

Assessing European actorness in a New World:
ENP as a tool for the formation of the European empire

(VERSÃO FINAL APÓS DEFESA)

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What does a great empire do when it's faced with imminent invasion and destruction? It can re-arm at home and seek allies abroad, but more cunningly it can revisit its history to forge a myth that will unite the people and carry them through to victory. A myth that will demonstrate to everyone that their country has been specially chosen by God and by history to uphold justice and righteousness. (MacGregor, 2013, p. 387)¹

¹ MacGregor, N. (2013). *A History of the World in 100 Objects*. United States: Penguin Books.

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Dedication

Para a minha mãe, Teresa, e para as minhas tias, Maria Emília e Maria José, pacientes Penélopes que tecem o fio aos dias em busca do meu regresso e a quem dedico este pequeno trabalho de forma a imortalizar o amor e admiração que por elas sinto.

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Resumo Alargado

Qual é a natureza das políticas da UE perante os seus vizinhos orientais? É criar um "anel de amigos" ou uma estratégia imperial? Desde o estabelecimento do projeto europeu, esse assunto tem sido fortemente debatido. A UE pode apresentar semelhanças com um império através das constantes, e visíveis, mudanças perante as suas fronteiras, perante o seu sistema de governança multinível, o seu uso de instrumentos de *soft power*, ou apenas demonstrar as características de um poder hegemónico. Uma "conquista" por 'acomodação' política e económica, e não por conflito militar. Acredita-se que a União Europeia tem vindo, ao longo dos anos, a adquirir as características de um ator internacional predominante: uma moeda comum, uma estrutura governamental que apresenta o seu *core* em Bruxelas, o reforço das fronteiras externas e até uma tentativa de criação de um exército europeu. Ao longo dos anos, a sua política de alargamento tornou-se a ferramenta mais importante na construção imperial. As variáveis de poder que traz consigo nesse mesmo processo, contribuem para o subproduto que é o processo de integração europeia e a criação de uma diversidade institucional cultural, política e económica.

Os impérios são muitas vezes caracterizados por uma dicotomia, centro-periferia, onde existem claras disparidades a nível económico e político, o mesmo tem acontecido com os países centrais e periféricos da União. Sendo muitas vezes acusados no sistema internacional, de desiguais distribuições de poder ou de tentativa de forma a tentar moldar o sistema internacional de acordo com suas próprias preferências pessoais. As 'flutuações' territoriais das quais a EU é constantemente alvo devido à sua política de alargamento e à falta de uma ampla gama de capacidades militares, uma vez que os seus instrumentos militares executam principalmente operações de manutenção da paz no exterior.

O poder 'civil' e 'normativo' são instrumentos preferenciais sobre qualquer instrumento de carácter militar estando de acordo com aquilo que é a imagem de actor benigno num cenário global. Assim sendo, a PESC não se destina a dissuadir possíveis agressores, mas a compreender e identificar problemáticas comuns dos respetivos estados-membros, que podem levar a soluções de denominadores comuns. Isso não significa que a UE não possui uma representação internacionais enquanto actor global, com um determinado poderio; demonstrando que os instrumentos de *soft power* podem funcionar de forma assertiva, sendo o melhor exemplo disso, as antigas repúblicas soviéticas de Leste para onde a UE com os seus instrumentos exportou, com mérito, os seus valores e normas.

Não há fronteiras fixas na UE, no entanto, torna-se difícil imaginar as relações estatais a retroceder ao que eram durante o regime soviético, uma vez que as infraestruturas de governança sofreram alterações tremendas.

Palavras-chave

EU;Império;Europeização;Alargamento;PESC;PEV

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Abstract

What is the nature of the EU's policies towards its eastern neighbours? Is it to create a 'ring of friends' or an imperial strategy? Ever since the establishment of the European project, this subject has been heavily debated. The EU might present similarities with an empire, through ever-changing borders, its multi-level governance system, its use of soft power instrument or that might present itself has characteristics of a hegemonic power. The 'conquest' through political and economic accommodation rather than military force or conflict. The Union is, thus, believed to be acquiring the characteristics of a predominant international actor: a common currency, a central governmental structure in Brussels, the reinforcement of external borders, and even an attempt at a European army.

Enlargement has, over the years, become the most important tool in the 'imperial narrative'. The power variables that the enlargement process brings contribute to the by-product that is the European integration process and the creation of a cultural, political and economic institutional diversity. Empires have also been characterized by a dichotomy, at a centre-periphery level through the disparities at an economic and political level. Meaning that they are, at times, accused in the international system, of unequal distributions of power or the attempt of trying to shape the international system according to its own personal preferences, but so do most hegemonic powers. The territorial fluctuations that the Union is constantly a part of due to its enlargement policy and due to the lack of an extensive array of military capabilities, since its military instruments mostly perform peacekeeping operations abroad, not a defence strategy.

The civilian and normative power are preferred over the use of military instruments, maintaining the benign 'repertoire' of the union in the global stage. It is implicit, that the CFSP is not about deterring aggressors, but to understand and identify common problems that can lead to common denominators solutions. This does not mean that the EU does not hold a powerful representation amongst international actors, its 'soft power' instruments have many times worked in an assertive manner, the best example being the former eastern soviet republics to where the EU, instead of implementing a direct rule exported values and norms.

There are no fixed borders in the EU, however, it is hard to imagine the state-relations to go back to what they were during the soviet regimes since the governance infrastructures have suffered tremendous changes.

Keywords

EU;Empire;Europeanization;Enlargement;CFSP;ENP

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Figure 1- Structure of the security system of the EU

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List of Acronyms

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EMP	European Monetary Policy
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IO	International Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UN	United Nations
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II

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Introduction

In a time where the European Union is plagued by internal issues, one might think that the analysis of such geopolitical actor is not a priority. In this paperwork regarding “Assessing European actorness in a New World: ENP as a tool for the formation of the European empire” it is my intent to explore the impact of an International System that is being controlled by a specific set of geopolitical actors, that may present resemblances, to old empires, where the European Union alongside the U.S, Russia and China have a primordial dwelling. Within a growing Euro-scepticism amongst European citizens and constitutional turmoil, this makes up pose the key question:

- In what way has the ENP been a tool in the formation of the ‘European empire’?
- Furthermore, what are the implications that, that same influence has on the projection of its external image in the “neighbourhood”?

The ‘closer Union’ that the Treaty of Rome once talked about in the beginning, makes, years later the public opinion start to diverge in terms of support for the EU.

Michael Doyle (1986) argues that the concept of empire represents “(...) a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy -the effective sovereignty- of the other, the subordinate periphery” (p. 12). Over time, there has been little doubt towards an existence of key hegemonic features in the discourse and actions of the European Union in the international system, that many times are seen as imperial, such as the continuously expanding territory that is now under the governance of the Union from Asia to the Middle East. The idea that now pertains to the Union, is now the image of a very meddling and continuously-expanding actor that through political and economic instruments tries to assert dominance over the peripheral actors that are alongside its borders. This is clearer in the eastern ‘neighbourhood’, since much like in other situations, the EU has tried, mainly through enlargement to bring peace and stability to the neighbourhood. Hence the fact that it portrays a very peculiar and distinct ‘imperial’ power, having 27 states at its core and not a single state, that have sovereign authority over its territory and the centre of the supposed empire is located in Brussels. Hartmut Behr (2016) and the concept that the Union ‘governs from distance’ mainly due to the fact that to govern from a distance there needs to be certain elements for that same authority to exist

If one associates Empires with formal territorial annexations, then the methods used by the EU will not enter such spectrum since its 'conquests' are made through invitation not by coercion or the use of military instruments. Guided by self-interest, like many other states, the EU, has the self-image of a 'benign' actor. Considered as a 'peace-making actor' that perpetuates good governance, democracy, security, sustainable growth, the European project has represented, from the beginning, where cooperation has been a key instrument.

Another important aspect is the dichotomy centre-periphery. As a result, the periphery of the international system, and the less powerful more generally, can drop out of the analysis of 'great power' politics, except as bargaining chips or as the location of natural resources. Alternatively, the periphery becomes the site of Western good intentions, of humanitarian intervention and development assistance. As a result of the role that the periphery has many times in the international system it is many times a "(...) site of Western good intentions, of humanitarian intervention and development assistance." (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002, p. 112).

The methodology is deductive since it starts from a broad perspective of the EU as an international actor and transforming into an in-depth analysis of the actor it can be 'classified' as, as well as the instruments, policies and bodies that aid the Union in such internal and external objectives.

The **first chapter** intends to set the scene of what is an international organization, what is the role it plays in the International System following the realist and liberal current of thought and the impact they pertain in what is the interaction of the different actors within the system they are inserted in. For that we also take into account the contribute of Wallerstein and the World-System theory to emphasize the existing core-periphery dichotomy. The discussion of concept of Europeanization allows for a thorough discussion of the 'downloading' and 'uploading' dimensions, to understand the impact that the EU has at a global but also at a regional level towards its own member states through the use of direct (conditionality and socialization) and indirect (externalization and imitation) mechanisms.

The **second chapter** explores the role of the European Union as a global actor where the conceptualization of 'actorness' and the characteristics that 'constitute' an international actor such as: internal identity/ self-perception; external recognition; international presence; institutionalization and a set instrument and policy-making procedures; are an important part in understanding what comes next in the attempt to define what type of actor does the Union represents through the use of normative and civilian power narratives.

The **third chapter** aims to understand the concept of Empire as it pertains to the unique international actor that the Union represents. Through the export of its core norms and values to the eastern ‘neighbourhood, and through a polycentric governance structure it can assert a dominance over the regions where interests lay. A strategy of ‘accommodate’, ‘eliminate’ and ‘assimilate’, much like in ancient empires. However, the concept of ‘Empire’ must be discussed in contrast to the concept of ‘Hegemony’ since upon its use many scholars cannot quite perceive its differences or similarities. The existence, or lack thereof, of geopolitical interests that the Union may have in that eastern ‘neighbourhood’ is also a topic of interest. And while there is an adamant denial, on the EU’s part, of any sort of geopolitical interest when dealing with the heterogeneity of actors that are represented in the international system, it can become harder to, conceivably, refute such claims when there is a geopolitical core to its actions.

The **fourth chapter** presents us with a constitutional background of the European Union and the creation of the European project, as well as its evolution through the various main treaties. Starting with the Treaty of Paris followed by the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice and finally, the Treaty of Lisbon , allowing us to have a broader vision of what the enlargement policy of the Union, and the external and internal constraints that are present during such process. One final aspect that needs to be is the concept of ‘Enlargement fatigue’ that has recently risen in the European lexicon where ‘wideners’ and ‘deepeners’ hold very different positions towards the future strategy of the Union in order to present new strategies to combat the enlargement ‘*ad infinitum*’ strategy that cannot be maintained much longer and what would that mean to the neighbours of the east and the CFSP and CSDP that have aided the Union in such construction.

The **fifth chapter** addresses, in a deeper way, the concept of ‘Europeanization’ and the security impact that it has towards the eastern ‘neighbourhood’. Stability, good governance and security usually dominate the debate surrounding the process of ‘Europeanization’ and this chapter is no different. The great effort, displayed by the Union in an attempt to establish a strong and engaging relationship with its neighbours thus, due to the fact that the construction of the Union’s identity is the subject of an ever-deeper discussion it should be addressed. There is a greater emphasis on security firstly on the European Security Strategy (also known as the ‘Solana Strategy’) created in 2003, and updated in 2008, and more recently EUGS and the proposal of a new security path for the Union through a new strategy

Lastly, the **sixth chapter**, presents a discussion on n the core-periphery dichotomy. The search for an identity for the European population is achieved through

common projects and goals. Many times, seen as an 'altruist' actor the EU's intention have been questioned many times as it pertains to the Union over projects such as the ENP and also the existence of 'concentric circles' that form the EU's security community. The idea of the EU as a 'peaceful' empire where the institutions it is constituted by along the power structure that starts at the centre and spreads through the periphery demonstrates that the so called 'benign actor' narrative whose mission is to spread its core norms and values throughout the world, and within its own neighbourhood, where democracy, stability, security and peace reign, or so the Union tries, may have other interests hidden in its formal agenda. Thus, the so-called 'imperial asymmetries' present a clear divide between the central EU members and the 'eastern neighbourhood'.

CHAPTER 1.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

1.1 International Organizations

International Organizations, as we know them, are relatively new. The first large scale international organization in International Relations emerged after the end of World War II. There was, nonetheless, previously set mechanisms to help guide and govern considerable elements of the domestic politics. There appears, however, to exist a lack of consensus towards a definition on International Organizations. Many different definitions can, therefore, be given. "The IO's are the result of progressive 'institutionalization' of a world of growing connections and transfers that require habits of the international organization. This international organization reflects a growing need for cooperative practices between states in a world of anarchy" (Pinto, 2007, p. 85). Thus, International Organizations can also be defined as "(...) an institutionalized arrangement among members of the international system to solve tasks which have evolved from systemic conditions" (Hanrieder, 1966, p. 297).

Legitimacy, as expected, has played an extensive role in the establishment of such organizations. International Organizations are a part of the modern-day international order as, not only independent, but also, or so they should be, unbiased actors that "(...) can transform the relationships between states, increasing the efficiency and legitimacy of their individual or collective decisions" (Gabriela, 2013, p. 311).

One must, however, emphasize that over time, a wide range of IO's have been formed and established however, new IO's are emerging and challenging the existing structure.

"Most IO governance structures also follow the same model, namely:

- A plenary supreme organ decides on major policy and operational issues.
- An executive organ frequently meets to make decisions on the implementation of the significant policy and operational decisions.
- Subsidiary bodies assist the supreme and executive organs in specific administrative or technical areas.
- A secretariat is tasked with the administrative management of the organization, notably support for meetings, linking areas of work across

organs, carrying out consultations and other consensus-building activities." (OECD, 2019, p. 5).

1.1.1 International Organizations through the lens of Realism

Dominant in the field of International Relations studies for many years, the realist perspective helps, in a way, to understand the role that IO's play in this state-dominated international environment (Tabak, Hoffman, & Herz, 2015). States, in the realist paradigm, represent unitary actors whose core concern was not only to increase but also to maximize its power in relation to other states, entailing equal concerns with the security of states.

Realism has three core assumptions (Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998):

1. States are the most important unit in the international system, and everything focuses around them.
2. States act out of their own self-interests and relative gain.
3. States act rationally, therefore, they are rational actors.

The lack of authority at a supranational level leads to the characterization of the International System as anarchical, as well as the strict, and apparent, distinction between what one considers the domestic sphere and the international sphere of politics. At a domestic level, peace, order, stability, and progress, can be achieved through good governance. At an international level war, anarchy and chaos rule the International system, to realist scholars this is a perpetual reality where power relations may suffer alterations, but the core nature of the international relations remains unchanged (Tabak, Hoffman, & Herz, 2015).

The pivotal emphasis for realists is to continuously seek power and influence. Such power has, when it comes to a state's capability, the aptitude to influence, predict and determine the behaviour of other states. Consequently, cooperation becomes difficulted by the insecure and unstable nature of the international structure. "Realist approach to policy implementation would emphasize the cost-benefit calculation of states in judging whether full implementation of internationally agreed-upon policies would be rational" (Joachim & Verbeek, 2004). Furthermore, the fear and constant concern that cooperation agreements will not be fulfilled by the correspondent parties contributes to the constant mistrust and fight for survival.

One abides by the saying today's friends will, most likely, be tomorrow's rivals.

Cooperation, to a certain extent, may be necessary, but the apprehension and the relative gains, will most likely restrain such cooperation due to a vast absence of clear information about the other side. International Organizations and their influence are, nonetheless, questioned upon since they have neither the power nor the authority to enforce them. "It is recognized that while the states have created IO's an instrument of interstate collaboration to serve their national interests and, therefore, with little power to compel members, IO's have eventually acquired a life of their own and a distinct personality" (Pinto, 2007, p. 93). States, are unitary and rational actors that are motivated by self-interest and gains, thus, choosing the path or option that better suits them.

States with the most power will not, willingly at least, join any IO that they cannot influence or control directly, or indirectly. On the other hand, small states will not join any IO that threatens their sovereignty (Gabriela, 2013). There is, however, a sort of 'capability-expectation gap' (Hill, 1993) towards the capacity of such organizations to implement solutions for global problems. States may, however, choose to abide by the norms and rules created by those organizations if they present themselves in accordance with their national interests.

1.1.2 International Organizations through the lens of Liberalism

"Liberal tradition is the foundation involving the role of international organizations (...) in the generation of more cooperation and more order in the international system" (Tabak, Hoffman, & Herz, 2015, p. 12). Mechanisms such as negotiations, law, and conflict management were focused upon. At a domestic level, liberal scholars developed approaches to control the exercise of power at an international level. It was thought that IO's would have the same responsibility. Being that cooperation and stability are what liberal scholars have strongly argued in favour of for years (Bayeh, 2014). The very own idea that these organizations may help change, and improve, inter-state relations has become the greatest divisor amongst realist and liberals alike.

In a summarized manner, one can say that states always look to be in a position of power, and a similar situation will occur in terms of cooperation. Meaning it only occurs when states understand they have the upper hand, and can fulfil their own interests. One can characterize the approach taken by the liberal scholars towards International Organizations as a profound belief in them, as well as the characterization of being agents that help states applying international agreements accordingly. Liberalism "(...) would suggest that this implementation depends on the nature of the domestic institution" (Joachim & Verbeek, 2004, p. 8)

1.1.3 World System Theory: Wallerstein's contribute and the dependency theory

For the last forty years, there has been a discussion of such theory in the academic realm, starting as a sociological approach that brought the ability to look "(...) at social change in a historical context, but quickly spread and included other areas of social science." (Franke, 2014, p. 2).

