



INTERNATIONAL scientific conference: "Initiatives of the 'New silk road' - achievements and challenges" (02 ; 2017 ; Beograd)

Initiatives of the "New silk road" : achievements and challenges / edited by Duško Dimitrijević, Huang Ping. - Belgrade : Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2017 (Belgrade : Donat graf). - 529 str. : ilustr. ; 24 cm

Tiraž 100. - "Thematical proceeding from the International scientific conference: Initiatives of the 'New silk road' - achievements and challenges Belgrade, July 12-13, 2017" --> spor. nasl. str. - "In co-operation with the Institute of European Studies (IES) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) from Beijing, the Institute of International Politics and Economics (IMPP) organised the second annual scientific conference: Initiatives of the 'New Silk Road' - Achievements and Challenges. The international conference took place in Belgrade on 12 and 13 July 2016. --> Preface. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz radove. - Abstract.

ISBN 978-86-7067-246-8 (broš.)

CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AS RETURN TO EARLY MODERN WESTPHALIAN BALANCE OF POWER

Neven CVETIĆANIN, Ph.D.
Senior Research Associate, Institute of Social Sciences,
Belgrade, Serbia¹

Abstract: The paper discusses the future of international relations in the 21st century. A possible pattern of these relations is found in the early modern European (Westphalian) diplomatic system of sovereign states, with the balance of power between the great powers as the basic principle. In order to support this thesis, the paper examines, in the basic outlines, the history of international relations from the Westphalian system to the present day and defines the different phases of these relations in a new and innovative way. In this sense, the paper offers a new periodization of the various systems of international relations of the modern epoch, with a special emphasis on the three phases of international relations from the end of the Second World War to the present day. The paper concludes that after a cold-war equilibrium between two superpowers (the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) and the short-term domination of the U.S.A. as the only super power after the end of the Cold War, we currently have the appearance of a new multipolar world with several dominant global powers (primarily the U.S.A., China, Russia, and the U.K) that are currently seeking a new balance of power between themselves. Therefore, the basic thesis of this paper is that these great powers will sooner or later have to organize a “new Yalta” (or a series of international conferences such as those in Yalta) for a “new deal” on the configuration of the international order in the 21st century. The thesis of our work is that the ideal model for this configuration can be found in the early modern European Westphalian system of sovereign states. Our thesis is similar to the thesis of recent research by Henry A. Kissinger, whose works we used mainly in our research on this topic.

Key words: Westphalian system, balance of power, great powers, international relations, 21st century, new Yalta, balance of power for the 21st century.

¹ E-mail: nevencveticanin@gmail.com. This scientific work is part of project *Social transformations in process of european integrations* (no. III 47010) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Government of Republic of Serbia for the period 2011–2017.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps we can say that at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the circle of Modern Age and its accompanying social processes coming to an end, and that current global social processes are flowing in the opposite direction in relation to the direction initiated by the French Revolution, and that we are attending the restoration of many pre-modern political-economic figures in a new post-modern context. This is not only confirmed by the return of the British Isles in the form of a self-sustaining kingdom after Brexit and the return of the informal “tsarist” system in Russia (and somewhat in China) as well as the return of the “sultanate” in Turkey after the constitutional changes initiated by Erdogan – but already confirmed by the mutual relations among the main world powers (United States, China, Russia, UK, the “German” EU, etc.) which today closely resemble the relations of the great empires of the past – with the difference of a greater interdependence today than it was before. All this seems to be a challenge to the enlightenment dream of the French Revolution and the practical victory of that model of politics and diplomacy described by Henry A. Kissinger in his Harvard doctoral dissertation (Kissinger, 1964.) about Prince Metternich, who once in the system of the Holy Alliance renewed the conservative diplomatic order of balance of power among the traditional empires, which was valid before the French Revolution and established with the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century. Nevertheless, we must be careful with our thesis of flowing history back to the early modern Westphalian international system in its extended version and refrain from harsh judgement, which is certainly not appropriate for a paper of this format. We need to refrain from the harsh judgement due to the fact that at the moment, at the global level, two elites are struggling for power – the conservative and liberal elite – and it is difficult to say with complete certainty which of these two elites will win this battle. It is possible that some “synthesis” among these elites will arise again as in the past (previously, Metternich, Kissinger and, in general, diplomats of this profile were bearers of such “synthesis”, and they possibly could be in the same role again in the future) and this “synthesis” can again, as in the past, reunite opposing poles of the world elite in a new balance of power between these different poles of the global elite and between traditional diplomatic great powers.

