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The Battle of Olustee (Ocean Pond) Florida

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THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE (OCEAN POND),
FLORIDA

INTRODUCTORY

This account of the battle of Olustee has been prepared at the invitation of the Florida Historical Society from the reports contained in *War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. A careful study of this source leaves one unsatisfied where the aim has been to arrive at definite facts of such nature as would enable a fairly complete record to be offered. It is undoubtedly true that these official records must give more accurate and complete information than any others, since the reports were generally made within a few days after the events occurred and have the sanction of official responsibility for accuracy and completeness. Yet that which is sought does not exist. Purported facts relating to the same occurrence are greatly at variance, while important elements necessary for analyzing and deducing other facts are entirely missing.

In attempting to locate troops and to present a picture in concrete form, acceptance has been given to a map prepared by Lieut. W. B. Grant, Corps of Engineers, Confederate Army, and Engineer Officer of the Confederate force at Olustee. He was present at the time of the battle, made observations of events and had conferences with higher commanders of Confederate organizations. From this evidence and a survey of the area, he prepared a sketch to accompany his official report. Study of reports on both sides leads to the belief that no better map representation can be made. Details concerning Union troops are necessarily incomplete, yet Lieut. Grant's representation

with respect to those troops is as complete and definite as a study of the reports of Federal commanders would reveal. Of course he did not have access to those reports. Reference is frequently made to this sketch in this article and much space is thus saved in explanation of troop movements and positions.

In offering an account of the engagement, controversial subjects arise with respect to delinquencies of individuals and some other matters. Discussion of these questions has not been attempted but has been purposely avoided. Many comments might be made which would reflect adversely on various individuals and organizations; but since it is impossible to gain an insight into the truth of the many factors and conditions, it would seem to be inappropriate and gratuitous to express definite opinions. Effort is made to eliminate collateral features and to confine matters to events bearing directly on the battle itself. A treatise on the subject has not been the aim.

As is usual in most military engagements, each commander credits the opposing force with much greater strength than it possessed. It is believed that the designated organizations shown and the total strength given for each force are reasonably correct. It appears that opposing numbers were about the same -except that the Federals had an advantage in artillery of four guns-sixteen to twelve.

It is most difficult to deduce the approximate hour at which events happened. Some Confederate reports contain statements which assist in this, but Federal reports are very defective, except in respect to one or two items. By comparison and by the application of the factors of space and time, attempt has been made to arrive at reasonable estimates as to time and place.

The following constitute the material considered :

War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies:

Series I, Vol. XXXV, Part I. Reports, pp. 274 356 ; Miscellaneous, pp. 463-465, 473-474, 479, 482, 488, 495, 542, 557, 559-560, 578, 580, 582-588, 594, 599-601, 603-5, 613-614, 619-22, 632-633.

Series I, Vol. XXXV, Part II. pp. 3, 333-339.

Series I, Vol. LIII, pp 24-26, 308.

It is believed no other volumes of these records contain any data pertinent to the operations culminating in this battle.

Through the courtesy of the Florida Historical Society, I have had access to a valuable paper prepared by Miss Susan Burdett, of Jacksonville, entitled ***The Military Career of Brigadier General Joseph Finegan of Florida.*** The author's research has been extensive and her presentation relative to the battle covers admirably the main features of that engagement.

BATTLE OF OLUSTEE, FEBRUARY 20, 1864

Origin of the Operation-On January 13, 1864, President Lincoln addressed a letter to Major General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, with headquarters at Hilton Head, S. C., directing that steps be taken "to reconstruct a loyal State government in Florida." Effort along these lines was stated as being already under way by "some worthy gentlemen."

Florida appeared to offer the best chance for such a possibility due to its relative military helplessness and easy approach. Also success in this venture would afford tangible evidence of progress in reestablishing a state government within the Federal union under the "late proclamation on the subject," dated December

8, 1863. This move, no doubt, had more of the political than military motive, as the nomination of a president would take place during the coming months. President Lincoln accordingly sent his private secretary, John Hay, commissioned as major for the purpose (later Secretary of State under President Roosevelt) to confer with General Gillmore and to deliver some blank forms, the use of which he would explain, "to aid in the reconstruction." The reconstruction was to be accomplished "in the most speedy way possible." It was an unusual procedure for the President thus to issue orders directly to a military commander for a military expedition and without the War Department having official knowledge of the undertaking.

