

Organizational Demography

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[AU1](#)

Synonyms

Mortality; Organizational survival; Structure of
government; Termination

Definitions

Termination An organization is considered terminated if it is fully abolished, merged with another organization, or split into different autonomous new entities.

Transition An organization experiences a transition if it is either terminated, absorbed by another organization, or succeeded by another organization with a new name, at a new level of operation, or with other new structural characteristics.

Introduction

24

Do bureaucracies become immortal beyond the control of elected politicians, as popular wisdom (or fear) often suggests? Since Herbert Kaufman (1976) started to investigate this very question, a new strand of research has emerged to study the demography of public organizations, somewhat in line with population ecology approaches in the business literature. Scholars on both sides of the Atlantic studied the transformation of government by looking at the creation and termination of public organizations.

The studies on survival of public organizations agree on one aspect. Public organizations are far from perennial. Scholars arrive at the same conclusion regarding a diversity of public sector populations: over time, most public organizations perish. Their explanations vary, ranging from factors such as limited public resources, elections and turnovers, liabilities of newness, adolescence and obsolescence, and the institutional “hardwiring” of individual public organizations.

Studies on the demography of public organizations seldomly build on each other, as is customary for business administration studies in the population ecology realm. In particular, disagreement over definitions of organizational termination continues to divide the debate on organizational survival in the public sector. As if during an autopsy, different doctors arrive at different conclusions on the cause of death whereas a third one claims the patient has not died at all.

56 The following sections provide an overview of
 57 current insights, including the disagreements, on
 58 public organization survival. Two strands of
 59 research emerge: (1) institutionalist theories with
 60 a more “dichotomous” definition of termination
 61 and (2) those using public choice-oriented theo-
 62 ries that consider a fine-grained range of political
 63 interventions on public organizations.

64 **Politics and Legacies**

65 **Two Perspectives on Termination**

66 What constitutes survival and termination of pub-
 67 lic organizations, really? In the field of business
 68 administration there seems to be little discussion
 69 on what is survival and what is not. Simply put, an
 70 organization is either in business or it is not. This
 71 lack of ambiguity in business literature allows for
 72 a dichotomous definition and “biological” meta-
 73 phor in studying the mortality of government
 74 organizations, referring to the “mortality,” i.e.,
 75 “life” and “death,” of organizations. The “popu-
 76 lation ecology” approach even sees competing
 77 organizations in a given area as a “species” that
 78 can be studied to explain firm mortality and orga-
 79 nizational founding, as well as population growth
 80 and change. Ever since Kaufman (1976) adopted
 81 the biological metaphor 40 years ago this ecology
 82 idea has been applied increasingly on populations
 83 of public sector organizations as well.

84 Yet studying termination of public organiza-
 85 tions defies such a strict, dichotomous definition
 86 of what constitutes survival. Being “dead” or
 87 “alive” in bureaucracy is not a dichotomy. Policies
 88 carried out by public organizations do not often
 89 come to a definite end. In fact, bureaucratic orga-
 90 nizations and the policies they implement seem to
 91 undergo constant structural reform. This reform
 92 drive blurs the distinction between termination or
 93 continuation in a dressed up (or down) version.

94 The reorganizing capacity of political execu-
 95 tives is what makes public administration and
 96 business administration such different fields. Pub-
 97 lic organizations do not only perish because other
 98 organizations outtrived them in securing essen-
 99 tial resources. Political executives can deliber-
 100 ately axe public agencies or deny them funding

101 for ideological or electoral reasons. This differ-
 102 ence matters for both termination definitions and
 103 their implications. In the study of the survival of
 104 public organizations, different perspectives on
 105 politics and administration have led to a consid-
 106 erable fragmentation of insights.

The Political Control Approach

107 The political control perspective implies that
 108 structural changes to public organizations are
 109 first and foremost political acts. The observer –
 110 from a political science background presumably –
 111 has an interest in studying political control over
 112 the structure of government, from the perspective
 113 of the principal. Each political act deserves similar
 114 attention, ranging from subtle name changes of
 115 organizations to fully fledged abolitions. From
 116 this perspective, biological metaphors and dichot-
 117 omous definitions make no sense.