Introduced in the '70s by Wallerstein (1976), he defines it as "A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage." (p. 229). The system presented by Wallerstein (1976; 2013), demonstrates a uniqueness due to its capitalist nature, where he showed the belief that the way that a country's integration in the capitalist world system will determine how the economic development will occur in a specific country. The subsequent arrangement of the world system there as occurred an accumulation process that has presented itself quite definitively. "While he acknowledges that there has been a trend toward ever-greater commodification and the expansion of capitalism within the modern world-system since the sixteenth century, for Wallerstein it was then that the European world-system first became a capitalist system uniquely different from the pre-capitalist world systems elsewhere on earth." (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, p. 393).

1.1.4 The core-periphery dichotomy and the impact in the European 'neighbourhood.'

The new economic world system was, thus, based in a labour division that would also determine the relationships that the different regions maintain amongst themselves. "In this model, the type of political system was also directly related to each region's placement within the world economy. As a basis for comparison, Wallerstein proposes four different categories, core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external, into which all regions of the world can be placed." (Halsall, 1997, p. 2). Presenting a better explanation, we have (Halsall, 1997):

- The core: These represent the region that prospered more from the world capitalist economy. "Politically, the states within this part of Europe developed strong central governments, extensive bureaucracies, and large mercenary armies." (p. 2). Allowing the *bourgeoisie* to hold a dominant grip over international commerce, thus, creating benefits for themselves while

the most disadvantaged social classes provided cheap labour when it was essential to the growth of each country.

- The periphery: The peripheral areas where there was a clear absence of governance presented unequal relations between these two areas. "Labour systems in both peripheral areas differed from earlier forms in medieval Europe in that they were established to produce goods for a capitalist world economy and not merely for internal consumption." (p. 3)
- The semi-periphery: "Between the two extremes lie the semi-peripheries. These areas represented either core regions in decline or peripheries attempting to improve their relative position in the world economic system. They often also served as buffers between the core and the peripheries." (p. 3) These are areas that display the tensions that exist between the core and the periphery itself. One can emphasize that the semi-peripheries were exploited, but they were actually exploiters as well towards peripheral regions.
- The external areas: with their own economic systems, they remained areas that were distant from the modern world economy. "Russia fits this case well. Unlike Poland, Russia's wheat served primarily to supply its internal market. It traded with Asia as well as Europe; internal commerce remained more important than trade with outside regions." (p. 4)

The conceptualization of the ENP was, at first, a policy for the better integration of the EU's 'new neighbours', however, the problem with such terminology is the fact that after a decade of the fall of the Soviet Union the EU insisted in calling them 'new neighbours' does not make much sense. There was present the common sense that changes were occurring in the EU, changes at its core. Whether it was by sea or land, the EU managed to establish a great number of relationships within that neighbourhood (Marchetti, 2006).

What is known as the 'harmonization of the Union's foreign policy regimes' was also one of the great motives that led to the establishment of this policy. However, the Union was to pay attention due to the existing gap that there was between the economic weight and the political strength the EU had before the other states that were a part of the ENP. The ENP, according to the author, was "(...) conceived as the European Union's (EU's) alternative to traditional geopolitics." (Lehne, 2014, p. 3). The establishment of this policy had, at its core, the protection and gain of authority over the region. There is a

perception of EU 'à la carte' in order to provide incentives, to maintain a privileged relationship within those countries that are a constituent part of the ENP.

Marchetti (2006) considers that the neo-Marxist approach by Immanuel Wallerstein has two main problems. Firstly, the claim that the concept of 'world economy' is said to be universal the arguments to such claim demonstrate themselves to be virtuously economical. There is, thus, on the argumentative spectrum a one-dimensional part and nothing more. Economy is, without a doubt, a relevant factor. However, it is not the dominating and decision-making factor that leads to a solution. Secondly, the fact that there are undeniable ties between the concept of 'world economy' and the dependency theories stating that the centre shows itself dominant and overpowering over the periphery maintaining it in a 'state of dependency' that benefits the centre. Nevertheless, with a world that presents itself ever more globalized, what was once an international system constructed upon dependencies is now constituted by interdependencies. It is also emphasized that while the centre does influence immensely the periphery, the periphery also presents a considerable influence capacity within the centre.

“The discrepancies between the Union’s official language and the undertone in its own documents suggest that at the core of the ENP concept lie geopolitical considerations” (Marchetti, 2006, p. 16). There is the perception that the attitude shown by the EU towards the neighbours was, and still is, strongly characterized by a 'Eurocentric attitude'. Seeing itself, in the beginning, as the centre of the universe with a clear disregard for other actors, later on, it became clear that the actors could no longer be ignored, as it was the case of the EU neighbourhood. The EU needed, thus, to integrate these neighbourhood countries within its foreign policy. Creating, in 2004, the ENP for that effect (Lehne, 2014). If the EU has a clear interest in the political and economic successes in the eastern 'neighbourhood', its support and relations towards these countries need to become more tangible and definite.

Romano Prodi (2002), former European Commission president, believed that they would share 'everything but institutions'. We must accept the fact that the ENP partners diverge in a variety of aspects from each other, its economic development, the cultural and even historical background, as well as their political systems and their characteristics. The one thing they present in common is a geographical proximity to the Union itself. “However, geographic closeness in itself is a poor indicator to the importance of a relationship. If the EU were to take a functional approach to neighbouring regions based on key EU interests such as trade, energy, migration, and counterterrorism, it would need to adopt a considerably broader concept of neighbourhood that includes all of the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and Central Asia.” (Lehne, 2014, p. 6)

The ability we demonstrate to define a “world system” reflects not only our history knowledge but also the questions we wish to see answered (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1994). The debate is still ongoing, nonetheless, the decentralization, or centralization process, that occurs in the modern world system is deeply attached to the rise and fall of hegemonic powers that have a core role in international relations. The simplest distinction and the easiest distinction we can make is the "(...) difference between a core-wide empire and a hegemonic core state is with regard to the degree of the concentration of political-military power in a single state." (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, p. 411).

There was, on Wallerstein's (1976; 2013) part, two distinct debates that one must take into account. The first debate has to do with the fact that if all the countries export and produce goods where they have the upper hand over other countries and respect their trading partners while importing goods from other countries, they will create a system where trade will be beneficial for all the actors involved. However, the 'utopia' created by Wallerstein may not be very plausible since the majority of states are unequal due to the core-periphery dichotomy. The countries that are at the centre present themselves better off economically than those that are at the periphery, these were better developed in the dependency theory (Franke, 2014). The dependency theory has, within itself, the understanding of the world-system theory. Wilson (2011) defines the dependency theory as "(...) a school of thought that explains underdevelopment as the result of the processes by which poor countries and regions are incorporated into the capitalist world economy." (p. 172). Many have focused on how the dependency theory is described where it is said that "(...) the ways classes and groups in the 'core' link to the 'periphery'. Underdevelopment and poverty in so many countries are explained as a result of economic, social, and political structures within countries that have been deeply influenced by their international economic relations. The global capitalist order within these societies have emerged, after all, a global capitalist order that reflects the interests of those who own the means of production" (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011, p. 253).

1.2 Europeanization

The concept of Europeanization prompted a still ongoing debate that steers around its conceptual meaning (Buhari-Gulmez, 2017; Cumming, 2015; Graziano & Vink, 2013). The concept of Europeanization emerges to give a better understanding on what is the impact that the EU has over member-states.

“Europeanization is understood as a process of institution-building at the European level in order to explore how this Europeanization process impacts upon the member states.” (Börzel & Risse, 2003, p. 3). Radaelli (2004) defines Europeanization as “(...) a process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy, paradigms, styles ‘way of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.” (p. 3). Ladi (2006) believes that the concept given by Radaelli (2004) is useful because “(...) first, it sees Europeanisation as a process of institutional and policy change that takes place at both the European and national level although it can be criticized for not acknowledging the importance of the two-way process of Europeanization. Second, it emphasizes the importance of policy transfer and of diffusion, and third it leads us to a broad definition of policy change.” (p. 7)

1.2.1 Downloading (Top-Down) or Uploading (Bottom-Up)

Ladrech (1994) argued that Europeanization occurs when EU political dynamics become part of the norms of domestic policy-making. He defined Europeanization as “(...) an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making” (p. 69). This seems to demand a process of 'downloading' or 'uploading'.

When talking about Europeanization, two different dimensions are suggested (Müller & Alecu de Flers, 2009; Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw, 2007):

1. Uploading dimension of Europeanization:

This particular dimension it is related “to the construction of European Foreign Policy. The outcome of Europeanization is the projection of national foreign policy preferences” (Müller & Alecu de Flers, 2009, p. 13). This dimension “(...) denotes the process of paying closer attention to Brussels.” (Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw,

2007, p. 3). As independent states abdicate partially of their sovereignty towards the European institutions, the expectation on a debate towards the power of the Union becomes ever more prominent.

In these circumstances, Europeanization supports the pursuit of national interests of member-states, which in turn, contributes to a Europeanization of the foreign policy of those same members. The design of European Foreign Policy preferences would flawlessly result in an adoption of policies on the member-states side. However, the reality appears to be quite different since "(...) Member-States will often inject their foreign policy preferences into EU-level negotiations" (Müller & Alecu de Flers, 2009, p. 14). Müller & Alecu de Flers (2009) argue that, that same institutionalization alongside the adoption and implementation of norms and values, that present themselves at the core of every member state, have impacted the 'environment of European foreign policy-making'.

The use of norm-based arguments may undoubtedly help to increase talks on such debate.

2. Downloading dimension of Europeanization:

This particular dimension "(...) refers to a top-down process where the state adapts to EU standards, norms, and institutions" (Müller & Alecu de Flers, 2009, p. 17). An example of guide-lines for policies adaptation is the ability to follow a common denominator objective, as well as the ability to ease off the national positions on determinate matters to integrate EU's institutions and policies;

This dimension implies "(...) taking account of what happens in other member states of the European Union." (Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw, 2007, p. 4). There is, therefore, a greater focus on debates of what occurs between member-states. This type of Europeanization is expected to take place as member-states present themselves ever more independently. Domestic factors are, in this situation, of the uttermost importance being that "(...) the size of a Member-State and the extent of a member-state's foreign relations network, as well as historically conditioned variables like national identity and strategic culture" (Müller & Alecu de Flers, 2009, p. 17)

Member-states that are considered 'bigger' and 'stronger' within the European Union are 'shapers not takers', it does not mean, however, that they are unaffected by the impact of the foreign policy adaptations. The contrary appears to happen in smaller member-states that have a restricted influence and power since the impact appears to be more extensive. "One way of linking the bottom-up and top-down dimension in the relationship between the EU and its Member States is to focus on the role of national governments as shapers and takers of EU policies." (Börzel, 2003, p. 3). Börzel (2003;

2011) accentuates that the question of shaping and taking constitutes a very important link between the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' dimensions of what are the member states response to Europeanization. However, member states are not just apathetic or uninvolved political bodies, a member can actively help reach and shape such policies and yet, still go through the process of adaptation. Not only do they have to adapt to policies but also to the pressure from the EU.

We can state three different degrees of domestic change, according to Börzel & Risse (2003, pp. 69-73):

1. Absorption: there is an assimilation on the member-states part of European policies into their own structures. Nevertheless, there is not a significant alteration of their policies, institutions, or processes. The level of domestic change is low
2. Accommodation: the pressure that derives from Europeanization causes member-states to accommodate policies, institutions, and processes without making significant changes to their own. The level of domestic change is modest.
3. Transformation: there is a complete replacement of policies, institutions, and processes for new ones, or a complete change to the existing ones. The level of domestic change is high.

1.2.2 Structural mechanisms of Europeanization

During the 1990s, scholars started becoming rather interested in how the European process and institutions affect member states. Changes started occurring when the focus and foremost objective of study went from the established physical borders of the EU from the impact that such governance can reach beyond its own borders (Schimmelfennig, 2010). It was also during this period that the efforts of European integration and how member states adapt to Europe, were considered to be a top-down process "whereby stimuli and commitments that emerge from the EU level produce changes of various aspects at a national level" (Müller & Alecu de Flers, 2009, p. 6). When European governance becomes aware, one thinks of the implemented mechanisms that are put in place to regulate the behaviour of actors in the most different areas. "(...) the EU, indeed, seeks to project its model of governance beyond its borders. This model consists in a combination of regional integration, a multilaterally regulated international market, and

liberal democracy – together with a myriad of policy-specific rules based on its *acquis communautaire*” (Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 7)

The mechanisms that made Europeanization possible can be divided into two groups (Schimmelfennig, 2010, pp. 8-10):

Direct mechanisms: “(...) are those in which the EU takes a pro-active stance and intentionally seeks to disseminate its model and rules of governance beyond its borders” (p. 8).

1^o Conditionality: at its basis is the manipulation of other actors pending cost-benefits calculations. The EU looks to spread its governance model and rules, which are established as conditions that member-states must fulfil, whether it would be in order to be praised or not to be disciplined. The 'accession conditionality' is a powerful tool used by the Union and their respective institutions, as a sort of coercion means in order for member-states to adapt the *acquis communautaire* of the EU. The demand to better improve the integration process, and governance has, over time, been achieved (Börzel., 2011). The ENP² is one of the several tools that the Union has offered, through this policy, at its disposal that geographically integrates the eastern 'neighbourhood', a 'ring of friends' that board the EU (Johansson-Nogués, 2017).

2^o Socialization: the EU persuades its member-states to adopt its own ideals at its core. In preference of manipulating or affecting cost-benefit calculations, the Union instils in the external actors the principles and rules at the core. External actors can adopt principles and rules if they acknowledge European authority. "A process characterized by deliberation and frequent as well as dense contacts between the EU and external actors is also thought to help." (p. 9)

Indirect mechanisms: “(...) are those in which either non-EU actors have the active part or the mere presence of the EU generates unintended external effects.” (p. 8)

1^o Externalization: “(...) works through the EU’s indirect impact on the cost-benefit calculations of external actors” (p. 9). Here, the EU does not promote its rules or principles beyond their respective borders. Dismissing or violating the EU's rule would bring costs to the external actors.

² European Neighbourhood Policy. Through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was revised in November 2015, the EU works with its Southern and Eastern Neighbours to foster stabilization, security, and prosperity, in line with the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. The ENP translates the EU's wish to build on common interests with partner countries of the East and South and commitment to work jointly in key priority areas, including in the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. To further information see the official page of ENP https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en [Accessed 21st of April 2020]

2^o Imitation: "(...) works similarly but without a pro-active role of the EU" (p. 10)
External actors mimic the model of governance mostly because they recognize its rules and policies as adequate solutions to the obstacles that appear.

The question is no longer if Europe matters but in what way it matters, to what degree and direction, at what pace or period of time. "A strong Europe does not simply imply maximizing territory, centre building, adaptation of national and sub-national of governance and export of European models" (Olsen, 2002, p. 941). A balancing act between the different member-states can only be possible through the application of a 'network model' of governance characterized by complexity. Graziano & Vink (2013) concur that generated adaptation or lack of it on European policies depends on the fit or misfit between the domestic framework and the institutions at a European level.

CHAPTER 2.

European Union as a Global Actor

Ever since its creation, the European Union has been the subject of an intense debate in relation to what kind of actor it would be, or the role it would, therefore, play in the International System.

Famous expressions such as “*Who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?*” by Kissinger³ (Baneth, 2016). “*An economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm*”, said by Mark Eyskens⁴ (Whitney, 1991). “*An unidentified political object*” alluded Jacques Delors⁵ (1985, p. 2). “*Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus*” declared Robert Kagan (2002, p. 1). Ginsberg (1999) describes it as “*neither a state nor a non-state actor (...) neither a conventional international organization nor an international regime (...)*” (p. 432). They represent just a few remarks from the still ongoing debate that was created around the EU’s *actorhood* and its place in world-politics.

To understand the European Union, we must, consequently, try to understand the concept of *actorhood*.

2.1 The concept of “Actorhood”

For many years, the European Union was nowhere near the focus of theorists of International Relations, because it could not be accommodated with the already established actors (Tonra, 2008). However, through time the Union managed to abolish certain preconceptions about the kind of actors that can be a part of the global system and, in that way, be a pioneer in the International Liberal Order⁶ established.

³ ‘*Who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?*’ One of the best-known remarks about the EU is the saying attributed to Henry Kissinger, a remark made while he was still Secretary of State (1973-1977). <http://www.baneth.eu/2016/08/10/kissinger-and-the-eu-phone-number-2/> [Accessed 25th of September, 2019]

⁴ ‘*An economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm*’. Then former Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eysken, in relation to the start of the Gulf War (1990-1991). <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html> [Accessed 25th of September, 2019]

⁵ ‘*An unidentified political object*.’ On 9 September 1985, President of the European Commission at the time, Jacques Delors, delivers a speech at the first Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Luxembourg where he uses the this, now, famous expression. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/423d6913-b4e2-4395-9157-fe70b3ca8521/publishable_en.pdf [Accessed 31st of September, 2019]

⁶ International Liberal Order. The rule-based established Liberal Order at the end of WWII is a by-product of the Bretton Woods Conference. Based on principles, such as open markets, liberal democracy and multilateral

When Robert Schuman, at the time French Foreign Minister presented the famous Schuman Declaration⁷, on the 9th May 1950, it was not only to prevent an interstate war between the European countries but also to ensure the long-lasting peace that the European continent needed (The Robert Schuman Foundation, 2011). The process was to happen through interregional integration, mainly political and economic, between the European states that later resulted in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Fast-forward seventy years and a high level of political and economic integration has been achieved, and the European Community, transformed now into the European Union, constituted, at this moment, by 27 members-states. Leading by example and not by force has appeared to be one of the Union's great priorities in order to ensure its external image as a benign actor (James & Maclean, 2005 (a)).

