
Source: M. Martin and K. Caminada (2016), 'Welfare Reform in the United States revisited: A policy overview analysis', in: Max J. Skidmore (eds.), *Poverty in America: Urban and Rural Inequality and Deprivation in the 21st Century*, Westphalia Press, pp. 298-342.



WELFARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES REVISITED: A POLICY OVERVIEW ANALYSIS. *

Megan C. Martin

Center for the Study of Social Policy 1575 Eye Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005, USA URL: <u>www.cssp.org</u> E-mail: <u>megan.martin@cssp.org</u>

Director of public policy

Koen Caminada

Leiden University Economics Department P.O. Box 9520, 2300 RA, The Netherlands URL: <u>www.hsz.leidenuniv.nl</u> E-mail: <u>c.l.j.caminada@law.leidenuniv.nl</u>

Professor of Empirical Analysis of Tax and Social Policy

Abstract

Several previous papers have marked the United States as an outlier: high poverty rates, low public social spending but high private social expenditures; a rather strong belief that people are poor because of laziness or lack of will; and remarkable differences across the States due to state discretion. With that established context in-mind, this paper analyzes U.S. welfare in more detail; focusing on the impact of TANF; part of the major welfare reform that took place in the United States in 1996.

U.S. welfare reform emphasized an American preference for work; and it was a move further away from the strategies other "wealthy" nations use to address poverty. Initially U.S. welfare reform did serve in part to increase work participation, although the earnings of most individuals who left welfare were still below the poverty line, even many years after their exit. We found huge variation of welfare eligibility rights across states, depending on the state's ability to pay and preferences to meet a certain level of social standard or other (social) objectives such as child care, work support and employment programs.

JEL-codes: H53, H55, I32 Keywords: welfare reform, poverty

* This is an updated and extended version of M.C. Martin, and K. Caminada. "Welfare Reform In The United States: A Cross-Atlantic Descriptive Policy Analysis." Poverty & Public Policy 3 (1), Article 8, 2011, pp. 1-38. "No one who works full-time and has children at home should be poor anymore. No one who can work should be able to stay on welfare forever." (Presidential candidate Clinton, 1992 campaign speech)

"In the absences of a renewed antipoverty effort, many households will continue to be unable to afford adequate food, housing, and shelter. Our high poverty rate contributes to an erosion of social cohesion, a waste of the human capital of a portion of our citizenry, and the moral discomfort of condoning poverty amidst affluence."

(Scholz, Moffit, and Cowan, 2008, 31)

1 INTRODUCTION

In 1996 the United States passed large-scale welfare reform through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), significantly changing the way the nation supports its neediest residents. Welfare reform impacted Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and most notably it ended the U.S.'s largest cash-based assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with a new program focused on work participation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). To appreciate the successes and failures of TANF, it is first important to understand the intended outcomes of the program, the tenants of the program's rules and how they differ from AFDC, and TANF's place within the context of poverty reduction strategies in the United States.

This paper, part of a series of research papers exploring cross-country poverty reduction strategies, follows work that established the United States as an outlier in comparison with other "wealthy" nations, with relatively high poverty and relatively low rates of social spending.¹ This article takes a detailed look at TANF, in part because of the prominence of its role in the U.S. safety net, and in part because the passage of PRWORA represents a shift in U.S. policy that moves the nation further away from the poverty reduction strategies being implemented in other wealthy, developed nations.

Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, while not the largest cash transfer program in the United States,² is the only direct cash assistance program

¹ K. Caminada and M. Martin, 'Differences in Anti-Poverty Approaches Between Europe and The United States: A Cross-Atlantic Descriptive Policy Analysis', Poverty & Public Policy, vol. 3, Issue 2, Article 3, 2011, pp. 1-17.

 ² The Earned Income Tax Credit is the largest cash-transfer program serving low-income working families at the federal level. In 2012, EITC served 27.8 million families, amounting to

that serves the nonelderly and those who are not disabled. While there are several in-kind monthly supports to families, TANF is the only mechanism for providing cash directly to poor families in order to supplement their income on a monthly basis.³

This paper begins with a brief primer on U.S. means-tested safety net programs for the nonelderly and trends in U.S. safety net spending (Section 2) as a way to provide context around U.S. safety net programs including both cash transfers and in-kind benefits. It then provides an overview of TANF (Section 3) that includes the policy's objectives and a detailed account of the policy's components. Section 4 moves to an evaluation of TANF through a literature review providing insight on some of the major successes and failures of TANF, organized by theme, followed by (Section 5) the conclusion.

2 U.S. SAFETY NET

2.1 Means-Tested Benefits⁴

This section serves as a primer on U.S. means-tested, safety net programs. We focus solely on the primary means-tested benefits, because these programs have explicit antipoverty goals. Means-tested programs are financed by general tax revenues, and all restrict benefits to those whose incomes and/or assets fall below an established threshold. Some are entitlements—all who satisfy the stipulated eligibility requirements get benefits, regardless of the total budgetary cost (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). Other means-tested programs, nonentitlements, provide benefits only until the funds allocated by Congress or a state are spent even if some eligible participants are not served (e.g., TANF).

Table 1 summarizes the evolution of means-tested (antipoverty) spending.⁵ Note that there has been a sharp reduction in cash entitlements for poor families in past decades in the United States. The nature of programs has changed as well: cash welfare benefits, for example, have been tied to work requirements;

⁵ Annex A presents figures for Supplemental Security Income as well.

a total of \$64 billion dollars in benefits. See, for details, G. Falk, "The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): An Overview," Congressional Research Service, 2014.

³ Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides support to elderly and disabled individuals through supplemental monthly income; however, because this program's eligibility does not include all families below an established income threshold, we do not address it directly in this paper.

⁴ This section summarizes a comprehensive study of Scholz et al. (2008) on trends in income support in the United States. See J.K. Scholz, R. Moffitt, and B. Cowan, "Trends in Income Support," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper 1350-08 (2008), Madison.

partly in response to evolving views about the nature of the poverty problem, responsibility for antipoverty policy has also broadened from the antipoverty agencies of the federal government to those in the U.S. States and to the tax code, as evidenced by the move to TANF and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).

	AFDC/T ANF	EITC	Medicaid	Food Stamps	Housing Aid	School Food Programs	WIC	Head Start	
	Constant 2007 dollars, billions								
1970	26.5		28.3	3.0	2.7	3.6		1.7	
1975	36.6	4.8	51.8	16.9	8.2	7.4	0.3	1.6	
1980	33.8	5.0	65.5	21.9	13.8	9.1	1.8	1.8	
1985	31.5	4.0	78.9	20.7	22.0	7.3	2.9	2.1	
1990	34.9	12.0	116.9	22.4	24.6	7.1	3.4	2.5	
1995	40.9	35.3	197.1	31.0	37.3	8.5	4.7	4.8	
2000	27.2	38.9	242.7	18.0	34.7	9.1	4.8	6.3	
2005	22.0	45.0	332.8	30.3	40.0	10.6	5.3	7.3	
2006	21.1		319.5	31.0	39.1	10.5	5.2	7.0	
2007				30.3	39.4	10.9	5.5		
	Index: 198	80 = 100							
1970	78		43	14	20	40		94	
1975	108	96	79	77	59	81	17	89	
1980	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
1985	93	80	120	95	159	80	161	117	
1990	103	240	178	102	178	78	189	139	
1995	121	706	301	142	270	93	261	267	
2000	80	778	371	82	251	100	267	350	
2005	65	900	508	138	290	116	294	406	
2006	62		488	142	283	115	289	389	
2007				138	286	120	306		

Table 1. Total Means-tested Benefits by Program, 1970-2007

Abbreviations: AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children.

Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 48-49).




Figure 1. Expenditures in 2015 on Low-Income Programs

Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015

Cash-Based Benefits. In the United States there are two major means-tested cashbased antipoverty programs: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). It is important to note that when AFDC was replaced with TANF, several other support mechanisms were added; TANF does not exclusively provide cash transfers to families.


Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the central safety net program for poor families with children from 1936 to 1996. This program was directed primarily at single-parent families, although some two-parent families with an unemployed parent received benefits. In 1996 the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant (TANF) was created. A five-year lifetime limit was imposed on receipt cash assistance (some hardship exemptions were allowed), and States had to meet targets for moving recipients into work activities. Note—for now—that benefits for ADFC/TANF declined from a peak of about \$40 billion in 1995 to about \$17 billion in 2014. In contrast, expenditures on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) have grown sharply from \$5 billion in 1975 to \$64 billion in 2012. No other federal antipoverty program has grown so rapidly. The EITC is now the U.S.'s largest cash antipoverty program. The incentives embedded in the EITC differ from those in AFDC/TANF. AFDC recipients with no earnings received the largest welfare payments. In contrast, the EITC encourages less-skilled workers to enter the labor market, since nonearners do not receive the credit and the EITC amount rises with earnings up to about the poverty line.

