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Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals

Public Values and Political Corruption in the Netherlands

(1748-1813)

Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals

Public Values and Political Corruption in the Netherlands

(1748-1813)

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For my parents

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Introduction: The Quagmire of Public Morality

The search for eudaimonia

Public values are, as George Frederickson put it, the soul of public administration. To Frederickson the fact “that values inhabit every corner of government is given. Who studies public administration studies values and who practices administration practices the allocation of values” (1994: 32). Politics and administration deal with the distribution of sometimes limited ‘public goods’ or services among various different sections of society and with this normative questions inevitably arise. In his famous 1940s polemic with Herbert Simon, Robert Dahl argued that public administration was actually based on a preference for particular values while claiming to be value-free (Dahl, 1947; Denhardt, 2004: 70-71). In a similar vein Rutgers wrote how “public administration is primarily about values, some masked as accepted facts. Assessment of information, such as the appraisal of the importance and meaning of facts and values is [...] the very essence of the work of the public administrator. Administration is all about what we accept as relevant facts; that is, what we value” (2008a: 43).

Government might indeed, as Dwight Waldo once argued, serve to ensure the greatest amount of ‘happiness’ for most citizens. Waldo wrote how he was “at pains to enumerate the values, both spiritual and material, which will be served, and to delineate the right relationship of man to his God, his State and his fellows” (2007: 65). However, one soon realizes that ideas on that ‘right relationship’ can hardly be objective, let alone universal. This was already noted by Aristotle (cf. Van Erp & Van Gils, 1987: 45) who said each person has his own idea of what is good or what brings happiness. People in any society simply disagree on public values, on assumptions of right or wrong public official conduct and on what government should or should not do. In deciding how to attain ‘the good’, different desires, assumptions and requirements almost inevitably collide or, as Herodotus wrote: “if the whole human race was given a free field and was instructed to choose the best laws from all the laws in existence, after due consideration they would each choose their own laws – so convinced are they respectively of the immeasurable superiority of their own” (cf. Toynbee, 1952: 141). Administrators are likewise constantly making value choices and often take themselves as point of reference. Some values are incorporated while others are simply ignored. Admirable as Waldo’s goal may have been, what he spoke of is – as a result – difficult if not impossible to obtain. There is no set of values or assumptions of correct public behaviour that pleases everyone. This, however, makes it even more important to study them.

The context of political corruption: who, where, and when

Public values are inextricably linked to political corruption because the latter tells us what we do and do not value. Some have defined political corruption as the degeneration of whole societies. Many ‘classic’ authors, such as Plato, Montesquieu and – in part – Machiavelli, all spoke of the corruption of the body politic in a very general sense (cf. Dobel, 1978: 957). In that case corruption is a broad concept simply referring to anything that is not working

‘properly’ (i.e., as it is expected to) or is subject to some form of decay or degeneration away from an ideal state of affairs. More recent authors often take a more narrow definition, such as the abuse of public office and/or public funds for private gain (Friedrich, 1966: 74; Van Klaveren, 1989: 25-28; Nye, 1967; Scott, 1972: 4). In that case, corruption becomes something else entirely. I will return to the matter of defining corruption in chapter one. However, for now it already has to be mentioned that even given a specific definition it remains difficult to establish when or why an act is corrupt. The seemingly simple question whether someone is corrupt turns out to be much more difficult at closer inspection.

First, it is difficult to assess political corruption because public values are subjective and differ from person to person. What constitutes political corruption often depends on *who* one asks for an opinion. Again: people simply often disagree about what is right and wrong and often – and I will discuss this later on – these differences are due to different ideas on what exactly is a public interest or a common good throughout society and among various groups or individuals. A legal scholar might judge an act differently to a politician because their roles serve different purposes or interests. A social anthropologist might have a different view on corruption than an economist. A judge might have a different view than any member of the general public and each individual is likely to have a different view on similar supposedly wrongful acts.

Second, what is called political corruption differs depending on *where* one looks. Behaviour that is acceptable in one place can be frowned upon elsewhere. Such acts as gift giving, certain forms of patronage or nepotism can be viewed differently across various ‘cultural’ contexts. Ethical relativists, for instance, offer the view that individuals, groups, societies and cultures, differ in their view of what is good or bad, in relation to character, conduct and context; relative to any given situation. This results in a ‘non-judgmental’ approach to morality, which holds that one should not sit in moral judgment over others. The question where one looks is also appropriate when looking at the same kind of behaviour that can provoke different moral judgments depending on the setting of an act (cf. Jacobs, 1992). Character traits, values and forms of behaviour are, for one, always contingent: “thou shalt not kill” acquires a different meaning depending on the situation (Van Wart, 1998: 6) or, as Rose-Ackerman (op. cit. Johnston, 1996: 323; Rose Ackerman, 1978: 9) wrote: “one does not condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration camp”. Adjectives, as MacIntyre has aptly put it, acquire meaning in a context of expectations associated with a public office (1981: 17-18).

Third, what constitutes political corruption or immoral public official behaviour depends on *when* we ask whether a certain act is corrupt. Arnold Heidenheimer (1989a: 3-4) once asked in what way perceptions of political corruption are a product of their time. This relates to the fundamental issue that practices that were tolerated in the past might now be condemned and signals that we cannot be sure how people will view things in the future. What was once detestable behaviour might very well be condoned again some day. In Plato’s *Politeia* (1998: 20, 24, 25-26) the Sophist and representative of the oligarchy, Tracymachus, speaks to Socrates of what he sees as good behaviour, justice and the morality of the state. To Tracymachus good behaviour is whatever is in the interest of the strongest, while justice and morality are only a means for the powerful to bind the weak with rules, albeit for mutual benefit. To Tracymachus immorality, reversely, can never be bad. After all, Tracymachus tells us: “honest people in public office are worse off than dishonest ones because they neglect their own affairs and not take from the treasury what they want. They will get into a fight with their families and

friends because they refuse to abuse their position to help them”. An immoral life, on the other hand “provides a man with more possibilities, more freedom and more power, if only that immorality is carried out far enough”. Tracymachus’ view on public morality would nowadays likely be considered corrupt. Yet, he might have represented a majority or ruling elite at the time and his ideas can nowadays still be heard.

The quagmire of public morality

Public values and political corruption form a quagmire of contextual and contingent elements because they are subject to changing environments and interpretations. At the same time they can hardly be called unimportant or uncontested concepts. First, relating to political corruption, there is the rather obvious matter of how or why public authority, power and funds are used. Second, but less obvious, there are also more fundamental issues at stake. Knowledge of public values and perceptions of political corruption leads us to have a look at core issues of human political interaction. The term ‘corruption’ immediately denotes assumptions, interests and values of countless actors in a changing political and social environment. Investigating contextual and changing public values and perceptions of political corruption therefore helps to get a clearer understanding of these assumptions, interests and values and enables us to determine changing ideas concerning the good life, the common good, the public interest, proper administration or the necessity of a delineation between public and private. It also helps to understand key topics from various academic disciplines. We can think of political science and public administration (on political legitimacy, private gain and public benefit, democratization, representation or political trust), anthropology and sociology (on forms of human interaction and human organization), law (on anti-corruption legislation) and administrative history (on change and continuity of morality or the workings of bureaucratization to counter political corruption).

The study of changing public values and political corruption helps to better understand and determine the entire purpose and function of ‘government’ or – even wider – ‘the public sector’. This is because condemning certain acts as corrupt has as much to say about any individual official or group of officials as it has to say about what government or the public sector as a whole should or should not be about. It is mainly for this reason that public values and political corruption are such fundamentally contested concepts. On various institutional levels and among various actors there is often little agreement on what political corruption is and which public values are most relevant. Of course, the fact that people often disagree on these matters has consequences for scientific debate and outcomes. This is summed up by Caiden (2010: 10) who writes: “the closer researchers get to specific forms of corruption the more they resemble the parable of the blind man and the elephant, that is, by concentrating only on one part (psychological, sociological, economical, political, religious, cultural, legal, administrative), they fail to see the whole and thereby oversimplify. To put things in their proper perspective, they need to step back a little and interact more with specialists in other fields”. This implies that interdisciplinary action helps us find a way out of the quagmire of public morality. In the following I will discuss just how this present study aims to contribute to this goal.

Research question, aims and assumptions

A way out of the quagmire was offered in the project ‘*Under Construction: The Genesis of Public Value Systems*’ funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The project aimed to study the history and development of public values and value systems over a period of three centuries of Dutch history by investigating political corruption scandals between 1650 and 1950. It focused on explicit debate on often implicit public values and perceptions of political corruption. It sought to assess the moral grounding of power in the Netherlands in this period and to combine a theoretical social scientific and philosophical perspective with empirical historical research. This was meant to complement existing knowledge of these issues in the Dutch setting as well as in a wider theoretical and thereby international context.

The period 1650 – 1950 was cut into three parts, each with similar aims and questions. Research for the first part, *The ancien regime in optima forma (1650 – 1750)*, was conducted by Michel Hoenderboom at VU University Amsterdam. Work for the third part, *The ‘modern’ constitutional state (1850 – 1950)*, was conducted by Ronald Kroeze, also at VU University Amsterdam. This present study is the result of the second part: *The ancien regime in transition (1750 – 1850)*. Its emphasis on transition obviously stems from the fact that it is positioned between the other two but is also derived from the fact that some major political and social transition occurred in this period. This study is first and foremost about changing public values in the context of public administration in the Netherlands¹ between 1748 and 1813, in particular in the province of Holland (see chapter three for a discussion of the parameters of this study). Second, it is about political corruption in a double sense. On the one hand it is used as a *tool* to study changing public values. By looking at explicit cases of political corruption we gain significant knowledge of implicit and/or hidden public values. On the other hand it is also regarded as a *topic* (or rather: a negative public value) in its own right. This leads to the following research question: *which changes in public values and public value systems become apparent from scandals of political corruption in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813?*

This research question relates to two central and closely intertwined aims of this study. The first aim is descriptive and consists of a set of ‘what’ questions with an empirical or ‘fact finding’ objective. I aim to investigate which public values and perceptions of political corruption were prevalent, mentioned and/or considered important in public administration as they become apparent in three large political corruption scandals in Holland. This then leads to a second aim to find out whether, and if so how, why and when the meaning and/or interpretation of certain public values and value systems changed over time. This is explanatory in the sense that I aim to provide meaningful relations or causality between changing morality and a wider historical context. This causality, however, can neither be clear-cut nor straightforward (see chapter three). This second aim consists of a set of theoretical and methodological questions that are in turn closely linked. Both sets are aimed at better understanding the ‘when’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of public value change in historical institutional context. Theoretically the aim is to better understand how public values and perceptions of political corruption are

¹ The Netherlands did not as such exist yet. However, it is used here to denote various subsequent forms of state between 1748 and 1813: The Republic of the Seven United Provinces (1555 – 1795), the Batavian Republic (1795 – 1806), The Kingdom of Holland (1806 – 1810), as part of the first French Empire (1810 – 1813) and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1813 – 1815). See chapter four for an overview of Dutch political history.

shaped, acquire new meaning, appear, disappear or evolve over time and why and when this happened. This essentially concerns investigating public value dynamics (see chapter one). Methodologically I consider the question how to best research changing public values and perceptions of political corruption in historical context. This methodological view is provided in chapter three and equally functions – much like political corruption in this study – as both a *tool* to study changing public values and perceptions of political corruption and as a *topic* of study in its own right.

The research question and aims hinge on two basic assumptions underlying this study (discussed in more detail in chapters two and three). First, the study examines political corruption and public values from a historical point of view. The observant reader might have noticed that history is not among the ‘elephants’ in Caiden’s parable discussed earlier. Nor is it mentioned as a possible way of avoiding the elephant altogether. This is surprising, especially since historical research takes into account or covers many of the disciplines that Caiden does highlight. Raadschelders and others (2000: 782), for instance, point out that the multi-disciplinary study of public administration benefits from historical research which has “at its core the insight that a phenomenon can only be studied holistically, precisely because of its contingent qualities in time and space”. It is the assumption in this study that historical research is actually more than merely one of the elephants. Instead, it is best considered the matriarch of the herd.

A second basic assumption of this study concerns the relevance of theorizing about public value dynamics despite the inherent contextual, contingent and ever-changing nature of public values and perceptions of political corruption. The virtue of theorizing is, after all, that it reduces confusion, simplifies and allows us to look beyond the superficial and to generate new questions. While providing a single universal standard for a definition of political corruption or a single category of public values that transcends time and place is impossible or meaningless (see chapter one), stepping back still shows us that throughout history behaviour has always been judged as being good or bad, right or wrong or honest or corrupt and why this was the case. This study aims to shed theoretical and empirical light on these conventions that are supposedly breached and to the circumstances that in the past either led to or prevented political corruption and might still do so today. Its aim is to better understand the way in which morality underlying public administration is perceived and shaped in social-historical institutional processes. This way we not only have a better knowledge of our history but also of our present as it allows us to understand ourselves, our institutions and our values and why we currently judge and behave the way we do.

Outline

This book is divided in three parts. Part one consists of three chapters. Together they make up the theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework of this study. Chapter one, *Public values and political corruption*, provides the first part of this framework with a discussion of the two main objects of research in this study. Chapter two, *Administrative history and public value dynamics*, offers the second part of this framework with a discussion on the use of history for public value research, on Max Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy and on historical institutional analysis. Chapter three, *Research design*, explicitly ties together theory, concepts and methods and sets parameters. This study expressly aims to combine historical and social-scientific explora-

tions and aims to contribute to assessing and developing new methodological and theoretical avenues or frames for historical comparative research into changing public values and political corruption. For this reason the three chapters of part one are allotted a significant amount of space.

In part two I turn my attention towards the historical and philosophical context of the later case studies and the first empirical chapter. Chapter four, *Political history and political culture (1748 – 1813)*, offers the historical (socio-political) context in which early modern Holland administrators operated. This is essential to understand the later case studies and why certain public values were or were not in existence, why some behaviour was or was not considered corrupt and why such things changed. The chapter also offers a view on the main elements of Dutch political culture in the period under investigation. Political culture, of course, also has a bearing on the research question. Chapter five, *Best-opinion and morality of the time (1748 – 1813)*, offers a first empirical chapter and examines the so-called ‘morality of the time’ or best-opinion on public morality as it was offered in a number of crucial writings of the period. This chapter serves a dual purpose. It provides context to situate the later case studies but also offers empirical evidence in its own right. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this study – which handles the cross-section of history and the social sciences – parts of chapters four and five will offer familiar scenes to historians of Dutch politics and administration while to those unfamiliar with Dutch history these may be new and therefore essential.

The third and final part consists of three in-depth empirical case studies of Dutch political corruption scandals between 1748 and 1813 and a concluding chapter. The three cases coincide – not accidentally – with three different phases in Dutch political-administrative history examined in chapter four and are linked to the political culture as described in chapters four and five. The cases take into account multiple views on political corruption from a wide range of sources. Every case is concluded with a similar section that provides analysis and conclusions in three parts. First, a brief interpretation and overview is provided of some of the core values and value statements as they emerged from the case. This provides an elementary view on the terminology used and allows one to partly assess what political corruption actually consisted of. Second, there is a discussion on the comparison between the various sources of public values investigated for each case study (see chapter three). Third, I address the question of change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption. Chapter six, *Taxes, political corruption and moral reform (1748 – 1756)*, offers a first case study on political corruption, bureaucratization and moral reform in the context of Holland’s changing system of taxation around 1750. Chapter seven, *Princely patronage and patriot cause (1770s and 1780s)*, offers a second case study of political corruption in the years of Patriot agitation and revolt. Chapter eight, *Gin, cloth and meat: political corruption in the Batavian Republic (1798)*, is a final case study on political corruption in the context of major transformations of the Dutch state following the Batavian revolution of 1795. While each case study is followed by its own analysis and concluding remarks, I will offer a general and overarching analysis and conclusion in chapter nine.

Part I

Public Values, Political Corruption and Administrative History

“Every system of public administration is the product of many influences. Its form and content reflect its historical origin; existing patterns are a composite of practices and procedures both ancient and contemporary. No administrative system can be well understood without some knowledge of what it has been, and how it came to be what it is.”

Leonard D. White,
Introduction to the study of public administration (1955)

1 Public Values and Political Corruption

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of the two main focal points of this study: public values and political corruption. First I discuss public values and value systems and the assessment of their change and continuity in historical perspective. In the same paragraph, since this study is about *public* values and *political* corruption, the public-private divide and notions of ‘publicness’ are discussed from a historical perspective. I then turn to the problem of conceptualizing, investigating and defining political corruption and propose a specific ‘neo-classical’ approach to the study of public values and political corruption. I end with a brief overview of existing work on Dutch political corruption to situate this study in its historiographical setting.

1.2 Public values: dynamics, classifications and ‘publicness’

Values are the subject of intense debate and study, especially when it concerns public life. ‘Good’ public administration can mean something different to every individual or group. Therefore, in making and executing public policy values are often contested and choices for specific values invariably have to be made. The importance of public values is reflected in much recent social scientific inquiry. Questions include what public values are (Bozeman, 2007, 2009; Gortner, 1994; Kamto, 1997; Kernaghan, 2000; Rezsóhazy, 2001: 14; Stever, 2001: 629; Van Wart, 1998) or how to classify or arrange them (Bozeman, 2008; Rutgers, 2008b; Schein, 1987, 1999; Schreurs, 2003; Van Wart, 1998). Other questions concern public value ‘trade-offs’ in actual policy implementation (Bozeman, 2008; Dobel, 1999; De Graaf & Van der Wal, 2010) or which values are appropriate for public administration given its specific nature and responsibility (Bozeman, 2002, 2007; Denhardt, 2004; Gilman & Lewis, 1996; Spicer, 2001; Van der Wal, 2006, 2008). Likewise, the ‘balancing’ of values is a constant concern for many (Copp, 1995; Goodsell, 1989; Hood, 2000; Van Wart, 1998). Moynihan (2009: 820), for instance, mentions Wise who suggests that the ultimate legitimacy of administration rests on its ability to offer a framework to manage competing values and trade-offs.

Values, as MacIntyre (1981: 5-6) writes, are tied to changing social settings. For this reason a sociological definition provided by Oyserman is adopted in this study. To Oyserman “values are patterns of regulations, accepted as desirable by persons in a given culture or family environment, and serve as guiding principles in their lives [...] they can be thought of as priorities, internal compasses or springboards for action – moral imperatives. In this way values or mores are implicit or explicit guidelines for action, general scripts framing what is sought after and what is to be avoided” (2001: 16148, 16150). Oyserman furthermore writes how “values are at the heart of human enterprise; embedded in social systems, they are what makes social order both possible and resistant to change. Values are more than individual traits. They are social agreements about what is right, good to be cherished” (Ibid., 16151). Obviously, different societies or social orders judge behaviour differently and perceptions of what is right or good invariably change. As a result, ideas about what is considered corrupt

become highly contextual and contingent, implying that understanding changing values and perceptions of political corruption requires a historical contextual approach (see chapter three).

Value systems are collections of values. Again, Oyserman provides a suitable definition for this study. He writes how value systems “represent what is expected and hoped for, what is required and what is forbidden. Value systems are not reports of actual behaviour but systems of criteria by which behaviour is judged and sanctions are applied” (Ibid., 16151) More than one value system can therefore exist at any one time, which sometimes causes clashes of values in the same administrative system. This is essentially what Riggs (1964) has called ‘polynormativism’: the need to answer to two (or more?) normative frameworks, which are usually but not always incommensurable. Von Thiessen (cf. 2009: 94-98; 2010) takes a historical perspective on this and speaks of *Normenpluralität* or value pluralism (see also chapters eight and nine). Others equally point to this. Schreurs (2003: 37-39) has noted how value systems sometimes support one another but can also co-exist in completely isolated spheres.

Public value dynamics: diversity, change and continuity

In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber (1864 – 1920) wondered how banking and other money-making pursuits become honourable at some point in the modern age “after having stood condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, and avarice for centuries past?” (cf. Hirschman, 1977: 9, 130-131; Weber, 1958: 74). Weber’s question essentially concerned diversity, change and continuity (cf. Raadschelders, 2000: 88; Tholfsen, 1967: 6-7) of public values and value systems. He noticed that acts are judged differently throughout time and depending on context (compare also the work of Norbert Elias). In the scale of medieval values money lending was for instance ranked lower than honour or courage. It is one of the essential aims of this study to shed light on how such value dynamics might occur. For Weber (see also chapter two) bureaucratization was a core element in this. From a Weberian point of view corruption is the deficient rationalization of the public service. It is a phase on the route from patrimonial to rational legal authority (Hoetjes, 1977: 53-55; see also Rubinstein, 1983). As such, Weber had a notion of changing value systems as a transition from one phase to another. “For him”, write Rubinstein & De Graaf, “corruption was the hallmark of an earlier, more ‘primitive’ stage of society, and would eventually vanish with the triumph of a professionalized bureaucracy” (2010: 21).

Clashing value systems do not, of course, necessarily have to lead to public value dynamics or evolution of values and value systems. Clashes are, in other words, neither necessary nor sufficient cause for change. At the same time, research has provided some interesting results with regard to this link. Various recent historical studies have shown how public values do come to change as a result of clashes and transitions between different phases of development. Wagenaar & Van der Meij (2006) have done so when discussing the moral dilemmas of a seventeenth century Dutch bailiff. In a different article (2005), they applied Riggs’ idea of polynormativism to a seventeenth century case of corruption to the same effect (compare also Nützenadel, 2009; Von Thiessen, 2009, 2010). In a corruption case of a seventeenth century public magistrate, Hoenderboom and Kerkhoff (2008) have shown how accusations of political corruption often occurred when different value systems clashed. Attempts to show the existence of different value systems over time have been made by Kerkhoff et al. (2010) and by Wagenaar (2010: 1-2) who juxtaposed so-called face-to-face

societies with more bureaucratic ones. Face-to-face society's highly personal and 'particularistic' norms could easily come into conflict with the impersonal and 'universalistic' norms attached to the budding bureaucracy also known in early modern society. In effect, there were often two distinct moral codes and administrators would often be judged according to both. Behaviour was considered corrupt as soon as the balance was disturbed (cf. Kerkhoff, et al., forthcoming).

Aforementioned studies show that clashes and coexistence of values and value systems bring about change in or at least debate on public values. They show that any public value system, as Alasdair Roberts puts it, is "the product of social struggles and popular arguments about proper conduct [...]. They are artefacts of human behaviour instead of inevitabilities" (1994: 412). This means that when value systems clash, people on all levels, in all times and in all functions have to balance old and new values. Somewhere and somehow, for instance, 'bureaucratic' values such as impartiality or neutrality might take over or are added to existing 'pre-bureaucratic' values such as honour or wealth. Rezsóházy stresses this very point when he writes that value systems are always 'moving'. Values are "constantly being added, lost, strengthened, weakened which has an impact on the system as a whole" (2001: 16153). It is also "hierarchically built up, it is a scale of values. The more a value is deeply rooted, the more it takes a central place and the more it is lived intensely, arouses emotion, and mobilizes vehement energies [...]. A set of values is a living system, very complex, open to seesaw motions and variations" (Ibid., 16154). This provides part of an explanation for historical diversity, change and continuity of public values. "Men", as Rezsóházy writes, "progressively learn the rules of their society", and that values and value systems are "maintained by conditions of real existence, i.e., if a value or value system appears to work as an efficient guide to life there is no reason to change them. Values are also maintained, reinforced, and changed through social approval or disapproval. Conformity is rewarded, deviance is penalized" (Ibid., 16154). Values in a system of course also change as they are "upgraded, downgraded, incorporated or exiled, intensified or weakened etc. according to changes in social environment". This is in line with Beck-Jørgensen's argument (2009: 456) that approaches to value change need to read values in their relevant political-ideological and philosophical context. This position is adopted in this present study as well.

Classifications of public values

While few would really argue that values are not contextual, contingent or changing, this has not stopped people from making lists and/or classifications. Well known are the four cardinal virtues of determination (*fortitudo*), temperance (*temperantia*), justice (*justitia*) and practical wisdom (*prudentia*), or the three theological virtues of hope (*spes*), faith (*fides*) and charity (*caritas*) as they are provided by Plato's *Politeia*, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* or Cicero's *De Officiis* and by Christian scholars such as Thomas Aquinas (Nieuwenburg, 2001: 33). In more recent times many others have tried to distinguish levels, classifications or categories of public values (See for overviews: Rutgers, 2008b; Schreurs, 2003). Recent attempts at categorization and classification can be found in the work of Schein (1987: 15-18; 1999: 15-26), Gilman & Lewis (1996: 517), Van Wart (1998: 166-171), Stever (2001: 629) and Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman (2007: 360-361). These attempts, despite definite merit, reveal some crucial difficulties that ensure that this present study does not provide a quantitative analysis, theoretical classification

and/or categorization of public values found in the cases between 1748 and 1813. A first difficulty, exemplified by the work of Schein and Van Wart (cf. Rutgers 2008b: 100-101), is that the basis for many classifications of and distinctions between different types of public values are not clear and that they often remain abstract and thus lack (much desired) precision. A second problem is that any classification and/or categorization inherently negates the contextual and contingent nature of public values. Rutgers (2008b: 109), for instance, states that “despite all these attempts it is hard to find any self-evident core values, or categorizations or hierarchies of values that can simply be applied universally in theory or practice”. Schreurs (2003: 41) similarly argued that lists, rankings and classifications do not actually teach us much about the meaning of particular values. Furthermore, while categorizations, classifications and rankings might bring order to the multitude of values, she argues that they tell us little about their actual foundation (Ibid., 35-36), about the relationship between public values, decisions and actions or about the actual function of a value in a specific context or situation (Ibid., 40). From a more historical point of view we can, thirdly, add to this that classifications and/or categorizations can only (potentially) tell us something about the relative importance of public values in a particular time and place. They are, therefore, unable or unsuitable to express or explain public value change over longer periods of time.

Shifting notions of ‘publicness’

Distinctions between something public and something private have always been a major element of almost any culture (Rutgers, 2004: 138). In public administration literature it has, in any case, been a fundamental empirical and normative distinction. If we want to understand public administration and its underlying morality – both in past and present – we need to know what ‘publicness’ means, not least because publicness is directly linked to public values and perceptions of political (i.e., public) corruption. Shifting or changing notions of publicness are, in other words, connected to changing notions of community, society and/or citizenship and therefore to changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. When ‘the public’ becomes increasingly separated from ‘the private’ we might, for instance, begin to find reasons why behaviour is judged differently in the two spheres. Expectations, assumptions and value judgments concerning the acts of public officials tend to vary as they are tied to varying notions of ‘publicness’ or ‘privateness’.

However, determining a public-private divide for times past is difficult. For most of history ‘modern’ notions of public and private – such as those based on organizational dimensions (cf. Rainey, et al., 1976) such as legal status and legal and regulatory power (cf. Dijkstra & Van der Meer, 2003) or funding and ownership (cf. Wamsley & Zald, 1973) – did not exist. A public office could often not be separated from a private person and his (women were rarely if ever involved in politics or administration) personal finances and the execution of what we would now call public tasks was often in the hands of ‘private’ actors such as the church or well-off individuals without formal legal status and regulatory power even being an issue. While a purely organizational perspective on the public – private divide is therefore too narrow for the question and aims of this study, the rise and/or increasing importance of legal criteria in particular will prove to be important. We will see how notions of publicness did indeed shift with their increased importance.

In addition, taking a somewhat broader perspective on the divide (or rather dichotomy, see Rutgers 2004), allows us to distinguish different notions of ‘publicness’ that have emerged throughout history. Weintraub (1997: 7) provides an overview of traditions that have affected the notion of publicness in history. Two of them especially help us determine publicness in the period between 1748 and 1813. The first is the so-called republican-virtue (or ‘classical’) model that sees the public realm in terms of a political community and citizenship, analytically distinct from both market and administrative state. Private, here, pertains to one’s household, the home and family. In general this classic model was a combination of attention for public duties and common good on the one hand and private interests and benefits on the other but in which the former was morally superior to latter (cf. Pesch, 2005: 39; Rutgers, 2003a: 20). According to Weintraub this general classical model was replaced in more recent times by a second, liberal-economic, model in which a clearer separation was made between state administration and market economy. In this tradition scholars such as John Locke (1632 – 1704) and Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) created the idea of a private sphere of ‘natural’ individuals guided by self-interest and the market. It meant, according to Weintraub, the complete reversal of the classical republican virtue model in which cooperation and collaboration between equal individuals was supposed to lead to a public collective (the political community).

A similar and related shift supposedly occurred with regard to the meaning of ‘the common good’ and the ‘public interest’ as opposed to the ‘private good’ or ‘commercial interest’. According to Münkler & Fischer, the early modern period – roughly from the Reformation onwards – reflected a paradigm shift “in which the old European ideal of political virtue, in the sense of the citizen’s voluntary orientation toward the public good” was replaced (2001: 12527). Now, rational self-interest emerged as a core concept “in the context of a market society in the course of self-differentiation, with the state now simply expected to set the conditions for maximized economic well-being of the citizenry in a civil society” (cf. Hirschman, 1977: 32-33; Münkler & Fischer, 2001: 12527). It remains to be seen, however, whether the shifts described by Weintraub and, to a lesser extent, by Münkler & Fischer also occurred in the Dutch eighteenth century context. For instance, while various early-modern authors did in fact start to discuss economic self-interest, they often found this – or wanted this to be – fully reconcilable with attending to the common good. Examples of this can be found in Bernard Mandeville (1670 – 1733) (cf. Van Erp & Van Gils, 1987: 110; Münkler & Fischer, 2001: 12527), in Montesquieu (1698 – 1755) (cf. Hirschman, 1977; xxii, 10) or Adam Smith (1723 – 1790). The latter famously argued that citizens generally do not promote the public interest and only intend their own gain but also said that people (should) realize that a common good is essential to protect any self-interest (Münkler & Fischer, 2001: 12527).

It is not unimaginable that Dutch authors between 1748 and 1813 also favoured similar combinations of ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ value systems. This would shed more light on public value change and I will return to this question in chapters five and nine. For now, however, it remains to be specified that the link between private and public interest (and common good) on the one hand and public values and perceptions of political corruption on the other hand is very important for the purposes of this study. To Blitz “public interests are what several of us happen to desire, or means to satisfaction that we generally want” (2001: 12547). In this way the scope of public interests becomes very broad to signify “anything that is not private, so that regard for the public interests means any regard for interests or groups that are not strictly or exclusively one’s own” (Lewin, 1991). Adding to the confusion about how to define public interests (and common goods) is the fact that there often exist different publics or groups who

all have their own interests (cf. Rutgers, 2004: 140). This leads to important realizations: first, there are as many public interests and common goods as there are publics. Second, we therefore need to accept there is no single public interest or common good and third, we need to realize that public interests and common goods are always contextual and open to debate and discussion. This has led Witteveen to call the public interest a “useful fiction” (op cit. Becker, 2007: 31). Becker (Ibid., 29) equally wrote that the concept “does not represent an actual existing value system but rather a point of orientation for everyone in society [...] it is an imaginary, overarching moral focal point positioned away from all sorts of societal forces”.

While public interest and public good are thus notoriously difficult to define we still need to do so because they are invariably connected to what are considered public values and what is perceived as political corruption. One approach to the public interest is that of political philosopher Brian Berry who noted that “the only really satisfactory way of approaching ‘the public interest’ is to take a great number of examples of actual uses – and see what could be made of them” (op cit. in Bozeman, 2007: 84). According to Bozeman few have answered this call but in this present study I attempt to provide at least a sample. In order to do so I use Bozeman’s definition of the public interest as a guideline. This reads: “in a particular context, the public interest refers to the outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective construed as a ‘public’” (Ibid., 12). It is a workable definition because it is changeable, adaptable, context-sensitive and situation-dependent. Finally, it helps us define what *public* values are. Bozeman again provides a definition – which is adopted in this study – of public values as “those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should be based” (Ibid., 17).

1.3 Concepts, theories and definitions of political corruption

Any society needs a social moral code if people are to live together. Social codes consist of public values and serve as standards by which we judge our actions and those of others in society (cf. Copp, 1995: 19). However, these codes or moral standards are made by people with different and often conflicting agenda’s, priorities and ideas on right and wrong. This means there are often various different moral standards that are derived from different sources in any given society (what is corrupt, as mentioned, depends on the questions *who*, *when* and *where*). If we are to define political corruption as the deviation from certain standards in society this means that whether something is corrupt or not is continuously open for debate. Precisely for this reason Caiden wrote how “theorizing about corruption, like theorizing about most things, is a hazardous venture but probably even more so. It requires speculation and conjecture, concluding proof based on evidence, and universal acceptance. Speculation can be wide of the mark. Accumulated facts can be quite deceptive and misleading. Universal acceptance can be impossible to achieve given the variety of belief systems that exist at any one time” (2010: 9). In the following, the issue of delineating, defining and studying political corruption is discussed in more detail. I will deal with the concept of political corruption, with academic corruption discourses (concerning the way in which political corruption can best be investigated and understood) and with different associated definitions of political corruption. Benefits and downsides of the various approaches and definitions lead me to discuss a specific ‘neo-

classical' approach. This approach will be one of the theoretical and methodological foundations of this present study because it is capable of tackling the contextual, contingent and changing nature of public values and perceptions of political corruption, also in historical context (see chapter three).

The concept of political corruption

Inherent difficulties to define political corruption have led Robert Williams to write that “it is a curious state of affairs when an academic mini-industry and the policy agendas of development professionals are dominated by a concept which most participants in the debate are reluctant or unable to define” (1999: 503). A single uncontested definition of political corruption seems nowhere in sight and it remains, in the words of Anechiarico and Jacobs, “a social, legal, and political concept laden with ambiguity and bristling with controversy” (1996: 16). The truth of this statement quickly becomes apparent from a brief look at dictionaries or encyclopaedias. Contrary to the common modern-day negative connotation of corruption the first encyclopaedia of Diderot and d’Alembert, for instance, provided the philosophical view of corruption as a generating or creating (i.e., a positive) force. D’Alembert discussed the view that “corruption is the state by which one thing ceases to be what it once was. One can say that wood is corrupted when it is no longer in existence; and that instead of wood, we find fire. Similarly, an egg is corrupted when it ceases to be an egg and we find a chicken in its place for corruption is not taken here in the usual sense. Hence the philosophical axiom, that the corruption of one thing is the creation of another” (d’Alembert, 1754: 278).

However, corruption is more often regarded as something negative and/or detrimental. The Oxford English Dictionary provides a number of interesting and common definitions. Corruption means dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery or the action or effect of making someone or something morally depraved; the process by which a word or expression is changed from its original state to one regarded as erroneous or debased or the process of decay; putrefaction. The term stems from the Latin *corruptus*, past participle of *corrumperere*, which is to ‘mar, bribe, destroy’ and is built from *cor* (‘altogether’) and *rumpere* (‘to break’). Many dictionaries define corruption similarly, for instance as the use of or participation in decay, bribery, and forgery. Sometimes it is equalled to the sale of offices (venality) or is described more broadly as degeneration, deterioration, adulteration, bastardization, malversation, falsification, irregularities, shady dealings, being diluted or watered-down, depravation, perversity, turpitude or vice. The context and use of the word is – naturally in the case of language – decisive. Corruption in the sense of decay or degeneration can for instance equally be linked to food (a corrupt apple), language (the corruption of a text), honour (the corruption of blood) or behaviour (a corrupt official). In fact Heidenheimer (1989a: 7-8) once noted how only one of nine commonly accepted definitions for the term corruption in the Oxford English Dictionary is applicable to political contexts.

We are dealing with two important and related difficulties here. First, there is the issue of (seeming) anachronism. The use of the term political corruption for times when the term might not have existed or might not have been used can, in other words, be dangerous. The same goes, for instance, for terms such as civil servant or bureaucrat. At the same time, however, the historian of ideas and concepts needs such terms to be able to observe and make sense of things in times past. Also, it need not be anachronistic (or deterministic) as long as the

term is defined in a broad enough way. As I will explain later on in this section (on old and new definitions of political corruption and on the proposed neo-classical approach of this study) a broad definition of political corruption leaves room to use a single term for reasons of clarity without in any way fixing its meaning in advance.

The second issue concerns assessing continuity and change in language and meaning. This is an essential part of historians' attempts to understand developments in political and social thought, intellectual history and history of ideas and can be vital to understand origins and past uses of concepts that are still central today (Richter, 1995: 5) but it remains a difficult task. Continuities in political language may, for instance, persist despite changes in political circumstances; shifts may also occur in the words or expressions designating a concept in the same or different periods; a concept may remain fixed while the terms regarded as its antonyms may alter (a term such as despotism may change meaning when opposite is thought liberty and another when opposite is anarchy). Furthermore, change in meaning can of course occur but then we have to ask ourselves how periods of crisis, of accelerated, radical, or revolutionary change produce fundamental disagreements about the languages of politics and society? (Ibid., 9-10).

I cannot here discuss all the problems associated with the conceptual history of corruption in detail. However, I do wish to mention two fundamental elements. The first has been noted by Richter, among others, who wrote that "the presence or absence of conceptual distinctions in the language of politics reveals much about the government of a society as well as about the conceptual resources available to those participating in discussions of its arrangements" (Ibid., 9). Such attempts to link changing language to descriptions of politics and political change have, most notably, been made by Reichardt and others (1985) in the case of France and by Brunner, Conze & Koselleck (1972; 1982; 1985) in the case of Germany. The latter's *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* proposed their famous – and of particular relevance for this study, see chapters three and five – *Sattelzeit* hypothesis with which they marked the period 1750 – 1850 in German history as one of major transition in political and administrative development (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 18). Koselleck and others linked transitions in political, social and economic structures to changes in the meaning and function of key political and social concepts. They investigated not just the concepts but the wider history as well and connected conceptual and social history in which they related thought to changes in the structures of government and society (Richter, 1995: 19-20). For the German situation they found four crucial elements contributing to changing concepts: *Demokratisierung* (a broader public of readers and the emergence of new genres of communication), *Verzeitlichung* (concepts became more dynamic because of democratization and came to refer to an as yet unrealized future), *Ideologisierung* (the content of concepts shifted from being concrete and specific to being abstract, allowing them to be used for general ideologies) and finally *Politisierung* (concepts were connected to current political conflict). As we will see such things also happened in the Dutch context.

Discourses and theories on political corruption

Political corruption is a phenomenon studied in a variety of disciplines, such as economics, political science, law or anthropology. This has resulted in several academic discourses trying to theorize about the concept and explaining what political corruption is and why it occurs. Recently a useful overview of eight theoretical approaches has been provided (cf. De Graaf, et al., 2010a: 17-19). I will briefly discuss four of these that are most relevant for the conclusions of this study, i.e., the case studies that follow are meant to put these four in perspective and to assess them critically.

A first approach takes the *institutional design* of political systems as a core focus. Here, institutions are believed “to shape behaviour which makes some political systems (presidential, federal) more prone to political corruption than others (parliamentary, unitary)” (De Graaf, et al., 2010a: 18-19). Closely related to this approach are (neo-) institutional theories (Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 1989; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) that emphasize the influence of institutions (such as rules, symbols, routines, norms or scripts) on individual preferences and action in collective social settings. “To act appropriately”, as De Graaf et al. write, then “simply means to act in accordance with institutionalized practices of a collective. Corruption or deviance from accepted norms and standards occurs when institutions do not fulfil this ‘sense making’ function and therefore create uncertainty and disorder” (2010: 18). This “normative version of institutionalism”, according to Peters, “has direct relevance for understanding corruption” as it “stresses the central role of ‘appropriateness’ within organizations and institutions and assumes that individual behaviours can be shaped by institutional values, symbols, myths and routines” (2010: 83; cf. Tavits, 2007). Peters relates the institutional design of political systems to the quality of government and addresses the question “how to design the interaction between state and society in ways that facilitate the quality of governance, defined broadly as well, as to minimize the probability of corrupt practices”. An institutional design approach therefore makes sense to explain political corruption although we should be careful to directly link structure to levels of corruption (cf. Peters, 2010: 95-96).

Second there is a *structural functionalist* approach to political corruption. This approach views society as a collection of coherent systems in which all societal phenomena have a function. Scholars with this approach ask which function corruption fulfils in a specific society (Hoetjes, 1977: 55-57; 1982: 67-69; Riggs, 1964; De Zwart, 2010). Corruption can for instance provide protection and influence for groups in society that possess material wealth but lack political influence (Waquet & McCall, 1991: 62). Similarly, brokerage (according to some a form of political corruption) can serve to facilitate action between central and local levels (Blockmans, 1985; Huiskamp, 1995). A structural-functionalist approach raises many interesting issues. Could it be, for instance, that specific forms of political corruption, when the context allows them to exist, actually initiate and stimulate political processes that might otherwise never have been possible? (cf. Welskopp, 2010: 222). Can political corruption also be a good thing? Without it, some things might simply not get done or continue to be done ‘the wrong way’. Such a perspective might also lead one to take a more relativist stance. If what some call political corruption simply works and/or is accepted in a specific context who is anyone to decide this is wrong? A closer look at the actual function of corruption can provide, as Welskopp says, some distance between “real political scenario’s” and “moral-philosophical fiction” (2010: 221).

A third approach that is often used to understand and explain political corruption is the *institutional economics* (or *rationality and economy*) approach. It has, arguably, been the most dominant in recent decades (Lambsdorff, 2002, 2007; Rose Ackerman, 2010). Rose-Ackerman's landmark study of 1978 was a first systematic application of economics to the study of corruption. In this view corrupt officials are rational utility maximizers who simply take the most profitable course of action in every situation (Rose Ackerman, 1978: 4) or, "corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap, it represents the illicit use of willingness-to-pay as a decision-making criterion. A private individual or firm makes a payment to a public official in return for a benefit or to avoid cost" (Rose Ackerman, 2010: 47). There are different sub-theories that belong to this approach as well. A notable one is *principal agent theory* (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose Ackerman, 1978) which sees "pathologies in the agency/principal relation", Rose-Ackerman writes, as "at the heart of the corrupt transaction" (2010: 48). The core of the principal-agent problem according to Bozeman (2007: 57) is "how to ensure that the agent (a contractor or employee) will act in the best interest of the employing principal, given differences in motive, information, and preference". It concerns difficulties that arise because of asymmetric relationships between principal (subordinate) and agent (superior), many of which are inherent in the delegation of legislative authority to bureaucratic agencies. Political corruption according to this approach can be explained as civil servants (agents) violating their official duties (imposed by principals) by favouring certain persons (clients) for material rewards (cf. Klitgaard, 1988: 24). However, both the institutional economics and principal agent approaches have attracted their share of criticism (cf. Rothstein, 2010; Williams, 1999). Most notable is the limitation to strictly economic motives and rational behaviour of individuals. Emotionally motivated political corruption employed for non-economic purposes seems to largely fall outside its scope. As we will see in the following case studies, this criticism can be verified.

The fourth approach is *Weberian ideal-typical*. The theoretical work on bureaucratization of Max Weber (1864 – 1920) has been of crucial relevance to the study of political corruption even though it seems not to have been a major (or rather: explicit) topic for Weber himself. His approach is often used to view political corruption as the deficient rationalization of the public service. Corruption is a phase on the route from patrimonial to rational legal authority (Hoetjes, 1977: 53-55; cf. Rubinstein, 1983). In short: the more bureaucratic a society becomes the less political corruption will occur because of the growing amount of and adherence to bureaucratic rules and regulations and (possibly) because of coinciding evolving ideas on neutrality, common good and public versus private interest. In many ways the Weberian ideal-typical approach is able to better incorporate and use elements that are problematic in some of the other approaches mentioned earlier. The bureaucratic ideal-type for instance enables us to analyze any shift from private to public or vice versa and is able to provide – at least in an ideal-typical way – solid standards (i.e., legal-rational rules) for a better use of more public office centred approaches. From a historical point of view it also helps to chart and understand important topics for the study of political corruption and public values such as state-formation or the link between state and society. Furthermore, it is able to tell us a lot about 'old and new' political corruption and the long term influence of new institutions and organizational reform on changing public morality (cf. Kerkhoff, 2011). I will discuss this in more detail in chapters two, six and nine.

Old and new definitions of political corruption

Since the concept of corruption is so difficult to delineate, problems of definition inevitably arise. These problems usually start with scope. In the introduction I mentioned that corruption in its ‘classical’ use (by Plato, Thucydides, Cicero and, partly, Machiavelli) was often understood in a general or broad way. It referred to the overall moral and political health or decay of whole societies (Friedrich, 1989: 18; Heidenheimer, 1989a: 4-5; Johnston, 1996: 322) and was often used to speak of “the corruption of the body politic” or “the decay of a political order” (Dobel, 1978: 959). Plato wrote of corrupted constitutions that were guided not by law but by the interests of the ruling elite. Cicero saw political corruption as one of the chief causes of the decay of the Roman Republic; Montesquieu (partially, see below) saw political corruption as the decay of an essentially good political system (i.e., monarchy) into despotism (Friedrich, 1989: 17-18). For Montesquieu, *corruzione* meant deterioration in the quality of government, no matter for what reasons it occurs (Hirschman, 1977: 40). Based on such views, Dobel defines this classical notion of political corruption as “the moral incapacity of citizens to make reasonably disinterested commitments to actions, symbols and institutions which benefit the substantive common welfare” (Dobel, 1978: 960). The essence of political corruption remains “the decline in the ability and willingness of the citizens to act spontaneous or disinterested to support other citizens or communal institutions” (Ibid., 963). This understanding revolves around key concepts of loyalty and civic virtue and thus encompasses or needs an idea of community or communal welfare (see earlier in this chapter on public interest and common good) and is about selfishness as opposed to altruism. Johnston notes how in its classical (Republican?) meaning “politics was meant to transcend any clash of specific individual interests” (1996: 322).

Although political corruption in its classical sense was often linked to the general health of the body politic, it could also often refer to economically motivated behaviour and actions of individuals. Aristotle viewed political corruption as the embezzlement of common money and Cicero viewed it as self-interest of civil servants (Tiihonen, 2003: 8). Machiavelli is a good example of how both classical (broad) and modern (narrow) understandings could go hand in hand. For him it “refers to a fall from general standards of honesty, fairness, and impartiality which essentially are bureaucratic standards” and “says nothing about the quality of our political leadership or the viability of our political values or style” (cf. Shumer, 1979: 6-7). According to Shumer, Machiavelli “stands in this older tradition of political discourse. For him as for previous political theorists, the concepts of political corruption and health were tools for critical understanding, for understanding the personality of whole political systems, thereby illuminating the significance of specific actions within the polity”. Shumer believes how political corruption to Machiavelli was the mirror image of the healthy Republic but that Machiavelli at the same time deduced from this general view several characteristics of the good individual official or ruler. Healthy politics supposedly created actors who “subordinate all of their own advantage to the common good” and who “with the greatest diligence cared for and preserved things private and public” who were “prudent and just” and “conducted themselves according to the laws”. Political corruption was consequently described by Machiavelli as abuse of liberty, licentiousness, lust, lavishness, avarice, ambition, violence, and acting without having any regard to any civil rights (Shumer, 1979: 8-9).

Some authors (cf. Hirschman, 1977: 40) have suggested that the ‘classical’ component of a definition of political corruption has vanished in recent decades to make way for entirely narrow and legally and/or economically based definitions. Shumer (1979: 6-8), for instance, wrote how “the sense that the polity itself may be corrupt is [at present, TK] lost from an older usage”. Political corruption has become “a form of personal dishonesty. Acts of corruption are the misdeeds of some politicians, or of some citizens [...]. Corruption refers to the use of bribes, to gain political ends or positions”. In order to “break the bonds of contemporary concepts with their claims of neutrality,” Shumer continued, “we must recall an older vocabulary designed for understanding and judging the fundamental bases of political life”. More recently Johnston wrote how “as the scope of politics broadened, our conception of corruption has however narrowed. Societies have become secularized and fragmented; many are seen more as arenas for contention among groups and interests than as embodying any coherent system of values; and ethical issues in politics now seems to revolve more around maintaining the fairness of this competition than around the pursuit of fundamental moral goals” (Johnston, 1996: 322; 2005: 62-63).

The ‘narrowing’ of the definition can be seen in various studies over the past few decades that seem to have taken wider moral issues out of the equation (cf. Williams, 1999: 504). Significant in a move from a ‘wide classic’ to a ‘modern narrow’ definition, as noted by Tiihonen (2003: 9), was James Bryce’s late nineteenth century definition of political corruption. This was (1) cash payment to civil servants, (2) another kind of payment to civil servants, (3) speculation on agreements, and (4) favour in nominations. In hindsight, Bryce was an early example of Rose-Ackerman’s institutional economy approach. Much like Rose-Ackerman the crucial elements were bribery and personal gain. With the narrowing of definitions of political corruption (and perhaps of politics itself?) many have taken the same route as Bryce in attempts to find some kind of (single) objective standard to define political corruption and/or improper individual conduct. As Rose-Ackerman wrote: “normative statements about corruption require a point of view, a standard of ‘goodness’, and a model of how corruption works in particular instances” (1978: 9).

Well-known in this respect is Heidenheimer’s distinction (cf. 1970; 1989a) between definitions centred on public office, market and public interest. First, a typical public office centred definition has been provided by Joseph Nye as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (close family, personal, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967: 417). Similarly, Scott found the standard of corruption in legal codes and rules that apply to the holder of a public office. To him political corruption was “the violation of formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding wealth or status gains” (Scott, 1972: 4). Of course legal rules and regulations seem solid enough standards by which to measure political corruption. This makes this kind of definition relatively easy to operationalize. However, the obvious downside is that it does not take into account the normative element of political corruption. For this legal rules of public office are too rigid and formal because legal acts can still be morally reprehensible. It also presupposes formal rules, regulations, and clearly defined public roles that do not always exist or have not always existed in times past (cf. Johnston, 1996: 323; Williams, 1999: 504-505).

As a result of the problems inherent in the legal public office definition some tried to break away from it early on. Leff, for instance, viewed political corruption as an ‘extra-legal institution’ (1970: 510). Second, a typical market-centred definition is found in the work of Van

Klaveren who wrote that “a corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will [...] seek to maximize. The office then becomes a ‘maximizing unit’. The size of his income depends [...] upon the market situation and the talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve” (Heidenheimer, 1989a: 9; Van Klaveren, 1989: 26). This definition is able to take into account the crucial element of maximizing gain but raises much criticism at the same time. Johnston noted it is difficult to say which market one should refer to and the definition also “overlooks the intangible benefits (prestige, promises of political support etc.) that can flow from the abuse of authority” (1996: 323-324). Third, a public-interest definition has been provided by Carl Friedrich who wrote that “the pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests” (1966: 74). This kind of definition is plausible, for instance, when Scott’s formal legal standards are difficult to find. It also takes into account an important moral aspect of political corruption: the harming of public interests (Johnston, 1996: 324). It becomes less plausible when we notice that it presupposes a distinction between public and private and a fairly clear idea of what constitutes public interests. As we have seen, these two issues are highly contested especially in historical context (cf. Rutgers, 2003a; Wagenaar, 2003).

Between Scylla & Scarybdis

The downsides of the various academic discourses, narrow definitions and single standards make it seem unlikely we will ever be able to present one definition of political corruption. Furthermore, as Kurer notes: the “discussion of the definition of corruption has progressed little since Heidenheimer’s groundbreaking distinction” (2005: 222). While such a statement is somewhat too gloomy it does point to a fundamental problem of common approaches and definitions: they are often too narrow to encompass the broad contextual meaning political corruption often acquires. Some therefore argue for a broader approach. Tiihonen (2003: 9) for instance noted a shift from broad to narrow definitions and in a critique of the use of too narrow definitions by international organizations (such as the *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development*) he attributed this to the fact that “broader definitions are difficult to handle in comparative studies”. However, to him a broad definition of political corruption is necessary “as a deep feature of political culture. It is not just a question of individuals, but also a question of the political system” (2003: 10). At the same time it is true that while a broad approach might be sensitive to context and is able to provide much detail it is also likely to be unclear, inconsistent and difficult to operationalize. There have been several scholars who “cast their net as widely as possible” (Heidenheimer, 1989a: 7) to come up with a broad definition. Berg et al. (1976: 3) for instance wrote how political corruption refers to any behaviour which “violates and undermines the norms of the system of public order which is deemed indispensable for the maintenance of political democracy”. Such a broad definition essentially prevents people, in the words of Mény & De Souza “from establishing empirically what standards defined political corruption”, which led them to “sacrifice clarity to brevity, in so far as it leaves too implicit how or why behaviour is deviant from which norms” (2001: 2828).

Thus we find ourselves between Scylla and Charybdis. This is described by Williams (1999: 504) who wrote that “if they are to serve a useful role in the subsequent analysis, definitions of social phenomena need to be capacious yet discriminating. If they are too narrowly drawn, they will not be comprehensive. If they are too broad, they may be seen as vague and imprecise”. Both narrow and wide approaches and definitions have benefits and downsides. Each approach and definition discussed so far offers interesting elements that can (at least partly) explain the occurrence of political corruption and its underlying values and assumptions. For example, while Nye’s public office definition or Rose-Ackerman’s institutional economics have their downsides it would be unwise to discard them entirely. On the other hand the downsides of each individual approach and/or definition are such that we have to move beyond their limitations and look for an alternative. Therefore I argue in this study (see also chapter three) that we should return to the classic notion of political corruption in our discussions on the topic while not forgetting more narrow standards. We should adopt a ‘neo-classical’ approach and definition. When we relate political corruption not just to such individual acts but also to wider notions such as (harming) the common good or the public interest it becomes clear why the ‘classical’ idea should be revisited and why the ‘modern’ idea should be revised.

A neo-classical approach

There have been various attempts to overcome the limitations inherent in all too narrow or too wide approaches and definitions of political corruption. Most of them are to be found in a family of approaches labelled ‘neo-classical’, ‘post-positivist’, ‘cultural’ or ‘constructivist’. The various labels point to different common characteristics that are particularly advantageous for investigating changing public values and perceptions of political corruption, especially in historical context. The core of these approaches is a focus on the contextual and contingent nature of political corruption and its various definitions (De Graaf, et al., 2010b: 99). Tänzler (2007) advocates a cultural approach as he investigates the social realities of how political corruption is perceived. Sissener (2001) advocates an ‘anthropological’ perspective and discusses how cultural or anthropological differences (between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ societies for instance) have different opinions on what is corrupt. Foremost in theorizing about a neo-classical approach (I will stick to this term for reasons of clarity) is the American political scientist Michael Johnston who also coined the phrase. Johnston (1996: 329) believes that definitions that classify (individual) behaviour are often too rigid to apply to all times and places. Adapting them to specific historical contexts is likely “to yield categories vague in content and soft at their boundaries”. This should be changed.

Johnston’s approach encompasses all major ‘standards of goodness’ as presented earlier. First it is ‘neo-classical’ as he aims to combine classical notions of the corruption of the body politic with modern notions of individual political corruption (legal, office-centred, economic, public interest etc.). Johnston sees political corruption and improper official conduct as a political and moral issue and not solely as individual acts of public officials. He has a view that is broad enough to encompass wrongful individual behaviour as well as the political and social processes that define it as such. Any definition of political corruption should, according to Johnston, therefore not just look at specific individual actions but at the broader contextual processes of consent, influence, and authority as well (1996: 329-331). Second, his approach is ‘post-positivist’ and ‘cultural’ in that it is not after one truth or out to

find and agree on one correct definition or meaning of a concept (De Graaf, et al., 2010b: 98). Johnston states that “corruption cannot be defined exclusively by legal, market or public opinion criteria” and adds that “a concept of corruption has to be flexible enough to include all these sets of norms” (1996: 333). His definition of political corruption (which is adopted in this study) then becomes “the abuse, according to the legal or social standards constituting a society’s system of public order, of a public role or resource for private benefit” (Ibid.). As such Johnston combines the commonly separated standards such as public office, market, public interest, public opinion into one. Third, the approach is ‘social constructivist’ because it is based on the idea that political corruption is defined through the contestation of aforementioned concepts in specific places and periods. ‘Corrupt’ is what is *considered* corrupt at a certain place and time and there is no universal or specific definition we can or should all agree upon. In this social constructivist view political corruption is understood as having a social meaning that must be understood in relation to its social setting. This means that its content differs between societies, and groups and individuals within societies and throughout history. Various political and social forces construct the public order of any society. Law, general interest, public opinion and economical motivation are all factors that influence the public domain and each other in one way or another. The neo-classical approach invites us to “consider not only how laws affect behaviour, but also how they might come to fit established customs” (Johnston, 1996: 331). We are invited to investigate how the content of notions such as (but not limited to) ‘abuse’, ‘public role’ and ‘private benefit’ are contested in specific places and periods.

According to Johnston concepts such as political corruption therefore acquire their true meaning in clashes between different views on what is right or wrong. Political corruption is socially constructed because of disagreements between fundamentally different notions of what government or administration should or should not be about. Johnston’s combination of broad and narrow allows for a kind of flexibility that is needed if we are ever to trace changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. It is precisely the contextual nature of political corruption that rules out any universal understanding or specific definition of political corruption. In a way only value judgments that change in time, place and setting, determine what constitutes political corruption in any practical historical sense. A neo-classical approach does not try and find any single meaning, standard or definition over time but focuses instead on how political corruption is actually constructed and how it acquires meaning in social-political context and contest. As such, as I aim to show in this study, the main characteristics of the neo-classical approach make it very suitable for historical research on changing public values and political corruption.

1.4 Existing work, voids and opportunities

The need for a renewed and different (i.e., historical and neo-classical) focus on changing public values and political corruption becomes even clearer when we contrast the research presented in this study with existing historical work. Such a comparison is provided below and essentially pertains to relevance. It serves to situate this research in its wider historiographic context and demonstrates that while we can build on and learn much from what has already been uncovered, there undoubtedly is a need for the (new) questions, research and approach presented in this study.

Existing historical research on political corruption and morality of Dutch public administration can roughly be divided in three categories. First, there is a small category of single descriptive historical case studies on Dutch political corruption (cf. Al & Van Cruyningen, 1992; Boels, 1988; Japikse, 1907; Van Maanen, 1997). A second category involves studies of political corruption as part of wider explorations and different questions and contexts. This makes sense because political corruption is a phenomenon that pervades society and can accordingly be studied in the context of a wide variety of disciplines, topics and questions. It often appears in historical research on crime, punishment and the legal system of the Low Countries, most notably in the work of Blockmans (1995), Diederiks (1976, 1988, 1989, 1992), Huussen (1976) and Egmont and Faber (2001; 1989). Historical perspectives on political corruption have also appeared in the context of studies on state formation. Blockmans (1985) famously discussed how the weak Burgundian state needed informal and personal (i.e., ‘corrupt’) systems to relieve strain and tension between highly autonomous layers of administration.

At the same time the resulting patronage kept that state weak and also enabled different rival parties to access or disrupt each other’s powerbase. De Wit (1965) discussed political corruption in his description of the ‘state formation struggle’ between aristocracy and democracy (see also chapters five and seven below) and Witte van Citters (1873) and Schutte (1978) did the same in discussions of the forming of oligarchies in the Dutch cities. Huiskamp (1995) investigated gift giving and patronage as essential parts of establishing a relationship between centre and periphery in the early modern Netherlands. A similar perspective was taken by Gabriëls (1989) who shows how elaborate structures of patronage in the second half of the eighteenth century were increasingly used in competition between different opposing factions in the Dutch Republic. His descriptions of ‘Lieutenant-Stadholders’ (see also chapter seven below) offer many interesting perspectives of Dutch political corruption. A third category of historical research on Dutch political corruption consists of overviews. First and foremost (essentially one of its kind) is work by Raadschelders and Van der Meer (2003) who traced academic attention for political corruption in the Netherlands in the post-Napoleonic era, provided a literature review and categorized types of political corruption that occurred in the Netherlands from 1800 onwards. Other works provide an overview of political-administrative culture of the Netherlands in which sometimes played a recurring role (cf. Hendriks & Toonen, 1998; Randerad & Wolffram, 1998). Others have provided overviews of ‘political culture’ in specific periods in which corruption sometimes plays a part as well. Klein (1995) discusses the Patriot era and Lok (2009) discusses the period of the Restoration in the Netherlands (1813 – 1820). Van Zanten (2004) provides a view on the period 1813 – 1840. Recently Van den Heuvel (2010) also published an impression of corruption and morality in the Netherlands for the seventeenth and eighteenth century. For an overview of corruption in the Netherlands in most recent times, the work of Huberts and Nelen (2005) has to be mentioned.

The final context for historical research into Dutch political corruption is that of bureaucracy, bureaucratization and Dutch political culture. Numerous studies on these topics pay attention to political corruption and moral behaviour of public officials. In the nineteenth century Fruin (1885: 389ff; 1904: 189) investigated and condemned the corrupt practices of city regent elites. In the first half of the twentieth century, Elias studied the Amsterdam regents to the same effect (1923; see also Van Sas, 1992). More recent explorations have been made by Diederiks (1977), Schama (1977: 48ff), Van Deursen (2004a: 277), Van Bockel (2009) or De Jong (1987: 56). A continuous line in these studies is the importance of obtaining office in the

political culture of the early modern Dutch Republic (see chapters four and five) that meant that administrators of all sorts attempted to abuse their powers and offices. They could for instance hand them out to friends or family (nepotism), sell them (venality) or occupy multiple offices at the same time using so-called substitutes (cf. De Jong, 1987: 52-53). Corruption in the context of bureaucracy, bureaucratization, collegial administrative structures and the 'game' of obtaining offices is also discussed by Raadschelders (1992: 28-31), De Vries (1977), Van IJsselmuiden (1988), Boels (1993) and Knevel (2001). Dekker (1986) provided a rare and early historical contribution to our understanding of political corruption.

The aforementioned body of existing historical work is of course highly valuable. It provides crucial in-depth images of political corruption and morality in times past. However, the brief overview presented in the above also exposes some problems. This especially goes for the older literature that provided rather one-sided and occasionally subjective moralizing or judgmental images of the supposed immorality of early modern Dutch public administration. Te Velde (2005) noticed how 'the early historians' (mainly Fruin and Elias) were quick to present an image of a closed, pedantic, hypocritical clique of regent administrators who simply served their own needs. This image remained dominant well into the 1970s through writings of Rogier (1954: 292-311), Blok (2002: II: 267, 423-427; III, 376-378, 431-437), Geyl (1938: 105) and Jan and Annie Romein (1973: 247, 260ff). For all the good these studies have brought us, they also present some difficulties. Most importantly, as noted by Te Velde (2005: 4-5), this concerns the fact that critique of early modern public administrative morality has been anachronistic at times since it has as much to say about present as past conceptions of what is right or wrong behaviour. Many of these studies found that public administrators were 'corrupt' according to the authors' own standards and ideas (Rogier's Catholicism and Jan Romein's Marxism must have affected their view on political corruption). Given the somewhat biased nature of many of these studies we have to wonder whether the image they provided is correct. Furthermore, these images still often persist until this very day.

In recent decades various scholars have dealt with this problem by taking a prosopographic approach that is, in part, also taken in the following. Among others, Roorda (1979), Kooijmans (1985, 1987), De Jong (1985, 1987), Prak (1985) and Gabriëls (1986, 1989) attempted to understand the world of the regent administrators (see chapters four and five) according to past standards instead of condemning it outright according to their own. Rather than providing the 'old' stereotypical image of the corrupt regent, they tried to understand administration in its own historical context. Roorda, for instance, showed how the regents in the Dutch Republic saw plans of civic reform and increased influence of wider parts of the population in administration as detrimental to the health of the Republic. Administration was meant for insiders who had the necessary connections and know-how. According to existing beliefs at the time it was morally fully acceptable to keep offices within families in order to avoid 'unnecessary' conflict that would only slow things down (Roorda, 1979: 25). This change in historical attitude in recent years (i.e., a stronger focus on existing practical attitudes to public administration in their original context) is related to what Van Eijnatten and Wagenaar (2007) have called the 'cultural turn' and is exemplified by authors such as Kooijmans (2000), Panhuysen (2005) and Janssen (2005) who have taken a 'micro-perspective' on the history of ideas and administrative practice and focused on such things as values inherent in education of administrators or the practical (structural-functionalist) workings of patronage. They thereby provided a more authentic, explicit and detailed view of public values and political corruption in the past. This 'cultural turn' obviously opens up promising ways to examine changing public

values and perceptions of political corruption. Taking a historical ‘micro-perspective’ (as is done in the case studies of this book as well) allows us to view morality as it was actually perceived and advocated at the time.

A second and perhaps more obvious problem with existing work on Dutch political corruption that needs to be dealt with is that there has been relatively little of it (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2003: 182). Also, apart from a very limited number of case studies (see earlier), most authors seem to have treated corruption and public values merely as a side event in the context of other topics and/or did not consider it worthwhile to systematically, comparatively or theoretically study changing public values. Little existing research is systematic in nature or regards political corruption (or public values for that matter) as a topic worthy of independent study. Historical or social-scientific research that is specifically and/or exclusively focused on and designed for investigating changing values and perceptions of Dutch political corruption is virtually non-existent, with the obvious exception of my colleagues in our shared wider research project. This has resulted in fragmentation and one struggles to find more than isolated impressions of past assumptions and interpretations of corrupt behaviour and public morality. While some (cf. Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001) provide discussions on public and/or political morality this largely remains descriptive and non-comparative.

Other ‘big’ works on the history of Netherlands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance by Israel (1998), Schama (1977) or Van Sas (2005) also seem to deal with public values, political corruption and morality as side issues instead of topics in their own right. Hardly ever are these impressions in some way connected to each other, either by means of direct comparison or through the use of shared theoretical and/or methodological frameworks. Comparisons over time are almost never made and when overviews are given (cf. Van den Heuvel, 2010) they often – purposefully, it has to be said – lack systematic, comparative or explanatory frameworks. This is a problem noticed elsewhere as well. According to De Haan and Van den Heuvel (2003: 27) a lack of systematic historical-administrative research, for instance, has to do with the fact that political corruption is difficult to trace, is often out of view and things we would now consider to be corrupt were not always regarded as such in times past. As a result they seem (too) pessimistic about future opportunities to rectify the situation. A solution to the problem of a lack of systematic, comparative or theoretical analysis can however be found and was already present in early theoretically inclined social scientific work on the subject in the 1970s (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2003: 184-185). Scholars such as Brasz and Hoetjes discussed political corruption from systematic perspectives of, respectively, sociology and anthropology. From the 1990s onwards, Huberts and Van den Heuvel took a more public administration and integrity-oriented perspective (cf. Van den Heuvel & Huberts, 1994; Van den Heuvel, et al., 2002; Huberts, 1994).

Apart from these efforts more recent years have seen a rekindling of systematic, theoretically inspired work on political corruption from a combined historical and social-scientific perspective (cf., among others, Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008; Kerkhoff, et al., 2010; Kroeze, 2008; Nützenadel, 2009; Schattenberg, 2009; Von Thiessen, 2009; Wagenaar, 2003, 2008, 2010; Wagenaar & Van der Meij, 2005). This present study takes further steps in a similar direction and, finally, aims to add to attempts that use Dutch history to explain and understand changing public values and political corruption in a wider European or global context. In Palmer’s seminal work on the Atlantic revolutions he exclaimed that “it is unfortunate that the affairs of the smaller European peoples do not enter more fully into our general histories, for

their experience has been illuminating” (1974: 323). Similar sentiments have been conveyed by Leeb who wrote how “those ill-assorted, ever-quarrelling, often disunited United Provinces stand as a special model to which the course of history and politics elsewhere can frequently and fruitfully be compared” (1973: 247). The atypical nature of the Dutch Republic (see chapter four) seems to be a main reason for this (Davids & Lucassen, 1995; Van Sas, 2005: 272-273; Schama, 1977: 15-23). Dutch history can be and has often been an interesting background from which various phenomena can be viewed that occurred outside its borders. Ample evidence for this can be found in a recent special issue of the *Low Countries Historical Review* (Van Berkel, et al., 2010). Strangely enough changing public values and perceptions of political corruption have not been among topics believed to be suitable for international comparison (unlike, for instance, water management, emerging capitalism and colonialism or tolerance and secularity, cf. Frijhoff, 2010: 7). This seems to be in line with a general trend in which discussions on developing public morality and changing public values in the early modern and modern age tend to focus on Germany/Prussia (cf. Rosenberg, 1958; Wagner, 2005), France (cf. Ford, 1953; Simon, 2001) or England (cf. Rivers, 1991; Wilson, 2007). Cameralism (the early modern science of administration with distinctly normative elements) is for instance hardly ever associated with the Netherlands. This research seeks to remedy this situation. While it does not compare Dutch morality of the period with other countries, a first necessary step in that promising direction does require more knowledge of Dutch morality and/or public debates on issues of political corruption and administrative moral reform.

2 Administrative History and Public Value Dynamics

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I discussed the two main intertwined objects of research of this study: public values and political corruption. I also discussed the advantages of Johnston's 'neo-classical' approach and pointed towards some gaps in existing Dutch historiography. One remaining problem or gap is that Johnston's approach is essentially without theory. In fact this is both its strength and its weakness. While the approach allows for contextual and contingent interpretations of changing public values and perceptions of political corruption in different times and places it (purposefully) does not provide explanations for potential change. However, since it is imperative to go beyond description and to also explain public value dynamics (see for more on this matter chapter three, section five) theory (as well as a heuristic device, see chapter three) is needed to fill what I call the 'Johnstonian hollow'. In this second chapter I first argue that this requires a better understanding of the meaning and use of administrative history in general and use of a combination of historical investigation and social-scientific explanation in particular. Second, I argue how two specific instances of such a combination (offered by Weber's ideal type of bureaucratization and by historical institutionalism) are particularly relevant for investigating public value dynamics.

2.2 History and public value dynamics

The previous chapter showed how past notions of a public-private divide were often blurred or vague, depending on changing notions of 'publicness' and/or 'community'. Such unclear and ever shifting notions of 'publicness' are inevitably derived from unclear notions of 'government', 'state' or 'public administration'. In the past (much like today) these were highly abstract terms (Lok, 2009: 23). Of course we should not conclude from this that public administration did not exist in history. Rather, there was already public administration before there was any public-private divide or any notion of government or state as we know them today. Essentially, public administration has been around for as long as humans have lived together (cf. Finer, 1997; Lynn, 2006: 43; White, 1955: 1). The existence of past Dutch public administration is evident in a complex network of institutions, organizations and public officials, from kings and parliaments to water boards and tax collectors. It encompassed a wide range of activities, and operated on multiple horizontal and vertical levels. To define past public administration one should consider the fact that it has always been shaped according to what people believed belonged to it. White argued that public administration always reflects the political and cultural values of its environment (cf. Moynihan, 2009: 813). This meant that public administration has always been the outcome of implicit and explicit value choices, binding people to and with policy amidst rather fluid boundaries of public and private, state

and society and politics and administration. When studying past public administration one should therefore pay attention to all those organizations and actors that have been experienced or perceived as ‘government’, who provided a ‘public service’. Public administration should accordingly be defined as the complex set of institutions and activities in society which attributes value and provides binding direction to society (Wagenaar, et al., 2011b: 16). The scope of past and present public administration is therefore best understood in terms of the reach (or binding power) of its decisions and in terms of the value it attributes to specific acts and processes.

Such a wide definition of (past) public administration requires a broad but inclusive definition of administrative history. The one adopted in this study is coined by Raadschelders. It is based on the same structural and normative elements that define public administration itself (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1992: 328). It is defined as “the study of structures and processes in and ideas about government as they have existed or have been wanted in the past and the actual and ideal place of public functionaries therein” (Raadschelders, 2000: 7). Such a definition enables us to ask descriptive as well as explanatory questions about structure, functioning and functionaries of public administration in the past and why and how administration in its various forms developed. It also asks normative questions about ideas regarding government and administration. It is, furthermore, precisely the combination of description and explanation that makes this approach to the study of administrative history suitable for the purposes of this study. Others already convincingly argued the case how historical research benefits the study of public administration (cf. among many others Caldwell, 1955; Raadschelders, 1994, 2010; Raadschelders, et al., 2000; Tilly, 2009; Vaughn, 1985) and I do not need to repeat this here. Instead, I wish to focus on those arguments that underscore the use and benefits of social-scientifically inspired historical research for the specific purpose of studying public value dynamics. Crucial in those arguments is the sometimes understated if not ignored worth of a combination of historical ‘descriptive’ and social-scientific ‘explanatory’ study in research on public value dynamics (see chapter three paragraph five on the related and more specific issues of explanation and causality).

2.3 A combined approach

Paul Pierson once stated that “to assert that history matters is insufficient; social scientists want to know why, where and how” (2000a, 72). In line with this view we can say that one of the most important advantages of systematic comparative administrative-historical research is theoretical in nature; it helps us reach ever higher (though never complete) levels of generalization (cf. Caldwell, 1955: 454; Raadschelders, et al., 2000: 781). Understanding and explaining long term social processes such as value dynamics thus requires comparative historical work and to falsify, build and test theories one needs explicit use of theory and models (cf. Laslett, 1980: 225). This, at least, is one of the fundamental assumptions of this study (see earlier) and is visible in the work of various scholars such as Luton (1999: 206), Raadschelders (1994, 2000; 2000), Skocpol (2003; 1980), Pierson (2003, 2004; 2002), Thelen (1999, 2002, 2003) or Mahoney and Rüschemeyer (2003a). In various ways such authors all venture across ‘the dividing line’ between history and the social sciences in their efforts to combine historical inquiry with social-scientific methods and theories of interpretation, understanding and explanation.

In this study I underscore the basic idea that conscientious use of history and explicit use of theory can lead to improvements in our knowledge of social, political-administrative processes and developments (such as value dynamics) in historical context. A combination of administrative-historical inquiry and the social-scientific study of public administration is, however, not entirely uncontested. In fact, depictions of the stereotypical historian and social scientist sometimes lead to unfortunate and unnecessary misunderstandings and distrust between the disciplines (cf. Laslett, 1980: 214-215; Lynn, 2006: 21-22). Essentially this boils down to the supposed distinction between historical fact-finding, description and ‘story-telling’ on the one hand and social scientific theorizing, explanation and deductive reasoning on the other. It is the stereotypical (i.e., not factual) opposition between Leopold von Ranke’s (1795 – 1886) “wie es eigentlich gewesen” (cf. Vierhaus, 1977) and Max Weber’s “warum es eigentlich passiert ist” (cf. Raadschelders, 2000: 37). In such a way, the historian who refuses to generalize by means of theory is juxtaposed to the social scientist who aims at understanding, explaining and providing – at least – law-like generalizations. The stereotypical historian accuses the stereotypical social scientist of oversimplifying, not paying attention to unique detail, and bending historical reality to suit the theory. The social scientist is accused of providing ‘Procrustean solutions’ (after the Greek myth of Theseus and Procrustes), i.e., tailoring data to fit the container. Reversely, the social scientist accuses the historian of being too descriptive and of not generalizing and theorizing enough. The debate is about finding harmony between generalization on the one hand while preserving historical detail on the other, or, as Laslett (1980: 219) has put it: “administrative historical research faces problems of the seeming contradiction between uniqueness of place and time and efforts to develop generalizations”.

Distinctions between these two extremes are however often not as clear-cut and usually stem from misunderstanding and subsequent unfortunate animosity. This has led authors such as Laslett (1980: 214) and Murphey (1973: 148) to lament that theory and models are often rejected where they could be useful. To them, explicit theoretical formulations can help yield possible answers when historical source material – as is so often the case – is lacking. Similarly, historian David Fischer argued how all historians in fact do and should operate with the aid of preconceived questions, hypotheses, ideas and assumptions. Why, he asked, “should a historian be supposed to go a-wandering in the dark forest of the past, gathering facts like nuts and berries, until he has enough to make a general truth?” (1970: 4). Of course many have taken such questions at heart; investigating the many shades of grey and situations of overlap. Not all historians shun away from working with causality, theory and explanations (Ranke himself for instance believed in the intervening hand of God in history) and not all social scientists are averse to empirical and/or descriptive historical study (this was the basis of much of Weber’s work too). Historical-administrative research, as it is carried out in this study as well, needs a little of both: social-scientific study of public administration needs historical methods, skills and knowledge and historical investigation needs models and theory (cf. Laslett, 1980; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1992; Raadschelders, et al., 2000; Stinchcombe, 1978: 13). In this way I follow Charles Tilly (1950) who showed early on that explanatory political science can hardly get anywhere without relying on careful historical analysis. I also follow Raadschelders’ argumentation when he writes that administrative history “teaches the administrative scientist to be cautious and realistic with what is prescribed, and it teaches the historian that individual and unique phenomena acquire meaning in a more interpretative and, perhaps, pattern-seeking framework” (2000: xii).

Taking a combined historical and social-scientific approach to study value dynamics provides essential knowledge of the context of human action, conduct and experience. According to Raadschelders (2000: 9) it “enhances insight in the meaning of human behaviour in relation the contextuality of human action to circumstances of space and time”, meaning that “for a proper understanding of contemporary structures and relations in public administration a geographical and historical setting is of great importance. Such a context does not only provide identity to individuals but also to institutions [...]. Without knowledge of the geographical and historical context, we are not able to assess the uniqueness nor the comparability of societal phenomena” (Ibid., 9). Similarly, Mahoney and Rüschemeyer (2003b: 9) state that comparative historical analysis is able “to derive lessons from past experiences that speak to the concern of the present”. Another, final, reason is that it provides a long-term perspective which is essential to “see through political and administrative fads and fashions of the day and enables us to get a perspective on more fundamental differences and similarities between present and obsolete structures, operations and policies” (Raadschelders, 2000: 13). Lynn uses administrative history in precisely this way when he argues how “history can reveal the fundamental dynamics of state building” (2006: 22).

A long-term historical perspective on public value change enables us, in other words, to see the more fundamental how’s and why’s of evolving public value systems. In addition, a combined historical and social scientific approach that looks for mechanisms and processes has much to offer because assessing value dynamics means judging motives, intentions and context at certain moments in time (cf. Moodie, 1989: 875-876). This is explained well by Moynihan who notes how there has always been vigorous debate about the relevance, meaning, and application of administrative values at any given point in time. Because of this, Moynihan says, “we need better historical accounts of the debate over administrative values, capable of linking these debates to the broader environment [...]” (2009: 820). Beck-Jørgensen and Bozeman likewise notice the disadvantage of quoting values out of (historical) context because this leads to the removal of values “from the message or argument of which they form a part, thus robbing them of specific meaning” (2007: 357-358). Such arguments indicate that values, expectations, norms and rules are by definition relative and contextually and temporally determined and therefore need historical contextual analysis. The buying and selling of public offices among family or professional relations through patronage and nepotism were, for instance, standard and acceptable practices for long periods of Dutch history (see chapter four and De Jong, 1987: 53). This indicates, finally, that one should have an emphasis on change, continuity and diversity in historical processes (cf. Raadschelders, 2000: 88; Tholfsen, 1967: 6-7) which often coincide and influence each other.

From the previous discussion on the meaning and use of administrative history in general and a combination of historical investigation and social-scientific explanation in particular, I now turn to the second part of this chapter. In the following I argue how two specific instances of such a combination are particularly relevant to investigating public value dynamics, which are therefore adopted in this study. The first consists of theory offered by Weber’s ideal type of bureaucratization. The second consists of insights taken from historical institutionalism. Together they complete the theoretical framework of this study (and thereby fill the ‘Johnstonian hollow’, see earlier) that is applied to the cases of political corruption. It should, importantly, already be kept in mind that different theoretical models can be applied depending on the case study at hand. Every theory or model has its own application and every case therefore has its own model that is best suitable to provide explanation.

2.4 Ideal type and bureaucratization

History, as Raadschelders and others noted (2000: 785), “has no explanatory theories of its own. It is a discipline that borrows its theories from others and then applies them to historical data”. One such explanatory theory involves the use of an ideal type, introduced by Weber, to explain and assess the rise and growth of bureaucracy (as administrative apparatus as well as a specific form of organization). Weber’s theoretical model will be used in this study (most explicitly in chapter six) because of its explanatory value when investigating changing public values in the context of increasing bureaucratization between 1748 and 1813. As a tool to help establish meaningful relations, Weber used an ideal-typical construct to “move between sociological generalization and historical differentiation” (Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 26). While not real itself, or even a description of reality, an ideal type is an abstraction partly based on empirical observations which is used as a means to interpret (historical) reality. It can be used as a way of generalization, to look for regularities between events in different contexts of time and place. It can also be used as way to organize or structure the qualitative elements that are always a part of social-scientific explanation (reasons, assumptions, intentions, meanings etc.). Third, it can be used as a measure or benchmark for historical reality. Comparing historical reality with the ideal type can help explain the why, how and when of events and processes (Van Braam, 1989: 38; Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 26).

Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy is, for the three reasons mentioned above, among the most often used theoretical and methodological tools in the historical study of public administration. It is especially useful when studying bureaucratic organization in the past as contemporary organization theories do not provide enough possibilities for this (Raadschelders, 1990: 123). To Weber, history showed a gradual development towards bureaucratic authority and administration because bureaucracy was the most efficient and rational of all forms of organization. He converted the consequences of legal-rational authority into a ‘list’ of characteristics of bureaucracy. The characteristics are ideal-typical: they might not ever have existed in their purest form and also need not have occurred simultaneously. Weber’s idea of bureaucracy has been explained and operationalized by various scholars (cf. Albrow, 1970; Mayntz, 1965, 1971), but in this study I choose the operationalisation of Van Braam (1977) because he extended Weber’s list to twenty characteristics and also made a clear distinction and schematic division (see figure 1 below) between bureaucracy as a type of organization and as civil service, i.e., the totality of civil servants. In addition, Van Braam’s operationalization offers, arguably, the most extensive operationalization of Weber’s ideal type. Furthermore, it is an operationalization that has proven its worth in various studies on bureaucracy and bureaucratization in the Netherlands (cf. Van Braam, 1957, 1977; Van der Goot & De Jong, 1982; Raadschelders, 1990; Wagenaar, 1997). In line with the general use of an ideal type, the list of characteristics compiled by Weber and Van Braam allows us to generalize, organize and compare in order to analyze past *and* present bureaucracy and bureaucratization. Most important for the purposes of this study (see especially chapter six) is that the ideal type allows us to better understand changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. Before explaining why this is the case I first briefly outline each characteristic as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. Weber on characteristics of bureaucratic organization (with the additions by Van Braam (1977: 459) and Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996: 97).

Characteristics of functioning (<i>legale Herrschaft</i>)	Characteristics of officials (<i>Bürokratische Verwaltungstab</i>)
i. continuous administrative activity, ii. formal rules and procedures, iii. clear and specialized offices, iv. hierarchical organization, v. use of written documents, vi. adequate supply of means, vii. non-ownership of office, viii. procedures of rational discipline and control.	ix. office held by individual officials, x. who are subordinate, and xi. appointed, and xii. are knowledgeable, have expertise, xiii. assigned by contractual agreement, xiv. in a tenured (secure) position, xv. who fulfil their office as their main or only job, and xvi. work in a career system, xvii. are rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money, xviii. are rewarded according to rank, xix. are promoted according to seniority, and xx. work under formal protection of their office.

The first group – the characteristics of functioning – consists of eight characteristics. *Continuous administrative activity* (i)[†] denotes the formal presence of functionaries and the regularity of their work. *Formal rules and procedures* (ii) denote (a) rules to control certain social-economic relations (ordinances, statutes etc.) and (b) instructions for officials (job descriptions). The characteristic of *clear and specialized offices* (iii) is meant to assess the temporary or permanent nature of the office. All sorts of offices are imaginable, from ad-hoc to permanent ones (cf. Van Braam, 1977), and qualifications and desired competences vary accordingly. *Hierarchical organization* (iv) is the formal structure of the organization as it is expressed in chain of command and different positions of authority. Various hierarchical levels of functionaries can be seen throughout history and across organizations. The *use of written documents* (v) pertains to the matter whether decisions are written down or not. *Adequate supply of means* (vi) relates to the question whether the means of office (pen, paper, ink, a desk, an office etc.) were provided for by the authorities or by the officials themselves. This characteristic is, of course, also useful to assess the public (means are provided by authorities) or private (means are purchased by official himself) nature of an office. The *non-ownership of office* (vii) is a related characteristic. Was an office the property of an individual, who could then sell it or hand it out as he pleased or was the office owned by the authorities so they were the one hiring and firing? The final characteristic of functioning is the existence of *procedures of rational discipline and control* (viii). We should think of (a) direct, non-systematic and personal control and (b) systematic or periodical, bureaucratic control and supervision.

The second group – the characteristics of officials working in a bureaucracy – is made up of a further twelve characteristics. Whether the *office is held by individual officials* or not (ix) is important to assess the mono- or polycratic nature of administration. The question of *being subordinate* (x) is important to assess the relationship between an official and his superiors and

[†] Numbers in between brackets refer to the Roman numerals in Figure 1.

subordinates. *Being appointed* (xi) means whether someone has been appointed or whether he has, for instance, paid to acquire the office. *Being knowledgeable and having expertise* (xii) is another vital characteristic. In what way, for instance, are experience and ability important to acquire an office and how was this measured or enforced? Also: what did it mean for an official to be knowledgeable? What was expected of him? *To be assigned by contractual agreement* (xiii) is important when assessing the voluntary or forced nature of someone's activities. *Having a tenured (secure) position* (xiv) denotes whether someone was, for instance, appointed for life or only a few months. This, obviously, has important consequences (among others) for the power and influence attached to office and official. The same could be said for *fulfilling your office as your main or only job* (xv) and whether you *work in a career system* (xvi) with possibilities of promotion. *Being rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money* (xvii) is also important for assessing the public/private nature of an office. Many early modern 'law-enforcement' officials were, for instance, paid from fines they collected themselves rather than from salaries they received from the authorities. Needless to say (see also below) this caused an often unhealthy mix of public office and private money, increasingly a key ingredient in the occurrence of political corruption. *Being rewarded according to rank* (xviii), *promoted according to seniority* (xix) and (xx) *being able to work under the formal protection of your office* are more or less self-explanatory.

Weber's ideal-typical characteristics are often used to understand changes in the way organizations function. They serve to help understand processes of bureaucratization. Ideally, the more reality correlates with the various ideal-typical characteristics, the more bureaucratic an organization becomes. In this way bureaucratization is a useful tool to investigate many processes, such as rationalization, professionalization, specialization, structural reform in organizations or the growth of government. However, while previous research using Weberian ideal-type characteristics of bureaucratization has proven useful to determine and analyze the nature of such changes in early modern Dutch public administration (Raadschelders, 1990; Wagenaar, 1997), morality was (deliberately) never a specific topic in these studies. It seems strange, however, that the moral dimension of bureaucratization is often forgotten (Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 28) if only because bureaucratization is so closely related to changes in ethics, morality and individual behaviour. The various characteristics of bureaucratization can be employed to investigate changes in morality. Bureaucratization often comes about precisely *because of* ethical reasons. It often reflects, fosters and furthers (renewed) emphasis on morality in public administration, as we will see in the later case studies. Many institutional and organizational changes and rearrangements either directly focus on implementing moral guidelines or indirectly reflect conceptions of correct public official behaviour. The design and introduction of new administrative and/or organizational layers and the introduction of new rules and regulations are almost always meant to ensure a better operating system for any public organization; also, I argue in this study, in a moral sense. A separation of public office and private money, for instance, serves to curb and counter corruption by public officials. The use of instructions and oaths of office is, similarly, often meant to ensure the proper behaviour of civil servants towards their superiors and their adherence to the law. A stricter sense of hierarchy should help improve and clarify accountability and responsibility. A ban on members of the same family holding office in a two council shows the importance of being loyal towards the authorities instead of one's friends and family.

Bureaucratization and attention for improving morality in public administration are, therefore, often two sides of the same coin: they can feed off each other and be mutually strengthening (cf. Kerkhoff, 2011: 14-17). Furthermore, the employment of characteristics of bureaucratization in political corruption scandals provides a 'before and after' view on cases of political corruption that allows us to assess changing public values and perceptions. Typically a process of value change might start with the realization by a certain group or individual that a certain act is corrupt followed by bureaucratic changes to the system. We must then ask ourselves what exactly changed and what were explicitly articulated reasons or motivations for this change? Interpreting the motives behind such changes and reforms allows us to see which (often implicit rather than explicit) public values and perceptions of political corruption actually existed in the past and how (if at all) they acquired new meaning in the process. A closer look at new or improved 'requirements of office' following scandals helps us to investigate new perceptions of proper public official conduct and the interaction between bureaucratization and public value change.

2.5 Historical institutionalism

A second and final element to aid our understanding of public value dynamics is offered by historical institutionalism. This present study is ultimately focused on assessing change or, as Laslett (1980: 220) wrote, to link "historically specific phenomena with general historical processes". It is largely about when, why and how processes of moral or public value change evolve over time and is concerned, to quote Skocpol and Somers, "with an understanding of societal dynamics and epochal transformations of cultures and social structures" (1980: 174). Often – and increasingly in the last few decades (cf. Raadschelders, 1998: 566) – efforts to explain social change have included a comparative-historical approach and the use of middle-range theories (see also below in chapter three, paragraph five). Crucial in this development, especially since the 1980s, have been studies based on historical institutional analysis. Likewise, this present study uses historical institutionalism in its aim to better understand change of public values over a longer period of time. The approach offers, I argue, plausible avenues to at least partly explain the intricate relationship between changing institutions (being understood here as values as well as organizations and individuals, see below) and changing public values in Dutch administration between 1748 and 1813.

Hall and Taylor provided an overview of three kinds of institutionalism commonly used to assess and explain social change. First is rational choice institutionalism that emphasizes the role of strategic interaction by individuals driven by rational calculus in which they "canvass all possible options before selecting those that bring most benefit" (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938). Second there is sociological (or cultural) institutionalism that is, contrary to the rational choice approach, based on the assumption that institutional forms and procedures are often *not* adopted because they are more efficient or because they are "in line with some transcendent 'rationality'" (Ibid., 946-947). In this view, people are culture-driven rather than rational 'utility maximizers' and institutional practices originate and change not because of rational calculus of means-ends efficiency but because they enhance social legitimacy of the organization or its participants. This is what March and Olsen (2004) called the logic of social appropriateness. The third kind distinguished by Hall and Taylor is historical institutionalism in which a broad conceptualization of the relationship between institutions, individual behaviour and social

change is taken. Contrary to the other two it is more eclectic because it uses elements from both rational choice and sociological institutionalism. It also defines institutions in a broader way as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938). In this way the definition is able to include organizational structures, individual persons and groups as well as norms, values, or perceptions. For these reasons historical institutionalism has much to offer. Its aim and ability to combine calculus and culture in determining the relation between institutions and social change is well equipped to deal with complex institutional origins and change, based on the idea that institutional origins are dependent on an existing institutional world that partly circumscribes the range of options. Also, historical institutionalism emphasizes the importance of asymmetries of power and holds that individuals do not always interact freely, rational and/or strategic, nor are they always bounded by established routines, culture or environment. Instead, historical institutionalism argues, “institutions give some groups or interests disproportionate access to the decision making process” (Ibid., 940).

A historical institutional approach enables asking and answering important questions such as “why something has or has not happened or why certain structures or patterns take shape in some times and places but not in others” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 696). In addition, it is able to explain “variation in important or surprising patterns, events, or arrangements rather than accounting for human behaviour without regard to context or modelling very general processes presumed to apply at all times and places (Ibid., 696-697). With historical institutionalism “deeper understanding of causal relationships can often be achieved through a more intense and focused examination of a number of carefully selected cases” (Thelen, 2002: 94). Pierson (2003: 187) for instance notes how causal chains are often not straightforward, in a direct line from x to y. Rather it is often that “x triggers sequence a, b, c which yields y”. To him, therefore, a causal chain “is about a sequence of key developments over extended periods of time since it might take a while to get from x to y through a, b, and c”. This is an appealing approach to investigating public value change as it comes close to the way in which social reality works. Social processes take a long time to unfold, are often cumulative and take place at different speeds and/or levels. Because it is unwise to focus only on the immediate and the present, the main strength of historical institutionalism lies in its contextual, long-term and comparative approach (cf. Thelen, 1999). According to Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 693, 703) it “makes visible and understandable the overarching contexts and interacting processes that shape and reshape states, politics and public policymaking” and allows one to “look at organizational and institutional configurations where others only look at settings in isolation”. It “draws attention to large-scale, lengthy but slow moving processes”.

Most importantly, the aforementioned means that historical institutionalism pays serious attention to time and long-term processes where other approaches often look at “slices of time or short-term manoeuvres” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 703). Because of this it is able to offer crucial perspectives on diversity, continuity and change. Sometimes past and present are linked by looking for ‘pre-determined paths’ that vary from society to society (Raadschelders, 1998: 569-570). This makes path dependence an essential and highly useful notion within historical institutionalism and within the context of this study. Path dependence is useful in either of two (or both) ways. First it relates to the important realization that decisions and actions in the present have at least partly been shaped and are determined by decisions and actions in the past. Douglas North (1990: 98) expressed this idea when he wrote that “at every step along the way there [are] choices – political and economic – that [provide] real alterna-

tives. Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through time". As Lynn (2006: 3) writes: "public management's historical and contemporary structures, practices and institutions are so intimately interrelated that answers to the foregoing questions require understanding of paths and patterns of national institutional development [...]. Reform, change and adaptation follow centuries of national historical developments". Second, path dependence – together with the notion of 'critical junctures' – offers useful perspectives on the 'interplay' between continuity (slow moving) and radical (fast and sudden) changes in social processes. According to Pierson (2003: 181-184) change is continuous and gradual in social processes in which, sometimes, incremental or cumulative forces have only modest or negligible impact until they reach some critical level which triggers major change. Such major changes have been called critical junctures.

The 'interplay' between path dependence and critical junctures has some explanatory power for understanding change and continuity of processes of public value change. Lynn (2006: 162) explains this when he discusses two distinct narratives of path (continuity) and/or punctuation (change). The first stresses the durability and continuity of administrative institutions (i.e., including values) and the way these institutions have been framed in processes of evolution and change. This narrative focuses on the evolutionary and long-term emergence of (national) administrative values such as legality, representation, participation, accountability or merit. The second stresses often dramatic and occasionally revolutionary changes as institutions evolve. Its focus is on discontinuity and change that transform structures, practices and cultures. Constitutional principles, for example, may endure, but their reflection in public management institutions, values and practices can take different forms.

