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Nature of Belief and Role of Belief in Statements Producing Process

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Belief is considered as a complex phenomenon of super subject-realization nature. This consideration is based on the combination of philosophical-anthropological approach and semiotic approach. Differences between personal belief and religious, confessional belief are revealed. Functions of belief in statements producing process are determined.

Keywords: belief, subject-realization, personal belief, religious, confessional belief, statements producing process.

Introduction

Beginning from the 1970's in philosophy of language influential concepts emphasizing essential meaning of belief in linguistic activity of the subject started to appear (Fodor, 1983; Searle, 1975, 1983). These concepts are subjected to the thorough criticism (Petrov, 1987, 1990; Lectorskiy, 2006) which fairly reproduces their important defects, ambiguities and basic insufficiency in the interpretation of statements producing process within the frames of a natural language (For example, in Searle's theory of intentionality statements producing process is explained as initiated by a condition of conviction, desirability and sensation. But to speak about desires, sensations and furthermore, about belief and intentions with reference to the person considering them as something essentially extralanguage it is inadmissible. And if it's so then in Searle's case the language behavior is

explained as caused by conscious-language factors and conditions. But then in order to avoid the tautology additional analysis of the linguistic status of these conditions and mechanisms of their interrelation with concrete speech acts is necessary). At the same time knowledge of essence of belief positive functions in language realization of the subject still remains incomplete. Thus in this article problems of the nature and the influence of phenomenon of belief (Analyzing phenomenon of belief it's necessary to give its preliminary definition: belief is understood here as a mental act, condition or habit of placing trust or confidence in a person, idea or thing. Such definition implies both belief which rest some extent on proof or material evidence (though they cannot be rigorous or immediately given) and belief which doesn't rest on them at least distinctly. In the latter case belief can reveal itself as a religious belief (belief in God), that is faith,

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which is particular belief state. Such approach to definition of belief gives an opportunity to understand that non-religious belief and religious belief with all the differences between them have the same nature) on linguistic activity of the subject are considered.

Belief represents an original and besides a syncretic component of a subjective reality, because it incorporates elements of different gnoseological and psychological nature: rational-conceptual structures, emotionally-sensual and strong-willed states. Moreover, belief which is paradoxical enough is some special knowledge, namely the knowledge that substitutes ignorance and accepted as necessary transition or synthesis to that knowledge which should be intersubjective, i.e. to that knowledge which should be presented in demonstrative, obligatory forms. The knowledge in the latter case appears as actual knowledge, i.e. as a result of informative display of real events and processes, a result presented in the form of the cause-and-effect statements (laws) empirically checked up and confirmed. In contradistinction to it, belief knowledge as a belief component has other content – presumable and not-realizable. However, in its form belief knowledge is still the knowledge, which is represented as a connection of abstract concepts. Here there is a true possibility to oppose knowledge and belief to each other, though, of course, this opposition cannot be absolute. After all the presumable knowledge can be confirmed subsequently, and on the other hand the system of the proved knowledge usually contains fictions and conventions (see, in particular, Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 84-310). At the same time it is clear that belief and knowledge cannot be identified. Belief as it was already mentioned is a complex mental condition of a subject (individual or collective one) since in this condition emotionally-sensual, intuitive, unconscious and rational components of a subjective reality are specially synthesized

and in this synthesis the first three components seriously overweight the rational one¹.

Thus, despite certain rational “insufficiency” in its structure, belief acts as utmost (not as some private) spiritual metaattitude “entitling” the person in all of his/her activity. In this case ontological and gnoseological analyses of belief appear to be insufficient and they are fairly supplemented by praxeological and axiological analyses of belief (see Dubrovskiy, 2002). From positions of the philosophical-anthropological approach synthesizing these four kinds of the analysis of belief, in its unity with the semiotic approach we’ll try to explain genesis of belief, to reproduce some important belief characteristics and also to determine functions of belief in statements producing process.