Federal Preliminary Measures - In executing the directions of President Lincoln, General Gillmore promptly communicated both with the Secretary of War (Mr. Stanton) and the General-in-Chief of the Army (General Halleck) stating his purpose to "occupy the west bank of the St. John's River, in Florida, very soon-preparatory to an advance west at an early date," and asking for troops to replace those he intended to withdraw from stations in his department for use in Florida. So far as can be determined no additional troops were furnished. Later General Halleck was informed by General Gillmore of the purposes of the expedition, which are summarized as follows: to procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, and other products ; to cut off one source of Confederate food supplies ; to secure recruits for his colored regiments ; to "inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance." The last purpose was explained to be in accordance with President Lincoln's personal instructions.

In keeping with his plans, General Gillmore directed Brigadier General Truman Seymour to proceed

with a specified body of troops from Hilton Head by water to Jacksonville, and to depart on the night of February 5-6, so as to arrive at Jacksonville on the 7th. This was carried out and the landing was made on that date. The troops of the expedition are not here enumerated, as all troops reported as participating in the Battle of Olustee are shown later. The number landed at Jacksonville are given as about 7000.

Confederate Preliminary Measures - At the time of the arrival of the Federal expedition at Jacksonville, Brigadier General Joseph Finegan, commanding the District of East Florida (all of Florida east of the Suwannee River) with headquarters at Lake City, had the following numbers of organizations under his command, all being Florida troops: Two battalions and three independent companies of infantry, seven companies of cavalry, two batteries of artillery comprising a strength at the end of January, 1864, as present for duty, 89 officers and 1178 men. This force was well scattered over the territory, because the Federal troops occupied Jacksonville and various localities within 50 to 75 miles of Jacksonville. The strength of the Confederates in the immediate vicinity of Lake City, and considered ready for use at time of the landing of the Federals at Jacksonville, cannot be ascertained. On February 7th, General Finegan promptly notified General Beauregard of the Federal expedition. General Beauregard commanding the Districts of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, with headquarters at Charleston, took immediate steps to strengthen General Finegan's forces. Orders were sent on February 8th to the Commanding General, District of Middle Florida (Brigadier General W. M. Gardner) at Quincy and the Commanding General at Savannah, directing prompt action in furnishing maximum reinforcements. Three days later General Finegan re-

ported 490 infantry, 110 cavalry and two pieces of artillery available at Lake City. The bulk of these troops came from middle Florida in compliance with General Beauregard's orders. Between February 10th and 19th (the exact date not obtainable), reenforcements were such as to make General Finegan's force available for employment, reported by him, as approximately 5200 infantry and cavalry, and three batteries of artillery-12 guns, with strength about 250. This force was then concentrated at or near Olustee, twelve or, thirteen miles east of Lake City. The troops thus assembled consisted of the following numbers of organizations or major portions thereof :

Infantry : Florida, 2 (3) battalions ; Georgia, 8 regiments, 1 battalion. (It is not certain whether the 2d Florida Battalion was present or employed in the battle).

Cavalry : Florida, 1 regiment, 1 battalion ; Georgia, 1 regiment.

Artillery: Florida, 1 battery; Georgia, 2 batteries.

Events Following Landing of Federal Troops at Jacksonville (Prior to battle) Federal - On February 8th, (one day after landing), 3 columns-2 Infantry and 1 mounted-strength not determinable, were dispatched toward Baldwin, 18 to 20 miles west of Jacksonville, with the mission of penetrating into the interior, seizing supplies and equipment and destroying those of value to the Confederates, and reconnoitering the situation and gradually moving a field force westward to hold certain territory and overcome any Confederate force that might resist. At this time there seemed to be no intention of employing the landing force to attempt penetration as far as the Suwannee River (about 100 miles west of Jacksonville, and 40 miles west of Lake City) with the determination of destroying the railroad there and severing the two dis-

tricts of Florida. In fact, the immediate intention of General Gillmore did not contemplate advancing beyond the Little St. Mary's (designated generally in Federal reports as the south prong of the St. Mary's River or South St. Mary's) 30 to 35 miles from Jacksonville.

The mounted column above mentioned, commanded by Colonel Guy V. Henry, advancing more rapidly than the foot troops, encountered on the 8th, about twilight and later, a scattered Confederate force of about 350 men of all arms under Lieut. Colonel A. H. McCormick at Camp Finegan (7 miles from Jacksonville) and at Ten Mile Run, where the Confederate loss was four pieces of artillery, captured about midnight, and probably 25 men, 50 animals and a small amount of transportation. The Federal loss is not shown. Colonel Henry reached Baldwin early on the 9th and there captured three railroad cars (one containing a 3 inch rifled gun and caisson and other supplies to the value of about one-half million dollars. Baldwin was the crossing of two railroads: The Fernandina and Cedar Keys and the Central of Florida (probably now the Seaboard Air Line) which were very important lines to the Confederates. With the capture of Baldwin, Generals Gillmore and Seymour proceeded there, arriving late on the 9th.

