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Recognition of the Armenian Genocide after its Centenary: A Comparative Analysis of Changing Parliamentary Positions

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Turkey's Preparations for the Centenary of the Armenian Genocide

On April 23, 2014, as Turkey anticipated increasing international pressure to recognize the Armenian genocide as such on its centenary in 2015, Turkey's then-prime minister and current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, sent a special condolence message to Armenian communities around the world. Published in nine languages, the message acknowledged the deaths of the Ottoman Armenians who perished alongside millions of people of all religions and ethnicities in the events of 1915, describing the tragedy as “our shared pain.” Erdoğan stated that “millions of people of all religions and ethnicities lost their lives in World War I”.¹ It seemed that the Turkish leader was finally acknowledging some basic facts about the genocide; however, in practice, the message was a sophisticated form of denial that placed the Armenian genocide within the context of a world war, alongside the loss of life of ethnic Turks.

This article will explore the connection between Erdoğan's message and the recent positions taken by the legislatures of three NATO members—the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands—all of which are traditional allies of Ankara. From 2016 to 2019, the parliaments of all three countries formally recognized the Armenian genocide. This development marked the transition from a stance based on pragmatism to one focused on “soft power,” and came after many years of hesitation.² Israel, on the other hand—which holds the same interests as the other allies with regard to Ankara, though it is not a NATO member—

has continued to adhere to its position that the mass slaughter of Armenians was not a genocide. Unlike the aforementioned countries, Israel did not seize the opportunity presented by Erdoğan's declaration to recognize the genocide, even though a number of Knesset members lobbied for such a move.

The decision of the US, Germany, and the Netherlands to alter their traditional positions on the Armenian genocide was no accident. I will argue that their new stance reflects three main factors: first, Erdoğan's own 2014 statement and the progressive weakening of NATO—specifically, the crumbling relations between Turkey and its three allies; second, the process of introspection and eventual acknowledgement of their own role in the perpetuation of Turkey's denial; and third, that acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide by three NATO allies reflected the growing scrutiny of Erdoğan's policies, especially toward the Kurds.

This article will also examine the deteriorating relations between Israel and Turkey, and in that context, the position of the Knesset on the Armenian genocide, namely, its continued refusal to recognize it as such, largely to preserve the "unique" nature of the Holocaust.

Parliamentary as Opposed to Governmental Recognition: Conceptual Clarity

First, the expression "recognition of the Armenian genocide" must be clarified, and a distinction must also be made between the roles played by the executive and the legislative branches regarding this issue. As a rule, the Armenians continue to insist that legislatures around the world recognize the genocide. While this is mostly symbolic, it is also of critical importance. Most important is that symbolic recognition makes it feasible to legislate a memorial day or official memorial events. This is a significant step that contributes not only to commemoration and to the preservation of the historical heritage of ethnic groups, but in certain cases also enables the establishment of a national commemorative museum partially or fully funded by the state.³ Thus, the struggle for recognition is significant for three parties: the Armenians, the Turks, and the country debating whether to recognize the Armenian genocide.

It is important to appreciate that legislatures and executives may have different and even conflicting interests in this matter. From the mid-1970s, the governments of the US, Israel, Germany, the Netherlands, and a number of other countries did not recognize the Armenian genocide due to concerns over their bilateral ties with Turkey. The basic premise was that recognition of the Armenian genocide would lead to a significant and almost automatic deterioration of relations with Ankara, the recall of ambassadors, and a possible rupture that could cause grave harm to vital interests. Consequently, governments with

good or even average diplomatic relations with Turkey would have no interest in recognizing the genocide. In fact, it was in their clear interest not to do so.

Legislatures, on the other hand, give voice to a broader range of norms, values, and ethics, and offer a platform for the discussion of minority rights. For this reason, recognition could cause tension between a country's legislature and its executive.