In-Kind Benefits. The safety net for low-income families in the United States also includes in-kind benefit programs, the primary of which are Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—frequently referred to as food stamps, housing assistance, Head Start, school nutrition programs, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).

With joint funding from the federal government and the states, Medicaid is a public health insurance program that provides health coverage for low-income individuals and families. Medicaid is an entitlement program; however, income is not the only measure for eligibility. States administer their own Medicaid programs within the broad guidance provided by the federal government; therefore, across the States there are varying eligibility requirements and benefit levels. The Affordable Care Act, actually two bills enacted in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152), ushered in a number of changes to the Medicaid program including, creating a minimum Medicaid income eligibility level across the U.S. and establishing that coverage for any newly eligible adults will be fully funded by the federal government for three years and then will phase down to 90 percent by the year 2020.

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is designed to enable low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. Between 1994 and 2000, real food stamp expenditures fell to \$18 billion from \$32 billion, even though only modest changes to food stamp program rules were made through welfare reform. In fiscal year 2013, federal expenditures for SNAP (\$79 billion) and participation in the program were the highest they have ever been. In an average month that year, about one in seven U.S. residents received SNAP benefits. Almost two-thirds of the growth in spending on SNAP benefits between 2007 and 2013 stemmed from the increase in the number of participants. Labor market conditions deteriorated dramatically between 2007 and 2009 and were slow to recover; since 2007, both the number of people eligible for the program and the share of those who are eligible and who participate in the program have risen. About one-fifth of the growth in spending can be attributed to temporarily higher benefit amounts enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In 2014 SNAP expenditures had begun to go down and were at \$74 billion.

Figure 2. Average Means-tested Program Spending per Participant for Selected Years, in constant 2012 Dollars⁶



Source: Congressional Budget Office, Growth in Means-Tested Programs and Tax Credits for Low-Income Households, 2013

The safety net housing assistance programs in the United States provide aid in two principal forms: project-based aid (or public housing), where subsidies are tied to units constructed for low-income households, and household-based subsidies, where renters choose housing units in the existing private housing stock and are provided rental assistance vouchers. Public housing is funded in large part at the federal level but is operated by independent public housing authorities that make decisions about eligibility in adherence with federal rules and regulations.

The school lunch and breakfast programs provide federal support for meals served by public and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, and residential child care institutions, that enroll and offer free or reduced-price meals to low-income children.

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) provides vouchers for food purchase, supplemental food, and

⁶ AFDC/ TANF per-participant spending data was not available.

nutrition risk screening and related nutrition-oriented services to low-income pregnant women and low-income women and their children (up to age 5).

Head Start is an early childhood education program to improve social competence, learning skills, health, and the nutrition status of low-income children so that they can begin school on an equal basis with their peers from more economically successful families.


2.2. EITC and TANF: Caseloads and Poverty


Through the 1996 welfare reform and subsequent policy changes the U.S. safety net has been transformed in striking ways for the nonelderly; Table 1 shows the reduction in AFDC/TANF expenditures, which historically went to nonworkers, and the increase in EITC benefits, which go overwhelmingly to low-income workers with children. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 encouraged former AFDC welfare recipients to enter the labor market. The tighter eligibility rules of TANF and policy-orientated increases of the EITC—in combination with rapid economic growth—"caused" a sharp decrease in the number of welfare recipients since 1996. However, the decline in the number of welfare recipients (AFDC/TANF) from 12.3 million to 4.5 million from 1996 to 2005 (63 percent) did not have a significant impact on unemployment during the same period; see Figure 1.

Studies have shown that the EITC has encouraged large numbers of single parents to leave welfare and enter into work. The Committee for Economic Development, an organization of 250 corporate executives and university presidents, concluded in 2000 that "[t]he EITC has become a powerful force in dramatically raising the employment of low-income women in recent years." In 2013, the EITC lifted 6.2 million people out of poverty in the United States, including 3.2 million children.⁷ Without the EITC, the poverty rate among children would have been nearly one-fourth higher. The EITC lifts more children out of poverty than any other single program or category of programs.⁸

⁷ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit*, 2014.

⁸ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit*, 2014.





Source: see Annex A for details.

An evaluation by Danziger suggests that, in its first few years, the 1996 welfare reform was more successful in some dimensions (notably, reducing caseloads) than in others (raising disposable income).⁹ The dramatic caseload decline did not cause the surge in poverty or homelessness that many critics of the 1996 Act predicted, because most former recipients did find jobs. Even though many welfare leavers were not working full-time, full-year, and many were, and continue, working at low-wage jobs, a significant number were earning at least as much as they had received in cash welfare benefits and some had higher net income. However, despite the large caseload reduction, the U.S. poverty rate fell rather little following welfare reform and rose for 6 consecutive years (2006– 2012) reaching an 19-year-high (15 percent in 2012). In 2013, the official poverty rate was 14.5 percent, down for the first time since 2006.¹⁰ Many who have left welfare for work remain poor and continue to depend on Food Stamps, Medicaid, and other government assistance; others have left welfare and remain poor but do not receive the Food Stamp or Medicaid benefits to which they remain entitled. The extent of economic hardship remains high because many former and current

⁹ S.H. Danziger, "Chapter 1 – Introduction. What Are the Early Lessons?" in *Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform*, ed. S.H. Danziger (Michigan: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2009).

¹⁰ DeNavas-Walt, C. et al. "Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013: Current Population Reports." U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration. U.S. Census Bureau.

welfare recipients have limited earning prospects in a labor market that increasingly demands higher skills.

2.3. Social Spending in the United States

Between 1975, the first year the EITC existed, and 2012, total spending on all means-tested cash and in-kind transfers rose from 1 percent to 4 percent of GDP.¹¹ However, in 2012, 40 percent of that spending was dedicated to Medicaid. This is important because while the growth in spending for health care programs (primarily Medicaid) stemmed from greater spending per participant, growth in spending for other means-tested programs resulted primarily from increases in the number of participants due to changing economic conditions – most significantly the recession that occurred between 2007 and 2009 and the slow recovery that followed. In other words, the U.S. has not made significantly greater investments in benefits for non-healthcare, anti-poverty programs, there has however, been an increase in need.

The contrast in levels in social expenditures between the United States and other OECD countries is striking.¹² Smeeding calculates a consistent set of social expenditures (including cash, near-cash, and housing expenditures) as a percentage of GDP for five groups of countries—Scandinavia; Northern Continental Europe; Central and Southern Europe; "Anglo" (Australia, Canada, and the U.K.); and the United States—between 1980 and 1999.¹³ Spending ranges between 2.7 and 3.6 percent of GDP in the United States, a far lower level than every other country group. The other Anglo countries averaged between 4.8 and 7.8 percent of GDP, similar to the Central and Southern European counties. Northern Europe and the Scandinavian countries averaged between 8.1 and 15.3 percent of GDP. The trends across country groups vary, although most country groups increased expenditures as a share of GDP between 1980 and 1999. The United States did not.

¹² See K. Caminada, and K.P. Goudswaard, "Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction in the EU: A Descriptive Analysis," *Poverty & Public Policy* 1 (2), Article 5 (2009): 1-51; and K. Caminada, and K.P. Goudswaard, "Social Income Transfers and Poverty Alleviation OECD Countries," Leiden University Research Memorandum Department of Economics #2010.01.

¹³ T.M. Smeeding, "Poverty, Work, and Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective," in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, ed. David Grusky, Third Edition. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 327-329.

2.4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

From 1935 until 1996, the centerpiece of the United States Federal Government (U.S.F.G.) welfare policy was a program entitled Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) whose principal benefit was the provision of cash assistance to needy families. In 1996, however, the U.S.F.G. dramatically shifted its poverty reduction strategies by implementing large-scale social welfare reform aimed at making "welfare a transition to work" by officially becoming a temporary assistance program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).¹⁴ The legislative basis for the reform was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).¹⁵ PRWORA terminated the AFDC program.¹⁶ In place of AFDC, PRWORA introduced a new program known as Block Grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).

