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INDONESIAN SECURITY RESPONSES TO RESURGENT PAPUAN SEPARATISM:

AN OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CASE STUDY

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Abstract

Simplistic but commonly held beliefs about State security functions would hold that the State manages an exclusive supply of the best possible quality of information, to which the public can only become privy via scandalous 'leaks'. Whether conducting counter-insurgencies, or intelligence collection and analysis of such operations, a State's special apparatus is often accorded an intelligence mystique, and its functions assumed to be specially endowed with 'the real story', far removed from 'low grade' information available to journalists, NGOs and other non-State actors and agents.

In challenging such views, this paper sets out to detail various aspects of the Indonesian counter-insurgency in Irian Jaya/Papua, with a view to two distinct goals. The first objective is to attain an overview of the counter-insurgency's political context and some of its implications for regional security. The second is to assert the rich, though seemingly neglected, intelligence value of public domain information as evident in the Papua case. Reliance is placed upon a critical appraisal of many sources, especially Indonesian press reporting, in the discussion heading towards both destinations.

Maps, tables and appendices are used to present the most specific and detailed aspects of the research made during the drafting of this paper. It must be emphasised that this study uses only information that has already been revealed in the public domain. Any analysis and opinion by the author is entirely his own, and made in a private capacity.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abn	[*Linud*]	Airborne
AO	[*Daerah Operasi*]	Area of Operations
BAKORSTANAS	*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*	Coord Body Assisting Consolidation of National Stability
BKO	*Bawah Kendali Operasi*	(Attached) under Operational Control
BrigGen	*Brigadir Jendral*	Brigadier General
BRIMOB	*Brigade Mobil*	Mobile Brigade
COL	[*Kolonel*]	Colonel
COY	[*Kompi*]	(Infantry) Company
DEPDAGRI	*Departemen Dalam Negeri*	Interior Ministry/Home Office
DEPLU	*Departemen Luar Negeri*	Foreign Ministry
DPR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*	People's Legislative Assy
FIC	-	Freeport Indonesia Co.
FKPPI	*Forum Komunikasi Putera Puteri Purnawirawan ABRI*	Children of ABRI Veterans Communication Forum
GCI	-	Ground Control Interception
Gen	[*Jendral*]	General
Inf Bn	[*Yonif*]	Infantry Battalion
IRGEN	*Inspektur Jendral*	Inspector General
KNPI	*Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia*	Nat Indon Youth Committee
KODALOPS	*Komando Pengendalian Operasi*	Comd & Ctl of Operations
KODAM	*Komando Daerah Militer*	Military Area Comd
KODIM	*Komando Distrik Militer*	Military District Comd
KOHANUDNAS	*Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional*	National Air Defence Comd
KOLAKOPS	*Komando Pelaksana Operasi*	Executive Comd of Ops
KOPASSUS	*Komando Pasukan Khusus*	Spec Forces Comd (Army)
KORAMIL	*Komando Distrik Militer*	Military Sub-District Comd
KOREM	*Komando Resort Militer*	Military Resort Comd
KOSEK	*Komando Sektor*	Sector Comd (Air Force)
KOSTRAD	*Komando Strategis AD*	Army Strat Reserve Comd
LANAL	*Pangkalan AL*	(Minor) Naval Base
LANTAMAL	*Pangkalan Utama AL*	Main Naval Base
LtCol	[*Letkol*]	Lieutenant Colonel
LtGen	[*Letjen*]	Lieutenant General
Maj	[*Mayor*]	Major
MajGen	[*Mayjen*]	Major General
Mar Inf Bn	[*Yonmar*]	Marine Infantry Battalion
MPR	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*	People's Consultative Assy

Muspida	*Permusyawaratan Pimpinan Daerah*	Regional Leadership Council
OPM	*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*	Free Papua Organisation
ORBAT	-	Order of Battle
OSINT	-	Open Source Intelligence
PAMTAS	*Pengamanan Perbatasan*	Border Security
PANGKOSTRAD	*Panglima KOSTRAD*	Cmdr-in-Chief KOSTRAD
PASKHASAU	*Pasukan Khas AU*	Air Force Special Forces
Pasmar	*Pasukan Marinir*	Marine Force
PHH	*Pasukan anti-Huru Hara*	Riot-Control Force
POLDA	*Kepolisian Daerah*	Police Region
POLRES	*Kepolisian Resort*	Police Precinct
POLRI	*Kepolisian Repuplik Indonesia*	Indonesian National Police
PP	*Pemuda Pancasila*	Pancasila Youth
SATGAS	*Satuan Tugas*	Task Unit/Task Force
SATGAS DARAT	*Satuan Tugas Darat*	Land Task Unit
SATGASPAM	*Satuan Tugas Pengamanan*	Security Task Unit
SATGASTER	*Satuan Tugas Teritorial*	Territorial Task Unit
SATRAD	*Satuan Radar*	Radar Unit (Air Force)
TNI	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*	Indonesian Defence Force
Tontaikam	*Pleton Pengintai Keamanan*	Recon & Security Platoon
TPN	*Tentara Pembebasan Nasional*	National Liberation Army
YDPK	*Yayasan Dharma Putra Kostrad*	(KOSTRAD Foundation)
YKEP	*Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi*	(Army Foundation)

Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism: An Open Source Intelligence Case Study

Matthew N.Davies

1. Introduction and Background to Research

Reports in late 2000 reports of an intensive Indonesian Army build-up throughout Papua Province (Irian Jaya)[1] exaggerated the situation on the ground and misinformed as to the nature of security force activity. In fact, if added together and accepted uncritically without systematic analysis, the various open sources reporting Indonesian troop strengths in Papua would indicate up to 20 battalions of non-local (non-organic) troops, including one whole division worth of units from the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD).

Systematic analysis of the matter reveals profound distortions of fact, especially apparent in the reporting from around August 2000. Perceiving a repetition of the 1999 East Timor mayhem, several NGO and Western press sources reported recent troop movements to Papua with a note of alarm. It appears that much of the distortion was intentional on the part of the Indonesian Army, and elements of the Government itself, to publicise to wider domestic and international audiences the onerous burden of maintaining the unitary State, and therefore, regional stability. It is remarkable that one of the world's most examined militaries could attract so much misunderstanding over a matter of its core function - i.e., internal security operations. A closer examination of primary and secondary sources reveals some serious flaws in what ought not be a neglected part of discourse on Indonesian society and politics. As is well known, any discourse on the State of Indonesia is severely limited if avoiding critical analysis of the country's security forces - perhaps its most defining national sub-culture since 1945.

Indeed, publicity was the primary focus of Armed Forces (TNI) and Police (POLRI) operations in the Province. The Jakarta establishment's message was an unequivocal, albeit belated, re-assertion of Indonesian sovereignty. To this end, all three of the TNI's services displayed a conspicuous operational presence in the area's skies and waterways in concert with the crackdown on the soil. Throughout the year 2000, TNI and POLRI leadership repeatedly announced plans to augment existing bases in Papua, or establish additional facilities. These plans signalled a gravitational shift in *internal* security priorities, and in the wider regional context, a refinement of Indonesia's longer-term contingency preparations against *external* aggression.

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Certainly, the publicity surrounding the year 2000 deployments to Papua coincided with an actual increase in repressive measures against widespread Papuan separatist demonstrations, combined with a concentrated counter-insurgency operation along the PNG border. While both POLRI and TNI made modest increases in force strengths in Papua for a phase of the repressive action, including increased activity by the Navy's Eastern Fleet and the Air Force, high-level political manoeuvres in Jakarta determined the timing and nature of the action, and the spurious quality of its publicity.

In concert with more direct counter-insurgency operations, loyalist paramilitary activity in Papua indicated a sophisticated strategy of 'black' operations comparable in method to those used in Aceh, with the active manipulation of, and infiltration into, separatist groups. As in Aceh, this strategy has seen the use of 'black flag' elements - as with copycat organisms in virology - as counter-insurgents and agents mixed amongst the general population. However, comparisons to 1999 East Timor were inaccurate or, at least, premature in this respect, as Papua was yet to endure a reign of blatant thuggery *a la* East Timor's barbaric pro-integrationist proxies and their press-ganged aides in 1999.

Background: Motive and Method

This paper examines the Indonesian security forces' multi-dimensional response to the resurgent Papuan separatism that arose concurrently with strident referendum demands in Aceh in the wake of the 1999 East Timor independence ballot. It highlights changing features of TNI and POLRI command, force structures and bases peculiar to deployments in Papua and, where relevant, refers to similar arrangements and developments elsewhere in the country. As its subject matter is of obvious interest to specialists in international security, this paper may also be regarded as an 'open source intelligence' (OSINT) report. Findings from the paper's research are intended to demonstrate the extent to which information in the public domain can satisfy potentially high-interest information requirements for the intelligence community in particular, and government and non-government policy- and decision-makers in general. Consequently, the paper includes identification of uncertain details possibly deserving more focused attention using both public domain and other research means.

The paper concludes with a discussion of some wider political context affecting the security situation in Papua. Of course, this 'big picture' affects the national scene in general, but the timing of events in Jakarta with others in Papua suggests a sharp mutual relevance in this respect. Similarly, incidents within Papua are covered only where relevant to the wider political context, or as they helped reveal changes in the security forces' operations, and in their command and force make-up.

In order to properly depict the setting for the non-organic, or non-Papua based, force deployments that have caused such attention in the western media, this paper details the institutional super-structure affecting all security force activity in Papua. Some of this information was explicitly reported in press sources, while parts were pieced together by comparison with activities in other provinces. Other detail was implicit from proposed or actual changes to the civil administration in Papua, as well as cadastral maps indicating those pending structural changes likely to occur at the time of writing or in the near future. Alongside such analysis, and referring back to include sources long available, one can identify trends to trace an outline of significant structural changes to TNI and POLRI operations from as early as 1996 in such areas as: command and control; operational sector boundaries; and territorial commands. Such wider contextual information is intended to best locate the more recent deployment activity within the dynamic national and provincial conditions of Indonesia's immediate post-New Order era.

It should be emphasised that examination of POLRI deployments is included on account of their actual military, or at least *para*military, internal security commitments. In fact, arrangements of command and control rendered essential POLRI's inclusion. Discussion of loyalist militia, paramilitaries and covert forces is also included for the same reason of an overriding security/military context.

The paper's endnotes are as exhaustive as possible given the time taken for the draft, though these could not feasibly include the entirety of references used for maps and tables, due to space already taken by direct notes to the text. The sheer volume of notes may invite an impression of pedantic obsession. Recourse to intensive referencing was required on account of several factors: the pre-existing lack of thorough source exploitation; the complex nature of the subject; and, most compellingly, the author's previous experience with similar research into East Timor in 1999, over which it was claimed, without investigation or reference to fact, that the author somehow (illegally) made use of official Australian Government sources to filter products of open source research. That matter remains unresolved at the time of writing, but every effort has been made in this draft to counter, in advance, any repetition of such damaging comment.

Open Source Research on the Region: Setting the Agenda

For the purposes of the paper, the resort to extensive endnotes was to make plain the public's access to vast open sources of information directly relevant to subjects otherwise considered the preserve of official agencies which characterise their business by security classifications, technical specialisation or diplomatic sensitivity. By citing all references used, the paper aims to affirm open source intelligence (OSINT) as a process whose proper incorporation into intelligence production and decision-making is long overdue. While separate government agencies may continue to resist the opportunity for evolutionary reform presented by OSINT, private sector commercial, NGO and international decision-making bodies[2] may be best suited to capitalise on OSINT, hence exchanging 'client' for 'patron' status when dealing with longer-established and better-funded national governments.

Indeed, in what may suffice as OSINT doctrine with regards source citation, some specialist writing by Bowen has urged the fullest possible referencing as one essential means of ensuring quality control. Interestingly, the same recommendation would imply that covert and clandestine sources never, or rarely, receive the same critical attention - as if their classifications amount to a form of franking for accuracy, lack of bias, relevance and freedom from disinformation[3]. Bowen apparently betrays this cultural problem - a 'high double standard' applied to open sources - but such an unbalanced assumption has been well countered by historical examples, where known covert or clandestine sources have been used to 'feed' their customers[4]. Moreover, any identified cultural bias and preference towards classified product would, in many cases, render classified agencies *more* vulnerable to deliberate disinformation. Such a circumstance makes feasible a converse solution from 1998-9 open source conference findings about quality control of OSINT product[5] - i.e., rather to use *OSINT* in quality control checking against disinformation used in *classified* sources. While OSINT must be produced in strict isolation from the classified realm, open source producers can enhance and broaden the perspective of their classified siblings - the cloistered sleuths working in the traditional and long formally established intelligence profession.

In practice, of course, the sheer volume and diverse origin of open sources are sufficient to *compel* critical treatment during processing. It can be argued that the skills needed for processing open sources demand an even higher analytical proficiency than those used in more compartmentalised and longer established fields of the intelligence discipline. The demands of OSINT need not be considered an inherent risk to security, or a degradation of the profession's classified intelligence skills, as has been suggested[6]. Once again, these concerns simply need addressing, along with an implementation of processes to ensure that open sources are properly exploited. If the situation in the US can be taken as a benchmark, the necessary reforms for open source exploitation have yet to be effected within western intelligence practice[7]. If posed as an interrogative without specific and comprehensive solutions, the term 'reform' will probably just invite complacent ridicule, or go unanswered, by the classified establishment. In reflecting on the fortunes of OSINT's cause to date, this paper will attempt to provide some specific address for these concerns.

The Papua situation offers an example of the vast potential for detailed and specific open source research into international affairs and security issues. Some OSINT proponents may have moderated their advocacy via tactful concessions to the massively funded and monopolistic government intelligence apparatus. But the time for diplomacy on this matter is over - the facts of large-scale inefficiency and wastage are hardly polite. This paper demonstrates that even an analysis of order of battle (ORBAT/OOB) - held by some of the intelligence establishment as basic and exclusive information from the classified realm[9] - can be thoroughly covered by processing open source information in the public domain. In fact, due to its retrospective and unfunded nature, this paper's coverage of ORBAT and other details was performed with access to only a minor portion of associated open sources actually available to the public. With relatively modest funding and a provision for dynamic communication to decision-making bodies, the case for exploitation of open sources on Papua (and elsewhere) will be all the more emphatic.

Notes on Map Information

Where possible, the maps in this report use non-colour specific earlier generation NATO-type tactical symbols, with variants as standardised by TNI and POLRI. The 'open' nature of the report requires that the maps' symbology suggest no specifically friendly, neutral or hostile units. Indonesian variations[10] appear wherever possible, as in the territorial base formations, but are avoided or altered where greater clarity and consistency has been deemed necessary. For example, special forces of the different TNI services have the same tactical symbols as one another due to their actual close similarity in training, equipment and function. Similarly, text is included or omitted to make distinctions of identity or avoidance of tautology. The reference for Indonesian military symbols was purchased as a photocopied document from a street vendor in Bandung.

2. Command and Control

As for the rest of Indonesia, various open sources have extensively detailed the hierarchy of TNI and POLRI static formations based in Papua[1]. Such information usually provides reliable placement of boundaries on the map, as the civil administrative and Army territorial structures are that part of Indonesian security apparatus activity which functions as a firm operational base. But in this respect, many post-New Order changes have significantly altered the command-and-control environment. Pending changes promise to adjust the scene in Papua further still.

Of course, alterations of this nature are not merely cosmetic. This is not to suggest that changed jurisdictions and command boundaries necessarily reflect a pragmatic reappraisal of *security* priorities in certain parts of the Province. In fact, the most serious of these changes derived from national-level *political* considerations affecting intra-government institutional relationships, most notably between POLRI, TNI and the Interior Ministry (DEPDAGRI). In particular, alterations in the status of territorial formations sometimes reveal major rivalry and tensions within the government infrastructure. This is nowhere more apparent than between POLRI and TNI.

Official POLRI Command Primacy: Police Region (POLDA) Papua

In 1998, BAKORSTANAS was formally dissolved, along with its de facto martial law provisions. This adjustment was followed by the formal separation of POLRI from TNI in April 1999. Subsequent efforts to subordinate POLRI to the DEPDAGRI would thereby ensure closer parallel between police and the civil administrative structure and, as was intended, greater independence of the TNI in conducting internal security. POLRI's post-1999 primacy in internal security responsibilities provides a greater presence of POLRI personnel, especially from the Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB), as well as normal operational command in the field, with at least official reduction of most TNI units to direct support status (*Bawah Kendali Operasi*, BKO; see Part 3).

However, official security force command at POLDA Papua is by no means guaranteed on the ground. Tension between POLRI and TNI manifests at all levels of the two organisations' hierarchies. Effective lobbying in Jakarta, as well as a re-ordering of local arrangements, ensures that actual command primacy may return to the Army. This gradual trend was apparent in developments since 1999. Although rarely accorded headline space, the issue may provide an important barometer to political conditions affecting the central government's authority.

POLDA-KODAM competition: KODALOPS/KOLAKOPS and hierarchical seniority

The most definite indication of POLRI's enhanced official responsibilities in Papua was the exercise of operational coordination by an appointed Police Commander at the KODALOPS Centre (*Komando Pengendalian Operasi,* literally 'Operations Control Command')[2]. Previously, a similar command and staff function - KOLAKOPS - attracted great attention in the wake of the 1991 Santa Cruz Cemetery killings as the position above the territorial (KOREM) commander in the Army's East Timor command structure[3]. However, KODALOPS and its preceding Army version KOLAKOPS are functionary elements of command and staff appointments in a command and control mechanism merely delineating seniority and are used for security operations throughout Indonesia. The KODALOPS/KOLAKOPS system should not be regarded as some type of extraordinary Special Forces or Intelligence arrangement, as has been implied with the former in Maluku[4] and in the latter case in East Timor[5]. Moreover, POLRI's assumption of such a role within Papua's territorial commands confirms the official Police primacy for operations in the year 2000.

An important feature of the KODALOPS system is its application to both the POLRI and territorial Army hierarchies in managing internal security operations, as noted in sources for some time[6]. In fact, the Indonesian Air Force also uses the term in managing its air- and ground-based assets[7]. A Navy KODALOPS can be reasonably assumed as well, though Indonesian Foreign Ministry (DEPLU) assumptions that 'KODAL' is an exclusively maritime function can perhaps be best dismissed as elitist civilian presumptiousness in place of checking the context of news reporting, or deigning to actually ask DEPLU-attached TNI staff of the acronym's meaning[8]. Essentially, resort to KODALOPS to coordinate the two internal security forces of Police and Army creates a situation whereby the disbanded BAKORSTANAS system's process of transfer from POLRI to TNI is adjusted to require authorization by the civil government, and without the direct pressures available from any equivalent to the old national BAKORSTANAS authority. As can be seen from the Maluku precedent, political lobbying has become the means by which a transfer of operational authority can be made from POLRI to TNI[9].

By December 2000, there was one important exception to POLRI's formal control of internal security operations in Papua. Non-organic Indonesian Army units along the PNG border came under their own service's operational command at local KORAMIL boundaries under KODIM control[10], probably as part of the non-organic *Satgas Garuda* or *Satgas Pamtas Papua-PNG* (see Table 2). It is likely that this arrangement was legally sanctioned from Jakarta as part of the special joint border operation *Lukautim Perbatasan* coordinated with PNGDF and PNG Police Force[11]. While a return to TNI autonomy of command may take the form of formal authorization from POLDA Papua, or higher, to non-organic TNI units deployed to the PNG border districts, sources have not explicitly indicated any such TNI-POLRI arrangement. The central government likely endorsed the change due to an implicit categorisation of separatist border-crossers as an 'external threat to national sovereignty'. Such TNI co-operation with PNGDF troops on the border was not a recent or new development, as can be seen from official acknowledgment at least as early as 1995[12].

This special condition on the border would apply despite the December 2000 upgrade to Papua Police Region's (POLDA) status from Type 'B' to Type 'A', which entailed greater seniority for the Police Region Chief, more resources and an equivalent seniority to the Army's local territorial KODAM commander - at Major General rank[13]. The upgrade was overdue given the hitherto incongruous situation where a Major General/Commander KODAM *Trikora* was providing support to a Brigadier/Chief of POLDA Papua. Papua POLDA's increased status was consistent with the official plan to abolish all Type 'C' POLDA status in the country[14].

In addition to the previously unequal hierarchical seniority, POLRI's former inferiority to TNI in Papua was also more apparent in terms of sheer land space covered by the respective services. This disparity was rectified by the 1999 re-establishment of KODAM *Pattimura* for Maluku Province. The POLDA command structure was smaller than the Army's territorial coverage in that the former always more closely paralleled provincial boundaries where the latter KODAM covered both Irian Jaya and Maluku provinces from 1985 to 1999[15]. A postponed plan to divide Papua into three new provinces[16] could well see POLDA Papua following suit with corresponding new POLDA formations, though their complete establishment would likely take some years.

Beginning with the March 1999 restoration of the separate *Pattimura* Military Area Command (KODAM XVI) for Maluku Province[17], the return of KODAM XVII *Trikora* was noted shortly afterwards in June 1999[18]. This re-numbering for the Irian Jaya/Papua KODAM from VIII to XVII was in itself unnecessary. It was probably a part of then Commander ABRI GEN Wiranto's intention to pre-empt, as far as possible, government disapproval of the planned return of the pre-1985 total of 17 KODAMs to the Indonesian Army's territorial structure[19]. The return to separate Maluku and Irian Jaya

KODAMs would obviously also involve removing subordination of Maluku-based units, particularly 733 Airborne Infantry battalion (Abn Inf Bn)[20], which previously deployed to Papua as an organic unit of KODAM VIII/ *Trikora*[21] and the rapid reaction - or 'strike' - battalion for the KODAM Commander[22]. There is no indication of any impact on the actual KODAM formation from the proposed (and long postponed) division of Papua into three new provinces, though it is possible that POLDA Papua would follow such a sub-division to become three parallel POLDA formations[23].

Security Forces' Internecine Conflict

Events have suggested that enhanced POLRI status and responsibility has almost certainly heightened tensions between POLRI and TNI forces in Papua (and elsewhere). Several serious clashes have been reported during the period before the 39th anniversary of the West Papuan Declaration of Independence on 1 December 2000 - one causing the death of a KORAMIL commander and another the hospitalisation of a KODIM commander[24]. The occasional ferocity of this inter-service conflict in Papua even lends an impression that the respective institutions' political and economic interests take priority over their avowed missions to preserve order, stability and national sovereignty.

It is in this sense that proponents of stable civil society may sound some alarm over any greater prominence of Army formations in the Province. Similarly, it may also provide the proper context for POLRI's apparently frantic savagery in repressing separatist demonstrations, especially as reported from Wamena in October 2000. In that case, the POLRES Commander himself was apparently compelled to micro-manage arrests of *Satgas Papua* members by platoon-size units[25]. In dealing with the separatist challenge, POLRI has apparently tried to use this tension to its advantage. In classic 'good cop, bad cop' treatment, Papua's POLDA Chief explicitly warned independence groups that TNI would 'take measures' against the separatists if they failed to comply with Police decrees to disband[26].

Combined Command or Cooperation?

Operationally, there have been genuine problems of inter-service coordination in Papua, as Lowry asserted in December 2000 referring to the Aceh case[27]. One can be certain that this problem in Papua has been at least partly due to the unequal hierarchical authority between local POLRI and TNI formations. However, Lowry did not seem to consider the inherent difficulty of merely appointing 'a local authority with full control over the military and police'. Whether in Aceh, Papua, or even metropolitan Java, such an appointment would as a priority need to overcome competing institutional interests of the two services. As such interests exist on a national level, any such provincial appointment would be hamstrung before it was even occupied. Moreover, given the TNI's political pressures on POLRI to maintain order, it may be more accurate to traduce from Lowry's assessment by stating that 'the...*police* will continue to be the meat in the sandwich'.

Intense political pressure is hardly a new phenomenon for POLRI, especially where more powerful institutions can coerce it into certain action or decision[28]. But the volatile national political scene can only have added pressure on POLDA Papua, especially as it fends off attempts to dislodge its official KODALOPS responsibility via the state of *Darurat Sipil* (Civil Emergency) powers, even if such an emergency declaration became just the first stage towards *Darurat Militer* (Military Emergency). In either condition, subsequent chaos could provide justification for the Army to regain local supremacy as the operational decision-maker[29], and one again take charge of local KODALOPS functions - as in Maluku in early 1999[30]. Although not a *carte blanche* reversion to Army control, such civil emergency powers could see operational primacy returned to the Army over POLRI via approval from the provincial Governor, as occurred in Maluku. A trend is obvious from the Maluku case, where a perceived 'failure' of civil emergency powers has been cited as a reason for extending Army powers via a state of *Darurat Militer* - a danger not lost on some local commentators[31]. Even at the *Darurat Sipil* stage, some overseas protest has focused on the excessive interference to foreign humanitarian assistance to victims of the Maluku conflict[32]. In this respect, the key aspect of *Darurat Sipil* is preventing any possible direct scrutiny of TNI operations in the 'emergency' environment.

Although legally binding states of emergency may be used as means by which to add the pressure of scrutiny onto POLRI commands during unrest, there are more direct ways for the Army to wrest operational control. After incessant and unsuccessful lobbying for a state of civil emergency to be declared in Maluku in 1999, sufficient political pressure effected a transfer of KODALOPS authority from POLDA Maluku to KODAM XVI/*Pattimura*[33]. In Papua, Army pressure to this end has been brazen in its challenge to both POLRI and the civil government, even usurping the due administrative process for such official proposals[34]. Assisting any usurpation of due process in this regard is the uncertain state of national laws for states of emergency[35]. Part of the Government's March 2001 draft legislation on these laws asserts Presidential and DPR power specifically over TNI forces[36]. Of course, ratification of these laws could not be guaranteed and, even if passed, the challenge would then be to actually enforce the laws. Almost simultaneous with the draft emergency laws' submission, it was no coincidence that the DPR Speaker, with the thinly veiled backing of the Chief of the Army, called for a return to TNI supremacy in internal security functions[37].

Of course, for the long-term observer of Indonesian security force activity, it may seem excessive to make lengthy dissection of the terms KODALOPS, *Darurat Sipil*, etc. TNI obfuscation of the matter does not help either, as when the TNI Chief of Territorial Staff assured of maintained POLRI control in *Darurat Sipil* during the protracted lobbying process for the Maluku case[38]. Whereas the actual provision for TNI takeover of operational control and responsibility in Maluku's *Darurat Sipil* has since been made quite unambiguous[39]. But these semantic distinctions can be fundamental to understanding the pressures applied to the government institutions involved and, less directly, to their opposition. In the field, locating the source of KODALOPS determines whether Army or POLRI forces exert immediate authority during operations in a given place or time.

In the local headquarters offices and in provincial and national government suites, the distinctions help to locate both responsibility for the actions of troops conducting operations, as well as the enhanced power and funding granted to the operational authority. For security at the December 2000 MPR sitting in Jakarta, for example, separate KODALOPS funds were allocated to the POLRI command[40]. Nonetheless, struggles for command and control are not likely to reach a *denouement* in the foreseeable future. The political pressure in Jakarta from these power struggles would appear to be their real purpose.

The trend towards a return to autonomous Army operational command has been obvious over time - at least in practice, if not formally declared. By April 2001, the situation in Aceh revealed the return of Army's KOLAKOPS (alongside POLDA Aceh's KODALOPS!) with the special appointment of former KOPASSUS Group IV Commander BRIGGEN Zamroni[41]. It is possible that a similar duality has been applied to Papua via an appointment under another KOPASSUS stalwart - Commander KODAM *Trikora* MAJGEN Mahidin Simbolon.