On the morning of the 10th, Colonel Henry advanced to the Little St. Mary's at Barber's (a plantation). Here he was opposed by Major Robert Harrison with two or three companies of cavalry, which were enroute from Camp Cooper (near Fernandina) to join General Finegan. After some fighting the Confederates withdrew, apparently on discovering the superior strength of the Federals, and continued toward Lake City. Federal casualties appear to have been about twenty killed and wounded ; the Confeder-

ate losses about five. The Federals promptly advanced on Sanderson, seven or eight miles to the west, and remained there until the next day, the 11th. Contact with Harrison's Cavalry seems to have been lost, and nothing was captured by Henry at Sanderson.

On the morning of the 11th, Colonel Henry set out towards Lake City, and around 10 a.m. was opposed about three miles east of that place by General Finegan, whose position was hastily intrenched. Finegan's strength is reported by him as 490 Infantry, 110 Cavalry and 2 guns--consisting largely of reinforcements from Middle Florida. Heavy skirmishing with the Federals resulted and after several hours Colonel Henry withdrew to Sanderson. The Federal strength by number is nowhere officially stated, but consisted of one regiment of mounted infantry and a battalion of cavalry with four pieces of artillery--which latter were not used in the engagement. Civilians living along the highway estimated the Federal strength as 1400, but it was probably less.

On the 14th, a detachment, reported as fifty Federal cavalrymen of Colonel Henry's command from Sanderson, entered Gainesville (about fifty miles distant) and captured large stores of supplies. Gainesville is reported to have been held for fifty-six hours, during which period the Federals were attacked by Captain Dickson, whose strength is claimed to have been two companies of cavalry. The Federal detachment returned to Sanderson on the 17th.

On the 15th, General Gillmore left Jacksonville for his headquarters at Hilton Head. Various conferences had been had with General Seymour, which indicate definite instructions to General Seymour and which made clear that his advance in force would not be beyond the Little St. Mary's and that that point and

Baldwin were to be strengthened so as to be held without question.

Between the 17th and 20th no distinctive operations are reported by the Federals. To include the 19th, Federal troops, to be employed the next day near Olustee, were concentrated at Sanderson and the vicinity of the Little St. Mary's.

Confederate. - During the period from February 8th to 19th, the Confederates were concerned mainly with the concentration of troops at and near Lake City. Previous contacts with Federals between there and Jacksonville have been noted, and the last in that general area was on the 11th near Lake City. From then until the 19th inclusive, there is shown a rising strength in Confederate forces. Reports of General Finegan set forth the following troops as being at or near Lake City: February 11th, 600 infantry and cavalry and 2 guns; 13th, 2250 infantry and cavalry and 10 guns; 19th, 5200 infantry and cavalry and 3 batteries (12 guns). Between the 11th and 19th the increase was due to Georgia reinforcements. This force was placed in camp at Olustee and had made some progress in entrenching its position, altho the "proposed line of work" (shown on map) was not completed by the 19th. Points marked "C" and "D" were separate intrenchments and ready by the 17th. No doubt a limited amount of preparation along the "proposed line of work" had been made by the 20th.

Opposing Forces, Their Information, Plans and Orders. ***Federals.*** As previously stated, the Federal force was commanded by Brigadier General Truman Seymour, and consisted of the following, the strength stated by him to be "near 5500 officers and men and 16 guns:"

Colonel Guy V. Henry's Mounted Brigade:

2 Squadrons, Independent Battalion, Mass. Cavalry, Major
A. H. Stevens

40th Regiment, Mass. Volunteers (Infantry), (Commander
not shown)

Horse Battery B, 1st U. S. Artillery (4 Guns), Capt. S. S.
Elder

Colonel J. R. Hawley's Brigade (Infantry):

7th Connecticut, Capt. Skinner (10-365)

7th New Hampshire, Col. J. C. Abbott (30-675)

8th U. S. Colored Troops, Col. C. W. Fribley (21-544)

Colonel W. B. Barton's Brigade (Infantry) :

47th New York, Col. H. Moore

48th New York, Major W. B. Coan

115th New York, Col. S. Sammon

Colonel James Montgomery's Brigade (Infantry) :

54th Massachusetts (Colored) Col. E. N. Hollowell (13-480)

1st North Carolina (Colored) Lt. Col. W. N. Reed

Battery E. 3d U. S. Artillery (6 guns) Capt. John Hamil-
ton

Battery M, 1st U. S. Artillery with

1 section James' Rhode Island Battery (6 guns) Capt. L.
L. Langdon

No data is at hand for deducing the battle strength of each organization above, except in four cases shown in parentheses. In these cases the first figure is the number of officers, the second the number of men. The three batteries may be taken as 75 men each, their approximate battle strength.

