S D S C

Strategic & Defence Studies Centre

Working Paper No. 365

The Utility and Limits of The International Coalition against Terrorism

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December 2001

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Published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, Canberra

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Dibb, Paul, 1939–
The Utility and Limits of the International Coalition against Terrorism

ISBN 0 7315 5418 3

1. Terrorism – Australia - Prevention.
2. Terrorism – Prevention – International cooperation.

I. Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
II. Title. (Series: Working Paper (The Australian National University.
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre); no. 365).

363.32

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The Utility and Limits of the International Coalition against Terrorism[1]

Paul Dibb

> Bin Laden in essence calls on the entire Muslim world to rise up against the existing world order... there can be no compromise or coexistence with Western civilisation.
>
> \- Yossef Bodansky[2]

The most dramatic political result of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 has been the building of a global coalition against terrorism. The diversity of this coalition is unprecedented. It includes America's NATO allies, Japan and Australia. But it also involves such unexpected partners as China and Russia, Pakistan and India. Major international organisations—specifically the United Nations, under the authority of Security Council Resolution No. 1373, and the APEC leaders meeting in Shanghai—have condemned the terrorist attacks, as has the Conference of the Islamic Organisation.

NATO has, for the first time in its 52-year history, invoked article 5 in which an attack on one alliance member is considered to be an attack on all members. The Australian government has, also for the first time, invoked article 4 of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty in order to meet the common danger. Britain, Canada and Australia have already committed military forces to the coalition's operations against Osama bin Laden's terrorist network and the Taliban regime. France, Germany and Italy have indicated that they may contribute military support to a peace stabilisation force in Afghanistan, as have several Muslim countries. And in a major departure from its past reluctance to send military units overseas, Japan has deployed naval warships in a rear area support role.

What is remarkable about this coalition of the willing against terrorism is not only the large number of countries involved from around the world, but also an apparent recognition that the fight against terrorism will be a prolonged one. And it will involve diplomatic pressure and financial sanctions, as well as the use of military force. Never in world history have so many countries combined together against a common threat in this manner.

But the war against terrorism will be unprecedented. It promises to be a long, drawn-out campaign that will be spread out across a wide range of countries, and not only in the Middle East. It will require patience and close coordination. Victories will not be readily apparent in the traditional sense of battlefield successes. As President Bush has said, the collective efforts of the coalition will require 'the patient accumulation of successes'. And even if Osama bin Laden is killed that will not be the end of the matter by any means. Yossef

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Bodansky observes in his book about bin Laden that '[u]ltimately the quintessence of bin Laden's threat is his being a cog, albeit an important one, in a large system that will outlast his own demise—state-sponsored international terrorism'.[3]

The question then arises whether this unprecedented coalition against terrorism can hang together under such difficult circumstances. A coalition, by definition, is a temporary combination of parties that retain distinctive principles. Already, there have been differing views about the bombing campaign in Afghanistan. And there are differences of opinion—not least within the United States itself—about whether the war should be extended to Iraq. The installation of a new regime in Kabul to replace the Taliban is a step fraught with danger, as is the wooing of the military regime in Islamic Pakistan. While it is true that the coalition members share a common fear of the threat from terrorism, the fact remains that only the United States has suffered a severe terrorist attack. This, and the risk that the war may widen, will put intense pressure on the coalition.

This article examines the events that led to the brokering of the coalition against terrorism. It then looks at how the coalition has fared in its military, diplomatic and financial coordination so far. And, finally, it assesses what the risks are for the future of the coalition—including the possibility of a widening war. The central purpose of this inquiry is to determine the utility and the limits of the international coalition against terrorism. This subject is a difficult one to assess; that is not only because the idea of a coalition war against terrorism is novel, but also because of the unpredictable nature of the campaign and its main target, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida terrorist group.

A Seminal Event?

It has become commonplace to assert that the events of 11 September initiated a fundamentally new era in world politics. The spectacular building of the coalition against terrorism is cited as evidence of that, as is the almost universal condemnation of the terrorist attacks on the US. The prominent French newspaper, *Le Monde,* proclaimed on 12 September: 'We are all Americans now.' The International Institute for Strategic Studies, which held its annual conference in Geneva the day after the attacks, came to the conclusion that we had passed through a defining moment; that a war on terrorism needed to be waged; that a broad coalition needed to be established for the purpose; that the war needed to be conducted with both diplomatic and military means; that the will to fight this war would need to be sustained over a very long haul; and that over that haul risks would have to be taken to ensure success. But it was recognised that building a coalition would not be easy and would involve unprecedented cooperation.