Christopher Hill (1993) believes that the current debate surrounding the EU is related to a "capability-expectations gap", simply because there is a limited capacity, on EU's part, to fulfil the expectation that were put upon itself.

By just existing, the EU, due to its size, whether it is economical and demographical it has an impact on the world-politics. C. Bretherton and J. Vogler (1999) advance three main aspects in order to relate it to the concept of *actorness*:

- Opportunity: "(...) denotes the external environment of ideas and events—the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction." (p. 22) This means that there is a series of factors that constrict actorness in the external environment.
- Presence: "(...) the ability to exert influence externally; to shape the perceptions, expectations, and behaviour of others." (p. 24). Presence reflects two sets of factors within itself:
 - Character and identity of the EU: it refers to its political system and common institutions. It demonstrates the fundamental core and nature of the EU.
 - External consequences of the EU internal priorities: here, it is exposed to the fact that its internal priorities and initiatives can generate the most varied assortment of responses.

institutions https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gj3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf [Accessed 31st of September, 2019].

⁷Robert Schuman proposed the idea to have French and German coal and steel production under a common High Authority, which in turn would lead to the creation of common interests between European countries. This would, then, lead to gradual political and economic integration. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en [Accessed 5th of October, 2019]

- Capability: “(...) refers to the internal context of EU action or inaction—those aspects of the EU policy process which constrain or enable external action and hence govern the Union's ability to capitalize on the presence or respond to opportunity.” (p. 28)

The EU, already being a small world-version, can have relevant experience in how the relations between different actors occur. If its levels of actorness could be increased in different parts of the world, and countless fields, then, such influence would allow them to influence the International System to their interest through the interregional and pluralist framework built on democracy, equality, and international law (Synnestvedt, 2014). Furthermore, even after all the efforts, when we talk about the European Union's role in the global governance is perhaps wise to say that there has, apparently, been a misconception or even miscalculation around its relevance and how it is presented in the literature. "It is because foreign policy is widely associated with nation-states that the EU is overlooked as an international political actor by many who study international relations" (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 12). Ginsberg (1999) also emphasizes two crucial features. The first feature is related to the overwhelming influence of the traditional state-centric approaches, which has undoubtedly shaped the perception of researchers. The second feature is related to the fact that there is a tendency to limit external activities to what is considered *high politics*, and many believe that the EU might be less effective upon those areas.

Based on internal and external perception and institutionalization we can distinguish five requirements of actorness (Wunderlich, 2008):

1. Internal identity/ self-perception

Recognition and identification are both part of the concept of identity. This image is primarily constituted by the "self-image" and "self-perception" as well as how others perceive the Union. Identity becomes, therefore, a crucial link between the actors that compose the International System and the interests that actors have on their agenda. Consequently, such actions by the actors that constitute the international system will help define the international order. In this case, the EU perceives its identity based on certain values, principles, shared norms, and political culture.

2. External recognition

While we saw the creation of an identity above, the recognition of the EU as an "active" actor in the International System is still a very current discussion. For example, it would not be possible, at the moment, for the Union to have a permanent seat in the

Security Council of the UN, since its member-states remain sovereign actors, which means that the EU's capacity to take action in any matter as a whole is restricted. Despite all sorts of obstacles that have plagued its external recognition, the European Union has managed to gain, or extend such recognition very effectively.

3. International presence

The International presence is undoubtedly related to the surrounding external environment. It can be said that the EU has been instrumental in the shaping of global governance and in certain vital organizations that nowadays have pivotal roles in the world. "The EU acts as a coherent organization on the behalf of its member-states but also side-by-side with them" (p. 26).

4. Institutionalization

Through its evolution, the Union was able to create institutions, policy-making processes, and structures. The current structure that the EU holds "(...) is the outcome of the complicated compromise between state-centric and supranational ideas" (p. 27). Institutions like the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Justice, and many others have created a distinct profile and identity for the Union while helping to create a more tangible position in the *actorness* debate.

5. A set instrument and policy-making procedures.

For quite a long time, the EU was not seen as a real actor in the International system, since for a realist, state-centric, and power-searching world, the Union lacked, perhaps, one of the most important set of instruments: military power instruments. Nevertheless, the EU has other instruments, the most used by them are of economic and diplomatic character, from persuasion to coercion. Persuasion implies a great deal of cooperation with different actors to obtain the desired outcomes, whatever they are. Coercion, on the other hand, involves the threat of the use of the most various punishments if one is non-compliant and a single sovereignty.

There is, however, very little belief that an actor can be efficient if he himself does not possess military capabilities. "Because the EU is not a state and it does not have the same capabilities that states have, or not at least all of them, it is seen as unable to act as a coherent and powerful foreign policy players" (Keisala, 2004, p. 7).

The EU created a new structure and, in the midst of it, all defied the conception of the Westphalian state. This affected and still is, affecting the international system as we know it. In order to play such a global role as the European Union desires it needs to increase its actorness and "(...) attain the status of an actor capable of making more autonomous foreign policy decision" (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005, p. 2).

2.2 Normative Power

The 'Normative Power framework', which was steadily developed by the EU over the years, has at its basis, the norms and values of the Union's foreign policy. Manners (2002) believes that the normative identity created by the EU presented within the *acquis politique* and the *acquis communautaire* five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Manners (2002) also believes what distinguishes the EU from other hegemonic actors in the international system is its "(...) commitment to universal rights and principles" (p. 241).

The EU was capable of constructing its own self-image and, at the same time, attained a considerable, and consistent, way to spread its norms and values. Change is necessary and essential to normative power, especially change through adaptation. "The three-constituent part of 'Normative Power Europe' are all truly mega-phenomena: 'Europe'; 'norms'; and 'power'" (Gerrits, 2009, p. 7). The nature of the EU's normative power emphasises the existing difference between traditional forms of power and the normative construction. Normative power Europe is about ideational power, a normative justification about the adoption of norms, leaving behind force and coercion it is 'power over opinion' (Manners, 2002).

Thus, Bengtsson & Elgström (2012) reiterate that "(...) not all actors that want to be normative great-powers are seen as such by outsiders. An actor attempting to be a normative great power may hold a role conception as ethically and normatively superior, but this need not be mirrored by others role expectations. The policy instruments used in the process of normative power projection can be of material and immaterial kind, or more concretely, civilian as well as military in character." (p. 95). While there is not a factual rejection of military power and its effects, Diez (2005) and Manners (2002; 2006; 2009) believe that in order for the EU to maintain such distinct identity there is no need for military power, preferring to favour normative and civilian instruments at its disposal.

Since when speaking of civilian power, the most important aspect is the aptitude to 'use civilian instruments', for normative power it is "(...) the ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations" (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Manners (2002; 2006; 2009) echoes, throughout his academic writings, that the EU's biggest asset is the ability to define what becomes "normal" in international politics. The simple existence of the EU in a sovereign state-dominated world-politics, challenges the perception of 'normal', and by doing so, it changes the expectancy in a state-centered system.

By diffusing its norms and values the EU presents an image of a "normative power 'civilizing' the external environment" (Zielonka, 2013, p. 35) and, therefore, should be

regarded as an empire, a normative one, attempting to “(...) stabilize the periphery, to draw economic advantages from it, to export the imperial order and cultivate elites there” (Del Sarto, 2016, p. 216).

A vast amount of literature on the matter has sought to comprehend the international role of the EU as a new kind of actor. Its role is a culmination of the actor it represents, the idea of the EU as a civilian power can also be represented, much like a normative power, in the various actions that the Union carried out at a global level, thus, there is the need to understand the ‘civilian’ characteristics of this international actor.

2.3 Civilian Power

The debate on the subject started in the 1970s when François Duchêne presented the notion of 'civilian power Europe' giving the EU, from there forth a new conceptual significance while presenting it with a potentially distinctive role. Civilian power, much like other powers, is about exerting influence. "Its objective is the civilianization of the international environment, which means that through a process similar to the civilianization within nation-states, the use of military force is tamed in order to guarantee the rule of law, prosperity and legitimate governance" (Tewes, 2002, p. 11)

While Duchêne was one of the prominent advocates of the 'civilian power Europe', Hedley Bull (1982) was one of the most frivolous critics of such notion. The central criticism component was rested upon the fact that "(...) the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control" (p. 151)

In addition, the lack of a 'single' European actor in favour of a conglomerate of states is also a critic. Bull (1982) continuously affirms that the only way to define the concept of 'actorness' within the realm of European borders is for the EU to acquire military capabilities stating that "(...) there is a need for the European allies at least to acquire a greater element of self-sufficiency in providing for their defence, and to establish that this is the broad direction in which they are seeking to move" (p. 152). Yet, Bull (1982) makes it quite clear that the defence policy would become a source of vulnerability if there were a supranational authority in that area, rather than an advantage because loyalty to make war lies with nation-states. The materialization of a military capacity on the EU's part would portray a mutation upon which the concept of civilian power was founded and preserved. Something that occurs out of necessity is transformed into a virtue (Orbie, 2006).

In contrast with previous views, Galtung (1973) believed that the EU was a superpower, and within the *Pax Bruxellana*, where a clear effort to create a world where the EU has a centre part. Its upcoming power was characterized as having:

- Resource power: it is related to other hegemonic actors and its power that prevailed at the time.
- Structural power: the promoted international structures by the EU that are instruments of this power

Karen Smith (2005) distinguishes between 'exercising' civilian power and 'being' a civilian power. The first concept of 'exercising' civilian power "(...) relates to the means (or

policy instruments) that an actor uses to try to exercise influence (p. 64). 'Being' a civilian power means that "(...) there is a difference between civilian means and military means: civilian is non-military, and includes economic, diplomatic, and cultural policy instruments; military is, well, military, and involves the use of armed forces." (ibid).

The military instruments that are embedded in civilian power take the attention off other vital aspects such as member-states and the ineffectiveness to reach agreements causing foreign policy to be ineffective as well (Özer, 2012). The compliance and incentives to develop military capabilities can reiterate the question of EU's true intentions since there is a possibility that that same military power could be used to target them (Smith., 2000). Both conceptualization of normative and civilian power is tributary of the constructivist theory (Wendt, 1992) in the realm of International Relations.

CHAPTER 3.

European Union as a 'modern-world Empire.'

3.1 The concept of Empire

The terminology of “Empire” as presented itself, over time, quite challenging.

The unfavourable connotation that the word ‘Empire’ holds has often posed a question of the *sui generis* and its exceptionality (Behr & Stivachtis, 2016). “Empire represents a type of political organization in which the metropolis exercises control over diverse peripheral actors through formal annexations and/or various forms of informal domination.” (Zielonka, 2016, p. 45). As an empire, it attempts to have control, whether that would be politically, economically, or any other way, over the numerously different peripheral territories. This occurrence is more noticeable in the immediate neighbourhood. However, none of the countries in the 'neighbourhood' were conquered in the traditional sense, they were invited, which they accepted eagerly. One can simply say that the policies adopted by the EU appear to be guided by self-interest. Taking us back to a time where most of the ancient empires throughout history have been the consequence “(...) of military conquest, incorporating the vanquished states into its political union.” (Stivachtis, 2016, p. 77).

An empire can also encompass regions that are not in reach of the territory of a state. When the empire discourse arises words such as “imposition” or “force”, for instance, are the ones that come to mind. The notion that the defining components of empires is their capability to ‘govern from a distance’ (Behr, 2016). Nonetheless one wonders how that can be achieved.

Those who anguish in the idea of the EU as an empire use the argument that the most pivotal and significant characteristic of empires has been, throughout history, territorial conquest through the use of military power. Since the EU does not present such dazzling military capacities and power, they argue, the Union cannot be considered an empire. It is normally due to the enlargement, and consequentially, the ENP that the empire discourse emerges towards the EU (Gravier, 2011). Quite contrary to one’s thought-process, the project of European integration consolidated itself through the assimilation of states that were ‘keepers’ of sizable wealth and power. It was only with its expansion to the South and later on to the East that the EU started to integrate states that would bring a bigger discrepancy between the centre and the periphery (Zielonka, 2008).

The constant discussion of what kind of power the EU holds or the nature of that same power is also a concern. Legitimacy of the EU as an international actor comes through the promotion of norms and values. However, while there is a belief that this behaviour can demonstrate its actions to be those of an agent of good governance, democratization and peace, there are those that believe that the EU, which holds an ample amount of power, is an actor whose policies are implemented to determine international behaviour and, therefore, are capable of dictating international rules legitimately, and impose constraints on other sovereign actors if they so wish (Stivachtis, 2018). The issues of democracy it is also very prominent since it is connected to legitimacy. “In order to foster their legitimacy, empires worked on developing a common identity throughout their territory and justified it as a mission of civilization in their peripheries.” (Gravier, 2011, p. 417)

The study of empires "(...) demands a focus of the scope and structure of governance, the nature of borders, center-periphery relations and respective civilizing missions" (Zielonka, 2012, p. 506). Valuing the periphery is essential since many of the times, they are able to drag the center into their conflicts. Empires also believe that the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs, unlike Great Powers, is questionable because, according to Zielonka (2012; 2016), many times, empires do not possess permanent borders. While Great Powers put a bigger emphasis on sovereignty and territoriality, empires have the capacity to account for non-definitive borders, informal hierarchies, and a dependency of center-periphery relations. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the study of empires could help to understand many aspects of the modern-day international system.

Rather than having a similar structure to old empires, the European Union as a kind of polycentric governance where its instruments are more of an economic and political nature than military. “Its territorial acquisitions take place by invitation rather than conquest” (Zielonka, 2008, p. 475). Such imperialistic tendencies are, possibly, seen on the enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement, in its core, is nothing more, or so it appears, than establishing power and asserting it too through economic and political means on what are considered more ‘fragile’ zones. These countries, who belong to the neighbourhood, were not conquered in the traditional sense, instead they were invited to be part of the EU, which they eagerly accepted (Zielonka, 2008; 2012; 2016). There is, thus, a strategic leverage on the EU's part that will significantly serve its own interests (Browning, 2017).

We often mention or focus a great part of our attention on the tremendous economic role the EU plays in the world, but the fact is that the Union is much of a global

security actor, as is economical. Since it leads several missions of Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and even Peace-Enforcement all over the world alongside with the R2P⁸. Perhaps the 'exportation' of its governance system through the neighbourhood and the world with the skilful use of the membership is an essential aspect of its foreign policy as well. An impressive exercise in empire-building (Zielonka, 2006). A staggering record of military and external political interventions does not make them doubt the mission's intention since the Union believes it is not only its responsibility to ensure peace and to ensure the stability in the areas that are key to the EU stability itself (Forsberg & Haukkala, 2018).

The polycentric system of governance that assists them greatly in diffusing internal conflicts, many times seen as a benign actor, it is rarely deterred any kind of external behaviour. The complex intergovernmental negotiations in the EU decision-making process ensures a certain degree of difficulty in making some bold, and perhaps even hot-headed, decisions (Stivachtis, 2018).

Different types of instruments will fit different aspirations of imperialism. There is, however, a distinction that needs to be done about the types of empires (Böröcz, 2016):

- Contiguous empires: Also known as 'land-based empires' are known for their hierarchical structure and the political authority where their imperial possessions are a continuous streak of ink spreading through a map. Its internal structure presents itself as concentric.
- Overseas empires: those are considered to be a European creation, a product of the colonial system. They are a linkage between a posthumous colonial power and its colonial possessions.

Böröcz (2016), maintaining the same train of thought states that within the EU, there are some connections to both types of empires. Since the conception and overall creation of the EU was "(...) a supra-state public authority whose key members were deeply enmeshed in the colonial empire (...) were colonial powers when they established the EU." (p. 65).

⁸ Responsibility to Protect. Is it a political commitment to put an end towards the various forms of violence as well as an attempt to reduce the gap that exists between the existing obligations that are under the international humanitarian and human rights law of the EU Member-States and the day to day life of the population the is endangered by threat such as crimes against humanity, risk of genocide, war crimes, and many more. <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml> [Accessed 24th of April, 2020]

Empires, more often than not, have three strategies that can be used together (Marks, 2011):

Accommodate: "(...) that is, allow the community a measure of self-rule in exchange for some share of its financial, physical or human resources" (p. 5). Considered the engine of the empire, this sort of indirect rule explains the speed and growth of imperial expansion. Since empires can grow mostly by acquiring vast geographical areas by war or even diplomacy. Imperial expansion and accommodation can be seen as a continuous negotiation, not a terminated deal. Its main units, the member-states are a great part of it. Combining the most diverse population into a community by a series of legal systems, industrial relations, welfare, economic regulations, and many more.

Eliminate: "(...) that is, destroy the community by dispersing, enslaving or killing its members" (p. 5). This variant has also played an important role in the creation of empires. Firstly, it has been a critical part in use to punish those who rebel or strike against the established order. Secondly, the defeat and destruction of communities in order to occupy and exploit the land. Empire-building often requires the use of decisive force against people that occupy the land. Eastern Europe is the perfect example since many of its communities have been in conflict and annihilated each other for a long time.

