

Scotland's Rural College

Technical experts' perspectives of justice-related norms

Lai, Jia Yen; Staddon, Sam; Hamilton, Alistair

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1 **Technical experts' perspectives of justice-related norms: Lessons from everyday** 2 **environmental practices in Indonesia.**

3 **1. Introduction**

4 Development and environmental conflicts have increasingly featured divergences between
5 representations of justice provided by environmental management policies and demands of
6 justice claimed by local affected social groups (Martin et al. 2014). If local affected people
7 perceive environmental policies as not reflecting social objectives, or as 'unjust,' the
8 effectiveness of management practices can be undermined (Mariki, Svarstad, and Benjaminsen
9 2015). To align environmental management with local justice demands, it is vital to understand
10 the governance processes and power relations between policy actors through which any
11 environmental policies are interpreted and implemented (Jacobi et al. 2017). As international
12 environmental governance initiatives and national governments have increasingly sought to
13 influence local environmental practices, linking local social and environmental objectives with
14 international and national governance practices can potentially reduce any negative impacts
15 of management practices on forest-dependent communities (Sikor et al. 2014).

16 A multifaceted framing of environmental justice has become influential for identifying,
17 explaining, and addressing uneven distributions of environmental impacts on forest-
18 dependent communities and other socially marginalized groups. Historically, environmental
19 justice has focused on 'distributive justice,' which investigates the fairness of the distribution
20 *outcomes* (Bullard 1994). While the concept of distributive justice remains essential, a
21 multidimensional frame of environmental justice has integrated 'recognitional justice,'
22 addressing the *processes* that result in unjust distribution (Young 1990). Recognitional justice
23 explores how misrecognition of culturally suppressed identities and worldviews can lead to
24 distributive injustice. Another dimension of justice, i.e., procedural justice, explores fair public
25 participation processes and outcomes; key issues include legitimacy, transparency, and
26 accountability in institutional decision-making (Suiseeya and Caplow 2013).

27 Norms related to environmental justice have become discernible both in local struggle
28 claims (Temper et al. 2018) and global sustainability objectives (Sikor and Newell 2014).
29 Critical institutional analysis, mainly its focus on norms (Ostrom 2009), has contributed to
30 understanding how justice perceptions are shaped in natural resource management (e.g.,
31 Agarwal 2001; Ribot 2012). Essentially, norms are the customary rules about the way things
32 should be and ought to be done in particular contexts. Others, including Acharya (2014),
33 Cleaver (2012), and Paavola (2007), further reconceptualize institutions in environmental
34 governance central to justice-related norms. Such norms are the socially determined rules of
35 fairness in travel between people and in the allocation of social goods. Postcolonial feminists
36 have broadly recorded norms that can shape ideas of justice in a wide range of environmental
37 governance phenomena. As an example, indigenous studies have investigated discrimination
38 and marginalization of indigenous worldviews in neoliberal conservation and development
39 initiatives, resulting in claims of injustices and conflicts (e.g., Li 2014; Doolittle 2010). Gender
40 studies have portrayed misrepresentation of top-down management tools enshrined in
41 patriarchal institutions and the socio-environmental struggles asserted by women in land
42 practices (e.g., Deere and Leal 2001; Nussbaum 2000). Other studies expand the knowledge
43 sphere of justice-related norms, illustrating the importance of meeting societal standards on
44 dignity (Su and Mangada 2020), sense of belongings (Eckenwiler 2018), and community
45 benefits (Cowell, Bristow, and Munday 2011) on improving social acceptability of
46 environmental management strategies in specific cultural structures. These insights show that
47 social expectations of justice are unique to local contexts, but they are not solely locally-
48 constituted. Negotiations at various sites and on different platforms by actors from global to
49 local scales can affect how justice is delivered to forest-dependent communities.

50 Environmental governance is a multi-scalar and dynamic process, where both formal
51 governmental regulations and local customs contribute to shaping practical arrangements and
52 outcomes of environmental and development policies (Acharya 2011). To transform externally-
53 conceived norms, for example, related to justice, from the international or national level into

54 the sub-national practice, involves the interplay of various intermediary actors from the
55 government, civil society, and the private sector (Dawson et al. 2018). These intermediary
56 actors may represent diverse stakeholders and carry out formal and informal roles in
57 interpreting and implement national policies on forests, land, and other natural resources in a
58 particular social context (Cleaver 2015).

59 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), as the world's most widespread
60 environmental policy tool, and its role in bridging local justice concerns and global
61 sustainability goals is essential in many natural-resource-rich countries where EIAs are the
62 only environmental policy tools that are publicly acknowledged (Lawrence 2013; Morgan
63 2012). The UN Environment (2018) also identifies EIA as a crucial platform for achieving the
64 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other related frameworks such as the
65 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity. EIA is relevant to distributive justice because its objectives
66 are fundamentally concerned with the impact of project actions on specific groups or
67 populations (Walker 2010), while engaging cultural minorities' voices may also promote
68 recognitional justice in decision-making procedures (Hanna et al. 2014). Procedural justice
69 concerns the 'effectiveness' of EIA, with literature exploring to what extent the formal
70 procedure of EIA addresses specific goals (procedural outcomes) and how the practice of
71 EIA achieves those goals (substantive outcomes) (Cashmore et al. 2010). Numerous studies
72 have explored the barriers to effective participation in EIA faced by local communities
73 (Cashmore and Axelsson 2013; Morgan 2012); however, few have examined the barriers
74 created or faced by those involved in delivering the EIAs, and their potential to influence the
75 substantive outcomes and the incorporation of justice in project negotiations.

76 Through exploring the perspective of intermediaries involved in everyday EIA
77 governance practices at the sub-national level, this article addresses three questions: 1) What
78 are EIA intermediaries' perceptions and prioritizations of justice-related norms? 2) What
79 structural factors influence the travel of justice-related norms between governance scales? 3)
80 Through which platforms do those EIA intermediaries negotiate justice-related norms?

81 Using semi-structured interviews, this article explored a case study of EIA in Indonesia to
82 investigate the perspectives of sub-national intermediaries involved in its technical review
83 process, from governmental agencies, private consultancies, and academia. Indonesia has
84 one of the world's highest deforestation rates, and EIA acts as one of the criteria for granting
85 licenses for development projects (Swangjang 2018), yet critiques of its fairness persist. This
86 article contributes new empirical evidence and insights to the everyday environmental
87 arrangements regarding justice, as shaped by sub-national intermediaries.

