

## FROM FACTICAL LIFE TO ART: RECONSIDERING HEIDEGGER'S APPROPRIATION OF DILTHEY

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**Abstract:** This paper challenges the common narrative that Heidegger's philosophical project explicitly and necessarily abandons his early engagement with Dilthey after *Being and Time*. By historically piecing together Heidegger's critiques of Dilthey throughout his corpus alongside significant shifts in his use of terms like *Erlebnis* ("lived experience") and *Faktizität* ("facticity"), I demonstrate continuity rather than a radical split in his relation to Dilthey's philosophy. This interpretation offers a new perspective that works against the periodization of Heidegger's thought by highlighting the overlooked relevance of his early engagement with Dilthey for his later turn to art.

**Keywords:** Dilthey, Heidegger, facticity, *Erlebnis*, *Erfahrung*, aesthetics

There is little doubt that Dilthey's philosophy was influential in the development of Heidegger's thought, especially his early lecture courses and *Being and Time*. In 1924, Heidegger drafted an article entitled "The Concept of Time: Comments on the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence" for the *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*. The article was a review of the published collection of letters between Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg. While the article was not published in the journal, the manuscript became one of the sources for *Being and Time*. Gadamer described "The Concept of Time" as the *Ur-form* of *Being and Time*, and scholars now refer to this manuscript as "The Dilthey Draft."<sup>1</sup> Heidegger includes entire passages from this unpublished article in *Being and Time* and even asserts that his analysis of Dasein "is resolved to foster the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey's work."<sup>2</sup> Heidegger himself describes *Being and Time* as an appropriation (*Aneignung*) of Dilthey, which has significant meaning insofar as this term has the sense of retrieving something from the past that has potential for the present and future.

Beyond this passage in *Being and Time*, the magnitude of Dilthey's role in Heidegger's philosophical development preceding his magnum opus has come to light only in the past twenty years as a number of his early lecture courses from the *Gesamtausgabe* have been published and translated.<sup>3</sup> Scholars have used these early lecture courses to study how Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey forms the questions that guide his early work and informs his philosophical method. Among these scholars, Scharff claims that we have failed to appropriate Heidegger's thought fully because we have not developed an adequate account of his relation to Dilthey. Drawing from Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures, Scharff presents a provocative argument that Dilthey was even more important to the young Heidegger than Husserl and that "the Dilthey appropriation taught the young Heidegger *how to philosophize*."<sup>4</sup> In this sense, Heidegger does not treat Dilthey as simply one philosophical influence among others, but rather models his own way of philosophizing after Dilthey.

Despite the critical role Dilthey plays in Heidegger's thought in the decade before *Being and Time*, this appropriation is considered to end some time around its publication. The typical narrative is that Heidegger's attitude towards Dilthey appears to shift in the late 1920s and early 30s when his positive references to Dilthey taper off and only criticism regarding his philosophical limits remains. This period of Heidegger's philosophical development, known as his 'turn' (*Kehre*), seems to indicate an intellectual break with Dilthey. At this time, Heidegger critiques Dilthey for being immured in traditional philosophical language and for rejecting metaphysics, which sets up an epistemological framework centered on a Cartesian 'I.' In *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1928), Heidegger accuses Dilthey of privileging presence and objectivity, an indication that his philosophy operates within a Cartesian framework.<sup>5</sup> Heidegger develops this critique further when he explains that the Cartesian subject precludes the possibility of philosophy by rejecting metaphysics, which reshapes philosophy into a mere anthropology. In his later essay "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), Heidegger argues that Dilthey's critique of metaphysics illustrates "a leading example of anthropology's doing away with—as opposed to overcoming—philosophy" (GA 5:99/OBT 75).<sup>6</sup> In his *Black Notebooks* (1931–38), Heidegger names Dilthey as one of the "three ambient 'temptations'" that *Being and Time* was unable to master in trying to achieve its goals and tasks (GA 94:104/BN 57).<sup>7</sup> This passage suggests that thinking with Dilthey, whom Heidegger groups with Kierkegaard under the category *existentiell*, limited his efforts to articulate the question of being. The notebooks as a whole assert Heidegger's efforts to begin philosophy anew by turning to ancient Greek philosophy rather than figures in the tradition of German philosophy (GA 94:37/BN 24). In doing so, he appears to discard Dilthey. Additionally, Heidegger's lectures on art and poetry in the 1930s and 40s malign aesthetic theories based on lived experience (*Erlebnis*), which seems to be aimed at Dilthey and his major aesthetic work, *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*. For these reasons, scholars treat Heidegger's relation to Dilthey as a passing phase that is a part of his early development and irrelevant to his middle and late work after the *Kehre*.

Yet this narrative is not so simple when examined in greater detail. Heidegger's earlier works that celebrate Dilthey's philosophical insights make similar comments about the philosopher's "Cartesian" epistemological framework and the apparent anthropological aspects of his philosophical method.<sup>8</sup> While Heidegger's praise of Dilthey clearly diminishes starting in the late 1920s, his criticism of Dilthey remains the same throughout his corpus. The continuity in Heidegger's early and late critiques of Dilthey suggests that he did not suddenly reject this thinker at a certain point in his intellectual development and complicates the task of interpreting the appropriation. More importantly, Heidegger's early critiques of Dilthey focus on his failure

to do justice to his most promising insights because his methods remain too ingrained in traditional philosophical language. For Heidegger, the originality of Dilthey's insights demands a new approach to philosophy to which he only gestures. Heidegger thus critiques Dilthey's language and methods, not his central insights and guiding questions. In this sense, the appropriation aims to carry forward Dilthey's most promising ideas by radicalizing his philosophical methods and adopting new language.

In what follows, I argue not only that there is no clear and necessary break with Dilthey in Heidegger's philosophical development, but also that there is common ground between these thinkers well beyond *Being and Time*. The first claim challenges a long assumed narrative, while the second constructs a new one. Both parts of my argument are important for giving an account of the appropriation that expands upon Dilthey's relevance, rather than confining him to narrow historical or philosophical interpretations.

In the first section, I demonstrate how Heidegger's apparent rejection of Dilthey rests on confusion over the distinction between *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*, which are both terms for experience. Specifically, I trace Heidegger's early use of *Erlebnis* in the 1920s and later rejection of it in the 1930s to demonstrate continuity in his concept of experience, rather than a fundamental revision as his changing terminology seems to suggest. In the second section, I give an account of early Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey through the concept of facticity. 'Facticity' (*Faktizität*) describes what is given in lived experience. Despite being 'given,' facticity presents a particular challenge for philosophy because it describes the need to articulate our concrete, lived experience in ways that are not abstract or reductive. Facticity calls for new modes of concept-formation, which Dilthey develops through his aesthetic theory. While Heidegger does not turn to aesthetics in his early engagement with Dilthey and factual life, my third section argues that his later turn to art reflects the same concerns. In this way, I will go beyond Heidegger's explicit appropriation of Dilthey to draw new connections both between the thinkers and within Heidegger's corpus as a whole.

### 1. Reevaluating the *Erlebnis-Erfahrung* Distinction

One way to examine Heidegger's relation to Dilthey is the *Erlebnis-Erfahrung* distinction. Both *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* can be translated into English as 'experience,' yet they have different meanings and usage. The root of *Erfahrung* (*fahren*) means "to drive," "go," or "move," and has the sense of engaging with something and gaining knowledge or information through experience. This term is used most frequently in the natural sciences. *Erfahrung* frequently describes a more neutral type of experience, whereas *Erlebnis* (from the verb *leben*, 'to live') conveys a more intense or immersive experience. While some translators distinguish between these terms by translating *Erlebnis* as 'lived experience,' the differences between these two terms are frequently lost in English translations and require more context to understand.<sup>9</sup> To complicate matters further, multiple nineteenth and twentieth-century German philosophers—including Hegel, Benjamin, and Husserl—ascribed finer, more technical distinctions to each term and debated their connotations and proper usage. Heidegger's use of the *Erlebnis-Erfahrung* distinction proves to be even more complicated, especially when read in relation to Dilthey.

