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Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers' Existential Philosophy

Clayton B. Ries

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FREEDOM AND SELF-BECOMING IN KARL JASPERS'

EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

by

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Bachelor of Arts, College of St. Thomas, 1970
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This dissertation submitted by Clayton B. Ries in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.

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Title FREEDOM AND SELF-BECOMING IN KARL JASPERS' EXISTENTIAL
PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

One of the primary concerns of contemporary counseling literature appears to be the self, to what extent it owes its being to freedom on the one hand, and to environmental influences on the other. This paper does not pretend to resolve so complex an issue. It seeks rather to view the problem within a philosophical framework which seems to recognize the rightful prerogatives of both contenders in the debate, thereby clearing the way for a better understanding of the vital issues involved. The philosophical framework proposed is that of Karl Jaspers. Within this framework it is proposed that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom provides the adequate precondition for self-becoming or Existenz. This existential self-becoming has decisive implications for the counseling relationship. Once the counselor has validated for himself the free effecting of his own selfhood, he is prepared to recognize this right and responsibility for his counselee. The counselee in turn accepts this right and responsibility for his own Existenz and rejects dependence on the counselor insofar as he is capable of coming to himself in authentic self-being.

FREEDOM AND SELF-BECOMING
IN KARL JASPERS' EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

Clayton B. Ries

University of North Dakota

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Among the widely acknowledged concepts basic to the counseling literature is that of the self.¹ One of the unsolved problems in self theory has been the relationship between the self-concept and the individual self.² However, by making use of an existential approach such as that of Karl Jaspers, this dichotomy can be resolved. The existential self is both what the individual does, and what he is or is becoming. "I am what I come to be--not what I passively grow into, like mere living matter, but what I want to be as I come to myself in the medium of self-reflection."³ In this passage from his monumental *Philosophy*, Jaspers epitomizes the principal thrust of this study. The human being freely creates his own selfhood as he comes to an awareness of his own potential and responsibility as a person.

Statement of Problem

Self-becoming or *Existenz*, the term used by Jaspers, involves for him a confrontation with three fundamental concepts: freedom, historicity and communication. Freedom constitutes the necessary

¹Ledford J. Bischof, Interpreting Personality Theories (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 595.

²C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 516.

³Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, trans. by E. B. Ashton, three volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971), p. 38.

precondition to the creating of one's self-becoming. In his own words, "What the word choice expresses is that in my free decision I am not only conscious of acting in the world but of creating my own being in historic continuity."⁴ Historicity, the second principal concept under consideration, is also suggested in the just quoted citation. Its implications for Existenz are that "A sense of historicity can simultaneously lend absolute weight to existence, as grasped by self-being, and keep it in suspension and relative, as mere existence."⁵ Finally, in Jaspersian thought there is no realization of self-being without communication. ". . . the origin of self-being which comes by itself and yet, in essence, is not of and by itself alone."⁶

It is proposed that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom provides an adequate precondition for the becoming of Existenz and results in decisive implications for the counselor and counselee and their relationship. One of these is that the counselor recognizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to effect freely his own selfhood, something he has first validated for himself. Another implication is that the counselee freely accepts this right and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting dependence on the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come to himself in authentic self-being.

Need for the Study

This study is written not without an awareness of the efforts of other writers who have dealt with the questions of freedom and the

⁴Ibid., p. 160.

⁵Ibid., p. 107.

⁶Ibid., p. 47.

self and the implications of both for the counseling relationship and those individuals involved in it. Neither is it an attack on a specific theory of counseling. However, in some instances it will be pointed out how an existential approach might offer a more consistent, adequate or integral view of man and his situation than usually proposed. More specifically, far from its being inane speculation with head in the clouds, "Existentialism is an endeavor to understand man as he really is. It takes issue with the assumption of science that to know the essence of man means that we have grasped the reality of man."⁷

Delimitations

Whereas self-being ceases in the isolated ego, implying the need for communication, this study limits itself to a consideration of what existential freedom brings to the realization of Existenz. It asks what is required as the absolute precondition for communication between two selves in historic consciousness, as well as the implications derived therefrom for the counselor and counselee and their relationship.

References

Primary sources cited in the course of this study are contained in the following list of references. Also included is a work edited by Schilpp which contains Jaspers' Philosophical Autobiography and Reply to My Critics, besides various critical essays about Jaspers.

⁷C. Gratton Kemp, Existential Counseling, p. 2, in Existentialism, ed. by J. M. Whiteley (Counseling Psychologist, 1971, 2, 3).

- Jaspers, K. Existenzphilosophie. Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter and Co., 1938.
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- Jaspers, K. Philosophy. Translated by E. B. Ashton, three volumes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971.
- Schilpp, P. A. (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers. New York: Tudor, 1957.

Definition of Terms

Since Jaspers' philosophy is characterized by a dynamic flow of thought, it was judged advisable to consider his basic concepts as an organic whole by way of an overview rather than list them in isolated fashion. On the other hand, Jaspers regarded his philosophical work not as a system, but as systematically connected and open structure. Therefore it follows that the concept for him is somewhat indefinite, pregnant and growing.

Since every philosophical thought is true only in a movement, and since this movement must be assimilated authentically and its repetition must be alive in order to remain true, a primacy of terminology . . . is catastrophic. . . . The domination by terminology turns philosophizing into that academic pedantry in which philosophy itself has vanished.⁸

To gain the proper perspective for a view of Jaspers' philosophy it must be kept in mind that his philosophizing is primarily and

⁸Karl Jaspers, Von der Wahrheit, p. 428, in Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.

essentially a search for Being. And man's concrete historical situation is the factor that largely determines the kind of questions asked and the answers received regarding the nature of that Being. Philosophy must make a fresh beginning in each individual, as he confronts his own insecurity, his own challenges. As a result it is always in process and in flux. It can never be presented in the form of a universally binding doctrine. For Jaspers philosophy seems to contain two layers of meaning. There is the one of objective truth and consistency with empirical fact, and the other which is that of the depth and intensity of the personal assimilation of this truth.

World is the first concept to be considered. In its broadest sense it signifies the totality of being. Jaspers distinguishes three general concepts of being: being-an-object, being-a-self and Being-in-itself. Only the first of these three can become an object of thought, those objects in space and time including things, persons, thoughts and ideas. This level of being constitutes the world in its narrower sense and is called existence.

Existenz is being-a-self in so far as the human individual freely determines his own being. Human existence for Jaspers can never become an object of knowledge in the same sense in which the world does. True, the individual self has a psycho-physical aspect which is empirical in nature and as such identical in structure with other selves. But the self is also more. As the locus for possible freedom of thought and action, this self is potential Existenz. Existential reality cannot be grasped conceptually since it expresses itself only in its own freedom, a mode not contained within the empirical categories. Jaspers, with regard to making oneself an

object of thought, even has this to say. ". . . I can become in no manner the object of my own speculation, I cannot know myself, but have only the alternative of either reaching self-realization, or else of losing myself." Existenz is "the axis around which all I am, and all that can become truly meaningful for me in the world turns."⁹

Kierkegaard is Jaspers' primary source for the specific content of the term Existenz, in itself simply a word meaning existence.

No definable concept--which would presuppose some kind of objective being--can express the being of Existenz. The very word is just one of the German synonyms for "being." The philosophical idea began obscurely, as a mere inkling of what Kierkegaard's use of the word has since made historically binding upon us.¹⁰

Kierkegaard in turn borrowed from Schelling the distinction between Idea and Existenz. It was the former who once and for all obliterated the dependence of the concept of Existenz on Hegel's universal Idea, thus vindicating for this concept those subjective and utterly personal qualities which Jaspers was later to borrow from him.

Since Existenz, according to Jaspers, cannot really be defined he makes use of a set of existential categories instead to circumscribe that term. Among the principal categories are freedom, historicity and communication. These in a sense determine the existential reality in a manner analogous to that in which the laws of causality determine empirical existence.

Existential freedom and Existenz are in actuality two sides of the same reality and are almost interchangeable concepts for Jaspers. This idea seems to emerge clearly in the following citation.

⁹Ibid., p. 76. In Schilpp, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁰Karl Jaspers, Philosophy I, p. 56, note.

My resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom in which I can no longer separate the choice and me because I am this free choice . . . freedom is the choice of my own self. This is why I cannot step out once again to choose between being myself and not being myself, as if freedom were nothing but a tool of mine. I am be choosing, rather; if I am not, I choose not. What I am myself is left open, of course, because of decisions still unmade; to that extent I am not yet.¹¹

What Jaspers seems to be saying is that the exercise of one's freedom need not result merely in a series of decisions concerning disconnected or insignificant happenings. No, the exercise of freedom is the sole and adequate source of self-becoming or Existenz. In fact, free choice is one's Existenz.

