

Scenario planning meets frame analysis

Using citizens' frames as test conditions for policy measures

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Abstract

Policy-makers expect that policy measures will lead to specific results. Generally, not all citizens respond as expected. One of the potential reasons is that citizens' frames do not always align with the policy frame. Combining insights from the literature on frame analysis and scenario planning, especially the idea of wind tunneling, this paper presents a conceptual framework in which citizens' frames are used as test conditions for policy measures. The framework consists of three steps: the reconstruction of a policy frame, the reconstruction of contrasting citizens' frames and wind tunneling. We studied two cases in the justice domain. The results indicate that the framework induces policy-makers to look beyond the official policy frame, to anticipate diverse reactions to policy measures, and to consider a broader set of policy options.

Keywords

Scenario planning, frame analysis, wind tunnelling, policy

Published in *Futures*, Volume 77, March 2016, Pages 28–44

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.01.005>

1. INTRODUCTION

Well-meant policy measures do not always work out well. Policy-measures are generally based on a policy theory. Hoogerwerf (1990: 285) defines a policy theory as the “causal and other assumptions underlying a policy”. Leeuw (1991: 74) states that a policy theory is “a system of social and behavioral assumptions that underlie a public policy which have been reformulated in the form of propositions.” Other authors use slightly different terms to express similar ideas. Schön and Rein (1994: 23) see policy positions as “resting on underlying structures of beliefs, perceptions, and appreciations, which we call ‘frames’ ”.

The assumptions that constitute a policy theory are not necessarily correct or uncontroversial. Policy-makers may try to increase the effectiveness of and the public support for public policy. For that purpose, they may try to improve their policy theory or policy frame. They may do this in a number of ways. For one thing, they may sharpen ideas on what constitutes effective policy measures by using knowledge of different actors.

In the first place, one could think of knowledge of *scientists*. This is what typically occurs in policy evaluations. A policy evaluation effectively amounts to comparing a policy theory with scientific knowledge (Leeuw 1991, Astbury & Leeuw, 2010). A policy evaluation can be considered a scientific test of a policy theory. Do policy-makers make correct causal assumptions? Do they have correct ideas of the causes of relevant problems? Do they select effective instruments? In order to be able to answer these questions, a researcher first of all needs to depict the policy theory. The next step is to test the policy theory, based on what is known from the literature or by doing empirical research (cf. Van Noije & Wittebrood, 2010). Such a policy evaluation helps in finding out “what works”.

In the second place, knowledge of *stakeholders* may be relevant. This not necessarily leads to a policy theory being tested against scientific knowledge. Cuppen (2012) argues that policy-makers may improve their policy frame by using knowledge of stakeholders. Stakeholders often disagree on the question of what the goal of policy should be, as well as what the relevant means are for attaining that goal (e.g. policy measures). She argues that diversity of knowledge is essential in dealing with wicked problems. Therefore, she suggests organizing stakeholder dialogues. These dialogues should have the character of a constructive conflict. “Constructive conflict refers to an open exploration and evaluation of competing ideas and knowledge claims in order to achieve new ideas, insights and options for problem solving. It takes place through a process in which participants confront each other’s claims with their own claims, unravel argumentations, make (implicit) assumptions explicit, and jointly develop new ideas that are more robust.” (Cuppen, 2012: 26).

In the third place, knowledge of *citizens* may be important. With “citizens” we simply refer to individuals, individual members of society (generally: inhabitants of a country that may be affected by policy measures). A policy theory may be compared to how citizens see the problem at hand. Citizens may have their own ideas on what the problem is, on what the causes of the problem are and on what instruments can be expected to be effective. Systematically taking account of this information may help policy-makers in increasing the effectiveness of and support for public policy. In this approach, the frames of citizens are used to reflect on a policy frame. The phrase “frame reflection” was coined by Schön and Rein (1994). In heterogeneous societies, one may find dissimilar

citizens' frames. By comparing the policy frame to different citizens' frames, policy-makers may find out what (different) responses can be expected in society.

What the three lines have in common is that a policy frame is compared to the frames of other actors: scientists, stakeholders and citizens.¹ To enable such a comparison, it is necessary to reconstruct the policy frame. If such a reconstruction is based on what policy-makers say, this frame may be called a "rhetorical frame". If the reconstruction is based on what policy-makers do, the frame may be called an "action frame" (Rein & Schön, 1996: 90-91).

The three lines serve different goals (finding out what works, getting to grips with wicked problems, anticipating diverse reactions). In this paper we focus on the third line: the use of citizens' frames to reflect on a policy frame. For a number of reasons, such a reflection may be relevant. It may, first of all, help policy-makers to understand how citizens react to policy-measures. Second, it may help in anticipating reactions to policy-measures. Moreover, explicitly taking account of differences between citizen's frames may help in anticipating diverse reactions in a heterogeneous society.

In order to systematically use citizens' frames to reflect on policy frames, this paper develops a conceptual framework. This framework combines insights from the literature on frame analysis and on scenario planning. The latter literature suggests that different scenarios can be used as test conditions to test the effectiveness of policy-measures under different conditions. In our framework, different citizens' frames are used to test how policy-measures are received under different conditions.

Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 first shows how the framework can be operationalized in practice: how to reconstruct a policy frame, how to reconstruct citizens' frames and how to use different citizens' frames to test policy measures? We studied two cases within the Dutch ministry of security and justice. The first case regards "support for victims", the second "confidence in the judiciary". Section 4 reflects on the findings. Why, when and how to use citizens' frames to test policy measures? What are limitations and potential extensions of the framework?

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Frames and framing

There is an extensive literature on frame analysis. Here we focus on the elements we need for our conceptual framework.² The seminal work in the field is Goffman's *Frame Analysis* (1974). The subtitle of Goffman's book is: *an essay on the organization of experience*. The book is about how individuals answer the question "What is going on here?". Goffman describes a frame as "a scheme of interpretation in which the particulars of the events and activities to which we attend are organized and made sensible. Frames lead people to notice particular aspects of an interaction,

¹ Scientists, stakeholders and citizens constitute partly overlapping sets of individuals. For instance, a small part of the citizens will have relevant scientific knowledge. And not all scientists will be inhabitants of the country affected by the policy measures. Scientists, stakeholders and citizens tend to have different types of knowledge and may have different types of input in public decisions (cf. Glicken, 1999, 2000).

² Recent overviews of the literature are Van Hulst & Yanow (2016) and Cornelissen & Werner (2015).

event or phenomenon at a subconscious level, which shapes how they interpret what is around them". Goffman (1974: 7) uses the concept roughly in the way Gregory Bateson (1972) used it earlier in the "ur-text for frame analysis" (Van Hulst & Yanow (2016:94)). Lakoff (2004: XV) takes a similar position "Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world."

