

THE SUPERPOWER, THE BRIDGE- BUILDER AND THE HESITANT ALLY

HOW DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION DIVIDED NATO
(1991-2008)



Leiden University Press

Cover illustration: Dust storm at Forward Operating Base Kushamond, Afghanistan, July 17, 2009.
U.S. Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs.

Cover Design: Maedium, Utrecht
Layout: Richard Podkolinski
ISBN 978 90 8728 147 2
e-ISBN 978 94 0060 065 2
NUR 697

© A.R. Korteweg / Leiden University Press 2011

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

THE SUPERPOWER, THE BRIDGE- BUILDER AND THE HESITANT ALLY

*HOW DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION DIVIDED NATO
(1991-2008)*

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. P.F. van der Heijden,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 15 september 2011
klokke 16:15 uur

door

Arie Rem Korteweg

geboren te 's-Gravenhage,
in 1980

PROMOTIECOMMISSIE

Promotor:

Prof. dr. R. de Wijk (Universiteit Leiden)

Copromotor:

Dr. N.J.G. van Willigen (Universiteit Leiden)

Overige Leden:

Prof. dr. H. Binnendijk (National Defense University, Washington DC)

Prof. dr. J.S. van der Meulen (Universiteit Leiden)

CDRE prof. dr. F.P.B. Osinga (Nederlandse Defensie Academie)

Dr. H. Pelikaan (Universiteit Leiden)

CONTENTS

Prologue	11
Introduction	13
1 Introduction	13
1.1 What is Transformation?	13
1.2 Transformation and Revolutions in Military Affairs.....	15
1.3 Transformation and Change in the Function of the Military.....	17
1.4 Two Types of Transformation	19
1.5 The Contemporary Period of Transformation.....	21
2 Transformation in NATO	22
3 Between Mars and Venus	25
4 Problem Statement.....	31
5 Theoretical Framework.....	32
5.1 System and Domestic-Level Theories of International Relations.....	33
5.2 Neoclassical Realism	37
5.3 Strategic Culture: National Character of States in Security	45
6 Research Design: Transformation and Neoclassical Realism.....	55
7 The Organization of this Study	57
7.1 Case studies	57
7.2 Methodology.....	59
7.3 A Word on Notes.....	62

PART 1 – TRANSFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES.....	63
Climbing the Ladder of Primacy.....	65
8 Introduction	65
9 US Transformation Defined.....	66
10 System Level Factors that Triggered US Transformation	70
10.1 Collapse of the Soviet Union.....	70
10.2 Guided Munitions Warfare: From Vietnam to Desert Storm	71
10.3 Pax Americana.....	81
10.4 Making War Obsolete	89
10.5 Technological War	103
11 Strategic Culture and US Transformation.....	111
11.1 A Symbol of Strategic Culture.....	111
11.2 Watchmen of Freedom	112
11.3 Expressions of US Strategic Culture	121
11.4 The Ball of Liberty.....	137
11.5 Strategic Culture and its impact on Transformation	144
12 US expressions of transformation.....	146
12.1 9/11 and Prevention	147
12.2 SOF-ing the Army.....	152
12.3 Air Force Transformation	160
12.4 Naval Transformation	161
12.5 The Hey-Day of Transformation: Towards the QDR 2006.....	163
13 The Impact of Changes in the Security Environment	166
13.1 A Struggle towards Strategic Transformation	167
13.2 Translating Irregular Warfare into a new Adaptive Strategy.....	178
13.3 Back to the Default.....	195
14 Conclusion of US Case Study.....	205
14.1 Transformation Hubris.....	208
14.2 A Transformation Bubble.....	210
PART 2 – TRANSFORMATION IN EUROPE:	
THE NETHERLANDS & GERMANY	213
The Netherlands: Between Relevance and Stability	215
15 Introduction	215
16 Dutch Transformation Defined.....	218
17 System-Level Factors	
that Triggered Dutch Transformation.....	218
17.1 Sustaining Western Power after the Cold War	219

17.2	European Integration	221
17.3	Towards Expeditionary Operations	224
18	Strategic Culture and Dutch Transformation.....	233
18.1	Stability Projection.....	234
18.2	Being Relevant	244
19	Expressions of Dutch Transformation	257
19.1	Ambition-based Planning: 1991 & 1993.....	257
19.2	Srebrenica and the Framework of Evaluation	261
19.3	Adding a high-intensity comfort zone.....	263
19.4	Capabilities for the A-Team	268
19.5	Network-centric emulation	271
19.6	Financial Constraints on the Extractive Capacity.....	272
20	The Impact of Changes in the Security Environment: Clashes of Culture.....	276
20.1	Allied Force: Identity in Friction	276
20.2	Iraq: The Demand for Stability is larger than its Supply	279
20.3	Left-Right Tensions over Defense Procurement	281
20.4	Uruzgan	283
21	Conclusion: Torn between Relevance and Stability.....	299
	Germany: A Slow, Strategic Awakening	305
22	Introduction	305
23	German Transformation Defined	306
24	System Level Factors that Triggered German Transformation.....	309
24.1	An Expeditionary Era	309
24.2	Solidarity	314
25	Strategic Culture and German Transformation.....	316
25.1	A Culture of Defeat.....	316
25.2	Zivilmacht Germany	325
26	Expressions of German Transformation	330
26.1	Capability and Personnel Initiatives	330
26.2	Inapplicability of American Transformation	332
27	The Impact of Changes in the Security Environment	333
27.1	Transforming for combat?	333
27.2	Caveats.....	336
27.3	A Process of awakening?.....	337
28	Conclusion of German Case Study.....	339

PART 3 – CONCLUSION.....	343
How Transformation Divided NATO in an Expeditionary World ..	345
29 Introduction	345
29.1 Differences in Transformation Strategies	350
29.2 Differences in Strategic Cultures	353
29.3 Products of Transformation	356
29.4 Different Expectations in an Expeditionary environment.....	361
29.5 Two Philosophical Models of Progress.....	364
29.6 Impact on the Future of NATO	369
Afterword: Death of a Concept	375
Bibliography	379
Archival Sources	379
Interviews	379
Books and Monographs.....	381
Published Articles.....	388
Policy Documents, Speeches and Testimonies.....	393
List of Figures.....	399
Glossary	400
Samenvatting	403
Acknowledgments	415
Curriculum Vitae.....	417

“Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi.”

– Tancredi Falconeri, “Il Gattopardo”

PROLOGUE

In the summer of 2005 I participated in a week-long course on NATO Network Enabled Capabilities hosted by the Royal Netherlands Army and supported by the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation. The course was attended by European officers from roughly twenty different states. At the seminar a Dutch Lieutenant-Colonel gave an oversight of how the Dutch armed forces were adopting new technologies to obtain what he called "full-spectrum battlefield awareness" and "information superiority" to eventually obtain "decision superiority." Hearing this presentation for the first time, the claim of "superiority" seemed boisterous to me. War is a messy and chaotic exercise in the application of force. Presuming superiority before shots were fired, irrespective of the adversary, was a utopia. I believed in Von Clausewitz's friction and the inherent unpredictability of warfare captured in the term 'the fog of war.' Although I could understand that states would want to minimize that uncertainty as much as possible, presuming 'superiority' could lead to hubris and miscalculations. The conference was about reducing this uncertainty through new information technologies.

A video showed the Dutch military launching missiles from airborne platforms to support land forces on the ground. An example of seamless combined and joint operations. New technologies were leading to the 'networking' of an Army battalion, increasing the speed of information exchange from operational to the tactical level and increasing overall effectiveness on the battlefield. The presentation by the impressive 6-foot four officer was an obvious attempt to show to NATO colleagues that the Netherlands' armed forces were high-tech and well ahead of the curve. Or better still, that the Dutch military was 'transformed'. The week-long course was saturated with presentations about that word, transformation. As it happens, the term had for several years been *the* buzzword humming around NATO corridors. Reflecting on its meaning, transformation sounded like a metaphysical process of self-reinvention, an inward-looking existentialist journey defining one's own purpose of being. Rather than being abstract, transformation was just as real as the missiles in the video. It was the overarching process giving shape to the West's new defense policy and posture. In that regard transformation indeed had an existential dimension. For it was envisioned to change how Western militaries would operate and how they would be used by Western states. Since the use of the military is at the core of state behavior and a reflection of national character, any structural shift in the way a state wields military power has profound implications for international relations. It triggered my interest. Since transformation dominated the security discourse, I expected to find a

clear understanding among officers and officials NATO-wide what the term meant. That expectation soon evaporated. There is no collectively held understanding of transformation. Instead, the change strategies pursued by NATO member states differed substantially. While NATO member states had agreed to pursue transformation, these initiatives in defense reform were shaped by the interplay between changes in threat-perceptions in the security environment and national strategic cultures.

Transformation is the principle vehicle through which the Alliance has aspired to maintain cohesion and develop collective capabilities to address common security threats. Tancredi Falconieri, the forward-looking nephew in Giuseppe di Lampedusa's novel *Il Gattopardo*, says to his aging aristocrat uncle that the changing political environment requires him to adapt as well, that "if you want everything to stay the same, everything must change."¹ So too, NATO member states in 2002 committed to transformation with the intent to maintain the viability of the fifty-something alliance in a changing security environment. As individual member states pursued defense transformation, it was supposed to offer a new common basis for the alliance in the 21st century. Instead, the diversity of the trajectories of transformation has become an expression of the fundamental difficulties NATO confronts to maintain alliance solidarity, particularly in an era when security threats are met abroad rather than close to home, and irregular warfare has replaced traditional defense. What does this mean for the future of transatlantic security policy? What has transformation meant to different NATO member states and why have the trajectories of transformation differed? This is the puzzle of this research and the topic of this book.

1 Translated from Italian, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, *De Tijkgerkat [Il Gattopardo]*, (Van Loghum Slaterus: Arnhem, 1960), p.24.

INTRODUCTION

“Every nation is caught in the moral paradox of refusing to go to war unless it can be proved that the national interest is imperiled, and of continuing in the war only by proving that something much more than national interest is at stake.”

– Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Irony of American History”²

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION?

What factors shaped defense transformation among NATO member states and what does it mean for the future of NATO?³ Defense transformation is a concept pertaining to a particular instance of defense reform which may describe military innovation – which emphasizes changes in the military organization, technologies or doctrine – as well as strategic-level shifts in the orientation of defense policy. In the United States, the semantic use of the term *transformation* has been closely associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs, as well as with the agenda of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. However, these represent but single expressions of deliberately pursued, discontinuous changes in defense policy. Neither does this negate the possibility of a similar instance of discontinuous change to also be considered *transformation*, even if it was described under a different name.⁴ In order to enable a comparison, a common definition of transformation must be provided. Prominent works on transformation have favored a US-centered defini-

2 Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 36.

3 Unless otherwise indicated I use the terms ‘transformation,’ ‘defense transformation’ and ‘military transformation’ interchangeably.

4 Robert G. Bell writes for instance that “Although the word “transformation” has been in vogue only in recent years, NATO has effectively faced a “transformational” imperative since the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade and a half ago.” See Robert G. Bell, “NATO’s Transformation Scorecard,” *NATO Review*, Spring 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art3.html> (accessed January 29, 2011).

tion attributing prevalence to the American expression of transformation, viewing it as a US-led process aimed at exploiting information technologies in the military realm and a process which European states have been able to emulate to differing degrees.⁵ This study takes a different approach. Rather than viewing transformation as a US-driven process to be emulated by others, transformation is considered a concept of discontinuous change in defense policy that is not confined to a specific time period or set of technologies. Instead it is a concept describing far-reaching change in a state's defense policy and approach to the military. In this study transformation is defined as the process of pursuing deliberate discontinuous change in a state's military policy, the purpose of which is to increase the compatibility and relevance of the military instrument to a state's foreign and security policy objectives, in response to major shifts in the international security environment. Here, the focus lies on transformation pursued by three states in the period subsequent to the end of the Cold War. The central elements of this definition are elaborated upon below.

Not all instances of military change can be considered transformation; instead transformation is a particular appearance of military change. According to a major study on the topic, military change is a policy to promote "change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization."⁶ This however includes both incremental modifications as well as major shifts. The discontinuous change associated with transformation invariably refers to the latter type. According to the dictionary transformation is "an act, process or instance of change in character or condition."⁷ It underlines the fundamental character of the change being pursued. Transformation is a policy of discontinuous, rather than incremental, sometimes referred to as evolutionary, change of the military. A scholar of transformation writes that "unlike military adaptation, which conveys the refinement of traditional routines or the grafting of new missions, technologies or tactics onto the old, transformation represents major changes in what military organizations do, how they do it, and who does it. Transformation does not merely encompass the development and use of new technologies, but constitutes qualitative changes in organizational strategies, procedures, and measures of effectiveness for performing critical tasks."⁸ Along these lines, defense transformation represents fundamental and far-reaching change in military policy and the military organization. This far-reaching change can occur along two dimensions.

5 See for instance Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds.), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p.1; David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

6 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, 2002), p. 5.

7 Merriam-Webster, *The Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, (Merriam Webster, 2004). Entry for "Transformation".

8 Adam N. Stulberg, Michael D. Salomone, & Austin G. Long, *Managing Defense Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change*, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), p. 15.

1.2 TRANSFORMATION AND REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Transformation may be the result of military innovation that produces order of magnitude changes in military competitive advantage. Andrew Krepinevich has for instance described the product of transformation as a dramatic increase in combat potential when new technologies combine with new doctrine.⁹ A sizeable body of research has focused on how different military organizations have evolved over time emphasizing the impact of technological innovation on the application of military power, describing cross-national differences in military organizations, and detailing how technological change produced doctrinal innovation to yield battlefield advantages.¹⁰ They focus on specific military services or inter-service distinctions and take the military service, whether Navy, Air Force or Army, as the core unit of analysis.¹¹ These studies demonstrate for instance how technological advances such as the introduction of the tank or the aircraft carrier led to new sources of military advantage for the Army and Navy in the guise of *blitzkrieg* and carrier aviation. Such changes produced discontinuities in defense policy since they made previous ways of operating obsolete and could rightly be seen as instances of discontinuous change in ways of warfare.¹² A common conclusion drawn from these studies is that those that adopted these innovations stand to gain, while those that do not fall behind, thus impacting the course of history. The Maginot line was outdated in light of Germany's

-
- 9 Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42.
- 10 See Theo Farrell & Terry Terriff, *Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics and Technology* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Stephen P. Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Stephen D. Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Stephen P. Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Williamson R. Murray & Alan R. Millet, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, (New York: Cambridge University Press 1998); Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1984); Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass, and Military Power," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 80-124; Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Max Boot, *War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World* (New York: Gotham, 2007); Joris van Bladel, *The All Volunteer Force in the Russian Mirror: Transformation without Change*, Proefschrift, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, June 7, 2004; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 14, pp. 65-94.
- 11 For instance Stulberg et al. (2007) compare German Army Blitzkrieg, military change in the US Navy, British Armored forces and US Army counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Adam N. Stulberg, Michael D. Salomone, & Austin G. Long, *Managing Defense Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change*, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007).
- 12 Jeffrey Cooper, "Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs" in John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, *In Athena's Camp*, MR-880-OSD/RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), p.118.

rapid mechanized assault and the battleship no longer formed the core of a maritime strike force as carrier aviation increased the range, concentration and precision of naval strike power.

In the 1990's, scholars studying these phenomena described such technological and doctrinal upheavals as revolutions in military affairs.¹³ In these years scholars, policymakers, tech-watchers and futurologists alike similarly thought that a revolution in military affairs, now capitalized and abbreviated as the RMA, was at hand resulting from innovations in the field of information and communication technologies. Like the telegraph and the railway before, these new technologies were thought to revolutionize how militaries fought in battle, creating dramatic improvements in the speed of operation and increased precision of targeting. Proponents - mainly in the United States where these debates precipitated - argued that by integrating information technologies throughout the military, mass could be substituted by information, enabling a whole new, more efficient and effective, way of operating characterized by a more nimble and adaptive military.¹⁴ They concluded that it would revolutionize warfare. Undoubtedly these technologies produced substantial changes in the US military. Yet since the appearance of an RMA was declared without the virtue of historic hindsight and was primarily based on events taking place inside the United States the validity of its revolutionary nature has been questioned.¹⁵ Nevertheless in the United States a policy of military change based on the RMA was pursued under the assumption that it would be a source of vastly increased military power and a new model of warfare.¹⁶ In the mid-1990's this process was dubbed transformation.¹⁷ It emerged as a replacement for RMA. The shift was apparently deliberate. In this period Andrew Marshall, director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, sent a memo to his staff saying that the term RMA was no longer of interest because it had become too value-laden. Rather than discussing the merits of the technological improvements and its implications for doctrine, debates erupted over the proper definition of the

13 See for instance Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: the pattern of military revolutions," *National Interest*, no. 37 (Fall 1994). A synonym sometimes used is 'military revolution'. This term is avoided as it is confusing in relation to distinguishing between military coups d'etat, or political change precipitated by the military and changes in the future of warfare.

14 Stulberg et al. (2007), p. 1, 14-15.

15 For a critique see John Arquilla, *Worst Enemy: the Reluctant Transformation of the American Military*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008).

16 According to the US Pentagon's definition transformation is, "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world." Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*, p. 3.

17 See Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: the pattern of military revolutions," *National Interest*, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42; Michael O'Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

term ‘revolution’.¹⁸ To avoid further confusion *transformation* was deemed a suitable substitute. Initially use of the term *transformation* to denote discontinuous organizational change had emerged from the business community. In the corporate world, transformation was the antithesis to making incremental adjustments to the organization.¹⁹ It described fundamental, comprehensive change in an organization’s objectives, structure or market-orientation in response to changes in the business landscape, precipitated by the impact of information technologies and globalization. New organizational structures were developed - networked and less hierarchical - and new strategies were developed to increase efficiency or improve competitiveness. Similar thinking was adopted with respect to defense policy and the military.

1.3 TRANSFORMATION AND CHANGE IN THE FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY

Transformation and the RMA however are not synonyms, especially when we turn to the other side of the Atlantic. In 2002, NATO member states adopted the term following the NATO Prague Summit - later referred to as the Transformation Summit - to describe their individual policies of military change.²⁰ The label was used by NATO’s European member states to describe all or parts of their change strategies after the end of the Cold War. The attacks of September 11 and the demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan further shaped, changed or reinforced these strategies, which presented no less a discontinuity from previous policy than the adoption of a Revolution in Military Affairs. It was however

18 Interview with Thomas Ehrhard, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, January 22, 2008. The academic debate over the accurate description of “revolutionary change” would continue throughout the decade. See for instance Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, “Introduction: Sizing up the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in Th. Gongora & H. Von Riekhoff (ed.), *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*, (Greenwood, 2000), pp. 1-21.

19 See for instance David A. Nadler, Robert B. Shaw, A. Elise Walton et al, *Discontinuous Change: Leading Organizational Transformation*, (Jossey-Bass, 1994); Thomas E. Vollman, *The Transformation Imperative: Achieving Market Dominance through Radical Change*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 1996); Howard Thomas, Don O’Neal & James Kelly, *Strategic Renaissance and Business Transformation*, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 1995); Michael S. Morton, *The Corporation of the 1990s: Information Technology and Organizational Transformation*, (New York: Oxford University Press 1991); Beverly R. Fletcher, *Organization Transformation Theorists and Practitioners*, (Praeger: Westport CT, 1990); Oron South, *Organization Development: Change, Reform or Transformation?*, (Action Research Group 1976); Michael Bresnen, *Challenge of Change: Theory and Practice of Organizational Transformations*, (Pluto Press, 1992); Christopher Sauer & Philip W. Yetton, *Steps to the Future: Fresh Thinking on the Management of IT-based Organizational Transformation*, (Jossey-Bass 1997); Robert H. Miles, *Leading Corporate Transformation: A Blueprint for Business Renewal*, (Jossey-Bass, 1997); Mike Davidson, *The Transformation of Management*, (New York: Palgrave, 1995); Jeffrey Amos, *Transformation to Agility: Manufacturing in the Market Place of Unanticipated Change*, (New York: Routledge, 1998); Eric A. Marks, *Business Darwinism, Evolve or Dissolve: Adaptive Strategies for the Information Age*, (New York: Wiley, 2002).

20 See North Council Atlantic, *Prague Summit Declaration*, Press Release (2002) 127, Prague, November 21, 2002 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>).

profoundly different from the American experience with transformation. In a nutshell, it was less technology-driven and more functional in nature, yet no less deliberate.

Although, as mentioned above, a substantial amount of literature associated with defense transformation has emphasized military innovation, research into geopolitical change and major shifts in the strategic orientation of states reveal discontinuities in military policy.²¹ Fundamental change in military policy which creates changes in the “goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization,” is not exclusively the result of technological developments. A state may not only engage in discontinuous military change as a result of technology-driven innovations in the field of warfighting, but also through changes in how the state understands the role of its military and its defense policy in the context of a changing international environment. While the Revolution in Military Affairs is crucial to understand US transformation, other NATO member-states pursued a policy of discontinuous change in their military policy largely independent of these technological developments. As the case studies make clear, to the Netherlands and Germany transformation was a process of military change to develop an expeditionary force in response to the end of the Cold War. This process is less focused on nuts-and-bolts and is more cerebral but is as profound in its implications, or perhaps even more so, than harnessing military innovations to produce a shift in the military organization.

There are several interesting historical examples of such far-reaching shifts. A key consideration is that such change may be precipitated by changing appreciations of the strategic circumstances confronting the state. Both the Greeks and the Romans deliberately chose a strategy of developing a Navy to protect and advance their interests without having one in the first place. The Greek politician-general Themistocles argued for building a Navy since he believed only this could avoid Greece from being invaded in the future by the massive Persian land army. The Romans by contrast shifted to sea power to counter Carthage in the Punic Wars. These were profound adaptations to the prevalent military structures at the time. A similar strategic choice lay at the root of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s argument to build a “great white fleet.”²² Without a strong Navy, the United States could not become a great power in the early twentieth century and his thinking turned the United States into a major naval power. Such shifts may be connected to the rise of an expansionary power. The reverse however is also true. In the early 15th century, the Chinese emperor Hongxi, in stark contrast to his father’s policies, abruptly forbade all maritime expeditions and refocused China’s attention inward. It precipitated a decline in China’s naval capacities and outward-looking foreign policy. Similarly, the Japanese defeat in World War II led to a transformation of Japan’s military, its military culture and its defense policy.²³ A further

21 Historic examples are German and Japanese military and social change following defeat in the Second World War, but also current research interest in the change in strategic orientation of emerging countries such as India and China.

22 John Arquilla, *Worst Enemy: the Reluctant Transformation of the American Military*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), p.12.

23 See also Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

example can be found in the way decolonization impacted the defense policies of erstwhile colonial powers. These shifts in defense policy occur due to changes in the international environment. In Europe, following the end of the Cold War, militaries slowly reoriented away from focusing on territorial defense and towards expeditionary operations outside their borders. This change from a defensive posture towards a more proactive orientation signaled profound changes in European strategic thinking. By the early 2000's the label *transformation* was used to describe this process that produced a wholesale revision and discontinuity in defense policy. It became the expression of a changing European strategic calculus regarding how the military could be relevant to advance security interests.

1.4 TWO TYPES OF TRANSFORMATION

In the Western world transformation, thus understood as the process of pursuing deliberate discontinuous change in the military, has taken place at two distinctly different, although related levels, both of which triggered fundamental organizational redesign of the armed forces and a rethinking of military policy. The locus of transformation can reside at the military or the political level, where the former focuses on improving the operational effectiveness of the military and the latter addresses the overarching orientation and the purpose for which the military is used. It leads to two types of transformation that both reflect elements of strategy; namely to what end the military is used, and how best to realize that end.

Borrowing from the business management literature on strategy-making, a typology of transformation is proposed that reflects the distinction between defense transformation at the military and the political level. This distinction follows from the discontinuous nature of both instances of change and the different objectives they hope to attain. Transformation can have two strategic objectives. It can lead the military to perform completely different functions, such as the shift from a defensive posture to one of expeditionary operations, or performing the same functions, but doing it fundamentally differently, such as the introduction of technologies and doctrines which revolutionize warfare. In the business management literature discontinuous change to leverage sustainable competitive advantage can be derived in two ways: “doing things differently” or “doing different things.”²⁴ This seemingly simple dichotomy has significant strategic repercussions. While the former describes radical ways to improve competitiveness through operational effectiveness measures, the latter refers to purposeful differentiation or organizational reinvention. Western states have similarly engaged in both types of transformation and are termed here “operational effectiveness transformation (Type I)” and “strategic transformation (Type II)”. Another way of looking at this is that operational effectiveness transformation refers to the nature of warfare in general, while strategic transformation refers to radical change in the defense policy of a state.²⁵

24 Michael E. Porter, “What is Strategy?” *Harvard Business Review* (November-December 1996), p. 61- 78.; Hema Prem & George Eby Mathew, “How Does Business Transformation Happen?” *Cutting Edge* (Infosys: June 2006).

25 Tom Dyson comes to a similar categorization of types of defense reform. Borrowing from

Type I, or operational effectiveness transformation focuses on improving the existing orientation of the military but doing it in a revolutionary new way. It is a form of organizational change meant to increase the overall operational effectiveness of the military. “Doing things differently” refers to changing doctrine, technology or organizational procedures in order to provide a better existing product. According to the US Pentagon such change is “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations [...]”.²⁶ An earlier example is *Blitzkrieg* which revolutionized land warfare, relegating the advantage to offensive powers. In the United States the maturing of information technologies was considered instrumental to produce a disruptive improvement in conventional operations, offering tremendously increased military power to the United States. In addition it would spell significant changes how the military fought, heralding a period of rapid, decisive and “clean” wars. In light of changes in the international security environment that led to a unipolar system with the United States as only remaining superpower, it was believed that these information technologies provided the means to sustain its hegemonic position. It is important to note that at the technological or organizational level these changes promised to be highly innovative but were intent to improve an activity the United States was already superior in, namely conventional, military-to-military high-intensity warfare.

Type II, or strategic, transformation by contrast concerns a discontinuous change in the orientation and function of the military. For European states in the 1990’s it represented a shift towards expeditionary operations. Previously focused on territorial defense and unable to sustain military operations far away from home, this shift amounted to strategic change.

This typology is critical to understanding the policies of military change pursued within NATO. To suggest that only one of these apparitions can truly be considered transformational, perhaps arguing that Type I transformation based on changing the character of war through new doctrine-technology linkages amounts to incremental rather than discontinuous change, denies the historical precedents of such change efforts. Type I transformation has tended to shape the course of history providing critical advantages to those that were quick to enact new policies and technologies, and lethal disadvantages to those that did not. Disregarding Type II transformation however, leads to underrating the

Peter Hall’s work on policy-making and the process of policy change, Dyson makes a distinction between ‘second-order change’ and ‘third-order change’ in the manner in which defense reform was pursued among Western states. The United States’ post-Cold War defense reforms, Dyson writes, were an instance of ‘second-order change’; instruments and settings of policy changed, but the overall policy goals – high-intensity expeditionary warfighting – did not. This resonates the concept of ‘operational effectiveness transformation’ used in this study. ‘Third-order change’, by contrast, entails change in the instruments, settings of policy, as well as the overall policy goals. It corresponds to ‘strategic transformation’ in this study. See Tom Dyson, *Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe*, (London: Palgrave, 2010), p. 12-13. See also Peter A Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain,” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1993), p. 278-279.

strategic change initiatives undertaken by European states which enable a more balanced understanding of NATO's attempt to adapt to the new security environment. Defense transformation and military change is a constituent component of a state's broader security policy. How a state views the place of the military instrument in its broader security agenda is crucial to understanding how and for what objective the state pursues military change. It means that amongst others the military's political masters also have a strong role to play in shaping a transformation strategy. Recent research efforts have given renewed attention to the study of the interplay between domestic factors, technological innovation and shifts in the international security environment.²⁷ Furthermore, a lack of typology disregards the discontinuous nature of both types of change and risks considering irrelevant the fundamental questions each state has had to grapple with regarding the military change program they pursued. It is precisely these dynamics, and the comparison thereof, which makes it possible to assess the future of the transatlantic alliance on the basis of variance in transformation.

1.5 THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD OF TRANSFORMATION

Transformation is not a specific event such as a Revolution in Military Affairs. Instead it is a process states have engaged in subsequent to perceived shifts in the international security environment. Such shifts may be the result of major improvements or deteriorations in the level of external vulnerability of the state. The path of transformation illustrates how states rationalized the role of their military in light of perceived changes in the international security environment. This research focuses on the period 1991 to 2008, from the end of the Cold War to the end of the second administration of US president George W. Bush. This period witnessed several system-level events, some more profound than others, that shaped a period of transition in the global distribution of power warranting reassessments of defense policy. The end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11, the Iraq War but also the promise of information technology in the realm of warfare shaped the context in which transformation was discussed and change strategies took shape. While the neologism was primarily associated with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – who made it a mainstay of his administration while in office between 2001 and 2006 – the term appears in official US strategy documents from as early as 1995.²⁸ To NATO, the term transformation became a mainstay in policy discussions from 2002 onwards. However, for European states, transformation had been going on in different guises since the years subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall. This research seeks to understand why transfor-

27 See Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US and Israel*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies 2010); Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff & Frans Osinga (eds.), *A Transformation Gap?: American Innovations and European Military Change*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010); Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

28 See John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Department of Defense, 1995). Joint Vision 2010 became the basis for the military transformation proposed in William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Department of Defense, May 1997).

mation took shape the way it did within NATO, and what this means for the future of NATO. As such this study into the trajectories of transformation is as much a historical study of the evolution of how a state views its use of the military under a changing security environment, as it is a research into the drivers of military change.²⁹

2 TRANSFORMATION IN NATO

Different trajectories of transformation illustrate the diversity within the NATO alliance.³⁰ This has not been straightforward since NATO is often considered to be a homogenous entity made up of same-minded states, the West, with a similar appreciation of the security environment due to a commonality of values “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”³¹ How did this diversity come about?

The end of the Cold War had serious ramifications for the security policy of Western states.³² For NATO it meant that its primary *raison d'être* dissolved. Founded in 1949 as a collective defense organization to counter Soviet expansionism and the Warsaw pact, NATO was considered victorious when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. With its purpose met, what remained to avoid NATO's slow and silent decline?³³ The alliance however, proved resilient in subsequent years as European and North American states underscored an interest to maintain the institution and use it to further their security interests; at first by enlarging the circle of democratic states with former Warsaw pact countries and later by embracing out-of-area crisis-management operations outside NATO's alliance territory. NATO became an instrument of stabilization in Europe's immediate neighborhood.³⁴ By 2006 NATO counted 26 member countries, up from sixteen a decade and a half earlier. More importantly NATO's strategic and operational focus changed as the alliance undertook operations in former Yugoslavia and an air campaign in Kosovo in 1999.

29 For clarifying purposes and to underline the different expressions of transformation, this study will also use the term 'transformation strategy' to denote the specific apparition of 'transformation' in a state.

30 Interview with Brigadier General Antonello Vitale, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Concept, Policy and Interoperability, Norfolk VA, January 25, 2007; See also Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “Does a Multitier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process of strategic change,” *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2 (2009) p. 211-226.

31 North Atlantic Council, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington DC, April 4, 1949, p.1.

32 See David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace 1998); Lawrence Kaplan, *NATO Divided: the evolution of an alliance*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a new era*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

33 Peter van Ham & Richard L. Kugler, “Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge,” *The Marshall Center Papers*, No.4; Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle For Consensus*, (London: Brassey's UK, 1997).

34 North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Washington DC, April 24, 1999, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm).

The shift indicated an acceptance to perform military interventions outside the treaty area. Contrary to the Cold War when its primary intent was to avoid action, the alliance was now embracing it. That same year a Strategic Concept was adopted cementing the Alliance's focus on crisis-management operations beyond the NATO treaty area, so-called "out-of-area" operations. A popular slogan describing NATO's change was "out of area, or out of business." With this new strategic orientation questions arose regarding the appropriate mix of military capabilities, doctrine and organizational structure. The posture necessary to fight the Soviet Union over the Fulda Gap would not likely be suitable for dealing with smaller, but more frequent crisis-management operations far away from home. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in 1999 was a first step to adapt the alliance to an expeditionary world. Assessments were made of necessary capabilities and shortfalls. The list contained items required for expeditionary operations such as strategic lift aircraft, refueling capabilities, precision weapons, reconnaissance, surveillance and communications capabilities, and capabilities for the suppression of enemy air defense.³⁵ Yet the Initiative fizzled. In the words of US ambassador Alexander Vershbow, the alliance's "rhetoric has far outpaced action when it comes to enhancing capabilities."³⁶ A sense of urgency seemed lacking as the security environment exhibited limited threats. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 gave renewed impetus to the argument that the world had changed and that the security environment was in a state of flux. On September 12, 2001 for the first time in its history NATO invoked Article V of the Washington treaty in solidarity with the United States. European allies offered their assistance to Washington. Yet European states had few relevant capabilities available as Washington set out to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. It became apparent that changes were necessary. Not a state tied to a particular territory but rather an elusive group of individuals spread across the globe using terror as a weapon and concomitant state fragility were the alliance's new foes. Security was no longer purely a function of territorial integrity and geographic distance to the threat. In 2002 the NATO alliance embarked on its first global, out-of-area mission, supporting the reconstruction and stabilization process in Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Nevertheless it became clear that the world's most powerful military alliance on paper lacked the capabilities and organizational structure to support a relatively small operation. And so, following DCI, in August 2002 the leaders of the NATO member states gathered in Prague to discuss how further to prepare the alliance for the new security environment. One capability shortfall in particular proved symptomatic throughout this period. With more than two million men under arms and several thousand helicopters among member states, NATO was not able to provide suffi-

35 See Gordon Adams, et al., *Bridging the Gap: European CAISR and Transatlantic Interoperability*, George Washington University, October 2004; David G. Gompert & Uwe Nerlich, *Shoulder to Shoulder, The Road to US-European Military Cooperability: A German-American Analysis*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).

36 Ambassador A. Vershbow, *Remarks on Euro-Atlantic Security and Defense*, Barcelona, May 10, 2001. See also Carl Ek, *NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment*, Congressional Research Service, RS21659, January 18, 2006.

cient helicopters, crucial to tactical transport in Afghanistan. Instead, NATO turned to commercially leasing the helicopters.³⁷

At the 2002 Prague Summit the heads of state committed “to transforming NATO with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners.”³⁸ The emphasis lay on creating capable expeditionary forces, able to operate under challenging circumstances, able to go “quickly to wherever they are needed... to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.”³⁹ In terms of capability development, the transformation plan was three-tiered. Firstly, it called for the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF), a 20,000-strong crisis-management force that would be able to deploy to any theatre of choice within days. Secondly, the strategic commands were rearranged, from a geographic to a functional orientation. The European strategic command in Mons was renamed Allied Command Operations and would coordinate and plan the alliance’s ongoing operations. Atlantic Command in Norfolk was renamed Allied Command Transformation. Its mission was to provide overarching guidance to transforming the alliance’s capabilities and doctrine and to oversee the transformation initiatives of the various states. The third component was to address the capability requirements mentioned in the Prague Capabilities Commitment; a list of capability shortfalls to enable the creation of the NRF. Distilled from DCI, the list included capabilities for detection and prevention against chemical, biological and nuclear attacks, advanced communications systems (C4ISR⁴⁰), strategic lift assets, precision-guided munitions and air-to-air refueling. The Prague Summit was a milestone and transformation became part of NATO vocabulary and policy.

The Summit however failed to lead to a common transformation strategy. The reason was that the Summit was never the starting point of transformation within the alliance. Although it marked the first time the term was used in an alliance-wide context, several Western states were in the process of pursuing military change echoing many of the Prague initiatives, and had been doing so since the early 1990’s or even before.⁴¹ In official docu-

37 James G. Neuger, “NATO to lease 20 Helicopters to fill Afghan Shortfall,” *Bloomberg News*, October 22, 2007. See also Joris Janssen Lok, “NATO Accelerates Search for More Helicopters for Afghanistan Operations,” *Aviation Week*, November 25, 2007; Thomas Withington, *Helicopter: Operational Mobility*, ISN Security Watch, May 5, 2008 (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=88742>); EDA, “Declaration of Ministerial support for the European Defence Agency’s work on improving helicopter availability,” *EDA Note for the Steering Board No.2008/ 21*, Brussels May 19, 2008.

38 North Atlantic Council, *Prague Summit Declaration*, Press Release (2002) 127, Prague, November 21, 2002 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>), accessed August 8, 2007.

39 Ibid.

40 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance are a family of capabilities that rely on advanced information technologies to collect and disseminate information through the military organization.

41 Besides the United States, other member states such as the United Kingdom and France had

mentation in the United States the term was already in widespread use. Furthermore, as the case studies will make clear, much of the American transformation strategy had been developed irrespective of NATO and the principal technologies were derived from innovations dating to the latter stages of the Cold War or pioneered during the 1991 Gulf War. For the Netherlands transformation was an extension of policies initiated by its shift towards expeditionary operations in 1993. In Germany transformation had its roots in the integration of the former GDR's military into the Bundeswehr, which later changed to reforming for expeditionary operations.

Since states have different international vantage points, cultures, histories and narratives, the interpretation of developments in the external security environment does not translate equally into policy. To some, mostly European states, transformation meant a fundamental reorientation of what the military is for, to others – like the United States – it was an organizational concept making the military more effective. General Antonello Vitale, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Concepts, Policy and Interoperability at Allied Command Transformation when I interviewed him in early 2007 acknowledged that there were different appreciations of transformation throughout NATO.⁴² This divergence increases the risk of strategic dissonance within the alliance. While the term is used on both sides of the Atlantic, the concept of transformation is understood differently and discussions among NATO member states resemble a Babylonian confusion of tongues. Explaining variance in transformation strategies is necessary to understand how foreign and defense policies take shape, how states respond to transitions in the external security environment and to understand the root causes of divergence in the transatlantic security relationship. It also offers an additional instrument with which to make assessments about the future of the Alliance. One of the central elements to explore in this study is therefore why the United States and European states differ in their appreciation of the military instrument.

3 BETWEEN MARS AND VENUS

In recent years an impressive volume of books and articles has been produced discussing differences in security policies among the states of the transatlantic community. These focused mainly on a distinction between European states and the United States, and many were published in the wake of the Iraq War.⁴³ Driven by the crisis in the run-up to the Iraq

already initiated military change programs towards expeditionary forces.

42 Interview with Brigadier General Antonello Vitale, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Concept, Policy and Interoperability, Norfolk VA, January 25, 2007.

43 See for instance Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Peter van Ham, "America's Rising anti-Europeanism" in *Europe's World*, Spring 2006, p. 30-35; Christopher J. Makins, "Power and Weakness or Challenge and Response: Reflections on the Kagan Thesis," August 1, 2003 ; Madeleine K. Albright & Kurt M. Campbell (eds.), *Crossing the Atlantic, A report from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops*, (The Aspen Institute, 2004); Ronald Asmus et

War in 2003, and subsequent torture and maltreatment scandals in the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay detention centers, observers focused on transatlantic alienation. Anti-Americanism among European publics was at a peak. In a 2003 Eurobarometer survey, 53% of Europeans felt that the United States was a threat to world peace, second only to Israel (59%) and on par with Iran and North Korea.⁴⁴ Similarly, European approval ratings of US leadership in international affairs dropped to 38% in 2002 and 37% in 2007, with European approval ratings of US President George W. Bush hitting a low of 17% that year.⁴⁵ Whether it was a rift, a divergence, a crisis or a gap, articles and books were addressing differences in European and US foreign and security policy. Most of the criticism focused on the role played by the military instrument in American and European policies. Perhaps the most important argument came from Robert Kagan, an American neoconservative commentator living in Brussels. In a widely-read essay published in 2002 he argued that transatlantic dissent over issues such as the Global War on Terror and responses to terrorism was not an incident but rather symptomatic of a strategic disconnect informed by the military weakness of Europe and the military strength of the US.⁴⁶ Because Europe is militarily weak, European states necessarily opted for multilateral solutions and ‘soft power’ instruments in their foreign policy. Kagan argued that this also enabled Europe to selectively choose which threats to focus on. However, because the United States is a military hegemon, it has a different strategic perspective. The United States’ strength preordains an active role in the field of security, Kagan argued. The capability gap between Europe and the US thus precipitated a strategic gap. Europeans were from Venus and Americans from Mars.

Indeed, the European response to 9/11, the War on Terrorism and concerns over homeland security, or appreciations of the Iraq-threat prior to the war in 2003, was different from Washington’s. And there was regular friction among transatlantic partners over the use of the military. A clear example was the criticism expressed by European troop-contrib-

al., “One Year On: Lessons from Iraq,” *Chaillot Paper*, no. 68, European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 2004; Phillip Gordon & Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004); Peter van Ham & Richard L. Kugler, “Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge,” *The Marshall Center Papers*, No.4; Steven Everts & Gary Schmitt, “Is Military Power still the Key to International Security?” in *NATO Review*, Winter 2002; Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004); Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and Geopolitics in the 21st Century* (New York: Knopf 2002); Parag Khanna, “The Metrosexual Superpower” in *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2004, p. 66-68. Sebastian Reyn, *Allies or Aliens: George W. Bush and the Transatlantic Crisis in Historical Perspective*, (Zoetermeer, NL: Atlantische Commissie 2004); Maarten Brands et al., *Transatlantic Relations at a Crossroads: Current Challenges in US-European Relations* (The Hague: Atlantische Commissie, 2004).

44 Eurobarometer, *Iraq and Peace in the World*, Flash Eurobarometer 151, Directorate General Press and Communication, November 2003, p. 78.

45 German Marshall Fund & Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *Worldviews 2002*; and German Marshall Fund & Compagnia di San Paolo, *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2007*.

46 Robert Kagan, *On Power and Weakness*, Policy Review, no. 113 (June-July 2002).

uting nations regarding the tactics used by American colleagues in Afghanistan in 2007.⁴⁷ European states complained that the United States was overemphasizing force protection and using the military bluntly in an area where European allies were desperately trying to engage the local population by avoiding excessive use of military force. European allies denounced what they perceived as US overreliance on the military to solve foreign policy problems, while officials in Washington criticized European states for not pulling their weight in crisis-management operations. In late 2006, to America's annoyance, NATO's Secretary-General was going around European capitals pleading for additional troops for operations in Afghanistan, while in the eyes of Europeans the United States was losing credibility in Iraq as a result of a heavy-handed approach disrespecting local sensitivities. European states accused the United States for not understanding the delicate dynamics of complex emergencies which necessitated greater attention to 'soft power.' The United States in turn was infuriated by the resistance of several European states to commit forces to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, the parts where the heaviest combat was taking place. Practitioners in Europe were also underwriting parts of Kagan's thesis. In 2006 at an international conference, a senior official at NATO's Allied Command Transformation remarked that there was a divergence in transatlantic "perception of challenges" and that the "real separation [between the US and Europe] is one of mind-set." Europeans, he said "view threats differently" than the United States. The remark echoed Kagan's conclusion that "when it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways."⁴⁸ Transatlantic differences were also brought to the fore in public opinion surveys. According to the Transatlantic Trends survey of the German Marshall Fund, there was a systemic gap between European and American appreciations of the use of force and for what force is considered justified (see figure 1). At the same time, it also showed ample differences between European states.

Kagan's essay begged further clarification, nuance and context. He wrote that European weakness was caused by a lack of military capabilities yet he failed to answer the question why Europeans - as structural realists would predict - had not emulated the United States and developed similar military capabilities. He bypassed the underlying question of what drives states to develop high-intensity military capabilities in the first place. Defense budgets were an obvious place to look. The United States militarily outspends the rest of the world. In absolute figures, while only at 3.3% of GDP, in 2002 the amount is almost twice as large as the combined budgets of the rest of its NATO allies. Including the emergency funds made available for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States spends an equivalent amount on defense as the rest of the world combined. Its defense budget

47 See for instance, "British Criticize US Air Attacks in Afghan Region" *New York Times*, August 9, 2007 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/world/asia/09casualties.html>). For an excellent assessment of differences in national perspective regarding the value of force in the Iraq post-conflict stabilization environment see Aylwin-Foster, Bg Nigel, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations" *Military Review*, November -December 2005, pp. 2-15.

48 Kagan (2002), p. 4.

exceeds spending on international aid and the State Department more than 17 times, while in the Netherlands and Germany the disparity is less substantial (see figure 2).⁴⁹

“Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice”




Figure 1: Comparison of German, Dutch and American Attitudes to War

(Source: German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends, 2009, Topline Data, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Top.pdf)




Figure 2: Table of Costs Appropriated to Defense and Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, Germany and the United States, including Ratio-Curve.

(Source: Author’s analysis. Figures taken from United States Congress, Finanzamt, Auswaertiges Amt, Ministerie van Defensie, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken)

49 In Europe, there are differences nonetheless as Germany spends five times more on Defense than on Foreign aid, and the Netherlands spends roughly an equivalent amount with the majority going to Foreign aid, rather than Defense.




Figure 3: Defense Spending as % of GDP in the United States, Germany and the Netherlands.

(Source: www.nato.int)

With such figures it is not surprising that the United States has an inclination to focus more on the military than Europeans. Underlying these figures is a fundamental distinction that pertains to how Europeans and Americans perceive their role in the world and the role played by the military in their security policy.

Furthermore, Kagan states that Europe “is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation.”⁵⁰ This observation is only tenable when looking at intra-European affairs in which Europeans have abandoned the use of force as an instrument of their foreign policy. However, it does not hold when considering the high-intensity combat states such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain have engaged in during recent interventions like Afghanistan. Referring to military power, he asserted that one of the principal distinctions between Europe and the US is that “those with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to fix them.” Yet this assumes that there is a causal relationship between superior conventional military power and success in complex emergencies. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that this is not the case and that certain elements of the United States’ conventional military power have been offset by innovation in the field of asymmetric strategies.⁵¹ This trend heralds a major system-level event with the potential over time to change the distribution of power and - as the case study on the United States makes clear - Washington is encountering substantial difficulties to adapt to it. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the once unquestioned superpower is not

50 Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 3.

51 See Rob de Wijk, *The Art of Military Coercion, Why the West's military superiority scarcely matters*, (Leiden: Mets & Schilt, 2005).

invulnerable. Not only does it provide possible adversaries with a practical manual on how to effectively confront the United States, as long as the US military remains embroiled in these theatres it provides an opportunity for others to expand their influence elsewhere.

Nevertheless Kagan's article triggered renewed attention to the dynamics inside a security community that was presumed to have a common appreciation of the threat environment. The belief that the West is a homogenous entity responding to the international security environment in similar ways was shattered. This impacts the trajectory of transformation as well. From an academic and policy-analytical perspective it is of interest to look at transformation strategies when NATO member states, commonly perceived as having similar security interests; historically constituting 'the West,' having commonly agreed to transform their military; and subjected to similar system-level parameters; in fact lack commonality in that approach. Understanding the factors that shaped the individual transformation strategies yields insights into how these states respond to changes in the security environment as well as how they perceive the role of the military instrument in it. This helps to understand variance in responses to security challenges such as irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan or dealing with international terrorism, and it allows assessing the future of the Atlantic alliance in an expeditionary environment. Analyzing the variables shaping a state's transformation strategy enables a better understanding of the behavior of individual actors in the realm of international security. It also gives greater substance to the discussion over European and American differences in security policy. For what purpose a state transforms its military is as important as how it does so.

From the moment that transformation was adopted throughout NATO, it was anticipated that a commonly pursued transformation strategy could bridge a capability gap with the United States and give new energy and cohesion to the NATO alliance.⁵² In spite of common values and an international system that was relatively risk-free and favorable to Western states, transformation has not been pursued similarly by NATO member states.⁵³ There are fundamental differences between the United States and its European allies, as well as among European states, and these differences impact NATO's ability to formulate a common response to security challenges. It can thereby be hypothesized that transformation strategies aside from the relative distribution of power are also shaped by domestic considerations. This lends credence to supplementing an interest-based analysis with elements derived from the school of international relations that emphasizes the role of domestic and ideational variables. While the international environment offers the framework within which a state pursues its security interests, a state's policies are given shape once filtered through the lens of a state's strategic culture. The theoretical basis for this hypothesis is elaborated upon in Chapter 5.

52 See David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

53 See Terry Terrif, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds.), *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

4 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The focus of this research rests on explaining how discontinuous military change was given shape from 1991 onwards by three NATO member states. So doing the research will assess which factors were crucial to give shape to transformation in these states and how this impacts cohesion within NATO. Why was transformation pursued the way it was? The principle research interest thereby rests on explaining variation in Western transformation strategies. It is the thesis of this research that the interaction between system-level dynamics and a state's strategic culture combined are the main factors that shape a state's policy of defense transformation.⁵⁴ Three states are considered, all members of the NATO alliance; the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The reason for their selection is offered in chapter 7.

Through a structured focused comparison of the transformation strategies of three Western states in the period 1991-2008 this research studies how NATO member states have interpreted and responded to periods of transition in the international security environment. On the basis of a theoretical framework derived from neoclassical realism I argue that the choice for, and outcome of a particular transformation strategy is a product of both the system-level position of a state in a given international distribution of power and a state's strategic culture. The research question is *How has the interaction between system-level factors and domestic strategic cultures influenced the trajectory of defense transformation of NATO member states and how does it shape future transatlantic security relations and the future of NATO?*

In the next part the theoretical framework will be presented. The theoretical basis is offered by the international relations theory of neoclassical realism. It fuses system-level and domestic-level variables to explain state behavior. In this conceptual framework strategic culture is considered the central domestic-level variable intervening in translating the external system-level environment and relative power differentials into transformation strategies. Following a discussion of strategic culture, subsequently the research design and methodology are presented, including the subquestions to be addressed.

54 This is based on the theory of neoclassical realism. For an overview see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and theories of foreign policy," *World Politics*, vol. 51, no.1, (October 1998), pp. 144-172.

5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There is, upon the whole, nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of; and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from one standpoint; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.

– Carl von Clausewitz, “On War”⁵⁵

The definition of transformation used in this research implies that variations in transformation strategies are principally the result of divergent interpretations of changes in the security environment. This underlines the importance of domestic variables to explain state behavior. From a neoclassical realist perspective, transformation strategies take shape in response to perceived major shifts in the international security environment, as filtered through domestic-level variables. For instance, the French *levée-en-masse* was a means to increase the power of Napoleon and so doing to extract greater resources from the French nation. It originated in the inculcation of nationalism in response to perceived external threats.⁵⁶ Yet this could only have taken place following major changes in French society subsequent to the French Revolution. The theoretical basis for understanding the drivers of transformation needs to take both system- and domestic-level factors into account. In this chapter a model for explaining transformation strategies is developed on the basis of the theory of neoclassical realism. Furthermore, the variable strategic culture is introduced as a crucial domestic-level factor shaping a state’s disposition towards the use of the military instrument. Sources of strategic culture are similarly presented. Finally, this part closes by elaborating on the case studies and the research design.

A theory is a logically coherent ‘bias’ in an attempt to foster greater understanding of a complex subject. Just as the economist focuses on economic trends and the spread of means of production and treats other aspects of social interaction as secondary, the theoretical underpinnings of this research act as a filter and a lens. The theoretical framework attempts to rationalize the inevitably subjective nature of some of the choices made in this research. Does this make the research in itself weaker or stronger? The choice of theory is that part of a social scientific research that makes it strong and vulnerable at the same time. The use of a theory may antagonize those that disagree with it in principle, perhaps for no other reason than not being their favored theory, yet it may also stimulate an academic debate about the ontology and epistemology of a subject, or which spectacles most sharply focus the topic. My intent is to offer a logical, internally coherent argumentation on this topic pertaining to foreign and defense policy.

55 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Penguin, 1982), p.404.

56 Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” *International Security*, vol. 18, no 2. (Autumn 1993), pp. 80-124.

5.1 SYSTEM AND DOMESTIC-LEVEL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Neoclassical realism is a relatively new field of international relations scholarship. It attempts to equip the school of Realism with greater depth and richness and explain foreign policy by bridging the gap between neorealist theories that rely on the explanatory power of international power distributions and material interests, and theories of *Innenpolitik* that emphasize the role of ideas, perceptions, culture and norms to shape decisionmakers' preferences. It has emerged as an attempt to refocus realist scholarship away from the structural analyses that were dominant in the past half century and towards foreign policy analysis, reminiscent of the focus of traditional realist scholars of the early 20th century.⁵⁷ Hence the attribution neoclassical. This has led neoclassical realists to carve out a space for their work in the turbulent theoretical waters where realism and constructivism meet. It has led to academic clashes with both neorealism, or structural realism, as well as with theories of constructivism that perceive interests, alliances, and power as social constructs. In the following chapter a neoclassical realist approach is put forward by discussing the shortcomings of both neorealism and constructivism to study transformation. Yet it is precisely the synergistic interaction between the two schools which offers a promising way forward. Subsequently strategic culture is presented as the domestic variable to complement a system-level analysis within the contours of neoclassical realism.

5.1.1 NEOREALISM'S SHORTCOMINGS

Arguably the theory most often referred to in contemporary international relations scholarship, whether favorably or not, is Kenneth Waltz's neorealism.⁵⁸ His balance of power theory is one of the benchmark studies against which various alternative theories are generally tested. Neorealism is interested in systemic outcomes of state behavior over a longer period of time, and says little about the individual foreign policies of states.⁵⁹ Waltz's theory does not deal with the question why particular states pursue particular strategies. This makes its system-level assumptions relevant but not sufficient for the present study of transformation.

Neorealism remains the dominant theory to explain the behavior of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. The Cold War was the product of a dangerous although inherently straightforward strategic threat environment. The number of important actors was limited, it was a bipolar system, and the nature of competition was predominantly military and military-industrial. It favored a systemic explanation which was provided by neorealism. The Cold War could be understood by knowing the distribution of material capabilities and the dominant impact the existential, nuclear threat had on the system as a whole. International politics was captured in a two-party game of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Not surprisingly, the allegory often used to describe the Cold

57 Lobell et al (2009).

58 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

59 Waltz (1979), p. 71-72.

War was the chessboard. As Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik argue, Waltz's theory is primarily applicable under the specific circumstances present during the Cold War.⁶⁰ They argue that the theory was of bounded validity, confined to a particular *Zeitgeist*. The end of the Cold War created new systemic dynamics and a different *Zeitgeist*, thereby spelling the end of the dominance, or perhaps even the relevance, of neorealism.

New challenges arose in the form of non-state actors, destabilizing spill-over from regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore the absence of a peer competitor of the United States implied a shift to a unipolar system founded on US conventional military superiority. The new security paradigm that took shape, as James Gow points out, was one where "new threats and challenges are fuzzy and hard to perceive. They have no equivalent to the a priori status of structurally bound states in neorealism."⁶¹ The strategic documents published by Western governments in the subsequent years similarly reflected uncertainty over the international system. Ethnic conflicts, intra-state conflicts, asymmetric conflicts, non-conventional conflicts, 'military operations other than war', non-military security threats, complex emergencies and terrorism formed the post-Cold War vocabulary used by international relations scholars trying to understand the behavior of greater and lesser powers, as well as a new type of actor in the international arena, the non-state actor. It tested the fundamentals of neorealist thinking, whose proponents nevertheless continued to promote the relevance of net assessments in support of their theory.⁶² A crucial problem is that neorealism avoids relying on domestic level variables for explanatory purposes, yet particularly in a unipolar system those factors that shaped foreign policy were becoming more important to understand state behavior. For instance in relation to understanding third-party interventions in ethnic conflicts. As Martha Finnemore points out, there was little structural realist rationale for Western intervention in the crises in Somalia and Cambodia. Instead, she argued, it was the norm of safeguarding human rights that shaped the decision of states.⁶³ Waltz later concurred that the United States intervened in several ethnic conflicts out of national ambition and domestic pressure, rather than systemic motives and external security interests. Neorealism, he clarified, describes systemic dynamics over the longer term, not the short-term when relative distributions of power are in transit.⁶⁴ Yet the short-term is precisely the period in which transformation policies take shape. This complicates making use of neorealism for this study.

60 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist," *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 49.

61 James Gow, *Defending the West*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) p. 34.

62 See for instance Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War" in *International Security*, Vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.

63 M. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

64 Waltz (2000), p.27.

Neorealism's sub-varieties are similarly problematic to explain the specific foreign policy behavior of transformation. Offensive and defensive Realism both focus on the role of relative power distributions yet they both explain state behavior differently. The offensive variant assumes that states are power-maximizers and that in an anarchic world the desire for scarce security is the dominant driver of state behavior. This persistently drives states to identify avenues to increase their power.⁶⁵ Offensive realists thereby equate another's greater military power to greater anticipated aggressive behavior, breeding the risk of confrontation. That states always and only seek to expand their power however is a simplification.⁶⁶ Defensive realism assumes instead that on the basis of the power distribution states are security-maximizers and thereby have the choice to 'balance' or 'bandwagon' against threats.⁶⁷ While states essentially want to avoid confrontation, they become victim of security dilemmas. This is a conclusion that is hard to falsify in general yet becomes problematic when applied in more detail. Although the security dilemma is a central aspect of interstate dynamics (and remains so in this neoclassical realist study), defensive Realism offers an incomplete theoretical understanding of how threat perceptions are formed. They are as much formed by domestic considerations as in response to the real military capabilities of others.

The foremost objection to both variants as well as neorealism in general is the assumption that actors first of all have an accurate understanding of the objective distribution of power in the international system and secondly, that this is translated friction-free into state behavior. This is a serious shortfall as international politics is not a chess-game where everyone knows the amount, type, function and position of all the pieces on the board. Instead, international relations are governed by imperfect information. States take decisions based on their own unique interpretation of that imperfect information.⁶⁸ Robert Bathurst offered the example of US reliance on technology-heavy solutions to security issues and how this skewed its estimations of relative power. Even when attempting to make objective estimates of relative power, such as through net assessments of Soviet military capabilities, perception and subjectivity came into play. Bathurst notes that the seemingly straight-forward and objectively verifiable act of counting military hardware as a measure of estimation was perception-driven and value-laden leading to misperceptions.⁶⁹ The United States assumed mistakenly that its use and application of military hardware was comparable to the Soviet's. Bathurst concluded that "only after long, usually

65 See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001).

66 See Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996) pp. 90-121.

67 See Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

68 Robert Jervis, *Perception & Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

69 Robert B. Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy* (London: SAGE, 1993), p. 115.

costly mistakes do we learn that a tank in a Soviet context was not the same as a tank in NATO.⁷⁰ Domestic factors influenced perceptions of external threats. In other research, Jack Snyder in 1977 argued that differences in nuclear strategy between the Soviet Union and the United States were due to domestic variables rather than anything else.⁷¹

Neorealism does not focus on explaining foreign policy. Rather it contents itself to taking a longer-term perspective and addressing longer-term system trends. This makes it inadequate for explaining why a particular state may be slow or fail to pursue a change in its strategy or why some states are able to adapt and others are not when facing similar threats or opportunities in the international system. This is relevant for the current study to understand why and how a state has pursued its path of transformation. As Jeffrey Taliaferro argues, unit-level variables instead determine whether and when a state pursues an adaptive strategy.⁷² These variables constrain or enable key decisionmakers to respond in the short to medium term to system-level events. With regards to this present study of transformation, perhaps the most explicit criticism has been articulated by Stephen Rosen. He argued that neorealists believe to have found a “universal science that explains the generation of military power in all countries, without regard to their internal societies.”⁷³ This can hardly explain the divergence in transformation strategies that are witnessed. While neorealist assumptions on the balance of power shape the confines within which state behavior takes shape, to explain a state’s foreign policy it needs to be augmented with an appreciation of domestic variables.

5.1.2 THE NEED TO AUGMENT THEORY WITH DOMESTIC LEVEL VARIABLES

Theories that focus exclusively on domestic level factors are known under the category *Innenpolitik*. They stress the role of domestic variables such as political ideology, culture and societal composition and reject the role of international systemics to explain state behavior. State structures and the belief systems prevalent among the governing elite are considered independent variables.⁷⁴ The democratic peace theorem, which holds that democracies do not go to war with each other, is perhaps its most important example.⁷⁵ It asserts that domestic structures and regimes define state behavior. Such theories focus on domestic-level factors yet they fail to explain variance in state behavior under

70 Ibid.

71 Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, R-2154-AF, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977).

72 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource Extractive State,” *Security Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006), pp. 465-469.

73 Stephen P. Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 5.

74 This applies to social constructivism but also some liberal theories of international relations. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

75 See Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3 (1983), pp. 205-235.

differing system-level contexts. For instance, although Saddam Hussein was a critical factor in shaping Iraqi policy, his foreign policy would have been very different if he was the president of the Solomon Islands instead of Iraq. The regional distribution of power in the Middle East cannot be ignored, nor can Iraq's geopolitical setting in the 1990's. The chief problem with theories that focus solely on domestic characteristics is that they fail to explain why the same state may pursue different strategies under different international distributions of power, or its inverse, why similar foreign policies can be produced by states with substantially differing domestic systems.⁷⁶ A purely constructivist interpretation of transformation would disregard the constraints offered by system-level dynamics in shaping threats and discount interests as dependent variables subject to intersubjective construction rather than the material requirements of state security. While anarchy to a certain degree indeed is what states make of it, within the confines of a relative distribution of power states are constrained in the options they can pursue as states at a minimum pursue their survival and at maximum pursue global domination.

Instead I have found it useful to look at the interaction between both system and domestic level variables. Waltz concedes that "the causes of war lie not simply in states or the state system; they are found in both."⁷⁷ In fact, in his 2000 article in *International Security* the neorealist infers both domestic and system-level elements to explain state behavior. "Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states," he wrote.⁷⁸ Neoclassical realism combines both system and domestic-level variables to explain state behavior.

5.2 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Both domestic and system-level factors are constraints within which a state's security policy takes shape. Neoclassical Realism has emerged over the past fifteen years in international relations scholarship as a deductive theory that combines both variables. Rather than being an additive theory, neoclassical realism underscores that domestic and system-level factors interact to produce foreign and defense policy outcomes.

Neorealism and neoclassical realism are closely related. Waltz's neorealism focuses on the long-term outcome of a system, not on the shorter-term transition periods in between different constellations of the relative power distribution. The neoclassical realists Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven Lobell and Norrin Ripsman write in their study that "over the long term, international political outcomes generally mirror the actual distribution of power among states. In the shorter term however, the policies states pursue are rarely objectively efficient or predictable based upon a purely systemic analysis."⁷⁹ At the end of

76 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," *World Politics*, vol. 51 (October 1998).

77 Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), p. 13.

78 Ibid, p. 24.

79 Steven E. Lobell, et al., *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.4.

the Cold War, neorealism predicted the United States would pursue a policy that sustains its position as a hegemon.⁸⁰ Yet, neorealism had little to offer in order to understand how the United States would pursue this position. It does not deal with the complex issue of how states interpret and respond to transitions in the distribution of power. It does not answer the question how governments assessed likely threats, and why they did so, and translated it into foreign and security policy. Particularly during these transition periods domestic variables are central.⁸¹ One of the crucial moments in the international system is when there is ambiguity over the distribution of power, or a period in which the distribution of power changes, or is expected to change. This is precisely where neoclassical realism has added value. In these transition periods information about the international system is opaque, and states are even more dependent on their interpretations of these shifts.⁸² Instead system-level distributions of power set the broad parameters of foreign policy yet domestic-level variables inform how those parameters are translated into policy.

Neoclassical realism has several core characteristics. Conform neorealism, neoclassical realism takes the international system and the relative distribution of power as a starting point. Gideon Rose, one of the principal students of the theory, writes that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.”⁸³ Likewise, Fareed Zakaria, another prominent neoclassical realist, argues that any theory of foreign policy “should first ask what effects the international system has on national behavior.”⁸⁴ Neoclassical realism is explicitly *realist* in its assumptions regarding the role of the relative distribution of material capabilities, the focus on power and the impact it has on interest formation.⁸⁵ Yet contrary to neorealism, it focuses on explaining foreign policy.

A second core characteristic is that neoclassical realism assumes there is an “imperfect transmission belt” between a state’s relative position in the system and its foreign policy. Contrary to neorealism, there is no direct, unfettered and undiluted linkage between relative power capabilities and state behavior. Instead, the impact of “power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must

80 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), p. 5-41.

81 See Tobias M. Wilke, *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the past to contemporary German strategic choice*, (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007).

82 Steven E. Lobell, et al. (2009), p.41.

83 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics*, vol. 51 (October 1998), p. 146.

84 Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics” in Michael E. Brown et al (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), p. 482.

85 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.⁸⁶ Since policy is shaped by officials, national interests and threats to these interests follow from their reading of the international environment. Responses to threats are similarly constrained by unit-level variables, including ideology or state institutions. As Rose elaborates, “one must analyze how systemic pressures are translated through domestic-level intervening variables such as decisions-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structure.”⁸⁷ Neoclassical realism takes account of the possibility that state-actors misinterpret, misunderstand, or misread the international structure, which in turn can produce foreign policy responses that are not congruent with neorealist expectations.

A third assumption in neoclassical realism is that as perceived power increases states expand the scope of their political agenda abroad.⁸⁸ When relative power increases, so too does the ambition to influence international affairs. The more perceived power an actor has, the more it will attempt to advance its normative view of the international environment. Robert Gilpin wrote in the 1980’s that increased power breeds a greater appetite for influencing the international arena.⁸⁹ Conversely, when relative power declines, these ambitions are scaled back. Power is an enabler for the spread of ideas, but ideas influence how power is used. An example is the increase in expeditionary peace operations after the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War signaled a benevolent environment to the ‘victorious’ West. It enabled these states to expand their domestic liberal agendas abroad. Not only did these states take a peace dividend but they also pursued liberal-interventionist agendas, promoting the advance of Western liberal values through peace operations, many far away from home. The new international constellation offered a US-led Security Council new opportunities to advance its global role. In these days, President George H. W. Bush spoke of creating a ‘new world order’. It marked an embrace of liberal interventionism.

While neoclassical realism does not explain systemic shifts, it accords weight to how the perceived distribution of power influences the opportunities a state has to advance its security interests. “Power in short, determines the options that preferences select.”⁹⁰ The systemic and unit level variables are thus mutually connected rather than one having precedence over the other. The neoclassical realist Jeffrey Taliaferro writes that “systemic forces shape domestic process within states, which in turn constrain states’ ability to respond to systemic imperatives.”⁹¹ Different system-level distributions of power thus produce different constraints within which domestic variables shape policy.

86 Rose (1998), p. 146.

87 Ibid, p. 152.

88 Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.33-42.

89 A pessimist’s equivalent of this would be to say ‘power corrupts’. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

90 G. Morgan, *The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration*, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 96.

91 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 210-211.

The interplay between domestic and systemic factors is relevant to understand how the United States coped with the changed post-Cold War security environment. The United States did not develop a military empire based on repression; instead it strengthened a set of international institutions and intervened on a limited scale in places like Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, amongst others to promote liberal norms. Instead, it was a combination of a benevolent security environment, in which no peer competitors appeared on the horizon, and domestic factors which shaped US policy.⁹² For smaller powers, from a neorealist perspective, the major changes in the international security environment after the end of the Cold War heralded a strategy of bandwagoning with, or counterbalancing the United States. Rather than respond in a similar fashion, a set of domestic constraints and different threat appreciations, along with institutional considerations, influenced the policies of European medium and smaller powers. International imperatives were filtered by domestic considerations to affect how officials conceptualized and responded to the new distribution of power and threats to national interests.

Turning to the relation between neoclassical realism and transformation, Samuel Huntington observed in the 1960's already hat "Major changes in military policy reflect changes in the relations of the government to its domestic and foreign environment." Huntington continues:

If the external balance of power changes and the government sees opportunities to expand its territory and power abroad, these changes in its external environment will be reflected in its military policy. The changes in military policy, in turn, may require changes in aspects of domestic policy. Similarly, changes in the domestic environment – such as rapid industrialization of the country, or a change in its form of government – may lead to alterations in its military policy and its foreign policy [...]. At any given time, military policy thus reflects the interactions between the external environment and goals of the government and its domestic environment and goals.⁹³

Huntington's comments correspond to the principles of neoclassical realism outlined above. For transformation it means that discontinuous change in a state's defense affairs can be derived from the interplay between domestic and system-level variables. The independent variable in neoclassical realism is the relative power distribution, while domestic-level variables intervene, to produce foreign policy. As such, neoclassical realism provides an appropriate theoretical framework within which to study how different Western states respond to periods of upheaval and change in the international system and to understand how states individually cope with the process of change and what this has implied

92 Lobell et al (2009), p.3.

93 Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defense*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 482.

for the role of the military instrument.⁹⁴ James Gow, professor at King's College, makes a similar point when he states that "Necessity lies at the core of the social construction of Realist understanding."⁹⁵ What one state feels necessary, the other does not. All changes in strategic policy pursued by a state – formulated in response to the perceived distribution of power – is governed by the notion that it is necessary due to an appreciation of the external environment. This opens the door to emphasizing the role of perceptions in understanding foreign policy.

Hans Morgenthau, the intellectual father of classical political realism, acknowledged the role that perceptions play and the influence of domestic level factors on interest formation. National character, Morgenthau argues, affects the development of interests as it "cannot fail to influence national power; for those who act for the nation in peace and war, formulate, execute and support its policies, elect and are elected, mold public opinion, produce and consume – all bear to a greater or lesser degree the imprint of those intellectual and moral qualities which make up the national character."⁹⁶ Von Clausewitz, a classical realist, stated that "one and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times [...]."⁹⁷ In these statements, neoclassical realism finds its classical roots. Differences between actors may depend on varying perceptions or variance in the external environment. Robert Jervis made this point clearly in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, arguing that even if different states acknowledge that a particular threat has arisen it does not imply these states will respond in a similar way.⁹⁸ Given the central role that perceptions play as a domestic variable, let us take a closer look.

5.2.1 THE ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS

The nature of regimes matters to explain state behavior. As Walter Russell Mead demonstrated in his treatise on US foreign policy schools, a Jacksonian or Wilsonian president will pursue foreign policy objectives differently, independent of a given system-level distribution of power.⁹⁹ Elites view the world through their ideological and philosophical prisms, whether it is isolationist or liberal internationalist. It impacts how the objective reality of the international system is viewed. An analogous dynamic can be seen in particle physics. The Heisenberg principle asserts that phenomena are distorted by the act of observation. It means that reality is a product of its interaction with the perceiving entity. Similarly, neoclassical realism advocates that events within the relative distribution of

94 Ibid, p. 21.

95 Gow (2004), p.35.

96 Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1985, 6th ed.) p. 151.

97 Von Clausewitz, p. 109.

98 Jervis (1976), p. 13-31.

99 Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

power are filtered through domestic level factors such as the perceptions of policymakers and governing elites. In short, context, shaped by the external environment and domestic factors, matters.¹⁰⁰ Officials filter information about the external security environment through their ideologies, histories and political philosophies. For instance, under the bipolarity of the Cold War, the behavior of the United States fluctuated from containment to détente to roll-back on the basis of differing assessments of Soviet behavior by different administrations. William Wohlforth asserted that the end of the Cold War was driven by perceived shifts in power rather than objective changes therein.¹⁰¹ Conservative nationalists and neoconservatives in the US have different interpretations of the intentions of other actors in the international system. They ‘read’ international affairs differently. Domestic-level determinants that shape perceptions are thus an essential element for sense-making and interpretation of the international security environment within the relative distribution of power. Robert Jervis is pessimistic about the effect of perception on decisionmakers and contends that state behavior is almost always based on faulty assumptions of the other. The security dilemma is the most obvious and most dangerous example:

*Actors frequently assume that their intentions, especially peaceful ones, are clear to others. Failing to realize that others may see the actor as a threat to their security, the actor concludes that others’ arms increases can only indicate unprovoked aggressiveness.*¹⁰²

An emphasis on intersubjective interpretations of reality opens the field of international relations to psychological analysis, as exemplified by the work of strategist Alexander George who contends that individuals simplify the world on the basis of “a set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social world.”¹⁰³ Perceptions are intervening variables to give meaning to the system-level distribution of power. Robert Bathurst argued that “we classify what we experience to what we know.”¹⁰⁴ In his discussion of neoclassical realism Gideon Rose writes that due to the role of elite perceptions “the world

100 See also Colin S. Gray, *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the Sovereignty of context*, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 2006.

101 William Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) as quoted in Legro and Moravcsik (1999), p. 39.

102 Jervis (1976), p. 410.

103 “In order to function, every individual acquires during the course of his development a set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social environment. These beliefs provide him with a relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of what would otherwise be a confusing and overwhelming array of signals and cues picked up from the environment by his senses [...] These beliefs and constructs necessarily simplify the external world [...] Much of an individual’s behaviour is shaped by the particular ways in which he perceives, evaluates, and interprets incoming information about events in his environment.” Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 57.

104 Robert Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror*, (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1993), p.3.

states end up inhabiting is indeed partly of their own making.¹⁰⁵ This deliberate reference to Alexander Wendt's social-constructivist work *Anarchy is what states make of it* is an expression of neoclassical realism's acknowledgement of the central role of domestic-level factors and that it aspires to a form of theory-synthesis between neorealism and *Innenpolitik*.¹⁰⁶ Neoclassical realism, so doing, allows a measure of 'securitization' or construction of security threats.¹⁰⁷ In fact, if the system-level variables sketch the broad contours in which policy can take shape, neoclassical realism relies for its specific explanatory power on the constructivist elements that were already underlined in Morgenthau's classical work.¹⁰⁸ The role of perceptions and national ideology are currently considered to be the exclusive realm of the constructivist school. Yet an interest-based analysis of state behavior, which rests at the foundation of realist thinking, can only but benefit from taking into account the role that perceptions play in shaping how elites understand what the national interest is.

A manifest example of the role of perceptions in international relations was formed by the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. For several years Saddam Hussein obstructed a UN-imposed weapons inspections regime. Blocking or delaying access to sites and failing to provide transparent accounts of stockpiles of weapons. The United States had become convinced that Iraq possessed and continued to have the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction. As such, Washington reasoned that Saddam had every reason to obstruct UN weapons inspections. Assuming that Saddam had such weapons, they were seen to pose a direct threat to the regional distribution of power and US national security. Iraq had a history of belligerence and these weapons could be used against

105 Rose (1998), p. 153.

106 See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. For a broad overview of Constructivist literature on international security see Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). There is a trend of theory-synthesis among IR scholars. In their article *Is Anybody still a Realist* Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik have advocated theory-synthesis as a means to deal with the problems offered by the traditionally divided areas of international relations and foreign policy. They refer to a 'two-step' method whereby "the domestic and transnational state-society relations of preference and belief formation can be analytically separated from the strategic logic of interstate interaction [...]" Neoclassical Realism is a concise effort to conceptualize this theoretical 'two-step'. On the one hand it has a profound Realist base, emphasizing relative material power. On the other hand there is a consideration of unit-level variables and a focus on the role of perceptions which may be considered Constructivist. While Constructivism is not *Innenpolitik* per se, it contends that state behavior – and the definition of interests – is determined on the basis of beliefs and norms of the actor, elements that are partial to neoclassical Realism's reliance on the perceptions of governing elites. Although it seems a contradiction-in-terms to coalesce these two separate schools of thought that are contradictory at first sight (Wendt 1987 & Barkin 2003), as Legro and Moravcsik point out, "is it realistic to maintain that patterns of important, complex events in world politics are the result of a single factor?" Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey W. Legro, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 2, (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55.

107 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, & Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A new framework for analysis*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

108 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Neoclassical Realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait," in Lobell et al. (2009), p.111.

Israel, enable him to blackmail states in the oil-rich region or – in the limelight of the 9/11 attacks - be supplied to terrorist groups. On February 5, 2003 US Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed the United Nations Security Council with “convincing and conclusive” evidence about Saddam’s weapons programs and it formed the primary justification to go to war. After the war, it turned out Saddam in fact did not possess such weapons. How could such a dramatic misperception have taken shape? For one, Washington relied heavily on intelligence from its array of satellites. These revealed suspicious movements at suspected weapons-sites. Iraqi military officials had also been eavesdropped. Yet this circumstantial information was interpreted through a filter shaped by years of Iraqi deception and animosity. On the basis of interviews with Iraqi officials in the aftermath of the war researchers concluded that by 2002 Saddam had been trying to persuade the international community that – contrary to his reputation - he was in fact cooperating with the United Nations. Iraqi officials said that orders had been given to remove all traces of WMD-related material, which might serve as a pretext for an attack. Ironically, the activities related to ensuring the removal of all liable material were interpreted as a cover-up instead of a clean-up. Iraqi trucks caught on satellite photographs rushing from a site about to be inspected were viewed as attempts to hide weapons. Conversations between military officers discussing that the term ‘nerve agent’ not be used over the airwaves were interpreted as steps to conceal forbidden programs. The authors of the *Iraqi Perspectives* report concluded that “US analysts viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit. They had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime’s attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions. What was meant to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it.”¹⁰⁹ Perception, misperception and the security dilemma played a pivotal role. The idea that Saddam had WMD and especially that he was deceiving the international community was more powerful than any alternative explanation. As the CIA director at the time, George Tenet, recalls in his memoirs: “we had no previous experience with a country that did not possess [WMD] weapons but pretended that it did... Before the war, we didn’t understand that *he* was bluffing, and he didn’t understand that *we were* not,[emphasis in original].”¹¹⁰ The idea that Saddam still possessed weapons and could not be trusted was the dominant perception shaping the lens through which information was interpreted. In fact, Iraq had long led its neighbors and the wider world to believe it had weapons of mass destruction rightly to avoid intervention. A security dilemma ensued that brought the two states to war.

Perceptions regarding the international security environment lie entrenched in ideational and normative variables that are referred to under the concept of strategic culture. This is the topic we turn to next.

109 K. Woods, J. Lacey & W. Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: the view from the inside,” in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, no. 3, (May/June) 2006. For the full report see Kevin M. Woods et al., “Iraqi Perspectives Project: A view of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership,” Joint Center for Operational Analysis, US Joint Forces Command, 2006.

110 George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), p. 332-333.

5.3 STRATEGIC CULTURE: NATIONAL CHARACTER OF STATES IN SECURITY

Neoclassical realist thinking stresses that the national character of states has a strong role to play in explaining state behavior. It thereby contributes to a rich body of literature that has addressed the role of cultural and ideational factors in shaping strategic behavior. This research applies the insights from the study of strategic culture to understand the pursuit of transformation strategies.

As Jeffrey Taliaferro and Steven Lobell indicate, neoclassical realists can relevantly draw on strategic culture to explain foreign policy outcomes in conjunction with a system-level analysis.¹¹¹ An example is the work by Randall Schweller, who asserts that states may be either revisionist or status quo powers, depending on domestic characteristics. Schweller studied the period of the run-up to World War II and concluded that state behavior and international outcomes vary as a result of state power, but also state preferences.¹¹² He defined status-quo states as those that “value what they possess more than what they covet, they maximize security not power.” This of course is reminiscent of defensive realist theory, although Schweller supplemented it with a cultural analysis. Revisionist states however are power-maximizers which tempt to shift the status-quo in their favor. This produces behavior corresponding with offensive realist theory. The difference however is that it is not exclusively the system-level constraints that define the strategy of the state, as is the case with defensive or offensive realism, but domestic variables as well. By drawing up a bestiary, Schweller categorized states by supplementing their position in the system of international politics; great power, medium power etc. with their ambition within the system; status-quo, limited revisionist, strongly revisionist etc. As such he argued that the US in the run-up to World War II acted as an Ostrich, Germany as a Wolf, Russia as a Fox and France as an Owl.¹¹³ A colorful exposé but Schweller’s bestiary is also useful for underlining the importance of the national characters of states in security affairs.

Central to the domestic intervening variables explaining patterns in foreign policy is the tenet of political culture. Political culture is the set of assumptions, habits and values unique to a state regarding the political process and its pursuit of political objectives.¹¹⁴ In the realm of foreign and security policy, this translates to the concept of strategic culture. As Barry Rosen writes, strategic culture is an “analogous concept [to political culture] applied not to the political class of a nation, but to the sub-set of political-military deci-

111 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 295.

112 Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

113 Ibid, pp. 59-93.

114 See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 11-14; Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” *International Studies Review*, vol.4, no.3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 90-93.

sions makers.”¹¹⁵ Strategic culture involves traditions and preferred methods of operation regarding the use of the military.¹¹⁶ Generically, it encapsulates the popular notion of a “way of war.”¹¹⁷

Three waves of scholarship on strategic culture can be identified.¹¹⁸ The term was pioneered by Jack Snyder and Ken Booth in the late 1970’s whose research focused on Soviet-US relations and their nuclear doctrines.¹¹⁹ These scholars argued that national belief systems and historical experiences produced a distinct attitude towards strategic matters. It introduced the idea that different security communities could think differently about the same security issue. The second wave followed the end of the Cold War and gave rise to seeing strategic culture as an independent variable. The third wave was associated with a constructivist shift in international relations research and increased scholarly interest in the role of cultural variables to explain state behavior.¹²⁰ This increased scholarly attention produced studies examining how cultural factors shape military doctrine and defense strategies.¹²¹ Neoclassical realism adds to this the notion that domestic-level factors impact the ability of governments to extract resources from the nation, in order to increase its relative power.¹²²

Within this increasingly rich body of research on strategic culture two methodological issues stand out that make the use of strategic culture as a variable intellectually challenging and the object of academic scrutiny.¹²³ Invariably this has to do with the abstract and elusive nature of ‘culture’ as a concept. These difficulties are also the result of the constructivist turn in international relations scholarship, which leads to new questions being asked, the interdisciplinary approach applied and the increased influence of other

115 Rosen (1995), p.12.

116 Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 28.

117 See Thomas G. Mahnken, *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

118 See Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 6-7.

119 Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977); Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).

120 For an overview of the literature on strategic culture see Lantis (2002); Katzenstein (1996),

121 See Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 14, pp. 65-94; Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force” in Kerry Longhurst & Marcin Zaborowski, *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 137-157.

122 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009); Dyson (2010).

123 For three discussions of the use of strategic culture see Christopher P. Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2008), p. 338-357; Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” *International Studies Review*, vol.4, no.3 (Autumn 2002), p. 90-93.; Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), p. 141–70.

disciplines on international relations studies aside from political science, such as sociology, historical research, psychology and anthropology. The first difficulty is methodological and relates to the task to narrow the range of variables that can be considered “cultural.” This pertains to a question of definition and identifying the factors that “own” culture. The second difficulty lies in strategic culture’s predictive qualities, and whether strategic culture is either an intervening or an independent variable. Both issues are addressed briefly below.

Strategic culture is a concept used by many scholars of security studies. Stephen Rosen defines strategic culture as “beliefs and assumptions that frame...choices about international military behavior, particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive models of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable.”¹²⁴ Colin Gray includes in his definition the notion of identity. He sees it as a set of behavioral patterns derived from “national historic experience, aspiration for self-characterization..., of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and ‘way of life’ which coalesces to “modes of thought and action with respect to force.”¹²⁵ As such it reflects how society views the military role of the state. In this manner it is also related to Charles Kupchan’s definition that strategic culture “refers to images that shape how the nation as a collective entity defines its well-being and conceives of its security.”¹²⁶ A conference on the topic in 2006 produced a consensus definition that strategic culture consists of “shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”¹²⁷ These definitions have in common that they all identify ideational elements as the cornerstone of strategic culture. Yet ‘shared beliefs’ and ‘images regarding how a state conceives its security’ are rather amorphous sources. It leads to an ontological question; where can strategic culture be found? B.H. Liddell Hart has written that strategic culture flows from a state’s geography and resources, history and experience, society and political structure.¹²⁸ This is amply broad to include nearly all domestic variables that could shape domestic perceptions, as long as they are of semi-permanent status. It offers researchers a certain amount of freedom to build a narrative regarding the constitution of strategic culture. As Ken Booth writes, the use of strategic culture is a demanding

124 Rosen (1995), p. 12.

125 Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy; The American Example,” *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 2. (1981), p.21-22. Other contributions to the literature on political and strategic culture are David J. Elkins, & Richard E.B. Simeon, “A Cause in search of its effect, or what does political culture explain?” *Comparative Politics* (January 1979), pp. 127 – 145.

126 Charles Kupchan, *The Case for Collective Security*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 21.

127 Darryl Howlett, “The Future of Strategic Culture,” paper presented at Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, October 31, 2006, p.3.

128 Basil H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way of Warfare*, (New York: MacMillan, 1933).

task and “will also remain an art rather than a science.”¹²⁹ Booth describes the use of strategic culture as a form of “strategic anthropology” which can supplement the more scientific approach of neorealism. Such an understanding does not appeal to scholars looking for methodological rigor.¹³⁰ This leads to the second difficulty, namely the predictive qualities of strategic culture. Jeffrey Lantis has pointed out that one of the problems associated with using strategic culture as a variable is its lack of a commonly accepted methodological design and its ability to produce replicable results.¹³¹ Various studies however have been able to convincingly argue how cultural factors influenced security policy. Thomas Berger for instance demonstrated how cultural factors rather than economic or technological power shaped German and Japanese security policies.¹³² Nevertheless, Lantis argues, strategic culture has not become accepted as an independent variable in its own right.¹³³ Colin Gray and Alastair Ian Johnston have battled over this topic in academic journals with the former ascribing to the view that strategic culture primarily offers context to explain strategic behavior and the latter complaining about the lack of causality others have attributed to the concept.¹³⁴ While Gray sees strategic culture as a supplementary factor to better understand a state’s strategic behavior, Johnston holds strategic culture to be a separate causal variable to explain such behavior. Gray’s argument contends that strategic culture is a “context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behavior.” The strategic culture of a state thereby represents a set of patterns of strategic thought and behavior. Ken Booth sides with Gray, and understands strategic culture as describing “a set of patterns of and for behavior on war and peace issues. It helps shape but does not determine how an actor interacts with others in the security field.”¹³⁵ This makes strategic culture an intervening, rather than an independent variable. Indeed if strategic culture is used as a lens that allows “discerning tendencies, not rigid determinants, then the end result should be richer theory and more effective practice.”¹³⁶ It is not the intent of this research to settle this debate, suffice to say that this latter interpretation makes strategic culture conducive to be

-
- 129 Ken Booth, “Strategic Culture: Validity and Validation,” *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, vol. 2, no. 1, (2005), p. 26.
- 130 Christopher Twomey for instance argues that the use of strategic culture tends towards overdetermined outcomes, empirical failings and difficulties with causality. Twomey (2008), p. 344.
- 131 Jeffrey Lantis, *Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism*, (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, SAIC, 2006).
- 132 Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
- 133 See also Twomey (2008).
- 134 Alastair Ian Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-45; Colin Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back,” *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25 (1999), pp. 46-69; Alastair Ian Johnston, “Strategic Cultures Revisited: reply to Colin Gray,” *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25 (1999), pp. 519-523.
- 135 Ken Booth, “Strategic Culture: Validity and Validation,” *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, vol. 2, no. 1, (2005) p. 25.
- 136 *Ibid*, p. 27.

operationalized within a neoclassical realist framework. Although identity is important, strategic culture is an intervening variable, along the lines of Colin Dueck's argument that "Culture is best understood as a supplement to and not a substitute for, realist theories of strategic choice." Dueck underlines that system-level factors rank higher in the hierarchy of variables than strategic culture: "Strategic culture can certainly help to explain 'deviations' from balancing behavior, but since the very concept of such deviations presumes some sort of appropriate or expected response to international conditions, it is only within a realist framework that such explanations make sense...when political-military cultures come under intense international pressure, they adjust and adapt in the end."¹³⁷

Strategic culture gives shape and substance to the identity of the state.¹³⁸ It defines constraints of strategic behavior in relation to what system-level theories of international relations would expect. This does not make strategic culture immune to system-level dynamics but it does provide depth and understanding to why a state responds to system-level dynamics in a particular way. Strategic culture in itself is insufficient to explain variance in transformation strategies, since the relative distribution of power preordains the overarching choices a state has. Yet strategic culture – as an intervening variable – is able to offer greater understanding why a state for instance was less than successful in pursuing a strategy a neorealist understanding would predict.

To understand how transformation strategies took shape, neoclassical realism supplements a system-level analysis with the added depth and richness provided by understanding the role behavioral patterns and shared beliefs played in order to bring greater understanding how security policies changed. NATO member states pursued transformation with the intent to increase the relevance of their military instrument to their foreign policy objectives as a result of shifts in the security environment. Strategic culture can contribute to explain how system-level dynamics impacted the choice and execution of a transformation strategy.¹³⁹

An additional important characteristic of strategic culture is that it has semi-permanent status. Dima Adamsky points out that "features of culture, norms, and ideas that transcend generations and impact continuously upon a state's strategic behavior are chosen as the parameters of the strategic culture."¹⁴⁰ It means there must be an element of 'lasting nature' to the identified vehicle of strategic culture. Christopher Meyer similarly ascribes a sense of semi-permanence to strategic culture as it is vested in norms.¹⁴¹ However this

137 Colin Dueck, *Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 204.

138 R.L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, P. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" in P.J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 33.

139 John Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?", *International Studies Review*, vol.11 (2009), p. 529.

140 Adamsky (2010), p. 12.

141 Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), pp. 15-24.

does not mean it is unchangeable. Strategic culture is “persistent over time, but neither particular elements nor a culture as a whole are immutable.”¹⁴² As the international security environment evolves new developments are assessed “through the perceptual lenses provided by strategic culture.”¹⁴³ Thomas Berger likewise argues that strategic culture is semi-permanent since its major principles are widely shared among the political class and society, and since it is the result of cognitive dynamics which tend to affirm existing ideas and beliefs and discounts alternatives as anomalies.¹⁴⁴ In other words, strategic culture is self-sustaining as developments are interpreted to confirm earlier interpretations. As such a process of institutionalization takes place. Just as it takes time to institutionalize strategic culture as a new pattern of strategic behavior is grown, change is a slow process in which internal reflection and resocialization play a large role.¹⁴⁵ Meyer argues similarly that change may gradually take place “through a constant stream of similar, or a repetition of the same kind of discrepant information” that deviates from the status quo.¹⁴⁶

This is closely related to the role of the principal ‘owners’ of ‘entrepreneurs’ of strategic culture, namely the foreign, security and military policy elite and, to a lesser extent, the institutions they run. They define security and military policy goals and the manner in which the state responds to new challenges. As they have a tendency to promote the status quo, change occurs slowly. However, as the principal ‘cultural actors,’ any sustained change in their behavior will amount to a change in strategic culture. Therefore, as Lantis points out, they might better be understood as “users of culture who redefine the limits of the possible.”

However, in exceptional cases change can come abruptly as a result of an external shock in the form of specific events in the international security environment, particularly if this is associated with a radical change in the foreign policy elite and its institutions. Military defeat, occupation or revolution can change the character of the state. It can also be the result of protracted incompatibilities of strategic cultural traits with the external security environment.¹⁴⁷ Change could come in the form of an experience which due to its impact leads to discontinuity over previous policy. Strategic cultural dilemmas thereby “define new directions for foreign policy and demand the reconstruction of historical narratives.”¹⁴⁸

As societies change, so can their perception regarding the use of force. Martha Finnemore’s research elaborated on this with respect to norms governing the use of force. The dismissal of forcible debt collection as a *casus belli* in the early 20th century and the

142 Booth (2005), p. 25.

143 Lantis (2002), p.94.

144 See Berger (1998).

145 Meyer (2010), pp. 24-27.

146 Ibid, p. 25.

147 See Lantis (2002) & Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” *American Sociological Review*, vol. 51, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 273-286.

148 Jeffrey Lantis and Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture,” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 96.

advent of humanitarian intervention principles for non-white, non-Christian populations are two examples of shifts in grand-strategic behavior. Furthermore, there is interaction between system- and domestic-level factors. The end of the Second World War led to a shift in the balance of power, and it led to a change in the nature of the German and the Japanese state. Defeat constituted an external shock that turned two of the most aggressive states at the outset of the 20th century into states that abhorred the use of force in the second half of the century. Similarly, the French Revolution brought a paradigm shift in France as the appeal of freedom and equality changed for which objectives and by whom war was waged.

5.3.1 SOURCES OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

What then are the sources of strategic culture? Which beliefs and attitudes are central to describe it? In a nutshell, there is no single explanatory variable that constitutes strategic culture; instead it must be developed indirectly, on the basis of a narrative vested in the state's historical experience with the use of the military. Ken Booth writes that "strategic culture is derived from history, geography and political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices; these may be, depending on the entity, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion."¹⁴⁹ This research includes the following sources of strategic culture: preferences in ways of using the military, the approach to justifying the use of the military, elite ideology, historical experiences with the military and military doctrine. These are elaborated upon below according to a distinction of the military and national-political levels.

5.3.1.1 HOW THE MILITARY SHOULD BE USED

Strategic culture resonates at various levels.¹⁵⁰ Firstly, at the military level, strategic culture reflects norms of warfare regarding how the armed forces should be applied. In 15th century France, knights had a code of chivalry. It represented their idea of what war was and how it was to be fought; mounted and man-to-man. When confronted with a British adversary at Agincourt that did not abide by these perceived rules, it was denounced as amoral, unjust, and altogether not war. The French were defeated by a much smaller group of forces that operated differently. The British longbowmen were instrumental to heavy French losses. In the 20th century, in Vietnam, the struggle against the Vietcong was regarded by some as not being war because it failed to match a preconceived idea of conventional maneuver war. Colin Gray argues, "Social and cultural contexts differ among societies. It is not safe to assume that strategic behavior deemed morally unacceptable by our society would meet with identical prohibition abroad."¹⁵¹ In other words, that which Western states consider

149 Booth (2005), p. 25.

150 See for instance Thomas Mahnken, "United States Strategic Culture," paper prepared for Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, November 13, 2006.

151 Colin S. Gray, *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the Sovereignty of context*, February 2006, p. 33.

just in war may not be reciprocated by the adversary. This has obvious consequences for the manner in which force is used. An example is the comment from a US soldier regarding the way insurgents in the Iraqi town of Ramadi confronted him in April 2006: “They fight us hard, the soldier said. “But there is no morality there. They hide among the population, among families, women and children. That’s how they fight. That’s how they do what they do.”¹⁵² The soldier did not feel that the way in which the insurgents fought was just or fair, not according to his idea of what war is or is supposed to be. The insurgent in turn may feel that dropping bombs from high altitude neither is a just way to fight.

These examples are illustrations of norms of warfare. Norms are institutionalized ideas about social interaction and “are collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity ... Norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.”¹⁵³ They are “cognitive blinders” or filters of information.¹⁵⁴ They justify certain forms of policy while denouncing other types of behavior. Not only are they an expression of how the state should act, but are similarly an expression of how others are expected to act. Deviation from the norm can then lead to the use of force being justified, just as the violation of international law can justify an intervention.¹⁵⁵ Norms unmistakably can have a relation with elements of *Realpolitik*, as they often express behavior that best contributes to the security of the state. For instance, strengthening the norm-based international rule of law by smaller powers is a means to counterbalance major powers. According to Lawrence Freedman, “All societies expect to fight their wars according to the core values upon which they are based.”¹⁵⁶ To Western liberal democracies this corresponds to a set of liberal values and ‘just war’ principles. It can also produce difficulties when different norms of warfare clash, as was the case at Agincourt or in Ramadi.

Furthermore, at the military level strategic culture can be found in military policy, doctrine, technology and procurement policy, illustrating how the military and individual military services want to operate.

152 T. Pitman, “Ramadi Insurgents Develop Clever Tactics,” *Washington Post*, April 9, 2006.

153 R.L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, P. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security” in P.J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.54.

154 P. Trubowitz, & E. Rhodes, “Explaining American Strategic Adjustment,” in P. Trubowitz et al., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), chapter 1. As Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane detail, “ideas help to order the world. By ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly shape outcomes.” Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.12.

155 See also Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the use of force*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

156 Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 35.

5.3.1.2 WHY THE MILITARY SHOULD BE USED

A further source of strategic culture which resides at the national level is the body of declaratory policy and political justifications regarding the use of the military instrument. Following Meyer's reasoning, the acceptable goals for the use of the military – whether for war, humanitarian intervention or reconstruction missions – goes to the heart of the national identity of a given political community and goes a long way to determine the composition and capabilities of a country's armed forces.¹⁵⁷ In liberal democratic states, the decision to prepare, organize, equip and use the military is accompanied by public debate among the different elements of the “foreign policy executive,” generally between the government and congress or parliament. As former Dutch Minister of Defense Joris Voorhoeve made clear, it is nearly untenable for Government to agree on an operation without seeking implicit parliamentary support.¹⁵⁸ The perceived necessity to use the military corresponds to the perceived justness and legitimacy of the act and yields important insights into how a state – defined for the purposes of this research as the “top officials and central institutions of government charged with external defense.”¹⁵⁹ – understands the security environment and its role in it. Declaratory doctrine, policy and political justifications regarding the preparation and use of the military are important as they are the public expression of how the state creates security for itself. Appeals to core principles, ideas or norms are tools which are used by the state to extract resources from the nation as well as to gain public support for the use of the military. These tools differ for each state dependent on its strategic culture. Here the role of the Parliament is crucial as it creates the opportunity to debate this declaratory policy in public.

Political justifications in specific necessarily appeal to common-held perceptions of grand-strategy, the external environment, the role of the state, collective histories about domestic society and those of others, and collective norms, values and beliefs. Particularly in coalition operations, different states may appeal to different ideas to justify participation in the same operation. This yields insights into different patterns of strategic behavior. For one state a military intervention against a WMD-producing state is justified in terms of a clash between good and evil, while for another state the same intervention may be justified in the name of supporting the United Nations and upholding the international rule of law. Other sources of declaratory policy are strategic policy documents, military doctrine, procurement policy and civil-military relations.¹⁶⁰ Building a historic overview of such justifications enables identifying semi-permanent structures.

157 Meyer (2010), p. 22.

158 “Het is buitengewoon moeilijk voor een regering om een uitzending te baseren op een klein draagvlak en het is al helemaal buitengewoon moeilijk om een uitzending door te drukken als de Kamer duidelijk laat merken dit niet verstandig te vinden.” Remarks by J. Voorhoeve to the Parliamentary Working Group Nato Response Force, quoted in Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Onderzoek NATO Response Force*, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30 162, nrs. 2-3, p.18.

159 Taliaferro (2006), p. 470.

160 “The military doctrine and its associated documents – threat assessments, intelligence plans,

5.3.1.3 PHILOSOPHICAL WORLDVIEW

A related source of strategic culture is the dominant political-philosophical or ideological outlook of the state and its foreign policy elite. This represents seepage from political culture in shaping a state's foreign policy outlook. The first generation of strategic culturalists for instance examined how Soviet strategic thinking was influenced by specific Soviet historical experiences.¹⁶¹ A contemporary example is the measure to which European states have developed a pattern of strategic thought influenced by the conditioning experience of the European integration process.¹⁶² Borrowing from sociological studies and philosophy, an expression of such political-philosophical distinctions is the contrast between 'structure' and 'agency' as the central driving force of history. For instance, Marxists and other economic determinists have a profound economically-driven understanding of societal progress, and understand conflict in terms of class-struggles rather than the neorealist reading of conflict being between states due to competing interests. In sociological literature, the debate between structure and agency is still ongoing.¹⁶³ It is a dilemma which deals with the question what are the defining motives for human action. Agency refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently, to make their own choices and to have responsibility over their lives and destiny. Structure refers to those factors such as social and political institutions, economic configurations, elements of governances and institutions which act as a set of variables shaping the opportunities that individuals have. It impacts and shapes the interrelationships between individuals that make up a society. A structure-based understanding of history holds that social structures are the dominant factor in shaping social behavior among individuals. Individual action is seen as the product of social structures. It is also reflected in the political systems of states.

The structure- and agency-focused approach to interventions are two exponents of liberal thought and makes its way into Western security policy through the vehicle of elite ideologies. While the latter is based on the principle that particular regimes and leaders stand in the way of liberal norms and values taking root and to that end the use of force may be justified, the former holds that the basis of international peace lies in a system of collective security and adherence to international law.¹⁶⁴ They translate into two different

military estimates and contingency plans – tell us very much about what is perceived, the order in which it is understood and what is not perceived.” Bathurst (1993), p.124. See also Lantis & Howlett (2010), p. 89-91.

161 Snyder (1977).

162 See Asle Toje, *America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Strategic Bargain*, (Routledge, 2008); Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003; Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).

163 See for instance Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books 1966); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 1984); John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Penguin, 1996).

164 Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 79-80 & 97.

strategic cultural orientations. One is based on stability projection, the other on power projection. In this research I use the term stability projection to describe an interventionist approach with the intent to promote stability and the international rule of law by addressing structuralist causes of conflicts. It is juxtaposed to power projection. While power projection concerns the use of force to coerce and shape the behavior of actors, stability projection consists of the use of the military in order to set conditions for the development of liberal institutions conducive to the stability of a state. It shuns using the military to create instability in the international system. Stability projection thereby emphasizes multilateral action, and exhibits a disinclination to use the military for the purposes of regime change.

Having discussed the core concepts underlying this study, it must now be brought together in a research design.

6 RESEARCH DESIGN: TRANSFORMATION AND NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

This study employs a neoclassical realist model in its attempt to explain variance in the transformation strategies pursued by NATO member states. As detailed above, transformation is the process of pursuing deliberate discontinuous change in a state's military policy, the purpose of which is to increase the compatibility and relevance of the military instrument to a state's foreign and security policy objectives, in response to major shifts in the international security environment. Two types of transformation strategy have been identified that have been pursued, although with varied success. These are operational effectiveness (Type I) transformation and strategic (Type II) transformation. Neoclassical realism is a theory of international relations that supplements a realist analysis based on the relative distribution of power with constructivist domestic-level elements to explain state behavior. While other domestic-level variables are imaginable, this study focuses on strategic culture. Strategic culture reflects a state's shared historical patterns and attitudes towards the use of the military. It thereby acts as a set of constraints on the strategic behavior of the states, formulating a bandwidth within which security policy can take shape, given a particular system-level distribution of power. This may then account for a deviation or lag in policy-outcome otherwise expected from using a neorealist model. A neorealist understanding of transformation would imply that European states would emulate US transformation strategies. This did not occur across the board.

The neoclassical realist model assumes that although the necessity to pursue a transformation strategy is triggered in response to transitions in the international security environment that significantly shift the (perceived) level of vulnerability, the shape of the transformation strategy is the product of the filter provided by the domestic-level variable of strategic culture. It is the combination of the system-level transition and the strategic cultural filter which results in the pursuit of a particular transformation strategy.

The major shift in the level of external vulnerability (or opportunity) forms the independent variable.¹⁶⁵ It is derived from the relative distribution of power, developments in military technology and geographic proximity of a threat. Major increases or decreases in opportunity or threat thereby form the initial trigger for transformation. Transformation may result from a Revolution in Military Affairs, such as France's development of the *levée en masse*, which presented an opportunity to France and increased the extractive capacity of the state. The greater available military manpower and heightened morale to fight for the French state increased the power of the state and subsequently turned it into a threat to neighboring states.¹⁶⁶

For smaller powers, system-level considerations such as NATO alliance dynamics or an institutional framework such as the European Union impact the perception of the distribution of power and external vulnerability. The international institutional environment, formed by organizations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, receives attention as a contextual element influencing strategic behavior. Small and medium powers are generally unable to singlehandedly emulate or innovate to offset a great power. Instead they can balance within an alliance. They are also able to emulate useful military capabilities or innovate to provide relevance to an alliance. Alliance politics thus play a role in the process of transformation. This further makes the interplay between domestic and system-level variables apparent. As Taliaferro contends, "Systemic forces shape domestic processes within states, which in turn constrain states' ability to respond to systemic imperatives."¹⁶⁷

Subsequent to the identification of a major shift in external vulnerability or opportunity, strategic culture then intervenes to shape a state's ability to adapt (see figure 4). States have three broad ways through which they can adapt: emulation by imitating the military policies and technologies of another state in an effort at bandwagoning, innovation in an attempt to offset the relative power advantage of another, or escalating current strategies by further developing "existing politico-military strategic and technological practices."¹⁶⁸ At the level of defense policy, a state's transformation strategy is the overarching expression of this adaptation.

As an intervening variable strategic culture then impacts how the transformation strategy is pursued, for instance whether there is a lag or not.

Jeffrey Talliaferro has defined resource extraction as the ability of a state to mobilize domestic resources to promote its security.¹⁶⁹ Transformation is a form of resource extraction to increase the relevance of the military to a state's foreign and security policy, and so increase the ability of the state to promote its security. Strategic culture determines the

165 Taliaferro (2006), p. 486.

166 Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124.

167 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 211.

168 Taliaferro (2006), p.471.

169 J.W. Taliaferro in Lobell et al. (2009), p. 195.

extractive capacity of a state in the context of changed international settings. Phrased differently, the ability of a state to pursue a transformation strategy is dependent on whether the bandwidth shaped by a state's strategic culture corresponds to the changed material reality.




Figure 4: Model of Transformation

(Source: Based on Taliaferro, 2009)

7 THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

7.1 CASE STUDIES

This study focuses on differences in European and American approaches to the military instrument. As such this study is organized in one part on the United States and a second part including the European case studies. Three states figure center stage in this structured, focused comparison: the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. They offer a good starting point to analyze the trajectories of the transformation strategies within NATO. These states were chosen as all three are first-generation members of the NATO alliance. The United States is NATO's primary member and by military standards in the period 1991-2008 it was the West's and the world's most powerful state. Given that the term transformation originated in the United States, any study of transformation excluding the United States would be considered incomplete. The Netherlands is a medium-sized NATO member state that has been an alliance member since its inception. A former colonial power with a rich maritime history, it has participated in all NATO operations and several UN interventions since 1991 including ISAF operations in Afghanistan, SFIR in Iraq and Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo. The Netherlands is exemplar for a smaller Western European state with an active security policy. Germany is the most populous state in the European Union; it is Europe's largest economy and has one of Europe's largest militaries in size. This gives it a leadership role in European foreign policy. Its geographical position

at the heart of Europe as well as the principal role Germany has played in 20th century security issues make it an indispensable voice in European security. Given its size, historical weight and place within both NATO and the European Union, Germany continues to influence the European security debate. If NATO was created from the outset, as former NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay had it, to “keep the Americans in, the Soviets out and the Germans down,” the future of European security hinges substantially on German policy. Simultaneously, over the past years Germany and the United States have criticized each other over their security policies, particularly regarding the Iraq War but also in light of operations in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁰

The sheer size and sophistication of the American defense architecture, the immense volume of the American defense budget, and Washington’s prolific use of the military have implied that there is a continuous and high-level strategic debate in the United States over the direction of defense policy. To this research it has meant that there is ample material available on which to base the analysis. For the European states, given their status as smaller powers, their smaller militaries, and a generally less militaristic approach to foreign policy, there has been less material available. Particularly in Germany, the strategic debate over the future of the armed forces has been meager at best. This has produced a smaller - although no less important - amount of relevant material. However, consequentially the German case study is thereby significantly the smaller of the three case studies. Since this research relies for a large part on the comparison between the United States and Europe, I have strived to balance both parts.

In order to make a structured, focused comparison possible and to address the research question, this study focuses on how the transformation strategy developed at the level of the foreign and security policy elite and the “owners” of strategic culture. To the extent that bureaucratic, academic or organizational discussions have been relevant to the overall trajectory of transformation, rather than to study the details of how these debates emerged and developed - a topic on which much relevant research has been done - this study focuses on the outcomes of these debates and how they impacted the level of the senior-level policymaker and political decision-maker.

Related to this is the observation that the group of relevant actors within each state shaping the actual transformation strategy is of limited size. There is much, often intensive, debate over the future of security policy, the impact of technologies and future security threats, within military bureaucracies, academic communities and political action groups and think-tanks. Yet, only a handful of actors are involved in setting the national guidelines which determine the direction of a state’s security and defense policy.

170 See Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

7.2 METHODOLOGY

In his analysis of American democracy promotion, Jonathan Monten summarized the basis for neoclassical realism as follows: “Power and ideas are not mutually exclusive explanations, but interact to produce foreign policy outcomes of interest.”¹⁷¹ In order to explain transformation strategies it is necessary to build a narrative taking both power and ideas, system and domestic-level factors into account. Neoclassical realism provides the theoretical tools to achieve this. The method follows Alexander George’s propositions and is a structured, focused comparison of the transformation strategies pursued by three Western states.¹⁷² This study is based on data obtained from historical analysis, extensive literature research, an analysis of political speeches, ministerial minutes, policy documents available in the public domain and in several archives, government budgets, and elite interviews. Many of the individuals central to the development and execution of the transformation strategies in the respective states are still available for interviews. This has allowed the research to benefit from nearly seventy interviews with key players, military officers, politicians, policy-makers, members of congressional staff, professors and researchers at think-tanks to offer greater understanding of the drivers of military change. They consisted of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews that served to give context and support the overall analysis. Archival research was used in order to study the historical consistency of the tenets of strategic culture influencing transformation. In particular, this relates to the manner in which states have justified the use of the military and domestic-level normative concepts underlying security policy decisions. Justification regimes are a crucial domestic variable that act as a constraint on, or stimulus for the extractive capacity of the state. Furthermore, strategic policy and military strategy documents are essential sources to understand how transformation developed.

From a strategic perspective transformation is composed of two analytical dimensions. On the one hand there are the actual capabilities that are developed and secondly there is the operational component, or the use of ‘transformed’ capabilities, including for what purposes and how they are used. Together these are the two main products of a state’s transformation strategy and also figure prominently in the analysis. Rather than to trace in detail the breadth of the transformation strategy as it played out in different levels of bureaucracies, military services, and policy communities this research looks at the political-strategic outcomes of those processes and emphasizes the foremost strategic-level policy documents, decisions, speeches, events in the international environment and use of the military that shaped the transformation strategy.

The key questions, which are derived from the theoretical model as well as the research question, along which the case studies are structured are the following:

171 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” *International Security*, vol.29, no.4 (Spring 2005), p.116.

172 Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison” in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

WHAT TYPE OF TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY WAS PURSUED BY THE STATE?

Did it amount to operational effectiveness or strategic transformation? This is the point of departure for the case study. As will be made clear, to the United States transformation was focused on pursuing vast improvements in warfare, increasing the ability of the United States to sustain its position of strategic dominance by developing military capabilities second to none. For Germany and the Netherlands, transformation was strategic in nature and revolved around shifting the military from territorial defense to perform high-intensity expeditionary missions.

WHAT CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY OR OPPORTUNITY, FORMING THE TRANSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, TRIGGERED TRANSFORMATION?

This study makes use of a new theoretical framework offered by neoclassical realism. The starting point for explaining strategic behavior is material interests and the relative distribution of power. In relation to transformation the locus becomes substantial changes herein. For the United States, the advent of information technologies yielded a necessity and an opportunity to protect its position as unipolar hegemon. To the Netherlands, the end of the Cold War triggered a reassessment towards promoting the international rule of law and sustaining relevance to the Alliance and the United States. For Germany, the end of the Cold War similarly produced a reassessment of its military policy based on maintaining allegiance to NATO.

WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURAL FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

A historical narrative is created from the strategic cultural factors that contributed to shaping the state's pursuit of discontinuous military change. It yields insights into how a society views the use of the military, and how states responded to events that affected its perception of the system-level distribution of power. To the United States, its domestic values including Liberty and Democracy promotion, and political exceptionalism played an important role in framing its role in the world. Dutch strategic culture was based on a structure-focused approach to the use of force in which the international rule of law was seen as an end in itself. For Germany, solidarity with the alliance was a central driver to pursue transformation. However, it did so while lugging its strategic culture, defined by *Zivilmacht* and the historical and political institutional remnants of the twentieth century along.

WHAT DID THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE MEAN IN TERMS OF CAPABILITIES?

Having identified the drivers of transformation how did these produce policy outcomes in terms of capabilities, doctrine and approaches to the use of the military? In other words, what was the outcome of the transformation strategy?¹⁷³

HOW DID FURTHER EVENTS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPACT THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

The transformation strategies were put to the test during military operations and in response to the rise of new threats. For European states, missions such as Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo tested the ability of domestic strategic cultures to acquiesce in the trajectory of transformation, or whether it resulted in limited extractive capacity. To the United States missions in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed it to irregular warfare and the demands of complex emergencies, leading to a strategic debate over the future direction of the military. Each state encountered events that triggered a reevaluation of the transformation strategy. How they coped with it yields insights into the importance of strategic culture in shaping a states' military policy.

This allows answering the final question at the end of the research:

HOW DO THE DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES OF TRANSFORMATION SHAPE FUTURE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF NATO?

Understanding the fundamental drivers of the transformation strategies of Western states explains the trends that determine the future of NATO. As members of the same military alliance and with many security challenges addressed within that alliance, the transformation strategies pursued by these states have ramifications for the Alliance's future and its ability to maintain cohesion and solidarity. Explaining variance in transformation strategies offers insights into the reasons why European states and the United States have often-times been at loggerheads in recent years over security policy, and why it will remain for as long as transformation strategies are not in sync. It thereby sheds light on Robert Kagan's insightful, but unpolished, assessment of the different national characters that produce the divergent Atlantic perspectives of creating security.

I argue that differences in transformation paths are on the one hand due to different appreciations of the international system, material interests and changes in the relative distribution of power, but on the other hand that emulation failed because of differences in strategic cultures. While the major variance is apparent between larger and smaller powers, between the United States and Europe; there are similarly differing domestic constraints between the Netherlands and Germany which leads to different extractive capacities to pursue transformation.

173 In order to facilitate a comparison, the emphasis rests on elaborating on policy outcomes rather than on the full breadth of discussions, dissenting views or alternative opinions within defense bureaucracies and services.

