Two Views of Non-Voting: A Critique

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ABSTRACT — The view that non-voting is bad is contrasted with the view that non-voting can be functional for a political system. Works by Schattschneider and Berelson et al. are examined. Limitations in their arguments are pointed out, particularly the former's assertion that non-voters are being manipulated and the latters' emphasis on the short-run aspects of the system. The arguments are related to traditional conceptions of democracy.

This paper is an attempt to examine some views of the phenomenon of non-voting in the United States. The views of two political scientists who assumed what are essentially opposing positions on the value of non-voting were chosen for examination. In addition, one represented a traditional approach to the subject and the other, a more sociological or "behavioral" position. The two writers are E. E. Schattschneider and Bernard Berelson; their arguments are abstracted from *The Semi-Sovereign People* (1960) and *Voting* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954), respectively. This paper is principally a review essay and critique, not a presentation of new data, although hopefully the analysis may stimulate some new explorations of non-voting.

In their discussions of non-voting and its consequences, both Schattschneider and Berelson et al. were concerned with the ability of democratic political systems to cope with problems created by internal system frictions and the external political environment. Each discussed at length the implications of the high rate of non-voting in the United States. While more or less concerned with the same problem, the two evaluated non-voting in quite different ways. Schattschneider basically said it is "bad," or at least "not good," while Berelson indicated that non-voting (at least within certain unspecified limits, or unaccompanied by complete dissatisfaction with the system) can be, and is, functional for the democratic system. Both agreed that there is "unused political potential" within the system. They disagreed, however, on whether it should be used and, if so, when and how.

The Basic Views

Schattschneider began his argument by distinguishing between the roughly 60 million voters and the 40 million non-voters, asserting that a curtain, although a "tissue-paper curtain," separates the two groups. Assuming that

the two groups differ considerably in political leaning, he argued that "the addition of forty million voters (or any major fraction of them) would make a tremendous difference" (Schattschneider, 1960: 103) in the world of politics. Schattschneider continually emphasized the "blackout of the forty million," which shows the "profound contradiction between theory and practice" in democracy. This non-participation is the "*sickness* of democracy." Although at one point he said that non-voting seems to be "voluntary," he later argued predominantly that non-voters are excluded from participation by invisible processes.

In the past, he wrote, the expansion of the electorate was a function of party conflict and a result of changes in public policy. Now the struggle had ceased to be over the right to vote; it was, rather, over the "organization of politics." The latter is quite important to meaningful politics, Schattschneider said, because, even though the formal right to vote is given, the vote can be made quite meaningless through the existence of obstacles to organization of the electorate. If the non-voting 40 million are to be made participants, a new political system "based on new cleavages and *about* something new" is necessary.

What makes the present division between the non-voter and the voter critical is that in effect they make up two communities; the social "haves" and political "haves" coincide, as do the social and political "have-nots." For Schattschneider, the 40 million are not in the same contest with the 60 million; the political organization of today is only the political organization of the 60 million. Nor should we be misled by the existence of conflict; we have concentrated attention on the cleavage *within* the 60 million to the exclusion of the cleavage between the two communities. Since support for a major shift in policy exists only outside the present electorate, this omission is a major flaw.

Berelson's prime concern was that the political theory of democracy accord with present democratic practice (see Almond and Verba, 1963: 475-6). He noted several assumptions in democratic theory, such as political discussion and strong citizen motivation to participate in politics and to be well informed (*cf.* Davis, 1964). He compared these assumptions with findings of empirical research about voting behavior, for example, that we talk rather than debate, have weak motivation to participate, and have low levels of political information.

His basic thesis was that, while individual voters do

not satisfy the requirements of democratic political theory, the total membership of the political system does. The theory, Berelson said, has been "defective in its concentration on the individual citizen" (Berelson et al., 1954: 312) and it has demanded that citizens possess characteristics such as rationality and awareness in too extreme a form. A functioning political system requires more than participant voters; stability must be assured and conflict must be restrained at the same time that change occurs. The conflicting requirements of adjustment and stability, of conflict and consensus, can be met by a distribution of characteristics among the population, rather than by possession by any one individual (or all individuals) of all necessary characteristics (see Almond and Verba, 1963: 479).

