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LE MONDE ON THE ALGERIAN WAR
UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
A STUDY OF THE NEWSPAPER'S COVERAGE
(1944-1958)

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keywords: Algeria, Algerian war, colonial policy, decolonisation, France, Fourth Republic, *Le Monde*, media, news, press.

ABSTRACT

This work is concerned with the coverage of *Le Monde* during a troubled historical phase: the Algerian war under the Fourth Republic. The Algerian war, *Le Monde* and the French Fourth Republic are all keypoints of reference in French political life and culture. Based on a corpus representing the entire output of *Le Monde*, this thesis sets out to examine *Le Monde's* claims that it was at the forefront of the decolonisation struggle. The methodology used is that provided by Laswell's investigative programme, *Who says what, to whom and with what effect*, updated and adapted for this purpose. The thesis uncovers the newspaper's bias in the portrayal and discussion of the protagonists: the army, the FLN and the civilian populations on both sides of the Mediterranean. An important dimension of the analysis relates to the coverage of civil liberties and the paper's position on the use of wide-scale repression and torture; and discusses the implications for press freedom. The analysis shows that in many respects these were undefended and their champions sacrificed on the altar of national interests and *Raison d'Etat*. The conclusions reached challenge the view that *le Monde's* coverage was critical of government and authority over Algeria, particularly Guy Mollet's administration. The analysis shows how progressive and challenging views propounded by some intellectuals were rejected, or minimised in favour of a more traditional and reforming discourse which did not seriously undermine French prestige. The overall conclusion reached, contrary to conventional wisdom, is that *Le Monde* did not construct a view of the Algerian war under the Fourth Republic that was fundamentally different from that propounded and circulated by official sources notably by the military. This analysis challenges an on-going myth, that *le Monde's* position was both radical and pro independence. This work, written primarily with the British social scientist in mind, combines insights from the historian, the political scientist and the media analyst. It gives priority to the political and historical -rather than the linguistic- aspects. It is the only work to span the whole of the Fourth Republic, and the only contribution in English to comprehensively address the political and historical context of *Le Monde*.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.....	I
Table of contents	II-XIV
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY	
1. Introduction	1
1.2.Historiography.....	1
1.2.1.Literature on <i>Le Monde</i>	1
1.2.2.Sources on Algeria.....	3
1.2.3.Mass communication research.....	6
1.3.Research Problems and methodological choices (aims and methods.....	10
1.3.1.The problem of objectivity.....	10
1.3.2.Problems of disinformation and misinformation.....	13
1.3.3.Objectives and methodological choices.....	15
1.4.Research corpus, structure, presentation and rationale	17
1.4.1.The corpus, structure and presentation.....	17
1.4.1.1. The corpus.....	17
1.4.1.2. Structure and presentation	22
1.4.2.Rationale of the study.....	24
1.4.2.1. Why <i>Le Monde</i> ?.....	24
1.4.2.2. Why the Algerian war?.....	25
1.4.2.3. Periodicity, or why the fourth Republic?	26

CHAPTER TWO.....	28
A UNIQUE NEWSPAPER: THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF <i>LE MONDE</i>	28
2.1. Introduction	28
2.2. An unusual paper for an unusual director	28
2.2.1.The paper's launch	28
2.2.2.Hubert Beuve-Méry, Managing Director of <i>Le Monde</i>	30
2.3.A brave paper despite difficult beginnings.....	31
2.3.1.A hard start	31
2.3.2.Position over the Cold War	32
2.3.3.The Fechteler report.....	35
2.3.4.The rise and fall of a rival: <i>Le Temps de Paris</i>	36
2.3.5.Further assaults.....	38
2.4. The positions of the paper a source of problems?.....	38
2.4.1.Indochina and the Cold War	38
2.4.2.Guy Mollet against <i>Le Monde</i> ?	40
2.5. <i>Le Monde's</i> journalists, readership, and the paper's philosophy	42
2.5.1.Readership and social distribution of the paper.....	42
2.5.2.A particular philosophy of journalism	45
2.5.2.1. A high reputation and profile.....	45
2.5.2.2. High calibre staff.....	45
2.5.2.3. Political and financial independence....	48
2.5.2.4. Objectivity and realism.....	48
2.5.2.5. Thoroughness and speed of reporting....	49
2.5.2.6. Freedom and justice as a vocation.....	50
2.6.Conclusion	50

CHAPTER THREE	53
3.THE ALGERIAN SCENE OR ALGERIA UNDER COLONIAL RULE	53
3.1. Introduction	53
3.2. Before the French conquest	54
3.3.The French conquest and the colonisation of the country.....	55
3.3.1. <i>Le Coup d'éventail</i> and the Algiers expedition (1827-1830).....	55
3.3.2.Military rule: 1830-1870	56
3.3.3.The Third Republic and the triumph of colonisation..	58
3.4.General evolution and the rise of nationalist political movement.....	59
3.4.1.Administrative and political evolution.....	59
3.4.2.Economic and social condition of the population.....	61
3.4.3 Resistance and revolt.	63
3.4.4.The nationalist movements	65
3.5. The last chances of peaceful settlement	69
3.5.1.The failure of the Blum-Violette Bill (1936).....	69
3.5.2.The Second World War crisis and its aftermath.....	69
3.5.3.Dashed hopes at the Liberation	71
3.5.4.From the Statutes (20/11/1947) to All Saints' Day? (1947-1954).....	72
3.6. The Closing years of the Fourth Republic.....	75
3.6.1. Prelude to 1 November 1954.....	75
3.6.2. Ripe conditions for a nationalist uprising.....	76
3.6.3. All Saints Day, 1 November 1954.....	76
3.6.4. The French reaction: the initial stages.....	77
3.6.5. Soustelle takes over from Léonard (February 1955)..	78
3.6.5.1. Internal dissensions and divisions of the Nationalist movement.....	79
3.6.5.2. The FLN an unpopular movement ?.....	80
3.6.5.3. From the August 1955 events to the Popular Front.	83
3.6.6. Guy Mollet takes over (26 January 1956).....	83
3.6.6.1. The Soummam Congress (20 August 1955.....	85
3.6.6.2. The capture of Ben Bella and the FLN leaders.....	86
3.6.7. The second phase August 1956-May 1958.....	87
3.6.8. The Colapse of the the Republic (13 May 1958).....	90
3.6.9. Conclusion.....	91

CHAPTER FOUR	93
4.REPORTING A COLONY (1944-1954)	93
4.1.Introduction	93
4.2.Period One (March 1945- August 1947).....	93
4.2.1.Limits set to manifest aspirations	93
4.2.2.A particular perspective: the communities and the economy.....	94
4.2.3.Political trends and developments.....	96
4.2.4.A particular view of the elections.....	99
4.3.The second period: August 1947- March 1951.....	101
4.3.1.Admiration for the Governor General.....	101
4.3.2.A peculiar conception of democracy.....	101
4.3.3.A willingness to accept views -to undermine them...103	
4.4.The third period: March 1951- November 1954.....	104
4.4.1.Dismissal of a changing world perspective.....	104
4.4.2 <i>Le Monde's</i> alleged U-turn.....	105
4.4.3.Economic, social and political problems.....	106
4.4.4.The state of the country as perceived in 1954.....	109
4.5.Conclusion	110

SECTION II: THE PROTAGONISTS.....	113
5.0 Introduction	113
CHAPTER FIVE	115
5.THE FRENCH ARMY	115
5.1. A dominant, influential and authoritative coverage..	115
5.1.1.Prominence of army views: <i>Une muette plutôt</i> <i>bavarde</i>	115
5.1.2.Army matters given considerable importance.....	117
5.1.3.Ambivalence of the discourse: the "war with no name".....	118
5.1.4.The cause of "troubles" seen from the army's perspec- tive	119
5.1.5.A positive image	119
5.2. A dismissal of revolutionary warfare?.....	120
5.2.1.Cold war and Indochina	120
5.2.2.Revolutionary and psychological warfare.....	120
5.2.3.Uncritical reporting: an instrument of propaganda?..	122
5.2.4.A restrained Army	123
5.2.5.Pacification: an oversimplified view	124
5.2.6.A Boyscout image	126
5.3.A "troubled" Army	127
5.3.1.More than a <i>malaise</i>	127
5.3.2.High-ranking officers getting restless	127
5.3.3.Algerian Officers in protest (1957)	129
5.3.4.Opposition to the conflict by conscripts and conscientious objectors.....	130
5.4.Conclusion	131

CHAPTER SIX.....	134
6.THE FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE	134
6.1.Introduction	134
6.2.A Negative image	134
6.2.1.The construction of the FLN: murderers, bandits, terrorists.....	134
6.2.2.The FLN maximalist and intransigent	135
6.2.3.Uncompromising	136
6.2.4.Anti-democratic	137
6.3. The FLN: a force that alienates everybody.....	138
6.3.1.Opposed by those most critical of Army methods.....	138
6.3.2.The FLN and the working class movement.....	139
6.3.3.An alienated movement disregarding French and world opinion	139
6.3.4.Sustained by the outside yet out of step with it...140	
6.3.5.Some strengths but many weaknesses	143
6.4. The FLN: a divided movement	144
6.4.1.Problems of divisions	144
6.4.2.Problems of leadership	146
6.5.The arrest of the potential negotiators	147
6.5.1.Attempts at peaceful settlement	147
6.5.2.Legitimation of Piracy in spite of official protests and resignations.....	148
6.5.3.Legitimacy of piracy through <i>Le Monde's</i> own position.....	150
6.5.3.1.Arraignment not <i>détournement</i>	150
6.5.3.2.France legally justified	150
6.5.4.A Forum of debate supporting the arrest.....	152
6.6.Conclusion	154

CHAPTER SEVEN	156
7. THE CIVILIAN POPULATION	156
7.1.Introduction	156
7.2The Settlers	156
7.2.1.European views, an inherent dominance.....	156
7.2.2.A defence of settlers' views and interests	157
7.2.3.A shifting of responsibility	160
7.3.The student community and the Algerian Question.....	161
7.3.1.The students'splits over Algeria and the support of simplistic neutralism	162
7.3.2. Minority views get a better coverage	162
7.3.3.Weaker Support for Algerian Students	165
7.4.The Catholic Church: a subject of interest for the paper.....	165
7.4.1.A natural link	165
7.4.2.Appeals to and by the Pope	166
7.4.3. Human face of the Church	166
7.5.The "Muslim" Community in Algeria	166
7.5.1 Introduction	166
7.5.2.Unfavourable reporting of the general strike	167
7.5.3.The under-reporting of the means used to break the strike.....	171
7.5.4.Conclusion	173
7.6. The Algerian Community in France	174
7.6.1.Introduction	174
7.6.2.A people deprived of status and identity	174
7.6.3.Human concern but little commitment	174
7.6.4.Immigration rife with gangsterism and rivalries....	175
7.6.5.Silent victims?	177
7.6.6. Favourable presentation of repressive measures ...	178
7.6.7.conclusion: a better life in France?	179
7.8.Conclusions	181

SECTION THREE: THE SOLUTIONS.....	182
COLONIALIST RESPONSE TO A DECOLONISATION PROBLEM.....	182
8.0 Introduction	182
CHAPTER EIGHT.....	184
8.AN OVERALL DEFERENCE TO THE AUTHORITIES.....	184
8.1. The last years of Roger Léonard (1951 1955).....	184
8.1.1.Official coverage	184
8.1.2.The Outbreak of Violence and the Government response.....	185
8.1.3. Predominance of official communiqués	186
8.1.4.Recommending a policy of selective repression	186
8.1.5.A call for reforms	187
8.1.6.Imminent fall of Mendès-France: a defence of the government.....	189
8.1.7.Recommendations for a solution	190
8.2. Soustelle's episode 1955- 1956	191
8.2.1.Expression of reserve, then support, for the new government.....	191
8.2.2.A rejection of nationalism but an explicit acceptance of the need for reforms.....	192
8.2.3.A case of fairness or duplicity ?	194
8.2.4. The last days of Soustelle: considerable criticism but overall support	195
8.2.5.A desperate need to hold on	196
8.2.6.Journalists reproduce the official discourse.....	197
8.2.7. The replacement and departure of Soustelle.....	198
8.3. From Catroux to Lacoste: <i>Le Monde</i> and G.Mollet at Loggerheads? a refutation of a received idea....	198
8.3.1.A new Governor General is appointed	198
8.3.1.Attitude towards the new team	200
8.3.3.Lacoste: the "last hour" slogan becomes widespread	201
8.3.4. Articles justified and excused the government	201
8.3.5. Real but ineffective criticism	203
8.3.6. The Fall of Mollet.....	208
8.3.7. Towards the end of a Republic.....	210
8.3.8.A more positive assessment of Felix Gaillard.....	212
8.4.Conclusion	212

CHAPTER NINE	214
9. TIMIDITY OF A JOURNALISTIC DISCOURSE	214
9.1. Introduction.....	214
9.2. Reassuring themes	214
9.2.1. Reassuring discourse	214
9.2.2. Things are getting better	215
9.2.3. Against defeatism and demoralisation	216
9.2.4 A docile propaganda instrument?	217
9.2.5."Algeria was not Indochina"	217
9.2.6.Critical forum: the <i>libre opinion</i> column	219
9.3.Independentist nationalism hard to swallow	222
9.3.1. Interpreting nationalism and refusing immediate inde- pendence.....	222
9.3.2.Independence -a long-term objective	225
9.3.3.An increased awareness of the wider context	227
9.3.4.Limited perspectives and unrealistic solutions	228
9.3..5.Consensus and divergence of journalists'views.....	230
9.3.6. A marked preference for the links to be maintained	234
9.3.7. The acceptance of change	237
9.4. Conclusions	242
CHAPTER TEN	243
10.THE REJECTION OF PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUAL VIEWS.....	243
10.1. Introduction	243
10.2.Importance of the Intellectuals in this context	243
10.3. François Mauriac and Jean Amrouche	245
10.4.Raymond Aron and Jacques Soustelle	249
10.5. Germaine Tillion and Albert Camus	251
10.6.Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi.....	253
10.7.Jean-Marie Domenach	255
10.8.Pierre-Henri Simon and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber	257
10.9. Sartre and the militant Left	258
10.10.Conclusion	261
10.11.Conclusions.....	262

SECTION FOUR: A DISAPPOINTING STAND ON CIVIL LIBERTIES...	265
THE MEANS OF REPRESSION OF A NATIONALIST UPRISING	265
11.0.Introduction	265
CHAPTER ELEVEN	267
11.INSIDE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK	267
11.1.Introduction	267
11.2. The State of Emergency (31/3/55).....	267
11.2.1.The introduction of the measures	267
11.2.2.A necessary and intermediate measure?	267
11.2.3.A supportive attitude towards a better legal arrange- ment?	269
11.2.4.Reactions: a welcome if somewhat unsuccessful mea- sure.....	271
11.2.5.Attacked by third-parties only	272
11.3.Special Powers (12/3/56).....	273
11.3.1.Introduction	273
11.3.2.A necessary and justified measure?	273
11.3.3.The repressive factors dominate	274
11.3.4.Army recall	275
11.3.5. A successful measure?	275
11.4.General implementation of Repressive measures.....	276
11.4.1.Extensive use of powers of repression	276
11.4.2.Exceptional measures justified	276
11.4.3.Collective sanctions	276
11.4.4.Zones interdites and enforced population movements.....	277
11.4.5.Special powers continue	278
11.5. The Coverage of Trials	279
11.5.1.Introduction	279
11.5.2.Trials reports	279
11.5.3.The trials of the <i>Chrétiens progressistes</i>	280
11.5.4.Aspects of the reports	281
11.5.5.An uncritical paper: a question of patriotic duty?.....	282
11.5.6.Trial irregularities	283
11.5.7.Trials and executions	284
11.6.A different story for France:	285
11.6.1.Introduction.....	285
11.6.2.Civil liberties.....	285
11.6.3.Executions and the death penalty	286
11.6.3.camps d'hébergement	286
11.6.5.Resistance to the introduction of special powers in France.....	287
11.6.6.More vocal protests	287
11.6.7.Measures not warranted by the state of affairs in France	289
11.7. Conclusion	290

CHAPTER TWELVE.....	291
12.OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK	291
12.1. Introduction	291
12.2. General repression on a massive scale	291
12.2.1.August 1955	291
12.2.2.Reporting the events of 20 August	292
12.2.3.The Penchenier controversy (1955)	293
12.2.4.The impact of Penchenier's article	294
12.2.5.Penchenier's assessment	294
12.2.6. <i>Le Monde's</i> position and protest against repression	296
12.2.7.Reporting characteristics	297
12.3. Repression on a smaller scale	298
12.3.1.Difficulty of information and imprecise reports ..	298
12.3.2.The security forces "provoked": not really their	
fault.....	299
12.3.3.Sources of the reports	299
12.3.4.Versions giving the benefit of the doubt to army and	
official sources	300
12.3.5.Other sources more informative as early as 1955..	302
12.3.6.A position of understanding.....	302
12.3.7.Paucity of comments	302
12.3.8. A very measured protest.....	303
12.4.The use of Torture	305
12.4.1.Introduction	305
12.4.2.Evidence of torture not in doubt	306
12.4.3. <i>Le Monde</i> in possession of incontrovertible testimo-	
nies.....	306
12.4.4."Passing the buck"	307
12.4.5.The coverage of well-known cases (Alleg and Audin)	310
12.4.6.Conclusion	311
12.5.Conclusions	311

CHAPTER THIRTEEN.....	313
13.AN AMBIVALENT ATTEMPT TO INFORM PUBLIC OPINION.....	313
13.1.Introduction.....	313
13.2.A Feeble defence of public opinion informers.....	314
13.2.1.A braver commitment possible for journalists	314
13.2.2.The outstanding commitment of some journalists (R.Barrat and J-J Servan-Schreiber)	315
13.2.3.Their position undefended	316
13.2.4.A limited philosophy of Journalism	317
13.2.5. A mild defence of the intellectuals	320
13.3.A weak defence of freedom of the press.....	322
13.3.1.Introduction	322
13.3.2.Analysis of reports of press seizures/censorship.....	323
13.3.3. <i>Le Monde's</i> occasional comments	324
13.3.4.Space given to protests	325
13.3.5.Press censorship and <i>Le Monde</i> itself	326
13.3.5.1. The first seizures of <i>Le Monde</i>	327
13.3.5.2. Other attempts to undermine the paper..	330
13.4. A lukewarm call for freedom of investigation.....	331
13.4.1.Introduction	331
13.4.2.The Provo Report	332
13.4.2.1. A not so neutral Report.....	332
13.4.2.2. A variety of views	334
13.4.3.The commission de sauvegarde des droits et des liber- tés individuelles (CSDLI)	336
13.4.3.1. A futile effort made to look worthwhile	336
13.4.3.2. The poor findings of CSDLI.....	338
13.4.4.The International Commission against detention (CICRC)	340
13.4.4.1. Another investigation made to look promis- ing.....	340
13.4.4.2. A sense of balance exposing the other side	341
13.4.5.The Radical Commission	342
13.4.5.1. An exceptionally promising commission..	342
13.4.5.2. A biased presentation of the opposition	343
13.4.5.3. Not devoid of objective criticisms.....	347
13.5.Conclusion	348
13.6.Conclusions	349

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONCLUSIONS	353
14.A MISINFORMED AND MISINFORMING MESSENGER	353
14.1.Introduction	353
14.2.A paper with high expectations but many unfulfilled promises	354
14.2.1.Prestigious and independent?	354
14.2.2.An establishment paper?	356
14.2.3."Soft" on civil liberties	359
14.3.A Disinformed and a Disinforming paper	360
14.3.1.The characteristics of brainwashing and disinforma- tion	360
14.3.2.Paucity and surfeit of information	361
14.3.3.A shifting of responsibility and sanitised informa- tion	362
14.3.4.Serious consequences: a victim of psychological warfare?	364
14.3.5. <i>Le Monde</i> : a problematic historical source	366

REFERENCE NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE.....	369
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO.....	382
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE.....	401
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR.....	421
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE	442
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX.....	477
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN.....	500
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT.....	539
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE.....	563
NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN	576
NOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN.....	583
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWELVE.....	615
NOTES TO CHAPTER THIRTEEN.....	638
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOURTEEN.....	671
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	673
APPENDIX A.....	710
APPENDIX B.....	726
APPENDIX C.....	734
APPENDIX D.....	735

SECTION ONE: THE CONTEXT

A NEWSPAPER IN A COLONIALIST CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

Modern societies are crucially underpinned by mass-media and communications, which impinge on every aspect of our lives, economic, social and political. Media research seeks to understand and account for the nature of mass-media processes, their role and impact on societies. Within this framework, the aim of the present study is to consider a particular coverage of print media -*Le Monde*- during a particular colonial conflict, and to analyse its reporting of matters relating to the Algerian war during the French Fourth Republic.

This introductory chapter consists of three parts: the first subsection provides a brief overview of the literature relating to both *Le Monde* and Algeria, together with a succinct review of the literature on mass communications and methodologies. The approach, presuppositions and methodology chosen for this study are outlined in the second subsection. The third subsection sets out the corpus, structure and presentation of the study, and its rationale.

1.2. Historiography

1.2.1. Literature on *Le Monde*

There was a renewed interest in *Le Monde* at particular moments of its history. Articles were published about its financial and organisational difficulties, its move to the *Rue Falguière* and *Ivry* from the *Rue des Italiens*, and its modernisation.¹ In addition, a number of books and articles have been

devoted to this newspaper. However, this number is small given the importance of the paper.² There have been serious, comprehensive studies of the paper, reinforcing the academic value of the topic.³ A comparative study has also been made by Padioleau.⁴

A thirty-year-old study and crucial book by Abel Chatelain⁵ provides invaluable insight into how *Le Monde* functioned under the Fourth Republic.

Books by journalists include Michel Legris,⁶ whose impartiality is slightly suspect, Edouard Sablier,⁷ and Jacques Dolléans.⁸

The literature on *Le Monde* and Algeria consists of two dissertations and two books. A Master's dissertation covered 1945 to 1954⁹ and a doctoral thesis looked at *Le Monde* and the whole of North Africa.¹⁰ As for the two books, both written by journalists, one, by Alain Jacob, covered the period 1958 to the immediate post-independence era,¹¹ and the other, published in 1989, consists of a collection of articles from *Le Monde* and testimonies about the Algerian war, gathered by P. Eveno and J. Planchais. This latter book is rather thin on articles covering the earlier period and offers a rather selective coverage of the Algerian war.¹² This could also be said of the 147th issue of *Le Monde - Dossiers & Documents* -which constitutes a post-war assessment rather than a contemporaneous account.¹³ Planchais, an already well-known historian of the French Army, wrote another book upon his retirement from the paper.¹⁴ Much earlier, another journalist, J. Lacouture, who was in charge of the North African desk from 1957, explained his reservations in a book that retraced his long and distinguished career.¹⁵

A few books were devoted to the founder and director of the paper, amongst which was a biography by Laurent Greilsamer (1990),¹⁶ a study by Bruno Rémond¹⁷ and a published series of discussions.¹⁸ Finally, there is a book on H.Beuve-Méry and de Gaulle by Beuve-Méry himself and another by Sainderichin on *Le Monde* and de Gaulle(1990).¹⁹

1.2.2. Sources on Algeria

As Maynadies reminds us,²⁰ Alfred Halpern has pointed out that "certainly more books have been written on what was once French North Africa than on most regions of the continent".²¹ More have been written since. Indeed, a plethora of books and articles exist on the subject.²²

This literature on Algeria is to a certain extent problematic since a great deal of it stems from a particular perspective - that of the dominant ideology.

With the exception of one or two major contributors, Algerian history in general, and particularly the Algerian struggle for independence, has been covered mostly by French authors with a bias evident in any literature written predominantly from a colonial outlook or background.

This is not to say that no outstanding work has been done by French historians, such as the late Charles-André Julien, Charles Robert Ageron, and, more recently, Benjamin Stora. Charles André Julien's contribution spans more than fifty years, and sets the scene for later work. It is much too voluminous to be listed here.²³ His most acclaimed *Afrique du Nord en marche* (1952) has for a long time constituted a standard reference work on Algeria. This study was complemented by another French scholar, Charles-Robert Ageron, whose recent work, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, is now available in

English.²⁴ More recently, Benjamin Stora has devoted his undoubted historical skills to treating the various aspects of nationalism. Yves Courrière and Jules Roy have also made major, though more journalistic, contributions. Others, like André Nouschi, enriched the early debate on Algerian nationalism.²⁵ More recently, he seems to insist more, (wrongly, in my view), on the idea of a "mythical" Muslim life and nation prior to colonisation.²⁶ Many more works deserve mention, and these are listed in the bibliography.

In addition, it must be said that there have been important contributions to the Franco-Algerian debate from outside France and Algeria. In this respect, Swiss,²⁷ German,²⁸ American and British scholars' contributions should be mentioned.²⁹

A debate over the last twenty years has encouraged the study of Algerian history from a different perspective. Efforts have been made to fund research institutes, to organise conferences and colloquia, debates in the press, finance research projects, and to encourage Algerians themselves to engage in research. The aim was to encourage Algerians to write their own history, rather than to have it written for them by Europeans. The process is not so much to Algerianise Algerian history as to decolonise it.

More and more Algerians are taking up the challenge. Some remain caught up in the colonial framework.³⁰ Others go too far in their anti-colonial discourse. Many Algerian authors have begun to make a significant contribution in this field.³¹ Now, there are more varied sources available; and it is possible to tackle the subject in a more serious and dispassionate way. This has been facilitated by the healing impact of time and the benefit of hindsight.

Outstanding amongst the general bibliographical works is that provided by Richard Lawless(1976, 1980 and 1991).³² Similarly, Maynadies made a major contribution in establishing his "bibliography of bibliographies" (1989).³³ There have been a number of earlier historiographies, which make a useful contribution to the study of the nationalist and colonial phase of Algerian history.³⁴ A British scholar gave an exhaustive assessment of the work on Algeria in the English language.³⁵ Of particular interest to this study is the work done on the actual discourse of the Algerian war by Denise Maldidier in terms of a diachronic and synchronic analysis of the language and concepts used.³⁶

In the present study, the analysis of the views and images portrayed in *Le Monde* is also compared with others appearing in contemporaneous publications, books, journals, periodicals, as well as newspapers and radio broadcasts.³⁷ A number of these are sometimes echoed in *Le Monde* itself. The use of more recent publications relating to the topic, as illustrated below (and in the bibliography), stems from the desire to include serious publications in the analysis which relate to the period examined and which are relevant to the topic.

In terms of archival sources, those made available have been published by writers such as Harbi(1985), Mandouze (1977),³⁸ but some archives were destroyed during the conflict (for instance, the fire in the Algiers Library in 1962), while other archives still remain closed.

Discussions and interviews with many authors, including Pierre Vidal-Naquet, André Nouschi, Benjamin Stora, Jean Lacouture, Jean Planchais and André Mandouze, have helped to complete the picture.

1.2.3 Mass communication research

Although the broad contours of this multi-dimensional field³⁹ can be easily defined, a thorough investigation calls for a multidisciplinary analysis involving linguistics, psychology, sociology, social psychology, politics, history and many more disciplines.

Laswell's work, subsequently refined, made a major contribution. Information Sciences have taken enormous steps forward since he defined a programme of investigative questions:

<< *Who says what, to whom, in what channel, and with what effect?*>>. ⁴⁰

Many pioneering works have paved the way for research in the field during the last forty years. ⁴¹

Investigating the sender of the message (*Who*) has opened up a series of questions. ⁴² Is it a single individual, a group of people, an organisation? What is the structure of the organisation? What are its financial and political links, its ideology? Who are the proprietors of the medium, the organisers, the journalists, those who transmit the message via the medium (the air waves for radio and television or the printed media)? What influences, backgrounds or ideologies have shaped their lives? A vast array of answers has been proposed to these questions.

However, apart from a few cases, like that of Macluhan, ⁴³ who refocussed attention on the "*who*" component, this aspect has not retained the attention of scholars. ⁴⁴ The trend in research communication has tended to concentrate on the second component of Laswell's question: the "*what*," ⁴⁵ and on the language of the newsmedia. ⁴⁶

Once the "*Who*" has been defined, attention must turn to the content of the message, its characteristics, its physical

aspect, its symbolic nature, its environment, its synthetic effect, its tone, its credibility, and the potential for identification that it holds.⁴⁷

Content analysis (CA) was soon to be spurred on by the increasing ease of access to the mass-media and the increasingly pervasive nature of the phenomenon.

CA can be investigated along two lines: quantitative analysis measures the surface devoted to articles, to texts and titles, illustrations and publicity, while qualitative analysis endeavours to obtain value judgments and introduces the notions of intensity and significative value, surveying the vocabulary, style and presentation of facts and arguments. It also makes comparisons with other models, verifications by tests in order to reconstitute intentional and implicit content, the connotations of the message and the way it is understood.⁴⁸

However, while CA can give a reasonable account of the differential behaviour of a group of press organs,⁴⁹ it has serious shortcomings, and a number of problems have been highlighted.

There is no entirely satisfactory method for CA. Each medium (in this case, each newspaper) is different in its shape, physiognomy and individual character. Each period has its own style of journalism, and the current affairs field presents each event and problem in an entirely original context.⁵⁰ Consequently, very few studies using CA alone have led to significant findings for the elucidation of any general theory of mass communication.⁵¹ However, the researcher can still formulate and conduct analyses in such a way as to be able to draw conclusions of statistical and sociological significance. It has been pointed out, nevertheless, that the most fruitful

analyses are not always the most rigorous, nor those made by people who are the most concerned with the technical, quantitative and statistical aspects of their empirical work or by those who are afraid of taking liberties with some of its aspects.⁵²

Another major finding in the field is that researchers, primarily trained in the literary field, have felt the need to acquire new techniques and disciplines more adapted to their work.

François Mariet commented on the poor findings of limited monodisciplinary training that:

*Le résultat c'est une littérature pédagogique aseptisée ou ne reste que le piment d'une dénonciation souvent ethnocentriste des contenus.*⁵³

The communication channel becomes the subsequent focus of the research. Radio, television, and the press (newspapers) are the main ones, and each of them has particular ways of communicating its message, its own method, with different advantages and disadvantages. Radio, for instance, has the advantage of speed, print is relatively permanent, while television is perhaps more easily digestible and can perhaps achieve the greatest impact.⁵⁴

In some studies, researching the audiences is of primary importance. Apart from studies of audiences under fascist and totalitarian systems, which preoccupied some scholars in the thirties and the forties, more recent studies constitute a literature in themselves. Researchers, both academic and commercial, often stimulated by commercial pressures, have multiplied work in the field in an attempt to account more accurately for, and understand, the readership of newspapers and magazines, and audiences of particular television or radio

channels. Determining social categories, age group and sex, political persuasion, purchasing power, and many other characteristics has become a legitimate and substantial field of enquiry.⁵⁵

The final question to be asked, which overlaps somewhat with the last one and is, to a certain extent, contingent on it, relates to the impact of the message.

The study of the mass-media impact has from the start been linked to understanding the means and processes of social control.⁵⁶ Many sociological studies looked at the complete process of communication. This calls for an informed awareness of the structures and processes inside and outside the world of communication, and not just the public's reactions to the media.⁵⁷

In this field, so much depends on the methodology selected and the theory or model that underwrites it. For instance, some would opt for a cultural rather than an institutional orientation.⁵⁸

Other analysts followed a behaviourist approach, especially during the 1960s, when they looked at the impact of the message being transmitted to the audience, because they considered it to be a "stimulus" and viewed the message receiver as an isolated being subjected to a "magnetic field of ideas, slogans and symbols". This is now universally considered to be flawed. Others gave the receiver of the message a more determining role in the content of the medium, and followed a more functionalist approach.⁵⁹

An increased emphasis has progressively been given to the message being transmitted, and to the context in which this takes place. Efforts have been made to widen the analysis to

encompass what the public does with the content/message, what it expects of it and what it thinks of it.⁶⁰

In terms of effects, both media⁶¹ and proprietors are linked generally to the world of business for which the maintaining of the *status quo*, of order and stability, is seen as essential. Such features tend to be considered, perhaps wrongly, as exclusive features of democracy. The need to maintain the *status quo* is even more crucial in societies where communication is under the control of a single party. Controversy, reformist, and revolutionary trends are reflected in media content at times of upheavals and major tensions, as in wars and revolutions.⁶²

Another factor highlighted by research is the fact that sensitivity and permeability to the media are highly selective processes - since the ultimate media censorship is operated by the audience/readership itself. People tend to read, watch and listen to material which largely corroborates their beliefs, values and interests.⁶³ When media messages contradict their beliefs, they tend to ignore them, shut them away, pretend ignorance of them, or interpret "badly" such alien messages which may be a source of discomfort or hostility.⁶⁴

People usually tend to choose their newspaper and, to a certain extent, contribute to its continued existence, success or downfall, which tends to produce a "boomerang effect". In practice, however, the reader has no control over the newspaper, short of discontinuing purchase or subscription, writing to the editors, or putting a bomb in the hallway.⁶⁵

1.3. Research Problems and methodological choices (aims and methods)

1.3.1. The problem of objectivity

A major hurdle in an investigation of this kind is the

notion of objectivity or bias. The literature on this subject alone is vast.

It could be said that objectivity in journalism does not exist. Many, like Doris Lessing, have a very poor view of journalists; they are alleged not to be concerned about the truth and spend much time reading each other, and merely repeat what others have said.⁶⁶

Other researchers have insisted on the fictional nature of objectivity in journalism and on the fact that the media could not really be objective, as journalism is not a science but an art, *c'est à dire un mélange de techniques et de bricolage*.⁶⁷ It has also been argued that journalists cannot be independent of the subject they are reporting.⁶⁸

Indeed, Hubert Beuve-Méry himself, the founding-father of *Le Monde*, the paper forming the basis of the present study, is reported to have said that objectivity did not exist, but that honesty was an essential tool for a journalist to do his job.⁶⁹

If a bias is taken for granted from the start, then the next task consists in investigating the nature of the bias, of its rationale, its aims and objectives. This would constitute a legitimate approach.

However, many still consider *Le Monde* to be a newspaper offering the most objective coverage.

*L'important est de voir pourquoi "Le Monde" (titre qu'on ne sépare jamais en France et ailleurs des adjectifs <prestigieux> et <respectable>)... pourquoi ce quotidien est attaqué... en raison de l'austérité prude de sa présentation, ainsi que de l'objectivité de son langage.*⁷⁰

It is very much the "sacred cow" of French journalism, whose coverage very few dare question, and which constitutes much of the compulsory daily reading diet of the most significant or

educated members of French society.⁷¹

Conversely, it is possible to argue that, on the one hand, journalists are not "value-free", since they are the product of their own historical circumstances and, as with writers, the words they use can explicitly or implicitly construct or reflect to a great extent their values and beliefs.⁷² One would expect to find images or mirror images of such constructs in the reports they write, the opinions they express, and in the overall content of the newspaper for which they write.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect a newspaper of the standing of *Le Monde's*, which enjoys considerable financial and political independence, to reflect fairly the variety of views expressed and to be more able than many other media to state opinions and produce factual reports in which the subjective element has been minimised.

Even in 1991, some outspoken critics of the media maintained that *Le Monde* was more "serious," had more of an objective stance than any other newspaper.⁷³ If this is still the case, and this is debatable, was it always so, especially over Algeria?

If one is to look for it in the paper, objectivity should be understood as distinct from "neutrality." It is not simply the presenting of a variety of views, or an array of opinions out of which each reader will find "their part of the truth," or would dismiss them all for an "obvious interpretation infused in the presentation of the document".⁷⁴

It is understood that the differences outlined for the readers must include contradictions;⁷⁵ and that objectivity, in the sense of fairness of information, implies that the information provided must not only be correct and reflect all opi-

nions, but it must also reflect them in equitable proportions.⁷⁶

Much of the media, attached to the erroneous and traditional conception of objectivity as neutrality, attempt to hide the inadequacy of their reports by presenting it as the natural form of information.⁷⁷ But it is clear that objectivity in journalism appears as much more than a strategy of caution, a refusal to commit oneself, under the pretext of a "very stringent morality" or "faultless intellectual honesty". The rejection of this type of objectivity in no way implies a complacent attitude towards bias and supposes a falsification of verifiable facts.⁷⁸

Neither does objectivity mean, either, that the journalists should merely report factually. To separate information from commentary is viewed as a "total aberration", since informing means to give meaning, signification, and to throw light on a particular topic.⁷⁹

However, this raises a whole series of problems: which elements are to be highlighted?⁸⁰ The choice of subject, the selecting of information, the adoption of a moral tone, the series of explanations used to make the information "understandable" -all constitute areas in which subjective elements can take over and objectivity recede.⁸¹

1.3.2. Problems of disinformation and misinformation

The reading of newspapers is not "innocent",⁸² but the journalist shares responsibility for what the reader concretely makes of the message transmitted by the information incorporated in the newspaper. Often the journalist has a determinant role.⁸³

There are ways of deliberately misleading the readers or of disinforming them, ranging from printing outright lies, to making far-fetched parallels or comparisons, from insinuating to printing what the reader wants to read, from excessive resorting to the use of the conditional mood of the verb to the immoderate use of ambiguous or vague and even misleading concepts.⁸⁴

There are many others.⁸⁵ Indeed, a major problem, as far as journalists are concerned, is that in informing their audience, they run the risk of *misinforming* them. Journalists work under pressure and have very little time for checking details.⁸⁶

On the other hand, it is also true to say⁸⁷ that journalists do not simply repeat information they receive without subjecting it to their critical judgment. Because of the lack of time for analysis, they may fall back on "a series of old certainties," not to say prejudices and misconceptions.⁸⁸ Sometimes, because of the perceived readers's need for clarity, they may forego very necessary *nuances* in their reports.⁸⁹

Audiences can be misinformed, irrespective of the state of media technology. This was illustrated by the Gulf war (January-February 1991), when information was under strict military control, as it soon became clear even in the most serious press. This feature has always been present and can be explained by various factors.⁹⁰

Misinformation may be explained partly by the fact that newspapers represent both a commodity that has to be sold and information that has to be delivered. This concern has been denied by Claude Julien, who stated that "*Le Monde* was not a capitalist firm, in the business of giving dividends to shareholders".⁹¹ It is clear, however, that the paper could not

survive, short of borrowing and jeopardising its independence, if it were not financially viable.

Some of the "errors" made by journalists are due to the confusion which sometimes occurs between projected and real events being put on the same level or on a level where it becomes difficult for the reader, consciously or subconsciously, to distinguish between them.⁹²

Problems of verification, a "crucial procedure" for the journalists and the "guarantee of the quality of information"⁹³ and the lack of accuracy, can lead to misinformation. Even if a piece of information can be cross-checked by reference to several sources, it can still have originated from a single source or interview. Furthermore, using several press releases (*panachage de plusieurs dépêches*) is not a guarantee that the various sources have not taken the same inaccurate or false information.⁹⁴ Government statements do not necessarily provide the truest or the most reliable sources of information⁹⁵ and well-informed sources, more or less genuinely well-intentioned, may well turn out to be a single person.

Misinformation can also be caused by a lack of information relevant to the context.⁹⁶ It can also be caused by a surfeit of information which may end up confusing the readers, giving them too many elements to make sense out of them. There are, of course, other elements situated outside the informational field. These may include factors of misinformation and may shape or influence the judgement of journalists.⁹⁷

1.3.3. Objectives and methodological choices

This research is concerned with the content of the newspaper, *Le Monde*. Some essential quantitative aspects of CA of the topic under consideration here have already been addressed.⁹⁸

The limitations of a purely positivist approach can, nevertheless, be easily demonstrated⁹⁹ as very often this method is not cost effective¹⁰⁰ and lacks explanatory power. Furthermore, it has rightly been pointed out that systems of random sampling may distort the analysis. The pitfalls of statistical work and random selections have already been highlighted by other scholars' pseudo-scientific use of figures.¹⁰¹

An initial attempt to use these frameworks¹⁰² through a random selection of reports, editorials, pages, confirmed that their usefulness was limited in the context examined.¹⁰³ In order to uncover the reality of the paper, its ideology, its trends, themes had to be followed, step by step, to see if there was any evolution in the way news was perceived by its analysis of events. It has to be said that the safety of figures is of little comfort when one is trying to comprehend what is beneath the surface of a text, with its connotations and implications.¹⁰⁴

Therefore, this work consists essentially of a qualitative analysis which looks at the written discourse, at both the objective and the subjective elements, at the use of words and concepts in a synchronic and a diachronic movement, and at the ideological frameworks in which they operate.¹⁰⁵

Taking to heart Voyenne's advice to the Press researcher,¹⁰⁶ the task was to adopt a coherent plan and to follow it methodically through its various stages.

On the whole, the approach did not seek to select a sample of reports and editorials. Instead, it analyses the whole of the newspaper output at the time,¹⁰⁷ with a view to revealing what the paper was trying to tell its readers, to determine what the paper said, and what it did not say. The author's per-

spective on the whole is an objective attempt to analyse and dissect coded as well as explicit messages, covering the most significant themes in the paper -those most frequently used, as well as those played down and neglected. The research tries to assess to what extent the attitude adopted by the newspaper during the War of Independence through the series of themes identified was, or was not, a colonial attitude. It tries to dissect the message conveyed to the readers informing them, helping them to inform themselves, assessing the situation for them, but also making judgments on their behalf. An attempt to draw conclusions and provide a tentative assessment of the possible impact, or lack of it, on the readership has also been made in the light of some comparisons with other contemporaneous publications and media. The intention is to reveal what kind of discourse was used, what sort of images, views and opinions were being presented by *Le Monde* on a wide range of related subjects.

The analysis and the findings relating to various topics or themes¹⁰⁸ are presented under the various chapters and headings in this dissertation (with the necessary cross references). These provide for a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, account of the subject studied.

The analysis and insights will help draw much firmer conclusions concerning the ideology and attitudes, explicit or implicit, as they were produced and reflected by and in *Le Monde*.

1.4. Research corpus, structure, presentation and rationale

1.4.1. The corpus, structure and presentation

1.4.1.1. The corpus

This research examines *Le Monde's* coverage of Algerian

issues during the War of Independence, until the end of the Fourth Republic (May 1958). In the light of the methodologies and problems outlined above, the work will cover *Le Monde* (who-Chapter 2), its reporting of Algeria (what Chapters 4-14) to its readers (to whom-Chapter 2), and will try to draw some conclusions on the possible impact or lack of it. It must be emphasized that, like Lebrazi's, this work seeks to avoid falling into the Laswellien paradigm of limiting research to studying and evaluating the influence and impact of techniques on the public. It is considered more fruitful here to examine the mass-media phenomenon in its context, as the discourse produced is the product of particular conditions likely to determine a text, or at least have an impact on it:

*(..) pas seulement le locuteur dans sa personnalité psychologique, mais la situation dans laquelle le texte est émis, depuis la relation psychosociale entre émetteur et récepteur, ou situation restreinte, jusqu'à la situation générale, à savoir le contexte social idéologique et politique.*¹⁰⁹

The channel of communication (*in what*) is, of course, the newspaper itself, with all its articles, editorials, letters to the editor, reportages, etc..

It is claimed that *Le Monde* played a very significant role in the fight against colonialism and journalists, and editors alike, take great pride in the stances taken by the paper during the Algerian conflict. This is done through inflated claims made by the paper's journalists. André Fontaine, for instance, was quite adamant about *Le Monde's* successful role in the decolonisation struggle when he declared in 1977

(...) et s'il y a un point sur lequel me semble-t-il Le Monde y a réussi c'est sur le thème de la décolonisation. Lorsque Le Monde a pris les positions qu'il a prises il y a vingt ans sur les guerres coloniales, aussi bien l'Indochine que l'Algérie, à ce moment là il prenait à rebrousse-

poil une grande partie de l'opinion française et il me semble qu'il a contribué l'opinion française à l'idée de la décolonisation.¹¹⁰

Claude Julien has also been known to have stated that the problems the paper had with a minister (Alain Peyrefitte) in the 1980s paled into insignificance compared with *Le Monde's* denunciation of torture in 1955. He wrote:

(...) Les choses étaient fort bien ainsi et, après tout une polémique avec M. Alain Peyrefitte paraissait en 1980 assez anodine à côté des dénonciations, vingt-cinq ans plus tôt, de la torture en Algérie.¹¹¹

Le Monde and its staff, as well as historians¹¹², all claim that the paper played a central role in the Algerian war.¹¹³ However, as our study will show, this was not the case.

It is asserted openly by historians that *Le Monde* is well known for its anti-colonial views and that very early on in the Algerian War of Independence it adopted liberal views supporting the struggle of Algerians and even backing their emancipation, self determination and independence. This claim was even made as recently as March 1992 by Patrik Eveno at the Colloquium on Memory and Teaching of the Algerian war.¹¹⁴

Although not claiming that *Le Monde* supported the idea of independence immediately, another historian and former journalist and editor of the newspaper, Jean Planchais, nevertheless stated in a letter to the author (see Appendix D) that the paper was a "proponent of the most liberal policies in Algeria" and "a great defender of human rights" in that country, causing it to be seized on many occasions.

There are more indirect and insidious ways of making the same point. This was exemplified in a publication of *Le Monde* commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Algerian war. [*Le*

Monde: Dossiers et Documents, No 146, July-August 1987, for instance, pages 1 to 9 were devoted to the period of the Fourth Republic which is being covered here. Only a third of a single page (4 articles) was given as a sample of articles written at the time. The date chosen for that sample (29 January 1959) could be very questionable. This was the day when the paper reported that the Algerians were on strike in Algiers and when bombs destroyed the Otomatik, Cafeteria and Coq Hardi brasseries in Algiers, killing and injuring a number of Europeans in some of busiest cafés of the capital.

Curiously, apart from the five official statements, public declarations or documents, in the public domain at the time, only four of the 23 articles covering the period were written contemporaneously by Minay (1955), Penchenier (1955), Herreman (1957) and Sirius (1957). All of the others have been written since that time.

More seriously, in my view, are claims made in academic books which propound the same view. This selective view of history is particularly evident in the book published by J. Planchais and P. Eveno on the Algerian war.

Although the title does not associate *Le Monde* with the Algerian War explicitly, the superimposition of the title of the book, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, on a background showing an enlarged front page of *Le Monde* (with the name of the paper in large characters), leaves no doubt in the mind of a reader as to the linkage this implies.

Furthermore, although the title of the book is said to consist of a dossier and testimonies gathered and presented by the authors, the latter do, indeed, situate the book at a "meeting point between memory and history (*confluent de la*

mémoire et de l'histoire).

Additionally, although they concede that at times (*parfois*) articles are written with a degree of hindsight (*un peu de recul*), they emphasise that their articles are, indeed, written often in the heat of the action (*souvent à chaud, au coeur de l'événement*).

But they go further. They claim that the Eveno and Planchais book may be read not only as a history of the Algerian war, but also as a chronicle of *Le Monde's* memory throughout events, in which it was itself one of the actors.

However, a close examination of the book reveals that very few articles indeed were written at the time. Most of them in fact have been written since independence, with a lot of hindsight.

More precisely, there was a total of 400 pages of main text written or 136 articles. Documents, official statements and other publications that were in the public domain at that point (17) cover 47 pages, while testimonies (27), mostly interviews recorded in 1988, cover 63 pages. Documents and testimonies about the war cover about 25% of Planchais and Eveno's book.¹¹⁵

If sequels of the war may be accepted as a useful part of a book dealing with the Algerian war (19 pages), the 10 pages of the power struggles after the war seem less appropriate; and the section devoted to the 1988 riots (23 pages) seems really out of place in view of the fact that fewer than 25 pages were actually devoted to the paper's writings on the four years (1954 to 1958) covered by this study.

The danger with this kind of publication is that, if taken at face value, it is likely to convince many, including academics, that *Le Monde* did, indeed, express progressive views, and

that it was at the forefront of opposition to government colonial policy during the Algerian War.¹¹⁶ This received wisdom is still largely unchallenged today. In the last Colloquium on the Memory and the Teaching of the Algerian War (March 1992), Patrick Eveno, acknowledged historian of *Le Monde*, explicitly repeated this claim with renewed vigour.¹¹⁷ Even Algerian writers subscribed to this view.¹¹⁸ After all, had *Le Monde* not been denounced by J. Soustelle as one of the *quatre grands de la contre-propagande française*?¹¹⁹ One might, therefore, think that the paper did indeed play a major role in the fight for Algerian independence. But nothing is more misleading.

A more rigorous look at the portrayal of the protagonists, governments and policies, as well as an examination of civil liberties and their advocates, provides us with a sharper focus for testing this hypothesis. This in turn will provide a firmer assessment of the role of the paper.

Some hypotheses may be set up for the purpose of verifying this claim through an examination of the newspaper's content.

Was the position claimed by the paper clearly demonstrated in its portrayal of protagonists and policies that sought to change or resist the transformation of the colonial order? What was the paper's attitude towards the means used to implement the various policies, and towards their advocates and opponents? To what extent were *Le Monde's* reports objective or biased in any way? These constitute the central themes explored in the study which follows. These questions invariably raise other linked subsidiary questions and these are also addressed.

1.4.1.2. Structure and presentation

The work is now presented in four sections. Section one

provides a discussion of the context. The origins and development of *Le Monde*, the problems encountered by this newspaper throughout the period studied are explored in Chapter 2. This also examines the paper's audience and related aspects.

A review of the history of the country and its nationalist struggle against foreign invaders are outlined in Chapter 3, which sets out the background to the analysis.

Chapter 4 deals with *Le Monde's* coverage of the colony up to the November 1954 uprising. This has been done through a critical examination of *Le Monde's* articles (1944-1954) and with reference to T. Firchon's dissertation covering *Le Monde and Algeria* over the same period.

The main focus of the dissertation thereafter is devoted to a critical discussion of the content (*what*). Section two deals with the coverage of the protagonists: the French Army (Chapter 5), the Algerian FLN (Chapter 6), and the civilian population of both Algerian and European communities in Algeria and in France itself (Chapter 7). This section examines aspects that have been overlooked or addressed rather superficially by other researchers.

The third section of the study deals specifically with the coverage of the solutions proposed and discussed in relation to Algeria. Chapter 8 discusses the various governments in France and governor-generals in Algeria, and tries to assess to what degree the paper supported or rejected official views. Chapter 9 explores the nature of the discourse present in the paper in relation to Algeria, as well as the views propounded by journalists and contributors to the paper, to see whether these were consistent with claims of anti-colonial leanings. Chapter 10 looks at how *Le Monde* treated and discussed the views put

forward by the most enlightened members of society, and which the intellectuals expressed in various books and periodicals.

The final section deals with two major issues: civil liberties and the freedom of information. Chapters 11 and 12 look at the coverage of the repressive measures taken to deal with the nationalist uprising, concentrating on those taken within and outside the legal and institutional frameworks respectively. Chapter 13 assesses the length to which the paper went to encourage freedom of enquiry, debate and expression to inform public opinion. It reveals a very ambivalent attitude to these freedoms as well as a very equivocal support of those prevented from, or persecuted for, doing just that -informing public opinion. The final Chapter (14) attempts to bring all the strands of the discussion (of the various chapters) together and presents a critical synthesis of the findings. This study, although comprehensive, does not claim to be exhaustive. The final Chapter also suggests ways in which this study could be pursued and developed.

1.4.2.Rationale of the study

1.4.2.1. Why *Le Monde*?

Le Monde was chosen on account of its independence and the seriousness of its reports.¹²⁰ It is also, of course, extremely well known. Of all the French newspapers at the time, it is the one that one would expect to be most complete in its coverage, the most enlightened, and the less likely to exhibit bias.

Le Monde is largely known as the "newspaper of record".¹²¹ It is widely used and quoted. It has provided scholars with useful information and comments about most aspects of French society, and especially of French political life. It is judged by many, including its critics, as a serious newspaper which,

since its inception in 1944, has kept its finger on the political pulse of France. Pierre Albert gives an idea of the esteem in which it is held in France:

*Le Monde est le journal français de référence par excellence. Le sérieux et la variété de ses informations, la qualité de ses enquêtes et de ses articles de commentaires, la valeur surtout de l'équipe de ses rédacteurs (...) en font de tout point de vue une exception dans la presse française....*¹²²

Although this research is in the general field of the mass-media, it has to be understood that *Le Monde* is a particular medium with a specific public. Its message and content are in many ways unique.

All newspapers, including *Le Monde*, have their history. In the case of *Le Monde*, it also helps to make history,¹²³ and is therefore of great interest to the historian. *Le Monde* is said to have a central position in French democracy.¹²⁴ Albert du Roy gave the paper a historic responsibility when he wrote that:

*Le Monde a été le filtre unique à travers lequel toute une génération a vu l'histoire vivante (...).*¹²⁵

1.4.2.2. Why the Algerian war?

The importance of Algeria as a French colony does not need to be established as a subject of interest for the French. As the war progressed, interest in the question increased. With the heightened interest of public opinion about Algeria,¹²⁶ *Le Monde* devoted a number of articles (including front page and leading articles) to the question; and the importance of the country for the paper became increasingly apparent.

A phenomenon like a colonial war, leading to a prolonged period of armed struggle, tension and conflict in the political

and social spheres, is likely to reveal the political stand of a newspaper. The merciless struggle which engulfed communities on both sides of the Mediterranean, which *Le Monde* witnessed, is likely, more than any other event, to make it abandon its reserve. It is, therefore, an ideal event or phenomenon for investigating its ideology, the underpinnings of its thinking, and the views of the paper and journalists alike.

Another reason for studying *Le Monde* and the Algerian war of independence is that, in general, the French have been slow in finding out the truth about Algeria and the Algerian war.¹²⁷ The same was true of France's collaborationist record. It took years before FR3 showed the Channel Four series on the Algerian war in the mid-1980's and, despite the number of books and articles published on the subject, it still remains a controversial and emotive subject. Some have explored the processes by which national consciousness chooses to postpone the moment when it had to face up to a different reality.¹²⁸

A further reason for the choice of subject is that it is not very well known in the English-speaking world, although a considerable number of works are now available.¹²⁹

1.4.2.3. Periodicity, or why the Fourth Republic?

Because the Algerian war as a whole (1954-1962) is a huge topic, the study has been limited to the Fourth Republic. Limiting the coverage to the end of the Fourth Republic¹³⁰ has its own academic logic. The Fourth Republic constitutes a watershed in French history in the sense that its experience helped the French resolve the fundamental questions of the distribution of political power and the nature of their political system. The Fourth Republic was characterised by a long period of *immobilisme*, political squabbles, indecision, a lack

of focus of power, and over-concentration of decision-making. The complexities of this era of French history have been explored in detail by the work of Philip Williams, which in many respects has remained unsurpassed.¹³¹ The character of French politics suddenly changed with the Fifth Republic, when leadership and initiative in the Algerian question came from General de Gaulle himself. After 1958, it was in relation to his position that *Le Monde*, other papers, and even politicians situated themselves.¹³²

CHAPTER TWO

2.A UNIQUE NEWSPAPER: THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF *LE MONDE*

2.1. Introduction

For many, *Le Monde* is generally recognised as the "newspaper of record". The paper is widely used and quoted and has thus provided many scholars with information and comments about most aspects of French society and political life. For a number of observers this "serious newspaper" has kept its finger on the political pulse of France since its launch in 1944.¹

It is always of interest to find out why particular papers are launched. *Le Monde* is a case in point. The history of the paper has been well documented² and this section will be limited to some of the most relevant facts.

The chapter examines the appearance on the scene of *Le Monde* and its history up to 1958. It also looks at the launch of the paper and introduces its founder (and director until 1969). It examines its difficult beginnings, the bravery of some of its outspoken positions and also attempts to undermine it. A final part will be devoted to a brief look at the readership and philosophy of the paper.

2.2. An unusual paper for an unusual director

2.2.1. The paper's launch

During the Occupation, which preceded the setting up of the newspaper, there was no freedom of the press and most of the papers in circulation at the time were thought to have collaborated with the Germans.³ This was the case of *Le Temps*.⁴

A Provisional government decree (30 September 1944) banned all newspapers published during the Occupation and allowed the State to seize all their assets.⁵

This situation left France in need of a respectable newspa-

per of high standing which could fill the gap left by *Le Temps* at a time when the State was in possession of confiscated buildings, presses and assets which were not being put to productive use.

J.Dupraz, a member of the Ministry of Information under P.H.Teitgen, was given the task of trying to create a successor to *Le Temps*, independent of powerful financial interests. Hubert Beuve-Méry (HBM), a former diplomatic correspondent of *Le Temps*, was then approached towards the end of October 1944 and formally asked by the Minister for Information and former journalists of *Le Temps* to head a new paper.

The first copy of *Le Monde* was sold on 18 December 1944 carrying the next day's date.⁶ It was printed on a sheet double its present size.⁷ Though it was accused of stealing *Le Temps'* clothes,⁸ *Le Monde* had a radically different philosophy.⁹

Despite the post-war enthusiasm for the nationalisation of all major services, the new paper was created with government help but as a private company. The new company, *S.A.R.L. Le Monde*, was set up on 11 December 1944 with a capital of 200.000 francs divided into 200 shares worth 1000 fr each. The major shareholders were HBM, René Courtin and Christian Charles Funck-Brentano, and there were a few minor ones.¹⁰

If there were means put at the disposal of *Le Monde* which no doubt helped the launch of the paper, these did not ensure its survival. This was achieved through the paper's own organisation, efforts and performance.¹¹

Though the appointed Editor-in-Chief was André Chênebenoît, former general secretary of *Le Temps*, from the start *Le Monde* had to work under the troika of Courtin, Funck-Brentano and HBM, who made up a board of directors headed by the latter.

During the period covered by this study, he was the single most important person to determine the newspaper's stance and outlook.

2.2.2. Hubert Beuve-Méry, Managing Director of *Le Monde*

HBM, who came from very humble origins and was plagued by ill health, made tremendous efforts to complete his education.¹² He managed to start a professional career and gain a position of influence.¹³

Very early on in his career, he showed evidence of integrity, honesty and commitment to honest journalism.¹⁴ He saw his role as being that of a teacher and educator of the people of France and of its elite.¹⁵

He was not ignorant of matters dealing with colonialism¹⁶ and experienced the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Germans. On that occasion, he also showed bravery and a willingness to stick to his role and his duty as a journalist against all odds, even putting his job on the line when required.¹⁷

HBM was to remain as managing director of *Le Monde* for twenty-five years. Through his style and directorship he was to leave an indelible mark on one of the most important French newspapers. *Le Monde* has become an institution in itself and has acquired a central role in French society and culture as we know them today. His importance cannot be emphasised enough, as he was put on a par with de Gaulle in terms of influence in shaping modern France.¹⁸

Despite his role in *Uriage*, HBM was greatly admired by many of "the Good and the Influential." Michel Drancourt called him "*l'Alceste et le Cassandre du journalisme français*". Françoise Giroud, who herself ran *L'Express* with the help of J-J. Servan-Schreiber, described him in the following terms:

Le poil gris, l'oeil jamais d'accord avec la bouche... de rude et haute allure, amoureux de l'humanité, mais distant de tous les hommes, cet inamovible Breton est gracieux comme un cactus. Il n'oublie jamais qu'il a débuté dans la vie en tirant une charrette à bras pour payer ses études; mais il faut bien le dire, dédaigner l'argent et les agréments qu'il procure est relativement aisé à l'homme d'orgueil qui croit à sa mission et qui, au-delà des plaisirs, ne poursuit qu'une seule joie: la joie amère d'être seul, seul à être lucide, seul à rester pur. Beuve-Méry a pour l'argent plus que du mépris: il le craint pour tout ce qu'il le soupçonne d'apporter de corrupteur et d'amollissant aux meilleurs. Et c'est presque une faiblesse, une peur.¹⁹

When he retired in 1969, J.Fauvet, his colleague and successor at the head of the paper, used the following words to describe him:

(...) un homme agissant et éduquant moins par ses préceptes que par sa présence; "..ce mystère d'influence magnétique qu'on appelle présence au théâtre disait Madame Dussane. Un sage sans cesse présent à l'événement, mais sachant être à la fois loin et près de l'événement, prenant toujours la distance ou la hauteur permettant de le décanter, de le dominer, bref de le juger. Enfin, un libéral, non pas comme le général de Gaulle le lui dit un jour-en allemand et en public-celui qui dit toujours non, mais celui qui veut dire non au pouvoir, à tout pouvoir, chaque fois qu'il abuse de ses pouvoirs; dire non chaque fois qu'il pouvait être porté atteinte à l'indépendance du journal, et qui voulut la garantir à jamais.²⁰

However, the paper which HBM led had a very difficult start. An examination of its difficulties, of the images portrayed, of the positions it proclaimed or adopted, would help us set up further hypotheses to be tested later.

2.3. A brave paper despite difficult beginnings

2.3.1. A hard start

Experiencing a series of crises, *Le Monde* was riddled with problems which, for the sake of simplification, can be placed in three categories: personality conflicts within, internal

conflicts of opinion leading to clashes over the line to be taken regarding the different issues of the day, and threats or attacks from outside. It is sometimes very difficult to separate these categories, as there is a degree of overlap between them, or at least between two of them.