On February 20th, the Federal commander's information regarding the Confederate strength, location and dispositions was apparently quite indefinite. In his final report on the engagement (March 25, 1864) General Seymour stated that he had no "doubt as to the propriety of a conflict on equal terms." On February 22d, in a partial report, he states that "according to the best information" the Confederates were 4000 to 5000 strong. After the battle (in the same report) he states that "the enemy was greatly superior in force."

The plans of General Seymour, merely for the general employment of his force, were formed at Baldwin on the 17th. On that date he wrote to General Gillmore, then at Hilton Head and who had left General Seymour's headquarters on the 15th (see above), that he had decided to move to the Suwannee River for the purpose of destroying the railroad there. On the 22d (after the battle) he stated to the same authority that he moved from Barber's (on the Little St. Mary's) on the 20th "with the intention of meeting the enemy at or near Lake City and of pushing the mounted force to the Suwannee River, to destroy if possible the railroad bridge at that stream." This plan of action was, as stated, entirely contrary to instructions of General Gillmore, who, in a sharp letter to General Seymour on the 18th, in reply to the latter's letter of the 17th, said, among other things: "You must have forgotten my last instructions, which were for the present to hold Baldwin and the Saint Mary's South Fork as your outposts to the westward of Jacksonville-." Whatever may have been the lure and reasons, General Seymour clearly disregarded the orders of his chief.

No orders are found for the advance, but the march toward Lake City, on the 20th, was commenced in the following order, starting about 7 A.M. from Barber's (Little St. Mary's) and joined by Henry's mounted force at Sanderson :

Henry's mounted force with Elder's Battery, (from Sanderson).

Hawley's brigade, with Hamilton's Battery.

Barton's brigade, with Langdon's battery.

The trains and medical vehicles.

Montgomery's brigade.

It would appear that Hawley's brigade, at least, marched in three parallel columns (by regiment), and that Henry's troops did not continue to lead the ad-

vance at the time first touch was had with the Confederates.

Specific performance of Henry's mounted force during the march and the succeeding battle is not contained in any of the reports.

Confederate. As previously stated, the Confederate force was commanded by Brigadier General Joseph Finegan, and consisted of the following, he reporting his "whole effective force as infantry 4600; cavalry less than 600 ; artillery, 3 batteries-twelve guns" :

First Brigade (infantry), Brigadier General A. H. Colquitt:

6th Georgia, Colonel John T. Lofton

19th Georgia, Colonel James H. Neal

23d Georgia, Lt. Colonel James H. Huggins

27th Georgia, Colonel Charles T. Zachry

28th Georgia, Colonel Tully Graybill

6th Florida Battalion, Lt. *Colonel* John M. Martin

Chatham (Georgia) Artillery (4 guns), attached, Capt. John F. Wheaton.

Second Brigade (infantry), Colonel George P. Harrison, 32d Georgia:

32d Georgia Volunteers, Major W. T. Holland

1st Georgia Regulars, Captain H. A. Cannon

64th Georgia Regulars, Colonel John W. Evans

1st Florida Battalion, Lieut. Colonel Charles F. Hopkins

Bonaud's Battalion (Ga.), Major A. Bonaud

Guerard's (Ga.) Battery (4 guns), attached, Captain John M. Guerard.

Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Caraway Smith, 2d Florida Cavalry:

4th Georgia Cavalry, Colonel Duncan L. Clinch (250)

2d Florida Cavalry, Lt. Col. A. H. McCormick (202)

5th Florida Cavalry Battalion, Major G. W. Scott (140 approx.)

Reserve: Florida Light Artillery (4 guns), Captain R. H. Gamble.

Colonel R. B. Thomas was assigned as Chief of Artillery.

No data is at hand for deducing the battle strength of each organization above, except in three cases shown in parentheses. These numbers probably cover the strength for both officers and men. The batteries

may be taken as 70 men each, their approximate battle strength.

