


## Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook

**Proceedings of the October 2011 Workshop** 

Thomas Fellmann, Sophie Hélaine



EUR 25147 EN - 2011





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## **Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook**

## **Proceedings of the October 2011 Workshop**

Thomas Fellmann, Sophie Hélaine

Disclaimer:

The views expressed are those given and presented at the workshop and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission or of the other institutions that participated at the workshop.

### Workshop background

This report contains a summary and the presentations of the expert workshop 'Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook', jointly organised by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (Institute for Prospective and Technological Studies, JRC-IPTS) and the Directorate General Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI). The workshop took place in Brussels on 25-26 October 2011 and is part of the workshop series on commodity market modelling and development, yearly held since 2006.<sup>1</sup>

The 2011 workshop was held to present and discuss the preliminary results of the European Commission's outlook on EU agricultural market developments. As part of the validation procedure, suggestions and comments made in the course of the workshop were taken into account to improve the final version of the outlook. Thus, for reference to the DG AGRI baseline projections refer to the final report:

'Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income in the EU 2011-2020': <u>http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/caprep/prospects2011/index\_en.htm</u>

The workshop gathered high-level policy makers, modelling and market experts from the EU, the United States and international organisations such as the FAO, OECD and World Bank. The workshop provided a forum to present and discuss recent and projected developments on the EU agricultural and commodity markets, to outline the reasons behind observed and prospected developments, and to draw conclusions on the short/medium term perspectives of European agricultural markets in the context of world market developments. Special focus was given to the discussion of the sensitivity of the projected market developments to different settings/assumptions (regarding e.g. drivers of demand and supply, macroeconomic uncertainties, etc.).

Fellmann, T., R. M'barek, S.H. Gay (Eds.) (2009): Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook. November 2008 Workshop Proceedings. JRC Technical Notes, European Commission. JRC 51276

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The proceedings of the respective workshops are listed below and can be downloaded at the JRC-IPTS website (<u>http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/</u>):

Bartova, L., R. M'barek (Eds.) (2008): Commodity Modelling in an Enlarged Europe. November 2006 Workshop Proceedings. AGMEMOD Report V. JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, European Commission. EUR 22940 EN/5

Bartova, L., S.H. Gay, R. M'barek (Eds.) (2008): Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook. November 2007 Workshop Proceedings. JRC Technical Notes, European Commission. EUR 23377EN

Fellmann, T., B. Van Doorslaer, R. M'barek, S.H. Gay (Eds.) (2010): Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook. November 2009 Workshop Proceedings. JRC Technical Notes, European Commission, JRC 60425

Fellmann, T., R. M'barek, S.H. Gay (Eds.) (2011): Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook. October 2010 Workshop Proceedings. JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, European Commission. JRC 65170

### Acknowledgements

The workshop 'Commodity Market Development in Europe - Outlook' was jointly organised by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS), Agriculture and Life Sciences in the Economy Unit (AGRILIFE) together with the European Commission's DG Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), Economic analysis of EU agriculture Unit (L2). We would like to acknowledge contributions made by all participants (a complete list is included in Annex 2) and their consent to share their knowledge and ideas. We thank all contributing and participating colleagues from the European Commission and especially the following invited external experts:

Bruce A. BABCOCK John BAFFES	Iowa State University, USA World Bank, USA
Adam BELL	DEFRA, UK
Julian BINFIELD	FAPRI, USA
Maria BLANCO FONSECA	UPM, Madrid
David BLANDFORD	Penn State University, USA
Pauline BOISSINOT	Tallage, France
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Alison BURRELL	Freelance, Spain
Philippe CHOTTEAU	Institut de l'Elevage, France
Sune Jin CHRISTENSEN	Danish Agriculture and Food Council, Belgium
Claudiu COVRIG	Kingsman, Switzerland
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Joseph GLAUBER	USDA, USA
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Chris HORSEMAN	Informa Agra, UK
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Christophe LAFOUGERE	GIRA, France
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Andreas LUNDBY	Arla Foods, Denmark
Caroline MIDGLEY	LMC International, UK
Catherine MOREDDU	OECD, France
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Guna SALPUTRA	LVAEI, Latvia
Josef SCHMIDHUBER	FAO, Italy
Klaus-Dieter SCHUMACHER	Nordzucker, Germany
Laurine SIMON	Tallage, France
John TJAARDSTRA	International Grains Council, UK
Pavel VAVRA	OECD, France
Eckhard WURZEL	OECD, France

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## Workshop Agenda

#### Date: 25/26 October 2011

Venue: European Commission, Centre Albert Borschette, Rue Froissart 36, B-1040 Brussels

Organisers: JRC-IPTS and DG AGRI

	AGENDA - DAY I - 25 O	CTOBER 2011
09:30 09:40	Welcome. Background of workshop Policy Background:	John Bensted-Smith, JRC-IPTS Tassos Haniotis, DG AGRI
10:00 10:10	Impact assessment CAP-post 2013 Main conclusions of last year's outlook Baseline process and description of the uncertainty analysis	Thomas Fellmann, JRC-IPTS Pierluigi Londero, DG AGRI & Robert M'barek JRC-IPTS
10:25		pact of related uncertainties for agricultural
Session 1		evelopments ted-Smith, JRC-IPTS
(20 min) (15 min)	EU agricultural outlook – settings and uncertainty analysis Agriculture and the global economy	S. Hubertus Gay, DG AGRI & Zebedee Nii-Naate, JRC-IPTS John Baffes, World Bank
11:00 – 11:30	Coffee break	Sonn Danes, wona Dank
<b>11:30</b> (10 min) (10 min) (30 min)	<b>Session 1 (continued)</b> Comparison FAPRI vs. EC outlook settings Exchange rates and agri-food markets Panel discussion	Julian Binfield, FAPRI William Liefert, USDA Björn Döhring, DG ECFIN Eckhard Wurzel, OECD Josef Schmidhuber, FAO
(40 min)	Open discussion	All participants
13:00 – 14:30	Networking lunch	
14:30 Session 2		neat markets and related uncertainties ia Navarro, DG AGRI
(20 min)	EU agricultural outlook and uncertainties	Edit Konya, DG AGRI & Emanuele Ferrari, JRC-IPTS
(30 min) (40 min)	Panel discussion General reflections Beef markets Pork markets Open discussion	Richard Brown, GIRA Consulting Philippe Chotteau, Institut de l'Elevage Sune Jin Christensen, Danish Meat Association All participants
16:00 – 16:30	Coffee break	
16:30 Secolar 2		nd dairy markets and related uncertainties
Session 3		ison Burrell
(20 min)	EU agricultural outlook and uncertainties	Beatriz Velazquez, DG AGRI & Sophie Hélaine, JRC-IPTS
(30 min)	Panel discussion	Pavel Vavra, OECD Christophe Lafougère, GIRA Consulting Andreas Lundby, Arla Foods
(40 min)	Open discussion	All participants
18:00	End of Day I	

## Workshop Agenda (Day 2)

#### Date: 25/26 October 2011

Venue: European Commission, Centre Albert Borschette, Rue Froissart 36, B-1040 Brussels

Organisers: JRC-IPTS and DG AGRI

## AGENDA - DAY II - 26 OCTOBER 2011

09:00	Wrap up day 1	Willi Schulz-Greve, DG AGRI			
09:15 Session 4		f uncertainty and volatility? eman, Informa Agra			
(20 min)	EU agricultural outlook and uncertainties	Alberto D'Avino, DG AGRI &			
(30 min)	Panel discussion	Olexandr Nekhay, JRC-IPTS Caroline Midgley, LMC International Bruce A. Babcock, Iowa State University Claudiu Covrig, Kingsman			
(25 min)	Open discussion	All participants			
10:30 – 11:00	Coffee break				
11:00 Session 5		, productivity and related uncertainties Delincé, JRC-IPTS			
(30 min)	EU agricultural outlook and uncertainties	S. Hubertus Gay, DG AGRI & Mihaly Himics, JRC-IPTS John Tjaardstra, International Grains Council Laurine Simon, Tallage/Stratégie Grains Klaus-Dieter Schumacher, Nordzucker			
(30 min)	Panel discussion				
(45 min)	Open discussion	All participants			
12:45 – 14:15	Networking lunch				
14:15 Session 6		ts: which relationship over time? for Agriculture and Rural Development			
(15 min)	Evaluation of agricultural policy reforms in the European Union	Catherine Moreddu, OECD			
(50 min)	Panel discussion	Tassos Haniotis, DG AGRI David Blandford, Pennsylvania State University George Rapsomanikis, FAO Joseph Glauber, USDA			
(40 min)	Open discussion	All participants			
16:00	Concluding remarks	DG AGRI & JRC-IPTS			

## Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CAPRI	Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis
CGE	Computable General Equilibrium
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CV	Coefficient of variation
c.w.e.	carcass weight equivalent
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
DDG	Dry Distillers Grain
DG AGRI	Directorate General 'Agriculture and Rural Development'
DG ECFIN	Directorate General 'Economic and Financial Affairs'
EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
EDA	European Dairy Association
EFMA	European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association
ERS	Economic Research Service
EU	European Union
EU-12	12 EU Member States of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements
EU-15	15 EU Member States before May 2004
EU-25	25 EU Member States after 2004 enlargement
EU-27	27 EU Member States after 2007 enlargement
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAPRI	Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, USA
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDF	International Dairy Federation
IGC	International Grains Council
ILUC	Indirect Land Use Change
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPTS	Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
JRC	Joint Research Centre
LUC	Land Use Change
NREAP	National Renewable Energy Action Plans
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PE	Partial Equilibrium
PSE	Producer Support Estimate
SAPS	Single Area Payment Scheme
SFP	Single Farm Payment

TRQ	Tariff Rate Quotas
UPM	Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain
USD	U.S. Dollar
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
WTO	World Trade Organization

### Summary

The 2011 workshop 'Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook' forms part of the intensive validation procedure of the results of the DG AGRI outlook on EU agricultural market developments. In the following chapters the presentations and discussions of the workshop are briefly summarised. Suggestions and comments made during the workshop were taken into account to improve the final version of the outlook. Thus, for the DG AGRI baseline projections please refer to the report 'Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income in the EU 2011-2020' which can be downloaded at the DG AGRI homepage<sup>2</sup>.


The workshop (and thus this summary) was structured as follows. First the background of the baseline construction process was delineated (Chapter 1). As the projections of an outlook are always subject to numerous uncertainties, some specific uncertainty analyses on the baseline projections have been carried out. The main assumptions of the uncertainty scenarios are described in Chapter 2. The macroeconomic environment (assumptions) can strongly influence the projected developments on agricultural markets. Therefore a specific session was dedicated to the discussion of the macroeconomic assumptions and the consequences of related uncertainties (Chapter 3). The sessions on drivers of supply and demand and related uncertainties are summarised for the meat markets in Chapter 4 and for the milk and dairy markets in Chapter 5. A specific session was also dedicated to biofuels (Chapter 6) and a summary of the session on production, productivity and related uncertainties for cereals, oilseeds, and sugar markets is given in Chapter 7. The workshop concluded with reflections on the relationship between agricultural policies and markets (Chapter 8).


#### 1. Background of the baseline construction process

The European Commission annually constructs an outlook for the medium-term developments in agricultural markets in the EU. This outlook (also called baseline) helps to better understand the markets and their dynamics and it also contributes to identify key issues for market and policy developments. Furthermore, the outlook serves as a benchmark for assessing the medium-term impact of future market and policy issues. The model used for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> <u>http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/caprep/prospects2011/index\_en.htm</u>

medium-term projections is the European Commission's version of AGLINK-COSIMO<sup>3</sup>, a recursive dynamic partial equilibrium model with a detailed representation of world agriculture and policy. The data used to construct the outlook is based on the latest available market and policy information (in the case of the preliminary outlook this was the data available at the end of September 2011). Projection results are presented in balance sheets for main agricultural commodities, with detailed results for EU-27, EU-15 and EU-12 aggregates for cereal, oilseed, biofuel, meat and dairy markets, and as of 2011 also for the sugar market.





The process of the baseline construction is depicted in Figure 1. In order to improve the accuracy, usefulness and relevance of the EU market prospects the entire process of the baseline construction has been reviewed in 2010 and considerably improved by increasing both the number of market and modelling experts involved, and the steps of evaluation and validation of the projection results. Starting point for the DG AGRI baseline is the latest available version of the AGLINK-COSIMO model, which was used for the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook.<sup>4</sup> The EU module of the AGLINK-COSIMO model is then modified, and an add-on for agricultural income included. The starting point for the adjustments in the EU module are the latest (internal) short-term forecasts (September version). Furthermore, the latest available macroeconomic projections are taken into account. An in-depth discussion of

Source: Presentation Londero and M'barek (DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Note: The results of any analysis based on the use of the AGLINK-COSIMO model by parties outside the OECD are outside the responsibility of the OECD Secretariat. Conclusions derived by third-party users of AGLINK-COSIMO should not be attributed to the OECD or its member governments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2011-2020 is available online: <u>http://www.agri-outlook.org/</u>

the first baseline results takes place with modelling and market experts of DG AGRI and the JRC-IPTS during a 'baseline week' in September. After further adjustments the baseline is presented at the workshop 'Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook', organised by JRC-IPTS and DG AGRI. In order to assess the sensitivity of the baseline to some uncertainties, the results of additional scenarios with varying assumptions are presented during the workshop. Suggestions and comments made during the workshop are taken into account to improve the final version of the outlook, which is then published in the report 'Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income in the EU' by DG AGRI in December.

# 2. Background of the uncertainty analyses and assumptions of the uncertainty scenarios

Building a baseline and thus an outlook for agricultural market developments is always subject to numerous uncertainties, especially with regard to weather conditions, developments in the wider macro-economy (e.g. GDP growth, exchange rates, oil prices), market developments related to supply and demand patterns (e.g. yield trends and consumer preferences) or policy issues (like specific agricultural or trade related policies, renewable energy policies, etc.). However, a deterministic baseline is based on explicit assumptions regarding such exogenous variables, e.g. usually normal weather conditions, a specific path for GDP growth rates, exchange rates and oil prices are assumed. Consequently, a deterministic baseline provides a single set of outcomes for a single set of assumptions and it is important to keep the uncertainty of these assumptions in mind when looking at the results of the outlook. In order to show how the projected results of the EU agricultural market outlook would be impacted by alternative assumptions, some uncertainty analyses on the baseline have been carried out. These uncertainty analyses follow a 'what-if'-approach, i.e. they try to exemplify *what* would change in the results of the outlook projections *if* a derivation of the 'standard' assumptions would occur.

For the uncertainty analyses, a set of five scenarios has been analysed using different agroeconomic models (in addition to AGLINK-COSIMO also CAPRI and GLOBE have been applied).<sup>5</sup> Discussions in the outlook workshop of last year revealed that a stochastic analysis could be helpful in order to capture the contribution of uncertainties in macroeconomic developments in the modelling approach of the outlook on agricultural market developments. Therefore, this year a partial stochastic simulation with respect to macroeconomic variables was conducted. Regarding drivers of demand, the role of China was raised several times in the workshop of last year. As the Chinese authorities communicated that they will try to slow their GDP growth for the period 2011 and 2015, an uncertainty scenario with slower GDP growth rates in China was carried out. Further uncertainties for the developments of agricultural commodity markets arise with regard to the drivers of supply. To assess the sensitivity of the baseline to some of the uncertainties on the supply side, three different scenarios were carried out. Firstly, one of the key drivers of production quantity is yields. To examine the different ways EU and global agricultural market projections may be impacted by variability in yields, a partial stochastic uncertainty analysis with respect to crop yields was applied. Secondly, increased operating costs in the agricultural sector in the EU have been observed in recent years. A further, and even faster increase in operating costs could impact the supply of agricultural commodities and farmers' income. The possible effects for the developments in agricultural markets were analysed in two scenarios with higher operating costs in the EU. Thirdly, the consequences of possible supply constraints in major supply countries were examined. For example Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are key players on the world markets for cereals and in recent years it has been seen that harvest failures and related export restrictions in these three countries have impacted the world cereal markets. Therefore a scenario analysis with respect to limited availability of grains from the three countries was conducted. An overview of the uncertainty scenarios is given in Table 1, and the assumptions of each scenario are further delineated in the following subchapters.

<sup>5</sup> CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact): highly disaggregated (regions NUTS 2, products) partial equilibrium (PE) model. A model documentation is provided by Britz, W. and H.-P. Witzke (eds.) (2008): CAPRI Model Documentation 2008, Version 2. Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Bonn, Germany. <u>http://www.capri-model.org/docs/capri\_documentation.pdf</u>

GLOBE: multi-regional, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. A model documentation is provided by McDonald, S., K. Thierfelder, and S. Robinson (2007): Globe: A SAM Based Global CGE Model using GTAP Data. Economics Working Paper, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, USA

Scenario Name	Uncertainty analysed	Scenario	Model used	
Macro Uncertainty	Partial stochastic analysis of macroeconomic variables random selection A		AGLINK-COSIMO	
Slower Growth China	Slower GDP growth in China	7% GDP growth	GLOBE and AGLINK-COSIMO	
Yield Uncertainty	Partial stochastic analysis of yields	random selection	AGLINK-COSIMO	
Higher Costs	Higher operating costs in the EU	30% increase 10% increase	CAPRI	
Harvest Failure East	Limited availability of grains in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan	No exports Lower exports	AGLINK-COSIMO	

 Table 1:
 Overview on the uncertainty scenarios

## 2.1 Macro Uncertainty Scenario: Partial stochastic analysis of macroeconomic variables

Developments in the macroeconomic environment are key drivers for the developments on agricultural commodity markets. However, the macroeconomic variables for the outlook projections are exogenous and their development is rather uncertain. In order to capture the consequences on the projected results of some uncertainties related to macroeconomic developments the AGLINK-COSIMO model was adapted to conduct partial stochastic simulations with respect to some exogenous macroeconomic variables. The specific macroeconomic variables covered in the partial stochastic analysis are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, GDP deflator, consumer price index (CPI), oil price and the Euro-US Dollar exchange rate. For the uncertainty analysis the forecast errors of the respective macroeconomic variables are defined to be the realisation at time t minus the forecast made 18 months earlier. The forecasts errors are assumed to follow a multivariate normal statistical distribution. Out of this distribution, 500 sets of macroeconomic variables are incorporated into the model and 500 alternative baseline projections are obtained that lie between the boundaries of what might be possible given past levels of uncertainties. The scheme of the partial stochastic analysis of macroeconomic variables is delineated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Overview of the Macro Uncertainty Scenario

Source: Presentation Londero and M'barek (DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS)

In general it can be said that, in contrast to a deterministic baseline, a partial stochastic analysis examines the range of possible outcomes through a random selection of variables. This can help to understand which uncertainties have the strongest influence on the projected results (variability in relation to the mean, coefficient of variation) and which sectors and products are most sensitive to these uncertainties (which might be policy relevant, e.g. with respect to intervention prices). However, also this stochastic analysis has its limits and may not capture all the variability observed in the past as the uncertainty underlying the EU macroeconomic assumptions is not the only uncertainty affecting EU commodity markets. In addition the stochastic analysis is based on past trends and it could be that the past has been more (or less) stable than the future will be.


