the SAPs were mainly focused in realizing these goals at least in their short-term plans. Moreover, with the inclusion of additional concerns into the discourse of development like globalization, ICT, security, human rights, good governance, democracy and the like, the challenges facing Africa and the mission of realizing 'development' continued to be an uphill battle (Amoako, 2000; Cheru, 2002; Ihonvbere, 1996). Indeed, these features become part and parcel of the discourse and practice of development based on the material conditions of most African states as well as through the imagination of what 'development' has to constitute at the ideal level. Africa entered the decade (1990s) with unsolved, if not exacerbated, domestic challenges of incapacitated political systems, inappropriate policy environment, inefficient agricultural productivity, poor manufacturing base, inadequate skill base and an viable and realistic peace and security threat (Cheru, 2002: p.9-12). It is hardly possible to disentangle one from the other, rather each challenge contributing to the general bleak picture that has been painted about the continent both at that period and also in the previous years. Indeed, these seeming internal/domestic features did not operate in absolute manner rather in close collaboration with external challenges that, most of the time, exacerbated the fragile and deteriorating condition of the continent. As mentioned by Cheru, some of the key challenges that constituted the external challenges include: deteriorating terms of trade, uneven patterns in foreign direct investment flows, high level of debt and most importantly the absence of commanding power in decision making for the development strategies that the countries would like to adopt (loss of sovereignty) (ibid, p.13-19).

It is within such kinds of context that, the continental organization, Organization of African Unity (OAU) began its journey of transforming itself into a different institutional set-up and structure, the African Union (AU). Likewise, the challenges that the member states were facing both collectively and individually also triggered the formulation of different development road maps and documents

by leaders of some countries. With this regard the efforts of the presidents of Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria and South Africa were paramount. Chronologically, the institutional transformation of the continental body preceded the emergence of the NEPAD document, but the material condition and the historical reality that gave rise to both initiatives remained the same. The transformation process of the OAU into the AU as well as the early steps of producing NEPAD as a continental development roadmap will be presented in the subsequent sections.

5.1.2 The Transformation of the OAU to the AU

After being established as a continental organ on May 25, 1963, the OAU continued to be the sole continental institution which ensured and transcended the presence of the continent from a geographical location into a political economic entity. The establishment of the OAU by itself can be interpreted along various lines depending on the perspective. Some argue that it was the embodiment of the Pan-Africanism movement which started in the 19th century and the manifestation of the will to act collectively in the post-independence era (Abraham, 2003; AU, 2007; Muruthi, 2007, van Walraven 1999). According to Muruthi, the OAU can be considered as one form of institutionalizing the ideals of Pan-Africanism in the 20th century. Indeed, the organization has incorporated one of the core principles of the Pan-Africanism movement, i.e. ending colonialism or ensuring ‘political freedom’, when Nelson Mandela become the first democratically elected president of South Africa after ending Apartheid (Muruthi 2007, p.2). The attempt of the continental institution to address the socio-economic and political problems of the member states through its various initiatives were not without obstacles. The internal challenges within member states as well as among member states of the OAU and the external challenges from the international political economy presented serious predicaments for the functioning of the institution. Various reasons can be mentioned with regard to these challenges. For instance, some argue that the fact that the Charter of the OAU stipulated in its provision to ‘defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states’ (OAU, 1963) compromised the superior position that it can assume to preside over issues across the continent (ibid). With this regard, the OAU was more of an inter-governmental institution with less impact in influencing the socio-economic and political situation of its member states.

In spite of its institutional and principal limitations, the OAU has also attempted to realize one of the ideals of Pan-Africanism i.e. ‘collective self-reliance and self-sufficiency’ (AU, 2007). The Lagos

Plan of Action of 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 to establish the African Economic Community by 2030 were intended to realize the socio-economic and political integration of the continent. But these efforts did not materialize to bring the intended result within the context of ineffective institutional set up within the continent as well as fragile and hostile external political economic environment. It is within such kind of context that the OAU embarked on the process of transforming itself into a new institutional set-up where the initial ideals of Pan Africanism would be pursued at a higher level. In principle, the AU was intended to build on the success of the OAU and address the challenges it failed to deal with. The AU is also considered as the third phase institutionalizing Pan-Africanism, the Pan-African Congress and the OAU being the previous ones (Muruthi 2007, p. 3).

The core feature that constituted the AU was the new Constitutive Act which is the governing document of the institution. The Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) succinctly tried to address the recurrent challenges of the continent, to sustain and re-enforce the previous attempts of achieving certain goals, like establishing the African Economic Community and the Pan-African Parliament. It also envisioned incorporating the various newly emerging discourses in achieving socio-economic and political development, like issues of human rights, good governance, democracy, inclusion of civil society and the appropriate focus of peace and security issues (OAU, 2000). Both internal and external factors were seen as having an apparent role in informing the inclusion of these issues at this level as well as the attempt of ensuring the presence of appropriate institutional mechanism to realize them. For a Pan African perspective, the explicit assertion of the preamble of the Constitutive Act about the role of the Union in building partnership beyond the government level among ‘... all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among ... people’ is an unequivocal recognition of the failure of the OAU, which operated mainly among states and government level structures (OAU, 2000, Houghton, 2008). Moreover, by adopting the principle of non-indifference in its Constitutive Act, the AU is given more power to intervene into a Member State pursuant to the decision of the General Assembly with the responsibility of protecting the rights of citizens from serious violations of human rights like genocide and war crimes (Art (4h)). Though there is an attempt of changing the widely held perception towards the continental institution which is under the control of dictators or weak capacity to influence authoritarian regimes, in reality the newly born institution is still under

the control of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (Van Walraven 2004, p.199) This new discourse of creating a continental citizenship might be another success in the eyes of the early Pan-Africanists whose ideas were drowned out by African Nationalism (Sturman, 2007). The Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted in Togo, Lome at the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU on July 11, 2000 and the AU was formally established in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa.

The transformation of the OAU into the AU needs to be understood in the context of the increasing challenges that the previous institution had been facing in the areas of socio-economic and political development, in addition to the embodiment of Pan-African ideology and sentiment. It has become apparent that the old institutional set-up and some of the founding principles of the OAU were not going hand in hand with the dynamism of both the internal and external political economy. Moreover, the emergence of new challenges ideally required a new set of minds and strategies. With this regard, the discourse of globalization and marginalization of the continent, which has been echoed by various prominent figures and heads of states, played a significant role to re-enforce the institutional set up of the continent so as to fit into the global political economy context. The individual and collective effort of some presidents can be also understood as part of this wider attempt which finally produced NEPAD as a continental development program.