The Contested Memories of the Armenian Genocide in International Relations: A Concise History

In order to understand the political and international developments surrounding recognition of the Armenian genocide, it must first be explained how the genocide became a diplomatic instrument in international relations. Until the mid-1960s, a "conspiracy of silence" cloaked the issue, which served Turkey's interests. This was possible mainly because in the years following 1915, the genocide led to the worldwide dispersion of the surviving Armenians. New Armenian communities were established that had to contend with staggering loss and trauma.⁴ The uprooting and dispersal of the Armenians undermined their ability to consolidate a collective memory of the genocide. Therefore, the Armenian diaspora was unable to process what had happened in a focused and united manner. Above all, it was the Cold War that was the root of that failure; it polarized the Armenian communities living on either side under regimes that took vastly different approaches to human rights, freedom of speech, collective memory, and commemoration. The Armenian communities were influenced by the surroundings in which they lived during the world wars and the Cold War, and this prevented them from conducting a meaningful dialogue about the suppression of their trauma.⁵

At the same time, for their part, the Turks exploited the conspiracy of silence surrounding the fate of the Armenians in Turkey to foster an institutionalized denial of the 1915 genocide. Successive generations born and raised in Turkey after World War I raised on nationalist Kemalism, and the young citizens of the secular republic of Turkey were taught to deny the Armenian genocide as part of the secular nationalist narrative and the reengineering of Turkish society. This included redesigning Turkish cities with an emphasis on modern European features, and in the process, all traces of the Armenian genocide were systematically obscured or erased. The cultural and urban elements of those cities that had been created by the Armenians who had lived there were eradicated.⁶ The subject of the Armenian genocide became taboo and its very mention could (and still does) lead to indictments on charges of insulting the Turkish nation.⁷

The conspiracy of silence began to crumble when the issue burst onto the international scene in 1973. It was at this time that two Armenian terrorist organizations began mounting operations against Turkish targets around the world.

The first, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which operated out of Lebanon and Soviet Armenia, was in competition with the second, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), operating mainly out of North America and Western Europe. Beyond targeting Turkish diplomats and seeking to compel Turkey to recognize the genocide, they also urged Armenians living on both sides of the Iron Curtain to work together to remind the world about their common tragedy. In the 1980s, the organizations' terror operations and assassinations caused the deaths of more than sixty Turkish diplomats and their family members.⁸

The terrorism directed against Turkish embassies in Western countries in the early 1980s actually drew mixed responses to the Armenian cause: For the most part, western Europeans expressed sympathy or indifference, while the US roundly denounced the attacks.⁹ Some countries, including Israel, condemned the terrorism and leveraged the opportunity to improve ties with the Turkish foreign ministry. They worked together to disrupt ASALA cooperation with Palestinian terrorists, who were themselves training in southern Lebanon.¹⁰ Despite the international condemnation, the Armenians also achieved some success during those years. The topic of the Armenian genocide was increasingly present in international forums and during the late 1980s became a subject for discussion in legislatures worldwide. On the other hand, in the early 1980s, the Armenian campaign forced Ankara to launch for the first time an international denial campaign aimed at exerting pressure on Western countries, including Israel, to support the Turkish narrative.¹¹

From Pragmatism to Soft Power: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, the Netherlands, and the US

In the years prior to 2016, Berlin (and before it, Bonn) refrained from recognizing the Armenian genocide for three reasons. The first and least well known is related to Germany's recognition of the "unique nature of the Holocaust." In other words, West Germany—and from 1990, unified Germany—sought to preserve its standing as the only modern country to take full responsibility for its crimes, recognize the injustices it committed, and make restitution payments to the victims of the genocide it perpetrated, enabling it to serve as what might be called a "beacon of morality."¹² Berlin's interest in maintaining the Holocaust's "uniqueness" overrode Germany's interest in formally recognizing the Armenian genocide until the early 2000s. Germany feared that this recognition—together with that of other countries—might cause Turkey to admit to having perpetrated a genocide and thus strip Germany of its status as moral standard bearer.