88 **2. Literature review: Critical institutionalism and travel of justice-related norms**

89 This article uses a critical institutionalism lens and pays attention to the power relationships
90 underlying people's interactions that shape resource management arrangements and
91 outcomes (Cleaver 2012). In contrast to the assumption of an optimal institution (Ostrom
92 2002), which considers the relationship between policy and local practices as direct and linear,
93 Acharya (2004) proposes a critical approach emphasizing the complexity of institutions
94 entwined in everyday social life. Both structural factors and individual choices, particularly the
95 role of local actors, are considered in shaping local governance arrangements (de Koning 2014;
96 de Sardan 2015). That said, local actors are not passive followers of predetermined, top-down
97 objectives, but actively negotiate and shape norms through a combination of resources and
98 capabilities in certain normative beliefs and social contexts (Coggan et al. 2013; Kumar 2014;
99 Mukhtarov 2014).

100 Conceptually, this approach shows that norm diffusion and development is not solely a
101 downward process from international to local scales. Instead, national and sub-national actors
102 can influence global objectives of environmental governance from below (Hargreaves et al.
103 2013; Schomers, Sattler, and Matzdorf 2015). They may seek to create a transnational justice
104 network in mobilizing local struggles (Caouette 2007), offer knowledge services to facilitate
105 interactions among actors (Sternlieb et al. 2013), and collaborate to shape the outcomes of
106 environmental governance (Schröter et al. 2018). Transforming justice-related norms into

107 local environmental governance practices remains challenging due to barriers of local
108 implementation capacity and to ideological differences in the conceptualization of justice
109 amongst various actors (Dawson 2018). To enable the integration of local justice concerns into
110 environmental practices, they need to be represented and mobilized in policy negotiations
111 which is often through the representation by intermediary actors.

112 Intermediary actors from governments, private sector, and civil society (e.g., policy
113 managers, environmental consultancies and NGOs) engage in both formal decision-making
114 settings and informal processes, such as protest, media, and other lobbying approaches, which
115 influence norms formation and travel (Funder and Marani 2015). These intermediaries
116 perform as brokers in development (de Sardan 2005) who seek to or are claimed to represent
117 objectives held by local people in the environmental governance practices (Sikor et al. 2019).
118 They may work vertically between governance levels and horizontally across platforms and
119 issues, attempting to (re)interpret and (re)constitute the objectives of environmental
120 management, such as those included in policies, to find congruence with local customs and
121 priorities (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005). It is noted that intermediaries may not act
122 consistently for local interests. Instead, they may prioritize individual or organizational
123 agendas or represent contested causes for different stakeholders in different forums (Booth
124 2012). The perspectives of intermediary actors with regards to justice are influenced by certain
125 social and cultural context, and the intermediaries' norms related to justice and the
126 communities who they are speaking for can therefore affect how they interpret and mobilize
127 local concerns of justice.

128 Young (1990)'s and Fraser (2008)'s arguments on recognitional justice, which
129 emphasize political domination and oppression underlying the causes of unjust distribution of
130 social goods, can be used to understand the intermediaries' norms related to justice. Fraser
131 (2007) argues that misrecognition is constructed in institutional subordination, meaning the
132 interests and values of culturally privileged groups define peoples' institutional experiences in
133 society. In contrast, culturally suppressed identities and communities are often not recognized,

134 misrecognized and disrespected by other social members. Such subordination is deeply tied to
135 economic inequality and this inequality must be examined in a particular cultural and social
136 context rather than ideal procedures. It is because institutional, social and cultural structures
137 that construct and mediate social relations are keys for explaining why some social groups have
138 more privileges in accessing social goods than others (Young 1990, 22). It is therefore crucial
139 to understand the actors the intermediaries interact, collaborate with and represent, and the
140 factors underlying the choices made by intermediaries, especially about the justice-related
141 norms they prioritize and the type of platforms they use to articulate their agendas (Dawson et
142 al. 2018).

143 Institutionally, physically, and socially derived resources are necessary to access power
144 by intermediaries in their attempts to influence the process and outcomes of environmental
145 governance. Rules, either constitutional or regulative, can be institutional resources for those
146 who have more experience of using those rules in advancing their objectives (Hrabanski et al.
147 2013). For example, studies have questioned the practices and representations of enforcing the
148 law through the legal use of violence by state agents (see the volume by Blundo and Glasman
149 (2013)). Moreover, travel of justice-related norms can be enabled or restricted by the extent to
150 which minorities' voices are engaged in institutional platforms (Eastwood 2011; Sikor and Câm
151 2016). For instance, intermediaries may find it challenging to include indigenous worldviews
152 in decision-making when national policies provide little recognition of customary land rights
153 (Papillon and Rodon 2017).

154 Effective norms travel may be enabled when intermediaries have access to physical
155 resources (e.g., proper work facilities) and social resources (e.g., close relationship with other
156 actors) (Bosselmann and Lund 2013; Pham et al. 2010). In contrast, articulating justice-related
157 norms may, in turn, constitute a source of power by providing intermediaries with a
158 justification for resource access, such as external funding and knowledge support (Lindell
159 2009; Sikor et al. 2019). Studies of the role of intermediaries in facilitating the travel of justice-
160 related norms are still emerging (Dawson 2018). For an improved understanding of the

161 practices of these intermediaries, this article, therefore, draws attention to the interactions
162 between different intermediaries within project debates in the EIA process at the sub-national
163 level.

164 Researchers and practitioners of EIA have increasingly acknowledged that a rationalist
165 EIA model, which favors the setting up of ‘best practice’ and pays little attention to the power
166 relations in the implementation processes, is deficient in achieving substantive outcomes of
167 sustainability and justice (Rozema et al. 2012; Walker 2010). Literature has started to explore
168 political and social factors affecting the effectiveness of EIA at multiple scales. For example,
169 Connelly and Richard (2005) revealed the structural barriers to mobilizing environmental
170 justice values in the commonly expert-driven approach of EIA, which have prioritized
171 procedural elements of justice, rather than facilitating discussions about the costs and benefits
172 linked to local culture, i.e., distributional justice. Williams and Dupuy (2017) found that the
173 rationalist approach of EIA did not always match the local context of environmental decision-
174 making, which has increased the vulnerability of the EIA procedure to corruption and results
175 in ineffective participation. Studies related to power and political dynamics remain
176 underexplored, and technocratic approaches that seek the ‘best practice’ of EIA still dominate
177 scholarly attention (Cashmore and Axelsson 2013). The role and influence of various actors,
178 especially the intermediaries, in achieving equitable outcomes from EIA remain limited. This
179 article, which considers the perspectives and prioritization of intermediary actors around
180 issues of justice, is thus instrumental in improving the understanding of the formation and
181 implementation of just local governance arrangements.

182 **3. Methodology**

183 **3.1. Case study**

184 EIA, locally referred to as AMDAL (*Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan*), was
185 introduced into Indonesia in 1982 during Suharto’s authoritarian regime. The AMDAL
186 system aims to make management plans to prevent, minimize, mitigate or compensate for

187 adverse impacts identified. The granting of an environmental permit (*Izin Lingkungan*)
188 through AMDAL is a prerequisite for the operation of large-scale development projects and
189 therefore a vital, if limited, environmental safeguard mechanism in Indonesia. Following the
190 country's decentralization in 1999, AMDAL introduced a participatory mechanism. AMDAL
191 legislation also requires particular attention to the communities and vulnerable groups
192 potentially affected by any proposed land-use project, and calls for respect for local
193 knowledge of land-use practices.