5.1.3 Initial Steps towards NEPAD

The final document of NEPAD, launched on October 23rd, 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria was the result of previous attempts by different African leaders in producing a comprehensive development framework for Africa. The major initiatives which gave rise to the final document are the *Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program* (henceforth, MAP) which was spearheaded by the then President Tambo Mbeki of South Africa, and the *Omega Plan* produced by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. The two documents have traveled their own journey before being combined to form the *New African Initiative* (NAI) which later on changed into the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Compared to the Omega Plan, the MAP have gone further steps in popularizing its objectives and planned activities under the auspices of Mbeki in 2001. These efforts of popularizing the document under the motto of 'African Renaissance' were mainly targeting the 'development partners' in the West. After declaring his conviction that the 21st century should become 'Africa's century' during his presidential speech, Mbeki spend a lot of effort in promoting

his ideas through the MAP document. According to his own account, even before the document was produced a series of consultations have been made with ‘... the political leadership of the developed world – the North’ (Mbeki, 2001, as quoted on Nabudere, 2002). These consultations involve meetings with Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Bill Clinton, Governor George W. Bush, addressing meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers, addressing the meeting of the European Council, the G-7 meeting in Tokyo (with President Obasanjo and Bouteflika), with Japanese Prime Minister, President of the World Bank, Managing Director of the IMF, addressing the UN Millennium Summit, President Putin and UN General Secretary Kofi Annan (ibid). These consultations and meetings were conducted in the year 2000, mainly in the building up process of MAP and before the MAP document was initially presented at the World Economic Forum on January 2001.

Mbeki argued that the imperatives of conducting these series of consultations with ‘the partners’ in the global North was to express the firm commitment in addressing the developmental challenges of Africa and winning their will to be partners. In his address the World Economic Forum in January 2001, Mbeki mentioned that the MAP would be open to incorporate other African countries so long as ‘... (they) are prepared and ready to commit (themselves) to the underlying principles guiding the initiative’ (Mbeki, 2001, as quoted on Nabudere, 2002; Adesina, 2006). The Lome Summit in July 2000 delegated the Presidents of Nigeria, Algeria and South Africa to produce a document to be circulated to heads of States. But the efforts of Mbeki to popularize the ideals of MAP to the northern counterparts was already in progress, and later on President Obasanjo and Bouteflika joined him to the G-7 meeting in Tokyo, Japan. Hence, Mbeki was successful enough in bringing other leaders to join his effort and winning the support of the OAU in his endeavor.

The core argument of MAP with regard to addressing the development needs of the continent was by integrating Africa into the global political economy. Building upon the discourses of Africa’s marginalization and globalization, Mbeki argued that unless there is a sound continental development program in partnership with the global North, the social exclusion and continued marginalization of the continent might pose a serious challenge and threat to the global order. Hence, MAP insisted that African countries facing the challenge of exclusion and marginalization needed to do their homework to win their meaningful place and multinational institutions and donor countries had to also provide the necessary support. And MAP was ‘a pledge by African leaders ...’

(MAP, 2001) to engage in a full-scale commitment of addressing the social, economic and political challenges of Africa both individually and collectively.

On the other hand, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade presented, in May 2001, another document under the theme the *Omega Plan* to the platform focusing on issues of infrastructure, agriculture, health and education (Adesina 2006, p. 35; Nabudere 2002, p. 54). The Omega Plan prioritized investment on physical infrastructure and human capital development to achieve sustained economic growth and development. Indeed, both the Omega Plan and MAP had the same objective of creating an ‘African-driven’ development framework through which the challenges of the continent were to be addressed. Both documents called for the leading role to be played by Africa’s political economic elite and aspired putting the continent on the path of economic growth and sustainable development (Omega Plan, 2001, Map, 2001). Hence, building on their point of convergence, the Lusaka Summit of OAU in July 2001 decided to merge the two documents and produced the New African Initiative, which later became the NEPAD document.

5.2 The New conceptualization of Africa’s Development - NEPAD

The NEPAD document officially came into existence in October, 2001 at the meeting of the Heads of States Implementation Committee (HSIC) in Abuja, Nigeria. The HSIC was a new structure introduced as part of the NEPAD initiative to carry out a high level administration of the newly born development roadmap. In this section, an attempt will be made to introduce the basic features of NEPAD and its conceptualization of ‘development’ in the African context. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the main purpose here is to critically examine how ‘development’ was conceptualized and problematized. Hence, there will be a limited effort in going in-depth to examine the implementation strategy and the execution of programs of NEPAD.

The final version of the NEPAD document has seven core sections, each with a specific focus and purpose. The first section is an introduction which attempts to lay the foundations and the rationale of the basic arguments of the document. In the second section, an attempt is made to contextualize the feature of Africa in the world by contrasting the observed facts of poverty and prosperity in the world. In doing so, the historical roots contributing to Africa’s current situation and the impact of the present global system is also presented. The third and fourth sections of the document have

uniquely addressed the political economic elites and the peoples of Africa. The sections include a pledge from the political leadership and the political will that they have, followed by a section which calls up on the peoples of Africa and their role in achieving the objectives of NEPAD. A significant portion of the document is dedicated to outline the program of action under the theme ‘The Strategy for Achieving Sustainable Development in the 21st Century’. This section describes the core activities of NEPAD by stating the conditions and necessary scenarios for sustainable development, sectoral priorities and mobilizing resources as part of its component. The sixth section focused on one of the core features of NEPAD, i.e. the partnership, a ‘new global partnership with industrialized countries and multinational organizations’. Finally, the last section states the implementation of projects for the realization of NEPAD’s objectives (NEPAD, 2001).

5.2.1 Setting the Development Agenda in NEPAD’s Perspective

I) Africa and the Global Political Economy

NEPAD has attempted to present the socio-economic, political and environmental challenges that Africa has been facing in its own perspective. In the document, the articulation of Africa’s quest for development is attached with the features of the global political economic phenomena. The situation in which Africa is found (during the formulation of the document) is presented in contrast with the then situation in the ‘developed world’. By juxtaposing the ‘poverty and backwardness of Africa’ with the ‘prosperity of the developed world’, NEPAD builds its premise to argue that Africa is marginalized from the globalization process (NEPAD 2001, par.2). NEPAD asserts that allowing the continuation of such marginalization and ‘social exclusion’ has a dire effect on the stability and security of the global system (ibid).