There are significant differences between TANF and the AFDC program that it supplanted in 1996. TANF marked a break from the policy objectives, eligibility rules, funding, time limitations, and work requirements under AFDC. The changes have had serious implications for the families who continue to receive benefits under TANF as well as for those families who no longer participate. In the United States today, 19 years after PRWORA was passed and TANF replaced AFDC, it is not clear that the reform has achieved the intended results.¹⁷

While Europe and the United States have always had differences in their social safety net policies, the implementation of TANF, in place of AFDC, really marks the U.S. policy going in a drastically different direction than that taken in many European States. The remainder of this working paper details the most

¹⁴ Welfare reform included a series of policy changes through the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. For this paper, we address welfare reform through a component of that Act, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and its relationship to the prior law, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See, for details, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996* (P.L. 104-193), 1996.

¹⁵ The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 included the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Block Grants as a component, which is the primary matter of discussion in this paper. However, the legislation's passage also included almost 55 million dollars in cuts to low-income assistance programs including food stamps, benefits to legal immigrants, and the SSI program for children with disabilities. PRWORA also included a child support enforcement system as well as provided mandatory funds (\$50 million annually) in abstinence education funding.

¹⁶ TANF replaced not only AFDC, but also two accompanying programs, the Emergency Assistance Program and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program.

¹⁷ Danziger, "Chapter 1 – Introduction. What Are the Early Lessons?".

significant differences between AFDC and TANF. We begin by examining the underlying tenants and policy objectives of the two programs including the impact that increased U.S. State discretion has had on welfare in the United States. Following the policy overview, the paper surveys the literature evaluating the successes and failures of welfare reform. Finally, the paper considers some of welfare reform's unintended consequences and the overall impact of welfare reform on the U.S.'s neediest families.

3. POLICY OVERVIEW

This section of the paper walks through the differences between Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. It begins with an overview of the two policies' objectives, to provide some understanding about the significance of the move from a program that solely provides support to a program that also emphasizes work. The policy objectives section is followed by an overview of the major changes made when TANF replaced AFDC including the increased flexibility and discretion of States, the funding changes in moving from an entitlement to a block grant, the differences in eligibility requirements, the implementation of time limits, and the changes in work requirements.

The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 was incredibly controversial. It was considered by many in the social policy and political communities to be too great a compromise with very conservative members of the United States Congress, even leading to the resignation of several presidential advisors and officials at the United States Department of Health and Human Services. One such advisor, former assistant secretary of children and families, Mary Jo Bane, in an article titled "Welfare as We Might Know It," in *The American Prospect* (January/February 1997), stated, "The public, rightly, wanted welfare reform that expected work and parental responsibility. The political rhetoric supporting the new law, unfortunately, made the concept of a federal entitlement synonymous with irresponsibility and lifelong dependency, and the replacement of the entitlement with block grants synonymous with work requirements. This rhetoric was misleading but powerfully effective."¹⁸

¹⁸ D. Cabe, "Welfare to Work," *Kennedy School Bulletin*, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 2002.

3.1. Policy Objectives

The underlying purpose of U.S.F.G. welfare policy has always been to reduce poverty by providing assistance to the country's neediest families. While this fundamental mission remained unchanged following the welfare reform of 1996, the policy tools used to achieve that mission, and the programs implemented, changed significantly with the passage of PRWORA. The replacement of the country's primary cash assistance program, from AFDC to TANF, represented not only a change in name, but a serious policy shift that revised poverty reduction strategies throughout the United States.

AFDC was established through the Social Security Act of 1935. The policy's objective was to reduce poverty through the provision of cash welfare to needy children suffering from lack of parental support due to their mother or father being incapacitated, deceased, absent from the home, or unemployed.¹⁹ AFDC was accompanied by an employment training and education program called the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program (JOBS) and an emergency cash assistance program called Emergency Assistance (EA).²⁰ Although the funding for these programs was separate from AFDC funding, individuals could participate in the JOBS program only if they also participated in AFDC.²¹

AFDC was administered and supervised by U.S. States but was strongly regulated according to guidelines issued by the U.S.F.G. The U.S.F.G. established eligibility rules for the AFDC program, while the individual U.S. States set their own benefit levels and established income and resource limits.²² AFDC benefit levels established by U.S. States were required to be uniformly applied to all families with similar circumstances within the State.²³

In 1996, under the Clinton Administration, the passage of PRWORA came with the promise to "change welfare as we know it."²⁴ The principal vehicle for achieving this change was the introduction of TANF to replace AFDC. TANF terminated open-ended welfare funding and instituted a block grant program

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview*, 2004.

²⁰ The Emergency Assistance Program provided short-term emergency assistance to needy families. This assistance was not dependent upon participation in AFDC.

²¹ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

²² U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview.*

²³ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

²⁴ Urban Institute, Welfare Reform: Ten Years Later, Washington, DC, 2006.

providing each U.S. State, meeting certain criteria, with a fixed sum and increased flexibility in policy choice. AFDC was considered open-ended because U.S. States were entitled to reimbursement from the U.S.F.G. without a funding cap.²⁵ In contrast, TANF is administered as a block grant program in which U.S. States are provided with a determined amount of federal funding but allowed greater discretion over the way the funding is spent. As an ideological matter, whereas AFDC focused primarily on providing families with the means to survive, TANF emphasizes employment and makes welfare temporary in nearly all cases.²⁶

Through TANF U.S. States use U.S.F.G. block grants to operate their own programs. States can use TANF dollars in ways designed to meet any of the four policy objectives set out in the federal law, which are to: (1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.²⁷

The shift from AFDC to TANF marked more than a move from an openended cash-assistance program to a temporary-assistance program. TANF also introduced the practice of allowing welfare funding for programs aimed at influencing the family structure, including family planning and two-parent-family maintenance programs. This change reflects a shift in poverty reduction strategies in the United States. Whereas AFDC was designed to provide needy families with cash transfers that would supplement or replace employment income, TANF focused on the importance of work as well as attempting to foster nuclear families as a way to provide family economic stability.

3.2. The Role of State Discretion

PRWORA provided U.S. States with unprecedented discretion over welfare programming and funding. Under TANF, there are no federal rules that determine the amount of TANF cash benefits that must be paid to a participating family. Additionally, there are no federal rules that require U.S. States to use

²⁵ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview.*

²⁶ O.A. Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2005).

²⁷ M. Covin, An Introduction to TANF (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2005).

TANF to pay families cash benefits at all; however, all States do so.²⁸ Benefit amounts are determined solely by the U.S. States. The discretion provided to States through TANF has allowed for a great diversity in the way that welfare programs are funded and administered across the country. Each U.S. State has different initial eligibility thresholds, benefit payment amounts, and fund allocations.²⁹

According to Falk of the Congressional Research Service (2014), in July of 2012, for the average cash welfare family (a family of three), the maximum monthly benefit in the median state (North Dakota) was \$427, with a range from \$923 in Alaska to \$170 in Mississippi.³⁰ The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (no earned or unearned income) and who complies with program rules. Families with income other than TANF are often paid a reduced benefit amount. The diversity in program administration also extends to the initial eligibility threshold. Initial eligibility thresholds for families of three range from \$1,740 in Hawaii to \$269 in Alabama.³¹

State discretion has also created significant diversity in the way that TANF dollars are spent across the U.S. States particularly with reference to the level of cash benefits provided. The variation in the use of TANF funding spent on cash assistance ranges from 51 percent in Maine to only 7 percent in Illinois. Similarly, while several U.S. States decline to spend any of their TANF dollars on Family Formation programs, those encouraging two-parent families and decreasing out-of-wedlock births, New Jersey allocates more than 30 percent of its TANF dollars on Family Formation expenditures.³²

The discretion provided to U.S. States through the passage of the 1996 welfare law allowed for a huge amount of variety in program and funds administration, with very few federal guidelines. Subsequently, there are different welfare programs being administered in every U.S. State. These programs are having mixed results in aiding the families who, currently or formerly, receive

²⁸ G. Falk, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2014.

²⁹ A State's initial eligibility threshold considers all the State's financial eligibility rules regarding applicants, the limitations placed on gross income, the rules for deductions from gross income in determining net income, and any limitations placed on net income (The Urban Institute, 2004). Initial eligibility thresholds vary considerably across U.S. States.

³⁰ G. Falk, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2014.

³¹ Welfare Rules Database, "Initial Income Eligibility Thresholds (Family of Three) by State," *Welfare Rules Database Data Set 1e4-2* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2013).