Assimilate: "(...) that is, incorporate the community or its leaders by inducing them to identify with the empire" (p. 5). Assimilating is the most practical way of getting established members to be inclusive and be receptive of those new members. This is also a great opportunity for the alleged empire to grow in scale while obtaining more resources, presenting us with a sort of snowball effect, which means that by growing in size, it would gain more resources to keep conquering, and that would become a full circle effect. In the EU, the assimilating process is more of a combination of a 'dual local-imperial identity', not erasing in the process, the previous identity that the states had. In the Union, the rules of assimilation are set out in various treaties, thus, any state that wishes to be a part of it, must adopt a set of pre-existing rules.

The diversity presented of the mention of regional cooperation can be presented as either "complementary or competing" (Telò, 2016, p. 3).

3.2 Hegemony or Empire?

“The term hegemony originating from ancient Greek ‘hegemonia’ literally expresses the dominant status of one element in the system over the others.” (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 194). Originally used to classify the relations between what were at the time the city-states in Athens, the term is, later on, used to describe colonial empires, the domination of France during the Napoleonic rule, and more currently, the hegemonic rule that the US detain over the international system through its dominance of world politics, economics and culture to an unprecedented level. This supremacy bringing them closer to the status of imperial powers, blurring the lines between these two concepts (Doğan, 2011).

While various authors focus on different aspects of hegemonic rule, the core concept remains that of an actor who is noticeably more powerful than the other actors and whose lead the latter follows. Destradi (2008) sees the concept as “(...) a form of power exercised through strategies which are more subtle than those employed by states behaving as imperial powers.” (p. 10). However, the ambiguity of the concept is still very present, a fact which certainly does not help reducing it to a simpler definition (Doyle, 1986).

Hegemony focuses greatly on dominance (Dirzauskaite & Ilinca, 2017). That is made clearer through the geostrategic position of hegemonic powers, such as the EU, that has become an important aspect of the power dynamics that occur in the International System. Hegemony, much like the concept of 'empire' in social sciences, is conceptualized through the similarities found in the discussion of the concepts. Hence, the vital aspect of understanding hegemony as “(...) the exercise of leadership which is and has to be accepted by those led entails, furthermore, a differentiation between dissimilar sub-global spheres.” (Prys & Robel , 2011, p. 268)

The global sphere of the concept is differentiated into four different types (Prys & Robel , 2011):

- Hegemonic state: Has its place at the centre of the sphere. “Its decisions determine, to a certain but rarely irrelevant extent, the existence of the other states in the system and the room for other states to manoeuvre.” (p. 268).
- Hegemonic 'inner circle': Here, the 'inner circle' decided what will be foreign policy agreements and the way that they will be implemented. There is a homogenous when it comes to the inner circle, they are the countries elites "Here, ‘self-restraint of power’ (...) is comparatively high; not only do

military interventions by the hegemon not occur, they seem unthinkable.” (p. 269).

- Hegemonic 'outer circle': The states that constitute it are undoubtedly less hegemonic in their power, such as developing nations, yet they appear to be fully integrated in what is the basic interpretation of the inner circle. Countries such as Brazil, Russia, Iran, and many more are those that constitute the outer circle.
- Outcasts: Here are included the states that are evil, or deceiving states in the eye of the international system. Pariahs, basically, of the international scene, such as Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and many more. "It is no coincidence that these 'outcast states' are quite frequently demonized by significant parts of the foreign policy establishment of the hegemonic state” (p. 269/270).

There are three main distinguishable similarities between how the two concepts are seeming. The first is a clear centre-periphery dichotomy. Doyle (1986) determined that imperial powers assume control of other regions by annexing a peripheral state, naming a governor obedient to the metropole, and reforming the state apparatus into one consisting of metropolitan bureaucrats. It is well known that the EU lacks means of traditional coercion, hence the reliance on a network composed of its Member-States and other relevant parties. One of the biggest keys to the success of the European project was being able to prove that its "(...) legal output is done through a network-based system of executive arrangements" (Böröcz, 2016, p. 67).

Upon the dissolution of the old European empires, all, except the British colonies, were left with a political void which was quickly filled by dictatorships. This puts the British Empire between a formal empire and an informal one, as we are about to see. Informal empires exercise control by subjugating the existing state apparatus through the means of bribes, blackmailing, and other such practices, thus gaining command of a legally independent peripheral regime (Doyle M. , 1986). Hegemonic powers, much like imperial ones, will, in order to subjugate a state, to their own, will use the most assorted array of instruments and tactics, whether it presents internal or external consequences. A second similarity is the exportation of norms and values from the centre to the periphery. Through the willing embedment of traditions, governance institutions and structures, their language and culture, the periphery that saw itself distanced from the centre becomes ever closer until it becomes a vital and integrative part of the hegemon's empire, much like what has occurred over the years in the EU's periphery. The third and last

similarity is the ability to maintain control and stability over the territory in question, meaning that there needs to be a careful distribution of power (Ougaard, 1988).

Chase-Dunn & Grimes (1995) go even further and portray the clearest distinction between what is a hegemonic and imperial power: “Empire formation was a matter of conquering and exploiting adjacent core states by means of plunder, taxation, or tribute. The rise of modern hegemony has not occurred in this way. Instead, modern hegemony sought to control international trade, especially oceanic trade, that linked cores with peripheries” (p. 411).

3.3 EU and the geopolitical interests in the 'neighbourhood.'

Conceived after the 2004 enlargement, the ENP had the main function of not forming borders between the EU member states and the countries in its 'neighbourhood'. Countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, State of Palestine, Morocco, Syria, Libya, in the South and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine in the East.

Based on Copenhagen Criteria, the conditionalities of policies that constitute the EU and the rules that are at its core, are a key factor in the obtaining of membership. Moreover, conceivably, the first kind of horizon, or boundary, that comes to one's thought are geopolitical ones, mainly prompted by external stimulus and the respective responses of each intervenient actor. Even though there is the idea of a 'ring of friends' upon the creation of such policy, surely the displays in the neighbourhood that predeceased the establishment of this policy make many question the intentions of the Union towards it (Gänzle, 2008).

There is a clear and strict interpretation that the EU exudes towards the borders that shares with the 'neighbourhood' and the states it wants to include in it. When identity is constructed upon a space, it is impossible to avoid the discussion of borders. "Borders delimit individual spaces, but they are not just lines on a map. They represent complex institutions determining the link between the territory, authority, and rights." (Zielonka, 2016, p. 238). Borders, in a global era, present themselves as one of the key concepts in the international system. Through the years, the EU has transformed into a global actor, since its creation, and so have its security concerns towards the neighbourhood. "Accompanying this internal consolidation/integration, periodic expansion of the EU's external borders to incorporate European states (usually) contiguous to the EU has occurred over the years" (Armstrong, 2007, p. 1).

The Union, with a great support of its geographical position, has used its borders to generate a singular identity in the hegemonic realm of states that are a part of the international system as well as create authenticity through projects such as the ENP. The using of borders to present a one-of-a-kind identity has allowed the Union through its geography and projects, such as the ENP, to achieve authenticity as an international actor. Nitoiu & Sus (2018) accentuate that through EU institutions, the norms and values that present themselves in the core of the Union now have a universal frame that allows them to promote them throughout the world.

While there is a denial on the EU's part of kind of geopolitical interest when dealing with the heterogeneity of actors that are represented in the international system, it can become harder to, perchance, refute when there is a geopolitical core to its actions. Traditional forms of geopolitical instruments, that have, in recent times, re-emerged due to its centrality in power politics discussion, should be understood through an evolutionary sort of thought process, since it does, after all, represent the progression of the Union growth and expansionary interests (Zielonka, 2006). Its geographical confinement between what are some of the most powerful hegemonic states in the world order induces an exportation of norms and values on the EU's part in order to assert its power and fulfil its interests. Meaning that "(...) the recent rise of more traditional forms of geopolitics in the discourse and actions of the EU merely represents a revision of the hybrid approach (to include both soft and more traditional aspects) than a clear attempt to replace it." (Nitoiu & Sus, 2018, p. 5). Nevertheless, the Union has seemed to understand that its policy towards the eastern neighbours is one of more competitiveness, not cooperation. Representing a white canvas when it comes to the embodiment of the imperial debate, the policy seeks to assert, and have fulfilled its internal and external objectives with an emphasis towards the enlargement policy that has, through the course of time positioned the EU vis à vis with hegemonic actors of the international system (Anderson, 2007)

There is, on the EU's part, an adamant denial when talking of 'spheres of influence' and their pursuit to control the 'neighbourhood' however, such actions can be disputed. Its primary instruments might not be of military calibre, but they are surely economical. Thus, becoming evident in the ENP "(...) a policy that manifests a particular geopolitical vision of how space beyond borders should be ordered" (Browning, 2018, p. 107).

The policy is thought to be considered an effort to contain the 'imperial paradigm' and to put on display a relationship with the 'neighbourhood' that presents itself void of any geopolitical interest (Schimmelfennig, 2012; Haukkala, 2008). One can say that, as far as a geopolitical depiction of the ENP, Houtum & Boedeltje (2011) call it "(...) the conditions with the three P's: Proximity, Prosperity, and Poverty." (p. 123) Proximity, "(...) defined as the historico-geographical dimension of nearness to the European Union" (ibid). Prosperity and Poverty "Tackling the root causes of economic vulnerability, political instability, institutional deficiencies, poverty and social exclusion to prevent political and economic destabilisation and political confrontation" (ibid).

Thus, the never-ending belief that an imperial impulse lies within the ENP. "As the imperial metaphor tends to suggest, the EU clearly has interests and ambitions beyond its current borders. This, however, does not yet make the EU any more imperial than any

other power, even small ones that also have international objectives.” (Forsberg & Haukkala, 2018, p. 255).

CHAPTER 4.

Constitutional overlook of the Union

4.1 European Union Treaties

The term "Europe" has a variety of meanings. "First, it is associated with the establishment of a political community or tier of government in competition with that of the nation-state. Any Union policy, procedure or institution is thus always evaluated for its effects on the autonomy of national administrations. Secondly it is associated with government policies that could not be secured by the nation-state alone (e.g. environment or trade liberalisation). They are, however, policies of the governments of the day and, inevitably, they will benefit some constituencies and disadvantage others. (...) The third association is that European union provides a context for debates about the nature of the state and national identity." (Chalmers, Davies , & Monti, 2010, p. 9).

The primary law of the European Union is offered in its constitutional treaties. Article 2 of the TEU states that: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail."

The Treaty of Paris, the first one to be signed in 1952 founded the European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC) Jean Monet and Schuman were inspiring figures for such project to succeed and for there to be a halt between the conflicts that existed between the countries over raw materials (Horspool & Humphreys, 2012; James & Maclean, 2005 (a)). In this treaty, a 'High Authority' that was constituted by a Council of Ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly, a Consultative Committee, and a Court of Justice was put in place.

It was given to the institutions, that were a central part of the community framework, a higher authority that later transformed in a supranational power by the treaties.

The Treaty of Rome, that came into force on January 1st, 1958, presented a period during where the EU had almost a *quasi*-constitutional status, a more 'realistic' version of the importance of national identity settled in that same year bringing a bigger emphasis on state's self-interest and economic concerns, an enlarged economic cooperation (Panizza, 2018). Being the founding Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC), which

later came to be known as the European Union, all the treaties that were posthumous to this had it at its basis. The treaty of Rome was extremely focused on economic cooperation, with a well-designed political vision in order to eliminate any sort of dividing barrier in order to bring unity to the European continent (James & Maclean, 2005 (b)). Signed in 1957, the Treaty of Rome was validated by six signatory countries: Italy, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and West Germany. It presented itself as a result of the action in the post- World War II action. The ECSC had previously opened the respective markets of steel and coal between all of those countries, many of the institutional structures presented in the ECSC were adopted by the EEC (James & Maclean, 2005 (a)).

Federalist and intergovernmental ideas were shared within the European Project such as "United States of Europe", as it was presented by Churchill and strongly forward driven by Jean Monet in the 1950s. Fundamentally an economic institution at its core, it was during the 1980s and 1990s that it comes to be the supranational model of European integration that is at the basis for the idea of a European Union in the 1990s (Winzen & Schimmelfennig, 2016).

The treaty of Rome established four core institutions:

- European Court of Justice
- Council of Ministers
- European Parliament
- European Commission

The establishment of a common market, which had the four freedoms at its basis (movement of capitals, goods, people, and services), was a tremendous idea that had a great impact on the Union. In the declaration of Robert Schuman on May 9th, 1950, the grandiose impact of such a project would become clear: "(...) Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first-place concern these two countries" (The Robert Schuman Foundation, 2011, p. 1).

In the mid-1980s, the EEC was no longer just a 'member club' (James & Maclean, 2005 (a)). It had, over time, integrated 12 members and despite the large number of directives and regulations, its implementation demonstrated to be a more difficult process since consensus was hard to obtain. The recommendations proposed by the British Commissioner Arthur Cook made more than 300 recommendations that would give origin

to the Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986, becoming effective in 1987. The SEA emerges as an amendment attempt to the Treaty of Rome and its writings. The goal was to create a single European Market in 1992. And effectively by 1992, the European Single Market had been created. Nevertheless, on the one hand, there is the belief that the SEA presented the vision of Europe where integration had spread to a large number of areas. On the other hand, with the creation of the Single Market in 1992, there was the idea that Europe had shifted its focus (James & Maclean, 2005 (c)).

Ever since the early 1990s, there has been clear differences amongst the European integration process. "This period has been characterized by a far-reaching extension of the European Union's (EU) policy scope beyond the internal market, a progressive deepening of its competences, above all in monetary policy and justice and home affairs, and by more than a doubling of its membership (from 12 to 28)" (Winzen & Schimmelfennig, 2016, p. 1)

The Treaty of Maastricht served not only as an amendment of the Treaty of Rome while establishing the agenda settings in the SEA for deepening what was the political union of Europe. Internal affairs, foreign affairs, and economic relations became the three pillars, creating officially the European Union, and it initiated the process of establishment for the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), which would be responsible for the creation of the Euro. The TEU "(...) was simply the by-product of the establishment of an internal market. The TEU marked very definitely a change in tone. It created a new form of political project, which included, to be sure, an amount of arcane detail, but also marked out a new form of polity, which has its own set of political values and political communities" (Chalmers, Davies , & Monti, 2010, p. 23).

Two separate intergovernmental conferences, one to discuss the monetary union and the other to discuss the political union, were arranged, and after extensive negotiations, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992. Its major tasks were not only the deepening process of integration and the widening process of EU responsibilities. In order to create the EU (James & Maclean, 2005 (f)).

The *acquis comunitaire* is the basis for the EU external action, the EU values and their 'constitutionalizing' end up, many times, developing its own external dimension, in which nonetheless, a clear attempt to transfer its own rules to other countries or international organization (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009).

If the internal market and the EMU, were to be the main achievement of the SEA and Maastricht, the Amsterdam's Treaty biggest achievement was, thus the Area of Freedom (Chalmers, Davies , & Monti, 2010). Being the third major amendment to the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997, it also made an attempt of

completing issues such as the Schengen Convention, that was to be included in the treaty of Maastricht but due to British opposition was put as an extra protocol. With the prospects of including former Soviet republics into the EU, the 'democratic deficit' was another drawback. There was a clear projection of the unity of Europe beyond the Iron Curtain, transforming the Schengen convention into a part of the EU's law, which originated open borders amongst the members (James & Maclean, 2005 (e)).

The term 'two speed Europe' gave origin to another ratification, amongst other needed amendments. The Treaty of Nice was, hence, signed on February 21st, 2001, coming into force on February 1st, 2003, and later came to be known as the "Amsterdam Leftovers" (Panizza, 2018). Once more, the treaty represented an attempt to move forward with the integration process and, thus, to prepare the Union for a possible new enlargement. There was a discussion surrounding the type of strategy that would be more beneficial, the supranational or intergovernmental model to run the EU.

The future of the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam had to be discussed, and so the reform of the European Council began, bringing disagreement between the three prominent leaders. First, French President, Jacques Chirac, wanted a restraining on the Commissions power, and more power to the European Parliament. Romano Prodi, at the time president of the European Commission, wanted the contrary. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer wanted a vision where the model created was more towards a European Federation (James & Maclean, 2005 (d)). Like it was emphasized, many of the matters that the Treaty of Nice discussed were surrounding the process of the decision-making. Extending QMV, brought upon the European Parliament the power to elect the Commission's President and sack commissioners if there is good reason for it.

The last of the constitutional treaties was the Treaty of Lisbon, officially signed in 2007, in order to consolidate what had previously been done. The Treaty of Lisbon gave the EU legal personality, giving them powers to perform in areas such as human rights, foreign policy, judicial policy, emphasizing the idea that a citizen of an EU member-state is an EU citizen. "If the ethos and symbolism of the Lisbon Treaty were different from the Constitutional Treaty, for the overwhelming majority of states, the institutional detail and extension of supranational competencies were not significantly so." (Chalmers, Davies, & Monti, 2010, p. 48).

The concern with the formation of a super-state led the EU to clarify that the treaty was just a pillar of cooperation. After some setbacks, it was the German Chancellor alongside the French President that in 2004 thought of other ways to explore the idea of introducing other types of constitutional provision. The issue persisted into 2007 and with all the 27 member-states agreeing on an Intergovernmental Conference where a new

reform treaty was to be drafted and signed in Lisbon. Since the Treaty had to be ratified by every member-state and with the rejection on Ireland's part, there were serious doubts about whether the treaty of Lisbon would ever be signed. After some negotiations, all member-states agreed to ratify the treaty (James & Maclean, 2005 (g)). Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was probably one of the biggest changes introduced by the treaty. Unanimity became impractical and also a concern. There was, thus, a wish after the EU reached 27 member-states, where new decision-making processes were needed. The Treaty of Lisbon moved to the Qualified Majority System. This process makes mandatory that the decisions are to be approved by a double majority where "(...) 55% EU member states (15 states), representing at least 65% of the EU's population." (James & Maclean, 2005 (g), p. 2).