Security Forces' Business Interests: Large & Small Enterprise

Both the official and the illicit 'black' economies are evidently a major cause for competition between POLRI and the Army. In the latter case, evidence has arisen of security forces' involvement in trade outside of official duties, as in furniture export[42] (possibly from exotic species still plentiful in Papua, such as sandalwoods), old-growth logging[43], and the highly valued (and officially protected) *Arwana* fish[44]. Isolated reports of the fish trading may at first seem trifling, except that the practice has also been noted as a nationwide organised crime[45].

Security forces' logging ventures assume a more official legitimacy than opportunistic theft of Papuan villagers' exotic fish catches. A report of frantic logging by Army troops along the PNG border[46] conveyed the impression that the Indonesian Army deployments may have been compelled by certain pressing commercial imperatives. Some observers may disregard such a report as an example of 'rogue' conduct amongst the lower ranks. If viewed as a privileged corporation, however, the Indonesian Army's timber interests are clearly established and considerable. Even in 1995, at least six large logging companies were identified under the management umbrella of the Army's *Kartika Eka Paksi* Foundation (YKEP)[47]. PT Hanurata is one logging firm partly owned by the Army[48], and holding one of the largest logging concessions in Papua[49]. Of course, its is difficult to precisely follow the money trail within networks of military business foundations. Many of the Army business interests in Papua could well have been managed by the separate KOSTRAD foundation founded by Soeharto in 1964, the *Yayasan Dharma Putra* (YDPK).

Of most significance amid the legally valid enterprises are the political implications of Army business connections. Bob Hasan, Probosutedjo, Liem Sioe Liong and Tommy Suharto are just some of the businessmen long involved as partners in the Army's private sector concerns[50]. TNI financiers were very likely alarmed by the much-publicised reformist government action against the most influential of these business partners. Besides the consequent risk of market forces affecting YKEP's financial health, the established TNI - and especially Army - cash-flow appeared to be under threat should market reform continue beyond the highest-profile prosecution cases.

3. Indonesian Security Force Deployments in Papua

The counter-insurgency in Papua has required that the local TNI and POLRI territorial formations operate with a variety of units based outside of the province, as well as with special forces units. A special zoning by sector has long been applied to operations in Papua, and composite units of companies have deployed specifically for operations in these sectors. Such measures have also been taken in East Timor, Aceh, and to a lesser extent Maluku. Papua has differed from these other areas on account of its expanded territorial commands and shifting zone/sector boundaries. The major dynamic factor causing Papua's differences in this regard is the province's expansion in civil administrative units combined with a large and steady population growth through incoming residents from elsewhere in Indonesia (transmigration).

Subordinate Territorial Formations

At the end of 1998, Papua's KODAM *Trikora* publicised a change from 'military' to 'territorial' operations [1]. Despite the public-relations, hearts-and-minds or swords-to-ploughshares, explanation in the KODAM Commander's announcement of the change, this adjustment to territorial control merely returned command of deployed units to local territorial formations at the Military District (KODIM), and later Police District (POLRES) levels. By definition in the English or Indonesian, 'military operations' actually continued as before, and the KODAM Commander's statement would appear disingenuous in the context. The development towards this shift in direct operational responsibilities was confirmed by the concurrent disbandment of separate sector commands for non-organic units (see 'Operational Sectors' below).

Within Papua itself, a new KODIM - 1710 - arose as early as 1996, in accordance with the increased security infrastructure applied to the Timika-Tembagapura mining operations of the Freeport Indonesia Company (FIC), and the *kabupaten*- (regency-) status given to the area then covering East and West Mimika, and Akimuga, *kecamatan* (districts). Located in the same area was the *Satgaspam* [Security Task Unit] PT Freeport, probably operating from KODIM 1710 to control the operations of non-organic units attached to the area. Of course, the corresponding POLRI formation in Mimika Regency (POLRES Mimika) appeared at the same time as KODIM 1710[2]. In civil administration terms, Mimika Regency came into official existence in parallel to the new TNI and POLRI formations[3].

Such adjustments to the cadastral mapping of Papua have foretold of impending effects on the composition of other lower-level command within the Province's KODAM and POLDA. Since 1998, another three separate regencies have been created from Paniai Regency - i.e., Nabire, Paniai and Puncak Jaya[4]. There was obvious justification for the division, given that the previous Paniai Regency contained 17 districts, while most other regencies had between five and seven[5], as well as Paniai's difficult mountainous terrain. For the same reasons as the division of the Regency itself, and the local precedent set with Mimika Regency, it is assessed that new KODIM and POLRES formations will probably soon appear in accordance with the civil administrative structure, at least in the preparatory stage. It is also assessed that the easternmost of the new regencies - Puncak Jaya - will be brought under a new subordination to Military Provincial Command (KOREM) 172/Sector C. Most recent reporting indicated the similar pending sub-division of Jayapura and other regencies[6]. This program probably began at the time of this draft in mid-2001.

Operational Sectors

The main purpose of Indonesia's security force sectors is to define the larger and more fluid deployments of units in areas of counter-insurgency, as distinct from the territorial command structures already in place. Although sectors usually correspond to territorial boundaries on the map, the system of sector HQ elements would accommodate command and staff components from the additional forces deployed from outside the province. Although these aspects of Indonesian military operations have been seen outside Papua, sector boundaries there appear to have radically altered since 1998. This was most apparent at the time of changes in higher formation structure and POLRI's official assumption in 1999 of immediate internal security responsibilities.

Sector C appeared in March 1999 at the same time as Maluku's territorial army separation from KODAM *Trikora*[7], but long after the announced removal of certain 'sector commands', such as Sector E, Sector G[8] and a logically certain Sector F. Sectors E and G occupied at least as far as the northern and southern sides of the central highlands, respectively. Sector F probably operated in the other area of typically intense KOSTRAD/non-organic deployments along the PNG border. References to sectors E and G clearly confirm their non-territorial role as 'combat' commands, and the two were both headquartered in Timika, thereby indicating their supplementary nature to pre-existing territorial boundaries[9]. The sequencing for Sector C also appears to reverse the late 1970s zoning, where Jayapura controlled a Sector A[10]. Such irregularity over time demonstrates the arbitrariness of sector layouts in Papua, as in the earliest precedent there from 1965 using four numbered sectors, three of which faced the PNG border[11].

The non-territorial function of the commanders of Sector G in 1996-7, and Sector E in Jun 98, was indicated by their rank of Colonel - i.e., on par with the KOREM commanders. These sectors were additional to other sector boundaries and were commanded by non-organic officers, while the other sectors such as Sector C in 1999, were commanded within KOREM 172[12]. The latter KOREM-based sectors suggested their presence in January 1996 with Sector B around Paniai, and a sub-sector within the KOREM 171 command[13]. Other analysis of this issue in September 1999 would appear to be flawed due to limitations and timing of source material, whereby a nationwide consecutive sector order could have seemed feasible[14].

The change to the sector commands reflected the post 1998 shift back to more localised operational responsibility at the established territorial formations i.e., to the KODIM and KORAMIL [*Komando Rayon Militer* - Military Sub-District Commands][15]. Another aspect of the change to sector commands is their apparent command by POLRI officers beginning as early as October 1999, where previous command was exclusively by the Indonesian Army. This has certainly been the case with operational sectors in Aceh, where at least three operational sectors have been noted in 1999-2000[16]. While this has not been so explicitly reported in Papua, the intensity and primacy of BRIMOB tasking there in 2000 (as in Aceh), as well as the increased prominence of POLRI commanders in such tasking, would support the assessed post-2000 formal POLRI command of operational sectors in Papua[17]. Of course, another possibility is that for normal operational purposes, Papua's territorial Army sector commands simply became inactive in early 2001.

While Papua has no POLRI equivalent to the KOREM level of command, the formalised POLRI authority over sectors remains unconfirmed for this study. Indeed, an inclusion of Army KOLAKOPS for Papua - *a la* Aceh April 2001[18] - could see a binary command system working with nominal POLRI authority over the sectors. The protracted civil war in the Maluku Islands is an exception to this rule, and one that proves TNI's ability to regain its supremacy in internal security. Maluku's sector commands have come under TNI control almost certainly as a result of successful lobbying efforts to have POLDA supremacy repealed there. The two sectors for Ambon and North Maluku have variously appeared as lettered or numbered - A and B, or I and II[19] - but the order of the Maluku sectors should not affect the operational zoning sequence in Papua (or in other provinces), existing as they do outside of that command link.

Despite the postponed division of Papua into three new provinces and the appointment of corresponding governors, the division into sectors by

KOREM has apparently remained largely unchanged by the pending boundaries. For example, KODIM 1710 remains subordinate to the westernmost KOREM 171 at the time of writing[20]. However, this situation may change in the event of ratification of the new provinces, or any definite consolidation of the three or four 'representative governors' working within the Provincial administration.

Special Forces

Special reconnaissance operations in Papua have undergone significant changes since appearing throughout the 1970s to the 1990s as a KOPASSUS monopoly, first under the teams *Nanggala*[21] and *Maleo*[22], and later known as the *Satgas Tribuana* formation - a term standardised from late 1996 to apply to all task units deployed to Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya[23]. The *Tribuana* title was taken from the new KOPASSUS regimental motto adopted in mid-1996 - *Tribuana Chandraca Satya Dharma* - though some sources persisted with the previous titles[24]. Reporting has confirmed *Tribuana* also in East Timor and Aceh from the time of the next KOPASSUS rotation, probably in December 1996 - January 1997[25].

Tribuana was obviously KOPASSUS' own term for the Intelligence Task Unit (*Satgasintel* - SGI)[26], while the latter term was used more in KODAM circles to indicate *Tribuana*'s official subordinate BKO/attached-in-direct-support status in relation to the KODAM formation of the area of operations (AO). Recent emphasis in reporting indicates that *Tribuana* operates officially within the KODAM formation, while support from other units would occur at a local level in exceptional circumstances. For this reason, the continual KOPASSUS commitment to Papua is included here as an 'organic' component of KODAM XVII. Further to the East Timor leaks of 1998, more recent reporting[27] supports the assessment that SGI/*Tribuana* formations in Papua draw their cadre from KOPASSUS' Group IV *Sandi Yudha* (Covert Warfare/Intelligence), based in Jakarta[28].

Probably as a result of bad publicity generated by kidnappings of activists, the orchestrated East Timor militia terror, etc, some special forces operations now appear to involve more joint service activity, albeit comprised largely of the Army red beret component. This has been seen in Maluku operations with the *Satgasintel* (SGI) or *Pasgab* (Joint Service Battalion) of Marines (probably PASKAL divers), Air Force Special Forces (PASKHASAU) and KOPASSUS personnel, under command of a KOPASSUS Major[29]. During the late September disembarkation of 713 Inf Bn with special forces troops, the actual term 'KOPASSUS' was specifically reported as having been avoided, according to a relayed source comment[30]. This trend towards greater KOPASSUS discretion should not confuse as to their primary role of tactical intelligence and reconnaissance, especially in cooperation with *Satgas Garuda* teams near the PNG border. Such a cooperative and support function has been reported since at least 1996, though KOPASSUS' previous supremacy over other branches of the Army brought about the reverse in previous times. This was seen in the tasking of infantry battalion elements as support during a hostage rescue in the late 1970s[31], and in rumoured rough-shod behaviour to bypass the territorial chain of command at the time of Prabowo's involvement in the Geselama hostage rescue operation of 1996.

One expansion of special forces certain to affect operations in Papua is the creation of KOSTRAD's *Tontaikam* (*Pleton Pengintai Keamanan* – literally, Security Reconaissance Platoon)[32]. Trained by KOPASSUS Group IV, *Tontaikam* draw from KOSTRAD line battalions, and probably also some cadre personnel from KOPASSUS NCOs taken from KOPASSUS' long-planned reduction of some 700 to 2,000 troops[33]. It is uncertain whether *Tontaikam* attach to *Satgas Tribuana* as units in direct support, or deploy as part of KOSTRAD battalion elements. If the latter case applies, *Tontaikam* would certainly operate in close liaison and coordination with local *Tribuana* posts.

Table 1: KOPASSUS' *Satgas Tribuana* Detachments to Counter-Insurgencies

Area of Operations	Dec 96-97	97-98	Dec 98-99	Jan 00 >
Aceh	*Tribuana I*	*Tribuana IV*	*Tribuana VII*	*Tribuana XI?*
East Timor	*Tribuana II*	*Tribuana V*	*Tribuana VIII*	N/A
Irian/Papua	*Tribuana III*	*Tribuana VI*	*Tribuana IX*	*Tribuana X*

KOSTRAD Battalions and Satgas Garuda Pursuit Companies

Since early 2000, TNI troop movements throughout Indonesia have been characterised by an intensity not seen for at least most of the 1990s, even when considering that period's high concentration of troops in the East Timor AO. The different operational tempo was hinted in comments from then Commander KOSTRAD LTGEN Djadja Suparman in February 2000, who urged KOSTRAD units to increase their preparedness for deployment at a moment's notice to meet various threats to national sovereignty[34]. In more recent practice, several battalions (both KOSTRAD and organic KODAM) have been deployed in two AOs at once, with company sub-units sent separately to one AO while the battalion's main body has been tasked elsewhere. Still other units have deployed with their full battalion complement. Observers have generally failed to heed this aspect of current operations when reporting troop movements, but its effect is critical in trying to determining force strengths.

A further source of potential confusion in this regard is the existence of a non-organic composite force of company-strength units from several battalions - *Satgas Garuda* (Garuda Task Unit). Reports of intense KOSTRAD force build-up in Papua appear to be quite exaggerated, if not an outcome of subtle but persistent obfuscation of facts[35]. An additional factor is the competing demands for forces in areas hitherto not subject to high concentrations of troops - i.e., Maluku and the Eastern Lesser Sundas (NTT), regardless of the 1999 release of East Timor from such commitments. The avowed 'build-up' in Papua was betrayed by the preceding deployments of the non-organic task unit *Satgas Garuda* and two of its components, 515 Inf Bn and 330 Abn Inf Bn (both KOSTRAD), whose presence in Papua was noted as early as August 1998, when it was wrongly announced that these KOSTRAD Battalion company elements had been withdrawn to their bases in Java[36]. However, by June 1999, 515 Inf Bn appeared in Jayapura, as part of *Satgas Garuda,* in a disciplinary hearing of one of its soldiers[37]. In March and April 2000, 515 Inf Bn was again noted, only this time en route Jayapura for deployment[38]. Considerations of unit administration (including troop morale), budgetary limitations and the observed tour limit of between six and 13 months (in 515's case nine months), all require that a company not be kept in the field for twice the time of its parent unit. Hence, 515 Inf Bn has not deployed to Papua as a battalion, at least since early 1998. The above normal unit considerations are all the more compelling in the case of the relatively expensive KOSTRAD battalions. For the reasons outlined above, one is compelled to read further into an otherwise simple report stating that 515 Inf Bn was to replace 433 Abn Inf Bn, as quoted from the late KODAM Commander MAJGEN Tonny Rompis[39].

Similarly anomalous reporting has occurred in the case of 433 Abn Inf Bn elements, also in Jayapura Regency, but initially as a battalion sub-unit - i.e., company strength element of *Satgas Garuda*. The 'battalion' was reported as deployed to Jayapura Regency in May 1999[40], in a parachute drop on 23 November 2000[41], and later during a pursuit operation on 10 December 2000[42]. But in late November 2000, 433 Abn Inf Bn was reportedly to be replaced in Jayapura Regency by 515 Inf Bn[43], yet somehow almost simultaneously deployed there on 30 November after transport from its base at Ujungpandang, South Sulawesi[44] and later noted as based in Jayapura on 07 February 2001[45]. The situation may be best explained by other reporting

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at the time stating that *Parasut Garuda*, as well as 433 Abn Inf Bn had arrived together in Jayapura[46]. As with 515 Inf Bn deployment to the same area of Jayapura Regency, the maintained presence of the non-organic *Satgas Garuda* helps to complete an operations map jigsaw which would otherwise, in a total count, have KOSTRAD committing so much of its expensive mobile reserves to an already quite congested AO. Additionally, the transport vessel used - *KRI Teluk Langsa* (unlike 515's use of *KRI Teluk Lampung* in March 2000) - could accommodate a battalion as it had on previous troop rotations[47].

The key to grasping actual troop strengths lies in accepting the flexible nature of TNI non-organic deployments to counter-insurgency operations. Although an entire battalion may have deployed to one particular area, one company or more may be deployed separately as a pursuit company within that area and consequently, in accordance with a different deployment/ withdrawal schedule to the rest of the battalion.

The distinction of unit level is important in clearing up a common misinterpretation where whole battalions are reportedly deployed when, in fact, these are 'hunter' or 'pursuit' company sub-units. This use by a non-organic *Satgas* of such KOSTRAD battalion sub-units (companies) is not a recent development, having been reported as early as 1996 in Irian Jaya as part of *Satgas Rajawali*[48], as also in East Timor in 1997-98[49]. Again in East Timor, in mid-1999, *Satgas Rajawali* revealed itself as merely the previous title for *Satgas Garuda* with the reported withdrawal of an Air Force Special Troops (PASKHASAU) 'pursuit company'[50], just as in Papua at the same time 515 Inf Bn was reported as a *Garuda* element, where previous reporting from 1996 also referred to it as part of *Satgas Rajawali*[51]. The previous PASKHASAU deployment in East Timor explains their late 2000 subordination in Papua. A mid-1999 report added the final piece in this puzzle, revealing the nature of this subordination: *Garuda* comprising two battalion-strength *Rajawali* formations - i.e., I and II in 1997-8, and III and IV in 1998-9.

While the term *Satgas Rajawali* has continued on in Aceh since 2000, it is possibly no longer used at all in Papua since the application of POLRI's KODALOPS coordination and, on the PNG border, territorial KODIM command of non-organic battalion and pursuit company elements.

Table 2: Pursuit Company Task Units Deployed to Irian Jaya/Papua

1996-1997	Satgas Rajawali I
Oct 1996-1998	Satgas Rajawali II
Aug 98-Oct 99	Satgas Rajawali III
Oct 98- Jun 99	Satgas Rajawali IV
Aug 98-2000	Satgas Garuda
2000-2001	Satgas Garuda?/ Pamtas?

Table 3: Possible Composition *Satgas Garuda* in Papua Province, Dec 2000

UnitSize Size	Unit Origin	Designation	Area Deployed	Date Infil
Coy	515 Inf Bn	*Garuda I?*	Jayapura	23 Nov 00?
Coy	712 Inf Bn	*Garuda II?*	Wamena	16 Oct 00
Coy	433 Abn Inf Bn	*Parasut Garuda III*	Jayapura	23 Nov 00
Coy	323 Inf Bn?	*Garuda IV?*	Merauke	23 Nov 00
Coy	713 Inf Bn	*Garuda V?*	Merauke	28 Sep 00
Coy	411 Inf Bn	*Garuda VI?*	Jayapura	10 Aug 00
Coy	431 Abn Inf Bn	*Parasut Garuda VII*	Merauke	23 Nov 00
Coy	413/ PASKHAS?	*Garuda VIII?*	Jayapura?	10 Aug 00?
Coy	330 Abn Inf Bn	*Parasut Garuda IX*	Wamena	23 Nov 00

Note that the *Garuda* numbering in Papua changed from a task force sequence to one of separate company-level *Garuda* sub-units; for example, *Garuda I* as a pursuit company deployed in Jayapura Regency under the command of a Major - not a feasible seniority for an entire brigade-sized task force[52]. This is distinct from *Satgas Garuda I* noted in East Timor in 1998-9, for example, where the *Garuda* numbering sequence was continued up until the final withdrawal of counter-insurgent forces there.

POLRI Deployment

In addition to routine police duties, POLRI commands draw upon various branch personnel as a security requirement in response to unrest. The *ad hoc* creation of *Pasukan anti-Huru Hara* (PHH - 'Riot-Control Force') units is in theory a process familiar to policing throughout the world, where normal duties are set aside for police to be equipped and marshalled into barricade formations at demonstrations or riots, or in precautionary anticipation of the same. The Indonesian application of this contingency measure in Papua, as elsewhere, has often seen PHH forces actively involved as fully-armed troops in deterrence, confrontation or pursuit of separatist demonstrators[53].

POLRI's single largest branch commitment in Papua is from its BRIMOB forces. For practical purposes, BRIMOB must be understood as an *infantry* force, a fact reflected in its organisation, training, equipment, and even tactical symbol used in security forces' operational mapping[54]. Besides the local formations based in Papua under direct POLDA command, BRIMOB presence by late 2000 included several units (companies and battalions) from Jakarta, East Kalimantan and East and Central Java. Unlike the much-publicised KOSTRAD airborne battalions' mission, these forces did not deploy in any conspicuous 'build-up', but as a rotation of security forces already committed to the Province.

While the BRIMOB increase in Papua has been steady elsewhere, POLRI has devoted particular energy to the Timika-Tembagapura area. As part of the special Security Task Force there, Freeport's operations saw a commitment of two BRIMOB companies in 1997[55] increased to a full battalion[56]. The area also maintains permanent housing facilities for families of a much smaller proportion of BRIMOB personnel at approximately company strength[57].

Navy & Air Force

At the time of writing, Indonesia's naval commitment in Papua comprised a command facility, or Main Naval Base V (LANTAMAL V), at Jayapura, and five subordinate naval bases (LANAL) at Sorong, Manokwari, Biak, Timika and Merauke[58]. LANTAMAL V also supervises the activity of three LANAL facilities in the Maluku provinces. The fleet formation operating in Papua's waters is the Eastern Fleet Command based in Surabaya.

Air Force bases are located at Sentani in Jayapura, Biak and Merauke. At least 15 other communication centres operate airfields regularly used by the Air Force's and the other services' aircraft. As with aircraft owned by the other services, the Air Force detaches assets to airbases in Papua for transport and supply tasks. In addition to PASKHASAU soldiers on duty in the combined-service *Satgas* composite formations, minor detachments of PASKHASAU deploy as airbase guards[59]. A flight of 11 Squadron's fighter aircraft detached from Ujungpandang to Biak to conduct special flights coinciding with repressive action in late 2000.


UNCLAS OSINT
NATIONAL AIR DEFENCE COMMAND (KOHANUDNAS) GCI RADAR
Intercept: High / + Low Alt.
KOSEK HQ
201 SATRAD (Radar Unit)
KOSEK Boundary >2001
KOSEK Boundary Plan >2004
C Civil Ground Control Radar
Palau Is. (US)
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
Spratly Is.
PNG
AUSTRALIA
KOSEK I
KOSEK III
KOSEK IV
HQ KOHANUDNAS
Halim (Jakarta)
Sabang
209
204
Lhokseumawe
Medan
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Sibolga
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Dumai
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Tj Pinang
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Ranai
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Tarakan
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Balikpapan
Ujungpandang
Kendari
Kuandang
Manado
Morotai
Sorong
Biak
Jayapura
Timika
Merauke
Saumlaki
Ambon
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Buraen
Denpasar
Ngliyep
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Christmas Is. (Aust)
Radar: 2 X TRS-2215
12 X TRS-2230
6? X AR-325
* Radar lobes estimates only based on range & terrain
Civil radar lobes not shown
SCALE
KM 200 400 600 800 1000
©Matt Davies

Figure 1. Indonesian Ground Force Deployments

4. Planned Expansion of Bases & Permanent Deployments

BRIMOB: A Papua-based POLRI Infantry Regiment

Focus on the Indonesian Army's numerical and political dominance could distract the observer from a pending expansion of Papua's BRIMOB forces. BRIMOB has steadily expanded since 1995 from a total of 47 companies[1], to 49 in 1996, and 56 by the end of that year[2], including a prioritised increase for East Java[3]. Counting HQ and other support and administrative staff, that phase represented an increase from approximately 7,000 to 8,000 personnel in one year. By early 2000, the trend to expand continued with the Ujungpandang-based BRIMOB unit forming the 4th Regiment and making the 5th in Medan. The ongoing nationwide consolidation of regiment, battalion and battalion-equivalent formations pointed to BRIMOB strength of around 13,000 personnel after a five-year restructure and development - nearly double BRIMOB's size in 1995.

Included in the development for 2000 was a plan for regiments in Kalimantan and Papua[4]. It is likely that Papua's SATBRIMOBDA (Provincial BRIMOB Unit) was in a transition phase by mid-2000, as elements still identified from the 3rd BRIMOB Regiment in Jakarta operated in Jayapura Regency in late 2000[5]. Reports of 2,000 additional BRIMOB[6] ought not be taken at face value, however, as many would include rotations of units, while others likely comprised the cadre for the new 6th or 7th Regiment.

Papua's prospective BRIMOB Regiment was not in evidence as an *official* entity by September 2000, when the less definite structure of SATBRIMOBDA remained as the official organic BRIMOB commitment in Papua[7]. For operational purposes, troops of the 3rd Regiment would provide the most suitable cadre for Papua's own BRIMOB Regiment. Certainly, since the withdrawal from East Timor, POLRI has had more forces available for commitment to Papua - 36 BRIMOB companies were in East Timor in late 1999[8] - and it is most likely that these troops have accommodated restructuring elsewhere. Of course, the planned regiment-sized formation amounts to an optimal 'wish list' request in order to extract at least some greater permanent BRIMOB presence, but a force augmentation is likely to proceed to at least two Papua-based BRIMOB battalions.

As with the employment of Papua's territorial infantry battalions, local loyalties appear to be a deciding factor in the employment of POLDA Papua's BRIMOB troops at certain critical times. In mid-2000, a local BRIMOB Company at Fakfak deployed to North Maluku was replaced by a BRIMOB Company from East Kalimantan for the immediate conduct of repressive action[9]. This may be best explained by the paramilitary gang influx from

Maluku and Sulawesi at that time. Ethnic Papuan BRIMOB troops, and colleagues including those with local ties, would be a liability if kept in situ while introduced thugs began to hegemonise the lower strata of society in Fakfak, especially if new extortionist tactics challenged the pre-existing order.

The augmented budgetary priority for BRIMOB was seen in material acquisition as well as personnel increases. New weapons for BRIMOB in the form of AK-101 and 102 series of assault rifles were provided to frontline BRIMOB troops in Aceh, Maluku and Papua[10]. The despatch of the new weapons to deployed units seems to have been the cause for some political mischief-making and disinformation used by MPR speaker Akbar Tanjung, who sounded an alarm at that time about '12,000 guns smuggled into Irian'[11].

Marine Corps Force and Major Naval Base for Sorong

Marine Corps presence in Papua was set for an increase on a permanent basis with a plan announced in mid-2000 for a base in Sorong holding approximately 3,000 personnel[12]. Gus Dur's support for a plan to divert Marine Corps stationing to Sorong reflects a rationalisation of the Corps' role in the wider TNI structure[13]. Restructuring for the Marine Corps to the year 2004 was reported to involve the creation of two near-division-sized 'Marine Forces' (*Pasmar*) based at Surabaya and Lampung, with an Independent Marine Brigade at Jakarta[14]. The first move appeared as a Marine battalion deployment to Papua[15], but this was most probably to facilitate the transfer of assets from Jayapura to Sorong, as well as provide the standard Marine battalion base protection. A further third *Pasmar* at Sorong does not appear to have obtained official and budgetary support at the time of writing[16].

Another indicator of the increased Marine presence was the appointment of a Marine Corps officer to command LANTAMAL V at Jayapura[17]. These positions are normally held by fleet officers, but a Marine would be best suited to supervise the initial construction of new Marine force facilities as a matter of the greatest priority amongst his responsibilities. Emphasis on Navy presence was enhanced by the conduct of a major fleet exercise - *Dalla 2000* - in which 37 vessels began patrol of Papua's waters 2000[18]. The brief schedule for the exercise pointed to the simultaneous and subsequent employment of vessels to assist in the transfer of base facilities.