194 AMDAL is arguably the only public policy tool that requires public participation in
195 environmental decision-making in Indonesia. Critiques of its fairness however have pointed
196 out the procedural nature of AMDAL which serves as a mere formality instead of a meaningful
197 participation platform to land-use decision-making (Hasan, Nahiduzzaman, and Aldosary
198 2018; McCarthy and Zen 2010; Purnama 2003). Studies, investigative reports and news
199 revealed that public consultations during AMDAL often involve only businesses and political
200 ruling elites, such as village heads, religious chiefs and landowners. These actors, however, are
201 usually assumed to represent the voices of various stakeholders (Leitmann and Dore 2005).
202 Also, local stakeholders often have limited access to project information or a low capacity to
203 fully engage in the decision-making. For example, local stakeholders do not often understand
204 the purpose of AMDAL (Qipra 2005) and the implications of attending public consultation
205 (Gore and Fischer 2014). Issues of corruption also persist as barriers to just AMDAL practice
206 and forest governance in general in Indonesia (Muslihudin et al. 2018). These conditions
207 therefore enable the investigation of plural ideas of EJ in this study.

208 The processes of AMDAL consist of public consultation, review of impact analysis,
209 and environmental permit granting. The review of impact analysis in AMDAL comprises two
210 stages: technical evaluation and impact management evaluation. This article focuses on the
211 institutional intermediaries involved in the technical evaluation as they directly engage in the
212 interpretation and implementation of national environmental policies.

213 Technical evaluation of AMDAL is conducted under each national, provincial, and
214 district environmental authority. According to the Government Regulation No. 27/2012 on
215 Environmental Permit, the intermediaries involved in the stage of technical evaluation are
216 ecological and social experts (usually from local universities and research institutes),
217 governmental officers who work in various agencies responsible for environmental impacts
218 control (such as agriculture, forestry, and land-use planning), and environmental consultants
219 whom companies hire to conduct impact analyses. These technical experts negotiate the
220 project's compliance with laws and regulations, the scoping of the impact study, the
221 methodology used for data collection and analysis, and the feasibility of impact management
222 and monitoring plan. Their inputs are then considered in the second stage of impact review
223 (see the perspectives and roles of intermediaries in impact management evaluation in Lai
224 and Hamilton (2020)), which will result in a final decision regards environmental permit
225 granting.

226 **3.2 Study methods**

227 The findings were based on fieldwork conducted in East Kalimantan province between
228 February and July 2018. Natural resource exploitation has dominated the economy of the
229 province, which had led to numerous development projects applying for AMDAL review each
230 year. Simultaneously, land-use conflicts related to environmental degradation have arisen as
231 the majority of the population still live in rural areas and are dependent on forest resources
232 (Fünfgeld 2016).

233 A total of 38 intermediaries, i.e., technical experts of AMDAL, participated in this
234 study. These comprised 26 governmental officers, six academics, three academics who also
235 worked as consultants, and three consultants; who between them represented a wide range
236 of disciplines and fields, including forestry, agriculture, hydrology, biodiversity, health, labor
237 rights, sociology, spatial planning, and transportation. Three environmental agencies in the
238 province provided lists and contacts of the technical experts. Due to a considerable number

239 of consultants being available, the consultant candidates were selected based on three
240 criteria: 1) the person was handling at least one AMDAL project during the fieldwork period,
241 2) the person was based in East Kalimantan (in consideration of research budget and time
242 constraint), and 3) at least three other technical experts recommended the person.
243 Conventionally, some consultants may be included in the work team of any AMDAL project
244 as a nominal head and not involved directly in the analysis of the AMDAL projects. The
245 environmental agency is also not usually informed if a consultant leaves the position or
246 changes the contact. Seeking recommendations from other experts is therefore useful for
247 ensuring that the researcher approached the interviewees who are relevant to the issues
248 studied.

249 The intermediaries consulted were mostly senior staff in their organizations with an
250 average age of 46 years old (between 32 and 67 years old, excluding one interviewee whose
251 age was unknown). Thirty-five of the 38 interviewees were male. This study identified only
252 three female government officers during sampling, and all three participated in the
253 interviews. There was no female academic registered in the technical teams visited and no
254 female consultants were recommended by three other technical experts. Geographical
255 information and some information sources in Section 4.3 were anonymized to maintain
256 confidentiality. Participants granted consent to publication based on the confidentiality of
257 these data. The interviewees' information is in the appendix, where actual jobs are not shown,
258 but grouped into broad categories.

259 This study included a total of 46 semi-structured interviews. Some individuals were
260 interviewed more than once for either completing the question sets or answering follow-up
261 questions. Some of them contributed more inputs than others, which could imply more
262 influence on our findings. All interviewees were consulted for all questions designed in this
263 study nevertheless. Interviews were held in either public space (e.g., a coffee shop) or private
264 office/meeting room in the interviewees' workplace, except one in a shared workplace and
265 two in the interviewee's house. The conversations lasted on average 1.5 hours, ranging from

266 30 minutes to 3 hours. Language use was based on the preference of the research
267 participants; most of them communicated in a mixture of Indonesian and English, while
268 some used either language alone throughout the conversation. The first author of this paper
269 is fluent in both of these languages and conducted all the fieldwork and interviews for this
270 research.

271 Interviews consisted of three sets of open-ended questions. The first set of questions
272 explored the experience of the intermediary - as well as those of other intermediaries they
273 knew - in participating in the AMDAL review and sought to capture their perspectives of
274 justice as a technical expert. The intermediaries got to know the other intermediaries through
275 sitting on the reviewing meetings together; some of them, however, were also colleagues in
276 the same organization or had collaborated on other projects beyond the technical review of
277 AMDAL. The second question set investigated the social and cultural contexts underlying the
278 AMDAL policies and practices, and the barriers to the travel of norms as perceived by the
279 intermediaries. The final set of questions explored the challenges faced by the intermediaries
280 in negotiating their agendas and the opportunities identified, or the strategies used in
281 overcoming those challenges.

282 Interviews were audio-recorded after explaining the research objective and obtaining
283 informed consent. The respondents' permission for recording was reconfirmed when the
284 conversation involved sensitive topics. Data were transcribed and analyzed through thematic
285 coding to identify the intermediaries' perceptions and prioritization of justice-related norms
286 under the category of justice-related issues, factors to norm travel, governance scales, and
287 platforms of norm travel. The justice theme explored the prioritization of distributive,
288 procedural, and recognition justice norms in environmental governance. The factors to
289 norm travel recorded the factors facilitating or constraining the travel of norms. The
290 governance scales captured how norms travel between the national, sub-national, and local
291 levels. Finally, the platforms of norm travel illustrated the type of platforms (formal or
292 informal) the intermediaries used to pursue their agendas and the actors they interacted with.

