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War, Trade and Piracy
in the China Seas
(1622-1683)

Wei-chung Cheng

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War, Trade and Piracy
in the China Seas
(1622-1683)

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Prof. dr. J. E. Wills Jr. (University of Southern California, USA)

For My Parents
Cheng, Wen-shan
Lin, Hsueh-er

CONTENTS

List of Pictures and Tables

Acknowledgements	i
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Chapter Two: Nicolaes Iquan before 1627	28
Chapter Three: The Survival Game of the Mercenaries 1628-1631	68
Chapter Four: The Establishment of the An-hai trading Emporium 1630-1633	101
Chapter Five: Stormy Weather at the Imperial Court and on the South China coast 1632-1633	128
Chapter Six: The Winding Ways towards the Western Ocean 1631-1636	157
Chapter Seven: The Risk of Politics and the Politics of Risk 1636-1640	175
Chapter Eight: In Search of Silver in a Changing World 1640-1646	203
Chapter Nine: The Open Coast of the Chinese Empire 1646-1650	241
Chapter Ten: Fu-chienese Exceptionalism Transformed into a Political Project 1650-1654	270
Chapter Eleven: The Passions of a Merchant Prince 1655-1662	296
Chapter Twelve: All Acknowledged by the Kings 1663-1667	376
Chapter Thirteen: Monopoly Lost 1669-1683	413
Chapter Fourteen: Conclusion: Defensive and Aggressive Monopolies	463
Appendix I	471
Appendix II	481
Bibliography	492
Summary/Samenvetting	509
Curriculum Vitae	521
Propositions	522

LIST OF PICTURES AND TABLES

Picture 1:	Map of partial China, Vietnamese coast and southern Taiwan	66
Picture 2:	The Estuary of Chang-chou River in China	99
Picture 3:	Map of China and Taiwan, part.	154
Table 1-1:	The Wo-k'ou raids along the Chinese coast from 1552-1565	6
Table 1-2:	Estimates of Philippine Silver Exports to China, 1586-1615	13
Table 1-3:	Chinese and Japanese junks visiting Manila between 1577 and 1612	17
Table 4-1:	The various commodities sold by the Dutch between 30 Nov.1630 and 30 Sept. 1631	108
Table 4-2:	The proportions of the commodities sold	109
Table 4-3:	The revenue of commodities sold between 30 Nov.1630 and 30 Sept. 1631	110
Table 6-1:	The percentage of Pepper plus Elephant's tusk in total value of the cargo	172
Table 7-1:	The expected profits of the Siamese Commodities in 1636	186
Table 7-2:	The Sino-Siamese junk trade	188
Table 7-3:	The structure of the Chinese raw silk imports in Taiwan	192
Table 7-4:	The revenue generated by selling Chinese silk products in Japan and the benefits to the Factory in Taiwan.	193
Table 7-5:	The numbers of Chinese junks visiting Manila (1633-1640)	198
Table 7-6:	The price of raw silk shipped to Taiwan on Chinese junks.	198
Table 8-1:	Chinese raw silk exported to Japan directly and via Taiwan.	210
Table 8-2:	Silk goods monopoly of Iquan in Sino-Japan trade Nov. 1639-Nov.1643.	213
Table 8-3:	The demand and supply of gold for India shipped by VOC via Taiwan.	217
Table 8-4:	Chinese gold exported by the Dutch to India via	219

	Taiwan.	
Table 8-5:	The amount of pepper sold by the Dutch to the An-hai merchants.	224
Table 8-6:	Chinese junks arrived on Batavia.	225
Table 8-7:	The Chinese junks arriving in Japan from harbours to the north of Ch'üan-chou	232
Table 8-8:	Junks from Quinam, Cambodia in Siam and Japan carrying deerskins	233
Table 9-1:	The estimated silver exports from Taiwan to China during 1647-48	253
Table 9-2:	The pepper price in Taiwan from March to September 1647	260
Table 9-3:	The profits of some tropical commodities sold in Taiwan in 1648	264
Table 11-1:	The concentration of Chinese raw silk exports during 1651-1654	296
Table 11-2:	Number of Chinese junks visiting Manila.	305
Table 11-3:	The tax revenues of silver imports and Chinese commodities imports	306
Table 11-4:	Gold exports from Taiwan by the VOC.	325
Table 11-5:	The VOC Exports of Bengal (Coromandel Coast) Raw Silk to Japan.	329
Table 11-6:	The expansion of Chinese trade to Siam 1650-1661.	341
Table 11-7:	The Chinese and the Dutch Silver Exports from Japan and the Chinese Raw Silk Exports in Japan.	353
Table 13-1:	Chinese Junks Visiting Manila during 1663-1670.	415
Table 13-2:	Raw Silk Exports from China and Taiwan to Manila.	415
Table 13-3:	Raw Silk Price in Japan during 1668-1670.	416
Table 13-4:	The Tariff Revenues of Manila.	416
Table 13-5:	Taiwan Junks Visiting Japan and Returning from Japan	417
Table 13-6:	Sugar Production in Taiwan 1659-1661	419
Table 13-7:	Sugar Imports from Taiwan 1663-1665	420
Table 13-8:	Deerskins Carried to Japan by Chinese Junks	421
Table 13-9:	The Chinese Trade Accounts in Japan and Manila from 1663 to 1672	422
Table 13-10:	Chinese Junks Visiting Japan from Chinese Coastal Areas	425
Table 13-11:	Pepper and Tin purchased by Cheng merchants	437
Table 13-12:	The Junks of the Siamese King Dispatched to China and Japan	440
Table 13-13:	The Exports of Japan on Chinese Junks between 1673-1684	450
Table 13-14:	Junks from the China coast visiting Siam	451

Table 13-15:	Export of Precious Metal from Europe and Japan by the VOC	456
Table 13-16:	Junks Arriving in Manila	457
Table 13-17:	The Percentage of the Tariff of Manila Contributed from Different Origins	457
Table A:	The cargo of the junk from Quinam bound for Chang-chou, registered on 15 Aug 1633	471
Table B:	The cargo of the junk from Quinam captured around Cape of the Good Hope on 17th Aug. 1633	472
Table C:	The cargo of the junk from Quinam captured near Lampecao on 17 Aug. 1633	472
Table D:	cargoes of the two junks captured near T'ung-shan, on 31 Aug. 1633	473
Table E:	The Value of Rial and Tael in stuivers at Taiwan and Batavia 1624-1661	473
	The Ming Grand Coordinators of Fu-chien	478
	The Ming Superme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-his	478
	The Governor Generals of the VOC	479
	The Ch'ing Governor-generals of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien	479
	Ching-nan viceroy [in Fu-chien]	480
	The Ch'ing Governors of Kuang-tung and Kuang-his	480

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CHAPTER ONE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Silver tides sweep the Chinese tributary system

Before the Western countries forced China and its vassal countries under duress to join the nation-state system in the nineteenth century, the political relations of the Chinese empire in East Asia were regulated within the framework of the Sino-centric tributary system. This balance of power was an extension of the domestic political structure which sustained the Chinese empire for almost two thousand years.¹ ‘Barbarian’ rulers in the countries surrounding China acknowledged the superior status of the Chinese emperor and in return for this recognition the Chinese court guaranteed the legitimacy of their position. Sometimes it could even initiate substantial interventions to come to their rescue. How strong this intervention would be depended on the actual physical force available to be deployed by the Chinese empire at that moment.² In comparison with the other political entities in the region, the sheer size of the Chinese empire exerted remarkable psychological pressure on its neighbours. Leaving these various pressures aside, the economic rewards bestowed on the vassal states in this tributary system were very attractive since membership articulated with the operation of the monopolistic crown trade between vassals and overlord. When China was compelled to proclaim the *Hai-chin* or maritime prohibitions in a desperate attempt to stabilize the social order along its coast, these new regulations did not disrupt the arrival of the tributary embassies from overseas rulers which

¹ John King Fairbank, ‘Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West’, *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 1/2 (1942), 129-149 at 131-33.

² *Ibid.*, 137; For a more comprehensive and thorough description of the Ming tribute system and its relation to overseas trade cf. Chang Pin-ts’un, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade: The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fu-chien’ (Diss., Princeton: 1993), 8-11.

INTRODUCTION

continued to arrive regularly and formed the only legal channel for trade in the first half of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).³

As much as the tributary system was an extension of Chinese domestic political strength, domestic turmoil in a vassal state as the result of the collapse of central authority might also exclude it from the tribute system. Japan joined the Ming tributary system after its shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, was recognized as a subordinate with the status of 'King of Japan' by the Ming emperor in 1408.⁴ Almost sixty years later, the Muromachi *Bakufu* [Japanese, hereafter J.] lost its authority after disputes arising from the shogunal succession in 1467 and central authority in Japan began to fall apart.⁵ When the daimyos of Hosokawa and Ouchi separately dispatched tributary embassies to China in 1523, both of them claimed to be legitimate envoys authorized by the shogun and tried to vitiate each other's claims. Their conflict which degenerated into a series of continuous raids caused large-scale disarray to proliferate along the Chinese coast. Rather than become involved in the fighting between the two factions by choosing for one of the parties, the Chinese court eventually decided to cease any contact with Japan in 1547.⁶

³ Fairbank, 'Tributary Trade and China', 138-9; Hok-Lam Chan, 'Chinese Barbarian Officials in the foreign Tributary Missions to China during the Ming Dynasty', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 88/3(1968), 411-18 at 417; Chang, *Chinese Maritime Trade*, 11-36.

⁴ Ronald P. Toby, *State and diplomacy in early modern Japan: Asia in the development of the Tokugawa bakufu*, (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1984), 24; Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China*, (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1996), 90.

⁵ Marius Berthus Jansen, *The making of Modern Japan*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 4.

⁶ John Whitney Hall, James L. McClain (eds), *The Cambridge History of Japan*, 6 vols, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991), IV, 67; Toby, *State and diplomacy in early modern Japan*, 24; Moreover, because of the financial burden

CHAPTER ONE

At more or less the same time, a silver-mine in Iwami in Japan was put into full production. Using the silver it provided, Japanese merchants continued their quest to obtain Chinese goods via the Korean Peninsula, but their plan was thwarted. The Korean government became worried about the destabilizing effect the sudden increase in the silver flow could have and banned the trade in 1539.⁷ Nevertheless, the silk yarn produced in the Chiang-nan area around Su-chou and Hang-chou in China continued to be in great demand in Japan. The high profits to be obtained in the silver-for-silk trade created waves of smugglers who rushed to China from Japan. Without formal channels between the two countries which could maintain security, the smugglers often collaborated with the pirates or even turned to piracy themselves. This second wave of piracy is referred to in Chinese sources simply as '*Wo-k'ou*', namely 'Japanese pirates'. In complete contravention of the nominal goal of the Sino-centric tributary system, Japanese pirates escaped scot free at home and continued to plunder their Ming victims. The Chinese Ming court was not in the position to restore the central government in Japan which would have enabled the traders to obtain the silver it desperately required by this time through legitimate trade. The inability of the Chinese court to take adequate measures to respond to this wave of piracy along the Chinese coast was a consequence of the long decline to which its military defence system had been subjected ever since an unrealistic military farming programme was introduced to the military colonies (*Wei-so*) along the border in 1371.⁸ This system was devised so that the soldiers in the garrisons could be self-supporting by working as farmers and simultaneously be ready to keep the enemy at bay. This farming programme transformed the

placed on the Ming court in this tributary exchange, the court had discouraged tributary missions since 1430s, cf. Chang, 'Chinese maritime trade', 39-45.

⁷ Von Glahn, *Fountain of fortune*, 114-5

⁸ Ray Huang, *Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1974), 65-7. I followed the author to translate '*Wei-so*' as military colony.

INTRODUCTION

hereditary soldiers into peasants and in the result was the withering of the garrisons during the century-long peace that followed. By the middle the fifteenth century soldiers were even selling or mortgaging their farmland.⁹ In most of the military colonies along the coast, the numbers of residential troops had declined to less than half of what they had been when the Wo-k'ou first launched their raids. In Fu-chien the numbers of the Wei-so soldiers declined to only 20 per cent.¹⁰ In some extreme cases, the numbers of soldiers who continued to live in the colonies amounted to only 2 or 3 per cent of the original quota.¹¹ In comparison with the bellicose 'Wo-k'ou' who had earned their spurs in the interminable rivalry in the 'warring states' of Japan, the Ming coastal defence force had little fighting experience.¹² The upshot was that the Ming court had to rebuild the coastal defence force before it could really contemplate regulating the coastal commerce and diplomacy with Japan within or without the tributary system.

The emergence of the Chinese privateers

In 1554, as Supreme Commander of Chiang-su (Tsong-du) Chang Ching was dispatched by the Ministry of War to carry out this mission of military reform.¹³ His recruits included mountain aborigines from Kuang-hsi,

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Fan Chung-I, T'ung His-kang, *Ming-tai Wo-k'ou shih-lüeh* [A Brief History of Wo-k'ou during the Ming Dynasty], (Peiking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 2004), 202; Two different reports written by the Fu-chien officials which point out two different percentages and that actually the numbers were only 18.5% and 42.8% of the original quotas of the coastal defence of Fu-chien around 1547, see: Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade', 204-8.

¹¹ Ray Huang, *1587: a year of no significance : the Ming dynasty in decline*, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1981), 160.

¹² Ibid., 169.

¹³ The Chinese official titles in this dissertation are translated according to : Charles

CHAPTER ONE

salt-smugglers from South Chih-li (Nanking or Chiang-su) and Buddhist monks from Shan-tung. In the other words, he formed an army of mercenaries. Although the hereditary soldiers in the military colonies were still liable to be called up for duty, they were no longer able to play any meaningful part in engagements with the enemies.¹⁴ In 1557, in a hasty effort to build up some military pressure, the Supreme Commander of Chê-chiang-Nan-chili-Fu-chien, Hu Tsung-hsien, also devised plans to recruit a navy from among the Chinese pirates and smugglers who used to co-operate with Japanese. This came to naught as Emperor Chia-ching (1522-1566) rejected his proposal and eventually the most prominent smuggler and potential naval commander, Wang Chih, and his followers were trapped and sentenced to death.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the mercenaries were soon spreading alarm among the local elites along the coast who were horrified by their ill-discipline.¹⁶ Disorderliness was not the only problem they presented. The cost of maintaining the mercenaries in the intervals between the pirate

O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, (Taipei, Southern Materials, Inc.:1988).

¹⁴ Huang, *Taxation and Governmental Finance*, 292; Fan, *Ming-tai Wo-k'ou shih-lüeh*, 244-8.

¹⁵ T'ai-wan yin-hang ching-chi yen-chiu shih[hereafter, TWYH, The economic research department of the Bank of Taiwan](ed.), *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*[Historical Materials about Fu-chienese Coastal Waters Selected from the Veritable Records of the Ming] T'ai-wan wen-hsien ts'ung-k'an [hereafter TW, Taiwan Historical Documentary Collectanea] no. 296, (1971), 29; Huang, *1587: a year of no significance*, 164; John E. Wills Jr, 'Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang', in Jonathan D. Spence and id. (eds), *From Ming to Ch'ing*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 204-38 at 211-13. Hsü Kuang-ch'i insisted Hu Tsung-hsien had made a sincere attempt to recruit Wang Chih for the court camp. The Emperor did not allow this and demanded the death penalty. Cf. Hsü Kuang-ch'i, 'Hai-fang Yü-Sso[A General Discussion of Coastal Defences]', in TWYH (ed.), *Ming ching-shih wên-pien hsüan-lu*[Selections of Political Comments in the Ming Dynasty], 2 vols, TW 289, II, 211-23 at 212.

¹⁶ Fan, *Ming-tai Wo-k'ou shih-lüeh*, 189.

INTRODUCTION

raids also proved too high to bear for longer periods.¹⁷ In short, these mercenaries were more trouble than they were worth and so the recruitment of mercenaries from the local civilian population seemed to offer a more practical solution.¹⁸ The Wei-so Regional Military Commissioner, Ch'i Chi-kuang, attempted to turn the farmers and miners into more unified, stable brigades after 1559.¹⁹ As a reward for good behaviour, he promised each soldier at least as much pay as he would obtain from a day-labour and 30 ounces of silver for each enemy head taken in battle.²⁰ As it combined low costs with better disciplined troops, this solution proved very practicable; Chi Chi-kuang's troops became the backbone of the Chiang-su and Chê-chiang coastal defence forces and he gradually forced the pirates out and drove them towards the coastal waters of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung.²¹

Table 1-1: The Wo-k'ou raids along the Chinese coast from 1552-1565

	Chiang-su	Chê-chiang	Fu-chien	Kuang-tung
1552-1557	89	61	14	2
1558-1565	6	7	65	12

Source: Fan Chung-I; T'ung His-kang, *Ming-tai Wo-k'ou shih-lüeh* [A brief History of Wo-k'ou during the Ming dynasty], (Peiking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 2004), 140;158

¹⁷ Lin Jen-ch'uan, *Ming-mo ch'ing-ch'u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i*[Private Trade during the late Ming and Early Ch'ing Dynasty], (Shang-hai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta-hsüeh, 1987), 76-7.

¹⁸ Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade', 247-8. Chang Pin-tsun referred to these recruited soldiers as 'volunteers'. He also pointed out their status was different to that of the Wei-so soldiers.

¹⁹ Huang, *1587: a year of no significance*, 260.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 172.

²¹ Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade', 70-1.

CHAPTER ONE

In the struggle to restore peace along the coast during the continuing pirate raids, the Supreme Commanders and Grand Co-ordinators were awarded the power to take autonomous command of their armies, this was a privilege which had never been granted so frequently in previous times. Vested with this authority, they could even issue orders to local commanders without having to consult the generals first. They were also put in charge of provisioning the army. Since the military colonies had by then dwindled to mere skeletons, this measure integrated the troops into the budget of the provincial administration.²² To finance the newly recruited local mercenaries, the Supreme Commanders and Grand Co-ordinators were also granted rights to levy new taxes and spend the resultant sums without the ratification of the central court in Peking. These local taxes were not even listed under the provincial revenues submitted to the court.²³ Such conveniences allowed the Supreme Commanders and Grand Co-ordinators to exert unprecedented military and financial autonomy at the provincial level. The story below reveals that these authorities also played a role in the carrying out of the institutional reforms of the Ming maritime policy.

Even before the Wo-k'ou 's raids on the Chinese coast began, for a long time Yüeh-kang (Moon Harbour) in the estuary of the Chiu-lung River had long been a popular lair for smugglers. After the Ming court gradually rebuilt the coastal defence force in Chê-chiang and northern Fu-chien, the Japanese pirates turned up there once again.²⁴ As they did not have the requisite naval

²² Huang, *1587: a year of no significance*, 162; Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 80.

²³ Huang, *Taxation and Governmental Finance*, 291.

²⁴ Li Chin-ming, 'Ming-ch'ao chung-yeh fu-chien chang-chou yüeh-kang te hsing-ch'i yü fu-chien tê hai-wai i-min [The Rise of Yüeh-kang in Chang-chou during the Middle of Ming Dynasty and Fu-chienese Oversea Immigrants]', in: Tang Shi-yeoung(ed.), *Chung-kuo hai-yang-shih fa-chan lun-wên-chi* [Essays in Chinese Maritime History], (Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences Academia Sinica, 2008), Vol. X, 65-100 at 72-6; Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade',

INTRODUCTION

vessels, the Fu-chien officials were not able to eject the smugglers. An essay, 'Opinions about Pacification or Appeasement' written by a local member of the gentry, Hsieh Pin, in 1562, mentions that:

*'The groups which flocked there were no fewer than several tens of thousands, and the illicit junks constructed with double masts were no fewer than one or two hundreds. They sailed through the turbulent waves as far as Japan and as near as Siam and Pahang. They can visit any place. They have robbed traders and civilians along the borders for such a long time. When they heard that an official force was on its way, they fitted out their junks to carry evacuate their families and take refuge on islands like P'eng-hu (the Pescadores). They might just linger at some distance from the estuary and return after the official forces retreat again.'*²⁵

In the same piece, the writer also suggests that some of the smugglers should be recruited into the coastal defence troops and allow them the opportunity to become lower-ranking officers. The new recruits should register their vessels so as to take turns to be on duty. Junks which were not on duty should be allowed to pursue their own business.²⁶ About the same time, the Ming court also entered into negotiations with the most notorious smugglers in the area, namely: the twenty-four generals of Yüeh-kang,' who had occupied the harbour since 1556.²⁷ Later in 1564, the Grand

251-7.

²⁵ Liang Chao-yang, 'Hai-ch'êng hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Hai-ch'êng District]', in Lin You-nien (et al. comp.), *Jih-pên ts'ang chung-kuo han-chien ti-fang-chih t'ung-k'an*[Rare Chinese Local Gazettes Preserved in Japan], 24 vols, (Peking : Shu-mu wên-hsien, 1992), VI, 526.

²⁶ Liang, 'Hai-ch'êng hsien-chih', 527.

²⁷ Li, 'Ming-ch'ao chung-yeh fu-chien chang-chou yüeh-kang tê hsing-ch'i yü fu-chien tê hai-wai i-min', 76; Ch'ên Tsung-jên, 'Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi'[The Narrative of and the Reality behind the 'Lifting of the Maritime Ban' in Yüeh-kang during the Late Ming Period], in: Tang Shi-yeoung(ed.), *Chung-kuo hai-yang-shih fa-chan lun-wên-chi*[Essays in Chinese Maritime History],

CHAPTER ONE

Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, T'an Lun, sent a letter to Emperor Chia-ching, in which he requested that the junk traders be permitted to sail and trade in the coastal waters on condition they did not sail to Japan:

*'Now, the solution is that, although the trade with Japan should [continue to]be prohibited, the fishing junks, and those used for the rice transport trade, for the purchase of [Nan-yang] pepper and sandalwood in Kuang-tung, and for the distribution of white sugar from Chang-chou, should be allowed to sail in coastal waters on condition that all junks should be registered and monitored by each other.'*²⁸

The motivation for legitimizing the traffic in coastal waters was to ensure that the coastal defence troops were provided with enough seaworthy vessels. At that moment the Fu-chien force was poised to confront the Chinese pirate Wu P'ing, who was cruising Fu-chien and Kuang-tung waters with a sizeable fleet.²⁹ In 1564, Wu P'ing even successfully occupied Hui-chou and Ch'ao-yang with a fleet of 200 junks.³⁰ The troops of the Regional Commander of Fu-chien, Ch'i Chi-kuang, were skilled in fighting on land, but they did not have the skill to engage the pirates on the water. A shortage of sufficient war-junks was the reason the Fu-chienese coastal defence troops had failed to capture Wu P'ing after they defeated him at Nan-ao in 1565.³¹ Ch'i Chi-kuang therefore seriously considered enlisting

(Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences Academia Sinica, 2008), Vol. X, 101-42 at 122.

²⁸ T'an Lun, 'Tiao-ch'ên shan-hou wei-chin shih-i i-pei yüen-lüeh i-chih chih-an shu' [A Letter regarding to a Long-term Policy after the Battles to Maintain Order and Improve Later Coastal Defences] , in: id, *T'an-hsiang-min tsou-i* [The Official Correspondence of Tan Lun], (Peking: Hsien-chuang shu-chü, 2004), 24-5, cited from Ch'ên, 'Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi', 120.

²⁹ Ch'ên, 'Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi', 133.

³⁰ Lin, *Ming-mo ch'ing-ch'u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i*, 107.

³¹ Ch'ên, 'Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi', 134.

INTRODUCTION

fishing and trading junks from Yüeh-kang to assist his forces.³² In 1567 the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, T'u Tsê-min, actually put this suggestion into practice. Trading junks were registered and assigned to different localities at which they would act as a support force for the war-junks. They were paid from the budget of Chang-chou prefecture. If they actually engaged the pirates in skirmishes, the civilian junk traders would also be given cash rewards.³³ This arrangement promoted the Yüeh-kang junk traders to the formal status of 'privateers', that is, in an officially sanctioned war action, they had the right to use violence.

The Portuguese merchants in Macao were also incorporated into this pattern of privateering. In 1564, when a group of Chinese navy soldiers mutinied in Ch'ao-chou, the Portuguese volunteered to assist the Regional Commander of Kuang-tung, Yü Ta-you, to put down the rebellion. He enlisted 300 Portuguese soldiers and added some of the junks of local privateers to his fighting force.³⁴ Four years later in 1568, when the Fu-chien Grand Co-ordinator, T'u Tsê-min, had assembled a sufficiently large naval force including privateers from Yüeh-kang, Yü Ta-you planned to mount an expedition from Fu-chien to Kuang-tung, in a concerted effort to annihilate the pirate Ts'êng I-pên, Wu P'ing's successor.³⁵ In the meantime, Ts'êng I-pên attacked Kuang-chou, but was defeated by a joint force of the

³² Ibidem.

³³ Ibid., 126.

³⁴ Huang Hung-chao, 'P'u-t'ao-ya-jên chü-liu Ao-mên k'ao-lüeh'[A Brief Study of the Beginnings of the Portuguese Settlement in Macao], *Wên-hua tsa-chih*[Revista de Cultura], 66 (2008), 171-180, at 176; Tang K'ai-jian (T'ang K'ai-chien), Zhang Zhao (Chang Chao), 'Ming Chung-hou-ch'i p'u-jên pang-chu ming-ch'ao ch'ao-ch'u hai-tao shih-shih tsai-k'ao'[Historical Examination of the Assistance of the Portuguese of Macao to the Ming Government in the Eradication of Pirates in the Mid- and Late Ming Dynasty], *Journal of Hubei University* (Philosophy and Social science), 32/2(2005), 192-197 at 195.

³⁵ Ch'ên, 'Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi', 125-6.

CHAPTER ONE

Portuguese in Macao and local Chinese privateers.³⁶ Ts'êng I-pên was eventually defeated in 1569 by Yü Ta-you with his combined fleet from Fu-chien and Kuang-tung.³⁷

Although a few pirates still raided the Chinese coast in later years, peace had basically been restored along the Chinese coast. The coastal traffic between the different provinces was re-opened. In an ingenious solution, privateers were available when needed and tax revenues were obtained to support the coastal defence vessels.³⁸ Most sources confirm that, between 1567 and 1574, the customs revenues from Yüeh-kang/Hai-ch'êng emerged as an important source of income which bolstered the Fu-chienese provincial budget.³⁹

One side-effect of the re-organization of the coastal defence troops was that a specially designated harbour was opened up to cater for the overseas traffic bound for foreign ports, with the exclusion of Japan. Most of the overseas destinations were recorded in the '*Tung-Hsi-yang K'ao* (Authenticated Knowledge of Eastern and Western Oceans)', a work compiled by a local scholar Chang Hsieh and published in 1617.⁴⁰ This book provides a bird's eye view of the commercial map of the Fu-chienese junk traders in the East and South China Seas. The destinations were split into two groups, namely, the Compass Needle Route of the Western Ocean (*his-yang*) and the Compass Needle Route of the Eastern Ocean (*Tung-yang*). Leonard Blussé has given a brief sketch of this commercial map:

'The eastern route ran from Mount T'ai-wu in the Bay of Amoy via the

³⁶ Tang, 'Ming Chung-hou-ch'i p'u-Jên pang-chu ming-ch'ao ch'ao-ch'u hai-tao shih-shih tsai-k'ao', 195.

³⁷ Lin, *Ming-mo ch'ing-ch'u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i*, 108.

³⁸ Ch'ên, 'Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi', 135-9.

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ Chang Hsieh, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao* [Authenticated Knowledge of Eastern and Western Oceans], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981), 7.

INTRODUCTION

*P'eng-hu Archipelago to Luzon, from where it continued all the way to the Moluccan islands; while the western route from the same starting point followed the western perimeter of the South China Sea, running via Champa, Cambodia, Siam, the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra to the north coast of Java, from where it branched out to Timor, which in turn was connected with the terminus of the Eastern route, the Spice islands. The Eastern trunk route contained some 46 branches, most of them situated in the Philippines and the Sulu Archipelago, while the Western route had as many as 125 possible stop-overs.*⁴¹

The presence of Portuguese in Macao was tolerated by the Ming court during this period, although their residence there was never officially authorized and was frequently questioned until the 1620s.⁴² The Portuguese were able to survive in Macao because of their unwavering co-operation with the feudal lords of the island of Kyushu in Japan, which made them reliable go-betweens in the Sino- Japanese trade, and to the Chinese and Japanese smugglers. As Blussé has pointed out:

*'It is remarkable that the European maritime powers which managed to capture a share of the China Sea traffic in this particular period, all adjusted themselves to this existing transport situation: they either tried to link up their own shipping to the Tung -his yang network or turned the absence of a direct Asian navigation link between China and Japan to advantage by providing such a link, the Macao-Nagasaki connection being a case in point.'*⁴³

Besides the Portuguese who had settled at two terminals along the Western route, Malacca and Macao, the Spaniards established their

⁴¹ Leonard Blussé, 'No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690', *Modern Asian Studies*, 30/1(1996), 51-76 at 59.

⁴² Huang, 'P'u-t'ao-ya-jên chü-liu Ao-mên k'ao-lüeh', 179.

⁴³ Blussé, 'No Boats to China', 59.

CHAPTER ONE

headquarters in Asia along the Eastern route in Manila in 1571.⁴⁴ Because the Spaniards could provide the Hai-ch'êng junk traders with silver from Peru in Manila, the silks-for-silver trade soon forged a firm link between both parties.⁴⁵ After the last groups of Chinese pirates who had tried to establish themselves outside China, either in Taiwan or in the Philippines, were annihilated at the end of the 1570s, the Manila trade went ahead by leaps and bounds.⁴⁶ At least after 1589, the Chinese junks returning from Manila carried silver pieces-of-eight almost to the exclusion of any other valuable goods.⁴⁷

Table 1-2: Estimates of Philippine Silver Exports to China, 1586-1615

Year	Value of exports by Chinese junks (pesos)
1586-90	625,000
1591-95	3,827,500
1596-1600	4,026,000
1601-5	5,017,333
1606-10	7,730,500
1611-1615	4,479,700

Source: Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*[The Iberian Philippines and Pacific: 16th-18th century] (*XVI^e, XVII^e, XVIII^e siècles*), (Paris: S.E.V. P. E. N., 1968), 200-205.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 60.

⁴⁵ Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune*, 118-9.

⁴⁶ Lin, *Ming-mo ch'ing-ch'u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i*, 108-111. For example, Lin Tao-ch'ien tried to set foot in Taiwan and Lin Fêng tried to occupy a site in Luzon.

⁴⁷ Chang, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao*, 132. The Ming taxation reform of 'one single whip system (I-t'iao-pian-fa)' had also contributed to this huge demand. The reform was introduced into Fu-chien in 1578. Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade', 222-4.

INTRODUCTION

The maritime mercenaries step onto the stage

While order was gradually being restored along the Chinese coast in the 1580s, the domestic strife which had divided Japanese society for almost one century also gradually petered out and a real effort to achieve unification was made. In 1560s the warlord Oda Nobunaga enjoyed a meteoric rise to power and occupied Kyoto, the nominal capital of Japan. By 1568, he was no longer satisfied to be merely a supporter of the Muromachi Bakufu but made a concerted effort to unify all of Japan under his own sway. When he was betrayed and murdered by his subordinates in 1573, the territory under his control, about one-third of Japan, fell into the lap of his most trusted ally Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi took up the torch and carried on with Oda's ambitions to unify the country.⁴⁸ In 1587 he pacified the southernmost island of Kyushu and in the following year issued orders to eradicate piracy.⁴⁹ This was the moment at which the movement to subordinate the coast of Japan to central authority, the necessary prerequisite for initiating once again formal diplomatic negotiations with China, began.

In the 1580s as Peruvian silver poured into China via the Hai-ch'êng-Manila corridor and the Japanese silver stream was channelled to Macao through Portuguese hands, the Sino-Japan smuggling trade became more risky than the legitimate routes and was a less attractive option for Japanese investors.⁵⁰ However, when he noticed the great potential offered by this business, Hideyoshi personally stepped into this lucrative trade in

⁴⁸ Jansen, *The making of Modern Japan*, 11-17.

⁴⁹ Hall, *The Cambridge History of Japan*, IV, 68; 264; Iwao Seiichi, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū* [Studies in the History of Trade under the Vermillion-Seal Licenses of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Revised and enlarged edition], (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kombunkan, 1985), 57; Yoshi S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent: A Study in the History of Japan with Special Reference to her International Relations with China, Korea, and Russia*, 3 vols, (Berkeley, University of California Press: 1937), I, 124-5.

⁵⁰ Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 9-10.

CHAPTER ONE

1589 and became its biggest investor.⁵¹ As self-declared ruler of Japan, Hideyoshi decided to set about acquiring tribute from neighbouring countries. He challenged the traditional manner in which Japanese rulers had participated in the Sino-centric tributary system in the past. Hideyoshi's move might have seemed a puzzling one at the time, but his diplomatic measures suggest a consistent mindset. He sent a diplomatic embassy to Korea in 1587 and with the same purpose in mind dispatched three embassies to the viceroy of the Portuguese Estado da Índia in Goa, the Spanish Governor-General in Manila and the King of Ryūkyū in 1591.⁵² The junks carrying the envoys were provided with letters of marque and reprisal (henceforth Letter of Marque) to prove their status. On the strength of employing these tactics, Hideyoshi obtained an almost monolithic authority in regulating all Japanese traders abroad.⁵³

In an attempt to improve relations the Korean king, Yi Kong, sent an envoy to Hideyoshi but he could not agree with Hideyoshi's ideas of creating a Japan-centric tributary system. Upon this rejection, Hideyoshi decided to invade Korea and challenge the primacy of Ming China in the region.⁵⁴ He set up a ship-building programme using the most recent technology to provide the vessels to carry his troops across the sea strait.⁵⁵ After the first invasion in 1592, he expanded the trade with Macao, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and Siam in his search for military supplies like lead and saltpetre.⁵⁶ Japanese navigation was improved immensely by synergizing the Portuguese and the Chinese technology. After some 158,000 Japanese troops had landed in Pusan, Seoul was seized within two months. A large Ming army

⁵¹ Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 14-15.

⁵² Hall, *The Cambridge History of Japan*, IV, 68-9; Jansen, *The making of Modern Japan*, 19; Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, 143-5.

⁵³ Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 49-54.

⁵⁴ Hall, *The Cambridge History of Japan*, IV, 68; 70.

⁵⁵ Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 24-5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 16-7.

INTRODUCTION

was dispatched to succour the Korean king but, after several rounds of battles, the three camps entered into long protracted negotiations. Hideyoshi proposed a revision of the Sino-centric tributary system and requested a Ming princess to be the consort of Japanese emperor, subtly insinuating an equal status between China and Japan. The Ming court was not prepared to go farther than investing him with the title of the 'king of Japan', as it had done with Ashikaga Yoshimitsu in 1408. The negotiations were broken off and another 140,000 Japanese troops were dispatched to Korea in 1597. Eventually, the Korean adventure came to a sudden halt because of the unexpected death of Hideyoshi in 1598.⁵⁷ Since Hideyoshi had not arranged his succession, his death created a power vacuum in Japan. The fragile balance of power among the daimyos collapsed and a new round of contest for power began. The Japanese challenge to the Sino-centric tributary system also unobtrusively faded away.

Although Hideyoshi's plans had been doomed, not to come to fruition, bolstered by strong domestic demand the expansion of Japanese foreign trade did not flag. In 1595 a Jesuit father predicted to the Governor-General of Philippines, Gomes Perez Dasmarinas, that Chinese silk imports destined for Japanese junks in Manila would cause the silk price to drop.⁵⁸ Although official contacts between China and Japan had been terminated completely after the Japanese retreated from Korea, the silk-for-silver transit trade between Fu-chienese and Japanese merchants in Manila did not falter, apparently condoned by the Ming court.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Hall, *The Cambridge History of Japan*, IV, 72-3. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, 160-70.

⁵⁸ Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 12-3.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 30; Hsü Kuang-ch'i, 'Hai-fang Yü-Sso', 213.

CHAPTER ONE

Table 1-3: Chinese and Japanese junks visiting Manila between 1577 and 1612

Year	1577	1578	1580	1581	1582	1588	1591	1596
Chinese junks	9	9	19	9	24	46	21	40
Japanese junks							1	1

1597	1599	1600	1601	1602	1603	1604	1605	1606
14	19	25	29	18	16	15	18	26
2	10	5	4	3	1	6(4)	3(4)	3

1607	1608	1609	1610	1611	1612
39	39	41	41	21	46
3(4)		3	(2)	(2)	(1)

Source: Chaunu, *ibid.*, 148-150; Iwao Seiichi, *Nan'yō Nihon-machi no kenkyū*, (Tōkyō : Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 10-11.

Five years after Hideyoshi's death, one of his generals, Tokugawa Ieyasu, climbed to the summit of power and was appointed Shogun in 1603. Throughout the following years, he continued to strengthen the base of his new regime and turned Hideyoshi's aggressive diplomacy into a more moderate direction. In 1601, he sent separate letters to the Governor-General of Philippines and the Viceroy of Annam, in expressing his goodwill. In 1606, Ieyasu also sent a letter to the Siamese king. Formal trade relations were established soon after.⁶⁰ Ieyasu requested the recipients to protect the Japanese junk traders in possession of a licence with his vermilion seal (*Goshuin* [J.]) and to ban Japanese traders who tried to do business without

⁶⁰ Iwao, *Shuinsen to Nihon-machi*, 22-5.

INTRODUCTION

it.⁶¹ In the letter to the Governor-General of the Philippines, he also promised to punish any Japanese criminals if foreign authorities appealed to him to do so.⁶² Between 1604 and 1607 Ieyasu also issued licences to junks sailing to Macao . The visits of these junks indicated that an almost direct commercial trade channel to China had been opened.⁶³

Ieyasu also made efforts to repair the Korean-Japanese relationship. The lord of Tsushima, an island situated between Kyushu and the Korean coast, exploited his traditional middleman position and sought to renew relations with the Korean king. After King Yi Kong had informed the Chinese court of the Japanese request to re-establish friendly relations, he sent envoys to visit Ieyasu in 1604.⁶⁴ To prove his sincerity about re-establishing friendship, Ieyasu returned 1,300 Korean prisoners-of-war the following year.⁶⁵ When the Chinese court decided to leave this matter in the hands of King Yi Kong, in 1607 the latter decided to dispatch a 500-strong embassy to Japan to negotiate the restoration of a formal relationship.⁶⁶ Because Shogun Hidetada, who had succeeded Ieyasu in the meantime, was not willing to accept the Sino-centric tributary system as the basis of Japanese-Korean relations, a formal relationship was only concluded between the Daimyo of Tsushima and the Korean court two years later in 1609. This arrangement allowed all further trade between Tsushima and the Korean port of Pusan to ignore the tributary issues.⁶⁷ During the negotiations, envoys from Tsushima even suggested the Korean king allow them to send an envoy to China via the

⁶¹ Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 60-1

⁶² Iwao, *Shuinsen to Nihon-machi*, 22; 28-9; Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 64.

⁶³ Iwao, *Shuinsen to Nihon-machi*, 10.

⁶⁴ Toby, *State and diplomacy in early modern Japan*, 27.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 32-34.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 38-9.

CHAPTER ONE

Korea network.⁶⁸

Another way of re-opening the negotiations between Japan and China was to seek the help of the king of Ryūkyū as an intermediary. The Ryūkyū kingdom occupied a firm position in the Sino-centric tributary system. Hideyoshi had urged the king of Ryūkyū to pay him tribute, but this request was ignored. Tokugawa Hidetada harboured the same ambition and he authorized the lord of Satsuma in Kyushu to send an expeditionary force to Ryūkyū in 1609 and occupy its capital Naha. The following year the king of Ryūkyū was forced to pay tribute to Hidetada in Edo, but he also continued to do so as a vassal of the Chinese emperor.⁶⁹

When the Tsushima envoys visited Pusan and spoke of the plan to send an envoy to China, they were seeking a way to rebuild the formal commercial channel with China. Without beating about the bush, they asked for a tally trade licence '*k'an-ho*[J.]' which was normally used by tributary envoys to gain admittance to Chinese ports.⁷⁰ In 1610 a merchant from Nanking, Chou Hsing-ju, visited the shogunal capital and suggested to the Japanese authorities that they request the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Ch'ên Tzu-chên, to issue a tally trade licence. Hidetada ordered Honda Masazumi to write an official letter to have this arranged.⁷¹ Masazumi mentioned nothing about tribute-bearing in this letter, but simply asked for a licence for the tally trade. He requested the protection of the Chinese court for Japanese trading junks carrying official passes, if they were forced to anchor off the Chinese coast to take on essential provisions.⁷² Before the letter reached Ch'ên

⁶⁸ Ibid., 39.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁷⁰ Hayashi Fukusai (comp.), *Tsūkō ichiran* [Overview of All Foreign Communications], 8 vols, (Tōkyō : Kokusho kankōkai, 1912-1913), V, 340.

⁷¹ Hayashi, *Tsūkō ichiran*, V, 340-44; Hayashi Razan, *Hayashi Razan bunshū* [Collected Works of Hayashi Razan], 2 vols, (Tōkyō : Perikansha, 1979), I, 130.

⁷² Hayashi, *Tsūkō ichiran*, V, 340-44; Hayashi, *Hayashi Razan bunshū*, I, 131.

INTRODUCTION

Tzu-chên, he was informed that some Fu-chienese junk traders had just broken the ban on visiting Japan because the silk price there was double the price in Manila.⁷³ He was alarmed. Therefore, even if the letter had been delivered to Ch'ên Tzu-chên, he would not have deigned to reply. Both Chinese and Japanese sources confirm that more and more Chinese junks began to sail secretly to Japan during this period.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, the Ming court began to harbour suspicions about whether the Japanese were plotting another expansionist move after it was discovered that the Japanese were allowed to trade in Pusan and the king of Ryūkyū had been captured by the lord of Satsuma in 1612.⁷⁵ After messages were received from Korean court and a Ryūkyū tributary embassy arrived in Peking,⁷⁶ the Ming court correctly surmised that the Tokugawa Bakufu had no intention of returning to the fold of the Sino-centric tributary system, but was only seeking to establish some sort of trade relationship. The court also realized that most of the piracy along the Chinese coast was the work of Chinese not Japanese pirates, and hence the Tokugawa Bakufu had nothing to do with it. Since the Chinese court refused to adjust its tributary system to accommodate the Japanese request for equal relations, its only option was to reinforce the coastal defences in case Japanese aggression should happen to undergo a resurgence.⁷⁷ In the following year, in an attempt to undermine the smuggling trade the Ming court banned the coastal trade in the provinces of

⁷³ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*[Historical materials about Fu-chienese waters selected from the Veritable Records of the Ming]TW no. 296, (1971), 103.

⁷⁴ Fan Chin-min, 'Fan-fan fan-tao ssu fang-hsiu'[Foreign Trade Only Stops when the Trader Dies], *Tung-wu li-shih hsiao-pao*[Soochow Journal of History], 18(2007), 75-112 at 80.

⁷⁵ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 106.

⁷⁶ Hayashi, *Tsūkō ichiran*, V, 344.

⁷⁷ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 109-110.

CHAPTER ONE

Chiang-su and Chê-chiang.⁷⁸ About the same time, the Japanese inhabitants in Macao were expelled by the Kuang-tung authorities.⁷⁹

When the Japanese attempts to seek access the Ming court via Korea and Ryūkyū misfired, some Japanese junk traders tried to make direct but informal contact with the local Chinese authorities. In 1616 Murayama Tōan of Nagasaki had plans to establish a base in Taiwan which would serve as a transit harbour in the vicinity of China. His flotilla consisting of twelve junks ran into a typhoon near Taiwan and was blown onto the coast of China. A Fu-chien coastal defence officer, Tung Po-ch'i, was sent to investigate what it was doing, but was captured by the Japanese sailors and taken home with them to Japan. In 1617 Tung Po-ch'i was brought back to Fu-chien accompanied by Japanese envoys carrying a tributary letter '*Piao/Pau*[J.]' which was an overture towards the opening up of the tally trade. The Fu-chien authorities refused to accept the letter because its contents 'did not adhere to the correct style'.⁸⁰ However, the dialogue between the Japanese leader, Akashi Michitōmo, and the Hai-tao (Coastal Defence Circuit), Han Chung-yung, is recorded in different sources. The exchange of words shows that the Chinese side was concerned about the question of whether the Japanese intended to occupy Taiwan. In an attempt to allay their anxieties, Michitomo emphasized he was only interested in promoting trade. He also expressed the hope that the Fu-chien authorities would at least respect his legal status and would not treat him and his crew as pirates. By making this first move, he hoped to avoid falling victim to hostile treatment. In reply, Han Chung-yung requested the Japanese junk traders give up their idea of occupying Taiwan because any such move would cause alarm at the Chinese court. Nevertheless, he took the opportunity to imply that the Ming court would not consider the transit-trade between Fu-chienese traders and

⁷⁸ Ibid., 113-4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 115.

⁸⁰ Chang, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao*, 118.

INTRODUCTION

Japanese traders in Manila illegal. To quote his words: ‘ In fact sixteen junks have been granted licences to trade annually in Manila. Is it really possible that such large amounts of Chinese goods are all consumed by the limited population there?’ He also said frankly that the Chinese court would not prevent its subjects trading with Japan if they happened to be living abroad. To quote his words: ‘For these miserable people living in some faraway corners who take the risk of trading in your country, we have relaxed our restrictions and tolerate their behaviour’. Since the attitude of the Chinese court to the trade was now explicit, Han Chung-yung warned the Japanese against occupying Taiwan. Were they to do so, the Chinese court would have no choice but ban all silk exports, including the transit trade.⁸¹

In the meantime, the Fu-chien Grand Co-ordinator, Huang Ch’êng-hsüan, had been deeply shocked by the Japanese appearance off the coast of Fu-chien in 1616, because when the Michitōmo’s flotilla arrived on Quemoy no Chinese coastal defence troops were strong enough to confront them if necessary.⁸² In order to remedy the situation, Huang Ch’êng-hsüan immediately launched a series of measures to reform the coastal defence system.⁸³ He discovered that the Wei-so soldiers were not trained to fight at sea: ‘ Some of them turned pale when on board, hiding behind the hull when under attack. When they were expected to give assistance, they fled away.’ The way to strengthen the coastal defences in the short run was to hire maritime mercenaries. He said: ‘ Even soldiers who are hired temporarily are stronger than weak soldiers. We should bend the rules and allow the mercenaries to join the official troops if they prove to be brave soldiers. Incompetent soldiers should be disbanded.’⁸⁴

⁸¹ Chang, *Tung-hsi-yang k’ao*, 250-2; TWYH (ed.), *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 118-120.

⁸² Chang, *Tung-hsi-yang k’ao*, 118.

⁸³ TWYH (ed.), *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 113-4.

⁸⁴ Huang Ch’êng-hsüan, ‘T’iao-I hai-fang shih-i shu[A Letter Proposing a Project for

CHAPTER ONE

The newly recruited maritime mercenary force consisted of 300 soldiers in twelve war-junks. They were enrolled into a flotilla of thirty-two war-junks which patrolled the waters between Wu-yü and T'ung-shan and the P'eng-hu Archipelago (the Pescadores),⁸⁵ precisely the spot where the Michitōmo's ships had anchored in the summer of 1616. Twenty war-junks would be anchored off the Pescadores to back up the residential troops on land and the other twelve war-junks were to cruise the water between the Pescadores and Wu-yü.⁸⁶ All the clues point to the fact that this maritime mercenary force was assigned to this area as a counter-force to prevent the Japanese fleet from again anchoring in the same coastal waters.

A local member of the gentry, Chao Ping-chien, was appointed Assistant Squadron Leader to lead the mercenary flotilla. His task was to curb the smuggling between the Chinese and Japanese.⁸⁷ It seems that, having been presented this opportunity on a plate, Chao Ping-chien lost no time in making himself the boss of a smuggling network, whose members included the naval lieutenants in Amoy and on the Pescadores and a prominent Chinese smuggler, Lin Chin-wu, hiding out in Taiwan.⁸⁸ This flotilla rapidly grew into the most powerful force the area and harried any other junk traders who happened to be passing by. In 1618 when the new Grand Co-ordinator, Wang Shih-ch'ang, arrived in Fu-chien, all the complaints which had been piling up about Chao Ping-chien were reported to

Coastal Defence], in: TWYH ed., *Ming ching-shih wên-pien hsüan-lu*[Selections of Political Comments in the Ming Dynasty], 2 vols, TW 289, II, 202-210 at 210.

⁸⁵ Huang, 'T'iao-I hai-fang shih-i shu', 205.

⁸⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁷ Ch'ên Hsiao-ch'ung, 'Chang Hsieh "Fei-yün-chu hsü-chi shê-t'ai shih-liao kou-ch'ên"[A Historical Source concerning Taiwan in Chang-hsieh's "Fei-yün-chu hsü-chi"]', *T'ai-wan yen-chiu chi-k'an*[Taiwan Research Quarterly], 91(2006), 74-80 at 76; From Huang Ch'êng-hsüan's letter, it can be inferred that his position was that of 'Hsieh Tsung', literally the 'Assistant Chief Squadron Leader'.

⁸⁸ Ch'ên, 'Chang-hsieh "Fei-yün-chu hsü-chi shê-t'ai shih-liao kou-ch'ên', 76.

INTRODUCTION

him. Later, when he had obtained further evidence from the interrogation of a pirate which brought to light details of Chao Ping-chien's illicit correspondence, he lured Chao Ping-chien to Amoy, where the latter was arrested and executed.⁸⁹ Because Chao Ping-chien had not rebelled outright, it is hard to judge whether he had really committed treason. According to a letter sent by the Chiang-su-Chê-chiang Regional Commander, Wang Liang-hsiang, to the Shogun in 1619, Michitōmo's claim gained credit at the Ming court which loosened up the restrictions set forth in the maritime ban and allowed the trading junks to sail abroad again.⁹⁰ Perhaps Chao Ping-chien was removed from his post only because the Fu-chien authorities were convinced that the Japanese had no malicious intentions and hence judged that Chao Ping-chien and his mercenary gang had become superfluous, even harmful.

In the middle of the sixteenth century, when Regional Commander Ch'i Chi-kuang had recruited and trained mercenary troops to defend the Chinese coast against the Wo-k'ou invasions into Chê-chiang on land, and Regional Commander, Yü Ta-you had hired the privateers from Hai-ch'êng, Japanese vessels were still less well equipped than Chinese junks.⁹¹ This situation changed after Hideyoshi's seven-year expedition to Korea. His requirements improved Japanese ship-building technology enormously. Japanese junks were now constructed as skillfully as their Chinese counterparts which they matched in size and weaponry.⁹² This is the explanation of why Huang Ch'êng-hsüan had to hire maritime mercenaries to

⁸⁹ Ibid., 77.

⁹⁰ Hayashi, *Tsūkō ichiran*, V, 557. This letter requested the Japanese shogun to arrest some pirates raiding the Fu-chien coast. Because the letter was addressed to Shogun, the Japanese authorities decided it was not appropriate for them to accept it and hence no formal reply was forthcoming.

⁹¹ Huang, *1587: a Year of no significance*, 169-70. Yü Ta-you argued that the best way to eradicate Japanese pirates was to attack them at sea.

⁹² Iwao, *Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū*, 24-7.

CHAPTER ONE

be the core force in his proposal, and of why Chao Ping-chien had no problem in gaining supremacy over the other coastal troops. Since 1615, between one and four Japanese *goshuin* junks had visited Taiwan every year and this pattern continued until 1633.⁹³ After Michitōmo vouchsafed the peaceful intentions of his country in 1617, the Fu-chienese authorities decided to turn a blind eye to Taiwan as a de facto Sino-Japanese transit trading harbour, on condition that the Japanese promised to relinquish their plan of settling in Taiwan. Although Chao Ping-chien was removed from his post, the positions of the T'ung-shan and Wu-yü, Assistant Squadron Leaders in the Pescadores, were still open to the other maritime mercenaries. They took over the role of the intermediaries of the Fu-chienese authorities in the latter's attempts to manage the 'stateless' space in between the existing Chinese and emerging Japanese world orders.⁹⁴ In this regard, the maritime mercenary force in Fu-chienese waters fulfilled a similar function to that of Tsushima or Satsuma under the rule of the Japanese Bakufu, with the vital difference that it could be more easily removed whenever the Fu-chien authorities should happen to change their minds.

If the Japanese menace had continued, the Fu-chienese authorities could have relied more heavily on the newly recruited maritime mercenaries. However, this was the last attempt by the Tokugawa Bakufu to seek some sort of formal relationship with the Chinese Ming court. After 1617, the interest of the Tokugawa Bakufu in obtaining Chinese recognition gradually cooled, because the Korean king, Yi Hon, dispatched an embassy of 428 persons to visit Hidetada to congratulate him on his conquest of Osaka Castle

⁹³ Ibid., 127.

⁹⁴ This 'stateless' situation might be related to the concept of 'stateless maritime space' created by John Wills Jr, cf. Id., 'Hansan Island and Bay(1592), Peng-hu(1683), Ha Tien (1771); Distant Battles and the Transformation of Maritime East Asia', in: Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé, Leonard Blussé (eds), *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730-1830: Dutch, Chinese, Japanese Relations*, (Leiden, Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009), 255-260 at 255.

INTRODUCTION

and the further unification of Japan. To the wider audience attending the meeting, this embassy signified the triumph of the new Japan-centric tributary system, since in reality the Korean king ‘came to pay tribute’ to the Japanese shogun, even though the Korean envoys insisted they were not doing so.⁹⁵ This event offered sufficient grounds for the Tokugawa Bakufu to legitimize its rule over Japan and occupied by this project, it gradually lost most of its desire to pursue further overtures with China.

When the Dutch East India Company (VOC) dispatched a fleet from Batavia to sail to the coast of China to seek permission to open up free trade in 1622, the initial move of the Dutch was to attempt to seize Macao from Portuguese but after this plan failed they were forced to move to the Pescadores. This defeat just happened to coincide with the arrival of another group of *go-shuin* junk traders organized by a Chinese merchant Li-Tan, who was based in Hirado, Japan, and his mercenary partner Hsü Hsin-su. They were in the process of acquiring a monopoly in the transit trade in the waters around Taiwan and the Pescadores. After confrontations with the Ming army in 1623, on the advice of Li Tan the Dutch governor, Martinus Sonck, retreated to Taiwan in 1624. The conflict between the Dutch and the Ming troops provoked the Fu-chien authorities to promulgate another ban on overseas Chinese shipping, which suddenly interrupted the Sino- Japanese transit trade. Ironically just a year earlier, in 1622, the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien had just sent an official letter to the regent (*Daikan*[J.]) of Nagasaki, Suetsugu Heizō, in which he requested Japanese co-operation to arrest Japanese pirates. This move seems to hint that China was making overtures to Japan. Heizō replied that in that case the Chinese Ming court should send a formal envoy as would befit a state-to-state relationship. Heizō expected the Chinese court would allow the Japanese junks to visit China, but nothing more was mentioned about the tributary system.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Toby, *State and diplomacy in early modern Japan*, 65-67.

⁹⁶ Hayashi, *Tsūkō ichiran*, V, 345; Toby, *State and diplomacy in early modern Japan*,

CHAPTER ONE

King Yi Kong of Korea had consulted with the Ming court about the delicate question of whether he should reply to a Japanese invitation to send an embassy in 1606, but the Ming court left this decision up to him. The Korean court had little choice because it could not afford to risk Japanese hostility in the south just at a time the Manchus had begun to attack its northern borders.⁹⁷ Neither China nor Korea was able to keep the Manchus at bay in the years which followed. The Manchus inflicted a serious defeat on the Ming troops in the battle of Sarhu in 1619 and thereafter began their rapid territorial expansion.⁹⁸ While the Japanese silver exports might have been the prime reason for Hideyoshi to invent a Japanese tributary system alongside its Sino-centric counterpart, the rise of the Manchus was actually the most important reason the Sino- and Japan-centric tributary systems were kept apart after 1607. The Japanese silver and the expansion of the Manchus were the two elements which created this 'stateless space' which remained open to Chinese, Japanese and later Dutch traders until 1624, and also deeply influenced the later development of the Fu-chienese maritime mercenaries as will be revealed in the following chapters.

61-4.

⁹⁷ Toby, *State and diplomacy in early modern Japan*, 32.

⁹⁸ Frederick W. Mote.; Denis Twitchett (eds), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 7, The Ming dynasty 1368-1644, part I, (Cambridge, Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1988), 580-3.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

CHAPTER TWO

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

Shadow over the Sino-Japanese transit trade in Manila after 1617

Although they had served for a long time as the backbone of Spanish and Portuguese maritime expeditions, after the Spanish king declared an embargo against Dutch shipping in 1580 Dutch mariners now set sail into the Iberian-dominated waters in Asia and the Caribbean seas under their own flag. Two decades later, after intermittent attempts by various companies to gain a share in the spice trade of the Indonesian Archipelago, the Dutch authorities decided to establish one unified East India Company in order to concentrate forces and find a more efficient way to exploit the long-distance trade to Asia. In 1602 the Dutch United East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) was granted a charter which allowed it to operate in the hemisphere between the Straits of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope.¹

When the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian Archipelago in the last decade of the sixteenth century, their primary goal was to procure spices. Once they had arrived in the Moluccan Archipelago, they sought an ally in the Sultan of Ternate, the local rival of the Sultan of Tidore who was supported by the Portuguese. Because the Portuguese feared that they would not be able to ward off the Dutch menace on their own, they called in the assistance of the Spaniards in Manila. They considered them natural allies because, since 1580, Portuguese and Spain had been ruled by the same monarch.² Not until the spring of 1610, after the Dutch had gained a real foothold on Banda and Ternate, did they feel that they could retaliate against

¹ Femme Simon Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC* [The History of the Dutch East India Company] (Zutphen, Leiden/Walburg Pers: 1991), 13-23.

² Dirk Abraham Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren voor 1626* [The Dutch in Philippine Waters before 1626] (Amsterdam, J.H. de Wit: 1898), 11-2.

CHAPTER TWO

this aggression and began to blockade Manila Bay.³ On 22 September 1609, while he was sailing with a squadron of four ships from Ternate *en route* to Manila Bay, actually in sight of his goal, François Wittert successfully captured twenty-three richly loaded junks which were also making for the bay. Just over half a year later, on 25 April 1610, he himself was attacked a Spanish fleet of eight ships and totally defeated.⁴ Since eventually all the booty the Dutch had captured was retrieved and returned to its original owners, this blockade barely caused a ripple among the Chinese and Japanese traders there. However, this defeat embarrassed the Dutch so much they returned to consolidate their position in the Moluccas until 1614 when the governor of the Moluccas, Laurens Reaal, felt confident enough to strike another blow at the Iberian enemy. His attempt was doomed to failure because, caught by the turn of the monsoon, his fleet was not able to reach Manila Bay.⁵ As he face this new Dutch threat, the governor of Manila, Don Juan de Silva, called for assistance from both Mexico and Goa. His plan was to assemble a large force with which to drive the VOC out of the Spice Islands once and for all. On 7 February 1616, he sailed at the head of a spectacular fleet consisting of ten galleons, three yachts and four galliots towards Malacca where he planned to rendez-vous with a relief fleet from Goa. Once this large Armada was merged, his first plan was to crush the Dutch base in Bantam in Java and, once this had been accomplished, to sweep away the remaining Dutch garrisons in the Moluccas.⁶ On 9 February 1616, a Dutch fleet under the command of Joris van Spilberghen arrived in Philippine waters. Assuming the presence of the large Spanish fleet somewhere in the vicinity, before launching an attack, he decided to sail to the Moluccas first and gather a bigger fleet, composed of seventeen vessels there. Only on 12 October did he find out that about half the original force

³ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 23-5

⁴ Ibid. 24-5.

⁵ Ibid. 30-1.

⁶ Ibid. 33.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

had been left behind in Manila: namely eight big ships, three big galleons, and five to six frigates. When this news was received, the admiral of the newly joined fleet, Jan Dirksz Lam, decided to blockade Manila Bay in the winter of 1616 and the early spring of 1617. In that period the Dutch captured four richly loaded Chinese junks as well as two Japanese junks, but failed to capture the Spanish silver galleons from Mexico. Lam sailed his fleet a little to the north along the west coast of Luzon, expecting to capture more Chinese junks sailing for Manila in March 1617.⁷ After the fleet had been dispersed to intercept the Chinese junks, the Spanish fleet suddenly sailed out of Manila Harbour and sank the Dutch admiral's ship, the *Nieuwe Son*, and burned two more ships in a sea battle on 18 April 1617. The remainder of Dutch ships were able to escape and still managed to hold onto the five captured Chinese junks. Later, they were able to waylay the Spanish vice-admiral's ship and plunder all its cargo. When the main Spanish fleet returned from Malacca, the new governor of Manila, Geronimo de Silva, (Don Juan de Silva had passed away in Malacca) immediately dispatched seven ships to Ternate to hunt down the Dutch fleet. Unfortunately, this *escadre* ran into a serious gale in October and never reached its destination.⁸

The prolonged struggle between the Spaniards and the Dutch cast a long shadow over both the Sino-Japanese transit trade and the Sino-American trade in the Manila emporium, because many Chinese junks which sailed between China and the Spaniards in Manila, in the island of Luzon, with goods and provisions were intercepted. It was not long before the Dutch expanded the scope of the blockade when Commander Lam gave orders to the ships cruising in Macao waters not only to capture Portuguese carracks but also to seize any Chinese junks sailing to or back from Manila.⁹ One of

⁷ Ibid. 39-40.

⁸ Ibid. 41-2; For a detailed study of this naval battle, c.f. : Tien-tse Chang, 'The Spanish-Dutch naval battle of 1617 outside Manila Bay', *The Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 7(1966), 111-121.

⁹ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 41-2.

CHAPTER TWO

these ships, the *Oude Son*, captured one big and six small Chinese junks in the waters between Macao and Cochin-China in May 1618 and the booty was sold in Japan soon afterwards.¹⁰

The Chinese merchants in Hai-ch'êng, who were the principal investors in the Manila trade, must have had inklings of this Dutch-Iberian strife before 1618. When a local scholar Chang Hsieh published his book '*Tung-His-Yang K'ao*' in 1618, he mentioned, 'in the 45th year of Wan-li (1617) [the Dutch] attacked and wantonly plundered Chinese merchants outside the ports of Luzon. The ship owners were distressed'.¹¹ In May 1619, when the Dutch captured three more big Chinese junks near Manila Bay, they were informed that seven of the Chinese junks which visited Manila annually had delayed their voyage on account of a Spanish warning.¹² In Japan, one of the principal Chinese merchants residing in Hirado, Li Tan, requested the chief merchant of the English East India company, Richard Cocks, to issue him 'letters of favour' or passports for his and his friends' junks which were due to sail to Cochin-China and Taiwan. Apparently he secured these documents to avoid possible capture by Dutch ships. Eventually in the spring of 1618, Cocks issued nine 'letters of favour' and six English flags.¹³

This generous English assistance to Chinese traders in Japan was not continued into 1620 because the English and Dutch had signed a common resolution in Bantam on 28 April 1620 to form a collegial 'Council of Defence (*Raad van Defensie*)'. Under its auspices, on 31 May 1620, two

¹⁰ Ibid. 47.

¹¹ Chang Hsieh, *Tung-his-yang k'ao*[Authenticated Knowledge of Eastern and Western Oceans], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981) , 130. cf. Chang, 'The Spanish-Dutch naval battle of 1617', 117. note 20.

¹² Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 48.

¹³ Richard Cocks, *Diary of Richard Cocks, Cape-merchant in the English Factory in Japan, 1615-1622 : with correspondence*, 2 vols., ed. Edward Maunde Thompson (London : Whiting and Co., 1883) , II, 9. 26 Jan.; 19, 27 Feb.; 1 Mar. 1618; 21, 4 Mar; 6 Mar.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

Dutch ships and two English ships were dispatched from Bantam to cruise the waters between China and Japan. They carried instructions to capture not only any Iberian vessels, but also to take any Chinese junks sailing to and from Manila they happened to come across.¹⁴ As it sailed north, the fleet was joined by more ships on the way. By the time it arrived in Hirado, the fleet consisted of ten sturdy ships. When it departed to execute its mission in the spring of 1621,¹⁵ most of the junk skippers decided to not to venture out of the harbours of Japan, as Richard Cocks reported, 'Because the Dutch men of war have closed off their trade, only a few dare to look ahead and make any plans.'¹⁶ The Hai-ch'êng merchants in China had also been forewarned by the Spaniards and postponed the sailing date of their seven richest Manila-bound junks in the spring of 1621 to avoid possible losses. Despite all these precautions, another five junks were captured by the united Dutch-English fleet.¹⁷ In sum, the Dutch-Iberian rivalry in the Moluccas gradually shifted to Philippine waters and the East and South China Seas. Those who suffered most from this conflict were the Chinese junk traders who depended on the Sino-Mexican and Sino-Japanese transit trade in Manila. Seizing the opening which presented itself when Manila was temporarily removed from the list of suitable transit trading harbours, it was proposed that the foreign coasts of Cochin-China and Formosa be used as replacements.

Although the Chinese merchants knew the Dutch had been wrestling

¹⁴ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 53.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁶ *Diary of Richard Cocks*, II, 321. Letter from Richard Cocks to the E. I. Company, 13 Dec. 1620. I have revised the text a little in order to fit current English style. The original cited text is 'For that the hollanders, men of war have shut up their trade that few dare look out.'

¹⁷ Willem Pieter Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China: eerste stuk: de eerste bemoeiingen om den handel in China en de vestiging in de Pescadores (1601-1624)*, ('s-Gravenhage : Nijhoff, 1898), 56; *Diary of Richard Cocks*, II, 170.

CHAPTER TWO

with the Iberians in the Moluccas for years, they had not expected that they would have their fingers burned by the fire too. Since the Chinese court, which was increasingly preoccupied with the growing threats posed by the Manchus on the northeastern border, could not be possibly intervene, the merchants' only option was to look for other transit ports from which to continue their business. As mentioned before, the island of Formosa, a 'stateless' area, was seen as suitable replacement. In 1617-1618, the maritime mercenary Chao Ping-chien, who was based in P'eng-hu (the Pescadores Archipelago), attempted to set up a monopolistic trade network connecting Amoy- P'eng-hu- Taiwan(Formosa) and Japan. Chao's chief collaborator in Taiwan, Lin Chin-wu, was a merchant who had lived among other Chinese merchants in Japan. Richard Cocks' diary records that in 1616 he was asked by Li Tan to put up the money to bribe the Chinese authorities through Li Tan's servant 'Liangowne'.¹⁸ It is a matter of recorded history that in 1617 the captured coastal defence officer from Fu-chien, Tung Po-ch'i, was brought back to Fu-chien on a richly loaded Japanese junk by Akashi Michitōmo. Obviously Li Tan's investment had something to do with this enterprise. Therefore, it can be inferred 'Liangowne' should be identified as the above-mentioned 'Lin Chin-wu'. According to a recently discovered tomb inscription found in Ikura Harbour in Higo, a Chinese merchant named Lin Chün-wu was buried there in 1621. In Southern Fu-chienese dialect, the pronunciation of his name is identical to that of Lin Chin-wu, hence Lin Chün-wu would be the correct transliteration of the same name.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Diary of Richard Cocks*, I, 233. 28 Dec. 1616.

¹⁹ Gakusho Nakajima, 'Ch'ao-hsien ch'in-lüeh yü lu-sung mao-i: shih-liu shih-chi-mo Chia-t'êng Ch'ing-chêng tê t'ang-ch'uan p'ai-ch'ien chi-hua[The Invasion to Korea and the Trade in the Philippine Islands: Katō Kiyomasa], in Department of History of Soochow University(ed.), *C'üan-ch'iu-hua-hsia ming-shih yen-chiu chih hsin-shih-yeh lun-wên-chi*[Proceedings of the Conference: a new perspective in study of Ming History in the era of globalization] (Taipei: Department of History of Soochow University, 2007), vol. II, 13-23 at 21.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

Even though Chao Ping-chien and his network were destroyed in 1618, the smuggling transit trade in Taiwan did not suffer the same fate because Lin Chün-wu was still alive and active in it. Ironically, after Chao Ping-chien was removed by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Wang Shih-ch'ang, in 1618, the same Grand Co-ordinator recruited yet another maritime mercenary, Yüan Chin, also of 'piratical' origin in 1619.²⁰ Obviously, since the Ming court treated Taiwan as a 'stateless area', Chinese and Japanese merchants-cum-smugglers were free to bring capital and goods to the island. By now, the growing numbers of smugglers from the coast of Fu-chien who were rushing to the safe haven of Taiwan generated a security risk. No authorities had been appointed to settle the disputes between the investors and dealers fairly and in no time at all the quarrels among the smugglers degenerated into outright piracy. A retired Fu-chien official, Shên Yen, perceived this lack of order and discipline as a much more serious breach of the peace than were the random acts of piracy,

*' Although the pirates are very fierce when they suddenly burst upon the scene, they cannot sustain [their attack for] long and are easy to eliminate. The real worry is the transit trade in Pei-kang[Taiwan] managed by Lin Chin-wu. It is an exact repetition of the Wang Chih incident. Although it is impossible to blockade the trade with Japan, it is possible to ban smuggling. As long as somebody continues to bring Japanese silver to Pei-kang[Taiwan], the smuggling will continue, even were we to put several smugglers to death every day. Why? Because it is so profitable.'*²¹

Because of their known involvement in the smuggling trade, the Fu-chienese authorities distrusted the maritime mercenaries they recruited,

²⁰ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, TW no. 296, (1971), 125.

²¹ Shên Yen, *Chih-chih chai-chi*, vol.55, 20. recited from Ch'ên Tsung-jên, *Chi-lung-shan yü Tan-shui-yang: tung-ya hai-yü yü t'ai-wan tsao-ch'i-shih yen-chiu (1400-1700)* [Chi-lung Cape and Tan-shui Bay: a study of the early history of Taiwan in the East Asian oceanic region], (Taipei: Lien-ching, 2005), 172.

CHAPTER TWO

but they could find no other solution to combat the rampant piracy. As Shên Yen also commented,

*'Too many people carried their goods to Pei-kang [Taiwan] after they had been handed Japanese capital. It is proper neither to arrest nor to recruit them. If we push them too hard, they might escape to Japan in the same way as [the pirates did] sixty years ago.'*²²

On the other hand, without the support of the maritime mercenaries, the risk of collecting goods procured with the money already dispensed by traders in Japan became too high. In 1618, just after Chao Ping-chien's death, the three junks belonging to Li Tan which returned to Japan from Taiwan carried only deerskins and sappanwood, but no Chinese silk,²³ even though he had already handed his capital over to the smugglers who had taken the monetary advance and fled away to China:

*'The Chinese themselves rob each other at sea, thinking to lay all the blame on the Dutch and English. However, some of them have been intercepted in some provinces in Japan and have paid dearly for it. Other Chinese traders dispatched from Nagasaki by their own countrymen to trade for silk in Taiwan have been absconding to China with all the money, and have left their countrymen in Japan in the lurch.'*²⁴

Without the guarantee of a stable trading channel, after 1621 the

²² Shên Yen, *Chih-chih chai-chi*, vol.56, 32-3. recited from *Ibid.*, 173. note 86.

²³ *Diary of Richard Cocks*, II, 53. 12 July 1618.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 321. A letter from Richard Cocks to the E. I. Company in London, 13 Dec. 1620. Here I revised the original text to fit the current English style. The original text is: 'The Cheenas themselves robb one another at sea, thinking to lay all the fault on the Dutch and English; but some have byn intersepted in some provinces of Japan and paid dearly for it. And other China shipping, being sett out of Nangasaque by their owne cuntremen to goe for Isla Fermosa (called by them Tacca Sanga) to trade for silke, are run away for China with all the money and left their cuntremen in japan in the lurch.'

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

transit trade in Taiwan grew more risky than ever. By chance Li Tan's brother, (Li) Whaw, died in 1619,²⁵ and Lin Chin-wu passed away in 1621. Hence, by the spring of 1622, Li Tan was not only recognized by most Chinese merchants in Japan as their leader,²⁶ he was also faced with the task of organizing a reliable smuggling channel via Taiwan on his own, without being able to fall back on the assistance of Lin Chin-wu. The necessity to do something about the situation became urgent because, under the pressure of the Anglo-Dutch fleet blockading Manila and Cochin-China waters, the transit trade in Taiwan augered well under the protection of the vermilion passes or *Goshuin* issued by the Shogun. This assumption was confirmed when the Anglo-Dutch fleet captured four Chinese junks and one Portuguese ship loaded with silks outside the Manila Bay in 1622. The booty was sold in Japan for no less than 262,912:12:5 guilders. The success of the Anglo-Dutch fleet represented a tremendous loss to the Japanese and Chinese investors.²⁷ Possibly Li Tan avoided this loss by fitting out three junks to sail to Taiwan in 1621.²⁸ At this moment, he must have sensed the unique importance of his Taiwan corridor because he urged his Japanese protector, the lord of Hirado, Matsuura Takanobu, to secure a *Goshuin* pass from the *bakufu* in the summer of 1622, so that he would be able to monopolize the Taiwan trade the following season.²⁹

The Dutch presence and the revival of the maritime mercenaries in 1624

Although the Anglo-Dutch fleet terrorized the Chinese and Japanese junk traders and the blockade of Manila cut off supplies to its citizens, the Iberians

²⁵ Ibid., 309. 10 Mar. 1619

²⁶ Ibidem. 10 Mar. 1619

²⁷ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 72-3.

²⁸ Seiichi Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents at Hirado, Japan in the Last Days of the Ming Dynasty, *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 17(1958), 27-83 at 44.

²⁹ Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident at Hirado', 41-4.

CHAPTER TWO

still maintained a far richer trade in the pan-Asian region than any the Anglo-Dutch alliance could have managed at that moment. Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen said that the Iberians circulated about 50 million rials in it at a time in which all the VOC could make was a paltry 5 to 600,000 rials, only 1 per cent of what its hated rivals were hauling in.³⁰ Even if the VOC continued to blockade the Iberian harbours and seize booty, it was realized that it would not be able to strengthen its position until it gained access to the sources of income of its Iberian enemy. Since the bulk of the Iberian trade in Manila and Macao relied on the Chinese silk exports, one effective strategy it could adopt to achieve this aim was to force the Chinese to change trading partners. If the Dutch could push the Portuguese out of Macao and take over the export of Chinese goods in their place, the Chinese would probably not object, but should they fail to occupy Macao, they would have to force the Chinese into co-operation. In the summer of 1622, Governor-General Coen put his plan into action. He appointed Commander Cornelis Reyersen head a fleet to seize Macao. If this attempt should fail, Reyersen would have to change tactics and have to put pressure on the Chinese to gain a share of the trade. He chose P'eng-hu (the Pescadores) as the foothold from which to initiate his parleys with the Chinese authorities while he continued to blockade the Chinese junk traffic to Manila and the sailings of Portuguese ships to Japan.

When Reyersen arrived on P'eng-hu, on 10 August 1622 he sent an official letter addressed to the watch officer at the entrance of the bay of Amoy, the Defender of Wu-Yü Island, Wang Mêng-hsiung. In this letter he requested the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shang Chou-tso, to grant the Dutch Company a trading port where it could trade in silk and silk goods with the Chinese. He also asked the Co-ordinator to forbid his subjects to trade with the Iberians because they were the enemies of the VOC.³¹ After

³⁰ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 77.

³¹ VOC 1077, Translaet van hetgene wegen de commandeur Cornelis Reijersz. aen de

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

his demands were officially refused by Shang Chou-tso on 29 September, Reyersen took up arms against China. In the following month he dispatched eight ships, under Cornelis van Nieuwenroode, to attack Chinese junks in the bay of Amoy. After they had run into heavy weather, only five ships still managed to stick together. With their number reduced, they decided not to sail to Amoy but raided the roadsteads of Liu-ao and T'ung-shan instead. Not until 26 November did they really begin to carry out their mission to seize Chinese trading junks and paralyse the coastal commerce.³² When the Dutch fleet equipped with more advanced artillery arrived in the roadstead, the garrison of Amoy was not able to return fire. Chinese records say that the Chinese troops ' had to borrow some firearms from the junk traders living in Amoy before they were able to fight back'.³³ On 30 November, with only a few casualties, the Dutch invaders retreated to their ships laden with booty.³⁴ The term of office of the Regional Commander of Fu-chien, Hsü I-min, had already expired before the Dutch raid began. Nevertheless, he did his duty and led his troops on land, but probably left Fu-chien after the Dutch had retreated with their spoils.³⁵ The Regional Deputy-Commander of Fu-chien, Chang Chia-ts'ê, then assumed charge while the arrival of the new Regional Commander was awaited. He busied himself preparing a large number of fire junks to repel any further encounters. In the initial Dutch raids,

regenten van Chianchieu, in Chinees geschreven is, in het tweede jaer van de regieringe van de coninck Tchiencke, de vierde dach van de sevenste maendt[Translation of the Letter written from Cornelis Reijerszoon to the Regents of Chanchou written in Chinese in the second year of the reign of the T'ien-ch'i Emperor, the fourth day of the seventh month(10 Aug. 1622)], Pescadores, 7 Aug. 1622, fo. 227^r.

³² Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 127-8.

³³ Ch'ên Mêng-lei (Comp.), *Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'êng* [Complete Collection of Illustrations and Writings from the Earliest Days to the Present], 10,000vols, (Taipei: Han-chên t'u-shu ching-hsiao, 1726), vol. 1110, 5-7.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ *Ibidem*. It is irrefutably proven that Shu had been the commander in the battles, but when he left Fu-chien was not clearly recorded.

CHAPTER TWO

Nieuwenrode's squadron had destroyed fifty junks loaded with rice and salt and thirty small fishing *wankans*. One of the coastal defence officers, National Squadron Leader, Fang Yü, (*Hongsintson*[Dutch, hereafter D.], *Fang Ch'ien-tsung*), alleged that the five Dutch ships had not been issued orders by Commander Cornelis Reyersen in the P'eng-hu Islands, but had acted on their own rash judgement. He pleaded with the Grand Co-ordinator to inform Reyersen about the mutinous behaviour of his subordinates and to promise him to dispatch Chinese trading junks to other VOC settlements, if he would leave P'eng-hu immediately.³⁶ The Grand Co-ordinator, Shang Chou-tso, did indeed write a letter and ordered the Coastal Defence Circuit, Ch'êng Tsai-i, to deliver it.³⁷ When the four Dutch ships at anchor near Amoy received the intelligence in December³⁸ that a Chinese mandarin who was intending to open new negotiations about to come, Merchant Hans van Meldert was sent to Amoy, where he was received by the Regional Deputy-Commander of Fu-chien, Chang Chia-ts'ê. Chang sought to reach a truce which would be valid pending the return of two Chinese envoys who were to be sent to Batavia with two trading junks to obtain Governor-General Jan Pieterzoon Coen's orders for the retreat from P'eng-hu.³⁹ Meanwhile, Commander Chang promised he would provide sufficient commodities if the Dutch were to demolish their fort on the P'eng-hu and retreat to some other place.⁴⁰ He also handed over the Grand Co-ordinator's letter to Van Meldert,

³⁶ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 137.

³⁷ Ch'ên Mêng-lei, *Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'êng*, 5-7. When the Dutch arrived, the *Hai-tao* was Kao Ing-long who seems to have left this position when the truce began. Therefore, I infer that Ch'êng Tsai-i, who later was accused of taking a Dutch bribe, is the correct incumbent in this position.

³⁸ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 134.

³⁹ Leonard Blussé, 'De Chinese nachtmerrie: Een terugtocht en twee nederlagen', in: Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler (eds), *De verenigde oost-indische compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002), 208-37 at 216-7.

⁴⁰ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 379.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

for delivery to Reyersen on the P'eng-hu.⁴¹ Upon receipt of it, Reyersen decided to meet Grand Co-ordinator, Shang Chou-tso, personally in Fu-chou. Four days before Reyersen met Shang Chou-tso, the Deputy- Commander, Chang Chia-ts'ê, and a certain Squadron Leader, Fang Yü, came to see Reyersen and begged him to tell to the Grand Co-ordinator that he had already begun to demolish the fort. In exchange they promised to smuggle as much silk as they possibly could to Taiwan for the VOC.⁴² In his meeting with the Grand Co-ordinator on 11 February 1622, Reyersen held his peace about the original VOC requests to establish a port from which it could conduct monopolistic trade with China and also about the matter of demolishing the fort.⁴³

All the previous battles in October and November 1622 are recorded in Chinese sources, including the names of the four Dutch delegates who visited the Grand Co-ordinator in February 1623. A Chinese official named Fang Yü is mentioned. He can be identified in the Dutch sources as 'Hongsintson'.⁴⁴ When the Japanese merchants kidnapped a coastal defence officer, Tung Po-ch'i, in 1616 and took him to Japan, this same Fang Yü had proposed to undertake a mission to Japan to bring Tung back.⁴⁵ In 1617 when Tung Po-ch'i was brought back to Fu-chien by Japanese merchants, Fang Yü served as one of the pilots who guided the Japanese junks to their anchorage.⁴⁶ At the time the maritime mercenary Chao Ping-chien was

⁴¹ Ibid., 135, 378

⁴² Ibid., 156.

⁴³ Ibid., 157-158.

⁴⁴ Ch'ên Mêng-lei, *Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'êng*, 5-7. Dutch 'Hong' refers to his family name, 'Fang'; and the Dutch 'sintson' refers to his official title, Ch'in-tsong or National Squadron Leader.

⁴⁵ Tung Ying-chu, *Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu* [Selections of the Works of Tung Ying-chu], TW, no. 237, 1967, 16.

⁴⁶ Huang Ch'êng-hsüan, 'Appendix: a report to the emperor about the Japanese junks' in: TWYH (ed.), *Ming Ching-shih wên-pien hsüan-lu*, TW no 289, 1971, 251-60 at

CHAPTER TWO

accused treason in 1618, he held the position of Squadron Leader at P'eng-hu and was also arrested.⁴⁷ Since he was still active and had been promoted by 1622, he must have been able to absolve himself and was pardoned, probably because he was not a mercenary hired by the Grand Co-ordinator but a National Squadron Leader who had acquired his position either by formal examination or because it was an inherited rank and therefore an imperial appointment.⁴⁸

During the truce, on 2 April 1623 a junk commanded by Li Tan sailed from Japan to the Taiwanese port of Wan-kang carrying 140,000 rials of silver to trade with the Chinese smugglers.⁴⁹ On 11 April, four smuggling junks arrived in Taiwan. When they sailed to the P'eng-hu Islands, two of them were arrested by Squadron Leader Fang Yü.⁵⁰ This incident scared away the other smugglers,⁵¹ but Li Tan had to ask Dutch protection to dispatch small vessels to the Chinese coast in June.⁵² The VOC force on the P'eng-hu was unsuccessful in its bid to acquire any silk goods. Although Fang Yü had successfully opposed Li Tan's smuggling trade, he was not able to organize an alternative smuggling channel fast enough to provide the Dutch with goods. On 2 June, Grand Co-ordinator Shang Chou-tso found out

255.

⁴⁷ Ch'ên Hsiao-ch'ung, 'Chang-hsieh "Fei-yün-chu hsü-chi shê-t'ai shih-liao kou-ch'ên', 77.

⁴⁸ The Squadron Leader who was hired personally by the Grand Co-ordinator was called 'Ming-sê Pa-tsung' or 'Sê-tsung' abbreviated version. The rank of Squadron Leader was acquired either by passing formal exams or was the inherited status 'Ch'in-i Pa-tsung', abbreviated to 'Ch'in-tsung'. Cf. Chou K'ai, *Sha-mên Chih* [The Gazette of Amoy], TW, no. 95 (1961), 80.

⁴⁹ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 171-2; Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident', 52.

⁵⁰ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 172; Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident', 52.

⁵¹ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 392.

⁵² *Ibidem*, 176; Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident', 52.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

that the Dutch had not demolished their fort on P'eng-hu. Meanwhile, as he waited about there, Reyersen was losing hope of receiving any formal orders from Governor-General Coen to retreat from the archipelago.⁵³ That summer the new Grand Co-ordinator, Nan Chü-i, arrived in Fu-chien.⁵⁴ He announced that both parties had been cheated by Squadron Leader Fang Yü and threw him in jail.⁵⁵ On 23 September 1623, Chang Chia-ts'ê was also dismissed for arranging the truce with the Dutch.⁵⁶ After this happened, another Dutch merchant, Christiaan Franckx, was sent to Wu-yü with four ships to open a new round of negotiations. When they had been lured to a sham reception, this envoy and some of his comrades were ambushed and arrested by the Chinese officials.⁵⁷ On 8 February 1624, the new Regional Deputy-Commander of Fu-chien, Yü Tzu-kao, began to transport troops to P'eng-hu from the mainland.⁵⁸ The first camp the Chinese troops built was at Ma-kung, facing the Dutch fort across the bay. While they were stationed there, the Chinese gradually built up their forces on land and on water.⁵⁹ Faced with their vastly superior strength and plagued by the knowledge that

⁵³ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 401-2. Bijlage V, Journaal van Reijersen [Journal of Reijersen], 26 July 1623. They arrived in Batavia in the spring of 1624, cf. *Daghregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands India* [Diary kept in Castle Batavia concerning circumstances occurring all over the East Indian Area, hereafter *Daghregister Batavia*], 31 vols., ed. J.A. van der Chijs, H. T. Colenbrander, J. de Hullu, F. de Haan and W. Fruin-Mees (Batavia and The Hague: Ministerie van Koloniën, 1888-1931), Vol. I, 1-2, 6-8. The two junks which had been dispatched to Batavia, had not arrived there because they had failed to catch the monsoon.

⁵⁴ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 133.

⁵⁵ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 200.

⁵⁶ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 133.

⁵⁷ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 226-30.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 278; Blussé, 'De Chinese nachtmerrie: Een terugtocht en twee nederlagen', 218-9.

⁵⁹ Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident', 55.

CHAPTER TWO

three of his ships would soon have to leave for Japan, Reyersen's successor, Martinus Sonck, decided to retreat.⁶⁰ Reviewing what hopes there were for the Chinese trade, he could only hope that, through the mediation of Li Tan, he could obtain certain promises from Yü Tzu-kao.⁶¹ This attempt failed and Sonck eventually had to demolish the fort unconditionally and retreat to Taiwan on 18 August 1624.⁶²

Li Tan, who was seriously in debt because he could not collect from the Chinese smugglers, now had a heaven-sent opportunity to visit Amoy to act as mediator between the Dutch and Chinese. Meanwhile, a rural officer in Chao-an District, Shên T'ieh, discovered that Li Tan was indeed organizing a smuggling ring under the following pretext:

*'Li Tan, the blackguard, is one of the gang of Hsü Hsin-su, an agent of Holland. Since his earliest days, Li has been in communication with Japan, but has lately been making overtures to the Western barbarians. At present he is in Amoy under the pretext of settling his private debts and performing religious rites in honour of his ancestors. But the real aim of his visit is nothing to do with this at all. I believe his purpose is to purchase prohibited raw silk and silk goods to sell them to the Dutch, and to put out feelers about the situation for the benefit of the Dutch.'*⁶³

The most important key person whom Li Tan absorbed into this network was the Regional Deputy-Commander Yü Tzu-kao. The latter stated that he had tried to employ Li Tan as a spy in an attempt to monitor the actions of the Dutch in Taiwan:

'Li Tan, a man from Ch'üan-chou, has lived in Japan a long time,

⁶⁰ Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 279.

⁶¹ Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident', 58.

⁶² Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China*, 282.

⁶³ Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents', 62. Note. 140. (Iwao's translation slightly revised).

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

[and is constantly] cooking up some scheme or other. Hsü Hsin-su, with whom Li was on intimate terms, is now in jail. Therefore, we might take Hsü's child hostage, and dispatch Hsü to Li to try to persuade him to return his allegiance[to us]'.⁶⁴

Just at this time, the local gentry of Fu-chien were endeavouring to revive the policy of employing semi-self-financing maritime mercenaries. On 23 September 1623, an official You Fêng-hsiang, who had been born in Fu-chien, proposed that the mercenary posts which guarded the Fu-chiense coastal waters should be re-opened in response to the growing threats from the sea.⁶⁵ A proposal written by the Grand Co-ordinator, Nan Chü-i, on 17 May 1625, mentions that, after Regional Deputy-Commander Yü Tzu-kao had returned to Amoy, only two Squadron Leaders, Wang Mêng-hsiung and Yeh Ta-ching, should maintain a continuous presence in the army camp on the P'eng-hu. If they were to achieve the goal of securing the Pescadores, they should contemplate remaining there for another three years. Since they had all originally been either mercenaries or Provincial Squadron Leaders (*Ming-sê Pa-tsung*), the condition that National Squadron Leaders (*Ch'in-i Pa-tsung*) be posted there should be lifted.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the Hsü Hsin-su who was mentioned above had been recruited by Regional Deputy-Commander Yü Tzu-kao as a (Provincial) Squadron Leader,⁶⁷ whose task was to act as the contact person for the silk-smuggling trade with

⁶⁴ Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents', 63. Note. 142. (Iwao's translation slightly revised)..

⁶⁵ TWYH, *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao*, 127.

⁶⁶ The Ministry of War, 'T'iao-ch'ên P'êng-hu shan-hou shih-i ts'an-kao (2) [A Proposal for Dealing with the Later Stationing of Troops in the Pescadores (2), incomplete]' in: TWYH (ed.), *Ming-chi Hê-lan-jên ch'in-chü P'êng-hu ts'an-tang*, [Remaining archives about the Dutch invasion of the Pescadores in Ming dynasty], TW no. 154, (1962), 24. 16 May 1625.

⁶⁷ Ts'ao Lu-tai, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh* [An Account of the Pacification of Coastal Waters], TW, no. 33, (1959), 5.

CHAPTER TWO

Taiwan.⁶⁸ Hence, at more or less about the same time, the smuggling route which linked Amoy-P'eng-hu-Taiwan and Japan was revived in the same way as it had been to counter the challenge mounted by the Japanese merchants in 1616. Now there was one essential difference. In 1616, the Japanese merchants were willing to bypass Formosa (Taiwan) if the commodities for the transit trade could be obtained in Cochin-China and Manila, but now the VOC was determined to cut off all Chinese traffic with Manila and the Macao trade with Japan. If it achieved this goal, it could monopolize all the Sino-Japanese trade in Taiwan. This tricky situation meant that the new maritime mercenaries had to deal not only with the Chinese tributary system and the new tributary system which Japan was in the process of creating, they were also required to bridge the gap between the Chinese tributary system and the European newcomers.

Captain and reluctant mercenaries

In April 1623, the States-General and Princes Maurice of Nassau dispatched a fleet of eleven ships with orders to sail to Manila Bay via South America. The strategy was to intercept Spanish galleons *en route* from Acapulco to the Philippines.⁶⁹ In the same period, the governor of Formosa, Martinus Sonck, was ordered to send an auxiliary fleet from Taiwan to join forces with it in Manila Bay. On 12 December 1624, the Council of Taiwan decided to equip a squadron to patrol the Bashi Strait in between Luzon and Formosa.⁷⁰ On the

⁶⁸ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij den E heer gouv. Martinus Sonck za:[ende sijn raedt]op piscadores ofte pehou ende op Taijauwan op 't Eijland Formosa [Resolution issued by the Governor of Taiwan, Martinus Sonck, and his Council on the Pescadories or P'eng-hu and at Taiwan Bay near the island of Formosa], Taiwan, 14 July 1625, fo. 354^f.

⁶⁹ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 91.

⁷⁰ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/Pescadores, 12 Dec. 1624, fo. 341^v.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

same day, Governor Sonck wrote a letter to Governor-General Pieter de Carpentier in which he made an interesting suggestion:

*'Here are some junks belonging to the Captain China (Li Tan) and the Pedro China (Yen Ssu-ch'i), whom we would gladly recruit for the Company and have them accompany our fleet. The above-mentioned Captain China and Pedro China seem to be well disposed to this idea, so we shall keep working on it, expecting good results.'*⁷¹

Obviously Sonck was hoping for assistance from those junks which were anchored in the bay of Taiwan, but not all the members of the Taiwan Council agreed with his suggestion. Probably not even Li Tan and Yen Ssu-ch'i were sincere in their support. When the scheduled day of departure, 20 January, arrived the Council had not yet approved his proposal, but Sonck must have finally been able to persuade his Council, because on the 25th, it agreed to employ the Chinese smugglers:

'Previously in various meetings we have decided that it would be both advisable and useful to send some junks crewed by Chinese to Manila with our fleet, on the condition that they agree to serve the East India Company. Many Chinese are desirous of joining us now. Two junks have been fitted out by the Captain China (Li Tan) and one junk by the Pedro China (Yen Ssu-ch'i). It has been decided to dispatch these three junks from here in the service of the Company. The sailors will enjoy the same treatment as

⁷¹ VOC 1083, Missive van gouverneur Martinus Sonck naar Batavia aan de gouverneur-general Pieter de Carpentier [Letter from Governor Martinus Sonck to Governor-General Pieter de Capentier in Batavia], Taiwan, 12 Dec.1624, fo. 52^r; cf. Chiang Shu-sheng (ed.), *De Missiven van de VOC-gouverneur in Taiwan aan de Gouverneur-generaal te Batavia*[Letters from the Governor of Taiwan sent to the Governor-General in Batavia], (Taipei: Nant'ien Publisher, 2007), I 1622-1626, 153.(Hereafter cited as 'De Missiven')

CHAPTER TWO

*Companyemployees according to their rank.*⁷²

Nothing was mentioned about what reward would be given to Li Tan and Yen Ssu-ch'i after their junks had accomplished this mission. All that was required of them was to agree to hire out their junks and give the crews permission to serve the Company. Frankly speaking, it was a brilliant piece of calculation to keep the heads of the Chinese smugglers in the bay of Taiwan, while most of their manpower was being sent away. With these precious junks in their fleet without their owners, the Dutch did not have to be worried that Li Tan and Yen Ssu-ch'i might betray them. However, without their supervision, who would be suitable to be appointed the temporary leader of this mercenary squadron? One qualified person just happened to be at their disposal: Cheng Chih-lung alias Nicolas Iquan.

Cheng Chih-lung was one of the agents who had been employed by Li Tan to assist him in distributing capital from Japan to the Chinese coast. When Li Tan was liaising between the Chinese army and the VOC, he felt obliged to call upon an interpreter because he could not speak Portuguese fluently.⁷³ As it so happened, Cheng Chih-lung had been recommended by Li Tan to serve the VOC under Cornelis Reyersen as interpreter since the spring of 1624.⁷⁴ Not a great deal is known about Cheng Chih-lung's early career. What is sure is that he had been engaged as a commercial agent in the shipping corridor between Macao and Japan and that he had been baptized 'Nicolas Iquan' and had learned Portuguese well.⁷⁵ Not long before 1621, he

⁷² VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/Pescadores, 25 Jan. 1625, fos. 347^v-348^r.

⁷³ Leonard Blussé, 'Minnan-jen or Cosmopolitan? The rise of Cheng Chih-lung alias Nicolas Iquan', in EduardB. Vermeer (ed.), *Development and decline of Fukien province in the 17th and 18th centuries*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 245-64 at 254.

⁷⁴ Iwao, 'Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents', 78.

⁷⁵ Charles Ralph Boxer, 'The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chilung)', *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39 at 11-5.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

was living in Hirado in Japan, where he befriended the chief of the Dutch factory, Jaques Specx. It is about this time that he might have been recruited as an agent by Li Tan.⁷⁶ When he was dispatched to Taiwan, according to some Chinese sources he was also serving Yen Ssu-ch'i. There is good reason to believe that Yen Ssu-ch'i is identical to the Pedro China in the Dutch sources.⁷⁷

There must have been a tacit bargain between the parties. Li Tan and the Pedro China made Iquan feign that he was loyal the Dutch governor, but the governor neatly turned the tables and used Iquan to erode their influence. This drama reached its climax just two days after the fleet had departed, 27 January 1625. According to the journal kept by the captain of the yacht the *Victorie*, Iquan only managed to man his junks by the skin of his teeth.

‘Acting on the orders of the Honourable Commander Pieter Muijser, we hoisted the sails on the yacht in the roadstead of Taijouan, in order to sail out of the harbour towards the [South]Tamsuy River to join the four junks to our fleet. Just as we turned towards the south, the Chinese interpreter, Iquan, came aboard. He told us the junks would not be able to sail out of the river until the highest point of the flood tide at one o’clock in the morning. We had intended to inform the Honourable Commander but, because there was no wind, we could do nothing in the river. We anchored there and immediately sent a small junk with a short note, to help them come out, ...

...The above-mentioned Iquan came on board again, and said that the junks had been found, but he had seen nobody. I asked them why the junks had not come out at night. He answered that the tide had not risen high enough. Then he asked us if we could wait 2 or 3 hours. Iquan was planning to depart with us in the direction of Manila on the smallest junk of the four, which had already sailed out. The other three junks would follow as soon as

⁷⁶ Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident’, 72-5.

⁷⁷ De Missiven, 118-9. note 47.

CHAPTER TWO

possible...

*...When the appointed moment arrived, we saw no junk, so we abided by our decision to move on.*⁷⁸

Because the Council had been so late in giving its approval to this proposal, it had not been possible to shift the junks from the sandbank at the mouth of the river at the high tide. A check of the calendar shows that the best opportunities would have been at full moon on the 23rd. The junks finally managed to sail out of the river on 8 February, precisely the highest tide of the month.⁷⁹ The delays seem to be a sure sign that these Chinese volunteer mercenaries were not overenthusiastic about the task before them. Neither Li Tan nor the Pedro China supported the mission wholeheartedly. This assumption seems to be thoroughly confirmed by the fact Iquan reported that not a single member of the crew had actually reported for duty on these junks. Their absence seems to imply that he did not even have the support of his own mercenary soldiers. The fact that Iquan first failed to report personally with his small junk is just as mysterious.

About one month later, the yacht the *Victorie*, which was originally assigned to lead the junks to the fleet caught up with the other ships on 26 February near Cape Bolinao.⁸⁰ The next day, two junks led by Iquan also

⁷⁸ VOC 1087, Cort verhael van de voijagie gedaen met 't jacht Victoria naer de cust van Manilha int affweesen van de vloot van 27 Januarij tot 26 Februarij 1625 [The Short Log of the Voyage of the Yacht the *Victoria* to the coast near Manila after she was separated from the Main Fleet, 27 Jan.-26 Feb. 1625], fo. 354^{f-v}. (hereafter cited as 'The Report of the yacht the *Victoria*')

⁷⁹ VOC 1085, Missive van Martinus Sonck aan de gouverneur-generaal Pieter de Carpentier, Taiwan, 19 Feb. 1625, fo. 232^r; cf. Chiang (ed.), *De Missiven*, 174.

⁸⁰ VOC 1087, Journael van den tocht gedaen van Taijouan naer de baeij van Manilha ende custe van Luconia mette scheepen 't *Wapen van Zeelandt*, *Noorthollant* ende *Orange*, mitsgaders de jachten den *Haen*, *Fortuijn* en *Victoria* onder 't commandement van Pieter Jansen Muijser van 27 Januarij tot 22 Meij 1625, [Journal

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

joined the fleet. The commander of the fleet, Pieter Muijser, who was then on the warship the *Wapen van Zeeland*, reported this reunion with double-edged, wry humor:

*‘On the 27th of the same month, we spied two sails. Two of the junks destined to support us had appeared. The commander, Iquan, came on board straightaway accompanied by six or eight warriors, carrying long and short swords and halberds, and reported that he had sailed with his three junks only six days after the yacht the Victorie had departed. But the crew of the third junk had not been willing to sail...’*⁸¹

*...I promised them that, if they need such ammunition as bullets, fuses and gunpowder, I would supply them. He had no shortage of food or anything else... I ordered him to sail close to our ships, and to remain in the vicinity of the fleet, so that we would not become separated. He had no objection to this request, but asked whether we could come to anchor close to the shore at the night. The reason being that in their judgement, the sea would become too rough to hold a position.’*⁸²

After the 27th, the two Chinese junks under Iquan’s command did their very to deep up with the fleet,⁸³ but at night they still anchored their junks separately, somewhere close to the shore. Iquan complained to the Dutch

of the Ships the *Wapen van Zeeland*, the *Noortholland* and the *Orange* and the *yachts* the *Haen*, the *Fortuijn*, and the *Victoria* on their voyage from Taiwan to Manila Bay and the coast of Luzon under the command of Pieter Jansen Muijser, 27 Jan.-22 May. 1635], 22 May.1625, fo. 377^r. (Hereafter, ‘Journal of Ship Wapen van Zeeland...’); cf. ‘Bijlage III: Journael van den tocht gedaen van Taijouan naer Manila anno 1625’, in Dirk Abraham Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren voor 1626*[The Dutch in Philippine Waters before 1626], (Amsterdam, J.H. de Wit: 1898), 130.

⁸¹ VOC 1087, ‘Journal of the Ship the *Wapen van Zeeland*’, 22 May. 1625, fo. 377^r; Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 130.

⁸² Ibidem, fo. 377^{r-v}.

⁸³ Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 130.

CHAPTER TWO

commander on the evening of the 27th, but the Dutchman only laughed, saying ‘Iquan earlier suggested dropping anchor close to the shore tonight, the judgement of a naive sailor’.⁸⁴

On the night of the 28th, the Chinese junks still insisted on anchoring within sight of the coast. The following day, they were again loath to sail away from the shore with the Dutch fleet. On the 2 March, the two junks were still keeping their own course along the coastline separate from the Dutch fleet. Commander Pieter Muijser decided to take measures to discipline this disobedience. He sent Junior Merchant Abraham le Poivre to the two Chinese junks, with 50 pounds of gunpowder, 20 pounds of bullets, seven muskets and three bundles fuses, so that he could explain to them once again what their obligations were.⁸⁵

*‘I also told him that to steer clear of danger he should bring his junks nearer our fleet (they would be the Company employees approaching the enemy coast) and that we would not constantly hug the coast, therefore they should try to join us on the high seas. On the other hand, if were some accident to befall them, they should not blame us but acknowledge it was because of their own negligence.’*⁸⁶

The co-operation did not run smoothly. Iquan and his men still refused to sail too far from the shore, repeating once and again ‘*Haz mucho grande mar*’.⁸⁷

For five days, notwithstanding their contradictory navigational preferences, both parties had been making compromises. The Dutch Commander, Pieter Muijser, was never really aware of what Iquan was trying

⁸⁴ Ibid., 130.

⁸⁵ VOC 1087, ‘Journal of Ship Wapen van Seeland’, 22 May. 1625, fo. 377^v; Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 131.

⁸⁶ VOC 1087, ‘Journal of Ship Wapen van Seeland’, 22 May. 1625, fo. 377^v; Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Philippijnshe wateren*, 131.

⁸⁷ Sloos, *De Nederlander in de Philippijnsche wateren*, 131-2.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

to say: ‘*Haz mucho grande mar*’ could mean ‘the sea is very rough’ but also ‘the sea is very wide’. Iquan knew very well that the Chinese junks customarily sailed close to the shore rather than tempting fate on the off-shore routes. Hence, if he followed the Dutch fleet on the off-shore routes, this might reduce the chances of catching the Chinese junks. However, the reefs in the shallow waters near the shore posed a fatal threat to the larger Dutch ships. The goal of this fleet was to harass the Spanish naval force assembled in the vicinity of the bay of Manila and to welcome the fleet dispatched by the States-General which had sailed in from the Pacific Ocean. Neither of these two aims were of much use to Iquan’s team. Li Tan and the Pedro China would certainly expect rewards from Iquan for furnishing the junks, fitting them out and provisioning them. This sense of obligation was almost certainly the reason Iquan was so eager to lay his hands on booty, with or without the assistance of the Dutch fleet.

To remedy this situation, a semi-independent maritime mercenary team under Iquan’s command supplied with Dutch military apparatus and flags was established. It was a temporary arrangement devised to acquire enough booty to satisfy every participant in this business. And this is exactly what happened. Two Chinese junks carried an ample horde of booty when they returned on 19 March 1625.

‘The two Chinese junks brought 2,400 rials in silver and 3 piculs 40 catties of raw silk, which were plundered from various Chinese and Portuguese vessels in waters near Pangasilan, according to the commanders of above-mentioned junks. These junks and their crews were hired to serve the Company and should have been supplied with the same victuals and beverages as the Company’ employees were. These junks have now (according to them) left the fleet with the consent of the Commander Muijser, because they were afraid that, once the Spanish galleons sailed out, their mission would be over... As for their voyage home, they had received no provisions at all, including their wages and other expenses incurred by the junks, weaponry and ammunition, in view of their performance we decided to

CHAPTER TWO

*grant them 1,500 rials instantly, without waiting for ratification by Commander Muijser and to permit them to distribute it among their officers and seamen. If we pay the salaries and the fitting out and some other costs incurred by the commanders of above-mentioned junks, they will not be able to make any further claim (on booty).*⁸⁸

This privateering construction, although initially it was only a temporary arrangement between the Chinese smugglers and the Dutch governor in Taiwan Bay, gradually evolved into a steady co-operation, since the elimination of the Sino-Manila trade benefited both parties. Under this construction, Iquan did not serve the Company on an individual basis, but as a leader of a team. His role as contact person on both sides was a precious opportunity for him to gain status without offending his bosses.⁸⁹ At the end of this year, coincidentally Li Tan and the Pedro China died at almost the same time, which left Iquan in the role of the potential leader of all their followers residing in the area of the bay of Taiwan. From that moment, the Taiwan governor began to single him out quite markedly, which might be construed as a mark of respect.

'Iquan, who once served as interpreter for Commander Reyersen is

⁸⁸ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/Pescadores, 20 Mar, 1625, fo. 349^{r-v}.

⁸⁹ This ties in neatly with the hypothesis put forward by Leonard Blussé that Iquan is the 'third person' who 'achieved a position of his own, beyond the control of both of the parties who had originally intended to manipulate him.' Cf. Blussé, Leonard, 'The VOC as Sorcerer's Apprentice: Stereotypes and Social Engineering on the China Coast', in Wilt Lukas Idema (ed.), *Leyden Studies in Sinology: Papers Presented at the Conference held in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Sinological Institute of Leyden University, December 8-12, 1980*, (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 87-105 at 104-5. However, I believe that Chinese smugglers would not have been called upon to support Cheng Chih-lung at the beginning of his operations. If this is so, the Chinese smugglers should be included in 'parties' who were equally anxious to get rid of him.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

*expected to arrive here soon with some twenty to thirty junks. These junks have raided those Chinese in the north who refused to pay a contribution and those Chinese who are the enemies of the people from Satsuma (Satzuma [J.]). As soon as they arrive, we should call a halt to their robbery, because they sailed in the name of the Company under the Prince's flag and pennants.'*⁹⁰

Although this letter reveals that the next governor of Formosa, Gerrit Frederikzoon de Wit, intended to cease this co-operation before it spun out of control, he went ahead and asked Iquan to suppress the Chinese pirates, but Iquan was not given enough power to be able to accomplish this mission. He arrived somewhat later on a big junk which had sprung a leak and divided his booty under the terms of the contract concluded with the Company.⁹¹ Whatever the real truth of the matter, Iquan was the only person among the pirates and mercenaries on whom the Company could rely.

Crossing the Rubicon

In June of 1626, Iquan appeared before the Taiwan Council from which he requested letters which would allow him attempts to coax his 'associate pirates' or 'piratical associates' to live under Dutch rule in the bay of Taiwan,⁹² because the reason behind this move was that the authorities in Zeelandia Castle wrongly believed that the agreement with the Fu-chien authorities had been sealed and expected that it would not be long before the Chinese junks would arrive to sell their promised commodities. In preparation for this consummation, the roadstead should be kept safe at all

⁹⁰ VOC 1087, Missive van Gerrit Fredericksen de Witt aan de gouverneur-generaal Pieter de Carpentier, Taiwan, 29 Oct.1625, fo. 394^v; cf. Chiang (ed.), *De Missiven*, 216.

⁹¹ VOC 1090, Missive from Gerard Frederiksz de With to Batavia, 4 Mar. 1626, fo. 179^r; Chiang (ed.), *De Missiven*, 234.

⁹² VOC1093, Resolutie genomen bij de gouverneur Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/Pescadores, 9 Jun.1626, fo. 370^r.

CHAPTER TWO

costs. To be able to distinguish friendly from hostile Chinese junks, they needed the services of Iquan to inveigle any outlaws residing in the vicinity to reveal their true colours. The late governor of Taiwan, Martinus Sonck, had conceived a utopian dream: he wanted to create a free harbour, where Dutch, Chinese, Japanese, and Aborigines could live and trade together peacefully. He invited all Chinese residents to move to a new settlement in the island of Formosa, but his plans were thrown into disarray when the new town was devastated by a plague epidemic which spared no one.⁹³ After its depredations, this whole settlement had to be abandoned.⁹⁴

In the following spring, the Dutch Council in Taiwan again dispatched its Chinese maritime mercenaries to intercept Chinese junks sailing to and from Manila.⁹⁵ This time, the leader was not Iquan but one of his followers named Suntien. On 24 June, Suntien returned to Taiwan with captured cargoes of porcelain and a letter from Iquan, who was then residing on Nan-ao Island with a 'large group of followers'. Iquan asked the Dutch governor to grant him a pass so that he might bring his force to the Bay of Taiwan. He also asked Suntien be sent back to join him and his force, because the best moment to intercept Chinese junks returning from Manila was approaching.⁹⁶

During the monsoon season of 1627, forty-three junks made legitimate voyages to the Philippines, the Cochin-China Peninsula, the Malay Peninsula and other destinations in the South China Sea. By the end of the season, only

⁹³ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende den raet, Taiwan/Pescadores, 22, Sept.1625, fo. 359^v.

⁹⁴ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende den raet, Taiwan/Pescadores, 24, June 1626, fos. 340^v-341^r.

⁹⁵ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende den raet, Taiwan/Pescadores, 15 Jun.1627, fo. 385^f, '...who led three junks and departed from there with our pass in order to intercept those junks sailing to Manila.'

⁹⁶ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit, Taiwan/Pescadores, 15 Jun.1627, fo. 385^r.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

twenty-three junks returned. The losses, including cash and commodities, were estimated at several million taels.⁹⁷ The junks which did not return had definitely fallen victim to Dutch-sponsored privateers. Although it is not clearly expounded in the Dutch archival papers, Iquan's plan was strikingly similar to the Dutch project put forward in 1625. On 22 May 1625, after the operations around Luzon had been completed, the Dutch fleet dispatched part of its force to the waters around Nan-ao Island off the southeastern coast of China. Their mission was to intercept any vessel trading with Iberian settlements:

*'If you encounter any Chinese junk from Manila or Macao in the vicinity of Nan-ao Island, you should arrest it and confiscate its goods.'*⁹⁸

If any Chinese junk is intending to sail to Siam, Cambodia, Patani or other friendly places, you should allow it to pass without harassment.

*On the other hand, you should confiscate those coming from Macao or intending to sail to Malacca or any other hostile place.'*⁹⁹

Furthermore, a rumour was spreading about a Chinese privateer who

⁹⁷ Chu Ch'in-hsiang, 'Ping-pu t'i-hsing ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u fu-chien hsün-fu chu t'i-kaoh[The Report by the Grand Co-ordinator Chu Ch'ing-hsiang Extracted from the Ministry of Defence] undated', in: TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*[The First Compilation of Historical Documents referring to the Cheng Family], TW no. 157, 5.

⁹⁸ VOC 1093, Instructie voor de Commandeur Pieter Jans Muijser ende Raet vande schepen 'T wapen van Zeelant, Noorthollandt, Orangie, mitsgaders de jachten *de Haen, de Fortuijn* ende *Victorie* gaende in vloote naer de custe van Manilha, Taiwan, 30 Dec.1624, fo. 345^v.

⁹⁹ VOC 1087, Memorie voor de overhooffden van 't schip *Noorthollandt* gaende van hier langs de cust van China naer de baijen van Chincheu, Commorijn ofte Pandorang ende soo voorts naer Batavia[Memorandum for the Officers of the Ship the *Noortholland* Which is Bound for Batavia from Here via the Coast of China, Changchou bay, Cam-ranh or Phan-rang bay], Taiwan, 22 May. 1625, fo. 313^f.

CHAPTER TWO

was conspiring to attack Macao:

‘Lately we have received some news from Chinese junks, reporting that the Portuguese in Macao had been told that the Chinese freebooters (vrijbuijters) on the coast of China have made a contract with Chinese who live in or around Macao to take it over with their and Dutch assistance. Therefore, the Portuguese have expelled all Chinese from there, which has offended the Chinese officials in Kungtung province, so they no longer allow any food to be brought to Macao. This has resulted in a serious shortage of all things.’

100

Quite probably one of these ‘Chinese freebooters’ was Iquan, because at that moment he was the only person who really maintained very friendly ties with the Dutch authorities in Taiwan while he waited off Nan-ao Island where he was gathering vessels. Among the twenty-three junks which returned safely were ten vessels which did not sail on Fu-chien’s harbours but frequented ports on the Kuang-tung coast. Fu-chienese trading junks which sailed into Kuang-tung harbours committed a serious violation of the regulations of the Chinese Empire. As it was possible that these junks had returned from pro-Dutch destinations (Siam, Patani, Cambodia), Iquan left them unharmed according to his instructions, but he did everything in his power to keep them away from the Fu-chien coast.

When Iquan sent a delegation of his followers on Nan-ao Island to the governor of Taiwan, Gerrit Frederikz de Wit, mentioned above, he was looking for a new home where his people would be welcome. He needed a home-base so that he could set about accumulating his capital, in other words, a place to store his money and his booty. His people needed a place to live through the winter, and this matter had to be settled before the north monsoon began in autumn. He was probably pondering his next step. At this juncture,

¹⁰⁰ VOC 1092, Missive van Cornelis van Nijenroode aen den gouverneur generaal Pieter de Carpentier, Firando, 1 Oct. 1627, fo. 358^v.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

he was involved in a new situation. According to a letter sent by the T'ung-an District Magistrate, Ts'ao Lu-tai, a famine was about to engulf Fu-chien Province:

*'On account of the droughts, the harvest reaped in the spring of 1626 consisted of only half the normal amount of grain (in the fields of T'ung-an District). The following summer and autumn, the drought intensified in severity and the paddy fields were totally empty. Not until the spring of this year, 1627, did a drop of rain fall. In the countryside, people have consumed all the roots and skins of any plants.'*¹⁰¹

The failure of a rice harvest was never an unusual event for the Fu-chienese people who lived around Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou prefectures (the Min-nan area). Whenever this disaster struck, they had used to purchase rice from neighbouring Ch'ao-chou prefecture in Kuang-tung province.¹⁰² Therefore, when the first symptoms of a famine appeared in the spring of 1626, the Amoy Regional Commander, Yü Tze-kao, dispatched some junks to Kuang-tung province to purchase rice.¹⁰³ Apparently, this

¹⁰¹ Ts'ao Lu-tai, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, TW no. 33, 3.