A major naval base at Sorong would make sense both for logistical and security reasons. The location of LANTAMAL V at Jayapura was far too remote as a base responsible for all of Papua as well as Maluku. Logistically, the management of personnel, supplies and repairs at Sorong would be faster and cheaper, given its centralised position. Perhaps more importantly for the Indonesian Government, the vital asset of oil production in Sorong compelled a greater armed presence than was provided, and Marine troops based in Sorong would be more available for rapid intervention in Maluku or elsewhere in Papua. However, Gus Dur's emphasis on Sorong as one of three Marine bases nationwide was probably little more than hyperbolic and mischievous banter in his competitive dealings with the dominant TNI service - the Army. Any more than one Marine battalion in Sorong would create logistical problems all its own. Once again, the proposed stationing of 3,000 personnel in Sorong[19] may have been part of a Marine Corps planners' 'wish list' in order to lever the maximum funding for the project.

Plan for Papua-based Ground-to-Air Surveillance

While attention focused on security force activities conducted at fairly short notice in late 2000 on the ground, Papua assumed prominence also in the Indonesian Air Force's long-term national planning. The country's easternmost airspace had been hitherto sidelined in the Indonesian Air Force's early warning template until the National Air Defence Command (KOHANUDNAS) restructure plan was first made known in March 2000[20]. The plan involved the addition of an Air Defence Sector Command - KOSEK IV - to be headquartered in Biak[21] no later than 2004[22]. Later reporting may have cast some doubt on the overall plan for a new major airbase there[23], but the radar site construction was already underway by late 2000[24].

The establishment of KOSEK IV has already been pre-empted by the 1999 deployment of Radar Unit 251 (*Satrad* 251) from its previous base in Madiun, East Java, to Buraen, West Timor[25]. This new radar site was to come under KOSEK IV by the end of FY2000-2001[26], hence delineating the approximate boundaries for KOSEK IV. *Satrad* 251 attracted attention amid a local controversy over the appropriation of land for the Unit's new radar site[27], and claims of RAAF overflights of Indonesian airspace prior to the final withdrawal of TNI forces from East Timor[28]. As in the case of the Navy's major fleet exercise in Papua's waters, the Air Force combined the development plan with the transfer of a flight of Hawk fighters to Biak (later withdrawn upon diplomatic pressure) and the conduct of low-altitude A-4 Skyhawk sorties over population centres and at the PNG border from September 2000.

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Despite the anti-Australian - even chauvinistic - insinuations over the reason for KOSEK IV's creation, the Indonesian Government and KOHANUDNAS may have been motivated by wider regional defence considerations. As a backup early warning system for Australia, the revised KOHANUDNAS zoning appears to provide a layer of ground-based tripwires to set off aerial incursions headed for Australia's nearest Asian approach (see Figure 2). At least as early as 1997, Indonesia's strategically important Natuna Islands saw active Australian involvement in defence contingency plans, including for the deployment of radar installations[29]. Despite rhetoric and posturing around the late-1999 deployment to East Timor and the cancellation of the Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement, the KOSEK IV plan may actually comprise an undeclared continuation of regional security cooperation between the two states.

Public statements have indicated the likely siting of most of KOSEK IV's radar units to Papua[30], in addition to subordinating *Satrad* 251, which previously re-located from Madiun. The emphasis on Papua in this context appears to have been a deliberate exaggeration, albeit consistent with the intense publicity of concurrent security force activities, and other force development planning, around the Province. For practical considerations, however, the most favourable extra KOSEK IV radar deployment should see two sites in Papua - Biak and Sorong. Another is likely at the ideal northern approach to North Maluku's Halmahera Island. The remaining significant gap would be best covered from Saumlaki on the approach to Darwin. Although Timika may yet see a GCI radar unit deployed there too, this is likely to be last on the deployment priorities for Air Force radar units, if at all. The mobility of the AR-325 Plessey GCI radar allows for at least one deployable system for each KOSEK. It is most likely that KOSEK IV will retain one reserve GCI unit for contingency deployment to Timika.

Civilian-operated air traffic control radar are integrated within the KOHANUDNAS surveillance net via a system of Military and Civil Coordination Centres (MCC)[31]. Bearing in mind the expense of a single GCI radar unit at over US$ 30 million, it would be unlikely that a total of eight new radar units would be established for KOSEK IV to the year 2004, as has been cited[32]. The more likely development would involve integration of existing and upgraded airport radar into a Biak-based MCC, while four or five actual radar units deployed to cover the broadest surveillance gaps. Due to ongoing fiscal constraints and competing demands from the other security force services, the announced plan for new radar deployment is probably an exaggerated wish list in order to achieve a more realistic, but nonetheless advantageous, budgetary outcome for the future.

As a result of the radar defence plan in the new KOSEK IV, PASKHASAU is also planned to increase its presence of troops based in Papua. Upon the complete upgrade of the Biak airbase and the employment of the GCI radar facility there, a squadron (battalion equivalent) of PASKHASAU troops is to be based as permanent protection[33]. It is unconfirmed at the time of writing how the new squadron is to be numbered after expanding from Biak's 'F' Flight[34], or whether flights are to be detached to the other airbases in Papua, though a concentration solely at Biak would be unlikely.

Figure 2. Assessed GCI Radar Deployment & Planned KOSEK Addition[35]


UNCLAS OSINT
PAPUA PROVINCE
TNI-POLRI DEPLOYMENTS
Dec 00 - Feb 01*
5138? SMG 22 AUG 00
5111? MLG 22 AUG 00
752
24 AUG 00
SOLO Gegana
SBY 21 AUG 00
D 752
413? KOSTRAD 10 AUG 00?
173
KODIM 1708 Biak Numfor
C 753
XVII Trikora
POLDA PAPUA
PAPUA
SGD Garuda
VII? PAPUA
751
GRUP IV Tribuana
GRUP I
?
10 3 JKT
KODIM 1704 Sorong
Manokwari KODIM 1703
SEKTOR B?
753
Yapen Waropen KODIM 1709
Jayapura
KODIM 1701
171
E. Kal.
KODIM 1706
Fakfak
SEKTOR A?
KODIM 1705 Nabire
Paniai KODIM 1711?
KODIM 1712? Puncak Jaya
KODIM 1702
PASKHAS NOV 00?
SENTANI AB JPR?
413 KOSTRAD 10 AUG 00
PROB IN KOREM 171
JKT
KODIM 1710
Mimika
172
Jayawijaya
SATGAS PAM FIC
JKT
503 KOSTRAD 10 AUG 00
B 751
?
PAPUA 09 OCT 00
C 751
SEKTOR C
Merauke
KODIM 1707
411 KOSTRAD
515 KOSTRAD 23 NOV 00
433 KOSTRAD 30 NOV 00 (1)
514? KOSTRAD?
713 28 SEP 00
PNG
330 KOSTRAD 23 NOV 00
C 712 Spt? (2)
323? KOSTRAD 23 NOV 00
431 KOSTRAD 30 NOV 00 (1)
Notes:
KODAM Military Area Comd
KOREM Military Provincial Comd
BRIMOB POLRI Mobile Brigade
(1) EXFIL POSS Late FEB 01
(2) EXFIL POSS DELAY TO FEB 01
Dates indicate units' infil to AO
Dates indicate first noted in AO for period
*Some battalions using 1 X Coy 'step-up' usually 5 mths ahead of main body
*Recent Tours between 3-12 mths (see text)
Broken-line sector borders pending creation of 3 new provinces
UNCLAS OSINT
©Matt Davies

Entrenched State Presence and Challenge to Army Dominance

There were definite security factors driving the planned shift of Navy and Air Force HQ facilities, besides the obvious logistical and operational considerations. OPM strength has long been identified in the relative sanctuary of the PNG border areas, in proximity to the command and control hub of Jayapura. In comparison to other parts of the Province, OPM movements have been quite frequently reported between the border and the capital. By moving the Navy command centre, and the added Air Force command and facilities, away from Jayapura, it is likely that TNI planners perceived both a reduced risk and a saving in resources allocated to protecting the existing separate TNI HQ facilities in the Jayapura area.

From the perspective of intra-government dynamics in Jakarta, The long-term objective of base developments in Papua is the transfer of a certain amount of power, prestige and public image from the Army to the other services of Indonesia's security forces. In this sense, the renewed pressure on Indonesian sovereignty in the Province has provided an opportunity for continued reform of that very controversial element of Indonesia's government sector - the Army. From the perspective of the police, sailors and airmen in units preparing for Papua, this policy change amounts to an unforeseen opportunity to partake in what has traditionally been an Army monopoly on security operations in remote areas. In terms of career and financial benefits, an assignment or deployment to Papua would likely be pursued with vigour by the respective service chiefs.

At the same time, these plans for POLRI, Navy and Air Force expansion should also be seen as a spur to the Army's earnest efforts to protect its long-established interests. Despite a minority of Army officers concurring with calls for fundamental reform, the most influential cliques among senior Army ranks would have regarded the shift of favour to the other services as a challenge to be met with creative, strenuous and even ruthless competition.

5. Loyalist Paramilitary Forces

Reports of intensified loyalist militia activity in Papua followed on from the unprecedented province-wide birth and expansion of separatist forces. Known as *Satgas Papua,* this financed and numerically strong force grew from 1999 into an organisation claiming up to 20,000 members[1]. That this force was able to develop and display its presence so openly for almost two years can best be attributed to a well-planned counter-intelligence operation involving the parallel expansion of loyalist paramilitary forces. The sophisticated operation, begun while East Timor endured Indonesia's preparations for an independence ballot, ensured that the hitherto clandestine OPM support base could be identified and targeted for precise repressive action.

To trace the rise of Papua's loyalist militia from the year 2000, the observer must examine a series of inter-related developments. Just as no insurgency is formed as a generic model applicable to any region in the world, so too has the counter-insurgency in Papua formed itself in response to geographic and demographic conditions unique to the province. This loyalist militia response contains several inter-related factors that have worked in a mostly simultaneous manner.

Origins and Trends of Militarised Civilians/Militia in Papua

As also observed from operations in East Timor[2] and Aceh[3], the TNI in Papua has enlisted operational auxiliaries (*Tenaga Bantuan Operasi,* TBO) since at least the 1970s. TBO were noted in 1996 on patrols, probably in the capacity of scouts and civil liaison, with 732 Inf Bn (non-organic) troops[4], and in 1998 in a more general auxiliary function[5]. A specialist team of indigenous scouts - *Kasuari* (Cassowary) - worked well forward of normal patrols during the 1996 Timika hostage operation[6], though it appears uncertain whether the force officially comprised regular soldiers, selected TBO auxiliaries, other para-military elements, or a mixture of any or all such elements[7].

The 'militia approach' in Papua is much more complex than that which appeared in East Timor from late 1998. The major distinction is to be found in a greater concentration of effort to imitate, infiltrate, and compromise or 'turn', existing separatist followers in Papua, whereas the later phase of the East Timor counter-insurgency was already well beyond any serious attempt at that prospect. A closer contemporary comparison is with Aceh, where a large 'phoney GAM' operates to terrorise and destabilise a population largely disaffected with Jakarta's regime[8], while discrediting separatists where possible[9].

Hence, there is an emphasis in the Papua counter-insurgency on covert and 'black' operations. Obviously, indigenous participants would be preferable at least as a cadre for militia forces of this nature. An example of this approach is suggested by the creation of certain avowedly 'separatist' militia exclusively comprising former TNI and POLRI members. The availability of significant numbers of paid and/or pensioned indigenous Papuan veterans from 751, 752 and 753 battalions[10] is one obvious recourse in the creation of any loyalist paramilitary, or 'black flag' force, posing as *Satgas Papua* or affiliated separatists. Although a small number of Papuans may be working alongside the TNI and POLRI at any given time in formalised roles as TBO, *Wanra* (*Perlawanan Rakyat* - 'People's Resistance' Army auxiliaries), *Kamra* (*Keamanan Rakyat* - 'People's Security' Police auxiliaries), etc, the most critical component of militarised civilians has become the covert militia force. Traducing from Aceh's example, we may loosely call this element the 'phoney OPM'.

Besides legitimising funds for such groups, the formal recognition of an auxiliary force such as *Wanra*, for example, can become necessary for internal legal and accountability purposes. If any militia elements in Papua begin to receive specific scrutiny over anti-separatist human rights abuses after the time of this draft, it is most likely they will be described as PAMSWAKARSA (*Pengamanan Swakarsa* - 'Volunteer Security'). This term effectively dissolves any formal command and control responsibility in the government sector, giving the militia the legal status of self-starting vigilantes. In this sense, the example of 1998-9 East Timor applies very well, in that deniability must be joined to nil, or at least very blurred, official government accountability.

Indigenous TNI and POLRI Veterans

Unlike East Timor's vigilantes, whose lineage, as well as some leadership cadre and even militia force names, could be traced as far back as the 1970s and often as an officially sanctioned part of the Indonesian Army order of battle, military involvement in some of the recent loyalist Papuan vigilante groups has been less blatant, but still very apparent. The most obvious connection was in the September 1999 creation of the *Satgassus Front Nasional Papua* (FNP Special Task Unit), comprising native Papuan ex-TNI and ex-POLRI personnel[11]. Its leader, Herman Wayoi, is described as a former independence fighter against the Dutch, in an echo similar to the heritage of the East Timorese pro-Jakarta loyalist - and anti-Portuguese - militia leaders who came to prominence in 1999.

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O'Hare's research demonstrated that Papua's security forces have not developed to any serious level the formal *Bela Negara* (literally 'Defend the State') system of militia recruitment into *Wanra, Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil* - 'Civil Defence' guards) and *Kamra* elements of local defence units[12]. But in a move again closer to precedents in Aceh, the TNI's territorial commands at KOREM level instigated a *Bela Negara* program in August 2000[13], with all the emphasis on local KODIM and KORAMIL paramilitary militia activation that the term has previously come to mean[14]. Therefore, the numbers of *Bela Negara* militia members can be expected to have risen from late 2000, at least to the extent of formalised acknowledgment by the security forces when required. In this sense, it ought to be remembered that the actual raising of vigilante militias has remained a legally sanctioned activity, even after the international outcry over East Timor's 1999 turmoil[15].

Satgas Merah Putih (Red and White Task Force)

The loyalist *Satgas Merah Putih* (SMP) has not revealed a definite religious or ethnic affiliation, though these aspects are essential to understanding Papua's militia growth. Alarmist reporting indicated infiltration by *laskar* 'Mujahiddin' travelling out of Maluku, including illegal shipments of ammunition[16] and explosives[17]. This situation was deliberately enhanced by publicity in order to intimidate Papuan separatists and even to challenge OPM/TPN guerillas into more open confrontation with the security forces. As is most apparent from Timika, links to Maluku- and Sulawesi-based *laskar* would more likely connect to 'Christian' groups displaced in those areas since early 2000, providing as they would in missionised Papua a less blatantly sinister presence than would an importation of Islamist *laskar* gangsters.

However, there may be some more significant informal military connection to the Papua area in that the prominent *laskar* commander in Ambon, BrigGen (retd) Rustam Kastor, formerly functioned as KODAM *Trikora* Chief of Staff. In Jayapura, at least, the SMP action appears to have been no more than political display and provocation towards the separatist *Satgas Papua*. More likely than regular TBO-style close cooperation with TNI and POLRI is the use of the DEPDAGRI government apparatus, as in Wamena, where 'crash program' funding has been channelled into loyalist militias[18]. In a revelation similar to the compromised 'scorched earth' plan for East Timor in mid-1999[19], a classified document from DEPDAGRI, undisputed by Indonesian Government sources, located bureaucratic responsibility to that Department by specifying an underground intelligence campaign using integrationist militias throughout Papua[20].

But control and influence at senior military levels is apparent. In mid-2000, some identified as involved in the quite large payments were Interim Governor Air Vice Marshal (retd) Musiran Darmosuwito and KODAM *Trikora* Commander MAJGEN Ingkiriwang[21]. Besides enticing indigenous Papuans and long-settled transmigrants to the scheme, a ready source of recruits was the newly arrived migrants from Maluku and Sulawesi. Notably, the Timika area publicly declared a rejection of mooted influxes of Moluccan refugees, no doubt much to the benefit of the 'separatist' credibility of those enforcing such opposition there - the *Laskar Papua*[22]. This distracting publicity was probably irrelevant to the migration that had already occurred, especially from Sulawesi.

New Order-Era Gangs Compromising Separatists

But as with Aceh, Maluku and East Timor, players in the trades of the black market and underworld extortion are the most useful human resource for paramilitary terror[23]. In fact, as an administrative or coordinating base for expansion, such a resource is essential to a counter-insurgency using 'black operations' aimed at maintaining political deniability. An early 2000 increase in organised crime in Papua was one indicator of the more available 'fertile soil' for such mayhem[24]. Paramilitary activity and organised crime have become commonplace throughout Indonesia and have overtones of nationalist traditions harking back to the War of Independence[25]. The phenomenon is perhaps at its most explosive when appearing in counter-insurgencies. In Aceh, paramilitary political fronts - euphemistically termed 'youth organisations' (OKP) - represent the most direct and formal link to loyalist militia activity in the Papua counter-insurgency.

Sometimes these connections in Papua have been overt, as in publicity about the FKPPI's participation in KOPASSUS birthday festivities[26]. Since the demise of GOLKAR as the monopoly party, the FKPPI has been much more subdued in displaying its ties to the security forces, though significantly by April 2001, political developments in Jakarta allowed this FKPPI connection to surface again[27].

In a distinction between Aceh/North Sumatera and largely Christianised Papua, many official Papuan youth groups avow a Christian affiliation to affirm their members' identity. The KNPI (National Committee for Indonesian Youth), the umbrella organisation for youth groups such as the FKPPI, were subject to certain surveillance and controls by *Satgas Papua* separatists prior to the late 2000 crackdown. The detention of the KNPI Chairman and the Provincial Head of the Department of Religious Affairs while about to depart for Jakarta[28] showed that *Satgas Papua* had identified the important opposing political roles played by the Provincial youth and religious administration leaders.

The largest Indonesian youth organisation, the *Pemuda Pancasila* (PP) - some six million-strong nationwide - has been described as particularly strong in Papua[29] and Maluku. Previous evidence from Aceh once again showed a parallel with trends in the easternmost Province. A TVRI report in the year 2000 numbered PP membership in Aceh at 200,000, so the human resource was clearly plentiful. Additional to the Aceh case, but not identified as active in Papua, was the youth organisation, particularly powerful in Medan, known as the IPK (*Ikatan Pemuda Karya*) - also a GOLKAR creation. Although the covert and terroristic nature of these activities defies attempts at detail, the IPK was noted in 1999 conducting repressive action in Aceh with the direct security forces support[30]. The PP and IPK have engaged an underworld war against one another in North Sumatera since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, and access to extortionate activities in Aceh may account for the intense rivalry[31].

An overriding national context is essential for observers wishing to decode the darker forces at work in Indonesia's ongoing wars. The involvement of gangs in the Aceh counter-insurgency is a subtly expressed phenomenon that may be instructive for continual monitoring of similar developments in Papua. Evidence for such covert employment of criminals appears in euphemistic language. The term 'at play in Aceh' guardedly describes the IPK's activity in Aceh[32]. Perhaps more direct was Gus Dur's reference to the symbolic meaning when decrying the 'anti-*jilbab*' terror made against Acehnese women, which in context specified the murderous perpetrators as gang members in TNI camouflage fatigues[33]. But even such guarded subtlety has its limits, as seen in an Acehnese youth leader's allusion to the TNI and its intelligence operators as the forces answerable for those 'at play' in Aceh[34].

Although a gang war in Medan may seem unrelated to Papua's situation, the warring parties indicated a wider political rivalry that would almost inevitably affect power struggles in Papua's emerging paramilitary scene. Amid terrorist bomb attacks during the battles in North Sumatera, the alliance of Megawati's *Satgas* PDIP with the PP in Medan provided an interesting insight into the nationwide struggle for political control of the Indonesian underworld[35]. This struggle manifested itself in Papua more clearly through the divisive manipulation of Papua's separatist leadership. It is in this area that observers may best discern how the grass roots compromise of Papuan separatism has been effected.

Division, Arrest and Assassination: Separatist Leadership Targeted

The much-publicised separatist sympathies of PP leader Yorrys Raweyai are perhaps the most cynical aspect of the Indonesian counter-insurgency in Papua. As early as July 1998, Yorrys reconstructed his image in public meetings to express concern for human rights in Papua[36]. But such rebellious sentiment was never heard from Yorrys, or any of his charges, during his New Order tenure as the PP's deputy chief. In 1996, for example, the PP along with the FKPPI even went as far as obstructing the transport to Jayapura of Papuan separatist Dr Wainggai's corpse, whose death in custody could not even receive a proper autopsy[37]. Even by 1999, *after* his pro-independence pronouncements, Yorrys could sign a declaration fully supporting the maintenance of Indonesia's unitary state[38].

Bringing with him the force of numbers of Papua's PP members, Yorrys' involvement in the Papuan independence cause was at once an infiltration into the separatist leadership as well as its rank-and-file. In this enterprise the veteran GOLKAR stalwart brazenly exploited the absence of any adequate provincial OPM communications network that would otherwise counter the 'honey trap' strategy. Providing the funds for *Satgas Papua* was a certain means of drawing the separatist moths to the light of intelligence scrutiny[39]. Yorrys oversaw, encouraged[40] and signed a declaration at former GOLKAR representative Theys Eluay's ascension to the title 'Leader of the West Papuan People' calling for Province-wide independence flag-raising, recognition of Papuan independence and the removal of Indonesian security forces[41]. Less than a year later, Yorrys' word - even in writing - proved to be worthless to many hapless OPM and followers of the new *Satgas Papua*, as he publicly renounced all aspirations for independence[42].

Regardless of Yorrys' reputation as a rogue, this was not done in isolation of the political establishment. As with Yorrys' past connection to New Order political 'dirty tricks', appointed for this crucial period covering the year 2000 was a Papua Chief of DEPDAGRI's intelligence arm - the Socio-Political Directorate - with similar connections and experience. Like Yorrys, the 1998 DEPDAGRI appointee Col (retd) Wempi Wolla was also involved in the dismemberment of Megawati's PDI in 1996[43]. Of at least equal significance was former Governor Freddy Numberi's tenure, while Governor, as the PP's Provincial Advisory Chairman. Freddy even officiated at the appointment of Timika PP leader Clemens Tinal[44], and as is more widely known, later became the Minister for the Efficiency of State Apparatus.

Papua's old guard pro-independence leadership was a major target during the process of 'socialising autonomy' in the Province. The appointment of veteran independence agitator Tom Beanal as a deputy of the separatist Papuan Presidium - then becoming a Freeport commissioner[45] - was certainly a wily political wedge driven into the separatist movement both Province-wide and, most especially, in the Timika area. Theys' and Yorrys' support for Tom Beanal's agitation of Freeport in the US[46] indicated that Tom Beanal's co-opting formed an essential part of the 'wedge' strategy. Timed along with this development was the violent death of a veteran OPM commander was an early indicator of the Indonesian security forces increased use of 'black flag' operations in its counter-insurgency.

Violent executive action almost certainly complemented these political manoeuvres. It appears that nobody has been convicted of the brutal murder of the OPM's Hans Bomai in April 2000 in the PNG border town of Vanimo[47]. Though not officially admitted, and as yet not traced to Army or POLRI direction, the timing and unclear motive for the fatal attack on that reputedly hardline element of the OPM's senior leadership smacks of assassination.

The arrest in January 2001 of Mathias Wenda and a dozen of his lieutenants by PNG security forces[48] reflected a continuation of the focus against OPM leadership over the border. Obviously, this coup was achieved via diplomatic channels within the cooperative spirit, if not letter, of the bilateral agreement enabling the combined Indonesian-PNG *Lukautim Perbatasan* operation.

An Assignment for 'Christian Mujahidin'

While gangs and 'deserters' can be discerned as the covert terror force at work in Aceh, another corroborating factor revealing Papua's paramilitary scene was the strong nationalist overtones of the bizarre conflict in neighbouring Maluku[49]. Despite the Islamist advertising in the Maluku campaign waged in earnest from outside of Maluku beginning around mid-1999, the agenda of *laskar* leader retired Brigadier Rustam Kastor faked anti-separatism as an equally important publicity priority[50].

The background to this Maluku connection became apparent in reports of an influx of people from the civil war in Maluku, including former Maluku-based fighters, with accounts of storage of explosives and improvised weapons[51]. The national shipping line PELNI transported thousands from Maluku to Papua free of charge[52], ostensibly to return ethnic Papuans from the strife-torn area. As can be seen from the Maluku case itself, with time the TNI and POLRI attitude to the *laskar* forces in Maluku became even less than equivocal, as transport home to metropolitan Java was offered them aboard Navy troop carriers[53].

Special Covert Treatment - Timika and Freeport

The loyalist paramilitaries in Timika deserve separate mention here, as they have displayed a mixture of tactics common to the Islamist *laskar* militias first seen in numbers in Jakarta in late 1998. Even the title of the avowedly pro-independence Timika-based *Satgas* - *'Laskar Papua'* - indicates their actual nationalism, their national-level political connections, and the true context of their creation[54]. These *laskar* organisations were characterised by a pre-occupation with staging pogrom-style anti-alcohol and anti-vice demonstrations, as occurred concurrently in metropolitan Java and elsewhere in Indonesia at the hands of the Islamist *laskar*[55]. Examples of the groups active in Mimika Regency for these campaigns include: the *Panel Dewan Papua Kabupaten Mimika* (PDPKM); *Ibu-ibu Hak Asasi Manusia Antikekerasan* (Hamak); and the *Laskar Papua* itself[56].

Although the local press sources were hardly explicit in describing the true purpose of Decki's *laskar* and affiliated groups in Mimika Regency, certain reporting made obvious the security forces' different regard, in practice, for the separatist *Satgas Papua* and Decki's *laskar* in the matter of volunteer security functions. While the *Satgas Papua* took control of Wamena Airport security in Jayawijaya Regency, *Timika Pos* reported as prime significance the fact that 'police and security guards on duty there could not do anything'[57]. Yet the plan by Decki's *Laskar Papua* to instigate security watches at Timika Air terminal was reported as though it was a natural and proper development - i.e., no security force concerns appeared to be an issue with regards Decki's group[58].

The 'black' nature of Decki's *laskar* became apparent when the Mimika Regent repeatedly referred to the group as the local *Satgas Papua*[59], when they had hitherto been identified as *Laskar Papua* - the pro-independence *Satgas Papua* had not given any such confusion about its identity. The most striking distinction between Decki's *Satgas Laskar* and the *Satgas Papua* is the former's links to Sulawesi[60], the area where Maluku's avowedly inter-religious mayhem first spilled over provincial boundaries.

East Timor Repeated?

Indonesia's security forces know well that insurgencies can only succeed in the political arena of international opinion. For this reason, nationalist repressive action, including terror, has been exercised as much as possible through civilian proxies in order to preserve some deniability on the international political stage. Consequently, actions and decisions for operations of such a nature are as covert and clandestine as possible. The very open - and much less deniable - terror of 1998-9 East Timor was itself a publicity campaign for consumption by the other separatist provinces of Aceh and Papua[61], and should be considered an exceptionally blatant operational example in this regard.

Despite reports making sensationalist comparisons to the East Timor militias of 1998-99, the circumstances surrounding loyalist militias in Papua have indicated the following major differences:

- Likely dominance of static militias (*Hansip*, *Wanra*, etc.) by the non-indigenous - i.e., transmigrants, more numerous in Papua than in East Timor;
- Influence from the vigilantes of nearby Ambon/Maluku, less traceable to TNI/POLRI/Interior Ministry minders;
- More persistent ethnic diversity and even inter-tribal conflict in Papua, therefore easier manipulation of target populations; and
- Deliberate obfuscation of paramilitary identity via infiltration of loyalist hirelings into avowedly separatist groups.