The underlying arguments of NEPAD with respect to the interaction of Africa with the global political economy can be generally categorized into two themes: historical legacies and present challenges. Indeed, the two insights are not mutually exclusive; rather the challenges that constitute the present are cumulative effects and continuing legacies of the historical past. What is being presented in the historical legacies dates back to the colonial period, which ‘subverted ... traditional structures, institutions and values or made them subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial power’ (par. 21). The impact of the colonial period political economic system lingered to the ‘post-independence’ period having an impact for the failure of building a strong capitalist class

and inadequate professional skill contributing to the insufficient wealth accumulation in the entire economic system. Moreover, the newly 'independent' states were characterized by their weak capacities, inefficient and ineffective economic system, unresponsive political governance and patronage. The internally unfavorable situation further aggravated through the Cold War period which further deteriorated '... the development of accountable governments across the continent' (par.22).

Moreover, the historical legacies that NEPAD attempts to counter constitute the initial interaction that Africa has with 'institutions of the international community'. It argues that Africa joined this platform from a subordinate position, and its development endeavor is characterized through the channeling of aid or credit from these institutions. This feature, 'the credit and aid binomial', played a negative role against the development objectives of the continent. The credit element created the debt burden in many African economies whereas the aid element is also proven untrustworthy by its continuous reduction from the target set in the 1970s (par.3). Hence, what NEPAD aspires to achieve is to restructure this unbalance with the 'international community'.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing the relationship that underpins it Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions (par.5)

According to NEPAD, the developmental challenges that Africa is facing are a function of the colonial period legacies, the ineffective features of the entire socio-economic and political structure in the post-independence African countries, the influence of the Cold War period, and also the impact of the failed policies and strategies that Africa was forced to adopt during the SAPs period. The combination of these factors constituted the vicious circle of crisis that the continent is trapped in. The inefficient state structure which was further compromised during the structural adjustment period, the continuing economic decline associated with increasing debt and unsuccessful aid trap characterized the deeply rooted problems of Africa's development quagmire. And this characterization is further explained through the other dominant discourses in the NEPAD document i.e. marginalization and globalization.

The other basic point of departure in problematizing the development challenge of Africa in NEPAD's perspective is to locate the present challenges based on the historical legacies. The

present challenges of development presented by NEPAD are tightly associated with the process of globalization and explained through the discourse of marginalization. By laying the foundation for such an assertion in the historical legacies, Africa is presented as a passive actor in the globalization process with a ‘...limited integration into the global economy’ (par.16). According to NEPAD globalization is:

... a product of scientific and technological advances, many of which have been market-driven. Yet, governments-particularly those in the developed world-have, in partnership with the private sector, played an important role in shaping its form, content and course (par.39).

Globalization is further understood as a process that has both negative and positive aspects. The positive aspects are highlighted through the increasing opportunities for acquiring knowledge and skills, the intermediary role that ICT is playing in enhancing economic activities, improving access to goods and services and in general contributing to the creation and expansion of wealth. On the other hand, the negative aspects of globalization are explained through the asymmetrical power relation among the global players. NEPAD argues that ‘... globalization has increased the ability of the strong to advance their interest to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology’ (par.33). Such unfavorable conditions in the global context continued to disregard the interest of ‘developing countries’ and their capacity to control their own course of development. And so far, according to NEPAD, there has not been any effort to compensate the loss that these passive global players have suffered. The global political economy being a highly competitive, unfair and unjust system of attaining benefits, it is argued that developing countries are always in a disadvantageous position. African countries, most of them, are playing a minimal role in determining the course of the globalization process. Their weak role is characterized by losing their ground to benefit from what they have through unfavorable trade balances, being weak states in managing their internal political economy, and unable to attract private investment and foreign direct investment. These features combined to sustain the self-perpetuating cycle of marginalization in the globalization process (par.34-35).

Though the role of globalization in integrating the world political economic system is recognized by NEPAD, in Africa’s context ‘...greater integration has also led to the further marginalization...’ (par.33). Hence, an ‘...effectively managed integration...’ (par.28) is necessary to reap the benefits of

the current trend of globalization. NEPAD is optimistic that the present global order offers the ideal opportunity to reverse the historically unfavorable situations that hindered Africa's development. It is argued that resources (capital, technology and human resource) are readily available that can help to realize the aspirations of NEPAD and end marginalization of the continent from the system. 'Imaginative leadership', which would realize the ultimate use of the available resources and the presented historical opportunity is needed, according to NEPAD.

With regard to the dominant discourse of poverty reduction of that time, the globalization process is further understood as a phenomenon that inherently lacks any kind of element to achieve the poverty reduction agenda. Hence, what NEPAD is calling for is that actors within the global political economy to ensure the 'genuine integration of all nations' (par.41) as well as the creation of fair and just system within which the benefits and opportunities of globalization are equally shared through partnership with the international community (ibid). NEPAD presented the challenges and prospects of African development within a context which has been unfavorable for Africa since the colonial period and exacerbated by the current globalization process and the marginalization of the continent. It also recognizes the presence of genuine opportunities to redress the situation and also the commitment from African leaders to contribute to that.

II) Actors of Development

According to NEPAD, '...development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance.' And it argues that '... Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment' (par.27). Through such kinds of strong assertions NEPAD claims to give a credible way of realizing development through the active role of 'the people'. It claims that the will and the determination of 'Africans' to change the undesirable situation is considerably high, by arguing that,

Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstances. We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centered development and market-oriented economies are on the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership. These developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further

expedited. [NEPAD] is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations (par.7-8).

In the attempt of crafting a new development path for Africa, at least three development actors are identified in the NEPAD program. The initial and arguably leading actors are the states and by implication African leaders. There is a specific section in the final document dedicated to the ‘The New Political Will of African Leaders’. Given the fact that NEPAD is a combination of the initiatives of Mbeki and Wade, it is expected that it will continue to be a state-led initiative throughout its implementation. What NEPAD attempts to paint is a new image clearly showing that the political will of African leaders is already in place and they are committed to the realization of the program’s objectives. NEPAD recognizes the various continent-wide development programs in the past that were initiated both internally and externally and which were not successful enough in answering the ownership and leadership role of Africans. It puts itself in a unique position where ownership, leadership and commitment of African leaders and their political will is already in place. NEPAD takes the increasing trends of establishing democratic systems across the continent and the incorporation of new concepts of governance and development into the mainstream discourse, like the right to development, eradication of poverty, accountability, human rights and popular participation as a manifestation of the political will of African leaders (par.42-44).