118 The political control approach tends to define
 119 most political interventions to public organiza-
 120 tions as termination and (re-)creation. These
 121 changes not only reflect what happens to the pub-
 122 lic sector, above all they constitute important
 123 political acts representing political control over
 124 the public sector. It is important that no changes
 125 go by unnoticed because ignoring name changes
 126 and other events such as change of superior orga-
 127 nization may mask important discontinuities. The
 128 subtle variety includes different “termination
 129 types,” such as termination by change of name,
 130 form, level, or acquisition of activity.

131 In this perspective, even the least pervasive
 132 event (name change) reflects a significant act of
 133 political control over a public organization. For
 134 instance, the Dutch government decided to name
 135 the Air Traffic Security the Air Traffic Control
 136 Netherlands from 1998 onwards. “This name
 137 change signals an outward and transboundary
 138 approach to air traffic control. ATC has long
 139 been a domestic issue, but increasingly became a
 140 joint European and global responsibility – an evo-
 141 lution reflected in its name change. Though the
 142 agency continues as an organization this event can
 143 be interpreted as a termination of its previous
 144 form, and a start of a ‘new’ phase in a new
 145 form” (Kuipers et al. 2017). Seemingly small
 146 changes still represent a discontinuation of “key
 147

241 **Organizational Survival in the Public**
242 **Sector: Towards a Model**

243 In spite of their disagreement on definitions of
244 organizational termination, this section compares
245 the results of existing studies on survival of public
246 organizations. The result is a theoretical model of
247 determinants of organizational survival and over-
248 view of common findings and disagreements in
249 existing research. This section first introduces the
250 hypotheses and ends with a summary of findings.

251 Three categories of factors seem to matter in
252 the literature on survival of public organizations:
253 (1) demographic explanations centering around
254 the age of the organization, (2) design explana-
255 tions implying that “birth characteristics” of orga-
256 nizations will influence future survival chances,
257 and (3) contextual or functional explanations that
258 reveal why some public organizations survive
259 changes in their environment as opposed to
260 others.

261 The perhaps most prominent and oldest factor
262 of interest to students of organizational survival is
263 the age of the organization. Common wisdom
264 holds that organizations tend to survive infinitely
265 after they reached maturity. Empirical studies
266 demonstrated that an organization’s survival
267 chances do not monotonically increase with age,
268 however. New organizations are particularly vul-
269 nerable because they have not been able to nest
270 themselves and their routines sufficiently in their
271 environment. In their early years, political volatil-
272 ity or growing pains may be fatal to the budding
273 organization. Also, particular vulnerabilities can
274 arise for the riper organization: obsolescence
275 becomes a threat when an organization’s function-
276 ality cannot keep up with changes in their envi-
277 ronment (think of a steamboat inspection service,
278 or a firm such as Kodak) or when their mission has
279 been accomplished (fighting polio). If organiza-
280 tions’ hazards increase both when they are very
281 young and very mature, the survival chances of an
282 organization would resemble an inverted U-curve.

283 In between, the hazards of the juvenile organi-
284 zation may increase. In its infant years, when its
285 legislative support base has just been established
286 and its proponents are still in office, the organiza-
287 tion can develop relatively unharmed. More than a

decade down the road, the organization has suffi- 288
ciently secured its resources and support base to 289
fend of competitors and opponents. However, in 290
the in-between period, the organization’s hazards 291
rise because the protective shield of its creators 292
may have diminished, and it becomes vulnerable 293
to termination efforts by its opponents. Also, dur- 294
ing the organization’s adolescence, legislative 295
actors have had time to learn about the organiza- 296
tion and its accomplishments or performance 297
(Carpenter and Lewis 2004). This learning may 298
result in the increased likelihood of fatal critique 299
and termination. Each age effect results in a dif- 300
ferent hypothesis related to survival. 301

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- H1. *A public organization is less likely to survive 302*
in the first five years after creation (liability 303
of newness). After five years the termination 304
chances of public organizations decrease. 305
- H2. *Public organizations are more likely to be 306*
terminated in their ‘adolescent’ years 307
(>5 < 10). 308
- H3. *A public organization is likely to become 309*
obsolete at some point and thus faces 310
increased hazards when it has reached a 311
mature age (>30). 312