¹⁰² Wang Shih-mao, 'Min pu shu' [A Description of the Min Area], in: Ch'ê Chi-hsin (ed.), *Chung-hua yeh-shih* [Unofficial Histories of China], 16 vols, (Chi-nan: T'ai-shan publisher, 2000), II, 1911. 'There are no wells on the hills around Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou. The streams are short and contain little water. Owing to these reasons, the inhabitants welcome rain and worry about the onset of drought. ...Once the drought begins, people are anxious that riots will break out because of the poor harvest. On the other hand, the people frequently import rice from Ch'ao-chou.' For general situation pertaining to the rice production in Fu-chien, cf. Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade', 155-60.

¹⁰³ VOC 1090, Missive van Gerrit Fredericksen de Wit uijt het jacht Erasmus aen den gouverneur generael, Chiu-lung River, 4 Mar. 1626, fo. 176^v; also in: Chiang (ed.), *De Missiven*, 230. 'Three days later (12 Feb. 1626), Hsü Hsin-su came here, saying that he has just returned from a mission, on which he escorted several junks returning from Kuang-tung to Chang-chou after purchasing rice.' Cf. The Minister of War, Yen

CHAPTER TWO

imported rice was not sufficient to relieve the needs of the Ch'üan-chou people, especially those living in the non-urban areas: the T'ung-an District. In fact, when the famine devastated the countryside as the summer of 1626 drew to its end, a retired high-ranking official, Ts'ai Hsien-ch'ên, who had served at the Nanking court for about thirteen years, sent a petition to the District Magistrate of Chieh-yang in Ch'ao-chou prefecture, asking him to supply the T'ung-an people with rice. In this letter he implied that the new Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, Shang Chou-tso, had given the T'ung-an people a special dispensation to purchase rice, despite the current prohibition put on its sale by the Kuang-tung authorities.¹⁰⁴ Since Shang Chou-tso left his post in Kuang-tung soon afterwards, this petition must not have had any effect. Another high-ranking official who had served at the Peking court and was taking a rest in Fu-chou accused the Fu-chien Grand Co-ordinator, Chu Ch'in-hsiang, of having issued a rice-ban in the summer of 1627, a policy which punished not the pirates but the people in T'ung-an.¹⁰⁵ When the Chu's successor, Chu I-fêng, consulted him on the

Ming T'ai, 'Wei min-chiang pu-k'ê pu-ch'ü, min-fu pu-k'ê pu-liu têng shih on 13 Mar. 1628[Suggest to remove the Military Commanders of Fu-chien while keep the grand coordinator of Fu-chien at station], in: Ch'ên Yün-lin, *Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an kuan* [The First Archives of China], Hai-hsia liang-an ch'u-pan chiao-liu chung-hsin [The Center of Cross Strait Interchange in Publication] (comp.), *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien* [Compilation of archives in Ming and Ch'ing Court relating to Taiwan], 230 vols, (Peking: Chiu Chou, 2009), Vol. 3, 81-115 at 92.

¹⁰⁴ Ts'ai Hsien-ch'ên, *Ch'ing-pai t'ang gao* [The Compilation of Works in the Ch'ing-pai Mansion], (Chin-mên: county government of Chin-mên, 1999), 859-860; Wu T'ing-hsieh, *Ming tu-fu nien-piao* [A Table of All the Terms of Office of the Grand Co-ordinators and the Governors under Ming Dynasty], (Taipei: Chunghua bookstore, 1982), 668.

¹⁰⁵ Tung Ying-chu, *Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu* [Selections of Tung Ying-chu's Works], TW, no. 237, (1959), 69 'The previous Grand Co-ordinator did not understand the way the pirates behaved. He ordered all junks be prohibited from purchasing rice, as a solution to weed out pirates'; 'Before he declared the rice ban,

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

best way to eradicate the pirates, he replied, 'Hearing that in Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou, people can now sell their daughter for only several *tou* of rice, I realize that people will be forced to commit robbery. The only solution is to lift the rice ban. If you do not do it now, later there will be a heavy price to pay for this damaging policy.'¹⁰⁶

In these two years, it was very strange that only Ch'üan-chou prefecture, in T'ung-an District in particular, was afflicted by this famine. Why was there was no help forthcoming from Chang-chou or any special expedition to provide the starving people with rice? What is the explanation of the fact that that even when the local gentry of Ch'üan-chou tried to use their influence with their relatives and old friends at the emperor's court, the Fu-chien authorities still adhered so stubbornly to this ill-informed policy? The explanation is very simple: Regional Commander Yü Tze-kao was exploiting this situation to make money from the rice trade, because he and he alone possessed the right to dispatch his junks to purchase rice under the pretext of collecting food supplies for his soldiers. In a letter of censure written by one high-ranking minister of the emperor enumerating the mistakes that Yü Tze-kao had made, the former raised accusations about this trade.

'How desperate the people in Min-nan were! The junk trade with Kuang-tung

only about 100 vessels had been under Chêng Chih-lung (Iquan)'s command. After the rice ban was issued, the vessels under his authority increased to 1000.' In the other essay he mentions: 'When Cheng Chilung began his career, he had only a few dozen vessels. In 1626, the number had increased to 120 vessels. In 1627, it reached to 700 vessels.' Tung, *Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu*, 43. This record also proves that the rice ban must have been proclaimed by Grand Co-ordinator Chu Ch'in-hsiang in the summer of 1627.

¹⁰⁶ Tung, *Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu*, 38. A *tou* is a unit of dry measure. Each *tou* is equal to one-tenth of a *tan*. One *tan* equals about 107.4 litre, hence one *tou* equals 10.74 litres. Cf. Ray Huang, *Taxation in sixteenth-century Ming China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1974), p. xiv.

CHAPTER TWO

*had been disrupted. Moreover, when the harvest is poor the rice price jumps. The common people were starving, the situation was life-threatening. Yü Tze-kao dispatched some official junks to purchase grain, officially to collect supplies for the soldiers, but the actual upshot was that the grain was lost into the pirates' hands.'*¹⁰⁷

In short, while Iquan was intercepting the Chinese junks around Nan-ao Island in fulfillment of his contract with the Dutch, growing numbers of people were being forced to flee from their home town (which was also Iquan's native place) in order to survive. However, the famine did not hold sway in T'ung-an District because Iquan was intercepting the rice junks at the behest of the Dutch, it was the rice-ban itself which lay at the root of the famine. Iquan could offer the refugees temporary shelter on Nan-ao Island, just as Dutch had housed him and his men in Taiwan, but the real solution was to lift this 'rice ban' before it was too late. This was the decision Iquan finally made after July of 1627.

¹⁰⁷ Chiang Jih-shêng, *T'ai-wan wai-chi* [An Unofficial History of Taiwan], (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1704/1985), 32. 'Kung-k'ê kei shih chung Yen Chi-tsu ts'an yü-tzu-kao shu [Charge Laid by the Palace Steward at the Office of the Scrutiny of Work, Yen Chi-tsu, against Commander Yü Tzu-kao].' Although the document quoted is missing, it is mentioned in other official document and hence is reliable. Cf. Li Lu-shêng, 'Wei min-k'ou ch'ang-chüeh min-shêng tung-yao têng-shih 29 Mar. 1628[Suggestions in Response to the Rampant Piracy in Fu-chien and the Unstable Local Government]', in *T'ai-wan shih-liao pien-chi wei-yüen-hui* [Editorial Committee of Taiwan Historical Material] (here after cited as TWSL)(ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*[Compilation of Historical Documents of the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties], 110 vols, (Taipei, Yüen-liu Publisher: 2004), I 1621-1644, 304. The same quoted paragraph is also identical to another letter written by the Ministry of War. Cf. Yen Ming-t'ai, 'Wei pei-ch'ên min-shêng kuan-yüen ch'ü-liu ping hai-shang ch'ing-hsing shih, 17 Mar. 1628 [Opinions about Whether or Not the Present Authorities in Fu-chien Should Step Down]', in TWSL (ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, I 1621-1644, 295.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

On the first day of July 1627, Iquan defeated the Fu-chien naval force by surprising some ninety war-junks in the port of T'ung-shan (an Island nearby Nan-ao). It was the first time he used aggression on purpose against the naval force of Chinese empire.¹⁰⁸ Flushed with his success, he attacked Amoy and destroyed the remaining thirty war-junks, spreading proclamations everywhere to announce that his only quarrel was with Commander Yü Tzu-kao and his followers. Since he did not kill any civilians during this raid, it would seem that his goal was indeed to eliminate the naval force so that 'the rice ban' could be lifted. In the aftermath of this raid, it was easier for his adherents in his home town to sail to Kuang-tung to purchase rice.¹⁰⁹ However, since he had not brought all his followers to seek shelter in Taiwan Bay and had had the temerity to attack the imperial navy, he had crossed the Rubicon: he had passed the point of no return. What had forced him into this predicament? The long and short of it is that the Dutch turned out not to be such reliable friends the moment the Chinese officials offered them free trading rights to lure them into a conspiracy against Iquan.

Farewell, Dutch Brother

After Iquan had eliminated the war-junks, it was only natural that the starving

¹⁰⁸ The Minister of War, Wang, 'T'i wei-hai-k'ou P'i-Ch'ang Kuan-ping Nao-pai Chin-chü-shih ch'ih-pao ch'a-ts'an shih-shih kuan-yüen-shih [Because the pirates are still rampant and the official troops are defeated, we should certainly report the officials who failed to keep their duty and punish them, 13 Aug. 1627], *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, Vol. 3, 10-41 at 11-5. Iquan had once attacked the T'ung-shan fort and skirmished with Coastal defense fleet around Amoy bay from 7 April to 2 May 1627. With these actions Iquan claimed that he desired only to seek revenge on some of his rival pirates and that he was not seeking to pick up a fight with the official troops.

¹⁰⁹ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 3; Chou Ch'ang-chin, 'Ping-pu t'i-hsing ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u chiang-his-tao Chien-Ch'a yü-shih chou-ch'ang-chin t'i-kaio 10 May 1628 [Report of Province Chiang-his' Investigating Censor Extracted from Scrutiny of Work]', in TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 8-9.

CHAPTER TWO

people who had sailed their junks to Kuang-tung thronged to him. As more people from his home town came to join him, he eventually managed to gather a fleet of 400 vessels and several tens of thousands of refugees. Late in the autumn, this force plundered some coastal settlements in Kuang-tung in a quest for rice, after which they returned to southern Fu-chien province to seek a shelter from the worst of the winter weather. In the middle of October, the Commander of the Fu-chien Naval Force, Yü Tzu-kao informed Governor Gerrit Fredericksz de Wit of Formosa that, if he were prepared to help him to root out Iquan and his followers, such an action would greatly benefit the chance of the Dutch to be granted 'the legal trade'.¹¹⁰ Considering that the ultimate goal was to obtain the legal rights to trade with China, Governor De Wit agreed to join forces with the re-organized Fu-chien naval fleet in November but, buttering his bread on both sides, he also devised another proposal to put before Iquan. He offered the latter the opportunity to emigrate to Batavia with his followers.

*'For this purpose this very day we shall dispatch a junk with a pass and letters, (in accordance with his latest letter and his request we received yesterday) telling Iquan that he can sail to Batavia with all his people. If he, Iquan, and his people are not willing to go, we shall try to afflict as much damage as much as possible on them with our present force namely: the yachts De Vrede, the Erasmus, De Haen, the Slooten and the Cleen Heusden and another five junks which are under our direction.'*¹¹¹

Apparently Iquan did not accept this offer. It was likely that for him the

¹¹⁰ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende raed, Taiwan, 12 Oct. 1627, fos. 387^v-8^r.

¹¹¹ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende raed in't jacht Erasmus leggende ter rede voor Aijmoij inder revier in Chincheu [Resolution issued by Commander Gerit Fredericksz de Wit and Council on the yacht the *Erasmus* in the roadstead of Amoy in the Chiu-lung River], Chiu-lung River , 6 Nov. 1627, fos. 389^v-90^r.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

time had come to consider if now was the right moment to seek shelter in his home town, since most of his own people supported him. If he could make a contract with the Dutch for a lasting co-operation, why could he not request the Ch'üan-chou gentry to find an easy solution for him? After all, were they not united in their hatred of Regional Commander Yü Tze-kao?

As a matter of fact, the Dutch sent only three yachts and three junks to attack Iquan in *Beeren Bay* on the night of 16 November.¹¹² The Dutch were actually rather loath to fight Iquan and his followers and still tried to use persuasion:

'Regarding our negotiations with Iquan last night, that same night we terminated our brotherhood and friendship and made preparations for war, as we lay at anchor outside Beeren Bay where Iquan and his followers were anchored. He sent some fire-junks towards our yachts and junks, so we had to abandon our blockade and give them free passage. Thereupon the pirate sailed to the north with all his people (we thought they were heading for Chang-chou). They will cause huge damage there'.¹¹³

It seems that neither De Wit nor Iquan was anxious to fight each other, but the local gentry were convinced that Iquan had defeated the Dutch in a sea battle.¹¹⁴ Certainly, Commander Yü Tze-kao's alliance with the erstwhile pirates had originally not been welcomed by the gentry and his dependence on the Dutch force made his reputation even worse. As a result, by the end of

¹¹² General missive, 6 Jan. 1628, in Cheng Shao-gang, *De VOC en Formosa 1624-1662*, II, (Diss., Leiden University, 1995), 69. *Beeren Bay* is *Ta-hsing*, see picture 1.

¹¹³ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende raed int jacht Erasmus leggende ter reede in Haerlemsbaj op de custe van China [Resolution Issued by Commander Gerit Fredericksz de Wit and Council on the yacht the *Erasmus* in the roadstead of P'ing-hai Bay on the Coast of China], P'ing-hai bay 18 Nov. 1627, fo. 390^r.

¹¹⁴ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 22.


CHAPTER TWO

the year he had dug his own grave. In stark comparison with Commander Yü Tze-kao's cowardly behaviour, Iquan's conduct won him the affection of the people in his home town. He was now seen as the real protector of his people, far superior to the local officials who had not dared to remonstrate with Yü Tze-kao and criticize his ill-informed 'rice-ban' policy.

When the Dutch left Chang-chou Bay, Iquan slowly moved his fleet in a northerly direction with the plan to approach Yü Tze-kao's residence. In the first week of January, he finally sailed on Amoy, forcing Commander Yü Tze-kao to flee the city. Paradoxically, the mercenary Iquan returned home as the pirate who had protected his people from the machinations of corrupt officials. The gentry in Ch'üan-chou decided to send a petition to the emperor to ask that Iquan be pardoned and recruited into the naval force to defend their rice-junks. At the close of the summer of 1628, Iquan had basically obtained what he wanted and Commander Yü Tze-kao and his followers were given a prison sentence by the emperor.

NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627

Picture 1. Map of partial China, Vietnamese coast and southern Taiwan



Source: Nationaal Archief, VEL 291, Kaart van een gedeelte van de Chinese en Vietnamese kust en zuidelijk Formosa

No.	Place names in Dutch	Place names in English
1	D. Stadt Macao	The Macao City
2	Tiatz / Beerens bajj	Ta-hsing or Bay of Bears*
3	I. Lamo ofte Lamon	Nan-ao Island
4	Pehoe ofte Piscadores	P'eng-hu or Piscadores
5	Wankan	Wan-kang
6	Taijvan	Taiwan
7	Tamsokij ofte Tamscoij	[Southern] Tamsuy

CHAPTER TWO

8	Pangsoij	Fang-so
9	Cabo Balie	Cape Bolinao
10	De Bocht van Pangasinaō	The Bay of Pangasinan
11	Manilhas	Manila

The Chinese place names are mostly taken from ‘Yen-hai Ch’üan-t’u (The Complete Coastal Map of China)’ in: Ch’ên Lun-chiung, *Hai-kuo Wên-chien-lu*[My Knowledge about the Regions Abroad] · T’aiwan Wên-hsien Shih-liao Ts’ung-k’an, No. 7, 36-69.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

CHAPTER THREE

THE SURVIVAL GAME OF THE MERCENARIES

1628-1631

Marched to Amoy for empty fame

After Iquan's negotiation with the Dutch commander, Gerrit Fredrikszoon de Wit, had broken down, he led his whole fleet consisting of about 1,000 vessels with 20,000 people on board northwards in a gradual approach on Amoy.¹ His purpose was to seek revenge for the abuses inflicted by the rice ban, his special targets were those he held personally responsible and therefore his sights were set in particular on the men he saw as the major culprits: Naval Commander Yü Tze-kao and his subordinate Hsü Hsin-su (*Simsou* [Dutch, hereafter D.]).

In January 1628, Iquan appeared off Amoy. The local troops, both land and sea forces, all took to their heels, leaving their war-junks, weapons and provisions behind them.² A report submitted to the Ch'ung-chên emperor says that the citizens of Amoy sent a messenger to beg for his mercy. Iquan

¹ VOC 1094, Missive van Pieter Nuijts uijt het Fort Zeelandia aen den gouverneur generael, Taiwan, 15 Mar.1628, fo. 134r; 20,000 people is according to the Chinese source; Su Yen, 'Wei ch'ên-hsiang fu-k'ou ch'ing-hsing ping-ch'ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih [Humble Opinion about how to Deal with Pirates in My Home Town and Other Complementary Measures] 15 July 1628', in TWSL (ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, I:1522-1644, 318-9.

² Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 15. 'At the beginning of December, Cheng pirates visited Amoy again. Because the whole garrison had fled away, they seized all the war-junks and ammunition. Amoy city was in danger and the inhabitants of T'ung-an county succumbed to panic.'

CHAPTER THREE

not only acquiesced in their request but also prudently kept his men stationed outside the city walls.³ Commander Yü Tze-kao fled to Chang-chou city disguised in the clothes of a workman, but the local Amoy inhabitants laid the blame for their plight on his incompetence and fear of their retribution forced him to hide in a mansion at T'ung-an district, where far away from both Amoy and Chang-chou. He had his door sealed and pretended to be ill.⁴ Hsü Hsin-su's house was burned down and Iquan confiscated his goods. The entire Chang-chou area including Amoy Harbour (with the exception of the city itself) and the city on the opposite shore of the bay, Hai-ch'êng, were plundered.⁵ Once they had completed this mission the pirates settled down as a permanent 'force' resident in Amoy.

During the retribution, the hometowns of these pirates remained untouched and secure. Upon hearing what had happened during the past few days,⁶ the gentry in Ch'üan-chou prefecture summoned a consultative committee to a meeting in a temple with the city elders on 15 January. They all agreed that Iquan's case was a very particular one. They declared that they were willing to send a petition to the Ch'ung-chên Emperor and beseech him to forgive Iquan and those under his command, 'since they were only refugees driven to extremes by the famine'. After contacting Iquan, both sides reached a consensus: the prefectural magistrate would send a petition to the Imperial court and Iquan submitted himself to the Coastal Defence Force on 22 February.⁷

³ Su, 'Wei ch'ên-hsiang fu-k'ou ch'ing-hsing ping-ch'ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih', 318-9.

⁴ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 14.

⁵ VOC 1094, Missive van Pieter Nuijts uijt het Fort Zeelandia aen den gouverneur generael, Taiwan, 15 Mar. 1628, fo. 134^f.

⁶ About the general role of local gentry in Fu-chien during this period and their influential position in maritime affairs, cf. Chang, 'Chinese Maritime Trade', 217-21.

⁷ Su, 'Wei ch'ên-hsiang fu-k'ou ch'ing-hsing ping-ch'ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih',

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

Peace was restored under this temporary arrangement. Although Iquan had broken the law, he was considered a man of high moral principles. On 30 March, the emperor gave the order for the arrest of Commander Yü Tze-kao and his second-in-command, Hsü Hsin-su, after one of Investigating Censors had accused Yü Tze-kao of being a ‘stupid and corrupt’ person and had reproached Hsü Hsin-su with having ‘revealed classified information, participated in smuggling, and of having allowed the red-haired barbarians ashore.’⁸ The emperor awarded the death penalty but, perhaps even before the order arrived, Iquan had already been executed this verdict. This news was confirmed by two Japanese junks which arrived in Taiwan in June:

‘... He has not only arrested the great mandarin Hsü Hsin-su, but also seized his goods and those of some other people, burned his house down and killed him.’⁹

The same source indicates that *de facto* Iquan controlled the Amoy area and several nearby small towns, and that the Grand Co-ordinator (*Chün-mên*[Chinese hereafter C.], *Combon*[D.]¹⁰) Chu I-Fêng had made peace with him.

‘Although... this Iquan had cause such devastation in the country of China, the Grand Co-ordinator was obliged to sign agreement treaty with him, even to grant him a very high military rank, on condition he should desist from

318-9.

⁸ Chou, ‘Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao- ch’u chiang-his-tao yü-shih chou-ch’ang-chin t’i-kaò’, 10.

⁹ VOC 1098, Resolutie genomen [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.][Resolution of Governor Pieter Nuijts], Taiwan, 5 Jun. 1628, fo. 404^r.

¹⁰ *Chün-mên* means ‘Provincial Military Commander’. As mentioned in the previous chapter, during this period the Grand Co-ordinator was given the authority to take charge of a provincial military action, ‘Chün-mên’ became an additional title of the Grand Co-ordinator. Cf: Charles O Hucker., *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 202.

CHAPTER THREE

*leading the pirates and wreaking havoc on this country.*¹¹

Iquan had even shown the official letter pertaining to this temporary settlement to some Dutch sailors he had captured. They described the letter as, ‘embellished with golden characters in an elegant style, and sealed with the emperor’s chop.’¹² They were wrong. The letter had not been issued by the emperor; it was probably only a written memorandum issued by Grand Co-ordinator Chu I-Fêng without any legally binding force.¹³ The emperor’s sanction was issued in Peking only on 21 July, and was probably taken with him by the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, when he commenced his journey south.¹⁴ Iquan received the sanction from the hands of the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou, T’sai Shan-chi, on 23 August.¹⁵ In accordance with the petition

¹¹ VOC 1098, Resolutie genomen [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.], Taiwan, 5 Jun. 1628, fo. 404^r It tallies with Chu I-fêng’s report to the Emperor. Cf. Grand coordinator of Fu-chien Chu I-fêng, ‘Ti Wei-ts’ai T’ung-kuo Chih-lun na Chü-k’ou Chih-chiang Têng-shih, 4 July 1628 [On Allowing the Big Pirate to Submit According to General Public Opinions]’, in: Ch’ên Yün-lin, *Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, Vol. 3, 123-29 at 127-8.

¹² VOC 1098, Resolutie genomen [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.], Taiwan, 5 Jun. 1628, fo. 404^r

¹³ Chao Yin-ch’ang, ‘Wei cho-ts’ai yü-ch’ing chao-chiang chü-k’ou têng-shih [Suggestions Following Public Opinion about the Granting of a Royal Pardon] 12 July 1628’, in TWSL (ed.), *Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, I 1522-1644, 310. Grand Co-ordinator Chu I-Fêng mentioned he presented Iquan with a memorandum only after Iquan had kept the peace for about two months. Therefore Iquan only obtained this memorandum in April or May 1628.

¹⁴ Ku Ying-t’ai, ‘Appendix I: Cheng Chih-lung shou-fu [How Cheng Chih-lung Obtained a Royal Pardon]’, in P’êng Sun-i, *Ching-hai chih* [Gazette of the Pacification Overseas], TW no.35, 100. ‘1628, in the ninth month (lunar calendar, that is the end of October or November), Cheng Chih-lung was made a subordinate of Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an.’

¹⁵ Wang Chi, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu [Selections from the

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

approved by the emperor, the court exonerated Iquan of his alleged crime, on condition he pacify the waters off the coast of China in the following three years. If he succeeded, he would be granted a certain rank and be formally appointed a naval officer.¹⁶ In other words, he was on probation. As the local official commented:

*'Iquan was neither a subject nor a soldier. He has submitted to no superior and stationed anywhere... I can neither give him an order, nor summon him to present himself before me.'*¹⁷

Although Iquan did in fact have these areas under control, the title granted by the emperor offered him no substantial support as a genuine commander, because the court never paid his men any salaries nor granted them rations of rice throughout the following three years. Until they had successfully pacified the other pirates, the Grand Co-ordinator would not pay them the salaries and rice rations to which they were entitled. After having left the service of his former boss, the Dutch East India Company, Iquan now entered into a new contract with the Ming court and maintained his status as a semi-mercenary who would serve the court for the next three years. In reality he was essentially a mercenary captain employed by the gentry of Ch'üan-chou prefecture.

Hungry mercenaries need to be fed

Iquan and the other pirates knew that they were sitting on a time bomb.

Court Gazette during the Reign of Emperor Ch'ung-chên]', in TWYH (ed.), *Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao* [Historical Materials about Fu-chienese Waters Selected from the Veritable Records of the Ming], TW no. 296, 147; Cf. Charles O Hucker., *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 211.

¹⁶ Su, 'Wei ch'ên-hsiang fu-k'ou ch'ing-hsing ping-ch'ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih', 320-1.

¹⁷ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 27.

CHAPTER THREE

Twenty-thousand people had deserted their hometowns, pushed to this extreme by the starvation which was the inexorable corollary of the rice ban. Unless they did manage to survive, they would not be prepared to lay down their weapons for what seemed an empty promise. Therefore the first priority to ensure that the whole operation ran smoothly was to secure the regularity of the rice supply and, once this had been guaranteed, to create jobs which would allow the crews to earn their daily meals. The local gentry and the officials in the cities were perfectly aware that this was the only solution. Although foreign trade was prohibited by the imperial court, the coastal trade and local fishing conducted by small-sized junks was still permitted and was run under the supervision of the local officials. The first mission assigned to Iquan was to escort the rice-transport junks which were on their way to Ch'ao-chou, close to the border between Kuang-tung and Fu-chien provinces, and after he arrived there to purchase rice for the people of Amoy.¹⁸ Because it was harvested twice a year, in spring and autumn, Ch'ao-chou rice had to be transported to Amoy before the end of summer. The transportation of rice by sea had become a matter of routine in ensuring the supply to the Amoy market, as the Dutch witnessed in the following years:

*'In China every year, sometimes more and sometimes less, as the people are suffering from the piracy in the south and are ground down by starvation, they have to be fed by vessels of 25-50 last, laden with rice, from Amoy and areas nearby, bound for the food coast..... our cruising vessels have already witnessed that in one day alone in the months of June and July, some 40 to 50 junks sail by hugging the Chinese coast north of Nan-ao Island, each and every one loaded with rice and coarse wares.'*¹⁹

¹⁸ Ibid. 22. 'Nowadays Cheng Chih-lung escorts the rice-transport flotilla.'

¹⁹ VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht *Der Goes* aen de camer Amsterdam [Letter from Governor Hans Putmans on the yacht *Der Goes* to the Amsterdam Chamber], Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct.1632, fo. 198^v. Each *last* equalled 1,250 kilograms, therefore 20-25 *last* would equal 25-31 tons. Cf. Judith

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

Chinese sources mention that the rice-transportation fleet consisted of slightly over thirty junks in 1631, a figure which reveals the scale of this trans-provincial rice trade.²⁰

Once the rice supply had been put back on a sound footing, most of the people were happy to return to their villages where they could be reunited with their families. By the end of the summer of 1628, only 4,000 to 5,000 jobless people still remained in Amoy.²¹ Iquan ignored these people. He might have hoped that the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, would be willing to pay salaries and sign these people up as citizen militia members. His ideas struck a chord with the majority of the gentry in Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou prefectures. However, as mentioned earlier, since Iquan's official title had been granted in name only, there was no way that these men could be paid from the public budget. The new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, refused to acquiesce in Iquan's demands and one of his contemporaries commented on this stalemate:

*'The gentry and the citizens in Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou prefectures petitioned that salaries be paid to Iquan and his followers, but the Grand Co-ordinator[Hsiung Wên-ts'an] insisted that he would not pay these. I am afraid the Grand Co-ordinator might have already displeased quite a large number of people.'*²²

Schooneveld-Oosterling, Marc Kooijmans, *VOC-glossarium: Verklaring van termen, verzameld uit de RGP-publicaties die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2000), 67.

²⁰ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lieh*, 41. 'Recently the thirty junks of rice merchants sailed in the pirate flotilla and the latter did not harass the former. This was proof that these pirates had been subjugated.'

²¹ Ibid. 29. 'His gang still consisted of 4 to 5,000 people. He would have like to disband them but it seemed impossible.'

²² Tung, *Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu*, 71.

CHAPTER THREE

The report written by Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an mentions how urgently Iquan requested salaries as he cooled his heels waiting to receive the formal sanction by the emperor:

*'After Iquan had submitted himself to the imperial court, on the one hand on every single occasion he ignored the assignment of his superiors. Meanwhile, on the other hand whether day or night, he demanded salaries be paid to his people... fortunately I did not hand him a single penny.'*²³

If the truth be told, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an did not have enough money in the treasury to pay any salaries because his coffers had been drained by the cost of the military campaign mounted to expel the Dutch from the Pescadores in 1624. His hands were further tied because the new tax-revenue was earmarked to be spent on building new war-junks and on casting new cannons. There was no help for it, Iquan was going to have to solve his financial crisis by himself, because he was the one responsible for leading these people into this impasse. As the party accountable, it was up to him to find a way to keep a balance between rice consumption and silver supply among these vagrants, while simultaneously he had to try to persuade them to settle down and pick up the threads of their normal lives again. He almost failed to meet this challenge because everyone's life was dispensable in such a harsh environment, but somehow, undeterred, Iquan managed to pull himself out of this hell with a little help from the local gentry. About two months after Iquan received the emperor's sanction, his close comrade Li K'uei-ch'i (*Quichi*[D.]), chose to desert him and resume his piratical career.²⁴ In view of the seemingly insurmountable problems facing him at

²³ Hsiung Wên-ts'an, 'Fu-chien hsün-fu hsiung ts'an-chieh-t'ieh [Remaining Report from the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien Hsiung Wên-ts'an] 8 Jan 1631', in TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 22.

²⁴ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 29. ' They cannot be disbanded because their neighbours insist on killing pirates. These neighbours had not been able to defeat the pirates when they were confronted with them earlier, but they would be able to kill

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

that time, most of Iquan's followers chose to throw in their lot with this renegade. With envious and disapproving eyes they had seen how Iquan fawned on the officials and the gentry while he was less than generous to them who had been his faithful followers.²⁵ In their eyes his behavior almost verged on the betrayal of his pirate brethren. While he was doing his best to set up a commercial network, he had no other choice as all other avenues were blocked. This task would have proved impossible without the help of the gentry, or more precisely, the investors and potential clients who were willing to back the trade for feeding those pirates who had surrendered. Therefore, as they were totally ignorant of the diplomatic niceties of this game, most of the members of his band chose to join Li K'uei-ch'i and deserted him in droves, taking all their vessels, goods, weapons and capital with them. Overcome by exhaustion, Iquan wept and railed to one of his close comrades but he did not betray his raw emotions to his newly won rich gentry-patrons.²⁶ Li Kuei-ch'i had followed Iquan's lead and remained in Taiwan, after all they shared some common past.²⁷ In the end, even this old comrade lost his trust in him. Iquan was now playing for very high stakes.

disarmed pirates who had surrendered. No wonder they were still crowding into Amoy for they could not return to their hometowns.'

²⁵ Hsiung, 'Fu-chien hsün-fu hsiung ts'an-chieh-t'ieh', 22. 'Iquan stored several hundreds of thousands taels of cash without even sharing them with his followers'; Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 31. 'Iquan is disposed to make friends with rich families, nobles, officials. He is very proud of his noble guests, and has spent large sums of money on entertaining them.'

²⁶ Ibid. 32. 'It is said that Brigade Commander Chang was Iquan's best friend. After Li K'uei-ch'i had betrayed him and sailed off, Iquan did his best to appear normal and talked calmly with Provision-Master Wang. Only after he saw Brigade Commander Chang did he cry out and collapsed.'

²⁷ VOC 1093, Resolutie genomens bij den commandeur [Gerard. Frederiksz] de Wit ende den raet, Taiwan, 16 Oct. 1626, fos. 378^{r-v}. The Dutch in Taiwan decided to send soldiers to the village of Soulang slightly north of their settlement, in an attempt to capture Li K'uei-ch'i.

CHAPTER THREE

Iquan and the VOC engage in smuggling

Li K'uei-ch'i turned his back on Iquan when it gradually began to dawn on him that he no longer counted as his equal. After Iquan had been granted his imperial sanction, he thrice summoned Li K'uei-ch'i to have a meeting with the coastal defence official in Fu-chou but Li K'uei-ch'i refused and sailed away with all his fleet. Not long afterwards Iquan's suspicions were aroused and, in a state of alarm, he rushed home to Amoy where he promptly stationed 600 of his soldiers as a guard. His action was justified when Li K'uei-ch'i's people sailed into Amoy Harbour on 30 October and took the market place outside the city wall by storm, plundering all the goods they could lay their hands on in the process.²⁸ Five days later, Iquan received help from the militia stationed in the environs of Ch'üan-chou prefecture, among them the naval militia men recruited from among the fishermen. On the sixth day, Li K'uei-ch'i withdrew with his fleet of 3,000 people.²⁹ Now Iquan had to assume the sole responsibility of paying his troops because, if he did not have a permanent force at his disposal, he could not even guard himself against his former followers.³⁰

If a person happened to be in possession of junks and sailors, the traditional way to increase his income was to participate in foreign trade. But in 1628, with everything awry as a consequence of the disturbances along the coast, the emperor had issued an edict forbidding any overseas trade.³¹ This edict extinguished the hope of these sailors at a loose end who were hoping to engage in regular foreign trade to make a living. Li K'uei-ch'i's betrayal of

²⁸ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 31.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 28.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 32.

³¹ Chu, 'Ping-pu t'i-hsing ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u fu-chien hsün-fu chu t'i-kao, not dated', 5. This suggestion was approved by the emperor on 26 March 1628.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

Iquan might have been a consequence of this calamitous edict. The order had originally been issued by the previous Grand Co-ordinator, Chu I-fêng , who proclaimed that ‘ no merchants will be allowed to sail in this year (1628). Any merchant or official who violates this order will be treated as a criminal.’³² The order arrived in Fu-chien province around April³³ and, once it had been made public, merchants in Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou had no alternative but to engage in smuggling. Generally speaking, only pirates traded in contraband and officials were expected to live on the salaries they were paid by the emperor. The fly in the ointment was that Iquan’s title was that of an official *in spe*, he had to prove himself before it was officially sanctioned. How could he possibly pay his soldiers if he was unable to conduct any trade (legal or otherwise)?

This catalogue of disasters made life difficult for Iquan. Between February and August, he had to come to terms with the way his life had changed in such a dramatic way. These sudden changes embarrassed his old comrades, the VOC merchants in Taiwan, Japan and Batavia even more than they did him.

As far as the Dutch were concerned, before the end of the year 1627 when Commander De Wit had answered the appeal of the previous Grand Co-ordinator, Chu I-fêng, to sweep the seas clean of all pirates as proclaimed in the edict of the Chinese emperor, Iquan was a dispensable pawn. Grand Co-ordinator Chu I-fêng and Commander Yü Tzu-kao had both promised the Dutch free trade as their reward if they made short shrift of Iquan. Entertaining these high hopes, Commander Cornelis de Wit advanced a sum

³² Ibid. ‘Now it has been decided that the 1628 oceanic trade will be forbidden at the suggestion of the Grand Co-ordinator. All vessels have been prevented from sailing.’

³³ Kawaguchi Chojū, *T’ai-wan kê-chü chih*[A History of Taiwan during Separation], TW no.1, 8. ‘In the third month (in lunar calendar, thus April of 1628), the imperial edict declared that the oceanic trade of Chang-chou and Chüan-chou inhabitants was prohibited.’

CHAPTER THREE

of money to Commander Yü Tzu-kao's merchants and to Squadron Leader Hsü Hsin-su, expecting a huge amount of raw silk in return. On 29 October 1627, after the Dutch had handed over no less than 66,550 rials to Hsü Hsin-su, they received only 8,150 catties raw silk in return, because, they got cold feet because of Iquan's threats and had been forced to beat a hasty retreat.³⁴ On the 19 November, before he left for Batavia Commander Cornelis de Wit ordered three junks to sail to Amoy to pick up the remainder of the raw silk. Unfortunately they ran into pirates close to shore and were plundered.³⁵ By January 1628, when Iquan's fleet showed up in the roadstead of Amoy, Hsü Hsin-su was still trying to load the raw silk for which the Dutch had paid, because he was still expecting the three Dutch junks which were plundered by the pirates and would never arrive.³⁶ Around about February, the Dutch in Taiwan sent another three junks.³⁷ The first of these junks was accompanied by the junk of the Chinese official appointed to govern the Pescadores and she was loaded with a cargo of rice (perhaps for Hsü Hsin-su).³⁸ All three were taken by Iquan's people, and it seems the

³⁴ VOC 1098, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aan gouverneur generael [Jan Pietersz.] Coen, Taiwan, 14 Aug. 1629, fos. 408^{r-v}; Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1628, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 69-71. Because all Hsü Hsin-su's raw silk was for sale at a fixed price of 142 taels per picul, equals to 194.5 rials (1 tael=3.5 F= 70 stuivers; 1 rial=51 stuivers), which should have been enough to pay for 34,200 catties raw silk. Here 'rial' refers to the Spanish silver coin *plastra fuerte* which is written 'reaal van achten' or 'reaal' in Dutch but is called piece-of-eight by the English. Cf. Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 50.

³⁵ VOC 1094, Missive van Michiel Sael naer Taijouan aen gouverneur Pieter Nuijts, Haerlemsbay [P'ing-hai Bay], 7 Dec. 1627, fos. 197^r; Generale missive, 6 Jan. 1628, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 69-71. Haerlems Bay is P'ing-hai Bay. See Picture 3.

³⁶ VOC 1094, Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Pieter de Carpentier], Taiwan, 28 Feb. 1628, fo. 130^v.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ VOC 1094, Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Pieter de Carpentier], Taiwan, 15 Mar. 1628, fo. 134^r.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

Dutch then despaired of collecting their goods. At the same time, Iquan also captured a Dutch yacht which was returning from Japan laden with silver. Hence the original plan so carefully devised by the Dutch was smashed to smithereens by Iquan and later the insult was heaped on injury when it was reported that the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, had been reconciled with Iquan. Still fairly uncertain about whether free trade would be granted under these new conditions, the Dutch prevented the Japanese merchants newly arrived in Taiwan from engaging in the silk trade in Amoy. This high-handed treatment flared up into a violent conflict. The furious Japanese took the governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nuijts, hostage and seized 120.5 piculs of silk goods from the VOC warehouse by force. This action has been called the 'Hamada Yahei Incident' by later historians.³⁹ From March to August, both Iquan and the Dutch were keen to make some more money by conducting an informal trade, which meant in fact that they had to engage in smuggling without any word of this reaching the ears of the Grand Co-ordinator.

Initiation of family business

The news of the reconciliation was confirmed when some letters written by Dutch captives were delivered to Taiwan at the beginning of June 1628.⁴⁰ Governor Pieter Nuijts decided to try his luck and dispatch four yachts to Amoy.⁴¹ Somewhat earlier he had sent a letter from Taiwan to Iquan, telling

³⁹ Generale missive, 10 Feb. 1629, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 77-8. A more detailed study of the Dutch-Japanese conflict in Taiwan in 1628, cf. Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*[online], (Gutenberg Project, Columbia University Press, 2006), 27-43.

⁴⁰ VOC 1098, Resolutie [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s] genomen in Taijouan, Taiwan, 5 Jun. 1628, fo. 404^r.

⁴¹ VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam,

CHAPTER THREE

him that Commander Cornelis de Witt's hostility had been a grievous error and apologized as follows:

*'We are ignorant of what caused the dispute, and therefore [unable] to judge who is right or wrong. We cannot afford to allow complaints to be made and take root on either side. Therefore pray do not leave us in the dark about the actual conditions, so that we can ascertain a just punishment for those who have brought this about, and be reconciled with Your Honour.'*⁴²

The letter seems to have been effective, because Iquan released all the Dutch captives, including the yacht complete with all the cash and goods she was carrying.⁴³ As a consequence of this gesture, the tacit trade between Chinese merchants and the Dutch carried on for about two months, but it was not long before the balance was upset again. Iquan might have been given some prior warning that the emperor's sanction would be arriving at the beginning of August. Apprehensive that the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, might find out about his illegal dealings, Iquan asked Pieter Nuijts to leave at once, threatening that if he did not do so he would take up arms against the Dutch after 4 August.⁴⁴ Soon after Nuijts had returned to

Batavia, 30 Sept. 1631. fos. 389^v-390^r.

⁴² VOC 1094, Missive [van Pieter Nuijts] aan Iquan te seinden, Zeelandia, not dated Mar. 1628, fo. 127^v. It is an enclosure to a letter written by Senior Merchant Cornelis van Neijenroode in Japan to the Governor-General in Batavia. There is no trace of the main letter but it should have been written by Pieter Nuijts who in charge of the Taiwan factory at that moment.

⁴³ Generale Missive, 10 Feb. 1629, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 79; VOC 1096, Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijtz naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Jan Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fo. 203^r.

⁴⁴ Generale Missive, 10 Feb. 1629, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 79; VOC 1096, Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijtz naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Jan Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fo. 203^v. According to Governor Pieter Nuijts' report, this hostile gesture was elicited by Iquan's reluctance to allow some merchants sell their raw silks at a lower price. But since it is known that Iquan offered the silk at

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

Taiwan, a special delegate dispatched by Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an came to visit Zeelandia Castle. The delegate demanded Nuijts confirm that the Dutch had signed a private contract with Iquan and admit whether they had concluded peace with him? Governor Pieter Nuijts and the Council of Taiwan answered as follows:

*'... Although in response to the two letters received from the Governor, he[Iquan] has released the captured yacht the Westcappel, its crew and 863 taels of silver and some ammunition, clearly no verbal, or written treaty has been concluded. Indeed, His Honour (the Governor of Taiwan) is and will remain a friend of Your Excellency (the Grand Co-ordinator) and the Emperor of China....'*⁴⁵

The Dutch governor Pieter Nuijts must have begun to be aware of the risk he was running of losing the trust of Chinese authorities and he also believed that the free trade treaty might be nullified because of the smuggling trade which had been thriving during June and July.

On the horns of a dilemma, Governor Nuijts decided to direct all his ships to the Chinese coast and transport the Grand Co-ordinator's delegate back to the Chiu-lung River estuary on 12 August.⁴⁶ Several days later, the five Dutch yachts under Nuijts' command ran into Iquan's fleet, which was returning from the south, probably from another mission to escort the rice-transportation junks. Eight to ten days later Iquan returned and four more

a price of 130 taels per picul, which was not only a price lower than that Hsü Hsin-su offered (142 taels) but also lower than the price he had agreed with Pieter Nuijts on 1 October (140 taels), Nuijts' explanation was shaky.

⁴⁵ VOC 1096, Resolutie [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.]getrokken in de rivier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 12 Aug. 1628, fo. 216^r; cf. VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, met bijlage, Batavia, 28 Dec. 1631, fos. 413^v-414^r.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Five yachts and four ships. It is also mentioned that Governor-General's order, which required Governor Nuijts to conclude the free trade treaty, had just arrived.

CHAPTER THREE

powerful Dutch ships arrived in Amoy.⁴⁷ Iquan received his imperial sanction on 23 August. Perhaps the same day Nuijts invited him aboard on the yacht the *Texel*, and took him hostage. Nuijts has left the following description of the incident:

*'... (Iquan) was told that he must remain with us until our captains no longer had to face any opposition, or that news had been received from the Grand Co-ordinator in Fu-chou saying that the free trade conducted by the Hollanders was permitted conditional on the various promises. Otherwise, ... he would be transported to yacht the Arnmuijden.'*⁴⁸

Iquan was kept confined in the yacht the *Texel* for almost one month. Obviously no response had arrived from Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an, since Iquan's official title did not necessarily mean that he could count on the support of the court. The real purpose of his appointment had been to eliminate the menace threatening the sea trade, from either Chinese pirates or the Dutch 'Barbarians.' Under intense Dutch pressure, Iquan had pretended that he had the authority to allow all Chinese merchants to trade freely with the Dutch⁴⁹ and the smuggling trade picked up again smoothly during Iquan's detention. Iquan's mother was the only person to take steps to rescue her son.⁵⁰ She insisted that Nuijts should adapt/foster her youngest

⁴⁷ VOC 1096, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Jan Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fos. 203^v-204^r.

⁴⁸ VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, met bijlage, Batavia, 30 Sept. 1631, fo. 390^r.

⁴⁹ VOC 1096, Missive van Pieter Nuijts uijt Zeelandia aen den gouverneur generaal [Jan Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fo. 204^r. The silence in Chinese sources about this incident implies that either the authorities were impotent to rescue Iquan or they were glad of the opportunity to get rid of him.

⁵⁰ Iquan's father married two wives. The first four sons were born to his first wife, Shu, and the fifth son was that of his second wife, Huang. It is not certain to whom Pieter Nuijts was referring. Iquan's family members are recorded in 'The Genealogical Chart of the Cheng Family', cf : Cheng Chih-lung(comp.), *Chêng-shih*

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

son as a guarantee of the commercial partnership between the Cheng family and the VOC. This hostage would be a pledge that Iquan would co-operate with the Dutch. It would be a commercial contract without formal written articles.

The truth about Iquan's detention by the Dutch had to be concealed. His family must have spread the false rumour that he was being entertained by the Dutch. They would have feared that a treacherous follower might seize this opportunity to snatch his command. The 'adoption show' was played out with appropriate celebrations but the Dutch discovered that so-called 'delegate of the Grand Co-ordinator' whom they had dispatched to deliver their ultimate letter turned out to be a 'recognized' friend of Hsü Hsin-su.⁵¹ Therefore it was dubious whether the latter would have tried to help Iquan or was just attempting to string him along. In the meantime, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an forwarded the formal documents confirming the emperor's imperial sanction to Iquan's house in Amoy.⁵²

Realizing that he was not achieving anything in terms of a 'free trade treaty' from the Chinese court, Governor Pieter Nuijts did a volte-face and took Iquan's mother's suggestion. He accepted Iquan's younger brother as a security, and signed a tentative contract with Iquan on 1 October.⁵³ Thereafter Iquan's family was dragged ever more intensively into the

tsu-p'u [Genealogical Chart of Chang family], *T'ai-wan wên-hsien hui-k'an*[Collectanea of Taiwan Historical Documents here after TWH], 7 vols. (Peking: Chiu-chou Pulisher, 2004), I, No. 5, 597.

⁵¹ VOC 1103, Resolutie over het accoord met Iquan [Resolution pertaining to the Contract Concluded with Iquan], Chiu-lung River, 1 Oct. 1628, fo. 415^r.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ VOC 1096, Het accoordt getrocken tusschen Pieter Nuijts ende Iquan, overste Mandorijn van Aijmoij op Taijouan [Contract Concluded in Taiwan between Pieter Nuijts and Iquan, Chief Mandarin of Amoy], Chiu-lung River, 1 Oct. 1628, fos. 124-125; VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, met bijlage, Batavia, 30 Sept. 1631. fos. 390^r-391^r.

CHAPTER THREE

commercial whirlpool. Within a fortnight of the Dutch departure from Amoy, Iquan's old comrade Li K'uei-ch'i abandoned Iquan, taking with him all valuable resources which remained.

An-hai Harbour and the fishermen militia

From an emotional point of view it must have been acutely depressing for Iquan to be deserted by his old comrades but, from an economic point of view this incident served the purpose of reducing the expense of having to feed followers. Iquan now maintained his troops at the basic level of 600 soldiers. On land, whenever the situation necessitated it, he added some militia from the countryside of Ch'üan-chou, up to a total of 1,000 men. At sea he depended on a militia force composed of fishermen. He was not obliged to pay any expenses from his private purse for either of these forces. Li K'uei-ch'i and his fleet invaded Amoy on 2 January 1629 but he was defeated by Iquan's troops including his hometown militia after a nine-days struggle.⁵⁴ On 7 February, Iquan's force pursued them to the coast of the province of Kuang-tung and in the course of this pursuit managed to persuade some of the vagrants to go home.⁵⁵ A little later peace was restored and the rice trade between Amoy and Ch'ao-chou could be resumed without any more danger of assaults by Li K'uei-ch'i.⁵⁶ It was rumoured that this pirate chief had decided to remain in Macao⁵⁷ but, all of a sudden in July, Li

⁵⁴ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 36; 39.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 39; Chang Yen-têng, 'Ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u chê-chiang hsün-fu chang yen-têng t'i-pên [Report from the Grand Co-ordinator of Chê-chiang, Chang Yen-têng, Copy preserved in the Ministry of War], 16 May. 1629', in TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 14. 'After Li K'uei-chi betrayed and deserted Iquan, his gangs sailed to the border area between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung, including Ch'ên Ch'êng-yü (which was written *Zansingouw* in Dutch) in approximately 600 junks ...'

⁵⁶ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 41.

⁵⁷ VOC 1098, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans uijt 't Casteel Zeelandia aen de

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

K'uei-ch'i sailed back to Amoy with several big junks of the Kuang-tung type and ambushed Iquan.⁵⁸

*'(We) have heard that the pirate Li K'uei-c'hi (Quechi[D.]) has destroyed all Iquan's junks and has made himself master of the Chiu-lung River area.'*⁵⁹

After Amoy had been under siege for about forty days, the Ch'üan-chou gentry sent the Grand Co-ordinator petitions begging him to dispatch some junks from Fu-chou, because the size of these vessels was comparable to that of the big Kuang-tung junks.⁶⁰ When Li K'uei-ch'i heard the news that the Grand Co-ordinator was planning to dispatch 100 Fu-chou junks southwards to assist Iquan, he decided to steal a march on 12 August. He attacked the Grand Co-ordinator's fleet in Fu-chou before Iquan had had the chance join it. According to the news received in Taiwan on 25 September 1629:

'... a wancan has arrived which brought us the news that the Grand Co-ordinator (who had fitted out an armada about 300 junks in Fu-chou) had summoned Iquan from Amoy to put him in command of these junks as an 'Admiral of the Sea' and expel Li K'uei-ch'i. When Li K'uei-ch'i was informed of this, he suddenly moved his fleet there (before Iquan and his

Ed. heren bewinthebberen [in Amsterdam], Taiwan, 15 Sept. 1629, fo 32^v.

⁵⁸ Ts'ai, *Ch'ing-pai t'ang gao*, II, 861. 'These rebellious pirates including Li K'uei-ch'i and others like him, invaded again. Their junks were constructed in Kuang-tung and therefore larger than the Fu-chienese junks of Cheng Chih-lung and Cheng Chih-hu. Because of their smaller size, the latter were not able to compete with the former.' Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 48. These Kuang-tung-made large junks were called 'Wu-wei ta-ch'uan [big junk with a black stern]'.

⁵⁹ VOC 1098, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans uijt 't Casteel Zeelandia aen de Ed. heren bewinthebberen [in Amsterdam], Taiwan, 15 Sept. 1629, fo. 32^v.

⁶⁰ Ts'ai, *Ch'ing-pa- t'ang gao*, II, 861. 'The junks constructed in Fu-chou and fishing boats built in Chi-liao (coast of Hsin-hua county) are as large and as steady as the Kuang-tung junks...'

CHAPTER THREE

*people approached) and attacked the above-mentioned armada. He took the biggest and strongest junks with him, and set the others on fire...'*⁶¹

It was just the same old story, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an had to appease Li K'uei-ch'i in the same way as Grand Co-ordinator Chu had done previously in the case of Iquan. Accordingly the Grand Co-ordinator sent a petition to the emperor asking that Li K'uei-ch'i be treated in the same manner as Iquan had been and signed a cease fire with this pirate during the autumn.⁶² During the truce, Iquan and his troops remained inside the city walls of Amoy with Li K'uei-ch'i's followers stationed outside.

Since the Li K'uei-ch'i had now stepped into Iquan's shoes as it were, another pirate by the name of Ch'u Ts'ai-lao secretly contacted the Grand Co-ordinator to solicit better conditions than those granted Li K'uei-ch'i.⁶³ This request instigated a conspiracy against Li K'uei-ch'i. Local officials secretly set about fitting out a fleet of junks in the Ch'üan-chou region and offered them to Iquan. On 9 February 1630, Iquan and Ch'u Ts'ai-lao launched a surprise attack on Li K'uei-ch'i and were able to capture him that same day.⁶⁴

⁶¹ VOC 1098, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt 't Casteel Zeelandia aan d'Ed. heer gouverneur generael Jan Pietersz. Coen, Taiwan, 28 Sept. 1629, fo. 41^v.

⁶² Ku, 'Appendix I: Cheng Chih-lung shou-fu', 150. 'The Fu-chienese pirate Li K'uei-ch'i surrendered to the officials with Cheng Chih-lung. Later he fell out with Cheng Chih-lung and reverted to piracy. Thereafter Li K'uei-ch'i announced he would surrender to Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an. Hsiung Wên-ts'an reported this case to the emperor and the emperor allowed Hsiung Wên-ts'an to handle it at his own discretion.'

⁶³ 'Ch'u Ts'ai-lao' is noted in formal Chinese sources most likely as 'Chung Pin'. However, since he is mostly referred to in Dutch archives as Ch'u Ts'ai-lao, I shall use this name. Cf. Shên Yün, *T'ai-wan Chêng-shih shih-mo*[The begin and end of the Cheng regime in Taiwan], TW no. 15, 5.

⁶⁴ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 56.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

As Iquan had been absent from Amoy since the end of September, a new Regional Commander, Chao T'ing, was put in charge of the coastal defence.⁶⁵ Regional Commander Chao had sedulously flattered Ch'u Ts'ai-lao and urged him on to betray Li K'uei-ch'i.⁶⁶ The upshot was that Ch'u Ts'ai-lao did succeed in usurping Li K'uei-ch'i's position. On 9 March, the emperor assented to Li K'uei-ch'i being accorded the same treatment as Iquan had received. Once this matter had been settled, it was decided that Iquan would be based along the coast north of Ch'üan-chou, while Li K'uei-ch'i would be stationed along south of Ch'üan-chou.⁶⁷ Since Ch'u Ts'ai-lao had already taken Li K'uei-ch'i's place, he sent a letter informing the Dutch in Taiwan of his new position:

*'The Grand Co-ordinator has ordered me to accompany Iquan to Amoy, so that I might join Iquan there to serve the emperor properly.'*⁶⁸

After Li K'uei-ch'i had been arrested, Iquan returned to Amoy. In March, Governor Hans Putmans of Taiwan dispatched some Chinese

⁶⁵ He was appointed the successor of Regional Commander Yü Tzu-kao not long after Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an arrived. Although his was a formal court appointment, the garrison in Amoy had long been unmanned. The new garrison under his command should have been equal in size to the number of Iquan's newly recruited soldiers. Hsiung, 'Fu-chien hsin-fu hsiung ts'an-chieh-t'ieh', 23. cf. The Minister of War, Yen Ming-t'ai, 'Wei min-chiang pu-k'ê pu-ch'ü, min-fu pu-k'ê pu-liu têng shih on 13 Mar. 1628 [Suggest to Remove the Military Commanders of Fu-chien while Keep the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien at Station]', in: Ch'ên Yün-lin, *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, Vol. 3, 81-115 at 113-5. Chao T'ing was ordered to take this position by Emperor's order on 13 March 1628.

⁶⁶ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 47. 'Chao Ting got on well with pirates.'

⁶⁷ Ku, 'Appendix I: Cheng Chih-lung shou-fu', 150. 'The Fu-chien waters in the south of Chang-chou have been put under Li K'uei-ch'i's control and the Fu-chien waters to the north of Chang-chou are under Cheng Chih-lung's control.'

⁶⁸ VOC 1101, Missive van Tousailack [Ch'u Ts'ai-lao] naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received in]Taiwan, 8 April 1630, fo. 474^f.

CHAPTER THREE

merchants who were living in Batavia with instructions to sail to Amoy and Hai-ch'êng city to sell the Company pepper.⁶⁹ Iquan lost no time in sending a message to the Dutch factory in Taiwan ordering 200 piculs of pepper at approximately the same price as the Batavian Chinese merchants had asked.⁷⁰ When the Dutch junk arrived in Amoy, its crew were witness to the fact that Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an sent a mandarin to pay the salaries of Iquan and Ch'u Ts'ai-lao, as their reward for defeating Li K'uei-ch'i. As neutral parties, the Dutch had also taken part in this brave action and hence Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an was also acknowledging the friendship and amenability of the Dutch, an intimation that to some degree at least free trade would be granted:

*'This mandarin praised us extravagantly on behalf of the Grand Co-ordinator and because our endeavours [implied] that there is no doubt that we shall be granted free trade. All kinds of goods will be able to be brought in abundance to us in Taiwan. Some merchants have asked us to procure six or seven licences from the Grand Co-ordinator, intimating that if the licences were granted to them, they would be able to trade with us freely.'*⁷¹

Iquan began to distribute the pepper he had bought from the Dutch, as Ch'u Ts'ai-lao mentions in above-mentioned letter:

'The merchants have concluded a contract with Iquan, for which he went to

⁶⁹ VOC 1101, Resolutie des Comptoirs Taiwan [genomen bij Hans Putmans], Taiwan, 27 Feb. 1630. fo. 424^f.

⁷⁰ VOC 1101, Resolutie des Comptoirs Taiwan [genomen bij Hans Putmans], Taiwan, 6 Mar. 1630. fo. 425^f.

⁷¹ VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630, fo. 422^v; Leonard Blussé, Margot E. van Opstall, Ts'ao Yung-ho, Wouter E. Milde (eds), *De dagregisters van het kasteel Zeelandia: Taiwan 1629-1662* [*The Diary of Castle Zeelandia*], 4 vols, ('s-Gravenhage : Nijhoff, 1986), I:1629-1641, 21. 6 Mar. 1630. (henceforward cited as 'Dagregister Zeelandia'.)

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

see the Grand Co-ordinator so that the trade would be conducted in the proper fashion'.⁷²

Since Ch'u Ts'ai-lao was absent from Amoy Harbour, he was excluded from the luxury trade and therefore unable to build a proper source of income for his troops. Therefore, he had no other recourse than to squeeze this out of trade by violence.

'On the 10th of this month (April), about 20 small junks of his (Ch'u Ts'a-lao) returned to the harbour (of Amoy). The crews of these vessels came ashore and behaved brutally, smashing some houses to pieces... hardly a person was to be seen in the suburbs, and no resistance was offered.'⁷³

The same scene was witnessed by a Chinese official in the vicinity.⁷⁴ Ch'u Ts'ai-lao intended to redirect the proceeds he stole from Iquan's trade into his own pocket. He therefore positioned his main force at the entrance of Amoy Bay and sent some of his small junks into Amoy Harbour to harass those merchants who did business with either the Dutch or Iquan. Their special targets were those merchants who associated with Iquan. Because his base had been weakened and he was deprived of his own vessels, Iquan's only option was to retreat from Amoy to An-hai.⁷⁵ Later, Iquan's merchants from An-hai came directly to the Dutch ships anchored at Wu-yü

⁷² VOC 1101, Missive van Tousailack [Ch'u Ts'ai-lao] naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received in]Taiwan, 8 Apr.1630, fos. 473^v-474^r.

⁷³ VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenus naer Taijouan aan Hans Putmans, Chiulung River, 11 Apr. 1630, fo. 475r.

⁷⁴ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 50. 'The pirates have become extremely reckless. They sail around capturing people from all around Amoy. ...The residential command positioned on the city wall, [although] seeing such mayhem,.. ordered his soldiers to fire not a single bullet and kept his soldiers within the city, resisting any action which would attack the pirates.'

⁷⁵ VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630. fo. 412^r.

CHAPTER THREE

Island.⁷⁶ Unlike the town of Amoy which is built on a deep water bay, An-hai is located well within a shallow estuary. Big ships and junks had to anchor near the island of Quemoy in Wei-t'ou Bay (in Dutch records 'Erasmus' Bay) outside the river mouth. It was said:

*'This is a very narrow, shallow river, which almost always runs dry at low water level,... with the exception of the mouth.'*⁷⁷

As a consequence of its location, An-hai city was perfectly sheltered from the threat of a barrage of heavy cannon because of its shallow water. Its geographical position also made it the perfect headquarters for the fishermen militia and the rice-transportation junks. Hence, supported by a relatively small number of very well-disciplined soldiers, Iquan's mercenary company had no great difficulty holding out at An-hai. Because the foreign trade in luxury items was the most important pillar of his enterprise, Iquan was zealous in his efforts to have it legalized, but before Iquan had been able to arrange the legal licences for the Dutch, Ch'u Ts'ai-lao captured a Dutch yacht on 23 June and later took another three Dutch junks after he returned from his mission to Nan-ao Island.⁷⁸ Later he realized Iquan was residing in An-hai, so he decided to blockade Wei-t'ou Bay, using as his excuse that Iquan was a traitor. Iquan sent a letter to the Dutch authorities in Taiwan asking for help and declaring that the chance of setting up a legal trade was at stake:

'I shall do my best here. I have proposed free trade to the Grand

⁷⁶ VOC 1101, Missive van Nicolaas Kouckebacker naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 2 Jun. 1630, fo. 484^f.

⁷⁷ VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630, fo. 412^f.

⁷⁸ VOC 1101, Missive van Tousailack naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received in]Taiwan, 18 May 1630, fo. 480^v. His new mission was to eliminate the pirate Yeh Wo-chên written as 'Nooting' (in Dutch) who had occupied places in the vicinity of Nan-ao Island.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

*Co-ordinator through the Regional Commander, Chao T'ing (Tingia[D.]) and he has consented to it. Several merchants have contacted the Grand Co-ordinator personally about this matter, saying that he will grant a licence to them.'*⁷⁹

Meanwhile, Ch'u Ts'ai-lao had not remained inactive and had made further moves. He prepared to intercept the Amoy junks homeward bound from Manila in the hope of accumulating enough capital to build up his own foreign trade. On the 22nd, somewhere in the vicinity of Wei-t'ou Bay he captured around a Ch'üan-chou junk returning from Manila with a cargo valued at about 28,000 rials.⁸⁰ He also plundered fishing-boats and rice-transporters.⁸¹ Ch'u Ts'ai-lao even dared to send several small-sized war junks into the An-hai River, where they set fire to Iquan's junks.⁸² While he was carrying out these depredations, the fishermen militia, on whom Iquan depended, had all sailed to the Kuang-tung coast to fish, depriving Iquan of any means to fight back, so he prudently stayed put in An-hai,⁸³ where he busied himself purchasing goods there to meet the Dutch orders. Now the only possible threat to Ch'u Ts'ai-lao were the new war-junks which were under construction in some shipyards around Fuchou.⁸⁴ In a letter to the Governor of Taiwan dated 26 August, Iquan informed the former that he was leaving to sail to Fu-ch'ing (a district near Fu-chou).⁸⁵ Obviously this move was a reaction to Ch'u Ts'ai-lao's movements. Ch'u actually sailed out with a

⁷⁹ VOC 1101, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received in] Taiwan, 22 Jun. 1630, fo. 486^v.

⁸⁰ VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630, fos. 413r-v; fo. 421v.

⁸¹ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 58-59.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 46.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ VOC 1101, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received in]Taiwan, 26 Aug. 1630. fos. 497^{r-v}.

CHAPTER THREE

fleet of fifty junks bound for Hsiao-ch'êng (*Tsiotia*[D.]), a place near Fu-chou.⁸⁶ His absence gave Iquan's business partners the opportunity remove their stores from Amoy to An-hai:

*'... upon seeing that Ch'u Ts'ai-lao leaving, Iquan's people and the inhabitants of Amoy city grabbed everything which was his and on which he relied. They also killed (according to what we have heard) some of his followers. Thereupon, fearing that Ch'u Ts'ai-lao might come back, they returned to An-hai.'*⁸⁷

In September, Ch'u Ts'ai-lao's fleet ran into a severe typhoon and fifty to sixty of his junks foundered.⁸⁸ It was only then that Iquan's lucky star rose again because his losses meant that Ch'u Ts'ai-lao was no longer able to blockade Wei-t'ou Bay. On 15 October, before Ch'u Ts'ai-lao had returned to Amoy, the Mobile Crops Commander of Ch'üan-nan (*Ch'üan-nan You-chi*[C.], *Jouckicq* [D.]) and the Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-t'ung (*Wu-t'ung You-Chi*[C.], *Gotoncquiou*[D.]) of the Amoy residential troops promulgated a placard forbidding anyone to trade with Dutch vessels which happened to be in the vicinity of Amoy,⁸⁹ but by this time Iquan had already assembled all the merchandise Dutch needed in An-hai:

'...The Chinese merchant Jancon has informed His Honour Governor Putmans, that various commodities such as gold, silk, candied sugar and other sorts of sugar etc. can be obtained free from interference by anyone in

⁸⁶ VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630. fo. 413^v.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, fo. 414^f.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, fo. 423^f.

⁸⁹ VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende raedt int Jacht Bommel ter reede voor Aijmoij inde rivier Chincheo], Chiulung River, 15 Oct. 1630, fo. 511^v. Ch'üan-nan refers to southern side of Ch'üan-chou prefecture. Wu-t'ung refers to Wu-yü and T'ung-shan.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

*An-hai...*⁹⁰

But Ch'u Ts'an-lao was not finished yet. Within a very brief space of time, he reappeared in Amoy in the name of the new Regional Commander, Chao T'ing, and dispatched some messengers to Governor Hans Putmans whose ship was anchored in the Chiu-lung River estuary. He demanded that every commodity the Dutch shipped to Amoy be traded through his agency only.⁹¹ Such a condition was unacceptable to Putmans because it contravened the Governor-General's instructions to him.⁹² Both sides never fully reached an agreement on trade. While they were haggling about conditions, Iquan was gradually building up his naval force in An-hai. At the beginning of December, Ch'u Ts'ai-lao again led his full force away from Amoy with the plan to secure some advantageous anchorages which, he thought, would obviate his being encircled by Iquan.⁹³ Notwithstanding Iquan attacked Ch'u Ts'ai-lao on 16 December:

*'...Iquan attacked Ch'u Ts'ai-lao, burned his brother's junk and drove him off while he was scuttling away in a northerly direction with a few junks. Several days later, Ch'u Ts'ai-lao's vice-admiral deserted him and surrendered to Iquan with four large and six small junks. ...The pirate chief himself escaped.'*⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Ibidem.

⁹¹ VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende raedt int Jacht Bommel ter reede voor Aijmoij inde rivier Chincheo], Chiu-lung River, 28 Nov. 1630, fo. 515^v.

⁹² Ibid., fo. 517^f.

⁹³ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 21 Dec. 1630, fo. 521^f.

⁹⁴ Ibid., fo. 522^v-523^f; Wang, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsiün-lu', 157. 'Chung Liu (alias Chung Pin or Ch'u Ts'ai-lao) was defeated in the sea battle of P'ing-lin Bay on 16 December 1630. He was killed and his followers fled.... On 28th the remainder of pirates arrived in P'ing-hai. They were approached by Cheng's

CHAPTER THREE

When he was apprised of the news, the Dutch governor was excited about the potential trading opportunities this opened up and decided to transport 80,000 silver rials and 2,100 piculs of pepper and some other tropical commodities to the Chiu-lung River estuary.⁹⁵ The Dutch were able to enjoy selling their merchandise without interference until 27 January, when the official Chinese New Year began and all shops closed as everyone went home to celebrate the spring festival. The Dutch merchants decided to send Senior Merchant Paulus Traudenius to An-hai:

'His honour Governor Putmans and the Council decided to dispatch Senior Merchant Traudenius to An-hai on the junk the Tancoya with 4,000 rials, in order to purchase rice and to use this as a pretext to see whether he would be able to get hold of some gold and silk, and also[to spy out] what kinds of commodities the merchants there have, so as to spur them on to bring these goods [for trade], because the sale of pepper has been disappointing and hence it has to be stored with the Company. Therefore we should get rid of it. The junk should be loaded with 50 piculs of pepper and 15 piculs of Elephant tusks to be exchanged by the said Traudenius for some gold, silk, or porcelain. In order to facilitate Traudenius' access to the house of Theyma[the mother of Iquan] and her son Cheng Hung-K'uei (Zija[D], Iquan's younger brother), each one of them should be offered six bags of pepper and six yards of tusk.'

96

Because almost no one came to the Dutch yachts for pepper during Chinese New Year, the Governor and Council decided to offer Iquan more

soldiers. Faced with such a menacing threat, they abandoned their war-junks and ammunition, and fled to Kuang-tung in small boats.'

⁹⁵ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 4 Jan. 1631, fo. 523^v.

⁹⁶ VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt int Jacht Wieringen ter reede Aijmoij inde riviere Chincheo], Chiu-lung River, 27 Jan. 1631, fo. 524^f.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

pepper if he paid the last consignment of commodities off.⁹⁷ Therefore, although the Dutch yachts moored by preference in the Chiu-lung River estuary or in the Amoy roadstead, they sent one or two junks to An-hai. On March 17, Iquan, who had been busily fitting out more his armada in An-hai, eventually managed to destroy the whole of Ch'u Ts'ai-lao's force.⁹⁸ This victory marked the last act of the game of survival played out by the pirates. Although the Dutch did not take part in it, they did begin to play a co-operative role soon after they stepped on the stage. They stopped cruising and let the junks from Manila return to their home ports in exchange for being allowed to enter the Chiu-lung River area by the Chinese Coastal Defence Force.⁹⁹ On 12 June 1631, the triumph over the pirates was reported to the emperor's court in Peking.¹⁰⁰ Iquan might have felt encouraged by some promises from the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, according to a message received by the Dutch in Taiwan:

*'...Because Iquan will shortly be stationed in Amoy as Mobile Crops Commander [of Ch'üan-nan[C]]and his brother, Cheng Hung-k'uei [Sicia[D]], as Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-t'ung, our trade will depend greatly on him. Iquan requires 2,000 taels (he does not specify what for in his letter)....'*¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt int Jacht Wieringen ter reede voor Aijmoij inde riviere Chincheo], Chiu-lung River, 8 Feb. 1631, fos. 524^v-525^r.

⁹⁸ VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt in t jacht Wieringen liggende ter reede voor Aimoij], Chiulung River, 1 Mar. 1631, fos. 525^r; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I:1629-1641, 45. 5 Apr. 1631.

⁹⁹ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 29 May. 1631. fos. 532^{r-v};fo.533^r.

¹⁰⁰ Wang, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu[Selections]', 158.

¹⁰¹ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 4 Jul. 1631, fo. 533^v. According to a letter written by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien to Iquan, he tried to encourage him by recommending him for the

CHAPTER THREE

Later it was revealed that the 2,000 taels might have been restitution claimed for a certain Chinese junk returning from Manila which had been intercepted by a Dutch yacht.¹⁰² Governor Hans Putmans investigated this case immediately, and found it was possible that some of his subordinates had indeed committed the crime.¹⁰³ Very probably the owner of that junk was paid compensation through the mediation of Iquan.¹⁰⁴ After Ch'u Ts'ai-lao had been defeated, fifty-three junks departed from China bound for Manila. They were all involved in the smuggling trade. Were they sailing out under the cover of Iquan's armada? Reviewing their overall tonnage it would seem that only one-quarter of the usual merchant junks visited Manilla and thus they might have been mixed among Iquan's ships.¹⁰⁵ This smuggling trade

position of Assistant Regional Commander (Ts'an-chiang) of the Ch'ao-chang in Nan-ao and his brother, Cheng Chih-hu, for Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-hu. Therefore in this letter 'Sicia' might actually refer to Cheng Chih-hu. Cf. Tsou Wei-lien, 'Yü Chêng-ts'an-jung[Letter to Assistant Regional Commander Cheng]', in id, *Ta-kuan lou-chi* [Works in the Ta-kuan House], pien-chi wei-yüen-hui [Editorial Committee of Ssu-k'u ts'ung-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu](ed.), *Ssu-k'u ts'ung-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu*, 426vols, (Tainan county: Chuang-yen Wên-hua, 1997), part Chi, no. 183, 269.

¹⁰² VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 30 Jul. 1631, fo. 534^f. The claimed price was 1,900 rials.

¹⁰³ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 6 Aug. 1631, fos. 534^v -535^f.

¹⁰⁴ *Daghregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands India*[Diary Kept in Batavia Castle about What Has Happened All Over the East Indian Area], 31 vols, eds Jacobus Anne van der Chijs, H. T.Colenbrander, J. de Hullu, F. de Haan and W. Fruin-Mees (Batavia and The Hague: Ministerie van Koloniën, 1888-1931), 1631-1634, 51. 20 Nov. 1631. (here after cited as 'Daghregister Batavia')

¹⁰⁵ VOC 1102, In het Comptoir Tijouan den 10en Augusteo 1631 Joctee Chinesen weever met eenige Coopmanschap jongst uijt China alhier g'arriveert zijnde ende van dit tegenwoordige zuijder musson in Manilha geweest hebbende, is door last van D Hr Gouverneur Putmans onder vraecht vande gelegentheijt derselver plaatse ende heeft

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

will have provided enough income to pay the salaries of Iquan's troops and of the fishermen militia as well. After everything had been settled, Iquan was dispatched by Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an to eliminate a group of bandits hiding in the hills. This assignment was a confirmation that he had been accepted by the Chinese government after the pirate's game of survival had been played out. The comment of one of his contemporaries reveals what the gentry thought:

*'Although Ch'u Ts'ai-lao drowned, the rest of his people have fled away. Now that Iquan has removed his rival, we shall have to handle him with kid gloves. We cannot disband his followers too rapidly. We also cannot reduce their salaries too soon. Furthermore, as his revenue comes from the Dutch trade, so we cannot take that away and hand it over to public tender.In the Grand Co-ordinator's report of victory to the emperor, he has implied that Iquan and his brother should be appointed Frontier Defence Officers. I think this is very wise.'*¹⁰⁶

Although foreign trade was still officially forbidden, Iquan's people had to be fed. Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an might therefore have tolerated Iquan's smuggling trade in An-hai. As guardians and supervisors of the official foreign trade, under the emperor's edict the Amoy authorities should not have allowed any foreign trade. Mindful of their official duties, after all the junks had returned from Manila, and only after that, the Amoy


geantwoordt [Answers given after his arrival in Taiwan by the Chinese weaver *Joctee* who has been in Manila during current south monsoon to the questions raised by Governor Putmans about the situations in that place] (henceforward cited as 'Information about Manila'), Taiwan, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555^r. According to this report, 53 junks were needed to carry the cargo 12 junks had done earlier. They might have been the vessels belonging to Iquan's fishermen militia, because the tonnage of each vessel had been reduced to half and the profits would also have been cut.

¹⁰⁶ Tung, *Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsiian-lu*, 84.

CHAPTER THREE

officials again issued a placard re-iterating the maritime prohibition.¹⁰⁷ The order decreed that no Dutch vessel would be allowed to sail into Chiu-lung River estuary or its vicinity or the Amoy roadstead. Consequently, the An-hai trade was the only avenue open to the Dutch even though they were very reluctant to share the Chinese trade with their foe: the Spaniards in Manila.

Picture 2. Embouchure de la Riviere de Chincheo à La Chine [The Estuary of Changchou River in China]



Source: René Auguste Constantin de Renneville (ed.), *Recueil des voyages qui ont servi à*

¹⁰⁷ VOC 1102, Missive van de Chinese mandarijn Soutongiou naer Aijmoeij aen Hollanders [Letter to the Dutch in Amoy from the Chinese Mandarin Mobile Corps Commander of Wu-t'ung (Wu-yü and T'ung-shan)], Chiu-lung River, 8 Sept.1631, fo. 556^r.

THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631

l'établissement et aux progrès de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, formée dans les Provinces-Unies de Païs Bas [The Collections of Voyages about the Establishment and Expansion of the United Netherland Provinces' East India Company], (Rouen: Chez P. Caillous, 1725), Tome IX, 176. National Museum of Taiwan History, 2003.015.0036.

Original explanations following the letters:

A is the City Amoy, where the Coastal Defense Circuit is holding residence. It is harbouring lots of ships fully laden with merchants.

B is the great city An-hai, away from Amoy for 6 to 7 dutch miles. It is also very active in business and trade.

C is a stone brige stands over the river, which is 350 pace long and is made on the arches of steady hard lime stones.

D Erasmus Bay

E The eiland Quemoy is also very populated, and fisery is prosperous.

F The island Lieh-yü, where our [VOC] ships frequently anchored and traded with the coming merchants.

G The island Ta-tan, which usually laid at starboard side when we went up stream.

H The eiland Wu-yü or the temple, where our ships frequently moored behind and traded.

I the Island Kulang-yü, laid opposite Amoy at the distance of one shoot of an iron canon. It is inhabited by lots of fishermans.

K the island of tower (Kuei-yü), laid in the first narrowness of the Chiu-lung River.

L The Mount T'ai-wu, a very useful sign of the Chiu-lung River, where stands a square stone in a form as a tower.

CHAPTER FOUR
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE AN-HAI TRADING EMPORIUM
1630-1633

**1630: the exceptional year in which the Eastern Ocean monopoly of
An-hai was established**

Over such a span of time it is difficult to tell whether Iquan knew that the Dutch in Taiwan had decided to put a brake on their cruising expeditions against the Chinese junks sailing to and from Manila. Historical fact states that in summer of 1631 the governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, visited Amoy to pay compensation for the loss of a Chinese junk which had been plundered on her way back to China from Manila. The local Hai-ch'êng gazette reports the sea ban was lifted in that year. Interestingly, the tax revenues which Hai-ch'êng had hoped for from the expected rise in shipping fell short of the high expectations.¹ This local record runs counter to both the Dutch and Spanish accounts, which mention large numbers of junks sailing to the Philippines. The Dutch records state that fifty-three Chinese junks arrived in Manila that year, a number which tallies fairly closely with the Spanish records which mention fifty.² Perhaps this shortfall (many junks, but

¹ Liang Chao-yang, 'Hai-ch'êng hsien-chih', 382. 'In the year 1631, the oceanic trade was again permitted. But the customs revenues were still meagre' The court records tally with this information, showing that the emperor ordered to open up the trade on 4 August 1631. cf. The Minister of War, Hsiung Mingyü, Ch'ou-i Fu-chien k'ai-hai li-hai [Considerations on pros en cons concerning the opening of the Overseas Trade in Fu-chien] Setp. 1631', in: Ch'ên Yün-lin, *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, vol. 3, 150-97at 192-3.

² VOC 1102, The Information about Manila, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555r; William

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

disappointing tax revenues) can be explained by the prevalence of smuggling which continued to paralyse the legal trade. As mentioned before³, fifty-three small junks carried about as much as twelve big ones. Since the officials were approached for permission by only a small number of applicants who wished to pursue licit trade, it would appear that most of the junks sailing on Manila were small-sized junks belonging to smugglers. Other evidence reveals that the size of a fishing junk was very similar to that of these small trading junks:

*'Whether, according to the instructions of the Honourable Governor-General, [our] junks should cruise between Fu-chou and Chi-lung (where the enemy's stronghold is located) in the course of this voyage in order to intercept, confront, and attack Chinese trading junks sailing to or back from there, or whether according to the instructions from Japan, from their assessment of the situation in the Chinese trade, that we should save our expenses in this matter as [it seems the outcome of] a sustained cruising action against the Manila junks would be uncertain. [This is] because the many fishing junks which sail these waters every day are so big, they can scarcely if all to be distinguished from the trading junks. If some of them are hit or attacked by accident, this always arouses ire against us in China....'*⁴

It is true that two very important fishing grounds were located on the sea route between Ch'üan-chou and Japan, and that between Japan and Manila. The first lay very close to the sea route from Ch'üan-chou to

L. Schurz, *Manila Galleon*, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 71. On the other hand, according to Pierre Chaunu, the number was 39. Cf. Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques: XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIes* [The Iberian Philippines and Pacific: 16th-18th century], (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N, 1968), 156.

³ Cf. Chapter 2, footnote 105.

⁴ VOC 1102, *Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende raedt]*, Taiwan, 4 Oct. 1631, fos. 543v-544r. Although it describes the size of fishing junks as 'big', this is a comparison with the off-shore fishing junks. It does not imply that these fishing junks were as big as the overseas trading junks sailing to Siam and Java. The enemy in Chi-lung refers to the Spaniards.

CHAPTER FOUR

Okinawa[J.] (*Ryūkyū*[J.], *Liu-ch'io*[C.]) and Japan, not far from the northeastern Taiwanese waters where an upwelling current forms a natural fishing ground. The junks sailing to Japan usually set a course towards these waters first before following the string of islands of the Ryūkyū Archipelago until they reached Kyushu. The second fishing ground was situated close to the southwestern coast of Taiwan, where a cold current (the *Oyashio*) meets a warm current (the *Kuroshio*). The junks sailing to Manila usually set course for the Pescadores, from where they headed south, sailing along the coast of Taiwan towards Luzon. This route crosses the fishing grounds where the warm and cold currents meet.

It is amazing that the Chinese officials believed that by restricting the size of ships and the quantity of provisions they could carry they could confine the activities of sailors close to shore. This line of thought was decidedly impractical in the silk-for-silver trade, because both commodities occupied far less space than bulky goods like elephant tusks and deer skins. The coastal defence force was rarely in a position to offer these trading junks any protection. Its principal job was to prevent smuggling, and guard the shores. Fishermen, who always needed money, were far more accommodating and often offered merchants their services in delivering messages or supplying them with essential food and fresh water. Usually the sailing rhythm of the Fu-chien fishing junks to the different fishing grounds was governed by the fishing season. When they arrived during the season, they poured in in such huge numbers, the soldiers of the coastal defence force felt overwhelmed. Since the fishing fleets on the high seas were not regulated by any official authority, the pirates tended to fill the vacuum. The report of the Chê-chiang Grand Co-ordinator, Chang Yen-teng, clearly reveals his worry that these Fu-chienese fishermen were actually under the protection, if not the control of the pirates, who collected private protection money from them.

'The massive number of fishing boats causes problems. The fishing grounds situated off Chê-chiang province, off Tai-chou and Chang-kuo and Ning-po

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

prefecture yield ribbonfish. Only the Fu-chienese fishermen in Pu-t'ien district and Fu-ching district are skilled [at catching this species]. Several hundreds of their fishing boats arrive every July and August. This really huge gathering only disbands in December. The coastal defence force is embarrassed by the situation.

...The pirates live in islands nearby. They choose their leader themselves and issue passes, which they sell according to the size of the junks, at a price ranging from 20 to 50 taels. Before anyone can begin to collect their catch, they must show them the pass which they have purchased. To issue a licence before the merchandise is sold is called 'Pao-shui', to levy silver after the merchandise has been sold is called 'Chiao-p'iao'. This payment has always been collected efficiently in certain periods and has become a kind of custom. No one has ever even suggested that such a practice is illegal'.⁵

The size of the junks used in the rice trade was probably not very different from that of the fishing junks. They were certainly not as large as the big junks which sailed to Siam or Java. In other words, they fell also under the protection of the groups which controlled the fishing-boat. At the times the fishing-boats were under the control of pirates, they could be used against the official authorities because the coastal defence force was too weak to prevent the harassment by the pirates. When Iquan was recruited to serve in the coastal defence system of the Chinese empire, he tried to satisfy the requirements of both the officials and the fishermen. He did not stop collecting the protection money since he needed the revenue to feed his own men, but he opened the door for the fishermen to take part in the Manila smuggling trade.

When the Dutch decided to pay compensation for one plundered Manila-bound junk after Iquan had acted as mediator, the latter claimed that

⁵ Chang, 'Ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u Chê-chiang hsün-fu Chang-yen-têng t'i-pên', 16 May. 1629', 14.

CHAPTER FOUR

he was more efficacious than the former officials in safe-guarding the welfare of the merchants. The Dutch did not yet realize that Iquan was not a proper official and that the Chinese administration had never asked for the compensation. The only solution the officials could think of was to forbid anyone ever to trade with the Dutch again. Emerging from this incident with a glowing reputation, Iquan might have seemed to have gained even more legitimacy to collect his protection money from all shipping, irrespective of whether it was legal or not.

So far, no solid evidence has been found to prove that Iquan also intervened/participated in the Chinese smuggling trade with Japan at the time. This was precisely the period in which the Dutch were forced to suspend their trading activities in Japan temporarily because of the Japanese-Dutch conflict of 1628 in Taijoun. Their trade activities in Hirado were not resumed until four years later in the autumn of 1632.⁶ Coincidentally, the Portuguese trade with Japan was also suspended at more or less the same moment because the *Bakufu* had received the news that a Japanese junk had been attacked by a Spanish ship in Siam.⁷ The interruption of the raw silk trade which passed through these two important channels naturally drove the price up to a new height. The raw silk price reached 345 taels per picul in Japan in October 1631⁸ and in Manila it was selling for 311 taels.⁹ Despite these inflated prices, the Dutch could purchase silk from the Chinese for only 135

⁶ Innes, Robert LeRoy., *The Door Ajar: Japan's foreign trade in the seventeenth century*, (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1980), 185. Blussé, 'Bull in a China Shop: Pieter Nuyts in China and Japan (1627-1636)', in Blussé (ed.), *Around and About Dutch Formosa*, (Taipei: NanTien Publisher, 2003), pp. 95-110 at 103,106.

⁷ Innes, *The door ajar*, 266.

⁸ *Ibid*, 280. Table 10.

⁹ VOC 1102, Information about Manila, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555^f. The raw silk price was 350 rials per picul. As one Japanese tael equalled 58 stuivers and 1 rial equalled 51 stuivers, 1 rial equalled 0.89 tael. In this conversion, the raw silk price in Manila was 311 taels per picul.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

taels.¹⁰ A simple calculation shows that the profits earned by the Chinese smugglers would have been at least 155 per cent in Japan and 130 per cent in Manila. Unsurprisingly they were loath to share this opportunity to make a large fortune. Besides the fifty-three Chinese junks which made port in Manila, approximately sixty arrived in Japan.¹¹ Two junks belonging to Iquan also returned to An-hai from Japan in the winter of 1631.¹²

How much profit Iquan actually earned from his fisherman smugglers is shrouded in mystery. However, in the above description the strong position occupied by the Ch'üan-chou or An-hai merchants in the silk-for-silver smuggling trade emerges quite clearly for the first time. For different reasons, the Chinese merchants in Chang-chou, the Portuguese merchants in Macao and the Dutch merchants in Taijouan were all temporarily excluded from the Japan trade in this exceptional year. The explosive growth of this trading link must have astonished every member of the newly constructed trading system which was based in An-hai.

Towards the An-hai Monopoly in the Western Ocean: the Taijouan trade from 1630-1632

The Dutch insisted on selling their goods from their yachts or junks at an anchorage in the bay of Amoy, in the vicinity of Amoy or Hai-ch'êng. As there was a ready market in Chang-chou for most of the commodities they had to sell, slowly and surely they had succeeded in building up a smooth-running channel of exchange through the good offices of Squadron Leader Hsü Hsin-su and Regional Commander Yü Tzu-kao when Iquan shattered their carefully laid plans in 1628. After his intervention threw all

¹⁰ The price in 1631 was 135 tael. Cf. Generale Missive, 1 Dec. 1632, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 103.

¹¹ Innes, *The door ajar*, 635. Table A.

¹² *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 61. 21 Jan. 1632.

CHAPTER FOUR

their projects into disarray, the newly appointed governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, decided to follow the Governor-General's instruction to trade directly with Chinese peddlers and carry this commerce out on a cargo by cargo basis. This cautious approach would avoid being saddled with the huge debt which was frequently the unpleasant outcome of paying advances to rich agents too hastily.¹³

While they were busily engaged in selling their commodities to some adventurous peddlers, their old partners, under the protection of Squadron Leader Hsü Hsin-su and Regional Commander Yü Tzu-kao, were eliminated on the orders of the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts'an. When Iquan showed signs of gradually shifting his base to An-hai in 1630, the Dutch saw his move as a second option to fall back on if they ran into more difficulties in and around Amoy. As some of their fears had been allayed after Ch'u Ts'ai-lao's pirate force had been rapidly reduced in October 1630, the Dutch decided that it was safe to return to the bay of Amoy again to purchase the Chinese commodities ordered by Batavia. By February 1631 the trade had been more or less resumed on a normal footing and was busily conducted throughout the whole of the following spring and summer. Then, sometime around August 1631, Iquan was formally assigned to root out the bandits who occupied the hilly areas on the southwestern border of Fu-chien province.¹⁴ After he left on this mission on 8 September on the orders of Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an, the Amoy Regional Commander Chang (further name unknown) put up a placard forbidding any trade with the Dutch

13 Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 16. 'These pirates who betrayed Cheng Chih-lung would lure the red-haired barbarians into Amoy waters and cause trouble.'

14 Liang T'ien-chi, 'Hui-ch'ao Kuang-tung shan-k'ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz'u ts'an-kao[The Suggested Rewards for the Joint Forces to Attack the Bandits in Kuang-tung Chung-ling-hsiu]', in TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 24. 'Around August or September, Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-t'san dispatched Acting Regional commander Cheng Chih-lung with Cheng Chih-hu to lead 2,000 soldiers to Shang-hang District.'

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

and requiring all Dutch vessels to leave Amoy and return to Taiwan.¹⁵ The Dutch drew up an account which has survived of what the Chinese merchants had purchased from them between 30 November 1630 and 30 September 1631.

Table 4-1. The various commodities sold by the Dutch between 30 Nov. 1630 and 30 Sept. 1631

Commodity	Stored amount on 30 Nov. 1630	Sold amount on 30 Sept. 1631	Percentage Sold
Pepper	231,074 catties	198,024 catties	85%
Elephant Tusks	6,412 pounds	5,312 pounds	82.8%
Sandalwood	9,679 catties	800 catties	8%
Cloves	1,659 pounds	48 pounds	2%
Nutmeg	10,270 pounds	2,624 pounds	25%

Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen 'tsedert primo November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565^v-566^f.

This account provides unequivocal evidence that, although various sorts of tropical commodities were offered for sale by the Company, the most popular commodities were pepper and elephant tusks. These goods were sold in different ways:

¹⁵ VOC 1102, Missive van de Chinese mandarijn Soutongiou naer Aijmoeij aen Hollanders [Letter Written by Chinese Mandarin Soutongiou to the Dutch in the Vicinity of Amoy], Chiu-lung River, 8 Sept. 1631, fo. 556^f.

CHAPTER FOUR

Table 4-2: the proportions of the commodities sold

Commodity	Pepper (catty)	Elephant tusk (pound)	Nutmeg (pound)
Cash purchases	35,550(18%)	2,297(35.8%)	552 (21%)
Bartered in the bay of Amoy	140,574 (71%)	3,075(47.9%)	872 (33.2%)
Chinese merchant Gampea	13,600 (6%)		1,200(45.8%)
Other Chinese merchants	8,100 (4%)		
Total amount sold	197,824	6,412	2,624

Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen 'tsedert primo November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565^v-566^r.

The table reveals that, even though some Chinese merchants (Gampea, Hambuan, Injeij Watting) obviously had larger amounts of capital to dispense, most of tropical commodities sold by the Dutch passed through the hands of the peddlers who carried small portions of goods or cash to the Dutch vessels anchored in the bay of Amoy. As Governor Hans Putmans reported:

*'...So it is that the Chinese who come to the Chiu-lung River estuary with some commodities do so stealthily, running a grave risk not least because they are poor, obscure peddlers not men of property, and unless the Company allows them some credit, as indeed we have done so far, the Company must distribute its capital and receive some goods here.'*¹⁶

¹⁶ VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens Naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Jacques Speex, Taiwan, 30 Oct. 1631, fo. 560^{r-v}.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

Table 4- 3:

the revenue of commodities sold between 30 Nov.1630 and 30 Sept. 1631

Commodity price (tael)	Pepper (10taels per picul)	Elephant tusk (55 taels per picul)	Nutmeg (50 taels per picul)	Total Amount (tael)
Paid in cash	3,555	1,035.5	226.2	4,816.7 (20.7%)
Bartered in the bay of Amoy	14,057.4	1,386.3	357.4	15,801.1 (67.8%)
Chinese merchant Gampea	1,360		491.8	1581.8 (6.8%)
Other Chinese merchants	810			810 (4.7%)
Totally sold amount	19,782.4 (84.9%)	2,421.8 (10.4%)	1,075.4 (4.7%)	23,279.6 (100%)

Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen 'tsedert primo November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565^v-566^f. The price of each commodity. Cf. *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 52. 20 Nov. 1631. Picul = 122 pounds.

The figures in this table leave no doubt that the bulk of the income came from the pepper trade, especially that conducted with peddlers in the bay of Amoy the total sum (23,279 taels) of the goods traded amounted to 32,591 rials.¹⁷ Putmans' report states that some 80,000 rials in silver coins had been made available before 2 February.¹⁸ Bearing this in mind, the proportion of

¹⁷ In 1632 one rial equalled 50 stuivers while one Chinese tael equalled about 70 stuivers. Therefore one tael equalled 1.4 rials. See Appendix I, table E: the value of rial and tael around Taiwan, 1624-1661.

¹⁸ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende rade], Taiwan, 4 Jan. 1631, fo. 523^v; VOC 1103, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 10 Oct. 1631, fo. 339^f. The former

CHAPTER FOUR

capital which the Dutch invested on the Coast of China in cash and tropical commodities was about 10:4. Silver coins imported from Batavia predominated in this trade.

Although it would be hard to say how much of this was invested with Iquan or with his merchants, it does give some idea of the scale of the An-hai-Taijouan trade during this initial period. The bulk was sold to the peddlers but certain established merchants were certainly involved. Gampea (Hung Hsü) and Bendiok (Ming Yüeh, alias Cheng T'ai) were the two most important merchants who represented Iquan in the An-hai-Taiwan trade. Bendiok took over the supplying of high quality silk goods after Iquan moved from Amoy to An-hai in the summer of 1630.¹⁹

In his guise of Iquan's servant, Gampea seems to have begun to deal with the Dutch in the area around Amoy after the defeat of Ch'u Ts'ai-lao.²⁰ As the tables show, his main duty was to take charge of the tropical commodities imported by the Dutch. Both of Gampea and Bendiok were also mentioned as food suppliers when the Dutch in Taiwan accidentally ran into a shortage of rice:

'... since last month we have been informed of the need for such a quantity of rice, owing to the enemy's siege[of Batavia], otherwise they would have been able to deliver more than enough to cover our requirements.

source mentions that Putmans decided to take cash to the Coast of China and the latter reported that most of the cash had been paid out before 2 Feb. 1631.

¹⁹ VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenius naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 7 May. 1630, fo. 478^v; VOC 1101, Missive van Nicolaas Kouckebacker naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 2 Jun. 1630, Fo. 484^r. Hung Hsü and Cheng T'ai are two most prominent merchants who serve the Cheng family. Their active period and role correspond to those of Gampea and Bendiok in the Dutch archives. However no direct evidence of their identities can be traced.

²⁰ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 46. 5 Apr. 1631.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

*....upon which we and His Honour [Putmans]unanimously decided to draw up a contract with the merchants Bendiock and Gampea for 1,200 sacks of wheat and about as much again of rice, to be delivered in Taiwan.*²¹

Later the Dutch heard that a placard had been posted in Amoy on 8 September, ordering them to depart to Taiwan. Nearly a fortnight later, on 20 September they decided to send a letter to An-hai, requesting Iquan's assistance. The response from An-hai was that Iquan's mother told the messenger that because the mandarin ' who was in charge of the annual inspection of the junks' had arrived, she could not help and asked them to leave.²² Both Bendiock and Gampea were depicted as maintaining close links with Iquan, in fact they were his employees.²³ They sailed to Taiwan with licences granted through his intervention.²⁴ On 27 September 1631, the governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, decided to pay each of them 100 picul pepper and 400 rials in cash as an advance which would enable them to barter for the goods they desired from the Company yachts moored in the bay of Amoy, irrespective of the hostile proclamation on the placard.²⁵ Hampered by the absence of Iquan and put under pressure by the Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, the Dutch gradually acquiesced in trading with Iquan's merchants rather than, as had been their wont in recent years, of with some

²¹ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 5 Sept. 1631, fo. 537^v.

²² VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 20 Sept. 1631, fo. 539^f.

²³ VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 2. Sep. 1632, fo. 227^f. Both of them are referred as Iquan's 'creatures'; VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 227^v.

²⁴ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 20 Sept.1631, fo. 539^f.

²⁵ VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 27 Sept.1631, fo. 543^v.

CHAPTER FOUR

obscure peddlers. Later, the Dutch left the Amoy roadstead and shifted their anchorage to an island in the mouth of the bay called Lieh-yü , where they waited to see what would happen next. When the stream of peddlers dried up completely, they decided to try to make official contact with An-hai in November:

*'The Council...decided unanimously in agreement with His Honour [Hans Putmans] that because of the placard placed by the Grand Co-ordinator in Amoy (which forbids all our trade), now no one else other than Gampea and Bindiock will dare to come... and the trade will obviously slow down, to dispatch Traudenius to An-hai from Lieh- yü with 6,000 rials in an attempt to stabilize the trade to its former level. And in order to entice Mrs Cheng (who is a greedy woman), we shall bestow on her goods worth about 100 rials.'*²⁶

The message seemed to be that only if the Dutch were to leave the place where the Amoy troops were garrisoned would their trade be tolerated.²⁷ When he returned from his mission on a junk Merchant Traudenius reported that the 6,000 rials had been successfully spent mostly on raw silk and gold. Also In his opinion, An-hai could supply more than had been included in this order.²⁸ When they heard this news, the Dutch in

²⁶ VOC 1105, Resolutie gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende sijn presente raaden]int Jacht Wieringen ter reede voor 't Eijlandt Lissua in de rivier Chincheou], Chiu-lung River, 8 Nov. 1631, fo. 214^r.

²⁷ The next Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, confirmed this smuggling trade between Iquan and the VOC had been tolerated by the previous Grand Co-ordinators, Hsiung Wên-t'san. Tsou Wei-lien, 'Fêng-ch'ao hung-i pao-chieh shu [A Report on a Victory in the Battle to Eliminate Red-haired Barbarians]', in id., *Ta-kuan lou-chi [Works in Ta-kuan house]*, Ssu-k'u ts'ung-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu pien-chi wei-yüan-hui[editorial committee of Ssu-k'u ts'ung-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu](ed.), *Ssu-k'u ts'ung-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu*, 426 vols, (Tainan county: Chuang-yen Wên-hua, 1997), part Chi, no. 183, 240.

²⁸ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Catwijck ter reede onder t eijlandt Lissuo inde revier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River,

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

Lieh-yü decided to send another 8,000 rials to An-hai immediately, and dispatched another junk carrying all their remaining pepper, elephant tusks and 20-30 piculs of sandalwood from Taijouan to Lieh-yü to see what would happen.²⁹ On 28 January, the Dutch gave both Gampea and Bindiook 300 rials because they were the only merchants who still continued to supply what the Company ordered.³⁰ The upshot of these machinations was that in the spring of 1632 the Sino-Dutch trade fell into the hands of the An-hai merchants. Because no systematic accounts are available detailing the silver imports from Taiwan to An-hai, it is impossible to form some idea of the exact figure of the capital flow. What is known is that Batavia had shipped 80,000 rials to Taiwan on 1 July 1631 and some 20,000 rials still remained in Taiwan six months later on 7 January 1632³¹. There is also evidence that 36,000 rials were still in store in Taiwan in April 1631.³² After calculating these amounts, it seems fairly safe to say that at least 96,000 silver rials were invested in the An-hai trade between April 1631 and January 1632, bearing in mind that the Dutch capital in Japan was still frozen by the Shogun during this period. Comparing this amount with the cash investment of 80,000 rials in February 1631, this estimate sounds acceptable.

Although the Dutch spent 176,000 rials in cash during the time they spent around An-hai between February 1631 and January 1632, the commodities they purchased were not delivered straightaway. The most of the goods had to be collected later either in Taiwan or in An-hai. As they were

1 Dec. 1631, fo. 215^v.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Zeebrurch ter rede ondert Eijlant Lissuw inde riviere Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 28 Jan. 1632, fo. 219^v.

³¹ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant Lissuw in de revier Chincheo, 7 Jan. 1632, fos. 218^{r-v}; Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1632, in: Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 96.

³² *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 10. 2 Apr. 1631.

CHAPTER FOUR

not sure whether they would be able to collect most of the goods before the south monsoon season in the summer of 1632, the Dutch authorities in Taiwan dropped their plan to intercept the junks which would be returning from Manila as they were afraid of running the risk of missing out on the goods which had not yet been delivered.³³ In that monsoon season seventeen Chinese junks from Amoy and An-hai visited Manila³⁴ And the Spanish records show that they exported about 114,279 rials from Manila.³⁵ Hence the volume of the Dutch trade in An-hai was comparable to the Amoy-Manila trade, but the price which the Spaniards paid for raw silk in Manila was much higher than that for which it could be had in Taiwan. At a time at which the Dutch were reluctant to pay 134 taels per picul on the China Coast, the Spaniards were having to pay 360 rials (257 taels), almost double that price, in Manila.³⁶ The bulk of the capital invested in An-hai by the Dutch

³³ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant Lissuw in de revier Chincheo, 7 Jan. 1632, fo. 217^v. The Dutch heard of the report from Japan stating that seven or eight junks were going to be fitted out for the run to Manila. They decided not to intercept them, which meant deliberately ignoring Governor-General Jacques Specx's order to do so. They even consulted with Iquan about this matter.

³⁴ VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Batavia aan gouverneur generael Jacques Specx] [Letter from Hans Putmans on the Yacht *Der Goes* at the Anchorage nearby Lih-yü to Governor-General Jacques Specx], 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 206^f. It also mentions one of the junk was intercepted by a Chinese pirate, Liu-Hsiang (Janglau[D.]), on its return voyage. The Spanish records state that only 16 junks from China arrived in Manila. Chaunu, *Les Philippines*, 156.

³⁵ Ibid, 200- 219. The total amount of the Chinese commodities imported in Manila from 1631-1635 was worth about 571,396. 67 rials, therefore the average value for each year was about 114,279 rials. Chaunu accounted with Spanish 'Peso', which equalled one rial when circulated. Id., *Les Philippines*,30. The peso was equal to 8 reales. Cf. Oskar Hermann Khristian Spate, *The Spanish lake*, (Canberra: The Australia National University Press, 1979), xxi.

³⁶ VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

consisted of silver coins, supplemented by some tropical commodities, especially pepper. After they had purchased a sizeable amount of pepper from the Dutch in the bay of Amoy in the 1630-1631 season, the realization that they could also reduce their costs if they purchased pepper directly from Batavia dawned on the Chang-chou merchants. When they were fitting out the junks for the voyage to Manila, they solicited Iquan's help in applying for the requisite licences to participate in the trade to Batavia from Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an.³⁷ It is a recorded fact that at least one Chinese junk sailing in Iquan's name did depart from Chang-chou and arrive in Batavia.³⁸ Hence, by giving them these sorts of opportunities, the Dutch indirectly helped Iquan to expand his influence among the merchants of Chang-chou.

As they trading season opened in August 1632, the Dutch began to contract business deals with the Chinese merchants again. With 32,000 rials in hand for their ventures, their first step was to visit Iquan's mother and his brother, Cheng Hung-k'uei, an excuse they used to carry 8,000 rials to An-hai.³⁹ When they had ascertained the price of raw silk, on 2 September

onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Batavia aan gouverneur Specx], Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 206^f; the rate of conversion between the tael and the rial, see: Appendix I, Table E: the value of rial and tael circulating in Taiwan 1624-1661.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, fo. 197^f. Iquan had returned from his mission in the hills and spent a short time in An-hai. He also had a meeting with Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an whom he consulted about the strategy to be employed against the rising new pirate Liu Hsiang.

³⁸ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 73. 3 May. 1632. The junk left Batavia on 6th July 1632.

³⁹ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht der Goes leggende ter reede buiten t Eijlant Quemoij voor de reviere Chincheo, 24 Aug. 1632, fo. 227^v; VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw naer Batavia, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 201^f. Although the Dutch authorities decided to carry 32,000 rials to the Chiu-lung River estuary, they later reported that only 16,000 rials had actually been taken.

CHAPTER FOUR

1632 another 6,000 rials were sent to An-hai to be divided in half between Gampea and Bindiok.⁴⁰ A fortnight later on 17 September they decided to send another 20,000 rials and 600 piculs of pepper from Taiwan.⁴¹ After these sums had been dispatched on 14 October their remaining capital amounted to 61,600 rials.⁴² Therefore at least 93,600 rials in silver coins were collected to be invested in China in that season.⁴³ This amount was about the same as in the preceding two years.

The export of Japanese silver which had suspended on account of the Hamada Yahei Incident in Taiwan in 1628 was gradually resumed in the year 1632. On 27 January and 21 February 1633, new loads of Japanese silver were shipped to Taiwan.⁴⁴ Governor Putmans decided to invest 175,730 rials in a more conservative speculation, because he was worried that the Chinese merchants would not be able to absorb any more. On 10 February he again sailed at the head of his ships to the bay of Amoy intent on trading. From there he set sail to Batavia at the beginning of March 1633.⁴⁵ In the short time he spent in the bay of Amoy, he found that the limited free trade

⁴⁰ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht der Goes leggende ter reede ondert eijlant Taota in de revier Chincheo [Resolution issued by Governor Hans Putmans and his current Council on board the yacht *Der Goes* in the roadstead of Ta-tan Island in the Chiu-lung River], 2 Sept. 1632, fo. 228^{r-v}; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 75. 2 Sept. 1632.

⁴¹ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht der Goes ter reede onder t eijlant Aijmoij in de revier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 17 Sept. 1632, Fo. 228r; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 77. 17 Sept. 1632.

⁴² Generale Missive, 1 Dec. 1632, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 103.

⁴³ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 148. 7 Feb. 1633. At the end of 1632 only 16,000 rials remained in Taiwan. Therefore at least 77,600 rials must have been released up to then.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 151. 22 Feb. 1633.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 160-161. 4 Apr. 1633.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

permitted with the An-hai merchants had been encroached upon once again. The merchants only dared to visit the Dutch vessels under the cover of the darkness. Putmans tried to contact Iquan, who had finally returned to An-hai from his bandit-eradication mission, so that he could push him to acknowledge the right of the Dutch ships to trade at the bay of Amoy, but all his efforts were in vain. He left for Batavia convinced that Iquan could not be trusted and feeling he was on slippery ground decided to suspend any further negotiations with the Chinese authorities. Why did Iquan suddenly become so reluctant to help the Dutch after he returned from the hills?

Regional commander without a fixed base

On 12 June 1631, after Iquan defeated the pirate Ch'u Ts'ai-lao, he was finally granted the longed for official status he had been promised earlier. But it was almost a year before the rank was formally confirmed on him and his adherents on 22 May 1632.⁴⁶ In other words, tantalizingly Iquan was forced to linger eleven months before his rank was officially conferred. This gap offers a possible explanation of why his greatest supporter, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an , had kept silent about his smuggling trade with the Dutch. He had been abashed that he had had to fund Iquan from the public budget. In the meantime, Iquan had to make do with the rather embarrassing rank of 'Fu-i You-chi ', which literally means 'Commander of the Barbarian-deterrent Mobile Corps'.⁴⁷

This provisional title granted by the Grand Co-ordinator implied that he had still not been accorded a permanent title. This fraught situation might

⁴⁶ Wan, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu', 161. 'On 22 May 1632.... Cheng Chih-lung was awarded the official rank of Commander of Mobile Corps and Cheng Chih-Hu was awarded the official rank of Defender.'

⁴⁷ Liang, 'Hui-ch'ao kuang-tung shan-k'ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz'u ts'an-kaio', 48; 54-5; 57; 63.

CHAPTER FOUR

have been one of the reasons Iquan had been willing to obey the Grand Co-ordinator's order to do battle against the mountain bandits. Undoubtedly this military action had been deemed an essential exercise because one of its effects would be to protect the interests of the merchants in Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou. The mountain bandits threatened the vital paddy-fields and harassed the merchants trading along the land route between Kuang-tung and Fu-chien provinces. As Iquan had been personally affected by these raiders, he was probably very happy to have the chance to eradicate them.⁴⁸

The bandits, some 20,000 of them,⁴⁹ had originally plundered at random in the hills on the eastern border of Kuang-tung province in April 1631 and had then gathered near the Mei River Valley, some 95 kms distant from the town of Wu-p'ing in the southwest of Fu-chien province, about 200 km from Amoy. This was far away from the area in which Iquan could exert what power he had. The bandits barricaded themselves in on the slopes of a mountain called T'ung-ku-chang, east of the Han River Valley. Downstream from here, stretched out along the Han River were located the most important paddy fields which were vital to provisioning the cities of Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou. With such a prize at stake, no wonder Iquan's mission was sanctioned by three high-ranking Mandarins: the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, the Grand Co-ordinator of Southern Chiang-hsi and the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Southern Chang-chou.⁵⁰ A Dutch source discloses that Iquan departed from Amoy on his mission in September 1631:

'The China trade has recently lain under a threatening cloud, because the Mandarin Iquan and all his soldiers have been summoned by the Grand

⁴⁸ For example, the porcelain was imported from Chiang-hsi and the preserved ginger from Kuang-tung. Both items featured on the Dutch order-list.

⁴⁹ Liang, 'Hui-ch'ao kuang-tung shan-k'ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz'u ts'an-kao', 37.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 39.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

*Co-ordinator to pacify some rebellious Chinese who have fortified themselves in the mountains.....It has been a month since they left Amoy. He has taken his brother along with him too.*⁵¹

Iquan led 2,000 soldiers to Shang-hang almost on the southwestern border of Fu-chien,⁵² and set up camp at San-hê-pa near the northern end of the Han River Valley on 8 October 1631. This site was not far from the eastern side of T'ung-ku-chang Mountain.⁵³ The bandit chief whose name was Chung Ling-hsiu had fortified himself at a place on the side of the mountain which was too high for the government force to launch an attack. The bandits had robbed their food supplies from the fields in the Han River Valley and frequently collected taxes in the local river port called Hsin-tu.⁵⁴ Iquan's first plan was to cut off the food supply of the robbers and only when this had been accomplished to attack them at Hsin-tu, which he did on 17 October 1631.⁵⁵ He dispatched only 500 musketeers under the command of his brother Cheng Chih-hu to ransack the port in a night attack. Forty-five vessels which belonged to the bandits were set alight, so that they could no longer be used to exact private taxes.⁵⁶ As they could not do without food,

⁵¹ VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens naer Batavia aen gouverneur general Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 30 Oct. 1631, fo. 557^v. Although this letter does not mention that Iquan approached T'ung-ku-chang by water, the Dutch knew he had left Amoy. Later, on 31 December, they heard that Iquan might depart from Amoy and head for T'ung-ku-chang. Probably the Dutch only knew he had travelled farther than Wu-ping, which was at the southwestern corner of Fu-chien. They believed Iquan's destination was Wu-ping (written as 'Boupijningh' in Dutch) by water. VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiulung River, 31 Dec. 1631, fo. 216^v.

⁵² Liang, 'Hui-ch'ao kuang-tung shan-k'ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz'u ts'an-kao', 39.

⁵³ Ibid, 39-40.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 37.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 40.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 40.

CHAPTER FOUR

the bandits decided to descend from the western side of the mountain and proceed to a port on the Mei River called Ping-ts'un. As this tactic had been predictable, Iquan sent his brother ahead with 300 soldiers while he collected another 1,000 soldiers for the final battle with Chung Ling-hsiu. When he heard that there were only 300 musketeers in Ping-ts'un, Chung Ling-hsiu lost no time in attacking them immediately, because he believed his troops were superior to Iquan's musketeers. The scene is vividly depicted:

*'On the 30th ... 1,000 bandits with Chung Ling-hsiu among them appeared. He was furious with Iquan's musketeers so he selected his best people to confront them. Chêng Chih-hu pretended to be poorly armed, and kept his real force hidden. The bandits saw he had only a few soldiers with him, gathered into a pack and launched a headlong assault on horseback. Suddenly many muskets were fired simultaneously and the bandits could not hold their position. Some were decapitated, others were killed in other ways, and the rest fled, so they were totally wiped out.'*⁵⁷

After this victory, Iquan wasted no time but led all his troops in an attack on the bandits' lair on T'ung-ku-chang Mountain. From 6 to 8 November, Iquan's soldiers destroyed most of bandits' houses and food stores. The remaining bandits gathered 4,000 people to do battle against Iquan on the final day but all in vain. One of the officers of the reinforcements was 7.5 km away while the battle was raging. He testified that 'the sky was filled with gunshots and the faint sound of yelling'.⁵⁸

Iquan's victory won him a high reputation among the officers who took part in this military action. It seems they were all astonished by the performance of his musketeers, who had skillfully repulsed an enemy at least twice their number. This was the moment at which the value of Iquan's musketeers was burst upon the world. Small firearms were widely used in

⁵⁷ Ibid, 37-8.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 41.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

East Asia at this time and therefore could not be classified as any kind of secret weapon but in that period, unless well-disciplined, the musketeers usually could still not gain the upper hand over archers. The overwhelming victory of Iquan's musketeers against the bandits was only made possible by their discipline. A Japanese author, Kawaguchi Choju, had this to say about the military tactics deployed by Iquan:

*'Iquan led his troops in an attack on the bandits from Wu-p'ing. He ordered every soldier and officer to bear a musket and divided them into groups of five men. They opened fire in turn while the spearmen defended them. In this fashion they pushed forward step by step until they had destroyed the bandit lair.'*⁵⁹

Iquan himself was a very good shot. In the autumn of 1629, Li K'uei-ch'i had occupied the harbour area of Amoy and destroyed Iquan's vessels, while Iquan fortified himself and his people inside the walls of Amoy. Li K'uei-ch'i was forced to drop his siege plans because Iquan's musketeers managed to hold his troops at some distance from the city walls, which made an attempt to storm them impossible. It was said that:

*'Iquan's house was in the city of Amoy. He poured all his efforts into defending his own property. When the pirates stormed the city walls with 100 men, Iquan fired two shots and killed two people with two shots. Li K'uei-ch'i was shocked by this, and made no further attempts to storm the town.'*⁶⁰

It was no coincidence that 600 soldiers, possibly his musketeers, were stationed inside the walls to defend the city.⁶¹ When Iquan captured the Dutch yacht the *Westcappel* in 1628, he enlisted seventy-six Dutch soldiers who had been on her to guard his house in Amoy⁶² and he probably used

⁵⁹ Kawaguchi, *T'ai-wan kê-chü chih*, 8.