When we understand institutions primarily as norms, values, perceptions, attitudes and/or assumptions, then historical institutional analysis includes the analysis of value dynamics. When not taken in any deterministic way, path dependence is an useful idea because 'paths' provide us with a better understanding of where we come from, how we are bound or restrained by the past and how historical and social processes evolve. Its combination of calculus and cultural factors is crucial to understand complex historical processes of social change. Also, its focus on the importance of power relations, its emphasis on the fact that existing circumstances in part circumscribe the range of options for institutional creation and its emphasis on induction (looking for evidence in historical archives to find out why actors behaved as they did) are promising. The same can be said for its emphasis on time and sequencing and large-scale, lengthy but slow moving processes, sometimes interrupted by critical changing events. In the history of Dutch politics and public administration these can for instance clearly be distinguished as we will see in chapter four. Before turning to this chapter, however, I will outline the research design and methodological framework of the research presented here in chapter three.

3 Research Design

3.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters I discussed the theoretical and conceptual framework of this study. In this third chapter theory and concepts are tied together in a research design and methodology. In the following I discuss the analytical framework of this study and provide a discussion of the case-study set-up (such as reasons for case selection) and some of the necessary parameters of the research. I also elaborate on the strengths and possibilities of historical case study research and focus explicitly on the issues of explanation and causality. Finally, before elaborating on current and future possibilities for research, I provide a brief discussion on some of the linguistic, practical and theoretical problems inherent in a study such as this.

3.2 A framework for analysis

In the introduction I briefly stated how the research of this book is first and foremost about changing public values between 1748 and 1813 in the Netherlands. Second, I stated how it is about political corruption which serves a double purpose. It is used as a *tool* to study changing public values but is also a *topic* (or rather: a negative public value) in its own right. This resulted in the central research question: *which changes in public values and public value systems become apparent from scandals of political corruption in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813?* In the following I discuss the analytical and methodological framework that is used to answer this question.

Hidden morals, explicit scandals

Public values and political corruption are intangible by their very nature. Personal moral choices and deliberations often remain sealed off from public view, and political corruption – for obvious reasons – usually remains hidden. In all times and places ideas on what is right and wrong tend to be implicitly understood rather than explicitly stated. It is therefore difficult to find out what is right or wrong in specific historical contexts. In study I argue that the problem is solved when we look for explicit views that inevitably occur when things go wrong. After all, what is wrong does often become the explicit subject of debate and discussion. When behaviour of public officials becomes regarded as *unacceptable*, public values and perceptions of political corruption that until then had remained largely hidden are discussed out in the open. For this reason, this study focuses on scandals that caused a significant amount of debate, i.e., political corruption that is discussed by a number of sources of public values (see below).

Of course, a focus on scandal and debate has its downsides. For one, the political corruption in scandals is potentially different from what we might call ‘normal’ political corruption or ‘regular’ crime. This concerns political corruption that was not accompanied by scandal and/or debate because there was no normative ambiguity. It was often solved outside of public court and/or pamphlet wars and never went beyond a small circle of people on the shop floor. It was political corruption in which the only question was whether someone was guilty or not. Since it is of course possible that only a fraction of the political corruption in the province of Holland between 1748 and 1813 turned into a scandal we might therefore miss crucial information as attention is almost inevitably focused on high-profile actors and far reaching affairs instead of low key officials and their ‘petty’, normal or fully ‘institutionalized’ and therefore ‘invisible’ political corruption. An exclusive focus on extraordinary or abnormal instances in scandal and debate might then offer a somewhat distorted view. Related to this is a second possible objection that an explicit focus on scandals inevitably leads to some sort of bias because many scandals occur for political reasons. This potentially causes allegations of political corruption to be either exaggerated or simply made up as they are used as instruments in political debate. This can make it difficult to separate truth from fiction.

Such objections are important. They signal that much political corruption will not and cannot (at least in this study) be taken into account and that allegations can also be fabricated for political ends. At the same time I argue that the benefits of a focus on scandals outweigh such objections and that the objections can, in part, be refuted. First and foremost, as mentioned, a focus on scandals has the benefit of bringing often hidden and implicit public values out into the open. It is precisely because the unacceptable rather than the acceptable is often subject to explicit public debate that the focus of this study has to be on scandals. Public values and explicit perceptions of right and wrong behaviour become apparent in moments of crisis and condemnation. Scandals and the explicit debates and discussions they fuel serve to articulate and show the unacceptable, the unwanted and the intolerable. This, in turn, provides a view of what was accepted, or as Brooks wrote: “the existence of political corruption implies the existence of positive political values” (1970: 61).

Secondly, large scandals – while often focused on high profile actors or events – can and often do reveal ‘normal’ political corruption by different actors on different levels. Examples of this can be found in the large scandals discussed in chapters six and seven, which provide much insight into systematic and highly institutionalized ‘normal’ political corruption. Third, although political motives are indeed often at play this does not have to be the case and, more importantly from a methodological point of view, does not make the public values that are expressed any less noteworthy. Why something is said is not as important as the fact that it is being said at all. In a case investigated by Hoenderboom and Kerkhoff (2008), for example, two rival factions in the Dutch town council of Gorinchem, seem to have accused each other of being guilty of the same wrong behaviour. Both sides argued from or adhered to the same set of values and accused each other of committing the same type of offences. We will see examples of this in the case studies presented here as well (for instance clearly in chapter eight) where accusations of political corruption are obviously hypocritical, ambiguous and politically motivated but this is outweighed by the fact that certain ‘new’ values were in fact mentioned. If we want to look at which public values are mentioned and what perceptions of political corruption can be found then *all* statements to that effect are valuable, whether or not they were true. Admittedly the question why something is being said does become of crucial

importance when assessing the when, how and/or why of changing public values. For this reason the case studies will not ignore the possible impact of political motives.

A focus on scandals has more advantages when investigating the contextual meaning of public values and perceptions of political corruption and fits well with approaches discussed earlier. In chapter one I put forward Johnston's definition of political corruption as "the abuse, according to the legal or social standards constituting a society's system of public order, of a public role or resource for private benefit" (1996: 333). I discussed how this broad and flexible definition was able to catch the contextual and contingent nature of public values. In doing so the definition not only does more justice to the concept of political corruption but also makes it suitable for historical research into changing public values. Crucially, Johnston's definition urges us to look at the interaction between individual abuse of office and legal and social standards of a society's system of public order. It invites us to investigate how the content of notions such as 'abuse', 'public role' and 'private benefit' are contested and thereby acquire meaning in specific times and places.

It is, according to Johnston, precisely in the clash over boundaries that concepts like political corruption acquire their meaning. Johnston wants us to put conflicts over standards at centre stage as "contention over the basic outlines of corruption may be the most important facts to understand, and indeed conflicting conceptions of corruption may be both key weapons in those conflicts and useful diagnostic tools for making sense of political and social change" (2005: 72). He therefore adds: "disputes over the meaning of (such) basic ideas are substantial issues worth careful study in their own right" (Ibid.). Disagreement and contestation over key issues such as the behaviour of public officials demonstrates a lack of consensus but also offers opportunities for change. Scandal, debate and contestation are the result of 'interaction gone wrong' which makes the implicit visible and explicit. Scandals involving public official misconduct become instruments to trace changing public values to try and get a grip on contextual perceptions of political corruption over time. They help to explain why and when certain things are not acceptable anymore. Why and when, for instance, did it become unacceptable for tax officials to have some people pay more taxes than they legally should (see chapter six), for magistrates to only serve their patron and/or oligarchy (see chapter seven) or for public officials to only serve their personal interests (see chapter eight)?

Since public values are only defined as such in some kind of historical context, scandals are a good way of investigating this context (see also Moodie, 1989: 873). Lawrence Sherman's definition of scandal is used in this study. To Sherman a scandal is "a social reaction to the violation of socially invested trust in an institutional role" (1989: 888-889). Sherman explains how a scandalous act is usually not a part of the assumptions to which people are accustomed. In addition, it is often a matter of betrayal of trust that explains the public outrage often witnessed in scandals. When a public official betrays trust it means that a particular part of society deviates from what is considered appropriate and what are 'agreed upon' standards of conduct. This triggers debate that at specific junctures in time (in moments of 'crisis') becomes explicit about which values are regarded as relevant to the behaviour of public officials. In public debates explicit statements are provided on what is the 'public good' or 'proper' behaviour. Since public values are essentially contested (see chapter one) the idea of 'clashes over boundaries' is central to the question what, if anything, occurs when different views on correct or incorrect behaviour collide or come together and how this affects the changing meaning of public values and perceptions of political corruption over time.

3.3 Sources of public values

From scandals it becomes apparent that some sort of boundary between groups or individuals in society is crossed. Scandals generate public debate concerning the unacceptable and the acceptable. However, difficulties immediately arise. There are often many different ‘publics’ (see chapter one) consisting of various actors or groups on different levels and there are as a result many different standards of what is acceptable and what is not. In chapter one I discussed how attempts to define political corruption often centre on taking single standards (law, public opinion etc.) and how a ‘neo-classical’ approach urges us to combine those different standards instead. The same logic applies here: public values are potentially (i.e., not necessarily) linked to a wide and sometimes conflicting variety of perceptions, assumptions and interpretations. To follow the useful terminology of Hoetjes (1977: 12-17; 1982: 27-31) they are derived from or uttered by different sources of public values. In this study I follow Hoetjes in distinguishing four² such sources: best-opinion, public rectitude or the ‘morality of the time’ (1), legal rules of public office (2), public opinion (3) and the functioning codes of the ‘shop floor’ (4).

In the following (chapters five, six, seven and eight) these four sources of public values each (in theory) provide a potentially different view on one and the same act. Sometimes these sources value the same behaviour differently. Consider perfectly legal behaviour that is still considered immoral or ‘corrupt’ by members of wider public. Consider, also, conduct that is acceptable on the ‘shop floor’ among colleagues but condemned by either law or public opinion. When multiple sources of values surrounding a single scandal are taken together (compare Johnson’s use of disagreement and contestation through debate) this provides a detailed and varied view on what is considered abnormal and normal, right and wrong or unacceptable and acceptable in a given context. Finally – as a cautionary note – Hoetjes’ typology of sources of values must not be confused with any of the categorizations or classifications of public values mentioned earlier in chapter one (paragraph two). Instead, it serves a different function. Rather than creating a classification or categorization of public values, it offers a heuristic device to uncover and investigate public values. In addition, it also goes a long way in explaining the contingency and contextuality of public values because it shows what is considered politically corrupt in different social spheres or rather: according to different sources of public values. Finally, it is able to explain public value change when these different spheres are compared and juxtaposed.

Best-opinion and morality of the time

Of the four sources of public values as provided by Hoetjes, the one called best-opinion and the morality of the time (hereafter best-opinion) is perhaps most difficult to delineate. The term seems to have been first used by Senturia who wrote that “where the best-opinion and morality of the time, examining the intent and setting of an act, judge it to represent a sacrifice of public for private benefit, then it must be held to be corrupt” (1935: 449). As such he seemed to argue how the normative judgments of an elite should be used as criteria. Heiden-

² Hoetjes in fact outlined only three sources (law, public opinion and best-opinion). To him, the codes of the shop floor belonged to best-opinion. In the project “Under Construction” we have opted to treat the shop floor as a separate source due to a different interpretation of the source of best-opinion.

heimer was doubtful of this and argued how Senturia's "particularistic emphasis" on the elite as a source of best-opinion, "would require that this fairly large body serve as a jury for each particular case" (1989a: 10). He could have added that it is also problematic – to say the least – to determine who actually belongs to such an elite. While Heidenheimer himself avoids such terms as elite, his own division of 'shades of corruption' ranked the level or seriousness of political corruption as grey, white or black, depending on congruence between elite and mass public opinion on an act of political corruption. Therefore, argues Johnston (2005: 67), it is built on a similar idea as Senturia's. In either case both Senturia (best-opinion based on elite) and Heidenheimer (public opinion of elite and/or masses) are rather vague. Hoetjes' definition of best-opinion seems no less so. He refers to Aikin (1964: 142), who speaks of the "highest ethical standards that exist in a community at a certain moment in time, with regard to integrity and corruption" (Hoetjes, 1982: 30) and seems to conclude that what matters most is the social rank of the person uttering the opinion.

More specifically, Hoetjes mentions government leaders, ministers, official spokesmen and judges but his definition of best-opinion (just like the one proposed by Heidenheimer) still lacks precision. This is especially true as soon as one wishes to use it in a more concise way for empirical research. Johnston (2005: 66) discusses how cultural standards can be unclear or contradictory at the best of times and are likely to vary among segments of society. Whose best-opinion should we be looking at and is it possible (as the 'best' implies) to rank the opinion of one person or group over that of another? If so, we have to ask ourselves how this is to be done. Clarification is provided by Rezsóhazy who has written that values are partly 'produced' by "historically situated outstanding figures or institutions" (2001: 16155). These he calls 'value producers', 'standard setters' and 'sense makers'. They are "great moral personalities, prophets, philosophers, ideologists, intellectuals, scientists, artists, novelists, film directors and institutions such as churches, clubs, learned societies, research centres, universities etc". To Rezsóhazy the task of these individuals and groups is "to answer society's existential questions, in giving meaning to events, in elaborating systems of thought, in proposing new horizons. They supply society and the actors with ideas, objectives, programs, ethical principles, critical judgments etc" (2001: 16155).

Best-opinion can be further specified by comparing it to similar concepts. First, it often takes the form of meta-ethics in the sense that the opinions expressed by 'value producers' are often (heterogeneous) reflections on vague, implicit and sometimes conflicting morality. Much like ethics best-opinion often constitutes explicit articulations and explanations of morality and tends to offer more or less coherent visions on what is right and wrong. Second, best-opinion can be better understood when comparing it to ideology. Then it becomes obvious that many elements generally associated with ideology are true for best-opinion as well. Heywood provides a useful definition of ideology (2007: 11) as "a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power". All ideologies, to Heywood, share three basic elements: they offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a 'world view' (a), they advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the 'good society' (b), and they explain how political change can and should be brought about (c), or, in other words, how to get from (a) to (b).

The links between these three elements offer a view on how ideology (and/or best-opinion) potentially shapes public morality. First, world view and desired future are, for instance linked because 'facts' in ideologies tend to merge into and become confused with

‘values’ (Heywood, 2007: 12-13). In such a way, best-opinion has the ability to cross the gap between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought to be’. Best-opinion, when compared to Heywood’s notion of ideology, provides groups and individuals with “intellectual maps” of their societies, which are deeply embedded within a set of normative and prescriptive beliefs (or rather: values). Second, the link between desired future and change can, according to Heywood, be made in many ways. It can be ‘fundamental’ as a political philosophy, dealing with abstract ideas and theories in a ‘dispassionate’ way but it can also be ‘operative’ as a broad, practical and passionate movement engaged in popular mobilization. Not every ideology (or best-opinion) is as strong on each of the two levels. As a source of public values, best-opinion, like ideology, can have an important part to play in actively shaping political action and change. “Ideas”, writes Heywood, “are not merely a passive reflection of vested interests or personal ambition, but have the capacity to inspire and guide political action” (idem 2007: 2-3). Change, in this view, is guided by pragmatism and struggles for power but also by beliefs, passions, values and convictions about what to do. One of the main purposes of best-opinion is, we could say, to either offer change in or adherence to (as in adding legitimacy) a set of ideals where conformity already exists. The ‘value producers’ Reszohazy speaks of can pave the way for reforms and/or consolidate and legitimize (new) morality. They contribute to new institutions (including public values) by questioning and rejecting the philosophical and/or theoretical foundations of old institutions and initiating or legitimizing new ones.

We are able to distinguish between several sources of best-opinion in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813. A first source includes religious sources such as catechisms (cf. Van Deursen, 2004b) or sermons. Especially public sermons were, according to Van Eijnatten, often inherently political. Van Eijnatten writes how towards the end of the eighteenth century sermons were focused on “improving the moral condition of the congregation. They consequently took into account various spheres of life, civilian, social and private; clergymen could now sermonize on philosophy, nature or the realms of politics, and economics” (2008: 137-138). Sermons often came to reflect presuppositions concerning the relations between religion, the public sphere, and political power. Popular religiously inspired texts also commented on the morality in or of politics and administration. Such works included, for instance, those by Ijsbrand van Hamelsveld, an eighteenth century Dutch ‘political minister’ (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 255-263) or Hieronymus Bosch who, in 1785, published a work called *Selfishness*; a powerful indictment of contemporary politics and the immoral behaviour of its members.

Similar were handbooks on morality such as those by the Patriot reformer Johan Hendrik Swildens (cf. Swildens, 1781, 1790; Hake, 2004). These books and pamphlets often reflected or claimed to reflect an ‘enlightened’ anthropology and ethics. Another clergymen with a political pen was Johan Bareuth, an Orangist preacher in the second half of the eighteenth century (see chapter seven). Public values and ideas on political corruption from religious sources did not, however, seem to have played an important role in the cases investigated in this study. I will return to this in chapters five and nine. A third source of best-opinion between 1748 and 1813 was a tradition of political-philosophical writing, present in the Republic at least since the early seventeenth century. Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645), Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn (1612 – 1653) and Simon van Slingelandt (1664 – 1735) were among the early authors but in the eighteenth century the number of political writers would increase rapidly. Among the latter we find Jean Rousset de Missy (1688 – 1762), Joan Derk van der Capellen (1741 – 1784), Laurens van den Spiegel (1737 – 1800), Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck

(1761 – 1825), Isaac Gogel (1765 – 1821) or Willem Ockerse (1760 – 1826), to name but a few (see also chapter five).

Of course, best-opinion writings on administrative reform are not necessarily writings on moral reform. Therefore one of the main issues is whether and what kind of attention was given by early modern Dutch administrative reform movements to the reform of actual (practical?) morality of individual administrators in particular or the system in general. Until now, surprisingly little attention has been paid to these issues. Rather, historians have often chosen to describe general patterns of institutional reform and state formation. At most they dealt with general moral principles and values of public administration in the process. Often these are inherently vague notions such as equality, representation, popular sovereignty or liberty. More articulated and explicitly stated implications and consequences of these general principles and values have hardly been investigated. A first attempt to rectify the situation is made in chapter five of this study. The best-opinion writers which are discussed there are what I would like to call working on a ‘meso-level’ of ethics. For the most part they do not seem to produce practical handbooks or explicit codes of administrative conduct (such as, for instance Swildens or, arguably, Van de Spiegel). They also do not philosophize about fundamental underlying principles (à la Rousseau or Locke). Instead, they are better understood as ‘small-time’ ethicists who tried to explain and articulate current morality on a middle level of best-opinion. This – incidentally – might explain why texts of classic and contemporary foreign (English, French, American and German) authors on politics and administration were indeed widely read during the eighteenth century (cf. Van Eijnatten, 2000: 16-17; Leeb, 1973) but that none of these really featured in any of the scandals I have investigated.

From a research design perspective it is important to finally note that best-opinion as a source of public values will be discussed in a separate chapter while the other three sources are used within each case study chapter. There are three reasons for this. First, the sources in the cases in chapters six, seven and eight hardly ever refer to best-opinion. Only very occasionally can one find a reference to the likes of Cicero, Montesquieu or Locke or quotes from the bible. This means that public opinion, shop floor and legal codes do not appear to have been directly linked to best-opinion authors and/or their ideas and these will for this reason be treated separately. While this presents us with an empirical problem (in part due to case selection, see below) it does not mean that best-opinion sources did not have a role to play in changing public values and perceptions of political corruption or that it can not be compared (admittedly in a very interpretative way) to the other sources. The second reason for having a separate chapter on best-opinion has to do with the belief that despite some obvious differences the various authors on (moral) administrative reform as discussed in chapter five were part and parcel of three reform movements with a high degree of continuity between them. Discussing the three movements and some of their respective authors after one another in one single chapter serves best to underscore this belief. A third and final reason has to do with time and a different pace of moving compared to the other sources of values (compare chapter one on public value dynamics). By its very nature best-opinion seems to contain ‘slow moving’ elements (ideas, ideology and ethics) that are best to treat as a separate entity because direct impact is difficult if not impossible to assess. Often ideas are already around before they are put into practice which signals a difference in pace.

Public opinion

At first glance public opinion, or rather: “an opinion on matters of public concern” (Palmer, 1974, part I: 325), seems similar to best-opinion because both were often expressed through public media. For this reason authors like Senturia or Heidenheimer (see chapter one) connected the two. Yet although they are linked they are obviously not identical or, as Rezsóhazy says: “public opinion generally lags behind with regard to the value producers and the opinion leaders” (2001: 16155). Furthermore, not all opinions expressed in public media can be called best-opinion. Not everyone is a ‘value producer’ or is perceived as such. As a source of values, public opinion is crucial to understanding changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. Scandals often simply exist by the grace of public media as ‘public’ or ‘private’ interests are presumably violated. Much like the other sources it is not easy to get a grip on public opinion. Investigating this source of values leads to all the usual problems of interpretation because it is often unclear who says what for which reason. Authors often remained anonymous and what they wrote is, largely, a matter of interpretation. Different styles and genres served different purposes and it is not easy to identify irony and sarcasm or distinguish sincerity from joking in a world that is not your own. The latter is problematic since fear of legal persecution or other potential (social, economic) repercussions caused writers to widely use satire and cloaked criticism. Why something is said is also not often as clear as one would like it to be. Especially with regard to political corruption it seems that public opinion was often formulated for personal political reasons.

Nevertheless, in the end the historian has to work within the limits set by the available source material. This means that all problems of hermeneutics aside (see also below) specific public opinion on public values and political corruption can be traced. A focus on scandals again provides a way out as they entail public indignation. Many often felt the need to write down or otherwise express their opinion which provides the researcher with a view on public values. Public opinion is voiced as a means of providing or applying formal or informal pressure and control on moral behaviour and this also applies to the past. De Boer and ‘t Hart write how in this way public opinion can be viewed as a more or less “collective product influencing behaviour and opinions, aimed at social approval or disapproval” (2007: 29). It often provides values and norms and increases their visibility and tangibility (Ibid., 33). Scandal and controversy are therefore a good point of departure to investigate public opinion and with it changing public values and perceptions of political corruption (cf. Bloemendal & Van Dixhoorn, 2010). Historical research should therefore also be concerned with the effect of public opinion on big changes such as changing public morality. We are best able to investigate public opinion in its written form (newspapers, pamphlets or books). Much has been written on complex related topics such as printing and literary culture, and different media and their reception and distribution as well as the general importance of a growing public opinion (Hartog, 1872; Broersma, 2005; Buijnsters, 1984, 1991; Harline, 1987; De Kruif, et al., 2006; Pollmann & Spicer, 2007).

It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with such topics in detail. However, some categories of media and public opinion in the period between 1748 and 1813 need to be briefly discussed since they will play an important role in the debates in the later case studies. Broersma (2005) divided Dutch eighteenth century written media into newspapers, periodical press and pamphlets. The newspapers hardly paid attention to local and/or internal politics.

According to Broersma (2005: 219) they were instead focused on international news. The latter two categories, however, are of special importance for the purposes of this study. The periodical press consisted of so-called spectatorial journals and political journals. The spectators were highly popular in many European states such as Germany (Martens, 1971) or England (Buijnsters, 1991: 15). In the Dutch Republic (Hartog, 1872; Buijnsters, 1984, 1991) the mostly anonymous authors of these journals were also popular as they often argued for a revival of commerce, religion and civic morals (cf. Kerkhoff, 2007). However, they hardly contained explicit information about political corruption and public values as such. This view is supported by Broersma (2005: 221) who noted how current affairs are seldom to be found in these spectators since publishers did not want to risk discontinuation of their journals by the authorities. The political journals, on the other hand, flourished in the second half of the eighteenth century. Broersma writes this was especially the case as politics had by the 1780s definitely entered the public sphere in the form of a new public political discourse (2005: 235). Lok (cf. chapter seven of this present study) similarly noted how by 1800 public opinion had become a separate and independent source of political authority, next to 'king and church' (2009: 29-30). As a consequence of growing public opinion, Lok says, maladministration was more often discussed and condemned and this led to a diminishing of the authority of 'administrators'. In the cases that follow (especially chapters seven and eight) such journals had an important part to play. Unlike the spectators (which for this reason do not feature much in the scandals) they often contained explicit information on changing public values and perceptions of political corruption.

A final and most crucial media category for public opinion is that of pamphlets (cf. Broersma, 2005: 224). In the Dutch Republic between 1748 and 1813 public opinion on political corruption and public values was first and foremost visible in a surge in pamphlet literature; usually anonymous and once-only publications. Pamphlets would be used to convey many types of messages and would consequently take on many forms, for instance depicting imaginary actors (such as a regent, a farmer and a merchant) in a conversation on current affairs on barges, coffee houses or dinner parties. In such conversations (essentially role-plays) personified values often provided the views of which the author thought 'belonged' to each particular value. A character called 'truth' would for instance speak to one called 'betrayal' or 'justice' as they discussed social and/or political events of the day. Of course current events often included scandals of political corruption (although often hidden and very indirect) since this would sell copies. Pamphlets were also often used to spread court rulings in important cases, official proclamations of authorities or personal statements by individual citizens on a variety of matters. In either case, pamphlets in this way provided an outlet for public values and perceptions of political corruption (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 195-222). This will also become apparent from the case studies of this study.

Legal rules of public office

Legal rules are, at least at first glance, the most tangible source to investigate changing public values. In the brief overview of scholarly work on Dutch political corruption in chapter one I already noted how it is often a subject in historical research on crime, punishment and the legal system of the Netherlands. For this reason legal perspectives on scandals allow us to see what the law considered to be acceptable or proper behaviour for public officials. Legal rules are

found in a wide variety of shapes and forms. They can be found in scholarly legal arguments, in court proceedings against corrupt officials, in jurisprudence and in official legal proclamations and decrees of authorities. An instruction for a tax collector, an eighteenth century oath of office, a proclamation by the States-General or reports of an ongoing investigation (such as interrogations of suspects in a case) are all legal documents stating the legal rules of public office and legal assumptions of right or wrong behaviour. As such, the source of legal rules provides us with a varied view on desired and actual public morality.

While this source is relatively easy to locate there are a number of difficulties to its use as well. For one, legal codes seem notoriously and often purposefully ambiguous because of strategic interests (cf. Moynihan, 2009: 815-818). Also, law was immensely fragmented in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch Republic, characterized in part by its particularism. In short (see chapter four for a detailed discussion) this meant that cities, provincial states and the union of all provinces often had their own legal rules and regulations and legal institutions that resulted in a patchwork of different legal proceedings, fines, punishments, and rules. Not until the early nineteenth century with the introduction of French legal codes did legal uniformity become a reality which makes it difficult to deduce any general perceptions on political corruption from legal rules alone. Another problem is that administration and law (or any other powers) were not separated in the early modern Dutch Republic until the introduction of the French legal system in the early nineteenth century. For much of the period under investigation in this study different public officials could therefore have executive, legislative and judiciary powers at the same time (Groenveld & Wagenaar, 2011: 98). A typical mayor would for instance be head of the daily administration of a city, appoint important city officials, and control the city's finances but would also make legislation together with several aldermen in the form of local ordinances. This presents problems because it means that 'the law' was not as objective, neutral or 'universal' as it is (or is thought to be) now. It follows from this that the same can be said for the rules and regulations regarding public office and their behaviour. In addition, as is shown in the case studies that follow, public officials could also be above the law, which meant that even when judged 'corrupt' they would not always be tried. This means that sometimes legal codes might have been there in theory but were irrelevant in the practice of a political corruption scandal. This is corroborated by the cases that follow – in part there is a case selection bias here! – which show that legal standards were by no means the most important standard for the period between 1750 – 1813 (see chapter nine).

The functioning codes of the shop floor

A final source of public values delineated by Hoetjes and used in this study consists of the functioning codes of the shop floor. This source includes personal views and statements from people who were directly or indirectly involved. The codes of the shop floor involve the everyday rules or standards by which public administration was expected to be conducted by the actual practitioners. These codes are difficult to access but can be found in personal documents such as letters or diaries. They can also be found in pamphlets that were often written by key actors in scandals – in which they offered reflections on court cases – in personal deliberations on what 'really' happened, in public apologies or in publicized responses to interrogations. While such personal views are therefore often expressed in the form of some of the other sources they still have to be treated separately because the codes of the shop floor

(i.e., personal values and perceptions of political corruption) can often be different from those found in other sources. Tax farmers amongst themselves (see chapter six) could believe it was acceptable to fix prices, even though other sources disagreed. Sometimes (consider chapter seven) the codes of the shop floor were even all that really mattered (cf. Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008) especially when legal rules were vague or absent or when public opinion and/or best-opinion were not strong enough to make an impression (see chapter seven). Furthermore, when the actors in a scandal were also the ones making the rules (as was often the case) their personal convictions become crucial. On the shop floor, finally, we are perhaps best able to see values, opinions and assumptions for what they really were. We might be able to assume how notes in a letter to a friend or in a diary for one's private use are written without ulterior motives; stripped from political or strategic interest. This makes them, when written down in such forms, somewhat less ambiguous than values and interpretations in other sources.

Combining and comparing sources of values

What has been said for standards of political corruption (see chapter one) applies equally to sources of public values. Each source on its own merely provides a particular view on an instance of political corruption. Therefore: only when we take multiple sources in account at the same time does a more detailed and precise picture of changing public values appear. Objections can be raised to each source of values and combinations can also be problematic. We have to keep in mind there is considerable potential overlap between them. As we have seen pamphlets can be personal documents as well as expressions of public opinion and legal codes are often presented as public proclamations – sometimes in pamphlet form – of court sentences or in the form of personal writings and deliberations on the application of law and jurisprudence. A political journal belongs to public- and potentially best-opinion at the same time. Similarly, a major problem is that the historian is dependent on the availability of source material (see below). This means that not every instance (or even every case-study in this book) of political corruption will have every source of values available for examination in an equal measure. A major difficulty and limitation of taking a methodological approach based on examining, juxtaposing and comparing multiple sources of values is therefore that cases often lack one or more sources and that some sources might prove to be less salient than others. Hardly ever do we find all sources represented in an equal fashion in a single case at the same time.

Despite problems with individual sources and possible overlap between them each source still provides a particular view. Each also offers unique possibilities for research. Furthermore, the benefits of combining them also outweigh the downsides. A combination of various sources of values surrounding cases of political corruption is, first and foremost, likely to provide a historical view on how value dynamics work. Perhaps public values from legal codes conflict with those on the shop floor or best-opinion and public opinion show significantly different debates. Perhaps we see that excessive attention by administrators to any particular public value or set of public values is the result of the displacement of others (cf. Moynihan, 2009: 818). Perhaps a combined view on different sources of values helps to explain possible transitions from 'old' to 'new' public value systems due to specific sources of public values. The rise of public opinion as a source of new or reemphasized public values

might for instance have been key in displacing shop floor views (cf. Dekker, 1986: 117-118) and long-since established ways of doing things. When opinions differ – as they invariably do – and clashes between them occur, impetus is usually provided for change of public values and public value systems. When some sources start to outweigh others in importance this offers possibilities for change. One other added benefit of combining multiple sources of values is that it allows one to decrease the ambiguity of particular public values.

3.4 Case study design: selection and parameters

The case study design of this research consists of three cases in Holland between 1748 and 1813. This design is based on the heuristic devices of political corruption scandals and sources of public values. The cases all revolve around scandals that generated explicit debate. Each case assesses political corruption from the widest possible range of four sources of values. Since each source potentially provides a different view on similar acts, the context is reconstructed in which meaning is attributed. In this way the cases offer in-depth and detailed information about what was deemed appropriate public official behaviour according to different sources. When these sources of values are combined, in addition to the use of the bureaucratic ideal type and notions derived from historical institutionalism (see chapter two) this helps us better understand changing public values in early modern Dutch public administration. In the following paragraph I first discuss the case selection and will also delineate some essential parameters of this study. Scandal and the availability of a variety of four sources of public values (see earlier) are only two of the parameters applied to the case selection. There are also (necessary) chronological, geographical and topical limits to this research. These parameters are there in part because of practical constraints. At the same time they also increase the validity of the research design and offer reasons for the selection of the three specific cases.

Chronological parameters

Drawing chronological lines between periods is a delicate business. When a period begins or ends is a subjective matter and often only necessary to artificially cut up large chunks of time. We should, for instance, ask ourselves what events are actually crucial moments of change or watersheds between periods and whether we can distinguish these at all. Stefan Zweig for instance once spoke of “die Weltminute von Waterloo” but to this Dutch historian Jan Romein replied that “this battle did not end anything that had not been ended already and did not start anything that had not already begun” (op cit. in Harmsen, 1998: 101-102). This points to the problem of determining continuity and change in any given period and to the problem how to determine periods of tranquillity and ‘slow moving processes’ interrupted by ‘critical junctures’ (see chapter two). It is a problem of determining what changes occur when and of ‘old’ versus ‘new’. While we should therefore be cautious when attaching explanatory meaning to specific sequences of periods or moments in time or with trying to pinpoint moments or even periods of radical change, these can still sometimes be seen. To follow historian Ido de Haan (2004) there are always moments of transition: radical changes in the political system due to such things as war or internal struggle, when the legitimacy of the state is questioned and there is room for something new. Obviously, when investigating changing public value systems such moments of transition become extremely important.

With this in mind we can say that Dutch administrative history has seen some periods and events that were certainly more important turning points than others. Commonly accepted Dutch historiography usually identifies three watershed moments of transition and books on Dutch (administrative) history are consequently usually divided in four basic periods (cf. Blom & Lamberts, 1993; Israel, 1998; Wagenaar, et al., 2011a). First is the period until 1588 with the beginning of the Revolt against Spain. Second there is the period of the Dutch Republic until the United Kingdom of the Netherlands between 1588 and 1813. Sometimes a break in the latter period is made in which 1795 is seen as the start of a separate so-called French-Batavian period. Third, there is the period of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands to the formation of the constitutional monarchy from 1813 to 1848. Fourth is the period from 1848 onwards with the establishment of the Dutch constitutional monarchy. This standard segmentation of periods is useful for reasons of clarity and can be based on good arguments. However, it is not entirely without problems. Some critics have, for instance, argued how it usually coincides with a systematic (and normative?) undervaluation of ‘normal’ – as opposed to ‘abnormal’ – periods whereby the ‘abnormal’ times of Dutch Republic and French-Batavian period are also usually juxtaposed to the ‘normal’ periods before and after (Van Sas, 2005: 17).

Likewise, Schutte (1978) already argued how the period 1702 – 1780 was often mistaken for a period of tranquillity, stagnation and lethargy in between the ‘golden’ seventeenth century and the age of revolution after 1795. Schutte argued instead that severe clashes already occurred in this earlier (or ‘intermediate’) period which enabled the later transition from ancien regime to modern nation state after 1795. Important for the purposes of this present study is that Schutte also considered this period to have witnessed “a profound and encompassing process of mental change” (1978: 270). Equally important for the purposes of this study is that most common periodical divisions do not take into account the importance of the specific timeframe between 1750 and 1850. To Van Sas (2005: 17) chronological divisions of Dutch history should take this period into account as one of continuous change and thus of fundamental importance. Van Sas (2005: 20-21) is the most recent and, arguably, most outspoken advocate of attributing special attention to the timeframe 1750 – 1850. In a nutshell, the period 1750 – 1850 is sometimes considered a Dutch *Sattelzeit* (see earlier in chapter one) in which changes in social-political vocabulary coincided with processes of democratization, ideological and/or mental change and politicization (Van Sas, 1999; 2005: 18; Velema, 1999a: ix-x). While the term is controversial for use in the Dutch context (cf. Frijhoff, 2000) it is still used in this study to denote the link between fundamental institutional changes of the period and changing public values and perceptions of political corruption.

In this study I follow historians such as Van Sas and Velema in their appreciation for the specific period between 1750 and 1850 but I limit my focus to the years between 1748 and 1813, thus leaving out the period 1813 – 1850. This limitation has been partly due to practical constraints of time and space and because of the difficulty in finding suitable case material. However, there have also been substantive reasons for this choice. Firstly, the period between 1813 and 1850 constituted a different period than before because of the introduction of the (later constitutional) monarchy in 1813. In that year a fundamentally new political-administrative era began which warrants a separation as to not compare apples and oranges. A second reason is that, as will become clear from this study, contrary to common perceptions the foundations for the new era after 1813 were for a large part already built in the period leading up to it. An emphasis on the period 1747 – 1813 therefore serves to counter the common but misguided idea that the Dutch Republic witnessed relatively little change in

public values and value systems, bureaucratization and the foundations and structure of the Dutch state. Instead, I argue that some of the most fundamental changes in Dutch politics and administration – and of course especially those concerning public morality – had already occurred before 1813. Of course, this argument ought also to be tested by means of a comparison with a case study from the period 1813 – 1848. This, however, will have to be done on a later date. Finally, the choice to consider the period between 1748 and 1813 as a time-frame on its own is supported by the existence of three important major moral reform movements in this period in which public values and political corruption were a top priority (see below and chapter five).

The period 1748 – 1813 is in this study further divided in three parts based on important watersheds in Dutch political-administrative history (see also chapter four). Each of these parts will be covered by a case study in the following chapters. The first part runs from 1748 to 1755. The year 1748 was marked by large-scale tax riots and calls for administrative reforms in several Holland cities in part exemplified by a reform movement of so-called Doelists (see chapter five). The first case study is situated in this period and discusses problems with taxation and subsequent bureaucratic measures to combat political corruption and to strive for moral reform. It serves to illustrate the fact that new thinking on public morality was indeed on the rise and found its way in bureaucratic measures. It was a kind of new thinking, furthermore, that would become more powerful in the decades to come. The second part runs from the late 1770s to the late 1780s. This so-called Patriot period showed a rekindling of older demands for reform and a true – but failed – attempt at administrative and political reform by means of an armed revolution in 1787. This sub-period is often considered as exhibiting the highest degrees of political corruption in Dutch history and involved many instances, mostly dealing with the incorrect execution of office and extensive use of patronage and nepotism. Now, harming the ‘public good’ became a key notion that acquired new meaning as a result of American Revolution and Enlightenment ideas such as civic freedom and popular sovereignty.

As such the period proved of pivotal importance in the evolution of thinking about ‘proper’ public administration. The corresponding case study deals with the acts of two high ranking city officials in two Dutch cities who were accused of abuse of office for a variety of reasons, many of which were ‘new’ in the context of the time’s political debates. The third and final part to be distinguished and discussed in this study runs from 1795 to 1813. With the aid of French revolutionary troops, so-called Batavians managed to create the Batavian Republic in 1795. The events in this relatively short period can arguably be seen as the most crucial turnings point in modern Dutch political-administrative history (cf. Jourdan, 2009; Palmer, 1954; Rosendaal, 2005a; Van Sas, 1989; Schama, 1977). The Batavian revolution secured many decisive shifts as the new foundations of a ‘Napoleonic’ system were laid (cf. Lok, 2009; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995; Peters, 2008; Wunder, 1995) and new public institutions were installed (such as a parliament and a constitution). A case study on a parliamentary investigation into the behaviour of some leading politicians in the Batavian Republic serves to show just what debates were about and what the consequences of this might have been with regard to changing public morality.

Consequently, a division in periods directly affects the case selection in this study. The three cases of this study are, first, selected because they represent an important and/or highly typical instance of political corruption and surrounding debates in each of the three sub-periods between 1748 and 1813. They each represent a moment of crisis, a watershed, or a ‘plane of fracture’. Since three cases is a somewhat limited number, more research and case-

studies might provide different results. Yet, other cases with multiple sources of values are difficult to find and, more importantly, the cases presented in this study are highly representative of their time. They show fundamental debates, crucial values and value statements and current and dominant perceptions of political corruption. Second, the cases and sub-periods are selected based on the existence of the three subsequent ‘administrative reform movements’ that were also consequential to each other in the period 1748 – 1813: Doelists in the 1740s and 1750s, Patriots in the 1770’s and 1780’s and Batavians from the 1790s onwards. In chapter five I will deal with these movements more thoroughly but for now it should already be said that the existence of these reform movements is crucial to better understand the development of public values and perceptions of political corruption. Each new movement, for instance, had similar core demands but would be more successful than the previous (Israel, 1998: 1105-1106). This provides interesting possibilities for comparison and assessing change.

Geographical parameters

Geographical location is another important parameter of this research as I focus on the province of Holland within the larger framework of Dutch provinces (see chapter four). The choice for a focus on Holland is based on two reasons. First, it is due to the immensely fragmented nature of the Dutch Republic. As will be explained in chapter four, the various provinces and even cities therein would often differ greatly from each other; also in matters of administration. A comparative focus on multiple provinces is therefore highly problematic and a choice was made to focus on one. Second, Holland was in many ways the most important of the provinces. This too is explained in chapter four but for now one can say that Holland’s cities were the economic and therefore political powerhouses of the Republic. Because they contributed most to the Republic in terms of finances, economic growth and army and fleet augmentation for the Republic’s many wars, the province was dominant. In addition, the main administrative bodies of the Republic were situated in Holland and the majority of administrators came mostly from the all-important Holland town councils. Holland was in fact so powerful that it usually dominated all the other provinces. This does not mean that Holland is taken here as either measure or mirror for the entire Dutch Republic. That would be too simplistic and provide false accounts. However, it does mean that with a focus on public values and political corruption in Holland we are investigating the most influential part of the political-administrative world of the Dutch Republic.

Topical parameters

The case-studies are also restricted to certain ‘typical’ areas or policy domains of public administration of the time. The first case (chapter six) involves political corruption in the core business of taxation and the link between bureaucratic changes in the tax system and changes in public values. The second case (chapter seven) deals with political corruption surrounding obtaining and executing public office and patronage and nepotism. While debates had often focused on the proper or improper execution of public office before 1750 as well (see Hoenderboom, forthcoming, on the period 1650 – 1750) these issues, I argue, were more fundamentally discussed and brought to the fore in the period between 1748 and 1813 in general and in the 1770s and 1780s in particular. These discussions were crucial to an evolving

public morality. The third case (chapter eight) examines yet another crucial domain of public administration. The case from 1798 serves to exemplify the emergence of a budding political system with political factions (though not yet political parties) which opposed each other on various fundamental issues of a distinctly political as well as moral nature. Such issues included notions of representation and accountability but also the organization of the state, the content of a new constitution, the general role of politicians in the execution of their duties and discussions on a public-private divide.

3.5 Explanation and causality

Throughout the introduction and especially in the discussion in chapter two, the twin issues of explanation and causality already appeared in between the lines. This is, of course, due to the fact that research of this study is part explanatory: to provide insight in possible causal relations between a changing institutional environment on the one hand and changing public values on the other. Explanation and causality are, however, neither straightforward nor self-evident in the type of research presented here (i.e., historical case studies) because of the contingency and contextuality of public values in the ever changing and highly complex institutional environment of the Dutch Republic. Both concepts therefore warrant brief separate and explicit discussion in order to temper potential expectations as well as increase the clarity of – and to be honest about – this study’s aims and conclusions. After all, good comparative historical analysis, as Laslett (1980: 219) tells us, requires a good understanding of causality, explanation and generalization.

In short, explanation in the social sciences rests upon the interpretation of facts and presuppositions concerning any possible coherence among them. Historians of public administration for instance often speak of stages, patterns and mechanisms rather than universal or general laws. Explanation in this sense (and it is used in this way in this study) means establishing “meaningful relation(s) between observed (new, so far unknown) facts and known facts” (Raadschelders, 2000: 40) and the only way to do this is to abstract from reality and to select and interpret ‘facts’. Max Weber called this *die Erfassung des Sinnzusammenhangs* (cf. Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 23). It is an approach that is for instance illustrated by Mahoney and Rüschemeyer who argue that good comparative historical analysis “is defined by a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” (2003a: 6-9; see also Thelen, 2002: 94). To Raadschelders (2000: 36-39) models and the use of theory likewise help interpret historical facts, help simplify complex past reality and bring us closer to why questions. They also help generate new questions and enable systematic comparison. At best, then, a cautious and more realistic understanding of explanation, generalization and causality in the social sciences (and history) leads to ‘middle-range theories’. These are “more modest and restrictive but intensely studied segments of reality” (Van Braam, 1989: 36; Raadschelders, 2000: 44).

Because of this more cautious and realistic approach to explanation and causality, this study does not aim to provide a general theory on public value change. Nor does it delineate a (fixed or general) set of factors that lead to public value change. This, in fact, would be impossible if only because there is still much uncertainty and disagreement on what public values actually are (see chapter one) and because the range of potential explanations seems endless. Rather, the study provides a range of potentially explanatory factors and/or mecha-

nisms of public value change that can be observed in the province of Holland between 1748 and 1813. Because they are inductively generated by means of empirical case studies, this range of explanatory factors will necessarily be somewhat eclectic. Furthermore, the direction of any causal relationship (whether theoretically or in practice) will often necessarily remain unclear. It is impossible, in my opinion, to answer the question whether bureaucratization leads to public value change or whether it was the other way around. I argue that such a ‘chicken and the egg’ problem is best solved by leaving the answer somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, the two are not separated variables. Instead, as I will show in the later case studies they coincide and often go hand in hand. However, this does not diminish the importance of the causal link itself. In the end, furthermore, an eclectic range with uncertain causal directions still provides material that substantiates, complements and/or corrects existing abstract and general theories of public value dynamics (cf. Beck Jørgensen & Vrangbæk, 2011) and political corruption (see chapter one). It helps us to observe meaningful relations as to how and why new public values are potentially added or how and why the content, meaning and interpretation of existing values potentially changed.

A final related question is whether and, if so how, isolated incidents and cases can also function as some sort of structural and/or diachronic representations for longer periods of time. Parts of this question were answered in chapter two (the focus on the explanatory power of administrative-historical work in general) and earlier in this chapter (on case selection and parameters). In addition, focusing on the validity provides a further answer and shows the explanatory power of a specific historical case study design such as provided in previous sections. Essentially I aim to draw evidence from single cases in order to illuminate features of a (potential?) broader set of cases (Gerring, 2007: 29). Such a method serves to gain understanding of the whole by focusing on key parts and rests on in-depth knowledge of key cases through which general points are elucidated and evaluated. Furthermore, a focus on in-depth cases is able to preserve the texture and detail of individual cases. Mahoney and Rüschemeyer (2003a: 9) argue how “viewing cases and processes at a less abstract level enables us to derive lessons from past experiences that speak to the concern of the present. It yields more meaningful advice concerning contemporary choices and possibilities than studies that aim for the universal truths but cannot grasp critical historical details”. The somewhat low academic status of historical case studies (cf. Yin, 2009: 14-16; Gerring, 2007: 5-8) usually has to do with the view that single or a few case studies can not yield explanatory evidence. They are often not thought to be able to generate valid knowledge because cases are not randomly selected and there may not be enough statistical degrees of freedom to test all conceivable hypotheses critically.

However, much of the lack of appreciation for the case study method stems from it being poorly understood and can easily be rebutted (cf. Gerring, 2007: 8; Reuschmeyer, 2003; Yin, 2009). Most importantly, a case study research design “exhibits characteristic strengths and weaknesses relative to its large-N cross-case cousin” (Gerring, 2007: 37) and is able to generate rather than test hypotheses. Case study designs are consequently often identified as ‘plausibility probes’ or ‘theory-building exercises’ and are thought to provide more internal rather than external validity. This means they are generally not highly representative (unless potentially on a theoretical level, see Yin, 2009: 41) because they include only a limited number of cases of some more general phenomenon. On the other hand high internal validity makes it easier “to establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case (or a small number of cases) than for a larger set of cases” (Gerring, 2007: 43). Case study designs also

provide causal insights into mechanisms (or pathways from x to y, see earlier in chapter two) rather than effects and, finally, have a deep rather than a broad scope of proposition. These (and other) benefits of a case study design mentioned in the above makes it relatively easy to see why this method is especially useful for the research presented in this study. It best suits a look at causal mechanisms related to public value change and taking a deep or ‘thick’ contextual perspective rather than a broad and ‘thin’ one. Since I am interested in broader societal processes that affect public value change a thick description is needed. This is, in other words, in line with Johnstonian as well as a historical institutional point of view. The benefits of a case study design for the present study become more apparent when we take into account Gerrings statement that “the significant feature of most case studies is that they look at periods of change, and these periods of change produce (or are regarded as producing) distinct observations – classically “before” or “after” observations” (2007: 32). Similarly, the three case studies of this research are, as mentioned, cases on ‘planes of fracture’ in Dutch political-administrative history which allows a view on the ‘before and after’ or the ‘old and new’. Even more benefits of a historical case study design for the purposes of this study become visible when we consider specific writings on the use of case studies to explain historical dynamics in social or political structures. Raadschelders and Rutgers (1989: 26-29) state how a case study approach is useful to provide context and detail in (ideal typical) explanations. Similarly, Reuschmeyer (2003: 310-312) tresses how much can be learned from single ‘in-depth’ historical case studies because they are not just suitable to inspire new hypotheses and insights but can also test, reflect, modify and falsify them as long as one “makes an explicit link between theoretical imagination and empirical evidence”.

3.6 Limitations and solutions

The most important methodological difficulties, most notably the explanatory power of a historical case study design and problems of explanation and causality in general, have so far been discussed. Yet, it is essential to also briefly discuss some other limitations inherent in the methodology of this study. First, sources can either be impossible to find or simply do not exist at all, of course without the historian knowing this in advance. A general lack of indexes and overviews of material make the work of a historian who relies (in part) on primary sources difficult. Secondly, this means that the practical possibility of combining the different sources of public values creates challenges and that it is often difficult to incorporate all sources of public values in one single case-study (see earlier on sources of public values). A third difficulty has to do with language and interpretation. The problem is defined by the fact that the source material offered in the cases is in eighteenth century Dutch – and sometimes French and German – while this book is written in modern English. The book is in English because I believe that research on Dutch historical cases of political corruption and public value change has international relevance (see earlier in chapter one). The inherent problem, however, is that we run the risk of losing vital context and specific information when translating eighteenth-century Dutch into modern English. This is a particularly pressing concern for the research presented here since much of the language used to describe political corruption is indirect. Straightforward attacks on people’s behaviour were rare. Instead, attacks or discussions were often riddled with sarcasm, irony, wordplay and hidden meaning.

In Anglophone research translating all citations and giving a reference to the original in a footnote usually solves such problems. In Dutch works, on the other hand, citations are usually incorporated in a wide variety of languages into the main body of the text. I have opted for something of a compromise. To increase the readability of the English text I have translated all citations from eighteenth-century Dutch into modern English. At the same time I have put the Dutch originals in endnotes – combined in a separate appendix – in order to preserve the original language and meaning. The reader who wishes to follow the main line and arguments of the book and does not read Dutch may simply ignore the citations in the endnotes. However, those who wish to read the eighteenth century Dutch originals can still do so. Interpretation likewise presents us with difficulties that one has at least to be aware of. Of course translations are really interpretations with which one hopes to do justice to the original phrases. It has to be mentioned however that this brings to the fore the crucial problem of distinguishing between fact and interpretation in historical research. In a nutshell, perceptions of political corruption are contextual and subjective interpretations of events. The historian thus needs to distinguish between such different interpretations and has to deal with double hermeneutics because, as Lorenz (1987: 29) writes: “language is not a mirror of reality but embodies a certain viewpoint or framework with which we perceive reality”.

It is important to further note two things in the context of this research. First, values and value statements can never be separated from their context which remains vital to increase our understanding of the changing meaning of actual thought and practice. This is reminiscent of Skinner’s well-known critique of studying ideas as ‘isolated’ units of analysis or as ‘forms of words’ (cf. Skinner, 1969: 35; Tully, 1988: 29-67). Instead, Skinner argues, “we should study not the meanings of words, but their use” and “the meaning of the idea must *be* its uses to refer in various ways” (1969: 36-37). It is, as Velema writes, precisely “the contemporary linguistic context within which a term or phrase is imbedded which makes the use of the term or phrase understandable and which allows one to make meaningful statements regarding their meaning and function” (1999b: xviii-xiv). To Skinner, this does not mean that “a study of social context can not *help* to understand a text”. Rather, it means that “the assumption to study an idea *in terms of* its social context, can be shown to be mistaken” (1969: 42-43. Italics in original, TK). It also means, according to Skinner that “classic texts, especially in social, ethical, and political thought, help to reveal – if we let them – not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments” (1969: 52). Such an approach to the historical study of the history of ideas (such as the idea of political corruption) in which the historical context of ideas and terms is taken into account, finally also helps us to better understand the evolution of new politics (cf. Raadschelders, 1994; Tilly, 2009: 433) and of new language.

Part II

History, Culture and Morality of the Time

*“The entire world, my dear Aristian, only shows
the most elaborate portrayal of the aberrations of politics”*

Abbé de Mably (1709 – 1785),
Entretiens de Phocion (1763)

4 Political History and Political Culture (1748 – 1813)

4.1 Introduction

It is necessary to understand the wider social and political context of early-modern Dutch administrators (in the province of Holland) in order to understand how their actions were perceived, what was considered corrupt, which public values we can distinguish and how and why they changed. In this chapter I therefore first provide an elementary (due to limited space) historical overview of the main political and administrative actors, organizations and levels of administration. This is followed by an equally brief overview of events in Dutch political history between 1748 and 1813. Third, I provide a short discussion of some of the main characteristic elements of Dutch political culture in the period under investigation.

4.2 Administrative levels

The Dutch Republic as an anomaly?

The year 1648 marked a fundamental shift in Dutch political history. With the end of the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish empire an independent Republic of Seven United Provinces emerged. After nearly a hundred years of revolt and uprising, the Spanish crown – weakened by the size of its empire and crippled by war debts – finally recognized the independence of the Northern Low Countries with the Peace of Münster in 1648. Coincidence, luck and the fact that its main enemies were often too busy fighting each other, were the main reasons why this Dutch Republic was able to exist against all odds until 1795. Some have called this Dutch Republic an anomaly in early modern Europe (Davids & Lucassen, 1995; Davids, et al., 1988; Dekker, 1982; Schöffner, 1978: 184; 't Hart, 1993; Velema, 1999b: xvi). Even though others dispute this (De Bruin, 1999) it did indeed have some exceptional institutional characteristics, especially when compared to other neighbouring European states at the time. It lacked, for instance, a monarch and corresponding court life, a powerful nobility or strong central or 'top-down' state administration (De Jong, 1987: 32-33). In 1673, Sir William Temple, the English ambassador to the Dutch Republic, noticed how it: “cannot properly be styled a commonwealth, but is rather a confederacy of seven sovereign provinces united together for their common and mutual defence, without any dependence one upon the other. But to discover the nature of their government from the first springs and motions, it must be taken into yet smaller pieces, by which it will appear, that each of these provinces is likewise composed of many little states or cities, which have several marks of sovereign power within themselves, and are not subject to the sovereignty of their province” (1687/1972: 52). The Dutch

Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resembled a federation of sovereign provinces more than anything else (Boogman, 1979: 390-391; Van Deursen, 2004a: 138; Fruin & Colenbrander, 1922: 179). As a kind of federal Republic it was small and free on the inside and able to fight off any internal 'tyrant' (such as – according to some at the time – a strong Stadholder). At the same time it would be large and united enough to fight off any external threat (such as Spain, France or England) (Klein, 1995: 25).

Unity, centralization and local autonomy

At the most central level of the Republic there was the Estates General. Initially this had been an advisory council rooted in medieval feudal structures since the fourteenth century. It had served as a means for the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers to summon their local nobles for advice and money. Since the Union of Utrecht (1579) in which seven Dutch provinces (Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Groningen, Gelderland, Overijssel and Drente) united against the Spanish-Habsburg ruler, the Estates General consisted of delegates from these seven. It dealt mainly with war, taxation and foreign affairs (Fockema Andreae, 1961; Israel, 1998: 276). Apart from the Estates General the Dutch Republic had several supplementary 'central' or Generality institutions such as the Council of State, the Generality Accounting Office, the Generality Mint Chamber, and five Admiralty colleges. The Generality essentially existed by the grace of the individual provinces. The only real basis for unity among the provinces had been and would continue to be an ad-hoc alliance. Even the charter of the Union of Utrecht stated that it was the goal of the union to protect and maintain the rights and privileges of each province (Van Deursen, 2004a: 139). Unity was, at first, a necessary evil to improve cooperation in the revolt against the Spanish (Price, 1994: 221). After the Revolt, when the common threat was gone, tendencies to disintegration grew (Tamse, 1980: 91) but pragmatism still had the upper hand. The provinces realized that only together did they stand a chance in a hostile geo-political environment of potential enemies.

The practical reality of the Republic's political institutional design was that arrangements of power and sovereignty were based on local or provincial autonomy. Various authors have emphasized how only a small group of people truly believed in the union (cf. Blockmans, 1985: 242; De Jong, 1987: 31; Wagenaar, 2003: 126). The population at large and certainly the all important city administrators or regents (see below) were usually loyal to their city first, their province next and hardly ever to the generality at large. Despite the institution of the Estates General the Dutch Republic would therefore retain its federal and fragmented character throughout the eighteenth century. In principle all provinces had an equal share in power by means of veto in the Estates General and decisions could only be made unanimously. However, in practice some provinces were more powerful than others, mainly caused by differences in payment to the union. Because Holland contributed more than half of the entire budget it dominated the Estates General (Israel, 1998: 286; De Jong, 1987: 19; De Vries & Van der Woude, 1995: 126).

Essentially, there was no obvious or natural unity among the provinces. In the few common areas such as war, taxation and foreign policy, the other six provinces tried to influence the one (i.e., Holland) as much as possible. In all other matters the provinces tried to keep control over their own affairs as best they could. They only discussed matters in the Estates General that were important to them all while at the same time holding on to as much

autonomy as possible (Gabriëls, 1989: 40). Provinces often merely referred to each other as ‘allies’ in official documents, cities and provinces were often involved in bitter disputes over territory or jurisdiction (Dekker, 1982; Wagenaar, 2003: 111) and rules and regulations on various ‘policy areas’ often differed much from place to place. Provincial autonomy was therefore deeply engrained. Provinces each had their own Provincial Estates made up of representatives of cities and the nobility. The Provincial Estates also had daily standing committees called *Gecommitteerde Raden* that consisted of local city administrator delegates (Kooijmans 1985: 32). *Gecommitteerde Raden* were responsible for the day to day administration of their province and also chose the provincial delegate to the Estates General (Israel, 1998: 279). As a separate institution every province (at least in theory) also had a so-called Stadholder (see below) although multiple provinces would usually share one.

In the political-institutional constellation of the Dutch Republic before 1795 the local level of the cities was the most important. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Dutch cities got bigger and more complex. The Republic ranked among the most urbanized regions of early modern Europe. An increase in wealth led to explosive urban growth especially in the maritime province of Holland (Israel, 1998: 328). As a result, local government became more responsible for the welfare of larger numbers of citizens and ‘public policy’ was increasingly executed by public bodies instead of church and/or ‘private’ organizations (cf. Van der Heijden, 2009). This had a significant effect on bureaucratization and professionalization and in turn on morality underlying public administration because more elaborate rules needed to be established (see chapter six). The local level was essentially the only government most ordinary citizens ever had to deal with and the city was the most important physical, political and legal entity in the Republic (Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 149). Both Provincial and Generality power were derived from the local city level, which shows how the highly decentralized Republic essentially worked ‘bottom-up’ (Schöffner, 1978: 184). As mentioned, Provincial Estates mainly consisted of city delegates or representatives and city interests (although not every city was represented equally) thus largely determined a province’s stance in the Estates General. With the growing importance of the *Gecommitteerde Raden* and the large role of city administrators in them, the cities got ever more direct power over policy on all levels of government (Israel, 1998: 278). Large and wealthy cities could be very powerful. Especially Amsterdam was often able to ignore or resist the wishes of the Stadholder (Fruin, 1929: 71-72) or the other provinces and at times determined the course of their Provincial Estates (De Jong, 1987: 31) and thereby of the generality as a whole. Much like the provinces, the individual cities also viewed cooperation useful for common issues of war and foreign affairs. In most other matters they wanted to remain as independent as possible, for instance in issuing local statutes and ordinances and administering law and order (Raadschelders, 1992: 11-12).

Local sovereignty therefore extended to cities as well. Furthermore, city governments across the Dutch Republic displayed much of the fragmentation that was also inherent in the other levels. In the Western provinces, the geographical focus of this study, city governments usually consisted of two main bodies. First there was the town council: a group of ‘wise men’ who advised and selected city officials (Groenveld & Wagenaar, 2011: 49, 98-100, 164). The size of the town council differed from city to city but the maximum number of members of a town council seems to have been forty. From the seventeenth century onwards the town council would not only discuss city politics but would also determine their representatives’ stance or position in the Provincial Estates (De Jong, 1987: 37-38). Increasingly they formulated and executed policy too. Membership of the town council was for life but every year the city government was changed.

The town council would nominate two people for every office to be filled, usually – and later exclusively (see below for a discussion on the formation of oligarchies) – from among its own ranks. From the nominees the Provincial Estates of Holland or the Stadholder would appoint members for the Magistrate, the second main body of city governments in the cities of the province of Holland (see also chapter seven). The Magistrate was responsible for the daily administration of the city and consisted of a provincial representative called bailiff or sheriff, a few mayors and several aldermen (De Jong, 1987: 38-39). Usually members of the town council had to wait a long time for positions as these could only be acquired after a long and successful career in public office. Also, they usually had to wait for others to pass away and they had to be at least forty years of age. In cities with a big town council some would have to wait as long as fifteen years but offices were usually worth waiting for (De Jong, 1987: 49). Furthermore, administrative bodies were always made up of uneven numbers. This was a fundamental characteristic of collegial administration (see below) and served to prevent a deadlock in voting or decision-making. The regents in the town council also had numerous offices to hand out and this (see below) would have a profound effect on debates on political corruption in the form of nepotism and patronage. In turn, changing ways of dealing with political offices would have an effect on what was considered politically corrupt.

4.3 Groups and actors

The Stadholder

The Stadholder had traditionally been the most important link between central rule (the Burgundian-Habsburg ruler) on the one hand and regional (provincial) and local (city) nobles on the other (Damen & Stein, 2011: 53-54). After the revolt against the Spanish Habsburg King Philip II (1555 – 1598), the office of Stadholder remained intact but its function changed. His powers grew extensively as he became the commanding officer of the Generality army and, more importantly in the context of political corruption (compare chapter seven), he had the power to appoint high officials, such as Bailiffs or Sheriffs and certain members of town councils which would link him to accusations of patronage and nepotism. In a very general sense he was also responsible for provincial justice and the keeping of the peace. Although he was formally not a member of the Provincial Estates or Gecommitteerde Raden the Stadholder could claim the right to speak there and was often called in to resolve conflicts (Israel, 1998: 300-306; Schöffner, 1978: 190). By the nature of his office the Stadholder thus remained linked to the central level (generality), the regional level (provinces) and the local level (cities). Apart from any formal powers his prestige and dynastic pretensions further increased his authority and political power. The Stadholder was one of the most crucial political figures during the entire period of the Republic's existence. While obviously different from the absolutist rulers or Kings in some neighbouring states he would at times be or certainly strive to be the closest thing resembling a central authority or ruler in the Dutch Republic. Because of this he was loved and loathed by different groups at different times, depending on specific circumstances, events and interests. As such, his actions (and that of his circle) could be called corrupt or not depending on who was asked (as we shall see in the case studies).

The regents

The vast majority of people occupying public office – and therefore the single most powerful political group in the Republic – were the regents (De Jong, 1987: 31; Kooijmans, 1987), a name used for all those who participated in higher level civic government. The economic boom of the seventeenth century had caused the emergence of a new group of people, a ‘social middle group’ consisting of members of merchant families with the means to devote their time to running their cities and protecting their commercial interests. The regents were initially rich merchant burghers (cf. Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 147-163) who replaced members of older aristocratic and noble oligarchies. There is much debate about what this social mobility (the opening up of the patrician regent class to outsiders) looked like, what its consequences were and whether or not it ended during the eighteenth century (cf. Van Deursen, 2004a: 145-146; Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 147-149; Kooijmans, 1987: 93-94; Schöffner, 1978: 180-182). There is no doubt, however, that the regents of the eighteenth century formed new oligarchies themselves. In either case it was a very small group of regents that held office in the Dutch Republic. Schöffner (1978: 181) tells us there were approximately two thousand administrative offices for regents in the seventeenth century. Apart from city offices, regents would also occupy so-called *buitenambten*, highly lucrative offices in administrative bodies outside the city. These included being city delegate to the Provincial Estates, being member of the Gecommitteerde Raden or of the provincial treasuries and courts, being the provincial delegate to the Estates General, being a member of an Admiralty or of one of the chambers of the Dutch East Indian or West Indian Company. As such regents could essentially be found on all institutional levels of the Republic.

The regents became gradually more influential in seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch politics and administration because they were from good – i.e., old – families and because they had money. The first signalled natural authority and the second signalled independence or, interestingly, *incorruptibility* (Van Deursen, 2004a: 144). The original priority of the regent was protecting his (they, as all public officials at the time, could not be women) family interests. Although this ‘individualism’ remained, the regents also considered themselves part of a distinct social group as the eighteenth century progressed. To be sure they were part of a specific culture. They had mostly gone to the same Latin schools, had spent some time in university and all spoke some French (Van Deursen, 2004a: 279). In some ways the interest of the group (compare early modern notions of publicness and common good, see chapter one) therefore became as important as the interest of the individual regent and his family because cooperation at least preserved power within the group (Van Deursen, 2004a: 145-146). This is not to say, of course, that faction strife between families, individual regents and groups of regents did not occur (De Jong, 1987; Roorda, 1979). For the regent everything was tied to the city and the obtaining of lucrative offices. This was especially the case during and after the economic decline in the later eighteenth century. While the regents had initially been merchants who were also politically active, their main business increasingly came to be politics and administration and acquiring public office became ever more necessary as a means of existence. With the absence of fixed salaries they also had to find ways to supplement their income by using that public office to the fullest. Naturally this caused much political corruption and further ‘faction strife’ among them (see chapters five and seven).

The nobility

The nobility was another actor in the largely bottom-up administration of the Dutch Republic. They formally represented the local level of the countryside with one seat in their Provincial Estates. As such the nobility did not lose its political status and privileges altogether after the Revolt against the Spanish and could be quite powerful especially in the countryside. In fact, the elimination of the (Spanish) court and royal bureaucracy meant less rivalry for local Dutch nobles (Israel, 1998: 337). In the maritime provinces and its cities the nobility had less influence because here they were eclipsed by a wealthy and powerful regent elite. Still even in Holland the nobility was not entirely powerless. They owned much land and were influential due to their investment in land reclamation. They also held high offices in the army and navy. In addition, being of noble descent still meant a lot despite of the ongoing ‘social struggle’ with non-noble burghers who gained wealth and status through commerce, trade and offices. The Stadholder (himself of course the highest nobleman in the Dutch Republic) would also make use of the nobility in his attempts to increase his power. This would eventually lead to ever bigger networks of patronage and (critique of) political corruption by the nobility, especially (see chapter seven) during the second half of the eighteenth century (cf. Gabriëls, 1989).

The church

A fourth important actor in the institutional set-up of the Dutch Republic was the church. In the Union of Utrecht the provinces had officially become protestant but the protestant church co-existed with other religious groups (Van Deursen, 2004a: 148-150, 153, 303-308; Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998: 37). This was mainly because a certain level of religious tolerance was, at least until the final quarter of the eighteenth century, a political and economic necessity (Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 189). The regents wanted to maintain some sort of economic and political-religious balance in society and realized that unity (whether inside the cities, in the provinces or in the union as a whole) could quickly succumb to religious strife and fanaticism (Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998: 37). Still, tolerance (of Catholics for instance) was limited and people of reformed faith received all kinds of preferential treatment and were in theory the only ones eligible for public office (Van Deursen, 2004a: 181; De Jong, 1987: 123; Schöffner, 1978: 209-211). While the protestant regents were usually active and supporting members of the reformed church and its local councils they did not always have much sympathy for the way the church conducted its affairs. According to Van Deursen (2004a: 150) the administrative elite “preferred a broad church for the people that didn’t ask too many critical questions on teachings and life”. The regents seemed to want a separation of church and state insofar as it concerned church influence on politics and administration.

At the very least, regents – and not preachers – should control the church (Schöffner, 1978: 245; Zijlstra, 1989: 57-59) and regents rarely tolerated church domination over worldly affairs. At the same time the regents exercised much influence on church affairs. Town councils, for instance, often demanded the right to appoint preachers and paid their salaries (De Jong, 1987: 41). Echoing the political theorist Pieter de la Court (1618 – 1685), religion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was clearly a public affair (De Jong, 1987: 122-123; Price, 1974: 34-35). The final result was that regents were suspicious of church influence over

public administration while the church was often disappointed in the lack of political influence and cooperation of the authorities. As a consequence, according to Van Deursen (2004a: 299), most preachers backed the House of Orange and the Stadholder in the everlasting strife with the (Holland) regents (see also below). Where the regents did not need or consider church criticism on their morals, the church would usually take the side of the Stadholder in condemning the regent's acts anyway. However, as far as I have been able to tell from the case studies below they did so only in a limited way. Only very occasionally (see chapter seven) can we find preachers who publicly and explicitly criticized abuse of office. Limited church and/or preacher involvement or relevance in public debates on administrative morality and political corruption might have been caused by the paradoxical relation between church and state in the Dutch Republic.

4.4 Political history

The period in Dutch political history between 1748 and 1813 has been one of tremendous change and major political and administrative developments. In the following a basic chronological division of the period (see chapter three) is made to provide a rough overview and account of these developments in which the later case studies are situated. I draw general lines and focus on important watersheds in Dutch political history. This provides essential context for the following case studies and serves to help explain changing public values and perceptions of political corruption.

Stadholder and regent oligarchy (1748 – 1770)

The year 1747 presented a watershed in Dutch political history when an economic crisis coincided with foreign military threat (Israel, 1998: 1067-1069; Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998: 37). In April 1747 a small French army entered the Generality province of State Flanders. While apparently only intended as a warning to the Estates General, the act was perceived as a full-scale invasion just like the one in 1672 and caused widespread unrest and fear (Israel, 1998: 796-806). To many the 'invasion' proved the failure of the ruling elite (the regents in the Estates General and the Holland cities) to govern and protect the Republic. Adding to the grievances was the old and corrupted system of private tax farming in the Republic. Large-scale protest against tax farming became intertwined with calls for administrative (Dekker, 1996; Israel, 1998: 1072-1075) and moral reform (see chapter six). The problems led to calls for the return to power of a strong leader, meaning the restoration of the Stadholder. The latter had been deposed of by the provinces and the Estates General during the so-called second Stadholderless period from 1702 to 1747 in which the Holland regents decided not to appoint a Stadholder. In 1747, however, strife between the Estates General, Holland and its regents on one side and the Stadholder and populace on the other erupted once again. This time the latter 'faction' won and William IV (1747 – 1751) became the hereditary Stadholder for all the provinces.

William immediately tightened his grip on administration. Formally he was now allowed to recommend even more people for offices (see chapter seven). This meant he had more power than his predecessors ever had. Informally, his now hereditary title also increased his standing and power. The advent of William IV and his Orangist followers also went hand in

hand with popular calls by the so-called Doelisten for administrative reform of the regent system, such as ending corrupt practices of office rotation and allowing wider participation in politics. In chapters five and six I will discuss this reform movement more elaborately. For now, however, it remains to be said that in reality none of the demands for reform of 1747 – 1751 were realized. It quickly became obvious to most contemporary observers that the promised reforms would not be pushed through (Israel, 1998: 1076-1078; Rogier, 1980: 203-205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80). Instead, the ‘Revolution’ of 1747 proved to be a ‘conservative’ victory for the Stadholder and his moderate Orangist followers (Schutte, 1978: 300) since it succeeded in concentrating power at the centre in the hands of the Stadholder. Some, like Willem Bentinck van Rhoon (1704 – 1774), the trusted advisor of the Prince (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 137-145), had wanted reform but this did not include actually transferring power to citizens, ‘the people’ or regents outside the oligarchies, contracts of correspondence or existing patronage networks (see chapters five and eight). Bentinck could see that all the necessary ingredients for ‘unity of command’ under a single leader were now present. For one, the city regents were intimidated by the populace and the Stadholder got more powers to appoint people and was as close to becoming a monarch as he would ever be. Bentinck’s attempts to create ‘ministries’ (defence, navy, trade, finances, internal and foreign affairs) led by a few capable and reliable persons and headed by the Prince, however, failed (Israel, 1998: 1077-1080; Schama, 1977: 55; Schutte, 1978: 301-302). William IV thought the proposal was too revolutionary and his influential wife, Princess Anna of Hanover, did not trust Bentinck. As a result, only a limited number of regents were indeed deposed since William urged the Estates General only to get rid of regents when it was absolutely necessary to restore order in the cities.

Any chance of alternative actions by William IV disappeared when he died unexpectedly in October 1751. Furthermore, opposition from a still powerful regent elite continued to frustrate any attempts at reform (Rogier, 1980: 203-205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80; Wagenaar, 2004: 551-553). The Doelist Ockers, for instance, already lamented: “how are we better off now that the Prince is Stadholder? [...] He has changed the government to his liking and everything else is wrong; his highness has not reinstated the burgher in his right” (De Voogd, 1914: 209). Such popular disillusionment and frustration – aggravated by economic decay – did not make much difference, at least in the short term. The death of William IV led to yet another shift in power relations in the Dutch Republic. On the one hand, the lack of a strong Stadholder led to the partial restoration of anti-Orangist regent dominance in the Republic’s cities and provinces. On the other hand Anna of Hanover, who had assumed much of the responsibility of the Stadholderate after her husband’s death, attempted to hold on to as much power as possible until her son, the heir to the Stadholderate, was old enough to assume power. Anna received help from Bentinck and, above all, from the infamous Duke of Brunswick (1718 – 1788). These men relied heavily on a culture of patronage and brokerage (see below and chapter seven) to keep as much control over offices, and thus power, as possible (Gabriëls, 1989: 68-69). This continued in the period between 1759 (the death of Anna) and 1766 (the coming of age of Stadholder William V). Still, the period following the death of William IV was a temporary return to the way things were before 1747 (Gabriëls, 1989: 71-72). As Orangists were still holding on to as much power as they could, the regents again rose to power. The period after the death of Anna can even be considered another Stadholderless period (Schutte, 1978: 313), or as a contemporary observer noted: “then we

could see the resurrection of the old regents. Once again they handed out offices and commissions among themselves, just like before” (Te Lintum, 1910: 118).

The Patriot revolt and its aftermath (1770 – 1795)

When William V (1766 – 1795) came of age he assumed full responsibilities as Stadholder over all the provinces. This considerably strengthened his position and that of his court. Still, economic and military decay and the inability and/or reluctance of the Stadholder and his ‘clique’ to do anything about it, combined with growing concerns and protests against abuse of office such as patronage and nepotism put rival factions in the Republic in a deadlock towards the late 1770s. Tensions were especially rising as the inactive Orangist regime continued to alienate large parts of the population. Furthermore, patrons and clients still managed to divide up large parts of the Dutch political pie and many city regents simply reclaimed the power of ‘true liberty’ (see below on political culture and also Rogier, 1954; Schama, 1977: 46) to continue their ‘corrupt’ practices of office rotation, sale of offices and other forms of abuse of power. The Republic was, as Israel (1998: 1095) put it, “in a malaise which extended into every dimension of national life. The sense of the Republic being in steep decline became pervasive [...]. The combination of economic, political and imperial crisis facing the Republic created the necessary conditions for a revolution”.

A revolution was exactly what happened, spurred on in part by events in North America (Palmer, 1974, part I: 325-326; Schutte, 1978: 314-315). Dutch historian Rogier (1980: 208) once wrote how the 1780s witnessed the formation of a “monster-coalition” mainly consisting of bourgeoisie, common populace, purged anti-Orangist regents and disillusioned Doelists from the 1740s who were all fighting for reforms in (civic) government. Together the groups making up this particular ad-hoc coalition were labelled Patriots who, according to Palmer (1974: 326) were “for the most part well-to-do burghers, many of them bankers, merchants, owners of manufacturing establishments, printers and publishers, or professors at Utrecht or Leiden. They were upper middle-class, but so were most people of any consequence in the country”. As eclectic as their background and motives sometimes were, on international affairs the Patriots (in line with many of the ideas of the earlier Doelists) were against England and pro-France. In domestic politics this meant they were against the Stadholder’s pro-French politics (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 221). They were not, as is often supposed, against the Stadholder as such. They did not want to abolish the Stadholderate but ‘merely’ wanted to reduce him to being the ‘first servant’ of the state (Lok, 2009: 30-31). The Patriot’s class standing, according to Palmer (1974: 326), “could not be defined economically. It was more readily defined by the permanent exclusion from state affairs of persons like themselves, including their fathers and presumably their children”. They did not, in other words, belong to the right families nor were they always members of the Dutch reformed church and could therefore not become part of the regent elite. Their aim was to end the closed-off regent practices and the networks and structures of patronage (see below and chapter seven) set-up by the Stadholders William III (1672 – 1702), William IV (1747 – 1751), William V (1751 – 1795), their ‘advisors’ such as Bentinck or the Duke of Brunswick and many other local officials (Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 13; Gabriëls, 1989: 146-163; Israel, 1998: 1092-1093).

The Patriot protest and calls for administrative reform were exacerbated and fuelled by the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780 – 1784) that had disastrous consequences for Dutch trade and shipping and added economic misery to the pile of Patriot complaints. The war, in any case, was a tipping point in the success of the Patriot revolt (Lok, 2009: 30; Schama, 1977: 58). Once again the ruling administration – this time including the Prince of Orange and some of his close advisors – was blamed for the crisis. To the Patriots it seemed that both Orangists and their dynastic ties and regents with their commercial ties were prepared to subvert the national interest (i.e., protection from England and alliance with France) to protect their personal dividend and commercial connections (Elias, 1923: 238; Palmer, 1974, part I: 327, 329; Schama, 1977: 35-36). A pamphlet of 1782 (*Brief van Batavus*, 1782: 20-22) summed things up nicely as it remarked how many were following the Stadholders' court like machines or tools only to further their own interests, i.e., getting offices for themselves or their kin. At the same time, those among the regents who had always opposed the Stadholder and wished to break English economic and naval power, were fighting the Stadholder because of his choice to support England in the American war of independence (Palmer, 1974, part I: 326-327). Ironically, then, parts of the regent oligarchies were in this way aiding the cause of their Patriot 'enemies' who wanted to change the role of the Stadholder as well as the system of government in the Dutch towns and provinces. It is a sign of how complicated politics actually was.

Patriot agitation rapidly gained momentum mainly due to the emergence of a strong Patriot press and public opinion (cf. Broersma, 2005; Harline, 1987; Israel, 1998: 1100; Klein, 1995: 91-127; Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 81-102; Pollmann & Spicer, 2007; Van Sas, 1992: 99-104; Schama, 1977: 79-80). Events followed each other in quick succession from 1784 onwards as the Patriot movement grew into a revolutionary movement, according to Israel (1998: 1100): "welling up from below [...] to wrest control of civic and provincial life from the hands of the Stadholder's favourites, and the regent oligarchies, and transfer power to those who regarded themselves as the spokesmen and representatives of the people". Crucial in the beginning of the revolt were attempts to practically alter practices of recommendations and Stadholderly patronage (see chapter seven). In towns like Schoonhoven (May 1782), Dordrecht (August 1782), Deventer (January 1783), Utrecht (August 1783) or Groningen (1784), Stadholderly recommendations were duly banished (Klein, 1995: 152; Van Sas, 1988b: 20-22). Several Dutch towns saw the beginnings of Free Corps in the early 1780s. These were armed burger-led and occupied militia's (consider the Patriot demand for military as well as moral rearmament, see chapter five) that served to topple city administrations and protect the Republic from foreign and Stadholder troops. The first Free Corps, of Dordrecht, was set up in 1783 and soon consisted of over one thousand men (Israel, 1998: 1102). In various Holland towns (most notably The Hague, Rotterdam, Haarlem and Leiden) Patriot Free Corps clashed with Orangist crowds. The Republic became divided in pro- and anti- Patriot zones (Israel, 1998: 1107). By the time a National Assembly of Free Corps of around 13,500 men assembled in Utrecht in 1785, the Patriots were triumphant in most of Utrecht, Holland and Overijssel and had significant support in the other provinces as well. As a result, the Republic was in chaos and practical civil war loomed between Patriot militia's and regular troops (Israel, 1998: 1106-1107).

The revolt of the Patriot movement was fragmented and would only last a few years. Friedrich Wilhelm II (1786 – 1797) had ascended to the throne in Prussia. Not only was Friedrich "a disciplinarian and enemy of democratic ideas", such as those espoused by the Patriots (Israel, 1998: 1113), he was also the brother of Princess Wilhelmina, the wife of Stadholder William V. In a well-known instance of bad judgment and bad timing, Wilhelmina was arrested

by the Patriot Free Corps of Gouda. In response her brother sent an army of 26,000 men into the Republic and the result was a quickly disintegrating Patriot movement. Their demise was due to external pressure but also, writes Schama (1977: 102, 129), to their “unheeding attachment to the letter and the spirits of their ideas, which diluted the concentration of their strength and compromised the effectiveness of their organization”. Despite all the training and revolutionary zeal of the Patriot militia’s there was thus a triumphant return to The Hague of William V. Following in Williams’ wake was Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel (1787 – 1795), the new Grand Pensionary of Holland. With William back in the saddle the ‘old ways of doing things’ soon returned as Van de Spiegel led the restoration of the Orangist regime. Van de Spiegel was an able politician and a reformer and theoretician of public administration in his own right (Rutgers, 2005). His efforts to change things (within the limits set by William V) were however thwarted by still powerful vested interests. The failure or unwillingness of the restored Orangist regime to make drastic changes and reforms in their institutional and political structures meant a continuation of old practices. Orangist regent oligarchies took over and the prince tried to increase his grip on Dutch society and politics. Thousands of Patriots decided to lay low or flee their city, province or even the Republic, many going into exile in France. The initial failure of the Patriot Revolt should not obscure its monumental importance in the long run. The restoration of Orange after 1787 marked the beginning of Patriot ‘oppression’ by the Orangists. In short, it planted a vital seed of discontent and resentment that grew into a major movement in the Batavian Revolution of 1795.

The Batavian Revolution (1795)

In January 1795 a French army crossed the frozen rivers in the South of the Dutch Republic to free their ‘revolutionary brothers’ in the south. The French had been anxiously awaited by Dutch Patriots whose anti-Orangist and pro-republican sentiments had already been rekindled by French revolutionary zeal. It should come as no surprise that the Dutch Patriots – either in exile or in hiding – were likely to join forces with the French Revolution already in the early 1790s. The similarities and continuity of the revolutionary movements of 1787 and 1795 were striking (Israel, 1998: 1119-1121). The Orangist regime after 1787 had only been able to exist because of foreign help of England and Prussia. Internally the patriotism of the 1780s continued to live on (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 224; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 199-201) and in 1795, the Batavians (essentially a new name for the former Patriots, in reference to a West-Germanic tribe who in 69AD successfully rebelled against the Romans) established a Batavian Republic using French military revolutionary support (for extensive discussions see Geyl & Godard, 1971; Israel, 1998: 1119-1130; Palmer, 1954; Schama, 1977).

The French ‘invasion’ was, certainly in the beginning, seen by the Dutch Patriots as a liberation from (Stadholder-) tyranny and taken as a pretext to return to ‘civic government’. Colenbrander wrote that “whether the Orangists had won in 1787 without the Prussians is doubtful; that the Patriots in 1795 would never have been there without the French is certain” (1905-1922, part II: xxii). Stadholder William V, who had according to popular opinion (see chapters seven and eight) become the symbol of the widespread nepotism and abuse of office of his time (Kossmann, 1995, 123-124; Schama, 1977, 77), was forced into exile, despite efforts of Van de Spiegel to get him to stay. Van de Spiegel’s own office of Grand Pensionary was abolished in January 1795 and together with other Orangists he was placed under arrest (Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 551). The Batavians purged many city, provincial and generality councils of

Orangists, replacing them with people from their own ranks. The government in Paris decided, in return for land and money, see chapter eight) to acknowledge the Batavian Republic as a separate and independent political entity.

The events following the Batavian Revolution have been crucial in Dutch political and administrative history. Inspired and guided in part by French ideology (and a French army) the Batavians managed to forge the basis of a unitary state out of an existing federation of provinces. They also introduced new legislative institutions, a separation of powers and a new constitution. The French-Batavian period (from 1795 to 1813) has arguably been crucial to understand wider Western-European political history as a whole or, as Palmer put it, “it was a typical revolution of the era [...], it reveals on a small and well-lit stage, a great many phenomena then common to western Europe and in some degree the Western world” (1954: 35). For Dutch history, at least, it was surely another watershed moment. Before, the Republic had been a fragmented and decentralized collection of largely sovereign provinces, cities and institutions with administration running ‘bottom-up’ from the city level and horizontally through collegial systems, rather than ‘top-down’ and vertically from the Generality level. Power was fragmented and unevenly distributed, which resulted in highly complex political and social power structures, both formally and informally. In many ways, the revolution of 1795 marked the end of this ancien regime administration and politics. The Batavian Republic (1795 – 1806) and subsequent forms of state after 1806 had a fundamentally different appearance. Developments from 1795 onwards marked the beginning of feverish political experimentation and secured a decisive shift towards the Dutch state as it exists today as old institutions were torn down because of revolutionary ideas such as popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. But all this, of course, did not happen overnight.

A laboratory for constitutional experiments (1795 – 1798)

The Revolution of 1795 caused much internal strife over how to shape the new Republic and its constitution. The main questions were whether it should remain a federation of largely autonomous provinces or a unitary state with stronger central command and how ‘democratic’ this new state should be. Various political groups consisting of federalists, unitarians and moderates – admittedly a very rough categorization (cf. Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 225-226; Schama, 1977: 249) – strongly disagreed about these issues. The result was a period in which the Netherlands was essentially a laboratory for constitutional experiments (Palmer, 1954; Van Sas, 1989; Schama, 1977). The main task of the Batavians, drafting and adopting a new constitution, proved to be difficult. After lengthy negotiations in the First National Assembly (1 March 1796 – 31 August 1797), a constitution was presented but rejected in a referendum in August 1797. Continuous political strife in the following months in the Second National Assembly (1 September 1797 – 22 January 1798) over the content of the new constitution, and the question of ‘union’ or ‘federation’, ultimately resulted in a first coup d’état led by radical unitarians (see chapter eight). Encouraged and spurred on by developments in France, radical Batavians like Wybo Fijnje (1750 – 1809), Pieter Vreede (1750 – 1837) and Stephen Jacobus van Langen (1758 – 1847) were among the leaders of the coup. The coup was furthermore supported by general Daendels and could count on the full backing of the French Directoire that was, as discussed earlier, in a hurry to sort out the Dutch political organization once and for all. This ‘Batavian Terror’ was, in comparison to the one in France, bloodless but funda-

mental all the same. To Van Sas (2005: 19) the ‘Batavian Terror’ was even the true core of the Revolution. A total of twenty eight ‘federalists’ and ‘aristocrats’ from the Second National Assembly were placed under arrest and the remainder of its members had to take an ‘oath of hatred’ declaring their “unwavering aversion to the Stadholder, federalism and the [supposed, TK] general anarchy or failed administration” of previous decades (Colenbrander, 1905-1922: lxxv-lxxvi, see document number [doc.] 527 for the full original text; Schama, 1977: 291).

Drafting and adopting a democratic constitution for a future unitary state became much easier after both National Assembly and Primary Assemblies had been purged of federalist opponents. Also, a Provisional Executive Directorate (25 January 1798 – 12 June 1798) was set up, consisting of radical democrats (most notably Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen) to assume temporary executive power. In this way a new constitution could duly be accepted in a referendum on 23 April 1798. It was put into effect on 1 May of that year. The constitution was based on the principle of unitarism. It provided unity of law, a separation of church and state, abolished the guilds and reformed education. The radicals from the Provisional Executive Directorate would, however, only be in power for a period of roughly six months. On 12 June 1798 a second coup d’état (see chapter eight) was staged in order to safeguard the constitution, democracy and the basic unitary structure of the Republic. For the time being, a thinned out National Assembly became an Interim Legislative Assembly (12 June 1798 – 31 July 1798) and a new temporary Interim Executive Directorate (consisting of the moderate unitarians Gerrit Jan Pijman, Jacobus Spoor, Isaac Gogel, Reinier Tadema and Abraham la Pierre) took charge to pave the way for new elections. The already accepted constitution remained in place. In a matter of months the two coups had thereby ended the deadlock which had more or less “cast the Republic into a kind of Polish chaos” ever since 1795 (Schama, 1977, 271).

New foundations for a Dutch nation state (1798 – 1813)

The result, from July 1798 onwards, was a unitary state with a central government in the form of a Representative Assembly (31 July 1798 – 17 October 1801) – replacing the former Estates General – and an Executive Directorate (17 August 1798 – 17 October 1801) of five Directors, aided by eight ministers (also called agents) for various policy areas. One of the most notable changes was the dissolution of the provincialism and particularism that had so characterized the old Republic. Increased pressure from the French for further reorganization led to even more centralization. Napoleon Bonaparte was not impressed with the Batavian directorate and wished to strengthen his authority in the Republic (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227-229; Schama, 1977: 410-411). Ultimately, in 1801, the French installed a Council of State (1801 – 1805), consisting of twelve members. The National Assembly was further reduced to thirty five members. They were only allowed to approve or disapprove legislation given to them by the Council of State. This council was less democratic but also less centralistic than previous governments, even though the new constitution clearly ranked provinces and municipalities below the central level. Authority was supposed to be developed from the centre to the periphery. In practice, however, changing the old relationships between provincial, city and central levels proved difficult. This was, as Schama writes (1977: 363), partly because the “bureaucratically contrived cartography paid little attention to social or regional topography and the new shape of the Republic was designed, and taken, to be a deliberate insult to the

facts of Dutch history”. It was also because there was still much resistance to reducing the autonomy and inherent particularism of Dutch local government. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the Council of State after 1801 abolished the new division in departments and quickly reverted to the old provincial boundaries, enabling old elites of patricians and nobles to regain control on lower provincial and city levels (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227). It is also shown by the fact that town councils would still be largely in control of their own affairs, such as taxation, justice and citizen’s militias (Israel, 1998: 1124-1125).

Squabbling and indecisiveness among the Dutch, the apparent return to local autonomy instead of central command and the inability of the Council of State to bring about desired reforms made the French intervene again in Dutch politics. Napoleon Bonaparte simply did not feel the indecisive Council of State contributed enough to his newly created Empire (Lok, 2009: 40). The French, as a result, started to behave more as occupiers than liberators (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227), leading in part to the emergence of a new Dutch nationalism (including new ideas on common good and common interest?) in the years between roughly 1800 and 1813 (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227; Van Sas, 2005: 161). From 1805 to 1806, Napoleon put Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck – former ambassador to France for the Batavian Republic – in place as Grand Pensionary, or rather: as ‘president’ of a highly centralized system of government. More negatively phrased, he was nothing other than a “six-month Doge” (Schama, 1977: 466), instated by Napoleon to do the latter’s bidding. The constitution of 1805 reduced the Representative Assembly even further, to 19 members. They were only allowed to approve or disapprove legislation made by Schimmelpenninck. Political participation of citizens was curtailed, the executive was centralized under a single person, government finances were centralized by Isaac Gogel (1765 – 1821) and a system of general taxation was introduced (for more on Gogel and tax reform see Schama, 1977: 382-389, 494-524). The single year under Schimmelpenninck was therefore brief but important (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 228; Lok, 2009: 40; Schama, 1977: 466).

Although Napoleon later admitted he should have continued Schimmelpenninck’s rule for more than just a single year (Lok, 2009: 40) the Emperor, still not satisfied with the speed of reforms and meaning to increase his influence, used Schimmelpenninck’s illness (he had become blind) as a pretext to appoint his brother Louis Napoleon as King of Holland from 1806 to 1810. Although the new constitution of 1806 meant a doubling of the amount of representatives, the power of the Assembly became even more insignificant. Centralization, now in the form of a monarchy, increased. King Louis, however, identified with the Dutch a little too much, at least to his brother’s taste. The Emperor saw his brother as a ‘simple’ prefect, the executive of imperial orders. Louis, on the other hand, took his job as King seriously and increasingly chose the side of the Dutch in conflicts with France (Lok, 2009: 40-41). As a result, between 1810 and 1813, Emperor Napoleon dismissed his brother and turned the former Kingdom into a part of the Empire, which was now directly ruled from Paris by French institutions. This final episode in the long succession of regimes and changes of state was very important for the Netherlands. The annexation meant that French laws and regulations were firmly implemented, that functional and geographical unity were ensured and that a new legislative organization with true separation of powers and a coherent legal system were set up (cf. Lok, 2009: 13-17; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995; Peters, 2008; Rugge, 2003).

The annexation to the Empire led to crucial shifts and new foundations for government and administration in the Netherlands (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 220; Van Sas, 1992, 2005; Van Sas & Te Velde, 1998). Standardization and the introduction of

uniform administrative and legal organization of the state (Lok, 2009: 41-42) was in many ways the true beginning of the so-called Napoleonic model of government in the Netherlands. The model is that of an omnipresent government based on a uniform division of territory and a uniform organization of the civil service through hierarchy and unity of command. In the model administration and politics were separated as much as possible. Chosen representatives had limited (constitutional) power and a depoliticized civil service was there for execution of policy only. The model was centred around a civil service grounded in law and selected on the basis of expertise (Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 201).

Compared to the *ancien regime* of the Republic, the introduction of the Napoleonic Model meant a fundamental shift. It brought more vertical and centralized rather than horizontal and decentralized coordination and organization. This, in turn, led to top-down rather than bottom-up administration to which the Dutch Republic had grown accustomed. Government increasingly consisted of strong institutions on the national level (such as a King, a cabinet and a parliament) and weaker institutions on the provincial and local levels. Bureaucratization and professionalization were ‘natural’ consequences of such a shift. The ever stronger reliance on more central government from 1795 onwards also meant that public service delivery by the state grew (cf. Boels, 2011; Schama, 1977: 370-374). The later nineteenth century witnessed the rise of ‘big government’ with a multitude of ‘public’ tasks. More government on a wider variety of policy fields, in turn, increased bureaucratization and professionalization of the civil service and also included more emphasis on the moral elements of public administration. Some have pointed to the emergence of so-called *Napoleonic model*, which is important in the context of this study. It is supposed to be a system of organization as well as the embodiment of new ideas on ‘good government’ (Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 201). It stressed, for instance, the importance of centralized rule, hierarchy, and legal frameworks. This is important to assess public value change at the time (see also chapter eight).

