

Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU
Membership:
The Influence of the German Model of Integration in Hungary and
Poland

by

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A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements

of the Doctor's Degree of Philosophy

Faculty of Law, University of Leiden

November 2011

Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership: The Influence of the German Model of Integration in Hungary and Poland

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op dinsdag 1 november 2011
klokke 16.15 uur

door

Allan Francis TATHAM

geboren te Southport, Verenigd Koninkrijk

in 1965

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