An implication is that individuals with different frames tend to see the world differently. Schön and Rein (1994: 23) see policy controversies as disputes in which the contending parties hold conflicting frames. Frames are generally tacit. Policy controversies tend to be unproductive if they stem from conflicting frames that are largely unknown. In order to reflect on the conflicting frames that underlie policy controversies, we must become aware of our frames (Schön & Rein, 1994: 34). Therefore, Schön and Rein (1994) advocate for "frame reflection".

It is important to make a distinction between "frames" and "framing" (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016: 93; Cornelissen & Werner, 2014: 197). Frame is generally used in a static way. Given an existing frame, a scheme of interpretation, an observer interprets the world around him. Framing is often used in a dynamic way. An actor may try to influence the frames of other actors and, therefore, the way they interpret the world. In this paper we mostly refer to frames in a static sense.

In an extensive review of the literature on framing and frame analysis Cornelissen and Werner (2014) make a distinction between studies on the micro, meso and macro-level. Micro studies focus on cognitive frames of reference. In this literature cognitive frames are defined as knowledge structures that help individuals to organize and interpret incoming perceptual information by fitting it into already available cognitive representations from memory. Meso studies deal with frames and framing in organizations and social movements. Within organizations there may be "framing contests" (Kaplan, 2008) and within social movements we may observe "frame-alignment processes" (Snow et al., 1986; Benford, 1993). In the literature at the macro level is about the role of institutions. Institutions provide "taken for granted cognitive frames" (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014 : 207) and may influence frames at the micro level. Since we are especially interested in the question how individuals react to policy-measures, this paper fits in the micro-level literature.

If you want to understand how an individual reacts to a specific event, it helps if you are aware of this individual's frame. This frame, after all, determines how this individual interprets the world around him. By implication: if a policy-maker wants to understand how individuals react to a policy-measure, it helps if this policy-maker knows the frames of the individuals.

2.2 Dealing with multiple citizens' frames

2.2.1 Policy frames versus citizens' frames


As indicated in the introduction, policy measures are, at least implicitly, based on a policy theory. The term "policy theory" refers to the assumptions underlying a policy. In this literature slightly different definitions can be found. The probably most concise definition is formulated by Van Noije and Wittebrood (2010): a policy theory is a set of assumed causal mechanisms between means and ends. In this definition three elements can be distinguished. First of all, a policy is goal directed. Typically

the goal will be the mitigation or elimination of certain societal problems. Secondly, there must be an idea of the causes of these problems. That is, there must be an idea of the model that explains the phenomena of interest. Finally, there must be an idea on how the use of means will play out. In other words, why can it be expected that the use of specific instruments will be effective? Consistent with this definition of a policy theory, in this paper we make a distinction between three essential elements of a policy theory: a definition of societal problems, the attribution of these problems to causes, and a selection of instruments to address the problems. In fact in our terminology, a policy theory *is* a policy frame. Looking through the lens of a policy frame, a policy-maker “observes” specific problems, attributes these problems to specific causes and selects policy measures.³

A policy frame may or may not coincide with a citizen’s frame. Frame alignment yields a positive response, and frame disalignment yields a negative response (Snow et al., 1986). In a perfectly homogeneous society, all citizens would react identically to a specific set of policy measures. In reality, society consists of heterogeneous individuals. There are multiple citizens’ frames. Consequently, one can expect dissimilar reactions to selected policy measures.

The framing perspective helps in understanding why individuals may react differently to government policy. A frame determines, as stated before, 1. The phenomena an individual perceives to be problems, 2. The factors he considers to be the causes of these problems, and 3. The instruments he considers to be adequate to address the problems. Thus conceived, an individual can be expected to support government policy if: the governments addresses the “real problems”, these problems are attributed to “the real causes” and uses “effective instruments”. Consequently, an individual may oppose government policy if the government does not address the real problems (“They are tackling the wrong problems”), does not attribute the (real) problems to the real causes (“They don’t understand what causes the problems”), or chooses instruments that are considered to be ineffective (“They are taking measures that won’t work”).

Figure 1. Three dimensions and potential reactions



³ As a matter of fact, there will not always be consensus among policy-makers on the problems, causes and instruments. That is, there may be some variation in policy frames. Kaplan (2008) conceptualizes strategy-making as a framing contest that may lead to a predominant frame.

The three dimensions of a frame and the potential reactions are shown in figure 1. The first one is clearly normative: it is about what an individual considers to be desirable or undesirable.⁴ The second element is positive rather than normative: it is about “what-causes-what”. These are, in principle, testable hypotheses. The third element also contains testable hypotheses: is a policy instrument effective? Within a frame, statements on “ought” and “is” appear to be related.

This idea is clearly illustrated by Lakoff (2004, 2008). Lakoff presents an analysis of differences between progressives and conservatives in the United States. According to Lakoff (2008:44), they do not only have different goals and values. They also have different modes of thought. Behind every progressive policy lies a single moral value: empathy, together with the responsibility and strength to act on that empathy. Conservatives begin with the notion that morality is obedience to an authority that knows right from wrong. Lakoff (2008:77) hypothesized two versions of the family that would correspond to idealized versions of the nation: the strict father family and the nurturant parent family. The strict father and the nurturing parent frames each force a certain logic (Lakoff, 2004: 17).⁵

2.2.2 Wind tunneling

If policy-makers consider implementing specific policy measures, they may want to know what responses can be anticipated. For that purpose, policy-makers may test what responses can be expected to originate from a number of citizens’ frames. Citizens’ frames can, in other words, be used as test conditions for policy measures.

The idea of testing policy measures in multiple citizens’ frames is inspired by the literature on scenario planning. Therefore, we concisely discuss some elements from this literature.⁶ Essentially, scenario planning is a method to prepare for future developments. Future developments are, at least to some degree, uncertain. Scenario planning takes this uncertainty as a starting-point. Therefore, in scenario planning processes various scenarios are developed. Scenarios are plausible images of future developments. They can be used to test whether strategies are robust or flexible enough to deal with divergent future developments an organization may be confronted with. The evaluation of options against multiple futures is known as ‘wind tunneling’ of strategic options (Van der Heijden, 1997). In fact, wind tunneling can be considered the basic idea behind scenario implementation (Chermack, 2011: 172). Van der Heijden (2005: 284) suggests using a scenario-option matrix. Such a matrix gives an overview of how policy options work out in different scenarios. An option that works quite well in all scenarios is called a robust option (De Ruijter, 2014: 93).

⁴ Figure 1 intends to show that reactions to policy measures may refer to three dimensions: problems, causes and instruments. The dichotomy agree or disagree is a simplification. Agreement is a matter of degree. That is: individuals may to some extent agree with policy-makers ideas on problems, causes and instruments.