4.5 Political culture

Following the previous overviews of main institutions and Dutch political history a final overview to help describe and understand changing public values and perceptions of political corruption deals with Dutch political culture. While a notoriously difficult concept, a useful definition is provided by Baker (1987, part I; xii; 1990: 4) who wrote that “if politics, broadly construed, is the activity through which individuals and groups in society articulate, negotiate, implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon another and upon the whole [then] political culture is the set of discourses or political practices by which these claims are made”. According to Klein (1995: 2) such a definition sees political culture as “the constant battle in any society between arguments and counter arguments, between depictions and alternative imaginations and between individual and collective actions and counter-actions”. This makes political culture a mental and a social phenomenon. It is dynamic and always subject to change in wide networks of communication. Despite inherent contingency one can point to several main elements of Dutch political culture between 1748 and 1813. In the following these will be discussed. This is not, it has to be remembered, an exhaustive overview but serves as essential explanatory context for changing public values.

Enduring political struggles: true liberty and political corruption

The history of the Dutch Republic between 1748 and 1813 (as well as earlier periods) can be characterized by a few central political disputes and political alignments that served as core themes in the communication and strife between its various groups and institutional levels. Sometimes coalitions were formed between different actors. Some, such as the one between the House of Orange and the reformed church, lasted for a long time. Others, such as the one between populace and the Stadholder or the populace and the regents, would prove more shaky as the popularity of both amongst the populace waxed and waned depending on political, military and economic circumstances. The populace at large would for instance often call upon the Stadholder in times of great need (compare in the ‘year of disaster’ in 1672 but also in 1747, see chapter six) but would denounce him as soon as he proved incapable. A more fundamental and long-lasting dispute was that between Holland and many of its regents on one side and the Stadholder on the other. In a nutshell, the regent oligarchies in Holland’s cities were fearful of anyone with dynastic pretensions (i.e., the Stadholder) who could potentially curb their power. In their eyes, a free Republic ruled by free regents could not suffer such tyranny. At the same time those who opposed the dominance of Holland and its regents (for instance other provinces that envied Holland, noblemen who frowned upon non-nobles in public office, regents who were excluded from offices or preachers who wanted to diminish regent influence over church affairs) would often gather around the banner of the Stadholder. They did so because, as mentioned earlier, although technically nothing more than a provincial official the prestige of the Stadholder and his powers of appointment (see chapter seven) could carry a long way. The Stadholder of course welcomed any backing to boost his power and prestige.

The enduring political struggle between Holland and many of its regents and aforementioned other groups – or rather: the basic antagonism between the House of Orange (i.e., the Orangist faction) and the Holland regents (i.e., The States faction) – would sometimes lead to radical changes in the institutional set-up and political culture of the Republic such as the first (1650 – 1672) and second (1702 – 1747) Stadholderless periods. In these periods the regency gained what has been called ‘True Liberty’; a fundamental element in Dutch early modern political culture that is of vital importance to understand changing public values. It entailed the freedom of the relatively small group of regents to decide what was best for all. It meant they could govern without being hindered by the Stadholder or any other political entity, such as the Generality (Van Deursen, 2004a: 276-280; Rogier, 1954; Schama, 1977: 46). It meant the Holland regents could essentially rule their cities and province without consultation. The regent elites essentially did not have to answer to anyone but themselves. In the two Stadholderless periods (the latter of which is important for this present study) the regents – who, incidentally, could also be fighting among themselves (cf. Schutte, 1978: 270-273) – gained almost full control of the Republic. True liberty obviously worked well for the regents themselves and for a long time nobody really seems to have questioned the idea that these people were actually in the best position to govern based on their own ideas and values. Yet, true liberty would increasingly lead to the criticism that the regents were corrupt. This will especially become clear from chapters seven and eight. Then, such things as a lack of consultation, a lack of legitimacy and accountability, ruling with impunity and regents distributing offices as the saw fit would be fundamentally challenged.

Particularism and compromise

Van Deursen (2004a: 224-225) has written how the Republic did not have many constitutional rules and that even if they were there, it was largely unsure whether they were actually followed. “Formal constraints”, he wrote, “do not mean much when they are not confirmed in practice” (cf. De Jong, 1987: 51-52). This goes to the heart of much of the Dutch political culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and can be translated into two basic elements. First, there is the element of particularism which meant that in the fragmented and bottom-up system of administration (see earlier in this chapter) a large variety of autonomous actors all tried to hold on to as much independence as possible (De Jong, 1987: 34). The concept has extensively been explored by Fruin (1922), Van Braam (1986: 349-350) and, more recently, by Price (1994) who have shown how the Republic’s system of government was designed to reflect an enormous variety of particular (religious, commercial or political) interests. Second, there was an element of persuasion, consensus, deliberation, compromise and/or ‘giving and taking’ (Van Deursen, 2004a: 140; Hendriks & Toonen, 1998; Kickert & Hakvoort, 2000: 229; Randerad & Wolfram, 1998). Particularism and the lack of formal rules and regulations created a system in which no single actor or level could really determine the course of the others. Even Holland often had to rely on the other provinces and had to work within the system. Unity among the provinces, according to Van Deursen (2004a: 140), really only served to maintain as much diversity as possible, and statesmanship “required finding a middle way between inherently opposite ideals [...]. Neither force nor violence helped because the provinces were free to do as they pleased”.

The art of politics in the Dutch Republic was, therefore, to keep an eye on all relevant actors and levels and find a balance between often diverging and conflicting interests. In the practice of everyday Dutch politics, as Kloek and Mijnhardt have written, the vast majority of politically active individuals managed quite well to prevent polarization and the formation of cabals. This was mainly due to the essential mechanism of compromise due to pragmatism “which prevented the formation of a serious gap between administrators and administered” (Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 158-160). This means that the elements of particularism and compromise were structural-functional parts of political life in the Dutch Republic. This has obvious consequences when one wants to assess and understand changing public values. As long as particularism and compromise were basic foundations of the Dutch political system, practices that were essentially derived from it were not considered corrupt. I will discuss this in more detail in a later section of this chapter on brokerage, patronage, venality and nepotism as elements of Dutch political culture.

Obtaining office, collegial administration and oligarchy

From the previous it has become apparent how the centre of political and administrative power was to be found in the cities. From this level the influence of the regents extended to all other levels of provincial and generality government. Obtaining office was the most important goal of regents, especially as commerce and trade, their traditional lifeline, began to wane from the second half of the eighteenth century. Since, however, income from public office was still often not anything like a (fixed) salary, these officials tried to get as much out of their office as they could. This meant that the public and private were closely intertwined and that private gain from public

office was neither uncommon nor abnormal. The economic decay of the late eighteenth century thus actively promoted the hunt for offices that would become one of the core complaints of the various reform movements from Doelists to Batavians (see chapter five). Partly to avoid problems of faction strife, internal competition and abuse of office, government institutions on all levels were organized according to the principle of collegial administration. In essence this meant that organizations were run by cooperative agreement among those directly involved. It should come as no surprise that collegial administration was the most appropriate form of decision-making and organization given the Republic's political structure and its emphasis on particularism and consensus. It allowed making decisions based on mutual agreement between more or less equal actors who could correct each other and keep balance in decision-making. Collegial administration was also often able to prevent open abuse of office as it prevented any one party from becoming too powerful (Van Braam & Bemelmans-Videc, 1986: 349, 383-385, 387-388; Raadschelders, 1992: 28). Regents could simply not afford to alienate themselves from the bigger group because they relied on each other to get offices. Instability within collegial bodies, such as the all-important town councils, would be bad for everyone involved. For this reason, intricate systems of maintaining 'harmony' among the regents in collegial bodies were devised in the course of the early modern period.

The core of these systems consisted of office rotation based on seniority. Members of town councils, for instance, would acquire various offices within and outside of the cities in yearly rounds of allocation based on whoever was first in line. Since membership of a town council was for life, all regents would eventually share in the spoils of administration (Gabriëls, 1989: 276; Schöffner, 1978: 245). Maintaining this 'harmony' in day to day politics (on the shop floor, see chapter seven) among a collegial group of ruling regents became all-important (cf. Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008). Paradoxically, as De Jong (1987: 52) writes, self-interest of the regents prevented any obvious or outright abuse of power because group harmony was a prerequisite for individual well-being. Sometimes such informal arrangements would be semi-formalized in documents called contracts of correspondence. These provided detailed accounts of which members of the town council were to get office and which were not (Van Deursen, 2004a: 277; De Jong, 1987: 56; De Witte van Citters, 1873). To the regents the contracts of correspondence were accepted practice because they prevented faction strife in order to further their shared interest which was, in turn, a prerequisite for their personal interest (Kooijmans, 1987: 94-95). Needless to say the system did not always work. For one, while administrators increasingly became professionals, their jobs often still did not provide (regular or fixed) salaries. These professionals thus had to supplement their income from public office by alternative means and once an office came in someone's possession it became necessary to make the most of it. Also, the number of available offices was fewer than the number of regents because reigning regent families began to restrict the number of available and profitable offices in the course of the eighteenth century. A smaller group of regents wanted to have a bigger share in the spoils. This, naturally, led to the exclusion of others from office (Van Deursen, 2004a: 277; De Jong, 1987: 56; Kooijmans, 1987-95; Roorda, 1979). Life-long membership of a town council, sticking to the earlier example, was now no longer automatically translated into power or any chance of obtaining a substantial income.

Such circumstances created exclusion and faction strife that were increasingly perceived as being politically corrupt (see chapter seven). The intense competition among regents over offices was a dominant theme throughout the period between 1748 and 1813. It could sometimes tear town councils apart and lead to a scramble for positions in which regents handed out offices to

friends or family (patronage and nepotism), sold them (venality) or occupied multiple offices at the same time via so-called substitute offices (De Jong, 1987: 52-53). This, in turn, would in the end divide and weaken the regent bodies of the Republic, marking the beginning of the end of collegial administration. Once the collective body of regents was weakened, other parties (such as the Stadholder) gained influence (De Jong, 1987: 54). During several crucial episodes in Dutch history (such as 1672, 1748 and 1788) the Stadholder and his ‘court’ used internal divisions among the regents in various cities to overthrow reigning factions of regents hostile to the Stadholder and replace them with friendly ones (De Jong, 1987: 60-61).

To those outside of government, one of the most characteristic results of the way the town councils and other collegial bodies functioned was the formation of oligarchies. According to De Wit (1965, 1974), the existence of an unbridgeable gap between aristocrats and democrats in the eighteenth century (see also chapter seven) pointed to the emergence of a true oligarchy in the Dutch Republic. Continued ‘aristocratisation’ of society in which the regents kept the most important offices to themselves (using contract of correspondence and nepotism) meant, to him, that it became increasingly difficult for non-aristocrats (i.e., non-regents) to enter the political realm. Although, as Kooijmans suggested (1987: 94) it had not been uncommon to appoint friends and family in office ever since the seventeenth century, it became part of an “oligarchic ideology” in the eighteenth century.

Brokerage, patronage, venality and nepotism

Brokerage is a term that is often heard when early modern Dutch political culture is discussed. As a general term it was used by Charles Tilly (1990: 28-29) for his second phase of state formation (roughly 1400 – 1700). In that phase “mercenary forces recruited contractors, predominantly in military activity, and rulers relied heavily on formally independent capitalists for loans, for management of revenue-producing enterprises, and for installation and collection of taxes”. Administration and politics, in this view, were indirect. Put in modern terms, things that we now consider to be public (defence, education, health care or taxation – see case study one) were left to private third parties as much as possible simply because the authorities did not have the capacity or feel the desire to do it themselves. Brokerage is inherently linked to patronage, a situation in which personal power relationships between unequal persons (a superior or patron and a subordinate or client) are primarily meant to yield mutual advantage (Breman, 1971: 31; Ellemers, 1969: 433; Gabriëls, 1989: 147-148; Landé & Graziano, 1983: xx). Brokerage is patronage with the use of middle-men, a special form of patron-client relations where the patron needs the client to exert his powers everywhere (Gabriëls, 1989: 148). Similarly, Blockmans (1985: 231-236) described brokerage as a situation in which clients become middle men or ‘powerbrokers’ who use their access to patrons to make others dependent on them and create their own clients.

Patronage and brokerage were – not surprisingly considering the aforementioned – another elementary characteristic of Dutch political culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Dutch Republic, with its particularism and compromise and its lack of centralized authority, small bureaucratic system and vague lines between public and private interests, provided the ideal circumstances in which these practices could flourish. The weak Dutch state needed informal and personal systems to relieve strain and tension between highly autonomous layers of administration. Patronage and brokerage were often – much like other elements

I discussed in the above – structural-functionalist practices without which society and politics could hardly have functioned. We should therefore wonder whether and, if so why, how and when this kind of behaviour actually came to be perceived as corrupt. Some, like Schöffner (1978: 168) have argued that the sale of public office was not considered fraudulent at the time. Similarly, Schutte (1978: 280) has said that to profit from the system was acceptable according to the political norms of the eighteenth century. Schama, finally, noted that by eighteenth century standards the conduct of the Dutch regents was not considered outrageously scandalous. “Offices”, Schama writes, “had always been bought, sold and inherited as commodity rather than bestowed as duty” (1977: 48). The traffic of offices was often considered necessary by the Estates General and the Council of State and, as Schama (1977: 48) notes, was even taxed to the benefit of the public treasury until as late as 1800. Answers to the question whether, when and why such conduct did eventually become unacceptable will be discussed in chapters seven, eight and nine. From these chapters it will become clear that as soon as consensus among the closed group of regents and the idea of particularism were fundamentally questioned, people did begin to voice fundamentally different opinions on formerly more or less accepted practices such as brokerage, patronage, venality and nepotism.

Popular sovereignty, representation and participation

Some final important elements of Dutch political culture in the period are the ideas of popular sovereignty, representation and political participation that emerged from the second half of the eighteenth century amidst major changes in the political-administrative set-up of the Dutch Republic. While the Doelists of the 1740s emphasized the importance of greater ‘popular participation’ in and ‘representation’ of government, in reality things were not so bad. As Kloek and Mijnhardt (2001: 158-159) have for instance discussed in detail, the practical level of political participation in (roughly) the second half of the eighteenth century, was relatively high when compared to surrounding countries because of the decentralized and ‘bottom-up’ way of governing. Roughly two thousand Dutch regents decided, in various ways, on the fate of about two million inhabitants. That was, for instance, roughly fifteen times as much as in England. Kloek and Mijnhardt (Ibid.) also noted how in Dutch local administration, levels of participation were even higher, both formal and informal and direct and indirect. Still participation and representation became big issues from the Patriot period onwards, in part because of emerging ideas and concepts such as popular sovereignty, constitution and liberty which, however – according to Klein (1995: 199) – really meant something different to the various participants in the political debates of the 1770s and 1780s. As a rough indication, however, the Patriots did seem to have had a more inclusive perspective than most of their Orangist adversaries (see chapter five).

With the emergence of the Batavian Republic, the political culture changed quite dramatically. It is clear that from 1795 onwards, fundamental debates occurred over the meaning of such key concepts as participation and representation because of the creation of a new political order and a new ‘democratic’ political culture. Just how the meaning of such concepts changed and what various parties thought these were is beyond the scope of this study and requires independent research. Still, here (or rather in chapter eight), I do wish to answer a fraction of this question as it is directly related to changing public values. It is, I believe, safe to hypothesize – admittedly in a very general sense – that the radical changes between 1795 and

1813 and the creation of new political institutions (such as parliaments and constitutions), questions of participation, representation and accountability (indeed a new kind of democracy in general) became the centre of public and/or political debate. We can easily imagine, after all, that questions arose as to just how 'representative' the new members of the National Assembly were actually supposed to be or just how much representatives were to be answerable to voters? As the ancien regime seemed well and truly over after 1795, its 'old' political culture of particularism, compromise, collegial administration, the formation of oligarchies, patronage and nepotism might also have started to give way to a new political culture based on fundamentally new and different public values. Just how much this was the case, will be assessed in chapter eight.

5 Best-Opinion and Morality of the Time (1748 – 1813)

5.1 Introduction

In chapters one and three I discussed the idea that the period between 1750 and 1850 (a Dutch *Sattelzeit*) brought major political and administrative transitions that are likely to have affected changing social-political vocabulary. This change of vocabulary, I argue in this fifth chapter, included public values and perceptions of political corruption as many new institutions – being structures as well as values (cf. Hall & Taylor, 1996: 838) – replaced or altered older ones. In chapter three I also discussed the use of different sources of public values (following Hoetjes) to assess changing public values and why the source of best-opinion and morality of the time is presented in a separate chapter instead of being spread out over the case studies like the others. In the following I therefore assess changing public values and perceptions on political corruption between 1748 and 1813 by looking at a variety of best-opinion authors from three successive (moral, political, ideological) reform movements of *Doelists*, *Patriots* and *Batavians*. Best-opinion writings will be examined on the discussion, condemnation or advocacy of specific public values and their critique of political corruption. In this way I assess whether, and if so how, public values and perceptions of political corruption were actually a part of any discussion by a selection of best-opinion authors. What, in other words, did some of the eighteenth century ‘value producers’ (a term borrowed from Reszohazy, see chapter one) consider to be right or wrong public official behaviour? In doing so I assess whether this provides us with any sense of change and/or continuity of public values between 1748 and 1813 from a best-opinion perspective by explicitly focusing on the link between the three reform movements and some of their representatives and changing public values.

To temper expectations and counter potential critique, some cautionary notes have to be made. The first is that the following can only be an interpretation of a limited number of writings due to space and time constraints of this study. The best-opinion authors presented in the following only represent a part of the total amount. In the busy and varied intellectual world of the Dutch eighteenth-century other views existed, some of which were different from and conflicting with the views provided here. Although this inherently leads to some bias, some counter arguments can be made. First, it is not required here to provide a full account of best-opinion on public morality. Second, my emphasis on these particular authors stems from the idea that I wish to investigate progressive thinking and critique on existing practices and wish to focus on reform-minded opponents to established practices rather than on the orthodoxy of ‘conservative’ authors who protected vested interests. In addition, I argue how a focus on critique and negative public values (much like a focus on scandal and debate) allows for a better understanding of the fundamental elements in social and political discussion between opposing sides. A focus on the ‘negative’ (by critics opposing the status quo) provides a good view on the ‘positive’ (by supporters of the status quo). This approach allows for easier access to espoused public values. If one does not focus on scandal and critics, one is forced to

investigate an almost endless stream of regular sources (such as, for instance, sermons or all pamphlet literature).

A second cautionary note is that other reform-minded authors could have been discussed as well. Such a task would however have been impossible within the confines of this present study and the problem is alleviated by the fact that the selected authors were in many ways representatives of their time (though not of the entire population of the Dutch Republic). They were all part of and important spokesmen for the main administrative reform movements between 1748 and 1813 and provide us with an important cross-section of authors and ideas. They were all read, they had (sometimes temporary) political influence and a following. A third and final cautionary note is that much of the importance and/or relevance of the chosen authors obviously depended on the actual reception, perception and diffusion or dissemination of their work and ideas (see chapter three on public opinion). This too, however, has to fall outside the scope of this study. What concerns us here, and what therefore limits the following discussion, are the public values and perceptions of political corruption of a selection of authors between 1748 and 1813. Especially when linked to the other sources of values in Hoetjes' typology (see below) this has much to offer.

5.2 Best-opinion and Dutch (moral) reform movements

According to some, early modern Dutch writing on (moral) reform of public administration has been few and far apart (Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 272). This seems especially true when one compares the Dutch Republic to its neighbours such as the German lands or France where Cameralism was, for instance, a blossoming field of study. Rutgers has shown, however, how there have been at least a few early modern Dutch writers on administration and administrative (moral) reform. He has shown that although the actual amount of 'administrative science' work coming out of the Dutch Republic has been quite limited, it certainly received attention (2004: 75-78). From the following discussion on best-opinion authors and works a similar conclusion can be drawn. These authors and works featured in what have been three (ideological) reform movements in public administration between 1748 and 1813 (Van Sas, 2005: 9-12).

First, Doelists in the 1740s and 1750s argued for increased influence of citizens in administration and more opportunities for a larger group of people to acquire public office. They demanded an end to the oligarchic rule of the city regent elites and all the abuses that were inherent in the system (Israel, 1998: 1073-1076; Schama, 1977: 52-58; De Voogd, 1914). Second, Patriots from the 1780s onwards had similar demands, calling for an end to (princely) patronage, nepotism and abuse of office that, according to many, prevailed in the Dutch Republic at the time (Schama, 1977: 64-79). Third, Batavians between 1795 and 1813 demanded a new state as well as a new kind of public administration and politics. Influenced mainly by French revolutionary thought and political philosophy new public institutions (such as a parliament and a constitution) were designed (Van Sas, 2005: 275-292; Schama, 1977: 311-321). As a result, I argue, the position, functioning and proper moral behaviour of public officials therein had to be reassessed and redefined as well.

A more elaborate discussion of the three movements will follow below. For now, however, it is important to already realize that Doelists, Patriots and Batavians have been regarded as three consecutive movements and, more importantly, can be regarded as content-related.

Also, despite some apparent differences due to context and time, the three movements and subsequent ‘revolutions’ all proved to be watersheds in Dutch administrative history, providing important moments or periods of transition in thinking on public values and political corruption. All three movements increasingly rejected and condemned certain types of behaviour, such as the buying and selling of public offices, gaining privately from a public office or using patronage and nepotism to maintain power and wealth. Changing public morality, it seems, was at the heart of each of the movements. In questioning and changing (some of) the moral foundations of early modern Dutch public administration, each movement, furthermore, gained a little more ground than the previous (Israel, 1998: 1105-1106; Van Sas, 1992: 109-110).

5.3 Doelists

In chapter four I briefly discussed the rise of (popular) discontent in the years between 1748 and 1751. The advent of Stadholder William IV had raised expectations and hopes of administrative reform to a high level. Already from 1747 onwards, an ad-hoc coalition of populace, burghers and excluded regents wanted to get rid of the corrupt oligarchies who ruled the cities in the Republic (Israel, 1998: 1069). At least for a while these popular demands aligned with those of disenfranchised Orangist regents and noblemen who wanted to break the oligarchies that excluded them. All sides, for instance, made references to John Locke’s *Two Treatises on Government* (1689) (compare Rousset de Missy below) which seemed to provide an ideal ideological justification for enlisting the people on one’s side (Israel, 1998: 1074-5). Locke’s insistence on popular sovereignty made his book an important tool and symbol in exploits to gain support for both Orangist and Doelist cause. After all, as Schama (1987: 600-601) explains, to Orangists Locke’s ideas showed how a strong Stadholder with majority backing from the populace, instead of narrow cliques of oligarchic regents, was a more legitimate and preferable form of power. To others, popular sovereignty widened the scope of political participation. Political participation – or rather: exclusion from it – was among the main issues that caused discontent. Serious questions were raised regarding the delegation of sovereignty to an oligarchy and the obedience to patrician authority.

The reformers, often called Doelists (named after members of citizen committees in Amsterdam but consisting of people from various Holland towns), fuelled the discontent, criticizing the oligarchy and advocating an end to the abuses associated with the bestowal of office (Schutte, 1978: 297-298). Wealthy citizens excluded from participation in government by the oligarchy’s correspondences demanded political influence. Radical representatives of the movement even advocated the removal of the entire old clique of magistrates (De Jongste, 1980: 82-83). The periodical political press (cf. Broersma, 2005; Harline, 1987; Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 81-102; Pollmann & Spicer, 2007) created an image of continuous abuse within oligarchies and accused the magistrates of nepotism and venality, all detrimental to the ‘welfare and order’ of the country. The discharge of an office should be directed towards the interests of the people, not to self-interests such as increase of personal wealth, or power and advancement of family relations (Schama, 1977: 47-48).

For a while the political alignment between Orangists and Doelists created a common front against the regent oligarchies. However, the new Stadholder and his aides were reluctant and/or too weak to instigate reform. It quickly became obvious to most contemporary

observers that the promised changes failed to materialize (Israel, 1998: 1076-1078; Rogier, 1980: 203-205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80). William failed to use his powers of appointment to curb and punish regent corruption and he hardly purged the city governments. This led to increasing popular protest and friction between two camps and a ‘split’ among the Doelists. On the one hand there were moderate reformers who continued to adhere to the wishes of the Stadholder. They wanted a strong Stadholder with popular support but did not see the need for more popular engagement in politics and administration. The (radical) democratic reformers, on the other hand, were increasingly drawn into conflict with the Stadholder and their moderate Doelist colleagues. They wanted a Stadholder but only because they wanted him to deliver them from (corrupt) regent oligarchic rule. As the Stadholder persisted in his refusal to act the radical democrat Doelists started to organize agitation against both ineffective Stadholder and his followers and the regent oligarchies. Increasingly they called for administrative reforms and radical changes in local government. Adding to their grievances was the old and corrupted system of private tax farming in the Republic (see chapter six) and the obvious wealth of the regents which was thought to be intolerable, especially considering the steep decline in trade, industry and general economic prosperity (cf. De Voogd, 1914: 60).

A look at Doelist demands from an ensuing stream of pamphlets provides much information of best-opinion on public morality. A booklet entitled *Het ontroerd Holland* from 1750 described the unrest of the period and voices some of the Doelist demands. It contained a discussion of a request made by burghers to the mayors of Rotterdam and the subsequent Doelist riots in that city and other towns such as Leiden and Delft. In its preface we read a call for unity and just administration by the regents and love and subservience of the people[♦]. Its main target, typically, is the sale of public offices by the regents and the friction between the magistrates and their citizens. In Rotterdam, the booklet reads, the burghers had been angry about the many burdens put upon them by the Holland Estates and how they wanted to be relieved of taxes, imposts and excises (*Het ontroerd Holland*, 1750: 379). As a solution to ease their financial burdens, the request had called for the public sale (or auction) of offices whenever they became available (Ibid., 381).ⁱⁱ The wealthy and powerful could, in this way, buy as many offices as they liked and get interest on them as they pleased. The only requirement – apart from the buyers having to be Protestant – was that the money to be made with this sale would benefit the nation’s treasury, i.e., that of the city.ⁱⁱⁱ

It is interesting to note how capability of public officials was not an issue for debate. The only thing that seemed to matter was the money ‘the community’ would get. When the Rotterdam town council proved tardy in its response, another request was submitted on 6 October 1750. This time, the magistrates were asked in a much more demanding tone to reach a favourable decision without any further delay. It also restated that the regents had to sell their offices for the common benefit, not just because of “resolve” and “generosity” but also because not doing so was in violation of their “character and decency, yes, to the greatest disrespect of honour, glory and esteem of our great city of Rotterdam” (Ibid., 385).^{iv} In essence, public authorities were told they were the representatives of their city and community. Any bad conduct reflected badly on them and their city. Personal interests should, in other words, not trump public ones.

[♦] As explained in chapter three, Roman numerals in the text refer to the endnotes in the appendix of this study in which the reader can find the Dutch originals of the quotes.

The Rotterdam town council initially conceded to popular demand (Ibid., 386) and agreed with the public auction of offices to the benefit of city and province.^v However, William IV was not pleased, arguably because of the insolent tone of request. He also had other reservations. Unlike the Doelist request, William in fact argued that merit and capability would be hard to find once offices were sold to the highest bidder. To him, this would lead to “extortions and objections of the citizens”.^{vi} Considering his later reluctance to meet the demands of the Doelists, we could say that he did not really believe this. He might just have wanted to persuade the Doelists to give up their demands. In the end, however, he would be largely right. As the case study in chapter six will show, the public auctioning of (tax) offices, for instance, did indeed lead to political corruption and more popular protest. For now William IV, for aforementioned reasons, decided to overrule the Rotterdam town council’s initial decision.

The populace, partly gathered in front of the town hall to hear the final proclamation, was shocked. According to the booklet *Het Ontroerd Holland* (1750: 393), they removed their orange ribbons and trampled their rosettes under their feet. In Rotterdam, the town council tried to appease the crowd. They promised that all the benefits from the Postal Offices (these were highly lucrative offices) would still go to the town (*Het ontroerd Holland*, 1750: 411).^{vii} However, the complete public auction of all offices apparently went too far. Interestingly, the town council used the Stadholder’s argument that this would only lead to corruption. It was not right, they said, that people should acquire offices by paying for them. This, they added, was also clear from their oath of office (or more specifically the oath of purification) in which people were meant to swear they had not received or promised anything in return for their office.^{viii} Another argument of the town council (Ibid., 413) against the public sale of offices was that they thought it was wrong for offices to be available only to those with money. Interestingly, then, the Rotterdam town council raised worries of corruption to counter worries of corruption. Also, their arguments are interesting in light of their later initial reluctance to change the system of private tax farming in which tax farmers did have to pay to acquire an office (see chapter six).

These were the main issues raised by the Doelists. In Amsterdam similar events occurred when the town hall was actually stormed by an angry mob when it became apparent that their demands were not met (*Het ontroerd Holland*, 1750: 402-403; De Voogd, 1914). Among the more radical members of the disillusioned Doelists were men like Jean Rousset de Missy and Hendrik van Gimnig. Their pamphlets denounced the city regents as corrupt, selfish and only interested in monopolizing lucrative offices and lining their own pockets. While the likes of Rousset de Missy and Van Gimnig have been labelled as “skilful coffee-house demagogues” (Israel, 1998: 1070), they were, I argue, much more than mere populists. Instead, their writings and ideas provide a unique best-opinion insight into the Doelist *communis opinio* on appropriate moral public behaviour.

Jean Rousset de Missy

When Amsterdam expressed reservations about making the Stadholderate hereditary in 1747 a wave of unrest swept through the province of Holland. Protest was orchestrated among others by the journalist Jean Rousset de Missy (1686 – 1762). De Missy, a French Huguenot exile in the Dutch Republic since 1719, was “a fierce critic of regents and regent corruption and became the foremost populariser of John Locke’s radical political ideas in the Republic”

(Israel, 1998: 1048-1049). He was also one of the foremost leaders of the Doelist revolt and submitted, together with others (most notably another Doelist leader, Daniel Raap) a petition to the Amsterdam town council in October 1747. The demands (similar to those made by Laurens van der Meer and other burghers in Rotterdam) ranged from auctioning offices for the civic treasury chest to the restoration of the privileges of the guilds. Although the entire Doelist cause (see chapter four) would soon die out, the movements and these petitions were important first steps in the advocacy of moral administrative reform in the Republic.

Apart from the petition to the Amsterdam town council, De Missy also published his account of the events that had led to the advent of William IV. In a work entitled *Relation historique de la grande révolution arrivée dans la République des Provinces-Unies* (1747), De Missy (1747: preface) describes how in 1747 “the dispositions and sentiments of the magistrates [...] came to change, as it were, from black to white, in an instant; for we behold how suddenly their aversion to a Stadholderate, chang’d into an eager desire of it, and a haste to complete it, to which no obstacles could put a stop”. De Missy is sceptical and clearly convinced of the hypocrisy of these magistrates. He writes how fear for the populace is more likely to be the cause for their change of heart than “any sincere regard to the publick good”. After all, he continues (1747: preface), “the individuals who compose the several bodies of the magistracy are men (and subsequently subject to passions) who from the authority and the Post occupied by the individual drew that force by which they have triumph’d over all; from hence sometimes arise irreparable mischief’s to the interests of particulars”.

De Missy’s hundred-and-four page long tract describes, among other things, the advent and installation of William IV. In a telling passage De Missy recounts the commission by the Estates General of William IV as Stadholder and Captain-General of the army, on 13 May 1747. De Missy (1747: 90) writes how the Prince had been elevated to Stadholder due to his “steadfastness”, courage and zeal for the prosperity of the Republic”. In a conversation between Prince and Princess (supposedly told to De Missy by an eye witness) upon hearing the news of the former’s election to Stadholder, William was supposedly to have said to his wife: “what unsuspected tidings! [...] God, who has called me to it, will support me in it. All that we possess, (continued he, embracing his royal spouse) is the gift of the people, who, by this signify the great confidence they have in us; I hope I shall be found to deserve it, by the uprightness of my intentions, as well as the honourable name I bear; my friends will assist me with their councils, and all good men with their prayers” (Rousset de Missy, 1747: 96-97). All this, of course, was meant by De Missy to show how much change and improvement he (and many other Doelists) had initially expected of the Stadholder and how little had actually happened. De Missy hammers the point home that the Stadholder had, in fact, not done anything. De Missy then denounces the corrupt and wasteful regents at the same time and tells us of a so-called conversation between a magistrate and a burger. When confronted with the news of William’s rise to power, the magistrate says this will be costly, about three million florins a year, to which the burger replies: “so much the better. We have been forty five years without a Stadholder, and of course must have sav’d 135 millions. This fund will well support a war of three years with France, which cannot at present abound very much in money [...] and [...] to draw off the most powerful of the neighbouring princes [...]”. The reader, De Missy (1747: 99) continues, “may easily suppose that no reply was made to this reflection”. As if, De Missy seems to say, the regents have been so careful in spending the nation’s money. No 135 million had, of course, been saved by the regents.

Hendrik Van Gimnig

Hendrik van Gimnig, a mid eighteenth century Haarlem textile worker, was, like De Missy, one of the leaders of the radical Doelists. Like De Missy, he too was critical of the Stadholder and oligarchic regents and published a few short pamphlets in 1748 and 1749 advocating and outlining the Doelist cause. In September 1748 Van Gimnig published his *Address to His Highness Prince William* (1748a). At this point Van Gimnig still seems to be hopeful that the Stadholder is indeed going to change things (or he is already disillusioned with the Prince's efforts, which might explain the somewhat sarcastic tone of the pamphlet). Van Gimnig (1748a: 4) writes how the previous forty years without a Stadholder had only led to negligence, greed, incompetence, faction strife, domination and the general neglect of various administrators and rulers (Van Gimnig seemingly made no distinction between the two) to safeguard our freedom.^{ix} Of course, now that there was a "strong, loving and protective" Stadholder (1748a: 6), these things would surely be relegated to the past! William is called upon to introduce civil reforms and to curb the immoral behaviour of the regents.

Whether he was being sarcastic or still hopeful, Van Gimnig attributed achievements to the Stadholder that, as we have seen in chapter four, would never materialize. William – or the city regents in Amsterdam for that matter – did not do the things expected of him by the population or Doelists. Despite or because of the Stadholder's reluctance, Van Gimnig published a *Request on behalf of the Amsterdam Burgers* (1748b) that following October. Here Van Gimnig demanded the Stadholder to concede to all eleven demands submitted to the Amsterdam town council in July 1748 (Israel, 1998: 1075-1076). One of these demands was the sale (compare the demands of the Rotterdam burghers above) of the lucrative postal offices on behalf of the treasury instead of regents' wallets (Van Gimnig, 1748b: article [art.] 8; see also Knuttel, 1978: Pamphlet 18169, 1748, p. 29ff; De Voogd, 1914: 48-52). Another demand by the Doelists was the removal of the thirty-six members of the Amsterdam town council. There was, according to Van Gimnig, no need to prosecute them. Still they had to return the money they had unjustly taken.^x Also, the citizenry should elect the burgomasters from among the town council, instead of the common practice where members of the council elected the Burgomasters themselves. This, according to contemporary as well as later observers, often led to political corruption in the form of pre-arranged rotation of offices and contracts of correspondence (cf. Schimmelpenninck, 1785; Schama, 1977: 50-51; De Witte van Citters, 1873). Also, a wider range of citizens other than the small circle of powerful regents should elect militia officers and select the directors of the Amsterdam chamber of the Dutch East and West Indian Companies from amongst experienced merchants (Van Gimnig, 1748b, art. 4, 7; Israel, 1998: 1075).

The demands issued by Van Gimnig on behalf of the radical Amsterdam Doelists met a wall of resistance. The Amsterdam government, backed by the Prince, by and large refused to meet any of their demands (Israel, 1998: 1076) and issued a warning to the protesters (*Waarschouwinge*, 1748) that this kind of civil disobedience would not be tolerated. Indeed, to the regents and Burgomasters the demands and actions by the Doelists were tantamount to anarchy. Probably as a result of the continued refusal of Prince and local authorities to change things, Van Gimnig wrote a one page piece which was printed in the *Groninger Courant* of 3 September 1749 (Van Gimnig, 1749). The piece is an almost desperate call directed at regents and tells us more about the values Van Gimnig thinks are important for administrators. Once

again calling for civic reform and an end to oligarchic rule, Van Gimnig (1749: 1) writes: “burghers who are in power, if you want to rule our hearts, you must get rid of haughtiness and despotism. All your deliberations must be guided by justice and fairness, do not give in to self-interest, be kind-hearted and sign all your decisions with the seal of kindness and friendliness. If you do this, you will be honoured and esteemed by all citizens”.^{xi}

Concluding Remarks

On the surface (see also chapter four), most if not all changes resulting from the revolt of 1748 – 1751 were gains for the Stadholder and his moderate Orangist followers since it had succeeded in concentrating power at the centre in his hands. Some, like Bentinck (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 137-145), expected in vain that the Prince would open up to serious reform after all (Israel, 1998: 1077-1078) but very little power was transferred to citizens, ‘the people’ or regents outside the oligarchies and their contracts of correspondence (compare case study two). The refusal of William IV to act as well as his untimely death, Bentinck’s inability to persuade William to do something (despite serious attempts, see Israel 1998: 1080) and strong opposition from a still powerful regent elite (cf. Rogier, 1980: 205) frustrated attempts of reformers like Missy de Rousset or Van Gimnig. Still, best-opinion authors such as De Missy and Van Gimnig explicitly articulated values and behaviour that were needed to improve public administration. Seeds of change and reform of administrative morality had, in short, been sown. De Missy indirectly had several things to say about proper moral behaviour and values of public administration. Amidst the rhetoric, he denounced the serving of personal interests and the hypocrisy of men claiming to serve the people (and then only out of fear instead of noble motives) while at the same time abusing their office for personal gain and wasting (public) money, either through mismanagement or fraud. Van Gimnig provides new moral guidelines or values for appropriate administrative behaviour as well, albeit more implicitly. The demands and arguments launched by Van Gimnig had a clear moral purpose. This leading opponent and member of the Doelists had clear ideas about correct and incorrect behaviour. He lists several values as detrimental or important to the welfare of the state such as participation, honesty, justice and taking care of the common good. Other values, such as pride or haughtiness, despotism and self-interest, should be avoided at all cost. Crucially, and finally, De Missy and Van Gimnig (exemplifying the larger Doelist movement) argued for including broader segments of the population in the social and/or political community. In that sense, political corruption meant not taking a wider view on the common good to be served by administrators.

5.4 Patriots

From the previous it has become apparent that the decades following 1748 were bleak times for anyone arguing for administrative or moral reform. The reforms promised by or expected from William IV did not materialize and there was in many ways a return to the pre-1748 situation. This, at least according to Israel (1998: 1084), led to the 1750s and 1760s being relatively calm, stable and ‘conservative’. On the whole, reformers seemed to withdraw from direct involvement in politics (in part of course also because they were forced) and demands for civic reform were no longer heard as often or as loud. Still, while the reforms of civic

government argued for by Doelists had not materialized, not everything was lost. In fact, the failure of 1748/1751 made it almost inevitable that old issues reappeared with more force in the 1770s and 1780s. Geyl already explained how this worked when he wrote how 1748 led to an extremely powerful regime of the Stadholder, a regime that to Geyl was in its own way “as corrupt as the previous had ever been” (1948-1959: 31-32). The decades following 1748 had, according to Geyl, witnessed the continued “crumbling of democratic institutions” where old practices of (city) regents and (provincial) aristocracy were in full force again or, as Schama wrote: “the notion that it would be harder for a regent to enter the kingdom of Godly democracy than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle found a ready response” (1977: 651). While the disappointment of 1748 had discredited reform-mindedness for the time being, in due time, wrote Geyl, “the annoyance over all of this had to be directed against the patron of the system, Orange”. This is exactly what happened from the 1770s onwards. While earlier movements and reform attempts (such as those of 1672 and 1702/1703, see chapter four) had failed on the surface, much dissatisfaction had always kept simmering. This made the Patriot revolt essentially a further development of old tendencies (Israel, 1998: 1105). Some of the circumstances leading to the Patriot Revolt of the 1770s and 1780s (military threat, economic misery, a widespread feeling of corruption of the body politic, see Klein 1995) were, in any case, similar to previous ones.

Palmer has noted that “the Patriot movement was characterized by its lack of a developed ideology; it did not formulate its demands in terms of any universal ethical affirmations or any theory of world history” (1974, part I: 339 footnote 22). This, I argue, has to be nuanced. Once we follow our chosen concept of ideology from chapter three, the Patriots certainly had an explicit (although somewhat heterogeneous) ideology. They offered an account of the existing order, they advanced a model of a desired future (a vision of the ‘good society’), and they explained how political change can and should be achieved. What united the Patriots in an ideological or best-opinion sense was, in the first place, a strong sense of nationalism propagated and made possible by political periodicals (such as the *Post van den Neder-Rhijn*). Such national media transformed Patriots of all kinds into what Van Sas (1988b: 27) called a *Gefühlsgemeinschaft*. Secondly, they had a striking ideological and programmatic coherence in their shared desire to attack “social and moral decadence” (see also Van Berkel, et al., 2010: 25; Schama, 1977: 71) and to achieve “moral rearmament” (Van Sas, 1988b: 18) with the express purpose to secure the economic and administrative ‘regeneration’ of the Republic. These issues were closely related and, incidentally, made Patriot ideology “a mélange of old and new attitudes towards the Dutch constitution” as the Patriots wanted the old Republic “to be rescued from its infirmity and rejuvenated in the image of its heroic beginnings” (Schama, 1977: 68). Above all, writes Schama, the manners of the regent classes, and especially their “opulence in the midst of public squalor”, the loss of thrift and “excessive conspicuous consumption” were attacked (1977: 71-72).

Crucially, as Schama noted, the “attack on manners [or morals, TK] became linked with the authorization for government [...]. the Patriot burgher leaders were convinced that they were the true custodians of a national virtue which had been debased by those to whom office had been granted on trust and who had abused that mandate over the generations” (1977: 73). They, instead of the selfish regents should therefore be in power. The Patriot’s complete isolation and exclusion from political affairs had to be ended. To them political participation was a key element to achieve their goals (Van Sas, 1988b: 18). As such, they argued against the way in which the regent oligarchies governed the political institutions of the Republic. They wanted, in

the words of Palmer, “a reconstitution of the old constituted bodies, so that these bodies would become representative in a new kind of way, either by actual choice at the hands of voters outside their own ranks, or through a broadening of membership to reflect wider segments of the population” (1974, part I: 323). Such sentiments were expressed in the emerging political press of the period. Writers of Patriot periodicals such as Pieter ‘t Hoen and his *Post van den neder-Rhijn* (1781 – 1787) and J.C. Hespe and his *De Politieke Kruyer* and *De Constitutionele Vlieg* (see also chapter eight) made an important mark. Also, the reverend Ijsbrand van Hamelsveld (1743 – 1812) and Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck (1761 – 1825) were well known Patriot ideologists on these issues. Van Hamelsveld (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 255-264) published a characteristic blend of religion, politics and ethics, he perceived the totally rotten moral foundation of the Republic to be the root cause of the economic, military and political decay of the time (Van Sas, 2005: 259). A stable Republic should have high public morals which is, in turn, impossible without high personal morals and a high personal moral is, finally, dependent on firm religious beliefs (Israel, 1998: 1111). Schimmelpenninck’s *Verhandeling over eene wel ingerichte volksregeering* (1785) was a similar democratically inspired plea to serve citizens’ interests (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 293-302).

Joan Dirk van der Capellen tot den Pol

Joan Dirk van der Capellen tot den Pol (1741 – 1784), a provincial nobleman and member of the States of Overijssel since 1772, was arguably the foremost advocate of Patriot ideology. Since Van der Capellen was not originally from Overijssel he failed to meet the prerequisite for membership of the Provincial Estates. Still he got in, apparently due to William V who put in a good word for him (Zwitzer, 1987: 6). The fact that he got in because of William’s help is interesting because the patronage dispensed by William V was later so severely criticized by Van der Capellen and other Patriots. Perhaps, then, old and new were not so clearly demarcated even by the ‘leader’ of the Patriot movement. For the most part Van der Capellen did have unorthodox views on administration and foreign policy (in turn closely related to internal power struggles in the Republic, see chapter four). Foremost among them was his repudiation of near feudal services having to be rendered by farmers in Overijssel to their local lords, the so-called *Drostendiensten* (Van der Capellen tot den Pol & Van der Marck, 1782) and his disapproval of helping the English King George III fight the American rebels with the use of Dutch troops.

Van der Capellen’s views soon led to his suspension from the Provincial Estates between 1778 and 1782. It was during this time that he wrote his manifesto *Aan het volk van Nederland* of 1781. It became the ideological foundation of the Patriot revolution and was heavily influenced by ideas coming from the American Revolution, which in part explains his sympathy for the American rebels and his ideas on popular sovereignty (Van der Capellen tot den Pol, 1781: 24; Kossmann, 1987; Zwitzer, 1987: 6, 9-10, 13). Indeed, social movements criticizing royal policy in England and its North American colonies from the 1760s onwards closely resembled and influenced the Dutch Patriot complaints and action (Geyl, 1947: 430; Israel, 1998: 1095-1096). Van der Capellen was also attracted to the classic Republican idea (of course present in the American Revolution as well) that greater and freer involvement of the people – both in military and political matters – was the way to safeguard the Republican political community. It was, according to Van der Capellen (cf. Zwitzer, 1987: 10-13), every

citizen's duty to participate in political life. If citizens were barred from participation and if popular sovereignty was not granted, armed struggle by means of citizen militias and revolt became a justifiable option.

While in his manifesto Van der Capellen proclaimed the suppression of Dutch freedom to be the work of Stadholders who had usurped power, he was not against a Stadholder or even a monarch as such. Instead he was against any large concentration of power in the hands of a single person and the abuse of power that was often the result of it. Van der Capellen advocated more participation in civic government and called on people to start a 'bottom-up' revolutionary process of democratization. Government, to Van der Capellen and many of his fellow Patriots, was to be made answerable to the people, if need be by force. In the manifesto Van der Capellen (of course a former provincial official himself) introduces himself as someone who is "completely without interests and not out to gain personal wealth". To him these are, obviously, important values for a proper public office holder. For centuries, he writes, "the people of the Low Countries have been at the mercy of power-hungry rulers". No longer should they be led by people who only serve their own interests and fortune, who serve to feed themselves". In the past the people of the low countries were ruled by "the bravest, most wise and most virtuous people [...] they refused to be ruled by those who did not account for their actions to the people". In a direct attack on the system of patronage employed by the Stadholder and his clique, Van de Capellen sneers how "in the past, princes and rulers were not able to distribute profitable and unnecessary offices like our princes today. They were not able to so easily use so many hungry, proud and bald noblemen and other despicable high and mighty men for their cause, having them vote as they please even if it goes against the prosperity of the nation"^{xii} (Van der Capellen tot den Pol, 1781: 3-5). Thus, from the very beginning of the pamphlet, Van der Capellen gets to the heart of the matter. He condemns nepotism, patronage and serving one's own interests instead of those of the nation as a whole. The latter (compare De Missy and Van Gimnig) suggests he actively argued for the need to have a broader sense of community and common good and linked it directly to political corruption.

In his pamphlet, Van der Capellen continuously uses Dutch history to argue his case for civic reform. His discussion of the characteristics of previous Stadholders is a part of this and partly tells us what to him constituted a morally good administrator or ruler. William of Orange (1533 – 1583) had been "the most sensible, good, kind-hearted and good-natured prince" (Van der Capellen tot den Pol, 1781: 9). His son and successor, Maurice (1584 – 1625), "would have been a good ruler if only he had had as much virtue and patriotism as he had lust to rule" (Ibid., 13). Maurice, instead, had been "a man of the worst morals: a cruel, wicked and lewd man who was accustomed to seduce every woman he could, whether they were virgins, married or widows" (Ibid., 11-13).^{xiii} Van der Capellen was also critical of the regents. Interestingly, he denounced their dependence on the Stadholder and their breaking of oaths as he warned his fellow citizens "against the high and mighty [...] the Prince has got them all on his leash. To obtain offices or even a meal at court they will do everything. Oath and duty to the benefit of the fatherland are irrelevant to them" (Ibid., 17). These people, Van der Capellen continued, "treat you as their hereditary property, as their oxen and sheep, which they can slaughter or shear as they see fit" (Ibid., 21).^{xiv}

Van der Capellen, I already noted, was quick to point to ideas of popular sovereignty. The regents and other officials of the Republic were only, as he put it, the "directors-custodians of society, all their authority is derived from you. They [Prince, regents, and

magistrates, TK] should be obedient to the majority. They are only accountable to you and should submit themselves to your wishes” (Ibid., 21-22).^{xv} With a display of early-modern utilitarianism, Van der Capellen argues how “God, our common father, has created man to be happy. He has obligated us to make each other happy as much as we can”. For this reason, “we are all equal. No man should be governed by another” (Ibid., 22-23).^{xvi} Reality, according to Van der Capellen, sadly did not reflect these ideals. In order to obtain a public office, he wrote, it is not necessary to “be polite, friendly and obliging to one’s fellow citizens or to be an advocate of the nations’ freedom, privileges and prosperity, to be a true Patriot”. Such traits, in fact, only diminish the possibility of obtaining an office. For this “one only needs to win the favour of the Prince which, as we all know, requires no virtuous, polite or obliging behaviour at all” (Ibid., 36-37).^{xvii}

To Van der Capellen, nothing had changed with the advent of William IV in 1747 or that of William V in 1766. While William IV had promised “mountains of gold”, i.e., the end of abuses and the restoration of privileges (Ibid., 40), no such things had in fact been achieved. Indeed, “what have you won other than simply another master on your back who is even more difficult [because of the now hereditary Stadholderate, TK] to unhorse than your previous rider?” (Ibid., 40). To Van der Capellen, William V (1751 – 1795) was exactly the same. He abused military power and indiscreetly bestowed positions and made recommendations (see chapters four and seven). Clearly, William V was as selfish as other Princes had been before him and equally incapable of serving general (public) interests. Van der Capellen’s symbolism gets the message across even better. What to think, he writes, of the deer that have been put out so the Prince (and only the Prince at that) could hunt for game? These animals now eat the crops of the poor farmers who, “instead of getting their well-deserved rest are now obligated to guard their fields at night as well as work them during the day”. William V also surrounded himself with the wrong people, “honouring those with his trust who we already know are or will be scoundrels [...]” (Ibid., 52-54). Once again Van der Capellen addresses William V directly: “are not most of your favourites the most evil and immoral creatures, fornicators, adulterers, dice-players, who wallow in luxury [...] These are the people you choose for high office, people who sell their votes or are too incompetent or too afraid to resist your will. No! You consider the honest, able, bold Patriot, the man who dares and is able to speak up, to be your enemy. You view him with loathing and fear” (Ibid., 52-55).^{xviii} Interestingly, surrounding yourself with bad people and ignoring those who are true and loyal would at least be linked to a lack of capability (see also chapter eight in which a similar notion of political corruption appears).

The Grondwettige Herstelling

Another crucial Patriot plea for moral and administrative reform was the two-volume *Grondwettige Herstelling van Nederlands Staatswezen* of 1785. It was, essentially, a summary of the main arguments that had until then been voiced in various Patriot pamphlets and periodicals. This “catechism of political purity” (Van Sas, 2005: 213) was compiled by various leading Patriots. Chief among the authors were the Patriot intellectual Johan Hendrik Swildens (1745 – 1809) (cf. Hake, 2004), Joan Van der Capellen (again) and the latter’s nephew Robert Jasper van der Capellen van de Marsch (1743 – 1814) (Israel, 1998: 1102; Van Sas, 2005: 106). The *Herstelling* addressed most of the standard Patriot causes such as the usurpation of power by the

Stadholder. Invoking Grotius (1583 – 1645), the document showed (1785: 82-86) where things had gone wrong: “for he [the Stadholder, TK] is not a sovereign, he is not a party to a contract, he is a servant”. Other noteworthy elements from the document were the decay of society (especially in comparison with the seventeenth century), the increasing wealth and luxury of the regents as the cause of the Republic’s problems, and returning ‘rights’ to the people (Van Sas, 2005: 212). Morality, therefore, was explicitly put at the heart of the document. In the *Herstelling* (1785: viii-ix) it was stated that “with this constitution we also have to improve our morals [...]. Then our great building of the union that is built on sand and is now sinking, will get a steady foundation [...]. From general virtue will arise courage, industry and patriotism, and with these also the old honour and power of the Republic”.^{xix}

The *Herstelling* lashed out against the contracts of correspondence as well as the distribution of offices by the Stadholder. These were, after all, the reasons for keeping all important offices among a small clique of regents and/or loyalists to the Stadholder who were, often, incompetent, ‘corrupt’ and self-serving. The election of regents depended not on “reason, ability or justice” but rather on “wealth, luck and finding a girl [i.e., with connections and money, TK] gullible enough to marry you”^{xx} (Swildens, et al., 1785: II, 238; cf. Van Sas, 2005: 213). The Stadholder was, according to the *Herstelling*, in no position to recommend anyone for public office. Pointing to an ideal of merit-based appointments, they wrote how “no matter how clever, virtuous, tireless, benevolent a Stadholder might be, it is impossible for him to know those persons eligible for election well enough to make an informed decision” (Swildens, et al., 1785: 98, 179).^{xxi} Of course, such characteristics did not apply to William V. The Stadholder should therefore “either not interfere or get to know those he wishes to instate well enough” (Ibid., 98).^{xxii} The *Herstelling* was aiming at Stadholder William V’s use of ‘Lieutenant-Stadholders’ (friends and confidants put in office by the Stadholder to protect and further the Stadholders’ interests on a local level (see chapter seven for a detailed explanation). It is impossible, “that these Lieutenant Stadholders are safe and loyal leaders [...]. In Friesland, this system has changed a people’s government into some kind of absolutism”. It is harmful that the “entire civil government and the distribution of offices depends on one single regent”^{xxiii} (Ibid., 98-99). The *Herstelling* reminds the reader of the brothers Pestors. These lieutenant Stadholders in the province of Utrecht became renowned for their abuse of office, selfishness and opportunistic behaviour (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 202). Indeed, it says (1785: 99-100), “the more regents are dependent of the Stadholder, the less they depend on and serve their fellow citizens”.^{xxiv}

In order to show how administration should and should not be executed and what was or was not considered corrupt, three types of regents are described in the *Herstelling*: the Stadholder’s regent, the Aristocrat’s regent and the People’s regent. The first kind was appointed by the Stadholder. “Not seldom”, the *Herstelling* tells us, have offices been given to “little troublemakers, scallywags and deceitful men. The few competencies they might have are enough to acquire distinguished offices from the Princely court [...]. Masculine and Republican virtues are despised and suspect in the unwholesome [poisonous? TK] air of a Princely court. Independence of the soul and noble views are often enough to be excluded from all offices” (1785: 188). Instead, it is clear from the *Herstelling* that one can only get promoted “by means of cunning, cowardly flattery and a criminal eager to please or to compromise, which can only stem from depraved [corrupted? TK] hearts and narrow-minded spirits”.^{xxv} The second kind of regent was the Aristocratic kind. Although not as low as the Stadholder-kind, they are not less haughty and much more dangerous. According to the *Herstelling* (Ibid., 188-

189), “in the eyes of the Aristocrat, the people are nothing more than a group only fit to endure their haughtiness, to obey their demands and to be a tool to further their personal interests. These Aristocrats do not, however, live without fear. All the time, they are forced to fight each other for spoils. In order to balance the different parties/factions, their behaviour is governed by trifling and fainthearted caution. They are forced to live in constant jealousy of each other, they are always sizing each other up, secretly opposing each other and covering their actions in secrecy”.^{xxvi}

Needless to say, only the People’s regent (the third kind) was truly capable of the behaviour suitable for a public official. However, the *Herstelling* seems realistic about the opportunities for ‘true democracy’ and ‘proper representation’. The authors are also pragmatic and seem to be wrestling with ‘the problem of dirty hands’, “that painful process which forces a man to weigh the wrong he is willing to do in order to do right” (Walzer, 1973: 174). When circumstances call for it, and as long as one’s intentions are pure and good, it is alright to obtain an office by grovelling, i.e., by means of patronage and/or nepotism. “In a non perfect system of electing public officials”, the *Herstelling* says (Ibid., 189), “citizens wishing to hold office, will have to endure some sort of humiliation to achieve their purpose. These men will, however, let themselves be known as magnanimous, charitable and humane”.^{xxvii} In brief, it seems to say that the ends justify the means. We read that “even though their motives might not be fully free of self interest, this means is not degrading or humiliating because we can not take offence if a great man seeks the favour of the people”.^{xxviii} “In a government of the people, it is possible for a man of merit to expect to climb higher. One can see a lofty bearing which seems to show that he is indeed a representative of the people because of merit”. In such a great man, “pride [which can after all easily turn into haughtiness, TK] is, however, tempered by an affable appearance while he knows he is to take responsibility for even the least of citizens. He knows he bears the burden of the interests of the entire nation and he defends these with perseverance because he can show that these are not his own, personal, interests but the general interests of the people”.^{xxix} (Ibid., 189-190). Perhaps we hear Van der Capellen here? He was one of the authors and seems, as we have seen, to have gotten his place in the States of Overijssel due to a personal favour of William V. Perhaps this is his apology? It might well explain why Van der Capellen was so opposed to patronage and nepotism while this, at the same time, had gotten him (in part) where he needed to be. In any case it shows an important practical moral stance. In order to do good it is sometimes necessary to do bad. In addition, we again see the wider notion of common good and community that good (i.e., not corrupt) administrators were to have.

From the *Herstelling* (Ibid., 191) certain ‘democratic’ values furthermore become apparent. The authors feel, for instance, that ‘the people’ should get to decide who are to get public offices and what characteristics are important to do a good job. It is written, for instance, that “the root of all discontent, schism and the evil that results from it will [by letting the people decide, TK] be eradicated. The people will be satisfied once the election of officials is no longer dependent on scheming or machinations. From that moment on the trust between regent and people will be restored forever [...]”.^{xxx} Indeed (Ibid., 192), “there are many who obtain offices through relatives or friends, who use common spoils and profitable offices to enrich themselves. It is in the interest of all citizens to make sure all matters of state are properly governed. It is therefore necessary to elect able men for this task”.^{xxxi} Quoting from Montesquieu and referring to ancient Athens and Rome (Ibid., 192), the authors of the *Herstelling* argue their case for popular sovereignty and the need for the population to take

matters in their own hand. This is exactly the same kind of Republican ideology, mixed with democratic elements such as electing officials that we saw earlier.^{xxxii}

In the *Herstelling*, talk of lofty ideals as popular sovereignty or representation was often mixed with how to practically organize proper government by means of bureaucratization and what administrators should or should not do to ensure ‘good government’. Should public offices, for instance, be “perpetual or temporary” (Ibid., 193)? How long should officials be allowed to remain in power? When and why should officials be removed or be permitted to stay in office? The authors are, again, pragmatic as they list all kinds of pros and cons of various characteristics of bureaucratization (see chapter two). Offices in colleges of State should, for instance, be temporary as every man should have the possibility to obtain one (Ibid., 192). Still, when an official is doing his job well, why remove him? Giving people time to settle in and get to know their work is important as well. Why “rob the state of able men before they get a chance to properly know their jobs and give offices to incompetent people” (Ibid., 194)?^{xxxiii} Most legal offices (mayors, judges, aldermen) should, according to the document (Ibid., 193-194), still be temporary to provide equal opportunity. Failure to occasionally remove such officials undermines diligent behaviour, Patriotism and only causes sluggishness and haughtiness that are detrimental to the public wellbeing and general freedom.^{xxxiv} Indeed, the *Herstelling* (Ibid., 193-194) says, “those government officials who are never forced to return to the status of citizens are likely to believe they are the masters instead of the servants of the law. Bribery, impunity, arbitrariness and bad management of public affairs stem from protracted authority”.^{xxxv} High legal offices, on the other hand, should be more permanent as it would be “a disadvantage to citizens when courts are subject to dismissals and continuous change. In these important offices “proper consideration” is necessary. There, even the practice of a lifetime would not be enough to properly serve the state”^{xxxvi} (Ibid., 195).

The *Herstelling* constantly hovers between general principles, lofty ideals and practical prescriptions. Its thirteenth chapter actually discusses the requirements for being a public official. First and foremost is a law degree (denoting attention for merit). Before, “when times were not as complicated/tricky administrators could rely on common sense and sincerity [however], different times and virtues require different capabilities”^{xxxvii} (Ibid., 207). “No one should be allowed to become alderman without having proof of his abilities in law and at least having won some cases”.^{xxxviii} Regents should all have knowledge of international law, public law, politics, negotiations, business, agriculture etc. by means of an academic education (Ibid., 207).^{xxxix} Regents also had to be wealthy to some extent. This requirement for public officials was not new. Having money of your own seemed a good ‘natural’ way to avoid abuse of office for personal financial gain. However, the argument in the *Herstelling* is more intricate than that since the commitment one has to the nation was directly linked to the possessions one had in that nation. Therefore, “all those with possessions in foreign lands must be excluded from national colleges or assemblies, since one’s heart is always where one’s possessions are” (Ibid., 208).^{xl} Still – and this can be considered quite an innovative thought – ability and merit were just as important. Not having money should not prevent able men to become public officials. In that case, the people should grant these men a yearly income to properly execute their duties. “Instead of a salary”, the authors add, “he could also obtain an extra office which could yield some profit” (Ibid., 208).^{xli} Again the authors display their pragmatism since holding more than one office was, even at the time, often considered to lead to conflicts of interests. Other requirements were being a citizen of the Republic for a certain number of years and being able to speak the language (Ibid., 208-209). Those with a tarnished reputation or who had debts and

no credit left should be excluded until paying off their creditors (Ibid., 209). Service in a militia or the army was also a prerequisite for a good public official, “as it was already customary among the ancients to excel in art of war and politics” (Ibid., 209).^{xlii} Good public officials should also either be married or living with their parents and should not be related to anyone already having an office in the same town (Ibid., 209).^{xliii}

Concluding remarks

Much like the Doelists and ‘democratic’ Orangists of 1747 – 1751 the basic purpose of the Patriots had been to wrest control of civic and provincial life from the hands of the Stadholder and his favourites and the regent oligarchies, and transfer power to ‘the people’. The basic continuity between the movements was, as we have seen, not lost on writers like Van der Capellen or Swildens when we take into account their use of history (cf. Leeb, 1973) but there was change as well. While earlier movements had by and large failed, the Patriots were not so easily thwarted. The Patriot Revolution in the Dutch Republic in the 1780s had been a social movement of substantial proportions that had been unimaginable until then. It was, as Israel (1998: 1103) has put it, “a product of the Enlightenment [...]. Its assumptions and outlook show many affinities with the thought-world of men throughout the Western world eager for fundamental reform, and the sovereignty of the people”. The revolution, spurred on by ideologists like Van der Capellen and Swildens, surpassed the Doelist movement of 1748 – 1751 in many ways. Not only did the revolutionaries manage, this time, to gain ground in both the east and west of the Republic, they actually succeeded, however briefly it would turn out to be, in purging local authorities and restoring rights of the citizenry (see chapters four and seven).

Clearly, the Patriot ideologists discussed in this chapter, condemned some of the main existing administrative practices of their time and put new ideas forward. Closer inspection of the writings of Van der Capellen and the *Herstelling* reveals explicit public values. There was apparently interest in discussing practical morality for public officials next to discussing the general principles of ‘maladministration’ of the Stadholder, provincial elite and city regents. Van der Capellen, for instance, discussed various public values and aired clear ideas of proper moral behaviour. To him (and to the Patriots in general) proper administration was based on popular sovereignty, serving common interests and not abusing one’s power. His vision of proper public official conduct (at least) entailed being selfless, not having without lust for power and being accountable for one’s actions. Apart from that, one had to be a kind and benevolent patriot and be a custodian of interests staying clear of patronage, nepotism or luxury. Most crucially, perhaps, was Van der Capellen’s idea of administrators (and even the Stadholder) as servants and custodians of the people, responsible for but most of all accountable to the people. The *Herstelling* was even more explicit than Van der Capellen in prescribing new or reemphasized public values. The document argued for replacing regents with a new elite whose appointment would be more often based on ability and conscientiousness (cf. Leeb, 1973: 189-192). A good administrator had to serve the people’s interests instead of his own, should be bound by popular sovereignty and had to meet various kinds of explicitly stated bureaucratic requirements. Sometimes a more pragmatic stance was needed. The aforementioned Patriot authors were practically inclined moralists who seized the moment to (morally) improve administration and government. This becomes apparent from the *Herstelling*

(1785: 11) in which Swildens, Van der Capellen and Capellen tot den Marsch wrote how “certain times sometimes provide moments which, more than any other times, enable us to rebuild the nation on steady ground, to improve a people. When these moments, so brief, so delicate, are over, they do not come again. They either serve to confirm slavery or to revive freedom [...] This is the deciding moment, to determine and fix the rights of the people or to say our goodbyes to them forever”.

5.5 Batavians

As described in chapter four, the Patriot revolution of the early 1780s was followed by an Orangist counter revolution between 1787 and 1795 brought about by Prussian intervention. However, the spirit of Patriot opposition and revolutionary agitation over oligarchic rule and corrupt regents, the Stadholder’s abuse of power, and a lack of opportunities for civic engagement in (local) government remained alive despite (or perhaps because of) the Orangist crackdown of 1787. The Patriots merely went into exile or hid in the Republic awaiting more opportune times. These came with the arrival of the French troops in 1795. The degree of ideological continuity between the Patriot revolutionary movement of the 1780s and the Batavian Revolution in 1795 is, as a result, striking (Israel, 1998: 1120-1121). As has been well documented elsewhere (cf. Boels, 2011; Leeb, 1973; Schama, 1977) the drafting and adopting of a new constitution and the formation of new institutions led to continuous ideological strife over the content of the constitution and the shape and (unitary or federal) structure of the new Dutch state. Since the general reforms proposed by the Batavians have been discussed in detail before (Grijzenhout, et al., 1987; Rosendaal, 2005a; Van Sas & Te Velde, 1998; Schama, 1977), there is little need to thoroughly restate them here. What follows, however, is a brief overview of views on specific Batavian best-opinion morality of public administration.

The basic foundation of Batavian morality is to be can be found in the pages of the new constitution (De Gou, 1983; Rosendaal, 2005b; Van Sas & Te Velde, 1998) and in the writings of some of its ‘value producers’, such as Isaac Gogel and Willem Anthonie Ockerse (to be discussed below). Generally speaking, the suggested reforms of the Batavians were (at least in theory) based on the basic revolutionary sentiments of the era: ideas of freedom, equality, a separation of powers and popular sovereignty. In line with the general sense of decay and doom still hanging over the eighteenth-century Dutch Republic, the Batavians were also deeply concerned with the supposed deterioration of morals. As in other European countries (Kossmann, 1995, 119-120), and as had been the case for many Patriots, moral decay was often considered the root cause of decay in other areas as well, such as politics, economy and culture. The Batavians believed that if the Dutch were ever able to return to their ‘golden’ seventeenth century, the first step was to revitalize the nation through moral moral rejuvenation, by means of ‘new’ politics and new administration. To the Batavians, popular elections rather than political appointments were, for instance, meant to end a system of extensive patronage with which the Stadholder and/or an oligarchy of officials had wielded enormous influence for decades (see chapter seven). This meant that hereditary offices and mechanisms of office rotation within the oligarchic town and provincial councils should also be abolished. Public offices should instead be opened up to a wider group of people. Indeed, as Palmer (1954: 25) put it, “neither family, nor church, nor estate, nor town council, nor provincial assembly possessed [any longer] any public power in its own right”.

An important attempt at ‘national’ moral and political rejuvenation and reform – in part by means of education – was provided by the political journal *De Democraten* (Jourdan, 2009: 9; De Lange, 1971: 506; Van Sas, 2005: 289). It was edited by Gogel and Ockerse, two influential Batavian ideologists and politicians. The journal was a prime example of using the press to further both men’s Batavian ideology, spelled out for a wider audience. Among its main topics, listed by De Lange (1971: 507), we find popular sovereignty, the equality of all burghers and decisive – because unitary – administration. The journal, for instance, insisted that free elections were to guarantee honest representation, responsibility and accountability by administrators. To men like Gogel the bond between people and its representatives in political institutions had long since been broken and needed to be restored by means of centralization, unity and ‘true’ representation. They were not, as De Lange (1971: 509) tells us, arguing for an aristocracy eligible for election. Rather, they were arguing for a participatory democracy in which the people actually had a say. In true Batavian fashion Gogel and Ockerse furthermore combined calls for a moral ‘revolution’ with nation-building, centralization and state formation (Van Sas, 2005: 289-290). Constitutional revolution (see chapters four and eight) was only believed to be able to succeed if it went together with a moral revolution. It is because of the importance of the journal and both men as ideologists of the Batavian period that I briefly elaborate on Gogel and Ockerse and provide some further insight into their best-opinion concerning public morality. As we will see, both exemplify many of the core Batavian ideas on morality and reform that have been discussed in the above and will reappear in case study three.

Isaac J.A. Gogel

Isaac Jan Alexander Gogel (1765 – 1821) played an important role in establishing the Batavian Republic’s main institutions, most notably as first minister of finance of the Batavian Republic, a function he continued to hold under King Louis Bonaparte between 1806 and 1809 and after 1810 as part of the imperial government that was devoted to the Dutch departments of the French Empire (Schama, 1977: 617, 619-620). When, after the defeat of Napoleon, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was proclaimed at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, Gogel however refused to take office under the new regime. To him, according to Schama (1977: 630-645), this was only a restoration of the pre-1795 Orangist clique he so despised. Gogel’s aversion to the Orangist camp (despite his pragmatic calls for reconciliation, see Van Sas, 2005: 289) was deeply influenced by that same republican tradition which, as we have seen, had inspired several Patriot best-opinion ideologists before him. Gogel addressed similar issues. In a public lecture delivered in 1796 at a meeting of like-minded Patriots in Amsterdam,³ Gogel discussed the idea that the Republic was in moral decay. To him this was not necessarily a bad thing. Instead, it offered a way forward as he stressed how good morals and good laws all stem from striving towards the happiness of the entire society instead of individual happiness. Similar to the later Batavian constitution (cf. Roosendaal, 2005: General Principles, art. vi), Gogel said a virtuous public official was to live according to the golden rule “do unto others as you would have others do unto you [...]”. The desire to make profit and ever increasing wealth has brought immorality, disloyalty and extortion”. “Civil servants”, according to Gogel, “no

³ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-HaNA], *Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820*, accessnumber 2.21.005.39, inventory number [inv.nr.] 2, page [p.] 10-13.

longer saw the need to behave better than the people or their so-called masters. Stealing from the nation was no longer condemned in a harsh manner and ceased to be wrong – each pillaged and looted at will and the nations’ finances were ruined”.^{xliv} A similar message was conveyed by Gogel in *De Democraten* in which he stated how “only virtue and capability could be reasons to occupy a public office”. National unity, based on national loyalty and *l’esprit publique* would lead to thrift in (public) administration and finances”.⁴ As one might suspect, the opposite of this was the ‘Aristocratic system’, based on self interest and the lust to rule, the cherished system of those wishing to promote provincial interests and their own wellbeing over that of the nation”.^{xlv,5}

While Gogel had largely similar arguments as many Patriot ‘moral’ reformers before him, he also – in typical Batavian style – added something relatively new to the mix in a lecture to his (unitarian) fraternity – of which men like Wybo Fijnje (see chapter eight) and Ockerse were also members – on 18 January 1798 and in several issues of *De Democraten*. There, he made the (unitary Batavian) argument that a strong central state was the solution to overcome many of the problems that had paralyzed the pre-1795 Dutch Republic and would paralyze any federal state in the future. Among them were moral decay and corruption. From Colenbrander’s reproduction of the lecture (1905-1922, part II: cxxvni), this much at least becomes clear. Gogel, in his lecture, blames the faction strife among various groups in the Republic, the political inconsistency and the continuing changing of governments on the “dependence on internal quarrels, the mercy of external commonwealths, trifles and chimera’s”.^{xlvi} Lack of central authority and regulation had meant that the Dutch people were unable to curb vice and passions. The downfall of the Dutch people, according to Gogel, would be a sure thing unless they reached unanimity and unity to overcome strife. In order to do this there was a need for powerful administration that would earn the trust of the people and could thereby force all to do their duty for the well-being of the common good. If this does not happen, says Gogel, “then self interest, lust to rule and violent passions would suppress and smother the soft voice of reason [...], then ability, honesty and good virtues will be passed over.”^{xlvii}

Willem Anthonie Ockerse

Willem Anthonie Ockerse (1760 – 1826) – a former theology student and preacher – also argued for a new republican, democratic and national political system and in doing so presents us with clear views on moral rejuvenation and the ending of the political corruption of the old ‘Aristocratic system’. Van Sas’ essay (2005: 303-313) and Stouten’s biography (1982) have already provided much information of this important but largely forgotten Batavian and his political writings. His specific best-opinion thoughts on public values and political corruption have, however, remained relatively underexplored. In a work entitled *Batavians! Eischt eene nationale conventie* from 1795, Ockerse argued for a popularly elected National Assembly that was to provide a new constitution. Interestingly enough, as Van Sas (2005: 305-306) explains, Ockerse was critical of the events of 1787 and what he called the ‘Aristocratic system’ built by the once victorious Patriots. The patriots of the 1770s and 1780s (see before) had argued for moral reforms and the end of Patronage and oligarchy. According to Ockerse, many were now in power and had turned into a new Aristocracy. They no longer had any interest in true

⁴ NL-HaNA, *Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820*, 2.21.005.39, inv.nr. 173, issue 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, issue 20.

reform. To Ockerse, a truly representative National Assembly of a unitary state would reduce the number of public offices. Centralization and a national convention would guarantee simplicity and retrenchment and end the distribution and multiplication of offices so common in the old Republic. It would also end the eternal and harmful bickering among the various autonomous bodies in the Republic. In his quest for centralization and strong central administration as the cure for the Republic's illnesses, Ockerse was much like Gogel. The latter had, after all, argued for the same in the mentioned lecture to their fraternity. True popular sovereignty, according to Ockerse, entailed that the people (i.e., the elected representatives) would have to make the laws. It was Ockerse's ideal that every delegate would represent the nation as a whole instead of particularistic provincial or local city interests.

Van Sas (2005: 307-309) describes how Ockerse continuously returns to the themes of unity, democracy, popular sovereignty and anti-aristocracy in various public lectures held before the Amsterdam Patriot society *Doctrina et Amicitia* in 1796 and 1797. His 'Aristocrat bashing' is interesting to us as it shows a continuing line of argument between the Batavian Ockerse and Patriots such as Van der Capellen. Contemplating the current situation, Ockerse complains that he sees nobles instead of burghers and wealthy gentlemen instead of true representatives occupying the seats of government. Instead of gatherings of the people he sees sovereign meetings (Tydeman, 1831, part 2: 174) and denounces the aristocracy which is, to him, only a representative of itself instead of the people. To Ockerse, the 'aristocracy' had already usurped power after the revolt against the Spanish. To him, as I noticed before, the Patriots of 1787 had been more of the same and it was precisely for this reason that the new political system of 1795 should be fundamentally different. A new, unitary and democratic, constitution would, according to Ockerse, "end all abuses and will fit our nature, our virtues, our interests, our needs". It would also ensure that "the administrator is only a short-lived representative, that administration is responsible to the nation and that the voter is not a selfish intermediate regent but a popular body through consultation". Such a constitution would prevent anarchistic chaos as well as aristocratic subversion and despotic abuse (Tydeman, 1831, part 2: 185-186).

Clearly Ockerse saw institutional unity, representation and popular sovereignty as being directly related to ending the general corruption of the body politic by ensuring 'new' public values of public responsibility, accountability, representation and consultation. A similar message was conveyed in another main work of Ockerse devoted to describing the 'national character of the Dutch' (Ockerse, 1788-1797). It provides an interesting view on Ockerse's best-opinion regarding public morality and political corruption. Van Sas (2005: 309-312), again, explains how Ockerse uses his description of 'the Dutch character' as a political instrument to argue for institutional unity. According to Van Sas, Ockerse purposefully uses the discourse of decay to argue his case. Dutch society had to return to the morals and virtues of the past that had once made the Dutch Republic into a great nation. Politics and the message of unity, representation and popular sovereignty were to bring about the re-civilization and moral rejuvenation of a corrupted political society. Aristocracy, federalism and the hunt for offices (also among the Patriots of 1787) would all impede this cause.

Ockerse belonged to the small circle of radicals who staged the coup of 22 January 1798 (see chapters four and eight). His desire for a unitary constitution that would end all problems prompted him to take such forceful measures. To Ockerse, the coup of 22 January was simply necessary to break the political deadlock and in this he clearly resembled other radicals, like Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje (see chapter eight for more on these individuals). Ockerse did not, however, become a member of the Interim Executive. Instead, he chose to keep working on the new constitution as he became chairman of the third (and final) drafting committee (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 312; Schama, 1977: 303-307). His involvement in the radical coup had, however, alienated him from some of his former, more moderate, friends who were worried about the radical turn of events and the ‘lust for offices’, combined with political purging, displayed by some of the radicals. In a letter to Gogel on 3 February 1798 (see Colenbrander, 1905-1922, II: 715), he addresses this problem and justified his actions from which his views on correct (and incorrect) public behaviour become clear. He describes himself as “an honest and selfless advocate for the good cause of the fatherland and wishes not to be equated with hot-headed and immoral fortune hunters who are only out for personal gain and are motivated by lowly urges”.^{xlvi} Ockerse then goes on to defend the coup of 22 January. He writes how he “despises those who hunt for offices, the hot-headed ultra-revolutionaries, but in order to restrain them one should stop the destruction of the fatherland and the trampling of the people by evil despots who would have brought disaster on all of us”. Ockerse in fact blamed the current divisions, indecisiveness and long-windedness on the personal political corruption of people in government who only wanted to acquire offices and serve their own interests. The ‘despots’ he spoke of were the ‘federalist-minded’ politicians in the first and second National Assembly as well as ‘Aristocrats’ and the city oligarchies. The current state of affairs, Ockerse writes to Gogel, is one of “phlegm, weakness, lack of energy, a deviation from principles and an inclination towards aristocracy and urban federalism. This poison has infected near all bodies, even our own fraternity. We need purification to provide health to this phlegmatic and languishing body”.^{xlix}

In what Jonhston might call a ‘classical’ sense, Ockerse thus quite literally speaks of corruption as the general degeneration or indeed sickness of the body politic. A healthy, united political body is being invaded by the poison of corruption (i.e., division, federalism, indecisiveness, hunting for offices and serving personal interests). Ockerse (like Gogel) seems to have been a typical example of the unitary Batavian who, at the same time, did not shun from using strong measures to get what he wanted. In this he also closely resembled ‘radicals’ like Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen (see chapter eight). To Ockerse, the coup of 22 January had been a choice between two evils; necessary to speed up the process of constitution building and to steer the Republic in the right direction. The end justified the means. This is exemplified by the reasons given by the radicals to stage their 22 January coup. A proclamation by the new Constituent Assembly on that very day, in which we can clearly recognize Ockerse’s views, stated how: “it is time to close the gap between an orderly state of affairs and the deformed administration and its ruinous consequences which have so often befallen our nation [...] to end the confusion and uncertainty which has paralyzed our prosperity and has brought us [this] cesspit [...], “to end the lust to rule and the lack of administration”. It is time, the Assembly continued, to “end the plans of those suffering from megalomania”.¹ The proclamation continued by stating that “state funds have been abused to force a constitution on the people who had already rejected it in favour of people’s own personal goals”. It was time to end the use of public money, “the fruits of such hard work”, for foul personal interest. The

coup was necessary as a means to achieve popular elections rather than political appointments that were, in turn, to end a system of extensive patronage by Stadholder and oligarchic town councils alike. Privileged interests, hereditary offices and mechanisms of office rotation within the oligarchic town and provincial councils should be abolished (Staatsregeling, GP, Art. xv, xxv; Palmer, 1954, 25). In order to achieve this, a coup and a certain degree of self interest and acquiring of offices could be condoned. This line of reasoning will reoccur in chapter eight, particularly when people speak of ‘Italian Statecraft’.

Concluding remarks

From the previous it has become apparent that the French-Batavian period had a great impact on Dutch political and administrative history despite its relatively short life span. The various institutional breakthroughs and developments brought, among other things, institutional centralization and the beginnings of the ‘modern’ Dutch nation state. In the midst of these fundamental changes we are also able to discover the beginnings of a new kind of public morality. A substantial portion of Batavian best-opinion (exemplified by Gogel and Ockerse) was about moral reform and/or rejuvenation. A part of the new foundations of the state was made up of (new) morality of public administration. Attempts to end an old and corrupted administrative system were at the top of the Batavians’ list of priorities as they vehemently argued for a new kind of public administration. These Batavian best-opinion authors took the earlier Patriot line of argument a decisive step further. With their aim to end federalism (and with it particularism, patronage, oligarchy and privilege) through unity and centralization, they provided a new moral foundation based on ‘new’ or at least re-emphasized public values, which were in turn based on a different view of the common good. With their ideas of nation (in the more modern sense of the word), men like Gogel and Ockerse clearly had a much more inclusive notion of the public or common good and the public values they espoused – most notably representation, accountability, responsibility, participation and consultation – were tied to it. Good (i.e., not corrupt) administrators and/or politicians had to be accountable to the people; had to be responsible because they acted for an entire nation and (ideally) had to represent more interests in that nation than only those of a small and powerful elite. With a wider and more inclusive notion of common good, a whole new way of looking at public morality and political corruption seemed to have started. In chapter eight I will discuss just how much of this ‘new’ best-opinion can be found in relation to actual cases.

Towards part three

In the previous chapters of part two I discussed the general historical background and context for the scandals discussed in this book and provided a view on best-opinion thinking on public values and political corruption. In the following third part I turn to the case studies as I offer a detailed and in-depth empirical view on explicit scandals to reveal the open otherwise hidden morals. The cases are spread out over the entire period coinciding with the three reform movements in Dutch political-administrative history as described earlier. The cases combine a Johnstonian approach with Hoetjes’ heuristics and theoretical insights taken from Weber and historical institutionalism. Chapter six offers a case study on political corruption, bureaucratization and moral reform in the context of Holland’s changing system of taxation around 1750.

Chapter seven offers a case study of political corruption in the years of Patriot agitation and revolt during the 1770s and 1780s. Chapter eight offers a case study on political corruption in the context of major transformations of the Dutch state following the Batavian revolution of 1795.

Part III

Political Corruption Scandals

“Clio, properly respected, is the least straightforward of the muses. Her beauty lies in the complexity, not the simplicity, of her truth. Which is why her votaries, attentive to the sometimes difficult and winding path they must follow, are sworn to tell stories in order to make the journey easier”

Simon Schama,
A history of Britain (2009)

6 Taxes, Political Corruption and Moral Reform (1748 – 1756)⁶

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present the first case study in the sphere of tax collecting in Holland between (roughly) 1748 and 1756. In 1748 demands for change from an angry population and desires and assumptions from disgruntled administrators aligned to strive for a new and improved system of taxation. With the implementation of bureaucratic elements (such as fixed office hours, supplying means or separating person from office) the Provincial Estates of Holland slowly but steadily turned the ‘private’ system of tax farming into a more or less ‘public’ one. This was meant to eradicate political corruption, immoral behaviour and abuse of office that, according to many, had become endemic in the system of taxation. This chapter therefore explores the link between bureaucratic changes in the system of taxation and changing public values in the province of Holland. While the link between taxation and public values has been explored in the past – for instance by Jean Bodin (1530 – 1596) (cf. Wolfe, 1968: 269), Pietro Verdi (1728 – 1797) (cf. 1771/1993: 93), Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) (cf. 1981: 902) and, of course Max Weber (cf. Gerth, et al., 1991) – it has hardly been explicitly and/or empirically investigated in more recent times and is non-existent for the Dutch case.

In the following I therefore first provide a general overview of events in 1748 and empirical evidence that outlines the reasons for the changes in the system of taxation. This is followed by an empirical analysis of the bureaucratic regulations regarding tax collecting before and (mostly) after 1748 to assess public value change. I adopt an approach similar to the one taken by Van Braam (1977), Raadschelders (1990) and Wagenaar (1997) who used Weber’s ideal-type characteristics of bureaucratization to historically analyze reform in public administration. Unlike these authors, however, I apply Weber’s characteristics to specifically analyze and assess not only organizational reform in taxation before and after 1748 but also the link between bureaucratic tax reform and changing public values. These findings will then be connected to scandals in the area of taxation.

6.2 Taxes, political corruption and reform

Taxes, political corruption and protest

The province of Holland had a high number and large variety of taxes, something that was recognized by contemporary authors as well. In his *Fable of the Bees* (1705) Bernard Mandeville (1714/1988: 187) noted how Holland was “loaden with greater taxes than any other nation”.

⁶ Parts of this chapter have been published by Oxford University Press as: Kerkhoff, A.D.N. (2011). Organizational Reform and Changing Ethics in Public Administration: A Case Study on 18th Century Dutch Tax Collecting. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(1), 117-135.

similarly, Adam Smith (1981: 906) noted how “the singular countries of Holland and Zealand require a considerable expense even to preserve their existence, or to prevent their being swallowed up by the sea”. Taxes in the Dutch Republic mostly consisted of indirect excises on popular consumer items such as bread, wine, butter, peat, beer or meat (Diederiks, 1977: 485-490; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 32-42). The collection of these excises in Holland (officially since 1583) was largely arranged by means of tax farming by ‘private’ tax farmers in collaboration with public authorities. Tax farmers were private businessmen who could buy the right to collect taxes, usually for a year, during annual auctions organized by the authorities. In order to acquire the farm, tax farmers had to pay a deposit. They were also obligated to hand over a part of their proceeds to the authorities every month. The amount to be paid was determined in advance of the auction and was based on expected returns. The system was devised in such a way that it encouraged aggressive levying. Tax farmers had to collect enough to pay their monthly dues and had to recover their deposit. They were, however, allowed to keep the difference between the estimated amount (the money they paid to the authorities every month) and the money they actually collected (Dekker, 1982: 134; Heringa, 1983: 83).

Tax farming systems had been around since antiquity (cf. Kiser, 2007; Webber & Wildavsky, 1986; Weber, 1978: 557) and were common in other early modern European states such as France (Matthews, 1958; E. White, 2004), Prussia (Kiser & Schneider, 1994) and Britain (Kiser & Kane, 2001). Tax farming ensured the authorities of a steady flow of revenue without having to establish or operate an elaborate and expensive organization for collection (Ma, 2003: 441; Scholten, 1999: 308). Public authorities simply benefitted from entrepreneurs who were willing and able to acquire the know-how. In addition, tax collecting on consumer items was risky business. Harvests, live stock or trade routes could easily be affected by bad weather, plague or war and tax farming ensured that such risks – along with tax evasion and/or fraud – were for the tax farmers and not the authorities (Dekker, 1996: 9; Heringa, 1983: 83). The system also ensured that revenues were received partly in advance. This was obviously important for planning or making policy.

A final crucial idea behind the system was, as we have seen, that tax collecting should be left to private entrepreneurs. Since they were allowed to keep all the revenues other than the amount they had agreed to pay to the authorities, aggressive levying was beneficial for tax farmers and authorities alike. Self-interest of tax farmers was believed to make levying efficient and reliable. Of course, the disadvantage to the province was at the same time that part of the proceeds would disappear in the pockets of the tax farmers (Dekker, 1982: 134). If tax farmers were indeed able to collect more than the estimated amount, the province, in a way, lost out but this was apparently not enough to outweigh the benefits. This is no to say that the system of tax farming was indeed able to generate much revenue for the Dutch treasury. Gosse and Japikse (1947: 639) already noted that the eighteenth century United Provinces were a rich country with a poor government, meaning that the Dutch were largely unable to tax the wealthy (obviously because the wealthy were also those in charge), much like France or any other major European state apart from England (Palmer, 1974, part I: 78). Still, a public system proved (in hindsight) more effective in terms of revenue. Proceeds rose, especially shortly after 1748 with about 10% (Diederiks, 1977: 501; Heringa, 1983: 83-84, 89, 100-101; Oldewelt, 1955ff; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 42-44) presumably as parts of it no longer went to the private tax farmers.

Abuse of the system of tax farming seemed inevitable across Europe (Kiser & Schneider, 1994; Ma, 2003: 441-442, 445-448) and the province of Holland – as well as the rest

of the Dutch Republic – was no exception. Tax farming was a lucrative business and it was, thereby, also susceptible to abuse. While the Holland tax farmers, together with the local regent elite and public provincial officials were, at least in theory, tied to excise levels set by local or provincial authorities (Dekker, 1982: 132), they often abused their powers to collect more than was allowed. Lack of supervision and complexity of rules were part of the problem but there were also other – more fundamental – reasons. Abuse seems mostly to have been due to the way the system was intended to function. Certain organizational arrangements effectively facilitated fraud, abuse of office and highly aggressive methods of levying. Self-interest as a major catalyst of the system ensured that private tax farmers and public ‘law enforcement officials’ (bailiffs, sheriffs, debt collectors and the like) were, for instance, awarded parts of people’s fines as part of their income. This in turn led to aggressive levying and often meant people were arrested on false charges to collect more pay. The variety of offences such as smuggling, bribery or price fixing was also endless. Sometimes deals were made between tax farmers, public tax officials and traders to illegally import goods so they could sell it for themselves. Tax farmers would often smuggle goods by bribing officials or fix prices. People changed the prices of excises, deliberately over- or underestimated expected revenues, cheated with or forged tax notes, bribed people who weighed goods at markets or hid proceeds and goods from inspectors. Public officials in charge of supervision often turned a blind eye to illegal practices in return for rewards and sometimes actively participated (cf. Engels, 1862: 39-41). In addition, tax farmers would often pay bailiffs and process servers for their assistance in combating fraud or tracking down tax offenders making it interesting for the former to apprehend people without cause.

The high burden of taxation in Holland, but above all the level of fraud and abuse of office inherent in the system, led to violent and large-scale popular dissatisfaction concerning tax farming in the midst of Doelist agitation (see chapters four and five). Now, the protest was mostly focused against the moral corruption of the system. This, at least, was the case in the final days of June 1748. Protest in Holland followed that in Groningen and Friesland. In The Hague, Leiden, Haarlem, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, riots erupted that targeted the homes and possession of the hated tax farmers (Dekker, 1982: 134; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 44). As Doelist petitions that called for change were presented to local and central authorities (consider the complaints of men like Rousset de Missy and Van Gimnig in chapter five) many pamphlets simultaneously denounced fraudulent tax farmers. In Leiden, the house of tax farmer Van der Kok was pillaged and destroyed. A pamphlet of the time read “see here a crude image of Van der Kok, a tax farmer, renowned along the Rhine and Vecht for his extortion, the supreme Beelzebub, full of pride and vanity, so proud that even his house looks like the palace of some rich Venetian. His secret comforts alone have cost more than I have earned in all my life” (*Brief van een Zwitsers officier*, 1748: 19-20).^{li} Similarly, a short printed play in 1748 portrays a tax farmer saying “I always got what I want, no amount of complaining would help. How great was my power! How distinguished [as in posh, ‘aristocratic’? TK] my authority! It was, pay up, and if you did not have it then your wife and even your children would suffer the deprivation” (*Den bedroefden Pachter*, 1748: 7).^{lii} Various poems and other writings around the same time reflect similar basic sentiments. Tax farmer Lublink was, for instance, supposedly complaining about his lost wealth that he had been able to collect unjustly as one of the greatest usurers (*Historisch verhaal van het tumult*, 1748: 21) and tax farmer Glavink is supposedly full of remorse as he says “I have been devilish wise! I was a snitch! Yes the silliest bungler! Devoid of reason and spirit, I went and became tax farmer on butter. Oh! The remorse is

hardly bearable!” (Ibid., 23)^{liii} Tax collector Heus, as a final example, was depicted as saying “what goes around comes around. Now the angry mob is raging because I gnawed at their bones and did not know what a conscience was. Now I must suffer my usury and see the treasure [the tax revenues, TK] return to its source [the people? TK]” (Ibid., 25).^{liv}

The rioters of 1748 seem not to have succumbed to blind rage. They knew who the culprits were and targeted specific persons rather than laying waste to the entire city or even all tax farmers’ houses out of sheer frustration. Retired tax farmers from previous years were left alone and adjacent houses to those pillaged also remained untouched (Noordam, 1980). There existed a certain amount of order and discipline as becomes apparent from the plunder of the house of tax farmer of the wines Jan Staysail on 24 June in Amsterdam. Staysail had upped the excise on wine and had, accordingly, put small innkeepers or bartenders in such a stranglehold that they invariably went bankrupt (*Historisch verhaal van het tumult*, 1748: 16). The mob smashed his possessions but not until the maid had been allowed to secure her possessions. She was also apparently paid her wages by members of the attacking crowd (*Historisch verhaal van het tumult*, 1748: 12; Breen, 1934: 283). Tayspil himself, however, did not get off so easily. A poem from 1748 has him lament: “Ai! Poor me! That I have so shrewdly taken from other purses when I received my office. I have cheated myself and nobody cares” (*Historisch verhaal van het tumult*, 1748: 14).^{lv} Similar events apparently occurred during the sacking of the house of a certain Mr. A. Bundel in Amsterdam. A pamphlet of the time read how “the maid was allowed to leave with all her possessions before they went pillaging. Yes, they pillaged so carefully everywhere that all spectators had to wonder about the fact that the neighbours were not inconvenienced in any way” (*Pachters traanen*, 1748: 24).