Historicity expresses more than any other concept Jaspers' deviation from traditional philosophy.¹² For Jaspers it signifies both the limitation and the dimension of depth which attaches to man's being-in-time. Historicity is that quality of Existenz that denotes the unity of the individual, as well as for personal human existence within the empirical world. Analytical thought tends to separate Existenz from its concrete historical situation, while this situation is in fact the only mode for its appearance. Freedom too becomes real only through its bond with the body and with the world. Historicity is moreover the medium in which communication transpires. Jaspers gives expression to all this:

Something quite different is the existential historic consciousness proper, in which the self becomes aware of its

¹¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 160.

¹²Kurt Hoffman, Basic concepts of Jaspers' philosophy, in Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 101.

historicity as the only reality it has. . . . It makes me aware of myself in communication with other historic self-being; I as myself am phenomenally bound in time to a sequence of singular situations, my given situations.¹³

Existential communication is for Jaspers the sole means for the realization of self-being.

Existential communication is not to be modeled and is not to be copied; each time it is flatly singular. It occurs between two selves which are nothing else, are not representative, and are therefore not interchangeable. In this communication, which is absolutely historic and unrecognizable from outside, lies the assurance of selfhood. It is the one way by which a self is for a self, in mutual creation. The tie to it is a historical decision on the part of a self: to void its self-being as an isolated I and to enter into communicative self-being.¹⁴

Difficult as it is to recognize existential communication as such, the forms it may take Jaspers acknowledges are as diverse as the ordinary modes of communication among humans.

The Encompassing is that concept whereby Jaspers attempted to provide a vantage point from which to philosophize out of the totality of being. Its point of departure is the thought that whatever becomes an object of one's thinking is only one conceivable kind of being among others, only one mode of being. One cannot reach a position from which to view the closed whole of being, a position that no longer points to something beyond. Being remains forever unclosed for the thinking mind and keeps drawing it ever onward into the horizon on all sides.

We always live and think within a horizon. But the very fact that it is a horizon indicates something further which again surrounds the given horizon. From this situation arises the question about the Encompassing. The Encompassing is not a horizon within which every

¹³Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 104-105.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 54.

determinate mode of Being and truth emerges for us, but rather that within which every particular horizon is enclosed as in something absolutely comprehensive which is no longer visible as a horizon at all.¹⁵

As soon as it is thought, the one Encompassing splits into its seven modes. First there is the Encompassing in which the world or external being appears, and the Encompassing which the thinking individual is, which is consciousness-at-large or consciousness of empirical knowledge. Next the individual is also concrete and temporal existence and the carrier of that consciousness-at-large. Then he is spirit in so far as ideas guide and unify his life. Finally the Encompassing undergoes a third split involving a double leap. One is from the world to Transcendence, the other from existence to Existenz.

The Encompassing is that vehicle of thought that enables things to become more than they are on their surface, an added quality that empowers them to take on their unique transparency and depth. But despite this cumulative impulse and thrust, knowledge is for Jaspers still radically unable to reach Being-in-itself. The moment one believes he has grasped Being conceptually, he has already falsified it by making it into an objective content, which by definition it is not.

However there is a mode of knowledge proper to Encompassing Being. One becomes aware of it, rather than cognizes it directly. Something of itself non-objective is first thought in the form of an objective entity, but which acts merely as a catalyst and bridges the gap leading from the objective knowledge to the awareness of Being-in-itself in a reflexive thought. Jaspers here seems to draw attention

¹⁵Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 52, trans. by by William Earle (New York: Noonday, 1955), p. 52.

to the fact that there must be a direct givenness of Being, prior to all thought about Being, at the source of all thought and at the foundation of all knowledge. Without that primal awareness knowledge remains for him a superficial collection of data. With it everything that is known objectively can be blended into an awareness of Being.

Transcendence is "The source and the goal, both of which lie in God and out of whose depths alone we really become authentically human."¹⁶ According to Jaspers Transcendence is the philosopher's name for God. Together with Existenz it embodies one of the two polar concepts of Jaspersian philosophy. Existenz is directed to Transcendence which surpasses the individuality of Existenz, appearing only where the empirical and intelligible give way. Being-in-itself encompasses Existenz, which is aware of it and participates in it. In this way individual historical truth is included in and enveloped by the truth of Being and its subjectivity resolves itself in the affirmation of a transcendent reality. The absoluteness of Existenz gives way before an ultimate non-subjective Being, which is Transcendence or Being-in-itself.

Nevertheless, since knowledge is unable to attain a direct grasp of Being, for Jaspers the realm of Transcendence can only be dealt with in the language of symbols, which he calls ciphers. World, Existenz and Transcendence are the three ideal realms of being. Conceptually distinct, they are ultimately bridged by the concept of historicity. The world and the self are thus connected, the world as the ground for the freedom of the self and the self as

¹⁶Karl Jaspers, Rechenschaft und Ausblick, p. 264, in Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.

accepting and assimilating the world. The concept of the cipher leads similarly from the world through its appearances to Transcendence.

Philosophical faith, declares Jaspers, is man's only genuine response to and bond with Transcendence. Its sole alternative is abdication of one's selfhood and surrender to nihilism. Within his own personal and historical situation, the individual as Existenz is confronted with a most basic and extreme decision, whether in the anguish of boundary situations he will keep faith with Transcendence and in his own selfhood and independence.

If thinking philosophically means: learning how to die, it does so not by abandoning the present in fear and with thoughts of death, but by intensifying the present through never ending activity in the light of Transcendence. Hence, Transcendence means nothing to us if everything that is, is merely "a form of life" for us; and likewise, Transcendence is everything to us if that which is essential to us is so only in relation to Transcendence, or as a symbol of Transcendence.¹⁷

Boundary situations are

Situations like the following: that I am always in situations; that I cannot live without struggling and suffering; that I cannot avoid guilt; that I must die--these are what I call boundary situations. They never change, except in appearance. There is no way to survey them in existence, no way to see anything behind them. They are like a wall we run into, a wall on which we founder. We cannot modify them; all that we can do is to make them lucid, but without explaining or deducing them from something else. They go with existence itself.¹⁸

There can be little more to add by way of saying what the boundary situations are. What is decisive is how the individual rises to meet these boundaries of empirical life. The response may be indifference, escape

¹⁷Karl Jaspers, Existenzphilosophie, p. 71, in Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.

¹⁸Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 178.

or helpless dejection,

. . . but in the end we can do nothing but surrender. The meaningful way for us to react to boundary situations is therefore not by planning and calculating to overcome them but by the very different activity of becoming the Existenz we potentially are; we become ourselves by entering with open eyes into the boundary situations. . . . To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz.¹⁹

Design and Organization

Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II takes up the concept of the self or self-becoming through its stages from initial awakening to full realization in Existenz. Then in Chapter III, the concept of existential freedom is considered from the standpoint of the function of the will, followed by a review of freedom in itself and in its relation to existence, necessity and Transcendence. Chapter IV, after developing the situational concept of historicity, in this context brings together the key concepts of Existenz and existential freedom and views them in their mutual complementation. Finally, Chapter V considers the implications of the previous chapters for counseling theory.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 179.

CHAPTER II

EXISTENZ: ITS AWAKENING AND FULL REALIZATION

Introduction

Implicit in the essential forward thrust of this chapter is the answer to a vital question. That question is whether the being of the world, existence, the object of consciousness-at-large, is all there is. Jaspers asks it this way:

What is there, as against all mundane being? . . . We answer: there is the being which in the phenomenality of existence is not, but can be, ought to be. . . . This being is myself as Existenz. . . . In Existenz I know, without being able to see it, that what I call my "self" is independent. The possibility of Existenz is what I live by; it is only in its realization that I am myself.¹

This specific concept of the self is not Jaspers' exclusive property, however. As Wallraff attests, "The . . . idea of an innermost and uninvestigable self--a hidden source beyond experience which all experience presupposes--is widely shared."² Therefore this chapter will attempt to clarify or elucidate, to use Jaspers' term, self-becoming or Existenz. Its method is first of all to consider, within the framework of the concept of the Encompassing, the possible but still incomplete answers to the question of self-being. Then it

¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 3.

²Charles F. Wallraff, Karl Jaspers, An Introduction to His Philosophy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 97.

takes up self-reflection, the medium in which self-being can be either realized or lost. Finally it reflects on the paradoxical expressions to which Existenz gives rise. In them self-becoming is clothed in human language which at once partially clarifies and partially obscures its meaning.