In these terms, the least desirable voters according to the requirements of classical democratic theory may be helpful in the resolution of political problems through low political involvement, which facilitates their changing policy position and party preference. Those who vote least often, who are most erratic and perhaps least motivated when they do participate, may nonetheless be quite helpful to the system's functioning by contributing flexibility. As Glaser (1962) pointed out, "Under some conditions a successful presidential candidate may break even or perhaps lose among the politically more alert voters, while winning his majority from the ballots of the less interested" (p. 47).

One of Berelson's conclusions was that we need to accept the existence of a political division of labor, as much as we accept an economic or social one. Some perform regular participant tasks with stable, consistent views and others perform irregularly with inconsistent, unstable views. The non-voter, then, is not an unmitigated evil. In addition, Berelson suggested that a relatively low voting rate shows that the society has ways other than the political to resolve its conflicts—that not too much stress and strain is being placed on politics to solve the society's problems. In Almond's and Verba's (1963:475) terms, "The maintenance of other orientations limits the extent of his commitment to political activity and keeps politics, as it were, in its place."

Further Views, Criticism and Comment

Schattschneider was not completely clear on the reasons for the existence of such a large segment of what Merriam and Gosnell (1934) called "habitual non-voters" in the population. The burden of his argument about the need for a change in the agenda of politics was that the non-voters are "least involved or most convinced the system is loaded" against them, and are the "soft underbelly of the system," the "most likely point of subversion" (Schattschneider, 1960:104). We are *"very near,"* he said, *"to something like the limit of tolerance of passive abstention"* (Schattschneider, 1960:120). But "passive abstention" is one thing; the more forceful "boycott" of which he also speaks is something more critical, in that it involves a more active withdrawal from participation in the system, possibly on the basis of a decision that there is no real choice between the candidates

or that the system can provide nothing for the individual. It is at least a matter for debate and investigation, rather than of cold fact, that the nonparticipation by such a large segment of the population is purposeful, or that, as Schattschneider suggested elsewhere, the nonparticipation is purposely arranged by the active participants in the political system. It is possible that such nonparticipation is an unanticipated and unintended result of the behavior of the active participants, rather than an anticipated and intended one. Schattschneider also seemed to imply that the non-voters are non-voters against their will, that they are being manipulated. Although recent Negro registration drives in the South are changing the picture somewhat, it is possible that non-voters have done nothing to protest their status as non-voters because they are unconcerned and do not feel deprived. This view is partially substantiated by McClosky's (1964: 376) finding that the disagreements of those who are unclear about democratic ideals are *"passive* rather than *active*, more the result of political ignorance and indifference than of intellectual conviction or conscious identification with an 'alien' political tendency. Most seem not even to be aware of their deviations from the established values." While people can be manipulated without being aware of it, it does not follow that the nonparticipants or the deprived are *ipso facto* being manipulated.

A finding of Berelson's study, which is relevant to Schattschneider's argument, is that there is agreement on issues and rules of the game by the partisans of both parties. ("Among those with opinions the partisans *agree* on most issues, criteria, expectations, and rules of the game." [Berelson et al., 1954: 309].) This does not necessarily mean, however, that there is a conspiracy of the "ins" against the "outs," as Schattschneider suggested in holding that there are in effect two communities, a political and a non-political (or extra-political) one, within the larger society.

It may well be that the leaders of the participants take advantage of non-voting, by doing little to involve the non-voters beyond the usual "get-out-the-vote" attempts at election time, and that usually they move to expand the electorate when such expansion is to their own advantage. "It has been a matter of observation in the United States and elsewhere that the extension of the right to participate in selecting political leaders is often produced less by the demands of the excluded than by the manipulation of the party leaders" (Lane, 1959: 38, citing Schattschneider, 1942: 48). But this action is certainly not the same as purposely keeping the vote away from a segment of the population large enough to overwhelm the leaders; it is to the leaders' advantage to court the non-voter, to keep him in mind. The power of the potential voter is not measured by the number of times the vote is exercised. If the potential voter is taken into account, if the leaders of the politically active attempt to listen to "public opinion," then the non-voter has some political influence even without exercising the franchise. If, as Schattschneider held, the vote itself is meaningless, then action taken on behalf of the non-voter

may get him more than the vote itself. For the non-voters, virtual representation may, at certain times, provide at least as much "pay-off" as direct representation.