Genesis of belief and essential characteristics of belief

According to psychological, philosophical and linguistic data, the transition from merely sensory ways of the information processing by living systems to primitive languages of rational reproduction of the reality was connected with appearance of a verb, and consequently with comprehension of an agent (subject) (Meillet, 2002) who, on conditions of practice, was the human being himself. As a result a specific linguistic and intellectual attitude of basic subject-realization appeared. In the field of intellectuality, subject-realization revealed itself in understanding that a subject is the one who produces an action. And in the field of language, subject-realization revealed itself in appearance of precisely expressed subject and predicate in

¹ Thus knowledge as a component of belief is a so-called tacit knowledge (see Polanyi, 1985). And in the case of religious belief tacit knowledge has phantomlike, mystical character. So if in the frame of non-religious belief tacit knowledge can turn to explicit, proved knowledge in the process of cognition, then in the frame of religious belief such turning at least by means of ordinary logic as it will be shown further looks in principle impossible.

initially united words-sentences. This grammar and logic separation was the evidence of new form of calculus mechanisms ² that are in the base of evolutionary improvement of language. It proves, first, that ancestors of the modern human being had already a variety of language means of information reception and processing (sensory language and verbal language), and, second, that a specific linguistic-intellectual attitude of super subject-realization had been formed. Namely translanguage character of connections (relationships) between these language systems has caused the appearance of super subject-realization that is the appearance of specific mental metaattitude. It means that there is intellectual and sensual state of the subject and this state somehow “is built on” above his/her states and actions as a certain independent carrier of an action or an idea. At first super subject-realization reveals itself in passive constructions and also in designing an illusory subject. All this finally has entailed the formation of mythological and religious sign-symbolical systems and languages. According to K. Uhlenbek, North American Indian considers himself/herself not as an independent producer of an action, but as

an executor of it, as the one who causes it. The Indian’s way of speech should reflect this his/her outlook (Meshchaninov, 1975).

Taking it into account, it is necessary to specify the status of such illusory “agent”, i.e. of subject. In the Homer’s poems one can find an expression “*Zeus is raining*” instead of “*it’s raining*” (Meillet, 2002). On this occasion N. Marr wrote that all so-called impersonal verbs – Russian “*меня лихорадит*”, French “*il pleut*”, German “*es regnet*” – in fact are personal because the subject here should be understood as a totem (Marr, 1933-1937, p. 91-92)³. Illusory (irreal) subject in the form of mythological personification or in the forms of impersonal verbs, despite of its archaism, can be considered as an evidence of significant cogitative reorganizations, namely both mystic-mythological and “impersonal” perception of the subject of action meant a movement of consciousness on a way of the increasing generalization and abstraction. In this case the subject is understood not simply as a concrete person, whose borders and space are quite definite (which usual (personal) verbs characterized by), but as “a universal subject” – the carrier of unlimited forces and an arbitrariness. Such understanding of the subject, undoubtedly, occurred with the participation of sensory-emotional states of an ancient human being which meant an interaction of rational and sensual code structures, and the result of that was the initial formation of super subject-realization. Subsequently these archaic forms of super subject-realization disappeared or were replaced. However the mechanism of their generation turned out to be effective and productive and led, in particular, to the appearance of such complex form of super subject-realization as belief.

² Calculus mechanisms here are understood as such way of the reality representation when to its objects and phenomena material configurations/signs (neural connections, sounds, letters, words, figures, etc.) are put in conformity; and then according to accepted in system (in the central nervous system, in system of verbal language etc.) rules (conclusion rules) the operations which are necessary for the decision of a concrete tasks are made with them. It is obvious that for living systems including human being maximally generalized immediate task is the task of survival which in the evolution process of the person and a human society gets the certain specification. As to the conclusion rules which are the important characteristic of calculus mechanisms it is necessary to notice that they are not limited in this case to rules of formal logic. Thus calculus mechanisms appear to be plurality of logic principles and their supplementation. Concept of calculation if to treat it widely, i.e. not to identify it exclusively with numerical and formal-logic operations can be considered as a synonym of calculus mechanisms and at the same time can designate concrete cases of their display (including numerical and formal-logic operations).