4.2 Enlargement

March 25th of 1957, marked the day when the European project started with the six founding members and gave origin to what we know today as the European Union. A continent plagued by internal issues, conflicts, and where the two World Wars would have its origins. Countries would, then, come together in order to prepare for a better future (European Commission, 2011). From 6 to 28 countries, the EU manifests and presents itself as an unparalleled success and innovative project. The idea of integration was embraced by the six founding fathers (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg), abiding, therefore, to the commitment of promoting a strengthening of democratic institutions, liberty, peace, economic growth, stability, prosperity, democracy, and so many more (James & Maclean, 2005 (a)).

In order for the enlargement process to be beneficial not only to the countries in the process of becoming members, but also to the EU, the accession process needs to be done correctly. There is, thus, a pre-accession process in order to help the membership process of those countries. “At first, only Western Europe was able to benefit, but right when the impact of European integration on peace and prosperity in the region was beginning to be taken for granted, the challenge of expanding the mission to all of Europe presented itself.” (Emmert & Petrouif, 2014, p. 1351).

4.2.1 Negotiation path to membership

Article 49 of the TEU states that any country can apply to be a member, however, with it comes the respect for EU core principles of democracy, liberties, and human rights, as stated above. The Copenhagen summit in 1993 gave origin to the Copenhagen Criteria (also known as Accession Criteria):

“(a) have stable institutions that guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for protection of minorities,

(b) have a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU,

(c) possess the capacity to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union, and

(d) adopt the *acquis communautaire* (the entire European legislation) and ensure its effective implementation through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.”

What follows is an unbiased and a reasonable opinion on the approval or rejection for the EU to proceed with negotiations, it is called *avis*. “(...) *avis* is an advisory opinion

and not binding on the Council. In general, the Council follows the Commission, but sometimes it does not, usually for obvious political reasons.” (Emmert & Petrouif, 2014, p. 1357). The opening of negotiations, once agreed unanimously by the Council, is led by the Commission. Consequentially, once the country presents itself ready for admission and the Commission is satisfied, another *avis* is issued, a Treaty of Accession comes to be written. From there on, it follows to the European Parliament for approval.

The concept of Accession negotiations may be misleading, since it represents the ability to take the obligation of membership. Thus, the negotiation presents two distinct purposes: "On the one hand, the EU wants to ensure that the candidate country is "willing and able" to take on the obligations of membership. (...) On the other hand, the EU has to modify its own institutional structures to make room for the incoming Member State(s)" (Emmert & Petrouif, 2014, p. 1358). The adoption, implementation, and application of the EU's rules are, contrary to one's thought, unnegotiable. How and when they are to be adopted and implemented in the EU's core procedures are what members-to-be should be concern with. On the EU's part, guarantees and effectiveness are two important key parameters to obtain assurances upon the implementation process. In order to make the process easier, the negotiations are divided into "chapters", where each chapter has a corresponding policy area, there is 35 chapters in the *acquis* in total (European Commission, 2011).

The pace of negotiations where the EU member-states and the respective candidates are involved, depends much on the stability to implement the requirements in a timely manner. Some reform, however, due to the profound transformation of economic and political structures, may take a longer time to implement. Civil society and their support are, thus, essential in order to explain and clarify the reasons for the implementation of any reform (Schneider, 2009).

One can, thus, identify four phases in order to achieve membership (European Commission, 2011):

1. **Screening:** Analytical examination of the EU's *acquis* (also known as the EU law), is the preparatory phase for the accession negotiations. It is here that the European Commission works alongside candidate countries, allowing a familiarisation with EU law and a demonstration of their ability to present recommendations on whether a 'chapter' of the *acquis* needs further negotiations or to command that certain conditions and their implementations be made a priority, also known as "benchmarks". It is, then, left in the hands of the candidate country to emit a negotiation position. The Council, having by basis a Commission proposal chooses a common

position to adopt that in return will allow for the negotiation to open and proceeds;

2. **Pre-Accession Strategy:** Presents a 'structured dialogue' between EU institutions and the candidate countries where the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria is inherently obliged. This stage presents itself as a primary ground for the discussion of core aspects
3. **Accession Negotiations:** Accession negotiations with a candidate country will only begin once EU member-state governments, schedule a meeting that takes place in the European Council, unanimously agreeing to initiate the accession process. The negotiations materialize in intergovernmental conferences where member states and the respective candidate country are present. The implementation and adoption of the EU *acquis* and the conditions that the candidacy must oblige to are primordial topics of discussion. A draft accession treaty is made when both sides are satisfied with the *acquis* chapters.
4. **Membership:** If the 'golden triangle' of EU institutions approve the Accession Treaty and if it is ratified by the EU member-states, as well as, the respective candidate country then membership ensues. Here the candidate country is allowed to speak and comment on EU proposals, recommendations, initiatives but it has no formal vote, its status is of a formal observer to the European Union.

One must, however, emphasize the words denoted by Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2011) where the "(...) EU enlargement has far-reaching implications not only for the political shape of Europe but also for the institutional set-up and the major policies of the Community." (p. 501)

There are, in the enlargement process, several factors that contribute to difficult the process of negotiations. We can divide them into two categories (Grimm, 2019):

External constraints:

1. **Conflicting objectives:** the fostering of democratic institution-building and political actors, as well as the democratization process in general, is what the EU, through a variety of mechanisms, tries to achieve in any member-state that abides by the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the discussion of how that can be achieved is a whole different one.

"Consequently, the mismatched policy objectives of different actors serve to compromise democracy promotion" (p. 7)

2. **Hidden Agenda:** the problem with hidden agendas is not only related to democracy promotion. "At the same time, economic or security issues might be higher ranked on the policy agenda of external actors, what is, however, rarely explicitly revealed when democratization reforms are negotiated. Such hidden agendas also might negatively influence democracy promotion leverage." (p. 7)
3. **Lack of capacity:** There is the fact that "(...) external democracy promoters might suffer from poor capacity in the field." (p. 8). The frame presented to promote democracy is scarce in order to create deeper roots.

Domestic constraints:

1. **Domestic structure:** The process of democratization of a country would be done in the post-war conflict when a state presented itself in its most fragile state. Nowadays, any effort of democratization "(...) risk the transfer of cleavages amassed through violent conflict into the political realm" (p. 8), which in its turn can create political instability in institutions. 7
2. **Driving interests:** "As a consequence of diverging political, economic or social preferences, the attitude of domestic actors towards external demands for democratic reforms can range from very supportive to very critical" (p. 8). While the idea of democracy may be generally accepted, it is the reforms and their scope that can cause problems.
3. **Other domestic actors and veto players:** there are two distinct levels where domestic actors defend their interests "On the first level, the external-domestic interaction between external democracy promoters and domestic recipients (that are political actors such as governments, ministries, or parliaments) unfolds. (...) On the second level, domestic political actors have to interact and negotiate with domestic third-party actors (such as oppositional parties, political unions, civil society actors, and the like)" (p. 8). Without acknowledging the actors or the constraints that they debate themselves with demonstrating a discrepancy between what the domestic political arena is to the actors that are in it.

The *raison d'être* of the European Union in post-Cold War was enlargement, which has been an essential part of the identity that surrounds the Union (Phinnemore, 2006).

The question of why states would transfer part of their sovereignty for the sake of an international environment where cooperation is a crucial mechanism is for many baffling. Concepts such as 'widening' and 'deepening' where we have 'deepening' as being a process where a gradual and formal vertical institutionalization occurs, and 'widening' as being a process where a gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization occurs. In the first stage, "(...) EU member states expand the scope of their common interactions and organizational rules, and increase the number of policies that are decided on the intergovernmental and supranational level (Schneider, 2009, p. 34). Followed by the second stage "(...) in which new states accede and adopt the rules and practices of the Union" (ibid).

Geopolitical turmoil has, within the European Union, raised questions towards what is the identity and the role of the EU's space. Being a member of the Union is, undoubtedly, desirable, nonetheless, it is presented as such: "Although the discussion of what and who belongs to Europe is not new, the past decades have brought forth the possibility of witnessing its practical and everyday implications at the margins of the European Union beyond contingent political statements. Following the introduction of a European common market and accompanying the EU's fourth expansion in 1995, as well as the fifth and sixth expansions in Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, the respective European Commission strived for the construction of a common external border as a complementary instrument for abandoning internal border controls between the member states of the Schengen agreement." (Meyer, 2016, p. 24). The EU grew a strong desire to become a pinnacle of economic stability and with that came political stability. As a direct result of it, the enlargement process clearly emphasizes the economic and political benefits of membership. There is, therefore, two types of benefits when we talk of enlargement according to Schneider (2009). First, economic benefits. These translate into the elimination of barriers and tariffs in trade and a significant reduction of costs in the integration process. The access to growing markets will, in turn, increase imports and exports a clear change in the regularity system that presents itself as an efficient allocation of costs. Secondly, there is the aspect of political benefits. The most known is perhaps the reduction of negative externalities (non-member states can provoke economic and political spill-over effects that can be costly to EU members). There is also the idea that the EU members are more likely to promote the entries of equally democratic countries since they share the same values and norms at the EU's core, there is also the idea that they constitute a better choice because they are more likely to abide by its rules.

The accession process of new states affects how the institutional system would typically function with the accession process, the number of members in each institution will grow (European Parliament, 2019). However, the overall idea is that "(...) the various

EU enlargement rounds “succeeded” *despite* distributional conflicts because governments managed to redistribute EU enlargement gains (a) among the applicant countries and EU member states, and (b) from the relative winners to the relative losers among EU members.” (Schneider, 2009, p. 5).

4.3 Enlargement fatigue: the dilemma of the 'enlargement ad infinitum.'

Enlargement, is considered by today's standards, to be the most effective tool for the EU in the realm of their enlargement policy (Samardzija & Butkovic, 2014). Through peaceful means, enlargement has managed to fulfil the task it was created for, to deepen the integration amongst the continent. There is a long history of successful enlargements that constitute the EU today as we know it (European Commission, 2001). Nonetheless, a discussion of the 'enlargement fatigue' phase that the Union is currently enduring is needed.

The concept of 'enlargement fatigue' only became a part of the European lexicon after the failure of the French and Dutch Constitutional Treaties in 2005. 'Enlargement fatigue' is defined as "(...) as hesitance or unwillingness to grant the EU membership to new states as expressed in the interplay of 'wideners' and 'deepeners' in the context of an upcoming or just finalised enlargement round." (Szolucha, 2010, p. 5). The concept is not used to describe only past enlargements but also what can be possible future actions by the EU. There is, thus, a continuous debate between those that have incessantly supported the enlargement process, the 'wideners', and those that have worked alternative forms of integration in the EU, the 'deepeners' (Devrim & Schulz, 2009).

Members of small to medium size "(...) may lament the fatigue because it could, most likely, pertain to the reduced inner cohesion and inability to achieve consensus in the EU" (Szolucha, 2010, p. 2). On the other hand, the "(...) older members may perceive the enlargement fatigue as a chance to revitalise the original spirit of the Communities as a solely and somehow civilised European project evoking the importance of factors that led to the creation of the ECSC, namely geopolitical and strategic interests connected with the presumption of the unique and common European identity" (Szolucha, 2010, p. 3). The sharing borders, whether it be by sea or land, with an utter variety of countries, has allowed for the Union to obtain a strategic leverage through closer relations with the 'neighbours' (James & Maclean, 2006).

'Enlargement fatigue' also presents itself as reluctant in the support of the widening process, due greatly to the strategic interests of the member states. The accommodation of the 2004, and the following 2007, enlargements consequentially, demonstrated itself as exhausting primarily, because of an apathetic and contending public opinion (Börzel, Pamuk, & Stahn, 2008). The debate between 'widening' or 'deepening' had become very tempestuous, with the rejection of the entry of the United Kingdom by France twice in the

1960s demonstrated that De Gaulle concerns were not only towards the geopolitical configurations with the acceptance of the UK to the EEC and the accession process but also the finality that the process of European Integration would have towards the original members in the wake of such expansions. Later on, it was François Mitterrand who expressed this extinction towards countries like Greece, Spain, or even Portugal, and the same doubts persisted towards the eastern enlargement, believing that it could be a fountain of destabilization (O'Brennan, 2014).

Its values and norms and the EU's self-perception are what raise the question of 'rhetorical entrapment'. Szolucha (2010), one of the most prominent theoretical scholars on this matter, believes that the fatigue felt by the EU member states can be illustrated by three paradoxes:

1. "Schengen" Paradox: there is a close involvement of third-party countries in the complex process of 'deepening', thus, emphasising the need for commitment towards the EU's values and norms alongside a tighter integration process
2. "Insider/ Outsider" Paradox: the paradox corresponds to the different positions that an outsider (most likely a periphery country in the EU 'neighbourhood') that is not an EU member but suffers the spill over effects of the process
3. "Integration of a new country": the paradox greatly depends on the degree to which member-states identify with European norms and values as well as the existence of units that carry those same values, it means that the commitment of those countries will vary from one to another.

New rounds of enlargement are synonymous with new neighbours (Lavenex & Bicchi , 2015). The largest expansion of the EU was in 2004, bringing a lot of new neighbours to the EU's geopolitical map, which had to be re-drawn to present the new geopolitical changes in a continent where the division in the post-WWII period rearranged the International System. "The EU's interest in its neighbourhood automatically raises the question of the ENP's relationship with the enlargement process. In accordance with the intentions of its founders and the wishes of most of the EU's dominant actors, the ENP was explicitly conceptualized not as an accession instrument and is therefore considered distinct from the Enlargement Strategy. However, the distinction seems to have limits in theory as well as in practice." (Devrim & Schulz, 2009, p. 9)

The Enlargement Strategy Paper (2005) to answer their enlargement fatigue consists of three elements. First, it presents the candidate states with guidelines in the EU accession

process. Secondly, it emphasizes the advantages that come with enlargement, or the advantages that current member-states have by being a participant force in the EU. And lastly, it provides a much-needed explanation of the process and the finality of enlargement

There is the idea that while actual effects produced by the decision-making capacity produced by the EU might be small, it is, thus, the perceived effects that can have the longest consequences (Toshkov, 2017). Since, when there is a submission on an applicant countries part, it prompts a complex process and a series of sequential evaluation procedures in order to ensure the fulfilment of fundamental requirements. There needs to be an internalization of norms and rules that are at the core of EU institutions and its principles that has at the basis, a complex strategic calculation procedure on both integrated parts. (Archick & Morelli, 2014; Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich, & Maltby, 2013).

The fundamental idea that Kuss (2007) tries to impart is that “(...) the enlargement discourse is a hierarchical one, and that hierarchy is implicitly spatial and geographical. Making Europe 'whole and free', as the double enlargement is often described, invokes and inscribes the borders of Europe and Europeanness, the West, and Western values. Even as the Union is declared not to be a geographical unit but a community of values, there is intense concern about its borders and its sphere of influence.” (p. 155).

4.4 The Eastern Enlargement

Enlargement is seen as an inevitable event. “The supra-nationalists would see the first rounds of enlargement (‘widening’) as evidence of a step forward in European integration more generally and stimulating even ‘spill-over’ into new fields of integration like foreign policy (‘deepening’)” (Johansson-Nogus, 2015, p. 856).

When talks of enlargement towards the east of Europe started emerging, scholars were quick to point out that there would be two focal points in the discussion: “The first question was whether (and when) the EU should commit itself to Eastern enlargement in general. (...) The second issue concerned the selection of Central and Eastern European countries for accession negotiations” (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 49). Nevertheless, it presented itself as a historical opportunity. The sense of historical obligations towards the former soviet republics alongside the Commission's strategic action, helped candidate states to define an objective frame, and plan for accession, contributing to the enlargement expansion (König & Bräuninger, 2004). Hence, the eastwards enlargement “(...) might be regarded as a collective decision to promote the interests and preferences of the member states and solve the problems posed by the new situation in Central and Eastern Europe in a more efficient way.” (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 36). Once the integration process of a new member was completed, the EU would, thus, become a more reliable and recognizable actor not only just in its area but also around the world. Enlargement is a long-term process of reform, not only just political but also economical. The possibility of enlargement only materializes after a more efficient eastern enlargement, which in turn, satisfied the majority of member-states implying, in between the lines, economic, political, and geostrategic calculations (Ludlow, 2013).

There was on the EU's part a recognition that the social regimes in place for over more than 40 years had completely modified the economy (Grabbe, 2002). A long-term strategy, later known as "pre-accession strategy," was seen by the 'Brussels Complex' as inevitable for the successful integration of the Eastern countries. And so, it began, a series of agreements that greatly focused on “(...) a gradual opening of market access for goods and to a lesser extent the other factors of production (services, establishment, and capital)” (Emmert & Petrouif, 2014, p. 1378). Void of expectation on how and who would achieve the membership status. If done, it would be the biggest enlargement in the European Union's history, a serious preparation had, however, to be done.

There is, to this day, on the EU's part an outstanding integration capacity which in turn “(...) reflects a long-standing EU concern about potential detrimental effects of enlargement on the functioning of the EU and future integration.” (Börzel, Dimitrova, &

Schimmelfennig, 2017, p. 159). Börzel, Dimitrova, & Schimmelfennig (2017) believe that this same integration capacity can be distinguished between two types:

- External integration capacity. It is the process of turning non-members into EU members “It refers to the ability of the EU to associate states more closely and support them to be ready for membership.” (p. 161)
- Internal integration capacity: there is a concern in maintaining the normal functioning and cohesion of the EU and respective institutions. “The more successfully the EU integrates new members and maintains its cohesion and functioning, the more credible its promise is for aspiring members.” (p. 161). When it comes to how internal and external integration capabilities are implemented, the modes of implementation will differ when the EU uses different mechanisms of influence.