⁶⁰ Ts'ao, *Ching-hai Chi-lüeh*, 45.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 31.

⁶² Generale Missive, 10 Feb. 1629, in: Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 79.

CHAPTER FOUR

these men to drill a basic training into his 600 musketeers. The first muskets Iquan owned might actually have been furnished by the Dutch East India Company when he was hired as a maritime mercenary to intercept Chinese junks sailing to Manila in 1625. A contemporary Chinese record gives an impression of how efficiently the Dutch used these muskets when they intercepted Chinese junks:

*'After the Dutch sailed, they anchored their ships on the high seas and scanned [the sea] with their spy glasses. If a trade junk hove in sight, they would lower several of their ship's boats. Each boat carried six to seven men. As the junk sailed past, they would close in on her. If we exposed our bodies above the side of the junk to defend ourselves, they would fire their muskets [at us] and each shot killed one person, and not a single shot was ever fired in vain.'*⁶³

Iquan's 500 to 600 musketeers, sometimes reinforced by 1,000 to 1,500 infantry soldiers, seem to have been the backbone of his mercenary force. When he was forced to leave Amoy and move to An-hai in 1630, Iquan began to build a fort which he could use as an emporium for his trade in rice, tropical commodities and silver. As already said, the trading season of 1630 was probably his most profitable ever. The Dutch sources state that his fort was completed at the beginning of 1633. Gampea and Bendiok both admitted that they were the officers who commanded the soldiers who defended this An-hai fort.⁶⁴ Now Iquan's star was rising and he had achieved more than his original aim of feeding his own people. He had also succeeded in integrating the fisherman militia into his smuggling network and he maintained a private semi-permanent defence force of 500 to 2,000 soldiers. The naval force assembled with the consent of the local interests of the Chang-chou and

⁶³ Chiang, *T'ai-wan wai-chi*, (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1985), 43.

⁶⁴ VOC 1113, Missive van Gampea aan Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, 12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537^v; VOC 1113, Missive van Bendiok aan Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, 12 Apr. 1633, fo 537^v.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

Ch'üan-chou merchants was part of this army. As long as the illegal trade was tolerated by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, this official was prepared to overlook the fact that Iquan fed his soldiers from the proceeds of the smuggling trade.

After December 1631, after the provisions Iquan had brought with his soldiers had been consumed, he cut short the military action and returned to An-hai for a while.⁶⁵ His respite was of short duration as it was not long before he received another order to pursue the bandits deeper into Kuang-tung province.⁶⁶ On 30 March 1632, Iquan's troops finally succeeded in capturing Chung Ling-hsiu at the northern end of the Mei River Valley.⁶⁷ Most of the troops were due to have returned to An-hai in April, but Iquan was given more orders to pursue the remainder of the bandits into Chiang-hsi province the region into which they had fled in May.⁶⁸ This time the order came from by the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Southern Chang-chou who also sanctioned the issuing of two months' worth

⁶⁵ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant lissuw inde Rivier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 31 Dec. 1631, fo. 216^v; VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiulung River, 7 Jan.1632, fo. 217^v. Since Iquan did not depart from Amoy but left directly from An-hai, the Dutch believed he had taken the overland route and returned to the battlefield again. Liang, 'Hui-ch'ao kuang-tung shan-k'ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz'u ts'an-kao', 52. 'Cheng Chih-lung struck deep into the neighbouring province but the soldiers ran short of rations and some succumbed to illness. Therefore he returned to recruit new soldiers and purchase food.'

⁶⁶ Ibid, 54. 'During December 1631 to January 1632,...The Fu-chienese Mobile Corps Commander of Fu-i, Cheng Chih-lung, dispatched by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien in response to the invitation of the Chiang-hsi Grand Co-ordinator. He led 2,000 soldiers who carried enough provisions to last for three months, as well as sailors and ammunition, heading in that direction.'

⁶⁷ Ibid, 52.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 64.

CHAPTER FOUR

of provisions for 300 musketeers.⁶⁹ On 5 June, Iquan's troop defeated the bandits in the mountain area of Ch'ao-guan, approximately 300 kms from Amoy.⁷⁰ Although the size of Iquan's musketeer army was small compared to the number of official troops dispatched from Kuang-tung and Chiang-hsi provinces, their efficiency gave them the leading edge in this mission. Just when the execution of the mission was drawing to its final stage, Iquan was summoned to return to Amoy again by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Tsou Wei-lien. Amoy was under attack from yet another pirate who was cruising the coastal waters of Kuang-tung province; his name was Liu Hsiang. A Dutch source records that Liu Hsiang's fleet attacked the coast of Fu-chien in the first half of July:

*'...The pirate Liu Hsiang has plundered the whole area of the bay of Amoy with about 100 junks. He has destroyed all Iquan's junks anchored in the harbour of Fu-chou and killed a group of people. Iquan has returned once again from Wu-p'ing and travelled there render assistance to the Grand Co-ordinator (in Fu-chou). Consequently all traffic has been blocked and the coastal areas around the bay of Amoy have become unsafe.'*⁷¹

In short, Iquan had returned from his mission 300 kms away and rushed straight to Fu-chou to assist the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, who had only been assigned to this position on 25 April. The latter must have informed Iquan that his formal rank had been approved by the emperor on 22 May. The former Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, was promoted to the position of Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and

⁶⁹ Ibid, 64; 55.

⁷⁰ Wan, *'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu'*, 164.

⁷¹ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jach ten Catwijck leggende ter reede ondert Eijlant Lamao, Nan-ao, 22 Aug. 1632, fo. 224^f. When the Dutch ships arrived in Nan-ao on the last day of July, they heard the news from one of their junks. The junk had sailed from Nan-ao 12 days earlier and had picked up this news from Taiwan.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

Kuang-hsi provinces on 14 April.⁷² In order to set about securing law and order in Fu-chou prefecture, Iquan took up temporary residence on Wu-hu, an island located outside the estuary of Min River. Thereafter he was called the 'Regional Commander of Wu-hu'. Because of Liu Hsiang's depredations in the Fu-chou area, even the illegal trading junks were not able to depart on their voyage to Japan. In fact only four junks made it to Japan that year.⁷³ As they were able to take advantage of the disturbed situation around the bay of Amoy, the Dutch could continue to run their barter trade with Iquan's servants in An-hai undisturbed during the autumn, but change was just on the horizon. After Iquan had again successfully defended Fu-chou from Liu Hsiang's raids in October, the new Grand Co-ordinator instructed him to carry a new mission, one which embarrassed him. This official wanted Iquan to enforce the maritime prohibition as a means to reduce Liu Hsiang's strength. Iquan was caught between the Devil and the deep blue sea, either he had to try to legalize the Dutch trade or he might run the risk of being instructed by the Grand Co-ordinator to destroy the Dutch base in Taiwan, if the latter happened to be tempted to cast their lot in with the pirates this time. Although this was a seemingly impossible situation, Iquan still spent a great deal of time and effort trying to stifle this development in the bud:

*'The Red-haired barbarians had once occupied the Pescadores, in an attempt to force the Chinese government to open a market for them there. Later they shifted to Taiwan, but from time to time anchored their ships off Amoy. [Tsou]Wei-lien frequently advised Iquan to keep them away from Amoy, but he refused to comply.'*⁷⁴

A debate had been raging between two different parties at the imperial court. The different parties were divided about whether the Red-haired

⁷² Wang, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu', 161.

⁷³ Innes, *The door ajar*, 635. Table A.

⁷⁴ Chang T'ing-yü (et eds), *Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih*[Newly Compiled History of the Ming Dynasty], 332 Vols, (Taipei: Ting-Wên Shu-Chü, 1987), Vol.235, 6138.

CHAPTER FOUR

barbarians were good or evil and whether the Chinese merchants should be allowed to trade with them in Taiwan or not. Iquan had chosen the Dutch side since he had just succeeded in creating his An-hai base, but, treading a wary path, he affected an indifferent attitude as if to deny his friendly relationship with the Dutch. At least this is the impression Governor Hans Putmans of Taiwan had when he sailed from the bay of Amoy on his way to Batavia on 1 March, 1633.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

CHAPTER FIVE

STORMY WEATHER AT THE IMPERIAL COURT

AND ON THE SOUTH CHINA COAST

1632-1633

The Dutch Petitions

During the summer of 1632, Iquan was summoned back to the coast of Fu-chien to ward off the raids mounted by the Kuang-tung pirate Liu Hsiang. For the duration of this mission he was placed under the direct command of Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien. This new Grand Co-ordinator had been profoundly shocked by the surprise attack of Liu Hsiang and in a hurry to remedy the situation he availed himself of a disastrous policy: the re-introduction of the sea ban. In October 1632 the Grand Co-ordinator reported the strong measures he had taken to the capital Peking.¹ In response to this policy, Iquan had hurried to put his trade with the Dutch in order. Governor Hans Putmans reported that Iquan suddenly changed his attitude and became the obedient servant of the Grand Co-ordinator and the military officers at Chang-chou, Hai-ch'êng and Amoy:

'Besides, Iquan not only refused to let us station a merchant in Amoy or An-hai as before, but also to anchor our junks at those places. Moreover, he did not allow us to accept a consignment of timber which we had purchased

¹ Wan, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsian-lu', 165. 'On 15 October 1632, the Fu-chienese pirate Liu Hsiang led several thousand followers aboard 170 junks to raid Min-an-ch'en. They plundered and slaughtered, sweeping all the houses clean. All the inhabitants fled and the citizens in Fu-chou were terrified... Commander Cheng Chih-lung happened to be in Fu-chou preparing for a new assignment in Chiang-hsi, therefore the Grand Co-ordinator diverted his attention from this in order to defend Fu-chou. ...The pirates knew they were well prepared and decided to leave.'

CHAPTER FIVE

on an earlier occasion. [This volte-face] seems attributable to the strict supervision of the new Grand Co-ordinator (Tsou Wei-lien) and other grandees.'

When Iquan's merchants suddenly withdrew their co-operation, Governor Putmans was thrown into confusion:

*'Meanwhile, it seems also that his (Iquan's) merchants show more commodities than ever happened before. Whether this is meant to hold our necks and lure us to leave the coast soon, or to foster his own benefits and profits, cannot yet be judged.'*²

In essence, Iquan was trying to create the impression that his merchants were acting to please themselves and that they contravened his wishes. He now assumed the role of the director of a drama in which the 'Chinese-Dutch peddlers humbly sent petition to the emperor'. His new role as a royal official constrained him to remain neutral, acting as if he had nothing to do with the matter. The main actors on the stage were now his merchants, not he himself. He masterfully created a spectacle around the Chiu-lung River estuary through his merchants. He also tried to convince the Dutch to act as friendly guests. In the same letter the Dutch governor Hans Putmans reported:

'Rushing back to An-hai from Fu-chou, on October 7 Iquan dispatched his representatives Gamsia and Bindiok, to greet Your Honours' letter with gifts and sandalwood. On the same day they offered us an appropriate reciprocal honour and saluted us with cannon shots. It seems that Iquan was very inclined to receive us with appropriate ceremony. However, this does not accord with the customs of China and, because trading with us violates their

² VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht Der Goes liggende ter reede onder 't eijlant Lissuw in de riviere Chincheo aen gouverneur generaal Specx, Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 204^v.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

*laws, he did not dare to do so, fearing to create an enormous scandal.*³

Iquan had tried to explain his new tack to Governor Putmans in a personal letter sent three week earlier. He had written to inform him that via his personal connections he had begun to persuade certain mandarins to open up a trade corridor between Chang-chou and Taiwan. He implied that the best option for the Dutch was to obtain the legal right to receive Chinese merchants in Taiwan. Iquan put it this way:

*'Nowadays our Emperor rules by means of severe punishments. Your Honour can easily picture how different the customs in our land are from yours. For the reason, not everything can be fulfilled according to your wishes. I have done my utmost to persuade various great mandarins in Chang-chou to obtain freedom of trade for the Company.'*⁴

Iquan also set out his plan to help the Dutch (and himself) by legalizing Chinese shipping in Taiwan:

*'The Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch'üan-chou prefectures (Hsing-Ch'üan-Tao)[Ts'êng Ying] heard that the great mandarin in Chang-chou will help Your Honour out in this trade affair. He has written me a letter asking what was the best way for people to go about their trade? Therefore I have addressed a letter to the Grand Co-ordinator in order to enquire how our people can run their business as before. What answer we shall receive, only time will tell.'*⁵

Iquan's intention was to imply that he had persuaded some of his acquaintances to create a 'public opinion' among the local gentry. The main supporter of this move was the Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and

³ Ibidem.

⁴ VOC 1105, Missiven door Iquan aen den heer Putmans[Letter written by Iquan to Mr Putmans], 23 Sept. 1632, fo. 209^f.

⁵ Ibidem.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ch'üan-chou prefectures Ts'êng Ying,⁶ who was the key person in the issuing of all the licences for the Ch'üan-chou fishing boats and rice transportation junks and hence directly regulated Iquan's An-hai trade and the smuggling trade with the Dutch. Ts'êng Ying had been appointed to this position in 1631 on the recommendation of the former Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an.⁷ No doubt Ts'êng was aware of how the Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung had tolerated Iquan's trade because this allowed him to maintain his troops. However, his co-operation with Iquan was not based only on secular interests, there is good reason to think that there might have been other grounds as well. Iquan had been baptized a Roman Catholic and during his expeditions in Chiang-hsi province he had been summoned to Fu-chou for several times by the Grand Co-ordinator. It is possible that he attended a Roman Catholic mass said there by the Jesuit Giulio Aleni. At that time there was a very active local circle of believers in Fu-chou who gathered around this particular Italian priest. Iquan and Ts'êng Ying were both members of this special group.⁸ No wonder in his letter Iquan seemed to be expressing an appreciation of Western trade policies, assessing that they were better than the closed policy pursued by the Chinese empire. Whatever the

⁶ All those efforts also recorded briefly in: *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 119. 24 Nov. 1632.

⁷ Huang Jên, Kuo Kêng-wu, TWYH (eds), *Ch'üan-chou fu-chih hsüan-lu* [Selections from the Local Gazette of Ch'üan-chou Prefecture], TW no. 233, 68. 'In the year 1631, Ts'êng Ying was appointed the coastal defence official of Hsing-Ch'üan (Hsing-hua and Ch'üan-chou)... This was on the recommendation of Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an...'

⁸ Yeh Nung, 'His-lai k'ung-tzu: Ai Ju-lüeh chung-wên chu-shu yü ch'uan-chiao kung-tso k'ao-shu [The Confucius from the West, Aleni Giulio's Missionary Action and the Chinese Works]', *Journal of Jinan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, No.142(2009), 118-54 at 121; Ku Wei-min, 'Ming-chêng ssu-tai yü t'ien-chu-chiao-hui kuan-his [The Relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Chêng family for Four Generations]', *Wên-hua tsa-chih* [Revista de Cultura], 50(2004), 69-79 at 72-3.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

case might have been, the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, ultimately remained the only person who could legally issue passes to any Chinese trade junks sailing to Taiwan. Ts'êng Ying's opinion, expressing the point of view of a lower-ranking official, would not have held any water with the Grand Co-ordinator. Iquan's letter reveals that another high-ranking official was also involved in his lobbying. This 'great mandarin' who showed sympathy and was inclined to help resided in Chang-chou. Only because of the support this great mandarin did Iquan dare to beseech Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien to continue his predecessor's, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an, policy of granting passes and allowing local people to trade with the Dutch in Taiwan. The highest-ranking mandarin in Chang-chou was the Regional Inspector (*Hsün-an*), Lu Chên-fei, who was actually ranked more highly than the Grand Co-ordinator himself.⁹

Hence it seems that Iquan's party had lobbied the Chinese court to allow the Dutch trade ever since Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an's term of office. According to a letter Iquan sent to the Governor-General Jacques Specx dated 6 November, these attempts had led to a dead end:

*'So far we have done all we can to achieve freedom of trade for Your Honour. We have always been and still are sincere in offering a helping hand. However, our emperor refused to countenance Chinese engaging in business with the Dutch in whatever form.'*¹⁰

⁹ Wan, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu', 165. 15 Oct. 1632, '[the emperor replied] Tsou Wei-lien had been just assigned as the new Grand Co-ordinator, therefore he should not resign because of the pirate raids. All the achievements and failures of the Fu-chien government will be reported by the Regional Inspector'; Chi Liu-chi, 'Lu-wên-chên kung-ch'uan[Biography of Lu Chên-fei]', in Lu Chên-fei, *Lu-wên-chên-kung chi*[Complete works of Lu Chên-fei], TWH, I, No. 4, 498. This confirms that this Regional Inspector was Lu Chên-fei; Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 253

¹⁰ VOC 1109, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Iquan aen den gouverneur

CHAPTER FIVE

This situation explains why the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, refused to fly in the face of the emperor's order, even though Iquan pressed him to hand out at least a few passes for junks sailing to Taiwan, notwithstanding the fact that the Dutch obviously preferred to trade freely from their own junks in the Chiu-lung River estuary. Iquan reported the disappointing results of their lobbying:

*'We have approached His Honour ([Tsou Wei-lien]) several times, and seriously set out and championed the business prospect of the Company. His Honour replied, that we should exhort Your Honour's people to return to Taiwan, and then passes will be granted to (Chinese junks to sail to) all places.'*¹¹

In the other words, Iquan had arranged with the new Grand Co-ordinator that he could at least allow his people to trade with the Dutch if they met in Taiwan. After Gamsia and Bindiok had welcomed the Dutch, these two merchants sent petitions to the court. According to Iquan:

*'Immediately a letter (signed by Gamsia and Bindiok) was sent to His Majesty (in order to procure some passes so as to improve the trade). What answer we shall receive, only time will tell. Because I treat everyone fairly and reasonably, I fear no one (although there are some jealous people who slander me).'*¹²

In Iquan's opinion, the merchants' petition was the best way to bring about the legalization of the Sino-Dutch trade. The Dutch considered this questionable. Their first objection was that the price of silk sold by the

generael [Jacque] Specx [Translation of the Letter from the Mandarin Iquan to Governor-General Jacque Specx], Chiu-lung River, [received on] 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 213^r.

¹¹ Ibid., fo. 213^v.

¹² VOC 1109, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Iquan aen den gouverneur generael [Jacque] Specx, Chiu-lung River , [received on] 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 213^v.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

Chinese merchants in Taiwan would be higher than the price offered by the Chinese vendors who sold their goods in small lots in Chiu-lung River estuary. The second reservation was that the Dutch had been running their business in the Chiu-lung River estuary since at least 1630 more or less satisfactorily. Finally, although Shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu had ceased to issue passes in the year 1629 to 1630, in 1631 five and in 1632 three junks had left from Japan to visit the Spanish settlement in north Taiwan. In January 1633, a Japanese junk which belonged to a Chinese *Anachoda* named Kijko had arrived in Taiwan with a pass issued by the Dutch president at Firando, Cornelis van Nieuwenoodde. Its cargo was worth about 10,000 taels.¹³ This arrival of this junk from Japan would no doubt drive up the silk price in Taiwan. After due consideration of all these reasons, Governor Hans Putmans of Taiwan decided to take his trading capital to the Chiu-lung River estuary once again in the middle of February in 1633.

Putmans sent a letter to Iquan explaining that he had come because he was eager to know what the Emperor's reply to the petition of October 1632 had been.¹⁴ Iquan replied immediately. He explained that the execution of the plan had been delayed because of some trivial problems but was going ahead nonetheless:

'As regards the trade, I have remonstrated with the Grand Co-ordinator that when I was in Fu-chou I went to fill my junks with cargo. He therefore sent an express letter to the court. His Majesty's reply was that it has never been the custom to dispatch junks to Taiwan in the past, therefore proposal was out

¹³ VOC 1109, Resolutie bij d hr gouverneur [Hans]Putmans en den Raedt in Taijouan opt vertreck vanden E Willem Jansen (baeckende de medegebrachte contont als anders) genomen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1633, Fo. 220^v; *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 151. 22 Feb. 1633.

¹⁴ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer de rivier Chincheo aen Iquan [The letter from Hans Putmans to Iquan at Chiu-lung River], Taiwan, 12 Feb. 1633, Fo. 237^v.

CHAPTER FIVE

of the question. In response to this, I have written to several notable men in Chang-chou explaining that those people in Taiwan [the Dutch] are one and the same nation as those in Batavia (or Kalapa, the original name recorded by Chinese for generations).¹⁵

Under the constitution of the Chinese empire, all trade with foreigners had to be within the framework of the tributary system. Foreign rulers delegated envoys to pay homage to the Chinese emperor who symbolized the centre of the universe and the trade was carried out under the aegis of this diplomatic ritual as an extension of the exchange of presents. All foreign countries participating were supposed to have been registered on a list since the fourteenth century. The Europeans who had been arriving in Asia since the sixteenth century were all total strangers in this traditional picture.¹⁶ Iquan had to persuade the emperor that the Dutch had taken the place of the Kalapa kingdom, because Kalapa (which was occupied by the Dutch and renamed Batavia in 1619) was known to the Chinese of former times. The idea was that, after the emperor had recognized the Dutch were based at Kalapa, the traditional trade with Kalapa could be extended to Taiwan and be legalized. It is a pity that Iquan did not explain this in detail and that the Dutch did not have the patience to wait for the outcome. The only matter which concerned them was whether Chinese junks would be allowed to visit Taiwan, yes or no.¹⁷

Iquan was not able to offer Putmans any assistance in the trade in

¹⁵ VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received on] 16 Feb. 1633, Fo. 235^v. Kalapa is the original name of Batavia which had been recorded by the Chinese for generations.

¹⁶ Cf. John K. Fairbank, 'Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West.', in *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol.1, no. 2 (1942),129-49.

¹⁷ VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received on] 16 Feb. 1633, Fo. 235^v. Iquan mentioned five to six junks were ready to sail. Since the mandarin refused to issue passes, they dared not to leave for Taiwan.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

Chiu-lung River estuary and An-hai, because he had been assigned to other places. He wrote:

'Because I am now a mandarin and subject to the emperor, I am not allowed to trade. Therefore I cannot help Your Honour in the trade. The matters of trade are the business of the merchants and Your Honour should lodge your request with them and persuade them [to help you].

*Your Honour falls under the jurisdiction of the Mobile Crops Commander of Southern Ch'üan-chou (You-chi of Ch'üan-nan[C.]; Joukick van Swanglang[D.]). Your Honour can write a personal letter to him, explaining the purpose of your visit, and ask him to issue the licences which would allow the merchants to trade. Your Honour said in your letter that if the trade is not allowed, other measures will have to be resorted to. Let the above-mentioned Commander consider this.'*¹⁸

The evidence seems to indicate that Iquan's plan for issuing passes by referring to the relations formerly maintained with Kalapa was not only doomed, but he personally was being transferred away to another post. He even returned the gifts sent by Governor Putmans with the same letter. This gesture terrified Putmans, especially because Chinese merchants were still 125,741 guilders in debt to him according to the accounts up to 18 February.¹⁹ Four days later, Iquan sent another letter informing Putmans about the petition. He mentioned that a group of mandarins had voiced strong objections to the legalization of the trade. Their opposition meant that the case now passed into the hands of the ministry of Rites (*Li Pu*, in charge of

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ VOC 1113, Per het Comptoir Taijouan aen het Comptoir Generael op Batavia f 503,817:17:2 voor sooveel de naervolgende contanten, coopmanschappen, scheeps behoeften, victualien, ammonitien van oorloge ende andere restanten als uijtstaende schulden comen te monteren [The factory of Taiwan had been lent f. 503,817:17:2 in cash, commodities, provisions, ammunitions by the general factory in Batavia], Taiwan, 18 Feb. 1633, fo. 527^f.

CHAPTER FIVE

the tributary missions). Before the matter was settled, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien refused to issue any pass. Iquan warned Putmans that if he ventured to engage in the smuggling trade right now, public opinion might turn against to him. The best solution was to halt the trade for a while.²⁰ In despair, Putmans now wrote a very long letter protesting that the Dutch had been the dupe of the Chinese officials since 1622. He addressed this letter to all the principal mandarins, including the Grand Co-ordinator, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Chang-chou, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch'üan-chou, the Regional Commander in Amoy and the Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-t'ung.²¹ Then he sailed seething with resentment but with empty holds to Batavia on the first day of March.

Cry wolf again? Imperial permission for Sino-Taiwan trade

Ironically, the eventual success of Iquan's strategy was just on the point of materializing. The Ministry of Rites agreed that the Grand Co-ordinator had the right to issue passes to trading junks bound for Taiwan. Iquan explained this as follows:

'The superme mandarin in Chang-chou has sent a message to the Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch'ao-chou (Chootsieu[D]) and Chang-chou (Sonchieu[D]). His Honour has sent this notice to the Grand Co-ordinator [Tsou Wei-lien] and he had also remonstrated with the Imperial Council for Foreign Affairs [Ministry of Rites]. In the message, his Honour [announces that he] has decided to grant passes to junks bound for Batavia or Taiwan. It

²⁰ VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, [received on], 21 Feb. 1633, Fo. 236^{f-v}.

²¹ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Hocchieuw aen Combon van de provincie van Hocchieuw [Letter from Governor Hans Putmans to the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien in Fu-chou], Chiu-lung River, 25 Feb. 1633, fo. 238^v.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

*is a sure and rightful way to [gain] freedom of trade for the Company.*²²

It looks as if the other important mandarin the Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch'ao-chou and Chang-chou (*Ch'ao-chang hai-tao*) had sided with Iquan. Probably because the opinions of these two officials carried crucial weight, public opinion finally swung in Iquan's direction. The emperor left the matter in the hands of the Ministry of Rites to decide. The time had now come for the Regional Inspector, Lu Chên-fei, the most superior mandarin in Chang-chou, to intervene. This mandarin dutifully recorded the emperor's opinion on this matter and also noted how the local peoples had reacted to the maritime ban imposed by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien:

'Regarding to the opening of foreign trade, the emperor has commented: "The red-haired barbarians threaten us [by their attempts] to obtain trading rights. However, if all local authorities execute their administration as stringently as possible to prevent smuggling, their threats should not amount to anything much. Only because the Coastal Defence Systems have been corrupted and mischievous merchants trade covertly [with the Dutch] do such problems arise. At this court, we have still not made a decision about granting permission for this foreign trade. Someone has said it would be better to allow these people to trade in Manila rather than in Taiwan. My question is: since both of these are foreign countries, if we were to issue our junks permits to trade there, how can we force them to leave us alone? All mandarins should deliberate on this point and give your opinions." The mandarins from Chüan-chou have argued that the opening of foreign trade would generate four kinds of interests. The mandarins from Chang-chou have asserted that piracy is not the result of trade with the foreigners. I [Lu Chên-fei] and Grand Co-ordinator Tsou [Wei-lien] have listened to these opinions and, knowing that everyone had a firm perspective in mind and was eager to speak out, we have judged most of opinions were in favour of

²² VOC1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, [received on] 23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536^f.

CHAPTER FIVE

*opening up.*²³

Yielding to the pressure exerted by Iquan's party, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien declared himself willing to make a concession, but only if certain conditions were met. The Dutch should promise never again to visit in the Chiu-lung River estuary with their vessels. On 12 March, an official letter was issued by the Defender (*Shou-pei*[C.], *Sijpeij*[D.]) of Amoy, to confirm that the Dutch would be satisfied with such an arrangement:

*'Now Their Highnesses do not know how Your Honour[the Dutch commander] will react. Therefore they cannot proceed with the matter. If the eight junks mentioned above are issued with licences, this will be with the precedent that they enjoy the same treatment as the junks sailing to Manila.'*²⁴

Overjoyed by such a victory, on 23 March 1633 Iquan asked a merchant to send this official letter to Taiwan, accompanied by a private letter of his own. He was so excited that he even added some avuncular advice about how to address Chinese officialdom:

'If you have a notion to write a letter to the high officials of this kingdom, you should add the honorific word "gentlemen (Lao-yeh[C.], Lauja[D.])" after the titles of Coastal Defence Circuit (Hai-tao[C.], 'Haijtos'[D.]), the Provincial Military Commander (T'i-tu[C.], Titohous[D.]), the Assistant Regional Commander (Ts'an-chiang[C.], Samchang[D.]), the Mobile Corps Commander (You-chi[C.], Joukickx[D.]) and the honorific

²³ Fan Hsien, *Ch'ung-hsiu t'ai-wan fu-shih*[Newly Compiled Local Gazette of the Taiwan Prefecture], TW no. 105, 588. 'The record was extracted from Regional Inspector Liu Chên-fei's book 'An-min chi-Lüeh [Regional Inspector's Memorandum in Fu-chien]'. The completed memorandum might have been lost and not preserved to present time.

²⁴ VOC 1113, Missive van Pongsipij aen Nicolaes Couckebacker [Letter from Lieutenant Peng to Nicolaas Couckebacker], Taiwan, [received on]12 Mar. 1633, Fo. 537^r.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

“General-in-Chief” (Ta Chiang-chün [C.], Thaijtekoi[D.])” after the title of Deputy-Squadron Leader (Shao-kuan[C.], Tiquans[D.]), Squadron Leader (Pa-tsung[C.], Betsonghs[D.]), Defender (Shou-pei[C.], Sioupijs[D.]). If you treat these people with courtesy, they will soon be championing the trade with the greatest assiduity and bestow their favour on the Company.’²⁵

His final sentence says it all: ‘This is a sure and irrefutable act [werk].’ In other words, his efforts to propagate the Dutch trade had prevailed. Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien’s only condition was that the Dutch should promise never to dispatch any vessel to the coast of China again. On 30th, a ‘letter of credence (Credentie brief)’ from the Defender of Amoy was received. In this he urged the Dutch to reconfirm this condition. This letter was mandated by the Grand Co-ordinator, the Regional Inspector (*Hsün-an*[C.], *Sadnij*[D.]), the Coastal Defence Circuit (*Hai-tao*[C.], *Haijtoo*[D.]) and the Assistant Regional Commander (*Ts’an-chiang*[C.], *Samganh*[D.]). The letter is a genuine official document because it not only mentions all the highest ranking officials in Fu-chien province who were affected by this matter, but also carries an addendum, ‘ I have written to the Dutch governor, but have not received any reply. Therefore I am sending Your Honour this letter as verification.’²⁶

Iquan had pulled every string it was in his power to pull to have his trade with the Dutch legalized, but in his efforts he cut off all contacts between the VOC and the individual Chinese vendors. All trade would henceforth be controlled by the big Chinese merchants and if by some whim they were not willing to apply for passes to Taiwan, the Dutch would have no access to the Chinese market. Another worrying consideration was that, if the Japanese were to continue to visit Taiwan, they would soon outperform the

²⁵ VOC 1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, 23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536^{f-v}.

²⁶ VOC 1113, Commissie ofte credentie brief door sioupij van Aijmoij bij den coopman Sidnia [Letter of Credence from the Lieutenant of Amoy delivered by the Chinese merchant Sidnia], 25 Mar. 1633, fo. 538^{f-v}.

CHAPTER FIVE

Dutch because they had the edge in price competition. The only option open to the Dutch was formally to establish official links and exclude the Japanese traders, under the pretext that their participation was deemed illegal by the Chinese authorities.

Contrary to Iquan's expectations, the Dutch in Taiwan did not seem overjoyed and replied ambiguously. The acting governor of Taiwan, Nicolaes Coeckbacker, replied on 6 April 1633:

*'We shall remove our ships from the coast of China, after the commodities ordered have been supplied in sufficient quantities. Only after the said eight junks have arrived here with all the appointed commodities, do we promise that your strictures will be obeyed. If you allow Cheng Tai and Hung Hsü and the other merchants to bring the commodities in accordance with the order we dispatched, the Company will not only live with you in great friendship, but will also offer [you] some other special services [sonderlingen dienst].'*²⁷

By the time this letter arrived on An-hai, Iquan had probably already left for Kuang-tung on his mission to pacify Liu Hsiang.²⁸ Diplomatically speaking, the Dutch governor should have replied to the Defender or Regional Commander of Amoy rather than to Iquan who held no official position there. The former was the appropriate person with whom the Dutch should have had corresponded. The Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch'üan-chou, Chang Yung-ch'an, sent another private letter to urge the acting president of the Taiwan trading factory, Nicolaes Coeckerbaker, to confirm the message:

'I have sent Your Honour an earlier letter, but so far I have not received a reply. The three great mandarins dispatch their servants [hither] every day to

²⁷ VOC 1113, Missive van Nicolaes Couckebacker naer de rivier van Chincheo aen Iquan, Taiwan, 6 Apr. 1633, fo. 532^f.

²⁸ VOC 1113, Missive van Gampea aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537^v; Missive van Bendiocq aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, [not located], [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fos.537^v-538^f.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

*hear your answer to our letter. Your Honour, please send us an answer quickly.*²⁹

These great mandarins must have been Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien, Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei and Coastal Defence Circuit. As the change of the monsoon season was imminent, the Dutch fleet could appear on the coast of China again at any time. To avoid the incipient catastrophe of the arrival of the Dutch fleet where it was no longer welcome, even before the Dutch had replied Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien decided to dispatch junks to meet it. Iquan sent a letter to Taiwan on 22 May informing the Dutch that four junks from Chang-chou and four junks from Ch'üan-chou were on the point of leaving carrying the imperial passes.³⁰

Acting-President Nicolaes Coeckerbacker still doubted whether these eight junks would really show up in Taiwan, so he made cautious enquires among the Chinese merchants there, who confirmed this news, saying:

*'Placards have been posted in the jurisdictions of Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou, and also on all the gates of Hai-ch'êng city (Haton(D.)) for this purpose, declaring that anyone who wants to take a junk to Taiwan after paying the imperial tax, as well as those people who intend to trade with Manila, can purchase their passes from the Assistant Coastal Defence Circuit, (Hai-fang t'ung-chih [C.], Haijon'[D.]) who is issuing the passes by order of the Grand Co-ordinator.'*³¹

²⁹ VOC 1113, Missive van Silouja aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537^v. Chang Yung-ch'an was serving as Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch'üan-chou, vide: Tsou Wei-lien, 'fêng-ch'ao hung-i pao-chieh shu', 236.

³⁰ VOC 1113, Missive van Thee Silongh [Iquan] aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, [received on]22 May 1633, fol. 539r.

³¹ VOC 1113, Missive van Nicolaes Couckebacker aen de gouverneur commandeur oft overhoofden comende met de schepen van Batavia naer Taijouan [Letter from Nicolaes Couckebacker to the Governor, Commander or Admiral outward bound to

CHAPTER FIVE

Hence the first benefits of Iquan's arrangement fell to the Chinese side; the Sino-Taiwan trade was legalized, using the example of Manila where the Spaniards had no official diplomatic ties with the Chinese empire as precedent.

Red-haired Barbarians at the Gate

Despite Iquan's efforts, Governor Hans Putmans had long lost patience with the time-consuming procedure required to be granted access to legal trade on the basis of unequal status. In a letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 14 October 1632, he had proposed to follow the belligerent example set by the Chinese pirates and make a strike, since when the latter had employed this tactic all of them had been able to force the Grand Co-ordinators to listen to what they had to say. He complained:

*'This truly reveals the sort of treacherous and cowardly people the Chinese are. ... The more you deal with them with courtesy, civility, and punctiliousness, (as we have seen in a host of examples), the more they make us suffer and the more they push us around in circles and wear us out.'*³²

Putmans had reached the conclusion that military means would be necessary to force any granting of permission to trade with Chinese vendors in the Chiu-lung River estuary. When he returned to Batavia in April 1633, he

Taiwan from Batavia], Taiwan, 31 May 1633, fo. 540^{r-v}; According to the established pass-system, the pass was issued by an agent in Chang-chou prefecture, whose title was 'Hai-fang t'ung-chih'. Cf: Li Ch'ing-hsin, *Ming-tai hai-wai mao-i chih-tu*[The Overseas Trade System of Ming Dynasty], (Peking, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007), 320-25; This title is not included in Hucker's dictionary and has been translated with the closest term.

³² VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam], 14 Oct. 1632, Fo. 197^r.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

reported his experiences and revealed the plans he had made to Governor-General Hendrick Brouwer and the Council of the Indies in Batavia.³³ After he had done so, they agreed to wage a war on China.³⁴ On 2 June, Hans Putmans departed from Batavia with a fleet of six ships and four yachts and set his course towards Chang-chou.³⁵ The fleet arrived at T'ung-shan Island, off the southern coast of Fu-chien province on 5 July. Here they met the yacht the *Kamphaen* sent from Taiwan on 3 June by President Nicolaes Coeckerbacker to bring them up to date with all the negotiations which had taken place between March to June.³⁶ On 7 July, after one day's deliberation, Putmans made his decision: he assumed that this news was just another misleading lie and prepared for to launch an attack without further ado. He was confident that Iquan had no any knowledge of his secret plan. At that moment, five to six junks had just returned to Chang-chou from Manila. Iquan's brother had put in charge of some of the war-junks *en route* from An-hai to the Kuang-tung coast where he was to take up a new assignment, but the bulk of his own fleet was still anchored in the Amoy roadstead after his second sea battle with the pirate Liu Hsiang.³⁷ Is it possible that from the outset Putmans' target had been Iquan's force?

Hans Putmans left only three yachts moored near Nan-ao Island,

³³ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 161. 4 Apr. 1633; pp. 163-4, 22 Apr. 1633.

³⁴ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 228^f.

³⁵ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 186-7. 2 June 1633; Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 1633, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 110. The ship the *Warmont* was not in Batavia at that moment but was appointed to join this action.

³⁶ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 93. 19 May 1633; VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230^f. The yacht the *Kamphaen* had been dispatched to meet the new fleet from Batavia.

³⁷ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230^f.

CHAPTER FIVE

with instructions to go after all Chinese junks returning from Manila, Quinam, Cambodia or any other destination to ports along the coast between Nan-ao and the Chiu-lung River estuary. He took the other seven vessels with him with the plan to destroy all Iquan's war-junks anchored at Amoy at dawn on 12 July. This surprise attack was a great victory for the Dutch fleet because as it had been caught on the hop, the Chinese armada did not have time to prepare for battle. Twenty-five to thirty great war-junks were lying at anchor when the Dutch fleet opened its bombardment. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, many of the Chinese crews soon gave up the struggle and fled into the city of Amoy. The action continued the whole day and the Dutch ended up capturing three big war-junks and burned or sinking the others.

When all this was happening, the commander of the garrison in Amoy, Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch'üan-chou (residing in Amoy) Chang Yung-ch'an was not present. He had been dispatched to Ch'üan-chou with his most experienced soldiers and had probably taken the majority of his war-junks with him. Iquan who had taken up residence in An-hai, had left his fleet in Amoy for an overhaul and cleaning. As Coastal Defence Circuit Ts'êng Ying's report states that only five large war-junks of the Amoy garrison were destroyed by the Dutch, most of those sunk in the raid must have belonged to Iquan. Ts'êng Ying's report specifies that ten to nineteen war-junks were sunk, so that more than half of them were Iquan's.³⁸

As evening fell, the Chinese merchants Gamsia, Bindiok and the Defender Garrison Commander of Amoy (*Wang shou-pei*[C.], *Angpij*[D.])

³⁸ Lu Chên-fei, 'Ping-pu t'i-hsing ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u fu-chien hsün-an Lu Chên-fei t'i kao[Report of Regional Inspector of Fu-chien Lu Chên-fei preserved in the Ministry of war]', in TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, TW, no. 157, 88. 'Some ten more junks were burned by Cheng Chih-lung's troops, while five junks were burned by Chang Yung-ch'an's troops, under Mobile Corps Commander of Wu-t'ung.'

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

came to parley with Putmans.³⁹ They were bursting with questions about why the Dutch had carried out a raid of this nature.⁴⁰ It seems they had booty in mind since five to six Chinese junks had already returned from Manila, so Putmans probably fostered hopes of confiscating the remaining five to six richly laden junks which were due to arrive any time.⁴¹ Finally, ten days later on 22 July, the Dutch fleet did capture a Chinese junk from Manila with a cargo worth about 30,766 rials, including 27,994 rials in cash.⁴² By then the Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch'üan-chou, Chang Yung-ch'an, had returned to Amoy city. The letter addressed to Hans Putmans written by the Coastal Defence Circuit on 26 July was also signed by Chang Yung-ch'an and Iquan. They asked whether he desired peace or war.⁴³ Three days later Putmans replied that what the Dutch wanted was to be able to trade freely in the Chiu-lung River estuary on an equal footing with all the other vendors rather than to be restricted to do business with specific merchants assigned to them in Taiwan.⁴⁴

The conditions the Dutch had demanded after their arrival in the Pescadores Islands in 1622 had never been officially approved. Iquan had expended much time and energy trying to persuade the Dutch that these

³⁹ It is certain the 'pei' refers to 'Shou-pei', but what the 'Ang' represents cannot be identified.

⁴⁰ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 108. 12 July 1633.

⁴¹ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230^f.

⁴² VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230^v; Inventaris vande Haer volgende contant ende coopmanschappen uijt een joncquen comende van Manila in dato 22en Julij anno 1633 bij t jacht den Zalm voordesen Rievier Chincheo verover, [Inventory of Cash and Commodities on a Junk Outward Bound from Manila on 22 July 1633 captured by the Yacht the *Zalm* in the Vicinity of the Chiu-lung River], [not located], 22 July 1633, fo. 290^v.

⁴³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 112. 26 July 1633.

⁴⁴ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 114. 29 July 1633.

CHAPTER FIVE

conditions were unacceptable to the Chinese Imperial court, but Hans Putmans remained obdurate. His motive might have been that he did not believe that the Dutch would be able to compete with the Japanese merchants in Taiwan. In other words, if they were to secure the Sino-Japan trade, the Dutch were limited to two options only: either somehow or other to exclude the Japanese merchants from Taiwan or to participate in direct trade with Chinese in the Chiu-lung River estuary. As it was, the Dutch seemed to have been convinced that if they harried the Chinese coast continually, they might be able to obtain opportunities to take part in the smuggling trade with Chinese vendors in the Chiu-lung River estuary. They also had an ulterior motive. Their reasoning also seems to have been that, if all Chinese naval vessels were destroyed, they personally could seize all the Chinese junks from Manila, which they had so far left to Iquan to deal with as he wished. The long and the short of it was that the Dutch appear to have believed that they could take Iquan's place in the Sino-Japan trade.⁴⁵

In August, Iquan decided that his best option was to tackle the Dutch outright, but still no real battle took place. On the 24th the area was struck by a very severe typhoon, which forced both sides to cease their hostilities. On 30 August, because of the hazardous conditions created by the strong winds

⁴⁵ Leonard Blussé had correctly emphasized that Governor Putmans's project was to follow in the footsteps of the Portuguese in Macao and win a free trade privileges from the Chinese court by means of eliminating any other force which happened to be cruising Chinese coastal waters. He also points out that the absence of Iquan was the factor which triggered Putmans' aggressive action. However, in my opinion the trigger which fired Putmans' aggressive attitude was the new Grand Co-ordinator's, Tsou Wei-lien, plausible decision to cut off the illegal trade between peddlers and the VOC in Chiu-lung River estuary. Cf: Leonard Blussé, 'The VOC as Socerer's Apprentice: Stereotypes and Social Engineering on the China Coast', in Wilt Lukas Idema (ed.), *Leyden Studies in Sinology: Papers Presented at the Conference held in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Sinological Institute of Leyden University, December 8-12, 1980*, (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 87-105 at 101.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

and driving rain, the Dutch fleet sailed from Amoy and returned to T'ung-shan Island in the south. The following day, they captured two big junks just returned from Quinam, loaded with cargo worth about 13,694 rials.⁴⁶ After this rich capture, they did not encounter any other fully laden junks as the south monsoon season was gradually coming to an end. Because the north wind was increasing in strength, they could not sail back to Amoy again before 16 October.

Thwarted by the weather, the Dutch fleet was not able to put its strategy of blockading Amoy Harbour throughout of the whole southern monsoon season into action. Therefore the booty they had captured was far less than they had expected. On 22 October, the fleet of eight yachts succeeded in sailing against the wind to the outskirts of Chiu-lung River estuary. As he was well aware of the situation, it seems impossible to think that Iquan's armada had not been feverishly recruiting new vessels to fight the Dutch flotilla during the past two months. After carefully weighing up his chances, rather than opting for a pitched battle, he reverted to the old tactics that he had adopted earlier against Frederik de Witt in 1629. He let the Dutch fleet sail into the Amoy Bay and then sealed its mouth with suicidal fire-junks. As the Dutch confronted his 150 war-junks, they did not realize all these junks were all crewed by men who were potentially prepared to drop their vessels if it should be necessary for them to do so. In the battle which followed they lost two yachts. Governor Hans Putmans wrote:

'[We]had no chance to compete against their suicidal fire junks, [so we]

⁴⁶ VOC 1109, Inventaris van de coopmanschappen bevonden in twee joncquen, onder de stadt Tangsoa op de wal sitende ende op 31 Aug- anno 1633 aengehaelt, ende voor een geode prijse verlaert, [Inventory of the Commodities Loaded in the Two Junks Captured in the Vicinity of T'ung-shan], location unknown, 31 Aug. 1633, fo. 291^r. The total value of the goods was calculated from the inventory and the price list in the same document, see Appendix; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 123. 31 Aug. 1633.

CHAPTER FIVE

wighed anchor and sailed away.

*..., having blown towards their fleet by the wind, the Couckerken did her best to escape. But it was too late. Encircled by fifteen to sixteen big junks, the yacht was immediately stormed by them.*⁴⁷

Putmans led the other five yachts towards the Pescadores, where he summoned his council and declared that the projected war against China would be abandoned.⁴⁸

Lever effect of the Typhoons at the Imperial Court

Superficially it seems that Iquan was the one who suffered from this Dutch raid, but closer examination shows that in fact it tended to reinforce and expand his already substantial influence. The two typhoons which arose at the end of August and in the middle of September prevented the Dutch fleet from blockading Amoy Bay. The upshot was that the combat between the Dutch and Chinese garrison troops did not happen around Amoy, but in the vicinity of T'ung-shan.

When the Dutch arrived at T'ung-shan on 5 July, they acted very calmly. Five days later on the 10th they left and set course for Amoy, leaving only three yachts behind. They bided their time before launching any raid and allowed the five junks belonging to Iquan's brother to pass through into Kuang-tung waters. This reticence was deemed advisable if they were to conceal their intention of surprising Iquan's armada in Amoy. On 12th they began to attack the junks belonging to Chinese garrison of T'ung-shan. One of the crews, Thijs Hendrisen, reported:

⁴⁷ VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Oct. 1634, Fo. 2^r.

⁴⁸ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, p. 140. 31 Oct. 1633.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

*'...we decided to follow your orders, and to destroy the vessels lying at Nan-ao. This was executed successfully. We attacked 28 junks and set fire to them. Most of these junks were equipped for war, and carried a full complement of soldiers. When they saw that we were in deadly earnest, they fled to land immediately.'*⁴⁹

The report from the garrison troops states that there were thirteen garrison war-junks carrying 600 soldiers. Five junks were burned, even though they had returned fire ferociously. Their crews retreated to safety on land in T'ung-shan City.⁵⁰ The leader of the garrison troops was the Regional Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao, Ch'êng Ying-lin. He was of higher rank than Iquan, and the Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, apparently showed a marked preference for him as an reliable military man. After Iquan's force had been destroyed in Amoy by Putmans, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien, thought this might be a chance to get rid him or at least teach him a good lesson. He severely criticized Iquan, writing that his tolerant attitude towards the red-haired barbarians had caused this disaster.⁵¹ He also mentioned that the reason the Dutch fleet remained in Amoy rather at T'ung-shan was

⁴⁹ VOC 1111, Missive van Thijs Hendricxden aen Hans Putmans, onder zeijl voor Wierings baeij[Letter from Thijs Hendrisen to Hans Putmans under sail to Ching-hai T'ou bay], not located, 23 July 1633, fo. 542^v. Wierings Bay is 'Ching-hai T'ou' Bay, see picture 3.

⁵⁰ Lu, 'Ping-pu t'i-hsing ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u fu-chien hsün-an Lu Chên-fei t'i kao', 86. 'The thirteen junks and six hundred soldiers of the Chang-chou garrison opened fire with cannon... In the opening stages [of the battle] Hsieh Chi's junk was burned by the Dutch, the other four junks were also burned... the sailors and soldiers landed from their junks and ensconced themselves in Fort Nan-ao while the Dutch ships ceased their action.'

⁵¹ Ibidem, 83. Critical letter written by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien to the emperor entitled 'How my prediction came true when the Dutch launched a sudden assault. I accuse the Coastal Defence of negligence and urge them to expel the Dutch so as to redeem their laxity.' The Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei thought this letter apparently referred to Iquan and was blaming him.

CHAPTER FIVE

because of the glorious victory won by Regional Deputy Commander Ch'êng Ying-lin.⁵² Perhaps for the same reason, this aversion to Iquan, the most important supporter of Iquan's Dutch trade policy, the Coastal Defence Circuit, Ts'êng Ying, was demoted at the same time.

Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien might have achieved his desire had not the two typhoons brought the Dutch fleet back to Nan-ao Island, the area under the command of Regional Deputy-Commander, Ch'êng Ying-lin. There the Dutch fleet not only captured two valuable Chinese junks from Quinam, but also seized 214 cattle from the coast as booty.⁵³

When the Dutch did eventually return to the Chiu-lung River estuary where it was defeated by Iquan on 22 October, public sympathy swung his way. The Regional Inspector, Lu Chên-fei, Iquan's other fervent supporter, made no bones about this. Making a comparison between Iquan and Regional Deputy Commander Ch'êng Ying-lin, he said that the former had not only fought on water in other areas where out of his garrison zone and had suffered greatly, he had also helped the garrison troops in Amoy to win a glorious victory. (Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien had put him in charge of this military action because of Ts'êng Ying's recommendation). In contrast with his military proven prowess, Ch'êng Ying-lin had not been able to prevent the assaults launched on Amoy from T'ung-shan and had failed protect his charge properly when it was attacked by the Dutch. Consequently Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien was dismissed by the emperor after this incident.⁵⁴ His fall from grace was also partly attributable to the disputes

⁵² Ibid., 84.

⁵³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 127. 14 Sept. 1633.

⁵⁴ Tsou Wei-lien, 'Appendix: ping-pu hsing ping-k'ê ch'ao-ch'u fu-chien hsün-fu tsou t'i-kaoh[Report of the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Tsou Wei-lien, preserved in the Ministry of War]', in TWYH (ed.), *Ch'ing-tai kuan-shu chi ming-t'ai-wan chêng-shih wang-shih*[The Annihilation of the Cheng Family from the Official Records during the Ch'ing Dynasty], TW, No. 174, 47-8. 'On 23rd October 1633, the emperor issued

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

raging between factions at the imperial court as well as his un-co-operative attitude which had irritated the Fu-chienese mandarins.⁵⁵

As a consequence of accusations lodged by Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien's impotence in military matters and in maintaining law and order in the local situation could no longer be overlooked by the court. The emperor ordered somebody else be appointed to his position. Ironically, the official order was issued on 21 October, just one day before Iquan's victory in the Chiu-lung River estuary.⁵⁶ Although the court still did not recognize Taiwan as an official trading destination, local opinion in Fu-chien was adamant about its commercial possibilities and Coastal Defence Circuit Ts'êng Ying issued the Ch'üan-chou merchants with provisional passes after February of 1634.⁵⁷ Coincidentally, just at the same

commands in response to Tsou Wei-lien's letter: how could the Grand Co-ordinator complain about the militants under him? He should have apportioned rewards or punishment according to their achievements and abilities. Tsou Wei-lien is guilty of dereliction of his duty.'

⁵⁵ TWYH (ed.), *Ming-shih hsüan-chi*, TW no. 307, 153. 'All the Fu-chienese mandarins who served in Peking accused him (Tsou Wei-lien) at the imperial court; consequently he was relieved of his post by the emperor.'

⁵⁶ The Ministry of War, 'Appendix: Ping-pu hsing li-pu tzu-kao[Letter Sent by the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Personnel]', in TWYH (ed.), *Ch'ing-tai kuan-shu chi ming-t'ai-wan chêng-shih wang-shih*, TW no. 174, 46. The new Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shên You-lung, was appointed on 21 October 1633.

⁵⁷ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 196-7. 21 Oct 1634. New Grand Co-ordinator Shên You-lung approved the provisional passes issued before October 1634 but some official had already issued these sometime earlier than that. In a letter written in 1639, Ts'ai Hsien-ch'ên had mentions that Coastal Defence Circuit Ts'êng Ying had issued the passes which allowed Amoy junks to trade in Kuang-tung with the acknowledgement of the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shên You-lung, and the governor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, Hsiung Wên-t'san, This document confirms the official who was in the position to issue provisional passes was Ts'êng Ying. Ts'ai, *Ch'ing-pai t'ang gao*, II, 889-90.


CHAPTER FIVE

time the Nagasaki regent was accused of issuing passes for junks sailing to Southeast Asia, including Taiwan, without the acknowledgment of the Shogun. His slap on the wrist meant that no more Japanese junks would be able to come to Taiwan with a shogunal pass.⁵⁸ The sense of urgency which forced the Dutch to fight so hard to obtain free trade in Chiu-lung River estuary suddenly dissipated. The hostile feelings towards Iquan vanished as snow before the sun as the first junks sailed into the bay of Taijouan. In retrospect, during the summer and autumn of 1633 Iquan was facing storms which threatened his personal career at the imperial court and in Fu-chien waters, but after the tempests had been ridden out with luck and patience, both turned out to be very beneficial to him.

⁵⁸ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 249-50. 19 Feb. 1634.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

Picture 3. Map of China and Taiwan, part



CHAPTER FIVE

Source: VEL 272, Kaart van China en Formosa

No.	Place name along the coast in Dutch	Place name along the coast in Chinese
1	Canton	Kuang-chou
2	I. Haitiumon	Island Hu-t'ou-mên
3	Macao	Ao-mên
4	P. Lantaon	Cape of Nan-t'ou
5	Pedra Branca	Ta-hsing
6	Haarlems Bai/ Pingaisou	P'ing-hai-so
7	Branders Bay/ Kamptsou	Yen-chou
8	Kramers bay	Hou-mên
9	Pesau de schaar/ Groote imbocht	Pai-sha-hu
10	Oucham	Wu-kan near by (Groeningen Bay/ Tien-wei)
11	Reiersens bai/ Cathei	Chia-tzu
12	Cape de Goed hoop/ Phcio	Ch'ien-ao
13	Tsinsing	Shên-ch'üan
14	Nassouen bai/ onbekende imbocht	(Ch'ih-ao)
15	Wieringens bai/Zinhaisou	Ching-hai-so
16	Orangebai/ Zoatoupou	Ch'i-t'ou-p'u*
17	I. Lama/ Lamon	Island Nan-ao
18	Klox bay	Bay of Clock/ Bay of Hsüan-chung ⁱ
19	Tongsoa	T'ung-shan
20	Tongsoa/ victorie bay	Bay of T'ung-shan
21	Walvis bai	Bay of Whale / Bay of Liu-ao ⁱⁱ
22	Tinhajj	Chên-hai
23	Berg van Chinchieu	Mountain South Ta-wu
24	Quemoy	Quemoy

ⁱ 'Hsüan-chung' literally means 'a clock hanged'.

ⁱⁱ 'Liu-ao' literally means 'six gigantic fishes'.

STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

25	Aimon	Amoy
26	Haiting	Hai-ch'êng
27	R. Cinchieu	Chiu-lung River

The Chinese place names are mostly taken from 'Yen-hai Ch'üan-t'u [The Complete Coastal Map of China] 'in: Ch'ên Lun-chiung, *Hai-kuo Wên-chien-lü* [My Knowledge about the Regions Abroad], T'ai-wan Wên-hsien Shih-liao Ts'ung-k'an [Compilation of historical documents relating to Taiwan] vol. 7, 36-69; * Hao Yü-lin, *Fu-chien T'ung-chih* [The General Gazette of Fuchien], Ching-yin Wên-yüen-kê Ssu-k'ut-s'ung-shu, No. 527, 59

CHAPTER SIX
CHAPTER SIX
THE WINDING WAYS
TOWARDS THE WESTERN OCEAN
1631-1636

First dip into the Western Ocean

The legalization of Iquan's Sino-Taiwan trade appears to have been a natural consequence of his own growing official status. In view of his personal involvement with the VOC in Taiwan and the mercenary character of his troops, it was a simple and efficient way to maintain the regional peace and keep the balance between the multiple interests of the imperial court, the VOC and the Fu-chienese. The burden of Iquan's song as he tried to convince imperial court was that the Dutch were the natural successors to the people of Kalapa since Batavia had been founded at the same place. Therefore the trade with Taiwan should be seen as the continuation of the former trade with Kalapa. The Taiwan trade should be categorized under the title of Batavia trade and as a matter of course be slotted into to the traditional 'Western Ocean' trading route of the Chang-chou or Hai-ch'êng merchants, rather than that of the Ch'üan-chou merchants represented by Iquan.

As mentioned before, for the years, 1630-1632 the VOC trade with Japan was interrupted because of the violent incident involving the Japanese merchant Hamada Yahei in Taiwan but the burgeoning trade between Taiwan and An-hai was substantially swelling the existing trade between Amoy and Batavia. Since Iquan's raids on the coast of Fu-chien in 1629, Chinese foreign trade had been either prohibited by the Chinese authorities or obstructed by pirates. Naturally, this upheaval also caused an interruption of the regular visits of the Chinese junks to Batavia. The Dutch records show

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

that by the end of 1629 no junks had visited Batavia for two years.¹ The Chinese merchants who lived in Batavia had been doing their best to run the trade via the Batavia-Taiwan-Amoy axis. Limlacco had dispatched his junks with his son-in-law, Boyco, on board to Taiwan on private business.² Boyco and another Chinese merchant from Batavia, named Jancon, joined forces to purchase the pepper from the Dutch in Taiwan and then tried to sell it in Hai-ch'êng.³ Bendioc was also deeply involved in doing business with them. Later, owing to the restrictions of the Amoy authorities and the harassment inflicted by Ch'u T'sai-lao, the trade gradually shifted to An-hai and Jancon was the person who was dispatched by Governor Hans Putmans to examine whether the An-hai could offer the Company any useful commodities.⁴ As the partnership between Iquan and the Dutch was beginning to be constructed on a more solid foundation, these Chinese merchants from Batavia might have been seeking closer contact with Iquan's merchants with a view to doing business.

In the year 1631, because the pirate Ch'u T'sai-lao had been

¹ VOC 1098, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Kamer Amsterdam, Batavia, 15 Dec. 1626, fos. 319^v-320^r.

² VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jan Pietersz Coen, Chiu-lung River, 5 Oct. 1630, fo. 420^r; Resolutie des Comptoirs Taijouan, Taiwan, 27 Feb. 1630, Fo. 424^r. Because Governor Hans Putmans insisted, the Council decided to flout the instruction of Governor-General Jacques Specx, and lend Boyco and Jancon 400 piculs of pepper, accepting Limlacco's property in Batavia as surety.

³ VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenus naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiulung River, 11 Apr. 1630, fo. 475^{r-v}.

⁴ VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert [Resolution Made on the Chi-lung River], 15 Oct. 15 Oct. 1630, fo. 511^v. About the activities of Chinese merchants in Batavia running this axis, Cf. Leonard Blussé, 'Chapter IV Testment to a Towkay: Jan con, Batavia and the Dutch China trade', in id., *Strange Company: Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*, (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 49-96.

CHAPTER SIX

defeated by Iquan at the end of the previous year, the Chinese authorities decided to relax the maritime prohibitions and allow the Fu-chienese junks sailed to Southeast Asia again.⁵ According to the news passed on to the Dutch by Chinese merchants in Japan, five junks had been fitted out to sail to Batavia in the spring.⁶ Certainly, in July 1631 five junks returned to China from Batavia. One of them carried a cargo worth about 60,000 rials, double the value of the average cargo of junks visiting Manila.⁷ Perhaps the Chinese citizens in Batavia were lured by this sort of lucrative trade and this enticement to riches stimulated them to look for alternative channels to pursue the trade rather than merely sending junks under Dutch supervision. The solution was simple. All they had to do to run their business was to acquire Iquan's help which would enable them to use the junks which departed from Amoy. At this time the Dutch did hear rumours that there were two merchants in Haich'êng who had tried to obtain official Chinese licences for Batavia, probably via Iquan.⁸ In the spring of 1632, news came that Iquan had decided to dispatch junks to Batavia and these would be accompanied by those of other merchants.⁹ He had sent one of his nephews, Huang Liu-kuan (which is written in Dutch as 'Lacqua', 'Lacknio' or 'Lacknia'), on one of the three big junks bound for Batavia.¹⁰

⁵ Liang, 'Hai-ch'êng hsien-chih', 382.

⁶ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 9. 28 Mar. 1631.

⁷ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 30. 18 July 1631.

⁸ VOC 1107, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, 9 Nov. 1631, Fo. 197^r. Iquan was then summoned by the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, to defend Fu-chou after intelligence had reached there that the pirate Liu Hsiang was approaching.

⁹ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiu-lung River, 7 Jan. 1632, Fo. 218^r.

¹⁰ VOC 1105, Missive van Iquan naer Lissuw[Lieh-yü] aen Hans Putmans, 23 Sept. 1632, Fo. 209^r. He is called a nephew (neef) of Iquan and therefore was quite probably Huang Chêng-ming, a sixth cousin of Coxinga's on his mother's side. Cf.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

The Huang family were probably among the Fu-chienese merchants residing in the vicinity of Macao, which was Iquan's step-mother's native place. It was said that Iquan began his overseas adventures when he ran away from his parents and went to see his step-mother's brother, Huang Ch'eng, in Macao. Huang Liu-kuan must have been related to a branch of this Huang family in Kuang-tung. He was one of the merchants frequently seen trading with the Dutch in An-hai, where he was almost as prominent as Biendiok and Gamsia.¹¹ The junk arrived in Batavia on 24 April and departed nearly two months later on 6 July carrying 300 picul of pepper with a large quantity of silver coins and some sandalwood.¹² Unfortunately the junk did not enjoy a smooth passage home. She had departed too late and the monsoon changed direction as she neared the coast of Kuang-tung. Unable to sail farther north, she entered the mouth of the Pearl River on 2 September. Her choice of destination violated the imperial regulation which did not tolerate any junk sailing into this river without prior permission. Huang Liu-kuan had probably dared to break this law because he knew Iquan's old friend, former Fu-chien Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an who had subsequently been appointed Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi provinces. Although he had knowingly violated imperial regulations, he did possess a valid licence

VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacque Speex, Taiwan, 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 218^v; VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü] in de rivier van Chincheo aen Paulus Traudenius, Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202^v. This letter mentions that the previous Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung Wên-t'san, had issued three licences for Iquan's people. Although Liu-kuan is the person whose name best fits the transliteration, Lacqua, there is no direct evidence to indicate they are identical.

¹¹ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiu-lung River, 9 Mar. 1632, fo. 220^v. The Dutch paid Hung-hsu and Cheng-Tai together 1,000 rials in advance for gold.

¹² *Dagregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 73. 3 May 1632; p. 86. 6 July 1632; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 76. 11 Sept. 1632.

CHAPTER SIX

issued by the Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung personally in Fu-chien a year earlier.¹³ From this distance in time it is impossible to say with any certainty but family members living in Macao might have also had some useful connections with the local administration.

On her homeward voyage, one of the other big junks from Batavia ran into a typhoon which forced her to take refuge in Quinam.¹⁴ The third changed her course to Patani and finally sailed to Shang-ch'uan Island (*Sancqqan*[D.]), just off Macao in the estuary of the Pearl River where she was caught in the same trap as the first one.¹⁵

In the spring of 1632, these junks set sail on the north monsoon, while Iquan was called to Fu-chou to combat the raids of the pirate, Liu Hsiang, who had set foot in the Wu-hu Island. The defeat of Ch'u T'sai-lao had suddenly stirred up a fresh ambition to trade abroad when the maritime prohibition was lifted by the imperial authorities. The smuggling trade of Fu-chienese merchants, who bartered silks for Japanese silver, regained its prosperity. These route followed by these smuggling junks to Japan passed along the north coast of Fu-chien and the south coast of Chê-chiang. No doubt vendors in coastal villages also enjoyed some pickings. During the late summer of 1631, the pirate Liu Hsiang launched a raid on the Chiu-lung River before proceeding to the coast of Fu-chou, where his intention was to destroy Iquan's armada.¹⁶ This is the reason Iquan had been summoned to

¹³ VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü] in de rivier van Chincheo aen Paulus Traudenus, Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202^v.

¹⁴ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 6 Nov. 1632, Fo. 218^v.

¹⁵ VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü] in de rivier van Chincheo aen Paulus Traudenus, Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202^v.

¹⁶ VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Nan-ao Island, 22 Aug. 1632, Fo.224^f.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

Fu-chou and was finally granted permission to take up residence in the Wu-hu Island. Liu Hsiang was defeated at Hsiao-ch'êng near the Wu-hu with the help of the fishermen militia around the 7 December.¹⁷ Liu escaped and fled towards the south. Iquan was ordered by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Tsou Wei-lien, to chase after him and he was given the assistance of the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi provinces, his former superior, Hsiung Wên-t'san.¹⁸ A letter from Iquan dated 21 February 1633 mentions this trans-provincial assignment to eradicate Liu Hsiang from the coast of Kuang-tung once and for all.¹⁹ On the 22 March, Iquan wrote to the Dutch, informing them that he was about to depart on this long-range expedition.²⁰ He set sail and anchored at Chih-kang-t'ou, a place some 70 kilometres from Macao and 50 kilometres from Kuang-chou (Canton), strategically located in the estuary of the Pearl River, in between Macao and Liu Hsiang's base at Ta-hsing (which the VOC called 'Pedra Branca', 130 kilometers north of Chih-kang-t'ou). It is now impossible to say with any certainty but Iquan might have been more concerned about protecting his junks returning from Batavia than about his military assignment.²¹ On 25

¹⁷ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 81. 17 Dec. 1632; Wan, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu', 165.

¹⁸ Anonymous, 'hai-t'ou liu-hsiang ts'an-kao i [Partial Remnants of a Letter referring to the pirate Liu Hsiang (I)]', in TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 140.

¹⁹ VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received on] 21 Feb. 1633, Fo. 237^r.

²⁰ VOC 1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, [received in] Taiwan, 23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536^r.

²¹ About one year later, Iquan was accused of managing the foreign trade in Kuang-tung province under the pretext of earning profits to pay his troops. cf. The Minister of War, Chang Fêng-I, 'Yen-chin Min-ch'uan Ch'u-hai Chieh-chi Chêng-chih-lung Wu-yü Nan-ao 18 May 1634 [A strict ban on the provisioning of out going Fu-chien sea ships. Cheng Chi-lung should not move south of Nan-ao]', in: Ch'ên Yün-lin, *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, vol. 3, 299-313 at

CHAPTER SIX

March 1633, Iquan's fleet defeated Liu Hsiang in the vicinity of this place.²² However, according to the news the Dutch heard from Chinese merchants one month later, Iquan's victory was by no means decisive. Initially it was he who had been attacked by Liu Hsiang, but, after he had detected Liu's next ambush, he was able to turn the tables and win. Despite his victory, in the course of the engagement, his fleet had suffered serious damage.²³ He probably thought this is a small price to pay because this victory would have been worth his while if he wanted to run his business on the Western Ocean route via Macao. Had he not been victorious, his junks would have run a great risk as long as the coast of Kuang-tung was not under his control.

As mentioned earlier, while Iquan was leading his armada in his pursuit of Liu Hsiang, did not let this opportunity to slip to manipulate public opinion in the hope of persuading the stubborn new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, to legalize his trade with Dutch in Taiwan. However, just as he had almost succeeded, Governor Hans Putmans lost patience and attacked Iquan's armada in Amoy in July 1633 but luck was against him and he and his fleet ran into no fewer than two typhoons that summer and then had to endure the suicide attack of Iquan's fire-junks in October.²⁴ Although the Dutch did not achieve their goals, their raids had earned Liu Hsiang's fleet some time to recover and plan a new attack on Iquan.²⁵

305.

²² Anonymous, 'hai-t'ou liu-hsiang ts'an-kaio i', 140.

²³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 91-2. 26 Apr. 1633.

²⁴ Leonard Blussé, 'The VOC as Socerer's Appentice', 87-105.

²⁵ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 153. 21 Feb. 1634. Liu Hsiang and his men remained at the Pedra Branca and Brandsbaay, from where they captured 30 big junks and a city called Yen-chou (written in Dutch as 'Jamsieu'). Pedro Branco is 'Ta Hsing' and Brandsbaay is the bay outside Yen-chou (also written in Dutch as 'Kamptsou').. See picture 3.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

Kicked off the Kuang-tung pirates

When Governor Putmans returned from Batavia to T'ung-shan Island off the south coast of Fu-chien in the summer of 1633, he carried instructions to blockade all Chinese harbours and occupy either Amoy or Macao. In the hope of achieving these goals, he was advised to establish an alliance with the pirate Liu Hsiang. This strategy was thwarted because of the damage wrought by the two very powerful typhoons which hampered the co-operation between them. Later, when Putmans was chased away from Amoy Bay by Iquan, Liu Hsiang's fleet failed to offer him any constructive assistance either,²⁶ because the basis for this alliance between the Dutch and Liu Hsiang never really had a solid foundation. Furthermore, there were signs that the Chinese side did not take the Dutch raids seriously. A Dutch yacht from Japan arrived in Amoy Bay in December 1633 unaware of the conflict between Iquan and the VOC. Because of the typhoons in the earlier southern monsoon season, no Dutch vessel had been able to carry any message to Japan about the fresh hostilities. As matters stood, the Chinese would have had a very good reason to confiscate the yacht, but they did not. Instead, they sent several junks to escort the ship to the Pescadores. The Chinese merchant, Hambuan, also sent a message from An-hai, mentioning that the Chinese officials there had agreed to allow junks to trade in Taiwan.²⁷ Cogently, almost every mandarin reported to the emperor that the Dutch raid on Amoy was the direct result of adverse effects of the maritime prohibition. In other words, the views of Iquan's party had won fervent support among the local gentry and the mandarins. Indeed their backing was so strong the Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch'üan-chou prefectures, Ts'êng Ying, dared to issue three provisional passes to the An-hai merchants who ran the Taiwan trade. This gesture ameliorated the feelings of hostility among the Dutch and Putmans decided to declare a temporary cease-fire and then decide

²⁶ Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 1634, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 143.

²⁷ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 149-50. 22 Jan. 1634.

CHAPTER SIX

what steps to take.

Unfortunately just at this moment Liu Hsiang happened to seize the initiative again. After 30 December 1633,²⁸ Iquan had dispatched part of his naval force to the Kuang-tung coast where it was defeated by Liu Hsiang sometime between January and March. On 15 March 1634 Liu Hsiang's fleet anchored at the Pescadores bringing with it the richly laden trading junks it had captured off Quemoy (Chin-men, in the estuary of Chiu-lung River). Liu had been able to take these junks and their rich cargo, among them three which intended to sail to Batavia, one bound for Cambodia and six for Manila, without too much effort.²⁹ Liu Hsiang's bold move now put Putmans' design of blockading the whole Chinese coast into operation. To maintain his force, he made preparations to sell all the booty to the Dutch in Taiwan. Owing to a lack of cannon and gunpowder for the following raids, he needed Dutch supply in this aspect. On 22 March, Governor Hans Putmans wrote a letter in reply to Liu's statement of requirements for trade, accommodation and provisions. He neither agreed to purchase the booty Liu had taken from the Amoy junks nor did he give his fleet permission to remain in Taijouan or Wang-kang (a nearby roadstead).³⁰ He did not even react to the request for cannon and ammunition, declaring that the Dutch were honour-bound to respect a cease-fire while they awaited an answer from the Fu-chienese officials. This change of attitude caught Liu Hsiang on the back foot. Although he had assembled a fleet of eight big and thirty-five small junks, he did not dare to attack Amoy which was heavily guarded by Iquan's musketeers and cannon. Furthermore, his stolen goods would not bring any profit unless they were sold to Dutch. When he realized that the northern monsoon season had drawn to an end and the possibilities to ship these goods were ebbing away fast, he decided to try his luck again and see whether he

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 147-8, 30 Dec. 1633.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 150. 15 Mar. 1634.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 158-9, 22. Mar. 1634.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

could storm the Dutch fort successfully with his force of 600 pirates. At dawn on the 9 April Liu Hsiang tried to surprise the small Dutch garrison of thirty soldiers but failed. Not long afterwards, the pirates had to depart as they were threatened by starvation.³¹ They returned to Ta-hsing.

Around the middle of May, Liu Hsiang's smuggling trade partner in Japan, the son of Iquan's old boss Li Tan by the name of Li Kuo-chu (Augustin), decided to surrender to Iquan in Amoy.³² Liu Hsiang attacked Amoy again, but once again his attempt came to naught. Sometime later Iquan destroyed part of Liu's force in the vicinity of T'ung-shan Island but he was not able to reach the main force.³³ In between July and August, Liu Hsiang's fleet made another big capture: he intercepted five Portuguese galliots *en route* to Japan with a rich cargo of silks onboard, when they were blown off course by a typhoon. One galliot was captured but the remaining four sailed on.³⁴ Probably this capture astonished the Kuang-tung authorities because they offered Liu Hsiang a chance to be recruited as a naval officer just as Iquan had been in the past. Apparently he was not interested because, when the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi provinces, Hsiung Wên-ts'an, dispatched some mandarins to negotiate with Liu Hsiang, the latter took them hostage.³⁵

In the meantime, far from being at a stalemate the negotiations with the

³¹ Ibid., 162, 8 Apr. 1634.

³² TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 139. *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 175. 20 May 1634.

³³ TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 139; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 183-4. 29 June 1634.

³⁴ VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Oct. 1634, fo. 14^{r-v}. Boxer C. R. *Fidalgos in the Far East*, (Hongkong: Oxford University Press, 1968), 111.

³⁵ P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 5; VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Hendrick Brower, Taiwan, 9 Mar. 1635, fol. 329^v; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 207. 10 Jan 1635.

CHAPTER SIX

Dutch were also progressing. Although the Dutch were not satisfied with the conditions offered, they neither co-operated with the Chinese pirates nor did they intercept the junks from Manila. The reason the Dutch chose not to pursue their war with Iquan was that they simply did not have enough ships left to contemplate taking such a risk. Although the High Government in Batavia had decided to send several yachts to Taiwan as reinforcements, they could not take up a station between Manila and Amoy before the end of June when most of the Chinese junk would be returning, because the southern monsoon had begun late.³⁶ The last but not the least reason was the sudden change in Japanese maritime policy. After 1634, no Japanese junk ever visited Taiwan again. On the 12 July 1634, Governor Hans Putmans wrote a letter to all mandarins in Fu-chien, including the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien residing in Fu-chou, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Fu-ning, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-Ch'üan, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Chang-nan, Assistant Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch'üan-chou, the Assistant Coastal Defence Circuit of Chang-chou, the Magistrate of Chin-Chiang, the District Magistrate of T'ung-an, the District Magistrate of Hai-ch'êng, the Mobile Corps Commander of Ch'üan-nan, the Mobile Corps Commander of P'eng-hu. The letter announced:

'We also intend to anchor some of our ships at the Pescadores(P'eng-hu) so as to be able to serve the Chinese empire (should Liu Hsiang appear there again) and offer security to the good inhabitants there and those merchants who wish to come to trade with us.[I am sending this letter] especially to make sure there is not any any trouble, should some malicious people appear and report to Your Honours that we have come with some ulterior motive. Your Honours should not believe them, because as you will have noticed we have never raised our hand against the Chinese Empire as long as the trade

³⁶ VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 28 Sept. 1634, fo. 338^v; Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 1634, in: Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 151-2.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

*was granted to us and everything was abundantly provided in Taiwan.*³⁷

Although this was not a formal guarantee that the Dutch would never again return to the Amoy Bay, Putmans had clearly agreed to trade with the Chinese merchants in Taiwan if they could provide enough cargo.³⁸ This claim fulfilled the conditions the emperor had told Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei to impose when he asked for the legalization of the trade with the Dutch in Taiwan.³⁹ The newly arrived Grand Co-ordinator, Shên You-lung, now approved the three provisional licences issued by the Coastal Defence Circuit, T'sêng Ying and even issued an extra licence on his own authority in October.⁴⁰

Once the Sino-Dutch relationship had been placed on a firm footing, the An-hai merchants were falling over themselves in their eagerness to extend their trade to Batavia. Chinese merchant Hambuan and Iquan's servant, Cheng Tai, immediately asked Governor Putmans to issue each of them with a licence to trade with Batavia.⁴¹ The latter decided to sign these two licences, because 'they had offered the Company some services ...therefore we cannot refuse them.'⁴² In the middle of February

³⁷ VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen diverse mandorijns van het coninckrijk van China, onder verscheijdene tijtels versonden [Letter written by Hans Putmans to Various Mandarins under the Chinese Emperor], Taiwan, 12 July 1634, Fo. 74^v.

³⁸ Tonio Andrade has correctly pointed out that the VOC authorities were always prepared to use violence strike up an alliance with new pirates in order to pressure the Chinese authorities to maintain this trade. This is the real meaning of above quote. Cf. Tonio Andrade, 'The Company's Chinese privateers: how the Dutch East India company tried to lead a coalition of privateers to war against China', *Journal of world history*, vol.15, no. 4 (2004), 415-44 at.440.

³⁹ Fan Hsien, *Ch'ung-hsiu tai-wan fu-shih*, 588.

⁴⁰ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 196-7.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 198.

⁴² VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael

CHAPTER SIX

1635, three big and one small junk sailed to Batavia.⁴³

When the Fu-chien authorities found out that there were some mandarins who had been taken hostage by Liu Hsiang and were still being held by him, they arrested his mother who lived near Ch'üan-chou and it was not long before Iquan led his armada from Amoy bent on attacking Liu Hsiang. The two fleets met in T'ien-wei waters on 23 May 1635.⁴⁴ Seven thousand people including soldiers, sailors and fishermen militias found themselves pitched into the fighting. In the heat of battle Liu Hsiang blew up his own junk, jumped over board and drowned. Iquan was finally rid of with his greatest foe.⁴⁵

After this battle, the coastal routes were safe and the Fu-chienese merchants could again transfer their export commodities from Kuang-chou and Macao to Amoy. This happened just in time because the Portuguese-Japan trade was gradually tumbling into an irreversible crisis. According to Putmans' letter to Governor-General Antonio van Diemen in Batavia:

'Since the pirate Liu Hsiang was defeated and one of his adherents, Kouhan, surrendered, we have constantly submitted the list of what we need from there (namely ginger, China root, galanga, zinc, all sorts of coloured or black satin, silk velvet, camlet, chauls-silk and armous-silk and other goods) of the same quality and quantity as before. However, so far we have received no more than some silk goods and zinc. The merchant Hambuan promised us that, since the pirate has been destroyed, some junks will sail here, in this north monsoon season to bring above-mentioned goods without fail. This has

Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 3 Nov. 1634, Fo. 309^f.

⁴³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 210. 7 Mar. 1635.

⁴⁴ TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 110.

⁴⁵ VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Hendrik Brouwer, Taiwan, 19 Sept. 1635, Fo. 374^v.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

*already been shown to be true by the news we received that some junks from Amoy Bay, said that they passed through the pirate's waters and brought some powder sugar from some nearby places.*⁴⁶

As mentioned before, these Ch'üan-chou rice transporting junks had permission to sail to the eastern border of Kuang-tung to load rice and sugar from Ch'ao-chou. The above records show that the commodities they were collecting were gradually including wares which meet the standard demanded in foreign trade. Since the Kuang-chou silk industry had been flourishing with the help of the money made on the import of Japanese silver to Macao, it could also supply the demand of Fu-chienese merchants once the transit trade route to Japan via Taiwan was established.

Stretching out to the terminals

Since the 1631 ban on foreign trade had been lifted, several Fu-chienese junks were being fitted out to visit the coastal countries around the South China Sea. Two junks were bound for Patani, one to Sangora, two to Siam, five to Cambodia and five to Quinam.⁴⁷ In totally thirteen junks were preparing to sail the Western Ocean Trade Route. No record survives to show whether all thirteen junks did indeed sail but, since the five junks bound for Batavia arrived, the others also probably reached their destinations. In the spring of 1632 Iquan dispatched three junks to Batavia and three big and nine small junks sailed to Quinam from Amoy Bay.⁴⁸ As one of Iquan's junks bound for Batavia actually changed course to Patani, thirteen junks in all had sailed as in the previous year. Quite possibly because Quinam was both the

⁴⁶ VOC 1120, Missive van den gouverneur Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 7 Oct. 1636, fo. 269.

⁴⁷ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 9. 28 Mar. 1631.

⁴⁸ VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü], Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202^v.

CHAPTER SIX

first and last port of call visited by trading junks on the Western Ocean Route after they departed from or returned to China, this record might have only reported that they were bound for Quinam instead of another destination. During these two years, Japanese junks also visited the same area. In the year 1631, three Japanese junks visited Quinam, Cambodia, and Siam respectively. One year later, another three junks sailed to Quinam and four to Cambodia.⁴⁹ This activity indicates that the traditional triangular Sino-Japanese trade revived in the countries on the Western Ocean Route at this time.

In the years 1630-1632 the most welcome tropical commodities exported from Taiwan to An-hai were pepper and elephant tusks. Their popularity reflected the demand of the Chinese market. During the Dutch blockade in the summer of the year 1633, five of the six junks which had sailed to Quinam were captured on their voyage home.⁵⁰ Governor Putmans compiled a pretty accurate invoice of the booty taken from these junks.

From his invoice (see Appendix I) it seems the cargo capacity of these junks varied between 25 and 148 last. With one exception, the junks were all small-sized, between 50 and 30 last. The list of the cargo carried by Junk A demonstrates that even a junk of the size of around 50 last could carry a cargo valued at approximately 13,760 rials. The bulk of the load of the largest junk of 148 last (B) was composed of rice and ebony and its cargo valued at only one-quarter of that of the junk with a 50 last capacity (A). Size did not necessarily decide the value of the cargo. The bulkiness of the cargo was the determining factor in whether it should be carried by a large-sized junk. These largest junks usually carried pepper and elephant tusks as the following table shows:

⁴⁹ Iwao Seiichi, *Nan'-yō Nihon-machi no kenkyū* [Study of Japanese Settlement around the South China Sea], (Tōkyō : Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 11. 'Genkan nendai tokoosen kazu hyoo.'

⁵⁰ VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T'ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 229^v.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

Table 6-1: the percentage of Pepper plus Elephant's tusk in total value of the cargo

	Value	Value	Value	Value
	In Junk A	in Junk C	in Junk D	in Total
	(rials)	(rials)	(rials)	(rials)
Pepper	5419.5		9980	15399.5
Elephant tusks	2025	182.5	1283	3490.5
Total	13760.7	471.67	13694.2	27926.57
Proportion	54.1%	38.7%	82.2%	67.6%

Source: Table A, C, D.

The sum of these two commodities amounted to about 67.6 per cent of the total value of four junks (Junk D listed in 2 junks). No less than 1,980. 24 piculs of pepper were sold to An-hai via Taiwan. The vast quantity of this was carried by Junk (A) and Junk (B), whose cargo amounted to 1,218.5 piculs. It seems that the amount of pepper which could be absorbed by the Chang-chou market was approximately 1000- 2000 piculs or 50-100 last per year. During the summer of 1632, Iquan had dispatched two junks to Batavia where he had purchased about 300 last of pepper via his nachoda Liu-kuan (*Lackquan*[D]). Supposing Iquan had also received the confiscated cargo from the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi after April 1633, he could have met the demand of the market for that whole year. The real victims of the Dutch blockade was not Iquan but those Chang-chou merchants who had dispatched junks to Quinam after the maritime prohibition was lifted because Iquan was not really deeply involved in the trade of Western Ocean as a few other clues reveal. In the autumn of 1634 two junks were confiscated by the Dutch in the vicinity of Quinam. Neither

CHAPTER SIX

Iquan nor his servants showed any sympathy for those who had been affected by this incident, namely: the mandarins and gentry in Chang-chou who lodged a strong protest with the Dutch through the Chinese merchant Hambuan.⁵¹

The Sino-Quinam trade was part and parcel of the trade to the ports on the Indo-Chinese peninsula, the areas around the gulf of Siam and the Malay Peninsula. Some of the booty mentioned above had originally been purchased from the Siam. Two junks from Quinam arrived in Siam from where they returned to China with some wares ordered by the Chinese (sappanwood, deerskins and Cambodian nuts, for example) on 30 June 1633.⁵²

The pepper sold in Siam can be traced back to different sources, including Batavia. For example: there is a record that a junk of a Batavian Chinese sailed to Siam with pepper on 28 July 1633,⁵³ which indicates that Siam could be an alternative port to Batavia for those Chinese merchants who wanted to purchase pepper. Iquan might have learned about his Kuang-tung assignment from his merchant and nephew, Liu-kuan.

In these years of political disturbance, Japanese merchants fled from Siam to Quinam or Cambodia where their arrival contributed to the revival of the Sino-Quinam-Japan trade. Meanwhile, the absence of Japanese in Siam left a space which the new Sino-Siam-Japan triangular trade network could occupy. In the spring of 1634 two junks from Chang-chou carried copious

⁵¹ Generale Missive, 27 Dec. 1634, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 143,

⁵² VOC 1113, Missive [van Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael [Hendrik Brouwer], Siam, 8 July 1633, fo. 344^v. VOC 1109, Extract uijt de journaelse aenteijckeninghe van 't notabelste, dat in 's Comps. affairen, onder de directie van mij Joost Schouten voorgevallen is [Extract from Remarkable Happenings concerning the Company Affairs under my, Joost Schoten's, command] (hereafter cited as *Dagregister Siam*), Siam, 29 May 1633, fo. 43^v. According to the diary, the two junks were returning to Quinam.

⁵³ VOC 1109, *Dagregister Siam*, 28 July 1633, fo. 46^v.

THE WINDING WAYS 1631-1636

amounts of rough wares to Siam. Both of them were aiming to make a handsome profit, but instead of heading back towards China, that winter the Chang-chou junks remained in Quinam because they were anxious to avoid the Dutch attacks.⁵⁴ In the same year, Liu Hsiang robbed junks bound for Batavia in the vicinity of Quemoy and consequently only one An-hai junk arrived in Batavia.⁵⁵ On 30 March 1636, a junk under the command of one of Iquan's naval officers arrived in the roadstead of Siam, just five days after another Chinese junk.⁵⁶ This junk was a sign that Iquan and the An-hai merchants wished to expand their trade there at the expense of the Chang-chou merchants. Their rowdy, intrusive tactics to expand their trade did more than simply disgust the Chang-chou merchants, the rudeness and ruthlessness of the newcomers was also bound to stir up trouble.

⁵⁴ VOC 1113, Missive [door den heer Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael [Hendrik Brouwer], Siam, 26 July 1634, fo. 518^v.

⁵⁵ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1631-1634, 278. 27 Mar. 1634.

⁵⁶ VOC 1119, Missive [door Joost Schouten] aen d' E. Hans Putmans [in Taiwan], Siam, 20 May 1636, fo. 1396.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE RISK OF POLITICS

AND THE POLITICS OF RISK 1636-40

The mercenaries become involved in politics

After the Kuang-tung pirate Liu Hsiang had been swept from the seas by Iquan's armada, through his own intervention Iquan and a group of officers were incorporated into the coastal defence troops. Unfortunately all the official positions Iquan occupied from 1635 to 1640 have proved impossible to trace fully in the extant Chinese sources. The fate of these official records is uncertain. They could have been destroyed when the Manchus invaded Peking in 1644 or have been lost at any time since then in times of upheaval. It is known with certainty that Iquan was first raised to the rank of Commissioner-in-Chief (*Tou-tu*[C.]) in the year 1636. Following the general principle of the military institutions of the Ming Empire, commanders and troops belonged to different sections of the army. The commander only held his position for the duration of a particular mission. No matter whether a mission had been successfully accomplished or failed, the commander would be later dispatched on other missions, but the soldiers returned to their own garrisons.¹ All the commanders with the rank of general were members of the Institute of the Chief Military Commission (*Tou-tu-fu*[C.]).² The soldiers were a professional group stationed apart from civilian subjects in special camps called *wei* and *so*.³ The offspring of soldiers inherited their professional and social status and hence remained soldiers. This principle was

¹ Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 79-80.

² *Ibidem*, 72.

³ Chang T'ing-yü, *Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih*, 1856-7; 1873; Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 79.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

devised to avoid the menace of any growing military power which might pose a threat to the Emperor's authority. After a prolonged period of peace, the system gradually became corrupted and after inflation had eroded their livelihoods, most of the soldiers deserted their posts.

The number of coastal defence troops declined faster than that of their counterparts in land-based camps because they were forced to stand by and watch their vessels and weapons virtually rot away before their eyes in the salty sea air. The maintenance of the equipments became a heavy burden and hence resulted in more desertions. The rapid disappearance of the troops is the reason local officials had to set about organizing a civil militia when the pirate raids began to rampage the coast in the late sixteenth century. At the height of the Liu Hsiang's raids on Fu-chou, one official at the Emperor's court suggested the militia be reorganized and integrated into a new system of coastal defence troops.⁴ In other words, the barrier between civilians and the hereditary soldier class was not immutable and could break down under exceptional circumstances. This situation explains why able-bodied soldiers in the fishermen's and the civil militia could be recruited so easily into the coastal defence under Iquan's command. After Liu Hsiang was defeated, many of the soldiers and naval officers affiliated to Iquan had formal official

⁴ Wan, 'Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu', 166-7. ' In the long period of peace which now commenced, the number of standing soldiers and their junks have declined. The military officials have shown little enthusiasm to fight outside their city walls. The sea patrols have been halted. Nowadays to ensure security, we recruit civil militia, mercenaries and organize local self-defence corps, and fishermen's militias. The army now consists of five categories of soldiers. In the past only one type of soldier proved an effective force, nowadays even five types are not sufficient to maintain a standing force. The pirates are on the rampage and the officials are frustrated. My recommendation is that the standing number of the army must be restored. The patrols must be carried out. The civil militia and mercenaries should be selected [properly] and integrated. The local defence corp should be freed from inessential duties.'

CHAPTER SEVEN

titles bestowed on them and embarked on a military career.⁵

Iquan's superior military skills were confirmed by his remarkable victories. He was assigned to the Chief Military Commission in Nanking, the vice-capital of the Empire.⁶ It was a major turning point in his career. In this capacity he was no longer subordinate to the grand co-ordinators but served directly under the Emperor himself. Although he would still listen to advice and obey certain orders from the Grand Co-ordinator, the latter could not dismiss him unless this decision was approved by the Imperial Council or the Emperor personally. The Dutch in Taiwan heard the following news from the Chinese merchant they called Hambuan:

*'Via the Chinese merchants, the Chinese merchant Hambuan informed us how Iquan had become the Commissioner-in-Chief (Tou-tu[C], Toutock[D]) of Fu-chien. He is entitled to a palanquin with eight bearers. But for the Grand Co-ordinator and the said Iquan nobody is allowed such honor. When he excused himself from an audience with the Emperor at the Imperial Court and sent instead one of his captains to represent him on the journey [to Peking]this disobedient behavior was condoned [by the Emperor]. Consequently the said Iquan has now become a great master.'*⁷

The Grand Co-ordinator could no longer threaten Iquan's position and the latter was secure in the knowledge that the Emperor recognized his

⁵ For example, Ch'en P'eng and Hu Mei, two quite able commanders among Chang's troops were both recruited from the fishermen.

⁶ Cheng P'êng-ch'êng (comp.), ' Appendix: Shih-ching pên-tsung tsu-p'u[Records of the Cheng Clan Pedigree in Shih-ching]', in TWYH(ed.), *Chêng-shih kuan-hsi wên-shu* [Documents concerning the Cheng Family], TW no. 69, 36. 'In a certain year between 1628 and 1644, Iquan was given the title of Supreme Chief Military Commissioner (*Ch'ien-chiün Tou-tu*) on account of his outstanding military achievements.'

⁷ VOC 1120, Missive van Jan der Burch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen en raeden van India, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1636, fo. 362.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

substantial influence in Fu-chien. When it was all said and done, all the newly recruited coastal defence troops were his people and he even financed these troops personally. His position was so strong he could distance himself from the Wei-so system which was designed to minimize the affiliation between the troops and their leader. Furthermore, with the title of Regional Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao Island, which gave him control of the coastal waters stretching all the way from Chang-chou to Kuang-chou, he transferred his residence to this island. He retained this rank for sometime and was later raised to the rank of Regional Commander of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung at different occasions and retained this position until the Manchu invasion of Peking in 1644.⁸

An outstanding figure as a maritime mercenary under the flag of the Dutch East India Company and later in his service to the Fu-chien Grand Co-ordinators in their campaign to pacify the pirates, over and again Iquan showed exceptional bravery and sharp ingenuity in dealing with the systematic failure of the institutions of the moribund Ming Empire and for this he was accorded exceptional treatment. Nevertheless, Iquan neither introduced any innovations in the coastal defence system or maritime trade system of the Empire nor did he devote his talents and indubitable ingenuity to creating any new or different institutions. He simply brought about that the

⁸ Wan Yen, *Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien*[Chronicle of the Ch'ung-chên], TW no. 270, 11. 'On 14 December 1643, the Regional Commander of Fu-chien, Cheng Chih-lung, requested an honourable discharge on the grounds of ill-health. The Emperor replied: 'Cheng Chih-lung has held the position of Ch'ao-Chang Regional Commander for a long time and has performed excellent service. If he would be pleased to remain with the garrison and not resign.' In 1642 he was appointed Regional Commander of Kuang-tung, cf. The Ministry of War, Kuang-tung Tsung-ping Chêng-chih-lung Tai-tsui T'u-kung Ch'ing-ên-chun K'ai-fu, 4 May 1642 [The Regional Commander of Kuang-tung, Cheng Chih-lung requests to restore his position in order to excuse his fault]', Ch'ên Yün-lin, *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, vol. 3, 343-54 at 345.

CHAPTER SEVEN

people around him knew that he and only he could help them resolve the problems which beset them on all sides.

When he is compared to his contemporaries in the area of the China Sea, his was not even a very special case. Other mercenaries also succeeded in gaining a certain autonomous economic status in the region under other sovereigns. Japanese mercenaries already enjoyed such a privileged position in Siam. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Japanese junks had begun to venture to Southeast Asian countries, including Siam. The magnet which drew them was the deerskin-for-silver trade between Siam and Japan. This exchange proved so lucrative some Japanese merchants decided to settle down in Siam to throw themselves wholeheartedly into this trade. Because of their superior military skills as musketeers and doughty sword fighters, Japanese soldiers were appointed bodyguards to the Siamese King. Consequently some 500 Japanese were living in the capital of Siam, Ayutthaya by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Some of these men enjoyed the position of privileged merchants in the Siam-Japanese trade, known as the Vermillion Junk Trade (*Goshuisen boeki*), under the joint protection of the Siamese King and the Japanese Shogun. As long as the central authority in Japan remained vulnerable, this trade blossomed as a by-product of the competition raging between the *daimyo* or feudal lords. This situation changed after the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, when all of Japan was unified under Tokugawa rule. One upshot of this increased integration was that the diverse foreign traders were more strictly regulated.

Returning to Siam, a Japanese samurai named Yamada Nagamasa was elected head of the Japanese community in Siam in the year 1621. In that same year he set about the task of regulating the tributary-trade between the two countries.⁹ As the mediator between two sovereigns, he enjoyed certain

⁹ Chris Baker, Dhiravat na Pombejra, Alfons van der Kraan and David Wyatt (eds.), *Van Vliet's Siam*, (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005), 329-30. Appendix IV: Yamada Nagamasa.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

political favours granted him by King Song Tham of Siam. This proved a poisoned apple as the King's favour unavoidably dragged him into Siamese court politics after the death of the sovereign in 1628 and the struggle for succession to the throne began.¹⁰

The risk of politics:

Confronted by the Siamese King's Kuang-chou trade

Under the tributary system, the legitimacy of the trade was inexorably linked to the legitimacy of the throne and the intrusion of this institutionalizing feature compelled the Japanese mercenaries to take the side of the legitimate successor to the throne. Their dream collapsed when a usurper finally gained the upper hand and ascended the throne as King Prasat Thong in September 1629. Yamada was appointed to the position of Governor of Ligure under the new ruler,¹¹ but he was poisoned in the summer of the following year. After his death, the new King issued secret orders to set fire to the Japanese quarter in Ayutthaya. This act of wanton destruction forced the Japanese inhabitants either to take refuge in Cambodia or to return to Japan in September of 1630.¹² The usurper king soon realized that, although he had removed the menace of the Japanese mercenaries, he had cut off his nose to spite his face because by this deed he had lost the lucrative trade with Japan as well. When the news that a usurper had become king was made known to Siamese vassals in the Malay Peninsula chaos broke out. Neighbouring countries like Patani, Pegu and Cambodia also challenged the authority of this illegitimate king and all declared that they would wage war against him.¹³ As expenses

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand*, (Detroit: The Cellar Bookshop, 1977), 22.

¹² Iwao Seiichi, 'Reopening of the diplomatic and commercial relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period', in *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture*, 4 (1963), 2-3.

¹³ Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand*, 22-23.

CHAPTER SEVEN

rose exponentially in efforts to fill the war coffers, the revenue from the foreign trade assumed even greater proportions and this situation forced the usurper king hurriedly to pass care new measures which were hoped would breathe fresh life into the trade with China and Japan. Consequently, a Siamese tributary junk arrived in the Pearl River estuary in 1631, but was promptly seized by the Macau authorities in retaliation for the confiscation of a Portuguese ship by the Siamese king the year before.¹⁴ Despite this hiccup, the Siamese envoys were eventually allowed to pay their tribute to the Chinese Emperor in 1634.¹⁵

Meanwhile, owing to the waves of piracy which were quelling the coastal areas of China, the Chinese junks from Chang-chou ceased to make their customary voyages to Siam in the period 1628-1630. However, when the maritime ban was lifted in Fu-chien for a short time in 1631, two junks were fitted out to sail to Siam, but only one seems to have reached her destination.¹⁶ Two years later, in 1633, two Chinese junks sailed on to Siam from Quinam¹⁷ and the Siamese king simultaneously prepared to fit out a royal tributary junk for the voyage to Kuang-chou.¹⁸ The tributary embassies must have returned to Siam between 1634 and 1635 since the Chinese Court records mention that they had audiences in Peking in both years.¹⁹ After the accomplishment of the tributary mission to China had re-affirmed King Prasat Thong's legitimacy in spite of his usurpation, he devoted himself assiduously to foreign trade.

In 1634, while the Kuang-tung officials were trying to persuade Liu

¹⁴ VOC 1109, Dagregister Siam, 18 Sept. 1633, fo. 48^f.

¹⁵ Chang, *Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih*, XXIII, 317.

¹⁶ VOC 1113, Missive [door Joost Schouten van Siam] naer Japan, Siam, 8 July 1633, fo. 347^f.

¹⁷ VOC 1109, Dagregister Siam, 29 May 1633, 43^v.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Chang, *Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih*, XXIII, 317; 319.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

Hsiang to surrender and accept an official petition following the precedent set for Iquan, a brief truce was signed between Iquan and Liu Hsiang, and two Chinese junks were able to visit Siam where they were able to obtain satisfactory cargoes.²⁰ The peace was short-lived because in 1635 Iquan again concentrated his attention on fighting Liu Hsiang. Since the coastal seas of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung were all potential battle grounds, no more junks could run the risk of sailing to Siam until the sea route had been secured again. In its efforts to bring Liu Hsiang to heel, his action accorded with the maritime ban issued by the Ming Court. Indeed Dutch intelligence in Taiwan, reported that no more junks had set sail for Siam.²¹ Finally, in the spring of 1636, after the majority of Liu Hsiang's force had collapsed, two junks from Chang-chou, one of which was affiliated to Iquan's merchant group, arrived in Siam.

The first junk from Chang-chou, under nachoda *Bouwija*, was a very leaky vessel which finally did make it to Bangkok on 25 March. Bouwija had applied to the Dutch for a pass to secure his voyage onwards to Batavia in the year 1635. The application was made through the Chinese Captain, Bencon (Su Ming-kang), in Batavia, and the pass was duly issued by the Governor-General. Since the maritime ban was strictly enforced during the year 1635, Bouwija had to postpone his plan to visit the Indies but it did not deter him from using his old pass to sail as far as Siam, although the Dutch factory in Siam suspected that he had only made use of this pass as a device to intrude the Siamese trade. He behaved in a strangely hurried manner and sold all his goods (mostly coarse wares) at such a cheap price that no Siamese vendor would bother to come and purchase the same wares from the Dutch.²²

²⁰ VOC 1113, Missive [door den heer Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael [Hendrik Brouwer], 26 July 1634, Fo. 518^v.

²¹ VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 9 Mar. 1635, fo. 329^v.

²² VOC 1119, Missive aen [gouverneur van Taijouan] d' E. Hans Putmans, Siam, 20

CHAPTER SEVEN

After his arrival he spread the news that a forthcoming junk would be carrying a very luxurious cargo composed of fine porcelain and silk textiles.²³ Bouwija played some nasty tricks on Iquan's junk which arrived after his. It is hard to tell whether he meant to ruin Iquan's trade in Siam or had merely been loose-lipped and suffered from verbal diarrhoea. Whatever was going through his mind at that distant time, since the Siamese King was also busy preparing his next Kuang-tung trade expedition, this news really threw the royal factory into a nervous panic. Five days later, when the junk commanded by nachoda *Gbouneeuw* finally arrived, the factors of the Royal Factory immediately dispatched the royal guards to take the junk into custody and declared that the captain would not be allowed to sell his goods other than at the royal factory.²⁴ The Dutch recorded the incident as follows:

'... the junk was kept under strict watch by the King's staff when it appeared at Bangkok and the nachoda was ordered not to dare to open any package or sell anything, no matter how small, to anyone other than at the royal factory. However this nachoda, who had been a pirate and one of Iquan's captains, was not willing to kowtow to such an unusual reception and subsequently weighed anchor and sailed away from the roadstead, declaring that he would gladly toss everything he had brought overboard, and he swore to take revenge on Siamese property, if they wanted to rule in this way.

The Siamese staff were so terrified by such threats the Governor of Bangkok sailed to the junk followed by a retinue of all his vessels, accompanied personally by the Chinese interpreter, in an effort to persuade the nachoda to return. He promised him every assistance and favour and the liberty to sell his cargo[as he wished].

May 1636, fo. 1396.

²³ VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 9 May 1637, fo. 564^f.

²⁴ VOC 1119, Missive aen [gouverneur van Taijouan] d' E. Hans Putmans, Siam, 20 May 1636, fo. 1396.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

Accepting such a perfidious promise, the nachoda returned and sailed upstream. However, once this junk had arrived in the roadstead of Ayutthaya, it was again taken into custody by the royal guards. The Chinese were again ordered to sell their commodities to no one but the royal factory.

The nachoda lost patience, but kept his mouth tightly shut, swearing that there were no silk textiles, raw silk or another silk wares in the junk. He had been set-up in such a way by these duplicitous factors the imprudent King gave orders to put the nachoda behind bars and dispatch some prosecutors to the junk to carry out his orders.

The nachoda and his crew were lucky, because a Chinese (Olong Tziat, who resided here, and as a mandarin at the court had some influence with the King) was present on board the junk and by handing over gifts persuaded the prosecutors (to stay away.) They remained on board the junk during the evening but did not examine anything. Later they went directly to the court and reported what had happened. The King ordered members of his court to form an unbiased committee and enquire into the matter. After examining all the information in detail, it was found that the nachoda was innocent and that the King's accusation had been unfounded.

Nevertheless, the junk remained under watch as before and the supervision was so strict the Chinese were not able to sell their coarse porcelain wares. But the nachoda gave the guards some pennies so they could buy some Chinese beer and have a drink from time to time. In this fashion he secretly sold his fine wares to the Muslim merchants at a very high price.

The duplicitous factors found out when they were frustrated by their lower than expected revenues. They sought every possible opportunity to denigrate the nachoda in the presence of the King and to take revenge on him. They found that one of the Chinese who had arrived here as one of the nachoda's sailors had gambled with another Chinese, (a Court silversmith). The sailor lost his stake and beat the silversmith up. While they were wrestling with each other, a silver statue (which had been made for the King)

CHAPTER SEVEN

was knocked over. The silversmith (urged on by these factors) thereupon notified His Majesty that the newly arrived Chinese had committed a crime against His Majesty's statues and slaves.

*By the King's order, the nachoda was summoned to appear before the chief justice. He (without knowing anything about it) appeared in his usual clothes accompanied by the Shabandar and an interpreter. He was immediately flung into gaol with his followers. The chief justice wanted to summon all his crew, so that he might (so he claimed) examine them properly. Which request, the nachoda politely refused, declaring that only he, and no member of his crew, knew about the quarrel and he would not subject them to such improper coercion. Meanwhile the silversmith and his followers slandered the nachoda so badly for his alleged crime of disobedience that in a burst of fury His Majesty sentenced the nachoda and all his crew to death, and confiscated the junk, bringing everything into having everything brought to his royal factory.'*²⁵

²⁵ VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch, raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 9 May 1637, fo. 564^f. According to earlier records, in 1636 the royal guardians were called 'bras pintados', men with tattooed arms. Cf. VOC 1119, Dagregister gehouden bij den E. Jeremias van Vliet van 10 Maert tot 14 November 1636 [Hereafter cited as 'Dagregister Siam 1636']. Siam, 17 Apr. 1636, fo. 1345; Baker, Chris., *ibid.*, 51. note 20. The chief justice was called Balleije van Ija Innaerath. The interpreter in the 1637 was Opra Thonhuj and in 1636 this position was held by Oprou Thonghu, Cf. VOC 1119, Dagregister Siam 1636, Siam, 16 May 1636, fo. 1370. The Chinese merchant who rescued the *nachoda* twice from imprisonment was 'Oloangh Tziat/Oloangh Tsiar'. Cf. VOC 1109, Dagregister Siam 1636, fo. 1345. 17 Apr. 1636; fo. 1370. 16 May 1636. Another influential local merchant who offered assistance called 'Oloangh Sarpartiban' is also recorded in above diaries. The 'Tziat', might be the 'Chiat' which, according to George Smith's explanation, was the *shabander* (harbour master) of the Muslim community in Siam. The 'sabartiban' should be 'Sombatthiban', the Minister in Charge of the Royal Treasury. Cf. Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand*,

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

This impetuous sentence was not carried out and the *nachoda* and his crew were released a few days later. This is how Iquan's junk finally managed to escape the extortion of the Siamese Court. A local mandarin's support had turned the tables in this case and it is just one instance which shows that the rise and decline of Chinese influence at court was also related to these influential grandees. The Dutch factories in Taiwan and Siam recorded the prices of local commodities that same year. This list shows that if a junk sailed to Siam, it could expect a better price in Siam than in Quinam.

Table 7-1. The expected profits of the Siamese Commodities in 1636

	Price in Siam Tael/ picul	Expected profits in China
Cambodia nuts	1.2-1.4	500-600%
Shellac	13.5-14	200-500%
Jamma	20-22 (per 100 pieces)	200-300 % (in Cochin China)
Betel nut	12-16 maas/ picul	170%-230% (in Cochin China, Chang-chou, Kuang-chou)
Buffalo horn (Patany)	4-6	100%
Rattan (Patany)	14 (100 pieces)	100%
Lead	3.33 tael / picul	100-130% (in Cochin China)
Bird's nests (Patani)	2-2.5 (cattij)	<80-90%
Elephant tusks	50 (2 piece) 48 (3 pieces) 44 (4 pieces)	50-60%
Camphor (from Patany)	7-14	50-60%
Bird's plumes	4,	40-60 %
Bird's nests	4 1/2 5 (3-4,000 pieces)	

CHAPTER SEVEN

Source: VOC 1119, Missive van den coopman Jeremias van Vliet in Siam aen den gouverneur generael Van Diemen in Batavia, Siam, 13 Nov.1636, fos. 1278-80.

As mentioned earlier, the most valuable commodities sold in the An-hai market were pepper and elephants tusks, but these goods were not as easy to obtain as the Chinese had originally thought. The junks which arrived in 1636 had not been able to acquire these commodities in any great quantity. Instead of the expected copious cargoes of pepper and elephant tusks, they loaded other highly prized commodities like shellac. As a result, a quantity of shellac remained unsold in the Taiwan lodge, ' because a great amount of it had been brought onto the [Kuang-tung] market by the Chinese junks from Siam, Cambodia and some other places.'²⁶

Shellac purchased in Siam at 24 rials per picul could be sold in Kuang-chou for slightly less than triple this price at 60 rials.²⁷ Lead purchased at 6 rials per picul, was sold for more than double this sum at 15 rials in Kuang-chou.²⁸ These trading figures show how the Siamese market interconnected with the Kuang-tung market.

In the summer of 1636 the Siamese tributary embassy arrived in Peking. The Siamese King and his brother had dispatched three big junks carrying cargoes of 13,000 picul of sapanwood and other fine goods for Kuang-chou.²⁹ Unfortunately there was a mutiny on one of the three junks and the *nachoda* was murdered by the crew in Cambodia waters, where the junk was also

²⁶ VOC 1120, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 7 Oct. 1636, fo. 279^f.

²⁷ VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet opperhoofd des comptoirs Siam aen gouverneur Van der Burch raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 6 July 1637, fo. 580^v.

²⁸ Ibidem; VOC 1120, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 7 Oct. 1636, fo. 279^f.

²⁹ Chang, *Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih*, XXIII, 320.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

confiscated.³⁰ The Siamese embassy departed from Siam in 1635 and finally returned home in 1639 with a letter from the Chinese Emperor (known as a Golden Letter). It was also accompanied by some Chinese delegates and bore some reciprocal presents. Although the letter intimated that the new Siamese King had been officially acknowledged by the Chinese court, the reciprocal gifts from the Chinese Emperor were not very generous and the Chinese delegates even had the temerity to tell the Siamese King to curb his desire to engage in lucrative trade.³¹ In 1642, the Siamese King and his brother once again dispatched two richly laden junks to Kuang-chou³² and the Chinese record confirms that a Siamese embassy had an audience in Peking in 1643.³³ Since the Siamese King had successfully carved out a fixed niche for himself in the Kuang-tung trade, the Fu-chien merchants, whether from Chang-chou or from An-hai, were no longer able to squeeze themselves into the profitable trade in Siam.

Table 7-2 The Sino-Siamese junk trade

Year	Junks from Chang-chou	Siamese King's junk to Kuang-chou
1634	2 ³⁴	0
1635	-	-
1636	2 ³⁵	3 ³⁶

³⁰ VOC 1119, Missive van den coopman Jeremias van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio] Van Diemen, Siam, 13 Nov. 1636, Fo. 1286.

³¹ VOC 1131, Missive van Van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen], Siam, 10 Oct. 1639, Fo. 1042.

³² VOC 1144, Missive van Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen], Siam, 13 Oct 1642, fo. 619^r.

³³ Chang, *Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih*, XXIII, 334.

³⁴ VOC 1113, Missive [door den heer Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael [Hendrik Brouwer], Siam, 26 July 1634. fo.518^r.

³⁵ VOC 1119, Missive van d' E. Jeremias van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael Henrick Brouwer, Siam, 28 July 1636, fo. 1253.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1637	3 ³⁷	0
1638	1 ³⁸	0
1639	1 ³⁹	0
1640	-	-
1641	1 ⁴⁰	0
1642	0	3 ⁴¹

The Chang-chou merchants avoided any confrontation with the Siamese King's trade to Kuang-chou, because they were perfectly aware that the commodities they intended to purchase could only be obtained via the King's factory and discretion was the better part of valour. In 1637, when another three Chang-chou junks appeared in Siam from China, the King's factory restricted their purchases to sapanwood. The Dutch recorded that:

'The nachoda was not able to lay his hands on any lead, elephant tusks, shellac, pepper or rhinoceros horns, because a few days ago the King had

³⁶ Ibidem;VOC 1119, Missive[van Jeremias van Vliet] aen d' E. Hans Putmans [gouverneur van Taijouan], Siam, 20 May 1636, fo. 1396.

³⁷ VOC 1125, VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 14 May 1637, fo. 568^f.

³⁸ VOC 1127, Missive [van Hendirk Nachtegael] aen den oppercoopman Abraham Ducker in Quinam [Letter written by Hendrik Nachtegael in Siam to Senior Merchant Abraham Bucker in Quinam], Siam, 3 May 1638, fo. 372^v.

³⁹ VOC 1131, Missive van Van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen ende raaden in Batavia], Siam, 14 July 1639, fo. 1008.

⁴⁰ VOC 1139, Rapport van den commissaris Jeremias van Vliet aengaende sijn bevindinge in Siam ende bocht van Pattany [van Johan van Twist uijt Malacca aen gouverneur generaal Antonio van Diemen en raden in Batavia][Report written by Commissioner Jeremias van Vliet about His Experiences in Siam and the Bay of Patani, forwarded from Malacca to Governor-General Antonio van Diemen and Council in Batavia by Johan van Twist], Siam, 28 May 1642, fo. 802^v.

⁴¹ VOC 1144, Missive van Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen], Siam, 13 Oct. 1642. fo.619^f.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

*forbidden anyone except the King's factors to sell these goods (especially to the Chinese newcomers). The nachoda was also ordered to purchase these commodities from nobody but the King's factors. For this reason, but especially owing to a lack of capital, these junks could obtain nothing but sappanwood.*⁴²

More than 12,000 picul of sappanwood, a cargo which ran totally counter to the original expectations of the Chang-chou merchants, was eventually exported to Chang-chou. What they desired above all else was pepper, but this was not obtainable because the plantations there had been destroyed during the war (1631-1636) between the Siamese King and his rebellious vassal in Ligore.⁴³ In the year 1639, the Chang-chou junks could not even export elephant tusks, because the King had added four taels tax to every picul of this commodity. Hence it proved nigh on impossible to break into the Siamese King's Kuang-chou trade since he needed to earn capital to replenish his own treasury. In a nutshell, politics in Siam ultimately conditioned Fu-chienese trade with that kingdom.