The subsequent chapters are dedicated to the three case studies; the United States, and the two European states, the Netherlands and Germany. Each case study addresses the same questions, tracing the path of transformation pursued by the state. The final chapter offers a conclusion to the problem statement and provides an assessment of the impact of defense transformation for the future of the NATO alliance.

7.3 A WORD ON NOTES

Since this research relies on official documents and texts in other languages than English, and for purposes of heuristic clarity, the following general rule applies to the use of quotes. In the event that a non-English text or remark is quoted, I have taken the liberty to translate the quote to the best of my ability. The quote is then supported by the excerpt in its original language form in the footnote.

PART 1:

Transformation in the United States

CLIMBING THE LADDER OF PRIMACY

“...the best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”

- Presidential Candidate George W. Bush, Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999¹⁷⁴

8 INTRODUCTION

The following part traces the origin of the US government’s policy of defense transformation from 1991 to the end of the second Bush administration in late 2008. The term *transformation* came into use in the late 1990’s and evolved into the dominant paradigm along which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pursued change in the military organization. It fostered the promise that transformation could make warfare obsolete and yield a perpetuation of US military and strategic dominance.¹⁷⁵ Challenges associated with sustained irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan led to discord within the US government and military regarding the pursuit of transformation. To cope with the operational duress, the US Army alone revised its transformation strategy to adapt to the irregular challenge. American strategic culture influenced the pursuit of strategic transformation. Initially the extractive capacity was limited as the Army struggled to develop the capability to perform sustained stabilization missions. This improved when it evolved into an approach to irregular warfare in line with US strategic cultural tenets.

The case-study is divided into five segments each pertaining to a sub-question of the structured-focused comparison. The first part introduces the US interpretation of transformation as understood in US official policy. Subsequently two parts address the question what system-level shifts shaped the US approach to transformation. Two major changes in the realm of technology and military innovation heralded a transition in the external level of opportunity for the United States; the increase in precision and guided munitions and the rise of the Information Age. It amounted to a strategy of escalating America’s focus on conventional operations through a policy of operational effectiveness

174 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

175 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June 2002) p. 27.

(Type I) transformation. Transformation evolved from the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs, and came to denote an emphasis on harnessing information technologies to make the military instrument smaller, lighter, quicker and more lethal meant to improve the overall operational effectiveness of the US military to perform conventional combat operations.¹⁷⁶ Network-centric warfare became the dominant doctrinal paradigm intent on revolutionizing the face of the US military instrument. In the following part, the role of domestic factors in shaping US transformation policy and the dominant tenets of US strategic culture are presented. The notion of exceptionalism in US political culture has a strong influence over US foreign and security policy and secures an orientation to promote democracy as well as a quest for attaining absolute security. An agency-focused perspective on international relations produces an inclination to accept the use of the military as a political instrument in general and high-intensity operations in particular. The system-level variables and US strategic culture were initially aligned, producing the perfect conditions to drive this operational effectiveness transformation. The fourth part discusses what transformation meant for the development of strategies, capabilities and policy, culminating in the doctrine of preventive warfare and the invasion in Iraq. By 2004 the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan triggered a shift in the system-level distribution of power posing a challenge to the US strategy of transformation. The fourth question to be addressed is how US transformation responded to the changes in the security environment and how strategic culture led to responses to these changes.

9 US TRANSFORMATION DEFINED

The Pentagon's 2003 *Transformation Planning Guidance* is the primary policy document outlining the central idea and objectives of transformation in the United States. It offers a clear expression of what operational effectiveness (Type I) transformation is and what its objectives are for the United States. It defines transformation as:

*a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.*¹⁷⁷

This definition provides a clear objective for transformation, namely the continuation of American strategic dominance. Rather than a military-operational objective, it was grand-

176 See for instance Joint Vision 2010 which introduced the concept of "full-spectrum dominance" and "dominant battlespace awareness" and detailed how new technologies and operational concepts could increase the speed and lethality of conventional operations and "greatly enhance our capability in high intensity conventional military operations." General John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, 1996.

177 United States Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*, p. 3.

strategic. The definition writes that transformation's goal is to "sustain our strategic position." In 2003, this position was the sole remaining military superpower. Sustaining that position meant prolonging the unipolar system. It resonated President George W. Bush's declaration at the outset of the 2002 *National Security Strategy* that:

*The United States possesses unprecedented— and unequalled—strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.*¹⁷⁸

The *Transformation Planning Guidance* specified that rather than responding to changes in the external security environment, the United States itself could shape the nature of military competition.¹⁷⁹ This would provide the basis for sustaining its strategic position and the US would do so by "redefining standards for military success by accomplishing missions that were previously unimaginable or impossible except at prohibitive risk and cost."¹⁸⁰ Key to this was harnessing the Information Revolution.¹⁸¹ The Guidance declared that "the United States is transitioning from an Industrial Age to an Information Age military."¹⁸² In doing so it could stay several steps ahead of possible peer competitors and "ensure US forces continue to operate from a position of *overwhelming military advantage* in support of strategic objectives [emphasis added]."¹⁸³ Thus while the US had a military hegemony, this could only be guaranteed for the future by adopting these technologies. Transformation thereby represented an opportunity for the United States to persist in its unipolar status and extend its influence over the international system. The focus of which was to perform conventional military operations with greater speed and precision.¹⁸⁴

The term *transformation* was not first mentioned in the 2003 *Transformation Planning Guidance*. Rather it evolved from defense policy discussions in Washington during the early 1990's. The Gulf War, in which precision munitions, stealth technologies and cruise missiles played a large role, had demonstrated the military technological superiority of US armed forces and it fed the discussion that the United States was pioneering a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). RMA's are a generic concept. The central idea is

178 The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington DC, September 2002, (<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>), p. 1.

179 United States Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*, p. 3.

180 Ibid.

181 For a description of the impact of the Information Age on military affairs see Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave*, (New York: Pan, 1981).

182 United States Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*, p.3.

183 Ibid, p. 4.

184 Ibid, p. 10-11.

that as a result of new technologies, or organizational concepts, a discontinuous increase in military power can be achieved. Such improvements in warfighting capabilities impact the balance of power benefiting those that harness the improved effectiveness or combat potential.¹⁸⁵

The advent of these new technologies and operational concepts amounts to a discontinuous change as it revolutionizes the way in which wars are fought. Since the Middle Ages, Andrew Krepinevich identified ten such instances that produced significant changes in the way military operations were waged. Guided munitions warfare leading up to network-centric warfare was the eleventh.¹⁸⁶ Soviet scientists in the 1960's had predicted that "strategic reconnaissance complexes" fusing distributed weapons and sensor-systems together amounted to a "military-technical revolution". This emboldened proponents to argue that indeed a revolution was occurring. Following Operation *Desert Storm* the Revolution in Military Affairs came to describe revolutionary advances in the field of guided munitions warfare.¹⁸⁷ Advances in missile guidance systems and command and control were making it possible to hit targets over greater distances with greater accuracy and speed.

The definition of transformation above contains both realist and normative elements. It is realist by its emphasis on the system-level implications of change and its emphasis on military power. Focusing on military capabilities, transformation is meant to increase US strength, producing "overwhelming military advantage" to sustain US superiority. It presents a clear relation to a distribution of power and an ambition to maintain a position of military hegemony. Transformation is believed to make the military more usable as an instrument for the foreign policy executive. By pursuing a set of changes, the state would extract greater resources to enhance its power. The Guidance claims that "such efforts will

185 Andrew Krepinevich, former director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, defined the Revolution in Military Affairs as a situation that occurs: "...when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase – often an order of magnitude or greater – in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces." Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42.

186 Andrew Krepinevich, "From Cavalry to Computer". The ten revolutions are the Infantry revolution, coupling the strength of the longbow to dismounted men-at-arms (improved range and strength) beginning 14th century; Artillery revolution, cannon used against fortified defenses, late 14th century; Sail-and-Shot; naval warfare; 16th century; Fortress Revolution; *trace italienne*, return of static defense, 16th century; Gunpowder Revolution, more powerful gunpowder allows the musket-carrying infantrymen to outshoot archers, late 16th century; Levee-en-masse, greatly increases manpower on the battlefield, also through standardization of equipment and spare parts, late 18th century; Land Warfare Revolution, telegraph and railroads, machine guns, primacy to defensive, trench warfare, beginning 19th century; Naval revolution; dreadnoughts, submarines, torpedos, half 19th century; Interwar Revolutions, mechanization (internal combustion engine), aviation and information (radio and radar), led to carrier aviation, Blitzkrieg, strategic aerial bombardment, post WWI; Nuclear revolution, post-1944.

187 Interview with Robert Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2008, Washington DC, January 21, 2008.

render previous ways of warfighting obsolete and change the measures of success in military operations in our favor.”¹⁸⁸ The definition thereby provides a clear reference to operational effectiveness.

The normative element of the definition is based on the inferred assumption that US unipolarity, prolonged through successful transformation, is beneficial to international peace and stability. The Guidance writes that “over the long term, our security and the prospects for peace and stability for much of the rest of the world depend upon the success of transformation....If the United States fails to transform, then our current military superiority and the relative peace, prosperity and stability it underwrites will erode. We will see the rapid emergence of regional competitors and a world prone to major conflict.”¹⁸⁹ It provided the normative basis for pursuing change. *Pax Americana*, an international system based around US military power, was considered a strategic necessity to prolong US power, but also to promote global stability. Successful defense transformation thereby could enable the United States to shape the international environment.¹⁹⁰ And the military was critical to this. Pursuing that strategy required building and maintaining “defences beyond challenge.”¹⁹¹ Military innovation was central to the belief that the United States could sustain its strategic dominance. The promise of transformation was that it could reduce the costs of interventions significantly, it could enable the United States to pursue high-intensity conflicts faster, cheaper and cleaner and that this would produce the basis for persistence of America as the world’s global superpower.

In 1999 Presidential candidate George W. Bush embraced transformation. Speaking at the Citadel in South Carolina, he outlined his defense agenda. “We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war,” he said. “Power is increasingly defined not by size but by mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information; safety is gained in stealth; and forces are projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons.”¹⁹² Bush underlined that he would sustain US strategic dominance by pursuing a strategy based on harnessing these technological changes for the purpose of fighting high-intensity conventional wars. In the following pages it will be explored how this understanding of transformation was specific for the United States. In order to understand transformation from 1991 onwards it is necessary to trace the continuity of the American military focus on high-intensity combat. The end of the Vietnam War led the military to draw lessons that framed its outlook.

188 United States Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*, p. 3-4.

189 Ibid, p.4-5.

190 Ibid, p. 6.

191 The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington DC, September 2002, (<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>), p. 29.

192 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

10 SYSTEM LEVEL FACTORS THAT TRIGGERED US TRANSFORMATION

10.1 COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

“These congressional deliberations come amidst an historic transformation of the global security environment,” Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said as he and the military leadership testified on the Department’s budget request for the period 1991-1995.¹⁹³ Some four months earlier the Berlin Wall had collapsed and all present at the testimony realized that a new global distribution of power beckoned. As the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn stressed, “these changes have altered many of the basic assumptions on which our national security policy, military strategic and defense budget have been based for the last 40 years. The military balance had been altered as one end of the scale – the Warsaw Pact – seemed to be broken.”

Uncertainty, complexity, uncharted terrain, these were qualifications used by Administration officials to describe the new security environment. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell mentioned that an “enduring reality is the uncertain nature of world events.” The world became less dangerous but more opaque and complex as a result of the shifts in the Soviet Union. “A varied and complex security environment like never before,” according to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Air Force echoed this while showing a slide depicting the globe with *instability* written in bold lettering across it. Other challenges were also identified alongside the shifts in Europe, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to “potentially hostile states,” the presence of anti-American regimes and non-state threats such as drug-trafficking, anti-American insurgencies and terrorism. It promoted a need to develop capabilities for power projection.

It also gave new impetus to focus on technological improvements. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall the US government proposed a peace dividend. Secretary of Defense Cheney presented a defense budget with a 2 percent per annum real decline in the budget for the period FY1991 to 1995. This peace dividend was deemed acceptable on the assumption that the security environment would retain its benevolent momentum and the Soviet Union remained weak. On top of post-Cold War relaxation, an economic downturn implied that the defense budget would be further reduced. For fiscal year (FY) 1991 overall defense budget authority dropped by 11.3% as opposed to FY1990; a five-fold increase from what Cheney had initially envisaged. By 1993 active duty strength decreased with 91,400 forces. “We must preserve the high quality of our forces, even if that means major reductions in our manpower and active force structure. High quality derives mostly from our military people, but it also requires that our weapons and systems be technologically superior,” Cheney said in 1991. Technology came to figure centrally in the American mind.

On August 2, 1990 as Iraqi tanks were crossing the border with Kuwait, US President

193 Richard Cheney, “Prepared Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Washington DC, February 1, 1990, p. 1.

George H.W. Bush was in Aspen, Colorado. Present to celebrate the founding of the Aspen Institute, Bush spoke about changes in the military structure.¹⁹⁴ In the five-year plan that Bush presented active forces would be reduced with 25% by 1995. However, Bush warned against prorated defense cuts. “What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring” and declared that the military was to focus on expeditionary operations. Bush said at Aspen: “In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and our agility. And we will need forces that give us a global reach.” Speed, agility, flexibility, mobility, global reach would become dominant concepts for military change during the next two decades. The US would operate anywhere at any time. As the world’s remaining superpower, the United States needed to be able to defend its interests everywhere. By 2004, this had become engrained in military thinking, as the US national military strategy declared that the objective was to have military forces that were “rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global battlespace.”¹⁹⁵

The uncertainty of the global environment, the anticipated manpower reductions and the ambition to maintain a position of strength, placed the focus on mobility, rapid response and power projection. Technology could serve this purpose. Precision weapons could substitute for lack of manpower, while advances in mobility could give the US global reach. Cheney outlined his intention to develop multifunctional, deployable, logistically independent and highly mobile conventional forces in what would become a precursor for the transformation rhetoric of the late 1990’s. Unable to define where a crisis would erupt, flexibility and power projection became a central mission. Cheney wanted the ability to deploy “six additional Army divisions, 60 additional tactical fighter squadrons, one Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and associated elements” within 10 days anywhere across the globe. The US was securely positioning itself in the role of a global military hegemon. The Gulf War strengthened this position further.

To understand why the Gulf War was crucial to shaping thinking about transformation, we must retrace the development of the US military’s focus and doctrinal emphasis on high-intensity conventional operations from the end of the Vietnam War.

10.2 GUIDED MUNITIONS WARFARE: FROM VIETNAM TO DESERT STORM

The aftermath of the Vietnam War proved a pivotal moment for the reorientation of American defense policy, cementing a focus towards conventional maneuver warfare. It provides the genesis of what later became US operational effectiveness transformation.¹⁹⁶ It cemented a focus on conventional high-intensity operations.

194 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at Aspen Institute,” Aspen, CO., August 2, 1990.

195 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: a strategy for today, a vision for tomorrow*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 2004.

196 Frederick Kagan, *Finding the Target: the Transformation of American Military Policy*, (New York: Encounter, 2006).

It was not preordained that the Vietnam War would make the United States allergic to counterinsurgency operations. But defeat in Vietnam had profound domestic consequences. Politicians and the military services turned their back towards the conflicts they had just fought. Central in the shaping experience of the defeat was that the US military felt it had fought the wrong type of war. The diffuse nature of the conflict had negated US technical superiority, strained the civil-military relationship and fractured public support for the military. The officer corps felt it had been unable to fight the war it wanted to, nor fight the war in the way it wanted to due to political interference.¹⁹⁷ The dominant reading was that Vietnam had escalated slowly – along President Lyndon Johnson’s “slow squeeze” – rather than overwhelming the adversary with military force. This led to a half-hearted employment of US military strength that demanded ever greater sacrifices and resources while the political elite fell victim to strategic entrapment until finally the military was bogged down. The operational challenges of confronting an adversary that fought contrary to what Americans believed war to be like proved frustrating. The adversary hid among the local population, maneuvered stealthily through the countryside and avoided force-on-force confrontations. Doing so, it was able to bring the American military to a grinding halt. Famously, General William Westmoreland would recall that the US military never lost a single battle, to which his North-Vietnamese counterpart General Vo Nguyen Giap responded that it was true but also irrelevant. The war was a conflict in a gray zone neither constituting peace, nor war as Americans imagined it. Then already, failure was also attributed to the military’s one-dimensional focus on major theatre conflict.¹⁹⁸ Brian Jenkins asked the rhetorical question in 1970 why are “US government institutions.... unable to adapt to the kind of war we ought to have been fighting?” Jenkins’ response was that the United States was domestically disposed to fighting major conventional wars. He outlined that “as a result of technological advances we have more firepower and mobility in Vietnam now than we had four years ago, and theoretically we have always had more firepower and mobility than the Viet Cong. Considering our apparent lack of success, however, the case can be made that superior firepower and mobility have been perhaps irrelevant in this war.”¹⁹⁹ With nostalgia the officer corps remembered the Second World War, a war of liberation fought by generals not politicians, with a decisive end and an unconditional surrender of the enemy. That conflict echoed American perceptions of war. It was also a war where military power and superior technology did matter and progress could be measured in terms of an adversary’s casualties. Jenkins argued that “war is regarded as a series of conventional battles between two armies in which one side will lose and, accepting

197 For a critique on the role of the political leadership during the Vietnam War see H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that they told that led to Vietnam*, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998) and Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harvest, 2008).

198 Brian M. Jenkins, *The Unchangeable War*, RM-6278-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1970).

199 *Ibid*, p. 3-4.

this loss as decisive, will sue for peace... Our army remains enemy-oriented and casualty-oriented. War, then is assumed to be a battlefield where tactics rather than strategy are important.”²⁰⁰ The Second World War put the United States military in a favored role as liberators, and its ultimate success had branded American soldiers as heroes. The Vietnam War was its antithesis.²⁰¹ Rather than the Vietnam War leading to a reassessment of the distribution of power and refocusing its attention towards asymmetric conflict, the United States disregarded Vietnam-style operations and focused on conventional warfare instead. There was little attempt to innovate or balance the threat posed by irregular war.

Factors both at the domestic and system-level played a role in the subsequent changes. At the domestic level post-Vietnam reform was driven by a military organization that wanted to regain its stature in society. As Andrew Bacevich recounts, “successful reform... required two things: first, restoring the bonds between American soldiers and the American people, torn asunder by Vietnam; second, shifting the balance of civil-military authority on decisions relating to war and its conduct.”²⁰² Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams worried about the public ostracization of the military and the prolific micro-management of the war’s conduct by President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.²⁰³ To address both concerns Abrams took several measures. Principally he gave shape to the Total Force policy. Abrams restructured Army force components, making operational divisions dependent on the mobilization of critical components in the reserve. The result was that if politicians wanted to wage a large-scale campaign, a substantial amount of the total armed forces needed to be mobilized from the beginning. This had two effects. Because of the numbers involved, it would guarantee that any war would sit at the top of the political agenda and command the attention of the public and policymakers. It would also ensure that the military had sufficient forces to fight, since a substantial part of the total force would be mobilized in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, Abrams wanted to give full control of warfare to the generals.²⁰⁴ Since the nature of counterinsurgency in Vietnam had not been purely military, politicians had interfered throughout its prosecution. Abrams was appalled by the way the White House had micro-managed the war, at times with such mundane acts as target selection. That sentiment was further strengthened when following the war politicians, due to the public disapproval of the war, distanced themselves from military officers. Abrams’ idea was that the Army would become a profession focused on an exclusive core business. The reasoning was that if the US military could become a professional niche and excels in it, the public would regain trust in the institution. The move to an All Volunteer Force was a necessary step in this direction. The niche

200 Idem.

201 See Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular war*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), chapter 5.

202 Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by war*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 40.

203 See Bacevich (2005) and L. Sorley (2008).

204 Bacevich (2005), p.39.

to occupy became high-intensity conventional maneuver warfare. An added benefit was that conventional warfare was clearly a military affair, the realm of generals rather than politicians. It represented a return to a clear domain within the Clausewitzian trinity where government offers the political direction, the military commands the operation and delegates the care for warfare to the military, while the people - both at home and in the battlefield - are left by the side.²⁰⁵

There was also a system-level motivation to reorient the military away from irregular warfare. Besides the considerations of the military establishment, the United States government believed the greater threat came from the Soviet Union. Proxy conflicts such as in Vietnam detracted from preparations for the important challenge, which was maneuver warfare with the Soviet Union. The real battle was anticipated in Northern Germany over the Fulda Gap. Soviet numerical advantage was assumed, justifying a shift towards conventional warfare. This remained throughout the Cold War. Even in May 1989, as the Cold War was coming to an end, Soviet numerical advantages still troubled the Pentagon: “Even after the reductions announced by the Soviets occur,” Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said, “the Warsaw pact will still have more than a two to one advantage in tanks and artillery over existing NATO forces.”²⁰⁶

Professionalizing into the niche of high-intensity operations further rested on military-bureaucratic logic. It had no comparative advantage for other types.²⁰⁷ “Between nuclear annihilation on the one hand and the exhaustion of guerrilla warfare without end on the other: this was the space in which they intended to find a renewed sense of purpose.”²⁰⁸ The US military would prepare for and fight “clean wars,” with clear beginnings and ends. In these “clean wars” the cleanliness was provided by technology. Precision munitions, stealth, and advanced communications would contribute to effective maneuver warfare. Conventional war favored the advances in guided weapons technology. The smaller All Volunteer Force similarly benefited from the advantages offered by the new technologies, which functioned as a force multiplier.

10.2.1 AIRLAND BATTLE AND SYSTEMS WARFARE

Airland Battle became the US Army’s doctrinal framework following the post-Vietnam shift towards conventional maneuver warfare. It was the precursor to network-centric warfare that came to define US transformation in the early 2000’s. Published in 1981, AirLand Battle was a doctrine that combined land and airpower. It explicitly addressed what was perceived to be the Army’s failure in Vietnam, which let military strategy become the premise of politics. The doctrine affirmed that the objective of the military

205 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. xxvii – xxix and pp. 30-31.

206 Richard B. Cheney, “Prepared Statement of the US Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Washington DC, May 3, 1989.

207 Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 5.

208 Bacevich (2005), p. 42.

instrument was crystal-clear, namely to win wars. On the second page of the doctrine it stated “once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something –else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to avert defeat- - but rather it must be to win.”²⁰⁹ AirLand Battle relied on distant firepower, artillery and close-air support and the use of overwhelming force. It was based on presumed US technological superiority to counter greater Soviet numbers of armored and mechanized vehicles. It rested on the principle of disrupting a Soviet assault by simultaneously attacking Soviet forward deployed and second echelon follow-on forces through a combination of artillery, mechanized and armored formations as well as air power and army aviation. These latter units would engage in “deep attack” missions, targeting follow-on forces deep behind enemy lines. It would reshape military confrontations. Using words resembling those used two decades later in the context of network-centric warfare, AirLand Battle, “draws adroitly on advanced technology, concentrates force from unprecedented distances with overwhelming suddenness and violence, and blinds and bewilders the foe.”²¹⁰ Two decades later this evolved into the concept of rapid, decisive operations which envisaged military power applied with overwhelming force to achieve rapid and decisive victory.²¹¹

The objectives of AirLand Battle were comparable to the objectives envisaged for the Future Combat Systems, the dominant Army transformation program in the early 2000’s which will be discussed in more detail later. The latter’s conceptual basis was to enable “operational maneuver over strategic distances” intent on performing concurrent operations to shock the adversary into submission. Furthermore, the same principle to “blind and bewilder the foe” - as referred to in AirLand Battle - was echoed in the doctrine of ‘Shock and Awe’ in 1996.²¹² It envisioned victory in warfare by applying overwhelming force nearly instantaneously so that the adversary’s will to fight evaporates. The authors believed that the technologies of the guided munitions revolution and network-centric warfare offered the ability to achieve such quick victory. It was the logical end-point and pinnacle of achieving dominance through power projection, but pioneered in AirLand Battle.

AirLand Battle offered the conceptual foundation on which transformation’s network-centric warfare would later be developed. It also provided doctrinal momentum for the development of technologies associated with the guided munitions revolution.

209 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Military Operations: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations* – 1986, March 25, 1981, p.2.

210 Quoted in Bacevich (2005), p. 45.

211 “In the *Rapid Decisive Operations* (RDO) concept, a joint force would be able to deploy quickly to any location in the world and achieve victory by destroying the enemy’s ability to fight.” General Kernan remarks, July 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/t07182002_t718kern.html.

212 Harlan K. Ullman & James P. Wade, *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).

‘Deep attack’ required advanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities (the adversary’s follow-on forces need to be identified), improved command and control (the follow-on forces need to be engaged by the appropriate capabilities), precision munitions (the follow-on forces need to be engaged effectively with as few US capabilities as possible) and stealth platforms capable of penetrating deep into adversarial terrain. This created the demand for connecting various reconnaissance sensors in a network to get actionable intelligence on the adversary’s follow-on echelons, to be able to transmit that information to the forces in the field, and to have precision engagement. ‘Deep attack’ anticipated finding weak points and centers of gravity in the adversary’s advance, whether physical or moral, and to target these. This would become central to network-centric warfare.

Around the same time, in the mid-1980’s, the Air Force developed a doctrine known as System Warfare. Developed by Colonel John Warden III, it was a theory of airpower focused on targeting an adversary’s strategic pressure points and centers of gravity.²¹³ It was the Air Force’s precursor to network-centric warfare and its focus on so-called “effects-based operations,” in which the military aspires to produce certain effects to achieve victory rather than emphasize purely the physical destruction of an adversary.²¹⁴ It was a direct product of the systems-thinking developed with System Warfare since it relied on information about an adversary’s strategic pressure points and a system of airborne and space platforms, sensors and precision munitions to target them. It made use of the new advances in technology which yielded the possibility to target an adversary’s center of gravity, for example specific communication nodes or headquarters, in order to incapacitate a military. System Warfare relied on the ability to apply “overwhelming complexity” on the opponent by using multiple layers of attack, bomb and support aircraft in order to achieve “air superiority”. Moreover these aircraft were fitted with new types of precision munitions including heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, radar-homing SEAD missiles and laser-guided precision bombs which greatly improved accuracy. The Vietnam War had questioned the role of airpower in achieving strategic victory. But advances in precision, which theoretically enabled those distinct pressure points to be hit, implied that strategic bombing campaigns were reconsidered. In addition, these multiple layers of aircraft and sophisticated munitions created the demand to link these platforms together in a network. System Warfare was in effect a strategic bombing plan. It viewed the opponent as a system, rather than purely a military force, and airpower was applied to crumble that system. Operation *Desert Storm* would provide its testing ground.

10.2.2 THE PRECISION REVOLUTION & OPERATION DESERT STORM

Precision and stealth were central to the RMA and the evolution towards network-centric warfare. Precision meant that fewer forces needed to be put in harm’s way. Due to the technological increases fewer forces were needed to achieve the same effect. It produced

213 John Warden, “The Air Campaign,” National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1988.

214 For a discussion of the difficulties associated with “effects-based operations” see Zoltan Jobbagy, “Effects-based operations and the Problem of Causality,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, iss. 46 (3rd quarter 2007), pp. 90-95.

the dictum to “substitute mass for information.” It created less risk to American forces, increased the speed of operations and greater cost efficiency. It also meant that there would be less collateral damage and that objectives could be met sooner, promising to make warfare quicker, cheaper and less bloody. Advances in precision could realize the vision of “clean wars.” It was also a quantifiable metric to measure the superiority of US conventional forces. Operation *Desert Storm* advanced this principle which was central to thinking on transformation in the US.

Militarily, the Gulf War was a vindication for the changes pursued during the past decade and a half. The ground campaign drew on elements of AirLand Battle while the month-long air campaign put System Warfare into practice, although now in the desert instead of the West-German hills. The ground war saw the Army and Marine Corps dispose of the Iraqi military in one hundred hours. This was the major theatre war that the Army had planned for since Vietnam and vindicated its niche of conventional warfare. The spirit of Vietnam had loomed large over the White House as well. As President George H.W. Bush later recalled in his diary during Operation *Desert Storm*, “...Vietnam will soon be behind us...It’s surprising how much I dwell on the end of the Vietnam syndrome. I felt the division in the country in the 60s and 70s...I remember the agony and the ugliness, and now it’s together.”²¹⁵

In every confrontation during the ground campaign in Iraq American forces dominated.²¹⁶ The United States deployed 795,000 forces and suffered 240 casualties. With unprecedented low loss-rates, the US military was able to achieve its military objective of removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, liberating the small oil-state.²¹⁷ The Gulf War demonstrated the value of the guided munitions revolution. The use of precision munitions by the air force created vast increases in effectiveness.²¹⁸ The massive air campaign - well over 100,000 sorties in 43 days - was based on Warden’s concept of system warfare. Iraqi air defenses were crippled, key centers of command and control were destroyed and aircraft were able to strike targets as far North as Baghdad. Both in the ground and air campaigns, the opponent had been struck far behind the frontlines. While only a fraction of the bombs dropped were guided, the general public remembers the images from cameras mounted on missiles striking bridges and buildings. According to the authors of the *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, stealth and precision munitions greatly contributed to

215 George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, (New York: Vintage, 1998), p.484.

216 This is not intended to mean that there were no tough battles during the Gulf War, as the Battle of 73 Easting clearly demonstrated. Rather, that even when confronting a numerically superior Iraqi military, the United States proved dominant.

217 As Stephen Biddle points out, “This loss rate of fewer than one fatality per 3,000 soldiers was less than one tenth of the Israelis’ loss rate in either the 1967 Six-Day War or the Bekaa Valley campaign in 1982, less than one twentieth of the Germans’ in their Blitzkriegs against Poland or France in 1939-40, and about one one-thousandth of the U.S. Marines’ in the invasion of Tarawa in 1943.” Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.133.

218 See Thomas Keaney & Eliot Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, (Washington, DC: 1993).

success of the air campaign.²¹⁹

To measure advances in precision, an oft-used metric in the Pentagon is the target/sortie ratio. During *Desert Storm* twelve sorties of aircraft with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) targeted 26 targets using 28 bombs. With unguided munitions, it took the same twelve sorties 168 bombs to destroy two targets.²²⁰ PGMs were two orders of magnitude more effective than unguided weapons in terms of target per sortie ratios. The Air Force fully embraced them in the years ahead. While less than 10% of all munitions used during *Desert Storm* were precision-guided, that number rose to 60% in Operation *Enduring Freedom* and 68% of all munitions dropped in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. As sensor technology progressed during the decade and laser-guided was replaced by GPS-based guidance systems, disturbing factors such as weather or smoke could be removed further improving accuracies. Such GPS-guided JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) were emblematic of the revolutionary nature of precision. They decreased the circular error probability at close-to-zero risk to the pilots and limited cost, consisting of a \$28,000 GPS-kit mounted on a dumb bomb. During the combat-phase of *Iraqi Freedom* more than 6500 JDAMs were dropped with an average miss of less than 12 feet.²²¹ This spurred the faith that guided munitions could improve System Warfare and realize 'Effects-based Operations'.²²²




Figure 5: Circular Error Probability vs Fleet Capacity

(Source: US Office of Force Transformation, 2007)

- 219 Stephan Biddle later nuanced this, saying that it was superior technology that allowed better-trained American forces to exploit Iraqi mistakes to advantage. Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 139-179.
- 220 Thomas Keane & Eliot Cohen, *Gulf Air Power Air Power Survey Summary Report*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 243.
- 221 Michael G. Vickers & Robert C. Martinage, *The Revolution in War*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, December 2004), p.18.
- 222 See Zoltan Jobbagy, *Theory, Reality and the Nature of War: Effects-based Operations meet Post-Conflict Operations* (The Hague: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006).

Figure 5 was amongst others used by the director of the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation, Terry Pudas, to illustrate the increased potential offered by the guided munitions revolution. Showing that through the increased precision, the Air Force could plan for *targets per sortie* instead of *sorties per target*. Associated with the advances in precision was the ability of US forces to penetrate deep in enemy territory. Stealth technologies were central. The authors of the Gulf War Air Power Survey write: "The F-117, which flew only two percent of total attack sorties, struck nearly forty percent of the strategic targets and remained the centerpiece of the strategic air campaign for the entire war."²²³ Another precision capability was the cruise missile. 64% of the 288 cruise missiles were launched in the first two days of Operation *Desert Storm* to strike Iraqi centers of gravity. Precision and stealth gave the US air force the ability to attain access to a part of the airspace that had been denied to it through sophisticated air defense systems, and hit targets that otherwise could not have been. Furthermore, a strong argument based on force protection promoted the use of precision, stealth, cruise missiles and other stand-off weaponry. These capabilities provided an unprecedented measure of safety to airmen and ground troops which satisfied concern for American lives. Similarly, precision munitions held the promise that fewer sorties were required for particular missions, keeping more Americans out of unfriendly skies. It quite literally reduced the human and financial cost of major theatre war.

10.2.3 POWELL-WEINBERGER DOCTRINE

At the military-strategic level the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine cemented the Pentagon's mindset that the United States focuses on major conventional warfare in its defense strategy. The doctrine was initially formulated in response to the 1983 terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 Marines. The attack prompted the withdrawal of US forces. In response Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated six criteria which served as conditions to be met before the United States committed combat forces abroad. They were constraints not to commit forces to missions where limited interests were at stake or where insufficient forces were available. The Weinberger Doctrine meant to avoid Vietnam- and Lebanon-like deployments.²²⁴ The six questions to be answered in the affirmative were:

- Is a vital national interest at stake?
- Will we commit enough forces to win?
- Do we have clearly defined political and military objectives?
- Will we reassess and adjust our forces as necessary?
- Will Congress and the American people support the action?
- Is the use of force our last resort?

223 Keaney & Cohen (1993), p. 224.

224 Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 117.

Following the Gulf War Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell augmented the Doctrine with several military-strategic tenets. Together it would become known as the Powell-Weinberger doctrine. Powell underlined the necessity of using overwhelming force to achieve limited and well-defined political objectives. “We must not, Powell wrote, “send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish.”²²⁵ He inferred the hypothetical of pushing on to Baghdad in 1991 which he said would have created an uncertain situation with “major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship.”²²⁶ Instead the Allied coalition had stopped short of going to Baghdad, a position strongly supported by President George H.W. Bush.²²⁷ Powell’s observation proved a prescient, but unheeded warning when he was Secretary of State in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. Powell was keen to point out that when the decision to use force was taken, it should be applied overwhelmingly and decisively: “When we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively. If our objective is something short of winning ... we should see our objective clearly then achieve it swiftly and efficiently.” Powell advanced the principle of decisive force as criteria for deploying military forces abroad. It meant overwhelming the adversary to achieve swift defeat with a minimum number of casualties.²²⁸ The doctrine was captured in the Army’s Field manual, the principle doctrinal document of the US Army. It noted:

*The people of the United States... expect the military to accomplish its missions in compliance with national values. The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met.*²²⁹

The Powell-Weinberger doctrine was premised on realist considerations. It tempered decision-making regarding the use of the military for idealist purposes by making its use contingent on threats to vital security interests. It also reinforced the demand for military superiority and high-end, high-intensity capabilities making use of advanced technologies. It supported the tenets of AirLand Battle and System Warfare. It also confirmed high-intensity conventional warfare as the organizing principle for the military. The Doctrine was as much a capstone of the post-Vietnam reforms, as it was an implication derived from the Gulf War where overwhelming force had been applied with a definite exit-strategy in

-
- 225 For a concise articulation of Powell’s addendum to the Weinberger Doctrine see Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1992/93).
- 226 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1992/93).
- 227 Bush, Scowcroft (1998), p.464.
- 228 Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 118.
- 229 US Army Doctrine, Field Manual 100-5: Operations, (June 1993), p. 1-2/3.

response to a threat to vital security interests. For all its unique characteristics the Gulf War became the archetypical operation for the US pursuit of transformation.²³⁰

10.3 PAX AMERICANA

Critical to the development of US transformation was the belief that its successful pursuit would mean a comparative advantage for the US military allowing Washington to sustain its strategic position as unipolar global superpower after the end of the Cold War and *Desert Storm*. The Gulf War gave rise to three ideas. Firstly, technology had been essential to US victory. Secondly, the United States had the most technologically capable military on the planet. Thirdly, Operation *Desert Storm* heralded a new era of warfare based around US military dominance and its ability to project power and to wage major regional warfare at limited costs. It made clear that a unipolar system had been born.²³¹ The lack of a peer competitor on the horizon spelled a strategic pause to some, and a window of opportunity to others. Inside Washington, its political-strategic consequences were formulated in the *Defense Planning Guidance* of 1992. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz drafted the Guidance as an internal report outlining the grand strategic implications of the post-Cold War environment. It developed the idea of a *Pax Americana*, an international system based around American hegemonic military power. The document advanced two premises; maintaining a position of global dominance by preventing the rise of a peer-competitor and to that end dealing effectively with regional conflicts and other sources of instability that might give rise to great power aspirations: “Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor,” Wolfowitz wrote. It formed the basis for a strategic focus on power projection and major theatre warfare.²³² The document embraced a policy of interventionism to protect vital interests abroad:

*While the US cannot become the world’s policeman, by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interest, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.*²³³

230 For an analysis of the unique characteristics working in the US military’s favor during operation *Desert Storm*, see Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood,” *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 139-179.

231 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs: America and the World* (Winter 1990/91).

232 “Excerpts from the Pentagon’s Plans: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a new rival,” *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

233 Ibid.

The document advocated a policy of shaping the security environment from a position of strategic primacy. It was an assessment on the basis of the distribution of power in the international system.

Unipolarity based on US military power was confirmed in subsequent strategy documents.²³⁴ In 1997 Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen wrote that “America begins the new millennium as the sole superpower, the indispensable nation ... This report sets forth the Department of Defense’s vision of what lies ahead as our nation embarks upon a new American century ...”²³⁵ Strategic dominance was the status quo, and preserving it the objective of defense policy. The *1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* stated that the “US defense strategy for the near and long term must continue to shape the strategic environment to advance US interests... [emphasis in original]”²³⁶ *Joint Vision 2010* begins with proclaiming that it focuses “on achieving dominance across the range of military operations...” The 1997 National Defense Panel report stated that it contained recommendations for a policy “that molds the international environment rather than merely responds to it.”²³⁷ As presidential candidate, George W. Bush explicitly adopted this perspective when advocating in 1999 that the United States “must master the new technology of war – to extend our peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years.”²³⁸ After the attacks of September 11, President Bush asserted the status of unipolarity based on strategic dominance: “America has and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenges – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”²³⁹ The United States was the Leviathan in the international system.

Both the Powell-Weinberger doctrine and the *Defense Planning Guidance* were based on sustaining unipolarity through conventional military strength. It meant extending US military hegemony and it promoted the view that doing so required further improving on existing capacity to wage high-intensity warfare.

234 Major security strategy documents such as the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint Vision 2010 and the 2002 *National security strategy* formulated US military and strategic dominance as central assumptions.

235 William Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, May 1997, p. x.

236 Ibid.

237 Report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, December 1997, p. i.

238 George W. Bush, “Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,” November 19, 1999.

239 George W. Bush, “Address at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the US Military Academy,” West Point, June 1, 2002.

10.3.1 MOOTW & THE EMPHASIS ON MAJOR THEATRE WAR

Following Operation *Desert Storm* US defense strategy came to rely on high-intensity conventional operations. The international environment had taken a turn for the better and the post-Cold War, post-*Desert Storm* environment saw the United States as the unequivocal remaining superpower. According to realism, it implied that the US would aspire to expand its influence. Yet military-strategically this period of nascent unipolarity produced a hegemonic mindset whereby the United States focused on potential peer competitors. Regional hegemony, such as Saddam Hussein's regime, were Soviet Union 'mini-me's'. They were evil and had to be confronted by the threat of overwhelming military strength. Every other operation was of secondary concern and euphemistically became known as a Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). The 1993 *Bottom Up Review* – the first strategic policy review following the Cold War – was drafted in the spirit of Powell-Weinberger and emphasized high-intensity conventional operations. Not only was there no real change in the AirLand Battle-oriented force structure, Powell-Weinberger's criteria were explicitly reaffirmed in the document.²⁴⁰

Most importantly, the *Bottom Up Review* set Operation *Desert Storm* and the Saddam Hussein regime as the benchmark for future conflicts. Defending against rogue regimes that could threaten regional stability became the principal issue of concern and the document articulated a force planning construct that remained constant throughout the 1990's. The US should be "capable of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously." The construct was explicitly geared to address the threat of a resurgent Iraq and to defend South Korea against a rogue North, both at the same time if necessary. The Review even specified an Iraq-size military to be planned against.²⁴¹ The US military received a strategic guideline to repeat the intervention of 1991. The two Major Regional Contingency (MRC) construct ensured America's strategic focus on large-scale wars. The 1997 QDR – the follow-up to the *Bottom Up Review* - stated that the two-war-construct was "the sine qua non of a superpower" and in 2000 Secretary of Defense William Cohen again reaffirmed this.²⁴² Key to fighting two major regional wars was the

240 The *Bottom Up Review* enunciated four tenets which needed to be weighed before using military force; an assessment whether military action advances US national interests; whether objectives are clear and attainable; how an intervention will impact America's strategic posture; and finally, whether the military is up to par and has the right capabilities. See Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, chapter 2.

241 The Review articulated combating a force of 400,000-750,000 personnel, 2,000-4,000 tanks, 3,000-5,000 armored fighting vehicles, 2,000-3,000 artillery pieces, 500-1,000 combat air craft, 100-200 naval platforms, 50 submarines and 100-1,000 Scud missiles. See Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, chapter 3.

242 "The most demanding military requirement on US forces is the capability to fight and win two major theatre wars in overlapping time frames. This requires that US forces have a full spectrum of military capabilities in quantities sufficient to defeat any two regional adversaries in full-scale warfare involving land, sea and aerospace forces in two separate and distant theatres of conflict, with only a short period of time separating the beginnings of the two conflicts." W.Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Department of Defense 2000, p.18.

ability to project conventional military power. While the United States had always been an expeditionary country, an island nation, the National Defense Strategy of 2005 explicitly stated that “the United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach.”²⁴³

Paradoxically, contrary to the focus on rogue regimes, the two MRC planning construct and the use of the diminutive MOOTW, the 1990’s were characterized by US military deployments to deal with less-than-vital security issues such as Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, the cruise-missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, persistent enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq throughout the decade, and the operation in Kosovo in 1999.²⁴⁴ The US military became the fire-extinguisher of choice of both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Throughout the nineties the White House also came to rely more and more on the military to perform non-war tasks.²⁴⁵ It resulted in a strategic dichotomy. For planning purposes US armed forces were focusing on the two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC), yet MOOTW was the dominant form of intervention. Critics pointed out that MOOTW missions were a distraction since deployments for peacekeeping missions or humanitarian operations meant readiness requirements for the two MRC’s could not be met. It was assumed that preparing for an MRC meant that all “lesser included contingencies” could be performed successfully as well.²⁴⁶ Because of the dominance of the two MRC construct, the US military spent little time training and equipping for Operations Other Than War. The military’s focus on high-intensity conventional operations remained even though it was engaged in these ‘lesser’ operations at a greater frequency.²⁴⁷ Most of the MOOTW missions had limited interests at stake and thus had only limited impact on America’s perception of the distribution of power.

10.3.2 CAPTIVATED BY UNIPOLARITY

Performing these limited interventions is conform to neoclassical realism. The American position as a hegemon led to an expansion of its domestic agenda, in which limited, primarily morally-driven actions now had a place. It was reflected in the statement in 1993 by the Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright directed at Colin Powell: “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it.”²⁴⁸

243 Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Department of Defense, March 2005, p.8.

244 David Ucko, “Innovation or Inertia: The US military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,” *Orbis* (Spring 2008), p 290-291.

245 Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging war and keeping peace with America’s military* (New York: Norton & Co. 2004), p. 45.

246 “Other operations, from humanitarian assistance in peacetime through peace operations in a near hostile environment, have proved to be possible using forces optimized for wartime effectiveness.”General John Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1996, p.17.

247 David Ucko, “Innovation or Inertia: The US military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,” *Orbis* (Spring 2008), p 290-291.

248 Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: 1995), p. 576.

Because the United States had power, in the form of a peerless military, it could undertake missions even if vital interests were not at stake. Instead, the US could now do ‘good.’ It produced a greater willingness to use the military to correct perceived wrongs in the international system. While the military focused on conventional warfare, the foreign policy executive emphasized limited interventions as a consequence of unipolarity.

The unipolar moment meant that the United States could be unchecked in advancing its interests as well as its values. The Gulf War had demonstrated that the United States was capable of using force to adjudicate in the international system and the United States could shape its environment. Even Colin Powell, who had erstwhile promoted pragmatic realism with respect to the use of force, now seemed enthused by the opportunities presented by military hegemony. Powell expressed that the post-Cold War period was a “fourth rendezvous with destiny” in line with the American Revolution, the Civil War, US participation in World War II and the subsequent Cold War.²⁴⁹ The United States, wrote Powell, had a window “to lead the world at a time of immense opportunity – an opportunity never seen in the world before.” That opportunity meant advancing the ideals of a new world order on the basis of American values: “We can have peace. We can continue moving toward greater prosperity for all. We can strive for justice in the world. We can seek to limit the destruction and the casualties of war. We can help enslaved people find their freedom.” The unipolar moment brought an ideological policy to bear. The *Defense Planning Guidance* had also outlined the option to use military force for limited purposes rightly because there was no peer competitor to worry about:

*...because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge.*²⁵⁰

Limited interventions however did not mean peacekeeping operations. The United States remained focused on seeing the military as a specific niche. Small wars were considered acceptable, complex peace missions were out of the question. The transition at the end of the Cold War shaped a strategy to optimize its capabilities for conventional high-intensity warfare and rapid, decisive operations. The subsequent administration underlined this. In 2001, prior to entering office national security advisor Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed the military’s orientation to conventional warfare. She told President George W. Bush: “The use of the military is only used for warfighting . . . The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian

249 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992/93).

250 “Excerpts from the Pentagon’s Plans: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a new rival,” *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

society.²⁵¹ George Bush corroborated this when he said that: "... we will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling."²⁵² It proved to be a prophetic statement since a few years after Rice's comment the United States would confront irregular warfare and pursue counterinsurgency, a military-operation-other-than-war that was strategically important. But more on this later.

10.3.3 ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL THREATS

Following *Desert Storm* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell defined the requirement of the new geopolitical context as follows: "We have to make sure that as we build our new force structure in this new environment, we have the ability to respond to the crisis nobody expected, nobody told us about, a contingency that suddenly pops up at 2 in the morning. [...] Our national strategy is founded on the premise that America will continue to provide the leadership needed to preserve global peace and security."²⁵³ Secretary of Defense Cheney had earlier argued in favor of being able to deploy several divisions within days. President Clinton also adhered to the tenets of power projection based on a mobile force.²⁵⁴ The embrace of power projection produced a consistent emphasis on multifunctional, deployable, logistically independent and highly mobile conventional forces. Its keywords were best described by President Clinton in February 1993:

*Our military will be mobile (with the sealift and airlift it requires), agile (with new technologies and integrated doctrine which allows it to dominate by maneuver, speed and technological superiority), precise (to reduce the loss of life in combat), flexible (to operate with diverse partners in diverse regions), smart (with the intelligence and communications it needs for the diverse threats it will face), and, especially, ready (given the unpredictability of new threats) [emphasis in original].*²⁵⁵

The logical conclusion of the emphasis on power projection was the necessity to have global access. Following *Desert Storm*, although the United States believed it could claim superiority at the outset of any military confrontation, the operation had demonstrated that getting to the theatre timely had become a bottleneck and that theatre and strategic

251 Condoleeza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no.1 (January/February 2000), p. 53.

252 George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Citadel," Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

253 Colin Powell, "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee," Washington DC, February 21, 1991, p. 48.

254 "We need a force capable of projecting power quickly when and where needed. This means the Army must develop a more mobile mix of mechanized and armoured forces. The Air Force should emphasize tactical air power and airlift, and the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious forces, as well as sealift." William J. Clinton, *A new Covenant for American Security*, Georgetown University, December 12, 1991.

255 William J. Clinton, *A Vision of Change for America*, Office of Management and Budget, Washington DC, February 17, 1993, p. 69-70.

ballistic missiles – possibly even containing chemical, biological or nuclear warheads - could influence the strategic equation of an intervention by tempering an advance, stalling an operation or even preventing a deployment. Saddam Hussein fired forty Scud missiles at Israel and forty-three against Saudi Arabia. They had almost broken the coalition. The Scud attack on February 25, 1991 on an Army compound in Saudi Arabia killing twenty-eight and wounding 97 American soldiers – almost 20% of all US casualties in the war - demonstrated the vulnerability of large concentrations of military forces at points of disembarkation and vulnerable sites. The campaign plan of *Desert Storm* had called for 830,000 US forces to be deployed. Such a large amount required a momentous effort both in time and capital. The United States had used a five-month period to build up and accustom its forces to the desert surroundings.²⁵⁶ Future adversaries would not likely be as tolerant. Advances in missile technology and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could plausibly exploit these vulnerabilities. Known to possess medium-range ballistic missiles and chemical warheads, what would have happened had Saddam preempted the military build-up by making vulnerable points of disembarkation unusable? Or had successfully targeted large concentrations of troops? If the United States wanted to perform expeditionary operations, prevent the rise of regional hegemons and project power to wage major regional war, it needed to be nimbler; quicker in theatre and more dispersed. Defense analysts in Washington were pondering this question and it would become a main driver for operational effectiveness transformation, particularly among the ground forces, throughout the 1990's.

US power projection rested on superiority over the commons – space, air and sea – yielding unfettered access to many parts of the globe.²⁵⁷ It maximized freedom of action and thereby was considered central to sustaining strategic dominance. Command of the commons is an essential characteristic of US strategic policy. Already in the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review* the Command of the Commons philosophy was present. “Control of the seas and airspace” was mentioned as a critical enabler for US power projection. Some months later the National Defense Panel noted that:

*The cornerstone of America's continued military pre-eminence is our ability to project power rapidly and virtually unimpeded to widespread areas of the globe. Much of our power projection capability depends on sustained access to regions of concern.*²⁵⁸

256 One of the reasons being that 95% of material had to be shipped by slow sealift. See Keaney & Cohen (1993), p.4.

257 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons,” *International Security*, Vol. 28, no.1 (Summer 2003), pp.5-46.

258 National Defense Panel Report (1997), p. 12.

This global access also included space.²⁵⁹ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in 2005 that: “Key goals... are to ensure our access to and use of space, and *to deny hostile exploitation of space to adversaries*. [emphasis added]”²⁶⁰ When an adversary has the intention to “exploit space in the same way the United States and its allies can,” denying that ability was believed necessary. Space superiority was “the American way of fighting” said General Lance Lord, commander of the US Air Force Space Command, “... it is our vision for the future.”²⁶¹

AirLand Battle and System Warfare had been developed taking these concerns into account. Both doctrines required the US military to gain access far beyond traditional frontlines. A successful execution of the doctrine relied on establishing air superiority by defeating sophisticated air defenses. The SCUD-scare of the Gulf War made it clear that American reliance on single points of entry and large concentrations of forces presented significant vulnerabilities able to be exploited by adversaries armed with anti-access or area-denial weapons such as mines, cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles. The ability to project power quicker was key. In 1999 George W. Bush echoed the desire to project power “over long distances, in days or weeks rather than months.”²⁶² Five years after Bush’s speech the *National Military Strategy* stated that adversaries “will avoid US strengths like precision strike and seek to counter US power projection capabilities by creating anti-access environments.”²⁶³ Since US military dominance relied on power projection, the future operational environment was believed to be one where large concentrations of forces would be challenged. Conversely, the strategic bombing campaign during *Desert Storm*, which targeted the Iraqi infrastructure far from Kuwait, demonstrated the value of having freedom of action across the battlespace. ‘Getting access’ became an element of critical importance to sustain US military hegemony and military technology was considered crucial to achieving it.

Since the end of the Cold War this strategic orientation sparked an emphasis on dealing with anti-access and area-denial threats which deny US power projection capabilities and threatened its command of the commons. While command of the commons enables power projection, anti-access and area-denial threats deny it: “If anti-access (A2) strategies aim to prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations, then area-denial (AD) operations aim to prevent their freedom of action in the more narrow confines of

259 United States Department of the Air Force, *The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan*, Washington DC, November 2003, p. 45.

260 Donald Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2005, p.16.

261 Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons Programs” *New York Times*, May 18, 2005.

262 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

263 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America : a strategy for today, a vision for tomorrow*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 2004.

the area under an enemy's direct control."²⁶⁴ Adversarial capabilities that fall within the A2/AD category are amongst others ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, CBRN weaponry, sophisticated mines, air defense systems, anti-ship weaponry and submarines. This technology could "diminish [the United states'] ability to apply military power, reducing [its] military and political influence in key regions of the world."²⁶⁵

Thus following the end of the Cold War and underlined by Operation *Desert Storm*, the United States emerged as the dominant power in the international system. The US interpretation of this distribution of power inclined it to pursue a policy to sustain its position at the top of the unipolar system and prevent the rise of peer competitors. On the basis of its appreciation that the post-Cold War environment presented limited threats and driven by domestic factors - most importantly the inclination of the military to emphasize a focus on conventional wars and avoid Vietnam-like repeats - the United States pursued a strategy based on the model that was designed to fight the Soviet Union and had led to success in *Desert Storm*. AirLand Battle and System Warfare relied on the technological advances of the guided munitions revolution. Improving these capabilities would be the recipe to sustain its hegemonic position. Doing so required dealing with anti-access and area-denial threats that could negate the United States' ability to deploy military force where it wanted. It became the basis for its view on transformation.

10.4 MAKING WAR OBSOLETE

Aside from the rise of unipolarity and the sustained focus on major theatre warfare, the second element that drove US transformation and represented both an opportunity as well as an increased external vulnerability was the advent of the Information Age. Lacking a peer competitor while focused on preventing its rise, US policymakers in the 1990's quickly became seduced by the concept of the strategic pause. The unipolar environment offered a unique opportunity to advance US interests abroad, but also a window to sustain US unipolarity. By the early 2000's it was thought that given its military superiority the United States could even make military competition all but obsolete. In 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went so far to state that the objective of transformation was to "develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing."²⁶⁶ A military-strategy document two years earlier had envisaged successful transformation to allow the United States to defeat an enemy by simply being present, or even threatening to be there.²⁶⁷ If successful transformation would allow the United States

264 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, Robert Work, *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, 2003, p. ii.

265 Idem.

266 Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June 2002) p. 27.

267 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington DC, June 2000, p. 21.

to stay so far ahead of potential competitors that it could make military conflict futile. The reason for the optimism was the advent of, and America's pole position in, the Information Age.

10.4.1 FAITH IN TECHNOLOGY

Throughout its modern history, the United States has emphasized superior technology to provide it with victory in battle. Reliance on technology has been driven by a positivist philosophy that science can be applied to engineer society and solve social problems.²⁶⁸ The positivist view was that "as human knowledge advanced, human conflict would wither away."²⁶⁹ The technologies associated with the Information Age formed the next incarnation of security policy based on faith in superior military technology.

In the 1950's President Dwight D. Eisenhower realized that the United States confronted a Soviet adversary that was numerically superior. Eisenhower embraced technology and turned to the recently developed atomic bomb, pushing the Pentagon to make it suitable for maneuver warfare. The Pentomic division was a flirt with nuclear artillery intent on putting the science of nuclear physics to political-military advantage. Throughout the Cold War Washington believed that technology could tip the strategic balance in its favor. Forsaking the possibility of spending as much on defense as the Soviet Union - which was running in the ranges of one-third of its GDP- the US emphasized technological prowess. The historian Russell Weigley argued in 1973 that it was quintessentially American: "To seek refuge in technology from hard problems of strategy and policy was already another dangerous American tendency, fostered by the pragmatic qualities of the American character and by the complexity of nuclear-age technology."²⁷⁰ The principle described by Weigley remained applicable following the end of the Cold War. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney believed that the Cold War had been won on the basis of technological competition and that among US core strengths was its level of "technological innovation" adding that "one of the key strategic assets the United states has enjoyed now all these years has been our ability to do a better job of applying modern technology to military requirements than the Soviets have been able to do."²⁷¹ President George H.W. Bush similarly said in 1990 that:

268 Positivism originated during the Enlightenment as a reaction to metaphysics and theological explanations for social behavior. One of the first Positivists was Auguste Comte who looked towards a society based on science, rather than theology. See Comte, *The Course in Positivist Philosophy*, 1830. Other important positivists or influences on Positivism include Ludwig Wittgenstein, Immanuel Kant, and Bertrand Russell. For a critique of logical Positivism see Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, (Beacon, 1972).

269 John Gray, *Black Mass*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2007) p. 59.

270 Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 416.

271 Richard Cheney, "Transcript of the testimony of the Secretary of Defense," Hearings at United States Senate Armed Services Committee for FY1991, Library of Congress, Washington DC, February 1, 1990, p. 10.

The US has always relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strength in numbers – cruise missiles, Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart weapons" with the state-of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones. The men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology America has to offer.

While Operation *Desert Storm* demonstrated US conventional superiority, Cheney emphasized the importance to sustain that superiority. Eyeing the relevance of technology in 1991, he said, "staying ahead in this technological revolution will help shape the future security environment in ways favorable to the United States and will help give us capabilities that we are comfortable employing for defense or deterrence against tomorrow's regional aggressors."²⁷² Technological superiority was widely felt to be the basis for victory in the Gulf War. An exuberant Senator John Warner (ranking member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services) exclaimed in February 1991:

The technology is awesome! [...] Having heard directly from the American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines whose lives are at stake about how our modern weapons systems save lives, I must say that I am more convinced than ever that we must continue to invest in modern technology weapons.... Defending freedom is not cheap. Modern technologically advanced systems are expensive – but they avoid needless loss of life, the lives of American service personnel, the lives of innocent civilians, and yes, if able to bring about an earlier end of war, the lives of the opposing military personnel ... Defending freedom is worth these costs.²⁷³

In the 1990's technology was turned to for a variety of reasons; it could lead to cost-savings and it could take Americans out of harm's way to participate in non-vital conflicts. At a time of shrinking budgets, technology was a natural solution. Colin Powell, then retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in 1992 that technology could offset the loss of military power following the post-Cold War peace dividend: "A downsized force and a shrinking defense budget result in an increased reliance on technology, which must provide the force multiplier required to ensure a viable military deterrent."²⁷⁴ While the substitution of humans for technology had been necessary during the Cold War to face Soviet numerical superiority, in the 1990's it was necessary as a result of the post-Cold War strategic pause. Technology would allow the size of forces to be decreased or to avoid the use of troops altogether. Technology was preferred in order to remove US forces from the battlefield. It coincided with a period in which the United States undertook mainly

272 Ibid.

273 John Warner, "Transcript of Hearing before the United States Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services," Library of Congress, Washington DC, February 21, 1991.

274 Colin Powell, "Information-Age Warriors," *Byte*, (July 1992), p. 370.

non-vital interventions. The military strategist Edward Luttwak wrote that the conflicts in the 1990's did not impact the vital interests of Western states, and therefore were not worth dying for.²⁷⁵ He concluded therefore that Western states should invest in those technologies that reduced the risk to Western forces. The military and politicians wanted to perform these missions risk-free. Amongst others for fear of losing the support of the American people.²⁷⁶ With limited interests at stake, only limited resources were willing to be spent. The operation in Somalia had made clear that 18 dead Americans could lead to a withdrawal of US forces with the political objectives unattained, a damaged international image and emboldened adversaries. Technology offered the way out. The guided munitions revolution made the military an increasingly useful instrument at a time of limited domestic support for sending military forces into harm's way. It served the Clinton administration well throughout its limited interventions, relying on cruise missiles and airpower.²⁷⁷ The guided munitions revolution allowed reducing the size of a deployed force. For instance, close air support could substitute Army artillery. In the event that land forces were deployed, airpower would take on a supporting role, leading to a lower requirement of ground forces, thereby increasing the deployability of the force. With less forces deployed, the reasoning went, less Americans would be at risk. The technology of the guided munitions revolution was key to addressing political concerns over the missions in the 1990's; keeping the number of US deployed forces down, the government had a highly usable military instrument. Aside from the non-vital operations, it also increased the effectiveness of US military forces in those high-intensity operations its strategic documents called for. Network-centric warfare was the next step in a history of relying on technology to increase the extractive capacity of the state and the usability of the military, with the systems now being not tanks but bytes. It offered a further reason for a technology-centric approach, namely the belief that it would revolutionize the face of war.

10.4.2 THE FOG OF WAR DISAPPEARS IN A CLOUD OF ELECTRONS

Joint Vision 2010, the military's strategy document published in 1996 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili was the first to present network-centric warfare as the basis for US transformation. While the United States had demonstrated its capabilities in the realm of precision and stealth, a new set of technologies was promising to place those systems in a different context. With no peer competitor threats on the

275 Edward Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75. no. 4 (July/ August 1996), p.33-44.

276 See the study by Peter Feaver & Christopher Gelpi, "A Look at ...Casualty Aversion," *Washington Post*, November 7, 1999. On the basis of extensive surveys Feaver and Gelpi showed that contrary to the sentiment in Washington, the political leadership is more casualty-averse than the general public as long as the latter feels that the war can be won. See also Benjamin C. Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, & U.S. Military Intervention*, MR-431-A/AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), p. 1-27; Lt.Col. Richard A. Lacquement Jr., "The Casualty-Aversion Myth," *Naval War College Review*, (Winter 2004), p 39-57.

277 See Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 148.

horizon, *Joint Vision 2010* argued that the strategic pause warranted a rush forward into the Information Age.

The document argued that technological change yielded a unique opportunity for new advantages in warfare. The combination of enhanced sensors and information processing capabilities was leading to greater information about the adversary. *Joint Vision 2010* argued that the adversary could be identified, targeted and destroyed earlier, quicker and with greater precision. It was based on a network of 'sensors' and 'shooters' that the US would roll over a battlefield like a blanket. It promised to lead to *dominant battlespace awareness* reducing the fog of war; the term Clausewitz used to describe uncertainty and friction in warfare. The overarching concept was network-centric warfare. Rather than firepower or maneuver, it is based on the idea that superior information on the adversary leads to quicker and better decision making. Information superiority was defined as the "capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." This was the key enabler that would "transform the traditional functions of maneuver, strike, protection and logistics."²⁷⁸ It would change all elements of major theatre warfare and thereby present a discontinuous change to the US military. Transformation was based on the belief that through networking sensor-systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites or Special Operations Forces with platforms such as fighter aircraft, cruise missiles or Special Forces on the ground, "technology trends will provide an order of magnitude improvement of lethality." This opened a window to a whole new way of waging war characterized by speed and precision. The *1997 Quadrennial Defense Review* provided the Pentagon's interpretation of *Joint Vision 2010*. Referring to the Revolution in Military Affairs it stated that the information revolution was the principle source of the RMA and that it would "fundamentally change the way US forces fight. We must exploit these and other technologies to dominate in battle."²⁷⁹ The document deliberately shifted the focus towards future technologies and developing future capabilities, in line with the belief in a strategic pause and the opportunity it offered. Once successful it would lead to US forces that were "different in character" and give America an asymmetric advantage over its competitors. "The key to success is an integrated 'system of systems' that will give [US forces] superior battlespace awareness, permitting them to dramatically reduce the fog of war." In June 2000 the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton published *Joint Vision 2020*. Three years its junior this strategy document reiterated much of *Joint Vision 2010* although with a ten-year extension of the deadline. The document introduced the principle of full-spectrum dominance as the final objective of transformation.²⁸⁰ 'Full spectrum dominance'

278 *Joint Vision 2010*, p.19.

279 William Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, May 1997, p. iv.

280 "The transformation of the joint force to reach full spectrum dominance rests upon information superiority as a key enabler and our capacity for innovation." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington DC, June 2000, p. 7.

implied the ability to win conflicts at all junctions of the conflict spectrum and was “the ability to sense, understand, decide and act faster than an adversary in any situation.”²⁸¹ It would bring military superiority. As Eliot Cohen formulated it in 1996: “what can be seen on the modern battlefield can be hit, and what can be hit will be destroyed.”²⁸²

Technologically, network-centric warfare is made possible by advances in the guided munitions revolution combined with the critical enabler offered by information technologies. The central driver behind the Information Age, according to proponents such as David Alberts, was that the economics of information had changed as a result of satellite communications, fiber-optic cables and the internet.²⁸³ These and other information technologies had made gathering and transmitting large amounts of information cost-effective. Greater richness and reach of information was making “the ROI [return on investment] for a dollar spent on information greater than it was before.” In network centric warfare the value of individual platforms increases exponentially as a result of being integrated into a network. Network externalities make a coherent system-of-systems approach possible, changing the way in which militaries operate in order to increase the speed of operations, and the locus of value, or power, shifts from platforms to the network.²⁸⁴

The basis of the two *Joint Vision* documents and the 1997 *QDR*, namely improvements in operational effectiveness as a result of new technologies, was similar. It sought to establish a favorable “frictional imbalance” by reducing Clausewitz’s fog of war for the US military through advanced sensor systems. The goal of transformation was to develop, grow and harness that imbalance. By having superior information gathering, information processing and information dispersal, it would lead to decision superiority: “better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent can react.”²⁸⁵ Operational effectiveness would be achieved by having a quicker and better decision cycle than the adversary or enable the manipulation of the adversary’s OODA-loop.²⁸⁶ Being quicker and smarter than the adversary provided the basis for new military competitive advantage and sustaining US dominance.

At the tactical level, network-centric warfare was developed to reduce the fog of war, making the battlefield transparent, removing uncertainty and permitting increased speed of operations and hitting targets quicker. The operational advantage was that all friendly

281 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Concepts*, November 2003, p.8.

282 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), p. 44.

283 David S. Alberts, *Information Age transformation: getting to a 21st century military*, DOD Command and Control Research Program, 2002.

284 These ideas are derived from Geoffrey A. Moore, *Dealing with Darwin*, (New York: Portfolio, 2005).

285 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington DC, June 2000, p. 8.

286 For a full explanation of the intellectual origins of the OODA loop and John Boyd see Frans Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, (London: Routledge, 2006).

forces had the same operational picture (called situational awareness) and could self-synchronize.²⁸⁷ It would allow dispersed operations, reducing massed – and thus vulnerable – friendly concentrations of forces and enable synchronous instead of sequential action across the battlespace. The overall strategic effect would be quicker achievement of military objectives with fewer forces. It would reduce the military footprint, or number of forces on the ground, to the same effect. This improved the expeditionary nature of the deployed forces and the ability to project power. Admiral Owens, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996, wrote after reiterating that technology would be able to ‘pierce the fog of war’ creating a force:

*designed to exploit our lead in computer, sensing and communications technologies...It would be a force capable of achieving dominant battlespace knowledge and using it not only for general war but for maintaining peace. It would be a military that could, for the first time in history, pierce the fog of war, both minimizing American casualties, and winning the conflicts at hand. And waging war would be done for a cost of 20 percent less.*²⁸⁸

Joint Vision 2020 underlined the deterrent effect of such a transformed force and acknowledged that merely the anticipated presence of such a force could overwhelm the adversary into submission.²⁸⁹ Given the increased speed and distribution of operations, with multiple layers of systems, the opponent would face an overwhelming degree of complexity and possibly avoid confrontation altogether. As will be discussed later on, amongst others the Army’s Future Combat Systems arose from this concept. The power of the information revolution became critical to transformation.

10.4.3 TOFFLER & CEBROWSKI

Network-centric warfare was made possible by innovations in civilian information and communication technologies. Technologies originating from the civilian realm had historically led to shifts in warfare. Such was the case with the introduction of the telegraph, the radio and the railways. These technologies improved communications or mobility and created efficiencies in warfare and gave rise to new doctrine. They became a multiplier for the capabilities of the state. Changes in society similarly led to changes in warfare. The German Marshall Von Clausewitz alluded to this when he described how shifts in French

287 The central application of network-centric warfare in the battlefield is the principle of situational awareness; knowing where you, friendly forces and enemy forces are. The technology enabling it for the US Army is FBCB2 -Field Battle Command Brigade and Below - and Blue Force Tracker. This created a Common Operational Picture. Aside from this an integral part of network-centric warfare is the Global Information Grid. This is an information network which all US military systems, warfighters and policymakers use, modeled after the internet. See Government Accountability Office, “The Global Information Grid and Challenges facing its implementation,” GAO 04-858, July 2004.

288 William A. Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 2000), p. 202.

289 *Joint Vision 2020*, p.21.

political thinking enabled the *levée-en-masse*, the mass conscription, and increased the extractive capacity of the state.²⁹⁰ Von Clausewitz believed that this policy enabled the French army to fight with a higher “degree of energy.” The revolution had brought forth a shift in ideas which translated into the ability to mobilize vast resources of manpower for war.

In 1980 Alvin Toffler wrote a book about the linkages between societal progress and warfare, arguing that states wage war in the same way they create wealth.²⁹¹ He wrote that the extractive capacity of the state is influenced by the ‘age’ in which a society is; Agricultural, Industrial or Information. Preceding ages are trumped and rendered irrelevant in light of the next wave of warfare, Toffler argued. Just as the industrial era produced war-fighting capabilities superior to those of the agricultural era, the Information Age would overpower Industrial Age capabilities. More important, Toffler argued that Western societies were on the brink of moving from the Industrial age to the Information Age and warfare too was entering the Information Age, with the United States in the lead. His logic held that first-movers had a distinct advantage.

Particularly in the United States Toffler’s book had impact. Not surprisingly since it was American business that pioneered the Information Age. The World Wide Web – based on American innovations in the computing sector - led to a drastic remodeling of the business landscape and became an important engine of the American economy. It proved to be a new source of wealth, both for IT companies, as well as for traditional corporations that changed their business processes and organizational structures to take advantage of information technologies. As the dotcom-boom took off in the early 1990’s, Toffler’s argument captured the minds of Pentagon officials. The Pentagon also wanted part of it.

The person who was instrumental to promote this thinking was Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, former President of the Naval War College and the first director of the Office of Force Transformation, the Pentagon’s in-house think tank on transformation. “We live between two great chapters of human history, in the messy interspaces between the Industrial Age we are leaving and the Information Age we are entering,” Cebrowski wrote alluding to Toffler.²⁹² By making the change to an Information Age military the Pentagon could emulate the advances in competitive power in the business sector. According to Cebrowski: “Network-centric operations deliver to the US military the same powerful

290 “It is true that War itself underwent important alterations both in its nature and forms, which brought it nearer to its absolute form; but these changes were not brought about because the French Government had, to a certain extent, delivered itself from the leading-strings of policy; they arose from an altered policy, produced by the French Revolution, not only in France, but over the rest of Europe as well. This policy had called forth other means and other powers, by which it became possible to conduct War with a degree of energy which could not have been thought of otherwise. Therefore the actual changes in the Art of War are a consequence of alterations of policy; and, so far from being an argument for the possible separation of the two, they are, on the contrary, very strong evidence of the intimacy of their connexion.” Von Clausewitz, Anatol Rappaport, *On War* (New York: Penguin, 1968), p. 409.

291 Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave*, (New York: Pan, 1981).

292 Quoted in William A. Arkin, “Spiraling Ahead,” *Armed Forces Journal*, Commentary, February 2006. Available at <http://www.afj.com/2006/02/1813685>.

dynamics as they produced in American business.²⁹³ He later testified to Congress that the transformation from the Industrial Age to the Information Age was the central element of military reform and creating an Information Age military was a sine qua non for other efforts of military change.²⁹⁴

10.4.4 EMULATION FROM THE CORPORATE SECTOR

While AirLand Battle and System Warfare were conceptually its precursors, network-centric warfare was thrust forward by developments in the corporate sector. The central concept behind network-centrism is that digitizing information and making that information accessible in an organization that is structured as a network rather than a rigid hierarchy will create operational efficiencies. Transaction costs to distribute information fall drastically and the flow of information becomes a source of competitive advantage. This makes the computer and their cumulative network connections central to business. The technologies could not only reduce business operating costs through digitization, but more so enable businesses to be more responsive to the demands of the market or open up new ones. As companies transformed their operational structures to harness the increased competitiveness associated with internet-based technologies and instant communications, vast changes – or transformations - in the nature and shape of organizations occurred. Non-essential activities were outsourced, companies set up operations in different parts of the world where conditions were more favorable to their value-chain and new business models were pioneered, such as just-in-time supply. At the same time, networking technologies were leveling the playing field by decreasing barriers to entry and allowing new competitors to enter the market.²⁹⁵ Thus an internet start-up called Napster in 1999 could become a threat to major multinational entertainment industries. New markets were developed, such as online travel agents and bookstores, increasing customer value. Information technologies could reduce costs, provide new or more convenient services and improve customer intimacy while being more responsive to consumer demands. Computing and internet technologies became a source of economic wealth. If there was any doubt, by the mid-1990's the world's richest man had earned his fortune selling electronic '1's' and '0's'. Enthusiasts saw an information revolution that would change the shape of business competition. The lesson was that those that failed to harness this revolution would be out-competed by those that did: "Firms that invest in IT as a strategic resource for the future will survive. Those that do not will perish. Executives who invest in IT as one of their

293 Arthur K. Cebrowski & John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its origin and Future," *Proceedings*, January 1998.

294 "If this transformation does not succeed all of our other efforts in transformation will not likely bear fruit." Arthur K. Cebrowski, *Testimony on Military Transformation*, transcript of testimony delivered to Congress, Washington DC, April 9, 2002. Available at www.defenselink.mil.

295 See also Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2005).

primary strategic levers will thrive. Those who do not will be deselected.”²⁹⁶ Central to the Information Age is that it cuts both ways. It constituted an opportunity for those that were first-movers, yet it posed a strategic risk to those that did not.

Such thinking would spill over into the Pentagon, particularly with the Pentagon leadership. In the corporate realm the transformation to the Information Age had created operational efficiencies, increases in profits, and market leadership. In the military sector network-centric warfare would give the United States unparalleled competitive advantage.²⁹⁷ It could be a tool to increase state power. The 1997 QDR first outlined the need to incorporate the developments of the civilian IT sector into the military:

*We also need to take advantage of business process improvements being pioneered in the private sector. Over the past decade, the American commercial sector has reorganized, restructured, and adopted revolutionary new business and management practices in order to ensure its competitive edge in the rapidly changing global marketplace. It has worked. Now the Department [of Defense] must adopt and adapt the lessons of the private sector if our armed forces are to maintain their competitive edge in the rapidly changing global security arena.*²⁹⁸

The 1997 QDR drew explicit parallels between the corporate and the security environment. A RAND report in 2000 also advocated learning from the corporate sphere: “The breathtaking productivity gains that the information revolution is now yielding in the ‘new’ US economy cannot be dismissed as irrelevant by analysts and stewards of national defense.”²⁹⁹ The lessons the authors identified were output-focused processes such as the broad dissemination of information throughout the organization and non-hierarchical leadership, both improving flexibility within the organization. Robert Zoellick, former aide to Secretary of State Jim Baker and deputy Secretary of State in 2005 who would become the president of the World Bank in 2007, similarly understood transformation as the necessity to emulate the business community: “US companies that have not incorporated the revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies have been swept away by their competition with surprising rapidity. The Pentagon cannot afford to run a similar risk.”³⁰⁰ Like others, Zoellick understood Information Age transformation

296 Eric A. Marks, *Business Darwinism: Evolve or Dissolve, adaptive strategic for the information age*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), p.8.

297 Hema Prem & George Eby Mathew, “How Does Business Transformation Happen?,” *Cutting Edge* (Infosys, June 2006).

298 William Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, May 1997, p. ix.

299 David C. Gompert & Irving Lachow, *Transforming US Forces: Lessons from the Wider Revolution*, RAND Issue Paper, National Defense Research Institute 2000, p.12.

300 Robert Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), p. 77.

as critical to maintaining American military dominance, not only out of opportunity but also out of necessity. The advent of the Information Age, although pioneered in the United States, would shift the balance of power in the international system.




Figure 6: Networked Forces Outfight Non-Networked Forces

(Source: US Office of Force Transformation, 2007)

Many of the leading advocates of network-centric warfare collaborated in a series of publications sponsored by the Pentagon's Command and Control Research Program. In the late 1990's this program commissioned work to explore network-centric concepts, explicitly drawing on experiences from the civilian sector. One of its landmark publications was *Network-centric Warfare*. "War is a product of its age," the authors begin in reference to Toffler's concept of warfare in the Information Age. "In the commercial sector, dominant competitors have developed information superiority and translated it into a competitive advantage by making the shift to network-centric operations."³⁰¹ The US military should become an Information Age organization because, "organizations that have been able to fully leverage the power of information and information technologies... have dominated their competitive domains." It revealed the thinking in US military circles that network-centric warfare could be a holy grail. If the US military could harness the power of information technology it could "lock out" competitors and allow it to dominate warfare.³⁰² A period of endless American power dawned.

301 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein., *Network-centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, (Washington DC: DOD Command and Control Research Program, 1999), p.1.

302 Arthur K. Cebrowski, *Network-centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage*, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense, Washington DC, Winter 2003, p. 1.

Network-centric warfare increased operational effectiveness by creating a new source of military competitive advantage. Simply put, the dictum was that networked forces outfight non-networked forces.³⁰³ It resonated Toffler's concept that newer, Information Age warfare trumped older Industrial Age concepts. The principle is demonstrated in figure 6. It has two consequences. On the one hand, with the same amount of forces greater effects can be achieved than a traditional platform-centric force. On the other, fewer forces are required to achieve the same effects as a traditional force. It promised the possibility of substituting mass for information with greater cost efficiencies. It led Admiral Owens to embrace the bureaucratically powerful argument that network-centric warfare saves money.³⁰⁴

The principle of network-centric warfare is similar to its workings in the corporate sphere. Network-centric operations allow the dispersion of troops to create an operational advantage, just as companies have spread their operations or business-units to different countries around the globe to maximize the advantage of location. "Instead of concentrating forces to gain advantage, data sharing allows them to be scattered for advantage," Gompert and Lachow write.³⁰⁵ It makes the force more responsive to opportunities as they emerge. At the tactical level, forces are able to operate in a higher tempo. At the strategic level it allows objectives to be reached quicker and cheaper.

As a first-mover, it fostered the belief that the United States could dictate the terms of military competition. The rhetoric of dominance and the drive for market leadership infused the American transformation debate. This argument was particularly manifest at the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation (OFT). Its documents rationalized transformation as creating "overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives."³⁰⁶ John Garstka, one of the conceptual pioneers of network-centric warfare, described transformation as being either necessity-driven through a "rapid deterioration in an organization's competitive position" unable to respond to the competitive environment, or opportunity driven intent on shaping the market by developing new sources of competitive advantage.³⁰⁷ The latter was applicable to the United States. OFT defined transformation

303 Cebrowski (2003), p. 2.

304 Besides operational efficiencies in deployments, network-centric concepts would allow cost reductions for the military organisation through reducing overhead, streamlining infrastructure through base closure or realignments, reforming the acquisition process and outsourcing and privatizing support activities. The 1997 National Defense Panel report for instance stressed the necessity of changing the DOD acquisition process noting that system lead times must be reduced through greater use of commercial-off-the-shelf capabilities. See Owens (2000).

305 David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, *Transforming US Forces, lessons from the Wider Revolution*, RAND Issue Paper, National Defense Research Institute 2000.

306 Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*, Washington DC, p. 4.

307 John Garstka defined transformation as "sustained, purposeful change, often on a large scale, undertaken with the strategic objective of creating or maintaining competitive advantage, or of countering an advantage put in place by an existing or a new competitor." John J. Garstka, "The Transformation Challenge" Draft paper, provided to author.

foremost as a process to sustain strategic primacy by fighting wars differently, thus giving it unparalleled military advantage. Cebrowski said, “Transformation is meant to create new competitive areas and new competencies. ... Transformation is meant to identify and leverage new sources of power. The overall objective of these changes is simply—sustained American competitive advantage in warfare.”³⁰⁸ Testifying to Congress, he outlined that “the President and the Secretary have elevated transformation to the level of strategy, and that probably is the most important lens through which we should look at transformation. Strategy is about how one selects a competitive space and determines the attributes within that space which will lead to advantage. Strategy answers the fundamental question of how one controls the scope, pace and intensity of a competition.”³⁰⁹ Transformation thus touched the fundamental question of how the United States viewed the military instrument, how the United States could get the most value from its military forces and could remain dominant.

Controlling the ‘scope, pace and intensity of a competition’ reflected terminology used in the business management literature. This was echoed by Cebrowski’s successor, Terry Pudas, when he spoke of “developing and owning new competitive areas” by having “upstream influence” with the primary objective to “shape the future market.”³¹⁰ Cebrowski had also applied this thinking to explain the rationale for transformation advocating the “selection of a competitive space” in response to “falling barriers to competition” which were changing the terms of warfare.³¹¹ It meant looking ahead at what new sources of power may appear and to invest in those with the intent of leveraging their potential. The belief was prevalent that the United States, given its position as military hegemon based on high-tech capabilities, was able to define the terms on which military competition would be waged. The Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation saw the goal of transformation as creating an “agile, network-centric, knowledge-based force capable of...military operations against all potential future adversaries.”³¹² The Information Age force would sustain US primacy and transformation became an argument for increasing the operational effectiveness of the military.

308 Arthur K. Cebrowski, *What is Force Transformation*, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense at http://www.oft.osd.mil/what_is_transformation.cfm. (accessed July 4, 2005).

309 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Written testimony before United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, April 9, 2002.

310 Terry Pudas, Director, Office of Force Transformation, speaking at the National Defense University, January 30, 2007.

311 Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Elements of Defense Transformation,” Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, October 2004, p. 14.

312 Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,” Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, Fall 2003, p. i.

10.4.5 A BUSINESS MINDSET

The American strategy of transformation has much in common with a business-mindset, being intent to out-compete competitors in the field. US officials not only referred to business practices but also liked to quote business leaders when rationalizing transformation. Aside from the fact that many of the processes associated with defense transformation resonated tenets of the change programs that large corporations had gone through as a result of the introduction of information technology, American society looks up to successful CEOs. Speaking to Francis Fukuyama, professor at Johns Hopkins University, he said that much more than in Europe, US society looks advantageously at successful businesses. The cause, he said, lies in the role private entrepreneurship played in the development of the United States. Business made the US, while governments made Europe, Fukuyama said.³¹³ Thus Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric (GE) and best-selling author on changing a large traditional-era firm into a profit-making corporation, was regularly quoted during briefings from the Office of Force Transformation. Welch proved himself a strong proponent of developing learning organizations, developing a culture of continuously curious employees looking for best practices and opportunities to improve efficiencies. One of the central concepts Terry Pudas promoted was to provide richer information to more people on the battlefield to create an agile organization, able to respond quickly to opportunities and changing circumstances on the battlefield. Quoting Welch, Pudas said “ultimate competitive advantage lies in an organization’s ability to learn and rapidly transform that learning into action.” Similarly, forces in the field, needed to be ‘agile’ to respond to new threats and asymmetries. Welch further saw as the key to his success his strategy to sell all businesses in which GE was unable to become first or second in its market. According to Welch: “A company has only so much money and managerial time. Winning leaders invest where the payback is the highest. They cut their losses everywhere else.”³¹⁴ Other business management literature resonated this principle.³¹⁵ By translating Welch’s thinking to the military domain and using it to support the argument in favor of transformation neatly fit the US military’s focus on its primary competitive advantage, namely high-tech, high-intensity warfare. The market it would be number one in.

The business management literature conceptualizes three ways of coping with change: reacting to it, anticipating it and leading it.³¹⁶ As the world’s remaining superpower, the United States embraced a policy of the latter. In 1999, as a presidential candidate, George W. Bush said that “This [Information Age] revolution perfectly matches the strengths of

313 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.

314 Jack Welch, *Winning*, (New York: Collins Business 2005) p. 38.

315 The 2001 bestseller *Good to Great* similarly advanced the argument that great companies focus on what they know they can be best at and drop everything else. See Jim Collins, *Good to Great: why some companies make the leap...and others don't*, (New York: HarperBusiness, 2001).

316 Shona L. Brown & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, *Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured Chaos*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) p. 6.

our country – the skill of our people and the superiority of our technology. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”³¹⁷

Reliance on these business concepts was of course met with skepticism by some commentators. Frederick Kagan warned that the emphasis on operational effectiveness reflected a one-dimensional focus. Kagan wrote that the focus on efficiency would enable the US military to do one thing only, “even if they do it superbly well.” He continued:

*They will be able to identify, track and destroy enemy targets from thousands of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves. ... The business model that brought success to many companies in the 1990s will be adopted as the basis for this transformation, and all of America’s future success will rest upon this one capability and the applicability of this single model.*³¹⁸

From 2004 onwards operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would demonstrate the validity of this claim and demonstrate how the United States had primarily based its faith on war that could be won through superior technology.

10.5 TECHNOLOGICAL WAR

The belief that information technology could shape the nature of military competition has intellectual roots in the concept of ‘technological war’. It rests on the assumption that superior technology translates into superior state power and that remaining a step ahead in technological competition is sufficient to remain militarily dominant.

In 1968 the military strategist Stefan Possony – who contributed to the development of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative during his work at the Hoover Institution³¹⁹ - and science-fiction writer Jerry Pournelle captured the principle of focusing on technological innovation as the basis of national power. Entitled *The Strategy of Technology* the authors presented an argument of technological war, or military competition driven by technological innovation. It relies on the fundamental assumption that military technology can be translated into military power. This thinking resonated President Ronald Reagan’s strategy in the early 1980’s to ‘outspend’ and more importantly ‘out-innovate’ the Soviet Union.

A central concept of Possony and Pournelle is that superior technology deters military competition: “Military power may be...necessary to consolidate the victory, Possony and Pournelle write, “but the true aim of the Technological War is the denial, paralysis, and negation of all forms of hostile military power...Superiority must be constantly maintained and modernization must be continuous by a power that is determined not to end

317 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

318 Frederick W. Kagan, “A Dangerous Transformation,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 2003.

319 “Stefan Possony; Pioneered Air War Strategy in WW II,” *LA Times*, May 3, 1995. http://articles.latimes.com/1995-05-03/news/mn-61669_1_stefan-possony, accessed February 5, 2011.

the Technological War by destroying the enemy.”³²⁰ Technological superiority was believed to deter conflict. An anecdotal example appears in reference to the B-2. Air force colonel Robert Wheeler mentioned of the aircraft:

*Merely by having the B-2, we can better influence the decision-making process in rogue nations and encourage any other countries to perhaps go another route in their national defense. The stealth bomber is a diplomatic instrument as much as it is a military instrument.*³²¹

Many intellectual components of the ‘strategy of technology’ reappear in the operational effectiveness transformation of the late 1990’s. Network centric warfare was meant to give the US leverage over potential adversaries, shaping the future of military competition. In a landmark speech at the Citadel before his election George W. Bush said the source of the United States’ power was fleeting and technological innovation should be aggressively pursued. The strategic pause presented a window of opportunity. “[O]ur relative peace allows us to do this selectively. The real goal is to move beyond marginal improvements – to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies. To use this window of opportunity to skip a generation of technology.”³²² In 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went one step further to state that the objective of transformation was to “develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing.”³²³ It was an expression of achieving lock-out and resonated the thinking by Possony and Pournelle to sustain dominance through superior technology.

10.5.1 THE CONTINUOUS THREAT OF EMULATION

However, Possony and Pournelle were not exclusively optimistic. Technological innovation has a self-sustaining momentum to persistently continue to pursue change. They assumed that once technological innovation has occurred it is only a matter of time before it is emulated or offset by others: “Technology flows on without regard for human intentions, and each technological breakthrough offers the possibility for decisive advantages to the side that first exploits it. Such advantages will be fleeting, for although the weaker side does not have weapons based on the new technology yet, it is certain that it will have them in the near future. Under such circumstances, failure to exploit the capability advantage is treason [...]”³²⁴ It creates a perpetual cycle of innovation and at the same time demonstrates the fallacy in Rumsfeld’s thinking in the quote above. There is no finality in tech-

320 Stefan Possony & J.E. Pournelle, *The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War* (Amherst: University Press of Massachusetts, 1970) p.6.

321 Colonel Robert Wheeler, quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, “The Plane That Would Bomb Iran,” *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2007.

322 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

323 Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June 2002) p. 27.

324 Possony & Pournelle (1970), p.2.

nological change and it is fundamentally uncertain how long a particular advantage will last. Thus it is not possible to develop technologies that stop political-military competition.

Possony and Pournelle concluded that it is tantamount to ‘treason’ not to exploit capability advantages. This reveals a serious concern. Technological war’s stated objective is to “deny, paralyze and negate all forms of hostile military power” yet this remains elusive because emulation will always occur. While technological war is intent on avoiding military conflict, since the moment of technological superiority is by definition fleeting technological competition in fact increases the risk of conflict as the state is expected to take advantage of its technological superiority while it lasts. Only when there is parity are both sides mutually deterred. In other words, technological superiority in fact increases the likelihood that the military is used. This observation underlined US assumptions that transformation is pursued to make the military more usable for its defense policy. It is also observed in the fact that the United States has used the military persistently throughout the 1990’s rightly because of its technological edge.

The perpetual cycle of technological change reveals the logic for “skipping” a generation of technology, as Bush said in 1999. It is meant to retard the process of emulation by being several steps ahead of the competition in terms of technology. The goal, according to OFT’s director Terry Pudas, being to create overwhelming complexity through increasingly sophisticated military systems that would make resistance futile. Or phrased differently, to scale the ladder of technological innovation so high that the adversary becomes afraid of heights.

Two separate reports published in 1997 warned that US power projection capabilities based on the guided munitions revolution were in fact being compromised by technological innovations among adversaries. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States addressed the rising threat of ballistic missiles with possible payloads of weapons of mass destruction. The report focused on Russian, Chinese, North Korean, Iranian and Iraqi missile capabilities. The commission argued that “for those seeking to thwart the projection of US power, the capability to combine ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction provides a strategic counter to US conventional and information-based military superiority.”³²⁵ The authors of the report – under chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld and co-authored by Paul Wolfowitz - concluded that the United States was vulnerable to the emulation of this element of guided munitions. The National Defense Panel report similarly concluded that the guided munitions revolution not only favored the United States but potential adversaries as well. “Precision strikes, weapons of mass destruction, and cruise and ballistic missiles all present threats to our forward presence, particularly as stand-off ranges increase.”³²⁶ The report concluded the US should transform to cope with the consequences of other states catching up. The Report stated that

325 Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, Executive Summary, July 15, 1998.

326 Report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, Washington DC, December 1997, p.13.

“if we do not lead the technological revolution we will be vulnerable to it.”³²⁷ In other words, if the current opportunity was led to pass, others would adopt it first. Precisely those technologies which had been central to forming America’s ability to project power were now - coupled to weapons of mass destruction – creating anti-access and area-denial threats, jeopardizing US strategic freedom of action and its ability to project power. According to this logic, the post-Cold War window to shift to the Information Age was not a window of opportunity as much as it was as a necessity in response to shifts in the international distribution of power.

Even in a unipolar system, the ‘strategy of technology’ rationalized a self-perpetuating dynamic of technological innovation. Paradoxically, having developed particular technologies meant that it would only be a matter of time before a potential adversary emulates it. Steps should be taken to further improve the capability. It explains why there is persistent momentum to focus on next-generation platforms. For if the United States does not build them, a possible adversary may. The ‘strategy of technology’ similarly promotes a sizeable budget for research and development, as investments must be made in all areas of military competition. It produced an inward-looking dynamic. As Colin Gray critically comments; “It is difficult to resist the conclusion that in the minds of many the quest for revolutionary change, RMA, now transformation, comes perilously close to being an end in itself.”³²⁸ It serves to demonstrate that US operational effectiveness transformation had its own, self-sustaining dynamic.

10.5.2 LINEAR THINKING

Cebrowski’s right-hand man, John Garstka was among those that recognized the Information Age would in time be adopted by others.³²⁹ Only because the US corporate sector had pioneered the widespread introduction of information technologies was the United States military at an initial advantage. However if it would let this opportunity pass, others would grab it. The pace of change, Garstka writes, “demands that we change while we are still at the top of our game in order to survive the next wave.”³³⁰ Likewise, Terry Pudas reasoned that given American unipolarity, “ours is the team against which everyone measures themselves, and to the extent we do not transform we provide would-be adversaries a fixed target.”³³¹ Competitive advantage is fleeting. As Shona Brown and Kathleen Eisenhardt write, “Treat any strategy as temporary.”³³² A US Army video about the Future Combat

327 *National Defense Panel Report*, 1997, p. 8.

328 Colin S. Gray, *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the Sovereignty of context*, February 2006, p. 11.

329 Needless to say, there were many more transformation enthusiasts who shared this view. However, given the central position within the transformation debate, the Office of Force Transformation played a specific role.

330 John J. Garstka, “Understanding Information Age Warfare,” p. xiii.

331 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Written testimony before United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, April 9, 2002.

332 Shona L. Brown & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, *Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured*

System quoted Admiral Cebrowski outlining the thrust of this thinking: “Either you create your future, or you become the victim of the future someone creates for you.”³³³ Network-centric warfare was considered to be the emerging way of war and something to which other adversaries would also resort. It demonstrated linear thinking in US operational effectiveness transformation. The key idea was that the US, given its hegemonic position, was ahead of other potential adversaries and that they had to pursue a path of emulation to balance US military power. Admiral Cebrowski wrote in the fall of 2003 that if the United States failed to transform, its strategic dominance was at risk: “They are watching... We stand still at our peril... if we do not transform our enemies will surely find new ways to attack us.”³³⁴ Transformation was a must in order to stay ahead.

This thinking illustrates the fallacy associated with US operational effectiveness transformation. It was pursued according to the logic that the United States was – almost literally – in front of possible competitors on a ladder of technological innovation. The metaphor of the ladder is relevant since it captures this linear understanding. That ladder was held to be high-intensity warfare. It promoted the logic to “skip” a generation of technology and a belief that dominance would be sustained. It was a line of reasoning based on the notion that the United States had led military competition from the end of the Cold War onwards, because it led the military-technological competition. Warfare was understood to be major combat operations. The United States could thus focus on making high-intensity operations more complex and rapid, able to overwhelm any adversary. It was not anticipated that American military strength could be negated by shifting the realm of warfare away from force-on-force high-tech military confrontations as happened in the context of the Iraq insurgency. For it would mean that there were different ladders to scale.

10.5.3 VAN RIPER’S WAR-GAME

One of the clearest expressions of the linear thinking of operational effectiveness transformation became apparent during a war-game held in 2002. Millennium Challenge 2002 was a \$250 million simulation involving 13,500 people organized by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk.³³⁵ The war-game was presented as the “largest, most complex military experiment” that had ever been conducted. General Kernan, commander of JFCOM, said the war-game had as objective, “to determine the extent to which our forces are able to establish and maintain knowledge superiority, assure access into and throughout the battle space, leverage all national elements of power, and sustain ourselves as we conduct operations against adversaries that may come at us very differently than we have experi-

Chaos, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998).

333 Admiral A. Cebrowski (rtd) quoted in US Army video, *Future Combat Systems – North Korea 2014*, posted at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjsycklJg> (accessed May 15, 2008).

334 Arthur K. Cebrowski, *Military Transformation, a Strategic Approach*, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, Fall 2003, foreword.

335 Fred Kaplan, “War-gamed: why the Army shouldn’t be so surprised by Saddam’s moves,” *Slate Magazine*, March 28, 2003.

enced in the past.”³³⁶ The assumptions underlying the exercise were based on the promise of network-centric warfare. The General said:

*the bottom line upfront is we want to know as much about our adversary as possible, more than he knows about himself, whoever that adversary may be, that we can shut them down very quickly and very effectively, with the least amount of damage and loss of life...*³³⁷

The war-game was designed to test the principles of Joint Vision 2020 including information and decision superiority. General James Smith, JFCOM’s deputy commander, said “[Millennium Challenge 2002] will look at leveraging the information revolution to change the way we fight.”³³⁸ To Secretary Rumsfeld, the exercise was a test of the concepts underlying transformation: “This exercise will ... not only test the effectiveness of the force, but also the progress we have made thus far in transforming to produce the combat capability necessary to meet the threats and the challenges of the 21st century.”³³⁹

Held from July 24 to August 15 2002, the scenario was set in 2007 where a rogue general in a Middle-Eastern country – a mix between Iraq and Iran – threatens US interests, leading to war. Retired Lieutenant-General Paul van Riper was asked to command the Red Force, simulating the opponent. Van Riper was an avid opponent of the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs. In 1999 Van Riper had said the military had “oversold unrealistic promises” with respect to operational effectiveness transformation.³⁴⁰ Nor did he believe in the concept of ‘clean wars’ which transformation-enthusiasts had alluded to.³⁴¹

During the war-game Van Riper summarily defeated the US naval force by using asymmetric tactics. He for instance used salvos of cruise missiles to saturate US defensive capabilities. He also deployed a flotilla of small, high-speed boats – some of them filled with explosives – swarming around the naval vessels to confuse and overwhelm the US

336 General William F. Kernan, “General Kernan Briefs on Millennium Challenge 2002,” July 18, 2002. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/07/mil-020718-dod02.htm>.

337 Ibid.

338 Maryann Lawlor, “Facing the Challenges of the New Millennium: Tactics, Strategy change to meet today’s threats,” *Signal Magazine*, July 2002. Available at http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=99&zoneid=6.

339 Donald Rumsfeld, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Media Availability With Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Norwegian MoD,” July 29, 2002. Available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3621>.

340 Lt. General Paul Van Riper, “Remarks on United States and NATO Military Operations Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, April 28, 1999.

341 “‘War means fighting and fighting means killing.’ What we are seeing is what people wish war was, not what it is in reality. It is a terrible, bloody, dangerous business...” General Van Riper, “Remarks on United States and NATO Military Operations Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington DC, April 28, 1999.

Navy. He relayed the message to attack through minarets at the time of prayer, rather than electronic command and control signals. Sixteen ships were sunk, including an aircraft carrier. Several tens of thousands of fictitious marines were dead.

The results were so devastating that the war-game was stopped and the US fleet was refloated. In response to the explanation he received from JFCOM Van Riper said: "A phrase I heard over and over was: "That would never have happened," ... and I said: nobody would have thought that anyone would fly an airliner into the World Trade Centre...but nobody seemed interested."³⁴² It went from bad to worse. As the game got underway again, Van Riper wanted to use chemical agents to prevent an amphibious landing of US forces, but was prohibited from doing so because it would restrict US operational freedom. Furthermore, Van Riper was only allowed to use electronic communications and satellite phones, rather than his method of broadcasting through minarets or messengers, so the US could eavesdrop on his communications. Finally, at times his air defense systems were shut down to enable US forces to operate. Van Riper quit the war-game in frustration. He complained that it was a scripted exercise in which he had no chance of winning. As Van Riper recalled later on:

Unfortunately, in my opinion, neither the construct nor the conduct of the exercise allowed for the concepts of rapid decisive operations, effects-based operations, or operational net assessment to be properly assessed... [I]t was in actuality an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue 'win.'... You don't come to a conclusion beforehand and then work your way to that conclusion. You see how the thing plays out.³⁴³

Furthermore, the events of the war-game were downplayed by US military officials. The results of the simulation should have sent the message that "dominant battlespace awareness" and "information superiority" had their limits in practice, that asymmetric tactics could deny transformed US forces their strengths and have tempered the cabal surrounding presumed superiority resulting from transformation. Instead, senior military officials, among them the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to great lengths to illustrate why the real war would not have happened the way it did in the simulation. They argued that the Blue Force had unrealistic vulnerabilities and that the vulnerabilities exploited by Van Riper could never have occurred in a real-life situation given the game's constraints.³⁴⁴ They also engaged in a semantic explanation noting the differences between

342 Lt. General Paul Van Riper, quoted in Julian Borger, "Wake-Up Call," *The Guardian*, September 6, 2002.

343 Sean Naylor, "War Games Rigged?" *Army Times*, August 16, 2002. See also James Meek, "All at Sea," *The Guardian*, January 21, 2004.

344 "In Millennium Challenge, you had several cases of experimentation going on at the same time you had exercises going on... if what the opposition force commander wanted to do at a particular time in the experiment was going to change the experiment to the point where the data being collected was no longer going to be valid as an experiment, then he was asked not to do that" Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace, "DoD News Briefing -

exercises and experiments, and how this meant different things for the Red Force.³⁴⁵ What remains however is that General Kernan said prior to the war-game: "...this is free play. The OPFOR [opposing forces] has the ability to win here."³⁴⁶

There was of course much riding on this largest, most expensive war-game held to date. A "win" was necessary to validate the US concept of transformation. Van Riper's experiences however suggest that JFCOM had fallen victim to groupthink. "Nothing was learned from this," Van Riper later said. "A culture not willing to think hard and test itself does not augur well for the future."³⁴⁷ It strengthened opponents that said network-centric warfare was an untested idea. Colonel Douglas Macgregor, for instance testified to Congress in 2004 that Army experimentation was reminiscent of the queen in Alice in Wonderland: "first the verdict, then the trial!"³⁴⁸ Already in 1997 Van Riper had mentioned the risk of linear thinking with respect to transformation. Testifying to Congress he had said: "To decide now that we know and understand the coming revolution (or revolutions) in military affairs will more than likely close down a number of potentially significant options."³⁴⁹ After the Millennium Challenge 02 war-game Van Riper said about transformation: "I have no truck with those who talk about terms like transformation. It clearly indicates they don't know what they're doing. All it is a slogan rather than getting to the hard problems. ... These ideas have never truly been vetted, and yet they're being sold to our headquarters, our services, as the way we want to fight in the future. ... Rather than trying to think our way through the problem, we're trying to buy our way. So we had to buy our way in terms of technology; we buy our way in terms of some of these ideas without the underpinnings of real bases that you can fight on."³⁵⁰

Transformation was triggered by the end of the Cold War which spelled a moment of unipolarity for the United States. The United States was geared to prevent the rise of a peer competitor and sustain its position of strategic dominance. Network-centric warfare

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace," August 20, 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3595>.

- 345 US Department of Defense, "Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned", September 17, 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3653>.
- 346 General Kernan, "General Kernan Briefs on Millennium Challenge 2002," July 18, 2002. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/07/mil-020718-dod02.htm>.
- 347 Julian Borger, "Wake-Up Call," *The Guardian*, September 6, 2002.
- 348 Quote taken from Douglas Macgregor, "Army transformation: Implications for the Future," testimony before the United States House Armed Services committee, Washington DC, July 15, 2004.
- 349 Lt. General P. van Riper, "Information Superiority," Testimony before the Procurement Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, US Congress, March 20, 1997.
- 350 Lt. General P. van Riper, "Interview with PBS: Frontline," October 26, 2004. Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/vanriper.html>. Accessed April 23, 2008.

evolved as crucial elements in a strategy to wage conventional wars with ever more efficiency. The way US transformation was given shape could not have occurred during another distribution of power than the unipolar moment of the 1990's. The window of opportunity to invest in the Information Age coincided with a window of opportunity based on the strategic pause to further unipolarity. Neoclassical realism suggests that mobilizing Information Age capabilities was a means to improve resource extraction to sustain the American position of power. The technological innovations associated with network-centric warfare improved the military's relevance. As will be made apparent later on, events in the security environment, exemplified by counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, would test these assumptions underlying transformation.

However, before we move on to that period, we must identify the domestic factors that shaped US operational effectiveness transformation. It is not possible to explain US transformation and its normative elements purely through this system-level dynamic. Strategic culture intervened to provide the context for the US pursuit of interventionism and its reliance on high-intensity combat. Unipolarity meant that these intervening variables figured much stronger, as an unchallenged military power could expand its moralist agenda with impunity. It implied that the United States pursued a policy to promote the values of the American Revolution with greater resolve than before. This gave increased momentum to push forward with transformation.

11 STRATEGIC CULTURE AND US TRANSFORMATION

“Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment.”

– George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796

11.1 A SYMBOL OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

Atop the United States Capitol in Washington DC sits the statue *Freedom*. The white-marble building - itself an expression of American nationalism and political power - is adorned with a bronze allegorical figure attesting to US national identity. Cast in bronze by the sculptor Thomas Crawford *Freedom* was placed atop the dome in 1863, to celebrate the Union victory. The female figure holds a sheathed sword loosely in one hand and a laurel in the other. Prepared to defend freedom yet trusting in victory the statue stands as a reference to Freedom at arms. The relation between freedom and the use of force is closer still when looking at *Freedom's* headdress, a helmet. The original design by Crawford was to have her wear a Phrygian cap, the cap adorned by Roman slaves liberated from servi-

tude. However, its reference to slavery was considered too delicate at the time.³⁵¹ Instead, she wears a helmet featuring an eagle's head, feathers and the thirteen stars representing the states united. It was a reflection of America's ideological roots.

The American self-perceived role in the world is shaped by a belief that it can bring freedom across the globe and that this constitutes an American calling. Central is a civic religion based on liberty, and the idea that to protect or advance it the use of force is - at times - justified. It is an ideology based on a liberating tradition, which goes back to the Revolutionary war, and now serves as a moral compass for its foreign and security policy and a justification for the use of force. This is the necessary paradigm to understand, as freedom and the liberating power of warfare have shaped the American strategic outlook. They are the concepts through which American statesmen have framed the world and the role of the United States in it.

11.2 WATCHMEN OF FREEDOM

The Information Age promised a system-wide shift in military capability. Innovations in civilian technology were interpreted as opportunities to advance US military power and sustain the American position of primacy as the strategically dominant power in the system. The shift in external opportunity gave rise to a revamped foreign policy, in which conventional warfare and the use of force became an accepted instrument of foreign policy. Unipolarity offered the conditions for America's strategic culture to flourish and express itself more clearly, unconstrained by the limitations of a more restrictive international environment. Since its founding days the United States considers itself a liberating power and a defender of Freedom. Exceptionalism, vindicationism, and an emphasis on human agency in shaping history together produce a tendency in foreign policy towards unilateralism and interventionism in order to promote democracy and advance US values abroad. Even when vital interests are pursued the political justification relies on these tenets. Recall that the United States' official definition for transformation contains a normative element, namely that American strength underpins global peace and stability. The use of the military is considered amenable to America's overall normative objective "to promote a balance of power that favors freedom."³⁵² These normative components are reaffirmed by US exceptionalist thinking and are principles that have remained constant throughout American history.

351 David Hackett Fischer, *Liberty and Freedom*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.299.

352 The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington DC, September 2002, p. 1. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>.



Figure 7: The Statue “Freedom” Coronating the US Capitol and Symbol of American Strategic Culture.

(Source: Architect of the Capitol, Washington DC, <http://www.aoc.gov/cc/art/freedom.cfm>)

American exceptionalism refers to the notion that the United States is qualitatively different from all other countries.³⁵³ It is based on the concept of the American Creed.³⁵⁴ More specifically, in the realm of foreign policy it refers to the widespread belief that the United States is unique and has a specific role to play in the world. Derived from its founding principles and reaffirmed by subsequent administrations, exceptionalism is the overarching notion, comparable to a national cultural myth, that the American Revolution has endowed it with certain characteristics that make it exceptional. It produces a moralist undertone in US foreign policy, a belief in the benevolent nature of its actions, but also drives the pursuit of absolute security, befitting of an exceptional country. If exceptionalism is the engine of US strategic culture, vindicationism is its fuel. It entails the belief that the United States has a mission to promote the values of the American Revolution beyond its borders,

353 Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996) p. 18.

354 See Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy*, (New York: Harper, 1944).

primarily those of Freedom and Democracy, and by force if necessary.³⁵⁵ It rests on the belief that absolute security can be attained through the export of the US political system. It has endowed it with innate momentum to pursue great power status. The third element is an agency-focused perspective on social and political affairs. In social-economic policy it is expressed through distinct individualism and entrepreneurship. In strategic culture it portrays the understanding that security threats are actor-related rather than based on structures and institutions. This has created an emphasis on adversarial approaches to security threats and has strengthened a force-on-force understanding of warfare. It has led the United States to follow a security policy singling out specific actors as threats, and seeking their removal. This has developed a focus on high-intensity combat operations to deal with security threats. Along with vindicationism, and exceptionalism it has promoted the perspective that wars are at times necessary. Military interventions are conceptualized as chapters in the liberating mission started by the American Revolution and military technology is viewed as making their removal more efficient. Historically the United States has cultivated these elements. They have remained constant in spite of changes in the international distribution of power, or the political color of the White House and interact with the system-level factors to give shape to US transformation. Neoconservatism for instance, rather than being an anomaly of US political culture, is one particular, yet extreme, apparition of these elements of US political and strategic culture.³⁵⁶

In US strategic culture exceptionalism reflects a belief in an American *Sonderweg* in security policy. “America’s security role in the world is unique,” the *Quadrennial Defense Review* in 2001 stated.³⁵⁷ But rather than be a product of a unipolar system, the United States has always seen itself as different from other countries. It has produced both isolationism and international interventionism. Before the US became a superpower it promoted exemplarism and isolationism. As the United States grew stronger exceptionalism translated into interventionist behavior, not shying away from the military instrument.³⁵⁸

Following the end of the Cold War, unipolarity allowed these domestic tenets to be expressed with greater verve. It added to the momentum to develop a military that was able to rapidly and decisively defeat possible adversaries, climaxing in the principle of preventive warfare. Andrew Bacevich writes: “The RMA was peculiarly suited to the outlook, interpretation of history, and expectations of the future then au courant among American elites.”³⁵⁹

355 For a description of vindicationism in relation to US foreign policy see Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” *International Security*, vol.29, nr. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112 – 156.

356 For a review of the different foreign policy schools and their relation to US political culture see Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence*, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002).

357 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001*, Washington DC, September 30, 2001, p. 1.

358 See Monten (2005).

359 Bacevich (2005), p. 169.

11.2.1 US EXCEPTIONALISM

American exceptionalism encompasses the belief that the United States is further ahead on a universal path of history and that it has a mission to guide other people along its way. The ideology posits the US in a natural leadership role. Exceptionalism is premised on the American Creed as the basis of American political culture.³⁶⁰ The Creed reflects the tenets of the American Revolution: liberty, equality of opportunity, individualism, populism and laissez-faire.³⁶¹ While other states have a common language, ethnicity or geography to serve as the basis of national identity, to Americans a unifying force lies in the appeal of these ideals and the political system it brought forth. More than any other state in the West, national identity has been connected to its political traditions and institutions. As Samuel Huntington writes: “the United States has no meaning, no identity, no political culture or even history apart from its ideals of liberty and democracy and the continuing efforts of Americans to realize those ideals.”³⁶² He further elaborated that, “the nature of the United States has left it little or no choice but to stand out among nations as the proponent of liberty and democracy.”³⁶³ The historian Richard Hofstadter observed that “it has been our [American] fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.”³⁶⁴ Francis Fukuyama, professor of international political economy at John Hopkins University, noted that being American is intimately connected to the nature of the American political system. The US national identity cannot be disconnected from its founding principles of democracy and liberty, since the American Revolution as such has never been overturned. While the United States is not unique for using its founding values as the basis for its international policy, it is unique because the American political system continues nearly unchanged since its creation to this day.³⁶⁵ American political institutions were the product of the revolutionary spirit of 1776 and have not changed substantially over the past 250 years. The persistence of these institutions reaffirms the belief in American exceptionalism and explains why Americans continue to invoke the Founding Fathers in official rhetoric. American exceptionalism is thus based on the continued connection of today’s challenges to the ideals of 1776. Something that comes across as anachronistic to outsiders, yet which is of importance to this study as it relays a consistency in how the United States views itself and the world.

The persistence of the political-philosophical link to the Founding Fathers also

360 See G. K. Chesterton, *What I Saw in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1922) and Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy*, (New York: Harper, 1944). The term “American Creed” was originally coined by Chesterton.

361 Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, (Cambridge, MA: Bellknap Press, 1983), p.14. Huntington substitutes the last two tenets for “democracy and the rule of law under a constitution.”

362 Ibid, p.36.

363 Ibid, p. 255.

364 Quoted in Michael Kazin, “The Right’s Unsung Prophet,” *The Nation*, 248 (February 20, 1989), p. 242.

365 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.

explains why the histories of the Founding generation still inspire vast volumes of books published yearly. Quotes by Founding Fathers are omnipresent in political speeches and strategy documents. For instance, the introduction to the 1997 National Defense Panel report ends with a quote by Thomas Paine.³⁶⁶ Even a doctrinal document such as the Army's Field Manual ends a chapter with a reference to the Declaration of Independence and General Washington's "moral courage," "selfless leadership" and "personal sacrifice for the greater common good," noting that "today's Soldiers continue [Washington's] legacy of sacrifice and selfless service."³⁶⁷ Belief in American exceptionalism is widespread, including among those at the highest levels of the political system. Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State writes:

My own inclination is to say 'Bunk' to those who argue that America is not an exceptional country. I can point to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Gettysburg Address, the role of the United States in two World Wars, and the example of America's multiracial, multiethnic democracy and ask: what country can compare? A few are as big, some are as free, many have admirable qualities, but none has had the same overall positive influence on world history and none has been as clearly associated with opportunity and freedom.³⁶⁸

Belief in America's exceptional role in the world remains very much alive.