The second reason is related to Germany's own partial culpability for the Armenian genocide. The German and Ottoman Empires had been close allies during

World War I, and the Germans provided considerable assistance to the Ottomans, for example, by helping them confiscate bank accounts, insurance policies, and deposits in the Reichsbank belonging to Ottoman Armenians.¹³ The continued suppression of the memory of the 1915 genocide enabled Germany to refrain from addressing its own guilt as a facilitator. The third explanation is related to the fact that since the 1960s, a sizeable Turkish minority numbering close to three million immigrants has lived in Germany, and it was feared that should the Armenian genocide be formally recognized, they would find themselves in a state of conflict between their loyalties to Germany and Turkey.¹⁴

However, studies conducted by two German scholars, Hilmar Kaiser in the late 1990s and Stefan Ihrig in the 2010s, revealed the extent of ties between Turkey and the Third Reich, and that the “success” of the Armenian genocide was actually a source of inspiration for Hitler.¹⁵ Moreover, a documentary film released in 2010 exposed the extent of German culpability. This precipitated a change in the public discourse in Germany regarding responsibility for the Armenian genocide.¹⁶

The timing of Erdoğan’s April 2014 statement acknowledging some of the basic facts of the Armenian genocide—albeit absent any change in Turkey’s genocide-denial policy—further nudged the Germans toward recognition and opened the door to action by the Bundestag without wreaking complete havoc on German–Turkish relations. The stage was set to recognize the genocide, continuing the use of soft power to advance the Armenian cause. On June 2, 2016, the Bundestag recognized the destruction of the Armenians as an act of genocide.¹⁷ Chancellor Angela Merkel backed the deputies’ decision and stood her ground in the face of the furious rhetoric emanating from Ankara. She declared that Germany’s deep and longstanding relationship with Turkey would not be harmed by their individual differences of opinion over the Armenian genocide, noting immediately after the vote, “There is a lot that binds Germany to Turkey and ... our friendship, our strategic ties, are great.”¹⁸ Significantly, the Bundestag passed the resolution despite the fact that Germany needed Erdoğan’s cooperation in 2016 in granting sanctuary to Syrian refugees as part of an agreement with the European Union.¹⁹

For many years, the Netherlands also refrained from declaring the events of 1915 a genocide. The attitude among Dutch MPs toward the Armenian genocide relied on the assumption that it should be called the “Armenian question,” the official term employed by Turkey.²⁰ The Netherlands, like Germany, refrained from potentially forcing their own citizens of Turkish descent (a large minority of some 400,000) into an identity crisis, consequently eschewing even discussing the subject in The Hague.²¹ Like Germany, the Netherlands felt it bore a degree of indirect responsibility for the genocide and had not done enough to prevent it. That is one reason the subject was avoided in the public discourse. As a “neutral” state in World War I, the question of responsibility for the genocide remained unanswered, although Dutch politicians such as William van Ravesteijn and

Abraham Kuypers had lambasted Dutch journalists who refrained from reporting on the Armenian genocide, thus preventing the Dutch public from learning about what had happened.²² The Netherlands was also targeted by Armenian terror when the son of the Turkish ambassador in The Hague, Ahmet Benler, was assassinated in October 1979. Surprisingly, that did not stir up any particular interest in the Armenian genocide in the Dutch media and over the years, the subject was rarely discussed.²³

More importantly, the reason for shunting aside the memory of the Armenian genocide is related to the centrality of Holocaust commemoration in Dutch public debate, the story of the destruction of the country's Jewish community, and the German occupation from 1940–45. Having been conquered by the Nazis the Dutch people also considered themselves victims. However, in the past twenty years, there has been considerable academic and public discourse on the question of Dutch culpability for the destruction of Dutch Jewry. Despite its small size, the Netherlands boasts the largest per capita number—5,778—of people recognized by Yad Vashem as Righteous Among the Nations, non-Jews who rescued Jews during the Holocaust. However, the fact that so many Dutch Jews—almost 104,000, or 75 percent of the entire Jewish population—were transported to German death camps in occupied Poland can be explained largely by the partial collaboration of some local Dutch citizens.²⁴ Difficult questions have been raised, for example, regarding the responsibility of the Dutch railway company, which collaborated in the deportation of Jews from Amsterdam to the Westerbork transit camp on the Dutch–German border and from there to Auschwitz and Sobibor.²⁵ The centrality of Jewish victimhood and the crimes of the Nazis eclipsed the discourse on the Armenians.