The institute was also of the view that if America fails in its task of freeing the world from the scourge of terrorism the concept of world order will be relegated to the realm of imaginative literature. But the task for America, as the custodial power in the international system, is immense. America will have an enormous challenge before it to keep allies and newfound friends focused on a war that may appear—falsely in my view—to conform to a purely American agenda. Keeping together a coalition against a virtual and hidden enemy will be

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hard. New coalition building, which has no institutional base like NATO, is a huge task. The US will have to work hard to keep just NATO behind it; a wider coalition will require an intensity of diplomacy and degree of cooperation with culturally different countries that is without precedent. The coexistence of a broad political coalition and a narrow military one will create stresses in sustaining diplomatic support for the overall campaign. And maintaining the strength of the coalition will be hard when disagreements over other elements of US foreign policy intrude. It is an awesome agenda, offering as much scope for disagreement as for cooperation.

As Avery Goldstein has observed, it would be a mistake to believe that the terrorist attacks of 11 September so transformed the post-Cold War world that it heralded the beginning of an age whose only defining feature will be the global struggle against terrorism. For this to occur, the international community would need to present a united front among almost all states and mute their disagreements on less pressing matters. A second possibility would be to formulate policy based on the belief that 11 September did not fundamentally alter the strategic priorities of the US. In this view, the US must of course take steps to counter pressing terrorist threats but should not allow this necessity to obscure potentially more serious threats to American vital interests. Fundamentally reconfiguring US policy in the wake of 11 September would be seen as a dangerous mistake from this perspective. While fighting terrorism, the US should not lose sight of the strategic priorities that guided the Quadrennial Defense Review and that placed a greater emphasis on security challenges in Asia. This perspective would therefore suggest that the US should recognise that the more serious challenge in coming decades is from a hostile great power—such as China—rather than from non-state actors who are able to inflict damage, but not jeopardise US national survival.[4]

A third possibility, and the one that now seems to be shaping the Bush administration's thinking, is to formulate policy based on the belief that the 11 September attacks were neither a historical turning point, nor a tragedy of transient significance, but rather a momentous event that has helped clarify national interests long muddied by arcane speculation about the nature of the post-Cold War era.[5] In this view, the Bush administration's initial attitude towards such issues as multilateralism, the utility of allies, missile defence and the threat from weapons of mass destruction has now been modified from a unilateralist stance to one that recognises the need for international cooperation. This change in US posture reflects the seriousness of the terrorist threat it faces and the need to put together an international coalition that can be sustained over a considerable period of time. This has involved significant policy trade-offs and adjustments to previous US policy stances with countries such as Pakistan and Russia.

Robert B. Zoellick, who is now the US Trade Representative, argued at the beginning of 2000 that a modern Republican foreign policy emphasises building and sustaining coalitions and alliances.[6] But until 11 September, the Bush administration showed precious little interest in this aspect of its foreign policy. Instead, it seemed to be heading down the path of unilateralism. Prominent American commentators, such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan, argued the case for American hegemony. Others, such as Richard Armitage talked about US pre-eminence as a force for good. Whether these labels were accurate or not, the US had

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certainly lost its clear sense of national purpose with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the US alliance system risked losing what had been its compelling rationale. Lacking a clear enemy, Americans grew confused about whether expanding their costly global engagement was really necessary after the end of the Cold War.[7] Allies—including NATO, Japan and Australia—sensed a lack of focus and attention in Washington. Russia was treated as if it was unimportant and China was regarded with hostility. Both India and Pakistan were punished for their nuclear weapons programs.

All this has now changed with the events of 11 September. Putting together this coalition has involved important policy concessions to Russia, Pakistan and India in particular, as well as getting China on side. It has meant reversing the general expectation of US allies that it would be the US that would come to their assistance: instead, the NATO and ANZUS alliances have been invoked in the defence of the US. But while the diplomatic aspects of coalition building have been impressive, the countries willing to contribute combat forces have been the usual US allies—Britain, Canada and Australia. This is particularly disappointing given the perception in much of the Middle East that the US war on terrorism is a Western crusade against Islam.