Problems hit the paper from the very first day of publication, when Beuve-Méry was thought to be taking prominence over the other directors.²¹ This conflict was to emerge just as France was about to ration paper.²²

The first conflict of opinion appeared less than a month after the paper's launch, over the speed of implementation of the reforms introduced after the War.²³ The troika set up to run the paper did not last long. What remained was an *équilibre instable* between Beuve-Méry and Courtin until the spring of 1949.²⁴

Though the paper was attacked at the very start by the Left and by the Right²⁵ as well as by the print Union,²⁶ it was the Cold War which was to bring out the worst in the paper in terms of internal conflicts and external opposition.

2.3.2. Position over the Cold War

The Communists left Ramadier's government in May 1947 and adopted a hostile attitude towards the MRP, putting France in the first stages of the bipolar system of alliances and of the Cold War. France sided with the United States.²⁷ But Beuve-Méry's philosophy was to refuse the leadership of the US and to advocate a "neutralist"²⁸ policy for France.²⁹

At the centre of the "neutralist" battle of *Le Monde* were the articles of Etienne Gilson³⁰ which called into question the rôle of the US in the defence of Europe.³¹ The possibility of a Third World War looked very real to him, especially a war

between the two superpowers. Having come to the conclusion that America was not ready to defend Europe, it seemed perfectly feasible to him that Europe should be free rather than fight for the USA.

Gilson was not the only one on the paper to think along such lines.³² Beuve-Méry was also advocating neutrality, which he saw as a lesser evil than the double bluff of the Pact.³³

Although not widespread, this position was not unique to *Le Monde*; it was shared by *Esprit*. It was also similar to the views expressed by Gilles Martinet and Claude Bourdet of *France-Observateur*, who had written along the same lines in *Combat* in 1948.³⁴

This neutralist position was certain to provoke the wrath of both sides.³⁵ But the ideal of European independence and of the French identity in 1951 was said to be, with the first ideal of performing a public service dating back to 1944, the two pillars of the paper.³⁶

However, inside the paper the neutralist quarrel was to open old wounds.³⁷ Courtin was convinced that Beuve-Méry was more afraid of the USA than he was of the USSR, and that, if he had to choose, he would opt for the USSR as being the lesser of two evils.³⁸ Courtin himself stood for a united Europe which would be kept under the protection of the US, before one day becoming a fully-fledged partner. He tried to counter the work of Beuve-Méry and other journalists of the paper who did not share his views.³⁹ In July 1949, the stormy relationship culminated in his taking a six-month holiday.⁴⁰ He nevertheless was revolted by the articles of Duverger and Pierre Emmanuel (25 & 26 October 1949); and he realised that instead of adopting this escapist attitude, refusing to put his signature to articles he

disapproved of, he should adopt a more positive one and resist the people whose views he opposed, defend his ideas, and inform the people involved in the paper.⁴¹

Even E.Gilson's departure in September 1950⁴² did not convince Courtin that the neutralist campaign, which he felt was a dangerous position and one that was harmful to the country, was at an end.

Le Monde published a number of articles in support of Gilson whom it defended unreservedly against an attempted "moral assassination".⁴³ This was really aimed at Beuve-Méry who then became the centre of the polemic.

Courtin tried to contact Dupraz again to see whether he, as well as Teitgen and Bidault, believed that the departure of Beuve-Méry was called for and said that he had confirmation of that on 12 January 1951.

Beuve-Méry became increasingly exasperated, and Courtin was more and more dissatisfied with the new system.⁴⁴ He used to come every Thursday to inspect the copies of the paper for the six previous days. He made a number of criticisms, as he felt the same campaign was still continuing.

The Association of the paper met again on 12 July 1951. Courtin's attempts failed again when his proposal was defeated by 110 to 90 votes. He decided to call on public opinion and bring the affair out in the open.⁴⁵ When the departure of Courtin and Funck-Brentano seemed likely, it was Beuve-Méry who offered his resignation⁴⁶ despite some journalists openly siding with him (R.Gauthier, A. Fontaine and J Fauvet).

However, the readers⁴⁷ and the journalists themselves came to the rescue of Beuve-Méry.⁴⁸ They drafted a letter affirming their moral right to be involved in the paper, not to be kept

in ignorance, and expressed their support for Beuve-Méry.⁴⁹

Beuve-Méry then convened an extraordinary meeting of the SARL for 13 September 1951, by letter, outlining the problems at stake. When the journalists met⁵⁰ they wanted their claim to ownership of the newspaper to be set up in legal terms, and tried to put through a motion to this end, but nothing came of it. They met again on 14 September and deplored the fact that they had obtained no satisfaction. They also asked the President of the Republic to intervene, threatening a strike.

Readers were mobilised and a movement was started throughout France by intellectuals and academics in support of Beuve-Méry under the auspices of Duverger.⁵¹

A *commission mixte* prepared a project for the modification of the statutes arranged for 14 September. It led to the setting up of the Society of Journalists, which requested part of the shares. The object was to acquire 80 shares of SARL/*Le Monde* which would be created for that purpose. They asked for a reply by the end of November so as to enable the new shareholders to take their seats in a new general assembly.⁵² The increased status of the journalists could only help Beuve-Méry who, despite repeated efforts to oust him, remained at the helm of the paper.

Despite a difficult start, *Le Monde* showed during the first decade that it was adopting a very independent policy, especially over the Cold War. It was not afraid of taking very courageous and even open risks, as was illustrated by the Fechteler episode.

2.3.3. The Fechteler report

This is a report on American policy in the Mediterranean allegedly written by Admiral Fechteler for the National Securi-

ty Council.⁵³ It was published in *Le Monde* on 10 May 1952 (page three) and had a devastating impact. Introduced by A. Chênebenoit, editor-in-chief, the article seemed to have all the guarantees of authenticity.⁵⁴

The report was denied by the Admiralty and Churchill himself. On 14 May the Dutch paper *Algemeen Handelsblad* headlined with an article (strangely resembling the one attributed to Fechteler) by A. Besnard who stated that he had found the original of the so-called Fechteler Report published under the title of "Sea of Division".⁵⁵

In any case, Fechteler said that he did not recall it. It was revealed later that the report was false. Accusations were rife about the lack of seriousness of *Le Monde* which was publishing false reports and taking its job too lightly. *Le Monde* demanded an enquiry by the Quai d'Orsay.⁵⁶

In any event, Commander Talerico's report could have provided the basis of Fechteler's recommendations. The views developed in the US by people like Senator Taft, for instance, were quite similar. On 3 January *L'Observateur* published extracts from General Richard L. Zimmerman arguing along the same lines and developing the same views.

There were different reactions in the various political *milieux* to *Le Monde*, whose "seriousness" and reputation were questioned.⁵⁷ Chênebenoit, who had been previously the secretary-general of the editorial team of *Le Temps*, and who was the author of the *gaffe*⁵⁸ thought of resigning, then merely stood down from the presidency of the *Société des Rédacteurs*.⁵⁹

2.3.4. The rise and fall of a rival: *Le Temps de Paris*

After ten years of trying to undermine *Le Monde* from with-

in, a final attempt was made to kill it off by competition, through the recreation of *Le Temps*.⁶⁰ This was to lead, in the following year, to the creation of *Le Temps de Paris*.⁶¹

Money was to come from 40,000 shares of 10,000 fr each. The *Société de Presse d'Information et de Publicité* was constituted and *Le Temps de Paris* created.⁶² HBM found an informer in the group who kept him abreast of the latest developments, especially on the financial side.⁶³

The political complexion of this new company was made up of people who were defeated at the Liberation with the participation of people like A. Guérin, journalist and editor-in-chief of *Le Temps de Paris*.⁶⁴

When this paper was set up *The Economist* (London) hoped that the "the independent *Le Monde*" would survive this financial struggle.⁶⁵ Fortunately for *le Monde*, the strategy of the new paper could not be worked out properly because of internal differences.⁶⁶

However, the first copy of *Le Temps de Paris* was printed on 17 April 1956 (the day Prince Rainier of Monaco married the actress Grace Kelly). The paper had enough money to last 12-18 months, then it would have to secure revenue from publicity to balance its books in the long term.⁶⁷ It was launched with big blue, white and red posters. The Messageries de presses/Hachette were reluctant to distribute the paper and some of their employees chose that day to strike. This meant delays in the suburbs and the provinces, or the newspaper failed to arrive in sufficient quantities. On 30 April *Le Temps de Paris* complained to its readers that a real sabotage operation had been mounted to prevent or hamper its distribution.

The product was seen to be of mediocre quality. Technically,

it was badly presented and the photographs were of poor quality.⁶⁸ It was also unstable and inaccurate.⁶⁹

In the political field, it defended two lines: first, anti-communism, second, "French Algeria", which earned it the nickname of the "the newspaper of Robert Lacoste in Paris".⁷⁰ Its success was remarkable in North Africa where it sold 4,360 copies, compared with 5,290 copies for *France-Soir*, 2,300 for *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, 1,100 for *Paris-Presse*.

This was not to last. Sales of the paper slumped.⁷¹ Publication ceased on 3 July, when the public was informed that paper shortage had forced the stoppage of publication. The hybrid product managed to hijack G. Penchenier from *Le Monde*.⁷² However, *Le Monde* did not have to go to great lengths to fight the paper: it watched others do the work for it.⁷³

2.3.5. Further assaults

Le Monde had outside enemies who were trying to influence it, to stage a *coup d'état* from within or lure away its journalists.⁷⁴

A number of *Le Monde's* journalists at that time, especially those who had worked for *Le Temps*, thought that Beuve-Méry was leading them down a very hazardous political path. Moreover, the need for measures of economy was making him pay low wages.⁷⁵

Money (the sum of 50 million francs was mentioned) was also used by Robert Bollack, the influential boss of the *Agence Economique et Financière*,⁷⁶ to entice Beuve-Méry to cooperate or to retire early.

2.4. The positions of the paper a source of problems?

2.4.1. Indochina and the Cold War

It has been suggested that the difficulties of *Le Monde*

since 1949 may be explained by the analyses and positions adopted by the paper regarding the "governing elite".⁷⁷ Indochina and Algeria are presented as the most obvious cases when the paper went against many of the views prevailing at the time. As outlined earlier, the paper itself seemed to be proud of that record. But, in my view that remains to be demonstrated.

On Indochina, for instance, *Le Monde*, under the influence of Jacques Guérif, one of the more enlightened journalists, who favoured increased autonomy for French colonies, progressively moved towards recommending a federal solution. A federal solution is not an anti-colonial one. In fact, it seems that, whenever colonies were about to be lost, federation was seen to form the ultimate solution. Against that, many argue that at the time nobody, including the Communists, was apparently in favour of independence. But one can clearly find inside *Le Monde*, on the other side of the political spectrum from Guérif, journalists like Rémy Roure, who was opposed to Communism, hostile to Ho Chi Minh and who, in fact, argued for maintaining the French presence in Indochina.⁷⁸

It is well documented that Hubert Beuve-Méry had called the war *la sale guerre*.⁷⁹ The expression was taken from a report by William Bullit in *Life*. He, in turn, had borrowed it from one of the fighters involved in the struggle. Beuve-Méry had concluded his article by saying : *Il y a des générosités qui paient et des égoïsmes réputés sacrés qui coûtent affreusement cher*. But it is also true to say that an important contributor, Martial Bonis-Charancle, who played an important rôle in the setting up of the paper, left it in December 1947, because he could no longer cope with the position taken by the paper on

the Indochinese question.

In any case, Indochina seemed to have become a subject of disagreement within the paper up to 1950, with the revelations on 12 January of the "General's affair".⁸⁰ The position of the paper is reported thereafter as becoming unambiguous.⁸¹

However, more research, which could not be undertaken here, is needed to give a definite answer to that particular question.

After all, it is usually argued that *Le Monde* was against government policy in Algeria. How could that be when the paper was not against (in fact it welcomed) the Suez expedition, designed to deal with this "supporter of Algerian terrorism".⁸²

2.4.2. Guy Mollet against *Le Monde*?

There are also claims that governments of the Fourth Republic were against *Le Monde* because of the position it took on Algeria. Many accused G.Mollet of preventing the paper from putting up its price, of starving it of funds in order to hamper its independence and force it to adopt a more conciliatory line towards the government.

Despite claims to the contrary, this was not a vast conspiracy against *Le Monde* but a mere pricing problem which arose after the episode of *le Temps de Paris*.

Arguing that quality and austerity had to be paid for and that independence had its price, the management of *Le Monde* decided, at the beginning of 1956, to increase its sale price to 20 francs, to take into account the cost and the charges incurred since 1951.⁸³ In May, the Minister of Economy and Finance, P. Ramadier, was more understanding and encouraging towards *Le Monde*, but the decision was not implemented because of the competition posed by *Le Temps de Paris*. So, in the

autumn, nothing stood in the way of this increase, which was seen as justified in view of the vast price increases during the two previous years.⁸⁴ However, it was argued that the increase could start up a chain reaction and send the 213 price index up. The Mollet government was fighting inflation and had to watch the 5% threshold.⁸⁵ *Le Monde* nevertheless notified the government on 26 October of its decision to implement the new price from 29 October.⁸⁶

On 5 and 6 November, the sale of *Le Monde* was prevented (*saisies fictives*), a fine (*procès verbal*) was imposed on the paper for an illicit price increase, and the government planned to withdraw all state advertising from the paper. The bosses of the paper could face a 10 M. franc fine and two years in prison. These measures would have throttled the paper. On 9 November *Le Monde* backed down and reverted to the 18 Fr price (the subscriptions remained at their initial price).

Le Monde started again from square one by submitting a new request for a price increase to the Ministry of Finance and Economic affairs.⁸⁷ By the end of 1956, several other newspapers (*Vie Française*, *Figaro Agricole*, *Ici Paris*, *Juvénal* and *Guérir*) had all increased their prices without "offending" the government, which had itself authorised price increases for the SNCF.

The attitude of the government to *Le Monde* was seen by *Le Canard Enchaîné*, for instance, as a reaction to how the newspaper viewed government policy and an attempt to bring it into line. It was also alleged that the government could not take the opposition of the paper to its policies, since it was not a paper which could systematically be classified with the Left like *France-Observateur* and *Témoignage Chrétien*.⁸⁸

Some government circles are said to have suggested a change of name to get round the problem.⁸⁹ Others thought that Beuve-Méry had protested before the paper was really hit.⁹⁰ But, depriving the newspaper of 3 to 4 Million Fr a month, it was argued, would jeopardise the financial stability of the paper in the middle to long term and G.Mollet was trying to undermine its independence.

These perceived threats to *Le Monde* led to silence or to very mild reactions in the press generally. However, a number of weeklies criticised the government's decision.⁹¹ During November, the newspaper received 2,147 letters, 1,504 of them with cheques offering money.⁹²

Finally, in April 1957 Guy Mollet received Beuve-Méry at his request and gave in to *Le Monde's* request, since the 20 Fr price had allowed for a competitor, *Débats de ce Temps*, and was granted to any new publication.

However, the two battles in 1956 were the last ones to threaten the independence, if not the survival, of the paper. The return of General de Gaulle in 1958 coincided more or less with easier times for the paper and with a period of relative ease and security.

2.5. *Le Monde's* journalists, readership, and the paper's philosophy

2.5.1. Readership and social distribution of the paper

Le Monde's readership at the time was important, as was the paper's code of conduct and philosophy. We need, then, at the end of this chapter, to explore further the *who* and to whom before covering the *what* in the remaining chapters.

Le Monde's readership constituted an extremely influential

group in French society. Its readers tended to be successful professionals, businessmen and industrialists. Between 1948 and 1958 half of *Le Monde's* circulation (49% in 1948 and around 48% in 1958) was in the *départments* of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne, in other words, in the Paris region, the centre of political power and decision-making in the highly centralised French State.⁹³

It follows that the paper's rôle was bound to be of great importance in terms of giving a certain angle on stories, news and political analyses, and providing the reader with the raw material and finished products that were to shape that individual or group's outlook on very crucial matters of the day.

In his study of the paper, Abel Chatelain (1962) finds a degree of continuity in the composition of the readership which stabilised less than ten years after its launch. From a survey commissioned in 1954, some useful, if incomplete, conclusions may be drawn. Most of the readership belonged to two categories, the middle and well-to-do classes; and the maximum penetration of the paper was among the well-to-do-class.⁹⁴

45% of the readers belonged to the first three categories, 20.5% belonged to the professions and 18.2% were white collar workers or civil servants. The analysis carried out also took account of social status and external signs of wealth. Whereas the proportion of 92.5% of the readers who owned a radio was not exceptional as 80% of the French possessed one at the time, the percentage of those owning telephones (seven out of ten in 1954) does seem high for the time.⁹⁵

The 1958 survey carried was much wider and helped show that most of *Le Monde's* readers were men: 64% as opposed to *Le Figaro*, for instance, where the proportion of women reached

57%. Only 26% of *Le Monde's* readers were over 50 years of age. For *Le Figaro*, the proportion was 46%.⁹⁶

This 1958 survey also revealed that the readership was more urban than rural, with the higher educational level which that implies. *Le Monde* had the highest proportion of those who had attended primary, secondary and higher education (81%), whereas the average for the rest of the daily press (73 newspapers) was a mere 22%. The same applies for those with primary and secondary education, where *Le Monde* still led. The respective figures were 65% and 12%. The same conclusions are drawn for the higher education category, where the respective figures are 39% and 4%.

This set of data goes a long way to prove that the paper was indeed the newspaper of the intellectual elite, and especially the urban elite. The readers of *Le Monde* were to be found in "the University, the Bench, the Administration/Civil Service and Banking".⁹⁷ The newspaper was also read by educators and those in the teaching profession.⁹⁸

It had many qualities sought by a very small but important group of readers who had enough money to buy a few papers and who had enough time for a prolonged and serious read.⁹⁹

In addition, *Le Monde* was the main French newspaper read outside France, and in 1958 its circulation in North Africa reached 22,000.¹⁰⁰ Its importance worldwide, despite the low sale figures, cannot be underestimated. It was judged to be the sixth most important paper internationally. It was "the only French paper read all over the world .. the best made and the most hated ... the least sold".¹⁰¹

Indeed, with a coefficient of 2,5 (i.e every 2 copies of the paper are read by 5 people), it was the most read French paper

in the world even if the number of copies sold remained modest.¹⁰² The paper was described¹⁰³ as being unquestionably the first French daily,¹⁰⁴ written for those who think by journalists who are "most attached to intellectual rigour".¹⁰⁵

2.5.2. A particular philosophy of journalism

2.5.2.1. A high reputation and profile

Throughout the period of the Algerian War of Independence, *Le Monde* was probably the most important French newspaper in terms of quality and influence. Since its foundation in 1944, despite the Fechteler episode, it had acquired the reputation of being "the most serious Paris newspaper" because of the rigorously intellectual approach of its contributors and because of its informed and comprehensive treatment of developments in France and around the world.

2.5.2.2. High calibre staff

Many of the staff who joined *Le Monde*¹⁰⁶ were very experienced journalists who had previously worked for *Le Temps* before the war. Many of its contributors were graduates had gained doctorates in their field (Georges Hourdin, J. Schwoebel, P. Viansson-Ponté), were Professors (Maurice Duverger, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Kayser, Jean Vignal) or were even members of the *Académie* (Pierre Emmanuel).

The backbone of the paper was constituted by the Director HBM, who was the most important person in the paper, the Editor-in-Chief, André Chênebenoit, and many of the great names of the paper, journalists and contributors, such as Robert Gauthier, André Fontaine, Jean Shwoebel, Jacques Fauvet, Jean Planchais, Jean Lacouture (not a member of the paper's staff between 1953 and 1957) and Pierre Viansson-Ponté (not a member of staff between 1953 and 1958), who gathered around their boss

in the morning conference to decide what went in the paper that day where:

*On s'exprime à voix feutrée, et on se range, droits comme des i, en demi-cercle, autour du patron vertical (...). Le Monde est une maison où on ne s'assied pas.*¹⁰⁷

As Giroud put it: "In *Le Monde* if one had to die, then it would preferably be standing up."¹⁰⁸

Indeed, as a serious paper, distributed in 116 countries which account for 20 % of its distribution (Chatelain p. 166), a paper in which there was no horoscope, photographs, cartoons or *faits divers* and where advertising only represented 40 % of the income, *Le Monde* boasted many contributors and journalists: e.g. André Ballet, Raymond Barrillon, Georges Chaffard, Edmond Delage, Claude Ezraty, Jean François, Pierre Frederix, Pierre Froment, Etienne Gilson Jacques Grignon-Dumoulin, Jacques Guérif, Claude Julien, Michel Legris, Julien Lemoyne, Georges Mamy, Pierre Albin-Martel, Gilbert Mathieu, Pierre André, Bertrand Poirot-Delpech Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber (1948-1953) and Jean-Marc Théolleyre. All these signed numerous papers in *Le Monde* that made compulsory reading for other journalists, decision-makers, and the readership as a whole.

Some combined administrative and managerial duties with journalistic talents. This is the case for instance of the Director, who often wrote under the name of Sirius, Martial Bonnis-Charancle, André Catrice, Joannès Dupraz, René Courtin, Christian-Charles Funck-Brentano, Rémy Roure, Jean Vignal, Jacques Fauvet (who became director in 1989) and André Fontaine (who became director in 1991).

The paper also had many journalists who were special envoys or correspondents: Dominik Birmann, André Blanchet, Charles

Favrel, Maurice Ferro, Philippe Herreman, Pierre Henri, Alain Jacob, Jean Knecht, André Leveuf, Eugène Mannoni, Gilbert Mathieu, Georges Penchenier, Charles Pignault, Jean Wetz and Jean Planchais (who travelled occasionally with the troops).

Some were awarded the great title of *grand reporter*, like Jean Couvreur, Jean Lacouture and Edouard Sablier.

All these journalists may be assumed to be speaking on behalf of the paper.

This is also the case for others (Robert Escarpit, Yves Florenne, Jean Taillemagre and Maurice Vaussard , for instance), who, although they had regular columns which they wrote, were outside contributors. They were, nevertheless, closely associated with the paper and spoke in its name as head of the particular sections they managed.

The category of outside contributors includes also such journalists as André Blanchet (1946-1965), Jacques Driand, André Fabre-Luce, Jacques Kayser, Gaston Messud, Philippe Minay and R. Pierron, who were closely associated with *Le Monde*, as was Maurice Duverger, who wrote frequently for the paper but did not have a column himself. As a professor of Law and a Senior Researcher for the F.N.S.P., he was called upon to express his views on the major problems of the day. It can safely be assumed that his views were his own.¹⁰⁹

Many other contributors wrote a *Libre-opinion/libre tribune*, or sent an occasional article to the paper, at the paper's request (or without it), expressing their own point of view. This was the case for Jean-Marie Domenach, André Frossard, André Mandouze, Lyon-Caen, Henri Marrou and Pierre-Henri Simon.¹¹⁰ In no way could these journalists be considered to speak on behalf of the paper.

2.5.2.3. Political and financial independence

It is often argued that newspapers are not free to express certain opinions because of the very fact that they are not independent.¹¹¹ It is said that some financial interests make it an express condition that their continued financing and their sustained backing rest upon the paper adopting very clear and unequivocal positions which should not be in any way detrimental to those interests.

Le Monde states categorically that it is a politically independent paper, not linked to any political party. It does not claim to be simply a "newspaper of information", but declares itself to be "politically and materially independent," that it "expresses an opinion freely, presenting, however, the maximum number of items of information and reflection beforehand."

In fact, the independence of *Le Monde* is often hailed as its greatest asset. On becoming director, a very proud J.Fauvet wrote praising the achievements of the paper :

Le scandale pour ses adversairesc'est qu'il ait réussi en préservant son indépendance à l'égard de tous les pouvoirs, de tout parti, de toute idéologie, de toute confession et, bien-sûr de tous intérêts.

2.5.2.4. Objectivity and realism

One could safely assume from what precedes, and indeed, one is often reminded, that in *Le Monde* the reader should look forward to an objective treatment of news and political and other commentaries throughout the paper. This objectivity, emphasised by the editors and journalists of the paper, does not preclude choice. The reader is told that when a grave and crucial position is called for, *Le Monde* is able to make a choice. Aware of the difficulty of objectivity in reporting¹¹²

and the definite advantages of the historian whose best allies are time and hindsight over the "historian of the moment" (the journalist), J. Fauvet points out that the newspaper is well placed to access sources, even though it may have only a few minutes or hours to write this history of the moment:

*Un journal n'est pas dépourvu de moyens; il peut et doit multiplier les sources d'information, recouper et vérifier les nouvelles, publier plusieurs versions, user, bien-sûr sans trop en abuser du conditionnel..... et enfin, et surtout, compléter et corriger quand la lacune ou l'erreur est trop manifeste..... s'il n'est pas honteux de se tromper, il est malhonnête de ne pas rectifier.*¹¹³

The reader of *Le Monde* has some guarantees,¹¹⁴ or may have some expectations of the newspaper, provided that there is enough space:

Le lecteur a l'assurance, ou l'espoir que rien d'important ou de significatif ne lui sera dissimulé. L'objectivité naît d'une certaine façon, de l'abondance des nouvelles.

2.5.2.5. Thoroughness and speed of reporting

The reader is also informed that the spirit and the philosophy of the paper are different. And on the first day of its publication the paper proclaimed that it wished to provide a particular kind of service:

*"Assurer au lecteur des informations claires, vraies et dans toute la mesure du possible, rapides, complètes."*¹¹⁵

The newspaper also makes it clear that it refuses to wait until an event settles down before making it known. It is not afraid of getting its fingers burnt. Aware that in times of crises the reader will try and find in the paper "informative and thought-provoking items not usually available in other media coverage", the paper sets definite standards of what it expects of newspaper reporting:

*Le journalisme, c'est la vie, la vie mouvante, passionnée, troublante; les apeurés et les frileux n'ont guère plus de place ou de rôle dans la vie que dans le journalisme.*¹¹⁶

2.5.2.6. Freedom and justice as a vocation

The paper sets itself a high standard when it declares that it stands for the upholding of justice and commits itself to speaking out:

*Quand un homme ou un pays souffre d'une injustice grave, l'indifférence est une opinion. Et le mensonge par omission peut être la pire des opinions.*¹¹⁷

Quite proud of its record, Jacques Fauvet described the paper, which he worked for and which he headed from 1969, in very complimentary terms, stating:

*Cette passion de la justice, ce souci de la concilier avec la liberté, peuvent définir l'idéal de ce journal et le critère qu'il tente d'appliquer au jugement d'une actualité qui, au fil des ans se transforme profondément. Les problèmes, les disciplines, les valeurs, les événements, les pays auxquels s'intéresse un journal tel que celui-ci ne sont plus les mêmes qu'il y a vingt ans, dix ans. Le monde a changé; Le Monde, lui, n'a changé ni d'esprit ni de vocation.*¹¹⁸

This proud record is claimed by *Le Monde's* journalists themselves, even in respect of decolonisation and the Algerian war. They set the paper up as a defender of justice and freedom and like to see themselves as champions of these causes.

En soutenant l'entreprise de la décolonisation, Le Monde défendait à la fois la justice et la liberté.

*Ne désespérant pas de voir garanties un jour la justice et la liberté au sein d'une démocratie économique, Le Monde reste fidèle à sa tradition.*¹¹⁹

2.6. Conclusion

As we have seen, the Fourth Republic for *Le Monde* was a time

of struggle and hardship which did not prevent the paper and its journalists from being very outspoken on some of the issues on which they held strong views. In writing to, or in, the paper, some contributors were expressing their own views which may not have been similar to those held within the paper.

Considering the history of the paper and its most significant features, one is tempted to see this paper with its difficult beginnings, its struggle for political and financial independence, as a strong and resilient news medium. The strength of character of its director, who was a man of humble origins but of honest and forthright views and unquestionable integrity, added to the paper's established and declared record.

The self-proclaimed code of conduct and the ideals of journalism that it puts forward, as well as the nature of its readership, all lead one to conclude that *Le Monde* was indeed a very important paper which, in many ways, was unique on the French scene. This explains why *personne ne lui conteste, ni en France, ni à l'étranger, le titre de premier quotidien français* even in the 1950s when the paper was considered to be *le journal le plus sérieux de Paris*. Everything so far indicates that, if this paper was not altogether faultless, it was, indeed, committed to the noble ideals of freedom and justice, and not afraid of taking up a cause along those lines.

The purpose of this study, as outlined in the introduction, is to assess critically the reputation which the paper has acquired, especially in the coverage of Algeria (which constitutes an essential part of the decolonisation debate) over the period covered by this study and to determine to what extent the paper was faithful to its mission and objectives, self-

declared or otherwise.

De ses grands desseins de politique coloniale, la France n'a réussi aucun: l'assimilation par l'école, par l'armée, par l'émigration, par le syndicalisme, fut impuissante à éteindre l'esprit de révolte de l'éternel Jughurta.

Charles Robert Ageron,
Le Nouvel Observateur,
La Guerre d'Algérie: 30 ans après
Numéro Spécial (9), March 1992, p. 20.

CHAPTER THREE

3. THE ALGERIAN SCENE OR ALGERIA UNDER COLONIAL RULE

3.1. Introduction

When *Le Monde* was launched in 1944, Algeria had been a French colony since 1830. From that date the country experienced a series of uprisings against French occupation in almost every generation.¹ In 1954, however, *Le Monde* considered Algeria to be peaceful in relation to neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia, where "terrorist" activities were reported. However, what was to become the war of independence in Algeria broke out on the first of November of that year, and lasted until 1962.²

As it had been up to 1954, Algerian history for the next eight years was going to be a troubled one. Throughout its history, the country was subjected to various foreign invasions, some of which had a more lasting impact than others.³ Although it took various forms, the resistance of the indigenous population to outside influences and domination is a constant factor.⁴ Throughout the historical development of Algeria, there is ample evidence that beneath the resistance to foreign occupation, lay a deeply embedded developed sense of identity. There could not be such a degree of resistance without this sense of identity and an understanding of the concept

of "Umma" (nation).⁵

3.2. Before the French Conquest

Contrary to widespread belief evident in some colonialist literature, which tried to legitimise colonisation as a civilising venture, Algeria had been in contact with other civilisations for many centuries prior to its colonisation by the French after 1830.⁶ Throughout the centuries, Algeria had acquired traditions, customs and a cultural heritage unique to that part of the world.⁷

Since its emergence in history books, with the arrival of the Phoenicians in its eastern part in the 12th century BC (although traces of human life go back three to four thousand centuries),⁸ North Africa experienced many invasions, relatively peaceful and otherwise (Phoenician, Roman, Byzantine, Vandal, Arab, Portuguese, Spanish, Ottoman and French). Although important ruins of Roman cities and of Byzantine fortresses still remain, the most lasting influences were those of the Carthaginian occupation (about 1,000 years's duration in the Eastern part) and the Arabo-Islamic conquest that began in the 7th century A.D.⁹

The history of Algeria in particular, and that of North Africa in general in this earlier period, has been extensively documented, especially through the works of Charles André Julien,¹⁰ who was for many years the established scholar in this field. Nevertheless, Julien contends that the country was struck by a somewhat "congenital ineptitude" for independence, and that it remained constantly subjected to the influences and sometimes the destiny of outside civilisations. This position is somewhat surprising and hardly justifiable, when in the views of this same renowned historian, very few of these civil-

isations left long-lasting traces; and that underneath the "changing clothes", the "body and the soul" of the population of North Africa remained unchanged.¹¹

Moreover, towards the end of the Ottoman empire, Algeria was a partially independent province, just as it had been before. It was not under direct control, but run instead by notables of the indigenous population with a minority of Turks. It was a cohesive unit which was economically and culturally independent. Politically some form of authority was acknowledged to the Sublime Porte, but the province was run independently of it.¹²

3.3. The French conquest and the colonisation of the country

3.3.1. Le Coup d'éventail and the Algiers expedition (1827-1830)

The whole colonial venture started after a diplomatic incident involving the Dey of Algiers and the French Consul in Algiers.¹³ The French blockade of Algiers started after this diplomatic incident (1827) but did not constitute a real danger:

La Régence eût pu longtemps subsister si des tractations financières dont le dey fut victime, et les agissements suspects du Consul Deval n'avaient amené la fameuse scène du coup d'éventail (30 April 1827) dont les nécessités de la politique intérieure française firent, trois ans après, sortir l'expédition qui aboutit à la prise d'Alger (5 July 1830).¹⁴

In August 1829 the Dey went even further when he dismissed the French envoy and fired upon his ship while it was retreating under the flag of truce.¹⁵

In 1830 the French government decided on military intervention (which had been recommended since 1827 by the War

Minister) and sent 37,000 troops, who landed in Sidi Ferudj on 14 June 1830.¹⁶ By 5 July 1830 General de Bourmont had accepted the surrender of the Dey with the guarantee that the rights and property of the people of all classes would be respected.¹⁷

The assault on Algiers in 1830 was presented to Europe by the French government as an attempt to put an end to the activities of the pirates, which would, in the eyes of European nations, honour France and which earned her the benediction and the congratulations of the Pope in the name of Christendom.¹⁸ To the Algerians the assault was presented as an operation to rid them of the "Turkish oppressors".¹⁹ Indeed, it was the Restoration, condemned to incision by the general situation in Europe, which wanted to assert France's vitality by an *action d'éclat*, by a military action outside Europe.²⁰ As far as Algeria was concerned, the conquest was in many respects an "accident" of the general policy of the Restoration Monarchy in France.²¹ Initially there was no colonial preoccupation, nor desire for settlement²² when France, reluctant to make war, had proposed to the Ottoman Sultan to bring Algiers under his control.²³

3.3.2. Military rule: 1830-1870

Although not implying that the conquest had in any way been completed in 1830, this is how C.A. Julien characterised the story of the fall of Algiers:

*Une louche affaire menée par les tout-puissants négociants juifs d'Alger avec la complicité des politiciens tarés de Paris; un accident provoqué par un diplomate suspect: une expédition médiocrement conduite par un général discrédité; une victoire accueillie avec indifférence ou hostilité par l'opinion publique et suivie de la chute de la dynastie qui en revendiquait le mérite, tels furent les mérites singuliers de la conquête de l'Algérie par la France.*²⁴

The capture of Algeria did not save Charles X and the Restoration, replaced in late July 1830 by a new monarchy headed by Louis Philippe. The period following July 1830 was one of uncertainty for the French government.²⁵

The progressive occupation and colonisation of Algeria have been documented extensively elsewhere.²⁶ To start with, there was no big colonial project and from 1837 until 1840 a policy of "limited occupation" was adopted and treaties, preserving their rights, were signed with the Algerian populations, especially with the Emir Abdel Kader.²⁷

Even under Napoleon III, who took a great deal of interest in his "Arab Empire" through his "senatus Consulta" of 1863 and who in 1865 tried to protect the indigenous populations and their property rights, the colonials were not deterred from finding loopholes and continuing their expansionist policy at the expense of the local populations, who were more and more subjected to a policy of *refoulement* and *cantonnement*, especially after Napoleon III's fall in 1870. Ageron found no exaggeration in the use by the Algiers Lawyer, Emile Larcher, of the expression "consumed art of spoliation" to describe the way two fifths of arable land were removed from the Algerian Muslims.²⁸

The process continued with the Third Republic and beyond as, from 1871 to 1919, the Administration gave 897,000 hectares of land to settlers either freely or for very modest prices. If at the end of the First World War European property extended to 2,317,000 hectares, by 1954 it had reached 2,726,000 hectares.²⁹

3.3.3. The Third Republic and the triumph of colonisation

The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war and the establishment of the Third Republic saw the triumph of colonisation.³⁰

In the intellectual field, the classical economic ideas of Adam Smith (of the Manchester school), Richard Cobden (translated in France by Frédéric Bastiat), Jean Baptiste Say and others traditionally opposed to colonisation,³¹ were being slowly overtaken by ideas in favour of colonial domination, expressed in the following terms:

*Le peuple qui colonise le plus est le premier peuple; s'il ne l'est pas aujourd'hui, il le sera demain....*³²

There were also appeals by the Church, for instance from Cardinal Lavigerie to the people of Alsace and Lorraine, to emigrate to Algeria,³³ which became officially the promised land for France deprived of part of its territory.³⁴

The discontent of the colonists, opposed to the continuation of military rule in Algeria following the fall of the Empire (1870), was felt when Paris proposed to send a General to take over the destiny of Algeria as opposed to instituting a civilian regime.³⁵

The Moslem population was also unhappy but for the opposite reasons. In contrast, the discontent of the Muslims was triggered off by the possibility of a civilian regime being established in Paris and Algiers and by the French defeat in 1870, which inspired a desire of independence for the Muslims. The little authority that local Moslem chiefs had was undermined by French authorities. The departure and defeat of French troops and the fear of the new regime, as well as the hope of sending the colonists home, led more than one third of the population

to take up arms in a resolute way,³⁶ following the various insurrections which had nevertheless preceded in different parts of the country in 1859, 1860 and 1864.³⁷

The cancellation of the jurisdictions and the legal guarantees that had previously protected the Moslem population, the upgrading of the indigenous population of Jewish origin to full citizen status, the departure of the generals and officers who were on good terms with the local populations, and the extension of the civilian regime of the colonists, feared by the Moslems for a long time, are among the reasons for the Algerian uprising under Mokrani and his brother Boumezrag in 1871.³⁸

The Moslems suffered a great deal from deaths, casualties.³⁹ They were also victims of confiscations of land and property.⁴⁰ Moreover, the *Loi Warnier* (26 July 1873) was to permit the division of collective lands, increasing the disruptive process taking place in indigenous land property.⁴¹ Finally, the law of 22 April 1887 made transactions possible where they had not been possible before.⁴²

3.4. General evolution and the rise of nationalist political movements

3.4.1. Administrative and political evolution

The Third Republic's policy towards Algeria was that of assimilation. As a result, different public services were attached to different French Ministries.⁴³ An Algerian budget was created, prepared by the latter and his staff, discussed and voted by the *Délégations Financières* and implemented only after the consent of the French parliament.⁴⁴

The *Indigènes* were considered to be French "subjects": those of Jewish origin were declared "citizens" by the *Décret Cré-*

mieux (24 October 1870), issued on the initiative of a Jewish member of the Government of National Defence. Those of Moslem origin could aspire to the same rights only upon giving up their Islamic status. They would have had to accept French jurisdiction in all social and religious spheres of life.⁴⁵

The Algerians participated in the First World War and suffered in great numbers (25,000 killed out of a total of 173,000 soldiers).⁴⁶ The French government decided to increase their access to citizenship, but only to a limited extent. The decree of 6 February 1919 slightly increased their representation in local assemblies (*Conseils municipaux* and *Conseils généraux*). The number of voters went up to 421,000.⁴⁷ Algeria, with the exception of the southern territories under military rule, was divided into three *départements*: Oran, Alger and Constantine. The *départements* themselves were divided into two kinds of *communes*: *communes de plein exercice* similar to the ones in France with a high number of *colons* (settlers), and *communes mixtes* which had a very high proportion of Moslems. The indigenous population was ruled according to the severe *Code de l'Indigénat* (1881-1927), which enabled administrators and judges of the *communes* alike to repress it without any right of appeal.

In spite of the fact that the Moslem religion does not have a clergy, French authorities created an official one, paid and controlled by them.⁴⁸

In addition to the established French taxes, the natives were also subjected to a certain number of *Impôts arabes*.⁴⁹ This triumph of colonisation⁵⁰ meant further pauperisation of the local population, whose economic, social and educational aspirations were frustrated by the increase in their numbers,

the loss of their lands, the decline of their standards of living and by the relative decrease of education at all levels. On the eve of the Second World War and after the efforts deployed by the Authorities, about 110,000 children attended school out of 1,250,000 of school age.⁵¹ If in 1914 5% of the children went to school, by 1954 this figure had only reached 15%.⁵²

3.4.2. Economic and social condition of the population

By the end of the 19th century, colonisation forces had their way and the anti-colonialism expressed in Parliament and in the press went unheeded.⁵³ The number of "civilising colonists" rose steadily in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. But so also, and in even greater numbers, did that of the local indigenous population, especially after the famines and epidemics of the mid-19th century - famines and epidemics were still a feature in 20th century Moslem society (1920-21).⁵⁴

The laws on land property led to dismemberment for the benefit of speculators.⁵⁵ The Algerian population lived under dire economic conditions and when they were forced by their hardship to sell their lands, the cost of legal fees for land transactions ruined them.⁵⁶

The forests to which certain peasants fled after having been deprived of their land were sequestered by the Authorities and "protected" by the "Code Forestier", prejudicial to the Moslem peasants.⁵⁷ The Algerians were subjected to "harsh economic and social systems". The burden was too heavy for the population to carry; and the situation worsened as the years went by.⁵⁸ They had less and less income, having been victims of the

policies of repression and confiscation of land,⁵⁹ *refoulement* and *cantonnement* which pushed them towards the poorest lands.⁶⁰ Moslem traditional economy was being destroyed.⁶¹ The crisis in agriculture and the increase of mechanisation in this field meant even less revenue than ever, even as employees, for the Moslem peasant, who started to migrate to the cities and even abroad as industry was not developed to a great extent.

Whereas the colonists had a more stable revenue which, if it did not increase, stagnated, the revenues of the "fellahs" (Algerian peasants) was constantly decreasing.

During and after the First World War cereal production went down by between one third to a quarter of what it had been before.⁶² The gravity of the situation was never declared openly by the French authorities in order not to frighten off potential investors.⁶³ The total credit available to help agriculture was 82,000 francs whereas one single commune needed 120,000 francs.⁶⁴

The world economic depression of the early 1930s hit Algeria particularly hard because of the traditional structure of the economy. There was a sharp contrast between the two communities living in Algeria. The disequilibrium was in favour of the "colonists" minority.⁶⁵ Most Algerians lived off agriculture. The Muslim economy was more affected than that of the settlers.⁶⁶ The colonists ran no risk of dying of hunger. The only risk was bankruptcy, but they could hope to be reflatd.⁶⁷ Industry, which was not an important sector anyway, was down 75%.⁶⁸ Against this background of misery, exploitation and discontent nationalist movements started to increase their power and influence.

3.4.3. Resistance and Revolt

Despite the common territory, language, history, religion, culture, traditions and past history of the Algerian people, numerous authors assert that it is not possible to discern Algerian nationalist or political movements as such until the 1930s.⁶⁹ Letourneau, for instance, maintained that, in spite of the insurrections, Algeria did not have an indigenous political tradition or any national sentiment before the 1930s.⁷⁰

The resistance of the Emir (up to 1847), the uprising of the Mokrani (1870-1871), and the revolt in the area of Batna in 1916, were claimed to have been limited geographically to certain regions. They were also considered to have been either half-political or half-religious,⁷¹ or to have crystallised behind a particular leader the reaction, discontent and bitterness of a population, led or left to take up arms against the French.

When the means of transport and communication were not sufficiently developed for any extensive exchange of ideas or development of political debates, and when the means of expression of the increasingly impoverished local population were so limited, it would be wrong, in my view, to expect to find a modern nationalist movement.⁷²

The development of indigenous politics, and of modern style nationalism in Algeria, were further discouraged by the behaviour of the French army and of the French authorities. The massacres, atrocities, ordeals and punishments to which the local population in Algeria were subjected by the French stifled and repressed nearly all form of indigenous politics.

Moreover, Islam, which could have acted as a ferment and a catalyst for resistance and uprisings, did not have this role

because, as Le Tourneau himself pointed out, it was isolated from outside influences and subservient to the authorities.⁷³

It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that, in the same way as before French colonisation, the desire for independence had been alive since the early years of the conquest. The Bey of Constantine reigned until 1848. The organised resistance of Emir Abdel Kader against the French occupation and his fight for liberty from 1832 until his surrender in 1847 won him the praise even of his adversaries. Cavaignac, for instance, as de Luna points out, had a great respect for the resistance of Abdel Kader⁷⁴ and saw him as a national Algerian hero.⁷⁵ Altogether, the French were often concerned that if anything happened in Europe, and France required her armies, it would be the end of French Algeria.⁷⁶

The peasants' resistance and the frequent uprisings were the ultimate way in which the Algerians could express their patriotism.⁷⁷ There were very few moments of peace between 1871 and 1915. Resistance to occupation took various forms: from open armed conflict to refusal of conscription, from exodus to requests and demands for better deals.⁷⁸ Even on the eve of the First World War, the conquest of the Sahara was far from having been completely achieved.⁷⁹

The Algerians had to adapt themselves in view of the material superiority of the French troops. The nature of the struggle changed from open armed revolt (the last in 1916) to legal opposition, demands for independence or for the improvement of their socio-economic conditions and political rights. Different nationalist movements in the modern sense of the word appeared and started to organise and lead these struggles at the beginning of the 20th century.

3.4.4. The nationalist movements

The revolutionary events of the turn of the century greatly influenced the emergence of organised modern (Western-style) nationalist activities. Algerian peasants (and sometimes workers) migrated towards the cities (and even abroad). Because of their socio-economic and political circumstances they became very sensitive to the influence of communist, socialist and Islamic ideologies⁸⁰ the programmes of which offered ideas and objectives that to a certain extent they shared and hoped for.

After the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the congress of Tours (1920) led to the establishment and development of the Communist Party in France. In the same year the Socialist International also condemned colonial policy.⁸¹ For Algerian workers present in France, the mixing with French workers, the development of proletarian consciousness, the rise of Arab nationalism, the Turkish revolution of Mustapha Kemal, the war of the Riff in Morocco,⁸² all played an important role in the development of a "modern" Algerian consciousness. The role of the press, and the turbulence and agitation of these years, could not but have an impact on the dissatisfied nationalists.

The nationalist resistance consisted of three main movements. Firstly, in Metropolitan France a communist political grouping of workers in the Paris area known as *L'Etoile nord-africaine* (ENA) was formed in 1926. It became radical in its programme when headed in 1927 by Messali Hadj, a worker with little formal education who had stayed in France after demobilisation. Messali came under the influence of Chekib Arslan, an Arab nationalist leader, who established his *Bureau d'Infor-*

mation in Geneva.⁸³ After meeting Arslan in an anti-colonial congress, Messali moved away from the earlier communist influence. Upon returning to France he still favoured an Algerian independent nation, but in the framework of Islam and the Arab nation. The ENA took a more radical and revolutionary approach in its struggle under his leadership and adopted a more specifically Algerian programme (as opposed to North African). Dissolved by the French authorities, it was recreated in 1937 under the name of *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA). The latter experienced the same fate (26 September 1939) and was transformed into the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD). In the process, Messali was imprisoned several times, put under house-arrest at other times, and, occasionally, exiled for his ideas and his role in the party (or rather the parties).⁸⁴

After the reforms of 1919 there was a slight increase in the number of elected liberal Muslims to local councils and to the *Délégations Financières*. Dr. Bendjelelloul, one of the locally elected councillors, created the *Fédération des Elus Musulmans* in the *département* of Constantine in 1934, which was followed by similar organisations in other places. A few newspapers came to life like *L'Entente*, the official newspaper of the Federation, *Voix Indigène*, and a few books were published by people like R. Zenati. At that time, a young liberal, by the name of Ferhat Abbas, emerged and was to have a primordial importance.

Abbas characterises this second trend in the nationalist movement, formed by an elite with a French education background, which at first and for quite some time did not question French sovereignty in Algeria, but fought for a gradual trans-

formation of the political status of the Algerian people, asking for equality in the Army and the Civil Service, the suppression of exception laws, the reform of justice and education in favour of the Algerian population without a renunciation of their Islamic status. Abbas created the *Union Populaire Algérienne* (UPA) and then the *Association des Amis du Manifeste* on 14 March 1944, in which members of other parties were welcome,⁸⁵ but he had to create his own party: *l'Union démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA).

However, towards the mid 1950s he joined the radicals for an independent Algeria. Several developments had occurred before his disappointment led him to change his policy, from the stance adopted when he wrote in *L'Entente* in February 1936:

*Si j'avais découvert la "nation algérienne" je serais nationaliste.... Et cependant je ne mourrai pas pour la "patrie algérienne" parce que cette patrie n'existe pas. Je ne l'ai pas découverte. J'ai interrogé l'histoire, j'ai interrogé les vivants et les morts; j'ai visité les cimetières; personne ne m'en a parlé. Sans doute oui - je trouve "l'empire arabe", "l'empire musulman" qui honorent l'Islam et notre race. Mais ces empires se sont éteints. Ils correspondaient à l'empire latin et au saint empire Romain-Germanique de l'époque médiévale. Ils sont nés pour une époque et une humanité qui ne sont pas les nôtres... Nous avons donc écarté une fois pour toutes les nuées et les chimères pour lier définitivement notre avenir à celui de l'oeuvre française dans ce pays. Nous l'avons écrit. La sauvegarde de cette oeuvre est le pivot de notre action politique.*⁸⁶

But if, as Barbour points out, Abbas could not find the Algerian nation in history, it was because long years "separated him from the memory (and the patriotism) of the great peasant risings". It was also because "the centres of Arabic culture had been destroyed and his French upbringing had confined his education to textbooks used in the French schools".⁸⁷

Abdelhamid Benbadis, founder and leader of the third natio-

nalist movement, replied to Abbas' declaration two months later that, having "examined history" and discovered a Muslim Algerian nation "with its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good or bad like every other nation of the earth... we state that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France and does not wish to be France".⁸⁸

Already in 1931 a book on the history of Algeria had on its cover the motto of the *Ulémas*. This motto was "Islam is our religion, Algeria our motherland and Arabic our language".⁸⁹ The Association of the "Ulemas" was founded in 1931 by Benbadis, who was influenced by the reformist ideas of Djamal Eddine el Afghani and the Egyptian Sheikh Mohammed Abdouh. The organisation flourished under Benbadis, who wanted to improve the political standard of the Muslims and purify their religion which was tainted by corruption in many respects.

Several newspapers were formed, *El Muntakid* (The Critic), a monthly review, *El Chihab* (The Meteor), *El Islah* (The Reform) and several history books on Algeria were published in Arabic.⁹⁰ In its Statutes (Article 3) the *Association des Oulémas Réformistes d'Algérie* asserted its desire not to intervene in politics, but this could hardly have been the case.⁹¹ Since they had declared that "independence was a natural right for every people on earth," their ideals were far from accepting French domination. They preached their ideas in mosques from which they were banned from 1939 and in the schools which they managed to create (from charity funds) and which were sometimes tolerated, sometimes closed down by the French authorities, but always under persistent threat of closure.

3.5. The last chances of peaceful settlement

3.5.1. The failure of the Blum-Violette Bill (1936)

In spite of the euphoric celebration of the centenary of the conquest, there was a deep-rooted feeling of *malaise* in the population.⁹² The rise to power of the Popular Front increased, however, the hopes in the colony. The "Elus", the Communists and the *Ulémas* prepared a Muslim Algerian Congress which took place on 7 June 1936 and drew up a charter of demands (social, economic, cultural and religious, in order to create a more liberal, egalitarian and less discriminatory system for the indigenous community). As a result these different political groupings were only partly satisfied.⁹³

A second congress was convened for 2 August, at which Messa-
li participated, and at which he spoke without having been formally invited. From that moment onwards he had a greater impact on the Moslem community in Algeria itself. This gathering had little success because of the disagreement between the different tendencies, and because of the disappointment of the more liberal elements as a result of the failure of the Blum-Violette proposals designed to grant citizen rights to a small number of Muslims.⁹⁴

However, the proposals were withdrawn because of the opposition in France and because of the threat of resignation *en bloc* of the Federation of Mayors and councillors in Algeria.⁹⁵

3.5.2. The Second World War crisis and its aftermath

When the war broke out in 1939, tension was already high because of the numerous problems that were still unsolved.⁹⁶ Galloping demography and the economic impact of the war had disastrous effects on Algeria. If the European population

slightly diminished or stagnated between 1936 and 1948, the Muslim population rose by one and a half million (from 6.121.000 to 7.600.000) in the same period. The population of the countryside had risen by 20%,⁹⁷ that of the cities by far more.⁹⁸

The production of cereals fell to a tenth of what it had been before the war.⁹⁹ In spite of this slump, grain requisitions were made, allegedly for metropolitan France, but destined, in fact, for Germany and Italy.¹⁰⁰ In Kabylia, where olive production constituted the main revenue, already in 1940 the production represented only a quarter of the usual figure. Even wine production diminished by two-thirds and stabilised at half the prewar level in later years.¹⁰¹

Muslim livestock was also affected. It was sometimes down by half¹⁰² and the revenues of Algerian exports fell drastically in spite of the devaluation.¹⁰³

Because of its inadequate industry, Algeria was dependent on France for most manufactured and consumer goods.¹⁰⁴ There were no major salary rises, and prices according to government official figures increased by a rate of 11% in 1939 to a rate of 439% in 1945.¹⁰⁵ The most affected were essential items like bread, coal and fuel. A bread shortage led to starvation. Even the most essential commodities could not be bought as they had become too expensive for the peasants.¹⁰⁶

With the landing of the Allied forces in North Africa in November 1942 the black market established itself, but prices were out of reach for most Algerians.¹⁰⁷ It was estimated that during that period 10% of the population could manage to satisfy its basic needs, while 75% to 80% were poor and very poor.¹⁰⁸

In spite of its disastrous economic situation during the Second World War, Algeria nevertheless represented an important strategic position. Oran had become one of the main French bases in the Mediterranean. At Mers el Kebir, the Royal Navy attacked the French marine. After the fall of France in June 1940, the French colonial empire assumed a special significance both for Vichy and de Gaulle.¹⁰⁹

3.5.3. Dashed hopes at the Liberation

There were different resistance networks on Algerian soil for espionage and sabotage. In collaboration with some Muslims they prepared the field for the Allied forces landing and participated in the successful putsch in Algiers that was to secure power for the Allied forces.¹¹⁰

During the war years F. Abbas, without encountering open opposition, tried unsuccessfully to get the French government free from parliamentary obstruction to start a programme of reforms.¹¹¹ The defeat of the French army and the landing of the American troops on the North African coast (8 November 1942) showed, in the same way as the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, the weakness of France as opposed to the strength of the deployed American forces.

After failing to obtain any satisfaction from the French authorities and after discussions with D. Murphy, personal representative of President Roosevelt, about the implementation of the Atlantic Charter to Algeria,¹¹² Abbas sent a *Message des Représentants des Musulmans Algériens aux autorités responsables* in the name of the Algerian elected representatives. His attempt to internationalise the issue by invoking the declaration of the American President on "the right of self-determination of all people without distinction of race nor

religion"¹¹³ provoked anger and disapproval in France.

De Gaulle and his government had been too busy with the war to make any effort towards solving the Algerian problem. However, on 7 March 1944, some reforms were formulated tending more towards "assimilation" than anything else, realising the wishes expressed ten years earlier by the Blum Violette proposals. But this was too late as even the less radical of the nationalists were hoping for a federal system with an autonomous Algerian Republic.¹¹⁴ As a result of his more radical and popular appeal, as well as his continued imprisonment, Messali had become by the end of the war the leader of the Algerian people.

In May 1945, on VE Day, tension was high and pacific demonstrations turned into riots after skirmishes with the police who had tried to take the banners from demonstrators chanting nationalist slogans and asking for the freedom of Messali. About a hundred Europeans were killed and several hundred injured. The repression was the most severe that had been seen to date, with a death toll among the indigenous people varying, according to different sources, from 15,000 to 45,000, with recurrent and repeated use of bombing of civilian villages, executions, imprisonment, and forced labour.¹¹⁵

3.5.4. From the Statutes (20/11/1947) to All Saints' Day (1947-1957)

After the war a number of proposals were introduced in the French parliament by different political groupings in Algeria and France to improve conditions in the colony.¹¹⁶ A government proposal, adopted after several amendments, introduced reforms in respect of social equality. Further, it created the Algerian Assembly,¹¹⁷ but maintained the two colleges, which,

while remaining unrepresentative, now had an elected membership of sixty members each. The inequality of representation was weighted in favour of the small community of colonists, which numbered 922,000. 464,000 Europeans and 58,000 Muslims elected the same number of delegates as the 7,860,000 Muslim community with its 1,300,000 voters.

De Gaulle opposed the statute and declared on 18 August 1947:

*Souveraineté de la France, cela signifie d'abord que nous ne devons laisser mettre en question, sous aucune forme, ni au dedans, ni au dehors, le fait que l'Algérie est notre domaine. Cela signifie encore qu'il n'y a aucune matière concernant l'Algérie, où les pouvoirs publics français, exécutif, législatif, judiciaire, puissent aliéner leur droit et leur devoir de trancher en dernier ressort.*¹¹⁸

The nationalist parties had recommended abstention from local ballots, yet won an important majority. After the adoption of the statutes of 1947 and the arrival of the new *Gouverneur général* and former education minister, E. Naegelen, "good elections" were ordered for the *Assemblée Algérienne*, and the candidates backed by the administration obtained an absolute majority. The history of French Algeria is rich in these instances of *bonnes élections*. They were denounced on several occasions but were always validated by the French authorities in France, and especially by the Assembly of the Fourth Republic.¹¹⁹

The French authorities in Algeria were rightly convinced that force, repression and cunning would maintain the *status quo* to the extent that in April 1956, when the Algerian Assembly was dissolved, it had not even discussed the tasks given to it by the Statutes of 1947.¹²⁰

However, Algeria had changed. The MTLD was gaining greater

influence among the masses and preparing as well as organising them through the PPA's clandestine organisation and activities and its underground branch and secret army, the *Organisation Spéciale* (OS).¹²¹ O.S members had even robbed Oran's post office in 1949 to provide funds for the organisation - they included Benbella, who later escaped from prison. The O.S. fought French forces, which managed to dismantle their network (1950-1953).¹²²

The general condition of the indigenous population had not improved. It could only have worsened because no additional measures had been taken by the French authorities in agriculture, industry or education, and because of the increase in the birth rate. The fact that the poor tend to think usually that children are their only wealth,¹²³ improvements in health care and economic problems contributed to the high birth rate which in its turn exacerbated the original economic problems.¹²⁴

By 1951, one third of the best cultivated land (the value of which was often three times that owned by Algerian peasants), more than 5 million acres, belonged to 21,650 European settlers, while the Muslim population of 6,3 million (in 1954) lived on the rest.¹²⁵

The education authorities had made an important effort but it was not enough to absorb the increase of the population. In 1955, the capital, Algiers, which could be considered as the most advanced place in relation to education, 64% of the population (over 6 years old) was completely illiterate.¹²⁶ Neither the French political authorities in Algiers or France, nor economic and financial interests, were aware of the enormous effort that was needed to find solutions to the multiplicity of the problems at the root of Algerian society.¹²⁷ There was no

adequate response to this critical situation from the French government and parliament. The settlers were suspicious of any changes that might alter the "power relationship" and French public opinion was indifferent to the plight of Algerians. Even the most basic aspirations for human dignity were deliberately ignored.¹²⁸

In March 1954, unaware of the real problems at the core of Algerian society, one of the experts on North African policy wrote in *Le Monde*:

*Dans la tempête, l'Algérie tient ferme. Il est vrai que le statut n'apporte pas par lui-même une solution définitive à toutes les difficultés... Mais une sorte d'équilibre interne a été atteint, nous avons là une bonne base de départ. Il est vrai que les Musulmans accédant de plus en plus à l'instruction et la plénitude des droits politiques, prendront peu à peu plus de poids auprès des Chrétiens et des Juifs. Mais la francisation elle-même ne cesse de progresser. Les textes sont d'ailleurs souples et le statut contient bien des virtualités qui se prêtent à des évolutions diverses.*¹²⁹

Only a total unawareness of the gravity of the Algerian problem, or indeed of its existence, could explain the style and the confidence of this statement, confidence which was shaken seven months later when the country flared up in a bloody struggle which was to threaten the Republican foundations of the French state.

3.6. The Closing Years of the Fourth Republic

3.6.1. Prelude to 1 November 1954

By the autumn, the desire to resist foreign invaders by the inhabitants of the Central Maghrib, noted centuries earlier by Ibn Khaldoun¹³⁰ (1332-1406), and more recently by Paul Balta, was again in the air.

3.6.2. Ripe conditions for a Nationalist uprising

There were already subjective conditions present, such as the idea of an Algerian nation, united by its culture, common history and traditions, language, religion and territory. All of these provided the cement for the anticolonial struggle of the Emir Abdel Kader, El Mokrani and Bou'Maaza and, much later, to the *Ulémas*, the ENA and the PPA. There were also more objective reasons on the ground militating in favour of the anti colonial struggle.

Through the destruction of the old economic structures by the colonial order, the economic conditions of the Algerians had deteriorated.¹³¹

The social and political evolution of the Algerians had also been blocked for over a century, through the lack of political emancipation and repeatedly rigged elections. The lack of schooling, widespread illiteracy, and the inability of the system to integrate the indigenous fraction of the population heightened the feeling of alienation.