11.2.2 THE CIVIC RELIGION OF FREEDOM

The ideals of the American Revolution enunciated in 1776 persist to this day as a primary public reference for the conduct of government in internal and external affairs. Thirty-three years before *Freedom* found her place on top of the Capitol the French political commentator Alexis de Tocqueville travelled through the United States observing a "holy worship of freedom."³⁶⁹ The cult-like promotion of freedom he encountered was the product of the exuberance over the successful struggle against the British. Then, influenced by enlightenment ideals, most notably Locke's political philosophy espousing that legitimate government be stooled upon the 'consent of the governed,' and fed by continuous discord over

366 The quote reads: "Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must undergo the fatigue of supporting it."

367 United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1*, Chapter 4 (2005). <http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter4.html>. The full paragraph reads: "George Washington's moral courage and selfless leadership preserved the ideal of civilian control of the military. Washington's actions at Newburgh show what selfless service to the Nation means-enduring personal sacrifice for the greater common good and rejecting personal gain that comes at the Nation's expense. Today's Soldiers continue his legacy of sacrifice and selfless service."

368 Madeleine Albright, *Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and World Affairs*, (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), p. 31.

369 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, and Two Essays on America*, (London: Penguin, 2003) p. 22.

‘taxation without representation’ the American colonies drifted on a course towards Revolution against King George III and the British Parliament. It culminated in 1776 when Thomas Paine, a virulent anti-colonial and one of the later Founding Fathers, advocated in his essay *Common Sense* that freedom be taken by force and the United States be founded as a refuge for the oppressed:

*Freedom hath been hunted around the globe. Asia and Africa have long expelled her. Europe regards her as a stranger and England hath given her warning to depart. O! Receive the fugitive and prepare in time an asylum for all mankind.*³⁷⁰

Based on 18th century liberal rationalism and Protestant sectarianism, it evolved in to a concept known as the American Creed. The Creed promotes a sense of optimism and entrepreneurial spirit to engineer the unknown world as a haven for free man. Since at the time these tenets were unique to the American experiment – Europe was mostly a collection of monarchies, despotic regimes and fiefdoms - the American Creed gave rise to an idea of exceptionalism. The philosopher John Gray argues that American exceptionalism has its roots in Christianity and Enlightenment thinking.³⁷¹ The Creed indeed has a providential lining as it is infused with the history of the religious beginnings of the American colonies, founded as a safe haven for the religiously oppressed. It turned into a civic religion based on, “the sacred origin of individual rights . . . and the American sense of duty to defend freedom at home and, at times, abroad.”³⁷² And as religions do, it contained an element of conversion.³⁷³

11.2.3 THE CITY ON A HILL

Fleeing religious oppression in the 17th century, pilgrims left the European continent in search of a better life. For those that did, parallels with the biblical exodus from Egypt were straightforward. Aboard the *Arbella* that would take him to New England, John Winthrop the soon-to-be governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony spoke in 1630 of the New World in these terms,

*For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.*³⁷⁴

370 Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 33.

371 See John Gray, *Al Qaeda and What it means to be modern*, (New York: the New Press, 2003).

372 John Meacham, *American Gospel*, (New York: Random House, 2006) p. 27.

373 John Gray has argued that the American Revolution was a form of religion pursued by other means. John Gray, *Black Mass* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2007), p.2.

374 John Winthrop, quoted in Meacham (2006), p. 46-47.

The allusion to the city on a hill was taken from Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, and became an icon of American political rhetoric.³⁷⁵ Winthrop's sermon was interpreted to forebode America's missionary character as a force to promote freedom in the world. Three and a half centuries later, President Ronald Reagan among others, alluded to it when underlining his vision that America was an exceptional country with an agenda to further freedom. Adding an optimistic adjective, he described America as 'a shining city upon a hill' and promised that the United States was "the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom."³⁷⁶

The belief that the United States was at the vanguard of history can be traced to the early Pilgrims, but has been reinforced ever since. Thomas Paine wrote that: "we have it in our power to begin the world over again. A situation similar to the present has not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand, and a race of men, perhaps as numerous as all Europe contains, are to receive their portion of freedom from the event of a few months."³⁷⁷ This thinking was reflected in the founding documents of the young republic. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution both contain references to the providential nature of the political freedoms they are meant to protect.³⁷⁸

Religious connotations can be found everywhere in American political symbols, such as the Liberty Bell which holds an inscription from the book of Leviticus.³⁷⁹ The Liberty Bell was rung on June 6, 1944, D-Day, its tolling broadcast over radio, intent on reminding people around the world that the liberation of Europe had begun. Later, Ronald Reagan would say that such religious motives were key to the American identity. "If you take away the belief in a greater future, Reagan said "you cannot explain America – that we're a people who believed there was a promised land; we were a people who believed we were chosen by God to create a greater world."³⁸⁰

Throughout forty-three presidencies, all important political speeches have included a confirmation of the civic religion of freedom.³⁸¹ It remains a constant factor in political

375 Matthew 5: 14-16 "You are the light of the world. A city on a hill cannot be hidden. Neither do people light a lamp and put it under a bowl. Instead they put it on its stand, and it gives light to everyone in the house. In the same way, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven."

376 Ronald Reagan, "Inaugural Address," Washington DC, January 20, 1981.

377 Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, (New York: Random House, 2003) p. 49.

378 The Declaration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." The opening lines of the Constitution read: "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union...and secure the Blessings of Liberty...establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

379 The inscription reads: "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land, and unto all the inhabitants Thereof"

380 Ronald Reagan, cited in Albright (2006), p. 28.

381 See John Meacham, *American Gospel*, (New York: Random House, 2006).

rhetoric and contemporary presidents and politicians keep this ideology alive. It became a justification for policy. The author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, declared that: “[t]he God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.”³⁸² In the 21st century President George W. Bush’s rhetoric was eerily reminiscent when during his third State of the Union Address in the run-up to the Iraq War he said that: “the liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity.”³⁸³

11.2.4 FREEDOM AND JOHN LOCKE

It is difficult to overestimate the measure to which the concept of Freedom is central to American political identity. The historian Eric Foner writes that, “devotion to freedom formed the essence of American nationalism.”³⁸⁴ Freedom constituted the grand idea that mobilized support for the Revolutionary war and ownership of Freedom is claimed by all domestic political schools of thought. From those that believe in the right to bear arms and are “protecting freedom” to the pro-choice advocates that believe they have the liberty to decide over their own body in relation to abortion, freedom is the dominant cognitive concept through which the American political experience is framed.³⁸⁵ The term has been employed by activists and politicians on all sides of the political spectrum and on a multitude - if not all – topics of political relevance.³⁸⁶ Not egalitarianism, but economic freedom dictates the objectives of US government in social-economic policy, while conservatives argue that individuals should be free to go about their business without external interference from the state. Intimately linked to Freedom is democracy since it reflects political freedom.

The political philosophy of the 17th century English philosopher and physician John Locke provides the intellectual basis for the prominence of political freedom in the United States.³⁸⁷ Locke’s argument, based on Enlightenment thinking and its emphasis on human reason, defended natural rights of life, liberty and property and promoted the view that the legitimacy and authority of a government is vested in the “consent of the governed”. The principle is echoed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and in Wash-

382 Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” July 1774.

383 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 28, 2003.

384 Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: Norton & Co., 1998), p. 16.

385 *Ibid.*, p.299, 328.

386 “Industrial freedom”, “economic freedom”, “wage slavery”, “civil liberties”, even the movement to institute women’s suffrage argued that it was essentially an act of liberation rather than a measure of equality. In the 1920s new kitchen appliances were introduced under the heading that “cooking slavery” had come to an end. Left-wing politicians framed social welfare provided by the state in terms of liberating citizens from social burdens such as healthcare and unemployment. See Foner (1998), p.163-218.

387 John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*. ed. Peter Laslett. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*. (London: William Tegg & Co., 1849).

ington's Farewell Address in 1796.³⁸⁸ Central to Locke's thesis is the principle of *Tabula Rasa*. It means that man is a blank slate (*tabula rasa* in Latin) and that man is essentially free of a pre-ordained position in society and his future is his for the making. At the time, it presented a radical departure from the structuralist thinking dominant in Europe, with its feudal, aristocratic and rigid, if not hereditary, social structures. Locke however embraced the concept of individual responsibility, and marked the path for the principle of social mobility which would be central to the American belief in equal opportunity and the pursuit of happiness. It was inherently optimistic as it affirmed the ability of man to improve society rather than see this as static, as was the case in the monarchies of Britain and France at the time. Conversely, it bred an individualistic agency-focused perspective on history, and saw structures as subordinate to individual action in determining human behavior.

Locke's individualism was reinforced by the dominance of a wide variety of religious Protestant congregations in the United States, instead of a single state-church. Protestantism also stressed the centrality of the individual as opposed to the hierarchical institutions prevalent in Catholicism. While religious tolerance had led the United States to open its arms to a wide range of denominations, it also served a different purpose. The Founding Fathers, intent on avoiding the creation of a state-church that had caused war and repression in the Old World, openly embraced the sects which, given their multitude, minimized the risk of one achieving dominance. Likewise it meant a strong role for religion and moralism in public life, including in foreign policy.

The appeal of Locke's thinking, and the level to which his individualism was institutionalized in the US political system also helps explain why the growth of socialist movements, which thrived in the rigid class-based societal structures found in Europe, was marginal in the United States. Influenced by Locke's Libertarian principles American politics focused on individuals and local communities rather than socio-economic structures.³⁸⁹ As Seymour Martin Lipset writes, the lack of a socialist movement became one of the defining elements of US exceptionalism.³⁹⁰ A foreign policy based on an agency-focused approach evolved from it.

388 In the Farewell Address, George Washington said: "...The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government...".

389 While the Democratic party has focused more on socio-economic, structuralist policy than the Republicans, this remains less so than European social-democratic parties. I extend thanks to Professor F. Fukuyama for addressing this point.

390 Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword*, (W.W. Norton: New York, 1996), p. 23.

11.3 EXPRESSIONS OF US STRATEGIC CULTURE

11.3.1 GEORGE WASHINGTON'S EXCEPTIONALISM

US exceptionalist thinking is rooted in both ideology as well as practical realist considerations. After its founding the United States distanced itself from the machinations of power politics in Europe which had led to multiple wars. Exceptionalism implied a belief that the dynamics of international politics that affected European states did not hold for the US. It was apparent in George Washington's 1796 Farewell Address:

*Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities... Our detached and distant [geographic] situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course...when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.*³⁹¹

Exceptionalism was reinforced by geography. Cushioned by the Atlantic Ocean, the United States could sail the seas of an independent foreign policy. Washington called for maximizing American freedom of action and isolating the US from the toils of European *realpolitik*. Washington asked: "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice?" Washington was however not an idealist, but a staunch realist intent on maximizing American freedom of action cloaked in the rhetoric of idealism.³⁹² For his Farewell Address was an appeal for self-reliance that would also be resonated by subsequent presidents.³⁹³ Joseph Ellis, a historian of the Founding Fathers, attributes the following words to George Washington in relation to the Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793. They shed light on Washington's longer-term horizons. "Twenty years peace with such an increase of population and resources as we have a right to expect: added to our remote situation from the jarring powers, will in all probability enable us in a

391 George Washington, "Farewell Address," September 19, 1796.

392 Washington's premise that the United States should remain at a distance from the dealings of the major powers in Europe was based on a realist understanding of the weak position of the young republic. Washington was keenly aware of the critical role played by France in enabling the American military victory, amongst others in his close friendship with the Marquis de la Fayette. France's participation was based on *realpolitik*, in the form of an interest-based calculation by Paris to oppose King George. European powers continued to interfere with American affairs, such as during the quasi-war at the turn of the 19th Century and the British-American wars in 1812 which led to the burning of the US Capitol.

393 See also Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," Washington DC, March 1, 1801.

just cause to bid defiance to any power on earth.”³⁹⁴ In this light, Washington’s isolationism was deliberate, avoiding entangling alliances as a result of perceived weakness. Washington was buck-passing until the state became more powerful. US exceptionalism implied opting out of global politics. Washington had however grasped that the US had a role to play in the world. He said, “It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.”³⁹⁵ The Address was meant to strengthen American independence and so the basis of freedom of action in the international arena was laid. For it was not isolationism that the Address meant to convey, but a keen appreciation of the international system instead, mixed with the founding ideals of the Revolution. Washington’s Address thereby belies great ambition, rather than isolationism. Eric Foner writes: “Americans have sometimes believed they enjoy the greatest freedom of all – freedom from history.”³⁹⁶ American exceptionalism in its strategic culture came to denote a policy of maximizing freedom of action. Achieving such strategic freedom either placed the United States outside of history, or stimulated a drive to define history by advancing American values abroad. Both can be found in the Address.

US exceptionalism in the international realm has also been expressed as a tendency towards *exemptionalism*, the belief that the United States is not bound by international agreements.³⁹⁷ International norms tend to be applied with double standards as a result of its exceptional nature. Disregard for international legal frameworks such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court form contemporary examples, as are US policies regarding the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay and the pseudo-applicability of the Geneva Conventions to try unlawful non-combatants. Under President Clinton the Landmine Treaty and the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty come to mind. While the resistance to being bound by international legal frameworks is symptomatic for the behavior of a hegemon in a system, it is reinforced by such domestic variables that claim American uniqueness, an exemptionalist impulse which is exhibited stronger in Congress than in the White House. Since President F.D. Roosevelt, the United States had been an avid institution-builder, shaping organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank and IMF. Yet it has also always claimed a controlling share in these organizations, through veto-powers or a majority vote. Particularly at the inception of these institutions, the United States was either the official or non-official *primus inter pares*. In addition, many international agreements encountered non- or late ratification by Congress.³⁹⁸ For instance, the UN *Convention against Torture*

394 Ellis (2000), p. 135.

395 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796.

396 Foner (1998), p. 332.

397 Michael Ignatieff, “Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights,” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) p.4.

398 John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global Governance,” in Michael Ignatieff (ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 322-324.

was adopted in 1984 but was ratified in the US Senate only a decade later. An ILO convention banning forced labor stalled in Congress for thirty-four years. The importance is not that the United States did not comply with the spirit of these conventions while stalling ratification – it did – but rather that distrust of big government, which international governance is in particular, has been an undercurrent of US exceptionalism.

11.3.2 ABSOLUTE SECURITY & THE END OF HISTORY

Exceptionalism is intimately connected to the pursuit of absolute security. From the Pilgrims who fled from religious persecution, to Thomas Paine's belief that the United States could be a refuge for Freedom, and centuries later to the notion that defense transformation could nullify military competition, there has been a persistent ideological momentum to attain a strategic position in which US security would be uncontested. At first by distance through the virtue of geographic isolation, and later through military strength and the promotion of its values abroad. Democracy promotion thereby becomes a policy to make the world more in its own image and contributing to absolute security.

Once its security perimeter had been established through the expansion of the Frontier, the Monroe Doctrine and regional hegemony, the United States could advance its values and interests in the major events of the 20th century with the luxury of not risking being invaded. By the start of the Cold War military technology had given the United States unprecedented power but had paradoxically also made it increasingly vulnerable. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction nullified the protection offered by distance or military strength. Weapons of mass destruction, even in the hands of weak adversaries, could level the strategic playing field and their spread undermined the promise of absolute security. The Cuban Missile Crisis made the direct threat of ballistic missiles all too clear. It made the United States simply a country like any other, subject to the same Damocletian sword of insecurity as any other state. It spurred a drive to annul this vulnerability through ballistic missile defense. Although the strategic covenant of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between Washington and Moscow had made its deployment impossible, American leaders strongly favored developing ballistic missile defense throughout the Cold War. The acceptance of MAD had always been reluctant. It was an inherently instable and for Washington unsatisfying equilibrium. Alfred Wohlstetter's work on the missile gap, the move to develop conventional military superiority and the doctrine of *flexible response*³⁹⁹ were all meant to avoid being captured in the prism of mutual nuclear vulnerability. If not, the United States would be constrained in pursuing its agenda abroad. The presence of such a strategic threat ran counter to America's position as a global superpower and clashed with the assertion of the US as an exceptional nation. How could it claim to be exceptional if its actions were threatened by weapons of mass destruction? The result has been a persistent quest for returning to a mythical period where the US is cushioned from the rest of the world. The two alternatives have been isolationism or interventionism.

399 Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 15 (Summer 1974), pp. 3-20.

Isolationism has never been absent from the American strategic debate as it is the logical theoretical alternative for attaining absolute security. Isolationism is the mirror companion of an American assertive internationalist foreign policy. Both strive to reach the same strategic end-state of a United States that is unaffected by the dynamic of international security. Technology offered another route to isolationism. For instance, in the 1980s the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was advanced by President Reagan as a means to make the US invulnerable to nuclear attack. If successful it would reaffirm America's exceptionalism. In order to develop absolute security the United States pursued a policy to place itself outside the dynamic of international affairs. Achieving unquestioned military dominance would also serve the purpose, as would using that power to advance the principles of the American Revolution. The appeal of the guided munitions revolution and network-centric warfare and the pursuit to sustain US strategic dominance should be seen in a similar light.

The pursuit of absolute security also explains the appeal of the 'end of history' thesis in the 1990s which supported a policy of US interventionism and making the world in the American image. As the Cold War neared its end, a belief had taken root that liberal capitalism would become the dominant model and American values would spread. This thinking climaxed in the book *The End of History* in which Francis Fukuyama wrote that:

*What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold war, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.*⁴⁰⁰

President George H.W. Bush professed support to the universal appeal of liberty in a 1990 speech summoning the end of the Cold War:

*At long last we are writing the final chapter of the 20th century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a close, and after four decades of division and discord, our challenge today is to fulfill the great dream of all democracies: a true commonwealth of free nations. To marshal the growing forces of the free world, to work together, to bring within reach for all men and nations the liberty that belongs by right to all.*⁴⁰¹

The wave of democratization in the 1990's confirmed that regime change throughout the former Warsaw Pact was taking place at unprecedented rates and regimes were reverting to a Western model based on American values.⁴⁰² Infatuated by the moment, Colin Powell

400 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *National Interest*, no. 16. (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.

401 George H.W. Bush, "Speech at Aspen Institute," August 2, 1990.

402 Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp 53-55.

explained these developments in reference to the American Revolution. “The march toward democracy and freedom seems inexorable,” he said. “Our founding fathers would find no mystery in this, merely the confirmation of their fondest hopes and their firmest beliefs.”⁴⁰³ In the domestic political spectrum, neoconservative thinkers saw these developments as nothing short of revolutionary and believed that what could happen with Soviet communism in Eastern Europe could also apply elsewhere, for instance in the Middle East. If an end to history could be achieved it would spell that American absolute security was within reach. ‘End of history’-thinking persevered throughout the decade, particularly in neoconservative circles.⁴⁰⁴ Richard Perle and David Frum, both prominent strategists in the first George W. Bush administration, wrote in 2003 that, “now that the United States has become the greatest of all great powers in world history, its triumph has shown that freedom is irresistible.”⁴⁰⁵ It reflected faith in the ultimate success of the American Revolution and the spread of its values across the globe.

Advancing US values abroad as the basis for security policy is a reflection of the democratic peace theorem. This liberal theory, based on the thinking in Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, holds that democracies do not go to war with each other. Its consequence for policy is that promoting liberal democracies is the best guarantee for security. In 1999 presidential candidate George W. Bush argued, “America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom – and gains the most when democracy advances.”⁴⁰⁶ He stated later unequivocally, “because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.”⁴⁰⁷ His statement would penetrate into other high-level documents. The *National Security Strategy* similarly declared active support for the theorem: “The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”⁴⁰⁸ Bush appealed to the pursuit of absolute security since only in the event that states have benevolent, democratic regimes the possibility existed for uncontested security.

The democratic peace theorem contrasts with supporting multilateral institutionalism. While the United States is member of international institutions, they are considered an instrument rather than an objective. In the eyes of many neoconservatives, the

403 Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Washington DC, February 1, 1990, p. 144-5.

404 Francis Fukuyama, who pioneered the End of History-thesis, for instance was one of the signees to a neoconservative “Statement of Principles” on the future of US foreign and security policy. See Project for the New American Century, “Statement of Principles,” June 3, 1997, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>.

405 David Frum & Richard Perle, *An End to Evil*, (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 275.

406 George W. Bush, “Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,” November 19, 1999.

407 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Washington DC, March 2006.

408 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Washington DC, March 2006, p.1.

United Nations had lost credibility because it offers equal membership to dictatorial and democratic regimes alike. In the 1990's neoconservatives denounced President Clinton's preference to work with international institutions as impediments to US freedom of action that disenfranchised American exceptionalism.⁴⁰⁹ This skepticism towards international institutions however is not exclusive to neoconservatism and can be found throughout American political culture. It is based on the Lockean principle that international institutions do not have legitimacy of themselves but derive if it from the character of their members. The realist logic that superpowers view international institutions instrumentally to avoid normative constraints further amplified this. Likewise it has led to calls in the United States to set up a League of Democracies as an alternative legitimate international decision-making body.⁴¹⁰

11.3.3 UNIVERSALISM

Belief in American exceptionalism led policymakers to take an uncritical approach to the American role in the world, viewing it as exclusively benevolent and in pursuit of universal causes. After all, if American values are not better than any other, than the United States could not be exceptional. In fact, US interventionism was considered critical to international stability and improving global security. In 1991 Colin Powell invoked the tradition of American exceptionalism following the Gulf war saying that the United States is a "remarkable nation" and the "last best hope of earth."⁴¹¹ This notion specifically resonated among the neoconservative movement. William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan wrote in 2003 that "the alternative to American leadership is a chaotic, Hobbesian world."⁴¹² The United States was the "custodian of the international system" according to Charles Krauthammer⁴¹³, or the "global cop" according to Thomas Barnett. Edward Luttwak strongly believed in the power of American military strength, saying that: "if US military power is withheld in one crisis after another, it is bound to stimulate the growth of other mili-

409 Richard Perle said of the period: "The Clinton administration went so overboard with multilateralism that they created the impression that the United States was just another country, that we would be bound in the way every little dictatorship in Africa would be bound. We would all sign agreements together. We'd get as many signatures as possible. And, we would behave the way everyone else would behave. I think that's a complete abdication of American leadership and responsibility. We're not just another country. And if we are ever led by people who regard us as just another country, the whole world is going to be in trouble." Interview with Richard Perle. *Frontline: the war behind closed doors*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/interviews/perle.html>. Accessed February 12, 2010.

410 See G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: US National Security in the 21st Century," Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security, The Princeton Project Papers (Princeton 2006); Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, "Democracies of the World, Unite," *The American Interest*, (January-February 2007), pp.5-15.

411 Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 36-41.

412 William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (Encounter: San Francisco, 2003), p. 121.

413 As quoted in Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment," *The National Interest*, vol. 76 (Summer 2004), p. 59.

tary powers...A policy of non-intervention would yield a world not only less stable, but also more militarized.⁴¹⁴ Among neoconservatives the US was the only vehicle to correct moral wrongs in the world.⁴¹⁵ It favored a view that the US should advance its own values based not out of self-interest, but because in doing so it was promoting universal values that it held would benefit the greater common good. As David Frum and Richard Perle wrote: "To say that we are engaged in 'imposing American values' when we liberate people is to imply that there are peoples on this earth who value their own subjugation. ... Much more often than not, democracy will not have a chance *unless* it is aided from outside – and by force if necessary [emphasis in original]."⁴¹⁶ This thinking resonated with elements inside the Bush White House. National Security Advisor to the first G.W. Bush administration, Condoleeza Rice declared simplistically that: "American values are universal. People want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those who govern them"⁴¹⁷ President George W. Bush echoed it on multiple occasions. In 1999 he declared, "the most powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a nation but a truth: that we are spiritual beings and that freedom is the soul's right to breathe."⁴¹⁸ He reminded the world that "I believe every person has the ability and the right to be free ... and we believe that freedom, the freedom we prize, is not for us alone. It is the right and the capacity of all mankind."⁴¹⁹ He appealed to the teleological principles of universalism and the unequivocal belief in the righteousness of American policy derived from its founding principles. The belief was widely held among US policymakers and commentators that because of its Revolutionary values, its behavior was always just. As Fukuyama wrote in 2004 in reference to US hegemony: "we have in effect said to the rest of the world. 'look, trust us,... we are not just any run-of-the-mill hyperpower. We are, after all, the United States."⁴²⁰ Robert Kagan wrote an article in the summer of 1998 entitled *The Benevolent Empire*. In it he argued that America's military hegemony was the best the world could ask for: "If there is to be a sole superpower, the world is better off if that power is the United States," Kagan wrote.⁴²¹ He

414 Edward Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy: the new seasons of bellicosity," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, nr. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44.

415 "A world at peace; a world governed by law; a world in which all peoples are free to find their own destinies: that dream has not yet come true, it will not come true soon but if it ever does come true, it will be brought into being by American armed might and defended by American might, too. America's vocation is not an imperial vocation. Our vocation is to support justice with power. It is a vocation that has earned us terrible enemies. It is a vocation that has made us, at our best moments, the hope of the world." Frum & Perle (2003), p. 279.

416 *Ibid*, p. 276-78.

417 Condoleeza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1. (January-February 2000), pp. 45-62.

418 George W. Bush, "Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library," November 19, 1999.

419 George W. Bush, "Address at the National Endowment for Democracy," November 6, 2003.

420 Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment," *The National Interest*, vol. 76 (Summer 2004), pp. 57- 68.

421 Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998), pp. 24-35. Reprinted with permission at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index>.

later drew this argument to its logical extension and promoted moral interventionism: “if the United States is founded on universal principles, how can Americans practice amoral indifference when those principles are under siege around the world.”⁴²² Even the eminent scholar Samuel Huntington believed in the exceptional nature of the US, writing that: “The impact of no other country in world affairs has been as heavily weighted in favor of liberty and democracy as has that of the United States... American power is far less likely to be misused or corrupted than the power of any other major government... If the United States plays a strong, confident, pre-eminent role on the world stage, other nations will be impressed by its power and will attempt to emulate its liberty in the belief that liberty may be the source of power... The future of liberty in the world is thus intimately linked to the future of American power.”⁴²³

The premise of US exceptionalism is rooted in Lockean Enlightenment that society can progress through the human capacity to improve his condition. This perspective reflects a linear, agency-focused teleological view of history. In this thinking the use of force is not condemned but is at times viewed as an instrument to advance a people, civilization or the world in total toward a particular end-state. American strategic culture reflected similar teleological thinking.⁴²⁴

11.3.4 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND LIBERATION

Democracy promotion became the key policy to pursue absolute security and has been a fundamental element of US foreign policy, and very explicitly so since the 9/11 attacks. Jonathan Monten has argued that: “democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to US political identity and sense of national purpose.”⁴²⁵ The presidency of George W. Bush offers some of the most pronounced examples of this thinking. Although President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech in 2002 was profoundly realist in its assertion that “the United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons,” Bush nevertheless framed it through the prism of advancing US values and democracy promotion.⁴²⁶

cfm?fa=view&id=275.

422 Robert Kagan, “The return of cheap pessimism: Inside the Limo,” *The New Republic Online*, vol. 4, no. 227, October 4, 2000.

423 Huntington (1983), p. 255-257.

424 The neoconservative movement reflects an extreme variant of this thinking, as it openly linked US exceptionalism and the pursuit of absolute security to the willingness to use force. John Gray has made the following comparison between Trotskyism and neoconservatism: “Trotsky’s delusion that the European working class longed for socialist revolution in the interwar years is matched by the neo-conservative fantasy that the Arab world yearns for American-style democracy. [Trotsky’s] contempt for the ‘Quaker-vegetarian chatter’ of those who condemned Bolshevik methods such as hostage taking in the Russian civil war is mirrored in neo-conservative scorn for those who condemn the use of torture in the ‘war on terror.’” John Gray (2007), p. 123.

425 Monten (2005), p. 113.

426 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002. Transcript available at <http://>

Talking to journalist Bob Woodward, Bush explained that he had embraced the concept of liberation as the principle component of his presidency, a role that was thrust upon him by the attacks of 9/11: “Freedom is God’s gift to everybody in the world. I believe that. . . . And it became part of the jargon. And I believe that. And I believe we have a duty to free people. I would hope we wouldn’t have to do it militarily, but we have a duty.”⁴²⁷ Bush announced before taking office that he would take advantage “of a tremendous opportunity – given few nations in history – to extend the current peace to the far realm of the future [...] to project America’s peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years.”⁴²⁸

The second half of 2003 saw the pinnacle of political change through military power. That November Bush spoke to the National Endowment for Democracy. Strengthened by the rapid demise of the Saddam regime, he outlined a domino theory for the Middle East based on democracy promotion: “Iraqi democracy will succeed -- and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran -- that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”⁴²⁹ A democratic and free Iraq would be an example to the rest of the Middle East and contribute to the fight against terrorism. It would be a place where individual hope and economic well-being would provide an alternative way of life than under the neighboring dictatorial regimes. Iraq would become a small “city on the hill” in the Arabian Desert. Bush’s argumentation relied on the perfectibility of society, the universality of American ideals, the strength of individual aspirations of freedom irrespective of culture and history, and the ability of the US to act as an external agent of change. By bringing democracy to one authoritarian country by force, other regimes like Syria, Iran and Libya would be scared into changing their international behavior. As the smoke settled over Baghdad, Libya renounced its WMD capability, the democratic process in Lebanon seemed to pick up speed and council elections were organized in Saudi Arabia.

In his 2005 second Inaugural Address, Bush declared a policy to promote freedom and remove tyrannies around the world. Bush’s threat perception portrayed a confluence of interests and values.⁴³⁰ Democracy promotion became the basis of his national security policy. The *Quadrennial Defense Review* of 2006 reiterated that “as freedom and democ-

archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/.

- 427 George W. Bush quoted in Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p 89.
- 428 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Citadel,” Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.
- 429 George W. Bush, “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,” United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, November 6, 2003.
- 430 “For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder, violence will gather and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat....The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.... America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” George W. Bush, “Inaugural Address,” as published in *New York Times*, January 20, 2005.

racism take root in Iraq, it will provide an attractive alternative to the message of extremists for the people of the region.”⁴³¹ It posited an inverse domino-theory. Published in the shade of the insurgency in Iraq, the *National Security Strategy* of 2006 remained highly idealistic about the project to advance democracy. It declared that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movement and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”⁴³² It argued that tyrannical regimes which violate human rights and limit the freedom of citizens by their very existence threaten the United States. The relation between the domestic character of a regime and international security was made explicit. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* was a pamphlet for democratizing the world. It reasoned that if all states had a system like the United States, the United States would be secure and absolute security would be within reach.⁴³³ It professed that promoting the same model that had brought the United States security and prosperity would likewise extend security and prosperity around the world.

It is crucial to underline that although neoconservatives were very explicit, this thinking was not only a product of theirs or a response to the 9/11 attacks, but was integral to US strategic culture. This argument is similarly made by the prominent scholar of strategic culture, Theo Farrell who argued that “neoconservative ideology – emphasizing moral certitude and military unilateralism – took root in American diplomacy with such ease because it found a fertile bed in US strategic culture.”⁴³⁴ In the limelight of Operation *Desert Storm* in 1991, Senator John Warner, the ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, expressed the intimate connection between American security and the spread of freedom: “We in the United States will never fully attain the freedom to which we aspire, and for which we stand, if others in the world seeking that same freedom can be denied it by dictators like Saddam Hussein.”⁴³⁵ Similarly, in 1991 President Clinton declared that: “the defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world aren’t merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interests... US foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principles most Americans share.”⁴³⁶

George W. Bush, as his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy quoted above makes clear, believed America’s fundamental security depended on the freedom of others. At its most profound he was perpetuating the ideology of the American Revolution.

431 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.10.

432 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Washington DC, March 2006, p.1.

433 Paradoxically it also meant, if successful, the United States would no longer be an exceptional country, but rather the norm.

434 Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” *SAIS Review*, vol. 25, no.2 (Summer 2005), p. 13.

435 Senator John Warner, Senate Committee on Armed Services, US Congress, Washington DC, February 21, 1991, p. 6.

436 William. J. Clinton, *A new Covenant for American Security*, Georgetown University, December 12, 1991.

As one of the most extreme expressions of this Wilsonian tradition, President Bush said in late 2003:

*The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom -- the freedom we prize -- is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind.*⁴³⁷

Bush translated this into an interventionist agenda. In the brief but important seventeen minute 2005 inaugural address President Bush referred to freedom or one of its derivatives, liberty and free, on fifty occasions, declaring that:

*It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.*⁴³⁸

It echoed Woodrow Wilson's speech prior to the First World War in which he declared that it was necessary to establish "a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."⁴³⁹ Central to this line of thought is the dichotomy between "the free" and "the unfree".

11.3.5 MORALIST INTERVENTIONS

US strategic culture contains a measure of moralist naiveté, framing the world in simple dichotomies. By presenting security threats in dialectic, or even existentialist, terms, it makes the United States less reluctant to consider the use of the military. Central to President George W. Bush's rhetoric is a construction of the world in these dialectics. Right versus Wrong. Good versus Evil. Black versus White. Freedom versus Tyranny. Following the 9/11 attacks Bush said, "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them"⁴⁴⁰ While Bush is a strong exponent of this tradition, it is found among many earlier presidents and politicians.

437 George W. Bush, "Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy," United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, November 6, 2003.

438 Idem.

439 Woodrow Wilson, "War Address," cited in Albright (2006), p.29.

440 George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Washington DC, September 20, 2001.

The tendency to posit security threats in simple dichotomies falls within the rhetorical lineage of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson placed his thinking in moral dichotomies, juxtaposing free against unfree, right against wrong, and good against evil. In the 18th century, Jefferson's biographer Joseph Ellis writes: "Jefferson's mind consistently saw the world in terms of clashing dichotomies: Whigs versus Tories; moderns versus ancients; America versus Europe; rural conditions versus urban; whites versus blacks. The list could go on, but it always came down to the forces of light against the forces of darkness, with no room for anything in between."⁴⁴¹ Jefferson's binary argumentation would leave its marks on US foreign policy thinking. The moralist dialectic was used to mobilize public support during the Cold war against the Soviet Union and it echoed in the Bush administration's response to the 9/11 attacks.

When the United States decides to use the military, it does so by appealing to moral justifications. As Seymour Martin Lipset writes, "support for a war is as moralistic as resistance to it. To endorse a war and call on people to kill others and die for the country, Americans must define their role in a conflict as being on God's side against Satan – for morality, against evil."⁴⁴² To mobilize support the adversary is demonized, quite literally framing him as the Devil or a materialization of Evil. Saddam Hussein was called the Butcher of Baghdad and compared to Adolf Hitler.⁴⁴³ Slobodan Milosevic and Osama bin Laden faced similar accusations. If a war is fought for moral purposes than nothing will be sufficient except the destruction of the source of that immorality. For instance, when Saddam Hussein was not removed from power, and left in power in Iraq, it galvanized critiques – particularly neoconservatives- who felt that the persistence of the regime was a security threat in and of itself.⁴⁴⁴ Anything less than absolute victory becomes morally suboptimal. Failing to deal decisively with a threat runs counter to the quest for absolute security as well as the exceptional nature of the US. At the level of military strategy it meshes with the Powell-Weinberger doctrine. The use of overwhelming force to reach a decisive victory, correlates with the political objective to achieve complete victory of a moral foe. This strategic cultural bias has at times led to operational difficulties. Once the United States declares that an intervention is part of a global struggle of liberation, it leads to strategic lock-in. The Vietnam War demonstrated this dilemma clearly. Escalation instead of withdrawal becomes the logical course of action. To President John F. Kennedy, the Cold War was a test of character, and he said the US would "pay any price, bear any burden" to assure the "survival of liberty". For President Lyndon Johnson similar rhetoric applied. It made it extremely difficult to change course when events did not proceed as anticipated. Having

441 Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers: the Revolutionary Generation*, (New York: Vintage, 2000) p. 231.

442 Lipset (1996), p.20.

443 Nick B. Williams, "Hussein orders four ailing US Hostages freed," *LA Times*, November 2, 1990. See also Felicia Okeke-Ibezim, *Saddam Hussein: A legendary dictator*, (2006) p.8.

444 See for instance William Kristol, "The Imminent War," *The Weekly Standard*, March 17, 2003; Project on the New American Century, "Letter to President Clinton," January 26, 1998 <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>.

declared that they were engaged in a seminal struggle in South-east Asia, these Presidents could not easily withdraw from Vietnam since it would mean backing down on their commitment to “defend freedom” against “evil.” The Iraq War portrayed a similar dynamic. Having committed to the promotion of a democratic Middle East, the US could not walk away without reaching its objective. The use of values to support an interventionist policy thereby creates a self-sustaining dynamic to remain involved.

11.3.6 AN ADVERSARIAL APPROACH TO SECURITY

American strategic culture further draws on the Lockean idea of the primacy of the individual. It holds that since behavior is not structurally-determined, individual action is able to shape the flow of history. It infuses American strategic culture with a focus on the role of agency as opposed to a focus on structures. Threats to the United States have persistently been configured in terms of specific actors, whether they are slavers of the 19th century, virulent European nationalists in the early 20th century, fascists, Nazis, communists, Islamic terrorists, or rogue leaders. A solution to these threats lies in the removal of these actors. It is closely connected with the perception that Good and Evil in fact exist. For instance, two leading neoconservative intellectuals wrote about terrorism that, “we do not believe that Americans are fighting this evil to minimize it or to manage it. We believe they are fighting to win- to end this evil before it kills again and on a genocidal scale.”⁴⁴⁵ It inclines Americans to the belief that wars at times need to be fought, in order to deal with this evil. A consequence of the adversarial approach has been that the United States is perhaps the only Western state which fully accepts that it wages wars, not referring to euphemisms such as ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘stability operations’ to placate the domestic public. In fact, the American public is comfortable with the concept of ‘war’. It is embedded in the collective American psyche and discourse and appears when talking about such non-military issues as the War on Drugs, the War on Poverty or dealing with economic recessions.⁴⁴⁶ Targeting, killing or capturing adversaries means removing a threat. Washington emphasizes defeating an enemy, rather than taking a structuralist approach to focus on root causes. The US aspires to defeat terrorist networks, prevent actors from acquiring or using WMD, defend the homeland against terrorists and shape the strategic choices of states. The 2006 US *National Security Strategy* presented a list of ‘root-causes’ for terrorism but all focused on the role of agency. They include political alienation, “grievances that can be blamed on others,” “sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation” and an ideology that “justifies murder.”⁴⁴⁷ The terrorist’s belief system is the problem, not his socio-economic surroundings or global inequalities that may influence it, as the EU has it. The only exception was a lack of political enfranchisement, for which the remedy is regime change or revolution. Obviously democracy is an agency-focused system primed on empowering

445 Frum & Perle (2003), p.9.

446 George W. Bush said: “We will prevail in the war and we will defeat this recession.” “Bush vows to defeat terrorism, recession,” *Reuters*, January 30, 2002.

447 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Washington DC, March 2006, p.10.

the individual. From the US perspective, “promoting democracy” and “advancing freedom” requires tracking down, killing or capturing those that stand in its way. Additionally it favors an emphasis on body counts as a metric of success. One killed terrorist equals one less terrorist threat. It is a reflection of an adversarial approach to security. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush signed a presidential finding which authorized intelligence agencies to target and kill Bin Laden and his senior leadership.⁴⁴⁸ Cofer Black, Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, testified to the 9/11 commission in 2002 that, “I know that we are on the right track today and as a result we are safer as a nation. [A] ‘no limits’ aggressive, relentless, worldwide pursuit of any terrorist who threatens us is the only way to go and is the bottom line.”⁴⁴⁹ The subsequent prolific use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles, known as drones, to target Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere is testament to the persistent adversarial focus among the US leadership.⁴⁵⁰ Official rhetoric also makes use of an agency-focused perspective to the Global War on Terror. President George W. Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union Address that “All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. . . . And many others have met a different fate. Let’s put it this way: They are no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.”⁴⁵¹ President Barack Obama in his first State of the Union Address in January 2010 portrayed a similar inclination: “And in the last year, hundreds of al Qaeda’s fighters and affiliates, including many senior leaders, have been captured or killed -- far more than in 2008.”⁴⁵² The revision of US strategic objectives in Afghanistan commissioned by President Barack Obama in early 2009 also expressed a reaffirmation of an adversarial agency-focused approach in tune with US strategic culture. The strategy review for the Afghanistan war stated that “the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”⁴⁵³

The agency-focused perspective is also reflected in the US Army’s focus on conventional warfare. It is present in the Army’s dictum of *See First, Understand First, Act First*,

448 Bob Woodward, “CIA told to do ‘whatever necessary’ to Kill Bin Laden,” *Washington Post*, October 21, 2001; Barton Gellman, “CIA Weighs ‘Targeted Killing’ Missions,” *Washington Post*, October 28, 2001.

449 Cofer Black, “Testimony to Joint Investigation into September 11,” United States Congress, Washington DC, September 26, 2002.

450 See for instance Christopher Drew, “Drones are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda,” *New York Times*, March 16, 2009; Peter Bergen, Katherine Tiedemann, “Revenge of the Drones,” New America Foundation, October 19, 2009. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_of_the_drones; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, “Between the lines, an Expansion in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, December 1, 2009; Jeremy Scahill, “The Secret US War in Pakistan,” *The Nation*, November 23, 2009 and Peter W. Singer, *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, (Penguin: New York, 2009).

451 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 29, 2003.

452 Barack Obama, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 27, 2010.

453 White House, *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Washington DC, March 2009.

Finish Decisively and the “Army’s Warrior Culture” into which soldiers are immersed and are seen as the “ultimate combat system.”⁴⁵⁴ Defeating an enemy remains the principle objective of the Army. Witness also the Warrior Ethos, the US Army’s motto for each individual soldier.⁴⁵⁵

An agency-focused perspective to security threats dovetails with democracy promotion and the US liberating tradition. By removing a physical threat, in the form of a terrorist or tyrant, liberation comes closer. At the strategic level, operational effectiveness transformation is similarly agency-focused. The envisioned product of network-centric warfare - full spectrum dominance - is configured as the ability to perform the OODA loop “faster than an adversary in any situation.”⁴⁵⁶ Through operational effectiveness transformation US defense policy and the US military prepares for force-on-force confrontations, not complex emergencies that lack a clear distinction between war and peace. An agency-focused understanding of security creates an impulse to develop a superior military for high-intensity operations. In a world where threats are perceived to arise from actors, rather than for instance the complex interactions among political and socio-economic circumstances, maintaining the capability to defeat any such actor becomes essential to security. Pushed to the extreme, it also inclines states to pursue a strategy of regime change.

11.3.7 CHANGING REGIMES

By the end of the 20th century the unipolar system created an opportunity for moving towards absolute security. Within US domestic politics it particularly appealed to the neoconservative movement that would come to intellectually shape the late 1990’s and early 2000’s and played a prominent role in the administrations of George W. Bush.⁴⁵⁷ From the neoconservative perspective, the end of the Cold war proved that the United States had “won” through military strength, rather than that the Soviet Union crumbled due to internal economic collapse. Neoconservatives embraced the theorem that militarily outspending Moscow and Reagan’s bold confrontation of the “evil empire” had led to success. It reinforced the belief that regimes could be forced to change through outside action, and military strength was key to it. In addition, the Cold War confirmed the importance of regimes and ideology in international relations. The Cold War was a battle of contrasting regimes and ideological oppositions. The Soviet Union and the United States were advancing Communist and liberal democratic models throughout their spheres of influence. Both systems believed they had found the keys to human progress and that their

454 Department of the Army, *Army Campaign Plan* (Change 3), Washington DC, May 12, 2006, p. 6-7.

455 “I am an American soldier, I am a Warrior and a member of a team. [...] I am an expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat. I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. I am an American soldier.” The Soldier’s Creed, from Department of the Army, *Army Campaign Plan* (2004), p. 13.

456 Ibid, p. 6.

457 See also James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004).

models could be applied universally.⁴⁵⁸ Both states felt that their model was superior and would lead history to its final destination. It was “class equality versus individual liberty,” but also “control versus freedom.” Citizens had a different role in a democratic or a totalitarian regime and thus regime change from one to the other implied a total transformation of the state rather than a “simple change of government.”⁴⁵⁹ Because the Cold War was also framed as a philosophical struggle how to structure society and advance the human condition, it became a war of ideas, and similarly it enabled American political elites to frame the struggle in terms of good and evil. Both regimes also believed that the use of force was justified to oppose the other’s model.

When the Cold War ended, the US continued to expand its domestic model abroad under the nomenclature of democracy promotion. As mentioned above, the changing security environment offered a great opportunity to “affect the shape of the world to come.”⁴⁶⁰ The Cold War had proven the value of military competition to bring about regime change, now it would not involve staring an adversary down but rather actively removing tyrants. The use of force to impose the model of US success on others was justified in terms of liberating a country from an oppressive regime or advancing democracy. Following 9/11 neoconservatives supported the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns in 2001 and 2003 in these terms.⁴⁶¹ Furthermore, a strong transformed military focused on high-intensity combat was a part of it.⁴⁶² Colin Powell advocated in 1992 that US military primacy is “as critical to us as the freedom we so adore. Our arms must be second to none.”⁴⁶³ Only by being dominant is the US safe from the threats of the outside world.

The drive for strategic primacy finds her ideological roots in the insular political culture which presumes that security is the norm, coupled to the ideal to advance the American Revolution.⁴⁶⁴ It breeds the perception that the United States will never be secure unless the world is made up of liberal democracies, while states that do not support American values constitute a threat. With a global mindset based on absolute security, tolerating different political-philosophical models of progress that are contradictory to

458 Gray (2007), p. 30.

459 Nicholas Xenos, “Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror,” *Logos* 3.2, Spring 2004, p.12.

460 Rice (2000), p.45.

461 See the Project for a New American Century, “Statement of Principles,” June 3 1997. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>; “Statement on Post-War Iraq,” March 19, 2003. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20030319.htm>; and “Letter to President Bush,” September 20, 2001. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm>.

462 See for instance Donald Kagan, Gary Schmitt & Thomas Donnelly, *Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*, A Report of the Project for the New American Century, September 2000. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>; and David Frum & Richard Perle, *An End to Evil*, (New York: Random House, 2003).

463 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no.5 (Winter 1992/93).

464 Colin Gray, “National Style in Strategy; The American Example,” *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 2. (1981), p.45.

its own is difficult. This acknowledges the virtue Americans attributed to the democratic peace theorem, a policy of unilateralism as well as the eventual adoption of preventive war. Given its central position in providing context to US foreign policy, this raises the question whether expanding the ideals of the American Revolution was indeed historically consistent. This next section briefly traces the historical trend for using the military as an instrument of liberation and democracy promotion.

11.4 THE BALL OF LIBERTY

11.4.1 A BEACON TO THE EAST, A BAYONET FOR THE WEST

Expansion of the ideals of the American Revolution beyond the thirteen states started almost immediately after Congress approved the Constitution in 1789. Democracy promotion was a central element of US foreign policy from that moment onwards.⁴⁶⁵ The French Revolution was seen as an extension of the American Revolution. Thomas Jefferson said about the events in Paris: “This ball of Liberty, I believe most piously is now so well in motion that it will roll around the globe.”⁴⁶⁶ Jefferson believed that the American Revolution tipped the global scale in favor of liberation movements against feudalism and monarchy. While Jefferson deplored the violence in France during the Revolution, he considered it an acceptable and perhaps even necessary price to pay. The liberty of the whole earth, Jefferson said,

*[...] was depending on that contest [the French Revolution] and was ever such a prize won with so little blood? My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed I would rather have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better than it is now.*⁴⁶⁷

Thomas Jefferson emphatically accepted that violence was part of the process of spreading liberty: “What signify a few lives lost in a century or two, he wondered, “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.”⁴⁶⁸ As his biographer, Joseph Ellis, summarized this revolutionary fervor was comparable to that espoused at a later stage by Lenin, Trotsky or Mao. When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on April 11, 2003 spoke in response to the widespread looting and chaos in Baghdad following the ousting of Saddam Hussein that “freedom is untidy”

465 Anatol Lieven, “Wolfish Wilsonians: Existential Dilemmas of the Liberal Internationalists,” *Orbis* (Spring 2006), pp. 243-257; Monten (2005), p. 112 – 156.

466 Thomas Jefferson to Trench Coxe, June 1, 1795, quoted in Ellis (2000), p. 142.

467 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, January 3, 1793, quoted in Joseph J. Ellis, *American Sphinx: the Character of Thomas Jefferson*, (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 150.

468 *Ibid*, p. 118.

it resonated this Jeffersonian logic. Jefferson was instrumental in making Freedom the defining construct around which domestic political battles devolved. Jefferson provided the ideas and words which allowed the end of the Cold War to be seen as the closing of a chapter in the advancement of the American Revolution. The same thinking appeared when the Bush administration promoted the belief it could change the Middle East by removing Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Defeating tyranny or Islamic terrorism was the modern-day equivalent of dealing with the feudalism Jefferson so despised.



Figure 8: John Gast, "American Progress," 1872

(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:American_progress.JPG)

Exceptionalism became an excuse for US expansionism. At first it became apparent through the expansion of the US frontier. To preserve the American experiment, and with it the Creed that differentiated American politics from European power politics, regional hegemony was required. In *Federalist 24*, on the basis of what we today would call realist considerations, Alexander Hamilton was hawkish and warned for the false security of having a nautical buffer across the Atlantic. He adamantly proclaimed that, "the savage tribes on our Western frontiers ought to be regarded as our national enemies, [and] natural allies [of the British and Spanish], because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them." Hamilton stated that the security offered by distance was irrelevant. "The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbours." And neighbors, Hamilton had made clear in *Federalist 6* were "naturally enemies of each other." Not only was the young republic to have a standing military capability but Hamilton offered a rationale for pursuing dominance over the continent. The roots for Manifest Destiny were born. It dovetailed with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which demarcated the Western hemisphere as an American

sphere of influence. European meddling represented a danger to US interests and threatened the security of the American experiment. The Continent would be American, if not the Republic would be insecure. Manifest Destiny combined power and ideas, drawing upon the providential mission of the American Revolution to assuage realist concerns.⁴⁶⁹

Manifest Destiny was itself a reflection of the American Creed. It appealed to the entrepreneurial spirit and embodied the ‘pursuit of happiness’ as well as the economic liberty to do with the vast continent as pleased but advancing the ideals of democracy and Freedom in its wake.

11.4.2 RIGHT IS MORE PRECIOUS THAN PEACE

Meanwhile, as the Frontier was closing, the Civil War erupted as the Confederacy challenged Unionist government in Washington over the most American of concepts; the interpretation of Freedom. To the Confederacy, it was the liberty of white landed Americans to do with other man’s labor as they pleased whereas to the abolitionist Union freedom was meant for all those that inhabited the United States.⁴⁷⁰ By the turn of the 19th century the Western world was engaged in moralist politics and using the military as a tool in far-away places. It reflected the reasoning by the political philosopher John Stuart Mill that interventions were justified as long as they had a civilizing purpose.⁴⁷¹ The British had their *white man’s burden*, the French had *mission civilisatrice*, the Dutch were engaged in an *ethische politiek* and in the United States President Theodore Roosevelt was one of the staunchest advocates for a vindicationist promotion of the American Revolution, a hawkish and morally infused imperialist foreign policy.⁴⁷² He called his policy *Americanism* explicating that he was intent on advancing American ideals. Its realist dimension was based in the Monroe Doctrine. In 1898 the United States went to war with Spain over Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam and the Philippines. The Spanish-American war, a “splendid little war” according to President Roosevelt, evoked America’s belief to use military power to liberate. While the Spanish-American war is commonly considered the defining moment marking the United States’ arrival as a world power, it was pursuing a principle formulated

469 The term ‘manifest destiny’ was first coined by the journalist John L. O’Sullivan in *Democracy Review*, July 1845. O’Sullivan supported America’s expansion into Oregon “by right of our manifest destiny to overspread and possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the great experiment of liberative and federative self-government entrusted to us.”

470 On the four variations that defined US freedom see Daniel Hackett Fischer, *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

471 “But there assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, without having been ourselves attacked, or threatened with attack. ... There is a great difference (for example) between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilisation, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a very low, grade of social improvement.” John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-intervention,” *Foreign Policy Perspectives*, no. 8, Libertarian Alliance, p.4. <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/forep/forep008.pdf>.

472 See Warren Zimmerman, “Jingoes, Goo-Goos and the Rise of America’s Empire,” in *The Wilson Quarterly*, vol. 22, no.2 (Spring 1998), pp. 42 – 65.

at the signing of the Declaration of Independence.⁴⁷³ After Hamilton advocated belligerence against colonial and tribal interests in North America, the United States had closed the Frontier, fulfilled its manifest destiny on the continent and liberated Southern slaves, now the time had come to push the perimeter of Freedom outward.

An example of this thinking was a speech given by the Republic Senator from Indiana, Albert Beveridge, in 1898. The speech, known as *The March of the Flag*, portrayed a missionary zeal and a keen fusion of ideological and realist considerations.⁴⁷⁴ Beveridge asked: "Have we no mission to perform, no duty to discharge to our fellow man? Has God endowed us with gifts beyond our deserts and marked us as the people of His peculiar favor, merely to rot in our own selfishness...?" Speaking to the background of the Spanish-American war in 1898 Beveridge formulated America's mission in the world as follows: "Would not the people of the Philippines prefer the just, humane, civilizing government of this Republic to the savage, bloody rule of pillage and extortion from which we have rescued them?...If England can govern foreign lands, so can America... The rule of liberty that all just government derives its authority from the consent of the governed, applies only to those who are capable of self-government."

President William McKinley retained the Philippines after the end of the war because, agreeing with Beveridge and John Stuart Mill: "they were unfit for self-government" and "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them..."⁴⁷⁵

Two decades later, American participation in the First World War was also justified along the lines of Freedom. President Wilson's "making the world safe for democracy" was juxtaposed to a castigation of Germany as an authoritarian, backward state. By 1917 German submarine warfare threatened American commercial shipping interests. Economic liberties were jeopardized yet Wilson found this basis to narrow for mobilizing American participation and enlarged it to encompass political freedoms as well. On the eve of American participation in the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson invoked American civil religion and the promise of Freedom:

*But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts... the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured.*⁴⁷⁶

473 Monten (2005), p. 132.


474 Senator A.J. Beveridge, *The March of the Flag*, September 16, 1898, Indianapolis, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/beveridge.html>. Accessed January 22, 2007.

475 General J. Rusling, "Interview with President William McKinley," *The Christian Advocate*, January 22, 1903, cited in Daniel Schirmer & Stephan Rosskamm Shalom, eds., *The Philippines Reader*, (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 22-23.


476 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to Congress," Washington DC, April 2, 1917.

While Woodrow Wilson has given his name to the foreign policy school that promotes American values abroad, his beliefs were integral to those of the American Revolution. As Jefferson had made clear, the ideas of the American Revolution were never supposed to end at the Appalachians. Once the frontier had been closed, the American model would expand by example and by active promotion. Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and in particular George W. Bush have similarly applied the rhetoric of Wilson to their day.

OURS...to fight for




Freedom of Speech



Freedom of Worship



Freedom from Want



Freedom from Fear

Figure 9: Norman Rockwell, "The Four Freedoms".

(Source: American Treasures at the Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm142.html>)

America's participation in the Second World War juxtaposed freedom-loving nations against a tyranny once again. This time it was the slave-system of Fascism. President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed the Four Freedoms as an ideal for a new world order and reflected US political culture and normative qualities of American society. With the four freedoms Roosevelt was declaring a policy of democracy promotion. In August 1941, before the Pearl Harbor attacks, Roosevelt argued that the United States should participate in the war to defend: "the great freedoms against encroachment and attack of the dark forces of despotism which would enslave the globe." President George H. W. Bush would repeat the quest for such a new world order in 1991, as would his son a decade later.

The Cold War posited the United States in the role of protector of the ‘free world’ now encompassing the Western hemisphere and Western Europe. The divided Germany, Africa, Middle East and Asia were seen as contested areas where the US-dominated sphere met the communist realm. The Truman Doctrine in 1947, in conjunction with Paul Nitze’s *National Security Council Report 68* (NSC-68) of 1950, delineated that the United States had a pivotal role in stopping and containing communist expansionism. NSC-68 recognized that the United States confronted a power with an ideology antithetical to its own.⁴⁷⁷ On the day Kennedy was assassinated, he was poised to give a speech that held the following paragraph which outlined the United States as the primary guarantor of Freedom, appealing to religious motives: “We in this country, in this generation are – by destiny rather than choice – the watchmen on the walls of world freedom.”⁴⁷⁸ The Korean and Vietnam Wars were likewise initiated to stop communist ideology from spreading. President Ronald Reagan subsequently framed the Soviet Union as an evil empire with the United States engaged in a “crusade for freedom.”

Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, this mindset persisted. In the unipolar world, the tendency to mesh the ideals of the American Revolution with a defense of realist interests remained. “Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq, it is the liberation of Kuwait,” President George H.W. Bush declared. In 1991 as the first aerial attacks on Iraq’s military infrastructure came under way Bush outlined that the unipolar world beckoned a period for advancing the ideals of the American Revolution:

*We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. [...] Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, “let’s free these people, so we can go home and be free again.” And he’s right.*⁴⁷⁹

The realist threat amounted to Saddam Hussein shifting the balance of power in a strategically important region, yet the justification for the war rested on liberating a sovereign state in a new chapter in the liberating tradition of the US. Bush’s rhetoric invoked the memory of one of the founding fathers, Thomas Paine, appealing to the similarity of then and now.

477 “Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. ...any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.” Paul Nitze, et al., “NSC 68: United States Programs and Objectives for National Security, April 14, 1950,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 27 (May–June 1975), pp. 51-108.

478 Theodore Sorensen, *Let the word go forth: the speech, statements and writing of John F. Kennedy 1947 to 1963*, (New York: Dell, 1988), p. 404-405.

479 George. H.W. Bush, “Address to the Nation,” Washington DC, January 16, 1991.

He quoted a Marine that Freedom would be served through the war. Furthermore Operation *Desert Storm* would show that the United States had an opportunity to mould the international system into a new world order based on US power and the advance of US values.

George W. Bush made no illusion of his belief in the pursuit of freedom as a fundamental American objective: "Our advocacy of human freedom is not a formality of diplomacy; it is a fundamental commitment of our country. [...]"⁴⁸⁰ He pledged his allegiance to the liberating spirit of the US. Infused by the military power of the United States, Bush argued for a stronger promotion of its ideals. In 1999 he said: "American foreign policy must be more than the management of crisis. It must have a great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace."⁴⁸¹ Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 direct line was drawn between the struggle against terrorism and the major conflicts in history. Islamic terrorism was conceptualized to mirror the dominant violent ideologies of the 20th century. The *Quadrennial Defense Review* of 2006 posited that, "victory will come when the enemy's extremist ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters, becoming unfashionable, and following other discredited creeds, such as Communism and Nazism, into oblivion."⁴⁸² Islamic terrorism was similar to totalitarianism, Fascism, Nazism or communism. The *National Security Strategy* of 2006 declared that all those ideologies had as common features that they were characterized by "intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement and repression," and the United States was its antidote as a "force for good."⁴⁸³ 'Jerry' Paul Bremer, the US administrator in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004, also expressed the link between America's mission in Iraq and these earlier struggles. Speaking at the first anniversary of the handover of Iraqi sovereignty, Bremer linked the American mission to extend Freedom and the Iraq war:

*When I go around the country I usually make the point that this is going to be a tough, long struggle. [But] we didn't quit in the eighteenth century until we turned out the British. We didn't quit in the nineteenth century until we had abolished slavery. We didn't quit in the twentieth century until we chased totalitarianism off the face of Europe, and we're not going to quit in the twenty-first century in the face of these terrorists.*⁴⁸⁴

480 George W. Bush, "Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library," November 19, 1999.

481 Idem.

482 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.21-22.

483 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Washington DC, March 2006, p.3.

484 L. Paul Bremer, quoted in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007) p. 298.

President Clinton had similarly invoked the seminal struggle between Freedom and tyranny in relation to the embassy-bombings of 1998, “Our battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our embassies in Africa nor will it end with today’s strike. ... This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism.”⁴⁸⁵ In 2007, in the run-up to the democratic primaries presidential candidate Barack Obama said, “the history of America is one of tragedy turned into triumph. And so a war over secession became an opportunity to set the captives free. An attack on Pearl Harbor led to a wave of freedom rolling across the Atlantic and Pacific. An Iron Curtain was punctured by democratic values, new institutions at home, and strong international partnerships abroad. After 9/11, our calling was to write a new chapter in the American story.”⁴⁸⁶ In 1969 Secretary of State Dean Acheson described that he felt “the threat to Western Europe [in the guise of expansionist communism] seemed to me singularly like that which Islam had posed several centuries before, with its combination of ideological zeal and fighting power.”⁴⁸⁷ With the rise of Islamic terrorism considered a new incarnation of the communist threat this statement was coming full circle.

11.5 STRATEGIC CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON TRANSFORMATION

Irrespective of the distribution of power in the international system, the idea of advancing Freedom through military power has been mortar and bricks to US strategic culture and how it justifies interventionism. The United States has not waged a war without doing so in the name of Freedom. US politicians observe and reinforce a historical trend in the moral justification of waging war for liberating purposes.⁴⁸⁸ The United States came into existence as a result of the American Revolutionary war, a military conflict to liberate British-Americans from colonial rule. The Civil War and its hundreds of thousands of casualties were redeemed by the moral cause of liberating slaves and abolishing slavery. The Spanish-American war was fought to liberate societies from barbarism. The First World War was fought to make Europe free and democratic, the Second World War for the Four Freedoms. The Cold War was pursued to defend the ‘Free World’, the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait and Operation *Allied Force* to liberate Kosovar-Albanians from Serbian oppression. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) was declared to liberate the Middle East from islamo-facism and the Iraq War specifically to liberate the Iraqi people and the world from Saddam’s tyranny. From 2006 onwards, use of the term ‘Long War’ to describe the GWOT framed the challenge against global terrorism as a twilight struggle against the forces of barbarism, just as the Second World War had been a “generation’s war.”⁴⁸⁹ While

485 William J. Clinton, “Address of the President to the Nation,” Washington DC, August 20, 1998.

486 Barack Obama, “Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center,” Washington DC, August 1, 2007.

487 Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 376.

488 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.

489 US Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker said: “This is a fight for the very ideas at the foundation

realist concerns dominated to engage in Iraq and Afghanistan, strategic culture played an important role to predispose the US to particular routes of action and to mobilize support. As the overview above makes clear, all major conflicts in which the United States has been involved, it has done so in the name of liberating a group or community and conventional warfare was the preferred option.

Strategic culture reflects the domestic drivers that give context to the objectives for which, and how, the military instrument is used. US strategic culture is based on pursuing the expansion of American Revolutionary values and is [rimed on the belief that the United States is exceptional and should not be subject to the same constraints or held to the same standards as other states. Simultaneously it nurtures the notion that the United States is capable of achieving absolute security. Doing so requires expanding its domestic model abroad, also known as democracy promotion. Exceptionalism has imbued the United States with a revolutionary verve. It manifests itself in the assumption that its exceptionalist values are universal, asserting that the United States is further ahead of other states on this teleological path of history and that it has a unique role to help others adopt these universal principles. Democracy promotion thereby becomes not only a way to expand the US sphere of influence, but is also an ideologically driven policy on the basis of its strategic culture.

Given the connection of US strategic culture to the ideals of the American Revolution, US interventions are framed as moralist undertakings. As conflicts between Good and Evil. Along with the Lockean individualism apparent in US political culture, it has contributed to an agency-focused approach to security. Regimes are held responsible for state behavior, and regimes can therefore also be held accountable. On the whole, the more a regime has an opposite system to the United States, the more it is likely to be considered a security threat. US exceptionalism produces the strategic perspective that the use of force is at times justified to address security threats and regime change can be realized through outside force. This is mirrored by societal acceptance to wage war for the purpose of liberation or defeating tyrannical regimes. In general US strategic culture inclines towards emphasizing high-intensity combat capabilities and a willingness to use them. Neoconservatism in the 1990's and 2000's was an extreme expression of this strategic culture. Adherents strongly and clearly expressed the tenets described above. However, in varying proportions they are consistent throughout US political history and in security policy.⁴⁹⁰

of our society, the way of life those ideas enable, and the freedoms we enjoy," Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker & Secretary of the Army R.L. BrownLee, *Serving A Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, 2004.

490 Walter Russell Mead has advanced four foreign policy schools as the framework through which to analyze US foreign policy. These four schools operate on regional, economic, social and class levels as well as foreign policy. The four schools resonate US strategic culture, as they individually reflect specific domestic understandings how to promote US interests. Combined they embody the spectrum of strategic culture. The Wilsonian school emphasizes the promotion of US values, Hamiltonians pursue a strong international position for the US which has led it to embrace its position as guardian of the global commons. The Jacksonian school is premised on a strong military to promote the United States and Jeffersonians emphasize safeguarding "American destiny and liberty" driven by exceptionalism.

Under different distributions of power and different political constellation the liberating tradition of US power and the usefulness appropriated to military power, is a constant.

In short, US strategic culture can be encapsulated as facilitating an acceptance of warfare to deal with specific actors and liberate a particular group as a means to overcome security threats. With regards to transformation, it provides an impetus to sustain military superiority in the field of high-intensity warfare. US strategic culture thereby created high-extractive capacity for pursuing the American strategic objective of sustained dominance. What this meant in terms of capability and doctrinal development is the subject of the next chapter.

12 US EXPRESSIONS OF TRANSFORMATION

The United States developed a transformation strategy in response to shifts in the external environment and a set of intervening domestic variables compromising US strategic culture. The question is how these system- and domestic-level elements produced the elements of US operational effectiveness transformation?

Transformation in the late 1990's and early 2000's was the product of a perfect storm bringing together developments in military technology, America's position as a unipolar hegemon and a strategic culture based on an agency-focused approach to security threats, belief in the usefulness of military power and its associated technology. The neoconservative wind that was blowing through Washington fused these elements together to produce an adaptive strategy based on sustaining its current dominance in high-intensity combat.

By the mid-1990's a central concern was the ability to project power and deal with anti-access and area-denial threats.⁴⁹¹ Two reports in 1997 detailed how anti-access and area-denial threats could be addressed. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States made clear in 1997 that ballistic missile technologies could be used as area denial capabilities, challenging America's ability to project power. The threat of being precluded or deterred from reaching specific areas constituted a strategic threat to the *Pax Americana*. Ballistic missile defense was the proposed response. If a functional shield were developed, the United States would be less restrained in its foreign policy, able to deploy forces irrespective of the location and creating the strategic option to pursue foreign policy objectives with greater resolve. While the system was defensive it would make interventionism less risky.

The same year that the ballistic missile report appeared, the report of the National

Neoconservatives are referred to as a mixture between Wilsonians and Jacksonians. See Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it changed the World*, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002), pp 86-98.

491 "To protect our vital national interests we will require strong armed forces, which are organized, trained and equipped to fight and win against any adversary at any level of conflict. [...] To ensure we accomplish these tasks, power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force." John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1995, p. 4.

Defense Panel *Transforming National Defense* was published.⁴⁹² It was an advertisement for operational effectiveness transformation to project power focusing on anti-access and area-denial threats caused by the spread of advanced technologies. In order to avoid the vulnerabilities of a large military footprint, the report recommended the creation of “smaller forces with greater lethality supported by leaner logistics.” Forces should operate in a dispersed manner, relying on speed, networked and distributed operations, and precision systems. Power projection would be based around smaller units, a smaller logistics footprint and with greater lethality through the use of precision munitions.⁴⁹³ It was a model emphasizing rapid, and decisive expeditionary operations based on smaller forces and distributed, network-centric operations.⁴⁹⁴

These studies indicated the technology-minded focus of US transformation efforts to improve power projection. As the Information Age beckoned, each military service developed plans to improve the ability of the United States military to project power globally. As bureaucratic competition goes, each military service wanted to be most useful to the US government. The attacks of September 11 however gave practical momentum to develop a military that was able to operate anywhere with greater speed. An overarching model became a military that was flexible, surgical and quick, where information would substitute mass and force-size could be reduced. Its hallmarks were speed, precision and light. It was a logical extension of rapid, decisive operations but now in the Information Age with the overarching strategic emphasis remaining on high-intensity warfighting.

As a generic category Special Operations Forces (SOF) are typically defined by their speed, stealth, self-sufficiency and versatility. Since these attributes became key characteristics along which the US military transformed, and as will be argued in the next pages SOF became a distinct model to emulate, I have termed this process ‘SOF-ing’ the military.

12.1 9/11 AND PREVENTION

While transformation to an Information Age military had been a key concept in the late 1990’s the attacks of September 11, 2001 made transformation a central priority. At a doctrinal level it led to the adoption of preventive warfare and justified a nearly limitless use of the military. The doctrine is a product of a unipolar security environment in which the hegemon has a military geared towards rapid decisive expeditionary operations, is infused with belief a drive to attain absolute security and strategic dominance, and the primary security risk is catastrophic terrorism. Prevention was the pinnacle of strategic dominance thinking; no threat would be allowed to come to fruition.

Its roots can be found in the US response to earlier terrorist bombings. In August 1998 President Clinton launched Operation *Infinite Reach*, a series of cruise missile

492 Report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, Washington DC, December 1997.

493 Ibid, p.33.

494 Other capabilities included: Mine countermeasures, CBRN gear and ballistic missile defense. Short and vertical take-off aircraft were necessary as carrier-based power was likely to increase in importance due to the vulnerability of points of entry.

strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the twin-embassy bombings, intent on preventing Bin Laden from striking again:

*With compelling evidence that the bin Laden network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving people, I decided America must act. And so [...] I ordered our Armed Forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the bin Laden network.*⁴⁹⁵

Although punishment and deterrence played a role, Clinton's argumentation above illustrates that the motivation to launch Operation *Infinite Reach* was preventive in nature. It also played a central role in his considerations to strike the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. As the 9/11 committee details, the factory was targeted to prevent Bin Laden from using chemical weapons.⁴⁹⁶ Substantial effort went into assessing whether Bin Laden indeed possessed the deadly VX gas or any of its precursors. One of the opinions ventilated in the White House was later echoed by the Bush administration with respect to Iraq; striking the pharmaceutical plant in 1998 was deemed necessary to minimize the risk of nerve gas being used in New York in two weeks.⁴⁹⁷ Five years later the argument in favor of preventive war against Iraq was to avoid "a smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud." Subsequent to Operation *Infinite Reach*, there was substantial debate over the course of action. Top White House counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke put forward an extensive military plan to go after Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In late 1998, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton even put the plan forward to use Special Operations Forces to capture Bin Laden. The episode offered the genesis for thinking about answering the threat of terrorist groups through preventive war.

Differences between Clinton's second term policies and Bush's first-term were not intellectual watersheds. Clinton had adopted preventive action against terrorism as well as embraced regime change as a policy. In 1998 he had passed the Iraq Liberation Act, making it the policy of the United States to "remove the regime of Saddam Hussein" and earmarking \$99 million to that end. In practice there were significant differences. The limited cruise-missile strikes had not proved effective in preventing Al Qaeda from plotting further attacks. Instead the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that a terrorist group could strike at the financial and political heart of the world's only superpower. The attacks changed the strategic calculus. From that moment, the possibility that a tyrannical regime could use a terrorist group as a proxy and strike the United States or hold it to ransom was considered unacceptable. What changed after 9/11 is that the two policies were brought

495 William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan," August 20, 1998.

496 "The argument for hitting al Shifa [pharmaceutical plant] was that it would lessen the chance of Bin Ladin's having nerve gas for a later attack." National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC, 2004), p.116.

497 *Ibid*, p. 117.

together; preventive action became a doctrine to pursue regime change. In addition, while Clinton's preventive action had been limited to risk-free cruise missile strikes, Bush was willing to use the full thrust of the US military with hundreds of billions of dollars to be spent.

Following the attacks of September 11, President Bush asked states to make a choice, either for the United States or for the terrorists: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them." To Bush it was clear that a page had been turned, that the strategic context had shifted and the promise of absolute security had receded:

*Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day – a night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.*⁴⁹⁸

The comfort of pursuing a *Sonderweg* and interacting with the Hobbesian external environment at will was shattered. President Bush alluded to this in the wake of the attacks stating that, "America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home."⁴⁹⁹ At the 2002 West Point Graduation ceremony Bush stated that, "the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."⁵⁰⁰ Bush compared terrorism to weeds noting that, "the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows."⁵⁰¹ It preordained a vigorous military response and agency-based focus of the US government.

The strategic impact terrorist proxy groups could have and the existence of anti-American dictatorships became a threat of strategic import. Preventive warfare dovetailed with the quest for absolute security. Vice-President Dick Cheney formulated it as the "one percent doctrine." It held that if there is a one percent chance that a threat will materialize, it must be treated as a one-hundred percent certainty. In the run-up to the Iraq War preven-

498 George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Washington DC, September 20, 2001.

499 George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address 2002," US Capitol, Washington DC, January 29, 2002. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html.

500 Ibid.

501 George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001.

tion was justified under the principle that “the risk of inaction is greater than the risk of action.”⁵⁰²

International law justifies anticipatory self-defense and pre-emptive action in the event of an imminent threat.⁵⁰³ However, the United States adopted a policy of preventive warfare, whereby action is taken to preclude the materialization of a challenge.⁵⁰⁴ Because a materialized threat is considered so severe, it is considered unacceptable. The White House said that deterrence is therefore not an option against terrorists; “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”⁵⁰⁵

The attacks of 9/11 gave the White House far-reaching powers to wage military campaigns to prevent terrorism against the United States. Its legal basis was provided by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, John Yoo. Yoo reasoned that the President had constitutional powers “both to retaliate for those [9/11] attacks and to prevent and deter future assaults on the Nation.” The legal opinion stated that, “Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution vests the President with

502 In preparation to the Iraq War Vice-President Dick Cheney made the gravity of the Iraqi security threat clear as he perceived it : “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors ... Ladies and gentlemen, there is no basis in Saddam Hussein’s conduct or history to discount any of the concerns that I am raising this morning. We are, after all, dealing with the same dictator who shoots at American and British pilots in the no-fly zone, on a regular basis, the same dictator who dispatched a team of assassins to murder former President Bush as he traveled abroad, the same dictator who invaded Iran and Kuwait, and has fired ballistic missiles at Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, the same dictator who has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism for the better part of two decades... Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action... Some concede that Saddam is evil, power-hungry, and a menace -- but that, until he crosses the threshold of actually possessing nuclear weapons, we should rule out any preemptive action. That logic seems to me to be deeply flawed.” Richard Cheney, “Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention,” Nashville, August 26, 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html>. Accessed April 30, 2008.

503 The classic international legal precedent is the “Caroline” incident. For a detailed overview of the “Caroline” incident see John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law ...*, II, 24-30, 409-14; VI, 261-62; VII, 919-20; Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 4, Documents 80-121: 1836-1846 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934) available at The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp. For a discussion on the tradition of preemptive use of force and international law see Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force,” *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no.2 (Spring 2003) p. 89-103; Rachel Bzostek, *Why Not Preempt? Security, Law and Anticipatory Military Activities* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008).

504 See also Francois Heisbourg, “A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,” *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no.2 (Spring 2003), pp. 75-88.

505 George W. Bush, “Address at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the US Military Academy,” West Point, New York, June 1, 2002.

the power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the security of the United States and the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas.”⁵⁰⁶ The legal opinion gave the Executive the right to intervene when and where it pleased on the basis of the possibility that a threat was gathering.

The Iraq War was the first major expression of this policy. President Bush stated, “Prior to September 11 however, a president could see a threat and contain or deal with it in a variety of ways without fear of that threat materializing on our own soil.”⁵⁰⁷ After 9/11 “Saddam’s capacity to create harm, all his terrible features became much more threatening.” It was amplified by Colin Powell’s claim during his speech at the United Nations on February 5, 2003, that “leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.” That Iraq was a target made sense from the perspective that Iraq, as Bush recalled, “gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place” and that “the danger is already significant and it only grows worse over time.”⁵⁰⁸ The nature of the Iraqi threat had both realist and ideological grounds. Weapons of Mass Destruction, rogue states and terrorism, the three major threats identified in the 1993 Bottom Up Review had collected in the regime of Saddam Hussein. Policymakers justified the Iraq war on the basis of his possession of weapons of mass destruction: “It was the one reason everyone could agree on.”⁵⁰⁹ Yet, there was also a strong notion of democracy promotion and liberating Iraqis from an oppressive regime in the initial argument for war.⁵¹⁰ In September 2002, making the case against Iraq to the UN General Assembly, Bush said that “the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced . . . And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”⁵¹¹ The character of Saddam’s regime posed a threat. During his second inaugural commencement address in 2005 Bush extended the warning to other ‘rogue’ regimes:

506 John C. Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them,” Office of the Attorney General, Washington DC, September 25, 2001.

507 Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 12.

508 George W. Bush, “Speaking in the Grand Rotunda,” Cincinnati, October 7, 2002.

509 Paul Wolfowitz in “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus,” *Vanity Fair*, May 9, 2003. <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594>.

510 When weapons of mass destruction were not found following the war the public justification almost entirely became focused on regime change and the promotion of freedom and democracy.

511 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, September 12, 2002.

*The rulers of outlaw regimes can know that we still believe as Abraham Lincoln did: Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it.*⁵¹²

The attacks did not change the content of transformation, it did make its program more urgent. In the following pages, it is described how this dynamic produced the transformation efforts of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

12.2 SOF-ING THE ARMY

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was primarily concerned with changing the US Army. He challenged the Army's emphasis on heavy mechanized maneuver units and its doctrinal focus on refighting Operation *Desert Storm*.⁵¹³ Influenced by the promises of the Information Age, Rumsfeld did not deny that the Army should focus on high-intensity conventional war, but rather that it could do so more effectively by substituting mass for information. Smaller forces would improve deployability, reducing the vulnerability of large concentrations and decrease the overall risk of anti-access and area-denial threats. In short, it would enhance the Executive's ability to wield the military instrument in a time when elements of the guided munitions revolution were being emulated by countries like Iran and North Korea. By decreasing the size of the force, it created cost-benefits as well. Added to this were the advances in precision. According to Rumsfeld, "the use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements."⁵¹⁴ It would turn the US into an expeditionary power able to confront both state and non-state actors.

Neither was this thinking entirely new. Flexibility, mobility and speed have always been an objective of the US military and new technology was always introduced to push this further. With the first inklings of the guided munitions revolution apparent in the 1950's, General Westmoreland alluded to the ability of the new technology to produce a qualitatively different military. In a note of historical significance, the shift to a rapid, nimble, and mobile force has been at the basis of US Army's change throughout contemporary history. In 1957 Westmoreland spoke of the necessity to develop lighter more agile forces to become more expeditionary in words that were eerily reminiscent of the debates in the 2000's:

Our Army is perhaps now in the most important period in its history. It is in a period of transition never before known in the history of arms. If the Army is to [continue to] play as important role in the service of our country as it has in the past, it is essential that we capitalize on technology and

512 George W. Bush, "Inaugural Speech," Washington DC, January 20, 2005 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>. Accessed January 22, 2007.

513 Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, (October 1993).

514 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in R. Scarborough, *Rumsfeld's War: the untold story of America's anti-terrorist commander*, (Washington DC: Regnery, 2004), p. 164.

*scientific advances. We must exploit strategic mobility by emphasizing light and compact equipment that will be easily transportable. We must exploit Army aviation and battlefield mobility while at the same time ensuring the ability of our infantry to [...] fight at the end of the trail. We must exploit electronic technology, capitalizing on better communications and the practical use of target acquisition devices. [...] That is a big order. However, we should achieve a truly revolutionary type of Army – an Army that can gain and retain the initiative in any type of military situation.*⁵¹⁵

It underlined the continuous nature underlying America's approach to transformation.

12.2.1 GO BE MORE LIKE THEM!

Deployability has been a key concern for the Army during the 1990's. It was made particularly apparent through the experience with Task Force Hawk in 1999. The Task Force was the Army's deployment of Apache helicopters in support of operations in Kosovo. Deemed necessary for dealing with Serbian armor, the helicopters were requested by General Wesley Clark forty-eight hours after the start of the operation in March 1999 yet it would take more than three weeks before they were deployed. Because Army planners were concerned with the risk to the pilots, the operational plan was based around using MLRS heavy artillery systems to 'prepare' the battlefield prior to deploying the Apaches while having several Abrams tanks as back-up. It meant that more than 5000 forces were required to support and protect a contingent of twenty-four Apache helicopters.⁵¹⁶ The large footprint implied long deployment times and high costs. The total cost of the deployment amounted to roughly a quarter of the entire cost of the military operation. In the end the helicopters were never used in combat.⁵¹⁷ The MLRS artillery systems could not be used because of their inaccuracy and the associated risk of substantial collateral damage. The Apaches could not be used because expected loss rates per sortie were 5% as a result of their vulnerability to small arms fire, opposed to the significantly lower risk estimate for fixed-wing aircraft dropping ordnance from 15,000 feet.⁵¹⁸ Finally, neither could the tanks be used because Army engineers estimated that the muddy and mountainous terrain

515 General William C. Westmoreland speaking at a conference of senior Army commanders in 1957. Quoted in Benjamin Schreer (ed.), *Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation*, SWP Berlin, June 2005, p. 11.

516 See also Ivo Daalder & Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: Nato's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

517 John Gordon IV, et al., "The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 2001-02), p. 55.

518 A further argument offered by Admiral Bill Owens is that there was substantial confusion in the planning cycle because the Apache had been developed as a complement to the deployment of ground troops in maneuver campaigns, not to operate without boots on the ground together with the force. As General Bob Gaskin said "No one has ever seriously envisioned including Army aviation in to a theatre strategic air campaign ...Everybody trains, organizes, and equips to their service doctrine." Owens (2000), p. 199.

would require extensive engineering to make bridges and roads accessible for the 68 ton tanks. The episode drew the usability of Army assets into question for rapid, power projection operations.

Several months before 9/11 Secretary Rumsfeld proposed to decrease the size of the Army and substitute mass for information. The Army's heavy but hard-to-deploy systems would have to go. Rumsfeld reasoned that the Army could compensate for the loss of armor by introducing network-centric systems, new weapons systems and operating jointly.⁵¹⁹ Reluctant to give up the source of their bureaucratic power, the Army brass proved unwilling to move. Because Rumsfeld was not getting traction with the Army brass, by the summer of 2001 the media was reporting the failure of his transformation plans.⁵²⁰

The attacks of 9/11 increased momentum to make the Army more nimble, flexible and rapidly deployable. Preventing catastrophic terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors required a military that could operate with speed, stealth and surgical precision with a strong emphasis on intelligence capabilities and Special Operations Forces. Small groups of terrorists could not be fought by large mechanized divisions, instead smaller units would be required that could operate quickly, silently and deadly.

On September 12, 2001 the White House considered responses to the terrorist attacks. A discussion ensued whether the CIA or the armed forces would be the most suitable instrument to respond in Afghanistan.⁵²¹ Rumsfeld tasked the Army's leadership to provide options for rapid operations against Al Qaeda. Yet the Army's war plans all relied on lengthy troop build-ups. The CIA by contrast had a plan lying on the shelf and with the help of several Special Operations Forces and Air Force capabilities they started Operation *Enduring Freedom*. During the first stage of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army was put on the sidelines. Rumsfeld's concern was that without enhancing the Army's power projection capabilities it would not be usable in the short-notice operations of the new security environment. Three weeks after the 9/11 attacks Rumsfeld sent one of his ubiquitous short memos - quaintly called "snowflakes" - to his senior military leadership entitled *What Will Be The Military Role in the War on Terrorism* in which he stated that there was something "fundamentally wrong" with the Pentagon for not being able to produce a plan for the president.⁵²² While Rumsfeld's memo addressed the military at large, the focus was on 'boots on the ground', the Army. In the memo Rumsfeld hypothesized that the department had become risk-averse throughout the Clinton administration. He was determined to increase the extractive capacity of Army for the foreign policy executive. He elaborated his vision in a *Foreign Affairs* article published in response to the fall of the Taliban.⁵²³ The article reads as Rumsfeld's blueprint for Army transformation. It detailed a

519 Tom Bowman, "Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts," *Baltimore Sun*, July 10, 2001.

520 Thomas E. Ricks, "For Rumsfeld, Many Roadblocks," *Washington Post*, August 7, 2001.

521 Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 77 – 78. See also Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 35.

522 Douglas Feith, *War and Decision* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 112-113.

523 Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/ June

greater reliance on SOF and the ability to connect different platforms together, citing the example of Special Forces being able to call in B-52 air-strikes to provide overwhelming force with a minimal footprint. “What won the battle for Mazar-i-Sharif, he wrote:

*...and set in motion the Taliban’s fall from power -- was a combination of the ingenuity of U.S. Special Forces; the most advanced, precision-guided munitions in the US arsenal, delivered by US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps crews; and the courage of valiant, one-legged Afghan fighters on horseback.*⁵²⁴

The service notably absent in this list was the US Army. The war in Afghanistan demonstrated the value of SOF with precision air and naval support and proved to Rumsfeld the value of a smaller, leaner, and precise force. Five years later, Rumsfeld created Special Operations Command, a military command overseeing all SOF activities, tasked to plan and synchronize all operations of the Global War on Terrorism. It was the most explicit expression that SOF-ing had the future. The strategist Thomas Barnett wrote that: “Rumsfeld not only transformed the role of Special Operations Command, he designated it as an agent of change within the US military, saying to the rest of the armed forces: *Go be more like them!*”⁵²⁵ He furthermore substantially increased Special Operations Forces capabilities.⁵²⁶ Special Operations Forces became the template of capabilities Rumsfeld wanted to grow in the Army: rapidly deployable small-sized units, able to operate anywhere under diverse circumstances, combining stealthiness with the ability to achieve precise results while operating as an integral element of the joint force.

To accentuate his point, Rumsfeld decided to challenge the heaviest and least deployable weapons program in the Army’s inventory. Referring to transformation imperatives, in the spring of 2002 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld cancelled the Crusader artillery tube. Explaining his decision in a newspaper op-ed, he said:

2002), pp. 20-32.

524 Ibid, p. 21.

525 Thomas P.M. Barnett, “Old Man in a Hurry,” *Esquire Magazine*, July 1, 2005.

526 From 2001 to 2006, expenditures for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) soared. Excluding supplemental war-time funding, procurement funding nearly doubled (93% increase) and operations and maintenance costs increased with nearly 75%. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that since 2001 Special Operations Forces had an 81% increase in the baseline budget. In FY2004, SOCOM received a 50% increase in funding and an increase in manpower with 1890 billets. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for a one-third increase in Special Forces battalions and a 15% increase of Special Operations Forces personnel expecting to grow with a total of 5575 billets by FY2008. Skills common among Special Operations Forces such as civil affairs and Psychological Operations would be expanded by a third. See also Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006.

*The decision to recommend its termination is based on our assessment that we must forgo a system originally designed for a different strategic context to make room for more promising technologies that can accelerate the transformation of future warfare on terms the United States must dictate.*⁵²⁷

Network-centric warfare did not mesh with the 110 ton artillery system. Even though the Crusader promised to shoot rounds faster, further and with greater accuracy than any system before, deployability gave the breakthrough. After all, precision could also be supplied by the joint alternative of close air support and the Air Force's precision munitions. Congress however was difficult to convince of the rationale of Rumsfeld's decision. There were vested interests related to the Crusader, in particular among those congressmen representing Oklahoma where the \$11 billion Crusader was to be assembled. A power struggle between the Pentagon and Congress ensued with Congress keeping parts of the program alive.⁵²⁸

That Donald Rumsfeld pushed SOF-ing in the Army also became apparent when he brought back General Peter Schoomaker from retirement to be the Army Chief of Staff in 2003. Schoomaker had been a four-star general commanding the Army's Special Operations Forces and shared Rumsfeld's belief that the Army needed to change. Importantly, he was not from the current line of command. Rather he was an outsider with insider experience. According to Bob Woodward, Schoomaker wanted to recreate "the Army in the image of the Special Force – smaller, self-contained units that could deploy rapidly into any situation."⁵²⁹

12.2.2 THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS: NEEDING ONLY ONE THIRD

Referring to Operation *Enduring Freedom* Rumsfeld said in 2002: "the world has stood by in some amazement at the effectiveness of precision munitions in Afghanistan. There is no reason we cannot apply that technology to the Army's land warfare capabilities."⁵³⁰ George W. Bush had outlined similar principles of US operational effectiveness transformation in 1999: "On land, our heavy forces must be lighter, he said. "Our light forces must be more lethal. All must be easier to deploy. And these forces must be organized in smaller, more agile formations, rather than cumbersome divisions."⁵³¹ He was referring to

527 Donald Rumsfeld, "A Choice to Transform the Military," *Washington Post*, May 16, 2002, p. A25.

528 United States Congress, Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental, 2002.: "The Army's deficiency in heavy artillery capability cannot continue to be deferred irrespective of the development of precision guided munitions. The gap left by the termination of the Crusader artillery system must be filled. The conferees believe it is imperative that the Army accelerate its plan to develop a next generation artillery cannon for the Objective Force to take full advantage of the \$2 billion investment in state-of-the-art artillery technology developed under the Crusader program."

529 Bob Woodward, *The War Within* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 124-125.

530 Donald Rumsfeld, "A Choice to the Transform the Military," *Washington Post*, May 16, 2002.

531 George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Citadel," Charleston (SC), September 23, 1999.

the Future Combat Systems (FCS). The defense analyst Michael O’Hanlon writes that with the FCS “the Army has come closest to following the rhetorical exhortations of George W. Bush... to ‘skip a generation’ of weaponry and hasten development of more futuristic technologies.”⁵³² FCS is also the implementation of a transformation policy focused on rapid, decisive power projection in the Information Age. Derived from the Army After Next program in 1994, FCS was designed to meet anti-access and area-denial threats, and scale the strategy of technology ladder to “hedge against the possibility that a large, technologically adept country may gain the ability to disrupt or negate US military advantages.”⁵³³ FCS was pushing technology to the next level for fear that otherwise the adversary would achieve par by emulating US strengths. It thus reflected the ‘strategy of technology.’ FCS amounted to an entire force structure explicitly directed at waging high-intensity operations more rapid and more decisively by being built around Information Age technologies. In total it consisted of a completely new family of 14 individual platforms and sensors, from unmanned helicopters to non-line-of-sight precision artillery tubes to technologies for the individual soldier.

The Future Combat Systems was drawn up in the early 2000’s to create tactical, operational and strategic advantages for the Army. Operationally, FCS was designed to meet the anti-access and area-denial threats which could impede the slow and month-long build-ups heavy divisions suffered from. The major maneuver units were developed with a weight limit in mind so that they could be transportable by C-130 tactical transport aircraft. It meant making the main platform half as light as its predecessor, the 68-ton M1A2 main battle tank. It would enable the Army to achieve “operational maneuver over strategic distances.” This implied not being dependent on single, large and predictable points of disembarkation or on long and vulnerable logistics lines. Using multiple points of entry would avoid reliance on major ports, increase operational tempo as forces would deploy on arrival and avoid the threat of ballistic missile attacks such as occurred during the Gulf War. In order to be light, weight in terms of passive armor had to be sacrificed. Instead FCS would rely on speed and guile to avoid enemy fire rather than have the capability to sustain it passively, like the armor plating of the M1A2 tanks. Tactically, the backbone of the force was the information and decision superiority espoused in Joint Vision 2010, substituting size and armor for information, outsmarting the enemy rather than outfighting it. O’Hanlon said FCS “will depend for its survival largely on not being shot at.”⁵³⁴ The ranking minority member in the Congressional committee responsible for political oversight of the project said in 2003:

The Army believes that non-traditional fighting tactics coupled with an extensive information network will compensate for the loss of size

532 Michael O’Hanlon, *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 88.

533 US Army Logistics Management College, *Why Future Combat Systems*, July 2006. http://www.almc.army.mil/sed/fa49/Readings/Why_FCS.ppt.

534 O’Hanlon (2005), p. 89.

*and armor mass by utilizing information superiority and synchronized operations to see, engage, and destroy the enemy before the enemy detects the future forces.*⁵³⁵

As a standard it would increase fighting power by a factor of three. The Government Accountability Office observed that “each [FCS] unit is to be a rapidly deployable fighting organization about the size of a current Army brigade but with the combat power and lethality of the current larger division.”⁵³⁶ The FCS concept was infused with thinking in terms of the shift away from the Industrial age, which relied on quantity, rigidity and mass, to the Information Age, which would rely on speed, agility, and adaptivity. If successful, it would be a remarkable improvement since it would mean that either the Army could be one-third its current size, or with the same amount of forces but with the multiplier effect of technology, the United States Army would have three times the power. Brigades could offer the firepower of divisions, greatly increasing deployability.

On paper it would be a tremendous improvement in resource extraction and operational effectiveness. At the strategic level FCS meant that objectives could be reached in a shorter time span with fewer forces, or perhaps even overwhelm the enemy into not fighting at all. By not being dependent on specific points of entry it enhanced American strategic freedom. Relying on extensive diplomacy to get access to ports or staging bases would be unnecessary. Because the distance from which the US Army could deploy was so much larger, anti-access threats would also be negated.

As a necessary step to pursue Army transformation, the QDR in 2006 also shifted the Army to a modular brigade-sized force. Rumsfeld initiated a change in the Army’s force structure from the division to the brigade. Army active force structure changed from ten divisions with three brigades to forty-three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The modularization of the force also meant the Army could deploy smaller structures without compromising readiness, thereby tailoring size to the mission and offering flexibility in force planning since the brigade-sized building blocks could operate independently of one another.⁵³⁷ In fact, the Army’s *Transformation Roadmap* clarified: “the decisive effort of Army transformation is the creation of modular, combined arms maneuver brigade combat teams [...]”⁵³⁸

FCS implemented the American belief that strategic dominance was pendant on power projection for rapid, decisive operations in high-intensity combat, especially major theatre war. Overwhelming the adversary through multiple entry points, dispersed and

535 Congressman Curt Weldon, “Issues facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program,” Government Accountability Office, Washington DC, August 2003.

536 Paul L. Francis, “Future Combat Systems, Challenges and Prospects for Success,” Government Accountability Office, Washington DC, March 2005.

537 Anne Plummer & John M. Donnelly, “Shaping a Modern Fighting Force,” *Congressional Quarterly*, February 28, 2005.

538 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Operations, Army Transformation Office, “United States 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap,” Department of the Army, p.3-2.

concurrent operations, the enemy would be shocked and awed. The Future Combat Systems was the pinnacle of operational effectiveness transformation thinking. It also offered the logical next step over AirLand battle. While the latter had pioneered deep-strike in order to make the battle non-linear, FCS was moving beyond the dependence on predictable points of entry FCS and would conduct concurrent distributed operations directed at the adversary's center of gravity.

12.2.3 CRITICS OF THE FCS

The idea of FCS worked on paper but it still needed to be realized. In 2005 Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker assessed the program's success at only 28%.⁵³⁹ Criticism was directed at its technical, tactical, operational, strategic and financial dimensions. Fourteen different next-generation platforms needed to be developed within a timeline of 9.5 years between concept development and production. It led to questions regarding its technical feasibility. A Government Accountability Office report observed that each individual system was as complex as fighter aircraft, and the standard for producing one single platform now applied to a complete family of platforms.⁵⁴⁰ As a consequence, in April 2005 the Congressional Research Service stated that the FCS was both "at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts" but simultaneously "a high-risk venture." At the tactical level, there was concern over its reliance on active defense; substituting speed and information for mass and armor. It risked producing a force too light for conflict against heavy forces but too slow to fight light infantry forces. Even in rapid, decisive operations the ability to maneuver around enemy fire and engage from distance was questioned. During the combat phase of *Iraqi Freedom* the maximum engagement range had usually been less than 200 meters, yielding preference to passive armor.⁵⁴¹ As a remedy FCS assumed perfect situational awareness and "dominant battlespace awareness," on both friendly and adversarial forces. This remained an unproven assumption. It also did not give the opponent a vote in the fight, a fallacy Millennium Challenge 2002 had made clear. Operationally, the principle of "operational maneuver over strategic distances" was doubted. Simply, the FCS vehicles were too big. The Stryker vehicle, the predecessor to the FCS vehicles, could not be transported fully outfitted in a C-130. The full configuration of the vehicle made it incapable of entering the aircraft.⁵⁴² Using larger aircraft however, would undermine the cost- and time-efficiencies to negate A2/AD threats.⁵⁴³ Furthermore, a principle source of criticism

539 Andrew Feickert, "The Army's Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, April 28, 2005, p.10.

540 Paul L. Francis, "Future Combat Systems, Challenges and Prospects for Success," Government Accountability Office, Washington DC, March 2005.

541 Peter R. Mansoor, "Transformation Reconsidered – The Iraq Experience" in Benjamin Schreer et al (eds.), *Divergent Perspectives on Transformation*, SWP June 2005, Berlin, p. 20-23.

542 Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles is well under way, but expectations for their transportability by C-130 aircraft need to be clarified*, Washington DC, August 2004, p.28.

543 Ibid.

was related to the understanding of the strategic environment. Substituting armor and passive defense for superior information and speed was only suitable in a conventional high-intensity conflict. For instance in Mogadishu 1993, US forces had had no armor and suffered sufficient casualties when they were confronted with close quarters urban conflict, small-arms fire and RPGs. It led President Clinton to decide to withdraw. That type of conflict returned in Iraq, particularly during the 2004 Battle for Fallujah, where the heavy armored Abrams tanks proved useful.⁵⁴⁴ From its outset, FCS favored high-tech, high-speed war primarily applicable in the event of war with Iran, North Korea or a replay with Iraq.⁵⁴⁵ It was designed to skip a generation of technology to perform those operations better. It was developed on the assumption, prevalent in the 1990's, that a major regional conflict formed the principle strategic challenge. FCS had been tailored to excel in operations at the high-end of the conflict spectrum, the question was whether those operations would still come to pass. Finally, the cost increases weighed heavily. FCS devoured most of the Army's research budget: 16.5% in 2004; 27.1% in 2005; 28.5% in 2006; 31.5% in 2007 and 28.5% of the Army's research budget in 2008.⁵⁴⁶ The original plan was to realize FCS for the entire Army by 2014. Procuring FCS for one-third of the force was expected to cost as much as \$157 billion, excluding roughly \$25 billion for the networking infrastructure allowing the different elements to communicate.⁵⁴⁷ The question was whether the high claim the FCS put on the Army budget was justified in light of the concerns mentioned above.

12.3 AIR FORCE TRANSFORMATION

FCS had been the Army's answer to achieve rapid dominance along network-centric principles. It was similarly addressed by the Air Force. Operational effectiveness transformation emphasized precision and speed. In 2004, the US Air Force published its interpretation of transformation in the *Transformation Flight Plan*. "Before long," its authors write, "Joint Force Commanders will be able to select the precise target necessary to achieve desired

544 See for instance the account of the Second Battle of Fallujah. Dick Camp, *Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq* (St Paul MN: Zenith Press, 2009).

545 Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV and David E Johnson, "An Alternative Future Force; Building a Better Army," *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter 2003-2004), pp. 19-39.

546 Another potential risk to cost has been the use of a lead systems integrator which has made oversight by the services difficult and increasing the likelihood of cost-growth. A similar situation occurred with the Coast Guard's Deepwater and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship. See for instance, Ronald O'Rourke, "Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, updated June 5, 2008 and "Navy Littoral Combat Ship: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, updated May 23, 2008.

547 For figures see Andrew Feickert, "The Army's Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, April 28, 2005.

effects and focus on the quality, rather than the quantity, of targets attacked.”⁵⁴⁸ It was an extension of the guided munitions revolution and portrayed a complete reliance on superior military technology. Realizing information superiority through building a systems-of-systems network of all aerial and space systems would lead to “predictive battlespace awareness,” not only discerning where the enemy is but also predicting his actions. This would allow optimized System Warfare and effects-based operations:

*[The Air Force] will be able to identify an adversary’s key centers of gravity and relay that information to combat forces in near real-time to attack and destroy the centers of gravity in the particular sequence that will be most devastating to the adversary.*⁵⁴⁹

It echoed many of the concepts found with the Army’s Future Combat System illustrating the common understanding within US transformation policy. Technological improvements in the US would make the enemy fight “blind, deaf and dumb” making them easy targets. Rather than overwhelming force, through ultimate precision it could produce overwhelming influence. The precision revolution would also lead to the development of a global precision strike capability, enabling the service to target anything on earth within 45 minutes. According to the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review prompt global strike* would form the basis for deterrence, help against homeland security threats and “shape the choices of states at strategic crossroads.”⁵⁵⁰ The Air Force had an adversarial, force-on-force perspective with a focus on using technology to achieve victory in high intensity operations. Emphasizing the superiority of airpower, the document exuded the impression that the Air Force was capable of fighting and winning any conflict by itself through superior technology and harnessing the information revolution.

12.4 NAVAL TRANSFORMATION

12.4.1 SEA-BASING

Naval transformation was based on increasing the reach of the military and negating anti-access and area-denial threats, much like the Army’s FCS program. The *Naval Transformation Roadmap* embraced the service’s desire to enhance power projection from sea, supporting ground forces by exploiting America’s Command of the Commons.⁵⁵¹ It was captured in the concept of sea-basing which formed the core of the Navy’s interpretation of transformation. The *Roadmap* outlined:

548 United States Air Force, *The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan*, Washington DC, November 2003, p.51.

549 Idem.

550 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.46.

551 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: the military foundation of US Hegemony,” *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.

*While the Navy-Marine corps Team is expanding the entire array of naval capabilities we provide the Nation, our transformation is centered upon the development of Sea-basing: the concepts and capabilities that exploit our command of the sea to project, protect, and sustain integrated warfighting capabilities from the maritime domain.*⁵⁵²

The concept of sea-basing is based on increased strategic freedom of action for the United States, much like FCS and the Air Force's global strike capability. Regardless of political constraints, it would enable the US to deploy power, negating A2/AD threats. It appealed to tenets of US strategic culture first formulated in Washington's Farewell address and the desire to avoid entangling alliances, but nevertheless wanting to shape the security environment. "Command of the commons" created the opportunity to exploit strategic freedom of action from the sea and increase resource extraction of the Navy, making it more usable to sustain dominance. Key to sea-basing was removing strategic dependencies to project military power and - as the *2007 Maritime Strategy* outlined - to maintain "global freedom of action."⁵⁵³ Sea-basing had a political, military and bureaucratic logic. From the Navy's bureaucratic viewpoint, sea-basing would give the service a dominant role in any expeditionary operation for it would be the central platform from which land operations would deploy and be commanded. From an operational perspective, it envisaged further exploiting one of America's greatest asymmetric advantages, namely the control of the sea. Sea-basing was the next step in making the Navy's carrier strike groups the central node of American power projection. Additionally it made sense from the perspective of force protection by minimizing the vulnerability to short-to-medium range missile attacks as opposed to a static base on land. Most importantly, at the level of grand strategy it would make the United States less dependent on diplomacy to project power. The National Defense Panel in 1997 had alluded to the possibility that crucial allies - on which US power projection depended - could be blackmailed precluding using access to a theatre.⁵⁵⁴ The US could avoid such strategic access-preclusion by extending security-guarantees to these allies or developing an alternative for the deployment of forces. Sea-basing provided such an alternative and would, "minimize limitations imposed by reliance on overseas shore-based support, and enable the transformed joint force to exploit our Nation's asymmetric advantage in the seaspace."⁵⁵⁵

552 Gordon R. England, *Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003*, Department of the Navy, 2003, p.1. <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/transformation/trans-toc.html>.

553 James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, Thad Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007.

554 Report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, Washington DC, December 1997, p.13.

555 *Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003*, p. 2.

12.4.2 THE MARINE CORPS: MORE EXPEDITIONARY THAN THE ARMY

As the Navy's infantry force, the Marine Corps similarly focused on anti-access and area-denial threats in its transformation policy, forming the ground component of the Navy's sea-basing concept. In its principal strategic-level document *Marine Corps Strategy 21*, it stated categorically that the service was "less encumbered by the political constraints often encountered by forces tied to land-based infrastructure."⁵⁵⁶ It did not suffer from the same constraints as the Army and instead, "the only invitation we [US Marine Corps] require to move to a crisis area is a request from the geographic combatant commander and an order from the National Command Authorities." Three years later, in the run-up to the Iraq War, this issue would receive new urgency as the Turkish parliament denied the 4th Infantry Division access to its territory in order to open a Northern front in the war in 2003, highlighting the vulnerability of the US Army to political sways of key host nations.

12.5 THE HEY-DAY OF TRANSFORMATION: TOWARDS THE QDR 2006

Increasing power projection also required addressing the military's focus on the two-war planning construct. Secretary Rumsfeld took this up in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* and revised the United States' political-strategic ambition. It would at any one time defend the homeland, have a deterrent forward presence in four theatres (Europe, Taiwan straits, Korea and the Middle East), have the capability to swiftly defeat attacks in two theatres with overlapping time frames and defeat the adversary decisively in one of two.⁵⁵⁷ The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that homeland security had been grossly neglected throughout the 1990's. US superiority in conventional warfare and emphasis on power projection had driven adversaries to seek out and exploit asymmetries amongst others by attacking the US homeland and its citizens directly.⁵⁵⁸ The rear had been left undefended. Most operational plans also relied on large concentrations of American forces and long build-ups. For instance the only Iraq war plan that existed in the mid-90's was a replay of *Desert Storm*: Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait again, and after a build-up of several months 500,000 US forces are tasked to liberate the country. Rumsfeld had shouted: "that is insane, that is crazy, either it's world peace or it's World War III. Either the switch is on or off."⁵⁵⁹ If the Army was to be more SOF-like, it would need to have a more flexible planning construct.

That the overarching emphasis remained on high-intensity warfighting was apparent when in 2003, following the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, new Joint Swiftness Goals

556 Headquarters of the United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Strategy 21*, Department of the Navy, Washington DC, November 3, 2000, p.4.

557 "Swiftly defeat" implied countering attacks to re-establish the status quo whereas "defeat decisively" implied regime change.

558 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 14.

559 Woodward (2004), p. 35.

were formulated detailing the deployment guidelines for the Army. The Goals stipulated a “10-30-30” guideline outlining how the two overlapping “swiftly defeat” operations were phased. Army doctrine declared a “10 day goal to seize the initiative” and a “30 day goal to defeat the enemy and be prepared for redeployment to a near-simultaneous conflict (within the second 30 days).”⁵⁶⁰ It was a shift from Operation *Desert Storm’s* half-year build-up and it institutionalized rapid, decisive operations and ‘shock and awe’-thinking. It was also conform the adversarial-focused emphasis on fast-in, fast-out operations. The US military would dazzle an opponent, confirming American strategic dominance. The Goals offered proof of the drive to wage wars with greater efficiency and speed. They also show little consideration for the stabilization phase of an operation. The devotion to speed before, during and after an intervention conveyed faith in American military superiority and that such brief wars could achieve favorable political objectives by taking out the ‘bad guys.’

By mid-2003, statues of Saddam Hussein had been toppled and the US had conquered Baghdad in an armored assault that was smaller and faster than critics had considered possible. It was the heyday for Rumsfeld’s vision of smaller, lighter more agile forces. The war had vindicated his views on SOF-ing the military. Besides operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Global War on Terrorism involved operating around the world to perform pinprick counter-terrorism operations in places like the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and Yemen. It became known as ‘the Long War.’ Dealing with the threat of non-state actors also required more Special Operations Forces, able to pursue terrorists around the world. In 2006 the Pentagon published its new *Quadrennial Defense Review*. It breathed transformation. In the 113-page document transformation, or grammatical variants thereof, appeared in 79 instances. Rumsfeld wrote: “Technological advances, including dramatic improvements in information management and precisions weaponry, have allowed our military to generate considerably more combat capability with the same or, in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms and with lower levels of manning.” The objective was to create forces that would “surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe.”⁵⁶¹ It was the military-strategic culmination of operational effectiveness transformation. The *QDR* 2006 also removed planning further away from the two major regional wars and instead geared the military to performing continuous operations around the globe (see figure 10).

560 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The United States Army Functional Concept for MOVE 1015-2024 version 1.0*, TRADOC pamphlet 525-36, Department of the Army, April 30, 2007, p.18 <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-3-6.doc>.

561 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.v.

	Steady-State	Surge
Defend the Homeland	Strategic deterrence, North American air and maritime defense, missile defense	Consequence management of catastrophic event
War on Terror	Globally distributed irregular operations, long-duration counterinsurgency, forward presence	One large-scale, potentially long duration irregular warfare operation with counterinsurgency and stabilization. Scale comparable to commitment to Iraq as well as Afghanistan.
Conventional	Deterrence through forward presence	Two nearly concurrent conventional campaigns (or 1 if already in war on terror-surge). Regime change in one of two, destroy its military capacity and set conditions for the transition to, or restoration of, civil society.

Figure 10: Planning Construct in US Quadrennial Defense Review 2006

(Source: Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 2006, Washington DC, March 2006).

There were two states the military planned for. “Surge” envisaged one long-term counterinsurgency campaign (as in Iraq) or performing two nearly simultaneous conventional operations. “Steady-state” referred to a period of relative peace yet with a protracted campaign of small-scale surgical irregular operations as well as forward deterrence. It thus envisaged a period of continuous operations. From the two-war planning construct in the *Bottom Up Review* of 1993, to the 2006 “steady-state/ surge” distinction, the US military moved away from distinguishing between peace and war, and towards a period of continuous military action. While the *Bottom Up Review* had led to an emphasis on *Desert Storm*-type operations, the *QDR 2006* focused on preventing another 9/11, and performing regime change campaigns if necessary.

The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* was the latest document since the end of the Cold War reaffirming the principle of American primacy through military dominance. In the 1990’s the belief was dominant that the United States could maintain strategic primacy by maintaining a focus on the two-war planning construct. Now, instead of being superior in “only” conventional maneuver warfare the United States adopted a strategic focus to meet irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges to its superiority. It meant that defeating terrorist networks, preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and defending the homeland, became objectives of the US military. A holistic approach to maintaining strategic dominance was developed. In this new approach the US was affirming the principles first enunciated in the 1992 *Defense Planning Guidance*, namely that of unipolarity based on US power. The Leviathan spirit of the United States resonated in the belief that Russian and Chinese foreign policy choices could be shaped. Their “sophisticated military modernization” programs led to concern that they might

evolve into possible peer competitors.⁵⁶² Regional hegemonies would not be tolerated, as the United States saw itself as a regional power everywhere and the US would “dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony.”⁵⁶³ Operational effectiveness transformation would sustain this dominance; however the security environment was shifting. The following chapter addresses the question how Washington’s adaptive strategy based on operational effectiveness transformation evolved in response to the challenges of sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

13 THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The final question to be addressed in this case study is how the United States dealt with changes in the security environment which increased external vulnerabilities, most notably through difficulties encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these affected US transformation. Given its strategic culture, which created an emphasis on high-intensity operations fighting wars with succinct beginnings and ends, and a reliance on sophisticated technology to produce military superiority, there was inertia to change when confronted with irregular warfare, counterinsurgency and protracted stability operations. The security environment clashed with US strategic culture.

By 2005, while the United States Air Force and the Navy continued to pursue their transformation agenda’s, the Army and Marine Corps were engaged in irregular operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ground forces were performing operations that would have been considered Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) a decade earlier. The mission in Iraq particularly was proving to be deadly and challenging. Crucial to the course of transformation was that the political leadership decided that stabilizing Iraq was a strategic necessity of vital interest.⁵⁶⁴ Leaving Iraq a failed state would mean leaving behind a prey to be exploited by networked non-state adversaries intent on targeting the US. It would mean accepting that an American strategic weakness had been found, and thereby compromise US exceptionalism. The war in Iraq stood in stark contrast to the opening stages of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Instead of rapid, decisive operations counterinsurgency operations

562 Robert M. Gates, “Testimony of the Secretary of Defense,” Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 27, 2007.

563 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.30.

564 “[Iraq] is a vital front in the war on terror, which is why the terrorists have chosen to make a stand there. Our men and women in uniform are fighting terrorists in Iraq, so we do not have to face them here at home. And the victory of freedom in Iraq will strengthen a new ally in the war on terror, inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, bring more hope and progress to a troubled region, and thereby lift a terrible threat from the lives of our children and grandchildren.” George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, February 3, 2005.

were “a long, hard slog.”⁵⁶⁵ Rather than achieving a decisive victory in agreement with the Joint Swiftness Goals, the United States would remain in Afghanistan and Iraq for several years. Instead of waging war against a clear adversary, the US was confronted with an adversary that hid among the people. Operational effectiveness transformation had been geared at performing high-intensity operations with greater efficiency, greater speed, and greater lethality. Yet speed and lethality were not the primary characteristics to win a counterinsurgency, nor did American superior military technology offer a panacea. The Army was facing substantial difficulties combating Iraqi insurgents, not because they were using advanced technology but rather because they denied the Army the effective use of theirs. In response to these changes in the security environment, the US Army adopted a different adaptive strategy pursuing a policy of strategic transformation towards performing sustained counterinsurgency operations. As a result of its incompatibility with US strategic culture, this subsequently evolved to an approach more reminiscent of the operational effectiveness transformation of the 1990’s, more in tune with US strategic-cultural constraints thereby increasing the resource extraction of the transformation strategy.