As the war enters a new phase involving peacekeeping/stabilisation operations in Afghanistan it is vital that non-Anglo Saxon countries participate. France, Germany and Italy seem to have come round to a commitment—but against some strong domestic political opposition. Other countries that have indicated a commitment include important Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Jordan and Bangladesh.

Effective coalition leadership requires clear-eyed judgments about priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, constant consultations among partners and willingness to compromise on some points but to remain focused on core objectives.[8] So far, the United States has fared well in this regard: in just four weeks it put together an impressive diplomatic coalition before it decided to use military power. But the military coalition has been less impressive: it has been almost totally dominated by the US with some assistance from the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, Australian and Canadian military operations were still very limited. Washington has found it difficult to manage the military operations in the Afghanistan theatre as a true coalition, as distinct from a dominant US military force with subordinate allies expected to do what is demanded of them. Much of this was to be expected, given the need to punish quickly the Taliban and their harbouring of bin Laden. But the management of this aspect of the coalition will require much more finesse in future.

The Coalition: Winners and Losers

Some American commentators, such as Walter Laqueur, would disagree with this analysis. They argue instead that establishing a broad coalition is 'nothing less than an invitation for paralysis'.[9] Even a coalition of Western governments will insist on having their say before decisions are taken. A coalition is never stronger than its weakest link and, so the argument goes, this coalition will consist of many weak links. Laqueur argues that the most effective course of action would have been for the US to have indiscriminately retaliated within a day

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or two after the attacks against any of the governments suspected of aiding international terrorism. His logic for this argument is that terrorism is not based on common sense and elementary logic, and neither is effective counter terrorism. But this ignores the uniqueness of the strategy of terrorism: that it achieves its goal not through its acts but through the response to its acts.

It is a fair supposition from what we know of bin Laden that what he wanted to provoke was precisely an indiscriminate US striking out at certain Middle Eastern Muslim countries. As David Fromkin argued over 25 years ago: terrorism is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead somebody else to embark on some quite different program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires.[10] Terrorism is an indirect strategy that wins or loses only in terms of how you respond to it. If you choose not to respond at all, or else to respond in a way different from that which they desire, they will fail to achieve their objectives. The important point here is that the choice is yours: and that is the ultimate weakness of terrorism as a strategy.[11] In this context, it seems to me that the US strategy so far has been correct. It is not lashed out, despite extreme provocation. Its use of force has been both discriminate and proportionate. And, contrary to expectations, it has resulted in the collapse of the Taliban.

The US is leading a moral campaign here. The firm conviction that what they were fighting was a wicked thing greatly simplified the Allied effort in World War II.[12] The willingness to fight the war to the bitter end was nourished by the image of a 'just war'. The difference is, of course, that in World War II the Allied powers were all the victims of aggression, which simplified the task of constructing the wartime consensus. Until and unless other Western powers are attacked by terrorism it will be difficult in the longer term to hold the coalition together. But the sense of moral outrage has certainly led to the view that this is a just war.

There are those who believe that for the global campaign against terrorism to be successful, political solutions must be given priority over military solutions. They are of the view that the only thing that can undercut bin Laden's brand of global terrorism is a sustained political effort to address the issues that have fuelled extremism. In this view, priority must be given to finding a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the debilitating economic sanctions against Iraq should also be removed. This line of reasoning argues that 'the link that currently exists between historical grievances, contemporary political injustices, social and economic hardship, closed political opportunity structures, and politicised religion must be broken, and military actions are only likely to strengthen them'.[13]

The problem with this is that it is an unrealistic approach to decision-making, particularly when the US had suffered such a devastating terrorist attack on its homeland. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be resolved in the longer term. Asking the US to desist from military action and concentrate on the long-term and well-nigh impossible task of solving the underlying grievances in the Middle East is not a practical course. It leads, in any case, to the entirely unacceptable view of moral equivalence between what bin Laden did and the defects that may, or may not, exist in US Middle Eastern policy.