It is frequently asserted that NEPAD is all about winning the African ownership and management and setting the agenda of Africa’s renewal by implementing development programs based on regional and national priorities. In doing so, the NEPAD initiative intends to facilitate the creation of a functional partnership with the industrialized world and multinational institutions (par.47-48). The stated responsibilities of African leaders manifesting their political will are described in four broad themes (par.49):

Governance, peace and security: conflict prevention, mechanisms of restoring and maintaining peace, promoting democracy and human rights, accountability, transparency and participatory governance

Managing the economy: macroeconomic stability, appropriate fiscal, monetary policies and institutional frameworks, regulating financial markets, auditing private companies and the public sector

Social Services: revitalizing the provision of education, technical training and health with special focus on HIV/AIDS and malaria, women empowerment (social, economic and political)

Strengthening State capacity: the capacity legal enforcement and maintaining law and order

Production sector: infrastructure development, agricultural diversification through agro-industries targeting both internal and external markets

It is argued that the unprecedented political will from African leaders to play a leading role in winning the developmental path of continent into their hands is the unique feature of the program. And combining this effort with the commitment of African people and the will of the international community will certainly bring the desired state development for the continent.

NEPAD also considered the peoples of Africa as major actors for the development endeavor it is embarking on. The ‘Appeal to the Peoples of Africa’ is a call in recognition of the fundamental role that African people can play in the realization of the NEPAD program. The call for the mobilization of the African people across the continent, ‘in all their diversity’, is tuned by the discourses that NEPAD is echoing. The role of the peoples of Africa is intended to help ‘...the rapid integration (of Africa) into the world economy’, ‘... to put an end to further marginalization of the continentbridging the gap with the developed countries’ and to ‘...build sound and resilient economies, and democratic societies’ (par. 52-58). By doing so, NEPAD defined the possible role of the peoples of Africa and integrated it into its development narrative by appealing to the people, an appeal from the leaders to the people.

The other significant actor that is identified by NEPAD throughout its development discourse is the ‘international community’, constituted by the industrialized countries/the developed world and the multinational institutions. Indeed, the entire notion of NEPAD is building ‘a new framework of interaction’ with these actors so as to implement the development program. In line with the arguments of globalization and the increasing marginalization of the continent, NEPAD admits that the ‘international community’ has a significant role in helping Africa to realize its development

objectives. It seems that, NEPAD has taken the existing trend of competitive globalization and liberalization processes for granted and the only way out is to ensure ‘...effectively managed integration’ of the continent into the process so as to answer the development questions (par.28, 48, 50, 52). Hence, for NEPAD addressing the socio-economic and political challenges of the continent is impossible without the intended balanced partnership and interaction with the ‘international community’

III) Stated Development Objectives of NEPAD

NEPAD claims that it has a unique approach from previous initiatives to deal with the development challenges of the continent, even though the challenges being faced are almost the same. And this distinctive approach has a long-term vision of ‘an African-owned and African-led development program’. As argued in its program of action, this long-term development endeavor intends to ‘...place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process’ (par. 59-62). NEPAD identified the core problem so far contributing to the bleak picture of Africa as the inability to build a mechanism of sustaining growth at all required levels which can significantly contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development (par.64). Hence, ensuring the presence of a program that deals with this identified key development challenges is what NEPAD is aspiring to do.

NEPAD stated its objectives in different forms. One of these objectives is , ‘...to provide an impetus to Africa’s development by bridging existing gaps in priority sector to enable the continent catch up with developed parts of the world’ (par.65). On the other hand, in its conclusion part, the objective of NEPAD is described as an action ‘... to consolidate democracy and sound economic management in the continent’ (par.204). Furthermore, the long-term development objective is stated in two points:

- To eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process
- To promote the role of women in all activities

The long-term objective is accompanied by two goals: to achieve and sustain a GDP growth rate of 7% per year for the next 15 years and to ensure the continent achieves all the International Development Goals by 2015 (which were later translated into MDGs). The stated long-term development objectives and achieving the goals is expected to have the following outcomes:

- Economic growth and development and increased employment,
- Reduction in poverty and inequality,
- Diversification of productive activities, enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports,
- Increased African integration.

The expected outcomes are intended to be achieved through extended project activities identified as priority areas by the program. In this regard, the conditions for sustainable development are identified and categorized in three broad sections: a peace and security initiative, a democracy and political governance initiative, and an economic and corporate governance initiative. These conditions are expected to facilitate the execution of the prioritized project activities in infrastructure development, human resource development, ICT, social service provisions, and other socio-economic and political sectors (NEPAD 2001, p.16-21).

5.3 Why NEPAD is ‘New’, why not?

After laying the foundation with regard to the historical emergence and the development assumptions of NEPAD, this section will focus on questioning the claims that NEPAD is putting forward. The ideas that govern the entire notion of the NEPAD initiative, its ‘newness’, the ‘different approach’ that it is adopting in addressing the development quagmire of the continent will be examined thoroughly.

5.3.1 Conceptualizing Africa’s Development

Development is not limited to technical and managerial aspects. It is highly influenced by the initial ideas that inform the perception of the actor(s) in understanding the context and prioritizing the situation at hand. With this regard, the position of the actor(s), the nature of interaction with other

actors, and the context in which the interaction is taking place plays a paramount role in understanding the development equation. NEPAD came into existence in a context dominated by certain ideas that fundamentally shaped the entire development endeavor in a hegemonic mode. Neoliberal perspectives of development informed by the post Washington Consensus have been influencing the theory, ideology and practice of development in the global political economy. Hence, the emergence of NEPAD and its attempt to adopt a 'different approach' to Africa's development need to be seen in this broad framework.

It is quite obvious that NEPAD simply adopts the mainstream notion of development: a continuum where 'undeveloped/underdeveloped/backward' societies/countries are following the footsteps of 'developed/industrialized/advanced' societies/countries in a unidirectional progression. In the statements like: '[T]he poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to the prosperity of the developed world' (par.2), and '[T]he objective of NEPAD is to provide an impetus to Africa's development by bridging the existing gaps in priority sectors to enable the continent catch up with developed parts of the world' (par.65), one can easily grasp the ideas informing what development constitutes in NEPAD's perspective.

According to Sally Mathews (2004, p. 498), NEPAD's conceptualization of development is a combination of modernization theory and the dependency school thinking. In describing the situation of Africa in terms of 'backwardness' and the objective of NEPAD to 'catch up with the developed world' or 'bridging the gap' and 'overcoming chasm': the mantra of modernization theory is embraced as the only framework of analysis. On the other hand, the characterization of the African context in terms of 'underdevelopment' is a classic feature of the dependency school argument which positions the underdevelopment of the some societies in a dialectical contrast of development of the other (Mathews 2004). In principle, dependency theory was presented as criticism to modernization theory. But it is argued in many instances that the critique of the "Dependentistas" was merely within the same framework of modernization theory, which assumes the presence of universally acceptable socio-economic and political conditions where everyone should head to (Kapoor 2008, p.8-9; Mathews 2004, p. 498-499). The normative understanding of development is a common feature for both theories; and their difference is mainly in the process of achieving this goal. According to Mathews, the architects of NEPAD have wisely used the combination of the two perspectives in conceptualizing the development challenges of Africa.