13.1 A STRUGGLE TOWARDS STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION

In *The Way Ahead: our Army at War*, a 2004 document based on the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker initiated the shift of Army capability development to meet short-term requirements for ongoing operations. In harsh terms Schoomaker denounced the opportunity-argument of transformation, focusing on current operational necessities instead:

*Some assumptions made and processes developed ... for an Army with a “window of opportunity” to transform itself, while valid at the time, are no longer relevant to the current security environment.*⁵⁶⁶

Transformation was reframed as the gargantuan task to create a military force capable of sustaining large-scale expeditionary operations in an environment where adversaries “will make every attempt to avoid our strengths”. It amounted to a strategic shift from the rapid, decisive campaigns that had been planned for before. Schoomaker said:

*We must assume sustained operations will be the norm and not the exception... the Army must be prepared for operations of a type, tempo, pace and duration different from those we have structured our forces and systems to achieve.*⁵⁶⁷

565 Donald Rumsfeld, “Memo,” October 16, 2003 reprinted in *Airforce Magazine*, December 2003, p. 65. [http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2003/ December%202003/1203keeper.aspx](http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2003/December%202003/1203keeper.aspx). Accessed February 17, 2010.

566 Schoomaker (2004), p.1.

567 Ibid, p. 2.

Sounding the alarm bells to get the attention of the organization, Schoomaker said, “Our Nation, the Joint Force, and our Army are engaged in one of the most challenging periods in our history.”⁵⁶⁸ Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were redefining the Army’s transformation agenda towards strategic innovation as the security environment changed.

Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq required stability forces to perform, long, continuous operations instead of rapid, decisive ones. This argument had also been made in 2004 by two prominent scholars on transformation at the National Defense University.⁵⁶⁹ In their publication, Binnendijk and Johnson argued for the creation of two permanent brigade-size equivalents to focus on stabilization and reconstruction missions as well as a change of military ethos to embrace stabilization and reconstruction missions.

It was a task for which the Army had been ill-prepared. As the 10-30-30 Swiftness guideline demonstrated, stability operations were grossly underestimated in the US military. A planning construct from the 1993 *Bottom Up Review* – which focused on a *Desert Storm*-type scenario – estimated that stability operations in Iraq would only require a “carrier battle group, one to two wings of fighters, a *division or less* [emphasis added] of ground forces, and special operations units.” This equated to approximately 20,000 boots on the ground, for the entirety of Iraq, a country the size of France. By 2005, there were more than 140,000 American forces in Iraq. As part of the strategic imperative to win the Iraqi peace and realize the strategic transformation initiated by Schoomaker, the Pentagon needed to refocus its attention to planning for stability operations.

It was in late 2005, two years into the Iraq insurgency, that the Pentagon came to grips with the new reality in which stability operations had become a strategic interest. To that end Donald Rumsfeld in November 2005 approved *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05*. The directive declared that stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities...”⁵⁷⁰ Thomas White, Secretary of the Army during the Iraq invasion, assessed the need for *Directive 3000.05* as follows.

*A) In the world that we face, the combat phase may be the easiest part; B) that what follows the combat phase is where most of the strategic objectives will be achieved or not achieved and, therefore, it deserves as much planning and attention as the combat phase does. Three, until you’ve done that, don’t start the operation in the first place. Fourth, it’s going to take you a long time and a great deal of effort if you get into anything the scale that we’ve gotten into in Iraq. So you’d better be ready for it.*⁵⁷¹

568 Ibid, p.14.

569 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson (eds.), *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

570 Department of Defense, “Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, Directive 3000.05,” Washington DC, November 28, 2005.

571 Thomas White, “Interview with Frontline: the invasion of Iraq,” January 31, 2004. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/white.html>, Accessed November 14

Some of the initiatives underlying the initial transformation strategy were put on loose screws. While Rumsfeld had wanted to cut Army personnel to substitute mass for information, the stability component of counterinsurgency operations required boots on the ground. The size and duration of the deployments triggered organizational shifts in an Army institution that had been geared for rapid and decisive operations. More than 140,000 troops had been deployed in Iraq continuously since March 2003. While Operation *Desert Storm* had demanded half a million troops, this had been for a six month period only. The Army was not organized to sustain such lengthy deployments and neither were the necessary capabilities in sufficient supply. Mentioned in the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, one of the first measures taken was the Active Component/ Reserve Component (AC/RC) rebalance. This encompassed increasing the pool of critical counterinsurgency forces such as civil affairs and military police in the active component. These capabilities had been put in the Reserve since they were not critical to perform conventional combat. The Army would reduce field artillery, air defense artillery, engineering and armor units and retrain or reassign many to transportation, civil affairs, military police, military intelligence, psychological operations, NBC-defense and combat support billets. It reshuffled approximately 100,000 forces.⁵⁷² The Army called it the most significant army restructuring in the last 50 years saying that it was “divesting Cold War structure to better fight the war on terrorism.”⁵⁷³ The rebalance meant stepping away from the post-Vietnam total force concept of Creighton Abrams which had placed critical units in the reserve. It also implied letting go of the Powell-Weinberger doctrine of focusing on overwhelming use of force for rapid, decisive operations, focusing instead on longer-term stability operations which de-emphasized rapid, decisive use of force. The Secretary of the Army in 2005 clarified that: “Our Army has passed from a time of contingency operations into an undetermined period of continuous operations.”⁵⁷⁴ Rebalancing went hand-in-hand with the objective, “to shift the center of gravity of [the Army’s] capabilities” to those required in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁷⁵ The 2006 Army *Field Manual 1.0* attested to the gravitas of the situation stating that the war in Iraq was:

*...the first severe, long-term test for the All-Volunteer force. The need to conduct sustained operations over a number of years may be the most significant aspect of the early twenty-first century security environment.*⁵⁷⁶

2007.

572 O’Hanlon (2005), p.45.

573 See Department of the Army, “Army Transformation and Army Campaign Plan.”http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocll/DOC/Presentation_Slides05/Briefing%20Slides/Day%201%20-%201%20-%20West%20Point/Transformation%20Brief.ppt.

574 R.L. BrownLee, *Serving A Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, Department of the Army (2005).

575 Department of the Army, *2006 Army Posture Statement*, p. 10-11.

576 United States Army, *Field Manual 1*, 2006, chapter 2.

It was a complete turnaround from operational effectiveness transformation which had been pursued with the idea that the foremost challenge would come in the form of a possible peer competitor. It was a long stretch removed from rapid, decisive operations relying on overwhelming force with clear exit-strategies and decisive battles promoted at the beginning of the 1990's. Different capabilities were required and the Army set out on a policy to adapt. After *Directive 3000.05* strategic transformation started, yet only for the land forces.

13.1.1 FRICTION WITH STRATEGIC CULTURE

The changes in the international security environment caused friction with US strategic culture and the US "way of war". The need for change had been brought about by irregular warfare posing a strategic challenge to the US. Not because of its lethality but because it challenged core concepts of US strategic culture and the way in which the US wants to use the military. Some services – such as the Marines – were better equipped to deal with irregular warfare, however none of the services was organized for the long, protracted deployment that confronted them. The difficulties the United States experienced highlight the fallacy of pursuing operational effectiveness transformation on the presumption of military superiority. Neoclassical realism predicts that a unipolar hegemon will overextend promoting its domestic agenda, thereby triggering counterbalancing behavior. The historian Adrian Goldsworthy, writing on the Punic Wars of the second century BC, made the point that "each society and culture tends to have a unique view of warfare which affects how they fight and as a result how they may be beaten."⁵⁷⁷

Given US military hegemony, an adversary could logically be expected to search for US weaknesses. The United States had focused on perfecting conventional warfare in order to influence an adversary's will, yet contemporary adversaries turned to targeting the political will of the West through means which proved antithetical to the operational effectiveness focus of US transformation. Frederick Kagan commented that "the danger does not come from the inevitability of an information revolution that will necessarily transform war in a certain way. It arises, rather, from the certainty that states contemplating war with the United States will work hard in the intervening years to find ways to counter American military predominance."⁵⁷⁸ As adversaries become more capable through emulation and innovation and the US more at pains to deal with them, it contributes to a transition in the international distribution of power.

Irregular warfare is able to challenge US power projection. In 2005 the Army Planning Guidance declared that "Irregular challenges are by-products of the current strategic environment and spring from an inability of our adversaries to confront U.S. power symmetrically."⁵⁷⁹ This was phrased as a sign of weakness from adversaries – as though adversaries would prefer to confront the US conventionally– yet it offered a foreboding

577 Quoted in Coker (2002), p. 41.

578 Kagan (2006), p. 390.

579 Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* (2005), p. 11.

of events taking place in the security environment. Overwhelming technological advantage had given the US unmatched power projection capabilities but “traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete.”⁵⁸⁰ Operational effectiveness transformation was driven by the US belief equating military success to political triumph. However, victory in the conventional military domain no longer automatically translated to strategic success.

13.1.2 AREA-DENIAL IN NEW TERRAIN

As a result of US superiority in conventional warfare and US dominance over the global commons adversaries arose from two new dimensions. On the one hand they did not challenge US power in the ‘commons’ but rather did so in urban, or other closed terrain such as mountains and jungles (see figure 11). On the other hand, adversaries timed the main thrust of their actions either before or after the phase of conventional operations, or avoided outright confrontation altogether. Instead they challenged US military forces in the stabilization phase with insurgency tactics, remotely-detonated weapons and ambushes or targeted US citizens during ‘peace’ through terrorism. It represented a shift away from the locus of US operational effectiveness transformation. While the United States pursued a policy of operational effectiveness transformation intent on improving its capabilities for high-intensity conventional operations, adversaries were pursuing a balancing response to US dominance. Unipolarity ensured that the United States was the state against which other states developed war plans. Arthur Cebrowski acknowledged in 2002 that “ours is the team against which everyone measures themselves, and to the extent we do not transform we provide would-be adversaries a fixed target.”⁵⁸¹ However, the United States, constrained by its strategic culture, was inadequately prepared for the path of military change pursued by others.

As any strategically thinking actor would be expected to do, adversaries were looking at ways to avoid US strengths and exploit weaknesses. The Chinese, as reflected in the work *Unrestricted Warfare*, embraced this explicitly.⁵⁸² Ralph Peters in 2006 articulated it as follows: “Why fight battles you’ll lose when you can wage war directly against the American population by attacking its digital and physical infrastructure, its confidence and morale?”⁵⁸³ Adversaries adopted a ‘center of gravity’ approach, conceptually comparable to the doctrine of System Warfare, where the political will to fight is directly targeted through terrorism, targeting non-military elements of the state, and sapping the military’s

580 Andrew Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no.4 (July/August 2009), p. 18.

581 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Statement before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee,” United States Congress, Washington DC, April 9, 2002.

582 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999).

583 Ralph Peters, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” *Weekly Standard*, vol. 11, no.10, (February 6, 2006).

strength by denying it a clear military victory. The irregular challenge posed by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan negated the ability of American forces to apply their military prowess in their preferred manner. It denied US forces obvious victory. By operating from urbanized surroundings, blending in with the local population and using concealed improvised explosives insurgents could deny the US military its use of its competitive advantages. The locus of the strategic challenge shifted to the phase of operations where the US military was at its most vulnerable. It was the realm of the ‘lesser included contingency.’ Throughout the 1990’s the United States was concerned with anti-access threats that negated the ability of deploying American power for conventional power projection. Irregular warfare now presented similar challenges since in urban surroundings for instance US military technology was less effective.




Figure 11: US and the shift of adversarial comparative advantages

(Source: Author’s Analysis)

Major US adaptations to warfare have been based on technology; whether it was network-centric warfare and the guided munitions revolution or the aircraft carrier and the nuclear weapon. In general these technologies have sought to increase the distance between US military forces and the opposing military. Precision munitions released from aircraft fifteen thousand feet in the sky or launched from vessels hundreds of miles off the coast, called in by small teams of nearly invisible Special Forces, the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles commanded by pilots several thousand miles away, or developing a global strike missile that could hit any target anywhere within the hour, the vision of US transformation has put ever greater distance between opposing sides. It was founded on the vision of a “clean war” in which no American would be harmed and the subsequent ability to pursue absolute security. While the United States removed the American warrior further from the battlefield through ever more sophisticated technology, the counterrevolution of

war in Afghanistan is in its ninth year. These dichotomies are exemplary for the strain being placed on US strategic culture.

13.1.4 IRREGULAR WARFARE AS A MEANS TO COUNTERBALANCE

Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King's College, argued that the major dilemma of warfare in this new security environment is internal to Western states. He referred to the difficulties facing liberal democratic societies to cope with the anti-liberal challenges posed by irregular warfare.⁵⁸⁹ This 'transformation of strategic affairs' is composed of two elements; on the one hand the adversarial asymmetric responses to US military superiority in the form of targeting innocent civilians, on the other hand the illiberal responses by Western states constraining civil liberties, suspending respect for human rights or humanitarian law or accepting civilian casualties. Insurgents that are immersed in the local population present a major difficulty: "The more warfare becomes intermingled with normal civilian activity, Freedman writes. "[...] the more difficult it is to respond by conventional military means."⁵⁹⁰ Phrased differently, the problem lies in the incompatibility of a state's strategic culture with the response required by threats in the external environment. While Western states use the military in the name of grand liberal ideas such as promoting democracy or freedom, it is increasingly difficult to uphold these virtues when combatants shed uniforms or retreat into urban terrain. Persecuting the Global War on Terrorism, the Bush administration attracted much criticism for its dismissal of the Geneva Conventions for 'unlawful combatants', secret CIA prisons and the legal opacity at the Guantanamo Bay military base.

Operational effectiveness transformation led to a less restrained approach to the use of force by the US under the assumption that it would reduce the cost of interventions. It invariably triggered balancing reactions. The insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan is the product of innovation by non-state actors in response to the perceived conventional dominance of the United States. Dominant powers naturally trigger balancing reactions.⁵⁹¹ As Kenneth Waltz argues: "As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power."⁵⁹² The United States miscalculated the nonlinearity of military change due to the inherent non-linearity of warfare. Military overstretch, operational effectiveness transformation and the rise of irregular warfare are thereby inherently linked.⁵⁹³ Waltz concluded that, "the very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it."⁵⁹⁴ In hindsight, the Powell-Weinberger doctrine was at once the logical

589 Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, (London: Routledge, 2006), p.9.

590 Ibid, p.77.

591 See Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 14-16.

592 Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), p. 28.

593 Frederick Kagan, "A Dangerous Transformation," *Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 2003.

594 Waltz (2000), p. 36.

irregular warfare has been notably non-technological. Those technologies that are used are everyday items such as cell-phones, video cameras and the internet that are accessible to most citizens around the world. Besides, the counterrevolution is 'human'. It takes place in the 'human terrain,' in which humans are the network-nodes, and adversaries operate within, as well as explicitly target, the social space of non-combatants through terrorism and improvised explosives. Here humans themselves, as they steer car-bombs or strap explosives to their bodies, become the precision munitions and lend the counterrevolution its punch. In addition, the counterrevolution is put into practice, not by the actions of a security-maximizing anonymous state, but rather by a group of individuals motivated by human emotion and connected by the common conviction of religious ideology. Absent the high-tech industry base that has allowed the United States to remove the human further from the battlefield through technology, and the liberal culture that has imbued the US to see war as an activity engaged in by militaries at distance from civilians, adversaries have emulated the concept of network-centric warfare but have innovated it into the human terrain. While the digitization of warfare was pioneered by the United States, an alternative version of network-centric warfare took shape in the Hindu Kush.⁵⁸⁴ It is the same style of operations as was witnessed during the Vietnam War and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Yet the United States, for the strategic-cultural reasons described in previous chapters, failed to develop an approach to embrace sustained stability operations.

13.1.3 SHIFTING MARKETS

The *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* states, "Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches [...] that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate."⁵⁸⁵ Transformation was about being relevant but more so about making "previous methods of conducting war" obsolete. Using a parallel offered by the business management literature, operational effectiveness transformation strived to 'differentiate' by waging war differently than others, thereby giving the US 'market leadership.' However, operational effectiveness transformation led the US to excel in a market in which the US already enjoyed a monopoly. Instead, very few competitors were willing to enter the market with the US. The decline of this market has little to do with the professionalism or skill of the US military and its soldiers, sea- and airmen. Geoffrey Moore, a business researcher, writes regarding corporations that differentiate in the wrong market that, "Management must recognize that the problem is not one of company performance. [It is a result of changing market conditions]. This concept is often difficult to grasp for execution-oriented management teams who are used to succeeding through outperforming the competition."⁵⁸⁶ From a business management perspective this quote is insightful to describe the problems the United States confronted with regards to insurgencies. Over

584 Guerilla warfare and insurgencies have been around for decades if not centuries, however the nature of the counterrevolution is such that it has matured – due to the networking technologies adopted - that it is able to present a strategic threat.

585 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 29.

586 Geoffrey A. Moore, *Dealing with Darwin*, (New York: Portfolio, 2005), p. 168.

the past decades the United States conceptualized its defense policy as outperforming any military, particularly in high-intensity combat. Yet now the United States was finding it troublesome to translate that market leadership into political profit in the new security environment.

The Iraq War and its aftermath demonstrated that a militarily weaker opponent could deny a superior military a clear political victory. It shattered the link between *military* dominance and *political* dominance. Winning battles is not sufficient to achieve the desired political end-state. War returned to Clausewitzian roots, as not only an extension of politics – which had relegated it to a realm of its own – but becoming intimately connected to politics and political will. Transformation enthusiasts in the Pentagon did not adequately realize that since network technologies originated outside the military environment, responses to it would neither be focused on conventional warfare, nor be purely military. 9/11 was a clear challenge to US primacy, and rather than a military strike it was a terrorist attack targeting US society at large.

As a result of American strategic culture, which preordained the US to emphasize high-intensity combat as the focus of its military policy, a form of groupthink occurred. This acted as a set of cognitive blinders. In the late 1990's the US perception of the international distribution of power and its approach to warfare was in sync with its strategic culture. Together it created a focus on high-intensity operations and precluding the rise of peer competitors through military strength. This was the paradigm through which military change had been viewed. Contrary to operational effectiveness transformation which focused on making war shorter, surgical and cleaner, adversaries engaged in insurgencies that make the confrontation longer, dirtier and more complex. In counterinsurgency the focus rests on winning the support of the local population, while in conventional war the focus is on destroying the adversary's military. The United States military has been engaged in Afghanistan for nearly ten years, yet the 2003 Joint Swiftness Goals prepared the military to leave a theatre within a month. Operational effectiveness transformation made conventional war less deadly for the United States, while irregular warfare in the stabilization phase has become more lethal. In the five major confrontations in the past fifteen years US armed forces have lost no more than 400 friendly casualties.⁵⁸⁷ Five years of stabilization in Iraq led to close to 4000 casualties.⁵⁸⁸ According to the Powell-Weinberger doctrine, wars should have clear starts and endings and limited timelines, yet the

587 Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), p. 119.

588 A phenomenon that hit home hard after the combat phase of the Iraq War, yet which was already apparent throughout the nineties is that wars get cleaner but stabilization phases remain nasty, brutish and in particular, long. An order of magnitude more people have died in Phase IV in the midst of the Iraq civil war than the combat phase. During major combat operations 140 US servicemen lost their lives. During the stabilization phase as of May 1 2008, 3937 Americans had been killed. This meant that on the combat phase is barely more lethal than the stabilization campaign: 3.2 forces killed per day opposed to 2.15. However, because of the stabilization campaign's longevity – 1828 days opposed to 43 days for the combat phase - it has killed far more forces. This lethality has driven American emphasis on force protection.

outcome of US strategic thinking but also its strategic flaw. The principle of overwhelming victory based on AirLand Battle, championed through the Gulf War, had as a logical downside that it would drive opponents away from these types of conventional confrontations. The Powell-Weinberger doctrine became the victim of its own success and led adversaries to challenge the US in a way for which it was unprepared and for which the Powell-Weinberger doctrine was wholly unsuited. Ironically, this had already been noted in 1989. Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to Congress that, “one of the reasons that low-intensity conflict has become so important is that we have done very well at the other end of the spectrum. The reason that this has become more important is because we have managed to tamp down the possibility of other kinds of conflict.”⁵⁹⁵ This warning went unheeded.

The realist assumption that other actors were intent on counterbalancing unipolarity by annulling American power was reaffirmed. The fallacy from the US perspective lay in the fact that they expected counterbalancing to occur as actors scaled the same transformational ladder as the US had. Rather than venture on an alternative path of innovation, adversaries were believed to have to go along the same path as the United States. Staying but one step ahead would be sufficient to maintain dominance. This proved short-sighted and dangerous, for it rested on a distinctly American perspective on war. “The principal danger in the years immediately ahead, Colin Gray wrote in 2006, “is that US Armed Forces will be so committed to their own network-centric transformation, that they fail to recognize the true character of potentially effective offsetting revolutionary change elsewhere.”⁵⁹⁶ It proved a true remark. Irregular challenges demonstrated that there were different ladders to climb. Due to the enhanced networking technologies available in the civilian world through communications and world-wide travel, irregular warfare has precision, stealth, advanced command and control. Combatants blur into civilian surroundings (stealth), they have the ability to target Western forces through suicide bombers (precision) while making use of internet technologies to broadcast their message or coordinate their attacks (Information Age command and control). One of the most powerful examples of how technologies were emulated in irregular warfare is the IED.

Military technological innovation is a process of continuous action and reaction. An iron law from Technological War is that the antidotes – in the form of innovation or emulation - will always succeed, giving rise to a new wave of innovation. Each revolution in military affairs has been matched by a balancing act of another; whether it was *Blitzkrieg*, *levée-en-masse*, the German railway system or the nuclear revolution. This is what might have dampened the expectations of the American transformation enthusiasts. Colin Gray wrote in 2006 that:

595 William J. Crowe, “Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1989, p. 68.

596 Colin S. Gray, *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the Sovereignty of context*, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 2006, p. 14.

*When feasible and judged desirable, [the fruits of transformation] will be copied in parts. When borrowed, it will be domesticated to fit local cultural preferences and strategic circumstances. If it cannot or should not be imitated, then the challenge will be to find ways of warfare that negate much of its potential.*⁵⁹⁷

Eliot Cohen wrote in 1996 of the emulation of technologies which would impact US military advantages. He was referring to information technologies.⁵⁹⁸ The rise of IEDs is a different variant of Cohen's argument. IEDs are directly related to the advent of mobile communications technology and the internet in civilian society. They are a highly effective precision-guided munition; cheap, concealed and high-impact. While IEDs are generally small bombs their impact on Western interventions is disproportionate to their size. Fabricated in basements and back-alleys IEDs are made from explosive ordnance such as left-over artillery shells or other munitions and fitted with make-shift triggers or timers, ranging from simple pressure wires to garage-door openers and cell-phones. They are concealed in piles of rubble, walls, potholes or even carcasses of animals or humans bodies. IEDs have been responsible for a consistently rising percentage of American casualties in Iraq throughout the period 2004-2007 rising to approximately 80% of all casualties.⁵⁹⁹ Their strategic impact lies herein that they deny the objectives of a stabilization campaign. The mission objective is to provide a secure environment so that reconstruction or development can take place. With hidden explosives going off, injuring, maiming or killing civilians, police or the military, a sense of security and faith in government institutions to provide for public security is eroded.

The United States has answered the threat of IEDs mostly through technological solutions. From late 2004 onwards, forces in the field were haphazardly adding armor plating. Since the initial war plan had not envisaged a long occupation, or a substantial insurgency, only a very small percentage of vehicles had heavy plating creating delays in delivering up-armored vehicles. Ad-hoc plating was being scrounged and welded to the vehicles and sandbags were placed on the floors of humvees to give added protection against the IED blasts.⁶⁰⁰ As vehicles were getting armor, they were also installed with electronic jammers. However, if the military used the jammers to counter the use of cell-phones, insurgents would start to use garage door openers as triggers. Added armor plating would lead to alternative and heavier IEDs such as Explosively Formed Penetrators which were able to pierce metal. As General Ton van Loon of the Royal Netherlands Army said in 2007, putting armor on vehicles was important for short-term protection. However, it could

597 Ibid, p. 46.

598 Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2, (March/April 1996), p. 37-54.

599 Evan Thomas & John Barry, "A New Way of War," *Newsweek*, August 20 / August 27, 2007.

600 Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, "Armor scarce for big trucks serving in Iraq," *New York Times*, December 10, 2004.

never be the solution.⁶⁰¹ The battle against IEDs turned into an arms race. In 2003 the US armed forces stood up an entire organization to deal with roadside bombs. In 2007 all tactical vehicles were replaced by the Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. These vehicles had V-shaped hulls able to deflect the energy of an IED detonated underneath the vehicle. In 2008 \$16.8 billion was appropriated to deliver 7774 MRAPs, with the amount increasing further.⁶⁰² MRAPs were produced and a second-generation was in the makes able to withstand the new heavier blasts.⁶⁰³ An IED, on the other hand, averages “the cost of a pizza.”⁶⁰⁴

13.2 TRANSLATING IRREGULAR WARFARE INTO A NEW ADAPTIVE STRATEGY

The challenges described above demonstrated the need for strategic (type II) transformation towards irregular warfare as opposed to continuing with operational effectiveness (type I) transformation. Initiating this strategic transformation was beset with difficulties as its efforts clashed with US strategic culture. Eventually it came to little. This became apparent through difficulties with personnel, a preference for a technology-heavy response, the military’s emphasis on force protection, as well as interagency and financial constraints. The following paragraphs detail the challenges the US Army encountered in pursuing such strategic transformation.

13.2.1 A PENTATHLETE FORCE?

The difficulties to adapt were firstly expressed on the practical level of personnel. Among the most salient was that shifting to sustained counterinsurgency operations required changes in the labor force. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq meant supporting reconstruction efforts, cooperating with civilian counterparts, building a relationship with the local population, while performing direct action against insurgents. It is a human capital-intensive style of operating, yet the Army’s operational effectiveness transformation had precisely been premised on removing the soldier further from the battlefield and ‘substituting mass for information’, meaning reductions in manpower. For decades the military had focused on being the best at putting ‘metal’ on target, since this was what delivered the greater return to sustaining strategic dominance. A focus on force-on-force confrontations had promoted a technology-oriented approach to warfare, whereas counterinsurgency emphasized its human side. In a way it was a clash between the “science of war” versus “the art of war,” presenting diametrically different models, particularly in terms

601 Rick Atkinson, “You can’t armor your way out of this problem,” *Washington Post*, October 2, 2007.

602 Mark Thompson, “Broken Down,” *TIME Magazine*, April 16, 2007.

603 Kris Osborn, “TRADOC Official: ‘Persistent Conflict’ Shapes Plans, Policy,” *Defense News* October 1, 2007.

604 Evan Thomas & John Barry, “A New Way of War,” *Newsweek*, August 20 / August 27, 2007.

of personnel requirements. As a potential remedy the Army launched the concept of a Pentathlete model for its officer corps.

Announced under the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, the Pentathlete officer is an ideal type individual that unites several attributes that render him capable of being both a soldier and a statesman, giving him the agility to operate in any situation he encounters. Aside from military skills the Pentathlete is versed in “governance, statesmanship and diplomacy.”⁶⁰⁵ It reflects the necessity of the Warrior to participate in activities traditionally considered to be civilian. The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* wrote,

*[Pentathlete officers] are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute and effective communicators. In addition to being experts in the art and science of the profession of arms and demonstrating character and integrity in everything they do, they must be astute at building teams, boldly confronting uncertainty and solving complex problems while engendering loyalty and trust. Above all, our future leaders must be strategic and creative thinkers dedicated to lifelong learning and ... are knowledgeable of culture, history and the language of the area of operations ... understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.*⁶⁰⁶

This view of the force was supported in 2007 by presidential-candidate Barack Obama who stated that the military must have “a program to bolster our ability to speak different languages, understand different cultures, and coordinate complex missions with our civilian agencies.”⁶⁰⁷ Julianne Smith, connected to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said plainly, “US troops lack cultural learning” yet it was considered a criterion for success in counterinsurgency operations.⁶⁰⁸ Secretary of Defense Gates similarly underlined that learning foreign languages and maintaining familiarity with different cultures would be essential, and soldiers would have to learn to embrace traditionally civilian duties: “Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance.”⁶⁰⁹ This was a long way away from the notion professed during the 1990’s that ‘superpowers don’t do windows,’ a term used to express disdain for nation-building and stabilization activities.⁶¹⁰ ‘Doing windows’

605 E.J. Harvey, “Building the Future Force while continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism,” *ARMY*, October 2005, p. 19.

606 *Quadrennial Defense Review 2006*, p. 42.

607 Barack Obama, “Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center,” Washington DC, August 1, 2007.

608 Interview with Julianne Smith, October 2006, Washington DC.

609 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” Association of the United States Army, Washington DC, October 10, 2007.

610 See John Hillen, “Superpowers don’t do Windows,” *Orbis*, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 241-258.

had now become an operational necessity. To shift to a culturally-astute force required a force made up of a warrior Homo Universalis.⁶¹¹

In the Fall of 2006 John Nagl and Paul Yinling, two lieutenant-colonels involved in the debate over the Army's response to counterinsurgency and the development of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine, argued that changing the promotion system was key.⁶¹²

The focus on the promotion system reflected the conclusion from Stephen Rosen's study on the topic of military innovation. His study emphasized the role of military leadership in shaping promotional paths for innovation-minded subordinates to produce change in the military.⁶¹³ In 2007 Secretary of Defense Gates similarly hinted at the necessity to look at the promotion system:

*Going forward we must find, retain, and promote the right people – at all ranks, whether they wear stripes, bars, or stars – and put them in the right positions to see that the lessons learned in recent combat become rooted in the institutional culture*⁶¹⁴

In spite of the declaratory statements to change the personnel system, lower-ranking officers with substantial counterinsurgency experience signaled change was not coming.⁶¹⁵ All efforts aside, Fred Kaplan concluded that: "six years into this war, the armed forces – not just the Army, but also the Air Force, Navy and Marines – have changed almost nothing about the way their promotional systems and their entire bureaucracies operate."⁶¹⁶ Strategist Thomas X. Hammes noted that the military's personnel system was reflective of that

611 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* vol. 85, no. 6 (November- December 2005), pp. 2-15.

612 "To win the Long War, the Army must develop a more adaptive organizational culture. To create such a culture, the Army must change its focus from a centralized, specialized focus on major conventional wars to a more decentralized and less specialized focus on full-spectrum operations. This shift in organizational culture cannot occur within existing organizations — indeed these organizations can be an impediment to change. The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion." Lt. Col. J. Nagl & Lt. Col. P. Yingling, "New Rules for New Enemies," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2006. <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425>. Accessed April 7, 2008.

613 Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

614 Robert M. Gates, "Remarks to the Heritage Foundation," Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.

615 Fred Kaplan, "Challenging the Generals," *New York Times*, August 26, 2007. See also Andrew Krepinevich quoted in Grant, Greg, "Iraq Reshapes US Army Thinking," *Defensenews.com*, August 29, 2005. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1026888&C=thisweek>. Accessed September 7, 2005.

616 Fred Kaplan, "Challenging the Generals," *New York Times*, August 26, 2007.

in the early 1900's; very hierarchical and not conducive to promote free-thinkers.⁶¹⁷ The personnel system was not geared towards counterinsurgency, and neither was the education system. In 2007 Kevin Reynolds concluded after researching the hours spent on counterinsurgency in the Army War College's curriculum that: "it appears the Army War College is devoting a relatively small amount of its curriculum to the study of a type of warfare that for the past four years has taken up nearly 100 percent of the Army's resources, energy, and effort."⁶¹⁸ Trying to find an explanation for the institutional indolence, Hammes said that the Army's institutional bias to focus on technology was to blame.⁶¹⁹ Years of focusing on operational effectiveness transformation had removed creativity from the forces. Emphasizing information and decision superiority was turning officers into "system operators instead of creative strategists." By September 2008, Defense Secretary Gates signaled continuing concern over the necessity to institutionalize a focus on counterinsurgency missions among military personnel:

One of the enduring issues our military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops – which is still not considered a career enhancing path for our best and brightest officers. Or whether formations and units organized, trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and fast enough, to dissuade or co-opt them – or, more significantly, to build the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying.⁶²⁰

A positive note appeared in the form of Lieutenant-General David Petraeus' drafting of a new counterinsurgency manual. A bi-service manual, for both the Army and Marine Corps, it stated at the outset that "counterinsurgency is counterintuitive to the traditional American approach to war and combat operations."⁶²¹ Petraeus acknowledged difficulties would arise because counterinsurgency contradicted the operational effectiveness mindset engrained in the military institution. Personnel change also figured centrally in his activities. In late 2006 for instance Petraeus supported sending military officers to civilian graduate schools as it would expose them to a different culture and mindset that would help them in an uncertain and flexible counterinsurgency environment.⁶²² Besides,

617 Interview with Thomas X. Hammes, January 10, 2008, Washington DC.

618 Kevin P. Reynolds, *Insurgency/ Counterinsurgency: Does the Army Get It?*, United States Army War College, Paper prepared for International Studies Association, Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28- March 3, 2007 (quoted with author's permission) p.8.

619 Interview with Thomas X. Hammes, January 10, 2008, Washington DC.

620 Robert M. Gates, "Remarks at National Defense University," Washington DC, September 29, 2008.

621 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* 3-24, December 15, 2006, p. 1-26.

622 David P. Petraeus, *Soldiering and the Schoolhouse*, Speech at the School of Advanced

there were signs Petraeus might improve the promotional system as well. The decision in late 2007 to place Petraeus on the promotional board of brigadier generals seemed to signal this.⁶²³ However it had taken six years, almost as long as the Vietnam War had lasted, to gain traction on the issue. The Pentathlete force still remained a bridge too far.

13.2.2 FACTORS OF MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL

Rather than sustain operations in Iraq, by late 2006 there was a practical motivation to withdraw rather than sustain the mission in Iraq, frustrating efforts at strategic transformation. This was a consequence of the operational tempo related to the inadequate size of the Army and the rate at which hardware was consumed. Since the Army had been geared towards conventional rapid-decisive operations and had been unprepared for the duration and stress of sustained irregular operations, the urgency and costs of Army reset and readiness increased from 2005 onwards. Testifying before Congress on February 9 2007, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker highlighted the readiness problems the Army confronted. The operational tempo in Iraq and the rate at which materiel was being consumed was eating into the strategic depth of the Army. He noted that while the Army was able to cope with the Iraq surge, it was not easy to sustain. The statement by the Army's highest ranking officer could not be misunderstood. The Army was under stress. The major reason being that several years into the Iraq campaign units were on multiple tours with very little time in between. Operational tempo was taking its toll. A year later, with little promise that a military draw-down would be announced, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace acknowledged the dire state of affairs in the Army. He stated that the current operational tempo had on average "about a 1:1 deployed/at-home ratio- which is about half the time we believe is necessary to sustain readiness for the long term."⁶²⁴ In other words, Army personnel were under tremendous strain. In fact, some deployed units were on fifteen-month tours with only one year at home, stretching the Army and weakening the strategic flexibility of the service to address other challenges.⁶²⁵ Readiness of the Army had become an issue of critical importance and it led to a debate over the ability to remain in Iraq.⁶²⁶ "Our Army is broken," Representative Solomon Ortiz, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness stated unequivocally in January 2007.⁶²⁷ Nine months later the Army's chief of staff, General William Casey, declared the

International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, November 16, 2006.

- 623 Ann Scott Tyson, "Petraeus Helping Pick New Generals," *Washington Post*, November 17, 2007.
- 624 Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee," United States Congress, Washington DC, February 6, 2007, pp. 4-5.
- 625 "Army Tours extended to Fifteen Months," *Military.com*, April 12, 2007..<http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,131926,00.html>.
- 626 See for an extensive review of the Army's readiness issues Mark Thompson, "Broken Down," *TIME Magazine*, April 16, 2007.
- 627 Solomon P. Ortiz, "Statement before US Congress House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness," United States Congress, Washington DC, January 31, 2007. <http://ortiz.house.gov/>

Army was “consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and [was] unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.”⁶²⁸ The Secretary of Defense euphemistically mentioned by the end of the year that the Army was “out of balance”.




Figure 12: Size of US services, 2001-2008

(Source: US Department of Defense)

One solution was to increase the size of the Army. Growing the size of the Army had run counter to Rumsfeld’s initial idea of transformation where information would substitute mass. In 2001 Rumsfeld wanted to decrease the size of the military with 90,000 troops and invest in the Future Combat System instead.⁶²⁹ Three years later, troop sizes became the dominant topic of discussion in Washington. The small size of the initial invasion force in Iraq was to blame for the struggles in the stabilization phase following the collapse of the Saddam regime.⁶³⁰ Contrasting Rumsfeld’s initial desire, the Army was now not becoming smaller but larger instead (see figure 12). The Army would grow with almost 20% in five years time to meet the challenges of sustained operations.

In 2004, the Army was authorized to increase its force with 30,000 troops. This would take some strain off the deployed forces. In December 2006, in the wake of the Republican mid-term electoral defeat, President Bush announced a further increase in the baseline size of the Army and the Marine corps. During the State of the Union address on January 23, 2007 the President requested Congress to support an increase over five years by 92,000;

index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=284&Itemid=78.

628 General George W. Casey Jr., “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,” United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, September 26, 2007.

629 Tom Bowman, “Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts,” *Baltimore Sun*, July 10, 2001.

630 See Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (New York: Penguin, 2006).

65,000 for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corps.

The Army cannot grow overnight yet the strain on the force was acute. With lower retention rates compounding the problem, growing the force came at a cost in terms of quality. Standards of required levels of education were lowered, crime-waivers were granted, and signing bonuses were increased to attract new personnel. “The data is crystal clear; our armed forces are under incredible strain, and the only way that they can fill their recruiting quotas is by lowering their standards,” the chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight said in 2007.⁶³¹ These developments compromised the Army’s objective to develop the highly adaptive high-skilled Pentathlete forces. Quantity was taking precedence over quality, while in some corners there had even been talk of reinstating the draft.⁶³²

Regarding equipment, the Army had been unprepared for the long sustained use of its hardware in trying environments. A report by the Government Accountability Office in October 2005 indicated that the high pace of operations and use beyond the planned operation of a capability was significantly affecting readiness.⁶³³ In 2006 official US Army documentation, the *Army Posture Statement*, noted a reset requirement of “50 brigades consisting of over 350,000 pieces of equipment including 615 aircraft, 7000 combat vehicles and 30000 wheeled vehicles.” The New York Times reported on December 5, 2006 that approximately 40% of all the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ground combat equipment had been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq and that 280,000 pieces of equipment needed to be repaired; among them core assets like M1A1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Humvees and Stryker vehicles.⁶³⁴ The state of Army material provided a technical assessment of how the Iraq war strategically weakened the Army. Concerns over personnel and

631 See Eric Schmitt, “Army Recruiting More High School Dropouts to Meet Goals,” *New York Times*, June 11, 2005; Tom Philpott, “Army Signs More Dropouts,” *Military.com*, November 22, 2006; Lizette Alvarez, “Army Giving More Waivers in Recruiting,” *New York Times*, February 14, 2007; Josh White, “Many Take Army’s ‘Quick-Ship’ Bonus,” *Washington Post*, August 27, 2007. See also the National Priorities Project, <http://www.nationalpriorities.org/militaryrecruiting2007>.

632 In 2003 Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) introduced a bill to that extent. Rangel’s bill was introduced from a socio-economic point of view, saying that if the Bush administration wanted to go to war against Iraq, the military should be a more equal representation of society. The question reappeared when manpower shortages became apparent in the aftermath of the Iraq War. See also Phillip Gold, *The Coming Draft: The Crisis in our military and why selective service is wrong for America*, (New York: Random House, 2006).

633 This concerned key assets such as the Army’s Chinook helicopter. Of the entire fleet only 70% was mission capable. The capability was being used three times more than planned. The M1A1 Abrams tank suffered from technical support staff and overusage and had roughly a 70% readiness rate in 2004. Other troubled assets were the Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Apache Helicopter, flatbed trucks, the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle and its Assault Amphibian Vehicle. Government Accountability Office, “Military Readiness, DOD needs to identify and address gaps and potential risks in program strategies ad funding priorities for selected equipment,” Washington DC, October 2005. www.gao.gov/new.items/d06141.pdf.

634 Ann Scott Tyson, “US Army Battling to Save Equipment,” *New York Times*, December 5, 2006.

material both increased momentum within the Army to draw down participation in these sustained missions, and give up on such sustained missions altogether.

13.2.3 BUDGET CONCERNS FOR THE ARMY

Compounding the problem of personnel and material readiness were its financial implications. The financial implications of the ongoing campaigns were staggering. The costs of repairing broken material or buying new gear – known as the reset – ballooned after 2005. In FY2005 \$688 million was earmarked for the Army reset in the bridge fund, an emergency appropriation for the defense budget. By FY2008 the Bush administration requested \$37.6 billion for resetting equipment. Meanwhile the forces that remained deployed continued to grind through material perpetuating a sizeable reset-bill.⁶³⁵

Additionally, growing the force necessitated structural increases in Army and Marine Corps funds. In FY2008 \$12.1 billion was requested for increasing the force with 7000 soldiers and 5000 marines. Extrapolating from that figure, at roughly \$1 billion per 1,000 troops, in the four remaining years some \$80 to \$90 billion is required to meet troop increases of 65,000 Army and 27,000 Marine Corps troops by 2012.⁶³⁶ Because the size of many other budget functions is dependent on the end-strength of the services, such as equipment, maintenance, construction, salaries and health benefits, the real costs of growing the force are much higher.⁶³⁷ Besides, in 2008 Special Operations Forces were to be increased with 1890 billets requiring an increase in SOCOM's baseline funding as well. It raised the question whether the war, and with it the Army's strategic transformation, could be paid for? For this there are several reasons.

There is substantial macro-economic pressure precluding a structural increase of the defense budget. Assessments by the Government Accountability Office suggest that an increasing US federal budget deficit coupled to an aging population necessitate increased federal outlays for Medicare, Medicaid and pensions, and until 2015 funds for national defense will be under pressure.⁶³⁸ According to the Congressional Budget Office, on the

635 By contrast, in peacetime this amount was roughly \$2.5 billion and \$3 billion yearly. Ann Scott Tyson, "US Army Battling to Save Equipment," *New York Times*, December 5, 2006.

636 Gordon Adams placed the figure in the same range saying that the Army and Marine Corps required between \$70 and \$90 billion over the period 2008-2012 for increasing the force. Gordon Adams, "Budgeting for Iraq and the GWOT," Testimony to the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 6, 2007.

637 See also Linda J. Bilmes, Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict*, (W.W. Norton: New York, 2008).

638 The Government Accountability Office analyzed in 2007 that balancing the budget by 2040 may require "cutting total federal spending by 60% or raising federal taxes to two times today's level." Mandatory expenditure will increase further as a share of federal spending and discretionary spending, including Defense, will take up a smaller share. However, forecasts for economic growth show that the fiscal gap is too large and 'the pie' will not have grown large enough to avoid tough choices. The Office therefore argues that budgets, including for defense, will be under stress. See David M. Walker (Comptroller General to the United States, United States Government Accountability Office), "DOD Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities," Presentation to the House Armed Service, House of Representatives, Washington DC, January 24, 2007.

basis of these macroeconomic trends the share of US defense spending is calculated to decrease from 2007 levels of 4% of GDP to roughly 3.3% in the next ten years.⁶³⁹ The global financial-economic crisis further catalyzed this process.




Figure 13: US Budget Authority including Emergency Appropriations, 1988-2008

(Source: US Department of Defense & United States Congress)

Throughout the Bush administration both military-wide operational effectiveness transformation and Army strategic transformation was made possible through substantial budget increases and supplemental appropriations (see figure 13).⁶⁴⁰ These levels of spending must be maintained or hard choices cannot be avoided between pursuing either form of transformation.⁶⁴¹ As the military looks beyond operations in Iraq and a drawdown is initiated, it is to be anticipated that the supplemental appropriations decrease instead of remain in the realm of tens of billions of dollars. On this all defense experts interviewed for this study agreed. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, anticipated this arguing in late 2007 for a structural 1% of GDP spending increase for defense and warning for a peace dividend as the country looks beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.⁶⁴²

639 Congressional Budget Office, *Budget Outlook*, <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7731/01-24-BudgetOutlook.pdf>. See also figure 17 for a historical table of the US Defense Budget.

640 Supplemental appropriations include Emergency Supplemental funds and Title IX Bridge Funds.

641 The Iraq Study Group, the bipartisan commission advising on Iraq policy chaired by former Secretary of State Jim Baker and Senator Hamilton, similarly acknowledged that “it will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other current and future security threats that need to be accommodated together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel,” noting that “the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray.” James A. Baker & Lee H. Hamilton, *Iraq Study Group Report*, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace 2006), p. 76.

642 “Interview with New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” *New York Times*, October 22, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/washington/22mullen-text.html?pagewanted=print>.

Given the size of the supplemental appropriations over the period 2002 to 2008 – nearing \$180 billion in 2008 - it is important to consider their effect on the defense budget. In the event that supplemental appropriations collapse, the Army is affected most.




Figure 14: Comparison of share of US Department of Defense budgets allocated to different services. With and without supplemental and emergency appropriations, 2002-2007

(Source: Author's analysis on the basis of United States Congress, Conference Reports on Department of Defense Appropriations)

Figure 14 compares the shares of the entire defense budget the different services have received from 2002 to 2007. The graph to the left illustrates the division before taking supplemental funding into account. The graph to the right is the budget-share devoted to the services including supplemental funding. It becomes apparent that the Army has been receiving a steadily increasing share of defense expenditures, at the expense of the Navy and Air Force, particularly as a result of supplemental funding.




Figure 15: US Department of Defense Annual Budgets, Supplemental and Emergency Appropriations Per Function Per Service 2002-2007

(Source: United States Congress, Conference Reports on Department of Defense Appropriations & Author's analysis)

Figure 15 demonstrates the percentage share per service per budget function of all funds. It includes both regular and emergency appropriations. It however includes a breakdown in budget-items. It illustrates how the Army has become the major recipient of defense funding, mostly due to increased shares allocated to Personnel, Operation & Maintenance

(O&M) and steep increases in Procurement. Only in research and development funding is it less than the Air Force and the US Navy.




Figure 16: US Department of Defense Supplemental and Emergency Appropriations Per Function Per Service, 2002-2007

(Source: Author's analysis on the basis of United States Congress, Conference Reports on Department of Defense Appropriations)

Figure 16 depicts the percentage share per budget function per service of the supplemental appropriations only. It shows that the Army has been the primary benefactor of emergency funding, excluding R&D accounts. Whereas the Navy and Marine Corps received hardly any additional funding.

In 2006 and 2007 54% and 63% of all Army procurement funds came from the supplementals and in 2005 this was roughly half. In the four-year period between 2004 and 2007 only between 50% and 30% of funds for Army operation & maintenance (O&M) was provided through the regular annual defense budget. From 2004 onwards, roughly one-third of all the Army's personnel funds – which includes salaries and benefits-, came from emergency funding.⁶⁴³ In short, supplemental funds have heavily benefited the Army and any decrease will impact Army operations.

A lack of supplemental funding puts pressure on the military in another way. In 2008 supplemental funding climaxed at 20% of the total defense budget.⁶⁴⁴ This figure paid for many programs associated with counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. For instance in 2006, half of the funds appropriated to procure an essential capability for network-centric warfare, the FBCB2 blue-force tracker, came from supplementals and emergency funding. In 2006 more than 25% of the funds for Special Operations Command came from the supplemental appropriations. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund for instance, was fully funded from supplemental and emergency funding. By being funded mostly through the supplementals, there is considerable risk that budgetary pressure will put some of these counterinsurgency capabilities at risk.⁶⁴⁵ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates mentioned that in the supplemental for FY2007 \$10.4 billion and in FY2008 \$15.2 billion was earmarked for among others body armor, the MRAP vehicles, non-lethal weapons and electronic jamming devices.⁶⁴⁶ It can be concluded that the Army's strategic transformation has largely been funded through emergency appropriations.

13.2.4 TECHNOLOGY & FORCE PROTECTION

The overbearing faith in technology and the linear interpretation of the evolution of warfare derived from US strategic culture presented obstacles for the United States to adapt to irregular warfare and build stabilization and reconstruction force. And when it did it focused on technological solutions to counterinsurgency. We have already seen how the threats of IEDs produced a costly technology-driven arms race. US strategic culture

643 Author's analysis on the basis of US Congress Defense Appropriations conference reports.

644 In FY 2008 the supplemental request was \$141.7 billion while the regular defense budget request was \$ 481.4 billion. In 2007 36% of total military procurement funding was emergency money. A similar figure was provided by Gordon Adams, "Budgeting for Iraq and the GWOT" Testimony to the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 6, 2007.

645 Other capabilities relevant for fighting insurgencies however, such as UAVs and Special Operations Forces were mostly funded through the regular budgets.

646 Robert M. Gates, "Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates," House Armed Services Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, February 7, 2007.

focused on high-intensity operations and adhered to the notion that technology could be a panacea for warfare.⁶⁴⁷

Effective counterinsurgency operations are based on restrained use of force and the subordination of the military instrument to the overall political objective. This runs counter to operational effectiveness transformation, which emphasizes precision targeting with advanced technology. In late 2005 during the Iraq stabilization phase the US Army was criticized for being “too kinetic.”⁶⁴⁸ Personnel was inclined to consider killing the insurgent as the key to a given situation, and “conversely failed to understand its downside.”⁶⁴⁹ American forces were predisposed to see counterinsurgency operations in the same adversarial context as major combat operations. Killing or arresting terrorists was the pre-eminent goal and there was a preference for “large-scale kinetic maneuver” in counterinsurgency operations.⁶⁵⁰ A kinetic approach to counterinsurgency was fostered by an institutional focus on technology and force protection measures. In the 1990’s force protection had been a central element of Operations Other Than War. These operations were considered a distraction from the Army’s strategic core business, leading to an emphasis on technology and choosing the least-risky route for forces deployed.⁶⁵¹ Protecting less-than-vital interests translated to bombing from 15,000 feet and peacekeeping forces operating from well-protected bases far removed from urban centers, virtually excluding interaction with the local population.⁶⁵² Enthusiasm about the Revolution in Military Affairs and operational effectiveness transformation further stimulated this. Congressional concern with force protection was one of the reasons it had endorsed network-centric warfare in the first place. The conferees of the 2005 Congressional Defense appropriation accentuated that the major benefit of the Stryker infantry vehicles deployed in Iraq was that they could “seamlessly review situational awareness and vehicle sensor data in a heads-up mode while the vehicle is on the move.” A primary benefit according to the conferees was that this “greatly enhanced force protection.” It was the same reason why Congress was quick to purchase the mine-resistant vehicles, the MRAPs. While undeniably safer for the soldiers, critics warned that there was a price to be paid for increased force protection in a counterinsurgency setting, noting a potentially harmful second-order effect. Due to their bulky exterior and small windows, driving around in MRAPs made it difficult to have contact

647 A somewhat anecdotal indication is that in FY2008, \$57.5 million was appropriated for research on the “bi-directional English-Iraqi instant language translation system”. It would avoid relying on scarce translators in the field. Other items under development were biometric devices.

648 The term ‘kinetic’ is US military jargon for conventional operations, such as firing bullets, missiles or other projectiles to kill or disable an opponent.

649 Aylwin-Foster (2005), p. 4.

650 Ibid. See also Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, p. 83.

651 Edward Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75., no. 4 (July/ August 1996), pp. 33-44.

652 See also Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and keeping Peace with America’s Military*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

with the local population, even more so than in Humvees. British Brigadier-General Nigel Aylwin Foster stressed that:

*In an environment where, above all else, it is imperative that the occupying force be seen as a force for the good, it is counter-productive when technological solutions are employed that promote separation from the population.*⁶⁵³

Also, the fuel consumption of the MRAPs far exceeds that of the Humvees they replaced, requiring more fuel transports with accumulating force protection risks.⁶⁵⁴ Emphasizing force protection comes at a cost in counterinsurgency, especially with regards to intelligence gathering and gaining the support of the local population. Counterinsurgency doctrine holds that “the more you protect the force, the less secure you are,” making it fundamentally contradictory to the US operational effectiveness transformation pursued until 2004.⁶⁵⁵

An additional element impeding successful strategic transformation is the congressional bias against the capabilities required in counterinsurgency or rather, a bias in favor of procuring military hardware associated with high-end operations. The role of Congress in shaping defense procurement is skewed towards high-technology products and big-ticket items such as new fighter jets, next-generation aircraft carriers and the Army’s multi-billion dollar FCS program. Not only are these program backed by significant vested business interests and accompanying lobbying power, Congress is keen to use procurement orders to provide jobs and income for constituencies. As T.X. Hammes observed, “there is no identifiable constituency for the major shifts in personnel and budget required to deal with [counterinsurgency].”⁶⁵⁶ Capabilities for stability operations and counterinsurgency require human capital and increases in end-strength more so than big ticket items. Jeffrey Nadaner, responsible for planning the Pentagon’s stability operations, likewise said, “After major weapons systems have been funded there is very little money left” to set up the required infrastructure for stability operations.⁶⁵⁷

This tenacious grip of technology on the American military-strategic approach had been met with criticism, albeit unsuccessfully. Paul Van Riper, the retired Marine Corps General, had warned for an over-reliance on technology to substitute boots on the ground.

653 Aylwin-Foster (2005), p.10.

654 See also, Andrew Krepinevich & Dakota Wood, “Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, October 17, 2007.

655 Eliot Cohen, John Nagl, Conrad Crane, et al., “Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (March-April 2006), p. 52.

656 Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), p. 226.

657 Jeffrey Nadaner, “DOD Directive 3000.05 - one year later,” Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, December 11, 2006.

Writing in *Parameters* in 1997 he criticized the American emphasis on high-tech solutions to replace ground forces and stated that, "Recurring proposals to substitute advanced technology for conventional military capabilities reflect a peculiarly American faith in science's ability to engineer simple solutions to complex human problems."⁶⁵⁸ Van Riper was describing the American Positivist idea that by mastering technology it could improve the human condition. In the 1970's historian Russell Weigley termed the US tendency to rely on technology as "dangerous" because it gave prerogative to science over art, producing a hubristic technology-focused view of history.⁶⁵⁹ It has implied that when confronted with an operational challenge technology was believed to provide the answer.

13.2.5 CIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS?

A further element constraining strategic transformation was the congressional orientation towards high-intensity conventional operations which posed problems for the development of civilian capabilities for counterinsurgency and stability operations. A week following Rumsfeld's declaration of the 3000.05 directive, the White House published a directive that intended to address the lack of civilian expeditionary capabilities. *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44* entitled *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* decided that the State Department would coordinate all government activities relating to stabilization and reconstruction with the Pentagon in a subordinate, supporting role. It was the President's response to improve interagency cooperation and prevent a reoccurrence of Iraq's post-war planning fiasco, in which an ill-prepared military had to take up nation-building responsibilities. It led to the creation of the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the State Department. Along with the Pentagon's support for stability operations provided by *Directive 3000.05*, *NSPD 44* offered the policy framework for performing stability operations under civilian leadership. One of its hallmark initiatives was to develop a standby civilian response corps, a group of civilians with the skills to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and can be deployed abroad. Expertise ranged from running a city-council to operating a sewer system. As Michael O'Hanlon argued, in Iraq the problem had not been a lack of military forces, but rather a lack of skill-sets in the form of "quickly deployable police officers, judges, criminal law experts, and other specialists in civil affairs."⁶⁶⁰ The civilian response corps received significant political attention. Not only was it called for by *NSPD 44*, it was referenced in the authoritative Iraq Study Group Report, mentioned in the President's 2007 State of the Union as well as in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's testimony in February 2007. Even Secretary of Defense Robert

658 Paul van Riper & Robert H. Scales jr., "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," *Parameters* (Summer 1997), p. 4.

659 R. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p.416.

660 O'Hanlon (2005), p. 53.

Gates argued for more funds for the State Department.⁶⁶¹

Funding proved a severe problem. It would take two years for S/CRS to be allocated initial funds by Congress. By late 2006 S/CRS was staffed with 11 people, yet had a mandate to be the military behemoth’s counterpart in stability operations. Only through the so-called 1207 section of a congressional amendment introduced by Senator Inhofe in 2006 was a \$100 million transfer authorized from the Pentagon to S/CRS in a rare instance of interagency budgetary cooperation. However, by early 2008 the amount received had not surpassed \$10 million, nor was there structural funding for the agency. In February 2007 Senators Biden and Lugar had reintroduced a bill from 2004 that would “authorize \$80 million for the operation of [S/CRS] and the creation of a 250-person active duty response corps” as well as a 2,000 person standby component. At the time of writing these S/CRS funds had not been authorized and S/CRS remained understaffed and underfunded. In contrast, in 2006 the Defense Department received additional emergency funding of more than \$95 billion, while the State Department was waiting for a fraction of that amount.⁶⁶² The Pentagon receives roughly 17 times more funding than does the State Department (see figure 2). It portrays a structural skewing towards the development of military instruments over enabling civilian instruments. The difficulty with which Congress appropriated funds to the State Department for stability operations made strategic transformation challenging.




Figure 17: US Defense budget 1991-2008 (Nominal, Real and % of GDP)

(Source: US Department of Defense & United States Congress)

661 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture, Remarks as delivered by the Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>. Accessed August 21, 2008.

662 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians,” *Washington Post*, February 24, 2007.

Given the practical difficulties to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the difficulty to change the personnel system, the financial pressure, the congressional emphasis on major weapons systems, the emphasis on force protection and technology, and the lack of adequately sourced civilian counterparts, the Army's strategic transformation was under strain.

13.3 BACK TO THE DEFAULT

An operational necessity triggered the pursuit of strategic transformation. Yet given the difficulty to transform the Army towards a force for protracted stability operations, the adaptive strategy refocused towards high-intensity operations in the context of irregular warfare. This resonated stronger with US strategic culture and the American "way of war". The first step in doing so was to institutionalize the military's orientation towards irregular warfare.

13.3.1 FIGHTING THE LAST WAR?

Secretary Robert Gates embarked on an approach to readjust the military's – and particularly the Army's – focus towards irregular warfare. He ran into difficulties as the military tried to fight a war it was unaccustomed to. The military's focus on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare had been marginal. Gates scolded the bureaucracy for retaining a focus on major theatre conflict: "For too long there was a view, or a hope, that Iraq and Afghanistan were exotic distractions that would be wrapped up relatively soon – the regimes toppled, the insurgencies crushed, the troops brought home."⁶⁶³ It echoed a commentary following the Vietnam War when Brian Jenkins wrote that, "the war in Vietnam is regarded as an exotic interlude between the wars that really count."⁶⁶⁴ Gates however, declared that due to American superiority adversaries would continue to confront the US in an irregular manner.⁶⁶⁵ And so, in 2009 Secretary Gates took several steps to institutionalize the Army's orientation towards irregular warfare. Firstly he cancelled the manned vehicle of the Army's Future Combat System, effectively dismantling the entire FCS program. Gates said that the family of eight vehicles, "do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan."⁶⁶⁶ General Casey, Chief of

663 Robert M. Gates, "As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates," Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, April 15, 2009, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1344>.

664 Jenkins (1970), p. 7.

665 "It is hard to conceive of any country confronting the United States directly in conventional terms – ship to ship, fighter to fighter, tank to tank – for some time to come.[...] Smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – will find ways, as they always have, to frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger, regular militaries. And even nation-states will try to exploit our perceived vulnerabilities in an asymmetric way, rather than play to our inherent strengths. Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today." Robert M. Gates, "Remarks to the Heritage Foundation," Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.

666 Robert M. Gates, "Defense Budget Recommendation Statement," Arlington, April 6, 2009.

Staff of the Army, said of the FCS ground-vehicle cancellation: “The original design of the vehicle, and we need to be upfront with this, when we started designing the FCS program, it was designed to fight conventional wars, we thought conventional war would be fought in the 21st century. That’s clearly changed.”⁶⁶⁷ The Pentagon leadership underlined that the operational environment had changed, and with it the idea underlying transformation. It was a major practical step by the Obama administration to shift budget priorities towards counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.⁶⁶⁸ Secondly Gates decided to cancel further procurement of the F-22, noting that 187 units of the fifth-generation fighter were sufficient. The original plan, in line with operational effectiveness transformation in which the US would remain well ahead in terms of advanced technologies for high-intensity operations, had called for fifty more. There was obvious resistance to these plans. Michael Wynne, the Air Force Secretary under George W. Bush, postulated that the Obama administration was focusing on combating groups that posed no strategic threat to the interests of United States. Instead he advocated investing in future technologies to counter those states that might.⁶⁶⁹ Gates retorted that: “Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support – including in the Pentagon – for the capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of missions we are most likely to undertake in the future.”⁶⁷⁰ It represented one of the fundamental dilemmas defense planners encountered, preparing for the future and preparing for the current war. The resistance Gates encountered was symptomatic of a movement with the military establishment that had coalesced two years earlier, and which emphasized a refocus towards high-intensity combat operations and the tenets of operational effectiveness transformation. In October 2007 the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, sent a memo to the Pentagon brass in which he implored the military leadership to take,

...a larger, longer view of risk assessment that helps us maintain a position of global leadership and preserves our freedom of action.[...] The demands of current operations – however great – should not dominate our training

667 Greg Grant, “FCS Not Killed: Casey,” *DODBuzz*, May 19, 2009, <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/05/19/fcs-not-terminated-casey/>.

668 Christopher Drew, “Conflicting Priorities Endanger High-Tech Army Program,” *New York Times*, July 19, 2009.

669 “Gates Cuts Leading to ‘Strategic Drawdown’: Wynne,” *DODBuzz*, April 13, 2009. <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/13/gates-cuts-leading-to-strategic-drawdown-wynne/>.

670 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks at National Defense University,” Washington DC, September 29, 2008.

*exercises, education curricula and readiness programs. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will one day end. We must be ready for who – and what – comes after.*⁶⁷¹

Gates by contrast had gone on record stating that a structural focus on irregular warfare would be logical:

*...one of the things that I think is very important in the transformation is continuing to strengthen our capacity to fight irregular wars. I think that's where the action is going – is most likely to be for the foreseeable future. And so it's very important that it go forward.*⁶⁷²

However, for all the attention being paid to the Army's efforts to pursue strategic transformation, it was not undertaken by the Air Force or the Navy. In general their focus remained on precluding the rise of peer competitor-states. In terms of numbers, with the US Army and the US Marine Corps engaged in strategic transformation to irregular warfare, and the Navy and Air force retaining an operational effectiveness focus, approximately one-third of the active component of the United States forces were engaged in strategic transformation with two-thirds still pursuing operational effectiveness transformation. Operational effectiveness transformation based on high-intensity capabilities remained the dominant change strategy. This was also reflected in the FY2010 budget discussions. Conciliating his critics, Secretary Gates said only a small amount of funding went explicitly to irregular warfare in the defense budget. In his budget statement Gates said it contains "10 percent for irregular warfare; about 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities."⁶⁷³ The message was that irregular warfare was not the mainstay of the armed forces. Furthermore, maintaining access for global power projection remained a prerogative for US defense planning. Michele Flournoy remained committed Barry Posen's concept of the 'command of the commons' and wrote: "ensuring relative stability throughout the global commons remained central to the maintenance of US power and influence in the 21st century."⁶⁷⁴ In other words, the mainstay of US defense policy remained the maintenance of US primacy, the ability to project power, exploiting the global commons, protecting sea lines of communication, maintaining air superiority and dealing with anti-access and area-denial threats.

671 Michael Mullen, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance for 2007-2008," October 1, 2007.

672 Robert M. Gates, "Nomination hearing for Secretary of Defense," Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, December 5, 2006.

673 Robert M. Gates quoted by Jim Garamone, "Budget Recommendations Provide 'Home' for Warfighters, Gates Says," *American Forces Press Service*, Washington DC, April 7, 2009.

674 Michele Flournoy & Shawn Brimley, "The Contested Commons," *Proceedings*, vol. 135/7/1277 (July 2009), pp. 16-21.

13.3.2 A BIFURCATION RESULTS

It led to a de facto division of labor, with the Navy and Air Force focusing on the potential rise of a peer competitor while the Army and Marine Corps concentrated on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Army leadership underlined that the US Army would “remain the pre-eminent landpower on Earth – the ultimate instrument of national resolve,” this appeared to be questioned by Secretary Gates.⁶⁷⁵ Instead, he said that “for years to come, the Air Force and the Navy will be America’s main strategic deterrent.”⁶⁷⁶ Gates’ reference to “years to come” seemed to imply that the Army would remain focused on counterinsurgency. While it was performing operations traditionally considered lesser contingencies, not surprisingly voices were heard to refocus the Army to high-intensity combat operations. The dilemma was best summed up by Andrew Krepinevich, former Pentagon official:

*The best way to assure a central role for ground forces [in the current strategic environment] is to tackle the irregular warfare challenge. Yet the Army as an institution is most comfortable preparing for traditional or conventional warfare.*⁶⁷⁷

From the Army’s strategic documents it can be concluded that from 2004 onwards there was a schizophrenic focus to maintain both conventional dominance as well focus on irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations. The key policy documents primarily outlined operational effectiveness transformation for the Army to fight the conventional war. The Army *Transformation Roadmap* stated unequivocally that “the primary goal of Army transformation is the development of the Future Force — a strategically responsive, precision maneuver force that is dominant across the range of military operations.”⁶⁷⁸ It referred to the Future Combat Systems. Similarly, the 2005 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* declared that “the Army’s ability to dominate any form of the traditional armed conflict is a necessary overmatch that we must retain.”⁶⁷⁹ It added weight to the argument that operational effectiveness transformation to sustain strategic dominance was the default, while strategic transformation was driven by operational necessities.

675 Army Vision, as mentioned by Gen. Peter Schoomaker, “Testimony to House Armed Services Committee,” United States Congress, Washington DC, February 14, 2007.

676 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.

677 Vago Muradian, “Is US Army Resisting Irregular War Focus,” *DefenseNews.com*, October 8, 2007.

678 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Operations, Army Transformation Office, “United States 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap,” Department of the Army, p. 4-1.

679 Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, December 12, 2005. http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/the_army_plan/army-strategic-planning-g.shtml. Accessed September 6, 2010.

	Operational Effectiveness Transformation	Strategic Transformation
Main trend	Supported by strategic culture, and follows from realist concerns	Operational necessity, responding to challenges in environment
Capabilities	Precision, speed, stealth	Persistent surveillance, training, US as 'force multiplier,' cultural awareness
Dominant Services	Navy/ Air force, Army pre-2005	US Army
Focus	Linking sensor and shooter platforms	Linking people, building partners
	Network-centric warfare	Counterinsurgency
Anti-access and area denial threats	Points of disembarkation and concentration of forces	urban and human terrain
Principle Documents	National Defense Panel Report, Joint Vision 2010	Counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24
Geographic area	East Asia & Persian Gulf	Greater Middle East
Type of Operations	Conventional rapid decisive maneuver warfare, high-intensity operations	Irregular warfare, Stability operations, counterinsurgency
Hallmark Technologies	Future Combat Systems, F22	MRAP, UAV
Period	1993-2009	2005-2009

Figure 18: Characteristics of US Transformation

(Source: Author's Analysis)

As long as an operational necessity persists for the Army to remain engaged in irregular warfare, the US military is bifurcated, with ground elements focusing on irregular warfare and others on conventional superiority. This strategic rift runs between the platform-centric and the people-centric services. It presents a dichotomy between strategic transformation of the Marine Corps and the US Army and continued operational effectiveness transformation of the Air Force and US Navy. The de facto division of labor between the Army and Marine Corps and Navy and Air Force reflects a geographic division as well. While the former are primarily engaged in the region known as the Greater Middle East, the latter are occupied with East Asia. Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of Defense for Policy, acknowledged in May 2009 that the renewed focus on irregular warfare would "pull the Army and the military writ large, in two very different directions."⁶⁸⁰ Richard

680 Michele Flournoy, "Remarks by Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy," the Army Leader Forum, Washington DC, May 4, 2009.

Kugler and Hans Binnendijk similarly stressed that transformation requires a trade-off between short-term and long-term goals by “strengthening US forces for waging expeditionary warfare along the southern arc of instability ... while also transforming for new operations.”⁶⁸¹ Stephen Biddle, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, goes one step further, arguing for a ‘double transformation’:

*...to avoid defeat in today’s wars may require a more thorough conversion to the needs of counterinsurgency, going beyond training and operations... to weapon acquisition programs, military service budget shares, and even promotion priorities we use to shape the officer corps and its skills. But the military that results will not necessarily be suited to the demands of the postwar world.*⁶⁸²

Figure 18 summarizes the dominant elements of the two types of transformation that the US military pursues.

13.3.3 SOF-ING RETURNS

While the debate raged between the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon brass, it slowly emerged that the US adaptive strategy to irregular warfare was becoming more in tune with US strategic culture. The intransigence to develop a stabilization force was a consequence of it being contrarian to US strategic culture. Yet by 2006 the Pentagon started to develop an approach to irregular warfare which was much more in line with its strategic culture, and in line with the initial thinking underlying operational effectiveness transformation. The United States Army had focused on sustained stabilization operations and ‘boots on the ground’ yet, in close cooperation with Special Operations Command it slowly adopted a more narrow SOF-like approach to counterinsurgency missions. It started to emphasize direct action against insurgents, while training partner nations in stability operations. It would allow the United States to maintain a strategy to focus on adversaries, reduce its footprint, as well as emphasize high-intensity operations and avoid ‘doing windows’ by outsourcing the bulk of sustained stabilization operations to allies and partner nations. Instead of being the main force provider for a stabilization mission, it would be a force multiplier, focusing on its high-intensity dimension.

The perception of the strategic environment had shifted and maintaining strategic primacy was equated to successfully pursuing irregular warfare as well. Until then as John Garstka said, the United States military believed it could afford to lose a stabilization campaign, but it could not afford to lose a major conventional campaign.⁶⁸³ On December

681 Hans Binnendijk & Richard L. Kugler, *Shaping Future Defense Budgets*, Defense & Technology Paper 6, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, November 2004, p. 7.

682 Stephen Biddle, “Funding the US Counterinsurgency Wars,” *Expert Brief Council on Foreign Relations*, June 19, 2009.

683 Interview with John Garstka, Washington DC, December 11, 2006.

1, 2008, eight years after Operation *Enduring Freedom* started, the Department of Defense officially increased the strategic importance of irregular warfare and counter-insurgency. In DoD *Directive 3000.07*, the Secretary of Defense declared that irregular warfare: “is as strategically important as traditional warfare.”⁶⁸⁴ The directive was drafted in the same spirit as the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* that military forces should be “as proficient in irregular operations [...] as they are today in high-intensity combat.”⁶⁸⁵ The directive stated that irregular warfare included “establishing order in a fragile state” and summed up skills and capabilities to be improved. This included elements that used to be the prerogative of Special Operation Forces such as “train, advise and assist foreign security forces” and “through direct or indirect means....support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries.” Irregular warfare gave renewed impetus to SOF-ing the force.

The relevance of Special Operations Forces to irregular conflict had already been outlined decades before. In 1991 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said intra-state conflict would require the abilities of SOF more so than any other service. After all, these contingencies “demanded unconventional solutions and the application of different criteria for victory – notably, winning popular support rather than merely capturing and controlling territory.”⁶⁸⁶ Special Operations Forces were considered essential in this regard. They could strengthen weak democracies by providing specific assistance including security, training, humanitarian and civil-military affairs. Cheney said they are useful for “assisting host countries in combating insurgencies, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking and related violence.” Even earlier, in 1962, in another clear example of the historical consistency of the American transformation debate, President Kennedy promoted counterinsurgency capabilities and SOF when he argued that the United States direct its military attention away from purely focusing on conventional warfare and towards unconventional, irregular doctrine. Responding to the rise of small wars as a new front in the Cold War, the Kennedy administration made it a priority to focus on Special Operations Forces, irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, “a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare.”⁶⁸⁷ Kennedy advocated a response that was quick, lethal and stealthy. It was reminiscent of the limited, high-intensity role Secretary Rumsfeld had foreseen for

684 Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*, Washington DC, December 1, 2008.

685 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.42.

686 Richard Cheney, “Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1990” Library of Congress, Washington DC, January 1990, p. 96.

687 “This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. [...] It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.” John F. Kennedy, “Address at the graduation ceremony at West Point,” West Point, February 6, 1962.

the US military in conventional operations. The contemporary approach was outlined in the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. By 2006 it had become the Pentagon's primary document to pursue the Global War on Terror.⁶⁸⁸ The strategy presented a SOF-like approach to operations in Iraq. High-intensity combat, defined as direct or kinetic action, remained the central focus: "the United States, its allies and partners must maintain the offensive by relentlessly finding, attacking and disrupting terrorist networks worldwide."⁶⁸⁹ Yet it would be accompanied by training local forces and building partner capability to enable them to police and stabilize their countries. The *Strategic Plan* notably excluded large-scale sustained US stability forces, which up until then had been the defining element of Army strategic transformation. Instead, building proxies across the globe to fight the War on Terrorism was the objective.

It reflected an approach to pursue global terrorist networks, and do so in a manner befitting US strategic culture with smaller, lighter and more lethal military forces plugged in to local capabilities while investing in training capabilities. It applied to Iraq and Afghanistan but also to other locations, such as operations under the guidance of Africa Command, which took on a large training mission on the continent.⁶⁹⁰ The concept was based on operations in the Philippines in 2002, in which the United States provided a limited contingent of Marines to pursue rebel insurgents in the Southern Philippines while simultaneously training the Philippines' military. With respect to Iraq, it resonated with plans to reduce the American presence by handing over responsibility to the Iraqis and its security forces, and instead focusing its efforts on training and performing counter-terror missions.⁶⁹¹ As a key element, in late 2006 a 20,000-strong trainer force was proposed in order to meet the requirements of training the Iraqi army.⁶⁹² By the spring of 2008, the

688 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, Washington DC, February 1, 2006.

689 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.22.

690 See for instance William Ward & Stephanie Hanson, "Interview: Africom seeks military-to-military relationships," *New York Times*, May 22, 2008.

691 "After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain non-sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35-50,000 U.S. troops." Barack Obama, "Responsibly ending the war in Iraq," Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009.

692 This was one of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report: "The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue." James A. Baker & Lee H. Hamilton, *Iraq Study Group Report*, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace 2006) p.7, and pp.48-50.

United States decided to send an additional 1000 trainers to Afghanistan.⁶⁹³ Focusing on training and counter-terrorist pursuit is a mode of operations that can best be classified as counterinsurgency-lite. According to Thomas Mahnken, deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning and Policy, this became the central objective of transformation. He said the primary measure of success in the Long War is “how well we enable partners to govern their countries.”⁶⁹⁴ The GWOT Strategy mentioned that “U.S. armed forces often contribute best by helping train the forces of other countries for the skills needed to combat terrorism.”⁶⁹⁵ The doctrine focused on the need to “enable partner nations to counter terrorism” with the goal to “establish conditions that allow partner nations to govern their territory effectively and defeat terrorists.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said training other militaries and empowering nations to defend and govern themselves was the “the most important military component in the war on terror.”⁶⁹⁶ He added in 2008 that “many of the [required] skills and tasks used to be the province of the Special Forces, but now are a core of the Army and Marine Corps as a whole.”⁶⁹⁷ He emphasized train and equip missions, and avoiding costly US military interventions: “Where possible, our strategy is to employ indirect approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces – to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial American military intervention”⁶⁹⁸ The Commander of Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson, said it was based on “enabling a state to address its security deficit.” It meant persecuting the global war on terrorism by proxy.

COIN-lite envisaged creating a military that could operate across the globe training, advising, mentoring other states to develop counter-terror units, or performing direct action. This required a “team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures [...]”⁶⁹⁹ Admiral Olson, commander of SOCOM, captured these objectives under the concept of a ‘Project Lawrence.’⁷⁰⁰ Developing forces modeled after the famous T.E. Lawrence who fought and lived among his allies and who was versed

-
- 693 Victoria Nuland, “The NATO Emerging in Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, February 1, 2008.
- 694 Thomas Mahnken, “Remarks during Global Norms, Organizational Culture, and Military Transformation,” Panel at the Annual conference of the International Studies Association, San Francisco (CA), March 28, 2008.
- 695 United States Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, Washington DC, February 1, 2006, p.25.
- 696 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” Association of the United States Army, Washington DC, October 12, 2007.
- 697 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, May 13, 2008.
- 698 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks at National Defense University,” Washington DC, September 29, 2008.
- 699 Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006, p.89.
- 700 Admiral E. Olson, “Keynote Address,” speaking at the Unrestricted Warfare Symposium, JHU-APL, Laurel MD, March 2008, p. 21. http://www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/proceedings/2008/Authors/Olson.pdf.

in local language and culture. It dovetailed with US strategic culture by being able to go after the “bad guys” through kinetic action, investing in high-tech forces such as advanced unmanned platforms, and being a high-intensity force multiplier to local counter-terror efforts. It meant operating within the US military’s own comfort-zone of high-intensity operations.

Special Operations Forces thus benefited both from operational effectiveness transformation as well as the strategic imperative to adapt to irregular warfare. Not surprisingly Special Operations Command in 2006 became the “supported combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks.”⁷⁰¹ This was Pentagon-speak for saying the Special Operations Command was in the lead. It was the summum of SOF-ing the military.

US forces would offer local militaries a multiplier effect in the form of unmanned precision strike or sophisticated American reconnaissance and special operations capabilities, just as CIA and SOF operatives had enabled the Northern Alliance in late 2001.⁷⁰² Such SOF-ing of the war on terror reflected Rumsfeld’s idea of the Afghanistan campaign: relying on Special Operations Forces, network capabilities and precision munitions, in support of other armed forces. In short, once again the US perspective of warfare would be sterile, speedy, surgical, stealthy but was also waged by surrogate forces trained by the US. It had all the hallmarks of the philosophy of operational effectiveness transformation within the paradigm delineated by US strategic culture. It presented an adversarial agency-focused interpretation of the US role in counterinsurgency. The focus remained on an American style of warfare, emphasizing high-intensity combat operations while training friendly forces. As the United States shifted its focus to include irregular warfare, it retained an emphasis on the same principles; smaller, faster, and lighter by for instance further removing the soldier from the battlefield with the prolific use of drones.⁷⁰³ The aim of the strategy is to deal with irregular warfare by having a very small presence. As Michael Vickers, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low intensity conflict announced in 2009 that within several years the global campaign against terrorism would not involve large troop rotations in a select number of theatres but rather small teams of Special Operations Forces spread around the globe hunting terrorists or training local forces.⁷⁰⁴ Vickers explained that an ‘indirect approach’ by functioning as a small-scale force multiplier to local capabilities, supported by clandestine operations, was the primary

701 *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (2006), p. 29.

702 In order to decrease the amount of US forces on the ground and increase the tempo of operations, SOF-ing went hand in hand with a closer relationship with the private sector. Outsourcing combat support activities to private military contractors increased during this period. Even to the extent that CIA and private contractors were cooperating closely in counter-terror operations. James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, “Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret CIA Raids,” *New York Times*, December 10, 2009.

703 See also Peter W. Singer, *Wired for War* (New York: Penguin 2009).

704 Greg Grant, “The Man Behind Irregular Warfare Push: Mike Vickers,” *DoDBuzz:Online Defense and Acquisition Journal*, April 7, 2009. <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/07/the-man-behind-irregular-warfare-push-mike-vickers/>.

US response to irregular warfare.⁷⁰⁵ It contrasted sharply to the ‘indirect’ or ‘comprehensive’ approach as understood by European states where the military facilitates development, institution-building and reconstruction in a subordinate role to other instruments of power. There where technology cannot substitute mass, or quick solutions are not available, but instead operations have become a slog and long-term deployments are necessary, the United States has been and remains fundamentally at unease.

SOF-ing was also a strategy to minimize the amount of US forces required to reach the strategic objective. This was politically, organizationally and financially advantageous. But more so it satisfied the American preference to maintain an adversarial focus and to emphasize high-intensity operations. On paper, it became an exit strategy from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan as it enabled the United States to adopt a lighter footprint and withdraw forces while empowering the Iraqi or Afghan military to wage stability operations. COIN-lite meant that the United States could focus on where its domestic preference lay, fighting adversaries instead of patrolling markets and manning checkpoints.

14 CONCLUSION OF US CASE STUDY

The US transformation strategy was based on making the military more nimble, agile, lighter and quick in order to make warfare by the US military sterile, surgical and safe for American forces. A preference for high-intensity military confrontations of limited duration was shaped by US strategic culture. It additionally imbued US security policy with the drive to promote American Revolutionary values. In the 1990’s transformation was initiated under a constellation of mutually complementary forces. Unipolarity had created system-level hubris and the United States believed it had a unique moment to shape its environment. The Information Age appealed to American faith in technology and US strategic culture shaped an emphasis on the use of the military to pursue democracy promotion, including through regime change. Together it produced an adaptive strategy based on operational effectiveness transformation whereby military-technological innovations would enable the United States to project power and perform interventions at lower costs and thereby to maintain a position of strategic dominance. President George W. Bush described this poignantly following the Iraq War: “By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technology, we are redefining war on our terms [...] more than ever before,

705 “Dealing with this problem requires, again, looking back at the Quadrennial Defense Review and other documents, fundamentally what we describe as indirect approach.....whether we apply [force] principally through ourselves as an instrument or through others that we enable in some way. This doesn’t necessarily have anything to say about the kind of power that’s applied, that one is more forceful or less forceful than the other, it’s just who is the primary instrument. Are we advising, training, enabling, doing something else, are we the smaller forces in number relative someone else’s larger forces that we are trying to amplify or are we the main force? And a clandestine approach, because much of this war is a war in the shadows, and fundamentally an intelligence war.” Michael Vickers, “Building the Global Counterterrorism Network,” Statement at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, October 24, 2008.

the precision of our technology is protecting the lives of our soldiers, and the lives of innocent civilians. [...] In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation.”⁷⁰⁶ Andrew Bacevich commented, rather than seeing the military as a club, as a blunt object, faith in operational effectiveness transformation produced an image of the military as a scalpel.⁷⁰⁷

This policy of transformation however, led to difficulties in response to the challenges presented by counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before the campaigns started, operational effectiveness transformation had infused the United States foreign policy elite with faith that quick military solutions to complex political problems were within reach. The reality on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to fit this mold. The case study has detailed how this process took shape. Below are presented the responses to the central questions underlying this case study, followed by a discussion.

WHAT TYPE OF TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY WAS PURSUED?

US transformation was a policy of operational effectiveness (type I) transformation to improve existing capabilities to perform high-intensity combat operations. This amounted to discontinuous change since the military relied on the technologies associated with the information revolution and the new doctrine of network-centric warfare. It was believed to produce vast improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of military interventions, reducing the human and financial cost of waging wars, and thereby shaping the future of warfare.

WHAT CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY OR OPPORTUNITY, FORMING THE TRANSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, TRIGGERED TRANSFORMATION?

Transformation was driven by a window of opportunity identified to sustain US strategic dominance following the end of the Cold War, related to the advent of the Information Age. The Information revolution was seen as a sea-change event that – as an early adopter - would bestow increased capability on the United States, while unipolarity imbued the United States with a sense of power that it could shape the external environment.

WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURAL FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

US strategic culture is characterized by an adversarial approach to security, a belief in US exceptionalism producing a steadfast belief in the universal applicability of US values, faith in the ability of technology to solve complex social problems, a belief that interventions for moral purposes are justified, and that the existential purpose of the US is to contribute to spreading freedom and pursue absolute security in which the military is considered a

706 George W. Bush, “President Bush outlines progress in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” St Louis, MO. April 16, 2004. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030416-9.html>. Accessed October 13, 2009.

707 Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: the end of American Exceptionalism*, (Metropolitan: New York, 2008), p.127.

crucial component. These elements serve as the basis for justifying the use of the military, explain the United States' interventionist foreign policy and its acceptance of high-intensity combat as a role for its military. By the late 1990's and early 2000's this strategic culture found its intellectual medium through the neoconservative movement in US politics, as well as in the US administration's military strategic documentation, yet it appears throughout US political history.⁷⁰⁸ The prominence of neoconservative thinking cannot be disconnected from US unipolarity.

WHAT DID THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE MEAN IN TERMS OF CAPABILITIES?

The objective of operational effectiveness transformation was to improve power projection capabilities for high-intensity operations. It was premised on the belief that the military could be a smaller and more effective tool for shaping the security environment and that the human, financial and political costs of an intervention could be reduced. To improve power projection, programs were developed to negate anti-access and area-denial threats. Each service individually incorporated the advances in precision technologies and network-centric warfare which promised to make forces smaller, quicker and able to deploy from greater distance. Particularly the US Army was singled out to adopt more SOF-like characteristics, which the new technologies were making possible. The FCS, sea-basing and global prompt strike were archetypical programs. The idea behind many programs was that they would yield the US such advanced capabilities that they would deter an adversary from competing with the US. If that was not enough, the doctrine of prevention became the ultimate expression of this type of transformation thinking.

HOW DID FURTHER EVENTS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPACT THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

Irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan posed a challenge to US military capability and it undermined the rationale for - particularly the Army's - operational effectiveness transformation. The service was ill-equipped to cope with counterinsurgency. The Army initiated a new adaptive strategy to perform sustained stabilization operations. It amounted to preparing for a long protracted presence and focusing on state-building and reconstruction activities. This approach failed to mesh with US strategic culture and proved unsuccessful. The threat environment changed and the military attempted to shift to stabilization forces, but US extractive capacity dwindled and it struggled to pursue strategic innovation. Instead the United States formulated an approach to irregular warfare which did resonate the tenets of its strategic culture and mirrored the idea underlying operational effectiveness transformation; namely to 'SOF' the military and become a high-intensity force multiplier for local armed forces. Counterinsurgency contains both kinetic and non-kinetic elements. The former concerns the realm of traditional combat, namely targeting specific adversaries. The latter involves winning local hearts and minds through security-

708 Farrell (2005), p.14.

improving presence and trust-building measures. The United States slowly adopted an approach whereby it could continue to focus on technology and high-intensity combat. Under a COIN-lite approach strategic transformation was pursued in a way conducive to US strategic culture.

US strategic culture did not align with the Army's initial effort to change its adaptive strategy to pursue sustained stabilization operations. It becomes clear that strategic culture is a key factor in shaping America's adaptive strategy to security challenges.

14.1 TRANSFORMATION HUBRIS

The challenge posed by irregular warfare tempered the appeal of transformation. It became clear that although the information revolution yielded improvements, these were not exclusively to the benefit of the United States and provide it with a panacea nor would they make warfare a sterile activity.

Critics had already pointed out the fallacy of focusing too extensively on the technology for high-intensity operations to yield political success. Referring to the notion of information superiority as the basis for strategic dominance Van Riper cynically said, "Never saw and don't believe bytes of information kill enemy soldiers."⁷⁰⁹ Similar is the parallel with chess, where information is perfect and the positions of all pieces are known on the board, yet victory is all but guaranteed. Frederick Kagan has criticized the Pentagon's logic of transformation. He believed it focused overwhelmingly on airpower and information technologies at the expense of land power. He identified two primary fallacies. The first related to interpreting transformation as an effort intent on improving the speed and precision of targeting. Kagan argued that this was only one element in the practice of combat and would increase the rate at which "metal" could be put on target but took little account of how this would impact an adversary's political will. According to Kagan, the US was trapped in a conventional warfare mindset, in which transformation was intent on perfecting that "target-set mentality." The second fallacy was an overemphasis on the business-logic that the military should invest more in those capabilities that have the highest marginal rates of return. The idea that because the US was good at applying airpower, it should become excellent at it reinforced the military's emphasis on speed and precision.⁷¹⁰ Kagan's analysis echoed that of Eliot Cohen when the latter argued that the guided munitions revolution might lead to tactical clarity – namely being able to see and target everything within a 200-by-200 mile box – but "at the price of strategic obscurity."⁷¹¹ A false sense of security and power pervaded US transformation enthusiasts.

A fallacy becomes apparent in relation to American difficulties to respond to the challenge offered by militants in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States foreign policy

709 Paul van Riper quoted in William Arkin, "Spiraling Ahead," *Armed Forces Journal*, February 2006. <http://www.afji.com/2006/02/1813685>. Accessed February 15, 2010.

710 Frederick W. Kagan, "The US Military's Manpower Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 91-110.

711 Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), p. 37-54.

elite was burdened by the cognitive blinders and linear reasoning derived from US strategic culture which produced a lag in its ability to adapt to the reality of irregular warfare. Strategic dominance had been taken for granted and was thought to only be challenged by a peer competitor of similar alloy as the US. This came eerily close to a form of groupthink shaped by a strategic culture that was biased towards high-intensity combat.

Transformation also reduced the perceived need for allies underlining a unilateralist trend in foreign policy. In this it finds support in US strategic culture, which has favored the pursuit of strategic freedom of action in its foreign policy, minimizing reliance on allies, ever since Washington's Farewell Address. While the objective of transformation is to make the military a more useful instrument for the political elite, US operational effectiveness transformation gave the false impression that military force – due to its surgical, swift and sterile application – could solve complex security issues. It led policymakers to see the military as an instrument of choice. Hans Binnendijk, of Washington's National Defense University, warned in 2002 that transforming the US military might make it more usable, but this risked creating a situation where policy-makers prefer the military over diplomatic means.⁷¹² This overbearing belief in transformation eventually led to overstretch where the United States claimed *full-spectrum dominance* and pursued interventionist foreign policies to pursue regime change with the military. This triggered counterbalancing behavior which we see – amongst others – in the form of irregular warfare.

A 2000 survey among US military officers showed that two-thirds of the officers expected the adoption of new technologies to make it easier for the US to use force.⁷¹³ It created the political risk that, as Thomas X. Hammes writes, “with the assurance of *battlespace dominance*... political leaders will be more inclined to commit US forces to an unclear situation.”⁷¹⁴ In other words, the jargon of US operational effectiveness transformation fostered belief in the invincibility of the US military and, in connection with a strategic identity which holds that the military can be used to advance the human condition, the chance to use it increases. As Colin Gray writes, “a problem with [US transformation] is that it encourages its devotees to overreach with their expectations of consequent advantage.”⁷¹⁵ Changes in the nature of war may lead to military output falling short of expectations, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The promise of transformation had been hyped to such great heights yet the United States and its military had failed to anticipate the strategic challenge posed by irregular warfare. Von Clausewitz, the seminal strategist and eloquent promoter of the relationship between political interests and the use of force, had already warned for the need to factor in strength of motives in warfare which can offset lesser, or weaker military capa-

712 Hans Binnendijk in Binnendijk (2002), p. xxx.

713 Thomas G. Mahnken & James R. FitzSimonds, *The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes to the Revolution in Military Affairs, Naval War College Newport Papers 17*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003).

714 Hammes (2004), p. 194.

715 Colin S. Gray (February 2006), p. 11.

bilities.⁷¹⁶ War is not about destroying an adversary's military, rather it is the activity to shape an adversary's will through the use of the military. Colin Gray writes that "cunning and capable enemies fight grand-strategically, not only military-strategically."⁷¹⁷ US operational effectiveness transformation however was primarily focused on the latter.

14.2 A TRANSFORMATION BUBBLE

The events in Iraq and Afghanistan were akin to the bursting of a transformation bubble. In the corporate sector, the Internet proved to be a disruptive technology; it changed the way business would be done. Nevertheless the corporate sector had to go through a period of trial and error before the true value of the World Wide Web could be asserted. This was not appreciated until after the dot-com bubble at the end of the nineties. Initial enthusiasm over the Web's potential trumped a true understanding of its value. At first there was wild speculation about "the new economy" which appeared to be producing immense profits. Subsequent the dot-com collapse, a reassessment of leveraging information technology took place. With defense transformation, the bubble burst following the Iraq War. Central to network-centric warfare and the American process of operational effectiveness transformation was that mass could be substituted by information. As mentioned above, it led enthusiasts to believe wars would be clean, short and sterile or non-existent. The Iraq War illustrated that reducing the number of boots on the ground brought substantial efficiencies in conventional warfare, but also increased vulnerabilities during the stabilization phase if information too severely substituted boots on the ground. As illustrated in the chart below, conceptually there are different diminishing returns and different optimums at which mass can be substituted for information to achieve greatest military effectiveness depending on whether a stability operation or conventional war is undertaken.

In stability operations, network-centric warfare is useful but in a different way than in conventional operations. Enamored by the dreams of pioneering the Information Age in practice, where war is reduced to a series of highly precise tactical acts fought by forces characterized by speed and stealth, the troubles encountered in stability operations constituted the bursting of the bubble. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld can thereby best be seen as a victim of this speculative bubble of transformation. He foresaw the impact of information technologies and pushed the military to adopt them, yet he failed to temper his enthusiasm with a dose of realism about the nature of war. Network-centric concepts have not been discounted but need to be understood in the wider context of military operations. A promising field for instance, is networking among different government agencies. Just as bricks-and-mortar industries did not disappear after the rise of the Internet but rather corporations reassessed its merits, so too the US military has had to learn that

716 "If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely *the sum of available means* and *the Strength of the Will*. The sum of available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon numbers; but the strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London: Penguin, 1982), p. 104.

717 Gray (2006), p. 43.

IT ‘enables’ instead of ‘replaces.’ Boots on the ground will remain necessary, however the principles of network-centric warfare promise to create greater efficiencies in each and every operation, whether it is major regional conflict or greater situational awareness during a stabilization campaign through, for instance, use of advanced unmanned vehicles.⁷¹⁸ Information technology leveraged appropriately can enhance the flexibility of the military. Network-centric concepts are useful to create greater efficiency. However they should be seen for what they are, multipliers not solutions to the nature of human conflict. The US Army may have learned this lesson, however the US Air Force and US Navy - and therefore the majority of the US military - remain committed to the strategic Holy Grail offered by operational effectiveness transformation.




Figure 19: Military Effectiveness vs Substitution of Mass for Information

(Source: Author's Analysis)

718 For a description of the usefulness of network-centric warfare in complex emergencies see M. Cox, “They weren’t going to get this bird,” *Army Times*, November 22, 2004. See also P.W. Singer, *Wired for War*, (New York: Penguin, 2009) for an assessment of the role of network-centric assets and unmanned aerial vehicles in counterinsurgency campaigns.

PART 2:

Transformation in Europe: The Netherlands & Germany

THE NETHERLANDS: BETWEEN RELEVANCE AND STABILITY

“Why don’t the Dutch think it’s a good thing to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban?”

- American official in response to Dutch parliamentary deliberations to contribute troops to Uruzgan (2005)

15 INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War triggered a reassessment of the role of the Dutch military as an instrument of state power.⁷¹⁹ While in the United States the basis for transformation rested on a strategic outlook to sustain US primacy in light of unipolarity and the advent of the Information Age, to the Netherlands the change in the security environment led to a wholesale revision of its defense and security posture. In 1989 the government had already concluded that “international developments and financial constraints constitute the pretext for drafting a new defense white paper by the end of 1990.”⁷²⁰ It led to the 1991 Defense White Paper which formulated a transformation of defense policy based on “a thorough review of defense policy, involving reorganization and reductions at the same time [...]”⁷²¹

As the existential threat of a Soviet invasion and nuclear war receded, the military would be used to project stability and strengthen the international rule of law. In 1991 the Dutch constitution contained a clause (article 90) which declared the Dutch government would actively promote the international rule of law. In 2000, this was specified in relation to the military. It detailed a specific constitutional role for the military in furthering international stability. It reoriented the Dutch military to become an instrument of liberal

719 Ministerie van Defensie, *Defence Priorities Review: Prioriteitennota (Abridged Version)*, (Delft: January, 1993), p.2.

720 “De internationale ontwikkelingen en het vastgestelde financieel kader vormen voor de regering aanleiding om eind 1990 een nieuwe defensienota uit te brengen.” *Handelingen der Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal*, “Regeringsverklaring,” vergaderjaar 1989-1990, The Hague, pp. 14303-14305.

721 Ministerie van Defensie, *Defence White Paper 1991: the Netherlands armed forces in a changing world* (The Hague: 1991), p.6.

interventionism in support of the international rule of law.⁷²² This was not only driven by concerns over international stability, but also by the Dutch ambition to be part of a core group of Western nations that actively shape international relations. After all, making relevant contributions would increase the international political standing of the Netherlands. It resulted in a transformation policy whose success was measured not only in the ability to perform expeditionary operations but also by how relevant Dutch contributions were to allied military operations.⁷²³ It consisted of bandwagoning with the principle ally in the system while simultaneously supporting balancing initiatives to bring about an international system governed by international institutions based on Western liberal ideas. The adaptive strategy was thereby not intent on emulating the United States but rather a mix between emulation and innovation based on pursuing stability projection.

The Netherlands pursued a policy of strategic (type II) transformation. The benign security environment resulted in a debate over the fundamental question what the military was for.⁷²⁴ This case study charts the development of Dutch transformation and it will be made apparent that although the end of the Cold War was the shift in the level of external vulnerability that triggered discontinuous change, Dutch transformation has been guided by two features of Dutch strategic culture. When these two tenets of strategic culture aligned, the Netherlands could push its adaptive strategy to perform expeditionary operations forward, yet when they did not - as a result of an increasingly challenging security environment - they produced tension in Dutch security policy. The debate about Dutch transformation was a clash between these two central elements and a security environment that has become more challenging. The Netherlands has skipped between an Atlanticist tradition to bandwagon with the primary security guarantor, the United States, which provides the Netherlands with a balance in the European dynamic while improving its international stature and influence with the United States, and a continental-European orientation which amplifies a normative agenda to promote supranational governance and a policy of soft-balancing heavily influenced by the process of European integration.⁷²⁵ It leads to the Netherlands pursuing the role of a bridge-builder among the greater powers in Europe and the United States and promoting the international rule of law, while advocating stability projection rather than power projection. As the European and Atlanticist traditions clashed it produced friction over the direction of Dutch defense policy and has acted as a constraint on the extractive capacity of the state. Principally this tension

722 Ministerie van Defensie, *Defence Priorities Review: Prioriteitennota (Abridged Version)*, (Delft: January 1993), p.6.

723 "Een krijgsmacht wordt relevanter en bruikbaar - en krijgt daardoor meer 'politiek-militair' gewicht - naarmate deze beter voorziet in capaciteiten waar internationaal behoefte aan is." Ministerie van Defensie, Commandant der Strijdkrachten, *Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006*, The Hague, February 6, 2006, p.26.

724 Interview with General (rtd) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.

725 Joris Voorhoeve delineates three concentric geographic rings to analyze Dutch security policy and makes the case that the Netherlands effectively plays a three-level game on these dimensions. The levels are the Benelux, Europe and Global. J.J.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profit and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, (Amsterdam: Nijhoff, 1979).

has fuelled a domestic debate over developing capabilities for, and participation in, high-intensity operations. Following the end of the Cold War it has led to emulating elements of American network-centric capabilities while similarly distancing itself from the American agency-focused approach to military operations. It has led to a pursuit of relevance to US military operations, while lambasting the United States for its unilateral approach. This tension has become apparent as expeditionary operations have become more challenging throughout the late 1990's and the first decade of the new century. Where it gravitates between these two elements Dutch transformation has shown characteristics that may be considered schizophrenic. It will be made apparent in the last part of this case study that the friction that constrains Dutch transformation is brought about by whether or not to take part in high-intensity expeditionary operations.

The Netherlands embarked on a transformation strategy aimed at increasing the ability of the Dutch state to provide for its security. Yet as a medium power, it was not the Dutch desire to fight wars more effectively or counter a specific threat but rather to increase its influence within international, transatlantic and European contexts and do so within the context of supporting the international rule of law and projecting a stabilizing influence. In a low-threat environment providing credible and relevant contributions to crisis-management operations made the military instrument a more useful political tool. Transformation thereby had a distinct political-strategic motivation. The Dutch transformation strategy implied a reorientation away from territorial defense towards a 'broad expeditionary' force of limited size, able to contribute to operations anywhere around the world under all intensities to promote the international rule of law.

This case study is structured in five chapters, with each addressing a question of the structured, focused comparison. The first chapter identifies what type of transformation strategy was pursued. The second details the rationale for Dutch transformation and how a change in the level of external vulnerability triggered the strategy. The end of the Cold War and the process of European integration shaped a benign environment that enabled the Netherlands to reassess the foundations of its security policy. The third chapter discusses the two main tenets of Dutch strategic culture and how they influenced Dutch transformation. They relate to the question 'What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors that shaped the transformation strategy?' These tenets are a structure-based, or institutionalist, understanding of security policy and an emphasis on stability projection to pursue the promotion of the international rule of law, and the pursuit of being a relevant ally. The fourth chapter answers the question what the interaction between the trigger for transformation and strategic culture meant in terms of defense capabilities. It describes how strategic culture influenced capability decisions and doctrine. The fifth chapter answers the question how further events in the security environment impacted the transformation strategy. It outlines how Dutch transformation was constrained as a result of events in the security environment that produced friction with Dutch strategic culture. The events that tested Dutch transformation strategy were participation in Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo, the war in Iraq and most prominently, the deployment to the Southern Afghan province of Uruzgan.

16 DUTCH TRANSFORMATION DEFINED

In the Netherlands transformation was an instance of discontinuous change in response to the system-level changes following the end of the Cold War and shift the military and defense policy towards expeditionary operations. It amounted to strategic (type II) transformation and was stipulated in the defense white papers of 1991 and 1993, and given shape in subsequent policy papers.⁷²⁶ It was however not called transformation in The Hague. The Dutch term for transformation, *transformatie*, is all but absent in Dutch security policy rhetoric. It appears regularly in reference to policy papers about the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, describing changes in the Alliance at large, but only once in the context of changes in the Netherlands defense policy. In the 2003 version of the Ministry of Defense's *Bundel voor Nieuwe Bewindslieden*, an introductory document for the new civilian chief at the ministry, *transformatie* is detailed to have started in 1991 and 1993 in response to transitions in the international distribution of power.⁷²⁷ While the term was not used explicitly, the 1991 Defense White Paper captured the essence of strategic transformation by using associated terms such as 'reorganizing' and 'restructuring'. The 1991 White Paper was entitled *Reorganization and Reductions: the military in a changing world*.⁷²⁸ The 1993 *Defense Priorities Review* further announced a "reassessment of tasks and size." It signaled the intent to improve the usability of the military instrument to contribute to the security of the state. The head of the policy planning unit at the Ministry of Defense, Lo Casteleijn, said that: "The major trend in Dutch security strategy has been the shift from a military based on mobilizing forces for territorial security to one primed on expeditionary forces."⁷²⁹ Others interviewed for this study specifically pointed to 1991-1993 as the pivotal period in which the foundation for transformation was laid. Dutch transformation can thereby be understood as the fundamental repositioning of the military from an organization directed at static defense to a broad expeditionary organization with the ability to perform high-intensity operations in response to a new system-wide distribution of power.

726 Interviews with General (rtd) Henk van den Breemen, Vice-Chief of Defense from 1991-1994 and Chief of Defense from 1994-1998, mr. Robert de Groot, head of the Security Policy Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007; mr. Lo Castellijn, head of the Defense Policy Planning Staff in 2007, prof. dr. Rob de Wijk who worked on the 1993 Defense White Paper; Henk Kamp, Minister of Defense 2002-2007; Maj-Gen (rtd.) F van Kappen.

727 Ministerie van Defensie, Directie Algemene Beleidszaken, *Ministerie van Defensie: Bundel voor nieuwe bewindslieden*, May 22, 2003, The Hague, p.52.

728 Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensienota 1991: Herstructurering en Verkleining: de krijgsmacht in een veranderende wereld*, (Den Haag, 1991).

729 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, The Hague.

17 SYSTEM-LEVEL FACTORS THAT TRIGGERED DUTCH TRANSFORMATION

Dutch transformation was triggered by several events that changed the level of external vulnerability. First and foremost was the abrupt and fundamental improvement of the security environment following the end of the Cold War. This was supported by the ongoing process of European integration that stifled intra-European military competition. Combined it led to a general discussion over the future of the military. The benevolent environment led the Dutch military to pursue a broader security agenda for which an appropriate defense organization was lacking. The Netherlands needed to develop expeditionary capabilities and an expeditionary mindset. It amounted to a policy to pursue crisis-management operations to contribute to international stability on the one hand and to help promote Western liberal values on the other.

17.1 SUSTAINING WESTERN POWER AFTER THE COLD WAR

In Europe, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall led to a general sigh of relief. The events led to a profound shift in the international system and a significant improvement in the Netherlands's security position. With the United States as the primary security guarantor of Western Europe and its position as military hegemon, European states were more secure than they had been for the previous decades. Although threats had dissipated from the European theatre, it soon became clear that beyond Europe instability festered. Security risks were now perceived in the form of regional instability. A secondary issue was to contribute to the continuation of a security environment characterized by Western predominance and with it to sustain the credibility of US power to underwrite European security. The Gulf War led to concern. Not because The Hague itself was threatened, but rather because there was anxiety over what it would mean for the United States' role as global policeman and enforcer of the international rule of law. Frits Bolkestein, MP for the liberal conservative party VVD, was a vocal exponent of this view. The Gulf War was considered an American war, with Europeans participating out of solidarity. Realist considerations to bandwagon with the principle security guarantor were supplemented by a liberal interventionist position to promote the international rule of law. Operation *Desert Storm* was considered a test of American global leadership in a post-Cold War environment. Failure on the part of the US would imply a failure of global Western dominance, empower dictators around the world and pose a threat to global stability.⁷³⁰ Stability of the international system was crucial to protect the rule of law. In other words, American success was believed to be of vital importance to advance international stability. Furthermore, the reasoning went that participating alongside the Americans would avoid endan-

730 "Bij dit alles is de rol van de VS cruciaal. [...] Als deze zaak slecht afloopt, zou het ernstige gevolgen hebben, niet alleen voor het machtsverevenwicht in het Midden-Oosten maar ook voor de rol die Amerika bereid is in de wereld te spelen. Een slechte afloop nu, kan kleine en middelgrote dictatoren met bedreigende wapenarsenalen slechts aanmoedigen." F. Bolkestein (VVD), Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, The Hague, January 11, 1991.

gering the relationship with Washington.⁷³¹ Although the Cold War had ended, an interest was perceived in supporting the United States' position to remain the only superpower. The Dutch government provided three reasons to participate. Firstly, the necessity to enforce a United Nations Security Council resolution. Support for the Gulf War was expressed in terms of supporting the rule of law.⁷³² The legitimacy offered by a UN mandate was believed to make participation nearly mandatory. Secondly, the "vital interest that Europe had in promoting stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty" in an oil-rich region. This was essentially an argument based on economic interests. And thirdly, the protection of Dutch citizens in Iraq and Kuwait.⁷³³ There was also a fourth reason which was given after the war ended, namely to support the United States in a show of solidarity to maintain US interest in European security. Following the liberation of Kuwait MP Ton Frinking of the Christian-Democrats said US participation in European politics was critical to avoid a resurgence of power politics on the old continent:

*The countries in Western Europe cannot do without each other and Western Europe cannot do without the United States. Without the United States the old power game as played by the individual European states before the Second World War would soon emerge again.*⁷³⁴

Thus support of the US was considered a Dutch vital security interest. The government decided to contribute naval and air-defense forces including two frigates in the Persian Gulf and Patriot air defense systems to Israel.⁷³⁵ Yet for lack of an All-Volunteer Force, ground forces were not deployed. Developing a professional military would become one of the concrete measures taken with the transformation strategy towards an expeditionary force. The lessons of the Gulf War – and particularly the notion that high-intensity warfare may still be necessary in a more benevolent unipolar world – informed the process of Dutch transformation.

731 Idem.

732 "De inval van Irak in Koeweit is een flagrante schending van de internationale rechtsorde. [...] De regering is zich bewust van de gevaren die aan deze missie verbonden zijn. De handhaving van de internationale rechtsorde weegt echter zwaar. Nederland kan niet afzijdig blijven. [...] De inspanning is nu gericht op vrede en het respecteren van de internationale rechtsorde." Queen Beatrix, *Troonrede*, September 18, 1990.

733 Tweede Kamer, 21664, nr.1, 1989-1990, August 13, 1990.

734 "De landen van West-Europa kunnen niet zonder elkaar en West-Europa kan niet zonder de Verenigde Staten. Zonder de Verenigde Staten zou het oude machtsspel van de afzonderlijke Europese staten van voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog weer snel opduiken [...]" A.B.M. Frinking, "Commissievergadering Defensie," UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p. 7.

735 No ground forces were deployed because there was no volunteer force available. It was considered that in defense of the international rule of law only volunteers rather than conscripts could be deployed abroad. See Relus Ter Beek, *Manoevreren: Herinneringen aan Plein 4* (Amsterdam: Balans, 1996), p.49.

The Netherlands supported the international rule of law from the realist motivation that it could moderate the behavior of rogue powers and contribute to global peace. The Gulf War, waged under a UN Security Council mandate, was a case in point. The Netherlands would participate in operations against rogue leaders that jeopardized the international rule of law and regional stability. The vehicle to do so was through alliance with the United States. The Netherlands bandwagoned with the United States to preserve the status quo. This approach was held to best serve Dutch interests.

17.2 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

A further trigger for the fundamental reorientation of the Dutch military was that the end of the bipolar system allowed a model for promoting Western liberal values to emerge in the guise of the process of European integration. European integration had precluded intra-European competition through institution-building and by strengthening the supranational rule of law. This model of stability could be expanded beyond Europe's borders as the end of the Cold War signaled an opportunity for its promulgation.

Both the fall of the Berlin Wall and the process of European integration had changed the calculus of power in Europe. European integration cultivated a stability-focused approach to security policy.⁷³⁶ European integration had several immediate implications on the European continent: a decisive trend to avoid the use of the military instrument, a stronger respect for human rights, and the notion that *realpolitik* was a lost cause and supranational legal regimes constituted a strategic interest instead. It bred support for the international rule of law.

The context in which the Netherlands formulated transformation policies was shaped by the European 'post-modern system'.⁷³⁷ The idea of a post-modern system offers an explanation how European states have forsaken the military as an instrument to pursue their interests in their internal dealings.⁷³⁸ European integration – and with it the dissipation of the dominant security threat in the European arena – was caused by far-reaching economic and legal integration which started with the Coal and Steel Community in the 1950's and has been elaborated into an intricate supranational and intergovernmental system where elements of national sovereignty are surrendered for the sake of prosperity and security. Postmodern security relies on a system of mutual interference through institution-building, or focusing on the structural constraints which determine the context in which foreign policy elites can act. This breeds transparency and trust, de-emphasizes territorial sovereignty and merges domestic and foreign policy. The European scholar-

736 See Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nation: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004); Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

737 Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nation: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004).

738 See also James Sheehan, *The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War*, (London: Faber & Faber, 2007).

diplomat Robert Cooper eloquently described the system of European integration whereby security issues are reduced to legal battles and competition policy.⁷³⁹ By changing the structure in which European states interacted, European states were able to move away from antagonism and towards cooperation. Given that the European Union established a regime where international legal frameworks superseded national law, it likewise gave rise to emphasize a legal regime that superseded the anarchy among nation-states. The European integration process was accompanied by a policy of enlargement, which was thereby able to extend the virtues and rewards of European integration beyond its borders. This demonstrated the viability of a liberal-European model that could be an alternative to an American model of addressing security risks and social progress; juxtaposing the liberating force of military power by removing specific actors to changing the structures in which foreign policy takes shape.⁷⁴⁰ In the European model, the military play only a subordinate role. Cooper explains that “in the postmodern world, *raison d'état* and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs.”⁷⁴¹ The benevolent strategic environment following the end of the Cold War opened the possibility for an expansion and deepening of this model and it cultivated the belief among politicians that a world of global governance was within reach if the European model could be exported.

At the supranational level Europe was envisaged as a civilian, not a military power. As Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst noted in the 1970's, “only this [civilian] Europe will be an additional force for stability and progress in the world, instead of a new factor of uncertainty, disruption and discord.”⁷⁴² The civilian, non-military Europe the Dutch government embraced reflected many of the core-elements of Dutch strategic culture: emphasizing stability through stimulating institution-building, embracing pacifism while shunning power politics, and achieving security ends by being virtuous instead of militarily victorious. The European Experiment embodied ideals the Netherlands pursued. Voorhoeve declared that “Europe should remain in the pre-federal stage and become a liberal, non-military force in the world, pursuing humanitarian objectives,” just like the Netherlands had in mind for itself.⁷⁴³ In fact, as Voorhoeve poignantly observed, the history of European integration was reminiscent of the development of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the early 19th century.⁷⁴⁴ The Netherlands was able

739 Cooper (2004); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, & Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A new framework for analysis*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

740 See also Parag Khanna, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, (New York: Random House, 2008), p.3-9.

741 Robert Cooper, “The Post-Modern State,” in *The Guardian*, April 7, 2002.

742 Quoted in Voorhoeve (1979), p 192.

743 Voorhoeve (1979), p.192.

744 “After the Second World War, America tried to promote unity among its West European partners, as Britain had forged unity among the Low Countries almost a century and a half earlier.” Voorhoeve (1979), p. 288.

to flourish under the security umbrella of Westminster then, just as Europe flourished under the US security guarantee after 1945. The comparison can be extended further. The American motive to defend Western European integrity during the Cold War was based on its desire to maintain a strong buffer against Soviet expansion, just as the Congress of Vienna had formed the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a buffer between the major powers of France, the United Kingdom and Prussia. Necessarily it meant that the buffer would be a non-military entity. Hence persistent US skepticism over the development of an autonomous European defense identity in the 1990's.⁷⁴⁵ The success of this structure- and institution-based system created a zone of peace unique in European history. With the end of the Cold War, the model had an opportunity to develop further. It did however present a paradox. The peaceful postmodern system was able to flourish only as a result of the security umbrella provided by an outsider power, the United States, who did not shun the use of the military. It allowed Europe to evolve beyond the modern system by being protected from modernity. It explains the essential role the United States has played and continues to play in European security and why the Netherlands has both pursued bandwagoning to the United States as well as soft-balancing in pursuing the European model of stability projection.