#### 2.2 Slower Growth China Scenario: Slower GDP growth in China

The government of China communicated that it will try to slow down Chinese GDP growth for the period 2011 to 2015. The reasons behind a forced slow down of economic growth are twofold, on the one hand China wants to ease pressure on the environment, and on the other hand China seeks to reduce its inflation. Therefore the latest 5-year economic plan of the Chinese government foresees a limitation of the annual GDP growth rate to 7% for the period 2011 to 2015.

To identify and quantify the possible impacts of such a limitation of Chinese GDP growth a sensitivity analysis was conducted. The limited GDP growth of China was first introduced into the CGE model GLOBE, to obtain a cumulated change in GDP growth (2020/2010) in China (-13% compared to the baseline) and only limited effects on the GDP growth of other

countries (e.g. Mercosur +0.6%) and a change in world oil price (-4.5% compared to the baseline). These results obtained from the GLOBE model were then introduced into AGLINK-COSIMO in order to depict the possible impacts for the developments of agricultural commodity markets in the EU (cf. Figure 3).





Source: Presentation Londero and M'barek (DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS)

#### 2.3 Yield Uncertainty Scenario: Partial stochastic analysis of yield

Yield is one of the key drivers of production quantity – and is quite variable. For example there was an increase of the EU average yield per ha in wheat of more than one tonne from 2003 (4.5) to 2004 (5.6). Such variability in average yield per ha logically translates in the overall production quantity. While in the deterministic baseline usually a steady growth rate for yields is assumed, partial stochastic simulations provide a means to capture the contribution of crop yield uncertainty to the agricultural production and prices variability.

For the partial stochastic analysis of yields the error between the yield projected by the model (corresponding to the expected yield in normal weather conditions) and the observed yield in the past years is taken into account. Therefore the standard yield equations in AGLINK-COSIMO are augmented with this error term for the EU-15 and EU-12 for the following set of yields: soft wheat, durum wheat, barley, maize, oats, rye, other cereals, rapeseed, sunflower and soybean. The 'errors' for the different crops are assumed to be correlated, because if for example wheat yield is lower due to a draught, the yields of the other crops are most probably also lower. However, stochastic fluctuations are assumed to be independent between years and are not correlated with other arable crop producing countries. The partial stochastic analysis of yield provides a range of projected results around the deterministic baseline based on 500 simulations (cf. Figure 4).




Figure 4: Overview of the Yield Uncertainty Scenario

Source: Presentation Londero and M'barek (DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS)

#### 2.4 Higher Costs Scenario: Higher operating costs in the EU

In recent years pressure on the agricultural sector particularly increases on the cost side of production. In the EU operating costs increased steadily in nominal terms over the period 2000-2007. The main drivers of the increase depend on the sector, e.g. in the cereal sector the rise was mainly driven by increased costs for fertilisers, machinery, seeds and crop protection.<sup>6</sup> In order to demonstrate the effects of a further increase in operating costs on the results of the agricultural market outlook, two scenarios were conducted with the CAPRI model. In the 'Normal Uncertainty' scenario, operating costs are assumed to increase by 10% and in the 'Worst' scenario by 30% relative to the baseline assumptions. The operating costs directly increased in both scenarios are: mineral fertilizers, fuel and energy, seed costs, veterinary costs, maintenance and buildings. The direct increases in these costs also lead to an indirect increase of the feed and animal purchases costs (with the respective adjustment calculated endogenously by the model). For both scenarios the cost increase was introduced over all agricultural sectors and EU regions (cf. Figure 5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> DG AGRI (2011): Farm Economics brief N°2: EU production costs overview. DG Agriculture & Rural Development, Microeconomic analyses of EU agricultural holdings, Brussels, <u>http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/pdf/Brief201102.pdf</u>





Figure 5: Overview of the Higher Operating Costs Scenario

Source: Presentation Londero and M'barek (DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS)

## 2.5 Harvest Failure East Scenario: Limited availability of grains in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (RUK) are key players on the world markets for cereals, e.g. in 2009 the three countries accounted for about 30% of wheat trade on the world market. However, due to forest fires, record droughts and price pikes, RUK governments feared in recent years that domestic prices for human consumption could rise too much and therefore implemented different measures to restrict grain exports. These measures (export bans, export quotas and export taxes) impacted the world market prices, and demonstrated the importance of these three countries for the international cereal markets. New exceptional events (e.g. droughts) in these three countries could again lead to limited grain availability and thus lower exports.

To depict the possible impacts on the projected agricultural markets in the EU of a limited availability of grains in RUK, two scenarios were analysed. In the 'worst case' scenario it is assumed that there are no wheat and coarse grains exports from RUK during two consecutive years (2012 and 2013), whereas in the second 'possible' scenario, exports are assumed only to be lower. For this uncertainty analysis the AGLINK-COSIMO model was used (cf. Figure 6).



#### Figure 6: Overview of the Harvest Failure East Scenario

Source: Presentation Londero and M'barek (DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS)

# **3.** Macroeconomic assumptions and the impact of related uncertainties for agricultural market developments

Macroeconomic developments (assumptions) can strongly influence the projected developments on agricultural markets. Therefore the first session of the workshop was dedicated to a discussion on the macroeconomic assumptions taken in the EU agricultural outlook and their general implications for agricultural market developments.

Stephan Hubertus Gay (DG AGRI) presented the macroeconomic assumptions used for the EU agricultural outlook and also the aggregated results for income. The draft baseline assumptions on key macroeconomic variables are shown in Table 2.

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Population growth												
EU27	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
of which EU15	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
of which EU12	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%
GDP growth												
EU27	-4.2%	1.8%	1.7%	1.2%	1.8%	2.2%	2.3%	2.1%	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
of which EU15	-4.3%	1.8%	1.6%	1.0%	1.7%	2.0%	2.1%	2.0%	1.9%	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%
of which EU12	-3.5%	2.2%	3.3%	3.2%	3.9%	4.2%	4.3%	4.3%	4.2%	4.1%	4.0%	4.0%
World	-2.1%	4.2%	3.0%	3.4%	3.8%	4.2%	4.2%	4.0%	3.8%	3.8%	3.8%	3.8%
Inflation												
EU27	1.0%	2.1%	2.5%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	1.9%	2.0%	2.0%	1.9%
Exchange rate												
USD/EUR	1.39	1.33	1.43	1.36	1.27	1.32	1.41	1.44	1.46	1.47	1.47	1.48
Price of crude oil												
USD per barrel	61	76	102	107	111	109	107	111	113	114	114	112

 Table 2:
 Draft baseline assumptions on key macroeconomic variable, 2009-2020

Source: Draft baseline DG AGRI and JRC-IPTS

Gay delineated that the starting point for the Commission projections is the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2011-2020. Projections for world market prices and also for the

agricultural commodity markets for the rest of the world are taken from this outlook. The EU Short Term Outlook is used as orientation for the first future years. The macroeconomic forecast comes from DG ECFIN for the close future and from other consistent sources for non EU countries and up to 2020.

For the development of agricultural income in the EU, projection results show that real factor income is declining, but increasing per labour unit due to structural change. Agricultural income is projected to grow faster in the EU-12 than in the EU-15, however it remains at a lower level (cf. Figure 7).




Figure 7: Real factor income per AWU

Source: Presentation Gay (DG AGRI)

Zebedee Nii-Naate (JRC-IPTS) presented major results of the partial stochastic uncertainty analysis of macroeconomic variables (cf. Chapter 2.1). The partial stochastic simulations were undertaken to examine the range of plausible balance sheet outcomes through a selection of correlated exogenous macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, CPI, GDP deflator, crude oil price and Euro-US Dollar exchange rate). It has to be kept in mind that over the projection period, the 90th and 10th percentiles move further away from the central projection. Hence, uncertainty increases with the projection horizon, i.e. forecast errors are accumulated over time.

With regard to *crude oil prices*, scenario results show that by 2020 the 90th percentile is nearly 220 USD per barrel and the 10th percentile is 60 USD per barrel. By 2020, we see an increasing distribution of possible crude oil prices around the non-stochastic baseline. The

coefficient of variation (CV)<sup>7</sup> is 24%, i.e. there is a large variation in the crude oil price relative to the mean. For the *Euro-US Dollar exchange rate* the variability relative to the mean is less than the one for crude oil prices but is still quite large (10%). The 90th percentile suggests an appreciation of the Euro relative to the US Dollar, i.e. the Euro is less competitive. This leads to larger imports of commodities and lower EU exports and thus a deterioration of the Euro relative to the US dollar, i.e. the 10th percentile suggests a depreciation of the Euro relative to the US dollar, i.e. the Euro is more competitive. This leads to smaller imports of commodities from other countries and higher exports from the EU and thus an improvement in EU net trade.

Concerning the *EU Consumer Price Index (CPI)*, the forecast error is relatively small for the EU. Consequently, the 90th and 10th percentiles for the CPI in EU-15 and EU-12 are close to the baseline. However, a larger variability relative to the mean can be observed in EU-12 (CV = 2%) compared to EU-15 (CV = 1%). When producing the deterministic baseline, *GDP growth* is used in the model to determine the increase in food use for each commodity. Results show that the variability relative to the mean is larger for GDP growth than CPI (which is consistent with results of other research) at 4% for the EU-12 and 3% for the EU-15.

Zebedee Nii-Naate also presented some aggregated results highlighting the agricultural commodity markets sensitivity to the uncertainties regarding macroeconomic variables. For the *EU cereals* (wheat and coarse grains), simulation results indicate that production is not particularly affected by the macroeconomic settings(cf. Figure 8). Even with high variability in producer prices, production and consumption vary only by a relatively small amount. In contrast, net trade seems to be more sensitive to the macroeconomic settings, with the variability of wheat net trade being about 20%, which is nearly comparable with the variability of crude oil prices. For EU total meats (beef, pork, poultry and sheep) less variability in projected meat prices and net trade is observed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The coefficient of variation (CV) measures the variability relative to the mean. It is defined as the ratio of the average standard deviation of a particular variable (taking values between the 10<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles, i.e. over the 400 'central' values out of the 500 simulation runs) to the average mean of that variable (also calculated from values between the 90<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> percentile), from 2011 to 2020.




Figure 8: Macro Uncertainty Scenario: Overview for the EU cereals

Source: Presentation Nii-Naate (JRC-IPTS). Note: CV = coefficient of variation

Overall, the aggregated results indicate that macroeconomic settings are important for the outcome of the agricultural commodity markets projections. While the settings have only a marginal impact on consumption and production, the partial stochastic analysis reveals significant impacts on projected prices and net trade. Furthermore, the cereal sector as a whole seems to be generally more affected than the total meat sector (nonetheless for certain meats the impact may be more pronounced than for certain cereals).

John Baffes (World Bank) gave a presentation on agriculture and the global economy, where he tried to assess if a new trend in agricultural market developments can be detected or if the latest developments are only a deviation from long term trends. Baffes delineated that energy and metal prices are likely to reach historical highs in 2011 in real terms, and agricultural commodity prices seem to follow this path. When looking at the cause of this increase in prices, it can be noted that most of the conditions for a 'perfect storm' are in place: in the past five years all factors moved together in a way that rather explains the high commodity prices observed today. Thus, analysts of the World Bank attribute the rises in agricultural prices to a perfect storm of various factors like poor harvests in various parts of the world (due to an increase in natural disasters), increasing crude oil prices, increasing biofuel usage, decreasing crop yields growth rates, global stock declines of several agricultural commodities, decreasing interest rates, increasing investment in commodity funds, a depreciation of the US dollar and general changes in the world economy (cf. Table 3).

	2001-05	2006-10	% change
Agricultural prices (nominal index, 2000 = 100)	117	198	+ 69
Grain/oilseed price volatility (stdev of log differences, monthly)	2.3	3.5	+ 52
Crude oil price (US\$/barrel, nominal)	33	75	+ 127
Fertilizer prices (nominal index 2000 = 100)	120	310	+ 157
Exchange rates (US\$ against a broad index of currencies)	119	104	- 13
Interest rates (10-year US Treasury bill)	4.7	4.1	- 14
Funds invested in commodities (\$ billion)	30	230	+ 667
GDP growth (low and middle income countries, % p.a.)	5.0	5.8	+ 16
Industrial production (low and middle income countries, % p.a.)	6.3	7.1	+ 13
Biofuel production (million of barrels per day equivalent)	0.4	1.3	+ 203
Stocks (total of maize, wheat, and rice, months of consumption)	3.2	2.5	- 21
Yields (average of wheat, maize, and rice, tons/hectare)	3.8	4.0	+ 7
Growth in yields (% change per annum, average)	1.4	1.0	- 32
Natural disasters (droughts, floods, and extreme temperatures)	374	441	+ 18

 Table 3:
 Factors for a 'perfect storm' and their developments

Source: Presentation Baffes (World Bank). Primary sources: Barclays Capital, CRED, FRED, IEA, IMF, USDA, World Bank

When estimating the impact of specific factors on agricultural market prices, the World Bank assessed in a simple model that oil prices matter most, but also exchange rates and the stock to use ratio drive agricultural commodity prices significantly. Furthermore, Baffes explained that the energy/non-energy link strengthened for all key price indices after 2005. Energy remains one of the key drivers of agricultural prices as agriculture is a rather very energy intensive sector. While the diversion of agricultural feedstock from food to biofuels production is still seen as one reason for increased prices this effect seems to be less than originally thought (the debate used to be heated and highly political, but seems to be less so now). Baffes highlighted also the two longer term issues with regard to biofuels: (a) biofuels will become profitable at current energy prices; (b) 2nd/3rd generations of biofuels may produce energy at much lower costs, thus putting further upward pressure on food prices.

Reflecting on speculation in agricultural commodity markets, Baffes stated that funds invested in commodities (agricultural products, metals, energy) are still increasing and are expected to reach US\$ 430 billion in 2011. Nevertheless, such funds only represent a small fraction of invested assets in investment, pension, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) (estimated about US\$ 35-40 trillion). Baffes sees the debate on the speculation effect on agricultural prices increase as being quite heated and highly political, while the empirical evidence being rather weak. However, increasingly more evidence comes in favour of an

impact of speculation on the variability of agricultural commodity prices rather than on their levels.

Summing up, Baffes delineated that agricultural commodity markets might not function in the same way as they did in the past, where the market fundamentals of supply and demand were mainly influenced only by three factors: weather variability, macroeconomic linkages as well as domestic and trade policies. Nowadays, domestic and trade polices become more complex and weather variability increased due to climate change. As new factors, the financialization of commodities and the energy link have to be also taken into account (cf. Figure 9).




Figure 9: Commodity markets as we knew them (left) and as they are evolving (right)

Source: Presentation Baffes (World Bank)

Julian Binfield (FAPRI) compared the settings and basic results of the FAPRI and the EC Outlook. The figures Binfield presented for Europe were taken from FAPRI-MU's<sup>8</sup> latest outlook, and thus are not the same as those from FAPRI-ISU<sup>9</sup> which use different models and in 2011 also different world prices. For the FAPRI outlook world prices are taken from the January FAPRI-MU stochastic baseline, and oil prices are taken from Global Insight as provided in January but updated for the short-run. Binfield illustrated that the macroeconomic data used by FAPRI for 2020 does not show significant differences to the ones used in the EC outlook. Most of the results of the commodity market projections are also quite similar, with the exception of rapeseed area, where FAPRI expects more growth due to demand for biofuels. Binfield highlighted that biogas might be a main source of uncertainty for the EU

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> FAPRI-University of Missouri–Columbia


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> FAPRI-Iowa State University

projections, as it already plays an important role in Germany (silage maize) and might also gain importance in other parts of Europe. However, producing biogas needs investment, and this may be difficult to get in the context of the current financial and economic environment. As major source of uncertainty Binfield highlighted biofuels. The demand for biofuels is strongly correlated to the crude oil price, and while with low crude oil prices renewable energy mandates and standards are binding, with rising oil prices biofuel production could go beyond the blending mandates in the US and in the EU. Reflecting further on biofuels, Binfield questioned that it will be possible that consumption of ethanol is above consumption of biodiesel in the EU market projections. As sustainability requirements could constrain the import of potential feedstocks, and with the EU looking for about 6 billion extra litres and the US for about 15 billion litres, the question is where that ethanol would come from.

William Liefert (USDA-ERS) focused his contribution to the panel discussion on the impact of exchange rates on world agricultural markets, especially by drawing on the example of Russia. Between 2000 and 2010, Russian agricultural imports have grown in both value and volume. The import growth has made Russia the second largest agricultural importer among emerging markets, after China, with main imports being meat, highly processed products, fruits, and vegetables. During the same period, Russia's agricultural exports have also grown, however from a much lower base in value terms (and with most of the increase coming from grains). Liefert explained that there are two main macroeconomic causes for the rise in Russia's agricultural imports during the 2000s. The first is high GDP growth, which increased consumer income and demand for food (although to the benefit of both foreign suppliers as well as domestic producers); the second is a major real appreciation of the Russian Ruble compared to foreign currencies. Liefert delineated that a change in the real value of a currency takes into account not only movement in the currency's nominal exchange rate, but also the difference in price inflation between the country in question and its trading partners. Thus, the real exchange rate captures all the main variables that affect the price competitiveness of a country's domestically produced tradable goods compared to foreign products. The reason for the Rubles appreciation in real terms since 2000 is that the relatively high inflation in Russia has exceeded the nominal depreciation of the Ruble. This development improved the price competitiveness of imports into Russia relative to domestic goods. Usually, if a country has high inflation, its currency depreciates in nominal terms, which makes the foreign currency more expensive in terms of domestic currency and hence makes all foreign goods more expensive for the country's consumers, i.e. improving the price competitiveness of domestically produced goods compared to foreign goods. However, since 2000, the Russian Ruble was fairly stable and has not depreciated nominally against the U.S. dollar, the Euro and other major currencies to correct for Russia's much greater inflation.