In addition, a distinction was sometimes made between good and bad tax farmers whereby the former stuck to the rules without extorting the population through fraud and corruption and who did not flaunt their wealth. The house of the ‘bad’ tax farmer J. van Ockhuysen in Leiden was destroyed by the mob because of his harsh methods of levying (*Korte schets der Leidsche pachters*, 1748: 20; Noordam, 1980: 93). The house of another Leiden tax farmer, Van Kouwenhoven, was initially ransacked on 17 June but on 18 June several people gathered at the spot to retrieve some of his furniture from the canals. They did so, according to Noordam (1980: 90), “not because of the destruction but out of remorse for having targeted this specific man”. Van Kouwenhoven had in fact been one of the good tax farmers (*Korte schets der Leidsche pachters*, 1748: 20). The Hague tax farmer David Beekhof was, as a final example, also spared because of his fair (i.e., non corrupt) way of levying (Wagenaar, 1997: 90). The mob passed by the house of Beekhof “because of his politeness and moderation” (*Brief van een Zwitsers officier*, 1748: 15). The wrath of the mob therefore seems to have been evoked not so much because they were tax farmers in the service of some vicious government but because they had exploited the system and abused their position for their own benefit.^{lvi}

From such characteristics of the tax riots we can deduce how the protest had mainly moral motives. They signal that the riots of 1748 were not so much against taxation in general. Instead, motives for protest against taxation were essentially moral. The system of tax collecting as such was no longer fundamentally rejected (Dekker, 1982: 135; 1996; Ma, 2003: 448) but was now mostly despised for largely being corrupt. This conclusion can also be derived from the fact that widespread discontent with regard to the corrupted system of taxation and the behaviour of the tax officials has to be largely understood in the context of the general socio-economic and political difficulties in the Republic at the time (Dekker, 1996: 17; Israel, 1998: 1069-1078; Noordam, 1980: 87; Schama, 1977: 45-58; De Voogd, 1914: 95). In

the first place (as I discussed in chapters four and five) this concerned the political failure of William IV and the regents to instigate any kind of administrative reform. To many, pillaging tax farmers' homes and urging for the end of the system of taxation seems to have been a way to protest against the system of regent oligarchic government in general. Tax farmers were (for good reason, given the close ties between regents and tax levying, cf. Dekker, 1982: 134; Engels, 1862: 41-42; De Jong, 1987: 43, 51, 65-75; Scholten, 1999: 309; Slothouwer, 1875: 14; De Voogd, 1914: 101; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 44) considered to be in league with regent authorities and both were seen as part and parcel of the same corrupt elite. In addition, the general economic and social decay of the period made the wealth of the tax farmers more visible and intolerable (Israel, 1998: 959-1121; Pfeil, 1998: 44-49). Many apparently considered expensive clothing, chariots and horses and big houses proof of the fact that tax officials enriched themselves at the expense of others. One pamphleteer denounced people "who were able to buy a carriage, a country house and twenty to thirty horses only two years after receiving the right to collect excises. This ill-mannered line, stemming from a tribe that knows no decency, only wishes to commit usury and to scrape money together for which any honourable persons would only be ashamed" (*Burgerlyke oplettendheid*, 1748, volume 2: 4-5).^{lvii} Another pamphleteer remarked that tax farmers who "manage to acquire a carriage and twenty to thirty horses in the first two years of their office", obviously achieved this through "avarice, usury, greed, haughtiness and general lack of decency" (Ibid., 5-9).

Reform of the system

Contrary to the more or less failed Doelist movement (see chapters four and five) the tax riots of 1748 had immediate consequences for Holland's administration. After a brief period of resistance from William IV (see for variety of official warnings: *Groot Placaet Boeck* [GPB], collection of ordinances and regulations by the Estates General and the Estates of Holland and West-Friesland," 1658 – 1796, Volume [vol.] VII, folio [f.], 830-831, 832, 836) he finally travelled to the Estates General on 25 June 1748 – to squash the riots – with a proposal to abolish tax farming after all (*Propositie van Synne Hoogheid*, 1748; De Voogd, 1914: 103). In his proposition he stated his desire that the Estates General should start thinking about a new system of taxation. William appears to have grasped the root cause of the problem. According to him, the citizens are not out to evade taxation in general: "it is", he wrote, "not their purpose or desire to avoid carrying the burdens that support the common cause".^{lviii} It was mostly the way in which levying took place that aroused such emotions.

The reasons why the Stadholder wanted to abolish the tax farm at this point when he had denied any such possibility only a few days earlier are essentially unknown. Still some can be deduced from his proposition as he writes, for instance, how the country must not be damaged by riots any further. Also, there must have been a sense of political opportunism in play as well, as the Prince was always looking to gain favour with the Orangist populace in his ongoing struggles against the powerful regents. In either case, on 26 June 1748 the Estates of Holland decided to abolish tax farming because of the grave disturbances, i.e., the riots (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1204-1205, 26/06/1748). Instead of tax farming, the Estates of Holland came up with provisional arrangements on 26 July 1748 (Ibid., f. 1204). The direct excises on consumer items were replaced with direct taxes to be paid by the cities, based on the estimated use of goods by their citizens. In this way they made fixed quotas out of the formerly farmed excises

(Heringa, 1983: 84; Wagenaar, 1997: 93-94). A year later, in July and August of 1749, the Estates decided to get rid of the initial band-aid and replaced the measures with a new permanent system of tax collecting which remained intact until 1805 (cf. GPB, vol. VII, f. 1360). The main reason was a lack of cooperation from local functionaries and tax payers which had made the revenues from the provisional measures very poor (Heringa, 1983: 84). In one of their official proclamations, the Estates wrote how “they could not be more astonished and lament more, the enormous sluggishness, if not unwillingness, of so many of our citizens to meet their obligations” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1209).

In a motivation for introducing indirect excises the Estates of Holland addressed the grievances of the populace. On 5 July 1749 they wrote that there “shall be introduced, tax levying on an equal footing for the whole of the province and the money collected in this way shall go into this countries’ treasury, and our citizens will be freed from the vexations that so often occurred during the time of tax farming of the common means. In this way the reasons for all the displeasure that we have come to find against tax farming are all taken away and have ceased to exist”.^{lix} The Estates of Holland were quite thorough in addressing the previous (moral) problems of tax farming. They wrote how those tax farmers who had been inclined to do evil had caused much harm to the country [Holland, TK] (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1214 – 1215, 04/07/1749).^{lx} They promise to act against all those who “willingly and knowingly, deliberately, profit from tax collecting and thereby extract revenues from the country” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1360, art. ix, see also GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005 – 1010, 22/07/1749).^{lxi} In the general ordinance of 28 August 1749 the Estates of Holland add that they plan to “deter as much as we can all those who are looking for profit through fraud and stealing, and protect the good tax payer from being cheated and oppressed by them” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119).^{lxii} Of course, they had less noble motives as well. They wanted an end to the riots and, perhaps, hoped to get more revenue this way although that seems unlikely.

Many things started to change from 1748 onwards to meet the demands of both rioters and reformers. Designing a new public system of tax collecting became the most time consuming responsibility of the Gecommitteerde Raden (Fockema Andreae, 1961: 45; Israel, 1998: 278-280). Among the people appointed to design the new public system of taxation were Anthony van Wesele (1701 – 1757) and Jacob Vosmaer (1717 – 1781). On 22 August 1749, Van Wesele became fiscal attorney and ‘attorney general’ of the Gecommitteerde Raden (see also GPB, vol. VIII, f. 1022, 05/05/1757 and GPB, vol. IX, f. 734, 09/01/1762) and was responsible on their behalf (Heringa, 1983: 100). As former fiscal attorney of the Court of Holland Van Wesele proved to be highly instrumental in setting up a new system from about 1750 onwards in which a new administrative structure of command was put in place and the private tax farmers were replaced with public tax collectors. The new public functionaries now had a legal position as public servants and were part of a much more encompassing chain of hierarchy and command. The main tax collector collected taxes in his area with the aid of some assistants (clerks, accountants or bookkeepers, process servers and investigators or ‘chergers’ who tracked down tax offenders and/or stolen goods). These officials were all appointed and officially employed by the Provincial Estates. This was a big difference with the way things had been before. In the case of very large excises (such as beer) the main tax collector could receive assistance from minor or subordinate tax collectors. Other key differences were a stronger emphasis on hierarchy, control and supervision. New supervisors served as a link between the main tax collectors and Gecommitteerde Raden (cf. Heringa, 1983: 90) and a new office of the

common means, headed by Vosmaer, served to implement and guide the immense reforms from 1 January 1750 onwards (cf. Heringa, 1983: 91; Wagenaar, 2004: 558).

6.3 Bureaucratization and changing public values

As the largely ‘private’ system of tax farming was turned into a public one a highly bureaucratic organization was created. Measures that were already there (most notable oaths of office and instructions) were revitalized but many new measures were introduced at the same time. The activity of Van Wesele, Vosmaer and countless others becomes apparent from a comparison of the situation before and after 1748. All sorts of bureaucratic measures can be distinguished with which tax officials were now confronted. Crucially, these measures show a change in moral stance. Since moral protest against abuse of office by tax officials and regent elite had been the main aspect of the tax riots, this abuse was also the main target for the reformers. From the new rules it becomes apparent that bureaucratic measures were effectively installed to counter political corruption and abuse of office. In the following I discuss several characteristics of bureaucratization to analyze and assess change in the organization of taxation before and after 1748. This includes changing public values and perceptions of political corruption with regard to the behaviour of the new, now public, officials.

Both private tax farmers and public tax officials (i.e., before and after 1748) were bound by *continuous administrative activity* (i).[†] Before 1748, tax farmers worked the whole year round and had to collect on a daily basis selling their tax notes. They also had to pay public collectors every week and have their books inspected by the latter on a monthly basis (GPB, vol. VI, f.1036-1039, art. xviii-xix). The city or regional public collectors would, in turn, send the money to the provincial officials (Engels, 1862: 41) who also worked the whole year round. The latter also had to deal with precisely set office hours (the office was in fact their private home): from eight to twelve in the morning and from two to five in the afternoon in summer and only from two to five in the afternoon in winter (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. ix).^{lxiii} They had to keep their books in proper order^{lxiv} and if they were not present at said hours they would have to pay a fine of twenty-five guilders (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. vii). If absent for a whole day they were, supposedly, to be fired immediately (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. xi; see also GPB, vol. VIII, June 1748, f. 999, art. xiii).

After 1748, Van Wesele and others came up with more elaborate guidelines regarding the regularity and continuity of the work of those involved in levying. The two provincial inspectors from the office of the common means were, as mentioned, required to supervise the now public collectors in three annual rounds from 1750 onwards and local inspectors were to continuously supervise the collectors (*Instructie voor de inspecteurs*, 1751, art. vi, 23/03/1751; *Instructie voor de opsienders* 1760, art. xxv, 04/04/1760). The collectors themselves would now have to deal with stricter regulations regarding their administration. Every year, for instance, they received two books. One rough book or daily journal, the other an official ledger. They were obligated to update their journals every day and would have to produce a balance sheet in their ledgers at the end of each month. For every day not updated in the books, they were fined ten guilders (GPB, vol. VIII, art. ix, September 1748; *Instructie voor de collecteurs*, 1748). Lower law enforcement officials in charge of stopping or preventing illegal activities after 1748 would have to inspect the different tollbooths and weighing houses “at least once a day at

[†] Numbers in between brackets refer to the Roman numerals in Figure 1 in chapter two.

irregular hours, to see or hear whether the people working there did so properly, in a sober [not drunk! TK] and capable way” (*Instructie voor de hoofdbergers*, 1760, art. iv, 17/04/1760).^{lxv} ‘Policemen’ would have to provide detailed accounts of their daily rounds every month (Ibid., art. iv, art. xiv-xv).

These examples show how local and provincial authorities were convinced of the importance of continuous administrative activity regarding the collecting of taxes. Apart from the fact that running a well-organized tax system demands such institutional arrangements as regular office hours and inspection this is also an ethical or moral stance. ‘Good’ public officials maintained their books in an orderly and regular fashion, were present at their office at least a few hours a day, would regularly supervise and inspect any subordinates and would regularly present their books to any superiors. Values such as continuity, systematization and uniformity were at play here as were being sober and having an eye for detail. The increase of rules and regulations after 1748 tells us that although these values were required prior to 1748 as well, they certainly gained importance after 1748.

As already indicated, tax officials were bound to many *formal rules and procedures* (ii), also prior to 1748. One instruction, dated 14 March 1701, obligated collectors to show their books to each other (note the desirability of peer supervision) and to provincial officials (GPB, vol. V, f. 1036). Non-compliance would result in a hefty fine of six hundred guilders, which could amount to as much as half a tax collector’s yearly income (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art.v; GPB, vol. VII, f. 1228, art.xiv-xv, 08/10/ 1749). The same instruction from 1701 stated that public collectors or private tax farmers should “not connive, pardon or collect less than what was rightfully theirs to levy, punishable with a fine of two hundred guilders” (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039).^{lxvi} The collectors were, furthermore, obligated to collect taxes from the tax farmers themselves. Only collectors of large means like wine or beer in the largest cities in Holland could hand over some of their business to other “loyal and capable persons” such as subordinate collectors. Interestingly, family members were explicitly barred from this arrangement (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. x, 17/03/1701). However, after 1748 the number of rules and procedures rapidly increased. In part this was, I believe, a direct result of growing ethical demands and the need to target political corruption (mainly in the form of fraud) that were now a direct and ‘internal’ government affair.

To solve some of the problems inherent in the old system and to get the new rules and regulations out to its officials, the Estates required all new officials to take an oath of office. For this they revived an oath of purification in 1748 that had originally been devised in 1656 and was then revised in 1715. The original oath from 1656 made officials promise to work in a “pure and incorruptible manner [...] without being corrupted by gifts, presents or any other direct or indirect interest” (GPB, vol. III, 24/02/1656, f. 102). In 1715 it was added that “those who receive any high or low public office will have to execute their duties with purity and integrity, as it suits all pious and resolute regents and officials [...] without having been corrupted by any gifts [...]. All those willing to hold public office will thus have to swear by oath that neither they, nor their wives, children or other family or persons, have received or given, directly or indirectly, any gifts” (GPB, vol. V, f. 686ff, 10/12/1715. Compare for a later version GPB, vol. IX, f. 400, 02/05/1777).^{lxvii} In 1749 it was added that public tax officials were to behave “punctual and to act in accordance with instructions and decrees” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1006, art. vi, 22/07/1749; see also GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. i, 28/08 1749).^{lxviii} This ensured they could no longer claim (after the fact) not to have understood the rules. To secure this even more, ordinances and instructions were publicly dispersed “so that nobody can claim

to be ignorant of their contents” GPB, vol. VII, f. 1222, art. x, 28/08/1749). Supervisors of the tax collectors after 1748 (like Jacobus Cras in the case below) received all ordinances and instructions from Gecommitteerde Raden and had to disperse them over all main and subordinate tax collectors (Heringa, 1983: 90). The importance of the oath also becomes clear from the fact that when a tax official passed away, his successor was to take the oath within eight days upon starting the new job. For every following day one neglected to take the oath you were fined ten guilders, to be paid to the poorhouse (GPB, vol. IV, f. 1068-1069, art. xvi).

There are many examples where higher and lower tax officials were convicted by provincial authorities for not obeying oath and instruction. Many verdicts handed out by Gecommitteerde Raden to corrupt tax officials start with the simple phrase that upon receiving his appointment the official “has received a proper instruction and has sworn on this the required oath”.⁷ ^{lxxix} Pieter Buijtenweg, process server and chenger of the common means in the town of Gouda was for instance convicted for not obeying his oath in 1751 and banished for twelve years from the province. While he knew that a certain Wouter Slappendeel was smuggling goods into the city, he did nothing about it. Indeed he even asked Slappendeel to provide some illegal meat for him and his wife. According to Gecommitteerde Raden, Buijtenweg “displayed enormous disloyalty for a sworn official, whose duty by oath it was to be vigilant against ‘froindes’ and contraventions”.⁸

An equally telling example of the importance of oath and instruction (and of not mixing public and private affairs!) can be found in the trial and verdict of Laurens van der Meer, main collector of excises on land reclamation, peat and coal in the city of Rotterdam. The accused admitted during his second interrogation by Gecommitteerde Raden⁹ that “he had taken the land’s money and that he knew this was not his to take for his own personal use or even to mix with his personal money”.^{lxxx} He had also used his son Roger instead of “the nations’ servants” to collect the excises. To Gecommitteerde Raden this was proof of his “excessive disloyalty and perjurious nature” and that “all his actions concerning the land’s business were evil and contrary to oath and duty [...]”.^{lxxxi} As a result Van der Meer was sentenced to “be whipped while a noose was around his neck, then branded and confined to a detention centre for twenty five years to earn his living with manual labour, after which he will be banished from the province for ever”.^{lxxxii} The aforementioned tells us that after 1748 increased attention was paid to seeing to it that good officials were neutral with regard to their ‘clients’ (i.e., citizens). Personal feelings and use of discretion (conniving, pardoning etc.) that had often been condoned in the past were now explicitly denounced. Furthermore, a good public official should be loyal and capable (whatever that specifically may have meant) and should not involve family in their work. Also, a good administrator should remain pure and incorruptible by following his instructions and oath and not mix personal finances with public office.

The characteristic of *adequate supply of means* (vi) is important as it relates directly to some kind of public-private distinction and the different things expected of public and private officials. This characteristic is somewhat problematic since tax collecting, both before and after 1748, was largely a mix of public and private elements. Prior to 1748, offices where taxes were collected (apart from small tollbooths at bridges, markets and city-gates) seem, for instance,

⁷ NL-HaNA, *Gecommitteerde Raden van de Staten van Holland en Westfriesland, 1621-1795* [*Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*], 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, folio [f.] 118.

⁸ *Ibid.*, inv.nr. 4076, f. 105-106.

⁹ *Ibid.*, inv.nr. 4077, f. 114-117.

not to have existed. Services provided by ‘policemen’ and subordinate collectors would, furthermore, have to be paid by the tax officials themselves. We can also safely assume that at least the tax farmers had to buy things like ‘office equipment’ with their own money. However, from 1748 onwards we can see a move towards supplying the now public tax officials with books and other materials. A decree in 1760, for instance, asked inspectors to provide the necessary equipment (*Instructie voor de hoofdbergers*, 1760, art. iv, art. xiv-xv, 17/04/1760). Since the new officials were expected to maintain their administration in an orderly fashion, the Estates ordered the use of a specific type of book in 1748 provided by the authorities. On the first page a clerk of the Office of the Common Means would write down the exact number of pages and sign off with his initials. The thread used to bind the book was then sealed at both ends with the coat of arms of the Province of Holland (*Instructie voor de collecteurs*, 1748, art. viii, 07/08/1748).^{lxxiii} The Estates thereby hoped to make it more difficult for tax collectors to take out pages, insert new ones or otherwise withhold or alter information. This implies an important change in the attitude of the Estates that they were serious about control and supervision. It also shows they accepted responsibility and regarded tax collecting as a provincial instead of a local (city) matter.

Just how seriously the Estates were about proper bookkeeping and using the official books becomes apparent from the conviction of Abraham van der Linden, main collector in the town of Heusden.¹⁰ Although his oath and instruction (see ii) were clear on these matters^{lxxiv}, Van der Linden had written down his collected taxes on separate sheets of paper instead of in the official ledger. This had caused him to be behind in his administration even though his supervisor had approached him several times to improve the situation. Van der Linden also seems to have tampered with the money as he appears to have borrowed public money to pay his personal debts. From the books it appears that he has received money but has not noted this down, “making it seem as though the money was never paid”.^{lxxv} Since Van der Linden had, however, signed every monthly statement to the supervisor with a “declaration to the oath to the land” he was now “forced to admit that he had lied and that these statements were false”.^{lxxvi} His punishment was being fired as main collector.

Although the private nature of tax collecting was increasingly rejected after 1748, some remnants still remained. Public tax collectors would still use private means to pay for certain things such as notary costs when accepting their office. Collectors would, as said, still use their own house as an office, even though they would now sometimes receive a lump sum of around 600 guilders for furniture and incidental compensation for peat and candles (i.e., heating and light) (Heringa, 1983: 89). However, after 1748 it was no longer needed to pay for services of local law enforcement or administrative subordinates. Even though this saved the collectors quite some money, it also meant that they were “no longer allowed to use government officials for private purposes” (*Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders*, 1759, art. xliii).^{lxxvii} Furthermore, all tax officials now received some form of salary from the authorities although this still entailed many private elements (to be discussed below). As we have seen tax officials were personally responsible for taking commercial risks before 1748. These risks were, however, also not completely eliminated after 1748. Public law enforcement officers would for example have to pay twice the amount of any unnecessary damages resulting from an arrest or property search with private money (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. xii).^{lxxviii} Tax officials would be held financially responsible in case of accepting false money, whether doing so knowingly or not (GPB, vol.

¹⁰ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 48.

VII, f. 1119, art. xxi). They were also still responsible for the “integrity of their cash registers”. Deficits at the end of the month, which could just as well be the result of citizens’ refusal to pay rather than embezzlement, would still have to be replenished by collectors’ private funds (*Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders*, 1759, art. xxix. See also GPB, vol. VII, f. 1010, art. xxv-xxviii; GPB, vol. VIII, f. 995, art. i, 10/02/1748).^{lxxix}

Even family members would sometimes be held financially accountable for any wrongdoings or deficits should the tax collector himself have passed away (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005-1010; cf. Wagenaar, 1997, 209-210). Several ordinances state regulations that wives of tax functionaries also had to sign an act of deposit in which they relinquished beforehand any inheritance that was (in case of fraud or mismanagement by their husbands) owed to the authorities (See GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005 – 1010, art. v, 22/07/1749).^{lxxx} The mix of public and private elements even after 1748 also becomes apparent from the fact that several tax collectors still received parts of fines as part of their salary (cf. Heringa, 1983: 86-89; Wagenaar, 2004: 557). In case of fraud, after public tax collecting was introduced, any plaintiff would receive two thirds of the fine. The remaining one third would be divided in two: one half for the person who had brought the offence into the open and one half for the poor house (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005 – 1010, art. v, 22/07/1749). Prosecutors, finally, could still choose to prosecute cases themselves, reaping either benefits when winning or suffering the risks when losing. They could also ask the Estates of Holland for financial backing but were then expected to pay a percentage of any winnings to the Estates in return for this ‘service’ (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005-1010, art. xxii-xxiii, 07/22/1749).

Good public officials were, interpreting the aforementioned, expected to work just as well at home and to take good care of their books and administration, both before and after 1748. Although I currently lack the evidence for a more detailed comparison, at least after 1748 good public officials were expected to make use of official materials supplied by the authorities. Furthermore, public tax officials should no longer pay law enforcement officials themselves, although some payment out of their own pockets would still be considered normal. The fact that they were still personally responsible for taking commercial risks was not completely abolished, showing how the authorities expected to ensure prudence, caution and responsibility from their employees. Private gain for public tax officials was only gradually stamped out as a motivator. As in the case of already discussed characteristics we do, however, see a gradual change in attitude. Although there were still private elements in public tax collecting after 1748 this did in fact decrease.

The seventh characteristic, *non-ownership of office* (vii), is also important in a moral sense. In part, it denotes whether a person owes allegiance to a superior or not and whether someone treats the office as their own possession or not. It relates directly to issues of accountability and responsibility. When looking at this characteristic before 1748 one again finds many complications. Before 1748 tax farmers technically did not own the office but only the right to collect excises for one year. On the other hand there were tax farmers who did in fact buy the office for longer periods of time (Scholten, 1999: 308, 310). Furthermore, no tax farmer was allowed to do whatever he wanted even though he had bought the rights attached to the office in the auction. They still had to abide by provincial rules, for instance by not employing *compositie* (see also GPB, vol. IV, f. 732, art. xvi, 20/06/1699). This practice entailed the settling of disputes among parties outside of court or legal procedures. Usually this was not allowed but it occurred quite often. Faber (1988: 255-260) noted how the term originally had a positive meaning, denoting reconciliation between parties without having to take recourse to expensive

and bothersome legal procedures. However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it got a more negative meaning denoting illegal buy-offs with which the public official would enrich himself. After 1748 composition would be punished more frequently but it was never abolished outright. In July 1749 the States, for example, ordered that collectors could not do it based on general ordinances unless they had permission to do it based on particular ordinances (GPB, vol. VII, art. vii, 22/07/1749).^{lxxxii} Similarly, a later instruction stated that collectors could not do it unless they had prior permission (*Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders*, 1759, art. xiii).^{lxxxiii} From this it becomes apparent that the relationship between tax farmers and official public authorities resembled a rather ambiguous and complicated ‘semi-private outsourcing’.

Given the fact that after 1748 there were less ‘private’ elements attached to the office of tax collector and that officials would now be appointed (see also xi), it becomes easier to assess whether office and person had indeed become more separated. Here too we see a mix of old and new as well as some confusion. It was still possible, for instance, for a tax collector to have a family member replace him in case of illness (*Instructie voor de collecteurs*, 1748, art. vii, 07/08/1748).^{lxxxiii} The fact that the authorities still had to adjust to new rules and procedures becomes clear from a statement by the Estates from September 1748 that this too was no longer allowed. The office now did become more separated from the person. In case of illness family members could no longer be employed. The supervisor had to provide a solution (GPB, Vol. VIII, f. 991, art. xvi).^{lxxxiv} Ownership of office, or at least a vague separation between the two, after 1748 also becomes apparent from the fact that successors sometimes paid a pension to their predecessors upon taking over the office. Sometimes, apparently, the office was really still considered a personal possession in part because people had invested their own money (Diederiks, 1977: 499).

Procedures of rational discipline and control (viii) also played an important role in attempts at reform. Prior to 1748 there appear to have been considerable regulations that prohibited hole-and-corner arrangements between, for example, tax farmers and officials or between tax farmers and taxpayers (GPB, Vol. IV, f. 732, art. xvi). If corrupt officials were caught, discipline was tough and could consist of banishment from the province and/or a lifelong ban on working as a tax official. Failure to report fraud or misconduct of a colleague to the city or regional collector would result in a fine of six hundred guilders (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. xx, 14/03/1701). If you did notify the proper authorities you could however receive 600 guilders and, had you been accessory to the fact you would even be exempted from any punishment (GPB, vol. IV, f. 732-734, art. xvi, 20/06/1699). After 1748, *compositie* was targeted with increased vigour by the authorities although it was still possible in specific circumstances (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005-1010, art. vii, 22/07/1749). See also *Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders*, 1759, art. xiii). The authorities considerably intensified their attempts to reduce fraud and abuse of office (at least on paper) after 1748. In several decrees public whipping, jail time, confiscation of possessions, banishment and a permanent ban on working in public office were again stated as punishment (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. iv-vi, x, 28/08/1749). The possibility to (anonymously) spill the beans on someone in return for money was maintained and reemphasized in 1760 and 1797 (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 991, art. iii. See also *Instructie voor 's lands bedienden*, 1797, art. vi).

Again I briefly restate some of the new, or at least reaffirmed, ethical or moral views implicit in these official formal-legal organizational changes. Both before and after 1748, a good public official should not make use of *compositie*, conniving or other kinds of hole-and-corner arrangements, except in some extraordinary and formally agreed upon instances. A

good public official was also expected to be loyal to the authorities first. It is also worth emphasizing that there were fines for active as well as passive official misconduct. In general it became increasingly unacceptable (in theory) after 1748 for tax officials to abuse their money, rank, and standing and influence to bully or extort taxpayers.

There are other Weberian characteristics that we use to determine both bureaucratization and new and/or more explicit standards of moral conduct for public tax officials. What are left are the characteristics of officials (*Weber's Bürokratische Verwaltungstab*). There is, for instance, the characteristic of *being appointed* (xi). Prior to 1748 tax farmers were appointed based on the size of their bid. They bought the right to collect for one year. Public tax officials before 1748 were overall appointed by the Provincial authorities although city magistrates often had an important say in the matter. After 1748, tax officials were all appointed by the Gecommitteerde Raden of Holland. Appointment was based on recommendations from supervisors and/or the town council. Either way, local magistrates still had a lot of influence in these matters (Heringa, 1983: 85). The Estates made a clear ethical stand in their attempt to limit this influence of local magistrates after 1748. The first article of the first decree concerning the new system of collection stated: “magistrates, regents or other persons can not denounce [as in appeal, protest, disapprove, TK] decisions regarding the levying of the common means”. Furthermore, it stated that regents “can not give their own interpretation or hinder [the process, TK] or even interfere in such matters, on penalty of being suspended for a year” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. i, 22/07/1749).^{lxxxv} However, we shall see in the case of Reijers and Vaster (see below), that this principle would not always apply.

Being knowledgeable and/or having expertise (xii) pertains to essential qualities, characteristics, background or skills public officials were supposed to possess. Tax officials and tax farmers alike should preferably be debt-free and frugal Calvinists (Scholten, 1999: 312- 313; Wagenaar, 1997: 90). Most tax officials and tax farmers also had to be able to read, write and calculate properly and all officials were tacitly assumed to know the different decrees and instructions regarding the common means. Collectors should also be “sober and capable men of honest behaviour and reputation.” (GPB, vol. VIII, art. i, 02/10/1748).^{lxxxvi} One instruction comes close to actively create a ‘service oriented’ state of mind among tax officials when it stated how public inspectors of weights and measures at the weighing-house were to be “decent people, over twenty five years old who should treat everyone with kindness, help people as quickly as possible and, above all, make sure citizens would not be delayed any longer than strictly necessary” (*Instructie en eed voor de ykers van de zoutmaten*, 1797, art. vii).^{lxxxvii}

Other expressed values were: being of good disposition; being flexible and amiable, being vigilant, honest, loyal and cautious (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. xii, 22/07/1749; Idem f. 1006, art. iii). Higher officials were often explicitly expected to have legal expertise. In the instruction of Vosmaer it was stated, for instance, that “he shall be an able and diligent person, of the true reformed religion, a born Dutchman, a legal scholar or skilled user of the law, especially experienced with the levying of excises on the common means” (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 1007, art. i, 11/06/1750).^{lxxxviii} Further requirements both before and after 1748 often dealt with reducing possible conflicts of interest and limiting single large concentrations of power. Provincial inspectors should, for instance, not be an interested party in any of the common means (*Instructie voor de inspecteurs*, 1751, art. i-ii. See also an earlier ordinance in GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036, art. I, 14/03/1701). Tax officials were not allowed to occupy the post of bailiff, sheriff or mayor. Nor could they be any other kind of legal magistrate (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. iv, 22/07/1749; GPB, vol. I, f. 1806; GPB, vol. IV, f. 728). At the same time knowledge of the

local community was considered a good asset for tax officials (Heringa, 1983: 86). We should note the obvious collision between having strong roots in the community and the desire to avoid conflicts of interest. This is, I believe, a strong indicator of how old and new ideas concerning correct public official behaviour were still very much at odds with each other.

Fulfilling ones office as a main or only job (xv) – i.e., were offices full-time or part-time? – is another bureaucratic characteristic with important moral ramifications. Diederiks (1977: 500) has written how most jobs regarding the common means in Amsterdam were full-time. Only rarely did it concern part-time jobs. Some subordinate tax collectors in rural areas would often have a main job as, for example, surgeon or teacher (Heringa, 1983: 86) but main tax collectors were not expected to have any other job on the side (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. iv, 22/07/1749).^{lxxxix} The same applied to higher offices such as those of Van Wesele (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1004, 22/08/1749, art. ii)^{xc} or Vosmaer (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 1007, art. ii-iii, 11/06/1750). As lower officials (such as clerks) could apparently have more than one job (Heringa, 1983: 99) we might be able to say that it was more allowed to have additional offices the lower one got in the hierarchy.

As the eighteenth century progressed authorities increasingly acknowledged the importance of *being rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money* (xvii). Before 1748, tax farmers and their staff obviously did not receive any salary. They were paid based on what they collected. Before 1748, higher ‘public’ officials such as collectors and inspectors did sometimes get a fixed salary but this was almost always supplemented with ad-hoc payments or emoluments and salaries depended on the amount of revenue that was brought in (GPB, vol. IV f. 1968, 30/07/1711). After 1748, a fundamental change was that fixed salaries would now (slowly) become the norm, although often still mixed with payments in percentages of proceeds (Heringa, 1983: 86) and usually differing from city to city (cf. Diederiks, 1977: 492; Heringa, 1983: 86-89). A transition to truly fixed salaries for all tax officials, of course, did not happen overnight. Main and minor tax collectors appear to have been in some kind of transition period after 1748, since a part of their income was still derived from fines. However, on average main collectors would receive somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 guilders a year and supervisors would receive around 1,000 guilders in 1750 but already 1,800 guilders around 1760 because their work was initially underestimated but soon proved to be a lot harder and more time consuming. Inspectors would receive money to cover their travel expenses (Heringa, 1983: 86-90). Despite this transition period, the idea of a fixed salary did start to gain ground and was a major shift in attitude from roughly 1748 onwards. According to several instructions for various officials the idea behind fixed salaries was most of all that it would keep officials from accepting gifts or bribes (*Instructie voor de opsienders* 1760, art. lxy, 04/04/1760).

Standard public salaries instead of diverse emoluments or ad-hoc rewards were regarded as a means to curb political corruption and bribery and keep officials in check. After 1748 the Estates of Holland wrote that “now everyone is rewarded based on their qualities in a reasonable fashion” and that “because the collectors are, in fact, to be considered receivers of money owed to the treasury of the common land [...] each shall have to be fairly rewarded based on his quality and condition by the common land [...] which is of course more natural, fair and consistent with the nature of things than using parts of fines to that end” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1020, art. xxii-xxiii).^{xcii} The Estates argued how a salary (instead of emoluments or premiums) was meant to end accepting any gifts (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1020, art. xlv). With regard to pensions (as part of a salary) one can be brief. These were rare. Only very high public

officials like the Grand Pensionary of the Estates would receive a lump sum when retiring (GPB, vol. VII, f. 128, 05/07/1749). Lower officials seem not to have had such benefits and should instead rely on savings or family. Still there have been cases in which successors of tax officials would have to yield a certain amount of their income to their predecessor (Diederiks, 1977: 499). Again, aforementioned regulations show a blurred boundary between old and new and/or public and private elements. Paying a pension to a predecessor who had apparently invested his own money in the office signals how the office was at least partly considered to be personal. Also, personal economic gain was not ruled out as a motivator since payment by percentage of the proceeds was still common after 1748. However, paying salaries at all does tell us that the Estates gradually came to have a different perception of its officials, how they should be rewarded and how they should act. Most importantly salaries also became a way on controlling the actions of public officials: receiving a salary obligated tax officials to act in a non-corrupt way.

Applying a final bureaucratic characteristic, we can see that after 1748 tax officials increasingly came to *work under formal protection of their office* (xx). Before 1748, the authorities did their best to emphasize the public nature of the work of the (private) tax officials. In protests and riots before 1748 the Estates already often explicitly stated that all officials were under the formal protection of the Provincial authorities (cf. GPB, vol. VI, f. 879, 14/05/1727. See also GPB, vol. I, f. 2250; GPB, vol. IV, f. 723, f. 1169; GPB, vol. VI, f. 606, f. 743, f. 874, f. 875, f. 877, f. 879 and f. 888).^{xcii} Warnings not to harm tax officials would however become more frequent and explicit in 1748 (GPB, vol. VII, f. 825, 21/06/1747; GPB, vol. VII, f. 830, 12/06/1748; GPB, vol. VII, f. 835, 22/06/1748). The authorities would react more severely to violence directed against ‘their’ officials as the riots of 1748 progressed (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1221, art. xv; GPB, vol. VIII, f. 575). Some of the main culprits of the violence against tax farmers in Amsterdam in the 1748 riots were, for example, executed by hanging them from the beams of the Amsterdam weighing-house on Dam Square.

The tone of the Estates speaks volumes when they announce in August 1749 that any violence against tax officials, collectors and their assistants is punishable by death. After all, the Estates wrote: “it concerns people who work for the country and support its finances based on oath and duty (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1221, art. xv. Compare also Diederiks 1977, footnote 3).^{xciii} When a crowd gathered on 13 September 1758 to drive out two tax collectors from the town of Aarlanderveen by throwing sand and rocks at them the Estates reacted by stating that “all offences and violence committed against the Estates’ servants shall be considered as violence against the Estates themselves” (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 575).^{xciv} Such statements show how tax collectors were now truly being considered as government employees by the authorities (compare Scholten, 1999: 316-317) which was quite a radical change from before. The fact that the Estates increasingly considered tax officials as ‘one of their own’ and as true extensions of their power was, I believe, essentially a solution to early modern problems of legitimacy of public administration. The Estates no longer accepted any conflict between private businessmen making personal profit while their duties were based upon public authority and their office fell under the protection of the Estates. Having public officials would place the legitimacy of tax collecting beyond any doubt.

In the previous I provided empirical evidence of the link between changes in the system of taxation, bureaucratization and changing public values as it (mainly) becomes apparent from new bureaucratic regulations. In the following these findings are connected to scandals involving corrupt behaviour of tax officials. I describe what went wrong, how different sources

of values judged matters, what public values can be distinguished and what was apparently corrupt or reprehensible behaviour for public officials at the time in the context of the bureaucratic changes discussed earlier. This essentially serves to assess just how much new rules, assumptions and values were enforced and/or discussed in actual practice. It also serves to include views from the other sources of values.

6.4 Cases of political corruption

In chapter three I discussed some of the difficulties inherent in taking a methodological approach based on examining, juxtaposing and comparing multiple sources of values. One major downside was that cases often lack one or more sources. Also, some sources might be less salient than others. Hardly ever, in other words, do we find all sources represented in an equal fashion in a single case at the same time. For this reason multiple instances of political corruption are discussed in the following to allow for a varied view on different sources of values. Of course, all instances of political corruption belong to the sphere of taxation. The first case provides only a limited view on public values from legal sources. At the same time it has much public opinion and can strongly be linked to best-opinion (and wider social-political events of the time) too. The second case has more legal (bureaucratic) and shop floor codes, taken from official sentencing and interrogations of suspects. Following the cases I will consider just how much of the link between discussed bureaucratic characteristics and moral reforms we can see in these scandals, which public values can be found and how to assess change and continuity.

Pieter Reijers and Frederik Vaster

In June 1751 Pieter Reijers, main tax collector of the wines, and Frederik Vaster, supervisor of the tax collecting of the wines in Amsterdam, made a bad decision. Both men knocked on the Amsterdam town council's door to recover losses they had supposedly suffered at the hands of a certain aldermen of the local court. The alderman, they claimed, had not handed in a tax note provided by Reijers for the purchase of some wine and had, therefore, not paid his taxes. While the action of Reijers and Vaster was lawful and indeed fitted well with the new bureaucratic regulations regarding taxation (cf. GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. I, 22/07/1749), the authorities were not amused with such a brute treatment of regents by (lowly?) tax officials. With their complaint Reijers and Vaster seem to have disregarded an unwritten rule that regents should be left alone if at all possible. On 26 June 1751 the Amsterdam aldermen-commissioners wrote a letter to Gecommitteerde Raden¹¹ in which they spoke of the indiscrete, indecent and disrespectful actions of Reijers and Vaster. They requested Gecommitteerde Raden to interrogate both men for their disloyalty and asked for a full account of these interrogations.^{xcv} It followed on 8 July 1751¹² and states that Reijers and Vaster apologized in an elaborate way, vowing to have been unaware of any indecent action and stating never having meant to behave in any such way.^{xcvi} Furthermore, they were prepared to state the same to the Amsterdam aldermen-commissioners and the specific alderman in question if they were

¹¹ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 3103, f. 1388, 26/06/1751.

¹² *Ibid.*, f. 1447, 08/07/1751.

allowed to do so and hoped that would be sufficient.^{xcvii} In a reply to Gecommitteerde Raden the aggrieved commissioners stated they believed the response by Vaster and Reijers had been credible but at the same time they argued that Vaster and Reijers were too unequal persons to be judged in the same way.^{xcviii} As a result they chose to accept the apology of Vaster (the higher ranked supervisor) but not that of Reijers (the lower ranked collector) and Gecommitteerde Raden agreed. Reijers was subsequently fired while Vaster would be allowed to stay in office until 1757.¹³ Interesting, of course, is that such class justice was the opposite of Weber's equality of administrators. Here, perhaps, we find an example of mixing old and new ways of doing things.

More public values from legal sources

Pieter Reijers, undoubtedly distressed by this outcome, then made a bold move. He fled Amsterdam with a supposedly large sum of collected tax money. As far as the available sources can tell us, Reijers was never caught. He did not show up at his trial and was therefore sentenced *in absentia* and banned for life from the province.¹⁴ The verdict does not speak of any stolen money (probably because a motivation by the judge(s) of a verdict was not obligated and therefore usually not present in the files), but Reijers was ordered to pay the costs of his trial. Bicker Raye (1963: 195), an Amsterdam regent who kept a detailed journal of events in Amsterdam during his lifetime, furthermore writes that the parents of Reijers were forced to pay a certain amount to the Estates of Holland (and were supposedly ruined because of it). Perhaps they were made to pay the costs of the trial since Reijers himself had vanished. In any case, the fact that the parents were held financially responsible for the actions of their son seems to denote some sense of ownership of office or at least personal, individual *and* family responsibility for a public office.

Public values from public opinion sources

Apart from the brief court verdict, there were various other sources at the time that were quick to condemn Reijers and, to a lesser degree, Vaster. Authors of several pamphlets uttered their dismay at so much disloyalty and thieving, committed by people who were responsible for collecting their tax money. Images and short verses appeared in which both men were mocked and scolded, for instance calling Reijers a coward and a villain (*De Cerberus*, 1751: 10).^{xcix} A satire directed at Reijers and Vaster (and tax collectors in general) laments that the high and mighty always protect each other and always get away with anything by means of bribery and use of connections to the detriment of the land and its citizens. The author complains that Reijers will probably soon get some high office again (*De Cerberus*, 1751: appendix)^c, perhaps even at court. He also marks the obvious futility of the oath taken by Reijers and other tax collectors and notes their hypocrisy as they continuously profiteer and line their pockets when he writes: “alright gentlemen, now swear your oath, swear you sweat, blood and bile, swear you will not steal a dime but all the while fill your skinny bellies”.^{ci} Another pamphlet consisted of an imaginary letter from Reijers to his mother, while running from the law. As a new horse is

¹³ Stadsarchief Amsterdam [NL-AsdSAA], accessnumber 5031: *Archief van de Burgemeesters: stukken betreffende ambten en officiën, 1413 – 1859*, inv. nr. 109, f. 1.

¹⁴ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4074, f. 124, 29/07/1752.

supposedly saddled up at some roadside inn, Reyers is made to reflect. “Sometimes”, the letter states, “I am overcome with thousands of thoughts due to my lies and false oaths, and then I think of the state of mankind which comforts me. While we are all more or less sinners, he who is less so is most happy; the secret crimes that I have committed against the heavens, press hardest on me”. The imaginary letter then has him continue with saying that “stealing from the lands’ cash register is the least of my crimes, it is my bad upbringing that has made me incapable to be honest” (*Coppe van een merkwaardige missive*, 1751)^{cii} Then the letter gets to the heart of the matter as it reads how Reijers has never been fit to hold such an important office in the first place. Whereas everywhere in Europe, state servants are of such virtue and nobility, Reijers is – according to the pamphlet – only of low birth and lacks morals as well as education. And how could it be otherwise, the letter states, with a mother who (apparently) sold cooked eel on the streets.^{ciii}

Pieter Reijers quickly seems to have become a symbol for the fraudulent, thieving and greedy tax official. He is also attributed a distinct role in the political quarrels of the time as he appears in an image alongside Daniel Raap, a porcelain salesman and former Doelist leader in Amsterdam. Raap had been a confidant of William IV in the hey days of the Doelist revolt of 1748. However, with the failure of the Doelist movement he had fallen from grace and had become the symbol of its failure instead (cf. Beerinck & De Boer, 1963: 222-226). In the image, Reijers and some other (unknown) fraudulent tax collector are already at the gallows waiting for Raap to arrive (Breen, 1934: 299). The (imaginary) link in some of the media between Reijers (symbol of fraudulent tax collectors) and Raap (symbol of failed Doelist reform movement) is interesting. It demonstrates how accusations and ‘discussions’ of political corruption by tax officials were explicitly tied to the main social-political events of the time. According to popular opinion, corruption by tax officials could still continue precisely because of the failed Doelist reforms. Whereas men like Reijers (and Vaster, see below) initially appear to have been the victims of a kind of class justice for actually speaking out against a corrupt (or at least negligent) alderman they were turned into examples and warnings of what happened as a consequence of a failed Doelist reform movement. A pamphlet from 1751 provides a final interesting example of this. Now, Vaster and Raap are presented as imposters who pretend to serve the common good but only serve their own interests.^{civ} They deceived the people and mocked all that is holy, forgot their oath and duty and even dared to claim that it was all the fault of William IV, they abused his name for their own profit.^{cv} All their promises were only meant to deceive, to provide false hope and to keep up appearances (*Advertentie*, 1751).^{cvi}

Other tax functionaries were soon caught up in the public fray surrounding the scandal. Henricus Wachloo, main collector of the excises on butter in Amsterdam, was accused of having acquired his office from Raap, in return for a handsome sum of money and his support for Raap and the Doelist movement. On 2 November 1751, Wachloo is sentenced *in absentia* to banishment for life from the province.¹⁵ Although Gecommitteerde Raden (again) do not discuss the crimes in detail, there was never a shortage of pamphlets. A letter (*Brief van Henricus Wachloo*, 1751), supposedly written by Wachloo, is circulated in which he admits that while he was a wine tradesman “he had always been able to lead a quiet and advantageous existence by means of smuggling”. He also (supposedly) describes how Raap had seduced him to take an office (as main tax collector of excises on butter) that was in fact too risky (i.e., too costly) for Wachloo. According to Wachloo, Raap had told him he would give him an office worth four

¹⁵ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4074, f. 112, 02/11/1751.

thousand guilders [...] saying “I will protect you, I have enough friends at court and this the whole world knows”. Instead, Wachloo had been haunted by debt ever since he took the job (perhaps because of a deposit he still had to pay to the Province or because he was bad at tax collecting..) and had to take money from the collected taxes to stay in business. Wachloo curses himself for having taken Raap’s offer. He declared he had never intended to steal but had only borrowed money until one of his old cousins would die. He had then intended to use his inheritance to make up for the missing funds!^{cvi} Wachloo then points his anger at Raap and curses him for having approached him. “If only the judge would know”, Wachloo writes, “that you [Raap, TK] and your accomplices sold offices for money, your fate will surely be worse than mine”.^{cvii} Reijers is mentioned too: “Why is my colleague Reijers, a.k.a. pretty Pete (known as such by all the whores and strumpets) so forcefully protected, when everyone knows how he manages to keep a family, a whole array of whores and a mistress [...] for everyone knows that he had lots of debts when he started collecting”.^{cix}

Andries Mallan, another former Doelist agitator (from Rotterdam) and afterwards main tax collector of the excises on peat and coal in The Hague, was also publicly targeted and linked to Reijers, Wachloo and others (see below). In one pamphlet Mallan is portrayed as a fraud and a thief who used his position in the Doelist movement to acquire a lucrative office as main collector in the new tax organization. In a pamphlet dripping with sarcasm, Mallan supposedly writes: “I acquired through this and other dashing actions [as a Doelist, TK] the title of Patriot and because of this my sober countenance and dress came to be regarded by some as half and by others as three quarters divine. So it was in that time that I finally came to acquire the honourable position of collector of peat and coal for The Hague [...] in which I was so competent that in the first year I managed to borrow two thousand guilders from the communal coffers (to somewhat improve my sober appearance). By providing false monthly statements I managed to get as far ahead in life that I was publicly sentenced for being perjurious, without honour and shameful “ (*De Cerberus*, 1751).^{cx} The pamphleteers’ accusations were at least partly true as Mallan has indeed been sentenced by Gecommitteerde Raden for breaking his oath and instruction and having stolen 2,024 guilders from the Provincial coffers. At his trial – at which Mallan indeed appeared¹⁶ – he confessed that he had in fact taken an oath and also did not deny having received a clear instruction.^{cxii} As such he acknowledged that he had promised to report all incoming revenues to the supervisor. To Gecommitteerde Raden this was enough for a guilty verdict. Since, upon checking his books, Mallan proved to be short the 2,024 guilders, Gecommitteerde Raden concluded he must have taken this money “for his own use or that of his family”.^{cxiii} Mallan did not deny the charges but defended himself by saying that “necessity has led me to use some of the nations’ money for myself and my family, but I always intended to give it back.”^{cxiiii} Despite Mallan’s confession Gecommitteerde Raden blame him for “severe negligence, together with perjury, falsity and thievery which can not be tolerated in a land of justice but should be punished if only to let it be an example for others”.^{cxv} The verdict then read that Mallan was to be banished from the province for the rest of his life.^{cxvi}

Other public opinion pamphlets connected various aforementioned actors in the scandal as well. One of them presents Reijers, Wachloo and Mallan as the three heads of *Cerberus*. The author wants “to report on the many sinister, base and villainous acts and foul deceit of the collectors of the taxes” and wishes to disclose the “godless behaviour of the three bandits

¹⁶ See NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1752 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4076, f. 102.

or refugees [Mallan, Wachloo and Reijers, TK]” to provide a proper account of the Doelisten “and other colleagues of these thieves of the country”. This should be enough “to arrange the collection of the countries’ common means in a better way” and to do something against “the enormously villainous acts committed by these false patriots [the Doelists, TK] to the detriment of the common good” (*De Cerberus*, 1751: 3-4).^{cxvi} In an imagined conversation between the three heads of *Cerberus*, Wachloo and Mallan want Reijers to share the loot. Reijers, however, refuses and says he will use the money for himself as soon as his mother clears his problems and settles his debts. He will then return to Amsterdam to go to his beloved ladies of pleasure, to act once again like a ‘dandy’^{cxvii}, throwing his money (and that of his fathers’ pension) about.^{cxviii} The pamphlet’s (anonymous) author wants to sling as much dirt as possible. Reijers has supposedly taken six thousand from the provincial coffers to buy presents for his girlfriend. He is (like Wachloo and Mallan) also accused of having acquired his office as main collector by paying for Raap’s support.

Jacobus Cras and Jacob Nolla

Jacobus Cras was a supervisor of “the countries’ sealed and unsealed tax notes in Leiden” from 4 December 1749 to 6 August 1756.¹⁷ He was one of the new high-ranking public officials instated after the changes in the tax system of 1748. As supervisor Cras was responsible for the supervision and control of all main and lower tax collectors and local investigators in Leiden (at the time the third largest city of Holland). He was also responsible for handing out tax notes to the main collectors. The important role officials such as Cras had in the new public system of collecting meant they were always in the thick of it once problems occurred and this would often be the case in the early days of the new system: the new rules were vague, people were unsure what to do or expect and old ways still lingered on. Such elements can all be seen in a case leading to a considerable scandal involving Jacobus Cras and other tax officials – concerning events that had happened since 1747 – when Cras was convicted in 1756 by Gecommitteerde Raden for several offences in the execution of their duties.

One of the main collectors Cras was supposed to supervise and inspect was Jacob Nolla, main collector of the taxes on quite a few common means such as cows, horses, servants (a tax based on the number of servants one had) and general wealth (an early form of property and income tax), tobacco, coffee, tea and ferry fares in Leiden and some surrounding villages. Nolla had been in office since 1747 and was therefore one of those allowed to stay after the tax riots. He remained in office until his death in 1756 after which it was soon revealed that there were many problems and discrepancies in his administration. Investigations by Gecommitteerde Raden into Nolla’s books showed he had taken quite some ‘accountancy liberties’. It appeared that by the time of his death Nolla had a deficit of 17,000 guilders. The investigations soon led to Cras (who was after all Nolla’s supervisor) and Cras’ books showed Nolla only had a deficit of 4,000 guilders. The Estates found that Cras had violated the rules of his instructions that obligated him to “accurately supervise whether the main and other collectors kept their administration in proper order”.^{cxix} Second, Cras had obviously made some grave ‘accounting mistakes’ himself when dealing with Nolla’s books and settling his accounts after he had died. How else, after all, did his books reflect a deficit of only 4,000 instead of 17,000 guilders?

¹⁷ NL-HaNA, *Collectieve Middelen Zuiderkwartier Holland*, 3.01.41, inv. nr. 1226, f. 1.

Public values from legal sources

Nolla could, due to his death, no longer be punished or prosecuted for his actions (even though his widow and children had to sell everything they owned to repay as much of his debt to the province as they could).¹⁸ However, Cras was accused of bad supervision as well as bad accounting which were both regarded as offences against his instruction and oath. In his response before Gecommitteerde Raden¹⁹ Cras admitted he had not noticed the ‘liberties’ taken by Nolla over the years because he had not gone through the latter’s books as he should have. He also admitted having written to Gecommitteerde Raden right after Nolla’s death that all things were indeed in order (even though they had clearly not been!) and that the office had been run properly (which it had not!), also during Nolla’s illness.^{cxv} When Gecommitteerde Raden asked Cras during the trial to comment on these false statements and Nolla’s deficit, Cras had to admit how “such had not been possible had he obeyed the proper order to prevent such disloyal acts”. He also stated that his negligent behaviour as supervisor “is the cause of the great loss now suffered by the common land”.^{cxvi} Cras thus takes the blame for bad supervision and negligence but denies any criminal intent. This statement might be supported by the fact that in their verdict the Estates do not speak of him actually stealing any money for himself (cf. Heringa, 1983: 98).

During the course of the Estates’ investigations, however, more of Cras’ activities were brought to light on top of his bad supervision and bad accounting. It turned out that Cras had also been involved in earlier dealings with Nolla. Nolla had been a butcher before becoming a tax farmer, together with J. Ockhuysen (one of the tax farmers affected by the 1748 riots, see earlier), of the excise on meat in 1747. After becoming tax farmer and, in 1749, main tax collector, his son Jan Nolla had taken over the butcher shop. As we have seen, this happened because collectors (like tax farmers before them) were not allowed to have any business links with the common means for which they collected excises.²⁰ Even though the shop was now officially owned by the son, father Jacob still had an (indirect) interest in it. As such he provided meat to Cras between 1751 and 1753. Cras seems not to have been too eager or quick about paying Nolla for the meat. He told Gecommitteerde Raden, however, that he eventually gave Nolla an ‘I owe you’ worth 600 guilders promising to pay this amount in four instalments. Nolla died before the debt was paid and the obligation went “to a certain grocer in Leiden”. Cras did not know whether the obligation had been transferred to this grocer before or after Nolla’s death.²¹

In what appears to be a rare case of legal openness, Gecommitteerde Raden provide a basis for their verdict as they pointed to a resolution of 1749 (repeated on 31 October 1753) which stated that higher public officials are in no way allowed to borrow or provide money or credit to lower ranked (subordinate) officials.²² In violating this resolution, Cras was guilty of having had a conflict of interest and of abusing his superior position for financial gain. The conclusion of the Estates was that “all this is highly damaging and disadvantageous to the

¹⁸ Regionaal Archief Leiden [NL-LdnRAL], *Schepenbank* (Oud Rechterlijk Archief [ORA]), accessnumber 508, inv. nr. 50jj, f. 156, 15/12/1757.

¹⁹ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 33-35, 25/08/1756.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, inv.nr. 3099, f. 848, 29/11/1749, article [art.] 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, inv.nr. 4077, f. 34, 25/08/1756.

²² *Ibid.*, inv.nr. 3099, f. 861-867, 01/12/1749.

common land and its finances [...] such acts should be punished without connivance as an example to prevent such things in the future, especially when it concerns a supervisor”.²³ Gecommitteerde Raden were thus determined to make an example out of Cras possibly to boost people’s confidence in the new system of public collecting. His job had been, after all, precisely to prevent or stop the kind of political corruption he had hidden from view and participated in himself. Class justice (as had been the case with Reijers and Vaster, see earlier) seems not to have been an option and Cras was declared ‘incompetent’ and sentenced to “repay the damages inflicted upon the country”.^{cxxiii} If he did not or could not comply he would be banished from the province for life. Unfortunately, the records are unclear about the actual punishment but it seems likely Cras indeed paid some amount of money. An interesting further stipulation by the aldermen-commissioners of Leiden on 8 November 1756 however orders Cras to pay his creditors.²⁴ A list of creditors was eventually presented to Cras by the aldermen-commissioners on 12 July 1757. From the list it becomes apparent that Cras had a total remaining debt of almost two thousand guilders, to be divided over no less than nineteen creditors. Among the creditors are also several tax collectors of various common means, the Bailiff Van Alkemade and a large number of grocers. Apparently, Cras had purchased more than just meat on credit.²⁵

Even though Cras had been sentenced, the case was far from over. Several lower assistants of Cras (and Nolla) had been directly or indirectly involved in the uncovered mess. Even a supervisor and main tax collector were in a way aided and/or checked by such officials as bookkeepers, accountants and chergers. These lower public officials were to be scrutinized just as well. As such this provides some interesting cases of corruption of some lower officials in the new tax system. Among the employees of Nolla we find a certain Jan Andries Pelmeer, chergers and process server in Leiden and assistant of Nolla. Pelmeer had been assigned by Cras to Nolla’s office from 1754 onwards apparently as a part of emergency measures to alleviate some of Nolla’s burdens. Pelmeer, ordered to appear before Gecommitteerde Raden and declared that he never signed Nolla’s monthly statements but that he “did know and has also seen from the cash register books that every month collector Nolla reported less money than he received according to the cash register”.^{cxxiii} Pelmeer was convicted by Gecommitteerde Raden²⁶ because of his failure to report the political corruption of Nolla, “all of which are affairs with dangerous consequences that can not be tolerated from a servant of the common land”.^{cxxiv} Pelmeer was not banished but was fired and was no longer allowed to hold a similar office. He also had to pay for the costs of his trial.

Another employee at Nolla’s office was Pieter Ramak, a higher ranked assistant than Pelmeer who also knew things were wrong. Perhaps because of his higher rank, Gecommitteerde Raden were tougher on Ramak than they were on Pelmeer. They convicted Ramak²⁷ on the basis of having violated his oath of office and his instruction. These had, after all, obligated him “to tell Gecommitteerde Raden of any disloyalty or wrongdoing on the part of the collector should he find out, and therefore Gecommitteerde Raden can not but conclude that since he knew but did not speak of the discovered disloyalty, he had to be seen as an accomplice”.^{cxxv} Furthermore, he had failed to always behave with loyalty and diligence.^{cxxvi} From the

²³ Ibid., inv.nr. 4077, f. 35, 25/08/1756.

²⁴ NL-LdnRAL, ORA Leiden, 508, inv. nr. 50jj, f. 148, 08/11/1756.

²⁵ Ibid., inv. nr. 52+4A, f. 169-172, 02/07/1757.

²⁶ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 37.

²⁷ Ibid., inv.nr. 3099, f. 870-872.

court proceedings it had indeed become clear that Ramak knew of Nolla's malversations and even of Cras' negligence. Furthermore, Cras was himself guilty of political corruption according to Ramak. Ramak testified²⁸ that he had signed "all the monthly statements since 1751, and it is known to him that there was a certain sum of money missing every month, and that he has to confess that he did not follow his instruction, and that the collector Nolla ordered him to do so and forced him, and that supervisor Cras inspected the books several times but never mentioned anything to him [either Nolla or Ramak, TK]".^{cxxvii}

Ramak also testified that he had been ignorant of the exact workings of the embezzlement and that although he had seen things he had not understood much of it.^{cxxviii} Ramak seems to have been stuck between two 'corrupt' bosses, unable to do anything about it and was perhaps also ignorant of the reward he could get upon selling both Nolla and Cras out. He was also, possibly, hampered by a lack of proper education or knowledge of the workings of the new system. This was something many of his colleagues most likely had to deal with as well because of the increased technical and organizational complexity of the system and the sheer quantity of new rules and regulations combined with inherent problems of starting something new. Most collectors simply did not understand the new regulations (Heringa, 1983, 93-99). This was even more the case for lower and less educated officials charged with maintaining local order. These problems soon became apparent from the rounds of the inspectors of the Office of the Common Means from 1750 onwards which forced the Estates of Holland to come up with special regulations for "servants charged with countering smuggling and other offences with regard to the common means", restated in 1758 (with extra instructions), in 1760 and in 1797 (*Instructie voor 's lands bedienden*, 1797, art. ii).^{cxxix} Despite any such potentially mitigating circumstances, Ramak was sentenced to six years banishment from the province, was forever barred from having a public office and had to pay the costs of his trial.

6.5 Analysis and concluding remarks

In chapter three I outlined the basic elements and structure of the concluding sections to each case study. In the following I will therefore deal with a brief discussion of the public values and value statements found in the case and provide a comparison between the various sources of values. Finally, I will address questions of change and continuity of public values, mainly in the context of bureaucratization.

Public values and value statements in the case

The cases of Reijers, Vaster, Cras and others offer many public values and value statements with which public official behaviour was either condemned or supported. This allows us to find out what was considered corrupt at the time. Crucial values and value statements mostly included those linked to bureaucratization, such as keeping one's books in good order, being neutral towards citizens, keeping one's oath and instruction and holding regular office hours. In fact, as the previous discussion has shown, interest in each characteristic of bureaucratization was in itself often an implicit value statement and/or guide for proper behaviour. Behind many of the characteristics of bureaucratization we find implicit but

²⁸ NL-HaNA, *Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden*, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 36.

nonetheless fundamental ‘new’ or reemphasized public values such as having expertise (knowledge of the new rules), being neutral (avoid conflicts of interest, avoid having multiple jobs at the same time), act with legitimacy (with tax collecting now being a public affair), accountability (towards the province or city instead of friends and/or family) and honesty (do not break oath and instruction). The demand for loyalty toward the authorities instead of one’s colleagues was clearly going against the old and widespread collegial and shop floor way of doing things. Values such as caution and prudence when performing your public duty were reemphasized. The same goes for values such as continuity, regularity, uniformity, adhering to formal rules and procedures (oaths and instructions), hierarchical organization (rank is important in sentencing), use of written documents (keeping a proper administration) and procedures of discipline and control (being vigilant, prosecute offenders).

Comparing sources of values

The cases presented in this chapter have been viewed from a variety of sources of public values. A comparison helps to answer some fundamental questions having to do with how any value change worked. Differences and similarities between the sources and various ways of phrasing helps to decrease the ambiguity of particular values and sources of values. It also helps to explain possible transitions from ‘old’ to ‘new’ or value dynamics. Unfortunately, formal legal codes are largely absent in the cases surrounding Reijers and Vaster because the accused failed to show up in court and because the court was often not inclined to provide any elaborate motivation for a verdict or a discussion of what had precisely gone wrong. Still, Gecommitteerde Raden had a reasonably clear and certainly interesting view on matters. In their verdict they agreed with the views held by the aldermen-commissioners. In doing so they adopted the same line of argument, that there had indeed been indecent, indiscrete and disrespectful behaviour.^{cxv} Gecommitteerde Raden seemed to make what are essentially shop floor codes of disgruntled or offended aldermen (see shop floor codes later on) into legal codes. While they should have commended Reijers and Vaster for their attempts to hold an alderman accountable for not paying his taxes on time, they chose to fire Reijers and rebuke Vaster. Gecommitteerde Raden argued that Reijers and Vaster were too unequal to be punished in the same way. In punishing both men differently, they therefore seemed to have also neglected an important bureaucratic characteristic. Similarly they seemed to have interpreted the new laws rather interestingly when dealing with Reijers after he had stolen the money and fled the city.

Gecommitteerde Raden could of course do little else than give a guilty verdict in the case of Reijers. Not much else needed or could be said since Reijers had already fled the city. However, in making his family pay for Reijers’ crimes Gecommitteerde Raden seem to have denied any (bureaucratic) separation between office and official. If Reijers was truly considered a public official and the risks of his work were indeed thought of as being for the province, it seems odd that the parents (his mother at least) were driven to bankruptcy because of the acts of the son. The punishment of the lower official Andries Mallan provides some more public values as expressed in legal codes. Gecommitteerde Raden convicted Mallan for breaking his oath and instruction and blamed him for having taken (public) money for his own (private) benefit. They also blame him for neglecting his duties, perjuring himself, being false and thieving.

The legal codes in the cases of Cras and others are more elaborate and better traceable to several bureaucratic characteristics. This is most likely due to the different nature of the case but can also be due to the new system having been in place for a little bit longer. In the roughly five years between the case of Reijers and Vaster and the case of Cras and others, people are likely to have become more accustomed to the new system. In either case, the legal codes in these instances are characterized by much attention for detail and bureaucratic regulations. Just like in the case of Reijers and others, one need not look for any sweeping statements or pleas from the court on how their officials should behave. Still, many public values and assumptions of proper public behaviour are mentioned. Judgement, verdict and punishment in Cras' case seem to have been based firmly on legal sources and bureaucratic principles and arguments. Instructions, oaths of office and official proclamations regarding tax collecting (i.e., bureaucratic characteristics) provide the court with enough ammunition to convict and sentence corrupt tax officials.

Often recurring is also, for instance, the public value of loyalty, sometimes towards ones' superior official but mostly towards the Provincial Estates or the 'common land'. We also see many other legal-bureaucratic ('Weberian') values such as upholding promises made in oath and instruction. Cras was condemned because he had violated oath and instruction in which he had promised to supervise well and keep the books in good order. His corruption also consisted of having had improper financial relations (a clear conflict of interest) with a subordinate (Nolla) and having therefore abused his office for personal gain. From Cras' conviction it therefore becomes apparent that the Gecommitteerde Raden attributed much importance to values of accuracy and precision in maintaining one's administration or books in a proper way. Likewise, lower officials Pelmeer and Ramak were convicted because they failed to meet the bureaucratic principles inherent in their oath and instruction. Gecommitteerde Raden blamed Pelmeer and Ramak for their failure to report on Cras and/or Nolla. They were accused of not being loyal, diligent, resolute or vigilant enough in tracking down offenders. What was *not* mentioned also provides interesting information in the case of Cras and others. It becomes apparent from the court files that the legal codes were hardly bothered with harm done by corrupt tax officials to individual citizens or even citizens as a group. While the reasons for changing the system were moral in nature and directly related to citizens being harmed by wrong behaviour (i.e., preventing political corruption and the abuse of office harmful to citizens) these reasons can not be found in the court files examined here even though damages done to the common land or the country is mentioned quite a lot. This usually meant the city or province and seems to denote an important emphasis on some kind of common good that is harmed. Stealing common revenues means stealing money that is (in theory at least) supposed to be for common things.

One can find more information on what was corrupt and which public values there were in the instances involving Reijers, Vaster and others from public opinion sources. As is to be expected from this source of values there is a lot of attention for the broader (political-social, economic) circumstances. In public opinion we can find long tirades against the immoral behaviour of the public officials involved. We also see a mix of fact and fiction. This is not surprising as the public must have been largely unaware of the actual course of events and legal affairs in general. Pamphleteers were usually out to get their message across as best as possible in order to make some money on sales or to prove their point and making things up or exaggerating obviously helped. However, more importantly, in order to reach these goals their pamphlets had to connect to the values and ideas held by (the majority of) their reading

audience. The message that was subsequently broadcasted was that tax officials and the corrupted tax system were part and parcel of the wider failure of Doelists, Orangists and corrupt regents to bring about (administrative and moral) change. This meant that Reijers, Vaster and others seem to have been used mostly as scapegoats and examples regardless of what they were actually guilty of. It did not seem to matter, for instance, that Reijers and Vaster had initially acted correctly in dealing with the alderman.

From this point of view it becomes clear why Reijers is automatically accused of using his connections to get out of trouble (nepotism was meant but the term itself is not used), of getting ahead in the world by means of bribery, of flaunting his wealth and of lining his pockets whenever he could. According to public opinion this was simply what people like him did. One rhyme from a pamphlet read: “little thieves are hung between heaven and earth, but the big thieves ride in carriages and on horses. While those who steal the most are given countries and cities to rule” (*Historisch verhaal van het tumult*, 1748: 41).^{cxxxii} People like Reijers were imposters, only out to deceive others and enrich themselves by the taking from the common land. It is also why Reijers, Vaster, Wachloo and Mallan were all accused of leading a nice and comfortable life (blowing money on whores, mistresses, carriages and horses) while others suffered, despite the fact that their cases had very little to do with each other. Hypocrisy turns out to be another negative value that often occurs in the pamphlets. Saying one thing but doing another seems to have been very much despised in public opinion. Other negative values that were mentioned were disloyalty (similar to legal codes but now regarding citizens as well), *sluykery* (used not as a verb for smuggling but as a value, i.e., being a sluyker), thievery, lacking nobility (being dishonest, not being of good disposition), or deceit (of people and civic duty). Acquiring your office by paying for it (in this case buying it from Raap) was also on the whole considered wrong in public opinion.

The source of values least well represented in the studied cases is that of the shop floor. In the case of Reijers and Vaster the only real shop floor document is the letter by the aldermen-commissioners to Gecommitteerde Raden. While of course being a legal institution their letter and complaint looks more like a shop floor code. This is particularly so because Reijers and Vaster seem to have acted within the limits of the law but, apparently, transgressed the limits of acceptable shop floor behaviour. They had, in other words, dared to accuse a higher ranked regent of tax fraud. Perhaps we can assume they had violated or disturbed the fragile, precarious and/or shady link (cemented with unwritten rules?) between regents and tax collecting that was still there despite the new rules already being in place. A bureaucracy ignorant of class differences is, after all, something that takes time to grow. Although shop floor documents are mostly lacking we can find some more interesting shop floor information out of the bits and pieces from interrogations (mostly in the case of Cras and others). First, Cras and others do *not* seem to have contested that what they did was wrong. This was the case with Andries Mallan who described his malversations as wrong but justified his actions as a loan because he badly needed the money for his family. Cras himself also admitted his actions had been wrong. An excuse for his actions can not be found in the files. Pelmeer and Ramak also agreed that what they had done was wrong, but they both pleaded they were guilty of ignorance rather than wilful theft. They both (naturally) seem to have passed the blame to Cras. It seems they took the ‘bureaucratic’ stance that if the supervisor was not capable or willing to deal with the fraud, why should they be expected to do anything about it?

Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption

From the aforementioned some interesting conclusions can be drawn regarding the interaction between bureaucratic reform and changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. Firstly – bearing in mind the limited sources and instances discussed here – it seems there was in fact little disagreement (in public at least) between tax officials on the shop floor, Provincial authorities and their legal regulations and even public opinion about what was right or wrong moral behaviour for tax officials in the new system of public tax collecting after 1748. Relatively few people seem to have questioned that tax farming had run its course and I have found no evidence (either in public or legal sources) that distinct value systems clashed. The examined tax officials did not dispute the basic values underlying the (new) system or brand them as nonsense. All parties essentially seemed to agree that the acts described in the previous were in fact corrupt or wrong. There was, in other words, little value pluralism.

Of course, this is not to say that everyone was happy about the new system or able to work within it. In fact, local authorities would sometimes obstruct the introduction of public tax collecting right after 1748 (cf. Heringa, 1983: 93-99) and much reprehensible behaviour apparently still went on after 1748.²⁹ In the end, knowing something is wrong does not always keep people from trying to get away with it anyway. Discontent also did not go away with the introduction of the new system. Although William IV and the Estates of Holland had initially gained much appreciation for abolishing tax farming (especially among small shopkeepers and artisans, see Wagenaar, 2004: 556) this newly acquired respect quickly disappeared with the introduction of public tax collecting and the return of the indirect excises (Dekker, 1982: 137; Wagenaar, 2004: 551). Proof of the bad reputation tax officials and taxation still had among the population after 1748 was that upon introduction of the public collection some small riots erupted once more in several parts of Holland. Furthermore, the Estates of Holland had large difficulties recruiting public collectors after 1748 (Heringa, 1983: 96, 99).

However, discontent and continuing fraud were not, I argue, evidence of clashing value systems. They were, rather, caused by normal difficulties associated with the implementation of a new system. Establishing proper uniformity in rules and changing a system takes time and local particularism lasted for a long time especially (perhaps) in people's minds as the introduction of a new and highly bureaucratic system requires an equally radical change in mindset as well. People simply had to get used to new procedures and its implicit assumptions of political corruption and correct behaviour. As such, implementation of the new system did not always go smoothly, changes did not occur overnight and old habits died hard (cf. Heringa, 1983: 101). All things considered, the common citizen was not much better off than before as many problems associated with tax collecting were not immediately solved in the new system. There were still, for instance, possibilities to form monopolies whereby groups of people acquired the exclusive right to trade or produce goods (Scholten, 1999: 309-310). Excises in Holland were also often still higher than those in other provinces which kept resulting in smuggling of goods and other forms of corruption (Heringa, 1983: 95). Furthermore, a part of the salary of various officials was still sometimes based on a percentage of the proceeds and/or fines, encouraging

²⁹ See for instance a large collection of cases in NA 3.01.05, *Archives of the Gecommitteerde Raden of the States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1621 – 1795*, inv.nrs. 4074 – 4075: Sentences in criminal affairs regarding the common means over the period 1723 – 1766. See also NA 3.01.05, *Archives of the Gecommitteerde Raden of the States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1621 – 1795*, nrs. 4076 – 4080: registers of sentences in criminal affairs regarding the common means in the period 1738 – 1807.

fraud and aggressive levying (Heringa, 1983: 86). Still, since large tax riots were a thing of the past after roughly 1750 (Dekker, 1982: 28-29), some things must indeed have improved. Finally, growing pains and slow institutional change are natural and should not be regarded as fundamental disagreement about which public values are appropriate or important.

Institutional or organizational difficulties should also not mask a second conclusion that we can discern a change in moral attitude around 1748 from the case. We have seen how a great multitude of bureaucratic characteristics was specifically designed to counter political corruption and to improve the morals of tax officials in particular and the 'morality' of the new system as a whole in general. The specific and limited nature of the discussed instances, of course, makes it impossible to trace all or even many of these characteristics in practice. Some are simply not applicable to any of the committed offences. Still, the aforementioned (especially the discussion of legal codes) has shown that a number of bureaucratic characteristics were indeed functioning in practice and that correct public official moral conduct was clearly an important issue for the authorities in 1748. There seems to have been a sense that things should change. Reorganizing Holland's tax system and 'going public' provided windows of opportunity to tackle important moral issues. The fact that types of political corruption that had hitherto been accepted practice were either no longer supported or seem to have been more actively prosecuted after 1748 is proof enough that some things did indeed change. So is the fact that rules and regulations meant to prevent and combat political corruption became more elaborate and were, as it appears from the cases, relatively actively enforced. However, again we must realize that this change was neither abrupt nor new. There had been instances before 1748 where tax farmers were held accountable to bureaucratic and/or legal rules and principles (cf. Wagenaar, 2003).

A link between bureaucratic reform and changing public values can therefore be seen in the above. Next to a wide variety of (mostly bureaucratic) values and value statements it is interesting to see that there were also different interpretations or normative connotations of values and/or behaviour among various sources of public values. Values such as punctuality and accuracy (in bookkeeping for instance) or vigilance (in locating offenders or supervising subordinates) were, for instance, very important to the provincial authorities. However, to the tax officials the same value would often mean cumbersome paperwork or 'red-tape'. Similarly a value such as efficiency (denoting aggressive levying rather than anything else) was considered important by authorities and tax officials alike but thought too rigorous or extortive according to taxpayers. Values could also be interpreted or explained differently depending on who was asked. Loyalty is a good example. Being loyal to the province or to the citizens of a town makes a big difference and partly shows that ideas of popular sovereignty or accountability were still far from the (tax) authorities' minds in the middle of the eighteenth century.

However, the fact that the Estates did heed some of the rioters' calls for reform could be a sign that this too was about to change. The often invoked common interest (i.e., something bigger than self interest) shows, in any case, that public officials could no longer serve their own interests as before. In quite a general sense political corruption therefore meant not serving common interests but only one's own. With office and person and public and private becoming more (although not fully, see below) disentangled, values such as accountability, loyalty and responsibility got reemphasized and often acquired a new meaning. The main reason for a change in moral attitude adopted by the Estates of Holland therefore seems to have been the combination of social-political and economic circumstances of failed reforms and economic decline of the times on the one hand and the efforts of a relatively small group

of reform minded administrators on the other. Social-political and economic circumstances opened the door to achieve reforms in the tax system in 1748 where someone like Simon van Slingelandt (1664 – 1736) had failed miserably only a few decades before (Wagenaar, 2004: 550, 554). It enabled a limited group of reformers like Van Wesele and Vosmaer to devise new or reinforce old regulations. It also enabled them to ensure that provincial and local courts based their prosecution on (normative) bureaucratic characteristics. As such, popular protest in 1748 triggered organizational reform and new morals. As new administrative layers were designed, new officials were instated and new rules and regulations were announced, reformers tried to ensure a better (more moral) system.

7 Princely Patronage and Patriot Cause (1770s – 1780s)

7.1 Introduction

In chapters four and five I discussed how the Patriot period of the 1770s and 1780s witnessed major attempts at administrative and moral reform. In this chapter I provide a second case study against this backdrop. I focus on the criticism the Patriots had on so-called ‘aristocratic’ practices of patronage, nepotism and abuse of office for personal gain in a system of Stadholderly patronage that in many ways dominated the second half of the eighteenth century. In this system (discussed in detail below) the patron Stadholder placed clients in important positions to protect and further his interests. At the same time this often provided these clients with so much power that they themselves became patrons in their own right, often abusing their position for personal gain. In this chapter I will look at the acts of two such officials, Jacob van der Heim (1727 – 1799) in Rotterdam and Hugo Repelaer (1730 – 1804) in Dordrecht.

A fair amount of literature exists on the system of Stadholderly patronage in the second half of the eighteenth century. First and foremost (although written in Dutch) the topic has been explored in great detail by Gabriëls (1989). Despite of this I focus on Stadholderly patronage for two main reasons. First, the cases presented in this chapter form an essential link with the other cases of this study. In the search for changing public values and perceptions of political corruption from 1748 to 1813, the Patriot period is simply not to be missed. Fundamental (administrative, bureaucratic and moral) changes occurred which, although also in part independent and ‘new’, can and should be linked to the previous struggle of the Doelists and to later events in the Batavian period. This does not mean that we are to deny the importance of the Patriot period on its own. We should indeed not regard it merely as a prelude to the French-Batavian period after 1795 (cf. Klein 1995: 3-4). Instead, I argue that in the Patriot period many of the squashed public values of the Doelists regained strength and momentum and that the following French-Batavian period was in many ways a final fulfilment or victory of those values. Second, Stadholderly patronage and the cases in this chapter serve to get a closer and more specific look – from a ‘Johnstonian’ perspective – at the political corruption of the time and the public values that were expressed. This is a valuable contribution to our current understanding of this important period in Dutch political history since the explicit focus on scandals and public values is obviously closely related to, but still different from, existing discussions on political culture and/or institutional system of the time (cf. Gabriëls, 1989; Gosses & Japikse, 1947; Klein, 1995; Van Sas, 1988a, 2005; Schama, 1977; Vijlbrief, 1955). Existing historiography on the Patriot period has, in other words, not spent express, direct or specific attention to changing values of public administration and perceptions of political corruption. Therefore, it is the purpose of this present chapter to find out in more detail (in addition to what I have already discussed in chapter five) which views, values and perceptions were around in the Patriot period and how much change and/or continuity there was in public

value systems. We should wonder, for example, if the period was about realizing new public values (next to reinforcing old ones) and whether there were any fundamental changes in assumptions of what government was or should be about.

In the following I briefly discuss the link between emerging politics of the time and conflicting and changing public value systems. Next, I discuss the system of Stadholderly patronage in more detail as I focus on the (largely informal) system of recommendations in the province of Holland. Then, I turn to the two cases of Van der Heim and Repelaer. The critique on their dealings, the response they got from Patriot reformers as well as from their peers provide much information on changing public values and perceptions of political corruption at the time. I will end with an analysis similar to the other case studies of this book. There I assess the various values and value statements found, compare the sources of values and assess changing values within a wider (historical) institutional context.

7.2 Emerging politics, clashing value systems and public value change

Much like the other sub-periods distinguished in this study the Patriot period can be considered an important potential driver of public value change. We can hypothesize how the fundamental institutional changes of the time (those proposed and those actually put into practice) were not just about realizing, for instance, a new organization of town councils. It was also about realizing new ideas and values. Investigating change in public official morality in the Patriot period depends in large part on the emerging politics of the period. Baker for instance wrote how in eighteenth century France, political opinion became “the articulating concept of a new political space with a legitimacy and authority apart from that of the crown” (Baker, 1990: 199). For the Dutch situation (despite the fact that there was no ‘crown’) a similar conclusion can be drawn. As Van Sas (1988b: 18) stated, ‘modern’ politics were invented during the Patriot revolution of 1780-1787. Elsewhere Van Sas (2005: 223) wrote, “to many Dutch the Patriot period was a break from the past, despite the failure of the movement to gain actual power, that was of lasting importance. In the Patriot period the Dutch citizen lost its political innocence. He became ‘politically aware’, whether he wanted or not, regardless of his conviction”. In various publications such as the work of Van der Capellen and the *Herstelling* (see chapter five) a multitude of political issues were indeed discussed as people spoke of ideas and principles such as popular influence, representation, loyalty to and trust in government and the ‘right’ political system.

I explained in chapter five how Patriot best-opinion offered quite radical new perspectives on how public officials ought to behave and where their allegiance should lie. In many ways Patriot best-opinion tried to redefine the ‘political nation’. In this attempt political society was basically divided into ‘democrats’ and ‘aristocrats’. Patriot critique of aristocrats was heard everywhere and was exclusively used in a pejorative sense. The well-known Patriot activist Gerrit Paape (1752 – 1803) remarked how the term was an “iron hand grenade to each’s disposal” (Paape, 1798/2003: 46-47; op cit. in Klein, 1995: 228). Much like the term ‘regent’ nowadays (cf. Te Velde, 2005), it had become a term of abuse, basically referring to anyone who had any power over another and who abused that power in any way. Pieter ‘t Hoen, the writer of the important Patriot periodical *Post van den Neder-Rhijn*, distinguished between ‘conscious’ (people with honest characters but without much insight and with many prejudices) and ‘unconscious’ Aristocrats (those who willingly deceived the people, limited freedom of the

press and favoured their own family and friends over others). While one could find both kinds in both major political camps of the time (i.e., those against and those in favour of a strong Stadholder), the worst ones, according to Patriot ideology, were surely to be found on the Stadholder's side (Klein, 1995: 236). Israel furthermore noted how the Patriot terminology of democrats versus aristocrats was closely linked to the idea of freedom (2007: 14). This was again represented by Paape who wrote that freedom was always in danger from Aristocrats (and clergy) who knew how to manipulate the dependent, indifferent and ignorant burgher (1785: 9, 53, 55). Dependency would – incidentally – be a recurring characteristic of ‘bad’ government. The term Democrat on the other hand had a much more positive connotation and was frequently used by the Patriots to describe themselves. It certainly did not denote any actual influence of the real lower classes or populace (Palmer, 1974, part I: 331), but still meant more inclusion, participation, freedom and ‘popular sovereignty’ of a wider group of people than anything that had previously been proposed.

The terms democrat and aristocrat were central to the Patriot vocabulary of the 1770s and 1780s and pointed, according to De Wit's central thesis (1965, 1974), to the eighteenth century struggle between a powerful anti-Orangist oligarchic regent class of aristocrats on one side and pro-Orange democratic burghers, arguing for national unity, on the other. De Wit's thesis of an unbridgeable social-political gap between regents and burghers has since been often criticised (cf. Klein, 1995: 227-230; Van Sas, 1980; 2005: 20). It is, in short, considered too rigorous and therefore unsatisfactory to describe eighteenth century Dutch social political reality since we can find democrats and aristocrats *among* both regents and burghers. While I agree with the criticism that De Wit's thesis is too rough as a social distinction between groups I also believe this does not negate its use in marking the existence of two (almost ideal-typical) distinct political ideologies that potentially clashed in their visions of right and wrong, or corrupt and not corrupt. In this chapter these ideal-type political ideologies can therefore also be seen as two competing and clashing public value systems (cf. Van Sas, 1988b: 27) something that is discussed below as well.

7.3 The Stadholders' patronage as a catalyst for moral reform

In chapter four I discussed how patronage and brokerage were unavoidable and sometimes essential ingredients to make Dutch politics work. Especially in the second half of the eighteenth century these tactics were increasingly employed in competition between different opposing parties in the Republic (Israel, 1998: 1092-1093; Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 13). In chapter five I then discussed how much of Patriot best-opinion critique centred on the system of Stadholderly patronage of the second half of the eighteenth century. Essentially the Stadholder was a patron to clients. Sometimes (outside the province of Holland) these were called Lieutenant-Stadholders. At other times (inside Holland) they were simply called confidants (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 232 for this distinction). Both kinds of confidant acted as extensions of the Stadholder. Notorious examples of Lieutenant-Stadholders were Andries Schimmelpenninck van der Oije (1705 – 1776) in Gelderland (cf. Franken, 1997, 2002; Gabriëls, 1989: 185-190, 496, 499), the family of Van Lynden van Hemmen in the same province, Anthony Adriaan van Iddekinge in Groningen, Willem Carel Hendrik van Lynden van Blitterswijk in Zeeland, and Sigismund van Heiden Hompesch van Ootmarsum in

Overijssel (Van der Capellen's powerful adversary in the latter's fight against the *Drostendiensten*). Utrecht was in the hands of the infamous brothers Pestere.

The Stadholder would use his confidants to select and appoint people in important offices in various administrative bodies of the Republic. The clients would protect and further the Stadholders' interests on a local level and did so by taking positions themselves, by handing out offices to others and by recommending people for them to the Stadholder (Gabriëls, 1989: 1). Especially in instances where the Stadholder did not have any direct right (mostly in Holland, see below), a system of indirect appointment came into being. The Stadholder would in that case appoint people in office from a short-list (usually itself the result of a contract of correspondence) provided to him by a town council. However, often it became informal custom that the Stadholder was already asked about his preferences *before* the town council would make the short-list. In such a way Stadholderly patronage was dispensed in a system of recommendations in which the Stadholder, as Gabriëls noted (1989: 73), could actively prevent the recommendation of people he did not like and further that of those he did like. A recommendation by the Stadholder was therefore essentially an appointment. The Stadholder would choose people based on the advice of his local representatives who provided him with information and made sure that like-minded (i.e., Orangist) regents would get the positions. In this system it was often near impossible to get offices without help from the Stadholder or his clients (Gabriëls, 1989: 17).

Many Patriots were appalled at how the Stadholder gave offices to members of the nobility or to people from outside towns or provinces which – again – makes it interesting that Van der Capellen himself had once been such an outsider (see chapter five). However, to the Stadholder the system made perfect sense. Bringing in outsiders would increase their loyalty to him and would ensure they could act independent of existing relations or a shared past with older 'native' members of the local administration. The Stadholder would thus use outsiders to develop extensive networks of patronage throughout the Republic in return for which these men would gain power and wealth. The confidants were usually expert power brokers who were skilled in navigating fluent political lines using all means necessary to attain their goals and those of their patron. This meant that high scruples were often not required. To William IV and Anna of Hannover, at least, political convictions were hardly important for becoming a confidant. Past enemies could just as well get the job as long as they performed well (Gabriëls, 1989: 235) and personal affection between patron and client seems not to have been much of a requirement (see on Van der Heim below). Also, lieutenants had money and power and used both to secure loyalty to specific patron interests (Blockmans, 1985: 236) as well as their own purses. Of course, as Gabriëls notes (1989: 153), money and/or power were not always the reason for helping the Stadholder. Ideological or political views could just as well be reasons for them to do what they did.

Still, many confidants used (or rather abused) their influence in arranging offices for personal gain. As such, the system of recommendations often led to intrigue, abuse of office and nepotism. What essentially united most, if not all, confidants was that they distributed offices to friends and family, increased their wealth using their public offices and ignored or circumvented (collegial) principles of office rotation and seniority on the 'shop floor'. Those who did not agree or were in any way critical of the Stadholder or his confidants were purged, given bad offices (that is: less influential and/or lucrative) or were otherwise bullied into submission (Gabriëls, 1989: 145-149, 152-153; Israel, 1998: 1082-1084). In Patriot opinion the confidants of the Stadholder displayed all sorts of 'corrupt' behaviour such as being haughty,

greedy, wasteful or selfish. For all these reasons the system of Stadholderly patronage and recommendations was despised by many in the Patriot period (Geyl, 1948-1959: 125-126). We have already seen (in chapter five) how Patriot best-opinion fulminated against it.

In Holland the Stadholder and his confidants had less influence on local politics than in the provinces in the periphery of the Republic (Gabriëls, 1989: 17, 232; Klein, 1995: 141). Because of this the Stadholder was forced to mostly recruit his clients via the system of recommendations. While the Holland city regents had long been able to retain their 'true liberty' due to their economic power (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 66-67) even they were forced to bow to the Stadholder from 1747 onwards as he managed to put confidants in important Holland positions. In all eighteen Holland towns with voting rights in the Estates of Holland, the Stadholder appointed members of the town council based on short-lists. In the ten most prominent cities of Holland, the Stadholder furthermore gained the right to appoint people as alderman, mayor or in various other offices. Only some cities, such as Leiden, Haarlem and Amsterdam (Gabriëls, 1989: 73), were sometimes able to dodge the Stadholder's influence in these matters. Other towns, such as Rotterdam and Dordrecht were not. In the following I will discuss two cases of political corruption of confidants in both latter cities to assess what other sources of values than best-opinion had to say on these matters. The two (highly similar) cases deal with of abuse of office by Jacob Van der Heim in Rotterdam and Hugo Repelaer in Dordrecht.

7.4 Cases of political corruption

The scandal surrounding Jacob Van der Heim and Hugo Repelaer is, as was the case in chapter six, affected by the problem that not all sources can always be found at the same time. The cases that follow are mostly viewed from public opinion and shop floor sources (and are also juxtaposed to the best-opinion sources in chapter five) and, generally, lack a view offered by legal codes. This is not surprising given the enormous surge in public pamphlet literature in the Dutch 1780s in which accused and accusers all had a share. At the same time legal codes, including bureaucratic ones, were difficult to find essentially because of the absence of a *Rechtsstaat*. Furthermore, the offences of the Stadholder's confidants were only partly illegal as their functioning was often regulated by informal instead of formal codes. The complicated mix of formal and informal procedures and interpretations of whatever laws there actually were make the entire system quite 'shady' in a legal sense. In either case, the Stadholder's legal rights to appoint people were not very clearly defined and open to interpretation based on ever changing power relations. Despite or perhaps because of this, neither Van der Heim nor Repelaer would be summoned to appear before court. Instead, both were booted out of their administrative bodies by opposition from Patriots outside and their peers within the town councils. While this makes the legal source a somewhat difficult one to take into account, it is compensated by extensive coverage in the other sources of values.

Hugo Repelaer

Dordrecht was one of the Holland cities in which the Stadholder could recommend and in practice appoint people for offices. In Dordrecht the local confidant of the Stadholder had much power because the rules of seniority were not being obeyed. Instead of seniority, a

contract of correspondence (see chapter four) had been in effect since 1702 (Frijhoff, et al., 1998: 26-27). The contract had divided the forty members of the town council in two classes of twenty regents among whom the various offices were distributed. William IV made sure the contract was kept intact after 1747 but only in form. In reality he would now confer with the ruling mayors (who were not members of the town council but chosen from among its ranks, according to the contract of correspondence) about who would be eligible for which office. The members of the two classes of the town council did not have any influence over this (Gabriëls, 1989, part I: 235; part II (footnotes): 521). As such, the confidant in Dordrecht who suggested to the Stadholder which people to appoint, was not bound by any procedures (such as the contract of correspondence). This gave him much influence and opportunities for personal gain.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, two men competed for the favours of the Stadholder in Dordrecht. The first was Jeronimus Karsseboom (1706 – 1771), a former ‘Loevesteiner’ who had turned into an Orangist with the events of 1747 (Gabriëls, 1989: 235). Despite his original political convictions Karsseboom was given the task of confidant by William IV and Anna to keep them in the loop of events in Dordrecht and to advise them on who to appoint for various offices. Karsseboom exploited his position for personal gain, at least helping out friends and family and acquiring many offices for himself. His actions were openly criticised by other Dordrecht regents after Anna died in 1759 (Gabriëls, 1989: 235-236). Foremost among Karsseboom’s opponents during the 1760s was Hugo Repelaer, a member of one of the leading Dordrecht regent families (Palmen, 1998: 212). He was member of the Dordrecht town council since 1756 and holder of various (highly lucrative) offices ever since. Repelaer tried to take Karsseboom’s place in the 1760s but did not succeed. For a while, therefore, Karsseboom and Repelaer were forced to accept some form of shared power. However, when Karsseboom died in 1771, Repelaer became the one and only confidant of William V in Dordrecht. He was the all-important broker between Dordrecht and the court in The Hague and made sure he acquired all the benefits that came with the job. Repelaer, in the words of many contemporaries (see below) was renowned for his lust to rule. He was alderman (1757 – 1758), bailiff (1766 – 1771) and three-time mayor of Dordrecht (1778 – 1779, 1782 – 1783, 1794). Apart from that he was also Receiver of the ‘Convoeien’ (the right to levy money by the navy from shipping companies for the protection of their merchant ships) and ‘Licenten’ (rights imposed for the transport of goods to enemy territories) (in 1771), Dike warden of the Alblasserwaard and member of Gecommitteerde Raden of Holland (between 1775 and 1777), member of the Court of Audit (in 1782) and Drossaard of Liesveld (1790) (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 4: 1140).

In many ways, at least according to the Patriots and his fellow (excluded) regents in the town council, Repelaer was the personification of the typical Orangist confidant whose only purpose was personal gain and that of his close friends and family in the form of money, office and influence. In 1770, compare one of the pamphlets discussed below (Van Putten, 1782: 9), Repelaer supposedly appointed a friend as Receiver of the Common Means. In 1772, Repelaer has Paulus van der Heim (the son of Rotterdam mayor Jacob van der Heim, see below) appointed by the Estates General as second secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam.³⁰ Since Repelaer and Jacob van der Heim were relatives (their wives were cousins) and both were Stadholderly confidants, this was sometimes (see below) considered nepotism (cf. Gabriëls,

³⁰ National Archives The Hague [NL-HaNA], *Family archive Repelaer 1496-1940*, 1.10.70, inv.nr. 20, appendix c.

1989, part VI: 522, footnote 534). Repelaer also asked the Estates-General for his son Ocker Repelaer (1759 – 1832) to be appointed as assistant Receiver of the Convooiën and Licenten in 1779.³¹

Repelaer's actions to recommend his friends and family for offices, his own collection of lucrative offices and his apparent complete disregard for such things as seniority and 'proper' office rotation got him many enemies both within and outside the town council. His actions, according to Gabriëls (1989: 237), were among the main immediate causes of the early Patriot success in Dordrecht to abolish the system of recommendations in August 1782. As such, we could even say that Repelaer seems to have almost single-handedly kick-started the Patriot revolt. Somewhat surprisingly, Repelaer and his followers were allowed to remain in the town council afterwards. They refused however, according to some because the Stadholder would reward them handsomely for their continuous support (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 4) which was indeed what happened when Repelaer was reinstated as the Stadholder's confidant in Dordrecht after 1787. Only with the Batavian Revolution of 1795 would he finally lose all his offices, after a career in public office of forty-three years.