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Arising out of all of this has been a useful clarification of America's international policy stance. For much of the last decade—since the end of the Cold War—the US had become more unpredictable as a result of the loss of focus of its enemy for the previous 50 years, the USSR. The end of the Cold War removed a clear and simple rationale for devising foreign policy in Washington. Francois Heisbourg described this as the great risk of entropy, of growing inconsistency in the making of US foreign and security policy.[14] But his despair that foreign policy and security studies in the US are no longer given the same priority as they received in the Cold War is probably about to be reversed.

The question now is whether Washington can devise a new organising principle of the international system for the 21st century: but it cannot only be the principle of 'you are with us or with the terrorists'. The rise of China to power, the continuing risks of war across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean peninsula, the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, and instability in Russia and parts of the former Soviet Union, are all risks to world peace. They will need Washington's careful attention, while it fights the new war against terrorism and avoids, if possible, a wider war in the Middle East.

The problem here is that cobbling together the coalition against terrorism has resulted in some risky trade-offs in other key aspects of US national security policy. Condoleezza Rice's idea of a Republican foreign policy is that it should be firmly grounded in the national interests, 'not from the interests of an illusory international community'.[15] But, arguably, the US now needs such an international community of support against terrorism. This is not to deny Rice's view that the US must focus on dealing with the powerful and, in particular, on being able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe—areas in which not only US interests but also those of its key allies are at stake. The war against terrorism, however, will require some short-term tactical adjustments.

For example, both Pakistan and India are winners in this new situation in a way that would have been inconceivable before. Pakistan and India were nuclear pariah states. Now Pakistan, in particular, is crucial to the US military operations in Afghanistan and to pursuing bin Laden. And India's support has been important as the world's largest democracy and a key Asian power that has a large Muslim population. As a result, the sanctions applied against Pakistan and India because of their nuclear-weapons programs have been lifted and Washington's diplomatic focus on both of these countries has become much more intense.

Russia too is a winner. Its relations with the US have improved dramatically. During President Putin's visit to the US in November 2001, President Bush announced a unilateral reduction in US strategic nuclear forces from about 6000 to 2200 or less. At the same time, Putin feels confident enough to resist US pressure to agree to terminate the ABM treaty. Russia has facilitated American access to military bases in Central Asia. In return, the Russians have made it plain how they regard the terrorists in Chechnya and that Moscow has 'a right to expect that double standards will not be applied'.[16] Russia now feels, a decade after the end of the Cold War, that the US is at last treating it as a friend and as an important power.

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Japan has improved its status as an ally of the US. Its historic agreement to deploy naval ships to the Indian Ocean in support of the war against terrorism should not be underestimated. In the 1991 Gulf War, Japan incurred US displeasure because of its reluctance to contribute military forces (mine-sweepers) until after the war had finished. Its contribution this time has involved considerable domestic debate. There now seems to be a willingness to reinterpret the 1947 peace constitution imposed on Japan by General MacArthur. In October 2001, an anti-terrorism special law was passed by the Diet that authorises, under strict conditions, a military response to assist the US-led war against terrorism. This historic naval deployment will attract the ire of China and perhaps of South Korea. The US must firmly rebuff any such criticism.

The country that has gained most in status with the US is the United Kingdom. Once again, it has proven that it is the only ally with credible military forces and sufficient diplomatic clout to stand by the side of the US. In the bombing and missile attacks on Afghanistan, the UK was the only other country to contribute to the US military mission. And Prime Minister Tony Blair has exhibited diplomatic skills in bringing the coalition together that eclipse those of President Bush. Blair has been crucial not only with the Europeans but also with Middle Eastern countries, Pakistan and Russia. Australia, by comparison, has contributed important but token military forces. And Prime Minister Howard has been unable to exert any influence with either Indonesia or Malaysia—Australia's Muslim neighbours.