³² Schott, L, et al. "How States Have Spent Federal and State Funds Under the TANF Block Grant." Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington DC, 2012.

assistance through TANF and make it difficult to evaluate welfare reform's success as a whole.

Several commentators feared that TANF might set off a "race to the bottom," where States, fearful of attracting low-income families from other States, might lower benefits, which in turn would cause other States to lower theirs. In fact, total AFDC/TANF spending on cash benefits declined from a peak of about \$40 billion in 1995 to about \$21 billion in 2006 (Table 1), but this reduction is roughly proportional to the welfare caseload reduction.³³

3.3. Funding

Under TANF, the funding relationship between the U.S.F.G. and the individual U.S. States changed. The drastically increased level of State discretion over federally granted funds changed the ways in which State governments were spending welfare dollars and the degree to which the U.S.F.G. was providing funding to the States. By allocating block grant funding to U.S. States, TANF removed almost all federal eligibility and payment rules and provided U.S. States with wide discretion over programming, as well as the right to deny benefits to families.³⁴

Under AFDC, U.S. States were entitled to unlimited federal funds. The federal government provided reimbursement of benefit payments at "matching" rates that were inversely related to a U.S. State's per capita income.³⁵ U.S. States were required to provide aid to all persons who were eligible under the federal law and whose income and resources were within the state-set limits.³⁶

Under TANF, however, there is no guarantee of benefit provision. PRWORA simply mandated a fixed budget amount that the U.S.F.G. would grant to the U.S. States each year (the base amount of the yearly block grant has been \$16.5 billion since 1996 and is not adjusted for inflation).³⁷ U.S. States are required to contribute, from their own funds, at least \$10.4 billion in total under what is known as a "maintenance-of-effort" (MOE) requirement. The 1996 law also created supplemental grants for certain States with high population growth or low block grant allocations relative to their needy population (funding for this

³³ Scholz, Moffitt and Cowan, "Trends in Income Support," 10.

 ³⁴ R. Blank, "Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States. Revised," *Journal of Economic Literature* 40 (4) (2002): 1-43.

³⁵ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children and* Temporary *Assistance to Needy Families Overview*.

³⁶ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

³⁷ Congressional Budget Office, *Federal Budget Implications of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996*, Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, 2006.

provision was eliminated in the reauthorization process beginning FY2011), as well as a contingency fund to help States during a recession.³⁸ U.S. States that need or use more than the amount that has been granted for a particular year are not entitled to federal reimbursement for excess expenditures. Conversely, States that do not use all of their annual funding are allowed to carry over unused dollars from one fiscal year to the next.³⁹

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
State family								
assistance grants	16,489	16,489	16,489	16,489	16,489	16,489	16,489	16,489
Supplemental grants	319	319	319	319	319	211		
Healthy marriage/ responsible								
fatherhood grants	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Grants to the								
territories	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
Grants for tribal								
work programs	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Regular contingency								
funds	93	59	428	1,107	212	334	612	610
Emergency								
contingency funds				617	4,383			
Totals	17,137	17,103	17,472	18,768	21,639	17,270	17,337	17,335

Table 2. Federal TANF Funds: FY 2006- FY 2013 (in millions of dollars)

Source: Falk, G. (2013). Congressional Research Service

The AFDC program was funded specifically and solely to provide cash assistance to needy families. The corresponding JOBS and EA programs supplemented AFDC by providing vocational training and short-term emergency

³⁸ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families*, 2009.

³⁹ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

program funding, respectively.⁴⁰ Under TANF, however, States may direct federal funding toward any program that is within TANF's objectives, including programming that would have formerly been funded through the JOBS or EA programs. In the absence of federally mandated cash assistance requirements, many U.S. States have opted to spend less on cash assistance and more on the other programming that falls under the provisions of TANF such as childcare, or work support programs. Thus, with the transition from AFDC to TANF the number of families receiving income assistance fell sharply. In 2013, most TANF funds, 66 percent, were spent on areas other than income assistance. This is a significant shift. In fiscal year 1997, states spent about 23 percent of TANF funds on services other than cash assistance. In fiscal year 2013 the United States spent 31.5 billion dollars on TANF. (This number includes both the federal expenditure and the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) funding.) Only 28 percent of TANF dollars went toward providing families with cash assistance (8 percent went to work related activities and supports, 16 percent went to childcare, 8 percent went to refundable tax credits, 7 percent went to administration and systems, and 34 percent went to other areas).⁴¹

Annex B shows U.S. States variation in using TANF dollars. As a result, government aid across the nation varies remarkably; see Annex C. As millions of people seek aid, they are finding a complex system that reaches some and rejects others for "unpredictable" reasons. For example, the share of poor children and parents (below 100 percent of the poverty line) that receive cash welfare ranges from 2 percent in Idaho and Wyoming to over 45 percent in Maine, California, and Vermont—the U.S. average amounts to 21 percent. See Figure 3.

To conclude, the increase in State discretion over the use of their federal welfare dollars has decreased the provision of cash assistance to needy families. U.S. States are opting to utilize federal funding to provide assistance to needy families through means other than direct cash transfers.

⁴⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office (2015). TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES: An Overview of Spending, Federal Oversight, and Program Incentives. GAO-15-572T: Published: Apr 30, 2015. Publicly Released: Apr 30, 2015.

⁴¹ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.*




Figure 4. Rate of Poor Children and Parents that Receive Cash Welfare, FY 2013

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Current Population Survey

3.4. Eligibility

Welfare reform also had a significant impact on eligibility for assistance. Under AFDC, the U.S.F.G. provided cash assistance along with education and training programming indefinitely so long as a family qualified under the eligibility criteria. One of the most striking ways that TANF limited eligibility was through the implementation of time limits; this aspect of eligibility is discussed in section 3.5. In addition to establishing time limits, PRWORA tightened eligibility requirements both by providing U.S. States with the discretion to deny benefits and by reducing the base population who were eligible to receive federal assistance.

Prior to welfare reform, persons meeting financial eligibility requirements under AFDC were provided cash benefits from the government. AFDC did not include restrictions based on marital status or citizenship. Minor, unwed mothers as well as persons convicted of drug-related crimes were provided unrestricted benefits under the former welfare program. Legally residing immigrants were also eligible for benefits under AFDC. There were no limits on the size of a family that could be eligible for AFDC benefits; therefore, when an additional child was born, families were provided with additional benefits.

PRWORA imposed new conditions and restrictions to program participation. Since the passage of welfare reform, persons who have been convicted of a drug-related crime are prohibited for life from receiving benefits under TANF. Unmarried minor parents are provided benefits only if living with an adult or if in an adult-supervised setting and participating in education and training programs.⁴² U.S. States were given the discretion to exclude both legal immigrants who were new applicants to welfare as well as the right to exclude even those legal immigrants already receiving assistance under the prior welfare program.⁴³ While the federal guidelines under TANF do not limit eligibility based on family size, the policy does provide individual U.S. States with that discretion.⁴⁴

⁴² U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

⁴³ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

 ⁴⁴ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview.*

3.5. Time Limits

The most notable eligibility change through the passage of PRWORA might be the implementation of time limits in establishing the duration for which a family can qualify for benefits. Under TANF, families who have received federally funded assistance for five cumulative years are ineligible for additional federal cash assistance. This means that even if employment adequate to provide family stability is not found, at the end of five cumulative years, families are removed from the program and can never again participate.

AFDC's designation as an entitlement program ensured that U.S. States would receive funding from the U.S.F.G. as long as the States adhered to the federal requirements. Benefits were then guaranteed to eligible participants in the AFDC program.⁴⁵ Moreover, under AFDC, program participants remained eligible as long as they met the program's established rules. Because there were no time restrictions to participation in AFDC, families remained eligible for cash assistance as long as they were below the initial eligibility threshold established by each individual U.S. State and continued to meet the program requirements issued by the U.S.F.G. and the U.S. State of residence.

The establishment of time limits is one of the most consequential changes affecting families on welfare in the United States. The U.S. minimum wage plays a role in the ability of less-skilled workers to earn adequate incomes even if fully employed.⁴⁶ The inability to find employment at a living wage and maintain it while addressing health issues and child care have caused barriers for families in establishing financial security, particularly the very poor (families living below 50 percent of the poverty line) and single-mother-headed households.⁴⁷ In spite of these difficulties, welfare does not provide federal benefits to participants once the time limit has expired.⁴⁸ TANF does not ensure that, after the program eligibility time limit is tolled, participating families have secured work that will

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

 ⁴⁶ According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the federal minimum wage is \$6.55 per hour effective 24 July 2008. The federal minimum wage provisions are contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Many U.S. States also have minimum wage laws. In cases where an employee is subject to both the state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee is entitled to the higher of the two minimum wages.