EUROPEAN INTEREST FOR GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER

However, the bare fact of the struggle of the two global elites – the conservative (pro-national) and the liberal (pro-global) ones – regardless of the outcome of this struggle – confirms the thesis we advocated in our previous works and have explicated with the help of analytical tools that we have called the *dialectics of political mechanics* (Cvetičanin, 2016.) that in the political field at any time, we have a dominant *basic conflict* that defines it – i.e. every historic period has its own *forces of action and reaction*. However, in our time, the conservative elite that is marching with Trump and proponents of Brexit is actually “revolutionary” and in the position of the forces of action, while the opposed liberal elite is currently in the position of forces of reaction because it is the guardian of the “old liberal order” established after the fall of the Berlin Wall. While a new general pole of the synthesis between these two opposite poles would be a “new balance of power” for the 21st century that would pacify existing social and geopolitical conflicts – just as it once was the case in the old Westphalian diplomatic system in Europe with its different versions during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. But at the moment, the fate of our European continent and its pan-European political and economic creation – the European Union – in these new global processes is very interesting, because the European Union is precisely between the forces of action and the forces of reaction of our time (between conservative and liberal elements), both from outside and within European societies, within which the conservative and liberal elements are now explicitly struggling (right populism against liberal institutionalism, while leftist populism is also slowly rising), which is best seen in this year’s French presidential election. If international order will go in the direction of restoring the Westphalian (and “Metternich’s”, and “Kissinger’s”...) conservative order of balance of power among the great powers, the European Union, an economic but not a security giant (especially after Brexit, and not “a great power” at all in the strict meaning of the term), would have to find its equilibrium position in such a new order, which will certainly be easier if the dominant global great powers (the United States, Russia, China, the UK, etc.) established a peaceful global coexistence, and if the dominant regional powers on the borders of the European continent, like Turkey, would be interested in a peaceful co-existence with the EU – and finally if relations between the liberal and the conservative elements of European societies would be in balance (and if even a new political left also found a

political space) – which would altogether allow the whole system to balance and to keep its stability. However, if (especially three) dominant global super-powers (the US, Russia, China) in the new global circumstances do not establish peaceful coexistence (in the European context, the relations between the United States and Russia, which since the Cold War have affected Europe as some kind of “big brothers”, are the most important) and if regional powers on the borders of Europe, such as Turkey, do not want to be partners with the EU but will insist on a confrontation, and finally if conflicts within European societies between the liberal and conservative (and the growing left-wingers) elements escalate, then the European Union will face a difficult task of redefining its position and its institutions, becoming the centre of the struggle of various, broader, geopolitical interests, which the European political and intellectual elites will have to synthesize and reconcile if they want to keep the continent peaceful and stable, and the institutional model of United Europe sustainable in the long-term. It would also help to create a *new world balance of power* for the 21st century as the equilibrium point that is again (as always) in times of crisis, a principle of stability. We are inclined to believe that peace and stability at the global level will occur sooner or later (as always in the past), only at this moment it is not clear whether this will be only after a more noticeable social, political and geopolitical global conflict or things though will not go that far. This will not be possible to judge with scientific credibility at the moment because it is only possible to speculate about these processes, and all we have at the moment is the mere experience that according to all the available data (the volume of political, economic and armed crises around the world), we are currently living in a time of crisis in which history is receiving new acceleration – as never before since the end of the Second World War.

BACK TO THE ROOTS – THE RETURN TO THE EARLY MODERN WESTPHALIAN BALANCE OF POWER AS OLD-NEW MODEL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Why are the Great Powers “great”?

