

Terrorists and Targets

- A Relationship Founded on Bad Intentions,
Limited Capacities and Risk Willingness

by

Cato Hemmingby

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of
the requirements for degree of
PHILOSOPHIAE DOCTOR
(PhD)



University of
Stavanger

Faculty of Social Sciences

2019

University of Stavanger
P.O. Box 8002, Ullandhaug
N-4068 Stavanger
NORWAY
www.uis.no

©2019 Cato Hemmingby

ISBN: 978-82-7644-863-4

ISSN: 1890-1387

Abbreviations

ACDT	Academic consensus definition of terrorism
AIVD	Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst or Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service
AKS	Politiets Aktionsstyrke or The Danish police national counterterrorism unit
AQ	Al-Qaida
AQ Central	AQ core (excluding affiliates)
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
AQ-GB	Al-Qaida – Great Britain
AQI	Al-Qaida in Iraq
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
AUF	Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking or Norwegian Labour Party Worker’s Youth League
BSO	Black September Organization
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CPNI	Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (UK)
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service (UK)
CT	Counterterrorism

CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
DELTA	Beredskapstroppen or Norwegian Police National Emergency Response Unit
DGSI	Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure or General Directorate for Internal Security (France)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (US)
DSS	Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon or Norwegian Ministries' Security and Service Organisation
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire or Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (France)
ECA	Ephedrine, caffeine, aspirin
EDL	English Defence League
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Liberty
EU	European Union
FAD	Fornyings- og administrasjonsdepartementet or Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration and Reform
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area (Pakistan)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations (US)
FFI	Forsvarets forskningsintitutt or Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
FIS	Front islamique du salut or Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria)
FRP	Fremskrittspartiet or The Progress Party (Norway)
FrpU	Fremskrittspartiets ungdom or The Progress Party's Youth Organisation

GB	Great Britain
GBP	Pound Sterling (UK)
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armée or Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
GIGN	Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale or National Gendarmerie Intervention Group
GSG-9	Grenzschutzgruppe 9 or Border Protection Group 9 (Germany)
GSPC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat or Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Algeria)
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
HQ	Headquarter
IED	Improvised explosive device
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union
ISA	Israeli Security Agency
IS	Islamic state
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JP	Jyllands-Posten (Danish newspaper)
KMD	Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet or Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation

KSK	Kommando Spezialkräfte or Special Forces Command (Germany)
KT	Knights Templar (network)
LeT	Lashkar e Tayyiba or Army of the Righteous or Army of the Pure
LO	Landsorganisasjonen or Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Holland)
MANPADS	Man-portable air-defense systems
MCI	Mass casualty incident
MI5	Security Service (UK)
MI6	Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
Mossad	Secret Intelligence Service (Israel)
MP	Member of Parliament
NA	Nerikes Allehanda (Swedish newspaper)
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office (UK)
NESH	Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora or The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOK	Norske kroner or Norwegian currency
NSU	Der Nationalsozialistische Untergrund or The National Socialist Underground (Germany)

NTB	Norsk telegrambyrå or Norwegian National News Agency
NRK	Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation
OBL	Osama bin Laden
PET	Politiets Efterretningstjeneste or Danish Police Security and Intelligence Service
PETN	Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (explosives)
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PM	Prime Minister
Pro-NRW	Die Bürgerbewegung pro Nordrhein-Westfalen or Citizens' movement for Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany)
PST	Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste or Police Security Service (Norway)
RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion, Red Army Faction
RER	Réseau Express Régional or Regional Express Network trains (France)
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary (Northern Ireland)
SAM	Surface-to-air missile

SÄPO	Säkerhetspolisen or Swedish Police Security Service
SAS	Special Air Service Regiment (UK)
SKUP	Stiftelsen for en kritisk og undersøkende presse or The Foundation for a Critical and Investigative Press (Norway)
TATP	Triacetone triperoxide (explosives)
TC	Target type category
TGV	High-speed trains (France)
TTP	Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment (Northern Ireland)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USD	US dollars
VBIED	Vehicle-born improvised explosive device
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War 2
ZOG	Zionist Occupation Government

Contents

Contents

Abbreviations	iii
Preface	1
Summary	3
1 Understanding Terrorist Target Selection	8
1.1 Introduction.....	8
1.1.1 Terrorism in the spectrum of organised violence	9
1.1.2 Terrorism is also a crime	10
1.2 Defining terrorism	11
1.2.1 Towards a core definition.....	12
1.2.2 Defining lone actor terrorism.....	14
1.3 Communication through violence	18
1.3.1 The faces of terrorism	19
1.3.2 Terrorist targeting research so far	20
1.3.3 Level of analysis.....	24
1.4 Research objectives and target audience for this project	25
1.4.1 The research objectives for this thesis	26
1.4.2 The target audience for this research	29
2 Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations	32
2.1.1 Criminal reasoning and opportunity theories	32
2.1.2 Terrorist reasoning.....	33
2.1.3 Situational crime prevention.....	34
2.1.4 Deterrence and implications on terrorist targeting	36
2.1.5 The comprehensive approach.....	37
2.1.6 The merging of approaches.....	38
2.1.7 An inter-active framework on targeting processes	40
2.1.8 Ideology and strategy constitute the main framework.....	41
2.1.9 The internal and external factors	42
2.1.10 The challenge of interaction	45
2.1.11 Terrorist targeting and lethality.....	46

Contents

2.1.12	Establishing the situational context	48
2.2	The methodological approach.....	50
2.2.1	Within-case process tracing and analysis.....	51
2.2.2	Case selection within a low-frequency phenomenon	53
2.2.3	Terrorism research and sources	54
2.2.4	Study 1: Framework and sources	58
2.2.5	Study 1: Reliability.....	61
2.2.6	Study 1: Validity.....	64
2.2.7	Study 2: Framework and sources	66
2.2.8	Study 2: Reliability.....	72
2.2.9	Study 2: Validity.....	75
2.2.10	Ethical considerations	77
3	Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway	81
3.1	Introduction.....	81
3.2	The target overview	84
3.2.1	Targets discarded and selected	87
3.2.2	Most potential targets had limited symbolic value	90
3.2.3	Narrowing down to the actual targets	93
3.3	The terrorist's decision-making process	95
3.3.1	Relevant background factors.....	95
3.3.2	An ideology with a personal touch.....	97
3.3.3	Not without moral constraints	102
3.3.4	The strategy of a massive "shock-attack"	103
3.3.5	Who to attack?.....	106
3.3.6	Persistence compensated for lack of military background	108
3.3.7	A terrorist versus a peaceful society	110
3.4	From thinking to acting.....	113
3.4.1	Adjusting to three bombs and a shooting target	117
3.4.2	Information gathering and reconnaissance	120
3.4.3	Looking for a farm caused a serious delay	124
3.4.4	The final plan.....	127
3.5	The attacks and the consequences.....	128
3.5.1	The day of the attacks	130

Contents

3.5.2	Just another annoying driver.....	132
3.5.3	Police response in the initial phase	134
3.5.4	The shooting attack at Utøya	135
3.5.5	The police response.....	140
3.5.6	The final act of the brutal massacre	142
3.6	The trial and sentencing.....	146
3.6.1	Hit hard by the first psychiatric evaluation	147
3.6.2	The second psychiatric evaluation	149
3.6.3	Breivik's performance in court	151
3.6.4	Breivik's trial-strategy	152
3.7	Breivik in a comparative perspective.....	154
3.7.1	Solo terrorism as seen in Western Europe	154
3.7.2	From big 'spectaculars' to individual jihad	155
3.7.3	Striking from nowhere	157
3.7.4	The overview	158
3.7.5	A low-frequency phenomenon.....	161
3.7.6	Many attacks, few dead	162
3.7.7	Choice of strategy.....	162
3.7.8	Solo terrorists and the mass casualty focus	163
3.7.9	Level of discrimination	164
3.7.10	Level of operational sophistication	165
3.7.11	The challenge of detection.....	167
3.7.12	The tip from outside.....	169
3.7.13	Be prepared for the black swans.....	170
3.7.14	Scandinavia: Lone attackers versus groups.....	170
3.8	Concluding on Anders Behring Breivik.....	174
4	The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe	180
4.1	Introduction.....	180
4.2	Exploring the continuum of lethality	182
4.3	Casualty focus and the impact of fatalities	183
4.3.1	What is a mass casualty incident?.....	185
4.3.2	From the dataset	186
4.3.3	Few attacks cause many deaths	190

Contents

4.4	The hard and soft target preference.....	192
4.4.1	Most attractive targets are often out of reach	194
4.4.2	From the dataset	196
4.4.3	Deterrence and target displacement	199
4.4.4	Insiders are the Achilles heel of hard targets.....	200
4.5	The issue of discrimination	201
4.5.1	Indiscriminate or discriminate attacks is the main difference	202
4.5.2	Constraints mean discriminate targeting	203
4.5.3	From the dataset.....	204
4.5.4	Are random civilians legitimate targets?.....	206
4.5.5	Shedding the blood of other Muslims.....	209
4.6	The target type categories	210
4.7	Targeting authorities	213
4.7.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	215
4.7.2	Analysis.....	218
4.8	Targeting diplomatic missions.....	220
4.8.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	222
4.8.2	Analysis.....	224
4.9	Targeting law enforcement.....	226
4.9.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	228
4.9.2	Analysis.....	233
4.10	Targeting military bases and personnel.....	235
4.10.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	238
4.10.2	Analysis	242
4.11	Targeting public area	244
4.11.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	245
4.11.2	Analysis	259
4.12	Targeting transport.....	261
4.12.1	Targeting aviation	262
4.12.2	Targeting rail transport	272
4.12.3	Targeting ground transportation	282
4.12.4	Targeting the maritime sector	285
4.13	Targeting public debate participants.....	287
4.13.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	289

Contents

4.13.2	Analysis	293
4.14	Targeting religious institutions.....	296
4.14.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	297
4.14.2	Analysis	300
4.15	Less common target types	302
4.15.1	The most relevant plots and attacks	303
4.15.2	Analysis	304
4.16	US, Israeli and Jewish targets	309
4.16.1	Targeting Americans	310
4.16.2	Israeli and Jewish targets	311
4.17	Observations on target decision-making	314
4.18	Reflections on strategies and outcomes	315
4.18.1	Al-Qaida’s commitment to attack the West.....	316
4.18.2	The state-building project of ISIS	320
4.18.3	Concluding on observed strategies	324
4.19	Jihadists’ targeting preferences in a comparative perspective....	326
4.20	One perpetrator versus several perpetrators	329
4.20.1	Soft and hard targets, casualty focus and discrimination	332
4.20.2	Target types	333
4.20.3	Use of weapons.....	334
4.21	Concluding on the militant Islamists	335
5	Conclusions	340
5.1	An expedient approach to targeting research	340
5.2	The main findings from the two studies	343
5.3	So what is the practical output?.....	351
5.4	Need for more research	359
	Bibliography.....	362
	Appendix	433

Preface

The 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway resulted in an increased focus on societal security, and especially against threats related to political violence. At the time I had just completed my master's degree, and with a long-lasting interest for political violence and societal security, I was motivated for pursuing a PhD. With my background from security work in the Government Quarter, terrorist target selection came up as a relevant topic. With a positive response from the Norwegian Police University College and the University of Stavanger a PhD was in the making soon after the 22 July attacks.

It has been inspiring to conduct research on a topic of considerable interest for practitioners. As Paul Martin correctly notes; security is after all a practical matter (forthcoming 2019). It has, however, been important to do so without compromising the high academic standards all research must be founded on.

Doing a doctorate is a long endeavour, and if done in part-time, the timeline becomes even longer. To me, the long haul has meant more time to think, meeting more people, doing more presentations and visiting more universities and places, than I would have with a shorter timeframe. I believe this have had a positive impact on the finished product.

I have met a lot of people on this journey, and many have contributed to this project. It can have been a well-founded question after a presentation, or a comment made over a cup of coffee somewhere. It is not possible to name all contributors here, but rest assured that no one has been forgotten.

There are some key individuals I want to thank in particular for their contributions to this work. A huge thanks to my inspiring and including supervisor professor Tore Bjørgo, who generously has opened doors, shared his knowledge and commented drafts. We have also written a book together. I will also thank my cosupervisor, professor Odd Einar Olsen, for well-founded comments, advice, and follow-up in general. Thanks also to Jon Ivar Mehus, who on behalf of my previous employer, The Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation (DSS), supported this project when the idea of a PhD was born. Furthermore, I am grateful to my current employer, the

Preface

Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, which is responsible for securing government buildings and the new Government Quarter to be.

Thanks to all my colleagues at the research department at the Norwegian Police University College (PHS), and in particular Head of Department Haavard Reksten for unlimited and invaluable support, and Eileen Schreiner Berglie for excellent practical assistance. Also, many thanks to the TERRA group at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) for outstanding assistance, and in particular Petter Nesser, who has generously shared his data and excellent knowledge on the militant Islamists in Europe.

I have also benefitted from advice from international capacities on methodology, criminology and political violence. Professor and Pro-Vice-Chancellor Richard English at Queens University Belfast has been very helpful since we first met years ago, when he was director for CSTPV at the University of St. Andrews. Moreover, I have received important inputs from professors Cynthia Lum, Andrew Bennet and Fathali M. Moghaddam in Washington DC. An opportunity to spend time with terrorism researchers *par excellence* Martha Crenshaw and Bruce Hoffman was also fruitful.

Other individuals I will direct my gratitude to for different reasons are Håvard Walla, Paul Martin, Ellen Haugstad, Bart Schuurman, Paul Gill, Carlos Setas, Danny Morrison, Patrick Magee, Julia Wanda, Tor Inge Kristoffersen and Sissel Haugdal Jore. I must also express my sincere thanks to a number of persons who, due to the nature of their work, have to remain anonymous. Most of them work in security and intelligence agencies home and abroad, but members of the Norwegian National Police Emergency Response Unit (DELTA) and some other police units must also be included.

Finally, I will send a huge thanks to my family. My wife Monicha, who is a professional capability in relevant fields herself, has been an invaluable discussion partner and motivator. My two sons, Michael and Eskil, as well as my mother Ragnhild Inger, have also been very supportive from start to end of this project. Although our Giant Schnauzer, Camo, is totally unaware of this fact, the daily walks with him have also been good for intellectual clarity and problemsolving. To quote Christopher Morley (1922); *No one appreciates the very special genius of your conversation as the dog does.*

Summary

This thesis elaborates on the complex relationship between terrorists and the targets they attack. There are at least three main reasons for the complexity: each case, with the people involved therein, is unique; moreover, many factors may affect terrorist decision-making. Furthermore, most terrorists can choose between a number of targets. Therefore, a comprehensive approach is a prerequisite for research in this area.

The starting point here is that terrorists in general must be considered rational actors. I analyse the dynamic interaction between four main components that affect terrorists' target selection: *Ideology*, *strategy*, *internal factors* (characteristics or capacities possessed by the terrorist actor), and *external factors* (variables outside the terrorists' control). This categorisation is sensible for sorting the factors of influence, but in order to identify correlations between variables and arrive at a deeper understanding, case-study process-tracing has been applied. Situational analysis of plot scenarios and conducted attacks, with a systematic focus on offender(s), target(s) and situational context, also represent an essential part of this work.

There are three main objectives for this thesis. I present a generic theoretical and methodological approach for qualitative research on terrorist targeting. I apply the above-mentioned approach to the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway, tracing the terrorist's target selection process in detail. I also analyse the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016. In addition to target types, this study focuses on the terrorists' casualty focus, soft versus hard target preferences and the degree of target discrimination – all central issues in the context of public security.

The two concrete part studies are not comparative, but they exemplify how the generic theoretical and methodological approach can be applied both to single and multiple case studies, on terrorist actors from different ideological directions and on different levels of analysis. As such the two part studies are complementary.

Regarding the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway, Anders Behring Breivik was not the typical lone actor terrorist. The long timeline of his terrorist operation,

Summary

his hideous strategy, the mass-casualty focus and the brutality demonstrated at Utøya were beyond what most lone actor terrorists could do. His megalomaniac personality influenced several of these factors, but if we leave the aberrant characteristics and skills of Breivik aside, he was quite average in other ways. His background, radicalization process and ideological foundation were not that unusual. Also, his operational phase was not without its flaws.

This research shows that even the ruthless terrorist Breivik was affected by an overarching framework and constraints of various kinds. His customised right-wing ideology set the scene. He took both the inner (those responsible for immigration) and the outer enemies (the Muslims) into consideration, but chose to attack the inner enemy. The public rage following a racist killing in 2001 affected his decision. Breivik's strategy of a massive "shock attack" was related to his narcissistic personality and striving for attention. Moreover, his lack of empathy enabled him to conduct the barbaric actions. Breivik's decision to act alone, his focus on one political party only, and the fact that he discarded individual assassinations, were also important decisions.

Breivik's limited operational background was compensated for by a high level of motivation, persistence and thoroughness in terms of the bombmaking. The fact that he miscalculated the time needed to find a farm and only managed to make one bomb did, however, affect his plans significantly. Moreover, his financial situation worsened during 2011, and he also made practical mistakes during the operation. Regarding external factors, the terrorist took advantage of a peaceful society. The long process of closing the Grubbegata street in the Government Quarter symbolises how distant the terrorist threat was to different decision-makers at the time. This was exploited by Breivik. He also had the advantage of operating on home ground.

Breivik experienced that terrorist operations are dynamic and not fully controllable. He became frustrated and pragmatic, as the Utøya attack proves. The Labour Party and the media represented the most attractive targets for Breivik, but in the end, the media was not attacked. Constraints derailed the terrorist from this part-goal, leading him to attack only the Labour party. It is also a paradox that the shooting attack at Utøya outbid Breivik's number one priority target – the Government Quarter – regarding the death tolls.

Summary

Continuing with the militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016, this research finds that, in general, they are conservative regarding their target preferences. The vast majority of targets can be sorted into few target type categories, but the challenge is the almost unlimited number of potential targets the militant Islamists can choose from within certain categories. Attacks against people in public areas and on public transport is the dominant trend. As for public transport, the aviation and railway sectors stand out as attractive spots for plotting and conducting attacks; however, in practice, railway-linked targets are attacked more often than aviation-related targets. Soldiers and police personnel are also frequently targeted. Most of these attacks take place in public area, where the personnel are accessible and vulnerable. Top politicians, state institutions with a highly symbolic value, as well as diplomatic missions, are also attractive targets, but they are rarely attacked due to the robust protective security measures surrounding them.

This study finds that militant Islamists' dominantly and increasingly focus on soft targets, while well-protected targets are avoided. There is a substantial focus on mass casualty, but few attacks lead to many deaths. Indiscriminate versus discriminate targeting comes out as even. Also, the jihadists are more ambitious in the early stages of planning than in the process that follows. Additionally, launched attacks physically carried out by more than one perpetrator are more ambitious than attacks conducted by single individuals. Both single perpetrators and cells or groups with two or more perpetrators will normally attack soft targets. Individuals carrying out attacks alone are, however, more likely to act discriminately, have a limited casualty focus and apply simpler means. Attacks against name-specific individuals are usually committed by one perpetrator only.

The jihadists are, as with their target types, conservative with regard to attack approach and weaponry. A high level of sophistication has, however, been observed in a few cases, like the 2006 liquid explosives plot, and the 2010 cargo planes plots. The most advanced plots and attacks have been linked to the established networks. It is hard to identify modus operandi-related differences between AQ and ISIS-linked perpetrators, and shifts in trends seem rather to be influenced by practical and contextual factors. This part-study did not trace the decision-making processes of each case in detail, but those executing the attacks normally make the final target decision. This is so

Summary

because most attacks are not centrally organized. In several cases it can also be observed how the perpetrators decline target suggestions from others.

Both part studies illustrate the complex dynamics and unpredictability that follow terrorist targeting processes. This research also finds that jihadists have higher targeting ambitions in the early stages of planning as compared to the attacks that are actually conducted, which was seen in Breivik's case too. Moreover, the two studies illustrate how pragmatism often plays a role, protective security efforts being one reason for it. It is highly likely that the militant Islamists would conduct more attacks against attractive hard targets if the security efforts were not so robust. The awareness of assessing preventive security efforts can also be seen in the case of Breivik. Another observation is linked to brutality. It is commonly suggested that extraordinary brutality is a characteristic of the jihadists. Breivik demonstrate, however, that gruesome brutality is not reserved for one ideological direction only.

Regarding practical output, the comprehensive theoretical and methodological approach may be of value to researchers and practitioners working on targeting issues – it be on a very detailed or a slightly more superficial level. With reference to the complementary nature of the two part studies, the practical value from these differ in some respects. The in-depth study of Breivik provides a detailed explanation of proceedings and decisions in this particular case. It describes how a terrorist thinks and acts, and also the effect certain protective security measures have. It also shows how a terrorist may take advantage of existing possibilities, which again will be valuable for making new countermeasures. To a less degree, however, are such single case studies on their own contributing the identification of trends and to assessments of the bigger threat picture. In this area multiple case studies have more value.

In contrast, the part study of the militant Islamists provides a broader and more complete knowledge-based picture of a threat that Europe has been exposed to for nearly 25 years. The research clarifies developments and trends, which is essential for updated and effective counterterrorism strategies. Furthermore, the dataset itself is valuable for anyone seeking case overviews – like I did at the start of this research. Moreover, this dataset, with its brief case descriptions, is helpful for those seeking to establish knowledge-based scenarios, for example when working on threat assessments in security

Summary

related projects. Case overviews are also useful when organizing training and excersis.

Identified trends and developments have also a practical output regarding the different target types. This part study shows that greater attention should be given to protect people in public areas and on public transport. In many ways this is more challenging than protecting a top politician or a highly symbolic government building. For attacks in public area, the combination of physical measures, rapid and forcefull police response, and rational public behaviour may prove damage-mitigating. For cost-effective reasons, however, physical protective measures in public area should primarily be reserved for particularly attractive targets. Top-level politicians must continue to be given adequate protection, but more attention should be given to politicians on the level just below these, as they have been proven to be more exposed to attacks. Police and military personnel represent attractive and vulnerable targets when in public areas, and this should be reflected in their operational concepts and tactical behaviour. Protection of participants of public debates is also an issue that requires greater focus. Moreover, the attention from jihadists against US, Israeli and Jewish targets justify extensive protective efforts around these communities.

Finally, there is a need for more research on target-related issues. I highlight three concrete topics that require more in-depth research: target-decision making, hostile reconnaissance and the impact symbolism has in relation to terrorist targeting.

1 Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

1.1 Introduction

What and whom do terrorists attack, and perhaps even more importantly, why do they end up with the targets they actually do attack? How come terrorists choose target alternative A, and not B or C? Furthermore, why are some politicians and public debate individuals targeted while the majority are not? Further, why do some terrorists attack random civilians in an indiscriminate manner, while others deliberately focus on name-specific individuals, or even targets that are heavily protected?

These questions, which this thesis will try to answer, are of interest not only to security services and others tasked with detecting terrorists before they can cause harm. It also has relevance for security professionals engaged in protecting critical infrastructure and highly symbolic assets, as well as the private security industry. The surviving victims of terrorist attacks also always and instantly raise questions about the terrorists' choice of targets. What could possibly be more natural after being shot at, or indeed bombed, than to ask *why me*, and alternatively, *why us*?

Terrorist targeting processes and preferences is a narrow subject in contrast to classic, overarching issues like the root causes of terrorism, radicalization and ideology. The focus of this thesis is not on what Maxwell Taylor (1988: 183) characterized as *involvement* issues three decades ago but rather on one of several *event* issues. Moreover, terrorist targeting is to a large degree an operational issue, even though ideological, moral and strategic variables have considerable impact too.

The starting point here is that when an actor, individual or group has decided to turn to terrorism, initial thoughts on whom or what to physically target will soon emerge. The physical aggression may be directed against representatives of the system they want to change, or members of the police and armed forces, since they are the ones the terrorists are confronted by on the ground. The target could, however, just as well be random civilians if the actor finds

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

this morally acceptable and legitimate. In practice, and regardless of moral boundaries, most terrorists will have a number of targets to choose from. Following this, every act of terrorism will include some sort of target evaluation, and concrete decisions regarding whom to strike have to be made as the actor moves from thinking to acting.

1.1.1 Terrorism in the spectrum of organised violence

Physical violence occurs in many forms and surfaces under a range of different circumstances. Motivation and triggers for executing violence may vary substantially, and people involving themselves in one category of violence, for example in military campaigns they see legitimate, are likely to condemn other forms, like terrorism. There are different types of violence and they can be categorized in a number of ways. One way is to differentiate between conventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, violent uprisings, terrorism, sabotage, and violent crimes. It is important to note, however, that the difference between types of violence can sometimes be blurry and overlapping. This is not just due to definitional or legal issues but also because one violent actor may adhere to several types of violent means at the same time. Looking to Northern Ireland conflict it is obvious how violent crimes, uprisings and terrorism were – and to some degree still are – present in the conflict theatre. Furthermore, if we look to the militant Islamists for the last few years, we have seen how they have conducted classic acts of terrorism in the Western world, while their operational behaviour and conduct in Syria and Iraq have had the characteristics of insurgency operations and traditional warfare.

Following up on the distinction between terrorism and warfare, it is an important point that terrorist actors typically see themselves fighting a war (English, 2009: 23). Accordingly, they often refer to themselves as soldiers (Richardson, 2007: 176). In fact, terrorists can even promote the “fighting a war” rhetoric by pointing to Clausewitz’ definition of war, as it is based on the two assertions that a) war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will, and b) war is a mere continuance of policy by other means (Taylor, 1988: 61–62). Naturally, one could counter this by saying that Clausewitz’s reflections are taken out of context and that terrorism

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

does not carry the same legitimacy as military warfare. One of the main characteristics of terrorism is, after all, the moral condemnation that comes along with it. Furthermore, terrorists will rarely follow the rules of war. But then again, throughout history, there are also regular armed forces that have committed barbaric acts clearly in conflict with the same rules. As such, Richard English (2009: 23; 2016: 10) might have a point when stating that terrorism can be characterized as a subspecies of warfare.

1.1.2 Terrorism is also a crime

From the perspective of law enforcement, at least on home ground in the Western world, terrorism is primarily countered through the criminal justice model. Indeed, most will agree that the best response to terrorism in democracies is to use the legal framework (English, 2009: 133). This is in contrast to the war-like rhetoric from state leaders, often seen in the immediate aftermath of major terrorist incidents – for example, like George Bush after the 2001 9/11 attacks and Francois Holland after the 2015 November 13 attacks in Paris (Bush, 2001; Mullen & Haddad, 2015). Accordingly, terrorism is a crime and it should be treated like one in most respects (Bjørge, 2013: 2; Clarke & Newman, 2006: VII). Evidently, though terrorism represents a cluster of very serious crimes, it begs the question: what are the conceptual similarities and differences between terrorism and other forms of crime? Furthermore, what distinguishes terrorists from other criminals from a behavioural perspective? The answers to these questions will rarely be absolute and vary depending on which type of crime we compare specific acts of terrorism to.

Lafree and Dugan (2004) argue that some general similarities are that both crime and terrorism are social constructs that violate the law, and in both areas there are differences between formal definitions and how these are applied. Moreover, both phenomena undermine social trust. As for differences, the most striking fact, and one of few with consensus, is related to the motivation for the offenses (Clarke & Newman, 2006: 4–7). In contrast to most criminals, terrorists pursue a broader political agenda and their main motivation will typically not be materialistic or financial in nature. Here, it must be added that the motivation can sometimes be hard to identify, especially if a single

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

perpetrator dies in or after an incident. Shooting sprees in schools comes easily to mind, but other individual actions, like the vehicle attack by Karst Tate during a royal event in Netherlands in 2009, also leave the motive unclear (Spaaij, 2012: 12). Another major difference is that terrorists tend to seek maximum attention in order to spread fear among the general public, and communicate their message to decision-makers. Other criminals will typically avoid attention at any cost. Furthermore, local authorities will most often handle common crime, while handling terrorism is the responsibility of federal or national authorities. This indicates that terrorism has a status that goes beyond “ordinary” crimes and that it is considered to be more serious.

When discussing terrorism versus crime, it is also important to keep in mind that terrorists, in addition to their terrorist activities, conduct other forms of criminal offenses. For example, terrorists depend on funding and apply various methods, such as armed robberies, black market sales, kidnappings and extortion (Taylor, 1988: 50–52). Moreover, they may conduct break-ins and thefts to access weapons or information, or steal vehicles to use in terrorist operations. Hence, ordinary criminal activity is an integrated part of terrorism, both due to organizational and operational needs. As such, the crime-terrorism nexus often referred to today is hardly a new phenomenon (e.g. Makarenko, 2004; Hamill, 2011). How this relationship functions and develops, however, varies with time, place and actors involved, and this also explains why we see more research on this topic on a regular basis.

1.2 Defining terrorism

There is no consensus regarding an exact definition of the term *terrorism*. It is after all a politically loaded and morally tense term, with overwhelmingly pejorative normative associations. As previously described, it is also sometimes difficult to accurately place this phenomenon in the spectrum of violence and sort it from among other types of criminal activity. Therefore, no one should be surprised over the lack of agreement when it comes to defining terrorism, but at the same time a number of well reflected proposals in the definitional area have been presented (e.g. Lia, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Crenshaw, 2011; Schmid, 2011; Ganor, 2015; English, 2013; 2016).

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

Despite the lack of consensus, the debate over the definition is important not just because the definitions seek to clarify the phenomenon itself, but also due to the major impact they potentially have on research frameworks – in general and in specific research projects. On one hand, a definition that is too wide might create unclear borders with other types of violence and open up the potential for limitless data collection, leading to unmanageable amounts of information. On the other hand, a definition that is too narrow may not echo the true extent of the phenomenon or topic in question. Therefore, such questions as whether or not to include state terrorism in the definition, must be carefully evaluated. The author's impression is that most terrorism researchers don't include state terrorism in their research. Furthermore, it seems to be an increasing consensus among researchers within academia when it comes to the core characteristics of terrorism conducted by non-state actors. Following this, it seems that current debates on the definition of terrorism are often linked to the fringes of this issue. It is still, for several reasons, important to include a definitional clarification in concrete projects. One aspect is the impact basic definitions have on the overall framework of a project. Another reason is that there are research projects where terrorism and other forms of violent activity, like school shootings regardless of motive, have been merged. This underlines how important it is that readers of a finished work check the definitions applied, especially if they are going to use or refer to the work in question.

1.2.1 Towards a core definition

Two detailed and well-articulated definitions of terrorism can be brought in as examples at this point. In *The Routledge Handbook for Terrorism Research*, Alex P. Schmid proposes the revised *academic consensus definition of terrorism*, with the abbreviation ACDT 2011 (Schmid, 2011). This definitional solution consists of twelve elements, but we will concentrate on the first, which tries to capture the core dimension of terrorism, while the others have explanatory functions (Schmid, 2011: 86–87):

Terrorism refers on one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.

Schmid's definition is thorough and not controversial per se, although one could argue that some terrorists display moral restraint to a certain degree –if, for instance, they don't find it legitimate to target totally indiscriminately – as for example seen with the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) major bomb attacks in London in the 1990s. In several of these cases pre-warnings opened up for evacuation of people before the time of detonation. The civilian / non-combatant issue is also difficult, since attacks against the police and soldiers in Western Europe are most often characterized as terrorist attacks – by the authorities, the media and the general public. This is in contrast to attacks on soldiers in a warfare setting in distant conflict areas.

Another definition that grasps the essential elements of terrorism has been offered by Richard English (2009; 2016):

Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it processes an important psychological dimension, producing terror of fear among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form a part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage.

This definition incorporates all central elements and brings the potential variations and dynamics of terrorist activity to light more clearly than many others. Furthermore, the aspects of terrorist communication, the fear factor and overarching objectives are well integrated. I earlier touched upon English's view that terrorism can be regarded as a subspecies of warfare. We may also note that both Schmid and English are not making explicit distinctions between state and non-state actors. This is understandable in some ways, although their respective works concentrate on non-state actors.

In addition to the two academic definitions above, it must be mentioned that a widely used definition comes from the US State Department (2006):

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

(terrorism is) premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

This short definition covers much of what people identify with the term terrorism. The US State Department's definition has constituted the foundation for the definition of terrorism applied for this study, but some minor adjustments have been made. *Credible threats* and *attempts* have been included, in order to cover terrorist acts not yet perpetrated. The issue of credibility must be assessed in each case to enable the sorting hoaxes from serious threats. The somewhat widely defined *non-combatant* term is substituted with *civilian targets*, as this seems to offer better clarity with regard to the distinction between potential targets objects that are a part of the conflict picture and those who are not. However, it must be underlined that terrorist attacks on military personnel may also be regarded as terrorism – for example, being attacked when they are off-duty or outside the core conflict area. Such cases are included in the part study of militant Islamists in this research, which is also why I add *usually* perpetrated against civilian targets in the definition that follows below. Furthermore, the state-actor sounding *clandestine agent* expression is removed, even though it is likely that proxy groups are meant here. Finally, *sub-national groups* are substituted with *non-state actors (groups and individuals)* in order to exclude state terrorism, even though states certainly can use the same approach. Moreover, it is important to include individuals to ensure that solo or lone actor terrorism is included. Hence, the following definition of terrorism is used in this study:

Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence, including credible threats and attempts of such, usually perpetrated against civilian targets by non-state actors (groups or individuals), usually in order to influence a wider audience.

1.2.2 Defining lone actor terrorism

Clarifying the definition of terrorism does not mark the end of the definitional issue because there is also a lack of consensus regarding the definition of single individuals committing terrorist offences – as well as what to call it. In fact, it gets even more complicated with lone actor terrorism because here it is

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

also necessary to define what an individual act is. The most important thing is to distinguish between individuals really operating alone and cell or networks using individual attacks as a tactical choice. That said, there are many different interpretations of what it means to operate alone. Furthermore, there is a practical side to this as it can be profoundly challenging to trace existing links between a perpetrator and extremist circles or networks.

Some lone actor-studies deliberately include a small number of perpetrators working together (Hewitt, 2003: 79; Pantucci, 2011: 9; Ellis et al., 2016). Although this might be understandable in some regards, it is problematic since there are some basic differences between just one actor and two or more persons being involved – for instance, this becomes an issue with regard to psychological aspects and operational capability. Furthermore, the issue of detection is very challenging with lone actors as an intelligence-driven approach often is less effective on these perpetrators (Hewitt, 2003: 90; Bakker & Graaf, 2010). Also, by expanding to two or more perpetrators, the list of incidents will expand considerably, no longer reflecting what most readers would think of as lone actor terrorism. Another potential problem surfaces when lone actor terrorists are merged with offenders who are not politically motivated, especially if the research is tagged as *lone actor terrorism* (Ellis et al., 2016). In such cases, better transparency can be achieved by labelling the research in accordance with the type of crime or attack approach – and not motivation. One example can be works focusing in general on the so-called active shooters (Sinai, 2013). To sum up, there are arguments for applying a rather narrow definition when terrorist acts committed by single individuals is the subject, but, as will be made clear later in this thesis, most so-called lone actors are in some way connected with other terrorists – either physically or online.

The most typical factor of diversity when scholars seek to define lone actor terrorism is the degree of assistance the perpetrator has received from others. Since contact, or prior contact, with other extremists and radical movements is not unusual – physically or online – the essential question is whether the phases of planning, preparation and execution of the operation have been done in a self-reliant and independent way. In other words, it boils down to whether the perpetrator has received any form of guidance or assistance from people that know, or should understand, what the individual in question is planning

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

to do. It is profoundly challenging to assess the impact of psychological and motivational support – for example, from clerics that may be very conscious with regard to keeping themselves on the right side of the law. Still, I will argue that if *practical* support – related to financing, training, weapons, other equipment, travel documents or accommodations – is received from others, the individual conducting the attack has not acted totally on his or her own. Following this, individuals deliberately guiding or practically assisting a person to conduct a concrete act of terrorism (even though they do not know the exact target, time and place) must be regarded as accomplices. There is, then, a joint understanding that an act of terrorism is going to take place, establishing some kind of informal or formal pact between two or more individuals. Importantly, however, it is not enough that someone other than the perpetrator *knows* that a terrorist act is going to take place. For example, family or close friends might be against stated ideas or already committed crimes, but still choose not to inform the police, as seen with the Malmö-shooter Peter Mangs (Malmö tingsrätt, 2011). In contrast, the wife of the Breivik-inspired Brunon Kwicien in Poland became suspicious of his behaviour and alerted the police (Evans, 2013).

The practical challenges of identifying lone actor terrorism has been mentioned, and it is often quite difficult to trace links between a single perpetrator and other extremists or networks. This has become evident with the increasing number of terrorist acts committed by militant Islamists. The varying degree of assumed or documented affiliation to other extremists has led to characteristics like *enabled* and *directed* lone actors. Another, more comprehensive variety is the difference between *isolated* (inspired), *connected* (but operating independently), *networked* (embedded and coordinated with others) and *FTO-supported* (organizationally supported) lone actors (Mullins, 2017). The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) has made a distinction between lone wolves and solo terrorists (PET, 2012). Different terms and levels with regard to categorization does not, however, fully remove the uncertainty in a number of cases due to the lack of detailed insight into the individual cases. This is one area where the intelligence and security services possess a better insight than researchers do. On top of this, it is common that additional information regarding a plot or

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

attack keep coming as time goes by – potentially adjusting early impressions and conclusions.

Another issue is what to call an individual committing an act of terrorism alone. We constantly see a number of terms describing this phenomenon, for example *freelancer* (Hewitt, 2003: 79), *lone wolf* (Pantucci, 2011; Spaaij, 2012; Hamm & Spaaij, 2017), *solo terrorist* (PET, 2012, Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016), *single* or *lone actor* (PET, 2012; Nesser, 2012a), *single operator terrorist* (van der Heide, 2011) and *lone mujahid* (Inspire magazine, 2013). The term to be used may not be as important as the definition itself, but it deserves some reflection. One reason is that glorifying terms or metaphors introduced by terrorist actors themselves should be avoided. Since it was promoted by right-wing extremists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis in the 1990s, the metaphor *lone wolf* has been used extensively by news media and academia (Metzger, undated). This metaphorical characterization, much up to the reader to digest and decrypt, was probably chosen by the extremists themselves to associate themselves – free of negative associations – with a mythological, bold and strong animal. This is in contrast to the pejorative term *solo terrorist* that clearly indicates a person violating the legal and moral boundaries in a democratic society. Towards the middle, we find more neutral terms like the *lone actor* or *single actor*. Regardless of the term preferred, academics, researchers and analysts should clarify their definitional choices in their published works. In this thesis, the term solo terrorist indicates an individual acting without any motivational or practical support from others, like Anders Behring Breivik. When it comes to militant Islamists, I use the term lone actor, which I regard as more loose but still adequate, since in the relevant sections, I make the clear-cut distinction between one and several perpetrators physically conducting the attack in question. This approach has a tradeoff with regard to how independent the attacker really is, and also since terrorist organizations regularly initiate one-perpetrator attacks due to tactical considerations. However, an advantage of the clear-cut distinction is that the issue can be mapped with great accuracy and the output will provide important knowledge without involving the network factor – not least for practitioners dealing with protective security or first responders. The output from this approach will also constitute the best starting point for lone actor versus group analysis, before adding the network factor.

1.3 Communication through violence

Terrorist acts are in general not mindless, impulsive actions without some sort of function or purpose. Attacks are launched as part of a strategy to reach a long-term objective; so, terrorists attempt to produce social transformation and changes by performing symbolic acts of violence (Matusitz, 2015: 23). As such, the damage, deaths and injuries caused by the act are irrelevant to the political message the actor seeks to communicate (Neumann & Smith, 2008: 9), although they might indeed be relevant in other regards, which I will come back to in the section on theoretical approach. Returning to the political message, however, terrorism can be seen to be about more than what the phrase “propaganda by deed” indicates (Laqueur, 1997, 2012: 14). Terrorists want to achieve something; most often, this means a reaction from political authorities and decision-makers. By and large, terrorism is instrumental in nature, although this does not exclude the possibility that there might be complementary and overlapping emotional and psychological aspects involved as well, besides the potential intrinsic benefits for those involved (English, 2016: 37).

Since the terrorists can rarely strike and hurt the political authorities and the decision-makers directly – due to the preventive security measures surrounding these attractive targets – they will often attack a third party that is easy accessible. An essential element in this regard is publicity. Through the terrorist act - and the massive publicity following this - the terrorists communicate a message not only to the general public and interest groups but also to government officials and decision makers (Nacos, 2007: 15). In our modern world, they will often supplement the news media coverage with the use of their own social media channels. Also, the fact that the terrorists seek to create an atmosphere of fear in whole or specific parts of a population is central here (Bjørge & Heradstveit, 1993: 33). It is the threat of more and repetitive violence, and the fear built on its basis, that the terrorists hope will pressure the decision-makers to implement changes in accordance with their superior and long-term objectives.

1.3.1 The faces of terrorism

More thorough elaborations on the targeting processes and the symbolism involved are covered in the theoretical and methodological sections of this thesis, but having clarified the basic concept of terrorism, the many faces of this phenomenon must be briefly addressed. First of all, terrorists come from a range of ideological platforms, like socio-revolutionary left-wing extremists, far-right actors, ethno-nationalists and militant Islamists. There are also actors with a narrow agenda, typically referred to as single-issue terrorists. Within each category there are also a variety of low-capability actors and high-capability actors, ranging from lone actors with simple means and limited ambitions to robust and capable networks and groups conducting complex attacks and sustained campaigns over a long period of time. Equally, some terrorists operate in our own backyard, while others limit their activities to – what is for us – distant conflict zones. Accordingly, the nature of the problem may be substantially different from one continent or region to another. Moreover, both the scope of the threat and potential consequences of terrorism might differ between continents and regions. When it comes to Europe and the rest of the Western world, General Rupert Smith (2007) rightly points out that the terrorists are not strong enough to represent a direct threat to our democratic state construction and control of established territories, but “*the security of our people, other peoples, our assets and way of life.*”

In general, most terrorist incidents take place in, or in proximity to, conflict zones. So even though the Western world experience horrendous terrorist attacks from time to time, the frequency and seriousness of this particular security problem is higher and more substantial elsewhere, in parts of Africa and Asia, for instance. Furthermore, the many differences between our home ground and the distant conflict areas, not least societal factors, are illuminating exactly why counterterrorism efforts, and some research issues, must be customized to the regional or local context. In short, overarching counterterrorism strategies have to be held within the political and legal framework of the country in question, customised to the existing societal conditions and the resources within the law enforcement sector and be proportionate to national threat assessments. The fact that each conflict has its

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

own characteristics adds to this conclusion. For example, and as proven in the last decades, there are considerable differences in the way homebased ethno-nationalist actors like the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) have operated compared to the militant Islamists adhering to the global jihad campaign.

1.3.2 Terrorist targeting research so far

Modus operandi (MO) has traditionally not been given too much attention within terrorism research, and the number of publications on modus operandi in the 1970s and 1980s was limited. There were, however, a number of research notes and reports from a few institutions, like the Rand Corporation, where Brian Jenkins (1979; 1988; 1989) and Bruce Hoffman (1984; 1988; 1993) were central contributors. This was complemented by other individual works, often related to the large conflicts at the time. The Northern Ireland conflict sparked some relevant publications (Lyons & Harbinson, 1986; Pockrass, 1987). Indeed, although brief, one of the first few books with a particular focus on modus operandi and targeting was *IRA Tactics & Targets* (Bell, 1990). A book also including targeting aspects in the Basque conflict was written by Clark (1984). Likewise, Palestinian terrorism also received some focus (Hoffman, 1984). The focus was not isolated just to specific actors. Works also addressed terrorist tactics against specific sectors with protective security in mind, like aviation and nuclear facilities (Jenkins, 1989; Wilkinson, 1993a).

If we look at the 1990s, more work on terrorists' targeting and tactics gradually surfaced. The first major academic work on terrorist target selection processes came with C.J.M. Drake, who wrote a PhD thesis on the subject before he published a book based on the thesis (Drake, 1996; 1998). It is also a fact that the total amount of terrorism research increased significantly after major events like 9/11 in 2001, the M11 bombings in Madrid in 2004 and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005. This came natural, as authorities and others put in a lot of resources to prevent new attacks and establish adequate protection of exposed individuals, highly symbolic assets, critical infrastructure and major events. One important contribution regarding terrorist targeting came with Clarke and Newman (2006), when they took their

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

criminal reasoning and situational crime prevention from ordinary crime to terrorism. Although their focus strictly speaking was on prevention, much was based on how terrorists operate and what they target. Another published book with special focus on terrorist target decision-making on the individual level is on the Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks in Norway (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016).

Apart from this, there have been a number of papers and reports on targeting, and most of them have focused on specific issues. Some have addressed specific actors within certain geographical boundaries (McGladdery, 2006; Calle & Sanchez-Cuenza, 2006; Libicki, Chalk, & Sisson, 2007; Maccartan, Masselli, Rey & Rusnak, 2008; Levitt, 2009; Nemeth, 2010, Becker, 2014). Others have been focused reasoning and psychological aspects (Johns & Silverman, 2001; Newman & Hsu, 2012).

Other works have concentrated on concrete target categories. When it comes to attacks against the general public few works have studied these in isolation, but specifically focused on the targeting of civilians, but the study on soft targets by Asal, Rethemeyer, Anderson, Stein & Rizzo (2009) is one example. The same applies to Biberman and Zahid (2016) who has looked to targeting of children, and Bradford, Margaret & Wilson's (2013) publication regarding attacks against schools touches upon the same group. One single case study of violence against children or youths concerns the school attack in Trollhättan, Sweden, (Erlandsson, 2017), and nor can the attack by Breivik on the youth camp at Utøya be forgotten (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016; 2018).

There are not many specific works regarding top politicians, royalties and celebrities to be found, although there have been some interesting publications about how these attract unwanted attention from potentially violent individuals, including stalkers (Meloy, Hoffmann, & Sheridan, 2014; Øverland, 2012; Bjørge & Silkoset, 2017; 2018). When it comes to terrorist targeting of military installations and soldiers, as well as police stations and police personell there are few specific publications, but some exist (e.g. Lia, 2001; Gibbs, 2013).

Public transport is one category that has received noticeable attention, and within this category the focus has at large been on the aviation sector and

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

railway transport respectively, although there are reports covering a broader spectre of transport means (e.g. Lia, 2003). When it comes to targeting of the aviation sector in general publications of interest are for example provided by Jenkins (1989), Wilkinson (1993a), Merari (1998), Chow et al. (2005), Sweet (2008), Tønnesen (2008), Harrison (2009), Asal, Rethemeyer, Bellandi, Legault & Tynes (2010) and Hastings & Chan (2013). Furthermore, there are case-specific publications that may provide a useful insight regarding the targeting of flights, like the works by Silber (2012: 24-35) on the 2001 Reid shoe bomber case, as well as Nesser (2006) and Cruickshank (2014) on the 2006 Liquid plot in the UK. There are also several interesting research products concerning terrorist targeting of railway transport, like the works by Jenkins (2001), Fridheim (2007), Fridheim, Schjelderup & Borander (2009), Strandberg (2013) and Jenkins & Butterworth (2018). Specific case studies of interest are for example Hoffman (2014: 192-223) and Pantucci's (2015: 159-230) study of the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, as well as Reinares' work on the 2004 Madrid train bombings (2014: 29-60).

The maritime sector has been covered to some degree, although not extensively with regard to Europe and North America. Some contributions to look to are works by Jenkins (1988), Bjørge (1991), Tønnesen (2007), Asal & Hastings (2015) and Migaux (2016). Regarding offshore installations linked to the petroleum industry, see the section below about infrastructure.

Different target types linked to national or critical infrastructure have been addressed by a number of researchers, and probably first and foremost due to the serious consequences such attacks may cause (e.g. Lia, 2000; Lewis, 2014). The petroleum and energy sector has been given specific attention within this category, as seen with the works by Kjøk & Lia (2001), Kjøk (2004), Lia & Kjøk (2004), Pippard (2010), Toft, Duero & Bieliauskas (2010), and Porter (2015). A potential infrastructure target type concerns drinking water sources and dams, and some publications can be found in this area too (e.g. Bjørge, 2003; Lia & Nesser, 2003). Economic targeting has also been a subject to a limited degree (Johnstone & Nedelscu, 2005; Chesney, Reshetar, & Karaman, 2011).

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

The CBRN topic is also of interest in a targeting perspective, but as far as the author can observe it has mainly been covered as an attack approach threat, and in a “what if” or “how likely” perspective. That said, even such works are of interest in a targeting perspective, because in some scenarios this may include break-ins or attacks against institutions and facilities where CBRN means are obtained. Some interesting publications in this area are made by Hoffman (1988), Tucker (2000), Jenkins (2008), Stenersen (2008) and Mueller (2009).

Finally, there are works that have been focused on very specific subjects related to terrorist targeting, e.g. terrorist innovation (Dolnik, 2007; Oppenheimer, 2009; Ranstorp & Normark, 2015). Moreover, the role of symbolism, which is relevant for how terrorists operate and whom or what they target, have also been given attention (Matusitz, 2015). Relevant literature for the militant Islamists will be covered later in the thesis when discussing sources for this multiple case study.

As described above, the amount of modus operandi and targeting related publications increased from the 1970s to the 2000s, but from time to time researchers have still encouraged more research on operational issues (Lia, 2004: 12; Clarke & Newman, 2006: 233; Schmid & Jongman, 2007: 268; Schmid, ed., 2011: 468). Clarke and Newman called for systematic ratings of the attractiveness of different targets, analysis of attacks and other related subjects (Clarke & Newman, 2006: 233). In a survey made by the UN Terrorism Prevention Branch in 2007, initiation of more research on target analysis and preferred targeting was recommended (Ranstorp, ed., 2007: 286). A few years later, this gap in terrorism research still seemed inadequately covered, and in 2011 Schmid et al. (2011: 468) stressed that:

...some of the issues that have been given a limited amount of attention so far within terrorist research are the operational aspects of their activities, their modus operandi and targeting practice.

One general argument for continuous research on targeting and other operational aspects is simply the evolution of terrorism and shifting threats. In Western Europe from 1970 to the mid-1990s, this particular security threat came from far-left terrorists, ethno-nationalists actors and right-wing

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

extremists. Then, when the militant Islamists initiated attacks in France in the mid-1990s, this became a game-changer since the newcomers had a targeting practice that differed significantly from what Europe had experienced until then. Naturally, there were incidents in Northern Ireland, Spain, Germany and elsewhere involving indiscriminate targeting and mass-casualty focus but not with the established strategies and typical modus operandi as seen with the militant Islamists. Here indiscriminate targeting, mass casualty focus and the use of suicide bombers are fully integrated elements. Moreover, pre-warnings, as known from Provisional IRA and ETA campaigns, have never been an issue. Furthermore, shifting societal and technological conditions also have an impact on how terrorists operate and the kind of opportunities they have. Political shifts, demographic changes and increased mobility across continents are just a few factors. It is also a fact that technological developments continuously provide terrorists with new opportunities with regard to, for example, communication, information gathering and attack delivery methods. At the same time, however, technological progress is also beneficial for the law enforcement sector in creating constraints for the terrorists. In total, there are several strong arguments for continuous research on the modus operandi and targeting aspects on specific theatres of conflict as well as on the different actors.

1.3.3 Level of analysis

Before continuing to the research objectives for this project, it is useful to briefly say something about the link between information availability and levels of analysis in targeting research since this has relevance for the structure of this thesis. A basic acknowledgement is that the amount and quality of the information available affects the potential and output of any research. There are probably a number of ways to illustrate this, but one way is to make a customised use of the classic distinction between the macro-, meso- and micro-level respectively (Blalock, 1979).

If only very basic data is available for all known or a high number of cases related to terrorism it will be possible to do macro-level research. With this material, one can get a satisfactory general overview of the phenomenon in question, including relevant statistics. It might not be detailed enough,

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

however, to establish an adequate profile of a terrorist actor or to identify shifts and trends within specific target type categories and other characteristics useful for practitioners.

If the dataset have more detailed information that enables the researcher to clarify the situational context of each incident, it may be possible to map and analyse a terrorist group's general characteristics and profile related to targeting. This can be targeting preferences and shifting trends regarding attack approach against specific target type categories. One limitation here, however, will be that it is difficult to trace the concrete decision-making processes in detail, for example among a few individuals or a lone actor. Hence, it seems reasonable to argue that we here are talking about meso-level research.

That leaves us with the micro-level, which is research based on material so rich in details that it is possible to go in-depth on the individual level. This allows for opportunities to identify and trace – from start to end – the concrete decision-making processes, as well as the planning phase and operationalisation, of the case in question. In most cases, and especially when the research is based on open sources, micro-level research is not possible.

For the purposes of this thesis, it needs to be clarified that the case study of Anders Behring Breivik is based on unusually rich material that enables research on the micro-level. Regarding the multiple case study concerning the militant Islamists, the material is for example not detailed enough to trace individual decisions in detail. As such, it can be characterised as a meso-level study.

1.4 *Research objectives and target audience for this project*

Research on terrorist targeting issues may seem narrow, but the complexity is profound, both due to the high number of factors that potentially have an impact on these questions and their differing nature. If we add to this the different characters of conflicts, actors and operational environments, it becomes evident that research in this field benefits from a centred, focused and defined framework. As such, this research is not an attempt to cover all

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

aspects of terrorist targeting in a detailed and general manner as that would be too ambitious and out of range for this project. The aim is rather to make a meaningful contribution to targeting research by focusing on some specific aspects and actors.

1.4.1 *The research objectives for this thesis*

There are three main objectives for this thesis. The first objective is to present a generic theoretical and methodological approach suitable for qualitative targeting research. This approach can be used at the individual level, or on a group or network level. The generic approach also means that it can be used on threat actors across ideological directions and in different conflict regions. The second objective is to apply the above-mentioned approach to the target decision-making process of Anders Behring Breivik, who conducted the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway. Here, the target selection process and decision-making are traced in detail through the planning phase, as well as the operational phase. As such, the ambition is to explain why and how the terrorist's operation ended up with the two attacks in Oslo and on Utøya respectively. The third objective is to make an in-depth analysis of the *targeting preferences* of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe. In addition to the specific target types, this research will examine targeting related issues that are central from the perspective of societal security.

Following the conclusion of the two part studies on Anders Behring Breivik and the militant Islamists respectively, I will also elaborate on how in-depth single case studies and multiple case studies have complementary functions for decision-makers, analysts and others working on counterterrorism issues. Obviously, the two part studies serve as separate examples of the theoretical and methodological approach; on two different levels of analysis and with focus on actors with different ideological orientations. Hence they are not comparative, but having made that clear it should also be acknowledged that single and multiple case studies provide valuable insights in different ways, and accordingly they have complementary functions.

It should be made clear at this early stage of the thesis that both part studies have a main focus on the operational context, which means that overarching issues like ideology and strategy, as well as psychological aspects, are only

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

elaborated upon in the context of terrorist targeting. It can also be added that both part studies are highly relevant for the current threat picture in Europe, which hopefully makes this research interesting and potentially useful for individuals and institutions working on counterterrorism or protective security in our part of the world.

Study 1: Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks in Norway

On 22 July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik conducted two sequential terrorist attacks in Norway. First, the right-wing perpetrator bombed the Government Quarter in Oslo, killing eight people. Then he drove to a political youth camp, arranged by the Labour Party's Worker's Youth League (AUF) at Utøya, outside the capital. Here, he initiated a shooting spree, in which he killed 69 people. In total, Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people, fully illustrating the damage a solo terrorist can cause.

As described, this is a study of a solo terrorist with a far-right extremist ideology. Access to high-quality research material has provided a rare possibility to trace both the planning phase and the operational stages in considerable detail, primarily with an emphasis on targeting related issues. This includes general targeting preferences, concrete plans, priorities, influence of situational factors and decision-making sequences. As will be illustrated, the interaction between a series of variables caused a profoundly dynamic, non-linear process, clearly illustrating the unpredictability and pragmatism that normally follows terrorist operations.

Study 2: Militant Islamists operating in Western Europe

Militant Islamists adhering to the Sunni-based jihadi ideology have operated in Europe for more than two decades. Based on the dataset developed for this project, 246 plots and attacks are analysed to map the *targeting preferences* of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016. In this case, it is not only the target types that are categorized and analysed. This study also addresses three features of intent with significant impact on the threat they represent to the general public; the degree of target discrimination (random or selective targeting), casualty focus, and hard or soft target preference. With reference to the existing research on jihadists in Europe, and in particular the research conducted by Petter Nesser at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (2008; 2010; 2012; 2012a; 2012b, 2015), the

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

ambition here has been to complement this with a focused in-depth analysis of the targeting issue specifically, including parameters not previously covered in significant detail.

When it comes to *target discrimination*, there is a common assumption that militant Islamists target indiscriminately, without any moral constraints that would limit their scope for actions. This impression has probably been shaped by the combination of mass media coverage after major terrorist attacks against random civilians and propaganda from the terrorists themselves. There are several examples, however, where terrorists have been selective in their targeting – for example, by attacking police, authorities, name-specific individuals and others. Hence, this part of the research assesses the degree to which jihadi terrorists act indiscriminately and discriminately respectively.

Casualty focus is also a central topic related to the militant Islamists. Several large terrorist attacks have caused a high number of casualties and left the impression that the jihadists most often have a mass casualty focus. Having said that, other attacks have not displayed such a focus. This part of the research examines the extent to which the militant Islamists in Europe have displayed a mass casualty focus in practice.

The *soft or hard target* topic is also a relevant factor since one of the assumptions seems to be that Islamist terrorists primarily prefer to attack soft (easily accessible and not well protected) targets. We have, however, also witnessed an interest in, and attacks against, hard (particularly well protected) targets. This section elaborates on the differences between soft and hard targets and then examines the violent Islamists' actions in this regard.

The three issues mentioned above, that are commonly attributed to the militant Islamists, are all central with regard to the actual danger these actors represent from the perspective of societal security. They are also given a lot of attention in mass media and elsewhere, but despite this, they are often superficially addressed; this includes a very limited focus on defining and grading. As such, a closer examination of these issues will make a meaningful contribution to existing targeting research. The above-mentioned parameters are also examined in a 'one perpetrator versus several perpetrators'

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

perspective. Moreover, some other targeting related issues can be touched upon more briefly, even though the material does not allow firm conclusions.

The main objectives of this thesis have now been described, but I will also repeat the previously mentioned ambition it is to demonstrate how an in-depth single case study on micro level and multiple case study on meso level have complementary functions with regard to empirical and practical output.

1.4.2 The target audience for this research

In order to place this research in the academic landscape a good start is to look at the position of terrorism studies in general. Many researchers with interest in terrorism studies seem to agree that terrorism research is not an academic discipline, although exceptions are likely to be found. Rightly, the study of terrorism has taken considerable steps forward for the last 15-20 years and an extensive amount of high quality research is being published by many people working at different universities, research centres and other institutions. Large research projects will often have a transnational profile with regard to participants. There are still, however, several arguments going against seeing terrorism studies as an academic discipline of its own. It should rather be regarded as a field of research.

Hegghammer (2013a) points to three central characteristics which partially explain why terrorism studies is a field of research and not an academic discipline; it is a small international community of academics fully dedicating themselves to terrorism research, it is interdisciplinary, segmented and lacks clearly defined research programs, and it is institutionally “homeless”. Another factor is that terrorism studies are becoming less relevant for security services rich on resources, who have established proper analyst capacities making use of micro-level data academia have not access to (Hegghammer (2013a). Youngman (2018: 9-10) adds that it is a field with many one-time contributors (including journalists and others, author’s comment), and there is a core of relatively few academics who have considerable influence and “outsized” impact - also on new students which come under their wings. Youngman (2018: 7) also argues that new formats, like Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), is to narrow and isolates terrorism studies from other disciplines within academia. Reinares (2012) also makes it clear that it is not enough to

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

characterise terrorism studies as a social science sub-discipline, but that it should be regarded as;

“an inter-disciplinary field where History, Anthropology, Sociology, Criminology, Political Science, Psychology, Economics and other academic disciplines with their own - at times overlapping - traditions, methodology and learned corpus, coalesce in a mutually enriching exchange on problems concerning terrorism and counterterrorism. This exchange is thus based on their different theoretical, analytical and empirical perspectives.”

As described, terrorism studies may best be characterised as a field of research that is approached from different academic disciplines, leaving researchers several possibilities with regard to approach and frameworks - and furthermore they can be combined (Schmid, 2011:1-2). Moreover, terrorism can not be studied in isolation and should also be seen in connection to other forms of violence.

The link between terrorism studies and societal security studies may also be mentioned, because output from the first field provides important knowledge with considerable influence on the latter field. According to Aven et al. (2011), societal security has a relatively short history as a term, and like the terrorism term there is no accurate definition with consensus. Typically, however, it covers both safety (e.g. unintended accidents and natural disasters) and security (intended hostile acts), and the main focus is on protecting the basic needs of a society. Without going into a definitional debate with regard to what societal security is, the Norwegian Research Council (2011) explains that;

“societal security entails the ability of society to maintain critical societal functions and safeguard the life, health and basic needs of its citizens during events that pose various types of stressors.”

Like terrorism studies, societal security studies involves a range of academic disciplines, and some central themes are values, threats, vulnerabilities, risk perception, protective efforts, emergency management and resilience. Terrorism research provides an important supplement to societal security studies, and especially to the threat and risk part involved.

Understanding Terrorist Target Selection

This research project has been a joint project between the research department at the Norwegian Police University College and the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Stavanger, which has a program on societal security and risk management. The target audience is primarily academics with focus in the field of terrorism research, but also academics within the field of societal security issues who are engaged in security-related (not safety) issues. The latter category is included because this particular study involves a few issues with a direct link between the threat and protective security, like hard or soft target preference, deterrence and target displacement. Secondly, this thesis can hopefully bring knowledge of value to practitioners, for example analysts within police, security and intelligence services, protective security advisors, policy makers and others who provide decision-makers with advice. Parts of this study might also be of interest to a wider and more general audience with an interest for political violence and other forms of violence and armed conflicts.

2 Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

There are several different theoretical and methodological approaches applied to terrorism research in general; this is natural because, as explained above, there are several scientific disciplines with numerous fundamentally different topics within this particular field. Furthermore, a single topic within terrorism research may have intertwined psychological, social, ideological and situational factors of influence, fully illustrating the cross-scientific nature of terrorism studies. Research on targeting-related issues is not exempted from the complexity described, and there are two main approaches that seem particularly appropriate to merge for this project.

2.1.1 Criminal reasoning and opportunity theories

The first main path is related to criminal offenders' rationality and reasoning, and, in an extension of this, what may be characterized as *opportunity theories* (Felson & Clarke, 1998). Traditionally, these include theories like rational choice, routine activity, crime pattern theory and situational crime prevention. The latter is particularly relevant here because it focuses at large on the situational aspects of criminal acts in a local setting, or, more precisely, through concrete efforts reduces the window of opportunity for the criminals to act (Bjørge, 2015: 23). The current popular concept of *security by design*, which means integrating physical security efforts in an environment without destroying the aesthetics of the surroundings, is obviously a part of this. As such, it is essentially about preventing specific types of crime (an act of terrorism) rather than attempting to reform the offenders themselves (Clarke & Newman, 2006: 2). It must also be added that deterrence plays an integrated part in opportunity theories since preventive measures are supposed to signal to offenders that the chances of success are minimal, thus forcing them to abandon plots that have been considered, planned and prepared.

The second main path is comprehensive typological theorizing related to terrorist target selection processes. This approach is not unlike the theorizing presented decades ago in criminology (Cornish & Clarke, ed. 2014: 7). In the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

context of terrorism, however, the first main contribution came with C.J.M. Drake (1996; 1998). This approach is not only meaningful, but a necessary supplement to the situational theories from the first theoretical path since it more clearly catches and integrates the overarching ideological and strategic aspects of terrorist targeting. When it comes to the total framework the terrorists operate within, both ideology and strategy are of considerable importance, especially since they point out the main direction of their actions. In total, the two complementary and partially overlapping theoretical main paths described function, with some adjustments and adaptations to the specific objective of this thesis, as a generic and sound approach to research on terrorist targeting issues.

2.1.2 Terrorist reasoning

An initial logical starting point is what can be called the reasoning of terrorists (individuals, as well as organizations), and here, first and foremost, it must be considered from an operational perspective. From the late 1970s, researchers within criminology started to focus more on criminals' rationality and reasoning at the group and individual level. This became an important supplement to the social construction approaches that had dominated until then, often focusing on the so-called root causes of terrorism – what causes terrorism to occur at all and why people turn to terrorism in the first place. Scholars who set out to identify lack of abnormality or evidence for normality confronted old-fashioned assumptions that terrorists at large are mentally ill or stupid individuals, and the clearly dominating view today is that terrorists are essentially normal individuals (Bjørge & Heradstveit, 1993; Horgan, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Crenshaw, 2011; English, 2016: 1–2). Bruce Hoffman (2006: 38) has even described the modern terrorist as a *violent intellectual*.

Without further reflections regarding *how* normal, or indeed *how intellectual*, the average terrorist is, there is most often some kind of rational reasoning behind most terrorist offenses. Offender rationality is typically seen in a cost-benefit perspective, but when looking at terrorist target selection, we must also remember that terrorists operate within a framework and setting they only partially control. There are always some constraints, not least due to factors

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

the terrorists do not themselves control. As best as they can, terrorists will apply scenario thinking and try to foresee expected situational factors, but the execution of an attack will nevertheless always involve a certain amount of uncertainty and unpredictability, like sudden changes related to the target itself or situational circumstances, including serendipity. As such, it might be appropriate to characterize the rationality of terrorists in an operational context as *constrained rationality*.

Questions regarding perpetrators and mental health are often raised, but even individuals with mental problems or personality disorder will often have abilities intact when it comes to operational reasoning and planning – as indeed exemplified with the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016: 82). Following this, both individual terrorists and terrorist organisations are at large rational actors, but the question remains this: what is rational? For most people, the very nature of terrorism is inherently irrational. Killing innocent people in pursuit of a seemingly unachievable, distant objective does not make sense. This is closely connected to the psychological aspects linked to the radicalisation process itself. This will not be elaborated on in greater detail here, but, like Fathali M. Moghaddam importantly points out, terrorists' perception of reality leads to a rationality different from our accepted norms of social behaviour. They still have, however, their alternative moral and rationality to which they are truly dedicated (Moghaddam, 2008: 13). The core essence is that, when conducting terrorism research – and when it comes to operational matters – it is in general important to see things from the terrorists' point of view (Clarke & Newman, 2006: 20–23; Moghaddam, 2006: 1–11).

2.1.3 Situational crime prevention

Although methodological approaches varies, research on terrorist decision-making is often seen through the lenses of rationality. To understand this approach, we can go back three decades and look at works on criminal reasoning. In 1985, Clarke and Cornice published an article on modelling offenders' decisions with the focus being not on the psychologically and socially determined dispositions to commit criminal offenses, but on the outcome of the offender's rational decisions (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Three

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

main components were specifically elaborated upon: the image of a reasoning offender, a crime specific focus and the distinction between decision models for involvement processes and the criminal events (Cornish & Clarke, ed., 2014: 7). At the time, leading terrorism researchers found the latter issue particularly relevant for research in the field of terrorism since it turned the focus over to the event side of terrorism (Taylor, 1988: 181). Agreeing on this point, I will, however, also argue that the two first-mentioned components are important and relevant as well. The issue of a reasoning offender has already been mentioned, but a crime specific focus is also important. Evidently, white collar crimes and rape are different kinds of crime in a number of ways. Equally, terrorist offences can include profoundly diverse activities, like bomb-making, hostage-taking, kidnappings, assassinations and so on.

In 2006, Clarke and Newman developed the situational crime prevention model further and tried to place it in the context of terrorism, applying twenty basic principles from traditional crime prevention. Furthermore, they exemplified their model on different attack types (Clarke & Newman, 2006: 7). Conclusively, the authors argued that reducing terrorist opportunity includes separately analysing different forms of attack, establish separate programs for home and overseas protection, and build close relationships between governments and businesses. Furthermore, they argued that only the greatest vulnerabilities should be reduced, otherwise the task would be impossible, and nothing would be done (Clarke & Newman, 2005: 230).

The situational crime prevention approach has been the subject of criticism, though not so much regarding the reasoning or the situational focus (Akers, 1990; Weenink, 2015). One main criticism has been related to target displacement, in the sense that securing one asset will lead the terrorists to other, more vulnerable targets (Bjørge, 2015: 23). This will be discussed more thoroughly later in this thesis. From my point of view, and in a terrorist targeting context, the limitation for the situational crime prevention model is a natural consequence of its local and situational focus, since overarching factors linked to terrorists' ideology and strategy operate more in the background. On the other hand, that is exactly why this theoretical approach combines well with Drake's comprehensive approach – they complement each other in a meaningful way. It should also be added that there have been constructive suggestions regarding to the methods that may be utilised to

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

expand the situational prevention model (Wortley, 1996). Having said that, researchers who have developed theories in this area have themselves answered much of the criticisms that have been raised (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 41–46; Clarke, 2005). Furthermore, the situational crime prevention model has been updated over the years, and overall, it seems like a sensible approach when it comes to reducing opportunities for terrorists – indirectly coercing an impact on terrorist targeting and attack methods. In practice, the principles from situational crime prevention has a lot in common with modern security management and the continuous circle of regularly doing risk and vulnerability assessments, getting protective improvements in place and evaluate accordingly.

2.1.4 Deterrence and implications on terrorist targeting

As previously mentioned, one issue intertwined with opportunity theories is deterrence. The principles of deterrence, as many will know, go back to Beccaria, Bentham and, to some degree, Hobbes (Harcourt, 2013). In our time however, and as described by Nagin, the modern criminal justice system dispenses justice by apprehending, prosecuting and punishing individuals who break the law. Following this, crime is prevented through incapacitation, specific deterrence and general deterrence (Nagin, 2013: 200). At large, deterrence frames crime prevention in terms of two theoretical concepts, namely the certainty of punishment and the severity of punishment (Nagin, Solow & Lum, 2015). Nagin argues that the deterrent effect from the first concept is more consistent than the second but also that the certainty factor has a stronger linkage to apprehension probability than the certainty of punishment itself (Nagin, 2013: 199). A central question here, though, is how deterrence works on terrorists. While ordinary criminals seek to avoid apprehension and punishment, terrorists are not necessarily concerned about these potential consequences of their actions. Rightly, terrorists from a lot of different organizations across ideological differences have normally tried to avoid apprehension or even less attractive forms of incapacitation, but with militant Islamists, it is often a different story altogether. Repeatedly, we have witnessed suicide bombers and perpetrators conducting fedayeen-style (fight until killed) attacks. Among jihadists, there is a willingness to die for the cause. Even martyrdom is attractive. This is well illustrated through the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

varieties of an expression that has been used by al-Qaida jihadists, Hamas and Hezbollah on different occasions: *We love death as you love life* (Priest, 2009; Ryvchin, 2012; Pantucci, 2015). This begs the question, what could possibly deter these actors? The answer must be that for jihadists, deterrence is primarily linked to the question of operational failure or success. In some cases, the possibility of partial success may be enough for the perpetrators to go through with the actions, but if the likelihood of success is very small, it is likely that there will be a deterrent effect.

2.1.5 The comprehensive approach

As clarified, criminal reasoning, situational crime prevention and deterrence has relevance for terrorist targeting examination. It is still apparent, however, that a pivotal element is missing, namely a broader and overarching approach, linking the ideological and strategic part, together with the operational and tactical issues and factors. In brief, there is a need for the bird's-eye point of view. Drake's (1996; 1998) works on terrorist targeting were comprehensive as he systematically addressed ideology, strategy and tactics, while also including some of the most important external factors, target protection and the security environment. The outcome from his research was a couple of typologies, where the first typology was funnel-like, describing how ideology, strategy and tactics were affected by constraints, and eventually narrowed down to alternative targets (Drake, 1998: 176). The second typology was a step-by-step illustration of decision-making towards a target, including alternative options terrorists could take if the original target proved too difficult to attack (Drake, 1998: 180).

It is arduous to identify substantial weaknesses in Drake's work regarding philosophical and theological approach and structure, but his general focus means that the attention to detailed situational circumstances is limited, in contrast to the opportunity theories. Furthermore, some details in the typologies can be subjects for discussions, and the one-directional and somewhat linear illustration on decision-making may prove difficult to identify and follow in in-depth, real-life case studies. More evidently, however, some of the aspects that seemingly could be missed in Drake's work are due to the substantial changes in the security and threat situation in the last

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

two decades. As such, these flaws are not due to his theoretical and methodological approach. Just reflect briefly on the significant differences in the moral compass, modus operandi and the targeting preferences of Provisional IRA and ETA, and today's militant Islamists. In some respects, it has been a watershed. One example is the contrast between ethno-nationalist groups often selective targeting, and the indiscriminate mass-killing focus of the jihadists. Additionally, we must take increased global mobility, societal changes, technological developments, as well as changes regarding the broad approach in counterterrorism and within the security sector into consideration. The developments in all these areas do not change the fact that Drake's comprehensive approach to terrorist targeting continues to represent a meaningful approach to research in this area. This is also why it is still often cited (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Neumann, 2009; Nemeth, 2010; Silke, 2011; Wright, 2013; Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016).

2.1.6 *The merging of approaches*

Based on the research questions for this project, the merging of the theoretical approaches described above constitutes a sound basis. Some adjustments are called for not only to fit the specific subject and research objectives but also due to this author's preferences regarding structure, visual presentation and use of terms. Accordingly, this work is not so much about testing the theoretical approaches elaborated upon above but rather to develop and merge them for the specific purpose of this research project. The approach, now to be outlined in more detail, is generic and can be applied to any terrorist actor per se, even though the emphasis here will be limited to two different and concrete actor types. The starting point will be comprehensive, while the situational focus will become more apparent when it comes down to the tactical level, especially when analysing plot scenarios and the attacks themselves.

One simple model related to the theoretical approach of the research will be introduced, the main purpose of which is to visualise the structured approach for this research – this involves mitigating some of the challenges as well as the complexity that comes with terrorist targeting issues. However, it is essential to understand that the complex and dynamic interaction between the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

different independent variables can rarely be illuminated through such models. Indeed, typologies and models have their limitations, and considerable care must be taken to avoid mechanical simplifications. Joseph A. Maxwell (2008: 214) argues that;

“...typologies usually are based on a limited numbers of features of the study, and by themselves do little to clarify the actual functioning and interrelationship of the component parts of a design.”

How limited they are regarding features is likely to depend on how detailed the typologies are. If the main blocks are few and major, and fit all relevant explanatory variables, they will in general illustrate what Elman (2005: 298) characterizes as the dimensions of the property space. If expanding to a more detailed version, however, it could easily become too complex (Drake, 1998: 175). It might reduce the overview and make the process-tracing more difficult. As such, simplicity is preferable, unless complexity is absolutely necessary for an adequate explanatory theory (George & Bennett, 2005: 247).

Maxwell's point that typologies and models rarely provide a detailed explanation about *how* or *why* things happen in qualitative research is valid. Accordingly, it must be combined with other efforts like within case process-tracing. It is important to add that models do provide guidance to a structured approach and can serve as useful tools, as the researcher is identifying and sorting different variables that come to the surface during the endeavour.

Another point made by Maxwell (2008: 214) is that models illustrating logical progressions are typically linear and one-directional, and that they do not represent the logic and process of qualitative research. This is worth noticing when designing models, because interaction and dynamics between variables from different main categories may appear at any time of a process. One example is that moral qualms may force a terrorist to discard an alternative target early in the planning phase, or interrupt and abandon an attack minutes before it is initiated. For this reason, it makes sense to avoid advanced, linear and funnel-like illustrations. Therefore, the following model (fig. 2.1) should be seen as an *inter-active model* (Maxwell, 2008: 215). The dynamic nature of the issues focused upon is evident, and the main categories of influence can all affect, or become affected by, one another. In practice, there are no

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

rankings or priorities between the main categories related, for example, to the degree of influence, timing or directions.

2.1.7 An inter-active framework on targeting processes

What may be characterised as the structured target selection process starts when the actor in question seriously considers, or takes a decision, to actually commit a terrorist attack. On the other end, the process culminates with an attack, or attempt of such, against the selected target(s). Hence, the decision to conduct an attack and the attack itself represent the two dependent variables in a target selection process.

Between the start and end of this journey, there are multiple independent variables that affect the target selection. On an upper level, the categories of ideology and strategy constitute the major framework for a terrorist actor. On the lower (operational or tactical) level, the categories of internal factors and external factors represent the capacities and constraints the actor must relate to. Importantly, the variables from the different main boxes will interact with each other, which contributes significantly to the complex dynamics that makes terrorist targeting so profoundly difficult and unpredictable to assess. The following model illustrates this:




Fig. 2.1 The target selection process – Scope for action

2.1.8 Ideology and strategy constitute the main framework

Information related to ideology and strategy will provide us with the major framework the terrorists in question operate within. *Ideology* will supply us with the set of beliefs and moral reflections that constitute the basic fundament of the actor's rationality. Accordingly, we here expect to gain knowledge about the actor's subjective world-view, the current threat-picture, the identified enemies, more detailed characterisations of these enemies, moral justifications and legitimacy for violent actions as well as the group's or movement's ultimate objectives. While some of these variables can be rather straightforward to register from the outside, there may also be internal discussions of interest that are more challenging to disclose. Moral justification for acting against some specific parts of the public and legitimacy for extraordinary brutal violence are two topics that may create discontent within terrorist organisations. For example, is it justifiable to target civilians who are not a part in the armed conflict? Is it acceptable to kill women and children? Is it legitimate to attack people with the same religious beliefs who are not cooperating with the enemy? Internal debates and quarrels on issues like this have fractionated several groups and movements.

Strategy in our context is often about how an armed conflict is to be won for political purposes (Mahnken, 2010). In short, strategies are long-term plans on how to achieve long-term goals. Through their strategic decisions, terrorists may seek to achieve not only one but several indirect objectives. Based on a variety of sources (Thornton, 1965; Hutchinson, 1978; Drake, 1996, 1998; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016), these objectives can be categorized into *compliance, advertisement, endorsement, provocation, societal disruption and threat elimination*. Compliance refers to the change the terrorists seek to achieve from the psychological target. Attacks are carried out to generate advertisement for the cause through maximum media attention. Through endorsement, the movement wants to consolidate its ideological foundation and general support among followers, potential recruits and outsiders. Through attacks of provocation, the authorities may, in rashness, initiate operations that will prove counterproductive and benefit the terrorists. By societal disruption, the attackers seek to affect the everyday life

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

of a society over time to boost public mistrust against the authorities – ultimately increasing the political pressure. Finally, threat elimination covers a range of issues, from taking care of internal security and reducing enemy capability and capability, to maintaining the strength of the movement towards competing actors and unwanted processes. The latter can, for example, mean spoiling negotiations between other groups and the declared enemy.

The leadership of large terrorist movements or networks may use different strategies to achieve specific objectives, and they also might adjust their strategies over time. Solo terrorists and small-group actors will, however, most often have to rely on a simple and more straightforward strategy. For example, they may choose between conducting a complex and spectacular one-off attack, and a series of minor ‘needlestick’ attacks. Additionally, there are operational issues and decisions that may have strategic importance, like if they have potential for substantial impact regarding end results and reactions in the aftermath – both internally and externally. Major decisions are, for example, linked to issues like fighting in their own interest area or taking the fight to where the enemy belongs. It can also involve indiscriminate versus selective killing, mass-casualty versus low-casualty attacks, and suicide attacks versus escape or capture. The strategic importance of such issues can sometimes be seen when terrorist groups, networks and organizations experience serious backfire after major terrorist attacks. Sometimes this happens because something goes horribly wrong, or because they make poor assessments with regard to what kind of acts or attacks their sympathisers find legitimate.

2.1.9 *The internal and external factors*

On an operational or tactical level, the terrorists’ scope for action is affected by internal and external factors. *Internal factors* are characteristics and capacities the actor in question possess. In other words, these are variables that are controlled by the terrorists in one way or another. Manpower is one internal factor, and obviously the capability of solo terrorists, small cells, larger groups and networks will vary. Furthermore, operational experience, know-how, general skills and special expertise is likely to have an impact on

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

modus operandi and how well an operation is carried out. The weapons available also represent an important factor, and it has a significant impact both regarding attack approach possibilities and the lethality potential. In Madrid 2004, London 2005 and Brussels 2016 the effect of explosives was on display. In the Breivik case in 2001, the Tunis assault in 2015, the November 13 attacks in Paris and the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand (BBC News, 2019), the lethality of semi-automatic and military assault rifles were thoroughly demonstrated. On the other hand, we have also witnessed how *substitutional weapons* (physical items not made for the purpose of being a weapon) have generated tremendous damage, as proven in a bus massacre in Israel in 1989, in the 2001 9/11 attacks and the lorry attacks in Nice 2016, Berlin 2016 and Stockholm 2017 (Alexander, 2002: 37; Azulay, 2011; Stockholm District Court, 2018). With reference to the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, militant Islamists and others, we can also say that suicide bombers or Fedayeen style attackers have, in some ways, a bigger operational toolbox than terrorists, who prefer classic hit and run attacks. A perpetrators' ability to collect information and conduct hostile reconnaissance can be a factor of considerable influence. Furthermore, funding and logistical support, for example, regarding mobility, accommodations and communication, are also important factors.

One important factor not to be forgotten when addressing internal factors, although they might be difficult to assess in many cases, is how personal and psychological dimensions may interfere – both on the individual level and on an intergroup level. It is known that in the case of solo terrorists, personality disorders and other mental disturbances are quite common (COT, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Spaaij, 2012; Gill, 2015; Gardell, 2015; Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016: 82). This can influence the degree of discrimination and brutality in the targeting. Furthermore, intragroup processes may have an impact when, for example, terrorists discuss what or whom to target. Is there room for individual opinions and discussion at all, and what are the dynamics in play with regard to strong leaders and their obedient followers? Furthermore, within a network or a fairly structured organization, the leadership's discourse as well as the dialogue between the leadership and those carrying out the attack is relevant. Sometimes, it can be questioned whether the discourse from

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

central leaders in a remote location is followed in practice on the ground level in other parts of the world.

External factors are variables the terrorists do not control themselves but which they still have to take into consideration and relate to in their operational planning. There will always be such factors in any terrorist operation, and often they will function as constraints. A part of the bigger picture here is, for example, international and national intelligence and security measures designed and implemented to detect terrorists before they are able to strike. This can be effective border control, advanced technical intelligence gathering, monitoring of online activity, procedures for cooperation and sharing of information between states, and so on. Other relevant examples can be legislation related to gun control and financial transactions. Then, there are factors more directly related to the operational level; one basic factor here is the operational environment itself. Obviously, homegrowns will, in contrast to visitors and foreigners, blend in with the local surroundings and have local know-how in many respects. In contrast, there will be several constraints for terrorists who arrive from abroad. They might not blend in very well and they cannot acquire weapons legally – perhaps they also lack contacts that can help them with this. It is important to include, however, that the external factors are not even always foreseeable for the terrorists. There is always the factor of serendipity. Pure coincidences and unexpected circumstances, such as weather change, traffic chaos, cancelled events, or a school class passing by a group of soldiers, can stop a terrorist attack that is in motion.

Due to the need for more detailed information, as well as the high number of potential and very different variables involved, the operational or tactical proceedings of a terrorist operation are often more challenging to establish than the ideological and strategic background. As described here, however, it is evident that any terrorist actor (individual, cell or larger group) will act within a certain framework or scope for action, and that some factors can be controlled, but not others. This explains why a terrorist is never fully controllable and of a profoundly dynamic nature. From a research perspective, if the objective is to explain operational aspects and proceedings in concrete cases, this is also why it is essentially important to clarify how the variables involved affect each other.

2.1.10 *The challenge of interaction*

Recognizing the fact that the independent variables from the four main categories are not living separate lives but affect each other in a dynamic process, *interaction* is a keyword. Ideally, a target should be in accordance with all kinds of preferences the actor may have, but this is probably most often not the case. It is more likely that pre-set plans and priorities are disturbed, bringing compromises and pragmatism into the dynamic target selection process. In general, unexpected changes make it more difficult for the terrorists besides the analysts in security services trying to stay ahead and predict future threats. Importantly, targeting processes are not homogenous. Although we have seen some large, well-prepared, seemingly structured terrorist operations in the last decades, these are probably outnumbered by operations that may best be characterized as poorly planned, chaotic and marked by hasty decision-making – while a lot of operations fall somewhere in between (Schuurman & Eijkman, 2015).

Regardless of how structured a process has been, terrorists, if they have not been locked on a specific target from the start, will normally have several targets to choose from. They then enter the final decision-making phase, where minor details and situational circumstances may prove decisive. As previously explained, the target may be changed or abandoned at the last moment for various reasons.

As described, the dynamic target selection process is affected by a high number of different variables, further complicated by their interaction. A reduced focus on some type of variables (e.g. ideological, strategic or tactical) or certain parts of the targeting process (e.g. early or late stages in an operational process) will inevitably construct problematic trade-offs. Therefore, if the main objective is to achieve a complete understanding of a target selection process, all relevant variables must be included in the analysis. The complexity of interaction also means that care should be taken regarding inferences in the research output as there might be several pitfalls for firm conclusions on this particular topic.

2.1.11 Terrorist targeting and lethality

Targeting research generates more information than basic constructs like target types and categories. It can, and indeed, should be taken further, since it also provides an opportunity to closely explore related issues of interest and influence. With reference to the research objectives for this thesis, this includes the terrorists' focus regarding degrees of discrimination, casualty focus and whether the terrorists strike against hard or soft targets. These issues will be thoroughly addressed later in this thesis, but an introduction is appropriate at this stage.

The *degree of discrimination* is a most decisive factor due to its influence on lethality potential, and it is indisputably attached to the moral boundaries of the actor. Without any moral caveats at all, terrorists would find it legitimate to attack anyone, and the range of target alternatives would, as a result, be more or less unlimited. Totally indiscriminate targeting will result from there being no constraints at all regarding the target's gender, age, religious adherence, political views, ethnic background or position. In practice, anyone could represent a target under such circumstances. If there are some moral boundaries that affect the perpetrator's choice of victims, it is discriminate targeting since there is then some kind of selectivity involved. A perpetrator may, for example, prefer to attack a certain group of the population and not a name-specific individual, which represents the application of the highest degree of selectivity.

Casualty focus can be graded the same way as discrimination. Mass-casualty focus means that the terrorists simply seek to kill as many as possible and cause a mass-casualty incident. Terrorists could also have a middle-range casualty focus, for example, by acknowledging that killing too many civilians will backfire at them and cause negative consequences – like loss of supporters and sympathisers. An even narrower focus would be to kill one single individual only. However, if terrorists choose to kill one individual only, this does not necessarily have to be founded on moral boundaries. After all, murdering a top politician or public debate figure could also be a strategic or tactical choice, with no moral reflections involved at all.

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

Finally, there is the question that concerns *soft and hard targets*. Soft targets are unprotected, vulnerable and easily accessible; hence, an attack is likely to be successful. In contradiction, hard targets are well protected, and an attack is unlikely to succeed. Importantly, and in contrast to how these terms are often used by news and other forms of media, the distinction is often not as clear-cut as it seems at first glance. After all, the hard or soft target status must be determined after a closer assessment of the protective measures of the asset or target involved. The “protective toolbox” of police, security services and others is packed with minor and extensive security measures, and the appropriate authorities will typically have fixed protective levels with a standardised content for each and every one of them. For example, if a Member of Parliament is given verbal security advice regarding his or her daily behaviour, the MP in question will continue to be a soft target. In contrast, if the MP is followed 24/7 by a team of close protection officers, the hard target status will have been put in place. The main point here is that target hardening does not necessarily lead to a hard target status. It depends completely on the protective measures that are adapted.

In total, these three issues have a considerable amount of influence on the damage and lethality potential of terrorist attacks. Accordingly, analysing these characteristics together can generate useful knowledge about the actual security threat the actor in question represents – especially regarding the general public.

While the degree of discrimination and casualty focus are linked to the intent of a terrorist actor, the hard or soft target question will automatically bring in the factor of the actor’s capability. Hence, the two key terms that are known from the threat assessment content, *intent* and *capability*, are brought together. If one of them is completely missing, there is no threat. An actor’s capability will, as described earlier, generally involve a lot of different variables, but in this context, there are two variables of significant relevance, namely weapons and attack approach.

Regarding weapons, it is observed on several occasions that terrorists do not necessarily need a traditional weapon at all. Both bare hands and so-called substitutional weapons (airplanes, vehicles, diggers, bulldozers and lorries) have been seen in use regularly. In general, though, most will agree that

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

military assault rifles represent a profounder threat than melee (non-firing) weapons. A knife attack will often not lead to casualties at all, let alone mass casualties. Military assault rifles, on the other hand, may cause a high number of casualties. Nonetheless, this needs to be assessed and determined on a case-by-case basis. After all, it is not only the weapon type that matters, the intentions being just as relevant. For instance, a terrorist in possession of an assault rifle could plan to kill just one person, just as a bombmaker could choose to place the device under one individual's vehicle instead of in the midst of a crowded place.

The same applies for *attack approach*. It can, for example, be argued that a suicide bomber, due to his or her ability to manoeuvre with precision and a no-escape mentality, will often represent a greater danger than a hand-grenade tossed into a shop. Likewise, a sniper operating from a long distance is not likely to kill as many people as a terrorist shooting into a big crowd from close range. Obviously, there might be factors of influence beyond weapons and attack approach, but these two are central issues for establishing the context needed to answer the research questions here. Furthermore, they are most often possible to identify and determine, even in thwarted plots.

2.1.12 *Establishing the situational context*

In contrast to the detailed, hard-to-get information needed to track individual decision-making in a targeting process, the information required to determine the degree of discrimination, casualty focus and target protection level is, if not easy, often somewhat less difficult to retrieve. This is, after all, not dependent not so much on the detailed information from the mind of the perpetrator(s), but to a larger degree on the assessment of the situational context of the incident in question. In practice, we are here combining the two main theoretical approaches described earlier, since ideological, moral and strategic factors also have influence here, but at the same time, it is primarily linked to the situational context. As for thwarted plots, we are at large dependent on information found, statements from the involved individuals and evidence produced, and often this can provide us with the most likely attack scenario. Conducted attacks will be further strengthened by the actual actions taken at the scene of the crime, and the keyword is therefore *context*.

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

To retrieve the situational context, I have systematically analysed the information related to *the offender(s)*, *the target(s)* and *the situational circumstances*. Criminologists will recognise this as a variety of the classic triangle from Cohen and Felson (1979: 589), where the context is derived from a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of capable guardians. The latter is, however, just one factor among many that may influence and affect a terrorist attack situation. Accordingly, I have replaced *the absence of capable guardians* with the broader term *situational circumstances* to cover all relevant factors and achieve enhanced accuracy regarding the topic and objectives for this research.

From *the offender* indicators regarding ideological adherence, moral boundaries and operational capability can be retrieved. For example, if the actor in question wears some kind of uniform, shouts something during the attack or leaves a note, this may indicate ideological affiliation. Furthermore, statements during the act, combined with the actor's appearance, can tell us something about intent and the moral thresholds involved. The weapons and how these are used will disclose important information related to the degree of discrimination and casualty focus. Furthermore, the perpetrators' operational behaviour on the scene can say something about the offenders' skills and experience. Likewise, *the target* may have characteristics supplying valuable indicators for the research questions. Basic characteristics like ethnic origins, gender, age and profession are some examples of this. For example, we know that Jews may be exposed to terrorism from both right-wing extremists and militant Islamists. If, as in Merah's case, a Jewish young girl is ruthlessly killed, it potentially reveals important information concerning the rationality and morality of the perpetrator. Furthermore, how vulnerable and accessible the target is will be factors to explore with regard to the hard or soft target assessment. Finally, *the situational circumstances* could be anything not directly linked to the offender or the target. In what kind of environment does the attack take place? Is it a crowded area or a remote spot with few people around, and furthermore, what was done and in what way? Here, attack method and observable situational behaviour may provide us with important pieces of information, making the picture more complete.

2.2 The methodological approach

Several methods may be applied on qualitative research projects. Research on human choices or actions in a limited environment could, for example, call for traditional ethnographic methods like direct observation and interviewing. However, in projects focusing on issues related to terrorist actors, this is not possible to the same degree – at least not as long as they are active. Terrorists and extremists will often live in clandestine and autonomous social environments as they are involved in subversive and criminal activities. This does not necessarily mean that field research and interviews are totally impossible in terrorism research (e.g. Dolnik, 2012). At large, however, other methods must be applied. Therefore, case study research based on within-case process-tracing, and, if applicable or relevant, cross-case comparison stands out as a sensible approach.

Case studies as a method are still debated within social science. Hellevik (2011: 98) points out that variables of value may not be present in the chosen research units (cases), and that it might be difficult to say how typical the chosen unit is compared to others. This leads to the classic argument that case study methods are of limited value if the meaning is to generalize on the results. Andersen (2010: 10) also acknowledges that to use the results from one or a few cases to say something about a greater universe of cases is an analytical challenge. We should also, however, include Yin's (2009: 38) remark that a case study unit is not a representative for a greater mass, but more an investigation for itself. Following this, comparative or multiple case studies will, in principle, be a series of single experiments. The above-mentioned views make it apparent that case studies demand a well-developed theoretical foundation; as for how appropriate they are for generalization, this also depends to a large degree on the subject, research design and coding. Direct comparison might often be difficult, but, having said that, this also depends on the topic. As for projects related to terrorist modus operandi, I will argue that these at least can generate some general knowledge of value. The fact that the terrorists themselves learn from each other across ideological and organizational differences directly, as seen with Palestinian and German terrorist groups during the 1970s, or indirectly, as seen with the Internet browsing terrorists at the present, supports this view.

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

Despite his critical attitude, Hellevik (2011: 99) acknowledges that case studies open possibilities that may exceed the negative factors, namely that the detailed knowledge you get on the unit(s) of research can identify a whole range of variables not found otherwise, which again provides a good basis for a comprehensive perspective. Case studies can even be preferable when the phenomenon to be studied is significantly complicated and involves a high number of variables. Agreeing on this, George and Bennett (2005: 19) also add the potential for achieving high conceptual validity. Yin (2009: 9) underlines that case study may be a good choice for projects of an explanatory character, while Andersen (2010: 13) regards case studies as useful for projects involving behavioural aspects and decision-making. Some also argue that case studies represent a good alternative when looking at environments outside the public sphere or subcultures (Johannessen, Tufte, & Christoffersen, 2011: 212). Finally, it is a point that case studies may be of particular interest to those seeking detailed knowledge, and not just the big lines (Flyvbjerg, 2011). In total, a case study approach does seem both relevant and preferable for a research project like this, which sets out to arrive at a deeper understanding of terrorist targeting issues.

2.2.1 Within-case process tracing and analysis

The model introduced earlier (Fig. 2.1) on terrorist target selection processes ensures a structured approach, and it is an important tool for sorting different variables of influence. As such, we might say it constitutes a deductive starting point, but it does not *explain* the interaction between the variables, only claiming that it takes place. As such, the process-tracing will be inductive in nature, potentially disclosing decisive variables, variables not considered, variables that did not exist previously or variables that have been overlooked. Furthermore, the typological theory and process-tracing technique will help detect indicators and explain the interaction effects between them (George & Bennett, 2005: 255). George and Bennett (2005: 149) summarily argue that combining within-case process-tracing and cross-case comparison “*is a powerful way to create middle-range theories that are consistent with both the historical explanations of individual cases and the general theoretical patterns evident across cases*”.

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

There are several varieties of process-tracing, hereby use of hypothesis, more general explanations and analytical explanation. The latter seems to cover the approach used best, considering the nature of the research problem, the material used and the designated process (George & Bennett, 2005: 211). Analytical explanation differs from a more general explanation with detailed process-tracing, since controlled comparison is hardly possible with the research problem in question. Therefore, it is a good tool to examine whether the phenomenon is characterized by equifinality, and the detailed study provides an opportunity to identify different paths that lead to a similar outcome (George & Bennett, 2005: 215). Moreover, process-tracing is well suited for investigating processes that are not likely to be structured or linear, but are rather a convergence of several conditions, including complex interaction between independent variables (George & Bennett, 2005: 212).

At first glance, a concrete target decision identified in a case may have a whole range of possible explanations. For example, if a terrorist cell searching for a target has two buildings to choose from, why does it choose building A and not building B? Is it because the level of physical security gives them an opportunity versus the capability problem? Does the presence of many “innocent” civilians in one of the buildings cause a moral problem? Or is the geographical location itself, or the time of the day, causing situational or circumstantial problems? Obviously, several coinciding factors and motives can influence the decision taken with respect to a concrete target. It might, however, also be the case that only one specific variable will determine a decision at a certain stage in the process.

Likewise, there might be several and different potential targets at the scene of the attack. In such a situation, there is a need to clarify what the original target is. As an example, we can briefly look to the attack on two soldiers in Nice in February 2015 (Reuters, 2015). The soldiers were guarding a Jewish community centre, so was the original target the soldiers, the community centre or both? Both target types are obviously attractive to militant Islamists, so it might not seem like an important issue to clarify, but to examine terrorist reasoning and decision-making on targeting issues in the most thorough way, we must address them. A further complicating fact is that sometimes the victims of a terrorist attack may not represent the intended targets at all, and injuring or killing them may even be in conflict with the terrorists’ own

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

rationality and moral boundaries. A bomb with a timing device may detonate prematurely, often killing the terrorists themselves or innocent victims (Oppenheimer, 2009: 62). With some caveats, terrorists can also become what PIRA commander Brendan Hughes has characterized as “over-zealous”, to the degree that they do not see the potential consequences of their actions during the planning process (English, 2016: 147).

The discussion above has made it clear that each case and incident must be assessed properly to clarify the target selection processes, target preferences and the related issues this research has set out to explore. By applying process-tracing, looking at the smallest clues before and putting them into context, it is possible to analytically identify the most likely explanation and to discard others that are of a spurious nature.

Having described what can be achieved with the theoretical and methodological approach chosen for this research, it must also be stated that there are limitations. Much will depend on the amount and quality of information. Naturally, there is no guarantee that within-case process-tracing will find each and every variable of interest, but such an approach will certainly strengthen the possibility for correct inferences.