It was only in 2004 that the Armenian genocide received formal Dutch recognition for the first time when The Hague acknowledged that crimes against humanity had been committed in the Ottoman Empire, although it continued to refrain from explicitly employing the word “genocide.”²⁶ In 2017, a diplomatic incident marred relations between the Netherlands and Turkey when the Turkish foreign minister was denied permission to hold a pro-Turkish rally in Rotterdam. The Turkish foreign minister was expelled from the Netherlands and Erdoğan responded sharply, condemning the Dutch as “Nazi remnants.”²⁷ Although the crisis was defused a few months later and relations between the two countries were restored, Erdoğan's harsh rhetoric, which sparked the severe diplomatic incident between The Hague and Ankara, left the Dutch with a bitter taste. Erdoğan's declaration in 2014 and the German Bundestag's recognition of the genocide in 2016 together provided a tailwind for the Dutch recognition. Indeed, in 2018, the Dutch parliament decided to formally acknowledge the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as a genocide.²⁸ Then, too, Turkey inveighed against the decision and recalled its ambassador for consultations, but this failed to convince the Netherlands to reverse its decision.

In the US, a change in the position of Congress took place in late 2019, when the House of Representatives resolved to finally recognize the Armenian genocide.²⁹ Over the years, Washington has trodden cautiously and never offered formal recognition. Turkey's membership in the NATO alliance and its central role during and after the Cold War frequently scuttled attempts by Congress over the previous forty years to fully recognize the genocide and subsequently legislate the creation of an official day of remembrance for its victims. For reasons of national security— for example to obstruct Soviet access to Western Europe and maintain Washington's accessibility to the Persian Gulf through Turkey—the various American administrations refrained from confronting Ankara, potentially sparking a crisis over the memory of the Armenian genocide.³⁰ Like Berlin, over the past forty years, Washington also played a major role in supporting the Turkish denial narrative.

The change in the Congressional stance came in the immediate wake of the violent clash between the Turkish army and the Kurdish minority during Operation Peace Spring in northeast Syria in September and October 2019.³¹ The anti-Turkish tone in Washington was observed across the political spectrum, especially regarding Erdoğan and his hawkish approach toward the Kurdish minority, which had assisted the Americans in their war on ISIS.³² The feeling in Washington was that Erdoğan's Turkey had gone too far; the alliance between Trump and Erdoğan was not helpful to either of them.³³ On October 29, 2019, the House of Representatives passed a precedent-setting bill (by a near-unanimous vote of 405 for and 11 against) on the matter of the Armenian genocide.³⁴ Congress passed a sanctions package against Turkey later that year.³⁵ An eventual decision to recognize the Armenian genocide in the Senate would also mean that the US was committed to allocating federal resources toward building a US memorial to the victims of the 1915 genocide and to the establishment of an official, annual memorial day for the Armenian genocide.

From Pragmatism to Soft Power? Israel's Policy on the Armenian Genocide, 1982–2016

As noted, conflicting views on the Armenian genocide appeared on the international scene only in the late 1970s, and Israel's position on the issue was also consolidated during that time, developing over three distinct periods: The first was 1982–89, when, after many years of silence, Turkey first began to contend with the "Armenian question" on the international scene. To that end, Ankara created a well-oiled denial machine, for which it also received aid from Israel's foreign ministry and Jewish organizations in the US and Turkey.³⁶ The second period was 1989–2000, when Israel continued to provide international support for the Turkish narrative, but this was also when the subject was first put forward for discussion in the Knesset plenary. Throughout this period, despite pressure from

individual Israeli MPs, the Knesset largely acquiesced to the foreign ministry's request to keep this discourse from the public eye.³⁷

The third period began in 2001, shortly before Erdoğan first came to power (2002) and continues until the present day. Similar to the serious diplomatic crisis between The Hague and Ankara in 2017, and between Washington and Ankara in 2019, Israeli–Turkish relations have also been buffeted by several crises since 2008. Examples include Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008, the *Mavi Marmara* incident in 2010,³⁸ and the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2018, all of which sparked harsh exchanges between Ankara and Jerusalem and engendered strident rhetoric on the part of both Erdoğan and Netanyahu.³⁹ Similar to the Dutch and American cases, Israel's diplomatic clash with Turkey also led to increased parliamentary pressure and discussion on the subject, especially from the opposition factions pushing for Israel to give formal recognition. However, the Knesset did not pass such a resolution, unlike the NATO members that managed to pass the Armenian resolution during the same period and under very similar circumstances.