Schattschneider talked about the difference between "consent" and "support," maintaining that the former is not sufficient to uphold the system. While non-voters may exert a strong brake on political and social change, in that account must be taken of them if the potential for revolution is not to be created, they may provide support for the existing system simply by not working against it and by defending it against attacks. Schattschneider may have been asking for too much of a good thing; too much participation might cause additional conflict and exert an even more severe brake on action than now exists. In this connection, Berelson argued that high voting rates indicate high politicization of the society and a highly politicized society relies so heavily on its political subsystem for problem solving that the system's stability may be threatened.

At any rate, Schattschneider presented little, if any, evidence that the leaders of the politically active are able to manipulate political nonparticipants. In addition, it is not at all clear that the non-voters are outside the system, or in a position to march in and take over. Many of them are *within* the system (social and economic) and possess quantities of the goods available within the system, but they are in a state of flux or transition between different segments of the system. Relative satisfaction within the economic and social subsystems may obviate participation in the political subsystem, particularly where, as in the United States, politics is "marginal" and "low-key." On the other hand, being at least minimally settled in the society and economy, that is, possessing minimum shelter, food, and protection, may be a prerequisite to participation in the polity (Davies, 1962). While the minimum, in some absolute terms, may be possessed by nearly all in America, in relative terms many are still below the level that is defined for the society as "poverty." This condition and the acquisitive focus of much of the society may cause individuals to spend a disproportionate amount of their time attempting to secure material goods, time that thus may be unavailable for political participation.

While numbers of people in the society are alienated from it, the non-voters of whom Berelson wrote are frequently within the system and are simply moving about: to form new families, new community attachments, or to move up (or down) the socio-economic ladder. The upwardly mobile are certainly not disaffected with the society for they have accepted the values of higher strata within the system and are moving toward them. Schattschneider pointed out that the voting studies showed the non-voter as the "poorest" and "least educated" as well as the "least well established" in the community. The data Berelson provided suggest that some of those not established, who provide flexibility in the outcomes of elections, are often people moving from working to middle, or from lower-middle to upper-middle, class status, and are not simply the poorest or least educated.

Such non-voters may be temporarily somewhat rootless but are certainly quite committed to the values of the society and to the political system. In addition, some citizens are non-voters because they are highly satisfied with the existing system rather than because of alienation from it, or because they feel the country will do equally well under either candidate (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954).

In addition, many of those who are socially and economically "out" do not mind ranking low in socio-economic status or do not feel deprived because of their objective position. If they held the same values and had the same aims as those "above" them in the society, however, they would probably feel deprived. But Hyman (1953; also Lane, 1963) has pointed out that the expectations of the so-called lower and working classes are different; their goals are less lofty than those of the middle and upper classes — and this probably holds true even given equal opportunity — although their "lower" aims serve to reinforce their present position in the community. Schattschneider's statement and Berelson's finding that the nonparticipants are of lower social standing is somewhat questioned by Lane, with regard to local elections. The regular voters in these elections, he found, may be less "desirable" than the nonparticipants, because, "In these elections there may be some substance to the commonly expressed view that the highest participant group is a machine-dominated clique working for its own advantage" (Lane, 1959:343). As a result, "Here, then, is a situation where the political reserve consists of a different group, including more middle-class, better educated, 'civic minded' individuals." This finding does not really directly challenge the Schattschneider-Berelson findings but may require their limitation to national (and perhaps state) elections.

While one of the major burdens of Schattschneider's argument was that there are no issues meaningful to the present non-voter, he also argued, and thereby partially confused the argument, that technical factors may be responsible for low voting rates. He suggested that it is good to pay attention to technical factors as well as to the sociological and psychological ones. In a footnote, he indicated that the British ballot is the size of a postcard compared to our "bedsheets," and that we vote in many elections for many more officials, including insignificant ones. The technical factors with which Merriam and Gosnell (1934) dealt, such as lack of residence required for registration and inadequacy of absentee voter provisions, might thus be critical in establishing a pattern of non-voting, at least for some potential voters.