The history of international relations is very dynamic. Throughout the history of international relations, the power of some individual stakeholders (in the first line great powers) grew or declined. From the very beginning of

rulers and states, the phenomenon of ascending and descending of collective (national) power had been the topic and the subject of numerous analyses, expert reviews and articles. Such analyses have been particularly intensified since the Middle Ages and especially became relevant with the establishment of an early modern Westphalian international system with its key-principle of the balance of power (between great powers). Through history, we can classify a few permanent conditions for the level of power for every country (nation):

1. the size of the population
2. territory
3. natural resources
4. economy
5. military power
6. culture and
7. informational technologies (contemporary condition)

Throughout modern history, different nations with their different quantum of power have constituted specific international orders for different periods. The first and basic one in the modern history of Europe and the world was the so-called Westphalian system of sovereign states with its specific balance of power. This international system lasted for centuries in its different versions.

Westphalian Peace and Westphalian International Order of Sovereign States

The Peace of Westphalia (Gross, 1948, p. 20) was negotiated and signed on 24 October 1648, after a thirty-year war between the Emperor Ferdinand III, the German princes, representatives of the Netherlands, France and Sweden. It was based on three important principles:

1. *rex est imperator in regno suo* – (king is an emperor on his national territory), the sovereign cannot be a subject to a higher authority including the Christian church, and every king is independent and equal in rights to any king
2. *cujus regio, ejus religio* – (the ruler determines which religion will be present on the national territory where he is sovereign) up to that

moment, from the outside no one has the right to intervene in someone else's sovereign territory or the state even if he has the right to intervene for religious reasons and

3. *statera virtutis* (balance of power) – whose goal is the prevention of the establishment of hegemony on the European continent that would dominate all other rulers and peoples in their own countries.

The Peace of Westphalia established a new modern international (Westphalian) order (as opposite to the Middle Ages international order with supremacy of the Church in Europe) which stayed ideal of international stability until today (Kegerly, Raymond, 2002.). The Peace of Westphalia also established a so-called "Westphalian diplomacy" which was based on the *principle of balance of power among sovereign nations* and had its essence in the *balance of fear*. The principle of balance of power is colourfully described by one of the greatest diplomatic minds of our time – Henry A. Kissinger – who used this principle as a basis for his practical and theoretical diplomatic approaches: "In the West, the only examples of functioning the balance of power can be found in the city-states of ancient Greece and in Renaissance Italy, as in the European state system created after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The main feature of the system was that the real situation – the existence of numerous states of approximately equal powers – understood as the principle that will govern the world order." (Kissinger, 1994, p. 21)

Two Phases of Westphalian System and the end of Westphalian Balance of Power in the World Wars

The modern Westphalian international order had two distinct phases. The first phase was the phase of powerful rulers and their states which were in the balance of power in the second half of the 17th century and almost the entire 18th century. This phase lasted until the French Revolution. The second phase started with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars and was characterized by frequent multilateral congresses, where great powers resolved all open issues and problems in interstate and diplomatic relations with multilateral agreements with multilateral negotiations, as a permanent diplomatic practice. The peak of this second phase were the Vienna (1814/1815) and the Berlin Congresses (1878), which were

ingeniously conducted by two of the most talented diplomats of the 19th century – the Austrian Prince Klemens von Metternich, i.e. the Prussian Prince Otto von Bismarck, who re-established the old “Westphalian” balance of power between great powers and balanced division of interest spheres between the great powers (what was previously disturbed by the French Revolution) during the largest part of the 19th century. Thus, from the end of the Napoleonic wars and the Vienna Congress, the nineteenth century will be a century of relative stability in the international order, established by Metternich in the first, i.e. Bismarck in the second half of this century. However, at the end of the 19th century, after the fall of Bismarck and his moderate politics, the balance of power between the great powers will be dissolved, which will give rise to world wars in the first half of the 20th century. The end of the nineteenth-century balance of power established by Metternich and Bismarck was the announcement of a bloody 20th century marked by world wars as a frontal collision of the great powers: “Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the European balance-of-power system returned to the principles of power politics and in a far more forgiving environment.” (Kissinger, 1994, p.22). So-called “power politics” will lead to new wars in Europe and the world, with which, for some time, the Westphalian principle of balance of power in international and diplomatic relations was deconstructed. The world was, only after the end of the world wars, ready for a new agreement by which the great powers will establish a new “Westphalian” balance of power for the 20th century. This was done at the Yalta summit, which established for half of a century “cold-war” balance of power between the then dominant great powers.