Second, organizational survival in the public 313
sector can be explained by looking at the agen- 314
cies’ “birth characteristics” or “DNA.” Some 315
organizations simply have a stronger design, 316
they are “hardwired” for survival. Hardwiring 317
theory especially dominates in political science, 318
where organizations are seen as embodiments of 319
political interests. Political science intrinsically 320
links the acts of organizational change to 321
legislative-executive decision-making. Instead of 322
the invisible hand that weeds out some organiza- 323
tions in a population, public sector organizations 324
sometimes face very visible opponents. Politically 325
informed “attacks” on bureaucracy are predict- 326
able, so creators try to “hardwire” their organiza- 327
tional offspring into survival. The effects of 328
institutional design result in the following 329
hypotheses: 330

331 H4. *Organizations established by formal law*
332 *have higher chances of survival than organi-*
333 *zations established by decree.*

334 H5. *Organizations set up at arm's length of gov-*
335 *ernment have higher chances of survival*
336 *than organizations that operate in the hier-*
337 *archy of a ministerial department or execu-*
338 *tive office.*

339 Another product of intentional hard wiring is
340 the organization's internal structure. Organiza-
341 tions' structural traits such as whether they are
342 governed by a board or not (single administrators)
343 could also have an impact on survival.

344 H6. *Organizations governed by a board are more*
345 *likely to survive than organizations governed*
346 *by a single administrator.*

347 An increasing number of termination studies
348 have included the organizational "type" (advisory,
349 regulatory, executive) as a factor of influence.
350 Two types that stand out in the literature
351 (advisory and regulatory versus the rest) are both
352 included here. The distinct hypotheses reflect that
353 the assumed influence on survival differs.

354 H7. *Advisory organizations have less likely to*
355 *survive than other types of public*
356 *organizations.*

357 H8. *Regulatory organizations have higher*
358 *chances of survival than other types of public*
359 *organizations.*

360 Some organizations are intended to be termi-
361 nated from the start. Their "sunset clause" spec-
362 ifies when, or under what conditions, the
363 organization will be abolished.

364 H9. *When organizations are created with a sun-*
365 *set clause, they are unlikely to survive that*
366 *clause and mature into 'old age' (>average).*

367 Third, termination studies on public organiza-
368 tions usually control for political and economic
369 indicators. The general expectation is that turn-
370 over is likely to affect survival of organizations in
371 a negative way because incoming elects will

probably attack the creations of their predeces- 372
sors. In addition, a rightwing government will 373
probably aim to downsize the public sector. Eco- 374
nomic indicators also serve as an important con- 375
trol: when government revenues go down, it 376
seems less inclined to spend resources on uphold- 377
ing public organizations. The opposite effect may 378
also hold: recession makes incumbents unwilling 379
to dismantle government organizations unlikely 380
because in the short run this will increase 381
unemployment. 382

H10. *Political turnover negatively affects sur-* 383
vival of public organizations. 384

H11. *A right wing (majority in) government neg-* 385
atively affects survival of public 386
organizations. 387

H12. *Incumbency of a political executive of* 388
another political color than the organiza- 389
tion's creator (so-called 'unfriendly govern- 390
ment') negatively affects survival of public 391
organizations. 392

H13. *When total government revenues decrease,* 393
the likelihood of survival of public organi- 394
zations decreases as well. 395

The next section provides an overview and 396
discussion of the actual impact of these factors 397
on organizational survival according to a set of 398
recent studies. 399

Comparative Findings 400

Section three has not yet revealed how these fac- 401
tors fared in empirical analyses on the public 402
sector. The table below presents the findings 403
from the studies reviewed for each of the hypothe- 404
ses above. Positive relation to survival is indi- 405
cated by a "+" and a negative effect on survival by 406
a "-." So a "+" for newness does not mean that 407
the liability of newness is confirmed, but that 408
newness has a positive effect on survival. 409
A tested but inconsequential factor is indicated 410
by an "x" and the "U" stands for nonlinear effects 411
(for instance, insulation from presidential interfe- 412
rence is a liability in the first 6 years of an 413

414 organization's lifespan but protects it in the long
415 run; see Boin et al. 2010) (Table 1).