2.2.2 Case selection within a low-frequency phenomenon

In the West, terrorism is a low frequency phenomenon. Furthermore, the overall character and context of terrorist related conflicts differ significantly. There are, for instance, many differences with regard to how militant Islamists operate in Europe, as compared to in Afghanistan-Pakistan or Iraq-Syria. On the European continent, they operate more or less like other traditional underground terrorist movements seen for decades, while in the abovementioned distant areas, they act more like paramilitary insurgents, or even like ordinary military units. Additionally, there are several actor type categories involved, like lone actors, cells, networks, central leadership and affiliates, which represent different sorts of capacities – and threats within the different main ideological directions. With regard to qualitative research projects, this means that it is important to assess the overall framework and

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

scope thoroughly. It may be sensible to limit the research to a specific actor within a specific geographic area over a fixed period of time. This will enhance the precision of the research and probably increase its practical value at the output end. That said, tailored or customized research designs must necessarily also lead to some limitations. The most obvious factor is that the results may be difficult to use for direct comparison with other projects due to differing frameworks or theoretical and methodological approaches, as well as different datasets and coding. Furthermore, the end product may have a limited relevance for research on actors from other ideological directions or geographical areas. This will, however, depend on topic, parameters involved and other factors.

In the context of terrorist targeting, it is most important to choose actors that have actually conducted, or made credible attempts to launch, terrorist attacks. If we were to include individuals and groups that have only forwarded threats without any consolidating evidence of willingness to actually commit the violent act, this would cause fundamental and unsolvable problems. Furthermore, only with actors that have conducted attacks will it be possible to follow the whole targeting process from start to end. Importantly though, documented thwarted plots should still be included in datasets on targeting issues because they will also provide useful information on the selection processes and preferences. Evidently, we do not learn only by looking at the final targets chosen, but also from the targets that have been discarded en route to the attack itself.

2.2.3 Terrorism research and sources

Before looking more closely at the approach of the two respective part studies of this thesis, some reflections about terrorism research and sources in general is in order. This is a difficult topic and the most obvious reason is that most often, it is impossible to gather information directly from those we conduct research on, namely the terrorists themselves – at least those still active. A second challenge is that detailed, reliable and high-quality material will usually be under the custody of the police, security and intelligence services, and, when it comes to judicial documents, courts. Such information will typically be classified or restricted in other ways and out of reach for

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

outsiders, researchers included. The process of getting access to police investigation material and judicial documents (indictments and verdicts) varies between countries, but often it will not be possible, or alternatively too time-consuming in relation to the timeframe of the research project. If, however, access to such material is obtained, it is likely to have considerable value for the research. Police investigation material will be rich in details and give an extraordinary insight into the case in question, although the material may not be used in the trial at court. Court material, especially what is referred to in a verdict, will have gone through a legal assessment that can't be ignored and can as such be regarded as quality material. In total, police investigation material and judicial documents are maybe hard to procure but will most often possess valuable information. These paths should therefore not be left untried, if that is possible within the timeframe of the project.

The difficulties with access to prime research material from the terrorists, as well as the police and security services, means that research often or to a large degree must be based on open sources – at least when the mapping of incidents and operational details are involved. This is why information from news media becomes central. For various academic disciplines, which can use other methods and sources for information gathering, news media may not be regarded as the best source. It is, nevertheless, a fact that it probably represents the most dominant open source for terrorism research in general, simply because there is a lack of other alternatives, making us heavily dependent on it. It is true that mass media is a business where the competition to be the first to bring out and deadlines for printed newspapers creates time-pressure too. Sensational headlines that are not necessarily correct, and a fair share of assumptions, are also often observed. In general, I find that terrorism scholars are aware of this and, accordingly, news sources are handled with care and a critical approach. On the other side, news media is not a heterogenous branch and the quality of their work differs considerably. Some are obviously tabloid, superficial or politically biased, but it should also be acknowledged that media actors can be serious, reflective and generally useful for research purposes. Media reportage from plots and incidents are essential for keeping track of the developments in general, updating datasets, and for retrieving more detailed information for in-depth follow-ups. Media articles may also provide important details from terrorist incidents and the following

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

investigations – for instance, when they cover ongoing trials. In-depth articles written weeks or months after a major incident has taken place, or interviews with the people involved, or officials in central positions during investigations, can also provide important information. As Petter Nesser (2015:19) points out, some media institutions have dedicated employees with expert knowledge on terrorism. Some have also published books which are well-respected in academic circles (for example, Bergen, 2002; 2011; Burke, 2011; 2015; Sørensen, 2013). So, media sources are significantly valuable in terrorism research, but the researcher must be critical, selective, and assess the information in the best possible manner to avoid potential pitfalls. Often, it is sensible to use well-established and respected media institutions that are not linked to political parties or have private or industrial interests.

Academic publications within the topic in question are always important. The authors may have in-depth knowledge on specific actors or subjects, but such works can also be useful as background information. The authors may also have benefited from sources not accessible to yourself and provide useful information to your project. Likewise, experts in specific areas can be consulted directly, and this is not limited to experts on terrorism per se, but could be true for specialists in other areas of relevance, like religion, symbolism, strategy, finances or the use of weapons.

There are also various terrorism research databases (see e.g. Bowie & Schmid, 2011: 294–340) that may be used to research on targeting issues. There are, however, known limitations and weaknesses in many of them (Crenshaw, 2011: 4). Another point is that it must be assessed to which degree a specific database can be useful for qualitative research, or primarily serve quantitative research purposes. One example with regard to databases that can be of value in qualitative research is the Lost Lives project from the Northern Ireland conflict - systematically describing the victims of every lethal incident (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton, & McVea, 1999). Also relevant for qualitative research are smaller actor-specific datasets, chronologies and listings (e.g. Nesser, 2008, 2010, 2012; 2015; Spaaij, 2012; Hemmingby, 2017).

Official reports after major terrorist incidents will most often provide detailed and useful information. These are often detailed and based on relevant

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

information from police, intelligence and security services, and others. Likewise, in many countries national authorities will regularly declassify material, perhaps on an annual basis. Released material will then often shed new light on acts of terrorism committed a long time ago.

As previously mentioned, direct access to active terrorist actors is often difficult – and too dangerous. Sometimes, however, it might be possible to talk to or interview imprisoned or released former extremists. This may provide valuable information, although they will often be constrained by some factors – for example, they may not be willing to talk about something that might incriminate them or people they know. Although it may not lead to very detailed information on concrete cases, it will nevertheless have a general value. From this point of view, it is a bit surprising, as Richard English (2016: 22) points out, that so many terrorist researchers have never met a former terrorist. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to look into publications from terrorists on social media platforms, like the militant Islamist online publications *Inspire*, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. These are part of the propaganda machinery of the jihadists, and, even though the rhetoric is not necessarily followed in practice, it might have some value depending on the research topic – and at least as background information.

Memoirs from “turned” terrorists or law enforcement agents that have infiltrated terrorist cells or organizations can also disclose details that may not be found anywhere else. Some examples from the Northern Ireland conflict are works by Eamon Collins (1998), Martin McGartland (1998) and Sean O’Callaghan (1999), while examples relating to militant Islamists are publications from Omar Nasiri (2006), Morten Storm, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister (2014), as well as Anne Speckhard and Mubin Shaikh (2014).

So far, the research approach and sources have been elaborated upon on a general basis, but since the two studies here differ with regard to the level of analysis, form and sources, they also need to be addressed separately with regard to framework, sources and data. For the section that follows, Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks is study 1, while the militant Islamists in Western Europe is study 2.

2.2.4 Study 1: Framework and sources

The study of right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people on the 22 July 2011, has a particular focus on the target decision-making process, which include both planning and the operational proceedings in this case.

Regarding sources, access to high-quality research material has provided a rare possibility to trace both the planning phase and the operational stages in considerable detail, and here primarily with an emphasis on targeting related issues. This includes general targeting preferences, concrete plans, priorities, influence of situational factors and decision-making sequences. As will be illustrated, the interaction between a series of variables caused a profoundly dynamic, non-linear process, clearly illustrating the unpredictability and pragmatism that always follows terrorist operations.

This research is based on a variety of sources, and in total the research material can only be characterized as extraordinary rich and of high quality. As will be described later, this is first and foremost due to full access to the police investigative interviews of the perpetrator, including DVD recordings. Additionally, accurate word for word-scripts have been provided for this research by the Norwegian National News Agency (NTB) from the trial in 2012. This has provided a rather unique opportunity to analyse the planning and target selection process in detail on the individual level. The fact that it has been possible to identify concrete plans, and map discarded alternative targets, as well as the final targets, gives a more or less complete picture of the concrete target selection process of this case.

There are several important primary sources for this case study. The terrorist himself partially edited and partially wrote his compendium *2083 – A European Declaration of Independence*, under the pseudonym Andrew Berwick (2011). This 1400 page document has three parts. The first part covers historical aspects, the second part concerns ideological perspectives, and the third part is operationally and paramilitary oriented. The two first parts was mostly cut and paste edited products, from a variety of sources Breivik found on the Internet. The third part was largely his own writings. Important to have in mind, the compendium was a theoretical pre-attack work,

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

and not a planning document for what he actually did or a document illustrating what really happened. As such it must be reviewed with a sound portion of scepticism. That said, it provides us with a lot of information regarding his ideological stances, morality, enemy picture and strategic elaborations. As will be elaborated later in the case study, it is also interesting to observe the mismatch between Breivik's views or strategies in his theoretical work, and his actual operation - as well as in his appearance in court (Bjørge, de Graaf, van der Heide, Hemmingby & Weggemans, 2016: 478-479). In fairness, however, some of his strategic thoughts were also in accordance with what he actually did. In general, Breivik's compendium provides important insight into his ideological views and operational elaborations.

Another main source, and the most important one, is the detailed transcripts from all police investigative interviews. Breivik was interviewed for more than 220 hours, and every second of it was recorded both on audio and video, except for the very first interview on Utøya immediately after his arrests, which is on audio only. Police applied a structured and methodological approach for the police investigative interviews, called the KREATIV model, which will be more thoroughly described below (Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009). The protocolled summarised transcripts, signed by the perpetrator himself, are in total about 1200 pages. After a lengthy process through various instances, the General Attorney granted this project access to all the written material, and also to selected DVD recordings from the interviews. To the author's knowledge at the time of writing no other research projects have formally been given this access.

Another important source was the accurate word-by-word transcripts from the Norwegian National News Agency (NTB), from the trial of Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo in 2012. The transcripts fill 463 pages in all and cover everything that took place during the trial. The perpetrator was given several opportunities to elaborate on his views and actions, and underwent heavy cross-examination, as well. Furthermore, public judicial documents from the court, and especially the judgment (Oslo District Court, 2012) have been examined thoroughly.

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

The author has also conducted a few interviews with primary sources from the day of the attack. This include two security guards on duty in the Government Quarter at the time of the bomb attack in Oslo, and the team leader from the National police emergency response unit *Beredskapstroppen* (often just called Delta), who was in charge of the team that arrested the terrorist on Utøya. It must also be mentioned that I and my supervisor have had some correspondence by email with Anders Behring Breivik, as we considered interviewing him in prison due to a couple of concrete questions related to a book project (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016). This was never realised as Breivik, after initially agreeing to meet, made certain demands and tried to influence how him and his views were to be presented afterwards. Hence the interview was cancelled and never followed up on.

As for secondary sources, coverage in news media has been one source, for example statements from his defence attorneys and the prosecution. News media also released reports related to the psychiatric evaluation of Breivik. These were not just of interest with regard to the significant public and professional debate on his mental condition, or his strategy in court, since it is highly likely that his personality issues also affected his strategic decisions during the planning phase. How this happened will be described later, but one example is the decision to go for for an extensive shock-attack operation, instead of several small-scale attacks over time. Finally, there have been written several books and articles about Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks. Most of them have primarily been focusing on his background and launched theories on his radicalisation process (e.g. Borchgrevink, 2013; Bangstad, 2014; Gardell, 2014; Seierstad, 2015). His main defence attorney, Geir Lippestad, also released a book after the sentencing (Lippestad, 2013).

It is also relevant to point out that publications on solo or lone actor terrorism have added value to this research, and several relevant works are listed in the part study of Breivik, in the section covering comparative perspectives.

Having explained the sources this research has been based, it is time to elaborate on reliability and validity, where keywords are trustworthiness, confirmability and generalization (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).

2.2.5 Study 1: Reliability

In this part I will elaborate on the reliability of the research on Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks. Central issues are the accuracy of the data, which data that have been used, the way data has been collected, and also how they have been processed (Johannessen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2011: 40). As described above, the source material in this case is unusually rich, but type of sources and the amount of information retrieved leaves no guarantee with regard to quality, reliability and validity.

The starting point here is that this material is of high quality, and particularly so the judgement and the police investigative interview transcripts. Judgements are the result of a lengthy process where evidence has been thoroughly assessed, and all parties have had their saying. As such, they should be regarded as robust sources. As for the police investigative interviews these have been conducted in a structured and methodological manner, based on an approach called KREATIV, which is Norwegian for *creative*. This is based on the PEACE police investigative interview model from the UK (Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009). Central for this approach is the principle of free explanation, and one main objective is to extract as much information as possible from the suspect, in contrast to hastily pursue a confession. This is not only the right investigative and ethical approach. It also benefits research since more information is likely to be generated. One relevant question might be whether this methodology produce too much irrelevant information? The answer to this is no, if a structured and consistent research methodology is in place. Then relevant data will be included, while irrelevant data is discarded.

The interviews of Breivik were systematically covering all aspects of this case. They were well documented and the suspect signed the protocolled transcripts from each session. The interviews were held over a long period of time and the suspect was challenged several times over the same subjects, in an increasingly confronting manner. This setup strengthens the interview transcripts' position as a reliable, primary source. With regard to the DVD recordings, these were selected by the author after the written material had been studied in detail. This ensured that the recordings that were important for the topic of this project were included, and that valuable time was not used on

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

interview sections less relevant for this research. One might ask why the DVD recordings were important, since the written material was available. First of all, they confirmed the content of the written police investigative interview transcripts. Secondly, the written transcripts were *summarized* transcripts, and with the DVD recordings I was able to learn exactly what Breivik said – and I could quote him directly in this thesis. Thirdly, the DVD recordings made it possible to observe the behaviour of the perpetrator, and hence get an impression of his appearances, as well as the interview situation in general.

It must be added that the trial documents, the accurate word for word-transcripts from the trial, and the police investigative interviews also offered a possibility to triangulate the essential information in this case - although the police investigative interviews gave a more detailed insight in some matters, compared to the two other sources. The very good source material available for this research has also reduced the need for secondary sources.

There is nevertheless a question about trustworthiness that must be addressed. One important issue here is that Breivik was found sane and fit for sentencing, but he was also diagnosed with a narcissistic personality. Nor does the fact that he talked a lot and willingly, mean that he categorically told the truth. What the case study process-tracing actually has disclosed is that Breivik has displayed the whole spectre from lies to truth in his statements - from the time of his arrest and to the sentencing. At large this can be split into lies, exaggerations and correct information. The most apparent lie is that Breivik claimed to be a part of a network and that he did not act alone. Shortly after his surrender to the police, he claimed that there were two other terrorist cell members out there, ready to strike with even more deadly consequences, and that the police could save 300 lives if they gave in for his demands (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,01). The police investigation quickly found that there was no indications that the two other cell members existed. Breivik never admitted, however, that this was a bluff. He also stuck to the claim that the Knights Templar organization existed, and that an alleged meeting took place in London in 2003. During the trial he stated that his description of the group was “pompous” in order to maximise the propaganda effect, but he downplayed this when he realised that his preoccupations with uniforms and rituals made him appear insane (VG, 2012).

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

Breivik's bluffs regarding the two other cells and the Knights Templar organisation may be interpreted as a rational way to maximise the psychological impact of his terrorist attacks. One man under arrest will never be considered a threat, but an active terrorist group will be. It was also Breivik's deliberate strategy to try to instigate copycat operations. At large, Breivik lied when it served his strategic purpose.

It is also obvious that the narcissistic individual was eager to be regarded as a professional and skilled terrorist. Accordingly, he launched a number of exaggerations in order to consolidate such an impression, and one example is related to hostile reconnaissance. Breivik claimed to have done very thorough reconnaissance in the Government Quarter, but confrontations during the police interviews, as well as the author's detailed knowledge on the location, disclosed that the hostile reconnaissance was profoundly superficial (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016: 53). My cross-checking with experts on explosives has also disclosed what the self-proclaimed professional perpetrator actually did well in this field, and what he knew nothing about. He showed persistence and skills when making the explosives, but he had very limited understanding regarding how physical forces come into play when explosives actually detonate (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016: 40-41).

In contrast to his bluffs, lies and exaggerations the process-tracing also showed that the information he provided on concrete ideas, plans, potential targets and most operational steps should be regarded as reliable. The police investigation found little discrepancy between Breivik's explanations and the evidence documented by the investigators. He has, for example, admitted that he was repeatedly frustrated because he had to change planes several times. It is also a point that his lies and exaggerations, as described above, served concrete purposes. In contrast, it is difficult to see what he would gain by lying about the target selection process.

The theoretical and methodological approach for this research has been covered in detail elsewhere in this thesis, but in general I have found the chosen approach for this research meaningful and constructive. Hopefully, the clarification regarding the methodology and the primary sources for this research offers adequate transparency. Other researchers do have an opportunity to look into this research in detail, since the theoretical and

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

methodological approach is described in the thesis, combined with the fact that most of the material used are open sources. It is of course a factor that the police investigative interviews are not accessible for the public, but after the release of this material for this research it should be a formality for other researchers to gain the same access from the General Attorney's office, after a formal application process. Even without such access, however, the transparency of this research and all the open information available, makes it possible to elaborate on the reliability of the data of this research.

2.2.6 Study 1: Validity

After elaborating on reliability, a following and central question is how well the data in this research represent the phenomenon (Johannessen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2011: 69). Other relevant questions may be whether the topic could be approached in another way, if all central indicators have been included, and to which degree findings can be transferred in time and place.

Initially I will elaborate briefly on the first-mentioned question. Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks is an unique case, and indeed, most solo terrorists and their operations are. Accordingly, the purpose of this research has been to conduct an in-depth qualitative research on this case, and illuminate this process in the best possible way. This means that comparative perspectives have not been a primary priority in the part study concerning Anders Behring Breivik. Hence, a main question is rather how well the data in this study contribute to answer the research objectives of this particular case. Hence, we are crossing into the following, underlying questions. Is the approach and the data included relevant for the research objectives? As previously elaborated upon, possibilities regarding research approaches are often more limited when terrorists are in focus, compared to research on other categories of people. When it comes to the relevance of the data, the model with ideology, strategy, internal factors and external factors has a strength due to its comprehensive nature. Any factor with some sort of relevance with regard to the targeting issue should fit into one of the main boxes. Another question is whether all relevant indicators are found. This can never be guaranteed, and one must be realistic and open for the fact that some indicators will not surface from the research material at hand. That said, the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

quality and amount of research material available for this study has been very satisfactory.

Regarding validity it is also important to note that some indicators or variables are easily observable, like physical actions or items. In contrast, there may be variables not possible to see, like the personality or moral of an individual (Hellevik, 2011: 357). Often the first-mentioned category will be rather straightforward and not an issue of concern, while the second category may prove more challenging with regard to validity. If we look to Anders Behring Breivik his personality was a major issue in a number of contexts. Obviously, it would be substantially problematic if a researcher lacking relevant competence made assessments in this area. This is exactly why I for this research has relied on the assessments by the specialists appointed by the court, and other professionals in this area.

In the section on reliability I have already mentioned how information have been triangulated, how experts have been approached in order to clarify specific issues, and that I with my background has a detailed knowledge of his target number one, namely the Government Quarter, as well as police and the national security authorities in general, as well as protective security. This has been an advantage for understanding the terrorist reflections and the situational circumstances in general. I will also add that the findings from this research have been presented to security and intelligence services in a number of countries. Discussions with practitioners from such services are very valuable, because they are in position to challenge a researcher's thinking and arguments within the field of terrorism that few other can. In general, this research has been based on a focused and critical approach, and combined with the detailed process-tracing methods described previously on case study approach, sound and valid inferences are likely to be the end result.

With regard to transferability or generalisation, I have already stated that each terrorist and terrorist operation is unique. This does not mean that the case of Anders Behring Breivik is without interest in a comparative perspective, but consciousness should be applied with regard to the sort of issues one want to measure or compare.

2.2.7 Study 2: Framework and sources

This multiple case study focuses on the targeting preferences of militant Islamists plotting or conducting attacks in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016. Initially it makes sense to make a few definitional clarifications. With regard to the terms *Islamism* and *jihadism* I follow Thomas Hegghammer's (2013: 3) wording; "*Islamism refers to any form of political activism in the name of Islam (both violent and non-violent)*", while "*jihadism refers to any form of violent Islamism*". The term *militant Islamists* refer to those promoting the sunni-based jihad ideology predominantly promoted by al-Qaida and ISIS. When I refer to al-Qaida central this means the core leadership and the members under their direct control – hence excluding affiliates. As for IS, ISIS and ISIL, I have chosen to use ISIS without making a difference between these three terms with regard to content.

The dataset has been specifically developed for this project and it is based on open sources only. In total 246 plots and conducted attacks are registered for the whole time period. There are 70 conducted attacks and 176 plots. As such the dataset is a complete chronological overview, at least as far as this research have been able to establish.

The dataset is built on a variety of sources. The clearly single most important contribution has come from Petter Nesser at the Norwegian Defence Research Facility (FFI), who has published extensively on militant Islamists in Western Europe for many years (Nesser, 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012; 2012a; 2012b; 2015; 2019; Nesser & Stenersen, 2014; Nesser, Stenersen & Ofteidal, 2016). Nesser generously shared his dataset structure and case listings in form of a Microsoft Excel sheet (for the periode from December 1994 to October 2013) in September 2014. As such, the dataset for this project has been built on and is further developed from Nesser's dataset at that time.

Not only did Nesser's case listings represent an excellent starting point for identifying cases and backtrack sources in order to search for more details for the research questions of this part study, but the outline of his well-structured Excel sheet could also be built upon and developed to suit this research. In order to clarify differences between Nesser's and this project's dataset specifications, I removed datacolumns not relevant for this study, like the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

strength of perpetrator's network connections, foreign fighters status, foreign fighter destination and support organisations. Nesser's eight target type categories (military, government/law enforcement, aviation, public figure, public area, public transportation, other and unknown), were replaced with 17 target type categories (military, law enforcement, authorities, diplomatic missions, public area, public figure, religious institutions, flights, airports, rail transport, maritime targets, bus, electricity/gas/water, Internet/information systems, nuclear facilities, others and unknown). I also added columns for US and Israeli/Jewish targets. Then I adjusted or added columns for the specific research topics of this thesis, namely mass casualty characteristics or not, hard versus soft target distinction, and the degree of discrimination. The latter includes indiscriminate and discriminate targeting, as well as a column for individual specific targeting. There are also some different nuances between the two datasets with regard to perpetrator(s) cell type, and I also expanded upon the weapon categorisation, although Nesser's categorisation of different types of explosives remained more detailed.

Having explained the most important differences with regard to dataset setup, the reader might wonder how similar - or different - the two respective datasets are as of now. This is difficult to answer with exact precision for several reasons, but first and foremost because both datasets have been further developed and nurtured separately from 2014 onwards, and a lot of incidents took place from 2014 to 2016. The author has no detailed insight in potential changes or new case listings Nesser have done in his dataset later. Furthermore, since there has been a constant search for identifying new or unknown cases, and the fact that each case have been assessed individually, there might be a some differences with regard to which cases that have been included or excluded in the respective dataset. For example the 2000 Moinul Abedin case in the UK, the 2006 Alex Springer-incident in Germany and the 2007 Christopher Paul case were not in Nesser's dataset in 2014, and I have for example also included the 2010 Cargo bomb plot in the dataset since it involved response and handling on UK soil. It can also be mentioned that Petter Nesser in 2014 had listed the three incidents concerning Mohammed Merah in 2012 as one case, while I had to list them as three separate incidents due to the nature of this research – target selection preferences. Furthermore, I have in some cases found additional information with regard to targeting

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

characteristics, but here it is a rather obvious factor that new information often surfaces a long time after incidents on an irregular basis. In conclusion, and also with reference to works of Nesser from 2015 onwards, there are probably some minor differences with regard to case listings and details between Nesser's dataset and the final dataset of this research project. I do not, however, expect these differences to be major, which means that main conclusions regarding modus operandi of jihadists operating in Western Europe in general is not likely to differ much, but rather harmonise with each other. Then again, the ambition of this thesis has never been to test existing research on jihadists' modus operandi, but exclusively to add value to previous works, in the specific area of targeting preferences and characteristics related to this. Finally, it should be added that this dataset does not go further than the end of 2016, while Petter Nesser and FFI have continued to register new cases for updated analysis and more research on the militant Islamists operating on European soil.

Continuing with the framework, the limitation to Western Europe means that Eastern Europe is excluded, and this due to the fact that there have been few known militant Islamist incidents there (Nesser & Stenersen, 2014). Additionally, the timeframe for this project have not allowed this to be explored. Importantly, however, the geographical boundaries set for this research is strongly related to the significant societal differences between Western Europe on one side, and other regions and continents on the other. This means, for example, that the operational conditions for terrorists in Europe, are inherently different from the conditions terrorists in Middle East, Asia or Africa experience. I will even argue that there are a noticeable societal differences between Western Europe and the US too, in this regard. Here demographics and the geographical distance to current conflict areas can be mentioned, but also how easy firearms can be acquired in the US, in contrast to European countries. As such, it makes sense to limit this study to Western Europe, because this increase precision and relevance, for academics, practitioners within counterterrorism, as well as policy decision-makers.

The timeframe 1994-2016 comes naturally, as France experienced the first militant Islamist campaign in Europe from December 1994 to 1996, conducted by *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) (Lia & Kjøk, 2001; Nesser, 2008; 2015). According to Lia & Kjøk (2001, 43-46) this campaign was the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

result of a strategic shift within the GIA, and not the global jihad vision per se, but it nevertheless marked a timeshift for societal security in Europe. In contrast to the typical *modus operandi* experienced with ethno-nationalist and far-left actors in the 1970s and 1980s, the militant Islamists systematically launched indiscriminate attacks with mass casualty focus - and pre-warnings has never been an issue. From 2000, the transnational character of the militant Islamist threat to Europe became clearer as plots and attacks started to appear in several countries. As previously mentioned the dataset was locked on 31 December 2016, due to the timeframe for this project.

Apart from this, much of the material, and especially with regard to identifying plots and attacks, have been articles published online by newspapers or news agencies. The search has not been limited to specific databases or news services, since that would likely cause a number of missed incidents. Instead I have applied a semi-structured approach, using a set of specific terms related to terrorist acts and targeting, as well as years and countries. Online searches have mainly been executed in English language, but also in German, French, Spanish and Hebrew when following up concrete cases. It should be added here that my more or less non-existent French and Spanish knowledge, have been compensated with valuable assistance from native speakers (colleagues and research contacts abroad). These have translated relevant source material for me, and also helped me to assess the substance and seriousness of concrete cases, as well as the documentation. By applying a broad and open-minded information gathering strategy, the risk of missing out on incidents and cases has been significantly reduced. Furthermore, I have primarily tried to use major and acknowledged media institutions within each country, and in general avoided smaller news providers. This has not, however, automatically excluded all small or local newspapers, since these may be richer on details than national news sources. Furthermore, I have found that combining national news with foreign news sources can prove beneficial. When for example, Jews or Jewish institutions have been potential targets in terrorist plots in Europe, national media have from time to time failed to mention so. Israeli newspapers, in contrast, have had the tendency to highlight any Jewish or Israeli link. This has been experienced in several cases, including the M11 attacks in Madrid in 2004, the Geneva El Al plot in 2006, as well as the London Stock Exchange plot in

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

2010. Hence, crosschecking with news institutions in different countries has in some cases lead to a more complete picture.

Legal documents are in general difficult to retrieve for reasons previously mentioned, but in some cases I have accessed this kind of documentation. Some documents, where there is a European link in the case, have come from the United States, and others from Sweden. Furthermore, the Crown prosecution service in the UK has for a number of years published annual reports with summaries of terrorist cases finished in the legal system. Swedish police have also shared some documents linked to the right-wing terrorist Peter Mangs. Furthermore, a few court documents have been received from Petter Nesser. Often, however, detailed information from trial processes have been retrieved from newspapers reporting from these.

In an early phase of the research project, I looked to academic publications with concrete incident information or listings on militant Islamist plots and attacks in Europe. The importance of Petter Nesser's work has already been mentioned, and in addition to his publications works of several of his colleagues at FFI have proved relevant (e.g. Hegghammer, 2004; 2013; 2013a; Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015; Lia & Kjøk, 2001; Lia, 2000; 2001; 2003; 2005; 2007; 2015; Stenersen, 2017; 2017b; Tønnesen, 2007; 2008; 2015). Not just with regard to the general and specific knowledge they provided, but also because they provided source information that could be followed up on. Other general works on militant Islamists in Europe, or specific countries, have also provided valuable background knowledge, and in some cases also relevant information on targeting issues (Kohlmann, 2004; Steinberg, 2013; Hoffman & Reinares, ed., 2014; Rabasa & Benard, 2015; Pantucci, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015; Brisard & Jackson, 2016; Gerges, 2016; Warrick, 2016; Kepel, 2017; Mullins, 2016; 2017). Academic publications on specific themes, and not necessarily limited to militant Islamists, have also been valuable sources.

In addition to academic works, some publications by journalists have contributed with some insight in general or on specific cases. If we look to Denmark for example, the books by Morten Skjoldager (2009; 2016), Kaare Sørensen (2013) and Storm, Cruickshank & Lister (2014) give a good overview and insight into several cases. One example from the UK is the the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

book on Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park mosque by O'Neill & McGrory (2006).

Another type of source I have found valuable for this project are official reports coming as a result of major terrorist incidents. Such reports are most often based on solid mandates, commission members are often highly regarded and experienced in their fields, they have access to all parties involved, and the reports are often providing detailed information with regard to the proceedings of the event in question - including targeting aspects. One example in this regard is the official reports coming after the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005 (House of Commons, 2006; Intelligence and security committee of Parliament, 2009; London Assembly, 2006). Other examples are the report after the Lee Rigby murder in 2013 (Intelligence and security committee of Parliament, 2014), and the official report following the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015 (Assemblée nationale, 2016).

On some occasions, the author has met former extremists or terrorists from different ideological paths. Such meetings have varied between being loose conversations or semi-structured interviews. In retrospect, these have not added detailed information on concrete cases, partially due to the parameters of this research, and because several of them have not been right-wing extremists or jihadists. On the other side, all such meetings have been useful with regard to the mindset and “think terrorist” perspective that goes across ideological directions, for example when it comes to strategic thinking, modus operandi and operational issues.

Online publications from militant Islamists have also been examined, and first and foremost al-Qaida's *Inspire* and ISIS' *Dabiq*. These are obviously propaganda publications and not necessary credible when it comes to what have happened, or what is going to happen. Just like online statements from central terrorist clerics and leaders, however, they are interesting when seen up against how things have developed in practice.

I have also found academic works on militant Islamist rhetoric interesting and useful (Lawrence, 2005; Kepel & Milelli, 2008; Holbrook, 2014). Finally, and before leaving terrorist rhetoric completely, there have been several academic publications analysing ideological, strategic and operational texts from the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

terrorists (Lia, 2007; Lacey, ed., 2008; Stout, Huckabey, Schindler & Lacey, 2008; Cigar, 2009).

2.2.8 Study 2: Reliability

This part study is based on open sources only. In total, there are 246 plots and conducted attacks registered for the period 1994 – 2016. There are 70 conducted attacks and 176 plots.

Each incident in the dataset has been carefully assessed and the criteria for registration in the dataset are that they involve militant Islamists, as defined earlier, in Western Europe. It must be strong indications on a forthcoming, potentially lethal attack against one or several targets (plot), or that an attack actually has been initiated. A plot is here defined as a planned and/or prepared attack that has not yet been initiated, including concrete plans that late in the operational process have been abandoned. The latter will for example be when authorities, based on intelligence information, suddenly have increased the security level at specific assets significantly for a period of time – and nothing takes place. In order to be registered as an initiated attack, the attack itself must have been set in motion against the selected target. This will normally mean conducted attacks, but can for example also include parcel bomb attacks, if the bomb detonates prematurely during final preparations, as seen in the Lors Dukajev case in Denmark in 2010. Initiated attacks are in this thesis interchangeable called initiated, launched, conducted or executed attacks, as seen fit according to context, and for lingual variation. In accordance with the definitions previously presented, incidents conducted by perpetrators with personal greivances or serious mental health issues have been excluded. Moreover, incidents involving terrorists that for example are caused by coincidences or police arrest operations, where there are no indications of concrete forthcoming plots, have not been registered in the dataset.

Each plot and initiated attack is registered and assessed individually, which for example means that Muhammed Merah's terrorist offenses from 2012 are listed in this dataset as three separate attacks, and not as one case overall. This is a prerequisite for a functional dataset on targeting issues, since attacks committed by the same perpetrator may have different characteristics, for

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

example with regard to target type or degree of discrimination. On the other hand, incidents with simultaneous or sequential (within a short period of time) actions by the same actor (individual or group), like the 13 November attacks in Paris in 2015, as well as secondary attacks at the same location, are registered as one incident only.

For structure and analytical purposes a customized excel sheet has been used to map the plots and attacks. Each case has been given a case ID and plot number. Whether the case has strong or vague documentation has been noted, and so has the time for the plot or attack, as well as the country involved. Furthermore, the following is registered in each case: Actor profile (one or several perpetrators), attack status (abandoned, thwarted, launched), objective achieved or not, number of casualties, type of weapons used, attack approach, casualty focus (mass or limited casualty focus), attackers expected outcome (e.g. suicide or escape), secondary attack, simultaneous attack, degree of discrimination (indiscriminate, discriminate, individual specific), and hard or soft target. Regarding target types, these categories are established as best seen fit for this specific actor in question. Target types are therefore divided into the categorized *military, law enforcement, authorities, diplomatic missions, public area, public debate, religious institutions, transport* and others. It has also been registered if the terrorist actors have displayed an interest for targets related to the United States of America, the United Kingdom or Israel (including Jewish targets). My interest for following up on this issue is related to the fact that the US, UK and Israel have been declared main enemies of al-Qaida since the 1990s. Hence there is a question whether the rhetoric has been followed upon in practice by the jihadists.

A well-structured research design, including a clear theoretical and methodological approach, is essential if sound inferences are to be achieved. Sources are covered in the section before this one, but I will make some further comments with regard to the dataset. For this research all relevant incidents found for the period in question have been registered and included in the dataset. Hence some case selection challenges are not relevant here, since it is an “all in” approach. At the same time it must be acknowledged that the strength of the documentation differs from case to case, because the amount and quality of the information retrieved will vary substantially. This has to be

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

properly addressed if a negative impact on the analysis and the output from the research is to be avoided.

It is important to underline that cases lacking adequate documentation have not been included in the dataset at all. Furthermore, I have differentiated between strong and vague plots and attacks. This assessment has been done by looking to all the information available for the case in question, and not on targeting issues specifically.

Strong documentation in a case means that there are several and robust indications that an attack has been planned, initiated or conducted. It does not necessarily require convictions or confessions, since a number of plots are thwarted in advance in an early or late stage, but other strong indicators must be present. This might be that police have found firearms or explosives, plans, maps, photos of targets, communication etc. It could also be that some of the participants have been talking to the police, or that robust evidence from intelligence or police surveillance have been registered.

Vague documentation will be when there are concrete indications that an attack is planned, but that the indications are fewer and not so strong and precise as in the strong cases. A tourist map with well-known tourist places encircled is not necessarily a strong indication that an attack is planned, but most will agree that Islamists mapping synagogues or rabbis, or having pictures of police stations or UK military staff with faces encircled can be interpreted differently. It is also a matter of capability. If no weapons or explosives are found it might be problematic to claim that the documentation is strong, if there is no other evidence. For many extremists it is after all a long way from thinking to acting.

It must be added that a case assessed to have strong documentation does not necessarily give a good insight on targeting issues. Moreover, in some cases certain aspects of targeting may be clear, while others are not. If we look at the Touloun navy base plot from 2015 as an example (Reuters, 2015), this is registered with discriminate targeting as a factor, since military personnel was to be targeted. It is still not possible, however, to determine whether the attack would have a mass casualty focus or not, or whether the target would be a soft target or a hard target. This would very much depend on the attack approach

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

and other situational circumstances. Critical reflections like these have been present through all parts of this research.

2.2.9 Study 2: Validity

The basic strength of this part study lies in the comprehensive and structured theoretical and methodological approach, where multiple sources have been assessed with an open mind, without compromising on sound scepticism and critical examination of each and every plot and attack found. By casting a wide net from the initial phases of the project, it has been possible to locate more plots and attacks than a narrow approach would allow. This has led to a more complete picture with regard to the extent of militant Islamists' plots and attacks in Western Europe for the given period of time, and also strengthened the potential for valid inferences. Another strength of this study is the geographical limitation to Western Europe, since this ensures a contextual exactness and increases the relevance of the end product for the practitioners within law enforcement and others. Furthermore, it is an advantage that the dataset established here (although with a starting point from Nesser's dataset covering 1994-2013) has been developed by the author. This ensures consistency with regard to data inclusion, coding and assessment. It would be very challenging to achieve the same control and exactness if data from an external source was to be used. Moreover, the intimate familiarity with the research material must be regarded as positive in general.

To argue that there are no weaknesses in a study like this would be ignorant and a mistake. There is no absolute guarantee that some cases are missed out even though a broad, multiple-sources approach have been applied. Furthermore, one should remember that the inferences and conclusions are based on information currently available. As seen on a number of occasions, new information on concrete cases may surface in months and years to come. That said, it is unlikely that complementing information on a few cases in the future will alter the main conclusions.

The author has been open for all sorts of variables with influence on the targeting preferences of the militant Islamists, and as such a semi-deductive starting point has been followed by an inductive process (Flyvbjerg, 2011).

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

Regarding indicators, the interactive model (fig. 2.1) ensures a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, the approach regarding situational analysis, which is very central in this part study, has the same openness for different variables of influence. Variables that are not directly linked to the terrorist actor(s) or the victim(s), will be part of the situational circumstances. It is naturally another question whether all relevant indicators are found, and this can never be guaranteed. It is far more realistic to assume that some indicators often will be missing, but from an analytical point of view the most important thing is to identify a satisfactory number of central indicators that lead to the right conclusion with regard to the research questions and parameters. In general, the quality and amount of research material available for this study has been satisfactory, and it has been processed in a structured and thorough manner.

Regarding validity, it is also worth noting that the parameters measured here to a large degree are observable. It is also a factor that relatively few parameters have been mapped, so although there are many cases, the low number of parameters makes it manageable and controllable. Accordingly, known challenges, like the “too few cases, too many variables” problem is avoided (Goggin, 1986).

Like in the case study concerning Anders Behring Breivik, the information retrieved have been triangulated by using different sources. I have also been able to use local experts familiar with militant Islamists in their respective countries, and this has also widened the possibility to control source material in languages I do not master good enough. I have also been able to discuss cases with acknowledged expertise, like researchers at the Norwegian Defence Research Facility, and colleagues abroad. Moreover, the results from this research has also been presented to security authorities in a number of countries. Both the dialogue with skilled academics and practitioners have strongly indicated that the approach applied has been sensible.

With regard to transferability or generalisation, there are several interesting perspectives. The framework for this study has, for example, ensured a high degree of relevance for stakeholders within the geographical area covered. As such, the results are not necessarily relevant for or transferable to other regions, because the modus operandi and targeting preferences of actors from the same ideological direction may be entirely different. On the other hand,

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

this study could represent the starting point for a comparative study on terrorist actors from other ideological directions within the same period of time and geographical area, at least if the same the theoretical and methodological approach is applied.

2.2.10 Ethical considerations

When conducting research on terrorism, ethical challenges surface often and under different circumstances, and it is essential to pay attention to the set of values, norms and institutional arrangements contributing to the constitution and regulation of scientific activities. Terrorism is after all one of the gravest criminal offences any individual could be linked to, and the term terrorism itself is clearly a pejorative one – and not just because it is a criminal offense but also because it signals moral condemnation. Hence, carelessness or poor considerations from the researcher may wrongfully lead to substantially negative consequences for the people involved.

One factor with ethical implications that is relevant here is linked to documentation, question of guilt and identification of suspects by name in publications. Terrorism research is most often based on open sources and typically through news media. Hence, careful considerations must be given regarding the truthfulness and evidence in each case. If an individual is caught red-handed there might be no doubts, as with Anders Behring Breivik, but if not, there is a potential for wrongly naming suspects. An example found during this work is the case of Y.B. from the UK. He was convicted for planning acts of terrorism after downloading an AQ-manual from the Internet but was acquitted in the High Court in Glasgow in 2015 after a series of appeals (Daily Record, 2015). In another example from the UK, the police arrested a student for possession of extremist material while he was in reality conducting research for his master's thesis (Townsend, 2012).

Furthermore, several attacks in Europe have been characterized as terrorist offenses by the media, while investigations have shown that the individual behind the attack suffers from a mental illness. Central here is the ethical responsibility researchers have towards such groups (NESH, 2005: 23). These are often difficult cases to assess and categorize. In this context, one might consider the case of the two different vehicle attacks against crowds in France

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

in December 2014. Carrying several strong indicators of attacks often seen with militant Islamists, the perpetrators were identified to be mentally ill and not terrorists by the French authorities (Nordstrom, 2014). This makes it problematic to include these incidents on a list of terrorism incidents, and accordingly these have been excluded from the dataset of the second study here. To make it even more difficult, there are also examples of extremists that seemingly have exploited vulnerable individuals. This might have been the case in the attack on the US embassy in October 2007 in Vienna. Here, a seemingly unstable individual tried to enter the embassy, carrying a rucksack with grenades. The authorities officially discarded terrorism claims, but findings in the aftermath showed that another individual in the attacker's close surroundings was an extremist with Wahhabi ties, possibly exploiting the attacker (Alic, 2007).

To conclude the above-mentioned challenges, identifying a terrorist by name in academic publications should only be considered if there is absolutely no question of guilt. If there is, it should be dropped. However, an alternative often used in news media in several countries is to use the person's initials only – alternatively, the given name and the initial for the surname is used. Most importantly, however, anyone who considers naming terrorist perpetrators in publications must also ask these basic questions: Is it necessary? Does it say anything about the content or the meaning of the issue discussed, or is it, in practice, irrelevant? Often, it has no importance. On the other hand, it might seem odd for readers if a well-known and guilty perpetrator like Anders Behring Breivik is not identified by name, after identification by name in all sorts of media over a long period of time.

Another consideration related to ethics that will typically surface within terrorism research if interviewing former terrorists is source protection, both with regard to the incrimination and the personal safety of the individual (the author has spoken to former terrorists in Northern Ireland and elsewhere on several occasions). In extremist circles, talking to outsiders, like researchers, could be fatal, if detected. As such, the subject being interviewed places considerable trust in the researcher's hands, predominantly with regard to anonymity. Here, discretion, the way things are written and storage of data are typically important issues.

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

If the researcher has access to restricted material, caveats may follow. One example from this study is the police investigative interviews from the Anders Behring Breivik case. One restriction here, suggested by the author in the application to the Data Protection Official for Research (before it was forwarded to the General Attorney), was that information concerning third parties would not be used in the thesis publications. This was made clear for several reasons: not to cause negative effects to any third parties involved, to ensure that the individual's privacy was secured, and to ensure personal safety – all in accordance with national guidelines on research ethics (NESH, 2005). Such an approach will probably make it somewhat easier to get the permissions needed, but, on the other hand, it also could mean exclusion of information that is relevant for analysis and conclusions.

Another issue that comes up while seeking restricted material is linked to the normal practice of retrieving informed consent (NESH, 2005; Norwegian Personal Data Act § 8, 9 and 11). In terrorism research, this will normally not apply, but this does not mean that it should be neglected when possible. With regard to Anders Behring Breivik, professor Tore Bjørgo and the author retrieved informed consent directly from the perpetrator himself in late 2012. Then, after a formal application series involving the Data Protection Official for Research, the Council for Confidentiality and Research appointed by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, in 2013 we were given access to all transcripts and selected DVD recordings of the police investigative interviews. It is likely that we would have gotten the access without an informed consent, but informed consent probably made it easier for those handling the application. After analysing the material, a couple of questions remained to be clarified, so a dialog with Breivik for a prison interview in writing was initiated. The rightfulness of interviewing Breivik, even in a research context, was, at the time, a subject of public debate – also involving surviving victims and their families. It did seem justifiable, however, after a public meeting on ethics and a more thorough dialogue with survivors and their families (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016: 9). Our main arguments were that we only wanted a couple of clarifications; it would not give the terrorist any media publicity, and, most important of all, it would contribute to the best possible research on this important subject. Breivik himself quickly accepted to be interviewed in prison, but the idea was soon dropped when, during the

Theoretical, methodological and ethical considerations

practical arrangements, he started to express distrust, launch demands and seemingly prioritize otherwise. Since only a couple of details were missing, this had no significant impact on the main conclusions of the research.

A final ethical reflection here is specifically linked to research on operational issues. Terrorists gather knowledge and information from wherever they can, and this includes research publications (Taylor, 1988: 122–123). Researchers, security professionals and others publishing on modus operandi issues should therefore be conscious of the distribution of potentially sensitive information; moreover, spreading ideas about how terrorist attacks could be more effective should be avoided. Accordingly, such elaborations have no part in this thesis.

3 Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

3.1 Introduction

The purpose for this part of the thesis is to provide a thorough insight in the decision-making and target selection process on a specific case, on the individual level.¹ The case is Anders Behring Breivik's extremely brutal and ruthless attacks on 22 July 2011 in Norway. He first detonated a vehicle-borne fertilizer bomb in the centre of the Government Quarter in downtown Oslo, before he followed up with a shooting attack on the small island Utøya, where the Labour Party's youth wing (AUF, Worker's Youth League) arranged their annual summer camp. Eight persons were killed in Oslo, while 69 people lost their lives at Utøya, including 33 victims under age of 18. The atrocities seen on 22 July 2011 might be the most horrific solo terrorist operation seen to date.

The Norwegian terrorist claimed to be a Justiciar Knight Commander in a network he called Knights Templar Europe. The following police investigation did not find any evidence, or even indicators, that such a network actually exists (Oslo District Court, 2012). In contrast, it was found that he had operated in a very independent manner, and consciously not involving others in his operation. Thus, he can rightfully be characterised as a solo terrorist, even if a narrow definition of solo terrorism is applied.

Investigating or researching terrorist incidents is in general very challenging. Most often it is impossible to get an in-depth insight into the operational planning and decision making processes, due to lack of information. In this case, however, access to unique source material (all police investigative interviews), combined with a willingly talking perpetrator, has provided an opportunity to examine planning, decisions taken, as well as operational

¹ This part of the thesis is further developed from Hemmingby, C. & Bjørge, T. (2016). *The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process – Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

developments, in unusual detail. Taking into consideration the previously described need for more research on targeting issues, it is evident that such an opportunity had to be utilised.

Most will probably agree that the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway and the perpetrator are atypical. It is simply not common that one person can cause so many deaths and so much damage, and display the sheer brutality that Breivik did. This even though we have witnessed several grave terrorist attacks physically conducted by one perpetrator in recent years.

Despite the fact that Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July 2011 attacks is a rare case, a substantial amount of generic insights can be extracted from it. All terrorists operate within a framework where they control some factors, but just as important, there are always factors that are beyond their control. The terrorists can take some of these factors into consideration as they plan, but there will also be potential constraints that cannot be foreseen, namely pure coincidences, and even luck and bad luck. As described before in this thesis, this is why the operational phases in terrorist plots in general are so dynamic, and often even chaotic. As such, there will always be a fair amount of unpredictability, up until the very moment an attack actually is committed against the chosen target. It is primarily this endeavour that is under scrutiny in this case study.

In part one of this thesis, the high-quality source material for this project has been described. There is no need to repeat this here, but it might be of interest to see this work in the landscape of other publications covering Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks. First of all, I will argue that the books focusing directly on Anders Behring Breivik primarily have investigated the personal background and radicalization process of the perpetrator. They have tried to establish an understanding of how he turned to terrorism, and indeed how he was able to commit such dreadful acts (e.g. Borchgrevink, 2013; Christensen, 2013; Seierstad, 2015; Skoglund, 2013). In one publication Breivik has also been seen in a comparative perspective to another killer, namely Peter Mangs in Sweden (Gardell, 2015). Other authors have tried to explain his extremist acts primarily in terms of the political and ideological context he allegedly was influenced by (e.g. Bangstad, 2014). There have also been books offering a general overview of the attacks

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

(Solvoll & Malmø, 2011; Stormark, 2011). Furthermore, there have been a number of books contributing to the public debate on different issues, for example with regard to privacy versus security debate, and security measures in public space and architecture (Hausken, Yazdani & Haagensen, 2014; Simpson, Jensen & Rubing, 2016). Before this research project it was, however, no works with a main focus on the operational aspects in this case, which is also important to address. Not just for the general interest and how this complements the other works mentioned, but not least because this may provide important knowledge to practitioners involved in law enforcement and counter-terrorism.

Following this, a main objective of this part of the thesis has therefore been to fill the existing gap with regard to research on the operational aspects, by analysing the planning and target selection process of Anders Behring Breivik. Here there are several important questions to address. How and why did he end up with the two targets he finally attacked? What were the alternative targets he considered during the build-up phase? Which factors made him dismiss the targets he never attacked, and at what time in the selection process did crucial decision-making sequences take place? In most terrorist plots these questions are left unanswered, at least in a detailed manner, due to unknown or dead perpetrators, lack of cooperation from terrorists captured, limited research material, or no access to classified information. For this research project, however, the amount of primary source material can be characterised as better than normal, opening for a unique opportunity to analyse the target selection process in detail. Especially so because it creates an opportunity not just to learn about the two targets actually attacked, but just as much from the targets he considered, but did not choose to attack. As such there is more or less a complete picture, at least from the point where he started to develop concrete plans. Moreover, this research provides clarity to his objectives, and it gives an important insight into the strategic and tactical considerations the perpetrator made during the operation. Additionally, this work will include some elaborations regarding the comparative perspective between the Norwegian perpetrator, and other solo terrorists or lone actors.

Does this case offer any insights that may be of relevance beyond the specific example of the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway? The answer to this

question, I will argue, is yes. This even though Breivik is not a “typical” or “representative” solo terrorist. First of all, this case demonstrates how terrorists – single actors as well as group- or network connected – may have to change their plans, as things often do not develop as they had intended and expected. This case clearly shows that terrorist decision-making and target selection is a highly dynamic process. Moreover, many of the factors that constrained Breivik’s operation and influenced his decision-making, such as lack of time, capability and funding, apply to most terrorists. As such this research provides insights that go beyond this particular case. The way he organised and prepared the whole operation, as well as how he handled operational security challenges and avoided detection, is also of general relevance.

3.2 The target overview

When an individual decides to take action, there will be an active target selection process, where loose thoughts and ideas are leading to concrete plans, before an attack is launched. Operational proceedings and practical preparations can often be observed or identified, as part of a police investigation in the aftermath of a plot or attack. Important to remember, though, the perpetrator(s) will already be influenced by a number of thoughts and considerations when entering the concrete target selection process. As such, it is likely that numerous potential targets for different reasons have been discarded long before concrete plans are shaped, and this is very difficult to track during an investigation. This is one argument for tracing the personal history and activity of the perpetrator in question in detail, and as far back as possible. Accordingly, mapping and analysing a target selection process is just as much about finding potential targets that have not been attacked, as studying those targets that have actually been hit. Even potential targets that are not part of concrete plans have an interest in this context.

Having clarified that there is something to gain both from potential targets not attacked, as well as those actually struck, a target overview should be established when possible. Since the target overview for this case study, with relevant analytical assessments, will contribute to a better understanding of

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Breivik's targeting process and operational conduct to be elaborated upon later, it is introduced at this early stage.

Before proceeding to the concrete target overview here, some reflections are called for with regard to substance. First and foremost, it should be acknowledged that more or less complete target overviews as described above, will be hypothetical in one end. As the process narrows down to concrete plans and executed attacks, however, the hypothetical aspect is gradually reduced, and eventually replaced, by sound inferences based on analysis of the documentation available.

A target overview can be established in several ways. The approach used here has been based on a systematic review of two primary sources, namely all police investigative interviews and the word for word-transcripts from the trial. Breivik's compendium is a theoretical product and it has not been given the same weight here, unless it has been supported by information from at least one of the two other sources. This review of the primary sources has been done in order to identify everyone and everything that could have represented a potential target for the terrorist. More concretely, every potential target listed in the overview has been mentioned, or more thoroughly discussed, by the terrorist on one or more occasions. Furthermore, this must have been in a context implying that they, from Breivik's point of view and rhetoric, have characteristics or features that made them potentially attractive as targets. So although the majority of the individuals, institutions and organisations listed in the following overview did not end up in Breivik's concrete attack plans, they could have been included, because they were part of the broader enemy picture inside the dark and sinister mind of the terrorist.

Following this a step further, one of the most central issues when analysing the target overview is to explain why the targets not followed up on were discarded. What kind of factors influenced this? One factor can be linked to the importance and symbolic status of the potential target. A government or another highly symbolic state building is, for example, likely to represent a more attractive target, than a more low-level status building (e.g. a city hall building). It is also likely to get more national and international media coverage. Another issue is the threat actor's operational capability. Breivik acted on his own and had in many ways limited capacities. For example, some

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

types of terrorist attacks are only possible to conduct with several perpetrators. Moreover, if you do not have a state-of-the-art sniper rifle, it can be more difficult to assassinate someone protected by close protection officers, as you have to get closer – also reducing the possibility for escape after the attack. Yet another reason for why some targets are discarded may be linked to geography and issues related to location. Some potential targets may be too far away and out of reach. Likewise, it is more complicated to strike an offshore installation, than assaulting a single individual on the street.

In addition to the explanatory purpose with a target overview, it can also provide a practical output, based on the types of targets that have attracted the attention of the perpetrator. It can, for example, help decision-makers to make the right priorities with regard to protective security measures. Most importantly, however, a sequential target overview can effectively illustrate how the selection process narrows down towards the final targets actually attacked.

In total, the target overview for Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks lists 65 potential targets, including the two targets that were attacked in the end. One individual and two premises that for different reasons could be mistaken for potential targets have been left out of the total list. These are the Gunerius shopping mall, a Swedish nuclear waste facility and an individual by the name Ronny Johnsen. The latter is a former Norwegian Manchester United player, and it is most likely that Breivik here really meant Labour Party Secretary Raymond Johansen. The Gunerius shopping mall has been named as a target in media and in one police interview, but closer examination have clarified that the mall's parking facilities was to be a transit place for switching cars in one of Breivik's plans. (Kristiansen, Krokfjord & Meldalen, 2012; Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,02; 08,03,01; ref nr 11762579).

Also important to note, some assets or institutions registered in the target overview are in reality a number of potential targets. For example, Breivik refers to the *asylum lobby*, which is a collective term he used for all NGOs working for the rights of asylum-seekers and immigrants to Norway. Additionally, EU- and UN-buildings outside Norway represent a significant number of possible buildings to strike against. Therefore, the number of 65

potential targets in total is a modest estimate with regard to what the perpetrator could have established an interest for, in a targeting context.

3.2.1 Targets discarded and selected

The listed potential targets shall now be described and illustrated through four levels, where they are assessed in the light of the proven interest of the perpetrator, and his assumed operational capability. The levels are coded from Level (L) 1 to 4, and they will in the following part be presented and dealt with in the reverse order, illustrating how it narrows down towards the final targets struck on 22 July 2011. At *Level 4* the starting point are all 65 potential targets. Here the purpose has been to identify and discard all potential targets that are assessed to be highly hypothetical. Some of these would clearly be unrealistic with regard to Breivik's capability, and others are those that Breivik never gave a serious thought due to strategic or contextual factors at the time. The remaining potential targets move on to *Level 3*. Here the purpose has been to identify and discard all potential targets that would have been within the perpetrator's operational capability, but which were never seriously considered. If any reflections at all, they have been clearly superficial and without any sign of follow-up. *Level 2* consists of the targets that have been under serious consideration from the perpetrator's side. They can all be related to concrete ideas, and most of them also planning or preparation. *Level 1* consists of the two targets actually attacked on 22 July 2011, namely the Government Quarter in Oslo and the Labour Party's youth wing camp at Utøya.

The listed targets have been sorted after the *type of targets* they represent, into seven *target type categories* (TC). These categories have been customised in a meaningful way, as best for this particular case. It is made a distinction between TC1) *Government and authorities*, TC2) *Economic/infrastructure*, TC3) *Events*, TC4) *Law enforcement / military / security apparatus*, TC5) *NGOs*, TC6) *Media* and TC7) *Others*. In TC1, both state and municipality bodies are included, and also politicians and members of the royal family. Some targets could cross into two categories, like a political event on a ferry or at a public square. It is nevertheless chosen to keep events in a category of its own, because there are some specific features related to events. This can be

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

shifting locations, and the fact that events are time-fixed. This makes event targets different from static targets, like buildings and premises. In general, the events considered by Breivik was either linked to his political opponents or the news media. Following now is the target overview, which is in accordance with the levels previously described.




Fig. 3.1 Hemmingby (2016)

At Level 4, the starting point is all 65 potential targets, and nine of these were either not within Breivik’s capability, or not of interest to him for other reasons. Offshore oil and gas installations, on-shore gas installations, and nuclear facilities in Norway (research and test facilities) and Sweden are

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

assessed to be out of the perpetrator's capability, not least because he operated alone. Furthermore, he had no inside information from such assets. With regard to the oil and gas installations, Breivik has also stated that the Norwegian state is immune to economic attacks due to the solid financial situation of the country (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,09,01; 08,29,01). Therefore he did not see much point in initiating an operation with economical damage as the main objective. A bomb attack on the ferry between Norway and Denmark is also assessed to be a highly unlikely alternative. It is not impossible to get a vehicle loaded with explosives on board a ferry, but for Breivik the *civilian loss factor* that he has claimed to take into consideration in the target selection process, would be a big problem (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,01; 08,03,01; 08,08,01; 08,26,01; NTB court transcripts 19.04.2012; 20.04.2012). The idea itself also seems to be a passing thought during a police interview, and there are no indications that Breivik considered such an attack. EU- and UN-buildings outside Norway are also assessed to be totally out of the question, due to the fact that Breivik never was interested in conducting operations abroad. Rightly, he wrote about such targets in his compendium, but in his own target selection process these were never an alternative (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01). It is also highly questionable whether Breivik possessed the necessary capability needed for such attacks abroad. For one, highly symbolic EU and UN buildings are in general well protected, and the Norwegian terrorist would be operating away from his home ground. The solo terrorist, who was determined not to involve others for operational security reasons, would lack local knowledge, and could not have established such a thorough cover as he did in Norway. Finally, to assassinate President Obama during the Nobel peace prize ceremony in Oslo City Hall in December 2009 was dismissed by Breivik himself. It would clearly be beyond his capability (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01). In addition to the fact that it would be impossible due to the extensive security arrangements in place, the event took place too early in Breivik's process. He was not ready to act at the time of president Obama's visit.

3.2.2 Most potential targets had limited symbolic value

After making clear that nine potential targets at Level 4 were unrealistic or not of interest for other causes, there are 56 left, as we continue with Level 3. Of these 56 potential targets, this research has clarified that 35 of them were never part of any concrete plans. These were all, from the perpetrators point of view, legitimate targets. Furthermore, it is assessed that they were within the operational capability of the perpetrator. As such, it is likely that Breivik would have succeeded with an attack against most of these 35 potential targets. So why were these never part of any of the concrete plans Breivik established? One basic factor to remember here is that some of these individuals or institutions seem to have surfaced rather coincidentally, for example as instant ideas or loose remarks during the police interviews. It is still, however, a fact that the 35 potential targets discarded at Level 3 have three relevant features in common.

For one, they have all attracted Breivik's attention for some reason during the years before the attack. Secondly, he disliked these so much that they obviously came easy to mind when he was questioned by police. Thirdly, they were apparently not considered to be important enough to qualify for direct targeting. In general, most of the listed potential targets at Level 3 were not particularly prestigious, compared to most of those that he actually took into the planning process. In other words, most were not adequately attractive with regard to symbolism (see Matusitz, 2015). For many of them, the potential for a "spectacular" with massive and long-lasting media attraction would also to a lesser degree be present. Highly symbolic targets and maximum media potential were after all two essential criteria for this terrorist.

Looking closer at the 35 potential targets identified and discarded at Level 3, there were ten politicians (potentially also including family members), nine NGO's, five event venues, four media institutions, two individuals from the law enforcement sector, two education institutions, one individual from academia, one public café in the Labour Party building, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Concerning the ten politicians at Level 3 it should be noted that not only representatives from the Labour Party are found. Former Prime Minister Kåre

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Willoch from the Conservative Party is listed, together with former Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Wollerbæk, both from the Christian Democrats. Additionally, party leader and Member of Parliament Trine Schei Grande from the Social Liberal Party, who previously was in a government coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Conservative Party, is listed in Level 3.

It is clear that Norway's support of NATO's decision to bomb Serbia in 1999 frustrated Breivik significantly, and this was a direct reason for his dissatisfaction with both Bondevik and Wollerbæk. Additionally, the Norwegian government's comments to the Mohammed cartoons from 2005, the Nobel Peace Prize to Yasser Arafat in 1994, and the immigration policies in general were upsetting the terrorist significantly (Berwick, 2011: 1381; NTB court transcripts, 17.04.2012; Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,16,01; 08,20,01; 08,31,01). Important to note, however, Breivik wanted to concentrate his efforts on just one party due to his limited capability, and that would have to be the Labour Party (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,06,01). That left representatives from other parties out of concrete plans.

Labour Party politicians that drew Breivik's attention were ministers Trond Giske and Anniken Huitfeldt, deputy party leader Helga Pedersen, general secretary Raymond Johansen and Member of Parliament Martin Kolberg. Still, none of these were seemingly important enough to be part of any plans that Breivik established.

The most prominent target discarded at Level 3 was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is definitely a highly symbolic target and Breivik regarded this ministry as the second most important of them all. The terrorist meant it was infected with cultural-marxists bureaucrats, in contrast to the Ministry of Defence, where allegedly the conservatives dominated. That said, Breivik found it more important to go after the Labour party and the media institutions (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01).

The nine NGOs discarded at Level 3 are mainly immigrant-friendly or far-left organizations. Breivik used the expression *the asylum lobby* as common term for several of the immigrant-friendly organizations, but here he included SOS

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Racism, the so-called Blitz anarchists, Norwegian centre against racism, as well as Amnesty International. Additionally, the Norwegian terrorist declared his dislike for the NGOs Attack Norway, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, the Union of Municipal and General Employees (Fagforbundet), a council in the Norwegian Church that he probably mistook for a cross-religious council, and the Norwegian broadcasting board. None of these can, in the context of terrorism, be regarded as highly symbolic targets, neither in terms of size nor political influence. Breivik very much disliked them, but that was more or less it.

Regarding the event venues, it is in general important to note that Breivik would not have struck just any event indiscriminately. Also here it would be a prerequisite that the event attracted those he regarded as his enemies, like political opponents, people from the news media, or Cultural-Marxists in general. That could mean everything from conventions held at hotels, to rallies at squares in downtown Oslo. It is not likely, however, that Breivik would plan an attack against the major event venues like Telenor Arena or Oslo Spektrum, since these rarely are hosting events related to his enemies. As stated by the perpetrator himself, he could hire Oslo Spetrum and organize an event attracting Muslims and immigrants, but this was loose talk (Kristiansen, Krokfjord & Meldalen, 2012). On the other hand, the annual May 1st workers' day parade at Youngstorget Square, or a (for the terrorist), suitable event at the House of Literature could represent more likely targets.

The only two law enforcement individuals mentioned by Breivik in negative terms in the police investigative interviews were former national police commissioner Ingelin Killengreen, and the head of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) until 2012, Janne Kristiansen. It is apparent that these two women in top positions had been frustrating the terrorist over time, but they were nevertheless not attractive targets on Breivik's part. One factor is that he never planned individual assassinations as a principle. Just as important here, however, the terrorist considered the police and armed forces to be potential allies in the future (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,35; NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

“When there is a state coup, we must have support from the police and military.”

Anders Behring Breivik, 22.07.2011

As for the cafe *Internasjonalen*, on street level in the Labour Party’s HQ building, Breivik had an incorrect understanding. He obviously thought it was linked to the Labour Party, due to the name and because it was located in the same building. This misled the terrorist, since it was in fact a commercial and apolitical place, probably named for the surroundings. It can also be mentioned that Breivik in the police interviews mentioned a few individuals or institutions that seemed more or less spontaneous, like an academic at the University of Oslo, as well as a college for journalism at Volda.

In total, some views and priorities from Breivik’s part, combined with the fact that a clear majority of the 35 discarded targets at Level 3 cannot be characterized as highly symbolic, held these away from any concrete plans Breivik made. As we now move on to Level 2, the hypothetical factor is also reduced to a minimum, since the targets here were included in concrete ideas and plans that Breivik established.

3.2.3 Narrowing down to the actual targets

Level 2 contains the 21 possible targets that Breivik actually included in different plans, although some more seriously than others. Since some individuals were included in some of the attack plans, it is initially important to make one thing clear. Single individuals were never a priority to Breivik as main targets. In the very first police interview (recorded), initiated on Utøya at 8:15pm, less than two hours after his arrest, Breivik talks about so-called category A traitors (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,35; 08,01):

“They are very attractive, but a person with my intelligence would waste his capacities by killing one category A traitor. A person with my intellect or intelligence would be able to achieve much more than killing a prime minister.”

Anders Behring Breivik, 22.07.2011

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Breivik would in fact prefer a failed main operation, instead of killing just one person. He simply assumed that the overall shock-effect and the potential for advertisement of attacking one person only would be limited, in comparison to attacks of a larger scale. Hence, the politicians and others here were regarded as potential bonuses only (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). In order to briefly mention the politicians who actually could get be struck by the terrorist as a so-called bonus, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was one. His well-protected office was on 16th floor in the H-building in the Government Quarter, but it was on the side facing the Akersgata street, and not the Grubbegata street where Breivik parked his rented Volkswagen Crafter. In contrast, the office belonging to the Minister of Justice and Police Knut Storberget, on 7th floor in the same building, faced Grubbegata. This office had also improved protective security measures, which mitigated the damages quite substantially, as can be seen on pictures of the building after the detonation. It is also a fact that neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of Justice and Police were in their offices in the Government Quarter at the time of the explosion. Breivik did not have an overview of their whereabouts at the time, but that was not his priority either, as he ultimately wanted the building to collapse.

Regarding other individuals, journalist Marte Michelet from the newspaper *Dagbladet*, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre and former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, were booked as guest speakers for different days at Utøya, and as such they were also potential “bonus targets” for Anders Behring Breivik (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01). Rightly so, Breivik did initiate certain preparations in order to target these individuals at Utøya, and especially Gro Harlem Brundtland who was the guest on the day Breivik decided to strike on. Killing her would undoubtedly have been a significant achievement in the eyes of the perpetrator, due to her unique position in the Labour party. However, killing as many AUF youth camp-participants as possible remained to be the main priority for Breivik at Utøya, and here we return to the previously mentioned fact. Assassination of individuals was never a priority, as it was not spectacular or disastrous enough for the narcissistic Norwegian terrorist. In reality, it was therefore 16 possible targets that Breivik focused on in his planning process.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The H-building in the Government Quarter, the Royal Palace, Oslo City Hall, the Parliament, the Parliament Quarter, the Directorate of Immigration, the Labour Party HQ building and the office of the Socialist Left Party are all TC1 targets. The SKUP media conference, the Labour Party's annual convention and the Labour Party Youth Camp at Utøya are TC3 targets. The only TC5 target is the Blitz Anarchist house. TC6 is represented with the newspapers VG, Dagsavisen, Aftenposten and the Norwegian broadcasting company NRK. In the end, the H-building of the Government Quarter and the Labour Party Youth Camp at Utøya ended up in level 1, as the targets finally attacked.

A detailed analysis of the concrete planning and preparation process with regard to the Level 2 and Level 1 targets is covered in the next chapter. Before moving on, however, several important observations have been made. First of all, a high number of potential targets could have been selected by the terrorist for his concrete plans, but just a limited number were seriously considered. Some of them were never considered due to the limited capability of the terrorist. More apparent, however, a range of limited value, easily accessible, unprotected potential targets were simply not important enough for a narcissistic terrorist pursuing a spectacular operation. Rightly, many targets can be considered symbolic to some degree, but well-known and high-value symbolic targets were clearly preferred. As will be described later, iconic buildings were especially attractive for the solo terrorist. As for the shooting attack he preferred time-fixed events, crowded with his declared enemy categories. In total, political targets, NGOs and the media stood out as the most attractive targeting categories. More specifically, the Labour party represented main enemy number one, while media came second.

3.3 The terrorist's decision-making process

3.3.1 Relevant background factors

It is not for this study to analyse Breivik's radicalisation process, but a short glance at his background is still useful for the context here, as it affects where the aggression is directed.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Anders Behring Breivik was born in 1979 in Oslo, but his parents divorced shortly after, and he grew up with his mother and a six-year older half-sister. The living conditions were reportedly unstable in the early years, and a psychological observation of him reported some worrying issues regarding the boy and his relationship with his unstable mother. A recommendation from a centre for child- and youth psychiatry that he should be transferred to a foster home at the age of four was overturned by a court decision (see Borchgrevink, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). Thus, the boy stayed with his mother. Altogether he functioned normally and reasonably well in school, and also socially. At the age of 15, Breivik was arrested in December 1994 in relation to spray-paint graffiti, but apart from this incident he was never involved with the police. He tried very hard to become accepted in a graffiti gang, predominately consisting of youths with an immigrant (and Muslim) background. However, he was rejected as a "wannabe", and his immigrant mates also let him down in the process.

Interestingly, it was at this age he became increasingly politically conscious (Oslo District Court, 2012). Breivik dropped out of upper secondary school during the third year in 1997. He wanted to go into business without further delay, and was eager to make a lot of money (Oslo District Court, 2012). His political interest became even stronger with time and in 1999 he became an active member of the right-wing populist Progress Party (Frp), and it's youth organization (FpU) (Langset, 2011). This is not an extremist party, but it is also a fact that their distinct anti-immigration views have attracted many voters, who have considered this to be a very important issue. Some of Breivik's friends have stated that he in this period expressed strong and peculiar political views (Oslo District Court, 2012).

After a rather unsuccessful legal business experiences, Breivik started selling fake university diplomas. This turned out to be more beneficial, and he made a lot of money through this activity. He earned as much as 420 000 GBP from 2002 to 2006, only disturbed by some less fortunate investments on the stock market (Oslo District Court, 2012). His political efforts were less successful though, and he failed to be included on the party's list of candidates for the municipal election in Oslo. This was evidently a big disappointment for him, and it left him disillusioned with organised politics. Eventually his activity in the Progress party came to a halt. Breivik himself claimed he was finding the

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

party too moderate and therefore left, but his failure to get into position was probably the main reason for his disillusionment with regular politics. Indeed, so far, Breivik's young life had been characterised by a series of failures and disappointments in different areas - including his political career (Seierstad, 2015).

In 2006, Breivik moved back to his mother's flat, and this was the beginning of a time shift. He now temporarily isolated himself from his friend, and dedicated a year to playing *World of Warcraft* online. In the sentencing, the court explained this as a result of a complex process. Just as interesting, the court concluded that he had been strongly goal-oriented and structured from 2006 and until the terrorist acts in 2011 (Oslo District Court, 2012). The police investigation also found little to indicate that Breivik actually planned to commit a terrorist attack before 2006. As such it is likely that the build-up to the terrorist attacks started in 2006-2007, since he then also started to work on his compendium (Oslo District Court, 2012). The first parts of his compendium, compiled and written during the early stages of his seclusion, were less extreme in tenor and rhetoric than the latter parts, where he increasingly embraced a terrorist strategy. Thus, it seems his radicalisation was gradual. However, from some point during this process he became, to borrow the expression of psychiatrist Rosenqvist, *a man with a mission* (VG, 2012a). To what extent, however, was his mission and target selection influenced by his ideology?

3.3.2 An ideology with a personal touch

Like other solo terrorists before him, Anders Behring Breivik constructed and adhered to a personalised and customised ideology. This is hardly sensational since this has been the case with a number of other well-known perpetrators, like the Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski in the United States and Franz Fuchs in Austria. A substantial part of Breivik's ideology is coherent with traditional right-wing views and rationality. It is an important point, however, that right-wing extremism is not a fixed and one-dimensional ideology. There are a number of ideological varieties with minor or greater differences. Still, they do often have some basic characteristics in common, and the following

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

seems to fit Breivik's perceptions of the world (Bjørgero, 1997: 53-71, 272-311).

A basic component in a right-wing extremist worldview is the idea that people are fundamentally different and that they are given different value, due to race, culture, religion, nationality or sexual preferences determining their basic character. For example, Breivik claimed that Muslims everywhere and at all times first and foremost will be jihadists, whose goal it is to conquer and subdue Christian Europeans (Berwick, 2011: 524-527). Another typical trait of right-wing extremism is a conspiratorial view of the world, often claiming that an external enemy (e.g. Jews or Muslims) assisted by internal traitors, will take control of the society (Bjørgero, 1995). One typical anti-Semitic variety of this rhetoric, popular among neo-Nazis, is the idea of the existence of a Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG). The ZOG narrative has, for example, been fronted by the white supremacy-leader and author William Pierce, aka Andrew Macdonald (1978, 1989). The internal enemy will typically be identified as the authorities, political leftists, journalists, teachers and the cultural elite - what Breivik prefers to interchangeably call *Cultural Marxists* or *Multiculturalists*. In his compendium, Breivik states that the European governments have launched a great "campaign of deception" against their own people, in order to implement multiculturalism, ultimately leading to Eurabia, with the Muslims taking over Europe (Berwick, 2011: 47). The system-hostility is apparent. As the blogger Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen (aka *Fjordman*), stating, *the EU must die, or Europe will die* (Berwick, 2011: 330). Other issues discussed are the Islamic takeover, focus on the relative proportion of Muslims compared with non-Muslims. In his compendium, Breivik also states that he has never observed a successfully implementation of assimilation policy (Berwick, 2011: 496).

Ultimately, the right-wing extremists tend to draw a picture that the race, nation or society, as we know it, will be destroyed or exterminated in this globalized world, where big changes take place in a short period of time (Moghaddam, 2008). They fear the risk of social deprivation, both for themselves and the future generations. In the radicalization phase a strong *us versus them*-attitude typically surfaces, as for most violent extremists (Moghaddam, 2006: 97-98). Furthermore, Breivik expresses typical extremist feelings of group victimisation, like that nationalists are being ridiculed,

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

silenced and persecuted and that he represents the resistance (Berwick, 2011: 13).

Often nationalists are primarily focused on the local, regional and national context and situation within the borders of their country, although cross-border cooperation between far-right movements certainly always has been present to some degree. However, Breivik revealed a substantial interest for the European continent as a whole, and he has also applied a rhetoric that bears strong resemblance to the way militant Islamists are talking about the establishment of an *ummah*. Hence, he was not only aiming for a pronounced national position, but also international recognition and status through aggression towards the classical right-wing target groups, namely the Muslims and the alleged internal traitors. Breivik felt that he was acting on the behalf of a majority that was unaware, unwilling or unable to act themselves - like many other solo terrorists before him have tended to do (Crenshaw, 2011: 49). It comes almost without saying that he subsequently also expected endorsement and gratitude from masses of followers.

Interestingly, some parts of the ideology presented by Breivik in his compendium are controversial within some of the major far-right movements. Firstly, he distanced himself from National Socialism. On several occasions he claimed that he presented an alternative to this ideology, which he has characterized as an ideology of hatred (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,06,01; 08,13,01; 08,18,01; 08,20,01; NTB court transcripts 18.04.2012). Shortly after his conviction, however, Breivik have characterized himself as a fascist. Breivik's self-identification as a fascist was probably influenced by several expert witnesses on political ideologies, who during the trial characterized Breivik's ideology as a variety of fascism, based on his compendium and statements in court. Breivik apparently accepted and embraced this label and later claimed from his prison cell that he intended to establish the Norwegian Fascist Party. Later he even called himself a national socialist, claiming that his earlier distancing from this ideology was just a deception.

Secondly, on several occasions Breivik expressed support for Israel and its right to defend itself against the jihadists (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,06,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). This is naturally

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

utterly problematic for those within the right-wing movement who is adhering to the ZOG narrative mentioned above. Thirdly, he tried to use Christianity for what it's worth, although it quickly turned out to be a rather vague attempt, as he is not adhering to Christianity as a personal faith, but rather follow the cultural traditions of Christianity (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,02; 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 18.04.2012). Breivik's motivation for presenting these three views may be that he thought this would attract sympathizers from a broader political platform, since most people tend to automatically dislike and distance themselves both from both National Socialism and anti-Semitism - in addition to the fact that most Norwegians and other Europeans adhere to Christian culture and traditions - at least to some extent. On the other side, one may question the realism of the ideological path Breivik staked out, as the same people he tries to reach out to in this way, will have nothing but contempt for his ideology, which is strongly linked with racism, fascism and other violent ideologies - not to forget his actions. During the trial, he tried very hard to avoid any reference to the Crusader imagery so prominent in his compendium, as he had probably by then realised that this rhetoric approach was a failure.

In his compendium Breivik concretised and illuminated his enemy image by listing potential targets. These were in accordance with his stated focus on the Muslims and the Cultural-Marxists, but at the same time he stayed clear of any targets linked to Jews and the state of Israel. However, some of Breivik's writings from prison after his conviction, and embracing of national socialism, have become more anti-Semitic in character. The fact that he wrote to NSU terrorist Beate Zschäpe in 2012, although she probably never got to read it, also illustrates Breivik's ideological inconsistency (Svarstad, 2012)

In his compendium, Breivik clarified his target preferences through a listing of Western European primary targets, and a categorization system on the individual level. The first one focused on attacks against massive and compact buildings. He mentions the MA100 political parties (*Marxist/Multiculturalist Alliance 100*), which describes the current West European political establishment of political parties, who indirectly or directly supports the "islamisation" of Europe (Berwick, 2011: 933) He also mentions media conferences, individual assassinations, EU headquarters, government buildings, major multicultural buildings, media houses, certain universities,

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

any major Muslim targets, mosques and Islamic cultural centres (Berwick, 2011: 930). One strategy considered by Breivik, was to attack Muslim targets in order to provoke the Muslims to enter the Jihadi arena, so that they would mobilize against the Europeans – all in order to polarize the situation and ultimately leading to a confrontation between the Muslims and the Europeans (Berwick, 2011: 931). He later dismissed this idea, as he thought it would backfire, and not contribute to progress.

In his compendium, Breivik also constructed a categorization system for his enemies on an individual level, sorting them into the letter categories A, B, C or D, indicating their importance, and implicitly their value, as targets (Berwick, 2011: 939-940). A, B and C individuals were all considered traitors, while those in category D were merely facilitating for the B and C traitors. Category A traitors were defined as political leaders, media leaders, cultural leaders and industry leaders, all qualified for death punishment. Category B traitors were the Cultural Marxists / Multi-Cultural politicians and individuals from different professional groups, like media, teachers, writers, cartoonists, artists, celebrities and scientists. These were also qualified for death punishment. Category C traitors were seen as less influential than A and B persons, and represented targets of a lower priority. Punishment was to be fines, incarceration and expropriation. Category D individuals had little or no political influence, but were facilitating for Level B and C traitors. Here the punishment was set to none.

According to this categorization it stands out as a contradiction in terms that Breivik actually attacked the youths at Utøya at all, since he admitted that they were to be considered as category C traitors (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). His claim during the trial that many of the young victims killed had leadership positions in the youth movement, was a rather weak attempt on post-rationalization (NTB court transcripts 19.04.2012; Berwick 2011: 950). He also argued that when he could not get access to the most attractive targets, he had to go further down on his list of priorities (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). This stands out as a good example of the pragmatism terrorists often develop and adhere to during operational phases.

3.3.3 Not without moral constraints

It is not uncommon, or unnatural, to think that the most devious and brutal terrorists are without moral thresholds. It is, however, not always so. In Anders Behring Breivik's case there were indeed some moral constraints that affected him and his targeting. Despite the fact that he did not have any limits with regard to the number of casualties within his set enemy categories, he claimed to have taken into consideration the so-called *civilian loss factor*. What he meant with this was that that killing civilians outside his defined target groups should be avoided, or kept at a minimum. Breivik was quite eager to bring forward this point in the police investigative interviews, as well as during the trial. In fact, it was an issue already in the first police interview on Utøya.

"We have moral aspects, right, even though it did not seem so obvious today. There is, for example, a reason for us attacking the Government Quarter and not a kindergarten, like al-Qaida would have done."

Anders Behring Breivik, 22.07.2011

In an early phase after the bombing, Breivik stated that as much as 50% civilian losses would be acceptable, and that less than 10% would be optimal (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,01; 08,26,01). With regard to victims, Breivik emphasized in his compendium that women had to be killed alongside men (Berwick, 2011: 942). On the other side, it seemed important for him not to be considered a child killer. Obviously, this became rather difficult for him during the trial, since 33 youths killed were under age 18, whereas two were just 14 years old (Oslo District Court, 2012). Then again, Breivik had not reflected much on the distinction between youths and adults from a legal perspective. Nor had he bothered to check age restrictions on the youth camp at Utøya. It seems that he made a lot of assumptions on this area.

When it comes to the degree of discrimination and casualty focus, most will agree that the worst combination is terrorist actors conducting totally indiscriminate attacks, with an unlimited mass casualty focus. The second worst combination will be discriminate (more selective) targeting and mass casualty focus. Then there might be threat actors that seek to practice discriminate targeting, and a moderate number of deaths, for example in order

to avoid backfire from their own sympathisers. The mildest variety will be individual-specific targeting, which of course is very serious for the individual in question, but less a threat to the general public. Following this, Breivik was a representative for the second worst combination with regard to target discrimination and casualty focus, namely killing as many as possible within a specific target group. He never planned for any totally indiscriminate attacks.

3.3.4 The strategy of a massive “shock-attack”

Breivik’s ideology took form as he worked on his compendium, and so did his main strategy. Regarding the terrorist’s strategic objectives, these were clarified by the terrorist himself during the trial. There he listed four motives for the terrorist attacks, namely 1) attention to the cause, 2) distribution of his compendium, 3) to hold responsible those accountable for promoting the multiculturalism in Norway, and 4) to launch a provocation leading to persecution of the moderate cultural conservatives, in turn boosting their motivation for resistance (NTB court transcripts, 23.04.2012). As described, Breivik’s four objectives was linked and cross-linked to *advertisement*, *compliance*, *endorsement* and *provocation* (Hutchinson, 1978: 41-85; Thornton, 1965). It seems valid to argue, however, that Breivik did not gain any success with regard to compliance, endorsement and provocation. Rightly, the terrorist received some endorsement after the attacks, but first and foremost through letters and tributes on social media from a limited number of extremists abroad. Furthermore, the support he achieved on social media decreased from 2013. Breivik himself expressed that the attacks might be condemned today, but understood in the future, but that does not alter the fact that the ambitions were way beyond a realistic scenario (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,21,01; 11762579; NTB court transcripts, 17.04.2012; 19.04.2012; 23.04.2012).

With the 22 July attacks Breivik achieved, at least partially, two of his declared objectives, namely maximum advertisement and distribution of his compendium. As for the latter, he could of course just have distributed his compendium on the Internet from home, without conducting the horrific attacks. The downside to this alternative would be no or very limited media attention, and not the overwhelming media coverage and attention that

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

followed the attacks. Then again, the attention Breivik got was not so much related to his declared cause. It did not whirl up heated public debates about immigration or the government's politics. The media attention was, in contrast, focusing on the nature of his actions, how it was carried out, the sheer brutality involved, as well as the perpetrators personal history. Initially, he might also have boosted the fear factor in the Norwegian society, but mostly so while it was unclear whether two other cells existed or not – which did not last for long after his capture. On the other hand, it is clear that the terrorist failed with the two last declared objectives. He failed to hold the “responsible” accountable, and in particular so since the Labour Party received massive and unconditional support in the aftermath of the terrorist acts. Neither were there any signs of persecution of the so-called moderate cultural conservatives (NTB court transcripts, 23.04.2012). Additionally, Breivik failed totally to understand how counter-productive slaughtering innocent and defenceless civilians really are in general among ordinary people, and the contempt that immediately follows such actions. As will be described later in this chapter, he was actually reflecting on the counterproductive factor in his target selection process with regard to striking immigrants, but he obviously did not understand general mechanisms that come with the use of particularly brutal violence – regardless of victim category.

Seen in retrospect, the most crucial decision Breivik made with regard to the catastrophic end-result came with his determination to launch a devastating “shock-attack”. This was a strategy he devoted considerable attention to in his compendium (Berwick, 2011: 950-973). It is not clear exactly at what time he took this decision, but it is also a fact that he never considered anything else in concrete plans. This *one-off mass casualty approach* was also in contrast to the practice of most other solo terrorists, who have prioritized a series of small-scale attacks as some kind of war of attrition, for example as seen with Theodore Kaztinsky, John Ausonius, Franz Fuchs, David Copeland and Peter Mangs. Breivik reasoned cynically that a brutal and devastating *spectacular* (operation) would boost the fear factor and ensure him global media attention. Taking his narcissistic personality disorder into consideration, this would also get him into his imaginary Hall of famous, or rather infamous, terrorists as one of the worst (or most lethal) terrorists through history. This was highly

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

likely an attractive compensation for the unsuccessful youth politician and businessman, who during police interviews and trial desperately tried to hang onto the image of an above-average intelligent individual. The latter point is clearly illustrated in Breivik's correspondence with professor Tore Bjørgo and the author, where he commented on a remark Bjørgo made as an expert witness during the trial, saying that Breivik was an "above average competent terrorist" (Hopperstad, Ravndal, Brenna & Grøttum, 2012). That was seemingly not good enough for Breivik, who wanted to be rated as the number one terrorist of all times. In a letter to Professor Bjørgo and the author, dated 02.11.2012, he made the following comment (Breivik, 2012);

"It is not correct that I merely am an "above average militant revolutionary", as I possess more competence areas than both [Muhammed] Atta and [Timothy] McVeigh. I would therefore be interested in learning which successful solo militants in any political camp, through history, you think possess more areas of competence than me ☺. You will not find anyone ☺. In any case, good luck with your project, Bjørgo and Hemmingby! ☺ A narcissistic and revolutionary salute from Anders Behring Breivik."

Anders Behring Breivik, 02.11.2012

Regarding the fear factor, Breivik was probably right, thinking that a single extremely brutal mass-casualty operation generally creates more fear than a number of small-scale attacks. A prerequisite for maintaining a constant fear over time, however, is that authorities and the general public believe there are more terrorists ready to strike left out there. It is after all the expectation of more violence that may lead to the wanted behaviour, if it is going to work at all (Schelling, 2008: 87). This explains why Breivik claimed there were two other cells ready for immediate attacks from the moment he was apprehended, in addition to his organizational claim with regard to the Knight Templar network. He never admitted this to be a bluff, even if evidence weighted heavily against it. On the other hand, the threshold for carrying out such extreme actions is too high even for most solo terrorists. This is partly because of the brutality it involves, making it too difficult psychologically and emotionally to carry through, but also because it would create a high amount of contempt and condemnation against the responsible perpetrator, making the operation counter-productive. Interestingly, Breivik's grand inspiration with regard to means and methods came from the attack on the World Trade Centre

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

in 1993, and Timothy McVeigh's bombing in Oklahoma in 1995 (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 11762579; NTB court transcripts 20.04.2012). Accordingly, it seems like Breivik decided on the methods before the concrete targets. Firearms were for so-called bonus operations only.

3.3.5 Who to attack?

Based on his perceived enemy picture, Breivik had the choice of three main directions for his targeting. He could have acted against the Muslims and Islamists, as they represented the external enemy. As an alternative he could choose to strike the enemy within (the traitors). The third possibility would be to go for both of these groups, since complexity was not necessarily an obstacle for the Norwegian right-wing terrorist. As for the inner enemy, the political elite and the decision-makers responsible for the development of the society distinguished themselves as attractive targets. Breivik was particularly obsessed with the Labour Party, who at the time was the leading party in the government coalition with the prime minister in front. If not settling for the elite, however, Breivik could also choose to strike against the so-called "Cultural Marxists" he accused of assisting and facilitating for the development. This would include different parts of the political and societal establishment, for example journalists, teachers, bureaucrats, artists, scientists and celebrities.

So why did Breivik choose to attack the Labour party and Cultural Marxists, and not the Muslims and immigrants? According to Breivik, he initially considered striking the Muslims and immigrants like so many other far-right extremists have done before him. However, he claimed to have dismissed this option thinking years back on the racist murder of Benjamin Hermansen in January 2001 – long before Breivik himself turned to terrorism (Berwick 2011: 1394; Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,16,01);

"I think it was this incident that initially contributed to my view that it was essential to attack the facilitators, multi-cultural politicians and journalists, instead of Muslims."

Anders Behring Breivik, 12.10.2011

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Having a mother from Norway and father from Ghana, the 15-year old boy was assaulted and killed by neo-Nazis from the skinhead group Boot Boys in Oslo. According to Breivik, the massive public rage and condemnation following this killing proved to him that attacks against immigrants had a counter-productive effect for the right-wing movement. Hence, for him it was in no way a gesture of sympathy with the killed coloured youth, but rather a rational assessment from a strategic point of view when Breivik acknowledged that the goals for the operation was best achieved by attacking those “traitors” responsible for the situation and their accomplices (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,16,01; NTB court transcripts 19.04.2012; 23.04.2012).

In a police interview Breivik also stated that striking the Muslims would be the wrong choice since they are not traitors, but more like guests, and not the reason for the implementation of cultural Marxism (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,17,01). As such, both the Benjamin Hermansen case and more general considerations made Breivik set his sights on the Labour party and the “Cultural Marxists” – and not the Muslims.

Recognizing that a brutal “shock-attack” on the internal enemy was to prefer, Breivik also found that doing it alone gave the best chance of success. In court, he referred to how the white supremacy-group The Order had been detected and disrupted by law enforcement agencies in the mid-1980s due to infiltration (NTB court transcripts, 17.04.2012; 20.04.2012). The Order, founded by Robert Jay Mathews who was killed by police in 1984, was operating in the US in the 1980s. Breivik therefore never even tried to involve others as he started planning his actions. Through the whole operational phase he made a point of avoiding any overt or covert contact with domestic militant nationalists, due to the risk of being detected by the security police. Hence, he consciously accepted that this self-imposed restriction would reduce both operational capability and speed. He preferred to prioritise operational security. In his compendium, as shown below, Breivik made an overview where he drew lines between the number of perpetrators, labour time required to complete the operation and risk of detection (Berwick, 2011: 1472):

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The following chart illustrates labour required vs. risk of apprehension for individuals who are NOT already on any watch list.

Risk vs. Labour	Time required to complete	Risk of apprehension
1 person	30 days	30%
2 people	20 days	60%
3 people	16 days	85%
4 people	13 days	90%
5 people	12 days	90-95%

Looking at the overview in the aftermath of the 22 July attacks it is clear Breivik did not refer to himself regarding the time required for one person only, especially for a complex terrorist operation. One possibility is that the times indicate minimum time required for simpler attack types and methods, while more time open for more complex operations. Regarding the risk of apprehension, Breivik's calculations can be considered more realistic, but it will always be a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the detection issue. It is nevertheless obvious that the risk for detection and apprehension is significantly bigger for groups than single individuals. This will be illustrated in the part of this thesis that concerns the militant Islamists in Europa.

3.3.6 Persistence compensated for lack of military background

Regarding capability, little from Breivik's personal background made him a particularly resourceful and capable solo terrorist. He did not stand out as an extraordinary or specially gifted pupil in school. Neither was he particularly successful in the jobs he had after leaving school, with the legal business activity he initiated or with his political activity in the Progress party. On the other hand he was quite successful when he produced and sold fake American university diplomas from 2002 to 2006 (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). Regarding technical or special skills that could be useful for an individual planning a major terrorist operation, there were none. Breivik had not even done compulsory military service, like most Norwegian young males at his age did. Naturally, the terrorist later regretted that he had missed this opportunity to acquire military skills (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,25; NTB court transcripts, 17.04.2012). As a result of this,

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Breivik had very limited shooting experience before the 22 July attacks. He tried the rifle a few times and he was for some months active in a sports pistol club, but that was really it. Nor had he any previous knowledge whatsoever with regard to the use of explosives (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts 19.04.2012). As illustrated, Breivik did not have a particularly relevant background for a man with ambitions to conduct a massive, complex two-folded terrorist operation. Breivik did, however, compensate for his weak background in several ways.

First of all, Anders Behring Breivik's ability to stay focused and motivated over a very long period of time was essential. Despite the fact that it is somewhat unclear exactly when he did decide to commit a terrorist operation, it was nevertheless a project that went on for several years. This demands a high degree of long-lasting motivation, persistence and focus from the perpetrator's side. Secondly, Breivik obviously had an adequate ability to plan and operationalize a complex operation. Not everyone would be able to do that. Thirdly, his extreme and somewhat exaggerated (and by some ridiculed) security consciousness enabled him to avoid detection during the long phases of planning, preparation and execution of the attacks. Rightly, a few persons in his close surroundings did note his radical and extremist statements from time to time, but he never disclosed that he was planning violent actions (NOU 2012: 14, 355). Finally, Breivik was to demonstrate thoroughness in the bomb-production. Rightly, the bomb itself was not of the same quality that for example the Provisional IRA produced on a regular basis during the Northern Ireland conflict with regard to effect, but it nevertheless killed eight people and caused substantial material damage. It should be added here that Breivik did by no means choose the easiest path when he constructed his fertilizer-bomb. He also showed a high degree of persistency when he experienced problems and challenges during the bomb making process. It should also be noted, however, as a contradiction to this thoroughness, that Breivik's understanding of how explosives actually work after detonation was very poor. During police interviews he made some sketches, illustrating pre-attack thoughts he had with regard to the positioning of the bomb vehicle outside the H-building in the Government Quarter. The objective was to make the building collapse (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,08,01). The way Breivik thought he could direct and control the blast, made it clear

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

that this part was based on far-fetched assumptions, and not knowledge. Still, he managed to build a bomb that worked, and he got it into a position where it caused disastrous damage.

Funding is always a critical part of complex or continuous terrorist activity, and Breivik did indeed have a good starting point. The police investigation revealed that the terrorist had earned 3 687 588 NOK (about 420 000 GBP or 682 000 USD - based on the exchange rate on 22 July 2011) on selling false university documents in the period from 2002 to 2006. Using foreign bank accounts, the terrorist avoided taxes on most of this income (Oslo District Court, 2012). A part of the profits was later invested in the stock market, but without any significant success. When the terrorist in 2006 moved to his mother, Breivik claimed he had about 5-600 000 NOK (56 800 – 68 000 GBP) in his bank account, as well as about 300 000 NOK (about 34 000 GBP) in cash. Furthermore, during autumn 2009 he applied for - and got - ten credit cards. This provided him with an extra money reserve of 235 000 NOK (26 700 GBP) (Oslo District Court, 2012). As illustrated, with limited living expenses from 2006, the terrorist had quite a satisfactory financial situation. Just as importantly, without a regular job he had time to devote himself totally to the operation. This partially compensated for the fact that he, as a solo terrorist, had to do everything himself, in contrast to a group that can assign different tasks on the members. A last point worth noting with regard to Breivik's operational capability is that he did not seek to escape. He had some very superficial thoughts on the issue, but found it rather unrealistic. In general, offenders who intend to keep going until physically confronted by law enforcement personnel, will under normal circumstances be able to operate over a longer period of time, compared to offenders seeking to escape, hence also expanding their lethal potential.

3.3.7 A terrorist versus a peaceful society

It is important to remember the external factors and the societal context the terrorist operated within. Until the 22 July attacks, the Norwegian society had been blessed with an absence of major terrorist incidents. There had been a handful of violent right-wing attacks, but these were not grave enough to put societal security on top of the political agenda of any Norwegian government.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Nor did this subject concern people in general. As Cathrine Sandnes (2012) so appropriately wrote in the newspaper Dagbladet:

“Barely any of us were capable of envisioning a terrorist act of this kind in Norway, and just a few were interested in new (counterterrorism) efforts and restrictions. And the fewest of us have wished for politicians prioritizing counterterrorism preparedness rather than school, health or better roads.”

Cathrine Sandnes, 01.09.2012

The planned closure of the Grubbegata street in the Government Quarter was to serve as the ultimate illustration of bureaucratic and political negligence regarding security efforts before 22 July 2011. In 2003, the Prime Minister’s Office tasked the Directorate of Police to do a threat assessment with regard to the security for government members and the office buildings concerned (NOU 2012: 14, 423). In June 2004 the report was discussed in the government’s security cabinet. Two months later the government decided to follow up on the report, which recommended no less than 179 concrete steps to enhance the security - including closure of the Grubbegata street (NOU 2012: 14, 427). The Ministry of Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (FAD) was assigned to handle this. Although many of the recommended security efforts were established according to plan, the street closure turned out to be a particular difficult nut to crack.

In 2006, project leader Christian Fredrik Horst in FAD made it clear on national television that what they really feared, was that a terrorist with car or truck loaded with explosives would exploit the vulnerability, and drive unhindered into the centre of the Government Quarter. This appearance – or warning - did not spark any rapid response within the bureaucracy, or on the political top level (NRK Østlandssendingen, 2006). It should be added, however, that the government’s indecisiveness in this matter, was accompanied by the same degree of indecisiveness from the Oslo municipality’s conservative-led political leadership. Furthermore, there were also protests from commercial interests, neighbours and news media. In 2007, an editorial titled *“Hypothetical and hysterical”* in the major Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, slammed and ridiculed the proposed street closure (Aftenposten Aften, 2007). The Oslo municipality city development committee actively opposed the closure of the street, and the process was

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

delayed over and over again. It is also interesting to note that in 2012, the leader of the Conservative party running the Oslo municipality, Stein Berger Røsland, admitted that *Aftenposten's* editorial was something he took into account when they discussed the closure of street for normal traffic (Bergens Tidende, 2012). The case dragged out in time and in hindsight, the Grubbegata-affair had all the symptoms of a ludicrous travesty, and one man exploited this nonconformity gravely.