*The World after World War II and 3 Phases
of Post-war International Order*

After WWII international order went through 3 phases:

- (1) from the end of WWII until the fall of the Berlin wall – phase of cold war balance of power between two world super powers – the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R.
- (2) from the fall of the Berlin wall until the Global financial crisis – the attempt to create a unipolar world order with supremacy of the one and only super power – the U.S.A.

(3) after the Global financial crisis and especially after the crisis in the European Union (Brexit, economic antagonism between north and south, etc.) and the crisis in the U.S.A. (crisis after the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president with the disputed legitimacy of the new president as with no president before) we entered into a new situation in which no single (super)power can rule the world alone giving rise to the question of establishing a new balance of power between the great powers of our time such as the U.S., China, Russia, the UK, etc. in the new multipolar world. *Our paper set a thesis that this new multipolar world can find a model in the old European Westphalian (early modern) system with its balance between the great powers, based on the three previously mentioned principles (rex est imperator in regno suo, cujus regio, ejus religio, statera virtutis)* which basically consists of the division of spheres of interest with obligation of every great power not to intervene in the sphere of interest of other powers.

So the thesis of our paper is that sooner or later the great powers of our time (the U.S., China, Russia, the UK, etc.) will establish „a new Yalta Conference“ (or series of conferences) as “a new deal“ for international order for the 21st century and that international order could use some models of the old Westphalian international system, especially the model of balance of power (*statera virtutis*), but in the new context. However, let us go back to the original Yalta Conference and let us take a look at a specific dialectic of the “world order“ after WWII – from the Yalta Conference to present day.

*The Yalta Conference and the Division of Spheres of Interest after
World War II – Bipolar International System of the Cold War*

With the beginning of World War II the anti-Hitler coalition was formed with the leaders of three anti-Nazi great powers of that time: the U.S.A., the U. K. and the U.S.S.R. with their leaders: Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, who all together constituted specific “diplomacy at the top”. The peak of this “diplomacy at the top” was the Yalta Conference held from 4th to 11th February 1945, in Crimea. The Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin resulted in the division of spheres of interest – not only in the European continent but in the whole world – and led to the formation of the United Nations with its Security Council as a “permanent conference”

of winning the great powers who established predictable rules in international relations. On a political plane, the three leaders at Yalta Conference divided the world into two big spheres of interest – the western (the United States, the UK and their strategic allies in NATO alliance) and the eastern (the USSR and its strategic allies gathered later in the Warsaw Pact alliance). Strong antagonism existed between these two blocks during the whole time of the Cold War but at the same time balanced diplomacy also existed with a general respect to the “deal” from the Yalta Conference. The cold war between these blocks was quite cold, during most of the time really cold (with many diplomatic and security crises but without a big and direct armed conflict between the two super-powers) and at that time the world was in (nuclear) balance of power as (nuclear) balance of fear. Thus began the era of so-called *nuclear diplomacy* which controlled and managed all crises between the blocks as well as the biggest Cuban Missile Crisis, which lasted 14 days, from 14 to 28 October 1962. Thanks to the engagement of the best diplomats from both sides and especially the so-called discreet diplomacy, it was peacefully ended and the global peace was secured, despite smaller incidents, during the whole era of the cold war.