Incomplete Expressions for the Being of Existenz

I at Large

The first of these incomplete expressions of self-being is I at large, a composite term that must be viewed in the light of consciousness at large within the total framework of the concept of the Encompassing. In this term I is the being that grasps itself, that makes itself an object of knowledge. Thus the I is in a subject-object dichotomy, but not in a radical one like its division from things in the world. The I is aware of itself in a kind of circle with itself. How can the I grasp itself? It can do so only as a thinking subject, as that which constitutes the core of all self-consciousness. In this I think the I grasps itself as identical with itself. "At the moment of thinking, the I as I think is sure of its existence in the world. It does not know what it is, but at its present time it does know that it is."³ Such an I at large the individual is, just as is the case with every other. But the individual is not only I at large, he is himself. The I think does not constitute his self, since it is only an I at large. He is simply posited in it as a point-like subject drained of himself. Lacking any substance, it expresses only one's self-consciousness as one being among others.

³Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 27.

Aspects of the I, or Four Reflections
of the Individual's Existence

Inability to find oneself in the I at large may lead one to turn to his concrete existence. Here he is not only aware of himself, he is aware of himself under different aspects, as in so many mirrors. In none of them, however, does he see himself entirely. He perceives sides of his being and to some extent identifies with them, but does not achieve a full identity with himself in any.

When one says I what does he mean? First of all he is referring to his body. Without it he cannot act, and likewise he has to suffer whatever befalls it. He forms a unity with it. Its vitality or lack of it makes him feel strong or weak, ill at ease or glad to be alive. Although he remains one with his body, he seems to stand apart from it at the very instant he experiences it. This unity still does not establish identity. He is not his body. If he were his physical I, it would be incongruous that some body parts were not essential to him. He can lose limbs, various organs, even parts of his brain, yet remains himself. He may be present in the body's vital functions, but those functions are not his self. In last analysis his physical I is in his hands. Yet even if he takes the extreme measure of taking his own life to demonstrate his refusal to recognize his body as one with himself, he can only kill it, his body. Even then he must ask if henceforth he will be simply nothing.

When one rates in the context of social life is another aspect or mirror of the I. One's professional functions or job, the effect he has on others evokes a picture of what he is. He comes to feel that he is what he is for others. To be at all, everyone needs not only a body but a society, even if he stands outside or against society. The social

I so dominates people that a man's nature will seem to change along with changes in his social position and in the people he associates with. As a social I, however, he is not himself either. Although it is imposed on him, he can still put up an inner resistance to it. Throughout all changes he can remain himself, regardless of any social loss or gain. In his social existence he can be conscious of a role which he plays. But to him his role and his I are two different things. He knows himself only in his role, and yet he is not identical with it.

Society moreover rates one according to what he does. To him this constitutes a new mirror of what he is. What he has accomplished, what he can see as his success, his work, or what strikes him as his failure or wrongdoing, all this objectifies him to himself in its own fashion. In the active I his sense of being seems to merge with his sense of achievement. But here again he is not merely what he achieves. He can even come into conflict with it, or reject it as something no longer congruous with his ever changing demands on himself. What was once his achievement may turn itself into a thing from which he detaches himself.

I myself--while relatively acknowledging my works as mine and keeping faith with myself in upholding them--avoid identifying with them, especially as they seem to rob me of myself when I sense future possibilities, and when my present goal is what can make me sure of myself.⁴

Finally, it is by his past that one knows what he is. What he has been and experienced, thought and done, how he has been helped or what he has been made to bear, all this determines what he is conscious of being now, whether it is presently unknown or consciously remembered.

⁴Ibid., p. 31.

This is also where he derives his self-respect of his self-contempt, as well as the sympathies and antipathies that move him. This reminiscent I will objectify him to himself by mirroring his past to him. However, if he identified with this reminiscent I he would lose himself. He would be setting up the past as a criterion of what he wants to be, thereby depreciating both the present and future and their possibilities. Then he would not be what he becomes, but rather what he believes he has been. Thus his very concept of the present and the future will be as if they already were in the past. A decision in the present can once again unfold or wither the sense and significance of memory.

Four aspects of the I as holding out possible answers to the question of the nature of Existenz have been considered. But what was discovered was a schematization of objective existence, not an adequate statement of self-being. In each, one could find himself in the schema, but each time he had the experience that it did not fit entirely.

"None of these objectivations will achieve an absolute identity with myself. I go beyond such schemata; in them I would be bound to lose myself."⁵

Character, the Encompassing's Third
Mode Response to the Question of
Self-Being

When one asks once more what he is, he wants to know what is for him the being underneath his phenomenal or outward self. He has no direct way of knowing the kind and quality of his own being-in-itself,

⁵Ibid., p. 32.

but he infers it is that which underlies all his phenomena. One day he will have the experience that he not only exists and cannot be whatever he would like to be, he also finds himself the way he is. He may be amazed or ashamed, terrified or captivated to learn from his actions how he is. Throughout his life he experiences a dependency upon a being of himself he cannot fully control, a being he directs, promotes and restrains. It is a being too which may become for him a meaningful object of psychological research. This being is his character. Yet there is still something in him that resists recognition of himself as being simply given the way he is. He may even be disturbed in being that way. Although he may not know how to change it directly, he does know he is free. "I retrieve myself from the very being-in-itself that would make me resemble a given thing, and out of this given state, or against it, I take up myself."⁶

Three responses to the question as to the nature of Existenz have now been heard. The individual said I in three different senses but each sense was only a mode of his I, not his intrinsic self. Thus for him there is not yet a totality of what he is. He comes up against limits in the I at large, in the aspects of the I, and in the way he is due to his character. Indirectly, nevertheless, the thoughts he cannot avoid in his efforts to objectify himself will provide a degree of lucidity. First, he takes note of the shortcoming each time. There is more to him still. Then, in his self-retrieval from all objectivity, although illuminated by it, what has been thought each time will be excluded from himself. The result is an indirect knowledge about himself, rather than a knowledge of himself. "The self is more than all I can know."⁷

⁶Ibid., p. 33.

⁷loc. cit.

Self-Reflection as the Medium for Realizing Existenz

It has just been pointed out how the individual retrieves himself from the I of consciousness at large, from the profusion of aspects in which he appears empirically to himself, and from his character as the given way he is. In this retrieval is implied an acting on oneself suggesting the origin of a new self-comprehension. He has examined what he is, impersonally and objectively, and finds nothing more than an abundance of ever-particular facts. But he goes on to examine what he is intrinsically and he sees that his self-being is still up to him. When he says I myself, he no longer relates to himself merely contemplatively, but effectively. In actively dealing with himself he now finds the potentiality for authentic being, for Existenz. And since it is only potentiality accounts for there never being an end or a completion in time, why he does not know himself and is sure of himself only by becoming himself.

Self-reflection then is a new way to pose the question of self-being. Its aim is no longer mere self-knowledge. No, the question is a spur to come to oneself. In existential self-reflection the individual looks for himself as emerging from his judgment on himself. This judgment involves a seriousness incompatible with that curiosity about oneself that underlies judgments made in consciousness at large. Knowing oneself does not mean looking at oneself as in a mirror, but working on oneself so that he will become who he is. "In self-reflection I turn back from things in the world, back to myself, to my actions, to my motivations and emotions, to examine whether they are what I am myself and what I want to be."⁸

⁸Ibid., p. 36.

Essentially self-reflection is not an end but a means. What matters each time is that and how one emerges from it. Self-reflection is not self-study but self-communication. One does not realize it as cognition but as self-creation. Whenever one reflects upon himself he is for a moment both no longer and not yet himself. At that instant he is his potential in the point that separates his state of unconcern and his entering the door to his own intrinsic originality. Finally, the impulse behind the self-reflection in which one passes from one judgment to the next, making distinctions and analyzing, is his will to have one decision originate. His resolve to put an end to self-reflection is thus an expression of self-being, a means of encounter with the self.

Paradoxical Expressions of Self-Being

The first of these antinomical statements is that one becomes himself only as he overcomes himself. Empirically he could conceive his being as his character, as the way he happens to be. But his character does not constitute his intrinsic self. It is something rather that he has and relates to. The being of his character has the blindness of a given fact. Through struggle alone does he transform it into a freely willed being in which his self unfolds, the self for which he takes responsibility.

. . . in phenomenality there is no truthful I without self-conquest. I discard shells of my self, the ones I judge to be untrue, in order to gain my more profound, my intrinsic, my infinite, my true self. To come to myself as I perish is the phenomenon of self-being.⁹

⁹Ibid., p. 44.

Self-being and self-conquest in self-reflection may turn into an endless circle. Although one's existence in the world provides footholds for breaking out of this circle, he is enabled to break through it only by Transcendence. This is the second paradox. Self-being is the union of two opposites, of standing on one's own feet and of yielding both to the world and to Transcendence. One comes to Existenz by participating in his active world, only by being involved in his spatial and temporal existence. And just as he does not come to Existenz apart from the world, he cannot come to himself without Transcendence.