*Erlebnis* is central to Dilthey's philosophy, and early Heidegger's use of the term reflects Dilthey's influence. However, Heidegger eventually maligns the term—with which he associates all the philosophical ideas his thought attempts to overcome—and adopts *Erfahrung* instead. Due to the clear association between Dilthey and the term *Erlebnis*, scholars frame Heidegger's break

from Dilthey in terms of this shift in language. Understanding whether or not this critique of *Erlebnis* forms an explicit and necessary break from Dilthey means understanding how each thinker uses the term and the connotations they evoke in their use of it. In this section I will argue that Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis* undergoes such significant revisions that we cannot treat the term as an interpretative fulcrum for his break from Dilthey. The following will address Dilthey's understanding of *Erlebnis* and then trace Heidegger's use of the term from 1919 to 1939 to demonstrate how much it changes.

### 1.1. *The Erfahrung-Erlebnis Distinction in Dilthey's Philosophy*

Dilthey adopted the term *Erlebnis* in his philosophy to signal a particular approach to thinking that characterizes the human sciences and differs from the methods of the natural sciences. While the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) attempt to explain phenomena that are objective or follow lawful patterns, the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) cannot adopt the same methods because their subject—*Geist*, or human spirit—resists objectivity and lawfulness. Instead, the human sciences attempt to understand (*verstehen*) what cannot be fully explained (*erklären*). While both sciences examine experience, they approach it differently. The natural sciences assume a distant, reflective stance apart from its object of empirical study. By contrast, the human sciences are necessarily self-reflective and immersed in the very experiences they attempt to examine, which are contextual and continually changing. This distinction is why Dilthey adopts the term *Erlebnis* to convey the temporal and relational dynamism of lived experience in opposition to the more objective concept of experience conveyed by *Erfahrung*, which is the term used by the natural sciences and Kantian epistemology. For Dilthey, lived experience is historical—a complex, dynamic, and changing set of relations that cannot be reduced to the explanatory framework of the natural sciences. Unlike the experience of an object as distinct and separate from oneself, as *Erfahrung* suggests, *Erlebnis* conveys a sense of living through something—that is, a living perspective that changes over time.

Dilthey's adoption of *Erlebnis* relates to his attempt to revise Kantian epistemology. As Makkreel explains, Kant's use of *Erfahrung* treats experience as "a conceptual ordering of inert sensations" so that the basis for experience is not itself an experience, but instead raw material to be synthesized.<sup>10</sup> Kant's *Erfahrung* is a "phenomenal construct" of synthesized sensory input, whereas for Dilthey "the basic unit of consciousness is already experiential, namely, an *Erlebnis*."<sup>11</sup> In his unpublished notes *Fragments for a Poetics* (1907–1908) Dilthey states that a "lived experience is a distinctive and characteristic mode in which reality is there-for-me. A lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or represented" (GS 6:313/SW V.223).<sup>12</sup> Dilthey's use of *Erlebnis* emphasizes its lived aspect insofar as experience is *there-for-me*, meaning I am entangled in the world of experience, I live through it and in it, rather than the world being represented to me through experience.

Here it is important to note that Dilthey's concept of lived experience is not Cartesian, as Heidegger and his followers have suggested. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer claims that Dilthey's description of lived experience as *there-for-me* indicates an ego-centric Cartesian epistemological framework that requires everything be rooted in the subject.<sup>13</sup> Yet Dilthey's concept of *there-for-me* actually challenges Cartesian subjectivity because it describes a pre-theoretical unity between subject and object that is prior to any sense of an 'I.'<sup>14</sup> For Dilthey, the individual is not a disembodied ego but instead emerges only in relation to the world. Before we

even differentiate ourselves from the world, we possess what Dilthey calls “reflexive awareness” (*Innewerden*).<sup>15</sup> Dilthey develops an account of reflexive awareness in his “Breslau Draft” (1880) of the second volume to his *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Dilthey refers to reflexive awareness as “being-for-oneself, life” and describes it as an immediate state of awareness in which “the subject is not at all separated from what is perceived” (GS 19:160/SW I.339). Reflexive awareness is the dynamic mode of relation that precedes the recognition of subjects and objects. This pre-reflective state “contains no distinction between subject and object, but rather forms their foundation” (GS 19:161/SW I.339). For Dilthey, the separation that Descartes imposes between the self as a thinking thing and the world as physical thing is secondary to this prior unity and thus an artificial construction rather than a foundational one.

Moreover, unlike Descartes, Dilthey does not describe our relation to the world as subjects that stand over and against an external object. In *The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Justification* (1890), he argues that the world only becomes external to me when it *resists* me, which is not an intellectual relation but a tactile, bodily relation. Here Dilthey argues against Descartes’s concept of external objects as “projections of sensations into an outer visual or auditory space” (GS 5:106/SW II.24). Dilthey calls this concept of projection “superfluous” because the separation of self and world is secondary to our relation to the world and must be established through pre-reflective, embodied resistance. He explains how “a self begins to set itself apart from the objects within this spatial reality, as a *body*, as delineated and oriented in space” (GS 5:106/SW II.25). Whereas Descartes establishes a relation between the subject and world through the reflection of a transcendental ego or *res cogitans*, Dilthey sees the self as arising from immanent and embodied relations to the world. Accordingly, Dilthey’s use of the term *Erlebnis* conveys a very different sense of experience than Descartes. A lived experience is not a manifold of sensory data anchored by a transcendental ‘I.’ Instead, the term has existential and phenomenological connotations and conveys immersion in a world.

### 1.2. Heidegger’s Shifting Use of *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*

Early Heidegger adopts the term *Erlebnis* from Dilthey with similar concerns about how to approach the relational dynamism of experience. In his 1919 lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, a work thoroughly influenced by Dilthey, Heidegger uses *Erlebnis* in his discussion of the question “Is there something?” Here Heidegger addresses the phrase “there is . . .” (*Es gibt*, literally “it gives”). For Heidegger this question and the response to it are not purely intellectual or reflective. Rather, we experience the question as *lived*. He says, “The question is lived, is experienced [*erlebt*]. I experience. I experience something vitally” (GA 56:65/TDP 53). This early lecture course shows a preliminary account of what will become the question of being in *Being and Time*—namely, the question of why there is something rather than nothing. We experience the question in the sense that we live through it. The question strikes us. *Erlebnis* conveys the intensity of such an experience. This question of *Es gibt* as *an experience*, moreover, remains important throughout Heidegger’s corpus. In “Time and Being” (1962), Heidegger anchors his discussion of being and time in *Es gibt*. He notes that neither being nor time is a thing, meaning they do not exist like other things. Heidegger explains, “We do not say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is Being [*Es gibt Sein*] and there is time [*es gibt Zeit*]. . . . Instead of saying ‘it is,’ we say ‘there is,’ ‘It gives’” (GA 14:8–9/TB 4–5). Here Heidegger remarks that this phrase remains a mere idiom unless we “show how this ‘there is’ can

be experienced [*erfahren*] and seen” (GA 14:9/TB 5). In the *Protokoll* for “Time and Being,” Heidegger even points out how frequently he refers to ‘experience’ (*Erfahrung*) in the seminar. Heidegger explains this frequency by stating that the “awakening to Appropriation must be experienced [*erfahren*], it cannot be proven” (GA 14:63/TB 53). The strange and wondrous fact that there is something rather than nothing is not simply a statement—it is an experience. Despite using *Erfahrung* instead of *Erlebnis*, the late Heidegger emphasizes the *experience* of *Es gibt*, just as he did in his 1919 lecture course. More importantly, the shift from *Erlebnis* to *Erfahrung* from 1919 to 1962 is complicated, as the following will demonstrate.

In 1919 Heidegger describes *Erfahrung* as a distant and reflective form of experience, a “looked-at experience,” or a “de-vivification” of lived experience, an artificial construction that is secondary rather than foundational (GA 56:99/TDP 77). In this sense, *Erfahrung* adopts a Cartesian model of experience in which a subject stands apart from and looks at a separate, external world. Like Dilthey, Heidegger ascribes this de-vivified concept of experience to the natural sciences and their tendency to objectify and decontextualize:

Science determines and fixes objects in an objective manner. A science of experiences would have to objectify experiences and thus strip away their non-objective character as lived experience and event of appropriation. Already when I speak of *two* of my experiences I have objectified them: the one and the other, both are a something. For every experience that I want to consider I must isolate and lift out, break up and destroy the contexture of the experience so that in the end and despite all efforts to the contrary, I have only a heap of things. (GA 56:76/TDP 60)

Here the objective sense of *Erfahrung* conveys experience as discrete points of data abstracted from their context in opposition to the relational and dynamic sense of *Erlebnis*. *Erfahrung* treats the world as a set of objects that stand in relation to a subject, which is how Heidegger will characterize representational thought in the 1930s.