Nevertheless, there are a number of major differences between Israel and the other countries noted above. Several would have seemed to indicate that recognition by Israel might have been easier to achieve than in the others. The first is that there is no Turkish lobby in Israel, nor is there a significant ethnic Turkish minority as in Germany and the Netherlands, for whom recognition of the genocide might precipitate an identity crisis. Second, in the case of Israel, the issues of responsibility and guilt (for supporting the Ottomans or failing to help prevent the Armenian genocide) are irrelevant, since the State of Israel did not yet exist in 1915 and the pre-state *Yishuv* was itself subjected to the repressive policies of the Turks.

However, one of the most striking differences between Israel and the NATO members discussed here is that since the early 2000s, Azerbaijan has become a major factor in Israel's position on recognition of the Armenian genocide. This period saw a warming of relations between Jerusalem and Baku, a secular Muslim country on the Caspian Sea. The ramified economic ties between Israel and the Azeris, which in recent years have included arms sales, have brought the two countries closer together.⁴⁰ The border shared by Iran and Azerbaijan and the concerns of Jerusalem and Baku over the Iranian nuclear project have also served to bolster mutual ties. For some years, Israel also sought to create a triangular alliance with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which enjoy good mutual relations and together influence events in the Caucasus.

Some consider this Israeli policy a continuation of David Ben-Gurion's Periphery Doctrine, which embraced the non-Arab states in the region.⁴¹ Importantly, the territorial conflict between the Azeris and the Armenians over control of

Nagorno-Karabakh, triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, turned Azerbaijan into a stakeholder in the discourse on the Armenian genocide, and it led an extensive international campaign against recognition. Thus the Azeris, like the Turks, have a significant interest in Israel not recognizing the Armenian genocide.

The Azerbaijan–Israel International Association (AzIz), the aim of which is to advance relations between the two countries, speaks out against the recognition of the Armenian genocide at discussions of the Knesset Education Committee.⁴² The organization argues in favor of the importance of strengthening relations between the countries, and advocates for the security of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan and for recognizing Turkey and the Ottoman Empire for saving Jewish refugees who fled from the Spanish Inquisition in 1492 to lands under the Empire’s control. These arguments resemble those made by the Turks, which indeed held sway in Knesset discussions, especially in light of the relatively modest endeavors in the Knesset plenary in favor of the Armenians.

The “Uniqueness” of the Holocaust and Recognition of the Armenian Genocide

Beyond the changing geopolitical circumstances, there remains a basic, fixed issue, less influenced by outside parties but one that affects Israeli policy in regard to recognition of the Armenian genocide—the memory of the Holocaust as “unique.” For Germany, which assumes moral and material responsibility for the murder of six million Jews (and which is manifested in the payment of restitution in accordance with the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement), the memory of the Holocaust has played an important role in society and national identity. That is also the case—though obviously for very different reasons—in Israel, where the commitment to “never again” has been a watchword in society, politics, and diplomacy ever since the birth of the Jewish State, and especially since 1967. Immediately before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, the genocidal rhetoric in the Arab media and by Arab leaders was a stark reminder of the potential for a second Holocaust.⁴³ As historian Alon Confino maintains, “In Israel, as in the world, a change occurred in Holocaust memory from the 1970s up to the present. It is one that is central and now emphasizes victims rather than heroism.”⁴⁴

Were Israel to recognize the Armenian genocide, the possible legislation of an official memorial day in honor of the 1915 genocide would fall in close proximity to *Yom Ha-Shoah* [Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes Remembrance Day], since the International Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day falls on April 24. This could serve as a major obstacle, because it might actualize the threat of “competition” over genocide commemoration and of the possible “trivialization” of Jewish suffering, according to those who espouse that view. This situation, as

noted, is unrelated to geopolitical variables or to Israel's foreign relations but is rather an internal matter having to do with Jewish and Israeli identity.