Björn Döhring (DG ECFIN) gave a brief overview on recent developments and a short-term outlook for the EU economy. Within the EU-27, recovery of GDP growth is rather slow and the picture for the next year is seen as rather bleak. DG ECFIN forecasts currently a lower GDP growth for the EU in the short- and medium-term than this was assumed for the draft EC agricultural markets outlook (cf. Figure 10).

Figure 10: Real GDP growth, EU-27



Source: Presentation Döhring (DG ECFIN). Note: AR 2012 refers to the 2012 Ageing Report of DG ECFIN

In order to address the question where the EU currently stands with its economic recovery, Döhring explained some features of the subdued "post-financial-crisis" growth in the EU. He stressed some sectoral adjustment needs, the need for deleveraging (debt reduction), and a damaged growth potential with a higher NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, i.e. a higher level of unemployment below which inflation rises). Furthermore, Döhring pointed out that a multi-speed economic recovery within the EU can be expected. Economic improvement has also weakened outside the EU, with a softening of the recovery in the US and a moderated growth in emerging markets economies. With regard to world trade, stagnation could be observed during summer 2011 as dynamics in GDP strongly influence world trade.

According to DG ECFIN calculations, commodity prices are assumed to have peaked, which would be good news for the consumers. However, the sovereign debt crisis deepened and spilled over, which bears the risk of further credit constraints. In general, credit growth remains weak with banks tightening the credit conditions (which is also due to pressure from the institutional side, e.g. Basel III). While actually a "broadening of the recovery" was expected, this seems to be put on hold. Leading indicators like the Economic Sentiment Indicator and the Purchasing Managers Index have deteriorated sharply, as for example firms postpone investments because they are uncertain about the growth perspective. With numerous factors indicating downward pressure for economic growth, recent economic forecasts saw a cycle of downward revisions, and latest forecasts of both ECB and IMF expect a decline in real GDP growth for the Euro area in 2012 compared to 2011.

In a further contribution to the panel discussion, Eckhard Wurzel (OECD Economics Department) presented a similar picture as given by Björn Döhring before. Wurzel outlined that the two most recent negative events, namely the European debt crisis and the debt ceiling in the USA, led to a reassessment of the state of the world economy. The risk awareness in the commodity markets increased, a tendency that can be observed as well in the capital markets. Moreover, business surveys also point to a much weaker outlook for economic development. Altogether, Wurzel sees a general change in the awareness and mood of market participants, which seems to be something deeper with profound impacts on the markets.

Josef Schmidhuber (FAO) pointed out that the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the projections for the EU agricultural markets rather take a business as usual approach. However, the underlying assumptions are quite uncertain as there is brace for macroeconomic volatility on all fronts: GDP growth, inflation, exchange rates in the USA, the EU and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). On the other hand the relative importance of the macroeconomic variables is rather unclear; however the energy sector and exchange rates seem to play an important role for the developments on agricultural commodity markets. To get a better picture stochastic simulations are needed, and in this sense the partial stochastic analysis done within the uncertainty assessment of the EC outlook seems to be already a beneficial step. However, with growing income disparity Schmidhuber sees also a need for a more disaggregated picture for GDP growth. Food demand has become rather income inelastic in general. But as income disparities are rising and as income growth in different income strata evolves differently, an average GDP growth assumption applied to one consumer segment may not appropriately capture likely changes in food consumption due to a rise in GDP.

In the general discussion the outlook assumptions of a rather quick return to a stable economic growth path along the lines of the previous decade has been challenged. Some experts are less positive about the assumed positive macroeconomic environment. Especially further financial market tensions and a stronger short-run impact of fiscal consolidation are expected. Therefore, experts assume a rather longer and more difficult period of adjustment in the macroeconomic environment. This would imply also downside effects on the outlook for agricultural commodity markets.

There was consent that oil prices are important for the developments in the agricultural commodity markets, especially in the context of biofuels. However, as an additional issue in this context it was pointed out that huge oil reserves were discovered in Brazil, and Brazil will soon become a net exporter for oil. It is unclear what effects this might have on ethanol markets, but in any case Brazil will be more flexible in the future and could export ethanol to the EU without the need to expand the respective sugarcane area for production. This increased flexibility for Brazil with regard to ethanol may not only impact developments in the biofuels markets but also the markets for cereals and oilseeds, with respective spillover effects for livestock production.

As the developments of macroeconomic variables are rather uncertain and may differ from the assumptions taken for the baseline exercise, it is difficult to depict their impact on the future developments in agricultural commodity markets. Therefore the partial stochastic analysis of macroeconomic variables in the context of the uncertainty analyses on the EC outlook was appreciated by the workshop participants, as this helps to highlight and better understand the sensitivity of the baseline results to the related uncertainties.

# 4. Drivers of supply and demand for meat markets and related uncertainties

The preliminary results of the European Commission's outlook on meat markets were presented by Edit Konya (DG AGRI). The world market perspectives are driven by bullish demand and show that the aggregated world demand for meat is projected to recover from the setback caused by the economic crisis. The assumed macroeconomic environment has a mixed impact on the meat market prospects. On the one hand, macroeconomic assumptions suggest a weakening export potential when the Euro strengthens against the US Dollar over the outlook (from 2013 onwards). Furthermore, the gradual increase of the crude oil price has

to be taken into account, as this has impacts on input costs (energy, fertilizers and feed costs). On the other hand, there is the economic recovery and the population growth, both implying improved prospects for total meat consumption in the EU. The status quo policy assumptions for the outlook imply a continuation of the restructuring process of sheep, goat and cattle herds already induced in the past by the decoupling of direct payments. Beef production could be indirectly impacted by the phasing out and abolition of the milk quota system, as this may have an impact on the dairy cow herd.

In general the EU meat commodity markets show a mixed picture, with a relatively favourable outlook for non-ruminants on the one hand and a continuing decline in the production of beef and sheep meat on the other hand. Results for the aggregated meat consumption (kg/capita) show that on a per capita basis EU meat consumption would be more or less at the same level in 2020 as it was in 2010 (i.e. around 83 kg). Poultry meat consumption is projected to increase most, by more than 4%, while growth in pig meat consumption would remain below 3% on aggregate between 2010 and 2020. Nevertheless, pig meat would remain the most preferred meat in the EU at 41.2 kg/capita in 2020, compared to 23.6 kg for poultry, 15.8 kg for beef and veal and 2 kg for sheep and goat meat. Projection results also show that consumption would grow faster in the EU-12, but total per capita meat consumption at 84.4 kg would remain higher in the EU-15 than in the EU-12 with 75.4 kg in 2020. Overall meat production is driven by increasing poultry and pig meat consumption. While both pig and poultry meat production is projected to increase by 3% and 4% respectively, beef (-2%) and sheep meat (-8%) production is assumed to continue its declining trend by 2020. Figure 11 shows the change in meat production between 2010 and 2020 per commodity.




Figure 11: Change in EU-27 production (2020/2010), in % and thousand tonnes c.w.e.

Source: Presentation Konya (DG AGRI)

In the *beef market*, demand for beef and veal meat is projected to slightly decrease further by -1.1% over the projection period. This implies that per capita consumption will be reduced by more than 3% less than the level reached in 2010. Beef exports (namely fresh and frozen meat) have increased significantly during 2010 and 2011, especially due to an increase in exports to Turkey and Russia. As a consequence, the EU has become a net beef meat exporter in 2011, also by taking advantage of decreasing imports from South American beef producers. However, it is assumed that the EU will not remain a net exporter but come back to a net import situation at a level similar to 2010. Following the current situation of tight world beef supplies, the EU beef imports are projected to increase slightly by 2020, albeit at levels considerably below the high of 2007.

For the *pig meat market*, world demand for pork is projected to increase, with consumption increasing by 8.6% at global level, and by 2.5% in the EU-27. However, per capita consumption in the EU would remain at the same level until 2020. Even though total EU pig population is decreasing, higher productivity and concentration and further structural changes in the sector will result in a net production increase. At present, trade with third countries shows a strong export performance due to the high demand from Russia and major markets in Far East (South Korea, Hong Kong). However, pig meat exports may decrease in the next couple of years due a contraction in exports to Far East and therefore EU exports are projected to be at a similar level in 2020 as in 2010.

World demand for *poultry meat* is growing, which could be a long term tendency from which the EU could take advantage. In addition, chicken is expected to continue benefiting from its image as being 'good value and healthy'. With domestic demand also being high, total EU poultry meat consumption is expected to increase as well as production. EU trade in poultry meat shows a stable situation with strong export performance due to demand from Asia, Africa and the Middle-East. However, in the medium-term a strengthening of the Euro could result in a decrease in exports in 2020 below the 2010 level by 2%. Overall imports of poultry meat into the EU show a decrease in the medium term by -1.4% in 2020.

*Sheep and goat meat* production is projected to further decline. With demand for sheep and goat meat projected to further contract, the overall consumption is decreasing by 4% by 2020. Given that New Zealand would recover from the 2008/2009 droughts and poor lambing years, and import quotas would be filled, imports of sheep meat are projected to increase by 11% in 2020 in comparison to 2010.

Emanuele Ferrari (JRC-IPTS) presented the major results of the uncertainty analyses for the EU meat sector. In the Harvest Failure East Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.5) lower or missing wheat and coarse grains exports from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan would lead to lower world grain availability, and thus higher grain prices and higher feed cost. This would have an adverse effect on EU meat production, implying a loss of EU competitiveness relative to competitors with feeding systems based on grass (e.g. Brazil). The net trade position of the EU would deteriorate, with beef trade being affected most.

For the Higher Costs Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.4), Ferrari reflected specifically on the effects in the pig meat sector. Regarding pig fattening, higher fertilizer, energy, seed, veterinary and maintenance costs would affect feed and animal purchase costs only indirectly. Thus, the effects on total production costs in livestock farming are mainly secondary effects and are smaller compared to the effects in the cereals and oilseeds sectors. A 10% increase in the costs listed above would imply only a 2% increase of total pig costs on EU-27 average, with the cost increase being around 2-2.5% in most EU regions, and always below 5%. In the 30% increase scenario, a similar regional pattern in the EU can be observed, but effects are larger, with total pig costs increasing in the EU-27 by 6% on average and above 10% in very few EU regions. Regarding the change in gross value added per animal, scenario results indicate that in many regions higher operating costs are compensated by higher revenues (i.e. the higher prices resulting from the decrease in production level out the increase in operating costs. As a result, the gross value added remains stable on EU-27 average in the 10% increase scenario.

Results of the Slower Growth China Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.2) show bigger effects of a slower economic growth in China on the EU prices for wheat and coarse grains than on meat prices. Nevertheless, EU prices for poultry and beef meat would decrease by about -1.5% and for pork by about -1% (cf. Figure 12). Due to the downward pressure on wheat and coarse grain prices, aggregated feed costs are projected to decline by about -2.5%. While the EU could slightly improve its net trade position for pork and beef, poultry trade would be negatively affected by the slower economic growth in China.




Figure 12: Selected price changes in the Slower Growth China Scenario (2020/2010)

Source: Presentation Ferrari and Hélaine (JRC-IPTS)

In the Macro Uncertainty Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.1), the EU trade for meat varies significantly, given that trade flows are highly sensitive to the macroeconomic assumptions especially with respect to exchange rates. The EU remains a net exporter of beef meat and live animals until 2015, regardless of what the macroeconomic uncertainty is. On the other hand, in 2020 the EU is a net importer of beef in 50% of the simulations. For poultry, imports are limited by the tariff rate quota (TRQ) of 856 thousand tonnes which is fulfilled at 90% in 50% of the simulations. Exports of EU low quality poultry are much more sensitive to the macroeconomic uncertainty. The range of exports around the median is widening on the projection period, being 600 thousand tonnes in 2020 for 80% of the simulations. For pig meat the variability is less than for the other meats and the EU keeps its export position in all simulations.

In the panel discussion Richard Brown (GIRA Consulting) reflected on the results of the EC outlook based on Gira's long term strategic trends in world meat markets. Global meat demand has increased impressively and is recovering from the 2009 downturn, with demand in 2011 increasing more than was predicted. Furthermore, world meat expenditure still shows positive trends. According to Gira, global meat consumption continues to grow, pulled mainly by per capita demand in emerging markets. Between 2010 and 2020 global meat consumption would grow by about 40 million tonnes (+14%), which would be less than in the previous decade, but could be seen as a good recovery from the 2009 credit crunch. Due to relative price and production complexities poultry is foreseen to continue closing the gap on pig meat. Beef and sheep meat grow very slowly, due to poor efficiencies and high costs. The global

growth in meat consumption is seen as quite broadly based (China, South East Asia, Russia, Middle East and North Africa, South America), with Chinese growth being less dominant than in the past. Overall, global meat demand is forecasted by Gira to experience a higher increase than is projected in the EC outlook (cf. Figure 13).




Figure 13: Global meat consumption growth by region 2010-2020

Source: Presentation Brown (Gira); primary source: Gira Long-Term Meat Study

The positive meat forecast of Gira is based on a remarkably good recovery from the 2009 demand downturn and a modest further meat consumption growth. With rising disposable income Gira expects especially more growth for EU-12. Pig meat and poultry seem to be favoured by consumers because they are 'cheaper, quicker and convenient'. Gira expects also more meat imports than projected in the preliminary EU outlook as a consequence of WTO and bilateral Free Trade Agreements. Meat expenditure within the EU shows an increasing trend in real terms, and this is likely to continue due to high costs and tighter global supply. The world meat price index and the EU meat prices show a rising trend in real terms, which Gira forecasts at a higher rate than the EC projection results.

Discussing specifically the prospects for the beef market, Philippe Chotteau (Institut de l'Elevage) was less optimistic than the other speakers. Chotteau explained that for production the cows herd is the key factor. However, latest prospects show a reduction of 8.7% for the dairy herd, which translates into a reduction of about 2 million cows in 2020 compared to 2010. Having this in mind the EC preliminary outlook seems to be rather optimistic with regard to beef production, as results show only a reduction of 1.6% by 2020 (compared to -6.7% as given in the 2010 EC Outlook). Chotteau further delineated that he doubts that

production will be backed up by an increase in suckler cow herds. Despite herds have been stabilised in the EU in the last 10 years, decapitalisation is likely to occur in the next few years, especially in France, Ireland, Belgium, Italy, and probably also in Spain, because suckler cows suffer from a lack of profitability compared to dairy cows or crops.

With regard to export supply and world market prices Chotteau pointed out that Brazil will play a major role. Profitability of EU beef production seems to be rather weak, with for example the French beef cost of production global index (IPAMPA) being still at an historical peak. Furthermore, according to Agribenchmark network data the gap in production costs between Brazilian and European beef farmers (breeders or fatteners) is still between 1:2 to 1:2.5. Chotteau also argued that the EC outlook for beef demand in the EU seems to be rather optimistic. This is especially true when keeping in mind that in times of economic crisis beef demand is very sensitive to prices, mainly for mince or burgers which represent a great and still growing share of the market, e.g. 50% in the UK (45% in 2006) and 1/3 in France (+20% since 2003).

Sune Jin Christensen (Danish Meat Association) discussed the pig meat market and outlined that the global production in pig meat is continuingly rising (with 83.3 million tonnes in 1999, 98.8 million tonnes in 2010 and a forecasted 100.9 million tonnes in 2011). The largest share in global production is held by China (about 51%), followed by the EU (23%) and the USA (10%). As drivers for global pig meat demand, Christensen pointed out the significant importance of imports from China, Japan, the USA and Russia. Commenting specifically on China, Christensen highlighted the increase in per capita consumption in this country (19.7 kg/capita in 1990 compared to 39.3 kg/capita in 2011). With a domestic production in China also increasing (even though a lot of the production is still backyard), there is an increasing need for imported feed, which results in greater worldwide competition for feed stuff. In the long run, Christensen recalled the increased demand for food (meat) due to the general growth in global population and more specifically due to the growth in the middle/upper-class. In summary for the world market, Christensen concluded that global consumption in pig meat will continue to grow and importing countries will remain the same. However there are several uncertainties that may alter the production level among key players such as: developments in exchange rates and the general economic conjuncture, consumer preferences, different legislations (e.g. related to welfare or environment), feed availability, diseases and food scandals and also the impact of bilateral free trade agreements and the ongoing WTO negotiations.

Commenting on the specific situation on the pig market in the EU, Christensen highlighted that EU pig meat production has increased in total by only 1% since 2006 and that EU pig producers have actually experienced losses for a five year period (cf. Figure 14). Due to the negative margins in pig production for five consecutive years and problems to get financing from banks and financial institutions a decrease in EU pig production could be expected in 2012.




Figure 14: Profitability per kg slaughter weight EU pig producers

In the open discussion it was stressed that a number of factors are influencing the market perspectives for meat, especially the general economic environment and the global market context. Part of the discussion specifically focused on the developments in China. Even though meat production in China is still mainly based on backyard production, a steady move to more organised production can be observed. If this trend continues (which is expected) then competition for feed stuff will certainly increase on the world market and the striking question might be 'how to feed the animals' rather than 'how to feed the people'. On the other hand it was also stressed that feed conversion in China is rather low and it might be cheaper and hence likely that specific meat production is set up outside China in order to satisfy the Chinese market (thus China might import the meat instead of feed for the animals).

Reflecting on meat prices, it was discussed if the rather flat development of EU meat prices as projected in the EC preliminary outlook is consistent with the positive picture that panel discussants gave with respect to increasing global meat demand. Some of the participants are indeed more optimistic on price developments. Conversely, some of the workshop participants see that demand growth for meat will in general rather slow down as there are

Source: Presentation Christensen (Danish Meat Association); primary source: Interpig and L&F Estimates

alimentary limits to meat consumption. Such a slowdown in consumption would have an adverse effect on prices. It was also pointed out that the recent rise in EU beef prices was only due to exceptional export levels.

Uncertainty for livestock production could arise if countries would implement specific policies to restrict agricultural greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the context of climate change. This is expected to impact specifically ruminants, however would on the global level also depend on which countries would implement GHG mitigation measures. Unilateral commitments would certainly lead to shifts in world meat production, with adverse effects on the GHG abatement efforts at a global level.