Like Dilthey, early Heidegger adopts the term *Erlebnis* to convey a living, dynamic sense of experience that is not centered on a Cartesian ego but instead the unity between the self and world. Heidegger states that there is no ‘I’ at the center of experience, but instead “only an ‘experience [*Er-leben*] of something,’ a ‘*living towards something*,” which he describes in terms of comportment (GA 56:68/TDP 55). Here Heidegger’s account of experience is closer to Dilthey’s than Husserl’s.<sup>16</sup> While Husserl’s concept of experience describes a pre-reflective relation through intentionality—the idea that consciousness is always consciousness *of* something—he still centers his account on a transcendental ego. By contrast, for Dilthey and Heidegger, we are always already thrown into a factual and historical world. The concrete, lived relations between the self and world form the foundation for experience. As Vallega-Neu describes, Heidegger *decenters* the human subject by showing how “in our concrete everyday ‘there-being,’ we are precisely not first and foremost with ourselves, encapsulated in some self-conscious ‘I-thing,’ but rather ‘out there,’ engaged by things, tasks, and others. Dasein is being-in-the-world and only from there comes back *to* itself when it becomes reflexively self-aware.”<sup>17</sup>

Heidegger retains this concept of experience as an open relation between the self and world in his later works. In “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), Heidegger describes being as that “which rises up and opens itself” and in doing so becomes present to those who open themselves to its presence (GA 5:90/OBT 68). In opposition to representational models that

conceptualize the subject of experience as determining beings, Heidegger instead claims that “man is the one who is looked upon by beings” (GA 5:91/OBT 68). This notion of experience describes a mutual relation, not unlike Heidegger’s derivation of phenomena from the verb *phainesthai*, which he explains is in the ‘middle voice,’ an ambiguous grammatical construction that is neither active nor passive voice (GA 2:28).<sup>18</sup> The middle voice works against grammatical structures that identify a subject and object and instead establishes a reflexive relation. Along similar lines Heidegger’s undelivered lecture entitled “The Provenance of Thinking” (1973), which addresses *the experience of thought*, describes perception as a mutual relation between perceiver and perceived: “For perception to be able to be encountered at all by the perceivable, it must hold itself open. . . . Both perception as well as presencing require for their own possibility—and this means at the same time for their ‘to one another’—a free and open dimension, within which they encounter one another” (GA 15:402/FS 93). This statement suggests that perceptual experience is neither a subjective process nor the passive reception of an object, but an entangled, mutual opening up of self and world that allows an encounter to happen. Heidegger’s early use of *Erlebnis* thus describes the same dynamic as his later works.

The connection between *Erlebnis* and *Ereignis* in Heidegger’s 1919 lecture course also suggests potential threads of continuity, since *Ereignis* is significant throughout his entire corpus.<sup>19</sup> In his 1919 lecture, Heidegger explains that a lived experience is “an event [*Ereignis*]—meaningful, not thing-like” (GA 56:69/TDP 56). This emphasis that *Erlebnis* is an event of appropriation conveys Heidegger’s intention to avoid a Cartesian ego that relates to an external world through representation. Heidegger explains that when he looks at something, like a lectern, it is not a physical object that he represents to himself, a transcendental ego, through a psychological process. That formulation is too abstract to convey the experience. Instead, the self “resonates with the experience” as an event of appropriation (GA 56:75/TDP 60). For Heidegger, the event of appropriation grounds lived experience such that there is neither a distinction between inner and outer, nor a *res cogitans* that serves as a foundation. Appropriation does not mean a process of internalizing something external. Instead, “experiences are events of appropriation in so far as they live out of one’s ‘own-ness,’ and life lives only in this way” (GA 56:75/TDP 60). In this sense, *Erlebnis* conveys the vitality and dynamism of our relation to the world in a way that does not require a Cartesian concept of the ‘I.’ As Heidegger describes in his lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* (1920–21), “the experiencing self and what is experienced are not torn apart” (GA 60:9/PRL 7). For this reason, early Heidegger’s use of *Erlebnis* does not conflict with his later philosophical positions, even if his emphasis shifts.

At the same time that early Heidegger adopts *Erlebnis* in a way that is coherent with his later concept of *Ereignis*, he also expresses dissatisfaction with its connotations, which foreshadows his eventual rejection of it in favor of *Erfahrung*. It is important to note that Heidegger was ambivalent about the term from the outset. Even in 1919, Heidegger deplores that *Erlebnis* is “so faded and worn thin that, if it were not so fitting, it would be best to leave it aside” (GA 56:66/TDP 53). This observation is likely due to the popularity of *Lebensphilosophie* in post-WWI Germany.<sup>20</sup> Like ‘life philosophy,’ ‘lived experience’ had such a popular, broad, and varied usage that it became emptied of any concrete meaning. Even though Heidegger uses *Erlebnis* during the period when he was engaged deeply with Dilthey’s thought, he was still suspicious of the hackneyed term, which had taken on new meanings since Dilthey’s death in 1911. Moreover, when we examine his adoption of *Erfahrung* we see continuity with the concerns that led him to use *Erlebnis* in the first place despite his ambivalence toward it.

By observing the difference between his 1919 lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy* and his 1919–20 lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*,<sup>21</sup> we can see the exact moment Heidegger moves from *Erlebnis* to *Erfahrung* and the philosophical concerns that motivate this shift. In *The Idea of Philosophy*, Heidegger used *Erlebnis* to convey the *toward-which* that characterizes experience. This describes the relation between self and world that precedes the subject-object distinction, which mirrors Dilthey's use of *Erlebnis* to convey lived experience as there-for-me. The toward-which of lived experience means that I am always already in a world. Yet just a semester later, Heidegger uses *Erfahrung* to convey the idea of experience as a "factual encountering" (GA 58:67/BPP 54). By factual encountering, Heidegger means that experience is not centered on the self of experience, but instead on the relation between self and world, a relation in which things strike us and move us. As Heidegger explains

it is a fact that in our factual lives we—each one of us—encounters this and that, or that this and that encountering 'befalls' us, that we get to know this and that, which makes an impression on us. . . . We describe this as 'ex-periencing' [*er-fahren*], acquiring, meeting on the road [*Fahrt*] of life and doing so in various modifications of that *in whose factual progression* of a world, the environing-world and every life-world is constructed upon. (GA 58:67/BPP 54)

Here Heidegger adopts *Erfahrung* in its Hegelian sense—that is, in the sense of going (*fahren*) or traveling always in relation to something. The more object-oriented connotation of *Erfahrung* allows Heidegger to shift the dynamic of experience more emphatically away from the subject. This shift from *Erlebnis* to *Erfahrung* conveys an attempt to find less subject-centered and more object-oriented language, which nevertheless does not depart from his earlier concerns. Instead, he transfers the meaning of one term to the other. It should also be noted that the idea of 'befalling' in this passage expresses the same idea of experience that Heidegger maintains through his middle and late works. In "The Nature of Language" (1957), Heidegger explains, "When we talk of 'undergoing' an experience [*Erfahrung*], we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it" (GA 12:149/OWL 57). Not only does Heidegger begin to use *Erfahrung* in a way that is similar to his early use of *Erlebnis*, he shifts the meaning of *Erlebnis* in the direction of his previous critiques of *Erfahrung* by characterizing it as Cartesian.

In the 1930s, Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis* undergoes a dramatic transformation and comes to stand for Cartesian subjectivity, representational thought, modern enframing (*Gestell*), and every mode of thinking that Heidegger wishes to overcome. Yet these critiques of *Erlebnis* do not contradict his previous conceptions of experience because they are based on a complete reconceptualization of the term. In Heidegger's notebooks from 1936–38, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Heidegger gives a very different definition of *Erlebnis* than he had in his 1919 lecture course. Heidegger states that *Erlebnis* is "the certainty of the ego," which interprets all being through this I (GA 65:131/C 104). He explains, "What can count as actually 'being' is only what is or can be the object of a lived experience . . . what humans can bring to themselves and before themselves" (GA 65:129/C 102). Here Heidegger describes *Erlebnis* as the culmination of metaphysics, which determines being according to the representational thought of the subject. He maps the progression of metaphysics beginning from Plato's use of 'idea' in the allegory of the cave to 'constant presence,' 'representedness,' and finally 'lived experience' (*Erlebnis*) (GA 65:130/C 102). Lived experience thus expresses the culmination of



the idea that the world and everything in it is the representation of a subject. Everything exists and is meaningful insofar as it can be experienced (*erleben*) by the subject. Heidegger expresses the same idea in “The Age of the World Picture” (1938). Modern thought no longer recognizes the being of beings and determines everything in relation to the subject, which turns the world into a mere representation or picture: “the world becomes a picture as soon as man makes his life as subject the primary center of reference. This means: the being counts as in being only to the degree and extent that it is taken into, and referred back to, this life, i.e., is lived out [*erlebt*], and becomes life-experience [*Er-lebnis*]” (GA 5:94/OBT 71). Heidegger’s use of *Erlebnis* in the 1930s thus stands for the ego-centric dilemma of metaphysics and the violence of representational thought, instead of the broader notion of comportment, or living toward, from his early Freiburg lectures.