293 **4. Results**

294 **4.1. Intermediaries' perspective of justice-related norms in the AMDAL**
295 **process**

296 This section discusses intermediaries' perception and prioritization of justice-related norms.
297 Norms related to distributive justice and procedural justice dominated the interviews, while
298 the intermediaries discussed little issues about the recognition of minorities' values.
299 Distribution of the responsibility of impact management was the primary concern of the
300 intermediaries, as demonstrated in the following quotes:

301 "Companies should fulfill their commitments on compensation, employment, and impact management
302 [...] it is their responsibility." (Senior government manager)

303 "Some local NGOs and people are passionate about conservation but have limited abilities [...] Who
304 should bear the cost of empowerment? Is it the company, the government, or the people?" (Former
305 senior government manager)

306 The intermediaries consulted highlighted concerns about the disparity in recipients of
307 the costs and benefits associated with the developments addressed by the AMDAL, including
308 between 1) national and sub-national government; 2) companies and local communities, and
309 3) current and future generations:

310 "Those companies take our coal, but we do not get money in return. Profit goes to the central
311 government." (Academic and consultant)

312 "Companies leave with resource and profit. Local people stay and bear the consequences." (Government
313 officer)

314 "AMDAL covers only the [responsibility of] impact [management] within a project period. But many
315 impacts are irreversible and will be inherited by future generations." (Former senior government
316 manager)

317 The discussion also related to procedural justice, focused on *how* to empower existing
318 participants, namely the opinion leaders of local communities and NGOs, rather than
319 questioning *who* should participate. The technical experts commonly expected AMDAL to
320 open up political space for negotiating land-use decisions:

321 “AMDAL allows a space where companies, communities, and NGOs can negotiate. I hope local
322 communities use this chance to understand the impacts and make sure their concerns are answered.”
323 (Senior government manager)

324 AMDAL has also provided a legislative ground for supporting the objectives of
325 sustainable development, as perceived by the technical experts:

326 “Which company does not pursue profit? Which community does not want a comfortable life [...] But
327 whether a project is [environmentally] feasible, there are laws to follow.” (Former senior government
328 manager)

329 Finally, the intermediaries considered AMDAL as a tool for empowering local
330 communities by offering a platform for knowledge building:

331 “Public consultation should inform local communities on the project impacts [...] Not just tell them how
332 much they will be compensated.” (Academic)

333 “People often discuss their concern about diseases in the meeting. I use this opportunity to explain to
334 them” (Government officer)

335 While the interviewees commonly perceived that, as AMDAL technical experts, they are
336 neutral to project interests, they were skeptical of their influence on decision-making:

337 “The technical team just gives suggestions [on the impact analysis]. The company decides whether to
338 accept it.” (Senior government manager)

339 As a result, several intermediaries were discouraged from contributing to meaningful
340 AMDAL debates, instead approaching it as a routine task to fulfill:

341 “I give comments based on my knowledge. However, the companies and the people might not like it [...]
342 Just let them do whatever they want.” (Government officer)

343 A lack of influence on decisions coupled with low motivation leads to the question of
344 whether the intermediaries have adequately safeguarded the quality of impact analysis. Some
345 interviewees were concerned about the accountability of intermediaries:

346 “People who are involved in AMDAL should be accountable for their opinions [...] They could not just
347 speak whatever comes to their mind.” (Government officer)

348 “We are just brokers – neither do I have influence on nor liability to decisions.” (Government officer)

349 Related to *who* participates, the intermediaries had little engagement in the discussion
350 or promotion of recognitional justice. The interviewees were asked to talk about issues of
351 indigenous land rights and participants’ identities (usually male, landowners, and opinion
352 leaders) and most were satisfied with the existing arrangement of public participation:

353 “It is fair enough to involve local opinion leaders [...] More people, more chaos.” (Former senior
354 government manager)

355 “Landowners and local opinion leaders [*tokoh-tokoh masyarakat*] are invited to public consultations.
356 Landless people are, of course, welcomed to join, but it does not really concern their interests.”
357 (Environmental consultant)

358 While the interviewees were not particularly concerned about gender issues in the
359 technical team and public participation, some had voiced their opinions:

360 “No one deliberately excludes women from participating [in the technical team]. Sometimes there is no
361 suitable candidate.” (Academic)

362 “Women usually do not attend public consultations because they need to take care of housework [...]
363 Husbands represent the family, so it is all right.” (Academic)

364 Notably, most of the interviewees were male, and only three female technical experts
365 were identified and interviewed in this study. All interviewees, including the three female
366 intermediaries, reported that they did not know of any other female technical experts. Besides,
367 the technical experts consulted were mostly senior staff based in an administrative center (e.g.,
368 a capital city) and are not originating from rural communities that are affected by the AMDAL
369 processes. Their seniority at work may affect their social status, social capital, and their
370 perspectives to justice. The technical experts of AMDAL paid more attention to the issues
371 related to distributive justice (i.e., cost and benefit) and procedural justice (influence and
372 transparency of decision-making), rather than recognitional justice, including the participants'
373 gender and social status, which raises the question of whether the technical teams have
374 adequately represented various stakeholders' interests.

375 **4.2. Structural factors to norms travel between governance scales**

376 Social and cultural contexts underlying environmental policies and practices, particularly
377 those perceived by the intermediaries, can affect the formation and mobilization of justice-
378 related norms in multi-scalar environmental governance. The prioritization of distributive and
379 procedural justice is reflected in the intermediaries' perspectives of how a 'fair' AMDAL
380 practice ought to be. The interviewees pointed out some emerging concerns on distributive and
381 procedural justice raised by the stakeholders. Regarding distributive justice, the interviewees
382 identified the changing global perceptions of social impacts and sustainable development,
383 which AMDAL should follow.

384 "Minimizing social impacts become important [...] Foreign investors are concerned about their
385 reputation and hesitated to invest in conflicted areas [...] The government needs to listen to this call."
386 (Academic and consultant)

387 "Some investors want us to use international guidelines, such as RSPO [Responsible Sustainable Palm
388 Oil] and FPIC [Free, prior, and informed consent] to conduct impact analysis. AMDAL needs to keep up
389 to those new ideas of sustainability." (Environmental consultant)

390 Increasing calls on public participation and pressure from expanded media reach
391 have led to more emphasis on equitable distribution of benefit and cost and decision-making
392 procedures, as observed by the intermediaries.