# 5. Drivers of supply and demand for milk and dairy markets and related uncertainties

Beatriz Velazquez (DG AGRI) presented the preliminary outlook results for the dairy markets. In the medium term, perspectives for the dairy markets are favourable. With continued expansion of world demand EU exports will increase (but market shares decrease, as the Euro strengthens and world exports increase at a higher rate) and this will also support producers' gross margins (mainly due to increasing cheese and powder prices, and stable cereal prices). However, the dairy market perspectives are particularly sensitive to economic developments. The potential for further demand growth (mainly in emerging countries) remains the key driver for medium- to long-term market prospects, facilitated by economic growth, increasing population as well as continued preference towards dairy consumption.

Cow milk production in the EU is projected to continue increasing from 2011 onwards. However the increase will be at a moderate growth rate and production will remain below the possible augmentation provided by the gradual elimination of the milk quota regime. EU milk production is projected to reach 154.4 million tonnes in 2020 (i.e. a cumulative increase of 4% compared to 2010). The overall increase in milk production is mainly driven by a continued increase in the average yield per dairy cow, which is projected to reach about 7 300 kg by 2020 (i.e. a cumulative increase of about 14%). At the same time, the EU dairy herd is projected to decrease by almost 9% to the level of 21 million animals in 2020 (cf. Figure 15). Due to continuous restructuring of milk production the decrease in dairy cows is more pronounced in the EU-12 (-18%) than in the EU-15 (-5%), while at the same time the average yield per cow is also projected to grow more in the EU-12 (+21%) than in the EU-15

(+12%). Notwithstanding, average cow productivity in the EU-15 (7 700 kg) would remain well above the average cow productivity in the EU-12 (5 900 kg).




Figure 15: Milk production, deliveries and number of dairy cows in the EU

Source: Presentation Velazquez (DG AGRI)

For the *cheese market* the medium-term projections are fuelled by growth in demand at both domestic and world level. During the outlook period EU consumption depicts a return to the growth trend observed prior to 2007, albeit at a much lower rate, as consumer prices would remain at relatively elevated levels. Cheese consumption per capita is projected to reach 17.4 kg in 2020 (i.e. +7% compared to 2010). The positive domestic consumption projection derives mainly from an increase in per capita consumption in the EU-12. Cheese production is projected to grow by 10% between 2010 and 2020. Substantial demand from the main cheese importers (Russia, Japan, USA, etc.) will allow for a progressive increase of EU exports to reach 754 thousand tonnes in 2020. However, the EU will gradually lose world market share, but will still remain at around 28% of global exports in 2020.

The *SMP market* is projected to be balanced through exports. In 2010 and 2011 market conditions have been quite favourable due to strong demand on the world market, with China gradually becoming an important player in world SMP imports. The further prospective for EU SMP exports are favourable, but the EU will see a deterioration of its world market share, which will remain at around 23% of global exports in 2020. SMP intervention stocks built up in 2009 are expected to be completely eliminated by the end of 2012 through a combination of sales by open tender and release under the food programme for the most deprived persons. In addition, with an assumed increase in world prices EU production is projected to increase by almost 10% throughout the projection period to reach 996 thousand tonnes in 2020. On the

other hand, prospects for domestic SMP consumption are quite weak, with consumption projected to decline -1% in 2020 compared to 2010.

In the *butter market*, total EU butter production is projected to slightly increase by 0.7% between 2010 and 2020, indicating a stable butter market, with a solid EU demand at about 2 million tonnes. Projections for butter exports are less favourable, given the assumed strengthening of the Euro and increasing supply from other exporting countries. For the *WMP market*, production is projected to recover from recent contractions due to good market conditions, leading to a production increase in the EU of 8.5% by 2020 in comparison to 2010. EU WMP exports are projected to increase by about 10% due to increasing world demand, led by China.

The uncertainty analyses on the dairy baseline projections were presented by Sophie Hélaine (JRC-IPTS). Results of the Macro Uncertainty Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.1) show that the EU milk projections are quite sensitive to the macroeconomic uncertainties. Macroeconomic uncertainties imply that the  $10^{th}$  and the  $90^{th}$  percentiles of the EU milk production are higher or lower by 5 million tonnes than the non-stochastic baseline in 2020. The milk producer price also shows a very high variability due to the macroeconomic uncertainties. For dairy products the world price in Euro varies much more than the world price in USD and this variability, mainly linked to the uncertainties on the  $\notin$ USD exchange rate, is transmitted to the European market (cf. Figure 16). Trade flows are also highly sensitive to the macroeconomic assumptions, with for example the variability of SMP net trade being 14% relative to the mean.




Figure 16: Milk production and milk price variation in the Macro Uncertainty Scenario

Source: Presentation Hélaine (JRC-IPTS). Note: CV = coefficient of variation

In the Harvest Failure East Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.5) lower or no exports of wheat and coarse grains from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan would lead to higher feed costs, inducing a price increase for butter, cheese and SMP in 2013 while at the same time the respective EU exports would contract. In the Higher Cost Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.4) the feed and animal purchase costs are affected only indirectly. Therefore a 10% increase in operating costs (fertilisers, energy, maintenance, and veterinary) implies on average only a 2% increase of total dairy costs in the EU-27. In certain regions (Scandinavia, Eastern Germany, South England) the costs increase by more than 4%. In the 30% scenario similar regional pattern can be observed, but effects are larger with costs per animal increasing by 7% in the EU-27. Higher operating costs imply lower margins and thus a decrease in production which then results in higher producer prices. Due to higher producer prices the EU is less competitive on the world market which has deteriorating effects on the EU net trade position. However, with regard to income per animal, income in the EU-12 would increase because operating costs are relatively low in the EU-12 and thus the higher costs are more than compensated by higher revenues. The same effect can generally be observed in regions where the feed system is mainly based on grass. In the 30% scenario, effects are generally larger, with an overall income decrease per animal of 1% in the EU-27.

In the panel discussion Pavel Vavra (OECD) pointed out the following factors as key market drivers in the milk and dairy sector: demand growth (especially in developing countries), convergence in consumption patterns, increased health and nutrition concerns, supply adjustment to higher production costs and international investment. As key uncertainties he identified weather, the general macroeconomic environment, developments in domestic policies, the outcome of the ongoing WTO negotiations as well as consumer confidence and milk products competitiveness. Furthermore the magnitude of potential Chinese imports remains an important uncertainty, as especially the exchange rates of the Yuan make an important difference to projection results (cf. Figure 17). With respect to the preliminary results of the EC outlook for the milk and dairy sector, Vavra questioned the results on EU milk production, as they seem to be rather pessimistic especially in the light of milk quota abolishment. Indeed some Member States may increase production and the delivery ratio in the EU-12 could improve more.




Figure 17: Impact of 10% stronger Yuan on Chinese WMP imports (thousand tonnes)

Source: Presentation Vavra (OECD)

Christophe Lafougère (GIRA Consulting) focused on the main differences between the preliminary outlook results of the Commission and the forecasts of Gira up to 2015. With regard to total milk production the Gira forecast shows also an increase, however at a lower level than in the EC outlook. Furthermore, Gira foresees fewer declines in dairy cow herds but also smaller yield increases. Volatility of prices (inputs and milk) and price uncertainty through 2015 will discourage technical improvement and thus yields are expected not to increase that much. With the abolishment of the milk quota, Lafougère questioned the outlook results regarding an increase of milk production by only 1.5 billion litres in total between 2015 and 2020 (which corresponds only to a yearly increase of 0.2%), as it is unclear if production in the EU-12 would continue to decline enough in order to balance production growth in the EU-15 (especially in Ireland, the Netherlands and Brittany). For cheese, Gira has similar results as the EC outlook but foresees slightly higher consumption growth through 2015, whereas export growth is identical with EC projections. While Gira agrees with the trade growth for butter in the EC projections, it sees more increase in butter production in the view of continuing higher prices. Prices will be supported by a growing (unsatisfied) world demand, where especially demand from India could destabilise the global butter market. India already accounts for 43% of global butterfat consumption and is projected to increase its consumption significantly more than its production, which could lead to imbalances in global butterfat markets (cf. Figure 18). For SMP Gira agrees with the projected trade increase in the Commission's outlook, but foresees a lesser increase in production due to restricted milk availability till 2015. Given the strong competition in exports from New Zealand and

continuing attractiveness of cheese, Gira assumes that lower milk production growth will above all be reflected in lower WMP production and exports.




Figure 18: Dairy fats consumption changes, 2010-2015

Source: Presentation Lafougère (GIRA Consulting). Primary source: Gira

Andreas Lundby (Arla Foods) sees a generally positive picture for the milk and dairy markets, with consumption and prices being rather high and most likely continuing to grow further. Even though prices had been very volatile in the most recent years, and could be expected to remain volatile, Lundby expects that in the medium- to long-term milk and dairy prices will increase by about 2-3 % per year. Global demand will further increase, especially in China. The significant increase in Chinese demand can not be expected to be satisfied by domestic production, and China will need to import at least 30 million tonnes. While about some of Chinas extra demand could be supplied by New Zealand and Australia, the question remains who will be able to supply the rest. It has also to be kept in mind that demand for milk powder will further increase in Russia and the Middle East. Lundby further stated that the EU demand for dairy products seems to be generally overestimated, as consumer confidence is low due to the financial crisis. The EC outlook seems to be also too optimistic about cheese consumption, because for example with the newly introduced fat tax in Denmark the Danish government expects a 10% reduction in domestic consumption.

In the open discussion it was stressed that the outlook of the Commission does not depict volatility in milk prices, because it is a deterministic baseline that is based on 'normal' assumptions. However, the uncertainty analyses help to get a better picture. With respect to the cheese market it was discussed why EU production would increase even though cheese

has the lowest price increase among the dairy products. It was explained that this is rather a technical problem, as for the world market prices the projections of the latest OECD-FAO outlook are taken, whereas the market developments in the EC baseline for the short-term are based on the most recent short-term forecasts of the Commission. This can sometimes create a short-term gap in the baseline between EU and world market prices. However, in this context it was again stressed that the EC outlook actually focuses on the medium-term, i.e. on the results for the projection year (in this case 2020).

With respect to trade in dairy products the importance of the share of traded products for the determination of the world prices was discussed. Only about 7% of the milk produced is traded, and when taking into account that food is mostly consumed where it is produced, then it could be expected that the share in trade will rather remain the same, even though demand will increase in some countries. This would imply that an increase in demand in some countries will also trigger an increase in domestic production in these countries, minimising the effects on the world market for dairy products.

#### 6. Biofuels: a key source of uncertainty and volatility?

Alberto D'Avino (DG AGRI) presented the preliminary outlook results for the EU biofuels markets. For the outlook it is assumed that the mandate of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is met in the final projection year 2020, i.e. in 2020 at least 10% of transport fuel is coming from renewable sources. In contrast to assumptions in previous outlooks, a lower share of second generation biofuels is assumed, with 0.7% instead of 1.5% in the last outlook. As second generation biofuels are counted double in terms of meeting the 10% target, the share of first generation biofuels would be 8.6%. While the share of first and second generation biofuels is determined exogenously, the allocation of ethanol versus biodiesel consumption is determined endogenously in the model. Main results on energy share show that ethanol would represent 11.6% of EU gasoline consumption and biodiesel 8.2% of EU diesel consumption in 2020. The relative larger share in fuel use for ethanol than for biodiesel would be a reversal of the current situation, where biodiesel dominates the EU biofuel market. Moreover, this outcome is also in contrast with notified plans from Member States in the Renewable Energy Action Plans. EU ethanol production would further increase over the medium term, with an acceleration projected after 2012. Wheat and especially maize would remain the major ethanol feedstocks, with projection results showing a considerable increase in coarse grains (maize) but the share of sugar beet is also projected to increase (cf. Figure 19). The production increase in EU biodiesel production shows a rather gradual pattern. About half of the EU production would be based on imports of raw materials, especially palm oil, oilseeds oils and also oilseed grains and beans.




Figure 19: EU ethanol production by feedstock (billion litres)

Source: Presentation D'Avino (DG AGRI)

Olexandr Nekhay (JRC-IPTS) presented the main results for the biofuel sector of the uncertainty analyses. In the Slower Growth China Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.2) EU bioethanol production would be affected mainly through the lower oil price. Ethanol production in the EU is projected to decrease by 3% and would be substituted by ethanol imports from third countries to meet the mandate (because the decrease in prices for ethanol feed stocks is relatively higher in the world market than in the EU). In the Harvest Failure East Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.5) limited or no exports of wheat and coarse grains of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan imply less availability of grains in the world market and this would drive their respective prices up. As a consequence the higher world prices for bioethanol feedstock would cause a decrease in EU ethanol production and a further deterioration of the EU net trade position for ethanol in 2014 compared to 2010 (cf. Figure 20).




Figure 20: EU biofuels production in the Harvest Failure East Scenario, 2014

Source: Presentation Nekhay and Van Doorslaer (JRC-IPTS)

Note: Possible scenario = lower exports, Worst scenario = no exports

In the Macro Uncertainty Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.1) EU production of ethanol is projected to increase in all simulations, with only the pace being different. The variability relative to the mean of EU ethanol production is about 10% and the range of 80% of the simulations varies between 14 and 24 billion litres. Similar variability is observed for biodiesel. Ethanol producer prices in the EU show a variability of 11%, with the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile not going above 95 Euro and the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile not below 50 Euro per hectolitre. For ethanol net trade the EU is projected to stay a net importer regardless of what the extreme macro scenario would be. However, the variability of outcomes for the EU net trade position in 2020 is quite large, with a coefficient of variability of 33%, ranging from almost a break even position to -11 billion litres of net trade. The producer price for biodiesel in the EU shows a variability of 9%, with prices between 89 Euro and 143 Euro per hectolitres. EU biodiesel net trade shows a considerably high variability of 57%, with the EU becoming a net exporter of biodiesel in 2020 in the 90th percentile whereas for the baseline, median and the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile the EU's biodiesel net imports are projected to increase. The range between the extreme net trade positions (90th and 10th percentiles) varies from 2 billion litres of biodiesel exports to almost 5 billion litres of imports.

In the panel discussion Caroline Midgley (LMC International) outlined that if a full implementation of the RED is assumed, demand for biofuels will grow strongly in the EU. LMC projections show that bioethanol will expand at the expense of biodiesel while the use of second generation biofuels will be limited. LMC sees the ethanol forecasts according to the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP) of the EU Member States as overly optimistic in the short-term but similar to the medium-term forecasts of LMC by 2020. On the other hand, forecasts of NREAP and LMC for EU biodiesel diverge substantially, with LMC being far more pessimistic than the EU Member States. Even though biodiesel is cheaper than ethanol, it faces several problems which will limit future growth. These problems include a B-7 limit on new diesel cars<sup>10</sup>, poorer sustainability characteristics, potentially greater indirect land use change (ILUC) penalties and more limited access to raw materials. Mainly due to these problems LMC assumes a general under fulfilment of the EU mandate.

EU-27 demand for ethanol (fuel and non-fuel) is projected by LMC to grow by 12 billion litres between 2010 and 2020. With rather weak ethanol production growth this rising ethanol demand in the EU will push net imports of ethanol up to over 6 billion litres. However, in order not to exceed these 6 billion litres of imports, new investment would be needed in EU ethanol production, otherwise ethanol imports could be over 11 billion litres in 2020. Historically, capacity utilisation rates for biofuels production plants have been less than 80%, but by 2015 the need to raise output will push rates to over 90%. Midgley indicated that since mid 2010, EU prices have followed the cost of E-90<sup>11</sup>. Prior to that EU prices were linked to Brazilian replacement costs. With regard to supply prices for EU ethanol will be between 600-700 Euro/m<sup>3</sup> for grains and up to over 900 Euro/m<sup>3</sup> for sugarbeet (as world sugar prices are projected to be high, there are high opportunity costs for the industry) (cf. Figure 21). US imports face the ethanol tariff, the bulk of local supply will be cheaper.

Midgley pointed out several risks for the developments in the EU biofuels sector. One of the risks is the slow implementation of the RED in EU Member States. Policy changes that impose more stringent sustainability requirements could be also a risk for biofuels supply, albeit they would more likely have an impact on biodiesel rather than on bioethanol production. Lower crude oil prices which make gasoline cheaper than ethanol would increase the incentive to buy-out of mandates. Furthermore high volatility in grains prices are also a risk to the biofuels sector and with global stocks expected to be at relatively low levels, the grain market is more vulnerable to supply shocks.

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  B-7 is a standard outlined in the Fuel Quality Directive that allows a biodiesel content of 7% in diesel fuel  $^{11}$  E-90 is a fuel that contents 90% ethanol and 10% gasoline.




Figure 21: Supply prices for EU ethanol production


Bruce A. Babcock (Iowa State University highlighted the huge uncertainties related to the fulfilment of the mandates in the EU by 2020. Babcock also pointed out that the EU preliminary baseline underestimates how the US will meet their blending mandate. The US might increase their biofuel demand by 3 to 7 billion litres in the next three years, which could substantially influence the projected prices in the EC baseline (i.e. prices could be much higher). However, the US producer costs for biofuel is about twice the price of fossil fuels, and it could be questioned if the US congress will follow this and keep the mandate in the longer run. Babcock further delineated that it is also not clear if the US would import sugar ethanol from Brazil. Ethanol production Brazil could come up with in the next three years would be between 5 and 7.5 billion litres. Babcock also sees the possibility that Brazil could import corn-based ethanol from the US while at the same time exporting sugarcane-based ethanol to Europe as it would comply with sustainability criteria.

In a further presentation during the panel discussion Claudiu Covrig (Kingsman) pointed out that in 2010 world ethanol demand was 3.77 times higher than biodiesel demand, but by the end of 2011 demand is expected to be only 3.25 times higher. Thus worldwide fuel ethanol demand is losing pace versus biodiesel demand. However, Europe shows a different picture, with biodiesel demand being currently far higher than demand for bioethanol. In 2010 the

Source: Presentation Midgley (LMC)

world biofuel demand was mainly supplied by Central and South America. However, in 2011 high prices for sugar led to a decline in bioethanol production in Brazil. In 2011 the USA and Brazil have a share in world fuel ethanol supply of 62% and 24% respectively. The biggest shares in world biodiesel supply fall on productions from the USA (14%), Germany (12.5%) and Argentina (11.5%). The highest shares in world fuel ethanol demand can be found in the USA (60%) and Brazil (24%), whereas the USA (13%), Germany (12%), France (11%) and Brazil (11%) have the highest shares in world demand for biodiesel. An increase of biofuels demand can be observed in the majority of the EU Member States, with the EU demand particularly being driven by national and EU mandates and targets (cf. Figure 22).