4.5 The CFSP towards the enlargement policy

The post-WWII period allowed for unique circumstances that led to the creation of the ECSC (known today as the EU) which had an impact on what were to be the norms, values, constitutive nature and, nonetheless, in the expansion of the Union (Turunen, 2019). Having no restrictions, at a geographical level, the CFSP respects the values of the EU presented in article 2 (1) of the TEU, such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Article 24 (1) of the TEU in Chapter II section I, it states that the components that fall over the EU's CFSP "(...) shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security".

In article 3 (5) of the TEU, the integration of the foreign policy objectives is well presented: "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter". The nature of such policy remains very different from all the other policy areas that is mainly because "(...) the different roles of the European Commission and the European Parliament in the decision-making process, the impossibility of the CJEU to rule on most CFSP decisions and treaty provisions, the different effects of CFSP decisions in the domestic legal orders of the member states, and the different nature of the instruments themselves" (Wessel, 2016, p. 1)

The development of the EU's military ambitions that expand beyond Europe. There are five aspects that help us understand better the institutions, and the identity of the Union as a security actor (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010):

1. **Hierarchy, or the existence of multiple centres of power:** It is believed that "(...) the hierarchical mode of policy-making associated with government must be supplanted by an understanding of how actors other than government as such take part in increasingly complex and decentralized policy-making processes." (p. 1353). The emergence of the CFSP came as a distinct 'security centre' from NATO, bringing autonomous actors into the process. One can go even further and depict the evolution of such policy going from an 'intergovernmental bargain' to a 'highly institutionalized polity'. Hierarchy becomes, consequently, a key feature in the CFSP itself. The multiple actors that integrate such policy are a

significant factor that must be considered in the security environment. According to Reis (2017) the "(...) governments of member-states would remain, thus, responsible for the process of negotiation controlling the partial sharing of competences" (p. 111), which represents a transfer from a national to the European level since they remain complimentary of each other.

2. **The interaction of multiple actors, both public and private:** "While states remain primary actors in European security, their role both when it comes to security policy-making and delivering security is increasingly being challenged by multiple public and private actors." (p. 1354) This can be viewed through the various entities present in the post-conflict period or during the various years of war-fighting. "From a security governance point of view, however, this illustrates the fact that within the EU security policy apparatus there exists a number of actors, supranational and intergovernmental, that compete and, more or less successfully, integrate their approaches in a sort of micro version of the broader security marketplace." (p. 1355). Whereas traditional policy options were thought and carried out by states, today, a different actor is also present in their activity.
3. **Formal and Informal Institutionalization:** "When interacting in institutionalized settings, actors tend to develop shared ideas and a common understanding of what is the organization's purpose and legitimate scope of action, which is, in turn, sustained and enforced as they develop an allegiance to the institution and the cause." (p. 1356) The 'institutional nexus' alongside the committees and subunits that constitute a central aspect, which has led to a greater increase in "(...) in the overall body of work being carried out, but also to new tensions between national capitals and centralizing tendencies in Brussels. This is a process that has been referred to by various commentators as 'Brusselization'" (p. 1356).
4. **Relations between actors that are ideational in character:** The central message conveyed in the security governance literature that institutions act as socializing agents and not merely as arenas for coordinated action suggests that there exist certain collectively held *ideas* and *norms* that structure the relations between the actors involved whenever they interact in institutionalized settings (p. 1357). The absence of 'formal regulations' in what is a 'non-hierarchical structure' is to blame for

such ties. Ideas demonstrate to have great importance in the international politics they have, thus, to be reproduced by informal institutions that give them a legitimate basis to exist.

With the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, there was effective changes to the EU's structure, namely the provisions towards the existence of a legal personality of the Union, amendments to what is the EU's foreign policy, the position of the High Representative to the Union, was created alongside that of the President of the European Council. Thus, it is noticeable that these substantial modifications clearly had an effect on the Union at a structural level. The legal structure of the EU *sui generis* presents the Union as a well-integrated actor with a firm global credibility, that being an important aspect of the imperial paradigm. The structure and legal system presented by the EU, under the Treaty of Lisbon, has its basis on the TEU and the TFEU. Furthermore, there is a strengthening of the EU's status as an international actor, since it regulates not only such personality but also a set of relationships at a diplomatic level and the credibility of its institutions. "Regarding the CFSP, the explicit regulation of the EU's legal personality has at least two consequences: first, it refers to the question concerning the person who acts as a European party in international relations, particularly as a "European contracting party" in international agreements, and second, it corresponds to the external means of the EU to implement the CFSP." (Koehler, 2010, p. 63)

4.5.1 CFSP within Multi-Level Governance and Intergovernmentalism

The Treaty of Maastricht was more than a simple act of intergovernmental policy, it was also an emulation of other policies and areas of interest one cannot deny, by any means, that there was intergovernmental stimulus and vision, managing to change the EU and its foreign policy. Not forgetting the support of NATO and the US in order for the EU to have at its disposal other instruments of 'hard security' that would go further than sanctions or the economic structure (Smith, 2011; Keukeleire, 2010).

The development of the CFSP throughout time, with the help of integrational theories such as intergovernmentalism, supranationalism and trans-governmentalism have transformed the EU into a set of 'institutional mechanisms' that "(...)imposes unique requirements on European Union (EU) member states, and the co-ordination of these various obligations presents a major challenge to the EU's pursuit of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)." (Smith, 2004, p. 740).

There has also been a great deal of discussion of the CFSP in terms of multi-level governance. It is important to mention that before any talk of multi-level governance, to discuss the interest on the EU's part in cooperating with several international

organizations where its own member states are present, such as NATO, UN, OSCE, and many others. The 'system of governance' the Union adopts will help define other actor's capabilities. "Yet these general propensities for cooperation do not, by themselves, lead to common action, particularly in foreign policy. This is the 'added-value' of a multi-level governance approach to EU foreign policy: to explain how *common general interests* are defined, prioritized, and translated into *concrete policy actions* through institutionalized behaviours at the EU and domestic levels. *Governance* can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specified policy domain. *Multi-level governance* refers to the sharing of this authority across an institutionalized, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources" (Smith M. , 2004, p. 743)

Different European institutions are a part of the continuous development of the CFSP "(...) *the European Council* defines the priorities and fundamental principles of the CFSP, approves common strategies. *The EU Council of Ministers* adopts joint actions and common positions related to the spheres of the CFSP, implementation of which is mostly considered the task of the *Presidency*. *The European Commission* provides funding for joint actions. The Presidency of Council has a big role in political and legislative decision-making processes in the field of the CFSP in the organization of institutions' activities. In these issues, it gets the support of the *Secretariat and the Secretary of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP*. The European Parliament is periodically informed on developments in the field of the CSFP, and expresses its opinion on main courses and opportunities." (Galstyan, 2010, p. 13).

The CFSP, and the CSDP, have seen great improvements since its creation. Externally, a series of factors such as the UK exit of the EU, the state of U.S-EU relations, Russia's annexation of Crimea (illegal in the eyes of international law), the migrant crisis, terrorist attacks, are all a call for the EU's attention for a re-organization of the infrastructures, critical for the survival and success of the EU (Rayroux, 2013; Cherubini, 2012). With all these vulnerabilities in the foreign, security and defence policy measures need to be taken. Internally, legitimacy presents itself as the most troubling issue.

The recent narrative of 'opportunity and necessity' replaced the 'crisis discourse' narrative. Peterson (2005) believes that there are three main problems with the CFSP. The first is related to the 'lack of identity' where it is believed that the existence of a common foreign policy cannot exist if there is no 'European Public'. The second major problem as to do with the Union's common interests, since the identity crisis of the Union makes them unclear. Third, and lastly, as to do with 'weak institutions' when the CFSP was

created it was the result of a number of compromises that resulted in institutions with deep issues

With certainty, the CFSP is very different from its previous policies. The EUGS⁹, presented in 2016, presents the momentum, or ambition of the CFSP is impossible to foresee mainly because “(...) limits to Europe’s ability to stabilise and pacify its international surroundings” (Bendiek, 2017, p. 6). Resilience is, therefore, the keyword. Being a term that is explicitly used in the EUGS, Smith (2017) believes that resilience “(...) is a step away from previous EU rhetoric on democracy promotion, even though in practice, the EU has long tilted more towards the promotion of civil and political rights rather than democracy per se, and has privileged stability more than the spread of democracy” (p. 19)

Ambitions that were unreachable were what characterized the Union's external action. The common denominator of documents such as the ESS is the assertiveness that the Union assures and the ability to act within the realms, meaning, acting within the realms of the 'neighbourhood' to stabilize and transform. In article 24 (1), all areas of the CFSP are incorporated under the Lisbon Treaty.

With the concept of capability-expectations gap introduced by Christopher Hill in 1993, where the international expectations towards the Union, did not match its capabilities. Making it a point, several years later to emphasise that the “(...) *capabilities* of the Union are taken to be the conventional instruments of foreign policy—the use and threat of force, diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, cultural influence—but also the underlying resources of population, wealth, technology, human capital and political stability, together with cohesiveness, or the capacity to reach a collective decision and to stick to it.” (Hill, 2005, p. 24). The lack of capabilities on the EU's part could mean that its 'policy goals', or the means it uses to achieve them, could remain uncertain due to unique circumstances. And despite the development of the EU through the years, with shared goals, traditions, and visions, it has been hard to present to the world a common foreign policy a lack of common objectives (Rayroux, 2013). The Abilene Paradox¹⁰ is also a concern when it comes to reaching a consensus. Even though one's desire for the consensus process to not only 'identify' but also 'address' the considerations and concerns that come along the way. "The reason why the CFSP is governed by unanimity can be

⁹ European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). Formally presented to the European Council on June 28th, 2016. <http://www.scielo.mec.pt/pdf/ri/n53/n53a06.pdf> [Accessed on 17th of April, 2020].

¹⁰Abilene Paradox. The Abilene Paradox refers to actions taken by International Organizations/ Actors that contradict the purpose of the goal to which they were created to achieve, making, null, its creation. <https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/16-Harvey-Abilene-Paradox-redacted.pdf> [Accessed on 21st of April, 2020]

captured in a single word: *sovereignty*.” (Toje, 2008, p. 130). While member-states would like to present the power and weight of its other 27 compatriots in themselves, it becomes much less appealing when the foreign policy has to be defined by all its members and with a plethora of different preferences that the decision-making process remained largely in the Council and requires unanimity, despite the increasing institutionalization after the Treaty of Lisbon.

4.6 CSDP towards the enlargement policy

The architecture of what is today the European Security and Defence Policy existed for years before it ever became a concrete part of the EU. It was, therefore, during the post-WWII period that the concern over European security and defence framework began. It developed into a concept with a multidimensional basis, presenting elements of economic, political, and military characteristics. The commitment, on the EU's part, to promote security and global progress is well documented in the preamble of the TEU. In article 21 (2) of the TEU are above all:

- a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
- b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
- c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;

In 1998, the signing of the Saint-Malo Declaration, in order to fulfil the Petersberg Tasks¹¹, there was an urgency to determine the military and civilian components of the CSFP. The St. Malo Franco-British Summit is considered a very important moment in European history due to the changes proposed in European Security Policy and policy-making. "(...) St. Malo seemed to imply the determination of the two key military players in the EU (France and the UK) to bestow upon the Union a degree of actorness in the security field which would seem set to intensify the European integration process." (Howorth, 2002, p. 769). Considered, to this day, the much-needed impulse for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) this policy would become fully operational in 2003, the same year, the European Security Strategy "(...) outlining key threats and challenges facing Europe" (Lindstrom, 2017, p. 17). In 2016, the European Global Strategy (EUGS) replaced the ESS, which does not mean that the actions of the EU are non-strategic without it (Biscop, 2017, p. 28).

There are two distinct approaches towards security displayed with the use of the TEU. "This approach is characterised by its focus on the treatment of root causes of

¹¹ Petersberg Tasks. A set of tasks set out in the Petersberg Declaration, that in turn, was adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in the year of 1992. Since its adoptions these tasks cover a wide-range of areas from military advice and assistance tasks, humanitarian and rescue tasks, post-conflict stabilisation tasks, and many others. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html [Accessed on 23rd of May, 2020]

instability and insecurity and its clear preference for international cooperation and partnership and compliance with the rule of law. It shows a distinctive European way in international relations, a reflection of the EU's identity as expressed in the TEU and its aim to project peace and security in Europe and in the world.” (Carrasco, Muguruza, & Sánchez, 2016, p. 21).

The CSDP is presented in the TEU through articles such as article 41 that gives an outline of not only the CFSP, but also outlines the funding of the CFSP and CSDP, and extending to Chapter II Section 2 of Title V (‘Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy’), as well as extra Protocols 1, 10, and 11 as well as Declarations 13 and 14.

The “(...) idea of a common defence policy for Europe dates back to 1948 when the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, also known as the Treaty of Brussels.” (Carrasco, Muguruza, & Sánchez, 2016, p. 17). In section II, article 42(1) of the TEU, it is stated that “The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy.” It is to be reinforced through “(...) civilian and military assets”. Such assets may be used for “(...) peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.” Article 43(1) of the TEU complements what was said in the previous article by stating that the military and civilian means used “(...)civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.”.

The Western European Union (WEU) was, thus, born. It was not just a military alliance but also an international organization. It had its foundation on the mutual defence clause. Alongside NATO, the WEU, which stood until the 1990s, was the largest forum for discussing matters of security and defence in the EU. After being signed in 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon, that entered in force in 2009, made what was previously known as the ESDP the now CSDP, incorporating first, the mutual assistance clause and then the solidarity clause (Turunen, 2019). The mutual assistance clause is considered to be the Treaty of Lisbon's most notable commitment to take such policy beyond the control of the external crisis (Simón, 2012). The vision of crisis management was very much shaped by the mutual assistance clause stating in article 42(7) of the TEU: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”. Hence, the responsibility that previously fell

over the President of the European Council was transferred to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) with the support and assistance of the EEAS.

Traditionally, there is also according to the author the vague meaning of the word ‘assistance’ like many other concepts this too, gives states the possibility of using it in certain situations, but not in others. When the last part of this point in the article mentions ‘prejudice’ entails the mutuality but also a senior status at NATO.

There are two important clauses that should be discussed:

Solidarity Clause

The solidarity clause presented on title VIII article 222(1):

“(a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; – protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; – assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.”

Simón (2012) believes that the characterization of the word ‘prevention’ must be used “(...) in the sense of creating the necessary (permanent) structures and capabilities” (p. 106), meaning that it would deter agents against that kind of act. The link that is presented between the internal and external security is still current. One can, notwithstanding, conclude that the adoption and settling of both these clauses are not only an expansion but also a consolidation of the crisis management (Amorim, 2017).

Permanent Structured Cooperation:

Permanent Structured Cooperation is the development of capabilities in the EU’s past. Article 42 (6) of the TEU states that: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework”. The idea behind Permanent Structured Cooperation came from a Franco-German proposal in 2002, where the group that had originally proposed the idea through a strong commitment of not only capability development but also of cooperation within the framework presented in the CSDP and the EU. There was availability for new members if they possessed the necessary requirement (permanence and exclusivity) and the commitment.

Article 21 (3) of the TEU clearly states the need for cooperation to exist between the areas of the EU's external action in order for consistency to be ensured. "The idea is simple: CSDP is not to act in isolation from other EU external actions and instruments. On the contrary, it must act in sync with non-CFSP instruments for which Commission participation is required" (de Ojeda, 2017, p. 55)

There is one aspect that raises certain doubt when it comes to Article 47 of the TEU and Article V of the Treaty of Washington, that formally established NATO. On one side, article 47 is where the legal personality of the Union was established, allowing it to be a part of international organizations and the agreements that many times result from them. "(...) full membership of the EU in international organisations remains the exception rather than the rule, with its status in international organisations reflecting both the internal allocation of competences (vis-à-vis the EU Member States) and practical arrangements negotiated/obtained between the EU and the international organisation in question." (Van Genderen, 2015, p. 4). On the other side, Article V of the Treaty of Washington was instilled with life by an integrated military structure and massive and coordinated American and allied force deployments in Western Europe it "(...) was not the wording of Article V that deterred the Soviet Union, but the allies' political commitment to follow through on the spirit of that wording with appropriate military measures." (Simón, 2012, p. 106).

Political commitment is, thus, the explanatory factor that differentiates them. It appeared that the clause in question also suffered from a 'capability-expectations gap' (Hill, 1993) since there wasn't an attempt at creating a follow-up measures in order for this clause to succeed, therefore, not living up to its potential. Legrand (2017) emphasizes that due to the enormous role NATO plays in maintaining a global security environment, it also plays an inevitable great role in the realm of European Security and so the EU is a participant in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in order to help consolidate the relations. "(...) it enables them to act autonomously (albeit in operations of limited scope and intensity) when the US is disinterested or opposed to European action. In this respect, CSDP has the potential to emerge as a competitor to NATO. However, CSDP also functions as the 'European pillar' of the Atlantic Alliance. It is an institutional forum that facilitates the development of military capabilities which may also be of use to NATO. In addition, CSDP helps to augment the Europeans' ability to carry a great share of the security burden in their geopolitical neighbourhood, thereby freeing the US to deal with security challenges in other parts of the globe." (Dyson, 2013, p. 388)

In 2003, however, there was a rejection of the initial proposal at the Intergovernmental Conference "(...) rejection of the proposal to list the participating

countries in the protocol, removal of the reference to the need to fulfil higher military criteria and the ability for member states to join and leave” (Simón, 2012, p. 107), made the policy inclusive instead of exclusive, leading to the failure of the idea. While the shortcomings or failure of the ESS, when it was created, it was expected the opposite of what occurred, because instead of being forgotten, it was used to emphasize the EU's global role while contemplating the view of all its members. However, a few years later not everybody presented itself satisfied with the policy, and in 2007 Swedish Foreign Minister and the French President asked for a review of the ESS, and while the disagreements on the need for such review persevered, the countries of Spain, Italy, Poland and Sweden "(...) launched a think-tank process, which in May 2013 produced a report on a 'European Global Strategy' ” (Biscop, 2017, p. 30). It was with a proposal to the European Council by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini, it introduced a new vision and impetus of security and foreign policy that it was finally approved.