Adhering to the mainstream understanding of development is also manifested in the priority issues that NEPAD is dwelling on, the problems that it prioritizes and also the practices of achieving development. The reading of the African political economy both in the colonial period and in the post-independence era used to justify the appropriation of the dominant developmental discourse and ideology of the time. The same political-economic facts about Africa were used to introduce an 'alternative framework' i.e. AAF-SAP, whereas NEPAD implicitly embraced the neo-liberal orientation to give remedies for Africa's challenges. The neo-liberal inclination is widely visible in the NEPAD document in its succinct stress on "sound macro-economic policies, institutional and legal reform, and greater openness of Africa to the process of globalization" (Adesina 2006, p.34). The adoption of the mainstream discourses of the late 90s and early years of the new millennium, like poverty reduction, good-governance, human rights and democracy into the document is apparent given the fact that the main author, Mbeki, was seriously engaged in presenting and 'consulting' the document with Northern counterparts. Furthermore, NEPAD seems to take the current state of the global political economy for granted or as inevitable, and considered that the only option for Africa is to engage with it 'wisely'. The statement ' [T]he African Renaissance project ... depends on the building of a strong and competitive economy as the world moves towards greater liberalization and competition' (par.50), explicitly shows NEPAD's position with regard to taking liberalization and market-oriented political economy as an unavoidable reality. On the other hand, some argue that the arguments of NEPAD are deeply rooted into the discourse of the 'partners', and the call for greater integration into the globalization process is part of the diplomatic mission of winning their heart for the implementation of NEPAD (Taylor 2006, p.66).

Hence, if we go deep into the arguments of NEPAD and its conceptualization of 'development', what we find is merely a carbon-copy of what has been echoed by different actors for more than half a century. Moreover, what we find is an African version of appropriating the neo-liberal oriented 'development' endeavor, where economic growth, liberalization, free-trade are considered as the mechanisms for the poverty reduction. This conceptualization of 'development' deeply rooted into the mainstream perspective is manifested into the entire sets of arguments that are provided in the document, the marginalization discourse, the partnership and the like.

5.3.2 Power relations in Producing and Implementing NEPAD

The emergence of NEPAD in late 1990s can be also seen from the vantage point of the position of actors that have played major role in its formulation as well as their agency in realizing their ideas. The historical context with its own role to facilitate the presence of certain ideas presiding over others is also a vital element with this regard. The emergence of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo as presidents of their respective countries (South Africa and Nigeria, respectively) had a significant impact in changing both the political discourse as well as the institutional set up of the continent (Teiku, 2004). Further analysis of the ideas informing their foreign policies, the motives and interests clearly show, according to Teiku, the dominant political discourse of liberalism in the political economy of their respective countries. Hence, their action in the continental sphere is considered as an extension of their actions in their countries (ibid: p. 253-260). Mbeki was committed to boost South Africa's economy by increasing the employment opportunities and stimulating economic growth and to put South Africa at the front line in attracting FDI. His mission of realizing 'Africa's renaissance' was widely preached and used as an initial document to further produce NEPAD (Adesina, 2006; Taylor, 2006). On the other hand, Obasanjo was very keen on the issues of stability, security, co-operation and thereby development across the continent which were real challenges for most African countries in the 1990s. With this regard, the issues of stability and security were addressed mainly by incorporating the liberal principles of good governance, the rule of law, human rights and citizens' participation (Teiku, 2004; p.255-260).

NEPAD soon became the economic development program of the African Union after its official launching in October, 2001. The incorporation of NEPAD into the continental structure cannot be separated from the role that the main initiators of the document have within the continental political economy power structure. Though there is a normative principle that every member state has equal sovereign status, there is an implicit hierarchy. Particularly the so called the 'big five' [Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa] countries that are contributing huge amount of financial support to the AU, compared to other member states, have more diplomatic power in channeling their ideas easily. The NEPAD initiative being led by Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa, it was an easy mission to incorporate it into the continental structure. To this end, another organ under the Assembly of the African Union is created constituted by Heads of States and Governments which convenes its secretariat in parallel with the AU General Assembly. The diplomatic win within the

continental power structure to put NEPAD as the guiding framework of reference is consolidated without any significant challenge.

The external relations in which the lead initiators of NEPAD have gained positive response have succeeded by appropriating the dominant discourse of the time into the NEPAD. Rather than appealing for special treatment of African countries within the global political economy and a call for anti-imperialism, the authors of NEPAD favored the ideas of 'liberalization, free trade and globalization' as the means of realizing their objectives (Taylor 2006, p.66-68). Some people further argue that, this is the manifestation of the domination of a supranational class with the 'emerging transnational élite' playing its implicit role in determining policy orientations to its favor. This global élite functions globally and includes globalizing state bureaucrats, transnational executives, capitalist-inspired (liberal) politicians and professionals, consumerist élites, like minded think-tanks and the academia. Its global and transnational feature is marked with the role that both state and non-state actors from the global south are playing. And NEPAD is regarded as an embodiment of this phenomenon in Africa with the role of the political and economic élites the initiated and implemented it. Embracing the ideals of globalization, liberalization, free-trade, minimal state and active role of the private sector for poverty reduction and development in Africa is taken as a justification for the critique (ibid).

5.3.3 Paradoxes and Controversies

The very first opening statement of NEPAD states that it is '...a pledge from African leaders...' (par.1). This pledge is to end the miseries of Africa, to eliminate poverty, underdevelopment and 'exclusion from the globalizing world'. It is also considered as an effort to put the fate and destiny of the continent in the hands of Africans and to end the trends and circumstances that have been detrimental to the case of Africa (par.7). The core element that makes NEPAD different from earlier attempts of realizing development in Africa is its call for a 'new relationship of partnership' between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries. It aspires to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations' (par.8). Moreover, NEPAD also considers itself as 'a new framework of interaction' (par.48), and 'an African-owned and African-led development program' (par.60).