Heidegger’s *Contributions* undermine any positive notion of *Erlebnis* by connecting lived experience to machination (*Machenschaft*). For Heidegger, lived experience belongs to and verifies machination in modern thought. Machination is “the domination of making. . . . The pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself” (GA 65:131/C 92). Machination treats everything as something to be calculated, explained, and determined. Heidegger sees *Erlebnis* as yet another instance of the violence of thought, which imposes its own structures on things rather than being responsive to them. This relation between lived experience and machination becomes even more explicit in Heidegger’s critique of museum installations in *Mindfulness* (1938–39).<sup>22</sup> In this posthumously published journal written directly after *Contributions*, Heidegger describes the modern museum experience as a form of machination. A museum enframes (*gestellen*) works of art to calculate a specific response, which Heidegger calls “training-in-lived experience” (GA 66:33/M 25). The works of art are presented as “liveable” so that they can be incorporated into the viewer’s own life and digested whole (GA 66:33/M 26). This treats the work of art as an object that is wholly determined by the subject and consumed without any remainder. Thus, not only does Heidegger reject *Erlebnis*, he seems to reject any aesthetic theory that is based on the idea of lived experience. In particular, Heidegger’s writings on art emphasize his adoption of *Erfahrung* and rejection to *Erlebnis*. During this shift, the object-oriented connotations of *Erfahrung* serve his attempt to reinterpret the thing in *The Origin of the Work of Art* (1935–36). By contrast, the more subject-centered connotations of *Erlebnis* become an impediment to his attempt to approach the work of art as ‘thingly,’ despite early Heidegger’s insistence that *Erlebnis* is not subject-centered.

Yet given the dramatically shifting meanings of the word *Erlebnis* in Heidegger’s philosophy, we see how his later critique of *Erlebnis* expresses the same concerns he had when he originally adopted the word. His early use of *Erlebnis* and later use of *Erfahrung* both emphasize the open, relational dynamism of experience. The change in language thus covers over continuity and reveals a more complicated story of his relation to Dilthey’s philosophy. Moreover, it should be noted that one of the motivating factors of Heidegger’s shift from *Erlebnis* to *Erfahrung* is to account for the facticity of experience, which he adopted from Dilthey, as the next section will explain.

Having complicated the common narrative of Heidegger’s break from Dilthey, the following sections will attempt to reconstruct a new understanding of how to read these thinkers in relation to each other, beginning with the concept of facticity and ending with the necessity of thinking the factual through art.

## 2. Facticity and the Problem of How to Philosophize about Experience

Rather than examining Heidegger's relation to Dilthey in terms of *Erlebnis*, a term which shifts in meaning too much to provide a clear indication of a break, I will develop an account of the appropriation through Dilthey's formulation of facticity. As Scharff notes, Heidegger's engagement with Dilthey centers on the idea of facticity: "in Dilthey the young Heidegger sees a pioneering effort to take seriously the idea that all thinking originates in and speaks out from its directly lived, factual situation."<sup>23</sup> Early Heidegger adopts Dilthey's notion that the "standpoint of life" is the proper orientation of philosophizing as opposed to pure theoretical speculation. For both Dilthey and Heidegger, facticity presents the need for thought to be grounded in the concrete world rather than abstract formulas. Philosophy cannot simply proceed from universals to particulars or apply concepts and categories to experience.<sup>24</sup> Philosophy must find a way to negotiate between the concrete particular and the broader categories of thought; a challenge that both Dilthey and Heidegger take up in terms of factual life.

### 2.1. Dilthey's Formulation of Facticity through Aesthetics

For Dilthey, facticity describes what is given in lived experience, which we can never fully articulate or explain and thus calls for new modes of philosophical description.<sup>25</sup> The ground for lived experience (*Erlebnis*) is life (*Leben*), which acts as a deep and inscrutable source whose depths we cannot fully unearth. In his unpublished notes, "Life and Cognition" (1892–93),<sup>26</sup> Dilthey states:

The expression 'life' formulates what is most familiar and most intimate to everyone, yet at the same time something most obscure, indeed totally inscrutable. What life is remains an insoluble riddle. All reflection, inquiry, and thought arise from this inscrutable [source]. All cognition is rooted in this never fully cognizable [ground]. (GS 19:346/SW II.72)

Dilthey sees life as an origin that we cannot fully reach. He explains, "no matter how hard I struggle to obtain the pure experience of the given, there is no such thing. The given lies beyond my direct experience" (GS 19:335/SW II.60). In this way, facticity points towards the underivability of the given, which means we cannot arrive at an understanding of lived experience through transcendental concepts or logical derivations. The source or ground for cognition is itself not completely cognizable and thus forms a limit. As Dilthey notes, "What life is cannot be expressed in a formula or be explained. For thought cannot go behind the very life from which it arises and in whose context it appears" (GS 19:347/SW II.72). As we are always within life, we can never get beyond it to analyze it from the outside. We are always caught up within it. There is no absolute perspective that can provide an a priori account because life always involves a context of concrete particularities and immanent relations.

Dilthey explains that the interconnections and coherence of life provide the ground for philosophy—not logical relations or rational concepts. He asserts that "connectedness in life

cannot be reduced to logical connections” (GS 19:347/SW II.73). This is not to say that Dilthey rejects logic and reason to assert a mystical vitalism. For Dilthey, “Thought can indeed shed light on life, but it cannot go behind life” (GS 19:357/SW II.83). Facticity limits our ability to grasp and analyze the given completely, yet this limit provides another possibility: description. In this way, “to ground thought is to go back to this process of life and describe it” (GS 19:344/SW II.69). For Dilthey, description takes a different approach to philosophy than metaphysics, which attempts to impose an artificial, rational order on the world. Dilthey explains, “Because metaphysics sought to conceptually comprehend the world, it was thinkable only under the presupposition that reason is primary and creative in the world and that concepts of reason are the forms of actuality” (GS 19:347/SW II.73). Yet this system of rationality limits philosophy because it fails to recognize the constraints it has imposed. The intellect is not the most foundational ground—life is. For Dilthey, the intellect is a “transient function that appears in life only at intervals” and yet “made itself into the principle of the entire universe” in order to treat reality as coextensive with categories (GS 19:348/SW II.73). Dilthey, however, argues the opposite. Life is the ground out of which philosophy grows and thought cannot go beyond it, nor can thought fully penetrate it. Instead, “life manifests an individual factuality, a *haecceitas* that the intellect cannot demonstrate to be necessary . . . the intellect cannot elucidate the singular traits of this small fragment of reality that lies before it” (GS 19:348/SW II.73). For this reason, philosophy must not attempt to dissect or abstractly conceptualize the facticity of life, but instead describe it and interpret how life articulates itself. In Dilthey’s philosophy, this need for interpretation means that philosophy must turn to art.

Art has a special status in Dilthey’s philosophy because of facticity,<sup>27</sup> which he explicitly develops and frames in terms of art. In his *Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics* (1887), Dilthey describes facticity as a “surplus” and ascribes it to poetry as well as to life. “Facticity has always proved to be the ultimate fresh and firm nucleus of every poetic work. Therefore, a poetic work always contains more than can be expressed in a general proposition, and its gripping force comes precisely from this surplus” (GS 6:206/SW V.137). As a surplus, facticity cannot be subsumed into transcendental concepts or fit within a systematic framework. Reason lacks commensurable categories. The surplus of facticity describes not only the felt aspect of lived experience, but also its multi-faceted and contextualized nature. Factual life is excessive in the sense that it contains more than can be articulated or defined. Something unsaid always remains. The same is true of poetry. There cannot be a complete or final interpretation of a great poem. Poetic ambiguity allows for a plurality of meanings because what is central to the poem can take on new relations; its meaning is not fixed or determinate but fluid. Moreover, the poem says more than a simple proposition or idea because *how* it speaks is as important as *what* it says. Through rhythm, sound, imagery, and associations, the words of a poem take on greater significance than what they simply signify. For Dilthey the surplus of meaning in the poetic work evokes the surplus of factual life such that “a great poem is as irrational and incommensurable at its nucleus as the life that it portrays” (GS 6:217/SW V.149). A great poem, like life, overflows with possible interpretations and meaning.