Public values from public opinion sources

The actions of Repelaer led to agitation and protest from Patriots who expressed their opinions in public pamphlets. The decision by the Dordrecht town council to put an end to the recommendations was, for instance, hailed in the Patriot press on many occasions. One pamphlet provided two laudatory poems on the Patriot move to sideline both Stadholder and Repelaer. The courageous regents (two of which were apparently family members of Repelaer, see Missive, 1782: 12-13) valued freedom over treasure, honour over life. They withstood tyranny and were praised for their virtue, befitting "the grey-haired old man", meaning in this case Johan van Oldenbarnevelt^{cxxxii} (*Tweetal lofdichten*, 1782: 3). Now, one of the poems continued, "bribery has been warded off, the chair of the mayors no longer occupied by flatterers. No slave bowing for favour and oppression will any longer approach the honourable council chamber".^{cxxxiii} The poem ends with an appeal to squash all the other 'Repelaers' in the many towns of the Republic.^{cxxxiv} Clearly, Repelaer was seen as an example of a confidant. Interestingly enough this also signals how the Patriot movement was at heart a truly national movement in the modern sense of the word as the various towns and provinces were explicitly connected through a shared Patriot purpose. This, in turn, denotes quite a wide and relatively new idea of common good and public interest. Similar sentiments appear in another pamphlet and short poem. It spoke of the past in which lust to rule had affected cowardly souls by binding them to own interests with a gilded hand. The oppression that had resulted from this could, however, not survive as soon as the Batavian would awake to turn the tide (*De herstellde vrijheid*, 1782: 2).^{cxxxv} Then "one would once again find men in the [town, TK] council, who choose wisdom over slavish honour, despite slander, jeer and defamation" (Ibid., 3).^{cxxxvi} Most important in the poem is the attack against arbitrariness which is the result of the many machinations of patronage and nepotism. People appointed in this way have, according to the author, become "alienated from oath and duty", have been muzzled and will stop at nothing to rule in an arbitrary way (Ibid., 3-4).^{cxxxvii}

³¹ National Archives The Hague [NL-HaNA], *Family archive Repelaer 1496-1940*, 1.10.70, inv.nr. 20

Putting an end to the Stadholderly recommendations in Dordrecht as early as 1782 had repercussions for the entire Republic (see chapter four). The Dordrecht town council (for whatever partisan reasons) radically changed an ‘old’ practice and directly aimed to break the Stadholder’s hold over the city. The public attack on the system boiled down to some fundamental debates on representation, self-interest, public interest and ‘appropriate’ behaviour. Bad regents were to be replaced with good regents and this led to a discussion what both actually meant. In a pamphlet by Johan Bareuth, a Dordrecht preacher, fervent Orangist and moral authority of the day, this central issue is very well illustrated. The pamphlet poses a crucial question: if the regents of Dordrecht acted only out of self-interest (and the author expects they do), what does this say about their morality and principles? To Bareuth the motives of the Patriot regents to depose of Stadholder and confidants were not as pure as the Patriots claimed. He signals a difference between acting out of public or out of personal interest and he concludes that the Patriot regents act according to the latter. They are hypocrites who do not act on behalf of burghers or city but only wish to protect their interests or play a nasty trick on the Stadholder. Here – incidentally – we also find the idea of the Stadholder as a victim of political corruption rather than its cause. Furthermore, the decision to end the recommendations is, according to Bareuth, “useful and necessary in every way” (an interesting point to make for an Orangist!), to ensure that “offices are obtained through rotation and rank [i.e., seniority, TK] without paying heed to the recommendations of the Stadholder”. “But”, Bareuth writes, “the grand question is whether this resolution is brought forth out of self-interest to get a big piece of the pie since now everything is being taken by only a few people, and out of old spite against the house of Orange, or out of true Patriotism” (Bareuth, 1783: 3-4).^{cxxxviii}

Since self-interest, according to Bareuth was indeed the sole motivator of Patriot change, Bareuth could easily show the advantages of the present system, although with a few small adjustments. True Patriotism, according to Bareuth, was selfless and had to be ‘tested’ or measured by the first ‘constitutions’ in which the privileges of Dordrecht’s citizens had been written down. He was, of course, speaking of the restoration of the old privileges of the guilds. In a ‘conservative’ move, reminiscent of a demand once launched by the Doelisten (see chapter five) Bareuth argues how only the guilds have the actual right to appoint people in the town council and, thereby, in high offices. Both old and new Dordrecht town council (before and after 1782) are thus portrayed as oligarchies and both are rejected by the Orangist preacher. The new ‘Patriot’ regents, according to Bareuth, were no better than the old ones as all of them failed to protect the privileges of the citizens. They failed, in the words of Bareuth, to “live up to the great lesson of the conscience, do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you” (Bareuth, 1783: 3).^{cxxxix} Has it, asks Bareuth, “been the consideration of duty to uphold the privileges of their cities or the self-interest, advantage and the urge one has to clip the wings of the Stadholder, to take from him what they themselves once gave to him out of lowliness or voluntary will (Bareuth, 1783: 4).^{cxl} If the guilds, he continues, enjoy their rights to the fullest then all is right. But if they do not, let then these great Patriots, these champions of freedom, first remove the beam from their own eye before they remove the splinter from the eye of his Majesty” (Bareuth, 1783: 21).^{cxli} He urges the Patriots to look at themselves first before blaming the Stadholder. They should, in other words, return power to the citizens and only then “shall they deserve the praise that true Patriots deserve”^{cxlii} (Bareuth, 1783: 23). As such, Bareuth voiced a ‘public opinion’ (or is it a best-opinion?) against regency in general.

This must have sounded great; *both* to an Orangist populace and Patriots. It is another example of how meshed arguments and ideas sometimes could sometimes be.

Public values from legal sources

Hugo Repelaer's political career ended (for the time being) as a result of the 1782 decision to stop the recommendations. To assess any formal legal views on the case, it is important to restate however that he was not removed from the council but, instead, chose not to submit to the new regulations. Even though he was formally bound to the instructions that came with his office and could have been judged by a legal standard such as new Patriot town council regulations after 1782 (cf. *Bedenkingen over het aanstellen van regenten*, 1787) or by oaths and instructions (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 269ff), this was not done. Only occasionally can one find any reference to the oath as a legal argument in public opinion pamphlets. Had members of town councils not, as one pamphlet wrote, "obligated themselves with their oath to uphold and protect the rights, privileges, interests of the people and citizens of their city?" (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 3). The use of such legal arguments was highly limited. In any case, Repelaer was never legally charged with any criminal offence or summoned to appear before any court.

Several reasons for this can be thought of, which on their own might provide at least a superficial view on the role and importance of legal codes in the case (and that of Van der Heim, see below). First, a court case against Repelaer might simply have been too difficult for the contemporary legal system to handle because Repelaer's actions were not easy to brand as illegal. The system of recommendations in Dordrecht (and Rotterdam) was a strange mix of formal and informal rules and procedures and practices (see also below). Formally the Dordrecht town council had the right to recommend people after which the Stadholder would make a choice. In that sense some of Repelaer's actions (getting offices for friends and family) had indeed been illegal because he circumvented those procedures. Yet the town council of Dordrecht had long since relinquished any real rights to recommend people to the Stadholder and had given the Stadholder (and his confidants) the power to recommend and in effect appoint people in its stead. In that sense the actions of Repelaer (and his fellow confidants across the Republic, see also on Van der Heim below) were not illegal or, in any case, very difficult to regard as such. Second, the fact that the Dordrecht regents had been forced to play the game of Repelaer and Stadholder made them, essentially, accessories to the 'offences' committed, an argument that was, as we have seen, also made by Bareuth. Seeing as the regents were essentially trying to regain power from the Stadholder to again hand out offices among themselves, any legal action might also be turned against them in the future. Third, not formally prosecuting Repelaer must have also been due to his social standing and prestige. Some people certainly were above the (fragmented) law. Court cases and criminal indictments against powerful officials such as Hugo Repelaer were uncommon in the Dutch Republic, a possible sign of both inequality before the law and a lack of 'bureaucratic' principles of administration. In 1782, Repelaer was still a powerful figure with money, connections and offices. Fears for revenge in the case of a possible return of his patron might have kept the other Dordrecht regents from formally accusing and prosecuting him. This was, in hindsight, a wise decision since Repelaer was indeed reinstated as confidant in Dordrecht after 1787. However, the absence of an actual court case, a criminal indictment or any kind of judicial review make it impossible to truly assess any public values from legal codes.

Public values from shop floor sources

I now turn to the final source of ‘shop floor’ public values. It should be noted here that in the case of Repelaer (and the one of Van der Heim below), the line between shop floor and other sources of values is particularly difficult to draw. Most pamphlets are either anonymous or from an untraceable author, making it hard to label or categorize a source. Still, some sources can be called ‘shop floor’ based on interpretation of their content. In the following, pamphlets are labelled ‘shop floor’ for various reasons but mostly when authors display detailed and accurate knowledge of how things worked and/or constantly argue for reinstating the old system of correspondence and rotation (which was a typical comment any regent on the shop floor would make) instead of recommendations which they often found arbitrary. Also, documents are likely to be ‘shop floor’ when authors complain about the negative sides of confidant behaviour from the perspective of an excluded regent (such as harming his commercial interests) rather than from the perspective of a disadvantaged populace.

One such shop floor pamphlet focused on the convention of 1782 in which the Dordrecht town council regents had ended the Stadholderly recommendations. According to the anonymous author the town council had simply been forced to do so because of Repelaer’s actions. The author asked why the town council never halted the “arbitrary recommendations in giving offices”^{cxliii}, since “Repelaer had done nothing else than betray the trust invested in him by the Stadholder only to get for himself and his family in the most illegal way the favours of government, proven by the number of functions he has gotten out of turn and only because of the favour of the Stadholder” (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 3-4).^{cxliv} The use of the word illegal is of course interesting here since explicit legal codes hardly appear in this case. However, illegal is meant here as not following office rotation, i.e., waiting your proper turn. Repelaer’s ploy to get an office for his son Ocker (see before) is also mentioned in the pamphlet but now Repelaer’s schemes to try and get his second son, Johan Repelaer (1760 – 1835) appointed as *Raad en Rentmeester Generaal van Zuid-Holland* (something in which Repelaer seems to have failed) was also mentioned. Repelaer had been so hell-bent on getting offices that, according to the pamphlet, “as soon as anyone gets sick this gentleman is ready to take his position for himself or his children, which is easy for him since the Stadholder has put his faith in him and believes no one loves him [the Stadholder, TK] more and will do more for him in the city of Dordrecht” (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 4).^{cxlv} It is noteworthy that the Stadholder does not appear to be considered a guilty party in all this by the author of this pamphlet. Instead he is considered as much a victim as anyone else. Repelaer himself and the lack of action of the Dordrecht town council were to blame.

The author of the pamphlet has good insight into the system of Stadholderly patronage as he then puts his finger on one of the main weaknesses of the system. As soon as the majority of the city regents become unhappy, he writes, the system starts to fail. It might have been a way for him to argue for the return of collegialism and rotation. This, after all, had been the reason why the original contracts of correspondence were so successful. They kept everyone happy in the sure knowledge that the spoils of government would someday be theirs. When that security disappeared with the increasing entrenchment of Stadholderly recommendations, the foundations of the system were in danger. Still, the pamphleteer seems to be saying that having a Stadholderly confidant does not necessarily have to be a bad thing. It only becomes a problem when the confidant overstretches and thereby hurts rather than furthers

the Stadholder's interests (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 5).^{cxlvi} As an extension of the Stadholder's power the confidant has to tread carefully between local city regent interests and Stadholderly demands and actions. They were often in a difficult position, having to maintain harmony between a large variety of actors (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 150-152) and Repelaer had according to the pamphlet failed to do so. He had not "used appropriate means to strengthen the harmony between Prince and government". He had "ignored and thwarted all resolute decisions of the government concerning the troubles with England" to please the Stadholder but in fact had "treated the Stadholder with contempt". He had "willingly failed to understand that the regents knew well how bad all this [i.e., finding a solution for the crisis with England; meaning the restoration of the fleet] would be for their personal [commercial, TK] interests but that they did this for the nation's wellbeing (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 5).^{cxlvii}

A number of interesting values and value statements can be found here. Maintaining harmony between regents and Stadholder seems highly important, especially when compared to many cases of seventeenth century Dutch political corruption in which corruption essentially meant not maintaining harmony on the shop floor (cf. Hoenderboom, forthcoming; Hoenderboom & Kerckhoff, 2008). Also, the criticism that Repelaer acted selfishly and disregarded the nation's interests is interesting. Repelaer's way of distributing offices was, finally, also unbearable to the pamphleteer. "This is", he wrote, "solely dependent on his arbitrary goodness, to get douceurs [gifts in the form of money, TK], instead of being dependent on the order of government [rotation and seniority, TK]. His authority is accompanied by an unbearable haughtiness and contempt for his fellow regents, claiming to be a man without whom no office in Dordrecht can be acquired (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 5-6).^{cxlviii} Again we see critique towards possessing certain 'bad' character traits and not following proper (though not bureaucratic!) procedures. Regents are simply no longer able to know what is going on. All the order and regularity they had been used to (so consistent under the old contracts of correspondence) went out the door in the system of Stadholderly recommendations.

We have already seen that Repelaer, together with five other regents, declined the town council's offer to stay on as its members after 1782 (of the forty members, twenty-six immediately voted in favour and eight would sign later). According to this shop floor pamphlet, they did so because they "only had their short-term interests at heart, because otherwise they would see how the convention [to abolish the recommendations, TK] was good for the citizenry and the government because of the free deliberations it enables"^{cxlix} (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 7). The author suspects that the seven were only trying to hold out as long as possible to see which side (Dordrecht regents or Stadholder) would offer them the best deal.^{cl} The recalcitrant regents – among whom was also Pieter Pompejus Repelaer, brother of Hugo – in the end refused because of promises by Repelaer and (presumably) the Stadholder of future positions. In a sarcastic note the author writes he hopes that Repelaer "will keep his promise instead of keeping for himself a great portion of all these reserved offices" and that he will still have the power to dispose of them since the Stadholder must at some point realize that it had been Repelaer who destroyed his chances in Dordrecht (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 10).^{cli} Then, the author unfolds his vision of the future government of Dordrecht, consisting of "delegates that feel subordinate to the responsibility of their principals, who have freedom loving feelings and display enough resolve to govern their city in accordance with the wishes of their able Pensionary" (this was Cornelis de Gijsselaar, see below) (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 14).^{clii} The recommendations had to end to safeguard free deliberations because in that

system “even the most able, powerful and selfless regent will find it hard to serve his country when he is robbed of offices, that should have been his, by cowardly flatterers and courtiers” (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 15).^{cliii} Interestingly, public values of delegation (of authority) and free deliberation had a very particular meaning here. To the shop floor regents this meant being free from the influence of Stadholder and his confidants and had seemingly little to do with popular representation or accountability.

Similar sentiments reappeared in other shop floor pamphlets of the time. One pamphlet argues how Stadholderly recommendations and patronage had caused political power to move away from its original base, i.e., the cities and their regents. The pamphleteer counters the attempt at centralization apparent from the acts of the Stadholder and his confidants. In short, particularism and ‘bottom-up’ administration were under attack. The language is interesting as the pamphlet states that the cities provide the money and thereby form “the main nerve of the state [...]. When this source is not pure then the entire form of government will be affected. When the central nerve is struck by disease, calamity must follow through all branches of government and its pernicious influence will be felt everywhere” (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 4).^{cliv} Here (as elsewhere, see chapter eight) ‘classical’ notions of political corruption – in terms of disease, illness or being unwholesome – reappears. It meant moving away (a degeneration) from a state of purity. The corruption of the entire body politic was caused by Stadholderly recommendations and the acts of his confidants “because”, the pamphlet continues, “those regents who obtained office through the Stadholder will not counter him. They will use their opportunities to indulge in their main motives of glory, lust to rule power and self-interest” (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 5).^{clv} Any beginning to counter this state of affairs has to be reform on a city level since the town councils are the spring from which all other administrative bodies are formed (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 12).

Another particularly outspoken shop floor pamphlet was entitled *De legende van Hugo Repelaer* (Van Putten, 1782) written by a man called Gijsbert van Putten. Van Putten does not appear as member of the Dordrecht town council or in any other official office within or outside Dordrecht at the time. Perhaps, because authors often wished to remain anonymous, the name was a pseudonym dedicated to two ‘Patriot’ heroes – incidentally stemming from Dordrecht – Cornelis de Gijsselaar (Gijsbert?) and Cornelis de Witt, whose manor in South-Holland had been in the town of Putten. These men would often (see below) be made to serve as symbols of good Patriot regents. De Gijsselaar (1751 – 1815) was pensionary of Dordrecht between 1778 and 1787 and one of the main Patriot leaders and anti-Orangists of the 1780s alongside Van der Capellen and others (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 309-310). Cornelis De Witt (1623 – 1672) had been a symbol of regent ‘true liberty’ and martyr for this cause ever since he had been murdered by the Orangist populace in the ‘year of disaster’ 1672 together with his brother, Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (1625 – 1672).

Given his criticism and what is supposedly his reverence for men like Gijsselaar and De Witt, the author was someone close to or at least sympathetic with the regents even though Van Putten does cast his net somewhat wider than that. The pamphlet targets Repelaer in specific as well as the system of Stadholderly patronage in general as it calls upon the citizens to get rid of the Stadholder’s favourites by means of force for the purpose of the common good. They are to be replaced by those “not blinded by the glitter of gold, in whose soul no ignominy can be found” (Van Putten, 1782: 2).^{clvi} Repelaer was, of course, one of those regents to be removed because of “the behaviour and character of this lieutenant Stadholder”, a term that was – incidentally – therefore used at the time as well. Several main (bad) characteristics of

Repelaer are emphasized in the pamphlet. First, there is his lack of caution, in the sense of the classic virtue of *prudentia* but also, perhaps, in the sense of adhering to shop floor codes of office rotation and waiting one's turn. Second is his lack of courage, something which the author is sure Repelaer would never acquire beyond mere external display (Van Putten, 1782: 3). Ever since his early childhood, the pamphlet continues, Repelaer's language has been tough but his actions cowardly instead of illustrious with the result that his countrymen have had to stick up for him on many occasions when they did not want him to become a target of slander and contempt (Van Putten, 1782: 4).^{clvii} Possibly, the author of the pamphlet was referring here to the fact that Repelaer had failed to overthrow Karsseboom in the 1760s. Repelaer was accused of not being able to fend for himself, which was arguably a desirable characteristic for a city administrator. Repelaer was also accused of adultery and having loose sexual morals when the pamphlet told how, in 1758, he "had married, after several previous love affairs, a loveable, virtuous and God-fearing woman", but that "her piety was a burden to him just like his infidelity with two women had been a nail in her coffin" (Van Putten, 1782: 4).^{clviii} Similarly, Repelaer's actions vis-à-vis Karsseboom were a clear sign of the former's corrupt nature. Repelaer, supposedly in a drunk state, once publicly denounced Karsseboom as a villain for which insult he was made to publicly apologise to Karsseboom (Van Putten, 1782: 6). This, according to the pamphlet, was the reason for Repelaer's later lust to rule and his meddling in every affair. His antagonism with Karsseboom led him to want revenge and use every cunning trick or vicious fabrication to this end, "even under the pretext of serving the nation's interest" (Van Putten, 1782: 7).^{clix}

Repelaer's lust for offices was another main criticism as the pamphlet states how he is "known throughout the city as a true courtier [in the most pejorative sense of that word, TK] [...] someone willing to do anything to get what he wants, thereby forsaking oath, honour, duty and conscience".^{clx} The pamphlet makes much of Repelaer's career and his machinations to acquire offices. It tells of how Repelaer in 1759, after having been a member of the town council only for three years (i.e., rules of seniority are out the door!) displayed "the greatest lust to rule and selfishness after the death of Anna" and "joined several members of the town council that were not pleased with the [city] government [i.e., Karsseboom, TK]". Repelaer, the pamphlet states, used all the "scheming, intrigues or cunning ways that he knew of to get what he wanted".^{clxi} While Repelaer was unsuccessful at the time (because Karsseboom was still in power, TK) and the vast majority of regents did not submit to his unbearable lust to rule^{clxii}, his early attempts did already show his "seditious mind [...] almost nothing could happen without him interfering and passing judgment with the greatest conceitedness (Van Putten, 1782: 4-5).^{clxiii}

Van Putten continues by saying that with the advent of William V in 1766 the time had finally come for Dordrecht to submit to Repelaer's political domination.^{clxiv} Repelaer, "always worshipping the rising sun [...] used all his influence to protect and serve the interests of the Stadholder for which the latter fattened him and his friends up, as long as there was no villainy they would not commit.^{clxv} Repelaer's political corruption, according to the pamphlet, therefore also became apparent from Repelaer being a 'wind vane' without backbone and/or principles. Furthermore, everything was done by him to get offices "without there being any chance left for the old regents" (Van Putten, 1782: 7-8).^{clxvi} Repelaer was in this way being criticised for ignoring the old rules of rotation and seniority under the existing contract of correspondence. On one occasion (in 1770 according to the pamphlet) Repelaer, for instance, supposedly gave the office of Receiver of the Common Means (a lucrative office, see chapter

six) to one of his friends while then mayor Van Ouryk (lawyer at the Courts of Justice in the Hague and later Dordrecht and alderman and mayor of The Hague and later Dordrecht) had ‘rightfully’ claimed this office, first for his son and then for himself (Van Putten, 1782: 9). To Van Putten, the case of Van Ouryk and the (supposed) dealings of Repelaer provides a typical account of machinations in obtaining office in an eighteenth century Holland town. It was portrayed as the kind of cunning and intrigue Stadholderly confidants were renowned and despised for.

The pamphlet describes how Repelaer took the offices of Receiver of Convoeien en Licenten and the Dike wardenship for himself in 1771, as soon as they became vacant (Van Putten, 1782: 9). He had done so despite the fact that Karsseboom had already stipulated (before his death) that his son would get the office of receiver and that Repelaer would ‘only’ get the Dike wardenship. For Repelaer, according to the pamphlet on account of his greed, this was not enough (Ibid., 9).^{clxvii} At the same time Repelaer knew he had to tread carefully as “to ask openly for both such considerable offices could cause offence”. To avoid problems, he publicly declares the office should go to mayor Stoop who was himself a member of a long since established Dordrecht regent family (Palmen, 1998: 212) with, incidentally, close ties to the family Repelaer (Schotel, 1998: 15). Stoop wanted it for his nephew Van Puttenbroek. At the same time the pamphlet states that Repelaer, “against all traditions”, assembles a committee containing his friends and relatives and sends it to the Stadholder. The committee’s job is to ask the Stadholder if he would be willing to give the vacant office of Dike warden (which Repelaer already promised to Stoop) “to a capable person”. Apparently the scheme worked. When William asked the committee if they had any particular person in mind they suggested (of course) Hugo Repelaer^{clxviii} (Van Putten, 1782: 9). Now Repelaer had publicly promised the office to Stoop but had secretly arranged for the Stadholder to overrule that decision in his own favour. He had shown his devotion to the Stadholder, had seemingly (in public) followed informal rules of seniority but had at the same time gotten the office he wanted.

Van Putten seems to know exactly how things worked as he states that now “the Stadholder was confirmed in his belief to have found such an able and beloved man as his lieutenant Stadholder” and Repelaer “had the opportunity to show his love for the Stadholder to serve him by taking such a demanding task of Dike warden, a job that would only provide a few bags of guilders” [...] and “this shows the extent of the cunning of a human’s heart, when one sacrifices everything to his own interest” (Van Putten, 1782: 10-11).^{clxix} Mayor Stoop (the pamphlet reads) felt utterly betrayed in the meantime, especially since he had helped Repelaer to acquire an office (of Dike reeve) for one of Repelaer’s friends only two years earlier in 1769. At the time, Stoop had helped secure the office for Repelaer’s friend “in an unheard-of, unusual, yes to all utterly unknown way, completely going beyond any bounds of honesty”^{clxxx} (Van Putten, 1782: 11). This provides interesting views on what are essentially shop floor codes made public. On the one hand Van Putten writes that Stoop himself had ‘gone beyond all bounds of honesty’ in pleasing Repelaer. On the other hand, while Stoop had thus been ‘corrupt’ himself, Repelaer had committed an even greater sin when not returning the favour. To Van Putten (and most likely to Stoop as well) it had been wrong that Repelaer tried to get the job in the first place but it was even worse that he had done so by going against all shop floor codes of collegialism, ‘regent’ honesty and harmony. Political corruption meant not honouring the codes of the shop floor which, simply put, said scratch my back if I scratch yours or as the pamphlet stated: one service is worth another (Van Putten, 1782: 12).^{clxxxi}

Van Putten then goes on to state that after Karsseboom's death in 1771, Repelaer had "reached the top, and the entire city had to worship him and dance to his tune: should anyone have the courage to ask for an office without his consent, they would earn his disfavour" (Van Putten, 1782: 11).^{clxxii} His lust to rule and meddling knew no bounds. Only his fellow members of the Gecommitteerde Raden (he was a member from 1775 to 1777) were, so it seems, able to outplay Repelaer and keep him in check. On a Provincial level he was therefore not as 'capable' as he would have liked to be which apparently made his reign in Dordrecht all the worse (Van Putten, 1782: 11-12).^{clxxiii} Repelaer continued to hand out offices as he pleased to people he could use. Always, so the pamphlet reads, he ensured himself of future support in return for an office which many regents, being the "Judases" they are, happily did (Van Putten, 1782: 12). Van Putten also discusses Repelaer's move to get the Stadholder to appoint his son Ocker (see earlier) as assistant Receiver of the Convooyen in 1779 even though the latter was apparently still in school. Supposedly the Stadholder had in this way wanted to thank Repelaer for safeguarding the office of Dike warden (the one promised to Stoop) for the Orangist camp.

When Repelaer's credit in Dordrecht started to wane in the 1780s he was, according to Van Putten, ever less able to find regents who were willing "to sacrifice honour, oath and duty for their own interest" (Van Putten, 1782: 13). He could find ever less "nourishment for his dishonourable impertinence" (Van Putten, 1782: 13).^{clxxiv} Among the reasons mentioned by the pamphlet were Repelaer's Anglophilia and a general drop in revenues from commerce. Fellow regents were, in other words, less likely to put up with Repelaer's scheming the more their own commercial interests dwindled. His disregard for the codes of the shop floor were also to blame, as were his continuous efforts to serve his own interests instead of those of the nation (presumably in the fight against the English). And so, essentially due to the hypocrisy and self serving nature of his fellow regents, Repelaer was ousted from power by the town council (see earlier) "to get rid of the yoke of such a tyrant, to be able to guard with force the wellbeing of the fatherland, their city and freedom and to restore their government constitution which had been so trampled because of cowardly compliance". Now, the pamphlet states, "that salutary and reasonable objective can be attained that every regent in time is [should be] able to taste both the benefits and the burdens of government [in this way] they can prevent cowardly and lowly flatterers to keep offices for their own interest in fixed hands who thereby trample on their duty and oath" (Van Putten, 1782: 14).^{clxxv} Essentially (compare the author of the pamphlet "Missive van den heer L.V.J". discussed earlier) the author writes how it is in principle not wrong to reap the benefits of public office, as long as one deserves them. With offices "in fixed hands" the author meant, I believe, that they should be in the hands of the regent oligarchies and should be given to regents based on seniority and rotation. They should not be in the hands of a single actor. Here we see the shop floor self-interest of an excluded regent who wants things to revert back to the stability and security of the old ways.

At the end of the pamphlet Repelaer is contrasted with 'good' Dordrecht regents in past and present. First there was De Witt van Jaarsveld (1696 – 1769), grandson of the murdered Johan de Witt (see earlier) in whom "composure and caution, bravery and wisdom, and honesty and unfeigned fear of God had always gone hand in hand" (Van Putten, 1782: 14-15).^{clxxvi} Second, there were (again) Cornelis de Gijsselaar, Adriaan van Zeebergh and Johan van Berckel (two leading Patriot pensionaries of, respectively, Rotterdam and Haarlem). The latter is praised for being "a good soul, able, diligent, honest, firm or resolute and impervious to temptation". On Gijsselaar, the pamphlet continues, "you can count as on a copper wall. You would sooner see him lose his tongue than that he would harm the burdens [duties? TK] [of

office, TK] he has received only to please others” (Van Putten, 1782: 15).^{clxxvii} Both De Witt and Gijselaar were furthermore praised for their incorruptibility or unimpeachable integrity. If only the government of Dordrecht was in the hands of such men. Instead, Repelaer and others did everything for their own interest (Van Putten, 1782: 16).^{clxxviii}

Jacob van der Heim

Just like Dordrecht, Rotterdam was in the grip of the Stadholder’s confidants for most of the second half of the eighteenth century. In Rotterdam, Jacob van der Heim was the leading local representative and confidant of Stadholder William IV, Princess Anna and later Stadholder William V. Van der Heim was a typical example of a confidant. He was essentially the Hugo Repelaer of Rotterdam (as well as the latter’s relative as we have seen). He was undoubtedly selected as confidant because of the old and strong ties between the Van der Heim family and the house of Orange. Jacob’s father Anthonie van der Heim (1693 – 1746) had been Grand Pensionary of Holland and a staunch Orangist all his life. Jacob van der Heim’s first office of any significance was Secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam in 1746. This position along with his connections and family ties brought him in close contact with both Stadholder and his court in the Hague, which Van der Heim indeed frequented. The office brought him close to the Stadholder due to the latter’s interest in naval affairs since the Stadholder was General-Admiral of the Dutch fleet and its highest ranking officer. Van der Heim was also close friends to the Duke of Brunswick (Gabriëls, 1989: 237).

Gabriëls (1989: 237-238) briefly outlines Van der Heim’s career which was truly launched when Anna of Hannover disregarded the usual nomination procedures and circumvented the short-list of Rotterdam. In 1758 she gave Van der Heim a seat in the Rotterdam town council which he would keep until 1795. However, his first term as confidant ended quickly. When Anna died in 1759 Van der Heim was without a patron and his fellow town council members immediately excluded him from obtaining any offices in a quickly drafted new contract of correspondence. Van der Heim would be excluded for the coming seven years until William V assumed full responsibilities as Stadholder in 1766. From that year onwards Van der Heim would be confidant once again. In typical regent fashion, Van der Heim occupied an impressive string of legal, financial, military and ‘charity’ offices in, around and on behalf of Rotterdam during the second half of the eighteenth century (cf. Unger, 1892: 563-564). Foremost among them (besides his seat on the town council) was his position as mayor to which he was appointed by the Stadholder in 1766, an office he would occupy six times. His secretariat of the Admiralty also continued until 1795. Finally, but no less important, Van der Heim was one of the governors of the Rotterdam chamber of the Dutch East India Company from 1759 to 1795.

Van der Heim must have been a talented confidant as he managed to hold on to power for roughly three decades. The fact that his name was apparently mentioned by the Stadholder as candidate of Grand Pensionary of Holland and, also, as clerk (or *registrar*) of the Estates General (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 540 to part VI) might be proof enough of his talents. On the other hand it seems more likely that the Stadholder only threatened to give such a high office to Van der Heim because he knew of the opposition towards his confidant. Any suggestion that Van der Heim would really get such an office would have startled (which it did) the latter’s many opponents which would make it easier for the Stadholder to get what he

wanted. This can be deduced from the facetious way in which the Stadholder apparently proposed Van der Heim as candidate for Grand pensionary to Philip Jacob van der Goes (1728 – 1789). Van der Goes (cf. Engelbrecht & Poelmans, 1973: 354; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 949) was one of the leading opponents of Van der Heim in the Rotterdam town council (Krämer, 1901-1918, I: 98). He had been one of the driving factors in the removal of Van der Heim in 1782 and the related decision to end the Princely recommendations in Rotterdam. He had also been removed from the town council as a result of his Patriot sympathies in 1788 and was, for all these reasons, the perfect man for the Stadholder to startle into submission.

Van der Heim seems to have served both William and his own interests well and in Rotterdam, as had been the case in Dordrecht, his reign led to much (perceived) abuse of office (see below). In 1782, loathing towards him was mixed with political momentum when the Rotterdam town council, following Dordrecht, decided to end the system of recommendations. Here too, as suggested by Gabriëls (1989: 238), the behaviour of Van der Heim was a major factor in the town council's radical move. They did not waste any time and immediately excluded Van der Heim and six other regents from obtaining offices by means of a new contract of correspondence. At the height of the Patriot movement in 1787 he was even removed from the town council altogether. Only after the Prussians restored the Orangist order and crushed the Patriot revolution (see chapter four) did Van der Heim return to Rotterdam to again be William's confidant. In the end, the Batavian Revolution of 1795 proved to be the final end to his public career. As French troops marched on Rotterdam he fled to Bremen (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 1054) but soon returned to Rotterdam in 1796 where he died in 1799.

Much like Repelaer, Van der Heim used his special relation with the Stadholder to effectively gain control of the Rotterdam town council from 1766 onwards. His privileged position and the power, money and influence derived from his various offices enabled him to dispense patronage and make use of nepotism to get what he wanted. Van der Heim clearly knew how to be both patron (of officials in and around Rotterdam) and client (of William V) and was, all things considered, a powerful man. His nepotism and the fact that he disregarded proper procedures would be a main line of critique (see below). We have already seen, for instance, how his son Paulus had been recommended by his relative and counterpart Hugo Repelaer to the Estates-General to become second secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam. Jacob van der Heim had apparently left nothing to chance in this case. Upon his own appointment as secretary he already had it stipulated that his son Paulus would succeed him as (first) secretary when he died, making the office for Paulus a done deal.³² Repelaer's help to already make Paulus second secretary when Jacob was still alive and would obviously further such endeavours.

Apart from critique on nepotism and circumventing proper procedures on the shop floor (see below) there was also a persistent, though as yet unsubstantiated rumour that Van der Heim had personal gain from his office as secretary of the Admiralty. The five Admiralties of the Dutch Republic were highly autonomous 'semi-private' organizations. They were responsible for equipping the Dutch naval fleet and its maintenance, waged the naval wars of the Republic and protected Dutch trade and commerce across the globe. They also administered affairs on shore, such as shipyards, warehouses and arms depots (Groenveld & Wagenaar, 2011: 111, 122). Because of the importance of the Admiralties for the military and

³² Nationaal Archief [NL-NaHA], *Admiraliteitscolleges XXXI Bisdor, 1525-1793*, 1.01.47.21, inv.nr 161.

economic survival of the Republic, their high officials (which Van der Heim as secretary clearly was) were in a position to distribute and control offices, power and large sums of money. It might not come as a surprise that Van der Heim was accused of illegitimately getting his hands on money meant for the construction of war ships by the Rotterdam Admiralty in April 1784. Gijsbert van Hardenbroek (a nobleman from Utrecht and representative to the Estates-General who kept detailed notes and records in a personal diary of things going on in the Republic between 1747 and 1788) provides some information on the matter on several occasions. A first entry on 14 March 1783 (Krämer, 1901-1918, IV: 396-397) tells us how Van der Goes, in rather vague terms, told Van Hardenbroek that “money belonging to the Admiralty was given by Van der Heim and the master of equipping [R.F. van Staveren, TK] and that it had been more than fortunate that matters had not come to a head, because he, Van der Goes, hesitated to go and tell the Stadholder about Van der Heim, D’Escury [a much hated member of Van der Heim’s cabal in Rotterdam, TK] etc”.^{clxxxix} Apparently, Van der Goes had discovered something out of the ordinary but was afraid to tell the Stadholder. Perhaps for fear of reprisal.

Unfortunately, it remains unclear who the money was given to by Van der Heim and his master of equipping and what “matters” it exactly concerned. However, a second entry on the topic in Van Hardenbroek’s diary (1901-1918, V: 218-219) of 7 April 1784 provides clues as it speaks more clearly about (possible) transgressions of Van der Heim. This time it is Paulus Gilles (1708 – 1792) (cf. Krämer, 1901-1918, IV: i, v and V: 64, 557), Thesaurier-general of the union from 1769 to 1785, who complains to Van Hardenbroek about the quota’s of the various Admiralties. Gilles declares he wants purity and sincerity with regard to the finances [of the Admiralties, TK]. Van Hardenbroek recounts how Gilles says about Van der Heim: “he makes everything so obscure and confused, that it is impossible to make sense of things. I can achieve more with Bisdom [Dirk Rudolf Wijckerheld Bisdom (1740 – 1814), TK] in one hour as I can in eight days with Van der Heim who as secretary of the Admiralty has drawn immense sums of money from the accepted newly built ships, something he is not entitled to. From now on nothing should be done by the Admiralties without any prior communication by the Council of State, which would keep those bodies in an infinitely better order”.^{clxxx} Gilles seems to speak of Van der Heim taking money (contrary to Van der Goes who said he gave money).

Unfortunately Gilles is unclear about where the money went. Perhaps Van der Heim simply used too much money for the ships but it seems more likely that he did not use enough of the money that was he was given to work on the fleet and, instead, took some for himself. Truth is we do not know for sure even though some pamphlets (see below) point in the latter direction. What is clear, though, is that Gilles criticised Van der Heim for his behaviour. Similar criticism is found elsewhere too when Van der Hoop (cf. De Smidt, 1996: 132-133), Van der Heim’s successor as Thesaurier-General in 1785, complains that he misses Bisdom (as Fiscal-Attorney for the Rotterdam Admiralty) because now he has to put up with the procrastinations of Van der Heim (Krämer, 1901-1918, V: 556-557) who was still its Secretary. Van der Heim therefore seems to have been criticised by Gilles and others mainly for his shop floor behaviour but the solution, to Gilles at least, was in part to be found in increased ‘bureaucratization’, i.e., better order, better communication and clear lines of responsibility and decision-making.

Public values from public opinion sources

For his actions as confidant Van der Heim (like Repelaer) received much criticism from both Patriots and fellow regents. A short poem (*Doornekrans*, 1782) is telling for much of the other public opinion pamphlet literature on Van der Heim. It denounces him as the “murderer of the Batavians’ freedom and robber of their money, blood and honour. It is Jacob van der Heim, that fattened beast, who fears neither hell nor heaven, sold our fatherland to England out of a lust to flatter that Bacchus Orange”. It calls for an attack on Van der Heim “to break his neck and legs, to roll his fat belly through the mud, to feed him to the ravens as a burial”.^{clxxxix} Another anonymous pamphlet (*Aan den welgebooren*, 1783) was addressed to Van der Heim, who was “of good birth but of bad character”. It denounces the patronage of the Stadholder and accuses Van der Heim of following the Stadholder to serve his own interests when it says “you risk your life for a drunken Stadholder but you must be senile if you think this will gain you the rule of this land”.^{clxxxii} William V was – incidentally often portrayed as being drunk or with a bottle of wine in his hands. It was a symbol to accentuate his, supposed, inability to rule. In the end the pamphleteer promises that Van der Heim will be punished for his actions because that is “the reward for a traitor who dares betray the Netherlands [called as such, TK]”.

The pamphlet continues saying that “to lead a man to the throne for a hand of gold a man who mingles with ladies and devious whores, whose wife so often sighs at that thought, is truly a villain’s work”.^{clxxxiii} The obviously harsh tone of the pamphlet is testament to a kind of critique hitherto deemed unimaginable. To accuse a regent in such a way was daring and tells us something about the level of hatred some people obviously felt towards Van der Heim. The way it spoke of the Stadholder (implicitly at least) was also daring and for this reason the pamphlet itself caused something of a stir. In a reply (*Scherpe nagalm*, 1783) the critique towards Van der Heim was echoed but the (implicit) critique towards the Stadholder was fiercely condemned. William V, in the words of this pamphleteer, was only misled and blinded by the Duke of Brunswick. The pamphlet is another example of the complexity of the Dutch political situation in the 1780s. There were clearly (as we have seen already) those who viewed the Stadholder as a victim of corruption. The author states he “hates Van der Heim but loves the Stadholder with all his heart”^{clxxxiv} showing how there were those who were pro-Stadholder but anti-confidant.

Another pamphlet – entitled “The short way to authority and offices” from 1782 – quickly gets to the heart of the Patriot critique on Stadholderly patronage and Van der Heim’s specific role in it. The author provides an account of a dream he had in which he is walking along the various roads that lead to offices. The first road is via the court and its doorman the Duke of Brunswick, the guardian and later main advisor of Stadholder William V and key architect of the system of Princely patronage. On this road capability is not a requirement, only flattery and being a friend of the court (*Het verkorte gezag*, 1782: 7). The second road means hard work, honour and virtue. Throughout the pamphlet the author encounters and speaks to figures who tell him about the vices and virtues of government. Important virtues are valuing the interests of the citizens over one’s own (like a guardian watching over the interests of his pupil) and to teach them honour and virtue instead of obstinacy, haughtiness and licentiousness. In order to obtain offices, various figures hail the merit and qualities or capabilities that administrators should possess. A good regent should serve the nation’s interest, be conscien-

tious and should not turn a blind eye to things to please the Stadholder. He should also be selected based on capability and should choose a clean conscience over the finest gold (*Het verkorte gezag*, 1782: 12-15). The bad regent, on the other hand, displays haughtiness, self-interest, flattery, servility, toadyism and is bribed. A good regent, the pamphlet states, “is pure in his profession in that he is not bribed by gifts, by bags of English guineas to do something to the detriment of his neighbour”.^{clxxxv} Van der Heim, D’Escury and Bichon again appear as the typical examples of bad regents. The author writes “then I saw three others, of which one was a fat man, he was Jacob [Van der Heim, TK]; a second one, that was with Van der Heim, wore a big powdered wig *comme un pigeon* [Bichon, TK] as the French would say; the third had on a riding cap or a Calot d’ecury [Collot D’Escury, TK]. This trio aroused my curiosity and I asked Fame [one of the allegoric figures the author encounters in his dream, TK] who they were. They are, he answered, men of name; they have stalled instead of used ships [i.e., harmed the interests of the nation in fighting the English, TK]; they have helped the nation’s enemies [England, TK] and ridiculed themselves; they are low souls who would give up a pure conscience to obtain offices for their children (*Het verkorte gezag*, 1782: 10-11).^{clxxxvi} Here we find a hint at possible bad government and political corruption concerning the sailing and equipping of war ships (see earlier) was squarely put in the category of pro- versus anti-English sentiment. Perhaps that was all there was to the accusation as well. As I said before, political corruption to the Patriots could simply mean being pro-English.

Other public pamphlets address various bad character traits of the likes of Van der Heim. One pamphlet criticises Orangist regents, including Van der Heim, who are buddies with the Duke of Brunswick and give themselves offices and money. They are called (and we will find the term more often, see chapter eight), “chameleons [compare wind vanes, TK], changing their colours as often as they please” (*Als’t uw belieft een aalmoesje*, 1782: 16-17).^{clxxxvii} In typical fashion the pamphlet urges people not to trust these “men of ‘48”, meaning Orangists of 1748, such as Daniel Raap, Laurens van der Meer and Hendrik van Gimnig (see chapters four, five and six and note, again, the ideological and historical continuity between Doelist and Patriot movements) who are mentioned by name. To many Patriots these men symbolized the beginning of the end as their Doelist reforms had failed to bring change and had in effect only consolidated the Stadholder’s power (*Als’t uw belieft een aalmoesje*, 1782: 13).^{clxxxviii} Intrigue and flattery in order to obtain office are denounced as are bad regents (like Van der Heim) who damage commerce because they only serve personal interests and are on the side of the English. Perhaps the pamphlet is saying here that if Van der Heim had indeed withheld money meant for properly equipping the fleet and thereby protecting the interests of the Stadholder, then commerce might not have been damaged. Such a connection between bad government and decline in commerce and trade was often made. One pamphlet (*Brief van een rechtsgeleerden*, 1784: 13) for instance notes the damage to commerce and trade when “arbitrary rule of a monarch, or of a few aristocrats is made to serve the most important interests of society”.^{clxxxix}

A final public opinion pamphlet launches in at the debauchery of Princess Anna and her court including confidants such as Van der Heim. Anna is turned into the Marie Antoinette of the Dutch Republic when the pamphlet states “when one surveys the good characteristics of virtue and wisdom in her [Anna’s, TK] person, then one sees they only pertain to pageantries, galas, lavish dinners and other playfulness, the effect of which will only be the effemination of the nation, further immorality and marred royal lustre that would put an unnecessary weight on the nation’s treasury” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 3-4).^{cx} Such idle waste of money is then contrasted with the hardworking citizen when the pamphlet reads how “the good, honest,

hardworking and tireless citizen who is burdened with taxes while his freedom, goods and possessions are left unprotected” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 3-4).^{cxci} The confidants, called dependents and flatterers, join forces with Orange for their tyranny to work, “their boisterous nature and luxury make them look down upon the citizen as slaves and forget their equality. The more naughty these confidants are, the more able they are, and the more they hound people, chain them, and herd them as a flock of meek sheep” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 4).^{cxcii}

It is not surprising that the people of Rotterdam are urged by the pamphleteer to follow the exemplary lead of cities like Dordrecht in ending the Stadholder’s recommendations. Now is the time to “dispose of cowardice and mend the infringements [...] the cause of most decay and misfortune has been, the carelessness and neglect of several affairs [...]” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 8).^{cxci} Just as in the case of Repelaer the pamphlet contrasts ‘bad’ with ‘good’ regents and here too, ‘bad’ Van der Heim is contrasted with “the masculine bravery, the loyalty to the fatherland and the unwavering steadiness of the able pensionary Gijzelaar and the brothers De Witt who should be an example to others” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 3).^{cxci} In Dordrecht “people cheer and the names of De Gijzelaar, the De Witt’s of Jaarsveld and other good Patriots are on their tongues. The smallest day labourer praises them, at every meal people from all ranks drink to their wellbeing” (*Ibid.*, 6).^{cxci} Gyzelaar is depicted as “the best of good regents, who maintain property, freedom and the rights of the good community and their interests so well, so altogether creditable or deserving and so noble, which lets them be on such good terms with the community” (*Ibid.*, 6).^{cxci} Here, serving personal or communal interests are again juxtaposed. There is no doubt that this pamphleteer (and the Patriots in general) preferred to see the latter.

The pamphlet is most direct about the ending of the recommendations in Rotterdam and especially about the role played by Van der Heim and his clique (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 541). It states how Rotterdam, as yet, does nothing and “as soon as I mention the names of a Van der Heim, a Bichon, a Collot d’Escury, you will know the reason why; these cowardly dependents and gilded slaves [of the Stadholder, TK], who sacrifice civic freedom and burgher interests to caress their ambition and lust to rule, and especially Van der Heim is the disgrace and oppressor of his city”.^{cxci} Van der Heim, the pamphlet continues, “this courtier, unworthy of the dignity of being mayor and being of low principles, is not bothered by the complaints of his merchants and burghers” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 12).^{cxci} By Van der Heim and his clique “everything is countered if it’s not according to his aims and he knows to overrule the majority of regents” (*Ibid.*, 12-13).^{cxci} The author writes how there are still well intentioned regents in the city but they are overpowered by Van der Heim. If only Van der Heim would be gone, things would change. Then the good regents, “these once forced slaves”, would again behave like independent regents, protecting the interests, freedom and rights of the citizens just like they promised in their oath and duty to God”.^{cxci} Then “a forced majority [Van der Heim and his cabal, TK] would no longer counter the freedom and attempts at recovery from a good minority [those excluded from government, TK].^{cxci} Van der Heim’s politics of appointing people outside of ‘common’ procedures of the town council has to end. As long as Van der Heim is not stopped “Rotterdam and its merchants, burghers [referring to a social class, TK], regents and citizens [referring to inhabitants of a city, TK], will be disgraced by Anglophilia and dishonoured and humiliated in front of the free countrymen of Dordrecht and Schiedam” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 14).^{cxci} Again – just as in the case of Repelaer – being pro-English seemed to equal political corruption.

In rapid succession the author raises various interesting points. He has economic arguments to get rid of Van der Heim and clearly equates the individual well-being of merchants/regents (traditionally the backbone of a Dutch city, see chapter four) with that of the common good. On ‘proper’ administration the pamphlet says that it would be infinitely better when the citizenry would rule as with one voice, to counter a “lack of spirit, indifference being caused by ambition, lust to rule, self-interest, incapability, cowardice, narrow-mindedness, family interests and other such despicable motives” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 15).^{cciii} The fatherland, the pamphlet continues, now needs men like Gijselaar and Van der Capellen, “men who are true to their country, acknowledge their citizens as free and decent, and protect and serve the good community’s rights, privileges and precious interests, against all infractions, neglect and indifferent treatment, in a bold way, according to their oath and duty [...]. There are such bold regents and heroes who for freedom and citizens’ prosperity are willing to sacrifice everything, and will never allow people to be the victim of tyranny.^{cciv} They will counter characteristics of bad administration, being (again) lust to rule, boastful and ambiguous behaviour, dependence, indifference, narrow-mindedness of judgement and addiction to a few [a cabal? TK]. Instead, they will (like Gijselaar) use “wisdom, tact, eloquence, courage and persistence, combining the virtues of Brutus and Cicero, comparable to De Wit in virtue, to Barneveld in loyalty” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 30-31).^{ccv}

Public values from legal sources

As far as values from legal sources are concerned, the case of Van der Heim has many similarities with that of Repelaer. Here too hardly any values or value statements from legal sources can be found. Van der Heim, like Repelaer, was not prosecuted for any specific acts of political corruption after he had been pushed out of the town council in 1782. His fellow regents simply made a new contract of correspondence and got rid of him based on Patriot public opinion and shop floor codes (see below). Van der Heim’s machinations in Rotterdam politics and even his alleged malversations with the sale of warships were apparently not deemed enough reason for any judicial review, undoubtedly for similar reasons as in the case of Repelaer. The fact that Van der Heim had been appointed to the town council by Anna in 1759 in complete disregard for the usual nomination procedures had made his seat ‘illegal’ in the eyes of his fellow regents but this specific argument does not appear in the sources viewed, which leaves us without many legal points of view on the case from which we can deduce public values or value statements concerning the corruption of Van der Heim. While it was brought up in public opinion sources that Van der Heim had violated his oath of office (which can be construed as a legal argument) this was not part of any official deliberation. Still, what is interesting about the affair concerning alleged personal benefit from the sale of war ships is that Gilles (as we have seen) at least argued for improved bureaucratic control by the Raad van State. Also, the fact that any malversations by Van der Heim were in the end *not* investigated again points to a possible structural incompetence of the legal system to attack such practices from powerful Stadholderly confidants head on. This is, for instance, how we might interpret Van der Goes’ unwillingness or inability to notify the Stadholder.

Eventually Van der Heim would still be targeted immediately after the revolution of 1795 (see chapters four and eight) but more for ‘party-political’ reasons than anything else. Renting (1964: 275-277) tells us how on 6 January 1795 the Rotterdam town council charged

three of its citizens to draft a report on the whereabouts of former Orangist regents who were now in exile. They were also to execute plans already devised by the Provisional Representatives of Holland in February 1795 to sequester the goods of those former regents. Van der Heim was among those targeted and on 6 April 1795 (while he was still in Bremen) the final decision was made to indeed confiscate his possessions. Only due to an appeal before the Court of Holland by his sons did he manage to avoid this. Instead he was forced to provide a sum of money for a new ‘loan’ to the Provisional Representatives. The move to prosecute Van der Heim, while legal in the strict sense of the word, was essentially politically motivated and did not constitute anything like a formal legal investigation or court case, not least because the investigation was, in the end, not even carried out. Van der Heim was simply being targeted for being an Orangist and having forsaken to do the right (i.e., Patriot) thing.

Public values from shop floor sources

On the shop floor, finally, there was some interesting direct criticism from Van der Heim’s peers – as we have already partly seen in some public opinion sources. One critic was the Stadholder himself. I already wrote how the Stadholder essentially used the idea of appointing Van der Heim in a high office as political leverage in his power struggle with some opposing Rotterdam regents. Apart from any such motives the Stadholder really did not seem to have been too charmed by his confidant, at least on a personal level. Van Hardenbroek (1901-1918, I: 91, 98; IV: 113, 125) notes, for instance, how on various occasions the Stadholder had told people that he did not really want Van der Heim as Grand Pensionary, mostly because of continued requests of his family for “one office or another” and because Van der Heim was “far too long-winded and laborious in his speaking and writing”.^{ccvi} It was an opinion, as we have seen, that was shared by Van der Goes and Gilles. Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp (1762 – 1834) also agreed (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 540 to part VI) when he apparently once said how “M(onsieur) van der Heim n’a pas les vues très-étendues, et avec beaucoup de capacité et de connoissances, avec un grand pouvoir sur lui-même, il a l’esprit rétréci, il est servilement attaché aux anciennes costumes et il paroît manquer absolument cette générosité, cette grandeur d’ame, qui confondent la politique et la morale, l’homme d’état et l’homme de bien” (Van Hogendorp, 1866-1903, part III: 21-22).^{ccvii} Van Hogendorp thus characterises Van der Heim by a lack of vision, narrow-mindedness and, tellingly, as being stuck in old ways. Furthermore, according to Van Hogendorp, he confuses politics and morality, or the statesman and the good man.

Van der Heim was not just contested in court circles. In the Rotterdam town council he was contested even more. Of course, we can easily deduce this from his removal from the town council by his peers whenever the political circumstances allowed for it (in 1759 after the death of Anna, in 1782 with the end of the recommendations and, finally, in 1795 with the arrival of the French). His unpopularity also becomes apparent from other statements written down by Van Hardenbroek. Van der Goes, as we know one of the local opponents of Van der Heim in the town council of Rotterdam and fellow governor of the Rotterdam chamber of the East Indian Company (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 949), had, according to Van Hardenbroek (1901-1918, part I: 98), dared to complain to the Stadholder about the “far reaching credit of Van der Heim in Rotterdam, how he abused it, making more enemies than friends for his highness, as did Bichon and d’Escury, who pulled everything close to them, by which his

highness lost his influence”.^{ccviii} Clearly Van der Goes wants the Stadholder to think about one of the negative effects of the Stadholderly recommendations, that his confidants could also become too powerful. Similarly, Van der Goes (Krämer, 1901-1918, part IV: 433) had tried (but failed) to explain to the Stadholder how some in the Rotterdam town council were against Van der Heim, but that they did not know how to tell the Stadholder.^{ccix} Again we see the a pro-Stadholder but anti-confidant stance on the shop floor.

Another view from the shop floor is offered by some investigations that were launched by the Patriot Provisional Representatives of Holland in 1796 into the dealings of the Orangist regents of the past eight years. Much like the other prosecution of Van der Heim in 1795 (see earlier) this was a politically motivated move on the part of the Batavians to prosecute their former adversaries. This time a group of twenty-nine members of the so-called *Committee to investigate the political and financial behaviour of the members of the previous administration in Holland* were charged by the Provisional Representatives from 14 April 1795 until 28 January 1796 (when it was replaced by a new committee that worked until 28 June 1796) to try and deal with any (Orangist) regent wrongdoing in the past (cf. Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 22: 23-24). While the committee presented a report on 15 May 1796, it did not generate any results (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 5: 415-416), mostly because both committees were essentially shut down prematurely and a real investigation never got off the ground. Its members, among whom Gerrit Paape (the new Patriot leader in Dordrecht) and Reinier Leendert Bouwens (1755 – 1798) were, however, highly disappointed and would openly criticise the decision to stop the investigation.

Especially Bouwens seems to have had an axe to grind. This former Patriot regent from Amsterdam had been dismissed after the Orangist crackdown of 1787. He had been banned from the province of Holland for his attempt to stop the Prussian army from entering Amsterdam, by inundating land around the city even after the official decision had been made not to resist the Prussian troops. He thus became one of the many Patriot emigrants in France who returned in 1795, making his motives for investigating the Orangists who had banned him at least dubious. At the very least, this explains his outright anger at the decision to stop the investigations. The publicised thoughts of Bouwens on the matter provide interesting shop floor perspectives. Bouwens (1797: 33-34) for instance focuses on the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war and blames the “most scandalous management during the war, and the neglect of the navy of the state which they [the Orangist regents, TK] should have been maintained in a respectable way, as the preservation of our commerce is the foremost source of our commonwealth”.^{ccx} Van der Heim is then made into an example of this behaviour. As one of the governors of the East Indian Company of Rotterdam, the “now fugitive Secretary Van der Heim” was, again, accused of neglecting the fleet in favour of Orangist (i.e., pro-English) interests.

Van der Heim was held responsible for putting out to sea two ships (one commercial and one military) which “could have been saved if only they [Van der Heim, TK] had wanted it. Instead they chose, that is premeditated, to let these ships fall into the hands of the English”.^{ccxi} Van der Heim had deliberately failed to use common sense to serve his pro-English point of view. “This story”, Bouwens continues, “serves to show how the former regents openly favoured that pernicious system to help England [...]”.^{ccxii} Such accusations launched at Van der Heim for neglecting the fleet are interesting in relation to the accusations of profiting ‘personally’ from his work as Secretary of the Admiralty in dealing with (not) equipping the fleet. Perhaps, as was the case in some public-opinion views on the matter,

personal profit had a more ideological meaning here: i.e., not harming the Stadholder's relations with the English and not protecting the traditional commercial interests of the (Rotterdam) regents.

7.5 Analysis and concluding remarks

In the following I offer a brief synopsis of the main values and value statements found in the case. Then I provide an analysis of the main lines of arguments and the found values and value statements through a comparison of the different sources of values. Finally I will address questions of change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption in the context of wider institutional developments in the Patriot period.

Public values and value statements in the case

The scandal of this chapter offers an extensive amount of public values and value statements with which public official behaviour was condemned or supported. While, interestingly, the actual word corruption has not been encountered in any of the sources, there were many terms to describe instances which we can, for practical purposes at least, label as such. On a very rudimentary level, we can find many personal characteristics that public officials should or (more often) should not possess. When taken together both positive and negative characteristics provide quite a detailed picture of the 'ideal' public official. Good ones should, most notably, have a clean conscience and a good soul and be impervious to temptation. They should be diligent, eloquent, persistent or firm, bold, brave and courageous and at the same time be honest, reasonable, resolute, resolved, sincere, composed, conscientious, pious, cautious or prudent. Another important value (at least on the shop floor, see below) was maintaining harmony among the group of regents by following old procedures of rotation and seniority. Next to such positive statements and values we can find a string of negative ones. Foremost among them are being a courtier, a flatterer, a coward or someone with loose sexual morals. Such pejorative terms (compare also self-interest, degeneration, monarchy and slavery) were used to analyze and describe the political reality of the second half of the eighteenth century (cf. Klein, 1995: 149) and were juxtaposed with positive terms such as patriot, virtue, unity, republic and freedom. This was, of course, in line with general Patriot (best-opinion) ideology that considered the royal pretensions of the Stadholder as being a foreign element in a Republic, which could only lead to haughtiness, lust to rule, extravagance and wasteful behaviour. Other negative values and value statements included being boastful, boisterous, conceited, deceitful, dishonourable, indifferent, long-winded, meddling, narrow-minded, obstinate, seditious and/or scheming.

Comparing sources of values

Further analysis allows us to discuss public values in part based on the source of values in which they were uttered. Criticism against Stadholderly patronage and recommendations in general and against men like Repelaer and Van der Heim in particular, clearly allowed a complex variety of groups to present their arguments, protect their interests and argue with those who disagreed. Various groups in the Patriot period (in part representing different

sources of values) opposed each other on a number of fundamental administrative, political and moral issues. Between and within the various sources or 'groups' that were represented in the case, there were often different voices and arguments to be heard. Still, some coherent and persistent lines of argument can be distinguished if only because regents sometimes seemed to accuse each other of similar bad practices but as soon as they were in power all this was forgotten and they committed similar 'crimes'.

A first set of characteristics of bad – i.e., corrupt – government was mainly about arbitrary and therefore uncontrollable rule. It was a criticism with various meanings depending on context. On the shop floor it meant that Stadholder, confidants and their cabals were able to do as they pleased without consultation and were able to exclude some from office. Excluded fellow regents were not happy about Repelaer and Van der Heim because they disregarded the principle of harmony, i.e., existing formal and informal procedures and regulations such as contracts of correspondence and rotation via seniority. Circumventing these procedures and regulations meant that Stadholder, confidants and their cabals fundamentally disrupted long established ways of maintaining harmony between, first, competing groups in city and/or provincial governments and, second, between city and provincial governments and Stadholder. In shop floor regent opinion, the core of Dutch political organization – characterised by collegialism, particularism and compromise (see chapter four) – was therefore threatened by the illness or disease of political corruption and bad government. They believed that free deliberation (mentioned as such and referring to collegial practices) was better than bundling power in one person or only a few people and that offices should be given to people who have a right to them (i.e., through seniority and rotation). This meant, as mentioned earlier, that on the shop floor, values such as free deliberation and delegation of authority had little to do with popular representation and/or participation and accountability to 'the people' as Patriot best-opinion, for instance, suggested. Instead the shop floor regents wanted to return to 'true liberty' and be free from the influence of Stadholder and his confidants.

Best- and public opinion seemed to agree with this shop floor stance against violating old administrative principles or mechanisms, but for different reasons. Both sources cast a wider net as best- and public opinion considered breaking old procedures as detrimental to the general political and communal well-being of the Republic. They saw contracts of correspondence, seniority and rotation as leading to oligarchy, closed-off politics and arbitrary rule. Best- and public opinion, then, took the shop floor argument against Stadholderly patronage and recommendations one crucial step further as the shop floor still regarded these mechanisms as crucial for maintaining harmony among the regent group (compare the forthcoming dissertation of Michel Hoenderboom on the period 1650 – 1750). Public and best- opinion, however, saw these mechanisms increasingly as detrimental to 'community' well-being. They did not care about preserving regent oligarchy and this, I argue, is where morality on the shop floor and in best- and public opinion fundamentally clashed. On the shop floor the once excluded regents simply wanted to go back to the stability and security of the old ways. There were no calls for such things as participation, popular sovereignty or bureaucratization. This led best- and public opinion sources to state that the Stadholder, his clique and the regents with their 'true liberty' had *all* paralyzed the political system.

A second set of characteristics of 'bad' (corrupt) government was mainly about dependence – expressed through flattery and servitude – on personal interests in patron-client relationships. Again there is a distinction between shop floor sources and the other two (legal sources not taken into account for reasons mentioned). To excluded regents on the shop floor

being dependent on either Stadholder or confidant was a bad thing because it made you submissive (a term used as such) to another's views and demands. This, so it seems, was regarded as the end (the corruption) of regent 'true liberty'. Yet, here too, the other sources cast a wider net. There, dependence on anything other than the community, public interest or the nation's well-being (all terms used as such) was a bad thing. To best- and public opinion, dependence of regents on Stadholder, confidants and each other meant that the interests of the people or the wider community were no longer served. This is visible, for instance, in the thought of Van der Capellen – in the end the most prominent Patriot best-opinion ideologue – who saw 'aristocratic morality' as the complete subjugation to the Stadholder's whims; a morality that consisted of pleasing him only for personal gain (cf. Klein, 1995: 144; Zwitter, 1987: 52).

As such, in this second 'set', public values emerged that dealt with an elementary distinction between serving public and private interests, whereby the latter could (according to shop floor) or could not (according to best- and public opinion) interfere with the execution of a public office. On the shop floor, after all, a certain amount of self serving (sharing in the spoils of administration) was perfectly acceptable and even believed to be a prerequisite for proper administration. In best- and public opinion, on the other hand, serving one's own (financial or social) interests was wrong whichever way you looked at it. It meant, simply put, that administrators were not performing their duties and were quite simply traitors to the common good only to make some money. To best- and public opinion self-interest was solely used as a pejorative term and was constantly juxtaposed to complementary terms such as the common good, the nation's interest, the nations' well-being or the (good and hard working) community. Selfish 'tyranny', 'wallowing in luxury' and 'lust to rule' were simply juxtaposed to the supposed altruism of good government by men like Gijsselaar, De Witt and/or Oldebarnevelt who became symbols of public officials loyal to nation, society, fatherland and the interests of the people.

This fundamental distinction between the sources of values on public and private interests and a more narrow or a wider net also becomes apparent from different views on an 'Anglophile attitude'. This was condemned on shop floor and in public- and best-opinion but again for different reasons. The shop floor seemed to worry more about the apparent failure of Van der Heim to properly equip ships because of its effect on their own personal, commercial, interests. The other sources (again) debated such an issue in wider terms of harming public interests and the common good. Finally, self-interest could sometimes mean nepotism. Here too a distinction between sources can be made. While several public opinion pamphlets did not consider handing out offices to family members to be acceptable, the issue seems not to have been raised on the shop floor at all.

Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption

When we survey the case some questions concerning change and continuity of public values and perceptions of corruption still need to be discussed. First there is the question whether the vocabulary that was used was new or, rather, consisted of similar elements with new or reemphasized meaning. As Broersma (2005: 225) noted, many terms and accusations were of course politically motivated. Patriots purposefully used a quickly evolving political press and arena of public opinion to rally support. At the same time Patriot ideals of administrative

reform (and perceptions of political corruption?) were to a large extent sincere; so much so that, as Schama put it (1977: 102), their major liability was “their unheeding attachment to the letter and the spirit of those ideas [such as representative government and popular political participation, TK], which diluted the concentration of their strength and compromised the effectiveness of their organization”. Their ideals and values were also either new or reemphasized. Emphasis on community, common good, public interest, representation and accountability were certainly more prominent than before and sometimes gained new meaning. The Patriot concept of community and with it ideas on political corruption seem, for instance, to have been wider than those held by the Doelists before. The novelty of the Patriot political ideology (mostly expressed in best- and public opinion) becomes apparent from the fact that their ideas were considered completely alien to existing administration. This we can deduce from the simple fact that Orangist adversaries such as Elie Luzac (cf. Velema, 1992, 1993) or R.M. van Goens (see for Van Goens’ political thought Klein, 1995: 197-206) claimed that the Patriots had, in the words of Israel (2007: 15), “totally subverted the true Dutch constitution, past and present, by dragging in wholly extraneous abstract principles”. Strong opposition from Orangists as well as the shop floor and the failure (ironically!) of any of the Patriot measures to really take effect, also in part show the novelty of Patriot ideology.

A second and related question is whether any of this new or reemphasized language reflected a real change in moral attitude in the Patriot period. On a practical level of changing morality in town councils and provincial governing bodies, the Patriot cause does not appear to have had much lasting effect. Some cities witnessed a temporary changing of the guard around 1782 and 1787 – such as in Dordrecht and Rotterdam, but also the new Patriot town council in a city like Utrecht (cf. De Bruin, 1986) – but this was not translated in much moral change. Many (if not all?) of these new or purged town councils continued with established practices and ‘old’ ways. This is because, as we have seen, practices such as rotation, seniority, patronage and nepotism were still not considered to be bad things on the shop floor as long as all regents would benefit. It is also because the legal system was not willing or able to control or curb this shop floor attitude.

On a more ideological (best- and public opinion) level, however, the cases above certainly show a more lasting change in moral attitude. These sources of values increasingly considered ‘old’ ways of doing things to be unacceptable. In this way Patriot ideology proved to be a crucial contribution to the later reforms of the French-Batavian era after 1795. Between the two periods there was indeed a “genuine continuity of ideas and practice” (Schama, 1977: 68). The Patriots of the 1780s (many of whom would after all later be Batavians, see chapters four, five and eight) did in fact lay the groundwork for a lasting public value system in and following the French-Batavian era.

When we acknowledge that established practices were indeed fundamentally questioned by certain parties and that there was a fundamental difference between various sources of values, a third and final question arises. In ‘Johnstonian’ terms, the question is whether we see a clash of different value systems and whether we can see that some sources of values were more potent drivers of public value change? A first obvious thing to notice is the lack of any public values from legal sources. The absence of legal codes (i.e., the fact that men like Van der Heim and Repelaer were not subjected to any form of judicial action) might show that legal codes lagged behind the codes in other sources. While undoubtedly also due to the kind of scandal, specific circumstances of legal inequality and an unfortunate lack of material, it is also a sign of a blurred boundary between formal (bureaucratic) and informal (face-to-face or shop

floor) rules and practices of the time and of the absence of – as mentioned – a *Rechtsstaat*. This, I argue, is corroborated by a striking general lack of legal values (consider justice, equality or ‘due process’) in any of the other three sources. Apart from a few very general ‘bureaucratic’ statements (such as neutrality or adherence to oath and instruction) they simply did not seem to play any significant role. This is important as the apparent absence of legal codes from which to deduce any moral arguments is proof of the fact that strictly legal definitions of political corruption are not always feasible or useful. It also proves the use of the heuristics of this current study in that it also allows us to see what is *not* there.

The lack of interest from all parties in bureaucratic measures to counter political corruption is also revealing. Whereas best-opinion (compare the *Herstelling* discussed in chapter five) and, occasionally, public opinion did make a case for bureaucratic measures, these were hardly represented in shop floor sources. This means that high ranking officials as Van der Heim and Repelaer were not really embedded in any bureaucratic structures of discipline and control, something that seems to have changed in the Batavian period (see chapter eight). Finally, a lack of references to religious views by the various sources is interesting as well. Not even the preacher Bareuth used references to the bible or religion when he argued his case for reform. With legal and/or bureaucratic and religious values (in a way) ruled out, this still leaves us with other sources. First, the codes of the shop floor seemed to have been crucial in ‘conservative’ efforts to keep to old and mostly informal values, rules and regulations. This shows a remarkable resemblance to many cases from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century (cf. Hoenderboom, forthcoming) in which debates were equally about maintaining harmony on the shop floor as the all-important rule to uphold. Yet, one of the most interesting things about the cases discussed in this chapter is that the sources of best- and public opinion (indeed due to their growing importance in the period) now became truly dominant drivers of value change and started to offer crucially different views as opposed to the shop floor. There emerged ethical monism, a concept I will explore in greater detail in chapters eight and nine. Both best- and public opinion sources fundamentally questioned and disrupted the continuity of administrative practices and existing morality of maintaining harmony on the shop floor. If we have to describe this clash of value systems in any way perhaps the terms ‘aristocratic’ (meaning regent shop floor) and ‘democratic’ (meaning best- and public opinion) are not so bad after all. In the next chapter we will see just how these old ‘aristocratic’ practices would be fundamentally tossed aside, precisely as a result of major political, democratic and bureaucratic changes in the French-Batavian period.

8 Gin, Cloth, Meat: Political Corruption in the Batavian Republic (1798)³³

8.1 Introduction

In chapter four I discussed the main changes in the organization of the state in the French-Batavian period (1795 – 1813). These changes led to a government that increasingly consisted of strong central or national and weaker provincial and more local institutions. They also led to more ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’ administration. The beginnings of what is sometimes referred to as a ‘Napoleonic’ system of administration (cf. Lok, 2009; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995; Peters, 2008; Wunder, 1995) would lead to increased bureaucratization and professionalization of the civil service and, eventually, to more government activity for a wider public sphere. The period also brought increased politicization and a changing political culture. Among the public values promoted by the Batavians were (limited) popular sovereignty, representative government, accountability and public responsibility. The fundamental institutional changes of the period were thus about more than new structures or organizations. They also included public values.

For the French-Batavian period most attention has traditionally been directed towards the introduction of new institutions such as constitution and parliament. The underlying public values have been somewhat neglected. This is a missed opportunity since we can easily hypothesize how the fundamental changes of the period were also about new public values, about new assumptions of what government was or should be, and about new views on how public officials ought to behave. Because changes in values are inherently linked to changes in structures and institutions, this period – much like the periods around 1748 (chapter six) and around the 1780s (chapter seven) – can easily be viewed as an important driver of public value change. In this eighth chapter I discuss a scandal in the context of the dramatic events during the first years of the Batavian Republic. In the wake of the two coups d’état in January and June of 1798 (see chapter four) a ‘parliamentary’ investigation was launched by the moderates of June into the actions and morals of some January radicals. The result was a scandal involving bribery, high treason and the misappropriation of public funds for private benefit in a period when many already called for improving the morals of a nation thought to be in serious (economic, military and moral) decline (see chapter five and compare a large amount of moralist Spectator literature. See Hartog, 1872; Buijnsters, 1991: 32; Van Gemert & Sturkenboom, 2001: 123-124; Kerkhoff, 2007). With a detailed historical analysis I intend to help bring out some of the public values and perceptions of political corruption in the French-Batavian period. Secondly, I also offer tentative answers regarding value change in this crucial period. This is done by means of an assessment of a hypothetical link between processes of

³³ Parts of this chapter will be published in a special issue of the *Journal of Modern European History* (forthcoming, 2013) on corruption and the rise of modern politics in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, edited by A.D.N. Kerkhoff, D.B.R. Kroeze, and G. Corni.

state-formation, democratization and politicisation of the period on the one hand, and changing public values on the other.

8.2 State formation, democratization and public value change

It has been suggested that corruption became an important element in public and political discourse from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. Bayly for instance wrote how the French revolution and similar occurrences throughout Europe (including, I argue, the Dutch Batavian Revolution) started debates on the nature of good government in which representations of political corruption played a central role (2004: 101, 159, 286-288). In the French case, according to Bayly, this seemed to have happened within an already existing tradition of 'civic republicanism'. For the Dutch case a similar suggestion can be made once we look at moral reform movements of the time (see chapters five and seven) which sought to tame the tyranny of the Stadholders and the regent corruption which supposedly threatened the Republic.

According to Engels (2006) corruption in Germany and France likewise became a political issue from the end of the eighteenth century onwards and notions of political corruption also started to change which, we can assume, included public value systems. For Engels, this shift occurred partly as a result of democratization and politicisation which started a debate about the best non-corrupt form of political organization with bureaucrats who would safeguard the common interest as best as possible. Similarly, Asch, Emich & Engels (2011: 7-9, 19-27) explained this change in the context of major processes of increasing bureaucratization and democratization. The idea that links existed between such processes and changing public values and perceptions of political corruption from roughly the 1790s onwards is also supported in various other recent contributions, such as those of Bösch (2009), Schattenberg (2009), Fahrmeir (2009), Kroeze (2008) and Kerckhoff et al. (2010; forthcoming). This makes it plausible and worthwhile to also hypothetically link processes of state-formation, democratization and politicisation of the French-Batavian period to changing public values. The fast rise of a centralized bureaucratic, more democratic and politicised Dutch state could well have been an active catalyst of a 'new and improved' public morality (cf. Bayly, 2004: 245-284). The latter could well have evolved in processes of constitution-building, increased parliamentary control, growing popular influence and political participation, and changing ideas of political representation based on wider notions of popular sovereignty. Closely related is the question whether processes of state-formation, democratization and politicisation in the years around 1800 also caused a shift from early modern value pluralism (the co-existence of different and separated value systems) to modern coherent political ideologies that shared a single public value system. We already saw some movement towards ethical monism in the case of chapter seven. This, we can hypothesize, is likely to have gone ahead in later decades. Early modern value pluralism has been described by Von Thiessen who has shown how parallel norms existed within sixteenth and seventeenth century societies (2009: 94-98; 2010: 205-220).

According to Von Thiessen, early modern administrators constantly had to deal with values from two distinct moral codes. The first involved legally and formally fixed norms in service of the community. The other consisted of the informal or 'face-to-face' norms of administrative praxis. Early modern diplomats, for example, were constantly finding a balance between these two (Nützenadel, 2009: 121-142; Von Thiessen, 2010: 211-212). Such balancing has also been described by Wagenaar (2010: 1-2) who examined face-to-face rules versus more

bureaucratic ones when looking at seventeenth century Dutch bailiffs. He described face-to-face rules as functioning in a society “lacking central population registrations, large state bureaucracies, police files, social security, insurance companies and so on” consisting of members who “compensated by simply knowing anyone they had to do business with, and knowing his or her family”. These highly personal and ‘particularistic’ face-to-face norms befitted a political culture dominated by particularism, collegialism and patronage (see chapter four) and could sometimes come in conflict with the impersonal and ‘universalistic’ norms that were also already attached to early modern bureaucracy. In effect, early modern times were often characterised by two separate, co-existing value systems and administrators would often be judged according to both (cf. Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008). The following case study in part assesses whether, and if so how, this early modern world of value pluralism ended around the turn of the nineteenth century. Were different and separated public value systems indeed replaced by a single public value system based on shared public values and perceptions of political corruption and, if so how or why did this happen? Answers are offered by historical institutional analysis.

8.3 Cases of political corruption

As soon as the moderate Interim Directorate had taken charge after the second coup d’état on 12 June 1798 (see chapter four), the leaders of the overthrown radical Provisional Directorate were arrested.³⁴ On 12 June two companies of grenadiers, led by general Daendels (who had by that time turned against the radical regime) were sent to arrest the radical leaders Stefanus Jacobus van Langen (1758 – 1847), Wybo Fijnje (1750 – 1809) and Pieter Vreede (1750 – 1837). As soldiers entered the room where the three were having dinner with Charles-Francois Delacroix – then French ambassador to the Batavian Republic – Van Langen was arrested on the spot and immediately imprisoned. Vreede and Fijnje however managed to escape through the window (Schama, 1977: 350). Vreede fled to Lierre in the Austrian Netherlands (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251) and would as a result not be arrested. Wybo Fijnje turned himself in on 24 August 1798 and was, like Van Langen, imprisoned. The other two members of the Provisional Directorate, Berent Wildrik (1754 – 1831) and Johan Pieter Fokker (1755 – 1831) were also arrested but allowed to leave prison after only a few hours. Apparently they had been left out of the loop by Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje and seem to have been members of the Executive Committee in name only (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lxxiii). Furthermore, since they had already promised to resign, they were left alone. In a letter to the French Directorate, dated 12 June 1798, the Interim Directorate of the Batavian Republic states how “les citoyens Vreede et Fijnje ont pris la fuite, le citoyen Van Langen a été le seul arrêté. Quand aux citoyens Wildrik et Fokker, indignes de la conduite affreuse de leurs collègues ils avaient déjà dormés leur demission ce matin”.³⁵

Following the arrests of Van Langen and Fijnje, the Moderate Interim Directorate was asked by the first chamber of the Representative Assembly to launch what we might call the

³⁴ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, nummer toegang 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509: folder with loose documents entitled “Minutes of 12 June 1798”, document number [doc. no.] 25: Warrant for the arrest of Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen, 12/06/1798.

³⁵ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509, “Minutes of 12 June 1798”.

first ‘parliamentary’ investigation of the Netherlands into the actions of Van Langen, Fijnje and Vreede during the radical regime’s brief period in power. While initially undoubtedly designed as an instrument in the ongoing political strife between different factions, the reports and evidence published by the Interim Directorate – largely based on investigations led by attorney general Cornelis Felix van Maanen (1769 – 1846) (cf. Kluit, 1953; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 3: 803) offer much evidence. The radicals (mostly Van Langen and a host of ‘lesser cronies’ but Vreede and Fijnje as well) had been guilty of all kinds of wrong behaviour, ranging from high treason to financial mismanagement and abuse of public funds for private benefit.

Reports on political corruption

The main report (Pijman, et al., 1798) – hereafter called *Memorie* – was presented on 1 August 1798 and describes events leading up to and during the radical regime’s six months in power. It provides unique views on what was thought to be unacceptable public official behaviour at a time when the newly formed Batavian Republic was still trying to find its bearings. Despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that the case against the members of the radical Directorate was at least partly politically motivated, the *Memorie* offers a view on what both moderate regime as well as the lawyer Van Maanen believed to be wrong or ‘corrupt’ behaviour. Still, because the *Memorie* also served a particular purpose (to incriminate political adversaries) it most likely deliberately withheld or even changed some information (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xii). Therefore, the following makes use of other documents as well. These are, mainly, the so-called *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* (*Authentic appendices to the events of 12 June*)³⁶ made public by the Interim Directorate in eighteen separate issues in 1798 containing incriminating evidence (letters, bills of exchange, lists of expenses etc.) against Van Langen and others. Other documents used in the following were gathered and organized by Colenbrander.

Use of public funds for private benefit

When planning their coup of 22 January, Van Langen, Vreede, Fijnje and Theodorus van Leeuwen (on Van Leeuwen see Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xlix; Geyl, 1948-1959: 473; Schama, 1977: 287) knew they needed French support and money. Past experience had taught them that French assistance would not be cheap (in 1795 the French had already ‘asked’ the Batavians for a hundred million florins – three times the amount of the Dutch annual tax income at the time. Cf. Pfeil, 1998: 126). When radicals in France took control in a coup on 4 September 1797 – after a Royalist conspiracy against the French revolution had been unveiled (cf. Rosendaal, 2005b: 21) – the radical democrats in the Batavian Republic saw an opportunity to get support for their own plans from a French Directorate of kindred spirit (cf. Geyl, 1948-1959: 472). The very first steps in approaching the French were not so much taken by Van Langen and co. but by an eclectic collection of individuals, aptly dubbed by Schama as the “Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle” (1977: 298), who functioned as intermediaries between the French and the Dutch radicals. Members of the circle included Jan Eykenbroek, Hobbe van Eberstein, Hendrik Nobbe, Wouter Struyk, Anthonie Boeseken, Brahain Ducange, and A.H. Bode. Some, like Eykenbroek and Eberstein, were returned Patriots who had fled the Republic

³⁶ See NL-HaNA, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 509 and NL-NaHA, *Collectie 039 Gagel, 1752-1820*, 2.21.005.39, inv.nr. 172. Present there are issues 1, 2, 3 and 7.

after the 1787 Orangist crackdown. Others, like Bode, Boeseken and Nobbe were ‘Amsterdam Jacobins’, fierce unitarians and members of Batavian clubs such as “Letter Z” (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 1: 1384) which were largely responsible for purging the Amsterdam Primary Assembly (cf. Schama, 1977: 330). Despite some variation among these men they all belonged to what Schama has called “the throng of fortune hunters and office-mongers as well as more down-at-heel but reputable Patriots swarming like locusts around Paris” (Schama, 1977: 284). They were politically active ‘democratic’ radicals who were also mainly driven by personal financial interests (see below). All of them hoped to capitalize on the Batavian Revolution (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xlix).

Vreede, Fijnje, Van Leeuwen and Van Langen hardly ever dealt directly with the French (this could be perceived as treason, as it later indeed would be!) but used their henchmen to convince the French into helping the radical Dutch cause. First contact with the French on behalf of the radicals seems to have been made by Bode. Attached to a letter to Vreede is a note from 27 October 1797 from Bode to Paul Barras, the most powerful member of the five man French Directorate and according to some notoriously corrupt and greedy (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1250; Schama, 1977: 285-287). The note reveals the first steps in negotiating with the French as it says how “the spirit is good in Holland, the majority wants the good. There is no shortage, neither of arms nor money, which will be offered to France as soon as the voice of the friends of their country is heard” (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 527).^{ccxiii} Following this initial contact, Bode, Eykenbroek and Eberstein were sent to Paris by Vreede and others for further negotiations (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xlix). Eberstein furthermore asks Ducange to act as middle man between the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle and Charles Delacroix (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lx-lxi).

The Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle eventually managed to secure a deal with Barras. Colenbrander (1905-1922, part II: lxxv. See also Geyl, 1948-1959: 472-473) discusses the rounds of negotiations that begin with a French request for 1,000,000 guilders in return for their backing of the Dutch radicals. Eykenbroek is then authorized to get 200,000 guilders in cash (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249-1250). The rest of the money will be paid in goods (gin, cloth and meat) meant as provisions for the French troops already camping in the Batavian Republic since 1795 (Kluit, 1953: 66-67; Rosendaal, 2005b: 21). Apart from the deal for French backing of the coup, another deal is also made in which the Batavians promise 1,500,000 guilders (part cash and part goods) to the French in return for acquiring territory, a trade agreement, protection for Batavian property under a neutral flag and decreasing the number of French troops on Batavian soil (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 588: 717). On 11 February, Eykenbroek and Eberstein return to Paris with this offer but Barras comes up with a new one. He now wants 300,000 guilders in cash and the rest in goods for the French backing (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 592) and 3,000,000 guilders for the other deal. Van Langen agrees with the first deal but reduces the second to 2,500,000 guilders. The first million would be transferred by Eykenbroek as soon as the latter was sure the French would hold up their end of the bargain (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lxxv. See also idem, doc. 588 and footnote there; Pijman, et al., 1798: 165-167; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1009-1010 and part 9: 1250).

For ready cash the radicals turned to the (public) funds of the former Dutch East India Company, since 1795 in the hands of the state and administered by the so-called East Indian Committee (EIC). It was convenient – but hardly a coincidence – that Van Langen was appointed member of this committee on the day of the coup on 22 January (Molhuysen, et al.,

2008, part 8: 1010) and that Fijnje was already a member (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 1: 906). The remaining millions to be paid to Barras were, in part, acquired through bills of exchange from the EIC. These bills were orders made by one person to another to pay money to a third person. Much like a cheque today, it was a written order by a drawer to a drawee to pay the money to a payee. In this case Van Langen – virtually the only Directorate member directly dealing with money (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1009) – was the drawer who ordered the drawee P. de Munnick – the secretary of the department of finance for the EIC – to pay money to the payees Eykenbroek and others who then used it to pay Barras.

In order to acquire the goods (gin, cloth and meat) for the French army the radicals turned to even more creative techniques. They decided to use their own businesses to supply these goods and pay themselves for it with EIC credit. Both Van Langen and Vreede were textile merchants who made sure their businesses would benefit from such a large order. Providing armies with equipment, clothing and food, the so-called “bonanza business of the 1790’s” (Schama, 1977: 284) was indeed lucrative. Just after 22 January 1798 Vreede already supplied a first batch of cloth to the French (Legrand, 1895: note 2 page 162; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249) and paid himself for it with EIC credit. Van Langen would do the same. In a short note to Eykenbroek from 9 February 1798 Van Langen writes: “I have accepted the batch of cloth, now it is up to you to make sure it is shipped” (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: doc. 590).^{ccxiv} Other actors in the negotiations with Barras turned out to be equally self-serving. Many of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle already dealt in supplies for the French and Batavian armies (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 525, doc. 526; Geyl, 1948-1959: 472). On 6 February 1798, a partnership between Struyk (conveniently a major in the citizens militia of The Hague and dealer in army supplies at the same time. See Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 555, footnote 3), a certain Anthony Gertner and Jan Eykenbroek was, for instance, set up to supply uniforms (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 523, doc. 589; Pijman, et al., 1798: 160-161, exhibit 19a). The partnership seems to have acted as a front for Vreede and Van Langen (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249). Eykenbroek, furthermore, was a former distiller (Schama, 1977: 284) who might still have had connections in the field and Eberstein, finally, still owned a gin distillery at the time of the deal (Pijman, et al. 1798: 38-39, 160-161, exhibit 19a).

In short, it quickly became apparent after 12 June that Van Langen and others had used the credit of the EIC for purposes other than merely ‘arranging’ French support and ‘serving the Nation’s interests’, as Van Langen and others would later call it to defend their actions. The moderates, however, had rather different ideas about what the interests of the nation were. To them the coup of 22 January was nothing short of treason. Besides, the deal to pay part of the amount in cloth, gin and meat was a rather obvious way of serving private commercial interests. The fact that much of the communication among the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle was written in secret code perhaps testifies they knew what they were doing was wrong. Money was, for instance, referred to as corn (or *smorfio*) and Holland was called Africa. As such, a letter from Eberstein to Eykenbroek from 11 December 1797 suddenly makes sense as the former writes that Joseph (?) and the Rabbi (?) insist that they (Eykenbroek and Eberstein) sail to Africa and get corn before they are willing to do anything (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 539: 561).^{ccxv}

The deal to supply the French army with provisions and clothing was not the only scheme for which Van Langen and others used the trick of using EIC bills of exchange. Among the documents seized by Van Maanen³⁷ was Van Langen's personal business administration which revealed how he had often used EIC funds to settle personal debts and business affairs. The administration of Van Langen's cloth factory revealed how EIC funds had been used to settle personal matters. Van Langen paid money to the Vreede's cloth company (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798, issue no. 5; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249), to Jan Pessers (a fellow cloth merchant from Tilburg and Assembly man (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798, issue no. 5; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8, 1010) and to J.E. Guerin, a clerk in Van Langen's cloth business. In part, these payments had already started before the coup of 22 January. Van Langen – by his own admission³⁸ – would sometimes decide to keep money taken from the EIC for himself and buy parts of the cloth needed for the French army from people who still owed him money (Pijman, et al., 1798: 36).³⁹ To settle his debts Van Langen's cashier Guerin seems to have been constantly looking for, and receiving, EIC money (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798; Pijman, et al., 1798: 36-37).

Van Langen and, albeit to a much lesser extent, Vreede thus made sure they were serving the revolution as well as their personal commercial interests. A letter by Van Langen to Eykenbroek, dated 21 February 1798, is especially revealing. Van Langen calls on Eykenbroek to keep on strengthening the ties with the French (i.e., Paul Barras) since his personal financial affairs are also on the line. He writes: “how I have had to sacrifice my commercial interests to the revolution”. The French, according to Van Langen, “should therefore keep on taking steps” and Eykenbroek should “keep this in mind, or else nothing will happen, then our other engagements [the supply of gin, cloth and meat? TK] would fail, you know what I am trying to say here” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 17, 67, appendix 1).^{cxvii} The French, in other words, had to stay on board to receive their payment which was beneficial to Van Langen and others. Furthermore, the longer the radical Directorate was backed by the French, the longer Van Langen and others could stay in power, enabling them to potentially reap even more financial benefits in the future. The fact that Van Langen and others had constantly used EIC money for a wide variety of purchases really does become apparent from the *Memorie*. One appendix (Pijman, et al., 1798, appendix 10: 88) provides a list of expenses on ‘luxury items’ found in Van Langen's office by Van Maanen's investigators. The list totals 15,926 guilders. There was, for instance, 697 guilders for renting carriages; 242 guilders for buying hats and scarves as presents for the directors Wildrik and Fokker; 15 guilders for the repair of some furniture; 5 guilders for several tea cups and 2 guilders for the repair of a chess game. Another payment by Van Langen using EIC credit was 3,000 guilders to Pieter Ondaatje (1758 – 1818),⁴⁰ a Patriot of the first hour and – incidentally – fellow member of the EIC as well as Secretary to the Agent of Internal Police. Perhaps the money was a bribe to keep Ondaatje quiet about taking EIC money?

³⁷ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509, “Minutes of 12 June 1798”, document number [doc. no.] 13: Order to La Pierre to seize all personal documents of Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen, 12/06/1798.

³⁸ NA, *Collectie 018 C.F. van Maanen (1900), 1717-1867*, 2.21.114.03, inv. nr. 18. Secret letters by the removed representative Van Langen to Pieter Vreede during the former's detainment at the Voorpoort in The Hague. Letter 3: Van Langen to Vreede, date unknown.

³⁹ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 508, item 399: “Rapport van Johan Philip Hildebrand en Adrianus Zeemans aan den burger La Pierre, agent van inwendige politie”, 27/06/1798.

⁴⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509, item 68, 06/07/1798.

Views on the case: different sources of public values

The case revolving around Van Langen can be viewed from a variety of sources of values. Best-opinion has been largely described in chapter five but will sometimes return in the following because some key actors in the scandal (most notably Gogel, Vreede and Fijnje) were also key best-opinion moralists. Public opinion, shop floor and legal sources of public values also had an important part to play. Even though there is often much overlap between the sources (see chapter three) I will – as in the other two cases – separate them as much as possible.

A mixture of sources: the Interim Directorate on bad government

First there were documents from the Moderate Interim Directorate itself. Obviously there was the *Memorie*. This source of values in the case is, in reality, more of a mixture of sources. It holds personal (shop floor) views of members of the moderate Directorate who condemned the actions of the radicals. At the same time these views are also best-opinion stances from the new political leaders and (for instance in the case of Isaac Gogel) long time Patriot ideologists (see chapter five). The *Memorie* can also be regarded a legal source of public values. It was partly assembled by legal prosecutor Van Maanen and judgment by the Interim Directorate was therefore also based on legal arguments. Although the *Memorie* is by far the most elaborate and important source through which we can view the public values of the Interim Directorate, they also published the, already mentioned, *Authentieke bylagen tot den 12 Junij*. Clearly, the Interim Directorate wanted to get public opinion on their side. In the following both sources are discussed.

A first major line of critique in the *Memorie* entails broad or general critique at the political corruption of the entire radical regime. Here we can recognize Johnston's notion of classical political corruption as the corruption of the body politic in general. The moderate Directorate focuses on bad government by the radicals, which is especially reprehensible in times of political and economic hardship. They criticize, for instance, the purges following 22 January 1798 which were – at least according to Colenbrander – generally detested (1905-1922, part II: lxxiii). Bad government also entailed the way in which the radicals had assumed power. This had resulted in a lack of legitimacy, problems of accountability and office hunting of the regime. The inability of the radicals to follow proper procedure and keep their administration in order was also criticized. The *Memorie* shows how the Interim Directorate was unanimous in condemning the coup and the behaviour of the previous regime. "Solid reasoning", the *Memorie* (Pijman, et al., 1798: 27) states, "makes one understand that the administration of a nation cannot be left to men who, through a desire for self preservation and self elevation, have acted with so little tact that the building only just built [i.e., the Batavian Republic, TK] already had to collapse under its own weight".^{ccxvii} "One would have to search in vein", the moderates continue, "for men of capability, loyalty and courage [...] all of it testifies to their incapability, negligence, sloppiness and disloyalty" (Pijman, et al., 1798: 30).^{ccxviii}

Clearly, the Interim Directorate was critical. While undoubtedly politically motivated, their critique also consisted of a fundamental ethical positioning. A first set of ethical issues raised was the perceived lack of legitimacy and accountability of the radical regime. According to the Interim Directorate – as explained in the *Memorie* – Van Langen, Vreede and others had

formed an “unconstitutional and illegitimate” Directorate after 22 January. In the constitution of 1 May 1798 it had been stipulated that the Constituent Assembly should organize the election of a new Representative Assembly after which the former was to be dissolved. However, despite of this stipulation the radicals introduced a so-called ‘two-thirds’ rule. With this rule they decided that two thirds of the new Representative Assembly were to be former members of the purged convention that had come into being after 22 January (Elias, et al., 1991: 11-12; Palmer, 1954: 31). In a way the temporary Constituent Assembly which had been purged of all ‘aristocratic’ elements had thus decided to elect itself as the new Representative Assembly on 4 May. The radical Directorate (Van Langen and others) also remained in power instead of stepping down. In applying the ‘two-thirds rule’, the radicals had, according to the *Memorie*, bypassed the constitution and ‘re-elected’ themselves without giving the population a proper chance to vote. They had thereby undermined the idea of popular sovereignty so essential to the Batavians. It had “attempted to secure and consolidate its position before the representative body had a chance to decide on the constitution and before the population had a chance to speak” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 26-27).