Prior to Erdoğan's 2014 declaration, Turkey's NATO allies and Israel were fully aligned: recognizing the Armenian genocide could have been harmful to relations with Turkey and consequently to NATO's geopolitical interests and collective security. Thus, before 2019 it was impossible to assess the actual weight of the "uniqueness" claim with respect to Israel's position since geopolitical interests were the supposed basis of Israel's policy. However, after Turkey's loss of influence over its NATO allies, the enactment of laws in the German, Dutch, and US legislatures further complicated those nations' respective relationships with Turkey, putting Israel in the spotlight. Given that the Israeli legislature did not change its stance, it is evident that the "uniqueness" claim holds significant weight in Israeli discourse and will bear monitoring in the coming years.

Conclusion

For forty years, the main consideration guiding Germany, the Netherlands, and the US on this issue was the fear that formal recognition of the Armenian genocide could precipitate a crisis with Turkey, a key NATO ally, thus undermining the collective security of the alliance. That these countries changed their positions between 2016–19 was the result of a number of developments at that point in time: Erdoğan's 2014 declaration; the weakening of the NATO alliance and general criticism of Erdoğan's policies (particularly toward the Kurds); and the change in the public and academic discourse in Germany and the Netherlands. Since 2016, Turkey's loss of influence over its NATO allies has been significant. That development and Ankara's harsh policies contributed to the actions taken in those three countries. Turkey overplayed its hand and this worked in the Armenians' favor.

The "uniqueness" of the Holocaust for Germany and the question of German and Dutch responsibility for their failure to intervene to prevent the Armenian genocide during World War I helped marginalize it until 2016. However, from 2016–19, a series of recurring diplomatic crises occurred between Turkey and the Netherlands (resulting in a cooling in their relations), as well as between Turkey and the US, around a number of major issues. These diplomatic rows triggered increased ethical introspection on the part of these countries, including regarding the long-term support they had provided to Turkey in continuing its denialist rhetoric. The coalescence of these factors eased the transition from an approach based solely on pragmatic considerations to one that included the moral perspective as well.

Israel, too, has always been a focus of attention in the discussion of the Armenian genocide. The change in the positions of the three NATO allies might put the

spotlight on Israel in the near future. Although the Armenian genocide has been discussed in the Knesset since 1989, Israel's lawmakers have not strayed from the position of their foreign ministry and have consistently eschewed formal recognition. The prevailing view in Jerusalem was and remains that Israeli recognition by both the Knesset and the government does not serve Israel's geopolitical interests in the Middle East, especially its strategic and economic cooperation with Turkey. Although relations between Jerusalem and Ankara have been in decline since 2017, and despite considerable criticism of Erdoğan from across Israel's political spectrum, the Knesset has refrained from passing a resolution that would acknowledge the Armenian genocide. Hence, despite similarities shared by Israel, the Netherlands, and the US, the Knesset appears to be weighing the diplomatic cost of formally recognizing the genocide against the benefit of its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, which is engaged in a longstanding conflict with the Armenians.

The Knesset's main concern is to refrain from compromising a deeply rooted element of Israeli-Jewish identity associated with the most tragic event in Jewish history: the memory of the Holocaust as "unique." Israel may fear that a symbolic recognition of the Armenian genocide could pave the way for the future legislation of a national memorial day that could "compete" with *Yom Ha-Shoah*, also marked in Israel each year in late April. Therefore, it may be concluded with considerable certainty that Israel's continued adherence to its traditional position is mainly due to its desire to preserve the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust and its place in the hierarchy of victimhood.

Translated from the Hebrew by Ruchie Avital

Notes

- ¹ Guney Yildiz, "Turkey Offers Condolences to Armenia Over WWII Killings," *BBC World Service*, April 23, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27131543>.
- ² "Soft power" in IR scholarship is a term first coined by political scientist John Nye. The concept relates to the ability to obtain goals in foreign policy, including influencing the positions of other countries regarding a particular subject, without leveraging military or economic might. The currency of this approach is the ability to influence through (mostly humanistic) values, culture, and political agendas. See Joseph, S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York, 2004).
- ³ See, for example, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: <https://www.ushmm.org/teach>.
- ⁴ Rebecca Jinks, "'Marks Hard to Erase': The Troubled Reclamation of 'Absorbed' Armenian Women, 1919–1927," *American Historical Review*, CXXIII:1 (2018), 86–123.
- ⁵ Rezmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (London, 2006), p. 3.