European integration also had realist logic. The Netherlands interpreted the process of European integration as a way to promote Dutch security. It was similar to promoting the international rule of law, a system through which the impact of the major European powers could be regulated. As former Minister of Defense Joris Voorhoeve argued: "supranationalism can be a shield under which Small powers can resist political pressure of large integration partners."⁷⁴⁶ European integration was expressed in defense capability initiatives throughout the 1990's. The UK/NL amphibious force, the 1st German/Dutch Army Corps, European pooling initiatives on strategic transport, contributions to EU battle-groups, the NATO Response Force, are examples of embedding Dutch armed forces in transnational structures and commitments to multilateral security structures. Doing so creates cost-efficiencies, as well as improves interoperability. Yet, there also is a solid political reason involved which fits within the Dutch focus on stability projection. Cross-European frameworks preclude the renationalization of European defense. Renationalization is a concern from a geopolitical perspective, particularly following shifts in the international distribution of power. Such shifts, if they trigger a renewed exclusive focus on national military structures, could lead to a return to power politics within Europe. By integrating European militaries such inward-looking policies are limited. It means creating military interdependencies. For the same reason, the Dutch favored that the United States remained engaged with Europe since the United States is the guarantor of the post-modern system that has taken root in Europe. These cooperative mechanisms have an additional benefit that they favor multilateral action. Multilateralism is advanta-

745 At NATO's 50th anniversary, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke of avoiding the "three D's" of NATO by any European Security initiative, referring to no diminution, discrimination and duplication.

746 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 189.

geous for the Netherlands. It fits within the general objective to project stability and protect the international rule of law. It is a guarantee against the renationalization of the military in Europe, and it enables a check on unilateral tendencies of major powers. Transformation enabled the Dutch military to complement the forces of the major powers, and coalitions are thereby the primary framework in which the Netherlands' military can perform operations.⁷⁴⁷ Multilateralism thereby is seen as a source of power. Martha Finnemore writes that for smaller and medium powers, "multilateralism not only creates opportunity ... to become involved in military interventions; it also creates a normative premium on action by these states as opposed to the strongest states and gives them significant say in the kinds of rules that evolve concerning multilateral action."⁷⁴⁸ For many states, the argument that an intervention has a multilateral character increases the pressure to participate. Playing a credible role in these institutions further strengthens the position of the state.⁷⁴⁹ European integration thus influenced the way in which the military instrument was seen and produced an emphasis on promoting the international rule of law through crisis-management operations.

17.3 TOWARDS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

17.3.1 A BENEVOLENT, BUT UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT

In 1991 the Dutch constitution stipulated that the Netherlands had a role to promote the international rule of law. In 2000 the Dutch constitution was amended to contain an article that the Netherlands armed forces had three main tasks: to protect Dutch territorial integrity, to support civilian agencies and disaster relief, and to assist in promoting the international rule of law.⁷⁵⁰ In 1991, the low-threat environment in Europe gave rise to performing expeditionary operations and promoting the international rule of law became a principle reason for which the military was restructured. It took shape in the 1991 and 1993 Defense White Papers. The end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in NATO's strategy, the benevolent environment and reduced defense spending necessitated reassessments of Dutch defense policy.

Two months after the Gulf War and as revolutionary changes were taking place in the Soviet Union the Netherlands published its first post-Cold War Defense White Paper, the *Defensienota 1991*. The document was the government's first response to a shift taking place in the international system. It marked the beginning of Dutch transformation as it

747 "Mede gezien de beperkte militaire middelen waarover Nederland beschikt, zal het altijd uitsluitend met andere landen – dus in enig internationaal verband – optreden. Onze deelneming zal dan ook steeds een complementair karakter hebben: zij zal een aanvulling zijn op de militaire eenheden van andere landen." *Defensienota 1991* (1991), p. 30.

748 Finnemore (2004), p. 20.

749 Duco Hellema, *Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland: De Nederlandse Rol in de Wereldpolitiek* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2006), p.364.

750 See Tweede Kamer, "Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004," vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29200, nr. 2, p. 24.

provided the fundamental intellectual basis for shifting the military to an expeditionary footing.⁷⁵¹ The Gulf War had made clear that the improvement of the security situation in Europe had not led to a world without crises and armed conflict, instead it gave way to uncertainty regarding the type, location and nature of future conflicts and crises.⁷⁵² It was uncertain what this would imply for the use of the military, yet the Gulf War made clear that wars would still be fought. The end of the Cold War had given way to a lower-risk, but more uncertain security environment. The White Paper announced that Dutch security interests could be threatened by activities that were less predictable, less concrete, less certain and less defined than they had been before. This implied that the type of conflict the armed forces would be called on to address would be of varying intensity. Minister of Defense Relus Ter Beek stated that: “one thing is certain, a common characteristic of the current security risks is that they are diffuse and unpredictable.”⁷⁵³ Uncertainty became a key word for defense planners. Fundamental questions were posed. How to deal with uncertainty and how to plan for it? And what did it mean for alliances? The main strategic question became: what was military force for? Trying to navigate these questions, the White Paper noted that three central elements driving change: changes in the Alliance’s strategy in response to the positive developments emanating from the Soviet Union, European disarmament initiatives yet mounting security risks outside the NATO area. It led to the following logical conclusions. First of all, the chance of a large-scale Soviet surprise attack had become unlikely. Nevertheless, the White Paper noted that “the Soviet Union remains the largest military power by far in Europe,” thereby warranting continuous attention and thus that the territorial defense task should not be cancelled altogether. The White Paper assessed that although the threat of a major Soviet attack would take several years to prepare, a limited incursion by Soviet forces was still possible. At the same time, NATO force-structure was reduced under the *Conventional Forces in Europe* (CFE) treaty. It led to the mobile counter-concentration concept. The basis of that concept was that reduced numbers of allied forces should be able to offset their numerical disadvantage by being able to deploy over larger distances to defend allied territory. Rather than massing stationary forces, this idea became the prelude to developing mobile expeditionary forces. By 1991 the Netherlands was in the process of developing a capability which allowed it to concentrate force over relatively large distances, and would be useful in the expeditionary age following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The airmobile brigade became the spearhead of this effort. At the same time, it was made clear that reorganization and restructuring would be necessary and that operations outside the NATO treaty area, for instance through the UN, would increase in significance. That same airmobile brigade would now play “a key role in the new organization [of the Army].”⁷⁵⁴ The 1991 White Paper identified an increased need for forces that were “smaller, more mobile, and more versatile to be

751 Interview with General (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.

752 *Defensienota 1991* (1991), p. 5.

753 Relus ter Beek, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, The Hague, June 10, 1991, p. 23.

754 *Defence White Paper 1991*, p.20.

able to react to a crisis in the most flexible way possible” and it underlined the increasing demand for diverse out-of-area operations to deal with indirect security threats. Flexibility, mobility and interoperability were put forward as key concepts around which to restructure the military. While the context for the discussion was shaped by NATO’s mobile counter-concentration and the demise of a Soviet threat, the White Paper hinted that changes in the international environment would lead to a reorganization of the military. The first tell-tale signs of transformation were present.

As a function of the benevolent security environment, the Dutch defense budget was significantly decreased. A peace dividend was taken and reductions in material and personnel were enacted. With 1989 as a reference a real decrease in the defense budget of 9.1% by 1992 and 18.0% by 1993 was enacted.⁷⁵⁵ In mid 1990 it was decided to freeze the defense budget, and to start reducing it the next year.⁷⁵⁶ It triggered the need to reassess policy.

With the Berlin Wall turned to rubble, the Netherlands moved beyond a strictly adversarial approach of a military aimed at countering a possible Soviet attack. The benevolent environment in Europe would allow the Netherlands to focus on security crises further away from home. Rather than prepare for war, the military would be an instrument of stability projection. Conform neoclassical realism, it gave rise to the opportunity to expand Western influence. Minister Ter Beek hinted that now that the fall of the Berlin Wall had renewed the primary security threat there was an opportunity to address those other security issues that had been disregarded throughout the Cold War:

I never defined security narrowly, such as the defense of the homeland or the protection of NATO territory. Security was and is for me more than the classic defense-task of the military. Now that the threat of large-scale conflict with the Warsaw-pact has dissipated, there was a possibility to give shape to addressing issues in other parts of the world. [...] After the fall of the Berlin Wall greater weight could be accorded to peace operations.⁷⁵⁷

Since the security environment no longer presented vital security risks, Ter Beek envisioned that the Netherlands pursue an agenda of stability projection through contributions to both peacekeeping and crisis-management missions. It created a focus on sources of instability and on actively promoting the international rule of law.

755 *Prioriteitennota* (1993), p. 69.

756 Willeke van Brouwershaven, *Turbulentie en Strategisch Vermogen; Strategievorming bij het Ministerie van Defensie*, (Eburon: Leiden, 1999) p. 152.

757 “Veiligheid definieerde ik nooit in enge zin, zoals de verdediging van het eigen grondgebied of de bescherming van het Navo-verdragsgebied. Veiligheid was en is voor mij meer dan de klassieke verdedigingstaak van de krijgsmacht. Nu de dreiging van een grootschalig conflict met het Warschapact wegviel, was er ruimte om inhoud te geven aan betrokkenheid op tal van andere plaatsen in de wereld... Na de val van der Berlijnse Muur zou aan vredesoperaties een groter gewicht kunnen worden toegekend.” Ter Beek (1996), p. 62.

17.3.2 A FOCUS ON STRUCTURES

Dealing with sources of instability, rather than specific threats or actors, became the cornerstone of Dutch security policy following the end of the Cold War. The 1991 White Paper identified several sources of instability: economic underdevelopment, rapid increases in population growth, non-democratic regimes, ethnic and religious tensions which connected to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, all had the potential of being globally destabilizing with “political, economic and military” consequences.⁷⁵⁸ It meant that conflicts far away from home would impact Dutch national security because of their destabilizing effects that rippled through the international system, particularly as the global straitjacket of the bipolar system had been removed. Global interdependence was creating mutual vulnerabilities and with it the increased risk of instability: “The security of the West, in its broadest sense, is increasingly intertwined with the security in the world as a whole.”⁷⁵⁹

Rather than focusing on particular leaders or regimes and advocating their removal, the 1991 White Paper formulated an approach to defense which relied on the development of societal structures. The government sought the creation of security by addressing structural factors such as disarmament, spreading human rights, and equitable economic development:

*The government [...] is led by the belief that security is not only benefited through credible defense-efforts, disarmament and political dialogue, but also through the improvement of democracy, respect for human rights and balanced economic development. In general she strives to improve an international rule of law that guarantees peace, security and justice.*⁷⁶⁰

In Parliament, during the debate on the white-paper, a similar position was voiced by Ton Frinking, MP for the Christian Democrats (CDA).

758 “Buiten ons continent – in het bijzonder in het Midden-Oosten – doen zich ontwikkelingen voor die de stabiliteit bedreigen en die hun oorzaak vinden in economische onderontwikkeling, de afwezigheid van democratische structuren en etnische en religieuze spanningen binnen en tussen staten. Nieuw zijn deze ontwikkelingen niet. Wel zijn ze bedreigender geworden door de opkomst van militair sterke regionale machten, die over de middelen beschikken om op grote schaal moderne wapens te kopen of zelf te produceren, en door de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens en voor de inzet daarvan benodigde overbrengingsmiddelen. Regionale conflicten, zoals de Golfoorlog, kunnen in een steeds interdependentere wereld gevolgen hebben – politiek, economisch en militair – die in grote delen van de wereld voelbaar zijn.” *Defensienota 1991* (1991), p. 10.

759 *Defensienota 1991* (1991), pp. 28.

760 “De regering laat zich [...] leiden door de overtuiging dat veiligheid niet alleen gebaat is bij een geloofwaardige defensie-inspanning, wapen beheersing en politieke dialoog, maar ook bij het bevorderen van democratie, respect voor de rechten van de mens en evenwichtige economische ontwikkeling. Meer in het algemeen streeft zij naar het bevorderen van een internationale rechtsorde, die vrede, veiligheid en gerechtigheid waarborgt.” *Defensienota 1991* (1991), p. 10.

*The Netherlands is dependent on a strong im- and export [...] The concentration of interests of the Netherlands with Europe and the rest of the world already indicates, that the current security-interests are not only addressed by defending the territory of the treaty, but can more and more be influenced by political, economic and military developments beyond it.*⁷⁶¹

Parliament supported crisis-management operations with the objective to promote international stability.⁷⁶² A structural perspective was emphatically promoted by the Labor Party (PvdA). MP Maarten van Traa stated that, “security risks of which we speak are in first instance caused by the unequal distribution of economic opportunities, knowledge, income and power. Much less than before is [security] about the struggle against a military power that wants to inflict evil. This is a big difference.”⁷⁶³ Security policy was reinterpreted to address global social-economic qualms. Democracy, justice, and respect for Human Rights were central objectives to establish an end state of global governance based on the international rule of law. As MP Frinking said, the Netherlands’ defense policy focused on addressing destabilizing forces and could be used to further the foreign and development agenda:

*The armed forces are not geared to specific threats, as during the Cold War, but are there for the protection of the treaty-territory and the control of crises and other sources of instability. The presence of the Dutch armed forces can also be used to support foreign policy and development aid in areas where people are in need as a result of political armed conflicts.*⁷⁶⁴

This altruism was a product of what was considered a benevolent security environment. It gave rise to a policy to perform out-of-area, expeditionary operations to “manage sources of instability”. It would turn out to be a dominant feature of Dutch defense policy for the subsequent decade and a half.

Changes in the security environment were proceeding faster than expected in 1991. Two years after the white paper was published, the Ministry of Defense produced an update.

761 “Nederland is afhankelijk van een krachtige in-en-uitvoer [...]. De verdichting van de belangen van Nederland met Europa en de rest van de wereld geeft al aan, dat de huidige veiligheidsbelangen niet alleen in de verdediging van het verdragsgebied liggen, maar meer en meer ook daarbuiten kunnen worden beïnvloed door politieke, economische en militaire ontwikkelingen.” A.B.M. Frinking, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p. 10.

762 A.B.M. Frinking, (CDA) Ibid, p. 7.

763 M. van Traa (PvdA), Ibid, p.20.

764 “De krijgsmacht is niet meer gericht tegen specifieke dreigingen, zoals tijdens de Koude Oorlog, maar is er voor de verdediging van het verdragsgebied en de beheersing van crises en andere instabiele ontwikkelingen. Het bestaan van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht kan ook worden benut ter ondersteuning van het buitenlandse en ontwikkelingsbeleid in gebieden waar mensen in nood zijn als gevolg van door politiek geweld ontstane conflicten.” A.B.M. Frinking, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p.10.

The 1993 *Prioriteitennota*, or *Defence Priorities Review*, carried the sub-title “A different world, a different Defense.” It suitably represented the strategic nature of Dutch transformation based on a re-appreciation of the role of the military in the new environment. In 1991 a Soviet resurgence remained a distant, but possible event. In 1993 the Cold War had truly come to an end. The document spoke of a “paradox of international relaxation” because the benevolent security environment did not mean a world without security risks, and declared that the international security environment had “fundamentally different contours.” The government embraced an activist defense policy as a necessary element to pursue the promotion of the international rule of law.⁷⁶⁵ Flexibility of military capabilities became a necessity as type, place and intensity of operations were uncertain and both low-intensity peacekeeping and high-intensity peace-enforcement were embraced.⁷⁶⁶ Territorial defense receded to a secondary task while expeditionary operations took center stage. An important shift took place in the security discourse indicating the changing nature of the environment and the security perception. Rather than discussing specific threats to security, the more general and less acute term of security risks was officially adopted. Because of these changes Rob de Wijk, then head of the Concepts Division at the Ministry of Defense, later referred to the document as “the most important Defense White Paper since the end of the Cold War.”⁷⁶⁷

The document forcefully advanced a liberal-interventionist approach to promote international stability by using the military to set the conditions for changing structures and institutions:

*Sometimes support from the international community can be indispensable in providing humanitarian aid, helping to repair infrastructural and other basis facilities and assisting in the return of the populations put to flight. It is this international involvement that fosters lasting peace, economic development and democratic government.*⁷⁶⁸

Just as two years earlier, the lack of a specific security threat allowed a broad interpretation of security. Demographic trends coupled to economic distress and ethnic or religious polarization could jeopardize regional stability and cause spill-over effects, while political pluralism, rule of law and a market economy could provide stability. The developments in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990's were a case in point.⁷⁶⁹ Seven years later, in 2000 this perspective was reasserted in the next White Paper. The 2000 Defense White

765 “[...] het streven naar een internationale rechtsorde en naar stabiliteit [is] onvereenigbaar met een politiek van afzijdigheid.” *Prioriteitennota 1993* (1993), p.8.

766 *Prioriteitennota 1993* (1993), p.15.

767 Rob de Wijk, “Defensiebeleid in relatie tot Veiligheidsbeleid” in E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht: Studies over the organisatie en het optreden* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004), p.156.

768 *Defence Priorities Review- abridged version* (1993), p.5.

769 *Prioriteitennota 1993* (1993), p. 5.

Paper expressed that the enlargement process in both NATO and the European Union had been important instruments to foster stability and security in Europe and moor Eastern Europe to a zone of democracy. It was based on projecting stability by advancing Western liberal principles through enlargement. According to the white paper, terrorism and mass-migration had structural causes such as ethnic conflicts or “religious fermentation.” Security in general was defined as a function of international stability rather than a specific threat.

It was a staple for the coming years. The 2000 Defense White Paper, as well as its 2004 successor, noted that European stability was primarily at risk by what was termed an ‘arc of instability’ lying along Europe’s southern and eastern borders. Stretching from northern Africa up to the Caucasus, this zone consisted of a multitude of factors contributing to overall instability: a ‘youth bulge,’ increasing unemployment, political-religious radicalism, ethnic tensions and autocratic regimes in the Middle East. The effects of which could be felt in Europe since “any intensification of the tensions in North Africa or the Middle East can increase the migratory pressure on Europe.”⁷⁷⁰ Such structural factors were putting regional stability at risk.⁷⁷¹ Ethnic struggles, religious radicalization, the proliferation of small arms, demographic trends and economic underdevelopment figured in the government’s understanding of the security environment. It would remain so for the subsequent decade.

“The Netherlands is an important and globally operating commercial nation that is economically dependent on a stable and flourishing international environment. Politically, militarily and socially ‘quiet’ stable resource- and export markets and commercial routes are of importance.” Thus begins the 2006 military-strategic assessment by the Commander of Dutch Armed Forces, General Dick Berlijn. He asserted that “a stable international environment is a vital interest.” The delineation of stability as a vital security interest corresponded with a worldview that viewed international stability and the rule of law as more important than actively liberating people by waging war. While stability projection was based on Western liberal principles, the means to do so was through addressing structural causes rather than using military coercion to topple a government. Rather than be a party to a conflict, the Netherlands would be a mediator. Projecting stability required military forces that could address crises and stem conflicts before ripples of instability could hit the Netherlands. Rather than focus on the potential rise of a peer competitor, it led to a focus on crisis-management and peace operations. In addition, to enhance stability, the military could not be deployed in isolation or in a purely kinetic fashion. It fostered a broad conception of security policy in which the military is embedded in the larger scope

770 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Defensienota 2000,” vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 900, p. 25.

771 “Aside from interests, fundamental values and principles of law can be at stake: in the event of massive violations of human rights, forced deportations and genocide. In many crises both values and interests are at stake. Both are often related: serious violations of Human Rights as in Kosovo often are destabilizing.” *Defensienota 2000*, p. 42.

of efforts to promote stability, such as development aid and economic policy. In 2000, the Defense White Paper noted:

*The prevention and control of crises demands a broad, integrated approach. [...] An integrated approach is necessary also for stabilization and reconstruction after the cessation of fighting. Diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and, if needed, military instruments need to be deployed in an integrated fashion. [...] Defense and development aid go hand in hand.*⁷⁷²

In 2004 this approach was reiterated in a document formulating the Netherlands' "broad and integrated security policy," rebranded as the 3-D (development, diplomacy and defense) *approach*.⁷⁷³ The first incarnation of a nascent 3-D *approach* became apparent during a major policy review in 1995.⁷⁷⁴ The policy review was an interdepartmental effort with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development Aid and Defense to develop an integrated foreign and security policy combining international economics, development assistance, diplomacy and defense. It epitomized the belief that the military could not be used in isolation to solve political problems, but only contribute to setting conditions for its solution. Dutch security policy revolved around stability projection since: "security and stability create essential preconditions for political, economic and social development."⁷⁷⁵

In addition, European security rhetoric matched the Dutch structure-focused approach to security policy. Late 2006 a strategy document was published by the European Defense Agency presenting its assessment of European long-term defense capability requirements.⁷⁷⁶ The booklet, endorsed by the European Council, set forth what it saw as the defining trends for defense capability needs by 2025. It is worth quoting for its structure-focused orientation and its contrast to American rhetoric:

The global context is sobering, with the central predictions of demography and economics foreshadowing a Europe which, two decades hence, will be older, less pre-eminently prosperous, and surrounded by regions (including Africa and the Middle East) which may struggle to cope with the consequences of globalization. Defense will need to contend with public finances under pressure from a growing pension burden; a shrinking

772 *Defensienota 2000*, p. 26.

773 Tweede Kamer, "Nederlandse Deelname aan Vredesmissies," vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29521, nr.1, April 8, 2004.

774 Tweede Kamer, *Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid: Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Economische Zaken, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, van Defensie en van Financiën*, 24337, nr. 2, 1994-1995.

775 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

776 European Defence Agency, *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, Brussels, October 2006.

recruitment pool; and societies increasingly cautious about interventions, concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force and inclined to favor 'security' over 'defense' spending.⁷⁷⁷

It portrays pessimism about the security environment and the ability to solve security challenges rather than a virulent belief in strategic superiority and a *Pax Americana*. But more than that, causes for insecurity are deemed to lie in structural factors. Rather than specific actors, security risks are identified in the form of trends like demographics, shrinking public finances and societal aversion against expeditionary operations. The document underscored that military operations are intent on creating conditions for political solutions, rather than military force being the solution itself.

In agreement with neoclassical realism, which holds that a state will advance elements of its domestic agenda when its perceived relative power in the international system increases, the benevolent security environment after 1991 triggered a military change program to actively contribute to expanding Western liberal values and to do so through a structuralist approach to support the international rule of law, stability and promote liberal institution-building. The Dutch transformation agenda was outlined in the first years following the end of the Cold War and entailed performing expeditionary operations to manage crises and uphold the international rule of law. The intent for doing so was on the one hand to show solidarity with the United States and keep Washington engaged in European security. On the other hand, the Netherlands pursued an active policy to promote Western liberal values. Not only in the years since the Berlin Wall but also throughout its modern history, Dutch thinking on security policy has underlined the necessity of stability as an objective.

777 Ibid, p. 5.

18 STRATEGIC CULTURE AND DUTCH TRANSFORMATION

Dutch strategic culture is based on two tenets that derive from the Netherlands' geopolitical positioning, its status as medium power, its international legal tradition, its maritime orientation and its memory of historical prominence. These two tenets are on the one hand the preference for stability projection to promote the international rule of law and is represented in a continental-European approach, and on the other hand an Atlanticist tendency which is also reflected in using the military as an instrument to increase political relevance. These tenets are derived from an interest-based assessment of the Netherlands' security policy, yet they have remained stable over recent decades and their pursuit has become an end in and of itself. While the system-level dynamic determines the Dutch approach to military policy, the two tenets described above form the strategic-cultural context within which the Netherlands is constrained to pursue strategic transformation. They portray a mix between Atlanticist and European tendencies, which enable the Netherlands – rather than another European country - to play a role as bridge-builder.

That the Netherlands is caught between a more pro-Atlantic and a pro-Europe orientation also becomes apparent from the following survey. A 2004 survey asked European and American respondents several questions regarding when the use of force is justified. The results of the survey illustrate that the Netherlands echoes both European and American positions. For instance, the Dutch are very European when deploying the military for a peacekeeping operation, yet are as militant as Americans in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or defend a NATO ally.

When is the use of the military allowed?	Europe	NL	USA
In order to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of war	91%	98%	81%
To provide peacekeeping troops in a post-civil war situation	80%	88%	66%
To prevent a terrorist attack	83%	84%	92%
To stop a civil war	56%	56%	38%
To defend a NATO ally under attack	75%	86%	87%
To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons	69%	80%	81%
To guarantee the supply of oil	42%	48%	44%
To remove a government violating Human Rights	50%	53%	57%

Figure 20: Dutch Views Regarding the Use of the Military

(Source: Nationaal Vrijheidsonderzoek 2003, 2004, as quoted in Philip Everts, "Ontwikkelingen in de publieke opinie," in *Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2004*, p. 224)

A survey is naturally a snapshot of opinions, however the following paragraphs will illustrate the structural consistency of both the European and the Atlantic orientations of the Dutch security outlook.

18.1 STABILITY PROJECTION

*“There is probably not a country in the world where girls are so happy to go to school. Because for years it was forbidden by the Taliban. In Afghanistan, peace is slowly getting back on its feet. Also thanks to the Royal Netherlands Air Force.”*⁷⁷⁸

“Everywhere in Afghanistan you still see election posters. On September 18 the population could vote for the first time in 36 years. In Afghanistan, peace is slowly getting back on its feet. Also thanks to the Royal Netherlands Air Force.”

- Transcripts of commercials for the Royal Netherlands Air Force (aired in 2006)⁷⁷⁹

A fundamental objective of international law is to create stable relations among states to avoid conflict and promote peace. The Dutch embrace of stability projection developed from a long-standing focus on the international rule of law. A realist argument lay at the roots of the focus on stability projection. The Netherlands is not a major power and it finds security in a strengthened regime of international law rather than being at the whims of the major powers in a system. This is a common position among developed liberal-democratic medium and smaller powers.

Given Dutch economic dependence on global trade and international commercial relations, the Netherlands had an interest in preserving global stability. An international legal framework was considered a Leviathan that could act as a regulatory and moderating mechanism. This provided a logical inclination to identify an interest in the development of global governance. It also became a justification for interventionism under the pretext of owning a higher moral ground as a benefactor of the common good which is international peace and stability. As a correlate, being an active proponent or even an armed promoter thereof, it improved the standing of the Netherlands internationally. It subsequently became part of the Dutch strategic cultural vernacular. There where the United States emphasized the concept of ‘Freedom’ as a defining feature of its strategic culture, the Netherlands portrayed a similar inclination to ‘stability’ and the ‘International Rule of Law.’ It can be found in a historically continuous emphasis on structural factors as security risks and on the spread of stability as the defining construct for undertaking military operations abroad. It has led the Netherlands to cultivate its position as an active protector of the international rule of law, for instance by emphasizing that it was the country that had brought forth the first international legal scholar in the guise of Hugo Grotius and has branded The Hague as the international legal capital of the world.⁷⁸⁰

778 Royal Netherlands Air Force advertisement, www.luchtmacht.nl, accessed July 24, 2006.

779 Ibid.

780 This is worthy of consideration, since states with a strong international legal tradition, such as Britain and Italy, have not tended to cultivate this tenet of their foreign policy history to the

Aside from a defensive-realist response to the international system which relegates international law to an instrument for security promotion, the Dutch pursuit for the international rule of law is not only a means but an end and an element of its strategic culture. This part traces its historical roots.

18.1.1 APPEAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW

In its foreign and security policy the Netherlands appeals to a tradition of promoting the international rule of law.⁷⁸¹ As a tangible expression, protecting the international rule of law has been codified in the constitution as one of the objectives of Dutch security policy. Article 90 of the constitution asserts that “the government promotes the development of the international rule of law,” while Article 97 reads that the Netherlands has a military to “defend and protect the interests of the Kingdom and to *support and promote the international rule of law* [emphasis added].”⁷⁸² Joris Voorhoeve has written extensively on the roots of Dutch foreign and security policy. He identifies three causes for the Dutch orientation to stability. They are maritime commercialism, internationalist idealism and neutralist abstentionism.⁷⁸³ Maritime commercialism, particularly during the Golden Age hey-days of the 17th century, is a central element of Dutch economic livelihood. It has led to identifying a vital interest in stable international relations. The international legal tradition of the Netherlands, pioneered by Hugo Grotius, was driven by this mercantile orientation. It promoted checking the great powers through international agreements. Similarly, it stimulated the view that commercial ties could increase stability by establishing relations of mutual dependence. Dutch dependence on merchant shipping further ensured an interest in maintaining stability in North-western Europe and to act as a mediator and non-partisan in conflicts that stretched as far as the Rhine flows. The Dutch geopolitical location in the Rhine delta effectively made it dependent on good relations upstream. The shipping tradition also ensured a naval focus as well as open view toward the world. Voorhoeve further argued that the Netherlands had a natural orientation away from the continent as a result of the historical economic and political predominance of the province of Holland and the subsequent perception that the Eastern and Southern provinces were merely buffer areas. This imbued it with an Atlanticist orientation. It furthermore accentuated the Dutch emphasis on trade rather than territorial expansion. It developed an impetus to avoid the use of force in its international dealings, unless it was done collectively thereby providing a natural inclination to favor collective military action rather than unilateralism.

extent that the Netherlands has.

781 P. Malcontent & F. Baudet, “The Dutchman’s Burden” in Bob De Graaf et al, (ed.), *De Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek in de Twintigste Eeuw*, (Boom: Amsterdam, 2003).

782 Article 97, de Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden.

783 See Voorhoeve (1979). Similarly Paul Scheffer has called these elements anti-continentalism, economic pacifism, emphasis on international rule of law and moral code. Paul Scheffer, *Een Tevreden Natie: Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de Europese Status Quo* (Bert Bakker: Amsterdam, 1988), p. 45.

Promoting the international rule of law also has a distinct idealist element to it. The international rule of law is closely related to the advance of global peace. Voorhoeve identified a measure of moral idealism in Dutch foreign and security policy: “Mundialist idealism has become an important driver in Dutch foreign policy ... characteristic of the mundialist view of world politics is the notion of international solidarity.”⁷⁸⁴ Connected to it is a pacifist tendency, which is an underlying objective of international law. Notwithstanding the declaratory power of supporting international law, by the early 20th century the Netherlands had developed a prominent position in the world as a neutral nation and host of the Hague Peace Conferences. Following the Second World War, this idealism bred respect for human rights, an element that would return in the Dutch tradition of development cooperation.

The third element has been to steer a course of neutralism and to avoid choosing sides in the dynamic among the European powers. Throughout the 19th century, Great Britain was the de facto guarantor of Dutch territorial integrity. Westminster had a security interest in avoiding the rise of a continental hegemon and thereby would not allow the breach of Dutch sovereignty. It enabled the Dutch to steer a course of abstentionism in European power politics: “Not the virtuousness of the Dutch, but the balance of power [in Europe] enabled Holland to abstain from power politics.”⁷⁸⁵ It did not hurt that the Netherlands could bank on an international legal tradition to promote its position of neutrality.



Figure 21: Dutch Forces Pay Their Respects to a Statue of Col. L. Thomson, Officer of the First Peacekeeping Operation in Albania (April 2009)

(Source: www.mindef.nl)

784 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 248.

785 Ibid, p. 48.

The policy of neutralist abstentionism served a realist purpose as it could be molded to meet a domestic ambition. The presumed neutrality in Europe fostered a belief in the bridge-building qualities of the Netherlands. This quality could be leveraged to increase Dutch influence among the major powers, benefiting its prospects for security as well as to improve its international influence. Aside from geo-economic and geopolitical considerations mentioned above, the Netherlands pursued a policy to promote the international rule of law because it believed it would accord the Netherlands a stronger position internationally. Influenced by its position as a medium power in Europe, the Netherlands resorted to a policy through which it could make its voice heard. Though geographically of limited size, its position in between the major European powers such as Germany, the United Kingdom and France ensured a natural disposition to play a role as an intermediary. It caused, and was reinforced by, its emphasis on the international rule of law. Promoting stability and defending the international rule of law thus had a neoclassical realist logic – made up of both domestic and system-level considerations – and performing expeditionary operations with the intent to promote stability became a source through which the Netherlands could increase its influence in the international arena. The first indications of how this strategic cultural concept would affect Dutch expeditionary operations in the early 21st century can be found at the beginning of the twentieth.

18.1.2 A NEW VOCATION

In 1913 the Netherlands took the lead in what may be considered the first ever peace-keeping mission. The young state of Albania, having seceded from the Ottoman Empire a year before, was beleaguered by its neighbors and threatened to implode due to internal turmoil precipitated by non-state actors, such as warlords and bands of irregular fighters. It would today be considered a failed state. The major European powers, Germany, Britain, Austria and France, decided to install a German as monarch, yet the Netherlands was asked to head a constabulary force to keep the peace and stabilize the country. The Netherlands was an ideal candidate. It was a medium power, small compared to the three political heavyweights and it maintained a policy of neutrality. Its role as host to the earlier Hague Peace Conferences demonstrated an internationalist but a non-threatening attitude. It meant that Dutch activities in Albania would not be a threat to the maneuverings that were taking place on the eve of the Great War and was therefore acceptable to all major powers. An added advantage was that due to its colonial experiences in the East Indies, the Netherlands had demonstrated it was capable of dealing with foreign, Islamic, cultures and populations. In November 1913 the first of fourteen officers, two medics and an assistant arrived in Albania. The mission soon met disaster. Six troubled months had passed when, as a foreboding example of the difficulties associated with complex stabilization campaigns, the Dutch commander of the mission Lodewijk Thomson was killed in an uprising on June 15, 1914. The event was of little consequences since several days later crown prince Franz-Ferdinand was shot in Sarajevo and Europe spiraled into World War I.

In a eulogy for the fallen commander, Queen Wilhelmina argued that the Dutch contingent had been in Albania to bring Western civilization. Throughout the beginning

of the 20th century, the Netherlands was engaged in an *ethische politiek* (ethical policy) in the Dutch Indies, promoting liberal values in the Orient including through the military. A similar dynamic was at play in Albania. Thomson had written home that, “the era of the Middle Ages never seems to have ended in Albania.” The deeper motivation for the Dutch mission was more complex. The mission was believed to be a new source of international influence for the Netherlands. The international legal scholar Professor Cornelis van Vollenhoven voiced it most powerfully in an article written in 1910 (republished in 1913) entitled *Holland’s Vocation*.



Figure 22: Cornelis van Vollenhoven, 1874-1933

(Source: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, <http://www.inghist.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/lemmata/bwn1/vollenhoven>)

In it he argued for a liberal Leviathan, a “supranational community of law in which an international fleet of police should maintain order.”⁷⁸⁶ Van Vollenhoven envisaged an impartial international police force which would operate as an international arbitrator to enforce the international rule of law. He wrote that the dictum should no longer be: “Si vis pacem, abjice arma,” but “Si vis pacem, para exercitum internationalem” instead. Rather than disarming, peace could only be achieved through an international armed force.⁷⁸⁷ Van Vollenhoven argued that in any such organization, the Netherlands should play a central role: “If the topic of a world-organization is an actuality to all Modern States, to us

786 Quoted in Peter Giesen, “Het Zedelijkste volk op vredesmissie,” *De Volkskrant*, January 14, 2006.

787 C. van Vollenhoven, “Holland’s Vocation,” in *War Obviated by an International Police* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1915), p.7.

Hollanders of 1913 it is of vital importance.”⁷⁸⁸ He argued that the Netherlands should in fact provide the bulk of the international police force, because due to its nature the Netherlands was the most appropriate state to do so. Major powers were unacceptable, nor could it be a “rising country” like the United States. Instead it required a “small state but great nation” with a “distinguished and historical ancestry” and one that played a prominent role in international discourse. Given The Hague’s role in recent peace conferences, its international legal tradition, and its policy of neutrality the Netherlands was most suitable to embrace it as a new vocation. Conveniently it would also earn it “self-esteem and the esteem of others.” It would allow the Netherlands to act as an essential intermediary between the major powers. It was an argument to increase Dutch influence in the international system making use of the international rule of law. Van Vollenhoven outlined a role for how the military could be more usable to the Dutch state. It was in effect a blueprint for increasing the international prestige of the Netherlands. He argued that it was only a question whether the Netherlands grasped this opportunity, and with it the chance of playing a renewed role of importance on the international scene. The international rule of law thus provided a ticket for increased international influence. This first expeditionary operation had set the intellectual guidelines for transformation a century later.

18.1.3 DEFENDING THE RULE OF LAW BY FORCE

The Netherlands used the military in support of international legal values. They served as the justifying principle. Not only peacekeeping operations, offensive interventions were also framed in these terms. Such was the case during the ‘police actions’ in the Dutch East Indies. Conceived as a mission to bring order and stability to the Eastern parts of the Kingdom, the military operations were the first instance following World War II when the Netherlands deployed the military far away from home in a high-intensity offensive operation. Between 1946 and 1949 the Netherlands engaged in a series of military operations against nationalist forces in the Dutch East Indies. With the Netherlands in shambles following the destruction of World War II, nationalists under leadership of Suharto declared an independent Indonesian Republic. The dominant Dutch perception held that the nationalists had collaborated with the Japanese during the war and were in fact communists rebelling against the *de jure* Dutch government. It led to the mobilization of the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL, to deal with what were called “terrorists” and “subversive elements.” A letter from the Government to each individual soldier deployed to the East Indies offered a justification for the mission based on the collapse of stability. The justification presented a structuralist focus of the security risks. Order had collapsed, which had been exploited by spoilers:

The Japanese occupation and its consequences – lawlessness, terror, poverty, hunger – destroyed the foundations and disintegrated social order. This situation did not end with the Japanese surrender. Too many irresponsible

788 Cornelis van Vollenhoven, “Holland’s Opportunity,” in Annie Wood Besant, *Theosophist Magazine July 1913 – September 1913* (Whitfish, MT: Kessinger 2003), p.798.

*elements – unfortunately part of every nation – took advantage of the disorder and the lasting defencelessness of their own people.*⁷⁸⁹

In total more than 100,000 Dutch troops participated in the subsequent occupation in parts of Sumatra and Western Java. The war was framed in legalistic terms, a tenet reflected in calling the war ‘police actions,’ and given the missions names such as “Justice and Security” and “Law and Order”. The *casus belli* was considered to be Sukarno’s failure to abide by the rule of law. According to the ministerial minutes, Minister Lambertus Neher of Reconstruction and Housing argued first that the constitutional agreement between the Netherlands and the local population, known as the Linggadjati, warranted military enforcement.⁷⁹⁰ It was seconded a few weeks later by Prime Minister Louis Beel. Respecting the constitutional agreement meant a willingness to defend it by force.⁷⁹¹ A “military mission with a policing nature” would be the result.⁷⁹²

Dutch politicians made an important side-note. While the military would be used, it would not be a war. It was a policing mission. The euphemistic label was used to avoid a public outrage, since it was considered unacceptable that the Netherlands wage a war in the aftermath of the destruction of the Second World War. The term ‘police action’ advanced the image that the Netherlands was upholding the rule of law, something that was considered acceptable. Throughout subsequent military operations, in its outward justification and rhetoric, the Netherlands maintained it was not a war-fighting nation, opting for terms such as police-actions, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions or stability operations instead.

In 1946, the Dutch cabinet also prescribed the military-strategic implications of performing a ‘police action’. To avoid the perception of a war, politics intervened in military strategy. More than a month before the operation took place Minister of Overseas Territories Jan Anne Jonkman made clear in the ministerial council that the objective of the military campaign would necessarily fall short of seeking the destruction of the lead-

789 Letter Published in Garderegiment Prinses Irene, *Van Arnhem tot de Poentjak: Herinneringen aan het 421e Bataljon Garderegiment Prinses Irene. Nederland-Indonesie: Maart 1948 – Augustus 1950* (1951), pp. 68.

790 “Als doel van een eventuele actie is toen duidelijk gesteld: het verkrijgen van de armslag welke noodzakelijk is om ons verblijf in Indie te verzekeren ter realisering van de verdere naleving van Linggadjati.” Nationaal Archief, *Inventaris van de archieven van de Raad van Minister [Ministerraad]*, June 16, 1947.

791 “Nederland moet niet schromen de consequenties te trekken uit voortdurende onmogelijkheid langs de weg van onderhandeling tot een goede uitvoering van Linggadjati te geraken en had zij op grond van Haar alomvattende verantwoordelijkheid ermede rekening te houden, dat zij gedwongen zou kunnen worden als uiterste maatregel, Haar militaire machtsmiddel aan te wenden, zij het zo beperkt mogelijk.” Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1946-1947, The Hague, July 10, 1947, p.2044.

792 “Indien dus de regering der republiek niet bereid of in staat mocht blijken tot uitvoering van Linggadjati mede te werken dan zou met behulp van een militaire actie van politionele aard het onhoudbaar karakter van de noodtoestand moeten worden opgeheven” *Ibid*, p. 2044 & 2045.

ership, located in Djokjakarta. If not, the government could not plausibly deny waging a colonial war. While he advocated a robust military intervention to demonstrate Dutch military superiority, it should fall short of the destruction of the city.⁷⁹³ It contrasted with the opinion of the commander of the colonial army who had said in May 1947 that if military action were taken, the “natural strategic objective” would be Djokjakarta as it formed the core of the resistance.⁷⁹⁴ Vice-premier Willem Drees supported Jonkman’s position and said that the military should avoid the city.⁷⁹⁵ Well aware of the necessity to maintain the apparition of non-war, the cabinet ministers agreed not to mention the term “military action,” and speak of “policing” or “police action” instead.⁷⁹⁶ A similar appeal was later placed to the media.⁷⁹⁷ Thus began an operation to occupy parts of Western Java and Sumatra which required more than 100,000 troops yet avoided the Indonesian Republic’s capital in Djokjakarta, and was a war but could not be called one.

18.1.4 SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The United Nations provided the international legal forum within which the Netherlands could play an important role, and potentially develop on the Dutch idea to create an international police force. In contrast to the League of Nations, the United Nations Charter did contain mechanisms for collective security. According to the Dutch government the creation of the United Nations would contribute to the promotion of peace and security on the basis of law and justice.⁷⁹⁸ Throughout the negotiations over the UN Charter the Netherlands was a supporter of limiting the power of the larger states. While they rightfully had a permanent seat in the Security Council, the Netherlands wanted to introduce checks on a potential dictate of the major powers. The Hague was of the opinion that influence in international affairs was not only a question of military power, but should

793 “Als noodgedwongen tot militaire actie moet worden overgegaan, kan, naar het oordeel van Minister Jonkman, de doelstelling niet inhouden de vernietiging van de Republiek. Daarmede zou men onvermijdelijk, althans propagandistisch onwederlegbaar, in een koloniale oorlog vervallen. Blijft dus over de mogelijkheid van beperkte militaire maatregelen [...] zulk een operatie moet overigens aan de Republiek een overtuigend beeld geven van onze militaire meerderwaardigheid, nog steeds wordt door de Republiek de eigen militaire kracht gevaarlijk overschat.” *Ministerraad*, June 2, 1947.

794 Lt. Gen. Spoor, quoted in P.M.H. Groen, *Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen*, (Historical Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1991), p.86.

795 Groen (1991), p.93.

796 *Ministerraad*, July 17, 1947.

797 *Ministerraad*, July 21, 1947.

798 “Nederland, dat zich in het verleden voortdurend tot taak heeft gesteld in de internationale samenleving der volkeren bij te dragen tot den opbouw van een vreedzame internationale wereldorde, zal ook thans naar vermogen krachtig samenwerken met al die landen, die eveneens den wederopbouw en de bevestiging van vrede en veiligheid willen dienen op grondslag van recht en rechtvaardigheid.” Opening of Government of July 23, 1946, quoted in Alfred van Staden, *Een Trouwe Bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap* (Baarn: In den Toren, 1974), p.16-17.

also be measured by the morale and willingness to consistently defend the rule of law.⁷⁹⁹ Resonating Van Vollenhoven's argument, this would give influence to smaller powers with an activist foreign policy. Such as the Netherlands. As an example of the desire to keep the major powers in check the Netherlands tried, to no avail, to have the United Nations Charter create a council of eminent men – rather than national representatives - to oversee the resolutions of the Security Council.⁸⁰⁰

In 1950 North Korea invaded its Southern neighbor. The United Nations Security Council subsequently mandated a military intervention to repel the attack. In justifying participation alongside the United States, the Netherlands said it was protecting the international rule of law. The government mentioned the need for an “international police force” to enforce peace. Marinus Van der Goes MP, the Labor party leader of the second largest party in Parliament quoted the US ambassador to the United Nations when he said, “the invasion of the Republic of Korea [...] is in fact an attack on the UN itself.”⁸⁰¹ Comparable to operations in the East Indies two years earlier, the operation was not considered a war but a ‘police action’ instead. This time to enforce a Security Council mandate to restore the international rule of law in support of the principles outlined in the UN charter.⁸⁰² Van der Goes explained that by its very nature a police mission could not be a war: “if I speak of police, and in this case of a policing action, it is clear that this is not war, for none of the countries involved.”⁸⁰³ The statement reflected the dominant rhetorical construct of stability projection; that the Netherlands does not use the term ‘war’ to describe its interventions is a tradition rooted in Dutch strategic culture. Since the dominant paradigm for Dutch interventionism is to promote the international rule of law and project stability, and since warfighting and breaching the sovereignty of another state is contrary to international legal principles and promoting stability, Dutch strategic culture holds no place for war and if an intervention is sanctioned by the UN it cannot be ‘war’ but a policing action instead. Avoiding the term ‘war’ also frames the strategic discourse on security policy, as it constrains Dutch strategic thinking when contemplating high-intensity expeditionary operations. ‘War’ is a laden term as it conjures images of aggression, destruction, human rights violations and occupation, just as the Netherlands experienced through the Second World War. A liberal-democratic nation would not perpetrate such acts. Nevertheless, the strategic cultural resistance to ‘war’ dates from at least the First World War as the Netherlands promoted itself as a neutral country, rather than a potential aggressor, seeking a global role at the vanguard of the international rule of law.

As the Korean War proceeded, the coalition had reason to believe that the Chinese

799 Van Staden (1974), p.18.

800 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 202-206.

801 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p. 2117.

802 J. Hoffenaar and G. Teitler (eds.), *De Politionele Acties: Afwikkeling en Verwerking*, (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1990), p. 169.

803 “Indien ik spreek van politie en in dit geval van politiedwang, is het duidelijk dat dit niet is een oorlog, voor geen enkele der betrokken landen.” Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p.2117.

were party to the conflict. In December 1950 the main concern was potential Chinese involvement in the war. The US commanding General Douglas MacArthur argued in favor of bombing Manchurian airports and infrastructure. Minister of Foreign Affairs Dirk Stikker, who had initially shown reluctance to deploy Dutch troops to Korea, now displayed a near automatic belief in the legitimacy of the United Nations and the legitimacy it offered to use the military. In this regard Stikker felt that acting against China was entirely contingent on whether the United Nations passed a resolution to that end: "If a resolution was adopted in the General Assembly [subsequent to a Soviet veto in the Security Council] to that extent, war against China would be justified."⁸⁰⁴ It presented further indication of the authority of international regimes in Dutch strategic considerations.

18.1.5 A GLOBAL ORDER

Throughout the Cold War, the ideal to create a system of global governance along the lines articulated by Van Vollenhoven remained intact. In 1968 the Dutch government outlined its long-term security objectives and the role it envisioned for the Netherlands in international relations. The Policy paper on NATO and Defense Policy (*Nota inzake de NAVO en het Defensiebeleid*) outlined the main norms and values to be furthered by the Netherlands in the international realm. The document resonated Van Vollenhoven's earlier declaration that the protection of international legal regimes was a strategic interest. The paper mentioned that all foreign and security policy should be directed at achieving an end state of a global order founded in international law:

*The eventual key objective of the Government's foreign policy is the creation of an international order based on the rule of law... The Government's entire policy, in all its facets, and also with regards to NATO, is directed at reaching that objective.*⁸⁰⁵

The Dutch government envisioned the development of a world government of sorts, the creation of a "collective government that has sufficient means to enforce the rule of law if necessary."⁸⁰⁶ Unilateral use of force would neither be authorized, profitable, nor possible

804 "Indien de Algemene Vergadering echter een resolutie inzake de aanwijzing van China als agressor zou aanvaarden zullen de landen van de VN China moeten gaan bestrijden." *Ministerraad*, December 4, 1950.

805 "[...] Het uiteindelijk hoofddoel van het buitenlands beleid der Regering [is] de vorming van een geheel in het recht gegrondveste internationale orde [...]. Op dit einddoel wordt het gehele beleid, tot in al zijn onderdelen gericht en derhalve eveneens het beleid dat met betrekking tot de NAVO wordt gevoerd." Tweede Kamer, "Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid," vergaderjaar 1967-68, 9635, The Hague, June 20, 1968, p. 9.

806 "In een internationale rechtsorde [...] zal essentieel zijn dat de betrekkingen tussen de eenheden die gezamenlijk de wereldgemeenschapvormen, door een sluitend stelsel van rechtsregels worden beheerst, waarbij de gemeenschappelijke overheid over afdoende middelen beschikt om naleving van deze rechtsregels zo nodig te kunnen afdwingen. Eigenmachtig gebruik van geweld in het verkeer tussen de samenstellende dele van de wereldgemeenschap zal niet geoorloofd, en ook niet lonend, of zelfs mogelijk behoren te zijn."

in a constellation where a world government had a Leviathan force. And in such a collective framework based on international law the West in general and the Netherlands in particular would have a considerable say over global affairs. Western civilization, with its fundamental respect for legal principles, and the rich international legal tradition in the Netherlands would make anything less unthinkable.⁸⁰⁷ The paper posited the creation of such an international system to be the final objective of its foreign and security policy. International legal regimes would create a peaceful and stable world. But in such a global regime based on international law the Netherlands would have a prominent and influential position. The international rule of law had become both a means as well as an end.

Contributing to the international rule of law, projecting stability and being part of a quasi-international police force were part of the Dutch aspiration to play a role of significance in the international arena. It was realism wrapped in the mantle of idealism. Lacking a position of military power, it pursued a policy to nullify the military power of others through international regimes. It was termed the “shield of the weak.”⁸⁰⁸ It enabled claiming the moral higher ground. The Netherlands would be the most virtuous, rather than the most powerful of nations.⁸⁰⁹

18.2 BEING RELEVANT

The second element of Dutch strategic culture that shaped the Dutch transformation strategy to develop a broad expeditionary force was the Dutch pursuit of international political relevance, particularly with respect to the primary security guarantor in the system, the United States, and using the military as an instrument to increase it. Stability projection and the promotion of the international rule of law were a means to increase Dutch influence internationally, yet from the latter half of the 1990’s onwards, as expe-

Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid (1968), p. 9.

807 “Gegeven het karakter van de Westerse beschaving, waarvan eerbied voor het recht als fundament van menselijke gemeenschap een essentieel bestanddeel uitmaakt en waarin het ideaal van een wereldrechtsorde zijn oorsprong heeft gevonden, kan zelfs worden gesteld dat in zulk een orde, en trouwens ook op weg daarheen – de westelijke landen een rol van zeer bijzondere betekenis zullen hebben te spelen.” Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid (1968), p. 38.

808 “...toen kracht ontbrak, schoot de jurist de diplomaat te hulp. Nederlands natuurlijke belang zich te onttrekken aan het machtsspel der ‘Groten’, vertaalde zich in het streven de machtsfactor zélf te neutraliseren, een andere grondslag te zoeken voor het interstatelijk verkeer. Men vond deze in de objectieve norm van het recht. Nederland omhelsde de arbitragegedachte, ‘het schild der zwakkeren.’” A. Eyffinger, “Moraal uit Noodzaak: het Nederlands buitlands beleid en de internationale rechtsorde” in R.E. van Ditzhuijzen et al (eds.), *Tweehonderd Jaar Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken* (Den Haag: 1998), p.152.

809 The historian W.J. Hofdijk wrote in the late 19th century: “Wij hebben eenmaal de zee beheerscht, en volkeren de wet voorgeschreven. Wij hebben Europa en de wereld doen spreken van, doen buigen voor den leeuw van Nederland, omwapperd van zijn driekleurige banier. Dat behoort tot het verledene, dat keert nimmer weder terug – en behoeft ook niet terug te keren. Een andere toekomst ligt voor ons [...]het is schooner het zedelijkste dan het machtigste volk ter wereld te zijn.” Quoted in H.J.G. Beunders, *Weg met de Vlootwet!: de maritieme bewapeningspolitiek van het kabinet –Ruys de Beerenbrouck en het succesvolle verzet daartegen in 1923*, Proefschrift Universiteit van Amsterdam, May 8, 1984, p.7.

ditionary operations became more challenging, a metric for the success of Dutch transformation was the extent to which Dutch military contributions were relevant to major military partners.⁸¹⁰ It became manifest through the notion that the Netherlands would be part of a so-called “A-team”; having the capabilities for, as well as have the political will to participate in, high-intensity expeditionary military operations.⁸¹¹ Underlying it was an element of strategic culture whose roots lie in bandwagoning. These paragraphs detail the structural persistence of bandwagoning with the United States as a foundation of Dutch security policy.

The relevance of a smaller power in an environment characterized by Western liberal interventionism is measured in terms of willingness to participate in operations alongside the major allies; the willingness to engage in high-intensity or initial-entry operations and developing the necessary military capabilities to achieve this. The pursuit of relevance took shape by being a good ally and making relevant contributions which would increase the political credit of the Netherlands. A healthy relationship with the United States would keep the United States committed to NATO, improving the Netherlands’ ability to protect its vital security interests and reducing the risk that the United States exclusively relied on London, Paris and Berlin as European interlocutors. Bandwagoning has its roots in a solid Atlanticist tradition of foreign policy. A close relationship with the United States would give the Netherlands greater leeway among the powers in Europe. It constituted a hedging strategy. There was concern over the possibility that if the United States dealt with Europe it would only approach Paris, London and Berlin. By proving itself a relevant ally, The Hague could make its voice heard.⁸¹²

18.2.1 BANDWAGONING: AN EXPRESSION OF EXPEDITIONARY SOLIDARITY

As a smaller power the Netherlands voiced realist concern over its relations with the major power in the system. In 1946, the police actions in the East Indies brought system level considerations to bear as The Hague considered the impact its actions would have on relations with Washington. Should they be informed prior to the operation or asked for approval? Minister of Foreign Affairs Pim van Boetzelaar was asked by the cabinet to assess getting Washington’s a priori approval to avoid “a catastrophe” to the Dutch international image.⁸¹³ The cabinet’s final position was to inform London and Washington *ipso facto* of the ultimatum announced to Suharto, assuming that London and Washington

810 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, *Militair Strategische Verkenning* 2006, February 6, 2006.

811 Frank de Grave, “Remarks of the Minister of Defense at luncheon for Vereniging van Europese Journalisten,” November 18, 1999; Interview with Henk Kamp, November 29, 2007, The Hague.

812 Alfred van Staden, *Een Trouwe Bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap (1960-1971)*, (Baarn: In den Toren, 1974).

813 “Acht minister van Boetzelaar het mogelijk om vooraf overeenstemming met Engeland en Amerika te bereiken over een militaire actie? Anders kan een militair ingrijpen tot een catastrofe voor ons land leiden” *Ministerraad*, June 19, 1947.

would accept a police action to combat extremist elements and terrorists in the name of order and stability.

Throughout the Cold War bandwagoning gave rise to solidarity with the United States and NATO. The new configuration of the international system sustained an Anglo-Saxon dimension in Dutch security policy. While earlier the United Kingdom had been the *de facto* security guarantor of the Netherlands, it was now the United States. A healthy relationship with Washington would also be the primary hedge against the rise to dominance of one of the larger powers in Europe and US strength was an insurance policy for stability in the international arena.

As the risk of Soviet expansionism into Western Europe increased, and two opposing ideological blocs took shape, it became apparent that the global collective security organization, the United Nations, would not be effective at promoting peace and stability. Instead the Security Council remained burdened by dead-lock throughout the Cold War. Instead the NATO alliance was created as primary protector of Western European security interests and Western military postures were primed for territorial defense. NATO became the vehicle through which the United States was integrated in the European security dynamic and strengthening the alliance became equivalent to safeguarding the relationship with the American superpower. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Stikker, speaking at the signing ceremony of the Washington Treaty in 1949, stressed that the United Nations and NATO were complementary and that the latter was a necessary instrument to achieve the enduring peace envisioned by the former.⁸¹⁴ In Stikker's speech traces can be found of the international police force Van Vollenhoven envisaged to support a world governed by international law. A functioning NATO alliance could contribute to the protection of the international rule of law, particularly if it could stop Soviet expansionism. In itself this would contribute to Dutch security. Solidarity with NATO and protecting the principles formulated in the UN Charter became central tenets of Dutch security policy. The Korean War provided the first example that solidarity in NATO implied solidarity with the United States. It was a principle that would later be repeated during operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. A year after the signing of the Washington treaty, the Netherlands participated in its first international expeditionary operation following the end of the Second World War. While it was not a NATO mission, NATO solidarity figured prominently in the rationale to deploy forces. The outbreak of hostilities in the Korean peninsula in 1950 was perceived to be the result of communist expansionism, the precise reason for why NATO had been founded in Europe. Given the unusual circumstances in the UN Security Council due to the absence of a Soviet veto, a resolution was passed that called for "all necessary means" to be used to counter the North Korean advance. In response to

814 "The Treaty we are about to sign marks the end of an illusion: the hope that the United Nations would, by itself, ensure international peace. Regretfully, we were driven to the conclusion that the Charter, though essential is not enough in the world as it is, to protect those vital principles for which we of the Western world who have gathered here, stand. Therefore, we felt it our duty to make this Treaty. So far from merely marking the end of an illusion it most especially marks the birth of a new hope of enduring peace." quoted in Van Staden (1974), p.20.

a request by the American ambassador in The Hague, the Dutch government signaled its intent to contribute to the international military operation. The government was explicitly concerned with the credibility of the US security guarantee for Europe if the US was not successful in Korea. If the United States did not come to the aid of the South Koreans, Prime Minister Willem Drees and Minister Stikker said, one needed to wonder whether Washington would come to the assistance of other states facing a similar threat.⁸¹⁵ It led Drees to declare the interventionist principle that “Europe is being defended in Asia.”⁸¹⁶ In Parliament Marga Klompé of the catholic KVP party concurred: “that which takes place in East Asia can tomorrow become the fate of Europe.”⁸¹⁷ If East Asia would become communist, it would lead to a tremendous weakening of the West, Prime-Minister Drees explained.⁸¹⁸ Failing to contain communist expansionism would weaken the West and jeopardize Dutch security. Therefore, Drees stated, troops and weapons should be made available for Korea.⁸¹⁹ He continued that containment was only possible if the ‘free world’ collectively stood up against the aggressor. At the same time ‘free’ states must realize that solidarity should be actively pursued or each state will be victimized one by one.⁸²⁰ Having grossly underestimated the force of the North Koreans in the first stages of the war the United States was confronted with heavy human casualties and terrain loss. The United States turned to its European allies for support in a classic plea of burden-sharing. What did an alliance amount to, if it was only the Americans that were suffering casualties for the sake of the greater good of international stability? In the Dutch Ministerial Council, concern was expressed that the Americans might wonder why Washington should support Western Europe in times of danger if those countries were not prepared to support the US now.⁸²¹ Both for its rapport with the United States as well as for its international image it was important to show the Dutch flag.⁸²² The plight of South Korea became essential to European security. Peace, according to Dress, could only be guaranteed if aggression was confronted collectively.⁸²³ Thus support for the US in Korea was driven by concern over the Netherland’s own security interests. As we have seen above, following the end of the Cold War, in the run-up to Operation *Desert Storm* Dutch politicians used a similar argumentation to support the US-led operation; showing solidarity elsewhere as a means to maintain US participation in European security.

On July 3rd 1950 the Dutch ministerial council proposed sending the frigate *Evertsen*

815 *Ministerraad*, June 26, 1950.

816 *Ministerraad*, December 11, 1950.

817 *Idem*.

818 *Idem*.

819 *Ministerraad*, December 23, 1950.

820 Remarks by Prime Minister Drees, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p.2128.

821 *Ministerraad*, August 7, 1950.

822 *Ministerraad*, August 2, 1950.

823 *Idem*.

to the Korean theatre. The cabinet stated that its contribution was ‘symbolic.’ Ground forces could not be deployed as they were necessary for domestic territorial defense.⁸²⁴ Yet discussion over a possible ground contingent persisted. More than a naval contingent, solidarity would be confirmed through ground forces. Yet consensus in the Cabinet was absent. Minister Stikker said he preferred a humanitarian contribution with Dutch ambulances, while Minister of Reconstruction and Housing Joris In’t Veld mentioned that the government should not be dissuaded from sending military forces to Korea since it concerned an appeal by the United Nations.⁸²⁵ Minister of Social Affairs Adolf Joekees proposed sending the marines which were the most mobile, expeditionary unit of the Netherlands armed forces.⁸²⁶ Prime Minister Drees however made clear that he was not willing to deploy conscripts to Korea, especially without the approval of Parliament.⁸²⁷ But Drees made an important exception, for “if the United States requested a volunteer force it would constitute a different situation.”⁸²⁸ It offered a convenient way out. It absolved the government from deploying conscripts, yet it allowed the Netherlands to show solidarity in response to a direct appeal from the United States. It also meant that the Netherlands could make itself directly relevant to the United States. When such a request came, the cabinet decided on August 28, 1950 to send a battalion of 600 forces to Korea.

Parliament supported the decision wholeheartedly. The Catholic party, the largest at the time and a member of the governing coalition, was a vocal proponent of the mission. MP Marga Klompé, the party leader, voiced her support for what she saw as a test-case for the free democratic world to avoid another ‘Munich’. Failure in Korea would lead to a defeat for all freedom-loving people, she said. It was a “challenge for the free democratic world...which under any condition cannot be lost.”⁸²⁹ MP W.H. Beaufort, a senator from the Catholic party cited the medieval philosopher Saint Augustine by emphasizing solidarity with Korea and collective security as a justification for Dutch participation: “he that is able and does not avert the injustice perpetrated on a neighbor is as guilty as the perpetrator himself.”⁸³⁰

824 “De Minister President is van oordeel dat Nederland geen troepen kan zenden aangezien met het oog op de eigen defensie geen mensen kunnen worden gemist, terwijl ons land de kosten evenmin zal kunnen dragen.” *Ministerraad*, July 17, 1950.

825 *Ministerraad*, August ,7, 1950.

826 *Idem*.

827 *Idem*.

828 *Ministerraad*, July 17, 1950.

829 “Wij zien het gebeurde op Korea als een test-case voor en tevens een uitdaging aan de vrije democratische wereld. [...] deze steekproef [mag] onder geen voorwaarde slagen. Dit zou immers niet alleen noodlottig zijn voor Korea, op dit moment, maar ook voor de gehele gemeenschap van vrijheidliebende volken.” Tweede Kamer, Handelingen vergaderjaar 1949-1950, The Hague, June 30, 1950, p. 2115.

830 “Wie, schoon daartoe in staat, een den naaste treffend onrecht niet afwendt, staat evenzeer schuldig als de onrechtpleger zelf” MP W.H. Beaufort, Eerste Kamer, Handelingen, 1949-1950, The Hague, July 18, 1950, p.857.

Throughout the Cold War the Netherlands remained firmly pro-American. The Soviet Union was the primary threat and the United States The Hague's primary security guarantor. The Netherlands was a loyal ally.⁸³¹ In 1961 State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hans van Houten asserted that in fact the security of the Netherlands could only be provided by the United States: "Nothing can change the Government's conviction that under current circumstances the guarantee of Dutch territorial integrity can only be secured through defense cooperation with the USA."⁸³² According to Alfred van Staden, Dutch distrust of Soviet intentions was as strong as faith in American security guarantees.⁸³³ The world was contextualized within the bipolar struggle and the government supported NATO policies to achieve military strategic parity with the Soviet bloc, approving substantive defense investments.⁸³⁴ This attitude was reflected in the Netherlands structurally appropriating more than 4 percent of its GDP to defense expenditures, a level never reached following the Cold War.⁸³⁵

18.2.2 THE 1995 POLICY REVIEW

As mentioned above, Operation *Desert Storm* had demonstrated a persistent willingness of the Netherlands to participate alongside the United States. Yet there remained concerns over the direction of US-European relations following the shift in the international system. If Europe and the United States started to drift apart because their natural alliance during the Cold War had come to an end, than the Netherlands needed to reassess its own Atlanticist orientation. In the mid 1990's an attempt was made to bring about a change. Changes in the distribution of power signaled that Europe was at risk of becoming a strategic backwater, at the expense of increased attention for Asia and the Middle East. Concerns were rife that this would lead to decreased interest from the United States in European security matters. In 1995 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, initiated a reappraisal of Dutch foreign policy. The *Herijking*, or *Foreign Policy of the Netherlands: A Review*, was driven by these "changing external circumstances," amounting to a new calculus of power in the international system.⁸³⁶ It fit within the overall context of strategic transformation described by the 1993 *Defense Priorities Review* as it took stock of the "acceleration of political and economic processes of change" following the end of the Cold War. However it

831 Van Staden (1974), p.42.

832 "“De voornaamste taak van buitenlands beleid dient te bestaan uit de handhaving van de nationale integriteit. Niets kan de regering afbrengen van haar overtuiging dat onder de huidige omstandigheden de garantie hiertoe slechts kan worden gevonden in de defensiesamenwerking met de Verenigde Staten van Amerika.” State Secretary Van Houten, Eerste Kamer, Handelingen, 1960-1961, The Hague, May 24, 1961, p.329.

833 Van Staden (1974), p. 52.

834 As quoted in Van Staden (1974), p.60.

835 Van Staden (1974), p. 171.

836 Tweede Kamer, *Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid: Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Economische Zaken, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, van Defensie en van Financiën*, 24337, nr. 2, 1994-1995.

drew a continentalist conclusion. Van Mierlo declared that the rapid rate of change meant that “the long-term has become the short-term” and that recalibrating Dutch foreign policy priorities and moving away from an Atlanticist focus was called for.⁸³⁷ He recommended a shift away from a reliance on the United States and an embrace of continental Europe, specifically calling for closer relations with Germany and France.

Instead of observing the rise of a unipolar system based on US hegemony, the 1995 policy review assessed that “on the whole developments are pointing in the direction of a multipolar international system without clear leadership.”⁸³⁸ The *Herijking* anticipated that US prominence would be short-lived and the persistent role of the United States in European security, irrespective of European shows of solidarity, was in doubt. American isolationism was foreseen. Secondly, following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, European integration was on the one hand given a new impulse with the plan for a European security and defense pillar but on the other hand, due to the enlarged membership, the government anticipated that the supranational, communitarian level would diminish in importance at the expense of intergovernmental European relations.⁸³⁹ It meant that the major powers in Europe would be more influential. The *Herijking* presented an outlook on European foreign and security policy where Europe was characterized by “less structure and more competition.” To make due, it required the Netherlands to refocus its security attention towards Europe and coming to terms with its traditional anti-continental perspective. Van Mierlo wrote: “It is clear that under these circumstances the Netherlands cannot stand with its back against the continent.”⁸⁴⁰

The 1995 *Herijking* policy review stated that “a European center of gravity should be much more pronounced in our policy than before – if not out of ideal than out of necessity.”⁸⁴¹ It announced renewed bilateral relations with Germany and France as the axis Bonn-Paris was considered critical to any European security initiatives. An authoritative report by the scientific bureau of D66, the party from which Foreign Minister Van Mierlo hailed, argued in preparation of the *Herijking* that “the Netherlands must strive to actively influence the politics of France and Germany in order not to be marginalized.”⁸⁴² Holding

837 Ibid, p. 2.

838 “Per saldo wijzen de ontwikkelingen dan ook in de richting van een multipolair internationaal stelsel zonder duidelijk leiderschap.” Ibid, p. 4.

839 “Zowel het communautaire stelsel als het Amerikaanse NAVO-leiderschap schermden in de naorlogse periode ons land af tegen de machtsverschillen in het nieuwe Europa... Beide factoren zullen naar verwachting minder prominent figureren in het nieuwe Europa. Nederland wordt daardoor meer blootgesteld aan de machts- en belangenverschillen tussen Europese landen.” Ibid, p. 8.

840 “Het is duidelijk dat Nederland in deze situatie niet met zijn rug naar het continent kan staan.” Ibid, p. 8.

841 “het zwaartepunt Europa zal in het beleid nog krachtiger moeten worden aangezet dan voorheen – zo niet uit ideaal dan toch uit noodzaak.” Ibid, p. 13.

842 “Nederland dient te streven naar actieve beïnvloeding van de politiek in Frankrijk en Duitsland om niet te worden gemarginaliseerd.” Rob de Wijk, M. de Kwaasteniet, M. Groothuizen, *Nieuwe Prioriteiten in het Buitenlands Beleid: Projectgroep Herijking Buitenlands*

on to its Atlanticist tradition risked reducing the Netherlands to the periphery of Europe.⁸⁴³ Security independence from the United States would instead be realized through a nascent European Security and Defense Policy.⁸⁴⁴

This security policy reappraisal never quite took off. The *Herijking* was an attempt to reorient foreign policy towards the European Union, yet Dutch strategic culture invariably resisted a clean break with its Atlanticist roots. Nor was the European Union yet an effective security actor which offered an alternative. The events at Srebrenica in 1995, as well as the persistent instability in the Balkans demonstrated that European states remained incapable of keeping their house in order, and were reliant on persistent US military support. Neither were relations with France and Germany easily intensified. Particularly with the former there were many political obstacles to overcome including differences over domestic policy on soft-drugs, immigration and strong resentment over the French continuation of nuclear testing. Critics also questioned the inevitability of US isolationism and the ability of the Netherlands to obtain political influence over France and Germany.⁸⁴⁵ Instead a balance was sought between an Atlanticist and a European position, a position where the relationship with the United States was reasserted while simultaneously strengthening the development of a European security identity. In its essence it was quintessentially Dutch as it became an expression of hedging, while strengthening its traditional policy to be a bridge-builder between states.⁸⁴⁶

In addition, throughout the 1990s the intensity of the conflicts to which Dutch forces were deployed was increasing. The events at Srebrenica made it clear to all concerned that relative risk-free peacekeeping was no longer a possibility. Peace-enforcement and humanitarian interventions in hostile areas started to take place. Events from 1995 onwards, and particularly the 1999 war in Kosovo, made it clear that high-intensity capabilities were a necessity in order to project stability and as a correlate that the United States remained critical to European security. September 11 further dissipated the belief in a benevolent security environment.

Instead support for an Atlanticist position became more pronounced. The inability to fully integrate the findings of the 1995 foreign policy review, as well as the persistent

Beleid, Stichting Wetenschappelijk Bureau D66, vol. 4, no.1., (June 1995), p. 35.

- 843 "Vasthouden aan de traditionele transatlantische relatie en anti-continente houding marginaliseert Nederland in Europa." *Ibid*, p. 14.
- 844 "De European mogen er niet van uitgaan dat de Verenigde Staten steeds voor hen de kastanjes uit het vuur zullen halen." *Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid 1995*, p. 17.
- 845 Peter Baehr, Erik Visser, "Eigenzinnig internationalisme is Nederlands kans in Europa," *De Volkskrant*, July 24, 1995.
- 846 The bridge-building function of the Netherlands is also expressed in the Dutch military's Atlanticist as well as continental orientation. The Air Force cooperates traditionally with the United States Air Force in terms of material and training, the Navy cooperates with the British Navy since the 1970's in the UK/NL Amphibious Force and the Army in 1991 set up a multinational corps with the Germany Army. This geographic institutionalization of the Dutch military allows it to operate with both Atlanticist and continental allies and predisposes it to operate in a coalition.

instability in the Balkans and later operations in Afghanistan, further cultivated the relation with the United States. At times it spilt into the public domain as politicians went to great extents to prove that the Dutch were taken seriously in Washington. A powerful example is the statement by Minister of Defense Frank de Grave in November 2001 in relation to his recent visit to the United States. "I have understood" the Minister said:

[...] that some among you have expressed concern that I would be received [in the United States] by a mere under-secretary and that this would be the definite proof of the Netherland's marginal position. To those of you that worry, I would like to point out that the Dutch Minister of Defense was the first Minister [of any nation] who has been received at cabinet level at the Pentagon following September 11 and also the first Minister to have visited Tampa [US Central Command]. For what it's worth!⁸⁴⁷

The attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon triggered an outcry of solidarity with the United States. Prime Minister Kok voiced his disbelief the following day with the words:

The indescribable catastrophe that has hit the American people fills us with astonishment and revulsion. The United States grieves and we grieve with her in solidarity [...] Along with the US government we also will not be led by fear, convinced as we are of the values of freedom, democracy and justice. The foundation of our democratic rule of law will not be harmed by the most brutal terrorist acts. The Netherlands and the United States share these same fundamental values.

At the EU Council the Netherlands indicated that the terrorist attack on the US constituted a direct attack on everything the West stands for: democracy, institutions that protect the freedoms and rights of the individual, free speech, free entrepreneurial spirit and responsibility towards the international community.⁸⁴⁸ The response to the 9/11 attacks, invoking Article V of the NATO treaty and subsequent support for the military operations in Afghanistan flowed forth from a widespread sense of solidarity. On October 7 the United States and the United Kingdom commenced operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. The Dutch government supported the action on the principle of self-defense and article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Dutch government proclaimed: "The Nether-

847 "Ik heb begrepen dat hier en daar enige zorg was dat ik slechts door een onderminister was ontvangen en dat dit het definitieve bewijs was van de marginale positie die Nederland inneemt. Degenen die zich daar zorgen over maken, wijs ik erop dat de Nederlandse minister van Defensie de eerste minister is die überhaupt na 11 september in het Pentagon op regeringsniveau is ontvangen en ook de eerste minister is die in Tampa is geweest, voor wat het waard is!" Frank de Grave, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 2001-2002, The Hague, November 15, 2001, pp. 24-1769.

848 Tweede Kamer, "Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme," vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27925, nr. 1.

lands stands right behind the United States in the fight against terrorism.”⁸⁴⁹

In late November 2001, after the fall of the Taliban regime and as operations moved into a stability phase, the Netherlands contributed a frigate to the Arabian Gulf and F-16s in a close air-support role over Afghanistan. The Netherlands became part of the Coalition of the Willing. During the debate in the Dutch Parliament over contributing forces to Operation *Enduring Freedom*, Frans Weisglas, MP for the liberal-conservative VVD party stated that, “Solidarity in words must be followed by solidarity in deeds.” Similarly, Jan Hoekema, MP of the liberal-democrats (D66) made clear that: “participation in a coalition obliges to engage, one cannot stand empty-handed at the sideline.”⁸⁵⁰

18.2.3 A MEMBER OF THE “A TEAM”

Rather than focus on any specific threat, following the end of the Cold War the opportunity arose to use the military instrument to increase Dutch international political influence by participating in expeditionary crisis-management operations. It was declared in terms of an international political ambition; relevant military capabilities could increase international political influence. Critical to increasing this influence was the ability to rapidly deploy for high- and lower-spectrum expeditionary operations. In 1991, MP Pieter ter Veer of the liberal-democrats (D66) voiced his support for the development of the Air Manoeuvre brigade in these terms. Not only did the capability fit within the new NATO Force concept of mobile counter-concentration, and address the necessity of expeditionary forces, but since there were few countries with comparable capabilities it gave the Netherlands a central position in the alliance.⁸⁵¹ A similar position was held by MP Sari van Heemskerck (VVD) regarding the creation of a multinational army corps with the German army:

*Only by contributing substantially to an Army corps, will we be seated at the table of the major allies and will we be able to truly influence decision-making that concerns not only the security policy but also foreign policy.*⁸⁵²

The Netherlands wanted to play a role of importance in the European and transatlantic security framework. The ambition was never to have capabilities that were merely relevant but capabilities instead that were high-profile, and that would give the Netherlands a position of significance. According to Van Heemskerck, only then would the Netherlands be

849 Ibid, p. 2.

850 Weisglas (VVD) and Hoekema (D66), Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 2001-2002, November 15, 2001, p. 24-1750.

851 Pieter ter Veer, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991, p. 19.

852 “Alleen door substantieel aan een legerkorps bij te dragen, komen wij met de grote bondgenoten rond de tafel te zitten en kunnen wij echt invloed uitoefenen op de te nemen beslissingen, die niet alleen het veiligheidsbeleid, maar ook het buitenlands beleid betreffen.” Sari van Heemskerck Pillis-Duvekot, Commissievergadering Defensie, UCV 51-4, June 10, 1991.

able to play the role in the alliance “...it has played for years: as most influential of countries, after the major powers.”⁸⁵³

The 1995 *Herijking* Foreign Policy Review mentioned that there was an explicit quid pro quo associated with using the military. Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo stated that, “providing troops to peace keeping operations means that, in the Dutch vision, participation in relevant international deliberations is guaranteed.”⁸⁵⁴ As an input into the Review, the D66 liberal-democrats declared that, “The Netherlands has to translate its substantial contributions to international military operations into political influence. Until now that has happened insufficiently, as is apparent by the fact that we are not part of the international Contactgroup for Former Yugoslavia.”⁸⁵⁵

In 2000 the government made the link between military relevance and Dutch political influence explicit in the Defense White Paper. It stated that “our international position and influence are determined by the Dutch contribution – politically, economically but also militarily.”⁸⁵⁶ It was an explicit reference to transformation as resource extraction by making it usable for overall state policy. According to General van den Breemen being part of the group of most capable nations had always underpinned Dutch defense policy objectives.⁸⁵⁷ He elaborated that this was part of the Dutch international outlook as well as the ambition the Netherlands had to play a role on the international stage. In 2006 the Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces General Dick Berlijn echoed this in a formal policy document, writing:

*The Netherlands is not a major power, but it does want to partake in discussions and decision-making at the international level.*⁸⁵⁸

The most forceful expression of this ambition was formulated as “remaining a member of the A-team.” The “A-team” is a group of Western countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, and includes other Western military powers that are most capable to perform expeditionary operations and are preferred coalition partners of the Netherlands. In the Netherlands the “A-team” as a concept was first pronounced in 1999 by Minister of Defense Frank de Grave in reference to the congressional testimony in October 1999 given by US Air Force Lieutenant-General Michael Short. In his testimony Short referred

853 Ibid.

854 “Troepen leveren ten behoeve van een vredesoperatie betekent, in de Nederlandse visie, dat aan relevant internationaal overleg moet kunnen worden deelgenomen.” *Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid*, 1994-1995, p. 18.

855 “Nederland zal zijn aanzienlijke bijdrage aan internationale militaire operaties meer moeten vertalen in politieke invloed. Tot nu toe is dit onvoldoende gebeurd, blijktens het feit dat wij buiten de internationale contactgroep voor het voormalige Joegoslavië staan.” De Wijk et al, (1995), p. 21.

856 Tweede Kamer, *Defensienota 2000*, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 900, p. 41.

857 Interview with General (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.

858 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, *Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006*, February 6, 2006.

to the Netherlands as part of an “A-team” of allies.⁸⁵⁹ The concept stuck. De Grave reiterated these words and underlined that this group is very small, an elite club, and being part of it had substantial political-strategic benefits. It would allow the Netherlands to make its voice heard to promote its security interests. In November 2003 De Grave’s successor, Minister of Defense Henk Kamp said that, “the Dutch air force has shown itself to be a highly professional and motivated fighting force. It is recognized internationally as a member of the A-team of air forces.”⁸⁶⁰ During an interview a senior official at the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs said, to his satisfaction, that the Netherlands was proud that in 2007 it was the only non-English speaking country able to credibly contribute forces to the challenging operation in the south of Afghanistan. It thus offered a means to differentiate internationally.

When the Netherlands deployed to Southern Afghanistan in 2006 it focused on projecting stability and enabling reconstruction, yet was also intent on demonstrating its unique value to the alliance. It could demonstrate that it was a serious and reliable member of the “A-team.” It led the Dutch government to distinguish itself from others, most notably Germany which at the time was facing substantial criticism from NATO allies regarding its reluctance to contribute to counterinsurgency operations. Lo Casteleijn recounted that with all the bad press the German armed forces were getting as a result of the caveats they had in place and their reluctance to deploy forces to Southern Afghanistan Dutch planners wanted clearly to avoid being branded as ‘Germans.’⁸⁶¹

A pro-American attitude was also reflected in the procurement policy for the Dutch Air Force. The US-built F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been earmarked as the successor of the aging F-16, at the expense of the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. The JSF would be the Dutch military’s largest procurement program in history. The Dutch government’s accounting office, the *Algemene Rekenkamer*, estimated in 2007 that procurement costs for the expected 85 aircraft would total €5.5 billion, excluding total operating costs throughout its 30-year lifetime of €15.1 billion.⁸⁶² It was the United States’ premier air superiority fighter and Dutch procurement would not only give the Netherlands a capability to operate in the highest spectrum of conventional military operations but also to sustain a close relationship with the major superpower and the Air Force’s historically preferred operational partner. The Dutch Air Force favored the procurement of American aircraft, predominantly for military-technological and cost efficiency reasons. At the same time there was a close working relationship between the Dutch Air Force and its US coun-

859 “Dankzij onze moderne F-16’s konden goed getrainde Nederlandse piloten veel moeilijke aanvalsvluchten met succes bekronen. De Amerikaanse complimenten onderstrepen dit, van minister Albright tot luchtmachtgeneraal Short in de Senaat. Short rekt Nederland tot het A-team, en dat is niet groot.” Frank de Grave, “Remarks at luncheon for Vereniging van Europese Journalisten,” November 18, 1999.

860 Henk Kamp, “Remarks at Air Power Symposium,” The Hague, November 19, 2003.

861 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, Ministry of Defense, The Hague.

862 Algemene Rekenkamer, “Monitoring Verwerving JSF – Stand van Zaken,” Handelingen Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 26488, no. 61, The Hague, December 4, 2007.

terpart, and personal relations among top-level officers were strong.⁸⁶³ It contributed to the view of the Netherlands as part of an “A-Team.” A question that remains to be conclusively addressed in further research is what factors belie why the main weapons-systems of the Air Force – the F-16 and the Apache helicopter – are American while the main weapons-systems of the Army – the Leopard tank and the Pantzerhaubitze 2000 – are German. It appears that aside from technological preferences it is also politically convenient since the United States and Germany are the principal cooperating partners of the respective services. From a political perspective this geographical division is expedient to enable the Dutch role as a bridge-builder.

While the US, UK, France and Germany were considered strategic partners, the Dutch 2006 Military Strategic Vision made clear that mainly the first two were preferred as operational partners. An Anglo-Saxon focus of the military was signaled by the UK/NL amphibious force and the link between the Netherlands Air Force and the United States Air Force.⁸⁶⁴ Regarding land forces, even though it had a close institutional relationship with Germany through the 1st Germany/ Netherlands Army Corps, due to cooperation with British, Canadian and Australian forces in Southern Afghanistan, and with Australian and British forces in Iraq, the Army also shifted further in the direction of Anglo-Saxon nations. The military-strategic assessment in 2006 wrote that: “for robust and rapid expeditionary operations and to keep options open outside solely the German” a further orientation of the Royal Netherlands Army towards the UK and US was envisaged. Of course the Anglo-Saxon focus is not absolute and the military engages with various international partners while the Royal Netherlands Army retains its allegiance to the German corps. However, the trend is illustrative of a strategic cultural trait to focus on those countries which embrace high-intensity operations and enable the Netherlands to play a high-profile role. These states are Anglo-Saxon.

The proof of the Dutch transformation strategy lay in its operational relevance. Only by using the military would the success of Dutch transformation be confirmed. The confirmation was expressed through operational relevance to Anglo-Saxon allies. The Netherlands’ strategic transformation, as enunciated in the 1991 and 1993 defense policy papers, was intent on creating an expeditionary military able to participate in the full range of operations, including high-intensity fighting. A consequence was that, after the 1995 foreign policy review and the increasing intensity of expeditionary operations, it sustained a policy of military relevance vis-à-vis the United States. Transformation was measured in terms of its relevance to US operations. Army General Ton van Loon, commanding general of NATO’s Regional Command South in Afghanistan made this explicit in late 2007. He said the fact that American Special Forces in Southern Afghanistan specifically requested Dutch F-16’s for close air support missions, “indicated how far we, the Dutch military, have come.” Van Loon concluded that it demonstrated the Dutch military had

863 See Bert Kreemers, *Hete Hangijzers: de aanschaf van Nederlandse gevechtsvliegtuigen*, (Amsterdam: Balans, 2009), p.182 – 236.

864 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, *Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006*, February 6, 2006, p. 13.

been, in fact, transformed. Due to this operational relevance to the United States in high-intensity operations “transformation, Van Loon declared, “was finished.”⁸⁶⁵

19 EXPRESSIONS OF DUTCH TRANSFORMATION

The two strategic cultural tenets – the emphasis on stability projection through a structuralist interpretation of human progress and support for the international rule of law, and the pursuit of political relevance through the use of the military instrument – have shaped the process of Dutch defense transformation. The mechanism by which these two constraints were internalized in Dutch transformation following the end of the Cold War was to link the use of the military, and with it the process of military change, to ‘political ambition.’ As General van den Breemen recalled, linking the development of the military to an expression of political ambition rather than specific threats was the key through which questions could be answered what the military was for following 1991 and how much the Dutch public was willing to spend on it.⁸⁶⁶ Political ambition addressed the question what the military was for and which capabilities would be required. It was the vehicle through which stability could be projected and the international rule of law promoted but also how the Netherlands’ international prestige could be increased and its relevance to the United States made clear. Due to the ambiguous nature of the term ‘political ambition’ however, a permanent topic of discussion was under what circumstances the Netherlands would actually use its military abroad and at what level of the conflict spectrum. This part details how the Netherlands interpreted its political ambition throughout the 1990’s and translated it to capability requirements.

19.1 AMBITION-BASED PLANNING: 1991 & 1993

Throughout the Cold War, the primary structuring element of NATO forces was deterrence through strength.⁸⁶⁷ NATO prepared for war, so as not to go to war. NATO was an organization that when functioning as designed, would not be called to act. Stability in the international system was maintained by balancing against the Soviet bloc and sustaining credibility of the alliance. After the end of the Cold War, stability had to be actively supported. The benevolent security environment and the lack of a vital security threat led to a focus on challenges to international stability and crisis-management.⁸⁶⁸ Crucial to its transformation towards an expeditionary force was the Dutch government’s decision to link its defense policy to particular political ambitions, rather than countering a specific

865 General Ton van Loon, “Remarks at Counter Insurgency Symposium” (Netherlands Institute for Military History), The Hague, November 14, 2007.

866 Interview with General (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.

867 “De NAVO strategie bovenal blijft gericht op afschrikking van agressie en daardoor op voorkoming van oorlog en handhaving van de vrede.” *Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid*, 1968, p. 25.

868 *Prioriteitennota* (1993).

threat. It was the mechanism through which transformation took effect.

Political ambition became the guiding principle of defense policy following the discussions in preparation of the 1991 Defense White Paper.⁸⁶⁹ The concept would influence the shape, size and use of the armed forces. Defense Minister Relus Ter Beek acknowledged that it meant disconnecting the size of the military from operational necessity. It was a clear enunciation of the political nature of the military instrument. It underscored the extent to which the military was an instrument of foreign policy and subject to the realm of political choice. Political will rather than countering a specific threat, Ter Beek said, would dominate the direction of security policy.⁸⁷⁰

The enunciation that political ambition would guide defense policy was informed by the observation that the security environment offered little certainty over the type, timing, magnitude and location of challenges and threats. Rather than focusing on specific threats, it led to capabilities-based planning. Political ambition was formulated in terms of types of missions rather than types of threats, thereby reversing the logic for which defense planning had been initially pursued. At the same time, the Netherlands realized it was too small a power to perform an expeditionary operation by itself, and would necessarily be part of a larger coalition.⁸⁷¹ This proved compatible with a multilateralist inclination to promote the international rule of law, as well as a policy to demonstrate its relevance.

Since the use of the military was now explicitly connected to a political expression of ambition, the use of the military became the product of political choice, as opposed to political necessity. The legalistically inclined Dutch strived to codify the terms on the basis of which operations could be undertaken and codify the mechanism how Dutch political ambition translated to expeditionary operations. In response to the 1991 Defense White Paper, requirements were formulated for engaging in operations outside NATO territory. On June 27, 1991, Parliament endorsed a motion citing a number of political criteria which any decision in favor of an expeditionary operation needed to fulfill.⁸⁷² For instance an intervention needed to be embedded in a United Nations Security Council resolution. Absent a UN mandate, a peacekeeping operation was only possible when all parties to the conflict concerned accepted the presence of the Dutch forces; or in the event of a large-scale and massive violation of Human Rights.⁸⁷³

Underlying this rudimentary framework was a discussion at what level of intensity operations could be undertaken by the Dutch military. In the benevolent security envi-

869 Interview with Gen (rtd.) H. van den Breemen, October 9, 2009, Schiedam.

870 “The link between size and military-operational necessity was separated. Much more than ever before would the political will to pursue an active security policy – the international political level of ambition of the Netherlands – determine the nature and size of the Dutch armed forces.” Ter Beek (1996), p.63.

871 *Defensienota 1991* (1991), p.2.

872 Motie Van Traa, Tweede Kamer, 1990-1991, 21991, nr. 26.

873 The summation concerns the contents of the motion – Van Traa as discussed in Tweede Kamer, *Betrokkenheid van het parlement bij de uitzending van militaire eenheden*, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, 23591, nr. 5, p.4.

ronment, did the Dutch political ambition also extend beyond relatively risk-free peace-keeping operations to higher-intensity peace-enforcement operations? It gave rise to friction between the two strategic-cultural traits. While stability projection and a protection of the international rule of law inclined a focus on peacekeeping, being a relevant ally and improving the political weight of the military instrument meant possibly participating in high-intensity operations as well. Since the military retained its task to protect NATO territory, and since this necessitated similar capabilities as higher-intensity peace enforcement operations, it initially made little difference in terms of force structuring. As the territorial threat became less important, this changed. As we shall see later on, making the political choice to participate in an actual high-intensity operation was a different matter altogether.

The military emphasized mobile and deployable assets to perform expeditionary missions. Triggered by a peace-dividend and the need for enhanced mobility, the Army would become lighter and smaller. Readiness, deployability and flexibility became key enablers.⁸⁷⁴ In 1991 it was decided that the Army would lose five of its twelve brigades and replace heavy armored units with lighter mechanized brigades. The number of tanks would decrease significantly. One of the major and most tangible initiatives lay in the creation of the 11th Air Manoeuvre Brigade. The brigade became the vanguard to transform the Army and it was the most prominent expression of developing expeditionary capabilities. The brigade was planned as the central pillar of the new defense policy. Consisting of light-infantry forces, tactical transport helicopters and attack helicopters, it was a flexible, mobile and deployable unit able to operate in high-intensity missions. Defense Minister Ter Beek exclaimed in his memoirs that the Air Manoeuvre Brigade, “was and is ... the example of the new armed forces.”⁸⁷⁵ The Navy would procure eight new frigates while six older platforms were decommissioned or sold, and to support expeditionary operations an amphibious transport ship was developed. For the Air Force the number of operational F-16s decreased from 162 to 144 while all remaining fighter aircraft received a Mid Life Update, increasing interoperability and prolonging their deployability. Two air-to-air refueling aircraft would be procured along with six tactical transport aircraft. The military focused on those capabilities that contributed to the elements of expeditionary operations identified by NATO (see chart 23). A further step was to modularize the forces and make the battalion the building block of the Dutch military. An expeditionary focus also required higher qualified personnel; the draft was phased out and a shift was made towards an all-volunteer force.

874 *Defensienota 1991* (1991), p.2.

875 Ter Beek (1996), p. 80.

	Concepts of Expeditionary Capabilities
Flexibility	The ability to perform various tasks in diverse areas and conditions
Mobility	Tactical mobility and strategic mobility
Multi-functionality	Capable of performing different missions
Interoperability	The ability to cooperate with other systems, units or services
Sustainability	The ability to sustain operations until the objectives have been met, including survivability
Deployability	The ability to perform at the right time and place in the right manner

Figure 23: Concepts of Expeditionary Capabilities, According to NATO and Adopted by the Netherlands

(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense, *Defensienota 1991*, p. 78-79)

In the 1993 *Defense Priorities Review*, which made crisis-management operations the principal focus of the Dutch armed forces, the political-strategic ambition was first explicitly defined. The ambition was to perform four simultaneous battalion-equivalent⁸⁷⁶ peacekeeping operations sustainable for up to three years operating in the lower tier of the conflict spectrum.⁸⁷⁷ Rob de Wijk, former head of the Concepts division at the Ministry of Defense said that the number ‘four’ seemed “about right.”⁸⁷⁸ Higher up in the conflict spectrum, the armed forces would be able to participate with a brigade-sized force for a single rotation of six months.

During discussions over the *Defense Priorities Review*, Minister Ter Beek provided further detail to the criteria for using the military. He formulated eleven elements to support political decision-making on expeditionary action. He reiterated that the protection of the international rule of law was a cornerstone of Dutch security policy. Rather than a check-list, he said the elements were intended as a framework to assist decision-makers. It included the following:

876 Equivalents consisted of a squadron fighter aircraft or two frigates.

877 Why the choice for ‘four battalion-equivalent peacekeeping operations’ was made remains an element of debate. De Wijk and others within the Ministry of Defense claim that it was based on the so-called ‘Dorien-norm’ reflecting the number mentioned by De Wijk’s partner while he was preparing the Defense Priorities Review. Minister Ter Beek later said that the number was arrived at following a calculation of available deployable assets. See “Ter Beek Ergert zich op Feestje Landmacht,” *De Volkskrant*, November 24, 1999; C. Klep and R. van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo: De Nederlandse Militaire Deelname aan vredesoperaties sinds 1945* (Den Haag: SDU, 2000).

878 Steven Derix, “Propagandist van de Realpolitik,” *NRC*, June 14, 1999 (<http://www.nrc.nl/W2/Nieuws/1999/06/14/Vp/04.html>).

- Dutch national interests need to be at stake, this includes the promotion of the international rule of law;
- Operations may be performed in response to violations of international law or human rights;
- An operation must be performed with the legitimacy of an international political (UN) mandate;
- Cooperation with allies is necessary, stressing the multinational nature of an operation (either through WEU or NATO);
- Sufficiently broad domestic political support is a requirement;
- An appreciation must be made regarding whether the military instrument is more appropriate than other instruments;
- The risks for forces deployed should be taken into account;
- The expected length of participation should be assessed;
- Are the capabilities of the forces appropriate?
- Financial consequences of the deployment must be considered;
- The geographic proximity of a crisis is important.⁸⁷⁹

The latter criterion provided fuel for a political discussion which would remain vibrant throughout the next two decades, namely over a possible geographic focus of the armed forces. Left-wing parties in general portrayed an inclination to focus on military operations in conjunction with development aid, preferring operations in Africa. At the same time, it provided the necessary rationale to participate in high-intensity missions such as Operation *Allied Force* which did take place in the European backyard.

19.2 SREBRENICA AND THE FRAMEWORK OF EVALUATION

The discussion over the type of capabilities the Dutch military required and the conditions under which they could be deployed continued throughout the 1990s. According to the ambition level peacekeeping did not require high-intensity capabilities, peace enforcement did. Events in the security environment however, were showing that a strict distinction between these two was becoming more and more artificial. In early 1994, in line with its stated ambition, the Netherlands undertook one of four low-end operations by contributing to the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) mission in Bosnia. In 1995, the Netherlands armed forces witnessed the harsh reality of ethnic cleansing at Srebrenica. What was supposed to have been a 'safe area', was overrun by Serb forces and an estimated 7000 people, mostly men and boys, were killed. The events demonstrated the failure of UN peacekeeping as understood in the narrow sense. The 600-strong Dutch contingent had been deployed under the political consideration that a light-armed UN force with a weak mandate by virtue of its blue helmets would be able to 'keep the peace' even if there was no

879 Quoted in Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzending, *Vertretpunt Den Haag*, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 454, no. 8, The Hague, September 4, 2000, p. 27.

peace to keep.⁸⁸⁰ Instead the Dutch contingent was outnumbered and out-armed and there was confusion at UN headquarters how to organize support for the Dutch contingent and the Muslim population they protected. Dutch requests for air support – which was to be provided by other countries – were repeatedly turned down.⁸⁸¹ The enclave was overrun.

‘Srebrenica’ came to denote the failure of the international community to keep the peace in a time of war, and the realization that peacekeeping is only possible when in fact there is a peace agreement. If not, a robust mandate and peace-enforcement capabilities are required. Sides need to be taken and escalation dominance is required if safe areas are created. As Kofi Annan reported, “they were neither protected areas nor safe havens...nor safe areas.”⁸⁸² Although the Annan report held the international community in its entirety to blame for the events at Srebrenica, it led to the fall of the Dutch government in 2002 after the publication of an official history chronicling the Dutch role in the collapse of the enclave. The predominant issue for defense policy was the political realization of the difficulties associated with crisis-management operations. It demonstrated that the conflict spectrum was fluid rather than neatly categorized into low-end or high-end operations. It marked an end to naiveté over the results to be achieved by peacekeeping and reliance on other coalition partners for escalation dominance. These lessons were discounted in a further specification of the conditions for deploying Dutch forces abroad.

In response to the events at Srebrenica, Parliament adopted the *Toetsingskader* or “Framework of Evaluation” for expeditionary operations. It was based on the elements that had been developed since 1991; the Framework was created to “structure deliberations with Parliament concerning participation of Dutch armed forces in crisis-management operations.”⁸⁸³ Crucial to the Framework was the need for escalation dominance and an exit-strategy:

*...if necessary, while taking the limits of the mandate into consideration,
[Dutch forces] should be able to act sufficiently robust. At all times, the*

880 See J.C.H. Blom, *Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyse van de val van een Safe Area*. (Amsterdam: Boom, 2002).

881 Kofi Annan, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35,” November 15, 1999. <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf>. Accessed March 23, 2009.

882 “Protected zones and safe areas can have a role in protecting civilians in armed conflict, but it is clear that either they must be demilitarized and established by the agreement of the belligerents, as in the case of the “protected zones” and “safe havens” recognized by international humanitarian law, or they must be truly safe areas, fully defended by a credible military deterrent... It is tempting for critics to blame the UNPROFOR units in Srebrenica for its fall, or to blame the United Nations hierarchy above those units. Certainly, errors of judgment were made - errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality and non-violence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia - but this must not divert us from the more fundamental mistakes. The safe areas were established by the Security Council without the consent of the parties and without the provision of any credible military deterrent. They were neither protected areas nor safe havens in the sense of international humanitarian law, nor safe areas in any militarily meaningful sense.” *Ibid.*

883 Tweede Kamer, “Betrokkenheid van het parlement bij de uitzending van militaire eenheden,” vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 23 591, nr. 7, The Hague, July 24, 2001, p.3.

*own forces need to credibly provide in their self-protection. [...] Plans will be made – nationally or internationally – in case of contingencies, and depending on the nature of the operation, to extract units and individual forces....*⁸⁸⁴

The protection of the international rule of law remained the basis for expeditionary interventions, however it would now be done while realizing the need to have, and possibly use, high-intensity capabilities. The events at Srebrenica were a political awakening that high-end capabilities were a necessity. From the military perspective it led to the assessment to focus on high-intensity operations, assuming that it would enable the military to perform lower-risk missions as well. The 2000 Defense White Paper writes that, “Higher-spectrum operations influence the organization of the armed forces, but through adjustments the military [is] suitable for lower-spectrum operations.”⁸⁸⁵ The 2006 *Military Strategic Assessment* stated plainly that the armed forces were oriented towards deployment for high-intensity operations, and that downscaling was possible.⁸⁸⁶ It had an impact on how the Netherlands would deploy force packages.

19.3 ADDING A HIGH-INTENSITY COMFORT ZONE

In October 2000 Eritrean and Ethiopian forces agreed to a ceasefire hoping to end their decades-long conflict. The two parties asked the United Nations to monitor the ceasefire, and to place a foreign force in the ‘Temporary Security Zone’, the buffer zone between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. The operation took place at the express request of both parties on the basis of a chapter six UN mandate. The Netherlands decided to participate in the UN mission as lead-nation. The Hague reasoned that its participation would support African security and the international rule of law. In addition, the humanitarian situation would improve with the cessation of hostilities, reducing migrant flows to Europe and the Netherlands and contribute to stability in the Horn of Africa. Across the political spectrum, the mission had wide-spread support. One of the exceptions was the Christian-Democrat fraction which supported the objective of the mission but not the means; they did not support a classic peacekeeping mission without a robust mandate and a solid exit-strategy. The initial force package consisted of a marine battalion, logistics units and Chinook helicopters. At the request of both the Christian-democrats and Labor party Apache attack-helicopters were added, for extraction purposes only.⁸⁸⁷ The Apaches were located in Djibouti instead of in the theater of operations. During a parliamentary hearing Major General (rtd.) Van Kappen noted that the decision to send the Apaches was not a military-operational necessity but rather a political decision to increase

884 Ibid.

885 *Defensienota 2000*, p. 41.

886 *Militair-Strategische Verkenning* (2006), p. 8.

887 Minister of Defence F. de Grave, Tweede Kamer, 2000-2001, 14 983, nr.14.

support for the mission. The Apaches increased the “comfort zone” for the politicians.⁸⁸⁸ The representative of the Labor party Bert Koenders acknowledged that it was indeed an “extra insurance.”⁸⁸⁹ In addition, a contingency planning effort with French and American forces was undertaken. By sending the Apaches and explicitly making contingency plans the Netherlands was sending a stronger-than-necessary force for political purposes. With the events of Srebrenica still fresh in the memory, the Netherlands opted for including a robust capability. It demonstrated how political choice was interacting with military-operational affairs, akin to the discussions in the 1940’s regarding the execution of the policing mission in the Dutch East Indies.

Not only was a robust force package introduced in the UNMEE mission. From then on, all deployments contained a high-intensity capability that could be used if events took a turn for the worse. This shift was an expression of coming to terms with the security environment which was less benevolent than initially anticipated. It demonstrated the changing environment in which the Netherlands was undertaking expeditionary operations. The promotion of the international rule of law through crisis-management operations would not be a risk-free undertaking. Peacekeeping missions that were initially considered straightforward were held to be potentially dangerous.

The attacks of September 11 made this point clear. Much more than the somewhat altruistic crisis-management operations performed during the early 1990’s such as the Dutch contribution to the UN mission in Cambodia, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington demonstrated the extent to which vital interests could be at stake as a result of instability in regions far from home. Protecting the international rule of law and addressing regional stability more poignantly could be a vital security interest and it further reinforced the necessity of having high-intensity capabilities. In particular, the attacks emphasized the need for precision-munitions, Special Forces troops and unmanned aerial vehicles.⁸⁹⁰ Precision operations were specifically mentioned as a focus area. It led to the development of military assets comparable to American initiatives in the field of operational effectiveness transformation.

It also led to a further coalescing of stability projection and high-intensity operations. In December 2001 the Dutch government informed Parliament of its intention to send a 200-strong Air Manoeuvre contingent including Special Operations Forces to Afghanistan as part of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force. It was a contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan and the protection of the international rule of law to avoid it becoming a safe-haven for terrorism.⁸⁹¹ The operation contributed to the fight against terrorism, as stability and responsible governance was held to

888 Tweede Kamer, “De Hoorn van Afrika; Verslag van een hoorzitting op 16 oktober 2000 over de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen in het kader van UNMEE,” vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 22 831, nr. 13, The Hague, November 7, 2000, p.20.

889 Ibid, p. 18-20.

890 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme,” vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 27 925, nr. 40, The Hague, January 24, 2002.

891 Ibid, p.3.

be a natural buffer against terrorism. The Dutch government stressed that the mandate was robust, being based on Chapter VII. Again the memory of Srebrenica appeared and liberal conservatives pressed for US guarantees in the event of an extraction. The six F-16s assigned to *Enduring Freedom* would also be available for “close air support” roles of the Dutch deployment under ISAF.

In 2003 Apaches were attached to the Dutch contingent for SFIR (Stabilization Force Iraq) in al-Muthanna. In the run-up to the deployment it led to a parliamentary discussion over the exit-strategy.⁸⁹² The government announced that the British military would take responsibility for any extraction. Yet MP Camiel Eurlings of the Christian-Democrats wondered whether the mandate was sufficiently robust, and the rules of engagement sufficiently solid. Why was the Netherlands not providing its own extraction capability, he wondered. Minister of Defense Kamp responded that details had been discussed with the British and an assurance had been given that within 15 minutes aerial support could be available, and within six hours tank support could arrive in the province. Eurlings pressed on asking if this guarantee was also on paper. Minister of Defense Kamp stated that, “we have analyzed what type of situations may arise. It is difficult to talk about it persistently with the British, because they think it strange, given our long-term intense cooperation and that we are part of their division at their invitation.”⁸⁹³ Robust force capabilities were likewise deployed to Northern Afghanistan in 2002, namely F-16s based out of Kyrgyzstan. Apaches, F-16s and Pantzerhowitzers were deployed for the mission in Uruzgan from 2006 onwards.

Critical to being a relevant ally was developing an expeditionary force and having the political ambition to perform high-intensity initial-entry operations. Frank van Kappen recalled: “Without the stated ambition to participate high in the conflict spectrum, the process of transformation would have resulted in an entirely different military. Those few words have been critical.”⁸⁹⁴ Minister of Defense Kamp echoed that many of the robust qualities of the Dutch armed forces were the result of its focus on preparing for high-intensity operations. The transformation debate in the Netherlands revolved around whether the Netherlands would be willing to operate in high-intensity missions, later including counterinsurgency warfare as well. Aside from the military-operational argument to have escalation dominance, such capabilities served a political-strategic purpose; the Labor party for instance considered sending the F-16s to Afghanistan in 2002 as elemental to increase the Dutch voice in the alliance.⁸⁹⁵

892 Tweede Kamer, “De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Verslag algemeen overleg op 25 juni 2003 over de mogelijke Nederlandse bijdrage aan de stabilisatiemacht voor Irak,” vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 120, The Hague, July 9, 2003, p.30.

893 Minister Kamp, *Ibid.*, p.30.

894 Interview with Maj-Gen (rtd.) Frank van Kappen, The Hague, September 6, 2006.

895 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme,” vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 27 925, nr. 40, The Hague, January 24, 2002, p. 2.

1993	2000	2003	2006
1 brigade-sized operation for 6 months, high-end	1 brigade-sized operation for 6 months, high-end	1 brigade-sized operation for 1 year, high –end	1 brigade-sized operation for 1 year, high –end
4 battalion-sized operations for 3 years, low-end	4 battalion-sized operations for 3 years, low-end	3 battalion-sized operations for 3 years, low-end	3 battalion-sized operations for 3 years
	1 brigade level lead nation HQ	1 brigade level lead nation HQ	1 brigade level lead nation HQ
			1 NRF rotation every 3 years: MCM-frigate, a logistic support vessel, 12 F-16s, two Patriot batteries, the staff of the German-Dutch Army HQ, a logistics battalion, elements of an ISTAR battalion, field artillery, a support battalion and role-2 Medical services. 3150 forces of which 2400 Army.
			1 EU Battlegroup rotation every 3 years
			1 UN SHIRBRIG rotation
			Homeland security guarantee of 4600 forces
			Smaller operations (police missions, security sector reform)

Figure 24: Evolution of Dutch Political Ambition, 1993-2006

(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense)




Figure 25: Netherlands' Contributions to International Operations, 1991 - 2009

(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense & Netherlands Ministry of Finance)

The main thrust of the Dutch political ambition did not change much, it was however further specified. In 2003, the number of low-end operations was reduced from four to three while the ability to sustain a high-end operation with a brigade-size equivalent was doubled to one year.⁸⁹⁶ The Netherlands also expressed the ambition to be a lead-nation in an expeditionary mission, increasing its military profile among allied nations. In 2006, in

896 As of 2003, Brigade-size equivalents implied for the air forces two squadrons with each 18 aircraft and for the Navy a maritime taskforce with 5 frigates at maximum, or a combination thereof.

light of an increasing number of multinational obligations, the ambition also included a commitment to a NATO Response Force rotation, an EU Battlegroup rotation, and a UN Stand-By High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) rotation.⁸⁹⁷ Later it specified that the three continuous battalion-sized commitments could also amount to one large one, as exemplified by the mission in Uruzgan.⁸⁹⁸ Several smaller commitments were specified including police missions, making military experts available for security sector reform, participation with Special Forces in counter-terror operations and support for civil authorities. Furthermore, contributions to homeland security were detailed. At the request of relevant civilian authorities 25% of Dutch forces could be made available for domestic security tasks, particularly intended for disaster relief and assisting law-enforcement. With the Ministry of Interior it was agreed that at minimum 4600 armed forces would be available at any one time for disaster relief in the Netherlands. Figure 24 indicates the evolution of the Dutch political ambition.

It was however, more a political-administrative tool, than a benchmark. Figure 25 illustrates the expeditionary operations the Netherlands participated in since 1990 with more than 100 forces. It denotes the length of the deployment and force-size. The dark bars illustrate those operations that are considered major missions, due to their intensity or size. The chart shows that while the political ambition delineated a guideline for the number of concurrent expeditionary operations, in reality the Netherlands usually participated in more than that number of operations. Major missions for instance have taken place on a concurrent basis.

19.4 CAPABILITIES FOR THE A-TEAM

Minister of Defense Henk Kamp was in office during the Rumsfeld years in the Pentagon, as well as at the 2002 Prague Transformation summit. He had asked for the drafting of the 2003 Defense White Paper (the *Prinsjesdagbrief*). Kamp defined transformation generically as the policy to make the military a relevant and usable instrument of government, and specifically as the shift towards expeditionary operations.⁸⁹⁹ He held a pragmatic view of the Netherlands' moral-political ambition. If the Netherlands wanted to do something about human rights atrocities, he said, it could not accept being dependent on others to participate only with a particular capability or system. The Netherlands needed to be able to provide an autonomous contingent in the full range of operations, even if that meant a smaller force. Such had also been the lesson of Srebrenica. If the Netherlands wanted to be relevant to allies, and bear a responsible role in the world, it required the Netherlands to operate alongside any ally, and do so autonomously from start to finish.⁹⁰⁰ Developing

897 Minister van Defensie, *Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief*, HDAB2006018085, June 2, 2006.

898 Minister van Defensie, *Wereldwijd Dienstbaar*, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 243, no.1, The Hague, October 16, 2007, p.15.

899 Interview with Henk Kamp, November 29, 2007, The Hague.

900 Idem.

a relevant full-spectrum capability of limited size informed procurement decisions such as the intended acquisition of cruise-missiles, pantzerhowitsers and reinforced the argument for the replacement of the F-16. In order to have a 'seat at the table', the armed forces needed to be of a qualitatively high standard, and offer a politically visible contribution and be geared towards multilateral operations. Too small to be a threat of its own, but reliable enough to participate fully, politicians perceived the role of the Netherlands as a bridge-builder among the major powers, just as Van Vollenhoven had argued in 1910. It gave preference to procuring high-intensity capabilities.

The 2002 Prague Capability Commitment was NATO's capability wish-list in response to the new security environment. It underlined the importance of procuring assets for increased mobility and logistics support. These were key enablers for deploying and sustaining forces in an expeditionary operation. The chart below juxtaposes NATO's capability list to the investment initiatives proposed in the 2003 Defense White Paper (the *Prinsjesdagbrief*).

NATO Prague Capability Commitments	Initiatives in the Netherlands
Strategic air- and sea lift	LPD, DC-10
CBRN Defense	Theatre missile defense
Air-to-air refueling	DC-10
ISR capabilities	Joint Strike Fighter, UAVs
Air-to-ground surveillance	Participation in Allied Ground Surveillance, UAVs, JSF
Suppression of enemy air defenses	Joint Strike Fighter
Precision guided munitions	PGMs, Tactical Tomahawks
Command, Control, Communications	TITAN, BMS, Link 16, NIMSIS
Deployable combat support units	Bare base kits

Figure 26: Prague Capability Commitments and Netherlands Defense Efforts

(Source: *Prinsjesdagbrief* 2003)

The Netherlands invested in various elements of the Prague Capability Commitments such as strategic transport (the Landing Platform Dock and a DC-10 aircraft), tactical transport, improved surveillance and reconnaissance by procuring the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a new Battle Management System similar to the United States' network-centric system FBCB2, but also in cruise missiles. Especially this latter capability as well as the JSF would enable the Netherlands to operate in high-intensity operations. While the Netherlands would procure 30 tomahawks, less than the opening salvo of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, it would make the Netherlands part of a select club which was allowed to share

in this high-tech capability and thereby give it extra political-strategic weight. But more on this later.

The emphasis lay on high-end, high-profile, visible capabilities – those capabilities that made it possible to be a voice in the alliance. They could only be afforded if substantial reductions elsewhere were made. It had been a constant in Dutch defense policy since 1991 to make a choice for quality over quantity. The Netherlands' limited defense budget and its desire to play a role on the international stage led it to procure expensive high-quality multifunctional capabilities. "It is better to have one multifunctional capability with which every task can be fulfilled satisfactory than to have a specific capability for each separate task," the 2006 military strategic assessment wrote. For a small country with limited resources this makes sense. Due to its ambition to be relevant among major powers, the Netherlands made sure it could offer highly-visible capabilities. Whether they were cruise-missiles, an airmobile brigade or top-of-the-bill LCF frigates. Similarly, since the pool of such expensive capabilities is necessarily limited, it produces a natural inclination to embed the force within coalitions. It created a military-operational logic to support international institutions and the principle of multilateralism. The Netherlands could not operate on a stand-alone basis and was dependent on major powers for its fundamental security. Dutch vital security interests are not able to be protected solely by the Netherlands. A multilateral approach is thereby warranted. The Dutch resort to multilateralism is fundamental to its security approach. A 2003 joint publication by the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs matter-of-factly stated that "our welfare and security is highly dependent on effective international organizations and security institutions," read the UN, NATO and EU.⁹⁰¹ This gave further momentum to engage in partnerships with other Western states. In this regard, the NATO Response Force was considered a solidarity-increasing instrument since it institutionalizes multinational cooperation in crisis-management operations.⁹⁰² A case in point is the NATO Response Force. Lo Casteleijn said that the Response Force had spurred transformation, not because it was actually used but rather because it necessitated concept development and experimentation to realize joint cooperation. It was a means to enhance interoperability and improve multilateral action.