The leaders of the Republic, as the *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* described it, had turned into “usurpers, trampling on the constitution” (issue no. 4: 13). The critique seems, at least with regard to Vreede, not completely fair. Someone like Vreede had always been one of the most fervent advocates of more and improved popular voting. His proposal of 24 January 1797 (leading up to the ‘referendum’ of august 1797 to vote on a new constitution) to get rid of the system of electors in order “to link popular will and government” was, for instance, denied (Colenbrander, 1905-1922: xlv; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1248; Rosendaal, 2005b: 29-30). At the same time, however, the radicals had clearly wanted to push through and grasp the moment instead of lingering on in elaborate (bureaucratic) procedures and routines. By their own admission (see shop floor codes of Van Langen and Vreede below), their desire to provide the Batavian Republic with a new unitary constitution seems to have trumped their ability or desire to follow proper procedures, even when (or because?) it concerned their own rules.

To the Interim Directorate, lack of representation and proper procedure had resulted in a lack of legitimacy and accountability. This, according to the *Memorie* became apparent from the improper way of appointing people in office; among them was La Pierre, one of the drafters of the *Memorie* (see also below). While executive orders and letters by the radical regime showed how people had been appointed there were no official minutes of deliberations on such matters of any kind. This, to the *Memorie*, proved that “important offices were given without their parameters having been properly defined”. It also proved how “the lack of instructions designed for these officials lays bare how the interests of the nation have become dependent on the ability, honesty and moderation of a single person” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 30).^{ccxix} These offices were handed out without procedures, instructions or proper (parliamentary?) supervision. The idea that lack of procedure and instructions led to a lack of accountability and legitimacy is of course interesting and, potentially, new. The fact that La Pierre, himself a member of the moderate Interim Directorate and co-author of the *Memorie* which attacked people for similar reasons, felt comfortable to have his own name mentioned is interesting too. It could have been a case of double standards and/or a remnant of ‘old regent ways’ but perhaps a more fundamental assumption was made. Perhaps it was wrong to appoint officials without proper procedure but not wrong for the official to accept a position offered to him in this way?

Other nominees for important offices also proved dubious. Fijnje, for instance, had been persistent in his nomination of Pieter Weiland (1754 – 1842) for the post of Minister of the Interior. When Weiland, a Remonstrant preacher in Rotterdam, told Fijnje he did not want the office as he had no knowledge of such matters, Fijnje apparently told him one learns as one goes along. When Weiland still refused, Fijnje (without success) threatened to use force to keep him (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251). We have to wonder why Fijnje was so adamant in appointing someone who was clearly unwilling and, by his own admission, incapable. Perhaps he wanted ignoramuses in important offices so that he himself could have more control? The selection of other ‘officials’ by the Directorate Directorate had also been shady. Eykenbroek, for instance, had been clerk of Van Langen’s business prior to the revolution (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1009-1010) and reappeared as Van Langen’s confidant in Paris.

Various requests for offices were also directed at the new regime. Investigations by Van Maanen showed correspondence between Fijnje and certain members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle asking for jobs. Hendrik Nobbe (*schout civiel* in Amsterdam as of 15 March 1798) asks if a certain G. Sonneveld could get a post in the navy (cf. Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 542, footnote 2)⁴¹; H.H. Midderigh asked of a certain H.C. Hooft could be placed as clerk somewhere⁴²; a certain Pieter Pijpers sent two letters asking for employment⁴³; Lucas Butot (for Butot see Schama, 1977: 328-329, 330, 333) puts in a good word for a certain De Jonge and Gieseken who, Butot writes, will go to Fijnje to ask for a job as clerk or something similar. Butot says of them “they write well, speak French and English and have spirit enough to work in a capable way [...] both families are loyal to the patriot cause and are brave, revolutionary and trustworthy [...] I ask you, if possible, help them”.⁴⁴ A certain Nozeman requests Fijnje to hire Pieter van Groeneveld⁴⁵ who would in 1799 (see below) be indicted for conspiring to bring down the moderate government of the Batavian Republic.⁴⁶

Lack of proper procedure and keeping a good administration also caused problems of accountability as far as the Interim Directorate was concerned. The moderate directors seem to have been appalled by the chaos at the radical Directorate’s offices (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251). It was so disorganized that it proved near impossible to check what the radical Directorate had done after they had assumed power. The minutes of their meetings were largely incomplete. Worse still, information that Van Maanen was able to find in all sorts of places could not be found in the official minutes. This obviously did not constitute open access to information or ensure proper accountability or control. To a suspicious eye (and by now there were many), it also hinted at irregular behaviour which the radical directors might have been anxious to conceal (Pijman, et al., 1798: 30).^{ccxx}

The purges of 1798 and the way in which the radical regime had appointed other new ‘officials’ (apart from Agents like La Pierre and Wielema) was another problematic moral issue to the moderates. According to the *Memorie*, the purges had been the result of an insatiable lust for offices. Purging of both National Assembly and Primary Assemblies of “good patriots” had been followed by appointments of men “who were incapable and unsuitable [...] who’s only asset was being able to shout real loud” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 45).^{ccxxi} Some, like Bode and

⁴¹ NL-HaNA, *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 508: Letters to Wybo Fijnje, letter 12, no date.

⁴² *Ibid.*, letter 13, no date.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, letter 14, 15, no date.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, letter 32, 02/02/1798.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, item 91.

⁴⁶ NL-HaNA, *Collectie 018 C.F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807*, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 20, item 1, 28/06/1799.

Boeseken had “made arrests deviating completely from the common rule of law, stemming only from the conceit of the administrators [...] thus weakening police and justice in the Batavian Republic” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 46).^{ccxxii} The role these men played in the purges (cf. Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lxx) was also criticized in the *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* (issue no. 4: 12) in which it was asked “are not all able and respectable citizens driven from their offices by incapable and evil men? Are not thousands of innocent civil servants, with their wives and children, reduced to beggary, by incapable men, drunkards without morals?”^{ccxxiii} It has been argued that Vreede and the other radicals simply “wanted to rid the National Assembly of the best and most honest people in order to have free reigns, so that their criticism would not hinder them” (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1248).

Another batch of criticism was directed at the fact that radicals had surrounded themselves with (and trusted, see below) people of bad reputation and supposed ill character. Of course, this involved the likes of Eykenbroek, Eberstein and other members of the circle. The disdain for these men was great. The *Memorie*, for instance, targeted Boeseken “who’s spiteful spying and devious insinuations were rewarded by an offer [by the radicals, TK] to make himself useful to the nation” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 45).^{ccxxiv} About Eberstein the *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* (issue no. 6: 8-11) state: “he will always be a chameleon [...] sliding through the grass like a snake, showing himself only in the dark; he claims to have revolutionary principles but his true disdain for these principles becomes apparent from his tone against everything having to do with the revolution. He lives like a king but nobody knows where he gets his funds”.^{ccxxv}

In a note from Jacob Blauw and Caspar Meyer (both representatives of the Batavian Republic in Paris) to Vreede and Van Langen (Colenbrander, part II, doc. 617) of 18 March 1798, the former complain about Eykenbroek (and others). They criticize his lack of experience and knowledge and his high-handed actions without following proper procedures (through Meyer and Blauw). They also state they had wondered whether it had been truly necessary to offer so much money to the French and that they questioned whether all that money had reached those it was intended for or had, instead, ended up in pockets of those whose authority only rests in making a show”.^{ccxxvi} This was also true for Eberstein who is (again) called a chameleon and a snake who only comes out at night. Another favourite target was Ducange who the *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* (issue no. 8: 3) called “that scum of humanity [...] that villain, whose life is nothing but a succession of atrocities” [...] He who for a hand of gold served the party of the Stadholder and England, he who betrayed that same court as soon as the French gave him bread”.^{ccxxvii}

Clearly, accusations and suggestions launched at Eykenbroek and others served to criticise Van Langen and others in the process. The second issue of the *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* presents five letters from Boeseken to the radical Directorate. From these letters it becomes apparent, according to the Interim Directorate, “how the national time has been wasted in such a scandalous way by the previous Directorate Directorate, among other things by correspondences that had no other point than to keep for themselves the positions they had managed to nestle in, not for the people! Only for themselves. [...] Now we will let the people judge in whom the Directorate power of the Batavian Republic put its trust without suspicion [...], whose wishes it granted without thinking [...]. They used them only as tools for their disguised lust to rule” (issue no. 2: 3-4).^{ccxxviii} It was a way to criticize the abuse of trust, the harming of the interests of the people, the lust for power, the misappropriation of power

under false pretences, wasting the national time (there were better things to do!) and serving private interests with public offices of the *entire* group.

The Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle was perceived as foreign diplomats, or at least as useful secret agents, by Van Langen and others but as detestable conspirators by the moderate Interim Directorate. In the name of the revolution, they had been, after all, mostly interested in making their own fortunes. According to Schama, Bode and Eberstein had, for instance, persuaded Eykenbroek to use his political connections with Barras for their mutual benefit, “adding that the successful outcome of their venture could only redound to the greater good of their beloved fatherland” (1977: 285). Also, a letter recommending Bode was sent by Van Leeuwen to Caspar Meijer, who would later arrest Eykenbroek in Paris (see Schama 1977: 340; Colenbrander 1905-1922, part II, doc. 602: 728) on 13 November 1797. The letter was later submitted to the Interim Directorate (on 27 July 1798) as evidence against the radicals (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 534; cf. Geyl, 1948-1959: 473). Van Leeuwen recommends Bode to Meijer as being a “trusted friend, a brave patriot” and asks Meijer “to be so good as to trust him as you would trust me. Let him know everything you know [...] point him which way to go so that he may achieve his goal. These services provided to him I will regard as services provided to me and mine; you will receive your reward in your conscience”.^{ccxxxix} The letter was clearly given to the Interim Directorate to show how the radical Directorate had put all their trust and a huge responsibility in the hands of ‘thugs’ like Bode.

According to Schama (1977: 286), Colenbrander’s interest in the individuals of the Eberstein-Eykenbroek circle gave them greater status and influence than they actually had. This might be so (this is not the place to discuss this) but when assessing the morals of the time, however, their position and actions are very relevant indeed. To the Interim Directorate (and others, see public opinion sources) men like Boeseken, Eykenbroek or Eberstein seem to have only been important because they were an easy target. Their existence enabled them to criticize the bad judgment and corrupt nature of the previous Directorate. Van Langen and others had, after all, put their trust, public money, matters of national importance and the national honour, in the hands of “fortune hunters and schemers” who abused the nations’ interests in favour of their own on useless schemes and intrigue.

While the petty corrupt conspirators of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle were thus relatively unimportant in the grand scheme of things, their involvement in the revolutionary cause was important as it reflected poorly on the radical Directorate. This becomes clear from the eighth issue of the *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* (issue no. 8: 3-5) which promised “several letters of a man [Ducange, TK] who deserved being despised by all but who nevertheless had a decisive influence on the French emissary Delacroix and the majority of the Directorate Directorate of the Batavian Republic – and who manages as such to rule the Republic. You ask how is it possible that a man completely without morality, known to be despicable, can get the trust of the administration in such a way? These letters will tell you the answer: he starts with flattery, he grovels, he begs for favours, all means are welcome [...] he does not know true and noble love for people”.^{ccxxx} The *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* further commented that a revolution (i.e., the second coup of 12 June) had indeed been necessary when “the hard earned money of the citizen was not spent right or simply stolen”.^{ccxxxi} The dishonesty towards the population was continuously stressed and unanimously condemned because representatives were there to serve the interests of the people and not their own: “it is indeed terrible to see such horrible deeds of men placed in high positions of power to serve our interests” (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798, issue no. 5).

A second main line of critique in the *Memorie* and *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* was about specific individual acts of abuse of office and financial malversations. It concerned the condemnation of individual and specific acts of stealing, bribery and abuse of public funds for private gain. This is reminiscent of Johnston's notion of more 'modern' perceptions of individual (financial) political corruption (see chapter one). The critique focused, above all, on the use of public money for private benefit and luxury and the Directors' inability (or unwillingness) to keep their administration in order. From the outset the *Memorie* (1798: 33) expressed the desire for a thorough investigation "to find out the reasons for the scandalous theft of so much money".^{ccxxxii} It also reacted to an earlier report which Gogel and La Pierre had sent on 25 July 1798 to the other members of the Interim Directorate by stating how: "the Batavian people, so famous for its frugality and simplicity has apparently had to pay for the extravagant expenses of three of its fellow citizens, as Fokker and Wildrik occupied an expensive home in The Hague [and how] in these destitute times we have seen how the nation has paid for costumes, a theatre and carriages [for Van Langen, TK], meant to serve the Directors' idle waste of time while so many citizens are so often waiting in vain to be heard" (Pijman, et al., 1798: 34).^{ccxxxiii}

Proof of this supposed idle waste soon emerged. According to a letter from the minister of justice on 4 July 1798, Van Langen had apparently indeed taken six thousand guilders from the EIC to pay for the renovation of the Amsterdam theatre (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798, issue no. 5). Vreede and Van Langen also seemed to have had a taste for opulence. They tried (but failed), for instance, to turn the court (The Noordeinde palace in The Hague) into their official residence (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251). Just how much this kind of behaviour bothered the moderate Directorate becomes apparent from the fact that they published a letter from Ducange to Van Langen on the topic in the *Appendices* to June 12 (issue no. 3: 13-14) in which Ducange supported the Directors in their efforts to find 'suitable' accommodation and wrote: "is it not necessary indeed that with the high dignity with which all five of you have been bestowed, should come a certain amount of splendour?"^{ccxxxiv} In a reaction to Ducange, the moderate Directorate wrote that "the splendour of Republicans is virtue, courage and sincerity and where these are lacking, affluence is a poor varnish to hide the stains".^{ccxxxv}

The combination of a nation in decline (see chapters four and five) while its Directors were living the good life was strongly condemned by the moderate Interim Directorate. The *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* (issue no. 6: 8-11) speak of the poor citizens who "give the most precious interests of the fatherland in the hands of people that do not deserve any trust and who, as soon as they had gained power, no longer thought of its terrible state; they squandered treasures that were entrusted to them which they knew how to extort in such a way that any decent Dutchman can only shiver at the thought of it".^{ccxxxvi} The Interim Directorate goes on to say that "they know people are not without interests or cannot be disinterested with their own good and that of their family but that there are still times when the fatherland requires one to be virtuous. We cannot, therefore, be more astonished at the fact this hunt for offices, this affliction to the common good, becomes more common in times when so many sources of wealth are clogged or dried up" (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, issue no. 9: 3-5).^{ccxxxvii} The accusation of using public funds for private benefit is mostly directed at Van Langen. In the initial report by Gogel and La Pierre of 25 July 1798 (see earlier) the two stated miserable the state of Van Langen's financial administration was (cf. *Memorie*, 34, appendices 9 and 10 and *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798, issue no. 5: 7).^{ccxxxviii} However, they had still

managed to find enough evidence (such as the list of expenses for the chess game and tea cups) to warrant an extension of Van Langen's arrest (see also legal codes later on) and further investigations into the case. As the investigations went on the Interim Directorate became increasingly convinced of the political corruption of Van Langen. His business deals with Pessers, Vreede and Van Marle became known and the list of bills of exchange made out to all sorts of people grew ever longer.

What the Interim Directorate seems to have been especially concerned about was Van Langen's use of EIC money to straighten his own disorganized financial affairs and to indulge in luxury. They wrote: "no matter how bad all of this is [the many expenses on luxury goods by all members of the radical regime, TK], it is nothing when compared to the reprehensible behaviour by Van Langen, being guilty of such vile behaviour of direct theft to keep his own mixed-up affairs in order at the expense of the nation" (Pijman, et al., 1798: 35).^{ccxxxix} The Interim Directorate was also amazed to learn about the deals and secret negotiations by Eykenbroek and Eberstein involving payments in cloth, gin and meat. Having examined the evidence they quickly realized Van Langen's (and Vreede's) intent: "since this way the citizen Directors Van Langen and Vreede, being the suppliers, could also get some extra profit" (*Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*, 1798, issue no. 8).^{ccxli}

Amazement quickly turned into outright condemnation when the Interim Directorate was confronted with "the shameless behaviour of one of the Directors [Van Langen, TK] in enriching himself with the Nations' money". "It is indeed difficult", they continue, "to believe how a member of the Directorate could have such vile an intent as corruption" [the first of two occasions, see below for the second, in which the word corruption is used as such in the case, TK] (Pijman, et al., 1798: 40-41).^{ccxli} The *Authentique bylagen* furthermore stated: "We shiver at the fate of our sweet fatherland when we see the desire to obtain offices become so widespread that people no longer ask whether the bread they receive from the fatherland is earned or not; whether the office one desires is earned or not. We shiver when we see that honesty and good faith are forgotten as soon as the opportunity arises to benefit on the expense of the common good, when people are indifferent about the way in which they satisfy their greed. It is, for example, unforgivable and harmful that those who have the highest rank abuse the power for their own benefit" (issue no. 9: 3-5).^{ccxlii}

Public values from legal sources

While the *Memorie* and *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* already contained some legal codes of their own, there were also separate legal sources of public values. Verdict and sentencing of the accused based on Van Maanen's investigations contains, for instance, a host of public values and (legal) condemnations and expectations of correct public official behaviour. The variety of actors in the case (from a trafficker and hustler like Eykenbroek to a distinguished Director like Vreede) makes for variety in sentencing and legal deliberations, providing us with many different legal codes. In any case, and this is interesting enough, it becomes clear that not all members of the Directorate were considered equally accountable or guilty in the eyes of the moderate Interim Directorate. Directors Berent Wildrik and Johan Pieter Fokker had, as mentioned, immediately been cleared of any involvement after 12 June and were soon released from prison (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 1207). Although both were sometimes mentioned in relation to political corruption (in the sense of being extravagant, greedy and/or too

subservient to the other Directors) they were largely perceived to be merely ceremonial members of the Directorate and victims of the schemes of Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje (*Memorie* 1798: 43).^{ccxliii} Wildrik was considered of such insignificance in the whole affair, that the Interim Directorate appointed him as member of the new Provisional Assembly on 12 June (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 1207). He would retire from politics in may 1801. For the same reason as Wildrik, Fokker could become a member of the Interim Directorate Directorate until 30 July 1798. Some sources (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 1: 870-871) report how Fokker was eventually forced to leave The Hague as a result of his partaking in the radical Directorate but do not elaborate. In any case, he retired to his native province of Zeeland to practice medicine until his death in 1831.

Pieter Vreede was not arrested or detained due to his escape to the Austrian Netherlands. However, already in July 1798 he was bold (or desperate?) enough to request the Interim Directorate to let him return to his hometown of Tilburg. His wife had died and he needed to take care of his children. At the end of August he was permitted to do so, which, perhaps, is proof that the Interim Directorate was not as cross with him as they were with Van Langen (see below). Vreede was granted his request despite the fact that he was often mentioned in the *Memorie* and *Authentique bylagen*. As some have correctly pointed out (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1253), Vreede had certainly been in the thick of it all along and appears, contrary to Fijnje but similar to Van Langen, to have also used EIC funds for his own personal gain, such as the deliveries of cloth to his and Van Marle's firm. Furthermore, he seems to have been of somewhat ill character. Together with Van Langen he tried (but failed), for instance, to persuade Fijnje to deport Pensionary Van de Spiegel and his advisor Bentinck van Rhoon (see chapters four and five) as criminals to Surinam. Vreede was also not prepared to extend the kind of help and sympathy to others which he himself would later receive. When Van Marle (one of the 28 purged and jailed Assembly members and his business partner at that) requested to be temporarily released from jail to visit his dying son, the radical Directorate, including Vreede, had refused. A request by purged Assembly member H.H. Vitranga to visit his dying 80 year old father was likewise denied (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1253).

Wybo Fijnje and Jacobus Van Langen were, contrary to Vreede, both detained. They were also immediately accused (whereas the charges eventually launched at Vreede seem to have taken much longer to develop). Fijnje and especially Van Langen had been the financial administrators of the Batavian Republic between January and June and were for this reason accused of embezzling the nation's money. The fact that both were member of the EIC and had used (abused?) its public funds was an important element in condemning them. An early report⁴⁷ by Reinier Tadema, the first minister of Justice, to the Interim Directorate Directorate, dated 6 July 1798, displays his initial (legal) reflections on the case against Fijnje and Van Langen as it was evolving. He writes how he (or rather attorney general Van Maanen and the investigators Philip Hildebrand and Adrian Zeemans) had already found evidence of dereliction and malversations of both men in spending public funds from the EIC using bills of exchange. He placed the blame squarely on Fijnje and Van Langen^{ccxliv}, especially since he did not believe the other members of the Directorate (mainly Fokker and Wildrik) had known what was going on. It is interesting to note Tadema's initial logic concerning the use of EIC credit. According to him it was warranted to get money from the EIC but only as long as the

⁴⁷ NL-HaNA, *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 508, item 68, Report by Tadema to the Interim Directorate, 06/07/1798.

money was spent on the nation's interests and as long as it was approved by the entire Directorate. Since neither condition was met, he thought Van Langen and Fijnje were surely guilty. Furthermore, Van Langen and Fijnje were (as yet) unable to account for their actions and explain where all the money had gone to. It might seem odd that Tadema did not include Vreede in this argument. Vreede, after all, had mixed public and private interests and was therefore at least as guilty as Fijnje who had 'only' used the money for revolutionary (but 'public') purposes. At the same time, Tadema's investigations were only just getting under way so we can imagine he did not have the full picture yet.

The early investigations by Van Maanen in July (as it was partly disclosed in the later *Memorie* and *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij*) led to the call by the Court of Holland for a more thorough legal investigation into the dealings of Van Langen and Fijnje.⁴⁸ On 7 September, Van Maanen writes that the evidence has "raised serious suspicions that Van Langen and Fijnje are guilty of disloyal and for the nation disastrous and most criminal use of their office". On 17 September Van Maanen reiterates the charges against Van Langen and Fijnje⁴⁹ and adds they "were guilty of disloyal and to the nation ruinous occupation of aforementioned important offices, in which they disposed of the nation's money in a criminal, irresponsible, wasteful way, yes even stealing the nation's money [...]".^{ccxlv} Van Maanen also wrote⁵⁰ how they had used or allowed others without qualifications [Eykenbroek *cum suis*, TK] to use this money, even before they were elected as members of the Provisional Administration".^{ccxlv} This time, however, Van Maanen makes an interesting distinction between them. Although Fijnje was essentially guilty of 'bad government', for instance in taking the lead to appoint Pieter Weiland (see earlier), he had not (contrary to Van Langen and Vreede) used the embezzled EIC funds for other than revolutionary purposes. While Van Langen was served with a criminal indictment (see below), Fijnje was only summoned to appear before court on 26 September 1798.⁵¹ He was initially spared the more serious indictment because Van Maanen wanted more time to investigate matters.⁵² However, later he would get one after all on 1 October 1798.⁵³ The reasons for Van Maanen's change of heart can be found in his archives. Based on the interrogations of Van Langen (see below) it appears that Fijnje had known about the secret instruction to Eykenbroek to start negotiating with Barras (see Colenbrander, part II, doc. 588: 717. For the secret instruction see *Ibid.*, part II: doc. no. 605). According to Van Maanen, Van Langen had told him⁵⁴ that Fijnje had given him EIC money to pay Guerin on 18 January 1798. Fijnje had, furthermore, known about Van Langen's tricks with the bills of exchange and had, of course, also known about the use of EIC funds to bring about the revolution.^{ccxlvii}

While Van Maanen and others had been lenient towards Wildrik, Fokker, Vreede and (initially) Fijnje, it seems nobody needed much time to point to Van Langen as the main culprit. It had been Van Langen who had "made use of money for his own individual, personal purposes". According to Van Maanen⁵⁵, Van Langen was therefore "guilty of stealing from the nation".^{ccxlviii} Van Langen had also⁵⁶ "been involved in the scandalous theft of the nation's

⁴⁸ NL-HaNa, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807*, supplement 1, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 4: 402.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 419-420.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 449-450.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 460-461.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 465-469.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 473.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 472-473.

⁵⁵ NL-HaNa, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807*, supplement 1, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 4: 449-450.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 419-420.

money, having made use of these funds [of the EIC, TK] before he was even elected as a member of the Directorate”. In short, the fact which made Van Langen’s behaviour wrong to Van Maanen (i.e., in a legal sense) was that he used EIC funds (public money) for private purposes while not (yet) being in the position to do so, i.e., *before* belonging to the Provisional Directorate on 25 January 1798.^{ccxlix} Given the evidence, it is not strange that such accusations were mainly launched at Van Langen. Still, one gets the impression that he seems to have also become some sort of scapegoat or ‘token corrupt official’ for the entire radical regime. He, at least, would see it this way (see below). His escapades formed a perfect example with which the entire previous radical Directorate was to be set straight, something Samuel Wiselius (1768 – 1845) as one of the leading Batavian politicians was, for instance, very anxious to do (Schama, 1977: 360).

It was certainly not just the former Directors that felt the sting of the Interim Directorate. The group of people of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle was also prosecuted. Eykenbroek seems to have been the main target (cf. Schama, 1977: 360). He had been arrested in Paris on 12 June by Meijer but was released by the French soon thereafter. Perhaps they were not too keen on keeping and investigating Eykenbroek because he could open up a big can of worms. However, to the Dutch moderate Batavians Eykenbroek’s release was not the end of the matter. The official resolution by the Court of Holland to prosecute and charge Eykenbroek (next to Boeseken and some others) is made on 4 December 1798. The whole group is charged⁵⁷ with what Van Maanen calls: “these pernicious machinations against the safety of the state [...] their treacherous and most criminal designs in Paris and Brussels to commit corruptions with money collected by citizens [Van Langen and others, TK] of this Republic”.^{cc} Here – incidentally – is the second and final time the term corruption is used as such in the case. Several members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle (among them Eykenbroek and Boeseken) would be charged with *crimen perduellionis* or high treason.⁵⁸ Sentencing of this mixed bag of culprits was however delayed and postponed⁵⁹ due to a failed attempt at yet another coup in which Eykenbroek and Boeseken were apparently also involved (Schama, 1977: 359-361). Van Maanen seems to have gathered clues of a plan to assassinate the five moderate Interim Directors.^{cc} Eykenbroek, at least, was supposed to have made the highly provocative or suggestive comment to the French that there was a rumour that the Directors might get killed or were already dead.⁶⁰ and had apparently added: “such rumours are usually good predictions of such things actually happening”.^{cc} For Eykenbroek these ‘machinations’ undoubtedly led to his recapture in Paris and sentencing “to be punished with the sword hanging over their head [traditionally a warning in most sentencing], to be imprisoned for 12 years at his own expense and afterwards to be banished for ever from the Batavian Republic.”⁶¹

However, on 17 November 1798 the moderates and their case against the radicals received a devastating blow when the Court of Holland received a letter from the representative assembly.⁶² The letter stated that the French had decided on a general amnesty which would be

⁵⁷ Ibid., 659, 676, 678.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 667-668.

⁵⁹ Ibid., inv. nr. 20.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁶¹ NL-HaNA, *Hof van Holland, 1428-1811*, 3.03.01.01, inv.nr. 5670: 7-37.

⁶² NL-HaNA, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807*, 2.21.114.02, inv. nr. 4: extract van besluit van de eerste kamer van het vertegenwoordigend ligaaam relatief S.J. Van Langen en W. Fijnje ontvangen en gesteld in handen van den Procureur Generaal omme consideratien”.

published in the *Bataafsche Courant* on 12 December 1798.⁶³ The amnesty meant to “forgive and forget what had happened, to establish constitutional order and to reunite all friends of freedom and order behind the constitution”. All crimes of the past years that had been “so closely related to politics that indeed they are inseparable from each other” were to be pardoned.^{ccliii} The argument is interesting. What, after all, is left of ‘political corruption’ if corruption that occurred in close relation to politics is pardoned? Perhaps the moderate Batavians saw it this way too. In the very least they were not happy about it. The French decision was a blow to them, not least because they had come to resent French involvement in ‘internal matters’ (Schama, 1977: 401) and because it meant that the cases against the members of the radical Directorate were to be over. Despite overwhelming evidence of bad government, abuse of office and/or treason, the charges against a host of individuals thus had to be dropped. Vreede, who had by now been accused but still not detained or arrested, was cleared of any charges. According to the French⁶⁴, the actions of Van Langen and Fijnje were clearly political in the aforementioned sense and they ought to be cleared of all charges too.^{ccliv} Even Eykenbroek was to be released (Schama, 1977: 401).

The reasons for the amnesty seem clear enough. To the French, any proceedings against Van Langen and others would be “dishonourable to their [French, TK] interests” (op cit. in Schama, 1977: 401). The French seemed not at all sure that their own role in the coup of 22 January had been a good one. They wanted bygones to be bygones, forget about the whole thing and, importantly, they still had the influence to make it happen. In November 1798, The moderate Interim Directorate and Representative Assembly, however, dug their heels in the sand one last time. In an attempt to still prosecute Van Langen and Fijnje despite of the French ‘request’, they instructed the Court of Holland to reassess the case against them. On the 17th they asked the Court to assess whether their crimes had really been ‘too closely related to political affairs’⁶⁵ but it seems that French pressure was too much to withstand. On 19 December 1798 minister of justice Tadema requested the immediate release of Van Langen and Fijnje, which happened the following day. A possible sign of a grudge against Fijnje might be that his salary for his time as Director would only be paid after his death in 1809. Van Langen reappeared in politics in 1799 and would even be elected by three constituencies but the Directorate, possibly still embarrassed by the Amnesty and/or also holding a grudge against Van Langen, decided to prevent the appointment (Schama, 1977: 359). That, perhaps, was their way of punishing Van Langen after all. At the same time Van Langen still received a yearly allowance from the Kings Louis Napoleon, William I and William II until the day he died (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1011).

An attempt to explain to a wider audience why so many would in the end not be prosecuted also appeared in the *Bataafse Courant* of 12 December 1798. This shows the mixed feelings the moderate Directorate had about the case. On the one hand, they knew the case was lost because the French wanted it to be over. On the other, they knew that what Van Langen and Fijnje had done was considered wrong and corrupt across the board. Letting them go would look bad. The Interim Directorate, then, had to navigate with care through this minefield of politics and public opinion. For this reason, the article not only provides an interesting public (legal) motivation for letting Van Langen and others go although the

⁶³ NL-HaNA, *Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820*, 2.21.005.39, inv.nr 74.

⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807*, 2.21.114.02, inv. nr. 4: 604 – 605.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, inv. nr. 608.

Directorate was clearly against it. “If”, the article stated, “we were to judge the case by our initial feelings [and a large amount of evidence, TK] then it would have been decided already. We would have painted a picture of two men [Van Langen and Fijnje, TK] who have wasted the nations’ money and used it for their own benefit, or at least helped each other in this [thus accusing Fijnje of ‘indirect’ corruption, TK], who abused the high dignity of their office which obligate them to practice the virtues they preached to their fellow citizens and to avoid committing crimes they are supposed to find highly punishable in others, the abuse of the nation’s money and especially converting this money for their own use. We would have shown you how such actions result in prosecution and trial. We would have also shown you the dangerous consequences should criminal procedures against them be halted for political reasons, an act surely [to be] condemned by all parties”. Then, however, the appeasing of the French starts. To twist things around, the French logic is after all adopted as the proclamation reads that “the abuse of state funds and in particular the use of these funds for personal gain has indeed been very intertwined with political events”. Because, it states, “these crimes have originated in the political events in such a way that without the revolution of 22 January, they could not have been committed [...] we have decided to apply the amnesty to both men”.^{cclv} Jeremy Bentham (1824: 366) once stated how “abuse can only be defended by fallacies”, i.e., that which is wrong can only be made to *seem* right by the (deliberate) use of incorrect reasoning. This seems to have been the case here.

Public values from public opinion sources

While some of the documents discussed above were circulated as pamphlets and can thus be considered a form of public opinion, there were also other separate public opinion sources on the case. These mostly included pamphlets and political periodicals written and published in response to the *Memorie* and *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* discussing the scandal surrounding the coups of 22 January and 12 June and, more specifically, the cases of Van Langen and others. In general, the views and arguments of different sources of values (legal, shop floor, best-opinion) are all reflected in various public opinion media. This demonstrates how all parties and vested interests managed to get their views across to whoever was willing and able to read their papers. One important periodical was *De Politieke Blixem*, most likely written and published by Bernardus Bosch or J.C. Hespe (Colenbrander 1905-1922, part II: 732, footnote 2). The periodical argued in favour of the unitarians and the coup of 22 January. It put forward similar arguments as Vreede, Van Langen and Fijnje (see below for a discussion of shop floor sources), and said something simply had to be done to end the continuous debating and to start working on the future of the state. To the *Blixem*, much like the radical Directors, the end justified the means of revolution. Lumping together aristocrats, Orangists and federalists, the periodical blamed them for their pride and lust to rule and thereby justified the coup of 22 January (*De politieke blixem*, 1797-1798, issue 36, 13 February 1798: 281-282).^{cclvi} It was a shame, though, that the radicals (or at least some of them) were guilty of exactly the same ‘offences’. A similar point of view was offered by J.C. Hespe’s *De Constitutionele Vlieg*, a series of commentaries revolving around a fly that, figuratively of course, managed to enter people’s homes unnoticed and listen in on their conversations, only to later comment on their arguments, views and opinions. The introduction of the first issue can be considered exemplary for many similar political writings in this period. In it the *Vlieg* says he will be “just and fair, but never

sparing anyone who deserves critique, like those who engage in pernicious ‘diaboloocracy’ [the devils’ democracy or could it mean oligarchy? TK], those demagogues, those hunting for offices and engaging in party politics. The *Vlieg* wrote (Hespe, 1798, issue 1: 2) how he had been favourable to the coup of 22 January and vouched to help complete it by “exposing fake friends, double-hearted, self-interested people and plotters and schemers and distinguish them from true and virtuous believers in the revolution”.^{cclvii} He promised to fight “those who stir up discord, schemers, fortune hunters, ignoramuses and unfettered and loud Patriots”.

On 9 June 1798, in an attempt to attack bribery and other vices, the *Vlieg* tells the story of the Roman consuls Marcus Curius and Caius Fabricius; symbols of incorruptibility in administration whose depictions were, for precisely this reason, on the walls of the Amsterdam burgomasters’ chambers in the town hall (the story of Marcus Curius, who refused a bribe from the Samnites and chose turnips over gold, is depicted on the cover of this book with a painting by Govaert Flinck). To the *Vlieg* the Romans exemplified the good virtues of justice, honesty, and simplicity. They were steadfast and selfless. Bad characteristics, on the other hand, were chaos, lust to rule and self-interest (Hespe 1798, issue 3: 17-18). On 16 June 1798, four days after the moderate counter coup, the *Vlieg* discusses the case against Eykenbroek and, by association, Van Langen and others. He calls upon them to provide a full account of their dealings (Hespe 1798, issue 5: 34). At the core of the message lies the fact that what happened on and after 22 January is in principal not a problem. Only when those participating in it acted out of self-interest does the coup become questionable. Finally, Cicero’s *On Duties* (see book 1, chapter 25) referred to by the *Vlieg* to provide lessons in politics and administration. Most of all, administrators should serve the interest of the citizens who have entrusted their faith in them. They should serve the state’s interests instead of particular ones (Hespe 1798, Issue 20: 43-44).

In this way the journal echoes some of the (initial) legal arguments of Van Maanen and, we can say, the French. As long as actions had been public business (Van Maanen) or ‘political dealings’ (the French in their amnesty) things were not so bad. As it was, though, since the men of 22 January did not meet these requirements, the *Vlieg* was glad they had been removed. The members of the constituent assembly and the radical Directorate had, after all, made a mess of things: “they had trampled on the rights of the people, renounced reasonable and moral principles, had been blinded by lust to rule and had, by the mad urges of some of its members, thrown away the esteem they would have received otherwise”.^{cclviii} Van Langen and others had, according to the *Vlieg* (Hespe 1798, issue 6), “jeopardized property and personal safety of civilians, given offices to ignorant debauched and blind members of their own faction, driven the best patriots from government, made use of services from a swarm of intriguing men”. Had they not, indeed, “pillaged the nations’ treasury to satisfy those who were bankrupt [Van Langen’s business? TK]. Yes, millions have been wasted to bribe the French government to help them in their cause”.^{cclix} It was time, the *Vlieg* said, for the “justice, fairness and all honest principles that have been adopted in the constitution after so much trouble.”^{cclx} Issue number eight went on to accuse Van Langen directly. It said “well now, former director Van Langen. It is a nice sum, to get fifty thousand guilders all of a sudden for your personal use” (cf. Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1011). But, the *Vlieg* continued, “*quod non audent regnandi cupido* – what does lust for power not bring about!” (Hespe 1798, issue 8: 33). The *Vlieg* warns of men like Van Langen and others who had “wasted the nations’ time. Heed those chameleons, showing their different colours at will, blowing in the direction of each new wind (compare the image of a wind vane discussed in chapter seven, see also Lok 2009). They are

hunters for office, did not serve the nation, and wanted only wealth and splendour for themselves. They hide behind a mask of love for freedom and the people but shunning the name of citizen like the plague. Under such men, treasuries do not have bottoms, laws do not have impartial protectors and the people have no protection” (Hespe 1798, issue 8: 71-72).^{cclxi} “Yes, Batavian citizens”, the *Vlieg* went on to say (Hespe 1798, Issue 8: 72-73), “pay heed to doubters, traitors, the rich and shouting wallowing in abundance. Choose [in the upcoming elections, TK] an honest man, someone from among you, someone you know. Chose someone who loves people, is honest and affable and who has not, through conceit or haughtiness risen above his true status, who is virtuous, down to earth and cool headed. Chose those who know how to unite a lofty character, excellent merits, a great spirit, proven wisdom and political principles with a virtuous civic lifestyle.”^{cclxii}

A final telling and quite common public opinion view is provided by the journal *De politieke donderslag* (*Political Thunder*, the follow-up of *Political Lightning*) which appeared from 23 July 1798 until 17 September 1798 in 10 issues. In the very first issue (*De politieke donderslag*, 1798, issue 1: 4-5) the author explains his reasons for publishing the journal as he writes: “Keep an eye out, Batavians! For those creatures who speak with conviction to pick your pockets”.^{cclxiii} He then explicitly mentions Van Langen, Fijnje and Vreede: “those infamous political charlatans” who had fortunately been “crude or extravagant enough to show their true colours, or else we would perhaps have been stuck with them for a long time to come, to all our ruin [...] never could the ex-director Van Langen have provided a better service to the nation than to use a lot of money in so little time; the sooner he would be caught out”.^{cclxiv} The author speaks of the fact that Van Langen had been too slow to see what was coming on 12 June. Fijnje and Vreede, however, had been quicker on their feet (to escape through the window, TK) as the author continues: “the great Pieter Vreede and Wybo Fijnje were more clever and took to their heels. Could these statesmen, with their escape, have proven even better that it is easier to swear on the battery [as in a group of large guns and the men handling them, TK] in service of the country than it is to be killed this way”.

The author seems to say how the Directors had not stuck to their word, had only made easy promises and had let others (the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle?) do the hard work. He continues (*De politieke donderslag*, issue 1: 6-7) saying: “when we observe the mess that has been left by the three ex-directors, we have to wonder how it is possible that so much was still done. With so many unskilled skippers on the bridge who knew not of quay, ship or wind it is incomprehensible that they have not utterly ruined the fatherland, incomprehensible that the ship of state has not struck on a rock in splinters”.^{cclxv} As it turned out, the author concludes, “we have been cheated by this miserable lot of war-horses, by the shining cover with which they concealed their true identity and learned, to our disgrace, that all that shines is not gold [...]. Piet Vreede writes nicely but throws dust in our eyes. When it comes down to it, deeds are lacking” (*De politieke donderslag*, issue 1: 6-7).^{cclxvi} Perhaps the author makes reference to the Patriot pamphlets which Vreede had published (see for an overview Molhuysen 2008, part 9: 1245ff). The comment here serves to state how the radicals talked the talk but not walked the walk or, in present terms, displayed a lack of integrity.

In another issue of 27 August 1798 the author returns to Vreede and discusses whether it had been right to let him return to the Batavian Republic (*De politieke donderslag*, issue 7: 52). To the author, Vreede’s flight had clearly been an act of cowardice and his return could be dangerous. If, so the pamphlet reads, Vreede believes to be innocent than he should turn himself in since “the nastiness of a dungeon can not startle an honest heart”.^{cclxvii} In the second

issue of 30 July the author deals with Eykenbroek *cum suis* as he notes how the constitution after 22 January was forced upon the nation and became a toy for fortune seekers and bullies (*De politieke donderslag*, Issue 2: 13). Another issue of 6 August provides an imaginary discussion between boss Piet [Pieter Vreede, TK] and his henchman Jacob [Van Langen, TK] in which Jacob confesses to Piet that the fourth of may [the day the ‘unconstitutional’ Representative Assembly had been elected out of the purged constituent assembly, TK] still weighs heavy on him (*De politieke donderslag*, Issue 3, 6 August 1798: 20). In the same issue, finally, a folk song is presented on Jan Eykenbroek and Pieter Vreede (*De politieke donderslag*, Issue 3: 23-24). It sings Pieter Vreede handed out offices to his friend and selected men who were only famous for their screaming. It sings of the use of public money to provide Eykenbroek with security and high office. It also sings of how Eykenbroek went to negotiate even though he had no knowledge of things and of Eberstein who was so skilled in cheating and acting like a wind vane in stealing money and breaking their oath and duty”.^{cclxviii}

Public values from shop floor sources

While some shop floor accounts have been discussed in the previous as well, separate ones can, finally, be found too. In the following I will mainly focus on Van Langen and Vreede as they published their personal account of events in pamphlets. Their opinions are in part of course justification strategies of accused men. Still, their accounts simultaneously contain shop floor ideas on appropriate conduct. Their accounts tell us what values or norms they adhered to; whether there were differences of opinion between them and other sources and what they thought of the accusations. Also, I will focus on reports of their interrogations by the investigators in the case to discuss how various actors in the scandal felt, thought and argued. Finally, I pay attention to private correspondence in letters, for instance between Eykenbroek and Van Langen and between Van Langen and Vreede, and notes as they have been gathered and organized by Colenbrander.

On 9 October 1798, Pieter Vreede submitted a seventy page long account to the Representative Assembly of his “public behaviour” which had resulted in his removal from the Assembly.⁶⁶ With his account Vreede hoped to rehabilitate himself by “separating guilt from innocence and accusation from proven truth” (1798: 1-2).^{cclxix} It was partly a direct response to the *Memorie* and *Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij* and provides an interesting view on Vreede’s shop floor views. According to Vreede, the federalists, aristocrats and Orangists had been the truly self-interested ones. This, together with the paralysis of the state due to the continuous bickering between moderates and radicals over the form of the state and the new constitution, had been sufficient reason for the coup of 22 January and the following purges. As Van Langen would later argue as well (see below), without a coup it would have been impossible to end “the paralysis and lack of administration and create an energetic government” (Vreede, 1798: 9-12). Vreede (1798: 15), interestingly, then stresses the fact that the purging had been done irrespective of rank. Also, where mistakes had been made, they had corrected them.^{cclxx} Furthermore, the accusation that he and the others had been guilty of acquiring offices and/or helping friends to them was ridiculous.

⁶⁶ NL-HaNA, *Collectie 001 Dumont Pigalle, 1780-1800*, accessnumber 2.21.057, letter QQQQQ; NL-HaNA, *Wetgevende Colleges*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509.

To Vreede, appointing like-minded people and purging opponents might have constituted nepotism and/or favouritism but this was natural in times of revolution. He writes: “was it a crime or a duty that we began to purge all constitutional powers; and appoint those persons, in the departmental administrations and municipalities, whose views were the same as ours?” (1798: 56-57). Vreede then turns things around (as Van Langen would too, see below) and focuses on the many things others did wrong. He argues that any government will always be surrounded by people asking for offices. He, however, had never felt this hunger and had thus never satisfied it. Others, however, wanted to put their relatives in lucrative offices; others have always tried to come out on top with every change of government; others have come forwards as Patriots only to disappear to the back once they got their fat piece in their possession, but never had he acquired any position for himself for other reasons than doing his duty and being of use.^{cclxxi} ‘Never’ probably had a peculiar meaning to Vreede as he admitted to have helped his second son Paul to a job at the ministry of foreign affairs. Importantly, Vreede does however sense this might have been a wrong move but tries to redeem himself by rhetorically asking: “is this lust for offices of a father who has six sons, who has never before taken anything for himself while always fighting for the cause of freedom?” (1798: 56-57).^{cclxxii} Apparently, nepotism was alright according to Vreede as long as one also fights for ‘freedom’.

Having defended the coup and the purges and having denied any wrongdoing in getting offices for himself or his family, Vreede (1798: 37) then goes on to counter other accusations made against him and the Directorate as a whole. He agrees that any criminal activity should be thoroughly investigated: “rightly so!”, he says, “investigate these evil deeds! Rightly so! Let the world know! Call it stealing, thievery, thievery of the land if you will. While I desperately hope that my colleague [Van Langen, TK] will be able to give a full account of his actions [...] there is not a shred of evidence that I have been involved in any crime. It appears that no evidence has been found against any of my other colleagues [either]”.^{cclxxiii} However justified it is to investigate crimes, Vreede (1798: 38) believes it is unfair how the entire Directorate should be held accountable for the actions of only a few of its members.^{cclxxiv} A feeling Van Langen would also express (see below).

Next, Vreede counters accusations launched in the *Memorie* (and various public opinion sources) that the Directorate had wasted public money on idle and extravagant display and food (1798: 39-41). He remarks that the Directorate had spent money on tablecloths and furniture (presumably for their new lodgings in The Hague) and on a big dinner for the *corps diplomatique*. He then launches a counter attack and asks: “does this deserve a reprimand? Is this excess? What am I to think of such an accusation? When the nation gives that money to the Directors, how can it be berated when they use it?” He sounds indignant now as he continues: “Yes, we have been to the theatre. Occasionally we needed relaxation from working all day, to keep on serving the nations’ interests at night with renewed strength, is that criminal? Yes, we have used carriages. The five Directors, the first civil servants of the Republic, *rented* two carriages a month! Would it even have been a crime had we *bought* five? Our dinner table was always sober and orderly, never wasteful. Never did we indulge in drinking. Why the commotion about the costs of our expenses and lodgings? Why these accusations that we waste money meant for widows and orphans on useless things? Would the nation be better off if its Directors put money [which was apparently rightfully theirs to spend, TK] in a box without touching it?”^{cclxxv}

Not a word is, perhaps not surprisingly, said by Vreede about any deal with the French and the fact that his and Van Marle’s company had been involved in supplying cloth. He does

speak of the secret negotiations between the radicals and Barras and about the use of men like Eykenbroek. In a passage that would have made Machiavelli proud, Vreede (1798: 60) writes how secrecy and lack of morality is often a virtue. The end simply justifies the means as: “diplomacy follows different values, different morals and different duties. The honest man, used to sincerity and having an open mind, is unsuitable for it. He is fearful of the slippery paths that need to be taken, his morals prevent him from doing what needs to be done”.^{cclxxvi} To Vreede (1798: 61), what he calls “Italian statecraft” is inevitable and can therefore never be a crime.^{cclxxvii} The use of morally corrupt men like Eykenbroek is, consequently, not wrong either which Vreede explains with two simple analogues. In the first (1798: 62) he writes: “a flamboyant nobleman, arriving with his horse and carriage, ringing the doorbell of a house and finding out he is not allowed to enter, surely is less suited for diplomacy than a civilian who arrives on foot, goes through the back door and gets things done”.^{cclxxviii} In a final analogy (1798: 63) Vreede notes that like a general on a battlefield, he knows “to expect something different from his spy than from his chaplain”.^{cclxxix}

Van Langen also did not remain silent on the affair. In a public statement somewhat similar to Vreede’s, he discusses the coup of 22 January, his own part in it and addresses some of the accusations against him.⁶⁷ Since 12 June, Van Langen had been arrested, prosecuted and detained for months. Although he was eventually freed in the general amnesty he had, arguably, been hit hardest by the entire ordeal and desperately tried to clear himself if only to stop his cloth business from going under (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1011). On the coup and purges after 22 January, Van Langen was clear and brief. To him the removal of political adversaries, “those not belonging to our system” had been perfectly in order. The end justified the means since without the purges and removals, nothing would ever have gotten done (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 605). In the process of clearing himself, Van Langen accused others of immoral behaviour just like Vreede had done. While trying to drag others along in your fall and spreading the responsibility is, perhaps, a logical or human response, it also provides an interesting view on Van Langen’s own morals. After all, the accusations he made tell us something about what he believed or knew to be wrong. At the very least it tells us what he knew others would consider wrong or morally corrupt behaviour.

Van Langen wrote how the Directorate had had to ‘thank’ General Barthélemy Joubert, representative of the French army in the Batavian Republic (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 7: 687) and Delacroix with ‘proper’ gifts. Joubert was offered a couple of horses which the Frenchman apparently refused, replying he wanted a thousand guilders instead (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 615). Delacroix received ten thousand guilders according to Van Langen. A note by Van Leeuwen to the Directorate seems to confirm Van Langen’s story at least partly when Van Leeuwen discusses the gift when he writes: “I have to tell you that since we are up to our elbows in money [EIC credit? TK], we should honour our commitment to minister Delacroix and give him a present so he can buy furniture and other nice things” (Pijman, et al., 1798, appendix 22, 6 February 1798).^{cclxxx} The simple note caused quite a row when it was disclosed, as the Interim Directorate considered it proof of how the radicals had carelessly wasted the money entrusted to them (Pijman, et al., 1798: 40-41).^{cclxxxi} Van Langen, however, seemed to want to show how much worse some others were compared to him. At the very

⁶⁷ NL-HaNA, *Collectie 002 S. Dassevael, 1790-1838*, 2.21.048. Also published by Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: #574: 594-623, no date but written after 1801.

least, it proved he was not alone in seeking riches or wanting to profit from political circumstances.

Van Langen (like Vreede) also discusses the scramble for offices that erupted immediately after 22 January. General Daendels had reminded Van Langen of his services to the coup of 22 January and had demanded offices for himself, for one of his nephews and for his friend J.C. Hespe (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 603).⁶⁸ Apparently Daendels was refused these favours, something which according to Van Langen had caused Daendels' 'betrayal' on 12 June (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 607). Van Langen recounts how others had equally tried but failed to acquire offices through him which had turned them into enemies of the Directorate. One of them was Admiral Jan Willem de Winter, who was taken hostage by the English after the disastrous Dutch defeat at the battle of Camperdown on 11 October 1797. De Winter had, according to Van Langen, asked for compensation for his dining expenses while imprisoned. When Van Langen told him that "since he technically was not in command of any fleet, let alone a ship, he could not possibly expect this to happen". De Winter had not been amused. After 12 June, incidentally, the Interim Directorate would still pay the Admiral 21,600 guilders for his expenses while in England (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 607).

In his public statement Van Langen (like Vreede) does not mention the deal with the French or his attempts to straighten his own business with public money. However, he does so in other places. The archives of attorney general Van Maanen contain several personal accounts from Van Langen concerning the case as he was detained and questioned. He also apparently started an illegal correspondence with Wybo Fijnje who was also incarcerated in the same prison in The Hague⁶⁹ in which he provides an account of his interrogations which are otherwise not to be found in the official case files. These letters and notes provide detailed accounts and excuses of what he had done and offer a unique and honest-as-can-be view on how Van Langen perceived his case and behaviour.⁶⁹ After all, to each other the 'accomplices' Van Langen and Fijnje might not have had many secrets. Furthermore, the fact that the letters were intended to remain secret add to the truthfulness of these accounts compared to public statements intended for a wider audience. As it was, however, the notes were intercepted.

During the first interrogation, when questioned on possible bribery by Van Langen, the latter denied ever to have bribed anyone. The sums of money taken from the EIC for his personal use had instead been meant for "travel expenses and correspondence". The bills of exchange found by the investigators – a great number of handwritten bills are attached to the file as evidence – could, according to Van Langen all be accounted for. When asked why the investigators could not find any proof of this, Van Langen responded that he had made verbal instead of written agreements with the rest of the Directors. The money and cloth given to Eykenbroek to conduct business with the French could not be considered bribery either. Rather this was meant for "secret negotiations". When asked whether Fijnje was aware of these bills of exchange, Van Langen answered yes. Finally, Van Langen was confronted with his letter to Eykenbroek (where he had insisted on proceeding as planned). When asked what he had meant by this, he answered that this was simply to protect "the system of 22 January and

⁶⁸ NL-Ha-NA, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807*, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 27.

⁶⁹ NL-Ha-NA, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1900), 1717-1867*, supplement 2, 2.21.114.03, inv.nr. 18: Secret letters by the removed representative Van Langen to Pieter Vreede during the former's incarceration at the Voorpoort in The Hague.

to serve the nation”.⁷⁰ His own commercial interests had nothing to do with it. The second interrogation mainly served to find out why Van Langen and others had continued using the funds of the EIC even after they had gained legal access to funds from the committee of foreign affairs (once they had become the Directorate). Van Langen says they at first did not know of these other funds. When they eventually found out it was easier, he said, to keep on using the credit of the EIC. Besides, he added, many people working at the EIC had had a hand in the coup of 22 January (remember the 3000 guilders Van Langen paid to Pieter Ondaatje, see earlier). This made sticking to EIC funds a logical choice. Van Langen denies they used the EIC to keep withdrawals hidden. Again he remarks that he had verbally asked and gained consent from Vreede and the others.⁷¹

After a while the interrogators seem to have gotten annoyed with Van Langen. When, finally, they ask whether he really thinks he does not need to take any personal responsibility and account for his actions, Van Langen continuously refuses to do so.⁷² He tells them that if they had a problem with the way things had been done they should ask the entire (former) Directorate and not just him. Everything he had done had been on behalf of the Directorate.^{cclxxxiii} Apparently he considered himself a scape-goat (see earlier). Whether he actually meant this is impossible to tell but he did remain consistent just as his interrogators remained convinced that he could not hide behind the other directors and kept applying pressure.⁷³ They told Van Langen outright that “this way it will take a long time before we can make any progress with your case. You can’t deny personal responsibility or call on the other Directors. We will need a different answer”.^{cclxxxiv} This they would not get, even when they confronted Van Langen with paperwork showing the deals with Pessers and Guerin. Importantly, from his answers it becomes clear how he did not consider it wrong in any way to use his own firm and settling his private business with public money from the EIC. Much like Vreede had argued, as long as the nations’ interests were served as well it did not matter to Van Langen where the money went. There was, in other words, no sense of any conflict of interest on his part. Besides, Van Langen recounts saying to his interrogators in another letter⁷⁴, the other Directors knew everything and also did it, which made it alright.^{cclxxxv} Van Langen might have had a point here. Resolutions from the radical Directorate show, for instance, how Vreede had approved of getting 400,000 guilders from the EIC.⁷⁵

8.4 Analysis and concluding remarks

In the following – as in previous chapters – I will conclude this case study with a brief overview of the main public values in the case. I will also provide a comparison between the various sources of values and will then address questions of change and continuity of public values in the context of wider institutional developments (such as democratization and politicisation) in the French-Batavian period.

⁷⁰ NL-Ha-NA, *Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1900), 1717-1867*, supplement 2, 2.21.114.03, inv.nr. 18: Secret letters by the removed representative Van Langen to Pieter Vreede during the former’s incarceration at the Voorpoort in The Hague. Letter 1: Van Langen to Vreede, no date.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Letter 2: Van Langen to Vreede, no date.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Letter 4: Van Langen to Vreede, 9 September 1798.

⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 509: item 260, 21/02/1798 and 23/02/1798.

Public values and value statements in the case

The case study has provided an extensive amount of public values, value statements and notions of political corruption. The first thing that becomes clear is that wrong public official behaviour could mean many different things to different actors. This conclusion is not as trivial as it may seem. It tells us there was quite a large variety of terms and concepts with which to condemn or condone public official behaviour. Furthermore, when we survey the third case study and the large amount of values, value statements and notions of political corruption, these can roughly be classified in two categories.

First, there seems to be a category of values and value statements that were either new or at least re-emphasized. This included having a lust for power and the abuse of power which were considered wrong or immoral especially since both were often regarded as a betrayal of common good and popular sovereignty; concepts that seems to have acquired new meaning or gained importance in the period (see below). According to many, it was wrong to abuse the power that people had invested in an office (and not, importantly, so much in a person). This requirement is interesting as it denotes the existence of the idea among various actors that the power of administrators was derived from a mixture of trust and a mandate which they had been given. We also find bureaucratic and behavioural or personal requirements as part of this first category of values and value statements. It concerns skills, capabilities or merits that were desired, supported or condemned. A large amount of desirables can be discerned in the case. Public officials should, for instance, act with tact, be calm, courageous, orderly, frugal, honest, trustworthy, virtuous, impartial, neutral in their work, be of lofty character, of good faith, moderate in their behaviour, reasonable, unpretentious, have ‘true and noble love for people’ and do as they promise. Undesirables, of course, also abound. Saying one thing but doing another (a lack of integrity?) was frowned upon and so was being disorganized in one’s administration. Public officials should not act like chameleons (i.e., ‘double-hearted’ traitors who change sides or ‘colours’ as they see fit), be conceited or haughty, doubtful, devious or loud. They should also not be plotting and scheming (faction strife), be drunk, sloppy, spiteful, stirring up discord, throw dust in someone’s eyes, or – in a very general and unspecified sense – be without morality or be incapable.

Second, there is a category of values and value statements having to do with wasting money and time in general, and wasting *public* money and time in particular. In times of economic hardship and military defeatism, wasteful and excessive behaviour and an exuberant lifestyle, hunting for fortune, squandering money, idly wasting time and/or having a ‘blinding’ lust for offices and power were considered shameful and, we can say, corrupt. For example, the condemnation of the use of public EIC funds to pay for a coup d’état was considered to be mismanagement of public funds. Crucially, this was not the same as stealing, which seems to have been an accusation in its own right. Mismanagement and wasting public money and time denoted a lack of administration. The subtle but important distinction between taking public funds for personal benefit and wasting public funds on excesses while in office also becomes clear from a third category of values and value statements pertaining to the use of public funds for private benefits. This was called direct theft or stealing, satisfying one’s personal interests or fortune, lining one’s pockets at the expense of someone else, self-interest or expediency and self-preservation. Self-interest versus that of a wider community was an essential part of late eighteenth-century political corruption debates.

The term corruption only comes up twice in the case. First, it is used by the moderate Directorate when the radicals are accused of enriching themselves with the nation's money. Second, it is used when the Court of Holland prosecutes and charges Eykenbroek and others for their machinations against the safety of the state. Both instances have quite a different denotations, signifying abuse of public money for private benefit in the first instance and harming the state in the second. Political corruption, then, seems to have been used in both its wide classical and more narrow modern meaning (see chapter one). Furthermore, while the term itself only surfaces twice, its many surrogate terms also show that wrongful public official behaviour pertained to the moral decay of the whole body politic (a degenerated state of politics in which fraud, treason, sluggishness, indecisiveness etc. went hand in hand) as well as the individual behaviour of public officials who were stealing public money for private purposes.

Comparing sources of values

Interestingly, the morality expressed by a majority of different actors in the various sources of values was similar in several important ways. Nearly all sources had similar perceptions of what was corrupt and what was not. Wasting the nation's time and money, engaging in party politics and/or faction strife, abusing the faith and trust invested in them by the people and having a lust for power and a desire to acquire offices were condemned across the board. Most of the other undesirables and desirables in the glossary also essentially seem to have been beyond dispute. The main actors in the scandal simply did not seem to propagate or endorse very different public values or views on right or wrong behaviour. When we compare some of the shop floor codes to political pamphlets, legal opinions expressed by Van Maanen or the moderate Directorate and best-opinion (see chapter five) we find they were essentially all in agreement that it was wrong to take public money for private purposes, to usurp power, to commit treason, to lie or to be disorganized (i.e., not keeping your administration in order). Again: while most groups and actors essentially argued from the same set of values they simply disagreed on whether they were guilty of such offences. Vreede, for example, wrote that he should indeed be tried if only he had actually committed the crimes he was accused of.

Another example can be found in the fact that the moral reasons for the moderate counter coup of 12 June were similar to those of the radical coup of 22 January. The radicals of 22 January believed they were fighting 'the good fight', just like the moderates after them would believe. In their declaration of 22 January the new Constituent Assembly had, for instance, said they wanted to stop the confusion and uncertainty of the past three years, they wanted to stop those who, for their own megalomania tried to prevent a unified administration. They wanted actions instead of words and wished to end lack of administration, rowdy or boisterous lust to rule, abuse of state funds for bribery, self-enrichment with the fruits of the people's labour and strife and partisanship.⁷⁶ These were all values and value statements that we also find among the moderates after June 12 and explains in part why some of the moderates of 12 June, like Gogel, had initially been on board on the 22nd but later decided to counter with a moderate approach to a shared ideal of a unitary state. In short, radicals and moderates in part argued from a similar or shared value system.

⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 33: 26-30.

However, at the same time there were some striking differences in the public values and assumptions of proper behaviour between some of the actors and sources of values, mostly about the way the shared ideal was to be reached. The radicals of 22 January meant to secure a unitary constitution through purges, arrests and a parliament that was devoid of opposition. Long-winded procedures and tiring deliberations were all ‘democratic’ and fair but ultimately stood in the way of progress and the quick results that were required. In the end the radicals decided for the latter as becomes apparent from the motives expressed by Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje. The end simply justified the means even if this required some form of ‘Italian Statecraft’, meaning secrecy, hole-and-corner-agreements and circumventing proper bureaucratic, political and/or shop floor procedures. The decree from the Constituent Assembly of 22 January 1798 shows how this worked.⁷⁷ To restore order, special measures are allowed “so that one understands that a temporary sacrifice of parts of our civic freedom do not serve any other purpose than to acquire a good constitution, through which we will ensure ourselves of an even greater pleasure of that freedom”.^{clxxxvi}

While moderates like Gogel initially agreed with circumventing procedures by staging a coup to get things done, they soon disagreed with the measures and behaviour of their radical peers which resulted in the ‘parliamentary inquiry’ and the *Memorie*. A similar position was taken by political pamphleteers. While initially enthusiastic about 22 January the behaviour of the directors and the way the coup was executed eventually rubbed them the wrong way. The radical Directorate’s choice to remain in power, even when their own constitution essentially required them to step down, was equally unacceptable to public opinion in general and the moderates in particular. The appearance of what seemed to be a bit of ‘true liberty’ (see chapters four and five) left in the radicals (a small group deciding for the rest), was not appreciated either. Both moderates and political pamphleteers, in contrast, constantly argued how parliament and people were to be respected and how the purges had only led to the removal of good and honest men. The radicals, while initially on the right track, had simply gone too far. Circumventing proper elections and using the likes of Eykenbroek and their ‘immoral’ characters for their schemes led to illegitimacy and a lack of accountability. It meant deception, treason, usurpation and the abuse of public trust and showed a lust for power and a desire to rule and to obtain offices at all expense.

Finally, it is important to conclude that the payments of large sums of public money for French support seems not to have been the most problematic issue to either moderate Directorate, legal codes or public opinion. The real problem was the fact that some had tried to benefit *personally* from the common cause (compare what I mentioned earlier about the distinction between stealing and wasting public money). The only real difference between best-opinion and public opinion on the one hand and some of the shop floor sources (Van Langen and Vreede) on the other therefore concerned the fact that some had tried to benefit personally from the common cause, and had thereby mixed public and private affairs. Whereas the moderate Directorate, the legal investigators and the pamphleteers thought such a mix was wrong, Van Langen and Vreede (as well as the various members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle) clearly thought otherwise. They seem to have thought it was perfectly in order to use the deals with the French as a private business opportunity. Van Langen and Vreede remained defiant in their position that it had been all right to obtain private gain from public office because it helped bring about the ‘common good’ of a unitary constitution which everyone

⁷⁷ NL-HaNA, *Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810*, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 33: 32.

wanted. However, to the other sources private gain from public funds meant a line had been crossed. Of course, Van Langen was probably right in pointing to the hypocrisy of others. After all, he had not been the only one trying to personally benefit from the Batavian Revolution.

Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption

At the beginning of this chapter a central question concerning changing public values and perceptions of political corruption in the French-Batavian period was put forward. This was the question whether the case study is able to show how the period's increased state-formation, 'nation-building' and democratisation (including politicization) together with a changing political culture (see chapter four) led to changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. Was the period, in other words, an important driver of public value change much like the periods around 1748 (chapter six) and the 1780s (chapter seven)? Also, a hypothesis was discussed concerning the possible end of early modern value pluralism. I will assess both issues in the following.

When considering the first question we can note that the scandal does indeed show new or at least re-emphasized public values and perceptions of political corruption. Political corruption, so it seems, was increasingly framed in terms of modern public values, i.e., those linked to state-formation and democratisation of the period. These were in turn linked to a wider and more modern understanding of the common good and the public interest (compare chapter one on classical and modern definitions). The public value of representation now meant representing 'the people' instead of one's friends, family or patron. A similar change can be seen in the value of accountability and/or responsibility. Now, public officials were accountable to and responsible for their lawful superiors (people, parliament and elected officials). Wider notions of the public interest and the common good (now entailing the Batavian *nation* rather than particularistic and autonomous provinces and cities) were of equal importance to new or reemphasized core public values such as loyalty (to nation, parliament and people instead of one's family, friends or colleagues) and legitimacy (act in accordance with representative institutions and a constitution, instead of shop floor harmony and collegial office rotation). Endless political bickering, especially in times when the nation as a whole was in trouble, was often not condoned. For this reason, demagoguery, usurpation and trying to rise above 'one's true status' were rejected.

It is in this context in which we can understand what was meant with phrases such as trampling on the constitution, trampling on the rights of the people and abusing the high dignity with which officials were bestowed by the people instead of by collegial bodies and mechanisms of office rotation. A similar conclusion concerning the changing meaning and increasing importance of common good and public interest can be drawn from another often recurring perception of political corruption in the case study: Van Langen and others did not just waste money and/or appropriated it for personal benefit. They wasted *public* money that belonged to the nation which (so it was apparently commonly felt at the time) desperately needed all the funds it could get to avoid a national military and economic catastrophe. According to all parties involved (apart from people like Van Langen and Vreede, see earlier) such conduct led to inadequate administration and amounted to nothing less than undermining the moral, economic and cultural revival of the new Batavian nation.

In addition to this first conclusion we can see how the fast rise and growth of a centralized Dutch state and the growing presence and power of its administration also seem to have had an effect on public morality. The case shows how the general actions of the Batavian government as well as the individual actions of Van Langen and others sparked heated discussion on the correct form and functioning of the new state. As soon as representatives in parliament and Directorate government were placed in power by means of elections (no matter how limited as yet!) debate occurred about what these people should or should not do with their power. No longer were administrators supposed or expected to act only in accordance with their own beliefs and value systems. Again, it appears from this that the times of ‘true liberty’ in which a small group of regents decided what was best for all, were – although slowly – coming to an end. Furthermore, as administrators were indeed getting access to growing amounts of (public) resources (compare the EIC credit at their disposal) and offices (compare appointing ‘secret’ agents from the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle) questions naturally arose whether money had been spent well and whether appointments had been correct. Increased bureaucratization of a new ‘public service’ did in fact bring about increased or reinforced attention for values such as professionalism, merit, expertise, clear rules and regulations, clear hierarchy, loyalty to your superior and neutrality in the execution of your public duties.

Similarly the voice of ‘burghers’ was more often expressed in political pamphlets which also might have influenced changing public morality. Perhaps from decades of reform from Doelists to Patriots to Batavians, many had come to believe they ought to have a greater stake in political life (i.e., participation) and a bigger say when things were handled wrong. This is expressed in the political literature of the time. Finally, democratization also led to faction strife based on ideological differences and the start of ‘parties’ and political debates on fundamental issues. It seems that in the midst of significantly restructuring the Dutch state attention was therefore also directed towards shaping and improving morality underlying public administration largely in line with the morally charged reform program of best-opinion Batavians (see chapter five). At the same time, as always, we should not be too hasty to draw a line in the sand. Old ways (nepotism, venality, patronage and family interests) were certainly not over after 1798 (cf. Schama 1977: 424-425).

A second conclusion requires an answer to the question whether early modern value pluralism indeed ended around the turn of the nineteenth century in the Batavian Republic. Some of the assumptions from the beginning of this chapter (by Bayly, Engels and others) can now be confirmed as early modern value pluralism did in fact seem to be gone almost entirely. The fact that the case shows a basic agreement between the various actors and sources of public values proves, I argue, how the French-Batavian period witnessed a shift from the co-existence of different and separated public value systems (such as shop floor versus legal-bureaucratic) to modern coherent ideas of a unified value system and shared ideas on political corruption. In an early-modern sense, political corruption occurred when actions such as patronage, nepotism, not honouring seniority or rotation conflicted with face-to-face codes on the shop floor of everyday collegial political practice. The other sources of values, hosting other value systems, had little to do with it. In the early modern debates of chapters six and seven, weak legal and bureaucratic standards usually came into play only after shop floor principles of harmony and face-to-face relations had been disrupted. The Batavian case, on the contrary, shows that there were not just different values and perceptions of political corruption at play (see earlier) but that there were also different debates going on between the various sources of values and formerly different and separated value systems.

Now, especially public opinion and best-opinion seemed to be able to counter and overcome long-since established shop floor dominance of face-to-face values. It is true that a few remaining shop floor actors in the case (such as Van Langen, Vreede, the various henchmen of the circle and all those who petitioned the radical Directorate for offices) still displayed an 'early modern' mindset. However, despite these few remaining 'pockets' of value pluralism (change does not happen overnight) the case does show how modern perceptions started to become dominant in the debates. It became more difficult for administrators or politicians to be in two worlds at the same time and to hold on to early modern notions of administration. Instead, the Batavian case shows the clear emergence of a more coherent and increasingly accepted political view on corruption which we can still see today. The disambiguation of value systems had the effect of harmonization of shop floor, legal and public opinion norms into one single concept of the public office as distinct from the realm of private interests or social life.

The case has therefore provided a view on how clashes between new ideas (such as popular sovereignty and adherence to a constitution) and established shop floor routines (such as office rotation or privately benefiting from public duties) led to the proposition and discussion of new public values and/or a renewed emphasis on existing ones. The institutional changes in the French-Batavian period thus caused old and new ways to fundamentally collide. Acts that had in previous decades been more or less accepted were now increasingly considered immoral and unacceptable. In this sense the Batavian Republic, and more specifically its two coups d'état, can be considered something of a critical juncture: a pivotal moment in the formation of a new direction taken not just in 'politics' but in morality as well. It is true, as already mentioned, that the Batavians of the 1790s owed much to the Patriots of the 1780s and even the Doelists of the 1740s. Still, it is clear that the Batavians succeeded where others had previously failed, also with regards to morality even though many new codes of conduct sometimes still had to sink in on the shop floor level. Research on other scandals in later periods will have to show whether, how much and why the 'new' ethics proposed by Batavians made a lasting impression.

9 Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

In the introduction I spoke of the need to find a way out of the quagmire of public morality. The contingency, normativity and intangibility of public values and ideas on good or bad administration might be inherent but it is not, I argued, enough to then say that the meaning of such concepts depends on *who*, *where* and *when* and simply leave it at that. Rather, the paramount importance of improved knowledge concerning the normative foundations of government calls for explicit theoretically inspired historical-institutional research. When we revisit Michael Caiden's parable from the introduction, then the 'missing elephant' (i.e., a historical-institutionalist approach) has to lead us out of the quagmire. It has to help us understand public values, ideas on right or wrong public official behaviour (i.e., perceptions of political corruption) and change therein over time. Such an approach has required asking big questions, taking a long-term perspective and studying the intricate links between a complex and changing institutional context and public value change. More specifically, the aim of this study has been to investigate changing public values in Dutch history between 1748 and 1813 as they have become apparent in explicit scandals. This essentially served to help assess the moral grounding of power in the Netherlands in this period (with an emphasis on Holland) in order to substantiate, correct and complement existing knowledge. The study also aimed to connect with the other time frames in the wider research project and, last but not least, served to draw conclusions about the use of certain theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of changing public values. The research question was: *which changes in public values and public value systems become apparent from scandals of political corruption in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813?*

In this final chapter I will answer this research question and will revisit the aims of this study. This is not to repeat what has already been said in previous analyses and conclusions to the empirical chapters five to eight. Instead I focus on broad strokes, main lines of argument and overarching conclusions. Taken together, the individual snap-shots of the three scandals provide a view on which public values were at stake, what exactly constituted political corruption or right or wrong public official behaviour between 1748 and 1813 and allow us to assess diversity, change and continuity of public values. Although the term corruption itself hardly seems to have been used there were plenty alternatives with which right (as in positive public values) and wrong (as in negative public values) were indicated. In the following a general overview on public values and perceptions of political corruption throughout the period will first be provided as they became apparent in the examined sources of values. Then I turn to the question whether and if so when, why and how we can see any public value change between 1748 and 1813. Conclusions regarding the use of theory (see chapters one and two) and methodology (see chapter three) are not treated separately but are provided throughout.

9.2 General conclusions

Perspectives from best-opinion

We have seen how various best-opinion proponents of three successive administrative reform movements between 1748 and 1813 explicitly articulated and proposed certain public values to morally improve public administrative behaviour. While there was much variety as well as disagreement (the movements did span half a century marked by profound social and political change), the movements and their representatives undoubtedly also had many things in common. There was ideological continuity from Doelists to Patriots to Batavians that can be seen as proof of the existence of a continuous current of revolutionary zeal and desire for administrative moral reform. The Batavian revolutionaries of the 1790s explicitly looked back to the Patriots of the 1770s and 1780s. In fact – and this shows an important personal continuity – both movements often consisted of the same people. The Patriots, similarly, had much in common with Doelist agitators of the 1740s, whether they realised it or not. Overall, we can say that while Doelists and Patriots initially failed politically they did have more permanent ideological success in the long run due to Batavian successes. As I have argued, in terms of practical application of ideas each later movement was, in hindsight, more successful than the previous.

Shared ideals of Doelist, Patriot and Batavian best-opinion authors seem mainly to have consisted of achieving more political participation for ever larger and different groups of people and having a wider understanding of popular sovereignty, community and the common interest. Attached were shared understandings of political corruption that were tied to core public values such as loyalty, integrity or justice. These values were in turn explicitly connected to changing notions of ‘people’, ‘community’ and/or ‘common interest’. As a result, the position, functioning and proper moral behaviour of public officials was constantly reassessed and redefined. These shared ideals also expanded, gained momentum and increasingly became institutionalized between 1748 and 1813. The various Doelist demands of men like Van Gimmig or Rousset de Missy, such as greater political participation for a wider group of people and politics serving a wider common interest, were initially ignored in 1748/1750 but essentially similar (although now expanded) public values returned with a vengeance in the 1770s and 1780s.

In those later decades further refined and redefined notions of popular sovereignty, common interest, participation and representation became big issues (i.e., important public values) and perceptions of political corruption changed accordingly. Men like Van der Capellen and the authors of the *Herstelling* meant to ensure that public officials were to be humble custodians of the people’s interests rather than haughty despotic usurpers who ruled with impunity. They expected public officials to be loyal and accountable to people outside oligarchic regent circles and to adhere to principles not belonging to ‘traditional’ regent thinking that consisted of maintaining harmony, rotation of office and protecting family interests. In the works of various best-opinion authors in the 1770s and 1780s a new sense of political community – increasingly an actual union rather than a collection of autonomous provinces and cities – was therefore explicitly connected to a new sense of political corruption. A good and virtuous (i.e., non-corrupt) Patriot was to uphold his oath and duty to the nation and was meant to subordinate particular interests to himself, his family and his fellow regents

to those of the ‘common land’ such as general wealth and prosperity. Such ideals reached their temporary peak in the Batavian state and its constitution after 1795.

Batavian best-opinion authors took the earlier Doelist and Patriot lines of argument several decisive steps further. The bulk of the Batavians wanted to create a nation and with it community and common good became more fully developed and widened notions. These now slowly but steadily came to stand for all provinces and cities. Through new central institutions such as parliament and constitution, public values such as representation, accountability and legitimacy were either new or acquired new meaning. To many reform-minded Batavians, such as Gogel and Ockerse, political corruption constituted behaviour that did not fit such widened notions of community. It now explicitly meant betraying trust and power invested in you by the people. This signalled the beginning of the end of regent ‘true liberty’, which slowly but steadily came to be replaced by new ideals. To many Batavians, political corruption meant harming the newly built unitary and centralized nation. This harm was done, in particular, by engaging in faction strife, by serving personal instead of communal interests, by extravagant spending and lavish living, by bowing to foreign – first English and later French – pressure and interests and by allowing particularism to continue.

One can therefore conclude that best-opinion texts between 1748 and 1813 had a rather ‘classical’ or wide understanding of political corruption as the general decay of the body politic (see chapter one). When individuals were accused of political corruption this was often done in terms of the supposed polity-wide impact of their actions. This can for instance be deduced from the fact that to the Doelists selling personal offices for money was fine as long as that money went into the town’s coffers to serve ‘the community’. This would also ensure that regents could no longer build networks of patronage to stay in power. In best-opinion texts throughout the period, political corruption therefore by and large meant the decay or collapse of the political community and/or communal welfare and seems to have denoted selfish behaviour as opposed to altruism. Political corruption, as mentioned, usually meant not taking a wide enough view, according to Doelists, Patriots as well as Batavians, on the common good or public interest.

In addition, especially from the Patriot period onwards, it was quite literally described in a very ‘classical’ sense as the degeneration or sickness of the body politic that was being invaded by the poison of corruption. To be sure, this could still mean different things in different times, allowing for a constantly differing meaning of political corruption. To many Doelists, for instance, a healthy system in which the guilds still had much power in the town’s government was being corrupted by selfish regent oligarchies. According to various Patriot best-opinion authors, the healthy body of a Republic was being invaded by the political corruption of the princely pretensions of a Stadholder and the abuse of his cronies. Likewise, to many Batavians the healthy, because unified, Batavian nation was threatened by political corruption in the shape of still prevailing particularistic tendencies and faction-strife. The pervasiveness of a classical understanding in the sphere of best-opinion can, finally, also be deduced from the fact that moral decay was often inextricably linked to decay (or corruption) in other key areas of society, such as politics, economy and culture. In this sense, fighting political corruption was closely linked to eighteenth-century attempts at moral rejuvenation of Dutch state and society.

Of course, accusations of political corruption by best-opinion authors were also often based on more narrow standards. Firstly, accusations of political corruption based on a public office standard can sometimes – albeit rarely – be found. Occasionally best-opinion authors for

instance accused people of deviating from the formal duties and roles belonging to their office although these were mostly general references to upholding one's oath and/or instruction. Sometimes best-opinion authors would also accuse people of not adhering to formal and informal rules of office rotation and seniority. Among the authors of the *Herstelling* we find – perhaps – the most elaborate vision on political corruption as the deviation of formal (legal-bureaucratic) rules of office. However, there emerges a general lack of references to legal public office standards in best-opinion. This is understandable given the general absence of legal codes and bureaucratic rules of office in the cases described here.

Secondly, best-opinion authors hardly ever referred to market-centred definitions of political corruption. Only occasionally, was political corruption linked to individual misconduct of 'maximizing' public officials. This happened, for instance, when Doelists referred to city administrators enriching themselves or when Van Langen was accused of stealing public money in 1798. Yet I argue that even these allegations were meant to emphasize a rather classical understanding of political corruption, which held that not being corrupt required transcending specific individual interests. Throughout the period it seems to have remained largely acceptable according to best-opinion authors for public officials to personally and financially benefit from their public office but only as long as communal or polity-wide interests were not harmed. This may have had mostly to do with the fact that certain structural bureaucratic arrangements (such as salaries) were not yet in place, but this is not a straightforward causal connection.

Third, best-opinion authors had a decidedly neo-classical understanding of political corruption. That is to say: 'classical' wide notions were mixed with 'modern' narrow standards. Harming the general public interest (which could, admittedly, mean different things) as well as more narrow standards (such as the rules of public office), were both condemned as politically corrupt. This underscores the conclusions drawn earlier (see chapter one) that each standard on its own is not enough to define political corruption and that classical notions should not be taken out of the equation when trying to understand political corruption in past as well as present. It also relates back to a fundamental question asked in chapter one whether the changes or shifts in notions of publicness or common good as described by authors such as Weintraub or Münckler & Fischer actually occurred in the Dutch eighteenth-century context and what this means for assessing public value change between 1748 and 1813. Based on the aforementioned we can conclude that different notions of publicness (in the form of a 'classical Republican virtue model' based on protecting the common good and in the form of a 'liberal economic model' based on self-interest and/or individualism) indeed existed. At the same time the idea of a fundamental shift from the former to the latter has to be denied based on the research conducted here. From eighteenth-century best-opinion (as from various other sources, see below) it becomes clear that the Republican virtue model and a broad classical notion of political corruption never went away and remained very much alive *alongside* an emerging liberal economic model. In fact these two continuously clashed and the former seems to have even had the upper hand in the cases examined.

Alternate perspectives

Following Hoetjes' heuristics, the views from best-opinion can be traced and compared to views held by other sources of values in the three case studies. While there was hardly any explicit link between best-opinion authors and their usually abstract and general ideology on the one hand and the legal, public opinion and shop floor views on the other, implicit connections can certainly be made by means of interpretation and comparison. In the following I provide an overarching perspective on public values and perceptions of political corruption from the other three sources for every case study. This serves to complement instead of repeat the conclusions and analysis sections at the end of each of case study. Again, main empirical conclusions are offered in combination with methodological and theoretical ones.

Taxes, political corruption and moral reform

Chapter six allows one to draw interesting empirical conclusions if only because tax collecting was a crucial and typical early modern task of public administration in the Dutch Republic. It is therefore likely – although this requires more research – that tax collecting stood as a model for other forms of public service delivery and that bureaucratization equally affected morality in other spheres of government. Chapter six shows that public authorities in various spheres took an active stance in improving both the system of taxation as well as the underlying morality of what was essentially a first-of-its-kind form of near complete public service delivery. In separating the public and private sphere and setting up a public system of tax collecting, the authorities – spurred on by an angry populace and a small band of active reformers – were forced to think of the moral standards that should be upheld by the new now *public* officials. As we have seen, for instance, the aim to increase tax revenue was subordinate to the aim to decrease 'corrupt' behaviour. Changes in the way taxation worked and its officials were supposed to function were not primarily instigated because of financial interests (after all: how could people have known beforehand that 'going public' would increase tax revenues?). This allows for a critical evaluation of institutional-economic views on anti-corruption efforts: reform occurred instead because of popular moral protest and opposition. This forced even Stadholder William IV and the Holland regents to allow men like Van Wesele and Vosmaer to devise a system of tax levying on a more equal footing. In addition, a system of taxation that had until then been based on utilizing self-interest for maximum financial gain for authorities as well as tax farmers was now thoroughly revised to end abuse of office, smuggling, nepotism and extortion. This happened in the interest of a new common good based on new bureaucratic ideals of public service delivery. Furthermore, the case study shows that economic self-interest can hardly be described as the main or sole reason for either the occurrence of or the fight against political corruption.

Chapter six has been able to tell us that being corrupt increasingly consisted of not adhering to bureaucratic values or not working within a bureaucratic framework. We have seen how values such as loyalty to one's superior, neutrality in the execution of one's duties, maintaining hierarchy in a system, keeping one's administration in order and/or displaying professional expertise and punctuality were either new or reemphasized. It also became wrong to mix public office with private interests – arguably the most crucial underlying element in

Weber's ideal type – which was a revolutionary thought in a world that barely knew such a separation. Even more revolutionary, perhaps, was the fact that authorities actually largely tried to uphold the new or reemphasized bureaucratic rules. Reijers, Vaster, Cras and a host of 'lesser' officials were by and large (but not yet entirely) held accountable according to the new bureaucratic standards. When looking at the other sources of values in the case we can see that political corruption also meant self-enrichment and wallowing in luxury, especially in times of economic hardship. It could also mean not serving the interests of the city by selling offices for personal benefit (compare – incidentally – a main Doelist demand as mentioned earlier) or extorting innocent and 'hard-working' taxpayers.

Even though some old elements of the system of taxation remained after 1748 and some new or supposedly 'modern' elements already existed before 1748 the case shows definite changes in the relationship between public authorities, tax officials and tax paying citizens. The bureaucratic reforms went beyond bringing about centralization or uniformity in the system; they went to the heart of a changing public morality. Chapter six was suitable to investigate the use of Weber's ideal type of bureaucratization to assess changing public values (compare chapter two in which I mentioned how different theories or models can be applied depending on the case at hand). The chapter has shown the theoretical and empirical relevance of the ideal-type in this way. From a theoretical point of view the benefits of using the ideal-type and a 'before-and-after' approach to assess public value change seem paramount. Furthermore, the idea of bureaucratization as a catalyst for moral reform and public value change has, I argue, been able to partly fill the 'Johnstonian hollow'. The 'plane of fracture' of 1748 together with bureaucratic reform provided an important impulse for changing expectations, assumptions, rules and regulations that is likely to have guided and helped shape public official behaviour of decades and potentially even centuries to come. Chapter six provides little evidence of value pluralism. Continuing discontent, difficulties in functioning within the new system and even fraud after 1750 were not, I argued, evidence of clashing value systems. All actors, including the tax officials themselves, essentially seemed to agree on the new bureaucratic rules, regulations and values, perhaps because the system was now set up differently. Paying people salaries for instance made them less dependent on bribes and/or gifts.

Finally, debates on the behaviour of corrupt tax officials such as Reijers, Vaster, Cras and others displayed both a narrow and a broad view on political corruption. The corrupt behaviour of individual officials was framed in terms of stealing money, extorting people, serving personal interests and not following the bureaucratic rules of one's office. The latter was a significant change because here, fixed and elaborate bureaucratic rules of office became dominant. They essentially became the only standards required by such a narrow notion. What one can see here, as opposed to the other two case studies, is the beginning of dominant 'modern' and narrow standards, that were mostly public-office centred, with which political corruption was defined. At the same time, echoing best-opinion views, a wider and more classic view on political corruption can also be seen. Public opinion was for instance quick to link the actions of Reijers, Vaster, Cras and essentially all other corrupt tax officials to the general decay of society embroiled in radical political and social change. Indeed, the entire tax riots might not have occurred on such a scale had other tensions not been around. The latter underscores the basic institutional design argument that changing institutions shape or change behaviour. Political corruption and moral reform in the field of taxation were linked to deviance from accepted norms and standards of tax official behaviour that had caused uncertainty and disorder. After 1748/1750 – compare the case of Cras – one was corrupt when

one ignored the new collective institutionalized bureaucratic practices. This, in turn, can be linked to a final theoretical conclusion from chapter six that underscores the use and benefit of structural functionalist theoretical approaches and explanations. Based on the research of this study one cannot conclude that an increase in formal bureaucratic rules and regulations led to a decrease in tacit arrangements or that it led to a decline in political corruption. However, one can say that it was the express aim of men like Vosmaer and Van Wesele to bring into play new bureaucratic elements that would decrease the need for tax collectors to rely on ‘private’ (i.e., ‘corrupt?’) elements. With this, a distinction was being made between private and public behaviour and each had their own time and place.

Princely patronage and patriot cause

In chapter seven, an altogether different sphere and level of government was investigated in the context of altogether different times. In part due to the rise of new political ideologies, such as those in North-America and France, the Dutch Patriots stressed and reemphasized ideals of popular sovereignty, civic freedoms and political participation. The times were also marked by the emergence of a distinctly political press. In many ways, although different sources of values showed different opinions (see below), the Patriot period witnessed full-fledged attempts to finally get rid of ‘old’ structures of office rotation, collegial harmony on the shop floor, nepotism and princely patronage of a hereditary Stadholder and his clique on the one hand, and ruling regent oligarchies on the other. Princely confidants such as Van der Heim and Repelaer were powerful symbols and ‘proof’ to many that these old corrupt ways were destroying the once virtuous Republic. The system of princely patronage was not just targeted by ideologically inspired Patriots such as Van der Capellen, the authors of the *Herstelling* or the various political pamphleteers of the day. Practically motivated and self-serving excluded local regents also targeted it. Ironically, we have seen how both these ‘groups’ fought against the system of patronage but that they each had their own reasons for doing so and their own frames of reference. The first group of ‘innovators’ turned against nepotism, patronage, rotation of office and venality because these practices harmed the public interest, understood by them to entail popular sovereignty, participation, protection of the citizen against arbitrary and/or despotic rule and the rejuvenation of commerce and trade. The second group of ‘conservative’ excluded regents were, so it seems, merely looking for ways to neutralize the Stadholder and his confidants so they could return to the old ways of ‘true liberty’ and town council politics based on collegial harmony and rotation.

Political corruption, accordingly, could mean two very different things in Patriot times. The shop floor regents adopted a specific kind of public office centred definition. To them the single most important measure for political corruption still seems to have been harming collegial shop floor harmony that was still inextricably tied to the core of what it meant to hold public office. To the shop floor regents it was corrupt not to honour contracts of correspondence, whether formally written down or not. To them political corruption – in an institutional design sense – therefore clearly meant not acting in accordance with institutionalized practices of the bigger collective. The disregard of seniority and office rotation meant that expectations were not being met and implicit promises were not being kept. For this reason, the patronage and scheming of the princely confidants clearly did not make sense to them and did in fact create uncertainty and disorder. The shop floor regents had no intention of widening the

political sphere or the idea of common good to include a wider variety of people in the political process. What still mattered most to this regent oligarchy was keeping power away from Stadholder, reform-minded Patriots or ‘populace’. To best-opinion and public opinion however, political corruption meant exactly the opposite: a corrupt public official took care of his own interests or those of a small group instead of looking out for the bigger community. Here a public interest definition was adopted.

In addition, this core contrast between the two ‘groups’ is proof that there now started to emerge some sort of ‘ethical monism’. Although different parallel value systems (i.e., value pluralism) still existed, it was increasingly less possible or desirable to adhere to both systems – shop floor harmony on the one hand and best-opinion and public opinion ideas of the common good on the other – at the same time. It was a process that would be shaped much further at the end of the eighteenth century (see below). Finally, we should again consider the fact that both narrow and classical views played a role in the debates surrounding the actions of men like Van der Heim and Repelaer but that the latter again did seem to have the upper hand. Individual acts of princely confidants were continuously framed as acts that harmed the entire body politic. Gathering wealth and keeping offices for oneself were wrong in the sense that this deprived others from a ‘fair’ share of the pie. To the Patriots these old practices literally and figuratively stood in the way of moral, political and economic rejuvenation. They wanted to make society healthy again, if only to bring about a new glorious ‘golden age’. To the shop floor regents the acts of princely confidants corrupted their old and ‘just’ system of administration based, again, on seniority, rotation and above all harmony. Between both groups we therefore find little evidence to support institutional economic approaches that view political corruption as purely financial maximization. The Patriots seemed to have a wider agenda and to the shop floor regents the principle of harmony entailed more than financial gain. It is also difficult to take a Weberian ideal-typical view on the case. Bureaucratic standards hardly seemed to have been in play. Apart from some references to oath and instruction, true legal-bureaucratic arguments to assess political corruption or to change system and/or behaviour do not emerge from the cases. The above means, again, that the findings from chapter seven demonstrate the need for a ‘neo-classical’ approach to corruption and changing public values.

Gin, cloth and meat: political corruption in the Batavian Republic

In many ways the third and final case in chapter eight has offered a view on the final fulfilment of various attempts at moral and administrative reform, although not in any absolute or teleological sense. The ideals of the Patriot movement appear to have been only dormant and thus resurfaced towards the end of the eighteenth century. With the French Revolution breaking all sorts of barriers regarding previously nonnegotiable issues, the Dutch Batavians seized their chance to construct a unitary and centralized state that was based on improved and yet again widened political ideals and public values such as popular sovereignty, civic freedom and ‘true’ political representation. State-formation, politicization and a rudimentary initial step towards democratization thus had a profound effect on public values of the time. The shift away from particularism and towards a centralized unitary state seems to have also been based on a new and wider notion of common good and public interest and therefore on new public values. A central unitary state with a parliament, a constitution, a new political-administrative

apparatus with more standardized procedures (such as a uniform code of law) brought about fundamental discussion about how the new government was to behave. It brought debates on how the state's power – now more or less directly derived from the people through actual elections – should be exercised. It also brought further politicization and ideological strife with regard to proper and improper public administration. Especially in the first years of the Batavian republic – in many ways the birthplace of the present Dutch political system – discussions were held over political corruption and integrity. In these discussions, so the case concerning Van Langen and others shows us, fundamental and often new questions were asked regarding public values and/or political ideals such as representation, legitimacy of government and administration, responsibility and accountability and a stricter separation between public and private sphere. From the case it becomes clear that mixing public office with private commercial interests was ever less tolerable to a growing number of people. Here too, extravagant individual behaviour was not done in times of *national* hardship. The often heard accusation of wasting the nation's time was, for instance, exemplary for this attitude. A similar conclusion arises from the fact that 'Italian Statecraft' (hole-and-corner dealings, scheming, plotting and using EIC credit) was acceptable as long as it could alleviate the nation's troubles. Essentially, the case often shows structural functionalist arguments why political corruption was a necessary evil.

Political corruption in Batavian times was therefore framed rather differently than before. The line between corrupt and non-corrupt behaviour now came to be based on 'new' or at least re-emphasized public values, an even broader notion of the public interest and a clearer separation of public and private. Political corruption seems to have been used in both its wide classical and its more narrow modern meaning. It was used to refer to the individual wrongful behaviour by Van Langen and others who served personal interests. Here we mainly find a market-centred definition with which Van Langen's behaviour was essentially condemned for his attempts to maximize profit. Again, apart from some references to oath and instruction, legal codes did not seem to be a criterion with which to assess or condemn behaviour as corrupt. As in chapter seven, a public office centred definition of political corruption was lacking in the case study. Instead, a public interest perspective was again dominant. Political corruption mainly denoted behaviour that contributed to the general moral decay or degeneration of the nation and the new Batavian structure. The case on Van Langen and others, finally, also showed a more fundamental transition from early modern value pluralism to a late eighteenth century coherent political view. Some 'pockets' of value pluralism undoubtedly remained: people like Van Langen and members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle still behaved as though they could function according to a different value system and still believed (or wanted to believe) they could mix public and private as long as it was in some way still in the interest of the nation. However, due to a clearer demarcation between the public and the private spheres their behaviour was increasingly condemned. In many ways, the case thereby showed the completion of 'ethical monism' started in Patriot times and the beginning of the end of value pluralism. Public functionaries like Van Langen could no longer really be in two worlds at the same time. Now, there was only one public world in which one set of norms and values was idealized and enforced, of which the personal (private) sphere should no longer form a part. As a result the debate in chapter eight could simply not have occurred fifty years earlier.