393 “Local people are increasingly concerned about their rights in decision-making. Now the AMDAL
394 authority has to deal with it carefully.” (Government officer)

395 “The government can close its eyes to project impacts when the public did not know what happened.
396 They cannot do that anymore. As soon as there is protest, the whole country is informed by various
397 media.” (Academic and consultant)

398 The interviewees also highlighted the political dynamic around environmental
399 governance as some discussed the impacts of decentralization on local governance
400 arrangement:

401 “Autonomy is good. Districts have stronger power in deciding for activities like forestry and mining. We
402 work more efficiently.” (Former senior government manager)

403 “In the past, anyone can conduct impact analysis. Now [after decentralization], the consultants need to
404 attend official training and get certified.” (Academic and consultant)

405 Several structural barriers have constrained the mobilization of justice-related norms
406 within the AMDAL debates. Many intermediaries pointed out the contested principles of
407 market-based environmental management, which hindered them from advancing
408 sustainability goals. One interviewee, for example, discussed the rising price of coal and
409 increasing mining activities at the time of fieldwork:

410 “International market decides supply, demand, and the price. We do not have much say on people’s
411 decisions on their land.” (Senior government manager)

412 Some found it challenging to implement top-down policies that were constituted on the
413 international or national level at the sub-national level due to lack of applicability to the local
414 physical and social context:

415 “International donors do not understand the situation here. They can travel from one country to another
416 in a few hours, while it may take us a day to move between two villages. Now, they complain about our
417 efficiency.” (Senior government manager)

418 “Developed countries are those who can focus on environmental impacts. We [local officers] need to
419 take care of many problems at the same time, and every single one of them is urgent.” (Government
420 officer)

421 “This country consists of thousands of island and ethnicities [...] The central government should not
422 apply a single set of regulation to all regions” (Government officer)

423 Patriarchal norms held by the intermediaries have also restricted the mobilization of
424 norms related to recognitional justice:

425 “Some multinational companies wanted to involve women in public consultations [...] Those women
426 found it stressful to speak publicly. This is disrespectful. Now I do not allow companies to force women
427 to participate.” (Senior government manager)

428 Hierarchical bureaucracy cultures have also limited open conversation and the
429 mobilization of justice-related norms in general. Several interviewees perceived that it could
430 affect their organizational or personal interests if they openly object to the authority of their
431 superiors:

432 “Better not to say ‘no’ to the [AMDAL] reviewers. I do not want to annoy them, in case it affects [the
433 result of] the application.” (Environment consultant)

434 “I was promoted [as the senior government manager of the anonymized environmental division] from
435 another agency. I had known nothing about the environment [...] I was not obliged to accept that offer.

436 However, if I disobeyed my superior, I might never get promoted again.” (Former senior government
437 manager)

438 Intermediaries such as the technical experts of AMDAL were observant of the emerging
439 norms related to environmental justice in local governance due to their close interaction with
440 various stakeholders and policies and have provided meaningful insights to understanding
441 existing and emerging values in the implementation of environmental policies. The political
442 and economic objectives embedded in the international and national policy frameworks have
443 also significantly changed the processes and outcomes of the intermediaries’ everyday
444 practices at the sub-national level. Enabling the mobilization of justice-related norms between
445 governance levels thus requires the understanding of the role of culture and capacity to find
446 congruence with global sustainability objectives.

447 **4.3. Platforms through which norms travel in the AMDAL process**

448 This section demonstrates some institutional, physical, and social resources and platforms,
449 through which justice norms travel in the practice of AMDAL. As the criteria for verifying
450 project feasibility, many intermediaries considered the spatial plans (*Rencana Tata Ruang*
451 *Wilayah*) made by provincial, district, and in rare cases, village governments to be particularly
452 useful and supported them in negotiating the outcomes of development projects. Ambiguous
453 or lack of land use planning, in contrast, has caused social conflicts and increased their
454 workload as they must mediate those conflicts:

455 “If a project does not fit the land-use plan, I can reject it immediately. It is straightforward - there is no
456 space for negotiation.” (Government officer)

457 “The regional land-use plan is ambiguous [...] We [the technical team] are forced to make critical
458 decisions on land-use, which is not under AMDAL’s authority.” (Senior government manager)

459 To mobilize justice-related norms effectively, the intermediaries had discussed the
460 need for setting up institutional strategies for two-way communication between the technical

461 team and the licensing authority. Some interviewees, for instance, shared their concerns about
462 the transparency of decisions made on license granting because they could not follow up on the
463 process of decision-making:

464 “I do not know if the consultants understand my feedback or if they revise the analysis based on my
465 recommendation [...] We [the technical team] do not get to see the final report. There is no follow-up.”
466 (Academic and consultant)

467 “I send the [commission’s] decision to the licensing agency. However, I do not know if the applications
468 are approved or rejected at their end. There is no means to monitor the process of permit issuance.”
469 (Senior government manager)

470 The intermediaries also found it hard to promote the value of sustainability and public
471 welfare within the existing legislative framework that has prioritized economic growth, as
472 shown in the following quotes:

473 “Economic growth is prioritized over social welfare. AMDAL aims to reduce the impact, not to remove
474 them. What a committee can do is limited.” (Government officer)

475 “Provincial profit comes mainly from natural resource [exploitation]. If we were too strict with these
476 activities, the profit decreased. The budget for environmental management would also decrease. This is
477 the dilemma.” (Senior government manager)

478 Interviews revealed that institutional resources were inadequate to support the
479 technical experts in advancing justice and sustainability values in the AMDAL negotiations.
480 Addressing these structural constraints thus requires attention on not only the norms included
481 in environmental policies but also the national policies of decentralization in a broader context.

482 Turning to physical resources that have affected everyday governance arrangement and
483 provided platforms for the travel of justice-related norms, the intermediaries identified
484 opportunities that both enabled or restricted their pursuit of organizational and personal
485 agendas, including those related to environmental management. Although the interviewees

486 struggled to navigate their organizational and personal goals within the growth-oriented
487 governance setting, they recognized that an improved financial condition of local governments
488 has also improved their working conditions. Proper physical facilities and resources are
489 perceived as essential to support the intermediaries in negotiating and mobilizing their
490 prioritized values in local environmental practice. Infrastructure, such as road, airport, and
491 mobile phone coverage, have enabled information exchange and access of knowledge service
492 beyond an administrative territory, which has been particularly useful for areas that have
493 limited institutional, physical, or social resources:

494 “It lacks environmental experts in this area, so we need to invite technical reviewers externally [...] A
495 good review is only made possible by fairly-built roads or airports.” (Former senior government
496 manager)

497 “There is an online forum of AMDAL where people exchange information and experience. Anyone may
498 ask questions about a certain location or [analysis] method or update any regional laws and regulations.”
499 (Academic and consultant)

500 The interviewees also demonstrated that the use of remote sensing and other
501 technologies has provided supportive tools to achieve their work goals in an improved work
502 environment:

503 “It is more efficient to monitor forest fire by satellite – the cost is lower, and it is safer for our staff.”
504 (Government officer)

505 “Now, we use mobile devices to conduct the survey. It improves work conditions in the field [...] You
506 can also check if the person-in-charge fulfill their tasks” (Government officer)

507 “We should use digitalized reports in AMDAL; the data archive will work better [...] The public can
508 access the data online.” (Former senior government manager)

509 In contrast, the intermediaries perceived that access to high-quality data, including
510 data scale, consistency, and access, have been significant barriers to a fair evaluation of

511 AMDAL. High-quality data therefore will be required for providing concrete scientific ground
512 to support intermediaries in project negotiation.