⁴⁷ W.L. Primus, Rawlings, K. Larin, and K. Porter, *The Initial Impact of Welfare Reform on the Economic Well-being of Single Mother Families* (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1999).

 ⁴⁸ States are allowed to exempt a minority of people from time limits and are allowed to continue paying benefits through State funds.

enable them to provide basic necessities or even offset the cost of childcare or transportation that work often requires.

Moreover, recipients who reach the time limits or who are sanctioned for not finding a job are being denied cash assistance even though they are willing to work, because they cannot find any employer to hire them. This labor demand problem will increase during recessions and will remain even in good economic times because employer demands for a skilled workforce continue to escalate. Note that the "time limit and out" system differs markedly from a "time limit followed by a work-for-welfare opportunity of last resort" initially proposed by President Clinton's advisors, but rejected by Congress.⁴⁹

3.6. Work Requirements and Activities

Although education, work participation, and financial security were objectives of U.S. welfare policy both before and after welfare reform, the 1996 welfare reform placed greater responsibility on the families receiving program benefits to find stable and sufficiently paying work. To enable families to achieve this goal, TANF provided additional support targeted at finding and maintaining employment.

Directly following welfare reform, U.S. States drastically altered their welfare programming to assist families in establishing employment. One such change made by U.S. States was a shift toward "work-first" welfare systems that reduced skills development and education programs while emphasizing job-readiness and employment search training. U.S. States also moved toward "making work pay" through incentivizing work participation by raising eligibility thresholds or adding earned income tax credits. Additionally, U.S. States toughened sanctions and time limits to enforce the message that welfare would provide only temporary assistance.⁵⁰

Under AFDC, in fiscal year 1994, 40 percent of two-parent households receiving benefits were required to participate in 16 hours of work activity per week in order to continue participation in AFDC's cash assistance program. Before the passage of PRWORA, the percentage of households required to meet the 16-hour work requirement was scheduled to increase to 75 percent in fiscal year 1997.⁵¹ In addition to the 16-hour requirement imposed on some participants,

⁴⁹ S.H. Danziger, "Approaching the Limit: Early National Lessons from Welfare Reform," PSC Research Report No. 02-507 (2002a).

⁵⁰ Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

all AFDC recipients were required to participate in JOBS unless they were exempt from the program. A recipient would be exempt from JOBS participation if he or she worked for 30 hours or more per week, attended school full-time, cared for a very young child or elderly family member, or was under age 16.

In contrast, under TANF, work participation standards require that the head of household in a single-parent family work at least 20 hours per week, and in the case of two-parent families, parents are required to work 30 hours per week in order to remain eligible for cash assistance. Eligible work includes subsidized or unsubsidized employment, on-the-job training, education programs, and community service. Hours spent in vocational education can count toward the weekly work requirement but only in a minority of U.S. States and only for a total of 12 months.⁵²

However, States are provided some flexibility in meeting their work requirements. The TANF statute requires U.S. States to have 50 percent of their caseload meet the established work participation standards (the so-called *all families rate*). In addition to the aforementioned standards, there is a separate participation standard that applies to two-parent families, requiring 90 percent of the State's two-parent family participants to meet work participation standards.⁵³ States that fail the TANF work participation standards are penalized by a reduction in their federal block grant amounts. However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a "caseload reduction credit."⁵⁴ The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard by one percentage point for each percent decline in the caseload.⁵⁵

3.8. Summary

Welfare reform and the implementation of TANF centered on the importance of work in providing families with economic stability. The policy intended to provide support through programming for five years, while

⁵² U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.*

 ⁵³ G. Falk, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2014.

⁵⁴ Although less than half of federal and state expenditures are associated with cash welfare, the "TANF caseload" number is the number of families and recipients receiving cash welfare. Information is not available on families and individuals who receive TANF benefits and services other than cash welfare. In September 2006, 1.9 million families, consisting of 4.6 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded cash welfare.

⁵⁵ G. Falk, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2014.

participants were able to gain employment and attain economic security. This was intended to be accomplished through stricter eligibility, the implementation of time limits, and the increased flexibility for States to meet the needs of their poorest residents. The programs established to assist poor families with job preparation and workforce engagement have been the source of a significant amount of welfare reform's praise. However, because programs vary from one U.S. State to the next, the degree to which the work-related programs assist families is also varied. The changes made in the move from AFDC to TANF shifted from a strong federal presence with entitled funding, to a strong state presence with block granted funding. The shift in the way welfare is funded and administered has led to varied programs succeeding to varying degrees across the country.

4. EVALUATING WELFARE REFORM

Following the passage of PRWORA, U.S. social policy analysts and economists have surveyed the impact of welfare reform on helping needy families in the United States move out of poverty. This is a difficult task, due to the discretion provided to U.S. States through TANF and the resulting diversity in programming and implementation. There are varied opinions about TANF's success in assisting the nation's poorest families. Research institutions and universities have developed new and diverse proxies for examining the extent to which welfare reform has been successful in meeting the needs of low-income families in the United States as well as for identifying the reform's failures.

Often the reduced number of families receiving cash assistance through TANF is cited as evidence of the success of the 1996 welfare reform. Other frequently cited indications of success include the increase in employment rates and the decrease in child poverty that took place during the 1990s.⁵⁶ However, this analysis only provides part of the information needed to evaluate the success of welfare reform in the United States. The following sections provide a review of data and literature evaluating welfare reform's success in supporting families moving from welfare and into work, and ensuring employment and financial security for poor families in the United States. We attempt to cover some of the critical concerns of welfare reform, through a literature review organized by theme. The themes in this section include Employment Trends, The Effect of the Economy, The Very Poor and Single-Mother-Headed Households, Program Participation Rates, and TANF Benefits and Inflation.

⁵⁶ S. Parrott, and A. Sherman, *TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood* (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006).

4.1. Employment Trends

Some of the employment trends observed after welfare reform were positive. Initially more welfare recipients were employed while receiving welfare benefits than they were in the past; increasing from 22 percent in 1997 to 33 percent in 1999. Unfortunately these numbers have fallen in recent years (In FY 2010, the employment rate of adult recipients was 22.3 percent)⁵⁷, they have still not dropped to the levels that they were before welfare reform.⁵⁸ However, a number of studies have found that even with increased work participation rates welfare and former welfare recipients are struggling to establish financial security.

One of the primary goals of welfare reform was for participants to establish "stable, long-term work patterns," under the assumption that regular involvement in work will improve their well-being. The justification for establishing only temporary assistance is that this approach provides support and impetus for families to become stably employed, which will be in the best interest of the participating families. Indeed, studies indicated that employment among former welfare recipients increased after welfare reform was enacted, and that when recipients left the TANF program their employment rate was 5 to 10 percent higher than when they left AFDC.⁵⁹

In the late 1990s, when families left the welfare system, they were more likely to have at least one working adult than they were prior to the implementation of TANF.⁶⁰ However, in the tougher labor market of 2002 and 2003, the proportion of former welfare recipients in the workforce fell from 63 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2002.⁶¹ Evaluations of welfare-to-work typically report that while most participants are able to secure initial employment, a large proportion, often a majority, lose those jobs within a year. Additionally, low wages among welfare recipients remain a concern. While research suggests that wages of former welfare recipients grow over time, this phenomenon occurs among only the minority of former recipients who are able to establish regular, stable full-time work patterns.⁶²

⁵⁷ Office of Family Assistance (2012).Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Year 2010. U.S. department of Health and Human Services.

 ⁵⁸ Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies.

⁵⁹ S.K. Danziger, M.E. Corcoran, S.H. Danziger, and C.M. Heflin, "Work, Income and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform," *Journal of Consumer Affairs* 34 (1) (2000): 6-30.

⁶⁰ Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies.

⁶¹ Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies.

⁶² Danziger et al., "Work, Income and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform."

A study conducted by Danziger et al. found that the former welfare recipients with the most work participation and experience have higher levels of financial success and subjective well-being than those without employment.⁶³ However, they also found that there were a large number of respondents who suffered from financial hardship regardless of their level of work involvement. The study concluded that employment is associated with "reductions in, but not the elimination of, economic vulnerability and material hardships" for welfare and former welfare recipients in the United States.