Schattschneider assumed that the distribution of non-voters is radically different from the distribution of voters, in terms of preference for particular policies. This assumption was probably necessary to his argument that simultaneous intervention in the political system by large numbers of nonparticipants would be a "revolution." If the distribution of preference among the non-voters is not radically different from that among those who vote regularly, then the intervention of the former might not

make a significant difference in the composition of the participant group. However, intervention by nonparticipants is not likely to be random or uniform among these opinions; different segments will intervene at different times. A parallel situation is pointed out by Key (1956: 143): "the Democratic following consists in the main of persons less disposed to vote than are Republicans;" intervention of a small percentage of infrequently voting Democrats in an election could produce a crucial difference in the result. If the nonparticipants *do* differ in views from the regular participants, excluding them may be a greater danger than allowing them to enter the game; participation itself will tend to socialize the newcomers:

> Although the attitudes and interests of the groups from which the newcomers to national politics may come are out of harmony with the general values of a tolerant democratic society, the risks to society of withdrawal by these members of the political reserve is greater than the risks of participation. The very act of participation tends to create bonds of identification between the participant and the society. (Lane, 1959: 344)

However, one of my students has suggested that the non-voters tend to support the political party in power, rather than to oppose the system, and that they shift their preferences in line with shifts in occupancy of the White House. He cited data (from Campbell, Converse, Stokes, and Miller, 1960:111) showing non-voters moving from an 82%–18% Democratic preference in 1948 to a 72%–28% Republican preference eight years later. The student then commented:

> Preference of the non-voters in 1948 after 16 years of Democratic administration was over four to one Democratic Similarly, their preference in 1956 after four years of Republican rule was nearly three to one Republican. The non-voter, in other words, shows a strong preference for the party in power.

> It would seem to me that if the non-voter felt that the system was loaded against him, he would show his displeasure for the party then in power. At least, I would not expect him to show overwhelming support for the party presently symbolizing the system (Jacobson, 1964).

One or two additional points ought to be made about Schattschneider's argument. He called for a politics based on "something new." Yet, whatever the new issues, they might be presented in the same way that older and (for Schattschneider) inadequate issues have been presented. Perhaps it was the *way* the issues are presented that disturbed Schattschneider. Yet he was by no means clear which of the two alternatives (new *issues* or new *manner of presentation*) would provide the solution to the problem posed, or, if each would, which would be the more effective. Despite this lack of clarity, Schattschneider's point about the need for something new seems to have its validity. "The more salient and clear-cut the issue, the more likely that a group will react in terms of its defined interest" (Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz, 1954: 1170). And the ambiguousness of democratic politics means that issues are not frequently presented in a salient and clear-cut" manner. If they are not, then it is unlikely that even part of the non-voters can be moved from their present habit of nonparticipation. "A sharp break in a traditional continuity by a sub-group can occur only when some experience is perceived as clearly affecting their interests and requiring a new political organization" (Lipset et al., 1954:1170). In addition, emphasis only on increasing the proportion of those voting, without attention to other types of participation or the quality of participation, seems inadequate. Voting, because it is minimal political participation, does not necessarily mean involvement in the system, but may take place out of force of habit, which is certainly not the same as the involvement Schattschneider said is needed. Therefore, lowering barriers to participation in voting would not necessarily produce a change in the character or quality of participation. More certainly, the solution is needed to problems of non-participation in our political system.

Let us now turn our attention somewhat more directly to Berelson. First of all, his position concerning the positive functions of lower participation, while perhaps representative of the thinking of some students of political behavior, is not representative of the dominant view in the population at large. From the point of view of the classical model of democracy, the least (politically) educated (our "nonparticipants") should not vote. Children are taught in schools that the good citizen should be an aware and informed one, and my college students suggest frequently, and not unrepresentatively, that one should not vote unless he is informed.

As stated by Lane, "It certainly is not clear that increased participation without an appropriate background of interest and involvement benefits either the participant himself or the society of which he is a member" (1959: 343). That many of those who do not fit the model, do not in fact participate in the system, may be functional for the system and may continue to reinforce the model for many people.

> Democratic viability is . . . saved by the fact that those who are most confused about democratic ideas are so likely to be politically apathetics and without significant influence . . .

> Apathy also furnishes its own partial corrective by keeping the doubters from acting upon their differences (McClosky, 1964:376).

However, this was not the burden of Berelson's argument, as we have pointed out in our earlier summary of his position.