Source: Presentation Covrig (Kingsman)

With respect to the food versus fuel debate, Covrig argued that estimates for 2011-2012 show that the industrial use of grains in the EU is about 29.3 million tonnes, out of which around 9.1 million tonnes will be used for fuel ethanol production. Compared to the total usable grains output of about 274.8 million tonnes, this would represent only about 3.3% and thus should not be blamed for being the only responsible for the rather big volatility in grain prices.

In the open discussion several comments were made on the link between energy and food markets and the influence of policies was further emphasised. The impact of policy on biofuels production was generally considered as quite profound, at least in the EU and the USA. In the EC outlook developments in the markets are mostly driven by the assumption that the mandate of the Renewable Energy Directive is met in the final projection year 2020. Even though the fulfilment of the mandate is supported by the forecast of National Renewable Energy Action Plans of the EU Member States, it is questionable that the targets will be really met. In this context it was discussed why the EC outlook does not foresee an eventual shortcoming in reaching the target. However, the baseline approach is usually to take existing and already agreed policies as given, and therefore it is also assumed that the EU mandate of the Renewable Energy Directive will be met.

It was also discussed that the gradual enforcement of sustainability criteria in the EU could be expected to cause decreases in imports of biofuels made from palm oil and soybean, which in turn would have further effects on the markets. In the EC outlook the sustainability criteria is considered, but this assumption means a continuation of existing trends because feedback from the industry states that the industry will be able to meet the sustainability targets. Nevertheless, if the rules on ILUC become stricter over time this could be expected to lead to shifts in the market.

With regard to  $2^{nd}$  generation biofuels it was asked what the source for the assumed 0.7% of  $2^{nd}$  generation in total biofuels production in the EC outlook would be. It was clarified that a big part of the 0.7% is assumed to come from waste oils. A further point of discussion was on how an improved technology for  $2^{nd}$  generation biofuels would probably impact LUC and ILUC.

# 7. Cereals, oilseeds, sugar: production, productivity and related uncertainties

Stephan Hubertus Gay (DG AGRI) presented the preliminary outlook results for cereals, oilseeds and sugar. With respect to the cereal balance, production growth in the EU is affected by the increasing use for ethanol feedstock. EU yield growth is expected to be lower than in most competitive regions and supply growth in the EU is projected to result from a very moderate yield growth and due to some area reallocation between crops. Domestic use of cereals is projected to notably increase due to the growing use for ethanol and biomass. EU

cereal exports will be lower in 2020 than they have been in 2009 and 2010 but slightly increase compared to 2011. EU prices for wheat and coarse grains are expected to remain at a relatively high level. For soft wheat continued high EU exports are projected while for barley there is rather no recovery expected after the 2011 drop and exports will stay at a quite low level. The balance sheet for maize in the EU is marked by a steady increase of both demand and production. Vegetables oils production is projected to increase in the EU, mainly driven by increases in demand. However, to satisfy demand also imports of vegetable oils will increase significantly. EU sugar production is projected to increase, mainly driven by a growth in use for ethanol and despite a decrease in EU prices. With respect to area allocation a continued shift to wheat and maize is projected in the EU between 2010 and 2020 (cf. Figure 23).




Figure 23: Shift in EU area allocation between 2010 and 2020

Source: Presentation Gay and Londero (DG AGRI)

After the latest rise in cereals prices, which was essentially due to the draught-driven short harvests in Russia and Ukraine (followed by export restrictions), world cereal prices are projected to decrease in the short term, but grow over the medium term, staying well above the historical average. As a response to higher returns, world cereal production is expected to increase significantly in the short-term, and then increase gradually in the medium-term.

Mihaly Himics (JRC-IPTS) presented the major results for the grains sector of the uncertainty analyses. In the Harvest Failure East Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.5) limited or no exports of wheat and coarse grains from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have significant impacts on the world markets. In the worst scenario (no exports) world prices increase by almost 30% for wheat

and by almost 15% for coarse grains. The increase in world prices is transmitted to the EU domestic prices, with prices for wheat and coarse grains increasing by 20% and 10% respectively in the worst scenario. The EU is projected to increase its cereals exports considerably, partially taking over the export markets of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. These changes in the trade balance are accompanied by an increasing domestic supply. By the second year of harvest failure the farmers in the EU would have adapted their harvested area (+4%) and EU production would increase by 5%.

In the Higher Costs Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.4) the higher operating cost would increase total variable costs in crop production by 10% and 30% respectively due to the scenario assumptions. As a primary effect cereals production would decrease, and as demand would not decrease as much as supply, producer prices would increase. Less production and an increased domestic market price imply lower exports and also an increase in imports. Cereals revenues (value of outputs, no premiums) per hectare of harvested area show an average increase in the EU-27 of about 2% and 7% respectively in the two scenarios. However, the increase in revenue is lower than the increase in operating cost and consequently the income is affected negatively. Most negatively affected regions would be those with input intensive production systems (e.g. in France) and those with small profit margins (e.g. Portugal). At EU-27 level income for cereals would decrease by -7% and -19% respectively in the two scenarios (cf. Figure 24). The impacts of higher operating costs are very similar in all crops sectors, i.e. also for the balances for oilseeds.






Figure 24: Change in cereals revenue and income in the Higher Costs Scenario, 10% increase in operating costs, 2020

Source: Presentation Himics and Nii-Naate (JRC-IPTS)

In the Yield Uncertainty Scenario (cf. Chapter 2.3) the random variation of crop yields in the EU is based on the fluctuations observed in the past, with the correlation between crop yields being taken into account. Variability of total EU cereals supply is about 4% relative to the mean, which corresponds to a difference of 40 million tonnes between the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile and the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile. Almost no variation can be seen in food use and only small variability in total feed use (1%). However, substitution between feed crops takes place, with the variability for some single crops in feed use being 3-4%. The crop price variation is also depicted in the feed cost index, with for example the EU-15 non-ruminant feed cost index showing a variation of 15%. However, the impact on the feed costs results in only a small impact on total meat production (less than -1%). With rather inelastic demand the variability in supply is mostly transmitted into trade and the variation in the EU net trade positions for cereals is big, like for example for wheat 46%.

In the panel discussion John Tjaardstra (International Grains Council) presented the IGC projections for grain production and highlighted the differences between the IGC projections of the previous year. In the IGC 5-year projections for wheat production, higher estimates (especially in Kazakhstan, the EU and Australia) for 2010/11 and 2011/12 lift the projections from one year ago considerably. The same effect can be seen in the IGC 5-year projections for maize production, where estimates have been increased especially in China, the EU, Ukraine and South America. The world grains balance has eased somewhat in the past month, and the outlook for global closing stocks is slightly easier than a year ago. However, while world wheat ending stocks are projected to be at their highest level since 2001/02, further stock decreases are forecasted for maize and barley. Global grains area is estimated to increase by 1.7%, thus returning to that of 2009, after a recovery in Russia from last year's drought. To a large extent, the upward crop revisions will be absorbed by forecasted consumption increases, particularly in China. A high proportion of demand has been answered in the first part of the season by Black Sea exports, especially from Russia. Tjaardstra pointed out that even though Russia may eventually introduce measures to control shipments of wheat beyond a certain level they are still forecasted to set new records. Furthermore exports by Ukraine are expected to accelerate following the recent removal of taxes. With respect to prices, the IGC Grains and Oilseeds Index (GOI) shows that prices in the current months return to the levels of last year. Tjaardstra also highlighted the more pronounced volatility in grains and oilseeds markets over the past decade (cf. Figure 25).





Source: Presentation Tjaardstra (International Grains Council). Note: HV 20 refers to the % standard deviation of daily price movements over a 20 day period

Laurine Simon (Tallage/Stratégie Grains) presented the forecast for crops and oilseeds of Tallage/Stratégie Grains. Simon first briefly delineated the main assumptions and methodology for the area and production forecast, which consists of the following three main steps: (1) forecast for total area used for crop cultivation, (2) area breakdown by culture and (3) yield forecast. The forecast is based on each crop share of total area including agronomical constraints. The rapeseed area is assumed to be maximised (taking into account rotation constraints) as the forecasted demand shows a sharp rise by 2020. Furthermore, climate change impacts on winter/spring crop distribution are also taken into account. For 2020 the forecast results show a change of +10% in rapeseed area, +14% in sunseed area, +1% in soft wheat area, -5% in barley area, +5 in maize area and +9% in silage maize area (mainly due to biogas developments) in comparison to 2010.

Further focusing on rapeseed area, the forecast of Tallage shows area increases in comparison to 2010 by 11% in Germany (i.e. +70 000 ha compared to the maximum reached in 2007), 16% in France (i.e. +70 000 ha compared to the maximum reached in 2007), 15% in the UK (+30 000 ha compared to the maximum reached in 2011) and 4% in Poland (+30 000 ha compared to the maximum reached in 2011). In addition to the increase in area, rapeseed yields are also forecasted to increase in both the EU-15 and the EU-12. For sunseed, the Tallage forecast shows the most significant area increases by 16% in Spain (which is still 40 000 ha less compared to the maximum reached in 2009), 3% in France (which is 20 000 ha

less compared to the maximum reached in 2011), 9% in Hungary, 16% in Romania and 24% in Bulgaria. Sunseed yields are also predicted to increase in the EU-27, with the yields growing somewhat more in the EU-12 than in the EU-15. As main factors of uncertainties Simon highlighted potential changes in the CAP, the effects of abolishing sugar quotas, the ability of farmers to effectively increase rapeseed area by 2020 (as climatic and agronomic constraints might probably be underestimated) and the biodiesel development in the EU which may have an impact on the long term use of vegetable oils (due to the sustainability criteria and its implementation).

Klaus-Dieter Schumacher (Nordzucker) commented specifically on the sugar market. He agreed with all the assumptions in the Commission's preliminary outlook for sugar, except the increase in sugar production due to a higher use for biofuels, which he sees as rather questionable. Domestic demand seems to be currently underestimated, with the sweets industry growing especially with respect to exports. A major uncertainty on the supply side is Brazil where in the next 2-3 years no growth could be expected because no necessary investments have been made. This constitutes a fundamental change, as in recent years the growth in global market demand was mainly served by Brazil. Without Brazil increasing its sugar production, the situation on the world market can became quite tight, with high prices and most likely also high volatility. The ability of ACP nations to supply the EU is also questionable because with sugar prices being higher on the world market, there is not a big incentive to export to the EU, moreover domestic demand in ACP is increasing, thus sugar imports from ACP will very likely go down in the EU. Within the EU, Schumacher sees the mandate for biofuels as most crucial, and he actually expects a debate on the mandate to arise soon. With respect to the abolishment of the sugar quota in the EU, Schumacher pointed out that resulting production effects are not clear as they mainly depend on the price relation of sugar to wheat and oilseeds prices, in addition isoglucose should be looked at carefully.

In the open discussion the quite optimistic outlook for developments in the grains markets was confirmed. It was also highlighted that there is a general tendency that stocks for grains are at a rather low level, which makes the market vulnerable to any interruptions or shortcomings on the supply side. As a general rule, without sufficient stocks volatility is a logical consequence.

A lot of the discussion was dedicated to the abolishment of the sugar quota in the EU, and it does not seem to be clear what the actual effects will be for the market. However, discussants

are rather sceptical with regard to an increase in sugar prices in the medium-term. Even though there is a lack of investment in Brazil, they could be expected to increase sugar production within 2-3 years as a response to higher sugar prices. On the other hand the supply response in the sugar market also depends on the developments in the biofuels sector. Some additional sugar supply could be expected from Thailand and also from some sub-Saharan countries, which seem to be in a rather good position for an export oriented sugar production. However, problems with infrastructure might detain these countries to explore their potential.

A further issue discussed was the need to close the yield gap in the context of global food security. Declines in yield growth rates reflect missing investment due to lower output prices and discussants were rather confident that yields would increase due to price incentives in the case of increased demand.

#### 8. Agricultural policy and markets: which relationship over time?

The final session was dedicated to the general relationship between agricultural policy and markets, how this relationship evolved in the past and how it might evolve in the future.

Catherine Moreddu (OECD) presented the outcome of the recent OECD study 'Evaluation of agricultural policy reforms in the European Union'. Moreddu marked out that the CAP has a history of 25 years in which it has been regularly adapted to evolving situations, like (i) the enlargement from 6 to 27 Member Sates which meant a constantly larger and more diverse agricultural sector, (ii) from production deficit to a surplus situation, (iii) increasing budget and international pressure; and (iv) the growing importance of environmental issues. The CAP developments have been monitored and evaluated since the mid-80s by the OECD.

Moreddu highlighted that since 1992 the CAP gradually and consistently moved towards greater market orientation. Support to producers has been significantly reduced and there is a clear trend towards decoupling support from current production. With market intervention and border protection decrease, domestic prices became more closely aligned to world prices (7% higher in 2008-10 compared to 71% in 1986-88). According to OECD classifications, the share of the most distorting support has been reduced from 92% to 29% (OECD average is 51%). The share of support that does not require any production is increasing (47% in 2010), and most of the remaining area payments are not linked to specific commodities. These changes in the way of providing support to farmers clearly increased the income efficiency of the transfer payments.

In the evolution of the CAP a clear development to more attention to environmental issues can be observed. There is a generalisation of constraints on production practices, with over 50% of the support having mandatory input constraints (cross compliance), and 12% having voluntary input constraints (compared to 2% in 1990). Moreover, more funds are used directly for land management and local public goods, with more funds for Pillar II from 10% of CAP expenditures in 2000 to 20% in 2010 and a minimum share for land management from 2007 (25% for Axis 2). There is quite diversity in the use of Pillar II measures, which reflects differences in priorities and conditions between the EU Member States (cf. Table 4).

•		-	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	EU-27	EU-15	Minimum	Maximum
Pillar II in CAP expenditures	20%	15%	5-10% DK, BL, FR, NL	50-60% EU-12
Axis 1 in Pillar II	35%	27%	Around 10% IE, UK, SE	Over 40% BL, ES, PT, EU-12
Axis 2 in Pillar II	51%	62%	Under 40% NL, new MS	Over 70% AT, FI, FR, IE, SE, UK
- Agri-environment in Pillar II	27%	33%	Under 15% BG, PL, PT	Over 40% AT, BE, DK, IE, SE, UK
- LFA in Pillar II	19%	22%	Under 10% BE, BG, DK, EE, HU, NL	Around or over 30% FI, FR, GR, PT, SI
Axes 3+4 in Pillar II	13%	11%	10 MS under 10%	47% NL, 40% BG, over 20% EE, DE, CZ, LV
Source: Presentation More	eddu (OE	CD)		

 Table 4:
 Diversity in the use of pillar II measures, 2010


Presentation Moreddu (OECD) Source:

Moreddu pointed out that even though the environmental performance of the CAP is rather difficult to measure, some general observations can be made. Set-aside in the EU had significant environmental impacts, positive overall. Decoupling of support is expected to be beneficial through extensification. The cross-compliance conditions are expected to deliver a minimum level of environmental management across farmland, albeit it has to be stated that it does not target specific problems. The evaluation of agri-environmental measures of the CAP showed benefits for biodiversity (at least a reduction of the rate of losses) and positive impacts on landscape, but due to a lack of data the evaluation could not show much evidence for the effects on soil and water quality.

Moreddu also highlighted that the evaluation of the CAP reforms showed that some challenges still remain. Especially in terms of the income objective a better targeting could be envisaged. Largest farms receive most support, with the 25% largest farms receiving 75% of all support; as they produce 82% of the EU agricultural production their farm income is about three times the average of all farms. Moreddu also stressed that more could be done to improve competitiveness, as for example the share of general services such as research and infrastructure investment remains modest (12% of total support). Also some impediments remain, e.g. measures that slow structural adjustment or that increase land value. In general, an increasing flexibility to respond to higher diversity in the EU would have to be balanced against EU-wide priorities.

With respect to the CAP post-2013, Moreddu depicted a favourable context for a new approach that is building on past successes and responds to present challenges and opportunities. A further shift of policy emphasis from supporting farm income to investing in further improving the productivity, profitability, sustainability and long-term competitiveness of the agri-food sector is needed. Such a move implies more investment in innovation, the provision of an effective framework for producer risk management, the usage of a range of instruments adapted to specific situations to improve the long run sustainability of agriculture, the adoption of a place-based, non sectoral, approach to rural development and the consideration of income issues on the basis of reliable and comparable information on income and wealth across the economy.

Tassos Haniotis (DG AGRI) specifically reflected on the European Commission's proposals in the policy framework of the CAP towards 2020 and the impact of alternative scenarios. With respect to market measures Haniotis pointed out that the proposals will lead to more structural adjustment in the EU as continued market orientation is envisaged, e.g. with the end of certain aid schemes (Skimmed Milk Powder, hops and silkworms) and the end of production limits (sugar). The proposals generally foresee improved instruments to address market developments, with an enhanced safety-net that includes (i) exceptional measures that allow for more flexibility and greater coherence, (ii) simplified public intervention and private storage that is more responsive to crises, and (iii) a "crises reserve". Furthermore, common action of farmers to get a better position in the food supply chain will be encouraged, for example through a facilitated recognition of Producer Organisations (PO), Associations of POs, and Interbranch Organisations, as well as through more clarity as regards competition rules and through a link to Rural Development funds (for start-up and co-operation measures). Commenting specifically on direct payments, Haniotis delineated the dual role of direct payments in the CAP, as they aim to contribute to keep farming in place throughout the EU territory by supporting and stabilising farmers' income and providing basic public goods through their link with cross compliance. More targeted and regionally specific agrienvironmental and climate measures are included in Pillar II. In the future, direct payments will generally enhance the environmental performance of EU agriculture through "greening" measures. With the proposals for a new design of direct payments, farmers would have generally access to compulsory schemes in all MS (basic payment scheme, 'green' payment, young farmers scheme) and voluntary schemes depending on the MS choice to implement them (coupled support, support in natural constraint areas). All direct payments would have to be subject to cross compliance and all farmers will have access to the Farm Advisory System. As alternative to these compulsory and voluntary schemes, it is compulsory for MS to offer a simplified scheme for small farmers which small farmers can claim for on a voluntary basis. An overview on the new design of direct payments in the CAP is given in Figure 26.