4.2. The Effect of the Economy

The fact that PRWORA was passed during a time of rapid and sustained economic growth complicates efforts to determine the extent to which certain phenomena such as increased employment and decreased poverty levels can properly be attributed to welfare policy reform. In the United States between 1992 and 2000, the labor market increased by 20 million jobs.⁶⁴ The U.S. unemployment rate fell to 5 percent in early 1997, and remained at or below that level until October of 2001.⁶⁵ Many businesses experienced worker shortages in the years following the passage of the 1996 legislation, making employers increasingly open to hiring ex-welfare recipients. Additionally, wages among less-skilled and less-educated workers started to rise in 1995, for the first time since the late 1970s.

During this time, less-educated, single mothers increasingly joined the workforce; whereas 62 percent of this population was employed in 1995, by 2000, 73 percent were working.⁶⁶ While this is impressive growth, the extent to which it can be attributed to welfare reform is ambiguous. Welfare reform policies might have increased the number of women in the workforce through job training and work incentives, but it is unclear to what degree the increase was a result of policy, and to what degree it was the result of a strong economy.⁶⁷

More recent evidence suggests that the economic expansion of the mid- to late 1990s may account for a significant percentage of the positive trends observed among needy families during this time. While the booming economy of

⁶³ Danziger et al., "Work, Income and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform."

⁶⁴ R. Blank, "Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent US History," Distinguished lecture on economics in government, delivered to a joint session of the Society of Government Economists and the American Economic Association at the annual meetings of the ASSA, Boston, MA, 2000.

⁶⁵ Blank, "Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States. Revised."

⁶⁶ N. Kaushal, Q. Gao, and J. Waldfogal, "Welfare Reform and Family Expenditures: How are Single Mothers Adapting to the New Welfare and Work Regime?" National Poverty Center Working Paper Series 0607, 2006.

⁶⁷ Blank, "Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent US History."

the 1990s correlated with a decrease in child poverty and an increase in loweducated single parents joining the workforce, those numbers began to change in the years following the recession in 2003⁶⁸ and continued to worsen following the recession ending in 2009. Moreover, attributing the successes of the mid-1990s to the implementation of TANF is also improbable because to do so would suggest that the 1996 reform yielded almost immediate results. Kaushal et al. suggest that given that some policies might have delayed results, it is difficult to attribute the success of the 1990s solely to welfare reform and the implementation of TANF.⁶⁹

The recession that started in 2007 and ended in 2009 proved to be a significant test for TANF's ability to support poor families in times of economic crises. TANF programs responded only modestly to the increased poverty and unemployment connected to the recession. While entitlement programs like SNAP increased significantly (in 2012, more than 46 million people received SNAP benefits - a 76 percent increase since 2007)⁷⁰ at its peak in 2010 TANF caseloads increased by only 16 percent. Unemployment, however, rose 88 percent over the same time period. In 2011, TANF caseloads fell 5 percentage points from their 2010 peak, while the unemployment rate remained at or above 8.5 percent throughout the same year.⁷¹

4.3. The Very Poor and Single-Mother-Headed Households

While welfare reform, along with a robust and incredibly successful economy, may have initially decreased child poverty and increased some employment rates, the reform had an unintended and significant negative effect on the very poor. Haskins found that "there is a small to moderate-sized group of mother-headed families that are worse off than they were before welfare reform."⁷² Shortly after TANF was implemented, the nation's poorest families were not benefiting from the success of the economy or the policies of welfare reform. Primus et al. found that from 1995 to 1997 disposable income for the poorest 20 percent of the population declined by 7.6 percent and the poorest 10

⁶⁸ A. Sherman, S. Fremstad, and S. Parrott, *Employment Rates for Single Mothers Fell Substantially during Recent Period of Labor Market Weakness* (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2004).

⁶⁹ Kaushal et al., "Welfare Reform and Family Expenditures: How are Single Mothers Adapting to the New Welfare and Work Regime?".

⁷⁰ Zedlewski, S., et.al. (2012). SNAP's Role in the Great Recession and Beyond. The Urban Institute.

⁷¹ Pavetti, L. (2013) TANF Provided a Weak Safety Net During and After Recession. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

⁷² R. Haskins, "Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Income and Poverty," in *The New World of Welfare*, eds. R. Blank and R. Haskins (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

percent of the population experienced a 15.2 percent decline in discretionary income. 73

Following welfare reform, the number of single mothers in the United States who were receiving cash assistance, then through TANF, fell by two million. However, employment among single mothers grew by only one million. Therefore, in the United States there were approximately one million unemployed single mothers who were not receiving any cash assistance from the government. This number is almost double what it was before welfare reform (up from 6,000,000).⁷⁴ The size of this group grew from 9.8 percent of participants leaving the program in 1999 to 13.8 percent in 2002.⁷⁵ The population of single mothers who are disconnected from both employment and government cash assistance is significantly more likely to be in poor physical and mental health as well as less ready for employment than those who left welfare for job opportunities.⁷⁶

A qualitative study conducted on TANF recipients in Maine analyzed the barriers to employment that prevented single mothers from being able to establish and maintain work. The study, by Butler, looked at women who were participating in the TANF program but who were struggling to maintain stable employment.⁷⁷ Butler's study identified several social and health issues that prevented the women in her study from achieving steady employment. The three most prevalent phenomena observed were domestic violence, raising children with disabilities, and long-term physical and mental health problems (the latter affecting 33-44 percent of TANF recipients nation-wide). Butler also found that not only are welfare recipients disproportionately affected by these issues, but often must cope with more than one simultaneously.

Recent findings from Moffitt suggest that the reduction in support to the very poor and to single mothers is endemic in the U.S. welfare system. While spending for the elderly and the disabled through the U.S. welfare system has increased in recent years, there have been significantly slower increases, if not decreases, in supports for single mothers and their children. Further, Moffitt finds that support for families with the lowest incomes has decreased, but support for those with higher incomes has increased.⁷⁸ In fact, Moffitt found that there was a

⁷³ Primus et al., The Initial Impact of Welfare Reform on the Economic Well-being of Single Mother Families.

⁷⁴ Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood.

⁷⁵ Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies.

⁷⁶ Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies.

⁷⁷ S. Butler, "Long-Term TANF Participants and Barriers to Employment: A Qualitative Study in Maine," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* XXXV (3) (September 2008).

⁷⁸ Moffitt, R. (2015). The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System. Demography (2015) 52:729–749.

significant shift in welfare spending, for those living in deep poverty —as little as 50 percent of the federal poverty line—to those with incomes as much as 200 percent above the poverty line. In 2014, a family of four earning \$11,925 a year likely got less aid than a same-sized family earning \$47,700.⁷⁹

4.4. Program Participation Rates

Reduced program participation is often presented as evidence that welfare reform is working to move people out of poverty. However, there are serious concerns with using reduced welfare caseloads as a proxy for welfare reform's success. While increased work involvement has certainly accounted for reduced participation in the TANF program, Parrott and Sherman point out that, despite the reduction in caseloads, in recent years the number of children living below half of the poverty line has grown significantly.⁸⁰ While the number of families in this category has increased, the rate at which eligible families are receiving TANF benefits has declined. Even when using the supplemental poverty measure, which takes into account noncash benefits such as food assistance, the number of children in families living in deep poverty (below half of the poverty line) has grown significantly.⁸¹

This increased deep poverty is a concerning trend. Child poverty, in the years following the 2007 recession also surpassed the levels that were seen in the years immediately preceding the welfare reform of 1996, and the growing rates of intense poverty raise doubts about TANF's ability to reach the most impoverished families. Before the 1996 welfare reform, the AFDC program lifted 64 percent of otherwise deeply poor children out of deep poverty. Conversely, in 2010, the TANF program lifted just 24 percent of deeply poor children above 50 percent of the poverty line.⁸² TANF programming does not seem to be addressing the needs of the poorest families in the United States, which is evidenced through both the increase in deep poverty and the rates at which this population is participating in TANF.

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program⁸³ and the Medicaid Program, which provide food stamps and healthcare, respectively, have continued

⁷⁹ Moffitt, R. (2015). The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System. Demography (2015) 52:729–749.

⁸⁰ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. (2014). *TANF at 18*.

⁸¹ Short, K. (2014). The Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2013. Current Population reports. The United States Census Bureau.