General Finegan's information about the Federal strength that could probably be employed in any serious advance, pointed to a force of three regiments of infantry, some cavalry and artillery. He, like his opponent, seemed not to have maintained reconnaissance with the other's main force ; and consequently had no specific knowledge on which to base definite plans. Higher Confederate authority had no general plan of action other than to reenforce General Finegan to the maximum that could be taken from other sources, with the purposes of enabling him to offer successful resistance to a serious westward advance by the Federals. With this idea of resistance General Finegan intended to entrench a position at Olustee, as shown on map. Here both flanks would be covered: to the north by Ocean Pond, to the south by a swamp, while the front presented very difficult, if not impassable, ground. He hoped to be able to entice the Federals into attacking this position ; and on belief that they had advanced to within about three miles of the position around noon, he sent his cavalry, supported by the 64th Georgia and two companies of the 32d Georgia, with orders to "advance and skirmish with the enemy and draw them to our works." The remainder of the force was "prepared for action," but in what manner is not stated. These measures constitute the initial plans for meeting the Federals.

Verbal orders no doubt covered all the above plans ; and nothing is found of record to change that assumption.

The Terrain. - The attached sketch fully shows the details of the area on which the battle was fought. Those familiar with this type of Florida topography recognize it as perfectly flat with pine growth and a

covering of thin grass, weeds and straw. No definite clearings existed except the small fields near and within the battle area. The ground, except the pond and marsh areas, was readily passable. The pine trees afforded cover for individual riflemen, but no irregular ground approaches nor that type of cover for groups or masses existed.

Concealed maneuver of forces could be made at reasonable distances from either opponent due to the screening afforded by the pine growth, and should the Confederates remain at their position, that position could be turned from the south. Should that be attempted, it would also offer flanking opportunities to the Confederates against the turning force. The area on which the fight did occur should have presented chances to the Federals for forcing the Confederates, through proper flanking, against the larger bay and with promise of serious results to them. Likewise, had it been practicable for the Confederates to have forced the issue farther to the rear of the actual battle area, and have rested their left flank on the large bay and while the bulk of their force was massed to their right, correspondingly serious results to the Federals might have resulted. This successful Confederate action could have forced the Federals against either or both bays, with no outlet except the narrow ground between the two bays and the large perfect obstacle of Ocean Pond directly to the rear.

It would appear most improbable that the Federals would or could attack the Confederate position partially prepared as shown at Olustee, because it could be reached only by narrow columns on the railroad and road from the east and over the road shown from the southeast. Such a plan of final attack could offer no chance of success. Likewise, would the Confederates be handicapped should they attempt to move

forward from that position to attack the Federals formed up to the east and south and within attacking range. Each force, under these circumstances, would be limited to an artillery duel that could gain no decisive ends.

In the failure of either force to maneuver for the purpose of decisive flanking action, a straight meeting engagement, with movements directly forward, would result in an encounter in the open without advantage of ground to either. And that is what happened.

THE BATTLE

The order of march of the Federals toward Lake City and the initial steps taken by the Confederate commander to gain touch with them are mentioned above.

Somewhere between Sanderson and before the Federals had reached the area at the eastern boundary of the sketch (Hawley's brigade marching in the lead with its three regiments in line of regimental columns), the 7th Connecticut was ordered to go forward as a protecting force about one-half mile ahead of the column with skirmishers properly provided. This regiment consisted of four companies formed provisionally from the original ten companies comprising the regiment, and employed two companies as skirmishers. The 7th New Hampshire and 8th U. S. Colored continued to follow abreast of each other, the former being on the right, with the line of march on the road for that regiment and the 8th Colored advancing via the railroad. The position and location of Henry's mounted troops are not known.

The skirmishers (leading companies, 7th Connecticut) encountered the Confederate cavalry (probably small groups of scouts) about four miles east of Olus-

tee, which would be near the road junction shown towards the eastern edge of the attached map. This first contact occurred probably about 12:30 P. M.

As nearly as can be judged, the Confederate commander sent forward his cavalry about 11 A. M.; followed, about noon, by the 64th Georgia and two companies of the 32d Georgia, as a support to the cavalry, with orders to "skirmish with the enemy and draw them to our works." The remaining Confederate forces were held at camp and "placed under arms and prepared for action."