Source: Presentation Haniotis (DG AGRI)

Regarding the issue of redistribution of direct payments Haniotis pointed out that it is getting increasingly difficult to justify high differences between farmers in the level of direct payments based on historic references. Therefore it is proposed to abolish the historic model for the basic payment scheme and to move to a national or regional flat rate per eligible hectare in all Member States. In addition, the difference between Member States in the per ha direct payment level is also strongly questioned. However, the redistribution of direct payments among Member States comes along with several difficulties. A unique EU 'flat rate' basic direct payment would ignore existing economic differences between Member States between Member States (e.g. wage levels and input costs). Furthermore, the relation to overall economy must be considered, as the share of direct payments in GDP is very high in many Member States with below average direct payments per hectare. The overall balance of incomes must also be taken into account, because a disproportionate increase of direct payments in some Member

States could lead to sectoral income bias towards agriculture. In addition, other subsidies must be considered, as Pillar II support and structural and cohesion funds also contribute to overall support levels. After assessing the impact of various options for the redistribution of direct payments among Member States, the Commission proposes a formula of redistribution where all Member States with direct payments below 90% of the EU average will see one third of this gap closed by 2020.

Haniotis also briefly delineated the key measures in the reform proposals for rural development under the CAP, which comprise measures for knowledge transfer, information actions and advisory services as well as for investments in physical assets (with higher support rates for young farmers, collective investments and integrated projects). Measures for farm and business development provide extended support for small farmers, young farmers and small businesses. Specific support will be granted for the setting up of producer groups in all EU Member States. With respect to agri-environment-climate payments and organic farming more flexibility and reinforced support for joint actions are foreseen. The co-operation measure will be significantly reinforced and include pilot projects, short supply chain and local promotion. Furthermore, a new toolkit for risk management will be provided and the leader approach will be strengthened across EU funds.

David Blandford (Pennsylvania State University) highlighted three major challenges for the developments on agricultural commodity markets in the short- and medium-term: the macroeconomic environment, the energy market, and domestic agricultural and trade policies. Blandford is rather pessimistic about the future development in agricultural markets especially due to the significant downside risk of the current macroeconomic developments and financial crisis. Shifts in real exchange rates and more inflation also bear major threats for agricultural markets. The question is how much of this could and should be incorporated in the analysis and projections for the outlook on agricultural commodity markets. In this context the stochastic analysis conducted in the uncertainty analysis of the EC baseline is very helpful and important. Blandford also pointed out that in the current macroeconomic environment it is very likely that budgets will be cut back for agricultural policy and this could also have an effect on the outlook projections. However it is not clear which measures would be cut, but in the EU and the US there seems to be an emphasis on preserving direct payments.

Regarding biofuels, Blandford foresees that the US will play a major role in the markets. Mandates might stay in both the US and the EU, however biofuels will be seen more critical and the achievement of mandates could be more under threat in the EU than in the US. Developments in Brazil are quite uncertain, but Brazil will not only produce ethanol but also more petroleum. Furthermore, Brazil will export blended fuel to catch the added value. In general Blandford thinks that the importance of fossil fuel will rather decrease while natural gas will become more important (there are already enormous investments), which will also impact on renewables.

With respect to domestic agricultural and trade policies, Blandford highlighted that even though during the workshop there was actually not much discussion on the WTO negotiations, a possible outcome of the DDA could influence market developments. As an important issue Blandford also pointed out that it is not clear what will happen in the future with the agricultural and trade policies in emerging and developing countries. Observations show that there is a move towards input subsidies in these countries. China is also moving towards a net support position and is probably getting more protective to its agricultural sector. Such a development will certainly also impact the developments on the world markets for agricultural commodities.

George Rapsomanikis (FAO) presented results of an interagency report on food price volatility.<sup>12</sup> The preparation of the report was coordinated by FAO and OECD, and jointly done by several organisations and agencies, following a request by G20 leaders. It is shown in the report that volatility in international agricultural commodity prices has been higher since 2000 than during the previous two decades and this is also the case of wheat and rice prices in the most recent years (2006-2010) compared to the 1970s. Irrespective of any conclusion about the long term trends, there is no doubt that the period since 2006 has been one of extraordinary volatility. Prices rose sharply in 2007 and 2008, and for some products prices peaked in the second half of 2007, for other products in the first half of 2008. Prices then fell sharply in the second half of 2008. Market tensions emerged again during 2010-2011 and there have been sharp rises in some food prices (cf. Figure 27), with the FAO food price index in early 2011 again reaching the peak of 2008.

Rapsomanikis pointed out that there are several determinants for further increases in food prices and volatility in the future. By 2050 the world's population is expected to have reached about 9 billion people and the demand for food to have increased by between 70% and 100%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The report 'Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses' can be downloaded at: <u>http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/Volatility/Interagency Report to the G20 on Food Price Volatility.pdf</u>

On the other hand, the rate of yearly growth in agricultural production is estimated to decrease to 1.5% (2010-2030) and further to 0.9% between 2030 and 2050. These estimates suggest that in the future, with the supply of food not growing at the same pace as demand, there will be more upward pressure on prices in world food markets. Moreover, predictions show lower stocks than in the past and low stock levels relative to use will also put pressure on prices and will especially add to a high risk of volatility in prices. In order to address the problem of rising demand and high price volatility, the interservice group recommends increasing investment in agricultural productivity growth. The required investment is estimated to amount to an average of USD 83 billion annually, which includes investment in primary agriculture and necessary downstream services such as storage and processing facilities.



Figure 27: Grain prices 2010-2011

Source: Presentation Rapsomanikis (FAO)


As further recommendations for policies that can help to reduce food price volatility, Rapsomanikis mentioned improved market access and the development of a 'notification process' for export restrictions in WTO, with an operational definition of critical food shortage to justify export restrictions. Concerning biofuels, flexible mandates should be introduced that allow the adjustment to safeguard food security. With regard to speculation, more transparency about transactions across futures markets and especially across over-thecounter (OTC) markets is recommended. Comprehensive trading data need to be reported, in order to enable regulators and participants to monitor information and understand what is driving commodity prices. Joseph Glauber (USDA) commented on the reforms in the agricultural policy of the USA. In order to discuss current issues on the 2012 Farm Bill, he set the current debate into the historical context of reforms in US agricultural policy. Reforms between 1985 and 1996 were characterised by lower support prices, moves towards greater planting flexibility, moves towards decoupling payments from production, and the introduction and extension of conservation programs. The 1996 Farm Bill foresaw a freeze of loan rates, the elimination of set aside, even more planting flexibility, the replacement of deficiency payments with fixed transition payments, and the elimination of honey and wool support as well as the phasing out of dairy support. Glauber explained that then something like a 'counter-reformation' in US farm policy could be observed, due to the collapse in producer prices in the late 1990s which lead to ad hoc legislations and the extension of the dairy programme. In the 2002 Farm Bill, loan rates were raised and extended to pulses, counter-cyclical payments (CCP) were reintroduced and payment bases had been updated. Afterwards, in the 2008 Farm Bill also the programs ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election) and SURE (Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments) had been introduced.

Glauber highlighted that the current debate on the 2012 Farm Bill is marked by discussions on the budget. The initial budget proposals by Administration foresaw a cut of the agricultural budget of \$33 billion over 10 years, while the Agricultural Committees proposed a cut of \$23 billion over 10 years with \$15 billion coming from commodity programs. Still the crucial question on what the Super Committee will propose remains open, but in any case it becomes obvious that the budget for agricultural policy will be cut. High agricultural commodity prices in the recent past have kept outlays and levels for Marketing Assistance Loans (MAS) low, but the potential to breach limits remains non-trivial if prices fall. Figure 28 gives an overview on the projected outlays for selected programs in the US Farm Bill if the current programmes would be continued.

In the current debate on a new Farm Bill there is particularly dissatisfaction with direct payments. The debate is centred around several aspects, especially on the need for payments in times of high prices, the fact that benefits accrue largely to landowners, the wide differences between planted and base acres as well as payment limitation issues. On the other hand, it is also often argued that for many producers direct payments are the only payments received over the past several years as no loan rates or counter-cyclical payments were granted given the high producer prices. Furthermore, the US direct payments are considered as minimally trade distorting and are notified as green box measures. Moreover, the direct payments are tight to conservation compliance. The latest program proposals for the 2012

Farm Bill foresee a transfer from the budget for direct payments to the ACRE/shallow loss programs (which would be qualified as green box in the WTO, at least if they are not product-specific), the extension of supplemental disaster payments, tying direct payments to the cost of production and a margin-based dairy program (which would be potentially blue or green box at least for base level protection).





In the open discussion it was highlighted that the relationship between agricultural policy and markets has been ambiguous over time. On the one hand the EU clearly moved from the support of agricultural prices to support that is decoupled from production and aims more directly on farmers' income. On the other hand, many other countries show signs of more protectionism and support that is more tied to prices and actual plantings, in fact shifting agricultural programs and measures from green box to amber box. Actually, the current macroeconomic environment, and with budgets under pressure in many countries, could provide opportunities to make some significant changes in farm policies. In addition it remains unclear what a WTO agreement might bring for the development of agricultural commodity markets. Likewise it was stressed that there are more and more bilateral free trade agreements coming into place that also will impact the markets.

It was also discussed what kind of risk management could be provided by governments and what has to be handled by the farmers. In general, the risk management of low impact risks has to be managed by farmers, and the government can provide training and information on risks. In general, for the management of risks where market instruments can and should play a

Source: Presentation Glauber (USDA). Primary source: CBO Baseline (March 2011). Note: MLG = Marketing Loan Gains, CCP = Counter-Cyclical Payments, ACRE = Average Crop Revenue Election


role, the government can help for a good functioning by providing the legal framework and information. It was also highlighted that governmental support should be temporary and not prevent the creation of private risk management markets. On the other hand, catastrophic risk can not really be managed by farmers alone and the government might have to step in. However, the rules for government intervention in the event of a catastrophe should be defined before the event happens and also the rule and amount of compensation has do be defined before.

In the concluding remarks the usefulness of the workshop was highlighted, as many valuable comments on the DG AGRI baseline have been made, and the discussions have helped to get a better picture of the drivers of supply and demand in the markets as well as on the related uncertainties. The uncertainty analyses are seen as an important complement to the DG AGRI baseline, as they help to identify and quantify potential risks to the 'standard' projections of the development of agricultural commodity markets. According to the discussions at the workshop it seems to be a rather solid assumption that agricultural prices will stay higher in the medium-term, but input prices will also stay at a higher level. Nevertheless, major uncertainty is seen with regard to general macroeconomic developments, and due to current global economic and financial imbalances it can not be excluded that agricultural prices will rather fall back in the short-term.

# **Workshop Presentations**

## The CAP towards 2020: Legal proposals Tassos Haniotis (DG AGRI)





Where are we with the CAP reform process?




#### How will the CAP be financed?

In MARIA EUR	Currenti prikces
- Filler 1-Direct payments and market-related expenditure	317.
- Pillar II - Rutal development	101.
Total Pillar I and II	418,
- Foot safety	23
- Most deprived persone	23
- Reserve for clises in the agricultural sector	33
- European Global sation Fund	Jote 21
- Research and innovation on face security, the bis-economy and sustainable agriculture	5.
Total additional amounts	Up to 17.1
Total proposed amounts for the period 2014-2020	Up to 436.5


#### Comparing CAP costs (in bn EUR, current prices)

	2013	2020
Market measures	3.31	2.70
Direct payments	42.17	43,45
Pillar I	45.48	46.15
Pillar II - RD	14.82	14.46
Total	60.30	60.61


CAP expenditure and CAP reform 1980-2020














Climate change - Possible impacts on EU agriculture









#### New design of direct payments (1)

· In 2014, EU farmers would have access to: Compulsory schemes (all MS): () Voluntary schemes (MS choice). - Basic payment scheme Coupled support
Support in natural constraint Green' payment\*
Young farmers scheme areas All payments subject to cross compliance All farmers will have access to the Farm Advisory System A simplified scheme for small farmers (compulsory for MS, choice for farmer) \* Payment for agricultural practices beneficial to climate change and the environment Eampean Carrier Agriculture and Earth Carrier




Redistribution of DP - Closing one third of the gap between current level and 90% of EU average by 2020





#### Improved instruments to address market developments (sCMO)





#### Key measures under Rural development

- · Knowledge transfer, information actions and advisory services
- Investments in physical assets:
- higher support rates for young farmers, collective investments and integrated projects
- Farm and business development
- extended support for small farmers, young farmers and small businesses Support for setting up of producer groups in all EU Member States
- ents and organic farming: more flexibility and Agri-environment-climate payments reinforced support for joint actions
- Significantly reinforced co-operation measure including pilot projects, short supply chain, local promotion
- New risk management toolkit
- Leader approach strengthened across EU funds
- . European Innovation Partnership and Prize for innovative, local coop
- Constant Committees Systematics Further and Further intern

#### An overarching objective: Simplification Examples

#### · Policy instruments

- A simple and specific scheme for small farmers (around 30% of beneficiaries)
- Greening as simple as possible, includes only measures that have an environmental impact AND are manageable / controllable without major extra cost;

#### Payments


- Only one Paying Agency for all CAP measures in a MS/Region
   A range of approaches to reimbursing payments by beneficiaries on the basis of a mplified costs (II Pitar).

#### Controls

Lampine C


- MS with properly functioning control systems and low error rates may be authorised to reduce the number of controls
- Crose-compliance: reduction and better streamlining of the obligations (13 SMRs instead of 18 and 8 GAEC instead of 15), follow-up checks to minor infringements repealed; farmers using certification systems less likely to be controlled.

# Outline 4. What's next? C Synchron de



	The CAP after 2013
h	the first success successly burning and could down as him
	http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/index_en.htm
	Commission Communication 'The CAP towards 2020'
h	http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/communication/ index_en.h
- 1	mpact assessment
h	http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/perspec/cap-2020/index_en.htm
• L	legal proposals
ħ	http://ec.euroca.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/legal-proposals/incex_en.h

## Main conclusions of last year's outlook Thomas Fellmann (JRC-IPTS)




#### Commodity Market Development in Europe - Outlook





## Baseline process and description of the uncertainty analysis

Pierluigi Londero (DG AGRI) and Robert M'barek (JRC-PTS)









Scenario laber	Scenarios	uncertainties analysed
Macro Uncertainty	random selection	Partial stochastic analysis of macro variables
Slower Growth China	7% GDP growth	Slower GDP growth in China
Yield Uncertainty	random selection	Partial stochastic analysis of yield
Higher Costs	30% increase 10% increase	Higher operating/production costs in the EU
Harvest Failure East	No exports Lower exports	Limited availability of grains in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Organisation of workshop


Session on macro-economic assumptions


JRC ik


- Sessions organised for each commodity market
   presentation of European Commission's outlook on EU agricultural
  - market developments
  - presentation on how different settings and assumptions regarding selected factors and uncertainties influence the projected developments
  - panel discussions with short presentations
- · Final panel discussion on agricultural policy and markets

# **EU agricultural outlook: settings and income results** Stephan Hubertus Gay (DG AGRI)












EU-12 faster growing at a lower level













# **Macroeconomic uncertainties**

Zebedee Nii-Naate (JRC-IPTS)








#### · Correlation of short term forecast errors

- stochastic variable = baseline/baseline(-1) forecast/forecast(-1) (mean (baseline/baseline(-1) forecast/forecast(-1))
- New exogenous variable = New exogenous variable (-1)\*(1+ (baseline baseline(-1)/baseline(-1) + stochastic variable)
- Covariance matrix of stochastic variable is computed
- Expected value of stochastic variable is assumed to equal 0
- Multivariate normal distribution imposed (means, covariance matrix)
- Multivariate normal distribution imposed (means, covariance matrix)
- Assume no correlation of variables between years.
- · 364 successful solutions out of 500 simulations

	ips			riano	ce ma	trix		Europ Agrice Renall	cen Come Elis ard Decelopite
	E1U-6 CP1	EU-12 CPI	EU-15 GDP	EJ-12 30P INDEX	EU-15 GDP DEFLATOR	EU-12 GDP DEFLATOR	USA GDP DEFLATORS		OL
E1U-5 CPI	1030.0	0.0001	0.060	0.0001	3,0030	3,0000	C.6800	0.0004	-0.3008
EU-12 CPI		0.0002	0.0003	0.0008	3,0000	3,0001	C 0001	6 0005	C.2013
EU-15 GDP INDEX			0.0004	0.035	3 (030	30031	0.0001	0 0 0 0 7	-6.3014
EU-12 GDP INDEX				0 (0)6	2000	30001	C.0002	0.0012	-0.3011
EU-15 GDP DEFLATOR					3 (030	30000	0.6600	0.0503	-0.5001
EJ-12 GDP DEFLATOR						0.0001	C.0000	-6 0001	0.0004
USA GDP DEFLATOR							0.0001	0.0204	6.2004
EURO-USD	-							0.0057	-C.3043
OIL PRICE									0.1266

JRC ips


European Commissi Apresiture and Busil Development




EU-15 GDP Deflator









## **Commodity Markets:** A New Structure or Deviations from Long Term Trends? John Baffes (World Bank)

World Bank - Prospects Group. World Bank - Prospects Group Short-term movements **Commodity Markets: A New Structure** 500 or Deviations from Long Term Trends? 400 JOHN BAFFES The World Bank 200 Workshop on Commodity Market Developments in Europe-Outlook October 25-26, 2011 European Commission, Brussels iamy-00 iuiL-01 janv.-03 luil-04 iany -05 juil-07 janv-09 juil.-10 ros: World Bank World Bank - Prospects Group World Bank - Prospects Group Most of the 'perfect storm' conditions are still in place Issues on post-2005 developments in commodity markets 2001-05 2006-10 change Agricultural prices (nominal index, 2000 = 100) 117 198 + 69% Grain/oliseed price volatility (stdev of log differences, monthly) 2.3 3.5 + 52% o A "perfect storm" that still continues? (# 3-5) Crude oil price (USS/barrel, nominal) + 127% 33 75 Fertilizer prices (nominal index 2000 = 100) 120 310 + 157% o What can simple models tell us? (# 6-9) Exchange rates (USS against a broad index of currencies) -13% 119 104 Interest rates (10-year US Treasury bill) 4.7 4.1 - 14% o What about facts? (# 10-16) Funds invested in commodities (\$ billion) 30 230 + 667% GDP growth (low and middle income countries, % p.a.) + 16% 5.0 5.8 o Are we experiencing the emergence of a structural Industrial production (low and middle income countries, % p.a.) 6.3 7.1 + 13% transformation or just deviations from longer term Biofuel production (million of barrels per day equivalent) + 203% 0,4 1.3 trends? Or, a storm that goes on for 6 years is no Stocks (total of maize, wheat, and rice, months of consumption) 3.2 2.5 -21%