416 According to this overview, on average 54% of
417 the cases perish during the period studied, about
418 1.5% of the studied population annually. This
419 result officially debunks the myth of immortality.
420 The varying time periods of the studies require us
421 to temporalize the results. The comparably high
422 percentages of 52% (Boin et al. 2016) and 58%
423 (Greasley and Hanretty 2014) become very differ-
424 ent termination rates when divided by the number
425 of years of the studied period.

426 Nine factors seem to have a significant unidi-
427 rectional effect on survival. Old age increases
428 survival chances (H3), and so does a regulatory
429 function (H8), and a firm legislative base (H4).
430 Adolescence (H2) is a hazard, but different expla-
431 nations rival for this effect. Advisory organiza-
432 tions (H7) are more likely to be terminated and,
433 not surprisingly, this also goes for organizations
434 set up with a sunset clause (H9). Political turnover
435 most likely negatively impacts the survival of
436 public organizations, because new political exec-
437 utives tend to reorganize the administration
438 (H10). Unfriendly incumbencies (i.e., political
439 executives of a different political ideology –
440 H12) are likely to terminate the administrative
441 agencies their political opponents previously cre-
442 ated. Rightwing incumbencies (H11) often have
443 negative effect on survival.

444 The incumbent government's ideology can
445 also interact with other factors. Götz et al. (2015)
446 point out that leftwing incumbents tend to be less
447 likely to terminate administrative organizations,
448 unless pressure for budgetary austerity increases
449 (factors 11 and 13). Likewise, Greasley and
450 Hanretty (2014) conclude that public organiza-
451 tions' termination hazards increase under
452 rightwing governments in "normal" times (low
453 to moderately high budget pressure). When public
454 debt increases, organizations face higher termina-
455 tion risks under leftwing rule. Greasley and
456 Hanretty additionally argue: "the effect of greater-
457 than-average debt on agency termination is nega-
458 tive for very young agencies, and for older agen-
459 cies, but positive for agencies in their third to
460 seventh years" (p. 17). So leftwing incumbencies
461 under economic strain are most likely to target

adolescent agencies for termination (which fits 462
with our hypothesis 2). 463

464 Surprisingly, the effects of economic down- 464
turns also point in other directions. Carpenter 465
and Lewis (2004) challenge conventional wisdom 466
with their finding that budgetary pressure 467
decreases survival chances for public organiza- 468
tions (H13). In fact, their budgetary surpluses 469
increase the hazards, and deficits make termina- 470
tions less likely. The short-term cost of organiza- 471
tional termination would make such decisions 472
unfavorable in times of austerity (Carpenter and 473
Lewis 2004, p. 222). By contrast, James et al. 474
(2015) found that budgetary pressure increases 475
termination hazards whereas Park (2013) and 476
Boin et al. (2016) tested the same factor but 477
found no significant effects. 478

479 Insulation from executive interference (arm's 479
length status – H5) can make organizations more 480
likely to survive than those created in proximity to 481
the President, but not all studies agree (Lewis 482
2004 vs. Boin et al. 2010). Disagreement also 483
exists regarding newness (H1): being green can 484
both help the organization to survive and prove to 485
be a liability (see Table 1). 486

487 Conclusion and Future Research

488 Explanations for the survival of public organiza- 488
tions abound. This chapter offered an assessment 489
of each potential factor by comparing different 490
research findings. The factors that were confirmed 491
in several studies could together form an inte- 492
grated model of organizational survival in the 493
public sector. Such an integrated model would 494
predict that regulatory tasks, creation by law, and 495
being older than 12 years makes organizations 496
most likely to survive, but by no means hazard- 497
free. In any case, hazards for public organizations 498
increase when political winds change and new 499
incumbents enter office. Rightwing executives 500
may be more likely to terminate public organiza- 501
tions in normal times but beware of the leftwing 502
executives under budgetary constraints. Such an 503
integrated model could best be tested on large 504
N datasets by using event-history analysis. 505
Revealing underlying mechanisms, discovering 506

Organizational Demography, Table 1 Overview and comparison of findings.