The relatively limited militia action by late 2000 has probably been regarded as a political victory for Indonesian nationalism, as separatist overreaction to the perceived vigilante threat would have harmed their credibility on the international stage. Moreover, the public visibility of separatist leaders and followers has almost certainly caused grave vulnerability to the OPM movement. The significance of this outcome cannot be over-estimated given the importance of international activism in assisting East Timorese independence.

It is assessed preparations in this area will be far more advanced from the time of this draft (mid-2001) to 01 December 2001 - the 40th anniversary of West Papua's Declaration of Independence. As can be seen from reports described above, by late 2000, loyalist militia strongholds had established themselves at Fakfak, Sorong and Nabire[62], in addition to predictable advanced preparations around Jayapura and Timika. By the time of the projected division of Papua into three provinces by around 2004-2009[63], it is difficult to conceive how the Indonesian State's resources could have been used for a more holistic and effective covert counter-insurgency effort in the province. As a measure of intensified anti-separatist action, this covert and clandestine counter-insurgency was a more accurate indication than the more highly publicised, though perhaps equally misunderstood, troop build-up.

6. Conclusions

TNI/POLRI Deployments and Activity in their Political Context

The timing of the announcement of increased non-organic deployments is an essential issue for consideration, coinciding as it does with strenuous efforts to impeach President Wahid. Former Commander KOSTRAD LtGen Agus Wirahadikusuma's mid-2000 criticism of the security forces' remarkable delays in responding to the separatist campaign. It should hardly surprise that LtGen Agus was sacked after his brief tenure as Commander KOSTRAD, probably because of his expose of KOSTRAD's clandestine budgets and proposal to eliminate the Army's territorial commands, but possibly also for his valid, logical and nationalist-inspired questioning of the security forces' protracted restraint with Papuan separatist demonstrations since 1999[1]. As Commander KOSTRAD, Agus' criticism was particularly revealing and challenging to some quarters given the inevitably prominent role of KOSTRAD in any late crackdown on Free Papua separatism. In this respect, President Wahid's public consent to Papuan flag displays should be read as a gesture of theatrical politics intended to pesent an image of political control - just as his 'chauvinist' statements over East Timor did upon his (much delayed) assumption of the Presidency in late 1999.

In terms of TNI/POLRI counter-insurgency, there is a valid comparison to East Timor in 1999 in the matter of delayed response to open separatist expression as the best way to achieve tactical and strategic goals:

1. To help identify opposition leadership and support bases (and potential local adversaries); and
2. To increase the political capital of the security forces as an institution by ensuring that any subsequent crackdown can exert greater pressure on the central government, and provide more compelling justification for TNI/POLRI prominence in government business, and greater protection from government control over TNI/POLRI affairs.

The second point above may best explain the very belated (late 1999) Papuan pro-independence lobbying by Yorrys Raweyai, executive leader of Indonesia's largest paramilitary youth group, the *Pemuda Pancasila* (PP). Added to the considerable evidence of PP mischief-making in the Maluku case since November 1998, this aspect of broader political manipulation of separatism in Papua should no longer be dismissed as wild 'conspiracy' theorising. The protection of New Order-era interests has correctly become an increasingly dominant motif in Indonesia's political discourse during this post-Habibie phase. It should be considered whether Indonesia's security forces react as a nationalist or Soeharto conglomerate-loyalist institution in meeting the challenge of Papuan separatism. Of course, the stakes are made yet higher if taking into account the international bargaining chips in Papua:

1. The Freeport mining complex, which has been a given in this regard since its creation; and
2. The PNG-Indonesia border, which must now receive greater attention since its extraordinary concentration of non-organic forces during the latter half of 2000.

In the context of an avowedly large KOSTRAD build-up in Papua, the reported 'black' funding of these troops is of crucial significance[2]. If any of KOSTRAD's key finance sources were duped by reports of the Papua build-up, it is possible that yet greater funding has been extracted in the interests of investment protection[3]. Read in the context of the 'militia' program, DEPDAGRI's pressure on Freeport (and simultaneously on President Wahid) by April 2001, amounted to an ultimatum for a large increase in funding for the anti-separatist effort[4].

Indirect extortion of that nature has been observed before in the country[5]. In such a case, several NGOs and prominent figures of the Papuan independence movement must take a great responsibility for a KOSTRAD 'coup' of sorts, fuelled largely by alarmist statements, verging on hyperbole, and based on unexamined information. Against the background diorama of military operations along the PNG border, the grim work of nationalist repressive violence was performed almost entirely, and most directly, by POLRI's static POLRES apparatus and often hastily deployed BRIMOB companies. It can also be said that the pressures of such publicity applied equally to POLRI commanders jeopardised by TNI ambitions to resume their command and control supremacy over Papua's internal security.

Repressive measures in Papua represent the State apparatus' reflexive action aimed at self-preservation. While the paramilitary *Merah Putih/Laskar* threat was not fully required for the late 2000 anti-separatist crackdown, and not fully prepared at any rate, the preparation for the civilian sphere is not some 'rogue' enterprise conducted outside of wider government and presidential awareness. Although these forces have been created to provide incisions into Papuan separatist organisation, they have probably developed into the more sophisticated and active Aceh-style of covert counter-insurgency as a 'phoney OPM'. This may not occur on the same scale as in Aceh, given that Papua's indigenous diversity can still be exploited to an extent not possible in Aceh. But as in Aceh, this activity forms an integral component of the State's self-preservation. As in the case of East Timor's loyalist militias, any adverse publicity or legal repercussions would likely befall operators at the 'ground level' in order to prevent compromise of decisive actors working in an accepted capacity.

Official Disinformation

In addition to certain misunderstandings about POLRI and TNI command and control, force structure and sponsorship of paramilitary elements, some reporting was further complicated by apparently deliberate disinformation from TNI sources. Unlike the case of the 1998 East Timor deployments, in which avowed 'troop withdrawals' were actually a mask for combined rotation and re-location, reports citing TNI sources on Papua actually exaggerated the actual scale of non-organic deployments, while decidedly skewing the picture of deployed non-organic unit origin towards the impression of a KOSTRAD-heavy presence.

In the year 2000, there were two obvious sources of disinformation from Army officers presumed by their NGO interlocutors to be reliable leakers of official military information. One source came from TNI HQ in Jakarta, while another was cited as 'a TNI intelligence officer sympathetic to the Papuan separatists'. The NGO reporters neglected to qualify their information from these officers, let alone make checks against any detail in the 'leaks'. Yet more interesting, nay hyperbolic, disinformation of this variety came from MajGen Tony Rompis during his brief tenure as Commander KODAM *Trikora*. In a single press briefing, Tony described '733 Bn...KOSTRAD' along with the more nonsensical 'Commander KODIM 733'![6] Given the usually reserved and circumspect bearing of TNI commanders at press briefings, perhaps Tony exceeded the role expected of him by making the disinformation demonstrably obvious.

POLRI were not exempt from such self-serving hyperbole. In fact, there may have been an element of traditional Army-Police rivalry in the intense exaggerations about force strengths. POLRI spokesman BRIGGEN Saleh cited 'three to four BRIMOB battalions in Wamena' for the October 2000 crackdown[7], but this is a most unlikely figure, and contrasts with all other reporting of BRIMOB movements to the area at that time[8]. Even an Army deployment of such magnitude and concentration to remote Wamena would stretch the Air Force's tentative friendship beyond breaking point.

Amidst exaggeration by TNI commanders, the Minister for Coordinating Socio-Political and Security Affairs LtGen (retd) Bambang Yudhoyono grossly understated the TNI and POLRI commitment of units to the Province[9]. As we have seen with the totals of locally based, externally deployed and composite *Satgas* formations, Yudhoyono's 'NI/POLRI strength' of 'four battalions in Irian Jaya' was rather ludicrous.

The Indonesian Security Forces as a 'Corporate Crassus'

Marcus Licinius Crassus was recorded as having become one of the richest, if not the richest, men in the ancient world, largely as a result of profits extorted from people whose properties were 'prone to fire'. Given the extreme delays to action against Province-wide and very open and militant West Papuan separatist expression and organisation since 1999, similar accusations against Indonesia's security forces - both the TNI and POLRI - are lent considerable substance. The Papuan separatist flames were indeed fanned by New Order paramilitary stalwart Yorrys Raweyai. In the Indonesian cinema of the world's cineplex of absurdist theatre, a more apt analogy may be to the darkly surrealist figure of *Catch 22*'s uniformed war profiteer Milo Minderbinder, who championed corporate growth by making all manner of 'deals' selling off his unit's issue equipment and even organising operations as part of a contract with the enemy.

In Papua, the Nation's strike force KOSTRAD was apparently deployed on a business export enterprise as much as an anti-separatist crackdown. A profitable international side venture was possibly also involved, through which concessions could be garnered in the realms of foreign aid and international law. Any soldiers not complicit in such corporate profiteering, or extortion, would be taking a grave professional risk, as did former Commander KOSTRAD LtGen Agus Wirahadikusumah who was sacked and then faced possible charges over alleged 'unethical behaviour'. Avowedly, his actual 'offences' amounted to no more than such matters as: failing to inform Chief of Army of the despatch of a mere KOSTRAD Combat Engineer company to Bengkulu for aid to civilian earthquake victims; publishing a book; and travelling to the US without express permission[10]. Agus took serious risks with his nonconformist outspokenness. It is not unreasonable to assess that like-minded officers without Agus' stature and pedigree could perhaps expect much worse.

Anti-Reformist Army Purge

One ought not underestimate the implications of KOSTRAD Commander Agus' removal, along with efforts to have himself and another reformist officer Saurip Kadi charged for 'breaches of TNI officers' codes of etiquette'[11]. As part of this process in October 2000, the TNI made very selective resort to an internal 'democratic' process by its commanding officers to determine support for disciplinary action against Agus and Saurip. Kusnanto Anggoro of the CSIS observed that besides warning the President against influencing TNI's affairs, this process was a means by which TNI leadership could ascertain who supported or opposed the two reformist generals[12]. In turn, the TNI's leadership was made more streamlined by basing appointments on known sympathies. Clearly, Agus and Saurip were made examples for any other potential Army dissidents.

The basic criteria concerned protecting key interests - namely extensive 'business' interests[13] open to only internal accountability. With Agus' audit of KOSTRAD's black funding effectively neutralised as an issue - given a lack of interest from the new Army Chief[14] - other examples had to be made of reformist senior officers, especially where they held key command appointments. Besides the demonstrative sidelining of Agus and Saurip, two other senior officers apparently received special treatment after the loyalty test over the two alleged transgressors of TNI norms.

The outspoken Slamet Kirbiantoro was effectively blacklisted for some four years prior to his command appointment to the prestigious KODAM Jaya in the greater Jakarta area. With the new Chief of Army to denounce Slamet as 'not suited to the job'[15], he lost the command of KODAM Jaya after only four months[16]. Slamet's preceding political difficulties are apparent in the other command appointment of only four months at Agus' old grounds - KODAM VII in Sulawesi - and this only after having no real duties for four years[17]. Clearly, MajGen Slamet Kirbiantoro was being made an example for the new year. Despite his prominent and central territorial command position in the Capital, and his proximity to Bandung, Slamet did not attend the October 2000 meeting, perhaps indicating that he knew of the ousting afoot amongst senior command ranks (only two other KODAM commanders did not attend, probably because of their intensified security activities in Maluku and Papua at the time)[18].

The trend next pointed towards a more sinister arrangement over the commands in Papua. The newly appointed Commander of KODAM XVII *Trikora*, MajGen Tony Rompis, had the rather ominous pre-condition of the short-duration appointment before taking command in Papua. His previous position as a deputy to Training Command lasted just over four months[19]. Tony's unusually intellectual disposition should at least prompt the question as to whether he counted as among the TNI's senior critical thinkers. As quoted by TVRI National News in November 2000, Army Chief Endriartono issued a thinly veiled insult to the recently deposed thinker and bookwriter Agus when addressing senior officers of the need to avoid becoming *perwira salon* (perhaps best translated to 'popinjay officers'). Significantly, Agus' replacement as KOSTRAD Commander, LTGEN Ryamizard Ryacudu, applied the same terminology in a thinly veiled barb against his predecessor[20]. Anti-progressive purges may be quite compatible with anti-intellectual rhetoric, and suggestions that reformists acted from a

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background of pampered and effete dilettantism could at least elicit support from some officers who could not possibly contemplate life (or profit) outside of the service. Endriartono's thinly veiled insult against an officer only recently his peer in rank reveals the hostility felt for any challenge to the status quo.

The aircraft accident that killed Tony Rompis also took the lives of the bulk of Papua's Provincial Leadership Council (MUSPIDA), including the newly parallel-ranked POLDA Chief. The question of sabotage should at least be asked, and not automatically dismissed, as Commander TNI did long before obtaining any investigation report[21]. Upon appointing Tony's replacement MajGen Mahidin Simbolon, Army Chief Endriartono described Mahidin as the 'most appropriate' man for the position due to Papua's 'special conditions'[22] - Tony Rompis did not have such a 'specialised' background. Of course, Mahidin's credentials are well known from his time in East Timor and as KODAM Chief of Staff at the time 'special conditions' prevailed in the 1999 East Timor independence ballot period. Tony Rompis could not boast of an East Timor KOREM command, having only occupied the then relatively benign KOREM 161 in the Eastern Lesser Sundas in 1996-7[23]. Unlike Mahidin's career progression, which even included sponsorship of a loyalist East Timor militia group as his namesake[24], Tony's indicated no specialised experience with paramilitary activity. Why then was he not appointed instead of Tony at the time of handover just two months prior to the accident?

The concurrent death of POLDA Papua adds to suspicion around the aircraft crash. As noted earlier, the assumption of POLDA Chief in Papua by Soemardi was accompanied by an increased status for POLDA Papua, placing its hierarchy on a par with KODAM *Trikora*. If sabotage *was* involved in the aircraft accident, certain TNI elements could be assured at having sent a message to those authorising greater assertion of POLRI authority in the Province. If Tony Rompis was reform-minded, and the other MUSPIDA members deemed an obstacle to efforts at returning TNI operational command of security forces there, then interested TNI parties could feel that two birds were killed with the one stone (*sekali tepuk dua lalat kena*). These questions deserve to be asked given Indonesia's highly charged political atmosphere. Besides the continual bombings at key places and times, especially in Jakarta, assassination attempts are not unknown - as with the apparent foiled attempt on Vice President Megawati in Bali in late 1999[25].

The murky detail of KOSTRAD's finances has yet to come to light. However, the fact of its existence is confirmed largely as a result of the extraordinary circumstance in which KOSTRAD's former commander also acted as a whistleblower. Due to its sheer scale, KOSTRAD's illicit funding via the YDPK foundation[26] should affect much otherwise routine analysis of its operations. It is very likely that major non-Indonesian financial interests are affected in this regard, particularly from the West, and particularly as they may concern ventures in Papua and Aceh.

Problems of security force coordination may yet persist as a result of competing institutional interests between POLRI and the TNI. Despite efforts to augment the status of Papua's POLDA Command, the Army's vested interests and habits of supremacy may well be too difficult to control via formal decrees simply delegating authority to Police commanders. In this sense, continuation of informal business activity could be a concession from Jakarta in an effort to placate the hardline Army interests in general, and especially from KOSTRAD.

The potential fissures, and actual tensions, within the Indonesian nation, with its vast ethnic and religious diversity and wealth disparities, have led to a general understanding that internal security would in practice form a routine responsibility of its security forces, whether such tasks could be confined to POLRI or not. Nonetheless, Indonesia's credit dependency and barely regulated public-sector economy pose a very serious, and longer-term, danger for the future of the security forces themselves.

Regional Implications

The planned shift of some TNI and POLRI force strength to eastern Indonesia confirms the Indonesian security forces actual priority of maintaining internal security. The other short-term consideration in the shift is a political one, whereby publicity has been used to demonstrate decisive response to the successful East Timor secession. For the longer term, the expansion of non-Army --especially Marine Corps - forces should be viewed as a rational improvement in defence capability for the archipelagic nation.

Despite the anti-Australian rhetoric and insinuation apparent in a significant portion of Indonesia's press reporting, another more serious consideration appears to have prompted the scale and nature of the response to Papua, particularly from the TNI. PNG's political and security woes no doubt receive at least as much attention in Jakarta as they do in Canberra, and repercussions from an unstable PNG could conceivably develop into a major security crisis in Papua. An Indonesian worst-case scenario could see the rise of pan-Melanesian activism affecting Indonesia's sovereignty to an unprecedented extent[27]. While OPM's moral support from such states as Vanuatu and Nauru may not have excited a major diplomatic campaign from Indonesia, the potential for a conflagration will not have been lost on the State's leaders. PNG's Bouganville quagmire has doubtless evoked the occasional nightmare in Jakarta, in which PNG's former income staple in the giant defunct Panguna mine resembled Freeport all too closely. Perhaps such concern best explains Gus Dur's chauvinistic and near bellicose public remarks defending the Air Force's right to perform flyovers by the PNG border[28].

Due to the overwhelming distractions of TNI and POLRI institutional self-interest, with its attendant shadowy political and 'business' priorities, an external power threatening Indonesian sovereignty may in future be more adept than even the country's most able 'black' operations masters at manipulating the State's internal tensions. If the TNI cannot make the transition to become a defence force focused on protecting against external threat, the arc of instability may become more sensibly known as the 'arc of vulnerability'.

The nature of counter-insurgency in Papua, as in Aceh, reveals the growing importance of 'information war'. In the longer term, the Indonesian State's ability to continue 'regime maintenance' operations will depend on an increasing minority of disaffected and disinterested participants. Although such a condition would probably not affect the integrity of Indonesia's post-Timor territorial boundaries in the immediate future, the introduction of external 'players' in separatist conflict would certainly accentuate the risk of state disintegration beyond all proportion to the effort required. Populations subjected to protracted counter-insurgency operations may be considered a major risk factor in this respect.

7. An Open Source Intelligence Basis for Exploitation

Security Force Troop Numbers

Of course, a thorough grasp of force structure is essential if the observer is to confidently calculate numbers of TNI and POLRI personnel deployed to Papua. As with the matter of near hyperbole in 2000 about increases in troop numbers, hasty press and NGO speculation has left little more than an extreme range of choice from which one can extract a mean total figure. The range from those reports can be located at between 1,400[1], 35,000[2] and even 40,000[3] troops! Unfortunately, the greatest challenge in these calculations has arisen from the bulk of deployed ground forces - i.e., organic territorial and non-organic Army and POLRI formations. If these largest components of deployed forces cannot be adequately counted together, it would be of little use to have precise confirmed figures for the remaining minority, even if such figures were to become available.

Table 4: Assessed Security Force Strengths in Papua, December 2000

Unit/Command	Composition by Sub-unit	Troop Totals
KODAM XVII	HQ, Armd, Engr, Mil Pol, Sigs & Tpt elm	900
KOREM	HQ KOREM 171-173	900
KODIM - KORAMIL	KODIMs 1701-1710 & sub-fmns	3,100+
Terr Inf Bns (Organic)	751, 752 & 753 Inf Bns	2,100
Satgas Tribuana	KOPASSUS	400
Satgas Garuda	Pursuit Coys (from KOSTRAD, Outside KODAM, Mar & PASKHAS)	1,100
Inf Bns (Non-Organic)	KOSTRAD & Mar	2,550
Other Non-Organic	KOPASSUS (Gp I Para Cdo Coy) & Engr Det (from Jkt)	350
Naval Bases	Jayapura Main Base HQ, Biak, Sorong, Timika, Merauke, Manokwari Depot	400+
Air Bases	Jayapura, Biak, Timika, Merauke	300+
Sub-Total TNI		12,200+
POLDA Papua-Irian Jaya	HQ & Spt Staff	300
POLRES-POLSEK	POLRES & POLSEK in each Regency & District levels	2,000+
BRIMOBDA Papua	2 X Organic BRIMOB Bns	1,240
BRIMOB (Non-Organic)	BRIMOB Bn from Jkt, Coy Elms from C. & E. Java & E. Kal (inc. *Gegana* elm)	1,310
Sub-Total POLRI		5,100+
Sub-Total Ground Forces		16,350+
SECURITY FORCES TOTAL		17,050+

The cornerstone for calculations must be made from the least dynamic component of deployed forces - i.e., the territorial formations of the Army and POLRI. Some previous in-depth research by Martin O'Hare[4], though itself noticeably flawed in figures given for the lower territorial echelons[5], and drafted a decade before this paper, remains instructive for later observers. While drawing on most of O'Hare's figures for territorial commands, Table 4 expands further with assessed strengths for BRIMOB, Marine, Air Force, and non-organic Army units. Comparisons with figures for East Timor-deployed units in 1998[6] reveal: BRIMOB battalion and company strengths (respectively 620-1 and 130 personnel rather than 'about 400' and an implied 100[7]); averages for POLRES and KODIM formations[8]; and Air and Naval bases.

Note that Table 4 omits figures for 'militia'. Figures for the local civilian loyalist groups were avoided because of the fissiparous nature of such organisations for the state of operations as conducted to the time of writing. Some sources claim militia numbers to range from 2,000[9] to a planned 10,000, but the category of militia type, details of employment and subordination, etc, are as yet too unclear for any useful inclusion here. Nonetheless, it is important to note that O'Hare's research correctly identified deficient preparations in the civilian militias by around 1990, inconsistent with official goals applying more to ethnically homogenous populations from East Timor and Aceh to rural Java[10]. In this respect, reports of *bela negara*[11] militia programs in 1998 and 2000 indicate the 'surge' capability recently levied on Papua's populace, especially amongst non-indigenous transmigrant youths. A total of 2,000 militia-type cadre personnel is a reasonable estimate, while thousands more recruits should be viewed as part-time commitments within 'surge'/contingency and socialisation preparations.

OSINT as Early Warning and Funnel for Collection Managers

As with any endeavour processing large quantities of detailed information, the Papuan case requires the best possible confirmation of fact. The post-Cold War explosion in open source information should impel a fundamental restructuring in the intelligence process - a cause already proselytised by many writers since the early 1990s[12]. The core and foundation of intelligence collection management can be best met by open sources as free (or mere subscription price) information unhindered by security concerns of source protection. The voluminous detail and source timing in this paper alone clearly indicates the value of open sources as a 'tip-off', or sentinel, for early warning on future developments. As a demonstration of

OSINT 'tip-off' capability, Table 5 indicates aspects of detail requiring closer examination or ongoing checks to ensure the best possible understanding of the security situation in Papua Province.

By their very nature, security operations do not usually provide instant and blatant revelation of all details to the outside observer. Historical precedents abound where disinformation has affected both open source *and* classified intelligence reporting of military operations. Assumptions that open sources are more vulnerable in this regard betray a cultural bias, which, in itself, betrays a weakness in the established Cold War methodology. The exclusivity of some secret warriors' stalwart resistance to open source information can be quite staggering. Vague misgivings about open sources' effect on information security and diplomatic sensitivities may be one obstacle, while a lack of clear and well-reasoned solutions to *actual* security risks in open source compound the problem. An altogether herculean task awaits the brave policy reformer who attempts to challenge complacent and elitist bureaucratic conservatism that betrays a post-Cold War identity crisis[13]. In a highlight to the concerns of this cultural and political problem, the apparent disingenuousness in such attitudes should appal at least those not initiated in the business[14].

OSINT and Information Security: A Need for Boundaries, Policies and Rules

Certainly, proponents of OSINT have consistently expressed a very justified zeal for reform of intelligence processes. The actual marketing of this reform has often been less than comprehensive and vigorous in pioneering the (perhaps) more mundane security processes as would concern OSINT's most influential target audiences - i.e., military and defence security professionals. As mentioned in this paper's introduction, unsupported or vaguely qualified misgivings about OSINT can simply alarm some whose everyday work requires a stringent application of information security procedures. Unfortunately, OSINT reformist discourse lacking close and assertive attention to requirements of information security procedure may deter - if not unconsciously frighten - the flocks of intelligence professionals long-steeped in strict rules of information handling applied since well before Cold War practices.

In this respect, the OSINT proselyte needs to empathise with the target audience by keeping in mind the very particular culture of the intelligence business. As with military culture in general, linear, 'black-and-white' and plodding rules are the means by which many individuals in the intelligence community can cope with their potentially enormous and anxiety-producing professional responsibilities[17]. The most dynamic and

Table 5: Collection Management[15] Tip-Offs for Security Issues in Papua

Pri	Ser	Information [16] Requirements	Detail
1	a.	Confirm KOSTRAD deployments	i. *Tontaikam* deployments
2			ii. Rotations of 330, 431, 433 Abn, 413 & 515 Inf Bn Coys by mid 01
2			iii. Rotation of 503 Inf Bn mid 01
2	b.	Confirm non-organic deployments	i. *Satgas Garuda* or PAMTAS
2			ii. KODIM Comd & Ctl for border district opns
2			iii. Rotation of 713 Inf Bn mid 01
2			iv. Mar Inf Bn X 1 and plan for 3 X Mar Inf Bns at Sorong
1	c.	Organic elements	i. KODALOPS at POLDA, KOLAKOPS at KODAM, or both?
2			ii. Plan for BRIMOB Regiment base at Jayapura (3 X Bns)
2			iii. Projected POLRES and KODIM formations at Paniai & Puncak Jaya
2			iv. New Air Force GCI radar units & KOSEK HQ. Rdr Units/MCC rdr in Biak, Jpr, Tmk, Mrk & Sor?
2			v. Locations of civilian GCI radar used by Biak MCC facility
1	d.	Incidents	i. PNG-based support for OPM
1			ii. Apr 00 & Jan 01 assassination actions against: OPM leadership?; and Papua MUSPIDA?
2			iii. "Black economy" activity by Army and POLRI elements
3			iv. Internecine POLRI-TNI conflict
2			v. Trends and aims of POLRI/TNI/ DEPDAGRI disinformation
1	e.	Paramilitary	i. DEPDAGRI sponsorship of loyalist forces
1			ii. Identification of loyalist, "front" and actual separatist forces
1			iii. Govt infiltration/manipulation of Papuan Separatist forces

free-thinking of intelligence analysts should know at least as well as anyone that compromised information in a defence-related intelligence community can amount to a catastrophe barely comparable in gravity to similar compromises in, say, the finance sector or even in law enforcement. Hence the instinctive wariness, even hypersensitivity, towards anything that may imply, on face value at least, a removal of the very necessary 'Chinese walls' protecting classified information.

Information security issues actually do require consideration when establishing procedure for open source exploitation. Essentially, OSINT must not be compelled to perform as if the classified cart is put before its unclassified horse. The collection phase, in particular, would require that certain specific details derived from classified information not be compromised in, say, a search engine entry or a collection briefing to a researcher with access to libraries and other archives. Indeed, every OSINT collection effort must take place independently of covert or clandestine - i.e., *classified* - information. If not done so, the collection process becomes, by logical and procedural definition, a classified intelligence effort[18], and not OSINT at all.

Although the above stipulation may seem obvious to some, the risk associated with the contrary practice is barely mentioned in some OSINT promotional literature. Without so much as a passing reference to security implications, Bowen suggests that 'open-source databases can...be searched...to check if information already exists in the public domain...'[19]. Wing and search to aid classified collection gaps (after Markowitz's 'OSINT-V')[20]. Indeed, open source conference findings by 1999 identified the need to develop in this area[21], though scant reference to specific measures, a series of Australian leak scandals since that time, and reported tightening of access and internal monitoring, all suggest that nothing progressive has been done alongside attempts to reinforce procedural and legal shields for official information.

Unambiguous boundaries for information security must also apply to operational considerations when managing the OSINT process[22] - operational security forming perhaps the very *raison d'etre* of military secrecy. A similar offhand-seeming remark occurs in Wing's summary of conference findings.