Not only does Dilthey develop the concept of facticity within his *Poetics*, he uses art and poetry to describe facticity in his philosophy of life. In “Life and Cognition,” his descriptions of facticity emphasize the need to approach it like music. He explains that life forms an “insoluble riddle” that resists formulas or static conceptualization and yet it “can be described. Its particular characteristic traits can be set in relief. One can trace, as it were, the accents and rhythms of the melody it arouses, but life cannot be analyzed into its factors. It is unanalyzable” (GS 19:346/SW

II.72). While the ground for lived experience cannot be analyzed in absolute terms, we can describe it like a melody. Dilthey thus rejects abstract conceptual analysis that presupposes a neutral perspective from the outside and instead develops a descriptive method that remains rooted in the standpoint of life—an approach to thinking that Dilthey characterizes as musical, rather than logical.<sup>28</sup> In other words, we must treat life in its fullness of sense, feeling, and expression like a melody, rather than reduce it to an explanatory framework of formal categories. Like music, the qualitative and felt aspects as well as the temporality of lived experience elude abstraction.

In his unpublished notes “Fragments for a Poetics,” Dilthey describes the poet’s ability to understand life. Unlike other ways of seeing the world, the poetic attitude does not subordinate things to a goal or purpose.<sup>29</sup> The poet is not engaged in a specific action that would interpret an event or object into a determinate framework that could restrict the meaning of life’s broader relations. Thus, for Dilthey the poet “apprehends the significance of life” (GS 6:319/SW V.230). As Dilthey explains, “In youth, life and poetic attitude coincide—life can still be spontaneous. Deliberate action forces life and poetic attitude to diverge. It is then that our poetic powers usually disappear” (GS 6:319/SW V.230). The poetic attitude describes the way of thinking that Dilthey finds necessary to approach life in its factual complexity and concreteness. We see this throughout these incomplete notes, since Dilthey’s revisions discuss not only aesthetic theory but also the need for “a different method” for approaching lived experience that “can lead us further” (GS 6:318/SW V.229). Dilthey sees the need to revise his approach to understanding life through a less direct method that does not force lived experience into determinate distinctions for the sake of clarity, but instead proceeds “through an intermediary” (GS 6:318/SW V.229). This intermediary between lived experience and understanding is expression—which becomes more vivid through art and literature in particular (GS 6:318/SW V.229).

Dilthey’s account of facticity thus sets up a descriptive method for approaching life that lends itself to aesthetics. Early Heidegger, however, approaches the challenges that factual life poses to philosophical concept-formation through phenomenology rather than aesthetics.

## 2.2. Heidegger’s Adoption of Facticity from Dilthey

Heidegger adopts the issue of factual life in his early Freiburg lectures (1919–23), the time period when he confronts Dilthey’s thought most rigorously. At this time, Heidegger’s philosophical questions revolve around the issue of how to philosophize from the perspective of factual life. Heidegger first uses the term in his 1920 lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, where he discusses and defends Dilthey’s philosophy at length.<sup>30</sup> While others are critical of the fact that Dilthey never provided a complete, systematic method of philosophizing, Heidegger states that this aspect of his thought was intentional since he questioned whether we could trace philosophical problems back to universal or unconditioned absolutes (GA 59:153/PIE 118). For Dilthey, the nature of history and lived experience is change, and life provides a limit that we cannot transcend. For these reasons, philosophy cannot attain the unconditioned conditions for experience and knowledge. Instead of seeking absolutes, Dilthey’s thought pursued the “ultimate philosophical motive: to interpret life from out of itself, primordially” (GA 59:154/PIE 119). Since life provides the ground and limit for thought, facticity describes the situation of our existence in terms of a constant interpretation and opening up of meanings. Here Heidegger’s definition of philosophy reflects this need for constant

interpretation in his description of ‘worrying.’ Heidegger characterizes the task of philosophy as “preserving the facticity of life and strengthening the facticity of Dasein” which requires “being worried in constant renewal” (GA 59:174/PIE 133). As Kisiel describes, facticity is “to be experienced not by taking cognizance of it, but by vital participation in it, being distressed by it, troubled and put out of ease, so that the troubled self who ‘minds’ or ‘cares’ is continually affected (*betroffen*) by this affliction.”<sup>31</sup> According to Heidegger, this worrying about factual lived experience is the essential task of philosophy yet is “hushed up” by his contemporaries and thus “only possible on the basis of Diltheyian intuitions” (GA 59:174/PIE 133). Dilthey opens up this possibility but does not achieve it and only offers “as perhaps every great philosopher, intimations: he sees a new reality but the expansion on what is seen is mostly never enacted” (GA 59:163–64/PIE 125–26). For Heidegger, Dilthey’s insights, though essential to the purpose of philosophy, are not fully realized and require a more radical approach.

Heidegger intends to further Dilthey’s “intimations” by delving into them through a *phenomenological-critical destruction*. Heidegger describes phenomenological destruction as necessary to prevent the return to things themselves from becoming “merely a retreat into one’s own common sense” (GA 59:30/PIE 21). Common sense is not primordial but instead generalized concepts formed from societal norms that have been adopted uncritically. Heidegger describes destruction as an attempt to go back to the primordial as historical, or the falling-away of life from what we can grasp through concepts (GA 59:37/PIE 26–27). For Heidegger, this form of destruction is essential to phenomenological method as “philosophy does not consist in deduced general definitions, but is always an element of *factual life experience*” (GA 59:36/PIE 26). Like Dilthey, Heidegger sees philosophy as necessarily enacted in relation to factual life experience. Unlike Dilthey, Heidegger considers the task of *interpreting life from out of itself* to require an ontological approach that “question[s] towards the primordially of the existence relation” (GA 59:38/PIE 27). While this 1920 lecture course set up Heidegger’s phenomenological destruction of Dilthey’s life-philosophy, his 1923 course *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* enacts this method. In this lecture course we can see Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey in his treatment of factual life through ontology. Like Dilthey, Heidegger situates his consideration of factual life in terms of the distinction between the human sciences and natural sciences. Heidegger seems to criticize Dilthey’s life-philosophy due to his remarks about psychologism, yet these critiques are not aimed at Dilthey but at the same psychological methods that Dilthey opposes. Namely, Dilthey rejects explanatory approaches to psychology that creates abstract divisions and compartmentalizes the mind, rather than illuminating our existence. Like Dilthey, Heidegger proposes a new basis for human science, “not as a system of propositions and grounds for justifying them, but rather as something in which factual Dasein critically confronts itself and explicates itself” (GA 63:72/OHF 56). These words resonate with Diltheyian overtones and suggest Heidegger’s intention to adopt Dilthey’s philosophical project in his own terms.

Here Heidegger’s criticism that Dilthey did not adopt phenomenology is tempered by his critique of phenomenology. Heidegger notes several problems with the development of phenomenology: (1) it uncritically takes up traditional epistemological questions, (2) its distinctions are defined by the limits of logic, (3) it has a misguided drive for system—a tendency that Dilthey avoids by realizing that knowledge is always incomplete—and (4) it adopts traditional terminology that waters down its meaning (GA 63:71–72/OHF 56). Heidegger’s ontology is an attempt to overcome these limitations of phenomenology for the task of establishing the human sciences without a traditional, systematic epistemology. He shares

Dilthey's task in reestablishing philosophy by breaking from traditional epistemology, yet does not fully acknowledge Dilthey's role in his adoption of this task. Thus the path that "hermeneutics of facticity attempts to travel" is more connected to Dilthey than Heidegger conveys.