. . . I am conscious of my Existenz only in relation to the Transcendence without which I slide into the void. When I see myself in the phenomena of existence, I never see my true self; Transcendence alone lends to all finite phenomena a weight they could not have as mere existence.¹⁰

By way of summary, this chapter has considered three basic approaches to the problem of self-being or Existenz. First, in I at large, aware of itself as a thinking subject, the I is conscious that it has being in the world. Its shortcoming is that this thinking I is not oneself, it simply constitutes his self-consciousness as one being among others. A further step along this first approach was to search for self-being in the four aspects of one's concrete existence, in the physical I, the social I, the active I, and the reminiscent I. But what one discovered here were four objectivations of one's existence, rather than adequate statements of self-being. Nor did character, as that which underlies one's outward self, provide the answer. There was still something that resisted taking himself as merely given the way he is. These first three responses did provide, nevertheless, an

¹⁰Ibid., p. 46.

indirect knowledge of Existenz. The second basic approach was a consideration of self-reflection as the medium for the realization of self-being. It results in self-communication which serves as the impetus for self-becoming. Finally, the third basic approach consisted in looking at two paradoxical expressions for the being of Existenz. Much as in the first approach, their function is seen primarily in terms of providing a kind of indirect knowledge of self-being by way of the clash between two apparently mutually contradictory statements.

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND EXISTENTIAL SELF-BECOMING

Introduction

Why raise the question of freedom in relation to the being of Existenz? Because for Jaspers there is no Existenz, no self-being for the individual as he is in mere empirical existence. It is through freedom alone that he achieves selfhood. "In my free decision I am . . . conscious of . . . creating my own being . . ." ¹

Freedom exists as volition. It comes to realization through the exercise of the will. Therefore this chapter will take up first the problem of free will in order to determine its relevance to the question of freedom. Then the concept of freedom itself will be considered, in its existential elucidation and in its relation to existence, necessity and Transcendence.

The Problem of Free Will

Propositions proclaiming the freedom or unfreedom of the will have long engaged in battle under the names of determinism and indeterminism. It was almost as if man's being were hanging on a theoretical decision. What is often overlooked is that the object of this struggle is not what freedom was originally all about. Possibly some examples will help clarify the issue.

¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 160.

One of the assertions about freedom understands free to mean without cause. Regarding the question of free will this would take the form of saying that in case of two equally strong possibilities, if anything at all is to happen, one possibility must be strengthened so as to be realized by choice rather than by necessity. This argument seems to show freedom more as coincidence and arbitrariness rather than as freedom proper, however.

Another assertion is one in which free will is defined psychologically as freedom of action without disturbance from outside. This can be thought of as a psychological freedom to act insofar as one's intentions can be undisturbedly translated into reality, and to choose by making a calm and orderly selection from the possibilities one is aware of. Conceiving free will in this manner seems plausible enough in its objectivity but disappointing in its lack of substance. But it does not seem to answer the question of free will as it does not determine precisely that will whereby one assumes responsibility for his own self-being.

Nevertheless, this psychological view does touch the borderline of freedom proper when one asks whether he has an inner freedom of volition itself, beyond the externally qualified freedoms of action and choice. In choice and in action the motives and goals one chooses from must already exist. The questions that arise then are, can one freely choose the kind and content of his motives? And can he freely choose the standards that govern his selection? Is he moreover responsible for the kind of person he is, for his character? Could he possibly have another will as well? Such questions appear beyond the scope of

the empirical psychologist and must look instead for indirect existential clarification.

A third objective freedom attributed to the will concerns human relationships in society and in the state. From a sociological standpoint personal, civil, and political freedom can be distinguished. The personal one requires only the possession of economic means to be free even in the absence of political and civil liberty, as in one of the modern dictatorships. Civil freedom obtains even in a state of political unfreedom if the law assures equal protection. The political one allows every citizen to participate in the selection of his leaders. Their existence in general cannot be doubted, but it does not answer the question about freedom and Existenz. The presence of these freedoms does not assure the realization of Existenz, nor would their absence make its realization impossible, although its exercise would be restricted.

Thus psychological and sociological freedoms are never freedom itself, but they are not irrelevant to it. The individual who knows he is free is aware that they are conditions of the appearance of freedom in existence if he wants realization in the world, and not merely possibility and internality.

The fight between determinism and indeterminism will continue as long as objective arguments are used to settle the nature of freedom. In this fight both sides lose sight of true freedom. On the one hand whatever objective evidence is presented for or against it is open to refutation. On the other, it rests on the assumption that the being of objects in the world exhausts the totality of being. "Freedom is neither demonstrable nor refutable. This is what Kant meant by calling

it 'inconceivable' and viewing the conception of this inconceivability as the limit of our insight."² In any case, determinism and indeterminism place the entire matter on the wrong plane. One side asserts freedom's existence while falsely objectifying and thus voiding it in fact. It is a defender of freedoms that do not really amount to freedom, thus turning its very success into an unconscious denial. The other side denies freedom but applies the word to an objective phantom. Jaspers believes both sides are in error. They regard objective being as the totality of being, with the result that freedom eludes them.³

Conceptualizing Existential Freedom

In every kind of questioning there is a sense in which the kind of question asked and the mode of the answer somehow relate to the questioner. But when one asks about freedom his potential self-being is both what asks and what answers. He is asking whether and how he takes hold of himself or lets himself go. He is not looking about him to see whether freedom is out there somewhere in the world. He is asking insofar as he is involved in his own question. Without the possibility of being free himself he cannot ask about freedom. Hence there is either no freedom at all or it is already in asking about it. What makes him ask is an original will to be free, so that his freedom is anticipated in the fact of asking. He wills it because he was conscious beforehand of its possibility. And freedom finally is proved by his actions, rather than by his insight.

²Ibid., p. 150.

³Loc. cit.

Yet to say that one might be free is to say that he might also be unfree. The agonizing fact that this might be the case is what could be called the negative impulse of freedom. As self-being he cannot bear the possibility of being unfree. Because things that depend on him can be of absolute importance to him, he must be able to be free. This is not a conclusion he draws from any facts or conditions. It is the expression of his very self-being, of his awareness of his own potential, of being still in a position to decide about himself.

Freedom, according to Jaspers, is the beginning and end of the elucidation of the being of Existenz. It constitutes its most distinctive characteristic. As a preliminary step to conceptualizing this existential freedom, freedom as knowledge, as arbitrary act and as law will be shown to be indispensable conditions, but not its essence. Then follows a consideration of freedom as idea, choice and responsibility. Finally, after attempting to clothe existential freedom in conceptual language, it will be viewed in relation to existence, necessity and Transcendence.

Freedom as Knowledge, as
Arbitrary Act, as Law

Whatever merely exists or happens in the world is unfree, is determined. The individual too finds himself in this existence. But he is not just a sequence of events. He knows that he has existence. He does something and he knows what he is doing. He has to die like everything that lives, but he knows he has to die. His knowledge of what is taking place necessarily does not free him from any necessity, but it lifts his consciousness beyond mere necessity. To be involved himself, to understand the things he must do, is a moment of freedom.

Knowledge does not make him free, but without knowledge there can be no freedom.

Through knowledge the individual can see a range of possibilities. From these he can choose from among the several he knows. Where several things are possible for him, the cause of what will occur is his arbitrary act. To be sure, he can try to understand this act as a necessary occurrence. His choice depends upon his mode of knowing, and he can trace the way this came about. His choice likewise depends on observable psychological drives among which the strongest motive prevails. And yet he can neither deduce the nature of the arbitrary act nor, with the rigor of causal insight, prove or predict any factual decision as necessary in a given case. Even if he turns his decision into what appears to him mere accident, by flipping a coin for example, the arbitrary element remains because he voluntarily places himself in a state of passive submission to chance. What seems random or haphazard is really a spontaneity coincident with his freedom and working through arbitrary decisions. As was the case with knowledge, arbitrariness does not amount to freedom, but without an arbitrary act there is no freedom.

But suppose one does not knowingly make an arbitrary decision. He may decide not at random but in accord with a law he recognizes as binding. He is free then since he is bowing to a norm he found within himself, a norm he could as well not bow to. A law is not an inescapable necessity to which he is subject. It is a necessity only in the sense of constituting norms of action and motivation with which he can either comply or not comply. When he finds these norms to be manifestly binding upon him, in recognizing and obeying them he is aware of his free self. While acknowledging things that are necessary and

valid for him, he realizes they may not be necessary in themselves. Because the norms are identical with the exigencies of his own self, he feels they are self-evidently valid. This freedom, in which one freely finds himself by obeying valid norms, is active as opposed to mere passive knowledge. It is also sustained by a necessity as against the randomness of arbitrary acts. This freedom includes that of knowledge and of the arbitrary act. As there can be no freedom without those two, there is no freedom without law.