In July 2011, personnel from the Norwegian Ministries' Security and Service Organisation (DSS) were securing the Government Quarter. This is an institution under the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation (KMD), and in practice they deliver regular guard services – similar to what private security companies offer. Accordingly, the guard personnel did not have any special authorities or weapons. Hence their operational capacities were limited, and they could in reality only handle minor security threats. For serious security threats the police had to be called in, as there was not a permanent police presence in the Government Quarter at the time. The limited security efforts were in many ways reflecting a low threat level, and seemingly there was an assumption that the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) would be able to detect any terrorist threat in time. This is obviously a rather naive assumption, and especially so since some particular highly symbolic individuals, buildings and places always will attract attention from terrorists and other potentially violent actors.

It is also a fact that the Norwegian Police Security Service, responsible for threat assessment and counterterrorism efforts within the borders, had been affected by the historical developments. This is perhaps not strange, since such services will prioritise in accordance with shifting trends, and with just a few small-scale incidents with far-right extremists for the last decades, the growing threat from militant Islamists was the focus in 2011. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice and Police had stated that international terrorism should be a priority for the service (NOU 2012: 14, 363, 366). Additionally, limited resources forced PST to focus on on-going cases, at the expense of other preventive functions (NOU 2012: 14, 367).

Overall, the peaceful Norwegian society was in 2011 vulnerable for serious terrorist attacks, and individuals like Anders Behring Breivik was not a part of the dominating threat picture.

3.4 From thinking to acting

As Breivik sat in his mother's flat developing his compendium, ideology and strategy, concrete ideas and plans started to take shape. However, as he moved towards the realization of these he was soon to experience the complexity of interaction with regard to the target selection process. In fact, different practical problems and constraints were to haunt him until the very day of the attacks (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012);

“Upcoming problems made me make adjustments all the time. My original plan failed again and again and again and again. It happened at least 20-30 times... I had to adapt, and I spent a lot of time doing so.”

Anders Behring Breivik, 20.04.2012

To identify and establish a timeline for the concrete plans Breivik made is challenging and the potential pitfalls are many – even with solid research material at hand. One factor contributing to this is the huge amount of speculations and inaccurate suggestions in the media, but Breivik's numerous statements in police interviews and from the trial also makes it difficult to grasp. He talked so willingly and much about everything on different occasions, that it is sometimes a challenge to clarify what was really considered and planned before the 22 July attacks, and what has been merely loose ideas or thoughts of the moment in the aftermath. Post-rationalisation is obviously also a subject to be aware of. Some of Breivik's statements have also been rather unstructured at times, leaving room for doubts, speculations and misinterpretations. Furthermore, his personality disorder and narcissistic personality opens for the possibility that he during police interviews and the trial tried to present his plans and ideas as more thoroughly considered than they in reality have been. There are several indications of this, but that said, some stated ideas and plans are more consistent and trust-worthy than others.

What seems to have been the first concrete, main plan in the planning process, which he according to himself devoted a lot of time on, involved three

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

vehicle-born IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) against different highly symbolic targets, followed by three shooting attacks against other targets (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.12). With reference to the target overview Level 2 targets, the perpetrator had a range of possible targets to consider - a process that was to become partly simple, but also partly complicated.

The simple part was that the H-building in the Government Quarter, housing the Prime Minister's Office from floors 13 to 17 and the Ministry of Justice and Police from floor 2 to 12, always was the undisputable target number one. In a police interview, Breivik stated that he already in 2006 thought the target had to be the Government Quarter, unless it proved to be too problematic (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01). The reason for this, as he explained in the court during the trial, was simple (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012):

"The Government Quarter, the H-building that is, is the most attractive political target in Norway."

Anders Behring Breivik, 19.04.2012

It is apparent that Breivik found the iconic H-building from 1958, housing the Labour Party-lead coalition government and bureaucrats that Breivik held accountable for the Cultural Marxist take-over of the Norwegian society, to be the perfect target. The fact that other ministries surrounded the H-building was considered a considerable bonus, boosting the attack potential with regard to the *accountable*-perspective. The Labour party's HQ on Youngstorget square, located almost next to the Government Quarter, was a seemingly a clear target number two. However, Breivik claims to have made some reflections with regard to the civilian loss-factor, due to other buildings in the area. He specifically mentioned the offices belonging to the Norwegian Tourist Association, at the time located on the side of the same building-complex, and he reckoned many would be killed if the HQ-building collapsed as a result of the bombing. Nonetheless, Breivik confirmed in court that the Labour Party-building remained to be target number two on the list even after the civilian loss-considerations. Like the H-building in the Government Quarter, the Labour Party art deco-style building from 1935 is a well-known

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

and iconic building, even though it is visually not as striking in the urban landscape, as the tall government building.

Interestingly, Breivik had substantial difficulties in deciding on bomb target number three - almost to the degree that he didn't quite know what to use the third IED for. He considered several buildings in Oslo, more specifically the Parliament building, premises belonging to the Parliament in the so-called Parliament Quarter, the Oslo City Hall, the newspaper Aftenposten's building, the Directorate of Immigration, as well as the Royal Palace (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,15 01). Some of these lacked attractive features and some had to be dismissed for other reasons. The Directorate of Immigration was probably not an adequate highly symbolic target, and it was a rather anonymous building in a tight and busy neighbourhood. Here the potential for an (for Breivik) unacceptable civilian loss potential was also a consideration. The civilian loss factor also put the newspaper Aftenposten out of the question with regard to a big bomb. The newspaper was located close to the Oslo central train station, and it rented a limited part of the building. If the construction had given in, as a result of a bomb blast, most victims would have no connection to Aftenposten at all. The Oslo City Hall was also a difficult target for a bomb attack. First of all, it was housing the conservative-lead Oslo municipality administration, including local politicians from the Progress party, that Breivik had been an active member in.

"The City Hall is a political building on municipality level. The City Hall would be a setting with the conservative parties in the building."

Anders Behring Breivik, 10.02.2012

Secondly, the iconic building's central location in downtown Oslo, normally crowded with tourists and locals, made it an unpredictable target with regard to civilian losses (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01). The civilian casualty perspective was also a point he considered with regard to the iconic Parliament building. Furthermore, the terrorist was not sure how he could get the vehicle into a good position. As for the Parliament Quarter, this is an ordinary block, consisting of office buildings belonging to the Parliament. It stands out as a rather unattractive target alternative with regard to symbolism, and the perpetrator would also here have little control over casualties in a massive bomb blast. On the other side, the Royal Palace

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

definitely had attractive features, since it is a highly iconic building overlooking the Karl Johan Street. It is also some distance to other buildings and crowded areas. Breivik also stated that it was a factor that a blown-up palace would be observed from the normally crowded and long high street of Oslo, the Karl Johan Street. This would not be the case (at least not just as much) with the iconic Parliament building (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01). Additionally, the mid-entrance for arriving cars under the palace would make it easy to get the bomb vehicle directly under the building. Breivik therefore ended up with the Royal Palace as the third bomb target, but with an ironic prerequisite. The royal family could not be present at the time of the detonation, because Breivik considered himself to be a monarchist (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,02; 08,03,01).

The strong position the royal family have in the Norwegian society may have played a part in the considerations. Accordingly, bomb number three should first and foremost be a warning to the royal family with regard to their immigrant-friendly attitude (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 11762579).

"It is not an alternative to hurt the Royal family, but one want to give them a warning that they shall not express any views concerning, and certainly not (views) supporting multiculturalism."

Anders Behring Breivik, 14.02.12

Breivik considered the royal palace to be a more important symbolic target due to its location at the end of the Karl Johan high street. The parliament's location was not so good for filming in a news coverage context. Breivik had tried to picture how it would appear on the television news (NTB court transcripts, 08,29,01).

After placing the last bomb vehicle at the palace, his plan was to rush to the Blitz anarchist house nearby and shoot as many as possible, before moving on to the newspaper Dagsavisen a few blocks away, and finally the Socialist Left Party's HQ. These targets are all located relatively close to each other, as well as to the chosen bomb targets, so the geographical location of the potential targets did probably have influence on this part of the initial plan. Another indication of this is that Breivik also considered to include the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) for a shooting attack. This would be a far

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

more prestigious target, compared to the three shooting attack targets previously mentioned. NRK is the national broadcaster in Norway, and attacking it would be fully in accordance with his declared hatred and focus against the news media in general. Here it can be mentioned that the former party leader of the Progress Party (that Breivik once was a member of) Carl I. Hagen, for a period of time consequently called the broadcasting corporation for the Labour Party Broadcasting Corporation, using the acronym ARK instead of NRK. He claimed that NRK treated the Progress Party unfavourably, for example in debates during election campaigns (Ringheim, 2009). Breivik did actually go to the broadcaster's facilities at Marienlyst in Oslo in order to consider the possibilities, but he quickly dismissed it as a potential target. One reason was the geographical location, but he also lacked knowledge of how it was inside the buildings. He expected there would be numerous sections with admittance control inside of the buildings. Hence he felt insecure regarding how this would affect his ability to move around when inside (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01). This is why he, after placing the three car-bombs, settled for the Blitz anarchist house, the newspaper Dagsavisen and the Socialist Left Party's HQ as shooting targets. Furthermore, he would simply keep going until the police stopped him. It must be noted, however, that the bomb attacks was the main priority for the whole targeting process. The shooting attacks were secondary (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012).

3.4.1 Adjusting to three bombs and a shooting target

At one point, quite early in the planning process, Breivik modified the idea with three bombs and three shooting attacks. He decided to change to a plan for three bombs, combined with only one small arms-attack at a fourth location (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). The exact time and reason for this decision remain unclear, but three factors may have influenced his change of plan. For one, the anarchist Blitz house would only be crowded, and as such an attractive target, on Friday or Saturday nights. This corresponded badly with the timing regarding the other targets, since they had to be attacked on daytime – possibly with the exception of the Royal Palace (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01). Secondly, compared to public events gathering lots of people, the mass-casualty potential was more

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

unpredictable with the three potential shooting targets had been thinking about. Thirdly, he might have feared that he could be confronted and stopped by police before he reached all the preferred shooting targets. He would after all be operating downtown all the time, quite close to the bombing targets that would attract a lot of law enforcement capacities. As the bombing targets remained to be the same, he therefore now set his sights on the SKUP annual prize conference for investigative journalism for the single shooting attack. This was to be held 1-3 April 2011, at Quality Hotel in Tønsberg, about 100 km from Oslo. If he was unable to be ready in time for the SKUP conference, his backup target alternative was to be the annual Labour Party convention 7-10 April, just one week later (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,29,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). The short time-difference between the SKUP-conference and the back-up event indicates that the self-confident terrorist only expected minor delays. Also worth noting, the back-up target was in accordance with his compendium, where he specifically mentioned the annual meetings of the socialist or social democrat parties in Europe as prioritized targets (Berwick, 2011: 951).

Breivik also thought loosely about what to do if he failed to produce the necessary amount of explosives for large bombs. In that case he thought about how to use small bombs, or a combination of a large bomb with one or two small bombs of about 50 kg, against news media targets. For example, he claims to have thought about delivering a small bomb to the newspaper *Aftenposten* wearing a FedEx uniform. He also claims to have considered the broadcasting company NRK and the VG newspaper for such alternative attacks, although both locations were inconvenient. However, it must be underlined that there are no indications that Breivik did seriously plan or make practical preparations for any such alternative small-scale plans. Therefore it should be regarded as very superficial thoughts only. On the other hand Breivik stated that with just one big bomb, he had to choose one target for this and one target for the shooting attack, which was to be the media conference SKUP (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012).

The first documented signs of practical preparations from Breivik's part are from 2009. On 18 May this year, Breivik registered the agricultural company Breivik Geofarm (which the terrorist renamed to A Geofarm in March 2011) in the national Brønnøysund Register Centre. For Breivik, formally

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

establishing the company was a necessity in order to have a plausible cover, as he wanted to rent a farm for the bomb production, and not least to be able to buy fertilizer and other components necessary. A few months later, in September-October 2009, he also acquired ten credit cards from different financial institutions, which ensured him 235 000 NOK (at the time equal to 26 700 GBP) in extra funding (Oslo District Court, 2012). By now he also had determined a strategy for the best possible distribution of his compendium, namely to e-mail it to as many people as possible, and preferably to potential sympathizers. From November 2009 to February 2010 he systematically collected email addresses through two Facebook-accounts (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,07).

From 2010 Breivik started to make the necessary investments, including acquiring weapons. The Benelli shotgun, which was left unused during the terrorist attacks, had been legally bought in 2003, after Breivik had completed a hunting qualification course. Regarding other weapons, the terrorist initially conducted an unsuccessful search on the black market. He claims he did this in the Czech Republic too. More specifically, he travelled to Prague in the late summer of 2010 with two objectives in mind. He wanted to get accurate Norwegian police insignia replicas from a local print shop, since he was afraid of detection if he did this in Norway. Breivik also claims he was looking for weapons there, but there is no documentation supporting this (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). He got his insignias, but returned without any prospects of getting his hands on illegal weapons. He concluded that it would be easier to acquire weapons legally. Breivik bought his Mini-Ruger rifle in November 2010 and the Glock pistol in March 2011 – both legally (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,07; NOU 2012: 14, 348-34). The rifle was in a category included in the hunting regulations and getting the licence for this weapon was more or less a formality, since he had done the qualifying course. Regarding the pistol, Breivik enrolled in a pistol sports shooting club in Oslo. After being an active member for half a year or more, the terrorist got the documentation needed. The club confirmed his active membership to the police authorities handling weapons applications, and Breivik bought his Glock pistol in a store in Oslo. With regard to other equipment Breivik needed for his terrorist operation, he purchased most of this between May and July 2010, although he undertook purchases as late as

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

June 2011 (Oslo District Court, 2012). Breivik acted cautiously as he bought weapon accessories, protection gear or items linked to the bomb production. On a few occasions, however, he was forced to accept some risk. Especially so when he bought sodium nitrate from a pharmacy, the 15-meter powder fuse from Poland, and also 150 kg aluminium powder from Poland (NOU 2012: 14, 353).

In December 2010, as part of an international cooperation effort, Norwegian customs authorities passed on a list to the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), disclosing money transactions between Norwegian customers and a listed Polish company. The overview did not show what kind of goods that had been bought, but merely the names of the customers, as well as the amount of money involved. The list with 41 names included Breivik, who had paid about \$20. This was for a 15 meters long fuse. Worth noting, the product type did not show and it was the smallest sum of money on the list. No actions were taken and although the list from the customs did not get appropriate follow-up by the police security service, the 22 July commission did not find sufficient reason to claim that PST should have detected Breivik in advance (NOU 2012: 14, 380, 393, 395).

3.4.2 Information gathering and reconnaissance

Breivik claims to have based his information gathering on three main sources, namely the media, different Internet sites and physical hostile reconnaissance. From ordinary news media, both paper and online sources, Breivik followed what was going on in general. He could also to a certain degree register the activities of central politicians. Not least, the terrorist could keep himself up to date on the planned closure of the Grubbegata street in the Government Quarter. It was in 2008 or 2009 that Breivik became aware that the street was to be closed for ordinary traffic (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01).

Using a variety of Internet resources Breivik also looked up information about the specific locations of institutions, details on the areas surrounding these, and more specific details regarding the buildings. He also tried to look into the activities of different ministers, as well as events coordinated by the ministries (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01). This was

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

partly not difficult to do, due to the simple fact that much information is made public by the Prime Minister's Office and the other ministries themselves. One example is the publishing of the official weekly programs for the ministers. Breivik claims he was very careful when he used his computer for more detailed information gathering, due to the fear of being "flagged", or in other words, draw attention from the police security service. His behaviour was in accordance with his partially exaggerated ideas of the capacities of the police security service, which affected him in several ways. One of the best examples in this regard is that Breivik was very restrictive with regard to the use Google Street View for planning and reconnaissance. He believed that if he used this tool to look at high-value targets he could be more or less automatically detected. Another example is that he would not visit the Internet site of the Norwegian government every day, because that could be regarded as suspicious (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01). Other decisions he made with regard to operational security - which made more sense - was that he consciously moderated his extreme political and ideological views when he visited far-right Internet sites and forums. This downplay from Breivik's side made it more likely that political opponents, and the security service if it was following the Internet sites in question, would focus on other and seemingly more extremist individuals. Finally, the perpetrator took active steps to hide his IP-addresses, which also was a rational precaution from his side (NOU 2012: 14, 355).

Breivik was equally afraid of detection when he conducted hostile reconnaissance on site, and also here his behaviour was partially affected by a mix of exaggerations and sensible considerations. For example, when he was out looking at the Government Quarter, he believed that even a short glance at CCTV cameras would "flag" him (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01; NTB court transcripts 19.04.2012). This one exaggeration became a constraint for him, and it reduced the quality of his information gathering significantly. Overall, potential targets he looked at on site were few, and most of them were just given a quick and superficial glance. Not surprisingly, the H-building in the Government Quarter caught most of his attention, and he claims to have conducted hostile reconnaissance there on eight occasions - four times on close range and four times observing from a distance. The four times he passed through the Government Quarter he emphasised on blending

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

in, for example by carrying shopping bags from stores nearby the site. On one occasion he also walked through with a friend, who was unaware of the sinister intentions of the terrorist. The four reconnaissance visits he conducted from a distance, was highly likely of limited value.

During the police investigative interviews Breivik was keen to give the impression that he had conducted the reconnaissance in a professional manner, and that he had been able to gather a lot of detailed construction information - especially from the Government Quarter's H-building. The police investigative interviews found, however, that Breivik was really not registering very much at all from his hostile reconnaissance activity. For example, when he gave the impression that he had studied the pillars of the building thoroughly as he passed by, this was easily contradicted when the interviewers started to pursue details. Another indicator supporting the theory of a poor information gathering result is that Breivik could not give up the position of a single CCTV camera, which he allegedly was very concerned with. There were about 200 CCTV cameras in the area at that time, both outdoors and inside cameras counted, and many were easy to spot for those walking around in the Government Quarter. Furthermore, his general knowledge about the capacities and facilities of the local guard unit was non-existent. He knew nothing about their organization, manpower, operational capacities or the location of key functions, as the guards operational control room. Nor did the terrorist register relevant security details in front of the H-building. He did for example believe that the thin plastic chain along the pavement in front, blocking most of the arrival space, was of steel. This was in fact a planned security detail, because it made it possible for the cars of the Prime Minister and close protection officers to drive straight through it, if a security threat occurred at the point of arrival, or departure.

One interesting aspect regarding critical national asset protection is that visible security efforts may influence the approach of a terrorist or terrorist group quite significantly, and this can be exemplified with one of Breivik's reconnaissance observations in the Government Quarter. One terrorist operation that inspired him greatly was the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing in New York and at a certain stage he was thinking that it would be preferably to get a bomb vehicle under the H-building. On one of his trips to the Government Quarter, he found out where the goods delivery facility

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

leading under the ministerial complex was. He also observed, however, that there was some kind of security check there, and he also was unsure whether the planned bomb vehicle was too big to get in. He therefore dropped the idea of getting the bomb vehicle under the bomb target without further ado (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01, NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). This concrete example illustrates that it is not necessarily the robustness of a security measure, but merely the existence of it, that deter terrorists from initiating an attack against a potential target.

As described, Breivik's reconnaissance efforts were in general of poor quality. This stands in contradiction to the statement in his own compendium, where reconnaissance was one of nine basic criteria for conducting a successful operation (Berwick, 2011: 839). On the other hand, Breivik did have a point when he stated that a detailed knowledge was not necessarily important, as long as he was able to drive the vehicle in front of the building (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01). For terrorists planning on using vehicle-delivered bombs, access is the one major subject of interest and importance.

Another practical constraint for Breivik was his class B driver license. This limited him to vehicles with a maximum load weight of 1200 kg, and he was not prepared to challenge that. First of all he was afraid of being stopped by police in a routine traffic control during transport phases. Secondly, he was afraid that the vehicle would break down if he pushed the load limit. This did not have any impact for the target selection, but it was a constraint with regard to the size of his planned bombs (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012).

The psychological dimension is a central topic, when individuals are committing so horrific actions that Breivik did. The perpetrator was very conscious on this, and he claimed that he had been using meditation techniques to prepare himself mentally for the brutality that was part of his plans (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). This in order to enable him to keep personal fear and empathy at a distance, and making him able conduct the atrocities (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012; 20.04.2012). In court, Breivik openly admitted he consciously dehumanised his enemies (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012)

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

“One have to dehumanise the enemy, if not, if one meet the enemy face to face, you will not be able to attack him. And the same goes for me. I have practiced a dehumanisation strategy against those I regard to be legitimate targets, in order to get in a position where I am able to kill somebody. If I had not done that in a very thorough manner, I would not have been able to do so.”

Anders Behring Breivik, 20.04.2012

This approach also helped him keep the motivation and focus over a long period of time, he claimed. In the compendium, he also spent considerable space on developing an argument to “embrace and familiarise yourself with the concept of killing women, even very attractive women” (Berwick, 2011: 942). It is not clear what direct effect these exercises had, but it is a fact that he on the day of the attacks demonstrated a terrifying ability to kill a large number of individuals, and most on short distance, without any mercy.

3.4.3 Looking for a farm caused a serious delay

During autumn 2010 Breivik started looking for a smallholding or a farm. It had to be within reasonable distance to Oslo and of an appropriate size, because this was relevant for the amount of fertilizer he could get without questions asked (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,07; NTB court transcripts, 16.04.2012). To his surprise, Breivik experienced significant problems finding a suitable place, and he was seriously delayed. As time went by, he widened the geographical search area considerably and he also began to approach several lessors at the same time. On 29 March 2011, a lessor in Sunnmøre (more than 500 km from Oslo) initiated an email dialogue with Breivik after the latter’s Internet advertisement on an agricultural site. Breivik ended the correspondence days later, however, when he was told it was an eco farm - realizing that cow manure is useless for making bombs (Nordal & Halkjelsvik, 2011). His frustration over this came soon to an end though, when he did get hold of another place. On 6 April 2011 he signed a contract for a farm called Vålstua at Åsta (about 150 kilometres north-east of Oslo) from 1 May. Four days after it came into effect, he moved in, eager to get his operation going without any more delays.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The delay caused by the search for a farm had ruined Breivik's overall timing. Both his primary shooting attack target, the SKUP investigative journalist conference, and his reserve shooting attack target, the Labour Party's annual convention some days later, had been held as planned in April, while Breivik was busy with his search and paper work. As such, he experienced the drawback of including time-fixed events into a plan, namely the fact that time may easily become your enemy – or at least a significant constraint.

Settled at the farm in the beginning of May, Breivik was still aiming for three bomb attacks and one shooting rampage, but now he was in need of a new shooting attack target, since both the SKUP-conference and the annual Labour Party convention had passed. It was therefore at this point of time the Workers' Youth League camp at Utøya surfaced as the alternative target number one for the shooting attack. It does not seem to have been a very complicated decision to make, simply because Breivik thought this event was the single most attractive target for a shooting spree at this particular time (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012).

"The primary target was the SKUP-conference. The secondary target was the Labour Party's annual conference. When these turned out to be impossible, I chose the third best alternative target, and that was the Utøya conference - the political summer camp. It was the best political target at the time."

Anders Behring Breivik, 20.04.2012

The camp at Utøya did not surface as a coincidence, though. The terrorist had kept an eye on the event at Utøya, 38km northwest of Oslo, for about a year as an alternative target (NTB court transcripts, 23.04.2012). An indication that this claim has credibility can be related to the fact that a young male person unsuccessfully requested the member list of the Workers Youth League from the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (FAD) in May or June 2010 – a list the ministry did not have anyway (Bjordal, 2012). Breivik has denied that he was the person in question, but the employee from the ministry who met the Breivik face to face, is convinced it was the terrorist.

When Breivik chose to attack the youths at Utøya, he disclosed a substantial degree of pragmatism in his targeting. The victims at Utøya were namely

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

what he had defined as category C traitors in his own compendium, and these were not eligible for death punishment. When pushed on this in court, Breivik said that the guidelines in the manifesto were to be followed as far as possible, but that adjustments could be made if it was not possible to reach the primary target categories (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). Not so surprisingly, Breivik tried to rationalize his targeting by claiming that most of the youths were political leaders, which was an obvious far-fetched attempt to justify his targeting. The teens held different administrative, functional and ordinary membership positions in local youth groups, and could hardly be characterised as political leaders. Breivik was also very keen to avoid the label child-killer, but this became difficult too. He (wrongly) argued that children in a legal perspective are those under age 14, and said he assumed everybody had to be at least age 16 in order to participate at Utøya, but he had never bothered to check it (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,10,01). This just underlines his rather negligent information gathering as he planned the attacks, and this also corresponds with the poor quality of his physical reconnaissance efforts. Another peculiar aspect of the Utøya-attack was that Breivik before the operation thought that only 50 % of militant nationalists would support that specific attack. He still went through with it, arguing that people would understand this in the future as the situation between “Europeans” and Muslims in Europe deteriorates (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). This might indicate an unusual degree of pragmatism on his part – or alternatively an unusual high degree of fanaticism. It is also important to note that Breivik regarded Utøya as a more or less perfect target location (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,09,01):

“Military technically Utøya is genius. There are up to 700 AUF-members on a limited area, and it is a long swim to the landside. A big operation could be executed with very limited resources, if it was set up strategically correct.”

Anders Behring Breivik, 09.08.2011

The terrorist saw the potential of conducting an attack on 700 people on a small island surrounded by cold water and 550 meters to the closest shore. It stood out as a particularly vulnerable target (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,09,01). In court, Breivik was also crystal clear on his intentions with the attack on Utøya, stating that his goal was to kill 600 people. First and

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

foremost this was to be done by shooting and chasing the panicking youngsters out in the cold water and making them drown. Hence he planned to use the water as a weapon of mass destruction (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012). He also hoped to catch and decapitate a top category “Cultural Marxist” visiting and talking to the youths. Breivik wanted to film the whole decapitation sequence and launch it on Internet. Here, the terrorist was clearly inspired by Al-Qaida decapitations movies on this point, and he did not deny it (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,09,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012; 23.04.2012.). Which person this would be was depending on the exact day of the attack. Journalist Marte Michelet was scheduled to visit the summer camp on Wednesday, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre on Thursday, and former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland on Friday. Prime Minister Stoltenberg was due for a visit Saturday, but this would not correspond time wise with the bomb in the Government Quarter. Stoltenberg was therefore in the clear here, and he was only threatened by the bomb in the Government Quarter. He was, however, not in his office at the time of the bombing.

3.4.4 The final plan

Breivik assumed it would take him three or four weeks to produce the three bombs needed for his major plan, but it turned out to take three times as long just to make one (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012; Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,14,01). Breivik said in court that manufacturers efforts to make fertilizers with high nitrogen content less suitable for bomb making, made it more difficult and time-consuming to make the bombs (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,15,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). The fact that he was running out of money also became a constraint, adding to the increasing pressure. His bank accounts were actually empty before he moved in at the farm, more specifically from 26 April. From that time he had to start using his pre-collected credit cards (NTB court transcripts, 16.04.2012). This was very much due to unexpected expenses the perpetrator in hindsight meant he should have foreseen (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

A significant concern for Breivik was that he would not be able to pay his credit card bills, when they started coming in - probably leading to insolvency registration in central registers. This would most likely cause him trouble when he wanted to lease vehicles necessary for the operation – especially the bomb vehicle that he was to lease just before initiating the attacks. He was also aware that the street leading to the H-building was to be permanently closed for security reasons after years of bureaucratic and political delays (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01; NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012). Late in 2010, he had also been worried that a jihadi cell arrested in Oslo and Germany would speed up the street closure (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,26,01).

As Breivik worked on the explosives with slow progress, he must have realised that the timing of his planned attack on the Government Quarter got worse for every week. This due to the fact that the offices are more or less empty in the holiday season, stretching from mid-June to mid-August. The politicians are not much present at all in this period, and only a limited number of bureaucrats keep the machinery in motion. Breivik was also stressed by the planned closure of the Grubbegata street leading to his number one target, as the work was in progress and due to take place in the autumn – although this was unannounced at the time. By the end of June, Breivik realized he had to carry out the attack with just one bomb, and from then on the focus was solely on a bomb action against the H-building in the Government Quarter and the shooting attack at Utøya (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). This plan was finally locked somewhere between 30 June and 10 July (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,08,01). While Breivik had rented his Fiat Doblo early in April, he picked up a VW Crafter cargo van from the company AVIS in Oslo on 15 July. That was the vehicle he was to load with the fertilizer-bomb and the operation was now only one week away.

3.5 The attacks and the consequences

Anders Behring Breivik originally planned to detonate his 950 kg fertilizer-bomb in the Government Quarter at 10am on Friday 22 July 2011 (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01). At that time of the day the

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

bomb would probably cause a high number of casualties, since the bureaucrats in general have to be in office 9am at latest. The terrorist would then easily be able to reach the Labour Party youth camp at Utøya, while the former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland was still present. She was the special guest speaker this particular day, and although she was not the main target for Breivik's shooting attack, he saw such a *celebrity-kill* as a big bonus, in addition to the slaughter of the participating youths (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). She is after all one of the most prominent and high-profiled leaders of the Labour party after WWII, and still a powerful voice when she makes comments on pending political issues. However, the terrorist was to experience unexpected complications in the very final stages of his operation. The result was a delayed start at the day of the attacks. This was to reduce the damage potential in the Government Quarter substantially.

On the evening of Wednesday 20 July, Breivik drove the Volkswagen Crafter loaded with the fertilizer-based bomb from his farm to Oslo. Arriving shortly before midnight, he parked near the train station in the street named Sigurd Iversens vei at Skøyen – not far from his mother's flat. He didn't want to park the cargo van right in front of the apartment building, as his mother then could have raised questions if seeing him with it. Another thing worrying Breivik was that gases from the bomb material could leak out from the parked vehicle, causing smells that could make people suspicious as they passed the vehicle. Breivik had therefore prepared a company logo, indicating that the car was into the business of sewer and drain cleaning. He placed a note with it in the driver's seat - visible from the pavement side. The terrorist thought this would minimize the chances for someone to call in complaints or becoming suspicious (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,06,01). After parking, Breivik walked to his mother's apartment. He slept over and took a train back to Rena about 10am the following morning. He arrived the train station there about 1pm and took a taxi straight to the farm. There he prepared the detonator-part for transport, as he wanted to take this separately from the booster charge to Oslo (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,06,01). At 8:40pm on the same day, Breivik drove the Fiat Doblo to Oslo. He arrived about 11:30pm and parked it right behind the Crafter, before walking to his mother's apartment (NTB court transcripts, 16.04.2012). Fortunately for the

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

investigation, the Fiat that Breivik rented had a GPS device mounted, making it easier to track the perpetrator's movements.

Back at the apartment, Breivik made a decision that would lead to serious delays at the day of the attack, which was the following day. Until this point of time his original plan had been to get up at 3am, in order to prepare the distribution of his You Tube-film and compendium. However, after an intensive period of preparations, and the tiresome shuttling between the farm and Oslo, he felt exhausted. He therefore decided to sleep longer (NTB court transcripts, 19.04.2012). Previous delays had already lead to a reduced number of targets, as well as a change of the shooting attack target itself, but this decision to sleep longer the day of the attacks was to have a significant impact with regard to the damage potential. Breivik did maybe not see all the potential pitfalls of sleeping longer than planned as he went to bed, but he must have seen at least two consequences. For one, it would at least lead to minor delays the following day, and secondly, if more unforeseen trouble came along when the wheels first were in motion, it could regardless of type have the potential of destroying the whole operation. Assessing Breivik's explanation, it seems odd that the terrorist after years of preparations, consciously takes a decision in the very final phase that reduces the potential of his attacks. Hence the explanation from Breivik on this matter should be met with a portion of sound scepticism.

3.5.1 The day of the attacks

Breivik got out of bed between 7 and 8am the morning of 22 July. After breakfast he went to the Volkswagen Crafter. Here he installed the fuse properly into the charge. Then he returned to the apartment and positioned himself in front of the computer, in order to upload his Knight Templar-film on You Tube. Another task was to send his compendium to a high number of e-mail addresses. This called for preparations, as he wanted it to be done as quickly as possible, when he returned after placing the escape car. He soon learned, however, that this was to be more time-consuming than he had expected. By now his time-schedule really fell apart. Subsequently, as Breivik drove the Doblo towards the Government Quarter sometime after 11am in order to park his escape-car, the damage potential was seriously reduced. He

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

now could forget about getting to Utøya in time for killing former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who was giving her talk at the camp the very same time. Furthermore, it was now clear that he would initiate the attack in the Government Quarter too late for full effect. A Friday afternoon in the middle of the holiday season meant that the H-building would be almost empty, maybe except for a few bureaucrats. However, even if the mass-casualty potential now faded with regard to the bomb, Breivik could still fulfil his ambitions of collapsing the building. Additionally, the youths at the island was still there, as it would be a full schedule for the whole weekend.

It was just before noon when Breivik parked the Doblo at Hammersborg square, nearby the Government Quarter. With a credit card he bought the maximum parking time of two hours. Then he walked through the centre of the Government Quarter for a last visual check. He wanted to make sure he would be able to park the vehicle right in front of the entrance, and there were no obstacles in this regard. He then took a taxi from Stortorvet square to the apartment at Skøyen. Here he immediately went to work, uploading the Knights Templar-movie on You Tube. He then sent the compendium to the 8109 e-mail addresses he had collected. He experienced more computer problems, however, and later it was found that only 958 e-mails actually got through (Oslo District Court, 2012). Finally, Breivik consumed a so-called *ECA stack*, described to be a cocktail of ephedrine, caffeine and aspirin, that Breivik believed would improve his performance during the day (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01). Now everything was set for the bomb attack and at around 2:45pm Breivik left the apartment for the Volkswagen Crafter. He brought with him a bag with the clothes he needed for the operation. In the back of the cargo van he changed to his police-like uniform. After that he sat the course for the Government Quarter, and this was just after 3pm (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,06,01).

The drive downtown went without any problems. Breivik arrived at the beginning of the Grubbegata street, leading directly up to the H-building in the middle of the Government Quarter, about quarter past 3pm. He made a short halt for final preparations outside Grubbegata number 6, before moving on to the H-building. As he came up to the bomb target at 3:17pm, he noticed a parked vehicle on the side of the small plaza in front of the building. This car belonged to the local guard unit, and was routinely parked there. Breivik

could still quite easily drive the Crafter up to the main entrance. Bollards did not allow full contact between the vehicle and the walls and entrance, but he could still park very close to the entrance. After Breivik parked the vehicle, he quickly lit the fuse. It gave him a delay of 6 minutes and 30 seconds before detonation. He then got out of the vehicle and consciously locked the car, so that no one could get inside it and potentially disrupt the attack. The perpetrator then left the scene, walking firmly towards the escape car parked at Hammersborg Torg square. He had his Glock pistol in his right hand, in case he was challenged by security guards or others. This did not happen and reached his car without any problems.

3.5.2 Just another annoying driver

It was a limited number of security guards on duty in the Government Quarter this Friday afternoon. This was not unusual since it was in the middle of the holiday season. Most of the security guards on duty were in fixed positions, and only the commanding officer (CO) and one security guard were available for upcoming tasks. However, at the time Breivik parked the vehicle, the CO was in one of the garage entrances putting up some information, and the security officer had been assigned to follow some workers on 9th floor in one of the other government buildings (Hemmingby and Bjørge, 2016: 63). In the operations room, the hub of the guard service located under ground level in the targeted H-building, there were two executive security officers. They were routinely managing the shift, monitoring the CCTV system, following up alarm system, and answering telephone calls coming in.

At 3:20pm, one of the two female receptionists in the H-building called down to the operations room, as she found the parking of the white cargo van outside the entrance suspicious (NOU 2012: 14, 17). Couriers and other drivers regularly ignored the *Entry prohibited*-sign outside the building, so such cases were at the time normally not regarded as security threats. That said, it is also obvious that Breivik had parked unusually close to the main entrance, so the reaction from the observant receptionist was indeed in place.

Receiving the call from the receptionist, the security officers in the operations room also assumed that it was a courier delivery of some sort, but both routinely started to use the CCTV system to locate the driver, in order to get

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

the vehicle moved straight away. The CCTV system in the Government Quarter was extensive and operational, in contrast to the criticism raised by the 22 July commission and others (NOU 2012: 419-421; Faldalen, 2014). The security officers were not able to identify or locate the driver in the live-mode search, so they started to backtrack selected camera recordings, in order to find the vehicle's arrival. They soon found the sequence on a camera positioned across the street. Due to the distance, and the angle of the camera at the time Breivik arrived, they could not get a very detailed view. They assessed that it probably was a security guard of some sort. They did not notice the helmet or the pistol he was holding, and the perpetrator's dark helmet actually made them believe it was a person with dark skin (Hemmingby and Bjørge, 2016: 63). The security officers continued to focus on the license plate number of the vehicle, in order to track a telephone number and call the driver directly. All along the vehicle and its driver was 'the usual suspect', meaning just another annoying driver.

Just when one of the executive security officers was in process of typing in the vehicle number for a quick-search, the bomb in the vehicle detonated (Hemmingby and Bjørge, 2016: 64). The time was 3:25pm and the massive blast wiped away everyone and everything on the first floor and the outside of the building. Fragments of glass, wood and concrete flew like lethal ricochets through the air striking indiscriminately at people in the area. Documents from the offices of the top politicians and bureaucrats flew over a large part of downtown Oslo. Simultaneously, chaos evolved down in the guards' operations room. The earthquake-like trembling and shaking was significant at the time of detonation. The monitors turned black as dust and smoke covered the cameras outside, emergency electricity power started up, water came in from above, fire alarm bells were chiming, and alarms poured in on the computer screen. One of the security officers grabbed the hotline to the police, telling the operator in the other end that there a there had been a huge bomb explosion. At that point, the police had already received other calls about the explosion, but the security officer could give more accurate information – also making it clear that this was a deliberate hostile act. After a couple of minutes, the first ambulance and police car arrived, and for the following hour medics, police officers, fire fighters, security officers and others constantly kept coming in for the extensive rescue operation.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

When the bomb detonated, the terrorist had reached his escape-car at Hammersborg Square and started on his trip towards the youth summer camp at Utøya. He turned on the radio in order to get the result of the bombing, as he was particularly interested in whether the H-building had collapsed or not. He got disappointed when he learnt that this was not the case. He was at this time also anxious whether police controls would make leaving the city centre difficult. However, he had a comfortable head start, as the police capacities in Oslo first had to engage themselves in the Government Quarter for the initial phase.

3.5.3 Police response in the initial phase

Oslo Police District's central of operations is the hub for management and coordination of all operational police patrols and officers on the streets. Receiving calls from several individuals, as well as the security guards in the Government Quarter, the operators here quickly understood that the explosion was an act of deliberate violence. Initially, however, 'the big button' was not pushed. The result was that a number of potentially important steps were not initiated as early as they should have been. The investigation of the 22 July commission showed that the one police helicopter the district had was not mobilised, neighbour police districts possessed capacities that were not used, the threat level in the surrounding districts was not raised, observation and control posts were not established early enough, the traffic control central (with good CCTV systems for the road net) were not notified, the national crisis alert was not sent out, and the emergency plans for terrorism incidents was not used. In total, efforts with regard to apprehending the perpetrator and prepare for secondary attacks were at large lacking, even though there were some focus with regard to protecting other highly symbolic potential targets in Oslo. Important to add though, the handling of the initial phase should be seen in the context of the time. The 22 July commission's report also stated that it was a substantially undermanned central of operations, there were generally not satisfying tools for communication, and the police data systems were also out of date (NOU 2012: 90-91).

It turned out later that the police had received a detailed, accurate and correct witness description of Breivik already at 3:35pm. A man called the police

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

switchboard and explained that he had observed a suspicious individual at the Hammersborg torg square. The way Breivik was dressed, as well as his behaviour, triggered the interest of the witness, who noted the car registration number. He called in this information, and he also described the direction Breivik had taken, which initially was against a one-way driven street (NOU 2012: 14, 86). The police officer in the receiving end did, in contrast to other allegations, recognise the importance of the message and wrote a note. She then went into the operations central and put the note on the desk of the officer in charge. The latter was busy, but they did apparently have eye contact, and the switchboard operator told the leader that the note was important (NOU 2012: 14, 100). At 3:56pm another operator became aware of the note on the desk and called back to the witness, getting things back on track. About 4:15pm the neighbouring police districts were alerted about the Breivik's description and his escape car (NOU 2012: 14, 102). In the police district Breivik was driving through, Asker and Bærum police district, the operations leader had three patrols out at the time, and two of them were on assignments. One had been tasked to do a prisoner transport, while the other was dealing with a psychiatry case. Both units were told to abort from those assignments and wait for further orders. It was later revealed, however, that they did not follow these orders – or at least not right away. The unit carrying out prisoner transport continued executing this, and the other patrol used a considerable amount of time to free itself from the psychiatry assignment. As described, the capability of the police district was very much reduced, and Breivik cruised unhindered through it (NOU, 2012: 103-104).

3.5.4 The shooting attack at Utøya

Breivik arrived on the landside of Utøya at 4:26pm, almost exactly one hour after the bomb blast in Oslo (NTB court transcripts, 16.04.2012). His bonus-target Gro Harlem Brundtland had left the island about 3pm, but this didn't change much, from the terrorist's point of view. The main target at Utøya had always been the masses of participating youths and not a single, visiting celebrity.

"My objective was not to kill 21 persons. My objective was to kill 600 persons."

Anders Behring Breivik, 20.04.2012

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The Labour party youths were on 22 July already looking forward to the next day, when Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg would come to give a talk to the next generation of Labour party politicians. As Breivik wanted to time his arrival with the ferry times he had found on the web site of the youth camp, he parked and waited on a private property for about half an hour. He used the waiting time to modify his clothing. He removed much of the protection gear and put on a combat vest with a lot of pockets for weapon magazines. In other words, he traded protection for better mobility, as he did not expect heavy resistance at the island. He also wore a fake police badge around his neck, hoping that this would establish trust between him and the people at the ferry place.

Both in police investigative interviews and in court, Breivik gave a detailed insight in how he got over to the island (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012). He drove his Fiat Doblo down to the ferry site just before 5pm. Here a small Labour party youth group assisted the camp administration with coordination of the ferry. When Breivik parked his vehicle, a person from the Labour Party group approached him. The terrorist now started acting as a policeman from the Norwegian Police Security Service. He said that he had arrived from Oslo in order to secure the camp, due to the bomb attack in Oslo. He explained that he had to be taken across to the island, and hence the ferry was called up for the task. While waiting, Breivik prepared the equipment he needed in the car and after 5-10 minutes the ferry arrived. Then the female camp administrator in charge of the whole event approached Breivik. He presented her with the same cover story, and when she questioned why they had not been contacted before he showed up, Breivik blamed the chaotic situation in Oslo. The camp administrator accepted his explanation. The terrorist suggested that they took him over to the island, and then gathered the personnel engaged with the camp security, so he could brief them more properly. As the camp administrator went back to inform the ferry crew, Breivik pulled the rifle and the equipment case out of the car, and took it to the ferry. He decided to leave the shotgun behind, as this weapon had no significant role in his planned shooting attack. Before boarding the ferry, Breivik was told by the administrator to cover up the rifle in order not to frighten the youths. He did as told and they all stepped

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

on board. Breivik had now accomplished what he beforehand had assessed to be the most difficult part with regard to the attack at the island, namely getting over there without being compromised. During the trip over, Breivik and the camp administrator continued to talk. Breivik now got important information about the security arrangements at the camp. He learned that an off-duty police officer named Berntsen was in charge of the security at the camp. He was unarmed, like the others assisting with security, and the participating youths had all been checked for knives and weapons as they came to the camp the first day (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,09,01). The terrorist nevertheless regarded the policeman as the biggest threat against the operation.

When arriving at the island, Breivik arranged for the equipment case to be carried up behind the main house, and quite immediately he met the off-duty policeman Berntsen. Breivik delivered the same story he had told the others. He was yet again convincing enough and at this stage the fake police uniform did not raise any eyebrows either. This despite the fact that the upper part of his uniform did not bear too much resemblance to a normal police uniform, except for the false police patches. It was more like the top of diver's wet suit. The real policeman started asking Breivik more detailed questions, however. He wondered exactly where Breivik worked and whether he knew some specific police officers. Breivik, lacking knowledge about the normal police, the police security service and police terminology, began to feel uncomfortable with the situation. He noticed that the policeman was getting a bit suspicious, but he bought himself some time when he suggested that they should go up to the main house for a more thorough brief on the situation there. The small group of people set in motion towards the building and Breivik was now walking right behind the camp administrator and the policeman, with a few other persons behind him. At this point Breivik thought *it is now or never* (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012). He then raised his Glock pistol and fired a single headshot at the policeman, before he did the same with the camp administrator. Those behind panicked, and here Breivik let the ferry crew escape because they were not necessarily members of the Labour party (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012). Everybody else was a target and without hesitation he shot down another security volunteer trying to escape (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,09,01).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The attack was initiated at 5:21pm and for the next 73 minutes Anders Behring Breivik systematically and ruthlessly hunted and massacred youths all over the island, where 564 people were present at the time (NOU 2012: 14, 25). His general idea was to shoot as many youths as he possibly could, so that the rest were driven into the water, trying to swim the landside about 600 meters away. The cold water, combined with distressed and panicking youths, would then serve as a weapon of mass destruction. He reckoned they would all drown. Breivik's assumptions proved wrong as numerous locals and tourists with small boats came the youths in the water to their rescue. Additionally, a number of those escaping made it to the landside themselves. In fact only one person drowned, while another individual died after falling down from a cliff. The rest died of gunshot wounds.

After initiating the shooting attack, the terrorist followed the main stream of panicking youths in the direction of the cafeteria building, just halting at the main building in order to get his rifle out. From then on he shot on everyone he spotted, both outside and inside some of the buildings on the island. Many of the victims were killed on a very short distance, and the calculating killer also managed to trick some youths out of their hiding places, claiming to be a real police officer coming to their rescue from the shooter that was on the island. Those who were deceived by his calls and left their hideouts, or just bravely approached him in order to get him to stop, were shot dead without any hesitation (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,10,01).

The perpetrator was very conscious with regard to his tactical behaviour at the island. As previously mentioned he had prioritized mobility over personal armour at the island, in contradiction to the attack in the Government quarter, but it was also reflected the way he moved around. He walked in a controlled manner and took his time, because he did not want to oversee potential targets - or rush into difficult situations. Regarding visibility, he moved so he could not be observed from the landside. This was mostly due to his fear of police snipers (NTB court transcripts, 20.04.2012). For the same reason he put the case with ammunition and equipment he had brought with him behind the main house. That allowed him to go there and reload his magazines without being visible from the landside. Breivik was also very careful entering buildings, as he was afraid he could be jumped by some of the youths in hiding. Some narrow rooms were in fact left unchecked.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The terrorist had prepared some smoke grenades or improvised smoke devices which he planned to use, for example in order to use to smoke people out of the buildings (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,10,01). He had also brought with him diesel, which he planned to use to set fire to the houses. He did not, however, find his lighter, which had been left in the bomb vehicle in the Government Quarter, He also had a back-up lighter, but did not find that one either, and hence he gave up that part of the plan. First and foremost because of the time pressure. The terrorist had to move on and keep the momentum (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,08,01; 08,10,01).

Anders Behring Breivik was originally also planning to use an IPOD to play relaxing and inspiring music during the attack, but once the attack was initiated he dropped the idea. He felt he had less control with earplugs and music, and that he would be particularly vulnerable for attacks from behind.

It is worth noting that although Breivik was seemingly well prepared for the brutal attack, he seemed surprisingly unprepared for some. He was clearly not prepared for the quick decision situations he encountered on his way. This was partially due to the limited information gathering in advance of the operation, and especially so with regard to the age of the participants. Breivik himself expected to confront people with an average age of 22-23 years, and not children and adolescents for whom he now literally was the judge of life and death within the split of a second (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01; NTB court transcripts 23.04.2012). At large, it seems clear that when in doubt, Breivik shot and killed, but there were a few exceptions. He came across a nine-year old boy, he spared. He also let “a conservative looking” young man go because seemed out of place and looked a bit like Breivik. Furthermore, he also avoided shooting at the ferry crew that brought him over to the island, although he later fired at a boat rescuing people that could be the ferry (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,10,01). He did not fire at a helicopter circling in the air during the massacre. In the latter case Breivik thought the helicopter belonged to the police, and he had no wish of killing police, since they were potential allies in a futuristic perspective. Had he known that the helicopter in fact was operating for the news media, which he hated so much, the decision would most likely have been different. In court, Breivik admitted it was difficult to make these shoot or not shoot-decisions, but the actions nevertheless spoke

for themselves. He rarely abstained from killing (NTB court transcripts, 23.04.2012). Doubt never benefitted the victims. Another more macabre detail is that Breivik was quite surprised of the sound that came, when he shot victims in the head from very short distance (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,10,01). So although Breivik was very conscious with regard his psychological preparations for killing people, not everything can be prepared for in practice.

3.5.5 The police response

The first emergency call linked to the attack at Utøya came to the medical emergency line in Buskerud county at 5:24pm, about 2-3 minutes after the killer initiated the shooting (NOU 2012: 14, 27). Due to the content, the call was immediately redirected to the Nordre Buskerud Police District's operations room. The man making the call was the skipper on the ferry MS Thorbjørn that had brought Breivik to the island. He told the police officer in the receiving end that "a man is walking around shooting. He is dressed like a policeman..." (NOU 2012: 14, 113). Just a minute after, both Oslo Police District and Søndre Buskerud Police District started to receive similar emergency calls from panicking youths trapped at the island – however not always accurate with regard to information. While the local police initiated the first steps to get police patrols to the location, things happened fast in Oslo. The Norwegian Police National Emergency Response Unit (*Beredskapstroppen* in Norwegian), usually called *Delta*, dispatched a patrol in the direction of Utøya just after 5:30pm, as soon as they learned of the attack. This was the very first police patrol heading for the island, but very shortly after Delta-operators engaged at the bombsite in the Government Quarter were also dispatched to Utøya (NOU 2012: 14, 116). The Delta teams set the course at full speed in their vehicles, even passing responding ambulances going in the same direction, while the possibility for helicopter transport for other operators was being checked out (NOU 2012: 14, 116).

At the local police quarter the first patrol with two police officers set the course at 5:38pm, arriving at the ferry site on the landside of Utøya just 14 minutes later (NOU 2012: 14, 113). In accordance with messages from the police districts's command central they stayed on the landside, observing and

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

trying to get an overview of the situation, and also starting to make boat arrangements for the Delta force soon to arrive. The communication between the different police quarters, as well as the local police and Delta units was difficult. Difference in type of communication equipment between units and bad signal conditions due to the terrain between Oslo and Utøya made it challenging to share information and establish clear arrangements for further action.

The first Delta unit arrived the area of Utvika just after 6pm, soon followed by other Delta patrols, but were then redirected to the bridge at Storøya, because there was a boat there for the transport to the island (NOU 2012: 14, 117). The Delta operators, eager to confront the perpetrator(s) at the island with maximum force, miscalculated the boat's loading capability, and took aboard too many heavily equipped operators. On their over way over to island the motor gave in, forcing the operators over to two privately owned boats passing by, before they could continue to Utøya. Although this unfortunate boat incident tarnished the otherwise very efficient Delta operation, in reality little time was lost, since these two boats could travel at a much higher speed.

While the police were arriving and making an effort to get over to the island in order to confront the terrorist, Breivik tried to call the police ten times, and he got through on two occasions (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,10,01). He claimed that he considered the operation to be over, and that he wanted to turn himself in (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,03,01). Police received the first call at 5:59 pm, when Breivik used a mobile phone he picked up in the so-called Café-building. He dialled the police emergency number 112 and was automatically routed to the operations room of the Nordre Buskerud Police District. Breivik presented himself as "commander Anders Behring Breivik in the Norwegian anti-communist resistance movement" (NOU 2012: 14, 27). He said he was at Utøya and claimed he wanted to surrender, but at this point the conversation was cut off. The sincerity of his claim is highly questionable, taking into account that Breivik continued with his massacre by killing more youths after the call ended.

The last call Breivik made to the police was made 6:24 pm (about one hour after he started his massacre), and this call was automatically directed to the

operations room at Søndre Buskerud Police District. Again he introduced himself with his full name, claiming to be the commander in the Norwegian resistance movement against Islamization of Europe and Norway. He added that he had been conducting an operation on behalf of the Knights Templar, and that it was now acceptable to surrender to Delta (NOU 2012: 14, 27). This call was also cut off, probably due to the technical overload of the communication lines in the area at the time. As Breivik used locked cell phones from random victims, the police did not see any number in the receiving end. Accordingly, they were unable to call him up again.

3.5.6 The final act of the brutal massacre

According to the Delta team leader that was to arrest the terrorist, who has provided the details of this part of the thesis, they arrived to Utøya with a situational understanding marked by substantial uncertainty. Based on incoming information, they expected to meet four to six perpetrators, who could be wearing police uniforms and presumably they were armed with automatic weapons. There were also suggestions that one of the terrorists could be in the main building, with a good view over the ferry site and the open area leading up to the house. Furthermore, there was a warning about possible booby traps in the trees, and there had been reports about smoke coming from one of the buildings. As previously described, Breivik did plan to set fire to buildings on the island, but he did not have his lighter with him. What he had, however, were at least three smoke devices. The smoke reported to the police came from one of these, when he tried to throw it into the main building. The window was shattered, but the smoke device fell down on the outside of the building, so Breivik did not succeed in smoking people out.

The CT-operators' plan was to go straight in and confront the threat as soon as possible. The fact that defenceless civilians were targeted, as well as the critical timeframe, meant that the Delta operators accepted a higher risk to themselves.

The first boat with police, consisting of four Delta operators, arrived the island at 6:27pm. When this team arrived there was no shooting, and the team was guided north by someone present in the area. The second team with four Delta operators and two local police officers (both of these were former Delta

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

operators) arrived a minute later. Upon arrival they could hear a lot of shooting, and they observed people in panic towards the south tip. The shooting was rapid and intense.

The operators got out of the boat before dry ground was reached and came over three youngsters on the pier. They were told to move to the other side for better cover, and while one operator stayed behind securing these, the rest of the team pushed on. At the pier area the operators felt exposed and vulnerable, and an enemy would also have the advantage of a higher position. Accordingly, the team moved fast up against a gravel road they had seen on a Google map while under transport. Moving along the water would have delayed them significantly, due to the difficult terrain there. As the operators moved up, they were continuously shouting out “armed police”, in order to attract the attention of any perpetrator towards themselves, and away from the helpless youths. As they advanced they used whatever natural cover they could, while maintaining a 360-degree field of observation.

Reaching the small road, the police had neither seen, nor been confronted by, any perpetrators and the group continued rapidly towards a building located south in the end of the road, called *the school building*. The shooting to the south was now less intense and more staccato, and then it became quiet. As they moved against the opening by the school building, they suddenly heard one single shot very close by. The view was still disturbed by trees and leaves, and the operators sat down and listened, before proceeding to the building. They took up position at one corner of the building, and observed towards the end of the forest on the opposite side.

Suddenly they saw someone moving on the other side, but they could just see from the person’s waist and down. It could be a uniform trouser, but also a training trouser, and no weapons were seen. As the individual began to cross in front, the visual conditions remained the same: just the lower part of body, and still no weapons to be seen. However, now the operators engaged him verbally, as they moved against him. The suspect’s instant reaction was to run out of sight for a few seconds, in order to get rid of his rifle, before he reappeared. The aimpoint-device on Breivik’s rifle fell off, and this is an indicator that he hastily just threw his Ruger rifle away. Now he faced the police with the arms out to the sides, even with his palms outwards, in what

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

looked like a textbook surrender. He did not, however, follow the verbal orders from the police officers, and he continued to walk towards them, while chattering something the operators couldn't quite catch the meaning of.

The distance was now only 15-20 meters. The team leader had a good position behind a tree, his colleague two meters to the right in front had his shield for protection, and the others were spread out on the flanks. They felt quite robust, and the team leader noticed that the slide of Breivik's pistol was in the rear position - the terrorist was out of ammo. However, the CT-operators suddenly noticed a wire going up his left arm and disappearing into the clothing one of his arms. He also had bulky pockets on his kit vest. Accordingly the situation escalated, because the police officers feared the terrorist was talking himself to a closer distance, in order to blow them all up. Due to heavy rain and dark sky it was difficult to get a clear view of the details of the kit vest. The verbal instructions continued, and the team leader had in his mind set a fixed point on the ground. If it were crossed by Breivik, he would fire. The trigger was partially squeezed in, and the operator knew that just a few more grams of pressure would release a shot into the head of the terrorist. Just a nanosecond before the final squeeze, both the team leader and one of the officers on the side understood that it was not a suicide rig, and they almost simultaneously called out that it was not a bomb. It was Breivik's iPod Nano and the bulky magazine pouches that made it look like a suicide bomb vest. Breivik then suddenly stopped and one officer came in from the side, taking the terrorist to the ground. He was quickly secured, while the music was still streaming out of his earplugs. Just seven minutes after the arrival of the CT-units to Utøya, but a nightmare-long period of 73 minutes after the start of the massacre, it was finally over.

Face down on the ground, with the team leader sitting on top of him, Breivik continued to chatter. Meanwhile, the three other Delta operators and the two police officers quickly reorganised. After all, it was still unclear whether he was alone or a part of a group. What they did know, however, was that there were a lot of dead and wounded people around. While the team leader started to retrieve information from the terrorist, the others initiated a quick search in the close surroundings. They quickly reported back to the team leader, requesting permission to start first aid on the several victims lying on the east

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

shore, which was granted. They were also told that if there was anymore shooting, the priority would still be to neutralise the threat.

More Delta operators arrived on the island, and a systematic wider search and rescue phase was now initiated. In the meantime, the Delta team leader that secured Breivik was trying to retrieve information from the terrorist, but this proved difficult. After a quick body search, the team leader found a bank ID-card (with picture) on Breivik, and a photo of this was immediately forwarded to the unit staff. Breivik also had 1 ½ inch spikes mounted in the heels at the back of his boots. These were quickly removed as they could cause harm if Breivik became less cooperative again.

The terrorist, who early on claimed there was another cell, was from the start very self-centred, mostly talking about how difficult it had been, and how everyone would understand his actions later. He also wanted to be interrogated by someone specific (probably the police security service). The man that just had slaughtered a high number of totally defenceless victims was also complaining about a small cut on one of his fingers. There were no signs of empathy for the victims at all, even though there were two dead individuals lying nearby to the terrorist and the Delta operator. The team leader wanted to take Breivik's picture with his cell phone, in order to send an updated picture of the terrorist with his uniform-like clothing to the unit staff. This made sense in case there were other terrorists involved, but a stubborn Breivik refused. He was soon tricked, however, and a photo was secured and sent, to the terrorist's fury. From that moment, the terrorist had a face for more people than the targeted victims and the police officers on the island.

After an hour or so the situational picture had changed. If there were more terrorists on the island, the Delta operators assumed they were now hiding or mixing with the victims. This has been seen on many occasions before, like in the Iran embassy siege in London in 1980, where the CT-unit of the Special Air Service (SAS) famously and successfully intervened (Davies, 1996: 78). What the police did find on Utøya, however, was not more terrorists, but a devastating number of dead victims, as well as a high number of wounded camp participants and unharmed, but terrified survivors. The police officers saved several lives that day with their excellent first aid skills, because paramedics could not be transferred to the island before the area was declared

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

safe and secure. After some time, the perpetrator was put on his feet and moved to the main building on the island. The main focus was from now on just two things. One was evacuation and medical assistance for the victims. Secondly, it was important to initiate a preliminary questioning of the terrorist. This in order to find out whether there were more perpetrators planning attacks in other places, and if Breivik had rigged any booby-traps on the island, in his escape car, or elsewhere

The terrorist killed 69 of the 564 people that were present on the island when the attack was initiated. As many as 33 of the victims at Utøya were under age 18. Furthermore, 33 persons suffered injuries due to the shooting, while many more suffered injuries during their attempts to escape. To complete this picture, there are still a high number of persons with psychological traumas after the incident (NOU 2012: 14, 171). In addition to the attack on Utøya, Breivik was also responsible for the deaths of eight people in Government Quarter (Oslo District Court, 2012; NTB, 2012). In the Government Quarter 10 people were wounded severely, while 190 persons suffered lighter injuries (NOU 2012: 14, 171). Moreover, the material damages in Oslo were enormous and the financial costs are in practice impossible to determine. The new Government Quarter will be raised at the same location as before. The ministries will be relocated back in accordance with the different phases of the on-going building project, and it is currently estimated that the first ministries will be in place in 2023 or 2024, more than 12 years after the incident.

3.6 The trial and sentencing

It is not part of this thesis to elaborate on the trial process and sentencing of Anders Behring Breivik, but a short resume is in place, because this will provide some relevant aspects regarding the profile of the perpetrator. More concretely it will support certain elements and impressions with relevance for understanding his pre-attack behaviour, choice of strategy and plans, as well as his pragmatic nature in certain situations.

The trial against Anders Behring Breivik commenced at Oslo Court House on 16 April 2012. For the self-confident terrorist, the trial process was to become just as unpredictable and dynamic as the operation itself, and certainly far more complex than his own expectations. Breivik was well aware that the trial

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

would provide him with a stage he could exploit for propaganda purposes. As such, the starting point for Breivik's trial was not quite typical. In trials related to terrorism offenses defendants normally focus on denial, or at least they try to minimize their role in order to get the mildest sentence possible (de Graaf & Schmid, 2015). Breivik was, however, perfectly aware that the question of guilt was established before the trial even started, and he wanted to use the opportunity to propagate his customised ideology to the world - and the potential was definitely there. The extensiveness of his horrific actions had definitely ensured a massive global media coverage. As such, Breivik saw the legal process after the attacks as the beginning of a new part of the struggle, namely the propaganda phase.

It was not only the two terrorist attacks, the You Tube video and the compendium that was to communicate Breivik's message to the world. The trial would give him a chance to present his ideology and mobilise support, and he was determined to use it. In police investigative interviews conducted soon after the attacks, he put forward some demands, which had to be met if the police wanted him to cooperate. Some of these demands were related to the forthcoming court proceedings. For example he wanted to wear his self-made military-style parade uniform in court (Kippernes & Reime, 2011). Another demand was that the press had to be allowed to follow the trial, which was not controversial since that is normally allowed in Norway (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,02). The terrorist's attempt to take control was not successful, however, and the trial was run as any other trial, just in a bigger scale. Furthermore, a firm judge and the psychiatry evaluations were to effectively mitigate the terrorist's strategy in court.

3.6.1 Hit hard by the first psychiatric evaluation

During the trial Breivik did nothing to moderate his extremist views, or excuse his actions. He seemed determined to appear fully dedicated and loyal to his cause. For him it was crucial to keep the game going, in order to boost support from individuals sharing his views. In the first remand hearing, on 25 July 2011, Breivik once again demanded to be allowed to wear his self-made uniform, but this was refused by the judge (Kippernes & Reime, 2011).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Breivik's principle attorney Geir Lippestad had from the start made an agreement with the terrorist. The defence team should take care of the legal issues, while Breivik could do whatever he wanted with everything else (Meldalen & Christiansen, 2012; Lippestad, 2013: 42). Hence, the defence team planned to argue in court that Breivik was mentally ill and not responsible for his actions, seeking compulsory mental health care as verdict. Initially, Breivik had no objections to this, but this was to change.

Soon after Breivik's arrest, the court decided that a psychiatric evaluation of the perpetrator was to be carried out. On 28 July 2011, the forensic psychiatrists Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim were given the task. The question of the mental condition of the perpetrator was of great public interest and widely covered in the media. The psychiatrists delivered their report on 29 November 2011, and the conclusion was that Breivik suffered from *paranoid schizophrenia*, and that he was *psychotic* during the attacks. This assessment was to have profound impact on the strategies of Breivik and his defence, but also for the General Attorney and the prosecutors, since the report would constitute the basis for the indictment.

For Breivik the conclusion of the report came as a shock. He knew the defence team was aiming for a compulsory mental health care verdict, but he characterised the first report as *the ultimate humiliation* (Dagsavisen, 2012). It was especially the conclusion that he was a paranoid schizophrenic that upset him, as he described in a letter he wrote afterwards (Andersen, 2012);

"Sending a political activist to a mental hospital is more sadistic and cruel than killing him! It is a fate worse than death."

Anders Behring Breivik, March 2012

Breivik's main problem with this conclusion should be seen in the light of his plans ahead. If he was to inspire future generations of violent right-wing extremists he could not be deemed as a lunatic, and then put away in a mental hospital. For him, it was essential to be regarded as rational leader, if his life project was to be continued after the sentencing. It is important to add that it was not just the first psychiatric report that made a considerable impact on Breivik at this stage. Two other important factors must be added. Firstly, Breivik was granted access to media sources just two weeks after the

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

psychiatric evaluation report, effective from 13 December 2011. Attorney Lippestad and the defence team had systematically collected newspapers and media reports for their client since the attacks. Accordingly, the perpetrator could now for the first time see how he had been described in the media after 22 July (Andersen, 2012). Going through a huge amount of articles characterizing him as a monster or a lunatic, while numerous others ridiculed him for his narcissistic personality, pompous behaviour and his ghost Knight Templar project, made a deep impression on the terrorist. Secondly, he received letters from extremist sympathisers around the world. It is likely that some of these forwarded the point that an insanity verdict would destroy his possibilities to be taken seriously by anyone – even potential supporters.

As described, over a few weeks' time the first psychiatric report conclusion, the media access and letters from sympathisers affected Breivik profoundly. Therefore, the pragmatism Breivik had shown during the terrorist operation surfaced yet again. According to attorney Lippestad, the insanity issue now became a question about politics for Breivik – putting his own personal issues in the backseat (Lippestad, 2013: 103). The terrorist therefore decided to change the defence strategy totally. Lippestad received his client's message on 23 December 2011 and the Christmas holiday was seriously disturbed (Lundervold, 2012). Even though the strategy for a delusion plea was abandoned, the defence team did not advertise this. Hence it took a while before the public and others noticed that a shift of strategy had taken place.

3.6.2 The second psychiatric evaluation

The first forensic psychiatric report was controversial, and took heavy fire from two different groups of experts. Leading psychiatrists and psychologists claimed that the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and psychosis were wrong and not documented. Experts on right-wing extremism claimed that the psychiatrists had no knowledge about the ideological context of Breivik's statements, and misinterpreted them as expressions of paranoid misconceptions (Torgersen & Svarstad, 2012). In an op-ed article, professor Tore Bjørgo stated that the psychiatrists' scope was too limited. It would be like two Norwegian psychiatrists leaving for the jungles of New Guinea to assess the saneness of the locals without any cultural knowledge (Bjørgo,

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

2012). In fact, both the terminology used and the worldview Breivik expressed were of a typical right-extremist nature. Lacking knowledge about this ideological context, the forensic psychiatrists misinterpreted many of Breivik statements, such as assessing his claims that he was engaging in a civil war as *expressions of paranoid misconceptions*. Likewise, his suspicion that he was under security services' surveillance, and the measures he took to avoid detection in general, was interpreted the same way. The fact is that this kind of thinking comes naturally for terrorists planning to do something.

The fierce public debate and professional disagreement that followed the first psychiatric report, created an uncertainty the court was uncomfortable with. The judges had also registered that the staff that dealt with Breivik at Ila Prison, which included one of Norway's leading experts on forensic psychiatry, had not observed any signs of psychosis. Hence the judges wanted a second opinion, and in mid-January 2012 psychiatrists Agnar Aspaas and Terje Tørrisen were tasked by the court to do a second evaluation of Breivik (Andersen, 2013). The defence and the prosecution did not appreciate this. The General Attorney had already stated that the psychiatric report was 'very thorough' and had apparently committed themselves strongly to its conclusions. Breivik's legal team appealed the decision for a second psychiatric evaluation all the way to the High Court, but without success. The High Court decision came 15 February, and just two days later Lippestad made it public that they had left the insanity plea strategy, and instead went for a criminally responsible plea (Meldalen & Christiansen, 2012). Having nothing to lose, The terrorist now cooperated with the second evaluation team, and the police team interviewing Breivik also noted a clear shift from early March 2012 onwards, for example in the way that he spoke about Knights Templar and the compendium (Hamar Arbeiderblad, 2012). He adjusted the time when he started planning the attacks, the rhetoric and terminology he used, and played down the importance of the Knights Templar network (Foss, 2012). The terrorist had adapted to the situation, become more pragmatic, and now his new strategy was in play.

In their report delivered 10 April, just days before the start of the trial, psychiatrists Aspaas and Tørrisen concluded that Breivik was sane at the time of the attacks, stating that he was not suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and that he was not psychotic during the attacks. They found him to have a

dissocial personality disorder and a *narcissistic personality disorder*. In other words, Breivik was fit for a prison sentence and this conclusion was far better received in the media and among most experts.

The debate concerning whether Breivik was sane and fit for sentencing or not is very interesting, as such assessments represent a challenge in many lone actor cases. Looking to the so-called “dark triad” within personality assessment, there are three characteristics typically associated with problematic behaviour. These are narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Martin, forthcoming 2019). Based on the second evaluation report, it seems valid to argue that Breivik ticked the box in two out of three of these characteristics. He did go clear of psychopathy, however, which is the one characteristic here that would send him to a medical institution instead of a prison.

Naturally, Breivik was satisfied with the conclusion of the second evaluation team, but he nevertheless felt compelled to attune his previous ‘pompous’ posture to these new findings, as became clear during the first day of trial.

3.6.3 Breivik’s performance in court

The trial began on 16 April 2012 and the defendant started his first day in court by making his fascist style salute with a clinched fist, which many people in the audience found offending (Ruud et al., 2012). He also allowed himself to talk for one hour in his opening statement, which was twice the time originally given to him. The talk was, however, not as offensive as what he had presented earlier for the police and in the remand hearings after his arrest. For example, he mentioned the Knights Templar network only once in the opening statement, clearly trying to play down its importance (NTB court transcripts, 17.04.2012). Later during the trial he continued to downplay the elite impression of the network, although continuing to claim that it existed.

Breivik admitted that what he said in court was influenced by the fact that there were four psychiatrists present in the courtroom. He wanted to avoid being sent to a madhouse (NTB court transcripts, 349; Foss & Johansen, 2012). He also argued that the prosecution wanted to make him look ridiculous, and he got irritated when titles and uniforms of the KT-network

were brought up again and again, as it now was part of his strategy to mitigate this dimension (NTB court transcripts, 349). He also admitted that he initially did want to use the uniform in court, but that he realised it would be unwise due to the psychiatric assessment (NTB court transcripts, 351). Clearly, the terrorist had adjusted his behaviour to his objective for the trial. It is worth noting that according to judge Wenche E. Arntzen, Breivik's ability to keep focus during the trial actually did prove beneficial to him. Seeing his performance and hearing him argue gave the court valuable information as to whether he was psychotic or not (Andersen, 2013).

As described, the psychiatric evaluation and the fear of a delusion verdict were the main constraining factors for Breivik during the trial process; they are the most likely explanation for the change of behaviour compared to his posture during autumn 2011. It should also not be forgotten that Breivik had media access during the whole trial. He could adjust to that as well.

3.6.4 Breivik's trial-strategy

It is interesting to take a glance at what Breivik actually wrote in his compendium about trial proceedings, and what actually happened. This not least because his theoretical work proved uneasy to adhere to during the operational phase of the 22 July attacks. Accordingly, it is also here about how theory meets interaction and dynamics, leading to adaption and pragmatism. First of all, Breivik states in his compendium that a trial is an excellent opportunity and a well-suited arena the Justiciar Knight can use to propagate his case (Berwick, 2011: 1107). As such, he sees the court as a stage, where the defendant is playing the key role with a unique opportunity to present his ideology and views to a wider audience. In the compendium, Breivik write in a detailed manner how the defendant should behave and present demands to the court. Furthermore, the defendant should present the audience with a given scenario, and in so doing prepare both enemies and the public for what lies ahead (Berwick, 2011: 1107). He gives a great deal of attention to the opening statement, as well as the closing statement, and he provides his potential followers with ready-to-use scripts (Berwick, 2011: 1107-1114).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Over two pages Breivik gives advice with regard to finding the right defence attorney, stressing that the defendant should reject any appointed public attorney. A patriotic-oriented attorney is important (Berwick, 2011: 1115). He lists three primary criteria with regard to what to expect from a defence attorney (Berwick, 2011: 1115-1116):

1. Willingness to facilitate you logistically.
2. Willingness to facilitate you ideologically.
3. Willingness to facilitate you to build a case against the regime.

Breivik's priority was therefore to find a lawyer who shared his ideas and ideology, rather than focusing on professional skills. That was an absolute necessity in order to achieve a proper defence.

As described, Breivik was in theory all set for a personal crusade in the courtroom, but did he really act in accordance with his own compendium, or was the content far-fetched and unrealistic. The answer to this is not clear-cut, but in some areas he did, and in other areas he did not. First of all, after declaring that he did not recognise the legitimacy of the court, Breivik gave a great deal of attention to the proceedings. He was well prepared for the meetings and followed every sequence closely. He also made use of his right to comment on statements made by witnesses. Finally, he used the opening and closing statement rounds. The content was not, however, the same as in the compendium, but very much adjusted to his personal situation. As such, the static and descriptive nature of the manuscripts in the compendium would not have worked very well, due to the dynamics of the trial. Trials can very much be like wars; they tend to live their own lives when first set in motion. Likewise, Breivik did not foresee that he would have to concentrate on avoiding a delusion verdict, and this constrained him significantly (Bjørge, de Graaf, van der Heide, Hemmingby & Weggemans, 2016: 479). In his compendium, Breivik also recommended a defendant to get a defence attorney who sympathised with the ultra-nationalist agenda. In Breivik's case, Lippestad performed his duty as a defence attorney in a highly professional manner, actually receiving considerable public credit for his way of handling the difficult task. Very much so because he did not defend the actions of the perpetrator, but focussed on his legal rights in order to uphold the values of a society governed by law and justice. In other words, Breivik did not get the

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

collaborating lawyer he described in his compendium. The only thing that really corresponded is that Breivik could choose his own lawyer, but the irony here was that Lippestad turned out to be an active member of the Labour Party that the terrorist hated so intensely. Ironically, Breivik's trial became a significant political career-boost for Lippestad (Lundervold, 2012). The lawyer became an influential Labour party-member in the following years, and was an Oslo City Council member from October 2015 to December 2017. Another irony is that one of Breivik's first demands when he was arrested was that torture and the death penalty should be reinstated in Norway. A couple of months after he started serving his prison term, he complained about the prison conditions, like that he had to write with a soft rubber pen. According to him, the pen he was given was 'an almost indescribable manifestation of sadism', and it represented a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention against Torture (Tranøy, L.K., Vikås, M. & Brenna, J.G. (2012).

Anders Behring Breivik was in August 2012 sentenced to preventive detention for a term of twenty-one years and a minimum period of ten years. This is the maximum penalty length in Norway, but in reality the terrorist can be kept in preventive detention for as long as the court finds him to constitute a danger to society - in theory for the rest of his life (Oslo District Court, 2012). Breivik accepted the sentencing and did not appeal, although he later took legal steps related to the prison conditions.

3.7 Breivik in a comparative perspective

The 22 July 2011 attacks by Anders Behring Breivik were unique in a solo terrorist context, but such a claim calls for a closer look at his actions in a comparative perspective. With reference to the elaboration on the definitional issue in the introduction to this thesis, this is not necessarily a straightforward thing to do.

3.7.1 Solo terrorism as seen in Western Europe

Traditionally, the focus of terrorism research has at large been on terrorism as a collective activity (COT, 2007), but for the last decade or so there have been an increasing number of in-depth studies of lone actor terrorism (e.g. Vollers,

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

2006; COT, 2007; 2008; Michael, 2012; Spaaij, 2012; Gardell, 2015; Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2012; Gill, Horgan & Deckart, 2012; Gill, 2015; Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016; Kaplan, Lööw & Malkki, 2015; Simon, 2013; Ellis et al., 2016; Schuurman, Bakker & Gill, 2017; Hamm & Spaaij, 2017).

In general, individuals committing terrorism without the assistance from others has probably existed just as long as collective terrorism. Before looking at the phenomenon in a West European context, however, the influence from white supremacists in the US must be mentioned, due to their early focus on lone actor terrorism.

In the late 1970s, William Pierce (aka Andrew MacDonald) wrote *The Turner Diaries* (MacDonald, 1978). It became a classic among right-wing extremists, but more importantly here, Pierce followed up with the book *Hunter*. This publication was dedicated to the right-wing extremist Joseph Paul Franklin, and it very much promoted the concept of individual action (MacDonald, 1989). This was followed with the *leaderless resistance* and *lone wolf* focus from Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis in the 1990s (Metzger, undated). At this time, the attention towards the solo terrorist threat was minimal in Western Europe. The focus was basically directed against ethno-nationalist organisations and far-left groups, such as Provisional IRA, ETA, Red Army Faction and Red Brigades. Solo terrorists and lone actors were really not part of the vocabulary at the time.

In 1991, John Ausonius brought solo terrorism on the agenda in the northern part of Europe, when he conducted a series of shooting attacks against immigrants in Stockholm (Tamas, 2005). Ausonius was nicknamed the *Laserman* and he generated considerable fear among immigrants in the Swedish capital - not least due to the extensive news media coverage. One person was killed and several were wounded in the attacks that Ausonius was behind, but after his arrest the solo terrorist focus was reduced again. Soon after a new threat was on the rise.

3.7.2 From big 'spectaculars' to individual jihad

In the mid-1990s, militant Islamists became a significant game-changer on the European continent. This happened when *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA)

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

decided to initiate a campaign of violence to France, representing a shift from a sanctuary strategy to a strategy based on coercion and deterrence (Lia & Kjøk, 2001: 43-46). It all began with the hijacking of Air France flight 8969 from Algiers to Paris on 24 December 1994. The following GIA campaign in France in 1995 and 1996 included a series of bomb attacks against the Metro system in Paris and other targets (Lia & Kjøk, 2001: 37; Nesser, 2008). In contrast to the ethno-nationalists and far-left actors previously mentioned, the militant Islamists systematically targeted civilians in an indiscriminately manner, mainly through bomb attacks on public transport and in public areas. This represented a new, tremendous security challenge for the French authorities, and within a few years time it was not limited to France. It became a transnational problem.

On 17 November 2000, Moinul Abedin was arrested in what has been characterized as the first al-Qaeda-related terrorist plot in Great Britain (Mackie, 2012). A month later the Christmas market-plot in Strasbourg was disrupted (Johnson, 2002). The militant Islamists, adhering to the global jihad ideology promoted by the al-Qaida Central, had by now become operational in Europe. The 9/11 attacks in 2001 initiated the extensive US offensive against al-Qaida in Afghanistan, while the 2004 Madrid bombings and the 2005 7/7 London underground bombings boosted the crackdown on the Islamists in Europe.

Over time the counterterrorism efforts and military operations in distant areas weakened the leadership, structure and capabilities of al-Qaida and their affiliates considerably. The terrorists were therefore forced to change their operational strategy. Among other things, that meant reducing the ambitions of conducting large, complex and spectacular operations. Instead al-Qaida and their affiliates had to settle for small-scale attacks. To their advantage, however, one or a small number of perpetrators are in general harder to detect than groups conducting large operations. Already in the early 1990s, al-Qaida strategist Abu Musab al-Suri highlighted such a strategy. In 1991 he wrote about global Islamic resistance and a year later he promoted the idea of *phantom organisations*, consisting of self-sufficient cells acting independently of any central command (Lia, 2007).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The call for *leaderless resistance* and *individual jihad* did not, however, immediately materialise itself into a wave of lone mujahids in Europe or the USA. A transition from group-based operations to small-scale attacks conducted by one or two perpetrators came about slowly in the end of the 2000s. The Fort Hood-shooting in 2009, conducted by Nidal Malik Hasan, was a grave incident, and this was followed by other lone actor incidents in 2010 and 2011 in Europe. The challenge of *home-grown* and *grassroot* jihadists had by then been a security problem for years, but now individuals seemingly acting alone became an increasingly worrying factor.

3.7.3 Striking from nowhere

On 22 July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik made his appearance, and he struck when practically everyone were focusing on the Islamists. The attacks brought the solo terrorist issue, as well as the copycat-fear, to the headlines in the news media - and to the top of the agenda of security and intelligence services in Europe. Vice President Alexander Eisvogel in the German security service *Verfassungsschutz* warned against Breivik-imitators just a few days after the incident (Der Spiegel, 2011). Director General of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, Jakob Scharf, stated that solo terrorists and small groups represented a grave threat to be taken seriously (Jyllands-Posten, 2011). MI5 Director General Jonathan Evans referred directly to the Breivik-case in a speech given before the Olympic games in London (MI5, 2012). Like no one before him, Breivik had demonstrated the lethal potential of a single individual in the most brutal way, and the concerns in the aftermath reflected just that.

At the time of the 22 July attacks in Norway, the unrest in Syria had begun and it developed into a regular civil war. Initially the civil war-like conflict did not affect the security situation too many countries outside the region directly. From 2013 onwards, however, the flow of foreign fighters into the region, the expansion to Iraq and the evolution of ISIS established an increased fear for militant Islamist attacks in Western Europe. Now, however, the solo terrorist phenomenon continued to be strengthened by the fact that group plots to a large degree were detected in advance, while single individuals (with and without links to extremists circles or networks)

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

occasionally slipped under the radar of the security services. This impression was particularly strengthened in the autumn of 2014. From August to December a number of incidents in Jerusalem, Melbourne, Quebec, Ottawa, New York, Sidney and France had solo terrorist or lone actor characteristics (Stern & Berger, 2015: 97). Police or military personnel were targeted in several of these attacks, and at large, simple weapons or vehicles were used.

The incidents in Paris in January 2015, consisting of the attacks on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the shooting of a male jogger in a park, the killing of a policewoman and the kosher shop siege, did not entirely fit the picture from autumn 2014. More precisely, it became a tragic reminder of the danger if two or more individuals avoid detection, and the case also displayed the deadly potential military assault rifles represent. The incidents (especially the Charlie Hebdo attack and the kosher shop siege) in Paris illustrated that there is something between small-scale attacks and complex *spectaculars*. It was maybe small-scale in number of perpetrators, but certainly extensive if the result is taken into account. Also, the weaponry may have just as much influence on the end result as the number of perpetrators. On one side, we have often seen that attacks conducted with knives, pistols and gas canister-based bombs fail to kill a high number of people. On the other side, Nidal Malik Hasan, Anders Behring Breivik, Seifeddine Rwzgui Yacoubi (the beach and hotel attack in Tunisia in 2015) and Brenton Tarrant (Christchurch Mosque shooting in 2019) have indeed demonstrated the lethal potential of attacks by a single person with automatic or semi-automatic firearm.

3.7.4 The overview

For definitional reasons, as well as a varying amount of information in different cases, it is challenging to elaborate on solo terrorists or lone actors in a comparative perspective. This is also the case with Anders Behring Breivik, and especially so because he was so independent in the real sense of the word. Very few terrorists are like that, although Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski is another example coming easily to mind when discussing solo terrorists following a narrow definition (Simon, 2013). It is not many terrorists like Breivik and Kaczynski, as most lone actors have some sort of connection to other extremists - physically or online. Aware of this fact, we shall see

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

Breivik in the light of a selection of lone actors in Europe, whom have seemingly acted without direct assistance of others. Ramon Spaaij's list of perpetrators has served as a starting point for the selection of cases, although some modifications have been done by the author of this thesis (Spaaij, 2012). The selection has geographically been limited to Western Europa, and the timeframe has been expanded a bit, in the sense that a few cases from 2013 and 2014 have been included. The overview is as follows:

1991 - 1992, Sweden. Right-wing extremist and criminal John Ausonius conducted a series of shooting attacks against immigrants in the capitol Stockholm. Nine attacks resulted in one casualty only, much due to the fact that Ausonius primarily used low calibre weapons.

1993 – 1997, Austria. Franz Fuchs was behind a campaign against immigrants and immigrant-friendly individuals, mainly using letter bombs. 27 attacks resulted in four fatalities and 15 injuries.

1994 - 2006, Italy. The so-called Italian Unabomber is believed to be behind 33 attacks using small explosive devices in public places. None of the attacks resulted in casualties. A suspect was arrested, but later released, as there was not sufficient evidence (Spaaij, 2012: 109).

1999, United Kingdom. Right-wing extremist David Copeland, also known as the London nail-bomber, conducted a thirteen-day long bombing campaign, striking in public places. He was focusing on immigrants, as well as gays and lesbians. Three incidents resulted in three people killed (Spaaij, 2012: 111).

2002, Netherlands. Volkert van der Graaf shot and killed politician and party leader of Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) Pim Fortuyn at close range, during the national election campaign in 2002 (COT, 2007). van der Graaf was arrested shortly after the assassination.

2003, Belgium. A 45-year old Iraqi was arrested for sending ten letters laced with toxic powders, to Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, two ministries, three embassies, a court in Brussels, the director of airport Ostend, and the port authority. Police officers and others handling letters and documents were treated for skin and eye irritation (Nesser, 2008: 933; Associated Press, 2003).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

2003 – 2010, Sweden. Right wing-extremist Peter Mangs conducted a series of shooting attacks on immigrants in the city of Malmö in 2003, 2009 and 2010, mainly using 9mm Glock pistol. In court, he was convicted for nine attacks and the killing of two people (Skåne Police Authority, 2010-2011).

2004, Italy. Moustafa Chaouki detonated a homemade bomb device supplemented with gas canisters, outside a McDonalds restaurant in Brescia. The only killed was the perpetrator himself. His car contained four cylinders of kitchen gas, each with a capability of 70 liters (Popham, 2004).

2006, Germany. Amer Cheema came to the office building of Alex Springer with a knife, intending to attack Die Welt director Roger Köppel, due to publications of Mohammed-cartoons. Security guards inside the building took control over Cheema, who was arrested (Der Spiegel, 2006).

2010, United Kingdom. Roshonara Choudry arranged a meeting with MP Stephen Timms and stabbed him with a knife when they met. Choudry was arrested and Timms survived. She was inspired by AQ ideology on social media (Dodd, 2010a, Spaaij, 2012: 115-116).

2011, Germany. Militant Islamist Arid Uka killed two US soldiers with a handgun at Frankfurt Airport. He approached soldiers outside a shuttle-bus going to Ramstein airbase, and initiated the shooting. Then his weapon jammed. Uka fled, but he was caught after a chase (Steinberg, 2013: 5).

2011, Norway. On 22 July Anders Behring Breivik first conducted a bomb attack against the Government Quarter in Oslo. He then continued to the island of Utøya, where he initiated a shooting attack against participants at a Labour party youth summer camp. Eight people died in Oslo, while 69 people lost their lives at Utøya (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016).

2013, Denmark. An attacker dressed as a mailman attempted to shoot Islam-critic Lars Hedgaard on his doorstep in Copenhagen. The first shot missed and then the weapon jammed. The attacker fled the scene. A suspect (Danish-Palestinian) was arrested in Turkey in April 2014, but later inexplicably released by Turkish authorities (Dansk Radio, 2014).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

2013, United Kingdom. Right-wing extremist Pavlo Lapshyn stabbed and killed a Muslim immigrant very shortly after arriving UK from Ukraine. He then followed up with three bomb attacks against Mosques, before he was arrested (BBC News, 2013a).

2013, France. Militant Islamist Alexandre Dhaussay attacked a soldier performing guard duty in a public area in a Paris suburb, using a small knife or box cutter. The soldier survived the attack and the perpetrator was soon afterwards arrested (BBC News, 2013).

2014, France. On 20 December Bertrand Nzohabonayo attacked three officers in a police station in Joue-les-Tours, while shouting "Allahu Akbar". The man wounded one officer's face at the entrance and injured two others, before he was shot dead (France 24, 2014).

3.7.5 A low-frequency phenomenon

Having already stated that very few terrorist attacks are conducted in such an independent manner as Breivik did, it is not that unusual that individuals with some sort of connection to other extremists act on their own. This will be more thoroughly addressed in the following part study focusing on the militant Islamists. Having said that it is an important point to underline that there is no definitive pattern with regard to when and where solo terrorists and lone actors turn up. Some countries have been spared from having incidents, while others have experienced several. It may be noted though, that France has experienced a number of attacks from 2013 onwards.

The overview also shows that solo terrorists appear from different ideological platforms. Right-wing extremists and militant Islamists are dominating the list, while a couple of cases seem unclear. This should, however, not make us overlook the fact that actors with other ideological views appear in the solo terrorist context from time to time. Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski was for example neither a right-wing extremist, nor a militant Islamist.

3.7.6 Many attacks, few dead

The overview shows that a few individuals conducted many attacks, but these were not necessarily killing most people. Regarding lethality a total of 16 perpetrators killed 91 persons in 105 attacks, leaving us with an average of 0,866 killed victims per attack. One should, however, take into account that Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks was an exceptional case. If this case had not taken place, the result would have been 15 perpetrators killing 14 persons in 103 incidents, leading to the significant lower average lethality rate of 0,135 per attack. Following this, solo terrorism does usually not lead to a high number of casualties. The 22 July attacks' significant impact on the numbers, also illustrates the challenges of using statistics on low-frequency issues.

3.7.7 Choice of strategy

Like groups and organizations, solo terrorist and distinctively independent lone actors will normally have some kind of operational strategy – even if it's only a simple one. One issue is whether to settle for a series of small-scale attacks in a long-term campaign, or to go for one attack only. This also begs the question whether the perpetrator is planning for escape, capture or death. A lone actor aiming for a long-term campaign depends on escape, and some have preferred letter bomb campaigns or remote-controlled bombs, which increases the odds for achieving this.

Anders Behring Breivik chose to do a one-off spectacular shock attack, where hundreds of people were to be killed. None of the other terrorists in the overview went for the same strategy, and they can be divided into two main categories. More than half of the perpetrators chose to do a series of small-scale attacks, and most of them preferred to use firearms or explosives. In this category we find Ausonius, Fuchs, the Italian Unabomber, Copeland, the Iraqi perpetrator, Mangs, Lapshyn and Dhaussy. Most of them did not seek a close physical confrontation with the victims and several mainly used methods according to this. Letter bombs, time-fixed bombs, toxic letters or long-distance shooting were approaches used by the majority.

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

The other perpetrators chose single operations, with a significant risk of being arrested during the execution of the attack. This was the case with van der Graaf, Cheema, Choudry, Uka and Nzohabonayo. One exception was Chaouki, who probably aimed for a suicide attack.

Another characteristic of Breivik's strategy is the extreme brutality involved, which is not for everyone. Most people will find killing someone at close distance far more emotionally difficult than killing from a distance, for example with a remote-controlled bomb or with a sniper rifle (Grossman, 2009: 98). Breivik, in contrast, shot unarmed and helpless youths at a distance down to 10 centimeters. It seems valid to suggest here that Breivik's combination of lack of empathy and psychological preparations, at least partly explains his ability to conduct such extraordinary gruesome and brutal acts. It was after all, essential for him to gain maximum news media coverage, as well as writing himself into the history as one of the worst solo terrorists ever. One way to do this is to do something more spectacular and worse than someone before. There is some similarity here to the grotesque beheadings conducted by ISIS, including the chemical factory attack conducted by Yassin Salhi in June 2015 in France. Salhi put the severed head up at the gate of the company targeted, in the first completed beheading by militant Islamists in Europe (Doward, 2015).

3.7.8 Solo terrorists and the mass casualty focus

Looking to the list of solo terrorists one gets a mixed impression with regard to how fixated they have been with regard to the mass casualty issue. Based on their planning and actions it seems that van der Graaf, the Iraqi male, Cheema, Choudry, Uka, Dhaussay and Nzohabonayo did not have a mass casualty priority. Volkert van der Graaf, Cheema, Choudry and Dhaussay attacked single individuals. The victims of the first three were specifically selected, while Dhaussay's selection probably was related to situational circumstances, in the sense that he picked a soldier he found suitable for attack there and then. As for the Iraqi male the content of the letters was actually not lethal. Regarding Arid Uka, he clearly wanted to kill more than two servicemen, but was it realistic to believe he could achieve a mass casualty result using a pistol at a location with armed response elements

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

relatively nearby? Finally, Nzohabonayo could hardly expect to manage to kill a significant number of police officers at the police station.

The three cases concerning Ausonius, the Italian Unabomber and Mangs are more difficult to assess with regard to mass casualty focus. Ausonius did use low caliber weapons, which is not the ideal choice if the intention is to kill - and certainly not from distance. On the other hand, he definitely shot to kill and it remains an open question whether he could have caused a higher number of deaths over a longer period of time. If we look to the Italian Unabomber, he used quite small explosive charges. If the number of incidents and the lack of control on the consequences of such acts are kept in mind, however, it is difficult to make this a clear-cut case in either direction. The Malmö-shooter Peter Mangs used more powerful weapons than Ausonius (who Mangs initially was inspired by), and he too shot to kill (Gardell, 2015: 107). It is not unlikely that he could have killed 10 or more people over time, but his limited tactical skills combined with a lack of self-restraint makes it questionable whether he really could achieve this when the manhunt came in motion.

Five of the perpetrators in the overview did have a clear mass casualty approach, and these were Breivik, Chaouki, Copeland, Fuchs and Lapshyn. Breivik did actually conduct two mass casualty attacks, so there is no need to elaborate more on this. Chaouki could, if successful, killed a high number of people with his improvised bomb construction. Copeland was deliberately targeting public places with a lot of people. Fuchs had a rather extensive campaign over a long period of time, and the explosive devices he constructed were indeed lethal. As for Pavlo Lapshyn, he both demonstrated an ability to kill ruthlessly, and he also placed explosive devices in places that could lead to a high number of fatalities.

3.7.9 Level of discrimination

An actor operating in a totally indiscriminate fashion may attack anyone and anywhere. Not all terrorists do that, however, and if we look to the overview there are significant differences with regard to level of discrimination. It is clear that the Italian Unabomber and Chaouki conducted indiscriminate

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

targeting. Setting of explosive devices in shops and public space where just anyone may be struck, cannot be described otherwise.

Then there are some actors which targeted specific, larger groups in the society, like immigrants, gays and lesbians, religious minorities or political opponents. In this category we find Ausonius, Fuchs, Copeland, the Iraqi, Mangs, Uka, Lapshyn and Breivik. Here it is also appropriate to include those attacking police and military personnel, like Dhaussy and Nzohabonayo. Finally, a few terrorist were very selective and attacked name-specific individuals. In this category we have Cheema, Choudry and van der Graaf.

What this means, is that Breivik was quite mainstream in this area, as he did have a mass casualty focus, but not totally indiscriminately. He preferred to strike against specific groups in society, which he regarded as part of the conflict, namely those he found responsible for the development of the Norwegian society.

3.7.10 *Level of operational sophistication*

Through news media one could get the impression that terrorists conducting attacks on their own are either less talented misfits of our society, or highly intellectual individuals representing an immense threat to society. If they do seemingly simple mistakes and have a troubled background, it is a short way to be included in the first mentioned category. On the other hand, if they succeed with attacks and are able to evade the long arms of the law over a period of time, they will often be placed in the second category. Accordingly, the reputation of a perpetrator is much linked to operational conduct, timeline and number of casualties.

To establish how advanced solo terrorists' operate in general is a complex matter, but one way to do this is to try to establish their degree of innovation and creativity, resulting in an impression with regard to their overall level of sophistication. *Innovation* will imply that the actor is featuring new methods or original ideas, so there is a change to something established. In the strictest sense this is so to speak never taking place. However, we can adjust it to a terrorism context and apply Adam Dolnik's definition; "*terrorist innovation is the use or preparations to use a tactic and/or technology that had not been*

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

adopted by any other terrorist organization prior to that moment”(Dolnik 2007: 6; see also Wilkinson, 1993; Ranstorp & Normark, 2015). With Dolnik’s definition we can definitely say that some terrorist groups have been innovative. The prime example is the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which demonstrated technical and tactical innovation, as well as ingenuity over a number of years – especially with regard to their development of bombs and mortars (Oppenheimer, 2009). Another example is the 2006 Liquid plot by a group of jihadists. This was a very advanced operation where the terrorists planned to down a number of airplanes over the Atlantic. This case is more thoroughly covered in the part study concerning the militant Islamists.

Creative relates to the involvement of imagination or original ideas in order to create or achieve something, for example to come up with unexpected approaches, overcome problems, find best practice and adapt to situations. As such, creativity may lead to innovation, or alternatively simply remain to be creative in an imitative way. As for the term *sophisticated*, this describes the terrorists’ ability to be aware of, and able to interpret, complex issues. For example with regard to planning, logistics and coordination. Accordingly, we are here doing an overall assessment of both planning and the terrorists’ practical abilities. So how can we measure this with regard to solo terrorists? One way is to make a structured, focused comparison based on a set of variables, like personal background, targeting logic, weapons and equipment, method of attack, pre-attack conduct, execution of attack, post-attack conduct, timeline and potential patterns in their modus operandi. It is not within the reach of this publication to give a detailed assessment of each perpetrator in the overview used here, but some general impressions can be given.

First of all, the cases selected for the comparative aspect here tell us that solo terrorists are normally not innovative, but rather imitative in their operational conduct with regard to weapons of choice, methods and approaches. Most use traditional attack methods and classic weapons, and even though those using explosives may seem more advanced, one could also argue that those using knives or firearms are cleverly adjusting their modus operandi to their actual capability, and hence increasing the chances of a successful result. For example, Choudry had a rather simple strategy that worked, despite the fact that MP Stephen Timms survived. Volkert van der Graaf succeeded with his

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

assassination of Pim Fortuyn, and both John Ausonius and Peter Mangs managed to keep going for quite a period of time due to a certain amount of tactical understanding. As such, much is up to how well they plan and conduct the attack itself. Here they often display a certain amount of creativity, both in gaining access to their target and the conduct of the attack itself. Several, however, also make basic mistakes on their way, for example with regard to pre-attack planning and reconnaissance. Two examples here are Peter Mangs and David Copeland. On several occasions Mangs waited outside the apartment of a potential target, unaware of the fact that the person in question was in prison. He also shot into the wrong apartment on a couple of occasions. Regarding Copeland, he turned up the wrong day of the week, when he was going to bomb a market place. Such mistakes can only be characterized as amateurish (BBC News, 2000).