For Berelson, an amount of nonparticipation was an indication, and a good one, that the society is not fully politicized, that other ways of problem solving beside the political exist (although problems may still go unsolved), and that therefore the political system is not burdened with having to solve all of society's problems. The converse might be indicated by a high rate of voting. However, the meaninglessness of the voting act for the individual voter weakens the force of his argument. If "for the bulk of the American people the voting decision is

not followed by any direct, immediate, visible personal consequences" (Berelson et al., 1954:314-5), and if the voting act is not very meaningful under present conditions, then an increase in the voting rate, even a substantial one, would not *per se* mean full politicization of the society or increased reliance on the polity for the solution of the society's problems.

While Schattschneider seemed unclear what weight to give technical factors as a cause of non-voting, Berelson clearly ignored them. His interpretation of non-voting may have been biased because of failure to evaluate technical reasons for non-voting as well as socio-economic correlates of non-voting. If people cannot vote because they do not fulfill certain legal requirements, they are not very likely to have any interest in the election; it would be interest invested to little avail. It may be that those of lower socio-economic status are less involved politically and might thus be less likely to vote *even if* registered, or if eligible to register, but this is hypothesis, not finding. Berelson, however, did state that the complexity of political problems (which might be taken to include such things as the long ballot) is relevant to the voting decision, but he suggested that it only changes the determinants of voting instead of producing non-voting.

Increasing nationalization of politics in America raises a serious question of the requirements of the theory of democracy. Classical theories of democracy, with their emphasis on rational discussion and debate, were based on the small community, just as Berelson's study was based on one city. In our system, grossly larger than the Greek city-state, we have provided some substitutes for face-to-face communication across vast geographic expanses, but we have provided very few substitutes for continuous feedback and interchange that debate and discussion provide. Berelson's attention to the single community may obscure some of this. Yet even at the local level, the changes in the structure of our life situation have altered the form and substance of political communication. And, when we do communicate, we talk, not debate. "On the grass roots level there was more talk than debate . . ." (Berelson et al., 1954:308). If we do not debate even on the local level, we are not likely to be able to do so on the national level, except perhaps for such special events as the extremely stylized debates between Kennedy and Nixon or through interchanges between syndicated columnists.

Berelson did not deal explicitly with methods for providing more effective communication, yet his data pointed to a way in which the requirement of rationality within the political system might be partially, although indirectly, satisfied. While political preferences are "relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation," they are "vulnerable to indirect social influences" (Berelson et al., 1954:311). The specific requirement of rational discussion (or "debate") may not be fulfilled, or what debate occurs may have little effect, but the "wilder" ideas may be filtered out because they do not get enough acceptance to be socially reinforced. This can reduce the amount of trial-and-error necessary in policy-making or in political decision-making generally. The members of the polity may

be somewhat protected from manipulation by this requirement that "indirect social influences" operate before an idea will be accepted, because the elites then cannot easily manipulate isolated individuals. New alternatives must receive acceptance among (large) numbers of people before they can become the basis for action. An idea is less likely to be reinforced by the social environment if only one in every two hundred people holds it than if one in every 20 do; the more frequent contact between people with the same idea in the latter condition may start a spiral of acceptance. What this means is that the threshold for acceptance of new alternatives is higher than if political preferences changed solely in response to direct argument, but once this threshold is reached, the alternative may become more firmly implanted and thus more resistant to change in the short run.

Berelson and Schattschneider agreed that there has been an overestimation by classical democratic theorists of the abilities and contributions by the individual, but disagree as to who will supply these deficiences. Schattschneider wrote, "All classical concepts of democracy have overestimated the strength and universality of the self-generated impulse of people to participate in the life of the political community" (1960:111). Somewhat differently, Berelson stated, "*Individual voters* today seem unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic system of government outlined by political theorists" (Berelson et al., 1954:312). Perhaps the biggest question raised concerning the theory of democracy by these two statements is, "Where will the burden for success of the democratic system rest?"