Six factors are at the basis for the transformation of the EU as a security actor (Sperling, 2018):

1. The aggregation of diplomatic, military and financial capacities that translate into strategic power;
2. The credulous foreign policy and security identity creates a leverage effect around the Union's security preferences;
3. The institutional framework that provides the respective member-states with harmonizing tools in order to fulfil their security strategies;
4. The collective action problem due to the absence of an uncontested leadership at a global level;
5. The set of structural changes in the European states towards their core character features that constitute them which implies cooperation amongst them;
6. The 'institutional imperative' of the entities that present themselves in Brussels;

“All in all, the Lisbon Treaty’s institutionalisation of comprehensive crisis management represents a consolidation of the CSDP’s reactive, soft and ad hoc focus.” (Simón, 2012, p. 109).

CHAPTER 5.

The concept of ‘Europeanization’ applied to the eastern ‘neighbourhood’

5.1 The ‘Europeanization of the ‘neighbourhood’.

“*Europeanization* is a form of transnationalisation limited to the European continent, or more specifically to the member states of the European Union.” (Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw, 2007, p. 3)

The Europeanization of said ‘eastern neighbours’ is a form of promotion, of norms and values as well as good governance, stability, and democracy in order to create leverage over those same countries. There is, nonetheless, the belief that the most powerful strategy used by the EU in order to achieve the ‘Europeanization of Europe’ is through the promise of integration, and ultimately, membership (Flenley, 2013).

There is, on the EU’s part, a great effort in trying to establish an engaging relationship with the respective neighbourhood. “Understandings of ‘Neighbourhood’ are not strictly defined by specific policies (such as the ENP) but can also be interpreted in terms of a political, cultural and socio-economic space where the EU exerts transformative power beyond its borders.” (Wesley Scott & Liikanen, 2010, p. 424). The means by which the identity of the Union is constructed upon can, of course, be the subject of a more in-depth discussion. The ENP as a policy tool presented by the Union “(...) was driven in part by the perceived inadequacies of the Union’s existing capacity for managing third country relations was driven, in part, by the perceived inadequacies of the Union’s existing capacity for managing third country relations” (Tonra, 2010, p. 64). These same relations gave origin to two distinct goals: partnership and membership. Partnership, sought to include states that would not become members but would like to acquire a closer relationship with the Union. Membership is, in the end, driven by the expectation of becoming a member of the Union, given the accession process it triggers, which would culminate in membership, after compliance is shown with the objectives set out to be fulfilled.

Stability, good governance, and security usually dominate the debate surrounding the process of ‘Europeanization’ (Cianciara, 2016; Borońska-Hryniewiecka, 2017).

The usage of the concept of ‘Europeanization’ as a new form of governance, as well as the internal and external factors that affect it, can be many times mistaken with the concept of ‘European Integration’ (Borneman & Fowler, 1997; Harmsen & Wilson, 2000).

The process of how the European Integration occurs is particularly crucial due to the transfer of power and competences on the member-states that are a part of the EU. Europeanization has, thanks to the eastern enlargements, evolved in their own process, helping the Union maintaining its stability and borders. The author believes that Europeanization depends on five factors (Börzel., 2010, p. 11):

1. the *costs of adaptation* as function of the misfit between EU requirements and domestic conditions,
2. the *external push* of the EU to comply with its requirements: Misfit and external push combine in the pressure for adaptation the EU exerts on a target country.
3. the *capacity* of the target country to respond to the EU's pressure for adaptation,
4. the *willingness* of the target country to respond to the EU's pressure for adaptation,
5. the *power* of the target country to resist the EU's pressure for adaptation.

Börzel (2010) goes even further and explains that the process of Europeanization could not occur if not for the EU member states that 'formulate, implement, and enforce' the needed reforms in order to be seen not only as adopters, but also adapters for domestic change to occur. Likewise, non-state actors require the capacity to pressure state actors to implement the reforms that are needed at the domestic level. Thus, such exertion of pressure may drive them towards change or even provide them with supplementary resources. Consequentially, state and non-state actors have a crucial role in the mitigation of the Union's power in the international realm. Hence, the nature of the democratic character of a determinate state will, subsequently, influence its compliance towards the implementation of changes at the domestic level.

Dealing with the Union's bordering 'neighbours' to both the south and east has been in the main stage of the Union's concerns (Samadashvili, 2016). The promotion of human rights, security, democracy, are all part of the instruments needed for stability in the European 'neighbourhood' (Rieker, 2016). The transformations, whether they are political or geographical, brought to the Union by its enlargement policy, has resulted in major transformations. The incorporation of new member-states alongside 'old ones' with their peculiar or idiosyncratic different interests, membership, has, then, been a part of the construction of Europe as we know it (Lynch, 2005). "The point is to find the right balance between the need to reinforce internal security and the need to continue 'values-based' engagement with the rest of the world, especially in the EU's neighbourhood."

(Samadashvili, 2016, p. 24). A privileged relationship based on common values and common commitment towards the fulfilment of the Union's goals, would mean that the intervenient parties helped establish that relationship.

5.2 Security Within the Union

Unpredictable security and geography developments are a definite challenge to the EU's external policies towards the neighbourhood. Becoming undeniable, the interest in the EU's part since the stability of the neighbourhood would mean the stability of its own borders (Petrov, 2014).

The awareness in the realm of security, is considered a remarkable achievement since the EU has been view as a rather weak security actor. "One of the themes that emerges particularly strongly from the various analyses is the existence of a complex relationship between values and security at the heart of several EU policies, particularly in relation to its neighbourhood." (Kaunert & Léonard, 2011, p. 363).

There are three dimensions to the security environment of the Union that can be considered (Biscop, 2005):

- Integration: The comprehensive security strategy of the EU "(...) starts with the recognition that there are various dimensions of security in the current international environment and that therefore the underlying causes of potential threats to the security of the EU are very diverse in terms of both nature and origin." (p. 23)
- Prevention: The comprehensive security strategy of the EU "(...)gives priority to active prevention of conflict and instability as opposed to a reactive and curative approach, which would be much more costly in both human and economic terms (...) It lies in their very nature that pursuing GPG serves the mutual interests of both the EU and its partners." (p. 25/26)
- Global Scope: The comprehensive security strategy of the EU demonstrates that "(...) the security of one is dependent on that of the other. This global scope does not contradict the specific EU role vis-a-vis its neighbourhood outlined in the Strategy. This is not a question of a hierarchy of priorities: an effective system of, at the regional level is a component of the overall objective of global governance; because of globalization, stability of the world order as such is equally important as stability in our neighbourhood." (p. 27)

Ever since its creation, the ENP has tried to offer a different relationship between the EU and its neighbours (Tocci, 2017). Developed as a 'strategic approach to the post-enlargement period,' there was a more considerable distinction through the recognition of borders of those that 'belonged' to the Union and those who did not. "The ENP also has a

structuring function vis-à-vis the EU's neighbourhood: it is aimed at, and thereby designates, permanent non-members, while leaving aside potential members and candidate countries, as well as countries with which the EU has a special relationship, such as Russia." (Whitman, & Wolff, 2010, p. 4). One can say that the 'looseness' and 'openness' of the Union's borders and the predefined concept of a 'good neighbour' present a distinct conceptualization of the meaning of time and space for the EU (Holm, 2005). The individual concept of 'neighbourhood' needs to be redefined beyond the prospect, or lack thereof, of membership and their respective geographical position member-states occupy within the European geopolitical space, mostly due to the threats the EU faces today (Bouris & Schumacher, 2017). Koenig (2016) believes that the EU "(...) suffers from a 'conception-performance gap' in its foreign policy. Essentially, it depicts its role as that of a unified and effective international actor. However, in its policy performance, it often fails to live up to this image due to the lack of pooled sovereignty, common political will, shared resources, or adequate instruments. What is true for EU's external action at large applies to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in particular." (p. 3).

The former Soviet republics, presented themselves with a succession of problems such as subpar living standards, unstable and volatile political system, corruption and organized crime, amongst many more issues that needed to be solved if they were ever to be part of the EU, thus bringing several barriers to the process of 'Europeanization' (Bafail, 2009; Riishøj, 2007). There are some peculiar features presented in countries that are encompassed in the ENP. "The high sense of threat awareness regarding the democratization process and opposition to appeasement of authoritarian states – the so-called Munich Syndrome – has also sometimes led elites in the new post-communist democracies to question the inclination or capacity of core West European states to come to the assistance of Eastern Europe, should push comes to shove." (Cohen, 2007, p. 52).

The Strategy Paper, presented in 2003, made the ambitions of the European Union quite clear, with the possibility to mitigate conflicts not only between the EU and neighbouring countries but also between the neighbouring countries themselves. Shared norms and values would lead to a special partnership where a 'ring of friends' would develop. Thus, the idea behind the ENP had in mind "(...) two objectives: to spread stability, security and prosperity in the EU's neighbourhood as a way to minimise the risks of instability flowing across the EU's borders, and to prevent feelings of exclusion within the new neighbours." (Whitman, & Wolff, 2010, p. 13)

There is, thus, two different aspects that may have led to such 'failure' (ibid):

- Unwillingness: the reluctance or unwillingness of member-states to strategically maintain strategic relations amongst those that are an integral

part of the ENP is one of the reasons that led to its failure. This ranges from “(...) prospect of membership, a form of substantial integration or even no integration at all.” (p. 14). This unwillingness of the EU’s part to address and re-think the strategic importance of the countries that are a part of the ENP affects the effectiveness of such policy.

- **Credibility:** the lack of a long-term perspective by only addressing the present and not the future means that there will not be long-term incentives presented as well, which in turn limits the options that such policy as to offer. The 'catch-all' type of characteristics that the policy presents are part of the credibility issue that it debates with.

The constant blurring of internal and external security still plays a big part in what are considered the EU’s interests in the ‘neighbourhood’. “The EU’s capacity to emerge as a security provider and the approaches developed in this purpose will be gauged against its security objectives in the region as identified in the main EU policy documents and in EU actors’ discourse.” (Delcour, 2010, p. 536).

There is, in contrast to the 2003 ‘wider Europe’ strategy, no longer room in the *repertoire* of the EU for the concept of proximity, previously considered an indispensable element of stability in the ‘neighbourhood’, there is now a bigger concern towards the establishment and embedment of democratic institutions, and democracy itself, in the constituent countries. Still, one can say that the EU “(...) continues to place itself at the centre of relations and in doing so it feeds into notions of the ‘self’ and delineates the borders that separate the ‘self’ from ‘others’” (Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, p. 11). With the creation of the ESS, it was the first time that a strategic approach was implemented towards the external relations of the Union (Lippert, 2007).

Biscop (2005, p. 40) enlists the following objectives of the ENP:

1. “preventing conflicts in our neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the EU;
2. settling ongoing disputes and conflicts;
3. establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;
4. controlling migration and all form of illegal trafficking into the EU;
5. protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.”

The ENP has also brought along a new interest in the process of integration, regional building, alongside the narrative of normative power Europe, that has strongly

oriented the Union in promoting their norms and values (Celata & Coletti, 2017). Rather than presenting a more significant focus on state-to-state relations, regional approaches must be taken into account. Within that approach, there is a realist core, when it comes to material power "This is evident not least in the emphasis on securitization processes (issues become security concerns because agenda-setting actors frame them as security concerns) and the conceptualization of region not as an objective entity, but as a social construction resulting from (among other things) the security practice of actors" (Bengtsson, 2008, p. 599).

"Always seen as a means to realize some ill-defined community, the EU is increasingly an end in itself" (Borneman & Fowler, 1997, p. 488). The responsibility of maintaining global security is now the Union's responsibility as well. The objectives and instruments at their disposal to combat threats such as terrorism, regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and many more (Churrua, 2005).

5.3 EUGS: a new Global Governance Strategy for a stronger EU

Born in 2003, the ESS came at a very specific moment in history, the height of the EU in every sense. The Euro had recently been implemented, the process of enlargement towards more countries of the centre and eastern Europe had started to be fulfilled, which was fruitfully terminated a year later, allowing for the so-longed European reunification. “Enlargement gave a new lease of life to the European narrative of peace and security on the continent, at a time in which the political salience of the traditional peace narrative—Franco-German reconciliation—was losing power as its success over the decades caused it to be taken for granted. The success of the Euro in its first years corroborated a second narrative, that of European prosperity through integration” (Tocci, 2017, p. 8).

What we know today as the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) was the result of an extensive process that started in 2013, with the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, to assess the impact that the constant changes that occur in the International System has within the European Union (Zandee, 2016). Federica Mogherini, the current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, took over the project, a year later, appointing Nathalie Tocci (a renowned analyst in the Istituto di Affari Internazionali di Roma) to develop such report that the HR/VP would present to the European Council in 2015. That same presentation would give origin to an order from the Council for the High Representative of the Union, alongside the Union's member-states, to create a strategic consideration that would later give origin to the EUGS.

This policy, presenting itself as a more extensive document that came to related the European Security Strategy in 2003, it is considered a more ‘realist’ version of the objectives that it has to fulfil. The EUGS shows itself as being a policy that is adapted within the international environment orientated to produce results and that “(...) takes on the challenges presented and formulates a guide for face them, organized in three parts: interests, principles and priorities” (Pérez, 2017, p. 72). This policy reflects not only an updated, changed environment but also the need to use different instruments when it comes to presenting a response to new threats and problems. "Such an action plan or Security and Defence Strategy (SDS) will have to deal with at least three components: (i) ambition level and tasks; (ii) capabilities; and (iii) tools and instruments needed for more commitment by member states" (Zandee, 2016, p. 27)

Given that no state can operate without others, in this interdependence-filled system, the political instruments remain the most important tool that will reinforce the EU relations and cooperation at an international level. “As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of the EUGS was two-fold. The first was precisely the process of strategic reflection which culminated in the strategy, an extensive and intensive process that succeeded in achieving considerable convergence among all players, an achievement that all my interlocutors from the Member States acknowledged. As this article has sought to document, that first goal was accomplished. The EUGS had to see light of day.” (Tocci, 2016, p. 469/470).

The recent changes that have occurred throughout the world presented a new change of power in the global governance spectrum 'from the West to the rest,' which have presented a series of new actors in the international scene (Chaban & Holland, 2019). Only a day after Britain had voted to leave the European Union, the EUGS was welcomed by the European Council, thus, in June of 2016, the new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy was born. (Smith., 2017). The EUGS makes it very clear that “(...) we live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union [EU]. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity, and democracy, is being questioned” (EUGS, 2016, p. 7). The Petersberg Tasks, now replaced in order to accompany, and maintain, the development of the EU, make clear that a redefinition of such policy is unavoidable due to the nexus of internal-external security.

There is, thus, within the EUGS, a commitment “(...) at the level of the civilian-military approach, as well as at the combination of instruments from the European Union and the Member States. The integrated approach to conflicts and crises was not only intended to fully account for the security development nexus but also to move beyond it by developing a holistic approach to conflicts, bearing in mind their identity, humanitarian, socio-economic, security, environmental, and energy dimensions.” (Reis, 2020, p. 4).

There is, primarily, on policies such as foreign and security policy, a demonstration of the transformative power of the EU describing the Union as a normative power (Manners, 2002; 2006; 2009) that sees Europe as a prominent international actor. Acting almost as biographies of the Union, the several documents that contain the different norms, values, and strategies.

There are four main changes with the implementation of the EUGS (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, pp. 8-9):

- The ‘bottom-up’ approach to security: “Citizens’ protection becomes a salient objective and replaces the traditional approach of the EU as an entity projecting values and providing security internationally.” (p. 8).

Recognizing that the complexity of the threats today requires a common and collective response.

- Resilience-based strategy: “Second, rather than promoting its norms and values in the neighbourhood for the benefit of a ring of well-governed countries, the EUGS adopts a narrative based on the concept of ‘resilience’” (p. 9). A strategy based on resilience would, thus, provide a middle ground allowing for peace and stability to flourish. The resilience strategy serves a double purpose of not discarding certain foreign commitments and to provide internal stability to problems that arise with the changes in the world.
- Cooperative regional orders: “Third, and as a result of the EU’s poly-crisis, the EUGS acknowledges the limitations of its model of regional integration and opts for the establishment of ‘cooperative regional orders’” (p. 9). The export of norms and values in order to achieve regional integration focuses greatly on what is considered to be a reciprocal between the EU and the various actors they interact with.
- Pragmatic nature towards the global order: “Finally, previous normative approaches to multilateralism are substituted by a more pragmatic tone on the shape of the global order” (p. 9). Demonstrating an evident change in the realm of the EU transformative approach.