Freedom as Idea, as Choice,
as Responsibility

Man thus moves toward freedom by an ever broadening orientation within his world, by a limitless visualizing of premises and possibilities of action and by allowing all motives to speak to him and work within him. But this aggregate of many parts will bring forth freedom only insofar as everything will not just factually tie in with everything else but will do so for his consciousness as the center of possible Existenz. This is what is meant by freedom as idea. The more the self creates order out of this endless diversity of accumulated motives and elements of orientation, the freer one knows he is.

In spite of that, whenever one decides and acts, he is not a totality or an idea but an I in concrete, given circumstances, in a situation that is specific and particular. In fact, one could never act at all if he wanted to wait for that totality to evolve as he tries to envision all premises and possibilities. The first consequence of this tension between the unfinished idea and the need to live, to choose, to decide at a certain time, now or never, is a

sense of unfreedom in being tied to time and place and having one's possible probes and safeguards narrowed down. But then he experiences this definite choice as not just a negative and unfree thing he must do without completing his ideal totality. It is this choice precisely that makes him aware of his original freedom, because it is only there that he knows himself as his true self. From this point of view all the other elements of freedom seem like mere preconditions to the manifestation of existential freedom. Now, having recognized and adopted those earlier elements, he sees the limits within which there confronts him either a desperate sense of not being at all or an awareness of the possibility of Existenz itself.

An existential choice does not result from a struggle of motives, as has been already pointed out. It is not a decision in which one merely decides after performing some kind of calculation that has yielded the correct result. Nor is it obedience to an objectively phrased norm. Rather, the crux of the choice is that the I chooses.

In this choice I resolve to be myself in existence. Resolution as such is not yet the rational will that makes me take some finite action "resolutely," despite everything. Nor does it lie in a heedlessly, blindly courageous existence. Resolution is what comes to my will as the gift that in willing I can really be--it is what I can will out of, without being able to will it. In resolution I plunge into freedom, hoping at the bottom of it to meet myself, because I can will. But what manifests my resolution is my concrete choice.⁴

In this free choice the individual holds himself responsible for himself, while from outside he is held responsible only for his actions in their factuality.

⁴Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 158-159.

I know that I not only exist, that I not only am the way I am and therefore act in that way, but that as I act and decide I originate both my actions and the way I am. My resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom in which I can no longer separate the choice and me because I am this free choice. . . . What I am myself is left open, of course, because of decisions still unmade; to that extent I am not yet. But this not-being, in the sense of not-being-definitive in phenomenal existence, is illuminated by the existential certainty of my being where I choose and thus originate in resolution.⁵

Nothing else will seem to an individual like real being once he has experienced that original feeling that made him the fountainhead of his own self. If possible, he would like nothing in himself to remain merely taken for granted. He would like to merge completely with his own choice, his own responsibility. Rather than resign himself to what is given in the objective world about him, his attitude will be one of taking responsibility for it to the extent to which his freedom allows. He knows there is no self-being when he denies his identity with his historic existence, for in this self-identification alone lies the potential for free choice and for unconditional commitment.

But unconditional commitment means leaving behind the delusive freedom of remaining in the realm of endless possibilities. He may not want to become real by making a compelling decision. Any choice, as long as it has not been made, has something uncertain and therefore disquieting about it. It requires an assurance before it can be made. Preceding this assurance there is a crisis of not knowing. On the one hand the fear when one cannot tell if it is the last try before straying into nonbeing or, on the other, the moment of existential decision.

⁵Ibid., p. 160.

Yet it is essential for the being of Existenz that there must be a decision.

Either I decide as Existenz, or a decision will be made about me, turning me into material for someone else and stripping me of Existenz. Nothing remains unsettled. There is but a limited margin of temporal possibility beyond which I cannot postpone a decision without having it made about me rather than by me.⁶

The steps leading to self-being are not one, however, but many. They are made up of many small acts, unnoticeable in detail but on the whole determining one's being. One may resist decision by shutting his eyes because he does not want to will. Fearful of his freedom to bind himself by his own choice, he would like to shake off his responsibility and let things happen. Or, without any commotion, he may calmly and just as unnoticeably go his way in small inner and outer actions which strengthen his self-being through real decisions. To welcome freedom or to shun it, to accept responsibility for oneself or to shirk it, whichever one chooses habitually determines the kind of being he is.

Conceptualizing Freedom

As regards stating the meaning of existential freedom in formal terms, it must again be emphasized that no concept is capable of adequately expressing its nature. It will be recalled that one cannot realize this freedom without knowledge, nor without being aware of the possibility of arbitrariness. In addition, self-assured obedience to an evident law and life viewed as a totality were likewise to be regarded as necessary conditions for freedom to become a reality. The origin of existential freedom sets it in opposition to the superficiality of chance. Existential necessity places it up against the

⁶Ibid., p. 161.

arbitrary volition of the moment. Responsibility and continuity, lastly, pit existential freedom against obliviousness and flight.

What the elucidation of freedom begins and ends with, however, is that it cannot be known as an object of empirical knowledge. One can only be certain of it for himself, not in thought but as Existenz, not in pondering and asking about it, but in action. Whatever one says about freedom serves merely as a means of communication, issuing only indirectly in any knowledge. It can be said that one does not possess freedom; he acquires it. Like freedom itself, conceptualizing freedom is in a sense pure movement. Thus no single expression can characterize the sense of freedom. Only the movement from one concept to the other will reveal a meaning that is not apparent in any one concept by itself.

If I say "I choose" and my sense of decision covers freedom proper, it still does not lie in arbitrary choice but in the necessity I mean when I say "I will," in the sense of "I must." Both terms assure Existenz of its original being as distinct from empirical existence; both would allow it to say, at that moment, "I am," and to mean free being. Only together can all these expressions--I am, I must, I will, I choose--be taken to express freedom. By itself, without interpretation by the others, each of them would mean either empirical existence or impulsive necessity or arbitrary psychological action. In the sense of freedom all elements are so entwined as to make one source from the depths of which those single elements spring as phenomenal forms: there is no choice without decision, no decision without a will, no will without necessity, no necessity without being.⁷

Freedom in Relation to Existence,
to Necessity, to Transcendence

Freedom has relevance and significance solely for self-becoming or Existenz. In the external world being is objective and comes within

⁷Ibid., p. 163.

the domain of empirical knowledge. But in this cognition there is not yet freedom, even though Existenz can only be free within the framework of temporal existence. Secondly, what merely happens within the context of the empirical order is not free. It is caused or determined by necessity, since it is subject to the physical laws of cause and effect. Yet freedom finds scope for its exercise precisely either in opposition to necessity or in union with it. Finally, in Transcendence there is no longer any freedom. However, freedom remains the lever by which Transcendence acts on Existenz, but only as that Existenz is its independent self. These three relationships of freedom to existence, necessity and Transcendence will now be further elaborated to derive their full import for existential elucidation.

At the moment in one's existence when he begins to ask about freedom, it may seem to him that he had always been potentially free. His own ability to ask and decide lights up the possibility of being responsible for himself. Jaspers sees two equally original ways in which one is struck by the question of freedom. In the first he sees himself sinking into a bottomless void when he cannot reconcile freedom with his situation in the world. But as he awakens to freedom, he aligns himself again with his unique historical setting which he cannot and will not betray or discard. Or the possibility of unfreedom which seemed already behind him, looms before him again with fresh urgency. It occurs to him that there may be no freedom at all. Perhaps freedom was a delusive notion of something that does not exist. And his own responsibility, without which he can no longer be himself, was perhaps too only a phantom. Struck by the possibility of absolute unfreedom, he is shaken to the depths of his being. Unsure of freedom,

he seeks to prove to himself that it does exist. If it does not suffice for him to be simply aware of freedom without knowing it, he will try to regain it in an objective fashion. The thoughts to which this leads will fail in themselves, but in failing and by contrast, they will much more decisively cast him back upon that true freedom about which the initial questioning arose.

There can be no freedom outside self-being since the objective world has neither a place nor an opening for it. One wills, moreover, because he does not know. The being which is inaccessible to knowledge can be revealed only to one's volition. Not knowing is the root of having to will. And Jaspers adds,

This is the passion of Existenz: that its not knowing is not an absolute agony because it wills in freedom. The thought of an inescapable unfreedom would plunge me into despair at the fact of not knowing. The roots of freedom exclude it from the existence I explore; what rests on freedom is the being which I myself can be in existence.⁸

Each manifestation of freedom becomes meaningful insofar as each is opposed to the limitations of a necessity that either resists it, of one that rules it as a law, or of one that is its cause. A true sense of freedom unfolds either in opposition to some form of necessity or in union with it. Taking into account first that manifestation which becomes meaningful through a necessity which resists it, the following considerations are decisive. Freedom, although tending to make absolute demands on the individual for the realization of self-being, is relative as regards the world. The free man is always confronting something that is a given by nature, but a given that can mean to him either dependency or resistance. Moreover Jaspers remarks:

⁸Ibid., p. 167.