9.3 Explaining political corruption and public value change

So far we have gained a detailed insight of public values and perceptions of political corruption between 1748 and 1813. Of course, we have seen much continuity. Old and new were often still intertwined, things did not change overnight and attempts at reform could take a long time to find their way into the everyday practice of political-administrative life. In this respect it is certainly useful – if not necessary – to think of public value change as something that happens in different social spheres and are expressed in different sources of public values which are not always synchronous. The cases show significant public value change. Public official behaviour that had by and large been acceptable around 1750 stood a good chance of being fiercely condemned a mere fifty years later. In this section I assess how, when and why this change possibly occurred in so far as I have not already discussed this in concluding sections of the various preceding chapters. For answers I turn to the fundamental methodological and theoretical approaches adopted in this study.

A neo-classical point of view on sources of public values

A first set of conclusions concerning public value dynamics is derived from the methodology and heuristics employed in this research. This concerns Johnston's neo-classical approach to understand and investigate political corruption in the context of scandal and debate and the use of sources of public values as distinguished by Hoetjes. The use and benefits of a Johnstonian approach are now paramount. The cases have shown how a closer look at debate and conflict surrounding scandals of political corruption has been able to uncover many otherwise hidden public values and ideas on proper administration. We have also seen how individual approaches to defining and understanding political corruption (market-, public office-, public interest- or public opinion centred, see chapter one) are useful but that these single standards alone do not help us understand such a complex issue. Only a combination (such as in fact suggested by Johnston) provides more detailed insights into the contextual and contingent nature of changing public values and political corruption. Other conclusions stem from the connection between Johnston's idea of change occurring through clashes, debates and contestation on the one hand and Hoetjes' heuristics of (potentially clashing, overlapping and/or mutually reinforcing) sources of public values on the other. Despite some overlap and the fact that not all sources were always equally represented in every case, a combination and comparison of sources of public values has provided interesting perspectives on public value dynamics, or possible transitions from 'old' to 'new'.

A first conclusion to be drawn in this regard is that some sources were not well represented and therefore seem to have had less impact than others. Especially public values from legal sources have proven to be scarce. The reasons for this have been discussed throughout this study. Most importantly, a unified legal code did not really exist as the *Rechtsstaat* still had to come into being. The Republic's particularism, its bottom-up administration and slow processes of codification are likely to have been major reasons for the latter. Also, legal motivations for sentencing were commonly lacking and higher public officials (compare the likes of Vaster in chapter six, Van der Heim and Repelaer in chapter seven or Fijnje in chapter eight) were often in the end not tried, and this was most likely due to social standing. Equally interesting with regard to the questions of this study is that legal codes consistently seemed to

lag behind the codes on the shop floor and ideas expressed in best-opinion and public opinion. With the exception of the case study on taxation (although legal codes were also not always enforced there), legal codes could be there in theory but were mostly irrelevant in the actual practice of a scandal. Although for different reasons, in the cases of Van der Heim and Repelaer and in the case of Van Langen and others, prosecution and condemnation did not happen by means of legal codes.

The question when and why legal codes truly became embedded as a standard for public rectitude and a measure of political corruption will have to be further explored. Perhaps the single set of public values (as a result of a movement towards ethical monism, see earlier) that arose towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century only became firmly embedded after 1813 with the development, more firm institutional establishment and codification of legal codes (introduced by the French) and, after 1848, the establishment of the Dutch constitutional monarchy in a *Rechtsstaat*. Another conspicuously absent or underexposed element in discussions surrounding the scandals were religious views. Only very occasionally do the cases show writers (in essence only Bareuth) who offered a somewhat religiously inspired view. To clarify, this is not to say that religion did not have an influence on changing public values but that I have not found any references to such sources or arguments in the cases investigated here. This is surprising, given the representative nature and the size of the scandals and therefore offers interesting avenues for further research. Perhaps, it was due to an already quite advanced separation of state and church in the minds of the ruling regents. After all, as mentioned, they did not seem too willing to let any preacher teach them moral lessons on how to behave in public office.

A heuristics of sources of values and an emphasis on 'Johnstonian' contest and debate have, finally, offered more than a view on what we did or did not find. Both tools have allowed us (again: despite some overlap) to see whether public values from some sources conflicted with other sources and/or whether special attention by administrators to one particular public value or set of public values resulted in the displacement of another. We can conclude that there have certainly been conflicts between the different sources. Corruption clearly acquired a different meaning depending on the source of values and/or the social sphere or group by which it was discussed. In general, the codes of the shop floor often conflicted with ideas expressed in legal sources – if at all applicable – in best-opinion and public opinion. Especially the rise of best-opinion and public opinion as sources of potentially new and/or reemphasized public values seems to have been a key factor in displacing shop floor views and changing public morality. At the same time differences and value pluralism have not occurred as often as one might have expected (see chapter one). The cases have shown an increasing alignment of opinions about which public values were important and what constituted political corruption. Possibly, the increased dominance of especially best-opinion, public opinion and, to a lesser extent, legal-bureaucratic values (i.e., at least visible in chapter six) over the shop floor and the emergence of some form of ethical monism demonstrates an important clash that itself functioned as a driver of public value change.

Historical institutionalism and other theoretical explorations

A second set of conclusions concerning public value dynamics is based on the historical-institutionalist approach of this study combined with insights taken from the theoretical explorations of institutional design, structural functionalism, institutional economics and Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucratization (see chapters one and two). With regard to historical institutionalism, we have been able to see how the interplay between continuity (slow moving) and radical (fast and sudden) changes in social and political processes in Dutch history between 1748 and 1813 is able to partly explain changing public values in Holland in that period. The notions of path dependence (continuity) and critical junctures (radical change) have proven useful to explain how decisions and actions were at least in part shaped and determined by decisions and actions in previous decades. Any change in public values at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century was due to a longer history of protest and attempts at reform. Furthermore, Doelists, Patriots and Batavians were part of an important yet slow moving series of attempts at moral reform and changing public morality but the actual realization of their ideals needed critical junctures such as tax riots, Patriot revolt and Batavian revolution.

Other explanatory elements hypothesized by historical institutionalism can equally be seen in the cases. For one, existing institutions (defined broadly in chapter two) did in fact partly circumscribe the options for change and reform. Reformers like Van Wesele or Vosmaer could not change the system of taxation overnight, even if they had wanted to. Having fixed salaries to counter corruption seems, for instance, to have been an alien idea to many. The notion of self-interest as a driver of public service delivery proved equally difficult to eradicate. We have seen this in chapter seven, for instance, from the fact that it proved impossible to change overnight existing procedures of informal office rotation, patronage and acquiring public positions based on public standing or family ties. In addition, we have seen how asymmetries in power relations did play a role in determining what or who was or was not corrupt. The impact of social standing of public officials on their prosecution, for instance in the case of Reijers and Vaster, speaks volumes. Furthermore, a historical-institutional approach to public value dynamics has uncovered how misappropriation of (public) funds became increasingly unacceptable in times characterized by economic, social, political and/or military difficulties. A feeling of economic decline clearly led to debates on political corruption and cries for moral reform (as well as more government) between 1748 and 1813. The threat of war and/or the inability of government to deal with it, for instance with regard to the threat of the French armies in 1747 and the disaster of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war between 1780 and 1784, equally led to repeated calls for more and different administration and public morals. This, we might say, is a rather timeless mechanism of public value change, which historical-institutional research in general (and this study in particular) brings out into the open. Even today accusations of political corruption seem more prominent due to the credit-crunch, banking crisis and economic uncertainty. In difficult times fundamental questions concerning public official behaviour (such as the use and spending of public money) seem to arise inevitably.

The historical institutionalist approach of this study has also offered plausible explanations of the relationship between changing institutions and public value change in Dutch history between 1748 and 1813. More precisely, the study has shown how the connected

processes of bureaucratization, state-formation, democratization and politicization were indeed important catalysts for moral reform. A Weberian ideal-typical approach centring on bureaucratization has proven highly promising to investigate and discern changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. As we have seen in chapter six, bureaucratization (at least in the area of tax collecting) also had an important impact on changing public values and public morality. While it is not possible to point at a clear one-way causal direction between the two (see chapter three, paragraph five), the link is there all the same. In short: new bureaucratic rules and regulations and a new attitude towards public service delivery visible in the area of taxation must have had a deep impact on the way people behaved. Of course bureaucratization was itself also the result of new values and attitudes.

With regard to state-formation, democratization and politicization we can return to Koselleck's *Sattelzeit-hypothesis* which can now, largely, be confirmed. Changing public values and perceptions of political corruption between 1748 and 1813 in the Dutch context can be related to some of the explanatory elements that he and others distinguished. Most importantly, democratization did lead to a broader public of readers and the emergence of new genres of communication. The rise of a political press (i.e., public-opinion) had a major impact on changing public values because it allowed crucial discussion. It gave a voice to new groups of people who wanted a bigger share in politics. This had a direct influence on public values and perceptions of political corruption because it ended, in many ways, long-standing ideas of 'true liberty' in which *all* parties (rulers and ruled) believed that regent oligarchic administration based on shop floor codes was best for everyone. Also, democratization together with politicization did make certain concepts (such as 'aristocrat' and 'democrat' but also various public values and value statements more dynamic and contested, not least because they were connected to major political conflicts of the time and because they sometimes seemed to represent entire value systems. The ideal-typical notions of 'aristocrat' and 'democrat', for instance, did serve a purpose if only to describe and explain two opposed (equally ideal typical) value systems of the eighteenth century.

Another important explanation for public value change that belongs to this second set of conclusions is that complex processes of bureaucratization, state-formation, democratization and politicization were responsible for a slow but steady widening of crucial notions of the common good, the public interest or the community. This, in turn, led to subsequent new and/or reemphasized public values such as representation, loyalty and accountability. A shift in the entire idea of the state and the role of government – from an emphasis on local sovereignty and particularism to an emphasis on national centralization and uniformity of rules – caused a change in ideas on right and wrong public official behaviour. It led, for instance, to changing ideas about the interests that a public administrator was supposed to serve. From the aforementioned we can therefore tentatively conclude that we can support institutional design's assumption that institutions shape behaviour and that some systems (i.e., bureaucratic, centralized and parliamentary) are indeed less prone to political corruption than others (i.e., non-bureaucratic, particularistic and decentralized). Also, a change in the form of the Dutch state seems to have decreased the *need* for 'corrupt' practices and at the same time increased intolerance of various forms of political corruption. It seems impossible to offer a straightforward causal link and/or direction between changing structure and changing morality. Instead, the two seem to have been mutually reinforcing.

Yet, we can say conclude that such acts as patronage and/or brokerage, bribery, price-fixing or nepotism increasingly became intolerable and inappropriate because they lost their function in political-administrative life. They became unacceptable because of a fundamental change in the specific structure of early modern society. While some forms were still occasionally deemed necessary – for instance in the use of private interests to further public interests or circumventing procedures because the end justified the means (see chapter eight) – on the whole this certainly changed. We see this change most clearly, as mentioned in the above, in the case of taxation in chapter six when new bureaucratic structures literally took away the need for certain ‘corrupt’ practices. It can also be deduced from the other cases. Aims to end (princely) patronage in Patriot times included attempts to formally or informally restructure city governments and to improve ways of appointing officials in order to decrease the need for patronage and/or brokerage. Since patronage, according to many Patriots, was no longer considered to have a beneficial function in political-administrative life, its *raison d’être* had to be removed. Similarly, an improved hierarchical, centralized and more or less representative structure of political-administrative activity around 1798 (i.e., the emergence of a strong state) was meant to decrease the need for patronage, brokerage and other ways of ‘informal’ delegation and use of power and authority. The strength of a structural-functionalist theoretical point of view is that it tells us that political corruption was ever less needed to make politics and administration work because its place was increasingly taken over by bureaucratic structures and new political-administrative arrangements (such as salaries, promotion, standard procedures and formal hierarchical structures).

A final conclusion in this second set can now be drawn. The ‘success’ of aforementioned theoretical approaches to explain public value change allows us to conclude that a sole perspective from institutional economics (a rational-economy and/or principal-agent approach) is not desirable or likely to provide enduring answers. Its main limitation, noted among others by Rothstein (2010) and Williams (1999) (see chapter one) can now be corroborated because the cases do show the limitations inherent in focusing solely on economic motives and rational behaviour. Emotionally motivated political corruption employed for non-economic purposes does largely fall outside its scope. Furthermore, institutional economics seems unable to explain political corruption outside formal, office-centred, and interpersonal relationships (Johnston, 1996: 326) and seems especially liable to affect or distort historical research into political corruption. It often turns out to be quite difficult, for instance, to determine who is ‘principal’ or ‘agent’.

In reply to such criticism, Rose-Ackerman recently wrote that “whether the principal is a single, named superior or a diffuse body like the public at large, the essential point is that corruption represents the violation of an obligation or a duty in return for private benefit”. She added that “it [the institutional economic and principal/agent approach, TK] may fail to take account of dynamic factors and social forces, but it provides a valuable place to start and places the burden of proof on those wishing either to add additional complementary factors [...] or to substitute an entirely different approach” (2010: 48-49). I agree with this last assertion and believe that we should indeed look for complementary factors and different approaches if we are to understand better what political corruption is, what causes it and what we can do to stop or prevent it. This study has provided evidence for this theoretical and methodological conclusion. The existence of broad and neo-classical notions of political corruption and the value of a historical institutional approach indeed enable us to add additional complementary factors to an institutional economics approach in order to better

understand what political corruption is and how, when or why public values change. When political corruption is often referred to as the general decay or deterioration of the entire body politic this means, for instance, that it is more than the violation of an obligation or a duty in return for private benefit. When ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ factors are equally important in changing public values, it furthermore means that any one-sided emphasis on either of them is not the way forward.

Final considerations

Historical research and subsequent insights into public value dynamics also (naturally!) have consequences for some present (or timeless?) dilemma’s of public (value) management, administrative morality and/or fighting corruption. For one, it makes it clear that at present, definitions of political corruption that are based on any single (quantifiable?) ‘standard of goodness’ are too limited. Instead, political corruption acquires meaning through broader contextual and institutional processes. Historical research shows how public values and change therein are socially constructed in an ever changing institutional setting. This should serve as an important realization for our current understanding and study of political corruption, the fight against it, and public values and their dynamics.

Furthermore, historical research tells us how it is essential to widen our scope when defining current political corruption and assessing public value systems. A wider understanding of political corruption as both narrow individual abuse of office and broad ideas on political or societal decay, proves applicable in current situations. As soon as one realizes that political corruption and specific public values (or a lack thereof) is best regarded as a problem stemming from and affecting the entire body politic, one realizes it should not be solely considered as an individual act of public officials. Fighting political corruption (i.e., taking away its causes) in any context therefore means tackling broader processes and ideas, for instance through investigating disagreement between various current sources of values. It is not a very useful approach to target the individual without paying attention to the system in which that individual functions.

By extension, something can be said about the failure of many attempts to bring about change in public morality (for instance through codes of conduct). Historical research shows us that current public values have been shaped in centuries of social-political development and that they are here for a reason. This means that any current public morality cannot – should anyone wish to do so – be changed either quickly or easily. In addition, to understand better how, when and why to improve public morality a broader approach that considers the contextual and contingent nature of public values (as expressed in a large variety of sources) seems essential. It could lead one to conclude that there is no timeless code of conduct able to please everyone. A historical perspective on changing public morality that underscores the contextual nature of public morality could also lead to an important realization of ethical relativism: current times are not necessarily more or less corrupt than past times and different public moralities acquire meaning in their own contextual frames of reference. People should do well to take such a historical vantage point and realize their own context-bound morality before entering into discussions over the values of someone else.

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This bibliography is divided in three categories to provide a more clear overview of the variety of sources used for this study. The first category, **Manuscript sources**, consists of non-printed archive material. The second category, **Printed sources**, consists of non-archival material and is divided into two parts. *Contemporary works and printed documents* contains seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth-century primary works and contemporary material that has been collected and compiled by others. *Pamphlets and periodicals* contains (often anonymous) printed contemporary pamphlets and political writings. The third category, **Secondary sources**, contains all other secondary literature.

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Samenvatting

Verborgen moraal, expliciete schandalen: publieke waarden en politieke corruptie in Nederland (1748 – 1813)

Inleiding

Publieke waarden vormen de kern van het openbaar bestuur. In het stellen van politieke doelen en het uitvoeren van beleid gaat het immers onherroepelijk om het maken van keuzes en waardeoordelen. Dat betekent dat er vaak verschil van mening bestaat over welke publieke waarden van belang zijn. Het betekent ook dat publieke waarden altijd aan verandering onderhevig zijn als gevolg van veranderende (politieke, sociale, economische) omstandigheden. De vraag wat goed bestuur is hangt altijd in sterke mate af van door wie, waar en wanneer die vraag gesteld wordt. Allereerst hebben verschillende mensen verschillende waarden en opvattingen. Ook kunnen vergelijkbare handelingen verschillend worden ervaren of geïnterpreteerd en kennen andere tijden andere opvattingen over goed bestuur. Gedrag wat ooit toelaatbaar was is dat tegenwoordig niet altijd meer en wat wij tegenwoordig acceptabel vinden kan in de toekomst evengoed weer worden afgekeurd. In deze studie is onderzoek verricht naar hoe, wanneer en waarom veelal impliciete publieke waarden veranderden in de Nederlandse geschiedenis aan de hand van onderzoek naar openbare corruptieschandalen. Dit onderzoek is van belang omdat het fundamentele kennis oplevert over sociaal-politieke interactie. Een analyse van publieke waarden en corruptie verschaft ons inzicht in veranderende opvattingen en verwachtingen ten opzichte van goed bestuur, het algemeen belang en de rol van de overheid. Het geeft ons ook een beeld van veranderende opvattingen over de verhouding tussen bestuur en bestuurder, tussen staat en samenleving en tussen publiek en privaat.

Om zicht te krijgen op publieke waardeverandering in de Nederlandse geschiedenis is in september 2006 een door de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO) gefinancierd onderzoeksproject van start gegaan. Het project “*Under Construction: the Genesis of Public Value Systems*” is opgezet om de geschiedenis en ontwikkeling van publieke waardestelsels te onderzoeken in Nederland tussen 1650 en 1950 in drie deelprojecten die ieder honderd jaar voor hun rekening nemen. Het project wilde veranderende opvattingen over goed en slecht bestuur en de achterliggende publieke waarden onderzoeken door middel van een combinatie van historisch en sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek naar corruptieschandalen. Het doel was om bestaande kennis over verandering van publieke waarden in Nederland aan te vullen. Deze studie richt zich op het tweede deelproject over de periode tussen 1750 en 1850 en beperkt zich hierbinnen tot het specifieke tijdvak 1748 – 1813 en in geografisch opzicht tot het gewest Holland. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: *welke veranderingen in publieke waarden en publieke waardestelsels worden zichtbaar in corruptieschandalen in Nederland tussen 1748 en 1813?* Corruptie is in deze studie zowel een middel om veranderende publieke waarden te onderzoeken als een zelfstandig object van onderzoek, dat wil zeggen een (negatieve) publieke waarde op zichzelf. De onderzoeksvraag verbindt empirische, theoretische en methodologische

doelstellingen. In empirisch opzicht wordt aan de hand van enkele casussen bekeken welke publieke waarden en opvattingen van corruptie eigenlijk bestonden in een belangrijke periode in de politieke en bestuurlijke geschiedenis van Nederland.¹ In theoretisch en methodologisch opzicht heeft het tot doel om door middel van historisch en sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek betekenisvolle relaties aan te tonen tussen verandering van publieke waarden enerzijds en de bredere historische institutionele context anderzijds.

Publieke waarden en politieke corruptie

Hoofdstuk een bevat een uiteenzetting van de twee basiselementen van het onderzoek. Ten eerste gaat het om publieke waarden die – in navolging van Barry Bozeman (2007: 13-14) – gedefinieerd worden als voorkeuren van mensen met betrekking tot de rechten en plichten van burgers en hun vertegenwoordigers. Een waardesysteem wordt vervolgens (cf. Oyserman, 2001: 16151) gedefinieerd als een verzameling van waarden die fungeren als criteria door middel waarvan gedrag wordt beoordeeld en sancties worden opgelegd. Uiteraard kunnen er meerdere verschillende waardesystemen naast elkaar bestaan. Ook kunnen er als gevolg van complexe sociaal-politieke ontwikkelingen verschuivingen binnen en tussen waardesystemen plaatsvinden.

Politieke corruptie vormt het tweede kernelement dat in het eerste hoofdstuk aan bod komt. De bespreking betreft vooral de voor- en nadelen van verschillende wetenschappelijke benaderingen die corruptie bestuderen en trachten te verklaren. Vier theoretische benaderingen (neo-institutionalisme, structureel-functionalisme, institutionele economie en een Weberiaanse ideaaltypische aanpak) worden kritisch besproken en in deze studie geheel of gedeeltelijk toegepast. Hoofdstuk één gaat daarnaast over de moeilijkheid om tot een sluitende definitie van politieke corruptie te komen en over de nadelen van het gebruik van enkelvoudige, te nauwe, definities. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt zodoende een algemeen – en zoals zal blijken fundamenteel – onderscheid tussen ‘klassieke’ en ‘moderne’ definities. In de klassieke opvatting betekent corruptie veelal het algemene morele verval van het politieke lichaam en het onvermogen om de politieke gemeenschap te dienen. In meer recente en ‘moderne’ definities wordt corruptie daarentegen vrij eng gedefinieerd als individueel misbruik aan de hand van enkelvoudige standaarden die als maatstaf van corruptie dienen. Het gaat dan veelal om juridische standaarden verbonden aan een publiek ambt, om het behalen van persoonlijk gewin uit een publieke functie of om het schaden van publieke belangen.

Het onvermogen van eendimensionale definities om corruptie in verschillende verschijningsvormen en in historische context te verklaren en/of beter te begrijpen leidt tot een alternatieve benadering van corruptie. In de neoklassieke benadering van de Amerikaanse politicoloog Michael Johnston wordt corruptie gedefinieerd als “the abuse, according to the legal *or* social standards constituting a society’s system of public order, of a public role or resource for private benefit” (1996: 333). Daarmee benadert Johnston corruptie als een zuiver contextueel en sociaal geconstrueerd fenomeen waarbij zowel de klassieke als enkelvoudige ‘moderne’ dimensies worden gecombineerd. Johnston nodigt ons vervolgens uit te onderzoeken

¹ Nederland bestond nog niet tussen 1748 en 1813 maar de naam wordt omwille van meer duidelijkheid wel gebruikt in deze studie en haar vraagstelling. In feite is er sprake van verschillende benamingen en staatsvormen in deze periode: de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (1555 – 1795), de Bataafse Republiek (1795 – 1806), het Koninkrijk Holland (1806 – 1810), de inlijving bij het Franse Keizerrijk (1810 – 1813) en het Vorstendom der Nederlanden (1813 – 1815). In hoofdstuk vier van dit boek wordt iedere periode en bijbehorende staatsvorm kort besproken.

ken hoe de inhoud of betekenis van begrippen als ‘abuse’, ‘public role’ en ‘private benefit’ in een bepaalde tijd en plaats wordt bevochten en schrijft dat corruptie datgene is wat op een bepaald moment als zodanig wordt ervaren in een bredere institutionele context. Economische, politieke en sociale strijd tussen individuen en groepen in een samenleving zal bepalen wanneer en waarom een bepaalde handeling als corrupt wordt beschouwd en welke publieke waarden wel of niet langer algemeen gedeeld of gepropageerd worden. Diezelfde strijd is veelal de oorzaak van verandering in publieke moraal en Johnstons benadering loopt zodoende als een rode draad door deze studie. Tot slot wordt in hoofdstuk één het onderzoek geplaatst binnen het corpus van bestaand historisch onderzoek naar corruptie en publieke waarden in de Nederlandse geschiedenis. Het gebrek aan specifiek onderzoek naar deze onderwerpen en de manier waarop corruptie en publieke waarden in het verleden veelal zijn bestudeerd geeft eveneens de noodzaak aan van een nieuwe ‘Johnstoniaanse’ en contextuele benadering.

Bestuursgeschiedenis en de dynamiek van publieke waarden

Hoofdstuk twee gaat in op de mogelijkheden die worden geboden door een combinatie van een meer historische en een meer sociaalwetenschappelijke benadering voor het beantwoorden van de hoofdvraag. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt hoe de historische aandacht voor context, detail en de lange termijn goed samen gaat met sociaalwetenschappelijke aandacht voor padafhankelijkheid, theorievorming en het gebruik van modellen en ideaaltypen om mechanismen en processen in de geschiedenis (zoals veranderende publieke waardesystemen) te duiden en te verklaren. In deze context worden in dit hoofdstuk de twee laatste theoretische en methodologische elementen aan het onderzoeksraamwerk toegevoegd. In de eerste plaats gaat het om Max Weber’s ideaaltype van bureaucratie en zijn notie van bureaucratisering. Het ideaaltype en de bureaucratisering worden in deze studie ingezet om veranderingen in publieke moraal te onderzoeken. Zoals uit de casussen – en vooral in de eerste casus in hoofdstuk zes – naar voren komt, gaan bureaucratisering (zoals de komst van meer regels en richtlijnen) en een veranderende publieke moraal hand in hand. Ten tweede gaat het in hoofdstuk twee om het benutten van inzichten uit het historisch-institutionalisme waarin aandacht wordt besteed aan fundamentele processen van sociale verandering over langere perioden in een historisch vergelijkend en sterk contextueel perspectief. Zowel Weber’s ideaaltype als het historisch institutionalisme bieden handvatten om de complexiteit van het verleden intact te laten maar tegelijkertijd te zoeken naar mogelijke verklaringen voor processen en mechanismen van verandering van moraal.

Onderzoeksopzet

In *hoofdstuk drie* komen de eerder besproken elementen en theorieën bij elkaar in een onderzoeksopzet. Cruciaal is de doelstelling om veelal verborgen publieke waarden en opvattingen van politieke corruptie zichtbaar te maken. Dat gebeurt door middel van een analyse van schandalen van corruptie in drie casussen (zie onder) waarin de zienswijzen (i.e. publieke waarden en opvattingen van politieke corruptie) van verschillende – potentieel tegengestelde – groepen en actoren naast en tegenover elkaar worden gezet. In een schandaal wordt het impliciete expliciet gemaakt: het toont ons wat als goed of fout publiek gedrag wordt gezien. Corruptieschandalen laten ons publiek debat zien en geven ons een idee van het ontoelaatbare

en daarmee ook van het toelaatbare. Schandalen bieden een uniek beeld van de strijd tussen de zienswijzen van verschillende groepen en individuen op basis waarvan (vergelijk Johnston eerder) publieke waarden en politieke corruptie betekenis krijgen. Deze zienswijzen van verschillende groepen zijn – in navolging van de bestuurskundige Ben Hoetjes (1982) – vervat in een typologie van vier bronnen van publieke waarden. Het gaat daarbij om de moraal van de tijd zoals deze wordt uitgedragen door morele autoriteiten en ‘opiniemakers’ (1), om juridische uitingen in wetgeving en rechtspraak (2), om de publieke opinie in pamfletten en politieke bladen (3) en om de zienswijzen van functionarissen zoals die gelden en geuit worden in de alledaagse praktijk van bestuur ‘op de werkvloer’ (4). Per casus worden deze vier bronnen van publieke waarden rondom een corruptieschandaal geanalyseerd. Dat levert een gevarieerd en gedetailleerd beeld op van zienswijzen. Het biedt ook zicht op de dynamiek van publieke waarden en opvattingen van corruptie wanneer bepaalde grenzen worden overschreden en er onder druk van bepaalde bronnen veranderingen optreden in het denken over publieke moraal. Dat gebeurt bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van opkomende publieke opinie in de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw waardoor gedrag ‘op de werkvloer’ feitelijk voor het eerst openlijk bediscussieerd en bekritiseerd wordt. Het is daarbij eveneens interessant om te zien dat er zo ook voortdurend nieuwe verantwoordingsrelaties ontstaan. Bestuurders zien zich bijvoorbeeld steeds vaker gedwongen om verantwoording af te leggen aan een steeds grotere groep mensen.

In hoofdstuk drie worden ook casusselectie en noodzakelijke beperkingen van het onderzoek besproken. De casussen zijn, zoals gezegd, in geografische zin beperkt tot het gewest Holland. Een blik op publieke waarden en politieke corruptie in Holland zegt, vanwege het particularisme van de Republiek (zie hoofdstuk vier) niet per definitie iets over de situatie in de overige gewesten. Tegelijkertijd was het echter zo dat Holland het economische, politieke en bestuurlijke centrum van de Republiek was en daarmee representatief kan worden geacht voor een aanzienlijk deel van het totale bestuur. Het aantal casussen is verder beperkt tot drie. Die keuze heeft vooral te maken met de hoge eisen waaraan zij moesten voldoen. Iedere casus moest een groot schandaal zijn waarbij sprake was van veel ophef en discussie in zoveel mogelijk verschillende bronnen van waarden. Met deze selectiecriteria bleek het niet eenvoudig meer dan drie grote casussen te vinden (wat uiteraard niet betekent dat deze er per definitie niet zijn). Daarnaast was deze beperking noodzakelijk gezien de beschikbare tijd en ruimte in samenhang met het gebrekkige en nauwelijks geordende bronnenmateriaal.

Een laatste beperking betreft een beperking in tijd. Er is gekozen voor drie casussen uit kenmerkende deelperioden van de Nederlandse geschiedenis tussen 1748 en 1813. De drie perioden (1748 – 1756, de jaren 1770 en 1780 en de periode 1795 – 1813) vallen samen met de opkomst van drie gerelateerde populaire hervormingsbewegingen (achtereenvolgens Doelisten, Patriotten en Bataven) die zowel de verbetering van bestuur als van bestuurlijke moraal hoog in het vaandel hadden staan. De keuze om te stoppen in 1813 (en niet in 1850) heeft andermaal te maken met beschikbare ruimte en tijd. Tegelijkertijd zijn er voor deze beperking ook inhoudelijke redenen. Ten eerste moet de periode 1813 – 1850 als een fundamenteel andere periode dan daarvoor worden beschouwd vanwege de komst van de (later constitutionele) monarchie in 1813. Ten tweede komt de beperking voort uit de idee – en dit gaat tegen het gangbare denken in – dat de fundamenten voor de ‘nieuwe’ periode na 1813 grotendeels gelegd werden in de periode daarvoor. Onderzoek naar de periode 1748 – 1813 vormt zodoende tegenwicht tegen de idee dat er ten tijde van de Republiek weinig veranderde in publieke waarden en waardestelsels, bureaucrativering en de fundamenten en structuur van de Nederlandse staat. Een laatste criterium voor de casusselectie is de idee dat iedere casus zicht geeft

op een typisch gebied van bestuurlijke activiteit en strijd in de periode. Casus een (hoofdstuk zes) speelt zich af tegen de achtergrond van belastinginning en bureaucratisering. Casus twee (hoofdstuk zeven) speelt zich af in de context van strijd over patronage, nepotisme, venaliteit en de vormgeving van stedelijke regeringen. Casus drie (hoofdstuk acht) speelt zich af in de context van staatsvorming, democratisering en politisering na de Bataafse revolutie van 1795.

Politieke geschiedenis, politieke cultuur en de ‘moraal van de tijd’

In *hoofdstuk vier* wordt aandacht besteed aan het beschrijven en analyseren van de context van de latere casussen. Dit hoofdstuk biedt in de eerste plaats een overzicht van de belangrijkste politiek-bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen tussen 1748 en 1813, zoals de opbouw en werking van de belangrijkste bestuurlijke niveaus, structuren, processen, personen en groepen in het openbaar bestuur van die tijd. Het hoofdstuk besteedt daarnaast aandacht aan enkele fundamentele karakteristieken van de Nederlandse politieke cultuur tussen 1748 en 1813. Het betreft hier eveneens essentiële context voor een goed begrip van de casussen en de veranderende publieke waarden die hierin naar voren komen. Zonder basale kennis van de politieke cultuur (formele en informele omgangsvormen tussen politieke actoren en/of niveaus) is het niet mogelijk te beoordelen wanneer iets wel of niet als corrupt werd beschouwd en waarom dat zo was en mogelijk veranderde.

Het eerste empirische hoofdstuk van deze studie is *hoofdstuk vijf*. Hierin wordt de eerste bron van publieke waarden (de vooraanstaande morele autoriteiten en ‘opiniemakers’) – in tegenstelling tot de andere drie bronnen – apart besproken in de context van de drie eerder genoemde hervormingsbewegingen. Enkele geschriften van auteurs tussen 1748 en 1813 worden onderzocht op de publieke waarden en de opvattingen van corruptie die hierin naar voren komen. De nadruk ligt op kenmerkende personen die als boegbeeld van hun beweging en/of periode fungeerden en die protest aantekenden tegen de status quo. De kritiek en de alternatieven die zij leverden geven belangrijke informatie over hoe er in progressieve en/of hervormingsgezinde kringen gedurende een langere periode over moraal van bestuur werd nagedacht. Uit deze bespreking blijkt in ieder geval dat er naast verschil vooral veel continuïteit te zien is. Tussen 1748 en 1813 is herhaaldelijk gelijksoortige kritiek geuit op bestaande publieke moraal en zijn er gelijksoortige oplossingen geboden. Deze oplossingen (zoals een einde aan venaliteit en meer bureaucratie) waren als gevolg van wisselende politieke en sociaaleconomische omstandigheden (zoals economische malaise en militaire tegenspoed die leidden tot onrust en protest) steeds succesvoller. In de kern blijkt het – ondanks de nodige verschillen – bij zowel Doelisten als Patriotten als Bataven te zijn gegaan om nieuwe danwel herbevestigde principes zoals politieke participatie, volkssoevereiniteit, representatie, politieke verantwoording en publieke verantwoordelijkheid. Corruptie werd goeddeels gezien (in een vrij klassieke zin, zie eerder) als het algehele verval van staat en samenleving als gevolg van eigenbelang, patronage en nepotisme. Daarbij blijkt er onder de besproken auteurs in toenemende mate sprake te zijn geweest van een hernieuwde en bredere connotatie van de politieke gemeenschap en het publieke of algemene belang die niet of niet voldoende in acht werden genomen door corrupte bestuurders.

Corruptieschandalen

De laatste drie hoofdstukken van deze studie bevatten de drie corruptieschandalen die plaatsvonden tussen 1748 en 1813. Deze hoofdstukken bieden voor iedere periode veel informatie – afkomstig uit verschillende bronnen van publieke waarden – over wat wel en niet geaccepteerd was of als corruptie werd gezien en waarom dat het geval was. Daarnaast biedt ieder hoofdstuk afzonderlijk – en de drie hoofdstukken gezamenlijk (zie hoofdstuk negen) – zicht op enkele fundamentele processen en/of mechanismen die van invloed zijn geweest op veranderende publieke waarden en opvattingen over corruptie in de onderzochte periode.

Hoofdstuk zes toont aan de hand van een corruptieschandaal met betrekking tot belastinginning rond 1750 aan dat bureaucrativering van dit belangrijke onderdeel van het achttiende-eeuwse bestuurlijke apparaat ook leidde tot een veranderende houding ten opzichte van bestuurlijke moraal. De casus laat zien hoe grootschalig protest tijdens het zogenaamde Pachtersoproer in 1748 tegen een corrupt en grotendeels ‘privaat’ systeem van belastinginning (door middel van verpachting) leidde tot het opzetten van een nieuw publiek belastingstelsel. In dit proces werden morele standaarden waar dit apparaat aan moest voldoen door lokale en centrale overheden expliciet opgesteld. Het protest en de reactie van lokale en centrale overheden laten zien dat het vorige systeem (grotendeels gebaseerd op eigenbelang en individueel financieel gewin als motivatie voor een efficiënte belastinginning) in morele zin niet langer voldeed. Corruptie betekende in toenemende mate het niet naleven van bureaucratische waarden zoals hiërarchie, expertise, punctualiteit en/of neutraliteit. Het vermengen van een publieke functie met private belangen door belastingfunctionarissen werd op termijn eveneens steeds minder getolereerd. Dit was een revolutionaire gedachte in een wereld die een scheiding tussen publiek en privaat voorheen nauwelijks kende. Belastingfunctionarissen moesten ook in toenemende mate in een sterk bureaucratisch raamwerk functioneren. Zij kregen, bijvoorbeeld, steeds vaker een vast salaris om corruptie tegen te gaan. Ook moesten zij zich houden aan strengere regels, procedures en instructies waar zij vanaf de jaren 1750 ook daadwerkelijk in juridische zin op werden afgerekend. Daarnaast betekende corruptie, zeker in de ogen van veelal anonieme pamfletschrijvers, vooral ook het vergaren van rijkdom en weelde in tijden van verondersteld economisch verval. Integere publieke belastingfunctionarissen zouden daarbij slechts het belang van de stadskas en dat van de burger in een bredere politieke gemeenschap voor ogen moeten hebben.

In *hoofdstuk zeven* wordt een sprong gemaakt naar de jaren 1770 en 1780 waarin andermaal fundamentele ontwikkelingen plaatsvonden op het gebied van publieke waarden en bestuurlijke moraal. De opkomst van nieuwe politieke ideeën, deels verspreid door een ontluikende politieke pers en publieke opinie, bracht ook de Republiek in revolutionair vaarwater. In de jaren na 1770 kwam er van de zijde van de Patriotten hevige kritiek op het corrupte politieke systeem van een steeds machtiger wordende Stadhouder op centraal niveau en de regerende oligarchieën van stedelijke regenten (en prinselijke vertrouwensmannen, zie onder) op lokaal niveau. De Patriotten baseerden zich op deels nieuwe ideeën als volksovereïnteit, vrijheid, politieke participatie en representatie. Zij wensten deelname van een grotere groep mensen in de besturen van de Republiek en zetten zich in voor ‘morele herbewapening’ om het gecorrumpeerde regime weer gezond te maken. Hoofdstuk zeven laat zien hoe de Patriotten vooral een moreel gevaar zagen in de corrupte vertrouwensmannen die door de Erfstadhouder in provinciale en lokale bestuurslichamen werden geplaatst om zijn macht te

vergroten en zijn belangen te behartigen. In de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw werd dit stelsel van stadhouderlijke patronage en lokale ambtenbegeving zowel door ideologisch geïnspireerde Patriotten als door praktisch gemotiveerde – want van bestuur uitgesloten – lokale regenten, fel bekritiseerd en bestempeld als ‘corruptie’. In de ogen van veel Patriotten werd het ‘publieke belang’ – dat nu ook bestond uit zaken als volkssoevereiniteit, politieke participatie, bescherming van de burger, wederopleving van handel en welvaart en een einde aan de ‘tirannie’ van de Erfstadhouder voor wie geen plek was in een Republiek – door deze functionarissen duidelijk niet behartigd. Voor regenten die door middel van de stadhouderlijke patronage buitenspel waren gezet, uitte de ‘corruptie’ van de vertrouwensmannen zich in het niet honoreren van aloude principes van senioriteit, toerbeurt en ‘harmonie’ tussen regenten onderling. Vooral dat laatste lijkt voor de regenten op de werkvloer in deze periode nog steeds de belangrijkste bestuurlijke waarde en maatstaf voor corruptie te zijn geweest. Zo bezien vonden uitgesloten regenten en Patriotten elkaar tijdelijk in hun afkeer van bestaande bestuurlijke praktijken maar hadden beide groepen heel andere ideeën voor de toekomst. De regenten wilden vooral terug naar de oude praktijken. De Patriotten wilden echter naar een nieuw en in hun ogen meer integer systeem. Uiteindelijk (zoals ook beschreven in hoofdstuk vier) trokken de Erfstadhouder en zijn clique als gevolg van Pruisische militaire interventie aan het langste eind. In de praktijk en op de lange termijn kwam er zodoende weinig terecht van hervormingsplannen. Nieuwe ideeën waren echter wel degelijk gezaaid en zouden na 1795 terugkomen en vanaf dan meer structureel worden doorgevoerd.

In *hoofdstuk acht* komt de laatste casus aan bod in de periode na de Bataafse revolutie van 1795. Dit was een tijd van grote politieke en sociale verandering waarin vrij resoluut een einde werd gemaakt aan het oude federalisme en particularisme van de Republiek. Onder druk van Fransen en Bataven kwam een sterke eenheidsstaat tot stand, gebaseerd op een staatsregeling of grondwet en een nationale vergadering. Publieke waarden en opvattingen over corruptie veranderden zodoende als gevolg van verregaande staatsvorming. Centralisatie en het optuigen van een nieuw politiek-bestuurlijk apparaat met meer gestandaardiseerde procedures (zoals uniforme wetgeving) en een professioneler ambtenarenapparaat kwamen echter niet zonder slag of stoot tot stand en hadden ook consequenties voor debatten over corruptie en publieke waarden. Het leverde vooral fundamentele discussies op over hoe een sterke centrale overheid zich had te gedragen en waar macht vandaan kwam. Soevereiniteit werd immers in toenemende mate aan ‘het volk’ toegedicht. Door middel van vooralsnog rudimentaire verkiezingen – in wat een beginnende democratie kan worden genoemd – konden burgers zich uitspreken over hoe deze macht het beste uitgeoefend moest worden.

Hoofdstuk acht laat zien dat discussies over corruptie in de eerste jaren van de Bataafse Republiek vooral gingen over nieuwe en/of opnieuw gewaardeerde fundamentele publieke waarden als representatie, legitimiteit van bestuur, verantwoording en verantwoordelijkheid. Ook de scheiding tussen publiek en privaat was onderwerp van debat. De casus met betrekking tot de corruptie van enkele leden van het Uitvoerend Bewind in 1798 laat zien dat het vermengen van publiek en privaat steeds minder getolereerd werd door steeds grotere groepen mensen (i.e. verschillende bronnen van waarden). Ook nu was extravagant gedrag van overheidsfunctionarissen bovendien niet toelaatbaar in tijden van een (vermeende) nationale economische crisis. Publieke functionarissen werden geacht een ‘nieuw’ publiek belang (het morele en daarmee economische en politieke herstel van de Bataafse natie) te dienen. Corruptie werd door het gros van de Bataven zodoende anders gedefinieerd dan voorheen. De scheidslijn tussen corrupt en niet corrupt was nu veelal gebaseerd op een breder idee van het

publieke belang en/of de politieke gemeenschap en op een strikter scheiding tussen publiek en privaat. De term corruptie werd zowel in de klassieke als in de moderne betekenis gebruikt maar de eerste had toch (nog steeds) de overhand. Corruptie werd in de Bataafs-Franse tijd direct gekoppeld aan het verval van de natie.

Veranderende waarden en opvattingen van corruptie

Hoofdstuk negen bevat een overkoepelende analyse en antwoorden op de hoofdvraag. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat veranderingen in publieke waarden en opvattingen over corruptie in de eerste plaats op de lange termijn speelden. Oude en nieuwe opvattingen bestonden vaak lange tijd naast elkaar en het duurde – voor zover dat überhaupt met zekerheid is na te gaan – vaak enige tijd voordat nieuwe ideeën in de dagelijkse praktijk terug waren te zien. Ideeën over goed bestuur zoals die door de Bataven werden uitgedragen waren, bijvoorbeeld, immers deels al in een of andere vorm door Patriotten en zelfs door Doelisten geuit. Op eenzelfde manier was het effect van nieuwe bureaucratische regels op een veranderende publieke moraal (bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van de belastinginning in hoofdstuk zes en voor het verkrijgen van publieke ambten in hoofdstuk zeven) eerder geleidelijk dan abrupt. Er werden weliswaar op cruciale momenten nieuwe ankerpunten uitgezet (zoals regels, procedures en opvattingen van goed bestuur) maar daar ging altijd een lang proces aan vooraf. Bovendien waren deze ankerpunten lang niet altijd vanaf het begin zo gezaghebbend dat zij ook daadwerkelijk meteen werden nageleefd. Het is dus noodzakelijk om verandering van publieke waarden te zien als iets wat op verschillende niveaus en in verschillende tempo's gebeurt. Dat neemt echter niet weg dat de periode tussen 1748 en 1813 wel degelijk enkele fundamentele institutionele veranderingen kende die van invloed waren op veranderend denken over corruptie en bestuurlijke moraal. Enkele kernelementen van publiek gedrag en politieke cultuur die rond 1750 vrijwel algemeen geaccepteerd waren (zoals ambtenbegeving, patronage, een regering door een kleine groep regenten en het vermengen van publieke middelen en privaat voordeel) werden rond 1800 sterk veroordeeld. In grofweg zes decennia was het beeld van de integere publieke functionaris – weliswaar geleidelijk en niet volledig, maar toch fundamenteel – veranderd.

Een neoklassieke blik op bronnen van publieke waarden

Hoofdstuk negen levert enkele algemene verklaringen en conclusies met betrekking tot publieke waardeverandering. Een eerste set van conclusies komt voort uit de theoretische en methodologische aanpak en doelstellingen van deze studie. Johnstons neoklassieke benadering en Hoetjes' heuristiek bewijzen in de casussen hun waarde. De casussen laten zien dat expliciete corruptieschandalen en discussies tussen verschillende bronnen van waarden een goed – want zeer gedetailleerd – beeld geven van hoe er daadwerkelijk over goed en slecht bestuur werd gedacht. De casussen tonen ook aan dat eendimensionale benaderingen van corruptie (bijvoorbeeld een 'public office' of 'public opinion' benadering, zie hoofdstuk een) alleen in combinatie nuttig zijn om inherent contextuele en contingente publieke waarden en opvattingen over politieke corruptie te kunnen begrijpen. Daarnaast wordt in hoofdstuk negen besproken dat een combinatie en vergelijking van verschillende bronnen van publieke waarden – ondanks enige overlap – cruciale inzichten oplevert over hoe, wanneer en waarom publieke

waarden en opvattingen van corruptie veranderen. Uit de studie blijkt bijvoorbeeld een relatief gebrek aan en/of minder belang van juridische bronnen van waarden. Dit is mogelijk niet verrassend gezien het ontbreken van een rechtsstaat en kan ook liggen aan de casusselectie. Desalniettemin is dit een interessante observatie. Het toont (met uitzondering van hoofdstuk zes) een relatief gebrek aan bureaucrativering in de vorm van codificatie en laat daarmee zien dat definities van corruptie die enkel geënt zijn op juridische en/of bureaucratische standaarden niet afdoende zijn. Uit de studie blijkt ook een relatief gebrek aan religieuze visies op corruptie en publieke waarden. Ook hier kan casusselectie een rol spelen, hetgeen net als in het geval van de juridische bronnen dus meer onderzoek vereist. Het is echter een interessant gegeven gezien de rol die religie over het algemeen wordt geacht in te nemen in de achttiende-eeuwse Nederlandse samenleving. Wij leren uit de studie, tot slot, ook dat toe- of afnemend belang van bepaalde bronnen van waarden zelf een belangrijke katalysator van waardeverandering lijkt te zijn geweest. Zo lijken de publieke opinie en de morele autoriteiten (merkbaar in een toename van pamfletten en politieke geschriften) in de onderzochte casussen belangrijker motoren van waardeverandering te zijn geweest dan de 'werkvloer' en het recht. Die laatste twee lijken toch vooral eerder volgers dan trendsetters te zijn geweest.

De voorgaande observatie leidt ook tot andere belangrijke conclusies inzake een algemene verschuiving als gevolg van al dan niet botsende waardesystemen. De casussen laten zien dat hierin tussen 1748 en 1813 wel degelijk ontwikkelingen zichtbaar zijn. In hoofdstuk zes is te zien dat, op termijn, vrijwel alle partijen in ieder geval in theorie akkoord gingen met de nieuwe morele en bureaucratische uitgangspunten van het nieuwe belastingapparaat. Tegelijkertijd konden verschillende mensen echter nog steeds opereren binnen verschillende waardesystemen. Het nieuwe bureaucratische waardesysteem werkte nog veelal naast (en niet in plaats van) oudere informele systemen gebaseerd op andere waarden. Het gegeven (uit de tweede casus in hoofdstuk zeven) dat rang en stand uitmaakten dat de ene persoon niet werd veroordeeld en de andere wel, is hier een typisch voorbeeld van. In de tweede casus zien wij echter tegelijkertijd een begin van het ontstaan van een soort 'ethisch monisme'. Hoewel er ook in de Patriottentijd nog steeds verschillende waardestelsels parallel aan elkaar bestonden, zagen bestuurders zich vanaf de jaren 1770 en 1780 vaker gedwongen een keuze te maken tussen een bureaucratisch en formeel waardestelsel enerzijds en een patrimoniaal en informeel waardestelsel anderzijds. Het lag volgens de meeste hervormingsgezinde Patriotten duidelijk niet langer voor de hand dat publieke functionarissen in beide stelsels tegelijkertijd konden functioneren. De derde casus toont het (voorlopige) hoogtepunt in deze periode in de verschuiving van waardepluralisme naar ethisch monisme. Uiteraard waren ook hier nog wel overblijfselen van pluraliteit te zien, zoals in de mening van enkelen dat publieke middelen en privaat gewin nog wel samen konden gaan of de idee dat een zekere mate van wat wel eufemistisch 'Italiaanse Staatskunde' werd genoemd, onontbeerlijk was om zaken nu eenmaal gedaan te krijgen. Uit het merendeel van de bronnen van waarden in de casus uit de Bataafs-Franse tijd komt echter naar voren dat publieke functionarissen niet langer in twee werelden tegelijkertijd konden opereren. De 'nieuwe', formele en bureaucratische wereld kreeg duidelijk de voorkeur. De casus laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat corrupte (hoge!) functionarissen nu wel werden gearresteerd en gevangenen werden gezet en dat zij zonder tussenkomst van de Fransen hoogstwaarschijnlijk voor langere perioden zouden zijn veroordeeld.

Historisch institutionalisme en overige verklaringen

Een tweede set conclusies is ten eerste gebaseerd op inzichten uit het historisch-institutionalisme en de aandacht hierin voor de invloed van een veranderende bredere institutionele omgeving. Zo kunnen wij concluderen dat de noties van padafhankelijkheid (de idee dat beslissingen en handelingen in het heden deels zijn bepaald door beslissingen en handelingen in het verleden) en van continuïteit en verandering van belang zijn. Het eerste is nuttig om aan te geven dat gebeurtenissen en opties rond 1800 inderdaad sterk geworteld waren in voorgaande decennia. De casussen laten zien dat moraal en publiek gedrag niet op de ene of andere dag veranderen. Nieuwe regels inzake belastingheffing hadden, bijvoorbeeld, veel tijd nodig om uiteindelijk in de praktijk volledig te functioneren. Wij zien ook continuïteit en verandering in de bewegingen van Doelisten, Patriotten en Bataven. Zij hadden veel gemeen maar de daadwerkelijke realisatie van gezamenlijke (morele) programmapunten kon pas tot stand komen door een gunstige institutionele omgeving na de Bataafse Revolutie en de tussenkomst van de Fransen. Zo zien wij dus ook dat naast continuïteit ook zogenaamde ‘critical junctures’ wel degelijk van belang waren voor een veranderende publieke moraal.

Een andere conclusie ten aanzien van veranderingen in de publieke moraal op basis van bredere institutionele ontwikkelingen is dat onbehagen met betrekking tot vermeend moreel, economisch en/of militair verval of tegenspoed (vergelijk de onrust in 1747/1748, de verliezen in de vierde Engelse Oorlog tussen 1780 en 1784 en verdere economische tegenspoed in de jaren na 1795) er ook toe heeft bijgedragen dat misbruik van publieke middelen steeds minder getolereerd werd. De studie laat daarmee een haast tijdloos mechanisme zien dat beschuldigingen van corruptie en aandacht voor publieke waarden juist in slechte tijden te horen zijn; wat nog maar eens bewezen wordt in de krediet- en bankencrisis van de afgelopen jaren. Nog weer andere betekenisvolle relaties tussen een veranderende institutionele omgeving en veranderende publieke waarden zien wij terug in de invloed van bureaucrativering, democratisering en politisering. Bureaucrativering (zoals het geval van belastinginning in hoofdstuk zes laat zien) kon hand in hand gaan met aandacht voor een nieuwe publieke moraal. Een begin van democratisering kwam op gang door de opkomst van een breder lezerspubliek, politieke commentatoren en nieuwe vormen van communicatie in de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw.

Dergelijke processen hadden ontegenzeggelijk invloed op een veranderende publieke moraal omdat het discussie en debat over publieke waarden en corruptie mogelijk maakte tussen nieuwe en grotere groepen mensen. Een begin van democratisering leidde ook tot een begin van de roep om bredere deelname aan het politieke proces en toenemende kritiek op de oude politieke cultuur van kleine gesloten regentenelites (gestoeld op de idee van ‘Ware Vrijheid’, zie hoofdstuk vier). Processen van bureaucrativering, democratisering en politisering bleken nadrukkelijk verbonden met bredere opvattingen van algemeen goed, publiek belang, politieke gemeenschap en nadruk op waarden als verantwoording, representatie en legitimiteit. Deze publieke waarden kregen een andere betekenis omdat de functie van de overheid ter discussie werd gesteld in de loop van de achttiende eeuw. Als gevolg van het groter worden van de politieke gemeenschap en een meer omvattende notie van het algemeen belang werden publieke functionarissen steeds meer verwacht bredere belangen te dienen.

De casussen in deze studie kunnen ook leiden tot andere, theoretisch geïnspireerde, conclusies op basis van inzichten uit 'institutional design', structureel-functionalisme, Weber's ideaaltypen van de bureaucratie en 'institutional economics' (zie hoofdstuk twee). In de eerste plaats kunnen wij – met betrekking tot de idee van 'institutional design' – de tentatieve conclusie trekken dat bepaalde institutionele staatsvormen (bureaucratisch, gecentraliseerd, parlementair) inderdaad minder vatbaar zijn voor corruptie dan andere (patrimoniaal, particularistisch, gedecentraliseerd) en dat bepaalde instituties (zoals bureaucratische organisaties en een geschreven grondwet) direct van invloed zijn op publiek gedrag. Ten tweede toont de studie de kracht van een structureel-functionalistische benadering van corruptie. Met het veranderen van de institutionele structuur (bijvoorbeeld van decentraal naar centraal of van collegiaal naar eenhoofdig bestuur) werden verschillende vormen van corruptie niet alleen minder acceptabel maar ook simpelweg minder noodzakelijk om te functioneren in het systeem. Praktijken als patronage, makelaardij, nepotisme, venaliteit en het geven van douceurs of het behalen van persoonlijk voordeel uit een 'publieke' functie waren enkel noodzakelijk in een wereld *zonder* strikte scheiding van publiek en privaat, zonder sterk bureaucratische procedures en zonder sterke centrale staat. Zodra er alternatieven voorhanden waren was het minder aanvaardbaar om dit soort dingen te doen en nam de verontwaardiging over dergelijke praktijken toe. Dat zien wij in het geval van veranderingen in het belastingstelsel wellicht het duidelijkst. Het is echter ook te zien in de poging van de Patriotten om nieuwe formele structuren en processen ten aanzien van (het aanstellen van) stadsregeringen in te stellen. Ook het streven van de Bataven naar meer hiërarchie, centralisatie en een representatieve overheid diende deels om de formele noodzaak van patronage en andere vormen van informele delegatie van macht en autoriteit uit te bannen.

Dit hangt samen met een derde conclusie dat een Weberiaanse ideaaltypische aanpak zeer vruchtbaar is om veranderende publieke waarden en waardestelsels te onderzoeken. Bureaucratie en bureaucrativering bieden belangrijke aanknopingspunten op te begrijpen hoe en waarom de publieke moraal verandert. Met de komst van salarissen, promotiekansen, standaard procedures en formele hiërarchische structuren veranderen ook denkwijzen met betrekking tot correct bestuur, hoewel de causale richting in deze beweging niet met zekerheid is vast te stellen. Ten vierde toont de studie en haar neoklassieke en historisch-institutionele benadering de beperkingen van verklaringen op basis van 'institutional economics'. Zuiver rationele en/of 'principal-agent' benaderingen blijken nauwelijks geschikt om publieke waardeverandering en veranderende opvattingen van politieke corruptie te kunnen verklaren. Theoretische benaderingen die, met andere woorden, enkel aandacht hebben voor economisch en rationeel strategisch gedrag binnen helder omliggende formele structuren zijn zeer beperkt bruikbaar. Zij hebben immers geen oog voor publieke waardeverandering en veranderende opvattingen over politieke corruptie als gevolg van informele structuren en emotionele (dat wil zeggen, niet-economische) motieven.

Besluit

Het negende en laatste hoofdstuk biedt tot slot ook enkele overpeinzingen met het oog op het heden en de toekomst. In de eerste plaats is het van belang dat wij ons realiseren dat corruptie zal moeten worden verklaard en aangepakt op basis van een ('Johnstoniaanse') neoklassieke definitie die in staat is de brede context en institutionele veranderingen mee te wegen. Dit

betekent dat wij bij de strijd tegen corruptie de zogenaamde klassieke opvatting van dit begrip niet uit het oog moeten verliezen. Wanneer corruptie ook tegenwoordig als uitkomst van een breder maatschappelijk en politiek proces wordt gezien dan biedt dat de mogelijkheid om niet alleen individuen te bestraffen maar om ook een brede basis of voedingsbodem tegen het licht te houden en eventueel aan te pakken. Ethische codes of handvesten voor publieke organisaties zijn in dat opzicht wellicht niet zelden te kleine pleisters op de wond. Daarbij leidt dit, ten tweede, tot de conclusie dat de oorzaak van corruptie nooit alleen bij individuen maar juist ook bij het systeem waarin zij werkzaam zijn moet worden gezocht.

Ten derde is het van belang dat men erkent dat opvattingen over corruptie in heden en verleden tijdgebonden en sociaal geconstrueerd zijn. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de interpretatie en betekenis en verandering van hedendaagse publieke waarden en levert hopelijk een genuanceerder aanpak op voor het begrijpen en beoordelen van het hedendaagse openbaar bestuur in het algemeen en haar publieke waarden in het bijzonder. Het voorgaande betekent, ten vierde, dat een historisch perspectief op veranderende publieke waarden met aandacht voor context en contingentie ook kan leiden tot een gezonde dosis ‘ethisch relativisme’. De huidige studie laat zien dat wij niet kunnen zeggen dat tegenwoordige tijden meer of minder corrupt zijn dan voorheen (ondanks dat er wel sprake is geweest van waardeverandering!) en dat het evenmin verantwoord is om het ene publieke waardestelsel bij voorbaat te verkiezen boven het andere. Ieder publiek waardestelsel (bijvoorbeeld binnen samenlevingen tussen verschillende groepen of tussen landen in een internationale context) is het product van een unieke omgeving en referentiekader en moet als zodanig bekeken worden. Het zou goed zijn als men zich bewust is van de contextgebondenheid van de eigen waarden voordat er een discussie plaatsvindt over die van een ander of voordat waardesystemen uit een deel van de wereld aan anderen elders ter wereld worden opgelegd.

Tot slot laat historisch onderzoek naar publieke waarden ons zien dat onze huidige waarden vorm hebben gekregen in decennia, zo niet eeuwen, van bewuste én onbewuste sociaal-politieke ontwikkeling. Dat is wellicht een open deur maar de consequenties reiken ver. Het betekent namelijk boven alles dat het succes van pogingen om de publieke moraal te veranderen of te verbeteren – vergelijk bijvoorbeeld de introductie van de Balkenende-norm – niet zelden ook af zal hangen van tijd, geduld en toeval. Tegelijkertijd neemt dat echter weer niet weg dat men niet ook doelbewust kan streven naar een minder corrupt en meer integer openbaar bestuur.

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Curriculum Vitae

Toon Kerkhoff was born on 2 February 1978 in Rotterdam in the Netherlands. He finished secondary school (the Rijnlands Lyceum in Oegstgeest) in 1997. After a brief spell of Dutch studies in Groningen he obtained a Masters degree in History and a Masters degree in Philosophy (1998 – 2005) at the University of Amsterdam. Toon joined the Institute (then Department) of Public Administration in Leiden in 2006 as a PhD researcher. Apart from research, he has been involved in teaching Bachelor and Master courses on the topics of organization theory, public management, classic texts and foundations of the study of public administration, theories in public administration and administrative history. He is co-editor (with Pieter Wagenaar and Mark Rutgers) and co-author of *Duizend jaar openbaar bestuur in Nederland: van patrimoniaal bestuur naar waarborgstaat* (Bussum, 2011), a Dutch-language book on the history of Dutch public administration. He has also published in scientific journals, including the *Journal of Modern European History* and the *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. He publishes on the topics of management and organization theory, political corruption, public values and administrative history. Toon is currently Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Administration at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University in the Netherlands.

Appendix: Original Texts and Citations

In this book, I have translated citations and passages from eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Dutch into modern English. This appendix offers the Dutch texts to preserve their original meaning.

ⁱ “Gelyk er niets beter is, en niets een koninkrijk of vryen staat en volk gelukkiger maakt, dan een onderlingen eensgezindheid ondersteunt door een rechtvaardig bestier der regenten, en een gewillige liefde en onderdanigheid des volks”.

ⁱⁱ I: “Om alle ampten, officien en beneficien van deze stadt en jurisdictie van dien dependeerende, die tegenwoordig open zyn, en in ‘t vervolg van tyd open zullen vallen, publicq op het raadhuis dezer stadt, op te veilen, en aan de meest daar voor biedende te verkoopen, mits dat de koopers van de protestantsche religie zyn, en dat het hen vry zal staan, om hunnen gekogte ampte en officien aan anderen te mogen verhuuren [...] waar door het zal gebeure dat veele gegoede lieden, ‘t zy voor haar zelve, of voor hunne kinderen, twee, drie en meer ampten, officien en beneficien zullen komen te kopen, [...] daar zy een beoorlyke intrest jaarlyks van kunnen trekken”.

ⁱⁱⁱ II: “ten tweeden: stellen wy aan de edemoedigheid der edel achtbare vroedschappen voor, of het niet heilzaam en noodzakelyk waren voor onze stadt, dat de heeren regenten hunnen particuliere ampten, en die van hunne kinderen en familien [...] dezelve kordaat tot redding des lands en styvinge der finantien, offereerden”.

^{iv} Dat “mede zoo zal worden gehandelt [i.e., de verkoop van eigen functies en die van kinderen en familie, TK], niet alleen uit kordaatheid en generusheid, in navolging van onzen heere stadhouder; maar zelfs als strydig zynde tegens hunne characters en fatsoen; ja zelfs tot groot disrespect van eer, glorie en achting, van onze, zoo aanzienelyke stadt Rotterdam”.

^v “...Opdat de ampten, officien en beneficien dezer stadt, van tyd tot tyd, op ‘t raadhuis dezer stadt publiek opgeveilt, en aan de meest daar voor biedende zullen worden verkogt...” [...] “Penningen by de verkoop van de voorszegde ampten, officien en beneficien te provenieeren, zuiver en zonder eenige afzondering, zullen komen ten profyte van deze provincie, en van tyd tot tyd zullen worden gebragt aan het comptoir generaal van Holland...”.

^{vi} Daar er immers “geen acht kan werden genomen op de bequaamheid van de persoonen die dezelve moeten bedienen, een van de voornaamste en hoofdzakelyke requisiten die by die aanstellingen vereischt werden, en dat daar op een deur zoude werden opengesteld tot allerlye knevelaryen, tot merkelyk bezwaar en ondiens van burgerye en Ingezetenen”.

^{vii} “... Gedeclareerd afte zien van alle de voordelen die voor hunne perzoonen, familien en vrinden uyt de vacature vande posteryen mogten ontstaan...” [...] “En is goet gevonden burgemeesteren te bedanken voor derzelve cordaaten afstand; en verstaan dat het provenu van de vacante te vervallen posteryen zullen worden geemployeert ten nutte van de stad, en dus ten nutte van de goede Ingezetenen van dien...”.

^{viii} “... Alle amptenaren van eenige regeringe, zouden onderhevig zyn aan een speciale eed van zuivering, van niets voor het verkryge derzelve gegeven of beloofd te hebben”.

^{ix} “De veertig jaarige ontberinge van een stadhouder [...] had dezen staat en de provincien van onze unie, reeds gebragt door verzuim, hebzucht, onbekwaamheid, factie, heerszucht, en verwaarlozing der onderschydene en menigviuldige bestierdders, en overheerschers [...] omme voor eeuwig onzen vrijheid overheerscht te zien”.

^x “[...] Alzo deze heeren niet onderzocht zijn geworden, maar met bedanken zyn vry gekomen, zonder het te onregt geworven geld wederom gerestitueerd te hebben [...]”

^{xi} “Burgers wie gy ook zyt, die den scepter en het roer van staat zy magtig geworden, zoo gy in een over de herten wilt regeeren, ontdoet u van alle hoogmoed en dwingelandye, betracht in alle uwe deliberatien

alleen de gerechtigheyd en billykheyd, en legt af alle eygen belang en voordeel, laten beraadslaagingen en beslyuten met het zeegel van zagtmoedigheyd en vriendelykheyd omtrent uwe burgeren geteekend zyn, dus te werk gaande zult gy van ons alleen geerd en geagt zyn, en wy voor altoos getrouwe ingezeetenen blyven.”

^{xiii} “In het verleden koos men de dappersten, wijsten, deugdzaamsten. Men liet zich niet regeren door mensen die hun (het volk) geen rekenschap gaven. Het volk was bovendien strijdbaarder en gewapend. Vroeger hadden vorsten geen vette en tevens onnoodige ambten te vergeeven als onze prinsen en konden dus zoo groot getal van hongerige, trotsche, kaale edelen en andere veragtelijke grooten zo gemakkelijk niet aan zig verbinden, en in de hooge vergaderingen, daar nogtans over het geluk of ongeluk van onze geheele natie wordt gehandeld en beslooten, zodanig laten stemmen als hun het behaagd, schoon nog zoo zeer tegens het heil den den voorspoed van het land aanlopende, overeenkomt”.

^{xiii} “Maurits was goed geweest als hij net zo veel deugd en vaderlandsliefde had als heerslust [...]. Hij was een man van allerslegste zeden: een wreedaart, een valsch mensch en een overmatig geile boef, die gewoon was elke schoone vrouw, evenzoveel of zij maagd, getrouwd of weduwe waren, te bejagen en tot zijne booze lusten te lokken”.

^{xiv} “Het zijn de grooten, o medeburgers, daar gijlieden u voor wagten moet. De prins heeft ze meest allen aan zijn snoer. Voor ambtpen en commissien, voor eene maaltijd aan het hof doen zy alles, eed en plicht en het welzijn van het vaderland gaat hun doorgaans weinig ter harte”.

^{xv} “Het land hoord ulieden met malkanderen toe en niet den prins met zyne grooten alleen, die ulieden behandelen als hunnen erflyken eigendom, als hunnen ossen en schaapen, dewelke zij naar hun goeddunken of scheeren of slagten kunnen en mogen [...] wie het ook is die enige post in die maatschappij bekleed, zyn maar enkel directuers, de bewindhebbers, de rentmeesters van die maatschappij, en in deze qualiteit, minder dan de leden van dezelve [...] al hun gezag is van ulieden ontleend [...] zy zijn aan het meerdergetal van ulieden onderworpen en rekenschap en gehoorzaamheid schuldig”.

^{xvi} “God, onze gemeene vader, heeft de menschen geschapen om gelukkig te worden, en aan alle menschen, niemand uitgezonderd, de verplichting opgelegd om elkanderen zo veel in hun vermogen is gelukkig te maken”. Om dit te doen worden maatschappijen opgericht waarin mensen “van nature allen egaal en aan elkanderen gelyk zijn en de een niet is onderworpen aan de ander”.

^{xvii} “Tegen zijn medeburgers beleefd, vriendelijk en gediensstig; een voorstander van ‘s lands vrijheid, voorregten en welvaart, een regtschaps Patriot te zijn, helpt hier niet alleen niets, maar is integendeel hinderlijk. Die hier enig fortuin zoekt daartoe een heel andere weg inslaan. Het is enkel de gunst van de stadhouder die hij nodig heeft en deze weten en zien wij allen dat niet te winnen is door zig deugdzaam te gedragen; door beleefd, vriendelijk en gediensstig tegen zijn medeburgers te zijn”.

^{xviii} “Wie wordt er met uw vetrouwen vereerd dan alleen zulken welken gy reeds als schurken kennen, of daar gylieden hoop en verwachting van hebt dat zy het worden zullen? zijn niet verre de meesten van uwe lievelingen de slechtste, de zedelooschte schepzels, hoereers, echtbrekers, dobbelaars, zwelgers? Dit soort mensen kiest u in hoge colleges: mensen die hunne stemmen aan u verkopen of te onkundig of vreesachtig zijn om zig tegen u te verzetten. Nee! Den eerlijken, den kundigen, den stouten patriot, den man die spreken durft en kan, beschouwt gy als uw vijand, met afkeer, schrik, vrees”.

^{xix} “Laaten wy met onze constitutie ook onze zeden verbeteren [...] dan zal de staat zich weder opbeuren en zyne verstrooide leden zich weder vereenigen. Het groot gebouw der unie dat op eene zandgrond gebouwd zynde en aan alle kanten wegzinkt zal een vasten grondslag verkrijgen en uit den schoot der algemene deugdzaamheid zullen de moed, de nayver, de nyverheid en de vaderlandsliefde, en met deeze goede hoedanigheden ook de oude eer en macht der Republiek herboren worden”.

^{xx} Verkiezing der regenten hing niet af van “redelykeid, regtmatigheid of het verstand”, maar “van een schitterend fortuin, van een gelukkig voorkomen, of van de genegenheid van een onnozel meisje”.

^{xxi} “Hoe schrander, hoe deugdzaam, hoe onvermoeid, hoe goedwillig – met één woord, hoe volmaakt een stadhouder moge bedacht worden, is het echter mooglyk, dat hy de verkiesbaarste perfoonen tot de verscheidene bedieningen der regeering in alle de steden en plaatsn der Republiek zou kunnen kennen”.

^{xxii} “Hy moet derhalven, ten deezen einde, of alles aan het geval overgeeven, of zich tot zyne onderrichting van zodanige lieden bedienen, die, onder den naam van premiers, en van lieutenant-stadhouders bekend zyn”.

^{xxiii} “Deeze lieutenant-stadhouders veilige en getrouwe leidslieden kunnen zyn. In Friesland had deeze gewoonte der steden de regeering van een volk, zo vry als ‘er ooit een volk onder de zon was, in eene soort van alleenheersching veranderd. De geheele burgerlyke regeering en de bcdelling van allen de arapten der steden hingen daar niet alleen af van een’ enkelen regent”.

^{xxiv} “Is het niet zeer natuurlyk, dat, hoe meer een regent van het stadhouderlyk hof afhangt, hoe minder hy van zyne medeburgers afhanglyk is? In deeze onnatuurlyke betrekking vind hy een steunsel, dat hem ongevoeliger wyze daartoe brengt, om van des volks genegenheid weinig werk te maaken”.

^{xxv} “Dezelve worden niet zelden begeven aan kleine wargeesten kleine deugnieten, en kleine listontwerpers, welker kleine begaafdheden, die aan de hoven genoeg zyn om tot aanzienlyke ampten te geraaken, enkel trekken om hunne onbekwaamheid te doen zien, wanneer zy eenmaal daartoe verheven zyn. De manlyke en republikeinsche deugden zyn gehaat, en verdacht in de verderflyke lucht van een vorstelyk hof. De onafhangelykheid van de ziel, de edele fierheid der denkbeelden, die doorgaans met de waare verdienden gepaard gaan, zyn daar genoegzaame hoedanigheden om van alle ampten en waardigheden uitgefloten te worden. Men kan daar tot gcene verheffing geraaken dan door laage listen, lafhartige vlejeryen, en misdaadige inschiklykheden, die niet kunnen voortkomen dan uit bedorven harten, en bekrompen geesten”.

^{xxvi} “Een aristocratisch regent bezit deeze laagheid niet; maar zyne trotsheid is niet minder ondraaglyk, en veel gevaarlyker. Men heeft voordezen in eene van onze grootste steden een burgemeester gezien, die een deftigen burger, wanneer deeze zyne klagten by hem kwam inbrengen, van het hoofd tot de voeten bekeek, en tegen hem op een’ trotschen toon durfde zeggen; wel kerel! Wie ben je? Het volk is in de oogen der aristocraaten niets meer dan een gemeene hoop, enkel geschikt om hunne trotsheid te verdraagen, aan hunne grilligheden te gehoorzaamen, en een werktuig ter bevordering van hunne belangen te zyn. Zodanige aristocraaten leeven echter niet zonder vrees. Dewyl zy melkanderen geduurig moeten ontzien om den buit, dien zy onderling te deelen hebben, en om de partyen in evenwicht te houden, heerscht in hun gantsch gedrag eene beuzelachtige en kleinhartige omzichtigheid. Zy zyn niets minder dan gelukkig. Gedwongen om in eene geduurige jaloesie te leeven, zyn zy onophoudelyk bezig met eikanderen in acht te neemen, heimelyk te bestryden, en bedekte laagen te leggen”.

^{xxvii} “In eene volksregeering zullen, zo de wyze van verkiezing niet wel is ingericht, mooglyk eenige burgers, die naar bedieningen slaan, zich eenige vernederingen laten welgevallen, om daartoe te geraaken; maar deeze hunne handelwys zal altoos gepaard gaan met eene zekere grootheid, die dezelve voor het oog bedekt, degeenen, die daarna staan, zullen trachten zich bekend te maaken door daaden van grootmoedigheid, milddaadigheid, en menschlievendheid”.

^{xxviii} “Schoon de beweegreden niet geheel vry is van eigenbelang, is het middel echter niets minder dan laag of vernederende, dewyl het een grooten man nooit kwaalyk voegt naar de gunst van het volk te staan”.

^{xxix} “In eene volksregeering kan een man van verdiensten altoos op zyne bevordering staat maaken. Men ziet op zyn gelaat eene zekere fierheid, welke, schynt aan te duiden, dat hy den streelenden, den roemryken eertitel van hoofd, van representant des volks alleen aan zyne verdiensteljkheid te danken heeft; maar deeze fierheid word altoos getemperd door eene spraakzaame minzaamheid, dewyl hy weet, dat hy zelfs den geringste burger moet ontzien. Hy zet zyne voornemens met onvermoeiden yver door, omdat hy zichzelve befchouwt als belast met de belangen van eene geheele natie, en hy verdedigt die met standvastigheid, omdat hy kan aantoonen, dat bet niet zyne byzondere maar de algemeene belangen van het volk zyn”.

^{xxx} “Zohaast het volk tot rechter gesteld word over die verdienden, die iemand moet bezitten om tot de gewigtige ampten van de wetgeevende magt bevorderd te worden, word de spruit en wortel van alle misnoegen en scheuring uitgerooid, en tevens ook het kwaad, dat daaruit zou kunnen voortspruiten. Het volk is ingenomen met zyn eigen werk; wanneer die wyze van verkiezing zoveel als mooglyk is de weg toesluit voor alle indringingen eu kuiperyën, van dat oogenblik af, heeft men eene wezentlyke, regelmaatige, en heilzaame volksverbeelding en volksregeering. Het vertrouwen tusschen de regenten en het volk is voor altoos hersteld”.

^{xxxi} “Het zyn niet eenige weinige persoonen, die zichzelve en hunne vrienden en bloedverwanten zoeken te verryken van den algemeenen buit en voordeelige ampten het is het geheel lichaam des volks zelf, dat hierm het hoogst belang heeft, dat de zaaken van den staat behooryk bestuurd worden. De belangen van

den staat en die van het volk zyn dezelfde. Dus is het voorzeker zyne zaak bekwaame lieden te verzen om dezelve te bestuuren”.

^{xxxiii} “Het volk, dat de souvereine magt in handen heeft” zegt Montesquieu, moet alles, dat het naar behooren kan doen, zelf doen, en alles, dat hetzelfde niet naar behooren kan doen, door zyne staatsdienars [laten] uitvoeren. De staatsdienars kunnen geene volksdienars genoemd worden, wanneer zy niet door het volk zyn aangesteld. Het is dus in deeze regeeringsvorm eene grondwet dat het volk zyne eigen staatsdienars, dat is te zeggen, zyne regenten benoeme. Het volk heeft, even als een vorst, en zelfs meer dan een vorst, noodig om door eene raadsvergadering voorgelicht te worden. Maar om in die raadsvergadering vertrouwen te kunnen stellen, moet het volk zelf de leden van dezelve benoemen; het zy dan, dat het dit voor zichzelf doe, gelyk te Athenen of dat het dit doe door een collegie, dat de magt heeft om die te verkiezen, gelyk dit gebruikelijk was te Rome by fommige gelegenheden te twyfen aan de natuurlyke bekwaamheid van het volk om de waare verdienden te onderkennen, zon men slechts het oog behoeven te slaan op de lange aaneenschakeling van bewonderenswaardige verkiezingen, welke de Atheniëzen en Romeinen gedaan hebben, en die men niet aan het bloot geval kan toeschryven”.

^{xxxiii} “Van den anderen kant kan het afdanken van een’ amptenaar, die zyn’ pligt behoortlyk waarneemt, den staat berooven van een’ noodzaaklyken dienaar in netelige omftandigheden. Men loopt gevaar van de ampten aan onbekwaame lieden over te geeven wanneer zy, die daarmede belast zyn, dezelve nederleggen éér zy die te recht hebben leeren kennen”.

^{xxxiv} “De gelykheid is de grondslag van de volksregeering; deeze zou vernietigd worden wanneer het gezag altoosduurend bleef, en derhalven moet hetzelfde rondgaan. Altoosduurende regeeringen blusschen de hoop uit, doen de yverzucht verflaauwen, en verzwakken de verknochtheid aan het Vaderland, Dezelve worden doorgaans waargenomen met eene traagheid, die niet zeer gunftig is voor het publiek welzyn; degeenen, die dezelve bezitten, vervallen tot eene trotsheid, welke voor de algemeene vryheid aanstoetelyk is”.

^{xxxv} “Regeeringspersoonen, die nimmer verpligt zyn weder tekeeren tot den staat van byzondere burgers, raaken ligt in de verbeelding dat zy de meesters zyn van die wetten, waarvan zy slechts de dienaars zyn. Omkoopning, strafloosheid, vergetelheid, willekeurigheid, en kwaade bestuuring der publieke zaken, vloeijen altoos voort uit de langduurigheid van het gezag”.

^{xxxvi} “Dus is het eene zeer goede instelling, dat de burgemeesters, de schepenen, en het grootse gedeelte der ondergeschikte rechters veranderbaar zyn; maar het zou voor de ingezetenen een groot nadeel weezen wanneer de rechtbank van hoogste uitspraak onderhevig was aan afdankingen, en geduurige veranderingen. In deeze gewigtige bediening zyn de diepste betrachting en de langduurigfte oefening van het geheel leven naauwelyks toereikende om den staat naar behooren te kunnen dienen”.

^{xxxvii} “In de tyden toen de processen minder netelig waren, en de chicane geene helpers vond om dezelve nog meer te verwarren, konden het gezond verftand, en de oprechtheid genoegzaam de plaats der rechtsgeleerde kundigheden vervullen; maar met andere tyden en zeden worden ook andere bekwaamheden vereischt”

^{xxxviii} “Dat niemand tot den rang van schepen zou kunnen verheven worden, die niet altoorens blyken vanzyne bekwaamheid in de rechten gegeven had door het toonen van eenige gewonnen pleidooijen”.

^{xxxix} “Een regent kan ook in het geval komen van tot eenige gewigtige commissie benoemd te worden ; het is zelfs somtyds zyn pligt eene zaak in eene souvereine vergadering voor te stellen, nader open te leggen, en te verdedigen. Hy moet kennis hebben van het recht der volkeren, van het publiek recht van zyn vaderland, en van alles, dat eenige betrekking heeft tot het staatkundige, tot onderhandelingen, tot den koophandel, tot den landbouw, enz. En zou men dan niet behooren te vorderen, dat zulk een man blyken van zyne bekwaamheid gegeven had? Zou men voor het minst niet moogen vaststellen, dat een benoeming, wie zyne academische studien volbragt heeft, en daarby de overige vereischte hoedanigheden bezit, de voorkeur zou hebben voor iemand die, in zulk geval niet was?”.

^{xl} “Behalven de bekwaamheden heeft, men altoos het bezitten van eenige goederen gevorderd, om tot de regeringsampten te kunnen geraaken; omdat men doorgaans minder of meerder verknocht is aan een land, naarmaate van de goederen, die men in hetzelfde bezit [...]. Allen, die eenige bezittingen, of bedieningen in een vreemd land hebben, moesten voldrektelyk uit alle staats-collegiën en vergaderingen worden uitgesloten. De renteniers hebbén des te minder betrekking tot het vaderland, omdat hunne

inkomsten aan de gewoone schattingen niet onderhevig zyn, en men doorgaans zijn hart by zyne schatten heeft”.

^{xli} “Intusschen zou het dan, het zy dan om, van tyd tot tyd, eenig recht te doen aan de gelykheid, welke de grondsteun der volksregeering is, het zy om aan te toonen, dat verdienen boven, de schatten moeten geacht moeten worden niet ongeoorloofd zyn. Somtyds lieden te benoemen, die geene andere rykdommen konden aantoonen dan hunne uitstekende verdiensten; maar in zulk een geval zou het volk, dat hem verkozen had verplicht zyn hem een jaargeld toe te leggen, om zyn ampt met behoorlyke vaardigheid te kunnen bekleeden, in dit zou ook kunnen geschieden door hem eenige voordeelige bediening daarby te geeven”.

^{xlii} “Dus was steeds het oogmerk der ouden zo in de krygs- als in de flaatkunde uit te munten. Dus bestuurden de gebroeders De Wit met dezelfde bekwaamheid, de overweegingen van eene staatsvergadering en de bewegingen van een leger, of van eene vloot. Men zou ook het voortreffelyk systema der ouden kunnen navolgen, van naamlyk op de lyst der verkiesbaaren en stemgerechtigden niemand te plaatsen of hy moest in staat zyn om de Republiek als vrywilliger te dienen”.

^{xliii} “Zou men niet nog daarby kunnen bepalen, dat iemand, om verkiesbaar te weezen, gehuwd zou moeten zyn, of geweest zyn, tenzy hy by zyn vader, of by zyne moeder inwoonde? Zouden vader en zoon, broeders, oomen en neeven, broeders- of zusterskinderen, schoonvader en schoonzoon, of behuwdbroeder, zitting moogen hebben in de regeering, of in den magistraat van dezelfde plaats? Zou men dit zelfs niet moogen uitstrekken tot meer verre bloedverwanten, volgens de grondwetten en gebruiken der verscheiden gewesten?”

^{xliv} “[...] Goede zeden, goede wetten, en een uit beiden voortgevoeid bestuur zijn de enigste bronnen van het geluk der maatschappij in ‘t algemeen en van elk lid in ‘t bijzonder”. [Handel volgens] “de goddelijke voorschriften: doe aan een ander hetgeen gij wilt dat u gebeurd etc.” “een deugdzaam man is ontwijfelbaar een patriot. De liefde voor het vaderland, voor zijne medeburgers, voor zijne natuurgenoten, doet hem aan hun belang alle daartegen strijdende zelfbelangen opofferen [...] nimmer zullen hem slinksche oogmerken tot onderdrukking of verderving van zijn vaderland bezielen – of hij houdt op een deugdzaam man te zijn”. [...] “te groote winzucht” [...] uit toenemende rijkdom kwam weelde – pracht – overdaad – en ontucht [...] de regenten en aristocraten beschouwden zich als boven t volk verheven [...] zedeloosheid, ontrouw en knevelarij namen de overhand. De ambtenaren zagen geen noodzaak beter te zijn als het volk of hunnen zogenaamde meesters. Verscheidenen soorten van landsdieverij werden slegts met zachte namen bestempeld en hielden op misdadig te zijn – elk plukte elk roofde wat hij kon en ‘s lands financien gingen te gronde”.

^{xlv} “een systeem waaraan de heerszucht en het eigenbelang zich met gretigheid gekleefd houden [...] het geliefkoosd stelsel van de begunstigers der bijzondere provinciaalse heerszucht en de hoop van allen die bij de revolutie de grote belangen des vaderlands aan hun eigen belangen wilden onderwerpen”.

^{xlvi} “Een volk dat vrijheid wil, en geen orde kent; dat zich van de ergste slavernij, die der ondeugden en driften, niet weet te ontslaan; een volk dat den eenen dag bestuurders verkiest, hen den tweeden dag mistrouwt, den derden vervloekt, en echter wenscht zijne belangen wel bestierd te zien; een volk dat geene toegevendheid, geen broederschap kent, waarin honderd verschillend denkende partijen worden gevonden die elk om een andere oorzaak elkander schelden en vloeken, zonder aan elkander iets te willen toegeven; een volk zonder eenige consistentie van buiten, afhangende van de genade van een naburig gemeenebest, onzeker van zijn lot, onzeker van zijne bezittingen, aan alle gevaren blootgesteld, veracht of niet geteld, en echter de verkrijging zijner onafhankelijkheid dagelijks opofferende aan binnenlandsche twisten, aan personen, aan kleinigheden, aan harsenschimmen”.

^{xlvii} “Burgers! Ziedaar eene korte, zwarte, maar waarachtige schets van den algemeenen staat der zaken na eenen driejarigen strijd! Burgers, mögt ik onwaarheid spreken, wanneer ik u den wissen val des Nederlandschen volks voorspelle, indien niet eenstemmigheid en eendracht eerlang onze schandelyke twisten vervangen; indien niet in weinig tijds een welingericht bestuur, met de noodige macht bekleed om elk tot zijn plicht, tot heil van het algemeen te dwingen, de tegenwoordige orde van zaken vervange. Indien eigenbelang en heerszucht, menigmaal als volksvrienden vermomd, niet worden geweerd; indien het mistrouwen des volks op zijne bestuurders, en van deze op het volk blijft voortduren, indien woeste driften de stem der waarheid en rechtvaardigheid, of het dol geschreeuw des on Verstands, of amptenhonger, de zachte stem der wijsbegeerte onder hun bulderend geluid blijven versmoren, indien de

keuzen tot het bestuur zich alleen op hen bepalen die uiterlyk hoofden van partijen of gezindheden zyn, en kunde, eerlijkheid en goede zeden worden voorbijgegaan”.

^{xlviii} “Een eerlijk man, een belangloos ijveraar voor de goede zaak des vaderlands, ziet zich niet gaarne gelijk geschat met eenige doldriftige en zedeloze fortuinzoekers, die alleen door eigenbelang en lage driften bewogen worden”.

^{xlix} “Alles is slijm, slaphed, gebrek aan energie, afwijking van de principes en helling tot aristocratie en stedelijk foederalisme”.

ⁱ “Het wierd tijd, dat de klove gedempt werd, welke men gevestigd had tusschen een geregelde orde van zaken en het wanstaltig bestuur van eene op zich zelf oppermachtige en in schijn zaam verbonden volken: een bestuur waar van ons vaderland zo veelmalen de rampzalige gevolgen heeft ondervonden [...] een bestuur welk’s schadelijkheid ons op elke bladzijde van de gedenkrollen onzes vaderlands overtuigend word bewezen” [...] het “doen ophouden van dien staat van verwarring en onzekerheid, deze heeft de zenuwen van onze welvaart verlamd, de stem van het volk gesmoord en ons gebragt op den rand van een jammerpoel” [...] “het was tyd, dat men de plannen vruchteloos maakte van hen die om hunner eigen groothedswille het bondgenootschapelijk bestuur tracht tegen te houden”. Het is tijd “een einde [te] maken aan de “heerszucht en regeringsloosheid”.

ⁱⁱ “Zie hier een ruuwe schets van Van der Kok, een pachter, aan Rijn en Vecht befaamt door zyne knev'lary, Den opper-belsebub, vol trotse hovaardy; zo trots, dat zelfs zyn huis geleck van voor tot achter, eer een paleis van een voornaam Venetiaan; zyn heimelyk gemak alleen (‘k meen wel te weeten) heeft meer gekost, als ik in myn leven heb bezeten”.

ⁱⁱⁱ “Myn eisch ging altijd door; daar hielp ook geen geklag. Hoe groot was doe myn magt! Hoe deftig myn gezag! ‘t Was, geeft, en heb je niet, men zal ‘t je wel leeren, al zouden ‘t zelfs het wyf en kinderen ontbeeren”.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ “Wat ben ik duivels wys geweest! / Ik was een gaauwert, een verlakker / Ja de allermaalste koekebakker / ontbloot van reden en van geest / Dat ik ging boter-pachter werden / Ó spijt! Die naauwelyks is te herden”.

^{liv} “‘t geval komt altyd wel van pas / Nu woed de raazende gemeente / Om dat ik knaagde op hun gebeente / En wist niet wat conscientie was / Ik moet myn woekerzugt ontbeeren / Den schat zien na zyn oorsprong keeren”.

^{lv} “Ach! Wee my! Armen ouderling! Dat ik zo slinks my heb vergreepen, En andere lui hun beurs gekneepen, toen ik het tolnaarsampt ontving. Ik heb myn eigen zelfs bedroogen, en niemand is met my bewogen”.

^{lvi} “Men heeft hunne huizen, hunne prachtige paleisen niet onder den voet gehaalt, om dat zy pachters waren; veel min is zulks uit verachting voor de bevelen van de overheid geschied; maar vermits zy zo vele onmedogende bloedzuigers, knevelaars en waren tyranne der burgers waren”.

^{lvii} “by betaamelyke ingezeetenen gerespecteert werden, dat er pachters zyn wien in vorige dagen verklikkers, gemeene soopjes- en bierverkopers zyn geweest, die na twee jaar nauwelyks tot de pacht zyn getollereert, een chaise, by het derde een faëton, en verders anderen, een buitenplaats, koets en 20 à 30 paarden in hoogmoet hebben. Dit onhebbelyke geslagte, als uit een stam herkomstig by wie het fatsoen geen plaats heeft, stelt autoriteit in woeker- en schraapzuchtigheid, waar door een eerbaar burger zich moet schamen dat zulken in eerlyken gezelschappen worden getollereert, veel minder dat heeren van aansien [i.e., de regenten] zulke woekeraars in hunne associatien toe laten”.

^{lviii} “...se [de onlusten, TK] tot doel zouden hebben eenige wil of begeerte om sigh aan de lasten tot onderstand van de gemeene saak te willen onttrekken”.

^{lix} “Zal worden geïntroduceert, een egaale practycq door onze geheele provincie, en de penningen daar van te provenieeren richtelyk in ‘s lands kasse zullen koomen, en onze ingezeetenen worden bevryd van de vexatien, die dikwils onder de verpachte middelen hebben plaats gehad, en waar door vervolgens de reedenen van het ongenoegen, dat wy voor deeze tegens de verpachte middelen hebben bespeurt, alle zyn wechgenoomen en koomen te cesseeren”.

^{lx} “Dat zy zich de lasten tot behoud van het gemeene best, niet zullen willen onttrekken, en waar door te gelyk te leur zullen worden gesteld de zoo verderffelyke machinatien van qualyk geïntentioneerden, en de waare zucht en liefde tot behoud en conservatie van het lieve vaderland en al wat dierbaar is, op het krachtigste zal worden bewezen”.

^{lxi} “By defraudatie, dat is willens en weetens, met opzet, van den impost profiteerden en die aan het land onttrekken”.

^{lxii} “Alle Baatzoekende van het pleegen van fraudes, zoo veel in ons vermoogen af te schrikken, en dus voor te koomen, dat die geene die ‘s lands lasten gewilliglyk draagen, door de fraudes en sluikeryen van anderen niet worden gedrukt en bezwaart”.

^{lxiii} Zij “sullen meede gehouden zijn haar op hunne comptoiren tot gerief van een yeder dagelijks ten minsten te laten vinden op de volgende uyren, te weeten, van den eersten Maart tot den laatsten September des voormiddaghs van agh tot twaalf uyren, en des namiddags van twee tot ses uyren, en van den eersten October tot den laatsen Februari des voormiddaghs van twee tot vyf uyren”.

^{lxiv} Zij moeten bovendien “yder jaar van de collecte en ontfangh van alle Impositien moeten houden twee boecken of registers, gefolieerd, geseegelt en geteekent ter financie van Hollandt [...] sonder die het zy onder preatext het oock soude moogen weesen, in eenige kladtboecken, ofte op aparte pladeren Papier te moogen annoteren”.

^{lxv} Zo moest deze funtionaris “de vaste posten van recherche aan de poorten, boomen, koorndmolens, hallen of waar ook verder mogten geplaatst zyn, ten minsten eens daags op onzekere uren visiteeren en verneemen of de bedienden, aldaar fungeerende hun post en wagt behoorlyk waarneemen, en zig nugter en bequaam bevinden”.

^{lxvi} De collecteur zal de accijns [van de pachter, TK] innen “sonder met yemant te conniveeren, ofte gratie te doen of in eeniger manieren, directelyck of indirectelyck, min dan de juiste gerechtigheyt te ontfangen [...] voorts sullen vervallen in een boete van twee hondert guldens”.

^{lxvii} Diegenen die in “eenige publicque hooge ofte minder employen zyn gesteld, sullen vanwege hare eedt ende plicht [moeten] betrachten, met die suyverheydt en integriteyt, die alle vroomen en cordate regenten ende beambten betaamt [...] sonder [zich] door giften of gaven te laten bewegen en corruppeeren”. Mensen die een ambt wilden vervullen moesten zich nu dus “by solemnelen eede suyveren, dat noch sy selve, noch (met haar weeten) haare Huysvrouwen, Kinderen, die van haar Familie. Ofte yemandt anders haar aangaande, eenige giften, gaven ofte geschenken, selfs of door andere, directelyck ofte indirectelyck hebben genoomen, ontfangen ofte genooten”.

^{lxviii} Dat zij zich in alles zouden “punctueelyk moeten gedraagen na de instructie voor haar gearresteert, en noch te arresteeren [...] en zich “in alle opsigte exactelyk gedraagen na den inhoud van de ordonnantie op de collecte van de voorschreeve regten”.