Investing in high-end capabilities meant investing in political credit which would allow the Netherlands to have increased influence among its Western peers. By being able to provide initial-entry capabilities, those assets needed at the start of a high-intensity operation, the Netherlands believed it would have a say about the shape and form of an operation. Not because the contribution of the Netherlands would be critical to mission-success, but rather because in the international political arena the contribution of a continental European ally was a valued good to improve the overall legitimacy of a mission.⁹⁰³

901 Tweede Kamer, "Nederlandse Deelname aan Vredesmissies," vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29521, nr.1, April 8, 2004, p. 7.

902 Tweede Kamer, "Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen; Verslag algemeen overleg op 13 november 2003 over het EVDB, de transatlantische betrekkingen en de NAVO," vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 21501-02, nr. 510, The Hague, December 12, 2003, p. 6 & 9.

903 Interview with Maj-Gen (rtd.) Frank van Kappen, The Hague, September 6, 2006.

Offering relevant, high-quality contributions meant keeping a close eye on the shortfalls in capabilities that NATO and EU heads of state had identified. The reasoning was as follows. The more high-end shortfalls the Netherlands could fill, the better reputation the Netherlands would have among its allies. The more credit it would get. The more it could make its voice heard, the better it could advance its interests associated with promoting the international rule of law and overall security. The 2006 *Military-Strategic Assessment* made this explicit: a “military becomes more relevant and usable – and obtains more ‘political-military weight’- the better it is able to provide capabilities that are needed internationally.”⁹⁰⁴ Therefore, the “military contribution that the Netherlands provides must be credible, relevant, realistic, proportionate, high-quality and nationally as well as internationally visible. *This increases the political-military meaning, also with respect to allies and enhances the position of the Netherlands* [emphasis added].”⁹⁰⁵ The Dutch *Military Strategic Assessment* explicitly addressed the added political value of having a specific capability, for instance Air Manoeuvre capabilities, mobility assets, or helicopter capabilities paid a dividend by increasing the relevance and political-military weight of the Netherlands because they were in short supply among European partners. According to the Assessment, this would contribute to an optimization of the defense budget in terms of its political-strategic relevance.

19.5 NETWORK-CENTRIC EMULATION

The keen focus on the United States fostered a degree of emulation to be able to interoperate with the US military. In 2007 the Dutch Defense Industry Strategy made a direct link between the American path of transformation and guidelines for Dutch defense capability development. Under the heading *Transformation of Armed Forces* the Dutch industry strategy outlined that the US *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* articulated the direction of transformation among armed forces in general, including for the Netherlands. It advocated a pursuit of network-enabled capabilities.⁹⁰⁶ Similarly, increased precision would decrease the risk of collateral damage as well as improve safety for friendly forces. It led to an embrace of elements of US operational effectiveness transformation.⁹⁰⁷ The *Mili-*

904 “Een krijgsmacht wordt relevanter en bruikbaar – en krijgt daardoor meer ‘politiek-militair’ gewicht – naarmate deze beter voorziet in capaciteiten waar internationaal behoefte aan is.” *Militair Strategische Verkenning* (2006), p.26.

905 *Militair-Strategische Verkenning* (2006), p. 6.

906 Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensie Industrie Strategie – Eindrapportage*, DMO/DB/2007012327, The Hague, August 27, 2007.

907 “Snelle inzetbaarheid, technologisch hoogwaardig materieel en het vermogen van Nederland te worden ingezet zijn belangrijke voorwaarden voor een optimale operationele samenwerking, zowel bij crisisbeheersingsoperaties in de hogere delen van het geweldsspectrum als bij operaties die gericht zijn op de duurzame stabilisatie en de wederopbouw van voormalige conflictgebieden. Deze voorwaarden en de noodzaak het eigen personeel optimale veiligheid te bieden en steeds preciezere wapens in te zetten om onbedoelde schade tot een minimum te beperken, beïnvloeden nadrukkelijker dan ooit de uitrusting van de krijgsmacht en de taakuitvoering.” *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal*, Tweede Kamer, *De maatregelen bij Defensie in kort bestek*, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 600 X, no. 49,

tary Strategic Assessment expressed that network-enabled capabilities were, “a critical factor and must form the core of the transformation of the Dutch armed forces, not only for power projection but also for stabilization-operations and national support missions.”⁹⁰⁸

The drive to adopt network-centric capabilities was a function of facilitating interoperability and had a political-strategic dimension. Only by focusing on technologically advanced contributions would the Netherlands be able to “find allegiance with our most important allies,” principally Washington.⁹⁰⁹ Interoperability was critical to enhance relevance. Network-centric warfare would lead to greater effectiveness and higher operational tempo allowing a “decisive advantage” to be reached over adversaries. Not in the least the Assessment noted that the US, UK and Germany, as well as NATO had embraced it. In the Netherlands, the introduction of network-centric capabilities came in the form of systems such as *TITAN* and *ISIS*. These enabled the Air Force and Army to share information.⁹¹⁰ While in the United States network-centric warfare was a new doctrine promising to change war altogether, for the Dutch it was adopted for the practical pay-offs of improved interoperability and deployability, and to be a better bridge-builder.

19.6 FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY

Financial constraints impacted the ability to pursue the proposals of the 1991 and 1993 White Papers. Resource extraction was affected by financial policy however, financial scarcity was used by policymakers as an instrument to spur transformation. If there had been any doubt, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington demonstrated that the benevolent environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union had dissipated. During this period the Netherlands undertook a series of expeditionary operations of increasing intensity. In 1999 the Netherlands committed two squadrons to Operation *Allied Force*, provided the lead element of the UN operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, deployed a substantial contingent to Northern Afghanistan in 2002, two battalion rotations to the stabilization force SFIR in Iraq in 2003, and participated in the demanding operation in Southern Afghanistan from 2006 onwards. Throughout this period however defense budgets would not rise. As a percentage of GDP, the defense budget has steadily decreased. From 1995 onwards – when the defense budget started to level off following the peace dividend – until 2008 it has only increased marginally, roughly 7% (see Figure 27). It meant that funds went to operations and maintenance at the expense of investment.

June 30, 2003.

908 *Militair Strategische Verkenning* (2006), p. 25.

909 Minister van Defensie, *Op weg naar een nieuw evenwicht: De krijgsmacht in de komende jaren* (*Prinsjesdagbrief*), vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 X, no.1, The Hague, September 23, 2003, p. 26.

910 Gordon Adams et.al., *Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability*, Defense & Technology Paper (Washington DC: National Defense University, November 2004), p.45.




Figure 27: Netherlands Defense Budget (real, nominal and as % of GDP), 1991-2008

(Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance)

The 2003 defense white paper, the *Prinsjesdagbrief: Enroute to a new Balance*, was characterized by a restrictive financial framework. The document, drafted under Minister Henk Kamp, at its outset extensively dealt with the dire financial situation of the ministry. It outlined a structural decline of the budget ranging between 255 and 380 million Euros over the period 2003-2008. It stated that reasons for the decrease were macro-economic: “increasing costs of pensions and dealing with health-care waiting lists” presented a typical choice of “butter and guns.”⁹¹¹ 3400 billets were removed, several bases were closed and operational capacities were reduced. Nevertheless it was an ambitious plan for improving expeditionary capabilities. Figure 28 sums up the reductions and investments proposed in the 2003 White Paper.

High-intensity capabilities such as howitzer artillery-pieces, tomahawk cruise missiles and a replacement for the F-16 were proposed, yet also key enablers to improve the expeditionary nature of the military, such as extra lift capabilities and network-centric capabilities, were put forward. These investments would be financed, not through increases in the budget, but in spite of them. Aside from the shifts in the distribution of power, Lo Casteleijn, the director of policy planning at the Dutch ministry of defense, signaled that budgetary constraints were in fact dominant drivers of Dutch transformation strategy.⁹¹² Static defense budgets were used as a tool to shape the process of rationalization.

911 Tweede Kamer, “Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004: Op Weg naar een Nieuw Evenwicht, de krijgsmacht in de komende jaren (Prinsjesdagbrief),” vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29200 X, no. 4, The Hague, September 23, 2003, p.5.

912 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, Ministry of Defense, The Hague.

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Military Police
Reductions	Seventy Leopard-2 tanks;			
	MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) capability	All Maritime Patrol Aircraft;	a reduction from 137 to 108 F-16s;	
	reserve units of the army were abolished surrendering the capability of the Netherlands to field an own division	Planned third marine battalion cancelled; two M-frigates, 2 mine countermeasure vessels	Reduction from 30 to 24 Apaches no replacement for Hawk air defense systems	loss of 240 billets
	sale of 18 armored howitzers to Norway.			
Investments		replacement of Navy helicopters with the NH-90;	procurement of precision munitions for the Air Force	
	expansion of Special Operations Forces	1 new amphibious transport vessel	procurement of Link-16 network-centric Air Force communication system	
	development of TITAAN a network-centric system for army communications	replacement of vehicles for Marine Corps	procurement of DC-10 for lift (bringing total to 3 aircraft)	
	procurement of 57 Panzerhowitzers 2000	a study into the placement of Tomahawk cruise missiles on the LCF-frigates	development of joint air defense with Army.	
	study into the procurement of a new infantry fighting vehicle	study into increased capabilities of replacement logistical support vessel, such as helicopter carrying capacity.	study into replacement of F-16 with Joint Strike Fighter	

Figure 28: Capability investments and Reductions in 2003 Netherlands Defense White Paper

(Source: Ministerie van Defensie, Prinsjesdagbrief 2003)

Casteleijn identified two key moments when this happened: the 1993 Defense White Paper and a decade later, the 2003 *Prinsjesdagbrief*. They combined two important dynamics. Both strategic reviews followed large-scale international upheaval: the end of the Cold War and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Secondly, they came at a time of budgetary scarcity. It created both a strategic and financial reason to prescribe a new direction in defense policy. In 1993 it was decided to reduce planned defense appropriations with half a billion Euros, and in 2003, three times that amount. It created a financial motive to “do things differently.” It was a stick the Minister could use to promote change among the services. The financial dimension was critical, Casteleijn said, in order to rationalize the defense organization: “It ensured that choices were made.” In 2006, this argument by Casteleijn was

explicitly mentioned in official defense policy documents. As the Ministry went through another round of budget considerations, the defense policy brief stated that “the budgetary framework that was set for this government defines the financial boundaries within which we must realize the new balance of the armed forces. We express that these boundaries are under pressure. *Such pressure is however not a priori undesired, because it stimulates effectiveness and prioritization* [emphasis added].”⁹¹³ A presentation by the deputy Commander of the Armed Forces stated that a dominant driver of transformation for the Netherlands has been the necessity to “balance between budget and means.”⁹¹⁴ As we have seen in the previous case study, this starkly differed from the United States. Fiscal initiatives in the US at the beginning of the 90’s were similar to those undertaken in the Netherlands. A peace dividend was taken. Yet in the United States, the peace dividend led to criticism from Republicans and the military leadership, procurement was believed to be neglected and there was talk of a pending “defense train-wreck” as a result.⁹¹⁵ In the Netherlands however, financial constraints were seen as a useful tool to drive change forward.

Why was fiscal pressure considered a useful tool? Following the hallmark shifts presented in the 1991 and 1993 defense white papers, throughout the 1990’s defense reform had been characterized by incremental reductions. The services retained their own budgeting power, the external environment did not yield threats to vital interests, and without robust Ministerial leadership, there was little pressure to stimulate coordinating investments and procurement policies to develop effective expeditionary capabilities. It gave rise to a policy known as the *kaasschaaf*, or cheese-grater. It was the Dutch analogy to the ‘salami-slicing’ method of incremental reductions. The Navy reduced a frigate, the Army a number of tanks, the Air Force several F-16s and so on. This would last throughout the decade. For example in 2000 the number of frigates was reduced from 16 to 14, the number of mine countermeasure vessels from 17 to 14, maritime patrol aircraft from 13 to 10, 136 Leopard tanks were divested, and the number of F-16s reduced by 18. While investments in new capabilities were made salami-slicing came at the expense of further weakening existing capabilities. A wholesale revision of capabilities was not undertaken, instead there were persistently fewer capabilities. When Henk Kamp came into office in 2002 he was pragmatic in identifying weak spots in the capability pool.⁹¹⁶ It became clear that for several capabilities the minimum threshold for operational sustainability had been surpassed and the cheese-grater had cut too deep. Capabilities that had been preserved at great cost were no longer fiscally viable and were cancelled altogether. Such was the fate of the MLRS artillery system and the maritime patrol aircraft. It resonated a similar move in the United States that occurred around the same time. Secretary Rumsfeld’s cancella-

913 Minister van Defensie, *Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief*, HDAB2006018085, June 2, 2006, p.25.

914 Hans Sonneveld, “Transformation of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands: how to remain relevant and affordable,” Presentation, The Hague, October 19, 2006.

915 Daniel Goure & Jeffrey M. Ranney, *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*, (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1999).

916 Interview with Henk Kamp, September 7, 2007, Ministry of Defense, The Hague.

tion of the Crusader artillery tube had as ulterior bureaucratic motive to assure the military services that hard choices would not be avoided. The financial reality was a means to enforce the transformation strategy towards an expeditionary military. This has created a policy culture where budget cuts are considered a useful mechanism to pursue change. The question remains to determine when has the fiscal knife cut so deep that meaningful change to be relevant is no longer possible?

20 THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: CLASHES OF CULTURE

The two tenets of Dutch strategic culture were constraints on the extractive capacity to pursue Dutch strategic transformation. When they aligned they pushed transformation forward. Such was the case prior to 1995 when international operations were of lower intensity and did not lead to questions of relevance to NATO or the United States. Afterwards Dutch security policy at times struggled to match the promotion of the international rule of law and stability projection in line with its ambition to play a relevant international role alongside the major allies in the security environment. It followed from a changing security environment which required more robust peace operations and in which the United States demonstrated its tendency towards unilateralism more forcefully. It meant that one pillar of its strategic culture was at loggerheads with the other. Under the bipolar system of the Cold War, support for the international rule of law aligned with the promotion of a strong NATO. Unipolarity however, had resulted in a more assertive US foreign and security policy and under the administrations of George W. Bush came greater US reluctance to work through international institutions. It created friction between the two elements of Dutch strategic culture. At the same time, with the attacks of 9/11 it became clear that the security environment had started to shift, although signs were already seen in the mid-1990's. The operation in Srebrenica and Kosovo had demonstrated that Western forces would need to be willing to engage in high-intensity operations as well. The tension was expressed in the dilemma whether the Netherlands could participate in operations that were effectively wars or not. It was also a dilemma between stability projection and relevance to the United States.

Four cases stand out to demonstrate how Dutch transformation policy was constrained by the clash when the two tenets of strategic culture did not align. They are the Kosovo air campaign, support for the Iraq War, the proposal to purchase Tactical Tomahawks, and participation in the ISAF operation in Southern Afghanistan with a "Dutch Approach".

20.1 ALLIED FORCE: IDENTITY IN FRICTION

While the Netherlands had traditionally held the international rule of law in highest regard alongside the desire to be a good ally, Operation *Allied Force* created friction between these two elements. In March 1999 NATO embarked on a military operation to stop

human suffering but did so in contradiction to its own international legal norms, namely without an explicit UN mandate. Parliament argued however that the violation of human rights warranted the violation of its own requirement to have a UN mandate. Stability would also be promoted since the mission addressed sources of regional instability on Europe's doorstep.

On September 23, 1998, UN Security Council resolution 1199 was adopted on the basis of Chapter VII, calling for the cessation of human rights violations in Kosovo. The resolution did not contain the explicit reference to employ "all necessary means" – authorizing military action - to enforce the resolution. Lacking an explicit mandate by the United Nations Security Council, a clear-cut international legal justification was unavailable for the Dutch government to participate in a military operation to stop the persecution of Kosovo-Albanians. Throughout deliberations leading up to the operation, the Netherlands' government maintained that resolution 1199 did in fact provide sufficient basis for military action. In a letter to Parliament on October 8, 1998 the continued refusal by Milosevic to abide by UN Security Council resolution 1199 was interpreted by the Government as a sufficient violation to authorize the use of military force.⁹¹⁷ Jozias van Aartsen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said "It was a resolution under Chapter VII [of the UN Charter], a sequel to resolution 1160. It was a sufficient basis because the FRY [Former Republic of Yugoslavia] was in non-compliance. According to us [the cabinet], the Parliament, the experts in New York and the 19 members of NATO, resolution 1199 was sufficient."⁹¹⁸ During parliamentary hearings, Van Aartsen was questioned over the necessity of judicial legitimacy for the operation. In his answer he made a distinction between judicial and political legitimacy. He explicated that, "only politics can take the decision" and that ultimately it was up to the politicians to decide whether an operation was legitimate or not. Although it defied the principle of international legal support for an operation, the distinction between judicial and political legitimacy found support in Parliament. MP Marijke Vos of the left-wing social-greens stated that:

[Resolution 1199] was judicially not a sufficient legitimization. ... We however found that the political legitimacy did suffice, because the resolution did mention that in non-compliance further action would be taken. From the debates that were held in the Security Council and elsewhere it was clear what type of action this would be. For us the humanitarian necessity stood paramount, given the violation of human rights and given the failure of diplomacy.⁹¹⁹

917 Tweede Kamer, "De situatie in voormalig Joegoslavië; Brief ministers over eventuele deelname van Nederlandse militairen aan NAVO-acties in Kosovo," vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 22181, nr. 213, The Hague, October 13, 1998, p.2.

918 Jozias van Aartsen, quoted in Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzending (2000), p. 314.

919 Ibid, p. 319.

Aside from this flexible reading of the text of Security Council resolution 1199, a further argument put forward was that a group of Western states could take matters into its own hands if it felt it was acting in the spirit of international law and the UN Charter, even if it was not explicitly mandated to do so. This line of reasoning held that the foreign policies of Western states, because of their presumed liberal justness, were sanctioned by international law whatever the international institution decided. The argument was a slippery slope since it defied the notion of international relations based on the legal principles agreed upon by all signatory states to the UN Charter. Instead it should be seen within the context of the unipolarity of the international system, whereby Western states were convinced of the overall righteousness of their actions irrespective of international law. If existing international legal institutions were incapable of acting, Western states, or NATO, could take over its role. Maxime Verhagen, MP for the Christian-Democrats, posited the Netherlands and NATO as a vanguard of the international community acting in the spirit of the UN Charter. Speaking to the parliamentary committee he said, "When we say that the protection of the international rule of law is the cornerstone of our foreign policy, then as the international community we cannot sit back as thousands of people are on the run, villages and houses are destroyed and numerous people killed, threatened or arrested [...] It is clear that Milosevic violated earlier Security Council resolutions. The humanitarian situation justifies the intervention." In the end, the Dutch government continued to emphasize that Security Council Resolution 1199 did provide sufficient justification for the military intervention, thereby maintaining allegiance to the international rule of law. The 2000 Defense White Paper made this position explicit when it declared that, "[although] the government adheres strongly to a sound international judicial basis for military action, however ultimately it places humanity over sovereignty."⁹²⁰ The Netherlands participated in Operation *Allied Force* with sixteen F-16 aircraft supported by two tanker aircraft.

The justification process surrounding the operation in Kosovo indicated how the Netherlands had walked up against its own self-declared vestige of international legal Puritanism. It led to a confrontation between Western liberal, human rights versus the international rule of law. Not to mention did it violate the norms Parliament had set for itself to only participate in an operation with an explicit international mandate. Had no action been taken, the letter of the United Nations Charter would be preserved, yet a human atrocity would be unaddressed. If action was taken, credibility of the United Nations would be jeopardized. The argument to be a relevant military power appears as a derivative of dealing with human rights atrocities. Could the Netherlands or NATO be relevant in the international security environment if it did not act to deal with human rights violations on its own doorstep? While in the early 1990's relevance implied contributing to peacekeeping operations, now the level of conflict intensity at which 'relevance' would be assessed had increased and had evolved to performing a humanitarian intervention. The Netherlands contributed to maintain the relevance of NATO as collective security organization, and thereby also a credible mainstay for its own security. Had NATO failed

than a cornerstone of Dutch security policy would have cracked. Showing solidarity in NATO was thereby a principle issue of concern. Ultimately, influenced by the unipolar international system, in the justification-process a third set of values prevailed, namely the legitimacy offered by democratic regimes. It was a symptom of the weakened stature of the United Nations and the alternative legitimacy presumed to be offered by a collective of Western liberal democratic states under the leadership of US liberal-democratic unipolarity. The liberal world governance structure promised by Van Vollenhoven was now policed by a group of Western states instead of the United Nations. The slippery slope of the argument became apparent during the 2003 Iraq War. Then, European states criticized the United States for asserting that its Coalition of the Willing made up of a random collection of states was representative of the international community's will. In fact Washington was using a similar line of reasoning it had done during Operation *Allied Force*. This time however, European states strongly objected, presenting a political ceiling for expeditionary operations.

20.2 IRAQ: THE DEMAND FOR STABILITY IS LARGER THAN ITS SUPPLY

The friction between being a relevant ally and promoting the international rule of law became apparent in the run-up to the Iraq War. Prime Minister Balkenende said on the eve of the war:

Peace is vulnerable. That becomes clear when one regime chooses the path of threat and terror, and does so for years. The international community must patiently hang on to international agreements and try to remove the threat. That patience may be large, but not endless. ... But to defend that rule of law, it is necessary that those that have violated those principles endlessly do not walk freely.⁹²¹

The Dutch government declared on March 18 2003 that it believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that the use of force was considered appropriate.⁹²² To the outside world support for the US-led Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was provided by referring to Iraq's violations of international law. Yet there was an internal debate raging in the Dutch bureaucracy whether Security Council resolution 1441 offered a sound international judicial

921 "Iedereen wil een wereld van vrede en veiligheid.[...] Vrede is kwetsbaar. Dat blijkt als één regime jarenlang het pad kiest van dreiging en terreur. De internationale gemeenschap moet dan geduldig vasthouden aan de internationale afspraken en zo proberen de dreiging weg te nemen. Dat geduld kan wel heel groot zijn, maar niet eindeloos. Want dan komt de basis van recht en vrede zelf in gevaar.[...] Velen hebben de afgelopen dagen gewezen op het belang van de internationale rechtsorde. Terecht. Maar tot het verdedigen van die rechtsorde behoort ook dat degenen die het recht sinds jaar en dag brutaal schenden, uiteindelijk niet vrijuit mogen gaan." Address by Prime Minister Balkenende, Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, March 20, 2003.

922 Tweede Kamer, "De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Brief minister over de Nederlandse opvatting ten aanzien van de laatste ontwikkelingen omtrent Irak in de VN-Veiligheidsraad," vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 94, The Hague, March 20, 2003, p. 3.

validation for the war since again an explicit UN mandate was missing. The Netherlands decided to adopt a somewhat schizophrenic posture which reflected the two contrasting traits of Dutch strategic culture. It decided to support Operation *Iraqi Freedom* politically, but not militarily.

Why did the Netherlands not choose to join the Franco-German diplomatic offensive against the war, or alternatively support the US-led operation with the armed forces? The Netherlands opted to bandwagon with the major power in the system. Yet, it did not do so completely. Rather the Netherlands chose to walk a fine line. Overtly supporting Franco-German resistance against the war would have posited the Netherlands at odds with its principle security ally and would contradict its Atlanticist tradition. Supporting the United States militarily contradicted its concerns over promoting the international rule of law for the second time in four years, yet this time it would also antagonize major powers in Europe. Neither was regime change part of the structure-focused understanding of the use of force. Removing Saddam Hussein without a UN mandate would lead to greater instability, particularly in the short-term and it remained to be seen what would happen in the long-term. Although for the United States the situation was comparable with the lack of a UN resolution to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, for the Netherlands that instance of legal tight-rope walking would not be repeated. The government said, "The lack of a Security Council mandate is an obstacle for national support for a further Dutch contribution. Therefore the government concludes that it will not provide an active military contribution to the operations."⁹²³ Confronted with the discord in the West, the Netherlands chose the middle road and adopted a traditional position to remain a bridge-builder.⁹²⁴

Though a combat role was excluded the Netherlands immediately offered to take a role in the stabilization process. In an effort to placate relations with the United States and support a niche for stability projection, Prime Minister Balkenende, even before the war had started, declared a willingness to contribute to the stabilization phase: "A war may be necessary, but it will not win you the peace. That must be won through the reconstruction of Iraq when the guns have silenced. The Netherlands is at its fullest prepared to contribute to this under the flag of the United Nations."⁹²⁵ The war started the next day. A stabilization mission in support of the United States, of course, did align both of the Dutch strategic cultural constraints, and would be an acceptable expeditionary operation.

On June 6, 2003 the decision was taken to send a marine battalion to the multinational stabilization force in Iraq. Stability in the region and Iraq's territorial integrity were deemed the interests at stake. Operating under overall command of the British, its objective would be to support the political process by improving security and the internal stability

923 Ibid, p. 4.

924 A similar situation occurred during the Vietnam War. It presented the Dutch government with difficulties. Torn between loyalty to its primary security guarantor and widespread public resentment of the war, the diplomatic position was to neither provide military support nor to explicitly denounce the American intervention.

925 Minister-President J.P Balkenende, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, March 18, 2003, TK 50, p. 50-3276.

of the country, crucial conditions for the process of reconstruction. It demonstrated the finesse of Dutch foreign policy to promote a liberal-structuralist view of social progress vested in stability projection while supporting the major power in the system.

20.3 LEFT-RIGHT TENSIONS OVER DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

Debate over the direction of defense policy and transformation towards an expeditionary force is influenced by left-right political dichotomies. Both sides of the political spectrum support the strategic cultural tenets to promote the international rule of law, project stability and use the military as an instrument to boost Dutch international relevance. This is the bandwidth of Dutch strategic culture however, the mix between these tenets is different on different sides of the political aisle. Right-wing parties do not shy away from high-intensity operations in order to promote the relevance of the Netherlands among its allies, or to do so to protect human rights. Left-wing parties however, rather use the military to promote the international rule of law through lower-intensity missions, which thereby in turn contribute to the overall standing of the Netherlands internationally. In practice it boiling down to a distinction between an Atlanticist foreign policy aimed at bandwagoning and a European approach that is primarily structure-focused.

Former Minister of Defense Kamp, of the right-wing liberals, articulated his political concern with respect to future transformation efforts. His answer was straight-forward when asked when the Netherlands' transformation policy would change. He said, "when leftist parties continue to be voted into power... We can break down in 5 years what it took 20 years to build up." Kamp was referring to the desire among left-wing parties to shift away from high-intensity operations and embrace lower-intensity stabilization forces as the mainstay of Dutch force structure. Three weeks before my interview with Kamp, on November 5, 2007 the Labor party (PvdA) and second-largest party in the Balkenende coalition government, presented a defense plan proposing to tip the scale towards lower-intensity stability projection and reorienting the military towards peacekeeping operations and crisis-management. The plan's title *Serviceable to the Netherlands, Serviceable to the World* articulated the implied altruism.⁹²⁶ The plan promised a dramatic revision of the capabilities of the armed forces that had been built up during the Kamp-era. Most notable would be revising the national level of ambition to remove the reference to operations in the highest spectrum. Furthermore heavy cuts in high-end platforms were proposed, including:

- ➔ half the F-16s (51 systems);
- ➔ half the operational tanks (44 systems);
- ➔ 2/3rds of the pantzerhowitzers (24 systems);
- ➔ 1 LCF frigate and 2 M-frigates.

926 See Angelen Eijnsink, *In dienst van Nederland, in dienst van de wereld, een plan voor een actieve en doelmatige krijgsmacht* (Den Haag: November 2007).

Instead the party promoted a focus on “soldiers with moral competence”. More attention would be paid to education and training diplomatic and humanitarian skills. It was a plan firmly rooted in the stability projection tradition of the Netherlands. According to one of the authors, Angeliën Eijnsink, “the PvdA wants to specialize and it chooses for ground forces.”⁹²⁷ Air Force and Navy would become supporting services to ground operations, implying a greater emphasis on transport and support roles instead of combat missions. According to Eijnsink, the PvdA had always been opposed to initial-entry operations and proposed to specialize in crisis-management operations instead. The plan demonstrated the thinking of the Labor party, and supported the ideas promoted in the 1968 policy paper forty years earlier, as well as the idealist interpretation of Van Vollenhoven’s concepts to develop a global governance system. Its vision contrasted sharply with Kamp’s procurement initiatives, such as the Tactical Tomahawks, which were also vested in Dutch strategic culture.

Four years before the Labor party presented its plans Minister Kamp announced his intention to purchase Tactical Tomahawks to be placed aboard the recently procured LCF-frigates. The planned purchase was typical of friction between the “stability projection through low-intensity missions” School of the Left and the “international relevance through participation in high-intensity missions” School of the Right-wing. The tactical tomahawk (TACTOM) stand-off weapon would allow the Navy to support land-operations through precision strikes with a minimum risk to friendly forces and collateral damage. It would also be a suitable tool to provide escalation dominance. Tactical tomahawks however conjured up the image of the opening salvos of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and were considered an offensive capability. Henk Kamp said the principle argument for procuring the system was to support land forces rather than having an initial-entry capability. He presented it as a “logical military means in a modern military”. It was also considered a relatively cheap system. The LCF-frigates were already equipped with vertical launching tubes. Refitting the launch system would cost €9,5 million over a period of 5 years excluding the cost of the missiles. At the same time the capability would greatly augment the Dutch ability to participate in high-intensity operations, its stated ambition since 1993. Perhaps most importantly, not just any ally could procure the tomahawk system from the United States, and it was therefore a way to demonstrate the Netherlands’ membership of an elite club of highly expeditionary and highly privileged states, it would support the Netherlands as an A-team member.

During two separate Parliamentary meetings in November 2004, the issue of the tomahawks was hotly debated. In 2004, left-wing parties wondered what the need was for a weapon that addressed no real military need. The Socialist party and the Social-greens overtly opposed the procurement as they believed it would constitute a qualitative shift in defense policy, emphasizing offensive operations. The Labor party stated that the cruise-missiles would empower the United States to “politically commit the Netherlands more strongly to potential preventive military actions that cannot be legitimated by the interna-

927 Noel van Bommel, “Wij willen soldaten met morele competentie,” *De Volkskrant*, November 3, 2007.

tional community.⁹²⁸ In 2006, left-leaning parties in Parliament stated that it was a purely offensive weapon only to be used at the beginning of a deployment. Given that the Netherlands would purchase a limited number of thirty missiles, the procurement was also deemed symbolic for political purposes, the Netherlands would be asked to participate at the start of an offensive operation simply for the sake of participating. Minister Kamp countered that in itself this would not be a problem as he conceptualized Dutch participation in a mission as a guarantee that The Hague could make its voice heard and therefore ensure due regard be given to Dutch concerns over the international rule of law. Dutch participation at the start of an operation would “only constitute an extra guarantee that the decision-making process occurs in the right fashion,” he said.⁹²⁹ In 2004, Minister Kamp noted that much of the resistance to the system was based on the historical-emotional dimension of talking about cruise missiles. It evoked the anti-nuclear sentiment dominant in the 1980’s. At the time, a heated discussion took place regarding the placement of US nuclear-tipped cruise missiles in the Netherlands. While the Tactical Tomahawk was a different system altogether, the focus of concern was on its offensive characteristics.

It was however decided to postpone purchasing the Tomahawks. The OPV, Ocean-going Patrol Vessel, replaced the cruise missile in the budget. This ship could operate close to shore and would be useful in counter-drug operations. Also Parliament wanted to have a capability that stimulated the Dutch instead of the American defense industry. Two years later, as operations in Afghanistan were eating into the Ministry’s budget, Minister Kamp’s replacement Eimert van Middelkoop, of the Christian Union, decided not to purchase the tomahawks at all. He acknowledged in May 2007 that the Netherlands would not operate at a level of intensity for which the missiles would be useful and therefore had decided to cancel the program altogether. The right-wing liberal party disagreed wholeheartedly and said that without the missiles the Netherlands would not be able to talk with sufficient weight to the United States.

20.4 URUZGAN

The fourth instance which makes apparent how Dutch strategic-cultural tenets clashed in light of a shifting systemic division of power is the decision in 2005 to deploy military forces to the Southern Afghan province of Uruzgan. Due to the high intensity of conflict and the deployment of ground forces in a counterinsurgency mission, ‘Uruzgan’ presents the most poignant case where internal friction in Dutch strategic culture was portrayed.

In the summer of 2005, the Dutch government informed Parliament that it contemplated sending Dutch troops to Southern Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission in what would become the largest high-intensity deployment since the Korean War.⁹³⁰ Two

928 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, Defensie, TK 28, November 25, 2004, p. 28-1905.

929 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, Defensie, TK 23, November 17, 2005, p. 23-1488.

930 “I inform you that in relation to a request by NATO [Secretary General] I have announced that the Netherlands will research the possibilities of contributing to the deployment of ISAF in South Afghanistan (stage 3) in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada.” Tweede Kamer, “Brief minister over de NAVO-defensieministeriële bijeenkomst, die op 9 en 10 juni

months later, on August 26, 2005, the Government informed Parliament that an intention to deploy had been communicated to the North Atlantic Council pending political approval from Parliament.⁹³¹ Four months later, on December 22, 2005 Parliament was officially informed along the contours of the *Toetsingskader* that the Netherlands would send a contingent to Southern Afghanistan as part of ISAF to aid the Afghan authorities to guarantee security and stability in Afghanistan.

Projecting stability in order to deal with a security threat was the overarching publicly communicated objective of the mission. Minister Kamp wrote, “The stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, particularly in the South where the Taliban’s roots lie, is of great importance to improving the international rule of law and combating international terrorism which also threatens Europe.”⁹³² On January 10, 2006 Prime Minister Balkenende said, “I want our Dutch military to contribute to the reconstruction of Uruzgan.” If unsuccessful, Minister Kamp had warned, Afghanistan would again become a sanctuary for terrorism, which amounted to a security threat for Europe.⁹³³

Operational risks connected to the operation were defined as “significant” and since Uruzgan was part of the Taliban’s heartland and “many among the local population did not support the ISAF coalition” the government recognized that the mission had “real military risks,” adding that “offensive actions may be necessary to create a safe environment.”⁹³⁴ On the other hand, the letter stated that the Netherlands had the necessary experience with high-risk operations and had performed them successfully before, citing operations in Iraq and Northern Afghanistan.⁹³⁵ The nature of the mission in Uruzgan would however be very different from the stabilization campaigns in the relatively risk-free environment of Al-Muthanna - where the Netherlands had left before the Iraqi insurgency picked up steam - and the peaceable area surrounding Pol-i-Khomri.⁹³⁶ Nevertheless, the letter to Parliament mentioned that the security-situation in Uruzgan was “bad.”⁹³⁷ Such a stark

2005 te Brussel,” vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 28 676, nr. 22, The Hague, June 29, 2005, p. 1.

931 Tweede Kamer, “Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme; Brief ministers over ontwikkelingen in de aanloop naar de verkiezingen in Afghanistan op 18 september 2005,” vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 27925, no. 182, The Hague, September 5, 2005.

932 “De stabilisering en wederopbouw van Afghanistan, in het bijzonder het zuiden waar de Taliban haar oorsprong vindt, is van groot belang voor de bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde en de bestrijding van het internationale terrorisme dat ook Europa bedreigt.” Minister van Defensie, *Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan*, DVB/CV-388/05, The Hague, December 22, 2005, p. 3-4.

933 Idem.

934 Idem.

935 Idem, p.3.

936 The Dutch SFIR contingent left Al Muthanna in April 2005, ten months before the Al-Askari bombing in Samarra which triggered widespread ethnic violence and fueled the insurgency, also directed at the coalition forces. Pol-i-Khomri lay outside the ethnically Pashtun, and troubled parts of Afghanistan. These notoriously instable areas were primarily found in the Eastern and Southern provinces along the border of Pakistan.

937 Minister van Defensie, *Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan*, DVB/CV-388/05,

reference to dire circumstances in an operational theatre had not appeared in the deployment letters for Iraq and Northern Afghanistan.

By 2006 the Netherlands' transformation process found its focal point in the mission in Uruzgan. Deploying forces to Uruzgan was a landmark for the Netherlands' security policy and would shape transformation itself. Kamp affirmed that the operation in Southern Afghanistan had become the driving force for transformation more so than any top-down grand scheme.⁹³⁸ The 2008 defense budget confirmed that the "cornerstone of Dutch security policy is the mission in Afghanistan." According to Casteleijn, the mission was the 'proof of the pudding' within the limits of the responsible.⁹³⁹ It tested the limits of the 'broad expeditionary' force under development since 1991. The operation represented a litmus test for the armed forces and Dutch politics. Could the Netherlands militarily and politically support the tougher implications of having a broad expeditionary capability?

Central to this test was that the security environment had evolved since the early 1990's and now a high-intensity expeditionary operation with ground forces had dawned. The military had underlined this eventuality since 1991, however politically it had remained a hypothetical. Throughout the 1990's stability projection to promote the international rule of law in coordination with promoting Dutch international relevance had encompassed relatively risk-free peacekeeping and peace support missions. Conflicts had however become more complex, and due to the threat of international terrorism, Western states had become a party to regional instability in places like Afghanistan. In short, the international system had changed and this affected the two main tenets of Dutch strategic culture differently.

While it was not presented as such at the time, the mission in Uruzgan was a high-intensity counterinsurgency operation, the first of its kind for the Netherlands' military and by far the largest and thereby the most demanding operation since the police actions in the Dutch East Indies in the late 1940's. It tested the limits of "out-of-area" operations in terms of duration (two years, later to be prolonged to four), in terms of intensity (engaging in offensive operations with ground forces), in terms of logistics and in terms of climate and endurance (the operation was 6000 kilometers away in rugged terrain).⁹⁴⁰ In 2005 Uruzgan was a black hole, lacking effective local governance but with plenty of warlords, guns, drugs, rebel activity and difficult terrain. It was a complex environment to bring stability, where people were more scared of the police than of the Taliban.⁹⁴¹

The battalion-sized contingent consisted of approximately 1500, later to be increased to 1700, troops initially drawn from units from the 12th Air Assault Infantry battalion of

The Hague, December 22, 2005, p. 3-4.

938 Interview with Henk Kamp, November 29, 2007, The Hague.

939 Interview with Lo Casteleijn, September 7, 2007, The Hague.

940 Minister of Defence, *Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan*, DVB/CV-388/05, The Hague, December 22, 2005, p.12.

941 Barbara Bedway, "Covering the 'Other' War: a reporter in Afghanistan," *Editor & Publisher*, April 3, 2006.

the expeditionary Air Manoeuvre Brigade and the 44th Mechanized Infantry battalion. Six F-16 fighter aircraft and six Apache assault helicopters were deployed alongside three armored pantzerhowitser artillery systems, and Chinook and Cougar transport helicopters. It was the heaviest deployment abroad of the Dutch military in contemporary history.

Prior to deployment a substantive political hurdle needed to be mounted by the government. Parliamentary support, although constitutionally not necessary but desirable, was not guaranteed. There was friction between the offensive element of the operation, which stood on a tense footing with the principle of stability projection, and expressing solidarity with NATO, ISAF and the United States. Public support for the mission in Uruzgan swayed heavily. On December 21, 2005, the day before Parliament received the government's letter of intent, in a public opinion poll 26% of those questioned were in favor of the mission, while 68% were against. Following the debate in Parliament six weeks later on February 2nd, 49% were in favor.⁹⁴² While it showed a significant increase in support for the mission, the question remains whether less than half was 'sufficient'.

In line with the emphasis on stability projection, the government presented the operation as a reconstruction mission. During the debate in Parliament in February 2006 three arguments in favor of the mission were put forward, all reflecting tenets of Dutch strategic culture: firstly the political-military responsibility to support NATO solidarity; secondly, the purpose of the mission to increase stability in a conflict-ridden part of the world and thereby avoid the creation of a terrorist sanctuary; and thirdly, the argument that the operation in Uruzgan would be qualitatively different from previous efforts in Uruzgan by the US military due to a unique "Dutch Approach" to stabilization missions.

20.4.1 SOLIDARITY WITH NATO

The most straightforward reason for the Dutch to deploy to Uruzgan was that the Netherlands had the capability to do so and solidarity in the alliance required its participation. Now was the time to use the capabilities it had developed. As the contingent was on the verge of deployment, Foreign Minister Ben Bot, in an interview in *NRC Handelsblad* on June 13, 2006, wondered out loud what the use of the military was if it was not used. He implied that the existence of Dutch expeditionary forces provided ample justification to participate. Coupled to this was solidarity with NATO. Pressure to participate also came from Brussels. Two days before the crucial debate in Parliament, solidarity stood central. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO's Secretary-General, pressured the Netherlands with a similar "use it or lose it"-approach:

942 J.S. van der Meulen & A. Vos, "Kwetsbaar draagvlak: de publieke opinie over Uruzgan," *Carré* no.6 (2007), p.21-23. See also the Dutch Ministry of Defense's monitor of Dutch public opinion regarding Uruzgan, "Monitor Publieke Opinie Uruzgan" which offers monthly public opinion surveys from August 2006 to July 2010. Available at http://www.defensie.nl/missies/afghanistan/actueel/monitor_publieke_opinie.

*This is an alliance based on solidarity where nations cannot pick and choose. Solidarity demands in this alliance that if you are in a position to participate in this operation you should participate. You should not say, sorry, it is too dangerous. We will not go. That is an argument I do not buy. What do you have armed forces for?*⁹⁴³

NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Jones signaled that NATO genuinely needed the Dutch contribution because the Alliance had little alternative aside from the Dutch.⁹⁴⁴ Even before the cabinet had informed Parliament about the decision to go to Uruzgan, it was made clear that, “it is important to NATO that the Netherlands participates.”⁹⁴⁵ Dutch credibility in the alliance was deliberately used as a coercive instrument of diplomacy. Addressing parliamentary hesitations about the mission, former Dutch Ambassador to NATO Michiel Patijn said, “We are not doing what we say, we don’t put our money where our mouth is. It’s about our image and we’re losing our sense of direction ... We have always said that we can best defend our interests through the UN, NATO as foundation of our security policy, and the EU ... I don’t understand where the sudden hesitations over this stability operation comes from.”⁹⁴⁶ The government acknowledged that the Netherlands was under significant pressure from NATO to agree to the mission. Although it stressed that any contribution took place on the condition of domestic political approval, it would have a significant impact on the Alliance’s military planning process. The government observed that it was under pressure from those allies intending to operate alongside the Dutch, meaning the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia. For the Netherlands, these were not the least of allies; instead these were the allies with which The Hague had historically the closest ties and towards whom they were most oriented.⁹⁴⁷

20.4.2 SUPPORT FOR STABILITY

The second argument combined solidarity with the notion of promoting the international rule of law. The Christian-Democrats noted as principle considerations solidarity with Afghanistan and the “obligation to improve the international rule of law” as well as The

943 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer quoted in “Dutch Pressed over Afghanistan,” *International Herald Tribune*, January 30, 2006.

944 T. Koelé & M. Peepkorn, “Tweede Kamer zwaar onder druk gezet,” *De Volkskrant*, January 31, 2006.

945 A. Brouwers & T. Koelé, “Kabinet nu voor missie Afghanistan,” *De Volkskrant*, December 2, 2005.

946 “We maken onze woorden niet waar, we don’t put our money where our mouth is. Het gaat om beeldvorming. En we verliezen ons richtingsgevoel... We hebben altijd beleden dat wij onze belangen het best kunnen behartigen via de Verenigde Naties, de NAVO als hoeksteen van het veiligheidsbeleid, en de Europese Unie... ..Ik begrijp dan ook niet goed waar de plotselinge aarzelingen over deze stabiliseringsmissie vandaan komen.” M. Patijn quoted by Jurd Eijssvoegel, “Blauw Oog voor Nederland,” *NRC Handelsblad*, January 13, 2006.

947 See Commandant der Strijdkrachten, *Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006*, February 6, 2006.

Hague's responsibility as a NATO member to deny terrorists a sanctuary.⁹⁴⁸ The third-largest party, the liberal-conservative VVD, argued that solidarity, as a central element of creating a system of collective security, was a major justification for sending the force to Uruzgan. The interest of relevance was put forward. The argumentation was framed around the historical role of the Netherlands as an international player. VVD party-leader Jozias van Aartsen referred to an international "calling of our country," which was based on solidarity with NATO to protect Western values of democracy and human rights:

*For centuries we have looked beyond our dikes, we have stood on the frontline to promote our solid belief in human rights, in democracy and international cooperation. That is why we are member of international alliances: the UN, NATO and the EU.*⁹⁴⁹

Similarly, the second-largest party, the Labor party, indicated their support in principle because it was a United Nations operation executed by NATO at the invitation of President Karzai.⁹⁵⁰ The mission met the requirement of an international legal mandate to contribute to the rule of law.

The smallest party of the governmental coalition, liberal-democratic D66 was however vehemently opposed to the operation. This jeopardized the cohesion in the governing coalition. D66 questioned the feasibility of the mission and complained that reconstruction would be difficult in such an adverse conflict environment. D66 said they "hardly identified opportunities for reconstruction, and instead saw many and substantial risks." Nor was the party convinced that ISAF could realistically be separated from the American-led Operation *Enduring Freedom*, which emphasized counter-terror operations rather than reconstruction and stabilization. D66's considerations were based on the question whether stability projection could take place. The party disagreed with the outset of the mission because its character would not be a representation of its publically stated objective; rather than reconstruction, the mission would involve fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives because of the non-permissive operational environment. What remained unclear was whether the party disapproved of the mission because it was considered too dangerous and included offensive actions, or whether it was against the operation because the government proposed a type of mission which it believed would not be able to take place. To substantiate his argument D66 leader Boris Dittrich recalled the situation

948 M. Verhagen, "Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan," Tweede Kamer, The Hague, February 2, 2006.

949 "Eeuwenlang hebben wij over onze dijken heengekeken, hebben wij vooraan gestaan om ons rotsvaste geloof in mensenrechten, in democratie en internationale samenwerking uit te dragen. Daarom zijn wij ook lid van die internationale bondgenootschappen: de VN, de EU en de NAVO." Jozias van Aartsen, "Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan," Tweede Kamer, The Hague, February 2, 2006.

950 Bert Koenders, quoted in *Trouw*, January 14, 2006.

in 1995 prior to the deployment to Srebrenica when the armed forces participated in an operation unprepared for the situation they would encounter on the ground:

*Then, as now, there was significant pressure from the international community, the media and the population. Then, we agreed without really thinking it through. We must not stumble into another war.*⁹⁵¹

References to the troubled operation in Srebrenica in 1995 hung over the decision-making process like a thunderstorm. Looking back, the noble objective of that mission had clouded rational judgment over the operation. The fear was that the decision-making process regarding Uruzgan would be based on similar good intentions. While recognizing the danger of the operation, the Christian-Democrats also made clear that if they were to partake in a dangerous military operation, they would only do so within a NATO framework alongside larger states. They wanted safeguards and guarantees for force protection and an exit strategy to avoid a second ‘Srebrenica.’ The Minister of Foreign Affairs noted however that the comparison with Srebrenica was not appropriate: “At the time, our soldiers were lightly armed because they had a different mandate.”⁹⁵² In the case of Uruzgan, he said, the soldiers would be “optimally armed” and NATO had given various guarantees in the event the situation went bad, referring to assurances given by an American counterpart.⁹⁵³ Additionally, six Dutch Apaches and six F-16s were available for an extraction operation if necessary. D66’s complaints that the mission could not contribute to stability projection left the other parties unconvinced.

20.4.3 DIFFERENTIATION WITH THE MAJOR ALLY: AGENCY VS. STRUCTURE

The previous two arguments portrayed the schools of Dutch strategic culture: solidarity with NATO and stability projection. The third argument was the most important in terms of demonstrating tension between these two elements and how it affected transformation. Just as the political deliberations over the police-actions in the 1940’s had outlined military-strategic implications - prohibiting the destruction of Djokjakarta - so too did parliamentary deliberations over Uruzgan proscribe military-strategic aspects: the Netherlands would operate differently from the United States.

While the Netherlands would show solidarity and assert its relevance to the US and NATO by participating, the Dutch emphasis on stability led it to criticize the United States

951 “Ook toen was erg grote druk vanuit de internationale gemeenschap, de media en de bevolking. Toen zijn we akkoord gegaan zonder dat we het goed hadden doordacht. We moeten ons nu niet weer een oorlog in laten rommelen.” Boris Dittrich quoted by Raoul Du Pré, “Dittrich vreest een nieuw Srebrenica,” *De Volkskrant*, January 27, 2006.

952 Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot quoted by P. De Waard, “Bot prijst ‘vrienden bij PvdA,’” *De Volkskrant*, February 1, 2006.

953 “We had a clear message. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said, “There can be no misunderstanding on our solidarity. The Dutch can rely on getting the military support that is necessary.” D. Fried quoted in “US Promises Dutch Military Support in Afghanistan,” *NIS News Bulletin*, December 1, 2005.

and its adoption of a primarily agency-focused approach in Afghanistan. The United States was focused on removing the threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, not by emphasizing structural improvements and institution-building but rather through a “kinetic approach”; targeting insurgents and terrorists with military capabilities including Special Forces conducting search & destroy missions and air-strikes.⁹⁵⁴ This clashed with the Dutch intention to embrace the military as part of a broader toolset in order to change the structures and institutions of Afghan society and bring stability. The Netherlands wanted to pursue stability projection. The Netherlands is not a warfighting state. It was the same reason why the Netherlands had been uncomfortable supporting Operation *Iraqi Freedom* militarily, and why it had been among the first to offer troops for subsequent stability campaigns. It clashed with the US perspective based on its liberating view of warfare.

During the debate for approving the Uruzgan mission, it led to friction in Dutch strategic culture. Between solidarity with the United States and the desire for stability became apparent. A key requirement formulated by Parliament was to explicitly separate, what was seen as the terrorist-hunting US mission Operation *Enduring Freedom* and multilateral stability-projecting ISAF. It was made explicit in the government’s letter to Parliament of December 22, 2005 which indicated that American activities in the region were questionable and that there was widespread concern over the US-style of operating:

*Among large parts of the population there is no support for the behavior of coalition forces [the US] which is considered to be inappropriate. Their actions seem to impact the local situation negatively instead of positively. An operating style of ISAF, explicitly focused on winning the hearts and minds of the population, is therefore necessary.*⁹⁵⁵

It was direct criticism of the agency-focused approach of the US military that was part of US strategic culture. The government later explained that in its perception the United States had not been successful in winning local ‘hearts and minds’ as a result of the collateral damage associated with the prolific use of airpower in a close air support role. Suspected terrorists were targeted with precision capabilities, but at the expense of the civilian population. Similarly, the heavy-handed way in which search efforts and arrests were performed had led the population to view US forces unfavorably.⁹⁵⁶ The underlying reason was that the United States had taken an enemy-centric rather than a population-centric perspec-

954 See Aylwin-Foster (2005) and Barack Obama, “State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 27, 2010.

955 “Daarnaast is er onder grote delen van de lokale bevolking geen draagvlak voor het als ongepast ervaren optreden van de coalitiestrijdkrachten. Dat optreden lijkt daarmee op dit moment eerder van negatieve dan van positieve invloed op de lokale situatie. Een overgang naar de aanpak van ISAF, met meer nadruk op het winnen van de ‘hearts and minds’ van de bevolking, is daarom geboden.” Minister van Defensie, *Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan*, DVB/CV-388/05, The Hague, December 22, 2005, p. 10.

956 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Ministerie van Defensie, “Antwoorden op Kamervragen van 20 januari 2006,” DVB/CV -041/06, January 27, 2006.

tive, and focused on targeting terrorists at the expense of promoting stability. The Dutch government underlined and criticized the American kinetic and agency-focused approach in Afghanistan:

*The international military presence, over the past years, has been directed at the armed fights against the OMF [Opposing Military Forces] instead of improving the living conditions of the population.*⁹⁵⁷

The Dutch government, with its focus on structure and stability, believed it would be better predisposed to address these needs, and thereby argued in favor of the deployment.

The parliamentary deliberations evolved into a debate over the military tactics American forces used in Afghanistan. Criticism over the US style of operating was commonly held throughout Parliament, across the political spectrum. Femke Halsema, the leader of the social-green party (GroenLinks) said that “Reconstruction can only work if it rests on the willingness of the population to open their hearts and minds to foreign forces. This is not possible if Americans kick in their doors at night.”⁹⁵⁸ Boris Dittrich of the D66 liberal-democrats noted that the Americans were partially to blame for the level of resistance: “Over the past period, Uruzgan has become more unsafe, in spite of, but also due to the actions of the Americans.” The leader of the Christian-democrats Maxime Verhagen argued that the Dutch would be more effective than American forces because of a greater level of consideration for the local population since “if you can improve the living conditions, even only in small steps, than they [Dutch forces] will definitively win the hearts and minds. If you “... do not kick in the doors but hang them up again, it implies a very different military operation.”⁹⁵⁹ Dittrich responded to Verhagen asking whether the population in Uruzgan would indeed be able to tell the difference between US and Dutch forces. Verhagen replied that not only different insignias on the uniforms but more so a different modus operandi would make the distinction clear.

The political elite went to great lengths to underline military differences with the Americans. In response to a question how the Dutch contingent would communicate with the local population, the cabinet reaffirmed that the Dutch forces would make clear to the local population that they were not American: “During the communication that members of the [Dutch contingent] will have with the population, they will advance the position that the Dutch or European effort is different from the American effort as it has been so far.” The government explained that it would do so through personal contacts, public meetings but also over radio broadcasts. The greatest risk to Dutch troops seemed not to be the Taliban but rather whether they were considered ‘American’ or not.

An additional element fuelling concern over US tactics was the public and political

957 Ibid.

958 Femke Halsema, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, February 2, 2006, pp. 45-3022.

959 M. Verhagen, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, February 2, 2006, pp. 45-3014.

outcry against the Abu Ghraib prisoner-scandal in Iraq and the dire humanitarian situation at the military prisons at Guantanamo Bay. For fear of Dutch complicity with human rights violations, Parliament wanted a formal promise from the Government that no individuals arrested by the Dutch contingent would be sent to Guantanamo.⁹⁶⁰ Maxime Verhagen said that in contrast to Operation *Enduring Freedom* there should “be no doubt that the humanitarian law of war will be upheld” and that “we want to build up a relationship with the local population in our area in our own way.”⁹⁶¹ Thereby juxtaposing a “Dutch Approach” to seeming disregard for humanitarian law by the Americans. The Netherlands was committed to take a qualitatively different approach to ‘Uruzgan’ from the other provinces where the US continued to operate. Dutch politicians went so far as to equate Dutch participation in the operation as a guarantee that no violations of humanitarian law would occur. The Labor party said that if the Dutch did not go to Uruzgan there was a “100% guarantee” that any arrested individuals would end up in Guantanamo Bay.

The main issue for the decision makers was whether the Dutch forces were sufficiently able to differentiate themselves from the Americans. The Dutch would be more effective in Uruzgan because they were not Americans. This was a surprising line of argument since solidarity with NATO and sustaining relevance to the United States were principal considerations to participate in the mission in the first place, as well as a core element of Dutch strategic culture. The reason must be sought in that other element of Dutch strategic culture, namely a structure-focused understanding of interventions and a military emphasis on stability projection. The military would not be deployed to fight wars, but rather to contribute to stability in order to enable liberal institutions to take root. It led to a concomitant resistance to the American agency-focused approach, and a belief that there where they had failed, the Netherlands would be successful. Because the Dutch operated from the vantage point of stability projection, they were disinclined to use the military in isolation from other instruments of power or purely with the intent to fight adversaries. This attitude was specifically promoted through belief in a successful “Dutch Approach” to stabilization operations.

20.4.4 THE “DUTCH APPROACH”

During the SFIR stabilization mission in Iraq, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs argued that by participating in the alliance the Netherlands could shape the operation so that SFIR would not resemble an occupational force. Dutch participation was believed to give the mission a different image. MP Camiel Eurlings of the Christian Democrats said, “I am convinced that a large majority of the Iraqi population will see our men and women not as occupiers, but as liberators and that the overall majority of the Iraqis will welcome the international support to the reconstruction of the country.”⁹⁶² Just as had been done

960 Ministry of Defense, “Answers to Parliamentary questions,” DVB/CV-041/06, January 27, 2006, p.36.

961 M. Verhagen, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, pp. 3013-3035, February 2, 2006.

962 Camiel Eurlings, Tweede Kamer, “De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Verslag algemeen overleg

during the police actions in the Dutch Indies, and later during the mission in Southern Afghanistan, it became government policy “not to emphasize the military presence.” For this there were two reasons. Firstly, it would cultivate the culturally preferred role of the Netherlands as a stabilizing power and not as an occupier or warfighter instead. Secondly, it was believed to improve force protection. By adjusting non-verbal communications – such as driving in light-armored vehicles, not wearing sun-glasses or only carrying weapons when necessary – the Dutch forces would come across as non-confrontational. Of course, it was far from new. Dutch politicians had preferred to perform crisis-management operations in this manner throughout the 1990’s. Nevertheless the way in which the Netherlands military operated in Iraq became the basis for what was termed the “Dutch Approach,” a term that remained in the public discourse to describe what was considered to be a qualitatively different way of operating in complex stabilization missions. The question was whether this “Dutch Approach,” or stabilization with a light touch, would hold up in a high-intensity environment like Uruzgan?

The label “Dutch Approach” was used for operations in Southern Iraq and Northern Afghanistan. It was described by the government as an operating style based on “knowledge of and respect for the local culture.” The term found widespread appeal in Parliament. While acknowledging the complexity of the environment in Uruzgan, Wouter Bos, leader of the Labor party, stated that if there was one approach that had a chance of success it was the “Dutch Approach” as it had already demonstrated its value during the NATO mission in the north of Afghanistan.⁹⁶³ Prior to the Parliamentary debate over Uruzgan, the commander of the Dutch armed forces, General Dick Berlijn, elaborated on the “Dutch Approach.” He summarized it as showing respect for the local population while remaining aware of the risks of an operation. The Approach had been nourished as a result of the experience with expeditionary operations throughout the 1990’s. Berlijn said, “the Dutch Approach is based on respect and understanding for the cultural context, but one that neither closes its eyes to the risks and gives our soldiers the protection and rules of engagement that are necessary to act adequately.”⁹⁶⁴ It was held to be a combination of limited force and cultural respect while maintaining the ability to escalate. It sounded sensible enough and appealed to Dutch strategic-cultural preferences to promote the international

op 25 juni 2003 over de mogelijke Nederlandse bijdrage aan de stabilisatiemacht voor Irak,” vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 120, The Hague, July 9, 2003, p. 5.

963 W. Bos, “Debat over de Nederlandse deelname aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan,” TK 45, pp 3013-3035, February 2, 2006.

964 “Sinds 1993 heeft de Nederlandse Krijgsmacht deelgenomen aan vrijwel alle internationale missies van formaat. We hebben daardoor veel kennis en ervaring opgedaan en een wijze van optreden ontwikkeld die succesvol is gebleken. Ook in risicovolle omstandigheden. Deze zogenoemde *Dutch Approach* is gebaseerd op respect en begrip voor de culturele omgeving, maar sluit de ogen niet voor de risico’s en geeft onze soldaten de bescherming en geweldsinstructie die nodig zijn om adequaat op te treden.” Gen. D. Berlijn, “Toespraak bij Vertrek F-16 detachment naar Afghanistan,” January 9, 2006.

rule of law in a non-confrontational manner. Aware that the term could be misconstrued, Berlijn added that in Afghanistan there would be no luxury of choosing for either reconstruction or fighting, and that both would be necessary.⁹⁶⁵

The “Dutch Approach” repeated traditional tenets of counterinsurgency such as engaging the local population and applying minimal force. It emphasized engaging the population rather than fighting. It thereby created the public impression that, although the need for offensive operations had been mentioned in the Government’s letter of December 22, 2005, the Netherlands could be successful in Uruzgan with a minimum use of force. Traditional counterinsurgency doctrine however dictates a necessity to be prepared to engage in direct action against insurgents as well.⁹⁶⁶ With a strategic culture focused on stability projection, this latter element was not publicly promoted. Winning local “hearts and minds” became the stated objective of the “Dutch Approach” in Uruzgan. “Our work was primarily directed at getting the support of the local population instead of hunting groups of Taliban warriors across the province,” battalion commander of Task Force Uruzgan Piet van der Sar said one year into the mission. He said it fit “perfectly in our counterinsurgency strategy.”⁹⁶⁷

Although it could be distilled from the government’s deployment letter, no mention was made of the term “counterinsurgency,” nor was it referred to in the Parliamentary debate. On October 4, 2006 MP Farah Karimi of the social-green party asked the government whether the Uruzgan mission was a counterinsurgency operation. The response was an elaborate description of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan describing both its indirect, stability-oriented elements emphasizing engagement with the local population, as well as its elements associated with warfighting. Yet the term itself was avoided.⁹⁶⁸ I asked a senior policy official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs why this was. His response was that the letter of November 22, was clear enough that offensive operations associated with counterinsurgency would occur. However, it proved politically expedient to avoid giving the

965 “Er is in een gecompliceerd land als Afghanistan niet een zwart-wit keuze tussen vechten of opbouw. Het is op vechten voorbereid zijn, maar de bevolking vooral laten zien dat opbouw de hoofddoelstelling is.” Ibid.

966 See also Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, John Nagl, et al. “Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency” in *Military Review* (March-April 2006), p. 49-53.

967 “Dat paste perfect in onze strategie van counterinsurgency. Kijk, ons werk was vooral gericht op het verwerven van steun van de lokale bevolking, in plaats van het jagen op groepen strijders van de Taliban door de hele provincie. Het eerste heeft meer zin, want de mensen in Uruzgan zijn niet zo pro Taliban. Overleven komt op de eerste plaats en daarbij kunnen ze de Nederlandse hulp goed gebruiken. Aan de andere kant kan het verzet onmogelijk zonder de steun van de plaatselijke bevolking. Voor voedsel en onderdak kloppen ze bij hen aan en daar nu ligt een kans voor de locale overheid en de International Security Assistance Force. Slaag je erin in de mensen in Uruzgan voor je te winnen, dan breng je de Taliban een zware klap toe.” Interview Colonel Van der Sar. http://www.regimentvanheutsz.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=244. Accessed June 13, 2007.

968 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Vragen van het lid Karimi (GroenLinks) aan de minister van Defensie over de rules of engagement van ISAF in Afghanistan. (Ingezonden September 21, 2006),” Kamervragen met antwoord 2006-2007, TK 30, October 4, 2006.

impression of fighting, nor did it fit in the Dutch strategic culture of stability projection. Emphasizing the offensive nature of counterinsurgency risked failing to get public support for the mission.

The idea that the Netherlands could achieve success in Uruzgan without fighting the Taliban was utopian. Asked in late 2007 about the existence of a “Dutch approach,” General Ton van Loon, commander of ISAF Regional Command South was adamant. “Fighting a bit” does not exist, he said. It however captured the impression shared by Parliament in the run-up to the decision-making process for the operation in Uruzgan. The day after the favorable parliamentary vote Minister Kamp finally stressed offensive operations would likely take place. He said, “the hard core of the Taliban and Al Qaeda must be eliminated with hard action. If attacks are planned in our province of Uruzgan, we will make sure they are not executed.”⁹⁶⁹

The Dutch emphasis on stability projection, and the “Dutch Approach,” translated into a focus on ‘hearts and minds’ rather than engaging the Taliban directly. Initially this was believed to have consequences for the military material and apparel used in Afghanistan. A different style of operating would necessarily mean a different set of tools should be taken along. This was another dimension along which the Netherlands would distinguish itself from the United States. Dutch forces would ride in open jeeps if possible, only “in an armored personnel vehicle if necessary.”⁹⁷⁰ It resonated traditional counterinsurgency principles that the more a force is protected the less secure it is because it is unable to contact the population. Another seemingly trivial element was that Dutch forces would not wear sunglasses which were favored by US forces, but open transparent ski-masks instead. The wrap-around sun-glasses American forces were known for had become a straw-man, criticized for being indicative of cultural insensitivity. This, as well, was believed to reduce the interpersonal barrier between soldier and Afghan civilian. It soon became apparent however that adequate force protection was indeed a priority.⁹⁷¹ Several steps were taken to this extent. The Netherlands purchased twenty-five mine-resistant Bushmaster armored vehicles. They would complement the open jeeps, although soon they were the only vehicles to leave the compound given the threat of improvised explosives. Dutch forces were prescribed to wear sun-glasses instead of transparent ski-masks to cope with the glare. Initially Dutch forces would also wear green camouflage uniforms to distinguish themselves from the desert-khaki American forces wore. Yet all other ISAF troops were outfitted with the same desert-khaki and the Netherlands soon abided. Besides, the military said, “[khaki] camouflages better in the surrounding environment” of Uruzgan.⁹⁷²

969 “Als we een klap moeten uitdelen om ellende te voorkomen, zullen we dat zeker doen. De harde kern van de Taliban en Al Qa’ida moet met harde actie worden uitgeschakeld. Als er aanslagen dreigen in onze provincie Uruzgan, zorgen we ervoor dat dit niet gepleegd worden.” Minister of Defence Henk Kamp, quoted in *De Volkskrant*, February 3, 2006.

970 “In een MB [Mercedes-Benz] als het kan, in een YPR rupsvoertuig als het moet.” Gen. D. Berlijn, “Toespraak bij Vertrek Deployment Task Force naar Uruzgan,” March 14, 2006.

971 S. Ramdhari, “Uruzgan-ganger in ’t nieuw,” *De Volkskrant*, July 14, 2006.

972 “Nederland wilde eerst rondlopen in groen spul. De bevolking moest duidelijk worden

While the Netherlands had tried to be different from the United States, the environment had rules of its own. Slowly it became accepted that the Netherlands was engaging in a high-intensity counterinsurgency operation. Military battles, such as the battle of Chora in June 2007 where the full range of capabilities was used and the most intensive fighting involving Dutch forces took place since the Korean war, removed any doubt regarding the nature of the operation.⁹⁷³ Following his command at ISAF Regional Command South General Ton van Loon would publicly elaborate on how the Dutch operation was a counterinsurgency, an impression that had been avoided in order to accommodate Dutch strategic culture.

The “Dutch Approach” offered the political label to stress that the Netherlands could indeed operate differently than the United States in Uruzgan. The Netherlands deployed to Uruzgan stressing how different it was from its most important ally, the ally with whom it would be deployed in the same operational theatre and for whose political-strategic credit amongst others it was participating in the first place. Dutch criticism of the US style of military operations, and the argument to participate out of solidarity with that same United States and NATO, demonstrated the friction not only between the Dutch structural and the US agency-focused approach to liberal interventionism but also internally within Dutch strategic culture. In the challenging security environment involving complex expeditionary counterinsurgency missions could the Netherlands be a relevant ally to the major power in the system whilst at the same time adhering to the premises of stability projection? Could the Netherlands show solidarity to the United States whilst simultaneously criticizing its approach?

20.4.5 AVOID BEING LIKE BELGIUM

The operation in Uruzgan impacted Dutch transformation. The military and financial burden of being a member of the “A-team” and participating in the intensive counterinsurgency environment of Uruzgan was high. In late 2007 as the first two-year deployment to Uruzgan was reaching its zenith, the focus of Dutch defense procurement turned to transport capabilities, recruitment and communications and information capabilities. These bottlenecks had appeared as a result of the tough surroundings which were impacting personnel and material alike. Particularly the Army’s material and manpower shortages resembled the problems that the US Army was encountering in Iraq.⁹⁷⁴ Combat

gemaakt dat de Nederlanders geen deel uitmaken van de operatie *Enduring Freedom*. Maar alle ISAF-landen gaan rondlopen in woestijnkleur. Van der Zee: “Bovendien trekt een donker pak meer warmte aan. In woestijnkleur val je beter weg in de omgeving.” S. Ramdharie, “Uruzgan-ganger in ’t nieuw,” *De Volkskrant*, July 14, 2006.

973 For descriptions of the Battle for Chora see Noel van Bommel, “Infanteristen, commando’s: iedereen vecht tegen Taliban,” *De Volkskrant*, June 23, 2007 and Paul Brill, “Ze schoten een magazijn op me leeg,” *De Volkskrant*, June 28, 2007.

974 On March 27, 2007 an internal assessment at the Dutch Ministry of Defense concluded that there were shortfalls in logistics personnel due to the high operational tempo, the amount of spare parts had dwindled leading to the procurement of new material on the commercial market at high cost, and higher than expected levels of maintenance were required due to

and service support forces such as technicians, but also more mundane affairs including catering staff, were in short supply as a result of the operational tempo. The harsh conditions both in terms of climate and Taliban resistance were straining the military one year into the operation. By September 2007, two extra platoons were sent to the province, while human, material and munitions shortages were putting deployability and sustainability of forces at risk. Helicopters and tactical transport were in short supply. For six months no Chinook helicopters were in use because there was a shortage of spare parts and technicians. The Army had to rely on the aging Cougars instead. In general the Ministry of Defense noted a 25% shortfall in helicopter-lift capability. It led to tactical air transport being acquired expensively on the commercial market implying that costs were drastically increasing. The two-year operation was initially budgeted at 380 million Euros in total but in the first year the budget had exceeded 600 million Euros, almost four times more than originally planned.⁹⁷⁵ With little over 1500 forces deployed, the operation was consuming 9% of the entire defense budget.

The 2007 Defense Policy Brief (the *Hoofdlijnennotitie*) outlined how the Ministry of Defense would deal with the budget constraints arising from the increasing costs of the mission. The financial hardship and the desire to continue the operation in Afghanistan necessitated the sale of the military's "silverware." Substantial cuts were announced in the primary weapon systems, including:

- 28 Leopard tanks (equivalent to 31% of the remaining stock);
- 12 Pantzerhowitsers which had been purchased only four years earlier (equivalent to 33% of the total operational stock);
- 18 F-16s (a 20% decrease in capability);
- Withdrawal of one of the two marine battalions from the Caribbean;
- Cancellation of participation in NATO's Allied Ground Surveillance system;
- Cancellation of the Dutch MALE Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program;
- Cancellation of intended procurement of the Tomahawk cruise missiles.⁹⁷⁶

These decisions would free assets to invest in support capabilities such as civil-military units, intelligence capabilities and logistical support. The military was cannibalizing its hardware to sustain current operations. It risked turning the Dutch armed forces into a highly experienced military force lacking the high-end capabilities to sustain high-intensity operations. Minister of Defense Van Middelkoop acknowledged that the Netherlands was close to hitting rock-bottom: "If you do not want to end up in a situation where the Dutch armed forces have the same allure as the Belgian, than you need to consider which

the harsh operational climate. These three elements combined led to substantial risks for the availability and deployability of troops. Document published in *De Telegraaf*, April 19, 2007.

975 "Kosten Uruzgan 200 Miljoen Hoger," *NRC Handelblad*, June 27, 2007.

976 Ministerie van Defensie, "Het Defensiebeleid op Hoofdlijnen," HDAB200718939, The Hague, July 2, 2007.

financial measures are necessary to sustain the military.⁹⁷⁷ Van Middelkoop proposed setting a fixed percentage of GDP as defense budget to replace the yearly negotiations over its size. Years of reductions threatened to reduce the military to what was believed to be a politically insignificant force. It would hurt the Dutch ability to use the military for international political significance. The remark by Van Middelkoop confirms how the Netherlands was aware of the political-strategic effect of having a particular type of military. Operating in Afghanistan, Van Middelkoop said, “should be part of the Dutch political honor.”⁹⁷⁸

Increasing Dutch international political clout by making relevant contributions to expeditionary operations was a mainstay of Dutch security policy since the 1990’s.⁹⁷⁹ It remained throughout the missions of the 2000’s. Relevance has two dimensions. On the one hand the ability to make useful contributions, and on the other hand the political will to participate. Minister van Middelkoop’s comment with respect to the quality of the Dutch military highlighted concern over the first dimension. He expressed concern over the high-level usefulness of Dutch military forces if funds were not appropriated. In late 2009, Maxime Verhagen, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to the second dimension, when he supported continued participation in Uruzgan as a function of sustaining Dutch international political relevance. Verhagen mentioned that the “Dutch Approach” had been made the predominant NATO strategy in Afghanistan since March 2009, and that in the event of withdrawal all NATO members except the Netherlands would remain.⁹⁸⁰ He insinuated the damage the Netherlands would suffer to its reputation as a result. In October 2009, on the question whether a Dutch withdrawal would diminish the Dutch political reputation abroad, the Minister of Defense answered in the affirmative, stressing that it was an important, if not the most important, dimension in his considerations:

This is a very relevant question and at the same time the most important element of my answer. I know that the Netherlands has gained a significant increase in reputation as a result of the Dutch commitment in terms of numbers and quality. That is why we could organize the Afghanistan

977 ““We lopen op onze tenen,” zegt de bewindsman. “Als je niet terecht wilt komen in een situatie waar de Nederlandse krijgsmacht dezelfde allure heeft als de Belgische, dan moet je gaan nadenken welke financiële middelen nodig zijn om deze krijgsmacht in stand te houden.” *De Telegraaf*, July 8, 2007.

978 “Ik vind dat een land als Nederland, met z’n bevolkingsomvang, met z’n enorme welvaart en z’n enorme internationale oriëntatie, bereid moet blijven inspanningen te verrichten zoals hier in Afghanistan. Dat betekent dat je niet mag afdoen aan je ambitieniveau. Dat moet een deel van de politieke eer van Nederland zijn.” *De Telegraaf*, July 8, 2007.

979 Rob de Wijk, “Defensiebeleid in relatie tot Veiligheidsbeleid” in E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht: Studies over the organisatie en het optreden*, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004) p.156.

980 Minister Verhagen, interview with *Business News Radio*, September 24, 2009.

*conference in The Hague. Also our participation in the G20 is related to it. This is something each of us should realize.*⁹⁸¹

It offered further testimony to the tenet of using the military as a means to improve Dutch international political credit. By contrast, left-leaning parties in parliament, including the Labor party's Minister of Development Aid were calling for a Dutch withdrawal with the intent to organize a mission in Africa instead in support of regional stability and to promote peace-building.⁹⁸² The cases showed the tensions between the two domestic constraints that drive Dutch transformation toward expeditionary operations.

21 CONCLUSION: TORN BETWEEN RELEVANCE AND STABILITY

WHAT TYPE OF TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY WAS PURSUED?

The Netherlands pursued a policy of strategic (type II) transformation with the objective to change the military and Dutch defense policy towards expeditionary operations, including high-intensity missions. It amounted to a discontinuous change from how the use of the military had been perceived before. To the Netherlands it thereby was a political-strategic issue revolving around the question, for what and how to use the military in the wake of a system transition. The principle documents in which this was outlined were the defense white papers of 1991 and 1993.

WHAT CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY OR OPPORTUNITY, FORMING THE TRANSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, TRIGGERED TRANSFORMATION?

The system-transition that triggered transformation was the end of the Cold War which produced a benevolent, low-threat environment. Following the end of the Cold War the Dutch security situation improved and gave rise to an expeditionary era where security policy was based on acting abroad. As security issues were downgraded from 'threats' to 'challenges' it yielded the promise that the Netherlands, as part of the West, could contribute to the spread of liberal values and institutions as a means to improve global security. Rather than spreading this through unilateral military interventions, the Netherlands advances

981 "Dat is een zeer relevante vraag en dat is meteen ook het belangrijkste deel van mijn antwoord. Ik weet dat Nederland door de inzet, in aantallen en kwaliteit, een forse reputatiewinst heeft geboekt. Daarom konden wij de Afghanistanconferentie in Den Haag organiseren, ook onze participatie in de G20 heeft ermee te maken. Dat is iets waar we ons met zijn allen bewust van moeten zijn." Minister of Defense, Eimert van Middelkoop, quoted in "Nederland onder druk NAVO," *NRC Handelsblad*, October 23, 2009.

982 See "Koenders werkt in geheim aan missie Afrika," *Algemeen Dagblad*, November 4, 2009; "Politiek Den Haag dubt over militaire missie Afrika," *De Volkskrant*, November 4, 2009 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Reactie Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie op publicatie AD," November 4, 2009.

a structure-focused position on the premise that liberal institutions cannot be imposed through force, but rather should be grown from within. To the Netherlands it became a policy of stability projection, perceiving the use of the military as setting conditions for the promotion of liberal institutions and where military interventions are only justified when mandated by a system of international governance entrenched in international law. It was further driven by the process of European integration which conditioned European states to avoid the use of force to settle international disputes, and to adopt a posture to promote stability through exporting political-economic institutions that underlie peace and prosperity within the European Union. The end of the Cold War spelled an opportunity to advance this model of Western liberal values. It turned into a policy of stability projection, by which the military is used in multilateral operations to support the conditions for stability, promote the international rule of law, and foster the creation of liberal institutions. In addition, the Netherlands could attain a position of greater international influence if it succeeded in strengthening a supranational governance system in which it played a central role.

WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURAL FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

Two elements of Dutch strategic culture determined the context of Dutch transformation. The first is the drive to support the international rule of law. It resonates directly with Dutch security interests. As a smaller power with limited military capabilities, a stable international environment benefits Dutch economic relations, and a strong international rule of law can act as a supranational Leviathan keeping rogue powers in check. Stability is a necessary precondition for prosperous economic relations and it coincided with a commercialist, rather than a military, view of international relations. The Dutch international legal tradition offered a suitable framework for playing a strong role in its promotion and thereby to enhance the Netherlands' influence internationally. It leads to the view of the military as a peacekeeping force to support international stability, or as one element within a broader pallet of national instruments to set the conditions for reconstruction and stability. It however strongly supports the shift towards expeditionary operations. In the early 1990's the Netherlands participated in UN-mandated peace operations as a result, and afterwards all expeditionary missions were justified on the basis of its contribution to stability.

It has led to an aversion to wage 'wars', preferring to term deployments 'peace support', 'stabilization' or 'policing' operations instead. It has also contributed to 'stability' being an overarching objective of Dutch security policy rather than decisively removing threats. Dutch security policy is characterized by an attempt at risk management, rather than threat resolution. The military is deployed in order to create the conditions for liberal institutions to take root, however the Netherlands denounces the use of force purely for the removal of a specific actor. The title of the 2007 Defense White Paper *Wereldwijd Dienstbaar*, translated as "Of Service across the Globe." This is symptomatic of this element of Dutch strategic culture, demonstrating that the government intends to develop a military

“where civilians and military forces collectively contribute to enhancing the security of our country and to improve the living conditions of people elsewhere around the world.”⁹⁸³

The other tenet of strategic culture influencing the shift of the military to expeditionary operations is to use the military as a political instrument to demonstrate relevance to the major power in the international system. Until an international Leviathan is created, the Netherlands depends primarily on the relationship with Washington to guarantee its security. Although after the end of the Cold War a specific security threat to Europe evaporated, by 1995 as Former Yugoslavia crumbled on Western Europe’s doorstep it was clear that the United States remained a necessary factor in the European security dynamic. Following the attacks of 9/11 this was further reinforced. Using the military in coalition operations to demonstrate its international political relevance allowed the Netherlands to have a voice in those Western-liberal institutions that were important to European security policy, most notably NATO. It led to policy explicitly underlining the international political credit the use of the Dutch armed forces could harvest by having particular capabilities and performing particular operations. Being relevant was an objective of its security policy in a benign environment for the indirect purpose that bandwagoning would increase its security relationship with the major power as an insurance policy in the event that the security environment took a turn for the worse. As Peter van Ham wrote, if the Netherlands wants to have some influence on Washington’s foreign policy, it is only possible through NATO.⁹⁸⁴ Essentially, combined these strategic cultural tenets are both dimensions of a defensive realist hedging strategy, resting on both bandwagoning and counterbalancing behavior.

The specific character of Dutch strategic culture is that it has both a European as well as an Atlanticist focus.⁹⁸⁵ Because the Netherlands embraced the concept of stability projection but accepts the need for high-intensity operations in order to remain relevant to the United States, it has also allowed the Netherlands to have a security policy acceptable both to Atlanticists as well as Europeans. It has fostered the perspective of the Netherlands as a trustworthy and capable partner in the international environment and promoted the view of the Netherlands as a bridge-builder between nations. It politically facilitates a natural inclination of pursuing a hedging strategy. This hedging strategy allowed the Netherlands to increase its international position. This effect was largest, and transformation was most successful, when the nature of a mission reflected and aligned both these elements. This was for instance the case with the deployment of Dutch forces for the SFIR mission in Iraq. The two tenets of Dutch strategic culture were however not aligned when the security

983 “Een krijgsmacht, ten slotte, waar burgers en militairen zich gezamenlijk inzetten om de veiligheid van ons land te bevorderen en om de levensomstandigheden van mensen elders in de wereld te verbeteren.” Ministerie van Defensie, *Het Defensiebeleid op Hoofdpijnenen*, HDAB2007018939, July 2, 2007, p. 3.

984 “Als wij nog enige invloed willen hebben op het buitenlands beleid van de Amerikanen dan kan dat alleen via de NAVO. Dat is een Europees en Nederlands belang.” Peter van Ham, quoted in *NRC Handelsblad*, July 30, 2006.

985 Rob de Wijk, “Defensiebeleid in relatie tot veiligheidsbeleid,” in E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht, Studies over de organisatie en het optreden*, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004), p. 168.

environment became more challenging.

WHAT DID THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE MEAN IN TERMS OF CAPABILITIES?

The objective of transformation is to increase the usability of the military as an instrument of state power. In terms of capabilities it has meant an orientation towards expeditionary operations, while having the ability to contribute with high-intensity capabilities. The Netherlands developed a leaning towards high-quality and high-tech material. Quality over quantity, coupled to visible and valuable capabilities was perceived by The Hague as creating political credit among the major allies. It allowed the Netherlands to sit at the table where decisions were taken since the Dutch military could offer capabilities that mattered and there was a willingness to use them. The desire to have influence within the alliance also reinforced support for multilateral operations. The armed forces were organized to offer capabilities complementing a coalition operation. Not only has this led to an emphasis on multilateralism and internationally mandated operations, it is also born out of a realist counterbalancing perspective in the European framework. By maintaining interoperability and relevance to the United States, albeit with limited capabilities, it assures the Netherlands of a prominent position within the alliance and a way to preclude a dictate from the three major European powers in security affairs. While the international rule of law was promoted to increase the power of the medium powers vis-à-vis the United States, the Dutch policy to provide relevant and high-end capabilities to operations with the US was a way to make itself heard among the major powers in Europe. While the Netherlands emulated certain elements of US operational effectiveness transformation, such as investing in precision weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles and network-centric capabilities, it did so within the broader context of a strategic level reorientation towards expeditionary operations and the interest to increase interoperability with the United States, rather than due to a belief these technologies would revolutionize warfare.

Rather than identifying specific threats, the concept of political ambition became the guiding light of Dutch security policy. It exemplified the political prism through which the use of the military was perceived. The military is used to promote the standing of the Netherlands in the international-political arena, whether that was through European stability-projection or Atlanticist relevance promotion. In Dutch transformation it has meant that discussions over capabilities are shaped by either being relevant or pursuing stability. During the early 1990's these tenets were aligned yet as the security environment became more complex and the United States responded differently to the security environment friction within Dutch strategic culture appeared.

HOW DID FURTHER EVENTS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPACT THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

From the mid-1990's onwards the security environment slowly deteriorated. In the early 1990's the benevolent security environment allowed the Netherlands to focus mostly on stability projection. As it became clear that high-intensity operations would remain neces-

sary, the relationship with the United States started to gain in importance. The events at Srebrenica, persistent turmoil in the Balkans and European weakness to cope with it, reinforced a focus on NATO and the US. It led to several operations of increased intensity which affected Dutch transformation. Operations became more challenging and tested the tenets of stability projection. The debacle at Srebrenica served as a crude wake-up call that stability could not be projected without a willingness to deploy high-intensity capabilities. Operation *Allied Force* led to friction between the two tenets of Dutch strategic culture. The Netherlands participated in an offensive military campaign in order to support Alliance solidarity and protect human rights, but doing so without a UN mandate it violated its own principles for stability projection. With the mission in Uruzgan, the Netherlands encountered the limits of its political ambition and with it the limits of its strategic transformation. The mission was the most challenging and high-intensity ground operation the Netherlands had pursued since the Korean War. It involved large-scale offensive operations with only limited progress in the field of stability projection to show. Instead it was a warfighting mission and clashed with Dutch stability projection. Because it did increase the relevance of the Netherlands within the Alliance and thus supported one element of Dutch strategic culture, the mission was prolonged in first instance. It was so controversial, and divided the Dutch foreign policy elite, that it also led to the fall of the Dutch government in 2010 when NATO requested a further extension of the mission.

With this in mind Dutch transformation has revolved around the fundamental question how much warfighting is considered acceptable in order to promote its liberal values of stability projection. When the objectives of stability projection and relevance promotion have been in line, in other words when the Netherlands could demonstrate its relevance and gain international political credit through participating in a mission that supported the idea of stability projection, the relevance of the military to foreign and security policy was high and it pushed transformation forward. Operations that expressed this combination were for instance the SFIR mission in Southern Iraq as well as the UNMEE mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia. This was comfortably within the bandwidth defined by Dutch strategic culture. Pursuing transformation and increasing the usability of the military to politicians, has been more difficult when these two elements were not aligned, such became apparent throughout the political discussions over the Uruzgan mission where stability projection and the aversion to 'wage war' clashed with the strategic cultural tenet to remain a relevant partner. It led to reduced capacity for resource extraction and impacted procurement efforts for high-intensity operations and capabilities whose contribution to stability projection were questioned. It led to a clash of strategic culture, or phrased differently it led to identifying the limits of the bandwidth formed by Dutch strategic culture.

As the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. With transformation, its proof lies in the actual use of military capabilities. Dutch transformation has been constrained by the demands of a deteriorating security environment which brought clashes to the fore between the strategic cultural tenets along which the Netherlands uses, and believes it should use, its military power. The reason the friction exists is due to a security environment which has slowly evolved to require higher-intensity operations to

be undertaken. As NATO engages in high-intensity missions, the resource extraction of Dutch transformation to contribute will be hampered, unless the case can be convincingly made domestically that the mission contributes to international stability.

GERMANY: A SLOW, STRATEGIC AWAKENING

“Those who know our European history understand that we do not live on Venus but, rather, that we are the survivors of Mars.”

– Joschka Fischer, Address to the United Nations Security Council, March 19, 2003.

22 INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Cold War, German strategic culture was characterized by a self-perception intent on “keeping a low profile” and “a desire for international rehabilitation.”⁹⁸⁶ It led to a hesitant approach to the use of the military instrument, rather emphasizing territorial integrity as the basis for its security policy. During the 1990’s German security policy slowly turned towards low-intensity peacekeeping and crisis-management operations as NATO was embracing out-of-area operations. By the mid-2000’s Germany was among the largest troop contributors to Afghanistan, but only in the relatively risk-free North. Germany appeared committed to an anti-militarist approach.

Neoclassical realism predicts that a medium power facing a benevolent security environment will promote an activist foreign policy to expand its domestic agenda abroad. However, it is constrained in doing so by its strategic culture. For none of the other countries in this research have domestic variables impeded the pursuit of a transformation strategy as in Germany. For Germany, defense transformation encompassed the process of changing the military organization towards, and politically coming to grips with, an expeditionary era of Western security policy in the European Union and NATO following the end of the Cold War. Due to the constraining influence of its strategic culture German transformation has led to a focus on low-intensity crisis management operations.⁹⁸⁷ A key limiting factor has been that in German security policy the role of the military is de-emphasized. As will be made clear in this chapter, security policy instead is geared at

986 Wilke (2007), p. 69.

987 See Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement* (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2006).

promoting stability abroad through economic and diplomatic means, by projecting the same values that have made it a civil power at the heart of Europe, and shunning the use of the military.⁹⁸⁸ This strategic culture has been codified in constitutional-legal obstacles to use the military abroad.⁹⁸⁹

German strategic culture is made up of two elements. On the one hand, a constructivist-idealist resistance to the use of the military based on its historical self-perception as a *Zivilstaat* and secondly, its defensive realist posture to pursue alliance solidarity. In its defense transformation, the premise to be a civil power has clashed with its attempt to shift the military towards expeditionary operations in order to sustain its credibility within, and the overall credibility of, the NATO alliance.

As NATO moved towards embracing expeditionary operations in the 1990's, Germany had to follow suit. This clashed with domestic constraints and negatively impacts the ability of the government to improve the usability of the military instrument. In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that Germany's process of defense transformation is shaped by the tension between the international security environment and Germany's attempts to accommodate its expeditionary requirements to its strategic cultural constraints. As long as NATO pursues an expeditionary course, and robust interventions such as Afghanistan, take place, German extractive capacity will be limited and transformation will proceed with substantial political friction. The four questions addressed in this segment are what is transformation in Germany? How has transformation developed since the end of the Cold War and what domestic factors shaped it? What did it imply for capability development? And how has German transformation fared in a changing security environment?

23 GERMAN TRANSFORMATION DEFINED

German transformation is a story of strategic awakening. Transformation is described in the 2006 Security White Paper as “a process of adaptation” in order to “improve the usability of the Bundeswehr in a changing environment.”⁹⁹⁰ It implied a military change program motivated by a rapidly evolving security environment. Since 1991 Germany has been engaged in multiple reform initiatives of the military and German policymakers have interpreted transformation to expeditionary operations as the “reform of the reform.”⁹⁹¹ Throughout the period under consideration, German changes in the military have been

988 See for instance, Hans Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” *Europa Archiv*, vol. 47, no. 10 (1992); Rainer Baumann & Gunther Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’, and the Quest for Normality,” in *German Politics*, vol. 10, no. 1 (April 2001).

989 See Deutscher Bundestag, *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Article 87a, Section 2.

990 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006, on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Berlin, October 2006, p.95.

991 See Henning Riecke, “Höchste Zeit für Reformen: Die Bundeswehr vor wichtigen Entscheidungen,” *Internationale Politik*, nr. 7 (2002), pp. 29-34.

three-pronged. The first step was taken when the West-German military moved to absorb the military of former East Germany upon unification in 1991. This fusion of forces had a significant socio-economic dimension since barracks were built, moving forces to former East Germany, and investing in infrastructure spurring the development of the impoverished region. It was a reform process that was definitely not geared at making the military more expeditionary. The second and third steps are the focus of this segment. The second step has been the paradigm shift to deploy forces beyond national borders for crisis-management and peacekeeping operations including operations beyond NATO territory. The third step has been to deploy forces in a combat environment. This final step has yet to be finalized. The story of German strategic transformation is thus still ongoing.

In 1991 the dominant perception of German security policy was that the international system had made a turn for the better. In Europe, the change in the security environment and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to a general sigh of relief. Particularly in Germany, where the 1992 *Defense Policy Guidelines*, the first Defense White Paper after the Cold War, outlined that the European security threat had dissipated. No longer held hostage by the bipolar struggle of the Cold War, and reassured in its territorial security through the European integration process, the Government declared that “the security dilemma ... has been resolved.”⁹⁹² Germany was no longer a *Frontstaat* or front-line state. Instead it was surrounded by allies and befriended neighbors. German defense transformation has been a process of internalizing the implications of this new security environment and move towards developing a force for expeditionary stability operations. More than the two other states under consideration in this study, factors of *Innenpolitik* limited the extractive capacity of the German government to pursue military change towards full-spectrum expeditionary operations predicated by the overarching security environment. German defense policy is driven by the strategic pause following the end of the Cold War and a cultural historic legacy that is antithetical to the use of force. It has given rise to a policy of transformation framed by a structure-focused approach to security based on non-military means, where the use of the military is constrained by legal considerations and military forces are viewed as armed development workers at best or a deplorable necessity at the worse. Transformation in Germany is the process of coping with these constraints of German strategic culture in pursuit of strategic transformation to have a usable military instrument in an expeditionary age. As in the Netherlands, transformation takes place at the political-strategic level more so than the military-organizational. It regards the fundamental question, what is the military for and how should it be used? It has required a shift in mindset, a discontinuous change in the German approach to the military. Changes in the security environment in 1991 slowly directed NATO towards expeditionary crisis-management operations.⁹⁹³ If it wanted to maintain relevance and

992 “Das Sicherheitsdilemma [...] hat sich aufgelöst” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

993 See North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*, November 7, 1991 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm; and North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, April 24, 1999 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_

solidarity to NATO it necessitated a redefinition of Germany's strategic orientation and a redefinition of the dictum *nie wieder Krieg*. Strategic transformation concerned the fundamental reorientation of the German armed forces away from a territorially-focused force towards expeditionary operations also prepared to participate in higher-intensity operations.

Germany is however torn between the reality of the new security environment and maintaining its appreciation of Western liberal values and its status as a *Zivilmacht*. Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer pronounced this dilemma in the *Bundestag* in 1995 prior to the deployment of German forces to former Yugoslavia:

*We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is the renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and majority decisions, through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which military means are rejected and in which the aim is to create structure to replace them and them redundant. On the other hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence – that is our dilemma.*⁹⁹⁴

Fischer's speech clearly articulated the dilemma confronting Germany's strategic culture and brought to the fore the impact of the changes in the system-level distribution of power.

German transformation is heavily influenced by the state's pacifist roots originating from the end of the Second World War while underscoring the desire to maintain a position of relevance in NATO and supporting the European model that fostered peace and stability in Europe throughout the Cold War.⁹⁹⁵ The second half of the 20th century revolved around a divided Germany and the legacy of military defeat in the 20th century. It fostered a strategic culture where the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy was shunned culturally, politically and constitutionally. The dominant dictum became *nie wieder Krieg*' (never again war) derived from Chancellor Willy Brandt's famous statement that "niemals wieder Krieg von deutschem Boden ausgehen dürfe."⁹⁹⁶ It fed the belief that the human condition could not be improved by the use of force. While *nie wieder Krieg* was a defensive strategy during the Cold War, it became a call for an activist foreign policy following 1991. Germany did not become isolationist and felt instead it had a role to play

texts_27433.htm.

994 Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer quoted in Hans W. Maull, "Germany and the use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?," Paper prepared for the Workshop on Force, Order and Global Governance, An Assessment of US, German and Japanese Approaches, Washington DC, July 1-2, 1999, p. 21.

995 See Cooper (2004).

996 Willy Brandt, Erfurt, March 19, 1970, quoted in Julia Brauch, *Nationale Integration nach dem Holocaust: Israel und Deutschland im Vergleich* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004), p.290.

as civil power to promote global peace, rightly because of its history. It embraced a policy to contribute to global stability by emphasizing civilian mechanisms such as economic cooperation and strengthening international institutions. Changing the structures of international relations became a central element of German security policy, and solidarity to NATO stood paramount. Both NATO and the evolving European integration process provided Germany with its security throughout the Cold War, shielding it from the Soviet Union and solve its security dilemma. It posited Germany as a civilian power, reluctant to use the military aside from territorial security. German transformation is therefore considered the struggle to pursue a *Sonderweg* as a *Zivilmacht* and to come to terms with the expeditionary agenda of NATO which critics were referring to as a ‘normalization’ of the German state.⁹⁹⁷

24 SYSTEM LEVEL FACTORS THAT TRIGGERED GERMAN TRANSFORMATION

The end of the Cold War led the NATO alliance to embrace expeditionary operations. Germany had to follow suit if it wanted to sustain its relevance to the NATO alliance. This provided the primary trigger for German strategic transformation. This meant that two important hurdles had to be overcome. The first important step was to change the German military, German security policy, and the German constitution to perform expeditionary operations. The second step involved the discussion whether German forces would also be able to undertake offensive military action.

24.1 AN EXPEDITIONARY ERA

24.1.1 THE 1992 DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES: GOING EXPEDITIONARY...

In November 1992, twelve months after NATO’s new Strategic Concept declared a shift toward crisis-management operations, the German government published a document that started the process of strategic innovation of German defense policy. It stated that a “radically improved” strategic environment triggered a shift towards a new defense policy.⁹⁹⁸ It became the starting point for German transformation.

In the same spirit as the US *Bottom Up Review* and the 1991 Dutch Defense White Paper, in 1992 the German Minister of Defense presented the *Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien)*.⁹⁹⁹ It took stock of German unification and

997 See Jan Ross, “Die Deutschen und der Krieg: Warum eigentlich herrscht so große Ruhe im Land?,” *Die Zeit*, March 31, 1999.

998 The 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines speak of a “historical instance of political change has radically improved the international situation.” (Die historische Dimension des politischen Umbruchs hat die internationale Situation grundlegend verbessert.).

999 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

the post-Cold war environment. Events following the collapse of the Soviet Union were described as a period of *Übergang*, or transition, acknowledging the systemic changes that were taking place. While Germany was no longer a *Frontstaat* and the environment had become more benevolent, the document voiced concerns over factors of uncertainty. Crisis and conflict management would become more important, and the document identified a necessity for expeditionary forces. It read that “a part of the German Armed Forces must be able to deploy outside Germany.”¹⁰⁰⁰ Such forces however would only be deployed within the appropriate international institutional context and in order to restore international security and the international rule of law. It was not specified under what intensity they could be deployed. Furthermore, in anticipation of the instability in the Balkans, the document specified a geographic focus on Europe’s immediate periphery.¹⁰⁰¹ The 1992 document did provide the textual basis for German transformation to be put into practice in the years ahead.

A structure-focused security concept pervaded the 1992 defense policy guidelines. The document stated that security policy would focus on non-traditional security challenges (the so-called *weite Sicherheitsbegriff*). Along constructivist lines, it advocated the development of an integrated international security culture (*internationalen “Sicherheitskultur”*) based on collective security mechanisms (*gemeinsamer Sicherheit*) and a disposition to promote stability (*Stabilitätsorientierung*) for the German government. As an anecdotal illustration, ‘stability’ or its antonym ‘instability’ was mentioned twenty-three times throughout the entire document. It presented an idealistic approach to security policy, which was no longer held to be exclusively military. Instead socio-economic, judicial and structural political factors were held responsible for creating international security risks. The document identified challenges to security in the form of social grievances, demographic pressures or ecological disasters. Rather than a military force-on-force calculus these structural trends in international relations would shape the priorities of its security policy. The focus lay on “regional crises and conflicts and non-military risks.”¹⁰⁰² Dealing with these challenges necessitated a broader response than the military could offer.¹⁰⁰³ Hence, Germany required a crisis-management capability but only within

1000 “ein teil der Deutschen Streitkräfte muss daher zum Einsatz ausserhalb Deutschlands befähigt sein.” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*, Bonn, November 26, 1992, p. 38.

1001 See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, Berlin, May 21, 2003, p. 18.

1002 “Nach Auflösung der bipolaren Ordnungsstruktur gewinnen regionale Krisen und Konflikt und nicht-militärische Risiken an Virulenz und Brisanz,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

1003 “Ursachen von Risiken und Konflikten werden generell nicht durch den Einsatz militärischer Mittel behoben. Jedoch können Streitkräfte gleichsam in einer “Katalysatorfunktion” die notwendigen Voraussetzungen schaffen, unter denen nichtmilitärische Instrumente einer ursachenorientierten Krisen- und Konfliktbewältigung Wirkung entfalten können. Um diese Instrumente nutzbar zu machen, wird im internationalen Krisenmanagement künftig auch eine Wiederherstellung der internationalen Sicherheit und des Völkerrechts unter einem legitimierenden Mandat der VN oder der KSZE erwogen werden müssen.”

the context of a broader range of instruments to address root causes. By 2006 this would evolve into strong support for a ‘comprehensive approach’ to security. It fostered a multi-lateral approach to promote a strong role for international institutions. The 1992 *Defense Policy Guidelines* stated that out of international security cooperation (*Kooperation*) a norm-based security community could emerge to collectively address threats. Simultaneously collective security institutions would prevent a unilateral resort to force. The resistance to unilateralism and faith in the sole legitimacy of multilateralism which was voiced in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003 was already apparent in this document.¹⁰⁰⁴ It reflected Germany’s inclination to view multilateral action as the only justified means to act militarily in the international security arena.

German security policy advanced strong regional and international institutions. NATO and the Western European Union, later the European Union, would be anchors of stability in Europe. As an element of its security policy, Germany embraced wider enlargement of these organizations. To promote security within Europe Germany envisaged deepening European integration, further promoting reform in Eastern Europe, and strengthening transatlantic relations.¹⁰⁰⁵ The policy paper presented a liberal-institutionalist view based on the post-modern European system of integration and mutual interdependencies. Given its size, exporting the European model would also increase the political weight of Germany. The government was thereby promoting a similar recipe for its security policy as had been the basis for its prosperity and peace throughout the Cold War, namely integrating the German economy with those of other European states and strong transatlantic relations. NATO would remain the foundation for German security and it acknowledged the organization had a role to play in crises in an “enlarged geographic” space, beyond NATO borders.¹⁰⁰⁶ Support for these institutions when the international rule of law is at stake meant showing operational solidarity and thus Germany would have to be able to provide a military contribution (*militärische Solidarbeiträge*).

The 1992 policy paper thereby provided the policy framework to make the Bundeswehr an expeditionary military, or *Einsatzarmee*.¹⁰⁰⁷ The policy guidelines enunciated that the Bundeswehr would focus on the following missions: Traditional territorial defense protecting Germany and its citizens from oppression and external danger; contributing to military stability and European integration; protecting Germany and its

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

1004 Joschka Fischer, “Address to the United Nations Security Council,” New York, March 19, 2003.

1005 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

1006 Ibid, chapter IV.

1007 “Die Notwendigkeit, bei kurzfristig auftretenden Krisen und Konflikten rasch, flexibel und solidarisch reagieren zu können, erfordert präsenste Kräfte. Deutlich begrenzte Teilkomponenten dieser Krisenreaktionskräfte werden, nach Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen, Friedensmissionen im Einklang mit der UN-Charta übernehmen, um der deutschen Mitverantwortung in der Völkergemeinschaft gerecht zu werden.” Ibid, para. 47.

allies if attacked; serving global peace and international security in line with the Charter of the United Nations; and providing aid in humanitarian or natural catastrophes. It also declared that the military would be divided into main defense forces for territorial security and crisis-response forces, able to operate abroad.¹⁰⁰⁸

24.1.2 THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION

While the 1992 defense policy guidelines opened the door to expeditionary operations, they would be difficult to put into practice. A persistent obstacle to Germany's transformation policy has been considerations over the constitutional legitimacy to send German military forces abroad, and to use German forces for something else than territorial defense. It has made using the military a controversial and highly politicized affair. At its inception in 1949 West-Germany prohibited the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy.¹⁰⁰⁹ The German state was a product of the violent first half of the 20th century and following allied occupation West-Germany was left without a military. In 1955, prompted by the threat of Soviet expansionism and the Cold War, West-Germany rearmed and simultaneously became member of the NATO alliance. The German constitution or *Grundgesetz* of 1949 stipulated, in a spirit of *nie wieder Krieg*, that "the Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense."¹⁰¹⁰ It ruled out the use of the military for operations beyond its borders and it implied that German governments could never legally use the military outside German territory. It was further accentuated by article 26 which explicitly reads that Germany will not partake in offensive military operations: "Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression (*Angriffskrieges*), shall be unconstitutional."

The end of the Cold War changed the distribution of power and the threat to territorial security dissipated. Western states, such as the Netherlands, adopted new defense white papers in which a focus towards using the military for crisis-management purposes was detailed. For Germany it posed legal-institutional difficulties. Even though the 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines opened the door to expeditionary operations, it produced friction between German solidarity vis-à-vis the NATO alliance and its constitutional restriction not to use the military abroad. However, conflict erupted in the former Yugoslavia and it became clear that the move to develop crisis-management capabilities had been correct. Yet the German military could not be deployed abroad to help stem a crisis without a new constitutional interpretation of 'defense'. It presented a constraint on the extractive capacity of the German state to make the military a usable instrument of its foreign policy. Because of the changing nature of the security environment, German transformation had to find a way around it. In 1994 the German constitutional court decided that participation in expeditionary operations in support of collective security arrangements was permitted.

1008 Ibid, para. 44 & 45.

1009 See also Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7, no. 3. (2001), p 315- 348.

1010 Deutscher Bundestag, *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Article 87a, Section 2.

This decision is detailed further below, however suffice to say now that it removed a crucial hurdle for German transformation.

24.1.3 ...AND COMBAT OPERATIONS: THE 2003 DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES

It would be eleven years before an update of the *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* was published. The 2003 *Defense Policy Guidelines* underlined the observation that security policy required crisis-management and conflict prevention, and stressed that the Bundeswehr would “conduct armed operations *only* together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.”¹⁰¹¹ 2003 however marked a turning point as it provided the doctrinal basis for the third step of German transformation. It explicitly embraced expeditionary operations beyond NATO territory, including missions of high-intensity. The 2003 Guidelines state at the outset that “defense as it is understood today ... means more than traditional defense at national borders against conventional attack. It includes the prevention of conflicts and crises, the common management of crises, and post-crisis rehabilitation.”¹⁰¹² It continued to state that the necessity to participate in a multinational operation could lead to a deployment anywhere across the globe, on a short notice, and across the entire conflict spectrum “including operations of higher intensity.”¹⁰¹³

Aside from the structure-focused emphasis, the 2003 *Defense Policy Guidelines* provided indications that it was moving in the same direction as other NATO nations and was accepting a role for an expeditionary military as a government instrument. The document declared that military force was a necessary element of the credibility of foreign diplomacy, “the political will and ability to enforce or restore freedom and human rights, stability and security with military means if necessary are a sine qua non of a credible comprehensive approach to security policy.”¹⁰¹⁴ The explicit willingness to use military force for complex stabilization missions amounted to a step towards the country’s strategic awakening.

The intention to create an *Einsatzarmee* was declared in 1992. Eleven years later Germany presented the military-organizational force structure for it, and announced the creation of a full-spectrum capability. The 2003 guidelines also outlined the capabilities to be developed to deploy a high-intensity expeditionary force, which were specified some four years later for the *Bundesheer*. Developing the policy framework to perform expeditionary operations was a long drawn-out process but the policy documents were there. Putting the policy guidelines into practice has been a different issue altogether. More than any of the other two states in this study, German transformation is a case of “the proof

1011 *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003*, p.4 .

1012 *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003*, p. 3.

1013 “Die Notwendigkeit für eine Teilnahme der Bundeswehr an multinationalen Operationen kann sich weltweit und mit geringem zeitlichen Vorlauf ergeben und das gesamte Einsatzspektrum bis hin zu Operationen mit hoher Intensität umfassen.” *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003* para 57.

1014 *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003*, p. 9.

of the pudding”. Crucial to it has been Germany’s relation to NATO and the process of European integration.

24.2 SOLIDARITY

Throughout the Cold War NATO has been central to German security. The end of the Cold War presented a system-level shift that led to discontinuous change in German defense policy. It triggered German transformation because of a German commitment to NATO solidarity. When the alliance ventured into the area of expeditionary operations Germany had to follow suit. The adoption of an expeditionary mindset was driven by alliance dynamics coupled with a value-based argumentation of ‘never again genocide.’ From a defensive realist perspective, abstaining from participation in NATO operations would diminish Germany’s influence in NATO.

Persistent allegiance to NATO and European institutions was a vital security interest for Germany. Instead of disavowing the use of the military, which had been the dominant paradigm until 1994, Germany embraced expeditionary operations for the sake of solidarity. German participation in Operation *Allied Force* in 1999 was explicitly framed in these terms.

Defending the government’s proposal to use military assets to stop Slobodan Milosevic, Volker Rühle, the Minister of Defense, underlined the role of solidarity to the NATO alliance as a justification for possible military intervention:

It is no exaggeration when I say that our allies today look at the decision of this Bundestag. All of the governments and parliaments of our NATO partners - including the three future members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - have unequivocally backed the planned air operations of NATO. They all expect a clear vote of the Bundestag. Even if there are early political successes on the basis of a credible military deterrent, I must say of your decision today: a deployment of German armed forces cannot be ruled out. When you cast your vote, you have to do so in the knowledge that such action can be taken, and can be demanded of us.¹⁰¹⁵

Karsten Voigt, MP of the traditionally-pacifist Labor Party, concurred:

1015 “Es ist keine Übertreibung, wenn ich sage, daß unsere Verbündeten heute auf die Entscheidung des 13. Deutschen Bundestages schauen. Alle unsere NATO- Partner - auch die drei künftigen Mitglieder, Polen, Ungarn und Tschechien -, deren Regierungen und Parlamente haben sich unzweideutig hinter die geplanten Luftoperationen der NATO gestellt. Sie alle erwarten ein klares Votum des Deutschen Bundestages. Auch wenn es erste politische Erfolge auf Grund einer glaubwürdigen militärischen Abschreckung gibt, muß ich Ihnen für Ihre heutige Entscheidung sagen: Ein Einsatz auch der Deutschen Streitkräfte kann keinesfalls ausgeschlossen werden. Wenn Sie Ihre Stimme abgeben, müssen Sie das in dem Bewußtsein tun, daß dieser Einsatz durchgeführt und von uns abverlangt werden kann.” Statement by Volker Rühle, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/248, October 16, 1998.

*A different policy than that which is proposed by the majority [the government] will isolate the Federal Republic of Germany within NATO and in Europe. You will reward those who use violence and leave unpunished those who violate UN resolutions. That is why Germany, with this decision, is now proving itself as a European and transatlantic partner.*¹⁰¹⁶

From an alliance point of view Germany needed to show that it was a good ally by embracing the shift towards expeditionary operations.¹⁰¹⁷ As the decade neared its end, not only the reality of Operation *Allied Force* but also important EU and NATO documents such as the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Helsinki Headline Goal emphasized the need for crisis-management capabilities and the ability to send ground forces abroad. Drafted in 2000, the report by the *Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr* chaired by Richard von Weizsäcker, advised the Schröder government to adopt a policy of ‘Europeanization.’¹⁰¹⁸ It meant German security policy should embrace the development of expeditionary capabilities in a European institutional framework. It amounted to a similar shift NATO had made with its adoption of out-of-area operations.¹⁰¹⁹

The 2003 *Defense Policy Guidelines* further underscored Germany’s relation to the North Atlantic alliance. Germany “has a crucial role and responsibility for the future course of NATO.” Throughout the Cold War, as Lord Ismay had famously said, NATO’s *raison d’être* was to “keep the Germans down, the Americans in and the Soviets out.” Germany was the frontline of NATO. It meant that Germany had a key role to play in the alliance. There was also a constitutional necessity to support international institutions, as Germany could only act within a multinational context. Strong international institutions were the path for Germany to play a military role internationally.

Institutionally the German army was explicitly multinational- and NATO-oriented. Throughout the Cold War, the Bundeswehr had been extensively integrated with other European armed forces. The Eurocorps with France and the 1st NL-German Army Corps are still expressions of this. This was the product of the end of the Second World War as well. Just as the German economy was integrated in the Coal and Steel community, rather than be disarmed the German military was integrated into European structures. It had a political purpose, signaling Germany’s connection to Western Europe and a submission

1016 “Eine andere Politik als diejenige, die von der Mehrheit vorgeschlagen wird, hätte die Bundesrepublik Deutschland innerhalb des Bündnisses und in Europa isoliert. Sie hätte diejenigen, die Gewalt anwenden, belohnt und hätte diejenigen, die die UN-Resolution verletzen, ungestraft gelassen. Deshalb bewährt sich Deutschland heute mit dieser Entscheidung als europäischer und transatlantischer Partner.” Statement by Karsten Voigt, *Ibid.*

1017 Zehfuss (2001), p 315- 348.

1018 Richard v. Weizsäcker, et.al., *Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 23, 2000.

1019 See NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Washington DC, April 24, 1999.

to Western European political values. This dimension of European integration precluded military renationalization across the continent.

Due to its strategic-cultural inhibition to use the military Germany had an interest in enhancing NATO as a political, rather than a purely military organization. Credibility of the alliance is necessary to guarantee a German voice in the security debate. Yet Germany does so by emphasizing a comprehensive approach and denouncing US reliance on military power to assert the relevance of NATO. Deemphasizing the military function of NATO means making NATO more acceptable to Germany while at the same time providing a rationale to keep the defense budget low. Keeping NATO together is one of Berlin's primary security objectives. In line with its structure-focused approach, Germany advocated a more non-military approach to operations in Afghanistan. As Chancellor Merkel said at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 2009, "NATO must be a place for political debate. You cannot promote a networked [or comprehensive] approach to security and at the same time see NATO as only a military alliance."¹⁰²⁰ Germany's relation to NATO deemphasizes the military while stimulating the need for internal cooperation. Coupled to it is a desire to stimulate US multilateralism in a policy of soft-balancing. German participation in the NATO Response Force, a high-end expeditionary instrument whose deployment the German *Bundestag* is unlikely to support, was a prize to be paid in order to maintain and strengthen the cohesion of the alliance.