In existential freedom I see myself between two necessities-- between the natural law, the irremovable resistance of reality, and the moral law, the rigid form of a rule. I am in danger of being crushed between the two. Yet if I seek to escape them instead of moving in both, in the closest proximity, my freedom is bound to get lost in fantasies. A sense of freedom that would place me wholly on my own would be untenable in such radical independence.⁹

Freedom likewise may be manifested by its opposition to a necessity that is in a sense its cause. One is free to choose, but by his choice he binds himself, carries it out and takes the consequences. What binds him is not the empirical reality which his actions made the way it is, but the inner, self-creating step he took at the moment of choice. He became the way he willed himself to be. Although in time the possibility of change always remains, his being is now bound by itself and yet still free. But in each new choice there is an even deeper necessity present,

. . . the one that lies in the feeling of "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise," as Luther put it--in other words, in the feeling that "I must." It is with this feeling that Existenz makes its most original decisions about freedom. Here is the point where some strange turns of speech make full sense: that man chooses the one needed thing, and "free" choice is out of the question; that absolute freedom is absolute necessity; that firmness in the right will leave no choice. . . . Hence the risk of total commitment at high points of decision; hence the impossibility of coming to a decision from outside myself, by way of reasons; and hence, on the other hand, the profound certainty of an original sense of Existenz in making the decision.¹⁰

Freedom's relation to Transcendence appears chiefly in the dual modes of dependence and independence, and in viewing Transcendence as both source and limitation of freedom. There are two possibilities regarding the question of man's ultimate dependence or independence,

⁹Ibid., p. 169.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 171.

according to Jaspers. In one he is entirely dependent. He has been cast into existence by a deity, and his will is not his own. His will would be of no help to him if this deity did not move it. But in last analysis this gift of moving man's will is undeserved, and he upon whom it is not bestowed is lost. Although this alternative is perhaps overstated by Jaspers and as such is not accepted as a viable possibility by anyone, yet it clearly remains an utterly unacceptable one if freedom is to retain anything of its true meaning.

In the other possibility one's sense of selfhood implicitly denies that kind of dependence. He is aware that he himself creates his selfhood through his will, not all at once, but in the ongoing actions of a lifetime.

I know that at the core I am independent, and it is from this core that I relate to Transcendence--to a Transcendence that has willed me to face it as a free man because I cannot otherwise be myself. I myself am responsible for my will, for my actions, and for my original being.¹¹

Finally, freedom is poised in a dynamic polarity with Transcendence when this Transcendence is seen as both source and limitation of existential freedom. Jaspers expresses this polarity in the form of a powerful antinomy.

Transcendence made me possible Existenz--in other words it made me free in temporal existence. To choose freedom and independence from every structure of this world, to decide against any authority, does not mean to decide against Transcendence. It is before Transcendence that the man who is entirely on his own will most radically experience the necessity that puts him together into the hand of his God. . . . Having done something, for instance, I may know: I could not do this alone, and I could not do it again. If it was my true self that willed, it was simultaneously given to me in my freedom.¹²

¹¹Ibid., p. 173.

¹²Ibid., p. 174.

To summarize, this chapter has dealt with the central concept of existential freedom. First it took up the problem of free will, since it is through the will that freedom comes to be realized. Next, it considered the question of conceptualizing freedom from several vantage points. Freedom as knowledge, arbitrary act and as law were viewed as its necessary conditions. Then a consideration of freedom as idea, choice and responsibility showed how these touched on the essential nature of freedom. Lastly, after an attempt to state freedom in conceptual terms, it was further elucidated by seeing it in relation to existence, necessity and Transcendence.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICITY: CONFINEMENT AND BREADTH OF EXISTENZ

Introduction

Existential freedom brings about the unfolding of Existenz solely within the context of a historicity which at once confines and at the same time opens up limitless possibility for self becoming. But in order to derive its full significance for the becoming of Existenz, Jaspers places the concept of historicity within the broader context of what he terms boundary situations. Viewed within this framework, historicity as the first boundary situation makes one aware of the singular constraint of one's own individual data. At the same time this very constraint allows for the possibility of an uncertain future. The uncertainty arising out of this boundary situation is such that what is left to be determined by oneself still lies ahead, while one's freedom finds its scope by assuming given facts and making them one's own as if they had been his will. It is in view of these considerations that this chapter will first develop the concept of historicity within the framework of a boundary situation. Then it will apply the consequences of this conceptual development to existential self-becoming by showing historicity as both confinement and breadth of Existenz.

When Jaspers speaks of historicity he is thinking of each human being as a noninterchangeable body in space, limited in his

possibilities of location. He is a being confined by others' existence to which he relates in one way or another. He may move toward that existence or reject it, fight it or use it, succumb to it or be destroyed by it. He comes and goes in time, spending his life in unrest or at least in ceaseless activity. Finding himself in a world of inexhaustible possibilities, it is within them that he brings forth a world of his own. Within this temporal existence, and only within it, does authentic self-being become possible. "For me as temporal existence, historicity is the one mode of access I have to absolute being."¹ And Existenz becomes aware of its utterly concrete space-bound and time-bound existence, its historicity, through what Jaspers calls historic consciousness. Briefly stated, "Historic consciousness is the lucid, factual historicity of Existenz in existence."²

Historicity as a Boundary Situation

When placed within the perspective of boundary situations, a sense of historicity confers an absolute significance on existence, as grasped by self-being, and at the same time keeps it in suspension and relative, as mere existence. For Existenz to be caught up in this tension is what Jaspers means by historicity. And he further clarifies this tension by a consideration of historicity as a polarity of Existenz and existence, determinacy and freedom, time and timelessness.

First, this vital balance between Existenz and existence is disturbed when one's existence becomes absolute to him to the extent that he no longer sees it as limited empirical existence. This might

¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 107.

²Ibid., p. 105.

happen, among other ways, if he does not freely face an environment he feels unable to cope with. Or, if he is living only on the level of the senses as if there were nothing else to life. But even these situations can give rise to Existenz if he confronts them as an existence that has a meaning that transcends itself. They will lose their restraining force as he freely adopts existence as his historic determinacy.

Regarding the polarity between determinacy and freedom it can be stated that, in historic consciousness, situations described as determined likewise appear to the individual as possibilities of freedom. A decision has been made whose outcome controls him, and at the same time it is still up to him as long as he lives. The decision once made makes him feel inevitably determined, but the chance to make his own decision makes him feel ultimately free. When he looks at given facts he is purely determined; when he looks at freedom, even definitive decisions are definitive only as he sees them now. Although he cannot reverse them by new decisions, he can direct their significance by endowing them with a meaning yet unknown. He can think of everything as taking place of necessity and regard himself as totally determined in the way he is, and he can cover everything with freedom thereby casting a ray of possibility on all definitive things.

If one is conscious of his Existenz, he does not see himself as just empirically given. His being appears to him as the possibility of choice, rather, and as decision. And yet, in this free origin he does remain historic because he can never make a new beginning. He must take the consequences of decisions that lie far beyond anything he has consciously done, of decisions made even before he was born. But the

encompassing sense of historicity, the consciousness that there is no given fact without freedom and no freedom without given facts, makes him respect reality as such and at the same time keeps him boundlessly ready to take every real thing and clothe it with possibility. "The sense of historicity keeps me close to reality because the necessity in it freely guards the well from which I draw the meaning and the substance of my actions."³

Finally, "Existenz is neither timelessness nor temporality as such. It is one within the other, not one without the other."⁴ For Existenz historicity implies an intensification of the moment, turning the present into a fulfillment that contains past and future within itself but which is not diverted to either. This fulfillment is not set as a future goal as if the present were a mere passing stage in the service of things to come. Nor is it set in the past as if the preservation and repetition of past perfection were all that one lives for. But Existenz does not appear immediately as a finished product. It is acquired step by step, by way of decisions taken in the course of time. Its phenomenal being is not in the single moment but in the historic succession of interrelated moments.

In each of those the interrelation is felt: in waiting for the exalted moment, refusing to waste myself; in relating a lofty present to its premises, which I preserve and will not betray; in continuing to live by the exalted moment, which is past and yet remains my standard for the present.⁵

³Ibid., p. 110.

⁴Loc. cit.

⁵Ibid., p. 111.