When the two forces first gained contact, the skirmish line of the 7th Connecticut apparently was not checked, but steadily advanced while the Confederate cavalry fell back. The Federal skirmish line arrived in the vicinity of the crossing of the highway and railroad at about 2 P. M. (two and one-quarter miles east of Olustee). Here they were met by Confederate infantry. The presence of this infantry came about as follows :

About 12:30 P. M., General Finegan directed General Colquitt to move forward with three regiments of his brigade and Gamble's Battery (shown in above table as, "Reserve") and to take command of all Confederate troops at the front. He was further directed to drive back the Federal force if not too strong, and to ask for needed assistance. The three regiments Colquitt took were the 6th, 19th and 28th Georgia regiments ; General Finegan believing at that time that the Federal force consisted of three infantry regiments, with some cavalry and artillery. The 64th Georgia, two companies off 32d Georgia and Smith's cavalry had already preceded the force Colquitt had, and, under the orders, became a part of his command. The battle, proper, was here initiated with no definite plan except to attack whatever was met. All employment

of troops throughout the fight was apparently left to General Colquitt. With this decision, the thought of drawing the Federals to the Confederate position was given up. The reasons for such a change of plan is not indicated. However it would seem very doubtful whether the Federals could be so enticed, and seemingly General Finegan believed his force at least equal to the Federals and was not fearful of risking a fight in the open.

Details are not available, but no doubt the Connecticut skirmishers were first attacked by elements of the 64th and 32d Georgia regiments around 2 P. M. about where the railroad and highway cross. This attack resolved itself into what is shown on the map as the "2 position" for the Confederates and the "1st position" for the Federals.

The 7th New Hampshire and 8th U. S. Colored regiments had probably been following the 7th Connecticut at about one-half mile as ordered, and as the latter fell back from the "1st position" the other two Federal regiments were ordered to deploy and attempted to do so on what is indicated on map as the "2 position" for the Federals. In the meantime the 7th Connecticut continued its withdrawal and passed to the rear of the other two regiments. This withdrawal probably began between 2:30 and 3:00 P.M.

The Federal commander's (Seymour's) plan, as stated by him, was to place all three Federal batteries approximately on one line (and near the locality shown as "captured guns"), to have these batteries supported and protected by his attacking infantry in that vicinity, and with the other necessary portion of his infantry to attack the Confederate left after the Confederate line had been subjected to heavy punishment by the fire of Federal artillery.

In attempting to execute this plan of action the 7th

New Hampshire and 8th U. S. Colored regiments undertook to get into position on either side and somewhat forward of the artillery which was trying to get to the assigned locations chosen for the batteries. These positions are mentioned above. The 7th New Hampshire, an experienced regiment, in making this deployment became involved in confusion through trying to conform to a change of orders after the deployment had been started. This circumstance, aided by the fire of the Confederates, brought about real disorder and eventuated in final uncontrolled retirement of the regiment. The 8th U. S. Colored, not experienced and without much training, after partially getting into its position, was strongly affected by the action of the 7th New Hampshire on its right; and, under the effect of Confederate fire, also ultimately gave way badly. The action of these two regiments greatly hampered the employment of the Federal artillery. The artillery fire was masked to a great degree, for the infantry became mixed with the personnel of the batteries.

In this state of confusion the batteries also lost both men and animals from Confederate fire, and were forced to abandon their positions. Being unable to withdraw all their guns, six of the sixteen pieces were captured as the Confederates reached the former battery positions. These events were critical incidents in the battle, and probably occurred during a period from 3:30 to 5:00 P. M.

The movements of the Confederates which brought about these conditions were, in general, as follows:

Upon becoming engaged with the 7th Connecticut and believing the Federals were bringing a strong force to the scene of action, General Colquitt directed the cavalry to take position well out on the flanks and to protect them -one regiment on each flank. Clinch's

regiment went to the left and McCormick's to the right ; each general location is shown on the map. At the same time he sent orders to other troops of his brigade to join him. These orders brought forward the 23d Georgia, 6th Florida and Wheaton's Battery. These troops had already been started forward by General Finegan. They soon reached their destination and were placed as shown in "3d position"; Wheaton's battery (Chatham Artillery) replacing Gamble's battery which, through loss of animals and injury to limbers had been reduced in efficiency. About 1:30 P. M. General Finegan ordered other troops to Colquitt's, assistance, and under the order Colonel Harrison moved forward from camp. He took with him the 32d Georgia (less two Companies already with Colquitt), 1st Georgia Regulars, and one section of Guerard's Battery. The troops left at camp were the 1st Florida Battalion, Bonaud's Battalion, 27th Georgia and one section of Guerard's Battery. Shortly after 3:00 P. M. Harrison's troops had reached the battle position and were generally located as shown in "3d Position." Harrison, by Colquitt's orders, was placed in command of the left portion of the line, which presumably consisted of the 1st Georgia Regulars, 32d Georgia and 6th Georgia. Colquitt commanded the remaining organizations on the right. The section of Guerard's battery which accompanied Harrison was originally placed on the right of Colquitt's command. The combined effort of the Confederates produced a slow advance which at about 4:30 P. M. caused the 7th New Hampshire and, 8th U. S. Colored to withdraw finally from their position.