But the two areas of endeavour need not exist in isolation from one another, just as the classified- or all-source analyst or collection manager does not remove memory cells that processed newspaper, web or TV reports upon entering a secure area to commence work.

Out-source or be Out-performed

The detail from this retrospective and limited open source research on the Papua case should amply demonstrate that OSINT can stand on its own merits for purposes of information-sharing in an international/coalition environment, for example. Downgrading of classified product and/or validation of OSINT[23] against classified product need not be necessary in many situations provided that a serious - i.e., not a token - OSINT capability is established. Of course, states which practise access restrictions on *all* non-publicity governmental information may be bound to include OSINT product that is wholly directed and produced from within the government sector, as would be their prerogative. In these cases, an OSINT capability would preferably operate outside of the official government apparatus. States with well-developed private sector cooperation, and those not observing blanket restrictions on all official information, may hold an advantage in the unclassified intelligence economy[24].

In this respect, information security and OSINT is an issue that must be addressed, but without policy-makers entering some darkly surreal scene in which publicly available information becomes a State Secret, or academics in avowedly free societies become suspect citizens for simply conducting thorough, accurate and legal research. The legitimate security (and diplomatic) concerns around OSINT demand that open source research becomes a mainstay not of government departments, but of private sector bodies including academia. Ongoing pretence of a classified intelligence community omniscience would merely portend disaster borne of elitist hubris.

It is natural for senior and leading members of organisations to fear any radical development that may call into question previously held prestige or mystique. If an unreformed classified intelligence establishment should fail to integrate a proper OSINT system, the establishment's customers will continue to risk being out-performed on a scale far worse, and more politically damaging, than in such 'told you so' cases as Somalia, or the bombing of the PRC's Belgrade embassy bombing. Both of those examples were coalition operations indicating the need to adjust to an open source world. The Somalia case proved OSINT's worth for the purposes of pre-deployment intelligence collection[25], while the PRC embassy farce pressed home the need to 'play straight' in coalition operations in order to prevent embarrassment or compromise to partners[26].

Limitations on Sources

From the wide range of public domain sources used for this report, it is reasonable to state that recent reporting of actual TNI *unit totals* in Papua Province (as distinct from troop numbers and, more so, troop increases) has generally been quite conservative, even to the extent of under-estimating the intensity of military activity. These distortions have occurred despite the sources' awareness that there was a change in the nature of TNI deployments to Papua. Unfortunately, Indonesian and Western press, as well as NGO, sources all appear to have been hampered in this regard, probably as a result of the following factors:

1. The virtual ban on foreign journalists entering Papua Province from late 2000;
2. Reliance upon a limited number of sources for their assessments;
3. Preference for leaks of 'official' information, as in East Timor troop strengths of August 1998, in order to confidently report facts of military activity, rather than using the 'collateral' value of existing unclassified information;
4. Undue focus upon the KOSTRAD/Special Forces aspect of TNI activity;
5. Complications of the subject by TNI restructuring, including the formal surrender of operational responsibilities to POLRI; and
6. Narrow scope of public domain reporting of the issue from within Papua itself.

The first factor was accentuated by the arrest and deportation of a Swiss journalist travelling on a tourist visa in late 2000[27]. The last two factors (5 and 6) would also be a result of Papua's harsh terrain, primitive communications infrastructure, and the disparate quality of demographic aspects - i.e., great ethnic/language diversity, coastal/urban concentration versus sparse inland settlement - where most of the TNI deployments would actually become apparent to local observers. Notwithstanding optimistic views of the potential for online information about the situation in Papua, comparisons with the East Timor case in this regard appear premature and somewhat misleading, not only because of the many differences between the Papuan and East Timorese insurgencies, and their respective TNI/POLRI responses - but due to the less developed international support networks for Papuan separatists and human rights agitators. Comparison with Aceh may be more appropriate, given the advanced state of covert operations in that westernmost province, and the relative isolation of the westernmost Province's independence movement.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that available sources provide relatively little coverage of certain details specific to TNI and POLRI operations, particularly in the areas of unit designation, subordination, and boundaries. Treatment of the paramilitary/loyalist vigilante forces also suffers from such lack of detail. These aspects of reporting on Papua contrast with the situation apparent in East Timor from 1994-99, where sources often provided a redundancy of detail on such matters, thereby better allowing confirmation of details wherever doubts existed. Confirmation is yet to be made of several assessed details of TNI and POLRI structure in Papua described in this report, as is apparent in the question marks attached in the map graphics.

The retrospective nature of this study meant that there was no thorough monitoring of online information as it appeared. Therefore, reliance was placed on the reduced quantity of *archived* online reporting. Similarly, subscription-based online reporting was largely absent from this study. Perhaps most frustrating to research was the severe deficiency of rich sources in locally produced hardcopy newspaper dailies and weeklies, as well as the primary sources of TNI and POLRI periodicals. Especially for observers outside Indonesia, these most valuable sources are only accessible with preparation and (modest) funding made in advance.

Too Late for Reform?

The study of repressive action against resurgent Papuan separatism presents a rather startling irony. While security forces' intentions were in large part made deliberately public, the official government means to systematically collate and analyse public information on the matter have apparently been absent. Even in Indonesia, with an ongoing economic crisis, open source intelligence would appear to have developed further than in established Western intelligence circles. The case of Suripto and his LSS and *Lesperssi* open-source reporting work indicates that the developing world can directly provide a significant collection *and* analysis capability[28]. One can only imagine what would become of Suripto's product if it became processed through Western intelligence bodies. More likely than not, the LSS and *Lesperssi* data and analysis would become official and classified information, while the actual source would not be revealed.

As Indonesian reformists attempt to remove the impediments brought about by decades of self-serving corruption, western efforts to maintain a continual and comprehensive watch on developments in Indonesia appear to have been hampered by their own vested interests. Unfortunately for the West, in this area it would seem that there has been little reformist energy amongst policy-makers. It is even conceivable that intelligence establishment monopolists *need* to make well-timed "leaks" in order to preserve the mystique sustaining their privileged and relatively untouchable status in government service. After all, what government apparatus exists that could possibly hope to provide the near-universal and pre-contextualised coverage of open source reporting networks comprising a diverse pool of press, NGO and activist agents?

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Notes

Part 1

1. 'Papua' is used throughout where applicable, following Gus Dur's re-naming of the Province, while aware of some lobbying underway in Jakarta at the time of writing to have the Province revert unequivocally to 'Irian Jaya'. 'Irian Jaya' appears where historically appropriate as the province's title. See: *Kompas*, 'Irian Jaya Renamed Papua', 1 January 2000 (translated article); and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Provinsi Irja Menjadi Provinsi Papua - Gus Dur: Jangan Ciptakan Negara di Dalam Negara', 2 January 2000 (Soehendarto).
2. Dolman proposes an 'International Information Agency (IIA)' to best counter the chaotic and unpredictable nature of post-Cold War insecurity. His argument is especially cogent when citing domestic political considerations in the context of public disaffection with, and lack of awareness of, government decisions to engage in operations other than war (OOTW). See: *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 'Military Intelligence and the Problem of Legitimacy: Opening the Model', Spring 2000 (Everett Carl Dolman).
3. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 'Open-source intel: a vauable national security resource', 1 November 1999 (Dr Wyn Bowen):

   > Inaccuracy, bias, irrelevance and disinformation...It is essential that open sources are not taken at face value because they may contain inaccuracies, biased perspectives, irrelevant data or even disinformation. For example, bias in secondary sources can be the result of cultural, personal or political outlooks. Moreover, open sources may be subject to disinformation. According to former CIA Director James Woolsey, for example, the CIA is 'cautious about relying on open-source information' in monitoring Russia because organised crime groups have 'corrupted' certain private and government publications by buying articles to 'push particular points of view'. The result is that open sources should be critically assessed for accuracy, lack of bias and relevance on an ongoing and systematic basis. In addition, full citation of all original sources used in OSINT should be included where possible to ensure the end-user is confident that he/she knows where the information is derived from.

4. Second World War histories of the North African and Normandy deceptions, and the turning of the 'Red Orchestra', are too numerous to mention here, but provide some of the most vivid detail on such a process.
5. At a 1998 conference, LTCOL Wing hinted at, and countered, the unconscious discrimination against open sources on grounds of potential disinformation or inaccuracy. See: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 'Conference Report: Optimising Open Source Information', October 1998 (LTCOL Ian Wing); Australian Defence Studies Centre, 'Optimising Open Source Information Sharing in Australia: Report and Policy Prescription', Paper presented at the Pacific Information Sharing Forum (PacInfo '99)

Monterey, California, 07-10 February 1999 (LTCOL Ian Wing):'*As with other intelligence disciplines*, OSINT may be susceptible to deliberate disinformation and manipulation. This can be overcome by quality control checking using classified sources' (author's italics).
Importantly, Wing makes his own (and OSS') point that validating OSINT via classified stocks is by no means any guarantee of accuracy: 'Validation. OSINT may be validated as part of all-source analysis of classified material (known as OSINT-V) although classified holdings may be fallible.' (ibid)

6. In a similar qualification to the advocacy at note.3 above, it has been warned that skills can diminish with exposure to OSINT. Unsupported statements such as these no doubt encourage those elements of the intelligence community indifferent, or even opposed, to the 'new-fangled OSINT interloper'. See: *The Bridges Review*, '"Open Secrets": Rethinking ADF Strategic Intelligence', 1996 (MAJ G. Hogan):

> Disadvantages...Reduced Expertise in Classified Intelligence. A preference for open sources will, over time, reduce expertise and degrade the experience in the skills required to fully exploit classified and technology-based intelligence.

7. Report Prepared for the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 'IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century', Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, February 28, 1996, concerning the 1995-6 Aspin/Brown Commission (Richard A. Best, Jr. & Herbert Andrew Boerstling):

> [From Executive Summary] Another example of 'surge' capability can be found in a small program within the CIA called 'when actually employed' or WAE. WAE, which is more of an employment status than a program, is used by individuals who are former employees or spouses of Agency employees. WAEs are asked to maintain a level of expertise in a specific area, sometimes by using open source research, so that if a crisis develops, he or she can bring his or her expertise to CIA Headquarters to augment an office or task force throughout the crisis period. ...the ability to bring in experts who understand local politics and players in a region is especially important during the early phase of a crisis, when the IC is often scrambling to come up to speed. Many of these experts can be kept on retainer and be asked to do unclassified work, which, in effect, will provide the IC with more knowledgeable access to the open sources. If the 'reservists' are asked to work within the IC for extended periods, then some thought has to be given to the issue of clearances and polygraph requirements. A flexible approach to these issues would best serve the overall interests of the IC and the nation.
>
> [From Appendix C.] In some cases, expensive technologies and/or scarce human agents have been directed to acquire data that could have been obtained from open sources. A major problem area has been a failure by the leadership of the Intelligence Community to prioritize collection requirements adequately. Too often collection efforts have been undertaken more because the technology and ad-

> ministrative infrastructure existed rather than as a result of significant operational or policy needs.

Association of Former Intelligence Officers - Weekly Intelligence Notes Washington Post, 'CIA Attempts to Deal with Data Deluge', 16 April 2001 (RADM Harvey, citing as source a *Washington Post* article of 26 March 2001); *Association of Former Intelligence Officers - Weekly Intelligence Notes* (AFIO WIN), 30 April 2001 (letter dated 19 April 2001 from OSS CEO Steele in response to the above article):

> The Aspin-Brown Commission stated very clearly that CIA's access to open sources was 'severely deficient'. Nothing has changed...CIA has four language-qualified all-source Chinese analysts, and DIA does a very mediocre job of covering Chinese language publications in a timely, effective, digital manner. Fluent and Oasis, like the Open Source Information System (OSIS), are typically half-baked technical approaches to what should be a global program with a cast of hundreds of experts linked by secure web-based collaborative work devices. Neither the CIA intelligence analysis reserve (25 members the last time I looked) nor the still-born collaborative work effort (not working, 10 members as of today) represent anything even close to competency in this arena...The old guard still does not get it - it is time for new leadership across the board, both in and out of the bureaucracy.

8. Cf note.7 above. *Association of Former Intelligence Officers - Weekly Intelligence Notes*, 'Section - Letters: Open Source Intelligence Issue', 7 May 2001 (Response letter by RADM Harvey). AFIO WIN's Associate Editor Don Harvey issues a rather waspish and non-committal reply to Steele's critique of Harvey's leap of faith in avowed CIA progress in dealing with open source information. Harvey's emphasis on Steele's former boss, rather than any reference to any actual matters of critique, betrays an old guard approach based on "who you know" - the most appropriate culture for resignation or complacency. For 21st Century western intelligence professionals, such an approach is equivalent to the fabled gin & tonic at the Raffles Hotel before Imperial Japan's conquest of Southeast Asia:

> I suspect I will never have the opportunity to read Robert's letter to the President and his four books [I had known of only one], so I guess we will never have a debate on unclassified material in the WIN pages. Robert's service under the unparalleled master of intelligence, John Guenther, makes his expertise far more credible in my eyes than any number of books. My own complaint with the intelligence community continues to be its inadequate absorption (i.e. processing) of all sources of incoming data, especially including open source material [Robert's fixation].

9. Steele, Robert D. & Lowenthal, Mark M., *Open Source Intelligence: Executive Overview*, OSS Academy, Oakton, October 1998, p.53. OSS quote UK Defence Intelligence Chief LTGEN Sir John Foley speaking in June 1997 on coalition operations: 'Indeed, the distribution of unclassified warning and *order of battle information based on classified collection*, must become a standard operating procedure' (author's italics).

10. *Petunjuk Tanda-Tanda Taktis ABRI*, Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 25 January 1986.

Part 2

1. In addition to specific secondary sources, too numerous for practical mention here, the most reliable basic primary sources are local telephone directories, both as hardcopy references and CD-ROM from PT Telkom. Using phone directories as a base resource, and comparing with recent secondary source studies, news monitoring can then keep the observer abreast of new formations as they arise.
2. *The Jakarta Post*, 'Authorities step up negotiations with rebels', 27 January 2001.
3. *Editor*, 'Dari Yon 303 ke Yon 433', 7 December 1991.
4. *Tapol*, 'Thousands killed in the land of a thousand islands', Bulletin Online 156, January/February 2000:"...the army announced that it had taken over security from the police. A special command KODAL, Komando Pengendalian Keamanan, Command to Control Security, has been established..."
5. Excitement over the KOLAKOPS issue may have been aggravated by ABRI's post-Santa Cruz publicity pledging to abolish the structure in East Timor, as well as by a lingering spectre of Ali Moertopo's OPSUS (special operations). The latter was indeed an intelligence arm specializing in 'black' operations. However, KOLAKOPS can be identified in post-Santa Cruz operations in Aceh, Jakarta and West Java, and probably elsewhere, whenever security operations were underway. In fact, the East Timor KOLAKOPS never dissolved, but became the functional command and staff term for the territorial (KOREM) HQ overseeing operations, as done in other areas. See: *Tapol*, "East Timor in a state of terror", Bulletin 110, April 1992:

   > Brig.General Theo Syafei...since becoming KOLAKOPS (the special operational command) commander...In the army KOLAKOPS had its own intelligence unit, the territorial commands from Korem, Kodim down to Koramil...all had their own intelligence.

   Apakabar, (email from Kahn, Bruno translating from *Editor*), 12 August 1993:

   > 22 May 1993, Editor's interview of Abilio Osorio: Q: What is the future of East Timor now that Kolakops has been dissolved? A: No problem, because only the structure has been dissolved. But its operational activities still go on. Only its control is no longer in the hands of Kolakops but rather in those of Korem. It will go on, especially since the Kolakops commander has now become the Udayana Military Area Commander. There won't be any big changes...

   Jawa Pos, '"Yang Vokal Perlu Diwaspadai" - Danrem 084 soal Pam Jelang SU MPR 1998', 24 February 1998; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Lima Korban Kecelakaan Heli TNI AD Di Timtim, Dimakamkan Di Jakarta', 5 June 1998 (Yudomo SHD Salamat Sidabutar);*Tapol*, 'East Timor Under the Indonesian Jackboot: An Analysis of Indonesian Army Documents', Occasional

Report 26, October 1998. The *Tapol* report suggests KOLAKOPS and territorial commands are necessarily independent of one another:

> After the Santa Cruz massacre when international pressure reached a new pitch, Kolakops was scrapped and East Timor became a regular resort military command or Korem 164 / Wira Dharma, under the military command in Bali.

Kammen, Douglas, 'Akhir "Kedigdayaan" ABRI?' ('The End of the Indonesian Military's "Invulnerability"?'), paper prepared for the 12th INFID Conference in Bali, 14-17 September 1999. Kammen was indeed correct to identify some of the deception on this issue, but was himself taken in by the widespread notion that KOLAKOPS itself was somehow a "special" function, and believing that it no longer applied to East Timor since Santa Cruz.

In East Timor the earliest of these was the *Komando Pertahanan Keamanan* (Defense Security Command), renamed the *Komando Operasi Keamanan* (Security Operations Command) in 1984, and subsequently renamed *Komando Pelaksana Operasi* (Operations Implementation Command) in May 1990 (fn). Similarly, in Aceh this combat command was called the *Komando Pelaksana Operasi Jaring Merah*... Even less well known than the existence of the Kolakops is the fact that these are subdivided into operations Sectors (*Sektor*).

TNI Watch!, 'Mengenal Panglima Wilayah Darurat Militer Timtim Mayjen TNI Kiki Syahnakri', 10 September 1999;*Tapol*, 'The Kopassus-militia alliance', Bulletin 154, October 1999: 'In 1993 Kolakops was dissolved but its functions were secretly transferred to Kopassus Group 3'; and *Panji Masyarakat*, 'Letjen (Purn.) Soeyono: Dulu, Langsung Pangab', 23 February 2000 (Interview by Budiyono).

6. *Tajuk*, 'Perpisahan di Tengah Kerusuhan', 15 April 1999; *Kompas*, 'Daftar Lengkap Mutasi di Tubuh TNI', 16 June 2000; and *Pos Kupang*, 'Mantan panglima Mahidi serahkan senjata', 4 October 2000.

7. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'HUT Ke-36 Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional', 2 November 1998.

8. Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs Press Cable No.004/060100, 6 January 2000 II ('NASIONAL: A. POLITIK', citing *Media Indonesia*).

9. *Media Indonesia*, 'Konflik di Ambon kian Gawat, DPRD Maluku Minta Pusat Tingkatkan Operasi Keamanan', 29 November 1999.

10. *Kompas*, 'OPM Menyerang Kamp Pekerja Kayu', 10 December 2000; and *Infopapua.com*, 'Enam Pelaku Ditahan Dalam Penyerangan Di Perbatasan', 11 December 2000 (citing *Koridor.com*).

11. Besides the explicit reference in a 'rules of engagement' document to border security agreements with Indonesia, the operation's name conjoins terms from the Pidgin and Indonesian languages. Two PNGDF helicopters were reported as tasked to assist in the border security operation. See: *The National* (PNG), 'OPM Seeks Aid, Lawyer Blasts PNG Government', 26 January 2000 (Harlyne Joku).

12. *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 'Satuan ABRI dan AD PNG lancarkan operasi kejar OPM', 28 November 1995 (citing *Antara*).

13. The change became known in a report citing the POLDA Chief's replacement as 'Irjen' (Inspector-General). See: *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Penahanan Theys Diperpanjang', 18 December 2000. The second recent revision of POLRI rank titles and preceding equivalents appeared in a bulletin based on an Indonesian press report. See Appendix 3, and Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Jakarta, 9 January 2001, with reference to: *Gatra* No. 8, 13 January 2001 (article not cited). Reporting for the same period clearly indicated that the replaced POLDA Chief remained at Brigadier rank i.e., for a POLDA status of Type 'B'. See: *Panji Masyarakat*, 'Panas Dingin Tanah Papua', 20 December 2000.

14. *Harian ABRI*, 'Irjen Polri: Tidak Ada Lagi Polda Tipe C', 12 November 1999.

15. POLDA Irian Jaya and POLDA Maluku remained unaffected by the 1999 return of KODAMs *Pattimura* and *Trikora*, except for Maluku's rapidly raised POLDA status from type 'C' to type 'B' i.e., command changed from Colonel rank to Brigadier General, with a corresponding adjustment of resources. Examination of Police Region Chief (KAPOLDA) ranks in various sources confirms such changes to POLDA status i.e., POLDA Papua remaining at status 'B' during the period up until December 2000. See also: *Jawa Pos*, 'Minta Status Polda Dinaikkan', 17 March 1999; *Gamma*, 'Mekar di Musim Konflik', 24 October 1999 (this source states that the proposal for division into three provinces first came about in 1982); and *Kompas*, 'Kapolda Maluku Bantah Aparat Keamanan Pecah', 5 November 1999.

16. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Irja Akan Dimekarkan Jadi Tiga Propinsi', 6 April 1999; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Tunda Rencana Pemekaran Irja Dan Maluku', 24 April 1999; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Tak Akan Diterbitkan Perpu Pemekaran Irja Dan Maluku', 27 April 1999; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Sejumlah Anggota DPA Desak Pemekaran Irja', 28 April 1999. The legislation for three Papuan provinces received further consolidation with the early 2001 proposal for an increase in regencies (*kabupaten*) from 14 to 30. See: *Antara*, 'Irja Dikembangkan Jadi 30 Kabupaten', 28 February 2001 (N.B. date is provided by another source and may be one or two days later than the actual *Antara* publication date).

17. Maluku's official upgrade from KOREM 174 to KODAM XVI actually occurred some two months after the process began. See: *Detik.com*, 'Kembalikan Kodam Pattimura', 8 March 1999 (Budiono Darsono); *Kompas*, 'Korem Pattimura Segera Jadi Kodam - Ambon Mulai Sibuk', 16 March 1999; and *Pikiran Rakyat*, 'Brigjen Max Tamaela Jadi Panglima Kodam Pattimura', 12 May 1999.

18. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kasus Tertembaknya Robby Young Disidangkan Mahmil Jayapura', 24 June 1999.

19. *Banjarmasin Post*, 'Idealnya, 17 Kodam', 21 March 1999; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Penataan Militer Didasari Perubahan Pola Ancaman', 2 July 1999.

20. 733 Abn Inf Bn was previously noted as KODAM *Trikora*'s Ready-Reaction force or Mobile Battalion. At the time of writing it is unclear which formation, if any, has replaced 733 since the return of Maluku-based units to KODAM *Pattimura*. See: O'Hare, Martin, 'The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya', May 1991 (MA sub-thesis for the SDSC, ANU), pp.26, 34.

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21. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pangdam Trikora: Situasi Keamanan Di Irja Terkendali', 4 July 1998.

22. *TNI Watch!*, 'Istilah Satuan Militer: Dari Regu Hingga Divisi', 27 October 1999.

23. For cadastral detail of the provincial sub-division (not effected as at the time of writing), see: Direktori Pemerintahan RI 2000 (Buku II) - Directory of the RI Government, PT Mitra Info - CV Laksana Mandiri, Jakarta, 2000; and GAYO, Iwan, *Buku Pintar (Seri Senior)*, Edisi 28, Warga Upaya Negara, Jakarta, 2000.

24. *Timika Pos*, 'Bentrok Antar kesatuan Layaknya Tawur Pelajar', 18 September 2000; *Timika Pos*, 'Delapan Anggota Dalmas Ditahan', 19 September 2000; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Keributan Antaraparat, 8 Anggota Dalmas Polres Jayapura Jadi Tersangka', 19 September 2000; *TNI Watch!*, 'Tiga Batalyon Infantri Dikirim ke Papua', 8 November 2000; and *Kompas*, 'Empat Oknum Tentara Keroyok Anggota Brimob', 10 March 2001.

25. The clearest indication of POLRI's almost desperate actions can be gleaned from the very detailed witness accounts from the separatist bastion around Wamena in October 2000. See: Tim Kemanusiaan Wamena Bagian Investigasi: SKP Keuskupan Jayapura (koordinator), KONTRAS Papua ELSHAM-Papua, LBH Jayapura, No.: 014/BD/2001/3.4.12 Hal: laporan Wamena 'Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena 6 Oktober 2000 Sebelum Dan Sesudahnya - Sebuah Laporan Investigasi' (posted on 'soc.culture.indonesia' newsgroup site 'deja.com').

26. *Indopapua.com*, 'Bila Maklumat Tidak Diindahkan, TPN diserahkan kepada TNI', 18 December 2000 (citing *Antara*).

27. *The Jakarta Post*, 'TNI to stay in politics unless new consensus comes', 20 December 2000 (Interview with Bob Lowry).

28. *Suara Independen*, 'Menggunakan Preman Justru Mengkeroposkan Sistem', May 1996, in an interview with BRIGGEN POLRI (retd., since deceased) Roekmini Koesoema Astoeti.

29. *Kompas*, 'Menyikapi Hasil Kongres Rakyat Papua Utamakan Dialog daripada Tindakan Militer', 7 June 2000; and Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep - Edisi: Bahasa Indonesia, 'Menurut Pemerintah Belanda Masalah Maluku Adalah Urusan Dalam Negeri Indonesia', 27 June 2000.

30. *Tajuk*, 'Perpisahan di Tengah Kerusuhan', op cit.

31. Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep - Edisi: Bahasa Indonesia, 'TNI Akan Ganti Sebagian Besar Tentara yang Bertugas di Maluku', 27 June 2000; *Gamma*, 'Laode Ida: "Darurat Sipil, Lalu Militer?"', 11 July 2000; *Kompas*, 'Situasi Jayapura Tetap Normal', 1 December 2000.

32. *Tempo*, '24 LSM Jepang: "Cabut Darurat Sipil di Maluku"', 15 July 2000.

33. Cf note.9 above.*Salafy.net*, 'Membantah Pernyataan Pangdam XVI Pattimura', 24 January 2001.

34. *Timika Pos*, 'KSAD Usul Darurat Sipil di Irja', 11 November 2000.

35. *DeTAK*, 'Mudarat di Balik RUU Keadaan Darurat', 8 February 2001.

36. *Kompas*, 'RUU tentang Pertahanan Negara - Pengerahan Kekuatan TNI Harus Izin DPR', 3 March 2001.
37. *The Jakarta Post*, 'House speaker wants TNI's role in security', March 4, 2001. This development almost immediately followed the eruption of more widespread ethnic mob murder in Central Kalimantan.
38. *Aksara*, 'Letjen TNI Agus Widjojo', 9 January 2000 (Daud Sinjal).
39. *Tempo*, 'Polri Tetap Pegang Kendali Keamanan Negara', 13 March 2001.
40. POLDA Metro Jaya received exactly quadruple the funding allocated to the traditionally dominant security executive in Jakarta, KODAM Jaya. See: *Forum Keadilan*, 'NU Pun Menerima Dana ST MPR 2000', 1 December 2000.
41. *Pikiran Rakyat*, 'TNI Kirim 3 Kompi ke Aceh', 21 April 2001.
42. The armed POLRI-TNI clash in September 2000 appeared to involve the transit of goods through Jayapura's Port Numbay. A bed-frame became evidence for investigators. See: *Timika Pos*, 'Delapan Anggota Dalmas Ditahan', 19 September 2000, op cit.
43. SBS Dateline, 7 March 2001 (Anonymous producer. Narrator: Jeremy Frankl).
44. The *Arwana* fish (including the 'Dragon' and 'Boneytongue' varieties - *Scleropagus Formosus* and *Scleropagus Leichhardtus*) fetches high prices throughout East Asia. Both Chinese and Malay traditions value the fish as a charm for prosperity. Troops on duty in Papua would have the additional incentive of gaining higher profit by being in a position to use service transport for direct sales back in metropolitan Java. See: *Kabar-Irian* (e-mail newsgroup from another: *Indonesian Nature Conservation List*), 'Intervensi Kopassus dan Kostrad dalam pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam di Merauke', December 1999 archive; and *Detik.com*, 'Kapolda Papua Membantah Aparat Selundupkan Arwana', 16 January 2000 (M.H. Imran).
45. *DeTAK*, 'Solihin GP: Penasehat Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia - Laut Kita Dikuasai Mafia', 24 November 2000.
46. SBS Dateline, 7 March 2001, op cit.
47. Susanto, Budi & Supriatma, A. Made Tony, *ABRI: Siasat Kebudayaan 1945-1995*, Kanisius, Yogyakarta, 1995, p.77.
48. SBS Dateline, 23 February 2000 (Matthew Carney).
49. *Astaga.com*, 'Eksploitasi Hutan Akan Rusak SDA Papua pada 2010', 21 March 2000.
50. Susanto & Supriatma, *ABRI: Siasat Kebudayaan*, op cit., pp.92-93.