Like Dilthey, Heidegger sees life as the basis for philosophical inquiry and a challenge to philosophical methods that apply conceptual frameworks to lived experience. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1919), Heidegger calls phenomenology a primal science that addresses "life in and for itself" (GA 58:1/BPP 2). The goal of life-philosophy is thus to bring philosophy "to 'life' . . . in an original and radical way" (GA 58:1/BPP 2). In *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* (1921), Heidegger calls life "a basic phenomenological category" and states that "life-philosophy is an actual attempt to come to philosophy rather than babble idly over academic frivolities" (GA 61:80/PIA 61). In his 1920–21 lecture course, *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger makes factual life fundamental by stating that "in it, the path to philosophy is made possible" (GA 60:11/PRL 8). Here he describes how philosophy's tendency to move *away* from factual life requires a "turning around" toward factual life "through an authentic transformation" (GA 60:10/PRL 8). For this reason, Heidegger claims "Philosophy's departure as well as its goal is factual life experience" (GA 60:15/PRL 11). Like Dilthey, Heidegger's approach to facticity is not through concepts and universals, but through an attempt to understand the concrete contexts and relations of life. Heidegger describes facticity as what life *is* and "whereby it is, in its highest authenticity" (GA 61:87/PIA 66). He wants to transform philosophical thought by reorienting and connecting it more deeply to the dimensions of our experience that seem to defy abstract conceptualization.<sup>32</sup>

For Heidegger as for Dilthey, bringing philosophy to life and illuminating life through philosophy is not a simple matter. Philosophy must examine categories as they arise from experience—that is, as life articulates itself. Life has its own modes of access—namely, "life comes to itself" and philosophy cannot "pounce" on it from the outside (GA 61:88/PIA 66). Like Dilthey, Heidegger considers categories to be grounded in life and in need of articulation, rather than concepts that can be impressed on the raw data of sensory perception: "Categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata . . . they are *alive in life itself* in an original way" (GA 61:88/PIA 66). For this reason, "Categories can be understood only insofar as factual life itself is compelled to interpretation" (GA 61:87/PIA 66). Interpretation, moreover, implies meaning. Heidegger explains, "In factual life, we always live in contexts of meaningfulness . . . which speak to themselves in their own language. If we transfer ourselves into such experiences, vitally going along, then we notice that in the context of meaningfulness in which we live, we somehow have ourselves" (GA 58:250/BPP 188–89). Heidegger's account of factual life emphasizes the meaningful contexts that form our lived experience, which echoes Dilthey's account of facticity and *Erlebnis*. As Sheehan describes, facticity describes "the fact that we are always already engaged with the *factum* of meaning-giving, from which there is no escape."<sup>33</sup>

In both Dilthey's and Heidegger's accounts of factual life the demand for philosophy remains the same. Namely, since factual life is not an object apart from us but rather something that involves us intimately, we are always already a part of that which we investigate. We cannot simply conceptualize life but must pursue it hermeneutically—in terms of moving from parts to the whole, interpreting life temporally through a narrative of the past, and recognizing the way we are always already entangled in the object of our investigation. For both thinkers, categories are not only articulated in terms of life but also must relate to life as a whole. Heidegger states that a "category is interpretive in relation to life in its entirety" (GA 61:89/PIA 67). For Dilthey

and Heidegger, this relation to the whole means that categories must be historical. That is, the temporal structure of factual life requires thinking life in terms of its historicity. In *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger states that factual life is only intelligible “from the concept of the ‘historical’” (GA 60:9/PRL 7). The basic character of factual life becomes visible through memory.<sup>34</sup> A hermeneutic approach to factual life thus adopts a mode of thinking that is grounded and immersed in what it attempts to understand. Like Dilthey, for Heidegger factual life defines the situation we find ourselves in: constant self-interpretation. As Kisiel explains, “Because factic life experience is more than a cognitive experience, more than even the simple initial experience of taking cognizance, philosophy in the face of it must undergo a total transformation. What is had, lived, experienced in factic life experience is more than a mere object for a subject and its theory-forming activity, it is a world *in* which one can *live*. (One cannot live in an object).”<sup>35</sup> This is why facticity requires, as Heidegger describes, “a peculiar turning around of philosophical comportment” insofar as factual life forms both its “departure” and its “goal” (GA 60:16/PRL 11).

Dilthey and Heidegger thus both use the concept of facticity to denote: (1) the felt, qualitative characteristics of lived experience, (2) its givenness in terms of the here and now—its *thisness*. Since life provides the ground and limit for factual lived experience, facticity emphasizes as well the (3) underivability of the given. Life is what is closest to us yet most difficult to understand. Moreover, as we are always within life,<sup>36</sup> we can never get beyond it to analyze it from the outside. We are always caught up within it. Facticity thus describes the (4) entanglement of the self and world as a hermeneutic circle. That means that despite being “given” as a *haecceitas*, facticity is not immediate or self-evident, but always in need of interpretation. Unlike a fact that is analyzable and can be correct or incorrect, the factual asserts a deeper source to what is given in the present moment that cannot be fully unearthed. In this sense, facticity conveys (5) the inexhaustibility of a lived experience and the surplus of possible meanings that unfold from it. The feeling, *haecceitas*, underivability, hermeneutic entanglement, and inexhaustibility of facticity form the basis for Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey and, as I will argue in the following section, remain relevant throughout Heidegger’s philosophical development.

Unlike Dilthey, early Heidegger does not frame his approach to factual life within aesthetic theory. Yet as early as 1919, Heidegger connects factual life to art.<sup>37</sup> In a 1919 summer semester course, Heidegger uses the artist and religious person as examples of “genuine life-experiences” (GA 56:208/TDP 155). In *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Heidegger describes van Gogh’s intense confrontation with his factual existence through his artistic work (GA 63:32/OHF 26–27). While he does not develop these connections in depth, his early thought provides some indication of why his later work privileges art. By the time Heidegger develops his philosophy of art, he no longer uses the term *facticity*. While facticity plays an important role in Heidegger’s thought up to *Being and Time*, he stops using the term almost completely after its publication.<sup>38</sup> There are a few possible reasons for him abandoning this term. First of all, Heidegger could have grown increasingly concerned with distinguishing his philosophy from neo-Kantians like Natorp and Rickert, who approached facticity as an attempt to articulate transcendental conditions for absolute consciousness. Like Dilthey, for Heidegger facticity is not a matter of transcendental conditions for experience but, as Kisiel describes, “a primal reality ever to be experienced, the self in the actualization of life-experience.”<sup>39</sup> In this sense, when facticity becomes a purely transcendental issue it loses its grip on experience. Another reason for Heidegger abandoning this term could be the rise of empiricism and positivism in the twentieth

century. The positivistic concept of ‘fact’ runs counter to Heidegger’s concerns because it exhibits a mode of representational thinking that cannot inquire into its conditions or situatedness.<sup>40</sup> Facticity, unlike the empirical sense of ‘fact,’ attempts to articulate the complex dynamics by which something is given and yet never exhausted or completely determined. Lastly, French existentialism shifts the meaning of facticity in the 1940s. Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* (1943) and Beauvoir’s *Ethics of Ambiguity* (1947) reinterpret facticity (*facticité*) to describe the inescapable conditions of existence that oppose human freedom. While facticity is connected to Dasein’s thrownness in a world, Heidegger’s discussions are more concerned with lived experience and challenges to concept formation than issues of freedom.<sup>41</sup> More importantly, Heidegger’s philosophy does not approach freedom in the same way as French existentialism due to his critique of Cartesian subjectivity. In these ways, the term facticity has a plurality of connotations and associations that do not necessarily serve Heidegger’s purposes. But he still deals with many of the same issues that facticity raises in his discussions of art—that is, feeling, *haecceitas*, underivability, interpretation, and surplus meaning.

In the following section, I will argue that this concern with facticity and the challenges it poses to concept-formation remain and take a new shape in Heidegger’s account of the work of art. Sheehan has shown how facticity remains significant through Heidegger’s thought. Specifically, he argues for continuity in Heidegger’s thought insofar as his early writings on facticity and later formulation of *Ereignis* (event of appropriation) both deal with the same questions of meaning and sense-making in terms of how the world is disclosed to us.<sup>42</sup> I will draw similar parallels between the early and late Heidegger, but instead focus on the event of art as a new vocabulary for the hermeneutics of facticity. Here I will re-appropriate Dilthey—specifically the relation between facticity and art—to show how Heidegger’s turn to art flows from, rather than against, his earlier philosophical investigations.