⁵ It is not only in the frames of citizens and policy-makers that normative and positive elements tend to be related. This may also be the case in the frames of scientists. As James Tobin (1974: 62) put it: “There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to the right of New Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare.” Swank (1994: 137) quoted Tobin in a paper on partisan views on the economy.


⁶ See for instance Schwartz (1996), Van der Heijden (2005), Ralston & Wilson (2006), Chermack (2011), De Ruijter (2014).

Answering the question of how policy measures work out in different scenarios, helps in preparing for future developments. If possible, the government may select robust policy options, i.e. options that work out well in all scenarios. Furthermore, it may help in reducing response time. Thinking through a number of scenarios may help in recognizing future developments. According to Peter Schwartz (1996: 192) using scenarios is “rehearsing the future”. Arie de Geus (1997) suggests that scenarios create “memories of the future”. These memories can serve as actual experience (Chermack & Swanson, 2008: 138). Therefore, memories of the future may decrease the response time of an organization to external changes in the environment because the situations have been considered (Chermack, Lynham & Ruona, 2001: 27). In order to recognize new developments, it is important to know how actual developments relate to the development paths depicted in the scenarios (Schwartz, 1996: 246). For that purpose, one may develop a monitor mechanism (Botterhuis et al., 2010) or signposts (Splint & Van Wijck, 2012).

2.2.3 Citizens’ frames as test conditions

The wind tunnel test in scenario planning essentially comes down to the question of how policy measures work out in different scenarios. Similarly, one can consider the question of how policy measures are received in different citizens’ frames. The line of reasoning is summarized in figure 2.

Figure 2. Policy frames versus citizens’ frames



The basic idea is that a citizen’s judgment on policy is based on the question of whether the policy frame and the frames of citizens do align. The starting-points of the figure are a policy frame (left-upper corner) and citizens’ frames (right-upper corner). Arrow 1 and 2 indicate that citizens’

judgements depend on both frames. A citizen can be expected to respond positively in case of frame alignment. Negative responses can be expected if policy-makers do not address “the real problems”, do not attribute problems to “the real causes”, or do not select “adequate instruments”. If frames do not align policy-makers are faced with the question of how to deal with it (arrow 3). First, policy-makers may reconsider the policy frame (arrow 4). That is, are there reasons to reconsider the definition of problems, the attribution to causes, and/or the selection of instruments? Such a “reframing” effectively amounts to the formulation of a new (or adjusted) policy-frame. Second, policy-makers may try to influence citizens’ frames (arrow 5). This may lead to a change in what citizens define as problems, what they consider to be the causes of problems and what they consider to be adequate instruments to deal with the problems.

Consider the case where a policy frame and one or more citizens’ frames do not align. In this case, a negative response to selected policy measures can be expected. In such a case, the government may want to reduce the gap between the policy frame and citizens’ frames.

First, the government may reconsider the policy frame. If a policy-frame does not align with citizens’ frames, policy-makers may try to find a new consonance between citizens’ frames and the policy frame (cf. Normann, 2001: 241). Frame-reflection (Schön & Rein, 1994) may lead to “reframing”, an adjustment of the policy-frame (Normann, 2001: 4). This is shown in the left hand side feedback loop in figure 2 (arrow 4). Following the literature on scenario planning, we distinguish four potential strategies (Van der Heijden, 1997).⁷

The first is known as a *robust strategy*. Selecting robust options essentially boils down to choosing policy options that are received well in all citizens’ frames. The advantage of such a strategy, is that the selected options are broadly supported. A disadvantage is that a number of measures that are (known to be) effective may not be implemented, simply because part of the population does not believe these measures to be effective. The second is called a *gambling strategy*. In this approach it is not only robust options that are selected. Policy-makers implement a broader set of options that are received well in a selected citizens’ frame. They accept that citizens with other frames will be discontented. The third variant is a *multiple coverage strategy*. This approach leads to the selection of a broader set of policy options. Seen from the perspective of a particular frame, some measures will not be received well. However, this may be compensated by other measures. By choosing a proper mix of policy measures, it is possible to obtain support of dissimilar groups. The fourth variant is a *flexible strategy*. In a scenario context, a flexible strategy essentially amounts to keeping options open as long as possible. Policy-makers prepare options for different scenarios and, if possible, postpone the implementation until it is clear what scenario is actually unfolding. A flexible strategy is about creating resilience. On the one hand, there are costs involved in preparing options for different scenarios. On the other hand, preparing options yields benefits (because it leads to a reduction in response time). In a framing context, a flexible strategy is about preparing for different citizens’ frames and trying to implement the most suitable measures.

Second, policy-makers may try to influence citizens’ frames. This is shown in the right hand feedback (arrow 5). This is a fifth potential strategy to reduce the gap between the policy and

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A similar distinction can be found in Schnaars & Ziamou (2001).

citizens' frames: *Influencing citizens' frames*. In order to reduce the tension between policy frame and citizen's frames, the government may engage in a communication strategy. That is, the government may try to convince people that the selected measures really are effective. Alternatively, communication may be focused on target groups. If effective, this would lead to a change in citizen's frames and, ideally, produce frame alignment.

3. CASES

In section 2 we presented our conceptual framework. In this section we turn to the question of how the framework can be operationalized and applied to cases. For that purpose we focus on two cases in the justice domain. First, we present some information on the context (section 3.1). Next turn to the operationalization of the model (section 3.2). Finally, we discuss the two cases (sections 3.3 and 3.4).

3.1 Context

When developing the framework, we were affiliated to the strategy department of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. The ministry is responsible for a broad policy domain. The domain includes security, drug policy, crime and juvenile delinquency, legislation and enforcement. The focus is on policy-making in both national and international areas. The ministry comprises a number of policy departments, including the judicial system department and the sanction and prevention policy department. Our aim was to develop a framework that is helpful to policy-makers in a heterogeneous society.

We studied two cases to find out whether the framework can be fruitfully applied in policy-making. The first case regards "support for victims". In this case we cooperated with policy-makers affiliated to the sanction and prevention policy department. The second case regards "confidence in the judiciary". In this case we cooperated with policy-makers affiliated with the judicial system department. Our role was to act as strategy consultants. We designed the process, acted as facilitators of workshops, and analysed the results. The policy-departments arranged participation in the process and the budget for organizing focus groups (to discussed in 3.3.2).

We were especially interested in whether our framework helps policy-makers to reflect on their policy frame. Investigation this question requires cooperation of policy-makers. And this presumes that they are interested in the results and that they are willing to spend time and money on the project. This turned out to be the case for "support for victims" and "confidence in the judiciary".

3.2 Operationalization

In order to apply our framework in practice, we have to operationalize the three steps: the reconstruction of the policy frames, the reconstruction of citizens' frames and the wind tunneling.