The entire notion of being ‘*new*’ and ‘*African-owned/led*’ can be questioned with its own explicit assertion that the ‘international community’ is the one upon which NEPAD is relying. NEPAD is equally calling for the ‘recognition of global interdependence ... that recognizes partnership among all peoples’ (par.41). Moreover, it is based on the ‘*hope*’ that the so-called international community is willing to create a fair and just global order that will help Africa to have a meaningful role (ibid). Historically speaking, during the last few decades, the African political economy has been under the watchful eyes of the former colonial masters and the Bretton Woods Institutions during and after the colonial period, respectively. The spheres of influence include the structures and systems of production and consumption, and the level of integration with the global economy and body politic. NEPAD admits that the interaction and relationship with the global political economy was asymmetrical, exclusionary and to the disadvantage of Africa. And yet, with the same tone, it is calling for the will of the leading global political economy players for a new set of modalities determining the relationship between Africa to be fair and just. The uncompromising commitment of the global political economic system to pursue capital accumulation, competitiveness and profit making endeavor is ‘*expected*’ to be willing to accommodate the development interests of Africa. But there is no explanation given in NEPAD why ‘...the competition that has marked the evolution of global capitalism would suddenly not set structural limits for Africa’s development, and why forces of global capital would be willing, given their search for expansion and profits, to facilitate the continent’s development’ (Sahle 2008, p.144). Maintaining a competitive environment and disregarding those that are unfit to exist, focusing on extending capital so as to cope within the fierce competitive environment is the mantra of the capitalist mode of production. And NEPAD is trying to go against this *basic* principle to establish a *partnership* with the so-called ‘international community’. Given the unlikely nature of NEPAD’s expectation, it makes it more unrealistic to convey a message claiming that the process is ‘African led/owned’ and ‘new’. It is a mere attempt of determining the destiny of the continent rhetorically whereas the reality proves totally the opposite to put the rhetoric into practice.

The other point of paradox in NEPAD relates to its understanding of the globalization process and the associated discourse of marginalization and exclusion. NEPAD explicitly mentioned as a long-term objective that ending the marginalization of the continent in globalization is a must. The globalization process is understood as a process of greater integration and interdependence which

could offer ideal opportunities for African economies with a cautious note that it has ‘...nothing inherent that automatically reduces poverty and inequality’ (par.40). For this reason and based on the premise that Africa has been excluded from the process and playing a marginal role, NEPAD is intending to re-integrate Africa into the ‘global economy and body politic’. It is stated that, ‘[W]hile globalization has increased the cost of Africa’s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of *an effectively managed integration* present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction’ (par.28) (emphasis mine).

What has been considered marginalization of Africa from the globalization process is a blind interpretation of the real position that Africa has in the process. In fact, it is not a matter of exclusion or marginalization, as many have argued; it is rather the nature of integration that is exploitative and against best interests of the continent. Africa is not loosely integrated into the ‘global economy and body politic’: it is rather deeply immersed into an asymmetrical system of global capital ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Nabudere argues that what is being taken as marginalization of Africa in terms of NEPAD is not the result of Africa’s absence from, or poor integration, into the process; rather it is a result of the exploitation within the global political economy that has been going on for centuries (Nabudere 2002, p.64). Samir Amin argues that the concept of marginalization is totally flawed. He contends that, it is the *nature* of the integration into the global system that needs to be considered rather than the *degree* of integration. ‘The so-called marginalized countries are, in fact, the super-exploited in a brutal manner – and therefore, impoverished countries, not countries located at the margin of the system’ (Amin 2002, p.2). The controversial insights of NEPAD on the process of globalization and marginalization of the continent are further criticized by other scholars and characterized as a failed attempt of both diagnosing the problem and giving the remedy from the same context. The stated goals and the means of realizing them contradict at every level. As it is argued:

NEPAD argues for unrestricted commitment to global free trade, on the one hand, and sees a fairer, more equitable global regime that delivers development for Africa, on the other; it concedes that the policy instruments that define the current neo-liberal globalization have failed to benefit Africa but proceeds to argue for more of the same. The solution to Africa’s ‘marginality’ is for the continent to become more firmly ‘locked into globalization’ (Adesina, et al 2006, p.7)

The 'newness', the 'partnership' and the 'different approach' that NEPAD claims to have are hardly manifested in the problematization of the African context, in conceptualizing the development challenges and aspirations and above all in the strategies opted to realize the stated objectives. For instance, the definition of development given in the document stated that '...development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance'. What NEPAD is claiming is ensuring that 'Africans (are)... architects of their own sustained upliftment' (par.27). And yet, this process of empowerment is planned to be pursued within the context of a fiercely inconvenient process of globalization which is under the control of the actors that have been disempowering societies through their covert and overt strategies and programs. Moreover, the 'self-reliance' concept is nullified by the objective of NEPAD which explicitly mentioned that 'catching up with the developed parts of the world' is the only way to develop. Indeed, there is no specific strategy of realizing a 'self-reliant' development; rather it is all about replicating the paths of the 'developed world' through the proposed strategies of liberalizing the continent, inviting foreign private investment, and having a 'sound macro-economic policy'. The erroneous assumption that NEPAD made in appropriating one of the principles of neo-liberalism is its difficulty in differentiating the principles and practices of liberalization or free-trade. It is a well-established fact that the 'developed world' is not open to manufactured and processed goods and products of African economies as it presents itself with a high degree of protectionism and trade barriers. But NEPAD is assuming that the inevitability of the liberalization process is advantageous for Africa and is rushing to integrate Africa into the globalization process to end its 'marginality' and reduce poverty.

The other crucial point of controversy and paradox in NEPAD's development ambition is the role of the state and the structure of the political economy it intends to pursue in the continent. The document blames many African governments for their failure to empower their people and realize development. Moreover, it also reflected on the weakness of the states and the lack of the required capacity to carry out long-term development policies and programs (par.23). Indeed, most African states were weakened during the structural adjustment period and one of the premises given for the introduction of the SAPs in most African countries was the presence of a wide, inefficient and ineffective African states structure. The various studies carried out on the effectiveness of the SAPs proved that the negative impact was much higher and more severe than the positive achievements. Even the WB, the main sponsor of the structural adjustment programs admitted this in one its

reports(WB 1988). But NEPAD opted to read this fact from a different angle and stated that the SAPs ‘...provided only a partial solution’ (par.24). The weakening of the state capacity, the deteriorated socio-economic situation of many African countries, the increasing debt burden and the growing dependency on aid that are further aggravated by the SAPs are totally ignored by NEPAD.

According to Loxley (2002, p.122-123), there is a big silence in NEPAD about the possible role that the state could play. Though there is a section in the document which describes *‘the New Political Will of African Leaders’* the document hardly makes a clear statement what the role of the State as an institution should be. More visible is the focus on the creation of an enabling and conducive business environment for the private sector as well as for foreign capital flows. By limiting the role of State to be a facilitator of private sector endeavors and as a watch-dog of ‘market-oriented economies’, NEPAD explicitly adhered to the neo-liberal conception of what the State should look like. With its submission to the increasing liberalization of the global economy, NEPAD is intending to integrate the financial sector of the continent into the global markets, still with the intention of bringing development. But, what is not taken into consideration or totally ignored is the necessity of having a strong institutional set-up to control and regulate this sector in its functioning and to ensure that the long-term development objectives are not compromised.