The politics of risk: co-operation with the Dutch in the Japan trade

In reply to Governor Hans Putmans' letter to then ten Chinese officials in charge of the Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou coastal defence forces, the Fu-chien authorities agreed to issue the An-hai merchants passes to enable them to deliver fine and delicate commodities to Taiwan. Undoubtedly, the richest exchange between Fu-chien and Taiwan was the silk-for-silver trade. The silk was not produced in Fu-chien, but came from Chê-chiang and Chiang-su (which were referred to by the Dutch at the time collectively as

⁴² VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 14 May 1637, fo. 568^r.

⁴³ VOC 1119, Missive van den coopman Jeremias van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio] van Diemen, Siam, 13 Nov. 1636, fo. 1278.

CHAPTER SEVEN

'Nanking' province). Every year the farmers had to begin to feed the silkworms in March or April. It took two months for the larvae to develop into a moth. The harvest season was heralded when the worms spun their cocoons in May or June. The farmers boiled the cocoons to loosen the glue which held the the precious filaments together and spun the silk threads they extracted from them. This procedure required purified water which was provided by the rainy season at its height during that month. The new silk would be put on the market in June.⁴⁴ Well-versed in this time-table, in spring, the merchants of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung usually shipped sugar from the south to Chê-chiang so that they could begin to purchase raw silks after their sugar business had been concluded. Before the onset of autumn, they had to return to Fu-chien or Kuang-tung where they could either re-sell the product directly as raw silk or as woven silk textiles to the Dutch in Taiwan or the Portuguese in Macao. In this manner merchants could receive payment in Japanese silver, which enabled them in turn to locally purchase sugar in order to enlarge their capital or to purchase more silk for shipments to Japan in the following trading season.

Since Iquan had cleared the sea route from Chê-chiang all the way to Kuang-tung in 1635 and was even then serving as officer-in-charge of supervising the traffic between the Fu-chien and Kuang-tung coasts, the sea routes of the Fu-chienese merchants were secured. Each year the four to six junks which put into Taiwan provided 60-90 per cent of the raw silk supplied to the Dutch. The rest was brought in on other junks which also carried rough wares such as sugar, earthenware and the like.

⁴⁴ Chang Hai-ying, *Ming-ch'ing chiang-nan shang-p'in liu-t'ung yü shih-ch'ang t'i-his*[The Market System and the Circulation of Commodities around the Chiang-nan Region during the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties], (Shang-hai: East China Normal University Publisher, 2001, 105-7.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

Table 7- 3: The structure of the Chinese raw silk imports in Taiwan

Season	Raw silk imported from China in piculs*	The proportion provided by the richest junks.*	Chinese raw silk sold by the Dutch in piculs**
1634-10/1635-10	1222	4(51%) 6(70%)	1309.49
1635-10/1636-10	1590	3(63%) 5(96%)	1665.44
1636-10/1637-10	1510.5	4(58%) 6(76%)	1496.69
1637-10/1638-11	1305.5	4(52%) 6(62%)	1931.9 ⁴⁵
1638-11/1639-11	1167	4(66%) 5(77%)	1462.89
1639-11/1640-10	-	-	1522.31

Source: * revised from: Lin Wei-sh'êng, *Hê-chü shih-ch'i tung-yin-tu kung-ssu tsai t'ai-wan tê mao-i (1622-1662)* [The VOC Trade in Taiwan during the Period of Dutch Rule], (PhD diss., National Taiwan University, 1998),111-3. Table: 3-20, the raw silk carried by Chinese junks to Taiwan. This table is based on 'the *Dagregister Zeelandia*' and 'the *Dagregister Batavia*'.

** Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i[Taiwan Trade in the Seventeenth Century Based on Dutch Sources]', in Tang His-yung(ed.), 2 vols, *Chung-kuo hai-yang fa-chan-shih lun-wên chi(VII)*, vol.1. 37-57 at 42. Table 1. The raw silk exports to Japan were carried on VOC ships. This table is based on the *Negotie journaal* 1633-1660.

This situation meant that the An-hai merchants who traded with the Dutch in Taiwan were clearly divided into two different groups. One group consisted of the rich merchants who handled the luxury commodities, the other was composed of the petty vendors who dealt in coarse wares and small number of luxury commodities. The big merchants were expected to pay 400 taels to for their licences, but their lesser counterparts were only required to pay 80

⁴⁵ Generale Missive, 22 Dec.1638, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 176. It records that 1421.94 picul of Chinese white raw silk had been shipped to Japan. The number differs slightly from Nagazumi's figures derived from the diary kept on Deshima.

CHAPTER SEVEN

taels.⁴⁶ Because the former fell under the regulations covering the category of overseas trade as the junks sailing to Manila and Batavia, they had to pay a national tax. The latter fell into the category of coastal traders like those involved in the rice and sugar trades between Kuang-tung and Fu-chien and therefore paid only a provincial tax.⁴⁷ Strictly speaking, it was illegal for the latter to export the silk goods to the Dutch in Taiwan. However, since the Pescadores Islands formed the boundary of China and were under Dutch protection as the letter written to the Chinese Coastal Defence Circuits suggests, the authorities turned a blind eye to the trade. In fact, as the table above shows that the big merchants still supplied most of the fine goods and indeed their trade was actually expanding. An-hai merchants collected the Chê-chiang raw silk in May and shipped it immediately to Taiwan so that the Dutch could trade it for silver in Japan in September and early October. The silver would have been shipped south during the previous spring and stored in the Taiwan lodge until the current summer, when it was used to purchase the new silks. If the Dutch merchants spent too much Japanese silver elsewhere before August, there would not be enough silver in Taiwan to pay the incoming silk junks, and such squandering on their part inevitably resulted in financial problems for the Chinese merchants.

Table 7-4: The revenue generated by selling Chinese silk products in Japan and the benefits to the Factory in Taiwan.

⁴⁶ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 210. 7 Mar. 1635. It records the sum of 50 taels for a coastal pass; VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 9 Mar. 1635, fo. 329^v.

⁴⁷ The Minister of War, Hsiung Ming-yü, Ch'ou-i Fu-chien K'ai-hai Li-hai [Considerations on the pros and cons of opening the Overseas Trade in Fu-chien] September 1631', in: Ch'ên Yün-lin, *Ming-ch'ing Kung-ts'ang t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, vol. 3, 150-97 at 173. There were two kinds of licence:

- a) The 'Yin' for overseas shipping that should be applied for annually, and
- b) The 'Chao' for the coastal trade that should be applied for every few months.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

	The revenue of Chinese silk products sold in Japan (florin.)*	Benefits of the Dutch Factory in Taiwan (florin.)**
1635	759,971	-93,492
1636	1,135,187	91,207
1637	1,926,997	-49,505
1638	1,959,992	-84,325
1639	2,712,273	-170,247
1640	4,862,139	13,589

Source:* revised from: Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i', 37-57 at 42-43. Table 1 the raw silk exports to Japan on VOC ships; Table 2: the silk product exports to Japan on VOC ships.

** revised from: Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*[online], Appendix C: Income and Outlays in Dutch Taiwan, 1631-1661.

Although the silk trade grew exponentially, the fixed investment required for the Formosan colony itself rose just as rapidly. As the table above shows, in most years in this period the VOC in Taiwan not only could not even scratch a profit, it even ran at a loss. As the revenue earned from the sale of the raw silk usually amounted to 50 per cent of its income, it should have been quite enough to pay for the next purchases the following summer,⁴⁸ but part of the silver was either sent to Batavia or used to pay for the construction costs of Zeelandia Castle - slaking lime, making bricks and wages of the Chinese building-workers. If there was not enough cash to pay the Chinese merchants, they were not allowed to take back their silk goods to An-hai, for the reason that the Dutch were still at war with the Spaniards in Manila and Portuguese in Macao during this period and did not want the precious commodity to fall

⁴⁸ VOC 1123, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 12 Dec. 1637, Fo. 920^f.

CHAPTER SEVEN

into enemy hands.⁴⁹ The only solution was to take the goods on loan from the Chinese merchants and to pay them interest before the Japanese silver arrived in the depths of winter. In the August of 1637, Governor Johan van der Burg in Taiwan resorted to this method for the first time. His first step was to ask the Chinese merchant Hambuan what interest rate should be paid to the Chinese merchants and he then signed a formal contract as receipt for a loan.⁵⁰ Later, when the news spread to An-hai and Amoy, the merchants all complained about this arrangement, because they had collected the raw silk on Hambuan's promise that they would be paid in silver immediately.⁵¹ In total the capital borrowed from the An-hai merchants amounted to 585,000 guilders (about 177,272 taels), which was paid at a monthly interest of 3 per cent interest when the Japanese silver arrived in Taijouan on a Company ship on 12 December.⁵² It was said that two junks which were on the point of leaving Amoy abandoned their plan to set sail to Taiwan as a direct consequence of the shortage of money at Zeelandia Castle.⁵³ In the years which followed, if all the silver had been used up by the middle of July, the Dutch governor had to resort to borrowing the silk goods from the Chinese merchants again.⁵⁴ By this time, the Dutch had decided to pay no more than

⁴⁹ VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt van Taijouan, Taiwan, 8 Sept. 1637, Fos. 831^v-832^f.

⁵⁰ VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt van Taijouan, Taiwan, Taiwan, 21 Aug. 1637, Fo. 825^{f-v}; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 366.

⁵¹ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 368; VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt van Taijouan, Taiwan, 8 Sept. 1637, Fos. 831^v-832^f.

⁵² Generale Missive, 9 Dec. 1637, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 166; VOC 1123, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 12 Dec. 1637, Fo. 920^f.

⁵³ VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt van Taijouan, Taiwan, Taiwan, 8 Sept. 1637, fos. 831^v-832^f.

⁵⁴ Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 173. It records

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

1.5 per cent interest per month on the loan. This decision caused enormous consternation among the Chinese merchants, because they had had to assemble the silk goods themselves by taking out individual private loans at an interest about 2.5 to 3 per cent.⁵⁵ Both sides negotiated back and forth several times, until the Dutch finally suggested they should pay part of the amount in pepper and the rest in silver at an interest in the region of 3 per cent. Both sides compromised. The Chinese merchants agreed to take 2,500 catties of pepper at the price of 15.5 rials and the remainder in silver at an interest of 2.5 per cent.⁵⁶

Governor Johan van den Burg adopted a firm stance in the negotiations and insisted that the An-hai merchants should accept part of the payment in tropical commodities which the VOC had shipped to Taiwan. His high-handedness irritated the Fu-chien merchants. They threatened that they would no longer support the gentry in An-hai in their bribery of the local officials, unless the Dutch promised to pay their overdue bills in silver and silver alone.⁵⁷ It seems the Dutch authorities did not lose any sleep over the matter. They were very confident that Chinese would not be willing to risk their lives on the voyage to Japan. For them to have undertaken the voyage in the first place would have been illegal and, even if they did throw caution to the winds, they would run the risk that all their earnings from this trade might be confiscated by the mandarins. Above them loomed the spectre of the typhoons which were notorious during southern monsoon season in the East China Sea.

The final shot the Dutch had in their locker was that, if Chinese were to engage in the direct trade with Japan, they might have to face the immediate

that all the revenue earned from the Japan trade had been completely spent by the middle of August 1638.

⁵⁵ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 427-8. 12 July; 15 July 1638.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 429-30. 20 July; 22 July 1638.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, I 1629-1641, 429. 20 July 1638.

CHAPTER SEVEN

threat of a Dutch blockade of Manila in revenge. A new maritime ban issued by the imperial court which follow such a disturbance was actually the last thing the An-hai merchants wanted to risk. A letter sent to the Gentlemen XVII makes no bones about this:

*'We have to do our utmost to remove all obstacles and allow those Chinese junks sailing to Manila to pass through unharmed whenever they happen to encounter our ships, allowing them to continue their voyage. We should not do them any damage but help them and provide them with necessities, like water....because it is both obvious and without doubt that these junks have been fitted out by the richest merchants and provided with passes issued by the great and powerful prince, who would be bold enough to take revenge on any trespasses committed by vindictive patrols.'*⁵⁸

As mentioned before, the Dutch authorities in Taiwan were aware of how ineffective any attempts to patrol the sea route between Chang-chou and Manila would be. They accepted that the price they had to pay for the legalized An-hai-Taiwan trade was to allow free Chinese shipping to sailing on Manila. Since 1636 various other factors might also have contributed to reducing the pressure on the An-hai-Manila trade. Newly elected Governor-General Antonio van Diemen had made the strategic decision to reserve most of his resources and ships to launch attacks on the Portuguese enemy in India. Hence his most prominent targets were Goa, Ceylon and Malacca.⁵⁹ The customs records of Manila are another source which confirm that An-hai-Manila trade was prosperous between 1633 to 1639.

⁵⁸ VOC 1128, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Nov. 1638, Fo. 368^{f-v}. Governor Johan van den Burch decided to allow all large Chinese junks sailing to Manila to pass unharmed, if they carried the legal passes issued by the Chinese Court.

⁵⁹ Ernst van Veen, *Decay or defeat? : an inquiry into the Portuguese decline in Asia, 1580-1645*, (Leiden : Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, Universiteit Leiden, 2000), 200.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

Table 7-5: The numbers of Chinese junks visiting Manila (1633-1640)

Year	Junks from China
1633	30
1634	26
1635	40
1636	30
1637	50
1638	16
1639	30
1640	7

Source: Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVI^e,XVII^e,XVIII^e siècles)*[The Philippines and the Iberian Pacific Ocean], (Paris: S.E.V. P. E. N., 1968), 156-60. Série 13, Table 3.

Although the records do not give the precise figures for the individual years, it is none the less possible to estimate the total value of the Chinese commodities imported by scrutinizing the customs duties paid. Between 1631 and 1635, the total value of Chinese commodities was estimated to be 571,396 rials, or an average of 114,279 rials each year. In the following section, 1636-1640, the value had fallen a little and was 458,063 rials, or 91,612 rials on average each year.⁶⁰

Table 7-6: The price of raw silk shipped to Taiwan on Chinese junks

⁶⁰ Wu Yü-ying, *Hsi-pan-ya t'ung-chih shih-ch'i tê chung-fei-mao i*[The Sino-Philippine Trade under Spanish Rule], (PhD diss., The New Asia Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies, 1992), 125. Table 7. The table is based on: Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*, 204. Série 14, Table 3. The table records the import duty on Chinese goods from 1646 to 1665. When the figures are divided by the tax rate of 6%, the total value of the imported Chinese goods can be estimated.

CHAPTER SEVEN

	Raw silk imported from China, in piculs.*	Raw silk purchase price in Taiwan, in rials per picul. **	Total estimated cost in rials
1636-10/1637-10	1510.5	191	288,505.5
1637-10/1638-11	1305.5	190	248,045
1638-11/1639-11	1167	200	233,400
Average			256,650

Source: *Lin Wei-sh'êng, *Hê-chü shih-c'i tung-yin-tu kung-ssu tsai t'ai-wan tê mao-i (1622-1662)*, 111-3. Table 3-20;

** revised from: Peter W. Klein, ' De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie en het inter-Asiatiscbe verkeer in de 17e Eeuw [The Tonkin-Japanese Silk Trade of the Dutch East India Company and the Inter-Asian Traffic in the Seventeenth Century]'. in Willem Frijhoff and Minke Hiemstra (eds), *Bewogen en bewegen: de historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economic en cultuur*, (Tilburg: Uitgeverij H. Gianotten B.V., 1906), 152-77 at 170. Table 2 De jaarlijks gemiddelde prijzen (gld.) per catty ruwe zijde in de factorij Deshima der VOC 1638-1668 [The Average Annual Price (Guilders) per Catty of Raw Silk in the Factory Deshima of the VOC 1638-1668].

Given that all commodities sold in Manila were exchanged for silver, the amount of money spent there, compared with the capital that the Dutch reserved in Taiwan for purchasing raw silk, would have amounted only to about 35 per cent.⁶¹ Therefore the ratio of An-hai trade with Taiwan and Manila was 3:1. Since they were aware that the Taiwan trade already

⁶¹ Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune*, (California: University of California, 1996), 232. In Table 23, Von Glahn also gives a separate estimates of the silver flowing into China from Japan and via the Philippines in these two different intervals. In the proportions of silver imported from those two places, the portions from Manila were lower, at 21% and 11%. These differences might have arisen from his estimates of the silver imported from Japan, which was based on 80% of the values of the imports.

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

absorbed the largest portion of Fu-chien exports, the Dutch felt no urgent need to ruin the An-hai-Manila trade at all costs.

After the last Dutch ship left Taiwan for Japan in September of 1638, the An-hai merchants delivered silk goods valued at 300,000 rials on board three junks two months later in November. They were prepared to wait for their payment for the silver which would be shipped from Japan in December. Seven Dutch vessels arrived in Taiwan from Japan before the end of December and the 2,280,000 guilders (800,000 Japanese taels) of Japanese silver was more than adequate to satisfy them immediately.⁶²

As the Japanese authorities suspected them of having had a hand in the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-8, the Portuguese were subsequently banned from the Japan trade. Two Portuguese galliots which arrived during the summer of 1639 were kept under strict surveillance and ordered to set a return course once the north monsoon had set in.⁶³ Watching from the sidelines, the Dutch in Japan judged this would be the best opportunity for them to take over the Portuguese business in Japan, if they could offer silk goods of the same quality as the Portuguese had done. During the south monsoon season in 1639, the Dutch shipped 2,963,018 guilders' worth of Chinese goods to Japan, expecting a 60 per cent profit.⁶⁴ According to a

⁶² Generale Missive, 30 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 179.

⁶³ Charles R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, (Hongkong: Oxford University press, 1968), 121.

⁶⁴ VOC 1133, Missive van Jan van den Burch naer Cambodja aen den oppercoopman Joannes van der Hagen, Taiwan, 31 Dec. 1639, Fo. 170^v. However, in 'the Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker', the sum is recorded as 2,898,802:18:4 guilders. Cf. VOC 1131, Rapport [van Nicolaes Couckebacker] aen den gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen ende de raeden van India, nopende Couckebacker's besendinge naer Tonckin ende gedaene visite des Comptoirs ende verderen ommeslag uijt Taijouan, gelegen op het eijlandt Formosa [Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor-General Anthonio van Diemen and the Council of the Indies, concerning His Mission to Tonkin and His Visit to the Taiwan Factory and

CHAPTER SEVEN

report of the same year, the Dutch were originally prepared to purchase 4,000,000 guilders' worth of Chinese goods, but the An-hai merchants were not willing to lend the Dutch 1,000,000 guilders' worth of goods. They were only prepared to go as high as 224,959 guilders at an interest of 2 or 2.5 per cent for two months. Hence their financial caution prevented the Dutch from expanding their Japanese trade to the extent they desired.⁶⁵ Although it seemed obvious that the An-hai merchants could not keep up with the pace of the rapid expansion of the Dutch trade, President François Caron, in charge of the Hirado Factory in Japan, still submitted an ambitious order for Chinese goods amounting to 5,000,000 guilders.⁶⁶

The sum of 1,050,000 taels in silver (2,992,500 guilders) arrived in Taiwan from Japan on board six Dutch vessels in the December of 1639.⁶⁷ Up to the end of April of 1640, another 1,130,000 taels (3,220,500 guilders) of silver arrived in Taiwan on three other ships.⁶⁸ Although the supply of silver was greater than ever, the Dutch still purchased more than they actually paid for, so finally 5,164,371 guilders' worth of Chinese goods were shipped to Japan in the autumn.⁶⁹

Other Company Establishments in the Island of Formosa] (hereafter cited as 'Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker'), [on the ship] *de Rijk*, 8 Dec. 1639, fo. 312.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, fo. 312.

⁶⁶ Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 188; VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Van der Burch aen Adam Westervolt president van 't comptoir Persien, Taiwan, 30 Nov 1639, Fol. 307.

⁶⁷ Generale Missive, 8 Jan. 1640, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 190-191; VOC 1133, Missive van Jan van Der Burch naer Cambodja aen den oppercoopman Joannes van der hagen, Taiwan, 31 Dec. 1639, Fo. 170^v.

⁶⁸ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, I 1629-1641, 488. 26 Dec. 1639; 493. 13 Jan. 1640; 495, 23 Apr. 1640.

⁶⁹ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1640-1641, 111. 6 Dec. 1640. It was estimated from the sum total of the cargoes of six junks, with the exception of the first ship, *de Roch*, the bulk

THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640

By indulging in these risky politics, the VOC factory in Taiwan succeeded in expanding its part in the Sino-Japan trade exponentially. When the Portuguese were expelled by the Japanese Shogun in 1639, the Dutch confidently expected to take over all of the rich trade the Portuguese had been forced to relinquish after their alleged support of the Shimabara Rebellion. Fate intervened and the political changes in Japan, China, and India affected the An-hai merchants in another way. The An-hai-Taiwan trade did not follow the path of Canton-Macao trade as the Dutch had hoped. The decisive difference between the Cantonese and Fu-chienese merchants was that the latter were granted passes which allowed them to sail to the South and East China Seas. In the other words, the adventurous Chinese merchants were granted the right to take a risk and they were quite willing to draw a bow at a venture as the next chapters will reveal.⁷⁰

of whose cargo was from Tonkin.

⁷⁰ Leonard Blussé, 'The VOC as Socerer's Appentice', 87-105 at 104. Blussé correctly points out that the VOC finally failed to force the Chinese Court to acquiesce in their role as just another element in the coastal order. Their failure to win imperial recognition created an essential position for a mediator like Iquan. The Fu-chienese merchants were not only able to play the mediator, they also had the right to sail and trade in other places in the South China Sea. Hence the contradictory structures cited above emerged in the wake of this confrontation.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CHAPTER EIGHT

IN SEARCH OF SILVER

IN A CHANGING WORLD 1640-1646

The usurpation of the silver trade from Macao

There can be no shadow of doubt that the primary goal of the Dutch in Taiwan was to usurp the places occupied by both Macao and Manila in the silk-for-silver trade run by the merchants of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung. In the year 1639, when the Shogunal Government decided to expel the Portuguese and banish them forever from Nagasaki, the Dutch finally had the opportunity they had been waiting for to replace the Portuguese in Japan once and for all. As they were still not in a position to access the Cantonese silk traders and weavers who supplied the Portuguese in Macao in person, they urged their Fu-chienese partners in An-hai to meet the Japanese silk order. These An-hai merchants had already been supplying most of the raw silk it required to the Dutch Factory in Taiwan, but now the Japanese merchants wanted more than just the raw commodity and were also putting in orders for finished silk products such as damasks and satins.¹ This expansion in silk exports was eventually accomplished in the south monsoon season of 1639-1640, but not without conflict. On account of the sudden increase in orders, the Dutch could not pay for the goods required with silver in time and, feeling hard done-by, the aggrieved An-hai merchants supplied inferior merchandise, although this was the sort of risk that the An-hai merchants

¹ VOC 1131, The Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebaker, [on board the ship] *De Rijk*, 8 Dec. 1639, fo. 298^{r-v}; Pol Heyns and Cheng Wei-chung (eds), *Dutch Formosan Placard-book Marriage, and Baptism Records*, (Taipei: SMC Publish, 2005), 130; 132. The placards were issued on 6 April 1638 and on 13 August 1639 respectively

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

could have expected to bear in this newly expanding commercial market.

Still able to hang onto his prominent status in town, the protector of the An-hai merchants, Cheng Chih-lung alias Nicolas Iquan, had other tasks to perform and was ordered to carry out his military duties in the the border area between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung provinces in his capacity as Regional Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao. Naturally, his duty required that he be with his men and therefore he found himself forced to reside on the border rather than in An-hai.

Around about this time it is said that the Emperor finally issued the passes required for the trade with Taiwan, as well as eight other destinations around the South China Sea.² With the issuance of these imperial passes, the deal reached between Iquan and the provincial grandees became something of a problem. Once the trade was formalized, the tax revenues would also have to be distributed in a normal way.

At this distance in time it is hard to fathom when exactly the An-hai merchants heard about the exclusion of the Portuguese from Japan. When Iquan received a message from Peking in September 1639 informing him that a Surveillance Commissioner (*An-ch'a-shih*[C]) was on his way to Kuang-tung province to supervise the security on frontier, he left to join his forces on Nan-ao Island.³ There, at the beginning of November, he encountered two Portuguese galliots which had run aground in these waters. Both ships had been turned back in August by the Japanese authorities. Iquan decided to confiscate both their cargoes and transported these valuable silk goods to An-hai. He gave orders that no one was permitted to send any goods to Taiwan until he had returned with the loot.⁴ At her own peril, in defiance

² Generale Missive, 12 Jan. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 182.

³ VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur general Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fo. 185^f.

⁴ VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Choromandel aen den

CHAPTER EIGHT

of Iquan's advice, one junk did depart from An-hai around 27 November 1640 and was duly impounded by a local official on Quemoy.⁵

Informed that the Portuguese had been excluded from the Sino-Japanese trade, Iquan recognized that this was the perfect juncture to grasp the nettle and re-arrange his trading ventures. By giving orders to hold the junks up in An-hai, he eventually forced them to carry 10,000, 20,000 and 30,000 taels' worth of his own goods respectively. With the weight of advantage behind him, he not only ordered the Anahi merchants to advance him 20 per cent of the proceeds of successful sales but also to carry the risk of the loss should any accident befall the ships during their voyage across the Taiwan Strait.⁶

At that moment, Iquan's servants were also embroiled in quarrels with certain of the An-hai merchants, because they believed that their boss should receive a percentage for shipping their goods at the expense of those Nanking merchants who also wished to dispatch their goods on the ships of the An-hai merchants.⁷ On 6 January 1640, the silk goods seized from the Portuguese galliots were taken to An-hai, where Iquan also arrived in person, on one of

gouverneur Arent Gardenijs, Taiwan, 30 Nov. 1639, fo. 302; VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 10 Dec. 1639, fo. 284.

⁵ VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 10 Dec. 1639, Fo. 285. The reason for this impounding was that the captain was not carrying the Emperor's pass. Other records show this captain was named 'Sualiangh' and that he usually paid for and carried a pass. Cf. VOC 1131, Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebaker, [on board the ship] *De Rijp*, 8 Dec. 1639, fos. 297-8.

⁶ VOC 1131, Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebaker, [on board the ship] *De Rijp*, 8 Dec. 1639, fos. 297-8.

⁷ VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fos. 180^v-181^r.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

his vessels.⁸ Under his personal supervision, three big junks loaded to the gunnels left for Taiwan under the leadership of the merchant Hambuan. Hambuan was also charged with transmitting a message to the Taiwan authorities, intimating that Iquan guaranteed to supply high quality silk products in the latest fashion (*exquize zijde stuckwercken op de nieuw moode*) according to the requirements of Japanese customers and that he also intended to attract weavers and merchants wooing them to move to An-hai from Kuang-tung.⁹ Soon after he had settled these arrangements, Iquan returned to Nan-ao with his soldiers to take up his new military assignment which was to lead his troops to the mountain areas on the boundary between the provinces of Kuang-tung and Hu-kuang (nowadays Hu-pei and Hu-nan) to put down a rebellion of the aboriginal tribes.¹⁰

Ten days after his arrival in Taiwan, Hambuan paid a private visit to the Dutch Governor's house. Iquan had entrusted him with yet another task, namely to propose drawing up a contract so that 'this tremendous Chinese trade might have an eternal and durable basis.'¹¹ Iquan had made this proposal when he summoned Hambuan to meet him personally at night. Hambuan had asked for a written version of the proposal, but Iquan thought the Dutch would trust Hambuan's words since he had lent them so much capital in the past. In this proposal, Iquan suggested that:

1. *He would supply the Company with fine silk and silk products on its own recognizance, in the same way as the Spaniards in Manila and the*

⁸ Ibidem, fo. 181^r.

⁹ Ibid., fos. 186^v-187^v. '...in order to take of them out of the clutches of the Portuguese...'

¹⁰ Ibid., fo. 186^v. According to the Chinese sources, it was located at Lienchou. TWYH(ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 178.

¹¹ VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fo. 190^v.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Portuguese in Macao had enjoyed the trade in earlier days.

- 2. The Company loan would be renewed annually. The Chinese wares would never fall short, if the Company paid a monthly 2.5 per cent interest on the money borrowed.*
- 3. Since the Company would be able to sell the Chinese wares at a good profit, about 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 guilders in Japan, no matter what damage the Company might suffer, 200,000 guilders should be sent [to Japan] annually on Iquan's account.*
- 4. More than 250,000 guilders which would therefore come from this [above] estimated amount would be reserved for annual presents to the grandees.¹²*

On 2 November, after having taken care of the settlement of that season's trade, Hambuan brought a written contract with revisions made by the Taiwan authorities back to An-hai.¹³ The revised version states as follows:

- 1. I, Iquan, shall send no more Chinese wares to Japan, although in the past I have fitted out junk cargoes amounting to 800,000 guilders' worth [of these goods] for that destination. Furthermore, I shall stop sending any vessels over there. I shall not send or order any ship to sail to Japan on my own account.*
- 2. I shall not only cease such ventures, but also impose extremely strict sanctions on any other grandees who engage in this trade, as proof hereof the Company will see that Chinese wares [to Japan] will be*

¹² Ibid., fos. 191^v-192^f.

¹³ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1640-1641, 112. 6 Dec. 1640; Generale Missive, 8 Jan. 1641, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 198. Unfortunately Hambuan perished in a shipwreck, therefore the letter was delivered by another merchant at a later date.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

reduced from the previous amount.

3. *I shall supply the Company with fine silk and silk products on its own recognizance, on the same terms as the Spaniards in Manila and Portuguese in Macao have enjoyed in the past.*
4. *In time, I shall deliver to the Company such Chinese wares as His Honour [the Governor of Taiwan] thinks will be most profitable in Japan, or other destinations in Asia, or to Holland, and never neglect to satisfy its requirements.*
5. *I shall renew the Company loan annually, so that it will never be short of Chinese wares, if it pays 2.5 per cent interest, even to the extent that goods will be delivered to the amount of 1,000,000 guilders [and the period sustained] three months.*
6. *The Company will be able to sell and trade about 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 guilders' worth of Chinese wares in Japan. For its part, the Company will ensure that 50,000 rials in merchandise will be sent on Iquan's account and another 50,000 rials in merchandise on the account of the Company (on which the proper transportation fee will be paid here and which should consist of requested and assorted wares) to be sent to Japan on the Company ships. This solution will bring honour to Iquan and the Company will obtain good profits. After the completion of the voyage, the Company will still be responsible for paying Iquan, the above sum plus 40 per cent profit. Every 50,000 rials should return a guaranteed 70,000 rials in total, without any risk of loss.¹⁴*

The only difference between these two proposals was in fact the amount of Iquan's personal allowance. In Hambuan's version, Iquan demanded about

¹⁴ VOC 1134, Contract tusschen gouverneur [Paulus] Traudenius ende den Mandorijn Iquan getroffen anno 1640 [Contract between Iquan and the Governor of Taiwan Paulus Traudenis in 1640], Taiwan, 1640 [date not recorded], fo. 121^{r-v}.

CHAPTER EIGHT

200,000 guilders of his be carried annually by the Dutch ships. Reviewing the 800,000 guilders of goods which he had previously sent to Japan, he agreed to reduce his shipment to 25 per cent. But Governor Paulus Traudenius dug his toes in and would only agree to allow 50,000 rials (140,000 guilders) to be carried. On 21 December 1640, another letter from Iquan arrived in Taiwan in reply to Governor Traudenius' proposal. Iquan asked the Company to give a shipment of 100,000 rials (280,000 guilders) in goods, thereby rejecting Traudenius' proposal.¹⁵ His reason was that this would have been only 35 per cent of his current shipment. Finally both parties failed to reach an agreement in 1640.

While these negotiations were going on, Iquan dispatched several junks to Japan laden with silk goods. Only two of them arrived, carrying the cargoes worth about 200,000 taels (or 660,800 guilders). In contrast the Dutch exported 5,164,371 guilders' worth of all kinds of goods including silk from Taiwan.¹⁶

¹⁵ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1640-1641, 175. 29 Jan. 1641.

¹⁶ VOC 1136, Missive van den Ed. president Franchois Caron aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio] Van Diemen , Japan, 20 Nov. 1640, not foliated; *Daghregister Batavia*, 1640-1641, 111. 6 Dec. 1640. The total of the cargoes of the *Otter*, the *Oostcappel*, the *Broeckoort*, *De Rocht*, *De Rijk*, and the *Pauw* carried to Japan from Taiwan. It should include the silk goods and other commodities.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

Table 8-1: Chinese raw silk exported to Japan directly and via Taiwan

	Chinese raw silk exported to Japan by the Dutch in Taiwan. (in piculs)	Raw silk exported to Japan by the An-hai merchants (in piculs)
1639-11/1640-10	1,522.31	1,852.2
1640-11/1641-10	716.3	1,319.05
1641-11/1642-10	422.43	639.33
1642-10/1643-11	289.24	1,795.24

Source: Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i [The Taiwan Trade in the Seventeenth Century Based on Dutch Sources]', 37-57 at 42. Table 1; 46. Table 3.

The An-hai merchants exported slightly more raw silk than the Dutch, and Iquan's exports occupied about 34 per cent of the total export of the An-hai merchants. The Dutch chief merchant in Japan, François Caron, seriously considered the possibility of signing a formal contract with Iquan. He agreed that competition between both parties would reduce the profits, but he wondered whether Iquan would be able to really keep his promise and prevent any other Chinese junks sailing to Japan from China. If he could not live up to his end of the bargain, there was still the nagging possibility that he might trade under someone else's name. At this stage of play, the attitude of the Japanese authorities was still unpredictable since they had just banished the Portuguese and were adjusting their regulations deal with the Dutch, who had been ordered to demolish their factory at Hirado and to sell off their stores as soon as possible.¹⁷ Placed under such stress and facing competition from the Chinese merchants, the Dutch discovered that their pure profits

¹⁷ VOC 1136, Missive van den Ed. president Franchois Caron aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio] Van Diemen , Japan, 20 Nov. 1640, fol. 771^r-7^v; *Daghregister Batavia*, 1640-1641, 147-8. 20 Aug. 1640;66. 13 Dec. 1641. The message was passed from Taiwan.

CHAPTER EIGHT

declined to only 850,000 guilders, which means they only earned a 13.5 per cent profit instead of the expected 60 per cent.¹⁸

While the Dutch in Taiwan and the An-hai merchants were locked in their bargaining, the Japanese authorities had decided that the *pacando* system would be re-introduced. The upshot of this was that the Japanese merchants would be forced to trade with the Dutch collectively under the beady eye of the Shogunal authorities. This system precluded competition between the individual Japanese merchants at the public auctions and, as a consequence, the raw silk price dropped from 292 taels in 1639 to 204 taels per picul in 1641. Instead of an average profit of 67 per cent in 1639, the profits obtained on the sale of the raw silk dropped to a mere 21 per cent in 1641.¹⁹

The Dutch were not able to expand the Japan trade, because they did not have any large amounts of silver to take to Taiwan which would have enabled them to trade with the An-hai merchants. Although Iquan and his An-hai companions also suffered heavy losses, he still was able to dispatch three richly laden junks on his own account carrying cargoes of silk amounting to 1,600,000 guilders to Taiwan in the spring of 1641. Governor Paulus Traudenius required them to stay to wait for the silver cash transfer from Batavia to arrive. At this moment he was unaware that the Batavian

¹⁸ Oskar Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im XVII Jahrhundert* [The Relationship between the Dutch East India Company and Japan in the Seventeenth Century], (Inaugural Diss., Rostock University, 1897), 289. 850,000 guilders divided by the total import value of 6,295,367 guilders.

¹⁹ Pieter W. Klein, 'De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie en het inter-Asiatische verkeer in de 17e Eeuw [The Tonkin-Japan Silk Trade of the Dutch East India Company and the Inter-Asian Trade in the Seventeenth Century]'. in Willem Frijhoff and Minke Hiemstra (eds), *Bewogen en bewegen: de historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economic en cultuur* [To Be moved and To Move: Historians in the Field of Tension between Economics and Culture], (Tilburg: Uitgeverij H. Gianotten B.V., 1906), 152-177 at 170. Tabel.2.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

authorities preferred to supply the Japanese silver to the Coromandel Coast because they thought that the Chinese trade was not as promising as its Indian counterpart.²⁰ The upshot of this stalemate was that, without being fed by a steady supply of silver, the Taiwan-An-hai trade came to a standstill. When Governor Traudenius again enquired what Iquan thought of his proposal, the latter remained silent.²¹ Iquan knew the Dutch had exported almost 4 million guilders in specie from Japan, but most of that silver had not ended up in Taiwan But had been whisked away to Batavia.²² After the Governor Traudenius had enthusiastically reported the High Government in Batavia about the rich cargoes of the three junks, he had to face the disappointment of having to return the goods back to An-hai because the silver needed to pay for them had been sequestered by Batavia for use elsewhere, namely in India.²³

The Dutch records reveal that Iquan's Japan trade rapidly expanded after 1640. Although generally more than thirty Chinese junks visited Japan every season, the bulk of the trade revenues were gradually concentrated in Iquan's junks at this period. By the autumn of 1643, seven of Iquan's junks were carrying 66 per cent of the silk goods carried by thirty-four Chinese junks in total.

²⁰ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 20 Mar. 1641, not foliated.

²¹ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1640-1641, 59. 6 Nov. 1641. An extract of the letter sent from Taiwan on 17 March 1641.

²² Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie*, appendix, ccii-cciii.

²³ VOC 664, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 4 May 1641, not foliated.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Table 8-2: Silk goods monopoly of Iquan in Sino-Japan trade Nov. 1639-Nov.1643

	The number of Chinese junks arriving in Japan*	The Number of Iquan's junks*	Value of silk goods exported by the Iquan's junks to Japan (Japanese taels)	Estimated proportion in all Chinese silk goods exported to Japan, of Iquan's silk goods cargoes (percentage)
1639-11/1640-10	74	2	200,000 ²⁴	-
1640-11/1641-10	89	6	(561,403) ²⁵	-
1641-11/1642-10	32	3 ²⁶	500,000 ²⁷	(52.8) ^{28***}
1642-10/1643-11	34	7 ²⁹	850,000 ³⁰	66 ³¹

²⁴ VOC 1136, Missive van den Ed. president Franchois Caron aen den gouverneur generael [Anthonio] Van Diemen, Japan, 20 Nov. 1640, not foliated.

²⁵ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 20 Mar.1641, not foliated. The return cargoes belonging to Iquan amounted to 1,600,000 guilders, which was equal to 561,403 Japanese taels.

²⁶ VOC 1140, Missive [van Johan van Elseracq] uijt het jacht Ackerslooth zeijlende door de straate Palimbangh aen den gouverneur generaal [Antonio] van Diemen, Strait Palimbang, 2 Dec. 1642, fo. 40^v; VOC 1140, Missive [van den edelen Johan van Elseracq aen de edele heer gouverneur Paulis Traudenius] na Taijouan, Japan, 2 Oct. 1642, fo. 47^t.

²⁷ VOC 1140, Missive [van Johan van Elseracq] uijt het jacht Ackerslooth zeijlende door de straate Palimbangh aen den gouverneur generaal [Antonio] van Diemen, Strait Palimbang, 2 Dec. 1642, 40^v; VOC 1140, Missive [van den edelen Johan van Elseracq aen de edele heer gouverneur Paulis Traudenius] na Taijouan, Japan, 2 Oct. 1642, fo. 47^t.

²⁸ VOC 1140, Missive [van Johan van Elseracq] uijt het jacht Ackerslooth zeijlende door de straate Palimbangh aen den gouverneur generaal [Antonio] van Diemen, Strait Palimbang, 2 Dec. 1642, 40^v. It records that in all the Chinese cargo sold for a total of 947,200 taels. Since the most valuable wares were the silk goods, I have taken these as a denominator to estimate the percentage of Iquan's monopoly.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

Source:* Nagazumi Yoko, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen*, 330-2. Appendix A.

*** The value of all Chinese silk exports including other low-value coarse wares.

Although of the maritime ban (*Kaikin*[J.]) imposed by the Japanese authorities had opened the door for the Dutch to realize their ambitious plan of supplanting the Portuguese, their undisguised preference for the India trade made it impossible for Iquan to believe their sincerity about wanting to sign a reciprocal contract. The Dutch partiality for the india trade prompted the An-hai merchants under Iquan to decide to keep the silk-for-silver trade with Japan in their own hands and bypass the Dutch. All this happened just at a time that the strategic shift initiated by the Dutch in the direction of financing the India trade with Japanese silver and Chinese gold was actually forcing them to rely on the An-hai merchants for the supply of the relatively cheaper Chinese gold, which could be sold at a much higher price in India.³²

Because Governor-General Antonio van Diemen and the Council of the Indies in Batavia made the critical decision to shift the investments to Coromandel and failed to supply Taiwan with an adequate supply of silver, the three large junks belonging to Iquan mentioned earlier were ordered to

²⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters : their original tables of contents*[hereafter cited as 'the Deshima dagregisters'], Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé (trans. from the Dutch and ed.), 12 vols, (Leiden : Institute for the History of European Expansion, 1986-2005), XI:1641-1650, 112. 12-3 Aug. 1643.

³⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1643, 112. 12-3 Aug. 1643.

³¹ Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1643, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 215.

³² Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690 : a study in the interrelations of European commerce and traditional economies*, ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 140. Raychaudhuri claims that the export of Chinese gold from Taiwan to India ushered in a new phrase in which the VOC rapidly began to enlarge its investment in the Subcontinent.

CHAPTER EIGHT

sail on to Japan.³³ In a nutshell, Iquan made up his mind to initiate this trade even though it meant he was disobeying an imperial ban on direct trade with Japan. His hand had been forced because the Dutch in Taiwan had not turned out to be reliable partners. Another additional reason behind his decision might have been the massacre in Manila in 1639, an incident in which the Spaniards slaughtered thousands of the Chinese inhabitants of the city. This outrage obviously upset the trade between An-hai and Manila and this interruption brought the supply of Mexican silver to a standstill. In view of these developments, it became more urgent than ever to obtain silver from Japan. Finally, since the Chinese Court still required Iquan carry out a large number of military duties, he could feel pretty secure that the local mandarins would not be disposed to disclose his smuggling trade to Japan. Not only was Iquan still engaged in pacifying the tribes in the mountains, just at that moment in June 1642 the Imperial Court was even planning to assign him to a mission devised to resist the Manchu invasion on the Northeastern border.³⁴

The Usurpation of the Pepper Trade of Macao in the South China Sea Region

In the light of all the commercial setbacks it had to encounter, the original Dutch-Fu-chienese plan, which was to supplant the Kuang-tung-Portuguese alliance in Japan trade, ended in failure after a short bargaining period. The Macao silver trade with Japan was gradually taken over by Iquan alone but, as will be explained below, the export of Chinese gold from Macao was gradually taken over by the Dutch East India Company after the Dutch had seized Malacca from Portuguese in January 1641.³⁵ The Dutch began their

³³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 5. 26 June; 7. 1 July; 8. 4 July 1641.

³⁴ TWYH(ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 174; Missive van Paulus Traudeniuss naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 3 Nov. 1642, Fo. 451^r.

³⁵ For a general impact of the capture of Malacca, see: Veen, *Decay or defeat?*, 201. However, the situation in the Chinese gold exports from Macao to India still requires more study.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

siege of Malacca in 1639 and, as a result, the trade between Macao and India was cut off. At precisely the same time, in 1639, Governor-General Antonio van Diemen was demanding that the Taiwan Factory supply Chinese gold to provide the Coromandel factory with the financial wherewithal to purchase textiles.³⁶ Obeying his orders, Zeelandia Castle did indeed begin to transmit some Chinese gold to India via the route through the Straits of Malacca.³⁷ It is estimated that because of the difference in the purchase and sales price during the period 1636-1639, Chinese gold generated a 11-15 per cent profit in Masulipatnam and 35.5-38 per cent in Pulicat.³⁸ When the trade between Taiwan and An-hai ground to a halt in 1640, the Dutch commissioner, Nicolaes Couckebacker, even entertained serious doubts about whether China could really provide the large order for gold for which Batavia asked. His doubts were based on that fact that as far as he was aware there were no gold-mines in China.³⁹ The Dutch plan to take over the gold trade from Macao never became a realistic option until 1641 when Governor-General Antonio van Diemen asked the Taiwan Factory to ship the Japanese silver to Coromandel instead of using it as payment for Iquan's silk junks.⁴⁰

³⁶ Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 175.

³⁷ Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 185-6.

³⁸ According to the research by Raychaudhuri, the Chinese gold from Formosa sold at a profit of 35 5/8% to 38% at Pulicat, and of 11% to 15% at Maulipatam during 1636 to 1639. The general profit of Chinese gold was 21% to 30% in 1643, which once dropped to 6% to 9 1/2 % in 1643. Cf. Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company in Coromandel*, 187. n 360; 190, n 363.

³⁹ VOC 1131, Rreport of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker, [on board the ship] *De Rijk*, 8 Dec. 1639, fo. 300^r.

⁴⁰ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 20 Mar 1641, not foliated. However, in order to retreat from Hirado, they were required to clear old debts and in return, the Japanese authorities offered them f. 638,689 in gold. The Taiwan authorities only shipped away f. 501,665, which was 50.2 % of the requirements of Coromandel.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Table 8-3: The demand and supply of gold for India shipped by VOC via Taiwan

	Gold demand for India (f.)	Shipped gold (f.)	achieved rate (percentage)
1639	600,000 ⁴¹	201,759 ⁴²	33.6
1640	800,000 ⁴³	500,000 ⁴⁴	62.5
1641	1,000,000 ^{45*}	501,665 ⁴⁶	50.2

* This is a demand for cash, in either gold or silver

If the Dutch had also been able to occupy Macao after their seizure of Malacca, any further co-operation with the Fu-chienese/An-hai merchants

⁴¹ Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 175; VOC 661, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 16 July 1638, no foliated.

⁴² Generale Missive, 30 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 180. It recorded that 134,759 guilders' worth of the Chinese gold was shipped to Surat; VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 1 Mar. 1639, not foliated. It recorded that f. 67,000 in Chinese gold was shipped to Coromandel.

⁴³ VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Souratta aen directeur Barent Pietersz, Taiwan, 30 Nov. 1639, Fo. 310^r; *Generale Missiven van gouverneur-generaal en raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, 11 vols., ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, J. van Goor and J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling ('s-Gravenhage: Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1960-2004), II:1639-1655, 60. 18 Dec. 1639. They expected that the Japanese silver sent from Japan via Taiwan plus the Chinese gold obtained in Taiwan would amount to 700,000 guilders in gold and 100,000 guilders in silver.

⁴⁴ VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Choromandel aen den gouverneur Arent Garadenijs, Taiwan, 30 Nov. 1639, fos. 302-3; Generale Missive, 8 Jan. 1640, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 192.

⁴⁵ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 20 Mar. 1641, not foliated.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

would have been pointless. Had their efforts been successful, the Dutch could have entered into a trade partnership with merchants in Kuang-tung province and supplanted the privileged position of the Portuguese in the Chinese Empire, which had been their original plan before they had decided to cast their lot in with the Fu-chienese in the 1620s. No wonder the Dutch began to lose their faith in Iquan during this period in which they had set their sights on the conquest of Macao, but the goal which was almost within their grasp was snatched away when Portugal regained its independence in 1640. When Portugal pried itself loose from Spain, the Dutch were left without a legal leg to stand on to continue their attempts to conquer any Portuguese colony. On 7 October 1642, when message of this political change of circumstances was officially received in Batavia, the High Government there proclaimed a truce for a period of 10 years.⁴⁷ The government of Macao had actually dispatched a delegate to Batavia and demanded a cease-fire even before the formal order had arrived in Batavia from Holland in April 1642. When the Macanese asked to be allowed to trade in Batavia, resume their trade with Malacca and be exempted from paying customs duties for three years, the Batavian authorities rejected their requests but welcomed any further negotiations which would allow them to obtain Chinese gold.⁴⁸ At this point, because it had eventually not been possible to snatch the Macao gold trade by force, the persisting competition with the Cantonese-Portuguese alliance once again made partnership with the Fu-chienese merchants a feasible option. In a letter sent to Iquan, the Governor of Taiwan, Paulus Traudenius, asked his help in purchasing high quality gold:

'Your Honour, be so good as to arrange good quantities of gold. Any alloy lower than 20-24 carat will not be acceptable. We shall pay at the intrinsic

⁴⁷ Veen, *Decay or defeat?*, 202. *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648, 146. 2 June 1643.

⁴⁸ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 11 Apr. 1642, fos. 60^v-61^v.

CHAPTER EIGHT

*value accordingly. The gold will be paid for in the same way as when you have supplied it in the past, please put your mind at rest about this.*⁴⁹

Therefore in contrast to the silk-for-silver trade which Iquan and the Dutch had decisively captured from the merchants of Macao, the gold trade of Macao still remained in Portuguese hands and the Dutch had to continue to rely on the An-hai merchants, who provided them with a steady supply of certain amounts of Chinese gold.

Table 8-4: Chinese gold exported by the Dutch to India via Taiwan

Chinese gold exported by the Dutch to India (f.)	
-1642.11	226,550
1642-1643	523,101
1643-1644	515,228
1644-1645	281,456
1645-1646	220,057

Source: VOC 1222, *Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomene Taijouanse schuijt gout* [Memorandum of the Quantity of and Reduction in the Gold Received in Taiwan], Taiwan, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

The truce between the Dutch and the Portuguese reinforced these conditions because legally the Dutch could no longer intervene to cut off the Macao-India trade by force. Hence the truce had a wider significance for all the players in South China Sea region because it opened up room for free commercial competition.

As mentioned earlier, the tropical goods most in demand in China were elephant tusks and pepper. The traders around the South China Sea, no matter who they were - the Siamese King, the Portuguese in Malacca and Macao or the Fu-chienese merchants - were all involved in dealing in these two commodities. During the 1630s when the An-hai merchants were gradually

⁴⁹ VOC 1146, *Missive van gouverneur Paulus Traudenius naer China aen den grooten Mandorijn Iquan*, 15 Oct. 1642, fo. 747^v.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

expanding their trade as a consequence of their co-operation with the Dutch in Taiwan, they also tried to obtain those commodities under their own steam.

Iquan had been trying to build up a direct link between Chang-chou and Ayutthaya since 1636, but successful Siamese tributary missions to Kuang-tung had squeezed him out of this rich trade. The pepper trade was also at a low ebb because the civil war in Siam had wreaked devastation on most of the pepper plantations. In that same year, Iquan therefore decided also to dispatch junks to the pepper-rich port of Jambi in Sumatra. Although this destination was situated on the traditional Hsi-yang route, the VOC had cut the Jambi pepper trade off and re-directed it to Batavia. Consequently, as she left Jambi Iquan's junk was seized by a Dutch ship. The intention of the Dutch captain was to force the junk to visit Batavia, so he put some of the pepper, cash and crew on his own ship and transferred thirteen Dutch sailors to the junk to take charge of the Chinese crew. His plan came to naught when the junk and the ship encountered a typhoon on the way to Batavia and the Chinese crew cut the cable which connected the two vessels, killed the Dutch sailors and eventually succeeded in returning to China.⁵⁰ The thirty-two Chinese on board the Dutch ship still remained in Dutch hands. In the autumn of 1636, Iquan's agent Bendiok (Cheng Tai) sent a letter to Taiwan demanding the restitution of the booty by Governor Hans Putmans, and requesting that the captives be sent back, because some of the hostages were sailors belonging to Iquan's navy. For example, one National Squadron Leader (*Ch'in-tsung*[C.] *Sintiong*[D.]) was one of his own relatives. In the letter it was stated:

‘ I assure your Honour this letter comes not from me (Bendiok) personally but was dispatched by the Mandarin Iquan who has been appointed Provincial Military Commander(Γ'i-tu[C.]) in Fu-chou, a rank which is almost the equivalent of that of Grand Co-ordinator. He is eagerly

⁵⁰ VOC 1120, Missive van jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1636, fo. 367.

CHAPTER EIGHT

*enquiring for information and requires me to give the names, because the junk, her crew and goods belong to him. Furthermore, I know that two of these persons have earlier served as Iquan's war-junks.*⁵¹

The Dutch had taken only limited amount of pepper from the junk and it was uncertain whether the thirteen Dutch sailors on the Chinese junk had been slaughtered by the Chinese crew or had drowned when the junk foundered in the typhoon.⁵² Whatever might have happened to them, neither Iquan nor the Dutch were keen to see this incident lead to a total war between the two sides just at a moment the An-hai-Taiwan trade had reached to its zenith. Hence, both sides were willing to practice self-restraint. Failure to have done so would have provoked another declaration of the maritime ban. The An-hai merchants made no further attempts to sail to Jambi during either 1637 or 1638. However, in the spring of 1639, when the Fu-chien authorities were offering the Chang-chou merchants passes to trade with the countries around South China Sea, Iquan's agent Bendiok (Cheng Tai) immediately submitted a request to Taiwan, requiring two Dutch passes which would allow them to sail to Palembang and Jambi in Sumatra to purchase pepper.⁵³ The High Government in Batavia refused the request and at the end of January dispatched two ships to intercept Iquan's junks. However, the Chinese had managed to steal a march and when the Dutch ships approached the coastal waters off Palembang, the two junks were already riding safely at anchor there. Since the Dutch were waiting outside the river estuary, the

⁵¹ VOC 1120, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen] en raeden van India, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1636, fo. 329. The surname of this lieutenant was recorded as 'Oiji', which sounds like the Chinese family name 'Wu' or 'Huang'.

⁵² VOC 1120, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1636, fo. 367. Two '*petack*' of pepper have been taken. A '*petack*' refers to two dividing bulkheads in a junk.

⁵³ VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 24 Jan. 1639, not foliated.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

Chinese merchants decided to send delegates to Batavia to acquire free passes for their homeward-bound voyage to China. The High Government in Batavia knew that the An-hai-Taiwan trade was crucial to the VOC trade in the Far East and, in view of the fact that ‘ the above-mentioned junks have been fitted out by Iquan, who is very influential in our trade with the Chinese Empire,’ the authorities decided to grant the passes and allowed the junks to take on 5-600 last of pepper in Palembang, on the condition that they should return to Batavia the following year to purchase pepper there and would not visit any other harbours in the Archipelago.⁵⁴ Unquestionably, this really exceptional gesture was only made because just at the moment the VOC was expecting a huge expansion in the Taiwan trade.

When added to the 455 last of pepper purchased at Batavia, these 5-600 last from Palembang added up to a total of 955-1055 last, an extraordinarily large amount. The reason for the An-hai merchants’ sudden desire to procure such large quantities of pepper was that it was required to fill the gap in the market left open since the Portuguese in Macao had been forbidden to trade with the Kuang-tung/Canton merchants. The Dutch in Taiwan were informed from An-hai, that:

‘The mandarins of Kuang-tung will not allow the Portuguese to reside in Macao any longer, even though the mandarins have pressed the Portuguese to pay the annual imperial tax (by which they have secured their residence there in the past).’⁵⁵

This piece of information tallies with the Chinese archival records. In

⁵⁴ VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 30 Apr. 1639, not foliated; Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 185; Judith Schooneveld-Oosterling, Marc Kooijmans, *VOC-glossarium*, 67. A last equalled 20 piculs, about 1,250 kilograms.

⁵⁵ VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur general Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fos. 181^v-182^f.

CHAPTER EIGHT

March 1639 the Portuguese had killed some Chinese soldiers.⁵⁶ An official report into what had happened depicted this incident as a rebellion because ‘the greedy mandarins required so many bribes, the Portuguese were forced to resist and killed some soldiers.’⁵⁷ No other records detail what measures were taken when the incident happened, but the same document points out that after 1640 the Portuguese were forbidden to enter the city of Kuang-chou (Canton). From that time, only Chinese merchants were allowed to convey goods down the Pearl River to Macao.⁵⁸ This incident brought the traffic between Kuang-chou and Macao to a temporary halt and created a wonderful opportunity for the An-hai merchants to capture this share in the lucrative pepper trade.

⁵⁶ Sun Chia-chi, ‘Ping-pu wei chiu-ts’an t’ung-i na-hui chih kuan-yüen shih hsing-kaio[Accusation Written by the Ministry of War Levelled against Some Officials Who Have Accepted Bribes from Foreigners] 4 Mar. 1639’, in Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an kuan [First Archives of China], Ao-mên chi-chin hui [The Macao Foundation] and Chi-nan ta-Hsüeh ku-chi yen-chiu-so [The Research Institute for Ancient Documents of Chi-nan University] (Hereafter cited as CKTI et al)(eds), *Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien*[Compilation of Official Documents concerning Macao during the Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties], 6 vols, (Pei-ching: Jên-min ch’u-pan-shê, 1999), I, 20-21.

⁵⁷ T’ung Yang-chia, ‘Liang-kuang tsung-tu T’ung yang-chia t’i-ch’ing chun-hsü hao-ching ao-jên t’ung- shang mao-i i-fu ts’ai-yung pên [Suggestions Made by the Governor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, T’ung Yang-chia, to Allow Foreign Residents of Macao to Trade with the Chinese in order to Raise Tax Revenues] 5 June 1647’, in CKTI (et al eds), *Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien*, 22-3.

⁵⁸ T’ung Yang-chia, ‘Liang-kuang tsung-tu T’ung yang-chia t’i-ch’ing chun-hsü hao-ching ao-jên t’ung- shang mao-i i-fu ts’ai-yung pên 5 June 1647’, in CKTI (et al. eds), *Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien*, 22.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

Table 8-5: The amount of pepper sold by the Dutch to the An-hai merchants

Year	Chinese purchase amount in Batavia (last)	Dutch ship carried to Taiwan (last)
1639	455 ⁵⁹ +(500-600) ⁶⁰	
1640	300 ⁶¹	
1641	170 ⁶²	
1642	450 ⁶³	303 ⁶⁴
1643	700 ⁶⁵	320 ⁶⁶
1644	300 ⁶⁷	
1645	150 ⁶⁸	
1646	0 ⁶⁹	
Sum	2525+(500-600)	623

The annual average amount of pepper imported by Fu-chienese merchants via

⁵⁹ Generale Missive 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 184.

⁶⁰ Generale Missive 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 185.

⁶¹ Generale Missive 9 Sept. 1640, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 196.

⁶² Generale Missive 12 Dec. 1641, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 200.

⁶³ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 19 May 1642, fo.88^v.

⁶⁴ Generale Missive, 12 Dec. 1642, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 202.

⁶⁵ VOC 666, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 3 June 1643, not foliated.

⁶⁶ Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1643, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 211.

⁶⁷ VOC 667, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 8 June 1644, not foliated.

⁶⁸ VOC 667, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 29 May 1645, not foliated.

⁶⁹ VOC 669, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 11 June 1646, not foliated. The Chinese junks carried very few commodities and pepper was not recorded on their cargo manifests.

CHAPTER EIGHT

the Dutch East India Company was about 346 last.⁷⁰ Two-thirds of this were imported on the Chinese junks which visited Batavia. The number of junks was not far from the quota for Batavia fixed by the Emperor.⁷¹

Table 8-6: Chinese junks arrived on Batavia

Year	Chinese junks arrived in Batavia	Chinese junk from An-hai arrived in Batavia
1639	7 ⁷²	3 ⁷³
1640	7 ⁷⁴	1 ⁷⁵
1641	2 ⁷⁶	1 ⁷⁷
1642	4 ⁷⁸	2 ⁷⁹
1643	5 ⁸⁰	3 ⁸¹

⁷⁰ Two-thirds of the amount of pepper purchased from Batavia was lost at sea in 1643. This was not included in the number cited.

⁷¹ According to the quota claimed in 1589, four junks were allowed to visit Bantam (the same area as Batavia) annually. Cf. Lin Jên-ch'uan, *Ming-mo ch'ing-ch'u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i* [Private Trade during the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing Dynasty], (Shang-hai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta- hsüeh, 1987), 262.

⁷² Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 184.

⁷³ VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 11 Feb.; 25 Feb.; 5 Mar. 1639, not foliated.

⁷⁴ Generale Missive, 9 Sept. 1640, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 196.

⁷⁵ VOC 663 Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 9 Mar. 1640. This nachoda is son of An-hai merchant Bindiook.

⁷⁶ Generale Missive, 12 Dec. 1641, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 199.

⁷⁷ Generale Missive, 12 Dec. 1641, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 199. It belongs to Iquan.

⁷⁸ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 19 May 1642, Fo. 88^v.

⁷⁹ VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 8 Feb.; 12 Feb 1642, not foliated.

⁸⁰ Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1643, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 214.

⁸¹ VOC 666, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 10 Feb.; 25 Feb.; 6 Mar 1643, not foliated.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

1644	7 ⁸²	-
1645	2 ⁸³	
1646	2 ⁸⁴	
Total	34	11

Obviously the Chinese Pepper trade in both Taiwan and in Batavia was running pretty smoothly around 1642-1643. In 1642 and 1643, the gold export to India also reached its first peak.⁸⁵ Although the Company missed out on the chance to establish a partnership with Iquan in the Sino-Japanese trade, it did succeed in making a link between the Chinese and Indian markets. In this respect at least the partnership between the An-hai merchants and the VOC in Taiwan was still useful.

Chasing silver in a changing world in crisis

On the northeastern frontier, the Ming army had been fighting the Manchu tribes for decades, but it was gradually losing its advantage even though its soldiers still outnumbered those who could be put in the field by the Manchus. During the 1630s, the Manchu cavalry had managed penetrate the border and even invaded Shan-tung province and the coastline of Hê-bei province.⁸⁶

⁸² VOC 667, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 8 June 1644, not foliated; *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 254. 23 Dec. 1644. It recorded eight big junks and one small *wankang*.

⁸³ VOC 668, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, Batavia, 29 May 1645, no folio number.

⁸⁴ VOC 669, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, Batavia, 11 June 1646, not foliated.

⁸⁵ Its zenith was around 1648, cf. Table 7-4.

⁸⁶ Frederick W. Mote, Michael Loewe, Paul Jakov Smith, Herbert Franke, Denis Twitchett, Willard J. Peterson, John K. Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Albert Feuerwerker, Roderick MacFarquhar (eds), *The Cambridge History of China*, 15 vols,

CHAPTER EIGHT

Since this manoeuvre cut off the supply-lines of the Chinese frontier troops, fearing an inevitable outcome some of the Ming coastal defence troops decided to desert and join the Manchu side.⁸⁷ Their disloyalty meant that control over the Gulf of Po-hai fell into the lap of the Manchus like a ripe plum. This gift from the gods allowed them to acquire provisions from Korea by sea as they continued to raid the Chinese supply-lines on the northeastern frontier. In the early 1640s, the Peking court began to be seriously worried that the Manchu would launch an attack via the Po-hai Gulf. Some officials proposed calling in Iquan to halt the Manchu force at sea. Hence, during the summer of 1642 the Emperor summoned Iquan, who was still occupied pacifying the rebellious aborigines at Lien-chou in mountains of Kuang-tung,⁸⁸ and ordered him to dispatch two capable commanders to take charge of 3,000 newly recruited soldiers. Iquan replied immediately that he needed to have new guns cast and to build new war-junks if he were to be able to carry out this mission.⁸⁹ He lost no time in returning to Fu-chien at the end of October 1642.⁹⁰ Governor Traudenius in Taiwan had this to say about the matter:

‘There were rumours that the Emperor had personally summoned him[Iquan] to the court for the purpose of enlisting his aid against the Manchus.... others have said that he will send his money north rather than go there himself, because he has little faith in the grandees of this Empire.’⁹¹

(Cambridge, Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1978-), VIII the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, part I, 615-617.

⁸⁷ Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (eds), *The Cambridge History of China*, (Cambridge, Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1988), VIII the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, part I, 688-9.

⁸⁸ TWYH(ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien*, 174; 178. The battlefield is located at Lien-chou in Kuang-tung province.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 175; 181.

⁹¹ Letter from Taiwan to Amsterdam Chamber, 1642-11-12, VOC 1140, Fol. 451^f.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

As far as it can be pieced together, both the Grand Co-ordinator in Fu-chien and the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi were in a quandary as they tried to calculate how the expenses which were bound to be incurred could be paid from the empty treasury. It had been drained despite the fact that Iquan's own trade revenues had assumed ever larger proportions during 1643. Iquan replied to the Emperor informing him that the new guns would be ready around May 1643, but he himself was ill and would not be able to lead this campaign.⁹² He suggested that his younger brother, Cheng Hung-k'uei, should take command but by that time the communications between Fu-chien and Peking had already been cut off by peasant uprisings. While bandits under Li Tzu-ch'êng plundered the cities in the area of the Yellow River, the Fu-chien authorities lost contact with Peking for about four months.⁹³ By the time communications were restored, the court had already shelved its previous plan. Nevertheless, the Emperor still needed the Cheng force to quell the rebellion and in November 1643 summoned the 3,000 soldiers under Cheng Hung-k'uei. This summons was soon followed by another asking for another 2,000 soldiers in February 1644.⁹⁴

In April 1644 the rebels took Peking by storm and the Ch'ung-chêng Emperor committed suicide on Coal Hill just before they arrived. The news of this collapse reached the second capital, Nanking, in the middle of May. On 19 June 1644, the new Emperor, Hung-kuang was elected by senior grandees. As Nanking was surrounded by a loop of the Yang-tze River, the

⁹² Anonymous, 'Wei tsun-shang ch'ao-chang fu-tsung-ping chêng chih-lung têng-yüen yin-liang têng-shih [Report about Awarding Silver as a Prize to the Deputy-Commander of Ch'ao-chou and Chang-chou Cheng Chih-lung]', in TWSL (ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, I 1621-1644, 438.

⁹³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648, 142. 23 May 1643; Frederick W. Mote (et al. ed.), *The Cambridge History of China VIII: the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644*, part I, 634-6.

⁹⁴ Anonymous, *Ch'ung-chên shih-lu*[Court Records of the Reign of the Ch'ung-chên Emperor], TW, No. 294, 302; Wan, *Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien*, 64.

CHAPTER EIGHT

new court summoned Cheng Hung-k'uei to station his soldiers at a strategic location to prevent either the bandits or the Manchus from crossing the river. Far away from the areas laid waste by the peasant uprisings and the Manchu invasion, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung provinces became the pillars of the re-organized Southern Ming Empire. To secure this backyard, the new Emperor awarded Iquan an aristocratic title and acknowledged his prominent status in Fu-chien province. After 31 October 1644, he was granted imperial permission to take charge of all coastal defences, including those in Chê-chiang province.⁹⁵ Henceforth Iquan controlled the coastal strip most strategically situated for running the silk trade between China and Japan. With an eye to the main chance, at that time he actually opened a direct link between Chê-chiang and Japan.

The disturbances at the heart of the Chinese Empire in the first few months of 1644 weakened any control the Court could exert over the illegal trade. Crucial evidence of this was provided when a group of Nanking and Fu-chou junks carrying silk goods visited Japan in the spring of 1644 during the north monsoon.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Li Ch'ing, *Nan-tu lu* [Court Records of the Reign of the Hung Kuang Emperor], (Chê-chiang: Chê-chiang ku-chi publisher, 1988), 95. There is a record that Cheng Chih-lung was granted the noble title of the count of 'Nan-an' on 26 September 1644. Later, on 30 October, he was appointed commander in charge of Fu-chien and somewhere else. In a preface to a newly published book, he had signed his full title as 'Ch'in-ming chen-shou fu-chien têng-ch'u ping chê-chiang chin-wên ti-fang tsung-pingp-kuan, t'ai-tzu t'ai-shih, ch'ih-tz'u mang-i nan-an-pa', which can be fully translated as 'Imperially Appointed Regional Commander of Fu-chien and Nearby Areas Including Chin-hua and Wên-chou at Chê-chiang, Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent, Earl-Pacifier of South, Wearer of an Imperidal Robe. Chêng Ta-yü, *Ching-kuo hsiung-lüeh* [The Great Plans for Re-invigorating the Empire], 2 vols, (Peking: Shang-wu yin-shu Kuan, 2003), I, 5.

⁹⁶ *The Deshima Dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 16 Feb./11 Mar./ 20 Apr./ 27 Apr./ 28 Apr./30 Apr. 1644, 159-60.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

The sudden increase in the number of Chinese junks visiting Japan during the north monsoon can also be construed as a reaction to the Dutch threats because, after the negotiations between Iquan and the Dutch about sharing the Sino-Japan trade had failed, the Dutch decided it was time to take some measures to lure Iquan back to the negotiating table. On 2 June 1643, the Governor of Taiwan, Maximiliaan Le Maire, told the Chinese merchants who were visiting Taiwan that:

*'The Governor-General does not understand why they [the Chinese] have created difficulties for the Company in Japan and have sent junks laden with all sorts of commodities to trade with our enemy in Manila, in direct contravention of the Emperor's ban. We have been suffering great losses because of those junks. In order to prevent further damage, he will dispatch a fleet to patrol the sea-routes between China and Japan. As you will have noticed, we have sent two junks and one Dutch ship to patrol the northern waters off Luzon. These actions will continue throughout the whole year; ... please make this known and warn every merchant in China that they should not try to visit these places.'*⁹⁷

Taking a modicum of notice of this threat, Iquan sent some commodities on junks which departed at that time, notwithstanding the northern monsoon, to reduce the risk of vessels being captured by the Dutch fleets. The two Dutch junks sent to the Philippines from Taiwan did indeed manage to capture a Chinese junk near Luzon on 4 June, and confiscated all the silver on board, warning the crew never to trade with Manila again.⁹⁸ The High Government in Batavia attempted to deploy some yachts to patrol against Chinese junks again during the summer of 1642, but the typhoons and the generally bad weather conditions prevented them from putting this plan

⁹⁷ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648, 145-6. 2 June 1643.

⁹⁸ *Dagregister* gehouden door opperstuurman Simon Cornelissen Clos, 25 mei tot 30 juni 1643, 4 June 1643[diary kept by senior captain Simon Cornelissen Clos, from 25 May to 30 June 1643], in: *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648, 160.

CHAPTER EIGHT

into action.⁹⁹ As the Dutch authorities were also wondering in the backs of their minds how the Japanese would react, in the summer of 1643 they informed the Japanese government of their plan. On 1 August, a letter written by Governor-General Antonio van Diemen was delivered to the Mayor of Deshima, Ebiya Shiōemon, in an attempt to consult him about the Japanese reaction to this plan to mount a patrol.¹⁰⁰ The latter answered ambiguously one month later saying that the Japanese would not intervene if the patrols did not take place in Japanese territorial waters but acts of piracy were out of the question.¹⁰¹ Word of this request soon reached the ears of the local Chinese community and they protested furiously to the Governor of Nagasaki. Consequently, the Governor issued an order to the Dutch on Deshima warning them not to seize any junks sailing from China to Japan or Japan to China.

*'If the junks which sail from Nagasaki to Ch'üan-chou and other ports north of Ch'üan-chou return here next year and declare that some have not arrived in these ports and that some are missing, an investigation will be held here to find out if the Dutch have captured or destroyed them...'*¹⁰²

Although this warning to the Dutch came only from the Governor of Nagasaki rather than from the Shogun himself, the message was clearly understood. Thereafter no Chinese junk was harmed by Dutch ships. This agreement developed into a tacit understanding between the Chinese and the Dutch which was honoured until the surrender of Taiwan in 1662.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ VOC 666, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 10 Apr. 1643, not foliated.

¹⁰⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 106. 1 Aug. 1643.

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, 118. 12 Sept. 1643.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 123. 29 Sept. 1643.

¹⁰³ Boxer correctly points out the attitude of the Japanese authorities was one of the decisive elements in warding off any VOC blockade of Iquan's monopoly of Sino-Japanese trade. Cf. Charles R. Boxer, 'The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

Furthermore, it is impossible to overlook the fact that Iquan was still offering huge amounts of Chinese gold to Taiwan and was purchasing pepper from Batavia in the period 1643-1644. All these reasons made it possible to contain the conflict at a low level.

Table 8-7: The Chinese junks arriving in Japan from harbours to the north of Ch'üan-chou.

Year	Number of Chinese junks arriving in Japan*	Chinese junks arriving in Japan which departed from the harbours to the north of Ch'üan-chou **	Percentage
1642	34	6	18%
1643	34	2	5%
1644	55	18	33%
1645	82	32	39%
1646	54	39	72%
1647	31	8	26%
1648	20	11	55%
1649	59	23	38%

Source: * Robert LeRoy Innes, *The door ajar*, 636. Table A. Shipping traffic between Japan and the outside world (excluding Ryukyu and Korea) from 1604 to 1715.

** *The Deshima Dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, XII 1650-1660, passim.

Despite the settlement about the Japan trade reached rather laboriously, there were still two different trading routes about which the Dutch and An-hai merchants were in conflict with each other: The first of these was the trade with Manila which the Dutch had patrolled seasonally from Taiwan since 1643. When one of Iquan's junks was captured in 1645, he flew into a rage and sent a letter in which he threatened the Chinese inhabitants in Taiwan that

(Cheng Chih-lung)', *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39, at 33-5.

CHAPTER EIGHT

they would run the risk of punishment if they assisted the Dutch when they patrolled in search of Chinese junks with hostile intent. The harsh tone he adopted was an expression of how powerless he felt in this matter.¹⁰⁴

The other less important route in which both sides were involved was the deerskin trade to Japan. Since the end of the sixteenth century, the Japanese had imported large numbers of deerskins of which the chief purpose was to manufacture Samurai armour. Before the Shogun suppressed Roman Catholicism and virtually closed off the country in 1640, this trade used to be managed by Japanese residing in overseas ports and the Portuguese. The bulk of the deerskins originated from Taiwan, Siam and Cambodia. According to the records of the Dutch trade factory in Deshima (see table below), the deerskin trade gradually increased.

Table 8-8: Junks from Quinam, Cambodia in Siam and Japan carrying deerskins

Year	Junks from Quinam and Cambodia in Japan	Junks from Quinam and Cambodia in Siam	Deerskins imported by Chinese junks to Japan**
1638	-	3 ¹⁰⁵	-
1639	-	-	14,050
1640	-	1 ¹⁰⁶	23,890
1641	2 ¹⁰⁷	2 ¹⁰⁸	41,550

¹⁰⁴ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648, 406-7. 7 July 1645.

¹⁰⁵ VOC 1127, Missive [van Henrick Nachtegael in Siam] aen den edelen Abraham Ducker in Couttchin-China, Siam, 3 May 1638, fo. 363^v. One of the two junks brought 10,000 pieces of deerskin to Quinam and the other junk carried no deerskins.

¹⁰⁶ VOC 1139, Missive uit Siam[van Reijner van Tzum] aen den gouverneur generael[Antonio van Diemen], Siam, 7 Nov. 1641, fo. 744^v.

¹⁰⁷ Nagazumi Yoko, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen*, 36.

¹⁰⁸ VOC 1139, Missive uit Siam[van Reijner van Tzum] aen den gouverneur generael[Antonio van Diemen], Siam, 7 Nov. 1641, fo. 744^y; VOC 1139, Rapport

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

1642	3 ¹⁰⁹	2 ¹¹⁰	183,216
1643	1 ¹¹¹	1 ¹¹²	-
1644	3 ¹¹³	2 ¹¹⁴	67,832
1645	3 ¹¹⁵	-	25,730
1646	3 ¹¹⁶	1 ¹¹⁷	54,270
1647	1 ¹¹⁸	-	-

Source:** Nagazumi, *You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i*, 46. Table 3.

Earlier it was pointed out that Iquan had failed in his attempt to get a

van den commissaris Jeremias van Vliet aengaende sijn bevindinge in Siam ende bocht van Pattany [van Johan van Twist uijt Malacca aen gouverneur generaal Antonio van Diemen en raden van India in Batavia], Siam, 28 May 1642, fo. 803^f.

¹⁰⁹ *The Deshima Dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 22 July; 17 June; 26 July 1642, 63; 69; 70.

¹¹⁰ VOC 1139, Rapport van den commissaris Jeremias van Vliet aengaende sijn bevindinge in Siam ende bocht van Pattany [van Johan van Twist uijt Malacca aen gouverneur generaal Antonio van Diemen en raden van India in Batavia][Report written by Commissioner Jeremias van Vliet about His Experiences in Siam and the Bay of Patani, Sent from Malacca by the Said Johan van Twist to Governor-General Antonio van Diemen in Batavia], Siam, 28 May 1642, fo. 803^f; VOC 1144, Missive van Reijnier van Tzum [in Siam] aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen in Batavia], Siam, 13 Oct. 1642. fo. 619^f.

¹¹¹ *The Deshima Dagregister*, XI 1641-1650, 112. 16 Aug. 1643.

¹¹² *Ibidem*, 108. 11 Aug. 1643.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 164; 169; 170. 8 July; 9 Aug ;27 Aug 1644.

¹¹⁴ VOC 1151, Missive door het opperhoofd Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur generael [Anthonio van Diemen], Siam, 25 Nov. 1643, fo. 661^v; VOC 1157, Journaelse aenteeckening van 15 Januarij tot 8 September 1644 [The Ship's Log Signed between 15 Jan. to 8 Sept. in 1644], Siam, 23 Feb. 1644, fo. 658^f.

¹¹⁵ *The Deshima Dagregisters*, 208; 209. 16 July; 21 Aug, 22 Aug. 1645.

¹¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 231; 234. 27 July; 18 Aug. 1646.

¹¹⁷ VOC 1157, Missive [uit Jan van Muijden in Siam aan] aen Reijnier van Tzum president van Japan, Siam, 26 June 1646, fo. 494.

¹¹⁸ *The Deshima Dagregisters*, 288. 7 July 1647.

CHAPTER EIGHT

grip on the Sino-Siamese trade because the Siamese King was busy developing his own crown trade with China. The Siamese King was able to establish this crown trade with Kuang-tung on a firmer base after 1643, but his trade was not the only outlet for Siamese deerskins which were also exported to Japan via Cambodia and Quinam. After the disturbances in Siam during 1630s, many resident Japanese had felt unsafe and subsequently moved to Cambodia and Quinam, from where they continued to purchase deerskins from Siam. They sold these skins to Chinese merchants in Quinam and Cambodia because they themselves had been excluded from the Japanese trade by the bans on overseas trade (*Kaikin*) since 1636. In the period 1637 to 1640, the Dutch merchants in Ayutthaya complained constantly about the ‘Cochin-China Japanese’ who came to collect deerskins in Siam. Although there are no specific archival records about the number of Chinese junks which visited Quinam and Cambodia during those years (1636-1640), it is recorded that in 1639 the Chinese officials issued ten passes to junks allowing them to trade in Quinam (eight passes) and Cambodia (two passes). One of the consequences of a huge sea battle which was fought between Tonkin and Quinam in 1643 was that no deerskins were exported to Japan by Chinese junks that same year.¹¹⁹ In 1642, two Dutch vessels which stranded on the coast of Quinam were captured by Portuguese vessels and their cargoes were sold as booty. The Dutch seized this opportunity also to declare war on Quinam and captured three Chinese junks which happened to be sailing to or from its ports in 1643.¹²⁰ According to the information the Dutch received in Taiwan, Chinese junks were being dispatched directly from Quinam to Japan in 1644. Knowing that the VOC had declared war on Quinam in 1643, Iquan also requested Dutch passes so as to be able to trade

¹¹⁹ VOC 1151, Missive door het opperhoofd Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur generael [Anthonio van Diemen], Siam, 25 Nov. 1643, fo. 661^v.

¹²⁰ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 259. 20 Jan. 1644.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

with Quinam in 1644.¹²¹

Shortly after Iquan asked for these passes, after crossing the Yang-tze River on 3 June 1645, Manchu troops occupied Nanking. His position now untenable, Iquan's brother Cheng Hung-k'uei retreated to Fu-chou with his soldiers, bringing with him a Ming prince who had sought refuge under his protection. Iquan and Hung-k'uei decided to make this prince the new Ming Emperor with the title of Lung-wu and established the new Imperial Court in Fuchou on 21 August 1645. Iquan's son, Cheng Ch'eng-kung, was recruited by this new court as one of the Emperor's bodyguards. Aware of how crucial it was to keep the the old troops up to scratch and train fresh recruits to keep numbers up, the new court acknowledged the importance of the foreign trade as a source for raising the funds to accomplish this purpose, hence no maritime ban was to be promulgated during this period of crisis and direct trade was allowed between China and Japan.

*'The Grand Mandarin Iquan has opened up the trade and traffic with Japan because of the profit this brings in, on condition that a certain tax is paid. Previously this [trade] was forbidden under penalty of death, although he secretly kept it for himself by bribing the coastal grandees.'*¹²²

'The cargoes brought to Batavia [from China] were poor in respect of the orders from Batavia and from Patria, mostly because of the protracted huge war in China and the malice of Mandarin Iquan who tries to obstruct the trade in Taiwan and reinforce his own trade on account of the lucrative profits to be made in the Japan trade, which he intends to keep solely for himself from now on. In return for rich payments, he has permitted all the merchants to sail to Nagasaki, and has also assembled a huge cargo himself. Therefore last year [1645], seventy-six fully laden Chinese junks went to sea

¹²¹ *Dagbregister Batavia*, 1644-1645, 161. 11 Mar. 1645.

¹²² VOC 1160, Missive van Francois Caron [naer gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn], Taiwan, 31 Jan. 1646, fos. 166^v-167^r.

CHAPTER EIGHT

*and exported more than 5,200,000 guilders' worth of goods. The prices of many commodities dropped causing the Company a serious loss. We cannot bear this constant competition with the Chinese.*¹²³

The new court in Fu-chien also revived the tributary mission as an important channel for crown trade. For example, in September 1645 it opened negotiations with delegates from the Liu-ch'iu (*Ryūkyū*[J.]) Kingdom in expectation of setting up a tributary trade in silk-for-sulphur.¹²⁴

Iquan even planned to build a formal alliance with the Japanese Shogun in the Emperor's name. He hoped to employ diplomatic means to persuade all the rulers around the South and East China Seas to acknowledge his rights and thereby obviate any armed intervention against his junks by the VOC. He allowed one of his naval general Ts'ui Chih, to send a message to the Shogun in which he solicited formal trade and military aid. The Dutch on Deshima

¹²³ VOC 870, Missive van Batavia[van Cornelis van der Lijn] voor den oppercoopman Willem Verstegen ende de verdure opperhooffden van 't jacht de *Zeerobbe* ende de fluijt de *Salm*, waernaer hun in 't seijlen van hier tot de Pescadores ende Taijouan sullen hebben te reguleren [Letter from Batavia Written by Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn to Chief Merchant Willem Verstegen and Other Chief Men on the Yacht *The Zeerobbe* and the Flute Ship *de Salm*, Assigning Them Tasks during their Voyage from Batavia to Taiwan and the Pescadores], Batavia, 18 June 1646, fo. 180.

¹²⁴ Ts'ai To (comp.), *Li-tai pao-an*[Tributary Documents Preserved in Liu-ch'iu], in Yang Yün-p'ing, cited in 'Nan-ming shih-tai yü liu-ch'iu kuan-hsi chih yen-chiu [A Study of the Relationship between the Southern Ming Court and the Liu-ch'iu Government]', in id., *Nan-ming yen-chiu yü t'ai-wan wên-hua*[Studies of the Southern Ming and the Culture of Taiwan], (Taipei: T'ai-wan fêng-wu, 1993), 307-40 at 316-28. 18 Oct 1645; Moreover, the Liu-ch'iu had ceased their trade with South-East Asian countries around the 1570s. Later, because of the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the first few decades of the seventeenth century, the Liu-ch'iu tributary mission was discouraged by the Ming court. After their final attempt to revive the trade in 1637 proved a failure, the tributary trade between China and Liu-ch'iu was also ruined. Cf. Chang, 'Maritime Chinese Trade', 195-7.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

found out that one delegate from Iquan had sent a letter to the *Bakufu* on 26 January 1646 requesting military assistance against the Manchus.¹²⁵ This semi-official letter to the Japanese authorities was dated 28 January 1646.¹²⁶ The letter was rejected by the Council of Elders (*Rōjū*[J.]), because by then the 'national isolation policy' (*sakoku*[J.]) had been implemented and squeezed out any possibility of a tributary trade between China and Japan.¹²⁷ Undeterred Iquan persisted in his attempt. In July 1646 he required the permission of the Lung-wu Emperor to mount a formal diplomatic mission to Japan. He personally wrote a letter to both the Japanese Emperor and the Shogun and delivered the documents attached with the express permission of the Lung-wu Emperor. This time the message reached the Shogun but he and the Council of the Elders still repudiated the request.¹²⁸ News of this affair even reached the ears of the Dutch on Deshima because the Shogun dispatched some courtiers to reject Iquan's requests, a gesture which attracted public attention.¹²⁹ Whatever the Japanese side might have felt, the trade with Japan had been legalized by the Emperor Lung-wu.

In May and June 1646 a Chinese envoy, said to have been dispatched by Iquan, also presented himself at the Tonkin Court. The delegation which accompanied him brought silk goods valued at approximately 20,000 taels. The envoy declared that his mission was to remind the King of Tonkin not to forget to pay tribute to the new Emperor in Fu-chien. They actually

¹²⁵ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 231. 13 Apr. 1646.

¹²⁶ Hayashi Gaho, Hayashi Nobuatsu, Ura Renichi (eds), *Kai Hentai*[The Change of Dynasty from Ming to Ch'ing], 3 vols, (Impressum Tokyo: Toyo bunko, 1958), I, 11-14; Ishihara Michihiro, *Nihon kisshi no kenkyū*[Studies of Cheng's Request for Military Aid from Japan], (Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1945), 32.

¹²⁷ Yang Yün-p'ing, 'Nan-ming shih-dai yu Jih-pên de kuan-his [The Relationship between the Southern Ming and Japan]', in Id., *Nan-ming yen-chiu yü t'ai-wan wên-hua*, 279-306 at 283-288.

¹²⁸ Yang, 'Nan-ming shih-dai yu Jih-pên de kuan-hsi', 283-288.

¹²⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 245. 9 Nov. 1646.

CHAPTER EIGHT

exchanged 600 taels of gold and some muskets, lances, and swords before leaving on 3 July 1646. The gift of gold for the Lung-wu Emperor was handed over with the ulterior motive of being granted a higher title in China.¹³⁰ Iquan also wrote a personal letter to the King of Tonkin couched in such terms ‘ as if he (Iquan) was his (the Tonkin King’s) brother.’¹³¹

These missions to Japan, Ryukyu and Tonkin during 1645 and 1646 all issued invitations to enter into a new tribute trade centred on Fu-chou. Iquan’s project was to re-affirm the diplomatic bonds with these vassal kingdoms and to utilize these diplomatic means to monopolize all Chinese trade. He had devised it as a blunt instrument which he could wield to break up all the privileges the Dutch had won at the expense of the Chinese merchants. He was bound for disappointment because the new Emperor was not convinced that Iquan’s project was of crucial importance to his new Court and ordered him to make himself ready to wage war against the Manchu force as quickly as possible. Iquan knew that it was impossible for him to provide finance and troops for such a mission without first securing an economic base and he chose to secure his own navy and property at the expense of that of the Lung-wu Emperor. When the Manchu force approached Fu-chien province, he ordered his troops to retreat city by city, because he was convinced that his new trade-system in the making would also be valuable to the Manchu rulers. Iquan introduced himself to the

¹³⁰ VOC 1160, Missive uijt Tonquin [door Antonio van Brouckhorst] aan François Caron gouverneur van Taiwan, Tonkin, 31 July 1646, Fos. 177^v-178^v.

¹³¹ VOC 1160, Missive uijt Tonquin [door Antonio van Brouckhorst] aan François Caron gouverneur van Taiwan, Tonkin, 31 July 1646, Fos. 177^v-178^v The Chinese record about this mission is very ambiguous and obscure. It says that the Lung-wu Emperor had dispatched a mission to Tonkin in January or February 1646. It had returned to Fu-chou in June or July without even landing on the Vietnamese soil. Chü Chi-mei, ‘Yüeh-you chien-wên [Journal of a Journey in Kuang-tung]’ in Liu-yün chi-shih (ed.), *Ming-chi pi-shih hui pien* [Compilation of Unconventional Historical Sources of the Ming Dynasty], 12 vols, (Shang-hai: Sao-shê shan-fang, 1900), IX, 1.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646

Manchu Emperor some years later in a letter, in which he unintentionally revealed how he defined his career in the last phase of his life:

*'Your Humble Servant was granted title of "duke" (P'ing Kuo-kung) when I was serving the Ming court, because I pacified the bandits in the mountains and the pirates on the high seas off Chê-chiang, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung, and because I also defeated the red-haired barbarians (the Dutch) and showed foreign kingdoms the right way to pay tribute to China.'*¹³²

A mercenary could hardly achieve more than this while serving a Chinese dynasty.

¹³² Cheng Chih-lung, 'Chêng-chih-lung t'i-wei tsun-chih chao-fu shih-pên [Cheng Chi-lung's Reply to the Royal Command Summoning Cheng Chengkung] July 1651' in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien* [Compilation of the Manchu Archives Referring to the Cheng Family during the Early Period of the Ch'ing dynasty], T'ai-wan wên-hsien hui-k'an (hereafter cited as TWH), 7 vols, (Peking: Chiu-chou Publisher, 2004), I no 6, 5.

CHAPER NINE
CHAPTER NINE
THE OPEN COAST
OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 1646-1650

The interlude of Nanking and Chê-chiang merchants

The advance of the Manchu invasion from Nanking into Chê-chiang province damaged the An-hai silk trade, because the land routes which the An-hai merchants took to collect the silk from Nanking and Chê-chiang were transformed into battlefields. One man's meat is another man's poison and these developments allowed the Chê-chiang merchants to free themselves from the An-hai merchants' monopoly in the Sino-Japanese trade. After the summer of 1645, there was an interruption in the maritime trade between Fu-chien and Chê-chiang. The junks departing from Fu-chou, Chang-chou and An-hai with their destination Nanking were forced to redirect their course to Nagasaki.¹ This sudden disruption jeopardized the sources of income which Iquan had tapped into to pay his soldiers' wages. Iquan had succeeded in legalizing the Sino-Japanese trade and had begun to dispatch his silk-carrying junks in ever greater numbers from Fu-chou and Nanking in an attempt to circumvent the potential threat presented by the Dutch fleet. The war which raged in Chê-chiang also posed a threat to Iquan's investments in Nanking. As the Manchus steadily pushed the frontier southwards, the land routes which were essential to transporting silk between Fu-chien and Nanking via Chê-chiang were blocked off. In the spring of 1646, word of this situation also reached the ears of the Governor of Taiwan, François Caron:

'This is of great concern. Rumours have reached us that the war in China will prove an obstacle to the junks from Chang-chou, An-hai, Ch'üan-chou, and Fu-chou visiting Japan. It will hinder the supply of goods

¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 209. 16 Aug. 1645. Most of these junks were loaded with sugar.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

offered on the market in Nagasaki, and the price might rise somewhat higher. However, on mature consideration this might not happen because if the silk exports from An-hai are reduced on the one side, on the other the silk exports from the Nanking areas might well increase in abundance.

Therefore, I believe that Your Honour [the Governor-General] will understand that, if the An-hai shipping is interrupted, the Nanking merchants will profit from it. This is something which has never happened before and is unheard of.

*I am therefore confident that silk in and around An-hai will become more expensive, because it cannot be transported over there.*²

This rumour proved true. Ten months later, Caron wrote another report to explain the situation.

'The supply of silk and the silk piece-goods which were transported to Japan by Iquan or in his name during last southern monsoon did not flow [as in the past]. The silk was not obtained as it was previously through ordinary trading channels, but has been scraped together from all the merchant houses and towns under Iquan's command. He has also given express orders to draw money from the countryside instead of hoarding silk as a guarantee for paying the wages of the soldiers. Furthermore, some quantities of silk from the northern provinces have been transported to the south on condition that certain duties be paid on the [provincial] boundary or at the frontier gates which were being guarded by Iquan's brother in the name of the Emperor and at his command. As a consequence of the plundering carried out by Iquan's brother, these quantities of silk fell into Iquan's hands and have all been sent to Japan. Therefore, I would like to testify that not only the Company but also Iquan himself and every merchant in the coastal provinces have been excluded from the silk trade.

² VOC 1161, Misive van Pieter Antonissen Overwater naer Batavia aen Cornelis van der Lijn, 31 Jan. 1646, fo. 682^v.

CHAPER NINE

The truth is as clear as day, not one single length of silk is to be obtained in the southern provinces of Chinese Empire owing to the war. Therefore Iquan has sent just as little silk to Japan as we have. Time will be our best teacher about what will happen next . The dirty trick that Iquan's brother has fraudulently played on those merchants has stirred up such fear and resentment among the merchants under the Manchus [in Chê-chiang], no one dares to do business there again. The traffic is also stringently obstructed by their enemy [the Manchus]' ³

The actions stated in Caron's report corroborate what is recounted in the Chinese records. In February 1646 at Iquan's request the Lung-wu Emperor sent a delegate to press the Kuang-tung provincial government for financial aid. Iquan also urged that all the officials should donate money to the imperial treasury according to their rank.⁴ After Iquan was appointed to the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Works in April 1646, he dispatched tax officials to examine the land-tax registration in every district in Fu-chien province, hoping to squeeze yet one more penny from the Emperor's subjects.⁵

On 5 April 1646, the Lung-wu Emperor ordered Iquan's brother, Cheng Hung-k'uei, to aid the resistance in Chê-chiang. He was commanded to lead his troops to Chê-chiang taking the route by the northern boundary of Fu-chien province and drive the Manchus out. As soon as his troops arrived on the border, he announced that there was no money to pay the soldiers'

³ VOC 1160, Rapport van 't gepasseerde op t eijlant Formosa 't sedert 27 Februarij 1646 tot 13 November daeraen volgende door den gouverneur François Caron, Taiwan, 13 Nov. 1646, fo. 76^f-77^f.

⁴ Ni Tsai-t'ien, *Hsü ming-shih chi-shih pên-mo*[Continued Compilation of the Chronicles of the Ming History by Events], TW no 133, 141.

⁵ Anonymous, *Ssu-wên ta-chi*[Simplified Chronicle of the Reign of the Ch'ung-chên Emperor], TW no.111, 84.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

wages and that he would therefore not venture beyond the border-gate.⁶ In fact, instead of assisting the Chê-chiang forces, Cheng Hung-k'uei dispatched soldiers to collect land tax from those counties across the border under the jurisdiction of the Chê-chiang government.⁷

In May 1646, Iquan lost no time in presenting the Lung-wu Emperor with a budgetary plan, declaring he would need 1,560,000 taels per year to pay for all the weaponry, wages and provisions for his troops if they were to repel the Manchus.⁸ All this points to the fact that, because the Chê-chiang merchants had wrestled the silk-for-silver trade between China and Japan from Iquan's hands, he and his brothers were now reluctant to lend their commercial competitors any assistance. In the year 1646, thirty-four junks departed for Japan from the coast of Fu-chien, but all the raw silks they were able to carry from Fu-chou (eked out with a little from Ch'üan-chou) amounted to a mere 201 piculs, only about 17 per cent of the total Chinese raw silk imports to Japan that year.⁹ The only conclusion which can be drawn is that about 83 per cent of the raw silk that year must have been exported by merchants from Chê-chiang.¹⁰ When this compelling truth

⁶ Anonymous, *Lung-wu chi-lüeh* [Simplified Chronicle of the Reign of the Lung-wu Emperor], TWH, I no 1, 137.

⁷ Sung Yüen-wên, *Tsun-jang lüeh* [Succinct Account of Royal Attempts to Halt the Invasion of the Manchus], TWH, I no 9, 180. 'They did not dispatch any troops to the area of the Ch'ien-t'ang River, but only collected food provisions from the Chin-hua, Chü-chou and Wên-chou areas.'

⁸ Anonymous, *Ssu-wên ta-chi*, 95; Ni, *Hsü ming-shih chi-shih pên-mo*, 144.

⁹ This calculation is based on the records in the *Dagregister Deshima*. According to Nagazumi, in the year 1646, approximately 117,475 catties of Chinese raw silk were still being exported by the Chinese junks. Moreover, information from Taiwan shows that Chinese merchants sold about 1,200 piculs (equal to 120,000 catties) in Japan. Cf. Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i, 37-57 at 42 Table 1; 46. Table 3.

¹⁰ The Japanese government forbade the traders under the Manchu (Ch'ing) administration to trade in Japan in 1645 and 1646. See below.

CHAPER NINE

dawned, it decided Iquan to enter into negotiations with the Manchus rather than financing a war which was not going to contribute anything to his own pocket. The archival records of the Manchu Court, show that Iquan contacted the Manchu officials as early as April 1646.¹¹ This was approximately the time he must have realized how the subterfuges of the Chê-chiang merchants were damaging his silk trade with Japan. Between May and July, Iquan did all he could to stimulate the ardour of the tax-collecting system so as to squeeze tax revenues up as high as he could, just as is mentioned in Caron's report. Despite his manouevres, the Chê-chiang competitors proved to be an unmovable obstacle because they were nominally allied with the Fu-chien government. The resistance in Chê-chiang held out steadily while the the nominal leader, Lu prince, was kept detained at Shao-hsing and they continued to defend their camps along the southern bank of the Ch'ien-t'ang River. Unfortunately, during the summer of 1646, a drought lowered the water level and it was easy for the Manchu cavalry to cross the river on 18 July 1646,¹² after which the Chê-chiang resistance soon collapsed. Now that both Nanking and Chê-chiang provinces were in Manchu hands, Iquan had no choice but to negotiate with Manchus sooner or later if he was to obtain the raw silks he needed for his trade with Japan. In August, he withdrew all his troops from the border of Fu-chien.¹³ The Manchus crossed the border in the first half of October 1646, the Emperor Lung-wu was opened to be hunted and die in chasing soon afterwards.¹⁴

¹¹ Huang Hsi-yün, 'Huang his-yün wei chao-fu chêng-chih-lung ch'ing-hsing shih-pên[Report Written by Huang his-yün Recounting Cheng chih-lung's Submission] Sept.1646', in CKTI(ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no 6, 1.

¹² Wang Kuang-fu, 'Hang-hsieh i-wên [A Forgotten History since Our Departure from Hsieh-Mên]', in Ch'ên-hu i-shih (comp.), *Ching-t'ò i-shih*[Forgotten Histories of Ching-t'ò], (1911), 1.

¹³ Anonymous, *Lung-wu chi-lüeh*, 147.

¹⁴ How Iquan withdrew all his soldiers who were garrisoned in cites is told by: Hsü

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

In the meantime, Iquan had put all his military provisions in order, had stowed his capital on board the junks anchored in Fu-chou Harbour and sailed to An-hai with all his fleet on 22 October 1646.¹⁵ Although Iquan had no direct communication with the Manchu commander, General-in-Chief of the Southern Expedition the To-lo Prince Polo in Fu-chou, he had earlier promised the Manchu court that he would withdraw all his soldiers if he was confronted by Manchu troops. This is how Iquan signalled his true intentions while apparently still operating as a Ming resistance leader. On 10 November 1646, a junk from Fu-chou visited Nagasaki and reported Iquan's plans and his failure to conclude a peace agreement when he first met the Manchus in Fu-chou.

*'It brought the news that Iquan had sent three or four envoys from Fu-chou to the Manchus... to make a deal with them.... [By proposing that] if he [Iquan] subjected himself to the Manchu's rule and shaved himself in their fashion, then he should be created a great mandarin, ruling over the three provinces, Kuang-tung, Fu-chou, and Ch'üan-chou. They [Manchus] would not listen to this and without giving any forewarning, marched straight for Fu-chou.'*¹⁶

When the Manchu troops began their final approach on An-hai after they had occupied Ch'üan-chou, Iquan hesitated about whether he should abandon An-hai before he had officially subjected himself to the Manchu

Hsiao-wang, 'Ch'ing-chün ju-min yü chêng-chih-lung Chiang-ch'ing shih-k'ao [A Study of How the Ch'ing Forces Entered Fu-chien and How Cheng Chih-lung's Submission to Them Took Place]', *Fujian Tribune: the humanity and social science monthly*, 7 (2007), 70-77.

¹⁵ Anonymous, *Lung-wu chi-lüeh*, 155.

¹⁶ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 245. 10 Nov. 1646. Some Chinese records actually announce that the Manchu grandees had proposed appointing Iquan Viceroy over three provinces; Yang-ying, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu* [Veritable records of Coxinga], TW no. 32, 42; Chiang Jih-shêng, *T'ai-wan wai-chi*, 86.

CHAPER NINE

Emperor. Some days earlier, on 16 October 1646, Iquan's youngest brother, Cheng Chih-pao, withdrew to An-hai from Ch'üan-chou with his soldiers.¹⁷ After he had done this, the Manchu troops engaged the Cheng troops near the bridge which connected the southern region of Ch'üan-chou to An-hai Castle. Skirmishes occurred for almost one month until the Manchu commander gave the order to cease fire.¹⁸ According to François Caron's report, the An-hai troops under Iquan's command finally retreated on board his ships when the Manchus headed for An-hai Castle:

*'Iquan fled away from An-hai (which was his headquarters) to an island. Possessing about 600 junks in total, he had burned all the other junks and vessels anchored nearby, or wherever he could reach, in order to secure himself from any harm from those who might want to sail on these vessels. It was not confirmed [whether it is true] that the Manchus held a huge and honorable reception (because he [Iquan] had submitted to them). However, it was obvious that, in order to humiliate and insult Iquan, the Manchus allowed their troops to rape the women and girls of An-hai. They the commenced a slow withdrawal to Fu-chou with these hostages.'*¹⁹

Iquan must have revealed his true intentions to his fellow military officers, including his brothers, cousins and eldest son. He issued the order to retreat from his own private castle in An-hai. Iquan's proposal to submit to the Manchu Court shocked his followers. Because he had been a great supporter of Ming Emperor Lung-wu, most of them did not trust that

¹⁷ Li T'ien-kên, *Chüeh Huo-lu*[Consuming as Fire : An Account of the Southern Ming Court], TW no. 177, 869.

¹⁸ Hua T'ing-hsien, 'Min-you yüeh-chi [Monthly Accounts during My Residence in Fu-chien]', in Ch'ên-hu i-shih (comp.), *Ching-t'o i-shih*, 50.

¹⁹ VOC 1160, Rapport van 't gepasseerde op 't eijlant Formosa 't sedert 27 Februarij 1646 tot 13 November daeraen volgende door den gouverneur François Caron [Report about What Happened in Formosa from 27 Feb. to 13 Nov. 1646 by Governor François Caron], Taiwan, 13 Nov. 1646, fo. 78^f.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

Manchus would accede to Iquan's request that he retain all his current privileges. Only after Iquan set sail with all his capital in his final withdrawal from An-hai did the Manchu General-in-Chief, Fucho Polo, send Iquan a message conveyed by a member of the gentry of Ch'üan-chou who happened to be a close friend of his. Polo confirmed that the Manchu Court was willing to negotiate with Iquan and promised that he could retain his current status and that he should send his troops to conquer Kuang-tung province in the name of the Manchu Emperor.²⁰ On 21 December, Iquan arrived in Fu-chou to initiate the formal negotiations.²¹ Meanwhile, the Manchu General-in-Chief had also launched an investigation to discover who were the most representative members of the gentry living in the vicinity of Fu-chou and sent messages to summon them to his headquarters. On 14 January 1647, this group of Fu-chienese grandees was taken hostage and dispatched to Peking by order of the Manchu Emperor. Iquan was among their number.²²

Iquan was suddenly borne away from Fu-chien by the Manchu General-in-Chief, Polo, before any substantial agreement had been concluded. Nor had any arrangement been made by the Manchu commander to put the regulations on the overseas trade in any sort of order. In short, the An-hai merchants still had no legal means to prevent the Nanking or Chê-chiang merchants from cutting into in the Sino-Japan silk trade.

Yet, there was a solution. Although the Manchu Court had not yet

²⁰ Anonymous, 'Appendix: Lung-wu i-shih [Forgotten Events during the Reign of the Lung-wu Emperor]', in TWYH (ed.), *Shêng-an pên-chi* [Biography of the Lungwu Emperor], TW no. 183, 205; Li, *Chüeh Huo-lu*, 885; Lin Shih-tui, *Hê-ch'a ts'ung-t'an* [Fragmentary Memorandum], TW no. 154, 156; Chi Liu-chi, *Ming-chi nan-lüeh* [Rough Historical Description of the Late Ming in the South], TW no. 148, 328.

²¹ Anonymous, *Lung-wu chi-lüeh*, 159; Li, *Chüeh Huo-lu*, 885; Chi, *Ming-chi nan-lüeh*, 328; Anonymous, 'Appendix: Lung-wu i-shih', 218.

²² Anonymous, *Lung-wu chi-lüeh*, 164.

CHAPER NINE

decided on what its maritime trade policy would be, the Shogunal government in Japan made no bones about despising any Chinese merchants who had shaved their heads in the Manchu fashion after submitting to the invaders. On 17 June 1646, a richly laden Nanking junk which had carried 65,500 taels' worth of cargo to Nagasaki was denied permission to trade because its crew had shaved their hair in the Manchu style.²³ Later they were allowed to sell their goods on condition that they would never return.²⁴ It seems feasible to assume that, if the An-hai merchants from the Cheng clan maintained their status as Chinese loyal to the Ming instead of submitting to Manchu, they might have been able to achieve the position of being the only Chinese who were allowed to continue to trade in Japan.

In 1647, when the coastal areas in Chê-chiang and Fu-chien were all opened up, many merchants from the two provinces fitted out junks for the Japan trade. On 13 May 1647, a junk from Nanking with a 'shaven' crew visited Nagasaki carrying 45-46,000 taels' worth of cargo, but owing to Japanese contempt for them was forbidden to sell anything. However, after her *nachoda* had spread the news that by now all of China would have been conquered by the Manchus and that Iquan had been captured and taken to Peking,²⁵ the Shogunal government underwent a change of heart and allowed this *nachoda* to sell his cargo in July.²⁶ This change of policy was officially acknowledged that same year, henceforth junks from Ch'ing China would be welcome.²⁷ Even before the Shogunal government had adjusted its position, Iquan had also dispatched several junks to Japan. One of his naval commanders, Ts'ui Chih, returned to Fu-chou in April 1647 and took up a position at Hai-k'ou (nowadays Fu-ch'ing city.)²⁸ He fitted out four junks to

²³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 231. 17 June 1646.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, 236. 10 Sept. 1646.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 284. 13-4 May 1647.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 287. 1 July 1647.

²⁷ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 324. 31 Dec. 1647.

²⁸ His-t'ing ling-hsüeh, *Nan-t'ien-hên*[Traces of Southern Courts], TW no. 76, 414.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

trade with Japan in the name of the Lu Prince, who had been the nominal leader of the Ming resistance in Chê-chiang. These junks arrived in Nagasaki on 15 and 18 May 1647. They even brought an envoy:

*'The envoy who has come on this junk is not taken seriously, although he seems to be the Governor of Fu-chou's younger brother and he behaves with enough pomposity. He has brought several women and a carriage in their fashion, three donkeys, and three buffaloes. When the governor's interpreter went on board, he seated himself in an armchair on the poop of the junk and had two men hold a canopy above him. He had the anachoda, or the skipper of the junk, speak with the interpreter, implying that he considered the interpreter too much beneath himself to open his mouth to him. Three times a day they fire their muskets and play their instruments. The flag is hoisted in the morning and lowered in the evening.'*²⁹

Compared with the richly laden junk from Nanking, those from

'In April 1647, he occupied Hai-k'ou and dispatched his adopted son with the King of An-ch'ang to require Japanese military aid.' ; Nan-sha san-yü-shih, *Nan-ming yeh-shih*[Unconventional Historical Accounts of the Southern Ming], TW no. 85, 256; Shao T'ing-ts'ai, *Tung-nan chi-shih*[Records of Activities in the Southeastern Regions], TW no. 96, 126; Ni, *Hsü ming-shih chi-shih pên-mo*, 113; Hsü Tzu, *Hsiao-t'ien chi-ch'uan*[Chronicles of Smaller Courts], TW no. 138, 955; Chang Lin-pai, 'Fu-hai chi [Journal of the Flooding upon the Sea]', in TWYH (ed.), *T'ai-wan kuan-hsi wên-hsien chi-ling*[Compilation of Fragmentary Historical Materials relating to Taiwan], TW no. 309, 11.

²⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 284. 18 May 1647. This description also agrees with the Chinese sources. Ch'a Chi-tso, *Tsui-wei-lu hsüan-chi*[Selections from A Certain Historical Book Forbidden by Imperial Court], TW no. 136, 269. 'The Lu Prince stationed on Choushan dispatched the Prince of An-ch'ang to Japan with a donkey and an ox-cart.' Li, *Chüeh Huo-lu*, 913. Therefore the 'governor Fu-chou's younger brother' referred to in the Dutch records was actually the ambassador, the Prince of An-ch'ang, who was also a member of the royal family which explains why he is recorded as a 'brother'.

CHAPER NINE

Fu-chou carried only a few goods. Apparently Iquan's monopoly on the Sino-Japan raw silk trade had slipped out of his hands after his failed negotiations with the Manchus. On 7 and 9 July, two more junks dispatched with an ambassador representing the Lu Prince arrived in Nagasaki, they were crewed by Ming loyalists who were still putting up a resistance on Chou-shan Island.³⁰ They carried no silks but did bring some pepper, medicines and black sugar, for there was little else they could offer.³¹

The Navy Commander (*Shui-shih Tsung-ping*), Ts'ui Chih, was expelled from Fu-chou by the Manchu troops on 8 May 1647.³² However, in the following August Iquan's nephew, Cheng Ts'ai, who had been appointed Admiral by the Lu Prince led his ships in an attack on Fu-chou and, while the city was still under siege in the following three months, his troops occupied the surrounding towns and the northern border region of Fu-chien province.³³ In his efforts to curb the export of silk from Nanking, Cheng Ts'ai now asked, just as Iquan had done earlier, the Liu-ch'iu Kingdom to send a tribute mission and he also sought to conclude an agreement about the crown trade with the Shogunal government in Japan.³⁴ Cheng Ts'ai's troops managed to keep control of most of the areas along the northern border of Fu-chien for

³⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 288. 7 July 1647.

³¹ *Ibidem*. 9 July 1647.

³² Chang Ts'un-jên, 'Wei t'ang-pao kuan-ping shui-lu lien-chan ta-huo ch'üan-chieh Shih [Report about the Great Victory Won at Sea and on the Land] 21 July 1647', in TWSL(ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, II 1645-1653, 98.

³³ His-t'ing, *Nan-t'ien-hên*, 39; Nan-sha, *Nan-ming yeh-shih*, 257; Shao, *Tung-nan chi-shih*, 133; TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*[Selection of the Veritable Records of the Shünshih Emperor], TW no. 158, 44; Sung, *Tsun-jang lüeh*, 190. Cheng Ts'ai was not a sibling of Cheng Chih-lung, but only bore the same family name 'Cheng'. Since they were close to each other, they usually pretended to be from one family.

³⁴ Yang, 'Nan-ming shih-tai yü liu-ch'iu chih kuan-hsi yen-chiu', 328-333.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

about one year.³⁵ In the year 1648, the Chinese (no matter where from) exported 19,415 catties of raw silk in total to Japan, which amounted to only 10 per cent of the Chinese raw silk exports in 1643.³⁶ Hence, although Cheng Ts'ai had undisputedly gained control of the coastal regions, the collection of raw silk for the Japan trade from the inland regions of China was still obstructed by war. The Manchu troops eventually re-occupied most of the towns in northern Fu-chien in 1649.³⁷

Once again, the trade between Nanking and Japan was forbidden by the Ch'ing Court and, when one of the Chinese junks returned from Japan on 18 March 1649, its crew was arrested by the Manchu coastal defence troops.³⁸ Hence, through intervention from Peking, in 1649 the serious competition between the Fu-chien and Chê-chiang merchants was brought to an end and the Fu-chien merchants temporarily regained their monopoly by the simple expedient their home region had still not been conquered by the Manchus.³⁹

Hunting silver and rice for the newly established Coxinga force

Iquan's failure to reach an agreement with the Manchu Court was a disaster for all his followers but the An-hai merchants continued to pursue their trade

³⁵ TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, 48. 23 Sept. 1648.

³⁶ Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i [The Taiwan Trade in the Seventeenth Century Based on the Dutch Sources]', in T'ang His-yung (ed.), 2 vols, *Chung-kuo hai-yang fa-chan-shih lun-wên chi(VII)* [Proceeding of Studies in Chinese Maritime History (VII)], vol.1, 37-57 at 44.

³⁷ His-t'ing, *Nan-t'ien-hên*, 40. 12 Aug. 1649.

³⁸ T'u Kuo-pao, 'Wei-pao-ming p'an-huo yang-ch'uan yang-ch'i shêng-chien-shih [A Letter Reporting the Capture of Trading-Junks and Suggesting How They Should Be Dealt With] 10 Jan. 1650', in TWSL(ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, II 1645-1653, 221.

³⁹ Nagazumi, 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i', 44.

CHAPER NINE

from Quemoy and Amoy. Even though they were no longer able to collect sufficient quantities of raw silk and silk products to satisfy the Japanese market, they refused to give in and continued to run the gold for pepper trade with Taiwan. Between April and August 1647, the An-hai merchants delivered some 700,000 guilders' worth of gold in all to Taiwan, which the Dutch paid for in silver, spices, and rice.⁴⁰

Table 9-1: The estimated silver exports from Taiwan to China during 1647-48 (f.)

Year-Month	Silver stores at the beginning of spring	Reserved silver for deerskins and sugar*	Imported silver from Batavia	Silver imported from Japan	Silver spent in the China trade*	The Chinese gold export from Taiwan
1647-4	594,000 ⁴¹	48,000 ^{42*}	0	326,920* ⁴³	568,120	883,898 ⁴⁴

⁴⁰ VOC 1164, Resolutie genomen [door Pieter Antonissen Overtwater] in 't Casteels Zeelandia, Taiwan, 8 Aug. 1647, fo.532^f.

⁴¹ Generale Missive, 14 Apr. 1647, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 245.

⁴² This is because from July to November the Factory in Taiwan maintained a constant debt of about 20,000 rials. I have assumed it was cash reserved for purchasing deerskins and sugar. VOC 1164 Resolutie genomen [door Pieter Antonissen Overtwater] in 't Casteels Zeelandia, 19 July 1647, fos. 530^v-531^f ; 8 Aug. 1647, fo. 532^f; 9 Nov. 1647, fo. 553^v.