Part 3

1. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pangdam Trikora Siap Dialog Dengan Pimpinan OPM', 30 August 1998.
2. *Kompas*, 'Waspadai, Kemungkinan Suhu Politik Naik - Penyandera 12 Karyawan Diminta Menyerah', 23 August 1996; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kasum ABRI Kunjungi Timika - Pangdam: Penyandera Akan Dikejar Terus Sampai Dapat', 28 August 1996. The KODIM numbering, and the existence of the *Satgaspam*, appeared shortly afterwards in *Kompas*, 'Bentrok Antarsuku di Tembagapura - Enam Tewas dan 52 Luka Berat', 29 January 1997.
3. Mimika Regency began as a *kabtif* (*kabupaten administratif* - lit. administrative regency) in the same manner as 'KODIM 1710 (*persiapan*)' and 'POLRES Mimika (*persiapan*)' in note.2 above - i.e., in a special preparatory stage of incorporation within the pre-existing provincial hierarchies. See: Gayo, Iwan, Buku Pintar (Seri Senior), Edisi 26, Warga Upaya Negara, Jakarta, 1998; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Mimika Resmi Menjadi Kabupaten', 23 March 2000.
4. Based on comparisons of progressive reporting from the following almanacs, an Indonesian Government publication, and press reporting: Gayo, Iwan, *Buku Pintar (Seri Senior)*, Edisi 28op cit., Gayo, Iwan, *Buku Pintar (Seri Senior)*, Edisi 26, op cit.; Gayo, Iwan, *Buku Pintar (Seri Senior)*, Edisi 11, Warga Upaya Negara, Jakarta, 1991; Gayo, Iwan, *Buku Pintar (Nusantara)*, Warga Upaya Negara, Jakarta, 1990; Direktori Pemerintahan RI 2000 (Buku II), op cit.; and *Kompas*, 'Usulan Pemda Irja - Otonomi Khusus di Tingkat Provinsi', '7 December 2000.
5. Badan Pusat Statistik, 'Daftar, Nama, Kode, dan Peta Wilayah Administrasi Indonesia 1996', CV Kurnia Sejati, Jakarta, 1996.
6. *Kompas*, 'Jayapura Dimekarkan Menjadi Tiga Kabupaten', 6 December 2000. The proposal was at the lobbying stage in this source, but apparent political support may have effected sub-division by the time of writing.
7. *Waspada*, 'GPK Irja Masih Sandera 109 Transmigran Lokal', 20 March 1999.
8. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pasukan Dari Pegunungan Tengah Irja Ditarik', 29 August 1998 (citing an interview with the KODAM VIII information officer discussing 'the disbandment of sector commands as with the disbandment of Sector 'E''); and *Pikiran Rakyat*, 'Satgas Rajawali Tembak Mati Anggota GPK', 19 October 1996.
9. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pasukan Dari Pegunungan Tengah Irja Ditarik', op cit.; and *Pikiran Rakyat*, ibid.
10. From MAJGEN Samsudin's memoirs it is clear that Irian Jaya's late 1970s sectors also matched KOREM boundaries. See: Samsudin, Majgen (retd), *Pergolakan di Perbatasan*, PT Gramedia, Jakarta, 1995, p.71, 149.
11. Djopari, John R.G., *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1993, p.155, making reference to: Dinas Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/*Tjenderawasih*, Praja Ghupta Vira, Jayapura, 1971, p.122.

12. *Waspada*, 'GPK Irja Masih Sandera 109 Transmigran Lokal', 20 March 1999, op cit.; *Antara*, 'Keributan Antar Kelompok Di Irja Lima Tewas', 29 January 1997; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Sidang Mahkamah Militer Segera Digelar Di Timika - Komnas HAM Ke Lokasi Pegunungan Tengah Irja', 13 June 1998.

13. The first reference below is to KODIM 1704/Paniai as Sector B command. The KODIM level for this sector is either an error of attribution for a sub-sector, an earlier zoning system in that area, or delegation to the KOREM's only subordinate located exclusively on Irian's mainland. Of interest is its sequential logic westwards from Sector C/KOREM 172, thereby revealing the probable identity of the whole Sector B - i.e., KOREM 173. The second reference indicates sub-sector II of KOREM 171 as commanded by that formation, headquartered at Timika, but covering the border area further west to Fakfak. This report confirms another sector identity, probably A-1 (cf note.7 above), separate to the non-organic sector HQs co-located in Timika - E and G. Note also the second reference's mention of 'full support' for the Army operation, in contrast to the reverse roles from 1999 where POLRI received support from Army units. *Kompas*, 'Komandan Peleton Diadili, Beri Perintah Tidak Jelas', 31 January 1996; and *Kompas*, 'Dua Bekas Sandera Masih Dirawat', 2 September 1996.

14. cf. note16 below for Aceh's sectors B and C in 1999-2000. Kammen, Douglas, 'Akhir "Kedigdayaan" ABRI?', op cit. Kammen drew a tempting and, based on most existing evidence at the time, mercurially incisive conclusion that the sector commands followed in order from East Timor to Aceh, then Irian Jaya. The author's reference here is not intended solely as corrective criticism, as Kammen's rationale on sectors is logically sound, and applies perfectly to the issue of KOPASSUS' Group IV deployments of *Satgas Tribuana* (see Table 1 and notes.23-25). Furthermore, most of the primary sources mentioning Sector C (KOREM 172) and the Aceh sectors appeared after Kammen's draft.

15. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pembebasan Markimin dari Sekapan GPK OPM Terganggu', 20 August 1998.

16. This subordination of TNI to POLRI also appeared to be the case, at least notionally, in East Timor in 1999, according to press releases in at the time, though Army sector commanders remain listed in documents made available since the independence ballot there. In Aceh's case, it should be noted that the following references indicated sectors there having undergone restructuring since early 2000 via Regency/POLRES/KODIM zoning into sub-sectors. There was no evidence of such a change in Papua, though probable sub-sectors have appeared at District/POLSEK/KORAMIL zoning. Note that the use of 'sub-sector' at POLRES level in Aceh may be a way of preventing confusion with the Police Sector (POLSEK) base commands under POLRES level. It also suggests wider sector areas 'A' and 'B' comprising several POLRES base commands, matching the boundaries of KOREM 012 and 011, respectively (the latter TNI Sector 'B' apparent from the most recent report cited as the final reference in the following list). *Waspada*, 'Sipil Bersenjata Beraksi Di Aceh: 4 Polisi Tewas, 4 Luka, 1 Diculik', 13 October

1999; *Serambi*, 'Dua Brimob Tewas, 11 Luka-luka', 23 March 2000; *MeunaSAH*, 'Mobil Kapolsek dan Danramil Digranat', 31 May 2000; *Serambi*, 'Dua Anggota AGAM Ditangkap Brimob', 28 August 2000; *Serambi*, 'Lhok Nibong Mencekam', 10 October 1999; *Serambi*, 'Di Peureulak, Satu Anggota AGAM Tewas - Satu Brimob Cedera', 4 November 1999; *Media Indonesia*, 'TNI Mendesak Syafei Tertembak', 27 February 2000; *Kontras*, 'Aparat Main Voli Bersama Rakyat', 21-27 June 2000; *Kontras*, 'Letkol Inf Deni K Irawan Dandim Aceh Timur - Jangan Hanya Memojokkan Aparat', 21-27 June 2000; *Serambi*, 'Tengah Malam, Kontak Senjata Berkecamuk', 4 March 2000; and *The Jakarta Post*, 'Troops Seize Five Homemade Bombs in West Aceh', 20 May 2001.

17. Confirmation and clarification on this point should probably arise via access and reference to a wider range of sources, particularly hardcopy such as *Cenderawasih Pos*, *Berita Yudha* and *Harian ABRI* (successor to *Angkatan Bersenjata*), or any similar POLRI periodical. Unfortunately, the author had no such access at the time of this draft. It is possible that sector command is met via POLDA staff appointments, or Police Territory (POLWIL) formations corresponding to KOREM level. The following reference from East Aceh demonstrates the POLRI command responsibility at Regency/ POLRES/KODIM level, as the KODIM commander emphatically states that the Sub-Sector Commander has the operational responsibility in the Regency. *Kontras*, 'Letkol Inf Deni K Irawan, Dandim Aceh Timur: Jangan Hanya Memojokkan Aparat ', 21-27 June 2000.

18. Cf Pt.2, note 41.

19. Yayasan Sagu - Solidaritas Anak Negeri Maluku, 'Maluku Report 13', 29 December 1999; Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep - Edisi: Bahasa Indonesia, 'Masih Perlukah Jihad Untuk Maluku?', 8 April 2000 (Interview with Thamrin Thomagola); *Antara*, 'Dansektor A Pengamanan Ambon Tertembak', May 17, 2000; *Antara*, 'Warga Halmahera Utara Tetap Kibarkan Merah Putih Ternate', 18 August 2000; and *Antara*, 'Umat Islam Minta Dansektor 1/Ambon Diganti', 30 September 2000.

20. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Evakuasi 9 Korban Terhambat Kabut - Jenazah Kapolda dan Kajati Masih Berada di Reruntuhan Pesawat', 20 August 1998 (Soehendarto). In addition to the hierarchically relevant fact of Commander KOREM 171's presence in Timika for the occasion, the article's photo reveals a thick red line on Mimika Regency's northern boundary - probably a confirmation of KODIM 1710's inclusion within KOREM 171's operational sector.

21. Samsudin, Majgen, op cit, p.195, 368, pp.394-6, and several unnumbered photographs printed in the book. Samsudin's memoirs of his hostage rescue operations in Irian Jaya in the late 1970s refer to several captains, including then CAPT Zacky Anwar Makarim, as 'Nanggala team commanders from Kopassanda/RPKAD' - Kopassandha and RPKAD being the previous names for KOPASSUS. Several team commanders at captain rank indicate that the 1970s *Nanggala* in Irian Jaya at least approximated the battalion strength of the subsequent LTCOL-led Team *Maleo* and *Satgas Tribuana* of the 1990s.

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22. *Gatra*, 'Yang Terpilih dari Lembah Tidar', 25 November 1995; *Kompas*, 'Sandera di Irja Tinggal Tiga Orang', 1 September 1996; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kasum ABRI Kunjungi Timika - Pangdam: Penyandera Akan Dikejar Terus Sampai Dapat', 28 August 1996; and *Gatra*, 'Penculikan: Sepucuk Surat dari Sandera', 6 January 1996.

23. This development was first hinted in the unit's corps journal and in pep-talk ceremonies at KOPASSUS HQ in Jakarta. *Baret Merah: Cahaya Chandraca*, 'Lambang-Lambang Kesatuan Kopassus', April 1997 (KOPASSUS magazine). The Sanskrit motto actually refers to KOPASSUS' role as an air-land-sea unit, as explained in: *Gatra*, 'Kopassus: Baret Merah Tak Cuma di Darat', 6 July 1996.

24. Many press sources suffer from a hiatus in trying to identify the KOPASSUS task units by their current name. Separatist and activist circles are not unique in this regard, though they have tended to frequent presumption perhaps due to over-familiarity. The previous title *Nanggala* was also used in East Timor, for example, though the term continued to appear in reports well after it had been superceded by *Tribuana* as in Irian Jaya and Aceh (cf note.26). *Antara*, 'Informasi di Internet Tentang Tewasnya David Alex, Tidak benar', 7 August 1997. The previous terms used in Aceh were *Satgassus* - a generic-seeming title for 'Special Task Unit' - and *Sattis* (*Satuan Taktis* - lit. 'Tactical Unit'), which appears to be a cynical word play from the Indonesian *sadis* (sadistic). *Waspada*, 'Aksi Pembakaran Tambah Marak: 4 Kantor dan 1 Rumah Musnah', 1 June 1999; *Serambi*, 'Sebelum Berangkat, Oknum Kopassus Menculik Lagi', 19 August 1998. One of the best primary sources possible in this context describes the earlier Aceh force more innocuously as *Satgassus* (Special Task Unit): *Baret Merah: Cahaya Chandraca*, 'Lintasan Sejarah Korps Baret Merah Kopassus', April 1997 (KOPASSUS magazine).

25. Prior to the separation of East Timor in late 1999, available *Tribuana* numbering (and the context of the new regimental motto) indicated three deployed task units at any given time. *Satgas Tribuana V* in East Timor in 1997-8 (see original TAPOL release of information from leaked ABRI documents dated between August and November 1998), and *Satgas Tribuana IX* in Papua from 1998-9. *Serambi*, 'Opini: Kiat "Menyembuhkan" Aceh', 10 January 1998. From the unit numbering and dates, the above opinion article was almost certainly from the *Tribuana* unit on tour in Irian Jaya probably from late 1996 through to the end of 1997. The dates and numbering also indicate one-year tours of duty for *Satgas Tribuana* formations. Confirmation of *Satgas Tribuana* in Aceh appeared in sources beginning at the end of 1999. See: *TNI Watch!*, 'Beberapa Perwira yang Pernah Berdinas di Aceh', 17 November 1999; and *Waspada*, 'AGAM Akui Perjuangannya Dapat Dukungan 15 Personil Kopassus', 18 August 2000. The apparent *satgas* numbering sequence was confirmed in the aftermath of the East Timor referendum. See: *Kompas*, 'J Lumintang Diperiksa Soal Telegram 5 Mei - Wiranto Ditunggu Jumat Ini', 24 December 1999.

26. ETISC, 'A Reference List (updated 13/9/99)', 16 September 1999. Analysis from this source's list shows that the actual identity of SGI in East Timor remained something of a mystery to many closely involved with military

and human rights issues in the Province, even at that late stage of East Timor's history as part of Indonesia. Cross-reference of telephone numbers at the next reference would confirm that SGI and the anachronistic *Nanggala* title refer to one and the same entity:

> 9. Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus: Special Force Command). Also called Nanggala. Tel 62 390 321942.
>
> 10. SGI (Satuan Tugas Intelijen) Intelligence Task Force for Kopassus (no telephone number given). Buku Petunjuk Telepon: DEPHANKAM - ABRI, PT Telkom, Bandung, 1995.'DAN SGI 21942 - - JL. ABELIO MONTEIRO DILI 0390'.

27. *Republika*, 'Tentara OPM Kembalikan Senjata Kopassus', 6 February 2001.

28. ibid.

29. *The Jakarta Post*, 'Police, military chiefs meet to clear the air', 6 February 2001: 'The remaining troops plus the joint battalion of Navy Marines, Air Force Paskhas and Army Kopassus will remain in Maluku,' he said. The joint battalion - led by Maj. Ricky Samuel from Kopassus - 'is believed to be an effective crack riot unit which has proved to be professional and impartial in doing their job to quell riots in Maluku.'

30. News from Free Papua Movement OPM/TPN, 'More Troops Arrive in Jayapura', 29 September 2000 (Summary of ELSHAM press release on the same day):

> An addition 650 troops from Infantry Battalion 713, North Sulawesi landed at the naval base in Jayapura, West Papua around midday on 28 September aboard the passenger ship Teluk Bone. The troops consisted of four companies and as well as a number of Special Forces (the term Kopassus is not used).

31. Samsudin, Majgen (retd), op cit, pp.163, 172-3, 182, 197-8.

32. The first two sources listed below describe *Tontaikam* as the 'Security Surveillance Battalion'. However, the other references' expansions of the acronym are more consistent with pre-existing ABRI/TNI units, and make more sense in terms of how *Tontaikam* would actually deploy within AOs. See: *The Jakarta Post*, 'Kostrad to launch new intelligence battalion', 12 March 2001 (Tiarma Siboro); Missionszentrale der Franziskaner, Die Nachrichten: 'Neue Aufklärungseinheiten mit deutschen Waffen', March 2001 (Father Andreas Müller OFM, ed.); *Jawa Pos*, 'Kostrad Perkenalkan Pasukan Terpilih di Korps Elit - Prajurit Tontaikam Tahan Berlari 3 Hari Non Stop', 12 March 2001; *Astaga.com*, 'Pasukan Anti Stres Itu Bernama Tontaikam', 12 March 2001 (Anton Setiawan); *Kompas*, 'Kalangan Mahasiswa Tolak Pemogokan Nasional', 12 Maret 2001; *Kompas*, 'KSAD: TNI AD Tidak Akan Biarkan Situasi Chaos', 13 March 2001 (Subur Tjahjono); *The Jakarta Post*, 'TNI may take control of security affairs', 13 March 2001; and *Gamma*, '"Begini Terus, TNI Habis"', 20 March 2001.

33. *Gatra*, 'Red Berets Tidying Up', 13 August 2000; *Asiadragons.com*, 'Kopassus Dirampingkan, Pangdam Jaya Diganti', 21 January 2001 (Muhammad Harun); and *Panji Masyarakat*, 'Mayjen Amirul Isnaeni: Kopassus Tidak Menolak', 31 January 2001.

For the early report misleading observers into believing KOPASSUS would reduce to only 700 troops, see: *Kontan*, 'Parkirkan saja, Repot Amat Gus Dur memutus kaitan organisasi TNI dengan masa lalu', 6 March 2000 (Nugroho Dewanto).

For reports of the actual plan under then Chief of Army Tyasno Sudarto, see: *Oposisi*, 'Menhan Juwono: Sydney Morning Herald Salah Kutip: Pasukan Kopassus Dikurangi 700 Personil', 8 March 2000.

34. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kostrad Dituntut Tingkatkan Kesiapan Operasional', 23 February 2000.

35. The 'build-up' reports appear to have taken on a life of their own in something of a snowball effect. See: *The Age*, 'Concern as Indonesia dispatches troops to West Papua', 10 August 2000 (Paul Daley):

> Intelligence analysts and defence officials confirm estimates from West Papuan sources that thousands of Indonesian troops have been dispatched since Monday, when Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid ruled out independence for the province that borders PNG. Estimates of the number of Indonesian troops normally based in West Papua range from 1400 to several thousand regular and special forces (Kopassus) troop. Some sources maintain that up to 600 troops - including members of the strategic reserve, Kostrad - have been dispatched in recent days to each of the province's 13 regencies or districts.

Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Action Alert: 'Indonesian military build-up in West Papua', 16 August 2000:

> Indonesia has responded with a major military build up. In the first week of August 2000, about five hundred KOSTRAD (Land Command Strategic Troops) were deployed to each of the thirteen regencies in West Papua (amounting to 6,500 new troops). The troops were deployed six hours after Indonesian President Wahid's statement to the Indonesian Parliament outlining his willingness to offer West Papua autonomy, but not independence.
>
> *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'More troops for West Papua as Jakarta tightens its grip', 17 November 2000 (Lindsay Murdoch):
>
> Indonesia is sending 1,300 more combat-ready troops to West Papua as its army chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, warned that secessionist demands could break up the country. The troops will arrive before a December 1 deadline for independence supporters to pull down the separatist Morning Star flag flying in most towns in the remote province, formerly called Irian Jaya...'Now we are witnessing many regions demanding to secede from the state...I call on the people to share a united vision on national integrity and to eliminate their vested interests.' Major Putranto, one of the commanders of the fresh troops, said before leaving the city of Makassar: 'We are prepared to defend national sovereignty, because that's our main duty.' Observers believe the new troops from the army's Kostrad strategic reserve will take to more than 10,000 the number of police and troops in the province, including a 650-strong police

> mobile brigade guarding the giant Freeport copper and gold mine, Indonesia's biggest taxpayer.

Indonesian Observer, 'Papuan rebels can fly flag on December 1', 28 November 2000; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 'Tension mounts in Irian Jaya', 28 November, 2000 (Richard Galpin):'The government has already sent more than 1,000 extra troops to Irian Jaya ahead of this anniversary.'

The Jakarta Post, 'Police arrest chiefs of Papua Council', 30 November 2000; Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep - Edisi: Bahasa Indonesia, 'Topik Gema; Warta: Rakyat Papua Yakin Kemerdekaan Adalah Kebenaran', 28 November 2000 (Aboeprijadi Santoso - cf note.46); Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Media Release: 'Indonesian authorities threaten "repressive measures" in West Papua', 1 December 2000:

On 15 November, two battalions of 'green beret' soldiers from Indonesia's Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) were sent to West Papua. Some 2000 Indonesian troops from Battalion 431 and 433 were sent from their base in South Sulawesi. Major General Sembiring Meliala, former military commander in West Papua, this week stated: 'We definitely need more troops to secure Papua. We will do all necessary measures to curb any separatist movement anywhere in the country. Repressive measures sometimes cannot be avoided.'

BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 'Papua New Guinea: Warning government needs to "beef up" border presence', 28 December 2000:

> Reports reaching Vanimo indicate that there is a heavy build-up of Indonesian armed forces on the other side of the border, forcing OPM Free Papua Movement rebels and villagers from both sides to flee further towards PNG.

Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian/Office for Justice and Peace Keuskupan Jayapura/Diocese of Jayapura, 'Recent Developments in Papua, Papua Congress II 29 May-4 June 2000 and the Situation Pasca-Congress', 12 January 2001:

> ...issues increased in number about possible infiltration by 'provocateurs' from the Moluccas, about the smuggling in of weapons, about the building up of 'militias', the security forces began to show its force and intention, by building up a striking increase of personel deployed in Papua. Although initially explained by security authorities as a 'normal replacement/refreshment of troops', later it was officially admitted that more security personel (figures are often only to be guessed) were and will be placed in Papua 'to guarantee the people's security'...During the MPR-session the 'Papua-issue' wasn't really treated with any understanding, but rather regarded as a very disturbing local movement which should be stopped with all means. The increasing deployment of troops started straight after the session was over. This intensified military / police presence has been accompanied by clear fields of action, concerning respectively: (1) the Papua Flag, and (2) the Satgas annex Posko and (3) the Presidium. It proved to be the beginning of some tragic and bloody clashes.

36. The first reference explains where *Satgas Garuda* actually re-deployed (Jayapura Regency), as mid-1999 reporting confirmed, and logistical constraints would require i.e., to move to a new AO rather than expend transport resources merely to attend a farewell parade, while effecting relief-in-place with pursuit companies from the same battalions. The second source misleadingly states that the units went home to Java.

    Suara Pembaruan, 'Kodam VIII Trikora Malirja Tarik Pasukan Dari Timika', 12 August 1998; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pasukan Dari Pegunungan Tengah Irja Ditarik', 29 August 1998, op cit.

37. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kasus Tertembaknya Robby Young - Disidangkan Mahmil Jayapura', 24 June 1999; and *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Prada Prayitno Divonis 5 Tahun Penjara Dan Dipecat', 8 July 1999.

38. *Tapol*, Extra troops arrive in West Papua - KRI Teluk Lampung 540 docks in Biak, 15 March 2000 (sourced from web-posted newsgroup Kabar-irian-irja.org):

    > According to ELS HAM sources, the troopcarrier docked before dawn on 14 March, carrying a number of troops. including Kopassus men and troops from Kostrad Infantry battalion 515. Ten men disembarked in Biak and the remainder of the troops continued the journey to Jayapura.

    South China Morning Post, 'Seeking freedom in the jungle', 21 April 2000 (Ben Bohane):

    > Now tension is mounting in the province many observers are calling the next East Timor as hundreds of Indonesian troops begin arriving in Jayapura in anticipation of large demonstrations planned by Papuan leaders for May. Locals are fearful because many of the troops are green beret and Kostrad troops from the 515 Battalion responsible for the massacre of up to 200 Biak islanders during an independence flag-raising ceremony in 1998.

39. It is just as likely that 515 Inf Bn was scheduled to replace 433 Abn Inf Bn (as for 322? with 431 Abn Inf Bn) after the late 2000 rotations i.e., for a subsequent rotation c. May 2001. See: *Koridor.com*, 'Kostrad to Look After the Border: Military Commander's Statement', 25 November 2000:

    > Maj. General Tonny Agustinus Rompis, Trikora Military Commander, said the arrival of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) troops transported by Teluk Bone warship on Thursday (23/11) should not be wrongly intercepted" (sic). "The arrival of Green Beret personnel was aimed at maintaining the security in the border area and replacing long assigned soldiers in the area. For example, Kostrad Battalion 433 which would be replaced by Battalion 515. Battalion 431 assigned in the southern part (Merauke town) would be replaced by Battalion 322.

40. *The Jakarta Post*, 'Separatist fighters kill villagers, take hostages', 7 May 1999. Another 'commanding officer' - Major Putranto - was also reported as being deployed in Papua six months previous to the November 2000 deployment: 'The commander of 433 Battalion, Maj. Saharuddin, believed

the rebels had taken the hostages to Bewani, a village just inside the border of Papua New Guinea.' *Indonesian Observer*, 'Kostrad troops bound for Irian Jaya', 16 November 2000.

41. Tim Kemanusiaan Wamena Bagian Investigasi, op cit.

42. *Kompas*, 'OPM Menyerang Kamp Pekerja Kayu', 10 December 2000, op cit. This reference also mentions 415 Inf Bn, but this is almost certainly a mistaken record of '515' Inf Bn, troops of which were repeatedly indicated as already tasked in the Jayapura Regency area since March-April 2000.

43. *Koridor.com*, 'Kostrad to Look After the Border: Military Commander's Statement', 25 November 2000, op cit.

44. The second-listed reference even claims that the KOSTRAD units were sent by KODAM VII - not KOSTRAD itself! *Gamma*, 'Siklus Baru Kekerasan', 12 December 2000; and *Detikworld*, '2 More Kostrad Batallions Sent To Papua', 15 November 2000 (Abdul Haerah HR/Hendra & GB):

> Wirabuana VII Military Area Command has again sent 2 battalions of Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) soldiers to Irian Jaya, ostensible to protect those who feel threatened by the growing independence movement. Battalion 431 and 433, as many as 2000 personnel, were sent off from the IV Main Naval Base (Lantamal) in Makassar, South Sulawesi, Wednesday (15/11/2000). Family members lined the wharves to wave the troops good-bye...According to the commander of Battalion 431, Maj. AM Putranto, the deployment came in response to the demands of local people...This deployment brings to three the number of battalions sent by the Wirabuana Military Command to Irian in the last six last months. 'All of it was in response to the people's requests,' he reiterated.

45. *Infopapua.com*, 'Anggota OPM Tertangkap', 8 February 2001.

46. The connection between these battalion elements and *Parasut Garuda* is strengthened by the fact that all of the cited battalions are *airborne* infantry - i.e., paratroopers. See: Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep - Edisi: Bahasa Indonesia, 'Topik Gema Warta: Rakyat Papua Yakin Kemerdekaan Adalah Kebenaran', op cit (cf fn.35).