In total, it seems that relatively few are displaying a low degree of sophistication in general, while most are at an intermediate level, with some pluses and minuses. Very few can be characterized as highly sophisticated. As for Breivik, it is already mentioned that his strategy is rather unique for a solo terrorist. He also conducted a far more complex and demanding operation than the others. Several characteristics may be mentioned here, but first and foremost I will highlight the time frame, his ability to keep focus and motivation over years, the significant operational security focus, the financial starting point, as well as the thoroughness with regard to building an appropriate cover. Furthermore, he did not take the easiest approach when he built the bomb. Finally, a sequentel operation involving two very different types of attacks on different locations quite far from each other, is more difficult to pull off than one single attack.

In conclusion, and returning to the beforementioned media-constructed impression that lone actors are either less talented misfits or very clever, a more likely answer is that most lone actors are somewhere in between with regard to operational behaviour.

3.7.11 *The challenge of detection*

Most countries apply an intelligence-driven approach in order to detect and disrupt terrorists, with their respective intelligence and security services in a

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

spearhead role - and it is the most vital part in successful counter-terrorism (English, 2009: 131). Indeed, in our part of the world the effectiveness has been demonstrated by the fact that most group or network plots seem to be detected and thwarted in time. This is also seen in the following part study of this thesis. That said, solo terrorists and lone actors with a loose link to other extremists, do represent a particularly difficult challenge with regard to detection - and especially so if they are security conscious. If there is no communication with others the chances of detection is very limited. Most lone actors have, however, some sort of link to other extremists, and the intelligence and security services have sometimes the possibility to utilize such openings.

For one, cultivation of informers and infiltration of agents into extremist groups and movements can prove effective against solo terrorists as well, if the individual in question have such affiliations. Then they may qualify for registration in records kept by police and security services. They can also give away indicators leading to an early intervention, if they are within circles kept under surveillance. The classic dilemma for the security services with regard to surveillance, however, is prioritization. Who should be given 24/7-surveillance in a situation with limited resources? Precisely who is most likely to take the final step? Such assessments are extremely challenging to make regardless if you have 50 or 300 hot-headed extremists or potential terrorists on your list. Not least because it takes a lot of manpower, probably more than most people think, to follow and monitor someone very close in live mode.

Second, a solo terrorist not mingling with other extremists may use social media platforms, and for example seek some sort of social or political fellowship in chat forums. If these forums, or someone in the other end, are under monitoring, detection may be the result. If, however, the suspect is deliberately downplaying his or hers extremist views, taking advantage of encryption tools to conceal his identity, or act security conscious in general, the intelligence-driven may turn out insufficient. Breivik became an example in this regard. He concealed his IP-adress when active on Internet, and furthermore he was deliberately downplaying his extremist views when he was online. In fact, even his political opponents following the far-right forums, have confirmed that there were a lot of people worse than Breivik on different extremist sites.

3.7.12 *The tip from outside*

If the intelligence-driven approach is not working, the authorities will at large be depending on receiving the first direct indicator in the form of a tip-off from the outside (Hemmingby, 2014). In a lone actor research project, it was looked at 120 persons involved in 98 plots and 72 attacks, and the researchers found that 46 per cent of the perpetrators exhibited some kind of leakage (Ellis & Pantucci, 2016: 4; Ellis et al., 2016: 38). It is, however, important to note that in this study the lone actor term was widely defined and included “small cells”. Furthermore, “leakage” from the perpetrator could be intentional *or* shown unwittingly. Still, the project found that 21% of the perpetrators shared some details of planned attacks with others (Ellis et al., 2016: 38).

Clearly, it will normally be the perpetrator’s close surroundings that will notice the first warning signs before a violent attack, but the context and/or the relationship between the perpetrator and the listener(s) or observant (s) is likely to influence if - or how - the information is being acted upon. So a main question is; will it be reported to the police or the security authorities or not? The answer is that some do and some don’t. A prime example regarding proper warning to the authorities took place in the UK in 2013. Colleagues of Ian Forman in Birkenhead noticed him browsing for chemicals on the Internet while at work, and his leader was notified (The Guardian, 2014c). Forman was confronted with his Internet activity by his superior. He did not provide credible answers, so the employer decided to notify the police. The warning was taken seriously by the security authorities and soon after the police conducted a search of Forman’s residence. There the police found a lot of compromising material, indicating that Forman planned to bomb two mosques, which he eventually was sentenced for. As such, this was a splendid, but quite rare, example of proper reaction when concern arises. On the other hand, there are also a number of examples of people knowing about plans or conducted attacks, who do not inform the police. For example, Peter Mangs told some of his friends about some of his deeds, but they did not forward the information to the police - with one exception after a considerable period of time (Aftenbladet, 2012).

3.7.13 *Be prepared for the black swans*

It is essential to understand that no matter how much resources that are put into intelligence and preventive efforts, there will always be a residual risk, and from time to time someone is bound to slip under the radar. This is a natural limitation of the intelligence-driven approach to be expected. As pointed out by David Omand, there are limits to what government reasonably can do to protect the public (2010: 79). A main challenge in this context is really what to expect and what to prepare for, which is difficult with a low-frequency phenomenon we get little experience on.

Most threat analysts and risk theorists will know the *black swan theory*, often referred to by academics and news media in relation to unpredictable events and actors. The man behind the theory, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, points to the fact that there are two types of black swans; a) the narrated black swans that are in the discourse, and b) those nobody talks about, since they escape models (Taleb, 2010: 77). In our context we may say that the solo terrorist threat is definitely in the discourse (occasionally hyped up though), but at the same time the shape and form they appear in may escape any model. Since the past does not repeat itself, it is indeed a challenging task to try to predict the new varieties these terrorists will turn up with.

Another factor here is also that solo terrorists may be more difficult to foresee with regard to *modus operandi*, if compared to groups. The latter will often have some sort of signature characteristics or typical preferences. In total, those who operate alone do enjoy a greater degree of individual freedom, as they are not affected by intragroup dynamics. The more structured cells, networks or organizations in practice are, the more reduced each individual's freedom may turn out to be (Moghaddam, 2006: 118-123).

3.7.14 *Scandinavia: Lone attackers versus groups*

In order to illustrate the problem of detection, we can look to plots and attacks conducted by solo terrorists, lone actors with extremist links and groups in Scandinavia from 2008 to 2015:

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

February 2008, Denmark. Several persons, both Danish nationals and foreigners, were arrested for planning to assassinate the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard (Nesser, 2014: 441- 442). There were no convictions in this case.

October 2009, Denmark. US authorities arrested T.H. Rana and D.C. Headley, on suspicion of planning a car-bomb attack on the newspaper Jyllands-Posten (Skjoldager, 2016: 114-138).

2009 – 2010, Sweden. Peter Mangs conducted a series of shooting attacks on immigrants in Malmö, in, 2003 2009 and 2010. In 2013, he was convicted for two murders committed in 2003 and 2009, as well as eight attempted murders (Skåne Police Authority, 2010-2011).

2009 – 2010, Sweden. An Islamist cell planned a shooting attack against artist Lars Vilks in Sweden. Colleen LaRose was arrested in the US. Others were arrested in Ireland (US District Court for the Eastern Quarter of Pennsylvania, 2010).

January 2010, Denmark. Mohammed Geele broke into the home of Kurt Westergaard, using a knife and axe, but was shot by arriving police. Geele had ties to AQ and al-Shabaab (Skjoldager, 2016: 139-152).

July 2010, Norway. Police arrested one Uighur and one Uzbek in Oslo, while German police arrested an Iraqi Kurd (Nesser & Lia, 2010). They were later convicted of planning an attack against Jyllands-Posten in Denmark.

September 2010, Denmark. Chechen Lors Doukaiev accidentally set of a bomb during preparation at a hotel. He was preparing a letter bomb that he was to send to the newspaper Jyllands-Posten (Nesser, 2014: 444).

December 2010, Sweden. T.A. al-Abdaly conducted a suicide attack near a busy shopping street in Stockholm, but blew him-self up after a bomb went off prematurely (The Guardian, 2010). An individual was later convicted in Scotland for providing assistance to the perpetrator.

December 2010, Denmark. Five men were arrested in Sweden and Denmark on the suspicion of preparing a Mumbai style against the newspaper Jyllands-Posten (Astrup & Herschend, 2012a; 2012c).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

July 2011, Norway. Anders Behring Breivik conducted the 22 July attacks in the Government Quarter in Oslo and at Utøya, killing 77 people in total (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016).

September 2011, Sweden. Four people of Somali and Iraqi background were arrested for planning to kill Swedish Lars Vilks at an exhibition at Gothenborg. None were convicted.

April 2012, Denmark. Three men were arrested for illegal weapons possession, and suspicion of planning a terrorist attack, as they tried to buy two AK-47 rifles (The Copenhagen Post, 2012). The suspects had links to criminal gangs and it was later revealed that the arms seller was a police agent. It is questionable whether there is a terrorism link in this case (Andersen & Dürrfeld, 2015).

May 2012, Denmark. Two Danish-Somali brothers believed to have connections to al-Shabab, were arrested in Copenhagen and Aarhus, suspected of planning a terrorist attack (The Copenhagen Post, 2012a; Nesser, 2014: 447).

February 2013, Denmark. A man attempted to shoot public debate participant Lars Hedgaard at his doorstep. The attacker missed with the first shot and then fled the scene. A Danish citizen of Middle Eastern origin, known to the police from before, was arrested in Turkey April 2014, but later released (Dansk Radio, 2014; Skjoldager, 2016: 316-333).

February 2015, Denmark. Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein conducted a shooting attack, killing one, on a public meeting with Lars Vilks in Copenhagen. Then after midnight, he turned up at a synagogue in central Copenhagen, where he killed a Jewish guard and wounded two police officers. El-Hussein was later killed by police near his home during an arrest operation (Jyllands-Posten, 2015).

October 2015, Sweden. Right-wing extremist Anton Lundin Pettersson attacked teachers and pupils at Kronan school in Trollhättan. He was armed with a sword and several knives, and three people were killed in the incident. The perpetrator was shot by police officers during the arrest, and succumbed to his wounds later in hospital (Erlandsson, 2017).

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

As described, actors with different ideologies did engage in terrorist acts in Scandinavia between 2008 and 2015, although militant Islamists were behind in most cases here. The overview tells us that all eight group plots were detected and disrupted. None of the eight lone actors or solo terrorists was detected in advance. Four of these attacks, however, failed during the final preparations or during the execution of attacks. Mohammed Geele, who tried to axe himself into a room in the house of cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, was shot and arrested by police. Loris Doukaiev was injured as the bomb he prepared exploded in his hotel room in Copenhagen. Abdulwahab al-Abdaly did not succeed, as he blew himself up on the streets of Stockholm. Finally, a male perpetrator missed when he tried to shoot Islam-critic Lars Hedegaard on the doorstep of the latter's home. All these four perpetrators had links to extremist groups or networks. Geele was linked to al-Shabab, Doukaiev to extremists in Bremen in Germany. al-Abdaly got some assistance from Nasseridine Menni in Scotland (BBC News, 2012e). The Hedegaard-assailant had links to extremists in Denmark.

This leaves us with the fact that the only four terrorists more or less managed to achieve their objectives with their attacks in Scandinavia from 2008 to 2015. These were Peter Mangs, Anders Behring Breivik, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein and Anton Lundin Pettersson. So even though groups may represent a greater danger due to stronger capacities, individuals acting alone tend to slip under the radar far more often, as exemplified with the overview from Scandinavia. It must be added, however, that a mix always have to be expected. After 2015, Sweden have both a group and a lone actor. In November 2016 and January 2017, right-wing terrorists from the Nordic resistance movement conducted three bomb attacks in the Gothenburg area. These were directed against a left-wing bookcafé called Syndikalisterna, and two refugee centers (Divinyi & Linné, 2017). Months later, on 7 April 2017, a militant Islamist conducted an attack in central Stockholm. Perpetrator Rakhmat Akilov drove a lorry on a city center high street, before crashing into a building. Five people were killed in this attack (Säkerhetspolisen, 2018).

3.8 Concluding on Anders Behring Breivik

Anders Behring Breivik's ideology was based on a somewhat customized far-right ideology. Parts of it, like his support for Israel's fight against Islamists, will be controversial for some far-right movements, but on the other hand the right-wing extremists are fragmented as a group in general on a number of ideological issues. The main content of Breivik's ideology was predominantly a combination of bits and pieces of conventional right-wing extremist material. Interesting to note, Breivik had an above average interest for the European continent as a whole, in contrast to many other right-wing extremists concentrating their efforts on a regional and national level.

Although Breivik's ideological stance was not unique, he was not a typical solo terrorist or lone actor. This is not just related to the outcome of his horrific actions, but just as much due to several other factors identified. Breivik's hideous "shock attack" strategy, his mass-casualty ambitions and the appalling violence he demonstrated at Utøya were beyond what most people would expect from one individual only. It is, however, more to the special characteristics of this case than the issues that are linked to the physical violence demonstrated. The personality of Breivik, as well as the psychology involved, is also important.

One central observation made from this research is that Breivik's megalomaniac personality, and other factors linked to his personality disorder, most likely influenced his devious strategy of choice considerably. Breivik knew his operation had to be *spectacular* in order to gain maximum media attention, as well as to ensure him a place in the history books as perhaps the worst solo terrorist the world has ever seen. A spectacular terrorist attack may simply include an innovative attack approach, or that the terrorist(s) in question opt for a hard target. Breivik found, however, that attacks can be characterised as spectacular for other reasons as well. He understood that the use of extraordinary cruelty and barbarism, that was so thoroughly demonstrated at Utøya, would lead to extraordinary attention from media and the general public.

Breivik also demonstrated a rare ability to stay focused and motivated for a long period of time. From start to finish his operation went on for several

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

years, and most lone actor terrorists will not be “locked on target” for such a considerable time before doing something. Breivik, however, managed to stay motivated. He also displayed a considerable degree of persistence, for example when he encountered difficulties when making explosives, and in his search for a suitable farm. Furthermore, the decision to act alone was based on rational considerations related to operational security, but there were certainly psychological aspects involved here too. Acting alone is after all quite different from doing something within the context of a group.

Regarding the operational side of Breivik’s activities, he had the necessary skills for meticulous and complex planning. His decision to act alone and the security conscious behaviour in general was important. If he had tried to involve someone else in a plot as barbaric as Utøya, it is highly likely that the operation would have been thwarted. Two central elements with considerable influence regarding his operational capability were his financial situation and the time factor. He had a robust financial starting point, and since he did not have a job he could devote all his time to the terrorist operation. He also had the advantage that he could acquire the weapons needed legally. Furthermore, the right-wing extremist was operating on home ground. He knew his way around and could blend in without any problems in most settings.

Leaving the aberrant characteristics and skills of Breivik, it is also apparent that he was quite average in other ways. His personal background cannot be characterized as particularly unusual, although it might have affected his radicalization process to some degree. He did not have any military background at all, but compensated for this with thoroughness with regard to the bomb making. When it comes to handling the weapons, he did not need to practice a lot with these, due to the fact that he shot most of his victims on rather close distances. His hostile reconnaissance efforts were clearly superficial and amateurish, although he tried to make a good impression in the police interviews in this area, so that he should be regarded as a competent terrorist. It did not work.

As for external factors this will be touched upon later in this section, but right-wing terrorism was not much in focus in Norway when Breivik planned his terrorist activities. Until 22 July 2011, Norway had been spared for serious terrorist incidents. Hence the focus and resources on societal security related

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

to the threat from terrorism had been limited before these attacks. This may partially explain the unfortunate process regarding the planned closure of the Grubbegata street in the Government Quarter, which in the end made it easy for the terrorist to reach his first target. It must also be added, however, that Breivik's very limited insight related to the capabilities of the police security service and the preventive security efforts at different locations, became a constraint in several ways. This was for example obvious with regard to his information gathering and hostile reconnaissance efforts.

Moving to the target selection process, this thesis has explained how even a seemingly ruthless terrorist like Breivik operated under, and was affected by, an overarching framework and a number of constraints. A high number of variables linked to ideology, strategy, internal factors and external factors - including unexpected constraints and pure coincidences - were involved. As they interacted like ingredients in a simmering pot, the operational phase became profoundly dynamic. Hence, Breivik experienced first-hand that targeting processes and operational phases in general are not linear and fully controllable. This frustrated Breivik considerably, because he had to adjust his plans and activities many times. He admitted this openly during the trial (NTB court transcripts, 25.04.2012):

"I assessed all the time. Problems surfaced, I had to reconsider. I had to make new assessments as a result of mistakes and other things. I had to adapt the strategy, the plan. The whole day, even when I was on my way (to Utøya) I had to make adjustments and new assessments."

Anders Behring Breivik, 20.04.2012

For Breivik, his focus on time-fixed events also increased the stress level, and with the decision to attack Utøya sheer pragmatism was introduced. The summer camp participants at the island were not eligible for death penalty, according to the terrorist's own manifesto. As such, the terrorist's determination and eagerness to act became too strong for his self-imposed restrictions with regard to whom to kill. Moreover, and as a matter of tragic irony, the terrorist's main operation, namely the bombing in the Government Quarter, was to be overshadowed by his secondary operation at Utøya (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,08,01). In short, one main conclusion

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

of this thesis is that terrorist operations are indeed dynamic and unpredictable processes, and the final output is uncertain until the attack(s) is actually conducted.

The analysis of the total target overview dataset and Breivik's concrete plans, has illustrated that the targets' symbolic value or status was essential in the selection process in this case. In particular, iconic targets functioned as magnets for the terrorist's planned bomb attacks, and unfortunately, even these did not have adequately protection at the time. Also worth mentioning, Breivik could not limit himself to attack a single individual only, as this would not be significant enough. He also wanted to focus on the Labour Party, and not potential targets linked to one of the other political parties in Norway. Moreover, he did not want to attack police or military personnel since they were potential allies in the future struggle. Adding here the fact that he did not want to kill random civilians, although he would accept some "civilian" casualties, Breivik was never planning for indiscriminate targeting.

With regard to target categories the authorities, political opponents and news media were the most attractive target groups for Breivik. He saw the media as the hub and amplifier communicating the policy of the authorities and the multiculturalists. In one of his writings from prison after the trial, sent to the police and a number of other institutions, Breivik stated that, "22/7 was mainly directed at the Labour party and the Norwegian press" (Breivik, 2013: 16). Although media institutions were ranked high on the list of targets he considered seriously, and the SKUP media conference was the shooting attack target number one in the original plan, in the end no media targets were actually attacked. Yet again, this demonstrates that the interaction between different constraints derailed Breivik from his stated goal of striking the Norwegian press, leading him to hit the Labour party only.

Norway learned a hard lesson on 22 July 2011. It was a peaceful society that was struck by a ruthless right-wing extremist, and although there was a clear political consensus that Breivik should be treated like a common criminal, and that the democratic values of the Norwegian society should continue, societal security came high on the agenda afterwards. This is typical for most countries that have experienced major terrorist attacks, and most often such incidents tend to boost counterterrorism efforts like nothing else. Just recollect

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

how the 1972 Black September attack in Munich became the mother of elite counter-terrorism units in several countries in Europe, or how the Provisional IRA campaigns in England led to the Ring of Steel in the City of London. Furthermore, we saw how the 9/11 attacks boosted aviation security and intelligence resources, and how the more recent Charlie Hebdo attack and Koshers shop siege in Paris released no less than €425 million to counter-terrorism efforts over a three-year period in France (The Local, 2015c). It should therefore come as no surprise that the Norwegian government initiated a number of evaluations in different sectors after the 22 July attacks, which in turn led to a number of reforms and more resources with regard to societal security. As such, it seems valid to say that focus, abilities and capacities with regard to prevention, protection, emergency capabilities and resilience have been improved in Norway after the 22 July attacks.

The Breivik case was not just a rude awakening for the Norwegian government, politicians and authorities in general. It also opened up the eyes of the Norwegian public. Until the attacks conducted by Anders Behring Breivik most Norwegians were not aware of the far-right extremist views and activity in our midst. The strike came from an unexpected direction, and few Norwegians expected to see a conservative-looking, blond Norwegian male on the front page of the newspapers the day after the attacks. Even though militant Islamists still represent the gravest security threat towards the society, the Norwegians may have become more realistic about the dangers of political violence in general after the 22 July attacks.

Even though it was Norway who learnt a lesson the hard way on 22 July 2011, the attacks did have an international impact too. The attacks put the solo terrorism phenomenon on the agenda internationally. A fear for copycats and “follow ups” were soon expressed from security authorities in a number of countries. As such, Breivik had demonstrated for the whole world that one individual only may cause just as much, or even more, damage than groups and large networks often do. His bomb in Oslo did not stand that much back for the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s “city buster” attacks in London in the 1990s. When the new Government Quarter in Oslo is established on the same location around 2024, the total price tag after Breivik’s attacks will by far exceed the costs after the mentioned PIRA bombings in London (see for example English, 2003). If we then add the barbaric attack at Utøya, it is clear

Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway

that few group-based operations have exceeded the lethality, material damage and financial consequences that Anders Behring Breivik caused. Unfortunately, we have in the last few years experienced several serious incidents in Europe and elsewhere where one individual only have caused a lot of casualties – sometimes by the use of simple means. As such, Breivik might not be so unique in that sense, but the long timeline, the operational security awareness, the complexity of the operation and the combination of both firearms and explosives still makes Breivik and the 22 July 2011 attacks to a special case.

Solo terrorism will never be a game-changer per se, in the sense that it will never represent a significant threat to the existence of a state, or topple a democratic society. The same applies for terrorism caused by groups or movements – at least in Western Europe. Solo terrorists can, however, inflict a substantial amount of casualties, as well as significant material and financial damage. They can also effectively spread fear and uncertainty in a population over a period of time. Their actions may also lead to limited political consequences, for example if negligence or mistakes are disclosed after official hearings. Therefore, solo terrorism (just like political violence in general) is certainly a serious threat that cannot be neglected. After all, a primary task for any government is to protect its citizens.

On a final note, solo terrorism as a phenomenon will never fully cease to exist, but be a part of the general threat picture. For periods it is likely to represent a very minor part in it, and at other times it may be a more frequent problem. It can, however, never be totally discarded from the threat assessment context. As such, solo or lone actor terrorism represents a constant, but unclear and unpredictable threat - and it will remain so for the future. There is, however, one comforting aspect. Solo terrorists, and especially those with a considerable operational capability and mass casualty focus, are a rare breed.

4 The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

4.1 Introduction

Militant Islamists adhering to the Sunni-based Salafi-jihadism ideology have been operating in Europe for more than two decades. The GIA-campaign, limited to France in the mid-1990s, developed into a greater transnational phenomenon in the 2000s, and currently no parts of the continent can discard the possibility of experiencing an attack from jihadists – although some countries have proven to be more exposed to the threat than others. The increasingly long timeline, combined with the increasing number of plots and attacks for the last years, have strengthened the basis for analysing operational aspects related to jihadist activity, including their targeting preferences. Accordingly, this forms the background of this multiple case study of the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe. As described in the section on theory and methodology, the open source information available for this research is not detailed enough to trace the concrete decision-making processes of most individuals, cells and organisations. Still, by looking at what the jihadists have actually planned in plots and executed in attacks, valuable knowledge can be retrieved regarding their *targeting preferences*.

The starting point for this research is the dataset developed specifically for this project, as described in part one of this thesis. The dataset consists of 246 plots and attacks, covering the period from 1994 to 2016 in Western Europe (see Appendix 1). In total, there are 70 conducted attacks and 176 plots. All conducted attacks, and 92 of the 176 plots, have been strongly documented. The remaining 84 plots have vague documentation. To maintain high research standards, only the plots with strong documentation and the conducted attacks are applied in the analysis (see Appendix 1). It is also obvious that only conducted attacks offer a complete and somewhat certain targeting process. Plots will always involve uncertainties until the attack in question is actually initiated.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Some countries in Western Europe have been exposed to more executed attacks than others. The following is an overview based on the 92 plots with strong documentation and the 70 conducted attacks*.

	FRA	UK	GER	ITA	DEN	BEL	OTHERS
Plots / attacks, n162	54	38	21	14	12	10	14

* For plots and attacks involving trans-Atlantic flights, the country of flight departure has been listed. In the 2007 Christopher Paul case, the target country in Europe could not be determined. In the 2010 Europe Mumbai plot, several countries could potentially become involved, and this is why the numbers in the overview add up to 163 in total.

There are noticeable gaps between France's 54 cases, UK's 38 cases, and Germany's 21 incidents, but these three countries draw the main attention from the militant Islamists in Europe. They are all large, central countries with extensive military involvement in conflict zones outside Europe. Furthermore, all of them have significant extremist networks within their borders. Then, there are a few countries in a mid-position. Italy has 14 registrations. Denmark comes next with 12 cases, while Belgium follows behind closely with 10 incidents. The category *Others* includes Spain (five cases), Netherlands (four cases), Sweden (two cases), Austria (one case), Switzerland (one case) and Norway (one case).

Looking at the development over time, all incidents registered for the mid-1990s took place in France. From 2003 to around 2010, UK had the highest number of plots and attacks, but Italy was also very much in focus then. From 2005, Denmark came into focus due to the cartoon drawings published the same year (Rose, 2005). From 2010, there was also a shift – France and UK were joined by Germany as the then most popular target countries. Until then, Germany had seen only a modest number of cases. In the last two years of this dataset, 2015 and 2016, France experienced the highest number of plots and attacks. Germany also saw a further negative development, with seven cases just in 2016. Belgium has also experienced more cases in recent years, which is probably partially due to its proximity to France. Even in the 1990s, Belgium was slightly affected by the terrorist activities in France. One example is from 1995, when a policeman was injured when a grenade was thrown from a car (Lia & Kjøk, 2001: 35). Another example is from 1996, when two GIA jihadists in a car opened fire against Belgian police officers

during a routine check (Nesser, 2008: 928-929). It is beyond the scope of this project to analyse the reasons for these geographic developments, but the point is that some countries are under a considerable higher threat from the jihadists than others. For the countries that have not been experiencing many cases, this offers little comfort in practice due to the transnational dimension of the threat and the fact that just one terrorist operation can cause devastating damage, as seen with Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks in Norway.

4.2 Exploring the continuum of lethality

In the following section, I first analyse the three issues of intent that have a substantial influence on the damage potential regarding the general public. These issues are as follows; mass casualty focus or not, the soft or hard target preference, and the degree of discrimination. For the latter, the distinction is between indiscriminate and discriminate targeting. Furthermore, I pursue the discrimination issue one step further, by categorizing and analysing the specific target types that have been given attention by the jihadists. Accordingly, the abovementioned are the key issues to be covered in this part of the research project. Some other related issues will also be touched upon, although more briefly, since lack of detailed information or a limited number of relevant cases do not allow for firm conclusions.

It has previously been explained why and how militant Islamists altered the public security situation for European countries from the mid-1990s onwards. In this part of the thesis, the focus will be on the main characteristics that were highlighted as an explanation for this, namely their willingness to commit mass casualty attacks, to strike against soft targets and to target totally indiscriminately. Obviously, militant Islamists commit such acts, but to what degree? This is important to clarify since, in practice, these three features of intent constitute a warning triangle regarding the lethality potential of terrorist acts with a massive impact from the perspective of societal security. After all, whether terrorists attack primarily authorities and representatives of the state or target the general public on random in public areas are two fundamentally different security challenges. In the latter case, the fear in the population will be taken to a higher level, and the security challenges for the authorities will

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

be considerably more complex. Not least, it will be very demanding in terms of resources like money and manpower. Accordingly, the three features of intent come across as central for why militant Islamists represent a more complex threat for European security authorities than the terrorists from the 1970s and 80s ever did (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992; Clark, 1984; Dartnell, 1995; Kraushaar, ed., 2006; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton, & McVea, 1999). This seems to be somewhat overlooked when the current threat situation is compared to previous decades (Bergen, 2015; Stanley, 2016). Moreover, I find that these features of intent are rarely defined thoroughly in books and reports – even in works focusing on operational aspects of terrorist activity (e.g. Hesterman, 2015; Sommer, 2010).

It should also be mentioned that, in many ways, the militant Islamists are not a heterogeneous group of actors. There are lone actors, duos and groups. Some might be centrally-led, while some may be more loosely connected to networks as affiliates; others may not be connected at all, but rather be “inspired” by AQ or ISIS. Also, it is important to note that the average terrorist attack is not the result of a multi-layered, complex, centrally-led operation with the potential of killing hundreds of people, but more often small-scale operations conducted by low-capability perpetrators. Having made that point, this commences with the issue of casualty focus, which will be followed by the hard versus soft target question before the subject of discrimination will be addressed.

4.3 Casualty focus and the impact of fatalities

Material or economic damage alone can very well be an objective for terrorist acts. Attacks against the transport sector or critical infrastructure, for example, can disrupt people’s lives significantly. It is still the case, however, that terrorism is most often inextricably linked to death – or the threat of it. After all, it is the deliberate intention of killing people that is the primary fear factor for the general public. Even more unfortunate here, I will argue, is the fact that the number of casualties does matter, and this is true for all parties involved. Let us think about how terrorist attacks are characterized or, in a way, rated in a historical context. What do they have in common? The answer is a high number of fatalities. The 2001 9/11 attacks are probably not at the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

top of the list of the worst terrorist attacks just due to the spectacular nature of these incidents, but also because almost 3000 innocent people were killed that day. Furthermore, most will agree that the 9/11 attacks were worse than the 2004 Madrid bombings (191 people killed), which in turn was worse than the 2016 Brussels attacks (32 people killed). Accordingly, for the authorities, as well as the public, the number of fatalities says something about the severity and gravity of an attack. As mentioned above, material and financial damage can also be a parameter for measuring consequences, but only if the damages are extensive. Furthermore, and at least in a Western context, such acts are more likely to be conducted by actors seeking to avoid killing civilians indiscriminately. Examples in this regard are the “city buster” bombings conducted by the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in London on several occasions, including the 1992 Baltic Exchange bombing, the 1993 Bishops gate incident and the 1996 Canary Wharf attack (McGladdery, 2006: 248–253). These attacks caused massive material and financial damage, but mass casualties were avoided due to pre-warnings from PIRA, allowing for evacuation before the bombs detonated. Militant Islamists conducting attacks in the West, in contrast, do not focus on material or financial damage alone. They consistently focus on killing a lot of people and there is no such thing as pre-warnings in these cases.

Considering that authorities and most people seem to rate the graveness of terrorist attacks by the number of fatalities, it should be added that there is a parallel here with the terrorists – just in an opposite manner. The number of people killed will typically affect the perceived degree of success among the perpetrators in a substantial way. The number of people killed will, at least, indicate a certain degree of success, while no casualties will mean total failure. The only way a high number of casualties can lead to negative implications for a terrorist actor is if the wrong people are killed. This is, however, at large a concern for violent actors who are constrained to target discriminately, and hence not necessarily a big issue for militant Islamists.

Another factor is that the instrumental effect of terrorism is based very much on extensive media coverage. Nothing ensures this better than the number of casualties (Nacos, 2007). A terrorist attack without fatalities is not likely to cause a lot of media coverage – at least the international press coverage will be limited. If there are casualties, however, the media coverage will increase

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

both in national and international terms – here, too, the number of casualties will impact the extensiveness. A massive media coverage lasting several days is primarily seen with major mass casualty terrorist attacks, like the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 7/7 London bombings and the 2015 13 November attacks in Paris. After such incidents the media coverage is taken to another level, and it is highly likely to significantly affect the fear factor among the public. Moreover, attacks resulting in a lot of casualties, and especially if they are part of a sustained campaign, will create political pressure on the authorities, and they may also cause political consequences.

Terrorist campaigns and major attacks causing a lot of fatalities can also prove negative for the terrorists. A point to be noted here is that although killing people generates publicity, it is also likely to turn people against the perpetrators (English, 2016: 89). The higher the number of fatalities, the greater the rejection can be, if the attack is not considered legitimate. This is, as mentioned above, somewhat dependent on the type of actor. Militant Islamists operating away from their geographical interest region may not fear such a backfire effect as much as ethno-nationalists operating on home territory. Another point is that complex mass casualty operations might be a double-edged sword for the terrorists in case they are not able to follow it up and keep the momentum going. Both internally and externally, a lack of proper follow-up may be interpreted as a sign of weakness or that the movement is under pressure. This leads us to the third point, namely that mass casualty attacks are the mother of all extensive counterterrorism packages that are likely to weaken the terrorists in the long run. We have seen this after devastating attacks, like 9/11, the 2005 7/7 bombings, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack and the 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice. They all triggered massive counter-terrorism efforts in various ways, including more funding for the law enforcement sector and military capabilities, legislative adjustments, as well as increased national and international intelligence cooperation.

4.3.1 What is a mass casualty incident?

Before addressing the nature of the militant Islamist's casualty focus in more detail, the definitional issue deserves attention. What is a mass casualty incident (MCI)? A common understanding is that it is an incident that

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

involves several casualties and requires an extraordinary effort from the emergency services - without linking it to a fixed number of deaths. This interpretation is in accordance with official definitions, like the one applied by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2007: 9): A mass casualty incident is;

“...an event, which generates more patients at one time than locally available resources can manage using routine procedures. It requires exceptional emergency arrangements and additional or extraordinary assistance.”



So, for emergency services, the decision to declare a mass casualty incident will be situational and contextual, not initiated due to an exact number of victims, but rather triggered by the overall emergency sector’s ability to cope with the situation. This makes sense since the local capability may vary significantly. Furthermore, a fixed number may, in practice, become a success parameter for the terrorists. One of the few definitions related to this issue, with a fixed number of casualties, is a US federal definition of mass killing. It is found in the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 (US Congress, 2012), also referred to in FBI report on active shooter incidents (FBI, 2013). Here a *mass killing* is defined as three or more killings in a single incident. Note, however, that the MCI term also covers non-criminal acts. From a research perspective, some may argue that a contextual assessment may challenge consistency when measuring this feature, but I will argue that contextual information will most often clarify whether the casualty potential is one or few victims (e.g. five or less), or a higher number of casualties. In the latter case, it is highly likely that extraordinary emergency steps will be activated, regardless of location and other contextual factors.

4.3.2 From the dataset

In 194 of 246 cases it has been possible to assess the casualty focus of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe. There are 124 plots and 70 attacks. Of the 124 plots, there are 47 plots with vague documentation. Confining the focus to the 77 plots with strong documentation (there are seven plots where both mass and limited focus are registered), there is a mass casualty focus in 87.0% and a limited casualty focus in 22.1% of the plots. For the 70 launched attacks, in contrast, the mass casualty focus is down to 54.3%, while it is a

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

limited casualty focus in 45.7% of the attacks. The development over time is shown below.



The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

As illustrated, mass casualty focus dominated in plots for almost the whole period, and quite clearly so from 2000 to 2009, before ending with a significant peak for 2016. As for launched attacks, the mass casualty focus dominated significantly in the mid-1990s. For the 2000s, however, the picture gets more varied. The mid-2000s came out quite even, before the limited casualty focus increased from 2010 onwards. It has been slightly dominant for the last few years, ending with a peak in 2016, a year that saw five mass casualty attacks and nine limited casualty attacks. The main conclusion is that the mass casualty focus among militant Islamists is substantial and has been so during the whole timeline of this study. Furthermore, mass casualty focus is rarely controversial within their ranks as long as the target is regarded legitimate.

The most interesting finding, however, is the divergence of casualty focus seen between plots and attacks, respectively. The mass casualty dominance seen in plots is clearly reduced for the launched attacks, where the limited casualty focus partially dominates from 2010 onwards. The question is whether there are sound explanations for these fluctuations. I will argue that two interlinked factors contribute strongly to explain the difference observed here. The first factor is that networks and groups are generally likely to be more ambitious and plan mass casualty attacks more often than lone actors. This is probably linked to the perceived and factual capability of a group, besides the impact this has on intragroup dynamics. More manpower will normally mean a higher operational capability; due to an expanded network, different tasks can be divided among several people, making it possible for them to attack simultaneously, and so on. Furthermore, the perception of high capability is likely to trigger ambitious ideas as soon as the target browsing begins. Quite often, however, initial high ambitions seem to be reduced quite soon, or at least later, during the planning process.

The second factor is linked to the lone actor development from around 2010 and to the fact that groups are more likely to be detected before they manage to launch an attack as compared to lone actors – as seen in Scandinavia for the last decade (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016: 101–105). Despite being linked to extremist milieus in one way or another, they slip under the radar of the security services more often than groups. In the dataset here, it can be seen how the mass casualty and limited casualty focus have developed in

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

accordance with the group versus lone actor developments. Going back to the timeline, the mid-1990s were dominated by the consistent mass casualty focus, applied by the GIA-affiliated terrorists operating in France (Lia & Kjøk, 2001: 37; Nesser, 2008: 927-929). The lack of other actors and thwarted plots in this period, however, reduces the analytical potential. For the 2000s, groups dominated until 2009–2010, but they were often detected in time, so the number of conducted attacks were rather limited.

From 2010 onwards, the limited casualty focus increased, corresponding with more attacks conducted by one perpetrator only. Several attacks conducted by lone actors suggest that many of these actually act more in accordance with their somewhat limited capacities. Three examples can be briefly mentioned here. The first is the case of Roshonara Choudry, who stabbed MP Stephen Timms in East London in 2010 (Nesser, 2014: 444; Rayner & Bingham, 2010). The second is Arid Uka, who shot and killed two US servicemen at Frankfurt airport in 2011 (Huffington Post, 2012). The third is Alexandre Dhaussy, who stabbed a soldier in Paris in 2013 (France24, 2013). As will be discussed more thoroughly in the section that covers discrimination, lone actors are more likely to target name-specific individuals, but this is not necessarily just a result of limited capability. It can, for example, be the case that such attacks are initiated against high-ranking politicians or individuals who have been branded with a trophy status by the jihadists. Examples of this are the LaRose plot against Swedish artist Lars Vilks in 2009, the Beisicht plot in Germany in 2013 and the interest shown for Tony and Cherie Blair by Erol Incidal and others in 2013.

A complicating factor from a threat assessment perspective is that some perpetrators conduct both limited and mass casualty attacks. Mohammed Merah conducted three attacks, and while the two first attacks against soldiers can be characterized as limited casualty attacks, the attack on the Jewish school had mass casualty potential (BBC news, 2015). The same was seen with Amedy Coulibaly, who in his two first attacks shot a jogger and a female police officer, respectively, before he initiated the kosher shop siege in Paris, which had characteristics of mass casualty (IBT, 2015). These two examples illustrate how tactics, practical considerations and situational circumstances – and not just moral reflections – influence target decision-making on the individual level.

4.3.3 Few attacks cause many deaths

26 of the 70 launched attacks have caused fatalities. In total, 555 people have been killed, leading to an average of 7.9 % fatalities per attack. It is important to note, though, that as few as eight attacks caused 523 of 555 deaths (94.2%), and seven of these were connected to established networks. In 1995, eight people were killed in the St Michel metro bombing in Paris (Nesser, 2008: 927). In 2004, the most fatal attack to date conducted by militant Islamists in Europe occurred when 191 people were killed in the Madrid M11 bombings (BBC news, 2004b). A year later, the London Underground and a bus were struck in the 7/7 bombings, causing 52 fatalities in all (London Assembly, 2006). The Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015 caused the death of 12 people (BBC News, 2015). Then, the 13 November 2015 Mumbai-style terrorist operation in Paris killed as many as 130 people (France 24, 2015c). The March 2016 Brussels bombings caused 32 fatalities and, finally, the 2016 Berlin truck attack killed 12 people. The 2016 Bastille Day truck attack in Nice, causing 86 deaths, seems, at the time of writing, to be the acts of a man acting more independently and without a network being actively involved. The eighteen remaining attacks that claimed lives caused four or less fatalities each. Hence, a majority of terrorist attacks do not lead to casualties, few attacks cause mass casualties and those that do are normally linked to established networks. Less connected, 'inspired' jihadists rarely achieve grave results. It has been a negative development for the last few years, however, with more attacks. Furthermore, five of eight mass casualty attacks took place between January 2015 and December 2016.

Weapons are highly relevant for the casualty factor. Melee (non-firing) weapons and vehicles have increasingly supplemented explosives and firearms in attacks during the last years. In the eight attacks causing mass casualties, explosives played an essential part in five –the 1995 St Michel incident, the 2004 Madrid attacks, the 2005 7/7 attacks, the 2015 November attacks in Paris and the 2016 Brussels attacks. A combined use of explosives and firearms was seen in the 2015 November attack in Paris. In the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, assault rifles were primary weapons. A number of terrorist incidents has shown that explosives made with competence represent a significant lethality potential, while people inexperienced with bombs often fail. This is either because the IED does not detonate at all, or only partially.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

In several cases, the perpetrator is the only one who is injured or killed. Knives and melee weapons are often not so effective when used by a lone perpetrator. Fusilier Lee Rigby, for example, was first hit by a vehicle before he was murdered in 2013. However, the 2017 London Bridge attack shows that several perpetrators with non-firing weapons can indeed represent a grave danger in crowded areas.

As illustrated in Nice and Berlin in 2016, the lethal potential of large vehicles is significant. Smaller vehicles are more often than not less effective, although the recent attack on La Rambla in Barcelona demonstrated that mid-size vans can also lead to devastating results (Sage, Bremner & Morris, 2017). In general, the lethal potential of military assault rifles must also be noted. This was thoroughly demonstrated in the attacks on the Jewish museum in Brussels in 2014, Charlie Hebdo in 2015 and in Paris in November 2015. The 2015 Sousse attack in Tunisia, where one man killed 38 people with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, is also often referred to regarding the militant Islamists. That said, semi-automatic rifles have proven to be just as lethal. This was demonstrated by Breivik with his Ruger rifle at Utøya, and also by the right-wing perpetrator behind the recent 2019 mosque attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand. He used two semi-automatic rifles in addition to other small arms for the attacks, in which 51 people were killed (BBS News, 2019a).

Moving to weapons we have not seen much of, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) based devices becomes an issue. Except for the 2003 toxic letters case, no attacks in this dataset have involved CBRN weapons. The interest of using biological or chemical weapons has been noted in a few plots, however. In the 2002 US embassy plot in Rome, poisoning water networks was one idea. In the 2003 ricin plot, involving jihadist Bourgass, CBRN protection suits were found in the Finsbury Park mosque (Makarenko, 2007: 52) It can be added that the interest for ricin have been observed quite recently in Europe too, in the June 2018 Cologne ricin plot (Flade, 2018). Furthermore, experiments and attacks elsewhere in the world should also be taken into consideration. The prime example is the Aum Shinrikyo movement, which pursued both biological and chemical agents. On at least nine occasions they spread biological agents in and around Tokyo and nearby US bases (Kaplan, 2000: 216). What is better known is that they launched two serious sarin attacks in Japan in 1994 and 1995. The first attack,

which was directed against a residential area of judges, killed seven people. The second attack, directed at the Tokyo subway, killed 12 people (Kaplan & Marshall, 1996; Kaplan, 2000: 207–226). As for the jihadists, there has been a debate about whether the 1993 World Trade Center attackers added cyanide to the explosives to increase the lethal potential, but there is no certainty on this issue (Parachini, 2000: 185–206). As for nuclear facilities as targets, these will be elaborated upon later in this thesis in the target type category *Others*. When it comes to cyber terrorism as a mean to achieve killings, there are no incidents in the dataset for this project. However, for some time now, there has been a considerable concern about a cyber Pearl Harbour (Hamre, 2015) – for example, taking control over flight management systems controlled by aviation authorities.

4.4 The hard and soft target preference

How well a potential target is protected is an important factor that terrorists will consider during a target selection process. In practice, the level of protection ranges from totally unprotected to extremely well protected. Well protected targets are typically characterized as *hard targets*, while targets lacking adequate protective measures are commonly known as *soft targets*. A more thorough definitional clarification is needed, however, since some vague or misleading explanations can be seen in this area. The differentiation between military and civilian targets, as partially done by Hesterman (2015:1), does not work since a military target could very well constitute a soft target, while a civilian could represent a hard target. For example, it has been shown that armed soldiers conducting guard duty alone in an urban environment are soft targets in practice. Much is due to the fact that at close range, surprise typically beats reaction. Furthermore, it is impossible for one person to have control in all directions at the same time. One incident illustrating this is the attack launched by Alexandre Dhassau against a French soldier at a Metro station near Paris on 27 May 2013 (France24, 2013). The perpetrator attacked the soldier from behind and stabbed him with a sharp instrument, leaving him with injuries in the neck and throat, before fleeing the scene. In contradiction, artist Lars Vilks was in reality a hard target when the meeting he attended in Copenhagen in February 2015 came under attack. At

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

this event, ordinary police provided an outer ring of security, while close protection officers took care of Vilks.

Another common type of differentiation is to focus on the degree of protective security only, where the basic principle is that well protected institutions, premises or individuals represent hard targets, while those insufficiently protected or unprotected are categorised as soft targets (e.g. Bowman, 2016: 5-6; Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2006: 1371; Hastings & Chan, 2013). This is more constructive since it relates to the level of protection and not the target type per se. The challenge to draw the line between the two categories remains, however, since *target hardening* does not necessarily lead to a hard target status. There are, after all, many kinds of security efforts and means in the toolbox for protective security; some have more impact than others. A member of government or parliament could, for instance, be given security advice with regard to their general behaviour. Such advice can typically be related to avoiding routines and altering the route they use while going to work. This is, however, not enough to make them hard targets per se. If, in contrast, their homes and offices are made safer with physical and technical measures, and they are followed by a team of dedicated close protection officers, the hard target status is justified. To complicate this matter even more, certain potential targets may alter between being soft and hard targets. Cartoonist Kurt Westergaard and artist Lars Vilks are two examples. The protective efforts established at their private homes do not necessarily make them hard targets, but when close protection officers are escorting them to public appearances, they probably are hard targets. As for Kurt Westergaard, the attack against him in 2010 could have ended in tragedy. The attack on Vilks in Copenhagen in 2015 was, in contrast, far from successful (Jyllands-Posten, 2015a).

If we turn to buildings and premises, an office building with bollards close to the building and ordinary admittance control will still be a soft target for terrorists with a certain capability. On the other hand, premises with solid perimeter security, good stand-off distance to traffic, CCTV and alarm systems, and having the presence of armed police or guards, will clearly be a hard target. Flights are also interesting in these contexts. In general, the extensive security measures at airports makes it difficult to get weapons and explosives onboard flights. Furthermore, the cockpits are locked, and several

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

major airliners even have armed air-marshals. Rightly, airplanes can be shot down with surface-to-air rockets during take-off or landing, but this is not easy. Just getting hold of such weapons and moving them around represents a considerable risk of detection. Using them also demands training and experience. Additionally, perimeter security around most airports makes such attacks difficult. In sum, flights can rightly be characterised as hard targets.

Regarding a definitional conclusion, hard targets are here defined as targets protected to such a high standard that a terrorist attack clearly is likely to fail. Soft targets are unprotected or inadequately protected to ward off an attack. The hard or soft target aspect must be assessed individually in each case, because here it is a prerequisite that the capability of the perpetrator(s) must be seen up against the security measures protecting the target (s) in question.

4.4.1 Most attractive targets are often out of reach

Although terrorists typically attack vulnerable civilians to achieve an impact on political decision-makers, many violent actors would also exploit any possibility to strike directly against the same decision-makers, if given the chance. From the terrorists' point of view, the political leadership of a nation do, after all, represent the command and control element of the enemy, and they are often held directly responsible for the conditions the terrorists ultimately seek to change. The terrorists' problem is that these highly symbolic targets most often are very well protected.

Just a few decades ago, protective security was not a big issue. The protection of highly symbolic buildings and premises was to a less degree based on physical barriers and technical means. The typical preventive security effort at exposed potential terrorist targets would – in many Western countries – involve some armed police officers on the outside of the building or premises. The risk of detection during hostile reconnaissance was limited, and for the terrorists the challenge was probably often more about how to eliminate police officers to gain entry than anything else. Today, protective security is a totally different matter. Highly symbolic state and government bodies, as well as private assets that are a part of the critical national infrastructure, are protected with assistance from national security authorities and police resources with a high-level of expertise. In the US, the Department of

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Homeland Security and affiliated organizations are heavily engaged in protective security efforts. In the UK, the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and its partners are working extensively with protective security matters. The broad and in-depth approach regarding physical and technical security efforts can, for example, be seen in manuals published by security authorities (FEMA, 2007; Department of Homeland Security, 2011).

For highly symbolic institutions and others, where robust protective security makes attacks difficult, the insider threat emerges as an option for the terrorists – for example, through infiltration. The 2010 Karim case in the UK, where the employee of an airliner planned to take down a plane is an interesting case in this regard (Pantucci, 2015: 278-279). Another alternative can be to exploit a dissatisfied or revenge-seeking employee or simply to trick unknowing employees. Employees can also be radicalized after being hired. Accordingly, in well-protected institutions, if holistic security is to be achieved, the human and organisational factor must be given just as much focus as the physical and technical factors.

As described, for terrorists, the scope for action has been reduced for the last decades. This not only due to efforts countering the threat directly, but also due to protective measures. Hence, for them the decision to go for soft targets comes easy, if there are no moral qualms involved. This is quite evident for low-capability actors, but even high-capability actors will often prefer easy targets. We have now entered the interesting issue of deterrence, which is covered in the analysis part that follows.



The elaborations above could lead to the illusion that hard targets are totally avoided by terrorists, but that is not the case. Several events through the history of terrorism have demonstrated that highly symbolic assets and individuals with extensive protection can be targeted for several reasons. It could be that a capable terrorist actor actually thinks it is possible to conduct a successful attack and initiate an operation anyway. If successful, the prize is grand, so some terrorists can indeed be willing to accept a higher risk of failure. When a Jewish terrorist assassinated Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the Israeli Prime minister was protected by a massive security apparatus. This is just one example proving that what seems impossible can be done after all (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009: 99–110). Likewise, the Provisional IRA's

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

attempt to kill Prime minister Margaret Thatcher in Brighton in 1984 serves as another example (McGladdery, 2006: 125-135). Although the attack on the Twin Towers on 9/11 was not an attack on a hard target per se, the attack on the Pentagon certainly was. As mentioned, there will also be less rational terrorists that are too ambitious or zealous, and hence, initiate attacks that are more or less doomed to fail. Another variety is also attacks conducted against hard targets by high capability actors, even though they acknowledge that the likelihood for achieving success in the form of a kill is non-existent. In such cases the ability to launch an attack, as a demonstration of strength and in order to boost moral within their own ranks and among their sympathisers, might be relevant objectives (Austin & Chan, 2013: 777). One example is the attack conducted by the Provisional IRA on 10 Downing Street in 1991 (Taylor, 1997: 321–322). Another is the Real IRA's attack on MI6 in London in 2000 (Morrison, 2013: 186).

4.4.2 From the dataset

In 205 of the 246 cases, it is possible to say something about hard or soft target focus of the militant Islamists operating in Western Europe in the period 1994–2016. 53 plots have vague documentation and accordingly they have been excluded from further analysis. For the 82 plots with strong documentation (in 15 plots both hard and soft alternatives are present), there is hard target interest observed in 42.7% of them, and a soft target focus in 75.6 %. For the conducted 70 attacks (in two cases both alternatives are present), the hard target focus is down to 14.3%, while there is soft target focus in 88.6%.



The illustrations show that the soft target preference is visible for the whole period, with some exceptions. The clear soft target focus in the mid-1990s is due to the consistent strategy of the GIA-network in France. The December 1994 Algeria hijack is the only hard target case in this period, but the airport security arrangements in Algeria at the time is difficult to assess. In the period

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

from 2000 to about 2007, we can see that there were several plots that involved both hard and soft targets. This period was dominated by group plots, which often means higher ambitions and a broader target browsing process than individuals planning to act alone. On the other hand, groups were often detected in time during this period. Regarding the soft target focus from around 2010 onwards, this is partially linked to the lone actor developments seen from that time and the fact that such actors seem to slip under the radar more often than groups do.

The most interesting observation from the overviews is that the noticeable interest for hard targets in plots has almost diminished when it comes to the launched attacks. A hard target focus is observed occasionally, but such attacks are few and far between. The most consistent hard target type seen in attacks are flights, with a total of four incidents. These are the 1994 Algeria hijack, the 2001 Richard Reid case, the 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab case and the 2010 cargo planes incident. Established networks were behind all these attacks, but low-capability perpetrators have also conducted attacks against hard targets, like in the 2007 US embassy case in Vienna (Anes, 2007).

The main explanation for the soft target preference among militant Islamists is that in general, they find it legitimate to attack random civilians, and because there are robust security arrangements around particularly attractive targets. The fact that it is deemed legitimate to attack civilians indiscriminately opens an almost unlimited targeting portfolio for the terrorists. Furthermore, nothing triggers the public fear factor more than such attacks, besides soft targets normally meaning better odds for operational success and escape.

Protective efforts around attractive highly symbolic targets, like parliaments, government buildings and top politicians, is a totally different matter today if compared to two-three decades ago. A look to the online resources of the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) in the UK and the Department of Homeland Security in the US illustrate this to a large degree (CPNI, 2016, DHS, 2016). Literature on protective security, developed and published by security authorities, gives an even more thorough insight on the issue (e.g. FEMA, 2007; DHS, 2011). In conclusion, for years now hard

targets have become harder, while soft targets are as soft as they have always been.

4.4.3 Deterrence and target displacement

Two issues often raised when discussing hard and soft targets, as well as protective security in general, are deterrence and target displacement. Regarding deterrence, protective security is very much about creating a discouraging, deterrent effect, so that the terrorists will not initiate an attack at all. As for ordinary criminals, in his work Nagin (2013: 199) has presented valid arguments regarding apprehension and punishment, but I will argue that the only factor with real impact on militant Islamists is the likelihood for operational success. As such, perpetrator outcome is often not a big issue. Criminals will normally want to escape and survive, while many militant Islamists don't fear dying for their cause as martyrdom is something to strive for. That said, robust protective security, which makes the terrorists realise that the chance for operational success is minimal, will often have a deterrent effect. The potential target will be discarded and when that happens the terrorists' risk willingness has been overcome. A practical and natural consequence of this fact is that there will be target displacement, since most terrorists act with some amount of rationality. What should also be acknowledged here is that, at least when it comes to the casualty factor, target displacement can be negative or positive. For example, if terrorists are deterred from attacking a top politician and initiate a mass casualty attack in a public area instead, the target displacement can be characterised as negative. If, in contrast, terrorists are denied the option of a vehicle attack on a busy high street due to physical barriers and instead launch the vehicle attack in a less crowded street, the number of fatalities can be reduced. Then the target displacement has led to damage mitigation. It is also a valid point that every shift of target during a planning process will involve more activity from the terrorists' side, opening up possibilities for mistakes and pre-attack detection.

There were no attacks between 1994 and 2016 that involved the very hardest targets – like state leaders or highly symbolic state buildings. An interest for such targets can, however, be seen in some plots. For example, the 7/7 2005 bombers were encouraged to consider the Bank of England, the G8 summit in

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Scotland and the London Underground as targets (CNN, 2012a). The 2007 London car bomb plotters considered 10 Downing Street, the Palace of Westminster and Buckingham Palace (MailOnline, 2008). Nicky Reilly, attacking a restaurant in Exeter in 2008, also considered a police station, a shopping centre and the Devonport dockyard (Adetunji, 2008). It is also suggested that the trainers of Mohammed Merah in Pakistan had tried to persuade him to attack the Indian embassy in Paris. Allegedly, Merah decided against this due to the difficulties of such an operation (Naravane, 2012). As we know, in all the aforementioned cases, the perpetrators went for soft target alternatives. Furthermore, as will be discussed later under the section on target type category, attacks against the law enforcement and military sectors have gone from hard to soft target attacks in the last fifteen years.

4.4.4 Insiders are the Achilles heel of hard targets

One possible negative synergy effect from improved protection of highly attractive targets is that terrorists may seek to use other attack approaches. The worst-case scenario here is if they succeed in getting someone on the inside to assist or conduct an attack. The insider threat, I will argue, is the Achilles-heel of the most prestigious targets today, because even the best physical and technical security efforts are not likely to help in such a case. This fact underlines the importance of good organisational security management, including proper personnel security efforts. Moreover, insider threats may appear in different forms. It is typically linked to employees but can also include others with a more sporadic access to a target, like the employees of subcontractors. In the section of the thesis covering the different target type categories, it can be seen how militant Islamists have on several occasions tried to use the insider approach. In other words, this threat is for real. The Rajib Karim case from 2010 has already been mentioned, but another example outside the scope of this project is the policeman killing the Russian ambassador in Turkey in 2016. He took advantage of his position, which enabled him to carry out the assassination (Walker et al., 2016).

4.5 The issue of discrimination

Another central topic when it comes to terrorist targeting is the degree of discrimination. What and who do terrorists find legitimate to attack? Is their focus primarily directed against military forces, law enforcement personnel and others that are directly involved in the conflict, or are civilians also legitimate targets? If so, may all civilians, including women and children, be attacked, or are some categories of civilians to be spared? As described, the discrimination issue is one of the factors with the highest influence on terrorists' target portfolio, and it has significant impact on the lethality potential as well as the danger the actor represents to the general public.

With reference to the definitional issue on terrorism, who is targeted is a central issue in terms of the distinction between a legitimate armed struggle and terrorism. Hence, this goes straight into the classical *freedom fighter versus terrorist* debate, which is particularly noticeable in ethno-nationalist conflicts. Armed actors focusing only on military targets and the security apparatus have a better chance of avoiding the label of "terrorist" than those attacking civilian targets. This means that strategic considerations regarding the targeting discrimination issue are of considerable importance for a terrorist movement – if it is an ambition to gain legitimacy outside their own ranks. Killing a high number of civilians indiscriminately is likely to be counterproductive, since existing support (if there is any at all) in parts of the population can be expected to drop. One problem with the militant Islamists, from a European perspective, is of course that this global movement's centre of gravity is outside this continent. Hence, what the populations in the Western European countries think of the jihadists' actions is to a substantial degree of no concern to the militant Islamists. This is why the jihadists can apply a strategy of systematic indiscriminate targeting.

A learning point from past conflicts is that there is not always a clear-cut difference between military and civilian targets. There are always some categories of people who, due to their functions, fall somewhere in between, since they play some part in the conflict picture. During the troubles in Northern Ireland, the British Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) became preferred targets for the republican groups because of their role as security forces for the Crown

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

(McKittrick, D. Kelters, S., Feeney, B. Thornton, C. and McVea, D.; 1999). That said, individuals working in the prison services were also targeted due to the central role of the prison services with regard to the British internment policy. If we look at Spain and the Basque conflict, courts and judges were often considered legitimate targets due to their role in the conflict. As such, we can conclude that an occupational category, if given a direct and particular role in a conflict, runs a risk of becoming a legitimate target.

Two additional factors must be kept in mind when dealing with the discrimination issue. First, not all indiscriminate attacks are necessarily intentional. A bomb may explode prematurely, pre-warnings may be given too late to evacuate the area and the information given in pre-warnings may be imprecise. Moreover, the wrong category of people can be hit; for example, civilians being killed when military personnel were the intended target. The abovementioned factors by no means represent valid excuses for any terrorists, since everybody knows from the start that mistakes and mishaps are bound to take place during an armed conflict.

4.5.1 Indiscriminate or discriminate attacks is the main difference

To measure the degree of discrimination, some sort of parameter is needed, and the most important, overarching distinction is simply whether there is indiscriminate or discriminate targeting. The discriminate factor is strongly attached to the terrorists' alternative moral and rationality (Moghaddam 2008: 13). In practice, *indiscriminate targeting* means attacking random civilians that do not play any part in the conflict picture, typically in public space. To fulfil the criteria of total indiscriminate, there is no differentiation or consideration from the perpetrators side with regard to the victims' nationality, sex, age, race, political affiliation, religious beliefs or other characteristics. If so, the terrorists may, in principle, attack anyone anywhere. Accordingly, they can make full use of the target rich environment that, for example, a large city centre represents. Such terrorists, if the indiscriminate focus is combined with a mass casualty and soft target focus, represent the most serious threat to public safety - especially if they are high-capability actors as well. These are also the most challenging attacks to handle with

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

regard to police response – at least if the actors are determined to go on until they are killed themselves.

Indiscriminate attacks will normally take place in public areas, including on public transport. Typical outdoor targets can be iconic tourist attractions, high streets, markets, sports events, concerts and other crowded places. Indoor targets can for example be shopping centres, nightclubs, museums, hotels and public meetings. With regard to public transport, the aviation and rail transport sectors have been more frequently attacked than other transportation means.

Until the militant Islamists started operating in Europe (with exceptions), terrorists from ethno-nationalist organisations like Provisional IRA and Basque ETA, or left-wing groups like Rote Arme Fraktion and Red Brigades had at large shown a more selective targeting practice. Accordingly, several European governments and their respective security authorities had to deal with a totally new reality when the militant Islamist attacks became a transnational phenomenon on the continent. To protect ordinary citizens in public places is different and far more demanding than being able to focus on a limited number of potential targets like state buildings, royalties and top politicians.

4.5.2 Constraints mean discriminate targeting

As soon as there is some type of constraint or consideration in the selection of target, it will in principle represent a shift to *discriminate targeting*. This could, for example, be that women and children should be avoided, or that ordinary civilians should be spared in general. Accordingly, discriminate targeting means that only specific groups or individuals are targeted, like military forces, law enforcement personnel, authorities, royal personages, political or religious opposition, NGOs, media institutions, critical infrastructure and so on. A consequence of terrorists dealing with constraints in their targeting is that they must have better control over the operation they undertake.


The narrowest form of discriminate targeting is attacks against name-specific individuals. Such attacks are typically directed against politicians, high-


The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

ranking police or military officers, and public debate participants. In the context of societal security, individual specific plots and attacks do not endanger the public in general, but the threat against the individuals in question cannot become more serious.

4.5.3 From the dataset

There are 207 cases where target discrimination is registered. 55 plots have vague documentation, and that leaves us with 82 plots and 70 launched attacks as a starting point for further analysis. For the 82 plots with strong documentation (there are 16 cases where both alternatives are present), there is indiscriminate focus in 64.6% of them, and a discriminate focus in 54.9%. For the 70 attacks (there are two cases where both alternatives are present), the indiscriminate focus is down to 48.6%, while there is discriminate focus in 54.3%.





The mid-1990s was marked by the consistent modus operandi of the GIA-network, which attacked indiscriminately with only two exceptions. One was the killing of the co-founder of FIS, Shaykh al-Baqap Sahraoui, in Paris in 1995 (Nesser, 2008, p. 927; Kraft, 1995). The other was a bomb attack against a Jewish school in Lyon in the same year, where 14 children were injured (Nesser, 2008, p. 928; Riding, 1995). This GIA campaign, based on indiscriminate targeting in France in the 1990s, represented a shift for the police and security services in France. From 2000 onwards, the security authorities in other Western European countries were to experience the same, as the threat became transnational. From 2000 to 2010, the balance between indiscriminate and discriminate attacks came out to be quite even. From 2010 onwards, there has been a higher frequency of attacks, and for plots we see a considerable indiscriminate targeting focus. If we look at the launched attacks, however, discriminate attacks are dominant. The difference between plots and attacks seen for the last years is because several individuals conducting attacks on their own have slipped under the radar, while groups to a large degree have been detected in time. Many of the individuals acting alone have chosen to initiate discriminate attacks against military and police personnel, as well as individual-specific public debate participants. This seems rational from the terrorists' point of view, both with regard to their limited capability

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

and the fact that those categories that are attacked are attractive targets in general – due to their direct part in the conflict and the symbolism involved. The overweight of discriminate attacks for the last years is not, however, overwhelming. In total, the indiscriminate focus among the militant Islamists is significant, and there is no reason to believe that this will change in the future.

The details concerning what kind of targets the militant Islamists have focused on in plots and attacks beyond the issue of discrimination will be thoroughly addressed later in this thesis. What we do note here is that for launched attacks, there is in total a slight majority of indiscriminate attacks (54.3%) compared to discriminate attacks (48.6%). As for the indiscriminate attacks, these are conducted, with few exceptions, against random civilians in public areas and on public transport. Here, and this is particularly noticeable in the mass casualty attacks claiming a high number of victims, the attackers have made no difference between victims' gender, age, skin colour, religious affiliation or other factors. It is public knowledge, however, that some specific issues concerning target discrimination are subject to discussions in jihadi circles. This includes the legitimacy of killing of random civilians in general, killing women and children, and killing Muslims.

4.5.4 Are random civilians legitimate targets?

When looking into why random civilians, including women and children, represent legitimate targets for the militant Islamists, previous research on Osama bin Laden's and AQ's discourse and statements represent a starting point (Holbrook, 2014; Kepel & Milelli, 2008; Lawrence, 2005). In the late 1990s and the first half of the 1990s, Osama bin Laden rarely alluded to violence as an important method in the struggle. In the latter half of the 1990s, following the 1996 Al-Khobar bombings, he defended the use of terrorism and endorsed violent attacks against US troops in the Arabian Peninsula (Lawrence, 2005: 74, 78). Then, with the 1998 declaration of war from the World Islamic front, the regional focus and the military targets were expanded to include both soldiers and civilians – wherever they could be found (Kepel & Milelli, 2008: 55). Osama bin Laden's and AQ Central's main arguments for legitimizing the killing of civilians were that those who paid taxes and

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

voted for their political leaders constituted a support network legitimate to target for the jihadists (Holbrook, 2014: 86). For Zawahiri and his network in Egypt, the targeting debate was a familiar issue from the early 1990s. After the attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995, organized by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Zawahiri came under pressure due to the targeting. In *Suicide Operations: The Reasons for the Attack on the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad in 1995*, Zawahiri addressed some targeting aspects (Lacroix, 2008: 157). He declared that embassy workers were legitimate targets due to their government loyalty; furthermore, there was a lengthy piece justifying the killing of civilians. He concluded that if there was a need or an obligation for Muslims to do so, it was acceptable (Holbrooke, 2014: 86). Another input on the civilian casualty issue came with the publication of *Toward A New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier* by AQ strategist Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim. He did not distinguish between military and civilian targets but stated that there were *combatants* and *non-combatants*. In a pragmatic manner, he argued that the peoples of the crusader West were all to be regarded as combatants. The same rhetoric was used by Chechen leader Shamil Basayev when he informed Russian civilians that they were legitimate targets as they were “unarmed military men” (Dolnik, 2007: 116). This was very much based on the same arguments made by Osama bin Laden regarding tax paying, voting and general support to their government (Lacey, 2008: 155). As described, Osama bin Laden and leading individuals in AQ Central have broadly legitimized the killing of civilians in general, but not to everyone’s satisfaction. Two prominent voices close to Osama bin Laden, Abdallah Anas (son-in-law of Abdullah Azzam) and Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, confronted the AQ leader on different occasion, challenging him on indiscriminate targeting that caused mass casualty results (Bergen, 2011: 298–299).

Regarding ISIS, there is, at the time of writing, limited research on targeting relevant rhetoric. Their statements and actions, however, speak for themselves. The organization has followed the bloody tradition once seen with AQ in Iraq and made atrocities and bestiality a part of their signature characteristics. Conducted killings and calls for more blood have been a part of their online activity, and central individuals, like their former spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani (killed in 2016), have given speeches, leaving no

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

doubt that there are no constraints with regard to their methods and targets (Bayoumi, 2014; Stern & Berger, 2015: 95–96). Furthermore, the external operations group within ISIS, Emni, orchestrated both the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris and the 2016 Brussels bombings (Callimachi, 2016). These developments represent not just talk, but also action.

Returning to al-Qaida, there are a few specific subcategories causing particular challenging currents beneath a seemingly calm surface. One topic is the killing of women and children. Grave examples have been seen from time to time, not least with the 2004 school siege in Beslan, where almost 400 people were killed – many of them children (Martin, 2011: 127). Through the years, there have been strong voices arguing that killing women and children should be avoided. In his Global Islamic resistance call, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri acknowledged the problem, and advised that places and institutions occupied only by women and children should be spared (Lia, 2007: 411). However, Osama bin Laden, in a 2001 interview with Taysir Alluni from al-Jazeera, claimed that the Prophet's banning of killing women and children was not absolute (Lawrence, 2005: 183–185). His main argument was that it is permissible since the infidels purposely kill women and children of Muslims. Following this, reciprocity is a keyword for AQ's justification for killing civilians in an indiscriminate manner – including women and children. There is also a pragmatic side to this because it would be a considerable operational constraint if women and children should be spared under all circumstances. Blowing up airplanes, packed train carriages, as well as detonating bombs in crowded places, would become practically impossible. It could possibly also have a mitigating effect in terms of the public fear factor. Looking back, the most disastrous jihadist attacks in Western Europe have, after all, been indiscriminate mass casualty attacks against soft targets.

It is important to remember that there is also a personal side to terrorist targeting practice. Perpetrators that can make their own decisions may avoid indiscriminate attacks more than group members; this may be, for instance, due to group hierarchy and intragroup dynamics. There are further elaborations on this later in the thesis, in the section on one perpetrator only.

4.5.5 Shedding the blood of other Muslims

Killing Muslims has been a more challenging topic within jihadi circles than the killing of civilians since taking Muslims lives is explicitly forbidden in the Quran. The most natural way around this obstacle for pragmatic jihadi hardliners has been to simply argue that those Muslims who are killed are not really Muslims – in accordance with the *takfiri* narrative (Holbrooke, 2014: 89–90). Both Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri stated early in the 2000s that Muslim leaders allied with the West, as well as members of their military and security apparatus, were legitimate targets. This was a signal that the al-Qaida in Iraq followed up on so thoroughly that it eventually became problematic for Osama bin Laden and AQ.

There is, however, no consensus on the matter. Even though other Muslims may be traitors, as well as obstacles in the way of the cause, strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri has argued that they should be met with words, not swords (Lia, 2007: 409). Furthermore, in the short publication *Toward A New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier*, AQ strategist Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim argue strongly that operatives must strive to avoid killing Muslims, and he disagreed with common arguments about not caring about Muslims getting killed (Lacey, 2008: 156–157). Additionally, the Osama bin Laden files found in Abbottabad in 2011 revealed that the former AQ leader argued against mass casualty attacks against Muslims – even stating that some concrete individual-specific attacks could have been executed in a more accurate manner than they were (The Osama bin Laden files, 2012: 27–28). Osama bin Laden also made it clear that indiscriminate attacks against Muslims is forbidden by God, and this fact did not change even though the motive was jihad (The Osama bin Laden files, 2012: 36–38).

The most sincere attempt to justify the killing of other Muslims came from Zawahiri in 2008 as an answer to criticism from one of his oldest associates, Dr Fadl (Sayyed Imam al-Sharif), and other jihadists in Egypt. In the publication *The Exoneration*, Zawahiri came up with three major justifications for shedding Muslim blood (Holbrook, 2014: 91):

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

- 1) Muslim deaths in and among other legitimate targets are justifiable since the Prophet allowed night raids, as they were necessary to achieve victory. This means that attacks that do not distinguish between enemies within a confined space must also be allowed.
- 2) the seventh-century Muslim conquest used catapults – therefore indiscriminate weaponry and bombs must be justifiable even where Muslims live.
- 3) “captive” Muslims being held by enemy forces may be killed since this falls under the category of “persisting in combat”, even if they use Muslims as “human shields” (a concept referred to as *Mas’alatut at-Tatarrus*).

As described, there is a combined use of medieval interpretations and modern-day scenarios in Zawahiri’s justification, but as Holbrook (2014: 91) points out, the arguments rest on a weak theological and jurisprudential foundation. In conclusion, the killing of Muslims continues to be a difficult issue for AQ and its affiliates, shown through more cautionary notes from Zawahiri in more recent years. As for ISIS, they have not applied the same caution. The takfiri narrative seems to be the only possible alternative – not least since they are waging a war in a Muslim region, partially against other Muslim parties.

4.6 The target type categories

Having covered the issue of indiscriminate and discriminate focus, the next step is to provide an in-depth analysis of the different target type categories that have been exposed to plots and attacks by the militant Islamists in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016. A more superficial differentiating between target types would not release the full potential of the research material. In general, each target type category is different from the others in

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

several ways; so, by digging deeper, more precise knowledge can be retrieved. This includes an enhanced general understanding of the targeting against the specific target type in question, a better insight regarding the modus operandi applied by the terrorists, as well as an increased potential for identifying targeting shifts and trends against the target type over time. Furthermore, detailed knowledge is important for those involved in the development of effective countermeasures – with regard to protective security measures, for instance. Here, it must be remembered that general threat assessments from security services are rarely rich in detail. Hence, when it comes to practical efforts, they might be difficult to apply directly at a lower level. Establishing a good risk assessment, for example, will include the development of realistic scenarios. Good datasets with case descriptions and details will be of major importance for this kind of work. Furthermore, detailed knowledge on terrorist modus operandi will contribute to the best possible practice in terms of the operational tactics of the police and military, for example while patrolling or securing critical infrastructure or crowded places.

I will continue to base my analysis on the plots with strong documentation and the conducted attacks. However, I refer to vague plots when they are necessary to exemplify a general or specific point. After presenting the numbers from plots and attacks and showing how these are linked to the different target type categories, each of the respective categories will be separately assessed in greater detail. The first four categories will be those directly linked to state and government, namely *Authorities*, *Law enforcement*, *Military* and *Diplomatic missions*. Then, the categories that affect the general public most directly, *Public area* and *Transport*, will be covered. The category of *Transport* will be broken down into subcategories to achieve more depth and precision for the sectors involved, not least because aviation and rail transport represent two substantially different types of targets. These will be followed by the categories *Public debate*, *Religious institutions* and *Others*. The latter consists mainly of potential targets linked to critical infrastructure and information systems, but can also involve any asset or individual not covered by the other categories.

For each target type category, there will first be a general introduction detailing why the target type in question is attractive to terrorists. As pointed out by Clarke & Newman (2006: 93–96), there may be several factors that

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

influence this. Focusing primarily on the target characteristics, however, the attention here will primarily be on the *role and function* (alternatively activity and identity) of the target – including symbolic value when relevant. Furthermore, the *vulnerability* of the target is a major factor to consider. Within protective security risk assessments methodology, this is typically related to the level of protection (if any at all), target accessibility and the capability to respond to an attack – alternatively, the amount of time it will take for first responders with adequate capability to get to the scene. How central and influential each of these features are will vary both across target type categories and from case to case. After this, I will present the results from the dataset. A table will point to the most central cases, and this will be followed by a short description of central plots and attacks in a chronological order, so the situational context and the timeline developments is seen. This will be followed by an analysis, and in addition to the aforementioned features, target type changes within the target type category, developments linked to frequency of attacks, attack approach, casualties, as well as indicators of contagious effect will be addressed.

The starting point for analysis here is the 92 plots with strong documentation and the 70 conducted attacks. In 12 of the plots, targets have not been identified by the police investigations, which brings the number of plots down to 80. It should also be noted that many plots and attacks have involved several target type categories.

Plots and attacks according to target type category

Target type category	Plots (n80)	Attacks (n70)
Authorities	13	2
Law enforcement	11	9
Military	17	8
Diplomatic missions	9	2
Public area	30	21
Transport	34	21
Public debate	9	7

Religious institutions	12	5
Others	6	2

4.7 Targeting authorities

From a terrorist's point of view, targeting authorities means attacking the enemy, namely those directly responsible and accountable for the specific situation or problem in question, at heart. It is sometimes stated that one of the main characteristics of terrorism is that the violence is directed against an innocent third party, but that is not always the case. Importantly, symbolism comes in with full force for this category, since an attack against an iconic state building – or a high-ranking individual – will generally be interpreted as an attack against the nation in question itself.

As described, the motivation for staging attacks against this target type category will typically be very high, and if operational success is achieved, the satisfaction afterwards will be equally strong. Also, the legitimacy for attacking the leadership of the declared enemy will go unchallenged among perpetrators, affiliates and sympathisers alike. The authorities, as decision-makers, are also key for the future changes the terrorists ultimately seek to achieve. Like terrorist attacks against other target types, this is obviously a double-edged sword since a successful attack is more likely to lead to more extensive counterterrorism measures rather than compliances. Targeting a top authority figure does not solely have to be linked to compliances, however. It could also be about changing the political landscape, if that is regarded as favourable from a strategic perspective. After all, a top political leader is, function-wise, easy to replace, but personal characteristics like charisma and appeal to the voters may be another matter. Just as important, a new leader may want to make changes with impact on the conflict situation. For example by adjusting the country's engagement in a distant area. This not necessarily due to the terrorists activity, but to please the general public - the voters.

Authorities may include numerous different institutions and leaders on the state, regional or local level. That said, the attention from terrorists is typically directed against the very top level, like governments and parliaments, as well as presidents and royalties. Rightly, royalties do not exercise politics and

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

governance per se, but their formal and symbolic role, as well as national value, is indisputable. Furthermore, male members of royal families often perform military service and some even participate in armed conflicts, like Prince Harry's stay in Afghanistan (Hopkins & Davis, 2013). As such, there is no surprise that royalties can also be attractive targets.

For terrorists, the main problem with highly symbolic state assets and top state representatives is that these are well protected. In general, they are hard targets and even terrorist actors with decent capacities will encounter substantial difficulties if they try to reach such targets. The background for the extensive security measures surrounding authorities, as well as royalties, is obviously a consequence of historic events and not related only to terrorism. Ministers and royalties have since long also been exposed to criminals and stalkers – not least mentally unstable individuals (Hoffmann, Meloy, & Sheridan, 2014). Looking at terrorism for the last five decades, we have, for example, also seen Provisional IRA's assassination of Lord Mountbatten in 1979, the attempt to kill Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Brighton in 1984 and the mortar attack on Downing Street 10 in 1991 (Oppenheimer, 2009: 112, 119–122). Another example is that ETA in 2004 considered launching an attack against King Juan Carlos, as well as the Spanish government (The Guardian, 2009).

As mentioned previously, terrorists may also launch attacks against highly symbolic targets even though they are almost certain the attack in question will fail. This can happen if they want to show operational strength, as explained in the section dealing with hard and soft targets. One example here is the mortar attack conducted by the Provisional IRA against Prime Minister John Major and 10 Downing Street in 1991 (Whitney, 1991), although a senior PIRA veteran interviewed by the author claims the perpetrators most likely actually believed they could “hurt PM Major and his government”. It may be questioned whether a show of strength was also a motivating factor with the Real IRA attack against MI6 in London in 2001. With this attack, they displayed an operational capability on British mainland, and they also revealed possession of heavy weaponry not used until then in Northern Ireland or England (Senguota, 2000). Such attacks could also be initiated, however, if the terrorists want to send a more concrete message to the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

authorities – for example, if they want to achieve more progress in a negotiation process that has been standing still.

Let us also remember that militant Islamists do not have many caveats when operating away from home, and that they can strike against random soft targets without risking backfire from their own ranks and supporters.

4.7.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

According to the dataset, targets in the category *Authorities* were under consideration as a potential target in 27 of 138 plots from 1994 to 2016 (in 38 plots potential targets are unknown). Focusing on the plots with strong documentation, the number is down to 13 of 78 plots (in 12 plots, the potential targets are unknown). Even here, however, the focus on top-level authority targets has been of a superficial nature, and subsequently they have been discarded in favour of other target types. There are, however, seven plots where militant Islamists have demonstrated serious attention towards authorities. These are accompanied by the two launched attacks directed against targets in the category *Authorities*. The overview is as follows:

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
2003	Attack	Toxic letters case	PM, ministries and others
2004	Plot	PM Alawi plot	Visiting Prime Minister
2005	Plot	Hoftstad gr. Wilders threats	Member of Parliament
2005	Plot	NATO / EU-commission	EU comm.
2006	Plot	Aabid Khan royalties plot	Royal family, parliament
2010	Attack	MP Timms stabbing	Member of Parliament
2013	Plot	Markus Beisicht plot	Party leader
2013	Plot	Blair or Mumbai-style plot	Former PM Blair, others
2014	Plot	EU Brussels plot	EU HQ building

The first incident took place in June 2003 when Belgian police arrested a 45-year old Iraqi male for sending letters laced with toxic powders. They were signed “The International Islamic Society” (Nesser, 2008: 933). Letters were sent to Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as others described in other following target type

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

categories. The content proved to be non-lethal (Associated Press, 2003). On 3 December 2004, German police arrested three Iraqi citizens of Kurdish origins and members of Ansar al-Islam separately in Berlin, Stuttgart and Augsburg. Police suspected that they planned to assassinate the visiting Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Alawi at a business forum at a bank in central Berlin the very same day (DW, 2004). The men were later convicted of attempted participation in a murder (Der Spiegel, 2008).

In July 2005, Dutch police arrested Dutch-British 17-year old Maik R., who was later convicted for threatening Member of Parliament Geert Wilders twice via e-mail earlier in 2005. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, at the time also a Member of Parliament, also attracted his attention. Maik R. was in possession of homemade explosives that were found in his parents' house (de Verdieping, 2005a). He had acquaintances in the Hofstadgroup, but he was not a member. Two months later, in September 2005, French police arrested nine members of The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) for plotting an attack in France (Nesser, 2008: 937). They probably planned to strike three European countries simultaneously on the eve of the 29 September referendum in Algeria. A cell that was arrested in Brussels was allegedly preparing suicide attacks on NATO headquarters and the European Commission (Tazaghart & Jacquard, 2005).

Aabid Khan was arrested on 6 June 2006 and materials in his possession indicated the planning of terrorist acts (Crown Prosecution Service, 2009). The main focus was on royalties and potential targets, which included the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of York, the Earl of Wessex and Princess Michael of Kent, the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester and the Duke and Duchess of Kent. Additionally, there seemed to be an interest in the Palace of Westminster, Tower Bridge and the London Underground (Gardham, 2008). Khan was affiliated to the Toronto 18 network, disrupted in Canada just days before (BBC News, 2008; Crown Prosecution Service, 2009).

In May 2010, the second attack in this category was conducted when student Roshonara Choudhry stabbed and injured MP Stephen Timm during a constituency surgery at the Beckton Globe Library in East London. She was angered by the Iraqi war and inspired by AQ's key figures Abdullah Azzam

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

and Anwar al-Awlaki (Pantucci, 2015: 283). The student had conducted research on the backgrounds of London MPs by using different websites, including *They work for you*, where she found information on voting records from the parliament (Rayner & Bingham, 2010; Dodd, 2010). She focused on MPs Jim Fitzpatrick, Margaret Hodge, Nick Raynsford and Stephen Timms, due to their support of the Iraq war (Rayner & Bingham, 2010). She decided to target Timms, made an appointment to see him, and stabbed him twice in the abdomen as they met (Rayner & Bingham, 2010).

In March 2013, four Salafists were arrested in Germany for planning to assassinate right-wing party leader Markus Beisicht. Two were arrested while conducting hostile reconnaissance. In addition to weapons, police found a list with eight Pro-NRW members' names marked in red, including Beisicht (Der Spiegel, 2013a). In a video made by Islamists in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan there were calls to hunt down and kill Pro-NRW party members. The small group had bought guns and a silencer to prepare for the assassination (Der Spiegel, 2013).

In September 2013, Eron Incedal was arrested in London for a traffic offense. A search of his car disclosed a piece of paper with the address of former PM Tony Blair and his wife, and surveillance was initiated after Incedal's release. Incedal had been in Syria and communicated with a male in Syria via email about committing an act of terrorism. Murdering an individual of significance or a Mumbai-style terror attack were ideas. On 13 October, police arrested Incedal again with Mounir Rarmoul-Bouhadjar (BBC News, 2015a). They found a SD memory card that contained bomb-making plans and notes for "Plan A" (MailOnline, 2014). Skype messages and emails on a laptop referred to guns (BBC News, 2015a). Police also discovered a photo of an East End synagogue on Incedal's iPhone (MailOnline 2014). Both men were sentenced to imprisonment for possession of a bomb making manual (BBC News, 2015c).

In August 2014, Belgium police detained a man and woman who had returned from the war in Syria via Turkey under the suspicion that they were plotting an assault on the European Union's main offices in Brussels – the Berlaymont building (The Guardian, 2014). Three other individuals were arrested in

Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey. Weapons were recovered in a raid on one of the suspects' Brussels residence (Fantz & Cruickshank, 2014).

4.7.2 Analysis

What the dataset shows is that the interest for targeting authorities is substantial among militant Islamists. Compared to other target type categories, the category “authorities” has in total (plots and attacks) received more attention than religious institutions and public debate participants but less attention than the categories “public area and public transport” – which clearly dominate. Important to note, however, is that the considerable interest for authorities in plots is not reflected when it comes to the conducted attacks. The toxic letter case from Belgium in 2003 and Roshonara Choudry’s stabbing of MP Stephen Timms in London in 2010 are the only conducted attacks within the category “authorities”, and the seriousness of the first incident is debatable. What this research has also disclosed is that perpetrators who have launched attacks against other target type categories have shown an interest in politicians and authorities in the early stages of their planning process without following up on them. For example, the individual killing filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, had previously shown an interest in politicians Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders. The 2005 7/7 bombers were allegedly asked to consider the upcoming G8 summit in Scotland as a target (CNN, 2012a). Furthermore, the 2007 Haymarket bombers had conducted a reconnaissance trip, considering 10 Downing Street, the Parliament and Buckingham Palace as options, but discarded these alternatives immediately after observing the visible security efforts in place (Mail Online, 2008). The level of protection surrounding high-end targets, like government members and highly symbolic state or governmental buildings, explain why such targets remain unexplored in practice. In many countries, these are protected by armed police, visitors must go through airport-style security screening, and layers with protective efforts will slow down intruders, allowing the escape of the main targets. With easier access and greater vulnerability, however, we would have seen more attacks against authorities and royalties; hence, I will argue that there is a documented deterrent effect due to protective security efforts.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

What must also be registered when assessing the category of authorities is that, more often than not, the attack is (or plans to be) directed directly at a high-ranking or profiled individual and not against highly symbolic buildings per se – for example, using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). There were no conducted attacks by the hands of militant Islamists against high symbolic state or governmental buildings from 1994 to 2016, and the only plot where there seems to be some substance for an attack against such a building was the Berlaymont building plot in Belgium in 2014. It must be added that there was an attack against the Palace of Westminster in 2017, and also an incident outside of the premises (vehicle attack) in 2018.

In a broader perspective, we have obviously seen several VBIED-attacks against official buildings, like the Oklahoma-bombing in 1995 and Breivik's bomb attack in Oslo in 2011, so it is important to keep an open mind about the matter. That stated, it is still clear that politicians in general are most vulnerable when they are out of office. This has been proven with assassination of party leader Pim Fortuyn in Hilversum in 2002, the stabbing of MP Stephen Timms in London in 2010 and the killing of MP Jo Cox in Birstall in 2016. It is worth noting that none of these victims had close protection officers. As will be clarified in the following sections of this chapter, ordinary politicians, public debate individuals and media persons are more exposed to attacks than prominent top politicians and royalties.

It is not only the level (or lack) of protection that matters when terrorists choose their individual-specific targets, because politicians are rarely chosen on random. MP Stephen Timms was carefully selected by Roshonara Choudhry due to his support of the 2003 Iraqi invasion. Tony Blair was President Bush's closest ally in the "war on terror" and received attention from terrorists involved in the 2002 Jubilee plot (Pierce, 2007), the 2004 Crawley case (BBC News, 2007; Nesser, 2015: 171-181), the 2007 Haymarket bombing (MailOnline, 2008), the 2008 AQ-GB case (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011) and the 2013 Incedal case (BBC News, 2015a). Although not part of the dataset here, the March 2017 Westminster attack and the August 2018 vehicle attack outside the premises illustrate that the target hardening of such institutions makes it more likely that attacks are initiated and at least initially directed against people outside the established security

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

perimeter. Such attacks might seem meaningless, but the symbolic effect will still be significant - and maximum media coverage is guaranteed.

Political events can also be of interest to terrorists, and both the public present and the political representatives can constitute the primary target. Closed national and international political summits will be even more attractive targets, but such events are always protected with a “ring of steel”. The chance for operational success is minimal, and this is also why there are no serious, well-documented plots directed against such targets. As previously noted, the G8 summit in Scotland was allegedly an alternative target for the 2005 7/7 bombers, but there are no indications that this was considered at all by the perpetrators. Likewise, the plans to crash a plane into the G8 meeting in Genova in July 2001, which president Bush was attending, is vaguely documented (The Guardian, 2001). The operational difficulties obviously rule out such alternatives for low-capability actors. The conclusion is that royalties and top politicians, the buildings they work in, as well as top summits constitute attractive targets, but they are so well protected that they represent very difficult targets for terrorists. As such, there is a greater risk for the politicians a step below the top level, and especially so when they are out in public areas or in local offices with a lower level of security.

4.8 Targeting diplomatic missions

Diplomatic missions are here defined as representatives from a state, (alternatively, it may be an international inter-governmental organization like the UN or the EU) present in another state to officially represent the former state or organization. Diplomats will, under normal circumstances, be based at an embassy or a consulate. The history of terrorism has on numerous occasions proven that diplomatic facilities and personnel constitute attractive targets for terrorists. The Holger Meins' Kommando's (Red Army Faction) siege of the West-German embassy in Stockholm in 1975 is a well-known example (Aust, 2009: 223–226). In the 1990s, al-Qaida initiated their campaign against the US outside the war zones with their almost simultaneous attacks against the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 (US Department of State, 2013: 50). It is not only buildings and premises, however, that are targeted. Several ambassadors and other diplomats have also

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

been targeted while they were out of office. Provisional IRA's assassination of British ambassador Christopher Ewart-Biggs in Dublin in 1976 sent shockwaves throughout London (Coogan, 2002: 470). Another famous attack is the Abu Nidal Organization's attempted assassination of Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London in 1982, which triggered the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (The Guardian, 1982). A more recent example is the murder of Russian ambassador Andrey G. Karlov in Turkey in late 2016 (Arango & Gladstone, 2016).

Some countries have been more exposed to terrorist attacks against their diplomatic missions than others. The United States of America is one of them (US Department of State, 2013). Israel is another. That said, diplomatic missions from practically any Western European country may be attacked, as seen with the attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad in 2008 or the Italian consulate in Cairo in 2016 (Rondeaux, 2008; Fahim, 2015). According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), there were 314 terrorist attacks against diplomatic missions around the world in 2014 and 2015 (GTD, 2016).

As official representatives, diplomatic missions will always stand out as attractive targets for terrorists. Most terrorist movements are, after all, fighting states. The attractiveness is directly linked to the role and function of diplomatic missions, and the symbolic link between the diplomats and the very top decision-makers of a state is crystal clear. Diplomats function as maintainers of the interests of their country and citizens. In some cases, diplomatic missions are easier or more practical to target compared to organising an attack within the territory of the state in question. The United States is not accessible for a lot of terrorist actors due to geographical reasons. Israel is another country that is difficult to enter and operate in for terrorists. This is one reason why the Hezbollah from time to time have targets Israeli diplomatic facilities and Jewish communities all over the world – just like the state of Israel have targeted their opponents abroad (see e.g. Pedahzur, 2009; Thomas, 2000). The 1992 attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 29 people is one grave example (LA Times, 1992). A more recent case is Hezbollah's targeting of the Israeli embassy in Baku in 2009 (Ynet News, 2009). It can also be the case that embassies and consulates in conflict regions are too difficult to attack, leading the terrorists to attack diplomatic missions in a third country. It is also possible that exile groups take advantage

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

of the hospitality of their host states and launch an attack against the foreign representation of their enemies in the country in question.

When it comes to vulnerability, embassies belonging to exposed states like France, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States of America will be well protected, and their ambassadors are typically accompanied by close protection officers when out of office. As such, embassies and ambassadors can rightfully be characterized as hard targets, since the chance of success through a terrorist attack against them is very limited. So, even though embassies are certainly accessible per se, security precautions will make it difficult to get inside the facility for anyone with such intentions. Hence, the conclusion is that even though embassies are attractive targets, other target types come forward as considerably easier to act against.

4.8.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

According to the dataset, diplomatic mission was a potential target in 16 of all 176 registered plots. If we just look to the plots with strong documentation, diplomatic missions were a potential target in 9 of 78 plots with strong documentation from 1994 to 2016. Seven plots from the vague plots are not included. To a large degree, however, the interest in embassies and consulates has been of an initial or superficial nature, which has been discarded in favour of other target types. This will be discussed later, but the starting point for analysis constitutes only three plots with a more serious focus towards a diplomatic mission, accompanied by the two conducted attacks from the same period. The overview is as follows:

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
2001	Plot	Khemais cell plot	Embassy, consulate
2001	Plot	Beghal, US embassy plot	Embassy
2002	Plot	Russian embassy, Paris	Embassy
2003	Attack	Toxic letters case	Embassies
2007	Attack	US embassy, Vienna	Embassy

The first plot with strong documentation against an embassy is from April 2001. Italian police arrested a cell headed by Sami Ben Khemai (Khemais)

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Essid, linked to the Islamic Cultural Center in Milan. More arrests followed in October 2001. Allegedly, the cell discussed bombings and other attacks in Europe, including the use of chemicals (Nesser, 2008: 930). Officials stated that Italian authorities worked with US officials to thwart an attack on the US Embassy in Rome. The US Embassies in Rome and the Vatican City, as well as the US consulates in Naples and Milan, were closed to the public for several days in January 2001 (Joschelyn, 2012). Court documents also pointed towards US targets (Chicago Tribune, 2002). The second case within this category came to light in France in September–October 2001 after the Djamel Beghal network was disrupted (Bright, 2001; Nesser, 2008: 930). Several North Africans, French-Algerians and French were arrested for planning to attack US interests in Europe. Of the two concrete plots involving diplomatic missions, French investigators believed one plot to be directed against the US embassy at Place de la Concorde in Paris, while the other concrete plot from the same network was directed against the US consulate in Marseille (Bright, 2001).

In December 2002, nine North Africans with ties to AQ and GSPC were arrested in Paris on suspicion of planning to bomb the Russian embassy in Paris, possibly in combination with biological/chemical agents (Nesser, 2008: 932). Empty butane gas containers, remote-control detonators and a chemical warfare suit were found (Smith, 2002). The first launched incident within this category came with the previously described Iraqi who sent out toxic letters to several institutions in Belgium in 2003. Among those who received letters were the US, British and Saudi embassies (Nesser, 2008: 933; Associated Press, 2003). The second launched attack in this category came to light in October 2007 when Austrian security authorities arrested two Bosnian Muslims, Asim C. and Mehmed D., for an attempted attack against the US embassy in Vienna. Asim C. had tried to enter the embassy while carrying a backpack packed with grenades, plastic explosives, nails, screws and other metal fragments (ORF, 2012). According to media reports in Bosnia, Mehmed D. had extremist links, and was the driver behind the incident (Alic, 2007).

4.8.2 Analysis

What this dataset has shown is that the general interest among terrorists for targeting diplomatic missions is limited, but it does surface on a regular basis, especially when we consider that this target type also appears in several other vague plots that have been excluded from the overview. The role and function of diplomatic missions, as representatives of states, as well as the symbolism involved, adequately explains why they are attractive targets. The interest for targeting embassies and consulates is mainly observed in early target browsing phases, and normally it is of a rather superficial character. Most often, the terrorists will, further down the lane, end up focusing on other target types. In no other target type category, possibly with the exception of “*Authorities*”, is initial interest discarded to such a degree in the early planning phases. We must also note that the two conducted attacks in Western Europe included here, namely the 2003 toxic letters case in Belgium and the 2007 US embassy in Vienna incident, were not sophisticated operations. As it turned out, the case with the toxic letters did not have a lethal potential (Associated Press, 2003). The second attack, the 2007 US embassy in Vienna case, was seemingly also significantly amateurish, and there are suggestions that the assailant was a weak figure, exploited and guided by the second accomplice (Alic, 2007). In contrast, however, more established groups or networks were behind the three plots in the early 2000s. What should also be added is that diplomatic missions from the United States are targeted more often than other nations’ representatives.

As described above, the most central questions to be answered are why the interest for diplomatic missions in Western Europe seems to be of limited priority among the militant Islamists, and why an initial interest is discarded most often in favour of other target types. To address the first question, the vulnerability of the diplomatic facilities and personnel are reduced significantly through the established protective security measures. Furthermore, most diplomatic facilities are accessible to the public, but appointments must be made and the security procedures are often thorough. In order to plan a sophisticated attack, hostile reconnaissance on site is a necessity, and terrorists quickly realize that breaching entry, or organizing an attack in the proximity of the perimeter, is a difficult task. In other words, the chance for operational success is very limited. The second factor is that

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

militant Islamists in general find it legitimate to target indiscriminately. In short, the chance for operational success, maximum public fear factor and escape are all significantly higher when targeting civilians as compared to embassies or ambassadors. So, even though the motivation for attacking diplomatic missions might be intuitive, present and strong, most terrorists considering such an act will abandon the idea.

It is interesting to note that the symbolic value of attacking diplomatic missions is so strong that leadership and distant instigators occasionally request that such targets be prioritized. In the 2007 Sauerland cell case in Germany, the Islamic Jihad Union in North Waziristan allegedly suggested that the cell should target the Uzbek embassy and other Uzbek facilities, but this was ignored (Steinberg, 2013: 71, 74). Moreover, media reports have suggested that Mohammed Merah was encouraged by his Pakistani handlers to target the Indian embassy in Paris, which he rejected due to the difficulty of such an operation (Naravane, 2012). The protective level at the embassies in question are likely to have played a role in both cases, and it can also be the case that the suggested targets were of greater relevance and importance to the instigators than the local perpetrators.

The militant Islamists' preference for US diplomatic missions is not surprising. The US (and, to a certain degree, Israel) has been the declared main enemy for the three decades AQ has existed. Furthermore, the US has deployed troops and been the largest military contributor from the West in the conflict regions. Finally, targeting the US has been a constant subject in jihadi propaganda and statements. The attention towards the US must be expected to continue. Although the focus on Israeli embassies and consulates is not significant in strong plots and attacks, interest is observed in several cases with vague documentation. Dutch Yehya K. claimed that he wanted to attack the Israeli embassy in the Hague since it would be easier to attack than the US embassy – which seems to be quite an easy assumption (de Verdieping, 2005). In 2006, Norwegians in Oslo discussed potential targets, which included the US and Israeli embassies in Oslo, as well as the Israeli ambassador (NTB, 2006). The militant Islamists' focus on attacking Jews – and not Israeli state targets – indicate a target displacement practice due to the robust protection of Israeli embassies. From the militant Islamists' point of view, an attack on Jews is an attack on the state of Israel. Other countries that

particularly exposed to the terrorist threat are the large actors in the West and Russia. The latter has been given attention due to the Chechnya conflict, as well as the current Russian engagement in the Syria and Iraq conflict. The last-mentioned conflict is also a reason for increased threats against Turkish diplomatic missions. There is no reason to expect a reduced interest in targeting the diplomatic missions of central countries in the West, but due to strict security arrangements it is likely that initial interest will rarely develop into concrete actions.