-Long term trends 250 200 150 100 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

longer a storm (#17-19)

Source: World Bank Note: 2011 Figures as of August 2011

urces: Barclays Capital, CRED, FRED, IEA, IMF, USDA, World Bank, and author's calo

#### World Bank - Prospects Group

18 4.0

374

1.4 1.0

441 + 18%

+ 7%


- 32%

#### A simple model

- $log(P_t) = \mu + \beta_1 log(S/U_{t,3}) + \beta_2 log(P_t^{cm}) + \beta_3 log(XR_t)$ +  $\beta_{s} \log(R_{s}) + \beta_{s} \log(GDP_{s}) + \beta_{s} \log(MUV_{s}) + \beta_{s} t + \varepsilon_{s}$
- the annual average nominal price of commodity (maize, wheat, P .: rice, soybeans, and palm oil)

(5/U)<sub>11</sub>: lagged stock-to-use ratio

- price of crude oil (average of Brent, WTI, and Dubai) P,OL.
- XR .: exchange rate (US\$ against a broad index of currencies)
- interest rate (10-year US Treasury) R;
- MUV;: inflation (exports price index of manufactures by G-5)
- GDP; world GDP (global; GDP in US\$)
- t time trend
- parameters to be estimated βs:
- error term ε,:




	Parameter estimates								
	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Soybeans	Palm oil				
S/U ratio	-0.45***	.0.53***	-6.08	-0.17**	-0.38**				
Oil price	0 19***	0.24***	0.25***	031***	0.45***				
Exchange rate	0.02	-0.81***	-2.83***	-1.31***	-1.09*				
Interest rate	-0.05	0.05	0.34***	-0.06	0.04				
GDP	-0.01	-0.01	-6.05**	0.01	0.01				
Inflation	0.64	0.08	0.62	-0.01	0.04				
Trend#100	-1.76***	-0.65	-6.75	-1.14*	-2.17**				
Adjusted-R <sup>2</sup>	0.87	0.91	0.76	0.84	0.62				
DW	1.03	1.10	1.03	1.27	1.24				
ADF	-3.90***	-5.52***	-3.95***	4.68***	4.43**				

Notes: Asterisks indicate levels of significance: (\*) for 10%, (\*\*) for 5%, and (\*\*\*) for 1% levels. DW is the Durbin Watson statistic for serial correlation. ADF is the Augmented-Dickey Fuller statistic for unit root.


What matters most Contribution of each versible to price thanger from 2003-CS to 2006-10, percent								
	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Soybeans	Palm oil			
5/U ratio	12.0	14.4	0.9	-2.4	1.3			
Oil price	32.6	41.4	27.2	57.0	58.2			
Exchange rate	-0.1	11.5	25.4	19.9	11.9			
Interest rate	0.5	-0.5	-2.0	0.6	0.3			
GDP	0.4	C.4	1.2	-0.4	-0.3			
Inflation	13.6	1.7	-8.4	-0.2	0.7			
Trend	-0.3	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3			
SUM (of the above)	58.7	68.8	44.2	74.3	71.8			
Residual	41.3	31.2	55.8	25.7	28.2			
ALL (SUM + Residual)	100	100	100	100	100			


Notes: The contributions were based on the parameter estimated reported earlier



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Source: Author's estimate






Note: Appiculture refers to copy [i.e., it excludes livestock]; it induces both direct energy costs (n cstly fuel) and chemicas (the most important of which is fertilizer). It avoid double-counting, manufacture does not include the relating sector.

#### -

Net imports and consumption shares, 1990-99

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


Source: Authors calculations from US Department of Agriculture data Note: The US is not included in the figure. Its (net) exports and consumption shares were 39% and 13%.




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
Net imports and consumption shares, 2000-09



Source: Authors calculations from US Department of Agriculture data Note: The US is not included in the figure. Its (net) econds and consumption shares were 33% and 14%.




Source: Author's calculation from US Department of Agriculture data



World Bank - Prospects Group

The largest demand shock of the pest decade (6-fold increase).

Diversion of food commodities to biofuels still rising



(Price motions)
 (Pr

World Bank - Prospects Group

Funds invested in commodities have been increasing, expected to reach US\$ 430 billion in 2011.

 But, they only represent a small fraction of invested assets in investment, pension, and SWFs (estimated about US\$ 35-40 trillion).
 The debate is heated and highly political while the views on charge and highly political

 The debate is basted and highly political while the views zee strong, ranging from "chose funds have injected liquidity into commodity markets, thus ensuring price stability" to "these existeric and complex instruments and practices spread as quickly as a deadly wins in a sol<sup>2</sup> pick."
 Yet, the empirical evidence is weak. Bet, instressingly, more evidence comes in favor of impact (on watshillity not levels).
 Although not expected to affect long term price variability [ctrictly personal view].

Commodity assets under management still rising



Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital



-

World Bank - Prospects Gro

Commodity markets—as they are evolving



### Comparison FAPRI vs EC Outlook Settings Julian Binfield (FAPRI)

Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute FAPRI University of Missouri

### Comparison FAPRI vs EC Outlook Settings

Brussels, 25<sup>th</sup>/26<sup>th</sup> October, 2011

#### Most of the time not different Crop areas- million hectares

	FAPRI-MU	EU Commission
Wheat	26.0	26.2
Barley	11.9	11.7
Maize	9.2	9.1
Rapeseed	7.7	6.9
Sunflower	4.0	3.9


#### FAPRI-MU EU stuff this year

- The figures for Europe that I have here are from FAPRI-MU's latest outlook
- They are not the same as those from FAPRI-ISU which use different models, and this year different world prices
- We drive world prices off the January FAPRI-MU stochastic baseline so we have January Global Insight oil prices in, updated for the short run


#### Macro data that we use, 2020

	From Global Insight	EU Commission
USD/FUR	4.50	4.45
EU-27 inflation (GDP defl.?)	1.50	1.48
GDP growth	2.1	2.0%
Oil price	\$103	\$112
Population growth	0.1%	0.2%


# Euro/\$ exchange rate and cereals prices




Biogas? Major cereals area in Germany – '000 ha



#### Income is important for biofuels EU-27 total energy cons. road trans. '000 toe



#### Corn and oil price, 2012-2020 average



# Factors influencing impact of oil price changes on biofuels demand

EU

- US
- Mandates can be waived
- Some countries have penalties for not meeting mandates
- Mandates and blend wall determine consumption over a range of prices
- If price falls to energy equivalent, flex fuel market likely to expand
- Mandates and standards determine consumption over a range of prices
- Can EU expand flex fuel market to the same extent?

#### Trade in biofuels


- Consumption of ethanol above consumption of biodiesel? Is that possible?
- What do sustainability requirements mean for potential feedstocks?
- Where will all that ethanol come from?
   El looking for 6 billion extra litres. US looking
  - EU looking for 6 billion extra litres, US looking min. 15+ billion litres, asking Brazil to nearly double prod.
     Economic climate will place a role
- Could EU export 1<sup>st</sup> gen., cellulosic or sugar ethanol?
- · (US/Brazil) policy uncertainty important too


#### Sugar - with or without reform

- FAPRI-US model has different prices for each fuel

   biodiesel, conventional ethanol, advanced
   ethanol, cellulosic ethanol
- Sugar counts as an advanced biofuel and meets sustainability requirements, will be in demand
- Will sugar ethanol be worth more in the EU?
- What will the end of quotas mean?
- If 'greening' requirements of the CAP are passed how will this impact sugar?

## Exchange Rates and World Agricultural Markets William Liefert (USDA-ERS)







# The EU economy: Recent developments and short-term outlook Björn Döhring (DG ECFIN)










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# Macroeconomic Settings: Comments I Eckhard Wurzel (OECD)

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






# Macroeconomic Settings: Comments II Josef Schmidhuber (FAO)








### Talking points: macro

- Stable macro outlook for a deterministic outlook scenario hides more than it reveals
- Baseline is model based but expert-driven
- Growing income disparity: disaggregated picture for GDP growth needed
- Brace for macro-economic volatility on all fronts: GDP growth, inflation, x-rates, US, EU and BRICS
- Relative importance of the macro variables unclear: energy sector/x-rates
- Stochastic simulations needed










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
# EU Agricultural Outlook: Meat Markets Edith Konya (DG AGRI)








# Impact of the uncertainties in the EU Meat sector

Emanuele Ferrari and Sophie Hélaine (JRC-IPTS)













JRC its Macro Uncertainty Partial stochastic analysis of macro variables In brief: GDP growth, GDP deflator, Consumer price index (CPI), Exchange rate and world oil price in the EU-15 and in the EU-12 AGLINK- US GDP deflator · The correlation between macros is taken into account JRC ips EU-27 Beef Net trade (10 Ma 300 200 100 -10th perc. 0 -100 -200 •Till 2015 whatever the macro-economic uncertainty the EU remains a beef net exporter -300 -400 In 2020, the EU27 is a net importer in 50% of the simulations -500 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 EU-27 Poultry Net trade JRC ips (1000 t) Mad ·Imports are limited by the TRQ (856 000t), fulfilled at 90% in 50% of the 1100 simulations CV = 31% •Exports of EU low quality 700 poultry are much more sensitive to the macro-500 economic uncertainty ----•The range of exports 100 around the median is widening on the projection period (600 000 t in 2020 for 80% of the simulations) -100 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 JRC ips EU-27 Pork exports European Agriculture











High costs and tighter global supply due to other opportunities


#### Gira Summary of Gira's main observations on draft I Commodity Outl


- Global and EU meat prices likely to rise by more than EC forecast
  - Global meat prices have risen to reflect firm 3<sup>rc</sup> country demand (China, S E Asia, Russia, MENA, S.America etc)
  - Global supply tightness reflecting alternative agri-opportunities
  - Higher feed costs
- EU imports likely to be higher than forecast
   Impact of FTA's ... and motivation of 3<sup>rd</sup> country exports to access EU market
- EU Consumption forecast seems slightly low
   Especially fir EU12: where Gira expects more growth with rising disposable income
- Short term dip in EU PK production with 2013 loose housing requirement on sows




Back-up charts

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
Either via FTA's or WTO the EU w


- Competitive advantage (within EU) from grass for sustainable production of BF and SH ... which are globally supply constrained
   Privileged access to relatively high price EU market


  - Credible retail relations, through well regarded processors
     But need to continually work on strategies / tactics to reduce the major cost inefficiency from small farm structure (especially in beef & sheepmeat) and excess capacity (everywhere) and tougher regulatory requirements
  - Opportunities for better <sup>3</sup><sup>m</sup> quarter valorisation (special sed <sup>3</sup><sup>m</sup> country exports, and niche marketing of anything, to maintain a reasonably broad customer portfolio)
- Sustainable pigmeat and poultry sector
- Cost penalty on feeds and location vs. commercial advantage of privelaged access to fresh EU market, and continued specific TRQ protection Intra-EU changes in the share of production

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
## Meat Markets: Comments II Philippe Chotteau (Institut de l'Elevage)








The production costs gap is still around 1:2 to 1:2.5 between Brazil & European beef farmers (breeders or fatteners) according to agribenchmark network results.



### Meat Markets: Comments III Sune Jin Christensen (Danish Meat Association)



production	nt in World Meat		A couple of	of comments o	n China		
production		DANSKE BLAGTERIER					DANSKE BLAGTERIE
1000 tormes			<ul> <li>Increa</li> </ul>	asing consu	mption (197	(1990) to 39.3 (	2011) ka per
			capita).			(	
110			sector and				
100							
		and the second second	<ul> <li>Increa</li> </ul>	asing domes	stic product	ion (still very m	uch backyard,
70	~		but)		8		
80							
50							
			<ul> <li>Other</li> </ul>	consequen	ces		
30			- Inci	easing import of	of feed stuff (for	ecast of 58 millio	on tonnes of so
10			bea	n = >5% in 201	0). Domestic pr	roduction approx	c 16 million
			ton	nes.			
1 8 8 8	r & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & &	マタチチャ や チ チ ト	- Gre	ater competition	n/demand for fe	eed stuff worldwi	de
		eef <u>lamb</u>					
			<ul> <li>Export</li> </ul>	ters: US, Can	ada. Denmark,	France, Spain, a	and now Brazil
	Source: GIRA		and UK				
		·					
Pigmeat - g	obal production (m	il.					
	production (in		a coupl	e of comments	on Japan and	d South Korea	
tonnes)		DANSKE SLAGTERIER					DANSKE BLAGTERIE
Total	100.9 mil. tonnes 2011 (forecas	at) 22.6 mil. t		gic situation (tsu prox. same level	All a support of the second	ima)	
	E	U-27 22.9%					
China			<ul> <li>South</li> </ul>	Korea			
China					2335.23		
50 mil. t		USA 10 mil. t		d and Mouth di			
50.6%		10.1%		ff-free pigmeat		(t slide)	
	Other		- FT/	EU-South Kon	ea		
		nil. t 16.4%					
Main o	thers:						
Canad	1	1.9 mil. t 1.9%					
Brazil		3.2 mil. t 3.3%					
Russia		2.4 mil. t 2.4%					
Japan rce: GIRA Korea	Philippines, Mexico and Taiwan	1.3 mil.t 1.3% 4.9 mil.t 5.0%					
Korea,	ramppales, mexico and Talwan	4.5 mm. t 3.0%					
			Increase	of export to S	South Korea	(1000 tonnes)	
		DANSKE BLAGTERIER					DANSKE BLAGTERIE
			Tonnes	Jan-June	Jan-June		11:10
				2009	2010	2011	%-change
			US	47.2	42.1	86.3	105.3%
			Canada	29.3	29.7	44.0	48.0%

#### The drivers of pigmeat consumption

Canada	28.3	29.1	44.0	48.0%
Chile	18.8	21.6	20.4	-5.6%
Mexico	0.9	4.6	4.7	2.2%
Austria	8.0	7.4	12.9	74.2%
Denmark	4.9	4.3	11.0	155.5%
Netherlands	5.5	6.4	10.9	69.1%
France	8.0	7.5	10.5	39.5%
Belgium	6.5	7.4	9.3	24.4%
Finland	2.7	2.0	3.4	70.0%

Top importing countries in 2010	DANSKE BLAGTERIER
China/HK	+ 2000
<ul> <li>Japan</li> </ul>	1179
Russia	898
• USA	1008
Mexico	452
Korea	354

Source: GIRA, USDA, DG AGRI, Statistics Canada and World Trade Atlas

Forecast

DANSKE BLAGTERIER


<ul> <li>Inc</li> </ul>	reased de	mand for 1	ood (meat)	)							
-	Growth in g	lobal populat	ion and mide	dle/upperclas	86		Year/ Country			2011 2 (forecast) (f	ID12 forecast)
	Vorit populätien dirved opmen			-			China	5.5%	2.2%	3%	(+)
Bet .		1		6	12		EU	-2.4%	2.0% (ELF23)	0.3% (EU-27)	2
1-			Sel a	1 1 1	-		100				
1		- •	No.3	11-			US Canada	-2.0% 1.8%	-4.0% -2.0%	0.8%	+
1			TER PA	120	1.37		Brazil	1.8%	-2.0%	1.2%	(+)
1				12	AN AND		Russia	6.0%	6.6%	6.4%	(+)
		0	Ler!		4		Total	2.7%	1.4%	2.1%	•
• Lev • Co • Fee	vel of supp nsumer pr ed supply/	oly of differ	nic conjune ent types of and differe bad harves ndals	of meat ent legislat	ion			Eur	opean	pig produ	iction
FT.	A´s vs DI	AC		CANS	KE BLAGTERIER				rs have e year pe	experience	d
• FT.	De		in exchang		HE BLAGTERIER	* *		or a five	year pe	riod kg slaughter weig	DAMSKE BLAGTERIER
• FT.	De		in exchang			* *	losses f	or a five	year pe Rentability per EU Pig	riod	DAMSKE BLAGTERIER
• FT.	De		in exchang			` *	losses f	or a five	year pe	riod kg slaughter weig	DAMSKE BLAGTERIER
• FT.	De 18 0016 0014 12 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14		in exchang			*	105585 f	or a five	Rentability per EU Pic	riod kg slaughter weig g Producers	DAMSKE BLAGTERIER
• FT.	De 18 2007 01.4 14 14 14 14 14 14 10 06		in exchang	ge rates	2011	*	1055555 f	or a five	year pe Rentability per EU Pig	riod kg slaughter weig	DAMSKE BLAGTERIER
• FT.	De 18 2007 01.4 14 14 14 14 14 14 10 06		15 2005 2007 20	ge rates		*	105585 f	por a five	Rentability per EU Pic	kg slaughter weig producers	CANSKE BLASTERER
• FT.	De 18 2007 01.4 14 14 14 14 14 14 10 06		15 2005 2007 20	ge rates	2011	*	1005565 f	or a five	Rentability per EU Pic	kg slaughter weig producers	CANSKE BLASTERER
• FT.	De 18 2007 01.4 14 14 14 14 14 14 10 06		15 2005 2007 20	ge rates	2011	*	1005565 f	por a five	Rentability per EU Pic	kg slaughter weig producers	CANSKE BLAGTERER
• FT.	De 18 2007 01.4 14 14 14 14 14 14 10 06		15 2005 2007 20	ge rates	2011	*	1005565 f	por a five	year pei Rentability per EU Pic 2006 2007	kg slaughter weig producers	CANSKE BLAGTERER
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



Summary/Conclusion

# EU Agricultural Outlook: Milk and Dairy Markets Beatriz Velazquez (DG AGRI)












# Impact of the uncertainties in the EU dairy sector Sophie Hélaine (JRC IPTS)





### Commodity Market Development in Europe - Outlook



2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

CV	Milk	Butter	SMP	Cheese	WMP
Production	1%	1%	4%	1%	4%
Consumption		0%	0%	1%	0%
EU price in €/t	7%	6%	8%	7%	8%
World price in €/t		8%	9%	9%	8%
World price in \$/t		4%	2%	3%	3%
Exports		13%	9%	6%	6%
Imports		9%	0%	5%	0%
Net trade		21%	9%	7%	6%