The Statute voted in 1947 remained inapplicable to Algeria because of the resistance of settlers.¹³²

In the various economic, social and political fields, the evolution of Algerian society had been held back for so long that another violent uprising was inevitable.¹³³

3.6.3. All Saints Day, 1 November 1954

After an initial period of growth, the revived Messalist MTLN was experiencing difficulties throughout 1953 which were to lead to the division of that movement in two: the Messalists, faithful to their leader, and the Centralists, each organised their own congress, respectively in Hornu in July

1954 and in Algiers in August 1954, expelling their rivals from their own organisations.¹³⁴

The FLN, founded on 10 October 1954 (see also Chapter 6) called for an armed struggle with the aim of restoring an Algerian state *démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes islamiques*. The first sparks of an eight-year-long war were lit with the first "terrorist" activities taking place on All Saints' Day (1 November 1954).¹³⁵

It was already clear quite early on that it was not a disorganised movement,¹³⁶ but one with precise political objectives, and one which was ready to present the French authorities with a serious challenge.¹³⁷ The CRUA¹³⁸ had kept imminent attacks absolutely secret. This meant that despite rumours, the FLN managed to surprise the French authorities.¹³⁹

The uprising of 1 November took place at the time when the nationalist leaders were announcing in Cairo:

* the birth of the FLN to lead the armed struggle for "the liquidation of the colonial system" and "national independence through the restoration of the Algerian state",¹⁴⁰

* and their rejection of all "relics of reformism".¹⁴¹

3.6.4. The French Reaction: the initial stages

The response of the French was to reject totally any idea of negotiation and declare through Mitterrand that the only form of negotiation would be total war against the enemies of France.¹⁴²

Initially, the French authorities in Algeria resorted to the very ineffective action of imprisoning all known nationalist leaders and militants, although it was clear at the time that they had nothing to do with the "troubles".¹⁴³

The initial response by the French was to repress the movement militarily, as most French authorities insisted on the reestablishment of order, a policy which was soon to be given the name of "pacification".¹⁴⁴ Estimating the number of "rebels" to be around 800 men divided into 15 groups, the French authorities used their 60-70,000 strong French troops; and those numbers were soon to be increased.¹⁴⁵

Even later on, still believing socio-economic causes to be at the root of the discontent, the French government instituted agrarian reforms, set up medical centres in the villages, and encouraged the spread of education by building hundreds of classrooms and staffing them with soldiers.¹⁴⁶

3.6.5. Soustelle takes over from Leonard (February 1955)

In February 1955 Roger Léonard was replaced as Governor General of Algeria by the Gaullist Soustelle, whose candidature had been suggested by Pierre Mendès-France prior to his demise.¹⁴⁷

During his time in office, there was no revolutionary changes in terms of policies, apart from a modification of earlier ineffectual reforms and policies with the concession of very small changes.¹⁴⁸

By using the full powers and resources of the army,¹⁴⁹ Soustelle did not change his approach in any way in dealing with the rebellion. Troop numbers were increased from 56,500 to 83,400 in February 1955 to include a number of conscripts.¹⁵⁰

Unwilling to climb down in public, the authorities followed officially and practically a policy of repression. Acquiescing to Army requests, France sent more troops to Algeria up to a

total of 120.000.

Additionally, emergency laws were promulgated on 3 April 1955¹⁵¹ to continue the struggle and deal with the insurgents, estimated to be 1,000 men. Self-defence groups were also set up by settlers (*groupes d'auto défense*), who did not always attack the culprits.¹⁵²

Towards the end the middle of 1955 more counter-revolutionary methods¹⁵³ were adopted with the creation of the Specialised Administrative Sections (SAS).¹⁵⁴

Ironically, France was intensifying its military effort in Algeria at the time when international opinion was being progressively swayed by the anticolonial powers with the Bandung conference of newly-independent nations in April 1955;¹⁵⁵ and when Tunisia and Morocco, French protectorates since 1881 and 1912 respectively, were edging their way toward total independence without too much resistance from France.¹⁵⁶

In the international arena, the nationalists played on the errors of France and, given the support of the Third World, managed to have the Algerian question tabled for discussion at the U.N. on 30 September 1955. When the UN decided to consider the question,¹⁵⁷ France walked out in protest.

Internally, the FLN extended its politico-administrative organisation network on the population¹⁵⁸ but not without experiencing serious difficulties on the ground, epitomised in the opposition of the Messalists of the MNA.¹⁵⁹

3.6.5.1. Internal Dissensions and divisions of the Nationalist movement

The opposition between the FLN and the MNA has been emphasised on numerous occasions to show that the FLN was terroris-

ing many indigenous people.

The struggle between the MNA members, who remained faithful to Messali, and members of the FLN, over the dominance of the population raged first in Algeria. However, when the MNA was losing the fight in Algeria, it continued its struggle against the FLN in France's mainland over the 120,000 Muslims who worked there. In 1956 the number of Muslims killed as a result of those struggles numbered 86.

Occasionally the French were able to exploit the enmity between these two movements. The incident of Melouza needs to be seen in that context.¹⁶⁰

The debate over the MNA-FLN conflict could be sidestepped as having been marginal. It could, for instance, be argued that both movements had opted for independence. Hence the struggle between them is to some extent irrelevant, in that both of them had a common enemy, the French colonial system against which they were fighting with the tacit and implicit support of the population. Material help was also forthcoming in terms of logistic support, food and shelter being given to the combatants.

Many argue that that the nationalist movements had a hard struggle to gain control over the local population; as in the case of many revolutionary movements, the latter is thought to have been slow to join the rebel forces,¹⁶¹ even though it usually offered tacit or implicit help and at times open support in the form of shelter and logistic assistance, including supplies.¹⁶²

3.6.5.2. The FLN an Unpopular Movement?

Possibly because of the Muslim victims of the FLN, there

were grounds enough for some historians to conclude that the FLN was terrorising the population at large. Although this aspect is not to be rejected out of hand, as the FLN did manage to terrorise some people in its own ranks, let alone outsiders, it is hard to see how the Algerian population, unhappy under the colonial system, failed to espouse the rebels' cause. The FLN's attacks against the population have to be seen, or so the FLN would claim, in the same light as the resistance fighters in France under Nazi occupation, engaged in the Liberation struggle and seeking to establish control to undermine the occupying force.¹⁶³

In view of the number of indigenous victims in the Algerian conflict in general, some have argued that the "first stage of the insurrection was entirely military in character and had no support from the Muslim masses" other than what was obtained at "pistol-point".¹⁶⁴

Some critics maintain that it was the comparative failure of the 20 August and 30 September demonstrations that brought home to the FLN that the Muslims masses were indifferent, not to say hostile, to its cause.

In discussing this question, the key factor of terrorism has been given, in my view, as in the MNA-FLN conflict outlined above, overdue emphasis in relation to the universal Muslim dislike of French rule.

But even for O'Ballance, who argued this case, it was apparent that by December 1955 the ALN was a force to be reckoned with, if "for no other reason than to escape an assassination for alleged collaboration with the French authorities".¹⁶⁵

He stated that the campaign for the minds of the Muslim people started in December 1955 and lasted for about 3 months,

"during which the revolutionary ideas and aims of the FLN were fully explained".¹⁶⁶

His explanation is not convincing since it is very difficult to see what the FLN did in order to win over successfully the minds of the people when the French efforts had failed over a much longer period. In any case, the intensive FLN propaganda campaign was said to have been so successful that by February 1956 the bulk of the Muslim population had become pro-FLN. They were reported as anxious and willing to help the ALN in its insurgent activities -without the presence of terror, threats or the fear of reprisals if they did not do so.¹⁶⁷

With the bulk of the Muslim population on its side, with the help of arms supplies across the borders, and with more recruits coming forward and new enthusiasm for the insurrection sweeping throughout the country, the FLN became a real military force leading a vast offensive against French forces throughout the country.¹⁶⁸

Referring to Plum , *Aussenpolitik*, 1956, p. 597, Opperman¹⁶⁹ gives the figure of at least half the Algerian population as supporting the rebels, who are also said to have had an important influence on trades unions and workers in France (250,000 to 400,000). It is undisputable that from 1955-1956, the FLN was taking over MNA's strongholds.¹⁷⁰

Although not a large movement, it has to be said that the FLN conformed to the strongest aspirations within the Algerian people.¹⁷¹ Harbi argues that it would be an exaggeration to suggest, as Yves Courrière does, that the first reflex of the Muslim population was to play ostrich (*rentrer la tête dans les épaules*).¹⁷²

3.6.5.3. From the August 1955 Events to the Popular Front

A dramatic incident took place on 20-21 August 1955. FLN fighters of a *Willaya* in the Northern Constantinois, assisted by the local population, unleashed an attack on 36 centres of colonisation. This was a suicidal operation which resulted in 123 deaths, including those of 71 Europeans. The assailants lost 1273 in the attack. The gap between the two communities was growing into a chasm. In their reprisals, the Europeans regarded all Muslims as rebels; and many of them were killed simply because of who they were.

The FLN fighters became celebrated as real heroes, *Mujahid-dins* fighters in a Holy War;¹⁷³ and the French war effort intensified.

Shocked by what was happening, and some say impressed or intimidated by the FLN, the Muslims *élus* resigned. In the Algerian Assembly even old official candidates began to speak of the "Algerian national idea".¹⁷⁴

After the dissolution of the French Assembly on 2 December, France tacitly returned its verdict through the victory of the Republican Front of Guy Mollet and Mendès-France, which heralded the rejection of integration and the recognition of an Algerian identity. The clear mandate was to put an end to the "troubles".

3.6.6. Guy Mollet takes over (26 January 1956)

With his fresh mandate, the newly-appointed Prime Minister of the Republic made preparations to appoint a new man in Algeria and to go there and see for himself.

He appointed Catroux, who had been a former Governor of Algeria during the Second World War. But Catroux, who had

identified himself with de Gaulle's 1944 reforms, was rejected by the Algiers mob. Mollet's visit to Algiers on 6 February was met with the famous demonstration by Europeans, who made him feel unwelcome and intimidated him until he gave in. Under the settlers' pressure, he appointed Lacoste to the post of Minister Resident in his place (10 February).

In March 1956, the two neighbours, edging their way towards independence, denounced French use of NATO troops against the ALN, and pledged their support for the Algerian fighters.

At the same time Guy Mollet obtained special powers from the National Assembly, including the Communists, to re-establish order and introduce a measure of democracy. From then on, the Governor General, elevated to the role of Resident-Minister, assumed dictatorial powers.¹⁷⁵

Lacoste gave priority to the military effort, requesting the recall of the 1953 and then of the 1952 national service intakes, and gave the army extended powers. The strength of the army was now increased to 400,000 men, practising a policy of *quadrillage* (division of the country into military zones) and building a huge fortified barrier separating Algeria from Tunisia. The policy of *ratissage* (combing the countryside), which ensued, was designed to go hand in hand with the resumption of control of the native population.¹⁷⁶

The army, commissioned to build a new Algeria, became the principal political force in the country. In 1956 France decided the dissolution of the Algerian Assemblies and the abolition of *communes mixtes*. These moves could have increased the number of Muslim representatives and may have provided the French with a Third Force, an "alternative interlocutor" opposed to the FLN. They failed, however, partly because there

were no volunteers for this Third Force, and partly because such political reforms gave way to simple administrative changes in tune with army requirements.¹⁷⁷ The limited measure of local government reform, allowing Algerian Muslims to direct communes, coincided with the takeover of responsibility of communities by the SAS of the army.¹⁷⁸ The agrarian reform, announced as a revolutionary measure, ended up by being of little effect.

With the dissolution of the all elected councils (5 December 1956), the government reverted back to the old "regime of the sword".¹⁷⁹

1956 also saw the intensification of the war effort by the FLN, which was scoring notable successes on the political front. These took the form of rallying various political forces such as the *Ulémas*, the underground PCA, "moderate" nationalist leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas, and Lamine Debaghine (the latter became the first president of the FLN executive). The FLN enlisted the support of various trades unions (UGTA, UGEMA,), was supported by strikes of students and school children, and desertion by soldiers and officers from the rank and file of the French Army.

In Algeria, support for Mesali collapsed. With the FLN success, came the signs of a rift beginning when the FLN leaders decided to hold a congress in Soummam on 20 August 1956, allowing no time for external leadership to be there.¹⁸⁰

3.6.6.1. The Soummam Congress (20 August 1956)

200 delegates from all parts of Algeria attended the conference. This led to the setting up of a CNRA, a sort of committee or governing body of 17 members (with 17 substitutes in case of

casualties), entrusted with the political leadership of the movement. The meeting affirmed the collegial leadership¹⁸¹ and the conference went on, due to good security arrangements, thanks to the organisational skills of Abane Ramdane. The French were unaware of the conference until its findings were made public on 1 November 1956,

The Soummam conference also created an executive body (CEE) consisting of five members.¹⁸² It also agreed to launch a "terrorist" offensive throughout Algeria and laid down principles of organisation.¹⁸³

Additionally major decisions were taken, and the ALN provided with a single general staff under Krim Belkacem.¹⁸⁴

In France, the SFIO Congress declared itself in favour of a cease-fire and a negotiated solution. The Prime Minister, Mollet, arranged contact with the FLN, but contacts were broken off at the end of September 1956, after two exploratory meetings at Rome and Belgrade. On 22 October, a Moroccan aircraft carrying, amongst other Algerians, four of the main leaders of the FLN (Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed and Khidder, who were to remain interned in France until 1962) was intercepted on the orders of Max Lejeune, Secretary of State of the Armed Forces, in charge of Algerian affairs.

3.6.6.2. The capture of Ben Bella and the FLN leaders

The capture of Ben Bella and the FLN leaders is the next momentous event of 1956. It was a virtual kidnapping of Ben Bella and of the FLN leaders, when on board a Moroccan airplane flown by a French crew. The latter seemed not to have been involved in the plot, but were talked down by the French Air Force on 22 October 1956.¹⁸⁵

This incident caused great indignation in the Arab world and proved to be a good propaganda coup for the FLN. Neither the French government nor the Resident Minister, Lacoste, claimed not to know anything about it.¹⁸⁶ Thus, yet again, the intelligence service had sprung a surprise,¹⁸⁷ depriving the FLN of its leadership. At the same time, several directives and a list of French European and Muslim agents and contacts being used by FLN was made available to the security forces. On the basis of this information, they arrested many agents, and a number of ALN projects were consequently thwarted.¹⁸⁸

Further negotiations were now impossible. Furthermore, the French together with the British were engaged in what was to be known as the Suez crisis against Egypt, from the point of view of the French, the training and support base of the FLN.

With the salvos fired by the two superpowers and the retreat of the two major colonial powers involved, Britain and France, the FLN increased its international standing. Pacification did not seem to be assured of success. The Muslim population was increasingly running away from the French.¹⁸⁹

3.6.7. The Second phase: August 1956 May 1958

European counter-terrorist activity can be said to have begun on 30 June 1956, when a bomb exploded at the headquarters of UGTA in Algiers. This was followed on 17 July by another explosion in the Communist newspaper office. These were followed by other incidents with increasing frequency during the latter part of 1956, including a bomb set off by the ORAF activists in the Rue de Thèbes in the Casbah (10 August 1956).

Anti-Muslim feelings erupted in anti-Muslim riots on 29 December on the occasion of the funeral of a murdered European

mayor, when crowds shouted "*l'armée au pouvoir*".¹⁹⁰ Extremist European organisations engaged in terrorist activities and propaganda, encouraged by Soustelle, and the French government's inability to control events in Algeria.

The French army was also scoring some successes. It hit hard in its *quadrillage*, killing FLN fighters in numbers.¹⁹¹

The civilian authority was being lost progressively in Algiers with the city becoming a scene of daily acts of terrorism and death. In December 1956, there were some 120 terrorist incidents in the city, especially in the Casbah.¹⁹² This housed 80,000 people, 4,000 of whom were said to be connected with terrorist activities, according to French intelligence sources.

Under the leadership of Abane Radmdane, whose scruples were lost as a result of the Casbah bombing,¹⁹³ the movement was beginning to be swayed by the arguments in favour of more and more indiscriminate terrorism. The Prefect became totally helpless. With the approval of Lacoste, he called in the army to take action.

By the beginning of 1957, the FLN had a series of small, partially successful strikes, culminating in a major strike in January 1957 to coincide with the UN debate over Algeria.

The European population was still without any understanding of the Muslim revolt. It reacted with increased anger, accusing the Socialists of wanting to abandon Algeria.

The funeral of Amédée Froger,¹⁹⁴ who was killed by Ali La-pointe, was the occasion for violent demonstrations by Europeans followed by terrorist attacks of their own.¹⁹⁵ After the execution of two convicted ALN guerrillas, the FLN turned to urban terrorism. Lacoste gave paratroopers the order to destroy "terrorists commandos" by any means.

In February 1957, the 10th paratroop division commanded by General Massu, with a strength of about 10,000, descended upon the Casbah. It rooted out the FLN, using informers, forcing about 1,500 of them to cooperate with the soldiers.¹⁹⁶

The Battle of Algiers, from January to September 1957, ended in the military destruction of the FLN in the capital. However, it was psychologically a pyrrhic victory, as the Muslims were now united against the French army. French public opinion was shocked to hear of the torture of young women and the torturing to death of a young university teacher, Maurice Audin.

When Ben Khedda and Abane Ramdane left Algiers for Tunisia, Yacef Saadi took over the fighting in Algiers until his surrender on 24 September. His successor, together with "23 terrorists", were killed on 8 October. This more or less ended the FLN organisation in the city: and in many other cities too, but not to the same extent. Abane Ramdane was blamed for the failure and killed by order of other FLN leaders.¹⁹⁷

With the bitter ongoing fighting in Algeria, the FLN found enormous difficulties in rebuilding its strength without arms. The efforts made by the French to round up and regroup the population in "Centres" contributed further to increase their isolation, despite the fact that they managed to keep a tight rein on entire regions in the East of the country. Thanks to Tunisian help, they also retained bases in the East, making occasional crossings over the fortified Morice line until it was completed.¹⁹⁸

Internally, the political leadership of the FLN was forced out of Algiers, after the capture and execution of Ben Mhidi.¹⁹⁹ It then took refuge in Tunis and Cairo.

The French government was disturbed by the formation of

North African front at the UN and turned its back on any discussion of statutes with an elected Muslim body. Instead, it worked on a *loi-cadre* (outline law) promulgated on 13 September 1957, seven days before the UN was due to discuss the Algerian question. This law, which was not to be negotiated but imposed by France, promised to respect Algerian identity while keeping it at the same time as an integral part of France.²⁰⁰

Approved by Parliament on 5 February 1958 with more resignation than enthusiasm, the *loi cadre* allowed for the recognition of five territories. The FLN described it as a ridiculous attempt to dismember Algeria, and forbade the Muslims from standing for the various assemblies it proposed. Lacoste had to appoint councillors in the *communes*. However, he did not succeed in persuading them to appoint members of the territorial assemblies before time ran out.

3.6.8. The Collapse of the Republic (13 May 1958)

1958 opened with the French Air Force bombing the village of Sakiet Sidi Youcef, in retaliation for raids by the FLN. The Tunisian government immediately obtained the good offices of the US and Britain for a mediation, which was designed to internationalise the Algerian problem even further.

The Gaillard government fell. The involvement of the Americans and the British, through their offer of good offices, made France look vulnerable internationally. Submitting to the offer made through Jean Monnet, France's hand seemed to weaken. This heightened the alarm amongst Europeans in France and in Algeria.

On 26 April, the Europeans in Algeria came out in street protests. While the Gaillard Government fell, Lacoste, con-

vinced that he would no longer figure in the new ministerial line up, commented that France was heading towards a political Dien Bien Phu, and thereupon left Algiers.

On 13 May, fresh demonstrations provided the pretext for the occupation of the Governor General headquarters (the centre for the administration of Algeria) by a small commando of European activists. But on this occasion, the "Comittee of Public Safety", set up in Algiers according to a familiar French tradition of rioting, was immediately taken over by the army and demanded the formation in Paris of a government of Public Safety. General Salan whispered the name of de Gaulle to lead this government, as he was the only person thought to be capable of avoiding civil war. The French offered no resistance, except for a left-wing demonstration in favour of the Republic. All on the scene expected de Gaulle to put an end to the conflict. This legendary figure was the saviour that France was expecting. But his statements were obscure in the sense that he appealed to both those who hoped for a military victory and to those who were keen to arrive at a negotiated settlement. On 1 June, when he was appointed the régime's last Prime Minister, the Fourth Republic was virtually dead.

3.6.9. Conclusion

As we have seen, Algeria and its people seemed to have resisted foreign invasions and dominations throughout history. Like others before it, the colonial venture of France was met with the most ferocious resistance. Using ruthless methods, the French progressively established a colony of settlement displacing the indigenous population and depriving it progressively of its dignity and the means for its survival. It failed to

deliver the self-proclaimed civilised order.

Modern nationalist movements were developing. However, they achieved very little because of their divisions, and the unwillingness of the French authorities to concede more than superficial and ineffective reforms.

At the time of the uprising, *Le Monde* appeared to display a startling ignorance of the Algerian situation. Is this the case after 1954 as it had been before that date? To what extent did *Le Monde's* view of things from an official and government perspective after 1954? Did it offer its readers a variety of views? How objective and balanced were *Le Monde's* reports of the various protagonists, events and situations?

A more thorough examination of the paper's coverage of Algeria between 1954 and 1958 will shed more light on the subject. This is the main thrust of this work.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.REPORTING A COLONY (1944-1954)

4.1.Introduction

Before looking at *Le Monde's* coverage of issues relating to the Algerian war, it would be useful to see how the paper covered Algeria from the time of its launch. This is made necessary by the need to be aware of the historical background and also in order to examine claims made by some researchers about this period of *Le Monde's* history. This chapter examines how *Le Monde* described Algeria and looks at the attitude the paper adopted towards developments in the colony up to the 1954 uprising, through the reports of the paper itself as well as through a study made of those reports by T. Firchon.¹

Firchon's findings identify three periods between 1945 and 1954: March 1945 to August 1947, August 1947 to March 1951, March 1951 to November 1954. Within this framework he identifies a change in *Le Monde's* attitude around 1951, the year of Governor General E.Naegelen's departure from Algeria.² Although these major periods have not been strictly adhered to by Firchon, sometimes for legitimate reasons of contrast and comparison, they will be used as subsections in this chapter.

4.2.Period One (March 1945- August 1947)

4.2.1.Limits set to manifest aspirations

What clearly appears in this period is that Algerian nationalist aspirations were known to various journalists of the paper³ but were not thought of, by the Europeans, as desirable and inevitable.⁴ This was not seen as problematic in anyway by the paper. Hence, events of the magnitude of May 1945 uprising were not foreseen by the paper, nor substantially reported.⁵

Firchon expressed justifiable concern at the lack of

information and at the silence about the event which could hardly be explained, especially since E.Sablier witnessed those events, as revealed in an article ten years later.⁶ The possible excuse put forward - the youth and inexperience of the paper, barely six months old- could not stand up. Given *Le Monde's* self-proclaimed conception of journalism, one would have expected it to have informed its readers about those serious events, which lasted more than three months, in some way other than by simply publishing the debates of the Assembly and the *communiqués* of the Ministry of Interior.⁷

In the reports in *Le Monde*, where reference was made to the troubles, there was an overall consensus (although with different emphases) as to the various sources of the troubles⁸ together with unanimity on a firm policy. There was also a consensus about the attitude to be adopted towards this outburst of violence.⁹

A number of parameters of the problem do seem to emerge, despite the lack of clarity. While the paper saw that "Muslims" had aspirations for freedom which it echoed,¹⁰ it pointed out the limits of such aspirations and journalists set the boundaries for what was acceptable in terms of these aspirations.¹¹

4.2.2.A particular perspective: the communities and the economy

Even when he provided more information about the topic in his account of "Algerian reality", G.Messud saw the problem in terms of two populations,¹² with the European element being well integrated¹³ and not the Muslim one.¹⁴ These populations are seen in terms of *deux blocs juxtaposés et irréductibles*¹⁵ between which "peace can be established only by tacit agreement".

In terms of the economy, the picture drawn is that of a population benefiting from the system. Messud found no industry, only local workshops; and he stated that the economy was based on agriculture, which occupied 25,000 settler families (some 200,000 Europeans) and seven million of the indigenous population.

The portrayal of Algeria was quite encouraging.¹⁶ Despite its increase in size and the drought that killed off half its cattle, the Muslim population did not seem to be having a rough deal because the problems seemed to have been dealt with by the growing European sector, which, supposedly, by making up the difference, constituted the main element in the prosperity of economic life.

In economic terms, Algeria was treated as an autonomous country, because journalists were writing in terms of the balance of exports, of shortfalls made up by the colonial sector, and even implying the country's self sufficiency. An important assumption was that the prosperity of the European section could make a difference to the Muslims' plight. It is clear, however, that there was very little connection: indeed, quite the reverse was true, in that the prosperity of some was very often acquired through the misery of others. In fact, the growth of the European sector might well have been at the expense of the best land taken from the Muslim community. The Muslims were still trying to scratch a living from poorer soil under an economy basically geared for export, in which they could barely maintain a level of subsistence.¹⁷

All these negative factors added to natural calamities, such as drought, to the inevitability of the debt crisis, the impossibility of investment and the like. Readers could only con-

clude, no doubt, that the War affected everybody, and that nothing could be done about it. They would remain quite unaware of the specific nature of the Algerian problem.

4.2.3. Political trends and developments

In terms of policies, Firchon pointed out that Pierron was more moderate than J. Driand, but, according to him, the essential point for *Le Monde* was to avoid "thoughtless generosity" (*générosité aveugle*). This does not say much for a paper claiming to be liberal.¹⁸

In the pages of *Le Monde*, Firchon found an echo of new aspirations -but also an insistence that France must remain sovereign at home.¹⁹ He maintained that more attention was given to European than to indigenous problems, and that no interest was shown in the nationalist parties and their leaders.²⁰

In relation to political developments, the reader could only learn that the *Ulémas* wanted to end the "sacrilege" caused by the fact that the Christians held spiritual power in Algeria and controlled education, justice and religious worship.²¹ The outlawed *Parti du Peuple algérien* (PPA) had become the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés démocratiques* (MTLD) and was "now" asking purely and simply for independence.²² But more information was progressively made available on Abbas, the leader of the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA)²³ and on the *Parti Communiste Algérien* (PCA), the next day. Even if one were to conclude that some of the facts were there, what is still missing is the causal link. *Le Monde* was not interested in sharing out the responsibilities.

Firchon could find only uncertainty over the choices to be made,²⁴ although it was clear that *Le Monde* found it paradoxical

cal that "our three departments" should be transformed into "a foreign nation",²⁵ which was one of the demands of the nationalists.²⁶

The paper seemed forward-looking as it examined what the future held, but the solutions envisaged were very limited,²⁷ the limit being: *Il y a des renoncements inacceptables.*²⁸

Indeed, *Le Monde* was attached to the idea of keeping the colony and categorically opposed to its separation from the mainland -the nationalist feelings and mood were quite strong at the Liberation. Having forcefully rejected separatism,²⁹ *Le Monde* saw only one way: this was through association, through giving the powerless Assembly competence over local matters. This obviously constituted a move towards liberal reform and democracy, but only in so far as local affairs were concerned. The extent of this competence was not so explicitly discussed, but the modalities of election to the Assembly were: "it could never be elected by a mixed electoral college... justice is not a matter of giving power to the highest number, but ensuring a balance between the two communities".³⁰

Firchon thought that *Le Monde's* articles gave the reader some elements to assess the situation, but did not show how. Perhaps these elements were compatible with the paper's view or attitude, or likely to justify them. However, the framework of this action to be taken can clearly be identified as keeping France's place amongst the world's powers:

*Seul le succès de l'élaboration de l'Union
française permettra à la France de garder son rang
de puissance mondiale.*³¹

In suggesting what was possible, the paper rejected assimilation which, Firchon pointed out, was "unthinkable" because the two communities, alien to one another, were not "able to

associate and fraternise".³² It could not accept separation from the colony either.³³ This attitude was described by Firchon as "anti separatist" for "economic reasons" (*Maghreb: place de choix*) as well as for "questions of prestige."

The paper accepted the need for reforms, but stated that France should act alone "at home". It warned of the danger of internationalisation, while at the same time advocating a certain *ménagement des USA*.

Le Monde remained opposed to any "precipitous" act which would fail to take into account the "major principles" and the "realities" of the country concerned. On the Algerian front it seemed that the events of May 1945, according to Firchon, made the paper distance itself from the indigenous problem and that its main concern was for the Europeans of Algeria -providing a voice for their bitterness.

Although *Le Monde* seemed full of admiration for the British decolonisation movement as early as 1947,³⁴ there was no evidence of any enlightenment or understanding of the new post-war nationalism and the need for the emancipation of the people of the French colonies. All that was still to come. As far as Algeria was concerned it was time for the 1947 Statutes and even that was resented at the beginning.

If *Le Monde's* reports on Algeria were said to be frequent, this did not mean that they were balanced or complete.³⁵ The drawing up of the Algerian Statutes³⁶ was greeted with equanimity by *Le Monde*, as Firchon pointed out: *nous avons promis un statut. Chose promise, chose due. Acquittons nous au plus vite.*³⁷ Clearly, here it was the promise that seemed to count, not the need for it, or any other justification.

As for the reforms, they were not to be brought in hurried-

ly³⁸ and it goes without saying that the paper was opposed to the question of the Maghreb being tabled,³⁹ let alone being discussed, at the UN.⁴⁰

Le Monde outlined the main points of the statutes.⁴¹ Weight was given to the European point of view and to the parity of seats attributed to the two communities, despite the striking imbalance of representation.⁴²

Even if we do not take into consideration the fact that Muslim delegates had withdrawn in order not to give credence to this reform, it is clear that, within the measures approved, there were enough provisions for the European minority to block any reform it did not accept. The possibility of requiring approval of a two-thirds majority made the rest of the "dispositions" of the law (the suppression of *communes mixtes* and the extension of elected municipal local assemblies, the independence of the Islamic cult and the teaching of Arabic at all levels) a dead letter from the very start. At this stage one can conclude that the paper did not show intentionally or otherwise any shrewdness of analysis. This is reinforced by its treatment of the elections.

4.2.4.A particular view of the elections

What is worse here is that there was as much a flaw in Firchon's analysis as there was in the analysis of *Le Monde*, which was his source. Exaggerated importance was given to elections in Algeria, for the purposes of chronology and analysis, despite the unequal representation. This was also done despite the awareness of both the paper and Firchon that, in Algeria, politics in the metropolitan sense were insignificant, that the existence of "political life was completely alien to Algeria", and only the business of the most initiated (*le fait*

de quelques initiés), a phenomenon, which Firchon described as very striking.⁴³

The elections which were to have taken place on 15 January were postponed until April. When they took place they showed, according to Firchon, that the Statutes were not welcomed either by Europeans or by the Muslims, and consequently they resulted in gains for the "extremists of both camps".⁴⁴

In *Le Monde*, Firchon found ample developments about the preparation of these elections to the First College, but his expectation of finding a similar analysis for the Second was in vain, despite the "*remue-ménage*", "*attentats*" against the "*friends of France*" in Kabylia since October, which *Le Monde* only mentioned in February.

For the municipal elections of 19-26 October 1947, Messud had noted a certain hardening of position. The proportion of abstentions in the Second College was more than fifty per cent: for *Le Monde*, these were *les voix de ceux qui tout au moins consentent à la France (...) qui attendent d'elle le signe qu'elle a repris confiance en elle-même....* This kind of reasoning, labelled *a-contrario* by Firchon, could hardly be believed.⁴⁵

Showing bias in his expectations, Firchon would also have liked *Le Monde* to have picked up the fact that those designated by the Administration were more numerous than the Messalists as an encouraging sign. But at that point neither Firchon nor *Le Monde* was concerned by the indigenous problem, nor did *Le Monde* express a preference for any of the nationalist parties of the time⁴⁶ which had fielded candidates.⁴⁷

Seeing voting for nationalist parties as wrong, and the abstentions as being in favour of France, demonstrated total

disregard for the nationalist aspirations.⁴⁸

4.3. The second period: August 1947- March 1951

4.3.1. Admiration for the Governor General

In February 1948, Edmond Naegelen, who had shown *une antipathie viscérale à l'égard de toute idée de séparatisme* and had been trained from a very early age to fight Alsatian autonomism,⁴⁹ was appointed as Governor-General of Algeria.⁵⁰

Le Monde seemed to be in complete agreement with the new Governor General, who saw separatism as treason, stating that *France govern[ed] in Algeria, it d[id] not plead.*⁵¹

4.3.2. A peculiar conception of democracy

Analysing the results of the elections, Messud brought to the attention of the readers the news that the Communists had been wiped out (which seemed to please the paper), and that the number of Socialists had dwindled. Apparently condemning the previous Governor General, he remarked that things had now changed for the better with the new appointment:

*Ce qui a changé, c'est que le représentant de la France a cessé de donner son appui au Manifeste et il a cessé de tolérer les violences du PPA.*⁵²

Le Monde's coverage of the two nationalist parties, MTLD and UDMA,⁵³ was merely factual, though it began to show a preference, or at least more understanding, for Abbas's group, when it conceded that equality was a prerequisite of justice.⁵⁴ But in practice this mattered very little.⁵⁵ The main conclusion drawn by the paper was that the Assembly, seen as a gift to Algeria by Jaeger,⁵⁶ had a big enough majority to work without snags (*sans heurts*).⁵⁷

The paper developed arguments against the concept of "Algerian personality" put forward by the Communists, stressing that Party's defeat in the election.⁵⁸



The attitude of *Le Monde* towards elections was patronising and smug, despite the fraudulent results. It claimed that France had no lessons to learn from the Arab League.⁵⁹

In its general attitude, and its review of the press, the paper seemed to be more on the side of *Le Matin*, *France Libre*, *l'Epoque*, which wrote of a good day for France, than on that of those indignant voices in *l'Humanité*, *Combat*, *Franc-Tireur*, which wrote of *truquages flagrants*.⁶⁰

The elections were indeed rigged.⁶¹ And *Le Monde's* justification was given much later (in 1952), as Firchon pointed out, when the expressed position of the paper was to present the choice as being not between free elections and rigged elections, but elections rigged by the nationalists and elections rigged by the Governor General's office,⁶² and to portray the Algerian electorate as being not ready to vote and unable to understand what was at stake.⁶³

It is odd indeed to discover a statement by a journalist and a paper in the land of the 1789 Revolution -so strongly imbued with that culture and heritage- so keen to disenfranchise people nearly two centuries after the Revolution.⁶⁴

No matter what one's view on French political culture may be, the paper seemed to think that Algeria was not mature enough for an electoral system constructed on "metropolitan" lines simply because the outcome might have been different from what the paper would have hoped for or preferred.⁶⁵

During this period, Firchon pointed out that the paper did not write much about Algeria⁶⁶ because the country was calm. But this did not mean that the paper lost sight of the problem.⁶⁷

It would appear that problems and aspirations in matters of

food, health and education had to be met, but not political aspirations.⁶⁸ The paper had noted that Algeria cost more than it was bringing in, but, as Firchon presented it, the reasons for keeping Algeria French were more to do with strategy, prestige and the civilising mission of France.⁶⁹

4.3.3. A willingness to accept views -to undermine them

In *Le Monde*, there was a willingness to consider opinions other than its own -very often contrary to its own. But the paper invariably tried to undermine them when it strongly disagreed with them.

This was illustrated in the case of the speech made by André Mandouze, a lecturer of Algiers University,⁷⁰ at an international congress for peace under the title "Algeria in a state of war".⁷¹

But, as Firchon pointed out, when Messud quoted Mandouze, he had no intention of leaving the readers with impressions given by the latter.⁷² Displaying irony about "this charitable progressist Christian" suffering from a "colonialist complex" which is "in the process of disappearing",⁷³ Messud argued that the most important thing was that:

*la misère est en régression et que ... les hommes se sentent devenir des égaux entre eux.*⁷⁴

Firchon raised the possibility that the paper deliberately avoided printing news which might instil doubts in the minds of the readers.⁷⁵ The desire of *Le Monde* to minimise problems is manifest.⁷⁶ Certain events appear only because they were discussed in the Assembly; and sometimes they were mentioned months later without explanation, a fact which could illustrate the desire of the newspaper:

*de vouloir conserver intacte cette atmosphère de paix qu'il s'est plu à décrire dans ce pays.*⁷⁷

In any case, the picture that the paper painted of Algeria at that time was a peaceful one. It stressed the peaceful atmosphere of political renewal with the decline of nationalist parties, especially the MTLD, which "not long ago could with impunity call people to revolt and murder".⁷⁸ Then, due to other developments, the coverage of Algeria in the paper was eclipsed until around March 1951.

4.4. The third period: March 1951- November 1954

4.4.1. Dismissal of a changing world perspective

By this time Third World countries' search for an independent role had become a predominant concern. This, for instance, was the case with Indochina but also with the Maghreb following Libya's independence.⁷⁹ The independence of Libya⁸⁰ and the revival of the Middle East seemed "to spell disaster" for the French.⁸¹

The campaign led by Bourguiba with the aim of achieving independence for his country was called by the paper "a demagogic campaign against the French presence in North Africa".⁸²

Nothing of interest was reported by *Le Monde*⁸³ on Algeria, which was still described as an oasis of calm throughout 1951, despite increased tension in Morocco and Tunisia and several nationalist events and meetings taking place. With the situation becoming more critical in the Maghreb,⁸⁴ one of *Le Monde's* journalists, E. Sablier, started writing on North Africa about *les chances méconnues de la France en Afrique du Nord*,⁸⁵ articulating his views around three objectives.

The first was to awaken metropolitan France and those "disoriented French people", who do not know much about North Africa,⁸⁶ and to save their "guilty conscience" by dissipating the

belief that the settlers were exploiting the indigenous people (*faire suer le burnous*).⁸⁷

The second concerned mainly Tunisia and Morocco, where genuine reforms were advocated, involving a repudiation of *immobilisme*.⁸⁸

The third was to deal with the Americans who, under the "pretext" of being a former colony, would declare themselves opposed to any form of colonialism.⁸⁹ The fight against Communism being seen as necessary, and the Americans being the main ally, it was recommended as advisable to enlighten them of the French position and intentions in order to persuade them to adopt a more favourable attitude in relation to the French position.⁹⁰

4.4.2 Le Monde's alleged U-turn

According to Firchon, the change in *Le Monde* took place around 1951 with the departure from Algeria of the Governor General E. Naegelen.⁹¹

The paper at that time (we are told) was a fervent defender of the Europeans' case, of the necessity of implementing the "union" so dear to *Le Monde*.

During that period, *Le Monde* believed Algeria was really part of France and different from the two neighbouring countries. It described the country as being characterised by a peaceful atmosphere, which sometimes made the paper forget the Maghreb context and even the existence of Algeria itself when other events came to the fore.⁹²

In this new era *Le Monde* began by introducing the new Governor General. It was the first time, we are told, that the paper provided such an introduction. It sketched a picture of the electoral situation,⁹³ stating that the electoral campaign

was dominated by a schism in the First College, but without being more explicit about it.⁹⁴

When analysing the election results on 20 June 1951, *Le Monde* found a double indication in Algeria which it saw as favourable: firstly, the success of pro-"rapprochement" candidates in the First College and, secondly, the failure of the nationalists and the Communists in the Second College.⁹⁵

Electoral fraud, which continued, was finally dealt with by J.Guérif.⁹⁶ He recorded the numerous cases where candidates had been selected by the Administration and not chosen through the ballot by "Muslim" electors, suggesting that candidates who did not benefit from the Administration's support experienced difficulties in getting their manifestos and vote papers printed, or even their list accepted (*déposées*).⁹⁷

The tone of the paper, even when it reported vote rigging, years after the habit was entrenched in Algerian politics, did not indicate any signs of outrage at the abuse of political rights, freedom and democracy, but rather a suspicion that if Messali were in power, similar methods would be used.⁹⁸

However, it was not long before the paper went back to its previous practice of keeping quiet about Algeria.⁹⁹ It would not be far-fetched to take it further and state that the paper misled public opinion in France. If people had been given accurate reports of what was going on in Algeria, pressure for a debate could have been exerted on influential circles, and people¹⁰⁰ could actually have made decisions with full knowledge of the subject at hand.

4.4.3. Economic, social and political problems

Agreeing with Frederix's article of 3 April 1952, Firchon

argues that there were two problems in Algeria, a political one and an economic one. But Firchon did not give them the equal importance accorded to them by Frederix.

Firchon saw the political problem as concerning a minority, the Muslim elite in search of equality. He wrote that for the majority of Muslims it was a question of hunger, and hence economics. The political aspect for the majority was secondary.¹⁰¹

Frederix¹⁰² distinguished between the metropolitan French (somewhat progressive in outlook) and the (rather conservative) French in Algeria.¹⁰³ The European, it was stated, who would open his door to members of the indigenous population in France would not do the same in Algeria because of the "conservation instinct" that made him believe that his self-preservation resided in the homogeneity of his group.

Seule l'homogénéité de son groupe (minoritaire) pouvait l'empêcher d'être submergé.

This was said to be a question of choice, which would only be denied by people who had never set foot in Algeria or those who did not want to see reality.¹⁰⁴ Then European fears were put forward and emphasised.

*Les Européens ont peur d'être un jour une minorité maltraitée, comme celle dont l'histoire des états islamiques nous fournit tant d'exemples.*¹⁰⁵

*Le Monde*¹⁰⁶ argued that agrarian reform would not solve anything, and would not resolve the fundamental problem of insufficient production. It would not create new jobs but only replace a number of badly-paid agricultural workers by an equal number of peasant land-owners.¹⁰⁷

Because of the consensus¹⁰⁸ that the problem in Algeria was essentially one of hunger concerning primarily the Muslim

masses,¹⁰⁹ it was argued, by both Firchon and Frederix, that the dream of industrialisation entertained by the nationalists was not an "Open Sesame" to a better world,¹¹⁰ on account of the soaring population birth rate and because of the revenues brought in by France, which would disappear if she ceased to be a client.¹¹¹

Firchon approvingly reported that the solution of Algeria's economic problems through indigenous industrialisation was unlikely to succeed because of the high cost of energy.¹¹² He agreed with Frederix that the real solution had to be found in agriculture.¹¹³

There was some interest in industrialisation. *Le Monde* referred to the project of industrial zones for Colomb-Béchar.¹¹⁴ Industrialisation was sometimes presented genuinely as the only way out.¹¹⁵ But, as Firchon remarked, it lay in the future. For the present, the essential sector for the present remained the agricultural front. Here the problem, we are told, was to fill the gap between Muslim and European agriculture. Firchon pointed out that for the first time the paper provided much historical background about the organisations created to help agriculture and deal with its specific problems.¹¹⁶

Firchon agreed with *Le Monde* that this problem could be overcome only by educating the "Muslim" youth and reminded us that the paper had touched on the problem before:

(..) on a calculé que pour être total et rapide l'équipement scolaire exigerait des centaines de milliards alors que des investissements plus productifs s'imposent dans le domaine économique.

Firchon also noted the contradictory reports on the achievements under the Statutes. Proposals for change within the

framework provided by these Statutes were not lacking, but the Conservative block remained determined to prevent any changes.¹¹⁷

Firchon also reported that *Le Monde* was aware of the danger of repercussions over the whole of the Maghreb and internationally of events in Tunisia and Morocco. In this period of decolonisation and emergence of a strong anti-colonialist movement in the UN, with the British involved in their decolonisation policy, the paper was concerned by "Anglo-Arab solidarity ... being built at the expense of other Europeans".

It was also concerned with the implications that the War in Indochina and the EDC debates were having in terms of divisiveness on parties, public opinion and government's efforts.¹¹⁸

When the situation became critical during 1952 and 1953 in the Maghreb, and even in Algeria and France itself, Firchon remarked that the paper had no comments to make, except for one sensible contribution.¹¹⁹

4.4.4. The state of the country as perceived in 1954

Le Monde attacked the influence of the Middle East¹²⁰ and, begrudgingly accepting reforms, the paper also attacked the administration for being a "veritable hurdle", denouncing the "factitious and provisional character" of increased immigration in France which "could not go on for much longer".¹²¹ The paper offered many contrasting views¹²² and published letters in its free opinion columns which were critical of the state of Algeria.¹²³ It was inclined to suggest some concessions before everything was lost:

*Perdrons-nous le Maroc comme l'Indochine ? ...
Les gouvernants français ont une conception de la
dignité qui les empêche de faire des actes et des
concessions à l'heure où ils sont profitables.*¹²⁴

For *Le Monde*, the position on Algeria was not comparable with that on Morocco and Tunisia "*plus que jamais Algérie française*". *Le Monde* was keen to prevent it from having a destiny similar to that of the neighbouring countries, asking the state and financiers to invest, to improve the social conditions, to mitigate the inseparable political and economic problems. The error, Firchon wrote, was perhaps to believe that by solving one the other would disappear automatically.¹²⁵

4.5. Conclusion

As we see from the examination of the coverage, although the paper was aware of the many nationalist aspirations, it gave a slanted perspective in many fields, including the two communities, the economy and the elections. It dismissed the real historical pull of the changing world environment. It emphasised agriculture instead of a real programme of industrialisation, accepting a peculiar conception of democracy instead of revolutionary changes, allowing views advocating those changes only to undermine them. The paper failed to highlight the real problems and find the real solutions. Hence, it did not succeed in pointing the right way forward.

Its keenness to keep Algeria French, its smug attitude towards the real dangers, its silence over repression, the portrayal of Algeria as a calm and peaceful oasis while a time-bomb was ticking away, made it impossible for the paper to anticipate the flare-up.¹²⁶

As far as Firchon's analysis is concerned, it failed to reveal many of the paper's weaknesses, because it was itself flawed.

In analysing the presentation of the Algerian question by *Le Monde*, Firchon did not wish to retrace the history of Algeria

through the "facts" reported by the paper but decided, instead, to put himself in the "shoes of the reader" in order to find out what the latter's knowledge of the question would have been.¹²⁷ Firchon might have thought that an intuitive approach and his own perception of the reader's views could save him from having to impose on himself a framework of academic rigour. This makes his method particularly flawed, despite his thoroughness, in that it assumes that the mind of the reader is blank, a *tabula rasa*, not subject to any preconception of the problem, or prejudice towards the question. It also assumes a uniformity of reaction to *Le Monde*, in terms of readings and interpretations.¹²⁸ The image he is trying to build up of some model reader might have had nothing to do with that reader and could well have turned out to have been exclusively his own. For, having stated that the subject of his study was the reader's perception of the problem, he reverted back to emotional appeals in the writings and presumptions of journalists like G.Marey¹²⁹ to back up his points.¹³⁰

Firchon agreed with many of the positions of the paper, which he described positively by stating that it was in favour of the Statutes and critical of feudal landlords,¹³¹ Algerian elections and missed opportunities. He saw in *Le Monde* a slow but real evolution: *l'évolution, pour lente qu'elle soit, n'en existe pas moins*. But what blurred its vision at the time, Firchon argued, was the calm, the *mask of serenity*, which gave a false impression of security. This could hardly be compatible with his view that the information provided was serious¹³² and abundant.¹³³

The evolution, which Firchon noted from 1951,¹³⁴ towards a supportive attitude towards the aspirations of the indigenous

populations was perhaps seen and presented as normal for other countries. But this was not the case for Algeria.

Even if we were to accept Firchon's statement that *Le Monde* realised that from 1951, it was a mere realisation not a stand.¹³⁵ To talk of a U-turn is quite inappropriate.¹³⁶

Firchon also claims that *Le Monde* was persuaded that the "Statutes" were a panacea, but even he had to admit, after four years of implementation,¹³⁷ that very few problems had been resolved. The departure of Edmond Naegelen symbolised this failure. This could not last indefinitely, wrote Firchon, and it did not.¹³⁸

The fact that the paper eventually recognised the existence and reality of the "electoral farce" in Algeria and that it allowed the opinions of Professor Mandouze and of Jacques Madaule to be heard¹³⁹ is no consolation.

What could not be disputed was Firchon's statement that *Le Monde* saw the problem in Algeria from a purely French, a purely European angle, that it was only interested in the economic demands of the autonomous movements and that separatism in this field was clearly rejected.

SECTION TWO: THE PROTAGONISTS

AN IMBALANCED VIEW OF THE PROTAGONISTS

SECTION II: THE PROTAGONISTS

5.0 Introduction

There can be no doubt about which political actors constituted the protagonists in the Algerian war of independence; this is not a controversial matter. They were the French army, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) and the civilian population in Algeria: the Algerians called "Muslims" and the European settlers called "Europeans." These constitute the three main chapters of this section, which, in the framework outlined in the introduction, constitutes another fold in the examination of the *what* or the content of the newspaper, that is to say the message conveyed by the newspaper.

This section, amply exemplified and illustrated, sets out to assess the particular bias of *Le Monde* in its reporting of these three protagonists. It is commonly thought that all media betray some bias, and that neutrality and objectivity are very often myths. However, *Le Monde's* claims and its reputation for neutrality and objectivity are taken for granted by many of its journalists, editors and readers. The paper claimed to give space to all shades of opinion yet retain a responsible and

authoritative voice.¹ Contrary to this, the evidence presented in this study would strongly suggest that *Le Monde's* coverage, in many respects, was shaped by information from army and official sources.² Far from giving support to the independence struggle and cause or to the FLN, *Le Monde's* construction of events and discourse justified the use of special powers,³ the army's role in putting down the "terrorists" and "criminals" of the FLN, whose "undemocratic" nature was highlighted and whose claim to nationhood was dismissed outright. As far as the civilians are concerned, the bias is also evident in the sense that the preoccupations of one community were highlighted over another. The aspirations of the Muslims, though at times perceived, did not weigh heavily in the balance when it came to sacrificing the interests of the Europeans. The following section will attempt to show how and illustrate this.

CHAPTER FIVE
5. THE FRENCH ARMY

5.1. A dominant, influential and authoritative coverage

5.1.1. Prominence of army views: *Une muette plutôt bavarde*

The Army could scarcely be considered to form part of the intellectual class, but even at a time when the army was still considered to be *la Grande Muette*, individual high-ranking officers wrote and published books, memoirs and articles, recounting their experiences, dispensing their wisdom for those wanting to share it. It could be argued that the views of high-ranking officers intrinsically have a great influence on the reader because of their first-hand knowledge (one-sided, nevertheless) of the situation and the prominence of their positions. The impact of these views was reinforced by the weight attached and the space given to them by the paper.

Through such writings, Army chiefs expressed their views of the problems at hand and took positions on the major issues of the day.⁴ *Le Monde* seemed to give great credence to these publications, since its journalists reviewed the main ideas discussed.⁵

Marshal Juin's book was reviewed and his ideas discussed by *Le Monde*.⁶ His advocacy of severe repression combined with preaching a language of "love and charity" to the masses, his denial of France's responsibility for the war and his call for introducing conscription to prevent the "rebels from enrolling youngsters by force" (*pour soustraire les jeunes gens à l'enrôlement par la contrainte par les rebelles*) were echoed unquestioningly by *Le Monde*.⁷

Le Monde shared Juin's belief in the "complexity" of the internal⁸ and external⁹ causes of the uprising in the North

African territories, to which were added poverty, a high birth rate, and a lack of administration (given in a number of books) considered to be at the root of the Algerian problem.¹⁰

Juin's conclusions were said to be authoritative, as was his recommendation that the minimum that could be demanded of the two "presumptuous neighbours (Morocco and Tunisia), prematurely promoted to independence, is to stop believing in extravagant dreams" and to suspend their help to the Algerian "rebels".¹¹

The main theme of the argument in favour of maintaining a French military presence against the opinion of some "Paris circles" was noted in *Le Monde* from Lyautey,¹² whom it appreciated and described in flattering terms.¹³

A great deal of attention was paid by *Le Monde* to official publications by the Ministry of Defence such as the *Revue Militaire d'Information*, which elaborated on the concept and the practice of revolutionary warfare.¹⁴

When doubts were expressed inside the Army as to what should be done in the "unique context" of the Algerian war, when excessive repression methods were being used and denounced by journalists French and foreign, and even within the Army itself,¹⁵ a situation which left many soldiers and officers alike confused, *Le Monde* generously provided the advice given by General Ely for the conduct of the Army in "revolutionary" times in the mouth-piece of the Army and government *Revue Militaire d'Information*.¹⁶

Evoking the fact that some may refuse to obey through "spectacular moves" (a possible reference to Bollardière), the advice for the commander was to take and not disengage his responsibility.¹⁷

History was said to forgive the Army for unease and confu-

sion but not for failing its duty to "preserve civilisation".¹⁸ In this duty there was only one choice to be made, without any limitation or *nuances*.¹⁹ If discussion occurred, it should not lead to weakening. The leader alone must resolve the problems of conscience. Soldiers should carry out orders and not weaken, it was suggested.²⁰

Le Monde's readers had to wait about three months before finding out the real reasons for General Bollardière's resignation.²¹

In the context of army publications, Barberot²² was presented very much as a loner, the only dissenting voice when *Ceux d'Algérie* was published,²³ giving the impression that the Army was still doing an excellent job.²⁴

The paper was reasonably complimentary about Michelet, the former Defence Minister, when it stated that his work, though concentrating on Algeria, went far beyond it -although it did not share his pessimistic conclusions.²⁵

Le Monde's references to work relating to the Army also included the book produced by one of its own journalists.²⁶ Echoing with approval his views about the Army not having any ambitions about leading the country, *Le Monde* stressed its need for a technological and psychological revolution.

5.1.2. Army matters given considerable importance

Besides its publications, there is no doubt that, generally, the coverage of the army in *Le Monde's* reports received considerable prominence. Important news of the army,²⁷ information relating to troops,²⁸ the means²⁹ and funds³⁰ at their disposal and decisions affecting it³¹ are featured on innumerable occasions.

Le Monde's reports were often based directly on views from

Chiefs of Staff or Headquarters,³² which described enthusiastic officers without a hint of skepticism, as they were convinced of the legitimacy of their fight and their ultimate victory.³³

The army in Algeria was not initially very large. But, increasingly, it became the main instrument for keeping Algeria under control.³⁴ A noticeable and regular flow of information about troop numbers illustrated the high level of interest in military matters³⁵ but also, as is made clear in many of the articles referred to here, a readiness to take the official line.³⁶

5.1.3. Ambivalence of the discourse: the "war with no name"

As in many later conflicts (Northern Ireland) and even though troops were dispatched in significant numbers, *Le Monde* adopted the official phraseology in not referring to the ongoing fighting as "war" but as merely "troubles".³⁷

It was obvious from the content of the articles, even at an early stage, that what was being described were genuine battles.³⁸ But it was claimed that this fight was to rid the place of 250 *salopards*.³⁹

It is abundantly clear that the paper did not portray this conflict as one in which a community had taken up arms against an occupier. The reader could not help wondering if that was really the case -as the readiness to believe what was being written does not mesh with the description of the fighting. It is quite easy at times to detect that the paper was not shrewd in its evaluation and assessment of the situation; perhaps it had fallen, unwittingly or otherwise, for the ploys of the propaganda machine.⁴⁰

5.1.4. The cause of "troubles" seen from the army's perspective

Over a period of time, the paper stated that the origin of the troubles was "crime" (*banditisme*), "fanaticism", "external interference" and the "poverty of the masses". A year into the conflict, the paper was still considering that the army was not fighting against nationalism as "*nationalism was difficult to find*" amongst these "*quarrelsome clans*".⁴¹

Eugène Mannoni, also putting across the view of the Army, wrote that the origin of the troubles in Algeria was to be found in the long neglect of the country and the contempt that some Europeans had for the indigenous population.⁴²

The journalists who often accompanied the army could not help seeing the problem through army eyes. Hence Mannoni wrote that the false implementation of the policy of *assimilation* was seen as responsible for the trouble.⁴³

There was, however, an acceptance that other reasons contributed to the Algerian problem. These included:

*[la] misère, le sentiment de frustration éprouvée par les fellahs dont les désirs de justice, de dignité (d'égalité), ont été trop longtemps méconnus.*⁴⁴

But having stated his case, the journalist turned to explaining why this was so, who had turned these "brothers in arms": *des "salopards"* was his answer; their task was made easier (according to the army, although this was thought to be at times an excessive and summary judgment), by the indifference of the Europeans to the "extreme poverty" of the Muslims.⁴⁵

5.1.5. A positive image

The overall picture was that the French army was managing to rebuild everything, restore order and security, and that part

of the blame for what went wrong lay with members of the Muslim community, who had abused their position of power.⁴⁶

On the whole *Le Monde* gave a positive image of the army,⁴⁷ outlined its fears⁴⁸ and praised its discipline, its organisation, its perfected methods and skills thanks to the Indochina experience.

The paper thought that with some alterations, more appropriate equipment, rapidly made available, further improvements were still possible.⁴⁹

Writing later on in February 1956, for those wondering how 210,000 men (250,000 on 1 May) could not get results against 15,000 or 20,000 "rebels," Blanchet explained sympathetically that it was not easy.⁵⁰

5.2. A dismissal of revolutionary warfare?

5.2.1. The Cold War and Indochina

To a certain extent, *Le Monde* did situate these "troubles" in the Cold War context by providing the readers with some sense of the Cold War, albeit influenced by army views, since much of the work carried out by the troops was of a psychological nature. According to the paper, the army carried out this task with resounding success. Yet, despite that, possibly fearing disquiet on behalf of the readership and its possible disaffection,⁵¹ *Le Monde* continued to adopt the official perspective and denied, sometimes clumsily, any similarity between the Algerian and Indochinese "problems".⁵²

5.2.2. Revolutionary and psychological warfare

Le Monde did much to give credence to the theory of revolutionary warfare⁵³ as a justification for army action. Some of its reports were based on that theory and information published by official Ministry of Defence reviews such as the *Revue de la*

Défense Nationale,⁵⁴ and the *Revue Militaire d'Information*.⁵⁵

Philippe Herreman went to the area of Orléansville, which, at the beginning of 1957, was one of the most "infested," according to him⁵⁶ and described the "successes" of the "psychological action".⁵⁷

Similarly, the previous year, articles had discussed the theory of revolutionary warfare and had claimed that the rebels were implementing it.⁵⁸

Reporting from official sources, *Le Monde* thought the army was coping admirably in view of its increased responsibilities. As illustrated earlier, the military measures taken were seen only as palliative if they were not integrated into a full policy. However, military actions and operations were invariably portrayed as successful⁵⁹ in ridding the areas of the "gangs of outlaws", at times very quickly.⁶⁰

The picture given by *Le Monde* was that of a successful army, performing its duty as it should, arresting authors of crimes, despite finding, occasionally, more numerous (battalion size),⁶¹ better skilled,⁶² more audacious⁶³ opponents (thirty "outlaws" attacked a military post with fifty-two men), a strong phantom enemy (enemy nevertheless) after 150 trees were felled blocking four roads leading to El Milia.⁶⁴

Even when it acknowledged that the other side had come off better in an incident, this was very exceptional,⁶⁵ and the success of the French army was never questioned. Although, occasionally, the paper had to admit that "terrorist activities" had continued, and that the army was obviously unable to quell the unrest,⁶⁶ and at times that the situation had degenerated materially and psychologically,⁶⁷ it is certainly the case that most of the descriptions of the Army were far from

critical. In the reports the journalists would describe the army as doing its best (even if not managing too well). Very often it was its successes that were highlighted, even if some reports betrayed some reticence.

Already by mid-December 1956, *Le Monde's* reports, echoing the official line, tone and even slogans,⁶⁸ gave the impression that people were back in their places of work, in the fields, children were at school being taught, the "Muslims" were drinking and smoking despite the FLN ban,⁶⁹ and some were even requesting arms to fight the FLN and defend themselves.⁷⁰ At times like these, and this happened frequently, the reports of *Le Monde* followed the official line and tone.