4.9 Targeting law enforcement

Members of the law enforcement sector are particularly exposed to terrorist attacks; these include members of the police, the security and intelligence services, the court system and the prison services. For a more specific definition with regard to what law enforcement (LE) includes we can look to Wikipedia (2018) with their reference to New Law Journal, 1974 (Hess & Orthmann, 2008: 1);

“any system by which some members of society act in an organized manner to enforce the law by discovering, deterring, rehabilitating, or punishing people who violate the rules and norms governing that society. Although the term may encompass entities such as courts and prisons, it is most frequently applied to those who directly engage in patrols or surveillance to dissuade and discover criminal activity, and those who investigate crimes and apprehend offenders.”

The police are the most exposed group within the law enforcement category, and this is first and foremost due to the basic responsibilities, functions and tasks police have in a democratic society. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), police personnel have been targeted by terrorist groups in 11 500 of the 98 112 recorded incidents between 1970 and 2010, comprising almost 12% of terrorism targets (Gibbs, 2013). From a definitional perspective one should keep in mind that the role and functions of the police may differ from one part of the world to another, and some countries also have police units with a paramilitary profile and function. Hence, in some countries there might be a blurry distinction between police and military identity and activity, but this is less unclear in Western Europe.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

There are many reasons why police officers are attacked by terrorists and other criminals, ranging from personal motives –revenge, for example – to calculated strategic considerations. With regard to role and function, the police is tasked with keeping public order, preventing and investigating criminal activity and securing the public against serious threats from a variety of actors. They are obliged to intervene when attacks happen, and, when applying legal use of force, they might injure or kill the terrorists involved. They also assist security services in arrest operations to thwart attacks – or in round-ups afterwards. In short, police officers are heavily and directly involved as one of the primary tools for the authorities in countering terrorism. Also, it is important to note that the police, as representatives of the state, constitute symbolic targets for terrorists. Therefore, an attack against police officers can be interpreted as an attack against the state. Rightly, regular police officers are, if compared to members of government or a parliament building, not highly symbolic targets, but still symbolic targets on a more moderate level. On the other hand, the national police headquarters and high-ranking police commanders could probably be characterized as highly symbolic targets. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that the role, function and symbolic value of the police makes this target type attractive and legitimate from the terrorists' point of view.

The issue of their vulnerability will vary according to the context. In most Western European countries, the police are armed and can respond to an attacker with deadly force, making the outcome more uncertain for them. Furthermore, central police stations and headquarters are often, but not always, physically well protected – at least to the degree that the element of surprise is significantly reduced. A police officer who is alone on the street is, however, significantly vulnerable even to attacks from a low-capability actor. Falling between these two examples are contexts where police officers are moderately vulnerable. The conclusion, therefore, is that the capability and ability of the police to instantly deal with a direct attack is highly contextual. As for accessibility, this is the Achilles-heel of the police force. Those wanting to target them will find them easily. They can be found in public areas. They are uniformed and easy to spot. They secure exposed events and assets, and they can even be lured into traps and ambushes because they are, for example, obliged to respond to emergency phone calls. They also run an

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

extra risk when dealing directly with terrorists – for instance, during arrest operations and under surveillance operations. They can be targeted if they have not blended in properly or if they have routines on or off duty, as seen in Northern Ireland on several occasions (see, for example, Young, McAleese, & PA, 2015). Not least, police officers, as well as civilians employed in the police force, may be attacked on or off duty.

Security and intelligence services will, under normal circumstances, also be considered to be potentially legitimate targets by terrorists, not least due to their direct role regarding counterterrorism. Both security and intelligence services constantly search for terrorist actors and networks, and while following up on these in practice, they become a direct and main enemy for the terrorists on the operational arena. Security services are, after all, the main reason for the operational security precautions and the general intragroup-paranoia among terrorists on a daily basis. As representatives of the state, the police also have a symbolic value. In terms of vulnerability, members of the security and intelligence services are less accessible than ordinary police. They are not visible in the public domain, they work in well-protected buildings and most members of these institutions should be fairly security conscious regarding their behaviour in general. This makes them less vulnerable and more difficult to target directly by terrorists, when compared to the ordinary police force.

The court system and prison services have not been common targets for the militant Islamists in Europe – at least not if compared to the Northern Ireland conflict and the Basque conflict, where judges and prison service employees were attacked on a regular basis (Irish Times, 2001; McKittrick et al., 2012; El Correo, 2006). Still, there are cases where militant Islamists have given serious attention to courts and prison services, and this should not be ignored.

4.9.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

According to the dataset, the law enforcement (LE) sector was a potential target in 17 of 176 registered plots. As for the plots with strong documentation, there was an LE interest in 11 of 78 plots from 1994 to 2016. In three of the eleven plots, however, the final target was more likely to be from another target type category. Hence, we are left with eight plots more

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

clearly aiming for law enforcement targets. When it comes to conducted attacks, law enforcement employees were targeted in 9 of 69 conducted attacks in the same period. The overview is as follows:

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
2003	Attack	Toxic letters case	Court
2004	Plot	Azzou / Hostad arrest	Security service HQ
2004	Plot	National court plot, Madrid	Court
2005	Plot	Bouhrama GSPC case	Security service HQ
2008	Plot	Rany Arnaud case	Security service HQ
2012	Plot	Richard Dart plot	Security services
2014	Plot	Police and military plot	Police on street
2014	Attack	Stab attack police station	Police station
2015	Attack	Police attack, Paris	Police on street
2015	Plot	Verviers shoot-out	Police station
2015	Attack	Rafik Yousef stabbing	Police on street
2016	Attack	Police st. in Paris attack	Police station
2016	Attack	Girl stabbing police	Police on street
2016	Attack	Magnanville couple attack	Police at home
2016	Attack	Charleroi police attack	Police station
2016	Attack	Brussels machete attack	Police on street
2016	Plot	Disneyland plot	Different LE targets*

* DGSJ (French security service) HQ, police HQ and the High court building

As for courts, there are only two cases in the dataset. The first appeared in June 2003, when Belgian police arrested a 45-year old Iraqi for sending several letters laced with toxic powders to different addressees, including Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, ministries, embassies, and – of particular interest here – a court in Brussels (Associated Press, 2003). The letters were signed “The International Islamic Society” (Nesser, 2008: 933). The second case that targeted a court is from October 2004 in Spain, when police rounded up a terrorist cell of North Africans that planned a suicide bomb attack in late 2001 or early 2002 against the National Court in Madrid (NBC News, 2004). The cell had also given attention to the Spanish Supreme Court, Partido Popular’s office in Madrid, the metro, Principe Pio train station and Tierno Galván park (Heraldo, 2007). Other potential targets mentioned in the indictment were Torre Picasso (Madrid’s tallest building), Real Madrid’s football stadium Santiago Bernabeu, a major convention hall and the railway

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

station Atocha (Villanueva, 2004; CNN, 2006). The last case that should be mentioned here involved the Strasbourg and Marseille cell from November 2016. They allegedly planned attacks against Disneyland Paris and the Champs Elysees Christmas market, but they seemingly also planned to target the HQ of a security service, a police HQ in Paris and the High Court building (Osborne, 2016). Cafe terraces and metro stations had also received attention (Lockett, 2016).

The first case with focus on security and intelligence services appeared in June 2004 when Dutch police arrested Samir A. (Nesser, 2008: 936). He had links to the Hofstad group and had been captured on security cameras at the AIVD's (the Dutch security and intelligence service) HQ in Leidschendam - apparently measuring distances. The suspect had looked to other potential targets as well, including a nuclear reactor in Borssele, the House of Representatives, the Ministry of Defense, Schiphol airport and military barracks in Roosendaal (Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker, 2014). The next two cases involving security services are from France – in 2005 and 2008 respectively. In September 2005, police arrested members of GSPC on suspicion of planning attacks against the HQ of the security service DST in Paris (Nesser, 2008: 937). Other potential targets were the Paris Metro and an unspecified airport (Beyler, 2006). The Paris cell was part of a bigger network, which allegedly planned to strike three European countries simultaneously on the eve of the 29 September referendum in Algeria (Tazaghart & Jacquard, 2005).

Then, in December 2008, French police arrested Rany A., Nadir B. and Adrien G. who planned a car or truck bomb attack against the DST HQ in Paris (Le Monde, 2012). The next case came in the UK in July 2012, with the arrest of Richard Dart and three others (Dodd, 2013). The cell had discussed targeting Wootton Bassett (a town receiving fallen British servicemen and servicewomen), and members of the security and intelligence services (Metropolitan police, 2013). A final target decision was not found, but Dart and two others received long prison sentences (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014). The last case involving security services appeared in November 2016, when French police arrested suspects linked to ISIS in Strasbourg and Marseille. Allegedly the cell planned attacks against Disneyland Paris and the Champs Elysees Christmas market, but they seemingly also planned to target

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

the France's counter-intelligence service (DGSI) hub, a police HQ in Paris and the High Court (Osborne, 2016). Cafe terraces and metro stations had also been given attention (Lockett, 2016).

Continuing with the law enforcement group most frequently targeted by militant Islamists, the ordinary police, the first case appeared in October 2014. Four men linked to ISIS were arrested in London, and it was found that Tarik H. and Suheib M. plotted to carry out one or multiple attacks against police officers or servicemen using a silenced handgun. Tarik H. had done online information gathering of a police station and a Territorial Army (Crown Prosecution Services, 2017). Media reports identified these as Shepherd's Bush Police Station and White City Territorial Army Barracks in London. Furthermore, Instagram-images of two Metropolitan Police officers and two Metropolitan Police community support officers were found (The Telegraph, 2014).

The first launched attack against police personnel took place two months later, when Bertrand N. attacked three police officers with a knife at the entrance to a police station in Joue-les-Tours. Three officers were wounded before the assailant was killed (France24, 2014). The first attack that caused a fatality happened on 8 January 2015, the day after the Charlie Hebdo attack, when Amedy Coulibaly shot and killed an unarmed female police officer in the Paris suburb of Montrouge. The next day, Coulibaly initiated the kosher shop siege in Paris (BBC News, 2015). On 15 January 2015, an arrest operation turned into a shootout between police and militant Islamists in Verviers, Belgium. Two gunmen were killed, and one was wounded. Allegedly, the Belgian nationals were preparing terrorist attacks on police stations (The Guardian, 2015). Interestingly, the Verviers incident allegedly disrupted the first centrally-led large-scale ISIS operation against Europe (Brisard & Jackson, 2016: 9).

On 17 September 2015, German police shot and killed Islamist Rafik Mohamad Yousef in Berlin, after he stabbed and injured a policewoman. In 2008, Yousef had been sentenced to eight years in prison for his involvement in the plot to kill Iraq's former PM Ayad Allawi in Berlin in 2004 (BBC News, 2015b). A few months later, on 7 January 2016, Sallah Ali, launched an attack against a police station in Goutte d'Or in Paris. He was carrying a

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

meat cleaver and had a dummy suicide vest. He was shot and killed by the police. A note found on his body “pledged allegiance” to ISIS. The incident took place exactly a year after the Charlie Hebdo attack (BBC News, 2016). Then, on 26 February 2016, a 15-year-old girl stabbed and injured a police officer in the neck at Hannover’s main train station before she was arrested. A 20-year-old German-Syrian was convicted as an accessory. (DW, 2017).

In the next case, police personnel were for the first time targeted in an off-duty situation. In June 2016 Larossi Abballa stabbed and killed police commander Jean-Baptiste Salvaing outside his home in Magnanville. The assailant then killed Salvaing’s partner, who held an administrative position within the police department. Their three-year-old son was rescued when the police stormed the house and killed the perpetrator. Abballa was known to the security services. At the scene, investigators found a list of other potential targets; rap musicians, journalists and police officers. (Labbé, Chine, & Carraud, Simon, 2016). A French prosecutor confirmed that Abballa knew Salvaing was a policeman, and the latter had at a time been stationed in Mantes-la-Jolie, the town in which Abballa lives (BBC News, 2016b).

On 6 August 2016 a man attacked two female Belgian police officers outside the local police headquarters in Charleroi. The assailant wielded a machete and shouted “Allahu Akhbar”. The suspect was shot by a third police officer and later died from his wounds. The attack took place at a small hut that had been mounted outside the Charleroi police station to provide an additional layer of security (Dearden & Forster, 2016). Two months later, on 5 October 2016, Hicham D. attacked a male and a female police officer on the street in Brussels with a machete. One officer was hit in the neck and the other in the abdomen before the assailant fled the scene. He was shot in the leg by several police officers nearby and arrested (Rankin, 2016). The final case involving the police has already been covered under the section covering security services, namely the Strasbourg and Marseilles November plot from 2016. Although Disneyland Paris and the Champs Elysees Christmas market were the primary focus, a police HQ seemed to be a potential target (Osborne, 2016).

4.9.2 Analysis

The focus of militant Islamists towards courts and judges has been few and far in between. Although they are a part of the law enforcement sector, they are not as directly involved as police and security services. However, the 2004 national court case in Spain and the 2016 Strasbourg and Marseilles case illustrate, that higher court institutions are attractive as highly symbolic targets. Although it has not been seen so far, the risk that courts and judges dedicated to handling terrorist cases may be targeted remains. However, there are always extensive security efforts during terrorist trials, so the residue risk is probably to a larger degree linked to day-to-day situations, as well as the off-duty time of judges. It is likely that in the coming years we will see an increasing number of trials against militant Islamists in several European countries. The combination of foreign fighters returning home and new legislation enabling judicial pursuit in some countries, may lead to terrorists showing an increasing interest towards courts and judges. The probability of more militant Islamists being imprisoned in the coming years must also be kept in mind by prison and correctional services. Although, except for the breakout plot in Belgium in 2007 (Nesser, 2008: 940; BBC News, 2007d), breakouts or freeing attempts have not been a big issue so far, such attempts cannot be thought of as impossible in the future.

If we look at police and security and intelligence services, the police are targeted more often, with 11 plots and cases in total against five for the security services. Maybe the most interesting part here is how security services received attention from the terrorists from 2004 to 2012, and how this focus clearly shifted to the police from 2014 onwards. Furthermore, plots against security and intelligence services never materialized into conducted attacks, while regular police were subjected to eight launched attacks from 2014 to 2016. Several factors contribute to explain the developments. As previously mentioned, the headquarters of security and intelligence services are often hard targets, and the interest seen for these has come from groups and networks which dominated the 2000s. These plots have all failed and the risk for detection will always remain high since such HQs will require hostile reconnaissance, as seen with Samir A. in 2004 (Nesser, 2008: 936; Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker, 2014). A scenario that security and intelligence services must always be aware of, however, is the insider threat

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

(Knobbe, Schindler, & Schmid, 2016). These services are not just of interest as potential targets for physical attacks but also due to the information they possess.

In general, police officers are vulnerable to attacks because they are easily accessible – even for terrorist actors with limited capability. What we can observe within the timeframe for this project is a shift from hard targets to soft targets. The conducted attacks against police officers have all been launched by single perpetrators – and seven out of eight attacks have been conducted with non-firing weapons, for example knives. All attacks have been directed against police officers on the street or against police personnel easily accessible outside or at the entrance area of police stations. There have been no attacks where the ambition has seemingly been to breach entry in order to fully penetrate a police station like in Loughgall in 1987 – or to blow it up, as demonstrated by the Provisional IRA on several occasions in the Northern Ireland conflict (Geraghty, 1998: 124–127). That said, some actors are likely to target civilians before police stations. Nicky Reilly, who tried to blow up the Giraffe Restaurant in Exeter in 2008, had considered targeting a police station but decided otherwise in the end (Crown Prosecution Service, 2009; Adetunji, 2008).

As for the time-shift seen regarding attacks against police officers, it is possible that Arid Uka's attack on US soldiers in 2011, the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013 and the attack on a French soldier by Alexandre D. shortly afterwards caused a contagious effect, inspiring others to conduct similar attacks against police and military personnel. This may be especially so since these attacks were quite successful from the terrorists' point of view. Here, it must also be added that there have been several street attacks against police outside Europe, like Zale Thompson's hatchet attack on police officers in New York in 2014 (New York Post, 2014) and the shooting attack on a police officer in Philadelphia in January 2016 conducted by an ISIS sympathiser (Berman, 2016). In general, the development in Europe has been in accordance with the development seen on other continents, like in North America and Australia.

Conducted attacks against police officers, as well as soldiers, have provided valuable learning from a tactical perspective. It seems that police officers

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

alone or in pairs in public area are vulnerable for attacks simply because they do not have chance to react before it is too late. When three or more of them are together or within a short distance to each other – or the element of surprise is not present - targeting police officers is more difficult. This is logical because it should be more difficult to take out several police officers instead of one or two, but we can also look to concrete cases with reference to the cases above and Appendix 1. The February 2015 synagogue incident in Denmark, the January 2015 killing of a police woman by Amedy Coulibaly and the June 2016 Magnanville murders illustrate police officers' vulnerability for close-quarter attacks. On the other hand, the December 2014 attack against a police station in Paris, the 2015 attack by Rafik Yousef in Berlin, the August 2016 attack in Charleroi, and the October 2016 machete attack in Brussels were unsuccessful, primarily because the presences of several police officers nearby, and in the case of Rafik Yousef in Berlin the element of surprise was never there.

The attacks outside or in the entrance parties of police stations also tell us that proper security efforts and routines are called for. The attack in Charleroi in 2016 suggests that establishing a security perimeter outside a police station has a limited effect if the police officers manning the checkpoint remain just as vulnerable as they normally are (Dearden & Forster, 2016).

4.10 Targeting military bases and personnel

Military forces will, based on the very nature of their business, often constitute the most obvious and attractive targets for terrorists, not least when they have been activated and given a direct task by the authorities in a given context. This is evident for remote war zones like Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in other places where expeditionary forces have been sent, but also in conflicts closer to home or indeed on home ground. During the Northern Ireland conflict from 1969 to 1998, a total of 503 army persons were killed. The only category with more deaths was civilians, meaning the army lost more personnel than police, as well as republican and loyalist paramilitary groups (McKittrick et al., 1999, 2007: 1552). If we look at the Basque conflict, civilians top the casualty list there too, while Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) and national police came next. Still, the armed forces lost as many as

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

98 soldiers in a conflict that claimed 829 lives from 1968 to 2010 (Sedghi, 2011).

From the perspective of role and function, military forces in remote conflict areas are targeted because they represent the direct enemy on the battlefield. Furthermore, they are typically held responsible for the pain and loss the civilian population suffers – often as a result of unintentional wrongdoings. When it comes to distant conflict regions, armed forces, with the possible exception of diplomatic missions and NGOs, are the only enemy present to launch attacks against. For terrorists operating on European soil, however, the range of different targets to choose from is almost unlimited, which means they must give closer considerations with regard to target decisions. Also, under these circumstances, military personnel will be a very attractive target group as a direct party of the conflict. Since the armed forces, together with police and security services, represent the practical tool for authorities in combating terrorism, they are also the representatives of the state. Accordingly, headquarters, bases and personnel are symbolic targets. Like a police officer, a soldier on the street is not a highly symbolic target per se but rather a symbolic target on a more moderate level. The headquarters of the armed forces and high-ranking military commanders could, on the other hand, rightly be characterized as highly symbolic targets. As described, the role, function and symbolic link to the authorities makes military facilities and personnel attractive and legitimate targets from the terrorists' point of view.

In the West, there is always a direct link between the nation state's decision makers and the military leadership, and therefore it makes sense for terrorists to prioritise military targets to get back at the state itself. Furthermore, attacking military forces will often be preferable from a strategic point of view. It is, after all, the most legitimate target in any armed conflict, and choosing this target category will not generate internal disputes or fractioning, nor is it likely to affect sympathisers and community support (near or remote) in a negative way. For civilians in a conflict zone, foreign soldiers represent the invaders, and they are directly responsible for failed bombings and drone attacks, thus inflicting pain and sorrow on the local population. Hence, attacking soldiers on the streets of Europe is likely to be considered logical and legitimate among terrorists, as well as their supporters in distant conflict zones. Military targets may even be seen as more legitimate to attack than the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

police, although a number of cases suggest that targeting soldiers or police is, to a large degree, affected by situational circumstances and not so much moral considerations.

As for accessibility, military bases and personnel can be targeted at home or in a foreign country. They can be struck while they are in their bases or when they are outside of them, in public areas and on public transport as they travel between home and base, for example. Like police officers, they can also be attacked on duty or off duty. In many European countries, army personnel are not as accessible as the police. In some countries, however, military forces are engaged in operations with policing functions typically related to protection of key assets and crowded areas, as well as patrolling. Such military operations are today seen in France with *Operation Sentinelle*, in Italy with *Operation Strati Secure* and also in Belgium (Higgins, 2015). Under such circumstances, soldiers become more visible and accessible, hence providing terrorists with an opportunity to strike against the ones they perhaps hate the most.

For the terrorists, targeting military personnel is not a straightforward task since they can defend themselves. Military bases are generally well protected with physical barriers, armed guards and heavy response capacities on the location. The attacker will inevitably, sooner or later, be stopped – regardless of whether it is a single individual or a small group. Furthermore, the possibility for escape is very limited.

Attacks on military personnel may be divided into attacks against bases and headquarters, attacks against military personnel accessible in public areas, and individual specific targeting, where the terrorists typically seek to strike a name-given high-ranking officer. Note that attacks on military personnel in the proximity of military bases or barracks are here regarded as attacks in public areas. It should also be noted that the jihadi propaganda instigates killings of military personnel – even in their home countries. For example, ISIS publicised in March 2015 a list with names of 100 US service personnel, encouraging local jihadists to act against them (Tufft, 2015).

4.10.1 *The most relevant plots and attacks*

According to the total dataset, the military sector was a potential target or was actually targeted in 40 out of 209 cases (in 37 of 246 cases, targets are unknown). Looking at all plots, the sector was targeted in 31 out of 139 cases. If we just look to the plots with strong documentation, the military sector was a potential target in 17 of 80 plots from 1994 to 2016. In 3 of the 17 plots, however, the interest for a military target was seemingly very superficial, and the final target was more likely to be from another target type category. Hence, we are left with 14 plots that aim more clearly for military targets. When it comes to conducted attacks, military assets and personnel were targeted in 8 of 70 conducted attacks in the same period. The overview is as follows:

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
2001	Plot	Beghal, Kleine Brogel plot	Military base
2003	Plot	Rovigo NATO plot	Military base
2003	Plot	Pakistanis in Naples plot	Military base
2005	Plot	NATO/EU commission	Military HQ
2007	Plot	Khan soldier abduction plot	Soldier in public area (PA)
2007	Plot	Sauerland cell	Military base
2008	Plot	Rachi Ilhami case	Military base
2009	Attack	Muhammed Game case	Military base
2011	Attack	Arid Uka case	Soldiers in PA
2011	Plot	El-Kebir Dusseldorf cell	Military base or PA
2012	Attack	Merah 1, soldier attack	Soldier in PA
2012	Attack	Merah 2, Montauban	Soldiers in PA
2012	Plot	Luton cell	Military base
2012	Plot	Richard Dart plot	Approach unclar
2013	Attack	Woolwich attack	Soldier in PA
2013	Attack	Soldier attack, Paris	Soldier in PA
2014	Plot	Brusthom Ziamani case	Soldiers in PA
2014	Plot	Police and military plot	Soldiers in PA
2015	Attack	Knife attack soldiers, Nice	Soldiers in PA
2015	Plot	Military institution plot	Military base or PA
2015	Plot	Junead Khan case	Soldier in PA
2016	Attack	Car attack, Valence	Soldiers in PA

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

The first case involving a military target in the dataset came when the Djamel Beghal network was broken in 2001. One of several concrete plans was a suicide bomb attack against the Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium, which Nizar Trabelsi was later convicted for (Nesser, 2008: 930; BBC News, 2003). The next case appeared in January 2003 when Italian police arrested five Moroccans in Rovigo (Nesser, 2008: 932). They were in possession of explosives and maps that highlighted potential targets, such as the nearby NATO and US military bases (Arie, 2003). Later in the same month, several Pakistanis were arrested in Naples on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts. Police found explosives, maps of NATO bases, as well as a photo including UK's Defence chief of staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (face encircled) (Nesser, 2008: 932-933). The US consulate was also mentioned as a possible target.

After the two Italian cases things were quiet until French police arrested the GSPC group planning to target different institutions in Paris in September 2005 (Nesser, 2008: 937; Beyler, 2006). The cell had international accomplices and a group arrested in Brussels was allegedly preparing suicide attacks on NATO headquarters and the EU (Tazaghart & Jacquard, 2005). Then, in January 2007, British police arrested leader Parvix Khan and other men for plotting to kidnap and kill a Muslim British soldier. They planned to film the atrocity and put it on the internet (Nesser, 2008: 939; Crown Prosecution Service, 2010). The group had a list of names and home addresses of 25 British Muslim soldiers from the south of England to Scotland (Wright & Taylor, 2007).

In September 2007, German police arrested the so-called Sauerland cell for planning car bomb attacks against US interests and citizens in Germany (Nesser, 2008: 940). Among the targets discussed was the US Ramstein base, but it is likely that they narrowed down to mass casualty attacks against non-military American targets (Steinberg, 2013: 71–74). In December 2008, Italian police arrested Rachid Ilhami and Gafir Abdelakder, suspected of preparing bomb attacks near Milan. The cell was looking at several targets, including military barracks in Milan, the immigration office at a police station, a shopping centre and a nightclub car park (Vinci, 2008).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

The first conducted attack against a military target took place in October 2009, when Mohammed Game detonated a small explosive device at the entrance of the Santa Barbara military barracks in Lombardy. Game was seriously injured, and one soldier suffered light wounds. Two other individuals were arrested for assisting Game with his preparations (Corriere della serra, 2009). Allegedly, during their planning, the men had identified seven potential targets, including barracks and other facilities belonging to the Carabinieri, police and the army (Bordonaro, 2009). The second launched attack took place on 2 March 2011, when Urid Aka shot and killed two American soldiers at the Frankfurt international airport. He approached soldiers outside a shuttle-bus that was headed to the Ramstein airbase, and initiated the shooting attack after being assured that they were US servicemen. After his weapon jammed, the assailant fled, but he was soon intercepted (Steinberg, 2013: 5). Just a month later, in April 2011, the Düsseldorf cell led by Abdeladim El-Kebir was broken (Nesser, 2015: 275). Among other target types, the cell had shown a substantial interest for military targets, including the former commander of the elite unit *Kommandos Spezialkräfte* (KSK) Hans Christoph Ammon and a US military base in Grafenwöhr (Schmidt, 2012).

In 2012, southern France was to experience three serious attacks conducted by Mohammed Merah, and the first two were directed against soldiers. On 11 March 2012, Merah lured a French paratrooper to a meeting after the soldier had advertised his scooter for sale, where he also revealed that he was a soldier (Nesser, 2015: 277). As they met, Merah shot the victim in the head, instantly killing him. The second attack took place on 15 March, when Merah gunned down three soldiers using a cash machine outside a small shopping centre in Montauban. Two soldiers were killed, and the third was seriously injured. A month later, in April 2012, British police arrested five men in Luton who allegedly planned to attack a Territorial Army facility – possibly using improvised explosives and a model car. The group also discussed targeting the US Air force, the English Defence League and a local shopping centre (Taylor, 2013). The UK also experienced the Richard Dart case in July 2012, as he and others planned to target Wootton Bassett (the town receiving fallen British servicemen and servicewomen), as well as members of the security and intelligence services (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

On 22 May 2013, UK was hit by the first launched attack by militant Islamists against military personnel on home ground. As Fusilier Lee Rigby approached the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, he was run over by an accelerating car. After the vehicle crashed into a signpost, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale attacked Rigby with knives. The perpetrators were shot and injured when an armed police patrol approached the scene of the crime after a few minutes (Nesser, 2015: 281-282; The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014). Adebolajo stated that they decided a soldier “was the most fair target” as they had joined the army fully understanding their life would be at risk (Daily Star Sunday, 2013). Just five days later, on 27 May, Alexandre Dhassau attacked a soldier patrolling outside the La Defense station of the Metro, RER and other railways, which is connected to the Quatre Temps shopping centre near Paris. The terrorist used a box cutter to stab the soldier, who survived, in the neck (Nesser, 2015, p. 282-283; France24, 2013).

On 19 August 2014, Brusthom Ziamani was arrested in East London – police found a 12-inch knife, a hammer and an ISIL flag in his rucksack. Ziamani had showed his weapons to his ex-girlfriend, hailed the Lee Rigby murderers and told her he would kill soldiers. Investigations revealed that the terrorist had previously researched the location of army bases in the southeast of London (The Guardian, 2015a). Two months later, in October 2014, four men linked to ISIS were arrested in London. It turned out that Tarik H. and Suheib M. plotted to carry out one or multiple attacks against police officers or servicemen using a silenced handgun. Tarik H. had conducted online reconnaissance of Shepherd’s Bush Police Station and White City Territorial Army Barracks in London (Crown Prosecution Services, 2017; The Telegraph, 2014).

On 3 February 2015 two soldiers were wounded in a knife attack conducted by Moussa C. outside a Jewish cultural centre in Nice. A soldier guarding the centre was initially targeted, but two soldiers nearby quickly intervened (Reuters, 2015). A local rabbi believed the soldier, and not the centre itself, was the primary target (France24, 2015b). A few months later, on 13 July 2015, French police arrested four suspects for planning attacks against military sites. According to media sources the alleged plot was aimed at the national commando training centre in Port-Vendres, near Perpignan, and the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

attack was to be carried out in late 2015 or early 2016 (Mullen & Smith-Spark, 2015). Le Monde reported that the attack could include the beheading of a high-ranking officer, recording the murder with a GoPro camera and then publishing it on the Internet (Wilsher, 2015). The following day, on 14 July 2015, Junead Khan from Luton was arrested by British police. Allegedly, he planned to run over a US serviceman with his car, before hacking him to death - copying the attack method from the Lee Rigby attack in 2013 (Whitehead, 2015). The prosecution claimed Khan planned to wear a suicide vest during the attack. Media reports suggested that the arrests could be connected to the cancellation of an air show to celebrate the US Independence Day on 4 July at RAF Feltwell in Norfolk (Sengupta, 2015). Khan had taken advantage of his work as a delivery driver and monitored the US air bases at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath, both in Suffolk (Whitehead, 2015).

The next incident took place in France on 9 October 2015, when police arrested a man linked to ISIS on suspicion that he planned to attack sailors at the Mediterranean base of Toulon (Reuters, 2015). The man had not formed a detailed plan at the time of his arrest, but had received a parcel containing a combat knife and a mask (The Local France, 2015). The final case with targeting of military personnel was seen on 4 January 2016 in France, when Raouf El Ayeub tried to run down soldiers guarding a mosque in Valence. The driver accelerated his car as he aimed at four soldiers in a car park outside the mosque. The driver bore down on the team of soldiers the first time, prompting them to shout a warning, and when he made another approach, they opened fire and injured him. One soldier and a worshipper suffered minor injuries (AFP, 2016).

4.10.2 Analysis

What the data shows us is that armed forces have generally represented attractive targets for jihadists operating in Western Europe from 2001. The interest must be characterized as considerable, and especially since plots with vague documentation are left out of this assessment.

As previously mentioned, attacks against the armed forces can be divided into attacks against bases or HQs, soldiers in public area and individual-specific targeting. To talk of the first, there has been a focus on military bases

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

(including the NATO headquarter) in ten cases – although indicators suggest that other targets were probably more likely in a few of these cases. Only one of the cases that focused on military bases was a launched attack; Mohammed Game's failed attack against the Santa Barbara military barracks in 2009 (Nesser, 2014: 443; Corriere della serra, 2009). Attacking military personnel in public area have been a focus in at least 13 cases – included here are the remaining seven conducted attacks. However, targeting name-specific high-ranking officers is only noted in two cases. Admittedly, the interest in UK's Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, in the case from Naples in 2003 must be regarded as superficial (Arie, 2003). The 2012 Düsseldorf cell's interest for former KSK-commander Hans-Christoph Ammon, in contrast, was more serious (Schmidt, 2012).

With reference to the overall timeline, the militant Islamists did not focus on military bases and personnel in the 1990s due to the preferred modus operandi – bomb attacks in public areas – of the GIA affiliates in France. The interest in military targets has, however, been quite significant in the 2000s. Interestingly, military bases were the main focus from 2001 to 2010, and seven of the eight cases included here showed a focus on bases or HQs. From 2011 onwards, there has been a shift in focus towards military personnel in public areas, which was the case in eleven of the fourteen cases during this timeframe.

The explanation for the described developments is linked to a few factors, but first, we should remember that the period when military bases were in focus was dominated by plots, not attacks. Second, it should be added that groups and networks dominated at the time, and groups will arguably be more ambitious than lone actors. Hence, killing a soldier on the street could probably seem a bit unambitious at a time when the echo from 9/11, the 2004 Madrid bombings and the 2005 7/7 bombings in London were still ringing in one's ears. Finally, the failed attack by Mohammed Game in 2009 was hardly an inspirational act for fellow jihadists.

The time-shift for targeting military personnel in public areas happened when plots and attacks from lone actors or “inspired by” perpetrators became more frequent. It is also important that some of the attacks were, from the terrorists' point of view, quite successful. The first lone actor who caused fatalities

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

during the time shift was Arid Uka, who killed two US servicemen in 2011. One year later, the next perpetrator was Mohammed Merah, who killed soldiers in his two first attacks. Further, about a year after Merah's crimes, the Lee Rigby-killers managed to achieve what they were after. It is also worth noting that the four attacks that caused military fatalities were conducted by low-capability terrorist actors, although Mohammed Merah did have a small arsenal of weapons which increased his capability.

What should also be noted is that all attacks that killed soldiers that have been mentioned so far have taken place in public areas, in settings where the soldiers have been taken off guard. The US servicemen killed by Uka were in transit, the first soldier killed by Merah was lured into a trap, the three soldiers gunned down by the same perpetrator were gathered around an ATM cash machine and Lee Rigby was on the move, going back to his barracks. The fact that the four attacks directed against military personnel in on-duty situations failed is, however, somewhat coincidental, since they all could have claimed lives. It is also worth noting that, starting with the Lee Rigby-murder, the terrorists have shown a tendency to target military personnel near their bases or barracks. Junead Khan's plan from 2015 was more or less a blueprint of the Woolwoch attack (Sengupta, 2015). In France, the perpetrators behind the July 2015 plot and the October 2015 plot planned for a similar type of attack – although the details from these cases are not sufficient (Mullen & Smith-Spark, 2015; Reuters UK, 2015).

4.11 Targeting public area

When people think about terrorism, the scenario that comes to mind first is probably attacks directed against random and vulnerable people in public areas. This is not least so due to a number of incidents that have taken place in the last couple of decades.

In this thesis, the target category *Public area* covers plots and attacks taking place against civilians in public space, except for incidents related to the transport sector, which is a category of its own. This can happen both outdoors and indoors – for example, in restaurants, concert venues, museums and shopping centres. The worst scenarios in this category are indiscriminate mass casualty attacks. It is important to note, however, that terrorist attacks in

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

public areas are not always about the worst case-scenarios. Often, there will be minor caveats that end up affecting the terrorists. Sometimes, a limited casualty focus is seen due to the intent or capability of the attacker(s). Likewise, some perpetrators may attack discriminately – for instance, if they wish to avoid killing women and children. Furthermore, during public meetings, it is possible to target specific groups of society, like gays and lesbians, certain nationalities and ethnic groups. The one basic prerequisite for conducting attacks in the category discussed here is that killing defenceless civilians must be considered legitimate. Here, it is worth noting that the legitimacy and acceptance among the perpetrators alone are not really enough. It should also coincide with the views of existing sympathizers, as well as potential supporters.

Much on this issue has already been thoroughly addressed earlier in this thesis, especially the elaboration on soft targets and indiscriminate targeting. As such, there is no need to repeat relevant factors and characteristics again, except for stating that attacks in public area and on public transport pose the greatest danger for most people in general: they create the greatest fear among people, and they have the greatest societal impact. It should also be noted that attacks in the two aforementioned categories are typically those that potentially lead to harsh responses from the government(s) in question, and they are also those that may backlash on the perpetrator(s) – for example, if they do things their sympathizers and potential supporters do not agree with. This can include killing the wrong category of people, murdering too many people or executing murders in a manner that is too brutal.

4.11.1 *The most relevant plots and attacks*

According to the dataset, people in public areas were potential targets and were alternatively targeted in 72 out of 209 cases plots and attacks. If we look at all plots, public areas were a potential target in 51 of 139 registered plots. If we just look to the plots with strong documentation, public areas were a potential target in 32 of 80 plots from 1994 to 2016. When it comes to conducted attacks, public areas were targeted in 21 of 70 cases. That leaves us with the following 53 cases as the starting point for thorough assessments.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
1995	Attack	Arc de Triumph attack	Public area (PA)
1995	Attack	Place de Bastille attack	Market
1995	Attack	Market bomb, Paris	Market
1995	Attack	Jewish school bomb	Jewish school
1995	Plot	Lille Market plot	Market
1996	Attack	Car bomb attack, Lille	Street
2000	Plot	Strasbourg plot	Market, cathedral
2001	Plot	France – Algeria match plot	Football event
2002	Plot	Al-Tawhid plot, Germany	Nightclub, bar, Jewish targets
2003	Plot	Rovigo NATO plot	Churches' markets
2004	Attack	Mustafa Chaouki case	Drive-in restaurant
2004	Plot	UK fertilizier plot	Shopping centre, nightclub
2004	Plot	Dhiren Barot case	Underground car park
2004	Plot	National court plot, Madrid	A variety of PA targets
2006	Plot	Aabid Khan royalties plot	Tower bridge
2006	Plot	Vollsmose case	Park, shopping centre, square
2007	Plot	Christopher Paul case	Unknown
2007	Attack	Haymarket carbombs	Outside nightclub
2007	Plot	Sauerland cell	Americans in PA
2007	Plot	Andrew (Isa) Ibrahim case	Shopping centre
2008	Attack	Nicky Reilly case	Restaurant
2008	Plot	Rachid Ilhami case	Shopping centre, nightclub
2009	Plot	Easter holidays plot	Shopping centre, nightclub
2010	Attack	Stockholm bombing	Busy shopping street
2011	Plot	El-Kebir Dusseldorf cell	Crowded places, public buildings
2011	Plot	Naseer, Birmingham cell	Crowded places
2012	Attack	Merah 3, Jewish school	Outside Jewish school

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

2012	Plot	Luton cell	Shopping centre
2012	Plot	London Boys case	Olympic park, hotels
2012	Plot	Shopping centre plot	Shopping centre
2012	Attack	Kosher shop attack	Kosher shop
2013	Plot	AQIM plots, France	Crowded places
2013	Plot	Balir or Mumbai style plot	Crowded places
2014	Attack	Jewish museum attack	Jewish museum
2014	Plot	Remembrance Day plot	Member(s) of the public
2014	Attack	Dijon car attack	Street attack
2015	Attack	Jogger attack, Paris	Jogger in park
2015	Attack	Kosher shop siege	Kosher shop
2015	Attack	Copenhagen Vilks attack	Public meeting
2015	Plot	Catalonia arrests	Crowded places
2015	Plot	Bike race plot	Bike race
2015	Plot	Silent bomber Rehman	Shopping centre, London underground
2015	Attack	Nov 13 attacks in Paris	Football match, concert, cafes
2015	Plot	Saint-Denice operation	Shopping centre, crowded places
2016	Plot	Girl school plot	Schools
2016	Plot	Lyon swingers club plot	Swingers club
2016	Plot	ISIS Düsseldorf plot	Crowded places
2016	Attack	Bastille Day attack, Nice	Busy promenade
2016	Attack	Ansbach bombing	Outside wine bar
2016	Attack	Rabbi stabbing	Street attack
2016	Plot	IS inspired Elton John plot	Concert, Oxford street
2016	Plot	Disneyland plot	Amusement park, Christmas market
2016	Attack	Berlin truck attack	Christmas market

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

France experienced a wave of GIA-related attacks in the mid-1990s, and most of these were indiscriminate attacks that took place in public areas (Lia & Kjøk, 2001; Nesser, 2008; 2015). On 17 August 1995, a bomb exploded on the corner of Avenue de Friedland and Place Charles-de-Gaulle, near the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, but no one was killed (Henley, 1999; Nesser, 2008: 928). On 3 September 1995, a homemade bomb placed under a fruit and vegetable stand partially exploded in an outdoor market near the Place de Bastille in Paris, but there were no casualties (Henley, 1999; AP, 1995). The following day, a bomb was found and disarmed in a public toilet at a market place in Charles-Vallin in Paris (Henley, 1999, Nesser, 2008: 928). On 7 September 1995, a car bomb exploded outside a Jewish school in Villeurbanne, minutes before 700 children would have ended classes for the day. Fourteen people were injured (Kraft, 1995a, Lia & Kjøk, 2001: 37). Two months later, French police thwarted a bomb attack against a Sunday market in Lille. Ten suspects linked to the Bensaid-network of GIA were arrested in raids conducted in Paris, Lyon and Lille (Kraft, 1995b; Nesser, 2008: 928). The last attack with clear links to GIA came on 28 March 1996, when terrorists parked a Peugeot 205 rigged with explosives and four gas canisters near a police station in Lille, three blocks from the location of an upcoming G7 meeting. The bomb malfunctioned, and only a minor explosion took place (Nesser, 2008: 929; Bernton, et al., 2002; La Parisien, 2001).

In December 2000, German police arrested four Algerians who were planning to bomb a Christmas market outside the Notre Dame Cathedral in Strasbourg (Nesser, 2008: 929). The police seized explosives, submachine guns and rifles with scopes (Johnson, 2002; The Michigan Daily, 2002). A videotape of the Christmas market and Strasbourg cathedral, pressure cookers and 30kg of chemicals were also discovered (The Guardian, 2003). Almost a year later, in October 2001, a GIA plot, directed against the first football match between France and Algeria since 1962 at Stade de France in Paris was thwarted. Police seized bomb manuals and a statement claiming responsibility for attacks in Algeria from the Guardians of Salafist Preaching (CBS News, 2001). The next case appeared in April 2002, when German police arrested Jordanian-Palestinians affiliated with the al-Tawhid group (Nesser, 2008: 930). A Palestinian tasked to locate targets recommended the Jewish community centre in Fasanenstraße in Berlin, the nightclub Oberbayern in

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Düsseldorf and the bar Le Clou in the same city (Steinberg, 2013: 46). He wrongly assumed that Jews owned or frequented the bar when it was actually a gay bar (Schraven, 2005). Bombs, hand-grenades and firearms were items mentioned by the terrorists involved.

In January 2003, Italian police arrested five Moroccans in Rovigo (Nesser, 2008: 932). Military bases seemed to be in focus, but churches and markets were also mentioned as potential targets (Arie, 2003). Then, on 28 March 2004, the first attack outside France occurred, when Moustafa Chaouki detonated an explosive device based on gas canisters outside a McDonalds drive-in restaurant in Brescia. Driving his Fiat Temptra, he joined the queue of cars. The device did not work properly, and the perpetrator died in the small explosion (Independent.ie, 2004). The next case happened in March 2004, when British police arrested eight nationals with links to AQ in Pakistan in Operation Crevice (Nesser, 2015: 171). Seven men were charged with planning to launch a major bomb attack or a series of attacks. The group possessed 600 kg of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and aluminium powder. Various targets were discussed, such as the Bluewater Shopping Centre, the Ministry of Sound nightclub, as well as gas and electricity supplies (Crown Prosecution Services, 2008). At the home of Omar K. in Crawley, police also found a 12-page list of synagogues – these were located in Manchester, London, Oxford, St Albans, as well as in Spain and Portugal (The Telegraph, 2007). Media reports also reported the tube in London, Gatwick airport and the Prime Minister's Questions in Parliament as possible targets (BBC News, 2007).

In August 2004, British police arrested Dhiren Barot and others for planning attacks in the UK and in the US in Operation Rhyme. Barot's plans were disclosed after a computer was seized in Pakistan in July 2004 (Pantucci, 2015: 176-183; Metropolitan Police, 2007). Four different types of attacks were planned for the UK. The main plot was to load three stretch limousines with propane gas cylinders and explosives and detonate these in an underground car park, possibly seeking the collapse of buildings. Three subsidiary and partially more unrealistic plots planned to be launched simultaneously, included an attack on trains, the hijacking of a petrol tanker to be rammed into a target, and a bomb under the River Thames to flood the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

London Underground. Barot received a life sentence, and others were given long sentences (Crown Prosecution Service, 2008).

In October and November 2004, police rounded up a cell of North Africans planning to attack the National Court in Madrid (NBC News, 2004). They had also considered the Spanish Supreme Court, Partido Popular's office in Madrid, the metro and train station Principe Pio and Tierno Galván Park (Nesser, 2008: 936; Herald, 2007). Other potential targets mentioned in the indictment were the Torre Picasso (Madrid's tallest building), Real Madrid's stadium Santiago Bernabeu, a convention hall and the railway station Atocha (Villanueva, 2004). The next case occurred when Aabid Khan was arrested at Manchester Airport on his arrival from Pakistan on 6 June 2006. The materials in his possession indicated a strong interest in the Royal family (Crown Prosecution Services, 2009). Khan also displayed an interest for the Houses of Parliament, the London Underground and Tower Bridge (Gardham, 2008).

In September 2006, Danish police arrested nine individuals suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the so-called Vollsmose case (Nesser, 2008: 938). The group had gathered bomb-making materials, and the prosecution's key witness claimed that they had discussed eleven potential targets. These were the Tivoli amusement park in Copenhagen, Odense railway station, Rosengård shopping centre in Odense, Copenhagen Central station, the Danish Parliament, the City Hall square in Copenhagen, newspaper Jyllands-Posten, Vejle traffic centre, the Copenhagen metro, the Great Belt fixed link (Storebælt) and significant political meetings (Storm, Cruickshank, & Lister, 2014: 67; Sørensen, 2007). The next case appeared in April 2007, when US citizen and convert Christopher Paul (aka Abdulmalek Kenyatta) was indicted and later convicted for planning attacks in Europe (Carafano, Bucci, & Zuckerman, 2012). He was accused of heading an AQ cell, plotting to target Americans living in Europe, by bombing tourist resorts and U.S. government facilities (McNamara, 2008).

In the early hours of 29 June 2007, two cars containing IEDs were parked and left by Mohammed Asha and Bilal Abdulla in Haymarket in London (Woolwich Crown Court, 2008). One vehicle was left outside the nightclub Tiger Tiger, the other around the corner in Cockspur Street. The men failed to

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

detonate the bombs with their mobile phones and in the morning a club employee noticed smoke and notified the police (Crown Prosecution Services, 2009). The failed attack led to a change of plans, and on 30 June an attack against Glasgow airport was launched (Nesser, 2008: 939). It is worth noting that the 2007 London bombers had conducted a reconnaissance trip to the capital in May 2007. Using tourist buses, they had looked at 10 Downing Street, Parliament and Buckingham Palace, but the visible security efforts in the area disillusioned them. Allegedly, they also discussed launching the attack on a significant date, like when Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair on 27 June 2007 (Mail Online, 2008).

In September 2007, German police arrested the Sauerland cell, consisting of Fritz Gelowicz, Daniel Schneider and Adem Yilmaz, for planning car-bomb attacks on US interests and citizens in Germany (Nesser, 2015: 226-233). The cell trained with the Islamic Jihad Union in North Waziristan, aiming to become foreign fighters, but IJU leaders persuaded them to act in Germany. Target discussions began in Waziristan and US installations were to be a priority, since it would be easier to attack them in Germany than in Pakistan. The US Ramstein base was an option, and they were also asked to initiate attacks at the Uzbek embassy, other Uzbek targets and targets of symbolic importance. The lack of concrete orders led to lengthy discussions on the target selection between the three men (Steinberg, 2013: 71). Moreover, the IJU wanted the attacks to coincide with the German debate over extending the mandate of the German contribution to ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (Steinberg, 2013: 73). The three men agreed to pick the final targets shortly before the attacks, and Frankfurt and Ramstein airports, and pubs and nightclubs frequented by Americans, were in their sights (Steinberg, 2013: 73). The cell seemed to settle on a mass casualty operation against three American targets using three car bombs, alternatively detonating a small bomb inside a nightclub followed by a bomb outside (Steinberg, 2013: 74).

On 17 April 2008, British police arrested convert Andrew (Isa) Ibrahim, after his visible explosive-type injuries and expressed radical views made members of his local community notify the police. Ibrahim had planned bomb attacks against Broadmed Shopping Centre in Bristol; he had manufactured explosives at home, where suicide vests were also found. He also had notes of a hostile reconnaissance visit to the Broadmed Shopping Centre on his phone

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

(Crown Prosecution Service, 2010). Police hailed the case as the first prosecution resulting from alerts from the Muslim community. A year later, on 22 May 2008, convert Nicky Reilly (aka Mohammed Saeed Alim) tried to blow up the Giraffe Restaurant in Exeter in a suicide attack. After entering the restaurant, Reilly went to the toilet and prepared three explosive devices, but they went off prematurely, injuring the perpetrator (Nesser, 2014: 442; 2015: 256). Findings on his computer revealed that Reilly had considered other targets in Plymouth (Crown Prosecution Service, 2009). These were a police station, a shopping centre and the Devonport dockyard (the largest naval base in Western Europe).

In December 2008, Italian police arrested Moroccans Rachid Ilhami and Gafir Abdelakder, suspected of preparing a series of bomb attacks near Milan (Nesser, 2014: 442). They were looking at several targets, including military (Carabinieri) barracks in Milan, the immigration office at a police station, a shopping centre and a nightclub carpark in Lombardy (Vinci, 2008). The next case appeared in April 2009, when twelve individuals (including Abid Naseer) were arrested across Northern England for planning a mass casualty suicide attack (Nesser, 2010: 3). Allegedly, the main target was the Arndale Centre in Manchester during the Easter holidays. The terrorists planned to park a bomb-rigged car outside the centre. Suicide bombers waiting in the nearby Market Street would then target fleeing shoppers (The Telegraph, 2015). Evidence indicates that several targets, filmed and photographed by the terrorists themselves, were considered during the operation. These include St Ann's Square, Cathedral and Piccadilly Gardens, the Trafford Centre, the Arndale Centre and the Birdcage nightclub, close to the Printworks – a popular entertainment complex housing cinemas, restaurants and bars (Express, 2009; Daily Mail, 2015). Photographs taken nine days apart in August 2008 show Naseer around the Arndale Centre, suggesting that the final target decision had been made (Daily Mail, 2015).

On 11 December 2010, Swedish-Iraqi Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly blew himself up near a busy shopping street in Stockholm, wounding two bystanders (Nesser, 2014: 445; 2015: 262). A bomb device went off prematurely and other bombs strapped to his body failed to explode. Abdaly had planned to set off three devices, including one at the main railway station and one at a department store. Motives declared in emails refer to Swedish

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

cartoonist Lars Vilks and Sweden's military contribution in Afghanistan (Borger et al., 2010). The next well-documented case appeared in April 2011 when German authorities disrupted the Düsseldorf cell led by AQ-affiliated Abdeladim El-Kebir (Nesser, 2015: 275). The cell considered several targets, including the former commander of the *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) Hans Christoph Ammon, a US military base in Grafenwöhr, TV-journalists Markus Lanz (who interviewed cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in 2010) and Ingo Appelt, as well as the French satire publication *Charlie Hebdo* (Schmidt, 2012). Allegedly, the cell settled for a mass casualty attack using splinter-bombs and a second attack was meant for the arriving police. Media reports suggested that the cell had also looked at public buildings, train stations and airports, and that they had conducted hostile reconnaissance against some target alternatives (Kern, 2012; Reiner, 2012). Information from the prosecutor in the case indicated that they had planned to detonate an explosive device in a place with a large number of civilians (Steinberg, 2013: 236).

On 18 September 2011, British police arrested several men from the Birmingham area for planning suicide attack(s), using time-controlled devices or a combination of these methods (Nesser, 2015: 275-276). The three men had experimented in making improvised explosive devices and discussed methods of attack and the number of people that they could kill (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014). The cell had also loosely discussed using poison creams on car door handles, and firearm attacks against synagogues or other places (Whitehead, 2012).

On 19 March 2012, Mohammed Merah, who by then had conducted two assaults against soldiers, attacked the Ozar HaTorah Jewish School in Toulouse. Allegedly, he did so after a failed attempt to locate a soldier he had identified in his local area and planned to kill the same day (Willsher, 2012). Using two pistols and wearing a GoPro camera, he killed a 30-year-old rabbi, the rabbi's two sons and a seven-year-old girl. Witnesses said Merah fired indiscriminately at everyone he could see (BBC News, 2012d). A month later, in April 2012, British police arrested five men suspected of planning an attack on a Territorial Army facility in Luton. Other potential targets were the US Airforce, the English Defence League and the local shopping centre (Taylor, 2013). The next plot of interest is the "London boys" case, which suggested that AQ had planned attacks against the London Olympics in 2012.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Information found on AQ's African leader, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed after he was killed in 2011, described a plot to massacre people at an Eton College open day event and a similar attack on a Jewish school in north London. Another plan involved storming and burning the Ritz and Dorchester hotels in central London (Express, 2013; Metro News, 2012).

In August 2012, Spanish police arrested three suspects with AQ links. Targets were "British interests" in Gibraltar and a Spanish-US naval military base. They also had an interest for conducting an attack in France (Cruickshank & Robertson, 2012). Allegedly, they also considered an airborne attack using a suicide bomber or explosives in combination with a paraglider or hang glider against the shopping centre Puerta Europa in Algeciras – alternatively against other crowded tourist places (Nesser, 2015: 277; El Mundo, 2012). The airborne-plan was probably abandoned due to the complexity involved. Allegedly, the terrorists also considered to attack a ship in Gibraltar waters, using a boat filled with explosives. The men had 300 lbs of explosives in their possession (Mirror, 2012).

In September 2012, two men threw a M75 hand grenade into a kosher supermarket full of customers in Sarcelles, north of Paris. Rolling under shopping wagons, the grenade had limited effect, and no one was killed. One of the perpetrators, Jeremie Louis-Sidney, was central in the Cannes-Torcy network, which was disrupted after this incident (Nesser, 2014: 448; Le Figaro, 2015). A list with Jewish targets and other alternatives was found (Reilhac & Sage, 2012).

In June 2013, French security authorities arrested six individuals suspected of plotting attacks (Nesser, 2014: 449). Algerian national Ali M. was the first to be arrested as he tried to board a flight from Paris to Tunisia to meet with a top figure in AQIM. Target discussions seem to have been very general in nature, but included Parisian tourist sites like the Eiffel Tower and the Louvre museum, "thousands of Christians" attending public events (probably hinting at the Avignon Theatre Festival), as well as markets, nightclubs and bars. Shopping malls were discarded as an option, because killing Muslims was to be avoided (Sparks, 2014). Police personnel, nuclear power plants and airplanes could also be targeted (Fluery, 2014).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

In October 2013, police arrested four men in London for planning terrorist acts (Nesser, 2014: 449). The cell focused on former PM Tony Blair, but they also talked about a Mumbai-style attack against other targets, possibly involving public areas (BBC News, 2015a). A launched attack was again experienced when, on 24 May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche attacked the Jewish Museum in Brussels, using a Kalshnikov assault rifle. Four people were killed (The Guardian, 2014a). Two former French hostages later identified Nemmouche as one of their captors in Syria, and claimed that in Syria he had revealed that he planned to attack Paris on Bastille Day (14 July). French Interior Minister Cazeneuve denied that the security authorities had received this information (France 24, 2014a).

On 7 November 2014, three days before Remembrance Sunday, British police arrested several young men on suspicion of plotting attacks (The Telegraph, 2014a). The investigation disclosed that Nadir Ali Syed planned an attack after being inspired by a speech by ISIS spokesman al-Adnani (Gardham & Hamilton, 2016). Explosives and firearms seemed to be of interest (The Telegraph, 2015a), but Syed had eventually bought an 11-inch carving knife, which he planned to use to behead a poppy seller or other members of the public (Crown Prosecution Service, 2016)

On 21 December 2014, eleven people were injured in the French city of Dijon after a 40-year old man drove into pedestrians while allegedly shouting slogans of an Islamic nature. Two persons were seriously hurt (Allen, 2014).

On 7 January 2015, Amedy Coulibaly shot a jogger – who survived – in the Paris suburb Fontenay-aux-Roses (IBT, 2015). After killing a policewoman on the following day, he established a siege in a kosher supermarket at Porte de Vincennes on 9 January 2015. When the Kouachi brothers were killed in Dammartin-en-Goele, police intervened and shot Coulibaly dead. 15 hostages were freed, but four hostages were killed (BBC News, 2015).

On 14 February 2015, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein conducted a shooting attack against a public meeting at *Krudttønnen* in Copenhagen, where Swedish artist Lars Vilks was giving a talk. Police and close protection officers on site confronted El-Hussein, who fled the scene. One man was killed in this attack (Jyllands-Posten, 2015). El-Hussein attacked the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

synagogue in Copenhagen the following night, before being shot dead by police near his home later the same night.

The next well-documented plot came on 8 April 2015, when Spanish police arrested eleven people in Catalonia under suspicion that they had planned an attack (El Pais, 2015). The group discussed targeting a Jewish bookstore in Barcelona, but other potential targets included synagogues and public buildings in the region (Haaretz, 2015). The latter included the Catalan Parliament, a police station, a hotel and a shopping centre, as well as military personnel (Simcox, 2015). The cell also discussed beheading a person on the street in front of cameras and kidnapping a bank director and demand a ransom. The police seized a grenade, knives, shotguns, ammunition and chemicals that could be used for bombmaking (Haaretz, 2015).

In April 2015, the classic bike race “Rund um den Finanzplatz Eschborn-Frankfurt” was cancelled due to a terrorist threat. A couple of Turkish origin was arrested in Oberusel and police found a pipe bomb, parts of a G3 assault rifle, 100 shots and a training-grenade for a hand-held rocket launcher. The couple had also acquired hydrogen peroxide and used false IDs for the purchase. The man, with AQ links, had shown specific interest for the route of the bike race (N-TV, 2015). A month later, on 28 May 2015, Mohammed Rehman and his wife were arrested for planning to bomb either the London Underground or Westfield shopping centre. Rehman, under the nickname Silent Bomber, had asked Twitter followers for advice on which of the two targets to choose. Rehman tested explosives in his back garden at least twice, and on one occasion he videoed the blast and sent the film to his wife. It is assumed that Rahman planned a martyr operation (The Guardian, 2015c).

On 13 November 2015, Europe experienced the first Mumbai-style attack when suicide bombers and shooters three locations or areas in Paris (Brisard, 2015: 5). Initially, three bombers failed in their attempts to gain access to the Stade de France stadium, where France and Germany met for a friendly football match – the match was also attended by President François Hollande. The suicide bombers then detonated their suicide belts outside the stadium, killing themselves and a bystander. A second team with three suicide bombers, also armed with assault rifles, acted against the Bataclan concert hall, where the American rock band Eagles of Death Metal was playing in

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

front of 1500 people. Furthermore, the attackers targeted several bars in the eastern part of the capital. 130 people were killed in the attacks (France 24, 2015c). On 18 November 2015, police conducted an arrest operation linked to the 13 November attacks in Saint-Denis in Paris. Information gathered after the raid documented that the terrorists were planning an attack against the capital's La Defense business quarter – probably the Quatre Temps shopping centre and the main square of the quarter (Jarry, 2015). Furthermore, the ringleader behind the 13 November attacks had plans to strike Jewish targets and to disrupt schools and the transport system in France. Abaaoud and his cousin Boulahcen died in the police operation in St. Denis (Vlierden, 2015: 30; The New York Post, 2015).

In Denmark, a 16-year old girl was arrested in Kundby on 13 January 2016 on suspicion of planning attacks against two schools. One of the schools was Sydszkolen (school) in Fårevejle, which she was a former pupil of. Police found bomb manuals, and also that she had tested out triacetone triperoxide (TATP) explosives (Berlingske tidende, 2016). A couple of weeks later, on 2 February 2016, six Islamist extremists planning to head for Syria were arrested in the French city of Lyon. Two of them were believed to have been planning to attack swingers clubs, possibly with firearms (The Local, 2016).

On 2 June 2016, German police arrested three Syrian ISIS-members planning an attack in Düsseldorf. The plan involved suicide bombings, as well as attacks with firearms. At least two of the suspects had entered Germany as refugees during 2015. Prosecutors said they had been tasked to attack an area of Düsseldorf packed with bars and cafes. One option seemed to be two suicide bombers detonating explosives along a main thoroughfare near the area's subway station, while other armed attackers carried out further killings with weapons and more explosives (Eddy, 2016).

On 14 July 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a rented truck into crowds of people enjoying Nice's beachfront, the Promenade des Anglais, during the 14 July Bastille Day celebrations. 86 people were killed, and more than 400 were wounded. The terrorist, who was shot dead by police, was in possession of a pistol, bullets, a fake pistol and two replica assault rifles, as well as an empty grenade. He had reconnoitred the area in the lorry on each of the two days before the attack (BBC News, 2016d). Ten days later, on 24 July

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

2016, ISIS-affiliate Mohammad Daleel blew himself up in Ansbach, Germany, outside Eugens Weinstube and near the entrance to the Ansbach Open Music festival. 15 people were wounded.

On 19 August 2016, a rabbi in his 60s was stabbed in the abdomen in the Jewish quarter of Strasbourg. The assailant was arrested at the scene. Witnesses claimed that the man shouted “Allahu Akbar” and press reports stated that the man had attacked others in the local Jewish community in 2010 (AFP Strasbourg, 2016). On 8 September 2016, British police arrested ISIS-inspired Haroon Ali Syed for making preparations for terrorist acts. His brother was behind the 2014 Remembrance Day plot. Police believe Haroon Ali Syed originally planned to be a suicide bomber, but he was also interested in buying machine guns or pistols. He had shown interest in an Elton John concert in Hyde Park on the anniversary of 9/11, but also Buckingham Palace, the busy Oxford Street and military bases (Gardham & Simpson, 2017)

On 20 November 2016, French police arrested a jihadi cell with links to ISIS in Strasbourg and Marseille. Police think the cell planned to launch attacks on 1 December against Disneyland Paris and the Champs Elysees Christmas market. The cell is also believed to have considered targeting France’s counter-intelligence services (DGSI) hub, the police crime-investigation headquarters in Paris and the nearby High Court building (Osborne, 2016). Media reports also suggested that cafe terraces in the northeast of the capital and metro stations had attracted attention (Lockett, 2016). Firearms and jihadist propaganda were found during raids. Some cell members had fought in Syria and had links to the 2015 Paris attackers (Osborne, 2016).

The final case for this target type category, came in the evening of 19 December 2016, when Tunisian Ania Amri drove a Scania semi-trailer truck into a Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin. 12 people were killed and about 50 people were injured. The Polish truck driver was found killed in the truck cabin. The perpetrator was shot and killed by Italian police four days later (Parodi & Cinelli, 2016).

4.11.2 Analysis

The militant Islamists' general interest for attacking innocent civilians in public areas is significant. It is found to be legitimate and gives the terrorists an almost unlimited targeting portfolio. The number of cases involving plots and attacks on civilians in the Public Areas category is the highest when compared to the other target type categories applied in this project, with the category Transport second in line. Also, in other target type categories, several well-documented plots have been discarded due to a very superficial and initial interest not being followed up on. In this category, however, there are no such cases. In all the 32 of 80 cases, there was serious intent and capability. This illustrates that attacks in public areas are always an option, and when the interest for more difficult targets proves difficult to follow through, attacks on public areas are often the easy way out.

The interest in causing mass casualties in attacks directed against this target type category is overwhelming. A mass casualty intent has been registered in as many as 30 of 32 well documented plots and has been seen in 18 of 21 launched attacks. Furthermore, 18 of the 21 initiated attacks have been of an indiscriminate nature and all the launched attacks have involved soft targets. This means that attacking crowded places in central areas stand out as particularly attractive to jihadi terrorists. Such attacks do not offer the perpetrators the best chances for escape, but what they do offer is maximum media attention, a substantial fear potential among the general public and more pressure on the political decision-makers they seek to influence. Also, and in contradiction to most terrorists from other ideological directions (although exceptions can be seen), militant Islamists are willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause.

The intention of causing the death of a lot of people is reflected in the weapons the terrorists try to obtain in plots or actually use in attacks, although ambitions may have to be reduced as things develop. In the 32 thwarted plots, as many as 27 of them involved explosives. Eleven plots involved firearms (in seven cases, both alternatives were of interest). If we look at conducted attacks only, 11 cases involved explosives, while firearms were used in 6 attacks (in the 2015 13 November attacks in Paris, both explosives and firearms were used). Furthermore, vehicles were used as a weapon in three

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

attacks, hand grenades in one attack, and a knife in another. Regarding the outcome, the highest number of casualties in a public area attack (public transport excepted) was seen in the 2015 13 November attacks. Here, a combination of explosives and firearms was used to kill 130 people, while trucks were used both in the 2016 Nice attack and the 2016 Berlin attack – killing 32 and 12 people respectively. In five cases, suicide bomber tactics have been applied, and in two other incidents the terrorists have shown a Fedayeen-style (‘fight until you are killed’) attitude. In the rest of the attacks, there has been an ambition to escape or willingness to be captured.

Most of the attacks committed in the category Public Area have taken place outdoors. For several cases of thwarted plots, this factor is difficult to assess, but in the conducted attacks, those attacked were outdoors in 16 cases, while in six cases the people targeted were indoors. It is only in the 2015 November Paris attacks that crowds both outdoors and indoors have been deliberately and systematically attacked in the same operation. The combination of a limited number of attacks and the variety of targets displayed makes it difficult to categorize targets more precisely, but the key word is *crowded places*. Busy streets and promenades have been hit on five occasions, including the 2016 Nice attack. Furthermore, three markets have been targeted, while restaurants, bars and nightclubs have suffered five attacks. In terms of time-fixed events, the 2015 13 November attacks in Paris targeted both a football match and the concert at Bataclan, but we can here also keep in mind that in the 2016 attacks in Nice (14 July Bastille Day celebration) and the 2016 Ansbach bombing (bomb was detonated near a festival entrance), timing was an important factor. Regarding the registered attacks against the kosher shops in France in 2012 and 2015, the school attacks in France in 1995 and 2012, the museum attack in Brussels in 2014 and the stabbing of a rabbi in Strasbourg in 2016, the Jewish connection is clear, which will be elaborated on later in the section dealing with US and Israeli/Jewish targets. In the 1996 car bomb incident, Amedy Coulibaly’s shooting of a jogger in January 2015 and the 2016 stabbing of a rabbi in Strasbourg, the motives do not seem to have been as mainstream as typical attacks in public areas are. The target variety seen in launched attacks and well documented plots means that it is essential to keep an open mind when assessing potential targets. We are back to the general fact that crowds attract terrorists. As such, city tourist

maps, combined with an event calendar, will say quite a lot about what terrorists could be targeting. Regarding the time of day, the attacks in public area have taken place between 8am and 01:30am. The limited number of attacks, combined with the variety seen regarding attacks conducted in mornings, in afternoons or in evenings, the conclusion is that the time of attack most often depends on when there are crowds outside.

Regarding vulnerability, ordinary people in public areas represent easy targets for terrorists, and it is not possible to protect everybody everywhere at all times. Therefore, in the large cities of several countries, a lot of resources are put into facilitating a quick police response. This does not mean that physical protective security efforts should not be implemented; this is addressed in the conclusions of this thesis.

4.12 Targeting transport

The category *Transport* involves different services of transportation, and, with very few exceptions, *public* transport has been focused on. That is why the two categories Public Area and Transport will at large mean indiscriminate targeting, including the significant impact this has for public security, public fear and the challenges for police and security services. Since transportation services can be quite different from each other, and some sectors are more exposed to terrorist attacks than others, I have chosen to use subcategories here. This is to enhance the precision of the analysis, as well as the relevance for practitioners in the respective sectors. Following this, I have divided Transport into the following subcategories: *Aviation* covers flights and airports; *rail transport* includes light trains (trams), subways and trains, as well as tracks and stations; *ground transport* covers bus and taxi services; *maritime sector* includes ferries, ships and offshore installations. Before commencing with the respective subcategories, some overall figures can be introduced.

According to the total dataset, the transport sector was a potential target for, or was actually targeted by, militant Islamists in Western Europe in 61 of 208 plots and attacks, in the period 1994–2016. If we look at all thwarted plots only, the transport sector was a potential target in 43 of all 138 registered plots. 17 of these plots carry vague documentation, while 26 plots have strong

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

documentation. As such, the starting point for analysis consists of 26 plots and 18 launched attacks. In eight of the 26 plots, as well as in three launched attacks, two different transport target types were involved. Just as important to note is the fact that in several plots carrying strong documentation, some target types were not as seriously considered as others. As will be described below, the terrorists' focus is at large directed towards aviation and rail transport, and less so towards ground transport services and the maritime sector.

4.12.1 Targeting aviation

Crime and terrorism in the air have been seen almost from the time the Wright-brothers took off in the first powered human flight in 1903 – and increasingly so after commercial flights were introduced. From the 1930s to the 1950s, they mostly included criminal incidents and hijacks related to escape from the Iron Curtain that dominated the West. An increasing number of security-related incidents in the United States and Europe from the 1950s onwards pushed the security focus within the aviation sector forward. Two waves should be mentioned in particular; the first came after Fidel Castro's takeover of Cuba in 1959. For many years, and with a peak from 1968 to 1971, the hijacking-to-Cuba phenomenon represented a significant security challenge for the aviation sector in North America (Gero, 2009: 19–43). The second wave came when Palestinians began hijacking airplanes in Europe, starting with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's (PFLP) hijack of El Al flight 426 in 1968 - the only successful hijacking of an El Al flight to date. More hijackings followed and the so-called Dawson Field incident in 1970 was one hijacking-operation with interesting similarities to the 9/11 attacks regarding coordination. In total five airliners departing from different locations in Europe and Bahrain were targeted by members of The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). With the exception of an El Al flight targeted by Leila Khaled and a male partner, they succeeded in taking control over the aircrafts. One empty airplane was later blown up in Cairo, while three others ended up at Dawson Field in Jordan, where they later were blown up after the crew and passengers had been removed (Gero, 2009: 53-54).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

In the late 1960s and early 1970s several countries had a give-in policy when hijackings took place. A number of countries replaced this with a no compliance policy. This happened gradually, but one relevant episode in this regard was the Black September Organization's hijacking of Sabena flight 571 in 1972, which ended at Lod airport outside Tel Aviv. The Israelis had by now established a policy of confrontation, and the aircraft was successfully stormed by the General Staff elite unit Sayeret Matkal, with two future prime ministers, Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu, participating in the assault team (Zonder, 2000: 64–77). After Palestinian terrorists conducted the massacre of Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972, several European states established national counterterrorism units tasked to handle flight hijacks and other complex situations. After Israeli commandos conducted the spectacular Entebbe-raid in Uganda in 1976, the Germans was to demonstrate their increasing reluctance to give-in to hijackers, when GSG-9 (assisted by the British Special Air Service regiment) successfully stormed the hijacked Landshut-flight in Mogadishu in 1977. It is likely that the respective governments hoped that the abovementioned counterterrorist operations was to signal to the far-left, Palestinian groups and others that hijacking of flights was no longer an easy or profitable approach in the West (Gero, 2009; Netanyahu, 2002; Peters, 2008).

Terrorist acts against the aviation sector have not always been directed against flights, though. For the last five decades, there have also been several several airport attacks. One example was the Japanese Red Army's attack on Lod airport outside Tel Aviv in 1972, killing 26 people (Farrell, 1990: 128–129). Another major incident was the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport attacks, probably conducted by the Abu Nidal organization (Melman, 1986: 126; Seale, 1992: 238). In the Western world, US and Israeli airliners have been particularly exposed to terrorism, but obviously with several exceptions.

Attacking the aviation sector has been popular among terrorists for several reasons. Historically, since many airliners for decades were state-owned, symbolism was very much a factor. An attack against El Al, or an American airliner, would often be interpreted as an attack on Israel or the US, respectively. Although many companies have become private ventures, the national tag is still a factor. Furthermore, such acts were means to be able to attack a distant enemy without going to their backyard. It is also a fact that

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

attacks on flights stand out as spectacular acts – especially if the flight is used as a weapon, like the 9/11 attacks – and successful attacks will be a display of strength from the terrorists’ point of view. The fear factor is maximised, simply because those on board are totally helpless - and the outcome is inevitably catastrophic if the terrorists succeed. It is, of course, also a factor that a flight can go from one place to another after a takeover, which may give the perpetrators a number of options, while at the same time the possible countermeasures of the security authorities are reduced.

Airports are in general easier targets than flights, and such attacks are not particularly different than attacks directed against crowded places elsewhere. The terrorists want to kill a high number of people, and since airports are crowded, they are potential targets. But public places in large cities are even less protected than large airports, so there is more to it than that. First, the overall impact is more substantial than a standard public area attack, since an airport attack will cause the airport in question to close down, and all flights will be cancelled – alternatively, they may be directed elsewhere. This has a significant effect on the general public and logistics for a long period of time, and the financial costs can be substantial compared to a street attack. Furthermore, perpetrators can focus on particular national groups or state-linked companies at an airport. What we have seen in some attacks is that attackers have acted against a carefully selected party within the airport terminals, like an El Al counter (Feldman, 2002). In the same way, a suicide bomber or a perpetrator armed with firearms may be able to identify travelling groups from specific countries before launching an attack.

The main challenge for terrorists planning an airport attack is that these targets have preventive security measures that make them difficult to approach. There are physical barriers outside and inside terminal buildings, camera surveillance, alarms and trained security personnel who constantly monitor travellers and the premises; moreover, the response time for police or other security forces is normally significantly quicker at large airports.

4.12.1.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

There are 13 plots with strong documentation and six attacks involving the aviation sector – either flights or airports. A more thorough assessment of the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

plots has led to the conclusion that four of the cases with strong documentation in this sector have been very superficial. Hence, the following 15 cases constitute the starting point for analysis.

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
1994	Attack	Algeria-Paris flight hijack	Flight
2001	Attack	Richard Reid case	Flight
2002	Plot	Heathrow airplane case	Flight / Airport
2003	Plot	Badat shoebomb plot	Flight
2005	Plot	Bourada cell, Paris	Airport
2006	Plot	Geneva El Al plot	Flight / Airport
2006	Plot	Airliners liquid plot	Flights
2007	Attack	Glasgow airport attack	Airport
2007	Plot	Perugia arrests	Airport
2007	Plot	Sauerland cell	Airport
2009	Attack	Underwear bomber	Flight
2010	Plot	Karim Heathrow plot	Flight
2010	Attack	Cargo planes case	Flights
2016	Attack	Brussels 22 March attacks	Airport
2016	Plot	Leipzig refugee arrest	Airport

On 24 December 1994, Air France flight 8969 was hijacked in Algiers by GIA terrorists, and three persons were killed during the takeover. It is believed they planned to blow up the plane over Paris (Lia & Kjøk, 2001: 37; Nesser, 2008: 927; Sancton, 2001), or crash it into the Eiffel Tower (Steinberg, 2013: 23; Filiu, 2014: 356). The plane landed in Marseille, where GIGN commandos stormed the aircraft and killed the terrorists. The next incident took place on 22 December 2001, when Colvin Read tried to detonate a bomb hidden in his shoe onboard trans-Atlantic American Airlines flight 63, which was travelling from Paris to Miami (Nesser, 2008: 930). Before the attack, Reid had visited several countries, including Israel and Egypt, to find potential targets. Reid reported to a contact in Afghanistan that the Tel Aviv train station would be a good bombing target (US Quarter Court of Massachusetts). Other targets were churches and “tall buildings”, Haifa train station, the Wailing Wall and Ben Gurion airport (Alleyne, 2003; Levitt,

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

2009). Allegedly, Reid got the shoebomb-idea during an El Al flight, since shoes then were not part of the security check (Alleyne, 2003).

In February 2003, security was strengthened at Heathrow airport as security services warned about an imminent attack by AQ. Security sources claimed AQ attempted to smuggle SA-7s into UK to shoot down airliners taking off from Heathrow (The Guardian, 2003). In December the same year, British-Malawi Sajid Badat was arrested in the UK for planning a suicide bomb attack on a trans-Atlantic flight back in 2001. He had previously met Richard Reid in Afghanistan and returned with a similar mission (Nesser, 2008: 934). Badat decided to abort the mission and enrolled an Islamic college in Blackburn (The Telegraph, 2012a).

In September 2005, French police arrested nine alleged members of GSPC on suspicion of planning attacks on DST HQ, the Paris Metro and an unspecified airport (Nesser, 2008: 937; Beyler, 2006). The next case involving aviation came in May 2006, when Swiss police arrested several persons planning to shoot down an El Al plane during take-off from Geneva Airport using an RPG or a surface to air weapon. Geneva was regarded as a good location due to the fact that the surrounding mountains could be used to the terrorists' advantage (Ynet News, 2006). As the plot evolved, the terrorists aborted the plan and instead aimed for airport attacks in Zurich and Geneva, according to security sources.

In August 2006, British police arrested 24 Muslims suspected of preparing suicide bombings on trans-Atlantic flights from Heathrow (Nesser, 2006; 2008: 938). They had developed a method to disguise homemade explosive devices in soft drink bottles. Mid-air on their way to USA or Canada, the devices were to be assembled and detonated. Ringleader Abdul Ahmed Ali was carrying a list of flights on a memory stick, and these were headed to San Francisco, Toronto, Montreal, Washington, New York and Chicago. The first departure, United Airlines to San Francisco, was recorded at 2:30pm. The final departure, American Airlines to Chicago, was at 4:50pm (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011). Allegedly, the terrorist network had ambitions to follow up on the 2006 liquid attacks with a second wave of terror against targets like power plants, nuclear power facilities, gas and oil refineries, UK's national electricity grid, a major Internet service provider exchange, the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Canary Wharf quarter, Heathrow airport's control tower, as well as a gas line between UK and Belgium (Cruickshank, 2014: 227).

After the 2006 liquid plot, the first attack launched against an airport took place in June 2007. Following an unsuccessful bomb attack using two vehicles in the Haymarket area in London, an attack was initiated against Glasgow Airport on 30 June (Nesser, 2008: 939). A vehicle with two men and an IED crashed into Terminal 1, but there was only a partial detonation and the car caught fire. The driver succumbed due to his wounds (Crown Prosecution Service, 2009; Mail Online, 2008). In July 2007, Italian police arrested three AQ-affiliated Moroccans in Perugia. The cell was seemingly at large training others in making explosives, poison and fly planes, and chemicals and equipment for detonating explosives were found in the mosque's cellar. Police suspected action was going to be taken and they found information on Fiumicino Airport near Rome (Nesser, 2008: 940; BBC News, 2007b). The next case appeared in Germany in September 2007, when the so-called Sauerland cell was disrupted. Frankfurt and Ramstein airports were among other targets discussed, but there is uncertainty about the final decision (Steinberg, 2013: 73).

On Christmas Day 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to detonate a bomb hidden in his underpants on a US flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. He had travelled with the bomb, which contained PETN and TATP, from Yemen to Africa, and then to Amsterdam, where he boarded Flight 253. When the plane was descending at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, he tried to detonate the bomb, but the result was a small fire. Passengers and flight attendants tackled the terrorist and extinguished the fire (US Department of Justice, 2012). Another serious case followed in February 2010, when British police arrested Bengali Rajib Karim, a British Airways (BA) computer expert (Nesser, 2015: 259-260). He had communicated with Anwar al-Awlaki through encrypted e-mails and received instructions to smuggle explosives or a person carrying a bomb on board a trans-Atlantic flight. Much of the information disclosed was due to the fact that Karim made mistakes with his disk encryption (Graham, 2016: 20, 22-23). Karim also had concrete ideas about finding and using insiders (Crown Prosecution Service, 2012).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

On 29 October 2010, in the middle of the night, police at East Midland airport removed a package originating from the Arabian peninsula from a UPS cargo plane arriving from Cologne. The package, addressed to a synagogue in Chicago, contained a printer cartridge in which at least 300 grams of PETN explosives was hidden. The bomb, designed by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), was very sophisticated (Hastings & Chan, 2013: 788). A similar bomb was found on a FedEx plane in Dubai. Both planes were to explode mid-air over the US (Dodd, Norton-Taylor, & Harris, 2010). According to Ramsey (2012), Anwar al-Awlaki displayed multiple and partly competing targeting priorities with this operation, including American economy, president Obama via his home town and two synagogues.

On 22 March 2016 at 7:58am, Western Europe experienced the second launched airport attack when suicide bombers Ibrahim el-Bakraoui and Najim Laachraoui detonated their IEDs within seconds in the check-in hall at Zaventem airport outside Brussels. They did so after positioning themselves at the opposite ends of the hall. One hour later, another bomb detonated at the Maelbeek metro station in Brussels. Sixteen people died in the airport attack, and there were 16 casualties in the Maelbeek incident. The cell was linked to the network behind the Paris attacks in 2015 (BBC News, 2016c). The last case appeared on 10 October 2016, when Syrian refugee Jaber al-Bakr was arrested by police officers in Leipzig after a 48-hour manhunt. Allegedly, the man, who had links to ISIS, planned to blow himself up at a German airport, probably the Schönefeld or Tegel airport in the Berlin area (Berliner Morgenpost, 2016). Another refugee was later arrested for providing Bakr with the room where he constructed his bomb (Connolly, 2016).

4.12.1.2 Analysis

Looking at the overall picture, the interest in attacking flights and airports is moderate in terms of the registered plots and frequency. Six attacks in total against flights and airports are not many, but the interest in the aviation sector displayed in plots must also be taken into consideration. As such, there is a sustained threat against the aviation sector, which must be taken seriously. This comes out as quite even in flights versus airport attacks. From the 15 cases, 9 involve flights, while 8 have been aimed at airports. In two cases, namely the 2002 Heathrow plane crash plot and the 2006 Geneva El Al plot,

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

both flights and airports were involved. Looking just at launched attacks, however, four attacks were directed against flights while two incidents were attacks against airports.

With reference to previous elaborations about why flights constitute particular attractive targets, the persistence shown with regard to this target type category is not surprising. Rightly, all four flight attacks included in this dataset were unsuccessful, but this was not due to the effectiveness of airport security. Accordingly, Rabasa & Benard's (2015: 157) argument that terrorists have not been able to successfully penetrate airport security in Europe can be questioned. I will say that the terrorists have done so on several occasions. The 1994 takeover in Algeria happened due to security breach at the point of departure. Even more clearly, however, both Reid and Abdulmutallab successfully passed airport security in Paris and Amsterdam (in transit from Lagos) in 2001 and 2009 respectively. Therefore, the reason these attacks failed was a matter of explosive device mechanism failure, not effective airport security. Also, the 2010 cargo plot failed due to warnings from intelligence services outside Europe, not due to screening of cargo before the flights departed. What the thwarted plots tell us, though, is that we rely significantly on the capability of the security and intelligence services for detection before the terrorists turn up at the airport. It would also be a mistake to think that the unsuccessful attacks discourage terrorists from future attempts. Seen from the terrorists' point of view, the impact of such attacks, if successful, is too powerful for that. Additionally, successful attacks that have taken place outside Europe, like the 9/11 attacks and the 2015 Russian Metrojet flight 9268 downing over Egypt, are likely to inspire terrorists to target flights for a long time.

There are other perspectives to note when it comes to the attacks against flights in this project's dataset. One is that the four flight attacks were initiated outside the European continent, which illuminates why thorough checks are required during departure and transit from flights from certain parts of the world. Furthermore, all launched attacks against flights have been orchestrated by established terrorist networks with adequate capabilities and not by low-capability individuals acting on their own. The variety of attack approaches seen in serious plots and launched attacks against flights must also be noted. Traditional hijacking, suicide bombers and bombs in cargo

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

compartments have been used in launched attacks, and the creativeness and competence displayed in some cases have been of an advanced level. The 2006 liquid plot can be regarded as innovative, which is quite rare, since terrorists are normally more creative and adaptive than innovative. That said, al-Qaida tried to smuggle onboard and assemble explosives long before, as they targeted a flight from Philippine Airline in 1994 (Tønnesen, 2008: 17-18). The advanced construction of the printer explosive devices in the 2010 cargo plot is another example of creativity and skills. Furthermore, we have recently seen how militant Islamists continue to explore methods to get explosives pass through security checks at airports – for example, by camouflaging explosive devices as iPads and laptops (MacAskill, 2017).

Shooting down aircrafts with MANPADS, SAM and other shoulder-fired weapons is not for everyone. Such weapons are difficult to obtain on the European continent. Operating them requires training and experience, and the operation must be conducted within reasonable distance from take-off or landing zones – which increases the need for hostile reconnaissance and risk for detection. Overall, this attack method seems too ambitious for most terrorists, and as seen in the 2006 Geneva plot, where the plotters considered such an approach, there was a shift towards airports attacks instead. Such attempts cannot be totally discarded, however. In November 2002, an aircraft belonging to Arkia Israel Airlines with 271 persons onboard took off Moi International Airport in Kenya (Tønnesen, 2008: 25). Two shoulder-launched missiles were fired by terrorists, but both missed (Gero, 2009: 123; Wilkinson, 2007: 257–258)

A serious threat that is given less attention has also here been previously mentioned – insider threat. There are several plots where an insider threat has been identified. In one case (carrying vague documentation) from August 2005, Dutch police suspected that militant Islamists planned to shoot down an aircraft at Schipol airport (Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker 2014). Here, one individual allegedly recruited two workers at the airport to pass on information on the airline's landing and take-off patterns (Haaretz, 2007). In November 2006, German police detained six Islamists suspected of planning to bomb an airliner (probably El Al) departing from Frankfurt during the summer of 2006. The suspects had engaged an airport employee to smuggle a suitcase with explosives onto a passenger plane, but allegedly the plan fell

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

apart due to disagreement regarding payment (Nesser, 2008: 939; Deutsche Welle, 2006). Furthermore, the 2010 Benji Karim case is a classic insider-case.

Moving from flights to airports, one could argue that attacking terminal buildings and the surrounding facilities is not as easy as attacking flights. For reasons mentioned before in this part of the thesis, however, airport terminals can still be more attractive than crowded places. Eight cases with a documented interest in airports have been described, which include six thwarted plots and two launched attack. The launched attacks were the 2007 Glasgow airport attack and the 2016 Brussels bombings, where the latter has been the only launched attack causing casualties in the aviation sector in the dataset for this project.

What this dataset, and general experiences in the West, have shown is that major terrorist attacks against airports are normally directed against large, international central airports. In terms of *modus operandi*, it seems clear that except for the 2002 Heathrow case (a flight crashing into the airport was one scenario) and the 2007 Glasgow attack (a vehicle driven into a terminal entrance), classic approaches seem to be preferred when airport attacks are considered, planned or executed. In seven of the eight cases, explosives have been involved, but both old and more recent experiences from other parts of the world make it clear that firearm attacks never can be discarded as an option either – especially in countries where assault rifles and submachine guns are available in criminal networks and black markets. Vehicle attacks against terminal buildings are, to a large degree, not an option for international airports anymore due to the use of bollards and other physical barriers. Non-firing weapons is always an option, but such low-capability and small-scale attacks will not cause the same disruptive effect on an airport as the use of explosives and assault rifles typically can. After low-scale attacks, it will soon be business as usual at the airport in question.

It is important to acknowledge that airports and their terminal buildings have hotspots. Some areas are more accessible and crowded than others, like the check-in zones in departure halls. Terrorists arriving with suitcases and bags full of explosives will normally end up there, since arriving and going elsewhere could raise suspicion. Inside a terminal building, there will

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

normally be at least two attractive options from the terrorists' point of view. The first option is simply to attack crowds of people, if the ambition is to kill as many as possible in an indiscriminate manner. The second option is to attack the counters and other spots belonging to some specific airlines, which may stand out as particular attractive targets – US or Israeli airliners, for example.

Although terrorist attacks on airports have usually taken place in departure halls and outside the security control for departure, it is important to keep in mind that, depending on the form of the attack, the area beyond the security control may also be vulnerable. The reason for this is that airport security checkpoints are primarily established to ensure safe flights. Importantly, however, it is perfectly possible to breach entry through the security control (or other entry points) with the use of firearms. Furthermore, the insider threat can also lead to possibilities, like initiating shooting attacks in unexpected areas of an airport. This means that the possibility for rapid evacuation is important both outside and inside of the security check. As described, airport security is a complex matter both because the security measures serve several different purposes and because the threats can be of significantly different nature. Finally, since long, cyber-threats have been a phenomenon that worries the aviation sector (Wilkinson, 2007: 262).

4.12.2 Targeting rail transport

To continue with the transport sector, rail transport was exposed to terrorism in the very early days of its existence. Already on 30 October 1883, Irish rebellions threw a bomb from a train during its departure from Praed Street (Paddington), causing significant damages and a high number of injuries, while a similar attack took place on the same day at Charing Cross station (McGladdery, 2006: 233). Since then, attacks against rail transport have been regularly seen from actors from a variety of ideological positions. What is regarded as ETA's very first attack came in 1961, and this was an attempt to derail a train taking Franco supporters to a commemoration ceremony in San Sebastián (Clark, 1984: 35). Many will also remember the dramatic train sieges conducted by South-Moluccan terrorists in Netherlands in 1975 and 1977. The Provisional IRA launched numerous attacks against the London

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Underground during the troubles (McGladdery, 2006). Furthermore, the 1980 Bologna train station bomb, which killed 85 people, was a massive attack that allegedly had a right-wing-affiliation. As will be described, the militant Islamists have also targeted rail transport extensively for the last two decades.

At large, attacks against rail transport can be divided into attacks that take place onboard the trains or trams themselves, attacks against station areas (including street entrances) and sabotage of tracks. This may, for example, include placing explosives on tracks to blow trains up or destroying tracks by other means to derail trains. Regarding vulnerability, rail transport targets are in principle just as vulnerable to attacks as other unprotected targets in public areas. Normally, there are no security checks before boarding trains, and this is one reason why rail transport historically has been an attractive target. Another obvious factor is that a railway attack will result in a more significant societal disruptive effect, especially when compared to street attacks. Moreover, public transport is in general packed with people during rush hours.

In addition to the three main factors that have been mentioned, there are other tactical and operational aspects terrorists may include in their consideration, depending on what they want to do and how they want to do it. If the aim is to use explosives to kill as many people as possible, underground services will be a particularly attractive alternative since the effect of explosive devices is increased in closed compartments. At the same time, escape will be profoundly difficult for the passengers, especially if the tunnels are so narrow that it is impossible to exit the carriages through doors or windows. Under such circumstances, smoke may become an equally lethal threat. Furthermore, the task for police and rescue personnel will be very challenging in an underground incident, as pointed out by an individual involved in the 2008 Barcelona suicide plot (Reinares, 2016a: 338). This includes general working conditions, facilities needed, as well as communication with the emergency services. Also, if the objective is to initiate a hostage situation, a seized carriage makes it easier for the terrorists to control the hostages and make it difficult for them to escape. As for sabotaging rail tracks with explosives or otherwise, such methods will be attractive for terrorists wanting to reduce the risk of detection and confrontation, since they don't have to be present when the train in question arrives. As will be described in the following part,

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

militant Islamists operating in Western Europe have turned to, or displayed an interest in, several different approaches and methods regarding rail transport.

4.12.2.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

There are 16 plots with strong documentation and 13 initiated attacks involving rail transport in the dataset. A more thorough assessment of the plots in question has led to the conclusion that the interest in rail transport targets in four of the plots has been quite superficial and was never seriously followed up on. Hence, the following 25 cases constitute the starting point for analysis.

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
1995	Attack	St Michel Metro attack	Train
1995	Attack	Railway track bomb	Railway track
1995	Attack	Maison Blanche attack	Subway station
1995	Attack	Belkacem train bomb	Train
2003	Plot	Bourgass ricin plot	Train
2004	Plot	Milan metro/church plot	Subway
2004	Attack	M11 Madrid bombings	Commuter trains
2004	Plot	Dhiren Barot case	Subway
2005	Attack	7/7 London bombings	Subway and bus
2005	Attack	21/7 bombers	Subway and bus
2005	Plot	Bourada cell, Paris	Subway
2005	Plot	Underground plot	Subway
2005	Plot	Bouhrama GSPC case	Subway
2006	Plot	Milan metro and church	Subway and church
2006	Attack	German train bombs	Train
2006	Plot	Vollsmose case	Transport hub, station
2007	Plot	Glasvej case	Train or bus
2008	Plot	Pakistani Taliban case	Subway
2012	Attack	Bonner train station	Train station
2015	Plot	Silent bomber Rehman	Subway
2015	Attack	Thalys train attack	Train
2015	Attack	London underground case	Underground station
2016	Attack	Brussels 22 March attacks	Subway, airport
2016	Attack	Würzburg train attack	Train
2016	Plot	Paris gas-cylindre plot	Train station

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

On 25 July 1995, GIA affiliates placed a gas canister bomb on a RER B commuter train. The device exploded at the St Michel Metro station in Paris, and eight people were killed (Lia & Kjøk, 2001; Nesser, 2008: 927-928). Then, on 26 August, a gas cylinder with 25kg of explosives was found on a high-speed train (TGV) north of Lyon, close to a big junction of the TGV network (Nesser, 2008: 928). A fault in the trigger mechanism prevented it from exploding (Dejevski, 1995).

On 6 October 1995, a bomb exploded outside the Maison Blanche subway in Paris. 12 persons were wounded (Nesser, 2008: 928). The time and place of the attack was probably in retaliation to an incident that had taken place on 29 September, when French police killed GIA leader Khaled Kelkal at the Maison Blanche bus stop in Lyon. Moreover, the attack in Paris took place at the time of Kelkal's funeral (CNN, 1995). One and a half weeks later, on 17 October 1995 at 7:06am, a bomb placed under a seat detonated on the second car of a suburban C-line RER train in the tunnel between the Saint-Michel and Orsay Museum metro stations in Paris (Whitney, 1995; Nesser, 2008: 928). Thirty people were injured in the attack, which police credited to GIA (Humi, 1995).

In January 2003, British police arrested several North Africans linked to AQ and GSPC (Nesser, 2008: 932). A suspicious chemical laboratory was found in a flat in London. Equipment needed to produce ricin were found, but not the finished product. Police claimed Kamel Bourgass and others had discussed various ways of spreading poison, including smearing it on car door handles in the Holloway Road area of north London (BBC News, 2005). Whitehall officials dismissed this and suggested that the terrorists planned to plant ricin on handrails and in toilets on the Heathrow Express trains (The Sunday Morning Herald, 2005). Maps of the Heathrow train route were found at the home of an associate of Bourgass (News 24, 2005). The next incident appeared in February 2004, when Italian police arrested Tunisian and Moroccan men for planning attacks on a Milan metro stop, below the cathedral and church in Cremona. They planned to use C4 explosives and kill about 250 people on the subway, before following it up by the church attack. The cell was allegedly linked to a mosque in the city of Cremona (BBC News, 2004).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

On 11 March 2004, 911 days after the 9/11 attacks, militant Islamists linked to AQ, launched simultaneous bomb attacks on commuter trains in Madrid (Nesser, 2008: 935). Thirteen bomb devices, each containing no less than 10kg of dynamite and about 650 grams of ironmongery, were left on twelve different carriages on four trains packed with people. Triggered by synchronized alarms of cellular phones, ten of the bombs exploded between 7:37am and 7:41am, killing 191 people and injuring more than 1841 (Reinares, 2014: 30). The attack was timed to coincide with the Spanish elections on March 14. Documents found by the police showed that the terrorists, who blew themselves up during an arrest operation, had planned more attacks after the M11 bombings. The documents listed three potential targets in and around Madrid; the Jewish recreation ground Masada, the Synagogue Hotel and the Brains school (BBC News, 2004b).

In August 2004, British police arrested Dhiren Barot and others for planning a series of synchronized terrorist attacks in the UK and the US (Metropolitan Police Service, 2007; Nesser, 2008: 936). The investigation revealed details of four different attacks, but the main plot was to load three stretch limousines with propane gas cylinders and explosives and detonate these in an underground car park. Three subsidiary plots, planned to be launched simultaneously, included an attack on trains, the hijacking of a petrol tanker to be rammed into a target and a bomb under the River Thames to flood the London Underground (Crown Prosecution Service, 2008).

On 7 July, at about 8:50am, there were three simultaneous explosions on the London Underground – in a Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations, on the Circle Line just outside Edgware Road, and in a Piccadilly Line tunnel between King’s Cross and Russell Square. At 9:47am, a fourth explosion occurred on the upper deck of a bus in Tavistock Square (UK Government, 2006). The suicide bombers were identified to be Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain. The bombs killed 52 people and more than 700 people were physically injured (London Assembly, 2006). Investigations suggested that friends of the bombers, accompanied by Hasib Hussein, conducted hostile reconnaissance in December 2004, as they visited the Natural History Museum, London Eye and the Aquarium (The Telegraph, 2008). These claims were, however, discarded by two juries (Pantucci, 2015: 195–196).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Furthermore, AQ documents found on a memory stick on an Islamist in Germany in 2011 revealed that the 7/7 bombers had considered attacking highly symbolic financial targets as well (The Telegraph, 2012). Here, in what appears to be Rauf's writings, it seems like the three potential targets were the Bank of England, the upcoming G8 summit in Scotland scheduled for July 6–8, 2005 and the London Underground (CNN, 2012a). There are no indications that the perpetrators seriously considered the Bank of England or the G8 summit, but they decided to target London Underground at the time of the G8 summit (Pantucci, 2015: 198).