⁴³ Generale Missive, 31 Dec. 1647, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 249. Adding together the 52 chests from the *Jonker*, the 55 chests from the *Berckhout*, the 35 chests from the *Hillegaersbergh*, the sum is 142 chests. Meanwhile, 1 rial equals 52 stuivers; 1 tael 57 stuivers, hence every tael equals 1.1 rial, and each rial equals 2.6 guilders. 142 chests=142000 taels, which equals 406,120 guilders. Among them were some chests of silver, worth 30,000 taels, which equals 79,200 guilders, were dispatched to Siam, therefore only 326,920 guilders remained in Taiwan.

⁴⁴ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 30 Mar. 1657, fo. 15^v.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

1647-11						
1647-11	304,800 ⁴⁵	31,200 ⁴⁶	668,418 ⁴⁷	396,000 ⁴⁸	728,418	1,605,661 ⁴⁹
1648-12						
1648-12	770,000 ⁵⁰	-	-	-	-	-

To cut a long story short, while the silk-for-silver trade with Japan ground to a halt through a lack of supplies, the An-hai merchants continued to obtain silver from VOC factory in Taiwan by shipping out gold. In the summer of 1647, 65 per cent of this export gold was paid for in silver; in 1648 it was some 45 per cent. Apparently silver was the most highly prized commodity among the An-hai merchants.

While all this was going on, a new force emerged under the command of Iquan's son Coxinga (or Cheng Ch'eng-kung).⁵¹ Coxinga did not follow in

⁴⁵ Generale Missive, 31 Dec. 1647, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 250. 127,000 rials equals to 304,800 guilders.

⁴⁶ VOC 671, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, Batavia, 11 Apr. 1648, not foliated. After the ship the *Berchout* departed from Taiwan on 25 Feb. 1648, only 12,000 rials which was equal to 31,200 guilders (1 rial = 2.6 guilders) were left.

⁴⁷ Generale Missive, 18 Jan. 1649, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 253. 155,270 rials in silver coinage was equal to 372,648 guilders and 131,571 taels were equal to 315,770 guilders. Added together these give the sum of 688,418 guilders. But this batch silver coins were debased for bullion because they can no longer be circulated as currency and thus lost 20,000 guilders in value. After deducted of this amount, the silver aid to Taiwan was: 668,418 guilders.

⁴⁸ Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1649, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 259. 150,000 taels of silver equals 396,000 guilders.

⁴⁹ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 30 Mar. 1657, fo. 15^v.

⁵⁰ Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1649, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 259. The 900,000 guilders excluded the 130,000 guilders in gold.

⁵¹ 'Coxinga' can be translated literally 'Lord of the Imperial Surname'. Cf. Boxer,

CHAPER NINE

the footsteps of his cousin Cheng Ts'ai who had chosen to focus on the Chê-chiang competitors. As a former member of the Lung-wu Emperor's guard,⁵² he was not a member of the army establishment like Cheng Ts'ai, but he could at least claim to be the possessor of An-hai Castle and of the private wealth left behind by Iquan when he was taken to Peking. According to the memoirs of one of his contemporaries, Juan Min-hsi, he employed these resources to organize a private army:

*'Coxinga planned to fight, but he commanded neither soldiers nor vessels. Therefore he went to Nan-ao and recruited troops. 300 people later followed him and he trained them on [the island of] Ku-lang-yu near Amoy. He ordered Huang K'ai in An-hai to raise money for the army supplies.'*⁵³

This picture is confirmed by the Dutch sources:

*'...I was told that Iquan's son and his younger brother have rendezvoused in the Pescadores with at least 700 junks and a host of men. They have been able to take with them many of the most prominent merchants and a substantial hoard of money and goods.'*⁵⁴

It is plausible to assume that the silver which was flowing in from Taiwan was used to pay for these newly trained troops.

In the spring and summer of 1647, the An-hai merchants also managed

Charles Ralph, 'The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chih-lung)', *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39 at 36.

⁵² Yang Yün-p'ing, 'Chêng ch'êng-kung fên ju fu k'ao' in: id, *Nan-ming yen-chiu yü t'ai-wan wên-hua* [Studies about the Southern Ming and the Culture of Taiwan], (Taipei: T'ai-wan fêng-wu, 1993), 375-91 at 383-6.

⁵³ Juan Min-hsi, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*[Observations about All the Events in Coxinga' Maritime Career], TW no. 24, 5. 300 persons may only referred to the officials, not including the attached soldiers.

⁵⁴ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 285. 29 May 1647.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

to appropriate another crucial military resource: rice from Taiwan. The Diary of Zeelandia Castle records that between May 1 and July 1, Chinese traders exported 2,636 big bales and 1,372 sacks of rice and 2,560 sacks of paddy to the China coast.⁵⁵ This trade assumed such alarming proportions that, at the end of 1647 the Dutch Council in Taiwan had to issue a placard forbidding any further exports of rice.⁵⁶

As always happens in conflicts, the civil war brought widespread famine to the areas around the battlefields in Fu-chien and Kuang-tung. In April of 1648, in the areas around Fu-chou the rice price rose to between '1,000 wen per Tou (10 taels per picul)' and '20 taels per picul'.⁵⁷ Cheng Ts'ai was forced to send junks as far as Kao-chou, almost in Kuang-hsi province, to purchase rice. As the areas around Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou were also famine stricken,⁵⁸ Coxinga found himself compelled to resort to

⁵⁵ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648, from 1 May 1647 to 1 July 1647, 568-82; From 15 July 1647 to 24 July 1647, 584-5; 1 Sept. 1647, 592; 11 Oct. 1647, 599; Nov. 1647, 605-7.

⁵⁶ VOC 1164, Resolutie genomen [door Antonissen Overtwater] in 't Casteel Zeelandia, 9 Oct. 1647, fo. 545^v. On what date the placard was announced, is not recorded by the Zeelandia Diary. But the Chinese junks which departed from Taiwan after April 1648 carried only the rice for crews.

⁵⁷ Sung, *Tsun-jang lüeh*, 194-5. 'In April 1648, a serious famine occurred in Fu-chou, the rich price rose to twenty taels per *Tan*, and forty taels inside the city, starving people wandered on streets. ... The soldiers [under Cheng Ts'ai] imported rice from Kuang-tung, and thus avoided starvation.' Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 6. 'The rice price reached 1,000 maas per *Tou* in Fu-chien'; one *Tan* equals about 60 kilograms, hence a *Tan* was more or less equal to one picul (62.5 kilograms). Because one *Tan* equalled 10 *Tou*, one tael equalled 1,000 wen, '1,000 wen (maas) per *tou*' equals '10 taels per *Tan*.'

⁵⁸ Shên Ting-chün, *Chang-chou fu-chih* [Local Gazette of Changchou Prefecture], 50 vols, (T'ai-nan, Têng-wên publisher, 1965), vol. 47, 10. 'In 1648, every county suffered from famine, the rice price reached 6 maas per *tou*.'; Huang Jên, *Ch'üan-chou Fu-chih* [Local Gazette of Ch'üanchou Prefecture], 73 vols, (T'ai-nan,

CHAPER NINE

the same measures.⁵⁹ The Portuguese in Macao, who depended on Kuang-chou for their food supplies, were likewise staring starvation in the face.⁶⁰ They dispatched two junks to Siam carrying an enormous sum of gold to purchase rice there. On the way back, both vessels foundered because they were so overloaded.⁶¹ Despite the placard which forbade the export of rice to China, the Dutch in Taiwan detected plenty of smuggling activity.⁶² Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia ordered the Dutch factory in Siam to ship 200 to 300 *last* of Siamese rice (about 250-375 metric tons) to Taiwan.⁶³ Because a mass of Chinese refugees poured into Taiwan seeking shelter, this large cargo of rice was consumed in no time at all. At his wits' end, the Dutch Governor of Taiwan, Pieter Overtwater, had to ask for aid

Têng-wên publisher, 1965) , vol.73, 12. 'In 1648, ... there was a famine.'

⁵⁹ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 6. 'In the year of 1648, Fu-chien was afflicted by a severe famine, Coxinga and Cheng Ts'ai dispatched junks to Kao-chou to purchase rice.'

⁶⁰ Ch'êng His-tso, *Wu-ch'uan hsien-chih* [Local Gazette of Wu-ch'uan District], in The Palace Museum Committee (ed.), *Ku-kung chên-pên ts'ung-k'an* [Collectanea of Rare books in Palace Museum] (Hereafter cited as KKCP) no. 183, (Hai-k'ou: Hai-nan, 2001), 458. 'In 1648, the rice price soared and reached 7 *maas* per *tou*. Some families gave their children for cannibalism.'

⁶¹ NFJ 282, [Missive]aan d E heer Frederick Coijett, President in Japan, van Jan van Muijden in Judia op 't Coptoirs Siam [Letter to the President of the Factory in Japan, Frederick Coijett, Written by Jan van Muijden in Ayutthaya in Siam], Siam, 24 June 1648, not foliated.

⁶² VOC 1170, Resolutie des Casteel Zeelandia [genomen door Pieter Antonissen Overtwater], Taiwan, 8 May 1648, fo. 524^f.

⁶³ VOC 1170, Brieff door den coopman Jan van Muijden opperhoofd in Siam 26 Junij 1648 aen den praesident Pieter Antonisz [Overtwater] [Letter sent by Chief Merchant Jan van Muijden in Siam to the Taiwan President Pieter Antonize Overwater], Siam [in't fluijt schip de witte duijf ter rhede voorde Reviere van Siam on the ship the *Witte Duijf* in the roadstead of the Siamese River)], 26 June 1648, fo. 484^v. One *last* equalled 1,250 kilograms, Cf. Judith Schooneveld-Oosterling, *VOC-glossarium*, 67.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

from Japan.⁶⁴ In November 1648, the Dutch merchants in Nagasaki were permitted to ship 6,000 bales (309 metric tons) of Japanese rice to Taiwan.⁶⁵

While Cheng Ts'ai and Coxinga were dispatching junks to purchase rice in Kao-chou, Iquan's brother Cheng Hung-k'uei sailed from Nan-ao to Chieh-yang where Iquan and he used to purchase rice in the 1630s. Now the circumstances had changed and, instead of purchasing the rice, he used force to subjugate several independent towns and castles. When this step had been accomplished, he urged the peasants to pay their land-tax to him in paddy.⁶⁶ This region, which is located in the eastern part of Kuang-tung, had not been affected by a bad harvest so Cheng Hung-k'uei had ample access to rice and sugar in 1648. In the following years, news reached Fu-chien that another claimant Ming Emperor, Yung-li, had established a court in Kuang-hsi province in the southwest. A little later the Manchu Regional Commanders Li Ch'eng-tung in Kuang-tung and Chin Sheng-huan in Chiang-hsi rebelled against the Ch'ing court in Peking. Their defection meant that although the war raged on in central China but the coastal areas remained relatively

⁶⁴ NFJ 282, Missive van Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater naer Japan aen den E. Frederick Coyett, oppercoopman en operhoofd in Japan en den voorderen raedt des Comptoirs aldaer [Letter from Pieter Anthonisz Overtwater in Taiwan to Chief Merchant Frederick Coyett and the Council in Japan], Taiwan, 24 Aug. 1648, not foliated; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 322. 15 Sept. 1648.

⁶⁵ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 329. 8 Nov. 1648; VOC 11207, *Uijterekening Van de Goude en Silvere Munts Waardye, Inhout der Maten en Swaarte der Gewichten, in de respectieve Gewesten van Indiën*[Calculation of the Value of the Gold and Silver, Content of Weights and Measures in Different Regions of East India], (Middelburgh: Johannes Meertens, 1691), 11. In Nagasaki, one bale weighed 82-83 catties, while one catty weighed 0.625 kilograms. Therefore one bale weighed about 51.5 kilograms.

⁶⁶ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 6; Tsang Hsien-tsu, *Ch'ao-yang hsien-chih*[Local Gazette of Ch'ao-yang District], KKCP, No.176, 463. 'In 1648, Ch'eng Hung-k'uei dispatched Ch'ên Pao to this town to levy taxes and collect rents. Local bandits tried to lay a siege to them, but the siege collapsed after about one month.'

CHAPER NINE

peaceful. Emperor Yung-li of the Southern Ming dynasty dispatched a delegate to recognize Coxinga's private army as a formal Ming force and to welcome the assistance he was prepared to give his new court.⁶⁷ Coxinga now had a legal basis from which to conquer the still independent districts around Ch'ao-chou which he set out to do with the assistance of his uncle, Cheng Hung-k'uei. They were quite successful because on 11 December 1649 Coxinga sent his Tax Levying Official (*Tu-hsiang-kuan*), Huang K'ai, to Amoy with a rich cargo of about 10,000 piculs (625 metric tons) of paddy.⁶⁸ In January 1650, Coxinga assigned Hung Hsu to reside in Ch'aoyang (the harbour of Ch'aouchou) and put him in charge of the rice exportation there.⁶⁹ Consequently, another several tens of thousands of piculs of paddy were shipped to Amoy in May.⁷⁰ The Dutch sources reveal that the rice trade along the coast of China was very profitable during these years. In March 1649, the High Government in Batavia decided to ship 600-700 last (750-875 metric tons) of rice to Taiwan, because it desired to maintain the price at about 60 rials per last (2.5 taels per picul) in Taiwan.⁷¹ Governor Pieter Overtwater wrote to Japan in 1649 saying that he believed that the rice price in Japan had also begun to rise. However he advised, 'It is only advisable to purchase rice and wheat if the rice price is lower than one tael two maas per bale (1.46 tael per picul)... which was the price last year and the year before.'⁷² The Chinese junk traders in Nagasaki also testified that

⁶⁷ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 6; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 355. 17 July 1649. 'Iquan's son - who is said to have become a great mandarin of Canton a short while ago.'

⁶⁸ Yang Ying, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, TW no. 32, 5.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, 7.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷¹ VOC 672, Resolutie van gouverneur-generaal Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, Batavia, 13 Mar. 1649, not foliated. 60 rials per last equals 50.7 taels per last. Therefore it was equal to 2.5 taels per picul.

⁷² NFJ 282, Missive van Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater naer Japan aen den E Dircq Snoucq, oppercoopman over 's Compagnie ommeslagh in 't keijzerrijk Japan,

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

‘on June 29, 1649, no fewer than seven ships had arrived in [Taiwan] from Batavia, the bulk of their cargo being rice for China.’⁷³ In October 19, the Dutch Chief Merchant in Nagasaki obtained permission from the Japanese authorities to export 6,000 bales (309 metric tons) of rice.⁷⁴ How much rice was transported to Taiwan is unknown, but Governor Pieter Overtwater commented that this supply: ‘had greatly contributed to the welfare of this place,’ and that it constituted a ‘desirable business.’⁷⁵ The high price of rice might be the explanation of why An-hai merchants like Huang K’ai and Hung Hsü never had any difficulty in laying their hands on Chinese gold in the years 1648-1650. The opening of the Ch’ao-chou- An-hai route came to the notice of the Dutch merchants when some commodities from Kuang-tung also began to flow into Taiwan.⁷⁶

The lucrative pepper trade targeted against Macao

The spices still in store in Taiwan were almost sold out between during March and June 1647.⁷⁷ The pepper price rose and fell depending closely on the news from China.

Taiwan, 26 July 1649, not foliated.

⁷³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 355. 17 July 1649.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, 371. 19 Oct. 1649.

⁷⁵ NFJ 283, Missive van Nicolaes Verburgh naer Japan aen d’ E. Anthonio van Brouckhorst, oppercoopman en opperhoofd over ‘s Compagnies negotie in ‘t keijzerrijck Japan [Letter from Nicolaes Verburgh to Chief Merchant Anthonio van Brouckhorst about the Company Trade in Japan], Taiwan, 21 July 1650, not foliated. Every ‘*bal*’ should equal 40 ‘*gantung*’.

⁷⁶ VOC 1170, Missive van Pieter Antonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 2 Nov. 1648, Fo. 573^v.

⁷⁷ VOC 1164, Missive van Pieter Antonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 24 Sept. 1647, Fos. 624^v-625^f.

CHAPER NINE

Table 9-2: The pepper price in Taiwan from March to September 1647

Month	Price (rial per picul)	Pepper sold Rumours from the China coast	Exported pepper amount (picul) (sack)	
1647-3	15 5/8 15 3/4	400 piculs		
1647-4	18 1/2 14 1/2	Two junks would return from Batavia A Quinam junk arrived in Kuang-tung	165	30
1647-5	15 11/16		142	42
1647-6	-		20	225
1647-7	15 1/4 15 3/4 16 16 1/4 17 17 1/4 17 5/8 17 3/4	1,500 piculs 500 picul	1716	1452
1647-8	19 1/2		1145	230
1647-9	16 16 3/8	Rumours about instability in China	900	
1647-10			17	195
1647-11			32	59
sum			4137	2233

Source: VOC 1164, Missive van Pieter Antonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn [Letter from Pieter Antonissen Overtwater to Batavia for the Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn], Taiwan, 24 Sept. 1647, Fos. 624^v-625^f; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, II 1641-1648.

Before September 1647, the An-hai merchants had apparently had high expectations of the profits to be made in the pepper trade, because Manchu troops had bungun to invade Kuang-tung since January 1647. It seems plausible that, because some of Iquan's former troops had participated in this

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

expedition, the An-hai merchants would have been well-informed about the general conditions in Kuang-tung.⁷⁸ Although the city of Kuang-chou surrendered when the Manchu cavalry arrived before its gates in January, the troops loyal to the of Ming cause laid siege to the city on 16 March 1647. The siege lasted one month.⁷⁹ The resistance struggle spread all over the coastal area and as a consequence Tung-kuan, Hsin-an and Ch'ing-yuan districts were re-occupied by the Ming forces in April.⁸⁰ They even attempted to take Kuang-chou in August.⁸¹ In the meantime, the area between Kuang-chou and Macao had become an extended battlefield, effectively barring the trade route between Kuang-chou and Macao. The situation in Fu-chien remained fairly peaceful, although An-hai Castle had had to endure an attack by the Manchu troops. The Dutch chief of the Deshima factory in Nagasaki described the situation as:

*'The Manchus are progressing peacefully, bringing everyone under their yoke. The Tartars(Manchus) offered to free Iquan and give him a high office on the condition that this [Iquan's] sons surrendered. His Japanese wife has died. The great conquests of the Tartars(Manchus) are carried out in the most civilized manner to the satisfaction of the subjugated: no one may rob anyone of a single penny or commit any theft.'*⁸²

⁷⁸ Anonymous, *Lung-wu chi-lieh*, 165. 'The Bolo prince of Ch'ing dispatched his subordinate officer, Shih Fu, to lead the cavalry and Chêng Hung-k'uei to direct the navy towards Kao-chou, Lei-chou and Chi'ung-chou. Cheng Hung-k'uei excused himself on the grounds of ill health, so that Shih Fu and Cheng Chi-pao moved first.'

⁷⁹ T'ung Yang-chia, 'Liang-kuang tsung-tu ts'n chieh-t'ieh [Remaining Part of a Letter sent by the Governor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, T'ung Yang-chia] 10 Aug. 1647', in TWYH (ed.), *Nan-ming shih-liao*[Historical Sources of the Southern Ming period], TW no. 169, 70; Anonymous, *Hsing-tsai yang-ch'iu*[Events at the Yungli Emperor's Court], TW no. 234, 9.

⁸⁰ Anonymous, *Hsing-tsai yang-ch'iu*, 12-15.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 17.

⁸² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 286. 29 May 1647.

CHAPER NINE

Under such conditions, the pepper trade could be pursued without a hitch and this boosted the price of pepper in Taiwan. The boom did not last. A steep decline set in at the beginning of September when Cheng Ts'ai launched an attack on Fu-chou which was located along the main trade corridor connecting Chê-chiang with Chiang-hsi provinces. Coxinga also attacked Ch'üan-chou and Hai-ch'êng during the same period but he was not able to take a single district until the beginning of the following year.

All other commodities shipped to Taiwan by the Dutch, such as lead, cloves, myrrh, amber, wax, camphor and sappanwood, were sold out by the end of the year.⁸³ The VOC ships generally purchased pepper in Jambi and Palembang in the island of Sumatra at a price of 10 rials per picul, and sold it for almost double that price in Taiwan. About 70 per cent (109,643 guilders) of the pure profit earned by the Dutch in Taiwan in that year (155,655 guilders) came from the sales of pepper.⁸⁴

In 1648, heavily overshadowed by the civil war in China, the trade situation in Portuguese Macao was still gloomy. Informed of what was happening in China, Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia believed that this was the reason the Taiwan trade had risen:

*'The longer the war in China continues, the more the trade in Macao declines. They [the Portuguese] have received very few provisions and commodities this year. Therefore the Company commodities have enjoyed a better market in Taiwan.'*⁸⁵

It is true that with the exception of gold hardly any of the Chinese goods for which orders had been placed reached Taiwan, but most of the tropical commodities the VOC had shipped from the Indonesian Archipelago to Taiwan were sold to Chinese merchants at a high price.

⁸³ Generale Missive, 31 Dec 1647, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 248.

⁸⁴ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 328. 31 Dec. 1647.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 343. 18 Jan. 1649.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

Table 9-3: The profits of some tropical commodities sold in Taiwan in 1648

	Purchased Price per picul in rial	Sold price per picul in rial	Profits
Lead	(f.) 5.5	(f.)11	100%
Sappanwood	(f.) 3	10	800%
	1.25	10 1/2	
Tin		11	
	15	30 1/2	203%
		31	
Nutmeg		31 1/2	
	2 7/16	33	1,358%
		34	
Wax		40	
	20	35	150%
Pepper	10	19	190%
		20	
		20 1/4	
		20 5/8	
		20 3/4	
		20 7/8	
		21	
		21 1/2	
		22 3/4	227.5%
	Sandalwood	15	25
		26	
		27	
		30	
		31	
		36	
		37	
Coconuts oil (per jar)	(f.3)	16	251%
	1.25	17	1,280%

Source: Missive van Pieter Anonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 2 Nov. 1648, VOC 1170, Fo. 567^r-569^r. (f) means it is counted in guilders.

In total 1,645,982 catties (= 882.91*lasts*) of pepper were carried to Taiwan in

CHAPER NINE

1649, which amounted to 40 per cent of the value of the cargo of the fifteen VOC ships dispatched to Taiwan from Batavia and Siam.⁸⁶ Most of these commodities were exchanged for Chinese gold.⁸⁷

The Re-organization of the Min-nan monopoly on Chinese overseas trade under Coxinga

In the summer of 1649, the export of new silk from Fu-chien province to Japan picked up again for a number of reasons: some of the Manchu generals in Kuang-tung and Chiang-hsi rebelled thereby moving the battlefields of the civil war farther inland and, as a consequence, the export of Nanking silk was forbidden by the Manchu coastal defence troops. In July, one junk belonging to Coxinga and two junks the property of Iquan arrived in Japan.⁸⁸ In the meantime there had been signs that An-hai merchants were expanding their trade with Quinam and Cambodia. The Dutch Chief Merchant in Nagasaki reported that thirteen Chinese junks had suddenly brought large quantities of deerskins to Japan from these two countries:

*'We are unable to say whether the Company will make large profits on its Siamese wares, because so many goods have been brought by thirteen Chinese junks (all very large vessels) from our enemies, Cambodia and Quinam. This not only thwarts our trade in Japan, it is also a daily undermining of the Company profit by the treacherous grandees in this country.'*⁸⁹

As long as it was at war with Quinam, the VOC did its best to intercept

⁸⁶ Generale Missive, 31 Dec. 1649, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 261.

⁸⁷ Ibidem, 263.

⁸⁸ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 355. 23; 26 July 1649.

⁸⁹ NFJ 282, Missive van Dircq Snoucq naer Taijouan aen de heer Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater, Japan, 24 Oct. 1649, not foliated.

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

all junk shipping from there, but to little avail.⁹⁰ Apart from that, the Fu-chien merchants were now also the only corridor through which the Siamese King could run his crown trade with China. Because the Manchu troops were marching towards Kuang-tung at the end of 1649 and again laid a siege to Kuang-chou in March 1650, the Siamese crown trade with that city was severely impeded. Seizing the opportunity created by this situation, the An-hai merchant fitted out ten junks to visit Siam right away.⁹¹ The siege of Kuang-chou also seriously obstructed the trade of Macao. This is what a Portuguese merchant, Francisco Bravo, who arrived in Malacca from Macao had to say about it:

*'He told us how the Manchus had taken Kuang-chou by force in December last year (1650) after a nine-month siege. They forced the inhabitants of the city to the sea shore and massacred most of them. ...Once Kuang-hsi province shall be conquered too, the whole of China will be under Manchu domination. Furthermore, he told us that the Portuguese situation in Macao is critical as no business is being conducted in the city because of the turmoil created by the war. But now Kuang-chou has surrendered to the Manchus, they[the Macauese] are hoping that the commerce will recover in the coming year.'*⁹²

The Fu-chienese merchants not only spoiled the Company trade in Japan because of their importation of large cargoes of deerskins,⁹³ their competition was felt elsewhere by the Dutch. Because An-hai merchants had

⁹⁰ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 351. 18 Jan. 1649. The VOC had also established a factory in Cambodia in 1636-1644, and in Quinam in 1634-1639. But it later withdrew from both places and began to carry out frequent patrols.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, 448. 20 Jan. 1651.

⁹² VOC 1187, *Missiven* [aen haer Eds.gouverneur generael Carel Rijniersz te Batavia] [door Joan Thijssen, Joan Verpoorten en Jan Willemse], Malacca, 26 Jan. 1651, fos. 794^v-795r.

⁹³ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 448. 20 Jan. 1651.

CHAPER NINE

dispatched two junks to Ligor to purchase pepper and tin, a Dutch ship which arrived slightly later was unable to purchase sufficient amounts of these commodities.⁹⁴ Not surprisingly, the sale of pepper and other tropical condiments fell short of expectations in Taiwan in 1650.⁹⁵

Apparently the An-hai merchants were able to capture the bulk of the Chinese foreign trade thanks to the maritime ban in force in Chê-chiang and the siege of Kuang-chou. The only Chinese harbour left which could offer a safe anchorage to the largest trade-junks plying the Siamese route was Amoy. If the An-hai merchants wished to preserve and enlarge their trade, the security of Amoy harbour was the prize. Therefore the local garrisons were assigned a key role in their project. In his memoirs, Juan Min-hsi recounts that Coxinga's commercial agent and naval commander, Cheng Chih-wan, quarrelled with the regional commanders of the garrison troops in Amoy and Quemoy, Iquan's nephews Cheng Ts'ai and Cheng Lien, over the question of the control of the foreign trade based in Amoy Harbour.⁹⁶ In May 1650, Governor Nicolas Verburgh of Taiwan received complaints from An-hai merchants, who accused Cheng Lien (alias *Salackia* [D.]) of dispatching an officer to the Pescadores to levy a tax on all the junks there, especially those bound for Taiwan.⁹⁷ Cheng Lien later offered Verburgh his excuses,

⁹⁴ VOC 1175, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijssen aen de Ed. heer gouverneur generael [Carel Rijniersz] ende heeren raaden van India, Malacca, 26 Nov. 1650, fo. 389^r.

⁹⁵ Generale Missive, 20 Jan. 1651, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 274.

⁹⁶ P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 20. 'In Amoy, Cheng T'sai and Cheng Lien had a conflict with Cheng Chih-peng... 'I assume that 'Cheng Chih-peng' refers to Cheng Chih-wan who was also fourth in Command of the Naval Force (*Shui-shih Ssu-chên*) under Coxinga and responsible for the rice import to Amoy from Chao-chou. Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 5.

⁹⁷ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 127. 8 May 1650. In the letter sent by Salackja to Nicolas Verburgh, 2 July 1650, the signature '*Teibing, Thunbingh, Tseij-souw Tingwanhouw*' refers to Cheng Lian's official title and noble rank

THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650

explaining that he would issue passes to the Taiwan-bound junks and that no junk would suffer any harassment in the future. He explained that he needed to collect taxes from the local fishermen who were under his jurisdiction at Amoy. He could use these funds to offer some financial aid to the Ming Emperor Yung-li:

'It is said that the cousin of our late Emperor has re-conquered the province of Kuang-tung from the Manchus. He requires all the support he can get in order to wreak even more havoc on the Manchus, who to our great sorrow have captured our illustrious country....I have decided to support him with well- equipped troops and junks. We are short of money to pay the many expenses, hence I must levy an annual tax for the Emperor. The inhabitants of the Pescadores are counted the same as other subjects.... Therefore I have sent my men to the Pescadores to collect the annual tax.'

All junks, departing from here bound for that destination must carry a pass issued by me and pay a certain tax. Those who do so are exempt from any further taxes and will not be harassed. All these junks will not be required to pay any other tax, not even as much as a single straw. I have forbidden my inferiors to demand any such on pain of death, I shall never allow such abuses to occur.⁹⁸

Since Cheng Lien had the authority to control all Amoy junks, including the right to issue passes and levy taxes, the An-hai merchants must have been afraid that they might be arbitrarily supplanted by some other merchants who pleased Cheng Lien more. They felt someone should take

'Ta-ming tsung-ping t'ai-shih ting-yüen-hou' [The Ming Regional Commander, Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent, the Marquis-Pacifier of the Far Frontier]. Hence it is evident that 'Sablackja' is another of Cheng Lian's names.

⁹⁸ VOC 1176, Translaat missive door de groot mandorijn Sablacja uijt Emoij aen den gouverneur Nicolaes Verburch geschreven [Translated Letter Written by the Great Mandarin Sablacja to the Governor of Taiwan Nicolaes Verburch from Amoy], Amoy, 2 July 1650, fo. 877^f.

CHAPER NINE

action to prevent the realization of this nightmare. Therefore, after the junks sailing to Siam and Ligor had returned to Amoy in the summer of 1650, the An-hai merchants persuaded Coxinga to seize control of Amoy. On 10 September 1650, Coxinga returned to Amoy from Chieh-yang, under the pretence of escorting a convoy of rice junks. He murdered Cheng Lien by a treacherous ruse and incorporated his cousin's troop into his own army.⁹⁹ Soon afterwards a richly laden junk belonging to Coxinga departed from Amoy setting course for Nagasaki, where it duly arrived on 18 October 1650. A formidable trading power was in the making. Possession of a naval force, the facilities offered by the deep-water harbour in Amoy and the rich trading capital of the An-hai merchants were now combined under one leader: Coxinga.

⁹⁹ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 9; P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 20.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

CHAPTER TEN

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM

TRANSFORMED INTO A POLITICAL PROJECT

1650-1654

The Renewed Struggle for the Monopoly on the Export of Silk

In September 1650, Coxinga murdered his courtesy-cousin, Cheng Lien, and seized control of Amoy and its garrison troops, while the victim's elder brother, Cheng Ts'ai, was still busy patrolling the coast of northern Fu-chien. Of the 963 piculs of raw silk exported to Japan that year, at least 50.4 per cent (485.5 piculs) was shipped from An-hai and Chang-chou, 7 per cent came from Nanking and Chou-shan and 16.7 per cent from Fu-chou.¹ Obviously Prince Lu on Chou-shan and Cheng Ts'ai in Fu-chou were still managing to produce about 22.7 per cent of the Chinese raw silk export in 1650. Shortly

¹ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 423. 10 Dec. 1650, mentions that 963 piculs of raw silk from China, including An-hai and Fu-chou, were exported to Japan. The amounts of raw silk imported into Japan were respectively, 138.5 piculs from An-hai, 347 piculs from Chang-chou, 160.7 piculs from Fu-chou, 59.7 from Chou-shan, and 7.5 from Nanking, figures taken from the cargo manifests of the junks. Yoko Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637-1833: fukugen tōsen kamotsu aratamechō, kihan nimotsu kaiwatashichō*[Overview of Commodities Imported into and Exported from Japan on Chinese Junks 1637-1833], (Tokyo, Sōbunsha: 1987), 42-8. The Dutch sources also give the total amount of raw silk imported to Japan in 1650, including that exported from Southeast Asia as 1081.2 piculs. *Ibid.*, 336. If the total of 963 piculs refers only to An-hai and Fu-chou exports, the export from there could have made up 90 per cent of the Chinese raw silk exports to Japan that year. Because the numbers in the total amounts do not tally with the sum given on the particular list, what the above figures really mean still need to be investigated in more detail.

CHAPTER TEN

afterwards, in March or April 1651 followers of Prince Lu defeated Cheng Ts'ai's fleet at sea off the Fu-chien-Chê-chiang border.² Cheng Ts'ai's power was seriously diminished as a consequence of this defeat but, despite his victory, Prince Lu did not manage to carve out a better niche in this trade for himself. Nature also put her oar in. Owing to a persistent drought the following summer, a famine which undermined the export network based on the support of the Nanking (Chiang-su) and Chê-chiang merchants held Chê-chiang province in its grip.³ The Manchu coastal defence troops gladly seized this opportunity it offered and, in the second half of September 1651, managed to defeat the main fleet stationed off Chou-shan and thereafter occupied the archipelago.⁴ In February 1652, the remaining ships of the defeated Chou-shan fleet sailed to Amoy where they submitted to Coxinga.⁵ Prince Lu had fled with his fleet leaving his court on Chou-shan in a state of total collapse.⁶ Some of Cheng Ts'ai's fleet chose for the other side and surrendered to Manchus after the Battle of Chou-shan.⁷ One of his naval commanders, Chang Yün-fei, was assigned to the newly established coastal defence force. Before he went over to Cheng Ts'ai's camp, Chang had been part of the Manchu garrison troops in Fu-chou.⁸ Consequently, after his

² Sung, *Tsun-jang lüeh*, 201.

³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 17. 18 June 1651.

⁴ Sung, *Tsun-jang lüeh*, 203.

⁵ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 20.

⁶ Sung, *Tsun-jang lüeh*, 203.

⁷ Ch'ên Chin, 'Wei hsü-ch'ên chui-ch'ao pu-k'ou ch'ing-hsing chi chao-fu liu-wang an-ch'a chou-shan shan-hou chi-i yang-ch'i shêng-chien shih [Orders from the Emperor to Pacify Pirates in the Chou-shan Archipelago and Arrange the Settlement of Refugees] 23 Nov. 1651', in TWSL (ed.), *Ming-ch'ing t'ai-wan tang-an hui-pien*, II 1645-1653, 354.

⁸ Ch'ên Chin, 'Chê-min tsung-tu ch'ên-chin ts'an chieh-t'ieh [Remaining Part of a Letter from Governor Chê-chiang and the Fu-chien Ch'ên Chin] 31 Mar. 1649', in TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*[The Second Compilation of Historical Documents referring to the Cheng Family], TW no. 168, 26.

FU-CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

return he was re-appointed to his old position and was once again able to take control of the Fu-chou raw silk export.

Considering that the negotiations between the Manchu authorities and Iquan had been interrupted since 1648, the relationship of the An-hai merchants with their northern neighbours in Fu-chou and Ch'üan-chou under the domination of the Manchus should also have been suspended since that year. Obviously they paid little heed to this and, according to the Dutch sources, before October 1654 the An-hai merchants carrying passes issued by Iquan were still allowed to trade in all the territories under Manchu control.⁹ The junks which sailed to Japan were sometimes even listed under Iquan's name, although his stepmother, Madam Huang, and his younger brother, Cheng Chih-pao, were the true owners. When Coxinga seized the fleet of Cheng Lien whom he had murdered, he had probably been incited to take this step by his step-grandmother and uncle.¹⁰ In December 1650 or January 1651, Coxinga led the newly recruited, well-trained and experienced naval force southwards, claiming he was on a mission to rescue Ming troops who were still holding out in the siege of Kuang-chou by the Manchus.¹¹

In fact, there was an even more urgent mission. Since Manchu troops had already penetrated into Kuang-tung and Ch'ao-chou had announced that it was prepared to surrender to the Manchus, the defence of the southern territory already conquered by Cheng Hung-k'uei and Coxinga had top priority. Thinking out his strategy carefully, Coxinga resorted to conservative measures and kept his troops in the border area between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung with the idea of preventing the Manchu troops from penetrating

⁹ NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Winninx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, Taiwan, fo.1.

¹⁰ Both of them contributed their trade revenues to Coxinga directly after the incident.

¹¹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 13.

CHAPTER TEN

into Fu-chien.¹² His fleet lay anchored off the border area for five months. Rather than launch an outright assault, he opted to collect rice from the eastern part of Kuang-tung province as he had done in previous years rather than to speed to the rescue of Kuang-chou city.

Unperturbed by these military excursions, the An-hai merchants continued to run their trade as usual, which enabled the Dutch in Taiwan to ship about 600,000 guilders' worth of Chinese gold to Coromandel at the end of 1650. Although this was a large amount, it was only about 52 per cent of what Batavia had ordered.¹³ Coxinga's expedition to Kuang-tung did not throw up any obstacles to impede this trade. In other words, the trade between An-hai and the northern parts under Manchu rule was still permitted. Since the An-hai merchants had made the pretence of having submitted to the Manchu regime, which is why they had been granted this trade, the Manchu authorities even used them to transport their troops to Amoy during Coxinga's absence. On 20 April 1651, the Regional Commander of the newly arrived Manchu Ch'üan-chou Garrison Troops, Ma Te-kung, was ordered to mount a raid on Amoy by Grand Co-ordinator, Chang Hsüeh-sheng. This was to be done under the guise of levying taxes from his 'subjects'.¹⁴ Therefore, the Manchu Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch'üan-chou Prefectures, Huang Shu, ordered the leader of the An-hai merchants, Iquan's younger brother Cheng Chih-pao, to arrange the junks for transportation,

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen [gouverneur generael]Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 20 Dec. 1650, fos. 542-3. The estimate should also include the orders for silver from different factories, therefore it is only a approximation.

¹⁴ Wang Ying-yuan, 'Wang ying yüen t'i-wei sha-mên têng-ti tê-shih ch'ing-hsing pên [Report by Wang Ying-yüen about the Situation around Amoy] 12 Feb. 1653', in CKTI(ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, I no.6, 6.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

while he held Iquan hostage.¹⁵ Just one day before Regional Commander Ma arrived in Amoy, he was still fighting against Coxinga's garrison in Liu-wu-tien. Finally forced to meet the Manchu troops face to face, the Amoy, Garrison Commander, Cheng Chih-wan, deserted his post and most of the garrison and the inhabitants fled away on ships.¹⁶ Hence, the Manchu troops landed without meeting any resistance and in the days following 20 April furiously plundered Amoy.¹⁷ Upon hearing this news, Cheng Hung-k'uei rushed his fleet from Quemoy to blockade Amoy three days later but Regional Commander Ma threatened to kill his mother whom he had taken hostage in An-hai and, holding this over his head, forced him to arrange the transportation of the Manchu troops back to Ch'üan-chou on 16 May 1651.¹⁸ Two days later, Coxinga rushed his fleet back to Amoy after receiving an urgent call for assistance from Cheng Hung-k'uei.¹⁹ The Dutch in Taiwan were also informed about this incident:

*'We certainly knew that, having levied tax from almost everywhere around the coastal areas, the Manchus conquered Amoy city last April and seized loads of booty. But [soon afterwards] they were expelled [again] by Coxinga, the son of Great Mandarin Iquan . He is now residing there and employing as much violence as the Manchus did on his own subjects as he forces An-hai under his control.'*²⁰

¹⁵ Pa Hana, 'Pa-ha-na têng t'i wei lieh-fu ch'ing-t'an ch'i-hsin sha-mên têng-ti shih-hsien shih-pên [Accusation Written by Pa Ha-na about How the Corrupt Grand Co-ordinator Caused the War and the [Subsequent] Loss of Amoy], 6 Nov. 1653', in CKTI(ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, I no 6, 28; Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 16-7.

¹⁶ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 10-11.

¹⁷ Pa, 'Pa-ha-na têng t'i wei lieh-fu ch'ing-t'an ch'i-hsin sha-mên têng-ti shih-hsien shih-pên, 6 Nov. 1653', 6.

¹⁸ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 10.

¹⁹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 16.

²⁰ VOC 1183, Missive van Neolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz,

CHAPTER TEN

Cheng Chih-wan was sentenced to death and beheaded by Coxinga on 28 May 1651.²¹ Coxinga raided several enemy camps around the shores of Ch'üan-chou Bay on 22 June, an action which finally gave him control of An-hai. Since the Manchu troops had plundered several tens of thousands piculs of rice from Amoy, Coxinga had to take this booty back by force. He landed in Hai-ch'êng in July but not long after withdrew to Amoy from where he launched another raid on T'ung-an in December 1651.²² He engaged the Manchu garrisons in both Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou, and cleared an area into which the Manchu force was unable to make a break-through. While Coxinga was engaged in waging this war from February to August 1651, the An-hai merchants did not dare to do any business. The Dutch in Taiwan received no more than 200,000 guilders in Chinese gold during these seven months, far less than they had expected.²³ In a breathing space between these two expeditions, Coxinga had returned to Amoy for a short while to reward his army. The An-hai merchants (who should have been moved to Amoy by Coxinga) brought another 72,000 guilders' worth of Chinese gold from An-hai and Amoy to Taiwan on 8 November.²⁴ For their return cargoes, they purchased 1,518.6 piculs of pepper, sold at 14¼ rials per picul during the same month, 56,264 guilders in all.²⁵ As they purchased hardly any other goods, the remaining 15,736

Taiwan, 25 Oct. 1651, fo. 888^r.

²¹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 18.

²² *Ibidem*, 20.

²³ VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 25 Oct. 1651, fo. 867^v.

²⁴ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III:1648-1655, 284. 8 Nov. 1651; VOC 1194, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 16 Dec. 1651, fo. 51^r. The letter recorded that 272,000 guilders' worth of gold would be sent to Coromandel. Since an earlier letter mentions that they collected fewer than 200,000 guilders between February and August 1651, they must have gathered more than 72,000 guilders between November and December.

²⁵ VOC 1183, Missive van den commissaris Willem Verstegen naer Batavia aen den

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

guilders was probably paid by the Dutch in silver.

As mentioned earlier, Kuang-chou lay under the Manchu siege from 7 March to 24 November 1650. When it was finally taken by the Manchu troops, about 40,000 citizens were either expelled from the city or killed.²⁶ The Portuguese in Macao delivered their letter of surrender to the Manchu commander, the Ching-nan Viceroy, Keng Ching-chung, on 20 December 1650, to which he replied in a formal letter on 31 January 1651.²⁷ After enduring three years of serious troubles (1648-1650), the Kuang-tung-Macao business gradually began to bounce back. Perhaps this change of fortune also explains why the gold exports declined to only 46 per cent since the end of 1651, compared with the previous year when Kuang-chou was still under siege. Nevertheless, the same low level still persisted the following year 1652, when three Portuguese vessels brought sandalwood and pepper from

gouverneur generael Carel Reniers [Letter from Commissioner Willem Verstegen to Governor-General Carel Reniers in Batavia], Taiwan, 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 842^v; 151.4 piculs were sold between May and October; VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1651, fo. 514^v. 1,670 piculs were sold at 14¼ rials per picul. Therefore 21,640 rials of pepper had been sold in all.

²⁶ Lin Tzu-hsiung, 'Ch'ing-ch'u liang-fan kung-chan kuang-chou shih-shih t'an-wei [An Examination of How the Two Viceroys Occupied Kuang-chou]', *Ling-nan wên-shih* [Literature and History of the Regions South of the Wu-ling Hills], no. 3, (1996), 8-11.

²⁷ Ch'ên Wên-yüen, 'Nan-ming yung-li chêng-ch'üan yü ao-mên [The Yongli Regime of the Southern Ming Dynasty and Macao]', *Chi-nan hsüeh-pao* [Journal of Jinan University], 22:6 (2000), 61-5 at 64; VOC 1184, Missive uijt Tonquin [bij Jacob Keijser] aen den gouverneur generaal Carel Reijniersz. ende raden van India, Tonkin, 8 Aug 1651, fos. 46^{r-v}; Li Ch'i-fêng, 'Kuang-tung Li-ch'i-fêng t'i-pao ao-mên i- mu ch'êng-wên t'ou-ch'êng ch'i-ch'ing i-shih têng ch'ing-pên [Report by the Grand Co-ordinator of Kuang-tung, Li Ch'i-fêng, about the Submission of the Portuguese in Macao] 2 Apr. 1651', in CKTI (et al. eds), *Ming-ch'ing shih-ch'i ao-mên wên-t'i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien*, I, 23-4.

CHAPTER TEN

Makassar back to Macao, thereby offering China an alternative source of tropical goods over and above those which the Dutch in Taiwan had to sell.²⁸

Although Coxinga was not able to rescue the resistance fighters in Kuang-chou his naval commander, Lin Ch'a, had been active on the Kuang-tung coast. The local gazette of Tien-pai District records that Lin Ch'a occupied Tien-pai, which is situated not far from Kao-chou, in late August 1650.²⁹ Following hard on the heels of this development, a junk from Kao-chou arrived in Nagasaki on 3 September 1650.³⁰ The leader of the resistance in Kuang-chou, Tu Yung-he, did not surrender to the Manchus when the city was overrun but sailed to Hai-nan Island before he finally surrendered to the Manchu Viceroy, Keng, in October 1651. Even when he was holding out in Hai-nan, he still managed to play a role in Kao-chou trade. No fewer than three junks sailed from Kao-chou to Japan under his aegis.³¹ One of these belonged to Coxinga, evidence that he was still actively participating in the Kuang-tung trade even while he was fighting the Manchus in Fu-chien.³²

As the Chê-chiang resistance gradually fell to pieces in 1651, the Manchu coastal defence troops steadily gained control of the coasts of Chê-chiang and northern Fu-chien, Kuang-tung also fell into their laps. Despite their steady encroachment, the Dutch records show that 937¾ piculs of raw silk were exported to Japan by Chinese junks in 1651, almost equal to

²⁸ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Mar. 1657, fo. 15^v; VOC 1197, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen den gouvernuer generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 29 Dec 1652, Fo. 769^f; *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 658. 31 Jan 1653.

²⁹ Hsiang Tou-nan, *Tien-pai hsien-chih* [Local Gazette of Tien-pai District], in the Palace Museum Committee (ed.) (here after cited as PM), KKCP no. 183, 330. The precise rank and title of Lin Ch'a has yet not been identified.

³⁰ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 47.

³¹ Shao, *His-nan chi-shih*, 94.

³² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XI 1641-1650, 17. 4 Aug 1651; . 19-20; 7 Aug. 1651.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

the amount of the previous year.³³ Although junks departed from different places along the China coast in the summer of 1651 and were sailing for different parties, by the time they returned from Japan at the beginning of 1652 Amoy was the only harbour left open along the whole coast of China. Besides the resurgence in the Japan trade, the commerce between An-hai and Manila was also resumed. After the Dutch Republic and Spain concluded the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the Dutch were deprived of their legal basis to mount patrols and stop Chinese junks sailing to Manila. This was a lucky break for two junks owned by Cheng Chih-wan (*Chao-ming-yeh*[C.], *Sammia*[D.], which means the Honourable 'Marquess of Chao-ming') which could bring wax, sugar, venison, deerskins and rice to An-hai from Manila in 1651.³⁴ The following year, 1652, the An-hai merchants brought about 300 piculs of raw silk to Manila at 350 rials per picul.³⁵ Manchu coastal defence fleet challenged the supremacy of the Amoy fleet after they apprehended the blooming commercial development in Amoy. In April 1652, Chang Yün-fei led a Manchu naval force from Ch'üan-chou for the specific purpose of attacking Coxinga's Amoy fleet, but he was defeated two months later.³⁶ This is one clue which indicates that Coxinga's naval force was gradually gaining the advantage on the Fu-chou coast and had been able to impound one junk which had returned from Japan in December of 1652.³⁷

After the Manchu troops garrisoned in Hai-ch'êng city had surrendered on 11 March 1652, from his headquarters on the coast, Coxinga pushed the frontier 30 kilometres inland through Chang-tai district. On 20 April 1652, outside Chang-tai he won a victory over the Manchu troops from Fu-chou led

³³ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 542. 19 Dec. 1651.

³⁴ VOC 1183, Missive van den commissaris Willem Verstegen naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 841^v.

³⁵ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 658. 31 Jan. 1653.

³⁶ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 22, 25.

³⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 101. 14 Feb. 1653.

CHAPTER TEN

by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Ch'ên Chin.³⁸ Coxinga now laid a siege to Chang-chou which lay even farther inland and this siege lasted from May to the end of October, when Manchu reinforcement troops arrived. This time the Emperor had dispatched native-born Manchu tribal troops from Nanking and Chê-chiang.³⁹ When the two armies clashed on the 1 November 1652, Coxinga lost the battle and had to retreat to Hai-ch'êng.⁴⁰

Although defeated, Coxinga's troops had no worries about food supplies because the towns in the area between Chang-chou and Ch'ao-chou had all been under his control just before the siege of Chang-chou began. Coxinga's personal authority had expanded by the expedient of unleashing several waves of raids on the area and he had succeeded in building up a centralized military establishment. Clearly the struggle fought out along the Chinese coast had contributed to his financial base in Amoy and the An-hai merchants had been steadily able to extend their grip on foreign trade, with the exception of the Portuguese in Macao.

Expansion of the 'Western Ocean' Trade in China and Japan

Even before Coxinga had gained control of Amoy, An-hai merchants were engaged in fitting out some of the ten Chinese junks which eventually arrived in Siam in 1650.⁴¹ They sailed just at the point at which the Manchus began to lay siege to Kuang-chou city. In Siam large amounts of tropical

³⁸ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 27.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, 28-31.

⁴⁰ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 32.

⁴¹ VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 547^v; NFJ 284, Missive in dato 4en Julij anno 1650 aen 'd Edle Hr Gouverneur Generael Cornelis vander Lijn ende d'E Hrn Raden van India ter rheedde voor Siam door Pieter Sterthenius int schip de Vrede, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 3^f. Although it records that the Chinese junks came from different areas, some of junks must have come from China itself.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

merchandise including sapanwood, *borijborij* uncton⁴², thin, lead, saltpetre, Cambodia nuts, black lacquer (*namrack*), rice, cow hides, buffalo horns, rattan, deerskins in various sizes, sugar and pepper were purchased.⁴³ The appearance on the scene of these junks threw a spanner in the works of the Dutch merchants who were consequently not able to purchase their planned quantities of rayskins (*rochvellen*), buffalo horns, Patani rattan, wax and tin. Their records reveal that large-scale purchases by the Chinese pushed prices up, even exhausting the supply of some commodities.⁴⁴

In 1646 the VOC had been granted the monopoly on the export of deerskins from Siam.⁴⁵ Since the Chinese usually fetched their export deerskins not from Siam but from Quinam or Cambodia, there had never been any real reason to enforce the monopoly right but, just as these ten Chinese junks were on the point of departure, the local Dutch merchants urged the Siamese officials to do their duty and examine the Chinese junks to see whether they had infringed on Dutch privileges. The Siamese officials did indeed confiscate 551 pieces of cow hide, but soon after returned all these to the Chinese by the order of the *Okya Sombatthiban* (an official at the Royal Treasury).⁴⁶ The merchant reported to Batavia:

⁴² A concoction of coconut and sandelwood oil and crocus.

⁴³ VOC 1175, Missiven uijt Judia aan de Ed. heer Carel Reniersen gouverneur generael ende d'Ed. heeren raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 13 Oct. 1650, fo. 530^f.

⁴⁴ NFJ 284, Missive in dato 4en Julij anno 1650 aen d'Edle Hr Gouverneur Generael Cornelis vander Lijn ende d'E Hr Raden van India ter rheede voor Siam door opperhoofd Pieter Sterthenius int schip de Vrede, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo.1^r. These commodities were rayskins, buffalo horns, and Patani rattan.

⁴⁵ Smith, George Vinal, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand*, (Northern Illinois, Northern Illinois University:1977), 60-1. According to Smith, the Company had been trying to compete with Chinese merchants in the China trade since 1635, but it had been being forced to retreat from the China market (via Taiwan) since 1643.

⁴⁶ Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand*, 180.

CHAPTER TEN

*'We believe that all this came about because of the gifts the Chinese had given him. Despite the privileges granted us by the Siamese king, if the Chinese can make a great profit from the cow hides and deerskins and give presents to the grandees, these privileges will not be worth the paper they are written on. Furthermore, although we were allowed to carry out an investigation at Camon Bantenaauw, what would happen if they shipped illegal deerskins and cow hides from Bantienpia on Pegu vessels? Or after they [the ships] had been examined were to pick skins and hides up at Camon on some other day as happened this year? We were informed that one-quarter of the cargo holds of some junks had been reserved for stowing deerskins and cow hides downstream.'*⁴⁷

Besides the ten Chinese junks which visited Ayutthaya that year, another two Chinese junks visited Ligor, where they purchased a huge amount of tin. After the Chinese had left, the VOC merchants realized that they could not possibly fulfill the order from Batavia because not enough tin was left.⁴⁸ Information gathered in Ayutthaya led the Dutch to believe that six Chinese junks were planning to sail directly to Japan from Siam.⁴⁹ The VOC records in Nagasaki of 1650 do indeed show that six junks carrying animal skins arrived in Japan, four from Quinam and two Cambodia.⁵⁰ Apparently they were the six junks which visited Siam. They had put in at

⁴⁷ VOC 1175, Missiven uijt Judia aan de Ed. heer Carel Reniersen gouverneur generael ende d'Ed. heeren raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 13 Oct. 1650, fo. 530^r.

⁴⁸ VOC 1175, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijssen aen de Ed. heer gouverneur generael[Carel Reniersen] ende heeren raaden van India, Malacca, 26 Nov. 1650, Fo. 385^r.

⁴⁹ VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 547^v.

⁵⁰ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 46-7. The Quinam junks arrived on 13, 20 and 23 August and 2 September 1650. The Cambodia junks arrived on 17 August and 4 September 1650.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

Quinam and Cambodia first before heading for Japan.

The competition between Chinese and Dutch merchants to offer tropical commodities on the Japanese market began in real earnest in 1649, when thirteen Chinese junks from Quinam and Cambodia arrived in Nagasaki carrying what were basically the same goods as those the VOC imported from Siam.⁵¹ The Dutch had also captured two Chinese junks in the Bay of Saint Jacques (*Vũng Tâu*[V.]) near the Mekong estuary in September of 1649.⁵² The Chief of the Deshima Factory, Dircq Snoecq, did his best to put his finger on the attitude adopted by the Japanese authorities to this action. He received the reply from the Nagasaki Governor stating that:

'As long as it happened outside Japanese territory, the Dutch can do what they think best' ⁵³

Snoecq therefore wrote a letter to Governor Overwater in Taiwan asking him to fit out some armed junks which could reinforce the patrols in Cambodian waters.⁵⁴ Most of the Dutch ships sailing along the Siam-Japan or Malacca-Japan corridors anchored at Pulo Candor (Côn Son Island) to take on fresh supplies of food and water. From Pulo Candor they could easily mount patrols in the vicinity of St Jacques Bay. Since Quinam and Cambodia were still at war with the Dutch at this period and as the routes taken by the Chinese junks and the VOC vessels overlapped, the latter frequently captured Chinese junks in this bay.

⁵¹ NFJ 282, [Missive aan gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn op Batavia]uit Japan van Dircq Snoecq int Comptoir Nagasackij, Japan, 29 Oct. 1649, no foliated. The head page of this document is missing, but its contents indicate it was a letter sent to Batavia.

⁵² VOC 1180, Missive uijt Taijouan aen seigneur Jan van Muijden opperhoofd van 's Comps. negotie in Siam, Taiwan, 30 Sept. 1649, fo. 602^f.

⁵³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 357. 8 Aug. 1649.

⁵⁴ NFJ 282, [Missive aan gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn op Batavia]uit Japan van Dircq Snoecq int Comptoir Nagasackij, Japan, 29 Oct. 1649, no foliated.

CHAPTER TEN

After the six large junks arrived in Nagasaki, the Chinese captains realized that there was a good chance that the Dutch might intercept them in Cambodian waters in the vicinity of the Mekong estuary on their return voyage. In an effort to take precautions before they left Japan in the winter of 1650, the captains of the four Quinam junks asked the Dutch Chief of Deshima, Pieter Sterhemius, to issue them with four passes and Prince's flags (VOC flag). He refused their request but did give them a promise that no junks returning to Quinam would be attacked.⁵⁵ The Chinese merchants also appealed to the Nagasaki Governor for protection. The VOC records reveal that the petitions of the Chinese captains might even have reached the Shogun's court.⁵⁶ The Governor of Taiwan, Nicolaes Verburgh, was informed by his colleagues in Japan that the Japanese had announced that 'no more Cambodian junks bound for Japan should be captured or harassed by the Dutch.'⁵⁷

Six Chinese junks visited Siam in the spring of 1651.⁵⁸ Once again, notwithstanding the Dutch monopoly, the Chinese entered into open competition with the Dutch merchants in the purchase of skins and hides. Again the VOC factory in Ayutthaya found itself in the awkward position of not being able to acquire the planned numbers of rayskins and buffalo horns.⁵⁹ In spite of this bold-faced attempt to trespass on the monopoly, Governor-General Carel Reniers in Batavia procrastinated about giving orders to commence patrols as he was afraid of upsetting the susceptibilities

⁵⁵ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 3. 22 Nov. 1650.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, 8. 5 Feb. 1651.

⁵⁷ VOC 1183, Missive van nicolaes Verburch near Batavia aen gouverneur generael Cornelis van der lijn, Taiwan, 20 Dec. 1650, fo. 542^r.

⁵⁸ VOC 1187, Missiven [aen haer Eds. te Batavia] [door Hendrick Creijers en Volckerus Westerwolt], Siam, 20 Oct. 1651, fo. 664^v.

⁵⁹ NFJ 284, Copie Missive door den E Hendrick Craijers oppercoopman en opperhoofd des Comptoirs Siam aen de Hr Pieter Sterthenius president in Japan, Siam, 30 Juni 1651, fo. 51.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

of the Japanese authorities.⁶⁰

Under the protection of the Japanese *Bakufu* and the Siamese grandees, the Chinese merchants succeeded in breaking through the commercial barriers built by the VOC. Four Chinese junks visited Siam in 1652 and again caused difficulties for the Dutch by not leaving them sufficient quantities of cow hides to purchase.⁶¹

In 1653 six Chinese junks visited Siam. Worried about the market in deerskins, Director Volckerus Westerwolt in Siam appealed directly to the King, insisting that the Siamese government should honour the Dutch monopoly on the export of deerskins. He visited the *Oya Phrakhlang* (Minister of Foreign Affairs) several times and informed him that he had seen with his own eyes that the Chinese junks did carry away deerskins. The *Phrakhlang* went to appeal to the King, taking with him the royal charter, and advised his royal master to allow the Dutch to examine those junks. When the six Chinese junks left the capital Ayutthaya and sailed downstream along the Chao-phraya River, the Dutch Director and the *Phrakhlang* immediately sought the King's permission to carry out an examination. However, the King always managed to avoid tackling this subject, by announcing that he was not in the mood to deal with it.

On 20 May, the Dutch merchants went to the check point *Canon Batenauw* to see whether the Chinese junks had been detained by the Siamese officials. Obviously the *Phrakhlang* had not taken the Dutch petition

⁶⁰ NFJ 285, Extract uijt de Generale Missive van 'd Ed heeren bewinthebberen, ter vergaderingh van seventhiene binnen amsterdam aen haer Ed op Batavia geschreven, Amsterdam, 14 Oct. 1651, fo. 67. The extract was done by Andries Frisius.

⁶¹ NFJ 285, Copie missive door 't opperhoofd [Henrick Craijers, Volckerues Westerwolt, Jan van Rijck] uijt Siam per deselven Coningh van Poolen en Trouw nae Japan gesonden [Letter from Senior Merchants Henrick Craijers, Volcker Westerwolt [and] Jan van Rijck Sent to Japan on the Ships the *Coningh van Poolen* and the *Trouw*], Siam, 3 July 1652, fos. 75-6.

CHAPTER TEN

seriously because the junks were gone. Aware that this might happen, the Dutch merchant Jan van Rijk had sent a written call for help to the VOC establishment in Malacca. In response, the Governor of Malacca, Balthazar Bort, dispatched the ship *Gecroonde Liefde* on to Siam after she had completed her mission to Ligor. When the ship arrived at the mouth of the Chao-phraya River, the five junks were still at anchor off the coast. Seeing the Dutch ship drop anchor and lower a sloop, the five junks immediately raised anchor and set sail. The Dutch ship was apparently anticipating such a manoeuvre and also set sail. She caught up with three of them on the high seas about 7 to 8 Dutch miles from the shore on 14 July 1653. After having summoned all the *anachodas* on board, the Dutch sailors examined the junks and confiscated 26,366 pieces deerskins from two of them.⁶²

When they arrived in Japan at the end of July 1653, the Chinese merchants lodged a complaint with the *Bakufu*.⁶³ Because the Dutch confiscation had damaged the investments of some Japanese and Siamese courtiers, the Nagasaki Governor demanded the Dutch desist from these actions in the interests of all the parties concerned.⁶⁴ On 10 November, the Merchant of Deshima Frederick Coyet was told that:

'They were not pleased with our account of why we had taken the deerskins from the junks which planned to sail hither from Siam. If we had the sole right to export deerskins from Siam, we should have stopped the purchase there and not harmed the Chinese who had already left that kingdom and were out at sea. We could attack the Quinamese, with whom we were again at war at will. But they ordered us explicitly not to harm in any way the Chinese, our friends, who trade only in these places and supply the

⁶² VOC 1197, Missiven [aen haer Eds. te Batavia [door den raedt te Siam], Siam, 31 Oct. 1653, fo. 497^r-498^v ; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 108. 20 Aug 1653; 114. 28 Sept. 1653.

⁶³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 105. 27 July 1653.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, 112. 21 Sept. 1653.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

*Shogun and his subjects with the silk and calambac they require on their voyages here, in compliance with what Ambassador [Andries] Frisius had promised when he was in Edo, if we want to continue to be welcome in this Empire.*⁶⁵

The Nagasaki officials were seriously concerned about this affair. The Chinese merchants must have also begged the services of the Japanese authorities in an effort to force the Dutch to compensate their losses. Since no records about these matters have been preserved, it is possible that the *Bakufu* turned their request down and chose to maintain neutral.

It seems Coxinga was kept in the dark by his merchants about this dispute. Although the suppression of a Chinese peasant revolt had ended in a bloody massacre in Taiwan in 1652,⁶⁶ he offered shelter to some Dutch sailors who had survived a shipwreck on the Chinese coast and arranged transportation for these survivors to return to either Taiwan or Batavia in that same year.⁶⁷ Towards the end of October 1653, Coxinga and his uncle (Cheng Hung-k'uei or Cheng Chih-pao) wrote separate letters to the Governor of Taiwan Cornelis Ceasar:

‘Containing nothing but compliments and declarations that they

⁶⁵ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 120. 10 Nov. 1653; VOC 1197, Letter from Japan to Taiwan, Japan, 12 Nov. 1653, fo. 820^{r-v}.

⁶⁶ A thorough study of this rebellion has been written see: Tonio Andrade, ‘Chapter 8, The Only Bees on Formosa That Give Honey’, in id., *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*, (New York, Columbia University Press: 2008), <http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/print.html>; Johannes Huber, ‘Chinese Settlers Against the Dutch East India Company: The Rebellion led by Kuo Huai-I on Taiwan in 1652’, in *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries*, Eduard. B. Vermeer ed., (Leien: E. J. Brill, 1990), 265-96.

⁶⁷ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1653, 1-15. 3 Feb.1653; Johannes Huber, ‘Chinese Settlers Against the Dutch East India Company’, 265-96 at 286-7.

CHAPTER TEN

*intended to live in friendship with Company, and that they would like to continue their current trade[with Taiwan]. Therefore they had asked the merchants to lend a helping hand as far as this was in their power. Coxinga had also fitted out ten big junks for trade with Taiwan.'*⁶⁸

Because he had heard a rumour that a Dutch ship had been wrecked near Nan-ao, Governor Cornelis Cesar also wrote a letter to Hung Hsü (alias *Gampea* [D.]) asking for his help. In his letter, he mentions Coxinga's intention expressed in a previous letter:

*'We are keenly conscious of the contents [of Coxinga's letter] and are most appreciative of the greetings transmitted by both Your Honour and Coxinga. We shall also treat all Chinese merchants, especially those recommended by Your Highness [Coxinga], with all due courtesy. Your Highness should have complete trust in our promises and our reputation.'*⁶⁹

In other words, although the original letter Coxinga wrote to the Governor of Taiwan has not been preserved, it seems that it contained not only greetings but also listed the official merchants in Coxinga's service. The VOC administration would therefore have handled them with kid gloves. In the following north monsoon season, Coxinga sent a similar letter to Batavia and requested Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker conclude an alliance with him.⁷⁰ These letters are express signs that Coxinga had been trying to build up a new trading system ever since Iquan had lost his leadership of the

⁶⁸ VOC 1197, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naar Batavia aen Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 24 Oct 1653, fo. 803^r.

⁶⁹ VOC 1207, Briefff aen den mandorijn gampea door den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, 16 Nov. 1653, fo. 546^r.

⁷⁰ VOC 878, Letter from the Governor-General in Batavia to Cheng Ch'eng-kung, 29 June 1654, fo. 193-195, re-cited from Johannes Huber, 'Relations between Cheng Ch'eng-kung and the Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s', in Leonard Blussé (ed.), *Around and About Formosa: Essays in honor of Professor Ts'ao Yung-ho* (Taipei: Ts'ao Yung-ho foundation for Culture and Education, 2003), 209-41, at 228-9.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

An-hai merchants.

The Politization of Fu-chien Exceptionalism

On 10 June 1653, Manchu troops who had now been buttressed with reinforcements laid siege to Hai-ch'êng in a desperate effort to expel Coxinga's force from the coast. The Manchu troops were led by an ethnic Manchu Commander (*Gusa* or Banner). Their initial tactic was to bombard the palisades surrounding all the camps with cannons for a period of one and half days before launching a cavalry charge. Coxinga had predicted their tactics and had buried landmines to forestall them. His strategic thinking made it possible to repel the Manchu assault successfully and he was said to have eliminated 30,000 Manchu soldiers in this battle; another 10,000 soldiers fled away.⁷¹ After this momentous battle, the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien (*Chê-min Tsung-tu*[C]),⁷² Liu Ch'ing-tai, decided to re-open negotiations between the Manchu Emperor and Coxinga.

According to the daily records of the Manchu Court, on 11 October 1652 Emperor Shun-chih ordered Iquan who was being kept hostage in Peking to write a letter to his son and act as mediator in the negotiations. The Emperor set four conditions: first, if Coxinga surrendered to the Manchu coastal defence troops, he could continue to reside where he was now living; second, he would not, like his father, be summoned to Peking; third, he would remain in charge of levying the taxes from all trading-junks; fourth, he should guarantee to pacify all the pirates in Fu-chien and Kuang-tung coastal waters.⁷³ Not until September 1653, almost one year later, did his father's

⁷¹ VOC 1202, Missive van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28, Feb 1654, fo. 313^f.

⁷² Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 534. The same title was translated as Supreme Commander in the Ming dynasty, but as Governor-General in the Ch'ing dynasty as its functions had changed slightly.

⁷³ TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, 75.

CHAPTER TEN

servant reach Coxinga with this letter.⁷⁴ Although the original letter from Iquan has not been preserved, there is a record which says that Iquan mentioned the Manchu Court would be willing to concede him a prefecture (*Fu*, lower than province but higher than district) as a place of residence.⁷⁵

Coxinga sent a reply to his father and began to bargain with the Manchus in the same letter. He took the offensive and began with the criticism that Iquan's words did not tally with those of the Emperor in the letter which had been delivered under separate cover by the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Liu Ch'ing-t'ai. Perplexed by the discrepancy, he wanted to make sure which place, how large a region and how much authority he would be granted by the Manchus. He emphasized that 'the coastal areas had belonged to us originally' and implied that they should not be included in the bargain but were his possession unconditionally. He argued that, on the basis of the number of his current troops, he should have at least Fu-chou prefecture from which he would enjoy a legal tax revenue as his place of residence.⁷⁶ These negotiations were not confidential, because even the Dutch in Taiwan soon heard about them from Chinese merchants who visited there frequently.

*'Lately a rumour has begun to circulate saying that Coxinga, the son of Mandarin Iquan, has entered into negotiations to conclude peace with the Manchus. And it is said that the great Manchus will offer him authority over Fu-chou and Ch'üan-chou prefectures, including all subjugated towns and villages.'*⁷⁷

During the period of negotiations, Coxinga and the Manchu did

⁷⁴ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 42-4.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁷⁷ VOC 1197, Missive van Cornelis Caesar near Batavia aen Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 24 Oct 1653, fo. 803^f.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

manage to conclude a truce. Coxinga took full advantage of this and dispatched his officials to collect taxes from all the subjugated towns and villages in the coastal areas of Fu-chien. In October he collected 200,000 taels of silver from the towns under Ch'üan-chou and in November 50,000 piculs of rice from the hinterland districts of Chang-chou. In December he levied another 300,000 taels of silver from the hinterland of Ch'üan-chou.

In the meantime, the Ming resistance fighters in Kuang-hsi under General Li Ting-kuo pushed their forces eastwards along the coast making for Chao-ch'ing in Kuang-tung.⁷⁸ If Chao-ch'ing was taken, the fall of Kuang-chou would be inevitable, so Li Ting-kuo urged Coxinga to dispatch troops to strengthen his action. Honouring the truce, Coxinga set this request aside.

After the Shun-chih Emperor had read Coxinga's reply to his father Iquan, he declared that he would not concede any jurisdiction to Coxinga. However, he was willing to assign four coastal prefectures, namely: Ch'üan-chou, Chang-chou, Ch'ao-chou and Hui-chou, as an area in which Coxinga's troops could reside and from which they would then enjoy the tax revenues. In choosing this arrangement, the Ch'ing Court was following in the footsteps of the Ming Court in the agreement the latter had reached with Iquan in the years 1629-1636. That agreement had acknowledged Iquan's substantial influence and had permitted his troops to be absorbed into the coastal defence establishment. It had also sagaciously allowed Iquan a certain degree of autonomy to engage in foreign trade. The Grand Co-ordinators had been pretty close-lipped about this latter arrangement as it was they who had functioned as mediators with Iquan at the provincial level with the consent of the Emperor.

The arrangement which Coxinga had visualized was completely

⁷⁸ What the military rank of Li Ting-kuo was has still not been sorted out by the author.

CHAPTER TEN

different from that proposed by the Manchu Emperor and his court. He asked that Fu-chou be his city of residence and that he be allowed full jurisdiction over the land. His demand shows that he was sticking to the conditions agreed between the Emperor Lung-wu and Iquan after 1646. Under the terms of that agreement, Iquan was to reside in Fu-chou and have jurisdiction over Fu-chien province, including the rights to levy taxes and maintain an army and a civil administration. Coxinga had insisted that this legitimate power had been granted by the Ming Lung-wu Emperor and therefore he assumed that the Manchu Court would accept this 1646 arrangement as a basis for the negotiations. On the level of provincial political affairs, there were no substantial difference between the two proposed arrangements since they were both based on using the foreign trade revenues to maintain the coastal defence troops, but they did diverge widely when it came to foreign trade. Under the terms of the 1646, arrangement Iquan had both legalized the post-1644 Sino-Japan trade and he developed a new tributary system centred on Fu-chou in the name of the Ming Lung-wu Emperor, as an instrument to resist the pressure of the growing competition presented by the VOC in the East and South China Seas. The Manchu Court was apparently well informed about the legalization of the Sino-Japanese trade in the post-1645 period, because in a letter written to the Shun-chih Emperor by the Provincial Administration Commissioner of Fu-chien (*Pu-chêng Shih*[C.]), Tung Kuo-ch'i, in April 1653, the suggestion was made that the Ch'ing Emperor should open up the Sino-Japanese trade to the inhabitants of Fu-chou, Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou under the terms of this previous arrangement with the Ming court orchestrated by Lung-wu and Iquan.⁷⁹ They were certainly not ignorant of the fact that Iquan had initiated the tributary trade, since envoys from Liu-ch'iu (*Ryūkyū*[J.]) had visited Peking earlier on a

⁷⁹ TWYH(ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 109. 'After the new dynasty was installed, it was forbidden to go aboard or to trade from the coastal areas... my suggestion is to lift this ban and allow all merchants from Fu-chou to Chang-chou to trade abroad with legal passes...'

FU-CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

tribute mission.⁸⁰

After he had gained control of Amoy, Coxinga tried to revive this tributary trade system and establish formal relationships with the rulers around East and South China Seas. Although the Chinese sources do not mention this attempt of his, the Dutch Factory in Malacca was informed about official communications which had taken place between Coxinga and various other countries in the region. On 24 February 1654, a Chinese *wangkang* arrived in Malacca which brought news that:

*‘ Ambassadors from Siam and Cambodia had arrived[in Amoy]. The former carried rice as present and the other brought two elephants as well as other valuable curiosities to do honour to Coxinga.’*⁸¹

As mentioned earlier, the letter Coxinga addressed to the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Ceasar, might offer a clue that his tributary trade had reached this stage in the summer of 1653. Certainly, towards the end of the spring of 1654 Coxinga dispatched nineteen junks southwards. These included eight junks bound for Batavia, seven junks for Siam, two junks for Cambodia, one junk for Ligore and one junk for Patani, all of them richly laden.⁸² The number of the junks tallies with the extant Dutch records. Therefore this information must be reliable.⁸³ Furthermore, Coxinga also

⁸⁰ Ts'ai To (comp.), *Li-tai pao-an* [Tributary Documents Preserved in Liuch'iu], I, 189.

⁸¹ VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo.313^{r-v}.

⁸² *Ibidem*.

⁸³ Eight junks did indeed arrive in Batavia, see: VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 2r; also eight junks visited Batavia, see: Generale Missive, 7 Nov. 1654, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 364; VOC 1202, Missiven van Jacob Nolpe aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Jambi, 17 Apr. 1654, fo. 378^v. It reported two Chinese junks visited Palembang, but it

CHAPTER TEN

wrote in his letter to Iquan in which he said that: 'The foreign soldiers from Japan and Cambodia might arrive in [Amoy] at any moment.'⁸⁴ This could be seen as an expression of his claim that he was operating a substantial crown trade as Iquan had done in the tributary system in Lung-wu's name in the post-1647 period. If this surmise is correct, it is an unequivocal indication that Coxinga must have to require the highest authority in Fu-chien province and exercised command over the coastal defence troops of Chê-chiang, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung as well as over the crown trade. Coxinga's aim was to be recognized as ruler of a subordinate kingdom like Korea. In February of 1654, the Manchu delegates dispatched by the Emperor from Peking arrived in Fu-chien province, Coxinga told the delegates personally and publicly that:

*'His troop numbers were so large that he required the area of several provinces to maintain them. Any political arrangement between him and the Imperial Court should follow the same pattern as that between the Manchus and Korea.'*⁸⁵

This announcement made no bones about the fact that Coxinga wished to preserve all the institutional arrangements which Iquan had been granted by the Ming Emperors in the period 1643-1647. The only thing which was not explicitly mentioned was that the crown trade (in the form of tributary missions) could only exist if Coxinga ruled an independent kingdom.

When the delegates arrived in Fu-chien, Coxinga's fleet had already sailed north to Chê-chiang coast.⁸⁶ The true mission of this fleet was to penetrate the Chê-chiang coast and suppress the vessels of the Manchu coastal defence troops stationed there and escort the trading-junks which exported silks to Japan. The Chief of Deshima, Gabriel Happart, noted a

also pointed out that they were based in Quinam.

⁸⁴ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 43.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 48.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

FU-CHIENESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

group of junks carrying silks and news from An-hai which arrived in Nagasaki during the same period:

*'Loads of commodities, including quite a large amount of silks and silk goods, were brought in by some junks from An-hai and other places a few days ago. They brought the rumour that Coxinga was about to make his peace with the Manchus. He will be appointed Mandarin of several harbours and part of Kuang-tung province.'*⁸⁷

This piece of news gathering is also proof that most merchants serving under Coxinga had been informed about the conditions agreed in the peace negotiations. In the records of one of his contemporaries, Ch'ien Su-t'u, Coxinga's intention is set out unequivocally:

*'In the year 1654...Coxinga asked that Fu-chien province to be ceded to him, a request which was rejected by the Manchu Emperor.'*⁸⁸

The delegates transmitted Coxinga's conditions to the Shun-chih Emperor who repudiated them and proceeded to initiate negotiations in a slightly revised version of the original one. In September 1654 another group of delegates, including Coxinga's youngest brother who was living with Iquan in Peking, arrived. Since the Manchu delegates had no intention of entering into any bargains, the gap between both sides grew so wide as to be irreconcilable. Coxinga was confident about maintaining his independent financial source from foreign trade and persisted in his demand that the Manchu Emperor would eventually have to conclude a peace treaty with him because the Manchu Grand Co-ordinators would not be able to find any other source of wages more stable than those which he had at his disposal.

⁸⁷ NFJ 286, Missive van Gabriel Happart naer Taijouan aen de Ed. Heer gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Japan, 12 May 1654, fo. 57. The news about the negotiations had been spread in Japan; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 150. 25 Apr. 1654. The above news should have arrived in Japan around April 1654.

⁸⁸ Sung, *Tsun-jang lüeh*, 207.

CHAPTER TEN

In 1567 the Ming Court had allowed its subjects in Fu-chien to pursue foreign trade, as it recognized the need to create a stable revenue with which to support the coastal defence troops and their vessels. This privileged trading system created Fu-chien exceptionalism, setting it apart from all the other coastal provinces. As a mercenary, after 1636, Iquan had manipulated politics and personal relationships to create a niche through which his private troops could be granted official status as coastal defence troops and continue to be supported by foreign trade. The original status of economic exceptionalism now began to take the shape a political shell. After 1646, by dint of developing the crown trade model under the tributary system in Lung-wu's name, Iquan gave Fu-chien exceptionalism its political form. As his successor, his son Coxinga wanted to preserve this exceptional political status of Fu-chien province with at least the toleration, if not the approval, of the Manchu Court. He never actually planned to contest the central power of the Manchu Court over China although he publicly claimed this to be his ultimate goal. In reality, all he wanted was to hold on to his own power in Fu-chien and be acknowledged by the Manchu Court. In short, his ultimate goal was to see Fu-chien exceptionalism be accepted in its political form.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE PASSIONS OF

A MERCHANT PRINCE

1655-1662

Challenging all limitations, 1654-1656

At the beginning of 1650s, firmly in command of his newly recruited private soldiers and by exploiting the rich Taiwan trade Coxinga managed to supplant the Macao trade where was under Manchu siege. His unremitting exertions also enable him to incorporate the Ming garrison in Amoy into his private army. By choosing the Ming Yung-li Emperor as the symbol to legitimate his local leadership, he ensured the consolidation of his combined army corps by throwing it into several battles against the Manchus in the Chang-chou region in 1652 and 1653. By the time the Manchu Emperor Shun-chih sent delegates to negotiate with him, his status as the leader of the An-hai merchants and Amoy troops was already uncontested. On the other hand, change of the Chinese foreign trade was already on the horizon because the Ming resistance in Chê-chiang collapsed in 1651 and Kuang-chou (Canton) and Macao were besieged by the Manchus. Hence, when the bans on foreign trade were implemented along most of the Manchu coast, Amoy was left as the only active overseas trading port and consequently the overseas silk export was concentrated there.

Table 11-1. The concentration of Chinese raw silk exports during 1651-1654

Year	Total (catty)*	Exported from Coxinga's areas (catty)*	percentage
1651	66,717	5,950 (An-hai+ Chang-chou)	8%
1652.11-1653.11	88,150	49,150 (An-hai+Chang-chou)	55%

CHAPTER ELEVEN

		58,150 (An-hai+Chang-chou+ Fu-chou)	65%
1653.10-1654.9.2 5	71,900	44,050 (An-hai+ Ch'üan-chou) 56,500 (An-hai+ Ch'üan-chou+ Fu-chou)	61% 78%

Source:* Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 336-7; 48-50; 52-8; 58-61. The total amount is cited directly from the report in the VOC account. The numbers for the separate areas are the sums of the single inventories of each junk, but do not cover every junk arriving in Japan. Therefore, the amounts from the different areas are the lower estimates. The raw silk and white silk in the different inventories are all counted as raw silk.

The largest shift in the export-volume happened in 1652, when Coxinga and the Manchus were engaged in fighting in the vicinity of Chang-chou and Hai-ch'êng. The proximity of these battlefields distracted the Manchu troops from supervising the main overland trading route which led from An-hai to Fu-chou. Freed from this burden, An-hai merchants armed with the passes issued by Iquan in Fu-chou continued to enjoy free access to raw silk and silk goods throughout an area reaching as far as Nanking (including all of the Chiang-nan region, the prime production site of silk in China).¹ When the terms of the truce came into force after September 1653, the An-hai merchants stepped up their activities and Coxinga's tax collectors scattered all over the coastal areas, covering all the districts and villages in the Chang-chou, Ch'üan-chou, and Hsing-hua prefectures. Limited garrisons of Manchu soldiers closed themselves up behind the walls of the main cities so Coxinga's officials could post placards wherever they arrived and

¹ NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Winninx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 1; *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

harvested rice from the fields as tax in kind.² In this fashion, the Sino-Japanese silk trade fell like a ripe plum into the hands of the An-hai merchants, as the table shows.

Frustrated and dissatisfied, the Manchu delegates left An-hai on 3 November 1654.³ Coxinga steadfastly refused to give the Shun-chih Emperor any official reply but did write to his father Iquan and had the letter delivered in Peking by his private servant. His message was passed on to the Shun-chih Emperor by Iquan on 22 December. Five days later, the Emperor and his Court concluded that the empire should no longer permit Coxinga's merchants to range any more of the coast, but this is as far as he went.⁴ He had not yet devised any further plan for a new campaign.

In the south, Coxinga did his best to continue carry out the usual rice-collecting operations and to keep the rice trade going in the Ch'ao-chou area. He sent his troops into the Ch'ao-chou region as the Cheng clan used to do in the 1630s and, on 30 November 1654, dispatched troops overland to the Chieh-yang and Ch'ao-yang regions to purchase or levy rice.⁵ These troops ran the risk of naval attacks because a local fleet of 150 junks which had surrendered to the Manchus was actively carrying out operations in the area. The fleet was under the command of Su Li (*Soulacq*[D.]) who resided in

² Chi-êrh ka-lang, 'Chi-êrh ka-lang têng-t'i wei chêng-ch'êng-kung fu-tzu shu-shên lai-wang shih-pên[Report Written by Chi-êrh ka-lang about the Correspondence between Chêng Chih-lung and Cheng Ch'eng-kung], 26 Dec. 1654', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no 6, 82-84.

³ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 67.

⁴ TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, 102-4.

⁵ Li Ch'i-fêng, 'Li-ch'i-fêng t'i wei chêng-chün chin-ju ch'ao-hui shu-i chêng-liang shih-pên [Letter Written by Li Ch'i-fêng Reporting that the Cheng Army Had Levied Rice from Ch'ao-chou and Hui-chou] 27 Jan 1655', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I No. 6, 94-5.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Chieh-shih.⁶ This Su Li had originally been the leader of an independent, native group which had organized itself in the wake of the collapse of the Ming administration. The Dutch sources report:

*‘ ... He used to be a friend of both the Manchus and of Coxinga, but recently he has surrendered to the Manchus.’*⁷

The Chinese sources state:

*‘Su Li is from a family with its roots in Chieh-shih. His soldiers or self-defence corps are all natives and most of them have private junks at their disposal. They earn their their livelihood by fishing and exporting salt’*⁸

After the Manchu troops had invaded Kuang-chou city in 1651 and expelled the defeated Ming troops to Hai-nan Island, Su Li put his junks at the disposal of the Manchus.⁹ In May of 1654, the Kuang-tung Manchu authorities submitted a petition to the Shun-chih Emperor, asking permission to recruit Su Li’s people to act as coastal defence troops on their own turf.¹⁰ After their formal submission, they were expected to remain in their home harbours and earn their living as usual, unless ‘the situation should require otherwise’.¹¹ The Manchu Court would grant them some autonomy in exchange for their naval assistance in fending off Coxinga’s irruptions into Kuang-tung.

Chieh-shih is located on the coast of Hui-chou near T’ien-wei-yang where Coxinga’s father Iquan had once defeated his Kuang-tung foe, the notorious pirate Liu Hsiang in 1633. This body of water is part of the

⁶ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 526. 27 June 1655.

⁷ VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 323^r.

⁸ TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 230.

⁹ *Ibidem*, 251.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 230.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

sea-route from Macao to Japan and from Hai-nan to Amoy and represented a focal point for Coxinga's trade network with Kuang-chou and the 'Western Ocean' (Southeast Asia). As he wished to gauge the strength of Su Li's fleet, Coxinga dispatched 100 war-junks under Naval Commander Lin Ch'a to patrol the coastal waters and blockade Su Li's force. Lin Cha's fleet left Amoy sometime around the first day of 1655 and arrived in T'ien-wen-yang waters around 12 January 1655.¹²

In the meantime, Chang-chou city had surrendered to Coxinga on 10 December 1654¹³ and the surrounding districts and villages soon followed suit. Coxinga now directed his troops towards Ch'üan-chou prefecture and laid siege to the cities of Ch'üan-chou and Hsing-hua on 17 January 1655.¹⁴ His strategy meant that the Manchu troops still occupying towns in southern Fu-chien were confined to several isolated spots, a situation which allowed Coxinga's merchants to go about their business freely.

In March 1655, Coxinga reached the conclusion that the Manchu Court in Peking would not respond to his political proposals if he did not make any military threats. He therefore decided to establish a well-organized cabinet around himself, moulding it into the form of the Ming Court.¹⁵ The tax revenues he levied from all the subjected areas proved extremely rich: 1,080,000 taels from Chang-chou city and its six districts and 750,000 taels from the seven Districts in Ch'üan-chou prefecture.¹⁶ He might have used

¹² Li Ch'i-fêng, 'Li-ch'i-fêng t'i wei chêng-chün chin-ju ch'ao-hui shu-i chêng-liang shih-pên', 94; 97.; Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 68.

¹³ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 71.

¹⁴ T'ung kuo-ch'i, 'T'ung kuo-ch'i t'i-ch'ing su-fa man-shih i-chieh hsing-hua ch'üan-chou chih-wei shih-pên [Letter from T'ung kuo-ch'i Requesting the Emperor to Dispatch Manchu Troops to Rescure Hsing-hua and Ch'üan-chou Prefectures] 27 Jan. 1655', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 92.

¹⁵ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 85.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 72; 73.; Chi-êrh ka-lang, 'Chi-êrh ka-lang têng t'i-wei ch'ing-fa ta-ping

CHAPTER ELEVEN

part of this revenue to equip the twenty-five junks which sailed southwards during the northern monsoon season that year: eight to Batavia, two to Tonkin, ten to Siam, four to Quinam and one to Manila.¹⁷

These richly laden trading-junks had to sail past T'ien-wei-yang where Su Li's naval force was on the look out for them. Indeed he might have attempted to intercept them, but the flotilla commanded by Lin Ch'a successfully warded off the attacks. This is what the Dutch sources reported:

'There is a certain Chinese pirate named Su Li (Soulack), a mandarin from Hai-nan, who is a friend of the Manchus. He has been commanding a large number of war-junks which have been plundering the coastal areas for quite some time. They were met by the above-mentioned Admiral [Lin Ch'a] who was assigned by Coxinga to deal with them off south Nan-ao. After heavy fighting and the loss of forty junks, [Su Li] was chased away and is believed to have been swept from the sea. This news gladdens the hearts of

shou-fu chang-ch'üan shih-ti shih-pên [Letter from Chi-êrh ka-lang Requesting the Emperor to Dispatch Troops to Retake Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou Prefectures] 6 Mar. 1655', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no 6, 114; Li-chi, 'Li-chi t'i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch'üan-chou san-fu shu-hsien shih-shou ch'ing-hsing shih-pên [Report Written by Li-chi about How the Areas Surrounding Hsing-hua, Chang-chou, Ch'üan-chou Prefectures ost] 2 Aug. 1655', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no 6, 181-6.

¹⁷ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 466. 9 Mar. 1655. VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] door Joan Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fo. 220v. The former source reported seven junks bound for Batavia, the latter sources reported eight. It was confirmed by Governor-General's letter to Coxinga: VOC 869, Letter from Governor-General Maetsuijcker and Councillors of India to Cheng Ch'eng-kung, Batavia, 17 Jun. 1655, fo. 296-298; re-cited from Johannes Huber, 'Relations between Cheng Ch'eng-kung and the Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s', in Leonard Blussé (ed.), *Around and About Formosa: Essays in honor of Professor Ts'ao Yung-ho* (Taipei: Ts'ao Yung-ho Foundation for Culture and Education, 2003), 209-41, at 232-3.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*the maritime merchants, because this pirate used to endanger the sea-route and played havoc with the merchants.*¹⁸

More or less around the same time, the Manchus gradually managed to close the trading route from both Ch'üan-chou and An-hai to Fu-chou again. Their move meant that the maritime trading route used to fetch raw silks in Chê-chiang (and farther away in Nanking) was also cut off.

*'...because all routes in China were barred by Manchus, no more goods could be sent to Fu-chou by Coxinga's merchants in An-hai and Ch'üan-chou. The moment any of his merchants appeared in areas where the Manchus were in control, all their goods were confiscated... This situation has lasted eight to ten months [since August of 1654].'*¹⁹

Although the An-hai and Ch'üan-chou merchants had already ceased purchasing silk because of the rising tension, they were still able to ship 131,600 catties of raw silk on twenty-one junks (the majority belonging to Coxinga) to Nagasaki between January and March, even though they had to sail against the north monsoon.²⁰ Because this was an abnormally large amount of silk, the Japanese merchants were reluctant to pay the set *pancado* price. This was a fixed price decided upon according to the amounts of silk imported during the past south monsoon season until 28 September 1654, but the unexpectedly large quantity of newly arrived silk in the spring of 1655 would have depressed the market price of later domestic distribution. The twenty-one junks were held in Nagasaki Harbour by the Governor of

¹⁸ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 514. 5 June 1655.

¹⁹ NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Winninx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 1. Less detail records see: *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655.

²⁰ NFJ 287, Missive vant Comptoir Nagasackij [Leonard Winnex] aen haer[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia per de schepen Armuijden, Vlielandt en Zoutelande over Taijouan gesonden, Japan, 19 Oct. 1655, fo. 20.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Nagasaki until the Shogunal Court had had time to permit the Japanese merchants to lower the price at the end of May 1655.²¹ Coxinga received news of this price crack-down from a returning junk about June 1655. He considered that he had been hardly done by by the Shogunal Court and was soon claiming that, as a counter action, he would forbid any Chinese junk to carry to Japan ‘a single thread of white raw silk on penalty of death’ in the following southern monsoon season.²² As the main trading route between Fu-chien and the silk-production areas in Chiang-nan had been cut off by the Manchus, this order meant that all he had to do was to exclude other silk exporters from elbowing in on the silk Japanese business. Hence, this was the first time Coxinga imposed an embargo as a measure to maintain his monopoly on this export commodity. The amount of raw silk exported was indeed sharply reduced, but the An-hai and Ch’üan-chou junks were not strictly forbidden to carry it.

The siege of Ch’üan-chou was lifted at the end of March.²³ Meanwhile the Manchu Court had given orders to unite the troops stationed in Chê-chiang province and Nanking and dispatch them to Fu-chou to prevent any further incursions by Coxinga. The main body of the troops arrived on 21 May 1655.²⁴ According to a contemporary Chinese source, at this juncture the total number of soldiers under Coxinga’s command amounted to 100,000 men.²⁵ The Dutch sources report that 40,000 to 50,000 Manchu soldiers and

²¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 209. 22 May 1655; 214, 9 July 1655.

²² *Ibidem*, 214. 9 July 1655.

²³ Li-chi, ‘Li-chi t’i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch’üan-chou san-fu shu-hsien shih-shou ch’ing-hsing shih-pên 2 Aug. 1655’, 184.

²⁴ T’ung kuo-ch’i, ‘T’ung-kuo-ch’i t’i-wei chêng-chün kung-ta lung-yen hui-ch’ü chang-p’ing ning-yang shih-pên [Letter Written by T’ung-kuo-ch’i Reporting that Cheng’s Force Had Made a Fresh Attack on Lung-yen and Attempted to Capture Chang-p’ing and Ning-yang Counties] 25 May 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), *Ch’ing-ch’ü chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no 6, 146.

²⁵ Li-chi, ‘Li-chi t’i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch’üan-chou san-fu shu-hsien

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

another 20,000 cavalry men were dispatched to Fu-chou in June 1655.²⁶ Because of the onerous cost of financing this ongoing war, Coxinga must have hoped that the twenty-two junks due to return from Japan in the spring of 1655 could relieve his financial burden somewhat. As he had to give matters some serious thought in an attempt to allocate his resources more efficiently, Coxinga decided not to spend money on the strengthening the fortifications of the inland cities in Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou prefectures but directed his troops to focus on more rewarding goals. He demolished the small forts around the shores of An-hai Bay, including the An-hai, T'ung-an(*Thota*[D.]) and An-hsi (*Lamsing*[D.]) Forts.²⁷ He used the bricks and stone from the demolished structures to build a new castle named 'Ping-chou' to be used as a bridgehead in the Wei-tou Bay (Erasmus Bay), on the opposite shore from Quemoy, to protect Pai-sha (*Peswaa*[D.]) Harbour where most of Coxinga's uncle's (Cheng Hung-k'uei) trading-junks were anchored.²⁸ He also demolished Kao-p'u Fort on the shore opposite Amoy, using its materials to rebuild three redoubts around Amoy to block the advancing Manchu troops.²⁹ While all this construction work was going on, all the rice and paddy within a radius of 50 kilometres of Amoy was collected and stockpiled in Amoy and in Hai-ch'êng Fort.³⁰ To ensure that Hai-ch'êng

shih-shou ch'ing-hsing shih-pên 2 Aug. 1655', 182.

²⁶ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 517. 15 June 1655; T'ung Tai, ' T'ung-tai t'i-wei chêng-chün ch'ai-hui yung-ch'un-ch'êng chun-pei t'ui-shou shih-pên [Report Written by T'ung Tai relating How the Cheng Forces Demolished Yung-ch'un Fort and Prepared to Withdraw] 30 May 1655' in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 150.

²⁸ NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Winninx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 2.

²⁹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 53-4.

³⁰ VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fos. 290^v-291^r.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Fort was a part of an extensive defence scheme, Coxinga constructed a line of defence which encircled Amoy Bay and included the islands of Amoy and Quemoy. This would give him control of all the shores on which the Manchus might land. Later he ordered the walls of Chang-chou city be torn down, so that the Manchus troops would have no walls within which to establish an army camp.³¹ He used the bricks and stones from the walls to enlarge the walls of Hai-ch'êng.³²

Just as Coxinga was spending all his capital on relocating and fortifying his strongholds, he had to swallow another disappointment, the silver from the Sino-Manila trade fell short of expectations. This trade had been an important source of income for An-hai merchants during the 1630s, but the Sino-Manila trade had increasingly been hampered by the Dutch since 1642. The truce concluded between the Dutch and the Portuguese gave the Dutch a free hand to attack Spanish Manila and, in the course of their prosecution of their old enemy the Dutch also attacked Iquan's Manila-bound junks in an effort to try to force him to sign the contract which would give the Taiwan factory the sole right to engage in the Sino-Japan silk trade. Although the An-hai merchants stubbornly continued to sail to Manila between 1644 and 1648, the Dutch continued to threaten them from time to time. However, after Spain concluded the Treaty of Westphalia with the Dutch Republic in 1648, the legal basis for patrolling against Chinese junks trading with the enemy was vitiated.

Table 11-2. Number of Chinese junks visiting Manila

³¹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 89 ; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fos. 288^v-289^f; NFJ 287, Missive van Pieter de Goyer en Jacob Keijser naer Taijouan aen den Ed. Heer gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Canton, 4 Dec. 1655, fo. 50.

³² TWYH(ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 517.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

Year	Junks from China
1649	14
1650	10
1651	9
1652	4
1653	8
1654	8
1655	3
1656	0
1657	0

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVI^e,XVII^e,XVIII^e siècles)*, 148-60.

There are no reliable statistics available about the quantities of silver carried away from Manila on Chinese junks but the customs records of Manila do give some impression.

Table 11-3. The tax revenues of silver imports and Chinese commodities imports

Year	Tax revenue from the silver imports (rial)	Tax revenue from the Chinese commodities (rial)
1631-1635	6,321	22,673.2
1636-1640	2,551.8	23,831.8
1641-1645	2,464.2	12,249.4
1646-1650	2,857	9,991
1651-1655	1,488.6	4,905
1656-1660	2,553.8	2,786.2

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques(XVI^e,XVII^e,XVIII^e siècles)*, 200-219.

As the table shows, the amounts of silver shipped to Manila from Acapulco were low in the first half of the 1650s, exacerbating the unsatisfactory economic situation caused by the fact imports of Chinese commodities had already been declining since the last half of the 1640s. In short, the supply of silver which had been abundant during 1646-1650 and

CHAPTER ELEVEN

became tighter during 1651-1655. Between 1651 and 1653 a scarcity of silver occurred because, as Dutch records show, no silver galleons visited Manila during these three years.³³ The situation improved in the spring of 1654 when two silver galleons finally arrived. The Sino-Manila trade should have picked up but no Acapulco galleon appeared again in 1655.³⁴ Of the three junks which visited Manila in 1655, at least one belonged to Coxinga. Given the shortage of silver, the return cargo must have fallen below Coxinga's expectations.

In the middle of July 1655 angry Coxinga placed a strict embargo on the Manila trade, just as he had done earlier against Japan. He accused the Spanish merchants of postponing payment or paying only half the price the commodities shipped were worth. He argued that having had to endure such ill-treatment for several years in a row, the Chinese merchants were fed up and no longer prepared to accept it lying down.³⁵ Pertinently, the key issue in his accusation was the not ill-treatment meted out to the merchants but the disappointing amount of the payment in silver. Coxinga also pleaded for assistance from the Dutch Governor in Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, hoping that he would also proclaim his edict to Chinese subjects living on Dutch soil.³⁶ Coxinga's request reveals the essence of his embargo. The crucial point was not to take revenge on Manila but to state his ultimate authority over any Chinese maritime merchants who might decide to engage in this trade in some way or another. Another possibility is that the embargo was issued in a

³³ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 704. 19 Jan. 1654.

³⁴ VOC 1212, *Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker*, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 317^r.

³⁵ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 557-8. 17 Aug. 1655; VOC 1213, Letter from Cheng Ch'eng-kung to Governor Caesar in Taiwan, July 1655, fo. 554-5, re-cited from Johannes Huber, 'Relations between Cheng Ch'eng-kung and the Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s', in Leonard Blussé (ed.), *Around and About Formosa*, 209-41, at 233-5.

³⁶ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III:1648-1655, 557-8. 17 Aug. 1655.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

desperate move to conceal the real problem which was that Coxinga was no longer able to acquire the supplies of silk he needed.

While arranging the supply of provisions for his newly established administration and his troops, Coxinga ordered his army of 30,000 soldiers to march slowly through the fields between Chang-chou and Ch'ao-chou and levy rice to supplement the food supply and perhaps also some sugar for the Japanese market.³⁷ Since the overland silk route was blocked by the Manchus in Fu-chou, he dispatched a fleet with 30,000 soldiers northwards to the coast of Chê-chiang, bypassing Fu-chou, so that purchases of silks could be made direct from the Nanking area.³⁸

While preparing the essential trading commodities for this fleet, Coxinga had to bear in mind that he would need to provide silver bullion and such tropical goods as pepper and sandalwood. These commodities could be purchased from a fairly wide range of places: Japan, Taiwan, Batavia, Quinam, Cambodia and Siam. Most pepper came from the more southerly places, more particularly from the western part of Sumatra, where it was cultivated. Since the Dutch had occupied Malacca in 1642 and had gradually extended their domination over the pepper-producing areas, Coxinga had no

³⁷ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 89; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 291^r; *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 561. 22 Aug. 1655. The rice shortage might have been a particularly curial reason. Cf. *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 214. 9 July 1655. '...rice was being sold for 15 rixdollars a picul on account of the shortage.'

³⁸ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 90. VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 291^r; *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 561. Although the Dutch sources record there were 300,000 soldiers in total under Coxinga, this does not tally with the Chinese records, which say that twelve camps of soldiers participated in both actions. Since each camp housed about 2,500 soldiers, 30,000 soldiers would be a more appropriate estimate.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

choice but to consult with the VOC if he were to obtain a lower price for it. The *anachodas* of the eight junks dispatched to Batavia from Amoy in the name of their lord, Coxinga, submitted a petition to the High Government in Batavia on 23 April 1655, in which they asked for a lower purchase price for pepper and lead. They were granted a one rial discount per picul of pepper or seven rials per picul, by the High Government. The Batavian authorities had hoped that offering this discount price would attract Amoy merchants to Batavia rather than having them deal directly with the Pepper Coast.³⁹ Compared to the pepper sold in Taiwan (which was 13.5 to 14 rials per picul), this was almost almost half the price,⁴⁰ but it was still almost twice as expensive compared with the 4 rial pepper price in Jambi (on the Pepper Coast).⁴¹ Thanks to its contracts with the ruler of Palembang, the VOC itself could purchase pepper at the low price of 2.5 rials per picul, which allowed it to make a 440 per cent profit in Taiwan.⁴²

Apart from his sparring partners the Dutch, Coxinga also regarded the Macaonese merchants as rivals in Pepper- trade. Although the Portuguese had lost Malacca to the Dutch, Macao still managed to keep connections with the trading networks on the Pepper Coast. A small *wankang* visited Jambi in February 1654, carrying Japanese, Portuguese mestizo and Chinese merchants from Macao. To exchange for the pepper, they brought double-sided satins, Chinese gold thread, porcelain, iron pans and earthenware. The rumour spread that four more Macao vessels which had obviously also come with the idea of purchasing pepper were anchored at

³⁹ VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 23 Apr. 1655, not foliated.

⁴⁰ VOC 1206, Missiven door den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar en raedt uijt Taijouan aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1654, fo. 201.

⁴¹ VOC 1209, Missiven aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en raden van India door Jacob Nolpe, Jambi, 23 Feb. 1655, fo. 288^v.

⁴² *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 17. 24 Dec. 1655.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

Palembang.⁴³

This was also the point in time at which Coxinga was harbouring dreams of expanding his 'crown' trade. At more or less the same moment as the Macao vessels were visiting Palembang a *wankang* from Amoy was arriving in Malacca. She carried similar commodities: 34,000 pieces of coarse porcelain, 50 picul of copper, 810 large and small iron pans, umbrellas, Chinese gold thread, *radix China*, raw silk and 24 catties of colourful satins, 3,000 pieces of cotton cloth and so on.⁴⁴ It is possible that Coxinga's junks also visited Palembang that year. In April 1654, one big junk and a small *wankang* visited Palembang to trade pepper and cotton. It was said that they were from Cochin-China. One Chinese resident of Palembang even planned to send pepper to China on this *wankang*. Later in her voyage, its crew intended to visit Jambi, where the local ruler had given them permission to trade in the past.⁴⁵

When the *wankang* put in to Malacca, its *anachoda* claimed he carried a pass issued in 1652 by the Dutch merchant in Jambi who had invited the Chinese merchants to return to Malacca in the future.⁴⁶ After protracted negotiations, the Governor of Malacca allowed them to trade. They sold most of their cargoes and purchased pepper at the price of 8 rials per picul on condition that they would not return again.⁴⁷ It was said most of the return

⁴³ VOC 1209, Missiven aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en raden van India door Jacob Nolpe, Jambi, 21 Feb. 1654, fo. 286^v.

⁴⁴ VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo. 312^v.

⁴⁵ VOC 1202, Missiven van Jacob Nolpe aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Jambi, 17 Apr. 1654, fo. 378^v.

⁴⁶ VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo. 312^v. It is said he departed from Hai-nam (Aijnam). Perhaps the junk set course to Malacca at Hai-nan, but had actually begun their voyages in Amoy.

⁴⁷ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 753. 7 Nov. 1654.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

cargo consisted of rattan.⁴⁸

Coxinga's desire to purchase pepper at a lower price strengthened perceptibly in 1655. Besides the eight junks which visited Batavia, the Amoy *wankang* which had visited Malacca the previous year returned again on 20 February 1655. It brought two letters from Coxinga and his 'uncle', Hung Hsü (signed 'Chung-chên[C] Kingingh[D]' his honorific title) respectively. In his letter Honshu questioned the regulations the Dutch had imposed on trade:

*'What is the motivation behind the Dutch forbidding their [junks] to trade in Malacca? Malacca does not differ from Taiwan and Batavia with which we have always maintained neighbourly relations and a correspondence. People who have sent innumerable junks to trade there could not understand why he [Hung hsü] had been treated so peculiarly. He could not see any reason people should consider it beneficial to exclude his vessels from there. He also mentioned that Coxinga had written a letter to Batavia, to apologize about sending this wankang to Malacca again, asking [the Dutch] not to impound it. He had sent this junk because he [Coxinga] needed to obtain some rattan to make shields for his soldiers.'*⁴⁹

The Dutch Governor eventually allowed this *wankang* to return to Amoy on 12 July 1655, on condition next time she should sail to Batavia instead. She carried away 650 piculs of pepper sold at 8 rials per picul and some rattan.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 10 Sept. 1654, fo. 341^v.

⁴⁹ VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fos. 220^{r-v}. Hung Hsü is not a member of Coxinga's family, but considering his age and relationship with Coxinga, it is no exaggeration to introduce him in this way.

⁵⁰ VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

As the eight Chinese junks were on the point of leaving the roadstead of Batavia on 17 June 1655, Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker wrote a letter in reply to Coxinga's request for cheaper pepper in both Batavia and Malacca. In this letter he expresses his position in no uncertain terms, stipulating that no Chinese vessel would be allowed to trade in either Malacca or Palembang. He insisted that Coxinga's junks should trade only in Taiwan and Batavia. Joan Maetsuijker believed that the Chinese merchants '...would not find another place where they could earn more profit or be treated better'.⁵¹ He refused to make any concession on the pepper trade with Coxinga, despite the fact that he was an ally and good neighbour of the Dutch.

Joan Maetsuijker did not confine himself to a verbal statement, he took action on the matter. In July 1655, VOC Merchant Antony Boey took a big junk to Batavia with him on his return trip from Palembang.⁵² Discovering three Chinese junks loaded with 1,900 piculs pepper and 400 piculs of cotton in the roadstead, Boey urged the *Pangeran* of Palembang to impound these junks, citing as his legal basis the contract concluded between Palembang and the VOC. Boey insisted that because the junks had come from Quinam which was currently in war with the Dutch, as a loyal ally of the Dutch the *Pangeran* should impound the vessels of their common enemy. Boey took the one big sturdy junk to Batavia, but burned the two other older ones after he had confiscated their cargo, including cottons which were sold right away.⁵³

Tijssen en raad, Malacca, 17 Aug. 1655, fos. 246^v-247^r.

⁵¹ Letter from Governor-General Maetsuijker and Councillors of India to Cheng Ch'eng-kung, Batavia, 17 Jun. 1655, VOC 869, fo. 296-298; cited from Johannes Huber, 'Relations between Cheng Ch'eng-kung and the Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s', in Leonard Blussé (ed.), *Around and About Formosa*, 209-41, at 232-3.

⁵² VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maetsuijker ende raden, Batavia, 13 July 1655, not foliated.

⁵³ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 17. 24 Dec. 1655.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Four hundred piculs of the 1,900 piculs pepper were assigned to the *Pangeran* of Palembang as his share. He re-sold this party to the Dutch under the terms of the sole-right contract he had concluded with them. After he arrived in Batavia, the *anachoda* lodged an appeal with the Council in Batavia and affirmed that this junk did indeed belong to Coxinga. He also argued that, since the VOC still maintained an alliance and a friendship with Coxinga, the Council should return the cargo and junk to him. The *anachoda* insisted she had not come from Quinam but had anchored there only temporarily before continuing her voyage to Palembang. After its own investigation, the Council found out that this *anachoda* had lived in Quinam and that therefore this junk was liable to be impounded. Consequently the junk including her cargo were sold at auction.⁵⁴

When Governor-General Maetsuijker's letter reached Amoy in the middle of August 1655, Coxinga was assembling commodities for sale in the Chê-chiang and Nanking markets.⁵⁵ Almost at the same time as the fleet led by Hung Hsü left Amoy sailing in a northly direction, Coxinga wrote a letter to the leaders of the Chinese community in Taiwan and asked them to pass his message word-for-word to Governor Cornelis Caesar of Taiwan. In his first point in this letter Coxinga required the VOC should treat his merchants in Batavia more courteously. He must have been referring to the petition about reducing the pepper price submitted by the *anachodas*. His second point was that the VOC should not exclude Chinese junks from Malacca, Ligore, Pahang and other nearby locations. These were all ports around the 'Pepper Coast' where this commodity was sold at only 20 per cent of the Company fixed price in Taiwan. Coxinga was also concerned about the junks

⁵⁴ VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 13 July 1655, not foliated.

⁵⁵ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 557. 16 Aug. 1655. Most of the junks dispatched to the South China Sea had returned home. Of the eight junks which returned from Batavia, three had lost their masts.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

which the Dutch merchant Anthony Boey had detained in Palembang. He had not yet been informed about what had become of them in Batavia. If his requests were not met, he would put an embargo on Batavia and Taiwan in the following monsoon season.⁵⁶

A couple of weeks before the main fleet of the northern expedition led by Commander Hungshu departed in the middle of July 1655, the vanguard fleet carrying 15,000 soldiers had landed in Sha-ch'eng (*Swatea*[D.]), the most important harbour on the border between Chê-chiang and Fu-chien provinces.⁵⁷ Dutch sources mention that even though this harbour had been maintaining a neutral status in its relations with the Manchus and Coxinga, the latter's troops had occupied it.⁵⁸ This fleet continued to patrol the coast of Chê-chiang and kept a grip on several sites on shore until November 1655.⁵⁹ Besides escorting the the Japan-bound junks and pursuing their rice-collecting mission, the soldiers with this fleet 'plundered' about 200,000 taels of booty in the course of their mission.⁶⁰ Coxinga had assigned other troops to march southwards. These soldiers reached the southern border of Fu-chien on 20 August 1655.⁶¹ With the assistance of the fleet, this army laid siege to Chieh-yang and encircled it on 8 September 1655.⁶² One month later,

⁵⁶ Ibidem, 582-3. 21 Sept. 1655.

⁵⁷ TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 296.

⁵⁸ VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 287^v.

⁵⁹ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 19.

⁶⁰ VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 288^v.

⁶¹ Li Ch'i-fêng, 'Li-ch'i-fêng t'i wei chêng-chün pao-wei chieh-yang shih-pên [Letter from Li Ch'i-fêng about the Cheng Force which Laid Siege to Chieh-Yang City] 1 Oct. 1655', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 203.

⁶² Li, 'Li-ch'i-fêng t'i wei chêng-chün pao-wei chieh-yang shih-pên 1 Oct. 1655', 205.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

on 6 October 1655, Coxinga's troops seized the town.⁶³ The soldiers remained there and occupied most of Chao-chou prefecture for half a year until 15 March 1656, after which they brought 100,000 piculs of rice provisions and 100,000 taels of silver back to Amoy.⁶⁴ In the meantime, in a tactical manoeuvre the naval force which had been escorting the southward-bound junks was again assigned by Coxinga to patrol T'ien-wei Bay to ward off Su Li's fleet. It reached its destination on 9 May 1656.⁶⁵ According to the Dutch:

*'The 300 junks had sailed southwards, intending to levy rice along the coast below Nanao. Manned with Coxinga's best soldiers, they were well supplied with weapons and ammunition. However, this was all just a pretext. They were actually preparing to make an assault on the junks of the pirate Su Li, who had his lair in the Chieh-shih Guard (Kitsjehoi[D]) around Tien-wei Bay (Groeningens baij). Coxinga's first strike at Su Li was very successfully, because many of Su Li's junks which were lying pulled up dry on the beach were set on fire. About 100 junks were taken away back to Amoy with the fleet.'*⁶⁶

⁶³ Li Shuai-t'ai, 'Li shuai-t'ai t'i wei chêng-chün kung-ch'ü chieh-yang shih-pên [Letter from Li Shuai-t'ai about the Cheng Force's Attack on Chieh-yang County], 24 Oct. 1655', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 209.

⁶⁴ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 98.

⁶⁵ Ibidem. Li Shuai-t'ai, 'Li shuai-t'ai t'i wei shou-fu ch'ao-chou shu-i chi min-ch'uan you-i nan-hai shih-pên [Report Written by Li Shuai-tai about the Re-capture of the Ch'ao-chou Area and Spotting Fu-chien Junks Patrolling the Coast Nearby] 22 May 1656', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 322.

⁶⁶ NFJ 287, Appendix tot de missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar uijt Taijouan naar Japan [aan Joan Boucheljon] [Appendix: Letter from Governor Cornelis Caesar in Taiwan to Joan Boucheljon in Japan], Taiwan, 18 July 1656, fo. 74. It also recorded that these 400 junks later ran into a very fierce typhoon on their way to Amoy and

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

During Iquan's several battles in 1630s it had been proved that from technically speaking, the Wu-wei or black-stern junks of Su Li were superior to the Fu-chienese war-junks. Although Su Li's naval force consisted of only about 5,000 men and 200 junks, it was the only naval force which ever really threatened Coxinga's base in Amoy and his comparatively more lightly armed junks.⁶⁷

On land, the Manchu troops attempted to break through Coxinga's defence line. In November 1655, the new Manchu General-in-Chief of the Southern Expedition, Heir of the Imperial Prince of Cheng (Chêng-ch'in-wang shih-tzu), Chi-tu, arrived in Fu-chien with 100,000 soldiers. Shortly after his arrival he gave orders for the rebuilding of the walls of Chang-chou city as well as those of various other cities which had earlier been demolished by Coxinga's army.⁶⁸ Chi-tu sent a conciliatory letter to Coxinga hoping to re-open peace negotiations.⁶⁹ According to the Dutch, Coxinga intimated that the Manchu Court should concede two more prefectures to him, namely Hsing-hua (*Ginwa*[D.]) and Hui-chou.⁷⁰ A truce which lasted several months was concluded between Ch'üan-chou and Amoy, so that Coxinga's merchants were allowed to trade freely in Fu-chou and

most foundered. *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, VI: 1655-1662, 84. 16 Aug. 1656.