3.2.1 Reconstructing policy frames

The assumptions underlying policy are often implicit, implying that policy frames have to be reconstructed (Leeuw, 2003; Van Noije & Wittebrood, 2010). In order to reconstruct a policy frame, we want to have a representation of the problems addressed by policy-makers, of the causes these problems are attributed to, and of the instruments the policy-makers consider to be effective. For that purpose we not only consult policy documents; we also consult policy-makers on the three elements of a policy frame. For our purpose, developing a method that helps policy-makers to anticipate the reactions of different groups in society, it is important to involve policy-makers in the process. We select policy-makers in collaboration with the responsible policy direction. In this way, we are able to reconstruct a policy frame. Since the reconstruction is based on what policy-makers say, this approach yields, what Rein and Schön (1994: 90) call, “rhetorical frames”. In practice we discussed the building blocks of the policy frame with policy-makers.⁸ In this discussion we collected statements on problems, causes and instruments. We summarized the statements and checked whether the formulations were correct. In this way we arrive at the ministry’s “official policy frame”.⁹

3.2.2 Reconstructing citizens’ frames


In the second step we would like to find representations of contrasting citizens’ frames. That is, we are not looking for the frame of an average citizen or a representative citizen. On the contrary, we would like to portray frames of dissimilar groups in society. Partly for institutional reasons, we decided to use focus groups.¹⁰ The Dutch ministry of security and justice uses the so-called *Justice Issue Monitor* to track changes in public opinion. This monitor, *inter alia*, makes use of focus group research. These focus groups are organized by research bureau SmartAgent. To classify individuals, SmartAgent uses a segmentation model called Brand Strategy Research (BSR). Based on this segmentation model it is possible to organize contrasting groups. The BSR framework can be represented in a map divided by two axes. “The first (horizontal) axis is called the ‘sociological’ axis and indicates how a person relates to the social environment: the right side indicates involvement (belonging), the left side indicates independence (affirmation). The second (vertical) axis is called the ‘psychological’ axis and indicates how a person copes with ‘tensions’: the top side indicates an expression of ‘tensions’ (extravert), and the bottom side indicates a suppression or ignorance of ‘tensions’ (introvert).” (Van Hattum & Hoijtink, 2009: 299). See figure 3.

⁸ We present more details in the description of the two cases.

⁹ Cf. “the official future” in the scenario planning literature. The official future is: “The explicit articulation of a set of commonly held beliefs about the future external environment that a group, organization, or industry implicitly expects to unfold. Once articulated, the official future captures an organization’s shared assumptions—or mental map” (Scarce & Fulton (2004: 88)). The official future can be considered to be the consensus forecast (Chermack, 2011: 145).

¹⁰ In our experience, the acceptability of a project and the outcomes of a project is increased if the project is related to established instruments within the organisation. In section 4 we will reflect on this choice.

Figure 3. Typology of individuals



Van Dam, Van Hattum & Schieven (2013: 4) give the following characterization of the four groups (“motivational clusters”):

- *Red World of Vitality*: In this world the main drivers are personal growth by exploring, testing boundaries and discovering new things. Typical characteristics are: open-minded, self-conscious, adventurous, passion, energetic, creative, always looking for the unusual.
- *Blue World of Control*: Persons from this cluster like to be in control over their emotions and feelings and have a need to stand out from the crowd, intellectually and materially. They have a desire to be seen as successful. Typical characteristics are: individualistic, rational, ambitious, competitive, wise, capable, and career oriented.
- *Yellow World of Harmony*: Connecting with other (new) people is a main driver in this world. Persons in this world like to share their life, experiences and emotions with other people in a harmonious way. They can be described as spontaneous, kind, open, enthusiastic, helpful, caring and optimistic.
- *Green World of Safety*: Persons from this cluster strive to feel safe and protected, and have a need to belong to a certain culture or a group. Order, discipline, routine and following the norms of that group give them stability and structure. They can be described as calm, cautious, conservative and traditional.

A focus group consists of 8 individuals. On our request the research bureau selected four groups, one group of each colour. Furthermore, we requested groups with a balanced composition in terms of sex and age.

In order to be able to reconstruct citizens’ frames, we use an interview protocol. This protocol consists of four building blocks. First, we ask respondents about their associations with the topic discussed in the focus group. Second, we focus on what the respondents consider to be problems. Third, we ask what they consider to be the causes of these problems. Finally, we turn to the question of what would be suitable instruments. The discussion is led by an experienced moderator. We watch the discussion in the focus groups via CCTV. The discussions provide the basis for the reconstruction of four citizens’ frames. In reconstruction the frames, we use verbatim reports of the discussions.

3.2.3 Wind tunneling

In the third step we focus on the relation between policy and citizens' frames. More specifically, what we want to achieve is that policy-makers reflect on the question of how the policy frame relates to dissimilar citizens' frames. For that purpose we organize a session with policy-makers. We ask them to consider policy measures taken from their policy frame (step 1). Then we ask them to assume that this measure is implemented and to consider a specific citizens' frame. How will this type of citizen react to the policy measure? This question is asked for all policy measures from step 1 and for all citizens' frames reconstructed in step 2.

Depending on the answers, we fill in a "+" (good), "0" (neutral), or "-" in a "frame option matrix". Exactly as in the case of scenario planning, such a matrix is a useful device in a wind-tunnelling exercise test. Are there any robust options (policy measure a in the example) ? And how to deal with options that yield different effects in different citizens' frames (policy measure b in the example)? (cf. Van der Heijden, 2005: 284).

Example of a frame option matrix

	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3	Frame 4
Policy measure a	+	+	+	+
Policy measure b	+	+	-	-
...				
Policy measure z	-	-	-	-

3.3 CASE 1: Support for victims

The first case concerns support for victims. Support for victims is one of the policy-goals of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. In this section, we report on the reconstruction of the policy frame, citizens' frames and wind tunneling.

3.3.1 Step 1. Policy frame

In order to reconstruct the policy frame we consulted policy documents¹¹ and we organized a session with policy-makers. In May 2011 we organized a session on "Support for victims". The participants of this session are affiliated to the sanctions and prevention policy department within the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. Nine policy-makers participated in the session. They were asked about the problems experienced by victims, the causes of these problems and the policy instruments directed at victim support. Based on these answers, we were able to reconstruct the policy frame. According to the policy-makers, victims of crime are in need of support directed at recovery. Furthermore, victims are in need of acknowledgement and fairness. The main elements are summarized in table 1.

¹¹ Especially Ministerie van Justitie, 2007. This is a policy review that reflects on support for victims.