25 STRATEGIC CULTURE AND GERMAN TRANSFORMATION

25.1 A CULTURE OF DEFEAT

German strategic culture is defined by an aversion to the use of the military, which in an expeditionary era limits the extractive capacity of the German government. This has been called a culture of anti-militarism.¹⁰²¹ Domestic level variables dominated the process of transformation as the German state since its reinvention following the end of the Second World War had been conditioned in the role of a pacifist status-quo power.

The shock to the international system following the end of the Second World War led to a revised division of power which led to a changed dynamic in Europe. It impacted the policies of all states.. But none more so than for the erstwhile expansionist powers which had been defeated by the allied states in 1945. The result of German defeat in the two world wars of the 20th century and the subsequent dismantling of Nazi Germany precipitated an

1020 "Die NATO muss ein Ort politischer Diskussionen sein. Man kann nicht Vernetzte Sicherheit fordern und anschließend die NATO nur als militärisches Bündnis begreifen." Angela Merkel, "Speech at the 45th Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, " Munich, February 7, 2009.

1021 John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 172.

international system-level shift in power which would have lasting effect on the European geopolitical landscape and the psyche of the German state. It led to a set of domestic-level constraints for the newly formed German state which helped develop a strategic culture that shunned the use of the military and provided the blueprint for a German *Zivilmacht*. Not surprisingly, May 1945 was considered a new political and societal departure point, a *Stunde Null* (zero hour).¹⁰²²

A “culture of defeat” shaped the German government’s strategic perspective regarding the use of the military. Nazi Germany’s policies to promote the ‘human condition’ had led to immense human, material, moral and psychological costs. The German population had suffered a form of collective shell-shock which helped cement a fundamental skepticism vis-à-vis use of the military instrument in West-Germany. The West-German government, and the political institutions of the state, had thoroughly changed and West Germany had become a qualitatively different regime than in the previous two decades.

By contrast, as we have seen, the United States retains a “culture of victory,” a belief that warfare is at times justified and can be used as an instrument to advance its liberating tradition. Germany instead has tried that strategy and found it wanting. This notion is reinforced by the concept of the German *Zivilmacht* (Civil Power), reflecting an institutionalization of pacifism, a disdain for military force, and a structure-focused approach to security policy that denounces unilateralism.¹⁰²³ It is expressed through legal and organizational obstacles for the government to effectively use the military. Among these obstacles is the constitutional prohibition for using the military abroad, the parliamentary mandate necessary to use the military and military-organizational constraints, including conscription.

25.1.1 CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES

It has been described above that the German Basic Law was among the primary obstacles for German transformation as it forbade the use of the German military abroad. Nevertheless, the security environment had changed and NATO nations were adopting expeditionary operations. In this context the Labor party (SPD) and the liberal FDP had placed complaints before the constitutional court to challenge the constitutionality of the German government’s decision to deploy German assets in three smaller scale missions. The missions included piloting AWACS surveillance airplanes over Bosnia to enforce a no-fly zone, a contribution to a naval embargo in the Adriatic, and a humanitarian operation in Somalia. On July 12, 1994 the constitutional court, the *Bundesverfassungsgericht*, ruled that article 87 of the *Grundgesetz*, which restricted the German military to territorial defense, did not preclude German participation in collective security arrangements as delineated in article 24 of the same constitution.¹⁰²⁴ The ruling meant that the constitution

1022 Wilke (2007), p. 54.

1023 More on this in chapter 25.2. Hans Maull, “Zivilmacht Deutschland,” in Gunther Hellman et al. (eds), *Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*, (VS Verlag, 2006). <http://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb3/POL/Maull/pubs/zivilmacht.pdf>.

1024 Article 24 (2) of the German Basic Law reads “With a view to maintaining peace, the

did not preclude contributing to peacekeeping operations preformed within the context of collective security arrangements, either out of solidarity or obligation.¹⁰²⁵ The only precondition was that such missions were preceded with a UN mandate. Solidarity with NATO hence became the basis for German military deployments abroad and the two central elements of German strategic culture were brought in line. Several further requirements for deploying forces abroad were formulated. As part of the court's ruling three criteria were outlined. Germany could only pursue objectives promoting international peace and security; do so in an institutionally mandated context by the UN Security Council; and with the explicit approval of the *Bundestag*. While the *Bundestag* had a constitutional oversight role of the military, this latter specification now underlined the 'parliamentary' nature of the German military. In practice it meant that Parliament controlled the deployment of the military. It amounted to a constraint on the German government's ability to wield the military instrument as an instrument of foreign policy. From a neoclassical realist perspective, it reduced the executive power's ability to extract military resources from the state.

In late 1994, as several requests for German contributions to UN operations piled up, the government of Helmut Kohl specified five political guidelines for military missions abroad. It portrayed a narrow interest-based focus:

- Military actions have a geographical limitation to Europe and its periphery;
- Germany only acts in a multinational framework under an international mandate;
- Any deployment should have broad parliamentary and public support;
- A 'compelling reason' must be advanced to support a mission beyond territorial or Alliance defense, such as a threat to Germany's political stability;
- Only reluctantly would Germany deploy to states that had been occupied during the Second World War.¹⁰²⁶

From the guideline mentioned last it becomes clear that Germany was well aware of the historical baggage that an international deployment of the German military implied. This historical baggage further limited the ability of the government to use the military as an instrument of foreign policy.

Ten years later, the German Parliamentary Participation Act of March 18 2005 (*Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über den Einsatz*

Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world."

1025 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 90, 286, July 12, 1994, Karlsruhe. Amongst others it Reads: " Art 87a GG steht der Anwendung des Art. 24 Abs. 2 GG als verfassungsrechtliche Grundlage für den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Rahmen eines Systems gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit nicht entgegen."

1026 Guidelines enunciated by Minister of Defense Volker Rühle, "Rühle: UNO-mandat – Voraussetzung fuer Auslandseinsätze," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 25, 1994.

bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland) codified the constitutional court's decision and Volker Rühle's guidelines above. It required the government to send a request of deployment to parliament with details on the operational objective, theatre of operation, length, costs, legal mandate, and amount of forces required.¹⁰²⁷ The important difference with the Dutch *Toetsingskader* described earlier is that the German version is approval-seeking and not informative.

The importance of constitutional legitimacy was also expressed in the 2006 White Paper. In it two full pages are dedicated to the summation of constitutional and other legal doctrine that reflect on the use of the military in the new security environment.

The first test of the legal ruling of 1994 and the expeditionary concept of the 1992 Defense Policy Guideline came in 1995. As the Yugoslav crisis continued to fester and human rights violations were broadcasted on German televisions, politicians contemplated deploying German forces in support of regional stability. It led to political friction as not all parties in the *Bundestag* supported the new expeditionary approach. The pacifist ideal of *Nie wieder Krieg* clashed with its Human Rights derivative of *Nie wieder Auschwitz*. Because of the benevolent security environment, proponents embraced the paradox of using the military to end the wars that others started. It would also serve a therapeutic purpose; the German military could be used to protect the world from a new holocaust, in this case in former Yugoslavia. This argument was brought forward by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in his speech in 1995 proposing to participate in NATO's rapid reaction force to the former Yugoslavia. According to Kinkel, Germany had in fact an overwhelming responsibility to contribute to these operations precisely because of its history. The "never again Auschwitz" argument, and its spin-off "never again dictatorship," was reinforced by Kinkel's articulation that Germany in 1945 had been rescued from its dictatorship through the allied use of force. Using the military could serve a benevolent purpose. Germany now had a responsibility to save the world from a new incarnation of its historic alter-ego. Others were opposed. Joschka Fischer, who would later become Foreign Minister in 1998, opposed sending forces to Bosnia, because of historical sensitivities associated with German troops in the Balkans.¹⁰²⁸ In 1999 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder referred to a similar *nie wieder Auschwitz* construct when justifying sending German aircraft to participate in Operation *Allied Force*. As crisis-management operations became the focus of NATO and the United Nations, Germany used this value-driven line of reasoning to support deploying forces abroad.

The 1994 decision by the Constitutional Court should be seen in light of the events of that period. A conflict took place not far from German soil, and the destabilizing effects of the conflict were spilling into the region. More than 450,000 refugees came to Germany during the period of the collapse of former Yugoslavia. Images suggesting the existence of Bosnian concentration camps increased the pressure to act. A realist as well as an idealist

1027 Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 2005, Teil I, Nr. 17, Bonn, March 23, 2005.

1028 See Nico Fried, "Ich habe gelernt, nie wieder Auschwitz," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, January 24, 2005. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/612/351445/text/>.

argument could be put forward to send troops to keep the peace following the Dayton agreement. A sense of urgency was felt while at the same time the military could be used for peaceful purposes. Resultantly, it led to Parliamentary support to deploy German forces in a peacekeeping mission in former Yugoslavia.

On March 24, 1999, German chancellor Schröder announced that German forces would participate in the first combat operations since the Second World War.¹⁰²⁹ The contribution to Operation *Allied Force* consisted of a deployment of Luftwaffe Tornado's to suppress Serb air defense systems. Not only was it the first participation of German aircraft in a combat mission, Operation *Allied Force* was also executed without a UN mandate. Nevertheless, the German *Bundestag* supported the mission. The *nie wieder Auschwitz* argument played a central role. The geographic proximity of the human suffering in Kosovo further reinforced the strength of the argument. Chancellor Schröder declared that it was impossible to accept that European values of freedom, democracy and human rights were violated at less than an hour's flight.¹⁰³⁰ Foreign Minister Fischer made clear that the humanitarian catastrophe necessitated Germany to act.¹⁰³¹ Several months earlier, in October 1998, the *Bundestag* had adopted a resolution to support military strikes against Milosevic in the event of a pending humanitarian catastrophe.¹⁰³² It was part of increasing diplomatic pressure on Milosevic to stop his actions against the Kosovo-Albanian population. But in March 1999, the content of the resolution would be put into practice. Standing before the *Bundestag* on March 26, 1999, Chancellor Schröder declared that a "humanitarian catastrophe had to be ended" and that the Serb leader Milosevic was "intensifying his war against the population of Kosovo." In that regard it would be "cynical and irresponsible to sit by idly."¹⁰³³ Fischer appealed to the international rule of law, noting that aggression - in this case against a minority group, would not be tolerated.¹⁰³⁴ Rather

1029 "schließlich stehen zum erstenmal nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges deutsche Soldaten im Kampfeinsatz." Gerhard Schröder, "Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Lage im Kosovo," Berlin, March 24, 1999. <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/rede/96/11696/multi.htm>.

1030 "Mit der gemeinsam von allen Bündnispartnern getragenen Aktion verteidigen wir auch unsere gemeinsamen grundlegenden Werte von Freiheit, Demokratie und Menschenrechten. Wir dürfen nicht zulassen, daß diese Werte, nur eine Flugstunde von uns entfernt, mit Füßen getreten werden" Gerhard Schröder, "Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Lage im Kosovo," Berlin, March 24, 1999. <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/rede/96/11696/multi.htm>.

1031 "Wir werden diesem Konflikt, wenn wir wegschauen, nicht entkommen können, sondern wie in Bosnien wird dann das Drama - das Morden, die Zerstörungen und die Flüchtlinge - letztendlich zum Hinschauen und dann zum Handeln zwingen" Joschka Fischer quoted in *Die Zeit*, March 25, 1999. <http://www.zeit.de/1999/13/199913.kosovo.xml>.

1032 Antrag der Bundesregierung, "Deutsche Beteiligung an den von der NATO geplanten begrenzten und in Phasen durchzuführenden Luftoperationen zur Abwendung einer humanitären Katastrophe im Kosovo-Konflikt," October 12, 1998. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/13/114/1311469.pdf>.

1033 Gerhard Schröder, "Speech before the Bundestag," Berlin, March 26, 1999.

1034 "Aggression darf sich nicht lohnen...Ein Aggressor muß wissen, daß er einen hohen Preis zahlen muß. Das ist die Lehre des 20. Jahrhunderts." *Berliner Zeitung*, March 24, 1999 <http://>

than participate in a war, Schröder argued, Germany was operating alongside the international community to use “military means to bring about a peaceful solution to Kosovo.”¹⁰³⁵ The German participation would be a deployment in the name of “humanity and peace.” The chancellor also noted that the credibility of NATO was at stake. Germany contributed fourteen tornado aircraft and support forces to Operation *Allied Force*.

In the wake of the operation, the *Zeit* newspaper published an editorial entitled *Die Deutschen und die Krieg* (The Germans and the War). In the article the author, Jan Ross, declared that a remarkable transition had taken place in the country and that a deeply embedded social pacifism had been left behind by the participation in Operation *Allied Force*.¹⁰³⁶ There was little popular resistance and yet Germany was silently at war, he wrote. Ross observed that the country had returned to ‘normalcy’, meaning that it had shaken off the burden of history, yet the author was surprised that its population underwent the state’s return to arms “surprisingly ahistorical (*geschichtslos*).” While on the one hand Germany was slowly coming to terms with NATO’s understanding of an expeditionary era, Ross however had jumped to conclusions. The circumstances surrounding Operation *Allied Force* were unique and would not be replicated in future deployments. While the Air Force had participated in combat operations over Kosovo, no ground forces had been involved. Geographic proximity strengthened the humanitarian argument to intervene, and NATO credibility was at stake. As the world’s most powerful alliance, and the West being unchallenged militarily, violations of human rights on the European continent had to be confronted. While *nie wieder Auschwitz* had trumped the need for an explicit UN mandate in the German justification, this would remain a unique situation. The deployment of ground forces in offensive combat operations, even with a UN mandate, remained only a hypothetical possibility.

By 2007 Germany had 8500 soldiers abroad, and was the third largest contributor of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan with roughly 3000 troops in the Northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faisabad. The constitutional framework however specified that German forces could not be deployed abroad in areas where offensive actions might take place, and only be engaged in stabilization and peacekeeping missions. Thus, while the military was actively engaged abroad, deployments were relatively small and relatively risk-free.¹⁰³⁷ The German weekly *Der Spiegel* captured this

www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/1999/0325/politik/0010/index.html.

1035 “Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft kann der dadurch verursachten menschlichen Tragödie in diesem Teil Europas nicht tatenlos zusehen. Wir führen keinen Krieg, aber wir sind aufgerufen, eine friedliche Lösung im Kosovo auch mit militärischen Mitteln durchzusetzen.” Gerhard Schröder, “Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Lage im Kosovo,” March 24, 1999. <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/rede/96/11696/multi.htm>.

1036 Jan Ross, “Die Deutschen und der Krieg: Warum eigentlich herrscht so große Ruhe im Land?,” *Die Zeit*, March 31, 1999.

1037 See Michael Rühle, “Am Rubikon der Kampeinsätze,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 4, 2008.

element of the Bundeswehr's mindset in an article in 2006 addressing Germany's role in ISAF. German forces were social workers, not warriors. It wrote:

*German soldiers drag sandbags in flooded areas, they help Serb mothers in Kosovo, they build schools in Afghanistan, they are social workers – but one thing they are definitely not in the public conscience: warriors who are trained to kill other people, and if possible to be killed.*¹⁰³⁸

Several tenets of what can be considered a “German Approach” delineate a preferred way of operating. General Viereck, former commander of EUFOR, the EU mission in Congo, mentioned among the elements to deploy troops the necessity to give priority to “social-human conduct” in the field, patrolling without weapons when possible and interacting with the local population with sensitivity. In other words, he embraced a culture of minimum force, where a very hesitant approach to the use of weapons was considered a trust-building measure.¹⁰³⁹

In 2007, I interviewed Rudiger Cristoph Zettel, a senior official with the policy planning staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He told me Germany's strategic comfort-zone over the past years rested in armed development assistance. Zettel argued that Operation *Amber Fox* in Macedonia was an ideal type operation for the Bundeswehr. Here the military could facilitate reconstruction efforts in a non-hostile peacekeeping environment close to home. On November 18th 2006, the Economist published a three-page article on “Germany's place in the world”. It wrote that “most people see soldiers as little more than armed development-aid workers ... who expend goodwill and good works, but do not get harmed.”¹⁰⁴⁰

25.1.2 CONSCRIPTION

Conscription remains at the heart of Germany's defense policy and is an exponent of the historical baggage weighing down on the *Bundeswehr's* efforts to transform towards an expeditionary force. Conscription is widely considered to hamper the flexible use of Western military forces, as they can generally not be deployed abroad in potential combat situations. By contrast, the 2006 White Paper declared that conscription had proven itself useful in the changed security environment.¹⁰⁴¹ Conscription has been kept in place for historical and social welfare reasons. On the one hand, it is to prevent the rise of an auto-

1038 “Deutsche Soldaten schleppen Sandsäcke im überfluteten Dreden, sie helfen serbische Muettern im Kosovo, sie bauen Schulen in Afghanistan, sie sind Sanitäter und Sozialarbeiter – nur eines sind sie im öffentlichen Bewusstsein bislang nicht: Kämpfer, die dazu ausgebildet sind, andere Menschen zu töten. Und die womöglich selbst getötet werden.” “Das Afghanistan-Abenteuer,” *Der Spiegel*, no. 47 (2006), p. 20–30.

1039 General Viereck, “Remarks at WIIS Conference,” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin, April 26, 2007.

1040 “Germany's Place in the World,” *The Economist*, November 18: 2006, p. 29.

1041 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006), p.76.

mous service culture, which had erstwhile been instrumental to the failure of the Weimar Republic and led to the empowerment of Hitler. The purpose of conscription is to create *gesellschaftliche Integration* (societal integration) of the military. It is meant to “anchor the Bundeswehr into society.” During the Weimar Republic, the small and centralized volunteer army operated as a state within a state, disconnected from society. Promoting *Staatsbürger in Uniform* (uniformed citizens) would allow such a historical repeat to be avoided. Secondly, conscription provides a cheap workforce for community service, as draftees that choose to forego military service are put to work in the *Zivildienst* instead. The 2006 White Paper stated that the government was committed to the *Zivildienst* as an alternative for military service.¹⁰⁴² At the time there were approximately 66,000 conscripts in the German armed forces and nearly 100,000 conscientious objectors performing a social service in the *Zivildienst* (see Figure 29). It had made the military an integral part of the German welfare state.




Figure 29: Number Of German Military Conscripts and Recognized Conscientious Objectors, 1990-2009
(Source: Data aggregated from website Bundeswehr.de and Bundesamt für den Zivildienst)

A possible abolition of conscription, which other European militaries have done amongst others to perform crisis-management operations abroad, fuels the political fear of disconnecting the military from society as well as to increase the costs of social welfare now partially undertaken by draftees. Finally, abolishing conscription, and reducing the size of the military, would lead to base closures which will solicit criticism from the *Bundesländer* over the regional economic implications. Precisely because the *Bundeswehr* is connected

to other policy areas including social and economic policy, as well as being associated with a sensitive part of the country's history, has meant that reshaping the military is politically sensitive. It makes any initiative regarding conscription vulnerable to political opportunism and has effectively stalled discussions on conscription.¹⁰⁴³ While the Netherlands abolished conscription to free necessary resources to invest in expeditionary capabilities and create a pool of deployable forces, in Germany conscription is among others preserved for political-historical sensitivities, and serves to "anchor the Bundeswehr in society." In the period 2006-2007 the German Ministry of Defense announced a yearly increase of the number of conscripts with 6500 troops.¹⁰⁴⁴

25.1.3 FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS




Figure 30: German Defense Expenditures (real, nominal and as % of GDP), 1991-2008

(Source: www.nato.int)

A further symptom of German intransigence towards transformation is the restrictive financial context in which Germany's strategic innovation has taken place. In eighteen years, the defense budget has decreased as a percentage of GDP, from 2.4% in 1991 to 1.4% in 2006 (see Figure 30). A peace dividend was taken after the end of the Cold War. In nominal terms the defense budget has remained more or less steady, however with an inflation correction it becomes apparent that the defense budget has been reduced with more than one-third since the end of the Cold War. While the slope of the decrease flat-

1043 Tom Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity," *European Security*, Vol. 14, No.3 (September 2005), pp. 361-386.

1044 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006), p. 77.

tened out in 1997, the budget was further reduced in 2002. In that year a massive debt control program was rolled out by the German government. Defense budget appropriations were kept static in absolute terms, and percentage-wise capped at roughly 1.5% of GDP. Minister of Defense Peter Struck was forced to take substantive measures. Force end-strength was reduced from 283,000 to 250,000, two air force squadrons were disbanded, and 80 *Tornado* aircraft were recapitalized. The number of *Leopard* tanks was reduced from 2200 to 850 and the planned number of A400M transport aircraft to be procured was reduced from 73 to 60. In 2004, Struck announced further budget cuts.¹⁰⁴⁵ It makes freeing resources for performing expeditionary operations or other investments difficult.

25.1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPEDIMENTS

The German military has been organized to avoid attaining a strong position within the state, and more than for efficiency, has been organized for civilian political control. Several key institutional processes are disentangled from key individuals in order to avoid centralizing too much power in the hands of a few. Aside from the parliamentary nature of the military, the military organization itself has not emphasized the ability to perform or plan for joint operations. In a desire not to strengthen the highest military officer, and centralize military power in one person, the German military organization has empowered individual services and their service chiefs.¹⁰⁴⁶ In addition, the procurement of military capabilities is handled by civilian agencies, rather than the services.¹⁰⁴⁷ The German judicial system also does not have a permanent military court system. Incidents that occur during deployments are processed under civil rather than military code. In all, although Germany does partake in NATO, EU and UN missions, these constitutional and organizational constraints impede Germany from efficiently pursuing expeditionary operations.

25.2 ZIVILMACHT GERMANY

25.2.1 “WE ARE THE SURVIVORS OF MARS”

Arguably the most accurate descriptor of Germany following the end of the Second World War is that of a civil power. The *World Power Survey*, organized by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in June 2006 compared the views of respondents in several countries worldwide regarding the status of global power.¹⁰⁴⁸ Among German respondents only 7 % indicated that military power was one of the most important qualities of a world power, whereas one third of respondents from the US felt this was the case, almost five times as many. The American results were on par with those from French, Chinese and Russian respondents. By contrast one-third of US respondents felt that the UN should have a more impor-

1045 Craig S. Smith, “Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense Spending,” *New York Times*, January 14, 2004.

1046 Interview with Henning Riecke, Berlin, April 2007.

1047 Ibid.

1048 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *World Powers in the 21st Century*, Berlin, June 2006.

tant role in maintaining peace and stability, whereas 83% of German respondents felt so. Germans are also stronger advocates of a viable ESDP than the French with 84% of Germans in favor and little over half of the French.

There is however a realist argument for focusing on international institutions and avoiding the use of force based on counterbalancing. Positing the United Nations as a proto-European model of global governance, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer noted during the Iraq crisis in 2003 that: “above and beyond we want a multilateral world order; we want a strong United Nations.”¹⁰⁴⁹ As the Iraq War started he elaborated on Germany’s overarching idea for a global world order based on multilateralism and international institutions. He asked, “How should a new world order be molded? Should it be cooperative? Should it be built on a multilateral foundation? Or is it a unilateral world, which makes substantive differences along the fault lines of power?”¹⁰⁵⁰ It was an expression, in direct reference to US unilateralist action against Iraq, to develop international institutions and moderate major powers in the system. The dominant explanation for this emphasis on multilateralism however rests not only in a defensive realist posture, but also with a constructivist understanding of Germany’s psyche. An additional element from the survey mentioned above adds further context to this German profile. Large majorities in all polled countries felt it important for their country to play an active role in world affairs: 82 percent in England, 86 percent in France, even 90 percent in Italy. Germans, at 65 percent, too are internationally minded but much less so. Conversely it means that almost a third of the German population wants the country to “stay out” of world affairs.¹⁰⁵¹ Marco Overhaus has termed this a lack of German *Gestaltungswille*, or will to shape the international environment.¹⁰⁵² Hans Maull has been the preeminent scholar in the field defining Germany as a *Zivilmacht*. His interpretation of the German psyche is closely related to Robert Cooper’s understanding of the European postmodern system. Maull described Germany as “projecting its influence and identifying its interests in a multilateral, not a national framework. It seeks influence through cultural and economic means rather than through the use of force.”¹⁰⁵³ Maull identified several core components of the *Zivilmacht*, among them were:

- The German state being fully anchored in the community of Western democracies;
- Foreign policy being based on Western democratic norms;

1049 Joschka Fischer, “Speech at German Bundestag,” Berlin, March 20, 2003.

1050 Ibid.

1051 Russell Berman, “The German Difference,” *Hoover Digest*, no. 1 (2003) <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3063211.html>.

1052 Marco Overhaus, *Between Military Interventionism and Cooperative Security: Germany’s Policy Towards NATO Transformation since September 11, 2001*, Paper presented at International Studies Association Conference, Chicago, February 28, 2007.

1053 Szabo (2004), p. 75.

- ➔ Skepticism towards military force and seeing the military as an instrument of foreign policy;
- ➔ Policy goals are based on economic growth and societal welfare.¹⁰⁵⁴

Besides, Maull writes, the *Zivilmacht* relies on “strong and vibrant international institutions.” It was closely echoed in the European integration process, a notion underlined in the German *Grundgesetz*. While the preambulatory clause of the constitution refers to the goal of a ‘unified Europe’, article 23 outlines that Germany will work to achieving a united Europe.¹⁰⁵⁵

Germany’s traumatic historical experience created the *Zivilmacht*. As Maull sums up:

*the lessons of history led to aversion or at least profound skepticism vis-à-vis any use of military forces and a fierce determination never again to allow German militaries and nationalism to threaten European stability, a desire never again to break ranks with Western democracies and – later on – also to a strong commitment to projecting universal democratic values in foreign policy.*¹⁰⁵⁶

Strengthened by the new geopolitics of Europe, the *Zivilmacht* concept was reinforced by the European post-modern system which had relinquished military competition between Western European states. European integration thereby both enabled the German *Zivilmacht* to take root – as it resolved Germany’s security dilemma - and at the same time further integration was a product of German policy to promote its vision of foreign policy abroad.

Total defeat and the destruction caused by World War II were shock-therapy to Germany’s security policy. The German state went through a process of regime change after World War II, similar to the extent that the Iraqi government changed as a result of the Iraq War. The nature of the German government changed. The German state pursued wealth and stability rather than an offensive-realist policy of power maximization. Two major defeats following two offensive military campaigns in the early 20th century produced ample disillusionment over what the military could achieve, while institution-building was embraced. As Joschka Fischer said on the eve of the Iraq War in reference to Robert Kagan’s dictum that ‘Europeans are from Venus, Americans are from Mars’:

Those who know our European history understand that we do not live on Venus but, rather, that we are the survivors of Mars. War is terrible. It is a

1054 Hans Maull (2006).

1055 Article 23 of the Grundgesetz starts off with: “Zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas wirkt die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Entwicklung der Europäischen Union mit...”

1056 Hans W. Maull, “Germany and the use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?,” *Trier Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik*, nr. 2, November 1999, p.1.

*great tragedy for those affected and for us all. It can only be the very last resort when all peaceful alternatives really have been exhausted.*¹⁰⁵⁷

Networked security, the core concept presented in the 2006 White Paper, supported the *Zivilmacht* since it gave increased relevance to the non-military dimension of security. Including more civilian instruments into security policy also meant that relatively less attention would be paid to military measures. As Michael Rühle argued, “those who emphasize non-military factors so much, want to downplay the role of the Military [factor].”¹⁰⁵⁸ Rühle continued to outline that the *Zivilmacht* cultivates stability projection as being superior to waging war.

Germany, like the United States, perceived itself as a historical reference-model. The German self-image was based on becoming a “power of peace”. It echoed a structure-focused understanding of society. Chancellor Schröder invoked Germany’s historical experience to denounce a security policy too narrowly focused on the military:

*[...] as we know from history as well as our own experience, to follow any strategy focused narrowly on military and police aspects would be a recipe of failure. What is needed is to address the root causes of terrorism and insecurity. To combat fanaticism, we must ensure social and material but also cultural security. That we can do only on the basis of a broad concept of security.*¹⁰⁵⁹

As a ‘power of peace’ conditioned by the defeat in two world wars and the process of European integration, Germany advocated a structure-focused approach to security. By contrast, the United States’ culture of victory leads it to accept the use of the military to push history forward. Given these dichotomies, it is not surprising that US-German relations were strained and will likely remain so in an expeditionary environment where these different visions clash. Both states advance their particular models of promoting social progress, one as a *Zivilmacht*, the other as a *Machtstaat*. As Stephen Szabo writes, “the Bush revolution in foreign policy ran directly counter to the evolution of the German strategic culture.”¹⁰⁶⁰

1057 Joschka Fischer, “Address to the United Nations Security Council,” New York, March 19, 2003.

1058 “Wer nichtmilitärische Faktoren so sehr betont, will die Bedeutung des Militärische herunterspielen.” Rühle (2008).

1059 Gerhard Schröder, “Address at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, September 24, 2003.

1060 Szabo (2004), p. 52.

25.2.2 STRUCTURE FOCUSED: NETWORK SECURITY

Central to the status of *Zivilmacht*, and along with the legal constraints for deploying German forces abroad, is the structuralist orientation inherent in German strategic culture. The 1992 *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* stated that it was a European-wide interest to engage in stability-building processes in its geographic periphery.¹⁰⁶¹ The Paper explicitly tasked Germany to embrace Eastern European countries and to integrate them in the European security architecture, as part of its security policy. Stability projection, not military force was articulated. It led to an approach using the military as but one of the instruments involved. Foreign Minister Fischer made this clear when he stated in 2003 in relation to the fight against terrorism that “[i]f we take the fight against terrorism seriously we must also fight the causes and intervene to bring stability wherever it draws strength from intolerable conditions and finds safe havens.”¹⁰⁶² Dealing with terrorism required improving institutional structures, as opposed to fighting terrorism by focusing on terrorist agents. Furthermore Minister of Defense Struck at the Wehrkunde conference in 2003 for instance reflected that defeating terrorism in Afghanistan required “the stabilization of Afghanistan, the consolidation of a multiethnic government committed to national reconciliation, the creation of favorable conditions for economic development and a democratic society [...]”¹⁰⁶³

The 2006 White Paper was a study in structural approaches to security and defense.¹⁰⁶⁴ It was a white paper published by the Ministry of Defense on “Security Policy and the future of the Bundeswehr.” As the name implied, its scope was broader than defense policy. “Network security” (*Vernetzte Sicherheit*) was its central concept. To substantiate a structure-focused perspective on security challenges, the German defense department proscribed an integrated approach where the use of the military is supporting to other instruments. Its core premise was to improve cooperation in the interagency and to develop civilian-military partnerships, rather than adopt network-centric warfare, as its name might have suggested. It was an expression of a desire to embed the military strongly among other agencies dealing with foreign policy. The 2006 White Paper outlined the objective of the Bundeswehr “to guarantee the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy,” rather than be part of the action of foreign policy itself.¹⁰⁶⁵ It resonated in the perspective advanced elsewhere that the military is an enabler rather than a problem-

1061 “eine Prozess stabilitätsorientierter und vertrauensbildender Zusammenarbeit einzubinden, das gegenseitige Verständnis zu fördern und auf die Entwicklung regionaler Sicherheitsstrukturen hinzuwirken.” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*.

1062 Joschka Fischer, “Remarks at German Bundestag,” Berlin, September 10, 2003.

1063 Peter Struck, “NATO’s Future Role,” Remarks at Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, August 2, 2003.

1064 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006, on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Berlin, October 2006.

1065 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

solver.¹⁰⁶⁶ “Network security” represented strategic transformation within the contours, or bandwidth, shaped by Germany’s strategic culture.

The White Paper assessed that internal and external security overlap and that combined they create a mosaic of security challenges which threaten the foundations of international stability. Rather than threats, the document identified ten risks and dangers in its strategic environment. These factors impact the underlying structures of the international system, none of them referred to specific actors per se. The paper stated that the categories of security challenges were: Globalization; Proliferation and Military Build-up; Regional Conflicts; Illegal Arms Trade; Obstacles to Development and Fragile Statehood; Disruptions of Transportation routes; Energy Security; Uncontrolled Migration; Pandemics or Epidemics and Terrorism.¹⁰⁶⁷ All these categories were structural in nature and impacted regional stability rather than pose specific threats to the German state.

The 2006 White Paper further made explicit that not only is the military an instrument of last resort but also that military developments did not define the nature of security risks: “The chief determinants of future security developments are not military, but social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only through multinational cooperation. It is therefore not possible to guarantee security by going it alone, or with armed forces only.”¹⁰⁶⁸ *Vernetzte Sicherheit*, or networked security, is intellectually on par with the comprehensive approach. It outlines that the military has a role to play, but only embedded in a broader pallet of national instruments in order to project stability. Not only nationally, but also internationally. Inspector-General Schneiderhan, commander of the German Armed Forces, said that the Bundeswehr needed to be embedded in a “network of security correlations,” referring to improved EU-NATO cooperation. A networked approach to foreign and security policy was advocated, based on interagency coordination and embedding the military into multinational institutions. The 2006 White Paper further concluded that NATO will increasingly have to deal with stabilization and nation-building efforts.

26 EXPRESSIONS OF GERMAN TRANSFORMATION

26.1 CAPABILITY AND PERSONNEL INITIATIVES

Due to the focus on stability and crisis-management operations, many of the German procurement initiatives were capability programs enhancing deployability such as the A400M and the NH-90 helicopter. Funds were also made available for expensive high-end platforms such as new frigates, submarines and *Eurofighter* aircraft.¹⁰⁶⁹ This is remarkable

1066 See also, Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: the art of war in the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

1067 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006), p. 19.

1068 Ibid, p.22.

1069 Josef Janning & Thomas Bauer, “Into the Great Wide Open: The transformation of the

given German reluctance to engage in high-intensity missions. Perhaps they were exclusively procured for territorial defense missions. Regarding the Eurofighter/Typhoon EFA 2000, initially designed in the 1980's as an air-superiority fighter, it came into production in the early 2000's as a fighter-bomber. Its high cost meant it dominated defense procurement budgets, making it difficult to pay for new systems that are more applicable to the stabilization missions Germany performed in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Congo.¹⁰⁷⁰ Reasons for its procurement must be sought in part in the realm of defense industry as it is a German-built plane. As for the next-generation Sachsen-class frigates and Type 212 submarines, they could be used in certain peace operations as well as classical naval tasks to secure lines of communication. In terms of capabilities it demonstrated that Germany was prepared to procure high-end capabilities for high-intensity missions. Deploying these capabilities was a whole different issue altogether.

Since the Cold War only limited changes had been made to the force structure. In 1990 the force structure consisted of 370,000 forces including 170,000 conscripts. In 1994 this was reduced to 340,00 including 140,000 conscripts. Six years later this same force profile was reduced to 277,000 forces including 77,000 conscripts.¹⁰⁷¹ It was not until the 2003 defense guidelines that a new pyramid-shaped force structure based on three force-types was proposed. It included a group of 35,000 response forces which would constitute the tip of the spear. These forces would be capable of operating across the entire intensity spectrum and form the core of the Bundeswehr. They would receive the bulk of Germany's defense investments. Secondly, a group of 70,000 stability forces for low-risk peacekeeping operations. And thirdly a group of 147,500 support forces, mostly conscripts, for duties inside Germany. Remarkably, this model resembled NATO's mobile counter-concentration force concept of the early '90's which was similarly based on three tiers of rapid response, follow-on and support forces.

In response to the guidelines, in June 2007 the *Bundesheer*, the German Army, published a transformation paper called *Das Neue Heer, Transformation Transparent*. The document can be seen as the German equivalent of the US Army's *Transformation Roadmap*. It offered both rationale and guidance for the *Bundesheer's* transformation drawing on the 2003 *Defense Policy Guidelines*. The German Army had a clear transformation objective in mind, namely improving deployability in a joint framework.¹⁰⁷² Lieutenant General Hans-Otto Budde, Chief of the Army, wrote that German transforma-

German Armed Forces after 1990," *Orbis*, vol. 51, no. 3 (2007), pp. 529 – 541.

1070 See for instance Stephen Szabo, "The Future of German Defense," AICGS Analysis. <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/security/szabo.aspx>. Accessed January 16, 2008.

1071 See Tom Dyson, "The Politics of Military Convergence: Neoclassical Realism and post-Cold War Armed Forces Reform in Britain, France and Germany," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, USA, March 26, 2008.

1072 "Verbesserung der Einsatzfähigkeit im streitkräftegemeinsamen Verbund." Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Das Neue Heer: Transformation Transparent*, Bonn, June 2007.

tion revolved around making German forces expeditionary, including for high-intensity operations.¹⁰⁷³

These capabilities however did not improve the ability of the German armed forces to project power. Instead they have generally taken a long time to develop. The Bundesheer's transformation document noted that following the attacks of 9/11 the urgency for German transformation received a new impulse since it became clear that the environment was not as benevolent as expected. According to the Bundesheer document, instead of worldwide peace the end of the Cold War had led to worldwide violence. The world was not as benevolent as initially anticipated. Six transformation objectives were formulated for the Army to develop multinational expeditionary capabilities.¹⁰⁷⁴ A key emphasis was on creating an Air Mobile brigade, the *Luftbewegliche Brigade*. While the analysis was solid, the proposal to develop an air maneuver brigade came fourteen years after the Netherlands drew up a similar capability.

Investing in high-end platforms came at the expense of investing in sufficient communications and sensor (C4ISR) systems, which lie at the heart of expeditionary efforts.¹⁰⁷⁵ Although Germany is introducing various networking technologies, experts believe it has proceeded slowly.¹⁰⁷⁶ It underscores the view drawn from multiple conversations at the Ministry of Defense that network-centric capabilities are not considered a central priority of German transformation. While it figures prominently under the heading "Transformation" in the 2006 White Book, nowhere in my interviews at the Ministry of Defense's policy planning staff, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the connection between German transformation and net-centric operations made. In my conversations with various German officers and policymakers about transformation, network-enabled capabilities or advanced C4I-systems were not brought up. Rather than discussing capabilities and military-organizational reform, the transformation debate in Germany revolved around the overarching political-strategic question for what purposes to use the military.

26.2 INAPPLICABILITY OF AMERICAN TRANSFORMATION

The term *transformation* met with skepticism among policymakers due to its resonance of US defense policy. Interviews in Berlin in 2006 and 2007 portrayed an aversion to the term. At the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the perception was widely held that transformation encompassed a US concept, applicable to a US style of using the military which met with strong German criticism. The debate about transforma-

1073 Hans-Otto Budde, "Einsatz verpflichtet," *Internationale Politik* (May 2007), p. 28 – 33.

1074 These were: focuses on expeditionary operations; remaining the core provider of ground forces; operating and thinking jointly; embedded in a multinational framework; planning within the scope of available resources; using modern technology. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Das Neue Heer: Transformation Transparent*, Bonn, June 2007, p.6.

1075 Interview with Benjamin Schreer, Berlin June 2007.

1076 Gordon Adams, et.al., *Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability*, Defense & Technology Paper (Washington DC: National Defense University, November 2004), p.34.

tion in Berlin revolved around the usefulness of US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's idea regarding changing the military and its impact on US foreign policy. The US process of military change meant to reduce the footprint and substitute mass for information, but with the overall intent to prosecute rapid high-intensity campaigns such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Although these wars had indicated the obvious strength of American military potential, its relevance was questioned in light of the obstacles to stabilize these countries. The discussion about transformation thereby invariably became a referendum on the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and the usefulness of network-centric warfare for stabilization operations. This same sentiment dominated in relation to the NATO Response Force (NRF). According to Zettel, NATO's vehicle of transformation was believed to impose an American concept on European militaries.¹⁰⁷⁷ Zettel underlined that by 2006 the NRF no longer was the focal point of transformation. Operations in Afghanistan were shifting NATO's attention towards counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. It conversely led to the feeling that the NRF was not the adequate instrument with which to address the challenges of the new security environment. Instead interagency operations and the comprehensive approach – or 'network security' as the Germans called it – would be guiding. The high-end NRF only appeared of limited usefulness in these operations that were 'people-centric.' Aside from the domestic-level constraints, the security environment changed and the transformation envisaged by the United States did not appeal to Germany.

27 THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

27.1 TRANSFORMING FOR COMBAT?

The third step of Germany's transformation policy, which is yet to be taken, is to deploy 'boots on the ground' to engage in combat operations. It presented the latest iteration of tensions between Germany's strategic-cultural tenets as a *Zivilmacht* and its support of NATO solidarity. For some years NATO allies increased the pressure on Germany to participate in higher-intensity crisis-management operations. Already in 1994, in relation to the crisis in former Yugoslavia US President Bill Clinton said, "I do not see how Germany, the third biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role. [...] It has no other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its responsibility."¹⁰⁷⁸

While Germany wished to contribute to global peace and stability, it had difficulty coping with its implications in the contemporary security environment. Throughout the 1990's and the early 2000's the security environment changed. The 2003 *Defense*

1077 A similar position was voiced by Henning Riecke at "NATO's New Strategic Concept," conference hosted by the Netherlands' Atlantic Council, The Hague, May 27, 2009.

1078 "Deutschland muss ein Fuehruungsrolle uebernehmen," *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, July 4, 1994.

Policy Guidelines made clear that “the boundaries between the different mission-types [peace-keeping & peace-enforcement] are fluid.”¹⁰⁷⁹ Stability operations implied complex campaigns in an environment in which high- and low-intensity events are a continuum rather than a digital dichotomy. In counterinsurgency and complex stability operations, Western nations, including Germany, are itself part of the conflict, rather than bystanders. “In these asymmetric conflicts, Michael Rühle wrote in 2008, “there is no place for an unequivocal distinction between ‘peacekeeping’ and combat operations.”¹⁰⁸⁰ Germany could not suffice by cherry-picking low-intensity operations. The security environment had changed and operations required elements of both. In addition solidarity in NATO implied that burden-sharing had to take place across the full spectrum of operations.

In December 2002, as Germany discussed the contribution to NATO’s ISAF operation, Defense Minister Peter Struck declared that the security of Germany was defended in the Hindu Kush.¹⁰⁸¹ In late 2001, some 100 German Special Forces had been deployed to Afghanistan to support Operation Enduring Freedom.¹⁰⁸² The Special Forces fall outside the prevalent regulations necessitating parliamentary approval, and thus these forces have also been used in combat operations. The two events contributed to an ongoing debate over whether regular German forces could be deployed for offensive operations or not.

NATO’s new operational reality in Afghanistan was leading to friction within Germany’s strategic culture. By 2006 Dutch, British and Canadian allies were confronting strong resistance in Southern Afghanistan and calls erupted for increased support. Germany was caught between solidarity with the alliance and a strategic culture that resisted using military force. In the Netherlands, a similar dynamic was at play. Yet while the Dutch found a political solution and approved the mission in the restive province of Uruzgan, the Germans remained in the relatively peaceable North. Even this German contribution in Afghanistan was however, burdened by legal considerations. Exemplar was the proposed deployment of six Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to Afghanistan in 2007. Initially NATO’s request was for aircraft able to provide close-air support. Yet given Germany’s constitutional restrictions regarding an *Angriffskrieg*, they were deployed in a reconnaissance role and were armed with sidewinder air-to-air missiles for self-defense only, even though the Taliban does not have known aircraft of its own. Since the aircraft, if supplied with different munitions, could operate in a ground-attack role whereas Germany was only mandated to perform stability operations, a complaint had been filed in the constitutional court by the left-wing PDS/die Linke. The plaintiff argued that the deployment was

1079 “Die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Einsatzarten sind fließend.” *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2003*, para 58.

1080 “In diesen asymmetrischen Konflikten eine eindeutige Trennung zwischen ‘peacekeeping’ und Kampfeinsatz zu fordern ginge an der Realität vorbei.” Michael Rühle, “Am Rubikon der Kampfeinsätze,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 4, 2008.

1081 Dirk Eckert, “Die Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt,” *Telepolis*, December 13, 2002.

1082 See for instance Timo Noetzel & Benjamin Schreer, *German Special Operations Forces: The case for Revision*, SWP Comments 26, November 2006.

illegal. The constitutional court ruled in favor of the government and the aircraft were not withdrawn.¹⁰⁸³ The ruling confirmed that the aircraft would explicitly not conduct close air support missions:

*The NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan serves the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. ... [In this deployment] no combat operations will take place, this is clear from the decision of the Federal Government for the deployment of Tornado reconnaissance aircraft. They will be prepared for reconnaissance work, the ability for a close air support role is not provided, and the planes are only armed for self-defense.*¹⁰⁸⁴

The aircraft would not be used for combat operations and the deployment could go ahead as planned. This method of deploying capabilities subject to court proceedings presented obvious limitations to the extractive capacity of the state. Other instances of constitutional proceedings relating to the operations of German forces abroad were the deployment of AWACS aircraft to Turkey in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003, the stationing of German troops in Kosovo after its independence and a decision in March 1999 which related to the legality of Germany's decision to support Operation *Allied Force*.¹⁰⁸⁵

Although the Constitutional Court has enabled rather than inhibited the government to perform out-of-area operations, the central role persistently played by the Constitutional Court on questions pertaining German security policy and how the German government can use the military, is a limiting factor on the extractive capacity of the government and hampers Germany's ability to transform its military institutions to perform expeditionary operations as detailed in its policy documents. As mentioned earlier, the proof of transformation is in the actual use of the military. From a neoclassical realist perspective, the strong role of the Constitutional Court illustrates how strongly domestic factors influence

1083 "Tornado-Einsatz in Afghanistan verfassungsgemäß," *Focus*, July 3, 2007. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/urteil_aid_65325.html.

1084 "Der NATO-geführte ISAF-Einsatz in Afghanistan dient der Sicherheit des euro-atlantischen Raums.... Dass von integrierten Kampfeinsätzen nicht gesprochen werden kann, ergibt sich bereits aus dem Beschluss der Bundesregierung zur Entsendung der Tornado-Aufklärungsflugzeuge. Danach sollen die Tornado- Flugzeuge Aufklärungsarbeit leisten, die Fähigkeit zur Luftnahunterstützung ist nicht vorgesehen, und die Flugzeuge sind nur zu Eigen- und Selbstschutzzwecken bewaffnet." Bundesverfassungsgericht, "Klage der Linksfraktion gegen Tornado-Einsatz in Afghanistan zurückgewiesen," Pressemitteilung Nr. 72/2007, July 3, 2007.

1085 The latter complaint was filed by the PDS left-wing party. It dealt with the issue whether the rights of political parties had been violated by the government given the government's support to Operation *Allied Force*. While the Constitutional Court concluded that the Bundeswehr acted in violation of article 25 and 26 of the Basic Law because there was no explicit international legal mandate for the mission. The court case was however ruled inadmissible on its merits since the Bundestag had supported the use of military force in October 1998 irrespective of a UN mandate. "Bei diesem Beschluß war dem Bundestag bewußt, daß der Einsatz aller Voraussicht nach ohne eine Ermächtigung durch den Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen durchgeführt werden würde." For more see, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es19990325_2bve000599.html.

German security policy. Additionally, since the Constitutional Court has a central role in justifying German expeditionary operations, it contributes to stifling a strategic debate regarding the use of the military which is fundamentally political-strategic question rather than a legal-constitutional one. The debate is removed from the political-military realm and diverted to a legal-constitutional setting. This leads to a legalistic approach to security policy and limits the ability of the state to pursue transformation.

The security policy debate in the *Bundestag* was considered “provincial” and dominated by party politics.¹⁰⁸⁶ It was a product of a “parliamentary” military, reducing decisions on strategy to domestic referendums or court rulings. The PDS and die Linke left-wing parties defended German pacifism and were the primary plaintiffs with the Constitutional Court on expeditionary operations. In 2007 the governing Labor party (SPD) had difficulties to convince its own constituency of the usefulness to remain involved in Afghanistan since it appeared to contradict its image as *Friedenspartei*.

27.2 CAVEATS

A further aspect that indicated tensions between German strategic and the operational environment were capability caveats declared for operations in Afghanistan. These consisted of limitations on the use of capabilities in-theatre and restrictive rules of engagement. It led to Alliance-wide criticism against German forces. Such caveats have included not allowing other NATO allies to make use of certain assets such as the above-mentioned Tornado aircraft, not deploying German forces to combat zones, or not being able to take prisoners.¹⁰⁸⁷ Another German caveat was that German transport capability could only be used for flights between Kabul and Termez. The capability would not be available for other NATO purposes for fear of providing support to a combat operation. It increased the scarcity of transport assets within ISAF and led to substantial criticism from allies. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaking in Heidelberg in late 2007 criticized the lack of burden-sharing among allies and its consequences for alliance cohesion. Although he did not mention Germany specifically, it was clear from the context:

*The failure to meet commitments puts the Afghan mission – and with it, the credibility of NATO – at real risk. If an alliance of the world’s greatest democracies cannot summon the will to get the job done in a mission that we agree is morally just and vital to our security, then our citizens may begin to question both the worth of the mission and the utility of the 60-year-old transatlantic security project itself.*¹⁰⁸⁸

1086 Interview with anonymous official at German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, July 9, 2007.

1087 See for instance Susanne Koebel & Alexander Szandr, “Not Licensed To Kill: German Forces in Afghanistan Let Taliban Commander Escape,” *Der Spiegel Online (International)*, May 19, 2008. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,554033,00.html>.

1088 Robert M. Gates, “Speech by Secretary of Defense,” Conference of European Armies, Heidelberg, Germany, Thursday, October 25, 2007.

Gates referred to alliance solidarity as an overarching justification for providing additional assets. Even though German policymakers were sensitive to the solidarity argument, the caveat discussion was not resolved. In fact, German politicians further denounced the role of the military, portraying strong disbelief that the war in the Southern part of Afghanistan could be won militarily.¹⁰⁸⁹ German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung said in early 2007, "I do not think it is right to talk about more and more military means [in Afghanistan]. When the Russians were in Afghanistan they had 100,000 troops and didn't win."¹⁰⁹⁰ Instead, Germany increasingly emphasized a comprehensive approach, promoting non-military instruments.

27.3 A PROCESS OF AWAKENING?

German commentators have continuously argued that Germany accept a greater role in burden-sharing in Afghanistan and share the burden of high-intensity stability operations.¹⁰⁹¹ Yet given that the military is subject to parliamentary approval and the underlying strategic cultural traits, this has been difficult. From this perspective transformation can be considered a process of re-education, particularly for the political elite, on using the military in an expeditionary environment.¹⁰⁹² It also underlines the political nature of German transformation, since it involves redefining a German political-strategic orientation to the military and its place in foreign and security policy. It requires aligning the *Zivilmacht* with the ambition of solidarity to collective security organizations and the operational requirements of the external security environment. Since NATO is now engaged in stabilization missions with a strong civilian component, it is logical to see Germany emphasizing this element of the mission.

This issue of 're-education' appeared with the military as well. In 2007 the commander of the Army, General Hans-Otto Budde, wrote that the German military should prepare for 'worst-case' scenarios when German forces deploy abroad. This required, he said, mental preparedness and self-knowledge (*Selbstverständnis*) since "to the soldier on deployment [the mission] is a case of life and death. This is a consequence that all citizens, with or without uniform, must realize."¹⁰⁹³ Budde addressed the traditionally pacifist psyche of the German population to provide some reality that missions are not risk-free.

Officials at the Ministry of Defense interviewed for this research had a tendency to excuse the German military and downplay allied criticism over the caveats. By mid-2007 there was a growing chorus in the West that Germany was not contributing sufficiently in

1089 "Sterben fuer Kabul," *Der Spiegel*, no. 47 (2006), p. 34 – 44.

1090 Franz-Josef Jung, quoted in Thom Shanker, "NATO Asked to Meet Promises Already Made to Afghanistan," *New York Times*, February 9, 2007.

1091 See for instance Timo Noetzel & Benjamin Schreer, "The German Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," *SWP Comments*, February 2008; Michael Rühle, "Am Rubikon der Kampfeinsätze," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 4, 2008.

1092 Interview with anonymous policy official at German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, July 9, 2007.

1093 Hans-Otto Budde, "Einsatz verpflichtet," *Internationale Politik* (May 2007), p. 28 – 33.

Afghanistan, and that it was hiding behind caveats to avoid participating in the warfighting in the Southern provinces. Most of my interlocutors went to great extents to weaken that criticism. Instead they said “Germany was not ready yet for counterinsurgency operations” or “Germany requires re-education”. Paraphrasing Germany’s highest-ranking officer, Inspector-General Schneiderhan, he said that German participation in a stabilization operation necessitated winning hearts and minds of the Germans first, before the military could win hearts and minds abroad. It was a remark that captured the dilemma that has burdened the German process of change. Fabian Breuer wrote in agreement that Germany’s civilian power, “does not exclude the use of force, but military interventions have to be in accordance with German values.”¹⁰⁹⁴ Breuer supports his argument with data from surveys that even though large majorities support the Bundeswehr undertaking humanitarian missions, only a small majority support peacekeeping missions and only 38% support an active German foreign and security policy.¹⁰⁹⁵ At the same time, criticism was dampened by pointing out that Germany had already come a long way. German Special Forces had operated in Operation *Enduring Freedom*, German aircraft had flown combat missions over Kosovo, and Germany had also suffered casualties in Northern Afghanistan.

As an indication that this process of re-education is slowly taking place was the acknowledgement by the Defense Minister that two German soldiers killed by improvised explosives in Afghanistan in October 2008 were casualties of war, or *Gefallenen*. Until then, this word had not been used when soldiers were killed by enemy-fire. Minister Jung said that the soldiers “had become casualties in Afghanistan while performing their duties on a mission for peace.”¹⁰⁹⁶ While the Minister did not describe the Afghanistan mission as war, it signaled a process of internalization. *The Economist* quoted a German top official saying, “Germans are still learning that they have to take over more responsibility.”¹⁰⁹⁷ Further indication was offered by reports that the national caveats on rules of engagement in Afghanistan were slowly being revised.¹⁰⁹⁸ The *Spiegel* outlined that this was related to a process of normalization of the German self-perception. In other words Germany was coming to terms with NATO’s expeditionary era, albeit slowly. Yet for every step forward there were also reaffirmations of German intransigence. In May 2010 the German president Horst Köhler suddenly resigned. The reason was a series of remarks Köhler made concerning the German deployment in Afghanistan which attracted fierce criticism. Köhler had suggested that missions as in Afghanistan were at times necessary to protect vital interests, and that a country as large and outward-looking as Germany should be

1094 Fabian Breuer, “Between Ambitions and Financial Constraints: The Reform of the German Armed Forces,” *German Politics*, vol. 15, no. 2 (2006), p.210.

1095 Data is retrieved from a 2004 survey conducted by Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, *Die Wehrpflicht und ihre Hintergründe* (Wiesbaden: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2004).

1096 “...in Wahrnehmung ihres Auftrags im Einsatz für den Frieden in Afghanistan gefallen.” “Jung spricht erstmals von Gefallenen,” *Die Welt*, October 25, 2008.

1097 “Germany’s Place in the World,” *The Economist*, November 18, 2006, p. 29.

1098 “German Troops Beef up Fight Against Taliban,” *Der Spiegel*, September 7, 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html>.

willing to participate in a military mission to protect trade routes and promote regional stability. His remarks portrayed a narrow realist view of the use of the military. It clashed with German strategic culture and the German constitution which only permitted expeditionary operations in support of a collective security organization and mandated by the United Nations. A mission in support of narrow economic interests did not fit this mold.

A *Sonderweg* argument appeared frequently as well. “You can’t expect the same from Germany as from other countries, Germany is different,” Franz-Jozef Meiers writes, “the problem facing Germany is how to define a rule of conduct that neither shirks responsibilities nor reawakens the fears of its allies.”¹⁰⁹⁹ There was concern, both among politicians and the military, regarding the way other states perceived German forces abroad. Even if Germany wanted to perform an expeditionary operation by itself, Inspector-General Schneiderhan categorically stated, “nobody would invite the Germans to go anywhere by themselves.”¹¹⁰⁰ Such fears were vested in offensive realism believing that Germany could resort to its former regional hegemonic role to protect its security.¹¹⁰¹ The remark was telling for the political tightrope of German transformation.

The domestic dynamic has been fundamental to the pursuit of transformation. Germany’s strategic culture is military-averse. In an age of expeditionary operations of uncertain intensity, is the German population ready to take on the responsibilities that have been described in the policy documents? Zettel said that in his assessment *Innenpolitik*, domestic political factors, were the primary determinants of German foreign and security policy.¹¹⁰² Internal politics rather than considerations of the international system were shaping German defense policy. Neoclassical realism however makes clear that it was the interaction between domestic and system-level factors that produced the process of German transformation, for without an expeditionary NATO, the debate in Germany would have been very different.

28 CONCLUSION OF GERMAN CASE STUDY

WHAT TYPE OF TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY WAS PURSUED?

Transformation in Germany was a process of strategic change to shift the military towards expeditionary operations in response to a shift in the security environment, and more prominently a shift in the posture of NATO. It amounted to a policy of strategic transformation. It was political-strategic in nature as it addressed the fundamental question how the military could play a role in German foreign and security policy. German transformation however was not accompanied by a grand strategy about Germany’s role in the

1099 Franz-Jozef Meiers, “Germany: the Reluctant Power,” *Survival*, vol. 37, no.3 (1995), p. 97.

1100 Inspektor-General Schneiderhan, “Remarks at WIIS Conference: German contribution to European Security and Transatlantic Cooperation – the White Paper,” Berlin, April 26, 2007.

1101 See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

1102 Interview with Rüdiger Zettel, Berlin, July 9, 2007.

world.¹¹⁰³ Nevertheless, given this political dimension as well as German constitutional constraints, transformation takes place as much within the *Bundestag* and the heads of the decision makers as much as it is written in the evolution of the Defense policy papers.

WHAT CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY OR OPPORTUNITY, FORMING THE TRANSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, TRIGGERED TRANSFORMATION?

The shift in the security environment following the end of the Cold War required Berlin to develop a military policy in line with NATO's expeditionary outlook.

WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURAL FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

Innenpolitik and history pervade the reform of the German armed forces and its understanding of transformation. Germany's constitutional constraint on using the military abroad made transformation a troublesome endeavor, comparable to a patient in psychological therapy. Transformation has gone to the core of the identity of the German state.

Two elements have shaped German strategic culture, namely its *Zivilmacht* and the pursuit of alliance solidarity. The interaction between these two tenets, following a change in the security environment producing an expeditionary era, has shaped the contours of German transformation. Throughout the Cold War, in fact since the creation of Germany in its current constitutional form, these two factors have been aligned. Solidarity to NATO throughout the Cold War meant sustaining a defense infrastructure while not using it, mainly preparing for its use should its territorial security be threatened. It allowed Germany to develop its status as *Zivilmacht*.

As NATO reorients itself towards expeditionary missions, Germany is weighted down by its domestic constraints. Given German historical and legal-constitutional factors, responding to the shifts that NATO has put forward has been troublesome. Its extractive capacity has been limited as a result and transformation has moved at a slow pace. Neoclassical realism suggests that domestic level variables may limit the ability of states to respond to system-level incentives. The case study shows that Germany has been unwilling to emulate the principles of US and unable to pursue the strategic innovation it envisioned in its White Papers as a result of these domestic constraints.

WHAT DID THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE MEAN IN TERMS OF CAPABILITIES?

Due to the intransigence of German transformation and the limited financial resources available, only few initiatives in the field of capabilities have been taken. Among them are improved assets for deployability by procuring the A400M, the creation of a pool of deployable forces and the development in 2004 of an airmobile brigade. However, these capabilities have not been able to be realized in a timely fashion. In addition, the persis-

1103 Dalggaard-Nielsen (2006), p. 146.

tence of a significant conscription force remains a practical impediment to free necessary funds to pursue transformation initiatives. Furthermore crucial is the role played by the *Bundestag* and the Constitutional court to shape military policy.

HOW DID FURTHER EVENTS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPACT THE TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY?

Germany was caught between solidarity with the alliance and a strategic culture that resisted using military force. As the security environment slowly deteriorated, this tension remained. German strategic culture fundamentally clashed with the high-intensity mission NATO was undertaking in parts of Afghanistan. The resource extraction of the German state dwindled as it committed to only deploy in the relatively risk-free areas in Afghanistan and denoted substantial caveats and preconditions for the use of its military assets. Subsequently this tested the foundation of Alliance solidarity. As NATO undertook more challenging missions, it forced Germany to confront the limitations offered by its strategic culture. It hampered transformation.

The expeditionary era following the end of the Cold War however shifted NATO's attention from preparing to defend, to acting in defense of regional stability and performing crisis-management operations. From 1999 onwards, and particularly following the events of September 11, it became apparent that NATO's security interests could be directly challenged by events taking place across the globe necessitating robust action, including combat operations. To Germany it implied a clash between its defensive-realist posture to sustain a credible position within NATO and a constructivist self-perception as a structure-focused *Zivilmacht*.

While Germany is economically the strongest, and militarily the largest of the European allies, on the basis of its strategic culture a form of *Sonderweg* will remain, leading to inhibitions to deploying military forces abroad in robust interventions. To that extent, a normalization of German foreign policy is unlikely to take place as NATO's expeditionary persists. In the event that the security environment leads to more robust action from NATO, it will amount to further difficulties for the German *Innenpolitik*. Germany has yet to send ground forces into combat operations, or to be directly involved in large scale offensive operations. Operation *Allied Force* marked the first combat mission since the end of the Second World War, yet the first mission involving ground forces still needs to take place. Nor has Germany confronted the same level of attrition on its military organization as states such as the United States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. These are further tests that await it, if it wants to successfully pursue its transformation to a full-spectrum expeditionary force. As with every educational process, it is characterized by trial and error. After Operation *Allied Force* the belief was prevalent that a German *Sonderweg* had been disavowed. The operation in Afghanistan indicated that this is not the case and that the *Zivilmacht* tenet of its strategic culture continues to weigh on German transformation. As Germany tries to take on more responsibility in military operations, succumbing to the pressure of alliance solidarity, the risk of a domestic backlash increases. Instead it is to be expected that within NATO Germany will remain a strong advocate of a comprehensive

approach to complex operations, and avoid making NATO a purely military organization. It offers the only way through which Germany can align both tenets of its strategic culture within an expeditionary environment. An additional element is to strengthen the European Union's Security and Defense Policy as it appears more in tune with Germany's *Zivilmacht* status. A strong *Zivilmacht* European Union could replace Germany's handicapped bid to sustain its solidarity to NATO.

PART 3

Conclusion

HOW TRANSFORMATION DIVIDED NATO IN AN EXPEDITIONARY WORLD

29 INTRODUCTION

This study has explored the nature of defense transformation and the elements that shaped it in three Western countries to explain variance in policies of transformation and its impact on the future of NATO. Transformation has failed to be the source of Alliance cohesion, as had been envisaged in 2002. Variance in transformation strategies created different responses to the expeditionary environment and are symptomatic of the different philosophies that have proliferated in the West regarding the use of the military. How these states have gone through the process of transformation goes a long way to explain the discord within the alliance in the contemporary security environment where the military instrument is deployed abroad in a variety of missions. This study implies that as long as an expeditionary environment persists, NATO's response to security challenges will remain troubled and subject to internal divisiveness. The reason for this is that states can only effectively pursue a process of fundamental change in their military policy if the content of that change program aligns with the state's tenets of its strategic culture.

The research question is *How has the interaction between system-level factors and domestic strategic cultures influenced the trajectory of defense transformation of NATO member states and how does it shape future transatlantic security relations and the future of NATO?* In this chapter, the most relevant conclusions of the structured focused comparison are presented. Additionally, the results from the three case studies are compared to make an assessment of its implications for the NATO alliance. The chart below presents the answers to the questions guiding the research on the transformation strategies pursued by the three states. A synopsis of the case studies follows below, followed by answering the final overarching question what differences in transformation imply for the future of NATO.

Transformation is the term used to denote the process of change in Western militaries in response to major transitions in the international security environment. Specifi-

Question	USA	Netherlands	Germany
<p>What type of transformation strategy was pursued by the state?</p>	<p>Operational effectiveness transformation to maintain strategic dominance, followed by Army strategic transformation to respond to system-level shift of irregular warfare</p>	<p>Strategic transformation towards a broad expeditionary force for stability projection.</p>	<p>Strategic transformation towards an expeditionary force capable of performing UN-sanctioned crisis-management operations and cooperation with NATO.</p>
<p>What change in the level of external vulnerability or opportunity, forming the transition in the international security environment, triggered transformation?</p>	<p>Unipolarity and advent of Information Age. Army strategic transformation: Iraq/Afghanistan irregular warfare.</p>	<p>End of the Cold War, pursuit of relevance in alliance (bandwagoning), and support for international rule of law (soft balancing). European process of integration.</p>	<p>End of the Cold War, necessity to support NATO solidarity, support for the international rule of law. European process of integration.</p>
<p>What are the characteristics of the strategic cultural factors that shaped the transformation strategy?</p>	<p>Agency-focused approach based on promotion of Freedom; advance of the values of American Revolution and US exceptionalism; emphasis on technology.</p>	<p>Use military to gain political credit with major allies, part of "A-team". Strengthen the international rule of law as an end. Vocation as "bridge-builder." Approach focused on structures.</p>	<p><i>Zivilmacht</i>; constitutional restraints on use of the military for expeditionary operations; Approach focused on structures.</p>

What did the interaction between the level of external vulnerability and strategic culture mean in terms of capabilities?

Development to substitute mass for information, network-centric warfare and SOF-ing the Army, emphasis on high-intensity combat.
Power projection

Stability projection. Political ambition as defining construct for defense policy. Debate over the development of capabilities for high-intensity operations. Budget reductions used as policy instrument.

Slow process of developing expeditionary capabilities for stability projection, due to continued use of conscription and domestic resistance to expeditionary operations.

How did further events in the security environment impact the transformation strategy?

Only US Army focuses on strategic transformation in response to irregular warfare. Leads to troubled effort to shift towards sustained stability campaigns, focus on high-intensity counterinsurgency and training missions instead.

From operations in Bosnia and Kosovo onwards, friction becomes apparent between two tenets of strategic culture. US policy leads to difficulty for the Netherlands to match solidarity with the primary ally and stability projection.

As NATO takes on more intense expeditionary challenges it becomes more difficult for Germany to deliver.

How do the different trajectories of transformation shape future transatlantic security relations and the future of NATO?

Because states can only effectively pursue a transformation strategy if the content of that change program aligns with the state's tenets of its strategic culture, variations in transformation strategies among different states are not easily resolved. Absent a major shift in the security environment, transatlantic security relations will continue to be characterized by dissenting views over the use of the military instrument. Unless NATO is able to harness the diversity in expeditionary outlooks, the Alliance will remain divided

Figure 31: Overview of Principal Research Questions and Answers

(Source: Author's Analysis)

cally it was used in Western strategic discourse throughout the late 1990's and early 2000's to denote their strategic-level change initiatives for defense and security policy. Within NATO, transformation was considered the dominant construct along which allied militaries would change in order to collectively meet the challenges of the first decades of the 21st century. The trajectories of transformation within the alliance thus become an indicator for the development of alliance cohesion. On the basis of the case studies it becomes apparent that there are fundamental differences in the way European states and the United States have viewed transformation.

In this study defense transformation is defined as the process of pursuing deliberate discontinuous change in a state's military policy, the purpose of which is to increase the compatibility and relevance of the military instrument to a state's foreign and security policy objectives, in response to major shifts in the international security environment. Transformation is pursued with the objective to make the military more usable for policymakers. This makes transformation an adaptive strategy to increase resource extraction; namely to increase the usefulness and relevance of the military in response to a changing international environment. It implies matching political objectives and preferences with the international security environment in order to reform defense policy and the military organization. Its effectiveness can only be assessed when the new strategic orientation or the newly developed military capabilities are proofed in real-life operations and the political decision-making procedures leading up to their use. It makes transformation a fundamentally political endeavor in which the measure of success corresponds to a state's interpretation of how the military is most useful to its policy objectives given a changed international environment.

A specific characteristic of transformation, as opposed to less far-reaching forms of military change, is its discontinuous nature. In contrast to incremental modernization, transformation is a form of radical change which impacts the existential character of the armed forces. Either it produces a magnitude level of change allowing revolutionary ways of operating to emerge, or it leads to a wholesale revision of the overarching activities of the military. In that regard there are two variants of transformation: Strategic and Operational Effectiveness. While the former emphasizes "doing different things" with the military, the latter is a policy to "do the same things differently." Both strategies have been apparent in the case studies researched for this study.

The choice for these strategies has been dependent on a state's power, its position in the international system and its interpretation of major shifts in external vulnerabilities or opportunities as filtered through its strategic culture. Neoclassical realism offers a theoretical basis on which to pursue the study of how transformation was interpreted and how it was shaped by these different variables, offering analytical value to both the system-level factors and a state's strategic culture which gives context to state behavior. The case studies make clear that primarily strategic culture has had a strong impact on the direction of transformation, particularly during a benevolent international system as it developed following the end of the Cold War. Neoclassical realism holds that a state will be more activist in

promoting a domestic agenda abroad if the security environment is more favorable to it.¹¹⁰⁴ Yet how this pursuit of an expanding mission is undertaken is subject to factors at the level of the polity. On the basis of a historical analysis it becomes clear that the tenets of strategic culture are semi-permanent in nature. They appear consistent over different distributions of power, are slow to change and illustrate a polity's understanding how it can 'create' security for itself and its "modes of thought and action with respect to force."¹¹⁰⁵ These "ways of war" are unique and it is their interaction with perceived shifts in the external environment that reveal why and how a process of discontinuous change in military policy is pursued. While transformation has been closely connected to developments in military technology in the 1990's, including what has become known as the Revolution in Military Affairs, in Germany and the Netherlands, transformation was hardly technology-focused. Instead, for them it was a shift in the strategic orientation in response to the operational environment. The expeditionary environment meant that Western states were to operate far from home and it led to a more prominent role for political and domestic considerations associated with a state's strategic culture.

On the basis of this research it can be asserted that strategic culture – aside from the relative distribution of power - is a central component to explain the variation of transformation strategies between the three cases. This in turn explains the roots for discontent within the alliance regarding the use of the military in an expeditionary environment. While the international distribution of power defines the contours of a spectrum in which security policy takes shape, strategic culture shapes the bandwidth of each individual state. The policy of defense transformation is then a product of how the new international security environment interacts with principle tenets of a state's strategic culture. Strategic cultures and international system-level variables meet when military forces are deployed to a particular theatre of operations and the political assumptions underlying the decision to deploy and its transformation policy are put to the test. This encounter, more than anything, offers the validating experience for the pursuit of transformation by the state.

The United States pursued a policy of escalating its existing strategy pursuing operational effectiveness by improving on its warfighting capabilities, while lesser powers, such as Germany and the Netherlands, pursued a strategy of innovation. The success with which the three states have engaged in this process has been dependent on the alignment of the state's strategic culture with the position of the state in the international distribution of power and the nature of the security environment. When domestic-level variables enable – rather than inhibit - a state in a given position in a given international distribution of power, the extractive capacity of transformation is high. The United States experienced such a situation in the 1990s and early 2000s as its strategic culture, governed by US exceptionalism and belief in the liberating force of warfare, was met by the promise of information technologies and a unipolar environment. When strategic culture and system-level

1104 Rose (1998).

1105 Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy; The American Example," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1981), p.21-22..

factors do not line up, friction between domestic and system-level variables increases and the extractive capacity is limited. This has been the case in Germany as it struggled to combine a strategic culture resistant to the use of the military and a security environment in which allies undertake expeditionary operations.

From this it follows that in order to foster successful transformation and achieve a high level of resource extraction in which the process of military change results in a military instrument in line with the political ambition, the state's response to the security environment must be aligned with its strategic culture. In other words, if a program of military change is pursued that runs contrary to a state's strategic culture, the process will be tedious at best or impossible at all. The alignment of strategic cultures and system-level variables is critical for the effective pursuit of transformation.

29.1 DIFFERENCES IN TRANSFORMATION STRATEGIES

Transformation was pursued differently by the United States, the Netherlands and Germany as a result of different positions in the international system and a variance in strategic culture. The following distinctions can be identified. First of all, transformation started in the United States as a strategy of operational effectiveness transformation based around the Revolution in Military Affairs whereas the two European countries both pursued strategic transformation to shift their militaries towards an expeditionary posture. The United States embarked on improving its ability to perform high-intensity combat operations, principally conventional warfare, since the Information Age was believed to enable a magnitude increase in combat effectiveness. In addition, its overall strategic objective was to prevent the rise of a peer competitor and to sustain an international system based on unipolarity. It meant improving its ability to project power globally and formulate solutions to area-denial and anti-access threats. It turned US transformation into primarily a military-technological and military-operational endeavor with a view to sustaining US military dominance and primacy. For the Netherlands transformation was not pursued for military dominance or to improve on existing modes of operation. Instead it was a process to reorient the military to undertake expeditionary operations in order to contribute to stability projection. It was informed by the benevolent security environment which offered an opportunity to expand the international rule of law, support human rights and promote stability. This transformation was strategic since it implied that the military would be refocused to actively undertake expeditionary operations, meaning a wholesale reassessment of what the military was for. To Germany, transformation was similarly strategic in nature. It was driven by the notion of alliance solidarity, which triggered participation in crisis-management operations abroad. However, given the historical and cultural constraints on the German polity and its military, the process of German transformation was slow.

Underlying these differences in transformation was a fundamentally different way in which the three states identified and interpreted the changing nature of the security environment. All three states accorded importance to the changing international distribution of power following the end of the Cold War. However, to the United States it represented

an opportunity to extend its influence. This was reinforced by the advent of the Information Age originating from US business and innovation in the field of IT. The United States saw the advent of an Information Age as a revolutionary event. The National Defense Panel report in 1997 concluded that “if we do not lead the technological revolution we will be vulnerable to it.”¹¹⁰⁶ Network-centric warfare and substituting mass for information were viewed as a game-changer and a source of strategic power, just as the nuclear weapon had been in the 1940’s. A benevolent security environment and a first-mover advantage to shift to the Information Age produced a dynamic to expand a domestic agenda abroad and sustain its dominance, amongst others by undertaking interventions to promote non-vital interests, and ultimately to actively enforce unipolarity through a doctrine of prevention.

Interestingly, the attacks of September 11 were not the key milestone to reshape US transformation as the security environment changed. Doctrine such as the Joint Swiftess Goals formulated in 2003 underlined that even subsequent to the terrorist attacks high-intensity combat operations with the possibility of regime change remained central to Washington’s defense outlook. Instead it was the tenacity of the insurgency and the difficulties associated with irregular warfare that did. The United States had remained convinced that it could defeat any regime, yet by 2004 it had to adapt to counter insurgencies. Notably, this mainly concerned the US Army and Marine Corps. The Navy and Air Force retained a focus on operational effectiveness transformation in their change initiatives. As the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan picked up steam and it became clear that, after 9/11, leaving a weak state at risk of being preyed upon by an international terrorist movement was unacceptable, a strategic transformation was initiated by the United States. A shift in the threat environment translated into an urgency to deal with irregular warfare. It meant that rather than be focused on avoiding the rise of a peer competitor and being able to destroy it, the US military should also accord strategic weight to successfully pursuing irregular warfare. But this only concerned the Army and Marine Corps.

In the Netherlands and Germany, the Information Age was not perceived as the strategic opportunity the United States’ government held it to be. Instead, strategic transformation was triggered by the end of the Cold War and gave rise to a re-evaluation of the nature of defense policy. It spawned new Defense White Papers that accorded greater attention to crisis management operations and expeditionary capabilities and a move away from territorial defense. The concept of security was broadened. To The Hague, the overarching intent was to strengthen the international rule of law and so doing to promote its own position as a credible and relevant ally. It was a policy of bandwagoning with the major ally, pursuing political relevance through the use of the military as well as dampening unilateral tendencies of major powers through soft-balancing and promoting the international rule of law. It meant that the Netherlands also partook in interventions to promote Western values. To Germany, the end of the Cold War implied a sigh of relief however it challenged the foundations of German security policy. Along with the changes proposed in NATO’s alliance strategic concept, Germany produced the policy documents

1106 Report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, December 1997, p. 8.

that embraced expeditionary operations however it would be due to domestic constraints that these could only tediously be put into practice.

Furthermore the process of European integration had altered the security dynamic in the European region. After the end of the Cold War this picked up speed and it predisposed European states to promote the tenets of European integration – namely economic relations and institution-building – as a key element in their broader security agenda. In foreign policy it translated into a policy of stability projection.

To the Netherlands, the system-level drivers that impacted transformation after the initial shift towards expeditionary operations were the policies of the United States and the increasing challenges of expeditionary operations. A guiding principle of Dutch security policy is soft-balancing by supporting the international rule of law. However, it led to difficulties for Dutch transformation towards expeditionary crisis-management operations as the security environment changed. During the first half of the 1990's the benevolent security environment allowed the Netherlands to undertake deployments that were relatively risk-free. It even led to domestic calls to reorient away from reliance on the transatlantic partnership and towards the European continent instead. However, as a result of continuing instability in the Balkans, the Netherlands became enmeshed in challenging security issues which European states were unable to resolve leading to a reaffirmation of the relationship with the United States. It gave renewed support to NATO. Solidarity with the United States and the Alliance strengthened the Dutch resolve to partake in Operation *Allied Force*. The Netherlands similarly deployed forces to Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and to Iraq subsequent to the removal of Saddam Hussein. In the wake of US initiated interventions the Netherlands has stood as a loyal ally. However, as operations became more challenging it tested the limits of Dutch political appetite for high-intensity operations and with it Dutch transformation. Strategic transformation in the Netherlands rested not only on the development of capabilities but also on the political willingness to deploy forces. The Uruzgan mission has brought these limits to bear as the Netherlands struggled to find the political and military capability to continue in that testing environment.

To Germany, following the end of the Cold War the missions that NATO decided to undertake shaped its trajectory of transformation. Similar to the Netherlands, the strategic effectiveness of transformation was shaped by its ability to develop expeditionary capabilities as well as to deploy these capabilities in real missions. Yet more so than the Netherlands, Germany has found it difficult to cope with NATO's expeditionary ambitions, only hesitantly contributing and foregoing participation altogether in the most challenging elements of complex operations the alliance has been involved in.

Not only did the three states pursue different transformation strategies, they also identified different incentives from the international environment to pursue transformation. The primary differences are between the United States, which as a great power had an interest in perpetuating a unipolar system and saw the rise of the Information Age as its enabler, and the smaller powers Germany and the Netherlands which pursued a defensive realist strategy, switching between bandwagoning and soft-balancing, and were condi-

tioned by the process of European integration. Yet there were ample differences between Germany and the Netherlands as well. Central was The Hague's willingness, and Berlin's reluctance, to partake in high-intensity operations. However, the system-level factors offer little context to understand the actual trajectory of transformation beyond its broad contours. Nor do they explain why different system-level factors were identified by the three states that shaped the overall trajectory of the transformation strategies.

29.2 DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIC CULTURES

According to neoclassical realism, the ability to extract resources for the polity is based upon the interaction between system- and domestic-level factors; between the security environment and how the state filters these events. Strategic cultures are a defining variable to understand transformation. Strategic culture frames a state's sensitivity to particular system-level events, while at the same time it gives shape to the execution of a transformation strategy within the outlines set by the international distribution of power. Strategic cultures are critical for understanding the justification framework of liberal democracies undertaking military operations in an expeditionary environment. These justification regimes act as paradigms, or lenses, through which the use of the military is perceived. It also informs capability or operational decisions since strategic cultures preordain specific modes of military conduct.

US strategic culture is defined by a widespread and long-standing political tradition of exceptionalism, which disposes it to a natural tendency for pursuing a strategic *Sonderweg* and a tendency towards unilateralism. The underlying motive for its security policy is to achieve a state of absolute security. This tendency is a direct result of the founding values of the American Revolution. It translates either to isolationism or a liberal-interventionist disposition to pursue the spread of Freedom and democracy as foreign policy objectives. This corresponds to a belief in the democratic peace theorem and a proliferation of its values - which are held to be universally applicable - abroad. This tradition has become a justification framework for waging wars, and in its public discourse the United States cultivates this liberating tradition as a central objective of, and justification for, its security policy. The American Creed and its underlying Lockean philosophy produce an agency-focused perspective to security policy in which threats are identified in the form of specific actors. Its corollary is that threats may be resolved when these actors are removed or killed. In terms of military strategy it sustains a tendency to emphasize decapitation - for instance as exemplified at the start of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* or continued support for unmanned drone strikes - pushing for decisive victories and to see the waging of war as an at times acceptable form of policy. In its strategic culture it leads to an emphasis on technology and a preference for high-intensity operations. Technology is developed to make the US military quicker and more lethal, or otherwise shielding it from security threats that may impede its strategic reach. For operational effectiveness transformation, it corresponded to an emphasis on rapid, decisive operations and precision technologies.

The strategic culture of the Netherlands is vastly different. Cultured by a maritime tradition and geopolitically surrounded by major European powers, the Netherlands

has emphasized the international rule of law out of strategic necessity. This has evolved into being an end in itself. The Netherlands cultivates an image as a bridge-builder based on stability projection. The strategic objective of transformation in the Netherlands is to increase the political position of The Hague within transatlantic and international frameworks. It informs a policy to “be relevant,” as former Minister Kamp said, and increase Dutch political relevance within the NATO Alliance, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, and to contribute to strengthening the international rule of law through stability projection. Dutch strategic culture influenced its policy of strategic transformation by using the premise of stability projection – as opposed to power projection – as a means to increase its international standing and satisfy its international ambition in line with an approach to security issues that emphasized the role of structures and institutions. Dutch political culture is popularly described in terms of a tension between moralism and commercial interests, between “the priest and the merchant.” However, this is too quaint when considering Dutch transformation policy. Instead, its strategic culture rests on a complex two-pronged approach to pursue relevance and promote the international order at the same time; producing a tension between soft balancing and bandwagoning, and between an Atlanticist and a European approach.

Its structure-focused approach leads it to favor managing instability rather than resolving specific threats. It produces policies that promote dealing with ‘root causes’ or building governance structures rather than “fighting and winning the nation’s wars.” The Dutch emphasis on stability has also led it to support the democratic peace theorem, but with less military verve than the United States; international stability is more secure if pluralist democracies proliferate. The difference with the American perspective is that it denounces the unilateral use of force in order to promote democracy due to the inherent instability that militarily imposing a political model on others creates. Instead it emphasizes shaping democratic societies over the long-haul through institution building, trade relations, multilateral engagement and strengthening international regulatory institutions. It explains the prominent position development aid has claimed in Dutch foreign policy while fostering resistance, both in rhetoric and policy, to ‘waging war.’

The other dimension is that the Netherlands has positioned itself as a ‘bridge-builder’ and a loyal ally. Over the past century, this posture has remained consistent. The peace-keeping operation in Albania in 1913, the contribution to the Korean War and later the deployment to Southern Afghanistan all reflected elements of this reasoning. While the Netherlands did not support the Iraq War militarily, it offered political support for the invasion and immediately promised assistance in the stabilization phase. The Hague pursues a policy of bandwagoning with Washington in an attempt to be a relevant ally. The Netherlands sees in relevant alliance relations a direct promotion of its security, a vehicle to promote its position internally within the alliance as well as internationally, and a way to prevent the United States from pursuing unilateral policies.

The two constituent elements make Dutch security policy appear somewhat schizophrenic. On the one hand support for the international rule of law is a means to decrease the influence of the great powers, while supporting the United States is meant to increase

its influence in the transatlantic security framework. The tension between these two objectives is a core element of Dutch security policy and forms a domestic constraint on the country's extractive capacity. This became apparent as the Netherlands struggled to align its support for the United States with a policy based on stability projection. The mission in Uruzgan suffered from this tension, as politicians on the one hand were committed to solidarity while others argued to stop an operation that was a combat operation more than a reconstruction mission.

German strategic culture is defined by its experience following the end of the Second World War, which conditioned it to denounce the use of force in its international relations. It led Germany to cultivate a status as *Zivilmacht*, or civil power. Constitutional constraints were imposed on the use of the military and its strategic culture was informed by the process of European integration. The military obtained a strong social profile, with conscription playing a necessary role to keep the military embedded in society, and permitting draftees to fulfill social services. Nevertheless Germany demonstrated strong support for the NATO alliance given the alliance's history as Germany's primary security guarantor. Its strategic culture thereby rests on two pillars; that of the *Zivilmacht* and the pursuit of alliance solidarity. Until the advent of the expeditionary era these two tenets could be satisfactorily fulfilled together, as defense policy was primarily based on territorial defense and alliance solidarity could be maintained through a deterrent posture while nourishing its *Zivilmacht* status. Following the end of the Cold War, this became more difficult since sustaining solidarity to NATO now implied actually using the military, and doing so in operations outside German borders. This had explicitly been prohibited in the German Basic Law. Besides the necessity of alliance solidarity, the military was viewed as either a superfluous instrument under the concept of *nie wieder Krieg* or as an instrument that could be used to prevent the world from reliving the horrors of Nazi Germany. It gave rise to policy argumentation based on *nie wieder Auschwitz* requiring Germany to actively strengthen the international rule of law. As Germany slowly embarked on expeditionary operations, its strategic culture created an explicit focus on structures. Germany supported the deployment of military capabilities only within an overarching multilateral setting, in which the promotion of stability and the international rule of law stood central. In addition, to avoid the appearance of warfare, or *Angriffskrieg*, Germany became a strong supporter of embedding the use of the military in a broader range of state instruments and to see the military as but one part of a potential solution to security threats, and the most deplorable at best. This became known as *Vernetzte Sicherheit*.

The question remains, are strategic cultures susceptible to change? Germany offers a clear example of the affirmative. Transitions in the security environment may change the domestic character of the state. Following the end of the Second World War, the system-level distribution of power shifted and changed the domestic-level composition of the German state. It led to a shock to German national identity and a transformation in its interpretation of the use of the military. In between these shocks however, strategic culture is not static and politicians have a role to lead it, rather than to be led by it. An example is the German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg who in 2010 was edging

Germany's strategic culture in a direction where it became accepted that the nation was engaged in battle in Afghanistan. This does not imply that politicians can simply extend the bandwidth of strategic culture at will, as this risks overextension with the potential for a backlash, however it does yield an opportunity for politicians to play a role as a strategic cultural entrepreneur rather than wait for events to take over. Zu Guttenberg's resignation in 2011 also demonstrates how fragile such momentum for change is.

29.3 PRODUCTS OF TRANSFORMATION

When Europeans and Americans discuss defense transformation, they mean decisively different things. The interplay between strategic culture and the international distribution of power producing the outcome of transformation is discussed below.

THE UNITED STATES

In the United States throughout the 1990's the operational effectiveness argument for transformation prevailed. It rested on the belief that the advent of the Information Age amounted to a major shift in external opportunity that if harnessed could extend US strategic primacy. Richard Kugler at the National Defense University defined the operational effectiveness aim of US transformation in 2006 as getting "greater strategic mileage out of force structure and to stretch military resources to maximum operational effect."¹¹⁰⁷ The introduction of information technologies could make the military a more usable instrument, reducing the costs of intervention, requiring fewer people to achieve greater effect at lower cost in capital and blood. It promised to produce discontinuous change in the American way of warfare as it rested on new network-centric models that allowed serious reductions in the force required, revolutionary improvements in the speed, precision, and lethality of conventional operations and at lower risk to friendly forces. It led to a process I have termed SOF-ing, or making the military stealthy, surgical, quick and precise, similar to Special Operations Forces. It yielded the promise that political objectives could be achieved at relative ease as the US would have the ability to deploy an order-of-magnitude more capable military force to any crisis or conflict. It produced a focus on rapid, decisive operations. The lessons of the Vietnam War, but also *Desert Storm*, held that the United States had a comparative advantage in fighting wars – rather than messy complex emergencies - and that it should expand that capability in which the US had an advantage, not in the least because these operations were also considered the primary source of strategic competition. Precision, stealth and network-centrism made it possible that wars would be waged with close-to-zero friendly casualties thereby satisfying liberal political concerns. By early 2006 Admiral Cebrowski said transformation would make the military not only more effective but also, more humane. The Revolution in Military Affairs "had great moral seductiveness," promising "to make it easier to protect the innocent."¹¹⁰⁸ Resource extraction

1107 Richard Kugler, *Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs* (Washington DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006), p. 292.

1108 William A. Arkin, "Spiraling Ahead," *Armed Forces Journal*, no. 143 (February 2006), p. 39-42.

would be increased as the substitution of mass for information through the introduction of net-centric principles and guided munitions implied that the military footprint could be reduced. Operations could be performed quicker and with less risk to friendly forces. Operational effectiveness transformation ensured that political support for a mission would thus be easier to attain. In sum transformation “promised war a brand-new lease on life.”¹¹⁰⁹ This vision was substantiated by an ever decreasing amount of US casualties since the Second World War culminating in Operation *Allied Force*, a military confrontation in which no friendly forces were killed. Operation *Iraqi Freedom* further proved the ability of the United States’ land forces to defeat a medium power within several weeks and with limited casualties. This overall increase in efficiency renders US politicians less reluctant to use force, making it a tool of US foreign policy policymakers more often turned to. It was only a small step to reason from this vision of unchallenged military power to the political pursuit of a “new world order.” The political implication of operational effectiveness transformation was that the ideals of the American Revolution could be further advanced. It strengthened the conviction that societies could be molded to US interests with little cost to US society, and promoted the view of the United States as a global system administrator. Democracy promotion, possibly by using force and regime change, became a key objective of US foreign policy, critically enabled by the promise of a vastly superior military.¹¹¹⁰ The process of operational effectiveness transformation, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the liberal-interventionist agenda’s of Presidents Clinton and Bush are thereby fundamentally connected.

More than the attacks of September 11, the Iraq War was a key moment in US transformation. In political-strategic and military-strategic terms, the Iraq War signaled the apotheosis of the US operational effectiveness agenda. The ‘shock and awe’ philosophy central to planning for the Iraq war was based on the idea that by demonstrating overwhelming force the United States could startle the adversary into defeat. It was the pinnacle of a rapid, decisive operation. Yet, because of the superiority the United States demonstrated in conventional operations during the Iraq War, it also triggered balancing reactions which appeared only after President George W. Bush claimed on the USS Lincoln that the mission had been accomplished. Irregular warfare necessitated a strategic transformation to adopt counterinsurgency skills and capabilities. Irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan put pressure on the Pentagon leadership to pursue strategic transformation, reorienting the Army and Marine Corps to a mission of sustained stability operations. This proved difficult as a result of institutional, financial and political constraints reflecting a strategic culture that favored high-intensity operations of short duration rather than lengthy deployments manning checkpoints. It led to reassessing the US approach to irregular warfare along US strategic cultural contours. A form of SOF-ing was pursued that emphasized training local forces while acting as a high-lethality, high-speed, surgical force multiplier for counter-terrorist missions. Whether in operational effectiveness or its brief

1109 Bacevich (2005), p. 166.

1110 On the historic background of US democracy promotion see Montan (2005).

experience with strategic transformation, the United States retains a focus on the combat element in warfare and strives to improve it further.

Neoclassical realism holds that the more power a state believes it has, the stronger it will promote its domestic agenda abroad. It leads to the conclusion that given America's great power status and the strategic pause following the end of the Cold War, it was substantially influenced by its strategic culture and pursued the promotion of its founding values. Whereas smaller powers, including the Netherlands and Germany, articulated the pursuit of their domestic agendas less strongly and are guided more by realist considerations pertaining to their position in the international system. The reason is simply that given less perceived power, a state has less incentive to promote its foreign policy agenda abroad. In short, it demonstrates that the United States has been more idealist in its security policy than European states. This was substantiated by the US emphasis on democracy promotion and other Wilsonian tendencies throughout the late 1990's and early 2000's.

THE NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands transformation led to the development of high-end, highly visible expeditionary capabilities to perform crisis-management and stability missions. It was a policy based on being a member of the "A-team," a select group of highly capable expeditionary Western militaries, but with the intent to pursue expeditionary operations in the name of promoting the international rule of law. An example is offered by the development of the Air Maneuver Brigade, a force package developed in the early nineties to allow the Netherlands to partake in high-end expeditionary missions. But it was also reflected in the discussion over procuring the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which would provide a high-end platform at the visible front of the Alliance, and US, capability efforts. By providing limited but high-end capabilities the Netherlands would increase its political credit among allies and allow The Hague to 'sit at the table' among the major players. Investing in high-end capabilities attests to solidarity with its major allies, especially the US. And cultivating the transatlantic relationship sustains fundamental security guarantees, but also decreases the political risk that the Netherlands be marginalized by the three major European powers in collective security affairs. Given the limited size of the Netherlands' military, participating in a military mission primarily had indirect benefits. Respected by the United States, it gives the Netherlands credit within NATO and enhances its image as a bridge-builder. The Netherlands emulated US network-centric concepts as necessary instruments to develop a broad expeditionary military with limited resources and to maintain interoperability with the US.¹¹¹¹ By focusing on high-end capabilities within a limited defense budget the Netherlands however, constrains its own strategic freedom of action albeit within the contours of its strategic culture. It creates a default inclination to operate in a multinational setting. This however dovetails with its political preference for multilateralism to increase the legitimacy of a military operation, reducing the risk of international instability asso-

1111 Ministerie van Defensie, *Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief*, HDAB2006018085, June 2, 2006.

ciated with unilateral operations. In fact, it is this latter aspect that is noted as a central political condition for any operation in the *Toetsingskader*. The development of capabilities that could also be used for high-intensity missions stood on a tense footing with that other element of Dutch strategic culture, an approach based on stability projection which focused on the role of structures and institutions in its security policy. While the experiences in Srebrenica had convinced the Dutch polity that escalation dominance was a key military necessity, using these capabilities in the operational environment led to friction as it tested the limits of where stability projection ends and warfighting begins. The intended procurement of tactical tomahawk cruise missiles, but also the increasingly challenging mission in Uruzgan brought these tensions to bear.

For the Netherlands stability projection is a derivative of promoting an international order. Since the 1990s this has evolved from post-conflict crisis management to developing an integrated approach for reconstruction and stabilization activities in war-torn territories. The Dutch structure-focused approach has both system- and domestic-level drivers. It is based on its heritage as cradle of international maritime law as well as the realist notion that being a smaller power which can build bridges between Atlanticism and a European approach benefits its reputation internationally. This is seen as a source of international influence, which can be used to further its liberal domestic agenda including the international rule of law and human rights. While originating as a realist response to the security environment, support for international institutions and playing an active role in stability promotion became a way for the Netherlands to increase its power and has become engrained in its strategic culture. As Joris Voorhoeve asserted, “A small power with vitality can find a respectful role and constructive vocation in the world arena by following mundialist ideals.”¹¹¹² Van Vollenhoven said something similar in the early years of the 20th century; the Netherlands could both promote itself, its security agenda, as well as limit the powers of larger regional powers by promoting an international security framework. This Dutch vocation, to claim a role at the vanguard of promoting the international rule of law, has been consistent in justifying its use and development of the military throughout the 20th century.

The focus on structures and an emphasis on stability have nourished a political realization that societies are not easily shaped by outside force. This has fostered a hesitant approach to the use of the military and led to the deployment of the military within a broader framework of instruments. It has also dampened the call for developing high-intensity capabilities. This mindset has proved helpful in developing a comprehensive approach in contemporary complex operations, which some Dutch policymakers have claimed to be a “Dutch Approach.” The near-parity in budgets between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense also creates a natural inclination towards cooperation. Compared to the United States where the Defense Department receives nearly 18 times

1112 Voorhoeve (1979), p. 247.

more funding, it is not surprising that effective interagency has been difficult in Washington.¹¹¹³

GERMANY

The strategic objective of German transformation is to develop expeditionary capabilities for peacekeeping and stability operations in a multinational framework and contribute to *nie wieder Auschwitz* while sustaining Alliance solidarity. It represents a policy of strategic transformation, shifting away from a posture based on territorial defense. While this is the objective, Germany has the lowest extractive capacity of the three states considered in this research as a result of the friction between its strategic culture and NATO's shift to expeditionary operations. The strong constraints on German extractive capacity have stifled substantial strategic debate in Germany. This is reflected in the limited size of the case study in this research.

Similar to the Netherlands, Germany has a structure-focused philosophy where the use of the military is considered but one element within a broader framework, a notion substantiated by the 2006 White Paper concept of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*. As a medium power it has a realist interest in promoting international institutions, the international rule of law and institution building. Its inclination towards crisis-management capabilities is informed by realist considerations and support for the Alliance. Germany's strategic culture however is a decisive domestic constraint on the use of the military abroad. A 'culture of defeat' following two World Wars that left Germany destroyed has conditioned Germany as a *Zivilmacht*. Constitutionally, Germany is bound to a pacifist heritage and the extractive capacity of the state advances only in response to cumbersome and slow constitutional court rulings, parliamentary debates or haphazard individual political leadership. This has meant that Germany is intrinsically hesitant to use military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. While it can deploy military forces within a UN framework for peacekeeping purposes, it remains impossible to send German forces to an area where they may have to operate offensively. As a senior official at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, Operation *Amber Fox* in Macedonia is the archetype of operations that the German public and parliament wish to pursue: close to home, in a relatively risk-free environment but in obvious proximity to Germany, engaging in reconstruction activities with support from the local population.

American and Dutch officials criticized Germany in late 2007 regarding German unwillingness to send forces to Southern Afghanistan. The so-called national caveats that the German government had imposed, mandating its forces to only operate in the relatively peaceful North of the country, were a reflection of a pacifist strategic culture. While the Netherlands complained from the perspective of NATO solidarity, the United States

1113 Within this context neither is it surprising that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates – intent on improving US capabilities for operations in Afghanistan - has requested more funds for the Department of State. Donna Miles, "Gates urges more emphasis, funding for all aspects of national power," *American Foreign Press Service*, November 26, 2007, Washington DC. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48226>.

did so from its purview that military forces must and should be at times used robustly. Germany instead was torn between considerations of alliance solidarity and domestic ill-preparedness to deploy troops for offensive operations.

However, the extractive capacity of Germany is slowly increasing as a timid strategic awakening takes place. To its commendation, at the time of writing the German government has taken an active approach to mediate between its strategic cultural constraints and the requests of the alliance including the requirements of the security environment. It has done so by making the case that an interest-based assessment of the security environment requires German military commitments. This strategic awakening occurs at a slow pace and steps of improvement can be identified only in the marginal shifts in public discourse as German politicians accustom the German public to the discourse of warfare when describing the mission in Afghanistan. The nature of these adaptations demonstrates the difficult and highly political nature of German transformation. As the security environment continues to lead to expeditionary operations, this friction will persist.

29.4 DIFFERENT EXPECTATIONS IN AN EXPEDITIONARY ENVIRONMENT

Strategic cultures explicitly come to the fore in the event of expeditionary operations, since it forces states to individually decide why and how to use the military abroad. Expeditionary operations make the politics of using the military much more poignant than territorial defense. In the current security environment, which has primarily led Western states to focus on expeditionary operations, this political dimension has become all the more important. In Germany and the Netherlands, politics has explicitly intervened in military operations. It has led to preferring specific terminology to describe a mission which thereby ties a state to specific objectives. Such is the case with euphemistically calling military interventions ‘reconstruction missions’. It leads to prohibitions on the use of specific capabilities and it creates a domestic political struggle to avoid the impression that the mission is contrarian to its strategic culture. In fact, given the variance in transformation strategies described above, one could argue that the expeditionary environment is the root cause for the lack of cohesion with the transatlantic alliance as it has brought these differences in strategic culture explicitly to the fore.

An insightful way to capture the differences in strategic culture towards expeditionary operations is through the differences in constitutional jurisdiction over the use of the military. The US Constitution states explicitly that “the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”¹¹¹⁴ The document does not offer specific constraints on the use of the military. The Dutch constitution makes explicit that the Kingdom has a military, amongst others, “for the purpose of upholding and promoting the international rule of law.”¹¹¹⁵ This offers a primary responsibility to undertake expedi-

1114 The United States Constitution, Article II, section 2. <http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html>.

1115 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Article 97. <http://www.st-ab.nl/wetgrondwet.htm>.

tionary operations, albeit within the context of international stability. The German Basic Law however explicitly forbids undertaking actions in preparation of an offensive war.¹¹¹⁶ This makes the German constitutional framework the most restrictive as it fuels a continuous debate over whether or not an expeditionary operation, or the capabilities involved, have an offensive dimension. This has also led political parties to argue before the Constitutional court that a particular deployment of German military forces is unlawful, thereby hampering the extractive capacity of the state and the responsiveness of the government.

The rhetoric of transformation is also decidedly different. As an anecdotal example and a straightforward test, the frequency with which words such as “liberty,” “freedom” and “stability” appear in Dutch and American defense white papers can be compared. This yields a broad, textual metric of the dominant concepts which are central to policy. In the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review, “freedom” or one of its derivatives was mentioned twenty-eight times. In the Dutch 2007 White Paper *Wereldwijd Dienstbaar*, the term was used twice. In the German 2006 Defense White Paper “freedom” was mentioned eleven times. When considering the different sizes of the papers, the weighted numbers become 28 (US), 19 (Germany) and 4.9 (Netherlands). By contrast, the weighted figures for “stability” are 23 for the United States, 19.6 for the Netherlands and 66 for Germany. While a soft measure at best, it illustrates the salience of these concepts in the leading defense documents.

To justify interventions Western states promote grand ideas of human progress. Whether it is the international rule of law, universal peace, the promotion of democracy or the advent of Freedom, ‘grand ideas’ to improve the human condition mobilize domestic support for military operations abroad. For the United States democracy and freedom are the dominant constructs, for the Netherlands stability and the international rule of law, for Germany an appeal to international stability and *nie wieder Auschwitz*. Present-day expeditionary operations have an explicit moral undertone. The desire to change and shape foreign societies, by force if necessary, is not new. Rather it is a Western liberal concept vested in Christianity, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It appeared as the *mission civilisatrice*, a *white man’s burden* or the *ethische politiek* throughout the colonial age and is profoundly paternalistic.¹¹¹⁷ The philosopher John Gray asserts that belief in the universal applicability of particular ideas to advance human society serving as the moral basis of interventionism is fundamentally Western.¹¹¹⁸ Prevalent within Western societies

1116 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 26, May 23, 1949. <http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg.html>.

1117 Kimberly Zisk Marten, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 65.

1118 John Gray, *Black Mass: Apocalyptic religion and the Death of Utopia* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2007). Gray points out that when other non-Western cultures have used terror or violence to advance their cause, they have done so only after Western ideas have fused with indigenous beliefs or religions. Jihadi terrorism, Gray suggests, cannot be explained without understanding its ideological basis, which is heavily influenced by Trotskyite reasoning. In fact, Gray asserts that Islam shares with Christianity certain millenarian beliefs and is therefore part of the Western philosophical tradition. “Only Christianity and Islam have

is the belief that liberal democracy, is not only the best political system but also exportable. It is underwritten by the broad support for the democratic peace theorem. One way to export it is with assistance of the military, as the United States has attempted to do unilaterally but European states have pursued as well through the ‘comprehensive approach.’ In this regard, the use of the military is viewed as a benign force, in line with Augustinian ‘just war’ philosophy.¹¹¹⁹ This produces a paradox of liberal interventionism: what drives Western states to intervene in other societies is often not congruent with the way the intervention is performed. The inverse of this statement is that the values that drive the US or other Western states to intervene similarly hamper its success. The problem lies with the high expectations generated by justifying an intervention on such Grand Ideas. No liberal democracy wages wars, or deploys the military, without appealing to higher values to gain public support. But the values that are appealed to by each state are a reflection of a strategic culture of how a polity accepts the use of force in an expeditionary operation. It has implied that persistently these constructs are referred to, and reaffirmed by a polity. This makes looking at justification regimes informative. Strategic cultures create a bandwidth, which describes how the military can and cannot be used. This leads to expectations that do not necessarily correspond to the operational reality or the justification frameworks of other allies or partners in the field. Friction then arises when the operational reality does not correspond to the expectations generated by the appeal to strategic cultural constructs, both among the allies, as well as within the polities.

In the context of coalition operations, strategic cultures produce dissenting views among allies over the purpose and objective of (their contribution to) the military operation. The strategic cultures resonate the domestic justification regime rather than the requirements of the operational reality. These different interpretations of a common mission hurt NATO solidarity. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan is a case in point. According to Germany, one of the reasons for installing national caveats was because in those areas where German forces were not deployed, an *Angriffskrieg* was being fought. It led Germany only to deploy to those locations where it could convincingly argue that the nature of the mission was stabilization and training. To the United States, ISAF had a strong counterterrorist dimension requiring large-scale military offensives and domestically the United States spoke of the mission as a war. To the Netherlands, ISAF was a stabilization mission and in Parliament the case was made that Dutch participation was critical to ensure that a Dutch presence implied a qualitatively different approach than the US mode of operating. Under the influence of divergent strategic cultures different interpretations of the same mission were put forward. These different understandings, even if they are for domestic consumption only, impacted capability decisions. It influenced domestic

engendered movements that are committed to the systematic use of force to achieve universal goals?” (p.71).

1119 Saint Augustine said: *Apud veros dei cultores, eciam ipsam belli patrati sunt, que non cupiditate aut crudelitate, sed pacis studio geruntur, ut mali coherceantur et boni subleventur.* [“True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”] Augustine, *De Verbis Domini et est* 23, 4, 1 quid.

expectations of the mission, and acted as a constraint on the alliance dynamic. Germany for instance could not offer logistical transport in Southern Afghanistan, as it would lead it to aid an *Angriffskrieg*. European allies criticized the United States for an overtly kinetic approach which was in line with US perspectives on warfare, pleading instead for a more 'European' approach built around stabilization and reconstruction. European states criticized the United States for focusing too extensively on getting the bad guys and not investing in building local relationships, while the United States criticized Europeans for not being sufficiently willing to combat the Taliban and share the risk of fighting. Symptomatic is that the American response to irregular warfare has been to focus on Special Operations Forces acting as a force multiplier, while the Dutch response to the challenges in Afghanistan has been to develop a comprehensive approach.

As individual strategic cultures demonstrate, the way in which, and the purposes for which, the military instrument is used differs. In coalition operations this leads to friction inside an alliance. This is the key problem for the future of NATO's expeditionary operations.

29.5 TWO PHILOSOPHICAL MODELS OF PROGRESS

What then are we to draw from these case studies? First and foremost, the interplay between strategic cultures and shifts at the level of the security environment enhance or incapacitate a state to pursue transformation. Assessments of the international security environment may point in a particular direction however the constraints offered by strategic cultures have the final say over whether and how a state will adapt to these changes. In addition, strategic cultures enable a state to extract military resources and provide the context for the justification regime to garner political support for expeditionary missions. However, at the same time they form constraints. The United States, for right or wrong, is caught in a strategic cultural paradigm in which warfare is viewed as a series of high-intensity combat sequences. Just as Germany is confined in a pacifist paradigm. One of the most poignant examples of the influence of strategic culture was the US attempt at strategic transformation from 2005 onwards. The balancing reaction to US unipolarity through irregular warfare was a logical outcome of its conventional superiority. The United States however failed to anticipate the strategic nature of the challenge posed by the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. When it finally did, it had difficulty to adapt to it because irregular warfare ran counter to its strategic cultural anticipation of what the military should focus on and what 'warfare' was. In fact, for a long time irregular operations had been considered 'military operations other than war'. By contrast, in the Netherlands and Germany the paradigm is the reverse and there is resistance to the notion of 'war' choosing to term deployments, policing missions or stability operations instead. It risks domestic friction as well as discontent within the alliance when it becomes apparent that robust action is required on the ground.

If placed on a spectrum, the United States and Germany would occupy opposite poles. In many regards they have opposing strategic cultures. While the United States accepts waging wars within the context of its political-strategic tradition of liberating

other peoples and states, Germany suffers from a form of strategic shell-shock and has denounced warfare. The United States considers itself to be a ‘power of Freedom’ in the world, which at times justifies combat against specific actors to protect freedom. Germany sees itself as a ‘power of peace’ and a ‘survivor of Mars’ and views the military as a means of last resort and only justified when deployed within a broader context to set the conditions for structural improvements towards peace and stability. To the United States, this German strategic culture has a ring of appeasement, while to German eyes American strategic culture is often viewed with disdain for its destabilizing impact. As US neoconservative columnist Michael Ledeen said in 2000:

*Whenever I hear policy-makers talk about the wonders of “stability” I get the heebie-jeebies. That is for tired old Europeans and nervous Asians, not for us. In just about everything we do, from business and technology to cinema and waging war, we are the most revolutionary force on earth.*¹¹²⁰

Robert Cooper said that there is a common agreement among European states that the use of force is a last resort in foreign policy, while in the United States the use of force could be a matter of policy.¹¹²¹

The differences in strategic culture appear primarily to be a contrast between Europe and the United States. The reason underlying this difference in strategic culture is perhaps the most interesting insight from this study. At its most profound, the distinctions between American and European transformation policies reflect not a geopolitical reality but rather an age-old debate in the social sciences between an emphasis on individual agency and the predetermination of human behavior by social structures. Is it the individual actor – the agent – who is responsible for the advance of history or are social structures, the collection of social, political, economic and cultural institutions within which the individual functions? The dichotomy between structure and agency is apparent in the strategies to pursue stability on the one hand and freedom – potentially at the expense of stability – on the other. The debate between structure and agency is central to the history of social science, and it has informed the development of political cultures. While European polities have well-developed social democratic and socialist political factions – reflective of an approach to society in which structures and institutions play a central role – US politics instead has a strong Republican dimension which emphasizes individual freedom and responsibility. European states find institutions less worrisome than the United States, which tends to view them as encroaching on individual liberties. In global institutions European states find security from predatory nation-states, whereas the US views them with disdain for limiting the freedom of action of the state. An extreme expression of national sovereignty lay at the root of 20th century European disasters and international institutions are believed to improve or moderate the behavior of states. The United States however, maintains its

1120 Michael Ledeen, “American Power – For What?” *Commentary* (January 2000), pp. 36-37.

1121 Interview with Robert Cooper, Brussels, September 11, 2007.

Lockean philosophy that the nation-state is the only legitimate actor in international politics.¹¹²² As an example, while three-quarters of Europeans and US Republicans favor democracy promotion, less than one-third of Europeans accept that this might justify the use of force, compared to more than half of polled US Republicans.¹¹²³ Unsurprisingly major structuralist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas, are continental European while libertarians like John Locke and John Stuart Mill have Anglo-Saxon roots. The continental European mind, it appears, may well be different from the American mind.

At the same time this distinction between structure and agency can be conceived as one between revolution and evolution, in which the United States pursues revolutionary changes abroad, whereas a structural focus necessitates longer timelines and change gradually evolves from within. Discord between Germany and the United States in the run-up to the Iraq War was emblematic of this dichotomy, just as the Dutch ‘balancing’ act in supporting both the German perspective and the United States is emblematic for Dutch strategic culture which is split between an Atlanticist and European approach. Both philosophical models are exponents of Western liberal thinking, and are different strains of liberal interventionism, however they accord a different role to the application of military force. The historian Norman Davies has argued that there are different variants of Western civilization, specifically separating the United States from Western Europe.¹¹²⁴ Although invariably based on common Latin Christian foundations which provide the United States and Western Europe with a common value-set, the differences are stark between these two models. The ‘American’ variant is based on US leadership of ‘the West’, capitalism, freedom and democracy, whereas a ‘Euro’ variant denounces Anglo-Saxon ownership of Western civilization favoring instead continental Europe and its model of European cooperation and integration which fosters economic prosperity. Davies warns that “a profound crisis both of identity and intent” will be the result in the transatlantic community as these two variants inevitably clash.¹¹²⁵ While the picture he paints is rather bleak, we see elements of this clash in the strategic cultural confrontation in relation to defense transformation.

American political and strategic culture is driven by an adversarial agent-focused philosophy of human progress. It is based on two elements; firstly, faith in human liberty and its beacon function for US political identity, which provided the ideological fuel for the American Revolution yet persists today. Secondly, a view that man is capable of shaping his external environment and technology can assist him in this process of social engineering. It has fostered a teleological, linear view of history and left American security policy to accept, if not to embrace, the use of the military. If the belief is prevalent that agency is the defining element for human progress, security can be attained through the pursuit of adversaries and having the capability to kill or remove them. Conventional war is essen-

1122 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, Washington DC, October 24, 2006.

1123 German Marshall Fund & Compagnia di San Paolo, *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings*, 2005.

1124 Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Harper Perennial, 1998), p. 24.

1125 *Ibid*, p. 27.

tially agent-focused, designed to destroy an adversary's military capabilities and removing a military threat. In an agency-focused approach conventional warfighting capabilities are essential. When threats are identified they can be dealt with through the ability of military power to change society. It also produces a sense of optimism about security policy, since solutions to problems are – on paper – relatively straightforward, with absolute results.

By contrast, a structure-focused approach holds that human progress is invariably shaped by the structures of society. It relies on internal democratic change and the moderating influence of liberal economic trade. Stability is a central objective since it creates the conditions for the development of moderating institutions. However it shuns the fundamentally destabilizing influence of agency-focused approaches, or the application of unilateral military force, instead seeing it as but a necessary shaping element for building structures. As such structure-focused stability projection is a soft counterbalance to agency-focused power projection. Underlying it is the philosophy that agents are the products of structures and act within the confines of those structures. Hence the European emphasis on regulating institutions. Structures can only be changed through slowly nurturing new institutions. Where Americans hold that terrorism is an enemy that can be destroyed, Europeans see it as the product of structural deficits in society. European states are not non-interventionist, rather conform this structure-focused approach they are only willing to use military force as a function of a broader effort where the military becomes a stability-improving instrument. Such states accept that absolute security is not possible and instead attempt to manage a certain level of insecurity, and choose measures to deal with threats that are more moderate. It can give the appearance of being more pessimistic about the security environment. Among the two European states, institutionalism is exemplified by adherence to the Comprehensive Approach, the integration of multiple elements of national power in the *3D Approach* and in the German principle of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*. It belies a structural, multilateral focus, where the military is conducive to the overarching objective, but secondary to achieving it.