- ⁶ Uğur Ümit Üngör, "Lost in Commemoration: The Armenian Genocide in Memory and Identity," *Patterns of Prejudice*, XLVIII:2 (2014), 147–66; Uğur Ümit Üngör, "Creative Destruction: Shaping a High-Modernist City in Interwar Turkey," *Journal of Urban History*, XXXIX:2 (2013), 297–314.
- ⁷ Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, 2012); Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1915–1950* (Oxford, 2011); Üngör, "Lost in Commemoration," op. cit.
- ⁸ Paul Wilkinson, "Armenian Terrorism," *The World Today*, XXXIX:9 (1983), 344–50; Francis P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects* (Boulder, 1991); Khachig Tololyan, "Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Special Issue, "Political Parties and Terrorist Groups," IV:2 (1992), 8–22.
- ⁹ Oleg Kuznetsov, "Armenia, Transnational Terrorism and Global Interests: What Do CIA and DoS Documents Suggest?" *Caucasus International*, V:2 (2015), 35–53.
- ¹⁰ Eldad Ben Aharon, "Superpower by Invitation: Late Cold War Diplomacy and Leveraging Armenian Terrorism as a Means to Rapprochement in Israeli–Turkish Relations (1980–1987)," *Cold War History*, XIX:2 (2019), 275–93.
- ¹¹ Jennifer Dixon, *Dark Pasts: Changing the State's Story in Turkey and Japan* (Ithaca, 2018); Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (New York, 2015), pp. 428–56.
- ¹² See Jacob S. Eder, *Holocaust Angst: The Federal Republic of Germany and American Holocaust Memory Since the 1970s* (New York, 2016).
- ¹³ See for example, Hrayr S. Karagueuzian and Yair Auron, *A Perfect Injustice: Genocide and Theft of Armenian Wealth* (New Brunswick, 2009), pp. 99–135. See also Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (New York, 2005), p. 11. As Bloxham argued in his timely book, the great powers were not "co-perpetrators" in the Armenian genocide and the Armenians were not victims of "European diplomacy." According to Bloxham, statements regarding the great powers as co-perpetrators reduced the responsibility for the 1915 genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire.
- ¹⁴ See Nanor Kebranian, "Genocide, History, and the Law: Historical Injustice and Legal Performativity in France and Germany," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* (forthcoming, 2020).
- ¹⁵ Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge, 2014); Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, 2016).
- ¹⁶ See *Aghet: Ein Völkermord*, a documentary film by Eric Friedler, which has emphasized some perspectives of German guilt for the Armenian genocide.
- ¹⁷ Alison Smale and Melissa Eddy, "German Parliament Recognizes Armenian Genocide, Angering Turkey," *The New York Times*, June 2, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/europe/armenian-genocide-germany-turkey.html>. The full text of the bill is available at https://www.oezdemir.de/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/20160531_Antrag_Deutsch.pdf.
- ¹⁸ "German MPs Recognise Armenian 'Genocide' Amid Turkish Fury," *BBC News*, June 2, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36433114>.

- ¹⁹ For more on the Syrian refugee agreement between Turkey and the EU, see, for example, Oded Eran and Galia Lindenstrauss, “A New Agreement between the EU and Turkey: Short-Sighted Considerations at the Expense of a Long-Range Perspective” [Hebrew], *Mabat Al*, (April 4, 2016), 881.
- ²⁰ For notable examples, see Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* (Istanbul, 1988); and Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed* (London, 1985).
- ²¹ Irem Bezcioglu-Goktolga and Kutlay Yagmur, “Home language Policy of Second-Generation Turkish Families in the Netherlands,” *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, XXXIX:1 (2018), 44–59.
- ²² See, for example, Jordy Steij, “An Inconvenient Truth: The Dutch and the Armenian Genocide,” *Dutch Review*, April 24, 2015, <https://dutchreview.com/culture/history/an-inconvenient-truth-the-dutch-and-the-armenian-genocide/>.
- ²³ “Son of Turkish Diplomat Slain in the Netherlands,” *The New York Times Archive*, October 13, 1979.
- ²⁴ See <https://www.yadvashem.org/he/righteous/statistics.html> and Peter Tammes, “Jewish Immigrants in the Netherlands during the Nazi Occupation,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, XXXVII: 4 (2007), 543–62.
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