Table 1. Incidents of near nuclear use

Date	Incident	States involved	Cause
October 1962	Operation Anadyr	Soviet Union	Miscommunication
27 October 1962	Cuban missile crisis	United States	Conflict escalation Cuban missile crisis
27 October 1962	Black Saturday	United States	Conflict escalation and miscommunication
22 November 1962	Penkovsky false warning	Soviet Union	Espionage
October 1973 1973	Arab–Israeli war	Israel	Conflict escalation
9 November 1979	NORAD: Exercise tape mistaken	United States	Exercise scenario tape causes nuclear alert for reality
3 June 1980	NORAD: Faulty computer chip	United States	Faulty computer chip
25 September 1983	Serpukhov-15	Soviet Union	Technical error
7–11 November 1983 exercise	Able Archer-83	Soviet Union, United States	Misperception of military training
18–21 August 1991	Failed coup	Soviet Union	Loss of command and control structure
25 January 1995	Black Brant scare	Russia	Mistaken identity of research rocket launch

Source: Patricia M. Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas, Sasan Aghlani, *Too Close for Comfort Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2014, pp.VI.

The End of the Cold War and Moving towards a Unipolar World with Domination of the U.S.A. as the One and Only Super-power

The end of the twentieth century, among other important historical events, is marked by the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism² as the opposed ideological system to the capitalist system and

² The fall of communism has been announced and “celebrated” by Zbigniew Brzezinski (Brzezinski, 1989).

a key-idea for legitimacy of the U.S.S.R. world power. With the fall of communism the bipolar international system slowly began to slip toward a unipolar one – led by the only remaining super-force – the U.S.A. Disintegration of the bipolar international system began when Mihail Sergejevich Gorbachov came to power in the USSR in 1985. Since then, several “summits on the top” between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. have been held and on these summits the space for the power of the communist bloc had been reduced, finally resulting in the replacement of the bipolar international system with two super-powers with the unipolar international system, with the U.S.A. as the one and only super-power. For example, the summit meeting of two presidents, Reagan (U.S.A.) and Gorbachev (U.S.S.R.) in Reykjavik (11-12 October 1986.) ended without concrete results, but resulted in the Agreement on nuclear disarmament, which planned to be a specific contribution of their planned foreign policy of detente. But after a few years, at the meeting in Malta, this process ended in the real collapse of the Cold War era of bipolarity³ as era of balance of power. At the summit in Malta and by the signatures of the two aforementioned presidents, the final end of the bipolar “cold war international order” was marked on December 3, 1989. A few years after this, in his famous speech, which was held on November 9, 1991 in the House Chamber (The House of Representatives) on Capitol Hill in Washington, George Herbert Walker Bush, US President, in a live broadcast of the national television and radio, openly mentioned that Americans together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians and Africans were working on achieving the “principle and the dream of a new world order.” (Bush, internet resources, 2014.) It was an open announcement of an attempt to constitute so-called “the new world order” with the political, military and cultural dominance of only one surviving super-power – The United States of America. After political and military suprematism of the U.S.A. in international relations during the nineties of the 20th century, at the beginning of the new millennium, Zbigniew Brzezinski especially highlighted the importance of American cultural dominance as an element of full American global dominance, as dominance that do not have rivals or historical comparisons: “The level of American cultural dominance itself has

³ The famous British historian Eric Hobsbawm believes that the Cold War ended in Reykjavik and Washington: “Practically the Cold War ended with the two summits in Reykjavik (1986) and Washington (1987).” (Hobsbawm, 2002, p. 191)

neither rivals or historical comparisons, nor there is a rival in sight. Moreover, as the world is becoming more urbanized, as humanity becomes increasingly interdependent and interactive, and that more traditional and predominantly rural parts of the world are becoming smaller and softer, the American cultural dominance is becoming more and more stronger” (Brzezinski, 2004.). At the time he wrote this, Brzezinski saw the USA as the only country in the world in the role of a global leader with no rivals, not only in that time, but in the entire history. On the other side, some strategists as, for example, Joseph Nye (and Henry Kissinger as well) warned officials of the United States that “our desire to go alone may ultimately weaken us” (Nye, 2004, p 11.). In that context, the next question is inevitable: what was the essence of Nye’s previous warnings to officials of the United States? The answer could be in Nye’s following statement: “Modern information and its accompanying sign, globalization transforms and reduces our world. At the beginning of this new century, these two forces have increased American power, including our ability to influence others through our attractive or ‘soft’ power. But over time, the technology will spread to other countries and people, and our relative superiority will be reduced” (Nye, 2004, p 11.). The previous words sound prophetic because at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, we found ourselves in a changed, dynamic world, which is increasingly difficult to manage from one centre and which is aspiring to multipolarity. So the main question of our time is *the question of a new balance of power as a key principle in creating a balanced international order for the 21st century.*