^{lxix} “Heeft bekomen behoorlyke commissie en instructie, en daar op heeft afgelegd den behoorlyken eed”.

^{lxx} Zo zegt hij tijdens het tweede verhoor “dat hij wel bewust zijnde dat ‘s lands pennigen de zijnen niet waren en dezelve voor zijn privé of negotie niet vermogt te gebruiken, ja zelfs niet te melleeren met zijne particuliere penningen [onderstreping in origineel, TK].

^{lxxi} Een “verregaande trouwelooshied en meenedigheid” [...] Dat alle zijne behandelingen omtrent ‘s lands zaaken zijn allerslegtste daaden; dat zij zijn strijdig tegens eed en pligt [...] en te kwader trouw daarvan is meester gebleeven, ‘s lands bediendens daar mede bedrogen en zig als een trouwloos en meenedig mensch gedragen heeft [...]”.

^{lxxii} Dat hij “met den koord om den hals wel strengelyk met roeden gesled en gebrandmerkt te worden en voorts in een tuchthuis geconfineerd te worden voor den tijd van 25 jaren om gedurende dezelve met zijnen handen arbeid de kost winnen en naar expiratie van dien tijd voor altoos gebannen [uit de provincie, TK]”.

^{lxxiii} To avoid fraud it was necessary “zig tot dat einde alleen bedienen van de boeken haar uit de financie bevoorens gegeeven, welke boeken in de financie zalen worden gefolieerd, en op het eerste blad door een commies of boekhouder het getal der folie genoteerd en ondertekent, en voorts de eenden van het garen, waar meede dezelve zyn ingenaaid, op het eerste en laatste blad met het cachet van Holland verzegelt”.

^{lxxiv} “[...] En dat hem bekend sijnde, dat de ordre van het land medebrengh en van hem vordert, dat hij alle de hem aangegevene posten aanstonds moet brengen in de boeken van het land sonder deselve alvorens op losse bladeren te mogen noteeren, hij evenwel dit laaste heeft gedaan [...]”.

^{lxxv} Ook heeft Abraham “meer dan eens posten [heeft] ontfangen die hij in de boeken heeft laten openstaan even als of deselve niet betaald waren [...]”.

^{lxxvi} Abraham heeft iedere (onvolledige) maandstaat beëindigd met een “Declaratoir op den eed aan den lande gedaan”. Hij heeft nu echter moeten erkennen dat “de declaratoiren onder sijne maandstaaten gesteld niet sijn conform de waarheid [...]”.

^{lxxvii} Zij zullen “de bedienden die hun ter assistentie zyn toegevoegd, moeten houden tot hunne verplichting en nakoming van hunne instructie als meede tot observantie van de ordonnantiën [...] doch zullen den gaarders ‘s lands bedienden tot hun leider particuliere of huisdiensten niet moogen gebruiken”

^{lxxviii} Zo moesten “de officieren of collecteurs alle omzichtigheid gebruiken en zich onthouden van onder pretext van de voorschreven recherche en visitatie de goederen te beschadigen, op poene van dubbel de vergoeding der toegebrachte schade”.

^{lxxix} “Op poene dat de schade, die daar door, zoo wel als door alle verzuimen aan het land wordt toegebracht, ten hunne laste zal worden uitgetrokken; ten waare [tenzij, TK] zy eenige wettige of voldoende reedenen van belet konden legeren”.

^{lxxx} “Gaarders of collecteurs sullen gehouden zyn ten behoeve van het gemeene land en tot securiteit van het selve te stellen zodanige cautie als onze gecommiteerde raden [...] van haar sullen koomen te rekwireren”.

^{lxxxi} “De gaarders of collecteurs sullen niet vermoogen eenigsins minder te ontfangen van ‘s lands regt by de ordonnantien gesteld [...] en ook niet te composeeren op eenigerhande wyse anders als haar by particuliere ordonnantien sal sijn gepermitteert op laste van twee honderd guldens voor iedere compositie zoo wel van den gaarder of collecteur als tot lasten van die geene die met haar gecomposeert sal hebben [...]”.

^{lxxxii} “De gaarders met niemant over eenige middelen moogen composeeren, nog accordeeren, dan wanneer hun zulks by de respectieve ordonnantien word gepermitteert [...] en zullen de gaarders aan niemand crediet van den impost moogen geeven [...]”.

^{lxxxiii} “De collecteurs de collecte haar toevertrouwt selfs of door iemand van haar familie sullen moeten waarneemen, en responsible zyn voor die geenen die sy van haar familie bij absentie, siekte of ander wettig belet daar toe gebruiken”.

^{lxxxiv} De mededeling dat de “de collecteurs de collecten haar toevertrouwd selfs en in eygene persoon sullen moeten waarneemen, en geensins door een ander, selfs niet door iemand van haare familie doen waarneemen [...]”.

^{lxxxv} “Magistraten, Regenten of andere personen geen denuciatiën teegen den ophef van de gemeene middelen moogen doen”. Verder mogen zij ook “geen interpretatie geeven of verhindering toebrengen, en mogen [zij] selfs sig daar meede niet bemoeien, direct of indirect op poene van gesuspendeert te worden van haare Officien voor den tyd van een jaar”.

^{lxxxvi} “Zy zullen moeten weesen, nugtere en bequaame manspersonen, van een eerlyk comportedement en gedrag”.

^{lxxxvii} “Zullen moeten weezen ordentelyke lieden, oud boven de vijftientig jaaren”. Zij zullen bovendien “elk en een yder met alle vriendelykheid moeten bejegenen, en hen zoo spoedig helpen als maar eenigzints mogelyk is, en vooral zorgen, dat die burgers, niet worden opgehouden”.

^{lxxxviii} “De commis fiscaal zal weesen een habil en neerstig persoon, van de waare gereformeerde religie, of defelve toegdaan, als meede een geboore Hollander, een regtsgeleerde of een zeer goed costumier en practizyn, vooral ervaren in het stuk van den opheve van des gemeene lands middelen en imposten”.

^{lxxxix} Vergelijk: “geen regenten, derzelve ministers, officieren, ontfangers en derzelve bediendens, zullen moogen worden aangesteld tot gaarders of collecteurs”.

^{xc} “Ten einde het gemeene land te beeter en gestaadig van deselve mag werden gediend, geen ampten of officien beneevens het selve binnen of buiten de provintie van Holland en Westvriesland moogen bedienen”.

^{xci} “Dewyl de gaarders of collecteurs in effecte zyn te considereeren als kleine of minder soort van ontfangers soodanig dat de gelden en penningen door haar ontfangen werdende directelyk koomen in de kasse van het gemeene land [...]. Dat een ieder van dien na sijn qualiteit en conditie door het gemeene land na billykheid sullen werden gesalarieerd en beloond [...] het mitsdien veel natuurlyker, billyker, en met den aard der saaken meer overeenkomstig is dat de portien in de boetens [...] directelyk ook koomen in de kasse van het gemeene land, als dewelke door de fraudes direct en alleen in haar inkoomen werd benadeeld”.

^{xcii} In a reaction against violence towards tax officials in Oostzaandam in 1727 Gecommitteerde Raden, for instance, write: “we declare hereby to safeguard all tax farmers, collectors and their servants, and forbid threats or misbehavior towards them and their goods and homes”. Of: “alle pagters, collecteurs en haare bediendens, by deesen verklaaren te neemen in Onse sauvegarde en souveraine protectie [...] verbiedende eenen iegelijken ... te dreigen of in het minste te misdoen, of haare huizen en goederen aan te tasten”.

^{xciii} It concerns: “persoonen die ‘s lans rechten tot ondersteuning van ‘s lands finantie directelyk voor het land ontfangen, of daar aan de hand leenen, volgens hun eed en plicht”.

^{xciv} “Alle feytelykheden en geweld, teegen deselve bediendens gepleegt, [zullen worden beschouwd, TK] als begaan directelyk teegen de hooge Overheid zelfs”.

^{xcv} Requesting “den opziender Vaster en hoofdgaarder Reijers van de wijnen te Amsterdam, te beschrijven, om voor den ontrouw van deze te werden gehoord en daarvan kennise te geven aan de schepenen commissarissen”.

^{xcvi} “Met alle opregtheid niet te weeten dat ‘t teegens gemelde schepenen commissarissen eenige indecentie of irreverentie zouden gebruykt oft eenige intentie daartoe gehad hadden”

^{xcvii} “Van die generusheid te zijn zulks te verklaren aan gemelde schepenen commissarissen oft den president een excuse te verzoeken wegens datgene waar in zij zig buyten hun weeten en teegens hunnen intentie mogt misgrepen hebben” en zeiden zij “dat zij niet wisten enig offensie gedaan te hebben immers geen intentie daartoe gehad te hebben en evenwel executie te verzoeken van hetgeen waar in scheepenen commissarissen oft den presiderende heer dagte door hen te zijn geoffendeert het welk bij hen is aangenomen. Waarmede zij heeren commissarissen hoopten en wagten dat genoeg zoude werden genoomen”.

^{xcviii} De schepenen-commissarissen meldden in hun reactie op het bericht van de Gecommitteerde Raden dat zij “van gedagten waren dat de defensie bij hen lieden gedaan vrij aannemelijk was voorgekoomen”. Tegelijkertijd waren zij ook van mening dat “den opziender [Vaster] en gaarder [Reijers] te ongelijke personen waaren om parralel gesteld te worden”.

^{xcix} “De lichtmis Ryers, los van kop / Die zonder complimenten,
Juyst eer hy selve kreeg den schop / Ging loopen met ‘s lands renten,
Is als een schelmsche collecteur / Der wynen, sans courage,
Met achtienduysent guldens deur / Dat maakt hier veel ombrage”.

^c “Op dat hij worde een baron, prins of graaf, o! dat es bon; Zo kriegt ‘er met ‘er tyd weer gracie, En speelt aan ‘t hof voor Jan Pottasie”.

^{ci} “Alon messiers doe nou je eed,
zweer dat je bloed en etter zweet,
zweer dat jou niet een duit zal sluiken
maar ondertussen vullen al die magere buiken”.

^{cii} “Zomtyds”, zo schrijft hij, “overvallen my duizenderhande gedachten wegens myne leugenen en valsche eeden, en dan wederom overdenke ik den staat des menschedom, ‘t geen my troost. Wy alle zyn min of meer zondig, doch gelukkig die de minste is; de geheime misdaden alleen die ik tegen den hemel begaan heb, drukken my aldermeest”. Hij vervolgt zijn boetedoening door te schrijven: “het besteelen van ‘s lands kasse is een myner minste misdryven, de geringe opvoeding, heeft my onbekwaam gemaakt om eerlyk te zyn”.

^{ciii} “Dat ik lachte over alle staatkundige streeken waar door alles in vuur en vlam gesteld wordende, ik ondertusschen rustig en lustig in myne vuist lache, en myn kleinen schat beschouwende, met luister en plaisier onder een vreedzamer horoscoop zal leeven. O Dios! Hoe is ‘t mogelyk? Dan men aan een jongman, wiens moeder met pan-aal langs de straten geloopt heeft, die van alle konsten, zeeden en opvoeding ontbloot is, zal toevertrouwen een ambt, dat de nobelste en eerste van een stad toekomt; hoe is ‘t mogelijk zeg ik andermaal dat de staatsdienaren byna de schranderste van geheel europa ons boeven schuim van collecteurs niet alleen patrocineeren [patronage, TK], maar zelfs door een dreigend placaat op de minste benaming de braafste luiden af-schikken om ons met den regten naam te doopen [...] als men de plakkaten naleezende geene opmerking maakt, om zyne fortuin uit dien chaos te zoeken, dat men als dan zot is, want alles moet absoluut in Holland tot een caos vervallen”.

^{civ} “Vervloekte Eygenbaat! Uit afgrond voortgeteelt,

Die, door bedrog gesterkt, 't gemeenebest verbeelt,
 En, tragt in deezen schyn, de weerelt te verblinden:
 Verbergt u agter 't griekx, men kan u Vaster vinden,
 Een waardig Patriot, in 't Middelburger pak,
 Schud u 't vermomde tuyg, waarin bedrog u stak,
 Roemruchtig uit, en zal in 't kort nog toonen,
 Dat gy, ontwaardig zyt, in Amstels vest te woonen.
 cv "Men huurd tot zulk bedryf het Rapiaansche rot,
 Dat roem op wetbreuk stelt, en, met het Heil'ge spot,
 Haar eed en plicht vergeet, en ons nog voor durft dragen,
 Dat al hun wanbedryft aan Friso kan behagen,
 Maar is 't allan genoeg 't eenvoudig volk misleit,
 En 's prinsen naam misbruikt, waar voor de deugd dus pleit
 Nooit zal die groote ziel regtvaardigheid doen bukken,
 Of door een linkze daat, het volk en vryheit drukken".
 cvi "Dat, de impost op 't gemaal, en and're eedb're waar,
 Verligt zou worden voor 't gemeen, wie ziet niet klaar,
 Dat dit weer 't deuntje, om elk in slaap te wiegen
 Denk niet gehuurden hoop, 't gemeen dus te bedriegen"
 "Des Vaster, Raap en al, die tot uw miskraam hooren,
 Men haat en vloekt u, ja, men heeft uw val gezwooren".
 cvii "Ik betuige echter en wil zulks met honderd duizend eeden bevestigen, dat myne intentie nooit
 geweest is om het land te besteelen; alleen heb ik de kas maar voor zekere som zoo lang willen crediteren,
 tot dat eene myne oude nigt de wereld ontruimd had, uit welke erfenis het saldo dan suppleren kon".
 cviii "Wiste de regter eens dat zyne meening in 't begeeven der ampten door uw toedoen en dat van uwe
 complicen, om geld verkogt wierden, uw lot zouw gewisselyk erger zyn dan het myne".
 cix "Waarom word myn confrater Ryers, alias mooi Pietje, (zoo beroemd by alle hoere en ligtekoyen) dus
 kragtelyk beschermd? Daar ieder bewust is, hoe hy, behalven het onderhouden van een pragtig huysgezin,
 en een heel party hoeren, nog een nimfje mainteneert [...] want welk weet dat hy zoo wel als ik met zyn
 gat vol schulden aan de collecte kwam".
 cx "ik verkreeg nogtans door deze en andere bravoures [zijn aandeel in de Doelistenbeweging, TK] den
 tytel van Patriot en wierd door myn stemmig uitgestrekte trony en kleding by sommigen voor half, by
 andere voor driekwart zalig, dat is in den tyd, zeer vroom aangezien, en raakte eindelijk tot myn beleid tot
 den eeretrap van collecteur van de turf en koolen over Den Haag en Haag-ambagt [...] in welken post ik
 my zoo dapper kweet, dat ik in 't eerste jaar, aan de kas van 't gemeene land, ruim twee duizend guldens
 moest leenen, om myn soberen staat wat te verbeteren; en door een valsche restant staat en kwade maand
 staten te formeeren, bragt ik het eindelyk zoo ver, dat men my bij openbare sententie meenedig, eerloos
 en infaam verklaarde".
 cxii "Buijten pijn en banden van ijser bekent dat hij bij de introductie van de collecte is aangesteld tot
 hoofdgaarder van het regt op turf en coolen alhier in 'sHage en dat hij als doen heeft gedaan den eed van
 suijsvering en ook als doen heeft bekomen een instructie".
 cxiii "Dat hij de som van f 2024 dewelker hij in sijn maandstaat over december 1750 minder in ontvangst
 heeft gebracht als hij werkelijk heeft ontvangen alsmede niet zijn gevonden in de cas van 't land, en dat hij
 de gelden tot gebruik van sig en sijn familie heeft geemployeert".
 cxiiii "dat de nood hem heeft gedwongen om dat geld te gebruijken voor sig zelfs en sijn huishouden en dat
 sulks sig van langsamerhand soo heeft toegedragen, dat hij van tijd tot tijd eenige geld van het land heeft
 gebruijkt [...] dog dat sulks sijnde geschied met intentie om dezelve tot den laatsten penning [weer] aan
 het land te voldoen".
 cxv "Een seer vergaande ontrouwigheid gepaard met mijneedigheid en falsiteit vallende te gelijk met
 diverij, dewelke gevolglyk in een land van justitie niet kunnen werden geleden maar ter exempel [...] behooren te worden gestraft".
 cxvi De gevangene "sal werden verklaard mijeedig, eerloos en infaam [...] en met het swaard over het
 hoofd werden gestraft en voorts sijn leeven lang gedurende gebannen".

^{cxvi} Over de collecteurs is zeer veel aan “sinistere practyken, snoode bedryven, schelmsche handelingen en vuile bedriegeryen” te melden. Datgene wat de auteur hier verhaalt over “het godloos gedrag der drie op den tytel genaamde bandyten of vlugtelingen” moet echter genoeg zijn om een indruk te krijgen van Doelisten an andere “confraters van deze canailjeuse lands-dieven” te krijgen. Deze informatie moet genoeg zijn om “de directie van ‘s lands middelen op een beter voet te regelen”. Dit werkje dient om iets tegen de “enorme schelmstukken die er van de zyde der valsgenoemde Patriotten, ten nadeele van het algemeen, gepleegd zyn” te doen.

^{cxvii} “Als een banjerheer den gebraden haan spelen”.

^{cxviii} “Ik denk er wat mooy weër mee te maken, en als myn moertje, die myn borg is, alles voor my vereffent heeft; dan weer als voren naar Amsterdam by myn geliefde dames d’amour als een banjerheer den gebraden haan te spelen, en de rest van vaartjes Indiaansch gewoekerd geld door het gat te lappen”.

^{cxix} Cras was “verplicht geweest nauwkeurig toe te sien oft de hoofd en andere collecteurs of gaarders heur boeken in behoorlijke ordre hielden”.

^{cxx} In zijn reactie voor de Gecommitteerde Raden verklaarde Cras dat “hij door het niet doorbladen van de boeken, de gepleegde vrijligheden hem niet sijn gekomen onder het oog [...] en dat hij evenwel na dode van den gaarder Nolla [...] aan Haar Ed. Mog. heeft geschreven dat het comptoir gedurende de siekte van den gaarder Nolla behoorlijk was waargenomen”.

^{cxxi} Bij vragen tijdens het proces hoe dit toch kon moest Cras dan ook “volmondig bekennen dat sulks niet mogelijk was geweest, so hij in sijne qualiteit de goede ordres tot voorkominge van so een trouwlosen handel gesteld had nagekomen [...] en dat hij door sijn [nalatig, TK] gedrag als opsiender gehouden, de oorszaak is van het imposant nadeel dat het gemeeneland komt te leijden”.

^{cxxii} “Het nadeel wat hij aan het land berokkend heeft”.

^{cxxiii} Dat hij “wel heeft geweeten en ook uyt de cas boeken gesien dat de gaarder Nolla ieder maand een seker somme minder verantwoordt als het casboek opleverde”.

^{cxxiv} “Alle dewelke saaken sijnde van dangereuse gevolgen die in een bediende van ‘t land niet konnen worden getollereert”.

^{cxxv} “Verplicht om in cas hij eenige ontrouw ofte quade directien van den gaarder mogt ontdekken, daarvan kennisse te geeven aan de gecommitteerde raden, en dat die selfde fijne instantie verder meede brengt dat hij van een ontdekte ontrouwigheid geen kennis gevende, voor mede complice moet worden gehouden”.

^{cxxvi} “Bovendien had hij zich verplicht zig “in alles met alle getrouwigheid, vlijt en naarstigheit te gedraagen”.

^{cxxvii} “Dat hij [Ramak, TK] de declaratoiren onder de maandstaten sedert het jaar 1751 iedere maand heeft geteekent, dat hem nogtans is bekend, dat ieder maand een sekere somme minder is verantwoord, als het casboek opleverde, en dat hij gevolgljik moet erkennen [...] dat hij sijn instructie niet heeft nagedient, en dat de gaarder Nolla hem sulks heeft geordonneert, en met brutalitijt daar toe gedwongen, en dat de opsiender Cras de cas boeken verschijden maal heeft nagesien en hem daarover nooit [heeft, TK] onderhouden”.

^{cxxviii} Ramak verklaarde verder dat hij zodoende “van niemand eenige onderrichting [kreeg, TK], en dat hij voor sijn ooggen zag dat door het niet overbrengen van de te kort verantwoorde somme voor het volgend jaar die te kort verantwoorde somme verduistert wierd, maar dat hij het so niet soude hebben begrepen”.

^{cxxix} Zo schreven zij: “op dat dezelve tot het volbrengen van hun plicht in staat mogen zyn, zullen zy zich in de ordonnantien, zoo generaale, als particuliere, publicatien, en resolutien, die op de invordering van ‘s lands middelen geëmancert zyn, moeten kundig maaken, en speciaal moeten observeren”.

^{cxxxx} Indiscretie of onomzichtigheit and indecentie of onbehoorlijkheit.

^{cxxxi} “De kleine dieven hangt men tusschen hemel en aarden, maar de grooten ryden in koetsen en te paarden; en die meerder hebben gestoolen werden landen en steeden bevoolen”.

^{cxxxii} “Vrijheit boven schat, eer boven leven stelden

wier arm der dwingelandij manmoedig weerstand boodt

wij roemen uwe deugd, den ed’len grijsart waerdig”

^{cxxxiii} “De omkoopning is geweerd. Den stoel der burgervaderen

Zal ‘t volk voortaan niet meer door vleiers zien gedrukt

Geen laffe slaaf zal meer uwe achtbare raadzaal na’dren

Die om genot van gunst, voor de overheersing bukt”.

- cxiiiiv “Dat Repelaer en al de zijnen
Gehaat van ‘t volk, van hartseer kwijnen!
Men vindt ze in ied’re stad – rechtvaardig God!; doe recht!
Dat uwe wraak dien hoop verplette!
Bescherm hem die voor t land het al ten beste zette!
Dat gy de zegekrans op zynen schedel hecht”
- cxiiiiv “De heerszucht wist soms, in dit land, ook laffe zielen uit te vinden
Die zij met een vergulde hand, Aan haar belangen kon verbinden
Zo dat het land door haar gedrukt, zich voor een tijd wel kromt en bukt
Maar nimmer kon zij t overleven, zodra de Batavier ontwaakt
Het monster kent dat hem ontwaakt, zag men wel ras de kans verkeren”.
- cxiiiiv “Men vind weer mannen in den raad, die wijsheid voor slaafsche eer verkiezen, in spijt van laster,
hoon en smaad”.
- cxiiiiv “Hun die vervreemd van eed en plicht / Haar [vrijheid, TK] hoonden in het aangezicht
Een muilprang op den neus zetten / Zo moet het zulke bozen gaan
Die alles ‘t onderste boven keren / Zich niets ontzien maar ‘t al bestaan
Om willekeurig te regeeren, Men zette hun met hoon en smaad / Uit het bestier van stad en staat
Maar zulken die het alles wagen / Voor burger, stad en vaderland
Zij door der vrijheid milde hand / Een eeuwig eerkroon opgedraagen”.
- cxiiiiv Het is een “nuttige en alleszins noodige resolutie” om “namelijk de ambten en commissien naar
toerbeurten en rang te doen bedienen en begeeven, zonder dien aangaande meer agt te slaan op de hooge
recommandatien van den erfstadhouder [...] maar de groote vraag in deze is of die resolutie in waarheid,
uit eigen belang om mede een vetten brok te mogen hebben (daar nu alle door eenige weinigen worden
ingepikt) of uit den ouwen wrok tegen ‘t huis van Oranje spruit, dan wel uit een waar patriottismus”.
- cxiiiiv “Hebben zij die groote les van ‘t geweten doet aan een ander niet dat gij niet wilt dat u geschiede, in
deze agt genoomen?”
- cxli Is het “de overweeging van pligt de instandhouding der privilegien hunner steden” of “het eigenbe-
lang, voordeel, en de drift die men heeft om den stadhouder te kortwieken, om hem weder afhandig te
maken, het geen men hem ‘t zij uit laagheid of vrijwillig zelve heeft opgedraagen”.
- cxli “Genieten nu de gilden hunne rechten ten vollen? Zijn er geene geschonden, in onbruik geraakt of
vervreemd? Dan is alles regt. Maar, is dit zoo niet? Laat dan deze groote Patriotten die voorstanders der
vrijheid eerst den balk uit hun eigen oog wegdoen, eer zij den splinter die in t oog van zijn hoogheid is
aanroeren”.
- cxlii “Dan, ja! Dan alleen zullen zij den toegezwaaiden lof als waare Patriotten verdienen, dan eerst op
dien een wettig regt hebben, en in waarheid gehouden worden, voor die geene waar van zij nu slechts
alleen maar den blooten naam voeren”.
- cxlii “Hebbe ik daar[in] geen meer belang dan mijne medeburgeren”. De auteur vraagt zich af waarom de
Vroedschap zo lang heeft gewacht “alvorens door het maaken van een conventie, paalen te zetten aan de
willekeurige recommandatien ter begeving der ambten en commissien”.
- cxliiv Repelaer heeft “het vertrouwen welke de vorst in hem stelde, niet anders gebruikt dan om voor hem
en zijne kinderen op de illegaalste wijze alle ampten en favours aan de regering gehegt na zig te sleepen,
uitwijzens het aantal van bedieningen, welke die heer buiten zijn tour en alleen door gunst van den
stadhouder verkregen heeft”
- cxliiv “Dewijl zoo ras iemand zich er wat ziekelijk bevind of schijnt aftenemen, die heer er op uit is om
deszelfs bediening voor zich of zijn kinderen te bespreken, het welk hem te ligter valt omdat de prins een
onbepaald vertrouwen in hem stelt en meent dat niemand zijn person en huis meerder toegedaan is en
dat dus die heer van zijn kant alles zal toebrengen wat het stadhouderlijk gezag en den invloed die de
prins altoos op de regeering van Dordrecht gehad heeft kan vorderlijk zijn”
- cxliiv “En de prins niets overblijft dan zig gehaat te maaken bij alle andere regenten, die billijk te onvreede
moeten zijn dat alle ambten meest al aan een persoon en zijn kinderen, schoon nog zo jong, begeeven en
besproken worden; dat nu den heer Hugo Repelaer voor alle genootten ambten en commissies niets heeft
toegebragt wat het stadhouderlijk gezag binnen Dordrecht heeft kunne bevorderen,”

cxlvii “Dat hij in plaats van door gepaste middelen de harmonie tussen de prins en de regeering te bewaren, integendeel alle de cordaate resolutien van de regeering, betrekkelijk de onlusten met Engeland genoomen, heeft uitgekreten, als of het geschiedde om den stadhouder minagting aan te doen, zonder te willen begrijpen dat de regenten die wel wisten hoe hinderlijk dit aan hun personeel belang was het alleen tot welzijn van hun vaderland deden”.

cxlviii “Van zijn willekeurige goedheid te moeten afhangen, ter verkrijging van douceurs, die hun volgens de ordre van der regeering waren toegekomen, te meer daar met zijn gezag is gepaard gegaan met een onverdraaglijk hoogmoed, lesive houding en minagting tegens zijne mede regenten, zig voorgevende te zijn een man (en niet te onregt) zonder wiens intercessie geen ambten of commissien in Dordrecht begeven wierden”.

cxlix “Velen zijn hier van gedachten dat de zeven heeren, die alleen hun tijdelijk belang in het oog hebben gehouden, wijl zij anders wel begrijpen dat zodanige een conventie of schikking van een oneindig nut voor de burgerij is door de vrije deliberatien die de regeering erdoor verkrijgt”.

cl De auteur verdenkt de zeven weigeraars ervan de drie weken te hebben doorgebracht “met onophoudelijk handelen, af en aangaan bij den prins tot dien laatsten dag toe [...] men kan ligt begrijpen de waare redenen en motiven van deze handelingen en consideratien dier zeven heeren en dat zij in dezen alleen te werk zijn gegaan en er op uijt zijn geweest om zig aan die partij over te geeven die hun het voordeligste zoude voorkomen”.

cli “Het is te hoopen voor al die heren dat de heer Repelaer zijn woord in die engagementen en beloften zal houden en dat hij niet te groote portie voor alle die besproken ambten voor hem of zijne kinderen daar af zal nemen” en “dat zijn crediet binnen kort zeer zal verminderen als den prins eens zal beseffen dat het alleen door toedoen van dezen raadsman is dat hij zoo veele injustities in de Dortsche regeering begaan heeft”

clii “Gedeputeerden te hebben daar men staat op kan maken die zig gesubordineerd gevoelene aan de verantwoording van hunnen principalen, die vrijheidminnende gevoelens hebben en die eindelijk cordaatheid genoeg bezitten om op zaaken waarop zij niet volkoomen gelast zijn (als het nood is) met hunnen kundigen pensionaris toestemmen, dat de stem van de stad naar het heerschende idee derzelve word uitgebragt”.

cliii “Om ten alle tijden en in alle zaken een vrije deliberatie te hebben, waar op men nooit kan vertrouwen zoo lang men recommendatien admitteert; wijl hoe magtig, hoe belangeloos ook een regent is, het dog ten uiterste hard valt, zig, om cordaat en naar zijn geweeten ten welwezen van zijn land gestemd te hebben, door een laffen vlejjer en hoveling beroofd te zien van een ambt of commissie, dat hem toekwam, dit heeft egter mede reets plaats gehad in deze stad [...]”.

cliv “Dat de oorspronkelijke magt, van verre het grootste gedeelte onzer regeering bij de steden huisvest, dat de eerste bronnen zijn, waar uit dezelve ontstaat; welke bron te aanmerklijker is, om dat de opbrengts der geldmiddelen, die voornaamste zenuw van den staat, voornamelijk uit de steden moet komen; wanneer derhalven deze bron niet zuiver is, moet noodzakelijk de geheele regeeringsvorm beroerd worden; wanneer hier eenige ziekte schuilt, moet het onheil zich spoedig door alle de takken der hooge regeering verspreiden en zijne verderfelijken invloed wel dra overal doen gevoelen”.

clv Veele regenten ook reeds langs deze weg van recommendatie in de regeering geraakt, en met ambten begiftigd rekenden zich (en vele rekenen zich nog) verpligt, uit dankerkentenis aan hunnen begunstiger deze gewoonte te onderkennen, of ten minsten niet tegen te gaan. En ik behoef u niet te doen opmerken, dat sommigen wier grootste drijfveren glorie, heerszucht en eigen belang zijn, zich langs deze weg altoos in het bezit der gelegenheden handhaven konden om deze het menschelijk hart zoo bedwelmende neigingen bot te vieren”.

clvi “Rot vrij in iedere stad by een!

Verschaf u recht door bloote klingen [getrokken zwaarden, TK]

Verderf des princen gunstelingen!

En styv' ten nut van t algemeen

Die braaven, dien de glans van 't goud niet kon verblinden

Noch in wier ed'le ziel geen schanddaad was te vinden”

clvii “Wat zijne jeugd betreft, daar van zyn zyne daden even min roemrugtig, als dezelve naderhand geweest zyn. Heerszuchtig in woorden, lafhartig in daaden, met dat gevolg dat zyne landgenooten het

pleit voor hem meer dan eens moesten opneemen, wilden zy hem niet tot 't doelwit van smaad en veragting gesteld hebben”.

clviii “Hij trouwde, na verscheide voorafgegaane amourettes, genoegzaam bekend, in den jare 1758 eene beminnenswaardige, deugdzaame, en Godvreezende vrouwe: ach! ...hoe haare Godsvrugt zelve hem tot last ware en hoe zyne ontrouw door al te zeer in 't oogloopende nauwe conversaties met twee vrouwen, heiden reeds overleeden, mogelijk een nagel aan haar doods-kist geweest is!”

clix “Dus is de lust [van Repelaer vanwege excuses die hij aan had moeten bieden, TK] om wraak te oeffenen, waar toe hy geen slingsche streeken of vuilaardige verdigtsels, zelve onder 't schyn van 't interest van 't land te behartigen, gespaard heeft”.

clx “Voor de hele stad bekend als een rechten hoveling, dat uwe edelen uit dit schilderij [deze beschrijving, TK] genoegzaam iemand zult kennen die, ter bereiking van zyn oogmerk, met verzaaking van eed, eer, plicht en conscientie tot alles bequaam is”.

clxi “Niet lang in de regeering geweest zynde greep hy de eerste gelegenheid aan om de werktuigen, die hem alleen bestuuren, heerszucht en eigenbaat ten toon te spreiden en wel even na de dood van mevrouw de prinsesse gouvernante in 't jaar 1759. Hij voegde zich bij “eenige weinige leden die over de vorm van regering malcontent waren. Geene kuyperijen, intrigues, of slinksche weegen, om zyn oogmerk te doen gelukken, wierden door hem nagelaaten”.

clxii “Evenwel met dat gevolg dat de groote meerderheid zig toen aan zyn ondraaglyke heerszucht nog niet behoevende te onderwerpen”.

clxiii “Zyn woelzieken geest”: “geene zaak konde er byna voorvallen daar die heer zig er niet mee bemoeide, en daar hy niet met de grootste verwaandheid en meesterlijk gezag zyn oordeel velde”.

clxiv “In dat jaar [1766, TK] was de tyd geboorden dat onze luitenant stadhouder de geheele stad van Dordrecht aan zyne onbepaalde staatzugtige overheersching zoude gaan dienstbaar maaken”.

clxv “Altoos de opgaande zon aanbiddende” verzette Repelaer zich tegen beslissing die door Anna van Hanover voor haar dood waren genomen. Nu “zoude hy in Dordrecht de belangen van de prins behartigen en door zyne influentie alles na deszelfs intentie dirigeeren, mits evenwel de prins aan zyn grootste oogmerk ook voldeed, met hem in de eerste plaats en voorts die aanhangers, die hy niet missen kon met ambten en commissien vet te mesten: ja als dat maar vast stond was geen schelmstuk te groot om door hem ten uitvoer gebragt te worden,”

clxvi “Zonder dat er voor de oude regenten eenige kans overbleef”.

clxvii “Dit konde zijn hebzucht niet verdragen”.

clxviii “Om opentlyk beide die considerabele ambten te vraagen mogt in 't oog loopen”. Dus declareert Repelaer het ambt bij burgemeester Stoop die de functie van dijk-graaf voor zijn neef de heer Van Puttenbroek wilde hebben. Tegelijkertijd echter stelt Repelaer, “teegen alle gewoonte aan” eene commissie (bestaande uit uitgezogte vrienden en een bloedverwant van den heer Repelaer) gedeerneet naar den Prins, ten einde dien Vorst te solliciteren in deszelfs recommendatie tot dijk-graaf toch het oog te willen vestigen op een kundige en daartoe geschikte persoon. De prins, de goede voorzorg van dat collegie bewonderende, vroeg, wie de heeren daar dan best toe zouden despiceren? Toen was de zaak gezond. Niemand beter als de heer Repelaer, was 't antwoord”.

clxix “De prins werd bevestigd in zyne uitgeleezene keuze van zoo een bekwaam en gelieft man tot zynen nieuwe lieutenant stadhouder gevonden te hebben”[...] “de heer Repelaer had de gelegenheid zyn attachement voor den prins te toonen, van malgré lui, om den prins dienst te doen, zo een lastige post [van dijkgraaf, TK] die maar op zijn best een paar zakken guldens opbrengt, te aanvaarden. Zo verre gaat de arglistigheid van 's menschen hart, als men alles aan zyn eigen belang opoffert”.

clxx Stoop had “medegewerkt op een ongehoorde, ongewone, ja aan alle ingelanden geheel onbekende wyze, die de paalen van eerlykheid volstrekt te buiten ging”.

clxxi “De eene dienst is d'andere waard”.

clxxii Repelaer was “ten top van alles verheeven, en de gantsche stad moest hem aanbidde, en na zyn pypen dansen: had iemand de couragie om buiten zyne toetsemming eene commissie of wat 't ook ware te vragen, die verwierf zyne ongenade”.

clxxiii “Lukte het hem minder zijn heerszucht den teugel te vieren, als in den stad van Dordrecht. Hy moest dus de scepter van zyne heerszucht alleen in Dordrecht zwaayen, alwaar zonder hem niet t minste bagatel mogt verricht worden en hy zig ook van alles de eer aanmaatigde”

clxxiv “Hy vond in Dordrecht al weinig voedsel meer voor zyne eerlooze onbeschaamdheid”.

clxxv “Om ‘t juk van zoo een tiran van hunnen halsen te schuiven, om voor ‘t welzyn van t vaderland, hunne stad en vryheid met kragt te waaken, en hunnen regerings constitutie die door inkruiping en laffe toegeevendheid tot dat uiterste vertreeden was, weder te handhaaven, met dat heilzaam en billyk oogmerk om aan elk regent op zyn tyd zo wel de agrementen van de regeering te doen smaaken, als hy de lasten heeft moeten draagen, en voor te komen dat laffe en laage vleyers om veel eigen belang, om ambten en commissien die thans genoegzaam altoos in vaste handen waaren, hun eed en pligt met voeten treden”.

clxxvi “By wien in alle opzigten bedaardheid met voorzigtigheid, kloekmoedigheid met wysheid, en eerlykheid met ongemaakte Godvrugt gepaard gaat”.

clxxvii “Uwen braaven, kundigen, volyverigen, eerlyken en cordaaten de Gyzelaar, hem mag men zonder laffe vleiry dien lof toezwaaien, dat hy boven alle verleiding is, dat men op zyn onwankelbaren trouw als op een koperen muur kan rekenen en dat hem eerder de tong uit de mond zal vallen dan dat hy zyn ontvangenen last om iemand te believen zoude verdraaien of te buiten gaan”.

clxxviii “Wyl het niet met hun interest, DE EENIGE DRIJFVEER [hoofdletters in origineel, TK] van hun doen en laten niet overeenkomt”.

clxxix “En toens komende op de historie van Rotterdam hoe daar geld op d’admiraliteit zijnde, gegeven soo door Van der Heim als door den equipagemeester, het meer dan een geluk was, dat de saken niet tot het uiterstens waere gekomen [...] Des hij, Van der Goes, hesiteerde om de prins alsnog te gaan spreken nopens van der Heim, D’Escury etc...”

clxxx “Dat die alle saken soo duister en verwardt maakte, dat er geen uitkomen aan was, dat hij, Gilles in een uur meerder met Bisdom konde uitvoeren als in agt dagen met Van der Heim, welke Van der Heim in qualité van secretaris van d’admiraliteyt immense sommen hadde geterokken van die aangenome nieuw gebouwde schepen, ‘t gunt hem niet toekwam. Dat er voorts niets nopens die admiraliteyt behoorde te worden afgedaan sonder communicatie van den Raad van State, waardoor due collegien oneindig beter in ordre souden worden gehouden [...]”

clxxxi “Kent gy den moord’naar van uw vryheid, Batavieren!

Den roover van uw geld, uw bloed, uwe eelaurieren?

‘t Is Jakob van der Heim, dat vet gemeste beest:

Die, daar hij hel nog hemel vreest,

Uit vuige vleizucht, voor den Bagchus van Oranje,

Ons dierbaar vaderland verkogt aan Groot Brittanje

Ô gy die vreiheid mint! Verzaamelt u te gaader!

Val aan, val aan op dien verraader:

En breek dien snoodaart hals en been;

Rold dan zyn ronde pens door slyk en modder heen.

Geef hem dan voorts tot spys der raven;

Want, zoo dien vuilik wierd begraven,

De duivel waarde om zyn graf,

En, wilt ge de oorzaak hier van weeten?

Hy heeft voor langen tyd zyn snoode ziel bezeeten.

Nu vergde hy willigt, dat me ook zyn romp hem gaf.

Of zoud ge voor vervolging vreezen;

‘t is slechts canaille dat hem mind,

Alleen door ydlen waan verblind,

Geef slechts dat woeste vee een borrel brandewyn,

Zy zullen ook uw vrienden zyn.

Voorts is ‘t een klein getal verachtelyke slaven,

Die voor hem kruipen draaven,

En dat voor een hand vol goud,

Waar op hy met den prins, al zyne sterktens bouwd.

Vel slechts die guiten met hem neder!

Zoo vest de vryheid als voor heen,

In weer wil van ‘t verblind gemeen,

In dit haar vaderland den ouden zetel weder”.

clxxxii “Gy waagt uw leeven dan voor eenen dronken-prins
wel meester Van der Heim zijt gij waaragtig kins?
Of denkt gij door dien vent ons Neerland te regeeren?
Verdomt het Amsterdam zal u wel moris leren”.

clxxxiii “Het loon van eenen held die Neerland dorst verraaden

Zij in dees korten spreuk, *vertrap hem om zijn daaden!*

Wagt dan dit zelfde loon voor uw gevloekte daên” [...]

“Om een hand vol goude een’man ten troon te voeren

Een man die zig vermengt met freules, snoode hoeren

En daar zijn lieve vrouw zo vaak om zugten moet

Is dunkt mij schurken werk en schelmen in hun bloed”

clxxxiv “Ik haat Van der Heim doch min de prins in mijne hart”.

clxxxv “Door in zyn beroep zuiver te zijn; zig door geen geschenken, ja door gansche zakken vol Engelsche
guinies te laten omkopen om iets ten nadeele van zyn naaste te onderstaan”.

clxxxvi “Zag ik drie andere, waar van een dik vet man was, zeer wel uitziende, hy was Jacob genaamt; een
tweede die ook by hem hoorde, had een groote ronde pruik op gepoeierd als een duif, of zoo als de
Fransche zoude zeggen *comme un pigeon*. de derde had een stalkapje of een Callot d’ecury op het hoofd. Dit
aardige driemanschap maakte myne nieuwsgierigheid gaande, om aan de faam te vraagen; heer wie zyn
deze? Deze zyn, was zyn antwoord, mannen van name; zy hebben schepen opgehouden in plaats van te
gebruiken; zy hebben ‘s lands vyanden bevoordeeld, en zig bespottelyk gemaakt; het zyn lage zielen, die
haar geruste conscientie, die haar vaderland, ja ik zou haast zeggen, die haar ziel ten beste zoude geven
om ampten voor haare kinderen te krygen”.

clxxxvii “Vetrouw nog verhef al die verdacht zynde aarslikkers van den hertog, geboore acht-en-veertigers,
in eeuwigheid niet. Alsdar is die trotsche verblindende griffioen, gesprooten uit de hoogadelyke afkomst
van een stadsboden en een vroemoer [?, TK]; die om zyn hoffiaans- en hertogsgezindheid, balliuw voor
zyn tyd gemaakt is, vertrouwt hem niet, hy is de cameleon gelyk; verwisseld zo dikwils als hy wil van
couleuren, houd enkel het oog ‘er maar op, dat hy een boezemvriend is van voorn: Quarles de Mey. Zyn
vader was al een groote hoffiaan by de tyd van Willem 4^e en viel de gouvernanten mede ten respecten van
Engeland, en ten nadeelen en der Amsterdamsche kooplieden, waar dor dat hy groot gemaakt is
geworden. Een hoffiaan door hart en merg hertogsgezind, nog geen twee jaar geleden door behulp van de
dikke duc burgemeester gemaakt, zyn zoon een ampt gekregen, en hy door het kanaal van zyn neef Van
Riel commies van ‘t cabinet en dykgraaf van Woerden geworden om dat hy in staat is water en vuur te
gelyk in een hand als men zegt te draagen, verdets is bekend is hy de boezemvriend van de Engelsch en
hertogsgezinde Rotterdamsche burgermeester Van der Heym”.

clxxxviii “Van die by Rotterdams volk verwenschten Laurens van der Meer, de gehaate en veragte
Amsterdamsche Raap, Gimnig en de Utrechtse verfoeilyke lobedanus”.

clxxxix “Als een willekeurige heerschappy van eenen monarch, of van weinige aristocraten over de
gewigtigste belangens der maatschappy bestelling maakt”.

cxc “Als men de goede hoedanigheden van deugd en verstand in haare doorluchtige persooone beschouwd,
dan die hier dan meerendeels, zo als nu ook, slegts bestaat in praalvertooningen, gala’s, pragtige soupés en
andere dattelheeden, wier uitwerkselen niet zelden de natie meer en meer verwyven, de zedeloosheid
bevorderen, den vorstelyke luister ontciëren, en ‘s lands schatkist nuteloos bezwaren [...]”.

cxci “Den braaven, eerlyken, den nyveren en onvermoeden burger met schattingen doen overlaaden,
terwyl zyne vrijheid, goederen en bezittingen niet alleen beschermloos worden gelaaten [...]”.

cxcii “Maar men ook door brooddronkenheid en weelde als buiten zig zelven gebragt, op den schamelen
burger als eenen slaaf neder ziet, zyner gelykheid vergeet, en ten langen lesten zig zo verre verkloekt dat
men met afhankelijk en vleiers die eeven zo zeer ondeugend als hunnen meester zyn, ja naar mate zy
kundiger zyn, te afschuwelyker moeten beschouwd worden eenen gemeenen beurs maakende, hen van
wien men de magt ontvingen by wien die alleen berust op de nek treed, aan yzeren kluisters hegt, ja zo
gedwee als schapen voor zig heenen dryft”.

cxciij “Dat het thans tevens de tyd is om zig van alle lafheid te ontdoen, de inbreuken te herstellen” [...]

“...den oorspronk van het meeste bederf en nadeel geweest is, namentlyk de onverschoonelyke

agtelooheid en verwaarloozing van verscheide zaaken, die in ons midden bestaan, en die zo als de twee vaderlandsche ridders de edele Capellen van den Marsch en den Patriottische Nyvenheim [...] hebben aangemerkt”.

^{cxciiv} “Van de vrijheidminnende en meterdaad bevorderderende stad Dordrecht die door de mannelijke kloekmoedigheid, vaderlandsche trouwe en onbesweeken standvastigheid van den kundigen pensionaris Gyzelaar in de uitvoering van de cordaatste en kragtadigste [...] zo luisterlijk uitblinkt, anderen voorlicht en billyk ter navolging van haar voorbeeld kan en vermag voorgesteld worden”.

^{cxciiv} “Men juicht er elkander alomme toe en de naamen van eenen de Gyzelaar, de Witten van Jaarsveld en andere braave Patriotten zweeven gedurig o paller tongen. De minste dagloner doet hen met lof vermelden. Op alle maaltyden en gezelschappen van wat rang of staat drinkt men op hun welzyn”.

^{cxciiv} “Is er wel immer een tijd geweest dat de braafste regenten en haare ministers den eigendom, vrijheid en rechten der goede gemeente, en derzelver interest zo significant, zo ongemeen verdienstelijk en zo allezins edelmoedig hebben gehandhaafd, mitsgaders de betrekkingen zo rondborstig erkend in welke zy met de gemeente staan?”.

^{cxciiv} “Rotterdam doet volstrekt niets [...], dit moet ik u toestemmen, dan concedeer my tevens, dat ik u verzoeke de burgery hier van niet geheel en al de schuld te geeven. Maar u slegts een Van der Heim, een Bichon, een Collot d’Escury op te noemen, en gy zult ras de oorzaaken bevinden, deeze laffe Afhangelingen en vergulde slaaven, die om hunne ambitie en heerszucht te streelen, den burgeren vryheid en belangens opofferen en nog onlangs ter vergadering van eenen ingewortelden verdorven aart en voornametlyk de eerste [Van der Heim, TK] want die toont allerwegen de schandvlek en onderdrukker zyner stad te zyn”.

^{cxciiv} “Deezen Van der Heim is het alleen te imputeeren dat Rotterdam even als ofze niet aanwezig waare, in deesen daagen ter staatsvergaaderinge zig gedraagt; en haat interest by de heilzamste voorstellen als uit het oog wordt verlooren. Deeze hoveling, de burgermeesterlyken digniteit onwaardig, is het genoeg, dat hy geduurig *a latere principis* mag zyn, en stoort zig even daarom niets met al aan de klagten zyner kooplieden. De kooplieden en burgers zyn daar even zo min als elders verblind door hunne en ‘t algemeen welzijn” [cursief in origineel, TK].

^{cxciiv} “Dan door Van der Heim en de zynen wordt alles gecontrequareerd, als het niet overeenkomstig zyne begunstigste oogmerken is. Hy weet door zynen invloed de meerderheid der regenten te doen overstemmen, want denkt niet dat de stad geheel en al ontbloot is van welmeenenden regenten”.

^{cc} “[...] Of als deeze Van der Heim eens uit zyne commissie raakt, ik my verbeelde, dat de zaaken eene anderen keer zouden neemen, en men deeze geforceerde slaaven, ten eenemaal zig zoude zien gedraagen, als het onafhangelijke regenten, die op de vryheid en regten hunner medeburgeren, onafscheidbaar altoos met de hunnen gemeen den behoorlyken prys stellen en volgens eed en plicht zig voor God almachtig daartoe verbonden hebben, betaamt”.

^{cc} “Geene gedwongen meerderheid de vryheid en heilwerkende pogingen eener braave minderheid tegengaan en vereidelen”.

^{ccii} “En zo lange Van der Heim niet gefnuikt word, zal Rotterdam, hoe zeer ‘t my smert van haare braave koplieden, burgers, regenten en ingezeetenen, met den schandelyke blaam van Engelschgezindheid overladen worden en een al te lydelyke gehoorzaamheid oonteerende en vernederende voor haar in aanmerking van haare nabuurige vrye landgenooten, die van Dordrecht en Schiedam inzonderheid beschouwd worden”.

^{cciii} “Ongemeen gemakkelijker zoude veele zaaken in de uitvoering zyn, indien de burgery op die plaatsen, daar een zekere geestelooheid en onverschilligheid, uit wat voor oogpunt zal ik daar laten, alzo die verschillende zyn, als daar zyn ambitie, heerszucht, eygenbelang, onkunde, lafheid, bekrompenheid, van denkbeelden, familiebelangen en dergelyke veragtelijke dryfveeren meer, heerscht, zig met eenpaarige stemmen vereenigde, haar bezwaaren voorstelde”.

^{cciv} “Het vaderland vereischt nu meer dan ooit de dienst van *mannen* [cursief in origineel, TK] die het zelve toonen getrouw te zyn, hunne medeburgers als vry en behoorlyk erkennen, en der goede gemeente rechten, voorrechten en dierbaare belangens, tegens alle inbreuk en verwaarloozing of onverschillige behandeling, kloekmoedig volgens hun eed en plicht voorstaan, verdedigen en bevorderen” [...] “Er zyn ook nog een aantal kloekmoedige regenten en helden die voor de vrijheid en der burgeren welvaart bereid

zyn alles opte offeren, hun vaderland trouwe en bescherming gezworven hebben, en nimmer zullen toelaaten dat men der overheersching ten prooije zoude worden”.

^{ccv} “Heerszucht, winderigheid, dubbelzinnigheid, afhankelijkheid, onverschilligheid, bekrompenheid van oordeel en verslaafdheid aan eenige weinigen [...] dog met verstand, beleid, welspreekendheid, moed en standvastigheid begaafden pensionaris Gyzelaar patrocineert [...] deeze waardige pensionaris in wine de deugeden van Brutus en Cicero zamengevoegd zyn, is een luister voor Dordrecht in de uitvoering haarer kloekmoedige besluiten [...] als De Wit in deugd gelyk, in trouw aan Barneveld”.

^{ccvi} Volgens Brandsenburg zou de prins te kennen hebben gegeven dat hij Van der Heim niet als Raadspensionaris wilde hebben vanwege de voortdurende vragen van zijn familie om “d’een of andere post” en omdat Van der Heim “veel te langdradig en omslaggelijk in sijn spreken en schrijven is”.

^{ccvii} “Mijnheer Van der Heim heeft geen uitgestrekte visie, en met veel vermogen en kennis, met grote vermogen over zichzelf, zijn geest is versmald, hij houdt slaafs vast aan de oude gebruiken en het lijkt hem absoluut te ontbreken aan vrijgevigheid, grootheid van de ziel, hij verwacht politiek en moraal, de staatsman en de goede man”.

^{ccviii} Van der Goes heeft zich krachtig uitgelaten tegen het “verregaande crediet van Van der Heim in Rotterdam, hoe die daarvan abuserende, sijne hoogheid veel meerder vijanden van vrienden maakte, ook soo Bichon en d’Escury, die alles naar hun en de hunne trokken, waardoor sijn hogheydt sijn invloed aldaar aanmerkelijk verloor, want dat nu de saak nopens de recommendatien misschien staken soude”

^{ccix} “In Rotterdam kwamen sommigen van de minderheydt ook aan de handt en spraken als uit eene mondt, hoe sy tegens Van der Heim waren, dan wisten niet hoe dat met de prins ten opzigte van Van der Heim te maken...”.

^{ccx} “Allerschandelykste directie [die] men, geduurende dien oorlog, gehouden heeft, zo omtrend de verwaarloozing der marine van den staat, die men in een respectablen ftaat had behooren te brengen en te houden, als het eenigfre behoud onzer commercie, de voornaamste bron, waardoor ons gemeenebest beftaan en floreeren moet”.

^{ccxi} “Kunnende hier van als een enkel verhaaltje bygebracht worden, de conduite, gehouden door een bewindhebber der O:I: Compagnie ter kamer Rotterdam, op den 25^e December 1781. En die van den toenmaligen en nu voortvlugtenden secretaris Van der Heym, betrekkelijk het laten uitzeilen van het Oost Indische Compagnieschip van Capt. Van Prooyen en het Oorlogschip Rotterdam Capt. Volbergen, welke men had kunnen behouden, zo men gewild had; maar welke men verkoos, liever dus gewillig, of wel gepramediteerd, in handen van de Engelschen te doen vallen, dan daar indenoodige voorziening te gebruiken, om hun uitzeilen voor te komen; zo als hun is aangeboden geworden, om zulks te effectueeren, gelyk door geloofwaardige getuigen kan beweezen worden”.

^{ccxii} “Deze uitstap medeburgers, hebben wy ons veroorloofd, om die gewigtige poincten van beschuldigingen, tegens de toenmaelige regenten, die in ‘t openbaar favoriseerden het verderfelyke systema, om Engeland in de hand te werken [...]”.

^{ccxiii} “L’esprit en Hollande est bon; la majorité veut le bien. Il ne manque rien, ni bras ni argent; l’un et l’autre sera offert à la France lorsque la voix des amis de la patrie pourra se faire entendre”.

^{ccxiv} “Ik hoop deze u fris en gezond te Parijs zal aantreffen; ik schrijf u alleen om te berichten, dat ik de partij lakenen geaccepteerd hebbe; gij moet nu maar maken dat die geëxpedieerd kan worden, en mij de paspoorten zenden en elucideeren of er ook attestatien bij moeten zijn, dat het inlands fabriek is nu Janbaas vaar voort, wij zullen het hier ook doen. Groet hartelijk Meyer”.

^{ccxv} “Nauwlijks waart gij vertrokken, of de zeemeerminnen begonnen in plaats van te zingen zoo ijselijk te brullen dat ik het benauwd kreeg; de barometer stond op orcaan; ik dagt de boot is verloren; maar door middel van de makelaar is de erfenis geassureerd geworden. Met Joseph is niets te doen; hij zingt hetzelfde deuntje als de Rabbi; zij willen dat wij naar Africa zeilen en hun koorn zenden; zonder dat willen zij niets hooren, naar niets luisteren. Van dezen avond zal ik zien wat ik met de lijst uitvoeren kan. Nopens de makelaar, wanneer hij in de boot zijn zal wil hij de schippers geheel en al buiten haar kostwinning zetten, en goede boeren in de plaats nemen; hij is slim maar bedwaard; hij wil het testament klaar maken. Het kleintje heeft mij ook zeer omstandig over de toestand van dit alles gesproken; men moet met vertrouwen werken zegt hij, zonder dat zal hij met zijn familie de erfenis reguleeren. Het kleintje weet van de tien last, en heeft mij in vertrouwen gezegd, dat die zaak heilig moet zijn, en dat hij gelast was mij daar in vertrouwen over te spreken. Ik hebbe hem alle mogelijke verzekering gegeven”.

ccxvi “Hoewel ik daaraan totaal mijne commerciele belangen moet opofferen” Hiervan, zo vervolgt Van Langen, “moet door of van weges het Franse gouvernement, een demarche gedaan worden; houd dit in het oog, want anders komt het er niet [...] dan zoude het met onze verdere engagementen in de war lope, gy begrijpt hiermede wat ik zeggen wil”.

ccxvii “Koele redeneerkunde begrypt, dat het bestuur van eene natie zeer slegt aan mannen is toevertrouwd, welke, door zucht tot zelf behoud en zelf verheffing gedreven daarop en daarop alleen schijnen bedagt geweest te zyn, en dit hun voornaam werk met zo weinig beleid hebben behandelt, dat het nauwelijks opgetrokken begouw door zijne eigen zwaarte noodwendig instorten moest”.

ccxviii “Vergeefs, zoude men, by het vernietigd uitvoerend bewind, als uit mannen bestaande, wier kunde, getrouwheid en moed, als drangredenen hunner wederrechtelijke continuatie ter constituerende vergadering opgegeven zijn, meerder beleid in de behandeling der zaaken van den lande verwagten” [...] “alles bewijst onkunde, nalatigheid, slordigheid en ontrouw”.

ccxix Zonder dat “hare grenzen bepaald, of eenige instructien, hoe ook genaamd, voor de agenten is ontworpen en in deze onbeslistheid s lands wezenlyke belangen grootendeels van de kunde, de eerlykheid en de gematigdheid van een enkel persoon afhankelijk [is] gemaakt”.

ccxx “Zo vindt men, gedurende de eerste zes weken na deszelfs aanstelling, herhaalde reizen stukken, en in het bijzonder van missives van schijnbaar aanbelang, vermeld, omtrent welker wezentlyken inhoud en dagteekening volstrekt niets in de notulen te vinden is”.

ccxxi “Goede vaderlanders zijn uit hun post ontzet [ten gunste van] lieden die onkundig en ongeschikt [waren] [en die] een woest en overdreven geschreeuw tot eenige aanbeveling hadden”.

ccxxii “Wij bedoelen nog andere arrestatien welke geheel afwijkende van de gewone rechtspleging aan den eigendunkelyken wil der bewindlieden alleen hunnen oorsprong verschuldigt zijn geweest”.

ccxxiii “Dat de duizende onschuldige amptenaren, die zich met vrouw en kinderen aan den bedelzak gebragt zagen, en zich niets kwaads bewust waren, tot wanhoop moetsen gebragt worden, mede klaagden, daar zij zich door onkundigen zuipers, zedenloze wezens zagen verdringen”.

ccxxiv “Eenen Boeseke, wiens hatelijk bespiederswerk en zijdelingse insimulatiën werden beloond door eene aanmoediging om zich verder bij het vaderland verdienstelijk te maken”.

ccxxv “Eberstein is en blijft een cameleon [...] hij kruipt als een slang in het gras, en vertoont zich nimmer dan in de duisternis; hij affecteert de groote principes der revolutie te zijn toegedaan maar zijn afkeer tegen dezelve straalt door in zijnen eeuwigdurenden toon, tegen alles wat de revolutie toegedaan is – hij leeft allerdeftigst en niemand weet waar hij de fondsen vandaan haalt”.

ccxxvi [...] “Was het wel noodig geweest, ter verkrijging van het appui van dit gouvernement zoo groote pecuniele sacrifices aan te bieden? Zijn die aanbiedingen wel gedaan, en zijn die penningen wel gekomen ter plaatse daar ze behoorden, of zijn dezelve gevallen meestal in handen van menschen, wier gezag niet anders is of bestaat, als in de parade die zij daarvan maken?”.

ccxxvii “Dat uitvaagsel der mensheid” [...] “die booswicht, wiens leven eene aaneenschakeling van gruweldaden is” [...] Hij, die voor een handvol goud, de partij van den stadhouder en van Engeland diende; - hij, die op hetzelfde oogenblik, dat het Fransche hof hem aan brood hielp, dat hof aan den gemeenen vijand verraden konde”.

ccxxviii “Hoezeer de nationale tijd op eene schandelijke wijze door het voormalig Uitvoerend Bewind verkwest weerd, onder anderen met correspondentien die geen andere strekking hadden, dan alleen om zich vast te nestelen in die posten, waarin men zich gedrongen had, niet om het volk! maar OM ZICHZELF! [...] wij zullen aan dat volk nu en vervolgens laten beoordelen, wie zij waren wien de uitvoerende macht in de Bataafsche republiek zijn vertrouwen waardig keurde [...] zonder den minste agterdocht zich en hunne belangen toevertrouwd, wier wenken zij zonder nadenken volgden, deze mensen bedrogen en hun alleen als werktuigen der vermomde heerszucht gebruikten” [hoofdletters in origineel, TK].

ccxxix “Brenger dezès is mijn vertrouwde vriend, een veel waardig, doorzichtig en moedig Patriot: wees dus zoo goed hem geloof, en uw vertrouwen, evenzoo als gij aan mijzelfen of iemand onzer geven zoudt, te schenken. Berigt hem alles ten aanzien van het onderzoek dat hij bij u en anderen zal willen doen; antwoord hem als landgenoot op alle zijne vragen betrekkelijk zijn voornemen; wijs hem den weg dien hij moet bewandelen; ondersteun hem door alle mogelijke middelen op dien weg, opdat hij tot zijn doel zal

kunnen geraken. Deze diensten aan hem zal ik rekenen aan mij en de mijnen bewezen; gij zult daarvoor het waarachtig loon in uw geweten omdragen”.

^{ccxxx} “Wij zullen in dit nummer eenige brieven plaatsen, van eenen man, die de verachting van elk, met recht verdiende, en nogthans eenen beslissende invloed, zo op den Franschen afgezant Delacroix, als op de personen, of ten minsten de meerderheid der personen van het Uitvoerend Bewind der Bataafse Republiek wist te verkrijgen – en door die weg de Republiek te beheersen” [...] “Gij vraagt hoe is het mogelijk dat een een en al geheel zonder moraliteit, bekend voor verachtelijk, het vertrouwen van het bestuur in zulk eenen hoogen graad we te verkrijgen? Deze brieven zullen u dit beantwoorden: hij begint met vleien [...] hij kruipt, hij bedelt om gunst, alle middelen zijn goed [...] hij kent die ware, groote edele menschenliefde niet”.

^{ccxxxi} “Revolutie is noodzakelijk wanneer de gelden door den burger opgebracht, de vrugten van zijnen bloedigen arbeid, of kwalijk bestuurd, of verkwist, of gestolen wierden”.

^{ccxxxii} “Wij wenschten, ten minsten, in het goed gebruik het welk van deeze penningen gemaakt is, eene genoegdzaame drangreden te vinden [...] vermits wij ons, in dien gevalle, niet zouden moeten bedroeven over de schandelijke wijze op welke sommige van deeze penningen verspild over de misdadige wijze op welke andere ontstolen zijn”.

^{ccxxxiii} “Zo heeft dan het Bataafse volk, die natie zo zeer wegens haare zuinigheid beroemd, en eenvoudigheid, boven alles, by haare bestuurderen verlangende de penningen door weduwen en wees met zoo veel moeiten te zamen gebracht zien dienen om eene kostbaare huishouding voor drie harer medeburgere gaande te houden, als hebben de burgers Fokker en Wildrik nimmer het hotel betrokken; zo hebben wy in deeze geldeloze tyden, door de natie en het costuum en den schouwburg en het rytuig zien betaalen, welke haare bewindslieden dienden, om hunnen tyd in een ydele vertooning te verspillen, terwyl een groot aantal ingezeetenen dagen op dagen vrugteloo verlangden om voor weinige oogenblikken te worden gehoord”.

^{ccxxxiv} “Is ’t niettemin, waarde burger, noodig, dat met de verhevene waardigheid, waarmede gij alle vijf bekleed zijt, ook gepaard gaa een zekere luister”.

^{ccxxxv} “De luister der republikeinen is deugd, mannenmoed en oprechtheid, en waar deze ontbreken, is de pracht een te armzalig vernis om de vlekken te verbergen”.

^{ccxxxvi} “Zij de dierbaarste en tederste belangen van het vaderland in handen gaaven van menschen die geen vertrouwen verdienden en die nauwelijks den vaderlijken grond waren afgetreden of zij dagten niet meer aan het gebrek en den jammerlijken staat van het vaderland; – en verkwistten schatten hun toevertrouwd en welke zij door ijdel drang wisten aftepersen op eene wijze daar de braave nederlander niet dan met huivering aan konde denken”.

^{ccxxxvii} “Wij zijn verre af, om te gelooven, dat de mensch over het algemeen belangloos in den dweependen zin van dat woord, dat is, onverschillig omtrent zijn lot omtrent het lot van zijn huisgezin kan zijn! Er zijn ook maar enkele oogenblikken waarin het vaderland dit vordert, waarin dit geen hersenschim, maar eene waarlijk verhevene, eene waarlijk eerbiedwaardige deugd is. Wij kunnen ons ook het niet verwonderen dat de ambtenjagerij, eene schadelijke, aan het heil van het algemeen zo zeer nadeelige ziekte, meer algemeen wordt, in eenen tijd, waarin zo veele bronnen van welvaart of verstoofd of opgedroogd zijn”.

^{ccxxxviii} “Dat zy [Gogel en la Pierre, TK] niet alleen geene behoorlyke ingeschreevene boeken, maar zelfs geene geringste aantekeningen van ontvangst noch uitgaaf hebben gevonden” [...] en dus: “hebben kunnen te werk gaan, naar dat geene wat door hun, zoo op de kamer van gemelden Van Langen als elders uit een chaos van verwarring is kunnen opgemaakt worden”.

^{ccxxxix} “Hoe laakbaar ook dit alles, hoe slecht het laatste ook moge zijn, het is egter nauwelijks iets, wanneer men verder den burger Van langens de laagheid zo ver ziet brengen van zich aan een rechtstreekse dieverij schuldig te maken om zyn eigen verwarde zaken ten kosten van den lande staande te houden”.

^{cecl} “En gedeeltelijk in lakens etc. want dan zat er voor de burgers directeuren Van Langen en Vreede, als leveranciers, ook noch een extra winstje aan”.

^{cecli} “Dat deeze verbazing verdwijnt zoodra men beschouwt dat een der directeurs [...] niet ontzag zich zelve schaafteloos met ‘s lands geld te verrijken”. [...]”Nauwelijks kan men geloven dat een lid van het bewind [...] een zoo laag oogmerk als corruptie najaagt”.

ccxlii “Maar wij sidderen voor het lot van het lieve vaderland; wanneer wij zien dat deeze zucht zich zo verbazend verre uitstrekt dat men ophoudt te vraagen, of dat stuk brood, het geen men uit de hand van ‘t vadelrand ontangt, verdient, of niet verdient word? Of men in staat is de post, welke men bekleed of bekleeden wil, al of niet waarteneemen? Wanneer wij zien dat eerlijkheid en goede trouw geheel worden vergeeten zo ras de gelegenheid daar is, om zich ten kosten van het algemeen te kunnen bevoordeelen; dat men onverschillig is omtrent de wijze waarop men zijne hebzucht voldoet, wanneer dezelve slegts voldaan wordt. Het is, bij voorbeeld, onvergeeflijk en schadelijk dat zij die in den hoogsten rang geplaatst zijn misbruik maken van de magt hun toevertrouwd, tot het bejag van verfoeilijk eigenbelang”.

ccxliii “[...] dan met drie leden, een stuk van zulk een aard, op naam van een geheel collegie, op te maken, [...] en zyne onschuldige amptgenoten (Fokker, Wildrik en het hele gouvernement) aldus bloot te stellen aan het rechtmatig ongenoegen van een volk hetwelk lang schijnt te sluimeren maar welks ontwaken schrikkelijk is”.

ccxliv De leden van het inconstitutioneel bewind zijn “aansprakelijk voor deeze somma’s, immers voor het geen betaald is geworden en behoorende aan te toonen dat de sommen ten nutte van het land zijn betaald [...] wijders behoorde men mijns inziens wel in acht te nemen dat er tot nog toe geene wissels gevonden zijn welke getrokken waaren door de burger Fijnje maar wel door den burger Van Langen ofschoon Fijnje zeker van eenige traittes kennis heeft gedragen”.

ccxlv “Dat uit het examen der voorzegde stukken [*de Memorie*, TK] [het] aan den procureur generaal is voorgekomen dat dezelve opleveren hevige vermoedens dat beide de voorn. Gearresteerden zich bijzonderlijk zouden hebben schuldig gemaakt aan een trouwlooze voor den land ruineuze en hoogstmisdaadige waarneeming der voorgemelde posten in welke zij hebben gefungeerd; en wel speciaal aan een onverantwoordelijke dilapidatie, ja zelfs ontvreemding van ‘s lands gelden [...]”.

ccxlvii Fijnje en Van Langen hebben “zich schuldig gemaakt aan eene trouwlooze en voor den lande ruineuze waarneming der voorgemelde gewichtige bedieningen in welke zij hebben gefungeerd of zich hebben laten employeeren onder anderen speciaal aan eene onverantworodelijke dilapidatie van en misdaadgie beschikking over ‘s lands gelden mitsgaders dat zij zulks reeds hebben gedaan of met hunne voorkennis, medeweeten en goedvinden hebben laten doen, immers buiten eenige qualifactie over ‘s lands penningen hebben gedisponeerd of laten disponeeren voordat zij tot leden van het provisioneel uitvoerend bewid verkozen of naderhand door datzelfde gemachtigd waren [...]”.

ccxlviii “Ook Fijnje [heeft] kennis gehad aan de instructie voor Jan Eijkenbroek [...]. Dat Wijbo Fijnje aan S.J. van Langen uit de cas van het committé tot de zaaken van de oost indischen handel ten privé behoefte van laatstgemelden, op den 18 januari 1798 heeft verstrekt een somma van f 7,000 door denzelfden te permitteeren om voor die somma op die cas te assigneeren” [...] “Dat hij [Fijnje, TK] ook op verzoek van zekere club of gezelschap welke werkzaam was tot het daarstellen der revolutie van de 22 januari 1798 voorzien is geweest van zekere credit op de cassa van het voorz. committé; waar door die club over de die cassa heeft kunnen disponeeren”.

ccxlviii “Ten zijnen bijzonderen behoeven te hebben gedisponeerd en alzo zich bovendien aan landsdieverij te hebben schuldig gemaakt”.

ccxlix “Mitsgaders dat de gearresteerde Van Langen zulks zelfs heeft gedaan: immers buiten eenige behoorlijke qualifactie over ‘s lands penningen heeft gedisponeerd: voor dat hij tot lid van het provisioneel uitvoerend bewind verkoren of naderhand door het zelfde tot het disponeeren over eenige gelden gemachtigd was”.

cccl “Verzoek en uitvoering van procureur generaal om provisie van justitie tegen Boeseken, Eijkenbroek en een hele schare anderen vanwege “verderfelijke machinatie tegen de veiligheid van de staat en de correspondentien daarover gehouden [...] dat bijzonderlijk gemelde Jan Eijkenbroek, A. Boeseken [...] tot het doen gelukken van hunne verraderlijke en hoogstmisdadgie oogmerken te Parijs en Brussel werkzaam zijn geweest daar toe aldaar corruptien hebben gedaan of trachten te doen met penningen op hunnen aandrang bij ingezeetenen dezer republiek opgezameld [...]”.

cccli Van Maanen schreef dat zij “plannen projecten [hebben] gemachineerd strekkende om den toenmaligen staat des lands te renverseren, de gestelde machten op eene feitelijke en geweldadige wijze van het bewind te verwijderen, ja zelfs te vermoorden”. Dan schrijft hij: “uit deze stukken verstaat de procureur generaal allerduidelijkst de violente en bloeddorstige oogmerken der personen door dewelke zij [de brieven, TK] geschreven zijn [...] gewaagd word van den generaal Daendels zijnen kop te krijgen, van het

daarstellen van een coup d'état, waardoor de voornaamste schurken, zo daarbij gezegd word, om zeep moesten geraaken; en van de verwachting dat de vijf directeuren en de generaal Daendels vermoord zouden worden”.

^{cclii} “Zij [het Franse gouvènement, TK] zijn deerlijk misleid met den 12 juni en wij zijn verzekerd zo er een coup d'état plaats had zoo dat den voornaamste schurke om zeep waren [...] sinds agt dagen loopt hier het gerucht dat er een revolutie is dat den 5 ministers directeurs vermoord zijn en dat er 5 andere leden benoemd zijn [...] deze gerugten zijn meest altijd voorzeggingen die plaats grijpen in het vervolg”.

^{ccliii} In de amnestie verklaring sontd: “inbegrepen worden: allen welke zich tot op den 31 juli 1798 uit hoofde van verschillende doelen omtrent het staatkundige aan eenige misdryven of excessen mogten hebben schuldig gemaakt zodanig dat deze misdryven of excessen alleen in voorschreve verschil hun oorsprong hebben gehad of ten minste zonder hetzelfde niet zouden zyn of niet hebben kunnen bedreven. Te verleenen volledige kwijtschelding en vergiffenis van hetgeen zy mogten hebben misdreeven [...]”.

^{ccliv} “Tot nut eener algemeene vergetelheid van het voorleedene zoo het de vestiging der constitutioneele orde van zaken als tot vereeniging van alle vrienden van vrijheid en orde rondsom de staatsregeling” [...]. Het gaat om misdrijven die “met hunne politieke betrekkingen zoo nauw verbonden zijn dat zij daar van niet kunnen worden gesepareerd” [...] “en dat dierhalven ook de opheffing der procedures tegen S.J. Van Langen en bij consequentie dan ook die tegen W. Fijnje daar onder moet begrepen zijn”.

^{cclv} “Wilden wij deze zaak beoordelen naar de eerste opwellingen van het gevoel dan was dezelve bij ons ten spoedigste beslist [...] wij zouden u de beide personen schetsen beschuldigd van ‘s lans penningen te hebben verspild en ten eigen nutte te hebben gebruikt of ten minsten elkander daartoe behulpzaam te zijn geweest. Wij zouden van hun beide tonen daartoe te misbruik makende van de hoge waardigheid met welke zij waren bekleed en als zodanig bijzonder verplicht tot het beoefenen van deugden welke zij telkens aan hunne medeburgers moesten prediken, tot het vermijden van misdaden welke zij in anderen als ten hoogsten strafwaardig moeten beschouwen. Wij toonden geheel het Bataafsche volk en een deel van Europa, met ongeduld en nieuwsgierigheid afwachtende, wat het einde zoude zijn van het proces deze twee burgers aangedaan. Wij schetsten u tevens alle de gevaarlijke gevolgen van hun politiek ontslag en van het sluiten en schorsen van der tegen hun ontgonnen procedures, als een daad die door alle partijen zal worden miskend” [...]“[...] het misbruik van ‘s lands penningen, en vooral het converteren dezelve voor eigen gebruik [...] dit misbruik en deze verspilling [zijn] zodanig met de grote gebeurtenissen in ons vaderland verknogt dat van tien punten van beschuldiging door den procureur generaal ingebracht, enkel de twee laatste geheel gaaf en ongeschonden kunnen worden behandeld [echter als deze twee punten nader worden onderzocht zal blijken dat ook] de oorsprong dezer misdrijven aan politieke gebeurtenissen zal worden toegeschreven of ten minste vrij waarschijnlijk kan worden betoogd dat dezelve zonder het vooruitzicht der revolutie van 22 januari dezes jaar niet zoude kunnen worden gepleegd”.

^{ccclvi} “Zie daar d’ aristocraat bespot [...] / zijn trotsheid kende perk noch paal”

Zijn heerszucht deedt ‘s lands vrijheid beeven / en trouw en deugd mogt zegevieren,

De foederalist werd ook verplet / Ja vijheid mag de kruinen sieren

Van hen die in den hoogsten nood / Haar redden mogten van den dood”

^{ccclvii} “De vlieg zal recht doen en niemand ontzien – niet op de wijze van hen, welke met die gulde spreuk slechts speelen, maar zoals die zonder verderfelijke diabolocratie, demagogerie, en ambtbejagende partijzucht [...] Zij zal het heil van den 22 januari 1798 helpen volmaken – doch tevens derzelve schijnvrienden en dubbelhartige ja eigenbelangzchtige bewerkers onderscheiden van waare en deugdzaame bevorderaads en ieverige voorstanders [...] zij zal iedere intrigant ontmaskeren”.

^{ccclviii} “Had de meerderheid van de constituerende vergadering vreemde invloed uit haar midden geweerd – had zij haar eigen werk niet verkragt – het volksrecht niet met voeten getrapt – de rechten van den mensch niet geschonden – redelijke en morele beginzelen niet verloochend, waarlijk zij zoude de achting van alle volkeren waardig zijn geworden; maar heerszucht verblinde haar en door de dolle driften van eenige weinigen haarer leden [Van Langen c.s] werd de roem door enige cordate stappen verkregen [i.e., de actie van 22 januari, TK] verdonkert”.

cclix “ [...] wierden niet ‘s lands schatkisten gespolieert om banqueroutiers te verzadigen, ja miljoenen zouden verspild zijn waare het mogelijk geweest het hele Franse gouvernement tot derzelve snoode oogmerken om te kopen”.

ccix “Het was dan gewis hoog tyd dat er eens een einde kwam aan zoo groote euvelmoed – aan zoo veele en geduurige inbreuke op de na zo veel worstelingen aangenomen constitutie – op ‘t regt, de billykheid en alle eerlyke principes [...]”

ccxi “Hoe onverantwoordelijk en strafbaar in de eerste en tweede nationale vergadering met beuzelachtigen en nuttelooze voorwerpen de kostbaare Nationale tijd wierd verspild [...] en eindelijk in de constituteerdende vergadering zich wel dra eene factie vormde, die door woestheid en heersucht gedreven al wat recht, billykheid en taalkunde mag genoemd worden, veragtede, door tallooze en ongehoorde dwaze buitenspoorigheden den reuzen arm van eenige groote mannen wapende, om dezelve te verdelgen, zoo zal ‘t er alleen op aankomen” [...] “wagt u voor die cameleons die naar believen met alle kleuren pronken, en gelijk het riet door de zwakste wind heen en weder worden geslingerd – zy zijn belangzoekers, ambtjagers, zy dienen u en het vaderland niet” [...] “wagt u voor die pragtzieke Nababs, die in rykdom, wellust en weelde verzonken, een fier hoofd boven de smalle gemeente uitsteken, den naam van burger als de pest schuwen – onder hun bestier hebben de schatkisten geen bodems, de wetten geene onpartijdige voorstanders en het volk geen bescherming”.

ccxii “Ja, Bataafsche burgers! Wagt u voor wyffelaars, draaijers en [in] overdaad zwelgende ryken en schreeuwers [...] volgt u eigen gevoel en vraagt u zelven: kiets uit uw midden een eerlijk man – kiets uit uw midden iemand wien gy kend, een menschenvriend, die de armen weldoet, wiens gedrag eerlijk, wiens houding minzaam en die dan een volksvriend is. Die nimmer door opgeblaazenheid en trotsheid zig boven zijn staat verhefte, nimer door roekelooze verkwisting zijn huishouden veraarloosde – vertrouwd aan hem die zedig, eenvoudig, bedaard en deugdzaam is [...] die een verheven character met uitstekende verdiensten, grootheid van ziel, met een beoefend verstand, wysgeerige en politieke beginzelen, met een deugdzame burgerlijke levenswijze wist te verenigen”.

ccxiii “Houdt het oog Bataven! Op die wezens, welke aldus van overtuiging spreken, om u de beurs te ligten en aan de dijk te jagen”.

ccxiv Deze “beruchte staatkundige kwakzalvers” [waren] “gelukkig lomp of wellevend genoeg om zeer spoedig hun rokje van de binnenzijde te laten zien, anders hadden wij misschien nog lang, tot ons totaal bederf, met hen opgescheept geweest [...]. Nimmer kon de burger ex-directuer Van Langen de natie meer dienst bewijzen als om in weinig tijd veel geld te gebruiken, des te eerder liep hij pal”.

ccxv “De grote Pieter Vreede en Wybo Fijnje waren echter beter bij de hand [...] en kozen het hazen-pad. Konden deze staatsmannen, beter dan door hunne vlucht, bewijzen: dat het gemakkelijker is te zweren van op de batterij in den dienst des vaderlands te sterven of te zegepralen dan om zich op dezelve te laten ombrengen? [...] wanneer wij het rommelzootje van die drie ex-directeurs [...] gadeslaat, dan moet men waarlijk zeggen: het is een wonder dat er nog zoo veel van de boel terecht is gekomen. Zo veel onbedreven stuurlieden aan het roer, die van schip, wal noch wind wisten en meestal in de keuken of kelder te zoeken waren – onbegrypelijk dat zy het vaderland niet aan den grond gestuurd hebben – incroyable dat het schip van staat niet tegen de klippen aan spaanders gestoten is”.

ccxvi “Wij hebben ons laten bedriegen, door dat ellendig zootje ijzervreters, door het blinkend dek-kleed waar achter zij hunne ware gedaante verborgen en tot onze schade geleerd: dat alles wat blinkt geen goud is” [...] “Piet Vreede schrijft een schone styl, maar des te minder moeite kost het hem om ons zand in de ogen te werpen. Daad zaken daar komt het eigentlijk en alleen op aan”.

ccxvii “De wrangheid van de kerker kan het eerlyk hart niet verschrikken”

ccxviii Het liedje ging als volgt:

“Toen groote Piet de hoofdrol speelde / En ambten aan zijn vrienden deelde,
Toen rees de domheid uit haar niet / Men zegt helaas! Tot ambtenaaren
Hen dien beroemd door schreeuwen waren / En vrienden van apostel Piet
Kon Eykenbroek dus ook niet reeknen / Dat hij weldra iets zou beteeknen
En delen van der burgren geld? / O ja! De bazen moesten zorgen
Dat broeder Jan ook wierd geborgen / En op een hogen post gesteld
Wel haast ging Jan uit negotieeren / Dat hy niet kende kon hy lezen;
In Frankrijk werkt men niet alleen / Een Eberstein, volleerd in ‘t drajen –

Met vaan en wimpel om te wajen / Toog als een mentor met hem heen
 Was Jan dus tot een werk geroepen / Waar van hy wel wat kon versnoepen,
 Adres aan Taddeman bericht! / Hij speelde een rol waar door de schyven
 Niet in de schatkist konden blyven / Maar eclipseerden uit 't gezicht
 Maar vraagt men: wat heeft Jan bedreven / Waar door de Handel kon herleven?
 Wat heeft hy voor 's lands geld verricht? / Dan moet men onbewimpeld schryven;
 Jan ging – hy werkte – ontving veel schyven – / Vergat als landdief eed en plicht'

^{celxix} “Verantwoording van myn publiek gedrag aen de natie en aen haere vertegenwoordigers. Immers ik ben door haar en in haar naam geroepen geworden, tot een der aanzienlijkste posten. Ik ben met veragting uit denzelven gestooten en heb moeten ophouden haare mij aanbetrouwde belangen, langerte behartigen”. Vreede spreekt de hoop uit dat aangezien de gemoederen inmiddels wat bedaard zijn, er nu de mogelijkheid is tot “koel onderzoek der onfeilbare rede waarin schuld van onschuld onderscheiden, betichting van bewezen waarheid onderkend”.

^{celxx} “Federalisten; voorstanders van eenen hoogere aristocratie; eigenbelangzoekers; misschien in 't geheim ook vrienden van oranje”. In de vergadering “werd de tijd doorgebracht met eindeloze haarkloveryen, daar werd niets afgedaan, niet een groot beginsel werd aangenomen, en in al zijn gevolgen mannyk toegepast [...] bekrompen bepalingen vernietigde straks wat men in een vlaag van gezonde regeerkunde gelukkig had ontworpen. Eene regeringsloosheid had met de daad plaats. Het volk was bovendien te onvreeden, om dat alle posten en bedieningen de republikeinen genoegzaam altijd werden aan voorbijgegaan” [...] “en daarin het rigtsnoer vinden, waar langs zal moeten worden afgemeten, of ik mij in den opgedragen post onbesproken of strafbaar gedragen heb” [...] “om de geconstitueerde magten voor een nieuwe verbastering te bewaren; en weder een dodelijke verlamming der staatsmachine te beletten. Was het dan een misdaad, of ene pligt in ons dat wij begonnen met alle geconstitueerde magten te zuiveren; en zodanige personen, in de departementale besturen en municipaliteiten aan te stellen van wier denkwyze wy ons meende te kunnen verzekerd houden? [...] hoe zoude zonder eene zodanige remotie de voorige verlamming en regeeringsloosheid voorkomen zijn en zich een energiek gouvernement hebben doen kennen? Dit ware zonder dat onmogelyk” [er] was de bereidvaardigheid om alles te verbeteren wat door hun kwalijk was gedaan geworden en hun te straffen die ten dezen van opzettelijke ontrouw konden beschuldigd en overtuigd worden [...] wij hebben zonder aanzien van personen hebben willen doen, waar onrecht geschied was”.

^{celxxi} “Ik gelove veeleer dat ieder gouvernement om 't even wat het is, zich altijd door een digten drom van hongerige vragers zal omringd en belemmerd vinden, zoo dra er maar een vooruitzicht komt dat er wat zal te knappen vallen [...] betuig ik, voor zover mijn persoon betreft dat ik dien honger nooit gevoeld, en dus nooit verzadigd heb. Dat anderen hunne naaste bloedverwanten in vette posten gesteld zien zodat er ter nauwer nood onder hun talrijk geslagt eenen enkelen onbezorgden te vinden is; dat anderen zich in allerly bogten wringen en door alle omwentelingen heen en bij alle bovendrijvende partijen ambten en bedieningen weten af te bedelen; dat anderen zich op den voorgrond van het patriottisme vertonen tot zij een vetten brok in hunne magt hebben, en dan eensklaps van het groot en glibberig toneel des staatsbestuur afsluipen om hunnen ambtshonger aan dien brok te verzadigen – ik zag daar dat ik nooit ten dezen aanzien enige begeerte had, met onverschillige ogen derzulken geluk aan [...] ik ben nimmer tot eenige post opgestegen of mijne beweegredenen waren: pligt; en mijne eenigste bedoeling was: nuttig te zijn. Dit bezweer ik voor een alziend en alweetend Opperwezen”.

^{celxxii} “Ik heb nooit aan een mijner bloedverwanten eenige bediening toegevoegd, mijn tweede zoon Paulus alleen uitgezonderd. Die is door ons op het bureau van buitenlandse zaken geplaatst [...] is dat ambtshonger in een vader die zes zonen heeft, die nooit iets genoot en zo veel voor de zaak der vrijheid gedaan heeft, en opgezet?”.

^{celxxiii} “Te regt! – men spoort die euveldaad na – te regt! Men maakt ze kenbaar! Te regt – men noemt het steelen, dieverij, landdieverij. Tot zoo ver zeg ik is alles volkomen goed, schoon ik vurig verlang en verwacht dat mijn collega zich ten vollen zal kunnen verantwoorden – maar men vindt spoor, nog nota, nog tittel – en al kon men alle mijne daden, alle mijne voornemens en gedagten met een enkelen oogwenk overzien, men zou voorzeker spoor, nog tittel, nog nota vinden, dat ik mij met die misdaad bezooedeld heb – het blijkt ook niet dat men iet in dit opzigt ten lasten van mijne overigen collegas gevonden heeft”.

celxxiv “Echter kan men goedvinden die misdaad van stelen en landsdieverij niet enkel toe te kennen op die enklen persoon die men er van beschuldigd; maar men brengt het thuis op het geheele bewind [...] van een misdaad waarvoor men geen het mionste bewijs in handen heeft [...] gen grond zelfs tot het geringste vermoeden. Heb ik dan geen reden ten dezen my met volle regt te beklage?”

celxxv “Verdient dat berisping? Is dat overdaad? De natie zelfs in de aangenomen constitutie ligt in die zelfde tijd van vijf maanden geen zestien, geen twintig, maar wel vijf en twintig duizend gulden aan het uitvoerend bewind toe. Wat moet ik dan van zoo een beschuldiging denken! De natie geeft dat tractement aan de directueren, hoe kan het dan bij mogelijkheid berisping verideneen, dat zij het gebruiken?” [...] “Maar de directeeren zijn naar de komedie geweest? Dat zijn we. Na een arbeid van den geheele dag, die de meesten tijd nog ‘s avonds moest hervat worden, hebben zij van tijd tot tijd een uur of twee a drie met tusenpoozing genomen, dikwijls verzeld eenige hunner agenten, om door een onschuldig vermaak zich te herstellen; en met vernieuwde krachten weder aan het behartigen der vaderlandsche belangen handen aan t werk te slaan. Is dat misdadig? Maar ze hebben in koetzen gereden? Dat hebben we. De vijf directeuren, de eerste ambtenaren van de republiek, hebben met hun vijven, twee koetzen bij de maand te huur gehad; zou het schande zijn geweest, dat zij er vijf in eigendom bezeten hadden? Onze tafel was ordelijk, dikwerf sober, nooit verkwistend – en onze dronk volkomen vrij, en is niet éénmaal, en in geen een geval de paalen der gestrengte matigheid te buiten gegaan. Vanwaar dan zoo veel ophefs van kostbaarheid en verteering? Vanwaar dan het geroep van zo veel overdaads in het directoriaal hotel? Van waar die weduwen en wezen die hun penningke zo zuur moeten opbrengen om de praal en wellust der directeuren te voeden? “Indien hij [de directeur, TK] nu dat tractement in zijn kist sluit en zijne geldliefde verzadigd, is dan de natie er beter aan dan dat hij ordentelijk overeenkomstig zijn staat leeft [...]”.

celxxvi “In de diplomatie treft men andere waarheden – andere deugden – andere pligten [...] de eerlijke man, gewoon aan oprechtheid en openhartigheid – gestreng op de volbrenging zijner zedelijke verplichtingen, en schuw voor alle kronkelpaden, ziet zich op dien vreemden en glibberige baan, veelal niet weinig onbelemmerd: en bij iedere voetstap die hij optreed voelt hij opwellingen van het hart die hij alleen kan te boven komen, door een gestrengte beredenering en ontwikkeling van het geen zijn plicht, in de bijzondere omstandigheden en betrekking, onvermijdelijk van hem vordert”.

celxxvii “Zeker is dat zy [geheime uitgaven en stille diplomatie, TK] zedert dat de Italiaansche Staatkunde in de hoven van Europa is binnengeslopen, genoegzaam onvermijdelijk; soms voor de belangen van het vaderland zeer noodzakelijk zijn geworden. Dit althands is onbetwistbaar dat zij geen burgerlijke misdaad in zich opleveren”.

celxxviii “Een Jonker, die met een koets aankomt, aan de voordeur aanschalt en niet gehoord word, verdient voorzeker in dit geval de voorkeur niet boven een burgerman, die te voet aan loopt, een agterdeur ingaat, en de zaak zijn beslag geeft”.

celxxix “Vordert men als een pligt in een generaal dat zijn veld prediker en zijn spion mensen moeten zijn van dezelfde deugd, eerlijkheid en onbesproken gedrag? Als de veld prediker was als de spion dan zou hij weinig uitrichten, en als de spion was als de veld prediker dan zou de generaal voorzeker niet veel van de vijand te weten komen”.

celxxx “Ik moet u berichten dat daar wij tot de ellebogen toe in het geld tasten, het meer dan tijd is dat woord gehouden worden aan den Minister La Croix, naamelyk om hem het gewoone present ter aankoop van meubelen en andere veraangenaamingen”.

celxxxi “Al wilde men eerst veronderstellen dat zy zich zelve niet wilden verryken, dan nog gewoon zijn, geld, het geen hun niets kost welks waarde zy nauwelijks kennen, met een ruime hand uitreiken en dikwijls buiten noodzakelijkheid te verspillen; geen wonder dat men hun van tonnen spreken, van tonnen beloven hoort, wanneer men een hunner gemeenzame vrienden, met den naam van volksvertegenwoordiger vereerd, maar dien naam onwaardig is, wanneer men, met een woord, den burger Van Leeuwen van onze toestand hoort zeggen, daar wij thands tot de ellebogen in het geld zitten en daar met hem, op deezen grond, het doen van een geschenk aan den franschen minister ziet aandringen”.

celxxxii “Op het oogenblik dat wij onze functiën begonnen wierden wij bestromd van sollicitatiën om geëmployeerd te worden: onder deze was de generaal Daendels, die mij zijn diensten herinnerde, en mij kwam verzoeken om een missie buitenslands voor zijn neef Grasveld, en een ampt van f 4,000 voor zijn vriend en adjudant Hespe. Ik antwoordde hem, dat zoo wij zulke lieden direct moesten helpen, die tot

nog toe posten hadden bekleed en nog hadden, wat er dan van die arme ongelukkige Bataven worden zou, die tot heden toe zoo onbarmhartig voor het hoofd gestooten waren?”

^{cclxxxiii} Antwoord: “ik heb mij nooit van ene verantwoording willen onttrekken, maar daar het een besluit was van het hele bewinden ik alles geconcoreerd [?, TK] heb. Zoo ik er al bij tegenwoordig of present was zal ik daarom alleen verantwoordelijk zijn daar mijne collegas die aan deze besluiten ook deel hebben niet alleen hun vrijheid maar een in het wetgevend lichaam zitting heeft, zijn deze dan niet verantwoording schuldig, maar is er dog enig bewijs te vinden in de notulen dat zij niet tot besluit geconcoreerd hebben laat staan geprotesteerd hebben, en kunnen zij zig beroepen dat zij van alle de handelingen geen kennis hebben gedragen. Is het daarom dat het wel deeglijk door de leden van het uitvoerend bewind verantwoord moet worden..

^{cclxxxiv} “Op deze wijze kan het nog lang duren voor dat wij met uwer zaak kunnen vorderen. Dewijl gij in uw particulier verantwoordelijk zijt en geen recht hebt u op het bewind te beroepen en wij zullen dus een en andere explicatie [antwoord] daarop moeten hebben”.

^{cclxxxv} Van Langen zegt bijvoorbeeld: “dat ik die som geld in betaaling zoude strekken voor J.P. Pessers, welke mij op die tijd dat die assignaties getrokken zijn, die sommen schuldig was [...] voorts moet ik hier nog bij voegen dat voor de partij lakens te accepteren ik het bewind verwittigd hebbe dat voornoemde Pessers mij die pennings schuldig was gelijk ook Vreede en Van Marle en dat wij die pennings als betaling zouden trekken daar Pessers [daar] in genoeg heeft genoomen [...] heb ik telkens niet meer getrokken als dat ik kan aantonen dat Pessers mij dier tijd schuldig was”.

^{cclxxxvi} “Dat men begrype dat de tijdelijke opoffering van eenige grotere gedeeltens van onze burgerlijke vrijheid nergens anders toe strekt dan om eene goede staatsregeling te verkrygen en door dezelve een veel groter genot dier vrijheid ons verzekerd zullen zien”.