5.2.3. Uncritical reporting: an instrument of propaganda?

It could easily be shown that *Le Monde* did not very often cover the whole nature of the operations in its reports. These were covered more thoroughly by other journalists.⁷¹

It fell victim to the official propaganda campaigns, in spite of being aware of the methods of psychological warfare. *Le Monde* was not very shrewd in its reporting,⁷² nor was it perspicacious in its account of what was happening. *Le Monde's* naiveness and its blind acceptance of the official version are astonishing in some respects as the likelihood, the veracity and accuracy of some items of news, presented like a piece of reporting, leave much to be desired.⁷³

There were frequent reports of people being killed on suspicion when the paper described them as suspects using the very terminology (without inverted commas or qualification of any kind) provided by the army to justify killing (and injuring, but this occurred less often,) "Muslims", whose guilt or involvement were in no way established.⁷⁴ Many reports of innocent

passers-by being killed or injured were laconically reported without an form of questioning or protest.⁷⁵

Le Monde also appeared to have been an easy instrument of official propaganda when the troops tried to find out the authors of terrorist acts, for which innocent "Muslims" were made to atone, and their guilt readily established by their simple presence or their refusal (which could be read to mean inability) to help the investigators. When the punishments seemed quite harsh they were still reported in the most neutral terms by *Le Monde*.⁷⁶ When Taleb Abderahmane was arrested by the parachutists, *Le Monde* gave details of the bombs "they" had made and the particular incidents in which they were used, as well as the number of victims "they" caused, without any trial and without these alleged "terrorists" being heard by anyone other than in secrecy by their torturers.⁷⁷

Very frequently also a very high number of "Muslims" would be arrested, without having been guilty of any crime other than that of being Muslims.⁷⁸

5.2.4.A restrained Army

In spite of this, the army was described as protective towards the inhabitants as well as discerning⁷⁹ and restrained in the use of its force.⁸⁰

The picture which emerged was that the army did not really want to fight these people whom it considered to be friends.⁸¹ The army appeared full of scruples,⁸² even when faced with the brutalities of everyday life. The most skillful and the more humanitarian of its officers were said to have kept their cool, and that of their men, and refrained from hotheaded actions even when sometimes it was admitted that the action of the troops had been *énergique sinon rude*.⁸³ The overall impression

of the French army that *Le Monde* gave its readers largely reflected the contents of most of the French patriotic press.⁸⁴

This depiction of the army contrasted with that of most of the left-wing press, which was giving more and more credence and space to Army "excesses." Amidst the various attacks against the army by the left-wing press, especially weeklies like *France-Observateur* and *L'Express*, as well as publications of the *Edition de Minuit* and *Le Seuil*, *Le Monde* provided a forum in which the defence of the army found a voice which helped minimise the extremist nature of its actions in the eyes of public opinion.⁸⁵

5.2.5. Pacification: an oversimplified view

The very words and concepts used by the official terminology and reported by *Le Monde* to describe the work of the army and its campaigns in Algeria, is that of *pacification*, thus labelled by government to imply that it consisted of measures designed to "pacify" the population.⁸⁶ The choice of the term *pacification* was obviously full of implications. It gave the war effort a peaceful name, or a connotation of peace, and removed from it any implication of what transpired later as being the full meaning of the army activities in Algeria.⁸⁷

Even when reporters travelled to Algeria, the reporting of army activities, based on army and official sources, led to many very real aspects of the Algerian war being played down and not shown up under their true light for mainland readers.⁸⁸ The means used by the Army, especially the paratroopers (as well as the police in Algeria and even in mainland France), to quell the unrest were very harsh indeed. These included the use of brute force, torture and even summary execution.⁸⁹

Many operations by the forces of order and decisions taken

by the civilian authorities in the colony resulted in Algerian countryside dwellers being moved from their already impoverished land, being deprived of its meagre resources, and kept under the supervision of the army.⁹⁰ In fact, it was the progressive establishment of concentration (euphemistically called "settlement") camps which was insidiously being developed.⁹¹

Even when *Le Monde* had the opportunity to report accurately what was going on, it chose to reveal only part of the truth.⁹²

The paper tended to give "pacification" a double aspect: that of destroying what was bad and building what was good.⁹³ Hence the paper showed more interest in establishing a parallel between times of troubles in the past and the present in order to demonstrate how things had improved. It compared 25 August 1955⁹⁴ when, *bouleversés par d'atroces massacres d'Européens et de non moins sévères représailles*,⁹⁵ only three Europeans and two Muslims remained in the village, and the present time when the officer in charge of the troops, who was also acting-mayor, had *managed to appease* the numerous population which could be found there. Now, according to the paper, "Muslim" children were playing outside, a situation previously unimaginable.

It could not be argued that *Le Monde* was genuine in its conception and reports of pacification and that it really meant it as a peaceful enterprise. Nor could it be accepted that the paper was confused as to the meaning of the word, because some articles indicated that that was not the case.⁹⁶

There was a manifest effort to present the action undertaken as being not simply a military exercise, by insisting that other measures, economic and social, were being taken, and

should be taken, but all that articles of this kind contained was information about military measures.⁹⁷

The journalist Mannoni discussed at length the role of the military, in the construction of roads and villages, falling victim to the fellagas yet providing tangible results, and transforming the area. He stated that the Muslims welcomed the soldiers (and himself, us), *right hand held out, left hand on the heart*.⁹⁸

5.2.6.A Boyscout image

In doing this, *Le Monde* tended to report the work of a very small section of the army, whose task it was to gain the confidence of the Algerian population, as being the general pattern for all its activities. It was stated that great numbers of *affaires indigènes* and SAS⁹⁹ officers were very enthusiastic in their task and doing a great job in discharging their "pacification" duty.¹⁰⁰

The army, in general, was described as doing a splendid job and coping magnificently, despite its lack of resources. Their dedication and achievements were praised so much that the journalist concluded that since the officers at work instilled confidence, were liked and did everything for the people, there is a need to believe that "the nightmare is going to end".¹⁰¹

This description of the army as boy-scouts¹⁰² really stretches the imagination of those Algerians who confronted the everyday realities and had been running for their lives.¹⁰³

No doubt a large effort was made by the soldiers to go to areas which were then too remote for everyday contact with the French army or civilian population, and to try and get to know, and subsequently, to gain the sympathy of the inhabitants of

the countryside and the remote parts of Algeria.¹⁰⁴ But this kind of activity, described as caring for the peasants in terms of health, educational and social matters, was undertaken by very few members of the military, who very often did not have the means to carry out this action.

The reports of caring officers were manifestly coloured with optimism. *Le Monde* wrote on the "experience of the black commandos" and of lieutenant J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's optimism after serving in that army corps (*le lieutenant Jean-Jaques Servan-Schreiber tire des raisons d'optimisme*).¹⁰⁵ Then, full of optimism for the future, the article discussed the discovery of the "small miracle of trust" and what could be saved and built of this country if only people were considered as people, in practice and not only in legal texts.¹⁰⁶ Needless to say, a completely different picture emerged when, upon his return to mainland France, Servan-Schreiber wrote his articles in *L'Express* and published the book, which retold his experience.¹⁰⁷

5.3.A "troubled" Army

5.3.1. More than a *malaise*

It soon became clear (because of the nature of the "troubles") that there was growing discontent within army ranks, even at the highest levels. Since the paper did not consider this to be more than a mere "malaise," it failed to give "incidents" the perspective needed and limited thereby their full significance.¹⁰⁸

5.3.2. High-ranking officers getting restless

From the role of a docile instrument of the Republic at the beginning of the conflict, *La Grande Muette* was slowly heading for a takeover in 1958 and a fully-fledged *coup d'état* in 1961.¹⁰⁹

Le Monde closely monitored the Army's central position on the Algerian scene,¹¹⁰ yet it failed at times to give events and their impact their real significance.

Covering the case of General Faure,¹¹¹ *Le Monde* explained that he had been arrested because he was linked to a "plot", the implications of which had not yet been defined.¹¹² *Le Monde* merely quoted *Le Figaro*¹¹³ and official *communiqués* on the matter,¹¹⁴ but its own statements made it difficult to see whether it believed the accusations or not.¹¹⁵

It was only on 9 January 1957 that *Le Monde* stated categorically that the general had "made contacts with civilian and military circles" which went beyond mere *imprudences verbales*. Its reports then were quite sympathetic.¹¹⁶

Having acknowledged that Faure had made several contacts with the Federation of Mayors of Algeria, *Le Monde* wondered whether one could really talk of "a plot"¹¹⁷ and included a brief quote of the AFP reporting an official declaration not taking the attempt seriously and Lacoste's description of it as "puéril".¹¹⁸

A few days later, Planchais offered an even more sympathetic view of the problems of the Army.¹¹⁹ Examining pacification, Planchais asserted that a large majority of the officers were neither "extremists" nor "reactionaries, opposed to any evolution",¹²⁰ and maintained that they, nevertheless, had reasons for grievances and discontent.¹²¹

According to the paper, the war in Indochina gave career soldiers the impression of being the victims of politicians' failures,¹²² that their survival¹²³ was under threat and that something had to be done.¹²⁴ Though Planchais concluded his explanation of the difficulties which the Army was experien-

cing¹²⁵ with the words of general Boyer de la Tour, expressing satisfaction that France was not the country of military revolts, his own prophetic conclusions were not so optimistic.¹²⁶

Trouble in the army was not brewing just from the right. The use of torture and various other repressive methods by the army was widespread.¹²⁷ *Le Monde's* comments on this important subject were quite sparse.¹²⁸

When General Paris de la Bollardière asked to be relieved of his duties,¹²⁹ he was described in very fair and even complimentary terms, but the paper failed to see the importance of the gesture of this high-ranking officer in the circumstances.

The paper offered a very timid defence of the man¹³⁰ and, though quite doubtful of the veracity of the official version, it challenged it very timidly.¹³¹

Le Monde, thereafter, continued to report on the case¹³² and on the sanctions being considered.¹³³ But when Bollardière was put under house arrest for sixty days, *Le Monde* did not even question the decision. On the contrary, it even provided further arguments that made his condemnation look even more justifiable.¹³⁴

5.3.3. Algerian Officers in protest (1957)

The indigenous fraction of the army was not immune from ferment. The inaccuracy of *Le Monde's* reports, due to a blind adherence to the official version and to an extraordinarily weak emphasis on army action, was very striking.

Some of these Algerian officers serving in the French army¹³⁵ expressed resentment about the policy of repression being followed by the Army in Algeria. Their various protests fell on deaf ears. In the end they resorted to writing to the

President of the Republic, Coty, as "the representative of the French nation", a letter in which, according to *Le Monde*, *ils exposent ... le cas de conscience que leur pose la politique poursuivie par le gouvernement en Algérie.*¹³⁶

Two days later, on the basis of official statements, *Le Monde* stated that sanctions had been taken against fifty-two Algerian officers, and that these sanctions were "exclusively for an infringement of disciplinary rules," as they refused to execute an order to move from one area to another.¹³⁷ It was only later that it reported that sanctions were being taken against one of the Algerian officers, who was now charged with *participation en connaissance de cause à une tentative de démoralisation de l'armée* and subsequently detained in Fresnes prison.¹³⁸

In a very minor article, *Le Monde* reported that a request for bail made by the lawyers on behalf of Rahmani had been turned down,¹³⁹ and three weeks later, along with other papers, it stated that Rahmani had been bailed.¹⁴⁰

The paper undertook no serious defence of the stance taken by the officers until it was enlightened by a letter sent by one of them,¹⁴¹ who reminded the readers and *Le Monde* itself that present legislation exempted legionnaires from fighting against their blood brothers or compatriots.¹⁴² But the real preoccupations behind *Le Monde's* concern for Muslim soldiers and officers were too evident.¹⁴³

5.3.4. Opposition to the conflict by conscripts and conscientious objectors

As we saw, above, dissent with regard to what was going on in Algeria could be seen to some degree through careful reading of the paper, which in no way reported the whole story.

This dissent was not limited to high-ranking officers. It was also to be found amongst the conscripts and those recalled for military service duties in Algeria, a number of whom protested against their dispatch to Algeria.

Opposition to the war in Algeria and unwillingness to participate in the war effort were to be found especially amongst communists and pacifists.¹⁴⁴ *Le Monde* reported these facts every now and then, and also the trial of those charged with related offences¹⁴⁵ as a result of these actions. But it did so in neutral terms.¹⁴⁶

It is clear, however, that in the coverage of incidents of mutiny amongst those being drafted to serve in Algeria, and also when reporting their trials, the explanations given to the readers reflected the official view.¹⁴⁷

There was a public outcry from the conscripts themselves but also from their families, concerned for the safety of their loved ones in the troubled shores of North Africa. *Le Monde*, however, tried to show, from the start, that their morale was good and that these conscripts understood their role.¹⁴⁸ Despite the worries expressed,¹⁴⁹ the paper assumed a very reassuring¹⁵⁰ and protective role.¹⁵¹

5.4. Conclusion

However, despite the fact that an entire army had been dispatched to the other side of the Mediterranean, the authorities still refused to acknowledge that a war was indeed going on in Algeria.¹⁵² *Le Monde* remained faithful to that representation, and to the official line, and hence failed to see and describe the "troubles" it was reporting with accuracy.

The conflict which *Le Monde's* readers were invited to con-

struct via the pages of the paper consisted of "troubles" which were being sorted out by the French army, but that at the same time economic and social interventions were also being made. The constructive role of the French army was highlighted at the expense of its more immediate role, which was left to other *communiqués*.

The "boy-scout" image of the army was very much echoed in the paper. It emphasised the role of the conscripts and active soldiers who functioned as administrators, doctors, teachers, builders and helpers -and even protectors of the indigenous population.

The reports of *Le Monde* also made much more of a case for the role of a very limited branch of the army specialised in helping local communities, and gave a misleading impression of what the army's task consisted of. The army appeared in the reports in a very pacifist light. The reports gave a very oversimplified view of what was in actual fact a severe and pitiless attempt to crush a nationalist uprising.

Consequently, the characteristics of the army had to be presented under a good light. This is to be expected at a time when nationalist pride in the army was paramount after the debacle of the Second World war and Indochinese conflict. However, the reports were used to give a rehabilitating image in view of the recent memory of the War and Indochina, still very fresh in the readers' minds. Contrary to many other papers,¹⁵³ *Le Monde* presented the army as kind and discerning, active only against "criminals" and "terrorists". It denied the kind of behaviour exhibited by the troops in the implementation of *Pacification*, that euphemism for what had become for the Algerians the most extreme repression against any form of

nationalist dissent.¹⁵⁴ The pacification behaviour was exemplified much more emphatically in the weeklies, such as *L'Express* and *France-Observateur*.¹⁵⁵

CHAPTER SIX
6. THE FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE
6.1. Introduction

The FLN was the direct descendant of the nationalist movements that preceded it.¹ It was the failure of these movements and parties which led to a small group of men launching the armed struggle. They set up a political organisation that was to assume the political direction of the radicalisation of the struggle against the colonial system.²

6.2.A Negative image

6.2.1. The construction of the FLN: murderers, bandits, terrorists...

The terminology used to describe the nationalists is of paramount significance. It tends to legitimise or criminalise those concerned and therefore attract the sympathy of the readers, or, alternatively, alienate them. Besides, it reveals what perception the paper had of the people concerned.

To start with, *Le Monde* used the word FLN in inverted commas until it progressively became part of the everyday language. For the paper the name FLN stood for "rebels", "terrorists", terms which the paper continued to use to describe the movement, even when it dropped the inverted commas, as the movement became part of the everyday scene and was recognised by that name. The rebels were also for a long time simply fellagas (*coupeurs de route*)³ which meant bandits, that is mere criminals without any nationalist philosophy. Other favourites of *Le Monde* were *salopards*⁴ and fanatics.⁵

The FLN were very often described as particularly callous, diabolical and indiscriminate murderers, placing bombs in public places, such as bus stations and bars, where their potential victims were more likely to be women and innocent

people.⁶

The FLN were perceived as being bent on terrorism and destruction,⁷ assassinating those who collaborated with the authorities, "confirming" their attempt to wreck local government reform by every mean available and undermining any Franco-Muslim cooperation.⁸

The rebels were said to be compromising people and forcing them to commit acts of sabotage.⁹ They were also described as financial blackmailers and extortionists,¹⁰ inflicting much harassment.¹¹

The FLN were also said to be experts in the use of propaganda methods "next to which Nasser's appear derisory".¹² But the propaganda on the French side was even more obvious, as the FLN were given objectives which they did not set themselves, possibly so as to try and prove how impossible these objectives would have been, or still were, to achieve. In most cases their deeds and actions were reported from French authorities or the army perspective, as their attacks were often described according to what was thought of them in Algiers,¹³ depriving their actions of any legitimacy.

6.2.2. The FLN maximalist and intransigent

The FLN demands for independence were seen by the paper as a form of extremism,¹⁴ and FLN members were, therefore, perceived as "maximalists," wanting to obtain a maximum, which was not considered as being a realistic proposal and for which France was not ready.¹⁵

The paper described the "FLN" as "intransigently" opposed to any cease-fire proposals,¹⁶ emphasising the appeal made by the Prime Minister and the renewal of the offer of a cease-fire, specifying that it was not capitulation that he wanted. In the

eyes of the paper, that ought to have been enough to make them want to take "an honourable way out," and then prove they can triumph legally and implement their demands through really free elections,¹⁷ demands which of course, they could not, "now more than ever, impose by force on their compatriots".

6.2.3. Uncompromising

In presenting this intransigent portrait, *Le Monde*¹⁸ was perfectly aware of the positions adopted and the demands formulated by the FLN, since it often reported statements received from their leaders or originating from their headquarters.¹⁹ *Le Monde* knew that since its emergence, and more so since its 1956 congress, the FLN had been constantly requesting independence.²⁰

In reporting their position, the journalists also played on the violence of the tone and delivery²¹ in order to put the responsibility for failures on the nationalists; rejecting, for instance, both cease-fire and free election proposals.²²

Consequently, nationalists were seen as indifferent to, if not careless of, international opinion and prepared, therefore, to alienate it. For the journalists this indicated a willingness to shoulder the responsibility of the refusal which "would not be well perceived (even disapproved) by the few capitals where there was still some credit left".²³

As we see, if it was not in the content, there was always in the tone a negative portrayal of the nationalists' view.²⁴ The descriptions attracted by the nationalists in the papers in general and in *Le Monde* had very negative connotations.

The nationalist movement was always described as uncompromising, and even worse, as constantly remaining intransigent or as hardening its positions, refusing all proposals at hand, all

efforts made by liberals (as in above), by the authorities trying to pacify them, including those by other foreign nationalists.²⁵

This emphasis on insisting upon independence or the right to self-determination was presented as not enjoying the acceptance by the majority of people and states.²⁶

6.2.4. Anti-democratic

The FLN was characterised as being an undemocratic movement. When the nationalists were said to be refusing elections unless they could lead to an Algerian Assembly able to opt for independence, they were described as not genuine in their acceptance of the idea of elections, suspicious and cunning. Moreover, their possible acceptance was presented as always attached with provisos and conditions.²⁷

Despite the objections put forward, and the real fears expressed by the nationalists about the conduct of elections in Algeria,²⁸ which it sometimes reported,²⁹ *Le Monde* presented these nationalists as being profoundly hostile to the democratic processes.

The paper thought that the FLN would not be interested in elections either at a local level or at a French parliamentary level, where the thirty or so potential MPs would be "drowned." Taking some of their points on board,³⁰ the paper put the accent on the FLN's "fundamental hostility" to elections in a revolutionary period, basing its arguments on some of their writings.³¹

According to the paper, the FLN had stated that because it was "indissociable" from the aspirations of the Algerian people: *il est superflu de se livrer à une consultation électorale quand l'histoire est en marche.* The FLN, the paper conti-

nued, believes "one-sidedly and without discussion" that it has a mission; and that in the present circumstances it considers electoral consultations superfluous. The paper concluded that the FLN was fearful of elections (*Dans ce sens on peut dire qu'il la redoute*) and tried to suggest that the movement was fundamentally anti-democratic.³²

6.3. The FLN: a force that alienates everybody

The FLN was portrayed as alienating almost everybody, French intellectuals as well as the Communists, Morocco and Tunisia as well as the UN.³³ The FLN was presented as rejected by democrats and the French intellectual class.³⁴

6.3.1. Opposed by those most critical of Army methods

Even when the news broke that France was fighting the war with dirty methods and after it had become widely known in France, *Le Monde* had a sharp reminder for those who were inclined to sympathise with the nationalists from Pierre-Henri Simon, one of the few people who were openly critical of torture and of the atrocities committed by the Army.³⁵ Having made his criticisms, he thought it important to point out to the FLN that he was not on their side.³⁶

Simon further stated that his request to his compatriots to examine critically a shared responsibility was not meant to serve the propaganda services of the FLN -but to give them an example in order to foster a feeling amongst them that this war was cruel and too absurd. This would then set up a moral climate in which the word "negotiation" would acquire a political meaning.³⁷ In his view, this should also signify to the FLN that there were chances for realistic negotiations. But if the FLN saw this as a *défaillance française devant un devoir historique évident*, he wrote, then it would be "gravely mistak-

en".³⁸

6.3.2. The FLN and the working class movement

The description of the struggle against communism and revolutionary warfare³⁹ did not square with the description of the nationalist movement itself.⁴⁰ Quoting *El Moujahid*, *Le Monde* pointed out that, for the Front, the bureaucratic leadership of the Communist party was severed from the masses, and had failed to assess the revolutionary situation. It was argued by the paper that the Communist party had lost on this front and on the European front as well, as it "disgusted" (*écoeuré*) the Europeans of Algeria, whose votes it had never been deprived of.⁴¹

The FLN was also said not to have forgiven the CGT, *symbol of the Franco-Muslim community*,⁴² for having recommended the brotherly union with the French people or the acceptance of the vote of special powers by the "lap-dog" of the mainland.

It could also be argued that *Le Monde* failed to see the social and political demands of the trades-unions as other than in "terrorist" terms. It saw these groups as instruments in the hands of the FLN only, not worthy of having genuine demands that should be satisfied; and those demands were identified as being those of the FLN itself.⁴³

6.3.3. An alienated movement disregarding French and world opinion

Le Monde presented the FLN and its leaders, who "knew of the harm that their methods were causing them" among world and French opinion, as being indifferent about their impact, since they were not expecting to rally French opinion, or to convince it of the nobility of its cause, or its legitimacy.

The paper stated that they were aware of the harm done to their cause by their methods, but that they were oblivious to it. "They dont ignore that French public opinion is divided on the future of Algeria, it was unanimous in its condemnation of the methods used by insurrectional forces," continued *Le Monde*:

*Mais les hommes du Front n'en ont cure. Ils n'espèrent pas se rallier l'opinion métropolitaine, la convaincre de la noblesse de leur idéal, ou de la légitimité de leur but. Ce qu'ils cherchent c'est la pousser à bout en lui faisant violence; c'est arriver à la négociation par la force et non par la persuasion. Le couvre-feu à Paris, m'a dit l'un d'eux, voilà ce qui obligerait les Français à réfléchir.*⁴⁴

According to the paper, what the FLN wanted was not to persuade it, but to force it to submit to them, to push it to the limit, using violence which would force it to negotiate.⁴⁵

The paper intimated even at times of "terrorist" respite that they were only reorganising to strike better as for them the only efficient weapon was terrorism.⁴⁶

The result of a presentation of that kind would be to alienate French opinion and readers from the FLN all the more since the authorities were said to be disappointed by the nationalists refusal to embark on negotiations without the recognition of the right to independence.⁴⁷ Official commentators were also said to be not hopeful since the first step demanded of the French government would have to be the renunciation of Algeria as an integral part of France, as it amounted to doing away with article one of the *loi-cadre*;⁴⁸ there were therefore no illusions on the chances of negotiation.

6.3.4. Sustained by the outside yet out of step with it

On this issue, the FLN was also presented as being in disagreement with the neighbouring countries and threatening the

North African front. The FLN was presented as out of step and very different from the nationalists movements elsewhere. It was perceived and presented by the paper as being disapproved of by these "brothers" (Morocco and Tunisia), who thought that it was on the "wrong tracks" when it defied French, world and even Muslim opinion.

Elle [la position du FLN] est de plus réprouvée par les Tunisiens et les Marocains pour qui, il ne s'agit pas de construire n'importe quelle Algérie, par n'importe quel moyen. Pour ces <<frères>> le FLN fait fausse route lorsqu'il défie les réactions de l'opinion française et mondiale, voire celle de l'opinion musulmane.

The nationalists were described as being dissatisfied with the Moroccans⁴⁹ but having less significant conflict with Tunisia. The paper pointed out, however, that even in the darkest days of their struggle for independence Tunisian and Moroccan parties (Neo-Destour and Istiqlal) distinguished between French liberals and the others and even, on occasions, played one group against another. This was not the case with the FLN spokesmen, stated *Le Monde*. For the spokesman, whom the journalist said he had met, there was no distinction between the liberals and the rest. Instead of using the liberals to bring negotiations nearer and justifying those who talk of negotiations by softening their methods, or utilising the divisions between the various groups, the FLN were said to consider Right and Left "en bloc" as representing the "colonial power" they were fighting against. The paper argued that the Algerian nationalists were therefore rejecting dialogue with any party.⁵⁰

According to *Le Monde*, the Algerian nationalists were only prepared to agree to enter into a dialogue with the non-communist left if it renounced its "restrictions", its

"stages" and its "compromises", and supported the struggle of the Algerian people for their independence "without reservations".⁵¹

The FLN hard line was said to have damaged the North African front set up before the UN debate, which in the eyes of its creators, was to augur (*préfigurer*) the united Maghreb of tomorrow.

The FLN were said to be disappointed by N.A.T.O. and the Americans and thinking of looking East.⁵² The paper even speculated that the leaders were trying (but hesitating to do so in the end) to extend the Cold War⁵³ to North Africa, despite the reluctance of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.⁵⁴ The FLN was described as a disappointment to the UN and US delegation. And the "maquis's thoughts" of rapprochement with the East were dismissed outright as the paper was doubtful of total revision of FLN <<diplomacy>>. This was said to be only a manoeuvre to alarm the Americans and persuade them to put pressure on the French.

There seems to be a profound contradiction in the discourse of the paper in the sense that, although these rebels were alienated and in disagreement with Morocco and Tunisia, they seemed to be sustained to a considerable extent by them. Since the activity of the "rebels" continued and was, at times, on the increase in spite of the efforts by the army, it was suggested that they were only kept going by help from the outside.⁵⁵ In fact, on many occasions the paper conveyed the idea that the nationalists appeared to have been pushed by outsiders. Pressure would be seen to have come from the Communist bloc, and also the Arab world, which who were said to be directing their nationalist panarab and Islamist anti-French

currents against France. Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, all were seen as helpers and abettors of terrorism, assisting in terms of arms, funds and training, as well as providing shelter for the terrorists.⁵⁶ The help provided was said to have included the supply of arms to the "terrorists".⁵⁷ Occasionally, the paper reported that the Egyptian ambassador had been summoned to the Quai d'Orsay over this issue.⁵⁸

6.3.5. Some strengths but many weaknesses

Le Monde assessed the FLN as having a few strengths but many weaknesses. They were seen as not having a very easy time,⁵⁹ but the paper had obviously no sympathy for them.⁶⁰ When one of *Le Monde's* journalists, Eugène Mannoni, examined the strengths and weaknesses of the FLN, he indicated that the leaders of the FLN had realised that they could not triumph militarily, seeing that the real battle, which was going to be decisive and which both sides were trying to win, was a political one.

In the FLN's favour, Mannoni illustrated the sense of insecurity,⁶¹ with people not being able to go about their leisurely activities and holidays (to go skiing or go to the beach).⁶² But, despite accepting that, according to experts,⁶³ the security forces needed four times as many troops as their adversaries, the paper made quite clear (perhaps wrongly thinking along the lines of a traditional war) that they had gained no strategic position and there was no paralysis of the whole system.⁶⁴ But the paper had to concede that the FLN had some hold over the population and was gaining sympathies even amongst former "Muslim" members of the Resident Minister's cabinet.⁶⁵

However, the general impression that the paper gave throughout was that the population was being terrorised by them. Even

when conceding that one of the strengths of the FLN was the backing of the population and accepting that this was an important factor, Mannoni, nevertheless, refused to commit himself, telling the readers that he was uncertain whether this backing was freely given.⁶⁶

Unwilling to concede that there was a real desire on the part of the Algerian people for emancipation and independence, Mannoni went on to state that the influence of the Front had increased⁶⁷ as the leaders of the nationalists had the advantage of popularising the seductive idea of nationalism. The idea of independence, he wrote, was more appealing to the people than the reforms, the implementation of which was prevented by terrorism.⁶⁸ But Mannoni hastened to emphasise the inability of the nationalists to run an independent country, because of their "inability to convince the international community of their ability to take the destiny of the country into their hands".⁶⁹

6.4. The FLN: a divided movement

6.4.1. Problems of divisions

Le Monde emphasised the divisions of the nationalist movement. Disputes over the legitimacy and control of the Algerian people were highlighted between the MNA and the FLN,⁷⁰ between the ALN and the FLN,⁷¹ but also within the FLN itself. The inevitable result of this representation would have been to undermine the credibility of the nationalist movement as there is no strength without unity.

The paper stressed that the FLN was a divided movement riddled with rivalries, ideological and ethnic splits, and internecine strife. In reporting these splits, *Le Monde* went so far as to suggest that there were assassination attempts of FLN

leaders on each other.⁷² There were also reports of demotions and deprivation of leaders' command on the basis of mere speculation.⁷³

Le Monde insisted at times on differences along ideological grounds. On many occasions, *Le Monde* highlighted the differences between the *politiques* and the *militaires* in the FLN. The paper presented Abane Ramdane as the most extreme of the military (whereas he was mostly thought of as a shrewd political man) and stated that he was contrasting the illusions and failures of the *politiques* with the "successes" of the ALN.⁷⁴

At times the paper combined these antagonisms with ethnic conflict and differences.⁷⁵ Although, occasionally, *Le Monde* warned that caution must be exercised until further information was available, it was clear that a movement characterised in this way could not gain legitimacy, and could not be taken seriously when it was caught up with in-fighting. So when later, *Le Monde*, in more serious reports (UP), had to deny some of the stories,⁷⁶ the F.L.N.'s reputation had already been damaged in the eyes of the readership. In the Algerian war the psychological dimension could not have escaped the attention of the paper, and news of that type could certainly not be seen as benefiting the nationalists, even if it were true. In fact, in the propaganda campaign, when accusations were exchanged between the Algerian nationalists and the French government the paper reported the accusations of the FLN but also provided the readers with the official French version. This invariably made it look as if the nationalists statements were not taken seriously. When the FLN accused the government of having refused the cease-fire, *Le Monde* went over the various occasions on which the Prime Minister (Pineau) and the Governor General

(Lacoste) had repeated their proposals (through leaflets and through radio broadcasts). The paper stated that it was the FLN, which, in their press conference of 22 March in Tunis, by putting independence as a precondition to any cease-fire (French government reasoning) were refusing the first stage of the government offer.⁷⁷

6.4.2. Problems of leadership

It is not altogether surprising that the paper should have presented the FLN and its leadership, with which it did not sympathise, negatively, or portray it as experiencing a host of problems.

Problems of FLN leadership featured frequently in the pages of the paper. The FLN was presented as unable to impose a leader on particular areas and regions and the area leaders were portrayed as helpless and unable to establish authority.⁷⁸ On this question of leadership, whatever form the FLN adopted, it could not win the sympathy of the paper. The fact that the FLN did not have a single leader⁷⁹ was said to have "deprived" it of a useful leader, to have given it a picture of "Leninism without Lenin or Stalin, fascism without Mussolini, Panarabism without Nasser" and nearer home "Neo-Destour and Istiqlal without Bourguiba and Allal el Fassi".

Even this refusal to have a single leader, this collective leadership that the "revolution" had given itself in order to avoid a personality cult, was not properly acknowledged and that "collegiality" was seen as a negative feature.⁸⁰ It was used to prove that, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria could not be independent.

There was negative reporting of the FLN despite the paper's acknowledgment of the capability of the movement, its pervasive

action and its efficient organisation which enabled it to keep a low key struggle going despite the severe blows it had received.⁸¹

In general, there was no love lost between the paper and the leaders of the FLN, and this appeared clearly during the arrest of the five FLN leaders whose plane was hijacked by the French military. During this episode what could be seen in the paper was an expression of tacit and sometimes explicit support for the operation.

6.5. The arrest of the potential negotiators

6.5.1. Attempts at peaceful settlement

Le Monde had very little sympathy for the FLN leaders and this showed clearly during their arrest by the French authorities. In 1956, after two years of conflict, a number of efforts were made to stop the war in Algeria. A series of meetings took place between Algerian nationalists leaders and representatives of the French government, but they not achieve much.⁸²

During the week of the arrest it became progressively clear that Mollet's government had initiated talks, altogether about five meetings, between the "rebels" and the Socialist leaders, amongst whom was Pierre Commin, general secretary of the SFIO.⁸³ It was established that, although the delegates to these talks were all socialists, they had represented the government. The latter was free to decide whom it wished to consider trustworthy enough to represent it.⁸⁴ The fact that Mohammed Khider, one of the arrested leaders, had been present at these meetings seemed to confirm *Liberation's* line about throwing the potential negotiators in prison.

Although at the time *Le Monde* included an article referring to a declaration by Mohammed Yazid in New York, in which he

stated that discussions had taken place between the FLN leaders and representatives of the Guy Mollet government, the paper also published, the next day, another statement from the authorities declaring that these meetings did not lead to any agreement;⁸⁵ and this was due to, according to Commin himself, *préalables inaccessibles*.⁸⁶

At the time, Morocco and Tunisia had recently become independent and were thought to be ideal intermediaries, likely to intercede successfully between the French government and the Algerian "rebels." In the Autumn of 1956, five leaders of the FLN were guests of His Majesty King Mohammed V of Morocco to take part in a series of preliminary discussions. The result was that a summit conference to seek a peaceful solution to the problem was to be organised in Tunis which these leaders were to attend. They embarked on a Moroccan plane, bound for Tunis on 22 October 1956. The French authorities in Algeria contacted the plane and ordered the French pilot to land in Algiers. After negotiations with the pilot, the French Air Force compelled the plane to land in Algiers airport and the five leaders were arrested.

6.5.2. Legitimation of Piracy in spite of official protests and resignations

Le Monde wrote about the implications of this event and presented its readers with various reactions to that event and subsequent developments.

There were official protests from both the Moroccan and Tunisian governments, from the Arab League and from French liberal groups in Morocco which were echoed by *Le Monde*.

For Morocco, Tunisia, and the Arab League the act was no less than an "act of piracy which could have the most serious

consequences". They denounced the betrayal by France which, they said, encouraged these meetings between official leaders of Morocco, Tunisia and nationalist leaders. The Moroccans claimed that the talks which took place between the Algerian nationalist leaders and the Moroccan head of state, prior to the arrest, did so with the full knowledge and consent of the French government. It was also claimed that this meeting was seen on both sides of the Mediterranean as an effort to bring about peace in the area.

The arrests also led to a wave of protests. A street demonstration ensued in Morocco accompanied by protests from the French liberal groups in that country.⁸⁷ The protesters handed motions to the French and Moroccan authorities, attacking the action of the government⁸⁸ and warning of serious unrest.⁸⁹

The resignation of three of the main politicians involved in North Africa could have been perceived as a protest against the arrests, which deserved some form of formal comment.⁹⁰ But *Le Monde* did not seem to share this view. It was only three days after the first articles on the arrests that *Le Monde* tried to explain, very inadequately, the resignations. The reports which the paper published were merely factual and lacked any incisive or judicious comments.⁹¹ The paper's reports, in general, consisted mainly of official declarations,⁹² and of national and international reactions in the press.

As far as the national side of the press, which included Algeria, the paper reproduced some of the most ecstatic statements.⁹³ For *Le Monde* most of the national papers in France and in Algeria was delighted by the arrests.⁹⁴ Judging by the quotes, two papers seemed ill at ease⁹⁵ and only one appeared severe in its judgment.⁹⁶

Some international press reactions were also included. Readers were told that the Indian papers were critical⁹⁷ while *The Times* of London was understanding.⁹⁸

6.5.3. Legitimacy of piracy through *Le Monde's* own position

Besides this general coverage, in our attempt to understand the attitude of the paper to the FLN leaders, it would be useful to see what could be assessed in terms of *Le Monde's* own comments and reactions to the events.

Despite the few hostile reactions to this operation reported by *Le Monde*, no strong condemnation is to be found in the paper. What is more, the paper seems to have approved and, to a certain extent, justified this initiative taken by the French authorities in Algeria without the prior approval of the French government in Paris. The editorials dealt with the event in no uncertain terms. The paper could not but see the FLN leaders as enemies of France and the tone was more than threatening towards Morocco and Tunisia.⁹⁹

6.5.3.1. Arraignment not détournement

There were also some subtle elements, such as the more frequent and deliberate use of the word *arraisonner* (*arraisonnement*) instead of *détourner* (*détournement*) to legitimise the action taken by the security forces.¹⁰⁰ The use of these concepts in this context is deliberate and biased¹⁰¹ and reduces the need for the paper to dig deeper and to ask more pertinent questions.¹⁰²

6.5.3.2. France legally justified

Moreover, the paper clearly tried to make the operation appear legal in international law.¹⁰³

Furthermore, from the comments of some journalists, the action was seen as perfectly legitimate even if it had taken

place without the consent of the government¹⁰⁴ which, in actual fact, it had.

According to Fauvet, nobody could reproach the security services of the Air Force, nor the Resident Minister, for having approved the operation before the landing of the plane; nobody, "military or civilian, in charge of Algerian affairs" (*responsable des affaires algériennes, civil ou militaire*) could have hesitated and every single parliamentarian, and every single minister, was rejoicing.¹⁰⁵

Confirming that it was not the first day that a government was faced with a *fait accompli*, Fauvet explained that the structure of power was such that the executors (*exécutants*) were free to do their job, but that the executive was unable to do its job, and stated that it would have been unthinkable to have acted differently.¹⁰⁶

Once the arrests had been made and despite the previous efforts to arrive at a settlement through negotiations, *Le Monde* showed a tendency to see the arrests as an acceptable move and, despite the government unawareness of the initiatives of the authorities in Algiers, as a justified action, blaming Morocco and Tunisia for the whole affair.¹⁰⁷

Even the director of the paper intervened in the debate. In an editorial published after the paper confirmed that there had indeed been talks between the FLN and the French government's representatives,¹⁰⁸ HBM clearly demonstrated double standards in his conception of the fight for freedom¹⁰⁹ when he could not see that freedom from Communist oppression might be as significant as freedom from French domination.¹¹⁰

6.5.4. A Forum of debate supporting the arrest

This is not to say that there was no opposition included in the pages of the paper. *Le Monde* opened its columns to a debate through the *Libres opinions* rubric, which obviously did not commit the paper's editorial board. Two contributors (of the articles), JM Domenach and André Philip, were critical of the operation. Domenach¹¹¹ saw the operation as double edged one with on spectacular and satisfactory side¹¹² but also another side which shamed him.¹¹³ For him, "Operation Tintin" led to political vacuum and set back the efforts made towards a solution.¹¹⁴ He thought it was not a proof of the government's strength and victory but evidence of its weakness and the subjugation of its authority.¹¹⁵ The second critical article¹¹⁶ of that category examined the legal and moral problem of the "good trick" (*bon tour*) which satisfied public opinion, and argued that French Socialists were wrong to act in that manner.¹¹⁷ He recommended some mitigating action such as the non-prosecution of those rebels arrested to get out of the situation.¹¹⁸

However, the opposition to the operation covered in this forum was followed by expression of support, of views in favour of the operation. The line of argument taken by the two above writers in *Le Monde* was soon to be followed by similar articles which argued strongly in the opposite direction. One of the most significant articles was written as a reply to A. Phillip by M. Debré.

In the same "Libre Opinion" column, M. Debré, then Senator for the Indre-et-Loire,¹¹⁹ gave his own interpretation of what Morality,¹²⁰ Right¹²¹ and Honour¹²² were. These obviously led to a justification of the arrest and a condemnation of the

enemies of France: the rebels and those who undermined French interests and rights. On all three grounds he condemned the attitude of Morocco and Tunisia who showed, in his eyes, a failure to keep their promise and a readiness to lead an anti-French operation.¹²³ The arrest of the nationalist leaders was equated with the defence of Algeria, and to defend Algeria was, for him, a patriotic task, a legitimate national activity, an expression of morality, right and honour.

*Morale, droit, honneur, tout contribuait à pousser ces fonctionnaires, ces militaires et ces ministres à agir comme ils l'ont fait. C'était même pour eux une obligation. Et en tant que serviteurs de l'Etat, ils ont donné un exemple aux dirigeants comme aux citoyens(..).*¹²⁴

Although Debré accepted that the failure of the French leaders to provide a programme of reforms, on the basis of which France could maintain its influence and its mission, he legitimised the arrests on the basis of the "right to serve the motherland" (*le droit de servir sa patrie*).

Examining the paper over the period, the prevailing view that one obtains from reading the different articles and editorials is that the event was more or less acceptable and that the French government had apparently acted in a legitimate fashion. The paper did, however, through letters and free opinions, provide a forum for debating issues (thus including views for and against the operation), and some of the ideas expressed within that forum were in no way similar to those of *Le Monde*, (as the arrest seemed to have been condoned by the paper). The only slightly sarcastic note came from R. Escarpit's column, *Au jour le jour*, which he entitled <<Das Ist Krieg>>.¹²⁵ This small comment of the day, which basically criticised the means but not the aim, did not want to examine

international law, deontological codes nor political opportunities and implications, but sought instead to "please his Muslim friends" in stating:

*Ils ont au moins remporté cette victoire sur les Français, qu'ils les ont amenés à considérer sans honte, ni horreur, des méthodes qu'ils croyaient avoir depuis longtemps dépassées.*¹²⁶

Even in April of the following year, *Le Monde* did not see the arrest of Ben Bella and his colleagues as a kidnapping. Reporting on the international commission of lawyers being instituted and due to meet to discuss the "diversion" (*déroutement* sic.) of the plane, the paper stated that the lawyers were chosen à titre personnel and would have to consider in strict legal terms "the conditions in which the aircraft of Air Atlas-Air Maroc took to Algiers instead of Tunis the five leaders of the Algerian rebellion".¹²⁷

The nationalist leaders arrested always refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of their arrest or answer any questions put to them by magistrates. The latter was not put to the readers until over a year later.¹²⁸ Their request for political status was ignored by the government and journalists of *Le Monde* alike until the regime of their detention was slightly better. When the conditions were slightly improved (half way between criminal and political) this was thought to be exceptional.¹²⁹

6.6. Conclusion

The picture of the FLN that emerges through the reports of *Le Monde* is a negative one. They were seen as bandits and criminals, extremists and intransigent, cruel and uncompromising. They were also portrayed as anti-democratic and alienated from the rest of public opinion in Algeria and abroad, finding

no sympathisers and acting in contradiction even with those that might have been helpful to their cause. Despite their acknowledged strengths, they were described as having many weaknesses. Their inability to lead the country was made very clear by the paper which had no sympathy for the leaders, perceived to be involved in constant squabbles. The bias against the leaders, whose collegial leadership was not seen as a democratic feature, appears clearly during the hi-jacking of aircraft transporting those who might have been the negotiators of a peaceful settlement.

CHAPTER SEVEN
7. THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
7.1. Introduction

In order to understand the positions of the paper towards the various sections of the population that were affected by the Algerian war, it is useful to examine the paper's coverage of the issues in which they were involved, looking at aspects which received scant attention in Lebrazi's survey (1987).¹

Such an examination would help establish whether some trends or patterns can be identified in the content of the various articles and reports. It would also help us grasp more clearly what attitude the paper adopted towards the various sections involved, what sympathies, if any, it had for certain ideas and views, what conceptions it disliked.

The coverage of the civilian population was examined in depth by Lebrazi (1987), who dealt with both the "Europeans" (*colonisateurs*) and the Algerians (*colonisés*). But many aspects were left untouched. It is therefore essential to explore this coverage further, to survey the way in which the various sections of the population were reported in the paper to see if an inherent bias, or explicit support, may be identified.

7.2. The Settlers

7.2.1. European views, an inherent dominance

One of the dominant features of *Le Monde's* coverage was the space given to the views of the settlers, despite the claims of the *virage* of *Le Monde* made by Firchon.²

It is clear throughout Algerian colonial history that the European settlers could form and join political parties without difficulty, and that they had newspapers which could express their wishes and opinions. Their views and opinions could be articulated, whereas those of the indigenous Algerian popula-

tion could not be. This was especially the case if they displayed any nationalist tendencies. The few "emancipated" Algerians who joined the "European" parties would have had to play by the rules of these parties and conform to their ideologies. Both rules and ideologies were hardly going to challenge the existence of the colonial order. Parties likely to do that had to be of a specifically Algerian nature. As far as these were concerned, their history is chequered with phases of illegality, name changes -internment of leaders and members alike- as soon as the established order appeared to be questioned. In any case, most of these parties were disbanded. Needless to say, the means of expression at their disposal, and especially the few newspapers which expressed some opposition to the established order, were also outlawed.³

The only coherent body of opinion given access to public opinion and political decision-makers in France was that known as the colonial lobby. This affected all decisions relating to Algeria and prevented the implementation of any liberal measures, like the 1936 Blum-Violette⁴ and the 1947 Statutes.⁵ As far as the Algerians were concerned, the only body of opinion coming out of Algeria that could express itself was that constituted by those people chosen to represent (besides the Europeans) the "Muslim" community and who did not antagonise the government's official position.

7.2.2. A defence of settlers' views and interests

This inherent bias in general was reinforced by a disproportionate coverage given to it by *Le Monde*, which, after the 1954 uprising, continued to report the views of the settlers spokesmen⁶ and those of the colonial lobby through the statements and motions of their various groups, especially the right-wing

Le Monde noted, through the motions being discussed and the questions raised in the Algerian Assembly, that there was a divorce between the First (European) College, expressing mostly colonial lobby's views, and most of those expressed by the delegates of the Second. A number of voices in the First College could also be heard in defence of the indigenous population and against government policy.⁸

There were occasionally balanced reports in *Le Monde* of what went on in Parliament or in the Algerian Assembly.⁹ But what could easily be shown, apart from the frequency and abundance of European views expressed in the paper, is that when the views of this European minority were reported they were presented as being pervasive throughout the whole of society or, at least, as being the feeling of the majority.¹⁰

The Algerian population as a whole was not organised, in the sense that it did not have any authorised institution through which to articulate its demands.¹¹ What could be perceived more forcibly, among the opinions expressed in the paper, were the attitude and position of the settlers and their opposition to any kind of concessions; concessions which were seen as a threat to the French presence in Algeria.¹²

The worries of this minority constituted some of the most important concerns of the paper.¹³ From the different statements and attitudes, it may be readily deduced that *Le Monde* was concerned about the protection of life and property of the settlers, and about expressing their views and attitudes to the various political developments.¹⁴

The events of February 1956¹⁵ and the demonstrations that took place could help us illustrate uniquely the heavy bias in

favour of the Europeans which can be found in the paper.

Although the views of "Muslims" were included in *Le Monde's* general reports,¹⁶ far more space was devoted to reporting the views of the minority of European settlers above that allotted for their statements.¹⁷

Apart from the weight and the importance given to coverage of the Europeans' views, the content itself was quite revealing when the reader sees them at times presented by the paper as hard done by and abandoned. The image given of the European population at this decisive time (period of 6 February) was that of helplessness. It was also suggested that the fact that the Europeans felt abandoned¹⁸ explained why so many delegations had been to Paris to express their plans, to warn or to explain "the real situation in Algeria".¹⁹

Amongst the multitude of opinions expressed (which of course included those in mainland France), ample space was also allotted to so-called liberals, such as J.Chevallier, who reacted against the proposed policies, especially the Single College, as well as similar opinions insisting on keeping Algeria French, yet requesting that some reforms and some concessions be made.²⁰

To other papers, which were more eager to emphasise the "Muslim side of things", *Le Monde* pointed out that the Socialists *ne peuvent s'étonner que le Président du Conseil ait été également frappé par le fait français* and that *la reconnaissance de l'un ne peut exclure le respect de l'autre*.²¹

Despite accepting that some might think the situation had gone too far,²² the paper maintained that the situation was calm and that all was not yet lost.²³

The margin of manoeuvre was described by Fauvet as narrow-

ing²⁴ by the day between the French who want "to send the fleet to Alexandria and the Muslims determined to ask for their national identity",²⁵ thus leading to a loss of common ground.²⁶ However, only one or two journalists sensed the extreme gravity of the events and assessed accurately the government's surrender to street pressure.²⁷

7.2.3. A shifting of responsibility

Although a strong position was taken against the anti-Mollet demonstration²⁸ and concern expressed that the "game was rigged", the settlers themselves did not take much of the blame. Chênebenoit blamed the government itself for announcing the visit in advance, thus depriving it of its element of surprise.²⁹

The paper did not really put the blame squarely on the settlers, and the overall assessment of 6 February played down considerably the significance of events and the surrender of the government to the streets.³⁰ This assessment (of this total surrender) was further weakened by a poor appreciation of the impact and by an evident desire to play things down even by the shrewdest of journalists.

P. Minay, who was to question whether there was not a reversal of policy,³¹ concluded that the events were the work of "kids". He thought the number of victims (14) "low" but that the demonstrations, which had been swept by an "undetermined or spontaneous ground swell",³² would have a lasting memory.

Despite the above uncertainty as to the cause of the outburst, the journalist stated more or less adamantly that the demonstrations were the work of youths, and amongst them a great number of students.³³ Later *Le Monde* even published a reader's letter reinforcing that point of view. The reader, a

teacher who said he attended the demonstrations, described the demonstrators as between thirteen and twenty years of age, many of them pupils playing truant (having deserted their classes with the complicity of their parents), whom he said he had tried to direct towards occupations or activities more in tune with their age, but had failed. The teacher also complained that teaching had become difficult in Algiers:

Enfants dont l'assurance n'a d'égale que la méconnaissance d'une situation très complexe et à qui l'on a donné le sentiment qu'ils ont sauvé l'Algérie en descendant dans la rue.

*J'ai entendu des bambins de l'école communale hurler à la mort d'un vieux général qui a servi en Afrique du Nord avant que les parents de certains manifestants y débarquent.*³⁴

This procedure of trivialising the responsibility of the settlers illustrate the unwillingness of the paper to subject them to criticism. It is evidence of bias which tends to reveal certain sympathies or affinities for a particular groups' interests. Further, evidence of this can be seen in the coverage of the student community.

7.3. The student community and the Algerian Question

Traditionally, the student community in France is one of the most politicised sections of the population. The main Union, UNEF, created at the turn of the century, saw its membership increase five-fold in the fifty years of its existence.³⁵

Student organisations could not escape from becoming involved in the serious problem which their country was encountering. The left-wing section in the UNEF main student body progressed from a minority position to take control of the organisation. The Algerian question became a dominant topic of debate around 1957.

7.3.1. The students' splits over Algeria and the support of simplistic neutralism

Le Monde announced that splits threatened the student body UNEF.³⁶ The newspaper seemed to favour the adoption of a neutralist stance by the Union over Algerian matters as it listed several (regional) organisations, which expressed their disagreement (*désolidariser*) with the "office" of the Union, whose intentions represented "a break away from the apolitical stand" (*apolitisme*).³⁷

It seems rather simplistic that the paper should consider this as a debate between politicising the Union and keeping politics out of it, as opposed to two conflicting political conceptions, views and philosophies.³⁸

The neutralist stance is also surprising because it seems to play down the fact that the students might have had a real political grievance against the state.³⁹ Here, also, it seems paradoxical that the question of the Algerian desire for independence, and the attempt to stop the continuous use of certain methods by the army and police, were considered and treated as a political question (when it was a simple matter of criminal activity in Algeria even in the pages of *Le Monde*).

7.3.2. Minority views receive a better coverage

What is noticeable about the coverage of this episode by *Le Monde* is that substantial attention was devoted to opponents of the majority in the union, giving the impression that the main thrust of the Union work had no sympathy in public opinion.

Although the University was presented as favourable to the Union,⁴⁰ in general, the opposition of the Mayor of Paris, M Ruais, and others to the line followed by the Union was more than over-represented,⁴¹ as were the views of ex-members of the

UNEF, such as Le Pen.⁴² Outside support clearly seemed to weigh heavily in favour of personalities opposed to the Union majority. But so did the coverage of the congress itself.

Expressing regret over the absence of some faces⁴³ when reporting the UNEF congress, *le Monde* described it as concerned with the limitations of *apolitisme*,⁴⁴ and treated the question very lightly in terms of a "family quarrel".⁴⁵

When commenting on the split of the Union,⁴⁶ *Le Monde's* sympathies seem to have been with the minority view. It was in July 1956, wrote Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, that the majority changed over,⁴⁷ with the European students of Algiers leaving the movement as well as most of the "Muslim" and overseas delegates breaking away from it:

*faute d'avoir obtenu d'elle une impossible (my
ital) approbation de la rebellion nationaliste....*⁴⁸

From the outset there seemed to be an attempt to define and present this problem as an even split between two conflicting currents, whereas in fact two thirds of the Union were solidly in favour of the politicised stand being taken.⁴⁹

Much more emphasis was placed on the issue of the split. One has the impression that too much was given to the issue, and especially to the position of (Europeans) students from Algiers. Much was made (on the basis of rumours) of splits which were somewhat exaggerated -with the impact of strengthening the views of the minority over those of the majority,⁵⁰ giving a general impression of an even split.

The impression of a split was reinforced in an article of 27 April, when the paper wrote that a few hours before the end of the debates, the outcome of the Algerian question, the last point on the <<agenda>>, was still uncertain. The paper repor-

ted that a good offices commission was still trying to conciliate between

les positions des deux tendances sur lesquelles se partagent les congressistes.

Aware that a majority was still in favour of drafting the letter to Mollet to protest against the <<exactions>> of the security forces and to recommend a peaceful solution to the conflict, on the basis of hearsay *Le Monde* reported that a strong minority (about twenty associations) was ready to leave the Union because of this proposal, thought to be unacceptable for an apolitical movement, or to propose as a last resort a text expressing the students' desire to see human rights respected but without favouring any political move.⁵¹

Wondering whether a reconciliation was still possible,⁵² *Le Monde* gave disproportionate coverage to the minority⁵³ and overstated the Algiers Students' case.⁵⁴

Then, as in previous articles, *Le Monde* continued to give an inordinate amount of coverage to the views of the Algiers delegation, in spite of the fact that it was only represented by its president, M. Jean Gautrot, who merely had guest status at the conference.⁵⁵ *Le Monde* presented the Algiers group as having acted in the name of *patriotisme*.⁵⁶ It had certainly done a good publicity job for them in airing their views and making them heard.⁵⁷

The paper was even sorry that the debates of the congress on the overseas territories *risquent d'être pénibles* and would give the impression that the students of mainland France were abandoning their Algiers comrades.⁵⁸

7.3.3. Weaker Support for Algerian Students

If the bias in favour of minority views, here essentially those of the Europeans in Algeria, continued,⁵⁹ this did not mean that the sympathetic coverage of "Muslim" students could not be found in the paper.⁶⁰

Le Monde echoed news of the arrests of various students and their leaders on occasions⁶¹ when it was made public or directly sent to the paper.⁶² But if it is true to say that there were some expressions of sympathy, there was indeed a sharp contrast with the way the paper dealt with the "European" students (above) as the views of the Algerians were very seldom heard.⁶³

7.4. The Catholic Church: a subject of interest for the paper

7.4.1. A natural link

The picture would not be complete without looking at another section of European population, or at least one of its important dimensions.

Le Monde seemed to share the concern of the Church as it published its findings and statements about Algeria.⁶⁴ But this did not constitute a very strong, antagonistic and politicised stand.

Because of the upbringing of the newspaper director, the Catholic tradition of France and the Church were always a subject of interest for *Le Monde*.⁶⁵ The interest given by the paper to Church questions was amply demonstrated by the series of articles and even studies devoted to the Church, such as those of Georges Hourdin, explaining the state of the Church and examining a number of its aspects.⁶⁶

Le Monde's coverage included various statements by various organisations regarding Algerian issues throughout the con-

7.4.2. Appeals to and by the Pope

Papal pronouncements on the subject formed part of the reports of the newspaper. Statements by the Pope against torture were included in an encadré, reminding the readers of Pope Pius XII's statement to the Criminal Law International Congress of 1953.⁶⁸

The appeal of personalities to the Pope during the conflict were also given coverage, even if they had been published elsewhere.⁶⁹

7.4.3. Human face of the Church

As can be imagined, during the Algerian conflict, the Church was placed in a very difficult position. It represented the faith of the European dominating power but, at the same time, witnessed the many uncivilised aspects of the war which was waged by the army and the police. The claims of the civilising influence became more and more tenuous.⁷⁰

Although it denied the claims of the racial superiority of the Europeans⁷¹ and expressed sympathy for the suffering,⁷² the Church was reported mainly as not wanting to get involved in politics,⁷³ refusing to take sides,⁷⁴ and proscribing political pronouncements on the issue⁷⁵ even if some organisations denounced some of the atrocities.⁷⁶ Yet most of the reports erroneously portrayed the Church's position as divided.

7.5. The "Muslim" Community in Algeria

7.5.1 Introduction

Notwithstanding the analyses made elsewhere of *Le Monde's* treatment of the Algerian community in its news coverage and reporting, it is particularly illuminating to examine how *Le*

Monde covered the Algerian community at the time of the general strike of 1957. This was one of the most important features of the "popular struggle" within Algeria at the time when the question of Algeria was about to be tabled again at the UN. At the beginning of 1957, the FLN initiated an eight day general strike and a wave of civil disobedience requesting shopkeepers not to open their shops in protest against France, with the aim of highlighting the problem in the international arena where it was about to be debated.⁷⁷

7.5.2. Unfavourable reporting of the general strike

Although *Le Monde* was aware that the majority, if not all, of the traders intended to close their shops, it reported General Massu's *communiqué*, outlining his intention to open by force any shop found closed and not to protect the goods found inside, without objecting to this denial of one of the most basic rights.⁷⁸

Without bothering to outline the deep-seated reasons for the strike,⁷⁹ *Le Monde* not only reported it as being imposed by duress,⁸⁰ but it described it as provocative and likely to cause violence.⁸¹ Moreover, the paper played down the importance of the strike in France⁸² and in Algeria, where the participation was said to be very quickly falling.

For *Le Monde*, the Muslims were being ordered to go on strike and this constituted a "showdown of strength" (*épreuve de force*) in Algiers. Algiers was described as a city that was almost deserted and reported to be under an impressive silence.⁸³

On the third day of the strike, Mannoni reported that people were progressively going back to work either spontaneously or under "injunctions" from the army. The first areas of weakening

(*fléchissement*) were said to be in the commercial sectors.⁸⁴

Le Monde wrote in terms of "controlled coercion", of passivity of the workers.⁸⁵ But it was clear to *Le Monde* that Muslims were "hit hard" and knew that some of their colleagues in Algiers, Oran and Constantine had been sentenced to between a fortnight and six months in jail.⁸⁶

Yet, writing on the fourth day of the strike, *Le Monde* portrayed it as a success for General Massu, who was reported to have ensured that work restarted and that violent clashes between the two communities had been avoided.⁸⁷ The paper concluded that the strike was already losing its unanimity, a unanimity which, one should point out, had not been reported.⁸⁸

But was it simply because more Muslims could be seen?, asked *Le Monde*. The paper mentioned that the Belcourt youth had some "bitter confessions," but did not say what these were.⁸⁹ This was clearly a case of understatement when almost everybody that went to work was forced to do so.⁹⁰

What *Le Monde* was evidently keen to point out was that Algiers had not become the "little Budapest which some promised and others feared".⁹¹ Using the third person, *Le Monde* wrote that international observers might see the protest as "implacable" on Monday as it did when it started. They were now said to have noticed no violent reaction but could see signs of passivity and "lassitude".⁹²

The paper's reports seemed to be confused (by the strike and numbers of those striking). In spite of conceding figures of 98% success in the railways, and without bothering to ask for their opinion, the newspaper wrote that the organisers must be disappointed.⁹³

Despite some 98% administrative workers staying away, *Le*

Monde reported that the strike finished that day and was even considered to have been over the day before by the authorities⁹⁴ which were "loosening their grip" around the Casbah. The absence of traders in the shops, which remained open and empty (*Le Monde* had failed to indicate to the readers that these shops had been raided and looted of their goods and when this was done), demonstrated for the paper that the "*mot d'ordre*" had been followed until the end by some, even if this were not clearly visible from the outside.⁹⁵

The paper stated that the constant pressure of the army during the first three days of the strike (implying perhaps that there was none afterwards), the weariness of the poorest sections of the population, and the delay taken by the UN to examine the Algerian case, broke the *bloc sans fissure*⁹⁶ into what the paper saw as several categories.⁹⁷

On 4 February, *Le Monde's* special envoy reported that shops were still closed, workers were having their papers checked by soldiers in town and "rejoining their places of work".⁹⁸ And even then, an important number were still reported to be away⁹⁹ since the paper admitted that it did not know whether this was a week's strike or a complete eight-day strike.¹⁰⁰

Even when *Le Monde* seemed to attempt an objective assessment of the strike, its reports were most tendentious.¹⁰¹ One of the main reasons could be found in the sources which, even if they seemed varied,¹⁰² were not necessarily balanced.¹⁰³

Apart from the conclusions that can be drawn from the above, others can clearly be seen. Despite knowing the objectives of the strikers,¹⁰⁴ *Le Monde* did not recognise their pacifist intentions and the peaceful nature of the protest.¹⁰⁵

As seen above, the strike constituted from the beginning a

protest movement rather than a prelude to insurrection. This did not prevent *Le Monde* from being alarmed and even wondering whether any large scale action was being contemplated at the borders.¹⁰⁶

The paper continued to insist on length as being a major factor and to ask whether the length of the strike was excessive, whether the effort needed would be beyond the capabilities of a population, whose conditions were described as being difficult.¹⁰⁷

In the view of the paper, the FLN would not content itself with just one or two days' strike (which was never its intention) but was "trapped" by its own recommendation. It therefore had no choice but to persevere in order not to lose out at the last moment.