Historicity as Confinement and Breadth of Existenz

As Confinement

At each moment the individual human exists by given data, and at the same time he must confront given data by referring his will and his actions to them. This is how it comes about that he is a being for himself as empirical existence, and how the concrete world to which he has access exists for him as a given he can mold. The concrete world, the real situation, confines him by the fact that it resists him thereby limiting his freedom and tying him to restricted possibilities. Jaspers envisions four different general forms of this resistance.

There is first the material which one uses. Although it fits the purpose he uses it for, it may be inadequate to itself since for itself it may have another destiny. Thus living things are consumed as nutriment by other living things and people become mechanical functions in a materialistic society. Next one confronts the life which he cultivates. He creates conditions for the life he wants and he lets it grow. The cultivated object is in a dependent state, however, though intended in itself and not as material for something else. It has no independence other than the one provided by the cultivator. He faces third a soul which he educates. Training, habitual application, and instruction prepare the ground for a freedom which is presently viewed as merely possible. In this freedom he confronts last another mind with which he communicates. Though unconditionally recognizing his independent self-being, he seeks mutually his own being in the other. And Jaspers sets forth the qualities of this fourth mode of resistance: "No limitations are established by any tacit purpose known to only one side.

What counts is not persuasion but conviction, not suggestion but self-attained insight, not authority but accord."⁶

One's unavoidable dependence on given facts of nature and on the volition of others makes up the external features of historicity insofar as it exercises a confining function in relation to Existenz. This dependence is summed up by Jaspers in terms of the four general forms of resistance.

Each of these definite things I face creates the situation by resisting. The material balks; life develops differently from my expectations; the soul opposes its own origin to me, developing a mind of its own, a mind sustained by the self-being of Existenz . . .⁷

As Breadth

Once historicity, which seemed to be nothing but resistance and confinement, is perceived as a boundary situation, it becomes the encompassing breadth of Existenz itself. But this breadth of Existenz is not simply a given in historically definite situations nor in a sense of historicity as such. To achieve it one has to have an existential awareness of his situation, to see it as a boundary situation. Nor is this existential awareness transferable. At the source of Existenz no man can substitute for another. "Everyone owes to himself what he is."⁸

As Existenz the individual does not act in a world at large. Yet, insofar as his historical situation contains aspects common to all human beings, he goes on taking his bearings from such a world. In this activity he is not free in the sense of having eliminated the

⁶Ibid., p. 186.

⁷Loc. cit.

⁸Ibid., p. 187.

resistance of material things and achieved full control over them, nor in the sense of having eliminated incomprehension through perfect existential communication. No, he is free in the sense that Existenz is able to transcend its own existence in the impetus arising out of a lucid historical awareness. As self-being he has the restless faculty of choice, the possibility of ascertaining a truth that lies in his singular and concrete situation.

When resistance is only partly surmounted by purposeful action, its insurmountable aspect will reveal the boundary situation to potential self-being. By making use of the ideas of freedom as resistlessness and as full accord, possible Existenz is achieved at the moment when the definite, the accidental, that which might as well be different, is either freely assumed as suitable for oneself or rejected as a reality in violation of one's own essence. But the surpassing freedom of Existenz remains the choice for which no rightness and no idea can provide adequate reasons, the choice in which one either accepts or rejects his historic existence as his own.

What has just been said has been an attempt to show that what could at first be thought of as the limitation of one's finite existence is in fact its possible phenomenal fulfillment. What looked like mere confinement for the idea of a world as the simple totality of existence becomes the only reality for potentially unlimited Existenz.

It is in historicity that I clearly see the duplicity that makes out the unity of my true sense of being: I am only as temporal existence, and I myself am not temporal. I know myself only as existence in time, but in such a way that this existence becomes to me the phenomenon of my timeless self-being.⁹

⁹Ibid., p. 107.

The basic thrust of this chapter can be summarized in a single statement. Existential freedom is the primary source providing the impulse for the self-becoming of Existenz arising within the confines of definite situations which limit at the same time as they open up limitless possibility for that self-becoming. Hoffman pinpoints the function of freedom in this context when he states: "Freedom becomes real only in its bond with the body and with the world, while the empirical order dips into subjectivity through its link with freedom."¹⁰ And Jaspers himself drives home the complementary role of historicity in the context of the boundary situations as the former relates to Existenz: "As existence I am in situations; as possible Existenz in existence I am in boundary situations. . . . To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz."¹¹

¹⁰Kurt Hoffman, Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy, in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 102.

¹¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, pp. 182, 179.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING

Introduction

"To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz."¹
This brief but powerful Jaspersian statement provides the capstone to the content of the preceding four chapters. Existential freedom has emerged as the primal source giving the impetus for the realization of Existenz, but only within the space- and time-bound situations which confine at the same time as they open up unlimited possibility for that self-realization.

It now remains to be seen what implications these existential ideas contain for counseling theory and practice. Two implications have already been stated in Chapter I. The first is that the counselor recognizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to effect freely his own selfhood, something he has first validated for himself. The second implication is that the counselee freely accepts this right and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting dependence on the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come to himself in authentic self-being. However, before examining these implications in detail, it will be useful to consider the possible

¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 179.

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It now remains to be seen what implications these existential ideas contain for counseling theory and practice. Three implications have already been intimated in Chapter I. First, Jaspers' concept of existential freedom provides an adequate precondition for the becoming of Existenz. Second, the counselor recognizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to effect freely his own selfhood, something he has first validated for himself. Third, the counselee freely accepts this right and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting dependence on the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come to himself in authentic self-being. However, before examining these implications in detail, it will be useful to consider the possible

¹Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 179.

philosophic frameworks for counseling. Having done this, it should be more readily seen what advantages the Jaspersian framework holds for counseling theory and practice.

Possible Philosophic Frameworks

What has been written thus far has been based on a predisposition toward an existential and specifically Jaspersian philosophic framework. To answer the question as to the advantages of the Jaspersian construct over others requires a somewhat arbitrary selection regarding their number and kind. This writer proposes three structural frames based on Carl Rogers' treatment of three ways of knowing underlying the behavioral sciences, which would seem to include counseling in its theory and process.

First, there is the subjective way of knowing. This knowing arises within the individual's own internal frame of reference. In Rogers' words,

Within myself . . . I may "know" that I love or hate, sense, perceive, comprehend. I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or dislike, be interested in or bored by. These are all hypotheses, which we often check . . . by using the ongoing flow of our preconceptual experiencing as a referent.²

Rogers illustrates his point by citing Gendlin on how subjective knowing relates to psychotherapy.

Often an example of it in psychotherapy is the way in which the client searches and searches for the word that will more accurately describe what he is experiencing, feeling, or perceiving. There is a sense of real relief when he discovers a term which "matches" his experiencing, which provides a more

²Carl Rogers, Toward a Science of the Person (paper presented for a symposium on "Behavior and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology," Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963), p. 3.

sharply differentiated meaning for the vague knowing which has been present, which permits him to be more congruent within himself.³

According to Rogers, little attention was being given to the subjective mode of knowing at the time at which he delivered his paper, because it does not lead to publicly validated knowledge. Yet he voiced the opinion that even the most rigorous science has its origin in this mode of knowing.

When one tries to test these inner, subjective hypotheses by checking with others or with the external environment, then he has passed to the objective or second way of knowing.

In this type of knowing, the hypotheses are based upon an external frame of reference, and the hypotheses are checked both by externally observable operations, and by making empathic inferences regarding the reactions of a trusted reference group, usually of one's colleagues. . . . This psychological process is the basis of all logical positivism, operationalism, and the vast structure of science as we know it. Its achievements have been most impressive.⁴

Such schools of counseling and psychotherapy as the behavioral and the psychoanalytic likewise look to the objective way of knowing as their theoretical foundation, and for that reason also depend on the identical psychological process at the root of all objective knowing.

Certain characteristics of this approach have not been adequately understood. As Rogers says,

Since it has had such vast importance, and since it has led to such incredible technological advances, it is often forgotten that it is not necessarily superior to the first, subjective way of knowing, and that in crucial instances, it

³E. T. Gendlin, *Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning*, p. 7, in paper presented for a symposium on "Behavior and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology," by Carl Rogers (Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963).

⁴Carl Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

bows to it. For example, the evidence for extrasensory perception is better than, or certainly as good as, the evidence for many of the principles which psychologists believe. Yet, with very few exceptions, psychologists reject this evidence with vehemence. It is not easy to impugn the methods which have been used in studying ESP, for they are the same as those used in any field of psychology. But the psychologist falls back on his subjective knowing. The evidence does not fit with the pattern of knowledge as he expects to find it, does not fit with his experiencing of the world. Therefore he rejects it. There have been many instances of this sort in the history of science. . . . The reason for pointing out these crucial uncertainties is to indicate the error of the widespread notion that objective knowledge is "out there," firm, impersonal, and secure. Quite the contrary, it is a very human invention--one of enormous value . . . but it is none the less a fallible and human way of knowing.⁵

A third mode of knowing, called interpersonal knowing by Rogers, is regarded by him to be somewhere in between the two types of knowing already described. This mode applies primarily to knowledge of human beings and the higher organisms. Rogers describes it pointedly in the first person.