On 21 July 2005, several North Africans launched a 7/7 copycat attack against the three trains on the London Underground and a bus in London (Nesser, 2008: 937). They tried to detonate four bombs, but failed. A fifth device was found abandoned on Wormwood Scrubs (BBC News, undated). In September 2005, French police arrested nine members of GSPC on suspicion of planning attacks on DST HQ, the Paris Metro and an airport – possibly Orly or de Gaulle airport (Beyler, 2006; Nesser, 2008, p. 937). The Paris cell was part of a bigger network, and a second cell was rounded up in Italy as it was getting ready to attack Rome's metro system (Tazaghart & Jacquard, 2005). According to *Le Figaro*, the network planned to act on the eve of the 29 September referendum in Algeria (Tazaghart & Jacquard, 2005). Two months later, in November 2005, Italian police arrested militant Islamists discussing large-scale terrorist attacks in Italy and abroad (The New York Times, 2005). Rome was a likely location, with Naples or Brescia as alternatives, but a source in the Ministry of Interior claimed an attack was most likely to take place outside Italy. The press, citing police documents, reported that placing explosives on subways in France and Spain had been discussed (Nesser, 2008: 938). Moreover, in intercepted conversations the cell discussed attacks by packing a large ship with explosives (The Hindu, 2009).

In April 2006, the Italian Ministry of the Interior stated that another terrorist attack against the Milan subway, as well as a church in Bologna, had been thwarted. Three suspects were deported and two were arrested. Media claimed that they planned to strike close to the national elections on 9 and 10 April (Nesser, 2008: 938; The Jamestown Foundation, 2006). Then, on 31 July 2006, Lebanese students Yusuf al-Hajj Dib and Jihad Hamad planted propane bombs transported in suitcases on board two commuter trains going between

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Dortmund and Koblenz. The bombs failed to explode, and no one was injured. The perpetrators were apparently motivated by the Danish cartoon affair (Nesser, 2008: 938; Steinberg, 2013: 52).

In September 2006, Danish police arrested nine individuals suspected of planning attacks (Nesser, 2008: 938). The suspects had collected material suitable for bomb production. Furthermore, they had discussed eleven potential targets, including Odense railway station, Copenhagen Central station, Vejle traffic centre and the subway in Copenhagen (Storm, Cruickshank, & Lister, 2014; Sørensen, 2007). A year later, on 4 September 2007, Danish police arrested eight persons with links to AQ in the so-called Glasvej case (Nesser, 2008: 940). Two men were charged and later convicted. The police suspected forthcoming bomb attacks after observing production and a test demolition of TATP. One suspect had visited AQ related extremists in Pakistan and received advice related to explosives and poison (Berlingske Tidende, 2008). Potential targets remain unclear, but sketches found by the police indicated attacks on a bus and/or train (Pedersen, 2008; Taarnby, 2014: 317).

In January 2008, Spanish police arrested a cell linked to Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in what is called the Cantata plot. The cell had planned suicide bomb attacks on the subway in Barcelona (Nesser, 2014: 441; 20 minutos news). Police found material for bomb production, but the preparations did not indicate a big operation and were probably aimed at testing. Furthermore, it is not clear whether it was to be triggered by the suicide bombers themselves or by timers (Reinares, 2014a). Some believe the attack would have taken place when President Musharraf visited European countries (Reinares, 2009). The prosecution, however, said that the bomb had been planned before the 2008 general elections and in response to the presence of Spanish troops in Afghanistan (BBC News, 2009).

In December 2012, German citizen Marco G. was arrested and charged for planting a pipe bomb in Bonn. He left the device on the platform of a train station, intending to kill as many people as possible (Reuters, 2014). The homemade bomb, hidden in a sports bag, was poorly constructed and did not explode. Marco G. was later also charged in the plot to kill the leader of Pro-NRW, with three other accomplices in March 2013 (Der Spiegel, 2012).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

In May 2015, a plot to bomb the London Underground or Westfield shopping centre was foiled with the arrest of Mohammed Rehman and his wife. Police found bomb-making material in Rehman's home, and he had tested explosives in his garden (The Guardian, 2015c).

In the afternoon of 21 August 2015, Moroccan Ayoub El Khazzani launched an attack on a Thalys train traveling from Amsterdam to Paris. A passenger trying to enter a toilet cubicle met El Khazzani, armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, on the way out. Passengers reacted quickly and overpowered the terrorist. In addition to the rifle, El Khazzani had 270 rounds of ammunition, a Luger pistol, a bottle of petrol, a box-cutter and a hammer (BBC News, 2015f). The next case appeared on 5 December in London, when Muhaydin M. launched a knife attack from behind against a 56-year old man at Leytonstone tube station, seriously injuring the victim. The arriving police officers quickly disabled the attacker with tasers (The Guardian, 2015e).

At 7:58am on 22 March 2016, two suicide bombers detonated their devices at Zaventem airport outside Brussels, killing 16 people. Just over an hour later, another explosion occurred at the Maelbeek metro station in the city centre, when a third suicide bomber detonated his device in the middle carriage (BBC News, 2016c). 16 people were killed, bringing the total number of casualties to 32. Furthermore, 340 people were injured in total. The cell conducting the Brussels attacks was linked to the November 13 2015 Paris attackers.

On 18 July 2016, three people were seriously injured when a 17-year old Afghan refugee, armed with a knife and an axe, went on a stabbing rampage on a commuter train near the German city of Würzburg. The suspect left the train, but was shot dead by police shortly after. A hand-painted IS flag was found in his room, and ISIS later posted a video featuring the individual. (Deutsche Welle, 2016). The final case in this overview came with the arrest of three women at a railway station south east of Paris on 8 September 2016. They were linked to a Peugeot 607 car packed with gas cylinders that had been left near Notre Dame cathedral in central Paris – it was without number plates and its hazard lights were flashing. No detonator device was found in the car, but the presence of diesel-filled canisters and arrangements made strengthened the assumption that there had been a plan to explode the vehicle (Chrisafis, 2016). The Interior Ministry stated that the intended target had

been Gare de Lyon, a mainline train station in central Paris. Several arrests followed, and there were links to Larossi Abballa, who was behind the murders in Magnanville, and one of the 2016 Normandy church attackers (Bon, 2016).

4.12.2.2 Analysis

If we look at the overall timeline, there has been a continuing interest in attacking rail transport for the whole period covered in this thesis, but there have been some clusters regarding the launched attacks. Four of the launched attacks occurred in 1995. This can be explained with reference to the GIA network's competence in bomb building and preferred modus operandi. The next cluster came in the mid-2000s, from 2004 to 2006. Then, there was a pause until 2012, when Marco G. left a bomb at the Bonner station in Germany. Finally, in 2015 and 2016, we saw the 2015 Thalys train attack in France, the 2015 London Underground attack, the 2016 Brussels attacks, as well as the 2016 Würzburg attack. From 2012 onwards, four of the five launched attacks have come from individuals who have conducted the attack physically and by themselves. This is also in concordance with general developments observed from 2010 onwards with regard to lone actors. Moreover, four attacks have caused a high number of casualties, namely the 1995 St Michel metro bombing, the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 7/7 bombings and the 2016 Brussels bombings.

It may also be noted here that the most horrible attacks within this sector have either been centrally led or been the product of an established group or network. Duos and lone actors have not been behind a single attack causing fatalities in the transport sector. This does not, however, mean that such actors do not constitute a danger in this context. Looking back at the train attack in France in 2015, conducted by a man armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, this could have led to a significant number of deaths if observant passengers had not reacted immediately.

Most plots and attacks with rail transport in focus have aimed for acts onboard the trains. More specifically, in 16 of the 25 cases, the focus seems to have been on onboard attacks; in five cases, the focus has been on platforms or other parts of the station area; there is just one attack directed against a

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

railway track (in three cases there is uncertainty regarding carriage or station focus). Concerning the use of bombs on trains, a typical question circulating concerns the carriage, or where in a carriage, terrorists typically place or detonate their bombs. Even though this is an understandable question, it has probably limited practical value. One factor is the low number of cases that may be studied. More important to acknowledge, shifting situational circumstances and pure coincidences are likely to have an impact. If we look at the 2005 7/7 bombings, one suicide bomber was in the first carriage of his line, while the other two were in the second carriages of their respective lines (House of Commons, 2006). How the perpetrators have positioned themselves on the platform, exactly where the train stops and how packed the train is may influence where a suicide bomber takes position onboard. It is important to remember, however, that any crowd, regardless of position, is likely to satisfy the needs of a suicide bomber. Also, the blast effect from a functioning bomb inside a carriage put everybody onboard in critical danger.

Regarding weapons, it is notable that as many as 20 of the 25 cases from the overview have been based on the use of explosives. The 2015 Thalys train attack is the only incident where a firearm has been used. Furthermore, there are two cases involving non-firing weapons, namely the 2015 London Underground attack and the 2016 Würzburg attack. The 2003 Bourgass ricin plot is the only case where poison has seemingly been the approach. Finally, in one case (the 2006 Milan metro and church plot), it has been difficult to assess the weapon and attack type. Generally, the preference for explosive devices against this target type is logical if the objective is to kill as many people as possible. Furthermore, use of timers or remote control allows the perpetrator(s) a possibility to escape, unless a suicide approach is preferred. Both alternatives have indeed been seen to cause disastrous results. The 2004 M11 Madrid bombs were triggered with cellular phones. The 2005 7/7 bombings in London, as well as the 2016 Brussels bombings, illustrated the lethal effect of suicide bombers, which has the advantage that the precision can be maximized. So far, however, less than half of the cases involving explosives include the suicide bombing approach.

When it comes to firearms, which was the preferred choice in just one of the listed plots and attacks (the 2015 Thalys train attack), I will argue that narrow and crowded carriages do not invite for the use of two-hand weapons. As

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

such, the tactical choice made can be questioned. The possibility that someone will be able to counterattack, as seen in the mentioned case, is substantial. This is why Breivik was not eager to enter small rooms on his killing spree at Utøya in 2011 (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016: 69). For the same reason, melee weapons can hardly be regarded as suitable for attacks inside carriages. Station areas, however, are another matter because there, the case will at large be the same as conducting an attack in a public area.

Several attacks with explosives have been seen against stations, not least in France in the mid-1990s. In general, however, the use of firearms, non-firing weapons or even bare hands may be used for such attacks. Nor must we forget that vehicles in several cases have been used to attack people waiting at light train stations and similar facilities. A variety of attack methods against light trains and their stop sites is still not seen in cases with militant Islamists in Europe, but can be illustrated with examples from Israel. In October 2014, a Palestinian drove a car into a crowd of people at the Ammunition Hill light rail station in Jerusalem, killing two individuals (Rudoren, 2014). In November 2014, a Hamas terrorist drove a van into people waiting at a light train station outside Jerusalem, causing three deaths (Dvir, 2014). In July 2016, a Palestinian was arrested in Jerusalem as he was going to detonate pipe bombs on light trains (Eisenbud, 2016). In October 2016, the Ammunition Hill light train station in Jerusalem saw a shooting attack in which two persons were killed (Ynet News, 2016). In April 2017, a female student from the UK was stabbed to death on a light train in Jerusalem (Fisher, 2017).

The conclusion with regard to public rail transport and central stations is quite clear. This sector has been, and will most likely continue to be, an attractive target type category for the jihadists. Accordingly, this should be given appropriate attention when counterterrorism strategies are developed.

4.12.3 Targeting ground transportation

Ground transportation typically involves bus and taxi services, although it is the primary targeting category that normally interests terrorists. If we look at Europe over the last five decades, there have been a number of serious attacks against bus transports, as seen during the Northern Ireland conflict. One example is Provisional IRA's M62 coach bombing in England in 1974, where

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

9 British soldiers and three civilians were killed. Another example is the same organization's 1988 Ballygawley bus (roadside) bombing in Northern Ireland that killed eight British soldiers (McKittrick, et. al, 2007: 1141). This incident led to a more helicopter-based transport of military troops in and out of County Tyrone, which is a republican stronghold.

In general, however, rail transport has seen far more attacks than ground transport in Western Europe. This is also seen with the Provisional IRA that was referred to in previous examples. As such, systematic bus attack campaigns have been more common outside Europe. A relevant example here is Israel, where Palestinian groups have conducted numerous terrorist attacks against bus lines in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (Alexander, 2002; Aviad, 2008; Katz, 1999). When it comes to the militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016, the interest for attacking ground transport has been very limited.

Regarding vulnerability, ground transport in general represent soft targets that even actors with limited capacities can manage to target. As will be described in the analysis, though, there are reasons why rail transport and aviation are more attractive targets for terrorists.

4.12.3.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

In the total data set, there are three registered cases that involve ground transport. One of them is a plot with strong documentation, while the two other cases are launched attacks.

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
2005	Attack	7/7 London bombings	Subway and bus
2005	Attack	21/7 bombers	Subway and bus
2007	Plot	Glasvej case	Train or bus

The first incident involving a bus came to light with the 2005 7/7 bombings in London. After the three simultaneous explosions around 8:50am on the London Underground (described under Rail transport), suicide bomber Hasib Hussain detonated a bomb on the upper deck of a bus in Tavistock Square at

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

9:47am (UK Government, 2006). It is likely that Hussain originally planned to target the Northern Line of the London Underground, and that the bus was struck as a replacement target. Two weeks later, on 21 July 2005, several North Africans launched a 7/7-type attack against three trains on the tube and a bus in London (Nesser, 2008: 937). However, they failed to detonate the four bombs (BBC News, undated). The last case to be included here is from 4 September 2007, when several individuals were arrested in Denmark in the so-called Glasvej case. Police suspected forthcoming bomb attacks after observing production of TATP, including a test demolition. One of the two men later convicted in the case had visited AQ related extremists in Pakistan (Berlingske Tidende, 2008). Possible targets are unclear, but sketches found by police indicated that they planned to place explosives in bus or train cabins (Pedersen, 2008). Another indicator may be the fact that the Danish security and intelligence service arranged a test detonation in a bus after the arrest (Skjoldager, 2016: 47).

4.12.3.2 Analysis

The few cases in this subcategory of Transport show that the militant Islamists' interest for ground transport has been quite limited. This impression is strengthened by the uncertainty in the one plot registered from Denmark, as well as the fact that the bus attack on 7 July 2005 became a reality most likely due to changing situational circumstances. The fact that taxis and other small-scale shuttle services are not attractive targets come as no surprise since the casualty potential is very limited, and the societal disruptive effect will normally be minimal. Buses, in contrast, will often have a mass casualty potential, and sustained campaigns can achieve a high level of public fear, besides disruption of everyday routine to some degree. Moreover, buses are often used to transport police and military personnel.

Still, targeting a bus will have a more limited casualty potential when compared to rail. There are normally more people onboard a passenger train or a subway. For example, in the first carriage itself of the Piccadilly line where Jermaine Lindsay detonated his bomb in the 2005 7/7 attacks, there were 127 people (House of Commons, 2006). Additionally, the effect of an explosive device will be severe for a carriage in a tunnel, the possibility to get away for surviving passengers will also be more limited in a tunnel, where

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

fire and smoke become additional threats. The societal disruption will also be more powerful by striking rail transport compared to ground transport.

This does not mean that attacks on buses can be discarded as a possibility in Western Europe. We should for example keep in mind the 2012 Burgas suicide bombing conducted in a bus by Hezbollah in Bulgaria. Overall, however, it makes sense that rail transport is preferred over bus transport. The fact that Israel have experienced massive bus attack campaigns thorough the last decades is probably due to the fact that bus transport is the most common way of going from A to B (except for driving cars). In contrast, rail transport is not much developed in the country. However, as more railways are introduced (like the light train already in place in Jerusalem and the subway currently under construction in the Tel Aviv area), it is likely that rail transport will become more attractive targets over time in Israel as well.

Another point to be aware of is that bus stops, taxi stations and tram stations can be crowded enough to make them attractive for attacks, just like other crowds in public areas. Although this has not yet been seen with the militant Islamists in Western Europe, I have previously exemplified this with respect to Israel (e.g. Lynfield, 2014; Ettinger, 2015).

4.12.4 Targeting the maritime sector

Maritime targets, like boats, yachts, ferries, tankers and offshore installations, have traditionally not received much attention from terrorists in Europe, but on some occasions, it has been observed. One significant event was Provisional IRA's assassination of Lord Mountbatten, who was killed by a bomb outside Sligo in 1979 (Moloney, 2007: 175–177; McKittrick et. al, 2007: 793–795). In 1981, frogmen from ETA placed a bomb on a Spanish destroyer, which almost sunk the ship after detonation (Burns, 1981). Another well-known incident was the Palestine Liberation Front's hijacking of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in the Mediterranean in 1985 –US citizen Leon Klinghoffer was shot to death and thrown overboard (Martin ed., 2011: 459). So, there have been some attacks against the maritime sector, but sabotage and criminal acts have dominated far more. Also, as illustrated by Bjørge (1990), Tønnesen (2007) and others, terrorism at sea has traditionally been more common in other parts of the world. In the 2000s, the piracy activity

outside East Africa, also involving al-Shabaab from around 2010, is a relevant example in this regard (Hansen, 2013: 109–112).

4.12.4.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

There are no launched attacks and only two plots with strong documentation registered in the dataset for this research. It is important to note, however, that in the case of both plots, the ideas involving maritime targets have lacked substance, making the other options seem more likely. The first plot was planned in August 2004, when British police arrested convert Dhiren Barot and others for planning a series of synchronized terrorist attacks in the UK and in the US (Nesser, 2008: 936; Metropolitan Police Service, 2007). Four different types of terrorist attacks appeared. The main plot was to load three stretch limousines with propane gas cylinders and explosives and detonate these in an underground car park. Three subsidiary plots, to be launched simultaneously, included an attack on trains, the hijacking of a petrol tanker that would be rammed into a target and a bomb blast under the river Thames to flood the London Underground (Crown Prosecution Service, 2008). The latter two ideas seem to lack credibility, and, as Raffaello Pantucci (2015: 182) argues, though Barot enjoyed playing the role of the international terrorist, often his plans lacked realism. The second plot came to light in November 2005, when Italian police arrested a group of militant Islamists discussing terrorist attacks in Italy and abroad (The New York Times, 2005). Allegedly, they had talked about executing an attack by packing a large ship with explosives, but there is no credible evidence that this was anything beyond loose thoughts (The Hindu, 2009).

4.12.4.2 Analysis

As described, the interest for maritime targets among militant Islamists operating in Western Europe has been marginal. Even if we include plots with vague documentation, like the US warning for attacks against European ferries in 2002 (Nesser, 2008: 931; Cowell, 2002), this impression stands its ground. Maritime targets have been few and far between in Western Europe, the documentation is most often vague, and the plans that have been observed have seemingly lacked realism.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

To explain the lack of interest from militant Islamists for maritime targets, it should first be made clear that highly symbolic and prestigious targets, like offshore oil and gas installations, are difficult to access. Targeting these would require resources and operational expertise few actors possess; even then, there would be considerable uncertainty regarding the chances for operational success. As for large gas- and oil tank ships these may be difficult to exploit as attack platforms simply because they are difficult to maneuver, and most terrorists lack the necessary skills and resources when it comes to advanced maritime operations (Tønnesen, 2007: 37; 41). Furthermore, and this concerns economic impact, states with oil resources are most often financially robust and not particularly vulnerable to the financial damage of terrorist attacks – a point also mentioned by Anders Behring Breivik (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016: 21–22). Nor will such attacks create substantial fear in the general population.

Ferries and cruise ships are another matter. These are more accessible, less protected, and crowded with people. Here, too, however, it is true that other target types are easier to attack. Also, from the terrorists' point of view, bombs and shooting attacks in public areas or rail transport have more potential regarding societal disruption and the general fear factor. Finally, on water, the escape option for the perpetrators is reduced – if escape is an option at all. In conclusion, maritime installations and vessels will probably continue to be low-priority targets, but isolated incidents can not be discarded. The importance of continuing to focus on security at sea is therefore not reduced.

In order to conclude, the total number of cases related to public transport tells us that this category has been attractive and prioritized by militant Islamists in Western Europe during the entirety of the timeline. It is, in fact, the second most popular target type, only slightly overcome by the category Public Area. The two dominating sectors within the transport category are aviation and rail transport, and it is most likely that they will continue to be so.

4.13 Targeting public debate participants

The target type category *Public debate* consists of two main parts: the news media and others involved in public debate. The latter can involve NGOs, think tanks and individuals expressing their views in public. Both the press

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

and public debate participants are, like profiled politicians, regularly exposed to intimidations, harassments and threats. This comes normally not from terrorists, but angry individuals, Internet trolls, stalkers, mentally disturbed people, as well as radical interest groups (see for example, Hoffmann, Meloy & Sheridan, 2014). Many of these actors do not have the intent or capability to take lives or cause extensive damage, although there are exceptions.

The news media sector is a powerful industry with considerable impact on society – including the top level of state. Media institutions can enjoy this fact, but this position can also come with a price, which in this context means attention from terrorists. Compared to a few decades ago, the press today reaches the masses far more quickly and effectively through their digital platforms and 24/7 broadcasting. Some might argue that terrorists do not need the press nowadays due to their own media agencies, glossy online magazines and social media tools, but they do. The main reason for this is that ordinary people do not follow the terrorists' channels, but get their news feed from mainstream media sources.

For terrorists, news media coverage is a prerequisite for the communication of their views and messages to a broader audience, as well as the decision-makers they want to have an impact on. It is also the most effective way to spread fear and unrest in a population, which is a key factor to establish pressure on a government and politicians. In short, terrorists need the mass media. In her widely cited speech to the American Bar Association in London, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1985) acknowledged this. In this, she called for;

"...ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend".

The fact that terrorists need mass media coverage does not mean that all media institutions and individuals are ignored or spared. Many media institutions are regarded as politically biased – for example, “conservative” or “to the left” – and national broadcasters have many times been targeted as the amplifier of the state in question. Neutral institutions can also be targeted if they intentionally or unintentionally publish controversial, offensive or provocative material or views. Likewise, NGOs, political activists and other

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

public debate participants with critical voices that are found insulting by another party run a risk of attracting attention.

In Europe and the US in the last decades, we have on numerous occasions witnessed how terrorists from different ideological directions have planned and conducted attacks against media institutions. The Red Army Faction bombed Alex Springer Publishing in Hamburg on 19 May 1972 (Kraushaar, 2006: 1075–1078). Jewish radio host Alan Berg was shot and killed in Denver by members of the right-wing extremist group The Order on 18 June 1984 (Michael, 2012: 34). The Real IRA (RIRA) bombed BBC Television Centre in March 2001 (McGladdery, 2006: 255). Finally, Anders Behring Breivik's obsession with specific media institutions and individuals is well documented (Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016). As will be described and elaborated upon in this part of the thesis, militant Islamists are no exception.

As previously mentioned, the attention media and public debate participants receive from violent actors can be somewhat similar to the manner in which politicians attract such unwanted attention, but from a security point of view, there are also differences here. Central public debate participants, be it members of the press or others, are in general vulnerable to hostile actors, especially when compared to high level politicians and members of parliaments. Their offices are often not secured beyond some form of admittance control; usually, they are easily accessible for anyone with an agenda, and appointments with them – in or out of office – can easily be arranged. In some cases, threats are received before attacks take place, allowing more extensive security measures to be taken, but this is neither normal nor to be expected when dealing with terrorists.

4.13.1 *The most relevant plots and attacks*

There are 20 registered plots and attacks against the news media and public debate participants in the total dataset. There have been 7 launched attacks, while 13 plots have been thwarted or abandoned. Nine plots carry strong documentation, while four are vague. Of the 13 plots with strong documentation, the media option was superficial or likely to be discarded in the end, so, in practice, there are five plots and seven launched attacks which should be given particular attention regarding analysis:

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Public debate target
2004	Attack	Theo van Gogh murder	Filmmaker
2006	Attack	Alex Springer incident	Editor
2009	Plot	Rana and Headley plot	Newspaper
2009	Plot	LaRose's Lars Vilks plot	Artist
2010	Attack	Geele axe attack	Cartoonist
2010	Plot	AQ cell in Norway case	Newspaper
2010	Attack	Lors Doukaiev case	Newspaper
2010	Plot	JP /Villa plot	Newspaper
2012	Plot	EDL plot	EDL
2013	Attack	Lars Hedegaard attack	Public debate
2015	Attack	Charlie Hebdo attack	Publication
2015	Attack	Copenhagen Vilks attack	Artist

The first launched attack in this category happened on 2 November 2004. Theo van Gogh, the producer of the short film *Submission* (written by Dutch MP Ayyan Hirsi Ali), was killed by Mohammad Bouyeri (Nesser, 2005; de Graaf, 2014). The perpetrator cycled up alongside Van Gogh, shot him several times with a pistol and then tried to decapitate the victim with a kukri knife. Failing in this, he pinned a note threatening Ayyan Ali Hirsi Ali to the victim's chest with another knife (Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker, 2014). In addition to Ali, MP Geert Wilders had attracted the attention of Bouyeri.

On 20 March 2006, the first terrorist attack in Europe linked to the Mohammed cartoons that were published in *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005 took place. Pakistani student Amir Cheema entered the lobby of the Alex-Springer publishing house in Berlin, demanding to see the editor-in-chief of *Die Welt*, Roger Köppel. Confronted by security guards, Cheema drew a knife, but he was quickly overpowered. His motive was related to the papers' reprinting of the Danish Mohammed cartoons (Steinberg, 2013: 49). On 3 May 2006, Cheema was found dead in his cell (Mühlman, 2006).

In 2009, the FBI arrested David C. Headley and Tahawwur Rana for their involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and for planning a terrorist attack in Denmark with individuals from Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT), Ilyas Kashmiri (leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami) and others connected to AQ (US Department of Justice, 2009). The target was the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

in Copenhagen or Århus; furthermore, both the editor and cartoonist were potential targets. Headley conducted hostile reconnaissance during two trips to Denmark in January and July 2009. On the first trip, Headley visited both Jyllands-Posten offices pretending he was interested in buying advertisements. He also took photographs and video recordings of the potential targets and their surroundings. One video focused on the Jyllands-Posten building in Copenhagen, nearby military barracks and Copenhagen's central train station (US Department of Justice, 2009; NDTV, 2011). Allegedly, Kashmiri suggested using a truck bomb and he also offered to provide manpower (US Department of Justice, 2010).

The next incident came to light in 2009, when an Islamist cell planning a shooting attack against an Swedish artist was disrupted. Colleen LaRose (aka *Jihad Jane*) was taken into custody in the United States in October 2009. Further arrests were made in March 2010 in Ireland (US Quarter Court of Pennsylvania, 2010). Vilks had drawn attention from militant Islamists after the Swedish newspaper *Nerikes Allehanda* published an editorial with one of his drawings, which portrayed Prophet Mohammed head on a dog's body in 2007 (Fröden, 2015). Al-Qaida in Iraq put out a \$150 000 reward for his death, and a \$50 000 reward for killing the editor (Ynet News, 2007). On 1 January 2010, Danish-Somali Mohammed Geele, who had ties with AQ and al-Shabaab, forced his way into the home of cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in Denmark. Geele was armed with a knife and axe, but the cartoonist managed to flee into a safe retreat room (Astrup, 2011). Police arrived at the scene within minutes and Geele was shot and wounded during the arrest.

The next case appeared six months later in July 2010, when the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) arrested Uighur Mikal Davud and Uzbek David Jakobsen in Oslo, while German police arrested Iraqi Kurd Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak. The trio was suspected of planning a terrorist attack on Jyllands-Posten or the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in Denmark. The group had links to AQ and networks in the US and UK (Nesser & Lia, 2010; BBC News, 2012b; The Local, 2015a). Davud and Bujak were sentenced for planning to attack Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen, while Jakobsen was convicted for assisting the other two.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

On 10 September 2010, Chechen Lers Doukaiev accidentally set off a parcel bomb while preparing it in a toilet at Hotel Jørgensen in Copenhagen. The bomb was to be camouflaged in a Nintendo console, and the target was Jyllands-Posten. After the bomb detonated, the injured terrorist ran out of the hotel, but he was arrested in a park nearby (Nesser, 2014: 444; Pedersen & Søgaard, 2011). The next case took place on 29 December 2010 when five men, suspected of preparing a firearms attack against the newspaper Jyllands-Posten, were arrested in Sweden and Denmark (Skjoldager, 2016: 202). In the early stages, they had also discussed entering random private houses and murder families enjoying their Christmas dinner (Astrup & Herschend, 2012a; 2012b). The attack team was under close surveillance by the Swedish police security service (SÄPO) and their Danish colleagues from PET as they went from Sweden to Copenhagen. At the presumed day of the attack, the national CT-unit AKS moved in and arrested the cell in their flat (Skjoldager, 2016: 215, 219).

On 30 June 2012, police stopped two men as they drove from Dewsbury to Birmingham and impounded the car for lack of insurance. Searching the vehicle later, police discovered weapons, an improvised explosive device (IED), parts of pipe bombs and a document revealing a planned attack by six men on the English Defence League (EDL) rally in Dewsbury on 30 June 2012. During their preparations, the men had tried to get bank loans, gathered information on the Internet, purchased cars, acquired weapons and made the IED (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014). EDL leader Tommy Robinson was the main target, but he withdrew from the meeting in the last minute and the rally finished early. Hence, the 750 EDL marchers had left when the Islamists arrived (Fricker, 2013).

On 5 February 2013, a male attacker, dressed as a mailman, attempted to shoot and kill Islam-critic Lars Hedegaard on the doorstep of his home in Copenhagen just before 11am. The terrorist missed with his first shot and then the weapon jammed. After some grappling, the attacker fled the scene and left the country the same day. After a few months, the Danish security service PET had a suspect – a Palestinian with Danish citizenship – but they kept it secret, waiting for him to appear. On 25 April 2014 he was arrested in Turkey (Skjoldager, 2016: 322; Dansk Radio, 2014). To the frustration of Danish authorities, the Turks released the suspect in October 2014.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

On 7 January 2015, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi attacked the office of the satiric magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, where a weekly editorial meeting was taking place. After gaining access, they shot and killed the editor's police bodyguard and editor Stéphane "Charb" Charbonnier, as well as eight others present in the room. When the gunmen were leaving, they killed a police officer on the street. The police lost track of the terrorists, but on 9 January, they were circled in at Dammartin-en-Goele outside Paris. The following standoff ended when the terrorists emerged from the building, firing at the police. Police returned fire and killed them (BBC News, 2015). Amey Coulibaly, an acquaintance of the Kouachi brothers, initiated two shooting attacks apart from the kosher shop siege in Paris, during the same time period.

A month after the Charlie Hebdo attack, on Saturday, 14 February 2015 at 3:33pm, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein conducted a shooting attack on *Krudttønden* in Copenhagen, where Swedish artist Lars Vilks participated in an open meeting about freedom of speech. El-Hussein used an M95 military assault rifle and initiated the attack as he approached the building from the outside. Swedish police close protection officers escorting Vilks, and the present Danish police officers, responded to the attack, and El-Hussein fled the scene. One man died, while three police officers were wounded (Jyllands-Posten, 2015). The terrorist initiated a follow-up attack the following night against a synagogue in Copenhagen, killing a Jewish guard outside the building and was later killed by the police when he turned up near his home early in the morning (Jyllands-Posten, 2015).

4.13.2 Analysis

The number of plots and attacks against news media and public debate participants tells us that this is not unusual, although it is not the most typical target type category either. Furthermore, the overview shows that media institutions, and individuals affiliated to these institutions, constitute the most preferred targets within the category of Public Debate. Also, it is important to note that it is within this category that we find most of the launched attacks against name-specific individuals. Additionally, in every terrorist plot or attack related to media institutions, and individuals affiliated to them, there is a direct link to the publication of Mohammed-cartoons or drawings, which

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

typically are interpreted by Islamists as blasphemy or insults to the Prophet. This commenced with the twelve cartoons printed in *Jyllands-Posten* on 30 September 2005 (Rose, 2005), but media institutions reprinting these or launching new versions or similar drawings at later stages, have also been targeted. For example, the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* re-published the Mohammed-cartoons in 2006, and in November 2011 the magazine had a Mohammed drawing on its front cover, where they also had changed the name to *Charia Hebdo* (Love, 2011).

In some cases, it might be possible to foresee an extensive negative response to publications in media. When *Jyllands-Posten* published the Mohammed-cartoons in 2005, it was quite obvious that it would be controversial. It was a response to an article in the newspaper *Politiken* from 17 September same month, where the topic was that Danish artists were reluctant to express themselves on subjects related to Mohammed due to fear of reprisals (Andersen, 2005). Furthermore, Kurt Westergaard's cartoon stood out as the most provocative: it showed Mohammed with a lit bomb in his turban – presumably inspired by a well-known drawing of Alladin with an orange in his turban.

If we, however, look at the publication of artist Lars Vilks' drawing (portraying Mohammed as a dog) in 2007, it was the newspaper *Nerikes Allehanda* (NA) that got the negative attention, despite the fact that both *Barometern* and *Aftonbladet* published Vilks' drawing shortly before NA did (Fröden, 2015). So, why did NA, in addition to Vilks (*Expressen*, 2010), get the negative attraction from the militant Islamists, and not the others? One possible explanation is that there were local groups and interest parties which instigated initial protests against NA, which in turn sparked protests from all over the world (Fröden, 2015). Regardless of how plausible this explanation is, international spread and attention will often represent a significant difference from a threat assessment perspective – both regarding target status and how the hostile focus is upheld and “kept warm” over a considerable period of time. Here, there are several intertwined factors in play.

Institutions and individuals that are subject to attention from central, authoritative clerics or leaders on the global jihad scene are more exposed to attacks when compared to those receiving only local attention; this is the case

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

for several reasons. The legitimacy of taking action becomes crystal clear for everyone – even for extremists not directly linked to the network or the central leadership. The importance of striking the target in question is highlighted, and a successful perpetrator will not only achieve self-satisfaction but also be rewarded with glory and recognition from the central leadership and the jihadi community as a whole. Clearly, targets that are prioritized by leaderships and are subject to massive attention over time, become *trophy targets* in the end. Under such circumstances, symbolism becomes an important element too.

To illustrate how central jihadi leaders have established a trophy target status for specific potential targets, the Mohammed-cartoons is a good example. On the day of the publication, *Jyllands-Posten* had already received serious threats, and when media institutions in other countries reprinted the Mohammed-cartoons in 2005 and early 2006, the situation escalated, resulting in violent incidents in and outside Europe. Eventually, it calmed down, but in April 2008, Osama bin Laden's deputy Zawahiri highlighted the insults against the Prophet as a motive for attacking Denmark (*Jyllands-Posten*, 2008). Shortly afterwards, in June 2008, Denmark's embassy in Islamabad experienced a suicide attack that killed six people. In addition to the cartoons, the presence of Danish troops in Afghanistan was given as a motive (Perlez & Shah, 2008). In statements from 2008 made by Osama bin Laden himself, threats against Europe over the Mohammed cartoons was a factor (BBC News, 2008a). The Jihadists' publications have also played a part, and in *Inspire* magazine (issue 10, 2013), the Islamists presented a dead or alive list, naming 11 people. Most of them were linked to the media, namely Carsten Juste (mentioned as Luste, editor-in-chief of *Jyllandsposten* from 2003 to 2008), Kurt Westergaard, Lars Vilks, Stéphane "Charb" Charbonnier, Flemming Rose (culture editor of *Jyllands-Posten* from 2004 to 2010) and Molly Norris (US based cartoonist). It would obviously be naïve to ignore the seriousness of such proclamations. Finally, every plot and failed attack taking place against a branded person serves as a reminder to other jihadists. It contributes to keep the attention against the potential target alive, and it does not make another attempt less likely.

From the perspective of protective security, the combination of hostile focus over a long timeline and proven persistence to follow up threats is

challenging, especially because protective resources are limited. When plots and attacks take place against the same target with lots of intervening years, it is difficult to say that “the danger is over”. As more specifically described in the section on hard and soft target, public debate participants are rarely as well protected as top politicians. Unfortunately, Lars Vilks may be right in stating that he will never be able to get rid of the threats to his life due to the special symbolic status he has been given from leading jihadists (Expressen, 2010).

The conclusion is that plots and attacks against media institutions (including individuals) and others in the public debate category represent attractive targets for the jihadists under certain circumstances. Attacks are generally of a discriminate nature and are primarily directed against those who stick their neck out in the public debate in a manner that is provocative or insulting from the terrorists’ point of view.

4.14 Targeting religious institutions

The link between terrorism and religion is a debate that has no consensus, not least due to definitional reasons (Schmid, ed., 2011). Most will, however, acknowledge that terrorist actors either have a secular profile, a religious profile or a mix of both, since religion is often combined with other political or social objectives (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 6) As pointed out in some works on this subject, all religions have been extensively represented in the history books of terrorism and political violence (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Stern, 2003). Furthermore, though suicide terrorism is also often linked to religious actors, secular perpetrators from different ideological directions have also turned to this tactic (e.g. Pedahzur, 2005; Pape, 2006; Moghadam, 2008). The phenomenon of suicide tactics is by no means restricted to terrorists. It has regularly been seen in other forms of armed conflicts through history. A good example in regular warfare is the Japanese Kamikaze pilots during World War II (Pape, 2006: 11).

Since religion plays an important role in many conflicts, one might assume that this is reflected in what and whom terrorists target, including buildings and representatives of competing religions. Indeed, religious institutions and individuals are targeted in many conflict regions. At the time of writing, the targeting of Coptic Christians by jihadists in Egypt is just one example (Trew,

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

2017a; 2017b). If we look at the modern history of terrorism in Western Europe after WWII, however, it still seems like religious institutions are not the most exposed target categories. Arguably, one exception is synagogues and other Jewish institutions, their leaders, as well as the common Jews, which are under fire from almost all directions. As will be addressed later in this thesis regarding US and Israeli targets, we have seen how jihadists, Shiite terrorists, Palestinians, far-left actors and right-wing extremists have all attacked Jewish targets not necessarily for being Jewish, but for being representatives of the Israeli state. So, even though there is often an element of symbolism involved when targeting institutions or individuals within this particular target type category, Jews are exposed to an extra dimension in the area of symbolism that is of a secular nature – just like American, British and French citizens sometimes are targeted because of their respective citizenships.

Regarding vulnerability, religious institutions, their leaders and members are just as vulnerable as the general public. Religious communities are often easy to locate, easily accessible and defenceless. There are some exceptions, and the most obvious one is that Jewish institutions, based on their numerous negative experiences throughout history in the form of anti-Semitism, have established security measures at their synagogues and other Jewish institutions. It does not make them hard targets per se –at least not for terrorists – but it makes it more difficult for those planning devious acts. In the major cities of some countries, main churches, mosques and synagogues are provided extra security by the presence of police or soldiers, which takes the security to a higher level.

4.14.1 *The most relevant plots and attacks*

In the total dataset, an interest in targets within the category of religious institution has been registered in 20 cases. There are 5 launched attacks and 15 thwarted plots. Regarding the plots, there are 12 cases carrying strong documentation and 3 cases that are vaguely documented. In 6 of the 12 plots with strong documentation, the interest for religious targets has clearly been superficial and seemingly not seriously considered. As such, there are 6 plots and 5 launched attacks that should be analyzed attentively:

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
1995	Attack	Sahraoui killing	Cleric
2002	Plot	San Petronio church plot	Church
2004	Plot	Milan metro/church plot 1	Church
2006	Plot	Milan metro/church 2	Church
2010	Plot	Cleric in Paris plot	Imam
2012	Attack	Shia imam killing	Mosque
2012	Plot	Jarmone, Brescia case	Church
2015	Attack	Copenhagen synagogue	Synagogue
2015	Plot	Church plot, Paris	Church
2016	Attack	Sikh temple bombing	Temple
2016	Attack	Normandy church attack	Church

The first attack in this category was conducted on 11 July 1995, when Shaykh al-Baqi Sahraoui and his bodyguard were shot dead by two attackers in a Paris mosque (Kraft, 1995; Nesser, 2008: 927). Sahraoui was the co-founder of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and it is assumed that the Kelkal network (GIA) killed him due to the rivalry between the GIA and FIS (Nesser, 2015: 74-75). Then, on 19 August 2002, Italian police arrested one Italian and four Moroccan men whom they believed had planned an attack on the Basilica of San Petronio in Bologna (BBC News, 2002). They had filmed the area outside the church, the fresco that depicts Muhammad in hell and a medieval crucifix on the main altar (New York Times, 2002).

In February 2004, Italian police arrested Tunisian and Moroccan militants accused of planning attacks on the Milan metro stop in front of the church in Cremona. Allegedly, they planned to use C4 explosives and estimated to kill about 250 people on the subway, following it up with an attack on the church. Allegedly, the motive for such an operation was Berlusconi's war on terrorism (BBC News 2004; Nesser, 2008: 935). Two years later, the Milan subway was subjected to another plot. In April 2006, the Italian Ministry of Interior stated that they had thwarted terrorist attacks against the subway and the Basilica of San Petronio in Bologna (Jordán, 2014: 284). Three suspects were deported and two were arrested. The media claimed that the terrorists planned on striking close to the national elections on 9 and 10 April (Nesser, 2008: 938; The Jamestown Foundation, 2006).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

In November 2010, police arrested five French nationals in the Paris region on suspicion of having trained in the Afghan-Pakistan border region and for planning a terror attack. Allegedly, two of them had expressed willingness to become martyrs. The Minister of Interior Hortefeux stated that one of the suspects had been involved in an alleged plan to murder the head of the grand mosque in Paris, Dalil Boubakeur (BBC News, 2010). In March 2012, a man, armed with an axe and a knife, entered the Rida Mosque (Shia) in Brussels (Nesser, 2014: 447). Inside the mosque, the perpetrator spread flammable liquid and started a fire. A Shia Imam died, but the police investigation that followed found that he died of smoke inhalation, probably while trying to put out the fire (BBC News 2012c). It is therefore not likely that the Imam was an individual-specific target in this case.

In March 2012, Moroccan Mohamed Jarmoune was arrested for planning terrorist attacks on the Via Della Guastalla synagogue in Milan. The suspect had images of the synagogue stored on the hard drive of his computer at his home in Brescia. He had detailed operational information on the synagogue, including security measures in terms of place, police presence, obstacles and access routes. He also had a pencil diagram illustrating a gas canister bomb. Other images showed the preparation of explosives (Daily Mail, 2012).

After midnight on Sunday, 16 February 2015, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein launched an attack against a synagogue in Copenhagen, the day after his shooting attack against the public meeting with Lars Vilks (). Appearing to be drunk, El-Hussein approached the synagogue, which was guarded by two police officers and a voluntary Jewish security guard. When he got close, he pulled out a handgun and killed the security guard before he shot and injured the two police officers. He then fled the scene, but was killed by police at 4:55am near his home (Jyllands-Posten, 2015).

On 19 April 2015, Algerian Sid Ahmed Ghlam was detained in Paris after he shot himself in the leg by accident (BBC News, 2015d). In his car, police found an AK-47 assault rifle, two handguns, bullet-proof vests, notes for an attack, a laptop and three mobile phones. In his apartment, police found three more rifles, jihadi literature, police-style lights and “Police” armbands (France 24, 2015). Before his arrest, Ghlam had killed a woman found dead in her car (Le Monde, 2015). Alternative targets seemed to be the two

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

churches Saint-Cyr-Sainte-Julitte and Sainte-Thérèse in Villejuif in Mal-de-Varne in Paris (La Parisien, 2015), and Ghlam had planned to conduct the attack on the day of his arrest. The Basilica of the Sacred Heart of Paris also seemed to have been a potential target at one time (Quest France, 2015). The operation was guided from outside France (Le Monde 2015; Rayner 2015).

On 16 April 2016, there was a bomb attack on a Sikh temple in Essen. Two teenagers suspected of carrying out the bombing were arrested shortly after. The blast is alleged to have targeted a wedding, although many guests had already departed to another location. Three people were injured (Worley, 2016).

On 26 July at 9:43am, two men attacked a church at Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in Normandy during morning mass. A priest, two nuns and two parishioners were taken hostage. One nun escaped as the perpetrators killed the 85-year old priest, Jacques Hamel. The assailants also unsuccessfully tried to slit the throat of another hostage. French police shot the two men dead as they came out of the church. One of the attackers, Adel Kermiche, had been released from prison on 18 March 2016, and was under orders to wear an electronic tag (Willsher, 2016).

4.14.2 Analysis

Fifteen plots and five attacks against religious institutions tells us that the interest for this category has not been substantial among the militant Islamists, especially since in several cases, only a superficial interest has been seen. The serious plots and the launched attacks nevertheless tell us that religious institutions are targeted from time to time; hence, the threat must be taken seriously. The fact that superficial interest, concrete plots and launched attacks have been aimed against churches, mosques, synagogues and a Sikh temple, as well as imams, priests and rabbis, illustrate that hostile acts against religious institutions and communities appear in different wrappings indeed. Just as important to note, however, is the fact that religious institutions and figures are rarely chosen at random.

The killing of Shaykh al-Baqi Sahraoui and his bodyguard in 1995 was linked to the fencing between GIA and the Islamic Salvation Front (Kraft, 1995).

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Likewise, the San Petronio church in Bologna that was targeted both in 2002 and 2006 seemingly became a target due to the fresco that allegedly depicts Muhammad in hell. It was perceived to be very offensive and attracted negative attention from moderate Muslims, as well as militant Islamists, which made it exposed to potential attacks. The fact that it was well-established and there was strong Islamist presence in the region did not reduce the risk of unwanted attention.

Furthermore, both the main synagogue in Lyon (vague case) and the synagogue in Copenhagen were central buildings in the respective cities and may have affected the target selection substantially. It should also be noted that Sid Ahmed Ghlam initially displayed an interest in the Basilica of the Sacred Heart of Paris, but this would undoubtedly be a difficult task since this is a place where the security focus is considerable (Quest France, 2015). At the time of writing, it is still an open question whether the churches Saint-Cyr-Sainte-Julitte and Sainte-Thérèse in 2015 were selected by Sid Ahmed Ghlam at random, due to their status or their geographical location. Both churches are in Villejuif, which can be translated to *Jew town*. If that had an impact on the target decision-making process, an extra symbolic dimension can be noted.

As in the case of other target type categories, demography and geography are likely to play a part in the target selection processes related to religious institutions. Terrorists will often “go central” and target the well-known and iconic religious buildings that attract thousands of worshippers, as well as regular tourists. Ghlam’s interest for the Basilica of the Sacred Heart of Paris has already been mentioned, but two other examples are the 2012 plot by Mohamed Jarmoune against Milan’s main synagogue Via Della Guastalla and the two French girls’ interest in the Great Synagogue in Lyon in 2014. Regarding the church attack in Normandy in 2015, it is difficult to assess whether the church was chosen due to its status or simply because the suspects lived there and saw the church as the most attractive local target. The fact that one of the assailants was under court order to wear an electronic tag may have influenced the decision to act locally.

What we have seen less of are attacks and plots directed against smaller synagogues and rabbis on an individual basis. In some of the previously

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

described plots, such alternatives seem to have been loosely discussed or considered but not followed up on in practice. It should also be mentioned that some of the religious minorities that militant Islamists have targeted in other parts of the world have not been attacked in Western Europe so far. For example, this is the case with the Coptic Church, which has been exposed to violence by Islamists in Northern Africa on numerous occasions, like after the 2011 New Year's Day bomb attack in Alexandria in Egypt that killed 21 people (BBC News, 2011). The absence of attacks against the Copts in Europe can not, however, just be explained with the fact that the jihadists have numerous other target alternatives in Western Europe. Violent attacks against Copts in Egypt and North Africa have a long history and involves a number of actors with different regional or local interests going beyond religious differences (consult for example Brownlee, 2013).

As described, relatively few incidents within this target type involve targets chosen at random. Some plots and attacks are a result of what is regarded as blasphemy and insults to the Prophet, while a central locations and locations with a grand symbolic status have seemingly played a part in other cases. This indicates the importance of establishing basic security measures on some central or particularly threatened locations. Furthermore, synagogues are quite exposed to hostile acts.

In general, however, it is necessary to see this from a broad perspective. In France, for example, there are around 45000 Catholic parishes, 4000 Protestant churches, 2600 evangelical churches and 150 Christian Orthodox churches. We can add 700 synagogues and Jewish schools to this, as well as 2500 mosques (France 24, 2016). It is impossible to dedicate robust protective efforts to most of these institutions. The fact that there are few serious plots and attacks against such institutions and that often, the attacks are quite specific in terms of targeting underline the importance of individual threat assessments for religious institutions as well.

4.15 Less common target types

The category *Others* covers target types that militant Islamists have planned or launched few attacks against. This is not a heterogeneous group of target types, so it would make little sense to approach this category the same way as

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

the others. Instead, I will address the specific and more uncommon target types that have been seen in the dataset. Most of these targets will typically fit into what is normally called national infrastructure (transportation excluded). This includes electricity facilities, oil and gas installations, internet and computer networks, as well as nuclear facilities. Some will also include financial targets in the national infrastructure category. Plots and incidents aimed to take place in the private domain (for example, within the walls of private homes) have also been included here.

4.15.1 The most relevant plots and attacks

In the total dataset, there are seven plots and one launched attack in the category *Others*. One plot carries vague documentation and, in five of the six plots with strong documentation, the interest for an infrastructure target was profoundly superficial. Regarding the launched attacks, there is only one attack registered, although the perpetrators behind a few attacks have loosely considered target alternatives in the *Others* category too. This means that only one plot and one attack can be rated as regarded relevant within this category.

Year	Plot / attack	Description	Target
2010	Plot	London Stock Exchange	Stock exchange
2015	Attack	Lyon gas factory attack	Gas fabric, employer

4.15.1.1 An overview of the most relevant plots and attacks

In December 2010, British police arrested nine men – all UK residents between 20 and 30 years of age. Four of them had planned to detonate a bomb in the toilets of the London Stock Exchange. Three others were preparing for future attacks, while the last two were involved in other ways (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013). During the investigations and trial that followed, it emerged that those planning to target the London Stock Exchange also wanted to send five mail bombs to various targets during the run up to Christmas 2010. They also discussed launching a “Mumbai-style” atrocity. Furthermore, a hand-written note found at the home of one of the men listed London’s Mayor Boris Johnson, two rabbis and the US embassy as potential targets. It should also be mentioned that two of the men were under

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

surveillance on 28 November 2010 as they observed Big Ben, Westminster Abbey, the London Eye and the Palace of Westminster. The terrorists also talked about leaving homemade bombs in the toilets of pubs in the West Midlands (BBC News, 2012). The men received long sentences ranging from 2 to 5 years (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013).

On 26 June 2015, Yassin Sahli killed his boss at a delivery company by strangulation, before decapitating him. He took a selfie with the victim and sent the image via WhatsApp to a Canadian mobile phone number (The Guardian, 2015b). Then, he mounted the victim's head and a flag with Arabic writing on the gate of the US-owned chemical factory (US) Air Products in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier before ramming a car into the facility, causing a minor explosion. Investigations revealed that the attacker had regularly made deliveries to the factory as part of his work. Furthermore, he had been under surveillance from 2006 to 2008 on suspicion of having become radicalized (France 24, 2015a). In December 2015, Yassin Sahli was found dead in his cell (BBC News, 2015e).

4.15.2 Analysis

The fact that only one plot and one two-folded launched attack are the only cases with well-documented substance in the category *Others* tells us that the militant Islamists have so far concentrated on a limited number of target type categories. Accordingly, they have been conservative both in terms of who and what they have attacked, and rarely shown innovation in their target selection per se. Obviously, the limited number of cases here suggests that general reflections on the target types concerned becomes important to explain why they don't seem attractive to the militant Islamists. This is not least because some potential target types are given considerable attention from researchers, in the media and from the general public. The interest in nuclear facilities is one example in this regard. I will therefore here focus on targeting aspects related to financial institutions, infrastructure and the private domain. I will also to a larger degree refer to vague plots in this analysis in order to see this in a slightly broader perspective.

Starting with financial institutions, terrorist attacks initiated to destabilize a state's economy or major financial interests are seen to emerge from time to

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

time, and it is nothing new. The Wall Street bombing in 1920 by anarchists, which killed 138 people, comes easily to mind. Various Provisional IRA attacks in England also exemplify this. One example is the republican organization's bomb attack on London Stock Exchange on 20 July 1990 (BBC News, 1990). PIRA's city buster bomb attacks in London and Canary Wharf in the 1990s are other examples (McGladdery, 2006: 158–159). Likewise, the 9/11 attacks against the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 had a financial dimension. As such, the motivation for the militant Islamists' London Stock Exchange plot from 2010 was seemingly rational. The wish to cause economic damage is likely to be also why a superficial interest for financial institutions have been noted in a few other cases. In March 2007, Islamists linked to AQ allegedly planned to bring down the internet through an attack on Telehouse Europe in Docklands to cause chaos to businesses and the London Stock Exchange (The Sunday Times, 2007). Furthermore, the 2005 7/7 bombers were encouraged to consider the Bank of England (together with the G8-meeting in Scotland) as a potential target (The Telegraph, 2012). There are, however, no indications that they followed up on this with any seriousness (CNN, 2012a).

Several factors can contribute to explain why financial institutions are not prioritized as targets by the jihadists. One aspect is that there are a lot of other target types that are easier to attack. Stock exchanges and national banks are normally well protected, and the odds for operational success will hence be limited. Furthermore, the general fear factor among the public will not be significant. Another aspect is that procedures at financial institutions and stock exchanges are likely to mitigate the economic damage to society and the financial sector. The third and most important aspect, however, is that both businesses and national economies are more vulnerable through attacks against other target types than financial institutions. For example, a sustained campaign against tourist resorts (or in the region) which reduces tourism may have a tremendous financial impact, as seen with Turkey at the time of writing. A report from the International Monetary Fund have disclosed that the reduction of tourism in the wake of terrorist attacks (and political turmoil) have cut about one percentage of GDP from Turkey's growth in 2016 (International Monetary Fund, 2017). Paralysing the aviation for a period of time is another example. Here, we should note that Israel experienced 30%

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

cancellation of upcoming visits after Hamas succeeded in closing the Ben Gurion airport for a short period of time in 2014 (Solomon, 2014). The conclusion is that if hurting a national economy is the objective, there are more effective ways than attacking financial institutions.

Infrastructural targets (public transport excepted) have been frequently targeted by a range of actors in several European countries. First, it is aimed at disrupting the daily life of the population to increase the pressure on authorities and trigger some sort of response. This is seemingly a rational approach if the aim is to cause damage and avoid killing people; at the same time, there is a limited risk of detection and apprehension. In a larger perspective, however, both the practical implications and the fear factor will often be limited. The Irish Republican Army's Operation Harvest from 1956 to 1962 is one example where the focus was very much on infrastructural targets; however, the campaign had limited support, and little was achieved (McKearney, 2011: 110–111).

As described earlier, militant Islamists have shown limited interest for infrastructure targets in Western Europe (transport excluded), and the interest that has been shown often has vague documentation. One such case appeared in Italy in February 2002, when police arrested four Moroccans suspected of planning attacks using cyanide-based chemicals in Rome. The cell was discovered to contain maps where the water supply networks of the capitol were marked, and it is believed that they intended to poison the water supplies in a commercial area of the capital where the US embassy is located (BBC News, 2002). Another case of interest was the UK fertilizer plot from 2004, where police found 12 CDs with information relating to the national high-pressure gas and high-voltage electricity network run by National Grid Transco. The CDs provided information on 4200 miles of underground pipelines and 24 compressor stations for natural gas along with 4500 miles of overhead line and 341 electricity sub-stations. One disc listed oil pipelines and hazardous underground plants. Police believe that one of the suspects stole the discs from the subcontractor he worked for (Gardham, 2007). It is clear, however, that, as the process evolved, the group narrowed down to focus more on other types of targets (Crown Prosecution Service, 2008). As for Yassin Sahli's attack against the US factory in France in 2015, this is the only launched attack against an industrial target, and it can be questioned

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

whether the target was chosen due to its function, the US ownership or because it stood out as a relevant target in the terrorist's living quarter (The Guardian, 2015b).

As for infrastructure, potential targets related to water, electricity, oil and gas and chemicals may to some degree be vulnerable with regard to attacks, although oil and gas facilities will often enjoy a high level of protective security. However, if the main objective is not societal disruption or financial damage, but rather killing a lot of people and creating maximum public fear, this may partly explain why Islamist terrorists prefer other target types in Western Europe in general. Blowing up a pipeline or taking the electricity from a community for a day or two is neither spectacular nor nearly as frightening as a bomb attack or shooting in a public square.

It must be added though, that jihadist groups have displayed a proven interest for infrastructure targets within the energy sector outside Europe, in order to achieve societal disruption, economical damage or take control over the resources if they are strong enough to hold the ground. One example is al-Qaida affiliated groups' attention towards critical oil and gas installations in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen (Pippard, 2010). This has also been observed in Libya for the last few years (Porter, 2015).

Another target type that deserves additional comments, even though we have already discussed a few cases that involves it, concern nuclear facilities. No other target type can probably generate so much fear in a population as attacks on nuclear facilities or the use of nuclear weapons can (Jenkins, 2008). Therefore, nuclear facilities might easily come to mind in the early brainstorming during the process of settling on a target. Most often, however, they will be discarded because these assets represent very difficult targets due to a high level of security. Furthermore, there are other practical challenges involved – for example, a hostile actor's lack of insight about how nuclear plants are constructed and run. Both the security arrangements and the need for insight will force a potential attacker to initiate a rather extensive information gathering process, as well as hostile reconnaissance. This will in turn lead to a high risk for detection. Therefore, the likelihood of operational success for non-state actors with limited capacities is significantly small. Finally, an outcome in the form of consequences will be very difficult to

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

predict. As it seems, both the level of protection and the difficulty of achieving the outcome were taken into consideration by AQ when they considered striking two unnamed nuclear power plants, in what later became with the 9/11 attacks (Mascolo & Stark, 2003). Not everyone shares these reflections, though, and if we look at the global arena, there are a few incidents showing that terrorists' limited interest should not be taken for granted. For instance, there were two terrorist related cases concerning the Australian nuclear power plant at Lucas Heights in 2005 and 2007 (Squires, 2005; Kennedy & Skehan, 2007). In 2014, it was also clear that Hamas tried to hit the Dimona nuclear facility with rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, although without any success (Jerusalem Post, 2014).

Returning to the militant Islamists in Western Europe, the first case where an interest for a nuclear facility was noted came to light in 2004. Then, it became clear that Hofstad-group affiliated Samir Azzouz had gathered information on the nuclear reactor in Borssele (Schuurman, Eijkman, and Bakker, 2014). It is also known that UK police, during the investigation of the 21 July 2005 bombers, found detailed plans of nuclear sites, including Sizewell, in a car connected to one of the bombers. The information had seemingly been gathered over at least a two-year period (BBC News, 2007a). Finally, Ali M. in the 2013 AQIM plot had stated that a nuclear power station could be a legitimate target (Sparks, 2014). It is important to underline, however, that in none of these cases was the interest for nuclear facilities seriously taken into an operational phase. Furthermore, a warning that nuclear facilities still may be targeted came after the 13 November attacks, when Belgian police found video footage of a senior nuclear official. Suspects had rigged a camera in bushes and filmed the official's house entrance for several hours, before collecting the material (The Guardian, 2016). This could mean that they planned to strike against this person outside the nuclear facility, but it is also possible that they planned to use this person, or his official documents, to try to gain access to the facility. Considering the security arrangements around such sites, access through employees represents an alternative approach for terrorists.

Apart from nuclear facilities, there are some other targets types that fall outside the established categories; here, two cases may be mentioned. The first took place in December 2010, when five men were arrested in Denmark

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

and Sweden under suspicion of preparing a Mumbai style against the newspaper Jyllands-Posten (Nesser, 2014: 445). Of interest here, however, is the fact that they also discussed entering private houses and murdering families enjoying their Christmas dinner – alternatively, they planned to do this on New Year’s Eve (Astrup & Herschend, 2012a). Entering random private homes have so far not been a typical modus operandi for militant Islamists, but it cannot be discarded as a possibility in the future.

Another interesting target browsing process was seen in the so-called Vollsmose-case in Denmark in 2006, when police arrested nine individuals suspected of planning a terrorist attack (Nesser, 2008: 938). The prosecution’s key witness claimed that the group had discussed eleven potential targets, and most of these were classic target types linked to public area and transport, except for the Great Belt Fixed Link (Storm, Cruickshank, & Lister, 2014: 67; Sørensen, 2007). The latter consists of three bridges, one double-tunnel for trains, as well as a road stretch on the small island Sprogø, and it connects the traffic between Fyn and Sjælland. This example serves as a reminder that bridges and tunnels must be given proper attention from a security perspective.

4.16 US, Israeli and Jewish targets

The United States of America and Israel, as well as Jews in general, have been a central and consistent enemy figure since the early days of the global jihad movement. This has this been documented through a number of statements from Osama bin Laden. In the open letter to Chief Mufti bin Baz in Saudi Arabia, his first public statement directed to a wider audience, he characterized Baz’s endorsement of the Oslo accords of 1993 between Israel and the PLO as a betrayal of Palestine (Lawrence, 2005: 3). In a message from the mid-1990s, bin Laden addressed the stationing of US and other foreign troops in the Arabian Peninsula (Lawrence, 2005:19). In a statement from August 1996, he called for Muslim brothers to join the jihad against the enemies of God – the Americans and the Israelis (Lawrence, 2005: 30–44). Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, how central the Palestinian cause really is for AQ in the big picture can be questioned (Holbrook (2014: 143–

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

147), but this does not eliminate the fact that the hatred against Israel and the Jews are an important driver for the global jihad movement.

In his work on the al-Qaida doctrine and the leaderships' public discourse, Holbrook mapped AQ's grievance narrative over enemies and targets based on central jihadi figures statements from the period 1991–2013. Here, the US (in general or more specific targets) came out on top, followed by The West/"Zionist-Crusader alliance", Israel and then the Jews (Holbrook, 2014: 73–74). The key analytical question here is whether this focus on the US, Israel and the Jews has been reflected in the targeting practice seen with the militant Islamists operating in Western Europe.

4.16.1 Targeting Americans

The United States of America is familiar with being targeted by terrorist groups. A study of attack patterns of 53 foreign groups that targeted the United States from 1970 to 2004 showed that 3% of all attacks were directed against the United States. Furthermore, 99% of these attacks occurred outside the US (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009). Militant Islamists have also primarily attacked US interests overseas. A report published by the Rand corporation in 2007 covers terrorist targeting preferences against the US and found that 9/11 and possibly the World Trade Centre attack in 1993 were the only al-Qaida attacks on US soil until that time (Libicki, Chalk, & Sissin, 2007). There have been AQ-linked incidents after 2007, like the Fort Hood shooting in 2009, but it is still obvious that the US is being primarily targeted outside its borders. Most of these incidents take place in conflict zones outside Europe, but it has been a noticeable interest for US targets among the jihadists on the European continent.

The dataset of this project shows that there have been US-linked targets involved in 34 of the 209 cases where a target interest is identified. This includes 9 conducted attacks and 25 plots (11 of these plots carry vague documentation). The fact that 12.9% of the 70 launched attacks in total have been targeting the United States and its citizens, combined with the number of plots where such interest is identified, makes it clear that the threat is present and enduring. As such, the discourse focusing on the United States seems to have some effect on the actors.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

In terms of target types, if we look first at plots that have strong documentation, diplomatic missions come out on top of the list with six cases, military bases (including military airports) are second with five cases, while flights have been targeted in two plots; finally, there are two cases that involve undefined US targets, where the objective has been to “kill Americans”. If we look at the conducted attacks, flights are on top of the list with three attacks, followed by two attacks against US embassies. The remaining four attacks have targeted a McDonald’s restaurant, US servicemen, a US owned gas factory, and a concert with a US band. As described, there is considerable variety regarding target types but the three types that stand out in the crowd are flights, military targets (including military airports) and diplomatic missions. Flights and diplomatic missions represent hard targets, while military targets are at large split into soft and hard targets, depending on the context. Here, there is a difference from military personnel in countries like France and Belgium, however, because US military personnel in European countries are not so visible and easy to access as their colleagues conducting patrolling and protective tasks in large cities. As seen in the 2015 Junead Khan case in the UK, the perpetrator sought to solve this by planning to target a US soldier at the entrance part of a US Airforce base – in the same style as the Lee Rigby murderers in 2013 (Whitehead, 2015).

In general, protective measures and limited accessibility to attractive US targets make terrorists seek other civilian targets in public areas. This was seen with the 2015 November attacks in Paris, where the concert hall at Bataclan was attacked during a concert with a band from the US. It is likely that militant Islamists, and especially actors with a limited capability, will continue to focus on soft US targets in the future. That does not totally dismiss the possibility of attacks against the hard targets, as there may be more capable jihadi networks in Europe than in the US itself.

4.16.2 *Israeli and Jewish targets*

The state of Israel and its citizens, are no strangers to terrorist attacks – within or outside their borders. Different Palestinian groups conducted several severe attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe from the late 1960s

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

onwards, starting with PFLPs hijack of an El Al flight in 1968, although the 1972 Munich massacre by Fatah's Black September Organization (BSO) is the ultimate example for many. In contradiction to Hamas, who by strategic choice has contained its armed campaign to the Middle East, Hezbollah has for decades represented a global threat to Israel and Jews. The 1994 suicide bomb attack at the Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 85 people, was likely the work of the Iranian Shiite proxy organization (Serman, 2014). The 2012 Burgas bus bombing in Bulgaria is another example of Hezbollah's lethal activity (Daivies, 2013). Hezbollah's efforts are also regularly demonstrated through their operatives being detained in remote parts of the world like Peru or Thailand (Jerusalem Post, 2014a; Levitt, 2015; Ravid, 2014). Also after Hezbollah's engagement in Syria the fear for Hezbollah's commitment to conduct terrorist attacks worldwide remains, and they are capable of doing so (Levitt, 2015).

Nor can it be overlooked that Jews to a large degree are constantly under fire from several ideological directions. This includes actors from the far left, the far right, the jihadists – and sometimes even Jewish extremists, as seen with the murder of Prime minister Rabin in 1995.

The dataset used for this project shows that there have been Israeli or Jewish targets in a total of 26 cases. This includes 19 plots (eight plots carry vague documentation) and seven conducted attacks. Furthermore, it must be added that the 2004 Madrid bombers had concrete plans to follow up their atrocity with attack on Jewish targets (BBC News, 2004b). Additionally, the Cannes-Torcy network also focused on Jewish targets – although they did not get an opportunity to realise more than the 2012 Kosher shop attack (Le Figaro, 2012; Le Figaro, 2013).

The fact that 10% of the 70 conducted attacks have been directed against Jewish targets, along with a high interest in plots, makes it clear that Israeli and Jewish targets are high on the agenda of the militant Islamists – not just in discourse, but also in practice. The most noticeable point regarding the identified targeting practice is the attention given to Jewish targets and how little attention potential targets directly linked to the state of Israel have received. In the plots, there are few and vague indications suggesting an intention to attack Israeli embassies or consulates. This has for example been

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

indicated in the 2004 Yehia K. case in the Netherlands. In this case it was revealed after the sentencing, in the perpetrator's biography. There were also indications in the 2006 Oslo plot, as well as in the 2016 arrest in Italy. As for conducted attacks, there are only Jewish targets. A Jewish school was targeted in the 1995 attack by the GIA network in the suburb Villeurbanne outside Lyon, as well as in the 2012 attack against the Ozar HaTorah day school by Merah. Kosher shops were targeted in the 2012 shop attack in Paris and in the 2015 siege conducted by Amedy Coulibaly in Paris. In 2014, the Jewish museum in Brussels was attacked and a synagogue was targeted in the 2015 attack in Copenhagen. Finally, a rabbi was stabbed in Strasbourg in 2016. As can be seen, there are a variety of targets, and if one includes the plots, the variety is even more noticeable. Still, synagogues and their rabbis stand out as the most typical targets. They are visible and vulnerable, although synagogues often have basic security measures in place – sometimes reinforced with police presence.

The explanation regarding the lack of attention towards Israeli diplomatic missions is that these are very well protected. After the Palestinian terrorist attack against the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1972, Israeli embassies and consulates around the world were systematically fortified (Pedahzur, 2009: 44). The Israeli Security Agency (ISA) provides security staff for Israel's diplomatic missions, and there are extensive physical and technical security measures. The incident in Berlin in 1999, where three Kurds were shot dead when a crowd tried to enter the Israeli consulate with force, demonstrates that Israeli diplomatic missions are hard targets (Drozdiak, 1999). Furthermore, it is likely that jihadists regard attacks on Jews as attacks on the state of Israel. Here, it must also be noted that the militant Islamists to a very limited degree have been able to pose a threat inside Israel and the Palestinian region. In this region, PLO, Hamas, Hezbollah and other groups have their own agendas, and it is not at all evident that they will let jihadists dictate the developments in their own backyard. Furthermore, it is not easy for AQ and ISIS operatives to enter Israel. Accordingly, there are several reasons why the militant Islamists attack Israeli citizens and Jews outside Israel.

Aggression and attacks against the Jews, and to a less degree targets linked to the state of Israel, will continue to be seen due to the existing soft and hard target distinction between these target types. The security threat to Jews and

their synagogues, community centres and museums is furthermore supplemented by threats against Jewish tourist groups, other groups (like sports teams) and special events.

4.17 Observations on target decision-making

This multiple case study has focused on the targeting preferences of the militant Islamists in Europe and not the concrete decision-making processes for each case. The information available is not detailed enough for such a project. That said, there are some cases where the information is rich in details like those that have been followed by investigative commissions – for example, the 7 July 2005 bombings in London. Additionally, there have been interesting indicators related to decision-making in some cases, although this information is typically fragmented.

The most central point regarding the jihadists target-related decision-making is that those conducting the attack normally themselves decide the target to be attacked. The reason for this is obviously related to the fact that most attacks are not centrally-led and guided by some distant command element, but both planned and executed by individuals or a small group of people (Nesser, 2012; Mullins, 2017). Quite often, these are citizens of the country under attack. The large and complex operations executed by the core of al-Qaida and ISIS, like the 9/11 or the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris, are relatively few and far between. Even in cases where there is an established network with a hierarchical organizational structure, there are good reasons for leaving the concrete target selection to those who would conduct the attack. With local knowledge, they will be in a better position to assess what potential targets it is possible to follow up on without too great a risk for detection. They are likely to blend in properly and be more qualified to make operational assessments related to, for example, security efforts, police presence, emergency services and response time. As such, leaving the target decision-making to those conducting the attack makes sense.

There are also indications in this thesis that illustrate that the operational control that central leaderships or contacts have over small, local groups or individuals can be limited, even though they provide the perpetrators with training, practical advice or other forms of support. The 7 July 2005 bombers

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

were allegedly given a choice between the Bank of England, the G8 summit in Scotland and the London Underground, but there are no indications that the first two were ever seriously considered (CNN, 2012a). The 2007 Sauerland cell, which was encouraged to strike against Uzbek targets in Germany through their distant contacts, decided on other targets (Steinberg, 2013: 71, 74). It is also suggested that Merah was encouraged to target the Indian embassy, but that he discarded this and decided to act otherwise (Naravane, 2012). Additionally, surveillance recordings, statements from terrorists under investigations and other information from media and trial documents have in several plots documented substantial target browsing and related discussions among individuals planning to conduct attacks.

4.18 Reflections on strategies and outcomes

The main focus of this part study of the thesis is to analyse the concrete targeting preferences and some targeted-related characteristics of militant Islamists in Europe, based on cases identified. For a deeper understanding on Salafi jihadism ideology and theoretical militant strategies specific works on these issues should be consulted (some of which are referred to in this part of the thesis). That stated, it is important to acknowledge that attacks against the West is not taking place in a vacuum, but very much affected by actors, conditions and developments both within and on the outside of our part of the world. In this section, I will therefore draw some lines with regard to the jihadists' reasoning for attacking their distant enemy in the West. Although plots and attacks against Western Europe is the main focus in this thesis, making a differentiation between Europe and the West is less meaningful in this context.

Before moving into the subject it must first be made clear that assessing links between stated or observed jihadist strategies and the effect of these with regard to concrete incidents is difficult, because many different factors are into play and may affect this. Some factors are related to the objectives, initiatives and capabilities of the jihadists, but there are also contextual factors with impact, like political developments, societal conditions and so on. Furthermore, declared or observed strategies may be regarded as more structured and controlled than they actually are. Anne Stenersen (2017: 173;

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

2017b: 6, 9) convincingly argues that al-Qaida's initiatives often have been the result of accidents, chance and opportunities.

One must also be observant to the fact that neither al-Qaida (Stenersen, 2017b: 7-8) nor ISIS (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015: 21-23; Ganor, 2015a, 58) can be characterized as "one terrorist organisation", where some sort of general army council is coordinating all operations and attacks in Europe with surgical precision. Rightly, the central leaderships of al-Qaida and ISIS have to their disposition a limited number of troops on the ground, but there are also near and more distant affiliate movements, overseas cells operating in an independent manner, single individuals guided from distant areas, as well as inspired individuals with no direct contact with AQ or ISIS at all. On top of this mentally disturbed individuals commit violent acts, and claim it is done on behalf of al-Qaida or ISIS. This is also a factor as to why there is not just a small number of clear or coherent jihadi strategies with regard to attacking the West.

4.18.1 *Al-Qaida's commitment to attack the West*

Although the history of jihadism goes a long back in time, al-Qaida and what Brynjar Lia (2015: 32) characterizes as "the contemporary jihadi movement" dates back to the late 1980s. Al-Qaida was initially established as an Arab insurgency group fighting side by side with the Afghan mujahidin (Stenersen, 2017b: 8). When the Soviet bear had been driven back over the mountains early in 1989, al-Qaida continued to promote its Salafi jihadism ideology, where a central objective is to replace state sovereignty with God's rule and the establishment of Qur'anic-based states (Gerges, 2015: 223). They expect the forthcoming revolution to be of a spontaneous nature and aim to wake up the sleeping masses and guide them in the struggle (Stern & Berger, 2015: 55). As such, the central leadership of al-Qaida probably saw themselves from the early start as intellectual leaders taking the role of a revolutionary vanguard of Salafi jihadism (Stern & Berger, 2015: 55; Stenersen, 2017: 175; 2017b: 8). Furthermore, al-Qaida acted with discretion as they provided guidance and support to various groups, without claiming credit for particular achievements or attacks.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Al-Qaida Central have argued that a caliphate cannot be established until Western forces have been defeated and removed from Muslim countries. As such, al-Qaida has chosen the long game strategy, or if preferred, a form of attrition warfare (Kydd & Walter, 2006: 63). Also in contrast to AQI and ISIS who have been fixated on a Sunni-Shia divide, al-Qaida Central's ambition has been to gather Muslims in a common fight against an outer enemy. Furthermore, al-Qaida has focused on taking back lost territory, and not to remove Muslim governance (Hegghammer, 2004: 10).

As earlier mentioned in this thesis, Osama bin Laden rarely hinted to violence against the West in the first half of the 1990s, but after the 1996 Al-Khobar bombings he defended the use of terrorism and he endorsed attacks against US military personnel in the Arabian Peninsula (Lawrence, 2005: 74, 78). According to Burke (2015a), a local strategy of working with individual groups around the Islamic world brought little success to al-Qaida Central. The 1996 declaration of jihad on the US did not appeal to those wanting to focus on the near enemy. AQ was in need of a boost, but without an established network in the Arabian Peninsula at the time, alternatives were sought. This ultimately led to the attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, although there were other factors of influence as well (Stenersen, 2017: 169). With the 1998 declaration of war from the World Islamic Front, the geographical area and potential targets were expanded upon, as bin Laden legitimised attacks against soldiers and civilians wherever they could be found (Kepel & Kilelli, 2008: 55). Hence, the embassy attacks became the start of the international campaign.

The 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Africa built AQ's confidence, and both the attacks against USS Cole in 2000 and the 9/11 2001 attacks were organised with relatively few senior AQ members involved. Al-Qaida saw the attacks as a necessary step for the Islamic revolutions to come in the Middle East – and for Osama bin Laden jihad stood above everything else (Stenersen, 2017: 162, 175). Regarding strategy, Stenersen (2017: 165) argue that bin Laden and AQ Central followed a dual strategy, in the sense that a small part focused on international terrorism, while the larger part was consolidating AQ locally. It may be questioned how prepared OBL was with regard to the international response that followed the 9/11 2001 attacks, and

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

the United States-led military engagement in Afghanistan did make life difficult for AQ Central. According to Hegghammer (2013), AQ still continued to allocate a lot of resources into attacking the West. Furthermore, the British participation in Afghanistan put United Kingdom high on AQ's priority list for international attacks, and this evolved towards 2003 (Chailand & Blin, 2016: 337).

Combined intensive intelligence and military efforts from the US and their allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan kept pressuring al-Qaida. The leadership of al-Qaida was forced to Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan and had to alter their strategy, towards a locally oriented approach in Muslim countries, but this also led to less central control (Stenersen, 2017: 178; 2017b: 6). As the threat from US drone attacks also started to force jihadis to leave FATA, the AQ affiliates or franchises, especially those in the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia, emerged as an important part of the global jihad campaign (The Osama bin Laden files, 2012: 228-229). Al-Qaida was selective, however, and sought only ties to those considered to be beneficial to the cause. Accordingly some offers were rejected, like the Lebanese group Fatah al-Islam (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011: 42).

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 sparked more deliberate targeting of Europe from al-Qaida. From 2003 to 2005 plots and attacks increased, and the main motivation was the Western involvement in Iraq (Nesser, 2015: 129). The jihadists sought to create disruption for the US-led coalition forces in Iraq, to punish the European states taking part in the military intervention force and deter countries not already engaged from involving themselves. As well known, the jihadists succeeded in several serious terrorist attacks against Europe the first few years after the invasion of Iraq, most notably the 2004 Madrid bombings and the 2005 7/7 London bombings.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who surfaced in 2009 after a merging of the AQ Saudi and Yemeni branches, became a very visible AQ Central affiliate, not least because of their focus on attacks against the West. AQAP had central leaders and ideologists, like Anwar al-Awlaki, that enabled to inspire near and distant followers. They demonstrated an ability to exploit

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

social media platforms and launched the Inspire magazine written in English language. AQAP called for global attacks and individual jihad, and the magazine was very much a how-to guide for conducting attacks (Gambhir, 2014: 1-2). The combination of a weakened AQ leadership and the effectiveness of the security and intelligence services in the West made it natural for AQAP and others to promote the lone wolf approach – more or less in accordance with strategic al-Suri’s *Global Islamic Resistance Call*” (Lia, 2007: 347–483). AQAP displayed a high level of operational expertise and initiated several attacks against the West. Regarding lone actor-attacks there were a few, but the amount was limited compared to what we have seen in Europe after the surfacing of ISIS.

As earlier mentioned, most AQ affiliates did not come under total control by AQ Central (Steneresen (2017b: 7; The Osama bin Laden files, 2012: 222). Hegghammer (2013) argue that the affiliates’ low motivation was as a result of their preference for local interests and targets. Furthermore, fear for massive retaliation from the US and their allies can be included. It can also be added that Osama bin Laden himself around 2010 had concerns regarding the focus of AQAP, as well as al-Shabab (The Osama bin Laden files, 2012: 222, 248-249).

Several important events took place over a couple of years from late 2010 onwards. Drone attacks and special operations forces continued to eliminate central AQ-figures, including Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki (both killed in 2011). These killings and the general pressure kept on al-Qaida Central and their affiliates weakened the movements’ international attack capabilities. Another important event was the Arab Spring revolutions, which according to Lia (2015: 35) was a “*watershed in the history of jihadi proto-states*”, that unsettled state authorities in the region. On the wave from the Arab Spring revolutions, and there was an escalating discontent with the Syrian leadership led by President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition. At the same time the Islamic state of Iraq (ISI), which was the predecessor of AQI after Zarqawi’s death in 2006, grew stronger. Soon the Syrian civil war became a reality and as the conflict evolved ISIS gained momentum vis-à-vis al-Qaida as the leading Salafi-jihadism movement, and attracted new aspiring followers in the West to a larger degree than AQ. Hegghammer (2013: 4) summarise that by 2013, al-Qaida’s core was weakened; much of the

leadership had been neutralised, the number of members had declined, there was a reduced plot frequency, fewer training camps and fewer foreign recruits.

4.18.2 *The state-building project of ISIS*

In contrast to al-Qaidas role as a vanguard of Salafi jihadism and its long-term strategy of attrition regarding the establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East, ISIS has displayed an outward-directed, extensive and direct operational engagement, and they have pursued an immediate state building project, following the visionary lines from al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Kydd & Walter, 2006: 55). With regard to the lines back to AQI and ISI, which early on illustrated the independent nature of ISIS vis-à-vis al-Qaida (Gambhir, 2014: 3, 8), it should be added that although ISIS has strong ties back to the *Iraqi* faction within AQI, the movement has also apparent ties to other networks, like the Baath party (Tønnesen, 2015: 54). This is also described by Gerges (2016: 144-169), who also claims that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is even more extreme and brutal than al-Zarqawi ever was (Gerges, 2016: 145). Regarding targeting of the West it should be added that while AQ Central has demonstrated much focus on the far-enemy under both bin Laden's and Zawahiri's leadership, AQI/ISI has in contrast traditionally focused on the near enemy (Stern & Berger, 2015: 274-275).

In April 2013 al-Baghdadi transformed ISI into ISIS, and June 29 2014 he declared that he was the head of a caliphate in a geographical area including parts of Syria and Iraq. The declaration gained worldwide attention, but did actually not represent a new jihadi phenomenon per se. As Lia (2015: 31, 34-35) clarifies, the formation of "Islamic states" or "emirates" has taken place in different parts of the Muslim world for decades, as seen with Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The main focus of ISIS and their new caliphate was the state-building project, which appealed to established jhadists, as well as aspiring recruits and sympathisers – including many linked to al-Qaida (Gerges, 2015: 250). Muslims in the West and elsewhere were early on encouraged to come and take part in building the caliphate – as seen in the first numbers of the Dabiq

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

magazine (Gambhir, 2014: 1-2). A lot of followers responded to the calls and travelled to the region, also from the European countries. Many of them as foreign fighters, but also others that wanted to contribute to the caliphate in other roles and ways.

There were none or few indicators of centrally organised plots aiming to attack the West in the early times of the Caliphate until 2015, although they had called for followers to take such actions (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015:14). On 21 September 2014, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (killed in 2016) declared the Islamic State's intention to target Europe (Stern & Berger, 2015: 95). Al-Adnani's call for attacks in September 2014 was followed by a similar message in the October 2014 edition of the Dabiq magazine, and ISIS made clear there were to be no constraints with regard to methods and targets (Bayoumi, 2014; Stern & Berger, 2015: 95–96). ISIS' calls for followers and sympathisers to conduct attacks in the West were not unlike those efforts seen with al-Qaida earlier, for example by AQAP through social media channels and the Inspire magazine. The motives for ISIS' calls for attacks and "individual jihad" may vary, but it is likely that ISIS wanted to realise the potential of those who did not want to go - or were unable to go - to the conflict zone. Furthermore, it had by then been several attacks in the West conducted by followers of al-Qaida, which showed that it could be an effect of such calls. Also, the intelligence and security services in Europe were mobilising, and there were efforts with regard to make it more difficult to get to the conflict area in Syria and Iraq.

In hindsight, ISIS and al-Adnani did not only call for followers in the West to conduct attacks themselves. There are strong indications that the external operations group Emni within ISIS from 2014, or already in 2013, were planning central-led attacks (Brisard & Jackson, 2016: 9). Starting out as an internal police and counterintelligence unit within ISIS, they expanded the portfolio to include organising terrorist attacks in Europe, North Africa and Asia (Callimachi, 2016). As such, ISIS were not longer just a locally or regionally focused terrorist movement with the sights on the near enemy, but also to the distant enemy. With self-governance, territorial control, more military experience and motivated jihadi fighters, one might argue that the

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Emni project had a slight resemblance to state-sponsored terrorism, or even states dispatching hit teams against their enemies abroad (Barrett, 2015: 2).

The Charlie Hebdo and kosher shop attacks in Paris in January 2015 lit the red light among security services and authorities in Europe, both due to the type of attack and the connections the perpetrators had to the conflict area in Syria and Iraq. As known, kosher shop perpetrator Amedy Coulibaly had links to ISIS. Even more interesting here, however, the Verviers incident in Belgium later the same month put a halt to the first centrally-led large-scale ISIS operation directed against Europe (Brisard & Jackson, 2016: 9). More specifically, the arrest operation that developed into a shoot-out between police and terrorists, gave grave indicators for future attacks. Moreover, the downing of the Metrojet Airbus full of Russian holidaymakers over Egypt in October 2015 also indicated an evolution in the strategic thinking of ISIS. Allegedly ISIS planned to bomb a Western plane, but changed to a Russian airline after President Vladimir Putin deployed Russian troops to Syria in order to support the Assad regime (Fishman, 2016: 239-240).

The 13 November Paris attacks came as a surprise to many, although the security services in Europe had talked about the possibility of Mumbai-style attacks ever since the original attack in November 2008 (Fair, 2014: 581-592). According to Burke (2015a) this incident confirmed that ISIS had “gone global”. The Paris attacks and the 2016 Brussels bombings fully demonstrated that ISIS had both intent and capability of conducting large central-led attacks in the West. As such, they were now well beyond merely inspiring followers to do individual jihad on the behalf of ISIS – they took lead. Central-led operations come at a price, however, as such capacities are limited and usually lost in, or immediately after, conducted attacks. This, at least partially, explain why there rarely are several central led large and spectacular sequential attacks within a period of months or a couple of years.

Interestingly, ISIS used different tactics with regard to whom they deployed to the attacks in the West. For a period of time they sent experienced fighters (e.g. the Verviers case), but during the first half of 2015 they started to quickly train and send back people who came to Syria (Brisard & Jackson, 2016: 11). In addition to this, they were able to guide followers from distance,

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

as well as to profit from actions of individuals they had no direct contact with whatsoever.

So what was ISIS' motive for launching central-led attacks instead of relying on acts by followers and sympathisers, like al-Qaida's leadership under Zawahri seem to prefer in the current situation? One explanation might be that the focus on attacks in the West came as ISIS started to experience trouble in Syria and Iraq, and were launched to divert attention from military setbacks and boost the sense of invincibility among its followers (Gerges, 2015: 250). This can, however, hardly explain the very first operations that must have been planned at a time the Islamic state still was on the offensive and had a momentum, although it might be a contributing factor for later initiatives. Kepel (2015: x) suggests that attacks may have been called for or executed in order to create provocation from Western governments to local Muslims in order to polarize the situation and fuel a religious war. Such a strategy of provocation is not unlike what Anders Behring Breivik argued for. Another factor can also be that ISIS felt strong and saw the time as right, and that they would display proof of the operational capability they possessed in order to motivate their troops and followers. Finally, factors motivating al-Qaida in earlier years, namely to punish states involving themselves in the conflict theatre in Syria and Iraq, and to create a pressure for political changes, should also be added as factors of motivation.

A majority of ISIS-related plots and attacks against the West have been conducted by people with either no direct contact, some remote contact or distant guidance from ISIS (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015: 23-24). Furthermore, most attacks can be characterised as low-tech and relatively ineffectual (Mullins, 2016: 26). Hegghammer and Nesser (2015: 26-27) also states that the increase of low-involvement plots in the West after September 2014 may indicate that al-Adnani's call for attacks actually did result in an noticeable operational output. Following this, ISIS has proved more successful with its calls for 'individual attacks campaign' than al-Qaida and AQAP years before. Rightly, al-Qaida did inspire several attacks, for example as seen with 'bin Laden of the Internet' Anwar al-Awlaki's influence on the perpetrators in the Fort Hood-shooting in 2009, and the attack on MP Stephen Timms in 2010 (The Telegraph, 2011). The phenomenon did not, however, come to the extent as seen with ISIS. From late summer 2014 there

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

was a series of lone attacks in the West that probably inspired new recruits and followers (Stern & Berger, 2015: 95-97).

The development with regard to less connected and “inspired by” attackers following al-Adnani’s calls may also have been boosted additional factors. The establishment of the caliphate and the territorial success in Iraq and Syria gave ISIS a momentum that may have triggered a number of followers – and also mentally unstable individuals. Likewise the increased international political and military involvement in Syria and Iraq can have motivated sympathisers sitting on the fence – not least because military interventions in Muslim countries has proven to be a main driver for attacks against the West (Nesser, 2019: 17). Other factors brought forward by Nesser (2019: 15, 18-19) is that ISIS have benefitted from experienced individuals and networks previously established by al-Qaida, as well as foreign fighters assisting others online.

4.18.3 Concluding on observed strategies

Regarding al-Qaida it is important to remember Stenersen’s (2017b: 9) observation that al-Qaida’s strategy does not seem fixed, but rather *“more reactive than proactive. And it is more often steered by accident and chance than many tend to believe.* This fact alone makes it hard to predict how this vanguard of Salafi jihadism will evolve in the years to come. It seems likely, however, that the central leadership will continue in a vanguard role, rather than to seek direct territorial control.

AQ has been weakened during Zawahiri’s time as leader, but the movement is still an actor to be taken seriously. In fact, Hoffman (2018) argues that ISIS no longer can compete with al-Qaeda in terms of influence, reach, manpower, or cohesion, but just with regard to power of its brand and its capabilities to carry out attacks in the West. The latter is helped by Zawahiri’s decision to refrain from attacks in the West and follow up on other regional or local priorities. Furthermore, Hoffman means al-Qaeda’s success in resurrecting its network is based on several strategic elements. These include strengthening of the decentralized affiliate or franchise approach, avoid mass casualty operations, avoid killing Muslim civilians, and let ISIS take the blows from the Western alliance. In general, it is likely that al-Qaida under Zawahiri’s

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

leadership has adapted or adjusted its strategy to the current situation (Stenersen, 2017: 179). This does not mean that their interest of attacking the West has gone away, but for the time being it seems they prefer attacks in the West to be conducted by Muslim followers and “inspired” cells or individuals living in the West. One of their main affiliates, AQAP, is also currently engaged in a long war strategy in Yemen (Horton, 2017). A more open question is what comes out from al-Qaida groups involved in Syria in a longer perspective – and foreign fighters returning to the West.

Regarding ISIS, a glance back to Lia’s (2015) findings show that few jihadi proto-states have survived for more than a year, and not all of them have controlled territory to speak of. As such, ISIS managed to take their state-building project quite far. They kept it going for longer than normal, and at a time they controlled significant geographical area - until the caliphate was defeated.

ISIS have managed to exploit the use of Internet and social media platforms, in order to communicate their messages, recruit and inspire attacks. They also managed to mobilise a high number of foreigners abroad to come and join the caliphate, as foreign fighters or in other roles. Moreover, the broadcasting and distribution of barbaric actions took the psychological warfare to another level. According to Ganor (2015a: 59-60) this helped them attract people to the conflict region, but it also deterred enemies on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, and it ensured obedience within the areas they controlled. As earlier pointed out, it also seems that ISIS, to a greater degree than al-Qaida, succeeded in inspiring many attacks conducted by perpetrators with weak or no links to the movement. Furthermore, ISIS did demonstrate a capability to conduct a few complex central-led operations in Europe. As earlier stated, however, such resources are limited and when some have been sacrificed in one operation, it becomes increasingly hard to follow-up with similar operations.

Also after the significant attacks in Europe, ISIS’ key strategic focus has remained to be with its state-building project in Iraq and Syria (Gerges, 2016: 250). With the state-building project crushed, the future of ISIS (and their priorities) is perhaps more difficult to predict, but as stated by Fishman (2016:

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

255), a decline of ISIS does not mean a decline of jihadism – and this applies to al-Qaida too.

When it comes to Europe a number of experienced foreign fighters have returned, and more will return in the near future. Some of these (although difficult to establish exactly who) are likely to represent a security threat for years to come, and especially those that possess the combination of operational skills and networking talent. Moreover, looking back to how central jihadists have moved from al-Qaida to ISIS it is hard to predict what kind of organisational belonging experienced foreign fighters and other followers of al-Qaida and ISIS will have in the years to come, other than it will be within the Salafi jihadism oriented family.

4.19 Jihadists' targeting preferences in a comparative perspective


After assessing the different target types focused on by militant Islamists in Western Europe in detail, one question remaining is how their targeting preferences are in a comparative perspective – all ideological directions included – in Europe. This is difficult to assess, also when using data from projects up against one of the large terrorism databases. This because the coding in a particular project is likely to differ from the coding in the large terrorism research databases - unless the latter is the primary datasource for the project in question. With this in mind, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) can contribute to a very basic comparative assessment here. GTD is an open source database where incidents, and not plots, are registered. The GTD codebook shows that most target type categories in the database fit this project reasonably well, although the GTD target type categories *Private citizens and property*, *Tourists* and *Business* have to be merged for direct comparison to the Public Area category of this project. What GTD refers to as ambiguous cases have been excluded from this overview, a few incidents have involved more than one target type and the target is unknown in 216 cases.


According to the GTD database (2017), in the period from 1994 to 2016, Western Europe experienced a total of 4409 terrorist incidents where the target(s) were identified. 2258 incidents were in the *Private citizens and*

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

property, Tourists and Business categories. 784 attacks were aimed at *authorities*, while 555 attacks were directed against *police*. *Military forces* were targeted in 61 cases, while *diplomatic missions* were targeted in 144 incidents. *Religious institutions* were attacked in 185 cases, while the category *Media, NGO and public debate* participants were exposed to 99 attacks in total. There were also 190 attacks in the category *Transport*. Finally, there were 248 attacks in the category *Others*.

If we turn to the 70 attacks conducted by militant Islamists in Western Europe between 1994 and 2016, 21 incidents were in the category *Public area*. Two attacks were aimed at *authorities*, while nine attacks were directed against *police*. *Military forces* constituted the target in eight cases, while *diplomatic missions* were targeted in two attacks. *Religious institutions* were targeted in five incidents, while the category *Public debate* was exposed to seven incidents. There were 21 attacks in the category *Transport*. Finally, there were two attacks in the category *Others*. The following illustrations show the results for the GTD and the dataset for this project respectively.





The illustrations above show that the general public is quite exposed to terrorist activity in general, since the categories *Public area* and *Transport* most often involve civilians with no part in the conflict picture. It may be noted that the GTD includes a number of incidents against private property, which is rarely seen with the militant Islamists in Europe. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the jihadists target people in public areas more actively than actors from other ideological directions. The Islamists are also more focused on targeting the transport sector than terrorists from other ideologies. One possible explanation for the militant Islamists' clear interest in the transport sector is that they often focus on mass casualty results to maximize the public fear factor, and by striking against rail transport and aviation, the societal disruption effect is considerable.

The jihadists' interest in targeting law enforcement seems average, but they give above average attention to military targets. Furthermore, terrorists from other ideological directions are initiating more attacks against authorities. Here, however, it must be noted that while the militant Islamists' interest at large is directed against protected top-level targets in this category, the GTD

shows that actors from other ideological directions also direct attacks against low-level and local authorities. Media, religious institutions and diplomatic missions are not frequently targeted. In the *Others* category of the GTD dataset, attacks against central or critical infrastructure is seen in several cases, but attacks against refugee institutions have also increased in the previous years.

4.20 One perpetrator versus several perpetrators

As elaborated upon in the beginning of this thesis, the lone actor dimension has been given a lot of attention in the news media, among researchers and the security and intelligence communities in the previous years. This is also of interest with regard to the targeting-related issues covered above. However, as described earlier regarding definitions, almost all militant Islamist lone actors have had some sort of contact with other extremists – online or physically – before they have conducted their violent acts. This is also the case when looking at lone actors from different ideological directions (see Schuurman, Bakker, Gill, & Bouhana, 2017; Schuurman et al., 2017). Hence, the general understanding of the so-called lone actor phenomenon becomes fragmented or blurry for the general public, researchers and practitioners within the field of counterterrorism.


What *can* be accurately done regarding this issue is simply to make a distinction between attacks physically carried out by one perpetrator and attacks executed by several perpetrators. This is what I have done here. This approach has a trade-off with regard to how independent the attacker really is not only for the reasons mentioned above but also since terrorist organizations regularly initiate single-actor attacks after operational and tactical considerations. Then again, it has already been made clear that most jihadist attacks are not centrally-led, but the acts are decided by those executing the attacks; this mitigates this trade-off. Furthermore, the main advantage of this clear-cut distinction is that the issue can be mapped with great accuracy and, importantly, the output will provide important knowledge even without involving the network factor. This will benefit practitioners dealing with threat assessments and protective security, or those tasked to handle emergency situations. The output from this approach will also contribute to

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

reflections on the lone actor versus group perspective in general with the previously described challenges in mind.

The starting point here are the 70 launched attacks. Plots are not included in this part due to the uncertainty it would involve, especially since several individuals acting alone have proven to be part of, or loosely linked to, extremist groups or networks. From such a setting, it is difficult to know beforehand whether an attack will be carried out by one individual or several perpetrators. If one individual decides to act alone, he is likely not tell anyone else about it.

The dataset for this research shows that as many as 45 of the 70 launched attacks between 1994 and 2016 were carried out by one individual, while 25 attacks were conducted by two or more persons.



Looking at the development over time, there were no lone individual attacks in the mid-1990s. The first attack that can be documented to have been carried out by one individual only was launched by Richard Reid in 2001. The period from 2000 to 2009 was characterized by few attacks in general, but there were six attacks conducted by more than one perpetrator, and nine attacks

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

committed by one individual only. For the period 2010–2016, eight attacks were executed by several perpetrators, while as many as 36 attacks were executed by one perpetrator. If we look just at the last two years, 2015 and 2016, where there was a substantially higher frequency of attacks, five attacks have been carried out by multiple perpetrators, while as many as 21 attacks have been conducted by one individual.

The explanation for the development over time returns to the fact that groups were more dominant in the 1990s and the 2000s – until around 2009. Group plots were mostly detected in time. After 9/11 and the devastating attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the core of the central jihadi networks came under substantial pressure, and the capability to launch top-down coordinated terrorist operations in Europe was reduced. It is important to remember, however, that networks and organizations also initiate attacks with one perpetrator as a tactical choice. The attacks against flights by AQ-related Richard Reid in 2001 and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2009 are two prime examples.

The combination of a weakened central leadership and the effectiveness of the security and intelligence services in the West made it natural for the Islamist networks to promote the lone wolf approach – this was actually not new in jihadist circles. In several parts of strategist al-Suri's *Global Islamic Resistance Call*, which became available online in late 2004 or early 2005, he writes about “*the school of individual jihad and small cell terrorism*” (Lia, 2007: 347–483). It was nevertheless AQAP who took the lead in the lone mujahid propaganda effort from around 2010 – for example, through the online magazine *Inspire*, which was very operationally oriented. Another important channel with impact was the videos with Anwar al-Awlaki, who was also available for direct communication with wannabe attackers from distant parts of the world.