The preoccupations of the paper did not differ from those of the army as it was precisely the length of the strike which became the issue, and on which the authorities were relying to win over the Algiers populace (*la masse algéroise*).¹⁰⁸

The passive resistance of "Muslims" under special powers and emergency regulations to "injunctions" and military orders (as if civilians could offer any resistance to them when ordered to leave their home) was described as not being successful, even though the paper admitted that these "Muslims", having been forced to leave their homes, wandered aimlessly in the streets and that many were still refusing to go to the docks or to the firms where they were employed.¹⁰⁹

The paper played down the significance of events¹¹⁰ and even reported the strike as having no effect.¹¹¹ Moreover, the paper stated that the fact that the strike was over¹¹² "before the UN debate began" (now postponed) deprived it of its

impact.¹¹³

7.5.3. The under-reporting of the means used to break the strike

The paper also minimised the looting aspect during the strike. Although a number of settlers looted the "Muslims" shops which had been forcibly opened by the soldiers, *Le Monde* reported that these Europeans did so in a very few lines, from AFP press releases,¹¹⁴ when it did not imply that it was the work of Muslims themselves.¹¹⁵

Also, it was very clear that the looters received a better deal from the courts than the strikers [see below]. But *Le Monde* did not see fit to draw a parallel, or make any comparisons.¹¹⁶

When reporting the methods used to break the strike, *Le Monde* was guilty either of a disinformation campaign or, at the very least, of an attempt to play down the significance of the factors surrounding the strike.

The army's role was seen as that of broker, when *Le Monde* wondered about the possibility of the army intervening to intercede between the two *éléments crispés de la population*. And the special powers at the hands of Massu were seen as a possibility of diminishing the risk of intervention by "irresponsible elements".

Whatever the steps taken, they were presented as inevitable.¹¹⁷ For the paper, the threat of the strike "had forced the authorities to take exceptional measures to keep the peace".¹¹⁸ But the reality of the tension can clearly be seen as Mannoni commented that Algiers had not seen *une semaine aussi tendue et aussi calme*.¹¹⁹

Le Monde did not make a major issue of the military's role

in breaking the strike, or its repressive activity and the intimidations which the AFP press releases (published by *Le Monde*) had mentioned briefly. The paper noted "constant army pressure", but only during the first three days.¹²⁰

When the shops were (forcibly) "reopened" by the army, *Le Monde's* readers could not possibly be shocked by the "deafened sound of mallets".¹²¹

The army, however, did not hesitate to use heavy tactics to break the strike. Indeed, the methods used were so severe that they are believed to have done much to benefit the cause of the nationalist movement.¹²²

This was far from obvious from reading the reports of the newspaper.¹²³ Whereas Governor-General Lacoste had ordered that the strike should be broken at all costs and by any means,¹²⁴ most of the repression went unreported. *Le Monde* even implied that the army stood guard in front of gaping doors "opened" by the army, revealing abandoned stocks. Commander-in-chief Massu was reported as having softened his approach by stating that looters of "Muslim" shops would be prosecuted.¹²⁵

However, *Le Monde* did give a hint or two, though insignificant in the overall reporting of the strike, as to the way the army "opened" the doors of the "Muslim" shops: *ont été arrachées, enfoncées ou parfois simplement et plus habilement ouvertes*.¹²⁶ This did not prevent the paper from continuing to defend the authorities¹²⁷ and to offer them advice.¹²⁸

The paper finally gave the impression that everything was becoming normal again on the second day of the strike - with Algiers deserted in the morning experiencing its normal bustle in the afternoon (although the streets of the Casbah remained empty) and the Resident-Minister even going for a walk in

town.¹²⁹

In any case, *Le Monde* made a poor case of the sanctions taken against the strikers and the harsh measures used by the army to break the strike. The sanctions taken against the "Muslims" were reported in a laconic way,¹³⁰ played down and characterised as leading to confusion. Sometimes they were even justified.¹³¹

The harshness of the measures¹³² used by the army and reported much later by *Le Monde* did not push the paper to make any comment or take any position. The bias becomes evident when we discover the sympathy with which other strikes were reported.¹³³

7.5.4. Conclusion

It could be said that the coverage of the strike in many instances amounted to a mere campaign of disinformation¹³⁴ which the paper justified by a sense of "national discipline".¹³⁵

The severity of the problems encountered by Algerians was revealed much too late to have any real impact on the strike. It was only at the readers' initiative and under pressure from them that *Le Monde* corrected its record of the strike movement.¹³⁶ It was doing so, not as an objective piece of reporting, but by a process of conveying to the general readership contents of the letters that some of the readers had sent to it, with the odd comment added. The excuse given by *Le Monde* for not publishing these facts there and then ("at the time of the UN meeting") speaks for itself and illustrates the patriotic feeling and mood of the paper.¹³⁷

7.6. The Algerian Community in France

7.6.1. Introduction

If it could be conceded that the poor reporting of the Algerian community was due to the distance separating the paper from that community, then it would be reasonable to hope for a better coverage of it in France. *Le Monde's* coverage of the immigrants in France seemed to be very meagre but informative at times as to their situation.

7.6.2. A people deprived of status and identity

The terms used to refer to the various people involved is very significant. If the population of European extraction in Algeria was every now and then referred to as "Algerian" to distinguish it from the population of mainland France, that adjective was seldom used for the Algerians themselves who were called "Muslims", with reference to their faith. The settlers were not called Christians but Europeans. In France the "Europeans" remained the "Europeans" but the Algerians living in France were invariably referred to as "North Africans".¹³⁸

In the official jargon, the "Muslim" Algerians were called *Français musulmans*, which in a sense was true since the 1947 Statute made the Muslim community French legally but only on paper.¹³⁹

7.6.3. Human concern but little commitment

Algerian immigration started at the beginning of the century and went through various historical phases of development.¹⁴⁰

The reasons for immigration given were that it was essentially caused by a demographic evolution with which Algeria could not cope and which made it a necessity for that country in 1955.¹⁴¹

When it looked at the immigrants in the Paris area, *Le Monde*

reviewed the different phases of influx in the area of the *Goutte d'Or*, starting with the foundations of the market of La Chapelle in 1900.¹⁴²

Though there was interest in the immigrant community¹⁴³ and concern about their fate, there was no deep commitment towards them and the problems they encountered in their every day life, despite the fact that immigration of Algerians to France was officially encouraged by the French government.

Their living and working conditions were erroneously described as satisfactory,¹⁴⁴ when this was clearly not the case.¹⁴⁵

Describing them as different, some of the reports were less than complimentary.¹⁴⁶ Prostitution was seen there, more than anywhere else, as a necessary evil. Without it, it was stated, the young girls in the area "would feel during the day the fears that prevent them from going out at night".¹⁴⁷

The language and aspirations of the Algerian immigrant were seen as alien to French society¹⁴⁸ and at night even the campaniles of the *Sacré-coeur* took shades of a minaret. The *Rue des Gardes* was said to become a *Souk* where faces were marked by the same nostalgia -where, "like it or not..., passions can be born".¹⁴⁹ Algerians were given worrying characteristics¹⁵⁰ which invaded and threatened Parisian life.¹⁵¹

7.6.4. Immigration rife with gangsterism and rivalries

Another fundamental aspect of the coverage of the immigrant community in France was the internecine struggle between the FLN and the MNA¹⁵² as the fighting in Algeria was bound to affect that part of the community which had emigrated in France.¹⁵³

Le Monde wrote that passions were running so high that there was talk of mainland terrorism (*terrorisme métropolitain*).¹⁵⁴

The attacks on Algerian cafés by Algerian immigrants were reported as frequently as they happened throughout France.¹⁵⁵ Although the attacks only involved Algerians themselves,¹⁵⁶ the coverage was the least sympathetic. And despite accepting that it was erroneous to see fighting between nationalists simply as a struggle between "gangsters settling their accounts",¹⁵⁷ the paper treated them as such in most of its reports.¹⁵⁸

While some reports¹⁵⁹ of violent incidents (in Metz, for instance) were without any suggestions as to their causes,¹⁶⁰ the possible reasons for some attacks were gratuitously given as being possibly the failure to respect fasting in Ramadan.¹⁶¹ The most common explanation put forward by the paper for these attacks was racketeering for the nationalist organizations. This term was not without implications, and would obviously alienate them from any sympathy from the readership. The other possible cause given was the struggle between the two factions of the MTLD,¹⁶² which by then was entirely inaccurate.

It was only in March 1957 that other reasons were put forward for these attacks and the readers were told of the political connotations of the conflict between the "Muslims".¹⁶³ On this occasion some of the victims were said to be neutral people who (exceptionally) refused financial contributions to the nationalists, and some for refusing to strike during the debate in the UN (6 of the last 25 killed in the previous month of February) "*six ont payé de leur vie leur refus de faire grève à l'occasion du débat de l'ONU*".¹⁶⁴

Despite being aware that that most of the immigrant community was made up of peaceful citizens,¹⁶⁵ descriptions such as "gangsters" and "criminals" were quite common.¹⁶⁶ At times the paper insisted on the criminal aspect,¹⁶⁷ stating that crime

had never been as important nor as "tainted with politics." Though the political aspect was conceded in the thirty or so dead, numbered since January of that year, *Le Monde* could not quote one single non-political murder.

Although *Le Monde* could clearly establish that there were deep nationalist aspirations,¹⁶⁸ the nationalist organisations¹⁶⁹ were accused of being involved in heartless blackmail, starving the immigrants who did not lack the desire to escape the pressures that "leave them no choice between hunger and death".¹⁷⁰

The nationalist activities were not seen as a reaction but as an act of provocation (see also general strike).¹⁷¹ The mutism of victims and witnesses was reportedly not making the work of investigators easy.¹⁷²

The inability of the authorities and the paper to find the precise reasons for these attacks led to the conclusion that there was complicity between the aggressors and the victims. It was as if *une loi étrange de silence semble lier agresseurs et agressés*.

Consequently, "North Africans" were described as unhelpful to the police forces in not providing them with information likely to ease efforts to find the culprits, whether out of collusion with the attackers or in fear of reprisals.¹⁷³

7.6.5. Silent victims?

The silence of victims and assailants alike was confirmed in an instance in Paris when police inspectors came to pick up a dead body. The journalist wrote that "justice without appeal had been rendered according to the brothers of the victims", and the police were unable to obtain the information they needed.¹⁷⁴

Very few complaints to the police were noted (5 complaints in 2 years) as when the time came to sign statements or identify assailants all the witnesses retracted their statements. Whether motivated by "fear" or as "reflex," Algerians did not involve the authorities officially and were said to be playing into the hands of "bandits".¹⁷⁵

7.6.6. Favourable presentation of repressive measures

Though, as we saw earlier, there were very few cases of criminal activity per se, huge repressive measures were taken by the security forces in France.

The "terrorist" activities of immigrants in France led to severe measures of repression being adopted. Arrests sometimes were made for the most trivial reasons, such as being in possession of a large sum of money.¹⁷⁶ The motive for the arrests ranged then from collection of funds¹⁷⁷ to failing to register their lodgers, as far as some landlords were concerned.¹⁷⁸ If some were jailed for carrying guns, leaflets¹⁷⁹ or even a knife,¹⁸⁰ some were arrested simply for not having papers or being without a job.¹⁸¹ News of these arrests were frequently brought to the attention of the readers.

Despite this most extreme form of harassment¹⁸² which was often done exclusively on the basis of race or "skin colour" (as these people looked, and lived in areas that were, different from the majority of Frenchmen), the checks operated by the police were presented as being normal and necessary, and the fact that very few arrests were made for possession of firearms, as opposed to the huge number of people questioned and searched, did not seem to prompt the paper to any critical examination of the strategy and the tactics of the police.

In other words, the climate of fear and insecurity which

characterised the Algerian community in France was in no way the concern of the paper, other than when it was caused by their compatriots. On many occasions, it saw the intervention and the activities of the police as perfectly legitimate. The fears of, and intimidation by, the police themselves were simply not perceived by the paper -they simply did not exist.¹⁸³

The measures taken against the immigrants were not limited to harassment and arrest. Some were deprived of their livelihood.¹⁸⁴ Even the right to demonstrate, the right to parade on labour day (1st May) were denied to the Algerian workers.¹⁸⁵

The various powers adopted and legal measures taken against the Algerians (still called North African although there was no need for any activity by the Moroccans or Tunisians as the two countries had gained their independence in 1956) were put under a favourable light and portrayed in a sympathetic way.¹⁸⁶ Sometimes they were even justified¹⁸⁷ and, despite the severity of sanctions and sentences alike, they were presented as too lenient.¹⁸⁸

Needless to say, *Le Monde* had hardly a word of protest against these obviously excessive measures and the harsh treatment to which the immigrants were subjected.¹⁸⁹ News of the community suffering never seems to have been reported by the paper until it was seen under a better light.¹⁹⁰

7.6.7. Conclusion: a better life in France?

What was more ironical, in a sense, about the coverage of the immigrants by the paper was that, despite the bad treatment, the repressive measures and the poor living conditions (which made living in France for an immigrant far from ideal),

the paper perceived their conditions as having been a very positive thing -as the Algerian worker is said to be "privileged" during his stay which changes the worker completely when he returns home.

*il devient plus exigeant à l'égard de sa famille, plus revendicateur sur le plan social. Sensible aux égards dont il a été l'objet en France, il supporte mal d'être traité différemment dans son village.*¹⁹¹

This was done without the paper putting any evidence forward in respect of this "privileged position," except for mentioning that the Algerians had priority over other immigrants. The paper was aware that they were not considered, legally, to be French nationals and that this preferential treatment in terms of employment was more fictitious than real, as they were the first to suffer the consequences of an economic downturn.¹⁹²

If the kind of treatment and life outlined earlier in this section were said to be equivalent to privilege, what could be said about the treatment of Algerians in Algeria, and about *Le Monde's* reports being close to reality?

The Algerian community on both sides of the Mediterranean was deprived of a national status and was subjected to a hard repressive regime without the paper springing to its defence or recognising its legitimate interests. On the contrary, the paper accentuated the inherent dominance of the views of the European minority in Algeria and even on the mainland, when its interests were at stake in the UNEF students' forum.

7.7. Conclusions

This section has illustrated clearly the coverage of the protagonists through the pages of *Le Monde*. The army was seen favourably by opposition to the FLN. Trying to do their best, with barely sufficient means, the troops were portrayed as boyscouts and the nature of the conflict played down. By contrast, the image of the FLN, unlikely to be popular in France, was made to look even less attractive, through the emphases put by *Le Monde* on characteristics less likely to endear them with French readers.

The bias seen in favour of some communities in relation to others makes it clear that there was a "right side" to be on throughout the conflict. Aspects deliberately played down, others exaggerated, gave a coloured picture of the protagonists to the readers who would have been less capable of understanding the Algerian cause, let alone sympathising with it.

SECTION THREE: THE SOLUTIONS

COLONIALIST ANSWERS TO DECOLONISATION QUESTIONS

SECTION THREE: THE SOLUTIONS COLONIALIST RESPONSE TO A DECOLONISATION PROBLEM

8.0 Introduction

The aim of this section, apart from outlining its general coverage of Algerian matters in relation to the various governments, is to determine whether or not *Le Monde* fought against government policies -policies which were designed almost exclusively to keep Algeria French and resist the independence movement.

The need for this section is made even more crucial, in view of the antagonism between the government of G.Mollet and *Le Monde*¹ and the claim made by many (editors of the paper and journalists alike) that this opposition, as well as the various assaults on the paper, were essentially due to the progressive views of the paper on the Algerian question. This implies, when is not asserted openly,² that in conformity with its principles and philosophy, *Le Monde* was at loggerheads with government policy over Algeria.

This task can best be achieved by examining the paper's coverage of the various governments and their policy pronouncements in relation to specific Algerian issues. We will examine *Le Monde's* coverage of the different governments and Governor-Generals and the response of the paper to their programme and to their views and perceptions. We will seek to highlight the differences, if any, over specific issues, and determine to what extent the views put forward by the journalists themselves were in concordance with government policies, whether

the journalists adopted a supportive line, or whether their views and positions sought to undermine government positions as well as deconstruct and criticise them. In either case, the procedures used by the paper and its discourse will be highlighted. In the scrutiny of articles and editorials, we will look for praise and criticism of government views and the recurrent themes developed throughout. The three periods covered, correspond to the three governorship of R.Léonard, J.Soustelle and Y.Lacoste. Some consideration is also given to the journalists' discourse itself and that of the intellectuals in the following two Chapters (9 and 10 respectively).

CHAPTER EIGHT
8. AN OVERALL DEFERENCE TO THE AUTHORITIES

8.1. The last years of Roger Léonard (1951 1955)

8.1.1. Official coverage

Since *Le Monde* tried to distinguish itself from its predecessor, claiming total independence from political parties and financial groups,³ it may seem somewhat surprising to find that the paper devoted a very substantial part of its coverage to official reports and pronouncements.⁴ This is only an apparent contradiction, as the official coverage represents a large part of any newspaper's content; and major statements by politicians, especially those in power, occupy very prominent positions in the medium. But a potential danger arises if these official statements and declarations are not assessed critically (which was often the case), as they provide major themes of debate and a source of information for the reader.

In 1954, Algeria, itself, did not represent a major issue for the paper.⁵ It made the front page only at times of catastrophes.⁶ *Le Monde* did, however, gather news of the "official" political debate in or about that country.

Faced with the inaction and the lack of initiative of people in power, Algerian "Muslim" delegates started urging reforms and changes in the structure of the system in Algeria.⁷

Interestingly enough, the desire of the government not to have an Algerian problem on their hands was also conveyed in the paper.⁸

Exaggerated emphasis was given to the elections in Algeria,⁹ despite their relative insignificance for the majority of Algerians.¹⁰ When reporting Algerian elections, *Le Monde* was frequently neither analytical nor very critical.¹¹

This kind of superficial and non committal coverage of the paper was typical of that period and it extended to many spheres of reporting.¹²

Given this superficial coverage, Algeria seemed unaffected by the problems experienced in the two neighbouring countries (Morocco and Tunisia). It was hardly surprising that public opinion in France had been lulled into a false sense of security and passivity so that it was completely taken by surprise by the outbreak of violence on 1 November 1954.¹³

8.1.2. The Outbreak of Violence and the Government response

Le Monde of 2 November 1954 announced on its front page the "extension of terrorism" to Algeria, which, until then, "seemed threatened only in its Eastern part". Although the paper was "led to believe", because of the "spontaneity of the attacks" in a "concerted action" it, nevertheless, gave prominence to the Ministry of the Interior's *communiqué* stating that the attacks had been committed by "isolated individuals", that troops were on their way, and that for the majority of the population: *le calme règne*.¹⁴

Needless to say, the official reactions echoed by *Le Monde* all treated this uprising as work of "terrorists" and "bandits" who should be punished "without mercy." And from a very early stage, the solution advocated was to crush the rebellion and, given the population growth and the stated economic deprivation in the country, to introduce economic and social measures with time.¹⁵

The official discourse represented an important part of the paper's coverage.¹⁶ The travelling of officials and politicians as well as their activities, meetings or speeches continued to be reported.¹⁷ The great majority of reports were invariably based on official statements.¹⁸

Parliamentary debates on Algeria (and incidents in the Assembly)¹⁹ were reported, so were written questions (*demandes d'interpellation*) to the government and the different motions voted in its favour. But it was the official statements²⁰ which dominated by far the content of the medium's discourse throughout the first few months of the crisis. The news, in this sense, amounted to the official *communiqués*.

8.1.3. Predominance of official communiqués

At this stage most of *Le Monde's* reports took the form of *communiqués* of government officials giving their version of the events and policies. The declarations by the Minister of the Interior and the Governor-General were the most significant at this stage, and lengthy quotes of Mitterrand's²¹ statements or speeches could be found regularly in the paper.²² No doubt the *communiqués* were also used to deny other versions of events given by other sources (which *Le Monde* had not previously reported), and which might have been gaining credence.²³

The view given through these *communiqués* presented the population as being neutral, passive, and living in fear of "the terrorists".²⁴ Two clear trends seemed to dominate the envisaged solution of the Algerian problem: reform and repression.

8.1.4. Recommending a policy of selective repression

With the understanding that this was a rebellious act which did not have any justification, and given the account of the

situation put forward to the readers, the paper recommended punishing the "rebels".²⁵

However, repression of the insurgents was to be a selective process for some of the journalists. From the very start, P.A.Martel stressed that repression was necessary, but that it should not be indiscriminate.²⁶ This position was reinforced by other viewpoints.²⁷

This insistence on selective repression did not in any way mean that the paper implied that the army's activities were excessive in any way. Two days previously²⁸ the paper was categorical about repression being selective.

8.1.5.A call for reforms

Coupled with the need to repress the terrorists selectively, other topics and trends started to appear more forcefully: the themes of reform, development, criticism of the system and the long-awaited application of the 1947 Statutes.²⁹ At times, such themes seemed to be abundant in the coverage of the paper. But it was more in the form of various groups' demands³⁰ than the paper expressing its viewpoint.³¹

Throughout 1954 *Le Monde* continued to echo most of the policies and decisions of reforms, as well as the reactions to them. The reports seemed to indicate that reactions to reforms were negative. A.Leveuf indicated that political circles expected Mitterrand's proposal to implement the provisions of the 1947 Statutes to "stay in their boxes" as long as order had not been restored.³²

There was also in his reports alleged surprise at the Minister's "haste." However, some personalities, it was reported, observed a "prudent reserve" and used neutral terms, whereas a number of "our compatriots find the moment badly chosen for the

implementation of the reforms".³³

In *Le Monde's* coverage, the most minor modifications were presented as major and very objectionable changes.³⁴ The idea conveyed was that the reaction should have been "to wait, and refuse any discussion under this violent threat".³⁵

Although it was stated that it was too early to have a complete picture,³⁶ it is clear from the reports that the opinions of a small but powerful minority were thought to be important.³⁷ These, for the most part, tended to reflect the view that these reforms would "appear as a real revolution for many".³⁸

The astonishment of Mitterrand, highlighted by the paper³⁹ in early 1955, at the objections formulated against reforms tending to give "the same rights to citizens of the same community" now becomes more understandable to the researcher. At the same time as criticism was expressed by the settlers' newspapers in Algeria which, as Leveuf reported, had concluded on a *sacrifié l'économique au politique*, it was emphasised by the paper that farming interests reacted violently against the reforms, and commented on *la fuite de M. Mitterrand vers un avenir inconnu, le dos tourné au présent*.⁴⁰ Despite the considerable importance given to the settlers' minority views, very little space or opportunity was given to the views of the majority of people living in Algeria, the Algerians, or as they were known in official terminology, the "Muslims".⁴¹

From what precedes, it becomes apparent that the opinion of the State and that of officials provided most of the coverage and constituted the majority of all the views reported to have been expressed on Algeria at the time. Because the paper had given considerably more coverage, and much more space, to the

settlers group, which was numerically smaller but predominant in terms of strength and political power,⁴² one would expect to find, for the sake of objectivity, some of the views expressed by this section of the population which had gone to war against France. Reports from nationalist sources were denied, and *Le Monde* did not even consider the possibility of interviewing any nationalists to give their version of the facts. The paper did, however, report, but somewhat less extensively, the reserve of the UDMA, the only legal "nationalist" (reformist and not independentist) group, which, although concurring with the need for economic development, was still concerned by the insufficiency of the measures taken overall.

8.1.6. Imminent fall of Mendès-France: a defence of the government

This is not to say that when it needed to express an opinion, the paper did not do so. The threat of the collapse of P. Mendès-France's government, attacked by the MRP and the Moderates, brought at least some of the journalists out in the open. J. Fauvet himself put pen to paper in a leader to advise Mitterrand and show the legitimate side of the proposals:

*Ce sera à M. Mitterrand de rappeler que les mesures proposées ne visent qu'à appliquer la loi, c'est à dire le Statut de 47. Si l'on refuse d'aller un peu plus en avant dans la voie de l'intégration de l'Algérie à la France, veut-on reculer vers la ségrégation?*⁴³

He reminded the readers that the unanimous stand of the "Muslim" delegates of the Second College in favour of equality of duty and rights, *ne peut pas ne pas frapper l'Assemblée Nationale.*

The next day, it was M. Duverger who, in *Le coup de l'Indochine*, defended the government and its policy in North Africa

against the Right and the MRP: *les conjurés de la droite et du MRP veulent faire à P.M.France, comme il l'a fait à Laniel* (leader article).

He violently accused the government critics of being at the root of the current problem in Algeria, and the initially lukewarm attitude of the paper was suddenly transformed into a firm stand.

*Qui a fermé les yeux sur les violations du Statut de l'Algérie, sur le truquage des élections, sur l'absence de politiques sociales, causes réelles des difficultés présentes? La droite avec la complicité du MRP.*⁴⁴

"They want to put an end," he continued, "to the policy of the government, to start again a policy of prestige for France".

"The fall of the government," he concluded, "would necessarily lead to the end of the experience of <<pacification>> undertaken in North Africa" and "would lead the government to embark again on a policy of force which would lead in the end to the loss of those territories essential for our prestige (*rayonnement*) in the world".⁴⁵ The strong position taken by *Le Monde* did not seem to be spurred on by the reforms themselves, but by the possibility that the government might be defeated and that blood would be shed.

His last plea was to the deputies of the MRP, hoping that some of them would hesitate at the last moment and

penseront à tout le sang que leurs bulletins de vote risquent de verser.

8.1.7. Recommendations for a solution

As regards French options in Algeria, the paper stated (the next day) that admittedly:

Le devoir de la France consiste à nourrir cette population en croissance constante car un homme n'a rien à perdre quand il ne possède rien.⁴⁶ Ce qui est le cas pour de nombreux Algériens.

When the paper clearly acknowledged the degree of dispossession and poverty existing in Algeria, it seemed to have done so to oppose Mendès-France's adversaries.⁴⁷

8.2. Soustelle's episode 1955- 1956

8.2.1. Expression of reserve, then support, for the new Governor-General

Upon receiving news of the appointment of Soustelle,⁴⁸ *Le Monde* first adopted a prudent reserve towards the new appointee, a Socialist member of Parliament and a local councillor in Lyon (Rhône),⁴⁹ reporting the various reactions of political circles before expressing its whole-hearted support of the appointment.

After having informed its readers of the appointment in large letters,⁵⁰ *Le Monde* proceeded to carry a few favourable reports in the press on the hope of "Muslim circles" and the "reserve" of the First College,⁵¹ before going on to cover his arrival,⁵² and his views that "Algeria was only going through a growth crisis".⁵³

In the paper reports critical of the two colleges, and of his nomination followed. It was pointed out that this was not to him as a person, but to the policy of the government, since the solution preferred was "outright repression of terrorism".⁵⁴ However, this was really the "Europeans'" view, which P.A. Martel conveyed in his support for the nomination since he was in a very congratulatory mood;⁵⁵ and, as for his

predecessor, ample space was progressively devoted to his speeches and statements⁵⁶ as well as to his travels and visits.⁵⁷

8.2.2. A rejection of nationalism but an explicit acceptance of the need for reforms

Under Soustelle the official discourse was contemptuous of any Algerian nationalist or political dimension, and could not see the uprising as a struggle for freedom, emancipation and independence. This meant that that particular concept of the "troubles", which dominated the discourse, denied any political dimension or legitimacy to Algerian nationalism. This was the case for practically all the political statements and declarations made by officials and people in positions of power. And these constituted a great deal of *Le Monde's* coverage. The uprising was considered to be the work of "bandits" and "terrorists", who needed to be punished for their criminal activities. This was so in the official discourse⁵⁸ but, importantly, it was also the case in the paper's own discourse, exemplified by journalists such as Blanchet.⁵⁹ After "analysing" the sources of the disease, Blanchet found that it was not too late to remedy it.⁶⁰ Irrespective of others peoples' doubts and the salient facts,⁶¹ Blanchet was more than generous in terms of his advice on how to remedy the defects of the administration and how to win back the hearts of the indigenous population,⁶² even though his recommendations were often based on very shaky grounds.⁶³

The desire for reforms outlined during the previous governorship continued⁶⁴ with Soustelle.⁶⁵ The paper perceived an agreement between Paris and Algiers that they should be imple-

mented.⁶⁶ The official discourse reported dealt with public order and the use of the security forces, but also with the need to put an end to the unemployment and to the "misery".⁶⁷ This was present as much in the coverage of the official discourse as in the discourse of *Le Monde* itself. Other statements reported went as far in their reformist programme as to urge the government to introduce a liberal and reforming transformation of Algeria.⁶⁸

The recurrence of the theme and the space given to Soustelle's views showed that there was actual support for the policy followed and the solutions advocated which went beyond the mere reporting of official statements.

In other words, *Le Monde* still believed in the future efforts allegedly made in order to implement, albeit progressively, a law which had been on the Statute books for eight years. The paper was still underestimating the degree of resistance that different French governments faced in trying to implement any liberal measure in Algeria, especially these long-awaited 1947 Statutes.

Sympathetic reports were written about the Interior Minister, M. Bourguès-Maunoury, and the Governor-General's efforts to implement the programme of social and economic measures established by him.⁶⁹ On paper this looked positive and helped to convey the idea that something was being done in order to dissipate people's fears. In practice, however, nothing was done to resolve the crisis at hand.

The paper also discussed the measures proposed by the Governor-General,⁷⁰ but close examination of the text reveals that the only money released and quantified five billion francs⁷¹ was to be allocated to a house-building programme for the

gendarmerie.⁷² In fact, it expressed a different emphasis altogether, unless the *gendarmerie* were to be put in charge of the projects, which obviously was not the case. Was this simply a confusion on the part of the journalist trying to put different factors together in the same article? It seems unlikely. Or was it a deliberate attempt to disguise the investment of a large sum of money in military or paramilitary spending as an economic and social investment?⁷³ It is difficult to prove.

In any case, through statements like these, *Le Monde* proved to be a good medium for an uncritical propagation of the government programme.⁷⁴ When rectifications were made the loss of impact on the reader and the lack of critical weight are evident.

8.2.3. A case of fairness or duplicity?

As a "liberal" newspaper, *Le Monde* could be expected to be advocating reforms in Algeria throughout this period; and the paper did seem to favour some sort of reform as a solution of the Algerian problem.⁷⁵ However, these calls for reform, especially the more significant ones, were often weak, and offered a "diluted" view of what was needed.

Moreover, having opened its pages to the proponents of these reforms, *Le Monde* did not ignore their opponents' criticisms which were also given space in the same pages. The fact that the paper gave extensive coverage to the statements of politicians advocating reforms, while simultaneously covering the protests of their critics could be seen as a measure of evenhandedness and unlikely to reveal duplicity in the paper. However, suspicions are bound to arise, in the sense that the paper must have been aware of developments concerning decolonisation all over the world. It was evident that the paper conti-

nued to be blinkered in the new dawn of decolonisation, and was unable and unwilling to perceive that changes might have to be radical and rapid rather than piecemeal and gradual. Nevertheless, *Le Monde* continued to cover the Governor-General's programme and offered little criticism.

Indeed, *Le Monde* was more a proponent than a critic of the Soustelle programme, especially since it favoured most of the programme involving the implementation of the 1947 Statutes. In the same way as for the previous Governor-General, *Le Monde* echoed the economic and other measures being suggested, and the reforms that Soustelle was proposing without much criticism, if any.⁷⁶

8.2.4. The last days of Soustelle: considerable criticism but overall support

During his stay in Algeria, Soustelle slowly became one of the staunchest advocates of a French Algeria. He declared his intention not to "surrender to the rebels", to implement a policy of "reforms" and integration measures as the only solution to the problem. This was all reported by *Le Monde*, which pointed out his dislike for any form of federal government and for the phrase itself.⁷⁷

Commenting on a report the Governor-General had submitted to the Council of Ministers, J. Fauvet wrote of the "equality of rights and duties" which would lead to the fusion of public services and the unification of social security within six years, which involved sacrifices preferable to those that "might be incurred by the end of French Algeria."

Fauvet's article discussing the measures proposed⁷⁸ contained both praise and criticism, as in his view the proposals were mostly "clear and constructive," but also "dogmatic and

lacking precision" as to the number of Muslim deputies who would be elected (30-35 even up to 100).

The expected rift between the way in which the two communities would receive the proposals continued to be outlined. As usual, they were thought to be too much for one, and too little and too late for the other,⁷⁹ which they were, since the measures had already been accepted in the Statutes of 1947 but never implemented.

Subsequent articles were more in support of Soustelle.⁸⁰ When *Le Monde* denied news of the latter's resignation in the middle of January,⁸¹ it took the opportunity to reiterate his position and his refusal to talk to terrorists, despite rumours of negotiations. The next reports echoed Soustelle's imperative to inculcate the "absolute conviction" that France would remain in Algeria, highlighting the need to reestablish security, solve the fundamental economic, social and political problems and end the confidence crisis resulting from government hesitations.⁸²

The recurrence of the theme and the space devoted to officials like Soustelle indicate that the support within the paper for that kind of policy was real and went beyond the mere reporting of official statements. This can be clearly seen in the need to hold on to Algeria; and this can be identified in both the official and the paper's discourses.

8.2.5.A desperate need to hold on

The need to introduce reforms in Algeria, combined with the view that repression was necessary and should be undertaken, can be explained by the authorities' desperate need to hold on to Algeria.

The more numerous statements maintaining the stance seen

previously throughout 1954 were adamant as to what France's position was in relation to Algeria and about what its methods were going to be.⁸³ Various other pronouncements included those made by Prime Minister E. Faure⁸⁴ and incumbent ministers,⁸⁵ as well as former officials.⁸⁶ This continued to the end of Soustelle's reign, when the acceptance of some sort of Algerian identity was increasingly becoming acknowledged. The major theme was that it was in Algeria's best interests to remain French, and that a feeling should be instilled in the Algerian population that a future without France could bring nothing but misery to numerous families.⁸⁷

8.2.6. Journalists reproduce the official discourse

The view that Algeria should remain French, which underpinned the views of French politicians, was also shared by *Le Monde's* journalists. Just as in the official discourse, it seems unlikely that the journalists could have thought the resolution of the Algerian problem was possible outside a French framework. This common belief that Algeria's problems could not be solved outside a French framework, and, indeed, the desire to keep Algeria French, appear explicitly in the articles of the journalists themselves. It was illustrated in the various solutions proposed by journalists such as Blanchet (above) but also others such as Duverger and Fauvet (below) and Yves Florenne, who expressed his views quite openly, leaving no doubt as to what Algeria should be: "Algeria was and should be a French territory".⁸⁸ In his view Algeria had already been French, the Sahara remained to be made French.⁸⁹

By January 1956, André Fontaine (subsequently the director of the paper) was aware of the urgency needed and did not hide his frustration.⁹⁰

8.2.7. The replacement and departure of Soustelle

When the new administration took over and outlined its programme, *Le Monde* reported official news of new government appointments and reshuffles. The nomination of G. Mollet and his vote of confidence in the Assembly was the subject of front page coverage.⁹¹ At the time most commentators, including Fauvet⁹² and Duverger,⁹³ pointed out that Algeria remained at the heart of the debate.

As usual, the paper presented the official statement of the new administration while outlining the difficulties it faced. Having heard G. Mollet talk in his investiture statement about "recognising and respecting Algerian personality", R.Gauthier found it vague and reckoned that the next task of the government was to define it. But from what he had heard of the expressed view by Mollet and Catroux (see below), on the acceptance of an "Algerian identity", he did not see anything that would question the view already expressed by the paper and made some forecast of what this identity would be.⁹⁴

Understanding that Algeria's fate would not be determined unilaterally, and that the government programme included elections,⁹⁵ he thought that these would not be straightforward, as the Algerian press had come out against the Single College.⁹⁶

8.3. From Catroux to Lacoste: *Le Monde* and G.Mollet at loggerheads? a refutation of a received idea

8.3.1. A new Governor General is appointed

The new Governor General, Catroux, was presented as aware of the Europeans' pressure, but hopeful that he would still find enough representative personalities who would be acceptable⁹⁷ to the people who had not joined the "rebels," or lent them

their support.⁹⁸ The intentions and the intended policies of the new Governor-General were also outlined by *Le Monde*⁹⁹ together with the problems and the hostility facing him.¹⁰⁰

In general *Le Monde* highlighted the opposition of the European settlers to the new administration and its programme much more significantly than it did issues affecting the Algerians themselves.¹⁰¹

From the start *Le Monde* reported the regrets at the departure of Soustelle and the concern, felt by the "Moderates" and the *Républicains sociaux*, for the future following the appointment of General Catroux. However, it explained that they were always apprehensive about new initiatives overseas, before rallying to them.¹⁰²

Le Monde finally reported Soustelle's "last message" before his departure, stating that the demonstration in sympathy for Soustelle quickly degenerated into a demonstration of hostility towards Mollet and Catroux.¹⁰³ But Escarpit¹⁰⁴ was a little irritated by the "fetishism" he saw in the demonstrations of support for Soustelle.¹⁰⁵

The demonstrations and violence which irrupted during the visit of the new Prime Minister to Algeria (6 February 1956) were to lead to the resignation of General Catroux, which, *Le Monde* quickly and obediently acknowledged, might be beneficial in removing

*aux excessifs le moyen de creuser le fossé, aux
obsédés du fascisme le prétexte d'une mauvaise
besogne.*¹⁰⁶

Giving in to street pressure, G.Mollet substituted Robert Lacoste for the General. The paper thought that the new appointment would solve the problem in Algeria, but the only concern expressed was that it would also leave the government

with the difficulty, if no ministerial changes were made, of having to find a competent-enough replacement to take over his job.¹⁰⁷

There was, however, no defence of governmental position over the appointment of Catroux when opposition to Mollet from the settlers forced the government to back down over the appointment as the result of the 6 February 1956 demonstrations.

8.3.1. Attitude towards the new team

Mollet's government marked the start of the longest term of the Fourth Republic. While this government appeared very fragile in view of the opposition to its policy and accusations of "betrayal" expressed by the Committee of Public Safety on the one hand and the Muslim delegates' request for national recognition on the other,¹⁰⁸ most of *Le Monde's* articles and reports expressed support and confidence. Gauthier presented G. Mollet under a good light, as a discerning but determined leader.¹⁰⁹

The events of 6 February¹¹⁰ did not shake the confidence of the paper in Mollet, nor did they cause its support to waver. Hoping that Mollet might be able to save the situation, Chênebenoit urged support for him.¹¹¹ He thought that the affair started badly, but was confident that the majority of French people and MPs in Parliament would not keep up this "destructive snub".¹¹²

Needless to say, in reporting the statements of G. Mollet, *Le Monde* gave more weight to them when it was arguing that he might be the only one to have all the facts in order to make a judgment.¹¹³

Mollet's coverage after his appointment became more prominent and the treatment his statements received was increasingly

favourable in tone. Even early reports showed him as sincere, patiently searching for the truth in a background of violent speeches made by those who "have taken it upon themselves" to find the "salvation of Algeria".¹¹⁴

Apart from the confidence expressed in him, Mollet's speeches and broadcasts asserting the French will to remain in Algeria became prominent.¹¹⁵

8.3.3. Lacoste: the "last hour" slogan becomes widespread

Although aware of the difficulties he would be facing,¹¹⁶ *Le Monde* gave an overall positive coverage of the new Governor-General, Lacoste, and soon presented him as having a reformist perspective. His trips and speeches inside and outside the National Assembly were always reported by the paper as well as government decisions on North Africa.

The positions taken by Lacoste also began to feature more prominently in the reports, asking for discipline on behalf of everyone to maintain Algeria French and help safeguard the "prosperity" of the country.¹¹⁷

The view offered by the paper was not dissimilar to the government's line. The official version was easily accepted by the paper since, as before, there was a heavy reliance on official statements and versions of events.¹¹⁸

Lacoste's slogan of the "last hour," widespread in official and military circles, was adopted as a headline in the paper before becoming widespread in public opinion.¹¹⁹ M. Lacoste continued to be reported as wishing to reestablish order from the outset and to implement social reforms.¹²⁰

8.3.4. Articles justified and excused the government

At the end of Mollet's premiership two tendencies became

apparent in the paper. While some articles became more critical, many of the reports and the comments made by journalists justified as well as excused government inaction.

Absolving the government in its assessment of what needed to be done in Algeria, J Fauvet wrote that most of the deputies had thought that the government had given itself until the following UN session to solve the Algerian problem, or at least "define a solution for it", and that a series of events (some of which were linked to the rebellion itself) had "thwarted" its plans.¹²¹ Fauvet noted that "many" thought it inappropriate or inopportune to act without awaiting further developments from Cairo.¹²²

The reforms, which were apparently to be implemented, never materialised. There was even an article justifying their non-implementation, stating that their early introduction would have resulted in failure.¹²³

Although most of the articles of *Le Monde* presented the good side of government policy, with favourable reports or comments by journalists offering the reader a view of the question not dissimilar to the one the government would have wanted to propagate, every now and then there was an occasional nudging of the government, with some of the journalists clearly putting forward the view that the *status quo* could not be prolonged. Much less frequently, there was also an outburst by a contributor or journalist who, aware of the economic plight of Algeria, did not mince their words and clearly questioned the government's action (or rather inaction).¹²⁴ However, overall it was left to people and places outside the paper to take a more critical line on government administration and policy, except for criticisms occasionally published in the *Libre Opinion's*

columns.

8.3.5. Real but ineffective criticism

Most of *Le Monde's* reports either used an army background or were a mere reproduction of a "digested" (and accepted) official version; and although *Le Monde* perceived the alternatives facing the French government in Algeria, it did not provide any perceptive answer. When Mannoni put the question in terms of "Reforms or a free Algeria?", he did not commit himself to any answer.¹²⁵

Criticism was beginning to emerge, even though it was not very penetrating. Nevertheless, Fauvet advised that the time had come to re-examine the problems of North Africa as a whole and their developing international implications, and to go beyond *déclarations et appels passés du gouvernement*.¹²⁶ He did not see in what direction, nor how fast, it should proceed.¹²⁷

Sometimes, however, particular reassurances were unconvincing and seemed to betray an acute awareness of the real political questions.¹²⁸ When a political solution seemed to be so close to being accepted, invariably the fears of the administration were always present and clearly expressed.¹²⁹

The Algerian Affair had to be resolved as a pre-requisite to any major government plan. As political leaders in parliamentary debates were pulling in so many directions,¹³⁰ Fauvet came to recognise that the solution might require new political and economic structures, new sacrifices through political and economic reform, which the Assembly might require from another government, if G.Mollet's were unable to deliver.¹³¹

Even towards the end of 1956 it was very much the hesitations of the government, as of *Le Monde's* journalists themselves,¹³² that became problematic.

For instance, although still a supporter of Algeria remaining French and against independence, which he saw as a *politique d'abandon*, Julien Le Moyne was beginning to show signs of impatience when he learned of the postponement of the government's statement of policy in Algeria concerning the granting of a new statute to be granted to the country.¹³³

And he was not the only one. Gauthier, who showed greater consistency in his assessment of government programmes and the problems confronting France, was also criticising government dilatory tactics.¹³⁴

Slowly the reader is led to believe that the *status-quo* was no longer acceptable in the eyes of the paper.

*Ce n'est pas davantage l'intérêt des Français de maintenir coûte que coûte une formule administrative dépassée.*¹³⁵

But no sooner was the change accepted than the break with the past seemed hesitant and half-hearted. Although the journalists began to realise that the *status-quo* was no longer acceptable, they were reluctant to accept a total break with the past. They wanted an intermediate solution which was not likely to satisfy anybody. Julien Le Moyne stated that it was not to the advantage of the French to maintain an outdated administrative system regardless and argued that France, in the interests of the Algerians themselves, should not concede a more radical formula by abandoning all the previous systems in one swoop.

*De même ne peuvent-ils céder, dans l'intérêt même des Algériens, à l'attrait d'une solution radicale -que certains trouveraient facile- en abandonnant d'un coup tout le système ancien.*¹³⁶

The new year saw a more critical retrospective look and approach by the paper. 1956 had been an "agitated year" for Le

Monde, which was now obviously letting its readers know (as if they did not) that G. Mollet, elected on a "liberal ticket" with a commitment to end the conflict in Algeria, was unable to solve the problem.¹³⁷

Le Monde was aware that the government was only delaying concessions because of its fear of the wrath of the settlers.¹³⁸ Whether one would find that a good reason for the suffering endured is another matter. The paper wrote:

*La politique gouvernementale a consisté à ne donner que progressivement satisfaction aux musulmans afin de ne pas provoquer les brutales réactions des Européens. C'était la leçon que G. Mollet avait tiré du 6 février. Mais les incidents de samedi donnent à penser que ce qui a été perdu d'un côté n'a pas été gagné de l'autre... le fossé continue de se creuser entre les deux communautés sans profit ni pour l'une, ni pour l'autre.*¹³⁹

The failure even led Fauvet to point out regretfully that the government had not used the opportunity given to it by its position of strength.¹⁴⁰

Questions began to be asked only when the government postponed its *déclaration d'intention* -but old habits were hard to change. While becoming a little more critical of the government,¹⁴¹ the paper remained staunch in its defence, and firm in its support of the French stand in the UN¹⁴² and in the coverage of the general strike.¹⁴³

The paper accurately pointed out that the reform had been adopted ten years previously (at the time the Algerians had considered it to be a step forward)¹⁴⁴ and that the measures had no effect on Algeria, except for raising the opposition of the "extremists". It was adopted, the paper continued, to help the UN adopt a better view of French policy and was given a good place in the UN dossier.¹⁴⁵

But the paper was not too critical for long. Quite the

reverse, the paper gave considerable attention to the measures which looked good on paper but were completely inefficient.¹⁴⁶

It was clear, then, that for most Algerian "Muslims" this meant no change whatsoever from the corrupt and unrepresentative system which had for so long prevailed in Algeria and which had hitherto characterised the hierarchy of command in that country. *Le Monde* itself conceded that it found no new element in the declaration offering a political solution, and suggested that it might be yet another case of "too little too late." When expressing its views, the paper emphasised, nevertheless, that independence was out of the question.¹⁴⁷

Despite the inefficiencies outlined by the "Muslims" and the Europeans, and a coverage that on the surface looked objective,¹⁴⁸ the paper was dismissive of the FLN claims to be representative.¹⁴⁹ It criticised many of the aspects of their "surprising" statements¹⁵⁰ -considerably more emphasis was given to the opposite point of view and to the Europeans' standpoint. For them, and the view seems to have been shared by the paper, the influence of the FLN on future elections was thought to be,¹⁵¹ as the title suggested, a threat to their freedom: *L'influence du FLN peut rendre illusoire la liberté des élections.*¹⁵² *Le Monde* suggested that that "interpreted feeling" was shared by the representatives of the settlers' community, for whom the FLN represented little else but terrorism and threats.

When giving substantial coverage of the declaration of intent of Mollet's government and outlining that he had written to all political leaders inviting them to approve the broad principles,¹⁵³ *Le Monde* explained that behind this lay the aim of persuading the other leaders to make a commitment. This

would deprive the "rebels" of any hope of contemplating any change from other political parties or any change of government. Suggesting that they may have been merely asked to approve a *fait accompli*,¹⁵⁴ the pragmatic Fauvet, as a measure of expediency and underlining the urgency, stated that the discussions at the UN gave sufficient reasons for the groups requested "to defend one way or another, not the credit of the government but that of France even if, once the debate was over, another government team could take the necessary decisions".¹⁵⁵ He even sprang to Mollet's defence, arguing subsequently that the Prime Minister had been right not to have consulted the various groups before his declaration ("as he would still be writing it") and continued to predict easier times ahead.¹⁵⁶

While periodically echoing slight criticism made by others¹⁵⁷ combined with a mistaken trust in Mollet and Lacoste, *Le Monde* continued to express confidence in the government of the day and report favourably on its decisions.¹⁵⁸

Fauvet presented Mollet as standing firm on the FLN¹⁵⁹ while, by the same token, making him appear conciliatory and progressive.¹⁶⁰

If criticism did appear in *Le Monde*, and the paper did show some independence, and times some impatience,¹⁶¹ its suggestions did not go beyond mere proposals, which in themselves were insignificant.¹⁶²

Martel was also keen to see a faster pace for "reforms" when he stated that the *communes de plein exercice, celles qui ont truqué toutes les élections passées*, were still in place, and that it was time for action,¹⁶³ but he ignored the reports of his colleague, Mannoni, on the ways and means used to implement this action.¹⁶⁴ But even Mannoni thought that the reforms had

been hailed as a desire to give administrative democracy to Algeria.¹⁶⁵

As we see repeatedly, when *Le Monde* ventured its own criticism, it was soon counterbalanced by yet another expression of confidence in the authorities.

Recommending that the Minister Resident could modify the atmosphere by showing some firmness towards the ultras and should give the "Muslims" the impression *d'être traités sur un même pied d'égalité*, the paper argued that the government could make public opinion understand the real facts of the problem, if it renounced "nationalist demagogy", and that the solution was not easy but not impossible.¹⁶⁶

However, a month later¹⁶⁷ Fauvet was to emphasise that Lacoste was not trying to be optimistic but (from his conversation with Army chiefs of Staff) had established that peace would be restored within three months; and he outlined, a few days later, Lacoste's confidence in meeting that deadline (through quashing the rebellion and accelerating reforms).¹⁶⁸

8.3.6. The Fall of Mollet

Despite a successful vote of confidence in the Assembly, fully reported and commented upon,¹⁶⁹ the government fell in the last week of May 1957, a fall which the paper was not keen on.¹⁷⁰

The outgoing Prime Minister was even afforded a right of defence by the paper, when he was reminded of his electoral promise by Waldeck Rochet, who did not want to give him "the means to carry on an imbecilic and hopeless war".¹⁷¹ Guy Mollet was given space in the paper to defend what he meant, to explain his position and to maintain that he stood by his promise, despite all evidence to the contrary.¹⁷²

The difficulties preceding the fall of the Mollet government attracted a degree of sympathy from the paper. But, after its fall, its performance was not spared sharp and pointed criticisms by a number of journalists -some of whom were still showing compassion.¹⁷³

An assessment of Mollet's 15 months and 21 day leadership was provided at that time, in overall positive terms, except for the Egyptian episode, which was now seen as ill-conceived and ill-presented.¹⁷⁴

Even if it accepted that the government had tried to weaken the "rebels" while searching unsuccessfully for help from the Allies, the paper thought that the Suez failure and US attitude could have been anticipated.

While identifying the immediate and not so immediate reasons for the fall of Mollet, *Le Monde* provided the elements of a solution which would alter not so much the aims of Algerian policy as the means of achieving it.¹⁷⁵

For *Le Monde*, the ousted government had great ambitions in the diplomatic field, which, with hindsight, appeared "quite contradictory" and have "led sometimes to catastrophic results",¹⁷⁶ and wasted the moratorium it had benefited from.¹⁷⁷

This leads us to conclude that irrespective of the received wisdom concerning Guy Mollet being opposed to *Le Monde* and vice-versa, as far as the period covered and as far as the coverage of Algeria at the time are concerned, there seems to be no more antagonism or more opposition between the two than there has been between the paper and any Prime Minister at any other time.¹⁷⁸

8.3.7. Towards the end of a Republic

In opposition to his predecessor, the new Prime Minister, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, was not made to feel welcome by some on the newspaper team.¹⁷⁹

In his assessment of the *Homo novus* in the sarcastic *au jour le jour* column, a condescending, but not dismissive, R. Escarpit hoped that the new PM would last longer so that "he could be used again". Knowing that Lacoste's policy would be continued, he urged those currently opposed to the PM to give him time and not to "use up the luxury of getting rid of newer men with every crisis".¹⁸⁰

*Les pessimistes, les scrupuleux, les protestataires, les professeurs enfin, auraient quelque raison de souhaiter une chute rapide à M. Bourgès-Maunoury. Dans la mesure où leurs vœux -une fois n'est pas de coutume- pourraient avoir de l'effet sur les événements, je les supplie de ne rien faire, du moins pour le moment. Attendons le nouveau président à l'épreuve. Nous ne sommes pas si riches que nous puissions nous payer le luxe de gaspiller des hommes neufs à chaque crise.*¹⁸¹

Two days later,¹⁸² it was the regime that Chênebenoît attacked together with the electoral system (which brought such results), on which it was based:

le sourire amer qui reste notre seule défense contre les inconséquences du régime, le dénouement, si l'on ose s'exprimer ainsi, que l'Assemblée lui [le vote] a donné.

Reluctantly, at a time when he thought the government of France needed the unity of all forces around it to give new meaning to the effort required, he had to concede that the crisis, no "banal parliamentary incident", was still apparent because the new government majority was less clear than ever.

For Chênebenoît, as for Escarpit, the new government did not solve anything. Expecting a Clemenceau-type Prime Minister,

imposing a strong hand on a failing assembly, in order to save the regime, he expressed concern at the "political power vacuum" and desolation at the sight of this man:

(..)symboliquement seul à son banc, isolé aussi à sa tribune parce que sans soutien visible à l'hémicycle, et qui luttait bien mal, il faut le dire, pas même pour s'imposer, mais simplement pour se faire accepter. De mémoire de vieux parlementaire on avait rarement vu un orateur aussi peu convaincant face à un auditoire aussi peu disposé à être convaincu. Et il était manifeste que si chaque député avait eu le courage de sa fonction, seulement même le courage de son opinion, le ministère Bourgès-Maunoury aurait dû hier rester dans les limbes.

He then delivered a scathing attack on the government, which he did not see as being up to France's expectations; he did not need in any sense to wait and see it at work in order to be convinced of its inherent weakness.

Est-il possible encore, pour juger un ministère, de l'attendre à ses actes, comme on dit en cédant à une coupable résignation, alors qu'on le sait condamné congénitalement à vivoter d'aumônes, de l'un ou de l'autre et de marchandage de tous? Est-il encore possible de dire qu'on espère qu'il apporte une dernière chance au pays alors que crève les yeux la disproportion dramatique entre ce qu'il faudrait à la France et pour qu'elle croie à son redressement, et ce gouvernement débile dont l'assemblée a si péniblement accouché?¹⁸³

Fauvet was more moderate in his assessment of the new government. He thought the P.M. lacked the assurance needed to inspire confidence and the eloquence which could have remedied that deficiency.¹⁸⁴

He saw two "noteworthy differences or omissions": there was no talk of a Single College, nor of an executive or legislative body at an Algerian territorial level. He also compared the general situation of the government with the 1946-1951 period, when the government (which included Radicals and Socialists) could not rely on their own parties' support.¹⁸⁵

8.3.8. A more positive assessment of Felix Gaillard

In contrast, Gaillard was treated better after the change-over of government (5 November 1957). When it reviewed the performance of its predecessor, *Le Monde* described it as being quite negative and characterised by two long ministerial crises- its two positive achievements being the European treaties and the *loi cadre* for Algeria.

The paper was more positive in its coverage of Gaillard and his government. It was extremely surprised by the strength of the new PM and reported that his statements were well received by the Americans.¹⁸⁶ It found it quite understandable that the PM did not talk of the past¹⁸⁷ in his last declaration, since the previous government's heritage had long been considered "unenviable".¹⁸⁸

In fact, *Le Monde* was quite complimentary about Felix Gaillard. It stated that it had been pleasantly surprised by his openness, his good experience of affairs of state, his serious knowledge of European affairs, and the breadth of his views over the whole range of international issues. Fauvet wrote that, in his new job, the PM had confirmed the qualities he was known for ("intelligence and hard work") but also an authority that was "surprising for his young age".¹⁸⁹

8.4. Conclusion

At the beginning of the year of the fated fall of the Fourth Republic, *Le Monde* was still giving much coverage to official communications,¹⁹⁰ the government being described as continuing its reformist policy.¹⁹¹ Even Lacoste appeared in a good light¹⁹² after earlier rough treatment.¹⁹³

The paper was still echoing the opposition to any abandon of Algeria by politicians¹⁹⁴ and Algerian newspapers' opposition

to any troop reduction.¹⁹⁵ In the same way as it had done since the beginning of the conflict, *Le Monde* gave a positive coverage of the release of prisoners, which was presented as a *détente* measure by a *détente*-minded government and heralded as yet another promising move.¹⁹⁶

This leads me to conclude that, far from being critical of the official discourse on Algeria, *Le Monde's* stance seemed to have been supportive despite occasional criticism. The paper reflected the official discourse on the Algerian problem and its own journalists reproduced it favourably. Though not opposed to the various reforms proposed, *Le Monde* was in no way an advocate of radical change, let alone self-determination for the Algerians. There does not seem to be any connection between Guy Mollet's alleged antagonistic attitude to *Le Monde*,¹⁹⁷ and the paper's stance on Algerian policy. Indeed, the paper's criticism of Bourguès-Maunoury reveals a positive bias by comparison. In actual fact, *Le Monde* was no more opposed to Guy Mollet's government than it was to any other under the Fourth Republic, despite the fact that some governments, like that of Félix Gaillard, seemed to win favour with the paper from the start.

CHAPTER NINE

9. TIMIDITY OF A JOURNALISTIC DISCOURSE

9.1. Introduction

The official discourse carried by the medium had a definite political message, a message which played down the troubles in an attempt to reassure public opinion, and which refused to accept Algerian nationalism as legitimate; it also refused to entertain any idea of Algerian independence. The discourse conveyed attacked the views opposed to it as defeatist and guilty of demoralisation. While other media carried a message which did not square completely with the official version of events given by the authorities and reported by *Le Monde*, there was in the latter a constant desire to reassure the readers and the population and to play down the effects of terrorism, especially through prominent places given to official statements.¹ There was also a noticeable tendency in the paper to deny the legitimacy of Algerian nationalism even if a minor evolution of the country was thought to be possible. This naturally excluded independence as a possible outcome.

9.2. Reassuring themes

9.2.1. Reassuring discourse

Even the newspaper itself and its journalists, just as they had done previously after the insurrection (Chapter 8), seemed to be continuing their attempt to play down the seriousness of the situation in order to reassure public opinion in France.²

These and other reports emphasised the killing or the arrest of insurgents and rebels. The state of affairs as well as statements of policy came largely from official sources, such as Roger Léonard, declaring that repression was an 85% success,³ or Préfet Dupuich, giving an account of military

activities in his area.⁴ They constituted the core of the information about Algeria and the state of affairs in that country.

Most articles of *Le Monde*⁵ attempted to reassure the readers about Algeria. With Mannoni, the tendency to state and emphasise that things were getting better in Algeria would have had a reassuring impact on the readers, who might have been worried by other media reports about the situation in Algeria and would have alleviated any fears of the possibility of losing Algeria.⁶

9.2.2. Things are getting better

The idea that things were improving was the other theme traditionally found in the pages of the paper alongside those showing pro-government sympathies. It was an attempt to avoid creating public panic and to reassure the public that things were not as bad as they seemed.⁷

Throughout the reports, there was also a feeling of a massive troop presence crisscrossing the country (*quadrillage*), providing security for population and travellers almost everywhere. In spite of the dangers, the defections and the troubles outlined, Mannoni seemed to reassure people.⁸ Even if the situation was not rosy, it was important not to create alarm. That seemed to be the feeling permeating this article, despite the proximity of another article announcing that battles had started again in various places and that 130 "rebels" had been killed or captured in the Djebel Amour.

Mannoni also established a parallel between 25 August 1955 (see p. 125),⁹ when only a handful of people could be found in the village¹⁰ because of the prevailing insecurity and the time he was reporting, when the village was teeming, people having

been "appeased" by the *chasseurs alpins* and their commanding officer. The journalist depicted peaceful scenes of children at play and ended on the following note:

*D'autres maisons construites par l'armée s'éri-
gent encore au Khroubs où les hommes n'oublient pas
qu'un de leurs correligionnaires, policier - blâmé
et déplacé -, leur imprima sur la paume de la main
ou sur le front un cachet encre pour pouvoir plus
sûrement procéder à une opération de contrôle
d'identité...*

The journalist intended to leave the reader with the impres-
sion that the French army had managed to rebuild everything,
restore order and security, and that part of the blame for what
went wrong, if not all of it, lay with members of the Muslim
community who had abused their position of power.¹¹

Mannoni was not alone in this. Although admitting that the
situation was "abnormal", Julien Le Moyne¹² described the army
as successful and the "rebels" in "disarray" and "losing".¹³

9.2.3. Against defeatism and demoralisation

Propagating that kind of information was to try to defeat
what was perceived by the authorities to be a campaign of
defeatism and demoralisation. A constant flow of official
statements echoing these concerns was found regularly in the
pages of *Le Monde*. This was the case, for instance, for state-
ments by the Minister of Interior, M Bourgès-Maunoury, who
intimated that numerous reports tended to exaggerate the situa-
tions in Algeria and the *Nord Constantinois*.¹⁴ More specific
attacks by the same Maunoury on reports exaggerating the extent
of terrorism and the seriousness of the situation¹⁵ followed
the reassurances and warnings by Soustelle after his visits to
certain areas,¹⁶ which preceded further warnings, in a Constan-
tine speech a week later, where he declared that:

se laisser aller au défaitisme, c'est faire le

9.2.4 A docile propaganda instrument?

The very content of these statements seemed to indicate that there were other sources of information providing such "falsehoods" and "exaggerations", and that *Le Monde* was a consenting medium playing the role (as did many other papers) of a source of denial at the disposal of the government. *Le Monde* behaved as a docile instrument providing nationalistic and patriotic support to a government in difficulty,¹⁸ trying to combat other media sources which were more critical of its policy and actions.