Who are the losers? The most obvious one is China. Beijing has seen the US take over influence in Pakistan—a country in which China has invested considerable military and economic assistance. It has also seen the US gain access to military bases in Central Asia—a region that China sees as being within its natural sphere of influence. Before the events of 11 September, China had developed an important relationship with Russia because both countries were concerned about what they saw as a hardline stance towards them by the new Bush administration. Russia now is seizing the chance to be accepted as a friend of the West and it seems ready to sacrifice its relations with China. Although China says that it supports the war against terrorism, it has contributed nothing to the coalition other than diplomatic support. It is fanciful in the extreme to propose, as some academics have, that the United States, Russia and China 'are the logical alliance in the war against Islamic terror'.[17]

The other loser is Israel. Israel's hardline military actions against the Palestinians are an embarrassment and potential danger to the coalition against terrorism. Washington has told Israel to keep its head down while the US is mounting sensitive military operations against bin Laden and the Taliban. And recent US statements that it approves in principle Palestinian statehood are a worrisome development for Tel Aviv. If the war against terrorism should widen to include US attacks on Iraq, Israel's position will become even more delicate. The US simply cannot afford to be seen to be pursuing a war against Islam in the Middle East in cahoots with Israel.

As this war develops, Saudi Arabia may find itself in an increasingly untenable position. It is a friend of the US, a critical supplier of oil to the West, and host to American military bases that have drawn the anger of bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalists. The majority of the terrorists who hijacked the aircraft involved in the attacks on 11 September came from Saudi

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Arabia (bin Laden himself was born there) and Riyadh was one of only three governments to maintain diplomatic relations with the Taliban. The autocratic regime in Saudi Arabia is trying to walk a fine line between its orthodox support for Islam and its friendship with the US. It needs to understand that Russia—the world's second largest oil producer—would be only too pleased to supplant it.

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country and the fourth most populous country; it occupies an archipelago that stands across narrow straits that control half of the world's maritime traffic. President Megawati Sukarnoputri has equivocated in her support for the US: a week after the attacks of 11 September she was in Washington giving fulsome support but once the bombing of Afghanistan started she implicitly criticised the US. While it is true that she has to keep a careful eye on her domestic Islamic credentials, there is no doubt that Washington is now disenchanted with her.

And which states support bin Laden? The Taliban regime in Afghanistan is now finished. While it is true that the attitudes of most Arab states, including pro-Western ones, 'range from lukewarm to ice-cold',[18] supporters of terrorism such as Iraq, Iran and Syria are keeping remarkably quiet. As Charles Krauthammer has observed: on the enemy's side are fanatical but weak forces, supported and sheltered by not a single major power. On the US side, for all near-term practical purposes at least, are NATO, Japan, Canada, Australia, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and scores of other countries.

What if the War Expands?

So far, so good. But what happens to the coalition if the war expands? There are three main dangers. The first raises the spectre of the US and the coalition becoming bogged down in Afghanistan in a Vietnam-style counter-insurgency war. The second involves the war being expanded beyond Afghanistan to other supporters of terrorism, such as Iraq. And the third possibility has another major terrorist attack on the US but this time using weapons of mass destruction.

The defeat of the Taliban should minimise the risks of another Vietnam. At the beginning of the bombing campaign the sceptics were predicting that the only way to defeat the Taliban was for a US ground force of 500,000. But the combination of air strikes, ground offensives by the Northern Alliance and special forces operations has worked well. The withdrawal of support by Pakistan was a fatal blow for the Taliban. While it is possible that Taliban remnants will retreat into remote mountainous areas in the south of Afghanistan, this need not demand a debilitating ground force operation by the coalition. Afghanistan will not become another Vietnam.

A more serious prospect for the coalition is if the US decides to widen the war to include other countries such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen that are hosts to either bin Laden's al-Qa'ida terrorists or to other dangerous terrorist movements. There are influential people in the Bush administration, such as Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who are keen to pursue unfinished business from the

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1991 Gulf War with Saddam Hussein. A widening of the war to include Iraq would undoubtedly place strains on the coalition, particularly with European countries such as France and Germany. It would probably be regarded in many parts of the Middle East as confirming that the US is fighting a war against Islam. But if evidence can be shown to implicate Saddam's regime, the coalition must agree to punish him. Otherwise, this so-called war against terrorism will falter.

A more dangerous situation would arise if the Musharraf regime in Pakistan were overthrown by a group of Islamic fundamentalists. Unlike Iraq or Iran, Pakistan has developed operational nuclear ballistic missiles. It could easily target US military bases in the Middle East or threaten to widen the conflict to include India, which also has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This would raise the war to an entirely different level of conflict from that discussed in the previous paragraph. Under such conditions how much of the coalition would remain and what price would US partners demand to stay in it?