The lone actor trend has also been boosted after ISIS established its caliphate in 2014. Initially, their propaganda was not so oriented towards actions in Western Europe. In the first numbers of their online publication *Dabiq*, the main priority was to get people to come to the geographical area of the caliphate. Increasingly, however, ISIS propaganda has promoted operational activity in the West, including lone actor terrorism. The high frequency of

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

lone actor attacks in Western Europe over the last two years indicates that the propaganda efforts of ISIS have been successful. This is strengthened by the fact that many individuals without a documented link to ISIS, but seemingly inspired by them, have carried out attacks. It must be added, however, that ISIS propaganda, advice activity and operational guidance are just one side of a plausible explanation here. The first thing to note is that the lone actor trend became visible long before the caliphate was a fact and ISIS had intensified its propaganda to agitate lone mujahid attacks. Furthermore, there are also external factors and circumstances that may have contributed to the rise of more attacks conducted by one perpetrator only. One factor is that the massive counterterrorism efforts are paying off, seen through the network’s ability to launch major attacks being low and often being thwarted. Moreover, several attacks have been conducted by individuals who have not succeeded in going to the conflict area in Syria and Iraq. We have also seen attacks conducted by people who have been released from prison, as exemplified with Rafik Yousef in Berlin in 2015 and Adel Kermiche from the Normandy church attack in 2016. Finally, it is difficult to assess to which degree psychiatric cases have launched attacks and used the ISIS tag, more or less in order to create maximum attention and boost the fear factor.

4.20.1 Soft and hard targets, casualty focus and discrimination

The table below shows findings related to the one versus several perpetrators distinction, concerning hard or soft target preference, casualty focus, and indiscriminate or discriminate targeting, based on the 70 conducted attacks.

	Hard Target*	Soft target	Mass casualty	Limited casualty	Indiscr. targeting	Discri. targeting**	Name-specific
One perp. N = 45	N8 17.8%	N39 86.7%	N17 37.8%	N28 62.2%	N16 35.6%	N31 68.9%	N7 15.6%
Several perp. N = 25	N2 8%	N23 92%	N21 84%	N4 16%	N18 80%	N7 20%	N1 4%

* Two attacks conducted by one perpetrator involved both hard and soft targets.

** Two attacks conducted by one perpetrator involved both indiscriminate and discriminate targeting.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Both categories focus overwhelmingly on soft targets, but there are significant differences in terms of casualty focus and discrimination. Those conducting attacks alone have a mass casualty focus in about one third of the cases, while attacks involving several people have mass casualty focus in more than four of five cases. Regarding discrimination, we see that when there is more than one perpetrator, they indiscriminately target four of five cases. This supports the impression that groups are more ambitious than lone actors regarding damage result – both in planning-processes and in launched attacks. Perpetrators conducting attacks alone prioritize discriminate attacks in about two of three cases. Also, it is interesting to note that seven of the eight attacks targeting a name-specific individual were executed by one perpetrator only.

4.20.2 Target types

The table below illustrates the target type preference related to the one versus several perpetrators distinction based on the 70 conducted attacks.

Target type category	One perp. (N45*)	Several perp. (N25**)
Authorities	2	0
Diplomatic missions	2	0
Military	7	1
Law enforcement	9	0
Public area	13	8
Transport – flights	2	2
Transport – airports	0	2
Transport – rail transport	4	9
Transport – ground transport	0	2
Public debate	6	1
Religious institutions	2	3
Electricity, gas, water facilities	1	0
Other	1	0

* Three cases involved more than one target type

** Three cases involved more than one target type

The target type overview shows that 60% of the attacks conducted by several perpetrators have been directed against transport (the majority against rail transport), while 32% have been directed against public area. The remaining

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

attacks are as follows: three against religious institutions / individuals, one against a military target and one against the Public Debate category. When it comes to attacks conducted by one perpetrator only, 64.4% of the attacks were directed against public areas, military personnel and law enforcement personnel – with one exception, these were police personnel. As seen, both individuals acting alone and cells or groups often prioritise attacks against people in public areas, but attacks against public transport are more popular when there are more than one perpetrator. It is interesting to note that the one perpetrator category focuses quite a lot on military and police personnel. Perpetrators executing attacks alone is also dominant with regard to the Public Debate category. Finally, there are slightly more target type diversity with the one perpetrator category than several perpetrators for this dataset, but this observation has little practical value. The bottom line is that both the one perpetrator category and several perpetrators attack a variety of target types.

4.20.3 Use of weapons

The table below illustrates the use of weapons while comparing one versus several perpetrators, based on the 70 conducted attacks.

	Expl.	Firearms	Melee	Vehicle	Others
One perp. (N45)	10	13	18	5	3*
Several perp. (N25)	20	4	2	2	3**

* Three cases involve the use of arson, toxic letter and hand grenade respectively.

** Two cases involve the use of hand grenades.

The one perpetrator category clearly dominates the firearms category, while groups are more often behind attacks with explosives. As for melee (non-firing) weapons, the single perpetrator category dominates totally. The same applies for vehicles where the only exception is that the duo that murdered Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013 – although we have another example with the 2017 London Bridge attack, which falls outside of this project duo to the timeframe (O'Neill & Sandeman, 2017). The attacks involving advanced explosives or assault rifles are without exception conducted by individuals with documented links to criminal networks or Islamist networks – alternatively both. Mehdi Nemmouche and Amedy Coulibaly are two examples in this regard. For lone actors without such connections, the “simple

means” approach comes rather naturally. It is after all not necessarily easy for “unconnected” people to acquire weapons illegally in West European countries with strict gun control without a considerable risk of detection.

4.21 Concluding on the militant Islamists

This research has shown that the militant Islamists represent a serious threat on the European continent due to the characteristics of their modus operandi and targeting. In general, a dominant and increasing soft target preference is accompanied by a substantial mass casualty focus. Just as important here is the fact that jihadists will typically not have any scruples when it comes to attacking indiscriminately, which in practice means targeting random civilians. The sum of these three target-related characteristics is that the jihadists represent a clear and present security threat to the general public in Western European countries today.

The threat to the general public is reflected in the findings from the specific target type categories of this research. Attacks against random people in the categories *public area* and *public transport* is the dominant trend – both in plots and conducted attacks. Attacks in public areas take place in a variety of ways, but often it is the presence of crowds that triggers the attention of the terrorists. In public transport, the aviation and railway sectors are the main focus. These are of equal interest in plots, but in practice, railway targets are more frequently attacked. This is probably because flights represent hard targets due to the security arrangements. When it comes to ground transport and maritime targets, the interest for these is low. Another popular target category is *military* and *law enforcement*. For the latter, police personnel in public areas are particularly attractive targets. In earlier years, headquarters of security services, military bases and police stations were in focus, but this has changed to attacks on the streets and to a certain degree to the entrance parties of police stations and just outside of the perimeters of military bases.

The categories *authorities* and *diplomatic missions* are given noticeable attention in plots but are rarely attacked. Initial high ambitions often seem to fade during the operational phase; the reason for this is the combination of robust protective security measures and the fact that jihadists find it legitimate to attack vulnerable random civilians. As for politicians, those under the very

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

top level are more prone and vulnerable to attacks compared to those on top with close protection police officers. *Public debate* participants are mainly targeted in a distinctively selective manner, and individuals in this category can get a trophy target status. As seen with cartoonist Kurt Westergaard and artist Lars Vilks, this may trigger plots and attacks over a long timeline. The picture concerning *religious institutions* is slightly more diverged, as there are several examples of both selective and more random targeting here.

This research on the militant Islamists has also assessed the targeting of US and Israeli/Jewish interests. It is evident that the hatred against the US and Israelis/Jews in jihadi rhetoric is at least partially reflected in their actions. In 12% of the conducted attacks, there was a link to the US, while there was a connection to the state of Israel or Jews in 10% of the attacks. As both US and Israeli diplomatic missions are heavily protected, the jihadists have to a large degree focused on other target types. When it comes to the US, trans-Atlantic flights, military personnel and ordinary citizens are particularly exposed. When it comes to Israel and the Jews, the jihadists most often target identifiable and accessible Jews in public areas, synagogues and other Jewish institutions. This strongly indicates that Jews in general pay a price for the fact that official representatives and institutions belonging to the State of Israel are well protected and out of reach for most terrorists.

The findings related to the target type categories means that the jihadists operating in Western Europe are conservative when it comes to their choice of targets. The majority of targets can be categorised into a limited number of standard target type categories, which contradicts suggestions that ISIS has shown innovation in this area (e.g. Europol review, 2016). As such, the main challenge has so far not been to foresee what kind of targets the militant Islamists focus on. The problem is rather the rich range of potential targets the militant Islamists can choose from within the common target type categories. The jihadists can in principle attack anyone anywhere. Furthermore, the complex dynamics and unpredictability following a targeting processes and the operational phase, as seen with the Breivik case, makes it practically impossible to pinpoint what or who the next attack will be directed against.

So what kinds of targets have been given little attention even in plots? This can be discussed broadly or in more detail, but it is sensible to be cautious and

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

not give the other side any ideas in this area. One obvious target type that has not been of particular interest to the jihadists so far, however, is infrastructural targets (public transport excluded). Possible explanations for this can be that some critical infrastructure targets are well protected, but perhaps it is more so because the militant Islamists pursue death tolls in addition to societal disruption. It can also be noted that attacks directed against random civilians in private homes have been more or less absent in Western Europe. This is from time to time seen in other regions, like in the Israel-Palestine conflict (B'tselem, 2018). It should be added here that the perpetrator behind the attack on the police couple in Magnanville in 2016 probably knew the police officer from before, making it a discriminate attack (BBC News, 2016b). The absence of attacks in the private sphere may be linked to the fact that militant Islamists often seek to trigger maximum public fear and societal disruption. Isolated, small-scale “needlestick” attacks are perhaps not regarded as an effective way of achieving this.

Although this research has focused on the targeting preferences and not on concrete decision-making processes per se, those conducting the attack will normally decide which target to attack. The reason for this is simply that most attacks are not centrally-led but planned and executed by individuals or a small group. The large and complex operations executed by the core of al-Qaida and ISIS are few and far between. There are also cases in this thesis that show how, when it comes to target selection, the operational control or resourceful contacts that central leaderships have over local groups or individuals is limited.

In this study, I have also looked at the distinction between attacks conducted by one perpetrator and attacks conducted by several perpetrators. This is a clear-cut approach, in contrast to lone actor discussions where the degree of independency is assessed. Analysis of the 70 conducted attacks shows that 45 of these were physically carried out by one perpetrator only; this became an increasing trend from 2010 onwards. Furthermore, there are higher ambitions in launched attacks that are carried out by more than one perpetrator. Both lone actors and groups prefer soft targets, but individuals acting alone are more likely to act discriminately with a limited casualty focus and simpler means. Furthermore, attacks directed against name-specific individuals are mostly a one perpetrator-phenomenon.

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

Having established that the targeting practice demonstrated by the militant Islamists is rarely innovative, this research also finds that the terrorists are conservative and imitative when it comes to attack approach and weapons. In a few cases, however, a high level of sophistication and creativity has been demonstrated. One example is the 2006 Liquid plot, where Islamists planned to blow up several trans-Atlantic flights by using homemade explosive devices disguised in soft drink bottles. This is probably the only attack from this dataset that can, in the context of terrorism context, be characterized as innovative. The 2001 Richard Reid shoe-bomber case and the 2009 underwear-bomber case were, in contrast, more creative than innovative. The devices were small and cleverly placed to avoid detection, but did not represent anything new with regard to *modus operandi*. Another example where creativity and a high level of skills were displayed was the 2010 cargo planes plot. In this case, the explosive devices were very well camouflaged. The fact that the central networks are not behind most of the terrorist attacks, however, means that the traditional not so complex attack approaches and weaponry that we have seen most often will continue to dominate. One emerging threat that should be mentioned is linked to the use of drones. Jihadists have some experience with these by now due to the Syria-Iraq conflict (Dearden, 2016). Although this is not related to the jihadists, recently the Venezuelan president was also allegedly attacked by drones with explosive devices (Herrero & Casey, 2018). Hence, the availability of this tool and how it can be misused should be given attention from a security perspective. Another topic that has been on the table for some time, but which we have little experience with in terrorist attacks so far, is linked to the threat potentiality of cybercrimes.

After a number of ISIS-related attacks in Europe from around 2013 onwards, the question has been raised whether there are *modus operandi*-related differences that may be observed between perpetrators linked to al-Qaida and ISIS respectively. According to this research project, the answer is no, which is in accordance with the conclusions of previous research by others (Nesser, Stenersen, & Oftedal, 2016). Shifts in *modus operandi* trends seem to be influenced more by contextual and operational factors than network affiliation. It is true that ISIS has proven its ability to launch complex mass casualty attacks, but AQ had done the same a long time ago. Both these

The Militant Islamists Operating in Western Europe

organizations and their affiliates have proven that they understand the psychological effects mass casualty attacks cause in any civil society, and that they are capable of launching such operations. Likewise, the lone actor trend began before ISIS established its Caliphate and initiated operations in the West and, as elaborated upon elsewhere in this thesis, there are other factors with substantial impact regarding the lone actor development. The one attack that arguably had ISIS characteristics, since beheadings became an ISIS signature from 2014, was the 2015 Lyon Air Products fabric incident, where the perpetrator beheaded his boss. That said, beheadings were also previously seen in AQ-cases in Europe. One example is the 2007 Parviz Khan plot, where the cell planned to kidnap and behead a British Muslim soldier “like a pig” (Carter, 2008). The Lee Rigby killers also tried to decapitate the victim. When it comes to weapons, both AQ and ISIS related terrorists have so far turned to traditional choices. The increased “simple means” approach seen for the last few years began before ISIS operations in Western Europe and is a consequence of counter terrorism efforts, lone actor developments and limited accessibility to firearms and explosives. When it comes to targets, there are no noticeable differences in target selection between AQ and ISIS actors.

As for the current ISIS domination in Europe, AQ’s current absence may be due to a short-term strategic self-imposed restraint and not a lack of operational capability per se (Hoffman, 2016). It is in fact likely that al-Qaida under Zawahiri’s leadership has adapted its strategy to the current situation (Stenersen, 2017: 179). In general, it is likely that the interest of attacking the West is still very much present, but for the time being, however, it seems al-Qaida prefer attacks in the West to be conducted by “inspired” cells and lone actors – avoiding the potentially high price tag that usually follows central-led attacks. It is also a valid point, that al-Qaida’s strategies seem to have been less structured and controlled than many have thought (Stenersen, 2017: 173) Regarding ISIS, the fall of the caliphate and the current situation make future prospects unclear, although the threat will still be there – as it was before they established the caliphate. It is more a question how the threat will evolve, how the position vis-à-vis al-Qaida will develop, and how this will affect the security situation in the West.

5 Conclusions

Concluding on this research, I will commence with an assessment of the theoretical and methodological approach that has been applied. Then, I shall elaborate on the empirical findings from both part studies in a broader context, before I elaborate on how single case studies and multiple case studies like these two are complementary to each other. After that I will continue with the practical implications of the findings from this research project. Finally, I will present some thoughts regarding the need for further research on terrorist targeting related issues.

5.1 An expedient approach to targeting research

The theoretical starting point for this research was that, generally speaking, terrorists are rational actors. There is always some kind of reasoning based on the ideology and objectives involved that affects the terrorists' judgements as they move from thinking to acting. Since a high number of substantially different variables have impact on terrorists' target selection, a comprehensive approach is important. This is to identify overarching ideological, moral and strategic variables, as well as operational factors, where both internal and external factors are included. This must, however, be accompanied with situational analysis of both plot scenarios and executed attacks. Accordingly, two complementary and partially overlapping theoretical and methodological main paths have been involved.

The categorisation of variables into the designated main component boxes, as illustrated in the inter-active model (fig. 2.1), has proven to be expedient. It is clear, however, that such systematic identification and registration of affecting factors must be accompanied by thorough qualitative research and suitable methodology. For this research, case study process tracing has been applied in order to identify all variables with an impact in this area, as well as the detailed proceedings and dynamics of a targeting processes. In both part studies, for example, have compromises between the perpetrators' ambitions and capacities, the surfacing of pragmatism and clarifications regarding intent in specific areas been illuminated, because focus have been given to details.

Conclusions

The value of situational analysis of plot scenarios and conducted attacks have been important. By emphasising on the offender(s), target(s) and situational circumstances, it has been possible to retrieve crucial information related to several targeting related issues, and especially was that important for the part study focusing on the militant Islamists. Here the research material was not as detailed as with the Breivik case, and on a general note, clinical observations are most often not enough in order to get the correct situational understanding. If, for example, it is known that terrorists are in possession of an improvised explosive device, this fact alone tells us little about intended targets or the focus of the perpetrators. They could for example plan to assassinate a high level politician or member of parliament. If, however, bombs are placed in crowded areas, as seen on several occasions in Paris in the mid-1990s, it is reasonable to argue that the perpetrators target indiscriminately and that they have a mass casualty focus. Obviously, this difference says a lot about the extensiveness of the threat the terrorists represent to the general public. As a whole, I find it valid to state that the two main approaches applied for this research have proved complementary and expedient to each other.

I still regard Drake's research and theoretical developments to be constructive and meaningful, and it does not differ much from the aforementioned path of this research regarding comprehensive thinking, as well as the categorisation and sorting of variables. It is important to add, however, that the use of case studies, including process tracing and situational analysis, gives added value. It provides an enhanced insight into the dynamics and complexity of targeting processes and clarifies the nonlinear nature and unpredictable outcome of these. Additionally, it provides important knowledge about the concrete threat actors in question, which is important for decision-makers and practitioners working within a counterterrorism context.

The potential of research in this area also depends on the amount and quality of the available information. In the case study of Anders Behring Breivik, the information available was unusually rich, and both his decision-making and the proceedings of the operational phase could be traced in satisfactory detail. This was not possible to the same degree in every case concerning the militant Islamists; therefore, the aim of this concrete part study was from the start oriented towards targeting preferences, instead of detailed decision-making

Conclusions

processes. Still, the study of the militant Islamists has shown that targeting preferences and other parameters related to intent can effectively be retrieved with a limited amount of information through situational analysis. However, it demands basic information about the offender(s), target(s) and the situational context for each plot or attack in the multiple case study. It is important to add that for the security authorities, such knowledge is probably just as important as the concrete decision-making processes of individual cases. This is the case not least because general threat assessments and counterterrorism strategies must be based on the broader picture, and not single incidents.

Having clarified the impact of the available information, I am open to the fact that there are potential limitations for the systematic approach applied to this research. One factor with multiple case research, where one wants to include all incidents, is that some cases can be overlooked. It is also possible that some important details in specific cases are overlooked or not available as part of the existing information. Furthermore, relevant information on concrete cases may appear years after the incident took place. Another factor is linked to the basic complexity of research on the terrorist targeting issue. If we are looking at the variety of potential variables that affects this issue, it is reasonable to argue that it has a distinct cross-scientific character, where the theoretical, methodological and practical understanding of the researcher(s) can be put to the test. One should, for example, understand ideological, strategic and tactical perspectives, but also psychological implications. Likewise, some assessments require both competence regarding the effect of explosive devices and weapons on one side, and protective security measures on the other. This is for example very much the case when assessing the soft versus hard target factor, which are related and connected, but still different areas of competence. Cross-scientific research teams may therefore be sensible for in-depth research on complex issues, although other theoretical, methodological and practical compromises may surface instead.

Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that in-depth research on specific issues that represent just a part of the terrorist targeting processes can be of value in terms of the broader picture. Examples can include studies that primarily look at intra-group decision making, the impact that overarching ideology and legitimacy has for targeting, how terrorists learn from each other, or the contagious effect some types of terrorist attacks might have.

Conclusions

Regarding comparative and complementary perspectives for two different studies, like those included in this thesis, I will elaborate on this after presenting the main findings from the two part studies.

5.2 The main findings from the two studies

This research on Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks in Norway has shown that this was not only a special case due to the result, but also that the Norwegian right-wing perpetrator hardly can be characterised as a typical lone actor terrorist. The autonomy and self-reliance he demonstrated makes him a more distinctive and narrowly defined lone actor than many others seen, for example several militant Islamists. Some features that make this case special in general are the long timeline, his rigorous security consciousness, his ability to stay focused, the “shock attack” strategy, the proven mass-casualty focus, and the horrendous brutality demonstrated at Utøya. Breivik’s narcissism and his strive for publicity and recognition as a very competent terrorist influenced several of these factors. Breivik did, however, make several miscalculations and faults regarding the planning and practical execution of his terrorist operation. The fact that he gravely miscalculated the time needed to locate and rent a farm, and only managed to make one bomb instead of three, had a significantly negative impact on his plans. Furthermore, he became affected by several minor constraints. Some were related to his own skills and capacities, but others were external factors out of his control. This led to several changes of plan in different phases of the operation, considerable frustration and pragmatism – which the Utøya attack stood testimony to.

One of the most valuable lessons following this in-depth analysis of the 22 July attacks is how complex, dynamic and unpredictable terrorist operations – and indeed targeting processes – are. It is reasonable to assume that the dynamics and unpredictability of terrorist targeting processes and the proceedings of terrorist operations is increasing along with the number of variables involved. These numbers will be affected by the complexity of an operation and the number of persons involved. The targeting process and operational phases are certainly not fully controllable for the perpetrators, even when they operate on home territory and are resourceful in at least some

Conclusions

areas – like time and money in Breivik’s case. Known or observable fixed external factors, like border controls, gun control and protective security at potential targets, make life harder for terrorists. What complicates matters even more, however, is the ever-present risk of pure coincidences and serendipities. Acknowledging how these complex dynamics create more or less unpredictable and non-linear targeting processes, it is equally easy to acknowledge why it is practically impossible for intelligence and security authorities (and others) to foresee the kind of specific targets a terrorist or a terrorist cell is going to ultimately strike. Here, we are returning to the fact that most terrorists have a range of potential targets to choose from, and that targets can be altered right up to the moment of attack initiation.

As for the target selection process in Breivik’s case, he never considered indiscriminate attacks against the general public. He wanted to target his self-declared enemies directly, which meant the Labour party and the media. He also made a basic decision to attack the inner enemies (the people responsible for and the facilitators of immigration), and not the outer enemies (Muslims and immigrants). The public rage following the racist killing of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001, and his general view that those responsible for the system were more responsible for the situation than the Muslims themselves, affected this decision. Furthermore, for his bomb plans, Breivik was driven towards highly symbolic targets. He never paid serious attention to most of the low-level potential targets he expressed anger and aggression towards. His operation had to be grand in order to gain maximum attention and give him recognition as a highly capable terrorist. Two other important observations concerning his target selection are that he would not waste his capability on individual assassinations only, and that he preferred to concentrate on one political party only. Breivik’s idea that the police and armed forces were to be future allies also excluded these as potential targets.

Breivik’s problem regarding finding a suitable farm, and the limited amount of explosives he managed to produce, altered his high ambitions significantly. His main plan with three car bombs directed against the Government Quarter, the Labour Party HQ building and the Royal Palace, followed by a shooting attack against the investigative journalist conference SKUP, fell through. Instead, he ended up targeting the Government Quarter and the Labour party youths at Utøya. The latter were, according to the terrorist’s own

Conclusions

compendium, not legitimate targets per se. Hence, it is a paradox that those that should not have been attacked were to bear the greatest losses, as Breivik's main operation (the Government Quarter) led to eight deaths, while his secondary "bonus" operation at Utøya led to 69 deaths (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: Interview 08,08,01). It is another paradox that the media, which, together with the Labour party, was a declared main enemy, was not targeted at all.

The research on the targeting preferences of the militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016 found that the jihadists in general are conservative when it comes to their target preferences in this part of the world. The majority of targets can be sorted into a limited number of target type categories, and none of these can be characterised as particularly innovative or creative. This is not surprising since creativity and innovation is often linked to the attack approach or method rather than the target type itself. There is nevertheless little comfort accompanying the conservative nature of the militant Islamists targeting preferences due to their practically unlimited and rich target portfolio. If, for example, the objective is to execute an indiscriminate mass casualty attack, it can be achieved in a lot of ways and in numerous different places, in any city or village of some size.

Regarding the specific target type categories, the dataset shows that attacks against random people in public areas and on public transport is the dominant trend both in plots and conducted attacks. In public transport, the aviation and railway sectors are the main focus of the jihadists. These are of equal interest in plots, but railway targets are more frequently attacked in practice. This is most likely because flights represent hard targets. This research also finds that military and police personnel represent particularly attractive targets for the jihadists. Most of the attacks against these have for the last years taken place in public areas, where they are accessible and vulnerable. In earlier years, military bases and police stations were targeted more often, followed by the headquarters of the intelligence and security services. This illustrates how the targeting and modus operandi within a target category type may change over time, which again may affect counterterrorism strategies and tactics.

Highly symbolic and prestigious targets, like government members and high-ranking politicians, parliaments and government buildings, as well as

Conclusions

diplomatic missions from certain countries, are given a noticeable attention in plots, but such potential targets are rarely followed up on as the targeting process narrows down. The reason for this is the combination of robust protective security measures around such individuals and buildings, combined with perpetrators that have no moral qualms about attacking random civilians. Thus, more vulnerable targets emerge as the natural choice. Public debate participants are mainly targeted in a distinctively selective manner. The scenario concerning religious institutions is slightly more diverging in nature, as there are several examples of both selective and more random targeting. As for the jihadists' limited interest for attacking national critical infrastructure targets, one central factor is simply their focus on taking lives rather than just disrupting people's everyday lives in a non-lethal manner. For terrorist actors trying to limit the loss of random civilians and cause societal disruption, attacking critical infrastructure is likely to stand out as a more attractive path.

This research has found that the hate rhetoric from the jihadists against the United States, Israel and Jews to some degree has been followed up on in practice. In 12% of the conducted attacks, there was a target link to the US, while there was a connection to Israel or Jews in 10% of the cases. Diplomatic missions are heavily protected, so the jihadists focus on softer target types. This is also why the jihadists primarily target Jews in public areas, synagogues and other Jewish institutions, instead of targets directly connected to the Israeli state.

Regarding the parameters that come in addition to the concrete target types, this study finds that the militant Islamists' soft target focus is dominant and increasing, while well-protected targets are almost totally avoided. There is a substantial mass casualty focus both in plots and attacks, but only few attacks lead to many deaths. Moreover, these incidents can most often be linked to established networks. When it comes to indiscriminate versus discriminate targeting, this comes out even. When comparing plots and conducted attacks, the jihadists are more ambitious regarding targets in early planning stages than later in the process.

Analysis of the 70 conducted attacks shows that as many as 45 of these were physically carried out by one perpetrator only, and this became an increasing trend from 2010 onwards. There are higher ambitions in launched attacks

Conclusions

carried out by more than one perpetrator. Both lone actors and groups prefer soft targets, but individuals acting alone are more likely to act discriminately, with a limited casualty focus and to use simpler means. Furthermore, attacks directed against name-specific individuals are mostly a one-perpetrator phenomenon.

The jihadists are conservative regarding not only what and whom they target but also when it comes to attack approach and weaponry. They can be creative, but are clearly more adaptive than innovative. A high level of sophistication and skills have, however, been seen in a few cases, most noticeably in the 2006 Liquid plot and the 2010 Cargo planes plot. The most advanced plots and attacks have been linked to established and central jihadi networks. There are no indicators from this research supporting suggestions of modus operandi differences between AQ- and ISIS-linked perpetrators. Instead, the shifts in trends seem to be influenced by practical and contextual factors. It should finally be noted that although this part study did not trace decision-making processes in each case in detail, those executing the attacks normally make the final target decision. The reason for this is simply that most attacks are not centrally organized, but in several cases it has also been observed that the perpetrators make the final decisions, despite suggestions from others.

After going through the two part studies, it is time to elaborate on the comparative and complementary aspects for two different studies like this. I will argue that they first and foremost are complementary, but initially it should also be acknowledged that the studies are supportive to each other in some areas. First out is a subject widely covered in the part study covering the 22 July attacks, namely the complex dynamics that represent an essential factor of influence during terrorist targeting processes. Although the decision-making and targeting processes are not traced in the same detail in the part study of the militant Islamists, there are several examples supporting the fact that there is a lot of dynamics and complexity involved. This has, for example, been seen in the 2007 Sauerland cell plot, as well as the 2013 Blair or Mumbai style plot, but also in several conducted attacks. Two examples here are the June 2007 Haymarket car bomb incident that culminated in the Glasgow airport attack, and the 7 July 2005 bombings in London.

Conclusions

Another observation made in both studies concerns ambitions. The study of the jihadists shows that there are higher ambitions among the perpetrators in plots and early planning stages, compared to what have been seen in conducted attacks. Although Anders Behring Breivik succeeded in conducting a most horrific terrorist operation, this research has clarified that he too wanted an even more complex operation that would have caused even more deaths. More concretely, Breivik ended up targeting his number one target, but he missed out on the other two planned bombings and the preferred shooting attack. Accordingly, both studies contribute to document the dynamics and unpredictability that follows targeting processes, as well as the sheer pragmatism that often comes into play. Although, not a result of this research, I also find it interesting to note Stenersen's (2017: 173; 2017b: 9) observation that the strategies of al-Qaida are not so structured and coordinated that one might believe, but rather affected by how situations develop, opportunities and chance. So also with reference to the part study of Breivik here, one might argue that both on the tactical or operational level and on the strategic level incidents are often the results of unlinear and complex dynamic processes, rather than fixed strategies and plans followed from A to Z.

Having mentioned pragmatism, another observation in both part studies is that protective security efforts represent one reason for why pragmatism often is displayed by terrorists. Protective measures do have a deterrent effect for some target type categories, and the militant Islamists (and terrorists from other ideological directions) would highly likely conduct more attacks against attractive hard targets if the protective security measures were not so robust. The consciousness of assessing preventive security efforts was also seen with Breivik, although it became less relevant for him in Oslo, as he could drive up to the entrance of the H-building in the Government Quarter unchallenged. If the Grubbegata street had been closed, it would have been a different matter.

Another observation from the two part studies is linked to brutality. The mass media, and possibly the general public, tend to relate extraordinary savagery and brutality to the militant Islamists alone. This assumption was strengthened after the actions displayed by AQ in Iraq, during the partially uncontrollable time of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the atrocities conducted by ISIS affiliated groups and individuals in later years (Gerges, 2016: 91; Stenersen, 2017: 178;

Conclusions

Warrick, 2016: 232–246). It is a point here that the brutality seen with Breivik hardly stand back from what we have witnessed with the militant Islamists. Moreover, a closer look at other conflicts and terrorist actors will probably disclose similarities. During the Northern Ireland conflict, for example, the infamous Shankill butchers displayed extremely grotesque violent actions against random civilians (Dillon, 1990; Edwards, 2017: 97–117). Arguably, the most gruesome brutality is not reserved for any one ideological direction.

After having presented some mutual supportive features from the two part studies, I will now elaborate on how studies like these are complementary to each other. In-depth single case studies, like the one focusing on Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July attacks, provides a detailed explanation of the operational proceedings and decision-making. This is important not only for investigative purposes and a following trial, but also essential for those seeking answers, including victims and their families. Single case studies may also describe how a terrorist thinks and acts in detail, which is an important aspect for our understanding of their radicalisation process, operational behaviour, decision-making and *modus operandi*. Such insights may come to use in a number of areas, like for countering extremism and radicalisation, for threat assessments and for establishing effective protective security measures.

Regarding the latter it is possible to find indicators supporting previous assumptions that some particular protective security measures do work. In the case of Breivik it was seen how he had to work on the fertilizer pellets, in order to make them useable for his devious purposes (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: 08,13,01). It was also seen how some security measures, or a lacking knowledge of such, have a deterrent effect. In Breivik's case not knowing the inside structure and compartmentalisation of the national broadcaster building, made him discard this potential target (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: 08,14,01). It is also possible to see how one terrorist identifies vulnerabilities and exploit these in practice, which again will be valuable for new countermeasures. One lesson learned from the street closure in the Government Quarter is that protective security measures must be rapidly installed when first announced. Another detail from the Breivik case, as also seen with the perpetrator in the recent 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings (2019b), is how easily he acquired a semi-automatic rifle for his attack on Utøya (Oslo Police District, 2011-2012: 08,32,01). A revision of the

Conclusions

relevant laws has now removed the possibility to buy semi-automatic rifles for hunting purposes (Trædal, 2018). In order to conclude, in-depth single case studies provide a detailed knowledge that is important in many respects. To a less degree are they alone useful for generalisation purposes or identifying trends.

Regarding multiple case studies, like the part study on militant Islamists in this thesis, these can contribute significantly in areas where single case studies come short. This is partially covered in the practical output part following below, but in brief, the study of the militant Islamists provides a broader and more complete knowledge-based understanding of a threat that Europe has experienced since the mid-1990s. The research clarifies developments and shifting trends over a long period of time. There is a range of issues of value here, like frequency of attacks, where they take place, actor profile, attack approach, weapons used and other modus operandi related issues. Such information is of significant importance, for example when working on threat assessments and effective counterterrorism strategies.

General threat assessments will be based on current trends, and they should ideally be based on all identified incidents seen over a period of time. Important to note, it is not only security services that have to produce threat assessments. Security managers, project groups, event organizers and different institutions will often have to do the same, in order to decide on or maintain an appropriate protective security level. Central state institutions are typically in position to receive advice and updates directly from security services, but also they will most often be presented the big lines, and not detailed statistics and case overviews. Fully accessible multiple case studies may therefore provide valuable, detailed knowledge regarding current trends, and make the regional or local threat assessments more concrete, robust and well documented.

Furthermore, a dataset with brief case descriptions will be very useful for establishing knowledge-based scenarios. Selecting scenarios is an integrated part of making risk analysis, and it has considerable impact with regard to making cost-effective decisions. It is after all a significant difference, practically and financially, whether the ambition is to protect a potential target

Conclusions

against a very professional, capable and heavily armed threat actor, or a lone actor with limited capability.

It should also be added that the datasets with concrete case overviews are useful for organizing training and exercises for police, military, state and municipal institutions, as well as private companies. Scenarios for such activities should be realistic and in accordance with current trends, although possible new approaches from the terrorists also need to be assessed.

With regard to counterterrorism strategies multiple case studies can ensure a knowledge-based approach, and also that they are in harmony with current needs. The threat picture is dynamic and shifting, and that should also be the case with counterterrorism strategies. They should be regularly revised and be based on the general developments, and not so much on single incidents.

I will briefly also mention that an extensive dataset on a specific actor over a period of time also has value for anyone seeking case overviews – like I did at the start of this research. Research like this is also likely to be of interest to security and intelligence services. One factor is that they can keep themselves updated and retrieve new information by following academia, but it also provides an opportunity for them to see whether their internal analysis are corresponding with those from the research community.

In order to conclude, and before going more into detail regarding the practical output from this research, in-depth single case studies and multiple case studies are generating complementary perspectives. We need both.

5.3 So what is the practical output?

This thesis has shown that terrorist targeting processes are complex and dynamic. It is practically impossible to pinpoint where, when and against whom the next terrorist attack is going to take place, unless the terrorist or cell in question is closely followed by security service in the final phase of an operation. Despite this fact, both general and specific insights from this study have practical value. Like in other areas, decision-makers, advisors and analysts working on counterterrorism or within protective security on a higher level should apply a knowledge-based approach to ensure that well-founded

Conclusions

decisions are taken. Scientific contributions play a key role here. Likewise, police, security authorities, armed forces and security managers need detailed knowledge in order to establish best-practice strategies and tactics for their activities. Additionally, new knowledge does not necessarily lead to changes to the existing strategies or efforts, if it is confirmed that current approaches work and should be upheld.

Following this, research on terrorist targeting practice and other modus operandi related issues contributes to a balanced and hopefully accurate view of the phenomenon in question. This can be information regarding an existing or emerging threat, actor-specific characteristics and profile, targeting trends, patterns and changes in modus operandi, as well as the locations and frequency of attacks. For this research, I can exemplify this point with the fact that the insights from part study two were presented by the author directly to the commission of the Official Norwegian Report tasked to review the arming of the Norwegian police (NOU, 2017: 9). It has also been used in specific reports (e.g., Hemmingby, Bjørge, Sand, & Snortheimsmoen, 2015) as well as in contributions to the public debate in media (Hemmingby, 2014; 2015).

In general, overall assessments of threat actors that are presented to decision-makers will affect, to a significant degree, the attention the threat receives, the amount of resources allocated to it, and the specific areas and efforts that should be prioritised in order to mitigate or remove it. Moreover, taking into account the threat perception and potential scenarios will influence overarching security ambitions and residual risk acceptance. It is fundamentally important to get this right because the difference between, for example, adhering to worst-case scenarios and most-likely scenarios can be enormous when it comes to costs, practical implications and societal values. Equally, a threat perception mistaken to be low, too relaxed or naïve may ultimately lead to preventable loss of lives. Here, I will argue that the dataset and case overview of the militant Islamists from this research represents a good starting point for scenario selection. It is also helpful for scenario selection for police training (e.g. Smith, 2013). Such datasets also have a potential practical value for other researchers chasing case overviews for their own research projects, like Petter Nesser's work (2008; 2010; 2014) has

Conclusions

proven to be for this thesis. In other words, knowledge related to terrorists' operational activity is vital for those working to counter terrorist activity.

This research has explained why the complex dynamics of targeting processes makes it practically impossible to predict exactly where and when the next terrorist attack is going to take place. Not in the least because actors with no or few moral constraints, as shown in the case of the militant Islamists, have a practically unlimited range of potential targets. Furthermore, Anders Behring Breivik demonstrated that an attack can surface from unexpected directions, as the militant Islamists were (and still are) regarded as the main threat in Norway. The right-wing terrorist also demonstrated how much damage one individual can cause. Finally, both the Breivik case and the attacks committed by the militant Islamists illustrate that measures preventing radicalisation and the intelligence-driven approach aiming to detect attacks in time are not enough. From time to time, someone with bad intentions slips under the radar, and attacks take place. This fact proves the validity of the well-known cliché: hope for the best, prepare for the worst.

There is both substance and good intention in the aforementioned expression as one really must keep an open mind towards possible threats. It is, however, not wholly unproblematic. The problem with the “prepare for the worst” part is that it is not always applicable because it overlooks the boundaries and constraints that one encounters in real life. It will never be possible to eradicate all security threats or protect everyone everywhere against terrorists, and no one will ever get enough resources to prepare for the worst – if that means the very worst scenario one possibly could think of. In other words, it is all about finding the right balance between the threat and the countermeasures, which brings us back to risk- and knowledge-based decisions. Hopefully, findings from research projects like this one can help tackle sinister futuristic predictions. One basic observation from this dataset is that most terrorist plots and attacks in Europe take place in a few, large countries, like France, Great Britain and Germany. Also, on a global level, both the number of attacks and deaths are concentrated in a few regions outside our continent (Global Terrorism Database, 2018). This points at the obvious fact that the threat differs from country to country, and from region to region. Acknowledging that most plots are disrupted in time in Europe, also indicates strongly that the intelligence-driven approach most West-European

Conclusions

countries apply against terrorism works reasonably well. It is also important to observe that only a few terrorist attacks cause a high number of deaths. Furthermore, most terrorist attacks conducted in Western Europe by militant Islamists today are executed by a single individual, and most often, simpler means are applied. It is also worth registering that many attackers are acting in a rather independent manner. These abovementioned factors mean that, even though the threat is transnational, national threat assessments are key, and a reasonable balance between threat and counterstrategies should be sought.

Going into greater details as to what the findings concerning the concrete target types mean, the study of the militant Islamists has shown that indiscriminate attacks against people in public areas (including public transport) represent the most challenging issue from a protective security perspective. The need for focus on public areas is further strengthened by the fact that discriminate attacks against police, military personnel and others also take place here. It is not possible to protect everyone everywhere, but this does not mean that this challenge can be overlooked. Combined efforts related to physical security, police response and the general public's behaviour during incidents can make a difference if a terrorist incident occurs in a public area.

Physical security efforts in public areas can be considered in urban areas where crowds of people are particularly exposed to attacks, like high streets, squares, market places or along busy shopping streets. Bollards, armed balustrades and vehicle barriers can for example deny access to terrorists who plan vehicle attacks and vehicle-borne bomb attacks. Even speed mitigating efforts alone may have a positive effect against vehicle attacks, for example if noise alert people and enable them to get away in time. With reference to the target displacement discussion, some will argue that forcing potential attackers away from one crowded area to another has little effect, but if the perpetrator(s) are led to a less crowded place, the damage potential is reduced. Breivik's attack on Utøya and several incidents involving the jihadists have also shown that both outdoor and indoor time-fixed events must be given proper attention, and this will often implicate temporary security arrangements. It is important to emphasise, however, that significant physical security efforts in public areas must come as the result of thorough, specific risk assessments. Vulnerability is not the same as the likelihood of an attack, and both establishing costs and the unpredictability regarding where terrorists

Conclusions

will show up means extensive protective measures should primarily be reserved for particularly attractive potential target areas. Another reason for this is that traffic flow, logistics and other practicalities around the location in question must be ensured. Finally, there is aesthetics, which is a factor that cannot be underestimated when it comes to public acceptance of security measures. By taking advantage of the concept of modern security area design, protective measures should, as far as possible, fit nicely into the affected urban or rural landscape. At best, security measures are not visible as such. Ideally the public should see integrated security efforts like nice water ponds, statues, benches, flowerbeds and bicycle racks.

It is a paradox that the security of top politicians and highly symbolic institutions, which are not often targeted by terrorists in our part of the world, are taken care of by well-established systems since long, while securing public areas has been given limited strategic thought in many countries. The reason for this is that public security, in the context of terrorism, is for many nations a relatively new dilemma. It is obviously also very challenging when the terrorists have almost unlimited possibilities regarding potential targets. Furthermore, a considerable challenge regarding protective measures in public areas is linked to ownership, responsibility and costs, which demands close cooperation between state, municipality and private actors.

In case of terrorist attacks in public area, and especially because of the constraints of physical protective security efforts, a rapid police response is vital – as acknowledged by French authorities after the 2016 Nice attack (BBC News, 2016e). Police emergency readiness is first and foremost linked to the density of police officers, as ordinary police officers are most often the first-responders. Accordingly, special police units are primarily reinforcement forces. Taking into account how resource-demanding it is to permanently have police officers securing potential target locations, this can only be advisable on very few locations, and only if the threat level is assessed to be very high. This is also why an increasing number of police patrols have become the trend in several large European cities. In London and other large cities, for example, there is a systematic use of armed (police) response vehicles (ARVs), dedicated to incidents that may require the use of weapons. The measures must also be cost-effective, because security has a high price tag. This is well illustrated in the case of France, which spends as much as

Conclusions

nearly one million euros a day on heightened security efforts (Alderman, 2016). It is also important to add that there is no country in Europe that will have enough police resources to adequately secure key assets and crowded places over a long period of time. During a critically high threat level going over time, this can be solved with the assistance of armed forces, as seen in France with *Opération Sentinelle*. Here, armed forces contribute with manpower to guard duty around potential terrorist targets and patrolling in public areas (Ministère de la Défense, France, 2016–2017). The Berlin police have another approach with their special guard units for securing non-federal assets, such as embassies and synagogues (Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 2017). In Denmark, the so-called police cadets are being trained and deployed for border duty, so the ordinary police can focus more on public security (Dansk politi, 2018). The conclusion here is that good relations and plans for cooperation between the police and the armed forces should be in place.

Regarding people's behaviour in public areas, one main issue is how the public should be observant with regard to suspicious items and activity and how to report this. Another issue is how to behave during a terrorist incident. Campaigns from security authorities in this area have mostly been seen in countries, such as the UK, where there has been continuous terrorist activity and a prolonged high-threat level. Here, Project Griffin is an example of broader knowledge and information sharing between authorities, private partners and the public. Likewise, the RUN – HIDE – TELL campaign informs people on how to behave during different types of terrorist attacks (National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2017). Information campaigns can also advise people on how to identify warning signs concerning people in their surroundings. Research has, for example, shown that lone actors relatively often give away signals to families, friends or colleagues, indicating that something is going to happen – in some cases even telling them so (Ellis & Pantucci, 2016). As such, these campaigns can help to counter threats that have proven to be particularly difficult to detect in time (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016: 88–95).

As for the transportation sector, many practical implications concerning public areas apply here as well, but a few additional remarks are in place. Starting with the aviation sector, flights are at large well protected due to the airport security arrangements and passenger control mechanisms. In this area

Conclusions

it is therefore most of all a question of keeping up with the creativity the terrorists display with regard to explosive devices and alternative weapons. The insider threat has to be taken seriously, since the human factor can make all physical and technical efforts worthless. In several countries, such as France, this key subject has been given more attention (Dearden, 2015). Finally, the cyber threat, which has worried the sector for a number of years, cannot be neglected either (Wilkinson, 2007: 262). As for terminal buildings and their surroundings these must be protected with physical and technical means just like other exposed potential targets. In general, there is a considerable security focus on large international airports today, and therefore there is no reason to elaborate further on this issue here.

Rail transport is just as challenging as public area security due to the combination of full public access and no security control. Underground subways and trains represent a particularly challenging issue because of the nature of the surroundings, which have probably attracted threat actors in several cases. This justifies a special focus on railway security. Not just with regard to detecting and handling incidents but also other damage mitigating efforts (Meyer, 2011). For example, focus on good solutions against secondary effects from explosive devices, such as fire and smoke developments, is important. Here, the materials used in carriages are one factor. It should also be added that the increasing number of vehicle attacks indicate that central and busy bus and light train stations should be secured against such threats.

This thesis has shown how well protected top politicians, royalties, highly symbolic buildings and embassies are rarely targeted in practice by militant Islamists. This is not due to lack of interest, but rather the result of protective security measures, which are now so robust that the insider threat probably represents the greatest risk also here. This suggests that protective security works, although there are no guarantees against the odd attempt, as illustrated in the case of the March 2017 Palace of Westminster attack and the August 2018 vehicle incident at the same location (BBC, 2017; Dearden, 2018). What these cases also indicate is that such incidents increasingly take place just outside of established security perimeters, calling for extra attention on the public areas surrounding such potential targets. A good example where such broader considerations have been made is the Whitehall Streetscape

Conclusions

Improvements project. Efforts here do not only protect institution buildings and premises, but also the pedestrians in the area (BBC News, 2007c).

Another important observation is that politicians a step below the top level are vulnerable to violent assaults, as seen in the knife-attack on MP Stephen Timms in 2010 and the murder of MP Jo Cox in 2016 (BBC News, 2016f). These politicians do not have the full protective security package, including close protection officers, and are particularly vulnerable when outside their offices, which are normally on well-secured premises. Behavioural advice from security authorities and less resource-demanding protective security efforts appears to be the most reasonable approach for this group. As for political meetings and events, the need for police presence has to be assessed individually, since some political topics and politicians trigger more aggression than others (Bjørgero & Silkoset, 2017).

Continuing with police and military personnel, both categories have proven to be attractive and vulnerable terrorist targets in public areas, as well as at the entrance of police stations and military bases. From a tactical perspective, several attacks have underlined the importance of staying alert in public areas, when on duty and in uniform. Moreover, police officers and soldiers operating alone or in pairs are significantly vulnerable to attacks from close range. In contrast, groups of three or more police officers or soldiers normally seem to be able to counter an attack, if they are not standing too close to each other. The bottom line is that proper tactics must be applied for both guard duty and patrolling in public area. This should be incorporated in the basic training. In an off duty context, as illustrated with Merah's first killing of a soldier in 2012, police and military personnel should also maintain a low profile regarding their line of work, including on their social media profiles. In other words, personal security is a subject to be taken seriously.

Public debate participants, religious leaders and other individuals who can attract the special attention of terrorists pose a difficult problem from a protective security perspective. They are not part of the security apparatus that high-level state officials and politicians benefit from. Threat and harassment are typically handled by the ordinary police organisation, and there has to be a more substantial threat before security authorities are engaged. This research has shown that public debate participants have been exposed to more plots

Conclusions

and attacks from the militant Islamists than politicians have. Furthermore, they can be under threat for many years. Accordingly, possible protective measures for this target category deserves more reflection. One should note with interest that former General Director of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), Jakob Scharf, indicates that the use of close protection officers should be evaluated in order to ensure they are used on those who need them most (Skjoldager, 2016: 153–155). As such, it appears more reasonable to assign close protection officers to public debate participants under threat, instead of individuals on the fringes of royal families or visitors from abroad that engage such resources for protocol reasons.

Finally, regarding the assessment concerning US, Israeli and Jewish targets, this research has shown that the threat against these parties is real and enduring. Not only does this justify robust protective security around diplomatic missions, but also around synagogues and other central Jewish institutions, as well as Israeli and Jewish delegations, teams and events. This need for protection is further strengthened by the fact that these are not only in the sights of the jihadists, but also under threat from actors from other ideological directions, like right wing and far-left extremists, as well as Palestinian and Shiite groups.

5.4 Need for more research

There are several targeting related issues that have been left uncovered or merely briefly addressed because they are on the outside of the scope of this thesis. One reason for this is the objectives and primary focus of this research, as well as the limited number of parameters it was natural to include. Another factor is that the open-source material used for the militant Islamist section has not been detailed enough in order to illuminate other parameters related to targeting that could be of interest. In some areas, there are certainly indications worth noting from this work, but more research is needed in order to make sound conclusions. A number of topics could be presented here, but I will limit myself to highlighting three issues that could be explored in greater detail in future studies.

Conclusions

The first issue concerns the concrete decision-making processes of those planning and conducting terrorist attacks. This research on Anders Behring Breivik has shown that this can be done in reasonable detail with high quality research material. The part concerning the militant Islamists, however, has illustrated that with less detailed material, researchers will normally have to settle with mapping targeting preferences instead of decision-making per se. This means we should seek to gain more detailed knowledge regarding militant Islamists, as well as actors from other ideological directions. One subject of interest here is for example the psychological aspect of intragroup dynamics and how this affects the decision-making. In general, more in-depth single case studies would contribute to an increased understanding regarding target decision-making.

Another interesting issue briefly touched upon in this thesis is the matter of hostile reconnaissance activity. To which degree do terrorists gather information about potential targets during their planning process, both online and through physical reconnaissance? This thesis has explained how Breivik was rather superficial regarding hostile reconnaissance, but in several cases related to militant Islamists, a substantial amount of target browsing and extensive preparations have been going on. In certain cases from this dataset, there have been surveillance recordings from the security authorities, statements from the perpetrators themselves in police interviews and during trials, written targets lists, as well as photos on the suspects' mobile phones. In several cases, perpetrators have been followed while conducting hostile reconnaissance, and in some case the so-called dry-runs (a physical walk through-talk through act around the target in question) have been identified. It will therefore be useful to learn more about how terrorists conduct hostile reconnaissance in order to establish the best possible countermeasures so as to detect them during such activity. Two crucial questions are how can they be detected on site and how can their information gathering be obstructed.

A third issue is related to symbolism, which plays a major role and affects terrorist behaviour (and in turn protective security measures) in a number of ways. There is often talk about symbolic or highly symbolic targets as well as symbolic actions. Most often, however, basic definitions and aspects regarding symbolism in terrorism are left unaddressed, and this topic deserves a thorough discussion and evaluation far beyond what have been covered in

Conclusions

this thesis. Even in official guiding manuals where symbolism is a central issue, for example, when considering symbolic values in a threat assessment perspective, proper definitions are not presented (e.g., Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2014). Moreover, terrorists are not only affected by symbolic characteristics in the targets themselves or their own flags, logos, photos or texts, but also when it comes to place and time. As for the latter, the 1995 Maison Blanche metro station attack in Paris is an excellent example, as the choice of both timing and place was most likely a result of a previous incident, where GIA leader Khaled Kelkal was killed by the police at the Maison Blanche bus stop near Lyon. The bomb attack took place at the same time as Kelkal's funeral (CNN, 1995). Hence, there is a need for more research on symbolism in the context of terrorism.

After recommendations for future research have been made, this thesis have come to an end. It has not covered all issues related to terrorist targeting in depth, but hopefully the approach and elaborations on terrorist targeting in general, as well as the findings from the concrete part studies, will be welcomed as a meaningful contribution to the existing research in this area.

Bibliography

Media sources

- Adetunji, J. (2008, October 15). *Man pleads guilty to attempted restaurant suicide bombing*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/oct/15/uksecurity>
- AFP (2016, January 4). *Man charged over car attack on French soldiers*. The Local.fr. Retrieved from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20160104/man-charged-over-car-attack-on-french-soldiers>
- AFP Strasbourg (2016, August 19). *Suspect arrested after stabbing of Jewish man in Strasbourg*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/suspect-arrested-after-stabbing-of-jewish-man-in-strasbourg>
- Aftenposten Aften (2007, July 26). *Hypotetisk og hysterisk*. Editorial.
- Aftonbladet (2012, May 8). *Avslöjades av vännen*. Retrieved from <http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article14793581.ab>
- Alderman, L. (2016, February 1). *Terror Threats Thaw Budgets Across Europe*. The New York Times. 2016: Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/business/international/europe-training-financial-firepower-on-terrorism.html>
- Allen, P. (2014, December 21). *Dijon 'terror' attack: 11 injured as psychiatric patient drives into crowd 'shouting Islamic slogans'*. The Mirror. Retrieved from <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/dijon-terror-attack-11-injured-4851540>
- Alleyne, R. (2003, January 31). *Brixton boy who became seeker of terrorist targets*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420701/Brixton-boy-who-became-seeker-of-terrorist-targets.html>
- Andersen, B.A. & Dürrfeld, S.K. (2015, March 19). *BT afslører: Anholdt fra Field's kendt af PET fra spektakulært våbenkøb*. Berlingske Tidende. Retrieved from <https://www.bt.dk/krimi/bt-afsloerer-anholdt-fra-fields-kendt-af-pet-fra-spektakulaert-vaabenkoeb>
- Andersen, C. (2005, September 17). *Dyb angst for kritik af islam*. Politiken. Retrieved from <https://politiken.dk/kultur/boger/art5006104/Dyb-angst-for-kritik-af-islam>

Bibliography

- Andersen, G. et al. (2012, April 4). *Breivik i protestbrev fra cellen: "Verste som kunne rammet meg"*. VG. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10049584>.
- Andersen, J.E. (2013, March 16). *Derfor oppnevnte retten nye terrrorsakkyndige*. Aftenposten.
- Andersen, M.A. et al. (2012, March 28). *Breiviks egne ord fra fengselscellen*. VG. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/p71Bo/breiviks-egne-ord-fra-fengselscellen>
- ANSA (2015, July 22). *Two ISIS terrorists arrested in Brescia*. Retrieved from http://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2015/07/22/two-isis-terrorists-arrested-in-brescia_211e255d-dc94-4ef9-82ef-b50d07dfe308.html
- Arango, T. & Gladstone, R. (2016, December 19). *Russian Ambassador to Turkey Is Assassinated in Ankara*. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/europe/russia-ambassador-shot-ankara-turkey.html?_r=0
- Arie, S. (2003, February 13). *Italian judge frees Pakistanis held in terrorism raid*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/13/italy.pakistan>
- Ashar, A. (2014, October 15). *How a Jewish French Girl Joined ISIS, Tried to Blow up Parents*. Retrieved from www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/186188#.VoVZ4EsTFyQ
- Associated Press (1995, September 4). *Incomplete Bomb Blast in Paris Marketplace Slightly Injures 4*. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-04/news/mn-42154_1_bombing-injures-paris
- Associated Press (2003, June 6). *Iraqi arrested after letters in Belgium*. Retrieved from www.apnewsarchive.com/2003/Iraqi-Arrested-After-Letters-in-Belgium/id-00fb046623dcb2bf11c25e8f7e0fd35b
- Astrup, S. (2011, June 21). *Øksemand atter kendt skyldig i angreb på Kurt Westergaard*. Politiken. Retrieved from <https://politiken.dk/indland/art5013721/%C3%98ksemand-atter-kendt-skyldig-i-angreb-p%C3%A5-Kurt-Westergaard>

Bibliography

- Astrup, S. & Herschend, S. S. (2012a, April 18). *Ny anklage: Tiltalte planlagde juleterror*. Politiken. Retrieved from <https://politiken.dk/indland/art5056081/Ny-anklage-Tiltalte-planlagde-juleterror>
- Astrup, S. & Herschend, S. S. (2012b, April 18). *Bombeopskrift fundet i terrortiltalts celle*. Politiken. Retrieved from <https://politiken.dk/indland/art5056074/Bombeopskrift-fundet-i-terrortiltalts-celle>
- Astrup, S. & Herschend, S. S. (2012c, April 18). *Aflytninger: »Dræb så mange af de mennesker, du finder«*. Politiken. Retrieved from <https://politiken.dk/indland/art5392068/Aflytninger-%C2%BBDr%C3%A6b-s%C3%A5-mange-af-de-mennesker-du-finder%C2%AB>
- Azulay, M. (2011, October 17). *Victims of 405 attack on bus No.405 cry out*. Retrieved from <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4135891,00.html>
- Bayoumi, Y. (2014, September 22). *Isis urges more attacks on Western 'disbelievers'*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-urges-more-attacks-on-western-disbelievers-9749512.html>
- BBC News (undated). *21 July attacks*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/21_07_05.sm
- BBC News (1990, July 20). *IRA bombs stock exchange*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_2515000/2515667.stm
- BBC News (2000, June 6). *Trader thought nailbomb was a joke*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/779697.stm
- BBC News (2002, February 20). *Cyanide attack foiled in Italy*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1831511.stm>
- BBC News (2002a, August 20). *Italy arrests men over church plot*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2205263.stm>
- BBC News (2002b, October 5). *Terror suspects arrested near Rome*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2302059.stm>
- BBC News (2003, May 27). *Al Qaida suspect tells of bomb plot*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2941702.stm>

Bibliography

- BBC News (2004, February 25). *Terror suspects arrested in Italy*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3487162.stm>
- BBC News (2004a, April 2). *Bomb found on Spanish rail track*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3593927.stm>
- BBC News (2004b, June 30). *Madrid bombers 'had more targets'*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3855085.stm>
- BBC News (2005, April 13). *Killer jailed over poison plot*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/4433709.stm>
- BBC News (2007, April 30). *Five get life over UK bomb plot*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6195914.stm>
- BBC News (2007a, July 10). *Terrorists had plans of Sizewell*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/suffolk/6288094.stm
- BBC News (2007b, July 21). *Italy police raid 'terror school'*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6909961.stm>
- BBC news (2007c, July 16): *£25m Whitehall street work begins*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/6900760.stm
- BBC News (2007d, December 21). *Belgium foils al-Qaeda jailbreak*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7155539.stm>
- BBC News (2008, August 18). *Aabid Khan and his global jihad*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7549447.stm
- BBC News (2008a, March 20). *New 'Bin Laden tape' threatens EU*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7306002.stm>
- BBC News (2009, December 14). *Spain sentences Barcelona subway terror cell men*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8413025.stm>
- BBC News (2010, November 11). *Suspects held in France raids "plotted terror attack"*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11733634>
- BBC News (2011, January 3). *Coptic churches in Europe report attack threats*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12108677>
- BBC News (2012, February 1). *London Stock Exchange bomb plot admitted by four men*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16833032>
- BBC News (2012a, October 11). *France "uncovers biggest bombing plots in*

Bibliography

- years". Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19907272>
- BBC News (2012b, January 30). *Norway jails two for Danish newspaper terror plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16790916>
- BBC News (2012c, March 13). *Imam dies in mosque arson attack in Belgian capital*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17346927>
- BBC News. (2012d, March 22). *Shootings in Toulouse and Montauban: What we know*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17428860>
- BBC News (2012e, July 20). *Nesserdine Menni guilty of funding Stockholm bomb attack*. Retrieved from www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-18923009
- BBC News (2013, May 31). *French soldier stabbing: Man on terrorism-linked charges*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22735883>
- BBC News (2013a, October 25). *Mosque bomber Pavlo Lapshyn given life for murder*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-24675040>
- BBC News (2015, January 14). *Charlie Hebdo attacks: Three days of terror*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237>.
- BBC News (2015a, March 26). *Erol Incedal: Student cleared of planning terror attack*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32067725>
- BBC News (2015b, September 17). *Germany police shoot Berlin Islamist after knife attack*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34284044>
- BBC News (2015c, April 1). *Erol Incedal: Jailed for 42 months over bomb-making manual*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32142038>
- BBC News (2015d, April 22). *France police arrest man 'planning to attack churches'*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32409253>
- BBC News (2015e, December 23). *France beheading attack: Suspect Yassin Salhi kills himself*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35166691>

Bibliography

- BBC News (2015f, August 25). *France train shooting suspect profile: Ayoub El-Khazzani*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34032218>
- BBC News, (2015g, April 29). *France increases defence spending 'to counter extremism'*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32509301>
- BBC News (2016, January 7). *Charlie Hebdo anniversary: Paris police shoot man dead*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35250344>
- BBC News (2016b, June 16). *France police killing: Jihadist Abballa 'knew his victim'*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36547663>
- BBC News (2016c). *Brussels explosions: What we know about airport and metro attacks*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985>
- BBC News (2016d, August 19). *Nice attack: What we know about the Bastille Day killings*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801671>
- BBC News (2016e, July 17). *Nice attack: France calls up 12,000 reservists*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36817435>
- BBC News (2016f, November 23). *Jo Cox: Man jailed for "terrorist" murder of MP*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38079594>
- BBC News (2017, April 7). *Westminster attack – what happened*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39355108>
- BBC News (2019, March 18). *Christchurch shootings: How the attacks unfolded*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47582183>
- BBC News (2019a, March 21). *Christchurch shootings: New Zealand to ban military style weapons*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47648549>
- Bergen, P. (2015, July 28). *The golden age of terrorism*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/28/opinions/bergen-1970s-terrorism/>
- Bergens Tidende (2012, November 16). *Røsland: Grubbegata kunne ha vært*

Bibliography

- stengt før*. Retrieved from <http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Rosland-Grubbegata-kunne-havart-stengt-for-2797735.html>
- Berliner Morgenpost (2016, October 9). *Möglicherweise Anschlag an Berliner Flughäfen geplant*. Retrieved from <http://www.morgenpost.de/berlin/article208378305/Terrorverdacht-in-Chemnitz-Einsatz-auch-am-Flughafen-Tegel.html#>
- Berlingske Tidende (2008, October 21). *12 og 7 års fængsel i terrrorsag fra Glasvej*. Retrieved from <http://www.b.dk/danmark/12-og-7-aars-faengsel-i-terrorsag-fra-glasvej>
- Berlingske Tidende (2016, March 8). *16-årig pige ville bombe sin gamle skole: Det er rystende*. Retrieved from <http://www.b.dk/nationalt/16-aarig-pige-ville-bombe-sin-gamle-skole-det-er-rystende>
- Berman, M. (2016, January 8). *Philadelphia police: Man who tried to kill officer pledged allegiance to the Islamic State*. Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/08/philadelphia-police-say-attacker-tried-to-execute-officer/>
- Bernstein, R. (2004, May 5). *German security plan falters as Qaeda suspect faces trial*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/05/world/german-security-plan-falters-as-qaeda-suspect-faces-trial.html>
- Bernton, H., Carter, M., Heath, D. & Neff, J. (2002, June 23-July 7). *The terrorist within: The terrorist tracker*. The Seattle Times. Retrieved from <http://old.seattletimes.com/news/nation-world/terroristwithin/chapter5.html>
- Beyler, C. (2006). *The terrorist threat in France*. The Hudson Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.hudson.org/research/9875-the-jihadist-threat-in-france>
- Binnie, I. (2016, April 28). *Italy says uncovers possible plot to attack Rome, arrests suspects*. Reuters. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-security-idUSKCN0XP13S>
- Binnie, I. (2016a, May 10). *Italy arrests three in probe into suspected planned attacks in Rome, London*. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-security-idUSKCN0Y10ZD>
- Bjordal, N. (2012, January 6). *Breivik ringte og ba om medlemslister*.

Bibliography

- Nettavisen. Retrieved from
<http://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/3305930.html>
- Bjørge, T. (2011, December 7). *Med monopol på vrangforestillinger*. Feature article in Aftenposten. Retrieved from
<http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/Med-monopol-pa-vrangforestillinger-172291b.html>
- Bloomberg News (2005). *Berlin court acquits Tunisian garnaoui of planning bomb attacks*. Retrieved from
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aEEBt0PGKKxM>
- Bon, G. (2016, September 9). *Arrested French women, directed by Islamic State, planned Paris attack*. Reuters. Retrieved from
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-france-idUSKCN11F144>
- Borger, J. et al (2010, December 31). *Sweden suicide bomber: police search Bedfordshire house*. The Guardian. Retrieved from
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/13/sweden-suicide-bomber-bedfordshire-house>
- Breeden, A. (2016, May 26). *French authorities given broader powers to fight terrorism*. The New York Times. Retrieved from
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/world/europe/france-terrorism-laws.html>
- Bright, M. (2001, September 30). *The secret world*. The Guardian. Retrieved from
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/30/terrorism.afghanistan6>
- Burns, T. (1981, October 3). *Suspected ETA bomb nearly sinks destroyer docked in Spanish port*. Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/10/03/suspected-eta-bomb-nearly-sinks-destroyer-docked-in-spanish-port/5a940d4b-1b95-40cb-9a07-7ea3eb05c259/?utm_term=.d287653e7b58
- Bush, G. (2001, September 21). *Text of George Bush's speech*. The Guardian. Retrieved from
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13>

Bibliography

- Callimachi, R. (2016, August 4). *How a secretive branch of ISIS built a global network of killers*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruit-interview.html>
- Cape Breton Post (2010, February 17). *Quebec court hands Namouh life sentence for al Qaida-linked bomb plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.capebretonpost.com/News/Regional/2010-02-17/article-837472/Quebec-court-hands-Namouh-life-sentence-for-al-Qaida-linked-bomb-plot/1>
- Carter, H. (2008, January 30). *Fanatic planned to kidnap British Muslim serviceman and behead him 'like a pig'*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/30/terrorism.world>
- CBS News (2001, October 6). *France detain Algerian militants*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/french-detain-algerian-militants/>
- Chicago Tribune (2002, February 7). *Trial tied to Al Qaeda plot nears end in Italy*. Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-07/news/0202070334_1_al-qaeda-essid-sami-ben-khemais-explosives-and-chemicals
- Chrisafis, A. (2012, March 29). *Former Cern scientist faces terror trial in France*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/29/cern-scientist-terror-trial-france>
- Chrisafis, A. (2016, September 8). *Paris police arrest three women suspected of planning attack*. The Guardian. URL <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/08/paris-police-arrest-three-women-in-connection-with-notre-dame-incident>
- Clapson, C. (2015, December 29). *"Brussels market or police stations target of New Year's attacks"*. Flanders News. Retrieved from <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/News/1.2534458>
- CNN (1995, October 7). *Two bombs, two days in France*. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9510/paris_bomb/10-07/index.html
- CNN (2006, March 21). *33 charged in failed Spain bombing*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/03/21/spain.indictments/>
- CNN (2007, May 29). *Spain convicts 3 on terror charges*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/05/29/spain.terror/index.html?iref=newssearch>

Bibliography

- CNN (2009, May 14). *Italy arrests linked to Brussels al'Qaeda' recruiting network*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/14/italy.alqaeda/>
- CNN (2010, November 23). *Belgium terror probe nets 11 arrests*. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/11/23/belgium.terrorism/>
- CNN (2012a, April 30). *Documents give new details on al Qaeda's London bombings*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/>.
- Connolly, K. (2016, October 10). *Syrian man seized in Germany 'was planning Isis bomb attack'*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/10/german-police-capture-syrian-man-suspected-of-planning-bomb-attack>
- Corriere della serra (2009). *Maroni: nel covo del kamikaze appunti su personaggi famosi*. Retrieved from http://archivistorico.corriere.it/2009/ottobre/23/Maroni_nel_covo_de_l_kamikaze_co_7_091023031.shtml
- Chrisafis, A. (2012, March 29). *Former Cern scientist faces terror trial in France*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/29/cern-scientist-terror-trial-france>
- Chrisafis, A. (2016, January 7). *Knife-wielding man in fake suicide vest killed at Paris police station*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/07/paris-police-shoot-dead-man-near-police-station>
- Cowell, A. (2002, November 13). *Threats and response: Continent on alert*. New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/13/world/threats-responses-continent-alert-port-ferry-operators-europe-brace-for-bomb.html>
- Cruickshank, P. (2014, August 28). *Raid on ISIS suspect in the French Riviera*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/france-suspected-isis-link/>
- Cruickshank, P. & Robertson, N. (2012, August 2). *Three terror suspects held*

Bibliography

- in Spain, authorities say*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/02/world/europe/spain-terror-arrests/>
- Dagsavisen (2012, April 10). *Kamp om Breiviks psyke*. Retrieved from <http://www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/kamp-om-breiviks-psyke-1.474662>
- Daily Mail (2012, March 15). *Woman, 40, arrested in London terror raid as police probe 'secret Facebook plot to blow up Italian synagogue'*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2115431/Woman-40-arrested-London-terror-raid-police-probe-secret-Facebook-plot-blow-Italian-synagogue.html>
- Daily Mail (2013, February 14). *Terrifying bomb arsenal of the would be Breivik who 'killed his own mother when she found out about plan to blow up Polish parliament'*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2278711/Brunon-Kwiecien-Terrifying-bomb-arsenal-Breivik-plotted-blow-Polish-parliament.html>
- Daily Mail (2015, February 26). *Al-Qaeda bomb plotter 'took sightseeing photos at alleged targets including British shopping center'*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2970914/Al-Qaeda-bomb-plotter-took-sightseeing-photos-alleged-targets-including-British-shopping-center.html#ixzz3TiPajKyl>
- Daily Record (2015, October 9). *Medical student who was arrested as he prepared to graduate from Scots uni is cleared of two terrorism charges*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/yousif-badri-trial-medical-student-6603694#0DQTXjAvMYd2yJcm.97>
- Davies, W. (2013, February 5). *Hezbollah linked to the Burgas bombing*. BBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21342192>
- Daily Star Sunday (2013, December 6). *Alleged-killers chose Lee Rigby as target because he was spotted first court hears*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/354314/Alleged-killers-chose-Lee-Rigby-as-target-because-he-was-spotted-first-court-hears>
- Dansk politi (2018). *Bliv politikadet*. Rigspolitiet. Retrieved from https://www.politi.dk/da/ompolitiet/jobipolitiet/bliv_politikadet/
- Dansk Radio (2014, October 12). *FAKTA: Det ved vi om Lars Hedegaards formodede attentatmand*. Retrieved from <http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2014/10/12/1012065216.htm>

Bibliography

- de Verdieping, T. (2005, August 15). *Terrorisme / Scholier vulde web met dreigementen*. Retrieved from <http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1559486/2005/08/15/Terrorisme-Scholier-vulde-web-met-dreigementen.dhtml>
- de Verdieping, T. (2005a, November 7). *Bedreiger Geert Wilders krijgt jeugd-tbs*. Retrieved from <http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4492/Nederland/article/detail/1560953/2005/11/07/Bedreiger-Geert-Wilders-krijgt-jeugd-tbs.dhtml>
- Dearden, L. (2015, December 15). *Paris attacks: 70 staff have security clearance revoked for suspected 'radicalisation' at French airports*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attacks-70-staff-have-security-clearance-revoked-for-suspected-radicalisation-at-french-a6773691.html>
- Dearden, L. (2016, October 20). *Revealed: Isis developing weaponised drones in secretive program*. The Independent. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-weapons-drones-uav-programme-development-weaponised-explosives-surveillance-terrorist-groups-a7371491.html>
- Dearden, L. (2018, undated). *Westminster crash suspect Salih Khater to face trial next year for alleged terror attack outside parliament*. The Independent. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/westminster-crash-trial-date-salih-khater-terror-attack-parliament-square-car-latest-date-a8559111.html>
- Dearden, L. & Forster, K. (2016, August 6). *Belgium police attack: Man shouting 'Allahu Akbar' attacks two officers in Charleroi with machete*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/belgium-police-attack-news-latest-man-shouting-allahu-akbar-attacks-two-officers-in-charleroi-with-a7176361.html>
- Dejevsky, M. (1995, August 28). *Bomb found on TVG line in France*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/bomb-found-on-tgv-line-in-france-1598345.html>
- Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin (2016). *Objektschutz*. Retrieved from

Bibliography

- <https://www.berlin.de/polizei/beruf/objektschutz/>
- Der Spiegel (2006, May 6). *Karikaturen-Streit: Pakistaner verbrennen deutsche Flagge*. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/karikaturen-streit-pakistaner-verbrennen-deutsche-flagge-a-414874.html>
- Der Spiegel (2008, July 15). *Ansar al-Islam in Germany: Iraqis Convicted of Allawi Assassination Plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ansar-al-islam-in-germany-iraqis-convicted-of-allawi-assassination-plot-a-565930.html>
- Der Spiegel (2011, July 31). *Attentat in Norwegen: Verfassungsschutz warnt vor Breivik-Nachahmern*. Retrieved from www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/attentat-in-norwegen-verfassungsschutz-warnt-vor-breivik-nachahmern-a-777539.html
- Der Spiegel (2012, December 10). *Bombenalarm: Tasche im Bonner Hauptbahnhof gesprengt*. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/hauptbahnhof-in-bonn-funktionstuechtige-rohrbombe-gesprengt-a-872041.html>
- Der Spiegel (2013, March 13). *Polizeiaktion gegen Islamisten: Salafisten planen Mordanschlag auf Pro-NRW-Chef*. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-anschlag-auf-pro-nrw-chef-verhindert-a-888676.html>
- Der Spiegel (2013a, March 14). *Murder plot: Germany cracks down on salafists*. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/islamist-murder-plot-and-raid-put-salafists-under-pressure-a-888949.html>
- Der Standard (2014, October 29). *14-jähriger mutmaßlicher Jihadist in Untersuchungshaf*. Retrieved from <http://derstandard.at/2000007429940/Mutmasslicher-Jihadist-in-Niederoesterreich-festgenommen>
- Deutsche Welle (2003, December 31). *Terrorism alarm in Hamburg*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.de/terrorism-alarm-in-hamburg/a-1073755>
- Deutsche Welle (2004, December 7). *Germany examines Allawi assassination plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.de/germany-examines-allawi-assassination-plot/a-1420935>

Bibliography

- Deutsche Welle (2006, November 20). *Six suspects questioned on plans for plane bombing in Germany*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/six-suspects-questioned-on-plans-for-plane-bombing-in-germany/a-2243811>
- Deutsche Welle (2015, February 15). *Braunschweig Carnival parade canceled over 'Islamist' terror alert*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.de/braunschweig-carnival-parade-canceled-over-islamist-terror-alert/a-18259148>
- Deutsche Welle (2016, July 7). *Several injured in attack on train near Würzburg, southern Germany*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/several-injured-in-attack-on-train-near-wuerzburg-southern-germany/a-19408848>
- Deutsche Welle (2017, January 26). *16-year-old sentenced to six years after stabbing German police officer for IS*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/16-year-old-sentenced-to-six-years-after-stabbing-german-police-officer-for-is/a-37278881>
- Die Welt (2016, January 1). *München entging womöglich Anschlag wie in Paris*. Retrieved from <http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article150505725/Muenchen-entging-womoeglich-Anschlag-wie-in-Paris.html>
- Dodd, V. (2010, November 3). *Roshonara Choudhry: Police interview extracts*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-interview?guni=Article:in%20body%20link>
- Dodd, V., Norton-Taylor, R., & Harris, P. (2010, November 10). *Cargo plane bomb found in Britain was primed to blow up over US*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/10/cargo-plane-bomb-us-alqaida>
- Dodd, V. (2013, April 25). *Three jailed for discussing possible terror attack*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/25/three-jailed-possible-terror-attack>
- Doward, J. (2015, June 28). *French terrorist attack: mystery of 'calm and*

Bibliography

- gentle' man who beheaded his boss*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/islamic-terror-france-beheading>
- Drozdiak, W. (1999, February). *3 Kurds Die in Berlin as Protests Continue*. Washington Post Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/curds18.htm>
- Dvir, N. (2014, May 11). *Terror attack in Jerusalem kills 1; Hamas claims responsibility*. Ynet News. Retrieved from <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4588371,00.html>
- Divinyi, S. & Linnè, P. (2017, July 6). *Etter vinterns bomdåd – Fengselsstraff for nazister*. Göteborgsposten. Retrieved from <http://www.gp.se/nyheter/g%C3%B6teborg/etter-vinterns-bombd%C3%A5d-f%C3%A4ngelsestraff-f%C3%B6r-nazister-1.4419459>
- Eddy, M. (2016, June 3). *Germany charges 4 Syrians in plot to attack Düsseldorf*. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/europe/germany-dusseldorf-isis.html?_r=0
- Eisenbud, D.K. (2016, July 17). *Major terrorist attack prevented in downtown Jerusalem*. Jerusalem Post. Retrieved from <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Police-arrest-Palestinian-suspected-of-carrying-explosive-device-460610>
- El Correo (2006, March 22). *Atentados de ETA desde la ruptura de la última Tregua* Retrieved from www.elcorreo.com/alava/pg060322/actualidad/politica/200603/22/ETA_atentados.html
- El Mundo (2012, August 6). *La Policía cree que los islamistas querían atacar en Algeciras durante los JJOO*. Retrieved from <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/08/06/espana/1344270781.html>
- El Pais (2015, April 8). *11 arrested in raid against jihadist cell in Catalonia*. Retrieved from http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/04/08/inenglish/1428484498_088301.html
- Ettinger, Y. (2015, December 14). *Fourteen people wounded in car-ramming*

Bibliography

- attack in Jerusalem*. Retrieved from <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.691740>
- Evans, B. (2013, February 14). *Terrifying bomb arsenal of the would be Breivik who 'killed his own mother when she found out about plan to blow up Polish parliament'*, Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2278711/Brunon-Kwiecien-Terrifying-bomb-arsenal-Breivik-plotted-blow-Polish-parliament.html>
- Expo i dag (2012, July 17). *Peter Mangs konspiratoriska världsbild*. Retrieved from http://expo.se/2012/peter-mangs-konspiratoriska-varldsbild_5197.html
- Express (2009, April 10). *Terrorists on student visas plotted to target Easter shoppers*. Retrieved from <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/94394/Terrorists-on-student-visas-plotted-to-target-Easter-shoppers>
- Express (2013, November 10). *Escaped terrorist suspect Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed 'is linked to Olympic Games bomb plot'*. Retrieved from <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/442162/Escaped-terrorist-suspect-Mohammed-Ahmed-Mohamed-is-linked-to-Olympic-Games-bomb-plot>
- Expressen (2010, November 24). *Här hotar al-Shabab halshugga Lars Vilks*. Retrieved from www.expressen.se/kvp/har-hotar-al-shabab-halshugga-lars-vilks/
- Fahim, K. (2015, July 12). *ISIS claims responsibility for blast at Italian consulate in Cairo*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/world/middleeast/egypt-bombing-at-italian-consulate-in-cairo.html>
- Fantz, A. & Cruickshank, P. (2014, September 21). *Five people suspected in terrorist activities arrested in Europe*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/21/world/europe/europe-terrorism-arrests/>
- Feldman, C. (2002, July 4). *Los Angeles airport shooting kills three*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/>
- Fjørtoft, M. & Omland, E. (2012, January 6). *Breivik ringte og ba om*

Bibliography

- medlemslistene til ungdomspartier*. NRK. Retrieved from <https://www.nrk.no/norge/breivik-ba-om-medlemslister-for-auf-1.7943344>
- Fluery, E. (2014, July 9). *Les cibles du jihadiste : la tour Eiffel, le Louvre, les festivals...* Le Parisien. Retrieved from <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/les-cibles-du-jihadiste-la-tour-eiffel-le-louvre-les-festivals-09-07-2014-3987713.php>
- Focus (2013, July 28). *Deutsche behördigen vereiteln sechs terror-anschläge*. Retrieved from http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/usa-warnten-verfassungsschutz-deutsche-behoerden-vereiteln-sechs-terror-anschlaege_aid_1055836.html
- Foss, A.B. & Johansen, P.A. (2012, May 2). *Slik har han endret forklaring*. Aftenposten. Retrieved from www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/22juli/Slik-har-han-endret-sin-forklaring-6818661.html
- France 24 (2013, May 31). *Paris soldier stabbing suspect hit with terror-linked charge*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20130531-judge-charges-suspect-french-soldier-stabbing-attempted-murder-terrorism>
- France 24 (2014, December 21). *French police shooting linked to calls for jihadist attacks*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20141221-police-shooting-allahu-akbar-joue-tours-jihad-islamic-state/>
- France 24 (2014a, September 8). *Brussels shooter 'planned Bastille Day atrocity' in Paris*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20140908-brussels-shooter-mehdi-nemmouche-planned-bastille-day-atrocity-paris>
- France 24 (2015, June 20). *Terror suspect claims he thwarted French church attack*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20150620-france-church-terror-suspect-claims-thwarted-attack-sid-ghlam>
- France 24. (2015a, June 26). *Suspect arrested in terror attack on French factory*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20150626-live-terrorist-attack-souteast-france-islamic-state-decapitated-explosion>
- France 24 (2015b, February 5). *French knife attack suspect says he "hates*

Bibliography

- military, Jews*". Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20150205-france-knife-attack-hates-jews-military#>
- France 24 (2015c, December 29). *Chilling details have emerged of the November 13 carnage at Paris nightspots as investigators continue to examine evidence from France's worst-ever terrorist attacks*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20151229-paris-attacks-investigation-bataclan-stadium-yanks-syria>
- France 24 (2015d, September 18). *Arrested French jihadist 'instructed' to attack concert*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20150918-france-jihadist-arrested-terrorist-attack-plot-concert>
- France 24 (2016, July 26). *Church attack renews French security fears over soft targets*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20160726-france-impossible-police-all-churches-terror-threat>
- Frant, M. (2014, August 29). *Two teenage girls arrested over French synagogue suicide bomb plot*. Newsweek. Retrieved from <http://www.newsweek.com/two-teenage-girls-arrested-over-french-synagogue-suicide-bomb-plot-267523>
- Fricker, M. (2013, June 10). *Islamist terror gang jailed for plot to bomb EDL rally in bid to spark race war*. The Mirror. Retrieved from <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/islamist-terror-gang-jailed-plot-1942837>
- Fröden, M. (2015, February 17). *NA inte ensam om att publicera Muhammed-bild*. Retrieved from <http://na.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2844566-na-inte-ensam-om-att-publicera-muhammed-bild>
- Gardham, D. (2007, April 30). *The Crawley targets*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550107/The-Crawley-targets.html>
- Gardham, D. (2008, August 18). *Islamic terror cell 'may have been plotting to attack Queen'*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2580940/Islamic-terror-cell-may-have-been-plotting-to-attack-Queen.html>
- Gardham, D. & Hamilton, F. (2016, June 24). *Extremist had plan to*

Bibliography

- behead poppy seller*. The Times. Retrieved from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muslim-who-planned-knife-attack-jailed-vdngv2m2>
- Gardham, D. & Simpson, J. (2017, July 4). *Elton John bomb plotter Haroon Ali Syed is jailed for life*. The Times. Retrieved from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/elton-john-bomb-plotter-haroon-ali-syed-is-jailed-for-life-9g6h8r3qx>
- Gazetta del Sud (2013, June 12). *Moroccan held in Brescia for 'planning terror attacks'*. Retrieved from <http://www.gazzettadelsud.it/news/english/50111/Moroccan-held-in-Brescia-for--planning-terror-attacks-.html>
- Glendrange, S. (2005, March 3). *-Tilhørte væpnet islamsk gruppe*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from <http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2005/03/03/425088.html>
- Haaretz (2007, October 17). *Dutch police kill man linked to plan to blow up El Al plane*. Retrieved from <http://www.haaretz.com/dutch-police-kill-man-linked-to-plan-to-blow-up-el-al-plane-1.231244>
- Haaretz / AP (2015, April 10). *Spain jails seven jihadists suspected of planning to bomb Jewish bookstore*. Retrieved from <http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.651258>
- Hamar Arbeiderblad (2012, May 31). *Breivik endret forklaring*. Retrieved from <https://www.h-a.no/nyheter/breivik-endret-forklaring>
- Hamre, J.D. (2015, December 9). *The "electronic Pearl Harbour"*. Politico. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/pearl-harbor-cyber-security-war-000335>
- Hanlon, C. (2012, March 29). *Former nuclear scientist at Large Hadron Collider goes on trial accused of 'being Al Qaeda agent'*. Daily Mail. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2122309/Adlene-Hicheur-trial-Former-nuclear-scientist-Large-Hadron-Collider-accused-Al-Qaeda-agent.html>
- Hanna, J., Cruickshank, P. & Cotovio, V. (2015, December 29). *Belgians arrest 2 accused in New Year's terror plot*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/29/europe/belgium-terror-arrests/>
- Hemmingby, C. (2014, July 8). *Bedre rustet til å stoppe ny Breivik?* VG. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/bedre-rustet-til-aa-stoppe-ny-breivik/a/23248996/>

Bibliography

- Hemmingby, C. (2015, June 30). *Sårbare for skytevåpenangrep*. VG. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/terrorisme/saarbare-for-skytevaapenangrep/a/23480148/>
- Henley, J. (1999, June 2). *Islamists in court for Paris terror campaign*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/02/terrorism.islam.print>
- Henley, J. (2015, December 29). *Belgian police arrest two over suspected New Year's Eve attack plot*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/29/belgian-police-arrest-two-suspected-new-years-eve-attack>
- Heraldo (2007). *Terrorismo*. Retrieved from <http://www.heraldo.es/heraldo.html?noticia=202466&imprimir=1>
- Herrero, A.V. & Casey, N. (2018, August 4). *Venezuelan president targeted by drone attack, officials say*. New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/americas/venezuelan-president-targeted-in-attack-attempt-minister-says.html>
- Higgins, A. (2015, January 18). *Belgium Deploys Troops After Foiling Possible Plot*. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/world/europe/belgium-mobilizes-troops-after-raid-said-to-have-killed-jihadists.html?_r=0
- Hopkins, N. & Davies, C. (2013, January 21). *Prince Harry: I've killed in Afghanistan. But dad wants me to act like a prince*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/21/prince-harry-afghanistan>
- Hopperstad, M.S., Ravndal, D., Brenna, J.G. & Grøttum, E.T (2012, May 31). *Breivik er en over gjennomsnittet kompetent terrorist*. VG Nett. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/terrorangrepet-22-juli-rettssaken/professor-breivik-er-en-over-gjennomsnittet-kompetent-terrorist/a/10053976/>
- Huffington Post (2012, February 10). *Arid Uka, Frankfurt airport shooter, sentenced to life*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/10/arid-uka-frankfurt-sentenced_n_1267770.html
- Huggler, J. (2015, May 26). *Austria convicts 14-year-old on terror charges*.

Bibliography

- The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/11629948/Iraq-launches-operation-to-retake-western-Anbar-province-from-Isil-live.html>
- Hultgreen, G. (2011, September 17). *Nekter for at han ville drepe Westergaard*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from <http://www.dagbladet.no/2011/09/17/nyheter/terror/pst/pet/litteraturhuset/18181313/>
- Humi, P. (1995, October 17). *Bomb explodes on Paris subway*. CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9510/paris_bomb/10-17/
- IBT (2015, January 11). *French authorities connect Amedy Coulibaly, kosher grocery store gunman, to separate shooting of jogger*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.com/french-authorities-connect-amedy-coulibaly-kosher-grocery-store-gunman-separate-1779834>
- Il Giorno (2015, March 26). *Anche Anas El Abboubi reclutato dalla cellula jihadista sgominata dalla polizia*. Retrieved from <http://www.ilgiorno.it/brescia/isis-terroristi-1.795635>
- Independent.ie (2004, April 2). *Car gas blast kills man at McDonald's drive-in*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/car-gas-blast-kills-man-at-mcdonalds-drivein-26014403.html>
- IOL News (2004, September 20). *'Detainees had video of Spain's twin towers'*. Retrieved from <http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/detainees-had-video-of-spain-s-twin-towers-1.222285#.VRATjInKzL8>
- Irish Times (2001, November 15). *ETA group claims killing of Spanish judge*. Retrieved from <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/eta-group-claims-killing-of-spanish-judge-1.403861>
- Jarry, E. (2015, November 18). *Exclusive: Suspects had planned attack on Paris business quarter – sources*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-attacks-idUSKCN0T714220151118>
- Jerusalem Post (2014, July 9). *Hamas: We attempted to hit the nuclear reactor in Dimona*. Retrieved from <http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Rocket-alert-sirens-sound-in-Zichron-Yaakov-120-km-north-of-Gaza-362087>
- Jerusalem Post (2014a, October 30). *Report: Peru arrested Hezbollah*

Bibliography

- operative planning attacks on Israelis, Jews*. Retrieved from <http://www.jpost.com/International/Report-Peru-arrests-Hezbollah-operative-planning-attacks-on-Israelis-Jews-380369>
- Johnson, I. (2002, April 16). *Terrorism trial may provide details of al Qaida network*. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1018899054453675760>
- Jyllands-Posten (2008, June 2). *Angreb kommer kort efter al-Qaeda-trussel*. Retrieved from <http://jyllands-posten.dk/international/ECE3952234/Angreb-kommer-kort-efter-al-Qaeda-trussel/>
- Jyllands-Posten (2011, November 17). *PET frygter flere solo-terrorister*. Retrieved from <http://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/article4600654.ece>
- Jyllands-Posten (2015, February 27). *FAKTA: Det ved vi nu om skyderierne i København*. Retrieved from <http://jyllandsposten.dk/indland/politiretsvaesen/ECE7489720/FAKTA-Det-ved-vi-nu-om-skyderierne-i-Koebenhavn/>
- Kennedy, L. & Skehan, C. (2007, January 5). *Nuclear plant target for stolen rocket launchers, police allege*. The Sidney Morning Herald. Retrieved from <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/nuclear-plant-target-for-stolen-rocket-launchers-police-allege/2007/01/05/1167777281891.html>
- Kippernes, G.A. & Reime, B.L. (2011, September 26). *Anders Behring Breivik vil bruke uniform i rette under fengslingsmøte*. VG. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/terrorangrepet-22-juli-anders-behring-breivik/anders-behring-breivik-vil-bruke-uniform-under-fengslingsmoetet/a/10080740/>
- Knobbe, M., Schindler, J. & Schmid, F. (2016, November 30). *Islamist schlich sich bei Verfassungsschutz ein*. Der Spiegel. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/geheimdienst-islamist-schleicht-sich-bei-verfassungsschutz-ein-a-1123676.html>
- Kraft, S. (1995, July 12). *Algerian opposition figure slain in Paris*. LA Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1995-07-12/news/mn-23086_1_islamic-salvation-front
- Kraft, S. (1995a, September 8). *Car Bomb Injures 14 at Jewish School in France: Terrorism: Blast in Lyon suburb is latest in a weeks-long campaign of fear. No one claims responsibility for attack*. LA Times.