It could be objected that perhaps the paper was merely deceived, in the sense that it must have believed in being cautious about defeatism and the reporting of "falsehoods," thus limiting itself justifiably to making safe reports. This would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the paper, which was to give objective coverage to the views and versions of the facts being put forward, allowing the readers to make up their own minds, rather than simply feeding them selective coverage.¹⁹

Another theme linked to those above, and which could be seen clearly in the paper, is the assertion that, despite the similarity of the two colonial situations, there was no parallel between Indochina and Algeria.²⁰

9.2.5. "Algeria was not Indochina"

In the reports of *Le Monde* another theme was present, which the paper was keen to emphasise: this was that the situation in Algeria was not comparable with that in Indochina.²¹

In Mannoni's articles, the tendency to differentiate between

the two situations would have had the immediate impact of reassuring those worried by other media reports about the situation in Algeria, and would have alleviated any fears of losing Algeria.²²

At the end of twenty-five months of "struggle , for a long time indecisive" (only then is one informed) "was it the end?" asked Eugène Mannoni. Referring to the "definite Yes" of the Resident Minister, he wrote:

Peut-être songera-t-on malgré soi, devant cette assurance -à cause de cette assurance- à l'Indochine, et aux promesses d'une victoire qui ne cessera de reculer jusqu'à Dien-Bien-Phu.

It would be wrong to do so, he stated categorically to those who, "despite themselves were expressing that fear." He was also keen to indicate that the rebels did not control the field, that there was no area inaccessible to the army and its helicopters, and that it would be fruitless to look for any area from which the rebels could launch any reconquering of Algeria which, in any case, would be in vain.²³

Both the content of the article and the title of the section (*Des <<mauvais souvenirs>>*) tended to suggest to other media and public opinion that Algeria was not another Indochina and that France was not on the verge of another Dien Bien Phu, illustrating clearly the length to which *Le Monde's* journalists went to emphasise that point of view.

The analogy which could be made between "pacification in Algeria" and "the war in Indochina" was dismissed as nonsense on various grounds -in terms of Algeria's proximity to France, outside help and number of troops involved.

The paper stated that French troops had pushed back the rebels and eliminated any possibility of incursion by them or

of any *déferlement populaire*. Then, describing the troops' "other victory," the paper went on to emphasise the "psychological results" achieved in certain areas through the use of the military as administrators, doctors and teachers (see also Chapters 5, 11 and 12). In this instance the Indochinese model appeared to be useful for the journalist who, despite having stated in the opening section that any analogy in this field was unfounded, wrote that:

*L'expérience indochinoise avait enseigné (...) certains officiers qu'au milieu du XXème siècle (...) on ne pouvait se borner à affronter un adversaire aux moyens d'une action extrêmement diversifiée sur le seul terrain des armes.*²⁴

Despite the contradiction, and the failure to prove its case in trying to differentiate between the two conflicts, *Le Monde* did attempt to distinguish unjustifiably between the two very similar situations of colonial domination being progressively eroded and destroyed by a nationalist struggle. It is quite clear that the parallel with Indochina was used when it suited the paper to attract the sympathy and support of the anti-communist sections of public opinion in the conduct of the war and that it was rejected when the comparison was perceived as detrimental or when it could suggest the possibility of a similar resolution of the conflict.

The view that Algeria was not comparable to Indochina propagated by the official discourse was shared by journalists such as P. Herreman.²⁵ The success of the psychological warfare was emphasised,²⁶ together with the methods used to achieve it. These were said to rely mainly on propaganda.²⁷

9.2.6. Critical forum: the *libre opinion* column

This did not mean that the paper did not carry a very critical discourse. Articles which were distinctly vitriolic in

their attack on the government of the day and its policies did find their way into the paper. But it was in the form of a "free opinion" expressed by outsiders. And the writers of those signed articles had ultimately to assume responsibility for what they were saying. It should be added that these columns of the paper were opened to all shades of opinion. Many of the articles defended the colonial system and the role and prestige of France overseas. But some were anti-colonialist and opposed government policy in colonial matters.²⁸

Despite the circulation of the official discourse with its many ramifications outlined above, there was, however, sharp, relevant criticism of the situation in Algeria, but it did not come directly from the journalists themselves taking a stance (supposing there was a stance to take), but from people writing to *Le Monde* who were allowed space on the *libres opinions* column of the paper.²⁹

One such "Free Opinion" dealt with the subject of elections quite early on in the conflict. Referring to the abstention in Algiers local elections, Abdeslam Meharra, an indigenous former councillor, attacked "the mayor's confederation of Algeria and the unfair electoral system³⁰ by which the choice is decided in advance."³¹

Another critical attitude to the government was expressed in a letter sent to M. Pierre Commin by André Phillip, in which he reproached the government for its policy in the Middle East and North Africa.

The letter had been sent to state A. Phillip's intention to express his views freely because the "Comité-directeur" had refused to convene a *Conseil national* or an "extraordinary session of congress." Since free debate had been stifled in

their ranks, some Socialists felt deprived of the right to air their grievances against the policies of the party, and wanted to set up a "tribune libre".³²

Expecting very little change, André Phillip accused the Radical-Socialists of being unable to fulfil their governmental function, which was to give a new hope to a deceived people and of being responsible for prolonging the war in Algeria.³³

It is clear that there was a great degree of opposition, and sharp criticism was levelled against Mollet and his government. However, it should be emphasized that this type of discourse, which could be glimpsed occasionally in the pages of *Le Monde*, was not profuse in the paper; and, when present, it was not penned by *Le Monde's* own journalists. Furthermore, in the various party congresses, Radical-Socialists were expressing the most virulent criticism of government policy. This was reported as taking place but was not in general taken up by the various journalists of the paper.

Another meaningful, although not exactly vitriolic, criticism of government policy, which did come from people outside the paper, was provided by Pierre-Henri Simon.

Examining the perils and the chances that France's historical development faced, he wrote that France was responding badly to the *pesées de l'histoire* of the last 30 years with its political power falling, its international prestige decreasing, its colonies braking up, its currency weakening, its dependence for its arms on the outside world increasing, and its powerful allies sometimes even making it feel its isolation. The danger in this was the pleasure of the "toboggan slide" -an easy feeling of happiness derived from living off the wealth of the

work of previous generations.

For Simon, the "cascade of government" continued with the frequent permutations of ministerial post, in total disregard of the national interests; this indifference to the problems confronting France was accompanied by blame attributed to "the Americans or the Russians, the trusts or the trade unions, the *Démocrates chrétiens* or the technocrats, the worker priests or the colonels, or anybody else but the person speaking..". He saw general apathy as breeding an excessive and unhealthy nationalism at a time when the future was at stake and when France was faced with choices which it should make in all realism and full awareness of the risks.³⁴

9.3. Independentist nationalism hard to swallow

The exploration of the general themes and the overtone of the discourse has provided a general idea of what is latent in *Le Monde's* discourse. But, in order to complete the picture, it would be essential to find out what is more explicit in the journalists' discourse. In other words, what were the possible solutions to the Algerian problem that the journalists of *Le Monde* or its occasional contributors openly contemplated? What kind of evolution did they envisage for the country?

9.3.1. Interpreting nationalism and refusing immediate independence

Despite the existence of nationalist movements committed to independence since the early part of the century, and the resistance met by French colonisers on the ground during most of the previous century (Chapter 3), *Le Monde*, like the greater part of French public opinion, seemed reluctant to accept that what was starting in Algeria was a liberation struggle by nationalists against a colonialist system, aimed at its de-

struction and the establishment, or rather the restoration, of an Algerian independent state.

In what looked on the surface like an attempt to understand from the start, *Le Monde* wondered about the meaning and the origin of the outbreak of violence in Algeria. P.A.Martel asked whether *Fellaguisme* was "nationalism" or "an Arab initiative",³⁵ only to put forward the view that it was not nationalism.³⁶

Il faudrait admettre que l'on se trouve en face d'une organisation étrangère aux formations nationalistes, comme à la population. Elle recruterait en Algérie des groupes

*Tout se passe comme si une main invisible cherchait à ruiner les solidarités verticales France-Afrique du Nord dès l'instant même où l'on parait pouvoir les renforcer.*³⁷

The next day³⁸ the paper thought that it was manipulation from abroad trying to fill the empty dossier of the Maghreb question in the UN and an "exaltation" from the broadcast of Radio Cairo and its "fanciful figures".³⁹

For *Le Monde*, as for the majority of French opinion, there was a criminal streak and more than a touch of madness, when it was not barbarism, in any movement fighting the civilising influence of France.

However, progressively the element of "nationalism" in the Algerian insurrection had to be accepted, but its legitimacy was still denied. The aim of emancipating the colonised had to be conceded, but the methods were never shared by the various French governments nor by the paper. It was thought that it was misguided nationalism fighting the civilising mission of France. The colonialist age was drawing to a close in the UN and many international fora and the dawn of independence and self-determination were increasingly appearing on the world's

horizon. Although it came to accept independence for Tunisia and Morocco, the French government rejected it outright in the case of Algeria. It tried to undermine any legitimacy the movement might have had for that cause. What is perhaps surprising⁴⁰ is that *Le Monde* was of the same view: in a number of articles it clearly argued against the idea of independence, which remained an anathema for the duration of the Fourth Republic as far as the paper was concerned.

In case anybody thought of applying to the Algerian case the idea of the model nationalism provided, Henri Laugier, a former Associate Under-Secretary to the UN, produced his article on exaggerated conceptions of sovereignty and People's Rights to self-determination.⁴¹

The article written for *Le Monde* was designed to make leaders of democratic countries think again about *certaines formules magiques qui pèsent sur la diplomatie, sur les relations internationales et sur les conflits de notre temps*.

According to him the formula of a people's right to self determination expressed a confused ideology resulting from Wilson's thinking behind the treaties following the First World War and the victorious nations' respect for the right to self determination, more out of timidity and hesitation than out of fidelity to an ideology.

Mais elles le respectèrent. Passives, elles s'inclinèrent devant le droit des Italiens et celui des Allemands de se donner des régimes de boue et de sang tels qu'il fallut une guerre mondiale affreuse-ment dévastatrice et meurtrière, pour en débarasser la planète.

He argued that there was a significant confusion in the ideology enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and in the texts of the UN Charter (article 2.7) because of their imprecision, since no person or text had defined authoritatively what exact-

ly was a relevant matter of national sovereignty. Laugier rejected any right of "interference by the UN organisations in matters relating to national sovereignty" and dismissed the absurdity of some types of nationalist ideology.⁴² Since nationalism was breaking the acceptable rules, logical limits had to be imposed on it in the real world.⁴³ But sometimes independence could hardly be ignored, since it was repeatedly put on the agenda by the various movements. However, when it was conceded as a possible solution, it was always put back as a long-term objective⁴⁴

9.3.2. Independence -a long-term objective

Whilst accepting that independence should be the long-term objective (the ultimate aim) of everybody's effort, Paul Rivet, in the pages of the paper, dismissed this notion as not representing a panacea for all human injustices and miseries. Even the acceptance of the independence objective in the long term made it look as a solution that could not be achieved practically, unless all inequalities of an economic and cultural nature had been possibly, if not completely eradicated, at least sharply diminished.

Claiming authority for his comments after a recent world tour, where he saw "immense cities where human beings were born, lived and died without knowing the comfort of a home", and having stigmatised some of the countries' record in terms of "material and intellectual misery" (with Bolivia's 70% and India's 88% illiteracy rates), and perhaps ignoring that France's own record in the field was no better,⁴⁵ Rivet argued that the improvement of cultural and material standards was a necessary, but not the only, prerequisite for independence.

It would be unreasonable to disagree with some of the state-

ments he made (for instance that the hungry and the illiterate are not really free), but what Rivet was really objecting to was the non-democratic nature of governments which followed independence.⁴⁶ However, at that time, what was being practised in Algeria by France could hardly qualify as democratic, and there were many aspects of Algerian life under France (to which he did not seem to object), which hardly differed from the fate he so much feared independence would bring.

Rivet's real concern appeared in the inside pages, where it was spelt out in terms of the role played by these newly independent countries, whose "self-assured and verbose representatives inside international organisations, were making the developed western world (which, admittedly, had long shown an "unbearable superiority complex" towards the "exotic people") forget "the role of guide that its experience imposes on it" or seek forgiveness for its social and economic superiority:

que l'ancienneté de leur civilisation et un concours de circonstances historiques favorables leur ont assuré.

In his view, the behaviour of the new states was excessively influencing the attitudes of the big nations within the debates of international organisations, which could and should have kept "a dispassionate and a serene climate in this troubled world." This was creating a climate (...) *empoisonné de de concurrence démagogique et de racollage dégradant.*

The solution of Rivet was to establish some moral order and remove the "pseudo-democracy"⁴⁷ by introducing a weighted system of voting, giving less weight to the newly-independent nations, until they acquired "the necessary maturity and indispensable experience" for the exercise of freedom. They need to feel, he continued, that the path was through culture, which he

thought it was the duty of the Western world to impart.

Although Rivet admitted to having thought long and hard, and even hesitated before committing his ideas to paper, he urged that they should definitely be read by those seeking to improve the material and intellectual condition of mankind without distinction and wanting to establish peace without fascism, racism or xenophobia.

Although he anticipated protests, Rivet was unashamedly arguing in favour of a patronising approach and suggesting a weighted voting system which gave voting rights inversely proportional to the number of illiterates in the country represented in the UN. The solution before these countries become, in his eyes, mature enough to exercise democratic rights, was to acquire social, economic and cultural development through the Western world.⁴⁸

9.3.3. An increased awareness of the wider context

Pierre-Henri Simon's wider perspective enabled him to perceive that the emergence of a Third World as a significant force made the use of force in solving colonial problems an obsolete concept. Simon was also conscious that the power relationship (*rapport des forces*) had changed, and that:

*[La France] ne peut prétendre au leadership dans un monde où des courants irréversibles ont constitué des nations-fourmillières et des Etats géants; que le milliard et demi des hommes de Bandoeng a introduit dans les problèmes d'outre-mer une donnée absolument nouvelle, et que le temps est passé où l'on résolvait une question coloniale en faisant remonter par une cannière le delta d'un fleuve.*⁴⁹

But all he recommended was a change of methods when he compared the two styles of approaches used by France to solve her problems and commented that the virile action in Suez led to the most negative consequences which included; oil supplies

being cut off, banks, schools and teaching institutions in the Middle East being shut down or destroyed (*subi les plus grands dégats*), the action of France itself being stopped after the *froncement de sourcil du cousin Boulganine..[et la] semonce de l'oncle <<Ike>>*, France's friends not being able to stand by her, and the Soviet activities in Budapest obtaining the cover of a good alibi.

Not underestimating the success of the Prime Minister and his foreign minister,⁵⁰ Simon declared that there were two ways of doing things: the way outlined above in Suez and the successful way used in the UN over Algeria, where France was granted some respite and where success was on the government's side, helped by the decisions taken over Black Africa and by the mistakes of the "adversary".⁵¹

Simon thought⁵² that the world was expecting France to think "French Algeria" in a twentieth-century perspective.⁵³ And despite the paper's clear awareness of the cruel realities of the war, *Le Monde* still believed that world opinion was on the side of France, which was able to get on peacefully with the building of "French Algeria".⁵⁴ This could be achieved through the "dissipation of the fictions of language and the intrigues of power which block the path of peace". Simon was convinced, though, that the world wanted France to find a solution to the Algerian problem as a French problem and he expected that solution to be "peaceful, democratic and fair".⁵⁵

9.3.4. Limited perspectives and unrealistic solutions

The lack of realism in the paper's content could perhaps explain the number of far-fetched solutions being proposed in its pages. Instead of envisaging a pragmatic and realistic programme, the paper devoted its pages to airing various limi-

ted and ill-thought-out solutions, ranging from a confederation between Europe and Africa (Eurafrica),⁵⁶ to the views of the Independents,⁵⁷ and many others such as Marshall Juin,⁵⁸ and Jules Moch.⁵⁹

Moch did not think that it was sufficient to state that nationalism and independence were outdated concepts⁶⁰ if one wanted to preserve the coexistence of the two communities.⁶¹ The refusal to allow Algeria to go its own way was turned down even when people in the paper were convinced that the country would adopt a republican form of government,⁶² as this did not exclude the "possibility of conflict" and was detrimental to the construction of a federal or confederate structure. When the new Tunisian regime adopted a republican form, *Le Monde* commented that Morocco should seek the arbitration of the French over the future of this North Africa Unit and wondered why the Sultan did not back the French presence.⁶³

Only Minay described the economic plight of the country accurately⁶⁴ and Sauvy was one of the few contributors ready to accept radical changes. He also tried to provide readers with the facts about the Algerian problem in a series of articles,⁶⁵ in which he tried to show that it was unrealistic to defend a policy of integration from a moral point of view by examining economic aspects (maintaining that Sahara oil, contrary to popular belief, would be insufficient) as well as social ones in terms of costs and sacrifices.⁶⁶ With economic difficulties and the problems caused by supporting current policy, Sauvy thought that there would be a transfer of power from those dominating to those dominated, Sauvy, who was unwilling to make France shoulder all the blame, did not recommend independence, but (sharing M. Allais's views) expressed a preference for

partition along the lines of Ireland which, although not very "pleasant", was efficient, since by creating two zones, a better defence of the borders could be ensured.⁶⁷

The consensus which seemed to emerge in the paper over the idea of keeping Algeria French did not materialise over how that goal could be achieved amongst the occasional contributors to *Le Monde*.

9.3..5. Consensus and divergence of journalists' views

Although there was a clear desire amongst all journalists writing for *Le Monde* that Algeria should remain French, some divergence can also be noticed in the field of what regular contributors were recommending as a solution to the Algerian problem.

All through the texts of reports and editorials there was an omnipresent desire and interest in keeping Algeria French and in restoring order. Blanchet was more than generous in terms of advice as to ways of remedying the defects in the case of Algeria, but what directions were these reforms to follow?

Various journalists favoured various "solutions", reflecting their political views. Duverger wanted a federal-type solution, while Fauvet was a proponent of greater integration. If total assimilation⁶⁸ were not thought possible and if the idea of secession were rejected, a formula had to be devised, and the stages of evolution and the structure of the "*départements actuels*" had to be determined.⁶⁹

At that time *Le Monde* tried to find some middle of the road way which would avoid assimilating the Muslim population into French society, while at the same time preventing the loss of that community:

L'intégration est fort différente de l'Association qui est une chimère. Il serait vain de recher-

*cher une identification des Algériens aux Français que ni les uns ni les autres n'accepteraient.*⁷⁰

Curiously, the wish not to impose integration (claimed to be in place since 1947), which the Algerians did not want, appeared only when it suited French interests. For the journalist, the integration advocated by Soustelle acquired a particular meaning.

*L'intégration est tout au moins un refus: celui de l'autonomie interne et celui du fédéralisme, deux formules qui selon le gouvernement mèneraient à l'indépendance.*⁷¹

C'est donc entre l'assimilation et l'indépendance, également impossibles, que des mesures concrètes et rapides peuvent être prises pour conférer au fur et à mesure de leur évolution un statut nouveau aux Musulmans algériens.

It was obvious here that the new statute being recommended (which had to be progressive) was a retrograde step, as it did not represent full and immediate citizenship. However, it appealed to the paper because it was a statement of the middle ground. But even that was no easy task, as Fauvet clearly saw the opposition to, and the difficulties of, the government in announcing the development of this statute and defining the general policy:

*Là encore le gouvernement se heurtera à ceux qui n'ont pas compris qu'à vouloir tout conserver on risque de tout perdre, et à ceux des nationalistes français, qui sont armés de cet esprit, rejoignant ceux des nationalistes arabes qui, eux, n'ont pas encore compris qu'à vouloir tout conquérir on risque de ne rien obtenir.*⁷²

He found the middle way best, and argued against extremism on both sides and defining what the aim should be.

Agreeing to keep the word *intégration* (the meaning of which had been defined by the government), *Le Monde* did not wish to give it a narrow meaning (*au sens strict*). For the paper it

could not be: *celle dont ne veulent ni les Algériens ni les Français*,⁷³ but a solution between "assimilation" and "federation", a notion which was thought capable of gathering (<ré-unir) the advantages of the two solutions, since a restrictive definition would limit participation to the most competent parliamentarians.

The "revolutionary" conception of the Pleven "round table," proposing a staged evolution of Algeria with statutes comparable to those of British Dominions, did not escape *Le Monde's* attention. The paper argued for a definition of the major principles of this policy, and for understanding that a healing process should be set in motion in order to bridge the gap between the two communities, even if there were an immediate implementation of the policy.⁷⁴

In his article, *L'Algérie, le Texas et l'Ukraine*,⁷⁵ M Duverger tried to compare the relationship between Algeria and France, on the one hand, to that pertaining between Texas and the United States and that existing between the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, on the other. He concluded that the Algerian situation was complicated by the presence of Europeans, and argued therefore that a more original, imaginative and intelligent solution should be found.

He also maintained that the "dualism of fidelity" of the Algerian people (some feeling more Algerian than French and others more French than Algerian), which he saw as very explicit in the educated factions of the population, should be accommodated. In his eyes this could be done, "though the room for manoeuvre is thin", only through a "Federal" solution which implemented the reforms of Soustelle .

He thought that extremists at both ends of the spectrum,

ultra conservative and ultra nationalist, did not accept this solution because they did not think dispassionately enough. If they did for one moment:

Ils verraient qu'il n'existe aucune autre possibilité réelle de résoudre le problème algérien.

Convinced that he possessed the only solution to the Algerian problem, and without bothering to enquire what the majority of Algerians would think of it, Duverger arrogantly presented it as the only way forward.

For him, only one question remained. How quickly would it be implemented?

*La seule question est de savoir si les solutions inévitables seront appliquées rapidement avec le minimum de conflit, ou s'il faudra encore des années de sang et de haine avant qu'on accepte enfin de part et d'autre de s'incliner devant les faits.*⁷⁶

With a slight change of mind three months later,⁷⁷ Duverger outlined the contradictions and differences between the two solutions of Federalism proposed by the Socialists and Soustelle's "Integration" or between respectively recognising Algeria's personality and "Algeria is France".

Duverger commented that none of these statements expressed the whole truth and outlined the fundamental dualism which he saw:

*Même les colons les plus colonialistes ne se conçoivent pas comme des Français absolument identiques aux autres: ils ont aussi le sentiment d'appartenir à une autre communauté en même temps qu'à la communauté française. Même les musulmans les plus attachés à la nation algérienne ne se sentent pas uniquement algériens; ils trouvent en eux mêmes une certaine présence française; ils ont le sentiment d'appartenir d'une certaine façon à la communauté française en même temps qu'à la communauté algérienne.*⁷⁸

The errors to be avoided in searching for a solution were

outlined as being: a solution on Moroccan or Tunisian lines,⁷⁹ a federal solution, which, if adopted, would entail gradual separation from France⁸⁰ and total integration.⁸¹

The main concern which exercised him throughout was that, in giving or accepting any reform or making any improvement, the interests of the French community in Algeria should not be neglected, especially in terms of local and parliamentary representation.⁸²

Paramount also in the mind of the journalist was that Algeria should remain French. But a sense of frustration developed at the lack of political action in the field. Journalists multiplied their warnings, and a degree of urgency was soon thought to be essential.

9.3.6. A marked preference for the links to be maintained

In reflecting the official discourse as well as in more direct forms of reporting, *Le Monde's* journalists did not hide their preference for a particular solution, nor was the paper discreet in its support for a particular framework. Reporting the economic and financial effort the government was going to make, the paper excluded a particular framework for action:

*le réalisme commande aussi de ne pas chercher hors de la France les chemins de la liberté.*⁸³

In most of their analyses, *Le Monde's* journalists expressed a preference for a solution that would help keep Algeria within the French nation. Discussing the options facing the government, and even when conceding that the notion of Algerian identity (*personnalité algérienne*) was already outdated (*dépassée*), the paper clearly put forward the view that an Algerian national identity (thought to be "widespread by many observers") was "premature and unacceptable in present

circumstances".

Sur le principe même , la reconnaissance de la personnalité algérienne peut apparaître comme dépassée, alors que celle du fait national algérien est prématurée et de toute manière impossible dans les circonstances actuelles.

The aim was to find a solution which would go beyond the former but stop far short of the latter, and that was no easy task:

Aller au delà de la <<personnalité>> tout en restant en deça du <<fait national>> n'est pas facile.

Looking at the possibility of free elections revealed one of the concerns of *Le Monde*, which could not help showing its true colours:

Il reste à savoir comment on éviterait que du scrutin ne se dégage une majorité de musulmans favorables, sinon à l'indépendance, au moins au fait national algérien qui, de l'aveu de tous, s'est plus ou moins forgé au cours des derniers mois.⁸⁴

It was not made clear why Algerian national identity was impossible. Support for it may have been lacking amongst most European settlers, or French politicians and media, but it was definitely seen as the only way out for the Algerians who had been deceived in the past. However, *Le Monde* certainly did not share that feeling, and did not see independence as a solution.

With the concluding remarks ... *le désir général de provoquer une <<ouverture politique >> afin de compléter le dossier que la France plaindra devant l'ONU,*⁸⁵ the immediate concern and the aim of the whole exercise became clearer: the objective was not primarily to find a solution but to make the French point of view, right or wrong, triumph objectively by convincing world opinion that something was being done, an objective shared by the French government of the day.

Even when conceding that the alienation of Algerian leaders had been achieved through "our clumsiness," which made "the situation of the overall North African problem more difficult", Gauthier (who was one of the most critical journalists) maintained that they (the Algerian leaders) were unwilling "to sever their links with <<our>> civilisation."

Gauthier urged a reconciliation⁸⁶ and advocated action in setting the conditions and making available the means for the necessary reconciliation, thus eliminating any idea that the solution could be found outside France.

The search for a solution compatible with that end (a reconciliation) entailed very dubious means at times, even for Gauthier himself.⁸⁷

Anxious to keep Algeria French, or that at least the solution should be a Franco-Algerian affair, and aware of the contradictions, Gauthier wrote of the:

*(..) sentiment patriotique qui se révolte devant <<l'abandon>> d'une population française et d'une terre qui l'est devenue, souci d'une position stratégique, volonté de ne pas renier l'entreprise poursuivie depuis plus d'un siècle, désir de l'adapter à l'évolution des populations et des idées, autant d'éléments contradictoires qui se débattent entre le coeur et l'esprit.*⁸⁸

Ignoring the arrest of Ben Bella less than two months previously, like many other journalists Julien le Moyne argued that Algeria did not have any leaders with the stature of HM Mohammed V or Bourguiba, nor a coherent team representing the whole country.⁸⁹ Trying to find a way forward which would avoid a solution of "abandon", he advised taking into account the interdependence of the North African countries with a view to uniting the various Algerian groups (including the FLN, MNA and ralliés) with the Tunisians and Moroccans and France to

stimulate the setting up of a North African unit ("ensemble") (the title said African) and use the wealth of the Sahara for a "new future" for the countries concerned. Although he hoped that a first step would be taken and that initiatives would begin in Paris, like Fauvet, he clearly advised that granting independence would be the wrong thing to do.⁹⁰

This piece of advice was given at a time when independence was not unheard of as a possible solution to colonial problem. Already towards the end of 1956 other groups amongst the most informed had perceived that the only way to end the Algerian conflict was through the granting of Algerian independence.⁹¹

When it reported the news *Le Monde* seemed astounded that the idea of independence could be expressed without causing an outcry (*tollé*). The paper wrote:

Il est tout de même peu banal que ... présidé par le Général Billotte et en présence de personnalités aussi peu suspectes de convictions progressistes que le Général Weygand, Bonnefous..., Pinay... le rapporteur chargé de la politique extérieure... (Raymond Aron,⁹² professeur à la Sorbonne, chroniqueur bien connu) a pu affirmer sans provoquer de tollé dans son auditoire: <<reconnaitre tôt ou tard que l'Afrique du Nord est une unité, qu'il y aura un état algérien et que dans un délai à fixer, il sera indépendant...>>⁹³

9.3.7. The acceptance of change

On that occasion, although the paper was convinced that government policy should not stand still, it had not yet made up its mind about the direction in which it should proceed

Il n'y a plus maintenant de bonne ou mauvaise solution, il n'y a que le choix entre des solutions plus ou moins mauvaises ... sinon si nous nous obstinons dans la politique actuelle nous courrons à une catastrophe nationale à côté de laquelle le traité de Paris de 1763⁹⁴ paraîtra glorieux.⁹⁵

The discourse of *Le Monde* was still dominated by a reformist attitude. Confronting the party divisions on Algeria, *Le Mon-*

de's J.Fauvet began to make favourable comments on the evolution of the African states. He began to praise the federal ideas being developed which, he hoped, would have a lesson for Algeria. He maintained his conviction that if a decentralised system had been put in place a few years previously, it would have modified the climate there too.⁹⁶

Writing at the end of January, about the need to modify or update the 1946 Constitution (section 8) to accommodate the new relationship between Algeria and France, Georges Chaffard defended this revision suggested by a number of politicians (Devinat, Coste-Floret) in order to allow for an "Algerian identity".⁹⁷

These issues left no doubt about the paper's belief in the "civilising mission" of France when it welcomed the "wisdom" of the Africans in not requesting immediate independence *dont ils mesurent les difficultés et le caractère illusoire*, and stated the capability of French know-how to guide them progressively:

*(..) sans heurts vers le self-government, compte tenu de ce que la coopération franco-africaine est une nécessité vitale pour les uns et pour les autres et un élément déterminant de la communauté la plus large que l'on voudrait réunir.*⁹⁸

Fauvet thought that one of the initiatives, the one proposed by the last Socialist Party congress, which was to fight against extremists in both camps, was possible, but the conditions for it were less favourable than they had been eight months previously (in mid 1956) either in Algeria or in the Assembly.

Fauvet, for whom the UN votes were a necessary but not sufficient condition for solving the "Algerian Affair" and for ending the paralysis which had been affecting political life

since July of the previous year (1956), was eager to see the 9 January declaration implemented. In his view, this meant that there should be a dialogue with the Muslim community which only a change of methods or even a change of participants could bring about. Inaction, he continued, could only contribute to the "success of our adversaries".

Blanchet suggested a more subtle form of evolution, which consisted in loosening the ties a little as the British had done, "losing a colony in order to gain a dominion."

Full of admiration for the institutions copied on Westminster and the use of English, Blanchet could not say which was more worthy of admiration: the wisdom of the nationalists epitomised by Kwamé N'Krumah, or the realism of the British colonial power represented by Sir Charles Arden-Clark in knowing "how to lose a colony in order to gain a dominion."

But the fundamental difference Blanchet saw was that Morocco, Tunisia and Viet Nam had not requested to be admitted into the French Union

..alors que de son banc de premier ministre dans un Parlement au cadre et aux rites copiés sur ceux de Westminster (et où l'anglais demeurera la langue officielle) Kwamé Nkrumah proclamait en décembre dernier: <<Nous sommes heureux de rester dans le Commonwealth>>.⁹⁹

Despite the international context, *Le Monde* persisted in its refusal to accept the nationalist trend as legitimate or that the FLN had enough competent leaders¹⁰⁰ and continued to regard the Algerian problem, not in colonial terms, but as a conflict between the two communities in Algeria.¹⁰¹

Upon the vote of the loi-cadre for Africa, Duverger suggested a much more subtle way forward by modifying the unitary structure of the French state through the reform of section

VIII of the Constitution creating a *de facto*¹⁰² institutional structure, which resembled more that of a federal state than the unitary system of government, reflecting what had been happening in Britain.

Duverger thought that the freedom requested could be possible with interdependence and that the impotence of the FLN over the control of their troops and that of the French government in respect of public opinion could make the situation in Algeria develop into a Hungarian-type scenario.¹⁰³ He did not consider the Algerian problem to be in an impasse, "as all problems have a solution, even the most difficult ones", and he thought that, if the Resident-Minister showed a degree of firmness towards the "ultras", and gave the "Muslims" the impression that they were being treated on an equal footing (*impression d'être traités sur même pied d'égalité*), this could modify the general atmosphere.¹⁰⁴ His other recommendation was to use Bourguiba and the Sultan of Morocco to help constitute a "North African Union" (*un ensemble nord africain*).

It was argued that if the French government could renounce demagogic nationalist slogans and make public opinion understand the real facts behind the problem, the solution, though not easy, would not be impossible:

*à condition de faire preuve d'audace et d'imagination... que notre politique algérienne ne se borne plus à claironner tous les quinze jours l'annonce d'un <<dernier quart d'heure>> qui est en passe de rejoindre <<la route du fer>> dans le Panthéon des mots historiques.*¹⁰⁵

For the benefit of those who might have been puzzled by the fact that nationalism was supported in Africa, Asia and even in the "Popular democracies" but discouraged in France, Duverger

explained that there were two stages and kinds of nationalism,¹⁰⁶ which "like any ideology, could be interpreted in two different ways" and ought to be judged "good" in a particular context and "bad" in another.¹⁰⁷ He argued that the two nationalisms combined together, especially in Asiatic and African countries, and warned the French Left not to be taken in and not to get involved in a fight which was not theirs.

Duverger discussed the solutions but never put the French presence into question. For him, most of the people on the mainland and in Algeria were against "abandon" but there was a need for draconian measures, as reforms were always promised but never implemented. Playing down the cycle of violence in Algeria, Duverger wrote that the Europeans in Algiers were living a terror, which excused certain extremes, as fascism was a defence reflex of a class in fear of its existence or privileges,¹⁰⁸ in the belief that a dictatorial regime would save them. He explained that the same thing would happen in France, given the same conditions. But the *civil war* (my emphasis) did not explain everything, in his view, every colonial situation develops into an attitude which is contrary and opposed to democracy.

The inegalitarian anti-liberal nature of the system explained, Duverger argued, the preference for authoritarian regimes by the "Europeans" in Algeria. For him, opposition between provinces was normal and not harmful, as long as there was a consensus view (*majorité exprimée du pays*). But for Algeria after some 125 years, it was no longer the case and, instead of bowing before the mainland, "our compatriots try to impose their will on it.

Despite the shrewdness of his analysis¹⁰⁹ of the resistance

to change, Duverger was unable to offer a serious assessment of the solution for Algeria. He still thought that an evolution by means of reforms which would keep Algeria under the French umbrella remained feasible.

9.4. Conclusions

The discourse propagated by *Le Monde's* journalists during the Algerian war seemed to be reassuring as to the state of the conflict. The reassuring themes which pervaded most articles as well as the feeling, implied and stated, that the situation was improving, together with the assertive tone over differences between Algeria and Indochina, echoed faithfully the main thrust of the official discourse. Clearly, some articles were specifically designed to counteract "the campaign of defeatism and demoralisation" taking root in public opinion. This was one of the main strategies of various governments, too embarrassed by events in Algeria, who could not even have survived their extremely short mandate had the difficult reality of the conflict been faithfully reported to the public.

Despite an increased awareness of the wider international context, independence as a solution to the conflict was rejected by all of the paper's journalists who showed, despite their divergence on the means of achieving it, a marked similarity of views and a preference for maintaining links with the colony.

CHAPTER TEN

10. THE REJECTION OF PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUAL VIEWS

10.1. Introduction

An examination of *Le Monde's* treatment of the ideas put forward by an important and particularly well-informed section of public opinion, the intellectual elite (writers, university professors, prominent journalists and the like), could provide a much sharper focus for testing our hypotheses on the attitude of *Le Monde* towards the Algerian question, the Algerian problem and its possible solutions, and offer a more complete image of the Algerian crisis and the war given to its readers by the paper.

A more rigorous look at how *Le Monde* presented statements made by members of the intellectual community,¹ and a better knowledge of the comments the newspaper made on them, might provide a better understanding of the views the paper expressed and hence what its preferences were. This, in turn, would provide a firmer assessment of its role.

This chapter surveys the kinds of discussions appearing in *Le Monde* concerning the stances adopted by intellectuals during the Algerian War, up to the end of the Fourth Republic. The areas covered include the colonial status of Algeria, the nature of links to be kept with this colony as well as the use of repressive methods, including torture, to prevent the demise of "French Algeria".

10.2. Importance of the Intellectuals in this context

As was seen earlier, throughout the Fourth Republic the "official reaction" to the Algerian uprising was to declare it totally unacceptable that "three French *départements*" should rebel against France.² The struggle became more difficult for

French troops and the French government sent in reinforcements (conscripts and reservists). In April 1955 a state of emergency was decreed and special powers assumed in March 1956.³ The methods used by the "forces of order" were increasingly "dirty" and included frequent recourse to indiscriminate use of force, collective reprisals, summary executions and frequent cases of torture.⁴

The perception of the problems at stake and hence their very solution tore France apart, and since the government considered any views which did not support the military effort or which criticised the use of certain methods by the army as a "breach of state security" and an "attempt to demoralise the army," with the full panoply of sanctions that that implied, accusations of treason were legion and many writers, intellectuals and journalists did not feel it was safe to say anything at all.

It is commonly accepted that well-known intellectuals usually enjoy high esteem in France, and many of them took various stances which put them at odds with one another and with the State during the Algerian War. Without wishing to detract from the importance of J.-F. Sirinelli's arguments⁵ which, if adapted to the circumstance, could be summed up in the well known phrase "a picture (in *Paris-Match*) is worth a thousand words", it should, nevertheless, be emphasised that the influence of intellectuals⁶ and what they say in a society like that of France is important not only for the public at large, but also for decision-makers and influential people in general; the authority of decision-makers and their power to decide could not go easily unchallenged for long if they alienated the intelligentsia of the country. Mauriac was aware that a few

well-written lines did have some impact.⁷

Some members of the intellectual community did speak, using the only weapon at their disposal: their word or pen and their voices were "heard" in the various newspapers and reviews, particularly in *Le Monde*. Despite the restrictions, this period is seen by many as the "golden age" of the intellectuals and also of the periodical press for which they wrote.⁸

Very few statements were made during the first two years of the war by the section of public opinion examined here.⁹ There were slightly more in 1956 and a considerable number in 1957, and the first half of 1958 when de Gaulle arrived on the political scene. Although the war, and its everyday succession of atrocities continued after the collapse of the Fourth Republic, attitudes in general, and those of the intellectual world in particular, seemed to revolve around the position of de Gaulle (when it was understood) and the solutions he was putting forward to solve the colonial problem.¹⁰

Since the significance of French intellectuals in political life and the importance of *Le Monde* and its influence, direct or otherwise, on decision-makers are already well documented, let us look at who was heard, when and how they were presented, and to what effect.

10.3. François Mauriac and Jean Amrouche

The debate between French intellectuals such as François Mauriac, and indigenous (anti-colonialist) thinkers like Jean Amrouche, was echoed in *Le Monde*.¹¹ Their dispute essentially revolved around two incompatible conceptions of the Algerian war:¹² a "liberation struggle" for Amrouche and a "family row" for Mauriac,¹³ a notion unacceptable to Amrouche, who distinguished himself from the prevalent thinking of French politi-

cians and most writers, for whom Algeria could be conceived only as being part and parcel of France.

For Amrouche, colonialism was the negation of a people's existence and honour, and the coexistence of colonisation (whether equated with a slave/master or pupil/master relationship) and equality was impossible for either states or individuals. Hence independence was essential, and the struggle for independence was the cornerstone of the "restitution" to the Algerian people of its right to exist and its honour. Consequently, to ask the FLN to renounce this demand was not, for him, to request a concession but was equivalent to "signing, for a long time to come, if not for all time, the death-warrant of the Algerian people."

These clear-cut principles were rejected by Mauriac on the grounds that independence could not be accepted by any Frenchman. Addressing the FLN leaders (but not Amrouche in person) he wrote that (quoted in *Le Monde*):

*ce qu'ils ne sauraient ignorer [c'est] qu'il ne se trouve en France aucun homme d'Etat pour proclamer, contre la volonté du Parlement et de la nation, l'indépendance de l'Algérie....*¹⁴

Amrouche was eventually given an opportunity to tell a few home truths to the French of Metropolitan France and to expand his ideas further. Despite finding them "bitter", *Le Monde* published them,¹⁵ but not without questioning his credentials as *l'interprète des <muets>*, a spokesman for the intellectuals and the FLN youth, and wondering whether he really did not know how one-sided and excessive his indictment was.

Justifying its decision to publish his article (but downgrading it to a simple testimony), *Le Monde* wrote: *Fallait-il étouffer ce cri d'un être déchiré?* His analysis was seen as

"too cruel", but it was thought that a number of readers would find his "testimony" worth hearing, *[pour] la part de vérité profonde qu'il met à nu et pour l'effort de réflexion qu'il peut imposer à tous.*

His views, stigmatising the French egocentric attitude of looking at things through their own eyes, of applying their own standards which resulted in associating everything French with universality and "treating the rest as barbaric, backward and primitive", and of seeing France herself not as a "component" but as the "end product of universal civilisation", were reported; so was his statement, made in the name of those who lived under colonialism, that the confusion between "real France" and "mythical France" has come to an end, leading to the discovery of an "abyss" between what the French really were and what they thought they had become, between the two realities, "opposed to the point of absolute contradiction":

(...) France coloniale, raciste, avide, oppressive, inhumaine, destructrice (inconsciemment sans doute) de valeurs irremplaçables, et la France émancipatrice, universaliste et salvatrice.

He rejected the idea that France could act as a mediator ("ultimate jurisdiction of appeal") for solving the conflict between the two communities in Algeria as an illusion and an extremely "serious misunderstanding" which should be removed as it would lead France to an "irreversible downfall".

Situating the liberation movements in a world historical context, he accused the "country of the Rights of Man" of having chosen to back colonial regimes of oppression and saw in the "policy of pacification" the traditional expression of repressive measures:

(...) qui ne diffère en rien de celle de Bugeaud et de St-Arnaud, par un président du conseil

socialiste et par un pro-consul socialiste, nanti d'un pouvoir absolu (...) a compromis la France (...) dans son ensemble en jetant le poids de ses forces et de son autorité morale dans une répression sans merci (...).

For him, France could no longer be believed or trusted:

Les promesses trahies, les actes de piraterie déguisés en exploits [reference to the hijacking of Ben Bella's plane in October 1956] ont épuisé l'immense crédit moral que la France avait capitalisé.

He dismissed the widespread view given of French culture and civilisation as constituting a justification for colonisation, stating that culture was often "stolen" by (*voleurs de feu*), as opposed to generously bequeathed to, those colonised (*héritiers choyés*):

Faire de la culture française la justification de la colonisation elle-même, c'est une imposture et une indignité. On sait avec quelle précautionneuse parcimonie la culture française a été dispensée et quels obstacles les maîtres coloniaux ont dressés devant elle.

Although he admitted that, without unfairness, all the blame for the errors and injustices of the colonial era could not be laid at the feet of France (*on les a commis en son nom [le peuple] en abusant de son ignorance, en le trompant*), he argued that France's prestige would not be restored until other peoples were free and independent and that the people of France would walk free towards their destiny only when they wake up from: *la somnolence où on l'a plongé, et qu'il marchera vers son destin, non point seul ou suivi de valets en livrée, mais accompagné d'un cortège de peuples libres et fiers d'être ses amis.*

The subsequent publication of a selection of letters received after the article appeared gives the impression that Amrouche's views were very controversial and far from being

accepted unquestionably by public opinion or by the paper itself.¹⁶

10.4. Raymond Aron and Jacques Soustelle

The significant stance taken by Raymond Aron in the Algerian conflict was given front-page coverage by *Le Monde*,¹⁷ which expected it to have some impact.

Le Monde stated that Aron's booklet had two parts, one of which was devoted to convincing some of his "friends", who had influence on public opinion, that the military effort should be accompanied by a programme of reforms leading to the setting-up of an Algerian state as the end product, but the newspaper made no reference to the fact that part of the book had been written six months previously, and could, therefore, have lost some of its relevance. The second part was not initially intended for publication but was included, since some of the contents had been quoted and commented on in other publications.¹⁸

The publication was described as emanating from a desire to submit to the public "these analyses" which *Le Monde* also saw as:

(...) des examens de conscience, avec les doutes et peut-être les contradictions que chaque Français éprouve en lui-même.

Le Monde thought the operation, which smacked of Cartiérism,¹⁹ not without risks, despite finding the editorialist of *Le Figaro* less suspect and more protected against some attacks. The paper considered that he, nevertheless, was exposing himself to "causing a scandal when he only wanted to make people think" and wondered whether he would be forgiven for saying out loud what so many Frenchmen, whether MPs or Ministers, thought.

Aron's book confronted the facts in the sense that he thought that the war could not be won, that in the way it had

been implemented, "pacification" had never been less likely to lead to peace, and that Algeria was going to be a costly proposition in economic terms, while at the same time it could not be left in the hands of "fanatics". He saw one way out: not to oppose in principle the nationalists' demands, to put conditions on the "inevitable evolution" and to fix the time-limits for the eventual creation of an Algerian state. He accepted that it was a "difficult undertaking", and argued that, although there was no guarantee of success, it offered at least a way out between indefinite violence and sudden capitulation.

The realisation by a number of intellectuals including Aron that the colonial empire, as a symbol of "grandeur," was forever lost, did not strike a chord with the paper which, nevertheless, gave his views reasonable coverage, since the economic argument made sense and the outcome was not immediate.

R.Gauthier of *Le Monde* was keen to present Soustelle's answer to Aron,²⁰ in which he spared nobody, including Aron himself,²¹ as a well known and confident position:

Autant toutefois les thèses de M. R Aron ont pu, sous sa plume, faire scandale, autant la réfutation de M.Jacques Soustelle paraît découler de positions déjà connues.

The offensive remarks and insults addressed by Soustelle to those not sharing his views were described as merely originating from the "polémique" part of the book, while the traditional thesis was said to be the defence of an "Algerian people committed to France", for whom "sacrifices could and should be made", if France was to avoid becoming a second-rate power, and making the political mistake, as well as "committing the crime", of repatriating 1.2 million people.

The ideas described as forming the serious part of the

thesis, the reader was told, revealed that frank and loyal cooperation would take place if it were not for "terror, fanaticism and outside help".

10.5. Germaine Tillion and Albert Camus

Le Monde was grateful to Germaine Tillion's book, which it also reviewed,²² for giving the real causes (although with *jugements nuancés*), of the "undeniable fanaticism" allegedly at work in Algeria. The book was described as having many merits in that it offered new ideas applicable to the rest of the underdeveloped world. Exploring these ideas, *Le Monde* seemed perfectly happy with the explanations the author gave about a "planetary civilisation" enabling some countries to improve their standards of living "quasi-mechanically", leaving others, which had been "unable to enter the race at the right time," bereft of all privileges, suffering from increasing pauperisation and heading inexorably towards a universal process of "clochardisation".

For her, outside help would only make things worse:

<<Tout ce que nous leur donnons se transforme dans leurs mains en feuilles sèches>>, comme si, à l'époque atomique, le vieux mythe de <<l'or maudit>> prenait sa pleine signification. 23

Le Monde did not seek to resolve the contradiction evident in her theory which, when applied to Algeria, saw only two-thirds of the population as subject to this "disgrace" and led her to conclude that only France, "not because of guilt or culpability" but because of a sense of responsibility, could help this country in the "middle of the ford," whose people were members of both communities (*qui se ressemblent comme des frères ... de même développement intellectuel et de même niveau de civilisation...*), to circumvent the current and enter the

race again through education, industrial jobs and a house-building programme.

It goes without saying that, in the eyes of the author (Tillion) and the paper alike, this theory had the merit of rejecting independence which would precipitate Algeria definitely into an <<enfer de misère>>.

Il n'est en effet aucun autre peuple que le peuple français pour faire participer, sans discrimination, les Algériens à tous les avantages intellectuels, économiques et sociaux, dont, dès leur naissance, bénéficient les métropolitains. Sans nous, aucun des problèmes qui se posent en Algérie ne pourrait être résolu.

Le Monde wanted people on both sides to state their views (se prononcer), but ran an advertisement for the book stating that *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *L'Express*, considered it to be un livre capital.²⁴

As for Camus, who did not become fully involved in the debate on the Algerian war, the only protests he made were against the arrest of his friends²⁵ who had joined his call for a "civilian truce". *Le Monde* reported how the writer had been affected by the Algerian problem and how the launch of his purely humanitarian initiative had been disrupted in January 1956, leading him to abstain completely from making any political comment.²⁶

The writer came to the fore again in the paper during the time of the award of the Nobel prize in Stockholm in December 1957. Reporting on the press conference Camus gave to students in the Swedish capital, Dominique Birmann felt a touch of pride for this "master of dignity", who argued successfully against an Algerian at the conference.²⁷ He was soon corrected by the letter Camus wrote to the paper expressing more sympathy with:

(...) [le] jeune Algérien, qui m'a interpellé,

*que je me sens plus près de lui que de beaucoup de Français qui parlent de l'Algérie sans la connaître (...) [il] savait ce dont il parlait, et son visage n'était pas celui de la haine, mais celui du désespoir et du malheur.*²⁸

Le Monde never questioned the writer's statement indicating his priorities and putting the "love of his mother" before his "belief in justice", nor indeed his alleged assertion that there was total and unfettered freedom of the press in France (amended in his letter to "minor restrictions") in the same week that several weeklies were seized.²⁹

We can clearly see so far that the views advocating that links between Algeria and France be maintained (even if some were allowing for emancipation in the long run), but offering reformist solutions were presented positively. Others, which were more radical, were neglected or viewed very critically.

10.6. Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi

F.Fanon's book³⁰ received only a passing reference when a few lines announced the author's expulsion from Algeria.³¹

A.Memmi's book³² indicting the colonial system was given a subtle rejection. *Le Monde* liked the defence that Memmi undertook of the North Africans, traditionally accused of "inherent laziness" which took no account of certain factors:

(...) ni de la sous-alimentation, ni du manque de formation technique, ni des bas salaires peu propres à exciter l'ardeur au travail, qui fait qualifier aussi injustement en Europe les paysans d'Italie méridionale.

Le Monde even added the climate as a contributory factor and did not contest the charges against the coloniser nor the arguments for the colonised "driven to despair and exacerbated nationalism, armed revolt and refusal of the assimilation policy, they had wanted for so long".

Although conceding that some might even agree with Memmi (the author, Vaussard, did not say so, but presumably excluded himself) in his judgment of the "reluctant coloniser" (*le colonisateur qui se refuse*), Vaussard took issue with him on his remarks that the effort of the likes of Mandouze and Barrat would lead nowhere and with the fact, which Memmi found inadmissible, that a "reluctant coloniser" should aspire to remain, and obtain a special status once the colonised country has achieved independence.

What Vaussard found weaker and less wise was Memmi's objection that the undisputed progress achieved by the colonised countries under colonisation was insufficient compared with what would have been achieved without it, and he endeavoured to remind him of:

(...) l'état d'anarchie et de misère où la France au début du siècle a trouvé le Maroc, l'un des territoires africains au passé le plus glorieux cependant? Le Japon serait-il devenu la grande puissance qui a failli dominer toute l'Asie après 1905 s'il ne s'était pas mis à l'école de l'Occident? L'immense Chine rougit-elle de ce qu'elle doit à Moscou et l'Inde à l'Angleterre, qui continue d'éduquer son élite pensante?

Vaussard rejected Memmi's ideas in this respect as pure conjecture, unprecedented, and, indeed, "contradicted by history" and proposed to let history run its course to see if countries like Ghana and the Cameroons would do better on their own.

Le Monde reinforced Vaussard's view with a reader's letter (who had not incidentally, by his own admission, read the book) approving the journalist's "pertinent observations" and requesting that Memmi and people like him, "indifferent to the fate of their compatriots", should go back to their homeland and direct their "misplaced indignation" at increasing the

intellectual level of their community and bringing it out of illiteracy, instead of "holding us responsible".³³

10.7. Jean-Marie Domenach

The positions adopted by *Le Monde* over the issue of independence could be more easily illustrated by the paper's analysis and views of other intellectuals, like Jean-Marie Domenach who believed that the independence of Algeria did not prejudice the federal project (uniting Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria on one side and France on the other), popular at the time with people reluctant to sever the links between France and its dependencies.

Florenne was not keen, either, on the "*propositions raisonnables*" of J.-M. Domenach in *Esprit* on the right to independence of Algeria which, in his view, was no more and no less than what the FLN was asking for, but conceded that Domenach's proposals for the setting up of a federal system were optimistic despite the "not very encouraging examples" of Morocco and Tunisia.

Florenne³⁴ attacked the "simplicity" of Domenach's argument that France, being who she was, could not but respect (unless she were to deny all she stood for) peoples' rights to self determination;³⁵ a principle with which Florenne agreed, but found ambiguous to apply when he pointed out that those who thought of this principle had historically defined people in mind, and nationalities which existed prior to oppression.

Florenne then put a series of questions as to how and when a people comes into being, requested a series of guarantees as to the form in which, and as to the veracity and sincerity with which, a people could express its wishes, ironically criticising the implementation of the principle to Algeria:

S'il suffit d'une <<minorité agissante>> et d'un maquis dans le bois de Boulogne, nous entendrons bientôt parler du droit à disposer de lui-même du peuple du XVIème arrondissement.

Having accepted that the integration of Algerians may have failed because France never really wanted it to succeed, Florenne doubted whether Domenach's proposal (to integrate the European population into an Algerian state) could have much success. Florenne did not consider that his "brave" but "slightly provocative" concluding statement,³⁶ which he thought Domenach "had picked up" in a quote by Comte, made much sense either:

(...) parce qu'on ne peut restituer que ce qu'on a pris ou ce qui a existé. En aucune façon ce qu'on a apporté ou ce qu'on a créé.

and he set about correcting him asserting:

(...) Il conviendrait de corriger Auguste Comte et d'avancer que les Français devraient donner dignement l'Algérie aux Arabes.

But he stopped himself in mid-stream, finding a fictional objector who might point out that the Algerians "would not know how to use it".³⁷

Florenne provided a very similar criticism of independence when he examined the "Socialist proposals" of J.Ries in the Revue socialiste:³⁸

Or la conséquence la plus sûre de toutes les solutions préconisées ou exigées par la gauche la plus active et qui se veut ou qui se croit la plus intégralement socialiste, cette conséquence serait de ruiner, pour une durée indéterminée, toutes les chances du socialisme en Algérie.

Florenne argued against any political mutation leading to independence, seen as a backward step .

"<<l'indépendance>> sous le couvert du nationalisme fascisant et religieux est un leurre et une

régression. Le socialisme se doit de dénoncer également le <<capitalisme (français) et les régimes qui, par une conception médiévale de l'Etat, provoquent à travers une baisse du niveau de vie déjà très bas un recul de la civilisation.>>

En somme, wrote Florenne, sans se laisser abuser par le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes (qui n'est souvent que l'alibi des tyrannies et des formes politiques condamnées), le socialisme luttera pour qu'il ne soit pas disposé du peuple -où qu'il se trouve, sur quelque terre qu'il vive- dans un sens qui l'écarte encore davantage de sa libération véritable."

As we see, there was in *Le Monde* under the Fourth Republic a definite aversion to a solution that would give the Algerians their independence.

10.8. Pierre-Henri Simon and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber

Of the books revealing the Army's implementation of pacification methods and its use of torture,³⁹ only P.-H. Simon⁴⁰ and J.-J. Servan-Schreiber⁴¹ were reviewed but their effect was understated.⁴²

Even though H. Beuve-Méry, the director and founder of the paper, conceded that Frenchmen could no longer deliver the same judgment on the "perpetrators of Ouradour and Gestapo torturers",⁴³ he tried to put forward excuses when pressed by readers:

(...) Il n'est pas facile d'établir avec certitude, en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances, ce qui s'est passé au fond d'une cave ou dans une mechta perdue. Il faut prendre garde de ne pas blesser au plus profond de l'âme ceux, policiers ou soldats, qui font simplement et honnêtement leur devoir. Il est fâcheux enfin de contribuer, si peu que ce soit à pourvoir l'arsenal de la propagande adverse.⁴⁴

His answer to the rhetorical question of P.-H. Simon, which made the headline of the article "Sommes-nous les <<vaincus d'Hitler>>?", was that:

Si profond qu'il soit, après l'occupation et la résistance, après la guerre d'Indochine et deux ans

*de guérilla algérienne, le mal ne paraît pas incurable. Nous ne sommes pas encore comme le redoute P.-H. Simon, <<les vaincus d'Hitler>>.*⁴⁵

Le Monde remained in this half-way house between outright condemnation and cover-up, accepting that unorthodox methods had been used, yet minimising their impact or extent. It echoed Mauriac's reply to P.-H. Simon that the French were no worse than anybody else: "*Nous ne sommes pas plus noirs que les autres*", as well as calls to "prosecute the traitors demoralising the Army", and expressions of outrage at the use of these methods.⁴⁶ This made *Le Monde's* position fall far short of the stance taken even by André Frossard in *L'Aurore*, who, although also minimising the frequency of these "excesses", remarked that "*les services de la Wehrmacht n'ont pas emporté toutes les baignoires avec eux*".⁴⁷

Le Monde even fell into the trap (unwittingly?) of presenting M.Massenet as having understood the "frightening complexity of the problem":

*Tel qu'il se présente et la voie demeurant ouverte à la discussion, le livre de M.Massenet a le grand mérite de dépasser la pure polémique pour préférer à la défense obstinée du passé la pénible recherche des solutions de l'avenir.*⁴⁸

Anything that seemed seriously to question the *status-quo* appeared suspicious to the newspaper, which treated popular books and publications that did not deal with the political questions at hand as objective, free of passion and polemic and positively recommended them.⁴⁹

10.9. Sartre and the militant Left

Publications like *Le Dossier Jean Muller* and *Des Rappelés témoignent*⁵⁰ received scant, if any, attention from *Le Monde*⁵¹ at a time when publicity and newspaper reviews of the very few

"controversial" books published by the even fewer brave editors⁵² were essential to bring them to the attention of the general public.

The publication of evidence about the methods of military action in Algeria in *Des rappelés témoignent* led Sartre to write an article under the title "*Nous sommes tous coupables*"; he offered it to "a major daily"⁵³ which refused to publish it. Sartre then resorted to his own journal but used a more sarcastic title.⁵⁴

Le Monde's Florenne⁵⁵ stated that, even if Sartre spoke "à huis clos", his voice was bound to be heard and that he, himself was fulfilling Sartre's wish by providing him with a platform, but not with the aim (declared by Sartre) of inciting people to read *Des rappelés témoignent* but only to read what Sartre had written about it in *Les Temps Modernes*.

Arguing that the aim of the article had doubly been missed because of the limited readership of *Temps Modernes* and its inherent support, Florenne refused to share the common guilt implied in the original article⁵⁶ and questioned Sartre's "credentials".

C'est sur cette égalité dans la culpabilité qu'on ne s'est pas trouvé pleinement d'accord et par voie de conséquences sur les titres et qualités qu'on serait en droit d'exiger de notre accusateur public.

Florenne wrote that other people denounced the excesses in Algeria before him as they had denounced, before Budapest, the "totalitarian enterprise of the Soviets and their crimes" and that criticism could be better taken from them.

On a simplement pensé que s'il fallait que quelqu'un ou quelques-uns nous frappent publiquement la poitrine, nous le supporterions mieux de ces hommes dont la lucidité et la conscience n'avaient connu de longues périodes ou de larges zones d'obs-

Florenne accepted that "we were not great or innocent. This we know" and that it was to protect "us from this silence, this consent, this contempt, that brave voices have spoken and that J.P. Sartre cried with real anguish", but it was "up to the French on their own to find out about the French truth".⁵⁷

The French have a bad conscience, wrote Florenne, but that was better than "a conscience that was too good or no conscience at all". Speaking in the name of "the least sleepy and complacent conscience" but not using the first person, he argued that the rapprochement made by Sartre could be disputed. He criticised "the implicit justification, without contrition", of what was not recognised by Sartre as a mistake: "the blind faith (...) the complicity demanded by the Soviet Communist state's *raison d'état*".⁵⁸

The parallel drawn by Sartre⁵⁹ did not inspire Florenne, who did not think much of his dialectic and contended that it was not by telling the French that they had fallen into the lowest form of abjection that Sartre would get them to read what he wanted. He also criticised Sartre's "efficient but contradictory" request to Frenchmen to face the truth which will demand that they "condemn publicly or endorse in full knowledge of the facts the crimes committed", arguing that the choice was not really given as with the same breath Sartre stated that "we cannot see the plain facts, the horror, our horror, without wanting to tear it from ourselves and crush it".⁶⁰

Florenne concluded that Sartre's statements were excessive, since the guilt of the French "bore no relation" to that of the Germans or the Soviets':

(...) et c'est ici qu'apparait le caractère

abusif des rapprochements entre situations sans commune mesure. Aucune vérité ne semble avoir pu "mettre en demeure" le peuple allemand. Non plus, d'ailleurs que le peuple russe, -après Budapest comme avant. Et cette horreur -la leur- ou bien, ils n'ont pu la voir, ou bien, en la voyant, ils l'ont supportée sans tenter grand'chose, semble-t-il, ni pour "l'arracher", ni pour "l'écraser".⁶¹

10.10 Conclusion

The intellectual world could be roughly divided into two sections: the European one which, with very few exceptions, sided with the interests of the coloniser, and the indigenous one, which sided, with greater fervour, with the interests of the colonised. These were generally the more visible lines of demarcation in the loyalties, divided though they may have been for some, with real tension and conflict of conscience, of the intellectuals of the time, with one or two exceptions for which the ethnic divide was irrelevant - in the case of Sartre, for instance.