³ The fact that there is a semantic subject in so-called impersonal sentences is proved also by contemporary linguistic investigations (Zolotova, 1982; Pavlov, 1992; Tarlanov, 1998).

Before turning strictly to the belief characteristics analysis it's necessary to emphasize that super subject-realization cannot be understood as a certain intellectual-linguistic phenomenon which is placed out of individual subject. Supersubject-realization is an intrasubject property, though it has social origin and socially articulated functioning. Certainly, there are rather distinct philosophical traditions (for example transcendentalism of German classical philosophy, psychoanalysis etc.), which consider super subject-realization to be independent from the subject. But some of them mystify super subject-realization (transcendentalism); others emphasize suppressing influence of external depersonalized super subject-realization on the person (psychoanalysis). It's true that these traditions, each one in its own way, confirm the linguistic-intellectual nature of super subject-realization formation, but understanding of super subject-realization proved in this article is more universal and natural. This understanding definitely confirms that every normally developed subject has an ability to be a carrier of super subject-realization and this last one is his/her linguistic-intellectual property and a condition which along with other mental components carries out an active function in generation of statements, especially significant statements. These significant statements are those which express constructive-reconstructive, i.e. creative possibilities of the subject.

Super subject-realization is carried out by the subject both in a mode of intellectual-strong-willed management, and in a mode of "autonomous" work of his/her central nervous system, when a subject is relaxing but at the same time he/she is in the state of an intellectual problem solution. But in both cases super subject-realization represents the utmost level of linguistic-intellectual freedom of the subject, and it's remarkable that in the latter "not strong-willed" case super subject-realization

can be perceived as an «unexpected finding». At the same time situations of such freedom testify information management and self-management in the sphere of intellectual activity of the subject. In "an autonomous" mode – situations of insight, intuitions, inspiration – super subject-realization can provide the maximum creative effect, though, it's clear that such effect does not always necessarily take place.

Belief has a super subject-realization status because an agent in it starts to be realized as a certain subject who transforms the real subject – the carrier of even not thorough developed abstract thinking – into the object of his will and reason. Such result in its very beginning was caused by a new form of calculus mechanisms, the basis of which was an interaction of languages of different types. In the state of developed abstract thinking a subject has even more rich typology of languages and developed code organization of brain work which corresponds to them. All this is the basis of formation of belief as the syncretic spiritual metaformation defining all kinds of realized mental activity and real acts of a subject. In this connection it is necessary to specify the well-known statement of M. Polanyi according to which one should acknowledge again, that the belief is a source of knowledge (Polanyi, 1985, p. 277). The fact is that this statement puts at once such question as what the source of belief is. One should answer this question the following way: initially belief as a specific component of a subjective reality is a result of development of cognitive structures and functions of the highest nervous activity of a human being, that is a result of dissipation of the language-symbolical means, of formation of new calculus opportunities within the frames of these means, and then it is a result of their additional complication and enrichment. Thus source of belief attitude are those information invariants which are presented by code interactions (calculations) of the highest

nervous activity. It means that phylogenetically cognitive processes are the base, the source of belief attitude. So it is possible to assume that at the initial stages of its formation in phylogenesis of a person belief attitude revealed itself as “the silent statement”, “silent consent”, “silent belief”. There are two reasons that make such assumption possible, first, animals with developed mentality already have such form of belief, and, second, such form of belief is a deep basis of realized forms of belief which are only *homo sapiens* has. “Silent belief”, operating not obviously, but intuitively or retrospectively, acts at the level of highly developed animals and the human being as the fundamental factor of biological self-organization providing a survival of a living being (Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 303-304).