Before the two Federal regiments just mentioned had made their final and confused retirement, Barton's brigade had appeared in line towards the Confederate left front, and originally took position farther forward

than is shown on the map. However the pressure from that part of the Confederate line slowly pushed them back to the vicinity indicated on the map.

With the increase of Confederate effort and the pressure on Barton's brigade, Montgomery's brigade (54th Mass. and 1st N. C.) arrived on the field; and with the 7th Connecticut (re-organized after its earlier experience) placed between these two, the fighting continued. The Federal lines, however, were being slowly forced back.

During the period from about 4:30 to 5:00 P. M. the 6th Florida Battalion, on the Confederate right, changed its front of attack, and assisted in causing the gradual withdrawal of the 54th Massachusetts and 7th Connecticut. At about 5:30 P. M. the Confederates had reached the vicinity of what is shown as "4th Position." Also about this hour, the ammunition of the 6th and 32d Georgia regiments (left of the line) had become practically exhausted ; and for probably twenty minutes, in this condition, their position was held, and until replenishment of ammunition could be accomplished shortly before 6:00 P. M.

The Confederates were gradually bringing their full strength into action and around 5:30 to 6:00 P. M. the last troops held back near Olustee had reached the field. These were the 1st Florida Battalion, Bonaud's Battalion, 27th Georgia and the second (remaining) section of Guerard's Battery. This infantry was placed forward of the center of the line to hold the Federals (see map) while troops on the original line were being supplied with ammunition ; the section of Guerard's Battery went into position to the left and rear of Wheaton's Battery (see location between "3d and 4th Positions").

With the arrival of the above troops and after ammunition had been supplied, General Colquitt ordered

a general advance, instructing Colonel Harrison to place the 6th and 32d Georgia so as to flank the Federal right. These results were brought about shortly after 6:00 P. M. and caused the general retreat of the Federals.

The Confederates followed for about a mile. The Cavalry had been ordered to take up the pursuit, but acted very timidly and apparently did not proceed farther than the road junction shown on the eastern side of the map. The cavalry had been joined about 4:00 P. M. by Scott's Battalion of Cavalry, which took position near McCormick's cavalry, on the Confederate right flank. On account of approaching darkness, the reported exhaustion of the infantry and lack of supplies, General Finegan did not attempt to press his opportunity but yielded to the recommendations of his subordinates that no serious pursuit be undertaken. Neither the Federal nor Confederate cavalry appears to have accomplished anything of value preceding, during or after the fight. Aside from indications that each was placed on the flanks of their own infantry during the action, the Confederate cavalry gained nothing from its opportunity and orders to pursue, while the Federal cavalry's positive activity of any nature is not ascertainable. The greater portion of the Federals proceeded unmolested that night to Barber's (about 13 miles), and the 7th Connecticut, as rear guard, is shown as having reached there about midnight. Some sources state that the Federal cavalry also performed rear guard duties.

On the 21st the retreat of the Federals brought them to Baldwin ; and on the 22d the movement was continued to the vicinity of Jacksonville. The Confederates arrived at Sanderson on the 22d and on the 26th General Finegan had his troops near McGirts Creek, 12 to 13 miles from Jacksonville.

Losses.-The officially reported casualties recorded for each force are as follows :

FEDERAL

(The figures on left of dash are officers; on the right, men)

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Aggregate</i>
115th N. Y. Vols	2- 27	4- 204	1- 58	7- 289
47th N. Y. Vols	3- 27	4- 193	0- 86	7- 306
48th N. Y. Vols	1- 16	1- 153	0- 44	2- 213
7th Conn. Vols	1- 4	0- 42	0- 22	1- 68
7th N. H. Vols	1- 16	7- 64	0-120	8- 200
8th U. S. (Colored)....	1- 48	8- 180	1- 72	10- 300
1st N. C. (Colored)....	2- 20	8- 123	0- 77	10- 220
54th Mass. (Colored) _	0- 13	3- 62	0- 8	3- 83
40th Mass. Mtd. Inf	0- 2	1- 28	0- 5	1- 35
Ind. Bn. Mass. Cav	0 - 5	0 - 5
Btry. B. 1st U. S. Art. (Horse)	0- 33	1- 12	1 - 16
Btry. E. 3d U. S. Art....	0- 11	4- 18	0- 6	4 - 35
Btry. M. 1st U. S. Art...	0- 4	1- 21	0- 6	1 - 31
Part. Btry. C. 3d R. I. Art	0 - 1	0 - 5	.	0- 6
Total	11-192	42-1110	2-504	55-1806