Several trends could be identified in *Le Monde*, as one would expect of a "liberal" newspaper. But the paper was far more critical of the views of an Albert Memmi, an Amrouche, a Fanon or a Sartre. *L'Express*, *France-Observateur*, *Témoignage Chrétien*, the *Editions de Minuit*, *Seuil* and reviews such as *Temps Modernes*, and *Esprit*, did far more than *Le Monde* to help the cause of "the colonised" in a very hostile environment.⁶²

10.11 Conclusions

The coverage of this section has illustrated how *Le Monde's* discussion of the policies put forward by the government and the views developed by the intellectuals on the burning colonial issue was very much a moderate one.

Since the war in Algeria provided the occasion for intellectuals to escape the mould of their party ideologies, embattled in the pursuit of a blind policy of repression (see Chapters 11 and 12), clinging on to old values and identifying the loss of colonies with the demise of France, ideas which were becoming more and more out of place in the Cold War and decolonisation atmosphere of the 1950s, *Le Monde*, given its declared independence (the only paper owned by its own staff -Chapter 2), could have provided an ideal forum for the intellectuals, most informed section of public opinion in France and especially its more radical elements. In this respect, the paper failed miserably.

Although the paper was at times clearly critical of decision-makers and it did, to a certain extent, provide a forum where an exchange of views took place over the solution of colonial problems facing France in the 1950's, alas! the paper was far more conservative than one would expect and not at all at the forefront of the decolonisation struggle. Some⁶³ have explained the lack of radicalism of *Le Monde* by reference to imposed censorship, fear of the authorities or of loss of income. But it is clear to the analyst that there definitely was a deliberate policy of self-restraint in not publishing, and even opposing at times, views of intellectuals for fear of

damaging French prospects and interests.⁶⁴

Truly wanting a liberal outcome (through incremental change), *Le Monde* aspired to improve the economic and social plight of the Algerian "Muslim" population as well as introduce some form of political reform but remained unable to conceive of an emancipation outside the French framework, a liberation without French supervision. The fact that *Le Monde* was unable to understand that independence and freedom could be conceived and attained outside "westernisation" shows the degree of parochialism of the paper.

Having pursued a neo-colonialist campaign in the case of Indochina⁶⁵ and changed its views in the later stages of the "sale guerre", *Le Monde* seemed not to have lost its neo-colonialist views or to have benefited from that lesson in the case of Algeria. If some aspects of the fight against colonial views and oppressive trends could be seen in the paper, the radical support for Algerian independence as a solution can be noted by its absence and if present, by the critical and unfavourable treatment it was given.⁶⁶ The interests of the European community living there were judged important enough for the paper to toy with various views ranging from shared sovereignty to partition.

Le Monde's journalists, and especially outside contributors like Duverger, with their critical comments on the more extreme views of the "ultras" seemed to have had a moderating effect, but the patriotic feeling within the paper and the desire not to damage irreparably the prestige of France, the timidity of its defence (and very often the lack of it) of the oppressed people, self determination and the intellectuals, made it fall far short of the general impression people have of the paper

and of the objectives of impartiality and independence which it had set itself and the general philosophy which the paper declares to have established at its inception and has constantly proclaimed since.

Although, arguably the Algerian war was not a television arm-chair war,⁶⁷ a more supportive attitude on the part of the paper, which already had a significant role in France,⁶⁸ on the issue of the people's rights to self-determination and in the decolonisation process in general might have had an impact on the more important sectors of opinion and could possibly have quickly moved important decision-making groups towards a speedier resolution of the conflict.

SECTION FOUR A DISAPPOINTING STAND ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

THE REPRESSION OF A NATIONALIST UPRISING

SECTION FOUR: A DISAPPOINTING STAND ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
THE MEANS OF REPRESSION OF A NATIONALIST UPRISING

11.0 Introduction

From time to time in French history, traditional republican values of democracy and the rule of law have given way, under circumstances, to military rule and exceptional powers, including martial law. In France, times of upheaval have led to the military gaining the upper hand.¹ In Algeria, military rule held sway throughout the history of colonial Algeria. Despite the inclusion of the territory into France after 1848 as three *départements*, it was only after the 1947 Statutes, integrating Algeria more closely to France, that the civilian authority came to prevail. Even then, larger areas of the colony were made up of *communes mixtes* under the total control of military administration. However, with the 1954 uprising, the various governments found themselves increasingly under the pressure of events and felt the need to adopt emergency powers to deal with situations which arose. The political and administrative authorities progressively felt that the "limited" legal and police powers were insufficient; they began to leave the job of policing Algeria (including those areas under civilian control) to the military. This was made possible by legally handing over control to area commanders, and by the adoption of legislation which allowed exceptional powers to be put in the hands of the authorities dealing with the "troubles". Since Algeria was,

officially at least, part of French territory, the government had two obligations: to protect life and property and to maintain civil liberties. It could be argued that the governments should at least have tried to steer a middle course between, for instance, proclaiming martial law and maintaining civil liberties. This is precisely what various governments of the Fourth Republic claimed that they were doing. The reality, as far as Algeria was concerned, was different, and what in fact took place was a very harsh regime of repression, whose victims included a large number of innocent people. This led to a loss of civil liberties for all Algerians ("Muslims") as well as for most of the Europeans who espoused their cause. *Le Monde's* coverage of these aspects of the war was to be quite revealing. The purpose of this and the following chapters is to focus particularly on the many aspects of civil liberties in France and Algeria under the impact of the war effort and their coverage in the pages of the paper.²

CHAPTER ELEVEN

11. INSIDE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

11.1. Introduction

This part deals with the "legal" measures adopted to deal with the unrest in Algeria. It examines the way the paper perceived and covered the adoption by the authorities of a range of powers taken formally at a political and legal level to deal specifically with the Algerian problem.

A State of Emergency was declared on 31 March 1955, and Special Powers adopted a year later. In addition to these texts and to the increased powers they conferred upon the authorities, a large measure of discretion in the repression of "terrorists" was given to the courts (civilian and military). This section will cover these three areas under three main headings. A fourth heading looks at the attitude shown towards the same issues in France, and proposes to compare attitudes and positions on both sides of the Mediterranean.

11.2. The State of Emergency (31/3/55)

11.2.1. The introduction of the measures

After the fall of Pierre Mendès-France,³ Guy Mollet's government decided to deal more severely with the situation in Algeria. It adopted new measures introducing a State of Emergency. These provided a legal basis for expediency as a means of "solving the Algerian problem." These measures threatened potentially and actually the remaining civil liberties of Algerians (and their sympathizers) in Algeria.⁴

11.2.2 A necessary and intermediate measure?

Le Monde justified the introduction of the measures on the grounds that the military had no power of arrest, except in

flagrante delicto at a time of increased terrorist activities which were "causing anguish to the population in the Aures area".⁵ This, of course, suggested to the readers that the law was necessary and even overdue.⁶

Considerable doubts could be cast on the need for the introduction of such emergency measures; at the time, reports indicated that the security forces were being successful, without the new measures.⁷ One could legitimately ask why, if the system were so efficient and had successful results in dealing with terrorism, did the government, or, indeed, *Le Monde*, go to such lengths to justify the measures and present them as acceptable, and even indispensable? The answer is clearly that the paper was trying to serve two purposes by seeking to present the government's need to take exceptional measures as justified, while not wishing to indicate that the "enemy" might be gaining the upper hand and even winning. This was why the success over the terrorists went hand in hand with increased discriminatory and exceptional legislation, without the contradiction being resolved.⁸

Another feature of the Emergency Law as characterised by the paper was that of its being merely an intermediate measure. It was presented as an attempt to avoid instituting a "state of siege", seen as an "extreme solution" with "serious disadvantages".⁹ If the skeptical amongst us tried to see this positive coverage merely as a journalistic presentation of the political debates and proposals, then doubts could be soon dispelled by the paper's explicit position and judgment on the measures.¹⁰ This position was maintained even later, with a background of protests against the State of Emergency's impact on civil liberties.¹¹

11.2.3.A supportive attitude towards a better legal arrangement?

Although the Emergency Law was very much a measure which, in a traditional sense, would not normally have many legal connotations, it was presented as a "better" legal arrangement.¹²

The paper also reassured the readers that *la durée et le champ d'application* would be subject to Parliamentary approval,¹³ but asked no question when it later printed that there was a possibility of that power being taken by decree,¹⁴ nor about the possibility provided for by the measures to deal, in certain cases, with crimes and misdemeanours in military courts.¹⁵ Chênebenoît also reassured himself and his readers that the measures would safeguard parliamentary prerogatives and provide satisfactory protection against abuse by administrative authorities.¹⁶

It was clear to anybody examining the articles of *Le Monde* and the text of the law¹⁷ that there were inconsistencies, and that, if the new law were to be implemented, many liberties would disappear, especially for the average Algerian. Indeed, he gave a word of warning to democracies, which illustrated the author's perfect understanding of what was at stake.¹⁸ But commenting on possible injustices, Chênebenoît presented them as remote, and, given the general tone of the article, as likely to occur only in very exceptional circumstances.¹⁹

If any reader glancing at the pages of *Le Monde* started to worry about the possible implications or consequences of such legislation and about the possible abuses that it might lead to, Chênebenoît had a reassuring thought.²⁰ This clearly illustrated that he, Chênebenoît, seemed to have forgotten how

unwise the Assemblies could be. It is unlikely that he, or any other competent journalist, could have forgotten so rapidly the lessons of 1940.

Considering the issue important, when it commented on the actual passing of the law in Parliament, *Le Monde* found the spectacle of a half-empty chamber surprising.²¹

From the description of the debates and the final vote,²² one could legitimately ask where *la sagesse et la foi de l'Assemblée ... dans la suite républicaine*, which Chênebenoît was so keen to evoke, were. The answer was not provided.

If the articles and discussions dealing with the State of Emergency themselves were to provide a measure of the paper's attitude, it was easily noticeable, even nearly a month later, that the paper seemed to be supportive of the law.²³

Le Monde also presented the "Emergency Law" as applicable to the entire French territory and, therefore, not exceptional to Algeria.²⁴ In spite of going to great lengths to explain that this was not discriminatory legislation (*législation d'exception*) (on page 1, see above), *Le Monde* printed (on page 5) a four-column title, *Le gouvernement invite l'Assemblée à instituer l'Etat d'Urgence et à y soumettre l'Algérie pendant six mois*, without, nevertheless, resolving the contradiction.²⁵

These measures could hardly be implemented in metropolitan France, as the trouble-spot was Algeria, and the law was devised to deal with it. The fact that administrative and military measures were to be accompanied by economic and social ones was emphasised. A great deal was to be written in the articles and "issues" of the paper during the following years on administrative and military matters, and very little on economic and social concerns. The latter interests were

eclipsed in favour of an emphasis placed on judicial and military measures. The sum of 5 billion francs to be reserved for economic measures was not immediately discussed nor commented on, despite its allocation to spending of a military nature.²⁶

But the paper's suggestion, which closely followed the official line, was to reassure those who were apprehensive by limiting its scope of application.²⁷

11.2.4. Reactions: a welcome if somewhat unsuccessful measure

There was a constant desire by *Le Monde* to show that there was a dual reaction to these measures and an attempt to balance the two views, but there was also an inherent bias.

Though the "Emergency Law" was perceived to be feared by Algerian representatives, such as F. Abbas and Dr Ben Salem, from the start, and the paper was aware of the implications for the Algerian population,²⁸ there was no precise evaluation of the reactions of the Muslims as a community. However, from the start, the paper was confident of the reassuring effect on the European section of the population.²⁹

The new measures obviously meant the increase in military efforts and activity, which *Le Monde* reported,³⁰ and which had resulted during the last "few weeks in important and significant success over the outlaws".³¹ The results, however, were not as clear-cut as these lines implied.³²

The official statements in favour of the State of Emergency continued to appear in the paper.³³ The paper even noted some impatience to see the measures implemented.³⁴

The measures, however repressive, did not always work. That did not seem to please the paper. When P.A. Martel remarked on the failure of the measures being deployed by the government,

the tone was one of sorrow.³⁵

Their failure was said to have occurred, even though the government had brought into service active and experienced officers.³⁶ Here the concern expressed for the "European" community resurfaced.³⁷ Here also, the security of one community was obviously seen as a *force majeure* for the insecurity, the suffering and loss of liberty of the other community.³⁸

The implementation of the measures was to make possible many abuses of civil liberties, causing part of public opinion to protest against them. Without taking a major stand on the issue, the paper continued to leave the protest to various other political groups, organisations and personalities, giving coverage to their views and protests every now and then.³⁹

Though *Le Monde* did not overtly encourage the adoption and implementation of the Law on the State of Emergency, overall it did present it as an unavoidable process by which a government was trying to reestablish order in an area that no longer seemed to respect it. It is clear that the paper did not revolt against this. The strongest attacks against the measures could only be found in the *Libres opinions* columns.⁴⁰

11.2.5. Attacked by third-parties only

In this particular instance the attack on the new measures, signed by Olivier Pozzo di Borgo, was quite virulent.⁴¹

The tone and the terms used clearly represented a very strong position. But they were not *Le Monde's*. Many of the measures were obviously not as innocent as they had been presented by the authorities and echoed in the press, including in *Le Monde*. Many personalities took a stance against them. *Le Monde* echoed the criticism, but also the praise for these measures; and, apart from a brief critical comment or two,

often made by outsiders, the paper did not see fit to show any staunch defence of civil liberties.

11.3.Special Powers (12/3/56)

11.3.1. Introduction

A year after the introduction of the Emergency Law, nothing of substance had been resolved in Algeria. On the contrary, things had followed the same pattern or even worsened. Edgard Faure's government had fallen, and had been replaced by another. In order to deal with the continuing crisis in Algeria, the Assembly (including the Communists) granted "special powers" to Guy Mollet's government.⁴²

When they were adopted, the reactions of the paper were very much the same as they had been following the introduction of the "State of Emergency".⁴³

In fact, it was very clear to many politicians and to a few newspapers on the left-wing of the political spectrum,⁴⁴ that most of the measures introduced were mainly devised as extensions of policing powers. These extensions included the transfer of many powers to the military.⁴⁵ This was not made completely clear in *Le Monde*, even when the paper was reporting their adoption.⁴⁶

Under J.Fauvet, *Le Monde's* editorial team thought, and continued to think, that special powers were helpful. It believed in the dual claim put forward by the government, as it was alleged that behind the intentions of these measures there was a dual purpose: to establish peace (to pacify) and reconcile the community (reform).⁴⁷

11.3.2. A necessary and justified measure?

While Chênebenoit, looking at it from a different perspec-

tive, did ask why special powers were being adopted, commenting that without a general policy, military means were inefficient,⁴⁸ for most of *Le Monde's* journalists the adoption of special powers⁴⁹ was justified; and the need for the adoption of the measures was repeatedly echoed by the newspaper.⁵⁰

This was done in the full knowledge that many of the measures could have been adopted without resorting to special powers.⁵¹ The non-essential character of the powers for military measures to be taken was evident when it came to committing more troops to Algeria.⁵²

11.3.3. The repressive factors dominate

After the vote for Special Powers (12/3/56) in the Assembly, J. Fauvet described the measures being undertaken. What comprised essentially military means⁵³ was not presented as being exclusively repressive but designed to heal the rift between the two communities.⁵⁴

The emphasis placed on military aspects was made clear when *Le Monde* showed that it shared the feeling of the government of the day that applying reforms was inappropriate before military measures were implemented.⁵⁵

Subsequently, headlines asked whether the extensive powers, thus granted, were likely to restore the situation in Algeria. But apart from a few administrative measures,⁵⁶ all were very weak measures.⁵⁷

Having been hailed as a necessary measure to repress and reform, Special Powers⁵⁸ appeared to be a mere pretext for removing what had been left of the legal constraints and controls over the security forces in subsequent articles.

11.3.4. Army recall

As a corollary of the increased repressive powers there was an increase in troop reinforcements to implement the new powers and to deal with the growing insecurity in Algeria.

Examining the alternatives, *renforts ou réformes*, *Le Monde's* J. Planchais recalled⁵⁹ that the *politique des petits paquets* had always been a mistake because of too few troops, suggesting that the number of troops in North Africa⁶⁰ be increased by a 100,000 to 200,000 -as "the house was still on fire".⁶¹ This concern became exclusively military when he reported that there were conflicting views within the government.⁶²

J. Planchais was already working out troop permutations between those who had been demobilised and those who were called up (65,000 men) before the government had even made up its mind about the numbers to be called up.⁶³

The recall of 100,000 troops, which followed, was decided by decree about ten days later,⁶⁴ and was characterised by the paper as reinforcements needed to prevent the situation from becoming more "rotten".⁶⁵

11.3.5. A successful measure?

This time the measures were said to be successful. *Le Monde* also echoed views, such as the declaration by Lacoste, that the vote was producing "a profound sense of well-being in Algeria".⁶⁶ The paper reported, and even gave front-page coverage to, statements by officials indicating improvements and expressing satisfaction after the vote of special powers.⁶⁷

The emergency laws and the Special Powers provided the legal framework for many repressive measures adopted in Algeria, which were not necessarily clearly spelled out in the

legal text, but which became an every day *modus operandi* for dealing with the local inhabitants, who were becoming increasingly suspect, justifiably or not, in the eyes of the security forces.

11.4. General implementation of Repressive measures

11.4.1. Extensive use of powers of repression

A whole series of other measures were taken by the authorities to deal with the troubles in Algeria,⁶⁸ and the use of repressive powers by the authorities led to many excesses and abuse of freedoms.⁶⁹

The way *Le Monde* perceived these measures, when it reported them (if it did so), is not without interest for the purpose of this study. The nature of the measures implemented, the approval and sometimes the justification of them are a clear indication of the support (or lack of it), for a particular repressive policy. Let us examine briefly some of these aspects.

11.4.2. Exceptional measures justified

The exceptional measures taken by the security forces, and the civilian and military authorities in Algeria, were often presented as if they were needed in the normal course of events and in many respects as essential, no matter how they affected the population, which was presented as accepting them, if not with joy then with a considerable degree of consent.⁷⁰

The measures taken to restrict the movements of people received similar treatment by the paper.⁷¹

11.4.3. Collective sanctions

Algerians were made also to atone for the "wrongs" of the "rebels" by building or rebuilding damaged roads and railway lines, as well as by repairing telephone and telegraph lines and communications networks. They were fined collectively for

being unwilling or unable to point out the culprits. This was reported by the paper, essentially from the point of view of information, without comment and without any disquiet amongst the reporters, even when the harshness of the measure seemed to require it.⁷²

11.4.4. Zones interdites and enforced population movements

One of the measures particularly favoured by the authorities was to declare whole areas (in this case Western Algeria) *zones interdites*. This meant that anybody living in the area would have to vacate their dwelling and meagre plots as the army would shoot on sight anybody who remained.⁷³

Decisions of this kind, taken at low level with hardly any legitimacy, were described in laconic terms.⁷⁴ The paper even justified the measure by stating that "the regions affected were generally not easily penetrable (*pénétration difficile*) or heavily influenced by the rebels" (*fortement marquée par l'influence rebelle*).⁷⁵

At other times, a hint of justification could be found in the reports of *Le Monde*, which were written in such a way as not to alarm readers who might be disturbed by such information, or to deny other reports which might have given a different version, unpalatable to the authorities.⁷⁶

The paper played down the severity of the methods presenting them as crucial for the "health" of the country.⁷⁷

Le Monde also stated that the people who were evacuated had received an indemnity enabling them to rebuild a dwelling in a designated area, as though any wrong that might have occurred as a result of their evacuation had already been righted; it thus failed to understand the impact of the uprooting, the loss

of land and livelihood, of neighbours and other members of the wider family and assumed that compensation given was sufficient.⁷⁸

These measures might have been seen simply as the culmination of the efforts used to bring down the rebellion, and used as a very last resort. But nothing was further from the truth: these and other no-less severe measures were systematically implemented from a very early stage in the conflict. Indeed, some of these complemented, if they were not conditioned by, or provided for, by the legal framework, when the need was felt to implement them.

11.4.5. Special Powers continue

A year after the Assembly (which included the Communists) gave special powers to G.Mollet,⁷⁹ *Le Monde* was still reporting events without any critical or negative comment apart from the odd "explanation" and frequent clear or more subtle "justifications" for their introduction and use. The language of these presentations was itself very euphemistic, calling a person detained *hébergé* for instance (sheltered/accommodated), despite the extraordinary and most disturbing implications being clear to a shrewd analyst.⁸⁰

After the fall of the government, Special Powers were reported to be still applicable (*en vigueur*). In contradiction with previous reports, the paper tendentiously "reminded" its readers that the next Premier could, if he wished, within ten days of forming a government, request the prolongation of those powers by Parliament.⁸¹

As has been previously illustrated, many of the protests against these exceptional measures were left very often to outsiders or contributors to the paper and to the rest of the

press, while *Le Monde* concentrated on giving the readers the "official versions".

11.5. The Coverage of Trials

11.5.1. Introduction

The coverage of the trials of those arrested by the security forces is of considerable interest. The sub-section sets out to analyse the general views of the paper on the subject of the Algerian question by examining its coverage of them.

11.5.2. Trials reports

During the Algerian insurrection, many of the indigenous population were to be taken to court to answer for their actions. They were soon to be followed by Europeans accused of helping them. A number of Europeans, often devout Christians, could not witness the excesses of the Army and the repressive nature of its activities without feeling sympathy for the cause of the nationalist movements. These French men and women took a stand which they thought was in conformity with their religious duty or conscience. Indeed, when confronted with the methods used by the security forces, a number of these Europeans living in Algeria, and, later, those living in France, identified themselves with the Algerian struggle. This stand led them actively to assist the nationalists by giving them shelter, help, medicine, money and to stand by them before what they saw as the unjust treatment meted out to them by the "forces of order" in the name of France.⁸²

If for some "Europeans" and "Muslims" the position was merely one of intermediaries trying to intercede between two communities in order to prevent a bloodbath, others definitely assisted those fleeing from the army or trying to organise resistance.⁸³

This involvement was punished by exile or banishment but very often by the arrest and trial of those involved.

The offences under which suspects could be charged were already legion and more specific legislation and powers were introduced to reinforce the authority of the State when the prevailing legal framework was thought to be insufficient.⁸⁴

Algerians and Europeans alike⁸⁵ were to feel the full force of the "law" all through the Algerian conflict. At the start civilian courts but soon military courts "dispensed French justice",⁸⁶ after initial enquiries were made and charges brought against the suspects.

The victims were French nationals, not only members of the outlawed Algerian Communist Party and fellow-travellers but also a number of teachers or intellectuals, professors (A. Mandouze⁸⁷ and H. Marrou⁸⁸), doctors, churchmen and women and Christians who held enlightened beliefs on the Algerian question.

If, for most Frenchmen involved in the issue there was no defence against the charges of threat to national security, the people whose action was motivated by their religious beliefs were not granted a better defence by the paper.

11.5.3. The trials of the *Chrétiens progressistes*

At the time of one of these trials involving people linked with the Catholic Church, labelled *Chrétiens progressistes*, by the press, *Le Monde* merely echoed the appeal by the Archbishop of Algiers, Monsignor Duval, to some of the press not to infer (from the appellation "progressive") a relation between these people (nuns and priests who were helping the Algerians) and the atheist ideology of Communism.⁸⁹

But, if the views of the Archbishop were echoed, so were

those of the press expressing completely hostile views and accusing those involved of having "curious ideals" and of helping the "FLN executioners".⁹⁰

11.5.4. Aspects of the reports

Many points could be made about the coverage of this particular aspect of the repressive system as seen and reported by the paper. At this point some trends might already be outlined about the paper's coverage.

Le Monde's heavy and frequent reliance on non-independent and biased sources⁹¹ made its reports appear flawed. This is clear from the particular lexical and syntactic choices used which revealed an overall bias,⁹² and through reports which convicted people before they were even tried⁹³ despite the occasional corrections made after the fact.⁹⁴

Another aspect revealed in the coverage is the interrelatedness of various factors, the feeling that everything was more or less tied together, connected. For instance, *Le Monde* combined in the same space (usually the same page 3 or 4) news of terrorist activities, of arrests and the condemnation of terrorists as well as their execution when sentenced to death by military tribunals, giving readers the impression of interrelation which may have been intended to justify the heavy sentences and the death penalties. It is difficult to see whether the paper could have found a more suitable arrangement⁹⁵ or a different space-allocation in the paper other than mixing all these different items of news under the overall heading of *Les événements d'Afrique du Nord*. It is clear, however, that this sort of spatial juxtaposition of the varied items outlining the "crimes" of some and the close proximity of sentences and executions of others did make the sanctions and execution of

those sentenced look even more legitimate- irrespective of the fact that those committing the crimes and those being sentenced or executed that day were not necessarily the same people.⁹⁶

Le Monde also seemed to defend the involvement of military courts, and appeared less respectful of, or confident in, the civilian court. In France civilian tribunals occasionally dealt with the offences but very often the DST and the military became involved. But in Algeria, although the civilian legal system remained in place, it was made redundant by military tribunals which expedited matters swiftly using their own brand of justice.

The arrest and detention of civilians by the military were not without problems for some "consciences." They led to a number of complaints concerning non-involvement of civilian authorities.

This issue prompted M. Patin (*Président de la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation*) to publish an article (*Recueil de Droit Pénal*) arguing that the existing procedure gave guarantees, which were seen positively by *Le Monde*.⁹⁷

11.5.5. An uncritical paper: a question of patriotic duty?

In many of its reports *Le Monde* never seemed to scratch below the surface to determine what was really happening at Algerian trials.⁹⁸ In fact, the non-inquisitive nature of *Le Monde's* reports is striking⁹⁹ and could only betray an unwillingness to "rock the boat," motivated by patriotic considerations.

Le Monde never appeared worried by the heavy sentences being passed on Algerians. There were cases where the action had clearly not been that of a criminal, but of a political nature,

and had not resulted in any injuries or deaths. Despite the paper's experience of trials (in one case, it had inserted the corrections and reported that the affair had been blown out of all proportions),¹⁰⁰ when discrepancies in sentencing were manifest (with Algerians being more heavily sentenced than Europeans),¹⁰¹ *Le Monde* presented both the sentences and the verdicts as "predictable" and merely described them as constituting "a refusal by the court to confuse a spirit of charity with nationalist action".¹⁰² *Le Monde* considered this type of sentences as "measured".¹⁰³

11.5.6. Trial irregularities

The trials were riddled with irregularities (touched upon in the case above) which the paper reported,¹⁰⁴ when lawyers involved claimed that they were not in a position to ensure the proper defence of those charged in Algeria because of the speed of the procedures, because of their status being questioned, thus making it very difficult, if not impossible, to discharge their duties. One of the articles published (a *communiqué* by 21 Paris lawyers) outlined that since February, lawyers in Algiers had been unable to represent their clients and that they had been arrested themselves.¹⁰⁵ These trials even brought arrested lawyers (eg. Boumendjel) before Algerian courts for their defence of nationalists and for allegedly passing on FLN directives.¹⁰⁶

But no comment or article appeared expressing the views of the paper, let alone condemning the practice, which was contrary to the most basic principles of justice.¹⁰⁷

It is clear to anyone looking at the paper at the time that there were very few indications¹⁰⁸ of the extent to which the Algerians had suffered at the hands of the security forces.

However, even when Europeans suffered at the hands of the security forces, *Le Monde* covered the news very superficially, as when it devoted a few lines only to *l'enquête parlementaire sur les sévices d'Oran continue*, reporting that the commission was still hearing witnesses about interrogation methods and the alleged bad treatment handed out to detainees.¹⁰⁹ The same applied after the arrest of Collette Chouraqui, a bank employee who belonged to the clandestine Parti Communiste Algérien, and Jack Laik, who belonged to the *Comité des Juifs libéraux* and was a teacher in the *Lycée Bugeaud*.¹¹⁰

During trials suspects would state that they had been victims of cruelty (for incidents of torture see section below). *Le Monde* would tend to include this in its report, but not emphasise it.¹¹¹

11.5.7. Trials and executions

When trials for offences against "state security" in France were leading to sentences of between six months to two years,¹¹² they very often resulted in the death penalty being used against Algerians.¹¹³

Trials were very often to lead to executions, even when convictions were thought to be highly irregular and when terrorist acts had not had the intention of injuring people.

This applied even to Europeans fighting for the Algerian cause, apart from those who died illegally at the hands of the security forces through torture. One European member of the Algerian Communist Party, Fernand Iveton, was the only one to die "legally" at the hands of French justice.¹¹⁴

Hardly any defence or appeal was heard against the death sentences and the execution of those convicted under the circumstances described above in Algeria.¹¹⁵ It was other papers

which became more involved in the protests, some of which were merely echoed by *Le Monde*.¹¹⁶

11.6. A different story for France:

11.6.1. Introduction

Establishing a parallel between the events and procedures in Algeria and in France and drawing conclusions from comparisons might be quite revealing. For this reason it would be useful to turn now to the assessment made by the paper of the rules, practices and procedures operating in mainland France.

11.6.2. Civil liberties

Civil liberties were held in higher esteem when they related to the citizen of mainland France. One could go as far as to state that even criminals received a better deal in France. The defence of individual liberties in France was accorded greater importance compared with the meagre efforts made against the erosion of the rights of the individual in Algeria.¹¹⁷

The pages of the paper were more open to debate when attempts to reform the Criminal Code were put forward by Isorni in the Parliamentary Commission of justice.¹¹⁸ Articles favourable to the reforms emphasised the sanctity of civil liberties¹¹⁹ and when the law was adopted (Text of modification passed 26/6/57), *Le Monde* gave another chance to Me Garçon to show his disapproval of the final text and present in full his views on civil liberties in France.¹²⁰

Despite the protests¹²¹ and the guaranteed access to medical examination by a doctor, "what of licit torture" he argued? It seemed so unreal to him that for the first time since the abolition of torture by Louis XVI, governments were justifying the use of force during the interrogation of their citizens.¹²²

11.6.3. Executions and the death penalty

Despite the dubious character of the convictions and the even more questionable methods of obtaining confessions, the wave of executions never led to any comment, let alone criticism when it was mostly Algerian or Communist blood¹²³ that was being shed. The question was totally different when it came to death sentence and the execution of French criminals in France. Yves Florenne expressed very strong views about a sense of justice which he did not share when he wrote in the *Au jour le jour* column.¹²⁴

The strength of his feeling was made even more forceful by his use of sarcasm towards those who ignored the views of the intellectuals on this matter:

*Seuls les intellectuels pervers -toujours eux, partout, en toute circonstance- s'obstinent à penser et à dire que la logique (laissons la simple humanité ou la charité, toujours suspectes) que la raison et la justice ne sauraient, nulle part, se trouver dans cette affreuse pesée de chair morte, de sang et de couteau.*¹²⁵

Unfortunately the executions of the Algerians on the other side of the Mediterranean did not stir up such feeling.

11.6.3. Camps d'hébergement

In Algeria, the sending away to detention camps of Algerians guilty or merely suspected of "anti-French" activity, as well as Europeans, liberals, Communists and trade-unionists¹²⁶ was not presented as being abnormal.¹²⁷

The attitude of the paper was a little different when an attempt was made to extend the setting-up of camps in France (even then it was expressed in articles by outside contributors such as Duverger). Without a word about their previous establishment and use in Algeria, Duverger protested against the

introduction of such camps in France.¹²⁸

Although Duverger believed that the extension of terrorism into North African *milieux* in France was serious, and that the violation of public order should not be tolerated, nor the security of citizens threatened,¹²⁹ he asked to what extent the camps would make it possible to fight terrorism on the mainland.¹³⁰

As these camps would cater only for people already convicted, he saw in their introduction a scandalous attempt to prolong a detention system whereby, once his sentence had been served, the ex-convict would then be "taken in charge" by the administrative authorities.¹³¹

He feared that the text would be interpreted loosely (and arbitrarily) and he warned against introducing camps whose symbolic meaning could lead to the downfall of Parliament itself.¹³²

11.6.5. Resistance to the introduction of special powers in France

When the government proposed to make special powers themselves applicable to all Algerians living in France¹³³ (who were not until then legally subject to the harsh realities of the special powers in Algeria), introducing the measures as "applicable to all persons born in Algeria no matter where they resided", *Le Monde's* protests became more vocal.¹³⁴

11.6.6. More vocal protests

The protests against the measures became more audible, and were given a higher profile, but they were still left to personalities opposed to them on principle,¹³⁵ or organisations such as the *Ligue des droits de l'homme* to attack:

[l']article qui a permis d'instaurer un régime de détention arbitraire contraire aux principes de

*tout le droit répressif français.*¹³⁶

Léon Lyon-Caen,¹³⁷ for instance, found it impossible for the calls for special powers to be welcomed by any lawyers or republicans. He commented on the known excuses put forward to introduce exceptional legislation and stated that even if one were to accept that conditions had been right earlier (in Algeria on 16 March 1956), to claim that they were needed in France was "excessive".¹³⁸

Referring to concrete examples¹³⁹ through which practices were legalised in Algeria, Lyon-Caen commented that, if similar practices (creation of camps) were legalised in France, the country would find itself "on the slippery slope of arbitrary power," which would be applied to non-conformist Frenchmen opposed to the government's Algerian policy, who can now be brought to book only through the penal system, and who would be subject then to the *arbitraire administratif*. Legal principles, the rule of law and democratic traditions, he concluded, must recommend the rejection of such a plan.¹⁴⁰

Maurice Garçon before him understood the problems and formulated some objections, but was ready to compromise. He¹⁴¹ analysed past history, when internal and external "political convulsions" had led to upheavals in society and to the recourse by governments (when *débordé*) to taking arbitrary measures to maintain order (their custodian role). He argued that *lois d'exception* gave easy solutions which conflicted with constitutional principles.¹⁴²

Acknowledging the difficulties over Algeria, the atrocities committed by the "other side" and the need to take exceptional measures, he commented: "It falls on us, because we wish to make civilisation triumph over barbarism, not to confront

disorder with injustice".

Only then, nearly two years after the introduction of the first discriminating measures, did *Le Monde*, using an outside contribution, provide a reasonable assessment of the measures implemented in Algeria, when it was further stated that the various laws¹⁴³ and such a regime were "not compatible with principles of *Public Law* in a Republic".¹⁴⁴

Le Monde gave positive coverage to the explanation of motives on the whole¹⁴⁵ by stating that it was justified by the need to prevent dangerous individuals using legal ways of redress to resume subversive activities and escape the due process of the law. It would make it possible for *l'assignatic à résidence*, explained *Le Monde*, to take place as soon as the sentence was pronounced. What the paper did not explicitly state was that the measures allowed for administrative detention even if the sentence was a mere fine without detention.¹⁴⁶

Despite constant favourable presentation by playing down the views against them,¹⁴⁷ the measures adopted were not really warranted by the state of affairs in France.

11.6.7. Measures not warranted by the state of affairs in France

What seems even more difficult to reconcile with the desire to introduce the measures in France was the statement echoed by *Le Monde* of the views given to it by the police chiefs, especially in Paris, which had the highest concentration of immigrants; views which were more reassuring than anything else and which did not justify the extension of the measures to France.¹⁴⁸

The activities of the police¹⁴⁹ indicated that it was an exaggeration to talk of terrorism in Paris¹⁵⁰ (and in France

generally) and that the 100,000 immigrants wanted to work in peace, while there were a few thousands "floaters", amongst whom were "delinquents, common law criminals and pimps" (souteneurs) who provided the nationalists with recruits.¹⁵¹

11.7. Conclusion

So, as we see, very few protests were voiced in the paper and when they were, they came from outsiders to the paper. A contrast can clearly be drawn between the positions over the same issues in Algeria and in France.

The coverage of the adoption and implementation of repressive powers in Algeria or against Algerians showed for most part the price the paper was prepared to pay in terms of silence and omissions so as not to undermine the authority of the state or jeopardize the interest of the French nation. In contrast the coverage of similar powers and issues in France showed the limits of that tolerance when "greater goals" were at stake.

CHAPTER TWELVE

12. OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

12.1. Introduction

Outside the "legal" or institutional framework, a range of indiscriminate measures was taken against Algerians. These included collective reprisals and mass executions, summary individual executions and the shooting in the back of people sent to fetch something or asked to run the *corvée de bois*. There were also spontaneous or organised incidents of beatings or lynching by troops and Europeans alike, as well as many instances of torture, which became common practice and was justified at the highest level (by the Commander-in-Chief Massu). Some of these measures will be explored in covering repression on a more or less general scale, as for example the events of August 1955, as well as individual acts of repression and, last but not least, incidents of torture.

12.2. General repression on a massive scale

12.2.1. August 1955

One of the incidents of repression on a massive scale during the Algerian war took place on 20 August 1955, about a year into the war, when Algerian nationalists attacked and killed about a hundred settlers, with their family and staff, in the Eastern part of the country.¹

The fact that a number of European civilians² had been killed showed that now, as a reaction to the indiscriminate ill-treatment inflicted on the Muslim population as a whole, the FLN was prepared to accept casualties on the civilian settlers' side. The reprisals by the troops were very harsh indeed and the soldiers did not seem to be concerned with

establishing a degree of guilt before punishing alleged offenders. As a result, thousands of Muslim civilians were killed and injured, the majority of whom, if not all, were unconnected with the violence against the Europeans.

12.2.2. Reporting the events of 20 August

The unrest in August 1955 took place both in Algeria and Morocco. To start with, *Le Monde* seemed to devote as much, if not more, coverage to Morocco, despite the more important nature of the events and the greater number of casualties in Algeria. It was only on 22 August (the day the paper bearing the date of the 23rd went to press) that it reported news of the events in Algeria.³ Its delay in publishing the news and comments could have been for a variety of reasons, ranging from a desire not to worry public opinion unnecessarily, to an attempt to avoid awareness and possible condemnation of the repression.⁴

However, whenever the paper did write about the troubles, P.A. Martel was ready to pass judgment on the tragic day and on the "fanaticism" of the Muslims.⁵

As for A Chênebenoît, he asked the instigators of terrorism "to weigh up the atrocities of their crimes and the extent of their mistake" (*mesurer l'atrocité de leurs crimes et l'ampleur de leur faute*). He found that there was an interaction, even a synchronisation (denied on page two of the paper of the same day), of events between the different North African problems and a common will (*solidaire*) against the French presence in North Africa in all its forms.⁶ What seemed paramount in his opinion was that "Algeria [was] French" and that any "armed insurrection there was intolerable and must be, as a matter of duty, brought under control".

As it had repeated throughout that terrorist activities were not the actions of the majority of the population, but those of a minority, when reporting the events of 20 August, *Le Monde* wrote that all "Muslims" were not rebels.⁷

The paper justified the repressive activities of the Army in its main comments.⁸ Penchenier's report, which seemed unclear about the repression,⁹ was clear about the guilt of the Algerians.¹⁰

In his story,¹¹ G. Penchenier covered the burial of European victims and the protests made by the settlers against the government (as well as complaints that they had not been armed and prepared beforehand to defend themselves against this kind of event).¹² He also mentioned that as a result of radio reports, all males had fled from the hamlets and villages, so that the troops could find only old people, women and children:

Les troupes hier mardi se sont donc trouvées en présence de gourbis abritant uniquement des femmes, des vieillards et des enfants.

This article of Penchenier caused a great deal of controversy in France and abroad.

12.2.3. The Penchenier controversy (1955)

Admitting that he could not have participated in all the "operations", he described the consequences of one of them and stated that he was prepared to bear witness to what he had seen (what he described as, but did not call, indiscriminate killings) in *Carrières Romaines* (five kilometres outside Philippeville), where 50 old people, women and children had been killed.¹³

Penchenier showed helplessness, even defeatism, when faced with something about which he could do nothing.¹⁴

Despite the attempt to play down the situation,¹⁵ on 26

August, the journalist persisted with his account of the previous incident, in which he saw that there were numerous people shot (*fusillés*) in *Carrières Romaines*, where the <*fosse commune*> contained "a thousand corpses", and maintained that the operation had taken place on Saturday evening, when the news of the massacre had just been announced and immediate and energetic action was thought to be required.

Penchenier's first article and the reactions to it¹⁶ could not have pleased the government, which issued a denial that any such deeds had occurred, published by the newspaper itself. However, when confronted with this denial, Penchenier had no alternative but to reply.¹⁷ But thus confronted, he became more specific¹⁸ about what he had seen and what made him arrive at his conclusions.¹⁹

12.2.4. The impact of Penchenier's article

The Penchenier controversy was echoed in the international press (see below). Reporting the murder of innocent victims by Penchenier also spilled over even into the parliamentary debates, which *Le Monde* reported religiously whenever they occurred.²⁰

In his reply to the denial of the then Minister of the Interior, Bourguès-Maunoury, Penchenier²¹ stated that he did not wish to carry on this polemic with the Minister. However, he did not subscribe to the official version of the "liquidation of ZefZef" at the time, and, "not having said anything to the contrary," he stated that he reported only what he had seen, arguing that he preferred to inform public opinion in France himself rather than let "foreigners do it".²²

12.2.5. Penchenier's assessment

Despite the objective approach²³ in the factual reporting,

Penchenier's stance was that of the official, of the military man, of the politician, of the Frenchman in general.²⁴ Trying to answer possible questions, he put about what was likely to happen to the leaders of the rebellion. In his eyes, they could not possibly win (*action perdue d'avance*), they could only retreat,

*à moins qu'ils ne veulent par là entrainer une tension qui <nous> conduise à multiplier les représailles et à exaspérer la population.*²⁵

In an article, *<Les insurgés du Constantinois s'ils ont perdu sur le plan matériel, ils ont gagné sur le plan idéologique>*, Penchenier, opting for a middle line, found it as dangerous to exaggerate the importance of the events as it was to minimise their consequences. He tried to dissipate the idea, which he saw as erroneous, but which was widely current at the time, that the Europeans were asking for a change of policy and, inversely, that severe repression would deter the indigenous population from taking up arms. This view, he thought, was misleading.²⁶

1955 was a decisive year, for Penchenier, for choosing between a political solution and a *<lutte sans merci>*. The spread of the movement was described as "gangrene", taking over the "tragic body" of Algeria, where even the South had been contaminated".²⁷

He perceived, however, a stay of execution (*L'Algérie en sursis*) as prevailing and nothing to justify large repressive measures:

Rien de précis, rien qui autorise l'appareil militaire à se mettre en marche.

*La Kabylie ... îlot berbère en monde arabe ... toujours été... centre des insurrections ... Djebels..éternels refuge des insoumis.*²⁸

Le Monde tried to portray this, not as a general revolution, or as an uprising by the whole country, but as a group of areas of insurrection, which had always been troublesome, rising to let off steam and then "quietening down" afterwards under repression and fines, to give reasonable ground to the idea that the movement could be brought to heel. It stated that it was difficult to distinguish between "crime" (*banditisme*) and "nationalism," but also that its undeniable patriotic conception was now slowly becoming established (with the help of Islam, the Arab League, disciplined contacts between the different regions, and with an army of liberation waiting in the wings).²⁹

The feeling seemed to be, "One does not want to believe that the liberation has started. What happened was a brief episode, badly orchestrated but revealing, in which the Berber fellahs waited for a new flare-up, even if they had to be amongst the victims." Penchenier's awareness of the danger of repression to innocents could be clearly seen here.

12.2.6. *Le Monde's* position and protest against repression

Despite world protests, and even after the events of August 1955, when news of the repressive methods used to quell the rebellion in Algeria were reported by some of the world media, *Le Monde* kept to the same line.

With very few exceptions, and Penchenier's case was one of them, *Le Monde's* readers could find out about excesses,³⁰ repressive measures, all the very negative aspects of French policy in Algeria, and its implementation in that territory, not through the paper reporting those events directly but through its reporting of reports or statements made by political groups, parties, politicians and other papers and

journalists.³¹ Some of these political parties or groups which protested against the methods used in repressing the unrest, expressed their indignation towards these methods, and requested that new solutions be envisaged as the "old ones did not work".³²

Clearly, apart from G. Penchenier mentioned above, there was hardly any incriminating evidence against the security forces put forward directly by *Le Monde* after these events.³³

12.2.7. Reporting characteristics

If we look at the characteristics of the reports made about the repression in Algeria we find that they were not commented upon. They were also characterised as being isolated incidents and/or that something was being done about them; but nothing was said about what these measures were or what effect they had.³⁴

When it mentioned these *exactions*, the paper reported them in minor articles, devoting very little space to them, sometimes "losing" the information inside a single article, or submerging it in a series of articles on official statements, expressing support for government efforts for, as an example, Soustelle's policy in every field. This tendency showed a rosier picture, which gave the impression that the situation was not too bad after all.³⁵

Sometimes this type of news was followed by news that a parliamentary commission was being sent along (with reinforcements) to make enquiries, giving the reader considerable reassurance.³⁶ At other times news of repression was put alongside news of its denial (or on different pages of the same paper), thus advancing two points of view.³⁷

12.3. Repression on a smaller scale

In the atmosphere of insecurity, confusion and controlled information caused by the war, attacks on soldiers or Europeans resulted in large-scale repression by the security forces (examined above), but also in self-initiated retaliatory measures, generally taken by the security forces or members of the European community, against Algerians, either individually or as a group.

12.3.1. Difficulty of information and imprecise reports

When measures of repression or reprisals were taken against (often innocent) Algerians by the military forces, *Le Monde* was invariably unable to confirm the fine details of what exactly had happened.³⁸

This was characteristic of *Le Monde's* reports. *Le Monde* was unable to give information quickly, to state exactly what had happened, to describe the situation clearly or to define the circumstances precisely, claiming that there was still little information that could be found, even when the paper had correspondents on the spot.³⁹

One could not explain why the paper was obtaining less information, while other papers could say more, despite having the same facilities in Algeria.⁴⁰ But even when the events occurred in France, such as in Marseille, where *Le Monde* also had a correspondent, the reports left much to be desired.⁴¹

Similar characteristics could be found in reports in which the incidents involved European civilians taking their anger out on Algerians.⁴²

Apart from the less than favourable presentation⁴³ and the inaccuracies of the reports,⁴⁴ there were further characteristics.

12.3.2. The security forces "provoked": not really their fault

The reports of incidents seemed to indicate invariably that the security forces had been provoked.⁴⁵

In the reports,⁴⁶ when the paper described how *trois des leurs ayant été victimes d'un attentat, les parachutistes stationnés à Alger ont violemment réagi*, the paper put forward *l'hypothèse de la provocation* (though it accepted that provocation did not excuse the act). The paper stated that, despite the recommendations of Lacoste, the soldiers had fallen into the trap of "provocation" (*tombés dans le piège d'une provocation*), which was said to be confirmed by the discovery of a "rebel" directive requesting them to harden their struggle⁴⁷ and attack soldiers near their barracks.⁴⁸

The coverage of the security forces in these instances seemed very understanding when it did not seek to absolve them.⁴⁹

12.3.3. Sources of the reports

Perhaps this is hardly surprising, as a great part of *Le Monde's* reports seemed to be based on official sources, including governmental ones, the Government and the Minister Resident, the official press agency, AFP, and the Army.⁵⁰

Sometimes *Le Monde* was only a secondary source for incidents reported by other journalists, other papers or academics and politicians. The incidents had to be brought to the attention of *Le Monde's* readers only after they were brought to the attention of public opinion by journalists, Academics,⁵¹ by debates in political *milieux* and by Communist or "Muslim" parliamentarians⁵² or, more often, by other media sources.⁵³

12.3.4. Versions giving the benefit of the doubt to army and official sources

At first glance many of the reports mentioned provide a semblance of objectivity as several versions were put forward.⁵⁴

Le Monde presented itself as a neutral observer and reported accusations of terrorism by *L'Express* and counter-accusations by the government, and chose to publish the various allegations with the government's denials, seen as *une série de précisions officielles*.⁵⁵

But a more thorough examination of the text makes it clear that many versions were giving the benefit of the doubt to army and official sources.

The tone of the reporting and the views expressed by the paper seemed to be more sympathetic to the official side and to the plight of the security forces. The articles in the paper revealed the existence of a slight slant in favour of the official version and to a certain extent a kind of understanding and sympathy for the official viewpoint.⁵⁶

In thus reporting these events, by giving different versions, *Le Monde* provided an appearance of objectivity, but did not question the plausibility of the versions put forward. If one examines the underlying contradictions, that appearance of objectivity withers away.⁵⁷

When reporting the event drawn to the attention of public opinion by *Movietone* and *L'Express*,⁵⁸ *Le Monde* declared from the outset (in the title) that a foreign firm shooting the newsreel had "bribed" (*soudoyé*) the *gendarmes* to perform the act for the camera, according to official sources.⁵⁹

These allegedly confirmed that the film had actually been shot by employees of Fox Movietone, who had given the *gendarmes* the money. Without any tangible evidence, apart for the above reference, *Le Monde* then stated that it was not a suspect but a man who participated in an attack on a neighbouring village, that the shooting was done in exchange for money, and that the whole thing had been a plot organised to prejudice France whilst the UN debate was taking place.⁶⁰

Although in this instance *Le Monde* did not seem to be totally happy with the versions provided by the authorities, it did try to show to some extent that the whole episode had been a fix by the media, and put forward views accusing the "out-laws" of being also guilty of atrocities that could not be denied.⁶¹

In cases involving civilians, there were hardly any differences. Writing about the funerals of the victims of the Casino bombing, which led to more horrific scenes, *Le Monde* stated that there was an important *service d'ordre* and described how Europeans had reacted violently to the incidents (*attentats*) of the last few days, indicating that some Algerians were molested "as others had been on Monday"⁶² and that several organisations were enforcing the strike (mourning the dead Europeans) with threats to compel shopkeepers to close down.⁶³

Some of the actions were ascribed to youngsters, whose responsibility the reader might excuse, but whose indignation the paper saw as legitimate, according to the report.⁶⁴

The attitude of the paper was very understanding indeed when, despite a police presence, shops and cars were destroyed, "Muslims" were molested, and the most horrific scenes took place with people being lynched. There were also serious dis-

crepancies in the report.⁶⁵

12.3.5. Other sources more informative as early as 1955

Already in 1955 other newspapers and magazines were more accurate in their reports and more forthcoming with information prejudicial to the official versions and the credibility of the latter.⁶⁶ Most of the other media, even as reported by *Le Monde*, seemed to have been less embarrassed either by the articles or the photographs which were published.

12.3.6. A position of understanding

If the paper was not ready to justify the atrocities, it was, at times, more ready to tolerate them, if not to excuse them.⁶⁷ Yet, even though it was requesting that sanctions be applied, as a rule it was after the authorities had announced that they envisaged taking them.⁶⁸

12.3.7. Paucity of comments

It was not unusual to find atrocities reported in the paper without any comment.⁶⁹ At times, *Le Monde* did seem to see these incidents of beatings and atrocities, already played down, as regrettable,⁷⁰ but even this was not usually on its own initiative.⁷¹ The slightly critical tone towards the atrocities was based on disapproval on the ground, and often (was) not initiated by the paper.⁷²

The paper showed a measure of disquiet when certain unpleasant events were happening. But despite the glaring facts, which, it would be reasonable to assume, the paper should have tried to confirm and investigate for the benefit of its readers, it failed to provide the readers with complete and accurate information. Instead, the paper sought a declaration from

the government at times, even when the events spoke for themselves.⁷³

Sometimes, very rarely though, the paper blamed the authorities for the lack of information. Asking for light to be thrown, after enquiries, on the true intentions of France,⁷⁴ the paper stated that it had already been noticed that in Tunisia, for instance, versions provided by foreign agencies had been allowed, and that accounts emanating from French journalists had been deliberately rejected.

The delay ordered on publishing news was seen as revealing a

*(...) souci de les étouffer, une censure qui dit-on, ne dit pas son nom, se retournent finalement contre le pouvoir qui adopte une telle attitude . Plus la vérité tarde à se faire jour, plus le scandale qu'elle suscite est grand.*⁷⁵

The paper even requested that the authorities become more open. When it transpired, no thanks to *Le Monde*, that some Algerians were just more victims of yet another act of revenge, thus starting another wave of protest, there were mild requests for openness and a desire to see more enquiries conducted to establish the truth about incidents of repression.⁷⁶

12.3.8. A very measured protest

Every now and then, *Le Monde* showed a state of unease at the events and adopted a position which could be seen by the authorities as provocative. But there cannot be any doubt as to the greater credibility given to the official version in the case reported by *L'Express* above.

Using government replies and calling them "official", often gave them more credibility, and calling them *précisions* even more so, but surely the paper ought to have known better, as officials in charge in Paris and Algiers, or in the places themselves where these offences took place, could hardly hold

themselves or their colleagues responsible for them.

In other words, the official point of view was hardly going to come up with the absolute truth, especially if this were likely to discredit the authorities or prevent them from implementing what they saw as the right policy. Even when it was clear that "incidents" or atrocities had taken place and were acknowledged by the paper, the language used was quite significant.⁷⁷

In my view it was quite wrong for professional journalists to rely at that time on official sources or terminology. If *Le Monde* needed proof of the worthlessness of the official side, despite the pictures, film reels released showing without any shadow of doubt the less "official" side of the incidents, it ought to have referred to its own pages, when G. Penchenier first reported incidents, which were denied "officially", but maintained as true by the journalist himself.

The paper's correspondent in America stated that, frankly, more than official *communiqués* from Paris and Algiers were needed to convince the Americans of the excellence of "our pacification methods".⁷⁸ Why was it not the same for France?

Even when it was apparent from other sources, especially foreign ones, as in this case, that things were getting out of hand, *Le Monde* was more worried about the impact of acts of repression on international or national public opinion than by the acts themselves. The different flavour was apparent when the articles of the correspondent in the USA were published on the same page of the paper.⁷⁹

The journalist's conclusion was also typical of the paper's attitude, stating that this explained "rightly or wrongly" that French repression had been ferocious and disproportionate.⁸⁰

Even in terms of terminology, the paper's correspondent, H. Pierre, who was quite critical, was using expressions such as "ferocious and disproportionate" when describing the repression of the French side; for the rebels side, the word used was "crimes".⁸¹

But he was not keen when reports reached American media uncensored. We see here the aim sought was to convince the Americans of the justification of French methods, not whether crimes against humanity had been committed by the forces of democratically-elected governments.

The desire to influence French opinion itself in a particular way could also be illustrated, for instance, by the fact that more than half the pages were devoted to official declarations from France and Algeria.⁸²

12.4. The use of Torture

12.4.1. Introduction

Notwithstanding whether or not arrests and detention were in accordance with the regulations, when Algerians and Europeans were arrested, they were subjected to very harsh treatment at the hands of their jailors (police, army, paratroopers). Their arrests ended more often than not with condemnations at trials and executions. During their arrest, many were subjected to torture (Alleg), the extreme form of repression, which raised its ugly head during the conflict, coupled sometimes with disappearances (Audin), as it would have been extremely damaging for the authorities and for the French cause if the victims had survived to tell the tale.

The coverage of torture by *Le Monde* during that period is well worth examining, no matter how briefly, since the attitude of the paper on the subject is quite significant.

12.4.2. Evidence of torture not in doubt

There was no lack of circumstantial evidence indicating the strong possibility that torture was being used in Algeria. If more evidence were needed to convince *Le Monde*, there were many cases of denunciations, echoed in its own pages,⁸³ as early as 1955, since it reported indirectly other papers' statements over allegations of torture, as well as declarations by the elected representatives of Algerian "Muslims".⁸⁴

But accusations of atrocities and torture by the French police and the military, as well as the denunciation of the methods used by the police in the interrogation of suspects, were often made in other magazines and newspapers (like *France-Observateur*, *L'Express*, *Franc-Tireur*, among others). What could be found in *Le Monde* from 1955 were only allusions and statements made by "Muslim" officials, deputies or well-known personalities, when they happened to have been reported.

12.4.3. *Le Monde* in possession of incontrovertible testimonies

If the paper was not sure of the facts it would be reasonable for it to adopt this kind of coverage, giving the story as both sides saw it. This would be more so, if we assumed that the paper had no proof about the practices of the security forces and thought it unwise to venture to take a stand without being able to support it with evidence, unless the paper had the means of investigating and giving its readers the true version of the facts.

But the paper did have evidence of at least one case of "ill-treatment of a "European" in custody, which occurred in 1956, when *Le Monde* reported that Evelyn Lavalette, arrested on 12 November 1956 and taken to Oran, where she arrived two

days later, had been subjected to "cruelties" (*séVICES*) consisting of deprivation from food for four days (from Tuesday to Friday) coupled with beatings, gagging to the point of choking, fainting and so forth.⁸⁵

When the story was denied by the authorities, *Le Monde* stood by what it had published, while publishing also the denials by the authorities.⁸⁶ But even here (and less so in other examples), *Le Monde* had contented itself with giving the facts and sticking to its story. There was no stand taken nor extensive commentary made over the issue, despite the time lapse between the incidents and the time they were made public.

12.4.4. "Passing the buck"

Even when it became obvious to all those objectively informed that there was widespread use of torture in Algeria, and the paper itself was aware of the allegation confirmed by many returning military personnel,⁸⁷ the stand taken by *Le Monde* was not that of outright condemnation of a method repulsive to any civilisation, but to open a debate⁸⁸ on the question, as if there was a choice to be made on the issue. Because over this question, it was not so much what to say, but what to think, that seemed to have puzzled the paper. To resolve its dilemma, the paper sought advice and help; this came from military and spiritual sources.

The paper was not blind to the fact that a "decisive step" had been taken by the authorities, whose attitude had shifted from a position of "indignant denial" of any hint of torture by the armed forces in Algeria, very often followed by legal action against the "slanderers," to one of justification or even of support for such methods.

The cases referred to by *Le Monde* included a declaration

made by Le Pen⁸⁹ and others made in various publications, such as the one by R.F. Delarue (an army priest working with the paratroopers). These two clearly justified the use of torture.⁹⁰

Not unsympathetic, *Le Monde* seemed quite happy to see the question of the legitimacy of the use of torture squarely put before Christian consciences to the extent that "we" were driven by an atrocious terrorism and its indispensable repression.

Aware that "a single priest could not speak for the whole Church," *le Monde* pointed out that it was up to the highest authority, Cardinal Feltin, "to inform the faithful about what can be expected of them in this revolutionary warfare that has been imposed on them and what should be forbidden", and to the Chiefs of Staff (commandment) to gauge the effects that some methods of "repression and information seeking" can have on the moral and morality of soldiers.⁹¹

Le Monde's "respectful request" and call for guidance was answered by R.F. d'Ouince⁹² who, debating the topic, tried to discuss what could legitimately be expected from the ecclesiastic authorities and what it would be unreasonable and excessive to expect.

Outlining the unease of the Catholics involved in the Algerian situation, as well as that felt by readers faced with the controversy it provided, the R.F. d'Ouince stressed the original nature of revolutionary warfare and the difficulty of fixing the boundary within the traditional framework of legal conventions.

The article⁹³ also appreciated the difficulty of the army's task,⁹⁴ for which the latter was said not to have been pre-

pared, the complexity of the situation and the difficulty of problems of conscience that might arise and at times lead to an apparent conflict of duties.

Le Monde commented that in the various interventions by theologians and the Church authorities, there may have been a perfectly legitimate motive for their discretion.

Moreover, this "reserved attitude" was even thought "preferable." The paper indicated, however, that R.F. d'Ouince had suggested ways in which the Christians might reconcile the demands of their conscience with those of the task with which they are entrusted.

It was up to the leaders, it was pointed out, who are responsible for the consciences and the honour of their men to find a way. "If they are Christians," the article continued, "they will know that there is a way that reconciles these dual demands and they will look for it".

This search was said to be led and actively encouraged by the Church through the directives sent by the hierarchy, the daily work of army priests (*aumoniers*) and by the efforts of secular Christians (*laics chrétiens*) "men of thought and action" who had an impact on public opinion in humanising the war and preserving some morality.⁹⁵

If some of the acts were said to be obviously inadmissible to a Christian conscience,⁹⁶ and if the use of the most human methods were judged to be more likely to succeed in the long run,⁹⁷ the Church's hierarchy was absolved from giving a ruling when an element of doubt remained, and its silence was perceived as a mark of honesty and prudence in such cases.⁹⁸

Though *Le Monde* seemed quite satisfied with R.F. d'Ouince's advice,⁹⁹ this seems to have been quite ineffective as the

paper appeared to give a "free vote" to all concerned on this issue.

Despite having said that it was up to the leaders to find the way forward, *Le Monde* was content to state what was unacceptable to the Church, but did not make this recommendation compulsory for anybody.¹⁰⁰ It was up to every individual to hear and act according to what he saw fit. This hands off policy must also have applied to the paper itself as its non-committal approach can be illustrated by the coverage given to the most well-known cases of torture in Algeria, as it is, I think, very significant.

12.4.5. The coverage of well-known cases (Alleg and Audin)

The best-known victims of torture in the Algerian war were two Algerians of European descent, one of whom survived his ordeal, Henri Alleg, and one who did not, Maurice Audin.