### 3. Rethinking Facticity through Art

While Dilthey explicitly draws connections between art and facticity, this relation is more implicit in Heidegger’s thought and harder to trace. Adding to this issue, it might seem counterintuitive to use Dilthey’s philosophy to understand Heidegger’s writings on art. On the surface, Heidegger sets up his approach to art and poetry against *Erlebnis* aesthetics.<sup>43</sup> Heidegger argues that such aesthetic theory treats the work of art as a mere object of sensuous apprehension to be analyzed and summed up in terms of the subject’s lived experience. In his epilogue to *The Origin of the Work of Art*, he writes, “Lived experience [*Erlebnis*] is the source that is standard not only for art appreciation and enjoyment, but also for artistic creation. Everything is a lived experience. Yet perhaps lived experience is the element in which art dies” (GA 5:67/PLT 77).<sup>44</sup> With this approach to aesthetics, the work of art is valuable only insofar as it produces a particular experience in the spectator. *Erlebnis* aesthetics thus approaches the work of art as a product to be consumed. For Heidegger, art dies when it becomes something that can be exhausted in terms of a subjective experience and has no depth or force of its own. Yet, as established by tracing the shifting meanings of the *Erlebnis-Erfahrung* distinction earlier, Heidegger’s rejection of *Erlebnis* does not indicate a rejection of Dilthey’s philosophy. Rather, Heidegger trades *Erlebnis* for *Erfahrung* in an effort to convey the facticity of experience. I will argue that despite Heidegger’s critique of *Erlebnis* aesthetics, facticity still informs his approach to art and that this continuity demonstrates resonances with Dilthey’s aesthetics. In *The Origin of*



*the Work of Art* Heidegger describes works of art in a way that reflects Dilthey's description of facticity as the qualitative and felt dimensions of experience that cannot be grasped through abstract concepts, as an underivable *haecceitas* that presents an inexhaustible surplus of meanings, and as the entanglement of self and world that calls for hermeneutic interpretation.

Heidegger begins *The Origin of the Work of Art* by pointing out that aesthetic theories focus so heavily on the conceptual meaning or symbolism of works of art that we fail to recognize this seemingly obvious and insignificant detail: that works of art are things, like other things in the world. For example, "Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest. During the First World War Hölderlin's hymns were packed in the soldier's knapsack together with cleaning gear. Beethoven's quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar" (GA 5:3/PLT 19). Works of art are material and are of this world, like other things in the world, and yet they are more. Unfortunately, as soon as we try to talk about "mere things"—things not defined by their usefulness—we are at a loss. In considering the history of the matter-form thing-concept and its prevalence in Western thought, Heidegger suggests that equipment has dominated how we think about things. Philosophy has treated things as equipment implicitly for so long that we no longer have any concept of a thing aside from its purpose. For Heidegger, however, works of art are significant not because they are physical vehicles for a spiritual meaning, but because they allow us to approach things in a more open way that is not limited by the concept of use. As exemplified in his description of van Gogh's painting of shoes, the thing must be understood in terms of the many relations that form its context or its world as a whole, which requires a different comportment than when we engage with equipment. When we use a tool, it fades to the background and does not become conspicuous unless it breaks. By contrast, the work of art preserves the thing within the complex relations that form the world and makes the significance of these relations more vivid. Rather than abstracting from the sensible and felt qualities of experience by privileging ideas, art delves into their depth. Through art we become aware of ourselves as *in* a world, not simply detached spectators of things. Art thus turns us toward the facticity of things.

Art draws out the facticity of things insofar as they cannot be exhausted, which Heidegger describes in the dynamic between earth and world. For Heidegger, the work of art "sets up a world" and "holds open the Open of the world" (GA 5:31/PLT 44). The world opened by the work of art thus describes what manifests itself vividly to us. Every work of art discloses something by bringing it to light: "metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak" (GA 5:32/PLT 45). Art makes the world present itself as such—it makes the world *world* (*die Welt welten*). This phrase seems to convey Dilthey's concept of *Erlebnis* as a heightened experience that makes the world more vivid.<sup>45</sup> The work of art opens up a world, by thrusting the extraordinary to the surface and the familiar down (GA 5:54/PLT 64). Yet what is disclosed must come from somewhere, a deeper source that is not fully disclosed. Heidegger calls this source 'earth.' While the world describes the dynamic by which things are disclosed to us, the earth describes the source whereby things withdraw from us and elude our full understanding. As Heidegger describes, "Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it" (GA 5:33/PLT 45). The dynamic between earth and world in the work of art is thus the strife between self-disclosure and self-seclusion. But Heidegger emphasizes that the earth and world are not separable, nor are their boundaries distinct: "The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts

through world” and their relation does not “wither away into the empty unity of opposites” (GA 5:35/PLT 47).

Art in particular expresses this relation between earth and world—or between withdrawal and disclosure—because it allows the thing to remain hidden and unexplained. Art lets the thing rest in itself. For Heidegger

the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up. . . . the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also uses the word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word. (GA 5:34/PLT 46)

The work of art, like facticity, draws our attention to the complex dynamics by which things are given to experience. What is most vivid in experience—its qualitative and felt aspects—resists explanation and cannot be exhausted. This relation between earth and world in the work of art describes the same dynamic that facticity brings to experience. With facticity, what is most familiar is furthest from our understanding. Art is not the symbolic representation of a reality that is set apart from us as subjects, but instead the disclosure of our factual entanglement with the world. In art we recognize the relations that make our being and the world inextricable from one another. We cannot sum up the meaning of a lived experience or arrive at final interpretation, but instead may always return to it to find new meanings. In the same sense, there is always more to be disclosed in a work of art. As Dilthey suggests, “the gripping force” of every work of art “comes precisely from this surplus” (GS 6:206/SW V.137).

Moreover, Heidegger’s description of the *createdness* of the work of art emphasizes its facticity in terms of *haecceitas* (thisness). For Heidegger, the creation of the work of art is not about the artist, material techniques, or circumstances that can explain how it came to be. Instead, “the simple ‘factum est’” of the work stands out (GA 5:52–53/PLT 63). We marvel that the work of art *is*, that it exists here and now, and “that such a work *is* at all rather than is not” (GA 5:53/PLT 63). The work of art is an event that provokes us to ask the question of being that Heidegger developed in *The Idea of Philosophy* and articulates more fully in *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time*, the broken tool can cause this sense of wonder because it interrupts us from our routine ways of being in ways that make us think about the nature of things. Yet the tool only does so when it breaks, unlike the work of art. In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger states that the *factum est* of tools “disappears in usefulness” and becomes a part of what is commonplace (GA 5:53/PLT 63). By contrast, the “more essentially the work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not” (GA 5:53/PLT 63). The work of art illuminates *haecceitas* in a way that other things cannot. Heidegger’s description of the significance of the work of art thus emphasizes its facticity. Facticity takes up the idea of a fact, something given in experience, but expands the sense of what is given. If the given is merely empirical data, it can be collected, analyzed, and determined in its entirety. Experience would be transparent, not interpretative. Facticity, however, recognizes that the incommensurability and un-derivability of the given—the simple “that it is” or *es gibt* that makes experience possible and at the same time cannot be grasped.

In these ways, Heidegger's turn to art after *Being and Time* expresses many of the same concerns as his earlier engagement with Dilthey and the problem of factual life.

#### 4. Reconsidering Heidegger's Appropriation of Dilthey through Facticity & Art

By connecting the work of art to facticity in Dilthey and Heidegger, I have constructed a new narrative of Heidegger's relation to Dilthey—one that thinks beyond the narrow confines of explicit historical influence and instead compares similarities in concerns and general approaches. This new interpretation of the appropriation thus challenges the periodization of Heidegger's thought and questions how scholars have placed Dilthey in the history of German philosophy.<sup>46</sup> Heidegger's thought clearly diverges from his early engagement with Dilthey and develops new insights and ways of thinking. Yet Heidegger's relation to Dilthey was always complicated and does not take a linear path from adoption to rejection. From the beginning, Heidegger described appropriation as a critical adoption, or *Destruktion*,<sup>47</sup> that carries forward the unseen potential of an idea. With this sense, Heidegger's appropriation takes up and carries forward Dilthey's insights beyond the possibilities that he saw for his own thought. We do not have to read critiques of Dilthey as indications of rejection.

At the same time I have attempted to reverse the appropriation by reading Heidegger through Dilthey to show how his turn to art might be understood through his earlier concerns with facticity. Since Dilthey develops his account of facticity in terms of art and poetry, his aesthetics helps us to see greater coherence in Heidegger's philosophy as a whole.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This term was coined by Theodore Kisiel in *The Genesis of Being and Time*. For details about the manuscript, its revisions, and its various transformations that led to the publication of *Being and Time* see Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, especially ch. 7, "The Dilthey Draft: 'The Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 455.