Table 1. Policy frame support for victims

Problems and causes	Policy instruments
<p>1. Victims of crime are in need of support directed at recovery</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Want to get back to normal • Want to know where to find help • Need for safety 	<p>1. Support directed at recovery</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Information on where to find help b. Specialized / specific help for selected target groups (for instance: surviving relatives, victims of identity fraud) c. Providing safety (preventing repetition, anonymity, etc.) d. Seamless transfers within the system, continuity of victim support
<p>2. Victims of crime are in need of acknowledgement and fairness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Want to be treated respectfully and to be informed well • Want to have a role in criminal proceedings • Want to be consulted • Want to receive compensation (preferably paid by the injurer) • Want retribution • Want minimization of secondary victimization 	<p>2. Acknowledgement and fairness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Proper implementation of existing regulation b. Standardization in order to increase reliability c. Courses for employees involved in informing victims (proper treatment) d. One computer system to increase reliability and consistency of information e. Restorative justice, facilitate victim-offender mediation


3.3.2 Step 2. Citizens' frames

As explained in section 3.1.3 we use focus groups in order to reconstruct citizen's frames. We organized four focus groups on support for victims in May 2011 (a "red world of vitality", a "yellow world of harmony", a "green world of safety", and a "blue world of control", 8 participants each). The discussions in the focus groups were structured along the following line:

- What are your associations with victims of crime?
- What problems are victims of crime confronted with?
- What are the causes of those problems?
- What do you consider to be adequate solutions, what is an adequate support for victims?

Based on the verbatim reports of the discussions in the focus groups, we were able to reconstruct citizens' frames. In reconstructing the frames, we accentuate consensus within groups and contrasts between groups. The frames are summarized in figure 4.

Figure 4. Citizens' frames support for victims



The horizontal axis (ego vs group orientation) in this case effectively regards the question of where the responsibility for the solution of victims' problems should be allocated. It is the victims' *own responsibility* to solve their problems versus it is a *shared responsibility* to solve the victims' problems. In the (ego-oriented) red and the blue frame, solving problems is considered to be the responsibility of victims themselves. In the (group-oriented) yellow and the green frame, solving problems is a shared responsibility; the social environment or (formal) institutions assume part of the responsibility.

The vertical axis (introvert vs extravert) in this case essentially relates to the type of support victims need. Victims primarily want *psychological recovery* versus victims primarily want *instrumental recovery*. In the (extravert) red and the yellow frame there appears to be an accent on psychological recovery. In the red frame victims want to overcome a loss of autonomy. In the yellow

frame, victims want to feel at home again in their social environment. In the (introvert) blue and the green frame, victims first of all want instrumental recovery. They want to get back to normal as soon as possible and they want redress.

3.3.3 Step 3. Wind tunneling

In the third step, we asked a group of 20 policy-makers to consider policy measures taken from their policy frame (October 2011). We asked them to assume that a policy measure is implemented and to consider a specific citizens’ frame. How will this type of citizen react to the policy measure? This yields the following frame-option matrix.

Table 2. Frame-option matrix: support for victims

	Yellow Harmony	Blue Control	Green Safety	Red Vitality
1. Support directed at recovery				
a. Information	+	+	+/-	+
b. Target groups	0	+	+	-
c. Safety	+	0	+	+
d. Seamless transfers	+	+	+/-	+
2. Acknowledgement and justice				
a. Proper implementation	+	+	+	+
b. Standardization	+	-	0	+
c. Courses for employees	+	0	+	+
d. One computer system	0	0	0	+
e. Restorative justice	+	-	-	+/-

The four policy measures under the heading “Support directed at recovery” are generally expected to get a positive response in the four groups. There are, however, a number of exceptions. In the “green world” there may be a negative response to “Information on where to find help”. Providing this information may not amount to referring to other institutions (then: minus rather than plus). In the “red world of vitality” providing specialized / specific help for selected target groups results yields a negative response, because thinking in terms of groups conflicts with the idea that individuals are unique. Measures to achieve seamless transfers within the system generally trigger a positive reaction; a critical response in the “green world of safety” can be expected: seamless transfers may be avoidable transfers (then: minus rather than plus).

The five policy measures under the heading “Acknowledgement and justice” tend to get a more mixed response. First, there are three more or less trivial policy measures that can be expected to trigger a positive or neutral reaction (proper implementation of existing regulation, courses for employees involved in informing victims, and one computer system to increase reliability and

consistency of information). Standardization in order to increase reliability is a more controversial measure. Especially in the blue world there is opposition against standardization in victim support. They want to be in control themselves. The last policy option, “restorative justice, facilitate victim-offender mediation” is very controversial. Restorative justice fits in the Yellow world of Harmony. But it clearly inconsistent with the blue and green world (they want redress rather than harmony). The result in the red group is mixed. The score may be positive if restorative justice helps the victims in mastering the situation, in regaining autonomy.

We now have an overview of policy measures and the responses that can be expected from different types of victims. Such an overview provides a basis for decision-making. The overview, however, does not determine the government’s choice. The choice depends on the strategy. In section 2.2.3 we presented 5 potential strategies.

A *robust strategy* is about selecting policy options that are received well in all citizens’ frames: Information on where to find help, Providing safety, Seamless transfers within the system, Proper implementation of existing regulation, Courses for employees involved in informing victims, One computer system to increase reliability and consistency of information. Caveat: Even for robust options, it may be necessary to think about frame-specific implementation. For instance, providing information on where to find help is a robust option. The type of help is, however, frame-specific. Consequently, there is no one-size-fits-all provision of information.

A *gambling strategy* leads to the selection of options received well by selected citizens’ frame. Focussing on the yellow frame would, for instance, include the introduction of restorative justice, even though this will trigger negative reactions from the blue and the green world.

In a *multiple coverage strategy* a mix of policy measures is chosen in order to obtain support of dissimilar groups. In such a strategy, a policy-maker may look for “compensating measures”. If a group responds negatively to a specific measure, a policy-maker may simultaneously implement a positively valued measure. At first sight, 1b (negatively valued by red group) and 2 b (positively valued by red group) appears to be such a combination. These measures, however, seem to be inconsistent. Specific help for selected target groups (1b) is hard to combine with standardization (2b).

Implementing a *flexible strategy* is about being prepared to start or to stop options. For instance: preparing a program to introduce restorative justice (so that it can be implemented of “the yellow world” becomes dominant), or preparing measures to stop “specialized / specific help for selected target groups” (so that these measures can be taken if the “blue world” becomes dominant.)

A *communication strategy* effectively amounts to selling selected policy measures to dissimilar groups.