Ontogenetically belief attitude arises in the process of overcoming of problematical character and insufficiency of available knowledge. Belief in this case acts as some sort of gangway from available knowledge to possible new knowledge. On the one hand such gangway is available in “stock”, and on the other, it’s completed whenever it’s necessary, and the completion material is again some “cognitive content” having “obvious or not obvious propositional structure”. In this respect D. Dubrovskiy referring to J. Margolis (Margolis, 1986) fairly considers that propositional structure can exist irrespectively of whether it’s expressed in language or not, and the researcher reasonably adds that most likely it is fair with respect to those subjective states of “not verbal ideas (thinking)” which are peculiar to the person possessing the developed language competence (Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 290). Thus belief being understood here as “an act of acceptance of defined cognitive content” (Dubrovskiy, 2002, p. 294), is based on some knowledge, is expressed in many respects as a knowledge, and only then belief can serve as a factor of knowledge augment.

Belief reveals itself as a high level of a coordination of spiritually-mental structures of the subject, which help the subject to take an effective decision in a difficult situation (it represents his original existential basis). And this coordination, being not completely realizable for the subject (and in this sense being “ignorant knowledge”), is formed and continued by behavioral successes, when some sort of cause and effect connection appeared, and in this connection a causal part remains out of full explanation. These characteristics of belief show its significance as a value, because in a productive part of its evolution belief carries out the interconnected functions of an element of personal management and self-management, of a stimulator of steady initiative and creative behavior and also of internal spiritual mediator of person integrity.

In the further realizations (for different reasons) belief can undergo various transformations. First, it can be a monotonously-obligatory state. Though in this case belief will continue to carry out integrating function, it will do so basically in inertial-conservative mode that means a crisis of belief and an appearance of doubt. Second, for this reason (disability of belief to keep and develop initiative-creative potential of a person) serious change of belief can take place.

Thus, if belief assumes knowledge and knowledge contains belief components, so noted discredit of available belief assumes the ascertainment of a role of doubt in the process of belief discredit. We will concern here neither the importance of historical-philosophical tradition in the analysis of a category of doubt, nor the detailed reproduction of positive modern results of such analysis. Suffice it to be guided by some characteristics summarizing both lines of the analysis of doubt.

It is clear that the doubt is essentially important both for cognitive process and for states of belief. Thus the greater degree of doubt

in knowledge and belief a subject possesses, the smaller becomes a degree of strength of his/her knowledge and belief. However as it is impossible to imagine that a level of belief and knowledge is equal to zero, so, obviously, (this again can be perceived as a paradox) a level of doubt never happens to be equal to zero. Liquidation of distrust factuality, as well as liquidation of intellectual significance of doubt, means liquidation of belief and knowledge. In the process of affirmation of successful knowledge everything that contradicts to it is eliminated by means of doubt and, besides, by means of doubt the vulnerable moments in a positive part of knowledge are withdrawn. The same things happen with usual (personal, civil) belief. And in the case of doubt removal both knowledge and belief pass into a dogmatism and blindness zone. However the maximum, total measure of doubt completely disarms the person in cognition and behavior, depriving him/her of any positive reference points. At the same time belief directions, that are reliable enough, can not only positively focus behavior of the person, but also define his/her unacceptance of humanistic harmful elements of possible own behavior and behavior of associates.

Belief can have both special character (for example, in case of I. Kepler's confidence that the way of planetary orbits organization conforms to mathematical laws), and universal character, assuming interosculation of the most general ideas about the universe and about positions of a human being in it. So, it is possible to believe, for example, in orderliness and harmony of the world, in probability of events in it. And it is possible to believe also in all these things together and in addition to this to believe in special orderliness in this world – in being of the person. I. Kant's well-known statements, given in the conclusion to his «Critique of practical reason», are perfectly express it (we will afford volume citing): «Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing

admiration and awe, the more often and the more steadily we reflect on them, they are: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into limitless times of their periodic motion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds» (Kant, 1965, p. 499-500; WW). It's necessary to add only that Kant substantiating a unity of the utmost purpose of the nature and the moral law carrier of which is person recognized a morally-teleological substantiation of God's life. For us, however, though it's clear that there is no need in divine definition of moral establishments of a person, but still essentially important remains a unity of the world of the nature and the world of a person in all of vital activities of the last one.