Some of the officers killed and wounded are given as follows :

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Killed (5)</i>	<i>Wounded (11)</i>
8th U. S. (Colored	Col. Fribley	Major Burritt
	Lt. Dempsey	
1st. N. C. (Colored)...	Lt. Col Reed	
115th N. Y.	Capt. Vanderveer.....	Col. Sammon
7th N. H.	1st Lt. G. W.Taylor	2d Lt. H. J. Davis
47th N. Y.	Col Moore
48th N. Y.	Capt. N. A. Elfing
3d Art.	Capt. Hamilton
	Lt. Myrick
1st Art.	Lt. McCrea
Organization not given	Capt. R. H. Jewett
	1st Lt. H. W. Littlefield
	1st Lt. E. G. Tomlinson

CONFEDERATE

(The figures on the left of dash are officers; on the right, men)

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Aggregate</i>
Colquitt's Brigade:				
6th Florida Battalion	1 - 8	4 - 69	82
Chatham Art.	0 - 3	3
6th Georgia	1 - 4	2 - 54	61
19th Georgia	1 - 7	7 - 81	96
23d Georgia	0 - 2	4 - 62	0 - 2	70
27th Georgia	0 - 7	8 - 59	74
28th Georgia	0-10	6 - 79	95
Gambles Btry.	0 - 2	0 - 3	5
Total	3-40	31-410	0 - 2	486

Harrison's Brigade:

1st Fla. Battalion	0 - 3	0 - 47	50
Bonaud's Battalion	1-11	2 - 93	0 - 2	109
1st Georgia	1 - 2	1 - 24	28
32d Georgia	0-15	6-143	164
64th Georgia	2-15	9 - 79	0 - 2	107
Guerard's Btry.	0 - 2	2
Total	4-46	18-388	0 - 4	460
Grand Total	7-86	49-798	0 - 6	946

No casualties are shown for cavalry organizations.

Some of the officers killed and wounded are given as follows:

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Killed (10)</i>	<i>Wounded (22)</i>
6th Fla. Bn.....	Lt. Thos. J. Hill	
6th Georgia.....	Lt. Combs	
19th Georgia	Johnson (Adjutant)....	
28th Georgia.....		Capt. Crawford
1st Fla. Bn		Lt. Col. C. F. Hopkins
		Lt. S. K. Collins
		Lt. T. Williams
Bonaud's Bn. (Ga.)..	Lt. W. W. Holland.....	Lt. J. W. Hall
	(Fla. Co. attached)	Lt. C. Pierce
1st Georgia	Capt. H. A. Cannon ..	Capt. A. F. Hill
	Lt. Dancy	Lt. P. H. Morel

32d Georgia	Major Holland	Capt. W. D. Cornwell
	Lt. R. J. Butler	Lt. W. T. Moody
		Lt. W. L. Jenkins
		Lt. J. H. Pittman
		Lt. Morris Dawson
64th Georgia.....	Lt. Col. Jas. Barrow.....	Col. J. W. Evans
	Lt. P. A. Waller	Maj. W. H. Weems
		Capt. R. W. Craven
		Lt. J. S. Thrasher
		Lt. M. L. Raines
		Capt. J. K. Redd
		Lt. T. M. Beasley
		Capt. R. A. Brown
		Lt. J. F. Burch
4th Georgia Cavalry..		Col. D. L. Clinch

Medical Provisions.- The Federals had twelve ambulances for medical transportation as well as means for setting up a first aid station. At the beginning of the fight equipment and transportation were brought forward rather close to their troops ; but due to the confusion of retreating troops and the wounded as well as danger from Confederate artillery fire, the medical station and ambulances were withdrawn to the eastern side of the small stream and marsh shown on that section of map. Meager information indicates that this location was used for probably three hours ; the wounded arriving there by walking, by litter, on animals, wagons, caissons, ambulances and whatever mode of transportation that could be utilized. In the evacuation of the casualties from this battlefield station, many wounded had to be left, but those able to walk or for whom transportation of any nature existed were taken to Barber's during the night. From there by rail and wagon, cases were forwarded to Jacksonville.

No information is obtainable concerning the definite handling of Confederate casualties or the medical service available. The smaller number of casualties

probably offered less of a problem and the town of Lake City was not far distant. It was used for hospitalization. The Federal wounded falling into the hands of the Confederates were, in part, sent to Tallahassee, and no doubt some cases were handled in Lake City.

GEORGE F. BALTZELL, U.S.A.
Colonel Infantry