Bibliography

- Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-08/news/mn-43554_1_car-bomb
- Kraft, S. (1995b, November 3). *French police reports foiling bomb plot*. LA Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-03/news/mn-64401_1_decisive-step
- Kristiansen, A. A., Krokfjord, T. P. & Meldalen, S. G. (2012, February 4). *Breivik la plan om å arrangere fest for muslimer i Oslo spektrum*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/02/04/nyheter/innenriks/anders_behring_breivik/terror/20084798/
- Labbé, C. & Carraud, S. (2016, June 14). *French police couple killed in attack claimed by Islamic State*. Reuters. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-crime-idUSKCN0YZ2KA>
- Langset, K. G. (2011, July 23). *Breivik har vært medlem og har hatt verv i ungdomspartiet*. Aftenposten. Retrieved from www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Frp-Breivik-har-vart-medlem-og-har-hatt-verv-i-ungdomspartiet-5014741.html
- Le Figaro (2012, October 10). *Cellule djihadiste : 7 suspects déférés, 5 relâchés*. Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/10/10/01016-20121010ARTFIG00632-cellule-djihadiste-d-inquietantes-decouvertes.php>
- Le Figaro (2013, July 5). *L'inquiétante cellule islamiste «Cannes-Torcy» passée au crible*. Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/07/05/01016-20130705ARTFIG00750-l-inquietante-cellule-islamiste-cannes-torcy-passee-au-crible.php>
- Le Figaro (2015, December 14). *Vers un procès de la cellule djihadiste de Cannes-Torcy*. Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/12/14/01016-20151214ARTFIG00316-vers-un-proces-de-la-cellule-djihadiste-de-cannes-torcy.php>
- Le Monde (2012, January 26). *Six ans de prison pour avoir projeté un attentat en France*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/01/26/six-ans-de-prison-pour-avoir-projete-un-attentat-en-france_1635235_3224.html
- Le Monde (2015, August 3). *Attentat manqué de Villejuif : sur la piste des*

Bibliography

- commanditaires*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2015/08/03/sur-la-piste-des-commanditaires-de-l-attentat-dejoue-de-villejuif_4709532_1653578.html
- Le Parisien (2001, October 2). *Le « gang de Roubaix », du banditisme au terrorisme*. Retrieved from <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/le-gang-de-roubaix-du-banditisme-au-terrorisme-02-10-2001-2002479417.php>
- Le Parisien (2015, April 25). *Sid Ahmed Ghلام avait fait des repérages autour des églises*. Retrieved from <http://www.leparisien.fr/espace-premium/actu/sid-ahmed-ghlam-avait-fait-des-reperages-autour-des-eglises-25-04-2015-4722733.php>
- Lichfield, J. (2015, January 21). *French Prime Minister announces 736m euros to combat terrorism in wake of Charlie Hebdo attacks*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-prime-minister-announces-736m-euros-to-combat-terrorism-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attacks-9992520.html>
- Lockett, J. (2016, November 24). *ISIS 'target Disney' Isis cell 'planned to attack Disneyland Paris and Champs Elysees Christmas market next week'*. The Sun. Retrieved from <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2256299/isis-cell-planned-to-attack-disneyland-paris-and-champs-elysees-christmas-market-next-week/>
- Long, W. R., (1992, March 19). *Islamic Jihad says it bombed embassy; toll 21*. LA Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-19/news/mn-5905_1_islamic-jihad
- Love, B. (2011, November 2). *French weekly firebombed after it portrays Mohammad*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/02/us-france-fire-magazine-idUSTRE7A117N20111102#Ek8Xyz0iJPCYlcy3.99>
- Lundervold, L. K. (2012, November 21). *Jeg har ikke snakket med Breivik siden vi avsluttet saken*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/11/21/nyheter/innenriks/geir_lippestad/terrorangrepet/terror/24469707/
- Lynfield, B. (2014, November 5). *Israeli police say one dead and 13 hurt as car rams crowd in East Jerusalem*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/driver-rams->

Bibliography

- [car-into-pedestrians-in-jerusalem-in-suspected-terrorist-attack-9840689.html](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/26/plot-explosives-ipad-us-uk-laptop-ban)
- MacAskill, E. (2017, March 26). *Laptop ban on planes came after plot to put explosives in iPad*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/26/plot-explosives-ipad-us-uk-laptop-ban>
- Mackie, P. (2012, March 2). *Moinul Abedin: UK's first al-Qaeda inspired bomber*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-17231013>
- MacPartland, B. (2016, July 26). *France has long feared terror would strike its churches*. The Local France. Retrieved from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20160726/france-cant-possibly-protect-all-of-its-churches>
- Mail Online (2008, November 12). *Doctor suspected of car bomb terror attacks admits he wanted to give Britain a 'taste of fear'*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1085121/Doctor-suspected-car-bomb-terror-attacks-admits-wanted-Britain-taste-fear.html>
- Mail Online (2012, June 29). *Muslim converts who 'plotted to attack Olympic canoeing venue' arrested after police see them acting suspiciously in a dingy*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2166399/Muslim-converts-plotted-attack-Olympic-canoeing-venue-arrested-police-acting-suspiciously-dinghy.html#ixzz223O2ryze>
- Mail Online (2014, November 11). *Law student accused of targeting Tony Blair faces retrial after judge discharges jury in secret terror trial*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2829969/Law-student-accused-targeting-Tony-Blair-faces-retrial.html>
- Mandraud, I. (2008, December 19). *"Frère Abou Zhara", apprenti djihadiste ou infiltré de la DST?* Le Monde. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2008/12/19/frere-abou-zhara-apprenti-djihadiste-ou-infiltre-de-la-dst_1133024_3224.html
- Mascolo, G. & Stark, H. (2003, October 27). *Cover Story: Operation Holy Tuesday*. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/cover-story-operation-holy-tuesday-a-271523.html>
- Meldalen S.G. & Christiansen T.W. (2012, June 17). *-Det er ting vi angrer*

Bibliography

- på*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from <http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/deter-ting-vi-angrer-pa/63211561>
- Metro (2011, September 21). *Männerna var ute efter Lars Vilks*. Retrieved from <http://www.metro.se/nyheter/mannen-var-ute-efter-lars-vilks/EVHkiu!sE0spm7yjNWk/>
- Metro News (2012, July 8). *Al-Qaeda terror suspect arrested after breaching conditions*. Retrieved from <http://metro.co.uk/2012/07/08/al-qaeda-terror-suspect-arrested-after-breaching-conditions-3373255/>
- Mirror (2012, August 8). *Terror plot uncovered: al-Qaeda planned 'to fly kamikaze plane into Brits watching Olympics on big screen in Gibraltar'*. Retrieved from <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/al-qaeda-attack-on-gibraltar-stopped-terrorists-1234792>
- Mühlman, S. (2006, May 8). *Pakistanische fundamentalisten verbrennen deutsche flaggen*. Die Welt. Retrieved from <http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article215188/Pakistanische-Fundamentalisten-verbrennen-deutsche-Flaggen.html>
- Mullen, J. & Haddad, M. (2015, November 16). *'France is at war,' President Francois Hollande says after ISIS attack*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/16/world/paris-attacks/>
- Mullen, J. & Smith-Spark, L. (2015, July 16). *France terror suspects plotted to behead military staffer, prosecutor's office says*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/16/europe/france-foiled-terrorist-plot/>
- NBC News (2004, October 20). *Spain says terrorist plotted biggest plot*. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6282532/ns/us_news-security/t/spain-says-terrorist-plotted-biggest-blow/#.VB4IRDn0BJ4
- Naravane, V. (2012, July 11). *Slain terrorist Merah planned to attack Indian embassy in Paris*. The Hindu. Retrieved from <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/slain-terrorist-merah-planned-to-attack-indian-embassy-in-paris/article3430764.ece>
- National Post (2012). *Former CERN nuclear scientist convicted of terror plot gets five years in jail*. Retrieved from <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/05/04/former-cern-nuclear-scientist-convicted-of-terror-plot-gets-five-years-in-jail/>
- NBC News (2004). *Spain says terrorist plotted biggest plot*. Retrieved from

Bibliography

- http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6282532/ns/us_news-security/t/spain-says-terrorist-plotted-biggest-blow/#.VB4IRDn0BJ4
- NDTV (2011, May 26). *NDTV accesses Headley's Denmark surveillance videos*. Retrieved from <http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/ndtv-accesses-headley-s-denmark-surveillance-videos/200701>
- Nettavisen (2010). *Al-Qaida medlemmer pågrepet i Norge*. Retrieved from www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/article2941616.ece
- News 24 (2005, April 17). *Heathrow faced poison terror*. Retrieved from <http://www.news24.com/World/News/Heathrow-faced-poison-terror-20050417>
- Nordal, S. & Halkjelsvik, S. (2011, August 26). *Vurderte å leige jord til Behring Breivik*. Retrieved from <http://www.smp.no/nyheter/soere/article371469.ece>
- Nordstrom, L. (2014, December 22). *French prosecutor rules out terror link in Dijon car rampage*. France 24. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20141222-dijon-attack-not-act-terrorism-says-prosecutor>
- NRK (2012, April 16). *Lippestad: Vurderer å be om utsettelse av saken*. Retrieved from <http://www.nrk.no/227/dag-for-dag/forsvarerne-vil-kanskje-utsette-1.8076216>
- NRK Østlandssendingen (2006, August 4). *Advarte om bomben i 2006*. Retrieved from <http://www.nrk.no/ostlandssendingen/advarte-om-bomben-i-2006-1.7737572>
- NTB - Norwegian National News Agency (2006). *Ville ta livet av ambassadøren*. Retrieved from <http://m.yr.no/nyheter/distrikt/ostlandssendingen/1.1029259>
- N-TV (2015, April 30). *Islamistischer Anschlag in Hessen vereitelt*. Retrieved from <http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Islamistischer-Anschlag-in-Hessen-vereitelt-article15013336.html>
- O'Neill, S. & Sandeman, G. (2017, June 6). *Terrorist went on dry run over London Bridge minutes before carnage*. The Times. Retrieved from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/gang-went-on-dry-run-over-bridge-minutes-before-carnage-3dxrxmrgc>
- ORF (2012, April 11). *"Bombe" vor botschaft: Keine ansehlagpläne*. Retrieved from <http://wiev1.orf.at/stories/269136>
- Osborne, S. (2016, November 24). *Isis terror cell 'planned to attack*

Bibliography

- Disneyland Paris and Champs Elysees Christmas market on 1 December'*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-terror-plot-paris-france-disneyland-champs-elysees-christmas-market-a7436441.html>
- Parodi, E. & Cinelli, A. (2016, December 23). *Berlin truck attack suspect shot dead by police in Italy*. Reuters. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-truck-idUSKBN14C0JP>
- Pedersen, T. (2008, October 21). *De er terrorister*. ExtraBladet. Retrieved from <http://ekstrabladet.dk/112/article4309973.ece>
- Pedersen, T. & Søgaaard, J. (2011, May 30). *Lors Doukaev skyldig i terror*. Extrabladet. Retrieved from <http://ekstrabladet.dk/112/article4097277.ece>
- Perlez, J. & Shah, P.Z. (2008, June 3)). *Embassy attack in Pakistan kills at least 6*. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html?_r=0
- Pierce, A. (2007, February 26). *Al-Qa'eda 'plotted to kill Blair in front of Queen'*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1543814/Al-Qaeda-plotted-to-kill-Blair-in-front-of-Queen.html>
- Popham, P. (2004, April 3). *Car gas blast kills man at McDonald's drive-in*. Independent.ie. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/car-gas-blast-kills-man-at-mcdonalds-drive-in-26014403.html>
- Priest, D. (2009, November 9). *Fort Hood suspect warned of threat within the ranks*. Washington Post. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110903618.html>
- Quest France (2015, June 25). *Attentats déjoués. Sid Ahmed Ghlam ciblait le Sacré Cœur*. Retrieved from <http://www.ouest-france.fr/societe/faits-divers/le-suspect-avoue-setre-lui-meme-tire-dessus-3507970>
- Rankin, J. (2016, October 5). *Brussels stabbing: two police officers targeted in suspected terror attack*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/belgian-police->

Bibliography

- [officers-stabbed-suspected-terror-attack-brussels-schaerbeek-neighbourhood](#)
- Ravid, B. (2014, April 18). *Hezbollah members arrested in Thailand admit to planning attack on Israeli tourists*. Haaretz. Retrieved from <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.586220>
- Rayner, G. (2015, November 19). *Who is Abdelhamid Abaaoud? The suspected ringleader behind the Paris attacks*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11998252/Paris-attacks-who-is-suspected-ringleader-Abdelhamid-Abaaoud.html>
- Rayner, G. & Bingham, J. (2010, November 2). *Stephen Timms stabbing: how Internet sermons turned quiet student into fanatic*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8105516/Stephen-Timms-stabbing-how-internet-sermons-turned-quiet-student-into-fanatic.html>
- Reilhac, G. and Sage, A. (2012, October 6). *French police kill one in raid linked to Jewish market attack*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/06/us-france-raid-idUSBRE8950BK20121006>
- Reiner, B. (2012, July 25). *Prozess statt sieger oder martyrur*. Frankfurter Allgemeine. Retrieved from <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/duesseldorfer-zelle-prozess-statt-sieg-oder-martyrium-11831954.html>
- Reuters (2012, June 22). *Breivik trial closes, victims' relatives walk out*. Retrieved from www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/22/us-breivik-trial-idUSBRE85L0CM20120622
- Reuters (2014, March 14). *German Islamist charged over failed Bonn station attack in 2012*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/us-germany-islamist-idUSBREA2D1BA20140314>
- Reuters (2015, February 3). *Two French soldiers wounded in knife attack in Nice*. Retrieved from <http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/03/france-security-idINKBN0L71P620150203>
- Reuters (2015, November 10). *France says foiled Islamist attack on navy*

Bibliography

- personnel*. Retrieved from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-islamist-arrest-idUKKCN0SZ2Y820151110>
- Reuters (2015b, January 16). *Austria again detains 14-year-old on suspicion of terror offences*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-mideast-crisis-austria-idUSKBN0KP0ZC20150116>
- Reuters (2016, January 1). *Leichte Entwarnung in München nach Terroralarm*. Retrieved from <http://de.reuters.com/article/topNews/idDEKBN0UF1RT20160101>
- Riding, A. (1995, September 8). *Car bomb explodes near Jewish school in France*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/08/world/car-bomb-explodes-near-jewish-school-in-france.html>
- Ringheim, G. (2009, September 4). *NRK-Takvam er mye hardere mot Siv enn Kristin*. Retrieved from www.dagbladet.no/2009/09/04/nyheter/valg_2009/valg09/politikk/innenriks/7953821/
- Rondeaux, C. (2008, June 2). *Car bomb hits Danish mission In Islamabad*. Washington Post. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/02/AR2008060200236.html>
- Rose, F. (2005, September 30). *Muhammeds ansigt*. Jyllands-Posten. Retrieved from <http://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE4769352/Muhammeds-ansigt/>
- Rotella, S. (2002, October 12). *6 alleged members of Milan cell held*. LA Times. Retrieved from <http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/12/world/fg-milan12>
- Rudoren, J. (2014, October 27). *Jerusalem adding police amid fears of violence*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/world/middleeast/jerusalem-adding-police-amid-fears-of-violence.html>
- Ruud, H.M.T. et al. (2012, February 6). *En type høyreekstrem hilsen*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from www.dagbladet.no/2012/02/06/nyheter/innenriks/fengslingsmote/terror/anders_behring_brevik/20104331/
- Ryvchin, A. (2012, July 24). *One dead Jew at the time*. Ynet. Retrieved from

Bibliography

- <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4259985,00.html>
Rørli, O. (2008, April 1). *Bhatti ville skyte kvinner og barn i synagogen*. Aftenposten. Retrieved from <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/--Bhatti-ville-skyte-kvinner-og-barn-i-synagogen-6555796.html>
- Sage, A., Bremner, C. & Morris, S. (2017, August 17). *Barcelona terror attack leaves 12 dead and 80 injured*. The Times. Retrieved from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/barcelona-terror-attack-leaves-12-dead-and-80-injured-t6vm3ww6k>
- Sancton, T. (2001, June 24). *Anatomy of a hijack*. Time magazine. Retrieved from <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,163487,00.html>
- Sandnes, C. (2012, September 1). *Blir vi et bedre samfunn av å sparke folk til de ikke reiser seg igjen?*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from <https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/blir-vi-et-bedre-samfunn-av-a-sparke-folk-til-de-ikke-reiser-seg-igjen/63130155>
- Schmidt, W. (2012, August 2): *Bundeswehrkommandeur war im Visier*. Retrieved from <http://www.taz.de/Duesseldorfer-Zelle/198715/>
- Schraven, D. (2005, October 30). *Terrornetz reicht bis ins Ruhrgebiet*. Die Welt. Retrieved from <http://www.welt.de/print-wams/article133882/Terrornetz-reicht-bis-ins-Ruhrgebiet.html>
- Sedghi, A. (2011, January 10). *Eta and Basque separatism: data over the years*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/jan/10/eta-basque-separatists-ceasefire-victims-over-time>
- Senguota, K. (2000, September 23). *Missile launcher in MI6 attack was new to UK*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/missile-launcher-in-mi6-attack-was-new-to-uk-698787.html>
- Sengupta, K. (2015, undated). *British man charged over alleged plan to launch terror attack against US military personnel in UK*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/man-charged-over-alleged-plan-to-launch-terror-attack-against-us-military-personnel-in-uk-10405948.html>
- Smith, C. S. (2002, December 28). *France says arrests halted plot to bomb*

Bibliography

- Russian embassy*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/28/world/france-says-arrests-halted-plot-to-bomb-russian-embassy.html>
- Solomon, Chris (2014, July 30). *Four factors to watch in Israel's economy after the Gaza conflict*. Global Risk Insight. Retrieved from <http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/07/four-factors-watch-israels-economy-gaza-conflict/>
- Sparks, L. (2014, July 10). *France foils Islamist terror plot to blow up Eiffel Tower and Louvre*. Express. Retrieved from <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/487930/France-foils-terror-plot-to-blow-up-Eiffel-Tower-and-the-Louvre>
- Spiegel Online (2015, May 20). *Karnevalsumzug in Braunschweig: Ermittlungen wegen terrorverdachts eingestellt*. Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/karneval-in-braunschweig-ermittlungen-wegen-terrorverdachts-eingestellt-a-1034728.html>
- Squires, N. (2005, November 15). *Plot to blow up Sydney nuclear plant*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/1503032/Plot-to-blow-up-Sydney-nuclear-plant.html>
- Stanley, T. (2016, March 25). *West Europe is safer now than in the 1970s*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/25/west-europe-is-safer-now-than-in-the-1970s-and-safer-than-almost/>
- Sterman, A. (2014). *Israel has killed perpetrators of 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, says ex-envoy*. Times of Israel. Retrieved from <http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-bombers-in-amia-attack-were-taken-out-by-israel/>
- Svarstad, A. (2012, November 18). *Breivik skriver til "kjære søster Beate"*. Dagbladet. Retrieved from <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/breivik-skriver-til-kjaere-soster-beate/63040566>
- Sørensen, H. H. (2007, February 19). *Danmark Terror-gruppe ville bombe Tivoli*. TV2. Retrieved from <http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-9062599:terrorgruppe-ville-bombe-tivoli.html>
- Taylor, M. (2013, April 18). *Four jailed over 'toy car' plot against TA base*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/18/four-jailed-toy-car-plot>

Bibliography

- Tazaghart, A. & Jacquard, R. (2005, November 7). *Terrorism: France in the line of fire*. Le Figaro. Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/2005/11/07/01005-20051107ARTFIG90373-terrorism-france-in-the-line-of-fire.php>
- The Copenhagen Post (2012, April 30). *Details emerge about terror suspects*. Retrieved from <http://cphpost.dk/news/details-emerge-about-terror-suspects.1455.html>
- The Copenhagen Post (2012a, May 29). *PET foil "concrete terror action"*. Retrieved from <http://cphpost.dk/news/pet-foil-concrete-terror-action.1747.html>
- The Guardian (1982, June 3). *Israeli ambassador shot in London*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/3/newsid_2496000/2496109.stm
- The Guardian (2001, September 26). *Bin Laden 'tried to kill G8 leaders in Genoa'*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/26/globalisation.afghani-stan>
- The Guardian (2002, September 18). *Charges over 'plot to attack tube'*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/nov/18/september11.transport>
- The Guardian (2003, March 10). *Four convicted of Strasbourg bomb plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/10/germany.france>
- The Guardian (2003b, February 12). *UK on missile terror alert*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/feb/12/terrorism.world1>
- The Guardian (2004, June 10). *Paris metro feared target of suicide bombers*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/10/alqaida.france>
- The Guardian (2006, September 7). *US says 9/11 suspect planned Heathrow attack*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/07/alqaida.september11>
- The Guardian (2009, April 14). *Eta 'planned to kill Spanish king Juan Carlos'*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/14/eta-juan-carlos-assassination-plot>

Bibliography

- The Guardian (2014, September 21). *Couple returning from Syria 'were plotting assault on EU Brussels office'*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/21/couple-returning-belgium-syria-plotted-assault-eu-berlaymont-building-brussels>
- The Guardian (2014a, June 1). *Brussels Jewish museum shooting: suspect with Islamist links arrested*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/01/suspect-arrest-brussels-jewish-museum-shooting>
- The Guardian (2014b, December 22). *Nantes christmas shoppers hurt as man drives van into crowd*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/22/nantes-christmas-shoppers-hurtman--drives-van-into-crowd>
- The Guardian (2014c, May 1). *Neo-Nazi terrorist jailed for plotting to blow up Merseyside Mosques*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/01/neo-nazi-terrorist-merseyside-mosques-ian-forman>
- The Guardian (2015, January 15). *Two dead in Belgium as police foil 'grand scale' terrorist plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/15/three-killed-belgium-counter-terror-raids-reports-verviers>
- The Guardian (2015a, February 19). *London teenager Brusthom Ziamani guilty of plotting to behead soldier*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/19/london-teenager-brusthom-ziamani-guilty-of-plotting-to-behead-soldier>
- The Guardian (2015b, June 28). *French terrorism attack: suspect took selfie with severed head*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/french-terrorism-suspect-took-selfie-with-slain-victim>
- The Guardian. (2015c, November 17). *Terror plot to bomb London was foiled before 7/7 anniversary, court told*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/17/terror-plot-to-bomb-london-was-foiled-before-77-anniversary-court-told>
- The Guardian (2015d, November 17). *Germany v Holland cancelled due to 'concrete plan' to cause explosion in stadium*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/nov/17/germany-holland-friendly-suspicious-suitcase>

Bibliography

- The Guardian (2015e, December 5). *London tube attacker shouted 'This is for Syria' during stabbing*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/05/suspect-custody-after-stabbing-leytonstone-london-underground-station>
- The Guardian (2016, February 18). *Paris attacks: suspects had video of Belgian nuclear official, says prosecutor*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/18/paris-attacks-suspects-had-video-of-belgian-nuclear-official-says-prosecutor>
- The Hindu (2009, November 22). *Italy faces growing jihadist threat*. Retrieved from <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/italy-faces-growing-jihadist-threat/article145575.ece>
- The Independent (2005, undated). *Ricin: The plot that never was*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/ricin-the-plot-that-never-was-2053.html>
- The Local (2015, November 11). *France foils jihadist plan to attack naval base*. Retrieved from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20151111/france-arrests-is-linked-man-over-planned-navy-attack>
- The Local (2015a, November 25). *Man with Norway terror ties gets 40 years in US*. Retrieved from <https://www.thelocal.no/20151125/man-with-norway-terror-ties-gets-40-years-in-us>
- The Local (2015b, July 22). *Two held over plotting Isis-style attacks*. Retrieved from <http://www.thelocal.it/20150722/two-arrested-in-milan-over-isis-support>
- The Local (2015c, January 21). *France's €425 million plan to combat terrorism*. Retrieved from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20150121/france-terrorism-valls-jihadists-surveillance>
- The Local (2016, February 2). *French 'jihadists' held for 'plan to attack swingers clubs'*. Retrieved from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20160202/six-french-jihadists-held-for-plan-to-attack-swingers-clubs>
- The Michigan Daily (2002, April 15). *Men stand trial for bomb attempt on Strasbourg*. Retrieved from <http://www.michigandaily.com/content/men-stand-trial-bomb-attempt-strasbourg>
- The Mirror (2014, December 21). *Dijon 'terror' attack: 11 injured as*

Bibliography

- psychiatric patient drives into crowd 'shouting Islamic slogans'.*
Retrieved from <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/dijon-terror-attack-11-injured-4851540>
- The New York Post (2014, October 23). *Islam convert shot dead after ax attack on NYPD cops.* Retrieved from <http://nypost.com/2014/10/23/man-shot-dead-after-striking-cop-in-the-head-with-ax/>
- The New York Post (2015, November 28). *Paris terror mastermind planned attacks targeting kids, Jews.* Retrieved from <http://nypost.com/2015/11/28/paris-terror-mastermind-planned-attacks-targeting-kids-jews/>
- The New York Times (2002, August 21). *Italy arrests 5; fresco showing Muhammad is issue.* Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/21/world/italy-arrests-5-fresco-showing-muhammad-is-issue.html>
- The New York Times (2003, November 1). *Calls to jihad are said to lure hundreds of militants Into Iraq.* Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/01/international/middleeast/01REC R.html>
- The New York Times, (2005, November 17). *Italy arrests three Algerians suspected of terror links.* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/world/europe/17ihtweb.1117italy.html?_r=1&
- The Sun (2015, June 26). *I.S. plot to bomb UK today.* Retrieved from <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/6518366/Islamic-State-monster-aimed-to-kill-British-soldiers.html>
- The Sunday Morning Herald (2005, April 17). *Police say London airport link was terrorist target.* Retrieved from <http://www.smh.com.au/news/Global-Terrorism/Police-say-London-airport-link-was-terrorist-target/2005/04/17/1113676650078.html>
- The Sunday Times (2007, March 11). *Al-Qaeda plot to bring down UK internet.* Retrieved from http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article61295.ece
- The Telegraph (2007, April 30). *The Crawley targets.* Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550107/The-Crawley-targets.html>

Bibliography

- The Telegraph (2008, April 10). *Friends of 7/7 bombers 'identified targets'*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584610/Friends-of-77-bombers-identified-targets.html>
- The Telegraph (2011, June 7). Online preachers of hate: Anwar al-Awlaki, “bin Laden of the Internet” . Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8560438/Online-preachers-of-hate-Anwar-al-Awlaki-bin-Laden-of-the-internet.html>
- The Telegraph (2012, April 30). *7/7 bombers planned attack on Bank of England*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9237355/77-bombers-planned-attack-on-Bank-of-England.html>
- The Telegraph (2012a, April 16). *Saajid Badat: 'walking angel' who became a terrorist*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9207088/Saajid-Badat-walking-angel-who-became-a-terrorist.html>
- The Telegraph (2014, October 17). *British police officers targeted by alleged Isil terrorists*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11169598/Four-men-charged-with-terror-offences-following-Isil-linked-London-raids.html>
- The Telegraph (2014a, November 7). *Armed police arrest four men amid fears of Islamist Remembrance Day terror plot*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11216261/Armed-police-arrest-four-men-amid-fears-of-Islamist-Remembrance-Day-terror-plot.html>
- The Telegraph (2015, November 24). *Abid Naseer: Student who plotted to blow up Manchester's Arndale Centre jailed for 40 years*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/12014115/Manchester-Arndale-bomb-plotter-jailed-Abid-Naseer-jailed.html>
- The Telegraph (2015a, November 9). *Remembrance Sunday: ring of steel around Queen to foil Cenotaph 'terrorist plot'*. Retrieved from [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/12014115/Manchester-Arndale-bomb-plotter-jailed-Abid-Naseer-jailed.html)

Bibliography

- [uk/11219150/Remembrance-Sunday-ring-of-steel-around-Queen-to-foil-Cenotaph-terrorist-plot.html](http://www.theguardian.com/uk/11219150/Remembrance-Sunday-ring-of-steel-around-Queen-to-foil-Cenotaph-terrorist-plot.html)
- Throrup, P. (2008, July 11). *Tidslinje: Mordkomplottet på Kurt Westergaard*. Retrieved from <http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-13017959:tidslinje-mordkomplottet-på-kurt-westergaard.html>
- Torgersen, H. O. & Svarstad, J. (2012, May 31). *Breiviks strategi: oppskrift på fiasko*. Aftenposten. Retrieved from <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/22juli/Breiviks-strategi---Oppskrift-pa-fiasko-6840568.html>
- Townsend, M. (2012, July 14). *Police 'made up' evidence against Muslim student*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/14/police-evidence-muslim-student-rizwaan-sabir>
- Tranøy, L.K., Vikås, M. & Brenna, J.G. (2012, November 9). *Breiviks egne ord om livet i fengsel: Sadisme satt i system*. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10055585>.
- Trædal, T.J. (2018, May 29). *Forbud mot 40 halvautomatiske våpen: – Vi er glade for forbudet*. Politiforum. Retrieved from <https://www.politiforum.no/artikler/forbud-mot-40-halv-automatiske-vapen-vi-er-glade-for-forbudet/438262>
- Trew, B. (2017a, May 26). *Coptic Christians killed in Egypt shooting*. The Times. Retrieved from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coptic-christians-killed-in-egypt-shooting-zsxj7k93>
- Trew, B. (2017b, April 9). *Twin blasts rock Egypt's Christians*. The Times. Retrieved from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/scores-dead-in-latest-attack-on-christian-church-in-egypt-3wqggs6kc>
- Tufft, B. (2015, March 22). *Isis calls on 'brothers' to kill 100 US military personnel named on 'death list'*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/isis-calls-on-brothers-to-kill-100-us-military-personnel-named-on-death-list-10125561.html>
- VG (2012). *Ord-for-ord, dag 43*. Retrieved from <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/terrorangrepet-22-juli-rettssaken/ord-for-ord-dag-43/a/10051118/>
- VG (2012a, June 6). *Foreløpig psykiatrisk vurdering av forhold rundt Anders*

Bibliography

- Behring Breivik*. Report by Randi Rosenqvist . Published by VG. Retrieved from http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/psykiatrisk_vurdering/
- Villanueva, N. (2004, November 3). *El Bernabéu, la sede del PP, Atocha, Príncipe Pío o Torre Picasso, objetivos de la segunda célula islamista desarticulada*. ABC.ES. Retrieved from www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-03-11-2004/abc/Nacional/el-bernabeu-la-sede-del-pp-atocha-principe-pio-o-torre-picasso-objetivos-de-la-segunda-celula-islamista-desarticulada_963223053676.html#
- Vinci, A. (2008, December 2). *Italian police arrest suspects for alleged terror plot*. CNN. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/12/02/milan.terror.suspects/index.html?eref=edition>
- Walker, S. et.al. (2016, December 19). *Russian ambassador to Turkey shot dead by police officer in Ankara gallery*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/russian-ambassador-to-turkey-wounded-in-ankara-shooting-attack>
- Weaver, M. (2017, March 6). *UK police have thwarted Paris-style terror plots, top officer says*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/06/uk-police-have-thwarted-paris-style-terror-plots-in-britain-top-officer-says>
- Whitehead, T. (2012, October 25). *Terror gang discussed killing 1,000 people with poisoned hand cream*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9634065/Terror-gang-discussed-killing-1000-people-with-poisoned-hand-cream.html>
- Whitehead, T. (2015, July 21). *Terror suspect charged over Isil-inspired plot for Lee Rigby style attack on US troops in the UK*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11753369/Terror-suspect-charged-over-Isil-inspired-plot-to-attack-US-troops-in-the-UK.html>
- Whitney, C. R. (1991, February 8). *I.R.A. attacks 10 Downing Street with mortar fire as cabinet meets*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/08/world/ira-attacks-10-downing-street-with-mortar-fire-as-cabinet-meets.html?pagewanted=all>

Bibliography

- Whitney, C. R. (1995, October 18). *Bomb rips train underneath Paris, with 29 wounded*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/18/world/bomb-rips-train-underneath-paris-with-29-wounded.html?pagewanted=all>
- Wikipedia (2019). *Law enforcement*. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_enforcement
- Willsher, K. (2012, March 24). *Toulouse shooting: failure to find first target led assassin to Jewish school*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/24/toulouse-shootings-assassin-jewish-school>
- Willsher, K. (2015, July 15). *Four arrested in France for planning terrorism attacks, confirms minister*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/four-arrested-france-planning-terrorism-attacks>
- Willsher, K. (2016, July 26). *France in shock again after Isis murder of priest in Normandy*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/france-shock-second-isis-attack-12-days>
- Wright, S. & Taylor, B. (2007, February 1). *Al Qaeda was behind 'plot' to behead soldier*. Daily Mail. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-432962/Al-Qaeda-plot-behead-soldier.html>
- Worley, W. (2016, April 29). *Sikh temple bombing in Germany was 'carried out by Isis sympathisers'*. The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sikh-temple-bombing-in-germany-was-carried-out-by-isis-sympathisers-a7007166.html>
- Ynet News (2006, May 19). *Terrorists planned to blow up El Al plane*. Retrieved from <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3252772,00.html>;
- Ynet News (2006, May 21). *Swiss agent who saved El Al plane fears colleagues*. Retrieved from <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3253561,00.html>
- Ynet News (2007, September 7). *Al-Qaeda: Bounty on Swedish cartoonist's head*. Retrieved from www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3449533,00.html

Bibliography

- Ynet News (2009, July 9). *Cell sent by Hezbollah to attack Israeli embassy*. Retrieved from <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3743694,00.html>
- Ynet News (2016, February 3). *Two killed in Jerusalem shooting attack*. Retrieved from <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4761536,00.html>
- Young D., McAleese, D. & PA. (2015, November 27). *'Significant weaponry' used in attack on police car shot at in west Belfast*. Belfast Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/significant-weaponry-used-in-attack-on-police-car-shot-at-in-west-belfast-34238641.html>
- Zakkariassen, G. (2006, September 17). *Skudd mot Oslo-synagoge*. Retrieved from www.nrk.no/norge/skudd-mot-oslo-synagoge-1.1005958
- 20 minutos news. *Cable sobre la sentencia de la 'operación Cantata'*. Retrieved from <http://www.20minutos.es/cable-wikileaks/952389/09madrid1207-cable-sobre-la-sentencia-de-la-operacion-cantata/>

Books, articles, reports and research notes

- Akers, R. L. (1991) *Rational choice, deterrence, and social learning theory in criminology: The path not taken*, 81 *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 653 (1990-1991)
- Alexander, Y. (2002). *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*. Ardsley: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Alexander, Y. & Pluchinsky, D. (1992). *Europe's red terrorists*. London: Frank Cass & co.
- Alic, A. (2007). *Investigation into Backgrounds of Bosnians Involved in Vienna Plot*. *Terrorism focus*, Volume 4, Issue 32. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4462&no_cache=1#.Vp3waE32apo
- Andersen, S. S. (2010). *Case-studier og generalisering*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Asal, V. & Hastings, J.V. (2015). *When Terrorism Goes to Sea: Terrorist*

Bibliography

- Organizations and the Move to Maritime Targets*. Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 27, 2015 - Issue 4, p. 722-740 Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.855636>
- Asal, V.H., Rethemeyer, R.K. Anderson, I., Stein, A. & Rizzo, J. (2009). *The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection.*, in Journal of Applied Security Research (July): 258-278. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19361610902929990?journalCode=wasr20#preview>
- Asal, V., Rethemeyer, K., Bellandi, R., Legault, R. & Tynes, R. (2010). *Making the Wrong Connection: The Determinants of Terrorist Targeting of Airplanes and Airports*. Note from the International Studies Association Annual Convention. Retrieved from www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/MakingtheWrongConnection.pdf
- Austin, J.V. & Chan, R.J. (2013). *Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling: The Case of Aviation Security*. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25:5, p. 777-797. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.699906>
- Aust, S. (2009). *Baader-Meinhof*. New York: Oxford university press.
- Aven, T., Boyesen, B., Njå, O., Olsen, K.H. & Sandve, K. (2011, 4 ed.). *Samfunnssikkerhet*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget
- Aviad, G. (2008). *Lexicon of the Hamas movement*. ISA.
- Bakker, E. & de Graaf, B. (2010). *Lone wolves - how to prevent this phenomenon?* ICCT Expert meeting paper
- Bangstad, S. (2014). *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia*. London: Zed Books.
- Barrett, R. (2015). *The Islamic State goes global*. CTC Sentinel, December 2015, Volume 8, Issue 11. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/november-december-2015/>
- Becker, M. (2014). *Explaining lone wolf target selection in the United States*. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Volume 37, Issue 11, 2014. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2014.952261>
- Bell, J. B. (1990). *IRA tactics and targets*. Dublin: Poolbeg Press.
- Bergen, P. (2002). *Holy war, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin*

Bibliography

- Laden*. New York: Free Press.
- Bergen, P. (2011). *The longest war*. New York: Free Press.
- Biberman, Y. & Zahid, F. (2016). *Why terrorists target children: Outbidding, desperation, and extremism in the Peshawar and Beslan school massacres*. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, published online 9 February, 2016. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1135425>
- Bjørge, T. (1990). *Maritim terrorisme – en trussel mot norsk skipsfart og oljevirkosomhet?* NUPI rapport nr.146, juni 1990. Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt.
- Bjørge, T. (1995). “Extreme Nationalism and Violent Discourser in Scandinavia: ‘The Resistance’, ‘Traitors’, and ‘Foreign Invaders’”, in: Bjørge, T. (ed. 1995). *Terror from the Extreme Right*. London: Frank Cass.
- Bjørge, T. (1997). *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia*. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug.
- Bjørge, T. (2003). *Norske dammer – i hvilken grad er de sannsynlige terror- og sabotasjemål?* Rapport for EBL kompetanse.
- Bjørge, T. (2013). *Strategies for preventing terrorism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot.
- Bjørge, T. (2015). *Forebygging av kriminalitet*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Bjørge, T., de Graaf, B., van der Heide, L., Hemmingby, C. & Weggemans, D. (2016). Performing justice, coping with trauma: The trial of Anders Breivik, 2012. In *Terrorists on trial*. Ed. de Graaf, B. & Schmid, A.P. Leiden: Leiden University Press, p. 478-479
- Bjørge, T. & Heradstveit, D. (1993). *Politisk terrorisme*. Oslo: Tano.
- Bjørge, T. & Silkoset, E. (2017). *Trusler og trusselhendelser: En spørreundersøkelse blant stortingsrepresentanter og regjeringsmedlemmer*. Rapport. Oslo: Politihøgskolen.
- Bjørge, T. & Silkoset, E. (2018). *Trusler og trusselhendelser: En spørreundersøkelse blant stortingsrepresentanter og regjeringsmedlemmer*. PHS forskning 2018: 5. Oslo: Politihøgskolen.
- Blalock, H.M. (1979). *Social statistics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Borchgrevink, A. S. (2013). *A Norwegian tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Massacre at Utøya*. Cambridge: Polity
- Bordonaro, F. (2009). *The October 2009 terrorist attack in Italy and its*

Bibliography

- wider implications*. CTC Sentinel, October 2009, Vol 2, issue 10.
Retrieved from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-october-2009-terrorist-attack-in-italy-and-its-wider-implications>
- Bowman, J.K. (2016). *Armed deterrence: Countering soft targets attacks*. Report. Air War University.
- Bradford, E. & Margaret A. & Wilson, M.A. (2013). *When terrorists target schools: An exploratory analysis of attacks on educational institutions*. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, Volume 28, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 127–138 Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11896-013-9128-8>
- Braniff, B. & Moghadam, A. (2011). *Towards global jihadism: Al-Qaeda's strategic, ideological and structural adaptations since 9/11*. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 5, Issue 2, May 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/issue/view/30>
- Brisard, J-C. (2015). *The Paris attacks and the evolving Islamic State threat to France*. CTC Sentinel, November/December 2015, Volume 8, Issue 11. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/november-december-2015/>
- Brisard, J-C. & Jackson, K. (2016). *The Islamic State's external operations and the French-Belgian nexus*. CTC Sentinel, November/December 2016, Volume 9, Issue 11. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-states-external-operations-and-the-french-belgian-nexus/>
- Brownlee, J. (2013). *Violence against copts in Egypt*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington.
- B'tselem (2018). *Statistics: Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in the West Bank, after Operation Cast Lead*. B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Retrieved from <https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/after-cast-lead/by-date-of-event/westbank/israeli-civilians-killed-by-palestinians>
- Burke, J. (2011). *The 9/11 wars*. London: Alan Layne.
- Burke, J. (2015). *The new threat from Islamic militancy*. London: The Bodley Head.
- Burke, J. (2015a, November 14). *Islamic State "goes global" with Paris*

Bibliography

- attacks. The Observer. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/14/islamic-state-goes-global-paris-attacks>
- Calle, L.D.L. & I. Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2006). *The production of terrorist violence: Analyzing target selection within the IRA and ETA*. Estudio/Working Paper 2006/230 Retrieved from http://epub.sub.uni-hamburg.de/epub/volltexte/2008/1870/pdf/2006_230.pdf
- Carafano, J., Bucci, S.P., & Zuckerman, J. (2012). *Fifty terror plots foiled since 9/11: The homegrown threat and the long war on terrorism*. The Heritage Foundation.
- Chaliand, G. & Blin, A. (2016). *The history of terrorism. From antiquity to ISIS*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Chermak, S.M., Freilich, J.D. & Simone, J.jr. (2010). *Surveying American state police agencies about lone wolfs, Far-Right criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist criminal collaboration*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:11, 1019-1041
- Chesney, M., Reshetar, G. & Karaman, M. (2011). *The impact of terrorism on financial markets – an empirical study*. Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 35, Issue 2, March 2011, p. 253-267
- Chow, J. et al. (2005). *Protecting commercial aviation against the shoulder-fired missile threat*. Santa Monica: Rand corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP106.pdf
- Christensen, M. (2013). *Moren*. Oslo: Aschehoug forlag.
- Cigar, N. (2009). *Al-Qaida's doctrine for insurgency*. Dulles: Potomac books.
- Clark, R.P. (1984). *The Basque insurgents – ETA, 1952-1980*. Madison: The University of Winsconsin Press.
- Clarke, R.V. (2005). *Seven misconceptions of situational crime prevention*. In Tilley, N. (ed.), *Handbook of crime prevention and community safety*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Clarke, R. V. & Cornish, D. B. (1985). *Modeling offenders' decisions: a framework for research and policy*. Crime and Justice, Vol. 6, p. 147-185.
- Clarke, R. V. & Newman, G. R. (2006). *Outsmarting the terrorist*. Westport: Praeger.
- Cohen, L. E. & Felson, M. (1979). *Social change and crime rate trends: A*

Bibliography

- routine activity approach*. American Sociological Review. 1979, Vol. 44 (August): 588-608
- Collins, E. (1998). *Killing rage*. London: Granta books.
- Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th edition (2006)
- Conway, M. (2011). *From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki*. CTX: Combating Terrorism Exchange. 2, 4, pp12-22
- Cornish, D. B. & Clarke, R. V. (2003). *Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions: A reply to Wortley's critique of situational crime prevention*. Crime Prevention Studies, vol.16 (2003), p.41-96.
- Cornish, D. B. & Clarke, R. V., ed. (2014). *The reasoning criminal*. New Brunswick: Transaction publishers.
- COT (2007). *Lone-wolf terrorism*. Instituut voor Veiligheidsen Crisismanagment. Retrieved from www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf,
- COT (2008). *Concepts of terrorism*. Deliverable 5, Workpackage 3. Instituut voor Veiligheidsen Crisismanagment.
- Crenshaw, M. (2011). *Explaining terrorism*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Coogan, T.P. (2002). *The IRA*. New York: Palgrave.
- Cruickshank, P. (2007). *Abu Musab al Suri: Architec of the new al Qaeda*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30: 1, 1-14, Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100601049928>
- Cruickshank, P. (2014). *The 2006 airline plot*. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, R.(ed). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dartnell, M. Y. (1995). *Action directe*. London: Frank Cass & co.
- Davies, B. (1996). *SAS rescue*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson.
- de Graaf, B. (2014). *The van Gogh murder and beyond*. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, R. (ed). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- de Graaf, B. & Schmid, A. P. (ed. 2016). *Terrorists on trial. Introducing a Performative Perspective*. Leiden: Leiden university press.
- Department of Homeland Security (2011). *Referance manual to mitigate potential terrorist attacks against buildings*. FEMA-426/Bips-06/October 2011 ed.2.
- Diesen, S. (2000). *Militær strategi*. Oslo: J.W. Cappelens forlag.

Bibliography

- Dillon, M. (1990). *The Shankill butchers*. London: Arrow books.
- Dishman, C. (2005). *The leaderless nexus: When crime and terror converge*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:3, 237-252
- Dolnik A. (2007). *Understanding terrorist innovation*. London: Routledge.
- Dolnik, A. (2011). *Conducting field research on terrorism: a brief primer*. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 5, Issue 2
- Drake, C. J. M. (1996). *The factors which influence the selection of physical targets by terrorist groups*. PhD thesis. University of St Andrews.
- Drake, C. J. M. (1998). *Terrorist target selection*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Edwards, A. (2017). *UVF – Behind the mask*. Newbridge: Merrion Press.
- Ellis, C., Pantucci, R., van Zuijdewijn, J., Bakker, E., Smith, M., Gomis, B. & Palombi, S. (2016). *Analysing the processes of lone-actor terrorism: Research findings*. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/issue/view/57>
- Ellis, C. & Pantucci, R. (2016). *Lone-actor terrorism - Policy Paper 4: 'Leakage' and Interaction with Authorities*. RUSI, ISD, Chatham House, Universiteit Leiden. Retrieved from <http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CLAT-Series-8-Policy-Paper-4-RUSI.pdf>
- English, R. (2003). *Armed Struggle. The history of the IRA*. Oxford: Oxford university press.
- English, R. (2009). *Terrorism – how to respond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- English, R. (2016). *Does terrorism work*. Oxford: Oxford university press.
- Erlandsson, Å. (2017). *Det som aldrig fick ske – skolattentatet i Trollhättan*. Stockholm: Norstedts.
- Fahsing, I. A. & Rachlew, A. (2009). Investigative interviewing in the Nordic region. In: Williamson, T., Milne, B. & Savage S. (2009). *International developments in investigative interviewing*, 39-65. Collumpton: Willan Publishing.
- Fair, C.C. (2014). The 2008 Mumbai attack. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, F., ed. (2014). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*, p. 571-599. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Falldalen, J. I. (2014). Video som varsler og vitne. In Hausken, Yazdani &

Bibliography

- Haagensen (ed. 2014). *Fra terror til overvåking*. Oslo: Vidarforlaget.
- Farrell, W. R. (1990). *Blood and rage: The story of the Japanese red army*. New York: Lexington books.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (2007). *Site and urban design for security*. FEMA 430 /December 2007.
- Felson, M. and Clarke, R. V. (1998). *Opportunity makes the thief. Practical theory for crime prevention*. Police research series. Paper 98.
- Filiu, J.P. (2014). Ansar al-Fatah and “Iraqi” networks in France. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, R.(eds). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fishman, B.H. (2016). *The master plan*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Flade, F. (2018). *The June 2018 Cologne ricin plot: A new threshold in jihadi bio terror*. CTC Sentinel, August 2018, Volume 11, Issue 7. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/june-2018-cologne-ricin-plot-new-threshold-jihadi-bio-terror/>
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2011). Case study. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. eds., *The Sage handbook of qualitative research*, 4th edition (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2011), chapter 17, pp. 301-316.
- Foley, F. (2013). *Countering terrorism in Britain and France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fridheim, H. (2007). *Jernbanestasjoner som mål for terror og sabotasje – utfordringer i sikkerhetsarbeidet*. FFI-rapport 2007/00233. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/07-00233.pdf>
- Fridheim, H., Schjelderup, T-E & Borander, A. (2009). *Viljeshandlinger mot kollektivtransport i storbyer – trusler og tiltak*. FFI-rapport 2009/01078
- Gambhir, H.K. (2014). *Dabiq: The strategic messaging of the Islamic state*. Institute for the study of War. Backgrounder, August 15, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.understandingwar.org/dabiq-strategic-messaging-islamic-state-0>
- Ganor, B. (2015). *Global alert. The rationality of modern Islamist terrorism and the challenge to the liberal democratic world*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ganor, B. (2015a). *Four questions on ISIS: A “trend” analysis of the Islamic*

Bibliography

- state*. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 9, Issue 3, June 2015.
Retrieved from
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/436>
- Gardell, M. (2014). *Crusader dreams: Oslo 22/7, islamophobia, and the quest for a monocultural Europe*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:129-155, 2014. Retrieved from
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849930>
- Gardell, M. (2015): *Raskrigaren: Seriemördaren Peter Mangs*. Stockholm: Leopard förlag.
- George, A. L. & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Geraghty, T. (1998). *The Irish war*. London: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Gerges, F. (2016). *ISIS. A history*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gero, D. (2009). *Flights of terror*. Sparkford: Haynes Publishing.
- Gibbs, J. C. (2013). *Targeting blue: Why we should study terrorist attack on police*. Working paper No 45, January 2013. Retrieved from
<http://www.coginta.org/uploads/documents/67f2b87b8e8bb8300a629a83dfb77f93de93da42.pdf>
- Gill, P., Horgan, J. & Deckert, P. (2012). *Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviours of lone-actor terrorism*. Report. International Center for the Study of Terrorism. Pennsylvania State University.
- Gill, P. (2015). *Lone-actor terrorists. A behavioural analysis*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Goggin, M. (1986). *The "Too Few Cases/Too Many Variables" Problem in Implementation Research*. *Political Research Quarterly*, Sage Publications, Volume: 39 issue: 2, p. 328-347.
- Graham, R. (2016). *How terrorists use encryption*. *CTC Sentinel*, June 2016, Volume 9, Issue 6. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/how-terrorists-use-encryption/>
- Grossman, D. (2009). *On killing*. New York: Back Bay Books.
- Hamm, M.S. & Spaaij, R. (2017). *The age of lone wolf terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hamill, H. (2011). *The hoods. Crime and punishment in Belfast*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hansen, S.J. (2013). *Al-Shabaab in Somalia*. Oxford: Oxford University

Bibliography

- Press.
- Harcourt, B. E. (2013). *"Beccaria's 'on crimes and punishments': A mirror on the history of the foundations of modern criminal law"* (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 648, 2013).
- Harrison, J. (2009). *International aviation and terrorism*. London: Routledge.
- Hastings, J.V. & Chan, R.J. (2013). *Target hardening and terrorist signalling: The case of aviation security*. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 25, Issue 5, 2013, pp. 777-797. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.699906>
- Hausken, L., Yazdani, S.R. & Haagenen, T.K (2014). *Fra terror til overvåking*. Oslo: Vidarforlaget.
- Hegghammer, T. (2004). *Betraktninger om al-Qaidas ideologiske utvikling*. FFI/notat-2004/00811.
- Hegghammer T. (2013). *The future of anti-Western jihadism*. Prepared note for the hearing on "Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, objectives, and future challenges. July 18, 2013.
- Hegghammer, T. (2013a). *The future of terrorism studies*. Draft remarks to the workshop "Intelligence, National Security, and War" at the Naval War College, March 2013. Retrieved from www.hegghammer.com
- Hegghammer, T. & Nesser, P. (2015). *Assessing the Islamic State's commitment to attacking the West. Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 9, Issue 4, August 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/440/html>
- Heide, L. van der (2011). *Individual terrorism*. Master thesis. University of Utrecht.
- Hellevik, O. (2011). *Forskningsmetode i sosiologi og statsvitenskap*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Hemmingby, C., Sand, P.H., Bjørge, T. & Snortheimsmoen, A. (2015). *Sikring av sentrale myndighetsinstitusjoner i et utvalg land*. Politihøgskolen. Retrieved from https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/285236/sikring_av_sentrale.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Hemmingby, C. & Bjørge, T. (2016). *The dynamics of a terrorist targeting*

Bibliography

- process – Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July attacks in Norway.*
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hemmingby, C. (2017). *Exploring the continuum of lethality: Militant Islamists' targeting preferences in Europe.* Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.11 No 5. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/642/html>
- Hemmingby, C. & Bjørge, T. (2018). *Terrorist target selection: The case of Anders Behring Breivik.* Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. XII, Issue 6, 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism/archives/2018#volume-xii-issue-6>
- Hess, M.K. & Orthmann, C.H. (2008). *Introduction to Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.* Boston: Cengage Learning.
- Hesterman, J. (2015). *Soft target hardening.* Boca Raton: CRC press.
- Hewitt, C. (2003). *Understanding terrorism in America.* New York: Routledge.
- Hoffman, B. (1984). *Recent trends in Palestinian terrorism.* The Rand Corporation. Retrieved from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6981.html>
- Hoffman, B. (1988). *The potential terrorist threat to commercial nuclear facilities.* The Rand Corporation. Retrieved from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7450.html>
- Hoffman, B. (1993). *Terrorist targeting: Tactics, trends and potentialities.* Terrorism and Political Violence, 5:2, 12-29.
- Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside terrorism.* New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (2016). *Al-Qaeda: Quietly and patiently rebuilding.* The Cipher Brief. Retrieved from <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/quietly-and-patiently-rebuilding-1089>
- Hoffman, B. (2014). The 7 July 2005 London bombings. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, F., ed. (2014). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*, p. 192-223. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (2018). *Al-Qaeda's resurrection.* Expert brief, Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection>
- Hoffman, B. & Reinares, F., ed. (2014). *The evolution of the global terrorist*

Bibliography

- threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffmann, J., Meloy, J. R. & Sheridan, L. (2014). Contemporary research on stalking, threatening, and attacking public figures, in *International Handbook of Threat Assessment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holbrook, D. (2014). *The Al-Qaeda doctrine*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Horgan, J. (2005). *The psychology of terrorism*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Horton M. (2017). *Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula*. CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2017. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/fighting-the-long-war-the-evolution-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula/>
- Hutchinson, M. C. (1978). *Revolutionary terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*. Stanford: Hoover institution Press
- International Monetary Fund (2017). *Turkey. Staff report for the 2017 Article IV consultation*. Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/02/03/Turkey-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-44614>
- Jenkins, B. (1979). *The terrorist mindset and decisionmaking: Two areas of ignorance*. The Rand Corporation.
- Jenkins, B. (1988). *Potential threats to offshore platforms*. Volume 8, TVI Report.
- Jenkins, B. (1989). *The terrorist threat to commercial aviation*. The Rand Corporation.
- Jenkins, B. (2001). *Protecting public surface transportation against terrorism and serious crime: Continuing research on best security practices*. MTI Report 01-07. Mineta Transportation Institute.
- Jenkins, B. (2008). *Will terrorists go nuclear*. New York: Prometheus.
- Jenkins, B. & Butterworth, B.R. (2018). *Train Wrecks and Track Attacks: An Analysis of Attempts by Terrorists and Other Extremists to Derail Trains or Disrupt Rail Transportation*. San José State University: Mineta Transportation Institute. URL: https://transweb.sjsu.edu/sites/default/files/1794_Jenkins_Train-Wrecks-Train-Attacks.pdf
- Johannessen, A., Tufte, P.A. & Christoffersen L. (2011, 4.utgave). *Samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*. Oslo: Abstrakt forlag.
- Johns, M. & Silverman, B.G. (2001). *How emotions and personality effect the*

Bibliography

- utility of alternative decisions: A terrorist target selection case study.*
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- Johnson, S. C. (1998). *Psychological evaluation of Theodore Kaczynski*.
Retrieved from
www.paulcooijmans.com/psychology/unabombreport2.html
- Johnstone, R.B. & Nedelscu, O.M. (2005). *The impact of terrorism on financial markets*. IMF Working paper WP/05/60, March 2005.
- Jordán, J. (2014). The foiled attacks in Italy. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, F. (eds.), *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Joschelyn, T. (2012). *From al Qaeda in Italy to Ansar al Sharia Tunisia*. The Long War Journal. URL
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/from-al-qaeda-in-italy.php>
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). *Terror in the mind of God*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kaplan, D.E. & Marshall (1996). *The cult at the end of the world*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Kaplan, D.E. (2000). *Aum Shinrikyo (1995)*. In Tucker, J.B., ed., *Toxic terror*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Kaplan, J., Löow, H. & Malkki, L.(ed.) (2015). *Lone wolf and autonomous cell terrorism*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Katz, S.M. (1999). *The hunt for the engineer*. Connecticut: The Lyons Press
- Kepel, G. (2017). *Terror in France. The rise of jihad in the West*. English edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kepel, G. & Milelli, J.P. (2008). *Al Qaeda in its own words*. London: Belknap Harvard.
- Kern, S. (2012): *Germany: Islamists want to bring Jihad to Europe*. Retrieved from <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3298/germany-islamists-jihad-europe>
- Kjøk, Å. (2004). "Motiver for terroranslag mot norsk oljevirksomhet". FFI-rapport 2004/01682 Retrieved from . Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/04-01682.pdf>
- Kjøk, Å. & Lia, B. (2001). *Terrorism and oil – an explosive mixture? A*

Bibliography

- survey of terrorist and rebel attacks on petroleum infrastructure 1968-1999*. FFI-Report-2001/04031. Kjeller, FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/01-04031.pdf>
- Kohlmann, E.F. (2004). *Al-Qaida's jihad in Europe*. Oxford: Berg.
- Kraushaar, W. (2006). *Die RAF under der linke Terrorismus*. Band I & II. Hamburg: Hamburger edition.
- Kydd, A. H. & Walter, B. F. (2006). *The strategies of terrorism*, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), 49-80.
- Lacroix, S. (2008). *Ayman al-Zawahiri, veteran of jihad*. In Kepel, G. & Milelli, J.P (ed.). *Al Qaeda in its own words*. 2008. London: Belknap Harvard.
- Lacey, J. ed. (2008). *The canons of jihad*. Annapolis: Naval institute press.
- Lafree, G. & Dugan, L. (2004). *How does studying terrorism compare to studying crime?* In Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Sociology of crime, Law and Deviance, Volume 5, 53-74. Elsevier 2004.
- Lafree, G., Yang, S-M. & Crenshaw, M. (2009). *Trajectories of terrorism: Attack patterns of foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970-2004*. American Society of Crimonology, Criminology & Public Policy, Volume 8, Issue 3
- Laqueur, W. (1997, 2012). *A history of terrorism*. New Brunswick: Transaction publishers.
- Laquer, W. (1999). *The new terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lawrence, B. (2005). *Messages to the world. The statements of Osama Bin Laden*. Verso.
- Levitt, M. (2009). *Israel as an al-Qaida target – sorting rhetoric from reality*. CTC Sentinel. Volume 2, issue 10, 2009. Retrieved from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/israel-as-an-al-qaida-target-sorting-rhetoric-from-reality>
- Levitt, M. (2015). *Hezbollah: Pulled between resistance to Israel and the defense of Syria*. CTC Sentinel. Volume 8, issue 2, 2015. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-targeting-of-the-libyan-oil-and-gas-sector/>
- Lewis, T.G. (2014). *Critical infrastructure protection in homeland security: Defending a networked nation*. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Lia, B. (2000). *Er sivil infrastruktur sannsynlege mål for terrorgrupper i*

Bibliography

- fredstid? Nokre førebelse konklusjonar om terrorisme som tryggingpolitisk utfordring i Norge*. FFI-rapport 2000/01703. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/00-01703.pdf>
- Lia, B. (2001). *Militære installasjonar som terrormål i fredstid? Ein gjennomgang av faktiske terroranslag mot militære installasjonar på 1990-talet*. FFI-rapport 2001/03419. Kjeller, FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/01-03419.pdf>
- Lia, B. et al. (2001a). *Atommateriale, gass og mikrober som terrorvåpen? – en undersøkelse av terrorgruppers interesse for og bruk av ikke-konvensjonelle våpen*. FFI-rapport 2001/02930. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Forskningen/totalforsvar/Terra/Publikasjoner/Sider/Artikler-og-rapporter.aspx>
- Lia, B. (2003). *Terror mot transport: En revurdering av terrortrusselen mot transportrelaterte mål i lys av 11.september*. FFI-rapport 2003-00731. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/03-00731.pdf>
- Lia, B., ed. (2004). *Satsing på forskning om samfunnssikkerhet og sårbarheter: Samfunnsvitenskapelige og humanistiske tilnærmingar*. FFI/notat-2004/01605. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Forskningen/totalforsvar/Terra/Publikasjoner/Sider/Artikler-og-rapporter.aspx>
- Lia, B. (2005). *The globalization and the future of terrorism*. London: Routledge.
- Lia, B. (2007). *Architect of the global jihad*. London: Hurst & company.
- Lia, B. (2015). *Jihadi proto-states*. Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 9, Issue 4, August 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441>
- Lia, B. (2017). *“Who, where and how” in global jihad: The evolution of al-Qaida leadership’s strategic discourse*. Presentation note from FFI conference Al-Qaida at thirty: Its historical resilience, current status and future evolution. Oslo, 4 September 2017. Courtesy Brynjar Lia.
- Lia, B. & Kjøl, Å. (2001). *Islamist insurgencies, diasporic support networks, and their host states - the case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000*. FFI-report 2001/03789. Kjeller: FFI.
- Lia, B. & Kjøl, Å. (2004). *Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of*

Bibliography

- 'Petroleum Terrorism' 1968-1999. In *Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and Development*, ed. D. Heradstveidt & H. Hveem, p.100-124. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Lia, B. & Nesser, P. (2003). *Terror mot drikkevann: En oversikt over terrorgruppers interesse for å ramme offentlig vannforsyning*. FFI-rapport 2003/01919. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/03-01919.pdf>
- Libicki, M.C., Chalk, P. & Sisson, M. (2007). *Exploring terrorist targeting preferences*. Santa Monica: Rand corporation.
- Lippestad, G. (2013). *Det kan vi stå for*. Oslo: Aschehoug.
- Lyons, H.A. & Harbinson, H.J.A. (1986). *A comparison of political and non-political murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974-1984*. *Medicine, Science and Law* 26, no. 3
- Maccartan, L.M., Masselli, A., Rey, M. & Rusnak, R. (2008). *The logic of target choice: An examination of Chechen rebel bombings from 1997-2003*. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 31:1, 60-79. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701767122>
- Mahnken, T. G. (2010). Strategic theory, in Baylis et.al (3rd ed.2010): *Strategy in the contemporary world*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Makarenko, T. (2004). *Crime-terror nexus*. London: Hurst & company.
- Makarenko, T. (2007). *International terrorism and the UK*, in Wilkinson, ed. (2007). *Homeland security in the UK*. London: Routledge.
- Martin, G., ed. (2011). *The Sage encyclopedia of terrorism*. New York: Sage Publications.
- Martin, P. (2019). *The rules of security. Guiding principles for protective security and resilience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Matusitz, J. (2015). *Symbolism in terrorism*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Maxwell, J. A. (2008). *Designing a qualitative study*. In *The Sage handbook of applied social research methods*, Bickman & Rog. London: Sage publications.
- McGartland, M. (1998). *Dead man running*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company.
- McGladdery, G. (2006). *The Provisional IRA in England*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
- McKearney, T. (2011). *The Provisional IRA*. London: Pluto Press.

Bibliography

- McKittrick, D. Kelters, S., Feeney, B. Thornton, C. and McVea, D. (1999, 2007). *Lost lives*. London: Mainstream publishing.
- McNamara, S. (2008). *Why NATO must win in Afghanistan: A central front in the war on terrorism*. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/why-nato-must-win-in-afghanistan-a-central-front-in-the-war-on-terrorism#_ftn8
- Melman, Y. (1986). *The master terrorist*. New York: Avon Books.
- Merari, A. (1998). *Attacks on civil aviation: Trends and lessons*. Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 10, issue 3, 1998, p. 9-26
- Meyer, S. (2011). *Preventing mass killings: Optimal strategies for protecting public targets against terrorist attacks*. PhD thesis. University of Oslo. Retrieved from <https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/13440>
- Michael, G. (2012). *Lone wolf terror and the rise of leaderless resistance*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Migaux, P. (2016). The future of the Islamist movement, in Chaliand, G. & Blin, A. (2016). *The history of terrorism. From antiquity to ISIS*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Moghadam, A. (2008). *The globalization of martyrdom*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the terrorists' point of view*. Westport: Praeger.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2008). *How globalization spurs terrorism*. Westport: Praeger.
- Moloney, E. (2007). *A secret story of the IRA*. London: Penguin books
- Morley, Christopher (2014). *Where the blue begins*. Los Angeles: Pomona Press.
- Morrison, J.F. (2013). *The origins and rise of dissident Irish republicanism*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Mueller, J. (2009). *The atomic terrorist?* Research paper commissioned by The International Commission of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, dated 31 April 2009.
- Mullins, S. (2016). *The road to Orlando: Jihadist-inspired violence in the West, 2012-2016*. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-road-to-orlando-jihadist-inspired-violence-in-the-west-2012-2016>
- Mullins, S. (2017). *Lone-actor vs. Remote-controlled jihadi terrorism:*

Bibliography

- Rethinking the threat to the West*. Commentary in War on the rocks. Retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/lone-actor-vs-remote-controlled-jihadi-terrorism-rethinking-the-threat-to-the-west/>
- Nacos, B. L. (2007). *Mass-mediated terrorism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nagin, D. S. (2013). *Deterrence in the twenty-first century*. In Crime and Justice: A review of research, Vol, ed. Michael Tonry, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago University Press.
- Nagin, D. S., Solow, R.M. & Lum, Cynthia (2015). *Deterrence, criminal opportunities and police*. Criminology, Volume 53, Number 1, 74-100 2015.
- Nasiri, O. (2006). *Inside the jihad: My life with Al Qaeda*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nemeth, S. C. (2010). *A rationalist explanation of terrorist targeting*. PhD thesis. University of Iowa.
- NESH (2005). *Forskningsetiske retningslinjer for samfunnsvitenskap, humaniora, juss og teologi*. Oslo.
- Nesser, P. (2005). *The slaying of the Dutch filmmaker – Religiously motivated violence or islamist terrorism in the name of global jihad?* FFI-rapport 2005/00376. Kjeller: FFI.
- Nesser, P. (2006). *The airliner plot" - en kort analyse av operasjonsmønster, motivasjoner og internasjonale forbindelser*. FFI-rapport 2006/03084. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/06-03084.pdf>
- Nesser, P. (2008). *Chronology of jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: planned, prepared, and executed terrorist attacks*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:924–946, 2008.
- Nesser, P. (2010). *Chronology of jihadism in Western Europe update 2008-2010*. FFI paper.
- Nesser, P. (2012). *Individual jihadist operations in Europe: Patterns and challenges*. Retrieved from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/individual-jihadist-operations-in-europe-patterns-and-challenges>
- Nesser, P. (2012a). *Single actor terrorism. Scope, characteristics and explanations*. Research note: Perspectives on Terrorism. Volume 6, issue 6, 2012. Retrieved from

Bibliography

- <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/231/464>
- Nesser, P. (2012b). *Jihad in Europe. Patterns in Islamist terrorist cell formation and behaviour, 1995-2010*. PhD thesis. University of Oslo.
- Nesser, P. (2014). *Toward an increasingly heterogeneous threat: A chronology of jihadist terrorism in Europe 2008-2013*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:5, 440-456, Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.893405>
- Nesser, P. (2015). *Islamist terrorism in Europe*. London: Hurst & company.
- Nesser, P. (2019). *Military interventions, jihadi networks, and terrorist entrepreneurs: How the Islamic State terror wave rose so high in Europe*. CTC sentinel, March 2019, Volume 12, Issue 3. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/march-2019/>
- Nesser, P. & Lia, B. (2010). *Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot*. CTC Sentinel, Volume.3, Issue.8, August 2010. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/lessons-learned-from-the-july-2010-norwegian-terrorist-plot/>
- Nesser, P. & Stenersen, A. (2014). *The modus operandi of Jihadi terrorists in Europe*. Perspectives on Terrorism. Volume 8, issue 6, 2016.
- Nesser, P., Stenersen, A. & Oftedal E. (2016). *Jihadi terrorism in Europe: The IS-effect*. Perspectives on Terrorism. Volume 10, issue 6, 2016.
- Netanyahu, I. (2002). *Yoni's last battle*. Jerusalem. Gefen Publishing House.
- Neumann, P. R., Smith, M.L.R. (2008). *The strategy of terrorism*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Neumann, P. R. (2009). *Old & new terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity
- New Law Journal - Volume 123, Part 1 - Page 358, 1974
- Newman, G.R. & Hsu, Y.H. (2012). Rational choice and terrorist target selection. In ed. Kumar, E. & Mandal, M.K, *Countering terrorism: Psychological strategies*, pp. 227-249. Los Angeles: Sage publications.
- Omand, D. (2010). *Securing the state*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- O'Callaghan, S. (1999). *The Informer*. London: Corgi Books.
- O'Neill, S. & McGerry, D. (2006). *The suicide factory*. London: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Oppenheimer, A.R. (2009). *IRA - the bombs and the bullets*. Dublin: Irish

Bibliography

- Academic Press.
- Orsini, A. (2011). *Anatomy of the Red brigades*. Cornell: Cornell university press.
- Palmkvist, J. (2016). *Äventyr i Svenssonland*. Stockholm: Bonnier Pocket.
- Pantucci, R. (2011). *A typologi of lone wolves*, s.23. ICSR Kings College
- Pantucci, R. (2013). *Amateur fanatics*. April 10, 2013. Jane's. Retrieved from <http://raffaellopantucci.com/2013/04/10/amateur-fanatics/>
- Pantucci, R. (2015): *'We love death as you love life': Britain's suburban terrorists*. London: Hurst & company.
- Pape, R.A. (2006). *Dying to win*. New York: Random House.
- Parker, A. (2015). *A modern MI5*. From MI5 website. Retrieved from <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/a-modern-mi5>
- Parachini, J.V. (2000). *The world trade center bombers (1993)*. In Tucker, J.B., ed., *Toxic terror*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Paulhus, D.L. & Williams, K.M. (2002). *The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy*. *Journal of Research in Personality*, Volume 36, Issue 6, December 2006, p. 556-563. Retrieved from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656602005056?via%3Dihub>
- Pedahzur, A. (2005). *Suicide terrorism*. Malden: Polity Press.
- Pedahzur, A. (2009). *The Israeli secret services and the struggle against terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pedahzur, A. & Perliger, A. (2009). *Jewish terrorism in Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Peters, B. (2008). *Tödlicher Irrtum – Die gesichte der RAF*. Berlin: Argon
- Pippard, T. (2010). *'Oil-Qaeda': Jihadist threats to the energy sector*. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Volume 4, issue 3, 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/103/html>
- Pockrass, R.M. (1987). *Terroristic murder in Northern Ireland: Who is killed and why?* *Terrorism*, 1987.
- Porter, G.D. (2015). *Terrorist targeting of the Libyan oil and gas sector*. *CTC Sentinel*. Volume 8, issue 2, 2015. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-targeting-of-the-libyan-oil-and-gas-sector/>

Bibliography

- Rabasa & Benard (2015). *Eurojihad. Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ramsey, G. (2012). *Targeting, rhetoric and the failure of grassroots jihad*. Journal of Terrorism Research, Volume 3, Issue 1 – Summer 2012.
- Ranstorp, M. (ed. 2007). *Mapping Terrorism research. State of the art, gaps and future direction*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Ranstorp, M. & Normark, M. (2015). *Understanding terrorism innovation and learning*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Rapoport, D. C. (ed. 2001). *Inside terrorist organizations*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Reinares, F. (2009). *A case study of the January 2008 suicide bomb plot in Barcelona*. CTC Centinel, January 2009, Vol.2, issue 1. Retrieved from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-case-study-of-the-january-2008-suicide-bomb-plot-in-barcelona>
- Reinares, F. (2012). *Discussion point: Terrorism studies is not a sub-discipline*. START, October 2012. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-terrorism-studies-not-sub-discipline>
- Reinares, F. (2012a). *The evidence of al-Qaida's role in the 2004 attack*. CTC Sentinel, March 2012, Vol 5, Issue 5. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evidence-of-al-qaidas-role-in-the-2004-madrid-attack/>
- Reinares, F. (2014). The 2004 Madrid train bombings. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, R. (ed). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Reinares, F. (2014a). The January 2008 suicide bomb plot in Barcelona. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, R. (ed). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rubin, H.J. & Rubin, I.S. (1995). *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Schelling (2008). *Arms and influence*, in Mahnken and Maiolo: *Strategic Studies*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Schmid, A. P., ed. (2011): *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research*. Routledge. London.
- Schuurman, B., Bakker, E., Gill, P. & Bouhana, N. (2017). *Lone actor*

Bibliography

- terrorist attack planning and preparation: A data driven analyses*, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2017 Retrieved from [10.1111/1556-4029.13676](https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.13676)
- Schuurman, B., Eijkman, Q. & Bakker, E. (2014). *A history of the Hofstadgroup*, Perspectives on Terrorism Vol 8, No 4 2014 Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/362/html>
- Schuurman, B. & Eijkman, Q. (2015). *Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment*. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1040426>
- Schuurman, B., Lindekilde, L., Matlhaner, S., O'Connor, F., Gill, P. & Bouhana, N. (2017). *End of the lone wolf: The typology that should not have been*. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1419554>
- Seale, P. (1992). *Abu Nidal: a gun for hire*. New York: Random House.
- Seierstad, Å. (2015). *One of us*. London: Virago.
- Silber, M. D. (2012). *The Al-Qaida factor : Plots against the west*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Silke, A. (2011). *Understanding terrorist target selection*, in Terrorism and the Olympics, ed. Richards, Fussey and Silke. London: Routledge
- Simcox, R. (2012). *Terrorist threat from Olympics thwarted*. Retrieved from <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2012/07/11/terrorist-threat-to-the-olympics-thwarted/>
- Simcox, R. (2015). Report: “*We will conquer your Rome*”: *A study of Islamic State terror plots in the West*. London: The Henry Jackson Society.
- Simon, J.D. (2013). *Lone wolf terrorism*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Simpson, D., Jensen, V. & Rubing, A. (2016). *The city between freedom and security*. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag.
- Sinai, J. (2016, 2nd ed). *Active shooter: A handbook on prevention*. ASIS International.
- Skjoldager, M. (2009): *Truslen indefra – de danske terrorister*. København: Lindhardt & Ringhof.
- Skjoldager, M. (2016). *Syv år for PET – Jakob Scharfs tid*. København:

Bibliography

- People's press.
- Skoglund, A. (2012). *Sinte hvite menn*. Oslo: Humanist forlag.
- Smith, R. (2007). *The utility of force – the art of war in the modern world*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Smith, S. (2013). *Stop! Armed police*. London: Robert Hale
- Solvoll, E. & Malmø, M. (2011). *Tragedien som samlet Norge*. Oslo: Forlaget historie og kultur.
- Sommer, D. (2010). *Terrorist modus operandi*. D. Sommer.
- Spaaij, R. (2012). *Understanding lone wolf terrorism*. Springer. Dordrecht
- Speckhard, A. & Shaikh, M. (2014). *Undercover jihadi*. McLean: Advances Press.
- Standard Norge (2014): *NS5832 Societal security - Protection against intentional undesirable actions – Requirements for security risk analysis* (in Norwegian).
- Steinberg, G. W. (2013). *German jihad*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Stenersen A. (2008). Nuclear Terrorism: Hype, Hoax or Waiting to Happen? Nuclear ambitions and capabilities of terrorist organisations. In: K. M. Osland and M. Eriksson (eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Old Players, New Game - New Players, Old Game* (Oslo: NUPI, 2008), pp 924 – 946. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Forskningen/totalforsvar/Terra/Publikasjoner/Sider/Artikler-og-rapporter.aspx>
- Stenersen, A. (2017). *Al-Qaida in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stenersen, A. (2017b). *Thirty years after its foundation – where is al-Qaida going?* Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 11, Issue 6, December 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/653/html>
- Stern, J. (2003). *Terror in the name of God*. New York: HarperCollins publishers.
- Stern, J. & Berger, J.M. (2015). *ISIS. The state of terror*. London: William Collins.
- Stewart, S. (2011). *Cutting through the lone wolf hype*. Retrieved from

Bibliography

- <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110921-cutting-through-lone-wolf-hype>
- Stewart, S. (2012). *The curious case of Adlene Hicheur*. Retrieved from https://worldview.stratfor.com/weekly/20091021_curious_case_adlene_hicheur
- Storm, M., Cruickshank, P. & Lister, T. (2014). *Agent Storm. My life inside al Qaeda and the CIA*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Stormark, K. (2011). *Da terroren rammet Norge*. Oslo: Kagge forlag.
- Stout, M.E., Huckabey, J.M., Schindler, John R. & Lacey, J. (2008). *The terrorist perspectives project*. Annapolis: Naval institute press.
- Strandberg, V. (2013). *Rail Bound Traffic: a Prime Target for Contemporary Terrorist Attacks?* Journal of Transportation Security, Vol. 6, nr 3, 2013, s. 271-286. URL: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12198-013-0116-0>
- Sweet, K. (2008). *Aviation and airport security*. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Sørensen, K. (2013). *Halshug. Historien om en terrorplan*. København: People's Press
- Taarby, M. (2014). The Danish Glasvej case. In Hoffman, B. & Reinares, R. (ed). *The evolution of the global terrorist threat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tamas, G. (2005). *Lasermannen – en berättelse om Sverige*. Stockholm: Ordfront forlag.
- Taylor, M. (1988). *The terrorist*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers.
- Taylor, P. (1997). *Provos – The IRA and Sinn Fein*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Thatcher, M. (1985). Speech to the American Bar Association 15 July 1985. London. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Retrieved from <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096>
- The Jamestown Foundation (2006). *The terrorist threat to the Italian elections publication*: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 4 Issue: 6. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=711&no_cache=1#.VQXsMTkTFJ5
- The Osama bin Laden files* (2012). Released to the Combating Terrorism center (CTC). New York: Skyhorse Publishing.
- The Research Council of Norway (2011). *What we know about societal*

Bibliography

- security*. Societal Security and Risk (SAMRISK). Retrieved from www.forskningsradet.no
- Thomas, G. (2000). *Gideon's spies. The secret history of the Mossad*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.
- Thornton, T. P. (1965). *Terror as a weapon of political agitation* in Eckstein, ed.(1965) *Internal War*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Toft, P., Duero, A. & Bieliauskas, A. (2010). *Terrorist targeting and energy security*. *Energy Policy*, 2010, vol. 38, issue 8, 4411-4421. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.070>
- Tucker, J.B., ed. (2000). *Toxic terror. Assessing terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Tønnesen, T.H. (2007). *Maritim terrorisme - Nye trender*. FFI-rapport 2007/00015. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/07-00015.pdf>
- Tønnesen, T.H. (2008). *We have some planes.. - Luftfarten som terrormål*. FFI-rapport 2008/00157. Kjeller: FFI. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/08-00157.pdf>
- Tønnesen, Truls H. (2015). *Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The relationship between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic state*. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 9, Issue 4, August 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/443>
- US Department of Justice (2009, October 27). *Two Chicago men charged in connection with alleged roles in foreign terror plot that focused on targets in Denmark*. Retrieved from <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chicago-men-charged-connection-alleged-roles-foreign-terror-plot-focused-targets-denmark>
- US Department of Justice (2010). *Tahawwur Rana and David Headley indicted for alleged roles in India and Denmark terrorism conspiracies*. Retrieved from <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/tahawwur-rana-and-david-headley-indicted-alleged-roles-india-and-denmark-terrorism>
- US Department of Justice (2012). *Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab sentenced to life in prison for attempted bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009*. *Justice News*. Retrieved from

Bibliography

- <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-sentenced-life-prison-attempted-bombing-flight-253-christmas-day>
- US Department of State (2013). *Significant attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel 1998-2012*. Bureau of diplomatic security. Washington. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211361.pdf>
- Vlierden, G.V. (2015). *Profile: The Paris attacks leader Abdelhamid Abaaoud*. CTC Sentinel, November/December 2015, Volume 8, Issue 11. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/november-december-2015/>
- Vollers, M. (2006). *Lone wolf. Eric Rudolph and the legacy of American terror*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Warrick, J. (2016). *Black flag. The rise of ISIS*. London: Corgi.
- Weenink, A. W. (2015). *Situational prevention of terrorism. Remarks from the field of counterterrorism in the Netherlands on Newman and Clarke's Policing Terrorism*. Trends in organized crime.
- Weiner, J.R. (2012). *Diplomatic immunity? Terror attacks against Israeli embassies and diplomatic representatives abroad*. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs VI: 2 (2012).
- World Health Organization (2007). *Mass casualty management systems: strategies and guidelines for building health sector capability*. Geneva, WHO.
- Wilkinson, P., ed. (1993). *Technology and terrorism*. London: Frank Cass.
- Wilkinson, P. (1993a). *Designing an effective international aviation security system*. Terrorism and Political Violence. Volum 5, 1993, Issue 2.
- Wilkinson, P., ed. (2007). *Homeland security in the UK*. London: Routledge.
- Wortley, R. (1996). *Guilt, shame and situational crime prevention*. Politics and Practice of Situational Crime Prevention, P 115-132, 1996, Ross Homel, ed.
- Wright, A. I. (2013). *Terrorism, ideology and target selection*. Princeton University.
- Youngman, M. (2018). *Building "Terrorism Studies" as an interdisciplinary space: Addressing recurring issues in the study of terrorism*. Terrorism and political violence, publishe online October 9 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2018.1520702?af=R>

Bibliography

- Zabel, S.E. (2007). *The military strategy of global jihad*. Report, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2007. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11517?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Zonder, M. (2000). *Sayeret Matkal* (in Hebrew). Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House.
- Zuijdewijn, J.D.R.V. & Bakker, E. (2016). *Lone-actor terrorism. Policy paper 1: Personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists*. RUSI, ISD, Chatham House, Universiteit Leiden. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296796210_Lone-Actor_Terrorism_Policy_Paper_1_Personal_Characteristics_of_Lone-Actor_Terrorists
- Øverland, S. (2012). *Stalking*. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.

Official reports, white papers and laws

- Assemblée nationale (2016). *Au nom de la commission d'enquête (1) relative aux moyens mis en uvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015*.
- House of Commons (2006). *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*. London.
- Intelligence and security committee (2009): *Could 7/7 have been prevented? Review of the intelligence on the London terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005*. London.
- Justisdepartementet (2012). Meld.St.21 (2012-2013): *Terrorberedskap*, Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet.
- London Assembly (2006). *Report of the 7 July review committee*. Greater London Authority.
- NOU 2012:14 (2012). *Rapport fra 22.juli-kommisjonen*. Oslo.
- NOU 2017: 9 (2017). *Politi og bevæpning — Legalitet, nødvendighet, forholdsmessighet og ansvarlighet*. Oslo.
- The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2014). *Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby*.
- UK Government (2006). *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in*

Bibliography

London on 7th July 2005. Retrieved from

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf

US Congress (2012). Public Law 112-265, 112th Congress, *Investigative assistance for violent crimes Act of 2012*. Retrieved from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ265/html/PLAW-112publ265.htm

Court documents, trial transcripts, trial summary reports and police investigative interviews

Crown Prosecution Service (2008). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2007*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2009). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2008*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2010). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2009*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2011). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2010*.

Crown Prosecution Service. (2012). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2011*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2013). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2012*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2014). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2013*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2017). *The counter-terrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2016*.

Crown Prosecution Service (2019). *Successful prosecutions since 2016*.

Retrieved from <https://www.cps.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-division-crown-prosecution-service-cps-successful-prosecutions-2016>

Malmö District Court, Sweden (2011). *Dom Mål nr B 10425-10*. Peter Mangs case. Malmö.

NTB - Norwegian National News Agency (2012). Word-for-word transcripts from the trial of Anders Behring Breivik in 2012. 463 pages.

Oslo District Court (2012). Judgment 2012-08-24 TOSLO-2011-188627-24E

Oslo Police District (2011-2012). Protocolled police investigative interview

Bibliography

- transcripts from interviews with Anders Behring Breivik.
- Skåne og Blekinge Court of Appeal, Sweden (2013). *Dom*. Mål B 3468-12. Peter Mangs case.
- Skåne Police Authority, Sweden (2010-2011). Protocolled police investigative interview transcripts of Peter Mangs, and investigation material.
- Regional prosecutor in Oslo (2012). *Tiltalebeslutning (indictment)*. 05.03.2012.
- Stockholm District Court (1994). *Dom B 4896/92, Almänne åklagaren mot John Wolfgang Alexander Ausonius*. 14.1.1994.
- Stockholm District Court (2018). *Dom B 4708-17. Åklagarmyndigheten mot Rakhmat Akilov*. 07.06.2018.
- Svea Court of Appeal, Sweden (1995). *Dom B 290/94, Åklagarmyndigheten i Stockholm mot Ausonius, John Wolfgang Alexander*. 19.05.1995.
- Svea Court of Appeal, Sweden (2004). *Dom B 2957-04. Åklagarmyndigheten i Stockholm mot Mijailovic, Mijailo*. 08.07.2004.
- US District Court for the Eastern Quarter of Pennsylvania (2010). *Indictment, USA v. Colleen R. LaRose*, Retrieved from <http://media.nbcphiladelphia.com/documents/JihadJane.pdf>
- US District Court of Massachusetts, Criminal No. 02-10013-WGY, United States of America vs. Richard Colvin Reid, a/k/a Abdul-Raheem, a/k/a Abdul Raheem, Abu Ibrahim
- Woolwich Crown Court (2008). *The Queen v Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdullah and Mohammed Jamil Abdelqadader Asha*. Opening note (Indictment), 7 October 2008. Courtesy Petter Nesser.

Databases and datasets

- Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) – Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland. Ulster University. Retrieved from <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/index.html>
- Global Terrorism Database (2017). National consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism (START). Information retrieved in June, 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>
- Global Terrorism Database (2018). *Global terrorism in 2017*. Background report. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Retrieved from

Bibliography

<http://www.start.umd.edu/news/terrorist-violence-decreases-worldwide-2017-remains-historically-high>

- Nesser, P. (2014). Dataset on militant islamist cases in Western Europe for the period 1994 to 2013. Received by the author 24 September 2014. See also Nesser's related publications (2008; 2010; 2012; 2014; 2015) and Nesser & Stenersen (2014) in section *Books, articles, reports and research notes* above.
- Spaaij, R. (2012). Chronology of lone wolf terrorism in 15 countries, 1968-2010. Appedix in Spaaij, R. (2012). *Understanding lone wolf terrorism*, p.103-116. Springer. Dordrecht.

Police and security authorities online resources

Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure

Department of Homeland Security (2011)

Europol review (2016). *Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks*. Retrieved from

https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/changes_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_attacks.pdf

FBI (2013). *A study of active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013*, Washington: FBI. Retrieved from

<https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/pdfs/a-study-of-active-shooter-incidents-in-the-u.s.-between-2000-and-2013>

Metropolitan Police Service (2007). *Operation Rhyme terror convictions*.

Retrieved from <http://content.met.police.uk/News/Operation-Rhyme-terror-convictions/1260267585542/1257246745756>

Metropolitan Police Service (2013). *Three men jailed for planning terrorism*.

Retrieved from <http://content.met.police.uk/News/Three-men-jailed-for-planning-terrorism/1400016933648/1257246745756>

Metropolitan police. (2017). *Firearms command*. Archive. Retrieved from

https://web.archive.org/web/20120503150929/http://www.met.police.uk/co19/armed_response.htm

M15 (2012). *The Olympics and beyond*. Retrieved from

Bibliography

www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-the-director-general/the-olympics-and-beyond.html

Ministère de la Défense, France, 2016 – 2017. *Operation Sentinelle*. Retrieved from

<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/france/operation-sentinelle>

Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (2014). *Veiledning i verdivurdering*. NSM.

National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2017). *Run – Hide – Tell*.

Retrieved from

<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-counter-terrorism-security-office>

Politiets etterretningstjeneste (2011): *The threat from solo terrorism and lone wolf terrorism*. Retrieved from www.pet.dk

Säkerhetspolisen (2018). *Säkerhetspolisens arbete med underrättelser före attentatet på Drottninggatan granskat*. SÄPO, 2018. Retrieved from <http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/ovrigt/pressrum/aktuellt/aktuellt/2018-02-06-sakerhetspolisens-arbete-med-underrattelser-fore-attentatet-pa-drottninggatan-granskat.html>

Other sources

Berwick, A. - aka Breivik, A. B. (2011). *2083 – A European*

Declaration of Independence. Compendium published online.

Breivik, A.B. (2012). Letter from Breivik to Bjørge and Hemmingby.

Breivik, A. B. (2013). Letter from Breivik to the police and other institutions.

Dabiq. English language online magazine published by ISIS. Issues 1-15.

Inspire. English language online magazine published by AQAP, Issues 1-16.

Macdonald, A. (1989). *Hunter*. Hillsboro: National Vanguard Books.

Macdonald, A. (1980). *The Turner diaries*. Hillsboro: National Vanguard Books.

Metzger, T. (undated): Retrieved from www.resist.com

Appendix

Appendix

Here is an overview over all cases in the data set regarding the research on militant Islamism in this thesis. Readers should note that conducted attacks are in bold fonts, plots with strong documentation are in normal fonts, and vague plots (not used for analytical purposes) are in italics.

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
1	Dec	1994	Algeria-Paris flight hijack	Algeria, France
2	Jul	1995	Sahraoui killing	France
3	Jul	1995	St Michel metro attack	France
4	Aug	1995	Arc De Triumphe attack	France
5	Aug	1995	Railway track bomb	France
6	Sep	1995	Place de Bastille attack	France
7	Sep	1995	Market bomb, Paris	France
8	Sep	1995	Jewish school bomb	France
9	Oct	1995	Maison Blanche attack	France
10	Oct	1995	Belkacem train bomb	France
11	Nov	1995	Lille market plot	France
12	Mar	1996	Carbomb attack, Lille	France
13	Nov	2000	Moinul Abedin case	UK
14	Dec	2000	Strasbourg plot	France
15	Apr	2001	Khemais cell plot	Italy
16	Sep	2001	Beghal, US Embassy plot	France
17	Sep	2001	Beghal, Kleine Brogel plot	Belgium
18	<i>Sep</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>Beghal, G8 Genova plot</i>	<i>France, Italy</i>
19	<i>Sep</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>Beghal, Marseilles plot</i>	<i>France</i>
20	Oct	2001	Algeria-France match plot	France
21	Dec	2001	Richard Reid case	Trans-atlantic flight
22	<i>Feb</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>US embassy, Rome</i>	<i>Italy</i>

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
23	Apr	2002	al-Tawhid plot, Germany	Germany
24	<i>Jun</i>	2002	<i>Queens Jubilee plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
25	Aug	2002	San Petronio church plot	Italy
26	<i>Sep</i>	2002	<i>Heidelberg couple</i>	<i>Germany</i>
27	<i>Oct</i>	2002	<i>Anzio cell</i>	<i>Italy</i>
28	Oct	2002	Milan arrests	Italy
29	Nov	2002	<i>AQ ferry threat</i>	<i>Multiple countries</i>
30	Nov	2002	<i>UK cyanid plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
31	Nov	2002	Heathrow airplane case	UK
32	Dec	2002	Russian embassy, Paris	France
33	Jan	2003	Bourgass ricin plot	UK
34	Jan	2003	Rovigo NATO plot	Italy
35	<i>Jan</i>	2003	<i>Barcelona/Catalonia</i>	<i>Spain</i>
36	Jan	2003	Pakistanis in Naples plot	Italy
37	<i>Feb</i>	2003	<i>Heathrow SA-7 plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
38	<i>Mar</i>	2003	<i>Anti-war demo, Berlin</i>	<i>Germany</i>
39	<i>May</i>	2003	<i>Tawhid poison plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
40	Jun	2003	Toxic letters case	Belgium
41	<i>Oct</i>	2003	<i>Hofstadgroup arrest</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
42	Oct	2003	Andrew Rowe case	UK
43	Nov	2003	<i>Costa Brava plot</i>	<i>Spain</i>
44	Nov	2003	Badat shoebomb plot	UK
45	<i>Dec</i>	2003	<i>Ansar al-Islam threat</i>	<i>Germany</i>
46	Jan	2004	Chechen poison plot	France
47	Feb	2004	Milan metro/church plot 1	Italy
48	Mar	2004	M11 Madrid bombings	Spain
49	Mar	2004	Mustafa Chaouki case	Italy
50	Mar	2004	UK fertilizer plot	UK
51	<i>Apr</i>	2004	<i>Bomb on track</i>	<i>Spain</i>

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
52	<i>May</i>	2004	<i>Rota Naval Base plot</i>	<i>Spain</i>
53	<i>Jun</i>	2004	<i>Italy/Belgium arrests</i>	<i>Belgium, France, Italy</i>
54	<i>Jun</i>	2004	<i>Azzouz / Hofstad arrest</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
55	<i>Aug</i>	2004	<i>Dhiren Barot case</i>	<i>UK</i>
56	<i>Sep</i>	2004	<i>Yehia K. case</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
57	<i>Sep</i>	2004	<i>Twin Towers, Barcelona</i>	<i>Spain</i>
58	<i>Oct</i>	2004	<i>National Court plot, Madrid</i>	<i>Spain</i>
59	Nov	2004	Theo van Gogh murder	Netherlands
60	<i>Nov</i>	2004	<i>Hofstad gr. Wilders threats</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
61	<i>Dec</i>	2004	<i>PM Alawi plot</i>	<i>Germany</i>
62	<i>Jun</i>	2005	<i>Piranha politicians plot</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
63	Jul	2005	7/7 London bombings	UK
64	Jul	2005	21/7 bombers	UK
65	<i>Jul</i>	2005	<i>Maik R. Wilders threats</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
66	<i>Aug</i>	2005	<i>Piranha El Al plot</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
67	<i>Sep</i>	2005	<i>Bourada cell, Paris</i>	<i>France</i>
68	<i>Sep</i>	2005	<i>Underground plot</i>	<i>Italy</i>
69	<i>Sep</i>	2005	<i>NATO/EU-commission</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
70	<i>Oct</i>	2005	<i>Ministry of interior plot</i>	<i>France</i>
71	<i>Oct</i>	2005	<i>Ex-Marrocan Minister plot</i>	<i>France</i>
72	<i>Oct</i>	2005	<i>Piranha, AIVD warning</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
73	<i>Oct</i>	2005	<i>Glostrup, Bektasevic case</i>	<i>Denmark</i>
74	<i>Nov</i>	2005	<i>Bouhrama GSPC case</i>	<i>Italy</i>
75	Mar	2006	Alex-Springer incident	Germany
76	<i>Apr</i>	2006	<i>Milan metro/church plot 2</i>	<i>Italy</i>
77	<i>May</i>	2006	<i>Geneva El Al plot</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>
78	<i>Jun</i>	2006	<i>Altimimi sleeper case</i>	<i>UK</i>
79	<i>Jun</i>	2006	<i>Aabid Khan royalties plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
80	Jul	2006	German train bombs	Germany

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
81	Aug	2006	Airliners liquid plot	Trans-atlantic flights
82	Sep	2006	Vollsmose case	Denmark
83	<i>Sep</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>Oslo plot</i>	<i>Norway</i>
84	Nov	2006	<i>El Al Frankfurt plot</i>	<i>Germany</i>
85	Jan	2007	Khan soldier abduction plot	UK
86	<i>Mar</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>Internet take-down plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
87	Apr	2007	Christopher Paul case	Multiple countries
88	<i>May</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>Kamel Bouchentouf case</i>	<i>France</i>
89	Jun	2007	Haymarket carbombs	UK
90	Jun	2007	Glasgow airport attack	UK
91	Jul	2007	Perugia arrests	Italy
92	Sep	2007	Glasvej case	Denmark
93	Sep	2007	Sauerland cell	Germany
94	<i>Sep, Oct</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>Austria/Canada plot</i>	<i>Austria</i>
95	Oct	2007	US embassy, Vienna	Austria
96	<i>Dec</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>Belgium jailbreak plan</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
97	Dec	2007	Hassan T., Birmingham	UK
98	Jan	2008	Pakistani Taliban case	Spain
99	<i>Feb</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>Lars Westergaard plot</i>	<i>Denmark</i>
100	Apr	2008	Andrew (Isa) Ibrahim case	UK
101	May	2008	Nicky Reilly	UK
102	<i>Aug</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>Kanmi's AQ-GB project</i>	<i>UK</i>
103	<i>Aug</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>Krenar Lusha case</i>	<i>UK</i>
104	<i>Sep</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>Rennes arrests</i>	<i>France</i>
105	Nov	2008	<i>Suicide attacks plot</i>	<i>Italy, France, UK</i>
106	Dec	2008	Rachid Ilhami case	Italy
107	Dec	2008	Rany Arnaud case	France
108	Apr	2009	Easter holidays plot	UK
109	Oct	2009	Rana and Headley plot	Denmark

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
110	<i>Oct</i>	2009	<i>Adlane Hicheur case</i>	<i>France</i>
111	Oct	2009	Mohammed Game case	Italy
112	Oct	2009	LaRose's Lars Vilks plot	Sweden
113	Dec	2009	Underwear bomber	Trans-Atlantic flight
114	Jan	2010	Geele axe attack	Denmark
115	Feb	2010	Karim Heathrow plot	UK
116	May	2010	MP Timms stabbing	UK
117	<i>Apr</i>	2010	<i>AQ Vatican plot</i>	<i>Italy</i>
118	Jul	2010	AQ cell in Norway case	Norway, Denmark
119	Jul -Sep	2010	Europe Mumbai plot	France, UK, Germany
120	Sep	2010	Lors Doukajev case	Denmark
121	Oct	2010	Cargo planes case	Trans-Atlantic flights
122	Nov	2010	Cleric in Paris plot	France
123	<i>Nov</i>	2010	<i>Jewish / NATO targets</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
124	<i>Nov</i>	2010	<i>Kashmiri threat</i>	<i>Germany</i>
125	Dec	2010	Stockholm bombing	Sweden
126	Dec	2010	London Stock Exchange	UK
127	<i>Dec</i>	2010	<i>Somali RPG plot</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
128	Dec	2010	JP Mumbai style/villa plot	Denmark
129	Mar	2011	Arid Uka case	Germany
130	Apr	2011	El-Kebir Dusseldorf cell	Germany
131	<i>Sep</i>	2011	<i>Röda Sten Vilks case</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
132	<i>Sep</i>	2011	<i>Kurt Westergaard threat</i>	<i>Norway</i>
133	Sept	2011	Naseer, Birmingham cell	UK
134	Dec	2011	Halil S. case, Dusseldorf	Germany
135	Mar	2012	Merah 1, soldier attack	France
136	Mar	2012	Shia imam killing	Belgium
137	Mar	2012	Merah 2, Montauban	France
138	Mar	2012	Jarmoune, Brescia case	Italy

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
139	Mar	2012	Merah 3, Jewish school	France
140	Apr	2012	Luton cell	UK
<i>141</i>	<i>Apr</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>AK-47 case, Copenhagen</i>	<i>Denmark</i>
142	May	2012	Somali brothers case	Denmark
<i>142</i>	<i>Jun</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>Olympic row stadium</i>	<i>UK</i>
144	Jun	2012	EDL plot	UK
145	Jul	2012	Richard Dart plot	UK
146	N/A	2012	London Boys case	UK
147	Aug	2012	Shopping centre plot	Spain
148	Sep	2012	Kosher shop attack	France
149	Oct	2012	Bombplot, Cannes Torcy	France
150	Dec	2012	Bonner train station	Germany
151	Feb	2013	Lars Hedegaard attack	Denmark
<i>152</i>	<i>Feb</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Mohammed Echaabi case</i>	<i>Spain</i>
153	Mar	2013	Marignane plot	France
154	Mar	2013	Markus Beisicht plot	Germany
<i>155</i>	<i>Apr</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Hachemi cell</i>	<i>Italy</i>
156	May	2013	Woolwich attack	UK
<i>157</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Prince Harry plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
158	May	2013	Soldier attack, Paris	France
<i>159</i>	<i>Jun</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Sharia4Italy plot</i>	<i>Italy</i>
160	Jun	2013	AQIM plots, France	France
161	Jun	2013	Model aircraft plot	Germany
162	Oct	2013	Blair or Mumbai-style plot	UK
<i>163</i>	<i>Oct</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Lyes Darani case</i>	<i>France</i>
164	Feb	2014	Boudina, French Riviera	France
<i>165</i>	<i>Mar</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>IS linked arrests</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>
166	May	2014	Jewish museum attack	Belgium
<i>167</i>	<i>Jun</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>Gard and Vauchuse arrests</i>	<i>France</i>

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
168	<i>Jul</i>	2014	<i>Syria jihadi plot, London</i>	<i>UK</i>
169	<i>Jul</i>	2014	<i>Ouharani arrest</i>	<i>France</i>
170	<i>Jul</i>	2014	<i>Jihadi threat</i>	<i>Norway</i>
171	<i>Aug</i>	2014	<i>Roissy arrest</i>	<i>France</i>
172	Aug	2014	EU Brussel plot	Belgium
173	Aug	2014	Brusthom Ziamani case	UK
174	<i>Aug</i>	2014	<i>Girls' synagogue plot</i>	<i>France</i>
175	<i>Oct</i>	2014	<i>Jewish girl plot</i>	<i>France</i>
176	Oct	2014	Police and military plot	UK
177	<i>Okt</i>	2014	<i>14-year old arrested</i>	<i>Austria</i>
178	Nov	2014	Remembrance Day plot	UK
179	Dec	2014	Stab attack police station	France
180	Dec	2014	Dijon car attack	France
181	Jan	2015	Charlie Hebdo attack	France
182	Jan	2015	Jogger attack, Paris	France
183	Jan	2015	Police attack, Paris	France
184	Jan	2015	Kosher shop siege	France
185	Jan	2015	Verviers shoot out	Belgium
186	<i>Jan-Mar</i>	2015	<i>Ceuta arrests</i>	<i>Spain</i>
187	Feb	2015	Knife attack soldiers, Nice	France
188	Feb	2015	Copenhagen Vilks attack	Denmark
189	Feb	2015	Copenhagen synagogue	Denmark
190	<i>Feb</i>	2015	<i>Braunschweig Carneval</i>	<i>Germany</i>
191	Apr	2015	Catalonia arrests	Spain
192	Apr	2015	Church plot, Paris	France
193	Apr	2015	Bike race plot	Germany
194	May	2015	Silent bomber Rehman	UK
195	<i>Jun</i>	2015	<i>Chechens' Louvain plot</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
196	Jun	2015	Lyon gas factory attack	France

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
197	Jul	2015	Military institution plot	France
198	Jul	2015	Junead Khan case	UK
199	<i>Jul</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>Italy arrests</i>	<i>Italy</i>
200	<i>Aug</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>Concert hall plot</i>	<i>France</i>
201	Aug	2015	Thalys train attack	France
202	Sep	2015	Rafik Yousef stabbing	Germany
203	<i>Oct</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>Toulon navy base plot</i>	<i>France</i>
204	<i>Nov</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>Madrid arrests</i>	<i>Spain</i>
205	Nov	2015	Nov 13 attacks in Paris	France
206	<i>Nov</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>Football match cancelled</i>	<i>Germany</i>
207	Nov	2015	Saint-Denice operation	France
208	Dec	2015	London underground case	UK
209	<i>Des</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>Representatives of state</i>	<i>France</i>
210	<i>Dec</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>New Years plot, Brussels</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
211	<i>Dec</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>New Years threat, Munich</i>	<i>Germany</i>
212	Jan	2016	Car attack, Valence	France
213	Jan	2016	Police st. in Paris attack	France
214	Jan	2016	Girl school plot	Denmark
215	Feb	2016	Lyon Swingers club plot	France
216	<i>Feb</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Algerians arrests</i>	<i>Germany</i>
217	<i>Feb</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Islamist arrest</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
218	Feb	2016	Girl stabbing police	Germany
219	<i>Mar</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Girls plotting concert</i>	<i>France</i>
220	Mar	2016	Brussels 22 March attacks	Belgium
221	Mar	2016	Reda Kriket arrest	France
222	<i>Apr</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>UK crowded places plot</i>	<i>UK</i>
223	Apr	2016	Sikh temple bombing	Germany
224	<i>Apr</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Rome and Vatican plot</i>	<i>Italy</i>
225	<i>May</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Puglia arrests</i>	<i>Italy, UK</i>

Appendix

Nr.	Month	Year	Case description	Country
226	Jun	2016	ISIS Düsseldorf plot	Germany
227	Jun	2016	Magnanville couple attack	France
228	<i>Jun</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Euro 2016 arrests</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
229	Jul	2016	Bastille day attack, Nice	France
230	Jul	2016	Würzburg train attack	Germany
231	Jul	2016	Ansbach bombing	Germany
232	Jul	2016	Normandy church attack	France
233	<i>Jul</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Nouredine H. arrest</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
234	Aug	2016	Charleroi police attack	Belgium
235	Aug	2016	Rabbi stabbing	France
236	<i>Aug</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Birmingham arrests</i>	<i>UK</i>
237	Sep	2016	Paris gas-cylinders plot	France
238	Sep	2016	IS inspired Elton John plot	UK
239	<i>Sep</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Schleswig-Holstein cell</i>	<i>Germany</i>
240	Oct	2016	Brussels machete attack	Belgium
241	Oct	2016	Leipzig refugee arrest	Germany
242	<i>Oct</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Naples arrests</i>	<i>Italy</i>
243	Nov	2016	Disneyland plot	France
244	<i>Dec</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Rotterdam arrests</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
245	<i>Dec</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>Derby and Burton arrests</i>	<i>UK</i>
246	Dec	2016	Berlin truck attack	Germany