The transformative nature of the EUGS is proof of the European change in the realm of security. For further understanding, there has been a more in-depth integration that has helped the international system's growth and the stabilization of the countries that want to be a part of this project. "Framing the EUGS around the contestation of traditional normative discourses shows the salience of EU crises and the evolution of the EU's narrative from a cosmopolitan and transformative vision to a more demarcated and securitized one, thus providing a discursive opportunity for the politicization of EU foreign policy. The EUGS thus recalibrates the long-lasting dichotomy between interests and values in EU foreign policy, arguing that these must go ‘hand in hand’” (EUGS, 2016, p. 13). In order to present clear strategy, there needs to be a ‘compelling geostrategic and political awareness’ (Tocci, 2017).

The EUGS made a “(...) a collective investment in EU credibility, namely, but not exclusively, through enhanced defence and security capabilities, responsiveness, through more reactive diplomatic, security and development instruments, through institutional and policy innovations” (Reis, 2018, p. 42). It is undeniable that such policy has adapted

and reacted to the changes occurring in the political and economic environment and, thus, the need to use a vast array of tools that can help the Union fulfil its global aspirations.

CHAPTER 6.

The Core-Periphery Dichotomy

6.1 Assessment of the EU role model in the periphery

There is a difficulty in defining the boundaries of the European Security, mainly because there is a nuisance in defining 'what Europe is and what security is' (Gänzle, 2007).

The bipolar environment that was lived during the Cold War meant that security was defined in 'politico-military terms' and not much beyond that. "Also described as 'freedom from fear' security, thus, clearly contains a subjective element, an element of perception" (Biscop, 2005, p. 1). With the end of the Cold War, that meant that the new security environment surrounding the EU would drastically change due to the disappearance of significant threats, mainly the Soviet bloc. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) lost part of its importance, since those that were a part of the Union stopped being a direct threat to each other with the creation of the European Project. And despite not having direct 'collateral damages' over the Union, the spill over effects were devastating, after all, the risk of conflict was still very present (ibid). Illegal immigration, fragile states, deficient institutions and infrastructures, terrorism and many other threats had affected the Union and their attempt to defend democracy, human rights, and the international order established as well as all the other values that have been at the core of the Union through its growth (Danjean, 2018).

The integration process has evolved consistently alongside Europe's role in the international arena. (Álvarez, 2007). The ESS, created in 2003 by the European Council, identifies threats and patterns that are posed in its geographical area. The emphasis on a 'ring of friends' that surround the Union is concerning if there is a chance that the Union could suffer the spill over effects due to the internal and external conflicts of the countries involved (Marchetti, 2006). There is, therefore, a need to discuss the relationship-status, the instruments used, and the core-periphery relation that exists within the Union. One can say that the ENP and the creation of the ESS, presented themselves as "(...) translating the holistic approach to foreign policy advocated by the ESS into a concrete policy framework for relations with the Union's periphery" (Biscop, 2010, p. 73). Considered an essential element, it demonstrates the importance of the core-periphery relations played a centre-stage role, historically the core-periphery dynamics are considered to be extremely important when it comes to state formation (Laffan, 2016). It is possible to verify that the "(...) higher the differences are, the higher are the costs to maintain just these differences

– the lesser the differences, the smaller the costs. Therefore, the EU has a vital interest in lessening the differences.” (Marchetti, 2006, p. 26).

The case of the ESS seemed to follow all the steps backwards since it is rather uncommon to approve the adoption of a strategy and only afterwards, acquire the necessary mechanisms, and capabilities, that are needed to succeed. Furthermore, although the concept of strategy was not completely void of responsibility and interests, when the military dimension of the ESS started to be put together, flaws became more evident. Despite the Petersberg Tasks enumerating the different responsibilities that the Union takes part in, always in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty it is evident that the "(...) main characteristic of the foreign policy *acquis* on which the ESS builds is its comprehensive or holistic nature, i.e., the integration of all dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military.” (Biscop, 2007, p. 8).

According to Haine (2007) we can discuss two types of threats:

6.1.1 ‘Old Threats’

“The tone and content of succeeding initiatives and the scope of European engagement on the ground indicate that old threats, i.e., failed states, regional conflicts, and organised crime, remain prominent.” (p. 22) The old threats can be divided into three distinct dimensions:

1. Hegemon rights/ Hegemon security: “It refers to situations in which the domestic population is the first direct or indirect casualty of state collapse or abuse.” (p. 24). The way the EU came across after it intervened in the Balkans in the 1990s with the idea that human rights needed to be protected at all costs, internally and externally, created a 'benign' image that follows the EU to this day. Consequently, an effort was triggered in the ESPD in order to help provide the protection that these countries needed in the area, whether it was military, political, economic, and many more. However, one cannot simply forget that the duties that need to be fulfilled abroad can present themselves costly and risky as well as with a strong opposition at home.
2. Governance: “In this framework, the failed state has lost its ability to provide to its citizens positive political goods, such as the provision of an independent judicial system to adjudicate disputes, to enforce the rule of law and to protect the most fundamental civil and political rights, the right to participate in free and fair elections, the right to compete for office, freedom of speech etc.” (p. 25). The spill over effects of conflict situations

into the 'neighbourhood' can give origin to an array of crimes, economic difficulties, political instability, and many more, that could seriously compromise the Union. This is where the Union's civilian responsibilities come to play an important role.

3. International Terrorism: Characterized the situation as a phenomenon through the 1990s, it was with 9/11 that the threats considered 'old school' needed to be addressed and contained without letting them to present new threats again. It can be said that in "(...) some instances, they are fighting against their hosts, in others, they are benefiting from them; in both cases, boundaries are easily ignored" (p. 26)

Consequentially, the EU has become more aware of the complexity of the problems presented demonstration that, through credibility on the Union's part, will more easily help solve any issue in the neighbourhood.

6.1.2 'New Threats':

The post 9/11 threats are a combination of "(...) non-state actors with easily available capabilities to inflict mass destruction or disruption." (p. 27) Thus, the unthinkable becomes a contemplation and the once acceptable is quickly deemed unacceptable. The new threats can be divided into two distinct categories:

1. Nuclear Challenges: a few decades ago, the idea of the EU participating in 'nuclear diplomacy' was unheard of. The post 9/11 landscape completely changed the global levels of tolerance towards WMD. The creation of the non-proliferation regime of WMD will always present us with some states that will willingly abdicate such weaponry and those that present resistance towards it.
2. Terrorist Threats: "(...) the threat of terrorism represents a clear, present and enduring danger. Europe has been attacked on several occasions, European casualties are counted in hundreds rather than scores and the probability of future terrorist acts in Europe remains extremely high" (p. 32) There is, thus, a wave of new characteristics that emerge themselves with older ones.

Being areas of vital interest for the EU, the Balkans and Eastern Europe as a whole, are areas of definite interest. Along these lines, if we are to discuss the strategic interests of the EU, we need to discuss its policy towards the eastern neighbourhood (Simon, 2013). The attempt to bring stability and democratization to the countries that sought

membership is an important part of the interest generated around them and their successful inclusion in the EU. However, with democratization and stability also comes the challenges posed by the 'frozen conflicts' that have been a part of the history in the neighbourhood. "The EU's initiatives in the neighbourhood also show that the EU has deliberately chosen to keep its profile low and to de-politicise its engagement in the region. In other words, the EU has opted for technocracy as a substitute for strategy." (Juncos, 2016, p. 24).

There is, thus, an underlying assumption, that the first line of defence of the Union will now lie abroad, recognizing a change, and a proliferation, of threats of all sorts, inside and outside of the European continent. "Faced with a significantly deteriorated international environment, the Union cannot postpone its strategic dimension any longer;" (Haine, 2007, p. 21).

6.1.3. The dichotomy centre-periphery: impact on the creation of a security strategy

The EU has, over the years, dealt with the incoming challenges in an integration-security manner. "Its means were at that time mostly economic, but the objective was political: to pacify Europe. As integration advanced and the potential for conflicts in Western Europe faded, the EU concern with conflicts has become increasingly *outward looking*." (Moga, 2012, p. 385). The strong connection created by the European countries after WWII through financial support, integration of national economies, but above all, the shared European ideals created strong bonds among those who are now a part of the European Project, were drawing from a Kantian inspiration point of view (James & Maclean, 2005 (a); Laporte, 2012).

The inclusion process, after the Cold War, was supposed to mean that unity would bond a continent that had been destroyed by two massive wars. There has been, over the years, an attempt at amending these same disparities. The idea prompted by Hill (1993) that an extension of what was to be the EU's borders would provide the more profound implication of enlargement "(...) creates new dividing lines between insiders and outsiders, lines which themselves create formidable problems for the countries on either side of them" (Smith, 2005, p. 758). The end of such war brought to EU a new dilemma of geographical definition and border limits. According to the Treaty of Rome, any country would be able to join, however, the geographical definition becomes blurry of what countries belong to the EU and what countries do not. The establishment of the ENP would, as stated before, mean an attempt at the creation of a 'ring of friends' where there is a sharing of values and norms through 'cross-border cooperation' (Smith, 2005;

Johansson-Nogués, 2017). There is, thus, a need to emphasize that these 'action plans' reflect a conspicuous similarity of what are the interests of the EU in the neighbourhood. The need to find a balance between maintaining some sort of stability while providing security as the European Project carries on, making it clear that the need for it has not subsided. "At the same time, as EU entry requirements become harder to meet as a result of a process of EU 'deepening' while security concerns continue to figure prominently in the EU discourse, it is essential to ensure that the momentum for EU enlargement is not lost. To do so, the EU must find a way to balance the need for deeper integration with candidate countries in a way that will reinforce peace, democracy, and stability in Europe, while in parallel, ensure that the rule of law is at the centre of enlargement policy." (Ioannides, 2014, p. 129). There has been on the EU's part an important transformative effort towards the neighbourhood since it wanted to implement a more democratic based policy for states as well as human rights (Crombois, 2019).

The 'security' dilemma is related to the 'altruistic' versus 'self-interested' actor dichotomy (Laporte, 2012; Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2015) where there is a questioning of the EU's intentions: does the Union wish to promote peace, stability, and democracy in the neighbourhood, or do the instruments at its disposal fulfil personal purposes? The thought-process that many suggest when implying the altruistic manner that the EU exudes towards its eastern neighbours "(...) overlooks the fact security-related issues are deeply embedded in the Union's way of thinking" (Laporte, 2012, p. 6).

The Union has over time, put more emphasis over the spread of norms and values all over the world give it a status of a 'peaceful empire', however, that idea appears to be contradictory in of itself since, no empire in history, with ambitions of geographical expansion, has been considered peaceful (Zielonka, 2016). The 'imperial overstretch', where it lies the undeniable pattern of geographical expansion of the Union, presents an 'absorption-capability' problem where the expansion of the Union exceeds the absorption capacity creating a debate around the enlargement process. However, the problem in question can be appeased by the integration in the imperial EU through 'invitation' where member states become part of the security community willingly (Zielonka, 2006).

Many times, embodying a lessening position and an integration, or lack thereof, from the centre to the periphery. "Essentially, imperial power rests on a series of concentric circles based on abating legal bindings. Brussels within ENP and its Security Strategy (2003) aims to establish a "ring of well-governed states" (Pänke, 2015, p. 354).




Figure 1- Structure of the security system of the EU

The concentric circles that form the Union security community in no way prevent them from slowly occupying through times, other places in the community. “On a wider scale, candidate and potential candidate countries constitute the ‘ascendant’ layer of this pluralistic security community. (...) Finally, I see the ENP countries as being the ‘nascent’ layer of this pluralistic security community.” (Laporte, 2012, p. 23)

The structure that constitutes the Union as a whole, as from a security point of view, have been under scrutiny. In addition to the ‘old threats’ that had been present from a few years ago there is now the outburst of ‘new threats’ that bring ‘strategic unpredictability’ at an internal and external level (Danjean, 2018). Built over the years with the intent to provide peace and stability throughout Europe, it represents in today’s day and age a common identity that through a set of institutions and policies that share the core values and norms upon which the EU is constructed.

Final Remarks

The complex study of the EU as a global actor that is part of International Organizations, inserted in an intricate environment that shows the dependence felt by those organizations and their role in the international system. The Eurocentric attitude and the 'official EU rhetoric' show how, many times, other sovereign countries are viewed by the EU. 'Europeanization', and the extensive discussion on the concept over the several chapters allows for there to be a better understanding of not only the impact that the EU has over its member-states, but also the 'institution-building' process. Thus, it is not by chance that the two dimensions (Uploading/Downloading), supported by direct and indirect mechanisms, are emphasized as being important dimensions that provide member-states and members-to be with mechanisms for a better adaptation of the policies and structure that constitute the core of the Union. There is, within the Union, a line drawn between 'shapers' and 'takers' that is representative of the asymmetrical distribution of power within the Union.

Ever since the first steps for the European Project were taken, and the international role it came to play, there has been an academic discussion of the 'imperialist' practices that it is often accused of in the eastern 'neighbourhood' and around the world. However, through the investigative route of the many scholars that insert their opinions into the matter, actorness is an extremely complex discussion that leaves a sense that the Union presents itself as a 'hybrid' that commands its core values through two distinctive narratives that were chosen in the process of understanding the actor the EU represents shows the apparent struggle of the EU in defining what kind of actor it represents in the international system. The EU's narrative as a power, where military capacity is not the main instrument, allow the EU to stand out from other actors whose access to traditional instruments of power provide them with hard power. However, with the use of economic and political instruments, hence the soft power connotation that is always associated with the Union, allows for the creation of an increasingly influential actor. The same narrative occurs when several other actors have referred to the EU as a normative power where the capability to define what is 'normal' in the international arena becomes an ever-growing discussion, providing that none of the concepts has ever become entirely satisfactory.

One must, therefore, return to the question that originated the project itself: In what way has the ENP been a tool in the formation of the 'European empire'? Furthermore, what are the implications that that same influence has on the projection of its external image in the "neighbourhood"?

The discussion over the concept of empire provides, above all, a sort of 'hybrid actor' undertone for the Union where the accommodation of the member-states does not require the use of force, or the many use of traditional cohesive tactics. Consequentially, enlargement has, over time, become the most crucial tool in the formation of the supposed 'empire'. The growth from 6 to 28 countries with a series of successive enlargements, does not mean that the accession process is an easy task, in fact, the complexity and complexities of such process, through external and internal factors, makes it harder for other countries to acquire membership. Thus, due to the complexity of such process, the reason for the willing abdication of part of their sovereignty, not only for the sake of cooperating under the same common goals, but also to become primary beneficiaries of the advantages that come with it is to this day a debating question. There is, nonetheless, a hierarchical stance not only spatially but politically in order to be a part of the EU in the eastern 'neighbourhood'. However, there has been in the last few years, a realization that enlargement is not a policy that can go on '*ad infinitum*', presenting an evident fatigue of such process which can be understood as a clear sign of the need for internal cohesion before any new external expansion, the old debate between 'wideners vs. deepeners'.

Nevertheless, can the so called 'imperial narrative' be mistaken with pure hegemonic rhetoric on the EU's part? In this definite quest to better understand the Union's intentions in the eastern 'neighbourhood', the focus of the imperial discussion is, then, put towards the influence of the EU in the ENP and the creation of the 'ring of friends'. The EU is seen by some as an 'altruist actor' that is not there to bring peace, stability and prosperity as well as the sharing of norms, values and joint projects and a benign actor or 'peaceful hegemon' by others through its civilizing missions around the globe and where sovereign states are invited, not coerced, to be part of the EU which they can accept or decline.

Given the similarities between the two concepts, and the lack of a central military power that would be representative of the Union, alongside the absence of the use of more traditional 'conquering methods' it is made apparent that, the EU presents itself as more of a super-state with aggregated sovereignties whose hegemonic, yet far from imperialist rhetoric, prevails. This same rhetoric was, to a degree created in the search for a better accommodation solution to the individual problems of the various member states that are a part of it, together with its allies throughout the world, which can blur the thin line that exists between the two concepts. Another vital aspect that becomes part of the discussion is that of borders. The European identity is very much based on those same borders. At the same time that the EU debates with its identity, there are what appear to be geopolitical interests and 'hegemonic tendencies' when it comes to the neighbours towards the east. The discourse of 'ring of friends', can quickly be dismantled as being a part of the 'benign'

global approach. Surely the instruments used to maintain a strategic influence are not military but they are definitely economic and political, thus, providing a sort of vision on the structure and order of the European space demonstrating an apparent interest over the maintaining and future expanding of those same borders.

The transformative power that the EU has attained, over the years, allowed for the establishment of a strong relationship between the members of the ENP and the Union. Despite the great emphasis given to the EU for its efforts and its work in general done with the eastern partners, the views and understanding of member states are an essential part of the equation as well. The implementation and enforcing process after the formulation of a policy are equally important steps. Not only that, but the interdependence that those same policies create will change the 'architecture' of the power relations established. Thus, the concern with security. The integration of sovereign countries and the prevention of conflicts have been the main concerns of the EU if they are to maintain the hegemonic control over such countries. Demonstrating that the work in the neighbourhood is still far from being entirely done, however, with the creation of the ESS (2003) and more recently, the EUGS (2016) there appears to be a new breath of fresh air that might help the parties involved in order to create a stronger bond and dissipate the 'centre-periphery' dichotomy many times applied when talking of EU-ENP countries relations. The apparent shift with the update to the ESS, demonstrates an attempt of an actor, the EU, to consolidate its internal and external structure to achieve a reaffirmation in the international arena through the years. Bringing, along these lines, a sense of uniqueness, and redefinition, when it comes to the traditional characteristics of what an actor is, the instruments to use and the actions to take.

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