In general terms, NEPAD’s attempt of crafting a new system of interaction with the ‘developed world’, with a new remedy to the developmental problems of Africa is in many ways deficient if we go deeper into its explicit and implicit assumptions. The above mentioned paradoxes and controversies are clearly contradictory to the real situation and contribute to the reservations that one may have towards NEPAD.

Chapter Conclusions

NEPAD emerged as a response to the challenges of Africa’s development in the 21st century. Indeed, it has attempted to present a different conceptualization of Africa’s quest for development and the necessary remedies that can bring positive change. One of the unique features of NEPAD is the fact that it is initiated and led by the political leaders. Though there is a fierce criticism for the absence of consultation and participation with concerned non-state actors and the wider society, it can still be regarded as a purposeful initiative. Indeed, the top-down approach is not unique to Africa’s political economic governance.

In answering the core question of problematizing Africa's developmental need in a context that differs from the already existing parameters is where NEPAD suffers very serious limitations. The well established arguments that question the appropriateness of neo-liberal inspired developmental narratives are embraced by NEPAD as the ideals of realizing Africa's 'renaissance'. The asymmetrical power relations between Africa and the major global players are conceived as the problem of Africa's marginalization. To this end, a 'carefully managed integration' into the globalization process is forwarded as a remedy. This is a very problematic diagnosis and solution which ignores various accounts of historical facts and socio-political realities. Some argue that, the genesis of the NEPAD project and the journey it travelled with consultations of the G-8, IMF and WB before being introduced to the continental forum is a strong indicator in showing the conformity of the ideals of NEPAD with the status-quo. Expecting something different from a document endorsed by these actors is unrealistic and unthinkable.

Moreover, the controversial issues that NEPAD raises makes the document prone to further criticisms. These include the rhetoric of winning the destiny of the continent into the hands of Africans against the unconditional reliance on the 'international community', and the 'self-reliant, self-sustained development' *vis-à-vis* the conviction of replicating the socio-economic and political features of the 'developed' world. The implicit assertions that NEPAD is making are in complete contradiction with many of the claims it depicts. Instead of questioning the fundamental causes of African development problems, NEPAD prefers to stick to the old school interpretation of development inquiries in-tandem with contemporary remedies, i.e. 'partnership'. The modernization theory and dependency school interpretation of development challenges are used to problematize Africa's development questions and globalization and 'partnership' are provided as a solution with a flawed analysis and interpretation.

Conclusions

In this final section, the concluding remarks of the entire thesis will be presented. The conclusions constitute reflections on the methodological line adopted in carrying out the research, and the link between the conceptual framework and the analytical presentation of the documents. These three core elements of the thesis (methodology, conceptual framework and analysis) will be examined in their capacity of answering the stated research question within the formulated problem statement in the first chapter.

Methodologically, using Critical Discourse Studies/Analysis (CDS) has both an advantage and a limitation. CDS enabled the research to give a thorough consideration for *textual* and *contextual* elements that inform the development documents. Both implicit and explicit assertions in the documents, the controversies and paradoxes, the strength and weakness of the documents are analyzed contextually. The structural and historical conditions that influenced the presence of certain dominant narratives, the actors and the position of the actors, the relationship among the actors, the interpretation of the same factual elements in constituting different (sometime contradictory) realities are given due emphasis by using CDS. With the research objective focusing mainly on the idea of development and its conceptualization, using CDS makes the analysis more critical and insightful at the idea and abstract level. In answering the research question and achieving the objective of the research, CDS helps the research both in setting an enabling analytical framework as well as a limited but in-depth inquiry of the documents. The limited analysis is mainly because of the conscious decision of not analyzing the soundness of the strategies and implementation programs. The research tried to avoid a policy evaluation kind of approach. By taking the documents as one form of social action with actors having their own interest, power and agency, and the interplay between these actors along the core concept of 'development', CDS helped to have a critical reflection on the entire scenario.

The limitation in using CDS as a tool is mainly observed in its openness to accommodate different viewpoints that are hardly detached from the researcher's perspective. The relative freedom of the researcher to focus on some issues or disregard other elements may not be accepted easily in producing 'valid knowledge', unless it is justified convincingly.

On the hand, the challenge to conduct the planned in-depth interviews with higher officials and experts contributed to the limited focus given to the power relations in the practical scene and the views of the officials. Hence, the relevance of the research is mainly in understanding and critically analyzing the ideas and discourses that inform the documents rather than the extent of identifying challenges and contestations in realizing their objectives in practice. This can be regarded as the scope/limitation of the research. But it is believed that a thorough analysis at this level may ease further work on the documents by setting a broad analytical framework. The established framework of analysis will certainly help any attempt of understanding the documents from various vantage points.

Conceptual Conclusions

Development is located within the historical, socio-economic and political spheres of social action. Hence; its conception, practice and outcomes are mediated by the kind of interaction that it involves both implicitly and explicitly. Setting the developmental endeavors within/about Africa across the historical lines, the position and interest of the actors, the power relation among the actors and above all in the epistemic inquiry of producing knowledges about development is the purpose of this thesis. In doing so, the ideological orientation of developmental discourse and the position of some actors in interpreting and reading historical facts, producing knowledges, imposing and counter balancing discourses was the core engagement.

There are plenty of interpretations with regard to answering the developmental problems of Africa. These attempts have their own line of analysis in problematizing the context, prioritizing their own relevant issues and determining the outcomes of the development endeavors. In Africa's context, within the realm of the study period, one can mention a number of initiatives that conceived Africa's developmental problems in their own manner and their attempt to impact the process through their actions. Most of these initiatives focused on enhancing the economic productivity and strength of the continent in general and African countries in particular.

There are two valuable initiatives that tried to address the developmental problems of Africa in an institutional manner. These two major initiatives AAF-SAP and NEPAD came into existence not as a specific attempt of effecting change in the continent, rather as a holistic approach of providing a broad framework of reference for the entire continent. Given the fairly agreed context of the socio-

economic crisis and deterioration particularly in the 1980s and the unsuccessful attempt of addressing the problems through stabilization and structural adjustment programs, the research intended to question what kinds of alternative insights informed these two development documents. By questioning to what extent Africa's context was problematized and how development questions were conceptualized differently, the thesis attempted to critically analyze the two documents as a case study.

The analytical tool adopted to answer the stated research question discussed the various contestations related to the theorization and conceptualization of 'development'. Development is seldom a neutral process of positive change inspired by goodwill and noble intentions. It is neither a merely technical process guided by experts and professionals. It has complicated features that are influenced by the power positions of the actors, their ideological orientations, and above all the epistemological framework employed. The contested nature of 'development' both as a theory and a practice, as an ideology and a discourse, has an extended influence in informing programs and policies as well as institutional engagements. The ideals of modernizing societies and thereby developing them, liberalizing economies in line with goals of alleviating poverty, adjusting structural bottlenecks so as to enhance markets are all practiced and executed by actors and institutions. The inherent power dynamics among institutions, the interests they would like to materialize as well as the ideas they intend to interpret into actions makes the entire notion of 'development' the highest point of political engagement.