European Commit Apricelture and Pured Development

#### Limited availability of grains in RUS, UKR, KAZ

#### In brief:


- · Wheat and coarse grains
- · For 2 consecutive years (2012, 2013)
- · Worst scenario: No exports
- · Possible scenario: Lower exports






	European Commission Aprentus and Bouil Development
Higher operating costs in EU	Higher Costs
In brief: • "All cash expenditures necessary to operate"	
Normal uncertainty = 10% increase in costs	CAPRI

- · Worst scenario = 30% increase in costs



<-5.00%

## Milk and Dairy Markets: Comments I Pavel Vavra (OECD)



# Milk and Dairy Markets: Comments II

Christophe Lafougère (GIRA Consulting)



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# **EU Agricultural Outlook: Biofuels**

Alberto D'Avino (DG AGRI)




### Biofuels policy assumptions


- · Achieving the mandates of RED by 2020
- Lower share of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation biofuels compared to previous projections
- Endogenous allocation of ethanol vs. biodiesel consumption



## EU ethanol production by feedstock



#### EU Biodiesel: mainly domestic production?



	#EU	BUSA					- 0	-	
				-					
								_	
			1						1
	-	_		-					-
-	HH			. 1	+				
									-
2005 200	207 202	700 70	0 2011	2012 201	3 2014	2015 201	6 2017	2018 2	


Trends for 2020 shown in the outlook


- Larger relative share in fuel use for ethanol than for biodiesel (this outcome being in contrast with notified MS plans)
- Partial EU import dependency for ethanol, but also for biodiesel feedstocks
- Increasing importance of the EU on global biofuels market

European Ceternitation April: frame and Rura Development	ips JRC
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
# Impact of different uncertainties on the EU biofuel sector


Olexandr Nekhay and Ben Van Doorslaer (JRC-IPTS)






# **Biofuels: Comments I** Caroline Midgley (LMC International)







# Table EXEC.6: Typical values of different biofuels, GHG emitted (g CO2eq/MJ)

	Oultivation	Processing	Transport & distribution	
Sagar beet ethanol	12	19	2	33
Wheat ethanol (lignite as process fuel in CHP plant)	23	32	2	57
Wheat ethanol (NG as process fuel in conventional boiler)	23	21	2	46
Wheat ethanol (MG as process fuel in CHP plant)	23	14	2	39
Wheat ethanol (straw as process fuel in CHP plant)	23	1	2	26
Com ethanol, BC produced (NG as process fuel in CHP plan	<li>(i) 20</li>	15	2	37
Sagar cane ethanol	14	1	9	28
Rapeseed oil biodiesel	29	16	1	46
Soybean oil biodiem!	19	18	13	50
Palmoil biodiese!	14	35	5	58

### Conclusions (Demand)

LMC

LMC

- Assuming that the RED is implemented, demand for biofuels will grow strongly. Demand for ethanol will slightly exceed NREAP expectations while demand for biodiesel will fall far short.
- While biodiesel is cheaper than ethanol, it faces several problems which will limit future growth. These include a B-7 limit on new diesel cars, poorer sustainability characteristics, potentially greater ILUC penalties and more limited access to raw materials.

#### Conclusions (Output)

LMC

- In the near term, output growth will be driven by projects in the pipeline as well as increased rates of capacity utilisation. Today, ethanol prices are too low to bring fresh investment into the sector. Even if the industry expands quickly in the second half of the decade, there will be a growing gap between demand and supply.
- The EU will therefore become increasingly reliant on imports. Imports from the US are unlikely to suffice and imports from Brazil will be needed.

LMC

#### Conclusions (Outlook for Prices)

- Based on LMC's 2011 Carbohydrate Outlook study, raw material prices are expected to trade at relatively high levels in the coming decade, albeit at a lower level than 2011. We project feed wheat prices (in Northern Europe) will trade in a range of €190-210/mt in 2015-2020.
- EU ethanol prices will need to rise in order to bring fresh investment into the sector, raise rates of domestic capacity utilisation as well as create an incentive for imports from Brazil. We therefore project T2 prices will trade in a range of €780-870/m3 in 2015-2020

 Slow implementation of the RED. Implementation has been disapointing to date. The EC recently said it would take action against states that fail to transpose the RED in full.

**Future Risks** 

- Policy changes that impose more stringent sustainability requirements (more likely to impact on biodiesel)
- Lower oil prices (<\$100/bbl) which make gasoline cheaper than ethanol, increasing the incentive to buyout of mandates.
- High volatility in grains prices. With global stocks expected to be at relatively low levels, the grain market is more vulnerable to supply shocks.

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
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
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NHE UNC has endemounted to ensure the accuracy of the data, excitances and knockasts constanced in this presentation, any decisions based on them (including those incolving investment and plenning) are at the clearit's over risk. NC International can accept no kisibility regarding information analysis and futneceds contained in this presentation.

## **Biofuels: Comments II** Claudiu Covrig (Kingsman)










The EU demand is driven up by national & EU mandates/targets 2011 European Biofuels Blending Obligations











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


Fuel ethanol trade - transition period









- one more thing ... do we have a real food vs fuel debate in the EU27 when actually there is SO MUCH unused land especially in the EU12 countries?

... and how are we going to solve cur main problems such as : CO2 emissions, unused arable land, employment, addiction to foreign crude oil imports & other energies, the sustainable future of our planet ???





 US ethanol production uses only about 3% of the world's grain supply...but this 3% consists of feed grains, largely corn for livestock. The food grains that people actually eat (mainly rice and wheat) aren't affected by biofuels production

About 1/3 of the corn used for ethanol becomes a co-product (DDG): livestock feed for cattle, poultry and hogs


 Volatile energy costs are the real drivers of all consumer prices (including for food). Energy impacts every facet of food production from growing the crops to processing the food to transporting it to market.

4. The US farmers are increasing their productivity. Ethanol's demand for corn has grown dramatically during the past decade. But so has the crop of corn produced by US farmers. Corn production more than doubled from'77 to '07: 13.1 bin bu from 6.5 bin bu

 Economists at Iowa State University and the University of Wisconsin shows that ethanol production has reduced wholesale gasoline prices by 25 cents/gal on average over the past decade noting that any disruption to ethanol supply could cause a dramatic increase in gasoline prices.

# EU Agricultural Outlook: Cereals, Oilseeds and Sugar

Stephan Hubertus Gay, Pierluigi Londero (DG AGRI)




#### Arable crops: cereals, oilseeds and sugar

- Biofuel feedstock demand determines growth
- · Prices are expected to remain high
- EU yield growth lower than in most competitive regions
- Maize and soft wheat will continue to gain against other grains
- Oilseeds continue to expand but at lower pace


Tys JRC


Sugar beet production increasing

European Ceremities Agriculture and Russi Development





### EU prices: at higher level







World projections: yield % difference in yield - 2020 compared to 2006-2010 50% USA CAN CARG CAUS CUKR ■EU27 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 5% 0% ips JRC European Cenets












Maize: growing demand and production







0%

Feed

costs


World price EU price World price EU price

Coarse grains

Wheat

## Impact of different uncertainties on the EU crops sector

Mihály Himics and Zebedee Nii-Naate (JRC-IPTS)



-10%


-15%

Production Consumption

Imports

Exports

### Commodity Market Development in Europe - Outlook



## **Cereal Markets: Comments** John Tjaardstra (International Grains Council)



## **Oilseeds Markets: Comments** Laurine Simon (Tallage/Stratégie Grains)






# Where rapeseed area should increase?


- ✓ +11% in Germany versus 2010 (+70 kha compared with max reached in 2007)
- ✓ +16% in France vs 2010 (+70 kha compared with maximum reached in 2007)
- ✓ +15% in the UK vs 2010 (+30 kha compared with max reached in 2011)
- ✓ +4% in Poland (+30 kha compared with max reached in 2011)

Rapeseed yield prediction (t/ha):



# Where sunseed area should increase?

- ✓+16% in Spain versus 2010 (-40 kha compared with max reached in 2009)
- ✓ +3% in France vs 2010 (-20 kha compared with maximum reached in 2011)
- ✓ +9% in Hungary vs 2010
- ✓+16% in Romania vs 2010
- ✓ +24% in Bulgaria



### Main swing factors

- CAP post 2013
- Ability for rapeseed to effectively increase the area forecast in 2020 (climatic and agronomic constraints underestimated?)
- Biodiesel development in the EU: sustainability criteria and its implementation (certification schemes, ILUC debate) - Impact on long term use of vegetable oils
- Sugar quotas?

## **Evaluation of Agricultural Policy Reforms in the European Union** Catherine Moreddu (OECD)

"






Workshop on "Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook" Brussels, 26 October 2011

#### 25 years of changes

- The Common Agricultural Policy has regularly adapted to an evolving situation:
  - From 6 to 27 member states: larger and more diverse agricultural sector;
  - From production deficit to surplus situation;
  - Increasing budget and international pressure;
  - Growing importance of environmental issues.
- Gradual and consistent move since 1992 towards greater market orientation.
- The OECD has been monitoring and evaluating CAP developments since the mid-80s, using indicators of support and impact assessment models.



CAP developments: Greater market orientation

Reduction of support to producers from 39% of farm receipts in 1986-88 to 22% in 2008-10 (OECD 20%). This amounted to EUR 77 Billion in 2010.
 Trend towards decoupling support from current production:


- As market intervention and border protection decreased, domestic prices

«

#### CAP developments: More attention to environmental issues

- Generalisation of constraints on production practices:
- Over 50% of support has mandatory input constraints (cross compliance);
- 12% has voluntary input constraints (compared to 2% in 1990).
- More funds for land management and local public goods:
  - More funds for Pillar II (modulation) from 10% of CAP expenditures in 2000 to 20% in 2010 (EUR 53 Billion);
  - Minimum share for land management from 2007 (25% for Axis 2);
  - Wide differences across countries.

**«** 



#### Diversity in the use of pillar II measures, 2010

%share			Minimum	Maximum
Pillar II in CAP expenditures	20%	15%	5-10% DK, BL, FR, NL	50-60% new member states (MS)
Axis 1 in Pillar II	35%	27%	Around 10% IE, UK, SE	Over 40% BL, ES, PT, new MS
Axis 2 in Pillar II	51%	62%	Under 40% NL, new MS	Over 70% AT, FI, FR, IE, SE, UK
- Agri-en vironment in Pillar II	27%	33%	Under 15% BG. PL, PT	Over 40% AT, BE, DK, IE SE, UK
- LFA in Pillar I	19%	22%	Under 10% BE, BG DK, EE, HU, NL	Around cr over 30% FI, FR, GR, FT, SI
Axes 3+4 in Pillar II	13%	11%	10 MS under 10%	47% NL, 40% BG, over 20% EE, DE, CZ, LV

reflects differences in priorities and conditions

### Environmental performance is difficult to measure

- · Set-aside had significant environmental impacts, positive overall;
- Decoupling is expected to be beneficial through extensification;
- Cross-compliance conditions are expected to deliver minimum level of environmental management across farmland, but they do not target specific problems;
- The evaluation of agri-environmental measures showed:
- Benefits for biodiversity, at least reduction of the rate of losses,
- Positive impact on landscape,
- Little evidence on soil and water quality due to lack of data.

### Some challenges remain

- Targeting still limited, particularly in terms of income objective.
- Largest farms receive most support: 25% largest farms receive 75% of all support; they produce 82% of agricultural production; their farm income is 3 times the average of all farms.
- More could be done to improve competitiveness:
  - the share of general services such as research and infrastructure investment remains modest (12% of total support);
  - Impediments remain, e.g. measures that slow structural adjustment or that increase land value, including regulations;
- Increasing flexibility to respond to higher diversity in the EU
- . ... must be balanced against EU-wide priorities.

### The EU Common Agricultural Policy post-2013

- A favourable context for a new approach, building on past successes and responding to challenges and opportunities.
- Shift of policy emphasis from supporting farm income to investing in further improving the productivity, profitability, sustainability and long-term competitiveness of the agri-food sector.
- This means:
  - investing more in innovation;
  - providing an effective framework for producer risk management;
     using a range of instruments adapted to specific situations to improve the long run sustainability of agriculture;
  - adopting a place-based, non sectoral, approach to rural development;
  - considering income issues on the basis of reliable and comparable information on income and wealth across the economy.

- 6 Amiculture Directorate

## The CAP towards 2020: The future policy framework and impact of alternative scenarios Tassos Haniotis (DG AGRI)



Where are we with the CAP reform process?










#### New design of direct payments



# Improved instruments to address market developments (sCMO)









#### Role of direct payments

- · Direct payments have a dual role
  - contributing to keeping farming in place throughout the EU territory by supporting and stabilising farmers' income
  - providing basic public goods through their link with cross compliance
- Direct payments form the basis for applying more targeted and regionally specific agri-environmental and climate measures in Pillar II
- In the future, direct payments will generally enhance the environmental performance of EU agriculture through "greening" measures

#### **Redistribution of direct payments**


- Increasingly difficult to justify the presence of significant differences in direct payments based on historic references
- However:

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
Exception Comment

- Common "flat rate" direct payment would ignore existing economic differences between Member States (e.g. wage levels and input costs)
- Relation to overall economy must be considered; share of direct payments in GOP very high in many Member States with below average direct payments
- Cverall balance of incomes must be considered; disproportionate increase of direct payments in some Member States could lead to sectoral income bias towards agriculture.
- Cther subsidies must be considered. Pillar II support and structural/cohesion funds also contribute to overall support level

#### Redistribution of DP - economic criteria










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	80		-	-	+/-	-	++	
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	RL.	+	++	++	+/-	-	-	+
	41	++	++	*	+/-	+	•	++
	PL.			1000	++	+	*	
	PT	•	-		+	++	+	++
	800				++	0.00	-	+/-
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Enternant Commission	SE		2.44	-	-		4+	-
Testinginess	<b>BK</b>		++	-				11.5.9.2.

Redistribution of DP - minimum 80% of EU-27 average



Redistribution of DP - minimum 90% of EU-27 average with objective criteria







#### Role of rural development

#### Policy objectives · Within the CAP framework rural development contributes to the following policy objectives: - Competitiveness cfagriculture

- Competitiveness or sympactics
   Sustainable management of natural resources and climate action
   Balanced territorial development of rural areas

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Enternan Com

In the service of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, these objectives are pursued through a set of six priorities that also translate the thematic objectives of the CSF

# Current distribution Distribution in the current period (2007-2013) reflects to a large extent the historical shares of Member States in the Guarantee, Guidance and Leader funds that were brought together into a single fund, the EAFRD

Current distribution and rationale for redistribution

.

Rationale for redistribution

- Ensure a better fit between funding and policy objectives and thus a more efficient use of budgetary resources in the pursuit of Europe 2020
- · Provide for a smooth transition from current distribution

#### Impact of alternative distribution scenarios

# The impact assessment considered alternative distribution scenarios: • Using criteria linked to the policy objectives, such as:

- Objective 1 (competitiveness of agriculture): Area, Labor, Labor productivity inverse index
- Objective 2 (sustainable management of natural resources and climate action): Area, N2000, NHA, Forest, Permanent pasture areas
- Objective 3 (balanced territorial development): Rural population, GDP inverse index

#### And . Factoring in the current distribution


#### Impact

- Use of objective criteria allows for a better use of budgetary resources
   Smooth redistribution allows for continuity in spending

Exemption Commit
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#### Impact of criteria compared to current distribution

	Area	Labor	Profactivity	NHA	Namera 2000	Forest	Formandet pastare	Rural population	CEP
ETE:	-	+		+	· · · ·	-	10 Aug (197	1 m	
BC.	-	-+	+	-	++	-	-	1.1	
CZ	1.4			-			+	+	+
DK	++	100	1.2	-		-	-	++	
DE	0.00			-					
EE	100	14	1971	1000	-		1		
1E		-	-	+		-		-	
EL.		-		-		-	~		+
ES	**	-			++	-	++		
FR	**		-+	+	+	-		++	-
IT		-	-	-		1.4	+0		
CY	-				+	1.4	-		
LX	-	-	+	+		++	+	-	
LT		14	+	1.4		124		1.1.1	
LL.	1.4	-	-	-		-	+		-
HU	14		+	-		0-1	-	-	
MT	100	1		-		-	-	-	
NL				1243		-		-	-
AT	140		1	-		1000	+	1	++
PL		-	+		-	1.4			++
PT			10.0+0.0	1.4			+ :		1.00
RO			+	-		1			-
51	100		+				+ -		-
SK	24				+	1.4	-	10 24	++
FI	14			+			-	12.24	1.4
SE		10-		-	++			S 14	-
UK						-			1.2.4



## Example: 1/2 objective criteria within 90-110% range and 1/2 current distribution EURINE 300 T 250 200 150 100 illuturi frey obsetti idine hito account idie ven i to stio nutional envekeros attar stie nosistatulu This set

#### For further information


 The CAP after 2013 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/index\_en.htm

Exemption Can Agriculture and


- Commission Communication 'The CAP towards 2020' http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/communication/ index en.htm
- Impact assessment http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/perspec/cap-2020/index\_en.htm Legal proposals
- http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/legal-proposals/index\_en.htm


# Food Price Volatility: Impact and policies


George Rapsomanikis (FAO)




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




- Improve market access and develop a 'notification process' for export restrictions in WTO
  - Operational definition of critical food shortage to justify export restrictions

  - Time limited measure of last resort
     Fast-track consultation process

Eliminate trade and support measures on biofuels or, introduce flexible mandates



# **Annex: List of Participants**

1. Bruce A. BABCOCK	Iowa State University, USA
2. John BAFFES	World Bank, USA
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#### Abstract

This report contains a summary and the presentations of the expert workshop 'Commodity Market Development in Europe – Outlook', held in October 2011 in Brussels. The workshop was held in order to present and discuss the preliminary results of the DG AGRI outlook on EU agricultural market developments.

The workshop gathered high-level policy makers, modelling and market experts and provided a forum to present and discuss recent and projected developments on the EU agricultural and commodity markets, to outline the reasons behind observed and prospected developments, and to draw conclusions on the short/medium term perspectives of European agricultural markets in the context of world market developments. Special focus was given on the discussion of the influence of different settings/assumptions (regarding e.g. drivers of demand and supply, macroeconomic uncertainties, etc.) on the projected market developments.

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