⁶⁷ VOC 1218, Missive van den ondercoopman Hendrick Leverij naer Taijouan aen den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Chieh-shih, 11 Mar. 1656, fo. 410^f; TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 322.

⁶⁸ Ch'ên Shou-ch'i, *Fu-chien t'ung-chih t'ai-wan-fu*[A History of Fu-chien Province (Taiwan Division)], TW no. 84, 943; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fo. 55

⁶⁹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 93.

⁷⁰ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 607. 30 Oct. 1655; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 345^v.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Sha-ch'êng (which was then under Manchus).⁷¹ In April 1656, the Manchu General-in-Chief, Chi-tu, broke the truce without prior warning, and immediately impounded all the trading-junks to use them as troop carriers for the Manchu cavalry and soldiers for a landing in Amoy.⁷² This Manchu fleet departed on 9 May 1656 but ran into a very fierce typhoon. The bold attempt failed and most of the vessels fell back into Coxinga's hands.⁷³

During this short truce, the trade embargo against Manila and Batavia came into force. In the spring, a news spread around Mindanao claiming that Coxinga was preparing a large fleet to conquer the Philippines.⁷⁴ Later it turned out to be a rumour spread by an indigenous king (King of Coralatt) who wanted to use this situation to weaken the alliance of one of his rivals with the Spanish.⁷⁵ The situation in Manila remained pretty much as usual,

⁷¹ VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 33^v. Han Tai, 'Han-tai t'i wei chi-pao p'u-mên pei-wei shih-pên [Emergency Report Written by Han-tai about the Cheng Force's Siege of P'u-mên], 22 Mar. 1656', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 291. Coxinga's fleet occupied Schach'eng on 28 December, 1655.

⁷² NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fos. 55-56; VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fos. 33^v-34^f.

⁷³ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 100; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan ende den raet aldaer [Letter from the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, to Joan Boucheljon in Charge of all the Company Property in Japan as Chief Merchant and His Council], Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fos. 55-56.

⁷⁴ VOC 1216, Missive door Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn aen haer Eds. [Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia [Letter Written by Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Ambon, 24 Apr. 1656, fo. 169^v.

⁷⁵ VOC 1216, Missiven door gouverneur Simon Cos en raad aen de Ed. heer Joan

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

one silver ship was scheduled to arrive from Acapulco but she ran aground near Aparri (*Takang*[C.], *Twakan*[D.]) on the northern tip of Luzon.⁷⁶ The Manila authorities later tried to salvage the silver from the shipwreck.⁷⁷

As the embargo held, no junks from Amoy visited Malacca and Batavia during the north monsoon season of 1656.⁷⁸ However, Coxinga had sent a letter to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker by way of the Chinese Captain of Batavia, P'an Ming-yen (*Bingam*[D.]) and Yen Erh-kuan (*Giequa*[D.]), in which he lodged a protest with the High Government in Batavia about Antony Boey's confiscation of 400 piculs of pepper from his junk in the roadstead of Palembang in 1655. He also requested the restitution of the deerskins which had been confiscated from his junk off the coast of Siam in 1653. On 7 March 1656, the Council agreed to the first request and showed its willingness to retribute the pepper according to the price in Palembang, if the *anachoda* came to present his case in person. It refused to acquiesce in the second request because this case had been closed a long time ago by verdict handed down by the Siamese Court, and it had issued a warning to the Chinese traders not to purchase deerskins before it took action. It seized the opportunity to accuse the Chinese *anachodas* of having tried to intimidate Dutch merchants during this incident.⁷⁹ Although the contents of the original

Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael ende Ed. heeren raaden van India tot Batavia, Ternate, 31 Aug. 1656, Fo. 221^r.

⁷⁶ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, IV:1655-1662, 75. 28 June 1656.

⁷⁷ VOC 1216, Missiven door gouverneur Simon Cos en raad aen de Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael ende Ed. heeren raaden van India tot Batavia, Ternate, 31 Aug. 1656, Fo. 221^v.

⁷⁸ VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijoan aen den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar]ende den raet, Batavia, 13 June 1656, fos. 229-235.

⁷⁹ VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 7 Mar. 1656, not foliated. According to a later letter sent to Taiwan from Batavia, the restitution had been made to Coxinga's authorized representatives in Batavia, but they had taken another 3,000 rials as surety that the junk would not abuse their restrictions

CHAPTER ELEVEN

letter are no longer available in any of the archives, it is clear that Coxinga's intention was to challenge the Dutch monopoly on deerskins and pepper, two very lucrative items on the Japanese and Chinese markets.

While Coxinga was fitting out his fleet for his routine northern expedition on 27 June, although he had not yet received any reply from Batavia, he issued a placard announcing that the embargo on Taiwan would begin in a hundred days' time (5 October 1656).⁸⁰ The placard set out the two-fold reasons for his action. On the one hand the embargo was a measure against the Dutch to squeeze a better price and was aimed directly at the Batavian authorities; on the other hand it was a measure addressed at the Chinese community in Taiwan to give them a shake up, because Coxinga was worried that this community would create the only loophole in his monopoly on Chinese trade and make good profits from Taiwan-Manila trade, taking advantage of the fact the Dutch were prevented by the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia from opening the trade with Manila. Coxinga threatened this small Chinese community, giving it a choice between joining his camp or abandoning its share in the Chinese trade.⁸¹

Although Prince Chitu's attempt to land in Amoy had failed, he refused to give up his aim of capturing Ping-chou Fort, Coxinga's bridgehead on the mainland. He was to be disappointed because its garrison was well entrenched and the Manchus had to return to Fu-chou empty-handed.⁸² Three

again. See: VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijoan aen den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar]ende den raet, Batavia, 13 June 1656, fo. 234.

⁸⁰ *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, IV:1655-1662, 80-1. 9 July 1656. The yacht, the *Leeuwinne*, carrying the letter from Batavia about this matter arrived Taiwan on 28 July 1656. *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 89. 28 July 1656.

⁸¹ As the Dutch and Spanish had concluded peace in 1648 with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, any direct trade between Batavia and Manila would have violated the treaty. However, the Chinese communities under Dutch were not restricted by this Article.

⁸² NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E Joan

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

months later, an internal crisis unexpectedly broke in Coxinga's ranks. One of his Defence Commands, Huang Wu (*Huang Erh-yeh*[C], *Onnia*[D]), suddenly surrendered Haich'eng city including its garrison to the Manchus on 12 August 1656, fearing the wrath of Coxinga on account of his recent serious defeat in a battle with the Manchus.⁸³ His defection not only opened up a break in Coxinga's sealed defence line, but the Dutch records state it also caused him a loss of valuable resources:

*'The same person [Huang Wu] has also taken his [Coxinga's] money. It was indeed a huge loss for Coxinga as this city was said to be unassailable, because it is surrounded by open sea on the outer side and enclosed by three layers of walls inside. Coxinga's principal treasures, which had been accumulated over a [long] period of time, were also kept there and an incredibly huge amount of paddy and military resources, according to Chinese sources. Coxinga therefore has lost more than two-thirds of his fortune. Problems have also arisen as it was the only place from where he could supply his junks with all their necessities. Therefore his junks will soon be in urgent need of masts, planks, nails and other supplies, which he will not be able to procure from anywhere else.'*⁸⁴

This dire picture might not have been an overexaggeration. Chinese records report that the 374,000 piculs of paddy and 410,000 catties of gunpowder from this city fell into the laps of the Manchus like a gift from the gods.⁸⁵ Most of the commodities were stored in Amoy and Quemoy, but more trade would be needed before this merchandise could be transformed

Boucheljon, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fo. 56.

⁸³ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 101.

⁸⁴ VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 35^r.

⁸⁵ Li Huan, *Ch'ing-c'i-hsien lei-chêng hsüan-pien*[Selections from the Biographies of Individuals under the Ch'ing Dynasty], TW no. 230, 331.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

into military supplies. This realization made Coxinga rely even more heavily on his trading activities as the vehicle through which to achieve his political ambitions.

Now that Coxinga had risen to power as the sole leader of the Amoy naval force, a position from which was able to monopolize the Chinese trade, he did not scruple to use both military and economic power in his pursuit of his goals. To sum up: he challenged the Manchu political structure by inventing a new political framework comparing the situation of Fu-chien province with that of Korea; he challenged the settled price required by the *pancando* system in Japan by unexpectedly dispatching junks to Japan in the teeth of the north monsoon; he challenged Spanish control of the Mexican silver supply by declaring an embargo on all Chinese junk shipping to Manila; he also challenged the Dutch monopsony on Sumatran pepper and Siamese deerskins by conducting official negotiations to purchase commodities and once again imposing an embargo. As his only hope was to push all these enterprises through to keep all his subjects together, he occasionally had to play the tyrant over his own people. For Defence Command Huang Wu, the choice was obvious: since living under Coxinga was no easier than to submitting to the Manchus, why bother continue to fight the Manchus?

Expanding war and trade 1656-1659

The loss of Hai-ch'êng may put an end to Coxinga's plans to enlarge his trading fleet, because he had lost most of the materials to maintain and repair his ships. As these items were essential, he immediately decided to raid and try to occupy the coast of Fu-chou (from where all kinds of timber were exported), so that his ship-building programme would not be thrown out of joint and his ambitions not be thwarted. The plan was that his troops would gain control of all the ship-building sites and seize any materials which were needed. As this was what he had set his sights on, Fu-chou prefecture was the

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

primary goal of the next northern expedition.⁸⁶ Coxinga's fleet sailed into the Min River and occupied Min-an-chên (now Ma-wei) on 23 August 1656.⁸⁷ Alerted by this attack, the Manchu General-in-Chief quickly assembled all his soldiers, withdrawing his men back to Fu-chou which he fortified from various scattered outposts.⁸⁸ As Min-an-chên is situated on the northern bank of the Min River between Fu-chou city and the coast, Coxinga's troops were in a prime position to blockade any attempt the Manchus might make to fight back by the Min River estuary. Besides occupying the estuary, they opened a series harbours along the coast including Sha-ch'eng. Coxinga arrived in Min-an-chên on 20 October 1656 and immediately arranged for the building of several forts from which to blockade the Manchu troops in Fu-chou city.⁸⁹ In November he ordered his fleet to sail to San-tou Island in preparation for the siege of Ning-te District (*Lintekwan*[D.]) which is located between Fu-chou and Sha-ch'eng. If he gained control of both Ning-te and San-tou, which lies opposite it, Coxinga would be able to secure the sea route from Amoy to Sha-ch'eng and this would give him access to the land route via Chê-chiang which connected up with the Chiang-nan silk market.⁹⁰ Once the Manchu soldiers were sealed off by Coxinga's blockade of Fu-chou, the trade between Amoy and Chê-chiang was re-opened. The Chief of Deshima,

⁸⁶ I T'u, 'i-t'u têng wei ch'ih kai-tou-fu yü huang-wu t'o-i chin-hai shih-pên [Suggestions from I T'u about the Imperial Edict Regulating the Enforcement of the Maritime Ban by Huang Wu and Related Governors and Grand Co-ordinators] 15 Aug. 1657', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 6, 377. 'The pirates [Coxinga's navy] seized the rice from Ch'ao-chou and Hui-chou which provided them with adequate supplies; they stole the commodities from Hsin-hua, Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou which they sold at a satisfactory price; they purloined the ship-building materials from Fu-chou, Fun-ning and Wen-chou which were ample for their needs.'

⁸⁷ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 102.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, 103.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 105.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Zacharias Wagenaer wrote :

*'The Chinese brought the news that the war in their region had ended. The Tartars (Manchus) were holding on to where they were and were keeping quiet. Coxinga on the contrary was taking advantage of this lull in the fighting and was busying himself with trade, sometimes sending two or three junks simultaneously to one place or many more richly laden ones to another place.'*⁹¹

Between 1 February and 15 September 1656, fifty-two junks from China and Southeast Asia visited Nagasaki. All the thirty-four junks which came directly from China this monsoon season were from the areas under Coxinga's control (An-hai, Chang-chou, Fu-chou), with the exception of two junks from Nanking which carried only a few goods.⁹² In a word, Coxinga had gained complete control over the Chinese silk exports to Japan. For the first time the Dutch merchants in Japan noted that the junks carried passes issued by Coxinga.⁹³ During the time he spent in San-tou, he consummated his plan and was able to collect enough timber to carry out his ship-building project satisfactorily.⁹⁴

When Coxinga launched his raid on Ning-te on 11 February 1657, the Manchu cavalry and infantry troops led by a Banner Vice-Commander-in-Chief (Mei-Lê Chang-ching), A-Kê-shang, left Fu-chou to curb the invasion by Coxinga's troops. While Coxinga's main

⁹¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 280. 26 Dec. 1656; NFJ 288, Missive aan haer Edelen[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia [door Zacharias Wagenaer] dato ultimo December per Chinese jonck over Siam geschreven, Japan, 31 Dec. 1656, fo. 8.

⁹² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 271. 1 Nov. 1656.

⁹³ NFJ 288, Missive aan haer Edelen[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia [door Zacharias Wagenaer] dato ultimo December per Chinese jonck over Siam geschreven, Japan, 31 Dec. 1656, fo. 8.

⁹⁴ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 104.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

corps laid the siege to Ning-te, other soldiers of his defeated the Manchu cavalry in a surprise attack.⁹⁵

As soon as the Chêchiang route became accessible again, Coxinga dispatched two junks carrying all kinds of commodities, including Chinese gold, to Batavia with a letter addressed to the Chinese Captains of Batavia, P'an Ming-yen and Yen Erh-kuan, asking them to forward his message to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker.⁹⁶ He explained that he had no intention of attacking Taiwan, even though he had issued a placard banning Chinese trade to Taiwan. His motive for this had been purely to ensure his traders in Taiwan were treated better. In his second point, he implied that the Batavian authorities should also reduce the price of some commodities (apparently he was referring to pepper) or he would no longer send any junks there. In this letter, the requests he had made earlier asking that the pepper price be lowered and that his junks should be allowed to sail to the Pepper Coast were omitted. The purpose of this letter was to avoid the conflict escalating into an all out war. While maintaining his embargo, Coxinga was also looking for better means to protect his junks against Dutch harassment.

Perhaps Coxinga did not really have any clear picture of what he might gain from this embargo, but it was absolutely certain that it was not going to hurt his trade. In 1655, one *wankang* carried a letter from Hung Hsü to Malacca, another richly laden Amoy junk and two Quinam junks with cargoes of equal wealth visited Johor and three other junks sailed to Ligore, Sangora, and Patani.⁹⁷ Some rumours mentioned other Chinese visits to Pahang and Palembang too.⁹⁸ It would be hard to believe that most of these

⁹⁵ Ibidem, 105; *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 141. 1 Apr. 1657.

⁹⁶ *Dagregister Batavia, 1656-1657*, 100-101. 18 Feb. 1657.

⁹⁷ VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fos. 221^v-222^r.

⁹⁸ VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Malacca aen den gouverneur Jan Thijssen, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 405^{r-v}.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

junks did not buy pepper, tin and rattan at low prices, even though the eight junks which visited Batavia in the same year had also purchased more than 16,000 piculs at a relatively higher price.⁹⁹ The Dutch Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, estimated that Coxinga's junks must have purchased the same or slightly more than the usual amount the Dutch generally provided to Amoy by way of Taiwan.¹⁰⁰ Although one of these junks had been captured by the VOC merchant Antony Boey near the roadstead of Palembang, Coxinga did not feel any need to stop dispatching junks to the Pepper Coast. For example, in the spring of 1656 one Chinese *wankang* from either Cambodia or Quinam still visited Jambi.¹⁰¹

The most important trade item exchanged between Coxinga and the VOC in Taiwan was Chinese gold. The trade in gold, which was shipped to India, was the real centre of gravity in the Sino-Dutch trade in Taiwan.

Table 11-4: Gold exports from Taiwan by the VOC

Year	Chinese gold exported via Taiwan (f.)*
1646-1647	291,665
1647-1648	910,595
1648-1649	1,962,697
1649-1650	1,321,351
1650-1651	1,423,761
1651-1652	668,410
1652-1653	629,086
1653-1654	1,110,525
1654-1655	312,229

⁹⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁰ VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Choromandel aen den gouverneur Laurens Pith, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 409^r.

¹⁰¹ VOC 1214, Missiven door Jacob Nolpe aan haar Eds. tot Batavia geschreven, Jambi, 22 Feb. 1656, fo. 182^v.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

1655-1656	104,497 ¹⁰²
1656-1657	168,200 ¹⁰³
1657-1658	424,736 ¹⁰⁴
1658-1659	525,000 ¹⁰⁵
1659-1660	180,000 ¹⁰⁶
1660-1661	141,901 ¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² NFJ 287, Missive door haer Edle [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] uijt Batavia per 't schip Aernhem over Siam [aan oppercoopman Joan Bouchelion in Japan], 4 May 1656, Batavia, fo. 78. In the spring of 1657, the yacht *Swarte Vos* carried f. 48,000 Chinese gold to Batavia. Cf. *Generale Missive*, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 409.

¹⁰³ VOC 1218, Missive door Frederik Coijet en verderen raad int Casteel Zeelandia aen d'Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en d'Ed. heeren raden van India tot Batavia, Taiwan, 27 Dec. 1656, fo. 467^f. In: *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 116. 31 Jan. 1657. It was recorded as f. 168,113.

¹⁰⁴ At the end of 1657, 10,486 62/73 rials or 7,655 taels pure gold was sent to Malacca (1 tael=100 condijn, 1 rial=73 condijn), which equals 393,256 guilders (1 rial pure gold = 750 stuivers. Cf. VOC 1212, Missive door Cornelis Ceasar en raad aan haar Eds. tot Batavia, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 305^f) Cf. VOC 1228, Missive naer Batavia aen de heeren den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende raden van India door gouverneur Frederick Coijett en raet, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 476^f; VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijssen, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 551^f. In the spring of 1658, 31,480 guilders of gold were sent to Batavia. Cf. VOC 1228, Factura van de poeijersuijcker en anderessints gescheept door ordre van Frederick Coyett in 't fluijtschip Breukelen, gaende van Taijouan naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 669^f. The two numbers added together show that the gold export from Taiwan during 1657-1658 was worth 424,736 guilders.

¹⁰⁵ General Missive, 16 Dec. 1659, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 462.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷ VOC 1236, Missive van den gouverneur Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Dec. 1660, fo. 167. 1,759 taels of Chinese gold, which equalled f. 90,359, was sent to the Coromandel via Malacca. Added to the gold sent to Batavia from Taiwan, which was 950.8 taels or 48,842 guilders, the total is 141,901 guilders, c.f. *Daghregister Batavia*, 1661, 61. 22 Mar.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Source: *VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomeene Taijouanse zuijt gout [A Memorandum of the Quantity and Drop in Taiwanese Pure Gold Received], 25 Feb. 1657, fo.15^v. note: most of the gold was transshipped from China, only a little came from Taiwanese gold-mines.

As mentioned earlier, when Coxinga recruited his first group of soldiers he and the An-hai merchants exported extraordinary amounts of gold through Taiwan in the period 1648-1650, when Kuang-chou was under siege and the passes issued by Iquan were still valid in the areas under the Manchus. Since 1651, after the Manchus occupied Canton and the Macao trade resumed, the exports of Chinese gold to Taiwan from Amoy had also been gradually declining. During the truce between Coxinga and the Manchus between June of 1653 and March of 1654, the gold exports jumped to a high level again. The VOC wanted Chinese gold to pay for the silks exported from Bengal and especially for the textiles from the Coromandel Coast. Rather than purchase the tropical commodities offered in Taiwan by the VOC, the Amoy merchants preferred to trade the Chinese gold for Japanese silver. They knew that the tropical commodities could be obtained cheaper elsewhere and the fact that the silver price in Taiwan had dropped below that in China since 1652 was an added incentive (they could barter more silver from Taiwan than before).¹⁰⁸ The High Government in Batavia decided that Japanese silver should be invested in other places (especially India) and therefore in the summer of 1653 ordered the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, to stop paying for Chinese gold with silver. On his own discretion, Governor Caesar decided to follow the order only in part and paid the Chinese merchants half in silver and half in tropical commodities as a means to get rid of the goods which were not in demand and were clogging up the Company warehouse.¹⁰⁹ This

1661. (1 tael= 100 condijns, 1 rial=73 condijns, 1 rial gold= 750 stuivers, 1 guilder=20 stuivers)

¹⁰⁸ Generale Missive, 24 Dec. 1652, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 313.

¹⁰⁹ VOC 1206, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker,

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

restricted policy certainly contributed to large exports of Chinese gold in 1653, but it backfired on the Amoy merchants because the Dutch postponed payment and trapped them, forcing them to accept these goods for which there was no demand. Despite resorting to such ruses, heavy debts still forced Governor Caesar to use silver coins from the Company warehouse as payment to settle these debts in 1654.¹¹⁰

Coxinga's embargo on Japan and Manila and his policies to disadvantage Taiwan were devised to squeeze yet more silver out of his suppliers. Before a total embargo was announced in June 1656, since February of 1655 the trade between Amoy and Taiwan had been gradually falling into a decline.¹¹¹ Just as when Coxinga had earlier announced the embargo on the trade in raw silk to Japan, the present embargo on Taiwan was also meant to conceal his incapacity to offer the goods demanded from China. Naturally, his own junks were excluded from the trade ban and he still sold gold to Taiwan. For example, in February 1657 several junks carried 48,000 guilders' worth of Chinese gold to Taiwan.¹¹² Therefore even under Coxinga's ban the gold exports were still maintained, though at a low level. Consequently, the restriction of the gold trade did his traders no special harm, for two reasons: he now purchased pepper directly from the pepper-producing areas at a lower price and the gold price in China had risen 5 per cent, which made it less profitable as an export commodity. When the silver price in Taiwan rose in comparison to that in China after the March 1657, the gold-for-silver trade became a less attractive prospect for the Amoy merchants.¹¹³

Taiwan, 5 Dec. 1653, fos. 134^v-135^r.

¹¹⁰ VOC 1194, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz. Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1654, fo. 157.

¹¹¹ Generale Missive, 1 Feb. 1656, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 387.

¹¹² Generale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 408-9.

¹¹³ Generale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 408-9.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Dutch in Taiwan were anxious to be able to get their hand on increasing quantities of Chinese gold to fuel the expanding Coromandel silk trade. Since the beginning of 1650s, the VOC had increasingly depended on the raw silk exports from Coromandel to supply the Japanese market and, after 1655, the Coromandel Coast became the sole source for the raw silk trade with Japan. The VOC merchants in India expanded their credit by borrowing money from local merchants, thereby incurring heavy debts because of the interest. As the price of gold in India was higher than that of silver, the rich profits reaped in the gold trade helped the Company to quit its debts in India.

Table 11-5: The VOC Exports of Bengal (Coromandel Coast) Raw Silk to Japan

Year	Bengal raw silk amount by the VOC in Japan (picul)*	Percentage in total raw silk exports by the VOC in Japan**
1652	525.22	43.6
1653	979.69	64.9
1654	453.86	56.3
1655	810.77	100.0
1656	1,394.82	75.1
1657	1,097.03	88.2
1658	1,446.83	100
1659	1,321.42	81.7
1660	1,567.18	100

Source: *Nagazumi, 'You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i', 42. Table.1; **The denominator of this percentage is the total amount of silk exported annually to Japan by the VOC, which is the sum of exports from China, Tonkin and Bengal. The silk exports from other places have omitted because they were insignificant.

Under these circumstances, the order sent from the Coromandel Coast to Taiwan in 1655 amounted to 1,000,000 guilders of Chinese gold, but only

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

10 per cent was actually delivered.¹¹⁴ In the following year, 1656, Coromandel Coast required an even larger amount of up to 1,200,000 guilders of Chinese gold.¹¹⁵ The Taiwan factory was only able to provide about 14 per cent of this amount as the above table shows.

On 27 December 1656, Cornelis Caesar resigned and Frederick Coyet was appointed Governor of Taiwan. Seeking to redress the problem, Coyet dispatched a Chinese interpreter, He T'ing-ping (*Pinquan*[D.]), to Amoy at the end of March 1657.¹¹⁶ When the envoy arrived there on 4 April 1657, Coxinga and his main fleet were residing on San-tou Island outside the Min River estuary, from where they were preparing to sail farther north to trade on the Chê-chiang coast.¹¹⁷ He T'ing-ping delivered the letters from Caesar to Coxinga's uncle, Cheng Hung-k'uei (whose name was written as 'Sikokon[D.]', his noble title 'Ting-kuo-kong[C.] (Duke of Ting-kuo)' in Quemoy), and Cheng Tai (who was addressed by his nickname 'Sauja[D.]') respectively and lodged with them for five days.¹¹⁸ Although He T'ing-ping had tried to catch up with Coxinga by ship, he had been held up in Amoy for

¹¹⁴ VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Suratta aen directeur Hendrick van Gendt [Letter from Governor Cornelis Caesar to Director Hendrick van Gendt in Surat], Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 414^v.

¹¹⁵ VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijouan aen den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar] ende den raedt, Batavia, 25 July 1656, fo. 324; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker naer Taijouan aen den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar], Batavia, 25 July 1656, fo. 128.

¹¹⁶ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657.

¹¹⁷ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 38^f; Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 110.

¹¹⁸ VOC 1222, Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T'ingpin to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527^r; *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657. Mr. Chiang Shu-shêng pointed out that 'Si' may refer to 'four' according to his previous nick name 'Si sia' (the fourth son).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

a fortnight because the sea route between Amoy and San-tou was under the threat from Manchu vessels.¹¹⁹ In late April, the unexpected strength of the north monsoon prevented the whole fleet from sailing north, so Coxinga had to return to Amoy.¹²⁰ At the beginning of May, He T'ing-ping encountered Coxinga's returning fleet and finally delivered Coyet's letter to him. The next morning, Coxinga summoned a committee and asked He T'ing-ping about the unfulfilled contract between Iquan and the former Taiwan Governor, Johan van der Burg (although he did not mention the latter by name). Coxinga and his court doubted whether the contract had really been concluded and were dubious about whether the Dutch had bothered to pay their duty or rent to be handed over annually since 1647 after Iquan had left to Peking. This suspicion was allayed by He T'ing-ping, who assured them that he had never heard any whisper of this since he had taken up residence in Taiwan and that there were no records of it in the Dutch documents.¹²¹ Coxinga took He T'ing-ping with him to Amoy where he summoned his Council to deal with this case on 25 May 1657.¹²² At this meeting, Coxinga

¹¹⁹ VOC 1222, *Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa* [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T'ingpin to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527^r. According to Chinese sources, these were vessels of the Ch'ao-chou Coastal Defence Fleet under Hsü Lung, sailing from Kuang-tung.

¹²⁰ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 110.

¹²¹ *Daghregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 161. 13 June 1657; VOC 1222, *Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa* [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T'ing-ping to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527^r-528^r.

¹²² *Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa* [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T'ingpin to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527^r. Cheng Hung-k'uei passed away when

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

raised several trivial matters to do with the treatment of Chinese merchants in Taiwan and wondered why former Governor Caesar had forced all the Chinese merchants to accept payment in commodities rather than in silver?¹²³ Instead of writing all these matters down, Coxinga wrote to Governor Fredrik Coyet saying that he condemned all the wrong doings of his predecessor and had high expectations that Coyet would set matters straight. Only two conditions did he mention for the lifting of the embargo (or ‘ for restoring the old friendship’).

The first of these required the Dutch would not harm any Chinese junks visiting Siam, Cambodia and Palembang, or anywhere else in the South China Sea. The second required that the goods which had been confiscated from his junks by the Dutch should be restituted.¹²⁴

This message was carried to Taiwan by He T’ing-ping on 13 June 1657.¹²⁵ It was translated into Dutch and read in the Council of Taiwan. Governor Coyett and the Council of Taiwan immediately drafted a reply. Promising the Chinese merchants prompt payment, they promised that they would also forward Coxinga’s requests to the High Government in Batavia, but they remained silent about the restitution of the lost goods.¹²⁶ In his letter to Cheng Tai, Governor Coyett stated he would ‘welcome a renewal of the old friendship’, and ‘the opening of free trade on this place (Taiwan) according to the old custom’.¹²⁷ Shrewdly Coyett let He T’ing-ping handle

they arrived in Amoy, therefore Coxinga and Cheng Tai had set aside five days to deal with the funeral. *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657.

¹²³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 159. 13 June 1657.

¹²⁴ VOC 1222, Translaet uijt zekeren Chinesen brief door den groot mandorijn Coksinja geschreven aan den heer Frederick Coyett [Translation of a Chinese Letter Written by Great Mandarin Coxinja to Frederick Coyett], not located, 25 May 1657, Fol. 516^v-517^r.

¹²⁵ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 158. 13 June 1657.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*, 162-3. 14 June 1657.

¹²⁷ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Aimuij aen Sauja, Tjonhoehse

CHAPTER ELEVEN

the negotiations first before giving any firm promise. He T'ing-ping must have felt like pig-in-the-middle because Coxinga's side was also expecting him to bargain for concrete concessions. Cheng Tai had drawn up a list of commodities for which he asked a discount 'in order to trade with gold at the first [possible] opportunity'. He asked for 10,000 piculs of pepper, 2,000 piculs of red sandalwood, 500 piculs of lead, 500 piculs of tin and such spices as cloves, patchak and incense. The Dutch discussed the list but refused to sell the commodities at the prices proposed by Cheng Tai, which were obviously too low to accept.¹²⁸ He T'ing-ping left Taiwan for Amoy carrying the official letters and the oral communications. He arrived there on 14 July 1657¹²⁹ and was summoned to Coxinga's court three days later. In the past weeks, Coxinga had received news that one of his junks had been captured by a Dutch yacht off the coast of Quinam.¹³⁰ When he heard about this, Coxinga's suspicions about the true intentions of the Dutch, who were talking about restoring the old friendships, deepened. He T'ing-ping replied that the Taiwan authorities had also heard about this incident and were willing to keep the confiscated goods until he could collect them. Coxinga thereupon put an end to the dispute and ordered his court to prepare a placard announcing that the embargo had been lifted.¹³¹ The placard was officially stamped and proclaimed everywhere in Amoy on 6 August 1657.¹³²

Meanwhile, before he set off on his northern expedition to Chê-chiang Coxinga was preparing a huge banquet to treat all his captains, officials,

Theloia, mandorijn in Aimuij [Letter from the Governor of Taiwan Frederick Coyett to Cheng Tai], Taiwan, 2 July 1657, fo. 509^v.

¹²⁸ VOC 1222, Resolutie des Casteels Zeelandia voorgevallen onder de regering van den president Frederick Coyett [Resolution Zeelandia Castle Issued during the Term of Office of President Frederick Coyett], Taiwan, 27 June 1657, fo. 72^{r-v}.

¹²⁹ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 185. 2 Aug. 1657.

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*, 168. 29 June 1657; 169. 30 June 1657.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 186. 3 Aug. 1657.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 204. 25 Aug. 1657.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

soldiers and their families.¹³³ Although He T'ing-ping was in a hurry to leave, he was invited to tarry and join the feast. Only one day after the placard was proclaimed, a Chinese junk returned from Siam and reported that another Chinese junk had been captured by Dutch ships on its homeward-bound voyage from Johor.¹³⁴ This accident embarrassed Coxinga and he ordered the removal of all the placards posted. He was in a quandary. Because the northern expedition was at stake and the demands of the Chê-chiang market had to be met, he needed merchandise from Taiwan. Thanks to He T'ing-ping's mediation, a reliable chain of communication with the Dutch in Taiwan had been opened and Coxinga therefore decided to set the dispute aside and lift the ban before the fleet departed on 19 August 1657.¹³⁵ On 21 August 1657 a Chinese junk belonging to the Mandarin of Nan-ao arrived in Taiwan (via Amoy) with 20 pieces of gold ingots and 1,005 taels of silver.¹³⁶ Her arrival meant the Chinese gold trade could be resumed. Up to the end of December, the Taiwan factory received 393,256 guilders in gold, while it sold 11,000 piculs of pepper at the price of 10¾ rials to 12 rials per picul.¹³⁷ He T'ing-ping carried letters from Coxinga and Cheng Tai as well as the Chinese

¹³³ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 113. *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 199. 23 Aug. 1657.

¹³⁴ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 200. 23 Aug. 1657.

¹³⁵ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 114. Perhaps on around 10 August 1657, cf. *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 193. 11 Aug. 1657.

¹³⁶ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 196. 21 Aug. 1657.

¹³⁷ In the end of 1657, 10,486 62/73 rials or 7,655 taels pure gold was sent to Malacca (1 tael=100 condijn, 1 rial=73 condijn), which equalled 393,256 guilders (1 rial pure gold = 750 stuivers, cf. VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 305^r) cf. VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 476^r; VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijssen, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 551^r. VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 35^v. *Generale Missive*, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

placards to Taiwan.¹³⁸ In his letter Cheng Tai wrote that he had managed to calm Coxinga down when the news about the captured junk arrived. He trusted that the Governor Coyet would take care of the restitution of the Johor junk.¹³⁹

Around the end of September in 1657, the two junks dispatched by Coxinga to Batavia returned, bringing Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker's reply.¹⁴⁰ In his letter the Governor-General confirmed that the Dutch were at peace with Coxinga and would welcome his traders, but he made only minor concessions as far as the trade to the Pepper Coast was concerned. Nevertheless, the High Government in Batavia graciously permitted Coxinga to send two or three junks to Malacca.¹⁴¹ Although this was not mentioned in the above letter, the two junks which delivered this message had also been offered half a rial discount per picul on the pepper purchased.¹⁴²

Coxinga's northern expedition to the Chê-chiang coast ran smoothly because only few Manchu banner troops had been posted in the province and most of the Ch'ing soldiers were Chinese who had surrendered to Manchus. Altogether there were only 35,000 to 39,400 Ch'ing soldiers scattered over the whole province. In contrast, Coxinga had at least 40,000 soldiers congregated at his disposal.¹⁴³ Most of the Ch'ing garrisons at fortified sites

¹³⁸ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 199. 22 Aug. 1657.

¹³⁹ VOC 1222, Translaet uijt seeckeren Chinesen brief door den Mandorijn Suja geschreven aan Frederick Coyett, [1657-8], fos. 522^v-523^r.

¹⁴⁰ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 225. 27 Sept. 1657.

¹⁴¹ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1657, 188. 17 June 1657.

¹⁴² *Ibidem*, 145-6. 24 Apr. 1657.

¹⁴³ Ch'ên Ying-t'ai, 'Ch'ên ying-t'ai t'i wei ch'ing-fa man-ping chi hsi-pei lu-ying-ping fu-chê shih-pên [Written Petition Submitted by Ch'ên ying-t'ai Requesting the Emperor to Dispatch Chinese Troops from the Northwestern Camps and Manchu Troops to Chê-chiang] 24 Dec. 1657', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 7, 69; I T'u, 'I-t'u têng wei chê-shêng ti-kuang ping-tan hsü-yao tsêng-ping shê-fang shih-pên [Petition

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

did not carry more than 500 men, while Coxinga's fleet would have no trouble transporting more than 10,000 soldiers at one time.¹⁴⁴ Just at this critical juncture, Coxinga directed his troops to T'ai-chou (*Tjoetiauw*[D.]).¹⁴⁵ On 21 September 1657, 20,000 soldiers landed in the vicinity of this city¹⁴⁶ and laid the siege to it four days later, on the 25th. Two days later T'ai-chou surrendered to Coxinga.¹⁴⁷ In the weeks which followed, all the neighbouring towns in the prefecture surrendered without offering any defence. As soon as the take-over had been completed by Coxinga's officials, the markets were re-opened.¹⁴⁸ Having discovered that Coxinga's main force had moved from his base in Amoy to the Chê-chiang coast, the Manchu Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, shrewdly prepared a massive assault on Coxinga's various bridgeheads in Min-an-chên. On 20 October 1657, his Manchu troops broke through the Min-an-chên fortifications which meant that the land route from Fu-chou to the

Submitted by I T'u Requesting that the Size of the Garrison Be Increased so that It Might be More Widely Deployed] 8 Jan. 1658', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no. 7, 77; Lang T'ing-tso, 'Lang t'ing-tso t'i wei chêng-chün ssu-you chin-fan wu-sung ch'ung-ming chih-shih shih-pên [Report Written by Lang t'ing-tso about the Attempt by the Cheng Force to Attack the Town of Wu-sung and Ch'ung-ming Island] 15 Oct. 1657', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no. 7, 430.

¹⁴⁴ T'ien hsiung, 'T'ien-hsiung t'i wei chê-chiang yen-hai hsün-kuang ping t'an ch'ing tiao-ping hsieh-fang shih-pên [Petition Written by Tien-hsiung to Request Larger Garrisons to Defend the Coast of Chê-chiang] 1 Jan. 1658', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no. 7, 95.

¹⁴⁵ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 214. 6 Sept. 1657; Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 114.

¹⁴⁶ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 115; I T'u, 'I-t'u têng t'i wei huang-yen t'ai-chou shih-hsien shih-pên 4 Nov. 1657, in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 7, 473.

¹⁴⁷ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 115.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 116.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Chê-chiang coast could be re-opened and the aid to Chê-chiang coast from Fu-chou (both on land and on water) would be allowed.¹⁴⁹ Coxinga therefore had to abort his advance and return to Amoy in November.

Meanwhile, Cheng Tai had urged Governor Coyet to honour his promise to restitute the impounded junks and confiscated goods and to give a guarantee that Chinese junks would be able to visit any port in the South China Sea region. He also made it tactfully understood that Coxinga might be provoked to proclaim another embargo if these conditions were not met.¹⁵⁰

Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan had already discussed the seizure of the junks on 4 September 1657 and they believed that Cheng Tai had already been informed about the outcome by his agent. Their resolution declared that the confiscation of the Johor junk had been legal because the embargo was interpreted as a malicious action against the Dutch. Although they had given orders that the impounded Chinese junks should be brought to Taiwan, the Johor junk was lost in a typhoon and the Company would only return the cargo which had been captured and salvaged. In the case of the junk which had been captured off Quinam, the list of goods lost submitted by the Chinese owner was not accepted as accurate. Nevertheless, the Council had punished the captain who had seized the junk and Cheng Tai's agent was free to sue him if he wished. Finally, the case of the junk captured in 1654 off the Kuang-tung coast had already settled by the Batavian authorities with Coxinga. For various reasons, the Taiwan authorities therefore repudiated Cheng Tai's request for compensation.¹⁵¹

As Coxinga was fitting out his trading-junks in the next monsoon and

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 118; VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 38^r.

¹⁵⁰ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 256. 13 Nov. 1657.

¹⁵¹ VOC 1222, Misive van Frederick Coyett naer Aimuij aen den mandorijn Sauja[Cheng Tai], Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1657, fos. 292^v-293^r.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

preparing to escort them southwards, Cheng Tai asked Governor Coyet to grant four passes to Siam, Palembang, Malacca and Johor.¹⁵² Perhaps because Governor Coyet was worried about having failed to satisfy all of Coxinga's demands, he decided to comply with the request. In his letter to Cheng Tai, he emphasized that this should be seen as an exceptional gesture.¹⁵³ Explaining his decision to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker, Coyet writes:

*'If only the Kings of Cambodia, Palembang, and other places which have concluded contracts with the Company would honour their promises properly and order their subjects not to sell designated goods to anyone other than the Company, the Company would suffer no harm. They should also punish those transgressors in their own kingdoms, which is more fitting than that we should have to check the junks and confiscate their goods. This had reaped us more than enough odium in Japan and China, and it has also caused the loss of earlier privileges in Siam since 1653.'*¹⁵⁴

Even the Japanese Shogun was aware of the recent Dutch patrol actions against Chinese junks. After she had been struck by a typhoon, some confiscated goods and the surviving crew of the Johor junk had been brought directly to Japan by the Dutch ship the *Urk* on 23 August 1657. This caused an uproar among the Chinese in Nagasaki who shouted 'Death to you' and 'Dutch robber ship', as they pelted the crew of the *Urk* with stones, even though the latter were already in custody.¹⁵⁵ After the Chinese merchants had

¹⁵² Ibidem, fo. 294^r.

¹⁵³ *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 256. 13 Nov. 1657.

¹⁵⁴ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 21^{r-v}; VOC 1228, Resolutie in rade van Formosa, Taiwan, 13 Nov. 1657, fo. 499^r.

¹⁵⁵ NFJ 288, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer en den raet deses Comptoirs aan haer Edts [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker]tot Batavia, Japan, 12 Oct. 1657, fo. 34. According to the log of the *Urk*, the crew of this ship had disobeyed the

CHAPTER ELEVEN

lodged an appeal with the shogunal court, the verdict was that the legal owner should be compensated in Taiwan for the loss of the junk and her cargo. The shogunal court also warned the Dutch not to commit any such acts of piracy again on pain of being expelled from Japan forever.¹⁵⁶ The upshot was that the urgent need for Chinese gold and the pressure exerted by the Japanese authorities forced Governor Coyet to make some concessions.¹⁵⁷ After he had received these four passes, in his reply the Official of Revenue, Cheng Tai, who was residing in Amoy (the *Chu-shou Hu-kuan*), revealed that Coxinga's real intention was to challenge the pass system:

*'Your Honour has sent me four passes, a splendid gesture and I feel highly satisfied with this treatment, even though Coxinga's junks sailing to the east and to the west are more than several hundred. My agent, Pingsick, has written to me that you had told him our junks can sail freely to your places. Even if we encounter some of your ships, we shall be treated as friends and there will be no antagonism as there was before. This being the case, all the junks can now sail the sea freely and there will no longer be any bother with the[Dutch] passes here'*¹⁵⁸

In 1646, Iquan had made an attempt to remould the Chinese tribute

instructions issued by Batavia. They not only chased junks far off their planned course, but also confiscated some goods for themselves. Cf. NFJ 288, Naerder bericht schrift gedaen door voornoemden E Zacharias Wagenaer aan haer Eedle [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Bataiva [Report Written by Zacharias Wagenaer to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 13 Dec. 1657, fos. 99-100.

¹⁵⁶ NFJ 288, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer en den raet deses Comptoirs aan haer Edts [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia, Japan, 12 Oct. 1657, fo. 58.

¹⁵⁷ VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijssen, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 552^r.

¹⁵⁸ VOC 1228, Translaet uijt zeekeren Chinesen brief door den groot mandorijn Sauja geschreven naer Taijouan aan den gouverneur Frederick Coyett, Amoy, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 656^r.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

system by absorbing the crown trade as a means to protect his business against the depredations of the patrols of the VOC. Between 1647 and 1653, Coxinga was still not aware of the fact that the VOC could use its privileges with local rulers as a legal basis to exclude him from certain lucrative trades. It was only after the VOC had confiscated deerskins from his junks off the Chao Phraya estuary in Siam, Coxinga and the Amoy merchants realized that the warning from the Japanese shogunal court was the only effective weapon which would give them any security. Hence, they began to require the VOC factory merchants grant them passes for their return journey to Amoy and their voyage to Japan. As early as May 1652, Chief Merchant Volkerus Westerwolt in Siam issued a pass to a Chinese *anachoda* for his return voyage to Ch'üan-chou.¹⁵⁹ In the summer of 1654, the *anachodas* of eight Chinese junks again asked the Westerwolt to grant them passes to secure a safe voyage home. Although Westerwolt refused their requests for passes, he did give them a guarantee that no junks would be captured at sea in response to the Siamese king's admonition of keeping Chinese junks secure.¹⁶⁰ In the summer of 1655 nine Chinese junks visited Siam and five of them intended to sail from there directly to Japan,¹⁶¹ but they ran into a typhoon and had to turn back, apart from a few which sought shelter in Quinam. When one of the junks finally arrived on Japan in July 1656, she carried the pass issued by

¹⁵⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 79. 2 Sept. 1652.

¹⁶⁰ VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India [Letter Written by Volckerius Westerwolt from Ayutthaya to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 13^{r-v}. Serious tension had been mounting between the two groups because the *anachodas* tried to gain restitution by the expedient of threatening the Dutch merchants in Siam with violence.

¹⁶¹ VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael en raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945^v; NFJ 287, Missive vant Comptoir Nangasackij [door Leonard Winninx] aen haer [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia per de schepen Aremuijden, Vlielandt, en Zoutelande over Taijouan gesonden, Japan, 19 Oct 1655, fo. 27.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Westerwolt and a prince's flag bearing the motto 'Vive Orangie'.¹⁶²

The support of the Siamese King was a very important element in the struggle waged by Coxinga's merchants against the Dutch pass system. In the past, the Sino-Siamese trade had been monopolized by the Siamese King who dispatched junks with tributary embassies to Kuang-chou. When Iquan tried to break into this trade during the 1630s, he was excluded but, as soon as the Lung-wu Emperor was pronounced the legal Emperor of the moribund Ming Empire in 1645, Iquan seized his chance and tried to set up a crown trade under the cover of the tributary system. As mentioned earlier, Siamese envoys did indeed visit Amoy in 1653. At that moment in time it would appear that the Amoy merchants had temporarily snatched the Sino-Siamese trade out of the hands of the Kuang-tung merchants.

Table 11-6: The expansion of Chinese trade to Siam 1650-1661

Year	Chinese junk visited Siam	Chinese junk sailing directly to Japan from Siam
1650	10 ¹⁶³	
1651	6 ¹⁶⁴	
1652	4 ¹⁶⁵	1 ¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 255. 7 July 1656; 256, 10 July 1656; 257-8. 17 July 1656; VOC 1219, Rapport van de coopman Volckerius Westerwolt wegen den toestant van 's compagnies negotie in Siam [Report Written by Merchant Volckerius Westerwolt about the Situation of the Company Trade in Siam], Siam, 16 Nov. 1656, fo. 803^v.

¹⁶³ VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt [van Siam] aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Japan, 4 July 1650, fo. 547^v; *Generale Missive*, II 1639-1655, 448. 20 Jan. 1651.

¹⁶⁴ VOC 1187, Missiven [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia] [door Hendrick Creijers en Volckerius Westerwolt], Siam, 20 Oct. 1651, fo. 664^v; *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 526. 19 Dec. 1651.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

1653	6 ¹⁶⁷	
1654	8 ¹⁶⁸	
1655	9 ¹⁶⁹	
1656	9 ¹⁷⁰	
1657	10 ¹⁷¹	3 ¹⁷²
1658	10 ¹⁷³	6 ¹⁷⁴
1659	21 ¹⁷⁵	7 ¹⁷⁶
1660	14 ¹⁷⁷	7 ¹⁷⁸

¹⁶⁵ VOC 1194, Missive [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia van Volckerius Westerwolt en Jan van Rijck te Siam], Siam, 22 Oct. 1652, fo. 248^f.

¹⁶⁶ VOC 1194, Missive [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia van Volckerius Westerwolt en Jan van Rijck te Siam], Siam, 22 Oct. 1652, fo. 248^f.

¹⁶⁷ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 694. 19 Jan. 1654.

¹⁶⁸ VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 2^f.

¹⁶⁹ VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael en raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945^v.

¹⁷⁰ VOC 1219, Rapport van de coopman Volckerius Westerwolt wegen den toestant van 's compagnies negotie in Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1656, fos. 803^v-804^f.

¹⁷¹ VOC 1223, Missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael ende raden van India residerende tot Batavia, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 812^v; but in: VOC 1223, Missiven aen opperhoofd Zacharias Wagenaer en raet tot Japan van Siam, Siam, 6 July 1657, fo. 600^v. recorded there were 13 Chinese junks arrived.

¹⁷² *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658.

¹⁷³ NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E Joan Boucheljon president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1658, not foliated.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷⁵ NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E Zacharias Wagenaer President opperhoofd over s' Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslach int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 5 July 1659, not foliated.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷⁷ NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia op t nieuw comptoir Siam aan den E Joan Boucheljon, president en opperhoofd over compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie

CHAPTER ELEVEN

1661	3 ¹⁷⁹	
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The expansion of the Chinese junk trade to Siam was another outcome of the wars between the VOC and Quinam and Cambodia during the 1640s. VOC ships frequently blockaded the harbours of these two countries, so that the Chinese junks were obliged to sail elsewhere.

Ever since 1646 when one of his vassals in the Malay Peninsula had rebelled, the Siamese King frequently required Dutch aid for the long-distance military expeditions he mounted to pacify these areas. In 1648 the Company sent seven ships to attack Kedah, forcing its ruler to pay homage to Siam again. When Songkla, Ligor, Patani and Pattalung joined together to rebel in 1649, the VOC personnel in Ayutthaya assisted the King Prasat Thong to mount an expeditionary force with his army. By 1650 most of the rebellions had been suppressed¹⁸⁰ but the Siamese King demanded an even larger force from the Dutch in 1651 for another expedition against Songkla. It was not forthcoming as in 1652 most of the Dutch military resources were already invested in the Moluccas and Amboina.¹⁸¹

As the Dutch were otherwise occupied and not able to help the Siamese Court in its pursuit of its expansionist policies, they found themselves alienated from the Siamese King.¹⁸² The new staff at the Deshima factory in Japan were informed that:

‘He[the Siamese king] is upset because of the refusal to send military aid from Batavia. His displeasure has been intensified by several Chinese

als vorderen ommevlagh int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 10 Aug. 1660, not foliated.

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁹ VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Jan van Rijck aen haer Eds. tot Batavia geschreven, Siam, 10 Oct. 1661, fo. 672.

¹⁸⁰ Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand*, 32.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 33.

¹⁸² Ibid, 34. The reign of King Prasat Thong almost exactly paralleled the period of Dutch political involvement in Ayutthaya.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*and Japanese who are ill disposed towards us [the Dutch] and who have taken this opportunity to curb our special freedoms.*¹⁸³

As the Dutch-Siamese relationship deteriorated, Chinese and Japanese merchants gained more weight at the Siamese Court because the King fostered the ambition of personally controlling the Siam-Japan trade. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the tributary trade between Siam and Japan had been pretty constant but it ground to a halt after Prasat Thong usurped the Siamese throne in 1629. He had poisoned the Japanese mercenary captain, Yamada Nagamasa, and had added insult to injury by burning down the Japanese residential area in Ayutthaya in 1630, effectively destroying the existing tie with Japan.¹⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, the trading-junk and the tributary envoy he sent to Japan in 1634 in an attempt to resume relations were rejected out of hand. Between 1634 and 1655, Prasat Thong sent six different consecutive envoys to Japan, all of whom were either repudiated by the Japanese Court or were lost at sea, swallowed up by the fury of the typhoons.¹⁸⁵ The two embassies dispatched in 1653 and 1656 were mostly probably sent under an arrangement with Chinese merchants. The first was sent on a private junk but the second, accompanied by both Chinese and Siamese sailors, was accomodated on the King's personal ship built in the Dutch style.¹⁸⁶ This vessel left Japan in October 1656 and visited Amoy on her way home. She left there on 25 February 1657 with two other Chinese junks.¹⁸⁷ This arrangement is a very strong clue that Coxinga was

¹⁸³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 104. 16 July 1653.

¹⁸⁴ Iwao Seiichi, 'Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period', *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture*, 4 (1963), 2.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 18.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 16-7.

¹⁸⁷ VOC 1123, Missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende raden van India residerende tot Batavia van coopman Jan van Rijck uijt Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 812^v.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

the organizer of this voyage, an exercise devised to build up a Japan-Amoy-Siam crown trading system.

The passive attitude adopted by the Siamese Court towards honouring the Dutch monopsony on cow hides and deerskins reinforced the expansion of Coxinga's trade and weakened the position of the VOC in Siam. In 1654, the head of the Ayutthaya factory complained that rivalry with the Chinese merchants was forcing the purchase prices to rise.¹⁸⁸ A year later, in 1655 he had not been able to purchase the appointed quantity of skins for Japan.¹⁸⁹ The upshot was that the balance of the Dutch factory in Siam was negative in 1652, 1655 and 1656.¹⁹⁰ Apparently the Dutch monopsony on deerskins had outlived its effectiveness. The friendship and favours shown the Dutch by the Siamese King entered even more troubled waters when King Prasat Thong passed away and his youngest son was enthroned as King Narai in October 1657.¹⁹¹ That year, not only did the Chinese purchase deerskins in large quantities but many Indian and Muslim merchants also entered the market in Siam to sell cotton textiles from India.¹⁹²

Again that same year, Coxinga's junks obtained VOC passes for Siam. These junks enjoyed a very rare opportunity to trade because all the vassals of the Siamese King thronged to Ayutthaya to pay homage to the new incumbent on the throne. Vessels from all over the Malay Peninsula, Patani, Johor and Pahan, crowded the roadstead.¹⁹³ The following year, 1658, the

¹⁸⁸ VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fos. 11^v-12^f.

¹⁸⁹ VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael en raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945^v.

¹⁹⁰ Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand*, 64. Table 3.

¹⁹¹ Iwao, 'Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations', 20.

¹⁹² NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias Wagenaar president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.

¹⁹³ VOC 1223, missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael ende raden van India

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

Chinese merchants were able to purchase no fewer than 70,000 pieces of deerskins and an equal quantity of cow hides because the privileges granted to the Dutch by King Prasat Thong ceased to be acknowledged after his decease.¹⁹⁴ Obviously, it was an opportunity not to be missed and well aware of their chance, Coxinga's merchants snatched away the deerskin trade from under the nose of the VOC.

On the Philippines front, Coxinga lifted the ban on the trade to Manila in the spring of 1657 after some negotiation with Spanish priests who had been dispatched by the Manila government.¹⁹⁵ When Cheng Tai asked the Taiwan factory to grant him several passes, the junks which had returned from Manila already begun to sell spices from the Moluccas.¹⁹⁶ Even before Coxinga had lifted the ban on Taiwan at the end of 1656, his merchants had already purchased 300,000 taels' worth of cotton textiles from Japan to supply the demand in Manila.¹⁹⁷ In the following spring of 1658, twenty junks carried coarse goods like *cangans* (cotton textiles), iron utensils and wheat to Manila, expecting to be able to acquire more Spanish silver there.¹⁹⁸

In conclusion, Coxinga had not only succeeded in monopolizing the silk exports from China, but he also penetrated the Dutch trading bulwarks in

residerende tot Batavia van coopman Jan van Rijk uit Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 813^r.

¹⁹⁴ NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias Wagenaar president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.

¹⁹⁵ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Mar 1657, fo. 1^r.

¹⁹⁶ VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1657, fo. 46^r^v.

¹⁹⁷ NFJ 288, Missive aan haer Edlen [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia dato ultimo December per Chinese Jonck over Siam geschreven [door Joan Bouchelion], Japan, 31 Dec. 1656, fo. 8.

¹⁹⁸ VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 11 Mar. 1658, fo. 492^r.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Siam and the Malay Peninsula, and had begun to focus seriously on Japan and Manila. Buttressed by the large income pouring in from his expanding trading empire, he intended to strike the weakest coastal areas of the Ch'ing empire, thereby forcing the Peking Court return to the table for peace talks.

Two ultimate strikes, 1659-1662

Not long after they had broken through Coxinga's blockade of Fu-chou Harbour, the Manchu tribal cavalry returned to Peking. At the end of December 1657, the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, immediately sent a letter to the Manchu Emperor, Shun-chih, requesting that another troop of Manchu tribal cavalry again be dispatched. This request was turned down on 14 January 1658, because the Shun-chih Emperor had just decided to dispatch Manchu soldiers on a new mission to eradicate the remaining forces of Yung-li Emperor in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou in southwest China.¹⁹⁹ The formal order for this was issued on 18 January 1658.²⁰⁰ At the end of February, two separate armies of Manchu troops went south and regrouped in the hinterland on the western border of Hu-nan province about 900 kilometres from Amoy.²⁰¹

On 5 December 1657 Coxinga led his fleet on a routine mission to Nan-ao Island,²⁰² where rice was both purchased and levied during February and March.²⁰³ Before the junks left in June, they had conquered two districts

¹⁹⁹ I T'u, 'I-t'u têng t'i wei min-chê liang-shêng wu-hsü tsêng chia ping-hsiang shih-pên [Statement Written by I T'u stating that There Was No Need to Increase the Military Budget in Chê-chiang] 14 Jan. 1658', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 7, 92-3.

²⁰⁰ TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, 136-139.

²⁰¹ Ku Ch'êng, *Nan-ming shih* [A History of the Southern Ming], (Peking: Chung-Kuo Ch'ing-Nien, 1997), 901.

²⁰² Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 120.

²⁰³ *Ibidem*, 121.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

along the coast near Chieh-yang.²⁰⁴ They discovered that the fortifications in Chieh-yang and Ch'ao-chou were better reinforced than they had been in previous years. The Manchu authorities had built two bastions on the bank of the Jung River, which obstructed Coxinga's naval troops from sailing upstream and reaching Chieh-yang.²⁰⁵ Coxinga must have detected the moves of the Manchus before March, because even the Dutch had heard about it by then:

*'Yung-li, the opponent of the Manchus, is causing them so much trouble around Hu-nan (Honan[D]) they have had to dispatch many soldiers there. This has allowed the lower land far away from there to find some peace. The direct journey from here (Taiwan) to Sha-ch'eng and the land route beginning from An-hai (to the north) has all become safer.'*²⁰⁶

Since the Manchu garrison troops in Fu-chien and Chê-chiang provinces were scattered around various locations and could not be readily assembled to make the massive force needed to invade Amoy and Quemoy, Coxinga faced fewer risks than might have been thought in mounting a long-range expedition. Since 1654, his strategy had been to attract massive numbers of Manchu troops to Fu-chien and keep them away from the coastal areas. This tactic weakened any impact they might have had on the trading routes to the Chiang-nan area. This was an important move because now that he had collected adequate supplies of commodities from both Japan and Southeast

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 124.

²⁰⁵ Wang Kuo-kuang, 'Wang kuo-kuang t'i wei chêng-chün tsai ch'ao-chou nan-ao i-tai huo-tung ch'ing-hsing shih-pên [Report Written by Wang kuo-kuang about Spotting the Activities of the Cheng Forces around Ch'ao-chou Prefecture and Nan-ao Island] 8 Jan 1658, in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 7, 82.

²⁰⁶ VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 487^v; VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 11 Mar. 1658, fo. 498^r.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Asia, the best way to expand his trade was to construct a direct link between the Chiang-nan region and Japan. If he laid siege to the city of Nanking and forced the Manchus to withdraw their scattered garrisons from the Chiang-nan region, he reasoned he could operate his trade at will in Su-chou and other locations in the vicinity of where the silk was produced. The siege would have the added advantage of forcing the Manchu Court in Peking to open peace talks with him.

On 13 June 1658, Coxinga led all his ships northwards, towards the Chiang-nan region.²⁰⁷ The fleet sailed along the Chê-chiang coast where it was able to levy sufficient quantities of rice around Wen-chou prefecture. This was stored on San-p' Island off the coast. In August the ships sailed on to the Chou-shan Archipelago.²⁰⁸ Although Coxinga laid siege to the prefectural city of Wen-chou for one day, for unknown reasons he suddenly withdrew. The junk which arrived in Japan on 24 July carrying Coxinga's ambassadors probably departed after this sudden withdrawal. Perhaps the Wen-chou authorities helped to fit out this valuable junk in exchange for a guarantee of the safety of their city. The junk arrived in Nagasaki flying 'many flags' and bringing 'beautiful gifts of curious silk fabrics worth about 60,000 taels'.²⁰⁹ The Japanese records show the envoy's suite consisted of 147 people and he carried an official diplomatic letter addressed directly to the Shogun in Edo.²¹⁰ The Dutch Chief merchant, Joan Boucheljon, witnessed their unusual appearance:

'The suite, consisting of 40 persons, proceeded him and came on shore first. They were dressed in strange garb. Once ashore, they stood in order in neat rows with all their ornaments, flags, fans, spikes, cutlasses, chains, trumpets and such. Then the ambassador came in on a similar barge, sitting

²⁰⁷ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 128.

²⁰⁸ *Ibidem*, 129.

²⁰⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 354. 24-5 July 1658.

²¹⁰ Ishihara, *Nihon kisshi no kenkyu*, 51.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*on a chair; with his norimono and bodyguards. He rested for a while at the top of the stairs.*²¹¹

In the letter, after addressing some words of praise to the Japanese, Coxinga implied that if he could defeat the Manchus successfully, he would restore the formal tributary relationship with Japan.²¹² But this only scratched the surface of the bargain. According to the information Governor Frederick Coyett of Formosa received, Coxinga presented a direct request through this envoy.

*'In this way he (although it is not a hundred per cent certain) would also send a junk carrying two his servants to Japan in order to bring his brother back, and he required a huge number of well-armed soldiers on condition that he could promise them (the Japanese soldiers) a piece of land to occupy as a reward. In fact, he would be willing to give them the best island in Nanking [province].*²¹³

This news was also later partly confirmed by Joan Boucheljon in Nagasaki:

'He also requested that permission be given to his half-brother (a son of the above-mentioned woman, who had been left with a Japanese and still lived in Nagasaki) to join him. Furthermore, according to our interpreter, because they were not sure whether the letter requesting assistance in their war against Manchus had been delayed, it was revealed to the interpreters that their envoy enjoyed as great an authority in China as the Shogun did in

²¹¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 355. 26 July 1658.

²¹² The letter was also preserved by the Japanese interpreters, see: *Kai hentai*, 3 vols., ed. Hayashi Harukatsu and Hayashi Nobuatsu, (Tōkyō : Tōyō Bunko, 1958-1959), I, 45; Chang T'an, 'Chêng ch'êng-kung tê kung-tu[Official Documents Written by Chêng ch'êng-kung]', *T'ai-wan Wên-hsien*[Taiwan Historica], 35/2 (1984),11-48 at 24-5.

²¹³ NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon en raadt in Nangasacqui, Taiwan, 30 July 1658, not foliated.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

*Japan.*²¹⁴

Coxinga needed Japanese aid to maintain the occupation of Ch'ung-ming Island. Since the 1650s, his forces had made several attempts to hold on to Ch'ung-ming Island because it was so strategically located in the mouth of the Yang-tze River. The distance between Nagasaki and Ch'ung-ming Island in the Yangtze River estuary was equidistant from this island and Amoy, about 800 kilometres in either direction, the crucial factor was that it was apparently easier to get provisions to maintain the garrison on Ch'ung-ming Island from Japan than from Amoy. The Dutch records report that in Nanking and the Chiang-nan area the price of silk was only half that in Kuang-chou and pepper could be sold at 25 taels (= 31 rials) per picul.²¹⁵ Indubitably the direct trade between Ch'ung-ming and Japan would maximize the profits of the triangular Siam-Sino-Japan trade. The Shogunal Court passed over Coxinga's bold request in silence and adopted a neutral stance towards the civil war on the continent. Before Coxinga's delegates departed from Nagasaki on 8 October, he had already left with his fleet to sail north from Chou-shan. Unfortunately it was struck by a fierce typhoon on 6 September 1658, a calamity which made any further expedition impossible because of the turn of the monsoon season was swiftly approaching.²¹⁶

Coxinga had to regroup his fleet using Chou-shan Archipelago as the gathering point and then commenced raiding several of the district towns around Ningpo. Since his departure from Amoy, until this raid no Manchu

²¹⁴ VOC 1228, Het rapport van het opperhoofd Joan Bouchelion wegens zijn verrichten in Japan gericht aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker tot Batavia [Report Written by Chief Merchant Joan Bouchelion about His Administration in Japan to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 30 Nov. 1658, fo. 700^v; NFJ 289, Missive van Joan Boucheljon naer Taijouan aen gouverneur Frederick Coyett, Japan, 13 Oct. 1658, fo. 15.

²¹⁵ Generaale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 426.

²¹⁶ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 131-2.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

garrison troops had actually been engaged in combat with Coxinga's soldiers. Even after the raids began, the conflicts were pretty small-scale. When Coxinga laid a siege to the district city Hsiang-shan which was situated on an island, the local gentry sent some representatives to negotiate with him and promised their co-operation in his trading ventures. He therefore spared the town.²¹⁷ Apparently trade loomed larger than war in the minds of both sides. Later, in October Coxinga's troops also occupied the Wen-chou and T'ai-chou regions.²¹⁸ Reports from Manchu scouts revealed that by and large his soldiers were engaging peacefully in trade in the countryside, after taking the precaution of shutting up the garrisons within in the city walls.²¹⁹ San-p'an Island was used as the base at which the provisions for all the troops were stored. Chou-shan Island was transformed into a base from which to operate the Japan trade and Sha-ch'eng Harbour was exploited to maintain communications with Amoy. According to Dutch sources: 'Coxinga had occupied two cities in Chê-chiang and was planning to advance into Nanking province.'²²⁰ He maintained a truce with the Manchu garrisons when he was living in Wen-chou and Sha-ch'eng from October 1657 to May 1658.²²¹ In December and January he dispatched five large junks to Japan, carrying different sorts of silk piece goods and sugar valued at about 270,000 taels altogether.²²² Because the silk cargo was estimated at 200,000 taels, Zacharias Wagenaer, the Dutch chief merchant, began to worry about

²¹⁷ Ibidem, 133-4.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 134-5.

²¹⁹ TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 855.

²²⁰ NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan [aen Joan Boucheljon], Taiwan, 7 Aug. 1658, not foliated.

²²¹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 136-138.

²²² NFJ 290, Missive door den E [Zacharias] Wagenaer en den voormelt Raadt [deses Comptoirs in Japan] aen 'd E heer gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende raden van India, Japan, 20 Jan. 1659, fo. 4 ; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 375, 3 Jan. 1659.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

whether this competition might not reduce the profits on Bengal silks.²²³ The following year 1659, Coxinga summoned the whole of his fleet and all his troops and assembled them on the coast of Wen-chou on 13 May. Once the south monsoon set in, he went ahead with his plans for the northern expedition.²²⁴ The cold-shoulder turned on him by the Shogunal Court forced him to shift his original plan of establishing a Japanese garrison on Ch'ungming Island to posting his best troops with their families there. Coxinga therefore gave the unusual order that his captains and soldiers should bring their spouses with them on this expedition.²²⁵ As he moved northwards, he dispatched another ten junks to Japan during the north monsoon. The Dutch records say this group of ten junks exported some 641.2 piculs of raw silk in total, which was about 2/3 of the amount for one season.²²⁶ The Chinese raw silks exports must have been approaching their zenith because the main forces of the Manchus were destined to march on Yün-nan province from Hu-nan province and hence moved farther away from Chiang-nan region.

Table 11-7. The Chinese and the Dutch Silver Exports from Japan and the Chinese Raw Silk Exports in Japan

Year	Chinese Silver* Exports (<i>kanme</i>)	Dutch Silver* Exports (<i>kanme</i>)	Chinese Raw Silk exports in Japan (picul)
1650	6828	3940	963 ²²⁷

²²³ NFJ 290, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer, en den Eaadt deses comptoirs [in Japan] aen Sr Jan van Rijck, met een Chinese jonk, naer Siam gesonden, Japan, 20 Jan. 1659, fo. 2.

²²⁴ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 139; Ku, *Nan-ming-shih*, 935-6.

²²⁵ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 138.

²²⁶ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 384. 3 June 1659. Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 342. Appendix A.

²²⁷ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 423. 10 Dec. 1650.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

1651	4749	4896	937.75 ²²⁸
1652	5687	5719	881.5 ²²⁹
1653	3517	6191	719 ²³⁰
1654	8181	3848	1400 ²³¹
1655	4655	4002	1401 ²³²
1656	5241	6190	1900 ²³³
1657	2450	7562	1120 ²³⁴
1658	11029	5640	1360 ²³⁵

²²⁸ Ibidem, 542. 19 Dec. 1651.

²²⁹ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 337. Appendix A.

²³⁰ Ibidem.

²³¹ NFJ 286, Missive van Gabriel Happart naer Batavia aen de Ed. Heeren den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] en raaden van Nederlants India [Letter from Gabriel Happart to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Taiwan, 18 Nov. 1654, fo. 105.

²³² *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 68. 1 Feb. 1656. But in :NFJ 287, Missive vant Comptoir Nangasackij [van Leonard Winninx] aen haer[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia per de schepen Arnemuiden, Vlielandt, en Zoutelande over Tajjouan, Japan, 19 Oct. 1655, fo. 20; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 340r. Both recorded as 1,316 piculs.

²³³ NFJ 287, Missive van 't Comptoir Nangasackij [van Joan Boucheljon] aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende de raden van India per t retour schip Aernhem naer Batavia gesonden, Japan, 16 Oct. 1656, fo. 78.

²³⁴ NFJ 288, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer en den raet deses Comptoirs aan haer Edts [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker ende raedt] tot Batavia per t jacht Kouckercken end de fluijt Ulisses, Japan, 12 Oct. 1657, fo. 54; *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658.

²³⁵ VOC 1228, het rapport van het opperhoofd Joan Bouchelion wegens sijn verrichten in Japan gericht aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker tot Batavia, Japan, 30 Nov. 1658, fo. 707^v.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

1659	19401	5960	2247 ²³⁶
1660	20151	4269	1988 ²³⁷
1661	25769	5544	
1662	12943	5960	
1663	5411	3672	

Source:* Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortun*, 227. Table 21.

Coxinga was very confident that he would be able to occupy Ch'ung-ming Island, which would give him control of the Nanking area, or more precisely what was known as the Chiang-nan region. The reason for his confidence was he was in secret contact with the commander of Ch'ing garrison named Ma Chin-pao in Su-chou. When his the van of his fleet anchored in the roadstead of Ch'ung-ming Island on 7 July 1659, he immediately announced:

*'Ch'ung-ming and its sounding islands will be our real base, as important as Amoy, because we shall bring our families to live here. The troops should treat the inhabitants here mildly. Therefore, anyone harassing the inhabitants, including the others in his section, will be sentenced to death.*²³⁸

The next day, Coxinga sent a messenger to Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao but the latter was hesitant about joining him and would only vouchsafe the reply that, if Coxinga approached the city of Nanking, he

²³⁶ NFJ 290, Missive door meergenoemde E [Zacharias Wagenaer]aen d E dle Heeren Gouverneur Generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] en raaden van India met de fluijt de Vogelsangh naer Batavia geschreven, Japan, 15 Oct. 1659, fo. 36

²³⁷ NFJ 291, Missive aan dEdle heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generaal ende E Heer Raden van India tot Batavia door Joan Boucheljon, Japan, 15 Oct. 1660, not foliated.

²³⁸ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 142.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

would offer his assistance.²³⁹ Since it was Coxinga's plan to keep Ch'ung-ming Island as his own trading station, he decided not to subject it to a violent assault but to cower the residential garrison into surrender. He had few qualms that he would not succeed because he had brought some 100,000 soldiers with his fleet. Time was pressing as the onset of the south monsoon season could be expected at the end of September. If he could not obtain certain political concessions from the Manchu Court, he might have no option but to return south. Ch'ung-ming Island was difficult to defend during the strong north monsoon and the attenuated supply lines made it unlikely that a Manchu attack could be fended off. Therefore as his only reasonable option was to force the Manchu Court back to the negotiation table for peace talks within two months, Coxinga decided to trust the word of Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao and ordered his fleet upstream. The distance from Ch'ung-ming Island to Nanking along the Yang-tze River is about 380 kilometres. At a distance of 270 kilometres lies Chen-chiang, which was considered the crucial jumping-off place for any invasion of Nanking. On 10 August Coxinga defeated the garrison of Chen-chiang in front of that city.²⁴⁰ His fleet finally anchored outside the Nanking on 25 August. On 29 August, he began to lay siege to the city walls of Nanking from the river banks: the northern and the western sides. The eastern side is hilly, but the southern side lay open. If Coxinga's troops could scale the walls the city would be his, but Coxinga was still waiting Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao's assistance to seal off the southern side of the city. His delegate to Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao left on 4 September and he planned to start bombarding the northern city gate on 8 September.²⁴¹ Unfortunately the Manchu cavalry broke through the entrenchment before the bombardment could begin and created a gap in Coxinga's siege lines. As these Manchu cavalymen were no more than 3,000 Coxinga decided to lure them out into the open field and to

²³⁹ *Ibidem.*

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 161.

²⁴¹ *Ibidem.*

CHAPTER ELEVEN

destroy them once and for all. He divided the whole army up in four parts on the hills along the Yangtze River and faced the Manchu cavalry in the open field. Seasoned soldiers, the Manchus did not fall into the mistake of rushing into the middle of his formation, but adopted a circuitous movement to attack the right flank. Coxinga's heavily armoured soldiers moved too slowly to be able to reinforce their flank and consequently the formation collapsed under the charge of the cavalry. Most of Coxinga's best soldiers and commanders fell in battle. On 13 September Coxinga decided to retreat with his whole fleet and on the way pick up the survivors from the river. His chief concern was to protect the families of the soldiers from the depredations of Manchu warships which were even then sailing downstream.²⁴² He arrived at Ch'ung-ming Island six days later and again sent a delegate to Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao, asking him to mediate in the negotiations with the Manchu authorities.²⁴³ On the 25th, Coxinga resumed his original plan of attacking Ch'ung-ming Island, but just one day later Commander Ma Chin-pao dispatched a delegate to Coxinga, asking him to abort this attack which would allow him to initiate peace talks with Manchu Emperor. Coxinga therefore retreated and led the fleet southwards to the coast of Wen-chou.²⁴⁴

Although Coxinga's plan to occupy Ch'ung-ming island was aborted by his defeat, Sino-Japanese trade still continued to expand successfully, undisturbed by the invasion. A report from Taiwan states that the Chinese trading route was left unimpeded:

'The land routes are pretty secure, the hostilities have recently halted and peace is being offered to Coxinga on good terms. He is on the island of Chou-shan just off the Nanking coast now and is residing there so as to

²⁴² Ibid., 163-4.

²⁴³ Ibid., 164.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 166.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*negotiate with Manchus.*²⁴⁵

As the above table shows, the Sino-Japan silk-for-silver trade still maintained its momentum even though Coxinga had been defeated at Nanking. Furthermore, during his retreat, Coxinga had also captured plenty of rice and provisions which had originally been gathered to pay the taxes to Peking.²⁴⁶ Therefore when Coxinga took his fleet and troops to Wen-chou this time, he did not have to send another fleet out to Ch'ao-chou to levy rice as he had done earlier. Since he had sent his delegate to engage in peace talks with the Shun-chih Emperor, trade was also tolerated to a certain extent. In 1658, Coxinga chose to reside in Wen-chou rather than in Amoy and he no longer dispatched a well-equipped fleet to patrol the Kuang-tung coast. In the same year, the Ping-nan Viceroy in Kuang-tung had been ordered by the Manchu Emperor to attack the Ming loyalist troops of Yung-li in Kuang-hsi province on the western border of Kuang-tung, a diversion which afforded Coxinga's forces some breathing space. Dutch sources record that Coxinga moved north since he 'could not get a grip on the pirates around Nan-ao nearby Kuang-tung'.²⁴⁷ When Coxinga's main force was in the northern expedition and absent from the Kuang-tung coast, the Ping-nan Viceroy had already established a naval force which was based in several harbours around

²⁴⁵ NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E. Zacharias Wagenaer, opperhoofd, en raat des Comptoirs Nangasacqui, Taiwan, 2 Aug. 1659, not foliated.

²⁴⁶ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 164. 'The junks were all fully loaded with rice and consequently were too heavy to sail.' How serious the impact of this raid was on the Manchu Court in Peking is uncertain. However, together the land-tax in Chê-chiang and Chiang-shu was 64.05% of the total land-tax revenue in China. C.f. Chang Hai-ying, *Ming-ch'ing chiang-nan shang-p'in liu-t'ung yü shih-ch'ang t'i-hsi* [The Market System and Circulation of Commodities in the Chiang-nan Region under the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties], (Shang-Hai: East China Normal University Publisher, 2001), 122.

²⁴⁷ NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E Joan Boucheljon en raadt in Nangasacqui, Taiwan, 30 July 1658, not foliated.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

the Ch'ao-chou area during 1657-1659.²⁴⁸ The Dutch also witnessed a flurry of building activity in the Kuang-tung coast.²⁴⁹ Although under Manchu command, the naval force under Su Li still remained in communication with Coxinga's force in Nan-ao and Amoy. For example, in May of 1657, when He T'ing-ping was in Amoy, he passed on some information about the situation in Kuang-tung obtained from four junks which had just arrived in Amoy from there.²⁵⁰ Again, in the summer of 1658 the *nachoda* of a junk which had been battered by a typhoon and had drifted to Macao where she was impounded by the Manchu Coastal Defence Fleet, was released before the junk reached the shores of Kuang-chou. Therefore 'in a roundabout way, the *nachoda* managed to join Coxinga, his master'.²⁵¹ Furthermore, a big Kuang-tung junk loaded with all kinds of Chinese goods accompanied by a junk from Amoy also visited Johor in the spring of 1659.²⁵² In July of 1659, a Kuang-tung junk visiting Japan also claimed that she had anchored first in Amoy.²⁵³ Both junks were actually part of the fleet of junks dispatched to Manila, Siam and Japan by the Ping-nan Viceroy.²⁵⁴ No matter what arrangements were made between Coxinga and Su Li or the Ping-nan Viceroy, the Kuang-tung trade undeniably recovered while Coxinga was absent on his expedition to Nanking.

²⁴⁸ TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 971; 1000.

²⁴⁹ Generale Missive, 4 Dec. 1656, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 426.

²⁵⁰ VOC 1222, Translaet uijt zeekeren Chinesen brief door den Chinese tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen Frederick Coyett [translation of a certain Chinese letter written by the Chinese translator Hê T'ing-ping to gouvernor of Taiwan Frederick Coyett], Amoy, 22 May 1657, fo. 528.

²⁵¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 375. 3 Jan. 1659.

²⁵² VOC 1229, Missive door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven [Letter written by the Gouvernor Joan Thijsz. from Malacca to Batavia], Malacca, 10 Apr. 1659, fo. 442^r.

²⁵³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 389. 6 July 1659.

²⁵⁴ Generale Missive, 16 Dec. 1659, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 470.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

As long-standing competitors of the Portuguese in Macao, in 1653 and 1655 the Dutch also dispatched envoys to contact the Manchu authorities in Kuang-tung.²⁵⁵ What prompted this move was that the ending of the Dutch-Portuguese truce in 1652. Freed from its constraints, the Dutch again began to raid Portuguese settlements in Asia. The Kuang-tung authorities arranged to have the Dutch envoys who arrived in 1655 welcomed as a tributary embassy. The envoys, Pieter de Goijer and Jacob de Keijser, arrived in Peking on 17 July 1656.²⁵⁶ Before they returned to Kuang-chou with a formal reply from the Manchu Shun-chih Emperor, the Ping-nan Viceroy asked De Goijer and De Keijser to grant him a pass to trade in Cambodia. The junk assigned to be the bearer of this pass returned to Kuang-chou fully laden and was accompanied by another junk belonging to the King of Cambodia, carrying rattan, sandalwood, ray- and deerskins.²⁵⁷ The following year, the King of Cambodia dispatched another big junk to Kuang-tung laden

²⁵⁵ Generale Missive, 1 Feb. 1656, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 403; Henriette Rahusen-de Bruyn Kops, 'Not Such an 'Unpromising Beginning': The First Dutch Trade Embassy to China', *Modern Asian Studies*, 36/1 (2002), 535-78 at 539-44; John E Wills Jr, *Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K'ang-hsi 1666-1687*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 42; Leonard Blussé, *Tribuut aan China: vier eeuwen nederlands-Chinese betrekkingen*, (Amsterdam, Cramwinckel, 1989), 61.

²⁵⁶ Generale Missive, 4 Dec. 1656, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 426; Henriette Rahusen-de Bruyn Kops, 'Not Such an 'Unpromising Beginning': The First Dutch Trade Embassy to China', 535-78 at 555.

²⁵⁷ Generale Missive, 4 Dec. 1656, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 425-6; VOC 1223, Missive naer Batavia door den coopman Hendrick Indijck opperhoofd tot Cambodja aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India residerende tot Batavia [Letter Written by Chief-Merchant Hendrick Indijck in Cambodia to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies Resident in Batavia], Cambodia, 17 Oct. 1656, Fol. 762r; *Dagregister Batavia*, 1656-1657, 37-8. 11 Dec. 1656.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

with pepper, benzoin and lacquer (*gemelak*).²⁵⁸

Meanwhile, the end of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1654 terminated the Dutch right to prevent the English from taking a share in the Southeast Asian and the China trade. In 1657, three English ships which had departed from Bantam, Surat and England respectively paid a successful visit to Macao. They initiated a reciprocal trade with the mediation of the Chinese merchants serving under the Pingnan Viceroy.²⁵⁹ In 1659, another two English ships visited Kuang-chou but left without engaging in any trade and thirteen small Portuguese vessels brought commodities from Makassar, Siam and Cambodia to Macao. The Ping-nan Viceroy controlled the Kuang-chou trade with an iron fist, preventing the local people from trading with foreign vessels, restricting this privilege to the owners of his own junks.²⁶⁰ The tributary junk dispatched to Kuang-chou by the Siamese King also fell victim to this monopoly policy. Her crew was detained in Kuang-chou for three years and did not return to Siam until January 1660 with nothing to show for their detention.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ VOC 1223, Missive aen opperhoofd Zacharias Wagenaer tot Japan door opperhoofd Hendrick Indijck tot Cambodja, Cambodia , 8 July 1657, fo. 766^v.

²⁵⁹ NFJ 353, Missive uit opperhoofd de Tonkin Gustavus Hansz int Nederlants Comptoir Tonkin aan den E Heer Joan Bouchelion oppercoopman en opperhoofd wegens dE Compagnies Negotie en ommeslagh ten Comptoir Nangasackij, Tonkin, 18 July 1658, not foliated; VOC 1222, Missive van [gouverneur van Taijouan]Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen [gouverneur generael] Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 33^v; Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 450. The last record mentions only two English ships. The English captains also reported they saw pirates fighting furiously with the Manchu Coastal Defence Force troops around Macao, actions which also hindered the trade in Canton. Cf. VOC 1226, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijsz. naer Batavia geschreven, Malacca, 18 Jan. 1658, fo. 585^r.

²⁶⁰ Generale Missive, 16 Dec. 1659, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 469.

²⁶¹ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 327. 16 Dec. 1660.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

Another party interested in the Macao trade was Spanish Manila. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the intermittent wars between the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, which had lasted eighty years, were over. In 1659, the Spanish merchants in Manila dispatched a yacht to Macao where she was loaded with typical Chinese goods like silk and iron pans. She then continued her voyage south to Johor in a quest to purchase pepper. The crew of the yacht intended to take that cargo of pepper back to Macao.²⁶² In the meantime, the Manchu Emperor had turned down the Dutch request for free trade which the latter had submitted during their 'tributary' embassy in 1655. Instead granting them free trade in Kuang-chou, he allowed them one tributary embassy every eight years. Smarting the Dutch found themselves saddled with an inferior position in the Kuang-tung trade. The Spanish country trader Joan Verguesse was allowed to leave for Manila from Macao and visited Johor again in January 1659.²⁶³ When the Viceroy of Kuang-tung also showed his eagerness to participate in this trade, this situation became even worse.

Against this background, further negotiations between the VOC and Coxinga began to unfold. After the Coxinga had lifted the ban against Taiwan, he wrote a letter to Governor-General, Joan Maetsuijcker dated 7 February 1658. In this letter he stressed that he had lifted the ban because the interpreter He T'ing-ping told him that the Governor of Taiwan, Frederick Coyet, had arrested those captains who had captured his junks and had guaranteed that the VOC would pay a proper compensation of 180,000 taels.²⁶⁴ He also dispatched three junks to Batavia to express his appreciation

²⁶² VOC 1229, Missive door d'Ed. Pieter de Goijer en raet na Batavia [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] geschreven, Jambi, 31 Jan. 1659, fo. 368^r; VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Pieter de Goijer en raet na Batavia [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] geschreven, Jambi, 14 Feb. 1659, VOC 1229, fo. 372^r.

²⁶³ VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker], Malacca, 24 Mar. 1659, fo. 441^v.

²⁶⁴ NFJ 290-2, Translaet missive door de mandorijn Coxinja aen de Ed. Heer

CHAPTER ELEVEN

of the presents sent to him by the Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker. It seems only two junks arrived. They were carrying 30 pieces of gold ingots, some gold thread, coarse porcelain and Japanese copper staves.²⁶⁵ The contents of the letter Coxinga sent via the two Chinese Captains or Headmen in Batavia were the same content as those in the letter addressed to Maetsuijker, but this time he required 200,000 instead of 180,000 taels in compensation. He also added one more line at the end of the letter, announcing that, if the Dutch did not honour their promises,

*'...[I, Coxinga] shall never again send junks to Taiwan and Batavia. Besides, I shall send letters everywhere proclaiming that the Dutch are such an evil people they are no longer worthy trading partners.'*²⁶⁶

Coxinga's junks carried 3,323 piculs of pepper when they left from Batavia on 8 June 1658.²⁶⁷ They also carried a letter from Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker which stated that the Dutch ship captains had been punished but argued that the required compensation was highly exaggerated. He took the chance to point out that the Dutch had earlier been obliged to use force to gain the right of free trade with China:

'Proof will be found if Your Highness will examine the old records of the history of the Chinese coast. You will discover we have sought to use

gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijker] geschreven met een sijner joncken alhier op Batavia den 7 Februarij 1658 aengecomen, [Translation of a Letter Written by Mandarin Coxinga to Govenror-General Joan Maetsuijker Carried by a Junk Arriving in Batavia on 7 Feb. 1658], not located, fo. 14; Generale Missive, 14 Dec. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 461.

²⁶⁵ Generale Missive, 14 Dec. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 461.

²⁶⁶ NFJ 290-2, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Coxinja naer Batavia aen capiteijn Bingam geschreven als voren [Translation of a Letter Written by Mandarin Coxinga to Chinese Captain P'an Ming-yen], not located, [received in Batavia] 27 May 1659, fo. 15.

²⁶⁷ Generale Missive, 1658-12-14, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 461.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*every courteous means to seek the free trade with China, as China has permitted some other nations, for sixty years. According to the rights enjoyed by all civilized people, [the Chinese] could not refuse this to us without great injury to themselves and deep disgrace. Being honest merchants, we shall not do harm to anyone else but neither do we like to be wronged or harmed by anyone else. This is why, when we found out that very friendly talks with the authorities in China had not been efficacious, we seized our weapons without a moment's hesitation, to achieve a better understanding. After some victories and defeats, eventually an agreement or contract was reached with the authorities. So we shelved the hostilities, and enjoyed free trade in Taiwan and Batavia [by all junks] from all Chinese harbours. This can be verified from our records over and over again.'*²⁶⁸

Joan Maetsuijker considered that Coxinga's ban on the Taiwan and Batavia trade had violated this 'agreement', therefore the Dutch had the right to take arms against him if necessary.

*'If Your Highness wants to persist with your pretensions and announce to all countries and people that we are evil people and boycott us, as Your Highness has threatened in your letter to Pan Ming-yan and Yan Er-kuan, we shall take due note of that. But Your Highness should also know that there will be plenty of means for us to take revenge and to discommode Your Highness' overseas commerce.'*²⁶⁹

The two Chinese junks returned to Amoy safely in July.²⁷⁰ The Dutch in Taiwan did not receive a reply about these matters until 1660, but nevertheless obtained a continuous supply of Chinese gold before the

²⁶⁸ NFJ 290-2, Missive van gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker aen den mandorijn Coxinja, Batavia, 8 June 1658, not foliated.

²⁶⁹ Ibidem.

²⁷⁰ NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon en raadt in Nagasacqui, Taiwan, 30 July 1658, not foliated.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

summer of 1659 as the above table shows. On the surface, the dispute was temporarily put aside. While this was happening, the Amoy merchants traded freely on the Pepper Coast of Sumatra with passes issued by Governor Frederick Coyet and in 1658 dispatched three junks to Ligore to purchase tin, another very lucrative commodity.²⁷¹ When an English ship visited Amoy she was welcomed by the merchants there.²⁷² Now free to trade in East, the English merchants were also trying to sell their pepper in Amoy and Canton.

Actually the gold trade did not run as smoothly as the table indicates. Because the Chinese gold prices were rising, the Amoy merchants preferred to pay in Taiwan with silver rather than to hand over their gold. Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan therefore decided to forbid any silver imports from China after the spring of 1658.²⁷³ In search of a higher price for their gold, the Amoy merchants dispatched one junk to Johor and one junk to Malacca in the spring of 1659. The gold could be traded for 12.5 taels silver per tael in Taiwan but fetched 14 taels in Malacca. Another incentive was that the Chinese merchants could meet Muslim merchants from Coromandel in Malacca who were willing to purchase the gold for as high as 15.5 taels. Eventually, they sold for 97¼ rials of gold (=f. 3636.8) to the Dutch in Malacca but 28 rials of gold (=f. 1050) to the Coromandel merchants.²⁷⁴

Now joining the throng of Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish and English competitors, Muslim merchants from Coromandel were also busy gradually

²⁷¹ VOC 1226, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijsz. naer Batavia geschreven, Malacca, 25 May 1658, fo. 604^f.

²⁷² NFJ 289, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen E. Joan Boucheljon en den raadt in Nangasacqui, Taiwan, 26 Aug. 1658, fo. 40.

²⁷³ General Missive, 6 Jan. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 443; Generale Missive, 14 Dec. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 457.

²⁷⁴ VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven, Malacca, 24 Mar. 1659, fo. 440^f. 1 rial gold equaled to 750 stuivers.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

expanding their cotton textile trade with Southeast Asia. They exported cheap cottons to Siam via Tenasserim (present-day Taninthary in Burma) in 1655²⁷⁵ and continued to export from Machilipatnam and Bengal via the same route.²⁷⁶ In 1659 they were even spotted in Jambi and Kedah.²⁷⁷

King Narai of Siam was eager to secure his crown trade so that he could finance his troops he needed to combat two threats on the Siamese border. In 1659 the invasion of Cambodia by Quinam forced the Siamese King to lead 100,000 soldiers to his eastern border to protect his country.²⁷⁸ The Manchu troops hunting the last Ming Emperor Yung-li to Burma, also pressed King Narai to send 60,000 soldiers to the northern border in 1660.²⁷⁹ Partly because of disappointment in the unpropitious course of the crown trade with China and Japan, in 1659 King Narai approved the Dutch request for the sole right to purchase the deerskins and cow hides.²⁸⁰ The Siamese

²⁷⁵ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 28-9. 24 Dec. 1655.

²⁷⁶ NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias Wagenaar president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.

²⁷⁷ VOC 1229, Missive door d'Ed. Pieter de Goijer en raet na Batavia geschreven, Jambi, 14 Feb. 1659, fo. 372^r.

²⁷⁸ VOC 1233, Missive door den coopman Jan van Rijck en desselfs raet den 11 Februarij 1660 met een appendix gedateerd den 26 Februarij 1660 [Letter Written by Merchant Jan van Rijck and Council on 11 Feb. 1660 with an enclosure dated on 26 Feb. 1660], Siam, 11 Feb 1660, fo. 560^f.

²⁷⁹ NFJ 291, Missive uit Janvan Rijck aan den E Joan Boucheljon President en Opperhoofd over 's Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int Coninck rijck Japan, Siam, 29 June 1660, not foliated; NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia op t nieuw comptoir Siam aan den E Joan Boucheljon, president en opperhoofd over compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 10 Aug. 1660, not foliated ; NFJ 291, Missive uit Janvan Rijck aan den E Joan Boucheljon President en Opperhoofd over 's Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int Coninck rijck Japan, Siam, 29 June 1660, not foliated.

²⁸⁰ NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E

CHAPTER ELEVEN

King ordered all deerskins and cow hides to be removed without warning from the Chinese junks and the warehouses in the Japanese quarter, and let the Dutch pay the same price for the confiscated skins as the Chinese had purchased them for from the local people.²⁸¹ Now that they had been cut out of the competition for deerskins, the Chinese merchants seized upon a new opportunity and gradually opened up a new business link with the Indian Muslim merchants. The following year, a group of twenty-two Muslim merchants was even transported to Japan from Siam on a Chinese junk. They brought Bengal cotton textiles imported via Tenasserim to the Nagasaki market, stealing a march on the Dutch.²⁸² Dutch sources claim that the Chinese merchants under Coxinga were planning even greater co-operation in the Japan trade with the Coromandel Muslim merchants:

*'The trade by Chinese junks from Siam has begun to increase year by year and has obstructed the honourable trade of the Company. They live in a prodigious style, keep large houses with their own servants and employ some Japanese to serve them, as if they will immediately bring larger quantities of all kinds of cloths and also part of the Bengal silk hither.'*²⁸³

The Chief Merchant of Nagasaki, Joan Boucheljon, wrote a letter to his colleague Laurens Pitt in Coromandel disclosing his concerns:

'It is a shame that we have not been provided with more white cotton

Zacharias Wagenaer President opperhoofd over s' Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslach int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 5 July 1659, not foliated.

²⁸¹ Ibidem. The order was still in force the following year 1660, c.f. NFJ 291, Missive uit Janvan Rijck aan den E Joan Boucheljon President en Opperhoofd over 's Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int Coninck rijk Japan, Siam, 29 June 1660, not foliated.

²⁸² NFJ 291, Missive uit Joan Boucheljon in Japan opt comptoir Nangasackij aen de Edle Heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur general en d EE heer raden van India [tot Batavia], Japan, 15 Oct. 1660, not foliated.

²⁸³ Ibidem.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*cloth this year, otherwise we should have made rich profits... Now the Muslims have brought quite a quantity from Siam on a Chinese junk I am afraid that these people have shared the rich profits and now, once they have tasted the sweetness of success, they might immediately import many more Bengal and Coromandel cotton textiles, as well as silk and other goods, from elsewhere. This heavy burden could force the Company to lower the price of its exports.*²⁸⁴

Apparently either Coxinga himself or his merchants had begun to toy with the idea of using Siam as a transit harbour in plans to initiate the triangular Chinese gold- Bengal silk-Japanese silver trade which the VOC did as well via Malacca. If the Shogunal Court and the Siamese King would throw their weight behind the idea of Chinese junks sailing between their ports, the VOC would have its hands tied and be bereft of any means to curb this plan. If it were successful, the Chinese gold exports would no longer flow into Taiwan, but would be channelled directly to either Siam or the Pepper Coast and end up largely in the hands of Indian Muslim merchants.

Even if Coxinga had decided to shift the gold flow from Taiwan to the Coromandel merchants in Siam or to the Pepper Coast around Sumatra, he would not have had it all his own way. The Dutch would still do all in their power to force him to maintain the gold supply to Taiwan until they were able to take over Macao, which would have guaranteed them access to the Chinese gold supply. Hence the Dutch base in Taiwan turned into a possible thorn in Coxinga's side, since the Dutch could well become his direct competitors once they had taken Macao. Come what may, without this gold-for- pepper trade between Amoy and Taiwan, the alliance between

²⁸⁴ NFJ 290, Missive uit Joan Boucheljon in Japan opt Comptoir Nangasackij aan 'd 'E Heer Laurens Pitt extraordinarij Raat van India ende gouverneur der Chormandelse kust, Japan, 25 Oct. 1660, not foliated; NFJ 291, Missive uit Joan Boucheljon in Japan opt comptoir Nangasackij aen de Edle Heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur general en d EE heer raden van India [tot Batavia], Japan, 15 Oct. 1660, not foliated.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Coxinga and the Dutch would be meaningless. In that case, war would be unavoidable. Sooner or later, either Coxinga or the VOC would take action against the other party.

A Chinese source relates that after Coxinga's delegate returned from Nanking in January 1660 and reported that his request for peace talks had been refused, he put forward a proposal to attack Taiwan.²⁸⁵ A Dutch source also reports that Coxinga had arranged for some fishermen to join the fish tax-farm auction on the fishing grounds around Taiwan in December 1660, in a manoeuvre to seize secret control of the fishing harbours in preparation for an invasion on the southwest coast of Taiwan.²⁸⁶ While he waited, he ordered all Chinese junks to return to Amoy, probably to reduce the damage to his trading-junks in the South China Sea once the VOC began to take retaliatory actions.²⁸⁷ The Dutch authorities in Taiwan believed that Coxinga had planned to invade the island on 10 March 1660 and had sent an emergency message to Batavia at about the same time.²⁸⁸

On 25 August 1659, the Emperor Shunchih dispatched 10,000 Manchu cavalymen to Fu-chien. They finally arrived in Fu-chou on 2 March 1660, having travelled all the way from Peking on horseback.²⁸⁹ This deliberate

²⁸⁵ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 167.

²⁸⁶ VOC 1235, Resolutie van den gouverneur [Frederick Coyett] en den raedt van Formosa rakende Coxinja's machination tegen de Compagnie [Resolution Issued by Governor Frederick Coyett and Council of Formosa concerning Coxinga's Machinations against the Company], Taiwan, 16 Apr. 1660, fo. 433^r.

²⁸⁷ VOC 1233, Missive door den coopman Jan van Rijck en desselfs raet, Siam, 26 Feb. 1660, fo. 563^v - 564^r. Although the junk which brought this message had reportedly sailed from Japan, she might have put in at Amoy first. Besides, no such order was recorded by the Dutch chief merchant on Deshima. It also proves that this order was primarily concerned with junks accessing the Pepper Coast.

²⁸⁸ Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1661, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 474.

²⁸⁹ TWYH (ed.), *Ch'ing shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, TW, No. 158, 159; Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 168.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

move by the Emperor Shun-chih forced Coxinga to respond by postponing the invasion for the moment. In April, the Manchu General of An-nan (An-nan Chiang-chün), Ta Su, arrived in Ch'üan-chou and set plans in motion to prepare all vessels for war.²⁹⁰ Coxinga judged that the best opportunity to ambush Taiwan had passed. If the Dutch interpreted his preparations as a declaration of war, he would not be able to wage two simultaneous wars against both Manchus and the Dutch. Probably at his instigation, Hung Hsü (*Gampea*), the most senior merchant and old trading partner of the Dutch, sent a letter from Amoy to Taiwan on 25 May 1660, informing Governor Frederick Coyet that all rumours about Coxinga's invasion plan were false and that 'Coxinga had never entertained any idea of undertaking a venture against the Company'.²⁹¹ Meanwhile, Coxinga was busy reorganizing his troops and raising their low morale.²⁹² By May 1660, Coxinga had prepared his defence. He had ascertained that the Manchu force lacked large junks and hence planned to carry the Manchu cavalry on smaller vessels to storm the shores of Amoy. Therefore, on 11 May 1660, he proclaimed that all the families of soldiers and officials should move to Quemoy.²⁹³ He was determined to take advantage of his superior large-size junks to strike all the Manchu troops while they were at sea. The Manchu troops departed on the morning of 19 June 1660, in an endeavour to cross the narrowest strait between Amoy and Chang-chou Bay from the north and west. Coxinga's strategy proved very effective. The Manchu cavalry could not approach the shore because the smaller vessels could not break through the cross-fire from Coxinga's cannons on his large junks.²⁹⁴ Coxinga gained the day in this sea battle. It is said that more than 10,000 soldiers on both sides

²⁹⁰ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 170.

²⁹¹ VOC 1235, Resolutie van den gouverneur en den raedt van Formosa rakende Coxinja's machination tegen de Compagnie, Taiwan, 26 Apr. 1660, fo. 437^r.

²⁹² Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 170-2.

²⁹³ *Ibidem*, 172.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 176-7.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

were killed during the battle, but the proportional loss of Coxinga's men and the Manchu forces were about 3:7.²⁹⁵ After this defeat, the Manchu General led the remaining Manchu cavalry to Fu-chou and returned to Peking in November. The Fu-chien authorities decided to beach all the vessels of the Ch'ing coastal defence force, fearing they might otherwise be captured. Coxinga allowed the civilians to return to Amoy after 6 October 1660.²⁹⁶ The biggest threat to Quemoy was the Ch'ao-chou naval force under the Ch'ing Regional Commander Su Li. But, although he received the order from the Governor-General of Fu-chien to send his ships in 1659, he failed to appear around Quemoy, offering the excuse that the Ping-nan Viceroy needed them in Nan-ao to guard his position against Coxinga's force.²⁹⁷

On the Dutch side, the High Government in Batavia had decided to send a fleet of twelve ships and 600 soldiers to guard Taiwan on 6 July 1660.²⁹⁸ Yet the question of whether it was essential to the VOC to keep Taiwan as a base for the China trade at all costs had already emerged as an issue since the Dutch had obtained an official reply from the Emperor Shun-chih in 1658. The Batavia authorities reported to the Gentlemen Seventeen that:

'We should consider carefully whether it is more important to occupy Macao than to trade peacefully in the northern areas[China and Japan]. Even if we are allowed to trade in China, the trade will face huge obstacles. In order to eliminate these troubles, we should occupy a place nearby like Macao which is occupied by the Portuguese... We believe that there is no place more suitable than Macao. The Company should reduce its operations

²⁹⁵ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 35.

²⁹⁶ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 182-4.

²⁹⁷ TWYH(ed), *Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien*, 1271.

²⁹⁸ Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1661, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 475; VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 6 July 1660, fo. 70.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

*on Taijoun and in Formosa, or withdraw from there once the business which can be done there has dried up. The Company would then have to leave this place anyway.*²⁹⁹

In the resolution to dispatch a fleet to Taiwan, the Governor-General and Council also showed their preference to mount an attack on Macao rather than keep Taiwan as ordered by the Gentlemen Seventeen:

*'According to the letter of Our Lords[Gentlemen Seventeen], whatever force the Company has should inflict all possible damage on the Portuguese as soon as possible, who cause the greatest obstacles to the Company trade and therefore are our enemies, so that the island and the city of Macao inhabited by Portuguese will no longer give the Company cause to be suspect by the Manchus or Chinese through their servants, and obstruct the Company trade in the Empire.'*³⁰⁰

In short, the High Government ordered the fleet to attack Macao from Taiwan after the north monsoon began to blow.³⁰¹ The commander of this fleet, Joan van der Laan, was experienced in the combat against the Portuguese army on the Coromandel Coast. His deputy was Jacob de Keijser, who had been the envoy in the tributary embassy to Peking in 1656-1657.³⁰² Van der Laan's mission was to defeat the Portuguese and occupy or destroy Macao, De Keijser's mission was to persuade the Ping-nan Viceroy that the Dutch would be worthy successors to the Portuguese, able satisfy all the services the Emperor Shun-chih might require.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ General Missive, 6 Jan. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 450.

³⁰⁰ VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, 6 July 1660, fos. 71-2.

³⁰¹ VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, 7 July 1660, fo. 72.

³⁰² *Ibidem*, fos. 72-3; *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 260 n 4. 16 Dec. 1659.

³⁰³ VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, 7 July

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The ships departed on 17 July and arrived in Taiwan on 19 September 1660.³⁰⁴ The fleet should have been prepared to attack Macao in October, but Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan insisted that the ships linger around Taiwan and the Pescadores. To solve the discord which had arisen between Van der Laan and Coyet, in a somewhat naive move, two delegates were sent to Amoy with three ships for the express purpose of asking Coxinga if he was really planning to attack Taiwan.³⁰⁵ Coxinga who was currently enjoying the fruits of his victory over the Manchus categorically denied fostering any plan to attack Taiwan but, even after receiving this reply, Governor Coyet still did not give the fleet permission to sail to Macao. When Joan van der Laan abandoned the Macao expedition and departed from Taiwan to return to Batavia on 27 February 1661, six of the ten vessels in the support fleet had already left to undertake different duties.³⁰⁶

This more or less coincided with the time Coxinga again planned to invade Taiwan.³⁰⁷ In December 1660, Coxinga had dispatched his best troops to the Ch'ao-chou area to purchase or levy rice. Since he had shifted his trading base to T'ai-chou on the Chê-chiang coast in the early summer of 1658 and had set about preparing the proposed expedition to the Nanking area, Coxinga's force on Nan-ao Island had maintained a truce with Su Li's local naval force stationed in Ch'ao-chou. During this truce, the Amoy merchants still frequently purchased rice from this area and probably Coxinga gave Su Li some leeway to share his foreign trade in 1659. A nasty surprise was in store. The Manchu officials had taken advantage of this truce

1660, fo. 73.

³⁰⁴ *Daghregister Batavia*, 1661, 62. 22 Mar. 1661.

³⁰⁵ Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1661, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 479.

³⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, 481; Generale Missive, 29 July 1661, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 485. C. E. S., *Neglected Formosa: a translation from the Dutch of Frederic Coyett's 't Verwaerloosde Formosa*, ed. Inez de Beauclair, (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center Inc., 1975), 39.

³⁰⁷ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 184-5.

THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

to consolidate their ground troops around the bastions on the Jung River, which allowed them gradually to expand their control over Ch'ao-yang and Chieh-yang districts. Coxinga's troops had not made any approach on Chieh-yang city since 1657. In the winter of 1660, the Manchu officials in Ch'ao-chou successfully managed to keep Coxinga's troops away from their richly provisioned rice storehouses inside the city walls.³⁰⁸ Without a steady rice supply from the Ch'ao-chou area, Coxinga and his Court ran the risk of running out of food.

Although all his Defence Commands were reluctant to invade Taiwan, Coxinga insisted on having his project executed.³⁰⁹ He could not afford to suffer any further defeat in the Ch'ao-chou area where some of his Defence Commands had proved to be disloyal during the last battle there.³¹⁰ Any failure would cut off his food supply and he would be deprived of the means to keep his officers and troops together. Once his force had been reduced, Su Li's naval force could easily mount an attack on Amoy and Quemoy by sea. If Coxinga could no longer guarantee the security of his soldiers' families and property, the whole army would eventually collapse. Although the attack on Taiwan would not guarantee adequate supplies, even if he were defeated by the Dutch Coxinga could at least keep his soldiers away from China and prevent them from going over to the Manchus.

Once resolved in his purpose, on 21 April Coxinga sailed from Quemoy with 300 junks carrying 30,000 soldiers and landed on the shores of Taiwan on 30 April 1661. A long siege of nine months followed. On 1 February of 1662, Governor Frederick Coyet surrendered to Coxinga, conceding the whole fort, including the cannon, muskets and gunpowder, provisions,

³⁰⁸ TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao san-pien* [The Third Compilation of Historical Documents concerning the Cheng Family], TW no. 175, 196-7.

³⁰⁹ Yang, *Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu*, 184-5.

³¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 178.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

commodities and cash, amounting to 1,200,000 guilders³¹¹ This victory came at an enormous cost as a large number of Coxinga's soldiers had died of starvation.³¹² As expected, Coxinga's garrison on Nan-ao surrendered to the Manchus in April or May 1662.³¹³ Coxinga himself might also have fallen victim to his harsh lifestyle. He gained Taiwan but died suddenly on 23 June 1662, without even leaving clue about how he intended to perpetuate his maritime enterprise.³¹⁴ If passion is an obsession which constantly drives someone on relentlessly to achieve a goal, it would be right to say that Coxinga was heavily afflicted by the passion of a merchant prince.

³¹¹ Generale Missive, 22 Apr. 1662, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 503.

³¹² Kees Zanvliet, 'The Contribution of Cartography to the Creation of a Dutch Colony and a Chinese State in Taiwan', *Journal Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization*, 35/3-4, 123-135 at 134; Juan Min-hsi, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, TW, No. 24, 39.

³¹³ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 40.

³¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

ALL ACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

CHAPTER TWELVE
ALL ACKNOWLEDGED
BY THE KINGS
1663-1667

The rift between the Taiwanese and the Amoy merchants

On 1 February, 1662, after enduring a nine-month siege, Governor Frederick Coyett surrendered Fort Zeelandia in Taiwan to the Chinese invader, General-in-Chief, Coxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung), who had transported his army over from his posts on Amoy and Quemoy. The bulk of Coxinga's soldiers were regrouped along the west coast of Taiwan to be ready to counter the expected engagement with the Ch'ing army, which had been successfully blocked from crossing the Taiwan Strait.¹ Making shrewd use of this situation, Coxinga was able to dissipate the crisis menacing his command, although a shortage of food almost incited a mutiny among his adherents. By moving most of his subjects from Amoy and Quemoy to Taiwan, he could turn these port cities into vanguard posts confronting the newly established Ch'ing Empire, the vast territory now under Manchu control. These two islands were transformed into part of a frontier area he could either occupy from the sea if need be or just as easily desert if this seemed the only viable option. As long as his Taiwan base remained inaccessible to the Ch'ing army, Coxinga could effectively exert his strategic advantage over the whole coast of China at any time he wanted. During his long-range expedition to Nanking in 1659, to his satisfaction, he had demonstrated that his army had the strategic capacity to harass any part of the coastal area in which a river

¹ Kees Zanvliet, 'The Contribution of Cartography to the Creation of a Dutch Colony and a Chinese State in Taiwan', *Journal Cartographica*, 35 No. 3-4, 123-135 at 134.

CHAPTER TWELVE

system debouched into the sea.² As the parvenus Manchus were still busy conquering the whole of what had been the Ming Empire, as much by forming strategic alliances with Chinese allies as by feats of arms, the Emperor had still not ruled out granting the Cheng clan various privileges such as a trade monopoly along the coast of China in exchange for its obedience.³

This issue would have been simpler had not some Fu-chien merchants conspired with the Dutch—who had lost their factory in Taiwan—to make a grab for the lucrative Japan trade. The Amoy merchants, by then under the Ch'ing, expected that their business with Japan would be able to proceed as usual, and their Dutch allies planned to crush the Cheng naval force in exchange for permanent free-trade privileges to be granted by the Manchu Emperor.⁴ By making a pre-emptive strike before the Manchu Emperor had been able to build a loyal armada of his own, whoever commanded the Chinese coast would become Coxinga's successor and to him would fall the spoils of the prosperous monopolistic trade with Japan. While he still lived, the towering stature of Coxinga's military reputation made it impossible for either the Amoy merchants or the Dutch to interfere in the negotiations

² John E. Wills Jr, 'Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang', in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr (eds), *From Ming to Ch'ing*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 204-38 at 225-6; Tonio Andrade, 'The Company's Chinese privateers: how the Dutch East India company tried to lead a coalition of privateers to war against China', *Journal of world history*, vol.15, no. 4 (2004), 415-44 at 441-2. Both authors concentrate on this one single attack, but I think it is also important to examine how the Cheng fleet and troops dealt with the harbours they encountered on their way to Nanking.

³ Wills, 'Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang', 222, agrees that the Ch'ing court tried to accommodate the entire structure of the Cheng clan's military and commercial exploitation in the course of 1647, after Cheng Chih-lung had surrendered.

⁴ John E Jr. Wills, *Pepper, Guns, And Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China, 1622-1681*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), 67.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

between Coxinga and the Manchu Emperor. However, Coxinga suddenly passed away in the summer of 1662, at the age of only thirty-nine. The most compelling reason for hopes of successful negotiations between the Manchu Emperor and Coxinga had been the Emperor's determined drive to establish a consistent, solid military organization, backed up by a sophisticated maritime logistic network under one leader—and this reason now suddenly disappeared. What seemed to herald the impending erosion of the Cheng regime allowed the two above-mentioned challengers to gain some room to manoeuvre which would allow them to aspire to gaining privileged status in the Sino-Japanese trade.

When the Cheng army and its families were transported to Taiwan, the trading fleet remained behind on the islands of Amoy and Quemoy. The Governor of these two islands was Cheng T'ai, who was also the Official of Revenue (*Hu Kuan*) in charge of Sino-Japan trade under Coxinga and chief negotiator with the Manchu court in Peking between 1662 and 1663. In the growing uncertainty, since his father had passed away without leaving any official testamentary disposition, Coxinga's elder son, Cheng Ching, decided to stake his claim to his legal right to the throne by force. The Official of War (*Ping Kuan*), Hung Hsü, and Regional Commander, Chou Ch'üan-pin, supported him, so all three of them set work to prepare the ground by pacifying the disgruntled army units in Taiwan during the autumn and winter of that same year.

Cheng T'ai probably did not share the full details of his negotiations with the Ch'ing court with his courtesy-nephew Cheng Ching. Sensing he was holding something back, Cheng Ching, began harbouring suspicions about Cheng T'ai's reliability, especially because upon Coxinga's sudden death, Cheng T'ai had not paid immediate homage to his son.

Whatever the real story might have been, desperately in need of funds, the young heir decided to execute his courtesy-uncle, Cheng T'ai, and confiscate his property to finance the Cheng army and navy. Apprised of this, Cheng T'ai's younger brother, Cheng Ming-chün, persuaded the rest of the

CHAPTER TWELVE

family to surrender their junks and trading capital to the Ch'ing government and, in June of 1663, Cheng Ming-chün and his followers abandoned Quemoy. The true damage lay in the fact that these deserters were precisely the coterie of experienced merchants who had run the Sino-Japanese trade expertly for years.⁵

The upshot was that unity crumbled and the Cheng merchants were split into two opposing parties. As representatives of the ruler of China, the Ch'ing authorities immediately made use their newly acquired junks by mounting an expedition to drive Cheng Ching's force out of Amoy and Quemoy. With the assistance of the Dutch fleet, in November 1663 they targeted Cheng Ching's armada, but the latter successfully avoided the engagement, and was able to preserve most of his junks by retreating to Nan-ao, an island lying off the southern border between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung.⁶

Cheng T'ai's adherents' desertion to the Ch'ing camp in July 1663 took place almost at the end of the southwest monsoon season, when the junks traditionally sailed northwards to Japan. The news about the split in the Cheng regime disturbed those Chinese traders who had already arrived in Nagasaki, because they realized that they would have to take sides upon returning to China. Six of the junks were from An-hai. During the truce required by Cheng T'ai as a condition for peace negotiations, these junks had loaded their goods at Ch'üan-chou, a city under the Ch'ing.⁷ Most of the captains under the Cheng regime found it hard to reach any decision it was difficult to come by reliable information in Japan. By the end of the northeast monsoon season, around 1 January, eight junks set sail on course for Amoy but the crews of the thirteen to fourteen other junks could not make up their

⁵ Wills, 'Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang', 228-9.

⁶ Wills, *Pepper, Guns, and Parleys*, 68-75.

⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 77. 13, 15, 17, 24, 26, July, 1663.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

minds which destination to choose.⁸ According to Dutch records, ten junks eventually announced that they were intending to sail to An-hai.⁹ Owing to the lack of records kept by the Cheng side, it is hard to estimate how many junks did eventually decide to go over to the Ch'ing. What happened is that in the following southwest monsoon season, about half (15 of 33) of the Chinese junks from Kuang-tung Province or its surrounding areas—probably Kao-Lei-Lien or Chieh-shih - returned to Japan, as will be explained below. Given the fact that the Cheng frequently purchased rice on Nan-ao, on the border of Kuang-tung Province, and that rice was rather scarce in Japan during the winter of 1663, it is plausible to infer that most of these Chinese junks rejoined the Cheng forces on Nan-ao in order to purchase rice.¹⁰

On the other hand, in August 1663 eager to seek revenge for the damage caused by Coxinga, the Dutch fleet had swept the northern Cheng harbour of Sha-ch'eng clear of any junks, an action which cut off the primary Cheng route for collecting silks in Chê-chiang Province.¹¹ Henceforth the coast from Nanking to Amoy was secured by the Dutch fleet from the sea and by Ch'ing troops on land. Quite apart from this major setback, some of the Cheng's most senior soldiers surrendered to the Ch'ing on Nan-ao in March

⁸ VOC 1247, Missive van de opperhoofden te Nangasacki aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Japan, 1 Jan. 1664, fo. 32.

⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 90-2; 94. 19 Nov. (3 junks); 1, 9, 10, 28 Dec. 1663 ;1, 21 Jan. 1664.

¹⁰ VOC 1247, Missive van de opperhoofden [Willem Volger et al.] te Nangasacki aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Japan, 1 Jan. 1664, fo. 28.

¹¹ VOC 1243, Appendix op seeckere missive dato 5 November 1662 door den Ed. commandeur Balthasar Bort voor Tinghaij aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia geschreven [Appendix in certain letter dated on 5 Nov. 1662 written by commander Balthasar Bort at T'inghai to governor general Joan Maetsuijcker at Batavia], Canton, 7 Jan. 1663, fo. 74^v.

CHAPTER TWELVE

1664.¹² The Cheng resident forces in several other harbours near Fu-chou soon followed suit.¹³ As a consequence, neither Amoy nor Fu-chou merchants had to live any longer in fear of Cheng raids. Now the Ch'ing-allied Fu-chien merchants could safely purchase raw silk in Chê-chiang for shipment to Nagasaki when the new raw-silk season opened in April of 1664.

The merchants who had deserted to An-hai also celebrated the occasion. In the southwest monsoon season of 1664, a junk from Fu-chou arrived in Japan loaded with 'the richest goods that had ever been seen in thirty years'. The value of its cargo was estimated at roughly 900,000-1,000,000 guilders, or 315,000-350,000 taels.¹⁴ In a letter written by the Dutch officials residing in An-hai, there is confirmation that this big junk was owned by the Count of T'ung-an (T'ung-an Po), the title of nobility borne by Cheng T'ai's younger brother, Cheng Ming-chün.¹⁵ This trade was obviously in breach of the edict pronounced by Manchu K'ang-hsi Emperor in 1662. The imperial edict stipulated not only the prohibition of foreign trade, it also contained the decree that all inhabitants living within the range of 30 Chinese *li* (about 15 km) from the coast should forsake all their fields, houses and so on, and

¹² VOC 1248, Missive van den residenten in China [Ernst van Hogenhouck] aan den oppercoopman en opperhoofd Willem Volger en zijn raet in Japan geschreven [Letter Written by Those Residing in China to Chief-Merchant Willem Volger and His Council in Japan], China, 3 May 1664, fo. 2580. On 20 March, the most important commander under Cheng Ching, Chou Ch'üan-pin, deserted to the Ch'ing side from Nan-ao, taking with him 6,000 experienced soldiers and 100 junks..

¹³ Wills, 'Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang ', 228-9.

¹⁴ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 116. 25 June 1664. Because the record of 23 Jan. 1665 counted 20 tons of gold as equivalent to 700 chests of silver, 1 ton of gold should equal 35 chests of silver. 1 chest of silver referred to 1,000 taels.

¹⁵ VOC 1248, Missive van den residenten in China aan den oppercoopman en opperhoofd Willem Volger en zijn raet in Japan geschreven, 3 May 1664, fo. 2582; VOC 1248, Missive van de residenten te Nangasacki aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, 22 Oct. 1664, fo. 2401.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

move inland behind the newly fortified frontier. The Ch'ing government believed that this prescription would eradicate the Cheng commercial network and ruin its financial base. However, its real effect was to assign the Provincial Navy Commander (*Shui-shih Ti-tu*) full authority over the areas evacuated. This arrangement was also confirmed by the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, in his report to the Emperor on 24 March, 1664.¹⁶

Although the Ch'ing Provincial Navy Commander, Shih Lang, should have had enough vessels at his disposal to invade Taiwan during the summer of 1664, he and his officers excused themselves from launching the invasion by asserting that a series of typhoons had severely damaged their vessels and had consequently rendered the invasion impossible.¹⁷ It seems to me that related lucrative trade opportunities must have had something to do with this postponed expedition.

This sudden change of mind expressed in the delaying tactics of the Ch'ing navy was very unreasonable in the eyes of its Dutch allies, who had dispatched a fleet to the Taiwan Strait from Batavia during the southwest monsoon season of 1664. They had crushed the Cheng fortifications on the Pescadores Islands before arriving in Fu-chou in July and had also re-occupied Chi-lung, on the northern tip of Taiwan, which might have provided the Ch'ing army a secure landing point in the event of an invasion.¹⁸ As a foothold on which the Ch'ing army could land on Taiwan had now been

¹⁶ Li Shuai-tai, 'T'i wei shui-lu kê hsün-ti fang-shou shih-pên [A Report on the Defences in the Different Strongholds along the Coast] 3 June 1664', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no. 8, 74.

¹⁷ Liang Ching-piao, 'T'i wei cho-p'ai shih-lang kung-ch'ü t'ai-wan shih-pên [Considerations for Dispatching Shih Lang to Conquer Taiwan] 16 Sept. 1664', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 8, 91.

¹⁸ VOC 1248, Resolutie van China genomen door de commandeur Balthasar Bort en de raad te Hoksiew [Resolution by Commander Balthasar Bort and the Council in Fu-chou], Fu-chou, 16 Oct. 1664, fo. 2675-2678.

CHAPTER TWELVE

prepared, it seemed to them to be no reason to postpone the engagement. Their confidence strengthened by their private trade in Japan, the Fu-chien authorities still dallied but tried to make amends by building a warehouse in which the Dutch could store their tropical trade goods. Twisting the meaning of the Emperor's edict, the Fu-chien authorities used the Emperor's permission to provide his Dutch allies with victuals prior to the Taiwan expedition as an excuse to dodge the prohibition on foreign trade with the Dutch.¹⁹ According to information later reported to the Japanese authorities, the VOC had been able to sell 50,000 taels' worth of pepper, sandalwood and cloves in Fu-chien. In their turn, the Dutch purchased large quantities of goods, including 500 piculs of Chinese white silk. Moreover, the Fu-chien authorities recommended that the Emperor give the Dutch presents soon after their fleet arrived in Fu-chou in 1663. The gift-giving would imply that the Dutch might be in line for some more trade with China at a later date.²⁰

The joint Ch'ing-Dutch fleet set sail on 27 November, 1664, but it seems that, shortly thereafter, the weather deteriorated. Seeking shelter, the armada returned to Wei-t'ou Bay where they celebrated folk festivals and amused themselves by watching some theatre. Even though the Dutch sailors

¹⁹ Mingandali, 'T'i-ch'ing chun-yü hê-lan-kuo chia-pan ch'uan mai-wu mai-mi shih-pên [Petition to Allow the Dutch Fleet to Trade Goods for Provisional Rice Supplies] 22 Nov. 1664', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no 8, 117.

²⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 136. 26 Jan. 1665. Rumours spread in Nagasaki that, in China the Dutch had sold goods valued at about 50,000 taels; Sha Ch'eng, 'T'i-pao hê-lan-kuo chia-pan-ch'uan ti-min chu-kung shih-pên [Report of the Arrival of the Allied Dutch Fleet](10 Nov. 1683)', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I, no. 8, 48. The Fu-chien authorities sent their recommendation to the Emperor on 2 October, 1663. The Minister of Ritual, Sha Ch'eng, replied to Emperor K'ang-hsi suggesting that the court should not give more than 300 pieces of satin and 1,000 taels to the Dutch as presents, and that the presentation could only take place after the joint Dutch-Ch'ing forces had defeated the Cheng force.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

had almost caught sight of the coastline of Taiwan during the voyage, they had no option but to return to Wei-t'ou Bay because the Ch'ing armada had decided to withdraw to the coast of China, remaining in the bay for a whole month until December 24. Only then did Provincial Navy Commander , Shih Lang, attempt to sail across the Taiwan Strait a second time. The expedition was again terminated when several war-junks collided with Dutch vessels just outside the harbour.²¹

In the meantime, on 2 December two more junks departed from Fu-chou and set course for Japan. Not surprisingly, these richly laden trading junks were the property of Keng Chi-mao, the highest military commander in Fu-chien Province, whose title was the Ching-nan Viceroy. They left just before two other junks, which belonged to the T'ung-an Count and the Hai-ch'êng Duke also carrying a rich cargo, returned from Japan.²² The two junks on course to Japan entered Nagasaki Bay on the 21 and the 23 January respectively in the company of another smaller junk from Fu-chou. The Japanese valued the total cargo of those three junks at about 700,000 taels, or 2,000,000 guilders.²³ Considering that the Manchu Emperor's prohibition on foreign trade must have lowered the purchasing prices of silk goods in China, while demand in the Japanese market remained constant, the profits on the sale of the cargo in Nagasaki must have been enormous.

Admittedly,owing to the very bad weather conditions that winter, it would have been difficult to lead a fleet of 400 junks across the Taiwan Strait

²¹ VOC 1249, Missive van d'Ed. Balthasar Bort en den raat aen haer Eds. tot Batavia, Canton 3 Jan. 1665, fos. 183-186.

²² VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur Nobel [Constantijn]en raadt tot Hocksieu aen haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker][Letter from Sir Constantijn Nobel and the Council at Fu-chou to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker], Canton, 28 Feb. 1665, fo. 200. The T'ung-an Count's junk is recorded to have arrived on the 25 June 1664, but the Hai-ch'êng Duke's junk is not mentioned in this record.

²³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 136. 21;22;23 Jan. 1665.

CHAPTER TWELVE

for an invasion, but it is also not beyond the bounds of possibility that the strictly prohibited Nagasaki trade generated such lucrative profits for the Fu-chien authorities, they would have been very reluctant about pursuing their military mission. They excused themselves from this duty by asserting that undertaking co-operative missions with the Dutch was compounded by the difficulties arising from navigation in foul weather. Therefore they respectfully submitted that the Emperor should reject any further offers of Dutch assistance. These views were never made known to the Dutch. Although the Fu-chien authorities promised the Dutch that they would try to persuade the Emperor to grant privileges for free trade, they actually used the Dutch fleet only as a protector and, thereby, reduced the risk of their junks falling prey to the Cheng force.

The merger between the Taiwanese and Kuang-tung merchants

According to the Dutch records, during the southwest monsoon season of 1664 twelve junks from Kuang-tung arrived in Japan. Assuming that the crews of those junks were still sailing under the flag of the Cheng when they departed, how did they behave in Kuang-tung between February and May 1664? Prior to the summer of 1663, the Kuang-tung merchants under Ch'ing rule had been involved in the rice trade with the Cheng troops residing at Amoy and on Nan-ao. At least six different reports written by the Kuang-tung authorities accused the naval forces detailed to the eastern border of Kuang-tung of allowing the transportation of paddy to the Cheng camps at Amoy and on Nan-ao.²⁴ For example, around May 8, 1663, some seventy

²⁴ Minandali, 'T'i-fu yang yü-ming wei hsü-lung têng wei-chin yü tsê t'ung-shang shih-pên [Letter in Reply to Yang Yuming Detailing How Hsü Lung Traded with Privateers without Permission] 2 Dec. 1663', in CCTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 7, 55-61.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

junks loaded with rice sailed to Amoy from the eastern part of Kuang-tung.²⁵ During the sea battle between the fleets of the Cheng and the Ch'ing navies off Nan-ao on 30 June, 1663, the Ch'ing naval captains witnessed how their Regional Commander of Chieh Shih, Su Li, deliberately let the Cheng junks escape their encirclement.²⁶ Like the naval force stationed at Amoy, the fleet under Su Li anchored off Chieh Shih Island was located outside the new boundary defined in the Evacuation Edict, but Su Li's fleet was also prohibited from conducting any trade. Of the Kuang-tung junks arriving in Japan in 1664, two declared themselves to be subject to Su Li. The Japanese estimated the value of the cargo of these two junks at 700,000 guilders.²⁷ Although the Dutch journal kept on Deshima does not mention the precise nature of the cargo, on the basis of the evidence that there was another junk from Kuang-tung which had brought raw silk and silk goods, it is likely that the junks were loaded with silk goods smuggled from Chê-chiang.²⁸ Unquestionably Su Li had a shrewd understanding of how he too could benefit from the maritime prohibition policy. The goods must have been smuggled through unsupervised gaps along the long coastline of Kuang-tung. Some rumours of what was going on reached the Dutch in Fu-chou: ' We have been informed that Hung Hsü, who is the person closest to Coxinga's son, has deserted him and fled to Kuang-tung.'²⁹ This information implies that Hung Hsü might also have been involved in smuggling activities in Kuang-tung. There is another point worth noting about these Kuang-tung

²⁵ Minandali, 'Wei shih-ma têng-ti ch'ao-tsê ch'ing-hsing pên [Report on the Suppression of the Privateers on Shihma] 28 June 1663', in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no. 7, 454.

²⁶ Minandali, 'Wei chin-ch'ao nan-ao shih-pên [Report on the Expedition to Nanao] 10 Sept. 1663, in CKTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no.8, 24-25; 28.

²⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 117,121. 2 July 1664; 11 Aug. 1664.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 124. 9 Sept. 1664.

²⁹ VOC 1249, Missive van d'Ed. Balthasar Bort en den raat aen haer Eds. [Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia, Canton, 3 Jan. 1665, fo. 187.

CHAPTER TWELVE

junks: two had departed from the Kao-Lei-Lien (*Colira*[D.]) areas.³⁰ These were the three different prefectures situated on the Lei-chou Peninsula which had been excluded from the compulsory evacuation along the Kuang-tung coast. From the Lei-chou Peninsula, it was possible to have complete control of the sea route between Kuang-tung and the northeastern part of Vietnam. Records exist which say that some local people resisted the compulsory evacuation and even retaliated against it by attacking Kuang-chou City with a naval force in 1663.³¹ Other sources also indicate that the people who inhabited the Kao-Lai-Lien areas co-operated with the Cheng force.³²

While the Kuang-tung junks lay anchored in Nagasaki Bay during the autumn of 1664, the Ch'ing focused their attention on Su Li. On 1 October, the Kuang-tung authorities sent troops to attack Su Li's castle in the Chieh-shih. He was subsequently defeated and decapitated but his 10,000 subjects surrendered and were spared.³³ News of this was probably brought by the above-mentioned junks of the Ching-nan Viceroy which sailed to

³⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 117, 120. 7 Aug. 1664; 8 Aug. 1664.

³¹ Tu Chên , *Yüeh-min hsün-shih chi-lüeh* [The Commissioner's Journey through Kung-tung and Fu-chien Provinces] 6 vols, (Shang-hai: Shang-hai ku-chi bookstore, 1979), I, 12. The Manchu court established the naval station at Shun-tê to counter the raids of two privateers/ pirates, Chou and Li.

³² Chao Erh-hsün, *Ch'ing-shih kao*[Draft of Chinese History in the Ch'ing Dynasty], (Taipei: Ting Wen, 1981, 9413.' Chou-yu, originally a person of lowly origin living on the junks, proclaimed himself general of the liberation army of Kuang-tung. He led several hundred junks, with three sails and eight rudders which moved rapidly on water. They were skilled mariners. When the Coxinga's junks arrived, they assisted them in their piracy. '

³³ TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, 24. The governor of Kuang-tung, Lu, reported ' Pingnan Wang and the commander led the army to attack the base of Chieh-shih's privateers, decapitated the leader, Su Li, and captured more than 10,000 people.' This implies that most of his subjects had been pardoned by the Kuang-tung authorities, even though they had violated the maritime prohibition edict.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

Nagasaki.³⁴ Unlike the Fu-chien authorities, who were charged with the conquest of Taiwan, the Kuang-tung authorities now confined themselves scrupulously to executing the edict which prohibited maritime trade and required the evacuation of the coastal provinces to the letter. The top military commander, the Ping-nan Viceroy, Shan Ke-hsi, had already made an attempt to load two junks with silk goods for Japan in 1661, but before they could set sail the civil authorities in Kuang-chou City confiscated the vessels citing the the prohibition as their grounds for this action.³⁵ Despite the fact Su Li lost his life, the rest of the Kuang-tung junk traders somehow managed to continue their activities under his colleague, Hsü Lung (*Colion, Corion, Colien*[D.]). The pilot of a Macao-based Portuguese ship which arrived in Malacca in the spring of 1665 reported:

*'Although the Emperor of China has issued an order that he must wage war against those in Taiwan with all the Chinese residing along the coast and with the whole navy financed by him, there are still some people living on a large, elongated piece of land near Macao who are unwilling to obey this directive.'*³⁶

During the southwest monsoon season of 1665, only four junks departed from Kuang-tung *en route* to Japan. All belonged to Hsü Lung.³⁷ Furthermore, the Dutch in Ligor heard about some 'long-haired' Chinese merchants, that is people who had not submitted to the Manchu rulers, who had visited Siam during 1666. These Chinese merchants were said to originate from an island under Su Li's rule. It turned out that merchants originally based on Chieh Shih Island had escaped and had regrouped in

³⁴ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 136. 23 Jan. 1665.

³⁵ VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Hendrick Baron aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fo. 853.

³⁶ VOC 1252, Missive van d'edele [Jan van] Riebeeck en raadt aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker], Malacca, 20 Feb. 1665, VOC 1252, fol. 75.

³⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 155. 19 July 1665.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Japan before sailing to Siam. They were still planning to check the current situation on their island in June of that year.³⁸ Evidently Kuang-tung merchants, or the local junk traders, had gradually begun to participate in the trade of the Cheng regime based in Taiwan after they had found themselves barred from their harbours on the Chinese coast by the promulgation of the Ch'ing policy of compulsory evacuation.

After 7 September, 1664, when the K'ang-hsi Emperor formally ordered the wresting of Taiwan from the hands of the Cheng, Shih Lang was expected to accomplish this mission without delay. This time something extraordinary happened. On 31 May, 1665, on its way across the Taiwan Strait, the armada was lying at anchor off the Pescadores Islands when it was engulfed by a typhoon of enormous proportions.³⁹ The Dutch chief merchant on Deshima heard from a Fu-chou junk:

*'...our fleet and that of the Manchus had run into a heavy storm off the Pescadores last November. One of our ships and most of the Manchu fleet (which consisted of at least 400 junks) has been destroyed. Time will tell if the report is true.'*⁴⁰

³⁸ VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de stad en Forteresse Malacca [Report Written by Merchant Adriaen Lucasz about his Activities in Ligor to the President and Commander of the City and Castle Malacca Balthasar Bort], Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208^{r-v}.

³⁹ Shih Lang, 'Fu-chien shui-shih t'i-tu shih-lang t'i wei chou-shih chin-kung t'ai-wan t'u-tz'u pei-fêng p'iao-san ni k'ê-ch'i fu-chêng shih-pên [Report Written by the Naval Commander of Fu-chien, Shih Lang, Recounting How the Fleet Was Struck by a Typhoon on Its Way to Taiwan and Being Fitted out for Depart Again]', in CKTI, Sha-mên ta-hsüeh t'ai-wan yen-chiu-so [Taiwan Research Institute XMU] (eds), *K'ang-hsi t'ung-i t'ai-wan tang- an shih-liao hsüan- chi* [Selections of Historical Material concerning the Conquest of Taiwan during the K'ang-hsi Period], (Fu-chien: Fu-chien jên-min publisher, 1983), 50.

⁴⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 152. 18 June 1665.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

This calamity represented a tremendous loss for the Fu-chien authorities, because they had paid for the construction of most of the vessels from their own private purses. Two hundred and fifty junks belonged to the Provincial Navy Commander, Shih Lang, and the Hai-ch'êng Duke, and another 100 were owned by the Ch'ing-nan Viceroy. The remainder were the property of various Fu-chien officials.⁴¹ This pattern of ownership might explain why the subsequent suggestions of these Fu-chien officials that Emperor K'ang-hsi should seek conciliation with Taiwan gained a largish following and why the Emperor decided to call a halt to any further expeditions.

This heaven-sent gale which struck the Pescadores in the early summer of 1665, enabled the Cheng regime to release its Taiwan-based troops from the unproductive duty of defending the island. The merchants who lived under the Cheng regime immediately poured their energy into maritime trade activities and resumed their monopoly over the trade. The first thing they intended to accomplish was to secure their share in the Japan market and, in particular, to repair the damage to the weakened Chinese silk export business.

Between 1664 and 1665, as the Ch'ing Fu-chien authorities were beginning to dispatch silk-laden junks to Japan, the Cheng regime in Taiwan sought the co-operation of the disaffected elements in Kuang-tung, either privateers or rebels. As the Dutch had destroyed their commercial harbour at Sha-ch'eng, the Cheng junk traders had to try to find some alternative port along the Chê-chiang- Fu-chou route at which they could obtain Nanking silk. Now that virtually the entire coast of China had been sealed off, the intermediate land route via Vietnam emerged as viable alternative. If the border between Vietnam and China was opened, then it would be possible to transport the Nanking silks overland and then channel them to Japan via

⁴¹ Su Nahai, 'Su-na-hai t'i wei chuan-ts'ai tsao-ch'uan ch'ou-pan ping-hsiang pên [Report Written by Su Nahai about Donating Money to Build Ships and Support Soldiers] 2 Aug. 1663', in CCTI (ed.), *Ch'ing-ch'u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien*, TWH, I no 7, 518.

CHAPTER TWELVE

North Vietnamese ports. Ever since the beginning of the Manchu invasion, opposing bands had been cruising the coastal waters between China and Vietnam. The Dutch had also seen how about 1,200 ‘long-haired’ resistance fighters had occupied the most westerly harbour at Longmen in September 1661.⁴² After the Manchu force had driven these intruders away in 1662, they probably sought refuge in Tonkin.⁴³ As mentioned before, as a consequence of Hung Hsu’s contacts in Kuangtung they had connections with the Cheng regime in Taiwan. Certainly, the Cheng trading fleet did dispatch junks to Vietnam from Japan and, in the spring of 1663, a Cheng junk carrying 100 armed men arrived in Tonkin (Hanoi). It was said that she had come from Japan and was loaded with pepper, lead, rattans and the like, which the Dutch suspected of being the booty plundered from Dutch Fort Zeelandia in Taiwan.⁴⁴ Just before this armed junk arrived in Tonkin, dozens of Chinese merchants residing there advised the resident Dutch merchant there to encourage the border trade. He reported the following to Batavia

‘In Lung-chou (Loctjouw[D.]) and Chiao-chou (Caatcjouw[D.]) we met more than ten Chinese merchants who had been travelling for twenty-seven days on a journey from Nanking (Nanquin[D.]) to Lung-chou. If they had not reached this border (near Lung-chou) by way of Chiang-hsi (Kiancij[D.]) Province and, further along, by way of the entire province of Hu-kuang (Huquam [D.]), and have headed straight to Kuang-chou (Canton[D.]) City, they would have had to travel the entire length of Chiang-hsi Province. Kuang-tung Province is situated about 60 Dutch miles

⁴² VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Hendrick Baron aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia geschreven, Tonkin, 13 Nov.1661, fo. 848.

⁴³ Chen Chingho , ‘Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung ts’an-pu chih i-chih nan-ch’i (shang) [The Migration of the Cheng Partisans to South Vietnam (Part I)]’, *The New Asia Journal* , 5/1 (1960), 433-359, at 442.

⁴⁴ VOC 1241, Missive van ’t opperhoofd [Hendrick Baron]en den raet in Tonquin aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] en de raden van Indien, Tonkin, 6 Nov, 1663, fo. 357^v.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

(450 km) away, eastwards from here by the sea. Because Kuang-chou City (and especially Macao) is situated on a geographical promontory stretching eastwards, it seems that Kuang-chou City is farther from Nanking than Lung-chou is.⁴⁵

These Chinese merchants did their best to convince the Dutch merchants in Tonkin that the land route (via the river systems) was now more convenient than the sea route via Kuang-chou or Macao. In fact, the Dutch had heard rumours of this plan from local Chinese merchants as early as 1661.⁴⁶ What the advisors failed to mention was that the difficulties at present upsetting Kuang-chou City were caused by both the evacuation and the prohibition on maritime trade. As the Chinese merchants Tonkin hailed from Nanking, it can be reasonably inferred that their bulk commodities were silk goods. The land route they were advocating so enthusiastically passed through the Cheng-nan Gate (nowadays Friendship Gate), where was the official gate the Ch'ing court received the ambassador from Vietnam (Tonkin) pay homage to the Manchu Emperor, K'ang-hsi. As they approached the gate, the merchants could choose to visit other border cities in Kuanghsi province namely: *Lung-chou*, *P'ing-shiang* (Pingkang[D.]), *Ssu-ming-fu* (Siminfoe[D.]) and *T'ai-ping-fu* (Theibinfoe[D]). Notoriously the King of Tonkin had handed over the last royal descendant of the Ming dynasty to the Ch'ing authorities via this route in May 1662.⁴⁷ After this event, the officials of the

⁴⁵ VOC 1243, Verantwoordinge door d'heer Hendrick Baron aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia, Tonkin, 14 Feb. 1663, fos. 136-137. The duration of the journey tallies with other Dutch records, which indicate that the overland journey from Nanking to Kuang-chou took 25 days. *Daghregister Batavia*, 1653, 60-1. 9 May 1653.

⁴⁶ VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Hendrick Baron aen haer Eds. [Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia geschreven, Tonkin, 13 Nov. 1661, fo. 851.

⁴⁷ VOC 1241, Missive van 't opperhoofd [Hendrick Baron] en den raet in Tonquin aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] en de raden van Indien, Tonkin, 6 Nov. 1663, fo. 357^v; Sha Ch'eng, 'T'i-pao hê-lan-kuo chia-pan-ch'uan ti-min

CHAPTER TWELVE

two countries gradually secured the Chengnan Gate against any illegal intrusions.

On January 24, 1664, a junk left Nagasaki bound for Tonkin.⁴⁸ It probably belonged to an independent Chinese merchant by the name of Wei Chiu-kuan.⁴⁹ Having first called at Cambodia this junk made good time to Tonkin.⁵⁰ She sailed into Tonkin on February 3, carrying a cargo worth 200,000 taels, and she returned to Japan in the summer of 1664.⁵¹ However, as early as May 1663, Dutch ships had received orders to intercept any Chinese vessel sailing to Japan.⁵² In August 1664, Dutch vessels noted that two Chinese junks, each worth 100,000 to 200,000 guilders, were leaving the harbour.⁵³ Assuming that one of them belonged to Wei Chiu-kuan, it is fairly safe to conclude that the other junk was operating under the orders of the Cheng regime. The trading mission of the two ships was abortive and they

chu-kung shih-pên', 48. This document also refers to the last royal descendant of the Ming dynasty as Chu Yan-ji.

⁴⁸ VOC 1248, Dagregister van het gepasserde in Japan ten comnptoir Nangasacki gehouden bij Willem Volger, coopman ende opperhoofd aldaer, Japan, 24 Jan. 1664, fo. 2450.

⁴⁹ VOC 1247, Missive van de opperhoofden te Nangasacki [Willem Volger] aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Japan, 1 Jan. 1664, fo. 33.

⁵⁰ VOC 1246, Missive van de heer Hendrick Baron en Hendrick Verdonck te Tonquin aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Tonkin, 12 Feb. 1664, fo. 280.

⁵¹ VOC 1248, Missive van de heer Hendrick Verdonck te Tonquin aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Tonkin, 5 Nov. 1664, fo. 2779.

⁵² VOC 1249, Missive van Ed. Enoch Poolvoet en raet aen haer Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 2 Dec. 1664, fo. 118.

⁵³ VOC 1248, Missive van de residenten te Nangasacki [Willem Volger] aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Japan, 22 Oct. 1664, fo. 2407.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

never reached Japan because of the Dutch interception.⁵⁴ The blockade elicited strong reactions from the authorities both in Tonkin and in Japan, who suffered great losses because of what they had invested in this venture. In the aftermath of this incident, in the summer of 1665 the VOC administration finally lifted its blockade order against Tonkin.⁵⁵ Soon, Japan was once again witnessing the safe arrival of junks from Tonkin.⁵⁶

Although the joint pressure exerted by both the Japanese and Tonkin authorities compelled the Dutch to lift their blockade, the smuggling scheme hatched by the Kuang-tung rebels collapsed because it had run up against other obstacles.

When official diplomacy between China (the Ch'ing court) and Vietnam (the Thrinh Court) gradually moved on to a more stable footing after 1662, the Thrinh king suddenly issued radical measures which forced the Chinese within his borders to assimilate to Vietnamese culture. On 27 September, 1663, the king promulgated a placard declaring that, if they wished to remain in Vietnam, all foreigners should immediately tie up their hair, dye their teeth and go bare-footed according to the Vietnamese fashion. The placard also declared that, with the exception of the Dutch, all foreigners should move outside the city walls of Tonkin.⁵⁷ These requirements signalled that Chinese 'long- hair resistance fighters', who preserved their Chinese identity, could be easily distinguished from Vietnamese and it would be

⁵⁴ Hoang Anh Tuan. 'Silk for silver: Dutch-Vietnamese relations, 1637-1700' (Diss., Leiden University, 2006), 114; VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur [Hendrick] Verdonck aen haer Eds. [Joan Maetsuijcker], Tonkin, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209-248.

⁵⁵ Tuan, *Ibid.*, 115.

⁵⁶ VOC 1253, Dachregister des comptoirs Nangasackij [bij Jacob Gruijs], 25 July 1665, fo. 2139; 25 Aug. 1665, fo. 2146.

⁵⁷ VOC 1241, Missive van 't opperhoofd en den raet [Hendrick Baron] in Tonquin aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] en de raden van Indien, Tonkin, 6 Nov. 1663, fo. 364.

CHAPTER TWELVE

simple to keep them under surveillance. According to the Kuang-tung governor's report, sometime before April 1665 a group of resistance fighters had seized a port in Kuang-tung.⁵⁸ While the Tonkin assimilation policy was in force, this group, which had retreated to Tonkin in 1662, must have had inklings that the Tonkin authorities would no longer give them refuge if the Manchu court declared them fugitives. As expected, the Ch'ing court did indeed demand that the King of Tonkin (the Thrin king) should extradite those rebels. It sent an official letter to the Thrin king, threatening him with war if he failed to hand over the fugitives in Vietnam.⁵⁹ For unknown reasons, the Thrin court did not feel obliged to obey. Consequently, tensions on the border worsened. Not long after this demand had been made, four Chinese junks visited Tonkin when they offered pepper and sandalwood at reduced prices. Their prices were so competitive they even lured Ch'ing merchants across the border. The goods might have been cheap but the taxes collected by the Thrin king were heavy, so in order to circumvent them, the merchants from Manchu China and the merchants under the Cheng regime choose to conduct their trade in a remote village near the border. However, when the king eventually discovered this rendezvous, he gave immediate orders that all trade should be confined to a certain site where it would be under the supervision of appointed officials and guarded by 1,000 soldiers to see that there were no defaulters. The site designated lay across the river from Tonkin City.⁶⁰

During the early summer of 1665, when the mood in Tonkin was

⁵⁸ Hua-wên shu-chü (comp.), *Ta-ch'ing shêng-tsu jên (k'ang-hsi) huang-ti shih-lu* [Selection of the Veritable Records of the K'ang-hsi Emperor], 300 vols (Taipei: Hua-lien, 1964), XIV, 14-15. 26 April 1665.

⁵⁹ Hua-wên shu-chü (comp.), *Ta-ch'ing shêng-tsu jên (k'ang-hsi) huang-ti shih-lu*, XIX, 3-4. 17 June 1666.

⁶⁰ VOC 1264, Missive door den coopman [Constantijn] Ranst ende den raet aen haer Eds. de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Tonkin, fos. 118^{r-v}; 119^f. 21 Jan. 1667.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

gradually turning inimical towards the Chinese maritime merchants, a typhoon damaged the armada under the Ch'ing Admiral Shih Lang in the Taiwan Strait. Delivered from a strong Ch'ing naval presence by the weather, the ties between Cheng Ching's force in Taiwan and the Kuang-tung privateers became tighter, especially after Hsü Lung (the successor of Su Li who trades with Cheng force in secret) had had to withdraw from the coast in obedience to the Imperial Order in 1666.⁶¹ Their mutual interests encouraged the two parties to consider developing a new corridor for the Sino-Japan trade. It would involve the joint forces exploiting their mastery of the Kuang-tung waters, either to smuggle Nanking silks from the Kuang-tung coast or to secure a sea route by which silks from Tonkin could be safely shipped. After the summer of 1666, this project gradually began to lose its appeal as it ran into obstacles created by both the VOC fleet and the Ch'ing court. Despite this disappointment, after the Fu-chien competitors retreated from the strait, the Cheng regime in Taiwan had the opportunity gradually to recoup its strength and revive its maritime trade. The joint forces of Taiwan and the Kao-Lai-Lien areas now turned their attention to their only competitor in these waters, namely the Dutch East India Company.

Suppression of Fu-chou, desertion of Siam and a focus on Cambodia

The Dutch merchants in Japan heard that, while bound for Japan in the late summer of 1665, a Chang-chou Junk (loaded with riches and probably belonging to the Hai-ch'êng Duke and the T'ung-an Count) had been seized by Cheng war-junks based in Taiwan.⁶² The Dutch merchants residing in Fu-chou claimed the junk was loaded with 600 piculs of white raw silk. They

⁶¹ TWYH (ed.), *Chêng-shih shih-liao san-pien* [The Third Compilation of Historical Documents referring to the Cheng Family], TW no. 175, 71.

⁶² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 159-60, 162.30 Aug. 1665; 25 Sept. 1665.

CHAPTER TWELVE

also reported that, during the same season, the Cheng naval force had captured three other extremely valuable junks during their voyage to Japan.⁶³ These captures marked the turning point after which the Cheng naval forces had definitely taken the upper hand, helped by the fact a typhoon had devastated the Ch'ing armada in May 1665. Not very long after (October 1665), seizing the day the Cheng authorities resident in the southwestern plain of Taiwan decided to dispatch six vessels to Tamsuy, a harbour on the northwestern tip of Taiwan facing the Taiwan Strait. Seventy armed soldiers repaired the redoubt (lain unoccupied since deserted by the Dutch in 1661) and fortified the area with gun emplacements for several cannon.⁶⁴ Since their invasion of Taiwan in 1661, the Cheng forces had not considered stationing a garrison in that part of the island, and apparently this small fort was seen as a counterweight to the Dutch garrison in Chi-lung on the northeastern tip of the island.

In the spring of 1666, the Cheng reinforced the Tamsuy garrison, bringing the total strength up to between 700 and 800 soldiers. They lived in some bamboo huts in a camp protected by a wooden palisade.⁶⁵ Cheng Ching sent a delegate from An-ping to Tamsuy to open peace negotiations with the Dutch in Chi-lung. On 2 March, 1666, the Dutch captain received them officially in Fort Noord Holland in Chi-lung.⁶⁶ Cheng Ching offered the Dutch a piece of the sandbar called Pei-Hsien-Wei (*Baxemboy*[D.]) near Fort Zeelandia, on which the VOC merchants could build a lodge and, as a reciprocal gesture, the Dutch would have to agree to trade peacefully with the Cheng regime. Eager to have his enemies out of northern Taiwan, Cheng

⁶³ VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir Nangasackij] aen haer Eds [Joan Maetsuijcker], Japan, 19 Oct 1665, fo. 1584.

⁶⁴ J. L. P. J. Vogels., 'Het Nieuwe Taijouan: De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie op Kelang 1664-1668 [New Taiwan: the Dutch East India Company at Chi-lung]' (unpublished MA thesis, Utrecht University: 1988), 23.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 24.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 26.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

Ching required that the Dutch withdraw from Chi-lung and cease their hostilities against all junks affiliated with the Cheng regime. After his proposal was rejected, a few months later, in May, Cheng Ching dispatched 6,000 soldiers to attack the fort at Chi-lung, but the Dutch managed to repulse the attackers after 10 days of fighting, in which time the Cheng army suffered some 1,000 casualties.⁶⁷ At this point, the Cheng troops had to adopt another tactic and tried to cut off the food supply the aborigines were providing the Chilung garrison. They then simply sat back and kept a watch on the Dutch in Chi-lung.

During these expeditions, at least twenty junks were needed to transport the Chinese soldiers back and forth between Tamsuy and Chi-lung. As there were only one or two Dutch yachts transporting supplies to Chi-lung from Fu-chou, the 300 Dutch soldiers in the fort were more or less helpless and, after the events of 1666, the Cheng junks could go and come the Strait as they pleased, safe in the knowledge that their vessels far outnumbered those of the Dutch. Finally, after the Ch'ing court had unconditionally rejected their petition for free trade, the Dutch deserted their fort on 6 July, 1668.⁶⁸ Hence, Cheng Ching finally realized his strategic goal of securing the trade route through the Taiwan Strait, but as this was only one part of the whole trade route, Cheng Ching now needed to secure the ports on the Cochin-China Peninsula.

As mentioned earlier, after what happened in 1663 securing the silk trade between China and Japan must have been the first priority for the Cheng regime. Since the autumn of 1663, the Amoy merchants who had defected to the Ch'ing had become the main rivals, but, owing to the Dutch blockade, the merchants under the Ch'ing still did not feel free to send their junks to all the harbours around the South China Sea. The strategy of the VOC was to try to block the harbours of Tonkin, Cambodia, Siam, anywhere

⁶⁷ Ibid. 29-33.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 91-93.

CHAPTER TWELVE

in fact where the Dutch residents had enough authority to press the local rulers to expel Cheng Ching's merchants.

Not unnaturally, this heavy-handed tactic rebounded on the Dutch. It certainly stirred up resentment at the Siamese court, where King Narai was poised to expand his royal trade with Japan and China. If and when the Siamese King entered into the trade, previously monopolized by the Chinese and the Dutch merchants, it stands to reason that the percentage of the trade allocated to the Dutch must invariably shrink to compensate for the Siamese King's newly created share. Moreover, for over a decade, ever since the 1650s in fact, the Dutch had frequently leveled accusations against Coxinga's adherents, saying that they were infringing the privileged Dutch monopoly on the export of animal skins (especially deerskins).⁶⁹ Coxinga's invasion of Taiwan cutting them off from one of the best sources of supply, forced the Dutch to employ tougher tactics to protect their rights. A notable example of this occurred on 16 August, 1661, when a VOC ship intercepted a Siamese crown junk sailing from Tonkin to Japan and justified her interception on the grounds that the junk was being manned by Chinese and Portuguese.⁷⁰ The news of the seizure spread in Siam during March 1662 and exacerbated the resentment felt by the local Chinese community against the Dutch residents. About 800 Chinese people gathered around the Dutch trading-post in Ayutthaya shouting that they would cut off the ears and noses of the Dutch.⁷¹ Encouraged by this, King Narai lost little time in demanding that the VOC compensate him for the seizure of the junk (and her cargo) valued at 84,000 guilders. To express his people's feelings of contempt for the Dutch, the Siamese King not only personally received the envoy and accepted the gifts

⁶⁹ Dhiravat Na Pombejra, 'The Dutch-Siamese Conflict of 1663-1664: A reassessment', in Leonard Blussè (ed.), *Around and About Formosa*, (Taipei: Ts'ao Yungho Foundation for Culture and Education, 2003), 291-306 at 295.

⁷⁰ VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 11 May 1663, fo. 71.

⁷¹ Dhiravat, *The Dutch-Siamese Conflict*, 295.

ALL ACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

sent by Coxinga in the spring of 1662, he reciprocated and dispatched an envoy bearing gifts and goods on the junk of Coxinga's envoy on her return voyage to Taiwan. The Siamese King also insisted that the Dutch factory issue free passes to all his junks sailing to China and Japan, including that of the envoy.⁷²

Aware that the VOC could not reasonably expect to obtain valuable commodities under these conditions, the Dutch in Ayutthaya closed down their office in November 1663 and, following the orders issued by Batavia, began to patrol the coastal waters in the vicinity of the Chao Phya estuary.⁷³ They decided to take this step about this time that Cheng Ching's adherents left Amoy and Quemoy, re-establishing themselves first on Nan-ao and, later (1664), totally withdrawing from all the islands along the China coast.

No junk from either Taiwan or Japan visited a Siamese harbour between 1664 and 1665. The Cheng authorities in Taiwan must have got wind of the Dutch blockade in the Gulf of Siam. After the Dutch seized a Siamese crown junk homeward bound from Japan off the coast of Cambodia, the Siamese court capitulated. In the peace treaty concluded between the Siamese King and the Dutch, the former agreed in principle not to employ any Chinese on his trading junks, irrespective of their destination or port of departure.⁷⁴ Although the Dutch merchants requested the Siamese King banish all local Chinese merchants from his kingdom, he balked at such a demand, claiming that all the resident Chinese (numbering about 1,000) were his own subjects, not those of the Cheng regime. To strengthen his assertion, the Siamese King pressed the local Chinese merchants to declare their allegiance to the Siamese crown.

⁷² VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 11 May 1663, fo. 71.

⁷³ Dhiravat, *The Dutch-Siamese Conflict*, 298-9.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, 300-1.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Unlike the situation in Tonkin and Siam, the Dutch outposts did not have any formal relationship with Quinam which, perhaps as a consequence, was disposed to provide the Chinese merchants with shelter. Four junks departed to Japan from Quinam during the summer of 1664, even though Dutch ships were patrolling the Gulfs of Tonkin and Siam. However, although disposed to be friendly, Quinam could not provide the Cheng junk traders with deer- and rayskins, which were the key commodities in the strategy devised by the Cheng regime to preserve its Japanese trade.

While Coxinga was laying siege to the Dutch in Fort Zeelandia from 1661 to 1662, political conditions in Cambodia had degenerated into chaos. After a sixteen-year long rule (1642-1658) by his brother, the Muslim Sultan Ibrahim, who had usurped the throne, the legitimate heir (Prince Nacpra Boemton) rose in revolt, principally because Ibrahim had introduced a radical Islamic movement into Cambodia. The legitimate prince demanded that the Cambodian people reinstitute traditional Buddhist worship and expel all the Malay high officials appointed by the Sultan.⁷⁵ When the revolt broke out, the prince took his mother's advice and asked the Quinam court for military support, a request acceded to in October 1658. The Quinam army invaded Cambodia, captured the Sultan and his family, and plunged into an orgy of plundering so fierce that it even caused the new Cambodian court to flee to the mountain areas. Instead of being a brother-in-arms, the Quinam army became the new oppressor. It plundered one big Chinese junk when she took shelter on the Mekong River after running into a typhoon on her voyage from Japan to Siam.⁷⁶ This was the straw which broke the camel's back, finally driven to react to this invasion, the Siamese King announced he would

⁷⁵ Ludovicus Carolus Desiderius van Dijk, *Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo, den Solo-Archipel, Cambodja, Siam en Cochîn-China: een nagelaten werk*[The Earliest Dutch Relations with Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, Cambodia, Siam and Cochîn-China: A neglected work], (Amsterdam: J.H. Scheltema, 1862), 343.

⁷⁶ VOC 1233, Missive door den coopman Jan van Rijck en desselfs raet met een appendix[aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker], Siam, 26 Feb. 1660, fo. 560^f.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

intervene and lead 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 vessels on a mission to expel the Quinam invaders.⁷⁷

News of his declaration caused the Quinam army to withdraw in 1659.⁷⁸ By the beginning of 1663, economic conditions in Cambodia had begun to recover. For example, that same year, a Chinese junk belonging to Wei Chiu-kuan exported 39,350 deerskins from Cambodia.⁷⁹ Two other junks carried a total of 53,360 deerskins to Japan.⁸⁰ The cargo of two other Chinese junks arriving in Nagasaki from Siam did not fare very well in comparison as they carried only 13,087 deerskins.⁸¹ It is important to note that, at this time, the Dutch blockade of Ayutthaya had just commenced and that, caught up in the throes of their crisis with Siam, the VOC merchants received an invitation from the new Cambodian king, Nac Boeton.⁸²

Trade negotiations officially commenced in February of 1665. The Dutch laid thirteen conditions before the King and his counsellors for their consideration, including the proviso that the Chinese should be totally excluded from the deerskin trade and the Dutch should be given the authority to patrol the Mekong River delta so as to be able to enforce their demands.

⁷⁷ VOC 1233, Missive door den coopman Jan van Rijck en desselfs raet met een appendix[aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker], Siam, 26 Feb. 1660, fo. 560^f; NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E Zacharias Wagenaer President opperhoofd over s' Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeslach int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 5 July 1659, not foliated.

⁷⁸ Dijk, *Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen*, 343.

⁷⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 78. 5 Aug. 1663; Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 93.

⁸⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 78-9. 18 Aug. 1663; 25 Aug. 1663; Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 93-4.

⁸¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 77,81. 11 July 1663; 6 Sept. 1663; Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 92, 95.

⁸² Dijk, *Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen*, 344; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 120-1. 5 Aug. 1664; 7 Aug. 1664; 15 Aug. 1664.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The King balked at this and stated that the Dutch could confront the Chinese junks only after they had left the coastal waters.⁸³ As a sop to Cerberus, he was willing to grant the Dutch an exclusive twenty-year privilege on the export of deerskins to Japan.⁸⁴

On 8 March, 1665, Merchant Pieter Ketting urged the *Shabandar* and several Cambodian grandees to announce that the VOC had been granted the exclusive right to export the skins; hence, all the local skin collectors were warned not to sell any of their wares to Chinese junks because any of these commodities sold in this manner would be liable to confiscation.⁸⁵ The Chinese deerskin traders immediately drew up a petition to the King, stating that

'Last year we advanced a considerable capital sum which our friends invested in purchasing and collecting of deerskins. We shall be able to supply those investors with the deerskins if Your Majesty permits us to keep one-third of the deerskins [to dispose of as we please]. Moreover, the Dutch do not have enough cash to pay for all the skins. Therefore, we shall find ourselves in a precarious position should the unsold deerskins remain in our warehouses, not able to be traded for the sizable sums of cash which the big

⁸³ Dijk, *Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen*, 346; VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur [Pieter] Ketting [ende J. van Wijkersloot te Cambodia] aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker], Cambodia, 12 Feb. 1665, fos. 101; 109. The boundaries of the territorial waters were defined as from the hook of Sinque Jaques in the north, to Pulo Obi in the south, and Pulo Candore in the east.

⁸⁴ Dijk, *Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen*, 344.

⁸⁵ VOC 1254, Dagregister gehouden bij den coopman Pieter Ketting wegens het voorgevallene omtrent 's compagnies saecken in 't rijk van Cambodia, beginnende in dato 12 Februarij 1665 dat den commissaris Jan de Meijer naer Batavia vertrock ende eijndigende den 12 November 1665 [Diary Kept by Merchant Pieter Ketting about the Company Business in the Kingdom of Cambodia, Beginning on 12 Feb. 1665 When Commissioner Jan de Meijer Departed for Batavia and Ends on 12 Nov. 1665], Cambodia, 8 March. 1665, fo. 1322. (Hereafter cited as 'Diary of Cambodia')

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

junks will bring.'

In their submission, the skin collectors asked the King to reduce the term of the Dutch privilege from twenty to ten years, and that he cut the annual export of skins from Cambodia by one half. The upshot was that the King did allow the Chinese to export one-third of the total number of the animal skins exported annually. The Dutch merchants did not raise any objections at this point, because Cambodian grandees told them that the order was only an expedient measure to appease the Chinese skin collectors in this one particular year.⁸⁶

Between March and April 1665, two Chinese junks arrived carrying silver coins, copper and some porcelain from Japan to Cambodia.⁸⁷ On 24 April, another junk arrived in Cambodia from Nanao.⁸⁸ These junks—perhaps under the aegis of the joint forces of Kuangtung privateers and the Cheng regime in Taiwan—were commanded by captains who must have noticed the deteriorating conditions in the deerskin trade in Siam. Intense rivalry flared up between the Chinese junk traders and the Dutch residents as soon as the Chinese junks arrived in Cambodia from Japan. At the beginning of May, the VOC merchants sought an audience with the king, urging him to force the Chinese collectors to sell their supplies of deerskins to the Dutch. The equivocal answer of the court was that the Chinese collectors had not built up a significant supply of deerskins on account of the shortage of copper coins.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ VOC 1252, Rapport van den coopman Johan de Meijer wegens zijn verrichtingh in Cambodia, Cambodia [Report Written by Merchant Johan de Meijer about His Activities in Cambodia], 10 March. 1665, fos 118-9.

⁸⁷ VOC 1254, *Diary of Cambodia*, Cambodia, 27 Mar 1665, Fol. 1332; 23 Apr. 1665, fo. 1341.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, 23 Apr. 1665, fo. 1341. The diary mentions that this junk from Nanao was actually a Quinam junk.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 8 May 1665, fo. 1346. 'some copper had been brought [by the Chinese junks],

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Dutch refused to be palmed off with such prevarication and demanded that the King order all Chinese traders to deliver forthwith whatever number of deerskins they already had in store to the Dutch Factory . The King ordered one of his courtiers, Nacpra Theeportioen, to write a short memorandum in the King's name, declaring that the Dutch demand be fulfilled.⁹⁰ On 26 June, the news spread that a Chinese junk was preparing to depart from the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh. When it came to his ears, the Dutch chief merchant requested permission to inspect her holds before it set sail on the high seas.⁹¹ After he had obtained permission and a search warrant, he took Nacpra Theeportioen and some inspectors to investigate the junk in question,⁹² but when the Chinese vigorously resisted their attempts to do so, the inspectors allowed the junk to set sail. Nacpra Theeportioen was indignant, but later, the Chinese mandarin, Tjauponia Sisermoth, declared that the inspectors had been wise to let the junk leave, because the King had issued another pertinent order in which he said that the junk should be left unharmed. Eventually the truth was out, namely that the King had purchased Japanese copper for casting cannons from the *nachoda* of the Chinese junk, and had paid the *nachoda* in deerskins.⁹³ As this pertained to the King's own private trade, the junk was inviolate. The long and short of it is that the Dutch residents in Cambodia failed miserably to enforce their privilege, because later that year, in the southwestern monsoon season, three junks loaded with deerskins departed from Cambodia to Japan.⁹⁴ To add insult to injury, the deerskins which the junks transported to Nagasaki yielded the Cheng more

with which he [the Cambodian King] had cast coins here in order to purchase and collect deerskins and some other sorts of goods. With this money, the Chinese would be ready to pay [and to collect the deerskins].'

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid., 26 June 1665, fo. 1352.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., fo. 1354.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 13 July 1665, fo. 1358. One of the junks would sail to Naoao first.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

silver than the Dutch were able to make.⁹⁵

The arrival of the ‘Taiwanese Chinese’ force under Piauja

As mentioned above, after a typhoon had wrought havoc with the Fu-chien armada in the early summer of 1665, the balance of maritime power in the Taiwan Strait gradually fell into Cheng Ching’s hands. Along the Kuang-tung coast, the evacuation policy implemented by the Ch’ing court created a vacuum which was eagerly being filled by roaming Kuang-tung privateers/pirates. They became particularly active after the fall of Su Li in 1664. Although some of the Kuang-tung privateers/pirates had attempted to set up an alternative silk trade route from Vietnam, they failed because of obstacles thrown in their path by the Ch’ing, Tonkin and the Dutch. At this stage of the game, as the Siamese King had declared his preference for the Dutch to the Cheng traders, the Cheng regime sensed the importance of the Cambodian deerskins and urgently recognized the necessity to cut the Dutch out of this trade.

One of the victims of the 1663-1664 Dutch blockade of Tonkin was the Chinese privateer/pirate Piauja. He had his revenge as later he was to play an important role in the Chinese raid on the Dutch factory in Cambodia. His own recorded recollections reveal that the Dutch had put him in custody on a VOC ship while they blockaded the Gulf of Tonkin. His summary custodial sentence cost him most of his property, reducing him to the level of a humble soldier instead of his former glory as a rich merchant.⁹⁶ On 20 February,

⁹⁵ VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir Nangasackij] aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker], Japan, 19 Oct. 1665, fo. 1589.

⁹⁶ VOC 1265, Rapport van den ondercoopman Jacob van Wijkersloot gedaen aen den Ed. Daniel Sixx coopman en opperhoofd mitsgaders den raedt over 's Comps. swaerwichtigen handel int keijser reijck van Japan omme in tijde en wijle haere Eds. [Joan Maetsuijcker] op Batavia bekent te maken den droevigen toestant in 's Comps.

CHAPTER TWELVE

1666, he arrived in Cambodian waters with a fleet of eight or nine Kuang-tung junks. He and his adherents sailed up the Mekong Delta and robbed seven or eight Malay vessels anchored there. Piauja and his men even captured a ship bound for Macao with a Portuguese priest on board. Later, he loaded four Kuang-tung junks with booty from the raids and sailed away, announcing that they were bound for Taiwan and that a bigger force of compatriots would return during the next northeast monsoon season. Four of his junks remained behind in Mekong River.⁹⁷

The Dutch Chief Merchant in Phnom Penh, two hundred kilometres up river, Pieter Ketting, was still insisting on claiming the exclusive privilege to any deerskins. However, his fortunes were about to take a turn for the worse. The most important Cambodian merchant on whom he relied died suddenly and his protector, Naval and River Master Occenja Calahon, got married and was absent from his post. Bereft of their protection, he was unable to prevent the Chinese traders from exporting deerskins to Japan.⁹⁸ At the end of this monsoon season, Ketting could purchase only about 6,262 taels' worth of goods for Japan, and could do nothing when the Chinese sent five junks to

voorgevalle saecke en ongehoorde proceduren int rijk van Cambodia aldaer 's Comps. ministers door den Chinesen rover Piauja aengedaen als mede het affloopen en verbranden der loges mitsgaders het droevigh vermoorden van 't opperhoofd seigneur Pieter Ketting als 'tgene andersints daer voorgevallen en gepasseert is [Report Written by Junior Merchant Jacob van Wijkersloot to Chief Merchant Daniel Six and Council in Japan and in Due Course His Excellency in Batavia about the Incidents and the Outrageous Happenings in the Cambodian Kingdom Committed by the Chinese Pirate Piauja Who Burned Down the Lodge and Grievously Murdered Chief Merchant Pieter Ketting, As Well As What Has Happened Since], [on the yacht the *Schelvis*], 19 Aug.1667, fo. 793^v. [Hereafter cited as 'Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia']

⁹⁷ VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Ketting aen de edele heer gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 5 Dec.1666, fos. 101^v-102^r.

⁹⁸ Ibid., fo. 101^r.

ALL ACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

Japan loaded with more than 70,000 pieces of skin.⁹⁹ The writing was on the wall, the presence of Piauja and his people in the Mekong Delta was exerting a strong influence on the attitude of the Cambodian court towards the Dutch.

On 15 February, 1667, the Chinese privateer sailed upstream from the mouth of the Mekong River to Phnom Penh in a small vessel. Not long before, on 16 January, two Chinese junks arrived in from Japan, carrying some 600 soldiers taken aboard in Taiwan.¹⁰⁰ Having joined forces with Piauja's men, in the king's name these soldiers massacred almost all the Quinam people living in the vicinity of the Mekong River.¹⁰¹ The Dutch suspected that the Cambodian King was behind this action, for they described him, in essence, as a wolf dressed in sheep's clothing.¹⁰² The massacre resulted in the deaths of almost 1,000 local Quinam people.¹⁰³

Piauja's influence at the Cambodian court underwent a sudden growth spurt after the King's official acknowledgment of his loyal service. He now commanded three junks and five local war-vessels, and was in the process of having another five war-vessels constructed.¹⁰⁴ Feeling that they were in a very precarious position, the Company servants in the Pnom Phen factory were afraid, and consulted their Cambodian adviser Tjuponja Zam. Through

⁹⁹ *Generale missiven*, III 1655-1674, 537-8. 25 Jan. 1667.

¹⁰⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 225. 10 Aug. 1667.

¹⁰¹ VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 1667, fol. 793^f. The manuscript is very hard to read. The author appreciates Dr Hugo s'Jacob's assistance in translating the text.

¹⁰² VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Ketting aen de edele heer gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 12 Mar. 1667, fo. 104^f.

¹⁰³ VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 1667, fol. 793^f.

¹⁰⁴ VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Ketting aen de edele heer gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 12 Mar. 1667, fo. 104^v.

CHAPTER TWELVE

him, Pieter Ketting got in touch with the court mandarin Tjauponja Tesemot, whom he asked to deliver Piauja 1,000 taels on his behalf in exchange for the safe conduct of the Dutch people out of Phnom Penh. Piauja turned down this proposal, suggesting that instead Ketting should give him a pass for two of his junks to sail to Batavia to enable his adherents to collect the debt a Chinese inhabitant of that city owed Piauja. The Dutch rejected this request as arrant nonsense. A little later their advisor was reduced to engaging in a shouting match with Tjauponja Tesemot. In March, the Dutch merchants were forced to call for help when the Chinese quarter in Phnom Penh mobilized 300 armed men, supported by heavy weapons. Chinese junks now also sailed into the river where they carried out patrols.¹⁰⁵

On 20 June, Piauja led between 170 and 180 armed soldiers to the Dutch trading-post in Phnom Penh. They entered through the palisade and delivered a letter translated from Chinese into Portuguese demanding the extradition of Pieter Ketting. Piauja took the Chief Merchant and some of his men hostage, and ordered the other Dutchmen to collect a ransom of 4,873 taels of silver. After the money had been handed over, the crisis seemed to abate.

On 25 June, when a VOC yacht from Batavia sailed into the Mekong River, Pieter Ketting in Phnom Penh asked the Cambodian King for protection, assuring him that Dutch reinforcements and a rich cargo were on their way to his kingdom. The yacht brought with it a cargo of piece goods which could be traded for deerskins. But, before the trade could begin, on 9 July Piauja suddenly raided the Dutch trading-post at midnight.¹⁰⁶ Earlier that day, Piauja's men had captured two Dutch sailors from the yacht on their way to visit a friend in the Spanish quarter of Phnom Penh, with whom they

¹⁰⁵ VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 1667, fo. 794^v.

¹⁰⁶ VOC 1261, Missive door d'overheden van 't jacht de Schelvis uijt de revier van Cambodia na Malacca geschreven, [on the yacht the *Schelvis*], 11 July 1667, fo. 359^f.

ALL ACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

intended to spend the night. When the two captives informed Piauja that no further aid could be expected from Batavia, he decided to attack the Dutch trading-post that same night.¹⁰⁷

Eighty Chinese soldiers broke through the palisade and took the VOC servants who were still asleep by surprise. Although the yacht was anchored nearby, the low water level made it impossible for the sailors and gunners aboard to fire on the factory, which was situated on high ground. Watching from the bloody massacre in the trading-post which was soon engulfed in flames, from afar, the crew dared not go ashore. The killing went on until dawn.¹⁰⁸

All acknowledged by the kings

This unequivocal use of force and violence by the 'Taiwanese Chinese' presents a picture of Cheng power around the South China Sea. The incident has remained almost completely outside the scope of Chinese records because, after seizing Taiwan from the Cheng regime in 1683, the Manchu government destroyed most of its official documents.

The tangled history of Chinese merchants pursuing revenue from the Japan trade and the military operations of the Taiwan-based Cheng regime bear a close similarity to the overseas adventures of Japanese samurai adventurers like Yamada Nagamasa in Ligor and Hamada Yahyoe in Taiwan several decades earlier.

¹⁰⁷ VOC 1269, Verbael van drie Nederlanders uijt Cambodia gevangen te Macassar aengebraght, nopende haer wedervaren geduijrende haere gevanckenisse aldaer [Report Written by Three Netherlanders Who Were Captured in Cambodia Recounting Their Imprisonment There], Macassar, 17 Jan. 1670, fo.701^{r-v}; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 226. 19 Aug. 1667; VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 1667, fo. 769^{r-v}.

¹⁰⁸ VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 1667, fo. 797^v.

CHAPTER TWELVE

This overview of the military operations directed by the Cheng regime between 1666 and 1667 reveals how it ran the Tung-ning (that is, the realm of the Cheng regime in Taiwan) as an entrepôt where goods, information and military resources could be exchanged. The Cheng merchants and soldiers were organized so that they could react quickly and flexibly to preserve their strategic advantage. Even though quite a few senior Cheng military officers and soldiers surrendered to the Ch'ing in 1663, most of the vessels remained at the disposal of the Cheng navy.¹⁰⁹ After the Cheng moved its commercial base from Amoy to Taiwan, they also established concealed bases along the coast of Kuang-tung in 1664, and the typhoon which had wreaked havoc on the Shih Lang armada in 1665, enabled the Cheng regime to gain control of the waters between Fu-chou and Tamsuy. The Dutch succeeded in keeping control of the export of Siamese deerskins in 1666 and again in 1667, but when they also tried to butt in and secure the deerskin market in Cambodia, they met with strong Chinese opposition.

Undoubtedly the most important driving force behind these events was the Japanese demand for deerskins. Ever since the middle of the sixteenth century, Japan had been exporting silver to the areas around the East and South China Seas. By issuing the proclamation that no Chinese vessels should be harmed in the waters between China and Japan, the Japanese authorities spread a *de facto* protective umbrella over the trading junks of the Cheng regime, keeping them safe from Dutch attacks.¹¹⁰

Although the fleets of the Dutch East India Company could still blockade any harbour, such an action would do it little good if the local rulers

¹⁰⁹ Shih Weich'i, 'Shih Weich'i mi-t'i t'ai-wan chêng-shih t'ung-yang ch'ing-hsing ping-ch'ên ch'ao-fu chi-i shih-pên [Secret Report about the Trading Activities of the Cheng Regime and Suggestions about How to Defeat It] 14 Aug 1668', in CKTI (et al eds), *K'ang-hsi t'ung-i t'ai-wan tang- an shih-liao hsüan-chi*, 82.

¹¹⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 95. 1 Feb. 1664. The Shogun issued a direct order that no Dutch vessels might attack any Chinese junks sailing to Japan.

ALLACKNOWLEDGED 1662-1667

could not be pressed to keep their promises. The VOC could not afford to lose its supply of silver from Japan. In the case of Cambodia, the Dutch could not effectively blockade the waters around the Mekong Delta because the capital, Phnom Penh, was located 200 kilometres inland.

Therefore, they were unable to keep an eye on the individual local vendors and ascertain their credit sources. Furthermore, the VOC could never collect the commodities it required without the assistance of the local rulers. Too weak to dominate the native market, the Company could not enforce its privileges effectively.

The 600 Cheng soldiers who were landed in Phnom Penh were far more seasoned fighters than the Dutch merchants. With the consent of the Cambodian king, the Cheng Chinese of Taiwan was free to ransack the Dutch trading-post. In 1663, the Siamese king chose to make peace with the VOC, fearing Dutch retaliation on the sea routes, but in 1667 the Cambodian king allied with the Cheng side because he did not expect sufficient aid on land from the VOC. The new ties between the Cambodian and Taiwanese rulers were built on an acknowledgement of mutual interests. The King of Taiwan assisted the King of Cambodia in expelling the Quinam enemy, and the Shogun of Japan guaranteed that the Taiwanese traffic between his country and Cambodia would be free of interference from the VOC.

Cheng Ching actually completed the trading system designed both by his grandfather, Iquan, by fending off the European competitors on the overseas markets, and his father, Coxinga, by building trading relationships with overseas rulers based on military alliances. What he could not foresee was the decline in the silver exports from Japan and Manila, which were just beyond the horizon. When this did become palpable he was forced to look for new markets. How the changing patterns in the Asian maritime trade eventually led to the decline and fall of the merchant princes of Taiwan will be described in the following chapter.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
MONOPOLY LOST
1669-1683

Reorganizing the trading network 1663-1670

When a typhoon left the Manchu armada in shambles in the early summer of 1665, Cheng Ching's navy seized the opportunity again to obtain a maritime advantage over its adversaries. At more or less the same time, his captains captured three Fu-chou junks and another one from Chang-chou loaded with a total of 600 piculs of white silk.¹ Now that the Kuang-tung exports were controlled by his new partners in Kao-lei-ran, Cheng Ching found himself in the auspicious position of being able to keep a tight grip on the China trade. He also found out that the defectors led by Cheng Tai's brother, Cheng Ming-chun, were trying to withdraw the remaining money from Cheng Tai's account in Nagasaki. Wasting no time, in a swift manoeuvre, he stepped in and claimed the money, said to amount to 500,000 taels, first in 1663.² Although the Shogunal court handed down a judgement stating that Cheng Tai's successor was the rightful owner of this capital, Cheng Ching's delegates refused to relinquish their claims, throwing the Japanese authorities into a quandary about to whom they should hand over the money.

Cheng Ching also had to tread a chary path because, if his men sold the captured goods from these four junks in Japan, this would violate the Shogun's edict that no harm should befall any vessel bound for Japan. To avoid this accusation, Cheng Ching had to find another party to whom he could sell these looted goods. As Japan was ruled out for the reasons stated

¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 159-60. 30 Aug. 1665; VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir Nangasackij] aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker], 19 Oct. 1665, fos. 1584-1585.

² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 168-9. 26 Nov. 1665.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

above, the Spaniards in Manila offered the next best market, but Cheng Ching's father, Coxinga, had once demanded the Manila authorities pay him tribute after he conquered Taiwan in 1662. That aggressive gesture had sown panic amongst the Manila authorities and had resulted in a bloody massacre in 1662, in which 2,000-3,000 Chinese people were slaughtered and their property confiscated.³ Later, Coxinga's sudden demise and the ensuing disputes over his succession had delayed the earlier declaration of war against Manila. After Cheng Ching eventually succeeded in legitimating his right of succession, he took control of Amoy, Quemoy and Taiwan in the spring of 1663.⁴ However, when he had taken this step but was faced by a bad harvest and subsequent food shortages, he cannily reversed his father's hostile plans and chose instead to propose a mutually beneficial trading plan to Manila.⁵ His ambassador, the Jesuit father Victorio Riccio, commented: 'The primary concerns [of the treaty] were that a great amount of property and silver owing them [the Chinese citizens] in Manila [should be returned].'⁶ In May 1663, a peace treaty was concluded and the trade was re-opened the following year.⁷

³ VOC 1243, Missive door d'Ed. Enoch Poolvoet en zijn raet aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia geschreven, Siam, 25 Feb. 1663, fos. 594-595; for the records of Spanish side C.F. José Eugenio Borao Mateo, et al. (eds), *Spaniards in Taiwan*, II 1642-1682, 600-8; Mauro Garcia; C.O. Resurreccion (eds), *Focus on Old Manila: A Volume Issued to Commemorate the Fourth Centenary of the City of Manila*, (Manila: Philippine Historical Association, 1971), 212-5.

⁴ Yang Yün-p'ing, *Nan-ming yen-chiu yü T'ai-wan wên-hua*[Studies on the Southern Ming and the Culture of Taiwan], (Taipei: T'ai-wan fêng-wu, 1993), 431-9.

⁵ VOC 1253, Missive van seigneur [Constantijn Nobel] en raad tot Hocksieuw aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijker], Fu-chou, 31 Oct. 1665, fos. 1855-1856; José Borao, *Spaniards in Taiwan*, II 1642-1682, 617-8.

⁶ José Eugenio Borao Mateo, Pol Heyns, Carlos Gómez, Anna Maria Zanduetta Nisce(eds.), *Spaniards in Taiwan*, 2 vols (Tapei, SMC Publisher, 2002), II 1642-1682, 617.

⁷ Borao, *Spaniards in Taiwan*, II1642-1682, 617; VOC 1264, Missive door den

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Table 13-1: Chinese Junks Visiting Manila during 1663-1670

	From China	From Taiwan
1663	2	
1664	4	1
1665	10	3
1666	2	2
1667		2
1668		4
1669		3
1670		8

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*, 148-60.

Table 13-2: Raw Silk Exports from China and Taiwan to Manila

	Price per picul (rial)	Total amount (picul)	Total price (rial)
1664	650	4.9	3,185
1665	450-400	27.5	11,675
1666	400	11.8	4,720
1668	500-450	3.4	1,640
1670	400	22	8,900

Source: AGI Philipinas 64, Vol. I, re-cited from Fang Chên-chên, *Ming-mo Ch'ing-ch'u T'ai-wan yü Ma-ni-la tê Fan-ch'uan Mao-i (1664-1684)*[The Junk Trade between Taiwan and Manila during the Transition from the Ming to the Ching Dynasty], (Taipei: Tao-hsiang, 2006), 191-2. Appendix II; Id, Fang Chên-chên, 'Ming-ch'ao chung-yeh fu-chien chang-chou yüeh-kang tê hsing-ch'i yü fu-chien tê hai-wai i-min: 1657-1686[The Silk Trade between China, Taiwan and Philippines 1657-1686]', in: Tang Shi-yeoung(ed.), *Chung-kuo hai-yang-shih fa-chan lun-wên-ch*, Vol. X, 267-328 at 320-3. Table 2.

As the above table bears witness, a regular shipping link was restored between Taiwan and Manila, but only very small quantities of raw silks were

coopman [Constantijn] Ranst ende den raet aen haer Eds. de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Tonkin 25 Oct 1666, fo. 117^v.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

actually exported to Manila. The silk seized from the Manchu junks did not after all go to Manila as the Dutch had conjectured. In fact, as the Japanese authorities were not irritated by Cheng Ching's action, the price differentiation between Nagasaki and Manila was the ultimate determinant of where the loot went:

Table 13-3: Raw Silk Price in Japan during 1668-1670

	Per picul in tael	Per picul in rial
1668*	440	(550)
1669*	520	(650)
	450	(562.5)
1670**	(480)	600

Source: * *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 259, 298, 287. 19 June 1668; 19 Jan.1669, 4 May 1669 ;** Chang Hsiu-jung , *The English Factory in Taiwan 1670-1685*, 69; The estimated value is given in brackets according to following standard: 1 tael = 70 stuivers (after 1666) (Voc-glossarium: 112);1 rial= 56 stuivers (VOC 11207, Uijtrekening van de Goude en Silvere Munts waardye, 12)

During 1664-1670, the raw silk price in Nagasaki climbed from 550 rials to 600 rials, while in Manila it declined even more markedly from 650 to 400 rials. In other words, although Cheng Ching was developing new connections with Manila, most of the silk he got hold of was still sold in Japan. As the table below shows, from 1646, the Sino-Manila trade declined to 30 per cent of the amount traded at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Yet, the proportion of Chinese goods in the total imports of Manila was still 40-50 per cent in the period 1661-1670. The importance of these wares explains why both sides were willing to reconcile in the summer of 1663.

Table 13-4: The Tariff Revenues of Manila

Year	The tariff revenues of Chinese goods in Manila (rial)	Percentage of Chinese goods in total tariff revenues. (%)

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1616-1620	31,045	73.5**
1626-1630	10,192.25	67.3**
1631-1635	22,673.2	75.8**
1636-1640	23,831.8	88.3**
1641-1645	12,249.4	83.81**
1646-1650	9,991	69.8
1651-1655	4,905	65.05
1656-1660	2,786	41.7
1661-1665	2,501.8*	51.5
1666-1670	1,581*	40.16

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVI^e,XVII^e,XVIII^e siècles)*, 200-19 ; * the tariff revenues of Taiwanese goods are included in; ** the percentage includes the tariff revenues of goods imported from Macao.

After the English merchants had been invited to establish a trade factory at Taiwan, they described how Cheng Ching's junks circulated between Japan, Taiwan and Manila as follows:

*'The King (Cheng Ching) had five or six junks that went yearly to Manila in January and returned in April or May, then fitted out for Japan, where they usually went from June onwards until about 12th, 14th July or later and returned here again in November or December.'*⁸

This is corroborated by the following table.

Table 13-5: Taiwan Junks Visiting Japan and Returning from Japan

Junks from Taiwan in Japan	Junks from Japan to Taiwan

⁸ Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to the East India Company in London, 16 Sept. 1672 (O. S.) in: Chang Hsiu-jung, Anthony Farrington, i.a. (eds), *The English factory in Taiwan: 1670-1685*, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), 151. The text has been revised for more proper English style.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

1665.6-1666.6	8 ⁹	15 ¹⁰
1666.7-1667.6	12 ¹¹	7 ¹²
1667.7-1668.7	7 ¹³	>5 ¹⁴
1668.7-1669.6	>8 ¹⁵	13 ¹⁶
1669.7-1670.6	10 ¹⁷	>10 ¹⁸
1670.7-1671.5	10 ¹⁹	8 ²⁰
1671.6-1672.5	13 ²¹	16 ²²

⁹ VOC 1253, Rapport van de seigneur [Jacob] Gruijs [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker][report from chief merchant Jacob Gruijs to gouvernor general Joan Maetsuijker], Japan, 9 December 1665, fo. 1912.

¹⁰ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 168, 171, 175. 26 Nov. 1665; 23 Dec. 1665; 24 Dec. 1665; 31 Jan. 1666.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 192-5; 209-10. 11 July 1666; 15 July 1666; 2 Aug. 1666; 6 Aug. 1666; 11 Aug. 1666; 15 Jan. 1667.

¹² *Ibid.*, 205-6. 2 Nov. 1666 ; 5 Nov. 1666; 24 Nov. 1666.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 224, 237. 25 July 1667, 26 July 1667, 28 July 1667; 1 Aug. 1667, 3 Aug. 1667; 23 Nov. 1667.

¹⁴ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 239; 242-4. 6 Dec. 1667; 16 Dec. 1667; 22 Jan. 1668; 31 Jan 1668; 11 Feb 1668.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 262-4;267-8. 6 July 1668, 12 July 1668, 20 July 1668, 12 Aug. 1668, 20 Aug. 1668, 24 Aug. 1668.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 281, 284. 30 Nov. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 307, 310. 21 July 1669; 17 Aug. 1669; 21 Aug. 1669.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 319, 321. 9 Nov. 1669; 13 Nov. 1669; 15 Nov. 1669; 18 Nov. 1669; 25 Nov. 1669; 18 Dec. 1669.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 341-4;346; 353 5 July 1670; 16 July 1670; 17 July 1670; 25 July 1670; 1 Aug. 1670; 20 Aug. 1670; VOC 1278, Dagregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij 't opperhoofd Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste inde negotie op de Jedose hoffreijsen voorgevallene, Japan, 30 Jan. 1671, fo. 1770^v; 6 Apr. 1671, fo. 1788^f.

²⁰ VOC 1283, Japans dagregister gehouden bij het opperhoofd Martinus Caesar[Diary of Japan kept by the chief merchant Martinus Caesar], Japan, 24 Nov. 1670; 26 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763^v; 29 Nov. 1670; 1 Dec. 1670, 2 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764^{f-v}; 3 Dec. 1670, fo. 1765^f.

²¹ VOC 1283, Japans dagregister, 30 June 1671, 1 July 1671, fo. 1792^f; 5 July 1671,

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Since 1663 most of the Taiwanese junks had been carrying sugar and deerskins to Japan. Ellis Crisp, English merchant, described this trade as follows:

*'The deerskins are a commodity that belongs solely to the King and annually provide 200,000 pieces. If it pleased him, he could have had even half as much again. This island produces 50,000 piculs of sugar annually.'*²³

As the Dutch records show, the English merchant might have been slightly deceived by his Chinese informant. Before the Coxinga occupied Taiwan, about 16,000 piculs of sugar were produced each year.

Table 13-6: Sugar Production in Taiwan 1659-1661

	Sugar produced in Taiwan (picul)
1659	17,500 ²⁴
1660	15,000 ²⁵
1661	<8,000 ²⁶

From 1663, Japan imported most of its sugar from Taiwan and other

12 July 1671, fo. 1793^f; 18 July 1671, 19 July 1671, 20 July 1671, fo. 1794^f; 22 July 1671, 23 July 1671, fo. 1795^f, 11 Aug. 1671, fo. 1802^v, 7 Sept. 1671, fo. 1809^f.

²² VOC 1290, Japans Dagregister, 30 Nov. 1671, fo. 326^f; 31 Dec. 1671, fo. 328^v; 31 Jan. 1672, fo. 333^v.

²³ Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670 (O.S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (ed.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 65. The original text has been revised for more modern English style.

²⁴ Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 464.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 482.

²⁶ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1661, 65.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

places in Southeast Asia because the Manchu Emperor forbade any sugar exports from China. At no time did the amount imported exceed 26,000 piculs annually.

Table 13-7: Sugar Imports from Taiwan 1663-1665

	Sugar carried to Japan by Chinese junks (picul)
1662.10-1663.10	21,045.3 ²⁷
1664	23,902.1 ²⁸
1665	25,631.71 ²⁹

In 1663, only 10,790 piculs of the sugar imported to Japan came from Taiwan, an amount which was not very different from the 10,112.82 piculs of sugar carried to Japan by the Taiwanese junks in 1682.³⁰ However, in 1641 the Chinese junks had carried as many as 57,269 piculs sugar from China and other places around South China Sea to Japan. Crisp's testimony might only represent a vague estimate of Cheng's commerce. The English later determined that about 10,000 piculs of sugar were produced in Taiwan

²⁷ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen*, 13. However, as counted in the Dutch records in the Dagregister van Batavia it was 1,9811.1 piculs of white and black sugar in total. C.f. *Dagregister Batavia*, 1663, 649.

²⁸ Iwao Senchii, 'Kinsei Nisshi Boeki in kansuru suryoteki kosatsu [A Quantitative Study of the Sino-Japanese Trade in the 17th Century]', *Shigaku zasshi* [Journal of Historical Science] 62 (1931), 31. re-cited from Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 506. Table 32. It is accounted as 23,915 piculs.

²⁹ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen*, 346. Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 506. Table 32.

³⁰ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 91-5;98-100. Both numbers include candied sugar.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

annually, an amount which would tally with our estimate.³¹

While the highest number of deerskins ever exported by the Dutch amounted to 151,010 items in 1638, according to an English report of 1663 the junks of Cheng Ching exported about 300,000 pieces,³² But this total number of deerskins included those from Siam and Cambodia as well.

Table13- 8:Deerskins Carried to Japan by Chinese Junks

	Total	From Taiwan	From Cambodia
1663	348,081 ³³	117,200 ³⁴	92,710 ³⁵
1664	234,342 ³⁶		128,000 ³⁷

³¹ Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 506; Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 15 Nov. 1672 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 159.

³² Nakamura Takashi, *Hê-lan shih-tai t'ai-wan-shih yen-chiu* [Studies about the History of Taiwan under the Dutch], comp. and trans. Wu Mi-tsa and Ang Ka-im, 2 vols, (Taipei: Pan-ch'iao, 1997-2002), I, 109.

³³ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1663, 648-9. 9 Dec. 1663; Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 345.

³⁴ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 91-95. The deerskins exported from An-hai were also included. Most of An-hai deerskins would have been purchased in Taiwan

³⁵ VOC 1243, Missive van Hendrick Indijck en raad aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia geschreven int jacht Calff voor de baij van Nangasacqui [Letter Written by Hendrick Indijck and Council on the yacht the *Calff* to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 21 Oct 1663, fos. 1956-1957. It records that about 100,000 deerskins were exported to Japan from Cambodia; Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 91-95.

³⁶ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 345.

³⁷ Pieter van Dam, *Beschrijvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie*, 7vols., ed. Frederik Willem Stapel and Carel Wessel Theodorus van Boetzelaer, ('s-Gravenhage : Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1927-54), Boek II, Deel I, 429.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

1665	148,168 ³⁸		(a lot) ³⁹
1666			70,000 ⁴⁰

In 1667 Cheng Ching joined forces with a group of Kuang-tung privateers/pirates and wiped out the Dutch trade factory in Cambodia in order to get hold of Cambodian deerskins. His intention was to obtain 100,000 deerskins from there each year.⁴¹

Even when the Manchu court strictly enforced the maritime prohibition policy, the import figures of Chinese junks sailing to Japan remained steady.

Table 13- 9: The Chinese Trade Accounts in Japan and Manila from 1663 to 1672. (Tail)

Year	Chinese Imports to Japan*	Chinese Silver Exports from Japan **	Taiwanese Imports to Manila***
1663	1,108,976.8	541,100	
1664	2,084,075.3	1,666,400	
1665	1,269,057	804,200	>9,035.5
1666	1,309,970.4	723,600	>2,626.2
1667	1,015,422	454,700	>3,634.5
1668	1,754,147.7 (280,000) ⁴²	341,500	>16,166.5
1669	1,640,836.1	29,600	0

³⁸ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 346.

³⁹ VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir Nangasackij] aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijker], Japan, 19 Oct. 1665, fo. 1589.

⁴⁰ *Generael Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 538. 25 Jan. 1667.

⁴¹ VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Kettingh aen de edele heer gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 5 Dec. 1666, fo. 101^v.

⁴² *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 267-8. 24 Aug. 1668. The private capital of the Tonkin private merchant Itchin was estimated to be 280,000 taels.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1670	1,528,203.7	39,500	>28,411.5
1671	1,442,611.5	95,000	>3,197.4
1672	1,508,217.	896,400	>8,644.4

Source: Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 410; **Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune*, 227. Table 21; ***Fang Chên-chên, *Ming-mo Ch'ing-ch'u T'ai-wan yü Ma-ni-la tê Fan-ch'uan Mao-i (1664-1684)*, 200. Table 5.23.

The rial was converted to tael according to the following standard: 1 tael = 70 stuivers (after 1666) (Voc-glossarium:112); 1 rial = 56 stuivers (VOC 11207, *Uijtrekening van de Goude en Silvere Munts waardye*, 12). Therefore 1 rial = 0.8 tael

The silver exports from Japan rapidly declined after 1667, after the Shogunal court had grown alarmed about the continuous drain of silver and took measures to reduce the amount exported. The Japanese authorities also lifted the ban on the export of gold in 1664, hoping to balance the trade accounts after the prohibition of silver exports. The Dutch were quite sanguine about this change of policy because they could obtain sufficient Spanish silver in Europe and also had recourse to Persian silver. The Japanese gold could be invested on the Coromandel Coast, replacing the Chinese gold that they used to obtain from Coxinga.⁴³ Consequently, this new Japanese export policy also weakened the motivation of the VOC either to regain Taiwan or to establish another trading station in China. When the maritime prohibitions failed to damage Cheng Ching's trading network, the Manchu court sent an official delegate, K'ung Yün-chang, with a letter inviting Cheng Ching to surrender in 1667. Cheng Ching's reply expressed no hostile feelings towards the Manchu court:

⁴³ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 658. 19 Dec. 1668; Femme Gaastra, 'The Dutch East India Company and Its Intra-Asiatic Trade in precious metals', in Wolfram Fischer, R. Marvin McInnis and Jürgen Schneider (ed.), *The Emergence of a World Economy 1500-1914*, (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden-GmbH, 1986), 97-112 at 103-104.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

‘.... *Tung-ning (Taiwan) lies in the ocean, it has never been part of Chinese territory. From here we trade eastwards with Japan, and southwards with Manila. The population is growing and business is prosperous. I sit on the throne here legitimately, and our government shall endure forever.*

*... If Your Excellency will consider allowing these coastal inhabitants [of China] to live in peace, I shall gladly conclude peace with Your Excellency. Please send a delegate to visit us and arrange the opening of trade between us.*⁴⁴’

In 1667 Cheng Ching was eventually successful in reorganizing a trading network which was based on a monopoly of the sugar and deerskin trade. In 1668, the remaining Fu-chienese fleet was ordered to abandon its position on the coast and the Provincial Navy Commander, Shih Lang, was summoned to Peking to consult with Emperor K’ang-hsi about how best to tackle the problem of Cheng Ching.⁴⁵ From 1669, the Emperor abandoned any idea of dispatching more expeditions and ignored Cheng Ching’s proposal to set up formal trading relations. In other words, both sides ceased fire, but for different reasons.⁴⁶

The struggle to maintain momentum 1670-1678

During 1667-1669, while official peace talks were proceeding, the administration of the maritime prohibition strictly according to the letter of

⁴⁴ Cheng ching , ‘Chêng-ching fu k’ung-yüen-chang shu [Chêng-ching’s Reply to K’ung Yüen-chang]12 Aug. 1667’ , in CKTI (et al. eds.), *K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai-wan tang-an shih-liao hsüan-chi*, (Fu-chien: fu-chien jên-min publisher, 1983), 70.

⁴⁵ Shih Wei-ch’ing, *Shih-lang P’ing-ch’uan* (A Commentated Biography of Shih lang), (Amoy: The University of Amoy, 1987), 88.

⁴⁶ K’ang-hsi, ‘Ch’ih-yü ming-chu, ts’ai-yü-jung têng [The Emperor’s Words to Ming Chu and Ts’ai Yü-jung] Oct. 1669’, in CKTI (et al eds.), *K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai-wan tang-an shih-liao hsüan-chi*, 85.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

the law was slackened, and Cheng Ching's merchants immediately again attempted to gain a foothold on the Chinese coast and obtain goods for trade by smuggling.

Table 13-10: Chinese Junks Visiting Japan from Chinese Coastal Areas

	Junks arriving from Fu-chou/P'u-t'o-shan/Nanking in Japan	Junks departing from Japan to Fu-chou/P'u-t'o-shan/Nanking
1665.6-1666.6	2 ⁴⁷	1 ⁴⁸
1666.7-1667.6	-	(9-10 to coast of China) ⁴⁹
1667.7-1668.7	6 ⁵⁰	>6 ⁵¹
1668.7-1669.5	4 ⁵²	8 ⁵³
1669.6-1670.6	12 ⁵⁴	>2 ⁵⁵
1670.7-1671.6	7 ⁵⁶	4 ⁵⁷

⁴⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 152,158. 18 June 1665; 17 Aug. 1665.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 175. 31 Jan. 1666.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 207. 11 Dec. 1666.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 223, 241. 16 July 1667; 29 Dec. 1667.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 243-4; 257-8; 262. 2 Dec. 1667; 31 Jan. 1668; 11 Feb. 1668; 23 May 1668; 4 July 1668.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 281, 284, 298. 29 Oct. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668; 15 May 1669.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 273-4; 284, 300. 26 Sept. 1668; 30 Dec. 1668; 30 May 1669.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 303, 310, 319; 322-3;326, 337-8;340. 7 July 1669; 19 Aug. 1669; 23 Aug. 1669; 9 Nov. 1669; 9 Jan. 1670; 12 Feb. 1670; 17 May 1670; 1 June 1670; 18 June 1670.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 319. 25 Nov. 1669; VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhoofd Francoijs de Haes uijt het comptoir Nangasackij aenden generael ende raden geschreven, Japan, 9 Jan. 1670, fo. 1857^r; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 326, 337. 12 Feb. 1670; 17 May 1670.

⁵⁶ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 344, 350, 21 July 1670; 8 Aug. 1670; VOC 1278, Dagregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij 't opperhoofd Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste in de negotie op de Jedose hoffreijzen voorgevallene, Japan, 10 Feb. 1671, fo. 1171^v; 13 Feb. 1671, fo. 1789^f; 25 Apr. 1671,

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

1671.7-1672.5	3 ⁵⁸	1 ⁵⁹
1672.6-1673.3	1 ⁶⁰	2 ⁶¹

Just over a fortnight after the Manchu delegates returned to Amoy from Taiwan on 10 December 1667, a Manchu smuggling junk arrived in Nagasaki on 29 December 1667.⁶² Cheng Ching had also dispatched trading junks to Fu-chou, which arrived in Japan on 15 March 1668 with 2,300 taels silver because they had not been able to spend that sum under the strict surveillance of Manchu Coastal Defence. When they sailed, these junks had left some goods and merchants behind on the coast of Fu-chou to await any new trading opportunities which might arise. On 2 April 1668 another two Fu-chou junks belonging to the same group of Taiwan merchants arrived in Japan laden with many silk goods.⁶³ On 29 October 1668 a small Fu-chou junk arrived, carrying silk goods worth about 135,000 taels and she was followed another one on 15 December.⁶⁴ Junks from Nanking and P'u-t'o-shan (located on the Chê-chiang coast) also began to arrive, although it cannot be said with any certainty to which camp they belonged. Whatever

fo. 1789^v; 27 June 1671, fo. 1791^v.

⁵⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 362-3, 26 Sept. 1670; 2 Oct. 1670; VOC 1278, Dagregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij, 1 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764^v.

⁵⁸ VOC 1290, Japans dagregister, 18 Dec. 1671, fo. 327^v; 14 May 1672, fo. 344^v.

⁵⁹ VOC 1290, Japans dagregister, 14 May 1672, fo. 344^v.

⁶⁰ VOC 1294, Japans dagregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar, Japan, 24 Nov. 1672, Fol. 567^f.

⁶¹ VOC 1290, Japans Dagregister, 24 Oct. 1672, fo. 364^f; 30 Oct. 1672, fo. 365^f.

⁶² Tsu Tsê-p'u. 'Tsu Tsê-p'u t'i wei k'ung yüen-chang ch'u-yang i-hui ping ch'a-yen hui-ch'uan shih-pên [Report Written by Tsu tsê-p'u about K'ung yüen-chang's Mission Abroad and His Return] 25 Dec. 1667', CKTI (et al eds.), *K'ang-hsi t'ung-i t'ai-wan tang-an shih-liao hsüan-chi*, 75; NFJ 81, Dagregister van 't Comptoir Nangasackij, Japan, 29 Dec. 1667; 3 Jan. 1668, not Foliated.

⁶³ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 257-8. 23 May 1668.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 281, 284. 29 Oct. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

the case, the fact remains that during 1667-1668 six junks engaged in this smuggling business sailed to and from Japan.

In 1669, the Manchu Emperor K'ang-hsi called a halt to hostilities and replaced the strict evacuation policy with a more relaxed surveillance. This easing of the strictures allowed peasants to return to their forsaken fields and fishermen to sail to the nearby fishing grounds. However, the maritime prohibition was still in force and it was still forbidden to live near the seashore.⁶⁵ Accordingly, in the summer of 1669, the number of smuggling junks climbed to fourteen, more than double the number in the previous season. One junk from Taiwan carried silk and silk goods worth about 185,000 taels,⁶⁶ indicates patent clue that Taiwanese merchants were playing a large part in this smuggling.

Occasionally the smugglers were caught by the coastal patrols. One Chinese junk from P'u-t'o-shan carrying silk and silk goods worth about 71,600 taels arrived in Nagasaki on 10 February 1670, and reported that two of its companions had been captured *en route*.⁶⁷ Perhaps to provide some counterweight, some of Cheng's warships were also cruising around these smugglers' haunts. Because of their presence, two Ch'ing Junks had to slip their anchors in order to avoid capture one of them at P'u-t'o-shan.⁶⁸ Another two Ch'ing junks returning to P'u-t'o-shan on 26 September 1670 fled back to Nagasaki, after they unexpectedly met Cheng Ching's fleet near

⁶⁵ Sun Êrh-chun, TWYH (ed.), *Fu-chien t'ung-chih t'ai-wan-fu* [Taiwan Prefecture in the General Gazette of Fu-chien Province], TW no. 84, 432. 'In 1669, an edict was proclaimed which allowed inhabitants to fish in coastal waters.'; 957. 'In 1669... an edict was proclaimed which allowed people to build houses and farms outside the border, within a range of five *li*.'

⁶⁶ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 310. 17 Aug. 1669.

⁶⁷ VOC 1278, Dagregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij 't opperhoofd Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste inde negotie op de Jedose hoffreijsen voorgevallene, Japan, 10 Feb. 1670, fo. 1945^r.

⁶⁸ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 338. 1 June 1670.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

Fu-chou.⁶⁹ Eventually, in May of 1670, the *anachodas* of five Ch'ing junks were obliged to submit a petition to the governor of Nagasaki pleading to be allowed to remain until the arrival of the north monsoon. They did not dare to return to Fu-chou or P'u-t'o-shan after they had been informed that Cheng's ships had appeared on the scene there.⁷⁰ The presence of Cheng's fleet on the Chinese coast was also reported by the English merchants in Taiwan:

*'Although they trade on the borders of China, it is only with stealth, being not yet at peace with the Manchus who are governing China. But he [King Cheng Ching] has settled people on islands near China called Amoy, Quemoy and P'o-t'u-shan.'*⁷¹

*...To the last of these, [they] have sent the pepper that went on the [English] pink [ship].'*⁷²

On the Chinese coast, the Chengs did business selling pepper and other tropical goods which have been supplied to them firstly by the English and others. In fact, this trade did not commence until 1666 when three of Cheng Ching's junks loaded with pepper with a course set for the coast of China ran into a typhoon and drifted off to Quinam.⁷³ In 1667, three Taiwanese junks

⁶⁹ Ibidem, 362. 26 Sept. 1670; VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhoofd Martinus Caesar, Japan, 20 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763^f; 23 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763^{f-v}.

⁷⁰ VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij, 28 June 1670, fo. 1961^v.

⁷¹ Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 20 Dec. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 74. The original text has been modified to facilitate modern readers. That Amoy and Quemoy were occupied by Cheng Ching's force is also confirmed by a Dutch source: VOC 1290, Memorie van eenige Nouvelles uijt d Eijlanden van Macao [door Abraham Wijs opt Jacht de Valck], [19 Jan. 1673], fo.19^{f-v}.

⁷² Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 20 Dec. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 74

⁷³ VOC 1264, Missive door den resident Ocker Ockerse tot Bantam aen Joan

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

from Japan arrived in Patani and another junk visited Johor *en route* from Siam, apparently in order to purchase pepper and other tropical goods.⁷⁴ Eventually the quantities provided by these means were not enough. The flourishing smuggling on the Chinese coast demanded ever greater quantities of pepper from the Taiwanese merchants, especially after the silver export from Japan was restricted in 1668. In 1670 the English merchants reported that only 3,000 piculs of pepper of the rich booty captured by Coxinga when he conquered Zeelandia Castle remained in Taiwan.⁷⁵ Taking into consideration that Coxinga had purchased the amounts of 16,000 and 11,000 piculs of pepper from the Dutch in 1655 and 1657, the amount cited above would certainly not have been sufficient to satisfy the market.⁷⁶ Therefore, in response to market pressure, the Taiwanese merchants were even obliged to purchase pepper and other tropical goods like sandalwood and putchuck from the VOC in Nagasaki in 1669.⁷⁷ The following year, although the English merchants had carried these tropical goods to Taiwan from Bantam, this

Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raaden van India [Letter from Ocker Ockerse in Bantam to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Bantam, 12 Mar. 1667, fo. 696.

⁷⁴ VOC 1265, Missive aan de heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael en d'Ed. heeren raaden van Nederlants India door de commandeur Balthasar Bort en den raadt tot Malacca [Letter Written by Commander Balthasar Bort in Malacca to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Malacca, 27 Aug. 1667, fo. 820^v.

⁷⁵ Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.) in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 66.

⁷⁶ VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Malacca aen den gouverneur Jan Thijssen, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 405^{r-v}; VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 35^v.

⁷⁷ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 319. 15 Nov. 1669; VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhoofd Francoijs de Haes uijt het comptoir Nangasackij aenden generael ende raden geschreven, Japan, 9 Jan. 1670, fo. 1857^v. The source does not record any direct contact between Cheng merchants and the factory on Deshima, therefore the exchange must have been mediated by the local merchants.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

practice still persisted.⁷⁸

After Coxinga took over Taiwan, in April 1662, March and September 1663, and April 1664 the Manchu court dispatched mandarins to the coast to supervise the proper administration of the evacuation policy.⁷⁹ Its terms was very strictly enforced and resulted in Su Li's defection. His followers and their fleet went over to Cheng Ching as mentioned earlier. However, the enforcement of the policy eased after peace talks between the Manchus and the Taiwanese were begun in 1667. In May 1668, the Kuang-tung Grand Co-ordinator proposed a relaxation of the evacuation policy, subject to the Emperor's approval.⁸⁰ Before the year 1670, most of the evicted inhabitants were allowed to return to their fields in the vicinity of the coast of Kuang-tung.⁸¹

The Portuguese in Macao were also almost expelled as a consequence of the evacuation policy. Under its stipulations, all the Portuguese should have also been obliged to move to the hinterland of Kuang-tung, but even after the maritime prohibition had been imposed, Macao continued to welcome some country traders sailing between Manila, Johor and Macao carrying Chinese coarse wares.⁸² The man in charge of the evacuation policy

⁷⁸ VOC 1283, Japans dagregister gehouden bij het opperhoofd Martinus Caesar, Japan, 2 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764^v-1765^r.

⁷⁹ Ch'ü Ta-chün, *Kuang-tung hsin-yü*[Novel Notes about Kuang-tung], 3 vols (Yang-chou: Kuang-ling shu-shê, 2003), I, 30-31.

⁸⁰ Ch'ü, *Kuang-tung hsin-yü*, I, 31-32.

⁸¹ Chang I-mei, *Hui-lai hsien-chih*[Local Gazette of Hui-lai County], KKCP no.178. 36. Chêng-chün, *Hai-k'ang hsien-chih*[Local Gazette of Hai-k'ang County], KKCP no. 184, 264.

⁸² VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Pieter de Goijer en raet na Batavia [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] geschreven, Jambi, 31 Jan. 1659, fol. 368^r; VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia[aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] geschreven, Malacca, 24 Mar. 1659, fo. 441^v; VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia[aan gouverneur generael Joan

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

the Governor-General of Kuang-tung, Lu Ch'ung-chün, had proposed expelling the Portuguese inhabitants from Macao and consequently had ordered them return home in 1663, but the Manchu Court in Peking decided to allow them to remain.⁸³ Perhaps having heard about the peace talks between the Taiwanese and Manchus or simply because of the plight in which they found themselves, the Macanese pleaded with the Vice-Roy in Goa to dispatch an envoy to the Chinese court to petition for the opening of trade. Ambassador Manuel de Saldanha arrived in Macao on 4 August 1667.⁸⁴ In the same summer, four Chinese junks arrived there as well, claiming that they represented a Siamese embassy which intended to pay tribute to the Manchu Court and the Emperor. However, the District Magistrate of Hsiang-shan (who supervised business in Macao), Yao Ch'i-shêng, noticed that half of the cargoes in the three Siamese junks were the property of a Fu-chien merchant Wang Wei-chung, and that one junk carried goods belonging to Wang's son. He therefore questioned whether they were proper ambassadors with credentials or just transgressors of the maritime prohibition gambling on a main chance. Although the official capacity of the Siamese

Maetsuijker] geschreven, Malacca, 10 Apr. 1659, fo. 441^v.

⁸³ Lu Ch'ung-chün, 'Kuang-tung tsung-tu lu-ch'ung-chün t'i-i hsiang-shan-ao his-yang-jên pu-i chun-liu pên [Suggestion Written by the Governor of Kuang-tung about not to Allow the Portuguese to Reside in Macao continually] 9 Apr. 1665', in CKTI (et al eds.), *Ming-ch'ing shih-ch'i ao-mên wên-t'i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien*, I, 48; Ch'i Ch'ê-pai, 'Li-pu shang-shu ch'i-ch'ê-pai têng t'i-ch'ing chiang hsiang-shan-ao his-yang-jên ch'ü-liu chih-shih jêng ch'ih ping-pu tsou-i pên [Suggestion Written by the Minister of Rituals about Consulting the Ministry of War about Deciding on Whether or Not to Allow the Portuguese to Remain in Macao] 17 June 1665', in CKTI (et al eds.), *Ming-ch'ing shih-ch'i ao-mên wên-t'i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien*, I, 55.

⁸⁴ John Elliot Wills Jr., *Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese envoys to K'ang-hsi, 1666-1687*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 193-236; *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 584. 5 Oct. 1667.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

ambassadors was repudiated, the trade went ahead covertly.⁸⁵ Besides these officially problematic junks, five vessels returned to Macao from Makassar, Cambodia, Malacca, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and Indragiri. Altogether the nine vessels brought about 735 piculs of pepper besides all kinds of other tropical products. These were traded under the eyes of the Kuang-tung authorities, who pretended to confiscate all the cargoes.⁸⁶ According to the Dutch records, the Siamese King did indeed dispatch an ambassador to Kuang-chou and, in their eyes, the Kuang-tung authorities' repudiation of the genuine ambassador was rather puzzling.⁸⁷ Although this semi-disguised smuggling did not guarantee Macao its old prosperity, it did attract more country traders to venture to sell their cargoes in this port. In the year 1669, eleven vessels from Southeast Asian ports arrived in Macao: three from Siam, two from Cambodia, two from Quinam and three from Timor, Manila, and Batavia respectively, plus one Portuguese vessel which had returned from Batavia. It was reported that they: 'All did their trade secretly with the Portuguese and the Chinese at night, ...and were forbidden to trade in town publicly on pain of death.'⁸⁸ After the Portuguese ambassador had been detained in Macao for three years, he was ordered to proceed to Peking on 4 January 1670.⁸⁹ Grasping this chance of actually reaching the Imperial court, the Macao governor dispatched a small vessel to Bantam which carried a

⁸⁵ Lu Hsing-tsu, 'Lu hsing-tsu so-ch'êng hsiang-shan-hsien chih-hsien yao-ch'i-shêng huo-tan hui-tan shên-ta-kuo ch'ing-chieh-ts'ê [Inquisition Initiated by Lu Hsing-tsu to Investigate the Administrator of Hsiang-shan County, Yao Ch'i-shêng appending Invoices and List of Bribes] 14 Oct. 1667', in Chung-shan-shih tang-an-chü [Archival Bureau of Chungshan County], CKTI (eds.), *Hsiang-shan ming-ch'ing tang-an chi-lu* [Compilation of Archives referring to Hsiang-shan County during the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties], (Shang-hai: Shang-hai ku-chi, 2006), 158.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ VOC 1272, Missive van den ondercoopman Jan van der Speijck aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker]en raden, Siam, 12 Jan. 1669, fo. 1096^v.

⁸⁸ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 712. 15 Dec. 1669.

⁸⁹ Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, 193-236.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

priest as his ambassador.⁹⁰ He was clearly eager to procure pepper directly from Bantam. The Dutch merchants in Tonkin reported that: ‘Macao was suffering from a scarcity of silver and therefore was selling all Chinese goods off cheaply.’⁹¹ In 1671, the junk of the Siamese King with its Chinese crew returned to Siam from Macao via Japan, accompanied by two other Portuguese vessels, carrying a rich cargo of Chinese commodities like silk goods, *radix China*, zinc and all kinds of coarse goods.⁹² The Chinese merchants in Batavia also smelled a profit and equipped six junks to sail to Macao in the summer of 1671, and all except one which was lost in a typhoon returned with similar goods. Their report reveals that the pepper price had risen to 13 Rixdollars (= 16.25 rials) per picul.⁹³ This fleet is proof that the Batavian Chinese merchants had claimed their place as new agents in the Sino-Japan trade via Macao, and hence had become the competitors of the Taiwanese merchants who were operating the Sino-Japan trade via P’u-‘to-shan.

Therefore, just as Cheng Ching was struggling to overcome his problems in supplying greater quantities of pepper and tropical goods just at a time that the smuggling by his competitors was expanding, his peace talks

⁹⁰ Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to George Foxcroft and Council at Madras, 7 Apr. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 51.

⁹¹ VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhoofd Cornelis Valckenier en den raet in Tonquin aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden van Indien, Tonkin, 14 Oct. 1671, fo. 1724^v.

⁹² VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706^{r-v}.

⁹³ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 810. 31 Jan. 1672; VOC 11207, Uitrekening van de Goude en silver munts waardije inhoud der maten en swaarte der gewigten, in de respectieve gewesten van Indien[intrinsic value of gold and silver coins according to its size and weight at different regions around East and Southeast Asia]. 1 rijksdallar= 60 light stuivers; 1 rial= 48 stuivers.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

with the Manchus had resulted the re-opening of the Macao Sino-Japan trade. These privileged merchants, sailing under the flag of the Siamese King and the Dutch authorities, would have no difficulty providing tropical goods. In return, the Kuangtung merchants were quite willing to offer silk goods at a cheaper price than that asked on those from Chêchiang province.

The astute Cheng Ching will have realized he needed to open up new supply channels to obtain tropical goods. Therefore in 1668 or 1669, through his merchants he sent invitations to urge ‘ all the merchants in general to trade in the parts under His Majesty’s jurisdiction.’⁹⁴ It was a public letter, saying:

‘From the son of Coxin, whose father has passed away, for us [English] or any other that would trade there, declaring that he intended to give great encouragement to trade in his ports.’

The declaration ‘was done by public writings, dispersed to several adjacent ports and places’.⁹⁵ In reply, in May 1670 the English East India Company factory in Bantam fitted out a pink and a sloop under the command of Merchant Ellis Crispe to initiate the trade with Taiwan.⁹⁶ Cheng Ching also passed this message to the VOC in Batavia through the Shabandar of

⁹⁴ Henry Dacres at Bantam to Iquan, ‘King’ of Taiwan, May 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 52-3. Here I change ‘your Majesty’ to ‘his Majesty’ for reader’s benefit.

⁹⁵ Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 27 Oct. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 71. Original text: ‘ About a month before wee were fitted came hither an invitation from the King of that place, vidzt. From the son of Coxin, his father being dead, for us or any other that would trade ther, declaring that hee intended to give great incouragement to trade in his ports,& this was done by publique writeings disperced to severall adjacent ports & places, one whereof wee procured & sent with them.’

⁹⁶ Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to Gerald Aungier and Council at Surat, 16 Aug. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 55.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Bantam, who was a Chinese, expressing his wish to conclude peace with the Dutch.⁹⁷ A leading Bantam merchant, Kea-nabby, fitted out a junk to visit Taiwan that year but she was struck by a typhoon and seized by the Amoy garrison under the Cheng regime as a foundered vessel.⁹⁸ By some means or other Cheng Ching managed to solve this misunderstanding and engaged in the trade with Ki Nabbi (Kea-nabby[E.], Keijnebe Secredana[D.]), probably prompted by the fact that the junk of the Sultan of Bantam arrived shortly afterwards.⁹⁹ In March 1672, two Taiwanese junks visited the coast of East Java. Ki Nabi tried to apply for four passes from the VOC under his own name, but his secret dealings were disclosed by the Shabandar.¹⁰⁰ Cheng Ching also ordered a junk to be built in Rembang in Java on Ki Nabbi's account.¹⁰¹ He planned to use this newly built junk to carry Ki Nabbi's cargo to Taiwan under the protection of the EIC.¹⁰²

The Amoy merchants under Coxinga had been involved in the Siamese trade since the 1650s. However, when the war between Coxinga and the VOC broke out, the Siamese King chose the VOC as his ally. As mentioned earlier, the Siamese-Dutch treaty persuaded the Cheng merchants to up sticks and

⁹⁷ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 747. 2 Sept. 1671.

⁹⁸ Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 65-66.

⁹⁹ Commission and instructions from Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to James Arwaker, Ellis Crisp and Charles Frith, 30 June 1671 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 94.

¹⁰⁰ VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regering van India, Bantam, 23 Mar. 1672, fo. 40^{F-V}; VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regering van India, Bantam, 26 Mar. 1672, fo. 43^F.

¹⁰¹ VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regering van India, Bantam, 15 June 1672, fo. 66^V.

¹⁰² VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regering van India, Bantam, 28 June 1672, fo. 70^{F-V}. The junk was captured by the Dutch ship and detained for a while. Therefore, it missed the departure of the English ship and was later sold in Bantam.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

move to Quinam and Cambodia in 1665. When the tension between the Manchus and the Cheng lessened after 1667, the Taiwanese merchants made yet another attempt to open trade with Siam. Some of these Japan-bound junks from Siam might also have called at Taiwan, as the English merchants witnessed in 1670, but the best solution open to them was to bypass the main harbours of Siam and sail to Ligor instead.¹⁰³ The grandees there were entrusted by the Siamese king with bartering the locally produced tin for copper on the Siamese King's account. Ligor was a vassal state and paid an annual tribute to the Siamese King as a token of its allegiance. Because then as now, it is located on the southern shore of the Gulf of Siam, the Taiwanese junks could avoid the blockade of the VOC ships around the estuary of the Chao Phraya River. The Ligor tin export was estimated at to 8-900 bahar (= 2,400-3,600 piculs) .¹⁰⁴ In addition to this metal, it also produced about 500 bahar (= 1,500 piculs) of pepper.¹⁰⁵ Several Taiwanese junks visited Ligor in 1666, selling silk goods, a large amount of porcelain and Japanese gold kobang and Japanese copper. In Japan, one kobang was valued at 6 tael 8 maas of silver, and sold in Ligor for 7 tael, which gave a negligible profit of 2 per cent. The same went for copper which was valued in Japan at 12 taels 4 maas and in Ligor at between 15 taels 5 maas and 16 taels. In that case the profit was only 25 to 29 per cent.¹⁰⁶ The tin was purchased at 20 taels per

¹⁰³ Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 64.

¹⁰⁴ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 543. 25 Jan. 1667.

¹⁰⁵ VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208^v; VOC 11207, Uitrekening van de Goude en silver munts waardije inhoud der maten en swaarte der gewigten, in de respective gewesten van Indien.

¹⁰⁶ Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie*, appendix, ccvii. Table D. VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208^v.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

bahar (=6.6 taels per picul) in Ligor, but could be sold for 15 taels per picul at Fu-chou in 1667, therefore generating a handsome profit of 127 per cent, assuming the Taiwanese could obtain about the same price as the VOC.¹⁰⁷ In 1666, it looked as if the Taiwanese merchants were set to become serious competitors of the Dutch in Ligor, as the latter could only purchase about half the amount they had hoped for.¹⁰⁸ After the Japanese court reduced the export of silver in 1668, the importance of the Ligor trade to the Cheng regime in Taiwan grew more crucial because Japanese gold and copper were not very profitable in Cambodia.¹⁰⁹ In February 1668, one Cheng junk visited Ligor carrying gold, silver, copper and porcelain, which was bartered for 900 piculs of tin and 450 piculs of pepper.¹¹⁰ In 1669, Cheng junks carried away 1,500 piculs of tin and 450 piculs of pepper.¹¹¹

Table 13-11: Pepper and Tin purchased by Cheng merchants

(in piculs)

	Pepper	Tin	Visiting Merchants
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¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, fo. 209^{r-v}; VOC 1264, *Memorie voor den coopman David Harthouwer verblijvende als opperhoofd over des Ed. Comps. negotie ende omneslagh in Hoczieuw om hem daer naer te reguleren door Constantijn Nobel en David Harthouwer*[Memorandum Given by Constantijn Nobel and David Harthouwer to David Harthouwer Resident at Fu-chou as Chief Merchant to Arrange All the Company Business], Fu-chou, 19 Jan. 1667, fo. 163^r.

¹⁰⁸ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 543. 24 Jan. 1667.

¹⁰⁹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 310. 21 Aug. 1669.

¹¹⁰ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 666. 31 Jan. 1669.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 686. 17 Nov. 1669.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

1666		(a lot) ¹¹²	(Under Cheng regime) ¹¹³
1668	450 ¹¹⁴	900 ¹¹⁵	(Chinese from Japan) ¹¹⁶
1669	450 ¹¹⁷	1,500 ¹¹⁸	(Chinese from Japan) ¹¹⁹
1671	(main cargo) ¹²⁰	(main cargo) ¹²¹	(Chinese from Japan over Canton) ¹²²
1672		600 ¹²³	Two junks from Taiwan ¹²⁴

The Dutch merchants asked the Siamese king to grant them the sole purchasing rights for the tin in Ligor, but after this was eventually approved in 1670, aware that they were at a safe distance from Ayutthaya, the grandees of Ligor and the King's factor, Oija Phraklang, still turned a blind eye to smuggling. The VOC was nonetheless satisfied with the king's supply of tin

¹¹² VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens zijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort, president en commandeur van de stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fos. 208^v-209^f.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, fo. 206^v; *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 543. 25 Jan. 1667.

¹¹⁴ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 666. 31 Jan. 1669.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 666. 31 Jan. 1669.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 686. 17 Nov. 1669.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ VOC 1290, Missive van d'heer gouverneur Balthasar Bort en den raet aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] te Batavia, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1672, fo. 417^f.

¹²¹ *Ibidem*.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ VOC 1290, Missive van de Ligoorse residenten Joannes Brakel en Joannes Zachariuszoon aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Ligor, 17 Dec. 1672, fo. 279^f.

¹²⁴ VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Siam, 20 Nov. 1672, fo. 240^v.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

because the Batavian High Government believed that seizing ‘ the Taiwanese junks visiting Ligor annually’ would only stir up more ‘hatred, hostility, and quarrels’ than benefits.¹²⁵

In 1672, when two Taiwanese junks again visited Ligor to purchase tin, the Dutch were very keen on keeping their sole rights and put pressure on the local grandees who still wished to trade with the Cheng merchants and had asked whether the Dutch were still at war with Coxinga’s people.¹²⁶

In the meantime, King Narai of Siam had successfully restored the direct trade relations between Siam and Japan, which had been interrupted owing to the usurpation of the throne by his father, King Prasat Thong.¹²⁷ In 1667 King Narai dispatched a tributary envoy to China who was detained for a few consecutive years with the Portuguese ambassador in Macao. According to Chinese records, the Siamese tributary envoys finally reached Peking in January of 1671.¹²⁸ As a result of this audience, the interrupted Sino-Siamese trade at Kuang-chou (Canton) was restored. Not only were the Batavian Chinese replaced on the Macao-Japan route but the Siamese King Narai and the Sino-Thai merchants who protected by him were also active on the Siam-Macao-Nagasaki route. The ruler of Kuang-tung province, the Pingnan viceroy, was also eager to participate in the Sino-Japan trade in the light of this reconciliation and invested in new ship-building.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 869. 31 Jan. 1673.

¹²⁶ VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Siam, 20 Nov. 1672, fo. 240^v-241^r; 244^v.

¹²⁷ Iwao, ‘Reopening of the diplomatic’, 2-7.

¹²⁸ Wang Chih-ch’un, *Kuo-ch’ao jou-yüen-chi*[Chronicle of Chinese Foreign Diplomacy during Ch’ing Dynasty], (Taipei: T’ai-wan hsüeh-shêng shu-chü, 1975), 95.