	MacCarthaigh 2014	Boin et al. 2010	Boin et al. 2016	Park 2013	O'Leary 2015	Bertelli and Sinclair 2016	Carpenter and Lewis 2004	Lewis 2004	Götz et al. 2015	Greasley and Hanretty 2014	James et al. 2015
t1.1											
t1.2											
t1.3	–	–	–	x	–	–	+			+	
t1.4				x			–			–	
t1.5		+		x	+	+				+	
t1.6	x	x	+	x			+	+			
t1.7		U					+	+			
t1.8		U	x					–			
t1.9					–	x				–	
t1.10		x						+		+	+
t1.11		x						–			
t1.12		–	x	–	x	–	–	–			x
t1.13		x	x				–	x	–	U	
t1.14		x	x		x					x	–
t1.15			x	x			+			U	–
t1.16	37 ^a	75	52	39	39	49	57	59	58	58	72
t1.17	0.4	1.0	0.7	2.3	NA	NA	1.1	1.2	NA	2.5	3.1

^aDerived through personal correspondence with author; NA means exact figures are not available

507 new variables, and explaining outliers would benefit from a case-oriented study, as advocated within the institutional legacy approach.

510 To enrich future discussions on organizational survival and transformation of the public sector, it seems imperative to abandon the binary definition of organizational termination. Instead, a focus on “transitions” would help to build on the diversity of existing research and allow for more analytical leverage. The word “termination” implies a definite “end” of a period in which an organization took on a particular form. Meanwhile the organization itself did not end. The preferred, more neutral term “transitions” refers to beginnings and ends of phases through which organizations evolve. Such transitions are both dependent variables in their own right and explanatory factors for survival – a great number of sudden transitions could be a prelude to full termination, or the total absence of transitions could indicate an ultimately fatal condition of rigidity. A sequence of transitions could reflect a pattern of staged adaptation to changing resource levels (Levine et al. 1981). The total sum of transitions of individual organizational units reflects a transformation of government.

533 Transitions pertain to all the structural changes to the organization that can be measured consistently and reliably over time, such as changes to the organization’s name, superior organization, hierarchical level, status as staff or line unit, structural autonomy by law, as well as mergers, splits, and abolishments. This approach allows building both on existing datasets for event-history analysis and on studies that use a dichotomous definition of survival. Coding all detailed changes as events allows for multivariate regression analyses and statistical explanations on survival in the public sector. The compatibility to institutional legacy studies is enabled by the possibility to discard more subtle transitions such as name changes in the dataset in order to study long institutional durations only interrupted by more definite passings such as mergers or splits.

551 Important steps have been made in studying the transformations of public organizations individually and the state in total, since Kaufman started his study on organizational mortality in

1976. However, today many studies on survival in the public sector focus only on independent agencies, in majoritarian political systems (cf. Park 2013; Greasley and Hanretty 2014; James et al. 2015; Bertelli and Sinclair 2016; Boin et al. 2016). Rich harvest is waiting in a demographic study of both autonomous agencies and bureaus within national ministries in continental Europe. Such populations would allow for systemic comparisons on the vulnerability of autonomous versus embedded public organizations and the effects of institutional design between majoritarian and consensual systems. Additionally, policy preferences in coalition governments probably affect administrative reform and organizational termination in a different way than in single party governments. Building on findings of Götz et al. (2015) and Greasley and Hanretty (2014), future studies could probe into the effects of political ideology under different circumstances or for different organizations. There is much to gain from a study on the relation between policy agendas (the Comparative Agendas project), policy preferences (the Manifestos data on electoral programs), and the structure of government in different policy areas.

Empirical research has now established that public organizations do perish and that organizational design can serve as a shield against termination hazards. Future studies need to probe deeper into how specific political power plays and particular policy preferences impact the structure of government.

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Cross-References

- ▶ [Administrative Autonomy](#)
- ▶ [Administrative Reform](#)