Both European and the American models have a history of internal success to prove their validity. The United States has a strategic culture that rests on the liberating experience of the American Revolution and European governments advance their model of liberal stability projection as a consequence of the success of European integration fostering peace and prosperity on the European continent. Under a benevolent security environment during the 1990's the model of European enlargement was integral to Europe's security posture. Exporting stability along Europe's rim has long been an alternative goal of enlargement. "The strategic decision to enlarge the European Union is the basis for a comprehensive policy of projecting stability," German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer explained in 2000 in reference to the enlargement with ten Central and Eastern European states.¹¹²⁶ The *acquis communautaire* is the explicit example of a structure-focused approach, based on cooperation rather than coercion. This European *Zivilmacht* is thereby closely aligned with German strategic culture. An outcome of the benevolent

1126 Joschka Fischer, "Herbert Quandt Lecture at Georgetown University," Washington DC, September 15, 2000.

security environment was that it created an opportunity to expand the models of Western civilization that in effect has provided them with success.

Thus a fundamental disparity emerges in which the United States and European countries have a different appreciation of how to use the military instrument for expeditionary missions and also how to measure success. The United States' agency-focused approach has produced an inclination to accept warfare as a policy instrument. Simply put, advancing Freedom is accepted to come at the expense of short-term stability. By contrast, the structure-focused approach has led European states to denounce using military force in isolation as a way to resolve threats. The promotion of stability is threatened by a unilateral use of military power. A structure- and an agency-focused approach to security policy leading to stability- or power projection create different appreciations of success. The Iraq War could be seen as a success by American policymakers, since it removed Saddam Hussein from power and provided the foundation for individual liberty and democracy to take root.¹¹²⁷ For European states, the Iraq War is seen as a failure as a result of the turmoil it precipitated following the initial invasion and which continues to destabilize the region at large. The same dynamic also enables the United States to define its mission in Afghanistan as intent on destroying Al Qaeda and preventing its return, whereas for European states this does not work. Instead European leaders must show a certain level of stability and development to be able to consider the mission a success, as removing Al Qaeda or the Taliban is not sufficient.

Aside from the notion that the three states were advancing specific models of Western civilization, they also did so in the belief that they were best disposed to do so. They pursue the model that has historically been successful to promote their own security. Each state under consideration holds that its historical experience is exemplar for the future development of the international system, or at least how it should develop. Thus the Netherlands held that European integration is a larger version of the process of integration pioneered in the Dutch Provinces in the 17th century and later with the creation of the Benelux. And Germany holds that its "culture of defeat" and its experience with the destruction of war cause it to speak with greater authority on security policy. And the United States acts in the conviction that the ideals of the American Revolution are universally applicable and that it is the primary guarantor of Western values.

Europeans and Americans have often disagreed in the past. Examples are US attempts to introduce theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO's military committee, the US war in Vietnam which led to widespread protests in Europe, the stationing of Pershing II missiles and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty.¹¹²⁸ Discord is nothing new. One reason however why it is of interest in the

1127 See for instance "It's time for the US to declare victory and go home," *Washington Independent*, July 30, 2009. <http://washingtonindependent.com/53224/col-timothy-reese-its-time-for-the-us-to-declare-victory-and-go-home>.

1128 Anthony Cordesmann, "Rethinking NATO's Force Transformation," *NATO Review* (Spring 2005). Other examples of transatlantic discord are detailed in Paul-Marie de la Gorce, "A Short History of Franco-US Discord," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (March 2003).

current international context is that a common existential threat, like Soviet expansionism coupled to nuclear deterrence, which sustained default transatlantic cohesion is absent. This is a consequence of the system-level change following the end of the Cold War and a shift to an expeditionary environment. The end of the Cold War marked the advent of interventionism. This has brought the fundamental distinction in strategic cultures into the open. The agency-structure dichotomy consists of a political-philosophical distinction that goes to the heart of Western civilization. This has significant repercussions for the future of transatlantic relations. At a speech at Georgetown University in late October 2006, Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot said that the US and Europe “only” disagree on means, not the ends of their security policy. The statement was intended to comfort. However, in the expeditionary environment this difference of opinion over means touches at the heart of the political-philosophical divide and fundamentally gnaws at alliance burden- and risk-sharing. It is reflected in the strategic cultures that drive the defense transformation policies of Western liberal-democratic states. Given the likelihood that the expeditionary environment will continue it can be expected that transatlantic disagreements over “means” will persist and continue to hamper transatlantic security relations. Because the disagreements derive from the fundamental character of the states concerned, it cannot be expected that these issues are resolved within the current constellation of forces in the security environment. These distinctions have been present throughout the history of the transatlantic alliance; however they have only come out in the open - and formed an obstacle - since the system changed towards an expeditionary environment for Western states.

29.6 IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF NATO

What does this imply for the future of the alliance? Transformation was intent on giving the NATO alliance greater cohesion and capability. It instead is the concept around which alliance divisiveness became apparent in an expeditionary environment. Transformation was not a strategic process coordinated by the international organization. Instead, the three states under consideration pursued adaptive strategies in response to changing external circumstances, taking domestic, strategic cultural factors into account. These led to unique national outcomes. For the time being, as the expeditionary environment continues, it appears that NATO is only able to indirectly influence these processes of adaptation. From the case studies it becomes apparent that states like the Netherlands or Germany definitely took alliance dynamics into account. However, this is qualitatively different from stating that these states expected NATO-level guidance to pursue their transformation strategy.

Rather than lead to a concise view of responses to the security environment, transformation policies in the different states were shaped by specific domestic considerations which reflected individual understandings of what the military was for in an evolving security environment. These unique approaches to military change brought to bear fundamentally contrasting views over the use of the military in an expeditionary environment, and contributed to weakening the alliance at a time when it is more active than at any time in its history. Of course, if something is hard to do, it does not mean that it is not worth doing. However, it does imply that as long as Western states pursue a policy of liberal interven-

tionism in an expeditionary environment there will be dissension among the transatlantic allies along the lines of different strategic cultures and different approaches to the military. Along with it, the debate over missions and responses to security threats will be troubled. As NATO operations evolve further away from stabilization operations and become higher-intensity, the contrasts within Europe and between the US and Europe will become more poignant.

The two models presented above appear to be in competition with one another, yet from the social sciences it becomes clear that this philosophical debate is not to be resolved easily, if at all. The European and the American model should be seen as complements rather than alternatives. Both strive for the same results, namely to extend freedoms, stability and democracy. However they do so in different ways.

The distinction is not only between Europe and the United States. The case studies of Germany and the Netherlands illustrate sensitive differences within Europe, reflecting different histories, geopolitical outlooks and strategic cultures. Perhaps the starkest example is the attempt by the Dutch government to avoid a negative perception in Washington by explicitly diversifying itself from being associated with Germany and its pacifist strategic culture by undertaking the mission in Southern Afghanistan. The Netherlands retains a hedging policy, by which it avoids both a purely Continentalist and a purely Atlanticist stigma.

Both arguments imply that NATO will remain relevant. For one because the objectives NATO allies strive for are similar, and secondly because intra-European strategic cultures are too diverse to fully supplant NATO. Yet within an expeditionary context, it will remain an alliance at odds with itself.

In an era where security is defended proactively outside NATO's territorial realm, the participation of member states in operations is essential to maintain the credibility of the alliance. This leads to one of the key dilemmas of the expeditionary security environment for NATO, namely that for the sake of the alliance a form of 'active solidarity' is needed. Given the highly political nature of an expeditionary age this is a serious obstacle. Strategic cultures complicate this process. What is needed therefore is a reassessment of what NATO is, taking stock of the different implications of the strategic cultures, and the different views of military force in the new security environment, in order to develop a version of solidarity compatible with the expeditionary environment. From this study it logically follows that the only way in which NATO will retain commitment of European allies is if the organization strengthens its political dimensions, and evolves away from a purely military organization. It is the military dimension, and the way in which the military is used in complex emergencies which forms the source of friction of strategic cultures. The primary reason for friction in the alliance, which is the same reason that has led to limited or troubled extractive capacity of the two European states, is the use of the military for high-intensity operations. Nor is this dilemma likely to be resolved soon. As European allies see the use of force as but one element of a broader range of state instruments to use in their security policy, NATO could broaden its pallet in the direction of stability projection, an activity it is now *de facto* engaged in anyhow. Along with the NATO Response Force,

a key NATO initiative of transformation towards expeditionary operations yet focused on high-intensity operations and thereby lacking necessary European political support, NATO could benefit from a NATO Training and Stabilization Force (NTSF). Such a force would institutionalize the shifting nature of the security environment towards irregular warfare and take stock of the orientation towards stability projection of the European allies. It would include members of the Special Forces or other forces specialized in training third parties as well as a team of civilian specialists able to assist in reconstruction and development activities. The NTSF would operate as a network manager with reconstruction agencies and NGOs, but also as a force multiplier for counterterror operations or COIN-lite. In addition it would have access to a robust protection force, but would primarily be geared towards population-centric operations. It would not replace but be institutionalized within NATO alongside the NRE, which would continue to function as an engine for transatlantic interoperability for high-intensity warfare. The advantage is that the NTSF would allow European states to pursue a structure-focused approach, while at the same time it would emulate elements of US SOF-ing for irregular warfare. It would also likely keep Washington interested in NATO since it would increase the relevance of the alliance and be more in line with European strategic cultures, offering a format for transatlantic cooperation in a field that Europeans would also be willing to engage in.

Such a recommendation however fails to take account of possible shifts in the security environment, which might require a more military NATO, whether Europeans like it or not. What is the future for transformation? Two decades ago shifts in the international security environment required a recalibration of defense policies. As the benevolent security environment gave way to greater US unilateralism and irregular warfare, it led to friction with strategic cultures. While the Netherlands desired to play a role of prominence alongside the United States, it became more difficult to do so while also adhering to its principles of stability projection. For Germany, as NATO expanded into more challenging operations, it has had difficulty to match solidarity with the alliance and its posture as *Zivilmacht*. In the United States, the shift in the operational environment was felt most strongly in response to the intensifying insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army initially attempted to shift towards sustainable stability operations, however given domestic constraints this proved difficult. Instead, by reintroducing the concept of SOF-ing in the context of irregular warfare, the Army focuses primarily on high-intensity combat operations and training partner nations. To the United States transformation encompasses an emphasis on small, surgical SOF-ing for irregular warfare whereas the majority of the military remains focused on conventional conflict and pursues the substitution of mass for information in the rest of the military. For Germany, transformation continues to be a tedious domestic endeavor that will advance step by step as the security environment clashes with its strategic culture. For the Netherlands, having made the shift to a broad expeditionary capability transformation is considered finished. Instead financial hardship will lead to cheese-grating of existing capabilities. Unless the perception of the security environment markedly changes, military change efforts will be in the form of

modernization and incremental. This does not mean that a modernization program will be easy. However it will not be a transformation, as defined in this research.

Nor is it to be assumed that the environment remains static. As a matter of illustration, four brief scenarios are presented that would require transformation of Western forces. If the security environment changes and multipolarity leads the international system to be formed by multiple rival centers of power in which great power war in strategic regions becomes a possibility, the implications could be significant for NATO. Especially within the context of financial austerity, hard choices would have to be made.

It would increase the push for high-intensity, smart but expeditionary, capabilities. To the United States this would mean a return to initial operational effectiveness transformation. The plans like the FCS could be dusted off. European states could start to merge their remaining conventional capabilities. Given domestic European constraints that preclude the use of the military in isolation, and dependent on the level of threat in the security environment, for European states this will be difficult to do. Yet if the environment disallows liberal interventionism and promotes a realist interest-based defense policy, a new strategic transformation may await European states, slowly bringing Europe and the US closer again.

The trap of focusing too much inward would have to be avoided. The risk of operational effectiveness transformation is that it stimulates an inward-looking policy, intent on continuously improving own systems, modes of operation and doctrine. It risks misinterpreting the relative distribution of power and failing to anticipate new modes of operation that can offset the strengths for which the operational effectiveness transformation was initially pursued. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000 have made clear that the United States ran this risk as it struggled with counterinsurgency and long-term stabilization missions. In a multipolar environment emphasis on operational effectiveness transformation for conventional operations would run the risk of being blind to non-conventional threats. Such could take the shape of cyber-warfare, weapons of mass destruction or extended threats to homeland security.

Another development that would trigger a discontinuous change in defense affairs is the scarcity of energy resources. Not only will this require different modes of operating and new missions as a scramble of resource-access occurs, it will also test the ability of states to extract resources through innovation to new modes of energy-provision and propulsion to keep the tanks running and the frigates afloat. At the same time developing energy independence for the armed forces would mean a magnitude level of increase in logistical capability, likely to revolutionize the use of the military by NATO states. Greening the military is not only ecologically prudent but would vastly increase overall capability and reach of the military.

A further scenario is the possibility of large-scale stabilization missions in countries like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Both states are several times larger and more populous than Iraq and Afghanistan, yet suffer from endemic instability. In addition they are of vital strategic interest; Saudi Arabia for the oil, Pakistan for their nuclear arsenal. Given the difficulties of Western states to staff and continue the stability operations in Afghanistan

and Iraq, such a scenario would be very testing. In response Western militaries would embrace training partner countries, as the United States has done as part of its strategic transformation towards irregular warfare. Teaching other militaries and police forces to perform stabilization roles and addressing security deficits would form a potential solution to the numerical inferiority that Western militaries are confronting. What is needed then is substituting mass for training capabilities.¹¹²⁹ Other options to be explored are further cooperation with private parties, such as private security companies, or third states to provide the training capabilities necessary. It would substantially change the nature of NATO; from a crisis-responder to a security enabler. The shift would be in line with the Dutch and German emphasis on stability projection however, it would be somewhat more troublesome to the United States which could contribute high-end force multipliers but would see NATO as but one tool among many, rather than as a cornerstone in its security policy.

Finally, on the basis of their respective strategic cultures, and the contrast between the European structure-focused model and the American agency-focused approach, it can be assumed that a weakening of NATO may lead to a strengthening of the European Union's ESDP. Several complicating factors however preclude this from occurring. For the time being Germany remains too constrained domestically to play a strong role in reinvigorating the ESDP. It remains the purview of the French and the British, and the British are politically inclined to favor a strong Atlantic security relation over developing a full-fledged European alternative. To the Netherlands, the security relationship with the United States has proven to be a vital link in order to maintain a credible voice in Europe and is likely to remain so. Yet perhaps most importantly, the United States has no interest in letting Europe slide away to develop a fully independent alternative of Western security policy and interventionism, or it would compromise US strategic freedom of action. Therefore Washington will continue to engage with the security policies of European states in order to prevent a full-fledged European security actor from emerging. In the end the two sides of the Atlantic are condemned to remain entangled in discussions over the use of military power along the distinctions dictated by their strategic culture. Although transformation in an expeditionary era appears to be pushing the Atlantic partners in different directions, friction without fissure will persist.

1129 See for instance Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, "US Plans widen role in training Pakistani forces in Qaeda battle," *New York Times*, March 2, 2008; Steven Lee Myers & Thom Shanker, "US May send more Troops to Afghanistan," *International Herald Tribune*, May 3, 2008; Craig S. Smith, "US Training African Forces to uproot Terrorists," *New York Times*, May 11, 2004.

AFTERWORD:

DEATH OF A CONCEPT

As the Iraq insurgency continued, the most ardent supporters of US operational effectiveness transformation started to reconsider their perspective. In 2005, the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation cautioned that network-centric warfare was not a panacea that gave war a preordained result.¹¹³⁰ In 2004 Arthur Cebrowski had noted that transformation had changed from its initial inception in the late 1990's, and advocated a transformation of the transformation.¹¹³¹ He said that the US military should "not simply provide a larger sheath of thunderbolts," which happened to be the focus of operational effectiveness transformation.¹¹³² The statements amounted to a substantial difference from rapid, decisive operations which had been the dominant focus before. It was close to a 180-degree turn by the transformation guru.

In the last weeks of 2006, with the Iraq insurgency at its peak and the resistance in Afghanistan starting to gain steam, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld left the Pentagon. Cebrowski, the 'father of Network Centric Warfare,' passed away and the Office of Force Transformation dissolved into the behemoth structure of the Defense department. In a cover article on December 20, 2006 the New York Times declared that the Bush administration had broken with Rumsfeld's policy of transformation.¹¹³³

Just as a dying star bursts into a supernova before fizzling out, the term had ballooned that year. Transformation had come to encompass a wide range of plans. Pentagon policy

1130 Office of Force Transformation, *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington DC, January 5, 2005.

1131 "The transformation started at the beginning of the administration has, itself, been transformed. But we must move faster -- increasingly, the pace of transformation is not one we set for ourselves. National defense is no longer just about the Department of Defense... Homeland defense is no longer an abstraction to the average American citizen, nor is it conducted solely at long range. This is no longer just about projecting power -- rather, it is about exporting security." Arthur Cebrowski, "Transformation and the Changing Character of War," *Transformation Trends*, June 17, 2004.

1132 Arthur Cebrowski, "Transformation and the Changing Character of War," *Transformation Trends*, June 17, 2004.

1133 Thom Shanker & Jim Rutenberg, "President Wants to increase size of armed forces," *The New York Times*, December 20, 2006.

included *Transforming the Medical Health System*, the *Training Transformation Plan*, the *Transformational Communication Architecture* and the standing up of the Defense Business Transformation Agency. A new Human Capital Strategy was described as transformational, while the *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* detailed a *Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Transformation*.¹¹³⁴ Furthermore the Business Transformation Agency, the executive body of the policy-initiative entitled *Defense Business Transformation*, had a sister agency called the Military Health Services Office of Transformation which supervised the *Military Health Services Defense Business Transformation*. Other agencies, such as USAID also adopted the term and similarly developed a *Business Transformation plan*. The Department of State also spoke of ‘transformational diplomacy’.¹¹³⁵ As the term was used more prolifically, it also came to describe ever more generic initiatives. It was used to denote any change program in the Pentagon and beyond. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace in February 2007 described transformation in almost esoteric terms, saying: “[it] is a continual effort to meet new challenges; ... It is not an end state. It is a mindset and a culture that encourages innovation and fresh thinking.”¹¹³⁶ The term described so much, it started to lose its meaning. And then it finally did.

A catharsis of transformation started with Rumsfeld’s departure from the Pentagon. The post-Rumsfeld leadership of the Pentagon avoided using the term. Secretary Gates used it only once, preferring instead to describe the content of the change program for which *transformation* used to be the label. The planning guidance drafted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen in October 2007 contained text about transformation without using the word.¹¹³⁷ The term had been tainted by Rumsfeld and was considered politically ‘damaged goods’ for its relation to the Iraq War. In the summer of 2008, General James Mattis who headed US Joint Forces Command as well as NATO Allied Command Transformation removed the concept of Effects Based Operations from the US and NATO agenda.¹¹³⁸ The term had fallen from grace because of its association with the overly technological approach of US operational effectiveness transformation.

1134 Department of Defense, “Defense Language Transformation Roadmap,” Washington DC, January 2005. <http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf>. Accessed September 7, 2010.

1135 USAID, “Transforming Business,” information on USAID website: http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/bus_trans/bt_plan.html. See also Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein, “Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy,” Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL34141, Washington DC, August 2007. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34141.pdf>.

1136 Peter Pace, “Posture Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 110th Congress,” Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Congress, Washington DC, February 6, 2007.

1137 Michael Mullen, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance for 2007-2008,” October 1, 2007.

1138 James N. Mattis, “Memorandum for US Joint Forces Command: Assessment of Effects Based Operations,” United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk VA, August 14, 2008.

In September 2008, Secretary Gates explicitly denounced the operational effectiveness ideology of the Rumsfeld years:

*...never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to upend the immutable principles of war: where the enemy is killed, but our troops and innocent civilians are spared. Where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or awed into submission, instead of being tracked down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block.*¹¹³⁹

Not only was the term *transformation* removed from official Pentagon vocabulary, the principle of producing revolutionary change in warfare on the basis of new capabilities was denounced. The belief advanced by Rumsfeld, Cebrowski and others that US transformation could lead to such increased military capability that others would be deterred from challenging the US was held to be utopian. Secretary Gates punctured the belief that the military could build a 'revolutionary' capability such as the Future Combat System. He advocated a dose of realism. "FCS, he said "was a revolutionary concept. My experience in government is, when you want to change something all at once and create a whole new thing, you usually end up with an expensive disaster on your hands... maybe Google can do something revolutionary. But we don't have the agility to do that."¹¹⁴⁰

Today, the only place where the term *transformation* is used with frequency is at a former naval hospital on the outskirts of Norfolk, Virginia. Here several hundred European and American officers formulate NATO's responses to future threats and attempt to coordinate the development of doctrine and capabilities across the Alliance's twenty-eight members. In general they work to prepare the alliance for the future security environment. Founded in 2002, when transformation was the buzz-word among security policymakers, it lies somewhat lonely as the only NATO headquarters in North America. However, it is located just across the street from US Joint Forces Command where transformation was first envisioned in the early 1990's and where the Millennium Challenge 02 exercise was organized. It is somewhat ironic that this NATO headquarters should carry *transformation* in its name, since the process of military change has been all but easy for the alliance. It is symbolic for the evolution of the term that this headquarters is called NATO Allied Command Transformation.

1139 Robert M. Gates, "Remarks at the National Defense University," Washington DC, September 29, 2008.

1140 Robert M. Gates, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College," Carlisle, Pa., April 16, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Library of Congress, Transcripts of Hearings of Congressional Committees, 1990-2008, Washington DC.

Nationaal Archief, *Inventaris van de archieven van de Raad van Ministers [Ministerraad]*, 1823-1988, June - July 1947; June-December 1950, Den Haag.

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1946-1947; 1949-1950; 1960-1961; 1967-1968; 1968-1969; 1990-1991; 1991-1992; 1994-1995; 1999-2000; 2000-2001; 2001-2002; 2002-2003; 2003-2004; 2004-2005; 2005-2006; 2006-2007; 2007-2008.

INTERVIEWS

* = multiple interviews

(Place of meeting in brackets)

NB. For the most part these consisted of formal interviews, if not they took the form of informal discussions on defense transformation or transatlantic security affairs. All interviewees are referred to in their capacity for which they were interviewed at the time.

Adams, Dr. Gordon. Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University (Washington DC)

Bank, Colonel Henk. Executive Assistant to Chief of Staff, NATO ACT (Norfolk)

* *Binnendijk, Dr. Hans.* Director, Center for Technology and Security Policy, National Defense University (Washington DC)

Breemen, General Henk van den. Former Chief of Defense Staff, Netherlands Ministry of Defense (Schiedam)

Brimmer, Dr. Esther. Director of Research, SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington DC)

Bucci, Dr. Steven. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense, Pentagon (Washington DC)

Brzezinski, Ian. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO and European Policy, Pentagon (Alexandria)

Casteleijn, Lo. Director Policy Planning, Netherlands Ministry of Defense (The Hague)

Cohen, Dr. Eliot. Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies; Director of Strategic Studies Program, Director of Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, SAIS (Washington DC)

Collet, Robert. Chief Engineer Future Combat Systems, SAIC (McLean)

Cooper, Dr. Robert. Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the European Union, (Brussels)

Daalder, Dr. Ivo. Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution (Washington DC)

- Dettke, Dr. Dieter.* Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (Washington DC)
- Ehrhard, Colonel Thomas P.* Research Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Washington DC)
- Farkas, Evelyn.* Staff Member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington DC)
- Fitschen, Dr. Patrick.* Political Affairs, EADS Deutschland (Berlin)
- Flournoy, Dr. Michele.* Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS, (Washington DC)
- Frontline.* "The war behind closed doors." Interview with Richard Perle. Accessed February 12, 2010. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/interviews/perle.html>.
- Fukuyama, Dr. Francis.* Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program, SAIS (Washington DC)
- * *Garstka, John J.* Assistant Director, Office of Force Transformation, US Pentagon (Arlington)
- * *Gompert, David.* Senior Fellow, RAND (Arlington)
- Grams, Christoph.* Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations (Berlin)
- Griep, Lt. Colonel Ekkehard.* Bundeswehr-Referent, German Federal Foreign Office (Brussels)
- Groot, Robert de.* Director Security Policy, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague)
- Gijssbers, Maj. General Koen.* Assistant Chief of Staff for C4 and Intelligence, NATO ACT, former Commander 11th Air Maneuver Brigade (Norfolk)
- Hamilton, Dr. Daniel.* Director, SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington DC)
- Hammes, Colonel Thomas X.* (Washington DC)
- * *Johnson, Stuart E.* Senior Research Analyst, RAND (Arlington)
- * *Jones, Dr. Seth.* Political Scientist, RAND (Arlington)
- Jonge Oudraat, Dr. Chantal de.* Senior Fellow, SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington DC)
- Kamp, Henk.* Former Minister of Defense, Netherlands Ministry of Defense (The Hague)
- Kappen, Maj. General RNMC (ret.) Frank van.* former Military Advisor to UN Secretary-General, senior advisor to NATO ACT (The Hague)
- Koehl, Dr. Stuart.* Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS (Washington DC)
- Kugler, Dr. Richard.* Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University (Washington DC)
- Leakey, Lt. General David.* Director-General, European Union Military Staff (Brussels)
- Macgregor, Colonel (ret.) Douglas.* (Washington DC)
- * *Mattox, Dr. Gale.* Professor Political Science, US Naval Academy (Annapolis)
- McCord, Michael.* Staff Member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington DC)
- McMahon, Captain Michael P.* Associate Chair, Political Science Department, US Naval Academy (Annapolis)
- Meyer zum Felde, Oberst i.G.Rainer.* Branch Head for Strategic Issues, Policy and Planning Staff, German Federal Ministry of Defense (Berlin)
- Naumann, General (ret.) Klaus.* Former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (Washington DC)
- Noetzel, Dr. Timo.* Research Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin)
- O'Hanlon, Dr. Michael.* Senior Fellow, The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair, Brookings Institution, (Washington DC)
- Osinga, Colonel Frans.* Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute (The Hague)
- Pederson, Susan.* Director of Strategic Development, SAIC (McLean)
- Potman, Peter.* Political Counselor, Royal Netherlands Embassy (Washington DC)
- Reijling, Colonel Jaap.* Air Force Attaché, Royal Netherlands Embassy (Washington DC)
- Riecke, Dr. Henning.* German Council on Foreign Relations (Berlin)
- Reijn, Maj. General (ret.) Joop van.* Former Head of Strategic Planning, Defense Staff, Netherlands Ministry of Defense (Utrecht)
- Schake, Dr. Kori.* Hoover Institute, West Point Military Academy (Washington DC)
- Schreer, Dr. Benjamin.* Research Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft & Politik (Berlin)
- Schnappertz, Jürgen.* International Security officer, Policy Planning Staff, German Federal Foreign Office (Berlin)
- Shea, Dr. Jamie.* Director, Policy Planning, NATO HQ, (Brussels)

- * Smith, Dr. Julianne. Director Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS, (Washington DC)
- Stellzenmüller, Dr. Constanze. Director, German Marshall Fund (Berlin)
- Terriff, Dr. Terry. Arthur J. Child Chair of American Security Policy, University of Calgary (San Francisco)
- Viereck, Lt. General Karlheinz. Former Commander EUFOR, Commander of the Bundeswehr Operations Command (Berlin)
- Vitale, Brig. General Antonello. Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Concepts, Policy and Interoperability, NATO ACT (Norfolk)
- Voorhoeve, Dr. Joris. Professor of International Relations, former Minister of Defense, Netherlands Ministry of Defense (The Hague)
- * Wijk, Dr. Rob de. Former Director Concepts Division, Ministry of Defense, Professor of International Relations (The Hague)
- Work, Robert. Vice President for Strategic Studies, CSBA (Washington DC)
- Zettel, Rüdiger. Policy Planning, German Federal Foreign Office (Berlin)

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS

- Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: Norton, 1969.
- Alberts, David S. *Information Age transformation: getting to a 21st century military*. United States Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program: Washington DC, 2002.
- Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein. *Network-centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*. United States Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program: Washington DC, 1999.
- Albright, Madeleine K. *Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and World Affairs*. New York: HarperCollins, 2006.
- Albright, Madeleine K. and Kurt M. Campbell, eds. *Crossing the Atlantic, A report from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops*. The Aspen Institute, 2004.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Arquilla, John. *Worst Enemy: the Reluctant Transformation of the American Military*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008.
- Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. *In Athena's Camp*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1997.
- Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. *Networks and Netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.
- Asmus, Ronald D. *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a new era*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- Augustine, Saint. *City of God*. Edited by Vernon J. Bourke. Translated by Gerald Walsh et al, New York: Image Books, 1958.
- Avant, Deborah D. *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by war*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *The Limits of Power: the end of American Exceptionalism*. New York: Metropolitan, 2008.
- Baker, James A. and Lee H. Hamilton. *Iraq Study Group Report*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2006.
- Bathurst, Robert B. *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*. London: SAGE, 1993.
- Baylis, John, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray. *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Beek, Relus Ter. *Manoevreren: Herinneringen aan Plein 4*, Amsterdam: Balans, 1996.
- Benedict, Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

- Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann. *Revenge of the Drones*. New America Foundation, Washington DC, October 19, 2009.
- Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas. *The Social Construction of Reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Anchor Books, New York 1967.
- Berger, Thomas U. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung. *World Powers in the 21st Century*. Berlin, June 2006.
- Beunders, H.J.G. "Weg met de Vlootwet!: de maritieme bewapeningspolitiek van het kabinet –Ruys de Beerenbrouck en het succesvolle verzet daartegen in 1923." PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 1984.
- Biddle, Stephen. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Bilmes, Linda J. And Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2008.
- Binnendijk, Hans, ed. *Transforming America's Military*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002.
- Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson, ed. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2004.
- Bladel, Joris van. "The All Volunteer Force in the Russian Mirror: Transformation without Change" PhD. diss., Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2004.
- Blom, J.C.H. et al. *Srebrenica, een 'veilig' gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyse van de val van een Safe Area*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2002.
- Bobbitt, Phillip. *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
- Bomert, Bert, Theo van den Hoogen and Ramses A. Wessel, eds. *Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2004*, Nijmegen: Center for International Conflict Analysis and Management, 2004.
- Boot, Max. *War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World*. New York: Gotham, 2007.
- Brauch, Julia. *Nationale Integration nach dem Holocaust: Israel und Deutschland im Vergleich*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004.
- Brouwershaven, Willeke van. *Turbulentie en Strategisch Vermogen; Strategievorming bij het Ministerie van Defensie*. Eburon: Leiden, 1999.
- Brown, Michael E. et al, eds. *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
- Brown, Shona L. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. *Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured Chaos*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
- Bush, George H.W. and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Vintage, 1998.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waeve and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
- Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
- Cassidy, Robert M. *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular war*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.
- Chesterton, G. K. *What I Saw in America*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1922.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by JJ Graham. London: Penguin, 1968.
- Coker, Christopher. *Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
- Collins, Jim. *Good to Great: why some companies make the leap...and others don't*. New York: HarperBusiness, 2001.
- Cooper, Robert. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003.

- Crevelde, Martin van. *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Crevelde, M. van. *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Daalder, Ivo and Michael O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
- Davies, Norman. *Europe: A History*. Harper Perennial, 1998.
- Ditzhuijzen, R.E. van et al. eds. *Tweehonderd Jaar Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken*. Den Haag, 1998.
- Dueck, Colin. *Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Duffield, John S. *World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Dyson, Tom. *Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe*. London: Palgrave, 2010.
- Elman, Colin and Miriam F. Elman, eds. *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
- Ellis, Joseph J. *American Sphinx: the Character of Thomas Jefferson*. New York: Vintage, 1996.
- Ellis, Joseph J. *Founding Brothers: the Revolutionary Generation*. New York: Vintage, 2000.
- Evera, Stephen van. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Farrell, Theo and Terry Terriff. *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
- Feith, Douglas. *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.
- Finnemore, Martha. *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the use of force*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Fischer, David Hackett. *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Fischer, David Hackett. *Liberty and Freedom: A Visual History of America's Founding Ideas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Foner, Eric. *The Story of American Freedom*. New York: Norton & Co., 1998.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The World is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2005.
- Frum, David and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
- George, Alexander. *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.
- Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Gompert, David C., Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki. *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1999.
- Gold, Phillip. *The Coming Draft: The Crisis in our military and why selective service is wrong for America*. New York: Random House, 2006.
- Goldstein, Judith & Robert O. Keohane. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Gompert, David C. and Irving Lachow. *Transforming US Forces: Lessons from the Wider Revolution*. National Defense Research Institute, RAND 2000.
- Gongora, Thierry and Hermann von Riekhoff, eds. *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*. Greenwood, 2000.

- Gordon, Phillip and Jeremy Shapiro. *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.
- Goure, Daniel and Jeffrey M. Ranney. *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millenium*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999.
- Gow, James. *Defending the West*, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005.
- Graaf, Bob de, et al. eds. *De Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek in de Twintigste Eeuw*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2003.
- Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Gray, Colin S. *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
- Gray, Colin S. *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: the Sovereignty of context*, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 2006.
- Gray, John. *Al Qaeda and What it means to be modern*. New York: the New Press, 2003.
- Gray, John. *Black Mass*. Farrar, Straus, Giroux: New York, 2007.
- Groen, Petra M.H. *Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen*. Historical Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1991.
- Hamilton, Daniel, ed. *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century*. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University, 2004.
- Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.
- Hellema, Duco. *Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland: De Nederlandse Rol in de Wereldpolitiek*. Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2006.
- Hellman, Gunther et al. eds. *Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Außenpoliti*. VS Verlag, 2006.
- Hillman, James. *A Terrible Love of War*. New York: Penguun, 2004.
- Howard, Michael. *War and the Liberal Conscience*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Common Defense*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *American Politics: the Promise of Disharmony*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*. Cambridge, MA: Bellknap Press, 1983.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: The Free Press, 2002.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Ikenberry, G. John and Anne-Marie Slaughter. "Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: US National Security in the 21st Century." Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security, The Princeton Project Papers, Princeton 2006.
- Jenkins, Brian M. *The Unchangeable War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1970.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception & Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Jobbagy, Zoltan. *Theory, Reality and the Nature of War: Effects-based Operations meet Post-Conflict Operations*. The Hague: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Grand Strategy and Strategic Culture in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Kagan, Donald, Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly. "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, a Report of the Project for the New American Century." Washington DC, September 2000.
- Kagan, Frederick. *Finding the Target: the Transformation of American Military Policy*. New York: Encounter, 2006.
- Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
- Kaplan, Fred. *Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
- Kaplan, Lawrence. *NATO Divided: the Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.

- Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. *The Culture of National Security; Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Keaney, Thomas and Eliot Cohen. *Gulf War Air Power Survey*. Washington, DC: 1993.
- Klep, Christ and Richard van Gils. *Van Korea tot Kosovo: De Nederlandse Militaire Deelname aan vredesoperaties sinds 1945*. Den Haag: SDU, 2000.
- Knox, Macgregor and Williamson Murray. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Kreemers, Bert. *Hete Hangijzers: de aanschaf van Nederlandse gevechtsvliegtuigen*. Balans: Amsterdam, 2009.
- Krepinevich, Andrew, Barry Watts and Robert Work. *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*. Washington DC: Center for Budgetary Assessments, 2003.
- Kristol, William and Lawrence Kaplan. *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*. Encounter: San Francisco, 2003.
- Kugler, Richard L. *Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs*. Washington DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006.
- Kupchan, Charles A. *The Case for Collective Security*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994.
- Kupchan, Charles A. *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002.
- Lauren, Paul Gordon. ed. *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*. New York: The Free Press, 1979.
- Liddell Hart, Basil H. *The British Way of Warfare*. New York: MacMillan, 1933.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. *American Exceptionalism: A double-edged sword*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1996.
- Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Locke, John. *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*. London: William Tegg & Co., 1849.
- Locke, John. *Two Treatises of Government*. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Mahnken, Thomas G. *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Mahnken Thomas G., and James R. FitzSimonds. *The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes to the Revolution in Military Affairs, Naval War College Newport Papers 17*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003.
- Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Viking, 2004.
- Marks, Eric A. *Business Darwinism, Evolve or Dissolve: Adaptive Strategies for the Information Age*. New York: Wiley, 2002.
- McMaster, H.R. *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that they told that led to Vietnam*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1998.
- McNeill, William H. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
- Meacham, John. *American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the Making of a Nation*. New York: Random House, 2006.
- Mead, Walter Russell. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it changed the World*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001.
- Meyer, Christoph O. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.
- Moore, Geoffrey A. *Dealing with Darwin*. New York: Portfolio, 2005.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Morgan, G. *The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1985.

- Muller, Erwin R. et al. *Krijgsmacht: Studies over the organisatie en het optreden*. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004.
- Murray, William R. and Alan R. Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy*. New York: Harper, 1944.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. *The Irony of American History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.
- Osinga, Frans. *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Owens, William A. *Lifting the Fog of War*. New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 2000.
- Paine, Thomas *Common Sense*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Posen, Barry R. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- Possony, Stefan and J.E. Pournelle. *The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.
- Powell, Colin L. *My American Journey*. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 2004.
- Reyn, Sebastian. *Allies or Aliens: George W. Bush and the Transatlantic Crisis in Historical Perspective*. Zoetermeer, NL: Atlantische Commissie, 2004.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin, 2006.
- Rosen, Stephen P. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Rosen, Stephen P. *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Scarborough, Rowan. *Rumsfeld's War: the untold story of America's anti-terrorist commander*. Washington DC: Regnery, 2004.
- Scheffer, Paul. *Een Teverden Natie: Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de Europese Status Quo*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1988.
- Schirmer, Daniel B. And Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds. *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance*. Boston: South End Press, 1987.
- Schweller, Randall L. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- Sheehan, James. *The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War*. London: Faber & Faber, 2007.
- Singer, Peter W. *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*. New York: Penguin, 2009.
- Smith, Rupert. *The Utility of Force: the art of war in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane 2005.
- Sorensen, Theodore. *Let the word go forth: the speech, statements and writing of John F. Kennedy 1947 to 1963*. New York: Dell, 1988.
- Sorley, Lewis. *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam*. New York: Harvest, 2008.
- Snyder, Jack L. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977.
- Staden, Alfred van. *Een Trouwe Bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap*. Baarn: In den Toren, 1974.
- Stillman, Edmund O. and William Pfaff. *The Politics of Hysteria: The Sources of Twentieth-Century Conflict*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
- Stulberg, Adam N., Michael D. Salomone, and Austin G. Long. *Managing Defense Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.
- Szabo, Stephen F. *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

- Tenet, George. *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*. New York: Harper Collins, 2007.
- Terrif, Terry, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell, eds. *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004).
- Thucydides, *Historiai - De Peleponnesische Oorlog*. Amsterdam: Athenaeum - Polak & Van Genneep, 2001.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America, and Two Essays on America*. Translated by Gerald Bevan. London: Penguin, 2003.
- Toffler, Alvin. *The Third Wave*. New York: Pan, 1981.
- Toje, Asle. *America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Strategic Bargain*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Trubowitz, Peter, Emily Goldman and Edward Rhodes, eds. *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions and Interests*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Ullman, Harlan K. and James P. Wade. *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.
- Vickers, Michael G. and Robert C. Martinage. *The Revolution in War*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004.
- Vollenhoven, Cornelis van. "Holland's Vocation." In *War Obviated by an International Police: A Series of Essays*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1915.
- Voorhoeve, Joris J.C. *Peace, Profit and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*. Amsterdam: Nijhoff, 1979.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 1979.
- Warden, John. "The Air Campaign." Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1988.
- Weigley, Russell. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Welch, Jack. *Winning*. New York: Collins Business, 2005.
- Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline. *Die Wehrpflicht und ihre Hintergründe*. Wiesbaden: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2004.
- Woods, Kevin M., James Lacey & Williamson Murray. "Iraqi Perspectives Project: A view of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership." Joint Center for Operational Analysis, United States Joint Forces Command: 2006.
- Wijk, Rob de. *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle For Consensus*. London: Brassey's UK, 1997.
- Wijk, Rob de. *The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West's Military Superiority Scarcely Matters*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2005.
- Wijk, Rob de, M. de Kwaasteniet and M. Groothuizen. *Nieuwe Prioriteiten in het Buitenlands Beleid: Projectgroep Herijking Buitenlands Beleid*. Stichting Wetenschappelijk Bureau D66 4, no.1. (June 1995).
- Wilke, Tobias M. *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the past to contemporary German strategic choice*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007.
- Woodward, Bob. *Plan of Attack: the Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.
- Woodward, Bob. *State of Denial*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
- Woodward, Bob. *The War Within*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.
- Yost, David S. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1998.
- Zakaria, Fareed. *From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Zisk Marten, Kimberly. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

PUBLISHED ARTICLES

- Adams, Gordon et al. *Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability*. Washington DC: National Defense University, November 2004.
- Alvarez, Lizette. "Army Giving More Waivers in Recruiting." *New York Times*, February 14, 2007.
- Arkin, William A. "Spiraling Ahead." *Armed Forces Journal* 143 (February 2006): 39-42.
- Asmus, Ronald D. et al. "One Year On: Lessons from Iraq." *Chaillot Paper* 68, European Union Institute for Security Studies, (March 2004).
- Atkinson, Rick. "You can't armor your way out of this problem." *Washington Post*, October 2, 2007.
- Aylwin-Foster, Nigel. "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations." *Military Review* 85, no. 6 (November-December 2005): 2-15.
- Baehr, Peter and Erik Visser. "Eigenzinnig internationalisme is Nederlands kans in Europa." *De Volkskrant*, July 24, 1995.
- Barkin, Jeffrey Samuel. "Realist Constructivism." *International Studies Review* 5 (2003): 325-342.
- Barnett, Thomas P.M. "Old Man in a Hurry." *Esquire Magazine*, July 1, 2005.
- Baumann, Rainer and Gunther Hellmann. "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint', and the Quest for Normality." *German Politics* 10, no. 1 (April 2001): 61-82.
- Bedway, Barbara. "Covering the 'Other' War: a reporter in Afghanistan." *Editor & Publisher*, April 3, 2006.
- Bemmel, Noel van. "Infanteristen, commando's: iedereen vecht tegen Taliban." *De Volkskrant*, June 23, 2007.
- Bemmel, Noel van. "Wij willen soldaten met morele competentie." *De Volkskrant*, November 3, 2007.
- Berman, Russell. "The German Difference." *Hoover Digest*, no. 1 (2003).
- Beveridge, A.J. *The March of the Flag*, Indianapolis, IN, September 16, 1898. Accessed January 22, 2007. <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/beveridge.html>.
- Biddle, Stephen. "Victory Misunderstood." *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 139-179.
- Biddle, Stephen. "Funding the US Counterinsurgency Wars." *Expert Brief Council on Foreign Relations*, June 19, 2009. Accessed July 17, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/publication/19666/funding_the_us_counterinsurgency_wars.html.
- Binnendijk, Hans & Richard L. Kugler. *Shaping Future Defense Budgets*. Defense & Technology Paper 6, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Washington DC, November 2004.
- Borger, Julian. "Wake-Up Call." *The Guardian*, September 6, 2002.
- Bowman, Tom. "Pentagon to Consider Large-Scale Troop Cuts." *Baltimore Sun*, July 10, 2001.
- Breuer, Fabian. "Between Ambitions and Financial Constraints: The Reform of the German Armed Forces." *German Politics* 15, no. 2 (2006): 206-220.
- Brill, Paul. "Ze schoten een magazijn op me leeg." *De Volkskrant*, June 28, 2007.
- Brouwers, Arnout and Theo Koel . "Kabinet nu voor missie Afghanistan." *De Volkskrant*, December 2, 2005.
- Budde, Hans-Otto. "Einsatz verpflichtet." *Internationale Politik* (May 2007): 28-33.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. and John J. Garstka. "Network-Centric Warfare: Its origin and Future." *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute* 124, no.1 (January 1998): 28-35.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. "Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians." *Washington Post*, February 24, 2007.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "A Revolution in Warfare." *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 37-54.
- Cohen, Eliot, John Nagl, Conrad Crane, et al. "Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 49-53.
- Cordesmann, Anthony. "Rethinking NATO's Force Transformation." *NATO Review*, Special Issues, Spring 2005: 36-40.
- Cox, Matthew. "They weren't going to get this bird." *Army Times*, November 22, 2004.
- Daalder, Ivo and James Lindsay. "Democracies of the World, Unite." *The American Interest* 2, no. 3 (January-February 2007): 5-15.
- "Das Afghanistan-Abenteuer." *Der Spiegel* 47 (2006): 20-30.
- Derix, Steven. "Propagandist van de Realpolitik." *NRC Handelsblad*, June 14, 1999.

- Doyle, Michael. "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (1983): 205-235.
- Drew, Christopher. "Drones are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda." *New York Times*, March 16, 2009.
- Drew, Christopher. "Conflicting Priorities Endanger High-Tech Army Program." *New York Times*, July 19, 2009.
- Dyson, Tom. "German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity." *European Security* 14, No.3 (September 2005): 361-386.
- Eckert, Dirk. "Die Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt." *Telepolis*, December 13, 2002.
- Eijssink, Angelien. *In dienst van Nederland, in dienst van de wereld, een plan voor een actieve en doelmatige krijgsmacht*. Den Haag, November 2007.
- Eijssvoogel, Jurd. "Blauw Oog voor Nederland." *NRC Handelsblad*, January 13, 2006.
- Ek, Carl. *NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment*. Congressional Research Service, RS21659, (January 18, 2006).
- Farrell, Theo. "Strategic Culture and American Empire." *SAIS Review* 25, no.2 (Summer 2005): 3-18.
- Feaver, Peter and Christopher Gelpi. "A Look at ...Casualty Aversion." *Washington Post*, November 7, 1999.
- Feickert, Andrew. "The Army's Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 28, 2005.
- Flournoy, Michele and Shawn Brimley. "The Contested Commons." *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute* 135, no. 7 (July 2009): 16-21.
- Francis, Paul L. "Future Combat Systems, Challenges and Prospects for Success." Government Accountability Office, Washington DC, March 2005.
- Fried, Nico. "Ich habe gelernt, nie wieder Auschwitz." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 24, 2005.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History." *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "The Neoconservative Moment." *The National Interest* 76 (Summer 2004): 57- 68.
- Garamone, Jim. "Budget Recommendations Provide 'Home' for Warfighters, Gates Says." *American Forces Press Service*, Washington DC, April 7, 2009.
- "Gates Cuts Leading to 'Strategic Drawdown'." *Wynne*, *DODBuzz*, April 13, 2009. Accessed August 31, 2010. <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/13/gates-cuts-leading-to-strategic-drawdown-wynne/>.
- Gellman, Barton. "CIA Weighs 'Targeted Killing' Missions." *Washington Post*, October 28, 2001.
- Giesen, Peter. "Het Zedelijkste volk op vredesmissie." *De Volkskrant*, January 14, 2006.
- Glenn, John. "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?" *International Studies Review* 11 (2009): 523-551.
- Gorce, Paul-Marie de la. "A Short History of Franco-US Discord." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 2003. Accessed April 8, 2005. <http://mondediplo.com/2003/03/07franceusa>.
- Gordon IV, John et al. "The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 2001-02): 52-57.
- Government Accountability Office. "Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles is well under way, but expectations for their transportability by C-130 aircraft need to be clarified." Washington DC, August 2004.
- Government Accountability Office. "The Global Information Grid and Challenges facing its implementation." GAO 04-858, July 2004.
- Government Accountability Office. *Military Readiness, DOD needs to identify and address gaps and potential risks in program strategies ad funding priorities for selected equipment*. October 2005. Accessed August 31, 2010. www.gao.gov/new.items/d06141.pdf.
- Grant, Greg. "FCS Not Killed: Casey." *DODBuzz*, May 19, 2009. Accessed August 20, 2010. <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/05/19/fcs-not-terminated-casey/>.
- Gray, Colin S. "National Style in Strategy; The American Example." *International Security* 6, no. 2, (1981): 21-47.
- Gray, Colin S. "Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back." *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 46-69.

- Ham, Peter van. "America's Rising anti-Europeanism." *Europe's World* (Spring 2006): 30-35.
- Ham, Peter van and Richard L. Kugler. "Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge." *The Marshall Center Papers* 4, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2002.
- Harvey, F.J. "Building the Future Force while continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism." *ARMY*, October 2005.
- Heisbourg, Francois. "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences." *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no.2 (Spring 2003): 75-88.
- Hillen, John. "Superpowers don't do Windows." *Orbis* 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 241-258.
- Howlett, Darryl. "The Future of Strategic Culture." Paper presented at Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, October 31, 2006.
- Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 171-200.
- "It's time for the US to declare victory and go home," *Washington Independent*, July 30, 2009. Accessed September 7, 2010. <http://washingtonindependent.com/53224/col-timothy-reese-its-time-for-the-us-to-declare-victory-and-go-home>.
- Janning, Josef and Thomas Bauer. "Into the Great Wide Open: The transformation of the German Armed Forces after 1990." *Orbis* 51, no. 3 (2007): 529 – 541.
- Janssen Lok, Joris. "NATO Accelerates Search for More Helicopters for Afghanistan Operations." *Aviation Week* (November 25, 2007).
- Jefferson, Thomas. "A Summary View of the Rights of British America." July 1774. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/Jefferson/Summaryview.html>.
- Jobbagy, Zoltan. "Effects-based operations and the Problem of Causality." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 46, 3rd quarter (2007): 90-95.
- Johnston, Alastair Ian. "Strategic Cultures Revisited: reply to Colin Gray." *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 519-523.
- Johnston, Alastair Ian. "Thinking about Strategic Culture." *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 32-45.
- Kagan, Frederick W. "A Dangerous Transformation." *The Wall Street Journal*, November 12 2003.
- Kagan, Frederick W. "The US Military's Manpower Crisis." *Foreign Affairs* 85, no.4 (July/ August 2006): 91-110.
- Kagan, Robert. "The Benevolent Empire." *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998): 24-35.
- Kagan, Robert. "The return of cheap pessimism: Inside the Limo." *The New Republic Online* 4, no. 227: 34-41.
- Kaplan, Fred. "War-gamed: why the Army shouldn't be so surprised by Saddam's moves." *Slate Magazine*, March 28, 2003.
- Kaplan, Fred. "Challenging the Generals." *New York Times*, August 26, 2007.
- Kazin, Michael. "The Right's Unsung Prophets." *The Nation* 248, February 20, 1989: 242.
- Khanna, Parag. "The Metrosexual Superpower." *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2004): 66-68.
- Kier, Elizabeth. "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars." *International Security* 19, no. 14 (1994): 65-94.
- Koebel, Susanne and Alexander Szandr. "Not Licensed To Kill: German Forces in Afghanistan Let Taliban Commander Escape." *Der Spiegel Online (International)*, May 19, 2008. Accessed March 13, 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 0,1518,554033,00.html>.
- Koelé, Theo and M. Peepkorn. "Tweede Kamer zwaar onder druk gezet." *De Volkskrant*, January 31, 2006.
- "Kosten Uruzgan 200 Miljoen Hoger." *NRC Handelblad*, June 27, 2007.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70, no.1 (Winter 1990/91): 23-33.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." *The National Interest* (Fall 1994): 30-42.
- Krepinevich, Andrew. "The Pentagon's Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power." *Foreign Affairs*. 88, no.4 (July/August 2009): 18-35.
- Krepinevich, Andrew and Dakota Wood, "Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC,

- October 17, 2007. Accessed August 31, 2010. http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20071017.Of_IEDs_and_MRAPs/R.20071017.Of_IEDs_and_MRAPs.pdf.
- Kristol, William. "The Imminent War." *The Weekly Standard*, March 17, 2003.
- Lantis, Jeffrey. "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy." *International Studies Review* 4, no.3 (Autumn 2002): 87-113.
- Lawlor, Maryann. "Facing the Challenges of the New Millennium: Tactics, Strategy change to meet today's threats." *Signal Magazine*, July 2002.
- Ledeen, Michael. "American Power – For What?" *Commentary* (January 2000): 36-37.
- Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. "Is Anybody still a Realist?" *International Security* 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999): 5 – 55.
- Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.
- Linn, Brian M. "America's Expeditionary War Transformation." *Naval History* 19, no. 5 (October 2005): 56-61.
- Luttwak, Edward. "A Post-Heroic Military Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July/ August 1996): 33-44.
- Mahnken, Thomas. "United States Strategic Culture." Paper presented at Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, November 13, 2006.
- Mauil, Hans. "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland." *Europa Archiv* 47, no. 10 (1992): 269-278.
- Mauil, Hans W. "Germany and the use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?" Paper prepared for the Workshop on Force, Order and Global Governance, An Assessment of US, German and Japanese Approaches, Washington DC, July 1-2, 1999.
- Meek, James. "All at Sea." *The Guardian*, January 21, 2004.
- Meiers, Franz-Jozef. "Germany: the Reluctant Power." *Survival* 37, no.3 (1995): 82-103.
- Miles, Donna. "Gates urges more emphasis, funding for all aspects of national power." *American Foreign Press Service*, (November 26, 2007).
- Mill, John Stuart. "A Few Words on Non-intervention." *Fraser's Magazine* (1859). Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/forep/forep008.pdf>.
- Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine." *International Security* 29, no.4 (Spring 2005): 112-156.
- Muradian, Vago. "Is US Army Resisting Irregular War Focus." *DefenseNews.com*, October 8, 2007.
- Myers, Steven Lee and Thom Shanker. "US May send more Troops to Afghanistan." *International Herald Tribune*, May 3, 2008.
- Nakamura, Kennon H. and Susan B. Epstein. "Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy." Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL34141, Washington DC, August 2007.
- Naylor, Sean. "War Games Rigged?" *Army Times*, August 16, 2002.
- Nitze, Paul et al. "NSC 68: United States Programs and Objectives for National Security, April 14, 1950." *Naval War College Review* 27 (May –June 1975): 51-108.
- Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. *German Special Operations Forces: The case for Revision*, SWP Comments 26, Berlin, November 2006.
- Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. "The German Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan." *SWP Comments*, Berlin, February 2008.
- Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. "Does a Multitier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process of strategic change." *International Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2009): 211-226.
- Nuland, Victoria. "The NATO Emerging in Afghanistan." *Washington Post*, February 1, 2008.
- O'Rourke, Ronald. *Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress*. Congressional Research Services Report, June 5, 2008.
- Osborn, Kris. "TRADOC Official: 'Persistent Conflict' Shapes Plans, Policy." *Defense News*, October 1 2007.
- Overhaus, Marco. "Between Military Interventionism and Cooperative Security: Germany's Policy Towards NATO Transformation since September 11, 2001." Paper presented at International Studies Association Conference, Chicago II, February 28, 2007.
- Pape, Robert A. "The True Worth of Air Power." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 116-130.

- Peters, Ralph. "The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs." *Weekly Standard* 11, no.10, February 6, 2006.
- Philpott, Tom. "Army Signs More Dropouts." *Military.com*, November 22, 2006.
- Plummer, Anne and John M. Donnelly. "Shaping a Modern Fighting Force." *Congressional Quarterly*, February 28, 2005.
- Porter, Michael E. "What is Strategy?" *Harvard Business Review* (November-December 1996): 61- 78.
- Posen, Barry R. "Nationalism, the Mass, and Military Power." *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 80-124.
- Posen, Barry. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony." *International Security* 28, no.1 (Summer 2003): 5-46.
- Powell, Colin. "Information-Age Warriors." *Byte*, July 1992: 370.
- Powell, Colin. "US Forces: Challenges Ahead." *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 36-41.
- Pré, Raoul du. "Dittrich vreeset een nieuw Srebrenica." *De Volkskrant*, January 27, 2006.
- Prem, Hema and George Eby Mathew. "How Does Business Transformation Happen?" *Cutting Edge Infosys* (June 2006).
- Project on the New American Century. "Letter to President Clinton." January 26, 1998. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>
- Reynolds, Kevin P. "Insurgency/ Counterinsurgency: Does the Army Get It?" Paper prepared for presentation at International Studies Association, Annual Convention, Chicago, IL, February 28 – March 3, 2007.
- Ricks, Thomas E. "For Rumsfeld, Many Roadblocks." *Washington Post*, August 7, 2001.
- Rice, Condoleezza . "Promoting the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1 (2000): 45 – 62.
- Riecke, Henning. "Höchste Zeit für Reformen: Die Bundeswehr vor wichtigen Entscheidungen." *Internationale Politik* 7 (2002): 29-34.
- Risen, James and Mark Mazzetti. "Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret CIA Raids." *New York Times*, December 10, 2009.
- Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and theories of foreign policy." *World Politics* 51, no.1, (October 1998.): 144-172.
- Rosen, Stephen P. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31.
- Ross, Jan. "Die Deutschen und der Krieg: Warum eigentlich herrscht so große Ruhe im Land?" *Die Zeit*, March 31, 1999.
- "Rühe: UNO-mandat – Voraussetzung fuer Auslandseinsätze." *Sddeutsche Zeitung*, November 25, 1994.
- Rühle, Michael. "Am Rubikon der Kampfeinsätze." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 4, 2008.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. "A Choice to Transform the Military." *Washington Post*, May 16, 2002.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. "Transforming the Military." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 3 (May/ June 2002): 20-32.
- Sanger, David E. and Eric Schmitt. "Between the lines, an Expansion in Pakistan." *New York Times*, December 1, 2009.
- Scales, Robert H. Jr. and Paul van Riper. "Preparing for War in the 21st Century." *Parameters* 27, no.3 (Summer 1997): 4-14.
- Schmitt, Eric. "Army Recruiting More High School Dropouts to Meet Goals." *New York Times*, June 11, 2005.
- Schmitt, Eric and Thom Shanker. "US Plans widen role in training Pakistani forces in Qaeda battle." *New York Times*, March 2, 2008.
- Schreer, Benjamin. ed. *Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation*. SWP Berlin, June 2005.
- Schweller, Randall. "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.
- Shanker, Thom. "NATO Asked to Meet Promises Already Made to Afghanistan." *New York Times*, February 9, 2007.
- Shanker, Thom and Jim Rutenberg. "President wants to increase size of armed forces." *The New York Times*, December 20, 2006.
- Shanker, Thom E. and Eric Schmitt. "Armor scarce for big trucks serving in Iraq." *New York Times*, December 10, 2004.

- Smith, Craig S. "Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense Spending." *New York Times*, January 14, 2004.
- Smith, Craig S. "US Training African Forces to uproot Terrorists." *New York Times*, May 11, 2004.
- Swidler, Ann. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (April 1986): 273-286.
- Szabo, Stephen. "The Future of German Defense." American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Analysis. Accessed January 16, 2008. <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/security/szabo.aspx>.
- Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource Extractive State." *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 464-495.
- "Ter Beek Ergert zich op Feestje Landmacht." *De Volkskrant*, November 24, 1999.
- Thomas, Evan and John Barry. "A New Way of War." *Newsweek*, August 20/ August 27, 2007.
- Thompson, Mark. "Broken Down." *TIME Magazine*, April 16, 2007.
- Tyson, Ann Scott. "US Army Battling to Save Equipment." *New York Times*, December 5, 2006.
- Tyson, Ann Scott. "Petraeus Helping Pick New Generals." *Washington Post*, November 17, 2007.
- Ucko, David. "Innovation or Inertia: The US military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency." *Orbis* 52, no. 2 (2008): 290-310.
- Waard, Peter de. "Bot prijst 'vrienden bij PvdA.'" *De Volkskrant*, February 1, 2006.
- Walker, David M. *DOD Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities*, Presentation at the House Armed Service, House of Representatives, Washington DC, January 24, 2007. Accessed August 31, 2010. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA461693&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.
- Waltz, Kenneth. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5-41.
- Ward, William and Stephanie Hanson. "Interview: Africom seeks military-to-military relationships." *New York Times*, May 22, 2008.
- Weiner, Tim. "Air Force Seeks Bush's Approval for Space Weapons Programs." *New York Times*, May 18, 2005.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46 (spring 1992): 391-425.
- White, Josh. "Many Take Army's 'Quick-Ship' Bonus." *Washington Post*, August 27, 2007.
- Wilson, Peter A., John Gordon IV and David E Johnson. "An Alternative Future Force; Building a Better Army." *Parameters*. Winter 2003-2004: 19-39.
- Wohlstetter, Albert. "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" *Foreign Policy* 15 (Summer 1974):3-20.
- Wolfowitz, Paul. "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus." *Vanity Fair*, May 9, 2003.
- Woodward, Bob. "CIA told to do 'whatever necessary' to Kill Bin Laden." *Washington Post*, October 21, 2001.
- Van der Meulen, J.S. & A. Vos. "Kwetsbaar draagvlak: de publieke opinie over Uruzgan." *Carré*, no.6 (2007): 21-23.
- Xenos, Nicholas. "Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror." *Logos* 3, no.2 (Spring 2004): 5-11.
- Zehfuss, Maja. "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison." *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001):315- 348.
- Zimmerman, Warren. "Jingoes, Goo-Goos and the Rise of America's Empire." *The Wilson Quarterly* 22, no.2 (Spring 1998):42 - 65.
- Zoellick, Robert. "A Republican Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 63-78.

POLICY DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES AND TESTIMONIES

- Adams, Gordon. "Budgeting for Iraq and the GWOT." Testimony to the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 6, 2007.
- Algemene Rekenkamer. *Monitoring verwerving Joint Strike Fighter, stand van zaken september 2007*. HTK 2007-2008, 26 488, nr. 61.

- Annan, Kofi. "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35." November 15, 1999. Accessed March 23, 2009. <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf>.
- Aspin, Les. *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*. Washinton DC, October 1993.
- BrownLee, R.L. *Serving A Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, 2005.
- Bundesverfassungsgericht. "Klage der Linksfraction gegen Tornado-Einsatz in Afghanistan zurueckgewiesen." Pressemitteilung Nr. 72/2007, 3. July 2007.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *Das Neue Heer: Transformation Transparent*. Bonn, June 2007.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 1992*. Bonn, November 26, 1992.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*. Berlin, May 21, 2003.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *White Paper 2006, on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*. Berlin, October 2006.
- Bundesverfassungsgericht. 90, 286, July 12, 1994, Karlsruhe.
- Bush, George H.W. "Speech at the Aspen Institute." Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990.
- Bush, George W. "Remarks at the Citadel." Charleston, South Carolina, September 23, 1999.
- Bush, George W. "A Distinctly American Internationalism." Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999.
- Bush, George W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Washington DC, September 20, 2001.
- Bush, George W. "Address at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy." West Point, New York, June 1, 2002.
- Bush, George W. "Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly," New York, September 12, 2002.
- Bush, George W. "Address to the Nation on Iraq." Cincinnati, OH, October 7 2002. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73139>.
- Bush, George W. "Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy." United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, November 6, 2003.
- Bush, George W. "State of the Union Address." Washington DC, January 28 2003.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. White House, Washington DC, March 2006.
- Casey Jr., George W. "Statement of the US Army Chief of Staff." Testimony to the Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, September 26, 2007.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. *Elements of Defense Transformation*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, October 2004.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense, Washington DC, Fall 2003.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. *Network-centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2003.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. "Transformation and the Changing Character of War." *Transformation Trends: Newsletter of the Office of Force Transformation*, June 17, 2004.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. *Statement of the Director of Force Transformation*. Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, April 9, 2002.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K. *What is Force Transformation*. Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense. Accessed July 4, 2005. http://www.oft.osd.mil/what_is_transformation.cfm.
- Cheney, Richard. "Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention." August 26, 2002, Nashville. Accessed April 30, 2008. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html>.
- Clinton, William J. "A new Covenant for American Security." Georgetown University, Washington DC, December 12, 1991.
- Clinton, William J. *A Vision of Change for America*. Office of Management and Budget: Washington DC, 1993.
- Cohen, William S. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington DC: Department of Defense, May 1997.

- Cohen, William S. *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2000.
- Conway James T., Gary Roughead and Thad Allen. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007.
- Crowe, William J. "Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee" United States Senate, Washington DC, 1989.
- Defense Planning Guidance. "Excerpts from the Pentagon's Plans: 'Prevent the Re-emergence of a new rival.'" *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992.
- England, Gordon R. *Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003: Assured Access and Power Projection from the Sea*. United States Department of the Navy. Accessed August 30, 2010. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/naval_trans_roadmap2003.pdf.
- European Defence Agency. *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*. Brussels, October 2006.
- Fischer, Joschka. "Herbert Quandt Lecture at Georgetown University." Washington DC, September 15, 2000.
- Fischer, Joschka. "Address to the United Nations Security Council." New York, March 19, 2003.
- Flournoy, Michele. "Remarks by Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy." Army Leader Forum, Washington DC, May 4, 2009.
- Gates, Robert M. "Nomination hearing for Secretary of Defense." Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, Washington DC, December 5, 2006.
- Gates, Robert M. "Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates." Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, February 7, 2007.
- Gates, Robert M. "Testimony of the Secretary of Defense." Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 27, 2007.
- Gates, Robert M. "Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates." Association of the United States Army, Washington DC, October 10, 2007.
- Gates, Robert M. "Landon Lecture, Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates." Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Accessed August 21, 2008. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>.
- Gates, Robert M. "Remarks to the Heritage Foundation." Colorado Springs, CO, May 13, 2008.
- Gates, Robert M. "Remarks at National Defense University." Washington DC, September 29, 2008.
- Gates, Robert M. "As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates." Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, April 15, 2009. Accessed September 15, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1344>.
- Gates, Robert M. "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College." Carlisle, PA, April 16, 2009. Accessed October 8, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404>.
- German Marshall Fund & Compagnia di San Paolo, *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2007*, 2007.
- Kennedy, John F. "Address at the graduation ceremony at West Point." West Point, New York, February 6, 1962.
- Kernan, William F. "General Kernan Briefs on Millennium Challenge 2002." United States Joint Forces Command, July 18 2002. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/07/mil-020718-dod02.htm>.
- Macgregor, Douglas. "Army transformation: Implications for the Future," United States House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, July 15, 2004.
- Mattis, James N. "Memorandum for US Joint Forces Command: Assessment of Effects Based Operations." United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk VA, August 14, 2008.
- Ministerie van Defensie, Commandant der Strijdkrachten. *Militair Strategische Verkenning 2006*, Den Haag, February 6, 2006.
- Ministerie van Defensie. *Defence Priorities Review: Prioriteitennota (Abridged Version)*. Delft: Brouwer Offset, January 1993.
- Ministerie van Defensie. *Defensie Industrie Strategie – Eindrapportage*. DMO/DB/2007012327, Den Haag, August 27, 2007.

- Ministerie van Defensie. *Defensienota 1991: Herstructurering en Verkleining: de krijgsmacht in een veranderende wereld*. Den Haag: 1991.
- Ministerie van Defensie, Directie Algemene Beleidszaken, *Ministerie van Defensie: Bundel voor nieuwe bewindslieden*, May 22, 2003.
- Ministerie van Defensie. *Het Defensiebeleid op Hoofdlijnen*. HDAB200718939, Den Haag, July 2, 2007.
- Ministerie van Defensie. *Toetsingskader 2001*. HTK 2000-2001, 26454, nr.18, Den Haag.
- Minister van Defensie. *Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan*. DVB/CV-388/05, Den Haag, December 22, 2005.
- Minister van Defensie. *Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief*. HDAB2006018085, Den Haag, June 2, 2006.
- Minister van Defensie. *Op weg naar een nieuw evenwicht: De krijgsmacht in de komende jaren (Prinsjesdagbrief)*. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 X, no.1.
- Minister van Defensie. *Wereldwijd Dienstbaar*. Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 243, no.1, Den Haag.
- Navy Littoral Combat Ship: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress*. Congressional Research Service Report, May 23, 2008.
- North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. Rome, November 7, 1991.
- North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Washington DC, April 24, 1999.
- North Atlantic Council. *Prague Summit Declaration*., Press Release (2002) 127, Prague, November 21, 2002.
- Reagan, Ronald. "Inaugural Address." Washington DC, January 20, 1981.
- Obama, Barack. "Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center." Washington DC, August 1, 2007.
- Obama, Barack. "State of the Union Address." Washington DC, January 27, 2010.
- Obama, Barack. "Responsibly ending the war in Iraq." Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009.
- Obama, Barack. *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*. The White House, Washington DC, March 2009.
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Operations, Army Transformation Office. "United States Army Transformation Roadmap 2004." Department of the Army, July 2004.
- Pace, Peter. "Posture Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, February 6, 2007.
- Powell, Colin. "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee." United States Congress, Washington DC, February 21, 1991.
- Powell, Colin. "Testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, Washington DC, February 1, 1990.
- Report of the National Defense Panel. *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*. Washington DC, December 1997.
- Riper, Paul van. "Information Superiority." National Security Committee, Procurement Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, March 20, 1997.
- Riper, Paul van. "Remarks on United States and NATO Military Operations Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington DC, April 28, 1999.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Media Availability With Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Norwegian MoD." July 29, 2002. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3621>.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001*. Washington DC, September 30, 2001.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2006.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*. Washington DC, July 15, 1998.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2005.

- Rumsfeld, Donald H. and General Peter Pace. "DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace." August 20, 2002. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3595>.
- Schoomaker, Peter J. *The Way Ahead, our Army at War: Relevant and Ready*. United States Department of the Army, January 2004.
- Schoomaker, Peter and R.L. BrownLee. *Serving A Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*. United States Department of the Army, 2004.
- Schröder, Gerhard. "Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Lage im Kosovo." Berlin, March 24, 1999.
- Schröder, Gerhard, "Address at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly." New York, September 24, 2003.
- Shalikashvili, John M. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1995.
- Shelton, Henry H. *Joint Vision 2020*, Department of Defense, Washington DC, June 2000.
- Staatssecretaris van Defensie. *De maatregelen bij Defensie in kort bestek*. June 30, 2003.
- The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington DC, September 2002
- Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzending. *Vertretpunt Den Haag*. HTK 1999-2000, 26 454, no. 8, The Hague, September 4, 2000.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Nota Inzake de Navo en het Defensiebeleid*, vergaderjaar 1967-68, 9635, The Hague, June 20, 1968.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid: Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Economische Zaken, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, van Defensie en van Financiën*. HTK 1994-1995, 24337, nr. 2.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *De situatie in voormalig Joegoslavië; Brief ministers over eventuele deelname van Nederlandse militairen aan NAVO-acties in Kosovo*. Vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 22181, nr. 213, The Hague, October 13, 1998.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Defensienota 2000*. HTK 1999-2000, 26 900.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *De Hoorn van Afrika; Verslag van een hoorzitting op 16 oktober 2000 over de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen in het kader van UNMEE*. Vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 22 831, nr. 13, The Hague, November 7, 2000.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme*. Vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 27 925, nr. 40, The Hague, January 24, 2002.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Brief minister over de Nederlandse opvatting ten aanzien van de laatste ontwikkelingen omtrent Irak in de VN-Veilighedsraad*. Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 94, The Hague, March 20, 2003, p. 3.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *De situatie in het Midden Oosten; Verslag algemeen overleg op 25 juni 2003 over de mogelijke Nederlandse bijdrage aan de stabilisatiemacht voor Irak*. Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 23432, nr. 120, The Hague, July 9, 2003.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004*. Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29200, nr. 2, The Hague, September 26, 2003.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004: Op Weg naar een Nieuw Evenwicht, de krijgsmacht in de komende jaren (Prinsjesdagbrief)*. Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29200 X, no. 4, The Hague, September 23, 2003.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen; Verslag algemeen overleg op 13 november 2003 over het EVDB, de transatlantische betrekkingen en de NAVO*. Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 21501-02, nr. 510, The Hague, December 12, 2003.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. *Nederlandse Deelname aan Vredesmissies*. Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29521, nr.1, April 8, 2004.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Brief minister over de NAVO-defensieinterministeriële bijeenkomst, die op 9 en 10 juni 2005 te Brussel*. Vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 28 676, nr.22, The Hague, June 29, 2005.

- Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. *Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme; Brief ministers over ontwikkelingen in de aanloop naar de verkiezingen in Afghanistan op 18 september 2005*. Vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 27925, no. 182, The Hague, September 5, 2005.
- United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. *The United States Army Functional Concept for MOVE 1015-2024 version 1.0*. TRADOC pamphlet 525-36, United States Department of the Army, April 30, 2007.
- United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Military Operations: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations - 1986*, Pamphlet 525-5, March 25, 1981.
- United States Department of the Air Force. *The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan*. Washington DC, November 2003.
- United States Department of the Army. *Army Campaign Plan* (Change 3). Washington DC, May 12, 2006.
- United States Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, December 12, 2005. http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/the_army_plan/army-strategic-planning-g.shtml. Accessed September 6, 2010.
- United States Department of the Army. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24*. December 15, 2006.
- United States Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: a strategy for today, a vision for tomorrow*. Washington DC, 2004.
- United States Department of Defense. "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap," Washington DC, January 2005. Accessed September 7, 2010. <http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf>.
- United States Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*. Washington DC, December 1, 2008.
- United States Department of Defense. "Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned." September 17, 2002. Accessed August 30, 2010. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3653>.
- United States Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. Washington DC, February 1, 2006.
- United States Department of Defense. *Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Directive 3000.05)*. Washington DC, November 28, 2005.
- United States Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance 2003*. Washington DC, (2003).
- United States Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation. *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington DC, January 5, 2005.
- United States Department of the Navy, Headquarters of the United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Strategy 21*. Washington DC, November 3, 2000.
- Vickers, Michael. "Building the Global Counterterrorism Network." Statement at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, October 24, 2008.
- Weiszäcker, Richard von, et.al. *Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 23, 2000.
- Wilson, Woodrow. "Address to Congress." Washington DC, April 2, 1917.
- Yoo, John C. "The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them." Office of the Attorney General, Washington DC, September 25, 2001.

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1: Comparison of German, Dutch and American attitudes to war, p. 28.
- Figure 2: Table of costs appropriated to Defense and Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, Germany and the United States, including ratio-curve, p. 28.
- Figure 3: Defense spending as % of GDP in the United States, Germany and the Netherlands, p. 29.
- Figure 4: Model of transformation, p. 57.
- Figure 5: Circular Error Probability vs Fleet Capacity, p. 78.
- Figure 6: Networked forces outfight non-networked forces, p. 99.
- Figure 7: The statue Freedom coronating the US Capitol and symbol of American strategic culture, p. 113.
- Figure 8: John Gast, "American Progress," 1872, p. 138.
- Figure 9: Norman Rockwell, "The Four Freedoms," p. 141.
- Figure 10: Planning Construct in US Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, p. 165.
- Figure 11: US and the shift of adversarial comparative advantages, p. 172.
- Figure 12: Size of US services, 2001-2008, p. 183.
- Figure 13: US Budget Authority including Emergency Appropriations, p. 186.
- Figure 14: Comparison of share of US Department of Defense budgets allocated to different services. With and without supplemental and emergency appropriations, 2002-2007, p. 187
- Figure 15: US Department of Defense annual budgets, supplemental and emergency appropriations per function per service 2002-2007, p. 188.
- Figure 16: US Department of Defense supplemental and emergency appropriations per function per service, 2001-2008, p. 189.
- Figure 17: US Defense budget 1991-2008 (Nominal, Real and % of GDP), p. 194.
- Figure 18: Characteristics of US transformation, p. 199.
- Figure 19: Military Effectiveness vs Substitution of Mass for Information, p. 211.
- Figure 20: Dutch views regarding the use of the military, p. 233.
- Figure 21: Dutch forces pay their respects to a statue of Col. L. Thomson, officer of the first Dutch peacekeeping operation in Albania (April 2009), p. 236.
- Figure 22: Cornelis van Vollenhoven, 1874-1933, p. 238.
- Figure 23: Concepts of Expeditionary Capabilities, according to NATO and adopted by the Netherlands, p. 260.
- Figure 24: Evolution of Dutch Political Ambition, 1993-2006, p. 266.
- Figure 25: Netherlands' Contributions to international operations, 1991 – 2009, p. 267.
- Figure 26: Prague Capability Commitments and Netherlands Defense Efforts, p. 269.
- Figure 27: Netherlands Defense Budget 1991-2008, p.273.
- Figure 28: Capability investments and Reductions in 2003 Netherlands Defense White Paper, p. 274.
- Figure 29: German number of conscripts and conscientious objectors, 1990-2009, p. 323.
- Figure 30: German defense expenditures (real, nominal and as % of GDP), 1991-2008, p. 324.
- Figure 31: Overview of principal research questions and answers, p. 346-347.

GLOSSARY

A2/AD	Anti-Access & Area-Denial
AC/RC	Active Component/ Reserve Component
ACT	NATO Allied Command Transformation
BMS	Battlefield Management System
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe treaty
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DOD	Department of Defense
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FBCB2	Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
FCS	Future Combat Systems
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GPS	Global Positioning System
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
ISTAR	ISR, including Target Acquisition
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
LCF	Air defense & Command Frigate
LPD	Landing Platform Dock
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MP	Member of Parliament
MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OFT	The Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OODA	Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
OPFOR	Opposing Force

PGM	Precision-Guided Munition
QDR	US Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D	Research and Development
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RNMC	Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
S/CRS	US State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SFIR	Stabilization Force Iraq
SHIRBRIG	Standby High-Readiness Brigade
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TACTOM	Tactical Tomahawk guided missile
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

SAMENVATTING

NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING BEHORENDE BIJ HET PROEFSCHRIFT “THE SUPERPOWER, THE BRIDGE- BUILDER AND THE HESITANT ALLY: HOW DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION DIVIDED NATO (1991-2008)”

Hoe is defensietransformatie door verschillende NAVO-bondgenoten geïnterpreteerd en vormgegeven? Wat waren de belangrijkste factoren die hieraan ten grondslag lagen? En wat voor invloed heeft dat op de cohesie van het bondgenootschap? Deze vragen staan centraal in dit proefschrift. ‘Transformatie’ was het overkoepelende concept eind jaren negentig en het begin van deze eeuw, dat een serie verregaande veranderingsprocessen van Westerse krijgsmachten omschreef. Het doel van deze hervormingsprocessen was het aanpassen van Westerse krijgsmachten aan de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving als gevolg van het einde van de Koude Oorlog, de opkomst van nieuwe technologieën, en de verschijning van nieuwe dreigingen. In 2002 werd de term ingevoerd binnen het NAVO bondgenootschap. Besloten werd dat alle staten hun krijgsmachten zouden transformeren in de veronderstelling dat dit de cohesie van de NAVO ten goede zou komen. Dit was echter niet het geval. Er waren grote verschillen in de wijze waarop de bondgenoten de transformatie doorvoerden. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt welke factoren tot verschillen in transformatie hebben geleid en wat dit betekent voor de toekomst van de NAVO.

Hoewel de term zijn intrede deed mid-jaren negentig in defensiekringen in de Verenigde Staten, is transformatie als concept niet tijdgebonden. In deze studie wordt transformatie gedefinieerd als het proces om gerichte, verregaande veranderingen in het militair beleid en de militaire organisatie van een staat te realiseren als reactie op grootschalige veranderingen in de internationale veiligheidsomgeving. Het doel hiervan is een verbeterde aansluiting van het militair beleid, de organisatorische structuur en de capaciteiten van het militair instrument enerzijds en de doelstellingen van het buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid van de staat anderzijds. Niet iedere hervorming van de krijgsmacht en het veiligheidsbeleid valt onder transformatie. Het belangrijkste onderscheid, ten opzichte van andere hervormingsprocessen, is dat transformatie een grootschalige kwalitatieve verandering van de krijgsmacht tot gevolg heeft als reactie op veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving.

VERSCHILLENDE VORMEN VAN TRANSFORMATIE

In deze studie worden twee soorten transformatie geïdentificeerd; operationale effectiviteit transformatie en strategische transformatie. Beide vormen hebben grote consequenties voor de krijgsmacht, maar zijn fundamenteel verschillend van karakter. In de literatuur rond militaire innovaties bestaat al geruime tijd aandacht voor zogeheten ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’ (RMA). Hierin leiden nieuwe technologieën, doctrines en wijzen van optreden tot revolutionaire veranderingen in oorlogvoering. De uitvinding van het buskruit, de Franse levée-en-masse, en blitzkrieg zijn hiervan voorbeelden. Zij die deze innovaties als eerste invoerden, stonden historisch meestal aan de kant van de overwinnaars. De introductie van informatie-technologieën en doctrines als netwerkcentrische oorlogvoering in de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht kregen veel aandacht omdat het vermoeden bestond dat dit eveneens een RMA betekende. Bij een RMA gaat het veelal om de ontwikkeling van nieuwe manieren – technologisch, organisatorisch of doctrinair – om de effectiviteit van oorlogvoering te vergroten. Deze vorm van transformatie wordt daarom ‘operationele effectiviteit transformatie’ genoemd. De tweede vorm van transformatie komt tot stand door het op militair-strategisch en politiek-strategisch niveau beantwoorden van de vraag voor welke doeleinden de staat een krijgsmacht heeft. Wanneer dit grootschalige veranderingen in de orientatie, het optreden en de capaciteiten van de krijgsmacht tot gevolg heeft is er sprake van strategische transformatie. De omslag in het militair optreden van de meeste continentaal-Europese krijgsmachten na het einde van de Koude Oorlog is hier een voorbeeld van. In algemene zin betrof het een doelbewuste omvorming van een krijgsmacht gericht op territoriale landsverdediging naar een expeditionaire krijgsmacht die ook elders ter wereld ingezet kan worden. Dit wordt ‘strategische transformatie’ genoemd.

Het onderzoek richt zich op het transformatiebeleid van de Verenigde Staten, Nederland en Duitsland na het einde van de Koude Oorlog in de periode 1991 tot 2008. Deze NAVO-lidstaten streefden verschillende vormen van transformatie na. De ontwikkeling van precisiewapens, innovaties op het gebied van informatie- en communicatie technologie en aanverwante doctrines vormden de basis voor transformatie in de VS. Het zou leiden tot een krijgsmacht voor het zogenoemd ‘informatie tijdperk’ en grootschalige veranderingen in conventionele oorlogvoering inhouden met een significante toename in het militair vermogen. Het vormde de basis van de Amerikaanse transformatie gestoeld op verbetering van de operationele effectiviteit. In Nederland werd transformatie gezien als de uitvoering van een defensiehervormingsbeleid richting een expeditionaire krijgsmacht zoals besloten in de Defensienota van 1991 en de Prioriteitennota van 1993. Het was daarmee een vorm van strategische transformatie. Zo ook in Duitsland, waar transformatie het proces omvatte om Duitse militairen in te kunnen zetten bij missies buiten het Duitse grondgebied en daarbij om te gaan met de eigen politieke en militaire geschiedenis.

Naast de formulering van deze strategieën ontwikkelde transformatie zich in de jaren erna in reactie op de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving. De opkomst van internationaal terrorisme, de proliferatie van geavanceerde technologieën, de oorlogen in Irak en Afghanistan, een toenemende unilaterale houding van de Verenigde Staten en

de strategische dreiging van irreguliere oorlogvoering hadden hun impact op de manier waarop deze staten met transformatie omgingen. In de Verenigde Staten leidde dit tot veranderingen in het transformatiebeleid. In de Europese landen beïnvloedde het met name de effectiviteit waarmee transformatie kon worden nagestreefd.

OPBOUW VAN ONDERZOEK

Dit onderzoek richt zich vooral op het politiek-strategische niveau, het niveau van de strategische beleidsmaker, de militaire strateeg en de politieke besluitvormer die invloed hebben op de toekomstige richting van de krijgsmacht en besluitvorming rond inzet en capaciteitsopbouw. Op dit niveau wordt aan defensietransformatie op hoofdlijnen richting gegeven. Hierdoor wordt in het onderzoek minder aandacht besteed aan afzonderlijke afwegingen binnen krijgsmachtdelen of hoe specifieke wapensystemen een effect gehad hebben op militaire innovatie. Het proefschrift betoogt dat variabelen op het systeemniveau en binnenlandse strategische culturen aan de verschillen in transformatie ten grondslag lagen. De probleemstelling die wordt beantwoord in dit onderzoek is Hoe heeft de interactie tussen factoren op het internationale systeemniveau en elementen van de binnenlandse strategische cultuur het proces van defensietransformatie in NAVO lidstaten beïnvloed en hoe is dit van invloed op de toekomstige transatlantische veiligheidsbetrekkingen en de toekomst van de NAVO?

Door middel van drie cases gebaseerd op archief- en bronnenonderzoek en aangevuld met semi-gestructureerde expertinterviews, wordt het proces van transformatie en de factoren die daarop van invloed waren onderzocht. Per casestudie worden de volgende vragen beantwoord:

- Waaruit bestond de transformatie die werd nagestreefd?
- Welke systeemfactoren en veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving vormden de noodzaak voor transformatie?
- Op welke wijze heeft de strategische cultuur van de staat bijgedragen aan transformatie?
- Welke gevolgen had transformatie in termen van organisatie, capaciteiten en beleid?
- Op welke wijze hebben veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving transformatie beïnvloed?

Op basis van neoklassiek realisme, waarbij factoren op het internationale systeemniveau (structureel realisme) verenigd worden met binnenlandse factoren (Innenpolitik) om het gedrag van staten te verklaren, kan vastgesteld worden hoe een staat omgaat met de gevolgen van een grootschalige verandering op het internationale niveau en in hoeverre normen en percepties die voortvloeien uit de strategische cultuur van een staat daar een rol bij spelen. Strategische cultuur omvat de gedeelde overtuigingen, ideeën en normen die samen een gemeenschappelijk narratief vormen rond het gebruik van het militair instrument om veiligheidsdoelstellingen te realiseren. Het beslaat de wijze waarop een staat het gebruik van het militair instrument ziet en is een product van de geschiedenis,

geopolitieke situatie, politieke instituties, waardensysteem en historische ervaring met de krijgsmacht van een staat. Naast de positie van een staat in de internationale systeemverhoudingen is de strategische cultuur van een staat van bepalend belang voor de wijze waarop transformatie wordt nagestreefd.

TRANSFORMATIE ALS POLITIEK PROCES

De Verenigde Staten volgden een transformatiestrategie gericht op het vergroten van de operationele effectiviteit van de krijgsmacht en de ontwikkeling van middelen om oorlogen sneller, met minder mensen, en met minder gevaar voor de eigen manschappen te kunnen winnen. Het politiek-strategische gevolg zou zijn dat het verkrijgen van politieke steun om militaire interventies uit te voeren vergemakkelijkt zou worden. De interventies in Kosovo en de eerste fase van de oorlog in Irak, waar slechts beperkte verliezen geleden werden, bevestigden dit beeld. Met de Verenigde Staten als enig overgebleven supermacht en als belangrijkste partner in de NAVO was het aannemelijk dat de kleinere landen, Duitsland en Nederland, een zekere mate van kopieergedrag vertoonden in hun transformatiestrategie. Hoewel Europese landen inderdaad deels het transformatie-proces van de Verenigde Staten kopieerden - onder andere door de introductie van ICT-systemen om interoperabiliteit te behouden en door de bereidheid om mee te doen met verschillende militaire missies aangevoerd door de VS - was dit slechts in beperkte mate aan de orde. In plaats daarvan stond transformatie in deze landen in het teken van de ontwikkeling van een expeditieaire krijgsmacht. Ook ging het hierbij niet om het excelleren in oorlogvoeren, maar om het uitvoeren van crisis-beheersings- en stabilisatie operaties. Duitsland en Nederland volgden een strategie gericht op innovatie – strategische transformatie – om te komen tot een nieuw model van de krijgsmacht en aanverwant veiligheidsbeleid. Het zorgde ervoor dat binnenlands politieke factoren en strategische cultuur een belangrijke rol speelden in het vormgeven van dit nieuwe model.

De verandering in het veiligheidsdenken na het einde van de Koude Oorlog hield in dat Westerse landen de krijgsmacht buiten hun landsgrenzen gingen inzetten in expeditieaire operaties. Dit leidde ertoe dat transformatie ingegeven werd door fundamentele politieke afwegingen over de rol van de krijgsmacht als onderdeel van staatsmacht. In plaats van redeneren vanuit een duidelijke defensieve instelling gebaseerd op territoriale landsverdediging bood de post-Koude Oorlog wereld voor Europese landen een andere context, namelijk een waarin de krijgsmacht op basis van een politieke keuze ver van huis ingezet wordt om de effecten van regionale conflicten op de internationale stabiliteit te verminderen en crisis-beheersingsoperaties uit te voeren. Zo leidde de expeditieaire omgeving tot een belangrijkere rol voor de binnenlandse politiek bij de inzet van de krijgsmacht en bracht het de elementen van de strategische cultuur van een staat helderder naar voren.

Het Europese integratieproces is een belangrijke externe factor die ertoe geleid heeft dat het Nederlandse en Duitse transformatiebeleid dicht bij elkaar liggen. Het veranderde de veiligheidsdynamiek in Europa. Na het einde van de Koude Oorlog kreeg dit proces vaart en Europese landen vaarden wel bij de versterkte onderlinge economische betrekkingen.

Dit ging gepaard met de institutionalisering en juridisering van de veiligheidsbetrekkingen binnen Europa. Onderlinge politieke kwesties werden omgezet in juridische, economische of institutionele vraagstukken. Dit proces van Europese integratie vormt de basis voor vrede en veiligheid in Europa. In het veiligheidsbeleid vertaalde zich dit in een nadruk op stability projection, waarbij de krijgsmacht alleen ingezet wordt om de internationale rechtsorde te ondersteunen en stabiliteit te bevorderen. Het leidde tot een voorkeur voor het uitvoeren van stabilisatieoperaties.

In de Verenigde Staten was eveneens een politiek proces essentieel voor transformatie. Ingegeven door de veranderende systeemverhoudingen, het unipolaire systeem, maar vooral ook de mogelijkheden die het 'informatie tijdperk' bood, werd operationele effectiviteit transformatie gezien als een recept om Amerikaanse dominantie te behouden. Het beeld van een kleinere, snellere, en veiligere manier van oorlogvoeren versterkte een exponent van de Amerikaanse politieke en strategische cultuur die veronderstelde dat superieure Amerikaanse militaire macht een belangrijk middel was om Amerikaanse waarden van vrijheid en democratie te verspreiden. Dat neoconservatisme zo een belangrijke rol speelde in de Amerikaanse politiek hangt samen met de effectiviteit van de Amerikaanse transformatiestrategie in de jaren 1999-2003. De politieke aard van transformatie komt terug in de rol die strategische cultuur hierbij gespeeld heeft.

STRATEGISCHE CULTUREN EN TRANSFORMATIE

Strategische culturen zijn bepalend voor de wijze waarop de relatieve internationale machtsbalans en veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving geïnterpreteerd worden door een staat en vertaald worden in beleidsinitiatieven. Het Amerikaanse dreigingsbeeld is een product van de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur waarbij dreigingen geïdentificeerd worden in de vorm van natuurlijke personen. Hierdoor is de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht met name ingericht op het opsporen en uitschakelen van een tegenstander. Dit is een kernelement van de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur en vertaalt zich in een acceptatie van het gebruik van militair geweld om doelstellingen te bereiken. Power projection is een integraal onderdeel van deze aanpak, gericht op het kunnen opereren in alle mogelijke inzetgebieden en daar militair dominant te zijn. De Nederlandse strategische cultuur is veelal gericht op stability projection. Het gebruik van het militair instrument wordt daardoor niet als leidend gezien, maar als voorwaardenscheppend, met als doel om structuren en instituties die stabiliteit kunnen bevorderen te ontwikkelen. Beide zijn gericht op interventie, maar stability projection vertaalt zich in een andere mix van capaciteiten, minder gericht op het uitschakelen van een vijand, en meer in samenhang met andere middelen van staatsmacht. De Duitse strategische cultuur is vergelijkbaar met de Nederlandse in zoverre dat het gericht is op het in multilateraal verband bijdragen aan regionale stabiliteit en internationale rechtsorde. Daarnaast is de nadruk op multilaterale actie en inzetten op het versterken van de internationale rechtsorde een defensief-realistische methode (soft-balancing) om grootmachten binnen het gareel te houden. De Duitse strategische cultuur verschilt echter op fundamenteel met de Nederlandse dat die laatste niet eenzelfde historische bagage bezit als Duitsland. Berlijn dienst er hierdoor

voor terug om militaire middelen buiten de landsgrenzen en later - in Afghanistan – in offensieve militaire operaties in te zetten.

Een strategische cultuur is multidimensionaal en bestaat uit verschillende componenten die - afhankelijk van de internationale veiligheidsomgeving – elkaar versterken of tegenwerken. Zo speelt in de Nederlandse strategische cultuur, naast de nadruk op stability projection, ook de realistische afweging een rol waarbij het militair instrument voor internationale politieke doeleinden wordt ingezet. Solidariteit met de Verenigde Staten als belangrijkste bondgenoot speelt hier een centrale rol. Nederland zet haar krijgsmacht ondermeer in om politiek krediet op te bouwen bij de Verenigde Staten, en een gewaardeerd bondgenoot te zijn binnen de NAVO. Het doel hiervan voor Nederland is om ‘aan tafel’ te zitten, serieus te worden genomen door de grotere landen, en mee te beslissen op het hoogste internationale niveau. De discussie in 2010 rond deelname aan de G20 en deelname in Afghanistan toont dat het hierbij niet uitsluitend om het realiseren van veiligheidspolitieke doelstellingen gaat. Tevens speelt een defensief-realistische afweging hier een rol waarbij Nederland als small power in Europa inzet op een sterke transatlantische relatie om zodoende zich staande te kunnen houden in het Europese krachtenveld gevormd door de Europese grootmachten. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de typen capaciteiten die de Nederlandse krijgsmacht ontwikkelt en de bereidheid van Nederlandse beleidsmakers om ook in het hogere geweldsspectrum actief te zijn. Capaciteiten met een hoge zichtbaarheid en hoge relevantie voor het bondgenootschap en de politieke bereidheid om een rol van formaat te spelen, zijn een uiting van deze dimensie van de Nederlandse strategische cultuur. Dit mondde bijvoorbeeld uit in deelname in 2006 aan de missie in Uruzgan, waar Nederland de zwaarste gevechten voerde sinds de Koreaanse oorlog. Het resulteerde echter wel in een spanning tussen enerzijds solidariteit met de Verenigde Staten en het zijn van een relevante bondgenoot, en anderzijds de vraag of met deze “vechtmissie” Nederland effectief bijdroeg aan stabiliteit en de internationale rechtsorde. Het uitte zich ook in hevige parlementaire discussies over het wel of niet aanschaffen van capaciteiten geschikt om hoge intensiteitsmissies mee uit te voeren. De discussies over de aanschaf van de opvolger van het F-16 jachtvliegtuig en de tactical tomahawk zijn hier voorbeelden van. Deze gespleten strategische cultuur heeft er toe bijgedragen dat er enerzijds in Nederland sprake is van een continu strategisch debat en anderzijds dat het niet expliciet heeft hoeven kiezen tussen de Atlantische en de continentaal-Europese dimensie van haar veiligheidsbeleid. Symptomatisch hiervoor was de positie dat Nederland de Amerikaanse invasie in Irak “politiek, maar niet militair” steunde. Dit heeft Nederland strategisch gepositioneerd als een transatlantische bruggenbouwer.

In Duitsland verliep transformatie moeizaam. Dit was het resultaat van de interactie tussen een verbeterde veiligheidsomgeving na 1991 die het mogelijk maakte om mensenrechtenschendingen en regionaal conflict aan te pakken, een transatlantisch bondgenootschap dat zich richtte op expeditionaire crisis-managementsoperaties en de Duitse strategische cultuur. Voor Duitsland vormde de notie om solidair te zijn met het bondgenootschap een cruciaal element om de Duitse krijgsmacht te hervormen naar een expeditionaire organisatie. Echter, het pacifisme dat gepaard gaat met Duitsland’s

zelf-aangemeten rol als Zivilmacht, en de politieke en juridische instituties die hieruit voortvloeien, leiden tot traagheid in deze transformatie. De centrale rol van het parlement en het *Bundesverfassungsgericht* in het vormgeven van het defensie transformatieproces zien we in geen van de twee andere landen terug. De militaire interventies in de Balkan en Kosovo leidden tot grote discussie in Duitsland. Terwijl er bij de eerste een juridische uitspraak aan te pas moest komen om Duitsland deel te kunnen laten nemen in de Balkan, werd de besluitvorming rond Kosovo gekarakteriseerd door verhitte parlementaire strijd en moest een moralistisch humanitair argument aangewend worden om inzet mogelijk te maken. In Afghanistan werden voor het eerst grote hoeveelheden grondtroepen in een oorlogsgebied ingezet, echter de term oorlog en daaraan gerelateerde activiteiten werden vermeden door de Bundeswehr. Dit resulteerde in spanningen binnen het bondgenootschap. Een continu spanningsveld over de vraag of Duitsland gerechtvaardigd was om aan de ISAF operatie deel te nemen bleef bestaan. Het maakte Duitsland tot een twijfelende, of soms zelfs onwillende bondgenoot.

In de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur wordt de focus op dreigingen in de vorm van vijanden verenigd met een nadruk op technologie. Samen met een sterk geloof in de revolutionaire waarden van het Amerikaanse politieke systeem, het Amerikaanse concept van exceptionalisme, het streven naar absolute veiligheid en het doel om vrijheid te verspreiden, leidt deze focus ertoe dat militair geweld als acceptabel beschouwd wordt om bepaalde problemen op te lossen of barrières voor vrijheid weg te nemen. Het produceert een beeld dat geweld, of zelfs oorlog, soms noodzakelijk is, en dat de daaruit voortvloeiende instabiliteit op de korte termijn op de koop toe moet worden genomen. Transformatie had tot doel om Amerika superieur te houden. Het unipolaire systeem na 1991 en de komst van het Informatie Tijdperk samen met deze elementen van de strategische cultuur gaven richting aan een Amerikaanse transformatiestrategie gebaseerd op het vergroten van de eigen conventionele militaire superioriteit. Het achterliggende idee was dat hierdoor een unipolaire wereld met de VS als enige supermacht zou blijven voortduren. De strategie was gebaseerd op het vervangen van eenheden ten behoeve van geavanceerde technologieën. Dit zou het mogelijk maken om sneller, met minder manschappen, en met minder risico voor burgers en de eigen krijgsmacht, oorlogen te winnen, waar dan ook. Toen in 2004-2005 irreguliere oorlogvoering in Irak, en later Afghanistan, tot grootschalige problemen leidden, resulteerde dit in een poging om bij de Amerikaanse landmacht en US Marine Corps verandering teweeg te brengen en een capaciteit te ontwikkelen om langdurige stabilisatie operaties uit te voeren. Dit botste echter met de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur, en de wil om de krijgsmacht juist in te zetten bij hoge intensiteitssituaties. Hierdoor is de nadruk van de Amerikaanse landmacht – en in mindere mate de US Marine Corps - komen te liggen op de hoge intensiteitsdimensie van irreguliere oorlogvoering. Dit produceert een trend om, naar het voorbeeld van speciale eenheden, in kleinschalig verband en ondersteund met superieure technologie, snel en doelmatig te kunnen optreden, en als force multiplier te dienen voor staten die geconfronteerd worden met binnenlandse opstanden (in het onderzoek wordt dit COIN-lite genoemd). De andere krijgsmachtdelen – luchtmacht en marine – bleven gericht op het hogere geweldspectrum en conventionele oorlogvoering.

Voor de Verenigde Staten leidde ‘Irak’ en ‘Afghanistan’ weliswaar tot een verandering van het transformatieproces, maar op een manier die uiteindelijk overeenkwam met de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur.

In Afghanistan zien we deze kaleidoscoop van strategische culturen terug en kwamen de verschillen in transformatiebeleid sterk naar voren. Dit onderzoek toont echter het semi-permanente karakter van de elementen van strategische cultuur. Deze zijn constant gebleven onder verschillende internationale systemen. Ondanks de verschillende internationale context is er nauwelijks verschil in de wijze waarop het gebruik van de krijgsmacht werd gezien tijdens eerdere militaire inzet in het buitenland. De Nederlandse rechtvaardiging voor deelname aan Uruzgan vertoont grote gelijkheid met de besluitvorming rond de deelname aan de Koreaanse oorlog, de missie in Albanië in 1993, of zelfs de politiole acties in Nederlands-Indië. De argumenten zijn vergelijkbaar: Nederland voert geen oorlog maar draagt bij aan de internationale rechtsorde en stabiliteit, tegelijkertijd is het bereidwillig een rol te spelen waardoor het een betrouwbare bondgenoot is voor de grootmachten en zodoende haar eigen internationale profiel vergroot. De Amerikaanse visie op en rechtvaardiging van het gebruik van de krijgsmacht is niet fundamenteel veranderd tussen manifest destiny, de Spaans-Amerikaanse oorlog, de Koreaanse oorlog of Irak in 2003. Het gebruik van geweld is geaccepteerd om democratie en vrijheid te verspreiden in navolging van Amerikaanse revolutionaire principes. Voor Duitsland is het evident dat de strategische cultuur semi-permanent is, doordat het pacifisme grondwettelijk staat vastgelegd. In de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving is echter zichtbaar dat culturele entrepreneurs, zoals Duitse ministers en staatshoofden een belangrijke rol vervullen in een proces van langzame strategische herorientatie. Dit toont tevens aan dat strategische cultuur niet in steen gebeiteld is.

SAMENSPEL TUSSEN STRATEGISCHE CULTUUR EN INTERNATIONALE OMGEVING

Verschillen in de internationale positie van de drie staten en verschillen in strategische cultuur leidden tot verschillende transformatiestrategieën. Het samenspel tussen strategische culturen en veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving versterkt of belemmert een staat om transformatie na te streven. Beoordelingen van de veiligheidsomgeving kunnen in een bepaalde richting wijzen maar de beperkingen die de strategische cultuur oplegt bepalen of de staat deze veranderingen door kan voeren of niet. Strategische culturen kunnen daarbij als een keurslijf fungeren. Net zo goed als Duitsland beperkt wordt door een pacifistisch strategisch cultureel paradigma, heeft de Verenigde Staten heeft te maken met een strategisch cultureel paradigma waarbij oorlogvoering gezien wordt als een serie opeenvolgende gevechts-momenten van hoge intensiteit. In 2005 probeerde de VS een proces van strategische transformatie in te zetten om te reageren op de dreigingen van irreguliere oorlogvoering. Dat deze dreiging opkwam was een logisch gevolg van de dusdanige conventionele militaire superioriteit van de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht, waardoor tegenstanders naar alternatieven gingen zoeken. De VS faalde er echter in om het belang van deze strategische uitdaging in een vroeg stadium te erkennen. Toen het dat

eindelijk wel deed, had het moeite om er mee om te gaan omdat irreguliere oorlogvoering tegenstrijdig was met de strategisch culturele veronderstelling wat ‘oorlog’ was en wat de rol van de Amerikaanse krijgsmacht daarin was. Niet voor niets stond irreguliere oorlogvoering lange tijd bekend bij de krijgsmacht als een *military operation other than war*. Het contrast met Nederland en Duitsland kon niet groter zijn. In deze landen was er grote weerstand om bij militaire interventies de term ‘oorlog’ te hanteren. In plaats daarvan werden euphemismen als politiemissie, stabilisatiemissie of wederopbouwmissie gekozen. Dit leidde eveneens tot moeilijkheden toen duidelijk werd dat Europese landen robuust moesten optreden, soms door het uitvoeren van operaties hoog in het geweldspectrum. Oorlog dus. Dit keurslijf van strategische culturen leidt er toe dat in coalitieverband landen met verschillende denkkaders en rechtvaardigingsmechanismen aan eenzelfde interventie mee doen. Het betekent dat deze staten niet noodzakelijkerwijs acties ondernemen op basis van de operationele realiteit in het uitzendgebied maar juist op basis van afwegingen ingegeven door de beperkingen van hun strategische cultuur.

EFFECTIVITEIT VAN TRANSFORMATIE

Transformatie is daarmee een fundamenteel politiek proces gerelateerd aan de wijze waarop een staat het gebruik van de krijgsmacht ziet en publiekelijk rechtvaardigt als instrument om beleidsdoelstellingen te realiseren gegeven de context van een veranderende veiligheidsomgeving. Pas wanneer de papieren plannen die de basis van de transformatiestrategie vormen, en de daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe militaire capaciteiten, getoetst worden aan de realiteit van militaire operaties en de daaraan voorafgaande politieke besluitvorming kan vastgesteld worden of het transformatieproces effectief is. Transformatie is daarmee een combinatie van plannen, de politieke besluitvorming en de daadwerkelijke inzet van militaire middelen. Hiermee kan ook een uitspraak gedaan worden over de wijze waarop transformatie effectief kan worden nagestreefd. Uit het onderzoek volgt dat transformatie moeizaam verloopt wanneer (elementen van) de strategische cultuur van een staat tegengesteld zijn aan de doelstellingen van de transformatiestrategie. Het succes van de drie staten op het gebied van transformatie was afhankelijk van de mate van afstemming tussen de strategische cultuur, de positie van het land in de internationale machtsbalans en de aard van de veiligheidsomgeving. Wanneer de strategische cultuur geen beperkingen oplevert voor de ontwikkeling van een bepaald veiligheidsbeleid gegeven een nieuwe internationale systeemverhouding, is de effectiviteit van transformatie hoog. De Verenigde Staten ondervonden een dergelijke situatie in de jaren negentig en begin jaren 2000 toen de Amerikaanse strategische cultuur, gebaseerd op Amerikaans exceptionalisme en geloof in de bevrijdende kracht van oorlogvoering, versterkend werkte op de belofte van een Amerikaanse voorsprong in het ‘informatie tijdperk’ en de unipolaire omgeving. Wanneer strategische cultuur en systeemfactoren elkaar belemmeren ontstaat frictie en is het effect van transformatie beperkt. Dit was het geval met Duitsland toen het moeite ondervond om een balans te vinden tussen een pacifistische strategische cultuur en een veiligheidsomgeving waarbij bondgenoten expeditionaire militaire interventies ondernemen. Hieruit volgt dat als een

transformatiestrategie geformuleerd wordt dat tegenstrijdig is met de strategische cultuur van een staat dan zal dat proces moeizaam verlopen, gaandeweg veranderen, of helemaal niet gerealiseerd worden.

De Duitse casus geeft aan dat transformatie traag verloopt als het transformatiepad niet, of slechts ten dele, overeenkomt met de strategische cultuur van een staat. De Amerikaanse ervaring met strategische transformatie toont dat de strategie, ondanks eerdere doelstellingen, zich zal aanpassen aan een model die overeenkomt met de strategische cultuur. Enerzijds beïnvloedt strategische cultuur de initiële vormgeving van de transformatiestrategie, anderzijds is het een bepalende factor, naast de veranderende veiligheidsomgeving, voor de effectiviteit van het transformatieproces. Het leidt tot de conclusie dat sommige landen, als gevolg van hun strategische cultuur, beter in staat zijn om met veranderingen in de veiligheidsomgeving om te gaan dan andere.

HET EXPORTEREN VAN VERSCHILLENDE WESTERSE MODELLEN

Hoewel alle drie de transformatieprocessen verschillend zijn verlopen en strategische culturen uniek zijn voor een staat, is het belangrijkste onderliggende onderscheid in de strategische culturen het onderscheid tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Europese landen. Dit onderscheid is niet gestoeld op een geopolitieke realiteit maar op een politiek-filosofisch twistpunt. Het gaat om de sociaal-wetenschappelijke confrontatie tussen de school die stelt dat het individu boven alles verantwoordelijk is voor zijn gedrag en zijn toekomst kan maken en de school die stelt dat het menselijk gedrag voortvloeit uit de inkadering van het individu door social structuren en instituties. De een richt zich op individuele verantwoordelijkheden, de ander op de wijze waarop structuren en instituties een rol spelen bij de ontplooiing van het menselijk handelen. De Amerikaanse revolutionaire waarden en de rol van de VS als voorvechter van individuele vrijheden heeft ook betekend dat binnen het veiligheidsbeleid dreigingen ontegenzeggelijk terug te voeren zijn op individuen. Sterker nog, dit heeft aan de basis gestaan van het succes van de Verenigde Staten. Voor Europese landen is het juist andersom. Het Europese integratie proces is instrumenteel geweest voor de wijze waarop Europa zich welvarend en vreedzaam heeft weten te ontwikkelen door randvoorwaarden voor het statelijk gedrag te formuleren middels een uitgebreid netwerk van instituties. Deze identieke institutionele kaders worden ingezet in het buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid. Deze twee varianten zijn beiden een product van Westers denken maar betreffen wel twee tegenovergestelde modellen. Belangrijk voor transformatie is dat Europese landen en de Verenigde Staten beiden interventionistisch zijn en het model promoten dat effectief is geweest om henzelf welvarend en veilig te maken; de een door de verspreiding van democratische waarden en vrijheden door middel van power projection, de ander door middel van stability projection. Deze wederkerigheid toont aan dat zowel Europese landen als de Verenigde Staten strategische culturen hebben die de modellen van het eigen succes trachten te exporteren. Dit heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor de toekomst van de NAVO. Zolang de NAVO interventionistisch is zullen de bondgenoten deze verschillende modellen en de individuele rechtvaardigingen, capaciteiten en militaire inzet

die gepaard gaan met hun strategische culturen blijven nastreven, uiten en toepassen. Dit zal leiden tot een voortdurende frictie en interne spanning binnen het bondgenootschap.

De verschillen in het transformatiebeleid van de drie landen zijn gebaseerd op verschillende reacties op de veranderde internationale veiligheidsomgeving. Deze hadden verschillende afwegingen rond capaciteitopbouw, organisatie, strategie en inzet tot gevolg. Met alle gevolgen van dien voor de coherentie binnen het bondgenootschap. De verschillen in transformatiestrategie zijn daardoor kenmerkend voor de problemen waar het NAVO bondgenootschap mee te maken heeft, zeker nu met 28 lidstaten. Het expeditionaire veiligheidsdenken heeft daarmee grote invloed op de toekomst van de NAVO. Zo lang het bondgenootschap een expeditionaire oriëntatie behoudt zal overeenstemming moeizaam gevonden worden. Sterker nog, de opkomst van de expeditionaire omgeving kan als hoofdverantwoordelijke worden gezien voor de aantasting van de cohesie binnen het bondgenootschap. Transformatie heeft daarmee iets blootgelegd dat altijd al onder de oppervlakte van het bondgenootschap speelde, namelijk de diversiteit van strategische culturen.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing a dissertation is a journey that although mostly pursued in solitude depends for its success greatly on the people you meet along the way. On my journey I have benefited intensely from the support and guidance offered by a number of people and organizations. First and foremost are several dozen experts, policymakers, (former) military officers and politicians in The Hague, Washington and Berlin. They were willing to be interviewed and took time out of their busy schedules to discuss such an abstract concept as *transformation*. My new-found colleagues at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies provided me with a home away from home. The hospitality and warmth offered by Daniel Hamilton, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Esther Brimmer and the rest of the staff was a crucial ingredient in making my stay in Washington a success. Without the support of the Fulbright Association, and particularly Linda Pietersen's enthusiastic involvement, this stay in the United States would not have been possible.

My greatest sense of gratitude I owe to TNO and the Netherlands Defence Academy for funding this research. Without their backing, this journey could not have started in the first place. The leniency and support offered by my colleagues and staff at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies created an outstanding environment to further pursue my project. A sincere thank-you to my supervisor, Rob de Wijk, for reaching out to me in Paris one afternoon in 2004 and convincing me of the value to pursue a dissertation research. Finally, my parents, Willem and Yvonne, my sister Mies and Elske must be mentioned. Their patience, perseverance and gentle pushing were a key and necessary motivator. Sticking with me through this process has not always been easy, but I have felt strengthened by their support. Many others have not been mentioned that were crucial in providing information, offering advice, acting as sounding boards or simply listening to the story I had to tell. I owe them my gratitude. However, needless to say, all the mistakes in this book are entirely my own.

As journeys go, they are never entirely finished, instead they remain with you and contribute to who you are. This definitely has been one journey to remember.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Arie Rem Korteweg (The Hague, December 8, 1980) attended secondary school at the *Christelijk Gymnasium Sorghvliet* in The Hague from 1992 to 1998. Having finished grammar school, he spent six months at a French language institute in Chambéry and three months at a German language institute in the Bavarian capital of Munich. From 1999 to 2002 he studied social sciences and humanities at University College Utrecht. He participated one semester in an academic exchange program to study Australian international relations and business economics at Deakin University in Melbourne.

He continued his studies at Utrecht University and obtained a Masters degree *cum laude* in the History of International Relations in 2004. From 2002 to 2004 he was a research assistant in the Security and Conflict Program at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Subsequently, he was a visiting fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris pursuing research on the military relationship between the EU and NATO.

Rem joined the Dutch R&D institute TNO as a PhD researcher in 2004. Besides working on his dissertation, he authored studies on the relationship between ungoverned areas and terrorist organizations, violent radicalization, defense transformation, the future of NATO and European security relations. He has given guest-lectures on these topics at venues including the NATO Defense College, Leiden University, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael,' and various think-tanks across Europe.

As a Fulbright scholar he continued his dissertation research in 2006-2007 at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC. Here he also audited courses on US defense policy.

Since 2008 he is a strategic analyst at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, an independent research institute focused on national and international security affairs. Here he directs projects and authors studies on geostrategic issues, the interface between security, economics and strategy, transatlantic relations, and Dutch foreign and security policy. In addition he lectures at the NATO Defense College on the role of private security companies and international security. His work has been published in scientific journals, edited volumes and newspapers.