The choice of a strategy is, in the end, a political choice. One possible choice is to serve a selected part of the electorate or to address the average citizens. Such a choice effectively amounts to a “one size fits all” solution. For that purpose, one would have to investigate preferences of the selected group or the average citizen and implement corresponding measures. Another possibility is to serve different groups by offering a set of options. In order to implement the most suitable measures, it is important to know the victim’s frame. It is, for instance, important to distinguish between the

“yellow” and “blue” victims in an early stage. “Yellow victims” prefer outreaching care whereas “blue victims” tend to see this as pampering. “Blue victims” have a preference for empowerment whereas “yellow victims” tend to see this as a lack of empathy. To differentiate between different groups, it is essential to develop a selection tool. This would provide the basis for optimal support for victims.

3.4 Case 2. Confidence in the judiciary

The second case concerns confidence in the judiciary. Research findings indicate a relatively high level of confidence in the judiciary in the Netherlands (Dekker & Posthumus, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a very critical public debate going on between politicians, judges, lawyers and citizens.¹² This debate can be interpreted as a manifestation of colliding frames.

3.4.1 Step 1. Policy frame

To reconstruct the policy frame we studied policy documents¹³ and we discussed the building blocks of policy frames with five policy-makers affiliated to the justice systems department of the Dutch ministry of security and justice. Based on these sources we were able to reconstruct the policy frame. This frame can be summarized under three headings: legal quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of litigation. According to policy-makers, confidence in the judiciary can be increased by enhancing legal quality, effectiveness and efficiency. The most important elements are summarized in table 3.

¹² On this debate, see: Frissen et al., 2012; Frissen et al., 2014; Achterberg & Mascini, 2013; Hertogh, 2011.

¹³ Especially a number of parliamentary documents on legal aid (31753, nr. 64), the new judicial map (32891) and on quality and innovation of the judiciary (32450).

Table 3. Policy frame confidence in the judiciary

Problems and causes	Policy instruments
<p>1. Confidence in the judiciary results from <i>legal quality</i> of litigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independency • Impartiality • Legality 	<p>1. Measures to increase legal quality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Selection and (permanent) education of judges b. Internal (professional) control c. External control (oversight by appellate and international courts; disciplinary oversight)
<p>2. Confidence in the judiciary results from <i>effective</i> litigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accessibility • Effective dispute resolution • Accepted outcomes 	<p>2. Measures to increase effectiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Guaranteeing adequate access to justice (legal aid, litigation costs, regional availability) b. Diverse systems of dispute resolution c. Careful procedures d. Adequate communication
<p>3. Confidence in the judiciary results from <i>efficient</i> litigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speed • Costs 	<p>3. Measures to increase efficiency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Streamlining procedures (faster, less complicated) b. Incentives for parties (alignment of individual and social costs & benefits) c. Modern technology

3.4.2 Step 2. Citizens' frames


To reconstruct contrasting citizens' frames we organised four focus groups in September 2012 (a "red world of vitality", a "yellow world of harmony", a "green world of safety", and a "blue world of control", 8 participants each). The discussion was organised along the following items:

- What are your association with the judiciary?
- To what degree do you have confidence in the judiciary?
- What factors may lead to an increase or a decrease in confidence?
- What are (policy) options to increase confidence in the judiciary?

Based on the discussions in the focus group, we reconstructed citizens' frames. The frames are summarized in figure 5.

In all groups confidence in the judiciary is primarily associated with criminal law (rather than civil law). We also observe a number of contrasts between frames. In the extravert frames (the red world of vitality and the yellow world of harmony) citizens are primarily concerned with the behaviour, attitude and language of *actors*. In the introvert groups (the blue world of control and the green world of safety) we see a focus on *the system*, speed and independence.

Figure 5. Citizens' frames confidence in the judiciary



3.4.3 Step 3. Wind tunneling

The final step is to confront policy instruments with citizens' frames, with as leading question: how will citizens in different frames respond to various sorts of policy measures? We discussed this question with policy-makers (November 2012). We asked them how, in their view, various policy measures will influence confidence in the judiciary of different groups of citizens. This yields the following frame-option matrix.

Table 4. Frame-option matrix: confidence in the judiciary

		Yellow Harmony	Blue Control	Green Safety	Red Vitality
1.	Measures to increase legal quality				
	a. Selection and education of judges	-	-	+	+
	b. Internal control	-	+/-	+	-
	c. External control	+/-	0	+	-
2.	Measures to increase effectiveness				
	a. Guaranteeing adequate access to justice	+	+	+	+
	b. Diverse systems of dispute resolution	+	+	-	+
	c. Careful procedures	+	0	+	+
	d. Adequate communication	+	0	0	+
3.	Measures to increase efficiency				
	a. Streamlining procedures	-	+	-	0
	b. Incentives for parties	-	+	+	+
	c. Modern technology	-/0	+	-	+

The three measures under the heading “measures to increase legal quality” appear to be somewhat controversial. They can be expected to work for the green world of safety, who will think that such measures will contribute to a stable and independent judicial system with judges functioning as legal experts. In the yellow world of harmony individuals may be afraid that measures to increase legal quality might lead to a more distant and formal judiciary. In the red world of vitality, individuals consider the selection and education important as it may contribute to the independency of judges, but they will value control-measures negative as they might enhance technicalities and endanger transparency. In the blue world of control individuals will value control measures dependant of, whether they are directed to conformity to legal rules which might harm speed and efficiency or to increasing speed and efficiency.

Measures to increase effectiveness are hardly controversial. These measures fit very well in the yellow frame (in so far as they contribute to an honest and empathetic treatment) and the red frame, but also rather well in the other frames. Guaranteeing adequate access and careful procedures are generally appreciated. The only measure which triggers a negative reaction is to stimulate diversity in systems of dispute resolutions. In the green frame, such measures will be valued negatively because they might threaten legal security.

All measures to increase efficiency will be welcomed in the blue frame. In the red world, individuals will also react quite positive, but only as far as if it does not endanger attention for the uniqueness of a case and the parties involved. In the yellow world, individuals will react negatively as in their view these measures will diminish the room for a sympathetic treatment by an empathetic judge. In the green world, individuals will probably be afraid that increasing efficiency might endanger legal quality delivered by experienced judges.

We now have a general picture about the expected responses of various types of citizens on various types of measures. Green citizens will especially value measures to increase legal quality, blue citizens appreciate measures to increase efficiency and yellow citizens and red citizens welcome measures to increase effectiveness.

This broad picture may help a policy-maker to make the necessary choices on what to do and what strategy to follow. A *robust strategy* implies selecting those options that are received well in all citizens' frames. Following this strategy a policy-maker probably will concentrate on measures that contribute to effectiveness. A policymaker could also choose to follow a *gambling strategy* and make a choice to select only those options that will be received well in on or more selected frames. If a policy-maker, for instance, wants to serve strict citizens he would concentrate on measures to improve legal quality. The policymaker could also decide to focus on pragmatic and self-assured citizens by taking measures that are designed to increase efficiency. In that case the policymaker should realize that these measures are valued quite negative by strict and social citizens. The policy-maker may also opt for a communication strategy in order "to sell the judiciary" (cf. Bybee & Pincock, 2011).

4. REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION

Combining insights from the literature on frame analysis and scenario planning, in section 2 we presented a conceptual framework in which citizens' frames are used as test conditions for policy measures. In section 3 we studied two cases within the Dutch ministry of security and justice. The first case regards "support for victims", the second "confidence in the judiciary". In this section we reflect on our approach. First, we consider the relation to the literature. Then, we turn to the question why to use the approach (what is the value of the approach), and when (under what conditions) and how to use it. Finally, we discuss limitations and potential extensions.

4.1 Relation to the literature

This paper is not the first to combine insights from the literature on scenario planning and frame analysis. In fact, already in Pierre Wack's seminal papers on scenarios there is a relation between scenarios and frames. Wack (1985b: 150) argued that "it is extremely difficult for managers to break out of their worldview while operating within it. When they are committed to a certain way of framing an issue, it is difficult for them to see solutions that lie outside this framework." And "To help reframe our managers' outlook, we charted the 1973 scenarios." (Wack, 1985a: 86). Scenarios can provide alternative 'frames' of the future (Wilkinson and Ramirez, 2010: 53). Also, the idea that multiple frames can be used for "wind tunnelling" can be found in the literature. Ramirez, Österman and Grönquist (2013: 827) state that scenario planning "helps to reframe issues by offering multiple legitimate frames to highlight the limits of the existing dominant frame". Referring to scenario planning, Ted Newland, former head of Shell's scenario team, remarked: "You are trying to manipulate people into being open-minded." (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013: 123). In this context, open-mindedness is essentially the ability to see the possibility of different frames.

A related line of reasoning can be found in Richard Normann's work (Normann, 2001). Characteristic for successful organizations is their ability to maintain consonance between the organization and its environment. This may require strategic change. Normann (2001: 241) refers to this as a "*frame-breaking process*". He makes a distinction between three levels. The first is "adaptation and correction", a continuous improvement within a framework. The second is "frame-breaking reconfiguration" structural change of business to match paradigmatic change in the environment. The third is "recurrent purposeful emergence", capacity and preparedness to achieve reconfiguration when required. Thus conceived it is essential for organization to consider the fit with the environment. For that reason Schön and Rein (1994) argue that "*frame reflection*" is crucial. By comparing the policy frame to different citizens' frames, policy-makers may find out what (different) responses can be expected in society.

The idea of reflecting on the policy frame is central to our conceptual model. Our main contributions to the literature are the following. First, the distinction between the three elements of a frame (problem definition, attribution to causes, and instruments) enables us to link policy theories and policy frames. The distinction helps in interpreting the reactions of citizens to policy measures. On what elements do we find "frame disalignment" that indicates a misfit of policy frames and citizens' frames? Second, we present a three step method to use contrasting citizens' frames as "wind tunnel" conditions. In this way we systematically reconstruct policy frames and citizens' frames and test policy options. Third, we use the various strategies presented by Van der Heijden (1997) as a way to arrive at reframing (Normann, 2001). Fourth, we analyze two cases in the justice domain to investigate whether the model actually helps policy-makers to reflect on a policy frame. And this actually appears to be the case. That is, the framework generates an opportunity for policy-makers to anticipate responses in a heterogeneous society.

4.2 Why use citizens' frames as test conditions?

Policy-makers tend to think in terms of a policy theory. Such a theory comprises a link between a definition of social problems, the attribution of the problems to causes, and the selection of instruments to address these problems. Selected policy-measures make sense in terms of the (official) policy frame. Citizens, however, base their judgements on policy measures on their own frames. These frames do not necessarily align with the policy frame.

The purpose of our paper is to present an approach that helps policy-makers to anticipate responses in a heterogeneous society. If policy frames and citizens' frames do not align, citizens may respond negatively ("they" do not deal with the real problems, "they" do not address the real causes, "they" select ineffective instruments). Explicitly comparing policy frames and citizens' frames, helps in understanding these responses. By better anticipating responses in society, policy-makers may increase the effectiveness of and public support for policy-measures. Applying the approach presented in this paper may, in other words, help in increasing the effectiveness of and public support for policy-measures. We consider this to be the main contribution of the approach presented in this paper.

Our case studies suggest that our approach actually helps policy-makers to put themselves in the shoes of different types of citizens. Presenting different citizens' frames appears to legitimize

policy-makers to think in terms that are different from the policy frame. This helps policy makers to understand why a policy measure that makes sense in terms of the policy theory (such as streamlining of legal procedures) may trigger negative reactions in society (the yellow group, for instance, will expect that an efficient procedure leaves no room for a sympathetic treatment).

Based on these findings, we would advise policy-makers to consider testing what response can be expected to arise from different citizens' frames. That leads to the questions: when and how to do this in practice?

4.3 When?

Although our approach may be applied to any policy-problem, it will not always be a fruitful exercise. Before actually applying the approach in a specific case it is important to consider some preliminary questions. Since our approach is essentially a wind-tunneling exercise, it makes sense to consider the conditions under which scenario thinking is appropriate for addressing policy problems. To find out whether the exercise can be expected to be fruitful, the following questions appear to be relevant (cf. Scarce & Fulton, 2004: 20).

1. How much diversity in opinions can we expect in society? If consensus can be expected, the exercise cannot be expected to generate useful results.
2. Is the organization open to change? That is, is it allowed that the "official policy frame" is not taken for granted? If the top of the organization wants to maintain the status quo, one cannot expect a fruitful discussion.
3. Is the organization open to dialogue? That is, are policy-makers willing to reflect on the "official policy frame"?

If the organization is not open to change or dialogue, in step 1 policy-makers will probably merely present a polished, uncontroversial version of the policy-frame. And in step 3 they will be inclined to say that the policy-measures are perfectly adequate to deal with different citizens' frames. If diversity of opinions can be expected, the organization is open to change and the organization is open to dialogue, policy-makers can fruitfully apply our approach.

4.4 How?

If diversity in opinions can be expected, and the organization is open to change and dialogue, we would suggest to follow our three step approach.

1. Organize a session with policy-makers (ca. 8 participants, 2-3 hours) in order to reconstruct the policy frame. It is crucial to involve policy-makers in this step, because the intention is to induce policy-makers to reflect on the question of how their frame relates to citizens' frames. To collect the necessary input, we would structure the discussion on the basis of three questions: 1. what are the problems addressed in the policy-domain, 2. what are the causes of these problems, 3. what instruments are effective? Based on the answers, one may reconstruct a policy-frame. That

is: draw a coherent picture that links problems, causes and instruments. Check whether the reconstructed policy-frame is an adequate representation of the policy-frame.