Thus, cited statements illustrate very well the properties of fully represented belief: it unites the ideas about the bases of the nature with knowledge of them, with general ethical requirements, and also with aesthetic representations. «The starry sky over me» is not only briefly expressed mechanics of space in unity with a person, but also it is briefly expressed aesthetic representation. In connection with this at least two more important properties of belief are found out: 1) belief exists and is expressed in the person in «large-block» without a detailed articulation which is carried out

only in concrete behavior of the person; 2) belief has philosophical character – it's synthesis of the principles, full articulation of which grows in philosophy where person is proved as the purpose of herself/himself.

Religious, confessional belief (that is faith), having as its object supernatural and in all senses absolute, is a specific kind of belief. In this case not only the object of belief gets transcendental characteristics, but also belief attitude itself is understood as having transcendental character, i.e. as caused by the connection of a person with the Absolute. Thus object, mystery-topic and ceremonial components of belief are perceived as the unconditional (absolute, indisputable) true at a level of regularly operating positive religiousness, that is they are perceived as coinciding with present and predicted constructive forms of day-to-day life. Standard organized confessions aspire to separate from mysticism as they see in it a germ of high degree of individualization of the religiousness leading to infringement of integrity of the doctrine and to appearance of heresies (Mechkovskaya, 1998). Nevertheless primary mystic of the Creed develops in practice into collective supermysticism. Archetypical-mystical in this case can reveal itself especially persistently both at the individual and collective levels and gravitates towards serious strengthening, which in some cases can lead to mass psychoses and antihuman orientation (the religious fanaticism, extremism and terrorism).

Religious, confessional belief, besides, has strongly pronounced canonical-dogmatic character: the object of belief and the ways of attitude to it are canonized in two ways – initially historical and situational-historical. The first means absolutely canonical set and character of the plots directed on disclosing of an object essence of belief and the ways of attitude to it, and also the form of their verbal expression; the second means historically pragmatic admissible transformation

of the interpretation of these plots and this interpretation not only destroys an opportunity of individual perusal of theological documents, but also really deforms (distorts) them. It's not a coincidence, that outstanding freedom-loving Russian philosopher – N. Berdyaev wrote: "I have a real disgust for theological-dogmatic conflicts. I feel pain reading history of ecumenical councils"; "...historical revelation was secondary for me, in comparison with spiritual revelation"; "Revelation assumes activity of not only Revealing, but also of the one who perceives revelation. Revelation is binomial" (Berdyaev, 1991, p. 354, 210, 204). The statements of N. Berdyaev show religious, confessional belief can get sometimes personal character⁴. Usually it happens when a believer has a variety of linguistic-intellectual means. Only having these means a person is capable to enter into a wide context of the reality which includes achievements and problems of science and art. In this respect not only N. Berdyaev's position, but also V. Solovyev's position is rather significant. Though they are considered (which is fair enough) as religious thinkers, undoubtedly, they are not only and not simply religious. Religiousness of these thinkers not only dissatisfies the requirements of orthodox religiousness, but in some cases turns into anti-religiousness, for example: V. Solovyev (Solovyev, 1995) separates ethics and religion⁵, N. Berdyaev distinctly proclaims individuality of interpretation of

⁴ Unlike traditional confessional belief personal belief assumes high degree revelation of individual-personal element in its organization and freedom from dogmatism. Examples of personal belief it's necessary to search in civil (secular) form of belief realization though as it was already mentioned separate cases of individual-personal transformation of confessional belief also can be perceived as examples of personal belief.