¹²⁹ VOC 1304, Dagregister ofte dagelijckse aanteeckeningh van ’t voornaamste gepasseerde ten Comptoire tot Nangazackij in Japan gehouden bij den opperkoopman Joan s’Camphuijs opperhoofd over ‘s Compagnies negotie ende verderen ommeslagh

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

Table 13-12: The Junks of the Siamese King Dispatched to China and Japan

	Arrivals in Japan	Departures to China	Returns to Siam
1669.7-1670.6	3 ¹³⁰		3 ¹³¹
1670.7-1671.6	1 ¹³²	3 ¹³³	4 ¹³⁴
1671.7-1672.6	1 ¹³⁵	3 ¹³⁶	(4) ¹³⁷

aldaar aanvanck nemende den 29 October 1673 ende eijndigende 19en October 1674 [below is cited as ‘Daghregister ten Comptoire tot Nangasackij’], Japan, 1 Dec. 1673, fo. 60^f.

¹³⁰ VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 20 Oct. 1670, fo. 1873^v-1974^f; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 302-3; 309-10. 4 July 1669, 3 Aug. 1669, 17 Aug. 1669.

¹³¹ VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 20 Oct. 1670, fo. 1873^v-1974^f. It returned from Japan.

¹³² *Ibidem*; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 350. 9 Aug. 1670; VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706^{f-v}.

¹³³ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁴ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671; VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706^{r-v}. One returned from Japan, three returned from China.

¹³⁵ VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706^{f-v}; *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671; VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhoofd Martinus Cesar, Japan, 26 July 1671, fo. 1795^v.

¹³⁶ *Generale Missiven*, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671.

¹³⁷ VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1672.7-1673.6	1 ¹³⁸	(1) ¹³⁹
1673.7-1674.6	1 ¹⁴⁰	3 ¹⁴¹
1674.7-1675.6	3 ¹⁴²	
1675.7-1676.6	3 ¹⁴³	2 ¹⁴⁴
1676.7-1677.6	1 ¹⁴⁵	
1677.7-1678.6	1 ¹⁴⁶	2 ¹⁴⁷

Joan Maetsuijker], 20 Nov. 1672, fol. 247v; VOC 1290, Dagregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 12 July 1672, fo. 348^f. Four king's junks intended to visit Canton. One of them was on her homeward-bound voyage from Japan to Siam.

¹³⁸ VOC 1290, Missive van d'edele [Johannes] Camphuijs en raet aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijker] te Batavia, Japan, 23 Oct. 1672, fol. 320^v. This junk might have returned from Canton; VOC 1290, Dagregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 12 July 1672, fo. 348^f.

¹³⁹ VOC 1294, Japans dagregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijk van Japan, Japan, 28 Feb. 1673, fo. 580^v. One junk sailed to Siam from Japan, but there is no indication given that she belonged to the Siamese king.

¹⁴⁰ VOC 1294, Japans dagregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijk van Japan, Japan, 28 Aug. 1673, fo. 609^f. On her voyage to Japan, she had called at Taiwan.

¹⁴¹ VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raet in Siam aan haar Eds.[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302^f; 304^f. One junk returned from Japan, the other two had sailed back from Canton.

¹⁴² *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1685, 4. 31 Jan. 1675.

¹⁴³ VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, 30 Nov. 1675, fol.14^f. The Siamese King dispatched two junks to Amoy and one junk to Canton.

¹⁴⁴ VOC 1322, Missive van het opperhoofd Dirck de Jongh en raedt geschreeven uijt Siam aen haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 14 Nov. 1676, fo. 1203^f. Two King's junks returned from Japan.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁶ VOC 1332, Dagregister gehouden ten comptoire Nangasackij in Japan, Japan, 3 Jan. 1678, fo. 640^v. Assuming this returning Siam junk had arrived previous summer.

¹⁴⁷ VOC 1339, Notitie van aengecomene en vertrocken vreemde scheepen en vaertuijgen in en uijt Siam zedert 14 October 1677 tot 11 September 1678, Siam, 22 Feb. 1678, fo. 458^v; 13 Apr. 1678, fo. 459^f. Two Siamese royal junks returned from

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

In 1671 King Narai sent another envoy to collect the Chop granted by the Manchu Emperor as symbol to confirm the restoration of relations.¹⁴⁸ In order to share in the benefits of the trade by expanding it into a Sino-Siamese-Japanese triangle trade, the junks of King Narai usually participated in the Sino-Japanese trade via Macao. But the Siamese King was not the only monarch to restore a direct link with the Manchu court.

The Ryūkyū (Liu-ch'iu[C.]) Kingdom, which had played an instrumental role as middleman between the Far East and Southeast Asia in the early Ming period, also again put itself forward to act as go-between in the Sino-Japan trade at a time in which it was paying tribute to the Tokugawa Shogunate via the daimyo of Satsuma.¹⁴⁹ Before Taiwan opened negotiations with Peking in 1667, in 1663 and 1665 the King of Ryūkyū had already dispatched envoys to the Ch'ing court via Fu-chou in the traditional manner.¹⁵⁰ The Manchu Emperor granted him the right to trade in Fu-chou once every three years. However, after the Manchu Emperor refused to continue the peace talks with Cheng Ching in Taiwan in 1670, the latter sent ships to the coast of Fu-chou to capture the Ryūkyū tributary junk and had her brought to Taiwan. This was the forcible strategy adopted by Cheng Ching to curb any attempt by other parties to build a Sino-Japanese trade link in which he was not involved. As some crew members of the Ryūkyū junk

Japan.

¹⁴⁸ Wang, *Kuo-ch'ao jou-yüen-chi*, 97-98; VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker]tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302^r. The Chop was eventually received in Siam in 1674.

¹⁴⁹ Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan : Asia in the development of the Tokugawa bakufu*, (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1984), 45.

¹⁵⁰ VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur [Constantijn] Nobel en raadt tot Hocksieu aen haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Fu-chou, 28 Feb. 1665, fo. 200; Wang, *Kuo-ch'ao jou-yüen-chi*, 69.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

managed to flee home, the news was revealed to their protector the daimyo of Satsuma, who thereupon claimed damage from the Shogun's court in 1672. As a consequence, three rich junks belonging to Cheng Ching were detained in Nagasaki in lieu of the losses.¹⁵¹ A fine at 30,000 taels had to be paid before they were released.¹⁵²

After 1669 Cheng Ching as adopted the pose of a peaceful trader and the Chinese merchants under the Dutch, Siamese and Ryūkyū flags all tried to ease their way into the China trade. Meanwhile the Chinese trade with Manila did not expand as expected because the Spanish silver galleons from Mexico did not show up either in 1670 or in 1671.¹⁵³ Cheng Ching is said to have been thinking of launching a surprise attack against Manila with 15,000 soldiers, but as the governor of Philippines dispatched an envoy, Don Francisco Arriki de Lorade, to visit him in the summer of 1672, this might have prevented Cheng Ching carrying out his plan.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 2 Dec. 1672, fo. 586^{r-v}; *Li-tai Pao-an*, Ts'ai Do comp., (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972), 15 vols, I, 205-6. 'Li-pu Wei Liu-ch'iu-kuo chū-piao chin-kung fang-wu-shih'[The Report of the Ministry of Rituals regarding to the Tribute from the Ryūkyū Kingdom Composed of tributary letter (Piao) and Gifts](18 Oct. 1671). It mentions a Ryukyū junk was captured by 'pirates' which departed at 1670.

¹⁵² VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 14 Jan. 1673, fo. 572^r; VOC 1294, Missive van het opperhoofd Martinus Caesar en den raet tot Nangasacki aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden van Indien geschreven, Japan, 31 Jan. 1673, VOC 1294, fos. 538^v-539^r.

¹⁵³ Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 67; Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 30 Jan. 1671, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 81.

¹⁵⁴ Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 12 Feb. 1673(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 171;

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

By that time, Cheng Ching had grown conscious of the fact that rival merchants were making use of his peaceful overtures to the Manchu government and saw in them a opportunity to join the Sino-Japan trade. Therefore, offended that his junks had been fined by the Shogunal administration in Nagasaki, Cheng Ching decided to use force against those rivals who were intent on undermining his monopoly. In the spring of 1673 he declared a blockade of all junks sailing to Japan.¹⁵⁵ Not only did he withhold all his junks from any voyages to Japan, he even dispatched a war fleet to the coast of Kuangtung. When four junks bound for Japan were intercepted on the high seas, one managed to escape.¹⁵⁶

Cheng Ching also warned King Narai of Siam about his blockade. A Taiwanese junk arrived in Siam in April of 1673 which delivered a letter from Cheng Ching to King Narai, explaining why he would order his war-junks to patrol the waters around Japan for the express purpose of capturing trading junks to compensate for his losses. Since the Siamese king was keeping the peace with Cheng Ching, the junks under Siamese flag would be spared.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, a junk of the Siamese King did arrive safely in Japan via Taiwan in the summer of 1673.¹⁵⁸

Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 781. 31 Jan. 1672; 813. 31 July 1672 ; VOC 1290, *Memorie van eenige Nouvelles uijt d Eijlanden van Macao*, [Bantam], 29 Sept. 1672, fo. 19^f.

¹⁵⁵ VOC 1294, *Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan*, Japan, 9 July 1673, fo. 598^f; 18 Aug. 1673, fo. 608^f. I

¹⁵⁶ VOC 1294, *Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan*, Japan, 6 July 1673, fo. 595^v.

¹⁵⁷ VOC 1295, *Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raet in Siam aende heer gouverneur generael Joan Maatsuijker ende d'Ed. heren raden van Nederlants India tot Batavia, Siam*, 26 Dec. 1673, fo. 788^v-789^f.

¹⁵⁸ VOC 1294, *Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan*, Japan, 28 Aug. 1673, fo.609^f. On her journey to Japan, she had called at Taiwan.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

On 28 August 1673, an envoy of Cheng Ching sailed on a junk carrying silk and silk piece goods valued at 250,000 taels to Japan. As a sign of his good intentions, he was also bringing along several Japanese shipwreck victims.¹⁵⁹ While Shogun and the council of elders were deliberating on how to deal with this unforeseen challenge from Cheng Ching, the Sino (Manchu)-Ryūkyū trade and the Sino (Manchu)-Siamese trade came to an abrupt end. In the spring of 1674 the Siamese King's junk on her way back from Kuang-tung delivered the news that the three southern provinces (referring to Yün-nan, Kui-chou, Ssu-ch'uan) under the P'ing-hsi vice-roy (Wu San-k'uei) had risen in rebellion. The same source also reported that Cheng Ching had dispatched 200 junks to the coast of China when news of this uprising came to his ears.¹⁶⁰ The outbreak of the rebellion was a warning that Siamese king should not venture into the direct trade with Kuang-chou.

The Ching-nan vice-roy of Fu-chien refused to facilitate the Ryūkyū envoys' trading activities (with Peking) any longer because he decided to throw in his lot with the rebels.¹⁶¹ Hence, as a consequence of unforeseen circumstances, in the spring of 1674, the crisis in Cheng Ching's monopoly of the Sino-Japan trade was suddenly relieved. Under these circumstances, Cheng Ching also ceased hostilities against Japan and again dispatched trading junks from Taiwan to Japan. Since the losses of the Ryūkyū merchants had been compensated, the Shogun remained neutral and adopted a detached attitude about this matter.

¹⁵⁹ VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 20 Sept. 1673, fo. 615^f.

¹⁶⁰ VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 304^f.

¹⁶¹ *Li-tai Pao-an*, Ts'ai Do (comp), (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972), 15 vols, I, 322-8 at 325 'Fu-chien têng-ch'u Ch'êng-hsüan-pu-chêng-shih-ssu wei-fang-hsün ch'ing-ch'ao-shih,' [A letter of the provincial governors in Fu-chien. about consultancy with the Ch'ing court (20 Aug 1677)].

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

The rebellion of the Ching-nan viceroy in Fu-chou created the opportunity for open competition in the Sino-Japan trade. This statement is supported by the shipping movements in the year that followed. The Fu-chou merchants might have had been able to make a better assessment of the Nanking silk goods than the Taiwanese merchants who operated the smuggling trade via P'u-t'o-shan and Amoy. The Fu-chou junks enjoyed the protection of both the Japanese court and the VOC ships and therefore the risks in this trade were alleviated. An *anachoda* of a Fu-chou junk declared that the Ching-nan viceroy had informed local Chinese merchants that the maritime prohibition was no longer in effect in Fu-chou and that the trade could proceed free of all restrictions in 1674.¹⁶² Although the Ching-nan vice-roy had asked Cheng Ching for assistance because he was worried that the local forces might not join him when he proclaimed his independence of the Manchu court at the beginning of 1674, he soon realized he had been overly concerned and he regretted having given Cheng Ching too many trade concessions.¹⁶³ The latter promptly reacted by mounting a blockade when the promises turned out to be empty.

Cheng Ching now sent about 200 junks to the Chinese coast in an effort to keep his advantage against the Fu-chou merchants.¹⁶⁴ Through mediation by the Pinghsi viceroy, the Chingnan viceroy agreed to ally himself with Cheng Ching again in the winter of 1674, which meant that the Taiwan merchants were allowed to visit Fu-chou.¹⁶⁵ In 1675, the Ching-nan viceroy sent a pass to the English merchants who had followed Cheng Ching and taken up residence in Amoy and bade them welcome to trade at Fu-chou. He

¹⁶² *Kai hentai*, 3 vols., ed. Hayashi Harukatsu and Hayashi Nobuatsu, (Tōkyō : Tōyō Bunko, 1958-1959), I, 97-8. The report of the junk no. 22 from Fu-chou.

¹⁶³ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 46-7.

¹⁶⁴ VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 304^r.

¹⁶⁵ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 47-8; VOC 1314, Dagregister van Japan [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 14 Nov. 1674, fo. 166^v.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

also dispatched two Chinese merchants to Batavia to declare that Fu-chou was a free harbour for the Dutch as well.¹⁶⁶ In a counter-measure, Cheng Ching now proclaimed that all merchants from other places were welcome to trade in Amoy and would be exempted from paying customs duties for a period of three years.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, he dispatched a Chinese war-junk manned with all soldiers clad in full body armour to the Siamese court in March 1675. When they arrived in Ayutthaya, a quarrel broke out between them and some Dutch sailors. The 150 soldiers would almost have torn the Dutch factory apart if the King's factors and their *anachoda* had not intervened.¹⁶⁸ This same junk also carried eight Chinese sailors from Batavia, who had been blown off course by a typhoon to Taiwan on their voyage to Manila. The *Anachoda* requested a pass from the Dutch merchants in Siam, saying that Cheng Ching was preparing to send an envoy to Batavia in the following spring to open the peace talks with Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker.¹⁶⁹ This gesture could be seen as an attempt to gain equal status with the Fu-chou merchants, because the Dutch ships were now allowed to trade in that port again. As well as Cheng Ching's junk, one belonging to the Ching-nan viceroy also showed up in Siam in April. King Narai dispatched two junks to Kuang-chou (Canton) and Amoy respectively once he had understood that these two ports were now in the hands of two different camps.¹⁷⁰ For one reason or another Cheng Ching's envoys never set sail to

¹⁶⁶ John Dacres, Edward Barwell and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Dec. 1675 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 223; *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1685, 89. 7 Feb. 1676.

¹⁶⁷ John Dacres, Edward Barwell and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Dec. 1675 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 219.

¹⁶⁸ VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 21 Oct. 1675, fos. 316^v-317^v.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, fo. 317^v.

¹⁷⁰ VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

Batavia, but the Ching-nan viceroy's messengers did and traded there successfully.¹⁷¹

Although the Fu-chou merchants dreamed of grasping their own share in the Sino-Japan trade after the maritime ban was lifted, the new frontline between Fu-chien and Che-chiang obstructed their access to the silk production area in Chiang-nan.¹⁷²

However, Cheng Ching solved the problem of access in a different way, besides maintaining a smuggling network along the Chê-chiang coast, he was successfully running his business from the Kuang-tung coast. In July 1674, two Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki from Canton carrying 1,200 piculs of silk which were sold at 300 taels per picul.¹⁷³ It is reasonable to assume that they both belonged to Cheng Ching because his army had just defeated the local troops of the Ping-nan viceroy near the eastern border of Kuang-tung province in June 1674.¹⁷⁴ In the following summer, the Regional Commander of the Kao-chou, Tsu Tse-ch'ing, joined the rebellion against the Kuang-tung authorities, which associated the Kao-Lei-Lien area with Cheng Ching.¹⁷⁵ As the tangible result of this Amoy- Kao-Lei-Lien axis, the four

Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 30 Nov. 1675, fo. 14^f.

¹⁷¹ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 89. 7 Feb. 1676.

¹⁷² *Kai hentai*, 3 vols., ed. Hayashi Harukatsu and Hayashi Nobuatsu, (Tōkyō : Tōyō Bunko, 1958-1959), I, 133-5 at 134. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou; 105-107 at 106. The report of the junk no. 28 from Fu-chou.

¹⁷³ VOC 1304, Dagregister ten Comptoire tot Nangasackij, Japan, 13 July 1674, fo. 84^v.

¹⁷⁴ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 48-9; VOC 1314, Dagregister van Japan [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 14 July 1675, fo. 196^v.

¹⁷⁵ Ch'ien I-chi, *Pei-ch'uan hsüan-chi*[Selections from Inscriptions], TW no.220, 224. 'the rebellious commander Tsu Tsê-ch'ing occupied Kao-chou, and led his party to capture Lei-chou and Lien-chou prefectures and the Tê-ch'ing, K'ai-chien and Tien-pai districts.' ; Chiang Liang-ch'i, *Tung-hua-lu hsüan-chi* [Selections of Documents Preserved by the Historical Bureaus within the Tung-hua Gate], TW, no.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Cantonese junks which visited Nagasaki in 1676 carried 1,282.29 piculs of silk.¹⁷⁶ In April 1676, the Pingnan viceroy (residing in Kuang-tung) also threw in his lot with the rebellion.¹⁷⁷ Consequently, Cheng Ching was able to join forces with the authorities in Fu-chou and Kuang-chou, which helped to assuage the hostility between Cheng Ching and the VOC.¹⁷⁸

Once the Kuang-tung authorities joined the rebellion and had allied themselves with Cheng Ching's force, all the coastal areas in the southeast were connected. But, even though Cheng Ching's naval force controlled the coastal areas from Ch'üan-chou to Canton, and an abundance of tropical goods was being transported to China, he was still thwarted in his attempts to exchange these import items for silks from Chiang-nan area (Nanking) for the simple reason that the roads were cut off. The troops of the Ping-hsi viceroy's force were fighting the Manchu army in Hu-nan, while the Ching-nan viceroy was engaged in battling the Manchus in Chiang-hsi province. These two battlefields cut off both the routes from Kuang-tung to the silk-producing areas around Nanking.¹⁷⁹ Cheng Ching's expansion along the coast inevitably required him to hire more soldiers to guard his territory, which increased his financial burden.

In October 1676, the Chingnan viceroy's army collapsed on the frontlines in both Chiang-hsi and Chê-chiang provinces and he was forced to surrender to the Manchu General-in-Chief, Imperial Prince Kang (of the

262, 201.

¹⁷⁶ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 87-88 7 Feb. 1676. A Tonkin junk dare not sail to the Gulf of Tonkin because of the rising might of the Kuang-tung 'pirates'.

¹⁷⁷ Li, *Chüeh Huo-lu*, 1250.

¹⁷⁸ VOC 1322, *Japans daghregister* [gehouden door Johannes Camphuys], 12 Jan. 1676, fo. 1464^{r-v}.

¹⁷⁹ *Kai hentai*, I, 133-5 at 134. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou; 105-107 at 106. The report of the junk no. 28 from Fu-chou.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

blood of the first degree) (Hê-shih Kang Ch'in-wang), Chieh-shu.¹⁸⁰ Knowing that Fu-chou had surrendered to Manchus again, the Regional Commander of the Coastal Defence, Chu T'ien-kuei, chose to surrender to Cheng Ching with his fleet.¹⁸¹

Table 13-13: The Exports of Japan on Chinese Junks between 1673-1684

(in taels)

Year	Chinese
1673	(1,152,198.3)
1674	1,827,031.4
1675	(1,670,687.6)
1676	739,988.
1677	959,988.2
1678	1,277,997.7
1679	956,820.9
1680	1,142,857.
1681	147,756.
1682	952,940
1683	486,929.1
1684	418,184.9

Source: Innes, *The door ajar*, 416. Table 23.

In November 1676, Cheng Ching's force of 20,000 soldiers was defeated by the joint forces of the Manchus and the Ching-nan viceroy, who had about 30,000 soldiers under his command.¹⁸² That winter the Ch'ing army slowly pushed Cheng Ching's forces out of most of the cities he had

¹⁸⁰ P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 80-1. VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens 's compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 5 Aug. 1677, fo. 1138^r.

¹⁸¹ P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 81; Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 50.

¹⁸² P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 81; Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President and Council at Surat, 2 Nov. 1677, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 287.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

occupied. His main forces retreated to Amoy and several other coastal spots which controlled Fu-chou Harbour and the sea routes to Kuang-tung.¹⁸³ As Table 13 shows, although these events caused a slowdown in the Sino-Japan trade, the Kuang-tung-Siamese trade profited as a result.

Table 13-14: Junks from the China coast visiting Siam

Year	Arrivals	
1674	2 ¹⁸⁴	From Japan One via Macao
1675	1-2 ¹⁸⁵	
1676	6-7 ¹⁸⁶	3 from Kuang-tung 1 from Fu-chou 2 from Amoy
1677	5 ¹⁸⁷	3 from Amoy, (2 belonging to Siamese) 2 from Kuang-tung (1 belonging to Siamese)
1678	7 ¹⁸⁸	1 from Fu-chou

¹⁸³ P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 83; VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens 's compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 21 June 1677, fo. 1134^v; Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President and Council at Surat, 2 Nov. 1677 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 287.

¹⁸⁴ VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302^v.

¹⁸⁵ VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 30 Nov. 1675, fo. 13^v-14^f.

¹⁸⁶ VOC 1322, Missive van het opperhoofd Dirck de Jongh en raedt geschreeven uijt Siam aen haer Eds. [gouverneur general Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 4 Nov. 1676, fo. 1198^{f-v}.

¹⁸⁷ VOC 1330, Notitie van aengecomen en vertrocken vreemde en inlantsche sloopjes en vaertuijgen uijt Siam sedert December 1676 tot October 1677, Siam, fos. 691-692. 20 Oct. 1677; 8 Feb. 1677; 20 Feb. 1677; 7 Mar. 1677; 20 Apr. 1677.

¹⁸⁸ VOC 1339, Notitie van aengecomene en vertrocken vreemde sloopjes en

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

		2 from Amoy (1 belonging to Siamese)
		3 from Kuang-tung (1 belonging to Siamese)
		1 belonging to Chinese in Siam
1679	1 ¹⁸⁹	From Amoy
1680	3 ¹⁹⁰	2 junks from Amoy; 1 from Kuangchou (All belonging to Chinese in Siam)

Because the alliance between the rulers of Fu-chou, Amoy and Canton opened the way for all their junks to visit Siam, the profits declined. In 1677, Cheng Ching also tried to invest in Tonkin silk as a means to obtain silver from Japan, but because that year's harvest was poor owing to bad weather, the silk exports to Japan had to be reduced.¹⁹¹ Chinese merchants from Yün-nan province who were trading under the flag of the Pinghsi viceroy were also not immune to competition. During the civil war, the Ping-hsi viceroy had been busy transporting copper to Tonkin and these copper exports inevitably reduced the profits made on Japanese copper exported on Cheng Ching's junks.¹⁹² Under the prevailing Japanese trade policy, the silk

vaertuijgen in en uijt Siam zedert 14 October 1677 tot 11 September 1678. Notice of all junks arrived Siam, Siam, fos. 458^f-462^v. 23 Feb. 1678; 1 Mar. 1678; 7 Mar. 1678; 12 Mar. 1678; 14 Mar. 1678; 27 Mar. 1678; 20 Apr. 1678.

¹⁸⁹ VOC 1341, Missive door den E. Aernout Faa en den raet uijt Siam geschreven aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijker] ende raden van Indien, Siam, 18 Feb 1679, fo. 845^v.

¹⁹⁰ VOC 1362, Notitie der aengecomene en vertrocken schepen en vaertuijgen et cetera tot en uijt Siam sedert primo October 1679 tot primo October 1680, Siam, fos. 990^v-992^v. 26 Feb. 1680; 1 Apr. 1680.

¹⁹¹ VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens 's compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 17 Aug. 1677, fo. 1142^{f-v}.

¹⁹² VOC 1330, Missive van den coopman Jan Besselman en den raet in Tonquin nae Batavia, Tonkin, 13 Oct. 1677, fo. 703^v-704^f. The vice-roy of Tonkin tried to forbid any further exchange in silver for copper coins from Chinese border; VOC 1348,

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

price had also been reduced to as low a level as 290 taels per picul.¹⁹³ Only when the battle line shifted from Fu-chou to Chang-chou in 1678, did the smuggling route by sea from Amoy to Fu-chou, which benefited from the support of Chu T'ien-kuei, gradually prove its worth.¹⁹⁴ On 19 July 1678, one Taiwan junk alone carried goods worth about 151,952 taels to Japan.¹⁹⁵ Again on 31 October 1678, another Fu-chou junk arrived in Japan carrying goods worth 97,000 taels. These data attest to the fact that smuggling was still going strong in this period.

Losing competitiveness 1677-1683

By October 1678, all the rebellions against the Manchus on the Chinese mainland had been suppressed.¹⁹⁶ After a new building programme of war-junks had been launched, the Manchu General-in-Chief, Imperial Prince of Kang, Chieh-shu, returned to Peking in September 1679.¹⁹⁷ On his recommendation, the evacuation policy was also rescinded by the Emperor in

Missive van den coopman Jan Besselman en raet in Toncquin aan Gouverneur Generaal Rijcklof van Goens, 1 Feb. 1679, fo.798^f. *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 380. 13 Mar. 1680. The copper coins dropped in price because of imports from 'Bauland', which designated the border between Vietnam and Yünnan province in China. The VOC merchants in Tonkin seized it as an opportunity to avoid competition from Taiwanese merchant as the latter also imported large amounts of copper coins from Japan as payment for silk goods.

¹⁹³ VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens 's compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 23 Sept. 1677, fo. 1151^v.

¹⁹⁴ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 220. 15 Feb. 1678; *Kai hentai*, III, 2997-9 at 2998. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou.

¹⁹⁵ VOC 1332, Dagregister gehouden [door Albert Brevinck] ten comptoire Nangasackij in Japan, Japan, 19 July 1678, fo. 677^v.

¹⁹⁶ P'êng, *Ching-hai chih*, 87.

¹⁹⁷ Sun, *Fu-chien t'ung-chih t'ai-wan-fu*, 983.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

November 1679.¹⁹⁸ According to Dutch records, in September of the same year Cheng Ching had sent an envoy to the Imperial Prince of Kang (before he had left for Peking) respectfully submitting that he ... 'conclude a treaty for a truce and free traffic with this kingdom (China). Under the terms of this treaty the Manchu Emperor would recognize Cheng Ching as the King of Formosa, Amoy and Quemoy, in other words that Cheng Ching be recognized as a free and sovereign monarch.'¹⁹⁹

Imperial Prince of Kang refused to receive the envoy and insisted that before he did so Cheng Ching should return all the territories he occupied on the mainland to the Emperor. Despite this sign of imperial disapproval, the envoy was nonetheless received by the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Yao Ch'i-shêng, before he returned to Amoy on 3 October.²⁰⁰ As soon as the new war-junks were completed in March 1680, the Manchu fleet sailed out of Fu-chou Harbour for the express purpose of attacking Chu T'ien-keui's fleet in Tin-hai.²⁰¹ The Manchu authorities knew that Cheng Ching had always doubted Chu T'ien-keui's loyalty because he was a former subject of the Ching-nan viceroy, and therefore had deliberately spared Chu's junks.²⁰² Some of Cheng Ching's junks fled to Amoy after this battle, which caused Cheng Ching mistakenly to believe that Chu had betrayed him and had joined

¹⁹⁸ Sun, *Fu-chien t'ung-chih t'ai-wan-fu*, 983.

¹⁹⁹ VOC 1350, Repport schrifttelijck gestelt en aande Ed Hr gouverneur generael Rijckloff van Goens ende De Heeren raden van India overgeleverd door het operhoofd den coopman Jacob van der Plancken met sijn verschijninge uijt Hockziewu op Batavia int jacht den Alexander ter rheedee Batavia, Batavia, 16 Dec. 1679, fo. 576.

²⁰⁰ VOC 1350, Repport schrifttelijck gestelt en aande Ed Hr gouverneur generael Rijckloff van Goens ende De Heeren raden van India overgeleeven door het operhoofd den coopman Jacob van der Plancken met sijn verschijninge uijt Hockziewu op Batavia int jacht den Alexander ter rheedee Batavia, Batavia, 16 Dec. 1679, fo. 576.

²⁰¹ Wang Tê-I, *Shih-chung chi-chi*[Notes on Deliberations within the Army], TWH, II no. 13, 242.

²⁰² *Ibidem*.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

forces with the Fu-chou navy. Eventually, on 26 March 1680, Cheng Ching decided to abandon Amoy and Quemoy and take all his people to Taiwan.²⁰³

After his return to Taiwan, Cheng Ching again focused his attention on Kuang-tung and in collaboration with the Ping-nan viceroy dispatched two junks worth about 290,000 taels from there to Japan.²⁰⁴ According to Dutch records, he ordered his admiral, Liu Kuo-hsüan, to lead a 'respectable' number of junks to occupy several islands in the vicinity of Macao, where they prepared to sell the salt from Taiwan. The Portuguese fitted out two ships to repel them but it was to no avail. They continued to occupy the islands after the Portuguese ships had left.²⁰⁵

Cheng Ching's shipping network, which connected Cambodia, Ligor and Manila so as to be able to provide the Japanese and Chinese market with goods and to maintain the prosperity of Taiwan, became hard to sustain after 1679. The Siamese King's direct trade with Japan and Canton had resumed, and a civil war had erupted in Cambodia.²⁰⁶ Attempts to build a direct link with Bantam were thwarted by the VOC. Meanwhile, the Chinese merchants in Bantam and Batavia, once possible allies, also gradually began to participate in the Japanese trade under the protection of the EIC and the VOC.

²⁰³ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 58.

²⁰⁴ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 381. 13 Mar. 1680. Since the Cheng force allowed the Ping-nan viceroy's junks to depart to Japan, I assume that this was the result of their collaboration.

²⁰⁵ VOC 1369, Missive van den coopman Jurriaen de Munninck en ondercoopman Albert Bruijningh aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens]tot Batavia geschreven in dato 20 November nevens een post scriptum van 26 November 1681 leggende geanckert onder 't eijlant Maserican [Letter written by Merchant Jurriaen de Munninck and Under Merchant Albert Bruijningh to Governor-General Rijcklof van Goens in Batavia on 20 Nov. 1681, with a postscript written on 26 Nov. 1681 when anchored off Maserican Island just off Canton], Canton, 20 Nov. 1681, fo. 775^{r-v}.

²⁰⁶ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 381. 13 Mar. 1680; *Kai hentai*, I, 301-302 at 302. The report of the junk no. 16 from Amoy.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

In 1678, the Sultan of Bantam even dispatched a junk valued at 10,000 rixdollars to Japan under the English flag.²⁰⁷ The need of the VOC for gold to spend on the Indian market had been satisfied by Japan since 1668, and there was a steady supply of Mexican silver dollars coming in via Europe. Consequently, the VOC was willing to tolerate the participation of Batavian Chinese merchants in the Japanese trade, especially as this would be to the detriment of the Cheng Ching's trade with Nagasaki.

Table 13-15: Export of Precious Metal from Europe and Japan by the VOC (in guilders)

Year	from Europe	from Japan
1640-1649	8,800,000	15,188,713
1650-1659	8,400,000	13,151,211
1660-1669	11,900,000	14,549,133
1670-1679	10,980,000	11,541,481

Source: Gaastra, 'The Dutch East India Company and Its Intra-Asiatic Trade in Precious Metals', 104. Table 2.

Another of the reasons which prevented Cheng's junks from taking a large share in the trade of the South East Asian ports lay in the expansion of the Indian Ocean trade. This trade had been making marked progress since the 1670s. As it expanded, more and more Surat merchants were tempted to try their luck in the Southeast Asian trade²⁰⁸ and extended their networks to

²⁰⁷ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 303. 13 Feb. 1679.

²⁰⁸ Gopal Surendra, 'Gujarati shipping in the Seventeenth Century', in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 8 (1971), 36; Femme Gaastra, 'Merchants, Middlemen and money: Aspects of the trade between the Indonesian archipelago and Manila in the 17th Century', in Gerrit Jan Schutte, Heather Amanda Sutherland (eds.), *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Lage Vuursche, the Netherlands, 23-27 June 1980*, (Leiden: the Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1982), 301-314 at 307.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Bantam in West Java.²⁰⁹ The Batavian authorities did not welcome Indian shipping in the roadstead of the Company headquarters and this negative policy backfired by making neighbouring Bantam 'great, bold and rich.'(groot, stout en rijk) .²¹⁰ The waxing prosperity of Bantam made it possible for this sultanate henceforth also to carve out a niche for itself in the Chinese and Japanese trade.

The expansion of the Indian trade also had an impact on the Manila trade. As the provider of Mexican silver in the Malay Archipelago and Siam, Manila became a popular destination of the Indian country traders in search of more direct trading links. Consequently, the Manila trade with ports in India steadily increased after 1670 as the following table shows:

Table 13-16: Junks Arriving in Manila

	Junks from China and Japan	Junks from Indo-China	Junks from the Indonesian Archipelago	Junks from India and Malacca
1660-1669	65	15	21	1
1670-1679	53	15	17	10
1680-1689	87	8	4	43
1690-1699	169	17	9	38

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*, 200-19.

Table 13-17: The Percentage of the Tariff of Manila Contributed from Different Origins.

	China and Japan	Indo-China	Indonesian Archipelago	India and Malacca
1666-1670	42.46	11.18	12.6	

²⁰⁹ Gaastra, 'Merchants, Middlemen and money', 309.

²¹⁰ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 15 Feb 1678, 234.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

1671-1675	20.81	2.27	7.91	27.37
1676-1680	37.17	3.88	11.57	19.74
1681-1685	33.35	0.87	2.13	28.73

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*, 148-60.

The above data tally with the observations of George White who was residing in Ayutthaya in 1679:

*'... The places, where this country [Siam] has been supplied with silver, are Japan and Manila. The former, [by]its emperor [means: shogun] have been prohibited to export for some years ago, and the trade with the latter was declining a lot since the ships from Coromandel sailed to there directly. Silver-bar became very scarce here. Because of desire to hoard cash, the commercial contract has been altered to barter which is very inconvenient.'*²¹¹

To lay its hands on more Mexican silver, the Batavian administration also tried to conclude a contract with the Spaniards in Manila, offering terms under which the Dutch would provide spices in exchange for the right to acquire Mexican silver in Manila. The negotiations failed in 1668, foundering on a clause in the peace treaty in 1648 had decreed that no Dutch ship would be allowed to visit Spanish harbours in the East.²¹² Instead of even contemplating allowing local traders from the Spice Islands to exploit the indirect trade between the Dutch and the Spaniards, the VOC authorities preferred to leave this business in the hands of Chinese traders in Batavia.²¹³ It seems plausible to assume that, because the Batavian Chinese could share the Indonesian Archipelago – Manila trade under the protection of the VOC, this freedom also curbed Cheng's Taiwan-Manila trade.

²¹¹ George White at Ayutthaya to Robert Parker and Council at Bantam, 15 Nov. 1679 (O. S.), in Anthony Farrington, Dhiravat na Pombejra(eds.), *The English Factory in Siam 1612-1685*, (London: The British Library, 2007), vol. I., 513.

²¹² Gaastra, 'Merchants, Middlemen and Money', 304-306.

²¹³ *Ibidem*, 307.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

All these circumstances contributed to the unhappy fact that the Taiwanese merchants were gradually losing their share in the luxury trade in Manila, Siam, the Malay Archipelago and Bantam after 1678 and had no option but to give way to local Chinese merchants sheltering under the protection of the European Companies or local rulers. Nevertheless, against all the odds, after Cheng Ching had led his troops back to Taiwan in 1680, he still managed to keep a firm hand on the Sino-Japanese smuggling. He lost this advantage when, on 26 March 1681, the K'ang-hsi Emperor agreed to rescind the coastal evacuation decree so that the population could return home.²¹⁴ Permanent Ch'ing garrisons were established in Amoy and Quemoy, but the strictest surveillance of the maritime ban was carried out by the newly constructed fleet of the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Yao Ch'i-shêng, led by the Naval Regional Commander, Chu T'ien-kuei, who had joined Manchus just three days after Cheng Ching had announced that he would return to Taiwan.²¹⁵ The upshot of these decisions was that the Sino-Japanese trade dropped 87 per cent compared to what it had been the previous year.

Cheng Ching passed away suddenly on 17 March 1681 and was succeeded by his second son, Cheng K'e-shuang.²¹⁶ From the moment he took over the reins the Cheng administration began to unravel. In a quandary about what to do for the best, an attack on either Hai-nan or Macao was toyed with as a diversionary tactic which would hopefully ward off the threat of a Manchu invasion of Taiwan and regain lost advantages in Southeast Asian trade.²¹⁷ In April 1681, Regional Commander Yang Yen-ti did indeed mount a raid on Hai-nan, but his fleet was soon dispersed by the Kuang-tung Coastal

²¹⁴ TWYH(ed.), *Ch'ing-tai kuan-shu chi ming t'ai-wan chêng-shih wang-shih*[Records in Official Documents Referring to the Annihilation of the Cheng Regime during the Ch'ing Dynasty], TW no. 174, 19.

²¹⁵ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 58.

²¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 59.

²¹⁷ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1684, 489. 28 Dec. 1681.

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

Defence Fleet, after which the plan to conquer Macao was postponed.²¹⁸ In August of 1681, the Taiwanese regime mobilized all its resources to defend the Pescadores against an imminent attack by the Manchu fleet.²¹⁹ As it happened, this threat still did not materialize as the Manchu authorities were still hesitating, debating about whether they should really launch an expedition against Taiwan.²²⁰ In Taiwan, the sudden decline in trade since 1681 caused a shortage of daily necessities, because the population there had grown rapidly as many new immigrants had poured in when Cheng Ching retreated from mainland China. According to Dutch sources, 35,000 soldiers were transported to the island which swelled the total population to 500,000-600,000 people. The fields in Taiwan were pushed to their limits in food production.²²¹ In order to provide rice for its subjects, the Cheng regime postponed paying its soldiers and used the money to purchase rice from Siam

²¹⁸ Chen, 'The migration of the Cheng Partisans to South Vietnam (Part I)', 444-5; VOC 1377, Missive van den resident Leendert de Moij en Johannes Sibens aan haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens], Tonkin, 5 Jan. 1682, fo. 557^{r-v}; Tonkin diary, 5 Mar. 1682, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 467. In the winter of 1681, the remnants of Regional Commander Yang's fleet retreated from Lungmen and sailed to Tonkin with their wives and children.

²¹⁹ John Chappell and Council at Taiwan to Edward Barwell and Council at Bantam, 22 Dec 1681(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 458.

²²⁰ Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 60.

²²¹ VOC 1377, Rapport door den coopman Johannes Leeuwenson opperhoofd tot Hocksieuw aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens] uijt de Maccause eijlanden overgesonden wegens zijn verrichten en afscheidj mitsgaders het opbrecken van het comptoir aldaer aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens] overgesonden van voor Maserican uijt het jacht Odijck [Report Written by Johannes Leeuwenson Chief Merchant at Fu-chou to Governor-General Rijcklof van Goens about His Activities, Delivered via Macao after His Departure from Fu-chou, Carried on the Yacht the *Odijck* from Maserican], Canton, 10 Jan. 1682, fos. 590^v-591^r.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

instead.²²² In the spring of 1682, six junks were dispatched to Siam for rice and returned fully laden.²²³ At this point most of southern China and northern Vietnam were afflicted by a drought which caused twenty-five junks from different places to arrive in Siam in a quest for rice.²²⁴ The Cheng authorities again had to dispatch another four junks to Siam for rice in the spring of 1683.²²⁵ In the following summer, Liu Kuo-hsüan's fleet lost a sea battle off the Pescadores on 16 July 1683.²²⁶ After deliberating for two weeks, the Cheng authorities finally decided to surrender to the Manchus. According to two English merchants, Thomas Angeir and Thomas Woolhouse, who witnessed the whole event at Taiwan:

*'His Majesty and his grandees here had observed the continual grumbling of the poor people and his army in want of rice. And there was about ten days in this time of distress in which no grain was brought until they had sold (what remained) at an extremely dear price, so that the poor people could not stuff their bellies unless they mixed rice with potatoes. If the supply from Siam and Manila would not arrive, some of the subjects must die in pain. Therefore they decided, after the loss of the Pescadores, now it is not possible to subsist and retain the prerogatives of his predecessors, for without a trade this country cannot be kept and without the Pescadores it is impossible for them to manage any commerce with foreigners.'*²²⁷

²²² *Daghregister van Batavia*, 1682 Deel I, 438. 3 Apr. 1682.

²²³ VOC 1377, Notitie der aengekomene en vertrocke scheepen, joncquen, barkien en vaartuijgen uijt en in de revier van Siam sedert October 1681 tot September 1682, Siam, fo. 534^{r-v}; fo. 535v.

²²⁴ Samuel Potts and Thomas Ivatt at Ayutthaya to Edward Barwell and Council at Bantam, 29 Nov 1682 (O. S.) in Anthony Farrington, Dhiravat na Pombejra(eds.), *The English Factory in Siam 1612-1685*, Vol. I, 690.

²²⁵ *Kai hentai*, I, 357. At least four junks were dispatched to Siam from Taiwan.

²²⁶ *Ch'ing shêng-tsu shih-lu*, vol 110, 1466. 18 Aug. 1683; Juan, *Hai-shang chien-wên lu*, 62.

²²⁷ Thomas Angeir and Thomas Woolhouse at Taiwan to the Agent and Council in

MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

The crisis brought on by the food shortage and the loss of the Pescadores were the last straw. To make matters even worse, the rice junks had to be unloaded on the Pescadores when it was discovered that alluvial deposit had made the bay of An-ping too shallow to enter. The coup de grace for the internal crisis came when any chance of external aid was cut off by the Manchu fleet. The rice trade, which had raised the Cheng lineage from maritime mercenaries to merchant princes, eventually also led to its collapse.

Siam, 20 Dec. 1683 (O.S.), in: Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English Factory in Taiwan*, 552.
The text has been modified to a more readable English style for modern readers.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONCLUSION

DEFENSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE MONOPOLIES

Unquestionably social turbulence in the southeastern coastal regions of China lay at the heart of the rise of the seaborne empire of the Cheng lineage. This maritime mercenary power group in the Min-nan area founded its powerbase on the skillful exploitation of foreign trade and by claiming the monopoly on violence. In origin it was the offshoot of the agriculture-rooted tax administration of the Ming dynasty which did not obtain enough revenue to pay for the maintenance of a permanent naval fleet to defend the coastal regions precisely in a period of change and foreign intrusion when this was so desperately needed. Forced to look elsewhere, the provincial government of Fu-chien had no option but to exploit the revenues it derived from maritime trade to secure the coastal frontier. By the expedient of promising the trading revenues to the maritime mercenaries, the local authorities conceded them a substantial autonomy to act as they pleased, on condition that they kept stable order in coastal waters to the satisfaction of the imperial court in Peking.

Historians generally consider the Edict issued by the Chinese Ming court in 1568 which partly lifted the *Hai-chin* or maritime prohibitions in southern Fu-chien to mark a milestone in the protracted struggle of local merchants and sailors to obtain a profit from the bounties of overseas trade. This exceptional 'privilege' permitted overseas trade from one local harbor, Yüe-kang, a port in the Haich'êng district of Chang-chou prefecture. It seems to have been devised to serve two purposes: it undercut piracy by offering unemployed sailors job opportunities, and it guaranteed the presence of a sea-going fighting force for the coastal defence, on call all the time. By any standards it would seem to have been a well-calculated decision but recent research reveals that, instead of being a well-devised move by the imperial court which would allow it to gain control of the overseas trade, it was

CONCLUSION

actually no more than an *ad hoc* arrangement to secure the survival of the commercial shipping whose existence was continuously under threat from local piracy. In short, the measure resembled the ‘Macao Formula’ under whose terms the Ming court allowed the Portuguese to remain in Macao.

The implementation of this policy to pacify the coastal waters and combat piracy as effectively as possible laid the financial foundation for being able to maintain a coastal defence force. Under the circumstances, the relationship between the coastal defence troops and the junk owners and their skippers who could now sail to overseas destinations with official permission evolved as a flexible arrangement.

The onus of getting the priorities right was placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the coastal defence troops. The coastal defence troops, or rather their leaders, were faced with many choices. Should they simply escort the trading junks to protect them, charging high prices for their services? Should they actively harass and arrest pirates and ordain a scorched earth policy on nearby islands to prevent them being used as bases by pirates and smugglers? Or would it be better for them to neglect these onerous duties and exploit their own trading junks and pursue a more forward-looking strategy? The share in the trading revenues collected was used for the upkeep of the coastal defence depended on the judgement of the provincial authorities, principally the Grand Co-ordinator who was in charge of the budget of the province.

The rise and decline in the number of maritime mercenaries was closely related to the barometer of fear of foreign aggression. At this early stage of globalization, the Grand Co-ordinators of the coastal provinces of China in the Ming period did not have the advantage of a comprehensive knowledge of what was happening in international waters. The more terrified the Ming court grew of the threat posed by maritime invaders, whether Chinese or Japanese pirates or Dutch privateers, the more strongly it supported the local monopoly rights in the seaborne trade of the maritime mercenaries, who were supposed to keeping the peace along the coast. As a

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

consequence of their fairly impregnable position, this ‘defensive monopoly’ policy, as I call it, made a strong contribution to the increase in trade revenues.

Just at this juncture, when the Japanese civil war was drawing to an end at the end of the sixteenth century and Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu, unified the country, Japanese piracy on the Chinese coast was also declining. Japanese traders, provided with passes from the Shogun, sought to reconnect their links with the China coast intent on engaging in peaceful, legal trade, but their pacific ambitions were obstructed by the imperial prohibition on trade with Japan, which had not been repealed .

In 1617, a merchant, a member of the local gentry in Chang-chou, Chao Ping-chien, was recruited by the Coastal Defence force of Fu-chien province when rumours began to spread about impending Japanese attempts to move to the nearby island of Taiwan. As he was covertly involved in trading with Sino-Japanese smugglers, he was happy to make use of his official position to exclude all other smugglers from this trade. When the Japanese ‘threat’ did not materialize, the provincial authorities decided to get rid of Chao Ping-chien and executed him once they no longer had any need of him. Likewise, the famous Japan-based smuggler Li Tan, who mediated between the Ming coastal defence troops and the Dutch who occupied the Pescadores between 1622 and 1624, had also been a low-ranking officer in the coastal defence force before he began organizing his smuggling network between China and Japan. Li Tan tried to regain a central position in the coastal defence by mediating between the Chinese court and the VOC, but he passed away before his plans could come to fruition¹ His death left the way open for Cheng Chih-lung, alias Nicolas Iquan, a former member of Li Tan’s

¹ Élie Ripon, *Voyages et aventures du capitaine Ripon aux grandes Indes: journal inédit d'un mercenaire 1617-1627* [Voyages and Adventures of Captain Ripon in Greater India: unpublished journal of a mercenary 1617-1627], Yves Giraud (ed.), (Thonon-les-Bains, Haute-Savoie: Éditions de l’Albaron, 1990), 113.

CONCLUSION

smuggling network, to join the coastal defence with his followers in 1629, after he had briefly collaborated with the VOC as a mercenary.

After the Dutch had occupied Taiwan in 1624 and continued to press the Fu-chien authorities to open up trade relations, the power of the Fu-chien coastal defence forces under Iquan reached unprecedented heights during the 1630s. Trade with Japan, first the smuggling via the Dutch in Taiwan and later the direct trade with Nagasaki, contributed immensely to the development of Iquan's 'defensive monopoly'. In effect he remained a maritime mercenary while assuming the guise of serving as a high officer in the coastal defence troops. He was helped out in his ambitions by a succession of Grand-Co-ordinators who realized that inevitably they would have to make concessions in exchange for coastal security and prosperity. Iquan's 'defensive monopoly' reached its zenith in the 1640s when the Ming court was facing the menace of the Manchu troops at the northeastern border of the empire. At this time, the Grand Co-ordinators of Fu-chien virtually openly tolerated his illegal trade with Japan because the prolonged war against the Manchus had exhausted the treasury. This all happened at the wrong moment for the Dutch. The rapid expansion of Iquan's foreign trade monopoly emerged as an uncompromising threat to the VOC trade on the Sino-Japan route just when the Dutch were expecting to be able to step in and replace the Portuguese after their expulsion from Japan in 1639. When Iquan arranged for the establishment of a restored Southern Ming court in Fu-chien province in 1646, he hit on the perfect way to develop a crown trade under the guise of the tributary system which would allow him to contest the trading privileges of the VOC in Siam, Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and Cochin-China. Realizing that his chance had come, Iquan grasped the sole authority over all coastal maritime activities in China and ironically grabbed the power to execute a maritime ban and turn it in to an 'aggressive' weapon. After Iquan's son Cheng Ch'eng-kung, alias Coxinga, succeeded in becoming the leader of the Fu-chien coastal mercenaries in 1653, he also employed the maritime prohibition as a weapon to bargain for more profits as he dealt with his various trading partners or competitors including the Japanese, Dutch and

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Spaniards. All his military actions were concentrated on the sites on which his maritime network relied most. The last two full-scale attacks he waged against Nanking and Taiwan were designed to protect the rich silk trade with Japan and to launch into the gold trade with India. The attacks waged by his successor, Cheng Ching, against the Dutch still holed up in Chi-lung in Formosa and Phnom-Penh in Cambodia, ran along the same lines and represented an aggressive monopoly enforcement, which consistently tried to secure its own trading networks by force. Even during the implementation of the maritime ban and the evacuation policy imposed by the Manchu court in the years 1663-1670 (in Fu-chien until 1684), secure in its position, the Cheng regime in Taiwan was still able to continue to trade with China by exchanging contraband cargo at various footholds along the coast.

The occupation of Taiwan by Coxinga in 1662 provided the Cheng lineage with a stronghold from which to negotiate its relations with the Chinese Ch'ing Empire. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Taiwan had been a 'stateless' space between China and Japan. The VOC occupation in 1624 upset this arrangement, which was further thrown out of kilter in 1636 when the Japanese adopted their own *Sakoku* or 'locked country' policy under the newly established Tokugawa Shogunate. Originally the maritime mercenaries in the Min-nan area did no more than serve as middlemen between China and Japan at their bases on the Pescadores and in Taiwan, but this situation changed radically in the 1630s when Iquan actually became an intermediary between China and the VOC in the An-hai- Taiwan axis. Later, in the 1650s, Coxinga widened his network to include Siam and Japan. The dramatic change in the geo-political conditions in China contribute greatly to the reinforcement of Coxinga's 'aggressive monopoly.' It threw such a spanner in the works of local trade, it prompted the VOC to seek an alliance with the Ch'ing naval forces in the period 1663-1665. Having weighed up their options in the area, the Dutch decided that their best course would be to seek a solid relationship with the Ch'ing court, on the basis of their mutual interest in toppling the Cheng regime.

CONCLUSION

When new rebellions by Ming loyalists against the Ch'ing court erupted in the southern provinces in 1673, they threw the competition in foreign trade between the Cheng regime and the rulers of the rebellious provinces of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung wide open. As the Cheng regime was not in a position to wage war against its Fu-chien and Kuang-tung erstwhile allies, its 'aggressive monopoly' ebbed away. It was reduced to being only one of many competitors in the Sino-Japanese trade. After the Fu-chien rebels surrendered to the Manchu court in 1677, the new Fu-chien coastal defence troops originally posted to guard the southern coastline of China by the Ch'ing court gradually began to recoup the status they had lost in earlier struggles with the Cheng and adopted a 'defensive monopoly' in which they depicted the Cheng regime as a threat to the common cause.

One of Iquan's former followers, Admiral Shih Lang, seized this opportunity to take command of the coastal defence troops in Amoy and attack the Cheng regime in Taiwan. His decision was ill-timed as his personal position became uncertain when, in its efforts to secure the coast, the Manchu court considered evacuating the whole littoral, a decision which would have made the defence troops superfluous. If Shih Lang was not to see everything he had fought for and planned for so long collapse, he had to eliminate the Cheng regime as soon as possible. However, he was only partially vindicated. After he destroyed the Cheng naval force off the Pescadores and accepted its surrender in Taiwan, the maritime threat, the principal reason for maintaining a 'defensive monopoly', also evaporated. Determined to preserve his hard-won position, Shih Lang plotted to lure the VOC into coming back to Taiwan again so that he could parade it as foreign threat to be reckoned with.²

Times had changed and the VOC was not very willing to fall in with his plans. It had already withdrawn from the direct trade with Fu-chou in China

² Cheng Wei-chung, 'Shih Lang t'ai-wan kui-huan hê-lan mi-i[Admiral Shih Lang's Secret Proposal for Returning Taiwan to the VOC]', *T'ai-wan wên-hsien*[Taiwan Historica], 61:3, (2011), 35-74.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

and even more importantly Japan had ceased to export silver, which it needed for its intra-Asian trade. Faced with the fact that Chinese goods were gradually becoming less profitable in Japan, the Dutch re-evaluated the ever worsening ecological conditions in the harbour in the Bay of An-ping (Taijouan) and judged that the port had become too shallow for Dutch ships. When all the conditions had been weighed up, in 1685 Governor-General Johannes Camphuijs in Batavia decided that the Company no longer had any use for a settlement in Taiwan, unless it could obtain the sole right of free trade with China from there.³ On its part, as it felt itself fairly secure on the Dragon Throne, the Manchu court judged that no more foreign threats could be expected from the sea and decided to open up all the coast to the Chinese overseas trade. The upshot was that the military budget was uncoupled from the monopolistic trading revenues. This radically affected the character and purpose of the coastal defence troops as there would no longer be any real need for other maritime mercenaries in the years to come.

In the long history of China, it has not been unusual for local warlords to rise and make bids for power whenever the might of the central government declined. The late East Han, the late Tang and even the late Ch'ing dynasty as well as Southern Ming period are good examples, not to mention the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty just a century ago. The common foundation for this phenomenon was the implementation of certain expedient measures by the court to enable local defence forces to pacify local rebellions when the court itself was no longer able to do so. For example, the Yellow Turban Rebellion (AD 184), the An-Lu-shan Rebellion (AD 755) and the Tai-ping Rebellion (AD 1850) were all the result of the rise of warlords and the demise of the power of the central government. Viewed from this perspective, the rise of the Cheng lineage is not much different from other local warlords under the Southern Ming Emperors. The feature which

³ *Generale Missiven*, IV 1675-1685, p. 722-3; VOC 700, Resolutie van Batavia, Batavia, 8 May 1685, fos. 214-5.

CONCLUSION

distinguishes the Cheng from the other Chinese warlords was its maritime capability which gave it its monopoly access to overseas trading revenues which provided it with generous funding for carrying out its plans. Instead of relying on the agricultural revenues plus military forces on land, it relied on its capability to secure maritime trade routes and a steady stream of useful commodities. The birth of the maritime mercenary was a creation of the newly emerged oceanic contacts as a consequence of the new wave of globalization. The way the Cheng regime dealt with its overseas trading partners, whether they were East Asians or Europeans, had more in common with the polities found in the Malay port principalities than Sino-centric tributary system of the Ming court.

Taken at the flood, the decline of Chinese central power coincidentally allowed the formation of this port principality but, as did so many others, it withered largely because of the effects of changes in oceanic trade and the competition of other coastal polities, rather than because of the embargo of the Chinese empire. However, in the long history of the Chinese maritime frontier, it stands out as an exception. It seems it was the outstanding leaderships characteristics shown by its first two rulers which made it the sole exceptional instance in which a coastal region almost escaped the control of the central power through its astute manipulation of its divergent economic base.

APPENDIX

Appendix I

Table A: the cargo of the junk from Quinam bound for Chang-chou, registered on 15 Aug 1633.

Commodities	Quantities	Price per unit (Rial)	Value (Rial)
Silver coins	3,266 pieces	1	3266
Pepper	411 1/2 picul	13	5349.5
Long pepper	7 picul	10	70
Ambergris	1.625 catty(26 taels)	25	40.625
Merstoff (sic.)	1/4 catty (4 taels)		
Rhinoceros horn	210 pieces	1	210
Elephant tusks	40 1/2 picul	50	2025
Ebony	187 1/4 picul	2	374.5
Sandalwood	15.7 picul	20	314
Sappanwood	50 picul	3	150
Dragon's blood	15 picul	30	450
Cardamom	12 picul	20	240
Copper	53 picul	10	530
Tjeddwock(sic.)	44 picul	2	88
Horsehair	4.7 picul	50	235
Agelhout (sic.) (Eaglewood)	22 picul	4	88
Bird's nests	4 bags	50/pl	
Tortoisheshell	0.54 picul	80	43.2
Ox hides	50 picul	1/4 stux	12.5
Rice	1/2 last		15
Camphor	166 taels (=10.375 cattij)	25	259.375
Total	< 45.2 last		<13760.7

Source: VOC 1109, Inventaris vande goederen ende comptanten becomen uijt een joncque van Quinam tenderende naer Chincheu bij 't schip Bredamme onder Lamaphe adjij 15en Auguste anno 1633 verovert, ende in de River Chincheo gebracht, Lang Pai-chiao, fo. 290v.

APPENDIX

Table B: The cargo of the junk from Quinam captured around Cape of the Good Hope¹ on 17th Aug. 1633

Cargo	Quantities (Weight)	Price per unit (Rial)	Value (Rial)
Ebony	1,200 picul	2	2400
Rice	88 last	30	2640
Tamberijn	38 baijlen (bales)	unknown	
Deerskins	8 items	unknown	
2 iron 1 pond canon		unknown	
Total	< 148 last=185 ton		< 3040

Source: Inventaris vande goederen bevonden in een jonck bij 't jacht Brouckerhaven op 17en August anno 1633 ontrent Caep de Goede Hoop verover, comende van Coutchinchina willende naer de rivier Chincheo, Cape of good hope, fo. 291^r.

Table C: The cargo of the junk from Quinam captured near Lampecao on 17 Aug. 1633

Commodities	Quantities	Price per unit (Rial)	Value (Rial)
Silver nuggets	141 taels(1.12 last)	1.37	193.17
Spanish rials	22 1/2 pieces	1	22.5
Elephant tusks	3.65 picul	50	182.5
rice	1 1/4 last	30	37.5
Veruwen(sic.)	3 pots		
Copper bowls	18 items	2	36
Total	>2.378 last		471.67

Source: VOC 1109, Bij 't jacht Broeckerhaven uijt een joncque comende van Quinam ontrent Lamophece verover, Lang Pai-chiao, fo. 292^r.

¹ Ch'ien-ao, see Picture 3.

APPENDIX

Table D: cargoes of the two junks captured near T'ung-shan, on 31 Aug. 1633.

Commodities	Quantities (weight)	Price per unit (Rial)	Total value (Rial)
pepper	760 picul	13	9880
Long pepper	10 picul	10	100
Elephant tusks	25.66 picul	50	1283
Beuijanoij (sic.)(Benzoin)	8.28 picul	15	124.2
Gommalack(sic.)	1.35 picul	20	27
Copper	61 picul	10	610
Sappanwood	480 picul	3	1440
Sandalwood	7 1/2 picul	20	150
Calmbac wood	46 picul	-	-
Craen oogh(sic.)	1.4 picul	-	-
Rompen(sic.)	0.5 picul	20	10
Bird's nests	1.2 picul	50	60
Tjeddeback(sic.)	5 picul	2	10
Cane	A lot		
Total	>70.39 last		13694.2

Source: VOC 1109, Inventaris van de coopmanschappen bevonden in twee joncquen, ander de stadt Tongsoa op de wal sittende ende op Aug. anno 1633 aengehaelt ande voor een goede prijze verclaert, Tongshan, fol. 291^r.

Table E: the Value of Rial and Tael in stuivers at Taiwan and Batavia 1624-1661

Year	Rial	Chinese tael	Japanese tael
1625			70 ²
1629	51 ³	(42) ⁴	

² Generale Missive, 27 Jan. 1625, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 44.

³ H.T. Colenbrander, Jan Pietersz Coen, V, 159.

⁴ Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

APPENDIX

1632	50 ⁵ (42) ⁶		
1636	(42) ⁷		57 ⁸
1637	(42) ⁹	66 ¹⁰	
1639	(48/51) ¹¹		
1640	(56/60) ¹²		
1642	52 ¹³		
1643	52 ¹⁴		
1644	52 ¹⁵	71 ¹⁶	59.8 ¹⁷
1645	52 ¹⁸ /56 ¹⁹	71 ²⁰	

1958), 54-5.

⁵ Generale missiven, 6 Jan. 1632, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 96.

⁶ Glamann, *ibid.* The numbers in brackets mean that they do not indicate directly the situation in Taiwan but generally in the areas under the VOC control.

⁷ Glamann, *ibid.*

⁸ VOC 1123, Missive van Johan van der Burch gouverneur van Taijouan naer Gouverneur Generaal Antonio van Diemen in Batavia, 5 Oct. 1636, fo. 697^f.

⁹ Glamann, *ibid.*

¹⁰ *Dagregister Batavia*, 1637, 34. 10 Feb. 1637.

¹¹ VOC 1188, Extract uijt 't Generale brieffsboeck, berustende ter secretarie generael, gerocken uijt de Missive door den Gouverneur Gener- ende de Raaden van India, aen de E Heeren Zeventhiene geschreven, 18 Dec, 1639, fo. 218^v.

¹² VOC 1188, Extract uijt Generale resolutieboeck van Batavia berustene ter secretarie Generale getrocken, 10 Mar. 1640, fo. 219^v.

¹³ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse Schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ VOC 1155, Missive door den gouverneur Francois Caron aen den Ed. heer gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen in Taijouan, 15 Feb. 1645, fo. 594^f. It reported 1 Japanese tail would be counted equal to 1.15 rial. Given the rial was counted as 52 stuivers, the Japanese tail was 59.8 stuivers.

¹⁸ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse Schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

¹⁹ VOC 872, Missive van Governor Generaal Conelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar

APPENDIX

1646	52 ²¹ /56 ²²	57 ²³
1647	52 ²⁴ /56 ²⁵	
1648	63.75 ²⁶ /60 ²⁷	

gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater inTaiwan, 22 April 1648, fo. 83^v. The letter ordered the Taiwan authority to end the old fashion of the values in rials, neither 52 nor 56 stuivers would be counted. However, since when Taiwan authority began to count one rial in 56 stuivers was unknown; VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren des eijlants Formosa nopende het invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 1650, fo. 795^v. According to this petition, 1 rial was counted as 56 stuiver when it was circulated since 1644 in Taiwan.

²⁰ Ibid; VOC 1155, Missive door den gouverneur Francois Caron aen den Ed. heer gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen, 15 Feb. 1645, fo. 594^f.

²¹ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse Schuigt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v.

²² VOC 872, Missive van Governor Generaal Conelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater inTaiwan, 22 April 1648, fo. 83^v. The letter ordered the Taiwan authority to end the old fashion of the values in rials, neither 52 nor 52 stuivers would be counted. However, since when Taiwan authority began to count one rial in 56 stuivers was unknown; VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren des eijlants Formosa nopende het invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 1650, fo. 795^v. According to this petition, 1 rial was counted as 56 stuiver when it was circulated since 1644 in Taiwan.

²³ *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 289. 21 Dec. 1646.

²⁴ VOC 1163, Factura der goederen gescheept ende geladen door ordre van d'Ed. president Pieter Antonisz. Overtwater voor Batavia, in 't Casteel Zeelandia, 19 Jan. 1647, fo. 332^f; VOC 1169, Factura's [van 't geladene in 't jacht de Drommedaris voor Cormandel en van 't gescheepte in de fluijt den Cooninck Davidt voor Suratta en Persia], 21 Nov. 1647, fo. 412^v; VOC 1171, Missive door de heer Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater en raad in Taijouan aan de gouverneur Arnold Heussens gouverneur in Palliacatta, 15 Dec. 1648, fo. 417^v. (*Check the fol number again*)

²⁵ VOC 872, Missive van Gouvernor General Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater in Taiwan, 22 April, 1648, fo. 83^v; VOC 1170, Resolutie van Taijouan, 18 June 1648, fo. 526^v.

²⁶ VOC 1171, Missive door de heer Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater en raad in Taijouan aan de gouverneur Arnold Heussens gouverneur in Palliacatta, 15 Dec. 1648, fo. 417^v.

APPENDIX

1649	60 ²⁸	69 ²⁹
1650	60 ³⁰	69 ³¹
1651	60 ³²	(57) ³³
1652	60 ³⁴	69 ³⁵
1653	60 ³⁶	69 ³⁷

(Check the fol number again)

²⁷ VOC 872, Missive van gouverneur generaal Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar gouverneur Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater in Taijouan, 22 April 1648, fo. 83^v; VOC 1170, Resolutie van Taiwan, 18 June 1648, fo. 526^v. The rial used to be circulated among Chinese in 56 stuijvers, but the order of Batavian authority claimed it to be 60 stuijvers.

²⁸ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse Schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v. During 1649 to 1652, the rial was circulated in 60 stuijvers

²⁹ VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren des eijlants Formosa nopende het invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 1650, fo. 795^v. During 1649 to 1650, one Japanese tail was circulated in 69 stuijvers.

³⁰ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

³¹ VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren des eijlants Formosa nopende het invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 1650, fo. 795^v. During 1649 to 1650 one Japanese tail was circulated as 69 stuijvers; VOC 1176, Missive uijt gouverneur Nicolaas Verburgh in Taijouan aen den gouverneur generaal Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden van India, 31 Oct. 1650, fo. 892^v.

³² VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

³³ VOC 1183, Factura's van 't geschepte in de fluijten Coninck David en Hillegaersberg te Taiwan[naar Batavia], 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 582^f.

³⁴ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

³⁵ VOC 1197, Missiven [aen haer Ed. gouverneur generaal Carel Reniers te Batavia door den gouverneur Nicolaas Verburgh en raedt te Taijouan], 29 Dec. 1652, fo. 775^f.

³⁶ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

³⁷ VOC 1206, Missiven door den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar en raedt uijt Taijouan

APPENDIX

1654-55	60 ³⁸		
1656		64 ³⁹	69 ⁴⁰
1657	(51) ⁴¹		69 ⁴² (57) ⁴³
1658	(48) ⁴⁴		
1660	(48/60) ⁴⁵		

1 Siamese Tail= 6 F= 120 stuivers⁴⁶

1 Tonkin tail= 4.125F= 82.5stuivers⁴⁷

aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, 5 Dec. 1653, fo. 134^v.

³⁸ VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteit en reductie van het becominge Taijouwane schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15^v.

³⁹ VOC 1218, Missive aen de Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael ende de Ed. heren raden van India in dato 20 November Missive van gouverneur Frederik Coyett te Taijouan naar Batavia, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 36^f.

⁴⁰ VOC 1218, Missive aen de Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael ende de Ed. heren raden van India in dato 20 November Missive van gouverneur Frederik Coyett te Taijouan naar Batavia, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 36^f.

⁴¹ *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 330-1. 10 Nov. 1657.

⁴² Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1658, in Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 442.

⁴³ VOC 1222, Resolutie van Taiwan, 22 Sept. 1657, fo.115^f; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 330-1. 10 Nov. 1657.

⁴⁴ VOC 1228, Factura van poijerzuijkeren naer Batavia verscheept van Taijouan, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 669^f.

⁴⁵ VOC 678, Resolutie van Batavia, 9 July 1660, fo. 76. The light (slecht) rial is 48 stuijvers while the heavy (sware) rial is 60 stuijvers in Batavia; VOC 872, Instructie voor gouverneur Pieter Antonioszoon Overtwater en raed te Taijouan van Batavia, 3 Aug. 1648, fo. 207r. The rial "in spetie" is 60 stuijvers while the rial "courant" is 48 stuijvers.

⁴⁶ VOC 1125, Missive bij Jeremias van Vliet tot Siam aen president Nicolaes Couckebacker tot Firando, 29 June 1637, fo. 558^v.

⁴⁷ VOC 1248, Missive door den coopman Constantijn Ranst ende den raet aen haer Eds. de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker en heeren raden van India, 25 Oct. 1666, fo. 114^v.

APPENDIX

The Ming Grand Coordinators of Fu-chien

王士昌	Wang Shih-ch'ang	1 Feb. 1618	
商周祚	Shang Chou-tso	12 Feb. 1621	2 Mar. 1623
南居益	Nan Chi-i	15 Mar. 1623	21 May 1625
朱欽相	Chu Ch'in-hsiang	5 June 1625	29 Oct. 1626
朱一馮	Chu I-fêng	14 Dec. 1626	21 Aug. 1628
熊文燦	Hsiung Wên-ts'an	Apr. 1628	Mar./ Apr. 1632
鄒維璉	Tsou Wei-lien	Mar./ Apr. 1632	8 May 1639
沈猶龍	Shên You-lung	1635	
蕭亦輔	Hsiao I-fu	16 Feb. 1639	23 Sept. 1642
張肯堂	Chang K'ên-t'ang	7 Nov. 1642	

Source: Wu, *Ming tu-fu nien-piao*, 514-517.

The Ming Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi

何士晉	Hê Shih-chin	19 Apr. 1624	May 1625
商周祚	Shang Chou-tso	5 June 1625	9 Feb. 1627
李逢節	Li Fêng-chieh	Feb./Mar. 1627	Aug. 1628
王尊德	Wang Tsun-tê	21 Aug. 1628	
王業浩	Wang Yeh-hao	Oct./Nov. 1631	
熊文燦	Hsiung Wên-ts'an	Mar./Apr. 1632	
張鏡心	Chang Ching-hsin	10 June 1637	9 Jan. 1642
沈猶龍	Shên You-lung		1644
丁魁楚	Ting K'uei-ch'u	1644	

Source: Wu, *Ming tu-fu nien-piao*, 668-670.

APPENDIX

The Governor Generals of the VOC

Pieter Both	19 Dec. 1610
Gerard Reijnst	6 Nov. 1614
Laurens Reaal	19 June 1616
Jan Pietersz. Coen	21 Mar. 1619
Pieter de Carpentier	1 Feb. 1623
Jan Pietersz. Coen	30 Sept. 1627
Jacques Specx	24 Sept 1629
Hendrik Brouwer	7 Sept. 1632
Antonio van Diemen	1 Jan. 1636
Cornelis van der Lijn	19 Apr. 1645
Carel Reyniersz	26 Apr. 1650
Joan Maetsuijcker	18 May 1653
Rijcklof van Goens	4 Jan 1678

The Ch'ing Governor-generals of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien

張存仁	Chang Ts'un-jên	1646
陳錦	Ch'ên Chin	1648
劉清泰	Liu Ch'ing-t'ai	
佟代	T'ung Tai	1655
李率泰	Li Shuai-t'ai	1656
張朝璘	Chang Ch'ao-lin	1666
祖擇傳	Tsu Tsê-ch'uan	1667
趙廷臣	Chao T'ing-ch'ên	1668
劉兆麟	Liu Chao-lin	1668
劉斗	Liu Tou	1670
范承謨	Fan Ch'êng-mo	1673
郎廷相	Lang T'ing-hsiang	1676
姚啟聖	Yao Ch'i-shêng	1678

Source: Hao Yü-lin, *Fu-chien T'ung-chih* [The General Gazette of Fuchien], Ching-yin

Wên-yüen-kê Ssu-k'u-ts'ung-shu, No. 527, vol. 27.

APPENDIX

Ching-nan viceroy [in Fu-chien]

耿繼茂 Keng Chi-mao 1661

耿精忠 Keng Ching-chung 1670-74

Source: Hao Yü-lin, *Fu-chien T'ung-chih*, vol. 28.

The Ch'ing Governors of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi

佟養甲 T'ung Yang-chia 1646

李率泰 Li Shuai-t'ai 1654

李棲鳳 Li Ch'i-fêng 1657

王國光 Wang Kuo-kuang 1663

盧崇峻 Lu Ch'ung-chün 1664

盧興祖 Lu Hsing-tsu 1668

周有德 Chou You-tê 1670

金光祖 Chin Kuang-tsu 1673

吳興祚 Wu Hsing-tso 1682

Source: Hao Yü-lin, *Fu-chien T'ung-chih*, vol. 29.

APPENDIX

Appendix II

Official Titles:

- An-ch'a-shih 按察使 Surveillance Commissioner
An-nan Chiang-chün 安南將軍 General of Aman
Ch'in-i Pa-tsung/ Ch'in-tsung 欽依把總/欽總 National Squard Leader
Chien-ch'a yü-shih 監察御史 Investigating Censor
Chün-mên 軍門 Provincial Military Commander
Ch'ien-chün Tou-tu 前軍都督 Supreme Chief Military Commissioner
Chêng-nan Ta-chiang-chün To-lo Pei-lê 征南大將軍多羅貝勒
General-in-Chief of the Southern Expedition the To-lo Prince
Ching-nan 靖南
Chao-ming-yeh 昭明爺 Marquess of Chao-ming
Chê-min tsung-tu 浙閩總督 Governor-general of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien
Chêng-ch'in-wang shih-tzu 鄭親王世子 Heir of the Imperial Prince of Cheng
Chu-shou Hu-kuan 居守戶官 Official of Revenue residing in Amoy and
Quemoy
Chu T'ien-kuei 朱天貴
Daimyo[J.]大名
Daikan[J.]代官
Fu 府 prefecture
Fên-hsün Ping-pei-tao 分巡兵備道 the General Surveillance and Military
Defence Circuit
Fu-i You-chi 撫夷遊擊 Commander of the Barbarian-deterrent Mobile Corps
Hsün Fu 巡撫 Grand Coordinator
Goshuin [J.] 御朱印 Vermillion seal
Hai-ch'eng Duke 海澄公
Hai-fang t'ung-chih 海防同知 Assistant Coastal defense Circuit.
Hai-tao 海道 Coastal Defense Circuit
Hê-shih Kang Ch'in-wang)和碩康親王 Imperial Prince Kang (of the blood of
the first degree)
Hsieh Tsung 協總 Assistant Squadron Leader
Hsien 縣 District
Hsien-ling 縣令 District Magistrate
Hsing Ch'üan-tao 興泉道 Military Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and
Ch'üanchou

APPENDIX

- Hsün-an 巡按 Regional Inspector
Kung-k'ê kei-shih-chung 工科給事中 Palace Steward at Office of Scrutiny of
Work
Mei-Lê Chang-ching 梅勒章京 Banner Vice Commander in Chief
Ming-sê Pa-tsung 名色把總 Provincial Squadron Leader
Muromachi Bakufu [J.] 室町幕府
Nanan-po 南安伯 Earl-Pacifier of South
Pa-tsung 把總 Squadron Leader
Ping-pu 兵部 Ministry of War
Pu-chêng Shih 布政使 Provincial Administration Commissioner of Fuchien
Shui-shih Ti-tu 水師提督 Provincial Military Commander of Naval force
P'ing-hsi 平西
Shui-shih Tsung-ping 水師總兵 Navy Commander
Shui-shih Ssu-chên 水師四鎮 The Fourth Command of Naval Force
Shui-shih Ti-tu 水師提督 Provincial Navy Commander
Shou-pei 守備 Defender
Shogun [J.] 將軍
Shao-kuan 哨官 Sub-Squad Leader
Ta Chiang-chün 大將軍 General in Chief
T'ai-tzu T'ai-shih 太子太師 Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent
Ta-ming tsung-ping t'ai-shih ting-yüen-hou'
大明總兵太師定遠侯[The Ming Regional Commander, Grand Preceptor of
the Heir Apparent, the Marquis-pacifier of Far frontier
Teibing, Thunbingh, Thseij-souw Tingwanhouw[D.]
Ting-kuo-kong 定國公 Sikokon[D.]
Ti-tu 提督, Provincial Military Commander
Tou-ssu 都司 Regional Military Commission
Tou-tu 都督 Commissioner in Chief
Ts'an-chiang 參將 Assistant Regional Commander
Tsung-ping 總兵 Regional Commander
Tsung-tu 總督 Supreme Commander [Ming]/ Governor-general [Ch'ing]
Tu-k'un 都閫 Brigade Commander
Tu-hsiang-kuan 督餉官 Tax Levying Official
T'ung-an Po 同安伯 Count of T'ung-an
Fu Tsung-ping 副總兵 Regional Vice-Commander
Wo-k'ou 倭寇
Wei-so 衛所

APPENDIX

You-chi 游擊 Mobile Corps Commander

Personal names in Chinese characters

Akashi Michitōmo[J.] 明石道友
A-Kê-shang 阿格商
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu[J.] 足利義滿
Chao Ping-chien 趙秉鑾
Chao T'ing 趙廷
Chang Chia-ts'ê 張嘉策
Chang Ching 張經
Chang Hsieh 張燮
Chang Hsueh-sheng 張學聖
Chang Jen-teng 張延登
Chang Yün-fei 章雲飛
Chang Yung-ch'an, 張永產
Cheng Ch'eng-kung 鄭成功
Cheng Chih-lung 鄭芝龍
Cheng Ching 鄭經
Ch'ên Chin 陳錦
Cheng Chih-pao 鄭芝豹
Cheng Chih-wan 鄭芝莞
Cheng Hung-k'uei 鄭鴻逵
Cheng Lien 鄭聯
Cheng Ming-chün 鄭鳴駿
Ch'en P'eng 陳鵬
Cheng T'ai 鄭泰
Cheng Ts'ai 鄭彩
Ch'êng Tsai-i 程再伊
Ch'êng Ying-lin 程應麟
Ch'ên Tzu-chên 陳子貞
Chia-ching 嘉靖
Chi Ch'i-kuang 戚繼光
Chi-êrh ka-lang, 濟爾噶朗
Chieh-shu 傑書
Chin Sheng-huan 金聲桓

APPENDIX

- Chou Ch'üan-ping 周全斌
Chou Hsing-ju 周性如
Chu Ch'in-hsiang 朱欽相
Chu I-fêng 朱一馮
Ch'ung-chên 崇禎
Chu Yan-ji 朱儼戢
Ch'u Ts'ai-lao 褚彩老
Chung Pin 鍾斌
Chu Ch'in-hsiang 朱欽相
Chung Ling-hsiu 鍾凌秀
Chieh-shu 傑書
Ch'ien Su-t'u 錢肅圖
Chi-tu 濟度
Chung-chên[C.]忠振 Kingingh[D.]
Ebiya Shiōemon [J.] 海老屋權右衛門
Fang Yü 方輿
Hamada Yahei 濱田彌兵衛
Han Chung-yung 韓仲雍
He T'ing-ping 何廷斌 Pinquan[D.]
Hidetada[J.] 秀忠
Honda Masazumi[J.] 本多正純
Hosokawa[J.] 細川
Hsieh Ping 謝彬
Hsiung Wên-ts'an 熊文燦
Hsü I-min 徐一鳴
Hsü Hsin-su 許心素
Hsü Kuang-ch'i 徐光啟
Hsü Lung 許龍 Colion, Corion, Colien [D.]
Hu Mei 胡美
Huang Ch'eng 黃程
Huang Chêng-ming 黃徵明
Huang Ch'êng-hsüan 黃承玄
Huang K'ai 黃愷
Huang Shu 黃澍
Hung-kuang 弘光
Hung Hsü 洪旭
Huang Wu 黃梧

APPENDIX

- Hu Tsung-hsien 胡宗憲
Juan Min-his 阮旻錫
K'ang-hsi 康熙
Keng Chi-mao 耿繼茂
Keng Ching-chung 耿精忠
K'ung You-tê 孔有德
K'ung Yuen-chang 孔元章
Liang T'ien-chi 梁天奇
Li Ch'eng-tung 李成棟
Li Ch'i-fêng 李棲鳳/李栖鳳
Li K'uei-ch'i 李魁奇
Lin Ch'a 林察
Lin Chin-wu 林錦吾、林謹吾 = Lin Chün-wu 林均吾
Li Shuai-tai 李率泰
Lin Fêng 林鳳
Lin Tao-ch'ien 林道乾
Li Shuai-tai 李率泰,
Li Tan 李旦
Li Tzu-ch'êng 李自成
Li Ting-kuo 李定國
Liu Ch'ing-tai 劉清泰
Liu Hsiang 劉香
Liu Kuo-hsüan 劉國軒
Lu Chên-fei 路振飛
Lu Ch'ung-chün 盧崇峻
Lu Hsing-tsu 盧興祖
Lung-wu 隆武
Ma Chin-pao 馬進寶
Ma Te-kung 馬得功
Mingandali 明安達禮
Ming Yüeh 明岳
Murayama Tōan[J.] 村山等安
Nan Chü-I 南居益
Oda Nobunaga[J.] 織田信長
Ouchi[J.] 大內
P'an Ming-yen 潘明嚴, Bingam[D.]
Ping-ts'un 丙村

APPENDIX

Polo 博洛
Rōjū [J.]老中
Satsuma[J.]薩摩
Shang Chou-tso 商周祚
Sha Ch'eng 沙澄
Shên T'ieh 沈鐵
Shên Yen 沈演
Shih Lang 施琅
Shun-chih 順治
Su Ming-kang 蘇鳴崗
Suetsugu Heizō[J.] 末次平藏
Su Li 蘇利 Soulacq[D.]
Su Nahai 蘇納海
Sun Chia-chi 孫嘉績
Su Yen 蘇琰
Takanobu Matsuura[J.] 松浦隆信
Tasu 達素
T'an Lun 譚綸
Thrinh[V.] 黎
Ts'ai Hsien-ch'ên 蔡獻臣
T'sai Shan-chi 蔡善繼
Ts'ao Lu-tai 曹履泰
Ts'êng Ying 曾櫻
Ts'êng I-pên 曾一本
Tsou Wei-lien 鄒維璉
Ts'ui Chih 崔芝
Tsu Tse-ch'ing 祖澤清
Tokugawa Ieyasu[J.] 德川家康
Toyotomi Hideyoshi[J.] 豐臣秀吉
T'ung Kuo-ch'i 佟國器
Tung Po-ch'i 董伯起
T'ung Yang-chia 佟養甲
T'u Tsê-min 涂澤民
Tu Yung-he 杜永和
Wang Kuo-kuang, 王國光
Wang Liang-hsiang 王良相
Wang Mêng-hsiung 王夢熊

APPENDIX

Wang Shih-ch'ang 王士昌
Wang Wei-chung 王位中
Wei Chiu-kuan 魏九官
Wu P'ing 吳平
Wu San-kuei 吳三桂
Yamada Nagamasa 山田長政
Yang Yen-ti 楊彥迪
Yao Ch'i-sheng 姚啟聖
Yeh Ta-ching 葉大經
Yen Chi-tsu 顏繼祖
Yen Erh-kuan 顏二官, Giequa[D.]
Yi Hon[K.] 李瑋
Yi Kong[K.] 李昫
You Fêng-hsiang 游鳳翔
Yüan Chin 袁進
Yung-li (永曆)
Yü Ta-you 俞大猷
Yü Tzu-kao 俞咨皋

Place names in Chinese characters

Amoy 廈門
An-hai 安海
An-hsi 安溪 Lamsing[D.]
Aomên 澳門
Chang-chou 漳州
Chang-kuo 昌國
Chang-tai 長泰
Chao-an 詔安
Chao-ch'ing 肇慶
Ch'ao-chou 潮州
Chao-guan 朝冠
Ch'ao-yang 潮陽
Chen-chiang 鎮江
Chê-chiang 浙江
Chên-hai 鎮海
Cheng-nan 鎮南
Chiang-hsi 江西 Kiancij[D.]
Chiang-su 江蘇

APPENDIX

- Chiao-chou 交州 Caatcjouw[D.]
Chia-tzu 甲子
Chieh-shih 碣石/Chieh-shih [Guard] 碣石衛, Kitsjehoi[D.]
Chieh-yang 揭陽
Ch'ien-ao 錢澳
Ch'ien-t'ang river 錢塘江
Chih-li 直隸
Ch'ih-ao 赤澳
Chih-kang-t'ou 赤崗頭
Chi-lung 基隆/雞籠
Ching-hai T'ou 靖海頭/ Ching-hai-so 靖海所 Wierings bay
Ch'ing-yuan 清遠
Ch'i-t'ou-p'u 崎頭舖
Chiu-lung River 九龍江
Chou-shan 舟山
Ch'üan-chou 泉州
Ch'ung-ming 崇明
Fang-so 放索
Fu-ch'ing 福清
Fu-chien 福建
Fu-chou 福州
Fu-ning 福寧
Hai-ch'êng 海澄
Hai-nan 海南
Hai-k'ou 海口
Han River 韓江
Hê-bei 河北
Higo[J.] 肥後
Hirado[J.] 平戶
Hou-mên 鮑門
Hsaio-ch'êng 小埕
Hsiang-shan 象山
Hsiang-shan 香山
Hsin-an 新安
Hsing-hua 興化 Ginwa[D.]
Hsin-tu 新渡
Hsi Yang 西洋
Hsüan-chung 懸鐘
Hui-chou 惠州
Hu-kuang 湖廣 Huquam [D.]
Hu-nan 湖南
Hu-pei 湖北
Hu-t'ou-mên 虎頭門

APPENDIX

Iwami 石見[J.]
Ikura 伊倉[J.]
Jung River 榕江
Kao-chou 高州
Kao-Lei-Lien 高雷廉
Kao-p'u 高浦
Kuang-chou 廣州
Kuang-hsi 廣西
Kuang-tung 廣東
Kuei-chou 貴州
Ku-lang-yu 鼓浪嶼
Kyushu 九州
Lei-chou 雷州
Lieh-yü 烈嶼
Lien-chou 連州
Liu-ao 六鰲
Liu-ch'iu 琉球
Liu-wu-tien 劉五店
Lo-yang 洛陽
Lung-chou 龍州 Loctjouw[D.]
Lung-mên 龍門
Luzon 呂宋
Ma-kung 馬公
Ma-wei 馬尾
Mei River 梅江
Min-an-chên 閩安鎮
Naha 那霸
Nan-ao 南澳
Nanking 南京 Nanquin[D.]
Nan-t'ou 南頭
Ning-po 寧波
Ning-te District 寧德縣 Lintekwan[D.]
Okinawa[J]琉球
Pai-sha 白沙 Peswaa[D.]
Pai-sha-hu 白沙湖
Pei-Hsien-wei 北線尾 Baxemboy[D.]
Pei-kang 北港
Peking 北京
P'eng-hu 澎湖
Ping-chou 炳州
P'ing Hai 平海/P'ing-hai-so 平海所 = Haarlems bay
P'ing-shiang 憑祥 Pingkang [D.]
Ping-ts'un 丙村

APPENDIX

Po-hai 渤海
Pusan[K.]釜山
Pu-tien 莆田
Quemoy 金門
Ryūkyū[J.]琉球
San-hê-pa 三河壩
San-p'an 三盤
San-tou 三都
Satzuma [J.](薩摩)
Sha-ch'eng 沙埕 Swatea[D.]
Shang-hang 上杭
Shan-tung 山東
Shao-hsing 紹興
Shên-ch'üan 神泉
Ssu-ming-fu 思明府 Siminfoe[D.]
Ssu-ch'uan 四川
Su-chou 蘇州
Ta-hsing 大星 / [Island of Ta Hsing]Pedro Branco
Tai-chou 台州 Tjoetiauw[D.]
T'ai-ping-fu 太平府 Theibinfoe[D.]
T'ai-wu 太武/ Ta-wu 大武
Ta-kang 大港 Twakan[D.]
Tamsuy 淡水
Tien-pai 電白
T'ien-wei 田尾
T'ien-wei-yang 田尾洋
Tsushima[J.]對馬
T'ung-an 同安 Thota
Tung-kuan 東筦
T'ung-ku-chang 銅鼓嶂
Tung-ning 東寧
T'ung-shan 銅山
Tung Yang 東洋
Wankang 魷港
Wu-hu 五虎
Wu-kan 烏壩
Wu-p'ing 武平
Wu-yü 浯嶼
Wei-t'ou 圍頭 Erasmus Bay
Wen-chou 溫州
Yen-chou 鹽州 Branders baij
Yüeh-kang 月港
Yün-nan 雲南

APPENDIX

Other special terms in Chinese characters

Chao 照

Chiao-p'iao 交票

Ch'in-ming chen-shou fu-chien têng-ch'u ping chê-chiang chin-wên ti-fang
tsung-pingp-kuan, t'ai-tzu t'ai-shih, ch'ih-tz'u mang-i nan-an-pa 欽命鎮守福
建等處並浙江金溫地方總兵官，太子太師，敕賜蟒衣南安伯

Fang Ch'ien-tsung [C] 方千總 Hongsintson[D]

Goshuisen boeki

k'an-ho[J.] 勘合

Pao-shui 報水

Piao, Pau[J.] 表

Sakoku 鎖國

Tou 斗

Yin 引

Wo-k'ou 倭寇

Wu-wei 烏尾

* [C.] = Chinese

* [D.] = Dutch

* [J.] = Japanese

* [K.] = Korean

* [V.] = Vietnamese

**All the Chinese terms are transcribed through Wade-Giles system to mandarin. Some common known personal names and place names are not applied to it strictly. The Chinese terms recorded in Dutch are usually according to the Min-nan dialect, which is different from mandarin.

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1116, 1119, 1120, 1123, 1125, 1127, 1128, 1131, 1132,
1133, 1134, 1136, 1139, 1140, 1144, 1151, 1157, 1160,
1161, 1164, 1170, 1175, 1176, 1180, 1183, 1187, 1194,
1197, 1202, 1206, 1207, 1209, 1212, 1214, 1216, 1218,
1219, 1222, 1223, 1226, 1228, 1229, 1233, 1235, 1236,
1241, 1243, 1244, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1252, 1253,
1254, 1258, 1261, 1264, 1265, 1267, 1269, 1272, 1278,
1283, 1290, 1294, 1295, 1304, 1311, 1314, 1322, 1330,
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SUMMARY

SUMMARY

The objective of this research is to examine the rise and fall of a prominent 17th century Chinese maritime power: the Cheng lineage. It elucidates how, due to the consequences of specific historical circumstances at a crucial moment in time, the Ming imperial administration initially tolerated a group of Chinese smugglers as a nominal coastal defense detachment. With the help of the local gentry, a substantial number of these mercenaries gradually transformed into the backbone of the defense force of Fu-chien province and became the main protectors of Chinese commercial interests in the East and South China Seas. Wrestling with other maritime competitors, the Cheng clan and their followers were dragged into a whirlpool of power struggles with the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English in the China Sea region during the early stages of globalization. The fall of the Ming Empire allowed the Cheng lineage to create an independent, but short-lived seaborne regime in China's southeastern coastal provinces.

The rise of the first leader of the Cheng clan, Cheng Chih-lung, otherwise known as Nicolaes Iquan, can be attributed to the split between the Chinese and Japanese world orders and the convergence of the silver flows from Japan and Mexico in China by the beginning of the 17th century. Ming China was already in decline when the armies of Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea, weakening the dynasty further. The Ming court was then forced to concentrate its financial resources on thwarting another threat: the southward expansion of the Manchu's at the North border. The silver flows from Japan and North America that entered China via its southeastern coastal ports were soon completely expended in order to pay for the defense efforts in the north. It was from the shady world of the overseas bullion trade that the residing head of the Cheng regime, Cheng Chih-lung, alias Nicholas Iquan, emerged.

Chapter One traces the institutional origins of the Chinese privateers (or maritime auxiliary force) in the later phase of the *Wo-k'ou* (Japanese

SUMMARY

pirates) raids on the southeast coast of China during the latter half of 16th century. The Chinese Court initially hired mercenaries to resist these raids, but this infantry was not able to fight the pirates on the water. The Grand Coordinators (*hsin-fu*) of Fu-chien province discovered that the sea-faring smugglers and traders provided better troops than the officially recruited mercenaries. In 1617, when the Japanese traders requested that the Chinese authorities legalize trade with Japan, the Grand Coordinator of Fu-chien recruited a group of maritime mercenaries from local sea-faring traders and equipped them with war ships and weaponry strong enough to prevent possible Japanese aggression.

Chapter Two illustrates that the revival of the maritime mercenary system in Fu-chien and the prohibition of overseas trade was the Grand Coordinators' response to the Dutch occupation of the Pescadores in 1622. This chapter then explains how Cheng Chih-lung, a trader in the illegal Sino-Japanese transit trade, was recruited by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to participate in privateering against the Spaniards in Manila. Even after the Dutch moved to Taiwan, the deadlock between the provincial Fu-chien authorities and the Dutch continued. However, when a drought hit Fuchien in 1626 and maritime prohibitions put a stop to the seasonal succor of Ch'ao-chou rice, Cheng Chih-lung sailed to the Chinese coast and took the lead in breaking through the maritime prohibitions with the tacit aid of the VOC in Taiwan.

Chapter Three examines how, after Cheng Chih-lung surrendered to the Chinese authorities, he obtained a position in the coastal defense force, and was able to finance his troops by smuggling goods from his local base at An-hai. The shallow waters of the An-hai harbor prevented rival junks from approaching. By 1631, Cheng Chih-lung had eliminated all Chinese competition in overseas trade.

Chapter Four examines the overseas trade of An-hai from an international perspective and shows how Cheng Chih-lung benefited from the sudden changes in the Sino-Japanese trade. Since the Japanese court ceased

SUMMARY

trading with the Portuguese in Macao, the An-hai smugglers under Cheng Chih-lung's leadership could monopolize the Sino-Japanese trade and accumulate their capital while expanding their trade with the VOC in Taiwan.

Chapter Five examines the conflicts of interest between Cheng Chih-lung and the VOC, which resulted in the naval battle of Liao-lo near the island of Quemoy in the summer of 1633. The Dutch suffered a decisive defeat, and in his new influential position, Cheng Chih-lung urged the Ming court to legalize Chinese trade with the Dutch in Taiwan.

Chapter Six demonstrates how the An-hai merchants rebuffed challenges from other Chinese traders after Chih-lung defeated his rival Liu Hsiang from Kuangtung province. The victory enabled Chih-lung to expand his influence as far as the mouth of the Pearl River. After obtaining access to large supplies of tropical commodities in Kuangtung, the An-hai merchants intended to extend their networks to all Southeast Asian ports bordering on the South China Sea.

Chapter Seven examines the expansion of the Anhai trade network to Taiwan, Siam and Manila and the early stages of its close cooperation with the VOC in trading with Japan.

Chapter Eight highlights the dramatic rupture of the cooperation between the Cheng lineage and the VOC in 1640. The Dutch looked to purchase silk outside of China and found markets in Vietnam and India. Since the company's expanding commerce with India required large supplies of Chinese gold, relations with Cheng Chih-lung, who was able to provide this bullion at a favorable price, were restored.

Chapter Nine explores how the downfall of the Ming court and the change of regime in 1644 impacted the An-hai merchants' monopoly in Sino-Japanese trade. After he was taken hostage by the new Manchu rulers, Cheng Chih-lung was replaced by his son Cheng Ch'eng-kung, alias Coxinga. Cheng Ch'eng-kung gained the loyalty of the maritime mercenaries who had been previously led by his father. He then declared himself loyal to the Ming

SUMMARY

court, which had by then moved to the south.

Chapter Ten explores the attempts of An-hai traders to expand into the Siamese market to the detriment of the VOC trading interests there. When the Siamese and Cambodian king sent envoys to Cheng Ch'eng-kung's headquarters at Amoy in 1653, the latter began to consolidate his power and restarted political negotiations with the Manchu courts and the VOC.

Chapter Eleven aims to present the consistency of the activities completed by Cheng Ch'eng-kung after he became the undisputed leader of the maritime mercenaries and protector of the sea-faring traders. The Manchus attempted to seal off the coast again in order to defeat the Ming forces in the south, but to no avail: Cheng Ch'eng-kung had gained control of all the important emporia along the coast.

Two large battles embodied Cheng Ch'eng-kung's strategic designs on the Manchu court in Peking and the Dutch in Taiwan. Firstly, by attacking Nanking on the Yangtse River in 1659, Cheng Ch'eng-kung attempted to capture Ch'ung-ming island and secure the Chiang-nan area where exported silk was produced. After the failure of this expedition Cheng Ch'eng-kung decided to invade Taiwan and lay siege on the VOC's island headquarters, Zeelandia castle, which he was eventually forced into surrender on February 1, 1662. What his further aims were – did he really plan an attack on Spanish Manila, the opening of the direct trade with India, or extend power to the Spice islands? – will never be known, because he died shortly after his conquest of Taiwan.

Chapter Twelve provides a general overview of the Chinese overseas trading network after the sudden demise of Cheng Ch'eng-kung in 1662. Cheng Ch'eng-kung's eldest son, Cheng Ching, however, soon consolidated his grip on the Cheng regime in Taiwan. Through cooperation with privateers from the Kuang-tung and Kuang-his coastal provinces he restored the trading network of his father between China, Japan, Cambodia and Philippines after 1667. The Siamese King Narai had turned his back on the

SUMMARY

Cheng regime when it nearly collapsed after the death of Cheng Ch'eng-kung. Without that support, the Cheng Ching and his followers no longer sought to compete with the Dutch in the Siamese trade.

Chapter Thirteen analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of Cheng Ching's trading network and also explains its final decline. The network had once extended as far as the Malay-peninsula and Sumatra for the purchase of tin and pepper, and with the support of the English East India Company, it even formed a connection with Batavia's great rival on Java, the port of Bantam. When the Japanese government issued a ban on the silver export in 1667, the silver flows from abroad gradually came to a stop. Simultaneously, the Manchus issued new maritime prohibitions. Although this policy largely backfired because it caused the coastal provinces to join the so-called three feudatories' rebellion between from 1674 to 1681, these developments inevitably took their toll on the trading fortunes of the Cheng merchants in Taiwan. In 1683, the maritime power of the Cheng lineage was effectively terminated by the invasion of the Qing admiral Shih Lang, a former ally of Cheng Chih-lung. As a result, the maritime trade from Taiwan lost its competitiveness in the trading world of China's seas.

The final chapter, Chapter Fourteen, tackles the complexities of the rise and fall of Cheng rule in the coastal province of Fuchien and Taiwan. The case of the Cheng lineage may be seen as a precedent to the self-proclaimed warlords in the border regions during the Chinese Republican period. As a trade-oriented polity, Cheng-ruled Taiwan showed many features of the port principalities scattered along the coasts of the South China Sea. Whatever the case may be, the temporary secession from central imperial rule by the Cheng and their followers in Fu-chien and nearby Taiwan during the seventeenth century amounts to an exceptional moment in the history of China's coastal frontier.

SAMENVATTING

SAMENVATTING

Het doel van dit onderzoek is om de opkomst en ondergang van een prominente zeventiende eeuwse Chinese maritieme ‘mogendheid’ te beschouwen, aangevoerd en bestuurd door drie generaties van de Cheng familie. Verklaard wordt hoe het keizerlijk bestuur van de Ming dynastie, als gevolg van bepaalde historische ontwikkelingen op een cruciaal moment, groepen Chinese smokkelaars in dienst nam onder het mom van ‘kustverdediging’s detachementen’. Met de hulp van de lokale gentry werden niet weinig huurlingen geleidelijk aan getransformeerd tot de ruggengraat van de defensiemacht van de provincie Fu-chien. Zo groeiden de aanvoerders daarvan uit tot de beschermheren van de Chinese commerciële belangen in de Oost- en Zuid Chinese Zee.

Strijdend met rivalen, werden de Chengs en hun volgelingen meegesleurd in de maalstroom van de machtsstrijd met de Spanjaarden, Portugezen, Hollanders en Britten tijdens het beginstadium van de globalisering. De val van het Ming keizerrijk maakte het de Chengs mogelijk kortstondig een zelfstandig, maar labiel maritiem regime te vestigen in China’s zuidoostelijke kustprovincies.

De opkomst van de eerste leider van de Cheng clan, Cheng Chih-lung alias Nicolaes Iquan, kan worden toegeschreven aan de spanningen die onstonden als gevolg van het schisma tussen de Chinese en Japanse wereldorden en de convergentie van de zilverstromen uit Japan en Mexico in China aan het begin van de 17e eeuw. Ming China was al in verval toen het binnenvallen van de legers van de Japanse krijgsheer Toyotomi Hideyoshi in Korea de dynastie nog meer verzwakte. Het keizerlijke hof zag zich daarop gedwongen om alle financiële bronnen aan te wenden om weer een andere dreiging af te wenden: de zuidwaartse expansie van de Mantjoes. De zilverstromen uit Japan en Zuid Amerika die binnenkwamen via de havens in

SAMENVATTING

de zuidoostelijke provincies werden al snel volledig benut om de verdediging in het noorden te financieren. Het was vanuit deze troebele wereld van overzeese handel dat het Cheng regime, Cheng Chih-lung, alias Nicolaes Iquan, opkwam.

Hoofdstuk één verdiept zich in de oorsprong van de Chinese gelukzoekers (of maritieme hulptroepen) in de latere fase van de Wo-k'ou (Japanse piraten) aanvallen op de zuidoostelijke kust van China tijdens de tweede helft van de 16e eeuw. Het Chinese hof had aanvankelijk huurlingen ingehuurd om deze aanvallen het hoofd te bieden, maar deze infanterie was niet bij machte om de piraten te bestrijden op zee. De gouverneur (hsün-fu) van de provincie Fu-chien ontdekte dat de zeevarende smokkelaars en handelaren betere troepen leverden dan de officieel gerekruteerde huurlingen. Toen in 1617 de Japanse handelaren de Chinese autoriteiten verzochten om de legale handel met Japan te openen, rekruteerde de Gouverneur van Fu-chien huurlingen van plaatselijke zeevarende handelaren en verzorgde hen van oorlogsschepen en bewapening, sterk genoeg om mogelijke Japanse agressie te voorkomen.

Hoofdstuk twee laat zien dat de herleving van het maritieme huurlingen systeem in Fu-chien en het verbod op de overzeese handel het antwoord was van de provinciale Gouverneur op de Nederlandse bezetting van de Pescadores in 1622. Dit hoofdstuk verklaart hoe Cheng Chih-lung, een makelaar in de illegale Chinees-Japanse doorvoerhandel werd gerekruteerd door de Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC) om deel te nemen in de kaapvaart tegen de Spanjaarden in Manila. Zelfs nadat de Hollanders naar Taiwan waren vertrokken, bleef de impasse tussen de provinciale autoriteiten van Fu-chien en de Hollanders bestaan. Maar toen in 1626 een droogte de provincie Fu-chien teisterde en de zeeverboden de toevoer van Ch'ao-chou

SAMENVATTING

rijst onmogelijk maakten, zeilde Cheng Chih-lung naar de Chinese kust en nam daar de leiding om het zeeverbod te doorbreken met de stilzwijgende hulp van de VOC in Taiwan.

Hoofdstuk drie beschouwt hoe Cheng Chih-lung na zijn overgave aan de Chinese autoriteiten een positie verkreeg in de kustverdediging en hoe hij door smokkelhandel vanuit zijn thuisbasis in An-hai zijn troepen kon blijven financieren. De ondiepe wateren van de An-hai haven voorkwamen dat de jonken van zijn rivalen dichterbij konden komen. In 1631 had Cheng Chih-lung zich ontdaan van al zijn Chinese concurrenten in de overzeese handel.

Hoofdstuk vier analyseert de overzeese handel van An-hai vanuit een internationaal perspectief en toont hoe Cheng Chih-lung profiteerde van de plotselinge veranderingen in de Chinees-Japanse handel. Omdat het Japanse keizerlijke hof de overzeese handel met de Portugezen in Macao had opgeschort, konden de An-hai smokkelaars onder het leiderschap van Cheng Chih-lung nu de handel met Japan monopoliseren en hun kapitaal verveelvoudigen terwijl zij tegelijkertijd hun handel met de VOC in Taiwan uitbreidden.

Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt de belangentegenstellingen tussen Cheng Chih-lung en de VOC, die resulteerden in de zeeslag van Liao-lo bij het eiland Quemoy in de zomer van 1633. Nadat hij de Hollanders een verpletterende nederlaag had toegebracht, spoorde Cheng Chi-lung vanuit zijn nieuwe machtige positie, het Ming hof aan om de handel met de Hollanders in Taiwan toch maar toe te laten.

SAMENVATTING

Hoofdstuk zes toont hoe de kooplieden van An-hai aanvallen van andere Chinese handelaren afwendden, nadat Cheng Chih-lung zijn rivaal Liu Hsiang uit de provincie Kuang-tung verslagen had. Deze overwinning zorgde ervoor dat hij zijn invloed uit kon breiden tot aan de mond van de Pearl rivier. Nu zij de smaak te pakken kregen van de grote voorraden aan tropische producten die zij in Kuang-tung aantroffen, wilden de An-hai handelaren hun netwerk uitbreiden tot aan alle havens in Zuidoost Azië .

Hoofdstuk zeven analyseert de expansie van het An-hai handelsnetwerk naar Taiwan, Siam en Manila en de beginfase van de nauwe samenwerking van Cheng Chih-lung met de VOC in de handel met Japan.

Hoofdstuk acht benadrukt de dramatische breuk in de samenwerking tussen de Chengs en de VOC in 1640. De Hollanders zagen nu uit naar andere markten dan China voor de inkoop van de zijde voor Japan en zij vonden die in Vietnam en India. Omdat de toenemende handel van de Compagnie met India grote leveringen van Chinees goud vereiste, werden de relaties met Cheng Chih-lung, die dit edelmetaal tegen een redelijke prijs kon leveren, weer hersteld.

Hoofdstuk negen toont aan hoe de val van het Ming hof en de verandering van regime in 1644 de monopoliepositie van de An-hai koopmannen in de Chinees-Japanse handel in gevaar bracht. Nadat hij in gijzeling was genomen door de nieuwe Mantsjoe leiders, volgde zijn zoon Cheng Ch'eng-kung, alias Coxinga, hem op. De troepen die eerder onder leiding van de vader stonden verklaarden zich nu loyaal aan de zoon. Cheng Ch'eng Kung bleef loyaal aan het Ming hof dat naar het zuiden was uitgeweken.

SAMENVATTING

Hoofdstuk tien onderzoekt de pogingen van de An-hai handelaren om de Siamese markt te veroveren ten koste van de handelsbelangen van de VOC aldaar. Toen de Siamese en Cambodjaanse koning afgezanten stuurden naar het hoofdkwartier van Cheng Ch'eng-kung in Amoy in 1653, begon deze laatste zijn macht te consolideren en hervatte hij de onderhandelingen met zowel het Mantsjoe hof als de VOC.

Hoofdstuk elf beoogt het consistente beleid van Cheng Ch'eng-kung' aan te tonen toen hij eenmaal de onbetwiste leider van de maritieme huurlingen en beschermheer van de zeevarende handelaren geworden was. De Mantsjoes probeerden de kust weer af te sluiten om de Ming troepen in het zuiden te verslaan, maar dit was tevergeefs: Cheng Ch'eng-kung kreeg controle over alle belangrijke handelsknooppunten langs de kust. Twee grote gevechten belichaamden Cheng Ch'eng-kung's strategie ten opzichte van het Mantsjoe hof in Peking en de Hollanders in Taiwan. Allereerst viel hij in 1659 de Yangtse rivier opvarend Nanking aan. Met deze aanval trachtte Cheng Ch'eng-kung het eiland Ch'ung-ming te veroveren en zich zo van de Chiang-nan regio te verzekeren waar de export zijde werd geproduceerd. Na het mislukken van deze expeditie besloot Cheng Ch'eng-kung naar Taiwan over te steken en het VOC hoofdkwartier op dit eiland, Fort Zeelandia, te belegeren. Op 1 februari 1662 dwong hij de VOC tot overgave. Wat zijn verdere plannen waren - was hij echt voornemens Spaans Manila aan te vallen, wilde hij de directe handel met India openen, of wilde hij zijn macht uitbreiden naar de Specerijen Eilanden? - zal nooit bekend worden omdat hij kort na zijn verovering van Taiwan stierf.

Hoofdstuk twaalf geeft een overzicht van het Chinese overzeese handelsnetwerk na het plotselinge heengaan van Cheng Ch'eng-kung in 1662. Diens oudste zoon, Cheng Ching, maakte zich snel meester over het bestuur

SAMENVATTING

van het eiland. Door de samenwerking aan te gaan met gelukzoekers uit de kustprovincies Kuang-tung en Kuang-his, herstelde hij na 1667 het handelsnetwerk van zijn vader tussen China, Japan, Cambodja en de Filipijnen. De Siamese koning Narai keerde echter het Cheng regime de rug toe. Cheng Ching en zijn volgelingen lieten nu hun wens varen om met de Hollanders te concurreren in de Siamese handel.

Hoofdstuk dertien analyseert de sterke en zwakke punten van Cheng Ching's handelsnetwerk en verklaart ook de uiteindelijke teloorgang. Het netwerk strekte zich uit tot aan het Maleise schiereiland en Sumatra voor de inkoop van tin en peper, en met de steun van de Engelse Oost Indische Compagnie, reikte het ook tot aan Bantam, de grootste rivaal van Batavia op Java. Toen de Japanse overheid een uitvoerverbod uitvaardigde op de export van zilver in 1667, droogde de zilverstroom uit het buitenland geleidelijk op. Tegelijkertijd stelden de Mantsjoes nieuwe zeeverboden in. Hoewel dit beleid grotendeels mislukte omdat de kustprovincies zich in reactie hierop aansloten bij de zogenoemde 'drie vazallen rebellie' tussen 1674 en 1681, eisten deze ontwikkelingen toch hun tol. In 1683 werd de maritieme macht van het Cheng geslacht effectief beëindigd door de invasie van de Qing admiraal Shih Lang, een voormalige bondgenoot van Cheng Chih-lung. Als gevolg hiervan verloor Taiwan zijn positie als geduchte handelsmogendheid in de Chinese wateren.

Het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk veertien, behandelt het complexe fenomeen van de opkomst en teloorgang van het Cheng regime in de kustprovincie Fu-chien en Taiwan. Het Cheng regime kan als voorloper gezien worden van de zelfverkleerde "warlords" in de grens regio's tijdens de Chinese Republikeinse periode. Als handelsregime toonde Taiwan onder de Chengs vele kenmerken van de Maleise havenvorstendommen in het zuiden.

SAMENVATTING

Hoe dan ook, de tijdelijke onafhankelijkheid van de Chengs en hun volgelingen in Fu-chien en het nabije Taiwan tijdens de 17e eeuw is een uitzonderlijk moment geweest in de geschiedenis van China's kustgebied.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Curriculum Vitae

Wei-chung Cheng (1974) holds a bachelor's degree in Sociology from National Taiwan University, Taiwan in 1998; an MA in Sociology from National Cheng-chi University, Taiwan in 2001 and an MA in History from Leiden University in 2003. He served at the National Museum of Taiwan History during 2005-6 and continued to pursue his research towards a PhD degree in History at Leiden University.

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His book (written in Chinese) 'The Fabrication of Formosa' earned an award of the China Times Top Ten books (2006). He is the co-editor of a Dutch archival source 'The Dutch Formosan Placard-book, Marriage, and Baptism Records' which is published in Dutch, English and Chinese. He also has published articles on the VOC's rule of Taiwan and on Chinese maritime expansion during the 17th century (in English and in Chinese).

PROPOSITIONS
PROPOSITIONS

I

What set Cheng Chih-lung apart from his peers in the overseas trade were his prominent military skills and practical mentality rather than his cosmopolitan character.

Cf. Charles Ralph Boxer, 'The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chilung)', *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39.

II

Cheng Chih-lung's headquarters at An-hai harbour were because of the shallow waters difficult to approach for the large heavily armed ships of his rivals. Yet An-hai could closely control the island of Amoy, the only deep water harbour for overseas trading junks in south Fu-chien. It was the strategic position of An-hai rather than the skills of its merchants that made the difference.

Cf. Lin Jen-ch'uan, *Ming-mo ch'ing-ch'u Ssu-jen hai-shang mao-i* [Private Trade during the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing Dynasty], (Shang-hai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta-hsüeh, 1987), 158-60

III

The personal contradictions between Cheng Chih-lung and Cheng Ch'eng-kung should not make us ignore that under their successive effective leaderships the maritime mercenaries continued to expand the overseas empire of the Cheng. The Oedipous complex explanation misses the point.

Cf. Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese nationalism : history, myth, and the hero*, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1977)

PROPOSITIONS

IV

The wars raged by Cheng Ch'eng-kung against his adversaries aimed to remove hindrances of his commercial expansion. The expedition to Nanking aimed to facilitate the trade between Chiang-nan and Japan. The occupation of Taiwan was to served as a springboard to enlarge Sino-Indian trade on the one hand, and to seek (via Manila) access to the Spice Islands.

Cf. John E. Wills Jr., 'Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang', in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills Jr (eds.), *From Ming to Ch'ing*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 223-8.

V

The maritime history of the China Seas should not closed up in the 'sprouts of Chinese Capitalism' or the 'periphery history of China' debates. It should be positioned on the interface and the overlapping zones of international trade and geo-politics.

VI

A synthesis of the fragmental pieces of evidence collected from the VOC archives, can effectively create an overview of the overseas trading network of the Chinese junk merchants.

PROPOSITIONS

VII

Although the overseas Chinese hardly identified themselves with Chinese authorities, the term 'overseas Chinese history' implies a concealed cultural identity with China. As a result the Chinese abroad have often unintentionally become victims of the Sino-centric perspective.

VIII

Compared with the far flung activities of the European East India Companies, the Chinese maritime activities in Asian waters may have been moderate, but as cultural and material brokers, the overseas Chinese have contributed to fundamental changes in Southeast Asia since the early phase of globalization.

IX

The experience of comparing diverse sources from the standpoints of different cultural backgrounds is almost like watching a movie with sub-titles in different languages. They are adapted to local contexts while trying not to distort too much what is shown on the screen.