47. This aspect may confuse observers dependent upon some statistical certainty in determining troop numbers embarked on these vessels. Several references list the vessels' designed passenger limits, but without consideration for their actual use by Indonesian authorities. Actual Indonesian sources indicate their previous use as troop transports for at least one battalion (minus), whereas original Western limits would restrict transport to one company of troops. Planned passenger loads for *KRI Teluk Langsa*, for example, even reached as high as 1,500 for a privatized transport venture from Batam in late 2000. See: *Suara Pembaruan*, '70 Kapal Bawa Senjata dan Amunisi Ditahan di Maluku', 23 July 2000; *Riau Pos*, 'Mudik dengan Kapal Perang Masih Terbuka Luas', 23 December 2000; *Jaknews.com*, '930 Personil TNI Dikembalikan ke Kesatuannya', 4 December 2000; Sharpe, Capt Richard (ed), *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 1999; Sharpe, Capt Richard (ed), *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Jane's Information

Group, Surrey, 2000; Southby-Tailyour, Ltcol Ewen (ed.), *Jane's Amphibious Warfare Capabilities,* Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 2000:'SEA LIFT...7 LST 1-511 and 512-1152 CLASSES (LST)...Complement: 119 (accommodation for 266). Prezelin, Bernard (ed), *The Naval Institute's Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1990/91: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament,* Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1990 (Baker III, A.D., prepared English language version), p.251: 'AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS...10 ex-US LST 542-class tank landing ships...Man: 119 crew + 264 passengers.'

48. *Jawa Pos,* 'ABRI dan GPK Kontak Senjata - Seorang Tewas, Sandera Belum Bebas', 23 August 1996.

49. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 'Human rights report on East Timor', 29 September 1997:

> In addition to the full battalions that are rotated in to East Timor, members of other Indonesia- based infantry battalions are sent in on a nine-month basis to augment the strength of the two 'task forces' (satgas) based in East Timor of the army special forces (Kopassus), Rajawali I and Rajawali II. In July 1997, for example, Jakarta newspapers carried an article about 146 soldiers from five different battalions of the Sriwijaya division of the army based in South Sumatra who were given a heroes' welcome after the completion of nine months in East Timor with Rajawali II. Collectively (and ominously) termed the 'Hunter Company' (Kompi Pemburu), the soldiers had been tasked with hunting down guerrillas in an effort to crush the insurgency.

Jawa Pos, 'Terjadi Lagi Kontak Senjata dengan GPK - Dua Tewas, Satu Anggota ABRI dan Satu GPK', 28 February 1998. The *Rajawali* deployment has also been apparent in Aceh, including the period since the 'humanitarian pause' negotiated from the President's office from early 2000. *Rajawali*'s presence in Aceh probably gives the lie to claims that no KOSTRAD forces were deployed there during that period. See: *Serambi,* 'Dua Warga Mengaku Disetrom', 25 June 2000.

50. *Pikiran Rakyat,* 'Satgas Rajawali Tembak Mati Anggota GPK', 19 October 1996, op cit.; and *Jawa Pos,* 'Kontak Senjata, Rajawali Tembak Tewas 1 GPK Irja', 19 October 1996.

51. Cf note 36, second reference; and *Suara Pembaruan,* 'DK PBB Sahkan Resolusi UNAMET', 12 June 1999.

52. *Republika,* 'Suku Semse belum Nikmati Pendidikan', 18 January 1999.

53. *MamberaMO* (Newsgroup), 'Di Manokwari Brimob Bentrok Dengan Masyarakat', 07 June 1999; *Suara Pembaruan,* 'Jayapura Mencekam', 30 November 2000; *Indonesiamu.com,* 'TNI Tambah 3 Kapal Perang di Irian', 3 Desember 2000; and *Gamma,* 'Siklus Baru Kekerasan', op cit.

54. *Petunjuk Tanda-Tanda Taktis ABRI,* Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 25 January 1986, p.187.

55. *Kompas,* 'Komnas HAM Soroti Sengketa di Timika: Dua Orang Tewas dan Tiga Luka-luka', 23 August 1997.

56. *Timika Pos*, 'Suasana Duka Warnai HUT Brimob', 15 November 2000; and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'More troops for West Papua as Jakarta tightens its grip', op cit.
57. *Harian ABRI*, 'Pangkalan Brimob Timika Irian Jaya Diresmikan', 10 November 1999.
58. http://www.dephan.go.id/satker/TNI AL/LANTAMALV.htm (Indonesian Defence Dept site).
59. Cf Pt.4, note.33.

Part 4

1. *Dharmasena*, 'Brimob: Penegak hukum ya pejuang', October 1995.
2. *Kompas*, 'Brimob akan Dimekarkan', 28 June 1996.
3. *Jawa Pos*, 'Kapolda Turba, Cari Lahan untuk Brimob: Tiap Kompi Minimal Butuh 3 Hektare Lahan', 9 October 1996.
4. Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs Press Cable PC-031, 14 February 2000 (II NASIONAL: D. HANKAM, 2., citing *Kompas*).
   The restoration of BRIMOB regiments should not be confused with the force structure of decades ago, when a 4th Regiment was noted in East Java, for example: *Jawa Pos*, 'Terimalah Kami sebagai Putra Bangsa', 24 February 1998 (published letter from Edi Soetjipto of Klaten).
5. *Koridor.com*, 'Wenas: Jangan Ragu Tembak Ditempat', 9 December 2000.
6. *The Jakarta Post*, '2,000 Mobile Brigade troops to be sent to Irian Jaya', 6 July 2000.
7. http://202.159.15.39/_bpers/00000033.htm, Siswa SETUKPA POLRI Angkatan ke-XXVIII T.A. 2000/2001), 18 September 2000 (POLRI personnel administration course panel list including members of various BRIMOB units).
8. *Tempo*, 'Senior Superintendent Drs. TB Chanafi S, SH: "Sekarang Teriak, Besok Baru Kumpul"'.
9. *Riau Pos*, 'Satu Kompi Brimob Fakfak Dialihkan ke Maluku', 27 July 2000.
   The same adjustment was apparent in Manokwari, though it was uncertain whether the East Kalimantan BRIMOB troops there were: briefly tasked in Manokwari; a sub-unit of the company at Fakfak; or another company formation replacing local Papua BRIMOB troops. Given the deployment to Manokwari in August of a BRIMOB company from East Java, the Kalimantan force was probably one or two platoons detached from Fakfak. See: *Timika Pos*, 'Wapres Bantu Satu Ambulance', 14 August 2000; *Timika Pos*, 'ELSHAM Sesalkan Insiden Manokwari', 8 September 2000; and *Indonesian Observer*, 'Brimob Reinforcements Spark Concern in Irian', 12 September 2000.
   This move had its own effect in Maluku, where the Papuan BRIMOB force reportedly sided with 'Christian' warring bands in the civil war. For a striking vignette of the absurdist and cynical 'sectarianism' in that chaos, note the following posting's description of truckloads of 'mujahiddin' wearing GAM tee-shirts: *Apakabar* (newsgroup), 'Christian Journalists in Ambon Targeted', 27 June 2000 from joyo@aol.com.

10. *The Jakarta Post*, 'Juwono: Jihad Force in Maluku Illegal', 26 July 2000; and *The Jakarta Post*, 'Indonesia to buy choppers from Russia: Embassy', 19 May 2001.
11. Cf note 6 above; and Siaran Pers Deplu No. 02/PR/1/00, 20 January 2000 (citing *Antara*, with Akbar insinuating similar 'international meddling' in the Maluku war). As further evidence of the consolidated nationalism of the country's Islamist militants, the 'issue' of *American* military weapons smuggling to Papua has been circulated amongst elements of the ultra-conservative *laskar* in metropolitan Java. See: *DeTAK*, 'Aksi Laskar Islam Solo Jilid II', 15 November 2000.
12. *The Australian*, 'Troops on collision course in Malukus', 28 June 2000 (Don Greenlees citing *Antara*); and Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Action Alert: 'Indonesian military build-up in West Papua', op cit.
13. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pusat Marinir di Tiga Tempat Presiden: Anggota AGAM Silakan Masuk TNI', 22 March 2000; and *Kompas*, 'Pemerintah Ingin Laksanakan Keadilan Setuntasnya', 25 March 2000.
14. *TNI Watch!*, 'Mengembalikan Kebanggaan Prajurit Korps Marinir', 21 March 2000; and *Xpos*, 'Marinir Membentuk Dua Divisi', 2-7 April 2001.
15. *Koridor.com*, 'Lagi, Pasukan Dikirim Ke Papua', 27 November 2000.
16. *Harian ABRI*, 'Mayjen TNI (Mar) Suharto: Terserah Pemerintah dan DPR', 16 November 1999.
17. *Indonesiamu.com*, 'Jenazah Korban Pesawat CASA TNI-AL Tiba di Timika', 12 January 2001.
18. *The Jakarta Post*, 'Eastern fleet exercise begins', 18 November 2000; and *Antara*, '37 Kapal Perang Amankan Perairan Irja', 4 December 2000.
19. Cf note 16 above.
20. *Angkasa*, '38 Tahun Kohanudnas: Upaya Menutup Lubang di Timur', March 2000.
21. *Angkasa*, 'Menhan Kunjungi Kohanudnas', June 2000 (ben).
22. *Timika Pos*, 'Pangkalan Udara Baru di Biak', 17 November 2000.
23. *Koridor.com*, 'Bukan Pangkalan Utama Tapi Kosek', 10 April 2001.
24. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'TNI Hanya Miliki 12 Radar Pendeteksi Pesawat Asing', 6 October 2000. At the time of writing, KOSEK IV was yet to become formally operational. See: *The Jakarta Post*, 'Air Force to build Air Defense Command in Biak', 14 May 2001.
25. *Avante!*, 'TNI Gusur Rumah Penduduk Untuk Bangun Pos Radar', August 1999.
26. *NTT Ekspres*, 'Combat jets only patrolling', 10 May 2000 (from translation posted by Elliot Hoffman on *Indopubs.com*).
27. *Avante!*, op cit.; *Kompas*, 'TNI Akan Jelaskan Pembangunan Radar Kepada DPRD NTT', 22 July 2000; and *Forum Keadilan*, 'Demi Kedaulatan, Rakyat Berkorban', 1 April 2001 (Teguh S. Usis, Irfan M. Amrullah).
28. The reader should be forgiven if inclined to conclude that TNI Spokesman Graito's comments in the fifth-listed article suggest that the 'incursion' and

public-relations activity. See: *Angkasa*, '38 Tahun Kohanudnas: Upaya Menutup Lubang di Timur', March 2000; *Antara*, 'TNI AU Siap Sergap dan Usir Pelanggar Wilayah Perbatasan Indonesia', 7 April 2000; *Angkasa*, 'Hawk 100/200 Cegat F-18 di Kupang', May 2000; *Angkasa*, 'Panglima Kohanudnas Marsda TNI Sonny Rizani: Bedakan Black Flight dan Tanpa Ijin', June 2000; and ibid., 'Kapuspen TNI Marsda TNI Graito Usodo: "Jangan Panas Kuping"'.

29. *Australian Defence Magazine*, 'Defence Strategy for Disputed Natuna Gas Field', July 1997 (Peter La Franchi); and *Times of India*, 'Australia, Indonesia Plan Joint Defence Move', 1 August 1997.
30. *Indonesian Observer*, 'Air Force to build base in Biak', 16 November 2000; *Kompas*, 'Seluruh Wilayah Timur Terjangkau Radar', 7 February 2001; and *Antara*, 'TNI AU Akan Bangun 4 Radar di Papua', 1 April 2001.
31. Lowry, *Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces*, ANU, Canberra, 1993, p.62 (citing Jakarta and Medan civil radar - not Bali or elsewhere); *Angkasa*, '38 Tahun Kohanudnas: Upaya Menutup Lubang di Timur', op cit.; *Kompas*, 'Seluruh Wilayah Timur Terjangkau Radar', op cit (Juanda, Hasanuddin, Biak and Ngurah Rai-Denpasar); and *Surabaya Post*, 'Radar, Apakah Tidak Berbahaya?', 14 April 2001.
32. *Indonesian Observer*, 'Air Force to build base in Biak', op cit.
33. *Jawa Pos*, 'Kupang airbase upgraded', 12 April 2000 (translated item posted on www.easttimor.com). The above report confirmed procedure for base protection as practised since at least the early 1990s. See: *Dharmasena*, 'Pasukan Khas TNI AU', October 1995.
34. *Angkasa*, '52 Tahun Korpaskhasau: Elit Tempur TNI AU', October 1999.
35. Further to notes 20-27, 30-32, this reconstruction was drawn from a comparison of several sources. The map indicates radar unit locations and KOSEK boundaries according to information directly attributable to TNI sources. On Lowry's 1996 map, KOSEK III does not extend across East Malaysia, but ends at the Natunas. Lowry advises that his map is 'representative only', and the author concedes that Lowry's (perhaps tactfully!) unacknowledged sources may be a more reliable guide on actual KOSEK boundaries. However, the 1995 TNI telephone directory specifies SATRAD 257's allocation to KOSEK III - primary source information upon which this paper relies in the absence of clearer contradiction. Another explanation for the discrepancy with Lowry's map may be that the Tarakan-based radar was out of action at the time of his research, as apparently evidenced by the 1996 *Kompas* article below. See: *Australian Aviation*, 'Indonesia's Air Capability of Critical Concern to Australia', April 1993 (Carlo Kopp); Lowry, *Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces*, op cit., pp.61-67; Buku Petunjuk Telepon: DEPHANKAM - ABRI, 1995, op cit.; Lowry, R., *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1996, pp.81-82; *Kompas*, 'Diuji, Kemampuan Tempur TNI AU', 10 June 1996; *Pikiran Rakyat*, 'Kohanudnas Dituntut Makin Profesional Penyusupan Lewat Udara Sangat Strategis', 17 February 1997; http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/public/

1998F20563/ws951985/penny-brief.htm (A quick confirmation of the UK-produced GCI radar model usually referred in sources merely as 'Plessey'. Page also describes radar 'Maintenance Unit 52' at Adi Soemarmo Airbase in Solo).
See also *Suara Pembaruan*, 'HUT Ke-36 Komando', 2 November 1998; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Operasional 15 Satuan Radar Dialihkan Ke Kohanudnas", 05 May 1999; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Radar-radar Strategis Untuk Mendeteksi Samudera Hindia', 27 July 1999; *Suara Merdeka*, 'Mobil Masuk Sungai, Ibu dan 4 Anak Tewas', 29 December 2000; http://www.dephan.go.id/homeau/jajaran_KOHANUDNAS.htm (a list of radar units and their abbreviated base names/locations); *Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2001-2002*; *Kompas*, 'Presiden: Segera Dibangun Pangkalan Udara di Kawasan Timur', 10 April 2001; and *Angkasa*, 'TNI AU Tidak Berminat Main Politik Praktis', 25 April 2001. (Article describes a typical Satrad strength of 47 personnel, and the vulnerability of radar units as evidenced by an attack on Satrad 251 in Lhokseumawe, then guarded by only two to four PASKHAS soldiers.)

Part 5

1. SBS Dateline, 'West Papua Militia', 5 July 2000 (Mark Worth).
2. Budiarjo, Carmel, & Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, Pluto, Leichhardt, 1984, Part II.
3. Cf. Pt.3, note.25, *Waspada*, 'AGAM Akui Perjuangannya Dapat Dukungan...'; cf note. 9, *Tajuk*, 'Siapa Dalang Bom? GAM, Militer Atau...'; *SiaR* (*Istiqlal* Newsgroup), 'Mengapa Cua'ak Stres Pasca DOM?', 6 January 1998 (Waspada Samosir); *Tempo*, 'Hikayat Musuh dalam Selimut: Cuak, dan pengkhianatan itu, telah ada sejak zaman Cut Nyak Dhien', 23 February-1 March 1999; Lhokseumawe Online, 'New Indon Military Brutalities in Aceh, 4 Women and 1 Youngman Shot', 12 May 2000 (M.N.Djuli, on site run by Human Rights Watch Press and separatist ANSLF/'GAM'. Article by Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA), Aceh Information Centre operated from Kuala Lumpur); *Serambi*, 'GAM-TNI Kembali Berbaku Tembak: Lima Warga dan Dua TNI Luka', 14 May 2000; *Serambi*, 'Korban Penembakan Dirawat di Rumah', 17 May 2000; and *Serambi*, 'Korban Penembakan Dibawa ke RSU', 20 May 2000.
   Characteristically for operations in Aceh, the TNI acronym 'TPO' differs from the 'TBO' almost invariably consistent in reports of auxiliaries in East Timor and Papua.
4. *Kompas*, 'Komandan Peleton Diadili, Beri Perintah Tidak Jelas', 31 January 1996.
5. *MamberaMO* (e-mail newsgroup), 'Pembunuhan Rakyat Sipil di Ilaga', 26 March 1998.
6. *Apakabar* (e-mail newsgroup), 'Teror di Mapnduma, Papua Barat', 2 May 1996.
7. A counter-insurgency operation in Irian Jaya during the late 1970s revealed the arbitrary recruitment of indigenous 'agents' and guides, along with Papuans of 751 Inf Bn, to form the bulk of long-range reconnaissance *Tim Tikus* (Mouse Team). See: Samsudin, op cit., p.430, 444. The *ad hoc* flexibility

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and interchangeable nature of local ethnic militia and auxiliaries has been well documented in the East Timor case. For a mid-1980s guide on the issue, cf. note 2.

8. From a check of several Indonesian sources at the time, Acehnese protests in 1999 to demand a referendum for independence were attended by up to a half of the entire population, if not more. On 8 November 1999, TVRI's *Berita Nasional* cited a total of approximately 250,000 demonstrators in the referendum demonstration held in Banda Aceh that day. On 11 November 1999 however, *Berita Buana*, for example, reported the presence of 2 million people in the 8 November rally in Banda Aceh. See interview with Governor of Aceh Specialo Area, Syamsuddin Machmud: *Berita Buana*, 'Gubernur Aceh: Rakyat Aceh Lebih Suka Merdeka', 11 November 1999.

9. Reporting on the 'phoney GAM' is quite extensive, and even includes acknowledgement by the Chief of Police in Aceh that 70% of reported GAM insurgents are actually armed gangs of TNI-POLRI deserters and prison escapees: *Serambi*, 'DPRD Pertanyakan Ikrar Setia', 8 March 2000:

> Dalam kaitan itu, Kapolda mengungkapkan bahwa yang 'bermain' dalam kasus Aceh ini melibatkan banyak pihak. 'Kalau GAM saya kira hanya sekitar 30 persen saja. Ini pun terbagi lagi, ada GAM, MP GAM, dan RIA (Republik Islam Aceh — red),' kata Bahrumsyah. Sedangkan kelompok terbesar, yaitu 70 persen, menurut Kapolda, terdiri dari berbagai macam, seperti para narapidana yang kabur dari penjara dan oknum TNI/polisi yang membelot. Karena banyak pihak yang 'bermain' inilah, maka pihak kepolisian memberikan nama kepada para pelaku tindak kekerasan di Aceh sebagai gerombolan bersenjata pengacau keamanan (GBPK).

The issue of KOPASSUS involvement has generated much attention on KOPASSUS operations in Aceh, if not on the subject of who actually controls these gangs. See: *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, 'Disturbances in Aceh: regional unrest, or *"mafia ganja"*?', November 1990 (John Maxwell, R.J. May and Larisa Taylor):

> It has also been suggested that those involved include former members of the North Sumatra Command, not all from Aceh, dismissed from the military for disciplinary offences.

Apakabar (newsgroup), 'Waspadai GAM Gadungan dan Achmad Kandang Palsu (tayangan kutipan)', 10 May 1999; *Tajuk*, 'Ketika Aceh Menjadi Kosovo', 19 August 1999; *Apakabar* (newsgroup), 'Konsolidasi Hasil - Pertinggi Kewaspadaan', 13 November 1999 (from GAM's European HQ in Norsborg, Stockholm); *Panji Masyarakat*, 'Mengungkap Dosa Para Jenderal', 8 December 1999; *Indonesian Observer*, 'Minister says provocateurs behind ethnic clashes', 26 May 2000; *Apakabar* (newsgroup), 'AGAM Wilayah Pase Binaan Kopassus? Sebuah Analisis ringkas', 21 August 2000 (Gani Ahmad); *Kontras*, 'Wakil Panglima AGAM Wilayah Pase Abu Sofyan Daud: Dokumen Asli Masih Banyak pada Kami', 30 August - 06 September 2000; and *Tajuk*, 'Siapa Dalang Bom: GAM, Militer, atau...', 2 October 2000.

Many media reports in metropolitan Java persist in treating the issue as one involving TNI 'deserters' who actually take up arms for the GAM separatist struggle. This was frequently the case with the bomb attacks on churches in Medan and the Jakarta Stock Exchange, though the issue of a 'phoney GAM' began to receive more widespread attention from that time. *Gamma*, 'GAM Palsu, GAM Asli, Kopassus, dan Bom BEJ', 3 October 2000; and *Gamma*, 'Polisi Menyisir Gunung Es', 10 October 2000.

Earlier reporting alludes to links to security forces and the paramilitary gangs, but POLRI statements maintain the 'TNI rogue element' in explaining that weapons smuggling, for example, was conducted for Acehnese separatists, and not to the covert mirror force, or 'phoney GAM'. President Wahid's comments on the matter drew an unusual response in a letter purportedly from 11 NGO leaders in South Aceh. See: *Gatra*, 'Musang Berbulu Domba', 6 November 1999.

10. 752 Inf Bn contained 85% indigenou Papuan troops in 1988. See: O'Hare, Martin, 'The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya', op cit., p.27.

11. *Tempo*, 'Papua Speaks - Supporting and Opposing Independence', 26 December 2000-8 January 2001:

> Another paramilitary group is the Papuan National Front Special Taskforce. The taskforce was formed last September by the Papuan National Front (FNP), headed by Herman Wayoi, a former fighter for Papuan independence from the Dutch. Its approximately 200 members are native Papuan, former police and Indonesian Military personnel. They say that their role is to lead the struggle for Papuan Independence carried out by the FNP. The Papuan Taskforce and the Special Taskforce are separate organizations but they coordinate their efforts. Before forming the FNP, Herman Wayoi wanted to found the West Papua Political Party. As a party, it would have worked within the Indonesian political structure. Because of that, Herman's plan was challenged by Free Papua Movement political prisoners. The Papua National Front is a more moderate organization than the Papuan Presidium. When the FNP held a national conference in September, several pro-Indonesia Papuan figures, including regional government officials, were invited to speak. 'The FNP is prepared to accommodate all aspirations from many different sections of society, both pro- and anti-independence,' says Herman Wayoi.

12. O'Hare, Martin, 'The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya', op cit., pp.52-53. Another category not apparent at the time of O'Hare's research is PAMSWAKARSA. This term first appeared in the security measures taken for the MPR in Jakarta in late 1998, and later from April 1999 in Dili. The term was later used throughout East Timor to describe militia forces hitherto recognised by a chain of command responsibility at Army territorial, KOPASSUS and POLRI formations.

13. *Infopapua.com*, 'Mobilisasi Massa Untuk Bela Negara Mulai Marak Di Papua', 31 August 2000, citing *Cenderawasih Pos*, 30 August 2000.

14. While the term *Bela Negara* may have also been incessantly bandied about in the East Timor case, the actual development towards expanded militias there was far less subtle. See: *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pangdam Trikora Siap Menarik Pasukan Dari Pegunungan Irja', 17 June 1998.
15. Basrie, Chaidir, *Bela negara: Implementasi dan Pengembangannya (penjabaran pasal 30 UUD 1945)*, Jakarta, Universitas Indonesia, 1998.
16. *Jawa Pos*, 'Polda Kejar Penyelundup Amunisi', 5 January 2000; and *Detik.com*, 'Diduga Gagal Masuk Ambon, Ribuan Amunisi Nyasar di Sorong', 6 January 2000.
17. Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, 'Topik Gema Warta: Diduga Keras Sorong Jadi Sasaran Dropping Laskar Jihad', 27 July 2000.
18. Depending upon the area, some SMP activity reveals the kind of staged political theatre that characterised New Order election campaigns by GOLKAR. An Argapura inhabitant and SMP participant, described the SMP 'parade' in Jayapura in a manner indicating that the loyalist rally was classic 'SOSPOL' (socio-political) action. KOPASSUS need not be involved in this business, though the *Tribuana* Deputy Commander's claims not even to be aware of it seem to challenge credulity. See: *Timika Pos*, 'Satgas Tribuana Merah Putih"', 14 August 2000. Another source - *Tempo* - appears to have accepted that this organisation is based in the capital's coastal suburb of Argapura, but insists upon the East Timor connection. *Tempo*, 'Papua Speaks - Supporting and Opposing Independence', 26 December 2000-8 January 2001:

    > One organisation that clearly opposes Papuan independence is the Red and White Taskforce, which has about 300 members. This pro-Indonesian militia has previously operated in pre-referendum East Timor. Most of them live in the village of Bom, Argapura Pantai, Jayapura.

    SMP has not appeared in the Timika area, though its existence elsewhere has been reported in the Timika organ. See: *Timika Pos*, 'Satgas Papua Pawai, Dua Tewas', 12 August 2000.
19. SOLIDAMOR (Solidaritas untuk Penyelesaian Damai Timor Leste), 'Surat Rahasia Asisten Menko Polkam', 20 July 1999.
20. *Reuters*, 'Secret plan shows Jakarta to bully, woo Irian Jaya', 26 November 2000 (Terry Friel); and *Indonesiamu.com*, 'TNI Tambah 3 Kapal Perang di Irian', op cit.
21. SBS Dateline, 'West Papua Militia', op cit. The SBS report incorrectly identified Musiran's rank, thereby suggesting he was ex-Army rather than Air Force.
22. Reporting on the 'crash program' funding became very frequent in *Timika Pos* from around mid-2000, but is not all is cited in this report, due to its very frequency and non-investigative nature. However, some Papuan groups have apparently rejected the honey-pot temptation out of suspicion that DEPDAGRI/local government are using the 'crash programme' to manipulate indigenous groups. For example, see: *Timika Pos*, 'FOKPAMAKOR Tolak Pemda Tangani Crash Program', 5 September 2000 (full article not available in online source accessed).

Some OPM reporting of these developments was very direct and, but remained hampered by a perceived international political imperative to urgently make comparisons to East Timor, as though direct and widespread loyalist mayhem was very imminent and inevitable by late 2000. See: *Kabar-Irian* (newsgroup), 'Latest on Wamena Militia Activities: Pro Jakarta Village Leaders Successfully Recruited', The CEB Reporting from Port Numbay, 27 November 2000.

23. The following article describes the seizure by Police of a massive supply of illicit alcohol, the hand grenade left on display to cause public panic, and the arrest of a suspect dealing amphetamines - all associated with a ship transport from Maluku: *Kabar Irian*, 'Dijinakkan di Pelabuhan Sorong: Granat Nyaris Ledakkan Dobonsolo', 11 February 2000 (M.H. Imran).

24. Once again, the connection was the inbound ships from Maluku via Sorong. See: *Indonesian Observer*, 'Drug trade on the rise in Sorong', 22 March 2000.

25. Cribb, Robert, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991.

    For a more recent reference exploring the theme of criminality within Indonesian society, using an approach from culture and media studies rather than traditional historical research, see also: Siegel, James T., *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today*, D.U.P., Durham (N.C.) 1998.

26. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'LINTAS NUSANTARA: Pasar Murah di Jayapura', 26 April 1998.

27. *Kompas*, 'Kesepakatan Ormas Berafiliasi ke TNI-Polri: Lakukan Pembaharuan Pemerintah', 20 April 2001.

28. *Astaga.com*, 'Satgas Papua Menyergap Ketua KNPI Irja', 27 May 2000.

29. *Xpos*, 'Paulus Sumino, Ketua Komisi B DPRD I Irian: "Di Irian Federasi Tidak Populer"', 26 December 1999-1 January 2000.