<sup>3</sup> Even when Heidegger does not reference Dilthey directly, he frequently adopts Dilthey's language, distinctions, and methods. The following lecture courses indicate the depth of Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey, particularly in terms of facticity: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1919–20), *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (1920), *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* (1920–21), *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* (1921–22), and *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* (1923). Additionally, Dilthey's influence on Heidegger can be detected in Heidegger's introduction to a book on Aristotle that was never completed, "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation" (1922).

<sup>4</sup> Robert Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation,'" 127. In his most recent book, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological*, Scharff provides a detailed account of how Heidegger develops his phenomenological method from Dilthey to critique Husserl's ahistorical, transcendental approach.

<sup>5</sup> For an overview of Heidegger's critique of Dilthey's philosophy of worldviews see Eric Nelson, "World Picture and its Conflict." Nelson demonstrates that Heidegger conflates the plurality of worldviews that Dilthey discusses into one type of worldview—naturalism—which is objectivistic. Heidegger thus misinterprets Dilthey's philosophy of worldviews. Heidegger also mischaracterizes Dilthey's rejection of metaphysics. Charles Bambach describes Dilthey's anti-metaphysical position not as a way of adopting a Cartesian epistemology but as a critique of Hegel and the idea that philosophy can posit an absolute ideal. See Bambach, *Crisis of Historicism*, 136–37.

<sup>6</sup> All of Heidegger's works are abbreviated according to the volume of the *Gesamtausgabe* [GA] followed by the page number of the original German then the page number of the English translation.

<sup>7</sup> Translated in English as *Ponderings II–VI*.

<sup>8</sup> Rudolf Makkreel explains Heidegger's misinterpretation of Dilthey's epistemology, especially in terms of anthropological description, in *Orientation and Judgment*, 29–33. While Heidegger sees Dilthey as unable to understand the ontological analyses of temporality due to his critiques of metaphysics and use of anthropology, Makkreel argues that Dilthey's anthropological reflections go beyond ontic time and draw out ontological implications that Heidegger ignores.

<sup>9</sup> For more historical background on this distinction see Martin Jay, *Songs of Experience*, 11–12.

<sup>10</sup> Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 8.

<sup>11</sup> Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 8.

<sup>12</sup> All of Dilthey's works are abbreviated according to the volume of his *Gesammelte Schriften* [GS] with the page number of the original German, followed by the English translation from the volumes of *Selected Works* [SW], edited by Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi.

<sup>13</sup> Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 56.

<sup>14</sup> See James Reid's explanation of how Gadamer misinterprets Dilthey in "Dilthey's Epistemology."

<sup>15</sup> This translation of *Innewerden* is established by Makkreel and Rodi to describe the reflexivity of awareness before reflection separates subject and object. The German translates to "becoming aware" (*Innewerden*), but does not convey the reflexivity or self-givenness that Dilthey describes in this pre-reflective state. See editors' introduction to SW I.

<sup>16</sup> For more on Heidegger's revision of Husserlian intentionality and phenomenological method through Dilthey, see John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 214–16, and Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological*, chapter 5.

<sup>17</sup> Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> See Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*, 4–5.

<sup>19</sup> The use of *Ereignis* here is distinct from his later development in *Contributions* (GA 65) and *The Event* (GA 71).

<sup>20</sup> See Jeffrey Andrew Barash, *Problem of Historical Meaning*, 160.

<sup>21</sup> Not to be confused with his 1927 lecture course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 24).

<sup>22</sup> For a longer account of Heidegger's critique of *Erlebnis* in *Contributions to Philosophy and Mindfulness* see Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*.

<sup>23</sup> Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation,'" 112.

<sup>24</sup> This challenge of how to philosophize also relates to formal indication. Scharff connects Heidegger's formal indication—which attempts to "steer us away from all the traditional misconceptions, distortions, and selective representations of phenomena, and precisely in the process of doing this, also guide us toward a transformative perception of how phenomena are there-for and given-to us in their own being"—to Dilthey's philosophy ("Becoming a Philosopher," 135.) See also, Kisiel, "Hermeneutics of Facticity," and Daniel Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, especially ch. 4.

<sup>25</sup> Nelson notes that this term is used very broadly in Dilthey's philosophy and can mean: "(1) the singularity and multiplicity of historical facticity, which defy theoretical comprehension into a systematic totality and require the infinite work of description and interpretation; (2) the givenness of positive factuality which is the basis, object, and potential limiting condition and other of rational and scientific inquiry" ("Empiricism, Facticity," 113.) These two senses are connected to the historicity of experience, which shapes the given.

<sup>26</sup> Dilthey later incorporated these notes that outline the idea of factual life in Book V of *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, which was a general plan for a later work, *The Formation of the Historical World* (SW III).

<sup>27</sup> Makkreel has argued that Dilthey's aesthetic theory does not simply exemplify his theory of the *Geisteswissenschaften*; his aesthetics transforms his way of philosophizing, especially insofar as his inquiries into art allows him to reformulate and refine his philosophical approach throughout his career. See Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 15–17. Perhaps the best example of Dilthey rethinking experience through art is "Fragments for a Poetics" (1907–1908), where he



reconceptualizes temporal experience through poetry. For a longer explanation, see my article “Heidegger and the Poetics of Time,” 136–37.

<sup>28</sup> For more on Dilthey’s use of music as a paradigm for understanding life, see Michael Batz, *Der Rhythmus des Lebens*; Anne O’Byrne, *Natality and Finitude*, 57–59; and Rodi, *Das strukturierte Ganze*, 133–50.

<sup>29</sup> For another account of Dilthey’s elevation of art as a way to grasp what is essential about life, see Kurt Müller-Vollmer, *Dilthey’s Poetik*, especially pages 136–45.

<sup>30</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, 136.

<sup>31</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, 136.

<sup>32</sup> As Scott Campbell explains, facticity concerns “those dimensions of human experience by which human beings are able to understand themselves... not looking on at life but participating in it, and so living” (*The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life*, 2.) See Campbell’s book for a longer treatment of factual life in early Heidegger, especially the connection between facticity and religious life.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” 61.

<sup>34</sup> David Carr discusses the idea of meaning in Dilthey’s description of the temporal structure of lived experience as *Zusammenhang*, or coherence, in terms of narrative. See Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, chapter 3, “The Self and the Coherence of Life.”

<sup>35</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, 134.

<sup>36</sup> See Jacob Owensby, “Dilthey’s Conception of the Life-Nexus.”

<sup>37</sup> In the editor’s introduction to GA 56, van Buren provides a brief overview of early Heidegger’s engagement with art and literature.

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger has a note about the “‘time-space’ and ‘facticity’ of Dasein” in *Contributions* that is worth further consideration (GA 65:371/C 293).

<sup>39</sup> For more on the differences between the neo-Kantians’ and Heidegger’s formulations of facticity, see Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, 136–37.

<sup>40</sup> See Heidegger’s WS 1935–36 lecture course, *The Question Concerning the Thing: Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Principles*.

<sup>41</sup> Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” 61.

<sup>42</sup> Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” 42.

<sup>43</sup> See also Hölderlin’s *Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,”* where Heidegger argues against the idea that poetry can be understood as an expression of *Erlebnis*, 26–28. In *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* Heidegger states that tragedy belongs to the truth of being and should not be approached as a psychological *Erlebnis*. In these passages it is not clear if Heidegger means to critique Dilthey or his followers like Spengler, since the early Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey was meant to rescue his philosophical insights from reductive or simplistic adoptions of his work.

<sup>44</sup> I have edited Hofstadter’s translation here, since he translates *Erlebnis* as “experience” instead of “lived experience.”

<sup>45</sup> I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

<sup>46</sup> Van Buren critiques the periodization of Heidegger’s corpus for overlooking his early thought and for simplifying a very complex, non-linear path of thought, whose twists and turns not even Heidegger could describe adequately. See *The Young Heidegger*, esp. 5–9, 19.

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<sup>47</sup> As Bambach explains, Heidegger's concept of *Destruktion* is not violent or forceful but instead a type of dismantling meant to allow "a free viewing of things as they show themselves in themselves" ("Phenomenological Research as *Destruktion*," 118.)

<sup>48</sup> Thank you to Rudolf Makkreel and Robert Scharff for encouraging this project and discussing it in its early stages. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful engagement with my work and insightful feedback.