⁵ Solovyev writes in particular, that: «The moral philosophy does not depend entirely on positive religion ... At existence of many religions and creeds disputes between them assume the general moral ground... and, hence, ethical standards to which the arguing sides equally refer, cannot depend on their religious and creed distinctions» (Solovyev, 1996, p. 7).

Revelation, perceiving with bewilderment and despondency (depression) conflicts of orthodoxy. Explaining this one should take into account that they are gifted persons whose gift is conditioned by and reveals itself in a variety of semiotic-linguistic means designing their general spiritual potential. Each of them is a magnificent expert on history, art culture, philosophy; each of them is an expert both in the field of poetry and in the field of philosophical essayistic and at the same time each of them is the recognized original author in philosophical creativity.

Probably, as a special case of “reconciliation” and “consent” of personal and confessional belief can be considered P. A. Florenskiy’s reasoning on the status of actual infinity and on the Scriptures contradictions. Being an expert on problems of mathematics, a logician and partly semiotician orthodox ordained believer P.A. Florenskiy, arguing on actual infinity in connection with Cantor’s formulation of this problem, proves such infinity to be an absolute maximum (no more subjected to increase) in a sense of maximum identity to God as it is treated traditionally by theologians. Other kinds of actual infinity are, first, “*in concreto*, in the dependent world, in a creature *in natura naturata*” and, second, “*in abstracto*, in a spirit, because it has a possibility to learn *Transfinitum* in the nature and, to a certain extent, *Absolutum* in God” (Phlorenskiy, 1990, p. 498-499). But in these cases we deal only with symbols of infinite, whereas real instance of infinite is God. Similarly to it, fairly marking that formal-logic law of the contradiction inadmissibility is not absolute and agreeing with presence of contradictions in the Scriptures, the religious thinker concludes: “... there is no need to assure rationalist that there are no contradictions: they are available; yes, they also are doubtless. But rationalist should believe mystic that these contradictions appear to be the highest unity in

the light of Never-Setting Sun and then exactly these contradictions show that the Scriptures and dogmas are above flesh reasoning and hence they could not be thought up by the person, i.e. they are divine” (Phlorenskiy, 1990, p. 505). Comments, as the saying goes, are unnecessary here. It is possible only to emphasize that putting noted problems in “bosom” of divine clarity is a method which doesn’t guarantee advancement in their solution.

Functions of belief in statements producing process

Belief in any of its forms (whether personal or confessional) is a semiotic-pragmatic spiritual formation that has super subject-realization nature. This formation carries out functions of self-determination and self-substantiation of a person when the person correlates accepted general regulations with general plans of actions, with cardinal acts, with significant speech self-expression. As for the ability of belief to generate statements it’s necessary to emphasize here that belief itself is a phenomenon generated by propositions (even not obviously), but at the same time it certainly participates in generation of statements (propositions) and texts. Participating in the statements generation process belief carries out the following functions:

- Initiating and stimulating function. In this case belief not only in some ways turns on, starts the mechanism of generation of statements of certain semantic loading, but also supports, stimulates it;

- Controlling and authorizing function. Carrying out this function, belief, on the one hand, authorizes selection of the language means working both towards the solution of an intellectual problem, and towards accepted belief directions, strengthening this belief directions, answering it (here rather significant is the use of

the figurative, metaphorical, emotionally loaded constructions); and on the other hand, supervises, does not allow the use of the language means that level it;

– Extrapolating function. In this case there is a distribution of propositions of belief – the statements establishing an object of belief – on the majority of other statements which directly haven't been connected with this object. In other words, these or those belief directions accepted by the subject, belief attitude realized by the subject can define speech behavior of the subject on the whole. So, for example, belief of a person in herself or himself, in her/his abilities and calling, let's say calling of teacher, is capable to set the general tone (syntactic and semantic) to each particular case of person's speech realization out of a school or high school audience;

– Synthesizing function. Carrying out this function, belief affects the composite organization of texts both written, and oral. So performance of this function by belief, for example in frameworks of confessional belief, promotes the formation of such initial genres of religious communication as Revelation, sermon and prayer.