Berelson devoted much of his analysis to this point. He said that classical theory demanded too much of the individual voter and suggested that the system as a whole bear the burden, with individuals taken collectively fulfilling requirements that none (or few) could fulfill individually. But his general argument did not remove the burden of fulfilling the requirements; instead, it shifted them, and, while answering one set of questions, posed and left unanswered a second set. He seemed to shift the burden from the individual citizen to (1) the non-voter and (2) the opinion leader. While high politicization and constant demands on the political system to solve the society's problems may tear the system apart if the demands are continued for long times, and while the less involved or uninvolved voter may provide short-run flexibility, Berelson was not clear on what is to happen when either sudden demands or constant demands deriving from crisis situations are made upon the system. If the individual voter does not fulfill classical democratic norms, and the uninvolved voter provides short-run flexibility, who is to provide strength over the long run? If people can be involved in the political system with only the difficulty that Berelson seemed to suggest (with the need for reinforcement from primary groups), where is the reserve that may be needed? Even if one grants, with Berelson, that the existence of numbers of non-voters provides slack to be taken up during periods of crisis, what happens when the slack is taken up completely?

I have referred to the "short-run" flexibility provided

by the relatively uninvolved potential elector. He can move with certain of the demands placed on the society. Berelson, however, did not fully suggest what happens to these people in the long run. Without doubt, some of them do put down roots, in new communities, in new socio-economic strata, and with this, their vote stabilizes. Some may be temporary "defectors," who will return to the fold in the next election. But some may become permanent "shifters," always vacillating. When decisive action is required, these may contribute to instability rather than to stability. Theory must be concerned with the long-run continuance of the democratic system, as well as with its short-run maintenance.

In addition to placing the burden of operation of the democratic system on the uninvolved citizen, Berelson also counted heavily on the opinion leader for the system's success. This is the individual who most closely meets the requirements established by democratic theory: "The classical requirements are more appropriate for the opinion leaders in the society, but even they do not meet them directly" (Berelson et al., 1954:322-3). The system depends on the opinion leaders, a set of individuals far smaller than the total potential electorate, for the transmission of ideas, for the filtering of communications transmitted by the candidates and office-holders, and for the reinforcement of ideas, particularly the latter (Key, 1961:51-3). The existence of these individuals provides a prop to classical theory; the existence of rational types who appear to approximate the older definition of "independent voter" (with their ability to communicate and rationalize so that they *appear* to delay voting decisions until the last moment) makes it difficult for many to see that the formal theory of democracy and its practice diverge considerably.

Classical democratic theory at least had the virtue of relying on all men in the community because it assumed that "there is such a thing as 'the' typical citizen on whom uniform requirements can be imposed," and that most citizens were typical. Berelson, by placing the burden on the opinion leader, in effect leaves democracy at the mercy of a much smaller number of individuals. If they fail in their functions of communication, filtering, and reinforcement, finding their replacements will be extremely difficult.

Summary

In brief, my main criticisms of the two approaches to the subject of nonvoting are as follows: It remains to be proved that non-voters are such against their will or that they are manipulated by the existing elite. That a large number of people are habitual non-voters does not necessarily indicate the existence of a separate non- or extra-political community, cut off from the political community. Even those who do not participate may provide support for the political system. Not all the non-participants are found in the lowest strata in the community, nor do they have political values totally different from those of the more regular participants. Geographical and social mobility, caused in part by our society's prosperity, may be an important factor in causing non-voting.

A high rate of voting does not necessarily mean high politicization if the voting act itself is relatively meaningless or is only minimal political participation. Agreement that classical democratic theory has overemphasized the role of the individual "ideal-typical" citizen shifts the burden of support from the average citizen either to the less motivated, less-well-educated individual, or to the relatively small number of opinion leaders who are our closest approximation of the democratic ideal. While short-run flexibility may be provided by the relatively uninvolved, problems of long-run strength of the system still remain to be solved.

Perhaps the most brief and direct statement upon which I can end this critique is this: more research is needed into non-voting — perhaps the examination of some of the points suggested here. However, with or without this research, we need to devote more thought to restatements of democratic theory so that the goals theory establishes will be felt to be possible of attainment. In this restatement, we must continue to try to adopt the classical democratic theory of the city-state to the grossly larger and more complex environment in which we now find ourselves, a setting that requires, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, a much more involved set of equipment, if it is to be operated properly. Non-voting is not a problem to be dismissed; we must at least make certain that the citizen "does have the potential to act if there is need" (Almond and Verba, 1963:481), even if we do not require him to be "constantly involved in politics" or actively "to oversee the behavior of political decision makers."

Political functions must be performed, and we want them performed well; therefore, we must see to it that even if *each* and *every* citizen is not equipped to play all requisite political roles, enough citizens play each role so that, through a highly interrelated system, our political work is accomplished.

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