513 “It does not make sense to assess the impact on a village when the analysis is done at the district level.
514 [...] We compromise because that is the only official data available.” (Government officer)

515 “If I wanted to be perfect, I would need to collect data from several agencies and crosscheck them.
516 However, you do not know whether and when they will reply. Furthermore, no one knows which set of
517 data is the updated one for sure.” (Environmental consultant)

518 Socially-derived resources and platforms that can affect the mobilization of norms
519 largely concerned the social relationship and interaction between the official and unofficial
520 actors involved in and affected by the AMDAL process. While many claimed that they did not
521 have a personal interaction with the unofficial actors who worked beyond the institutional
522 debates of AMDAL (i.e. military actors, police, and politicians), the interviewees generally
523 perceived the strong influence of those actors on the outcomes of their everyday practices and
524 involvement in AMDAL as shown in the following quotes.

525 “There was this time when I could not proceed with an [AMDAL] application because it had lacked a
526 document from [an anonymized governmental agency], which I had followed up for three months. One
527 day I received a call from a general, asking about the process of this application [...] The document I
528 wanted was put on my desk the next morning.” (Anonymized technical expert)

529 “It is hard to challenge a project, especially during an election year [...] Politicians need company
530 sponsorship, they may take the money and intervene [the license granting process].” (Academic)

531 How ‘closely’ the technical experts interact with each other has also affected the
532 processes and outcomes of project negotiations in AMDAL. The governmental representatives
533 were often chosen for different project reviews depending on their superiors’ arrangement.
534 Several interviewees commented that they hesitated to engage in the discussion when they
535 were unfamiliar with the other technical experts. In contrast, some found it harder to work
536 with colleagues who collaborated with them in other programs:

537 “The heads of the [governmental] agencies may assign different staff to participate in different projects
538 [...] I know who represents which agency, but I do not know if I can count on their expertise.” (Senior
539 government manager)

540 “I wanted to speak my mind frankly, but I do not want to be harsh [...] It would be easier if I could work
541 with the people who know my personality.” [Senior government manager]

542 “It is harder to give critical comments to a project if I know my colleague in the university conducts its
543 analysis.” (Academic)

544 While corruption persisted as a significant concern of promoting equitable decision-
545 making at the sub-national level, interviews revealed that issues of corruption should be
546 considered alongside the power relationships that have encouraged or eliminated the behavior
547 of corruption. The results presented until now show that several social and cultural factors have
548 contributed to maintaining the status quo of the management system and associated power
549 inequalities. Namely, patriarchal norms that have suppressed the voices of less powerful ones,
550 including landless people, indigenous people and women, prior to decision-making;
551 hierarchical bureaucracy norms that has encouraged individuals’ agendas on dominance and
552 promotion for securing greater power in the organizations; complex organizational structure,
553 clear cut assignment of functions, and lack of communication between divisions that have led
554 to lower commitment to accountability; and finally, top-down and market-based management
555 principles that allow little space for negotiations of norms to sub-national players.

556 People’s interactions, which are formed through these societal norms and the favoring
557 of those high in social dominance, promote corruption by enforcing power and status
558 inequalities in the organizational structure. For instance, two anonymized governmental
559 intermediaries perceived that they had been relocated to other departments due to their
560 rejection of bribery. Unequal power relationships also contribute to preserving the role of
561 corruption by rationalizing or legitimatizing the unethical doings as ‘culturally-fit.’ Being
562 involved in corrupted practice was not only for the monetary gain but also seen as a social norm

563 in the sense that the intermediaries perceived they might also, in turn, need to bribe if they
564 wanted to fulfill their tasks. In contrast, they would be socially penalized when they did not
565 accept bribery, as illustrated in the following quotes:

566 “There was pressure from the top and bottom [to receive bribery]. The colleagues teased me. You make
567 yourself unpopular if you do not corrupt [...] My wife might blame me if she knew I had rejected the
568 bribery.” (Anonymized technical expert)

569 “You would never get things done if you do not give money. The officers might say ‘you lack of this or
570 that document’ or ‘the person-in-charge is not here’ [...] If you give money, half-day.” (Anonymized
571 technical expert)

572 “We have a budget for bribery. You would know how to include this in the budget if you worked here [...]
573 You need this to get things done.” (Anonymized technical expert)

574 Issues of corruption can be coupled with low monetary and psychological incentives of
575 carrying on equitable practices for the intermediaries. The technical experts were often
576 overburdened by their workloads and worked part-time to make ends meet due to a low salary:

577 “I do not feel appreciated [...] I work as a lecturer, consultant, in AMDAL, and for other commissioned
578 works [...] I work so hard just to make ends meet.” (Academic and consultant)

579 “It is hard to nurture good technical staff in this civil servant system. Not only have you needed to
580 master the skill, but also to learn many regulations. It is hard to compete with the private sector by
581 lower pay and higher commitment.” (Senior government manager)

582 Interviews also revealed psychological rewards that were important for motivating the
583 intermediaries, notably the recognition of skills and in compliance with personal goals:

584 “I am not trying to win acclaim but to make good use of my knowledge. However, it is hard when you
585 work in the government.” (Government officer)

586 “I quit consultancy to join the technical team [...] I earned more as a consultant. But I hope my
587 knowledge can contribute to something bigger.” (Academic)

588 The intermediaries perceived that common understandings of justice and sustainability
589 goals were important for enabling such norms to travel vertically and horizontally. Not only
590 should the intermediaries improve their knowledge of global environmental agendas, but also
591 those whom the intermediaries seek to influence:

592 “There is no training in reviewing AMDAL. We review the reports as we perceived as fair [...] If the
593 authority does not prioritize the same thing as I, the project which I rejected might be approved anyway.”
594 (Government officer)

595 “I only know about the importance of sustainability after I got trained. However, the district/provincial
596 heads never get trained [...] How do I persuade them to prioritize sustainability despite other agendas?”
597 (Former senior government manager)

598 The intermediaries also provided useful insight into the potential of the private sector
599 in advancing justice-related objectives in environmental management. Any empowerment
600 initiatives should thus engage the private sector and identify the support needed by various
601 private sector actors in achieving justice-related agendas. While the private sector actors were
602 often perceived to create constraints to mobilize justice-related norms in local environmental
603 practice, all interviewees had some experience of positive collaboration with private sector
604 actors:

605 “I suggested some companies to include free health service, which the government cannot afford, as part
606 of their impact management. They agreed and implemented those programs with district health agencies.
607 Sometimes companies simply do not know what they can do.” (Government officer)

608 As the primary actor in environmental management, the private sector, especially local
609 companies on a smaller scale, has not been fully engaged with local environmental
610 management agendas, as perceived by the intermediaries. Identifying the barriers to executing

611 management responsibilities faced by the private sector thus may enhance the mobilization of
612 justice-related norms:

613 “Smaller companies cannot afford a good consultancy service. They do not know how to judge the quality
614 of the analysis, or whether their consultants did their job.” (Academic and consultant)

615 “Companies often do not understand what they had committed [...] They only realize they did not have
616 enough budget or ability when they started to implement the management plan as they had promised.”
617 (Academic)

618 Interviews with these intermediaries have contributed to understandings of the
619 institutional, physical, and social resources and platforms affecting the (re)production,
620 consolidation, and mobilization of norms, including those related to justice, in the sub-national
621 environmental management platforms. Unequal power relationships and social status have
622 initiated and enforced patriarchal and hierarchical norms and have promoted the role of
623 corruption in the EIA process. Most intermediaries therefore perceived EIA as constrained
624 forums for debating the principles of environmental policies and negotiating justice-related
625 norms compared to international and national arenas, and actively opted out of such debates.
626 The resources identified have focused on those platforms which facilitate the travel of norms
627 across the actors at the sub-national level. The interviews also portrayed the intermediaries’
628 perspectives on the influence of unofficial actors and informal relationships on their practices.
629 Further focus on identifying who the unofficial actors are, how they are involved in the
630 decision-making arena, and the extent to which they influence the formation and mobilization
631 of justice-related norms in local environmental management will be useful to support
632 intermediaries in the environmental practices.

633 **5. Discussion**

634 This section highlights our findings on the dynamics of justice brokerage through EIA
635 intermediaries in Indonesia, and discusses its implications on the three key fields of inquiry,

636 i.e., environmental justice, critical institutionalism, and effectiveness of environmental impact
637 assessment.

638 Firstly, we argue that traditional social norms underpin the ideological differences on
639 environmental justice. Environmental justice is conceptualized as being achieved through
640 three interlinked dimensions, which are distributive, procedural, and recognitional justice
641 (Schlosberg 2013; Sikor 2013). Our findings revealed that these justice elements were
642 prioritized unevenly by the intermediaries spoken to. Distributive and procedural justice-
643 related norms were their primary concerns, while the objectives of recognitional justice were
644 largely neglected. Power inequalities underlying the EIA process are found to promote
645 recognitional injustice, as consistent with the works by Young (1990) and Fraser (2007; 2008).
646 Traditional patriarchal norm persisted in the technical team also raises questions as to
647 recognition to and equitable participation of culturally marginalized ones in the EIA practices,
648 given inadequate attention paid by the intermediaries to unequal power relationships around
649 gender, indigeneity, and class. Although the intermediaries did not bring up or discuss
650 ethnicity as a factor, this paper acknowledges that ethnicity may play an underlying if minor
651 role. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide an in-depth perspective of the
652 implication of ethnicity on justice brokerage, this may be an area that should be included in
653 further research.

654 The interviewees' lack of awareness of recognitional justice has also created barrier to
655 justice in the EIA process. Some consultants, government officers and academics interviewed
656 positioned themselves as more 'objective' in the EIA process, emphasizing their technical and
657 legal knowledge in evaluating project impacts in the way they deem to be 'fair.' Our findings,
658 however, show that those intermediaries often fail to recognize and challenge the governance
659 system that has excluded alternative voices in the first place. Such a pattern of prioritization to
660 norms related to distributive justice was also reflected in the intermediaries' interpretation of
661 stakeholders' interests underlying the EIA policies and practices. Namely, the market-oriented

662 principles and top-down policies imposed on local environmental practices have affected how
663 they approached the emerging concerns of global sustainability agendas.

664 Additionally, hierarchical work cultures endorsing power and status inequality help
665 preserve the roles of unofficial actors (i.e., military actors, police, and politicians) and
666 corruption in the EIA process, which further constrain the production and mobilization of
667 norms related to recognitional justice. The EIA practices at the sub-national level therefore fall
668 short of producing justice for the communities affected, as argued by Hasan, Nahiduzzaman,
669 and Aldosary (2018), and yet the EIA intermediaries continue to adopt these practices. It thus
670 allows for the involvement of the intermediaries in local EIA practices into empty mechanisms,
671 whereby both the state and other powerful actors can maintain the rhetoric of justice and
672 portray an image of fulfilling their justice obligations. Taking into account that a technical
673 review process is commonly one of the initial stages in defining the scope of impact
674 management in an EIA process, institutional participation of diverse cultural groups in the
675 technical team will be required for promoting more equitable and sustainable outcomes of local
676 environmental decision-making.

677 Turning to our second field of inquiry, i.e., critical institutionalism, we argue that a
678 complex organizational structure and lack of collaboration between divisions, in this case,
679 have affected the intermediaries' prioritizations and strategies of mobilizing justice-related
680 norms. The decision-making process of EIA in Indonesia is divided into several stages (public
681 consultation, technical evaluation, impact management evaluation, and license granting) in
682 the decentralized governance system. The technical experts involved in this bureaucratic
683 process have been constrained to other stages beyond their set roles in the technical
684 evaluation of EIA. These institutional barriers embedded in the policies have hindered the
685 technical experts from assessing the outcomes of their efforts and discouraged these
686 intermediaries from investing efforts in the EIA practices and processes.

687 Also partly because of their set role as a technical reviewer, the intermediaries have
688 emphasized the use of scientific knowledge and data to enable the mobilization of their agendas,
689 instead of local justice concerns, contrasting to other findings (see Lindell 2009; Sternlieb et
690 al. 2013). The intermediaries in this case study had attempted to mobilize their interpretations
691 of justice horizontally within the sub-national level among their superiors and cohorts, aligning
692 with previous studies (see Coggan et al. 2013; Hargreaves et al. 2013). However, these
693 intermediaries tended to accept the existing policy framework of EIA and the institutional roles
694 assigned without seeking to influence or intervene in policy-making upwards, in contrast to
695 the theoretical expectation of promoting bottom-up policy formation through intermediaries
696 (see Caouette 2007; Schomers, Sattler, and Matzdorf 2015; Schröter et al. 2018; Sternlieb et al.
697 2013).

698 In seeking collaboration to influence environmental outcomes as suggested by Schröter
699 et al. (2018), the technical experts spoken to tended to work with other sub-national and
700 technical actors, instead of connecting with civil society organizations and local communities
701 as having been identified by Funder and Marani (2015). More importantly, the government
702 officials consulted were moved from post to post and there was no culture of developing a deep
703 professional profile in the EIA practice. Continued loss of experience by intermediaries can
704 stem the travel of justice-related norms in local environmental practice as the same justice
705 claims may be repeatedly encountered with no procedural learning.