*The Quest for a New Balance of Power in the Multipolar World
of the 21st Century and for a Balanced International Order
for the 21st Century*

The previous prophetic statement of Joseph Nye on the decline of American power (reflected on so-called “soft power, Nye, 2005, Melissen, 2005.), as opposed to previously mentioned findings of Zbigniew Brzezinski, became especially valid with the marching of global financial crisis in 2007/2008. A visible crisis of liberal international order (which is dominant from the fall of the Berlin Wall) began just with the global financial crisis in 2007/2008 and culminated with the election of Donald Trump for U.S. president a decade after. If Donald Trump’s key cry is to “make America great

again”, that means nothing else but that in the meantime America had become “smaller” – in the sense of world power. This is in fact recognition that we live in a multipolar world in which the great powers will need to make new arrangements with each other and find new (in fact the old) balance of power as always in the history of international relations. *The thesis of our paper is that the best model for the new-old balance of power in international relations for the 21st century is the old European Westphalian system of sovereign states which was at the peak in the 18th and the 19th centuries as we previously described in our paper.*

*The Creation of the International Order for the 21st Century
as a Return to Early Modern Westphalian Balance of Power*

Our previous thesis is quite similar to the thesis of Henry A. Kissinger who also viewed the Westphalian system of sovereign states as the best model for international relations in the 21st century and for what he calls “international order in the twenty-first century”. Kissinger said: “The international order in the twenty-first century will be marked by something that at first glance seems contradictory: on the one hand there will be fragmentation, on the other increasing of globalization. At the level of inter-state relations, the new order will be more like the European system of the states from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the rigid structures of the Cold War” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 10). Our interpretation of the quoted Kissinger’s words is that he thinks that the great powers of our time (the U.S., China, Russia, the UK, etc., with no single super-power) should establish a new (old) balance of power in international relations, just as was the case in the old European Westphalian system. Therefore, *our thesis with which we go a step further into the future than Kissinger is that the great powers of our time (the US, China, Russia, the UK, etc.) will sooner or later initiate the “New Yalta” as “New Deal” for balanced international relations in the 21st century.* At this moment we cannot say whether this will happen after more intense global conflicts between the great powers or things will not go so far and a new global stability arrangement will be found without escalating significant global conflicts between the great powers, which would certainly be better for entire humanity. This is out of reach of our knowledge and the only thing that we can say at this moment is that the new global stability arrangement will sooner or later be found at some “New Yalta”, as always in the past, but

we do not know whether it will be preceded by significant conflicts between the great powers (as in the past) or not. So we think that the continuation of the 21st century will be sooner or later characterized with the return of “diplomacy at the top” between leaders of the great powers of our time, just as was the case at the time of the previous Yalta Conference. That means that our century will be characterized by intensive multi-polar diplomacy between the great powers as a specific return to classic diplomacy and to classic *Realpolitik* of the old Westphalian system. However, we hope that all of this will be in service of global stability and global balance of power because “at the same time, international relations for the first time have truly become global. Communications are current; world economy operates simultaneously on all continents” (Kissinger, 1994, p.10). This means that many of the problems that have emerged in contemporary international relations (nuclear proliferation, environmental and climate change and environmental protection, demographic growth and economic development) can be resolved only at the global level with the help of permanent communication between the great powers. On the other side, the “great powers” are not only in the game because the sign of our century is the significant increase in the number of subjects of public international law, with all its flaws and shortcomings. This is especially true for the new states and the newly formed international organizations, which has led to an increase of not only international contacts, but also to the need to strengthen the diplomatic service in the world as such. In our time the world is the net of different international players with different interests just as it was at the time of the old European Westphalian system of sovereign states, which for this reason can be a model for the international system of the 21st century as mentioned by Dr. Kissinger and which also presents the main thesis of our paper. In the multipolar world of the 21st century our country, Serbia, has a chance to improve its position of political and military neutrality⁴, escaping from being involved in every big (and for Serbia unnecessary) international political crisis – and stay open for good relations with all main great powers of our time. Small countries like Serbia do not have the luxury to participate in major world crises and to declare some rigid, radical, attitude on main strategic groupings in the world, and it is best for them, if possible, to remain neutral. Even the

⁴ Research on the long-term sustainability of Serbia’s political and military neutrality is in Cvetičanin, 2015.