30. Sentral Informasi referendum Aceh (SIRA), 'Aksi Pengrusakan dan Penurunan Spanduk Oleh Penjajah dan Perampok Indonesia', 3 April 1999 (Press Release).

31. *Gatra*, 'Serangan ke Gedung Putih', 15 January 2000 (Mukhlizardy Mukhtar). The term appearing throughout articles on the subject is 'bermain' (cf note34 below):

    > Di tengah krisis ekonomi ini, ia sering membagi-bagikan sembako kepada penduduk. Terakhir, dia membiayai pengungsi dari Aceh, yang terdampar di Sumatera Utara, untuk pulang ke Jawa. Walau ada juga isu miring, yang menyebutkan bahwa anggota IPK ikut 'bermain' di Aceh dan terlibat bisnis judi.

32. ibid.

33. *Gatra*, 'Musang Berbulu Domba', 6 November 1999; and *Gatra*, 'Wolf in Sheep's Clothing', 6 November 1999 (translated version).

34 *Serambi*, 'Pemuda Muhammadiyah dan DEM-Unaya: Pasca MoU, Derita Aceh belum Berakhir?', 20 May 2000:

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> Namun statement yang dilontarkan membuat masyarakat semakin bingung. Apalagi ketika berhadapan dengan kondisi sebenarnya, di mana rakyat tetap menjadi korban akibat pertikaian yang tak berujung. Menghadapi kenyataan itu, Pemuda Muhammadiyah Aceh mempertanyakan, 'Siapakah yang masih terus bermain dan ingin menghancurleburkan Aceh?'. Seharusnya, menurut Pemuda Muhammadiyah Aceh, 'Pertanyaan itu bisa dijawab oleh pihak-pihak yang mengaku sangat terlatih dan bertaraf internasional serta memiliki tenaga intelligent yang sangat cakap'.

35. *Posmo*, 'PP dan IPK Bentrok di Medan', 22 November 2000.
36. Suara Pembaruan, 'ANEKA BERITA: Kebaktian di Senayan', 14 July 1998.
37. *Sinar Harapan*, 'Ringkasan Hal-Ihwal Irja', 14 March 1996.
38. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Tokoh Muda Nyatakan Komitmen Tegaknya NKRI dan Tolak Kekerasan', 29 December 1999.
39. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'Golkar youth funding separatists', 2 June 2000 (Lindsay Murdoch and Andrew Kilvert).
40. *Jawa Pos*, 'Yorrys Galang Pawai Tuntut Merdeka', 11 November 1999.
41. *Panji Masyarakat*, 'Benang Kusut Papua', 8 December 1999.
42. *Timika Pos*, 'Inginkan Papua Tetap dalam RI', 23 October 2000; and *Indonesian Observer*, 'Yorrys against West Papuan independence', 23 October 2000.
43. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pelantikan Kaditsospol Pemda Irja Diprotes Jayapura', 18 June 1998.
44. *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Gubernur Irja: Jangan Terpancing Isu Disintegrasi', 25 June 1998.
45. *Gamma*, 'Morning, Noon or Nights, Our Families are being Killed', 22-28 March 2000 (Dance Bleskadit. Translated interview with newly appointed Freeport commissioner and former OPM commander Tom Beanal.)
46. *Gatra*, 'Merdeka Tanda Kutip', 27 November 1999; and Radio Nederland, 'Demonstrasi Pro-Kemerdekaan Di Irian Jaya - Topik Gema Warta: Kini Giliran Irian Jaya Tuntut Kemerdekaan', 12 November 1999.
47. *The National* (PNG), 'West Papua activist killed in Vanimo', 26 April 2000; *Post-Courier News* (PNG), 'OPM rebel leader Bomai killed in brawl', 26 April 2000; ABC - Asia Pacfic Program, 'Murder of OPM Leader Raises Fears of Factional Violence, West Papua', 27 April 2000; and *Kabar Irian* (newsgroup), 'Hans Bomai meninggal dunia', 28 April 2000 (obituary letter from OPM Chief Moses Weror). Letter describes Bomai's efforts to establish dialogue with the President of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid.
48. *Kompas*, 'OPM Ancam Eksekusi Sandera', 27 January 2001.
49. A propaganda organ of the *Laskar Jihad* paramilitaries at war in Maluku describes the exodus of Christian militia to Papua. The site always refers to the Christian militia as 'RMS' in order to emphasise the ultimately loyalist nationalism of the *mujahidin* cause by depicting their enemies as inheritors of the 1950s Maluku separatists. See: *Maluku Hari Ini*, 'Laskar Jihad pembela

Ummat Islam', 18 August 2000, (Edisi 16-31 August 2000, Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah); and *Maluku Hari Ini*, 'Polri segera perkuat Maluku', 26 August 2000, (Edisi 16-31 August 2000, Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah). Another report revealed that Maluku-based Army members moved to Sorong, including a commander for Bula's KORAMIL: *Jakarta Post*, 'Maluku refugees arrive in Sorong', 23 March 2000.

50. Cf note 49 above (first two references).For the sources directly attributable to Rustam Kastor, see URL: http://listen.to/Rustam-Kastor. The approved *laskar* press organ linked to Rustam's site is *Pos Keadilan*, a newspaper established by *Partai Keadilan* (PK - 'Justice Party').

51. *Indonesian Observer*, 'Smuggled guns found in Irian', 20 January 2000; Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Jakarta, 20 January 2000; *Tapol*, 'West Papuans vote for independence', Bulletin Online 158 - June 2000 (citing *Tempo*, 31 May 2000); *Waspada*, 'Akibat Isu Masuknya Pasukan Jihad Bentrok Aparat Vs Warga Papua', 28 July 2000; and Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, 'Topik Gema Warta: Diduga Keras Sorong Jadi Sasaran Dropping Laskar Jihad', op cit.

52. *Indonesian Observer*, 'National shipping line stops sailing to Irian Jaya', 19 January 2000.

53. *Timika Pos*, 'Laskar Jihad Di Maluku Segera Dipulangkan', 26 July 2000.

54. The term *laskar* is itself loaded with particularly Indonesian nationalist (and concurrent criminal) connotations from the Independence War era of the 1940s and early 1950s. The term *laskar* itself actually comes from the Arabic, hardly a grass roots indigenous appellation for Papuan separatists. For an excellent study of some original *laskar* bands during that period, see: Cribb, Robert, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949*, op cit.

55. The 'priority' on 'public morals' and temperance was explicit in the agreement between Decki's group and the government apparatus in Mimika Regency. See: *Timika Pos*, 'PDPKM Perangi Miras dan Tempat Hiburan', 5 August 2000; *Timika Pos*, 'Mimika Siap Ciptakan Kedamaian', 12 August 2000; and *Timika Pos*, 'Laskar Mambruk Sita Miras dan Senjata Tajam', 7 September 2000.

56. *Timika Pos*, 'Timika Tolak Pengungsi Ambon', 5 August 2000.

57. *Timika Pos*, 'Satgas Papua Kuasai Bandara Wamena', 5 August 2000.

58. *Timika Pos*, 'Timika Tolak Pengungsi Ambon', op cit.
The relative powerlessness of the *Satgas Papua* in Wamena is apparent considering their action at Wamena airport was a response to reports that 'refugees from Maluku' were about to spark off violence there. Decki's *Laskar Papua*, on the other hand, had already been able to attain security force approval to make identity card checks on any Maluku refugees. See: *Timika Pos*, 'Mimika Siap Ciptakan Kedamaian', op cit.

59. *Timika Pos*, 'Penggeledahan Perlu Koordinasi', 14 August 2000. To highlight the successful co-opting of indigenous Papuans into Decky's *laskar*, the article also mentions Fidelis Songgonau and Pius Way as *Satgas Papua*

members warning of provocateurs entering Timika from Maluku. In context the two may be best understood as unwitting pro-independence participants in Decki's *laskar*.

60. *Timika Pos*, 'Laskar Papua Kerja Sama dengan KKSS', 5 September 2000 (full article not available in online source accessed). The Sulawesi connection indicates the involvement of Christian gangs in the Papuan case, in an informal transmigration program by other means.

61. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, 'Special Report: East Timor Analysis #1', 7 September 1999 (Richard Tanter):

> ABRI is using the violence of its East Timorese contras to send a message to the rest of Indonesia, and to the oil-rich province of Aceh in particular: 'this is what the rest of you can expect if you continue to oppose us.'

62. *The Australian*, 'West Papua in the grip of militia terror', 29 April 2000.

63. *Tifa Irian*, 'Faisal Tandjung Lecehkan Rakyat Papua: Demi Rakyat Saya Siap Dicopot dari Jabatan', Week 3, October 1999.

Part 6

1. *Kompas*, 'Menyikapi Hasil Kongres Rakyat Papua: Utamakan Dialog daripada Tindakan Militer', 7 June 2000; *The Jakarta Post*, 'No need for additional troops in Irian: Albert', 10 June 2000.

2. *Panji Masyarakat*, 'Djadja Diperiksa Irjen AD?', 30 August 2000.

3. The 'black' funds would not all necessarily be traced to exclusively Indonesian sources, as may be inferred from the precedent of Freeport aid to military installations built at the time of KODIM 1710's creation, while ownership/profit percentages of the FIC asset could make any such national-overseas distinction pointless.

4. *Kompas*, 'Dengan Otonomi Khusus Irja Minta 80 Persen Dana Perimbangan Keuangan', 19 April 2001.

5. *The Jakarta Post*, 'Editorial: Security for investors', 14 July 2000:

> But while firm military and police action or the deployment of private security guards could be helpful to protect enterprises from security disturbances, the 'license' for private companies to hire security forces is highly prone to abuse either by the military or police, which badly need an additional source of income, or by greedy businesspeople trying to quash legitimate claims from locals or trade unions. More clear-cut rules are therefore needed to safeguard what Juwono stated as cooperation between businesses and the military or police.

6. *Kompas*, Kasus Tiom Akibat Kesalahan Prosedur, 20 December 2000.

7. The figure is outlandish even for Wamena *Regency*, with its poorly developed land communications routes and mountainous terrain, let alone the town of Wamena. In comparison, this total amounts to approximately two-thirds of the entire BRIMOB force in 1999 East Timor (cf Pt.4, fn.8).

Detik.com, 'Diduga Provokator Wamena: Empat Satgas Papua Ditangkap', 10 October 2000; and *Suara Merdeka,* 'Empat Provokator Wamena Ditangkap', 10 October 2000.

8. For an example of reports specifying the (expensive) means by which BRIMOB troops to Wamena, and identifying the units as company formations, see: *Tempo,* 'Tragedi Berdarah Wamena 30 Korban Tewas Dan 40 Luka Parah', 7 October 2000.
9. *Antara,* 'Setengah Kekuatan TNI/POLRI Digelar Didaerah Konflik', 28 February 2001 (N.B.: Date is provided by another source and may be one or two days later than the actual *Antara* publication date).
10. *Panji Masyarakat,* 'Para Jenderal Penguasa Yayasan', 6 December 2000; and *Kompas,* 'Agus WK dan Saurip Kadi Terancam DKP', 8 October 2000.
11. In the context, *etika* should be understood as matters concerning protocol in traditional hirarchy relations, as distinct from any actual 'ethical' considerations. The latter seem to have received scant regard in the case of Agus Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi. Further still, the issue of 'etiquette' does not extend to the process whereby some officers technically subordinate to Agus - i.e., KODAM and other commanders, can submit recommendation that a LtGen be charged. For an early report of the anti-reformist coup, see: *Kompas,* 'Agus WK dan Saurip Kadi Terancam DKP', 8 October 2000.
12. *Tempo,* 'Kusnanto Anggoro: "Ancaman DKP, Pesan Serius Untuk Gus Dur"', 18 October 2000.
13. For a list of the official extra-regimental business appointments held by many senior Army officers, see: *Panji Masyarakat,* 'Para Jenderal Penguasa Yayasan', op cit.
14. *Suara Pembaruan,* 'Yayasan di Lingkungan TNI untuk Kesejahteraan Prajurit', 18 October 2000.
15. Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep - Edisi: Bahasa Indonesia, 'Mesin Mutasi Kembali Bergulir Dalam Tubuh TNI AD', 18 January 2001 (Syahrir).
16. *Kompas,* 'Dua Panglima Kodam Dilantik Senin', 18 January 2001.
17. *Forum Keadilan,* 'Tawar-menawar Politik Penjungkalan AWK', 14 August 2000.
18. *Kompas,* 'Agus WK dan Saurip Kadi Terancam DKP', op cit.
19. *Kompas,* 'Daftar Lengkap Mutasi di Tubuh TNI', 16 June 2000; and *Timika Pos,* Jangan Korbankan Rakyat Lagi', 14 November 2000.
20. *Gamma,* '"Begini Terus, TNI Habis"', op cit.
21. *Detik.com,* 'Panglima TNI Bantah Dugaan Sabotase Jatuhnya Cassa 212', 10 January 2001; and *Tempo-Online,* 'Pesawat Hilang Bukan Karena Sabotase', 10 January 2001.
22. *The Jakarta Post,* 'Maj. Gen. Mahidin posted to Irian Jaya', 17 January 2001.
23. *Kompas,* 'Daerah Sekilas', 27 June 1997.

24. *Deja.com* (e-mail discussion group alt.government.abuse), 'Info on ABRI's Paramiliaries (sic) in East Timor', 14 February 1999 (from Timor Today via etio@ozemail.com.au); and *Deja.com* (e-mail newsgroup misc.activism.progressive), 'Indonesian Military Intelligence Behind Militias in East Timor', 14 March 1999 (Rich Winkel). One can accept Winkel's reference to 'reliable information' linking Mahidin Simbolon to the expanded East Timorese loyalist militias. Winkel describes as possibly 'not…a coincidence' the near identical MAHIDI militia and then BrigGen Simbolon's name. In fact, the earlier *Timor Today* report, amongst many other textual reports, unambiguously referred to the MAHIDIN group. Televised news footage at the time clearly revealed prints of both 'MAHIDIN' and 'MAHIDI' on tee shirts worn as uniform by the group. Moreover, Winkel's analysis of the Simbolon connection is perhaps weakened by his resort to explanation of Javanese 'cultural' peculiarity when Simbolon is of Batak origin - stereotyped as the cultural antithesis of Javanese. In this case, perhaps the more appropriate frame is the simple universalist theme of patronage, as when military-brigands took their unit name from their commander-cum-financier in European precedents among the Renaissance *Condottieri* or the Weimar period's *Freikorps*.
25. *DeTAK*, 'Sabotase Mobil Wapres dan Carut Marutnya Intelijen', 2 October 2000.
26. One mooted finance channel of YDPK was to the PAMSWAKARSA in Jakarta in late 1998, and to the *laskar jihad* in Maluku in 2000. See: Aditjondro, George, *Financing Human Rights Abuses in Indonesia - Part II*, 18 November 2000 (George Aditjondro).
27. The spectre of a pan-Melanesian campaign probably alerted the Indonesian Government after the Governor of Sandaun Province offered comments sympathetic to the Papuan separatists. See: *Antara*, 'Gubernur Sandaun (PNG) Dukung Perjuangan Papua Merdeka', 30 May 2000; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'Machete militias clash as self-rule tensions heat up', 8 June 2000 (Andrew Kilvert); and Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian/Office for Justice and Peace Keuskupan Jayapura/Diocese of Jayapura, op cit.
28. *Koridor.com*, 'Mesin Perang TNI Ganggu PNG', 9 April 2001.

Part 7

1. *The Age*, 'Concern as Indonesia dispatches troops…', op cit. Daley states an minimum estimate, conceding that other estimates range to 'several thousand regular and special forces…'. *Jane's* ventured further upwards, factoring in mooted expansions of BRIMOB and Marine presence in Papua, but the vast jump in calculations suggested an element of information catch-up. See: *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 'More conflict in Indonesia?', 26 January 2001 (Briefings):

> ...army numbers have increased from 3,000 to 7,000 in the past year...confirmed plans to deploy 3,000 marines, as well as 2,000 paramilitary police, in the near future. ...financing a 7,000 strong pro-Jakarta militia force...

Jane's Intelligence Review, 'Jakarta raises stakes in West Papua', 1 April 2001 (News - Ian Bostock):"...boosting TNI presence in West Papua from around 3,000 personnel a year ago, to 10,000, with plans for a further 2,000 paramilitary police".

2. www.sprocki.de, 'West Papua nach dem 1. Dezember 2000', 9 December 2000. This source cites figures relayed by Klemens Rumaweri of the Papuan Council Presidium. The list may at first glance seem well considered, with a breakdown of BRIMOB, KOSTRAD, KOPASSUS, other POLRI and TNI into 'Sondertruppen (non-organic)'/special (non-organic) troops (21,000), and 'Reguläre Truppen (organic)'/regular (organic) troops (14,000). Unfortunately, the totals are outlandish e.g., a KOPASSUS deployment of 7,000 troops - just more than the Special Forces Command's entire establishment strength in late 2000.
3. *Timika Pos*, 'Pemuda Papua: Gus Dur Jangan Takut MPR', 15 August 2000.
4. O'Hare, Martin, 'The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya', op cit., pp.38-42 and p.46 (fn.30). O'Hare was unfortunate to have conducted his research prior to the boom of website sources increasingly available since the mid-1990s. This open source deficiency obviously affected the sub-thesis' results in the area of non-organic Army and BRIMOB troops.
5. ibid, p.41, 46 (fn.30). O'Hare's calculations are deficient for the KORAMIL formations - a stark anomaly given the thorough detail accorded higher territorial Army commands (KODIM, KOREM, KODAM), and the author is indebted to O'Hare's research on these parts of ORBAT reconstruction. O'Hare numbers all KORAMIL troops at 'around 100', but gives only passing mention to village management NCOs (*babinsa*) - a function at one stage set for disbandment in some of Indonesia's major metropolitan areas by the year 2000. For a sample of reporting on the abortive reform process of the *babinsa* system under former Army Chief Gen Tyasno Sudarto, and advocated by LtGen Agus Wirahadikusumah and MajGen Saurip Kadi, see: *Kompas*, 'Babinsa di Kota Besar Ditarik ke Koramil', 27 April 2000; *TNI Watch!*, 'Kita Dukung Gebrakan KSAD Menghapus Babinsa dan Koramil', 11 May 2000; *Kompas*, 'Saurip Kadi: "Saya tidak Kecewa"' 19 Juni 2000; and Tempo, 'Mayor Jenderal Saurip Kadi: "Mas, Zaman Sudah Berubah, Tugas Berubah ..."', 24 June 2000.

   An important point on KORAMIL area coverage is the 1994 plan to increase total KORAMIL formations in order to reduce the number of allotted districts (*kecamatan*), from between four and six, to two. Occurring after O'Hare's research, this measure would almost certainly have impacted on Irian Jaya by the mid-1990s. See: *Dharmasena*, 'Pembinaan dan Pengembangan TNI-AD pada Awal PJP II', Edisi Khusus, October 1994, p.73.

6. http://homepage.esoterica.pt/~cdpm/orgepen.htm (Portuguese website posting for leaked figures tabulated as: 'East Timor: Indonesian Military Forces - list of Officers - elaborated from Indonesian military forces (ABRI) documents (dated between August and November 1998'). The document must be treated with caution as it 'processes' statistics for *penugasan* from the original leaks, resulting in exaggerated distortions for some battalion strengths, and duplication of some unit figures. However, the non-organic *penugasan* details in this document were used in this paper to identify *Satgas* structure, not troop numbers.
7. O'Hare, Martin, 'The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya', op cit., p.48, fn.48. O'Hare numbers companies in KOPASSUS at 100, in infantry battalions at 150, and probably multiplied four companies of BRIMOB to equal 400 personnel per battalion. Even in battalions with under-strength companies, this calculation would omit battalion HQ and support personnel.
8. Admittedly, at the time of O'Hare's draft, East Timor was a more intense and concentrated counter-insurgency for the Indonesian security forces than Irian Jaya. However, demographic and administrative figures suggest that East Timor's relatively small regencies (for KODIM and POLRES)
9. Cf note1 above: *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 'More conflict in Indonesia?'; and *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 'Jakarta raises stakes in West Papua'.
10. O'Hare, Martin, 'The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya', op cit., pp.52-53.
11. Cf Part5, notes13-14.
12. The author makes only several references here, and mostly to works driven by Steele, as obviously created from a spirit of professional involvement - not academic detachment. The comprehensive OSS treatment perhaps deserves priority attention in the OSINT discourse. See: *American Intelligence Journal*, 'Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990's', Winter 1989-1990 (GEN Alfred M. Gray):

    > What does this mean from the Marine Corps' point of view? ...It means we must apply technology in ways responsive to our most immediate and frequent threats, and must balance our use of technology with the intelligence cycle: ...Establishment of a separate Open Source Committee co-equal to other national-level disciplinary committees; this is essential if community programs to apply information technology to open source exploitation are to be cost-effective and mutually reinforcing....

    American Intelligence Journal, 'Intelligence in the 1990's: Recasting National Security in a Changing World', Summer/Fall 1990 (Robert David Steele); *American Intelligence Journal*, 'The National Security Act of 1992', Winter/Spring 1992 (Robert David Steele); Open Source Intelligence: Professiona Handbook 1.1, Proceedings, Vol. 1, Fifth International Symposium on 'Global Security and Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions', OSS Inc., 1996 (from a draft prepared for the USN-USMC Intelligence Training Center); and Steele, Robert D. & Lowenthal, Mark M., *Open Source Intelligence: Executive Overview*, OSS Academy, Oakton, October 1998.

13. Discussion by the CIP Intelligence Advisory Board, Dirksen Senate Office Building, 'The Failure of Intelligence Review: A critique of three recent commission reports exonerating the CIA', Center for International Policy, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 312, Washington DC 20036, April 22, 1996. From the critique of 'Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence - Report of an Independent Task Force (New York, 1996):

> 3. What kinds of information can be considered "intelligence"? The CFR report suggests that the intelligence community should not be an all-purpose source of information and analysis. It should focus on that kind of information and analysis that it can uniquely provide - i.e., secret information and analysis. This seemed to Johnson an unworkable and undesirable distinction.

The solution to this problem lies in a new approach based on an *in*clusive definition of 'intelligence'. See Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.1, op cit., p.128:

> What we have here is a dilemma. On the one hand, we want the intelligence community to focus on secrets. On the other hand we have to keep the policy-maker informed, and find that 80% of the time OSCINT is better at informing policy than are secrets. What I believe we need is a new strategic definition of what constitutes 'national intelligence' — our definition must provide for a distinction between classified governmental intelligence and unclassified private enterprise intelligence, while also providing for the integration of both under the national intelligence umbrella.

14. Steele, Robert D. & Lowenthal, Dr. Mark M., op cit., p.15:

> From the 1940's to date, the generally accepted percentage of intelligence requirements that open sources are able to satisfy is 80%. In the United States, open sources — and poorly accessed open sources at that — are officially credited with contributing 40% of the final all-source production content, at a cost of 1% of the total cost of national intelligence across the board.

Figure 15. Authoritative Estimates Regarding Open Source Contribution
Allen Dulles (DCI): 80%
Ward Elcock (DG/CSIS): 80%
Gordon Oehler (D/NPC): 80%
Joseph Markowitz (D/COSPO): 40%.

Zacharias, Ellis M., *Secret Missions*, Paperback Library, 1961, pp.107-108:

> ...Approximately 95 percent of our peacetime intelligence comes to us from open sources...An additional 4 per cent comes from semi-open sources...Only 1 percent, and often less than that, is derived from truly secret sources.

Steele, Robert D., *The New Craft of Intelligence*, op cit., fn.3.

15. For descriptions of collection management in this context, see: Steele, Robert D., *The New Craft of Intelligence*, Author's Review Draft, 4 June 2001, p.14, on www.oss.net, and an earlier work in more detail: Steele, Robert D. & Lowenthal, Mark M., op cit., pp.45-47.

16. This term is logic-derived, not exclusive to Western intelligence doctrines, and a Russian military example of its use is referred here in anticipation of possible accusations that the author has used 'intelligence methods', *a la* WNINTEL in the US, for the production of the table. *Military Thought*, 'Armed Forces Informatization: Problems and Solutions', Vol. 9, No 2, 2000:

> ...the paramount importance of information resources for the satisfaction of information requirements of officials at military command and control agencies.

The term 'information requirements' may also be interchangeable with 'intelligence requirements' as cited in the following Australian professional intelligence journal, for example. Of course, which term is more appropriate would depend upon context - i.e., the former if OSINT is already systematically integrated within the intelligence infrastructure, and the latter if the OSINT process is merely served by an excuse of say, well-educated managers checking CNN and voicemail from ministerial advisers.

The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers, 'The Relationship Between Intelligence Analysis and Policymaking - Some Issues', Vol. 8, No 1, 1999 (Terry-Anne O'Neill, citing Davis, Jack, 'The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty - Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy Relations', at URL: http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96unclas/davis.htm, p.5).

17. Dixon, Norman, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, Pimlico, London, 1976. Although chapter 16 (on 'bull') attempts to reveal pathological causes of the rigid rules in symbolic military display, an application of Dixon's observations to the intelligence craft may help explain the 'cognitive dissonance' that appears to have occurred in the IC's response to the open source 'revolution in *intelligence* affairs':

> Since it aims to govern behaviour by a set of rules and defines a rigid programme for different occasions, it cannot meet the unanticipated event (p.178).
>
> It is essentially by constraint that 'bull' seems to combat disorderliness (p.179).
>
> Perhaps the single most important feature of 'bull' is its capacity to allay anxiety...there are good grounds for believing that those situations in which 'bull' flourishes are ones in which it reduces anxiety *because* orderliness is fairly vital to survival (p.182).

18. Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.1, op cit., pp.99-100 (citing an unclassified 1992 USMC documentary excerpt of a report classified SECRET):

> The official definition of OSCINT by the U.S. Intelligence Community: ...Whatever form it takes, Open Source *involves no information* that is: classified at its origin; ...or is *acquired through* clandestine or covert means (author's italics).

19. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 'Open-source intel: a vauable national security resource, op cit.

20. Cf Part 1, note5 for a definition, and note 23 below.

21. Australian Defence Studies Centre, 'Conference Report: Optimising Open

Source Information', op cit.; and Australian Defence Studies Centre, 'Optimising Open Source Information Sharing in Australia...', op cit., for another of the conferences' 'findings':

> OSINT requires a re-evaluation of security policy and practice as it is increasingly co-existing, and complementing, classified information and systems.

22. Indeed, OSS anticipated this key issue early, albeit with a suggested solution using cursory wording that would likely alarm less imaginative, and rigidly security conscious, personnel accustomed to the commandments of formal security instructions and briefs. See: Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.1, op cit., p.108:

> - Disadvantages include the possibility of revealing military plans and intentions (security can be provided by laundering the question through trusted intermediaries)...

23. As a workable classification or caveat for OSINT product sanitised against its classified counterpart, COSPO's Markowitz proposed 'OSINT-V' (validated). See: Steele, Robert D. & Lowenthal, Mark M., op cit., p.6 and fn.1.

24. Some smaller regional states could thrive by stealing a lead in this area. Singapore may be an apt example for the former reason, and New Zealand for the latter.

25. Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.1, op cit., p.10.

26. FAIR (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting) 'ACTION ALERT: U.S. Media Overlook Exposé on Chinese Embassy Bombing', 22 October 1999 on URL: http://www.fair.org/activism/embassy-bombing.html, and 'NATO's bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade was deliberate', (Chris Marsden) on URL: http://kosovo99.tripod.com/chinese.htm.

27. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 'Prison, Torture and Murder in Jayapura: Twelve Days in an Indonesian Jail', 22 December 2000 (Oswald Iten).

28. *Tempo*, 'Suripto: "Insting Intelijen Saya Sudah Tak Tajam Lagi"', 13 May 2001.

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