Here I "know" that you feel hurt by my remark, or that you despise yourself, or that you have a strong desire to get "to the top of the heap" . . . These knowings, like those described before, are all hypotheses. But in these instances, the way of checking these hypotheses is to use whatever skill and empathic understanding is at my command to get at the relevant aspect of your phenomenological field, to get inside your private world of meanings, and see whether my understanding is correct. I may simply bluntly ask you if my hypothesis is correct, but this is often a very inadequate method of inferring your private world. I may observe your gestures, words, inflections, and base my inferences on these. Or I may--and here is the essence of my experience in psychotherapy--create a climate which makes it psychologically safe and rewarding for you to reveal your internal frame of reference.⁶

⁵Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁶Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Two criteria for this type of knowing are suggested by Rogers.

I believe the criteria are twofold; either my hypothesis about the internal frame of reference of this individual is confirmed by the individual himself, or the inferences made about his internal frame of reference are confirmed by a consensual validation. For example, I sense that you are feeling unhappy this morning. If I say, "Looks as though your world is pretty dark this morning," and you by word or nod show your agreement, then I have checked my hypothesis and found that it has some validity. Another method of checking would be that if I kept to myself my empathic sensing of your unhappiness, but during the morning three other individuals came to me independently to speak of their concern over what seemed to them as your sadness, your depression, and the like, then the probability of the correctness of the inference as to your internal state would be greatly increased.⁷

Three ways of knowing have been described. It now remains to relate these modes to each other and to specific schools of psychological and counseling theory. Having done this, it should then be possible to point out the advantages for counseling theory the Jaspersian philosophic framework possesses over others. In Rogers' view the three modes of knowing are three ways by which one extends knowledge, by which one confirms or disconfirms the hypotheses one is continuously forming, both as a part of everyday living and as a part of psychological science. He says further,

I would advance the view that any mature psychological science uses each of these ways of knowing in appropriate relationship to the other two, that it is only as these three modes of knowing are adequately and appropriately interwoven that a satisfactory behavioral science can emerge. . . . I believe that recent history shows us that we make a serious mistake when we attempt to use one of these channels of knowing in isolation, without reference to the others. Thus the behaviorist frequently regards himself as using only the objective mode of knowing, and sees the other modes as objects of scorn, or at least completely unnecessary to a developing science. Some current existentialist thinkers, on the other hand, seem

⁷Ibid., pp. 12-13.

equally passionate in rejecting the objective way of knowing, relying entirely on the subjective and phenomenological way of knowing. Another type of mistake is made when we confuse or equate these very different modes of knowing. It is of the utmost importance to be entirely clear as to the mode we are using at any particular moment or in any particular enterprise. When we become confused as to which avenue to knowledge is being utilized, or attempt to equate the knowledge from these three modes, serious trouble arises. Much psychoanalytic writing exhibits this latter error to a painful degree.⁸

Rogers points with optimism to the fact that the so-called new third force in psychology shows signs of being willing to use all three of these channels to knowing for the advancement and enrichment of science. However, what he does not do, it seems to this writer, is to provide a broad philosophic framework within which to situate these admittedly rather comprehensive views of human knowing. It is proposed that this philosophic framework is to be found precisely in Jaspers' concept of the encompassing. Within this comprehensive construct, one could relate Rogers' subjective knowing to Jaspers' mode of Existenz, objective knowing to the mode of consciousness-at-large, and interpersonal knowing to Jaspers' concept of existential communication. The logical question as to the advantage of the Jaspersian framework over others requires further treatment and thus provides the principal thrust of the second section of this chapter.

Jaspersian Concepts and Counseling

Returning to the mainstream of this study, it must now be asked what are the implications for counseling theory of existential freedom within the limitations as well as the potentialities deriving from one's historicity. It was stated earlier that these implications were

⁸Ibid., pp. 14-15.

primarily twofold. The proposal of this study, broad and comprehensive in its scope, affirms that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom provides an adequate precondition for self-becoming or Existenz. Deriving from this are two major implications bearing directly on the counseling relationship. The first affects primarily the counselor's attitude toward the counselee; the second, the counselee's response to this attitude, together with its significance for the latter. These topics will now be considered in more detail.

That the Jaspersian concept of existential freedom embodies the indispensable prerequisite to the self-being of Existenz in the context of its historicity, follows from the essential movement of Chapters III and IV. This movement is epitomized in the concluding paragraph of Chapter IV.

Existential freedom is the primary source providing the impulse for the self-becoming of Existenz arising within the confines of definite situations which limit at the same time as they open up limitless possibility for that self-becoming.⁹

Here existential freedom is regarded as the origin, and historicity as both limitation and breadth, of self-becoming. Since this theme has already been dealt with at some length, further elaboration would seem redundant.

However, further delineation of the implications of existential freedom for the counseling relationship seems necessary. First, the counselor will recognize the right and responsibility of the counselee to his own free self-determination and self-becoming, provided the counselor has already validated this freedom for himself. Second,

⁹C. Ries, "Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers' Existential Philosophy" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Dakota, 1973), p. 47.

the counselee will respond to the counselor's attitude toward him by progressively assuming responsibility for his own Existenz, and by gradually rejecting dependence on the counselor as he grows in self-awareness and authentic self-being. This reciprocity of potentiality and exigency inherent in the very nature of existential freedom appears evident from all that has been said in Chapter III concerning that central concept. Finally, Jaspers himself, when referring explicitly to the therapist-client relationship, seems to attest to this same essential idea.

Therefore what is left as the ultimate thing in the doctor-patient relationship is existential communication, which goes far beyond any therapy, that is, beyond anything that can be planned or methodically staged. The whole treatment is thus absorbed and defined within a community of two selves who live out the possibilities of Existenz itself, as reasonable beings. For example, there are no rules deriving from some supposed assessment of the individual as a whole, which determine whether the person shall conceal or reveal; nor is the whole thing quite fortuitous, as if the person might listen to everything and then be left to his own devices. One questions and gropes from one freedom to another within the concreteness of the actual situation, taking no responsibility for the other nor making any abstract demands. . . . The doctor is not a pure technician nor pure authority, but Existenz itself for its own sake, a transient human creature like his patient.¹⁰

It should be pointed out that Jaspers is speaking here of the possible final or ultimate step in the therapeutic relationship. At the same time he presupposes an entire series of stages of therapeutic activity, each of which builds upon and succeeds the one preceding it.

Much of what has been said or implied regarding the counseling relationship has had to do with its possibilities. Nevertheless, this

¹⁰Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, trans. by J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton (Manchester, England: University Press, 1963), pp. 788-789.

relationship likewise has its limitations, and these are insurmountable, according to Jaspers. First of all, therapy cannot be a substitute for something that only life itself can bring.

For instance, we can only become transparently ourselves through a lifetime of loving communication in the course of a destiny shared with others. . . . A professional performance constantly repeated on behalf of many never reaches the goal which only engagement in mutuality can attain. Further, life brings responsible tasks, perforce, and there are the real demands of work which no therapy however artful can contrive.¹¹

The second limitation is,

A person is originally thus and no other and therapy finds itself confronted with this factor which it cannot alter. I in my freedom may confront this fact that I am thus and no other, confront it as something I may change or at least transform through acceptance, but any therapy of others has to reckon with unalterable elements, the mark of some lasting essence, something inborn. . . . The therapeutic attitude can only retain its integrity if it accepts that fundamentally.¹²

These limitations intrinsic to the counseling relationship bring the individual back to the sober realization that he, and ultimately he alone, must assume full responsibility for his own freedom and self-becoming.

This final chapter has been an attempt to outline the implications for counseling theory of the key existential concepts of freedom and historicity. First, the advantages of the Jaspersian model of counseling were considered. Then the implications of existential freedom for the individual person and for the counseling relationship were set forth. Finally, some limitations of the counseling relationship were indicated. Jaspers seems to synthesize the central theme

¹¹Ibid., p. 804.

¹²Loc. cit.

of the entire study in these words:

. . . in therapy the widest polarities lie in whether the doctor turns to what can be discovered by science, that is to the biological event, or whether he turns to the freedom of man. A mistake is made about the whole of human life, should the doctor in looking at persons let them be submerged in the biological event; so too, should he convert human freedom into that sort of being which, like nature, is empirically there and can be used technically as an instrument of therapy. Life I can treat, but to freedom I can only appeal.¹³

¹³Karl Jaspers, op. cit., p. 800.

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