⁸² Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.*

⁸³ Commonly referred to as food stamps. Gross monthly income eligibility limits are set at 130 percent of the poverty level for the household size. Net monthly income limits are set at 100 percent of poverty (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 2009a;

to assist a growing number of low-income families, while TANF participation has continued to drop.⁸⁴ The Congressional Budget Office reports that unlike the trends seen in program participation in TANF, the other four major poverty reduction initiatives have seen significant growth in participation over the last several years.⁸⁵ Moreover each of these programs served more low-income families than did TANF. In addition to serving more people than the major welfare legislation, the U.S.F.G. also provides more funding for the other four major poverty reduction programs. In 2012, the federal government spent \$17 billion on TANF, compared with \$80 billion on Food Assistance, \$50 billion on Supplemental Security Income benefits, and \$54 billion for the Earned Income Tax Credit.

The number of families who are eligible to participate in TANF, but who do not, is remarkably high not only with reference to participation in other poverty reduction programs, but also when compared with AFDC. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 2011 only 33.9 percent of families who were eligible for TANF assistance participated in the program.⁸⁶ This is a significant change. Prior to welfare reform, more than 80 percent of families that qualified for AFDC participated in the program. Moreover, a simple linear trend shows that participation of AFDC/TANF decreased by an average of 3 points each year in the period 1996-2011. See Figure 5.

²⁰⁰⁹b). Participation in the food stamps program is not taken into account when measuring a household's poverty, as food stamps are not a cash benefit. Following the 1996 Welfare Reform, participation in this program includes a work requirement.

⁸⁴ Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood.

⁸⁵ Congressional Budget Office, *Changes in Participation of Means Tested Programs*, 2005.

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Annual report to Congress*. Indicators of Welfare Dependence, 2014.




Figure 5. Rates of Participation in AFDC and TANF by Families that Meet Eligibility Requirements

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors, 2014).

The decline in welfare caseloads, a figure that was once frequently marshaled as proof of welfare reform's success, has increasingly been accepted as an inadequate measure of whether or not the program is working. Unfortunately, it is clear that reduced caseloads do not indicate that poor and low-income families are more financially successful and stable than they were before welfare reform, but rather that poor families are simply not participating in the program. As stated by Parrott and Sherman: "More than half of the decline in TANF caseloads since 1996 is due to a decline in the extent to which TANF programs serve families that are poor enough to qualify, rather than to a reduction in the number of families who are poor enough to qualify for aid."⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood.

4.5. TANF Benefits and Inflation

There are also significant concerns about the degree of help that TANF is providing to the families who are participating in the program. The basic TANF block grant that the U.S.F.G. makes available has been set at \$16.5 billion since it was established in 1996⁸⁸ (Table 3). As a result, the real value of the block grant has already fallen by about 32 percent.⁸⁹ In addition, Seventeen states had the same nominal benefit levels in July 2014 as in 1996, meaning that benefits have fallen in inflation-adjusted terms by more than 30 percent.⁹⁰

Fiscal	Value of the Basic TANF	Cumulative Loss in
Year	Block Grant in 1997 Dollars	Value (in percent)
1997	\$16.50	
1998	16.2	-1.60%
1999	15.9	-3.5
2000	15.4	-6.4
2001	14.9	-9.4
2002	14.7	-10.7
2003	14.4	-12.7
2004	14.1	-14.7
2005	13.6	-17.4
2006	13.1	-20.4
2007	12.8	-22.2
2008	12.3	-25.5
2009	12.3	-25.3
2010	12.1	-26.5
2011	11.8	-28.4
2012	11.5	-30.1
2013	11.3	-31.2

Table 3. Basic TANF Block Grant in Constant FY1997 Dollars

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors, 2014).

⁸⁸ Falk, "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions."

⁸⁹ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.*

⁹⁰ Floyd, I. & Schott, L. (2014). TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in Most States and Continue to Erode. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

The value of both the TANF block grant and the connected TANF benefits continue to fall, even in times when need has increased. A study by Flovd & Schott found that TANF benefits have declined in real (inflation-adjusted dollars) in every U.S. State since the passage of PRWORA.⁹¹ The same study found that as of 2014, every state's TANF benefits for a family of three with no other cash income were below 50 percent of the poverty line as measured by the poverty guidelines. In 1996, 16 states had benefit levels below 30 percent of the poverty line; today, 33 states and the District of Columbia do.⁹² In six U.S. states TANF benefits are below their nominal 1996 levels. Benefits in Arizona, Hawaii, and Washington are worth at least 40 percent less than in 1996, after inflation.⁹³ Even those U.S. States that have adjusted benefit levels upwards under TANF have not kept pace with the increased costs of basic needs. In other words, TANF benefits do less to help families rise out of extreme poverty than they did in 1996. The families who are participating in TANF are receiving benefits that do little to help them move out of poverty and the rate to which it is helping has continued to decrease over time.

4.6. Summary

While there are some indications that TANF had a modest positive impact on the employment patterns of former welfare recipients, there are also strong indications that the economy played a significant role in the availability of jobs. In tough economic times TANF is ill-prepared to address the needs of the growing number of people living in poverty. While the extent to which each state program is serving its populations varies greatly, there are some themes which can be established nationally: There have been negative findings in the program's effectiveness in serving the very poor and single-mother-headed households; participation rates have gone down—even among those who remain eligible for the program; and inflation has led to a decline in program benefits leading to the reduced ability to serve needy families.

⁹¹ Z. Schott, and L. Levinson, TANF Benefits Are Low And Have Not Kept Pace With Inflation: But Most States Have Increased Benefits Above a Freeze Level in Recent Years (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2008).

⁹² Floyd, I. & Schott, L. (2014). TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in Most States and Continue to Erode. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

 ⁹³ Floyd, I. & Schott, L. (2014). TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in Most States and Continue to Erode. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

5. CONCLUSION

When PRWORA was passed in 1996, it might have been the ideal time for welfare reform for political and pragmatic reasons. On the political side, there was a growing sentiment that AFDC was creating a population of welfare recipients that relied primarily on the government for financial support. With regard to the feasibility of reform, the economic climate at the time was such that there were more opportunities for less-skilled and low-income workers to secure employment at better wages than had been available in the past. Against this background, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid-1990s. Some of this decline is undoubtedly due to welfare reform, some to nonwelfare policy changes, some to the booming economy, and some to the interactions among them. However, it is a difficult task to evaluate U.S. welfare reform, because with the passage of PRWORA and the increase in U.S. State discretion, there are different programs, eligibility requirements, and benefit amounts in every U.S. State. We found huge variation across U.S. States, depending on ability to pay and preferences to meet a certain level of social standard and other (social) objectives such as child care, family maintenance, and work support and employment programs.

The 1996 welfare reform highlights America's emphasis on work. PRWORA represented a shift in the way the United States attempts to address poverty, as well as a general change in the philosophy about how poverty reduction strategies should be implemented. Although welfare reform increased work, the earnings of most individuals who left welfare are still below the poverty line, for some at 50 percent of the poverty line, even many years after their exit. Another drawback of this work-first approach is the termination of cash assistance after five years, especially for vulnerable groups with low skills. In the wake of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (which altered spending on a number of social service programs) States are beginning to provide low-income families, even those families who have left the TANF program, with additional resources.⁹⁴ These resources are often designed to create incentives to work by providing supplemental payments to families' employment-earned household income.⁹⁵

Poverty is a problem that impacts more than 1 in 7 Americans (14.5 percent of the population). The poverty rate is even higher for children in the

⁹⁴ The welfare reform law was reauthorized by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and extended until 2010. The Deficit Reduction Act was intended to reduce mandatory (entitlement) federal spending (Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, farm subsidies, etc.) through changes in program requirements set by revised or new federal laws. In some cases it allows for spending on new programming by providing more state discretion on programs and spending.

⁹⁵ Schott and Levinson, TANF Benefits Are Low And Have Not Kept Pace With Inflation: But Most States Have Increased Benefits Above a Freeze Level in Recent Years.

United States, 19.9 percent of whom are living in poverty, with nearly one-half of children under the age of 3 living in poor or low-income households. It is under this backdrop that changes to the TANF program must be considered. TANF has been up for reauthorization since 2010 and has been extended for several years with no major changes to the program. In 2015, a TANF reauthorization draft is being considered in the Committee on Ways and Means in the United States House of Representatives and if passed would make some significant changes to the program, including, adding outcome measurements, eliminating the marriage penalty, eliminating the case load reduction credit and making very significant changes to the program. Whether or not this legislation moves forward, changes to TANF are likely in the near future and carefully considering what has worked and what has not for poor families is a critical part of making successful modifications to the program.