2. Organize focus groups (2 hours) in order to reconstruct contrasting citizens' frames. Here it is essential to select, based on a relevant segmentation model, contrasting groups. We would structure the discussion in a focus group along the following line: Associations, problems, causes, instruments. Based on the answers in the focus groups, it is possible to reconstruct contrasting citizens' frames. In our experience it is very helpful to watch the discussion in the focus groups via CCTV, preferably together with a number of policy-makers in the project team.
3. Organize a session with policy-makers (2-3 hours) to test how the measures taken from the policy-frame play out in the different citizens' frames. First, concisely present the policy frame. Next, present a citizens' frame and ask policy-makers how this type of citizens can be expected to react on the policy-measures. Do this for the different citizens' frames. Based on the answers, construct the frame-option matrix.

4.5 Limitations and further development

4.5.1 *Depicting citizens' frames*

As explained in section 3.2.2 we used a specific type of focus groups to find contrasting citizens' frames. We did this partly for institutional reasons: as part of the *Justice Issue Monitor* the Dutch ministry of security and justice uses focus groups based on a specific segmentation model, the BSR model. Using an instrument that is well-known and accepted within the ministry presumably increases the acceptability of the results.

As explained in 3.2.2, our focus groups consisted of 8 individuals. On our request the research bureau selected four groups, one group of each colour. Furthermore, we requested groups with a balanced composition in terms of sex and age. We did not use further criteria.¹⁴ The selection of participants led to groups of non-specialists. By accident (although the probability seems to be rather low) a specialist or a stakeholder could be selected. Since we expect that a specialist or a stakeholder may dominate the discussion in a focus group, it seems to be preferable to select non-specialists only.

We do not suggest that this necessarily yields the best typology. The choice of a typology is, to some extent, arbitrary. Using a different typology can be expected to generate a different set of citizens' frames. Consequently, using a different segmentation model may result in alternative "test-conditions in the wind tunnel". This point is well-known from the literature on scenario planning. Here the basic idea is that scenarios describe plausible developments. It is not expected that future developments will follow the path described in one of the scenarios. Rather, the different scenarios delineate the scope of plausible developments. Similarly, the contrasting citizens' frames specify the scope of potential citizens' frames.

¹⁴ One of our cases concerns support for victims (see 3.3). We intended to have both victims and non-victims in the focus groups. For the "red" group it turned out to be problematic to find non-victims. This is probably due to the "exploring" life style of this group.

The reconstruction of citizens' frames is based on focus groups, consequently on discussions with a small number of citizens. This is qualitative research rather than large scale quantitative research. The details of the citizens' frames may depend on the specific selection of participants. For the purpose of this paper, we do not consider this to be very problematic. We are interested in differences between frames, rather than the details of a specific frame. Given the purpose of our project, we were looking for contrasting frames rather than the frame of the "representative citizen".¹⁵ One may, of course, question the validity of using citizens frames as benchmarks to test policy frames. Citizens generally lack the specialized knowledge of scientists and stakeholders. Non-specialists may make "objectively incorrect assessments" of the causes of problems and of the effectiveness of instruments. Nevertheless, if citizens in fact use their own frames as a benchmark to assess government policy, this assessment is relevant. Although the use of citizens' frames as test conditions for policy measures yields valuable information, we do not consider this test to be an alternative to policy evaluation (i.e. comparing a policy theory with scientific knowledge). Rather, we consider it to be complementary tests, serving different goals.¹⁶ On the one hand, scientific tests are clearly relevant in order to find effective instruments. On the other hand, in order to increase public support it is equally relevant to test how different (groups of) citizens can be expected to respond to selected policy measures.

4.5.2 Iterations

In the two cases discussed in the paper, we took the three steps. Policy-makers were induced to reflect on the question of how their frame related to dissimilar citizens' frames. In fact, this is one iteration only. We did not investigate whether the steps actually resulted in such a reframing that the adjusted policy frame yields a better response to dissimilar citizens' frames. This would be a natural extension (cf. Ramirez et al, 2015). For that purpose one could ask different groups of citizens' how they would react to policy-measures based on the "new policy frame". And this would lead policy-makers to the question of whether the reframing is adequate or whether further adjustments are necessary. The fact that we considered one iteration only is a serious limitation of our approach. More iterations or, even better, a continuous process would be required to develop a capacity to reframe when needed. That is: to achieve "recurrent purposeful emergence" in Normann's terminology (Normann, 2001).

4.5.3 Relation between frames

In the introduction we made a distinction between the frames of different actors: policy-makers, scientists, stakeholders and citizens. Depending on the goal, policy-makers may compare the policy frame to the frames of different types of actors. They may focus on a scientific frame if they aim at selecting instruments that are known to be effective. They may focus on stakeholders' frames if they

¹⁵ In the Dutch population the relative size of the groups is: red 17%, blue 23%, yellow 31% and green 29%. (Smart Agent Company, 2009).

¹⁶ Glicken (2000: 306) takes a similar position: "The type of information provided by non-scientists is different from that provided by technical experts. ... It should not therefore substitute for science, but rather supplement or augment it".

want to get to grips with wicked problems. And they may focus on contrasting citizens' frames in order to be able to anticipate diverse reactions in a heterogeneous society. This was the focus of this paper.

Comparing a policy frame to the frames of scientists, stakeholders, and citizens entail different tests of the policy frame. Note that we do not present "using citizens' frames as test conditions" as an alternative to policy evaluation to find out whether policy instruments are effective. Rather, we consider the approach presented in this paper as complementary.

Focussing on the relation between the frames of two types of actors is, of course, a simplification. As a next step, one may investigate how the frames of different types of actors interact. Stakeholders may, for instance, try to influence citizens' frames.

4.6 Concluding remarks

In this paper we presented a conceptual framework in which citizens' frames are used as test conditions for policy measures. The framework enables policy-makers to anticipate responses in a heterogeneous society. Thinking through these responses helps in increasing the effectiveness of and public support for policy-measures. Our case-studies suggest that the framework actually induces policy-makers to look beyond the official policy frame, to anticipate diverse reactions to policy measures, and to consider a broader set of policy options.

Our cases-studies demonstrate that using contrasting citizens' frames as test conditions for policy measures may yield valuable insights. The question of whether valuable results can be expected in other cases will depend on the circumstances. In cases where diversity in reactions can be expected and the organization is open to change or dialogue, in our view using contrasting citizens' frames as test conditions is a worthwhile exercise.

Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge Carolien Klein Haarhuis, Peter Mascini and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Furthermore we are grateful for many helpful discussions with Ellen van den Berg, Myrthe Feddema, Karin Wittebrood, and Stavros Zouridis.

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