The third possibility is if bin Laden, or some other terrorist group, uses weapons of mass destruction in the US homeland. This would be particularly dangerous if a nuclear device were exploded in a large US city. The outrage in the US would show no bounds: there would be a strong urge to retaliate in kind against some target associated with the terrorists. This would break with a norm of international behaviour that has seen tacit agreement, since the end of World War II, not to use nuclear weapons. Holding the coalition together in such an apocalyptic situation would be well nigh impossible.

These are highly speculative scenarios. Perhaps the more serious task is to keep the coalition together in the face of increasing accusations that it is a war against Islam. That is why it is so important that the international stabilisation force in Afghanistan must include Muslim countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Bangladesh and Indonesia—and exclude US troops. One does not have to agree with Samuel Huntington's clash of civilisations thesis to accept the dangers of the current situation. As *The Economist* has observed: the West can live in peace with Islam, but what is unclear is whether Islam can live in peace with the West.[19] Many Muslims in many parts of the world flatly say it cannot. They feel a deep sense of humiliation when they consider the comparative failure, in material terms, of their once mighty civilisation.[20] Matters have not been helped, of course, by the pre-modern attitudes in some Muslim countries that have increasingly left them far behind materially.

This is a complex issue and it needs to be handled with the utmost sensitivity if the world is not to slide into a confrontation between the West and Islam. We should not commit the error of typing all Islamic countries with the same homogeneous attitudes—as we did, incorrectly, with 'world communism'. Huntington asserts that the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived major threat to the other.[21] He predicts 'a civilisational war' between Islam and the West. This must not become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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Some Concluding Observations

It is obviously very difficult to predict how the war against terrorism will unfold and what this will mean for the coalition. So far at least, the US has handled the situation well. Who would have predicted such an impressive array of countries supporting the US, including every major power? And it must also be said that—contrary to much media speculation—the US has acquitted itself well in bringing about the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But even if bin Laden is killed, that will not be the end of the matter. The war against terrorism will demand infinite patience and satisfaction with incremental successes that are not measured in terms of historical battlefield victories. Keeping pressure on the financial, legal and diplomatic war against terrorism over a prolonged period of time will be far from easy.

There is a risk that the coalition will fray at the edges, particularly if the war expands. But that should be no excuse for a US retreat or a reversion to isolationist sentiment. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the US now has a new organising principle to help define its interests. This is not an excuse for the US to define its national interests in narrow and more circumscribed ways. If anything, the events of 11 September have increased the global commitment to democracy and open economic systems and decisively limited the unilateral and aggressive use of force and violence.[22] The US can expect its major allies to stand by it in this context, but it must involve them more in coalition decision-making.

The world will not, of course, stand still just because of the events of 11 September—as horrific as they were. Other crises will arise engaging US national interests. It is important that the US does not revert to its previous unilateral, America-first instincts and that it recognises that—as powerful as it is—it needs to work with other countries to achieve its aims. At times this will demand some uncomfortable trade-offs and concessions. Washington will need to watch that its current emphasis on greater domestic security does not undermine its traditional international support for human rights and democracy.

This historic coalition must not be discarded if the going gets tough, as it will. The US is no longer an invulnerable country. As the English 17th century philosopher John Donne said:

> No man is an Island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main. …
> And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

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Notes

1 Article for the Spring 2002 issue of the *Washington Quarterly*.
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3 Ibid, p. 406.
4 The thoughts in this paragraph are taken from Avery Goldstein, *September 11, the Shanghai Summit, and the shift in US China policy*, Foreign-Policy Research Institute, E-notes, 9 November 2001.
5 Ibid.
6 Robert B. Zoellick, 'A Republican Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, p. 69.
7 William Pfaff, 'The Question of Hegemony', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001, p. 228.
8 Robert Zoellick, p. 69.
9 Waiter Laqueur, 'Let the Eagle strike free', *The Australian*, 2 October 2001, p. 13.
10 David Fromkin, 'The Strategy of Terrorism', in James F. Hogue, Jr., and Fareed Zakaria, *The American Encounter* (New York: Basic Books for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 345. This article was first published in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1975 and it talks about 'how to drain the swamps of misery in which hatred and fanaticism breed'.
11 Ibid. p. 348.
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