The political features of 'development' do not start at the point of practice. They are rather deeply located into the epistemic orientation of the theoretical explanations and inquiries. The epistemic position determines the reading and interpretation of the socio-historical processes that influenced the present reality either directly or indirectly. As is argued by the decolonial school of thought, the position assumed in interpreting historical facts and building a reality is by itself a sphere of power relations. The power of some actors in presenting a certain feature of history and the use of these historical facts into the development narratives makes all theoretical explanations of development incomprehensive and open to critique. This makes 'development' a phenomenon beyond an engagement of only technical and managerial endeavors.

The AAF-SAP & NEPAD: the quest for development alternatives

It is nearly a general truth that Africa has suffered wide-ranging socio-economic and political crises particularly since the 1980s. Various reasons have been forwarded to explain this situation. The differences among the explanations influenced the solutions prescribed. The AAF-SAP explicitly argued that a basic factor that defined Africa's situation is the flawed structure of the political economy, specifically the production and consumption patterns. Moreover, the AAF-SAP critically examined the remedies forwarded to tackle the challenges of Africa's development with a thorough reflection on their conceptualization and practice. By identifying the problematic nature of the previous development narratives, particularly the SAPs, the AAF-SAP set a different and new framework of problematizing Africa's problems and conceptualizing the development path. The underlining purpose of producing the AAF-SAP was the conviction to craft an African-centered, plausible and appropriate development framework to the African political economic context. The reading of the socio-historical and political processes of the continent, linking the observed challenges with the historical past and the present realities as well as a critical analysis of the engagements so far informed the 'alternative framework'.

The 'alternative framework' presented its development scheme in a totally different manner than what was done so far. For instance, the 'structural' impediments it identified are deeply rooted into the entire organization of the production and consumption system of African economies rather than limited to the issues of balance of payment or high inflation, as identified by SAPs. Moreover, the kind of positive change that it intended to realize in African societies and the ethics of change are formulated to be part and parcel of the production and consumption system. This critical stand helped the AAF-SAP to take the real socio-historical, cultural and political features of African societies as a point of departure for the development endeavors it envisaged. Rather than depicting 'development' as a progress along a linear line, the AAF-SAP conceptualized development as a process that constitutes the socio-psychological, historical and cultural conditions of the people.

There is a genuine attempt in setting the entire notion of Africa's development in a comprehensive framework focusing on the root causes so as to contribute to the long-term transformation of African economies. The AAF-SAP gave equal attention both for endogenous and exogenous factors as well as short-term and long-term objectives. The 'human-centered' approach to development, the

wealth redistribution and welfare scheme for the majority (the poor and the vulnerable), the conviction to realize 'self-reliant and self-sustaining development', the balanced role it gives to the state and the private sector, the nature and ethics of societal change it aspired to be free from 'imitative modernism' are indeed radical departures from the dogmatic market-oriented perspectives of development of the 1980s.

The process that AAF-SAP have passed through during its formulation, the technocratic processes, the consecutive ministerial meetings and the adoption at the OAU general assembly did not prevent it from being sidelined. The main reason for AAF-SAP to vanish from the discourse of African political economy is its fierce contestation of hegemonic perspectives of development. The entire reading and interpretation of African historical, social, political, economic and cultural reality is diametrically opposite to what has been taken for granted. Indeed, the WB in its immediate report tried to show some sympathy to the ideals of AAF-SAP, at least rhetorically. But the power of certain ideas remained unchallenged in pursuing the development business as usual.

On the other hand, NEPAD failed to capture the bigger picture of Africa's developmental inquiry and limited its diagnosis and solutions within the existing framework of thinking and practicing development. NEPAD's conceptualization of development is a replica of what has been presented in almost all development narratives backed by discourses of marginalization and globalization. The narrow reading and interpretation of African socio-economic and political history, the obsession to the ideals of 'westernization' and the naïve belief in embracing the opportunities of globalization and liberalization are basic attributes that can describe NEPAD. It is an attempt of maintaining the status-quo both in conceptualizing and practicing development in Africa's context. It has more conformity to the dominant discourse and ideology of 'development' than to the practical lived reality of African people.

What makes NEPAD strong in the political scene is the support it has from the political leaders, the main global players and the institutions that favor their action. NEPAD is currently taken as the economic development program of the African Union mainly because it is an initiative from the political leaders. This clearly shows one of the basic features of 'development', i.e. the interest of actors and their position in the power structure, play a more significant role than the ideals that inform the discourse. The praises that were forwarded to NEPAD were not because of its

unreserved conviction to change Africa's 'backwardness', to 'end poverty' or narrowing the inequality gap. Rather because of the means it succinctly adopted to achieve its objectives, i.e. liberalization of African economies, minimal role of the state, the unprecedented priority given to FDI and the private sector, and above all the role of the 'international community' in managing the process through 'partnership'. NEPAD hardly challenges the existing global order and power structure; rather it confirms both in diagnosis and prescription for African developmental problems. NEPAD's conceptualization of development is too shallow and simplistic mainly in setting a development objective of 'catching up' and claiming that the main problem for Africa's development is its 'marginalization'. The rhetorical commitment to win the decision-making role on African issues for Africans is disregarded in setting the development objectives and intended practices. What NEPAD does is more of providing a superficial remedy for the African developmental problems by using the power that its initiators have on the political economic scene. The so-called 'partners' will also remain happily engaged in the process of realizing NEPAD's objective, since it is 'silent' in questioning their power position as well as because of the 'legitimate' role given to them to lead the initiative.

In general, NEPAD came into the scene 12 years after the AAF-SAP. In terms of addressing the developmental challenges both documents share fairly the same historical/material context. But the manner in which the documents crafted a possible alternative perspective for Africa's development is squarely opposite. The continuity of ideas one may trace between the two documents is very limited, or only at rhetorical level, whereas, their difference in envisioning Africa's future (like avoiding 'imitative modernism' *vs.* 'catching up') is wide. The '*Alternative Framework*' of AAF-SAP is clearly visible in its rigorous attempt of understanding African political economy differently and providing remedies that challenge both internal and external contexts and features of African political economy. On the contrary, the '*Newness*' that NEPAD claims may be found only in its unconditional acceptance of the asymmetrical position that Africa has as global player and the willingness to continue playing the same role.

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