Also taking into account this function it's necessary to show how confessional belief can influence both religious and secular communication strategies. For example in the Scriptures religions, in particular in Christianity and Islam, fideistic and non-conventional relation to a word appears to be connected closely with a principle *ipse dixit*⁶ in the former case and with a category of *isnad*⁷ in the latter case. Noted principle and category can be taken as an evidence of the same communicative aim:

to keep most important information. And though secular contexts of the XIX century in relation to a principle *ipse dixit* already are basically ironic, this principle even without former seriousness and indisputability still remains a reference point in modern communication space. As to *isnad*, then first, in Islamic bookishness *isnad* even in a greater degree, than the principle *ipse dixit* in the European culture, brought up Muslim theologian and lawyer in a constant orientation on authorities, and, secondly, *isnad's* manifestations and a consequence of them represent one of the powerful factors of traditionalism in Islamic culture (Mechkovskaya, 1998, p. 171).

In the cultures based on doctrines and religious practice of Buddhism and Daoism in their diverse variations (Lamaism, dzen-Buddhism, late daoists), a question *Who has told it?*, which is in the base of a principle *ipse dixit* and of a category of *isnad*, has no fundamental value in communications management. Fideistic and non-conventional relation to the word isn't peculiar to Buddhism and Daoism, on the contrary basic mistrust to the letter, to a frozen form, to a canon, to ability of language to help intuition are peculiar to them. It's well-known that dzen-Buddhist monks prefer language of images to language of words, and one dzen comparison says: to put truth into words it is not easier than to fish by a narrow-necked pumpkin (Konrad, 1980, p. 119-120, 122).

On the whole, carrying out noted functions, belief can be perceived as some sort of statements catalyst because it is capable to strengthen and accelerate statements influence on interlocutor. If we consider that the vector of fully represented belief can have a different orientation both humanistic, and antihumanistic, then it's obvious that belief catalization of statements can have both positive, and negative value.

⁶ *Ipsi dixit* (in Latin) means somebody main one — teacher, leader, master — has told (see Mechkovskaya, 1998, p. 140).

⁷ *Isnad* is a chain of reference to narrators in collections of legends about Prophet Muhammad and in other Muslim treatises (see Mechkovskaya, 1998, p.170).

Conclusion

To sum up it's necessary to emphasize that belief is always some knowledge existing in synthesis with ethic-aesthetic components, which is accompanied and supplemented with emotionally-strong-willed experiences; belief possesses mutually supplementing properties – to be a steady spiritual complex and, at the same time, to have certain dynamics: belief complex differs personally and besides it can change in the evolution of a person.

The semiotic approach to the analysis of belief shows the certain analytical opportunities in revealing the spiritual status and specificity of this phenomenon. Due to this approach that allocates three aspects (attitude) of any sign system – semantic, pragmatic and syntactic – it appears possible to fix independence of belief as a pragmatic formation of super subject-realization nature. And genesis of this formation has strong connections with the development of general fundamental linguistic-semiotic and gnoseological procedures, such as generalization,

abstraction and metaphor-making. Moreover, the given approach allows revealing a predominating role of the general spirituality of a person, constituted by languages of science, art, philosophy in relation to belief. Personal belief, being the certain “organizing” part of spirituality, does not assume a constant and strict conscious regulation of any behavioral step. A variety of linguistic-semiotic means which a person has, person's solution of different sort of specific targets, mediating the main directions of activity, weakens, and even completely removes a constancy of belief dictatorship. It makes clear, that belief carries out infrastructural functions in language realization.

Personal belief, leaning on fundamental “blocks” of the general spirituality of a person more freely than confessional belief, promotes expansion of borders of the general personal freedom and is capable of providing overcoming of person's excessive mental isolation. Besides (for noted reasons) personal belief is more inclined to transformations, reconstruction and change.

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