706 Our findings further covered institutional, physical, and social resources and platforms
707 that are instrumental in enabling the mobilization of justice-related norms horizontally within
708 the sub-national level. Social relationships among various official and unofficial actors (Pham
709 et al. 2010) is a significant consideration of the interviewees in their EIA-related decision-
710 making. Not only may intermediaries prioritize different agendas in different social settings or
711 forums, as others have found (Booth 2012; Hrabanski et al. 2013; Papillon and Rodon 2017),
712 but our findings also suggest that a poor work environment and low incentives can influence
713 the agendas they prioritize. Therefore, proper working conditions (Bosselmann and Lund,

714 2013), including workload, incentives, and safety, are critical for motivating intermediaries to
715 engage in the environmental negotiations actively. Even though it is beyond the scope of this
716 study, the literature in interactional justice which emphasizing the connections between the
717 perceptions of justice and organizational behavior (see Bies 2015; Zapata, Olsen, and Martins
718 2013) may be beneficial to further studies on the production and mobilization of justice-related
719 norms through intermediary actors in environmental institutions.

720 Finally, we argue for the significance of justice brokerage in affecting the effectiveness
721 of environmental impact assessment. The issue of effectiveness in achieving sustainable
722 development has been a key concern of EIA scholars and has been reviewed by others (e.g.,
723 Cashmore et al. 2010; Morgan 2012). Studies have started to explore the potential of EIA as a
724 tool to promote environmental justice goals in policy implementation, for example, Cashmore
725 and Axelsson (2013) and Connelly and Richardson (2005). While the literature on
726 environmental intermediaries has focused mainly on those engaged in international initiatives,
727 as have been found by others (Bosselmann and Lund, 2013; Coggan et al., 2013; Hrabanski et
728 al., 2013), our case study presents the barriers for local justice norms to travel upwards in the
729 existing local management tools with regards to the intermediaries' involvement.

730 The technical experts in the EIA commission were informed as to some global
731 sustainability and justice objectives, and actively sought to mobilize these norms into local
732 practical arrangements. Our findings demonstrated the intermediaries' constant attempts of
733 seeking feasible solutions between the stakeholders' needs, abilities, and budgets within the
734 local capacity of technology and facilities. Identifying the resources needed by these
735 institutional intermediaries, therefore, may be significant to improving local environmental
736 practices and delivering environmental justice from a cost-effectiveness perspective. This
737 empowerment strategy can be useful especially because many countries that possess rich forest
738 and natural resources often suffer from limited resources available for environmental
739 management.

740 **6. Conclusion**

741 This article explored and exposed the justice-related norms prioritized by intermediaries;
742 namely consultants, academics, and governmental officers, in the technical review process of
743 EIA in Indonesia. It also examined the platforms and resources through which justice-related
744 norms traveled, and the factors which facilitated or constrained the negotiation in the project
745 debates of EIA at the sub-national level. Recognitional justice is the least attentive aspect of
746 justice to the intermediaries, and our findings suggest that the EIA governance system
747 underlying patriarchal and hierarchical structure has contributed to the low engagement of
748 recognitional justice concerns. The intermediaries consulted nevertheless have actively sought
749 to negotiate and mobilize distributive and procedural concerns within the sub-national level.
750 Social relationships and working conditions are two key considerations in affecting
751 intermediaries' willingness to communicate for justice in this case study. Governance
752 mechanisms that comply with national environmental laws, such as EIA, have facilitated
753 necessary resource networks to be established and developed; such access to resources is
754 essential to support intermediaries' works. If integrating justice-related norms into the practice
755 of local governance is the goal of global sustainable initiatives, more attention will be required
756 to explore potentially useful national policies and platforms to influence environmental
757 decision-making at the sub-national level.

758 **Appendix Interviewees' information based on self-description**

759 All participants classified into one of these categories for anonymity:

- 760 1. Senior Government Manager (including current and former Heads, secretariats, and
761 other senior managers of Division of AMDAL, Disaster and risk management,
762 Environmental monitoring, Forestry, Health, Labor and transmigration, and License
763 issuance)
- 764 2. Government Officer (including officers of Division of Environmental monitoring,
765 Health, License issuance, Plantation, Spatial planning, and Transportation)

- 766 3. Academic (including specialists in biodiversity, hydrology, and spatial planning)
- 767 4. Academic and consultant (including specialists in biodiversity and sociology)
- 768 5. Environmental Consultant (including specialists in AMDAL, land-use licensing, and
- 769 project management)

770

No.	Field of work	Age	Sex	Years of experience in EIA	Number of interviews
1.	Academic	42	M	16-20	1
2.	Academic	44	M	6-10	2
3.	Academic	50	M	16-20	1
4.	Academic	50	M	Less than 1	2
5.	Academic	51	M	11-15	1
6.	Academic	58	M	6-10	2
7.	Academic and consultant	45	M	-	2
8.	Academic and consultant	60	M	21-25	2
9.	Academic and consultant	63	M	21-25	1
10.	Environmental consultant	34	M	6-10	1
11.	Environmental consultant	51	M	16-20	3
12.	Environmental consultant	56	M	16-20	1
13.	Former senior government manager	49	F	6-10	2
14.	Former senior government manager	67	M	1-5	2
15.	Senior government manager	38	M	1-5	1
16.	Senior government manager	43	M	1-5	3
17.	Senior government manager	43	M	6-10	0
18.	Senior government manager	43	M	6-10	1

19.	Senior government manager	46	M	11-15	1
20.	Senior government manager	47	M	16-20	1
21.	Senior government manager	49	F	16-20	1
22.	Senior government manager	50	M	6-10	2
23.	Senior government manager	51	M	Less than 1	2
24.	Senior government manager	51	M	1-5	0
25.	Senior government manager	53	M	11-15	0
26.	Senior government manager	56	M	1-5	1
27.	Government officer	32	M	1-5	0
28.	Government officer	37	M	1-5	1
29.	Government officer	40	M	6-10	1
30.	Government officer	42	M	Less than 1	0
31.	Government officer	42	M	1-5	2
32.	Government officer	42	M	11-15	1
33.	Government officer	43	M	1-5	0
34.	Government officer	43	M	1-5	0
35.	Government officer	43	M	1-5	1
36.	Government officer	46	M	6-10	2
37.	Government officer	49	F	1-5	2
38.	Government officer	-	M	Less than 1	1

771

772

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Author Statement

Jia Yen Lai: Conceptualization; Data curation; Formal analysis; Funding acquisition; Investigation; Methodology; Project administration; Resources; Software; Validation; Visualization; Roles/Writing – original draft. **Sam Staddon:** Supervision; Validation; Writing – review & editing. **Alistair Hamilton:** Supervision; Validation; Writing – review & editing.



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