Our interpretation of the literature is that welfare reform policies (TANF) had limited success in reducing poverty. With the slowly recovering economy and job market, low-income families need significantly more support. Supplemental cash assistance programs and education and job training that aid less-skilled workers in both finding and sustaining employment will be necessary for welfare reform in the United States to be successful in reducing poverty and supporting families in difficult economic times. If moving people from welfare to work is the goal of U.S. welfare policy, it is important to ensure that a living wage can be obtained through work, and that the costs of childcare and transportation do not exceed the income gained through employment. Automatically adjusting the U.S. minimum wage for inflation annually might be one complementary policy change that would serve to support working families facing these challenges. Moreover, one could argue that recipients who reach time limits without meeting work requirements should be offered a chance to work in community service jobs in return for cash assistance.⁹⁶

When TANF is reauthorized, it is important that the funding allocated is appropriate for the program's scope. Additionally, TANF's goals should be clarified; TANF's role as both a work program and the primary source of support for the most impoverished families is not realistic given the program's resources. If TANF is to remain a program that addresses the needs of the poorest families in the United States through supplemental income, work, and family supports, it is critical that we address these needs adequately. TANF, as a critical component of the U.S. safety net, must be flexible in meeting the needs of the most disadvantaged families in the most difficult economic times including the ability to better respond to recessions and unforeseen natural disasters. Finally, for

⁹⁶ S.H. Danziger, and S.K. Danziger, "The U.S. Social Safety Net and Poverty: Lessons Learned and Promising Approaches," PSC Research Report No. 05-580 (2005), 10.

TANF to continue to be a key piece of the U.S. effort to reduce poverty, it must be measured accordingly. Instead of measuring caseloads, it needs to include outcome measures that would allow for States to be evaluated on how well they are serving families, with particular attention to serving families in deep poverty and those with significant barriers to work.

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Annex A: Number of Recipients Means-tested Benefits by Program, 1970-2013 (thousands)

Abbreviations: Medicaid = medical assistance for aged, blind, disabled, certain pregnant women, or dependent children; SSI = Supplemental Security Income (federally administered cash assistance for aged, blind, and disabled); AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children.

Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 50-51), The United States Department of Agriculture, The United States Census Bureau.

	Cash	Administration	Work	Child	Work	Other	Total
State	Assistance		Supports	Care	Supports	Expenditures	
Alabama	0.269	0.143	0.123	0.032	0.022	0.411	1
Alaska	43.3	5.2	14.1	30.7	0.6	6.0	100
Arizona	-5.8	11.7	2.3	2.7	0.1	89.0	100
Arkansas	8.4	8.9	15.0	5.5	2.0	60.2	100
California	45.9	7.9	7.2	12	2.6	24.4	100
Colorado	22.4	6.6	0.7	0.4	2.6	67.4	100
Connecticut	16.8	6.0	3.3	7.3	1.0	65.6	100
Delaware	15.5	-0.2	1.7	68.7	0	14.3	100
District of Columbia	23.3	2.9	14.8	30.1	6.3	22.6	100
Florida	17.4	3	5.8	34.4	0.6	38.8	100
Georgia	9.6	3.2	-0.1	4.5	4.1	78.8	100
Hawaii	26.2	6.1	38.7	5.3	1.6	22.0	100
Idaho	14.2	12.1	13.5	23.3	0.6	36.4	100
Illinois	7.0	2.4	2.7	55.6	2.2	30.2	100
Indiana	10.4	6.4	5.7	27.8	12.1	37.6	100
Iowa	25.7	3.4	7.5	21.0	6.3	36.1	100
Kansas	15.8	7.8	0.2	13.0	31.2	32.0	100
Kentucky	36.8	4.3	12.3	26.8	7.8	12.1	100
Louisiana	11.6	9.2	2.9	2.4	8.6	65.4	100
Maine	51.9	2.8	12.9	10.3	12.4	9.6	100
Maryland	23.8	10.5	6.2	4.1	25.3	30.1	100
Massachusetts	29.8	2.9	0.6	26.0	9.6	31.1	100
Michigan	14.5	12.6	5.7	1.4	3.6	62.3	100
Minnesota	21.5	10.6	12.5	12.3	30.8	12.2	100
Mississippi	15.7	3.0	31.0	17.9	15.8	16.5	100
Missouri	25.1	2.3	4.3	10.5	0	57.7	100
Montana	28.6	15.7	22.6	18.6	0	14.5	100
Nebraska	22.3	3.2	17.8	21.6	33.0	2.1	100

Annex B: U.S. State Use of TANF and MOE Funds as a Percent of Total Federal TANF and State MOE Funding, FY 2013

Nevada	48.2	9.0	2.0	0	1.3	39.4	100
New Hampshire	32.7	16.4	9.5	12.0	1.8	27.5	100
New Jersey	23.5	6.3	6.8	5.7	14.7	43.1	100
New Mexico	24.9	5.0	4.1	17	22.3	26.8	100
New York	28.6	6.0	2.2	9.6	25.5	28.1	100
North Carolina	9.5	7.7	6.8	27.7	9.8	38.6	100
North Dakota	15,0	11.7	11.9	3.0	3.8	54.6	100
Ohio	30.1	14.6	3.6	38.1	1.0	12.6	100
Oklahoma	10,0	12.0	0	35.2	12.9	29.9	100
Oregon	43.8	11.5	5.3	3.4	1.2	34.8	100
Pennsylvania	26.0	7.7	7.5	37.9	0.9	20.0	100
Rhode Island	22.7	8.7	5.1	13.1	7.3	43.2	100
South Carolina	15.1	8.3	8.7	1.8	0.8	65.3	100
South Dakota	45.7	10.0	15.3	2.9	0.4	25.7	100
Tennessee	34.0	9.9	22.4	9.3	0	24.4	100
Texas	8.8	8.0	10.3	3.1	0.6	69.1	100
Utah	29.9	9.8	23.2	13.5	0.3	23.3	100
Vermont	21.7	7.7	0.1	31.2	27	12.3	100
Virginia	35.8	7.9	18.8	11	3.1	23.5	100
Washington	23.4	6.9	18.5	15.1	0.3	35.8	100
West Virginia	21.4	18.1	1.3	7.2	20.6	31.4	100
Wisconsin	22.2	3.8	5.7	33.1	7.9	27.3	100
Wyoming	7.5	22.5	5.4	11.1	0	53.4	100
Totals	27.6	7.2	6.4	15.8	9	33.9	100

Abbreviations: MOE = States are required to contribute, from their own funds, at least \$10.4 billion in total under what is known as a "maintenance-of-effort" (MOE) requirement. Admin = Administrative Expenditures; CCFD =Child Care and Development Fund; SSBG = Social Service Block Grant.

Source: Falk (2014). Congressional Research Service based on data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

	Share of people in poverty receiving TANF, FY 13	Share of the unemployed receiving unemployment benefits, FY 13	Share of eligible people that receive SNAP, FY 11
United States	19	41	79
Alabama	17	32	85
Alaska	6	84	68
Arizona	9	26	79
Arkansas	5	37	74
California	57	47	57
Colorado	11	34	66
Connecticut	9	59	85
Delaware	4	43	85
District of Columbia	5	45	99
Florida	10	30	82
Georgia	7	42	83
Hawaii	11	49	61
daho	1	41	85
llinois	8	40	84
ndiana	10	29	71
owa	13	43	87
Kansas	8	38	69
Kentucky	15	34	90
Louisiana	6	25	77
Maine	6	38	100
Maryland	15	39	81
Aassachusetts	36	56	88
Aichigan	19	41	99
Ainnesota	12	44	77
Aississippi	7	34	79

Annex C: Variations in Participation in TANF, Unemployment Benefits and SNAP

Missouri	27	36	91
Montana	4	52	75
Nebraska	6	36	69
Nevada	7	42	69
New Hampshire	3	27	78
New Jersey	25	62	67
New Mexico	11	37	86
New York	30	54	79
North Carolina	8	38	83
North Dakota	2	38	75
Ohio	31	33	85
Oklahoma	7	29	85
Oregon	21	50	100
Pennsylvania	36	58	84
Rhode Island	5	41	82
South Carolina	10	30	80
South Dakota	3	17	79
Tennessee	40	27	95
Texas	5	31	72
Utah	5	29	79
Vermont	6	46	97
Virginia	19	25	79
Washington	39	43	100
West Virginia	8	49	86
Wisconsin	24	55	89
Wyoming	0	37	57

Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Reaching Those in Need, 2014, The National Employment Law Project, 2013 & the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors, 2014

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