European Union and Europe as a continent can be in the new multipolar world of the 21st century “Big Switzerland” – a territory for the meeting of the great powers of our time – primarily the U.S., China and Russia as political and geostrategic giants in relation to the European Union, which, however, has great moral credibility as the birthplace of classical diplomatic systems, such as the Westphalian one. In these sense initiatives such as, for example, the Chinese initiative for the “New Silk Road” (One Belt One Road Initiative) could be useful not only for China, but for Europe and Serbia and for balancing world politics as such. This new (silk) road between two continents could be an introduction to the multipolar world of the 21st century in which continents and the great powers need to communicate and balance in every sense – economically, politically and diplomatically. In this case, we would live in a balanced multipolar world of the 21st century just as was the case in the old European stable Westphalian system of sovereign states. Otherwise, we could live in a hell of mutual conflict between the great powers that could turn the whole 21st century into a postmodern global hell, which is neither in the interest of the great powers (because a mess in international relations cannot be in the interest of the great powers) or finally in the interest of humanity as a whole.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York City, 1989.
- Bush, George Herbert Walker, *Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit*, (Internet, 14/04/2014), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9.
- Bžežinski, Zbignjev, *Američki izbor: globalna dominacija ili globalno vođstvo*, Politička kultura/CID, Zagreb-Podgorica, 2004.
- Cvetičanin, Neven, „Security position of Serbia in Europe today – concept of security neutrality and options of modeling Serbian neutrality according to Swiss neutrality model”, in: *Thematic conference proceedings of international significance Archibald Reiss Days*, Volume II, Belgrade, 2015, pp. 37-47.

- Cvetićanin, Neven, *Državništvo modernog doba*, Arhipelag-Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 2016.
- Cvetićanin, Neven, *Politička mehanika i veština državništva*, Arhipelag-Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 2016.
- Gross, Leo, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948", in: *The American Journal of International Law*, Washington DC, Vol. 42, No. 1/1948.
- Hass, Richard N, "The Age of Nonpolarity – What Will Follow US Dominance", in: *Foreign Affairs*, New York, Volume 97-No. 3/2008, pp. 44-56.
- Hobsbaum, Erik, *Doba ekstrema – istorija kratkog dvadesetog veka*, Beograd, Dereta, 2002.
- Kaplan, Morton A, "Balance of power, bipolarity and other models of International Systems", in: *International Politics and Foreign Policy – A Reader in Research and Theory* (edit. by James N. Rosenau), The Free Press/Collier-Macmillan Limited, New York-London, 1968.
- Kegley, Charles W, Raymond, Gregory A, *Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia – Building World Order in the NewMillenium*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2002.
- Kissinger Henry, *On China*, Penguin Books, London, 2011.
- Kissinger Henry, *World Order: Reflection on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, Penguin Books, London, 2015.
- Kissinger, Henry A, *A World restored: The Politics of Conservatism in Revolutionary Era*, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1964.
- Kissinger, Henry A, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York/London/Toronto /Sydney/Tokyo/Singapore, 1994.
- Lewis, Patricia M., Williams, Heather, Pelopidas, Benoît, Aghlani, Sasan, *Too Close for Comfort Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2014.
- Mearsheimer, John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Norton, New York, 2001.
- Melissen, Jan, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005.
- Naj, Džozef S, *Paradoks američke moći: zašto jedina svetska supersila ne može sama*, BMG, Beograd, 2004.

- Nye Joseph S, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2005.
- Waltz, Kenneth N, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reding, Massachusetts, 1979.
- Živojinović, Dragan M, *Kratak Pregled istorije novovekovnih međunarodnih odnosa*, Diplomatska akademija MSP/FPN, Beograd, 2009.