After the arrest of Audin and many others (including Raymonde Peschard, who was cleared by the court but disappeared after her arrest), *Le Monde* rarely wondered what had happened to those arrested. However, when the Oran court cleared a series of innocent victims of the security forces, *Le Monde* dared to ask:

*Disparues, arrêtées depuis plusieurs semaines ou plusieurs mois, d'autres personnes n'ont encore comparu devant aucun magistrat et l'on se demande ce qui est réellement advenu de Maurice Audin, "enlevé" le 11 juin dernier, comme du Cheikh Larbi Tebessi "enlevé" le 3 avril dernier.*¹⁰¹

A brief look at the coverage of *Le Monde* shows that the two men did not have access to their lawyers let alone the media, except through their wives. Both women created a stir, writing to the press and to the authorities. *Le Monde* echoed some of their complaints and letters, but only as a series of reports on what people were saying or what other papers were reporting

about them.¹⁰² The complaints mentioned that Mme Audin was living through the same circumstances as Mme Alleg but fearing the worst, since she had been told that her husband had escaped.¹⁰³

Another article appeared later, stating that the lawyers had still not managed to get in touch with their clients.¹⁰⁴

Another well-known case is that of Me Ali Boumendjel, a lawyer taken away and interrogated by the military and alleged to have committed suicide by throwing himself from the sixth floor of the building. This time *Le Monde* reported the main protests as well as the official version of the death, which made it look very much like suicide, together with protests by people doubting whether the events had taken place in the way described by the official sources.¹⁰⁵

12.4.6. Conclusion

As we have seen, *Le Monde's* reports consisted simply of echoing indirectly the complaints of the wives worried about their husbands under arrest since June, in the cases of Audin and Alleg, and the protests of a former teacher in another. It hardly assumed any part in the fight against torture and against government policy in this area, apart from reporting the complaints of friends, wives or lawyers of the victims and that of Alleg personally. Nothing in the paper suggested that there was any stand taken by the paper against the use of torture.¹⁰⁶

12.5. **Conclusions**

At a time when it was difficult, but quite possible, to be open to French public opinion on the issue of illegal and "uncivilised" means in the pursuit of a "noble aim," *Le Monde's* attitude is striking by its reserve and moderation. At times,

it is quite astonishing by its omissions and its "lack" of information. The duties of journalism did not seem to outweigh the responsibility that the paper felt towards observing the "rules". Despite one or two rare exceptions, quite revealing in their scarcity, the imprecision and the vagueness of the reports gave the readers a very partial view of the troubles on Algerian shores. Whether covering wide-scale repression or individual incidents, the version of events given to its readers in *Le Monde's* reports was one that was not unsympathetic to the plight of the security forces, even when the crucial issue of torture was involved.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

13. AN AMBIVALENT ATTEMPT TO INFORM PUBLIC OPINION

13.1. Introduction

As previously examined, the threat to civil liberties, which appeared earlier in Algeria with the adopting of State of Emergency laws, was followed by wide-scale repression throughout the autumn of 1955. The lack of success of these methods led to the adoption of Special Powers. These powers and the fight against "terrorism" led to a substantial number of atrocities and abuses of civil liberties on a wider scale (examined earlier). The reports in *Le Monde* on the subject examined in Chapters 11 and 12 seem quite reserved and ineffective.¹

In this respect, it is worth remembering that when publications contained reports about repression, or revealed anything sensitive relating to it, this was seen as damaging to security or to the morale of the troops. Consequently, the publications were seized and the editors and/or publishers prosecuted. How did *Le Monde* see these infringements of press freedom? What positions did it take itself when it was affected by them? All these are questions that need to be asked.

With freedom of expression stifled, the freedom of the press muzzled, public opinion and parliamentarians progressively worried by reports and rumours of atrocities committed by the security forces, there were clamours for commissions to be set up in order to investigate and establish the truth for the French people once and for all. How supportive was *Le Monde's* attitude and how keen was the paper for that opinion to be informed?

The following chapter will seek to show that it was possible to give a different coverage and take a different position than

those in *Le Monde*. This was not without consequences, as individual journalists or intellectuals were punished for speaking out. The attitude and the stand taken by *Le Monde* towards these sanctions are of some interest to the researcher. The position of *Le Monde* on press freedom also needs to be established. This chapter includes an examination of the newspaper's position towards censorship of the media (and seizures of newspapers), including when *Le Monde* was affected. It also addresses legal action and criminal proceedings against those people writing in them to determine and assess *Le Monde*'s position on these issues.

Finally, the coverage of the debate surrounding the various investigative commissions created, or requested to enquire into the realities of the Algerian conflict, is the subject of the third part of this chapter, as it is essential to gauge to what lengths the paper was prepared to go in order to ensure that public opinion was informed.

13.2. A feeble defence of public opinion informers

For French, and even international, opinion, there was a high level of interest in Algerian affairs. This interest had to be satisfied and there was no lack of volunteers for the job.

13.2.1. A braver commitment possible for journalists

When we see the mild, if not tendentious, assessment of the Algerian situation made by *Le Monde* in the previous chapters (11 and 12), the poor way in which the paper depicted the enormous apparatus deployed to crush the nationalist uprising and the dubious means introduced to achieve that end, we begin to wonder if the conditions for realistic reporting from Algeria were in any way propitious, and if it was at all possible to

give public opinion in France a truer picture.

The simple answer to that is that, although the conditions were far from ideal, it was still possible to report events more realistically and accurately, as was proved by two very dedicated journalists working for other papers.

13.2.2. The outstanding commitment of some journalists
(R. Barrat and J-J Servan-Schreiber)

Two journalists were able to give public opinion in France a picture of the "troubles" which differed strikingly from that given by *Le Monde*. These were Robert Barrat, who was working for *France-Observateur*, and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, co-editor of *L'Express*.

Barrat was one of the few people who spoke out unequivocally against government policies and challenged its version of the facts. The comments and statements he made, and the evidence he gave, were seldom found in *Le Monde*, except indirectly. Having understood the realities of Algeria,² he had an understanding, an accuracy and a frankness in expressing his views, which went far beyond any of *Le Monde's* journalists at the time.

He did not write for *Le Monde*, but had been given an opportunity to express his views in the *libres opinions* section of the paper, where already in 1955 he clearly stated that, despite the experience of Indochina, the French government "had been involved in repression in Algeria during the previous eighteen months" in order to reestablish the *status quo ante* instead of tackling the real problem.³

He described the Algerian "résistants" as real heroes, proposed to associate Algeria to the French Union, advised

consulting the Algerians on their destiny, and asking them whether they wanted to associate themselves with a "France which is wider than France".⁴

Barrat was, however, a journalist committed to finding, and giving his readers, the truth no matter how unpleasant it was to swallow. He had carried out an interview with a rebel leader and published a serious article about the gravity of the situation in Algeria in *France Observateur*.⁵

He was not the only one to challenge the attitude of the authorities. Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, co-editor of *L'Express* with Françoise Giroud, spent a spell in the army when called up as a reservist. When he returned, he was very well-placed, because of his first hand account of "pacification" and the easy access to *L'Express*, to report perhaps in a more accurate way than any other journalist at the time.

13.2.3. Their position undefended

As a result of their position, these journalists were sanctioned by the authorities. What did *Le Monde* think of the position of these journalists and of the authorities which were proposing to sanction them?

Following his article in *France-Observateur*, Barrat was arrested and charged with the non-denunciation of crimes *compromettant la sûreté intérieure et extérieure de l'Etat*.⁶ Exceptionally, what happened in this case was that the government in France expressed no objection to his release on bail. In cases where similar charges were brought, the suspect would be taken to Algeria, charged, interrogated and tried there. This time, because of different negotiations and various "dealings," Barrat was exceptionally released⁷ on bail but with some delay.⁸

The news of Barrat's arrest caused uproar (for different reasons) in most media and political circles, most of which came out in strong protest.⁹

13.2.4. A limited philosophy of Journalism

No official protest was published in *Le Monde* by the house journalists, but it did, as a paper, publish an article, or at least a political commentary, signed by A.Chênebenoît,¹⁰ indicating the position of the paper. For Chênebenoît, the arrest and legal proceedings against Barrat provoked *des troubles de conscience*. This was the case when "clear-cut principles, normally used as guidelines appeared hazy."

In this case, the problem for *Le Monde* was the existence of two contradictory principles: the first rule, the right to inform, which constitutes a journalist's *raison d'être*, was in contradiction with another, which concerns the limits that a journalist "must impose on himself" and on his right to inform.

Chênebenoît could accept that Barrat must have thought that his right to inform was paramount,¹¹ but rejected contacting¹² the rebels as not being part of a journalist's remit but the business of a politician.¹³

He argued that the publicity given to the fellagas (FLN fighters), like that given to the Vietminh, had a negative aspect: giving an audience for the actions of the fellagas and their propaganda; but, what is worse, it gave them, in the eyes of the undecided, some recognition and victory of sorts.

He seemed to think also that Barrat had a case to answer, as he "had gone beyond" what any citizen had the right to do, and was placing himself above the law and other citizens. Because of his limited conception of the journalist's duties, Chênebenoît concluded that Barrat had to pay the consequences

of not doing his duty as a citizen.¹⁴ It was only a few days later, on 1 October 1955 that *Le Monde* published, in fewer than twenty lines, Barrat's explanation.¹⁵

A number of journalists signed petitions against R.Barrat's arrest and prosecution, but they did so as individuals. Barrat's understanding of the duties of journalism and the publication of his article in *France-Observateur* (September 1955) met with a very lukewarm reception, an explicit admission that he should not put himself "above the law" as citizen, and even a clear dissociation from *Le Monde's* own articles.¹⁶

Thus, *Le Monde* revealed a very limited conception of the freedom of the press, confirmed by the attention given to official declarations such as that of the Prime Minister, E.Faure, justifying the measures taken against newspapers or journalists.¹⁷ And the passing of time did not do much to alter things.¹⁸

When Servan-Schreiber, whose activities were not limited to journalism *per se*,¹⁹ was prosecuted by the authorities over his articles on repression in *L'Express*, *Le Monde* reported both his position and that of the government. As it announced that Servan-Schreiber was being prosecuted for demoralising the army, his article having been published with two controversial photographs, taken allegedly in Morocco in 1955, *Le Monde* accepted that legal proceedings be brought against him over these photographs, which were unrelated to the events (*il est de bonne guerre*), but commented that, most importantly, the content of the article itself had not been challenged.²⁰

In a sense, the paper presented both cases to the readers by publishing the positions of both protagonists. But by virtue of it being called a *mise au point*, the official position (army

and authorities) was hence credited with some authority.²¹

According to subsequent comments made in *L'Express*, *Le Monde* reported that the paper had stated that the photographs, which dated back to 1955 and had been taken in Morocco, proved that the practice was widespread and not new, indicating that the pictures had been selected deliberately so as not to incriminate anybody, and that the paper had genuine photographs of the incident, which were too gruesome to publish.²²

In the reports of *Le Monde*, other declarations of Servan-Schreiber stating that the willingness to prosecute him over the photographs showed the weakness of the case against his evidence²³ were published alongside protests by the Left, by personalities and groups in favour of Servan-Schreiber, but also official or governmental declarations that were opposed to him.²⁴

In the pages of the paper, there were accusations and counter accusations between Servan-Schreiber and the authorities, and reports on various charges against him, making it look like a real controversy for the readers, before constant pressure put an end to the publication of Servan-Schreiber's articles in *L'Express*.²⁵

The full articles of Servan-Schreiber were later published in a book with the same title as the articles,²⁶ an event which was to restart the controversy. For J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, co-founder of *L'Express*, the most positive contribution supporting his case was an assertion by *Le Monde* that the real criminals were not those denouncing excesses.

Apart from the two specific cases dealt with here, *Le Monde* also reported somewhat briefly news of arrests of journalists

and the charges brought against them in a mere descriptive fashion. Claude Bourdet²⁷ was followed by others including André Still, of *L'Humanité*, who had published the declaration of the Parti Communiste Algérien (22 March 1956), with *Le Monde* merely stating that he had previously been charged with similar offences at the end of 1956.²⁸

Besides articles, the publication of cartoons was also severely dealt with by the authorities. *L'Humanité* was convicted for a drawing of paratroopers, a machine gun smoking, standing over a "Muslim" who had been shot down with the caption *urgence*.²⁹

Le Monde also reported law-suits brought against the outspoken *L'Express* by Rivarol³⁰ and by *L'Echo d'Alger* and its owner, the influential settler Alain de Sérigny.³¹

13.2.5. A mild defence of the intellectuals

Just as the journalists, intellectuals who took a stand against the war and its methods, or who published articles, books or pamphlets against the positions and policies of the government, did not find a supportive backer or a dedicated defender in *Le Monde*, even when their troubles started after the paper's publication of their ideas and views.

Henri Marrou was one of the first intellectuals to have an impact on public opinion with his stirring article, *France ma patrie*,³² warning that the country was "in danger", and in which he wondered what had become of France, when sometimes innocent victims were falling prey to collective and indiscriminate reprisals. A great deal of weight has been given to this article (written as a letter to the Editor) and the role of *Le Monde* in its publication greatly exaggerated. It must be pointed out, however, that, if *Le Monde* did indeed publish this

article, it was in the "*Libre-Opinion*" column, which did not, in any way, involve the paper's responsibility, only that of the article's author. Moreover, other articles expressing opposite views were also included in the section. Then, when the professor was harassed and persecuted by the authorities, *Le Monde*, which was not troubled by the authorities over the publication, contented itself by giving factual reports of events and news of petitions signed in his support.

Peyrega's³³ ordeal after his "letter to the President", protesting against the methods used by the army, and particularly the cold-blooded murder by soldiers in his presence of a innocent Algerian, produced, apart from a factual report of statements, only a mild protest by Duverger, a Law professor himself, against the staff of the University of Algiers for setting a bad example to the students. This protest clearly exonerated the students for conspiring against the Dean of one of their faculties.³⁴

A couple of years earlier, André Mandouze had fared no better; the most explicit support for him came through yet other *libre-opinion* columns.³⁵

Just as a number of publications which emerged during the war quickly ran out of stock because of a voracious public opinion anxious to know the real story, or were driven underground by censorship, bans and seizures, Henri Alleg's book (see also Chapter 12) did not meet with a committed response by the paper. In fact, Alleg's book³⁶ typified the tight-rope the paper walked, when it was quite convinced that most of the rumours, current among the public, were true, yet the paper stated that Alleg's version was as credible as stating the exact opposite. Then, after the book was seized, the strongest

position *Le Monde* could bring itself to adopt was to announce in a few lines that it would be reprinted.³⁷

13.3. A weak defence of freedom of the press

13.3.1. Introduction

Apart from its feeble defence of journalists and intellectuals, who ought to be considered as opinion makers, what were *Le Monde's* positions and attitudes towards the freedom of the press and newspaper censorship in general? What did the paper think of the efforts made by the various government and civil servants to prevent complete information reaching the public?

Press reactions to the Algerian conflict were diverse in France and abroad. In fact, if not every newspaper *spoke out* against the events of August 1955 abroad (see Chapter 12),³⁸ and there was diversity amongst the reactions of French newspapers to the events, too. Though most of them, including *Le Monde*, condemned the riots, blaming outside intervention and help, and seemed to understand, even if they did not justify, the reactions of the settlers and those of the army, some, like *Libération* and even *Le Figaro* were at times critical.³⁹

Compared with *Le Monde*, many newspapers and magazines had more informative policies, by publishing news which did not please the authorities. The latter ordered their seizure for reporting such events to their readers. As a result, many newspapers and magazines were seized by decision of the authorities for the stories and news printed in them.⁴⁰

It would be worthwhile examining the way in which *Le Monde* reported such seizures, to see whether the importance given in theory to freedom of the press was demonstrated (in practice) in the actual reports in the paper.⁴¹

13.3.2. Analysis of reports of press seizures/censorship

Directly or indirectly, *Le Monde* reported news of the seizures of newspapers in various ways. The paper was at times brave enough to give more information, mentioning, for instance, the number of times a particular newspaper had been seized.⁴² But very often, for the paper that was a self-proclaimed advocate of freedom of expression, the articles referring to press censorship had a very low profile, stretching from very few words⁴³ to a few lines⁴⁴ showing occasionally some inconsistencies.⁴⁵

Other publications frequently made reference to the use of torture and repressive methods which *Le Monde* sometimes echoed, but without specific comments.⁴⁶ Often, when papers included such references to the use of torture and repressive methods, they were seized. When this happened, *Le Monde* did at times report news of seizures without adding any comments.⁴⁷ Sometimes there were brief references to the authorities taking particular decisions to censor or seize publications⁴⁸ or to the "legal basis" on which such decisions were taken.⁴⁹ The "explanations" given by the authorities were always reported when available.⁵⁰ Frequently the paper added the motive for the seizure, giving the topic of the offending article, the charge under which the paper was being seized, or both.⁵¹

The incriminating articles were at times easily determined by the paper, which had no difficulty identifying, for instance, the letter sent to Servan-Schreiber by Bollardière as being at the root of the seizure, since the paper had that day removed all articles relating to Algeria.⁵² When the information was not available, *Le Monde* used conjectures from other

newspaper and included guesswork as to the reason for the seizure.⁵³

13.3.3. Le Monde's occasional comments

The timid coverage observed in *Le Monde's* reports of press censorship or seizures does not mean that the occasional comments were not made by *Le Monde*, nor that protests by people outside the paper itself, or by other newspapers about censorship decisions taken by the authorities, were not included. Progressively, more comprehensive accounts of the seizures of particular newspapers were given.⁵⁴ There were occasional denunciations made by the paper itself. But the very few timid remarks that appeared in *Le Monde* were given a low profile⁵⁵ and coming as they did, every now and then, these remarks looked insignificant, as they were invariably lost in the overwhelming mass of articles which remained faithful to the official versions of events.⁵⁶

Although *Le Monde* was enterprising enough to point out that the authorities would not be able to prevent public opinion from learning things that were common knowledge in Algeria "for a year now," one cannot help wondering where *Le Monde's* own readers would discover the information wanted, the truth about Algeria, if the paper itself was not providing it.

The fact that there was an apparent desire to see public opinion informed, together with the occasional complaint that the media abroad were more informed than in France, combined with the paper's unwillingness to provide the relevant information needed, reinforce the suspicion of double standards that one gets throughout the pages of the paper at that time.⁵⁷

Many of the seizures revolved around the torture issue. One

article, for instance, was a copy of a letter from a soldier to his father (*jeunes soldats devant la torture*), published by *France-Observateur*; this caused it to be seized by the authorities. *Le Monde* seemed to be in an uncomfortable situation in the face of all this censorship,⁵⁸ but its position seemed to be very much withdrawn and reserved in relation to other media, as it initially thought that the press could inform the Investigative Commission (see CSDLI below) and give the evidence to it, a role which was somewhat different from that of *France-Observateur*, which was prepared to inform its own readers directly, instead of doing it in the round about way *Le Monde* seemed to be suggesting.⁵⁹

As mentioned earlier, a number of texts and publications victimised by the authorities dealt with the very serious allegations of torture, which was being widely practised in Algeria.⁶⁰ The well-known cases of the torture of Henri Alleg, director of *Alger-Républicain*, mentioned earlier, was also the reason behind a number of newspaper seizures, without *Le Monde* making a very strong case for the journalist, or making any specific accusations against the State or the Military.⁶¹ The attitude of *Le Monde* on this occasion was also somewhat more diluted than that of others, such as *Franc-Tireur*.⁶²

13.3.4. Space given to protests

However, it would not be true to say that the reports of *Le Monde* did not include some form of protest against the military. Indeed, another characteristic of *Le Monde's* reporting of these seizures and of press censorship was that the paper included in its reports and articles the protests of journalists affected by government restrictions, even if the journal-

ists employed by *Le Monde* itself did not seem to be very vocal on the topic.⁶³ It even opened its "free opinions" column to the occasional spokesman of a victimised newspaper to defend his paper and argue its case against the injustice to which he thought it was being subjected.⁶⁴

In fact, throughout 1957, most of the articles relating to the seizing of other newspapers were accompanied with, or subsequently followed by, various declarations or complaints by newspapers (or their editors or the journalists concerned), organisations, or even individuals, unhappy with the circumstances.⁶⁵

It has to be said that quite often there was a combination of elements, such as the legal motives behind the seizures, and the protests of the publication,⁶⁶ especially while censorship measures were making editors publish newspapers with blank pages.⁶⁷ But quite frequently complaints were specifically made at the request of the organisations concerned.⁶⁸

The overall picture that develops is that of a paper reporting factually, with the characteristics outlined above. A paper whose stand on freedom of the press is in no way similar to the stance expected from either its position on issues that most affected it, or from its declared stance on freedom of the press. Even the illegality of the aspects of the seizures, when pointed out in the pages of the paper, had been initially highlighted by other papers and simply echoed by *Le Monde*.⁶⁹

13.3.5. Press censorship and *Le Monde* itself

The whole picture would not be complete if we did not look at how press censorship affected *Le Monde*, and at how the paper reacted to it. So far (except for the instance referred to above) it seems to have escaped the attention of the censors.

Was the paper unaffected by the seizures?

13.3.5.1. The first seizures of *Le Monde*

The short answer to that question is *no*. But further comments need to be made on this topic. Indeed, *Le Monde* was seized on a few occasions. Yet the paper did not seem to object to the State of Emergency Law (31/3/1955), even though some of its aspects clearly threatened freedom of expression, including that of the press. As early as 1955, *Le Monde* was able to realise the dangers to press freedom when the Law was used in Algeria. In fact, *Le Monde* expected it to affect some papers but voiced only mild criticism at the time.⁷⁰ But perhaps that was seen as very remote and did not particularly affect the paper.

The paper itself, however, first fell foul of the authorities when it published the Penchenier story in August 1955,⁷¹ when the account of the incidents displeased the authorities in Algeria, but the paper never even bothered to mention it.

Nevertheless, these first seizures did not seem to cause any stir in the paper, which did not see fit to protest, nor take any prominent stand over the issue. The whole matter seemed unimportant to *Le Monde*, which, unlike some other papers, did not appear to resent the fact that it was being seized, or that its circulation was being prevented.

The paper was in trouble with the authorities again at the beginning of 1957, when it published a report of an incident⁷² in which a punitive attempt by the paratroopers led to the death of a young Algerian girl.

In reporting an "incident" in Algiers (see also Chapter 12), *Le Monde* stated that the child had been "fatally wounded" but that this was very likely to have been "accidental", as the

paper specifically pointed out that she had been hit by "stray bullets".⁷³ When the authorities in Algeria seized *Le Monde*, this brought the Director himself out of his shell. What seemed to have infuriated him was that the version given of the incident did not really incriminate anybody⁷⁴ and the fact that the seizure was likely to alienate the paratroopers.

Beuve-Méry attacked Lacoste's "frightening" manoeuvre to "raise the furore" of the paratroopers against *Le Monde's* journalists and readers. He even went a step further and accused the government (in Paris and Algiers) of tending more and more (be it in North Africa or in Suez) to "impose its own truth, using and abusing all the means at its disposal". "Would it not be better", he argued, "to put an end to the absurd and odious hypocrisy", offering the Socialist government a choice between refraining from using such methods or going the whole way and imposing total censorship prior to publication.⁷⁵

Two things became clear over this incident. One was that, despite its awareness of the duties of journalists, to give the truth to the readers, the paper was seeking information from official sources. The other was that the newspaper was subjecting its free reporting policy to certain rules.

It was made clear here that HBM explicitly recognised the responsibilities of journalists and the newspapers to tell the truth. If so, one can legitimately ask why such a consideration was not taken on board in the many instances where the paper chose to ignore that responsibility.

An element of explanation can be noted here in the sense that before publishing the story, *Le Monde* was busy checking details with the Ministry of Defence, which was the least

likely source of accurate information at the time.⁷⁶

Le Monde was not the only paper seized on this occasion; a number of other papers, which had also covered the story, were seized as well, despite the opposition of the Press Federation, whose protests *Le Monde* published. And here, a second element of explanation could be suggested. It was only then (the next day), in this indirect way, ie. through a careful reading of the text of the Federation's protests, that the paper revealed⁷⁷ to its readers that there had been a request by the same Federation that "nothing" should be published "that could aggravate the situation in Algeria."

Manifestly, *Le Monde* must have observed this rule without informing its readers that it was doing so. By this action, it was not fulfilling its primary duty of informing its readers.⁷⁸

However, the reprinting of the story was its first attempt at confronting the Socialist government, and the non-seizure of the issues reproducing the story only helped the newspaper reinforce the strength of its argument; as it commented:

*Faut-il en conclure que ce qui était attentatoire un jour à la sûreté intérieure et extérieure de l'Etat ne l'était plus le lendemain, ou que les <<autorités compétentes>> avaient cette fois encore abusé de leurs pouvoirs... il reste la perte subie par le journal.*⁷⁹

But even this half-hearted defence of press freedom by *Le Monde*, being victimised when it thought it was abiding by the rules, was short lived. Having been banned from "internment camps" in Algeria, *Le Monde* waited until it was prompted by correspondence from a reader advising the paper that it had been seized in a *camp d'hébergement* to reply that it was aware of the seizure in "all camps".⁸⁰

Le Monde could hardly be described as a paragon of the

freedom of the press, or a symbol of anti-oppression and civil liberties.

13.3.5.2. Other attempts to undermine the paper

This could easily be illustrated in the coverage of other incidents.⁸¹ Apart from the attempt to launch a rival newspaper, *Le Temps de Paris* and the pricing episode,⁸² the paper was hardly harassed by the authorities over Algeria. There was, however, an unsuccessful attempt made on *Le Monde* when it was taken to court by a number of interested parties, including the Defence Minister, under the umbrella of a Veterans organisation, over an article published by Professor Duverger.⁸³ In his article, Duverger had warned of the dangers of a "super-police", sending to the government, to public opinion and to the paratroopers, a signal about possible consequences - "triple complex of power, humiliation and revolt which, *Le Monde* recalled, "had more or less been behind the emerging of all kinds of fascism, including hitlerism".

On this occasion, it was HBM again, the director, who put pen to paper to protest against the charge of public defamation of the army for what was essentially nothing but a form of "clinical diagnosis of one of the 20th Century's major social phenomena".⁸⁴ He clearly thought that *Le Monde* had been singled out⁸⁵ and tried to exaggerate the paper's role.⁸⁶ In order to strengthen its case, *Le Monde* echoed all the protests made in its favour in the foreign press, quoting extensively from what they said.⁸⁷

Clearly, in so doing, *Le Monde* was making too much of the few instances⁸⁸ when it was being victimised on the Algerian issue. It suffered much more on other fronts and took a more

aggressive stance.⁸⁹ On the issue of Algeria it was virtually unaffected under the Fourth Republic.

Other papers were more harassed because of their reporting.⁹⁰ The harassment to which *Le Monde* was subjected in terms of seizures represented about 3% over the whole period of the war (1954-1962).⁹¹ Other papers and journalists had a much courageous attitude. *L'Express* continued to attack the government, refusing to bow to its pressure and, in order to avoid financial bankruptcy, which would no doubt have ensued if its seizures had continued endlessly, the paper started publishing blank pages rather than emasculated and sanitised information.⁹²

Apart from Penchenier's 1955 article⁹³ and that of Blanchet,⁹⁴ for which they were never prosecuted, there were no cases in which the journalists of *Le Monde* themselves were persecuted by the authorities. Under the Fourth Republic, most of those persecuted for writing in *Le Monde* were not journalists⁹⁵ working for the paper, but outsiders like Marrou or Mandouze...or Duverger's case mentioned above. This pales into insignificance if we examine the difficulties of journalists like Barrat or J.J Servan-Schreiber.

13.4. A lukewarm call for freedom of investigation

13.4.1. Introduction

As was made clear in the previous chapters, a number of atrocities were committed daily in Algeria in an attempt to repress the nationalist uprising. This was a well-known fact in Algeria, but not so well-known in France at the start. Progressively, however, throughout French society reports were emerging daily of cases of "ill-treatment," atrocities and torture, increasing the pressure on the governments to do, or

look as though they were doing, something about what some on the Left called "abuses of human rights" and what the Left and the Right, as well as all governments, called "slanderous statements" aimed at "demoralising the army" and "threatening national security."

There was, to say the least, considerable pressure to verify or deny the reports, to set up an investigative commission which would examine what was really going on in Algeria and report it to public opinion. A number of commissions were set up and these visited Algeria to establish the truth, but without any significant revelations for the readers of *Le Monde*.

Apart from a few parliamentary groups of MPs visiting Algeria, one or two commissions of enquiry could have considerably helped public opinion to discover more about the atrocities in Algeria, and it is to *Le Monde's* coverage of these that I shall now turn.

13.4.2. The Provo Report

13.4.2.1. A not so neutral Report

With opinion in France becoming increasingly disturbed by the news and rumours coming out of Algeria, pressure was being progressively put on Parliament to create an official commission of enquiry to go to Algeria and investigate the situation there.

On 28 October 1956 the Provo commission⁹⁶ was entrusted by the Assembly to report as soon as possible on the allegations of "ill-treatment." The results were not to become public until March of the following year when, after completing its enquiries, the commission reported its findings with the dissent of one of its members,⁹⁷ who would not accept the principle and

the letter of the conclusions.

Despite this dissent by one member,⁹⁸ the fact that the paper had formal evidence of the maltreatment of Evelyne Lavalette⁹⁹ and also the realisation, by the paper itself, that the Association of Cardinals and Archbishops of France "could not, without reason, have unanimously thought it opportune to remind people of certain principles," the paper headlined on the conclusions of the report that there was no valid proof that detainees had been tortured and that the exceptional measures adopted in Algeria were fully justified.¹⁰⁰

As far as the report was concerned, the paper described it as being sometimes "categorical", sometimes "prudent",¹⁰¹ and concluded that, until further information was available, the press and the Communist Party had indulged in an "intoxication campaign which may turn against other detainees, whether Communists or not".

Ignoring its own evidence in the case of Lavalette and the fact that the commission had failed to arrive at any conclusions about what were then euphemistically called *camps d'hébergement*, and which had been part of its remit,¹⁰² the paper devoted considerable space, however, to its "analysis" of the report.¹⁰³ There were, in the text of the report, sentences stating that torture had taken place and others denying it, the weight of the argument tilting heavily in favour of the second.¹⁰⁴ The report further contrasted the rights of the defence counsel and the rights of the nation, concluding that the latter were predominant and constituted a guarantee for the former.¹⁰⁵

In a separate article, *Le Monde* gave coverage to the reservations of the dissenting member of the delegation

(Hovnanian).¹⁰⁶ This could perhaps be seen as a measure of objectivity by the paper. But *le Monde* did not attempt to integrate or contrast the two pieces of information with other available evidence -with the view to formulating its own point of view.¹⁰⁷

13.4.2.2. A variety of views

The conclusions of the report were later contested by the seven lawyers¹⁰⁸ who, stressing the contradictions, silences and omissions in the report, stated that these contradictions had not been cleared up, and maintained, on medical grounds (evidence denied by the report), that torture, including the use of electricity, had indeed taken place.¹⁰⁹ Instead of becoming involved in terms of commenting over the issue for the benefit of its readers, *Le Monde* "passed the buck" again to one of its contributors and outsiders to the paper to express his their views.

Duverger's views were very critical of the report,¹¹⁰ which in his eyes had the merit of putting the solution of the Algerian problem squarely.¹¹¹ In total disregard of nationalist demands, he thought that the government ought to be given all necessary means of action.¹¹²

Totally by-passing the problem of torture,¹¹³ of which he was not totally convinced,¹¹⁴ he nevertheless expressed doubts as to the path being followed in Algeria¹¹⁵ as far as it affected France itself.¹¹⁶ But one cannot help sense that his fears had more to do with the possible impact on France, which was paramount.¹¹⁷

Maurice Garcon took a different view. After examining the agenda in greater detail,¹¹⁸ he showed more readiness to accept their good faith.¹¹⁹

Agreeing with the essential principle that, "whatever the facts", one must not drift away from the "basic principles of French civilisation",¹²⁰ he proposed an altogether not very convincing way out of the dilemma by suggesting that it might be necessary¹²¹ to resort to measures outside the norms of the Law as long as a swift return to legality is sought.¹²²

Another brand of opinion was expressed by Cesar Santinelli,¹²³ who welcomed the fact that a "wave of horror" had swept public opinion, since he thought that the day public opinion would be indifferent to it would mean that "France was ripe for Barbarism".

There were, according to him, however, not only differences of degree but also of kind between the Nazi and French activity, because the policemen indulging in "cruelties" (*séVICES*) were doing so against clear orders and would be sanctioned if found out, while the Nazis practised it under precise instruction and would be sanctioned if they did not.¹²⁴

Undesirable though they might have been for *Le Monde*, these atrocities seemed to constitute as much of an embarrassment for the paper as they were for the government. So much so that, when these abuses of human rights were acknowledged, *Le Monde's* headlines did not express outrage that atrocities had taken place but were on the pattern of Mitterrand's statements to the House Committee that "there had been fewer cases of torture than previously reported".¹²⁵

Reports of sanctions, later revealed to be untrue, were given prominence with the result that they played down the authorities complacent attitude. This was the case for statements made by the Ministry of Defence, incidentally acknowledging the occurrences by insisting that all the incidents had

been sanctioned by the authorities.¹²⁶

But, while these denials were taking place, the setting-up of another commission was announced (see CSDLI below). One could not help wondering, if these incidents had been fewer than reported and in any case dealt with, why another commission was being set up? This sounded highly suspicious.

13.4.3. The commission de sauvegarde des droits et des libertés individuelles (CSDLI)

13.4.3.1. A futile effort made to look worthwhile

Notwithstanding the lack of comment and realistic explanation for the readers, *Le Monde* reported at the same time a *communiqué* from the *Elysée* relating the setting up of the CSDLI, and expressing the usual admiration for the troops' successes and attacking the enemies of France, who were organising campaigns against her.¹²⁷

This made the CSDLI appear as a supplementary effort of the French government, since reports of "excesses" kept coming, to reassure public opinion once and for all, giving the impression that it was better to be on the safe side.

It must be emphasised that this presentation was made in spite of *Le Monde's* awareness of at least three types of atrocities (*excès*) which might need investigation,¹²⁸ and despite the awareness of strong opposition by the authorities in Algeria,¹²⁹ whose desire it was to restrict the commission and impose on it an advisory capacity only. This would prevent it from having any real investigative powers. The pretext used was that the investigation might raise suspicion of the army or the administration. *Le Monde's* articles, just like its headline, reflected the inability of the paper to make an effective and accurate statement.¹³⁰

In the end the role of the commission did not seem to be clear at all for *Le Monde*, as some understood it to be *déceler et châtier tout manquement individuel*, while the others thought it was a kind of reaction against the campaign organised by the "enemies of France".

Trying to occupy the middle ground, *Le Monde* stated that, in its view, the numerous personalities from politics, religion, academe or the judiciary, who denounced a number of excesses could not be accused of treason; nor, on the other hand, had anybody portrayed as "torturers" (*tortionnaires*) the 700,000 soldiers who had served in Algeria.¹³¹

Though timidly sharing the objective that the authors of crime rather than the denunciators should be punished,¹³² *Le Monde* looked very ineffective and on the defensive in relation to the views prevailing in political circles.¹³³

In the circumstances, the view of the paper came to be expressed explicitly by Jean Planchais, who explained the decision to create a commission as a spectacular move by the Ministry of Defence to "protect the army against the campaign of demoralisation".¹³⁴

Dwelling on inconsistencies and fluctuations in policy, which "put the military in morally and materially nerve-shattering conditions", and evoking the possibility of an army rebellion in Algeria if it (the Army) were to lose (quoting *Militaires*, March 1957), Planchais was still trying to defend the honour of the army by explaining its role as a mere instrument caught up in a vicious circle created by unclear and undefined policies.

Despite some acknowledgement of errors, Planchais took up strongly the defence of the military, by arguing that a lack of

understanding on the part of some of the public, which "tarred them with the same brush," was making the "soldiers either scarecrows or scapegoats"¹³⁵ and then turning against them.

Sympathetic to the army's role,¹³⁶ he criticised derisively the attacks on military officers for not having spoken out or complained through their hierarchical structure at the time.¹³⁷

The whole exercise surrounding the commission, which *Le Monde* did not object to and even encouraged, seemed pointless, since the paper was aware of the possibility, in the hands of those guilty people, of removing any evidence, and of the ease with which it was possible to fool any enquiry by camouflaging facts and diluting responsibility.¹³⁸

Not really concerned about bringing the guilty to book, Planchais' paper turned to the future, recommending that an end be put to "condemnable practices" in the name of efficiency but also of unity of the country,¹³⁹ as the morale of the army could not be maintained if morality was not respected.¹⁴⁰

13.4.3.2. The poor findings of CSDLI

Towards the end of the following month the membership of the Commission de Sauvegarde had still to be decided.¹⁴¹ Reports of the setting-up of the Commission, its membership, its freedom to determine its attributions were followed by the announcement of its planned departure for Algeria the following week, without *Le Monde* seeking to remind either the commission or its own readers of the urgency¹⁴² of the task on which it had earlier seemed so keen.¹⁴³

There were already indications of the weak part the Commission was going to play. The files to be submitted to the members were to be split individually amongst them, and cases would be followed on an individual basis, which would obviously

detract from the official, solemn atmosphere that a court hearing or investigative commission, with its formal setting and its proceedings, would have given it.

It was also announced that members of the investigative team would travel separately and that anybody could apply to be heard in writing, so long as they included documented evidence. All these details made any real outcome uncertain. Furthermore, the inauguration speech of the Commission indicated that it was not only to receive complaints of atrocities, but also to adjudicate in cases of "exaggeration" or "calumny" against the army,¹⁴⁴ discouraging thereby almost anybody from speaking out or contacting the Commission. *Le Monde* seemed oblivious to the outcome and the debate moved to public opinion and outsiders to the paper.¹⁴⁵

Only two members of the Commission, General Zeller and Professor Rochet, spent six days in Algeria before the Commission fell into the doldrums shortly afterwards.

The Commission handed in its report in September 1957. The government had no intention of publishing it. *Le Monde* did not seek to publish it either, despite holding a leaked copy.¹⁴⁶ Instead of informing the readers straight away, the paper waited until 14 December 1957 before publishing the text of the *rapport de synthèse*, a very mild version of the whole report.¹⁴⁷ The journalists were said to be in total agreement about its publication¹⁴⁸ then, and subsequently proud, of having drawn the attention of public opinion to the irregularities of the methods used in Algeria by the security forces.¹⁴⁹ It must be pointed out, however, that the *rapport de synthèse* was itself a very mild and edited version of the complete report, which included many more damaging accounts of methods

and incidents of torture and atrocities, which remained secret for many years,¹⁵⁰ and which would then have indicted the government and the security forces in the eyes of the readers.

13.4.4. The International Commission against detention (CICRC)

In the meantime another Commission of investigation was being set up by the Red Cross, under a French chairman.¹⁵¹

13.4.4.1. Another investigation made to look promising

In the coverage of the paper, it looked to be an important investigative commission with an international dimension, being authorised by the French government to enquire about the sanctity of individual liberty and right to defence in Algeria and, particularly, on conditions of arrest, detention of prisoners in Algeria, and the prosecution of cases. The organisation which was to meet to constitute the delegation was said to have been "moved" (*s'émouvoir*) by information received, relating to police practices.¹⁵²

Over a month later, *Le Monde* reported the constitution of the Investigative Commission in a plenary session of the Organisation.¹⁵³ Stating that a previous commission in Tunisia had brought about substantial changes, *Le Monde* appeared keen on this Commission, as it gathered information on it and revealed the names of the members of the organisation and their support for the enquiry into civil liberties (rights of defence, conditions of detention, arrest and trials).¹⁵⁴

The text of the responses gathered by *Le Monde* also revealed that all detentions would be investigated, as well as the willingness of the group to speak to detainees in private

and their intention, after the twenty or so days of the enquiry, to inform the Prime Minister, the General Secretaries of the UN and the LBO (BIT) before making their findings public.

13.4.4.2. A sense of balance exposing the other side

When it was published, the report of the International Commission was judged to be "balanced and measured" by *Le Monde*, which praised it for being drafted in a "measured way and with great concern for balance and moderation," despite containing severe judgments in parts.¹⁵⁵ The paper commented that, while establishing fundamental distinctions between judicial and administrative authorities, the report revealed serious cases of excesses -of arbitrary detention, disappearances, torture- but established that there was no systematic implementation of these measures and that several people in charge had been punished by the authorities.

For the paper, this was sufficient reason not to deprive "une opinion travaillée par les passions" of an honest element of assessment, and that it was more than ever important to provide complete information.¹⁵⁶

Hence, the paper was keen to provide further details of the findings by Dr Georges André, commenting on the lessons to be learned from the enquiry,¹⁵⁷ and emphasising the personal remarks he made returning "frightened by the atmosphere of terror," and "shocked" (*bouleversé*) by the "savage treatment and mutilation cases" by "fellagas" on Algerians (in quotes), on which he was said to have brought ample documentation. *Le Monde* was also keen to point out that he refused to compare Algerian "rebels" with the European "Resistance" during the

Second World War¹⁵⁸ and that he personally thought that accusations against the French authorities were "excessive," deploring, however, that a General Inspector of the Administration had justified "certain methods of interrogation" as "the only way of saving a great number of lives."

Given the atmosphere of the time, this did not seem to be a step forward in "illuminating" opinion. In every respect, it was a mild assessment, with only twelve possible cases and only three definite ones, in relation to the "atrocities" of the "other side." It was not likely to create a revolution or set wheels in motion for a possible change of policy in Algeria.

13.4.5. The Radical Commission

13.4.5.1. An exceptionally promising commission

The enquiry which was most likely by far to reveal anything at the time was made up of a group of parliamentarians from the Radical Party, not necessarily in the pocket of the government. This was the Radical Commission.¹⁵⁹ Because of its independence from the government, this Commission could have been used as a front, if the real intentions of the paper had been to ensure that the public knew the facts about Algeria no matter what the costs were.

It was a glimmer of hope, as far as establishing the truth about atrocities in Algeria was concerned, which came with the wish expressed by part of the Radical Party to send a team of their own to investigate.

Despite the insufficiencies and the criticisms¹⁶⁰ of the CSDLI, non-existent until then, the lack of progress towards its creation and various critical comments by groups wishing to see human rights respected,¹⁶¹ the proposal for a Radical

Commission of Enquiry did not receive a particularly warm welcome by the paper.

At the time the government commission remained at a standstill,¹⁶² the pressure for the new Radical Commission was mounting, with statements that it would be made up of respectable Parliamentarians, politicians and lawyers, and that it would devote the first audience (but also successive ones), during the ten days it intended spending in Algeria, to the Resident Minister. Further audiences would then be given to civilian and military authorities respectively.

13.4.5.2. A biased presentation of the opposition

Yet, despite the declared similarity of objectives, no warm expressions of support could be found in *Le Monde* for the Commission. The organisation was greeted very lukewarmly by *Le Monde*, which in no way put itself out to help its search for freedom of information. Instead, the paper adopted what seemed to be a neutral reporting stance.

Although apparently keen to see something between a *commission éteignoir* and a *commission fantôme* installed, and aware that people were becoming more and more concerned about the atrocities committed and unhappy about the state of affairs in Algeria, when it was announced that an eight-member Radical commission had been appointed, *Le Monde* reported on the argument within the Radical Party between people like Maunoury¹⁶³ and Pierre Mendès-France (out of the government since 26 May 1956), without taking a definite stance, describing the exchanges as a "dialogue of the deaf".¹⁶⁴

On the one hand, *Le Monde* reported the Radical Party's insistence that its commission be given sufficient powers of

enquiry to conduct its investigation and fulfil its mission independently from the military and civilian authorities in Algeria, so as to enable it to inform public opinion.¹⁶⁵ On the other, it also stated that the Commission was criticised by the Right and opposed in the same way by Europeans in Algeria, especially war veterans, who requested that the Commission should never set foot in Algeria.¹⁶⁶

Le Monde reported both on the intentions of the Radical Commission to enquire about the whole situation in order to fulfil its duties absolutely independently of any interference, and to go to Algiers as soon as possible to help establish the truth and conciliate the rights of all, and the protests of the Algiers War Veterans Organisation against the Commission, as well as their clearly-stated intentions not to tolerate "liquidators", who have "the effrontery to want to set foot on Algerian soil," and to "defy and insult [them] inside [their] walls".¹⁶⁷

As far as the coverage of the paper revealed, there seemed to be a consensus against the Radical Commission as the paper further reported that the civilian and military authorities would refuse to cooperate with the Commission.

For the paper, many of the various European and right-wing organisations (Mayors) gave the impression that there was a consensus against the Radicals' visit and that this consensus had the sympathy of the authorities there.

But it could be argued, however, that, notwithstanding the apparent consensus of opposition, the groups involved in the protest represented only the right-wing faction of the European population and the authorities whose attitude had made the "excesses" possible.¹⁶⁸ Even if liberal-minded Europeans were

to be included in this consensus, it would nevertheless mean that the opinion of 90% of the population was not even sought.

This opposition from the Right, as well as from the Extreme Right (reported on page p. 1), and from the Socialists in Algeria (reported on p. 2), which represented only the interests of the few, was described as a real *levée de boucliers*. It was to lead, to start with, to a postponement of the trip by the Radicals, at a time when no progress had been made over the *Commission de Sauvegarde*.¹⁶⁹

Listing the War Veterans Organisation as an argument, the Poujade Mouvement (which asked for a strike) and Bourguès-Maunoury, who had not opposed it, *Le Monde* added what it called a "warning", but which looked very much like a threat, by Lacoste himself that the Algiers population (he meant the settlers mostly) would not be able to control itself (*La population algéroise ne saurait maîtriser ses émotions*).¹⁷⁰

It was manifest that none of the victims of these *sérvices* (which this, or any, commission of enquiry would investigate) or their sympathizers were listed in the opposition to this enquiry. The Radical Commission seemed to be the most likely organisation to report objectively on the excesses and looked as though it deserved some support from the paper for the sake of establishing the truth. The paper could have pointed out the need for, or even have defended, the Radical Commission's right to investigate and enquire.

Instead, while reporting on the Radical Valoisians progressively giving in, the paper stated that this did not dispense the government from setting up the *Commission de sauvegarde* (promised more than a fortnight previously), and was quite content to believe and to remind readers that G. Mollet had on

two occasions over the previous fortnight publicly expressed his wish to discover the whole truth (*hautement proclamé et à deux reprises le 9 et le 14 avril son désir de savoir toute la vérité*).¹⁷¹

This view was reinforced by the series of articles and the information subsequently published by *Le Monde* the next day. Coupled with headlines emphasising that some of the associations in Algeria were determined to prevent the Radicals from carrying out their task, the content of the article on the inside pages revealed that the various organisations involved had not heard of the Radicals' decision not to visit Algeria, since they were reported as having gathered in thousands invading the airport lawns,¹⁷² for a "welcoming ceremony" prepared for the Commission which consisted of a double row (*double haie*) of demonstrators, made up of "victims of terrorism," hostile to the visitors, blocking their way.

Other revelations, such as the one indicating that with the threat of smashing all the furniture in the hotel, where the members of the Commission were supposed to be staying, the management had cancelled the booking, and the text of the telegrammes, exchanged between the Minister Resident and the delegation, were also included.¹⁷³

This was followed by a statement of relief, that serious incidents had been avoided, and comments made by various personalities and newspapers, which reflected the indignation about the "arrogance" of the Radicals in the various criticisms of the Radical Commission in the French Press.¹⁷⁴

Thus, we see, in this example, a wide range of opinions and a substantial amount of information likely to help a critical reader assess the situation more or less objectively. But,

given the objectives of the Commission and the composition of the opposition to its mission, *Le Monde* seemed to keep a certain distance from the enquiry, and to be far from indignant over an issue, which was tantamount to preventing respectable politicians from investigating the truth or allegations of atrocities in Algeria.

13.4.5.3. Not devoid of objective criticisms

Although the paper highlighted some inconsistencies in the position of Lacoste, as for instance, when it reported that he did seem to have fought against the Commission,¹⁷⁵ despite his previous statement on 6 December 1956 (which was along the lines of: *je me permets d'inciter tous les hommes de bonne foi, appartenant aux pays libres, qui voulaient venir voir de leurs propres yeux la réalité algérienne, de ne pas hésiter à le faire*) and posed some judicious questions,¹⁷⁶ there was only mild criticism, which, in the light of the circumstances, did not absolve the paper from putting a strong case for the defence of the right of inquiry by parliamentarians and politicians.

Although *Le Monde* pointed out that Lacoste's claim to speak in the name of all political movements, except the PCA and the FLN, was to give the Radicals "a bias in favour of the rebels," which was not justified, given that criticism of the Resident Minister was coming this time from *milieux* "least suspected of sympathy for the PCA and the FLN," the interrogative form used by the paper in most points on which it questioned the government seemed merely to have been designed to make the reader think. *Le Monde* showed less willingness to commit itself to a strong "liberal position" as far as establishing the freedom of enquiry in Algeria. Instead of adopting a strong position, or

even of simply following the lead of *Combat's* Georges Art Schuller (p. 5), the paper was happy to press for a speedy setting-up of the "Commission de Sauvegarde"¹⁷⁷ which looked impotent from the start.

A sense of collusion clearly appeared in this context when, sensing a little urgency,¹⁷⁸ the paper revealed itself ready, following the rest of public opinion, not to rely too much on the conclusion of the report made by the previous commission led by Provo.¹⁷⁹

13.5. Conclusion

What could be found in the coverage of *Le Monde* was an ambition to please all concerned. *Le Monde's* policy seemed to be to report alternately the opposition to the authorities with statements in favour of their defence. The publication of the letter of resignation of the Socialist Senator from Algeria, A. Doumenc, in protest at the policy of Lacoste¹⁸⁰ and the protest of the Radical Party at the policies of Lacoste¹⁸¹ were combined with declarations by the authorities in their own defence¹⁸² and even arguments put forward by Lacoste himself,¹⁸³ stating that it was not just Algiers but the whole of the population of Algeria that was opposed to the Radicals, and that more than 3,000 troops would have been needed to protect their arrival. As far as one can see, apart from this desire to try to reflect the variety of opinions expressed, the paper failed to contrast and compare these positions with the aim of drawing conclusions and outlining clearly where it stood. This was implicitly a stand in itself. The paper thus did not succeed, in my view, in making a serious attempt to understand, comment and report on the Algerian situation clearly; therefore

it could not have helped many (of its) readers to come to grips with the matter.

In view of what the paper knew and came progressively to admit to, this was not far from contributing to the conspiracy of silence that surrounded atrocities committed by French troops then, and still does, to a certain extent.

13.6. Conclusions

Looking at the coverage of press freedom and the freedom of investigation, we find that there were outstanding journalists and intellectuals at the time whose commitment to their job and to their readership was without regard to their own personal safety, and without regard to the persecution they suffered.

One is also struck by *Le Monde's* feeble objections to the sanctions imposed on, and the persecution of, the intellectuals and journalists who dared question the colonial world or the methods used to preserve it, and the lack of support for writers who sympathised with the colonised population. The exercise of restraints, the absence of comments are sometimes eloquent in themselves. As silence over such important issues as sanctions taken against intellectuals and journalists seem at least as relevant and important as the potential comments that could have been made on the publications themselves.

These journalists and intellectuals held freedom of expression and information in higher esteem, as they were more often willing to risk much more than those employed by *Le Monde*. The

defiance of a Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber or a Robert Barrat was manifest. They, in a sense, preferred to face prosecution and to suffer imprisonment for the sake of giving their readers the unadulterated truth when *Le Monde's* journalists or its editor adopted a more "collaborationist", if not a timid, attitude to the truth and the freedom of the press.

In *Le Monde* the only bold evidence about repressive methods used by the security forces has to be found in the article of Sablier about the repression of 1945, which came about eight years after the event, and in the more immediate testimony made by Penchenier in 1955.¹⁸⁴ But here, *Le Monde's* defence of Penchenier's views and reports was not very forceful.¹⁸⁵ The paper did not appear to be involved, as Penchenier looked as if he was one of the protagonists in two versions of the same story.¹⁸⁶

The seizure of *Le Monde*, which thought it was playing by the rules, without the paper rebelling (or when it did -rarely and in reserved and mild terms) is bad enough. But it is somewhat more serious when we see an impassive paper not react to being banned, not through the expression of a point of view nor of an opinion, likely to cause damage to national security, but over the simple reporting of facts. As indeed, strangely enough, except in the case of Duverger already examined where a lawsuit was undertaken against him, in all the actual seizure decisions taken, it was the factual reporting of events that was being objecting to.¹⁸⁷

Moreover *Le Monde* never attempted to make a general assessment of the extent of press censorship, of the number of infringements of civil liberties in the field of freedom of expression, or that of the legal suits brought against journal-

ists, even if it did publish the estimates given by the military paper, *Le Bled*.¹⁸⁸

The restrictive definition of journalism illustrated here put the journalist in an impossible situation of not being able to report incidents, elements and facts (which are part and parcel of his job), a situation in which, therefore, he cannot perform his job as a journalist, which consists in giving as complete a picture as possible, reporting to the readers facts that they might not be able to find on their own. Should it not be said in this case that the journalist should look for another job? Or perhaps *Le Monde* thought that these controversial areas in law should be avoided by journalists?

This attitude taken by the paper, it could be argued, demonstrated a very weak and diluted understanding of the right of expression and information, but it still would not be so bad, so misleading and could easily be forgiven, had the paper not devoted such an importance to the freedom of the press when it published a series of articles by Jacques Kayser, one of the media experts at the time.

What we find in our examination of the paper on this question is that nothing damning to the authorities was stated, nor was the whole truth established for the readers. In fact, the conclusion to be drawn from the coverage of the enquiries into atrocities and severe repression is that the motto, "publish and be damned", did not constitute, in this respect, a *modus vivendi*. This attitude was taken and this position adopted at a time when the paper clearly showed that it was unhappy about freedom of information, as far as other media were concerned.

Before deploring from its own reading of *The Times* and *The New York Herald Tribune*, that public opinion in Britain and in

America had, up to then, been better informed than France, and while being aware of the conclusions of various commissions' reports and of the truth about the repression in Algeria, *Le Monde* criticised other media for their lack of information.¹⁸⁹

It could be argued, however, that if the paper had been so genuinely concerned, why had it not done something about it, and why had it been incapable or unwilling to put an end to this lack of information itself?

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONCLUSIONS
14. A MISINFORMED AND MISINFORMING MESSENGER
14.1. Introduction

The importance of the mass media in today's world no longer needs to be demonstrated. This is especially the case since they have acquired a global dimension, now that news can be relayed instantaneously with the development of world communications. This does not minimise the importance of understanding their coverage of historical events and of particular periods in history, as they may relate, in one way or another, to the dominant values and perceptions of society; and because they illustrate, consciously or subconsciously, the beliefs and positions of influential members of that society.

The society examined in this study was France, one of the major world powers, a society about to undergo a radical metamorphosis from a colonial empire to an industrial society; a society beginning to turn the page of its colonial past and looking towards a more prosperous and serene future in Europe.

This colonial past, not all of which has been swept away, has been the source of many of its problems, especially during the Fourth Republic. This was one of the most significant eras of French history: the Algerian "problem," which was more than instrumental in the downfall of the Fourth Republic, played an essential role in de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. Furthermore, it contributed to the collapse of a tottering state and constitutional system plagued by *immobilisme*.

14.2.A paper with high expectations but many unfulfilled promises

14.2.1.Prestigious and independent?

The importance of *Le Monde* could not be overemphasised. *Le Monde* was born out the troubles of the Second World War and became the most prestigious newspaper in French society, an institution in its own right.

The progressive views which the paper claimed to have expressed during the critical years of the decolonisation debate, and the positions alleged to have been taken by its journalists and editor,¹ constitute an important body of data for analysis. This is particularly the case in view of the paramount importance that the paper acquired within French society in less than fifty years of its history.

The investigation of the paper's background (Chapter 2), as shown in the description of the paper's launch, structure and mode of operation, suggests that it was, indeed, an independent medium capable of taking brave positions against all odds. Its background, combined with the spirit of independence of its director and most influential chairman-manager, made it unique in the French context.

In spite of some difficulties experienced by the paper, epitomised by the conflict over pricing policy, the launch of a rival and some attempts to destabilise it (as illustrated in chapter 2, which can partly explain its moderate and reserved attitude), the paper's independence remained, nevertheless, unrivalled in financial and political terms.

A study of the paper allows the reader to build up a set of expectations. These relate to objectivity, thoroughness and speed of reporting, and to a whole philosophy of journalism of

the paper. This set of expectations made it look capable of adopting outspoken positions more than any other paper. It seemed likely to report the situation of the time objectively, suggesting that it was well placed to provide a lead in informing and enlightening public opinion of the time. In this respect, the data on the readership (Chapter 2) showed its importance within French society.

The framework used to analyse the coverage of *Le Monde* in this study has been set out in Chapter 1.

What the readership ("to whom") was told by the paper ("the who") has constituted the most important part of this work. Indeed, the analysis of the detailed content of the newspaper's message (*the what*), explicit and implicit, regarding the colonial situation of Algeria, constitutes the bulk of this study.

As a country, Algeria always strove to keep or regain a degree of autonomy and independence (Chapter 3). If the nature of that independence is subject of controversy, and to a certain extent will remain so, its aspirations for freedom, resistance to oppression and domination, and the willingness of generations to sacrifice themselves for the freedom of their people, was never in doubt.

Chapter three also indicated the impending changes: the successive uprisings, the rise of modern nationalist movements, the deteriorating social and economic conditions, all of which pointed the way towards change. This change that was going to sweep away the injustices of a colonial order, based for the most part on claims of a Western nation's civilising mission. These claims could not be maintained -as the declared objective of emancipation could not be reconciled with the subjugation of the society being "emancipated." On the contrary, Algeria's

aspirations for freedom were met with even more violent attempts to crush its peoples into submission. If the Director of *Le Monde* and the paper's journalists understood anything about colonialism, they had to see that the colonial order, under all its forms, had to go, and that freedom of oppression was the *sine qua non* of the fulfilment of the colonised people through self determination. This meant that the people had to take charge of their own destiny.

Unfortunately, during the Fourth Republic, though they accepted that some improvement of the colonised people's situation should be undertaken, and, at times, adopted a reformist outlook, *Le Monde's* personnel refused to accept the Algerian people's right to self-determination. Yet, years after the events they claimed otherwise, and through various publications, gave the impression of having been an integral part, if not at the forefront, of the decolonisation struggle. However, as we have shown, this allegation could not be proven by the analysis of its columns. These findings constitute the historical and political significance of this work.

14.2.2. An establishment paper?

To determine whether or not the paper was supportive of the idea of decolonisation years before anybody else, or, indeed, to analyse whether the claims of the paper in this respect could be verified, it was helpful to ask a series of questions.

1. First, if the paper's stand was as brave as it is claimed to have been, should this not be reflected in its editorials and many of its articles relating to the various protagonists in this conflict?

2. Secondly, independently of our investigation of the position *vis à vis* the protagonists, we asked ourselves if

there was any support expressed for the views and positions that sought to undermine the colonial order and to fight for the liberation of the colonised people.

3. Whatever the views on the solutions to the Algerian problem, the methods used by the French authorities to maintain their domination in Algeria and crush the uprising included the most severe form of repression. We needed to ask additional questions. What was the position of the paper towards the adoption and use of these methods, which had serious repercussions on civil liberties? Did it denounce them or condemn them in any way?

4. Regardless of whether the paper chose to accept or refuse the repression of the uprising in Algeria, or whether it chose to applaud or condemn it, or whether it perceived civil liberties as paramount, or preferred to abide by the serious question of "state security," we also needed to find out if the paper approved the denunciation by other sectors of public opinion of the methods used, with the resulting infringements of civil liberties? Did it take a decisive and supportive role towards those who sought to inform public opinion? Did it defend the freedom of the press? If *Le Monde* was in no position to comprehensively inform public opinion, did it consider the right of others to do so as paramount? To what extent? To what lengths was the paper prepared to go to see these freedoms upheld?

As regards the first set of questions, the findings clearly suggest that while the French army was given a favourable coverage (Chapter 5), the FLN's coverage (Chapter 6), on the other hand, was less than sympathetic. Furthermore, the depiction of the civilian population (Chapter 7) further illustrat-

ed this bias in favour of the "European" civilisation and its people -to the detriment of the indigenous population on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Regarding our second series of questions, what emerged from the analysis, is implicit and explicit support for most of the governments' views and policies at the time -views and policies which indicated that these governments did not accept the fact that the world was changing. More often than not, they equated the loss of the colony with the demise of France and the loss of French prestige. Far more indicative of the paper's positions than the sympathetic portrayal of governments (Chapter 8) was perhaps the reassuring discourse of the newspaper (Chapter 9). Despite the crisis, it refused to make comparisons between the Algerian situation and Indochina (Chapters 5 & 7), refused to concede the existence of a legitimate nationalist aspiration and appeal, refused to accept the possibility of independence as a solution to the conflict, and, finally, emphasised the importance of keeping Algeria French. These positions and biases were further illustrated by the paper's preference for, and positive assessment of, the ideas of reform. These contrasted with the positions adopted by radical intellectuals which were unambivalent (chapter 10).

Indeed, the reassuring discourse and the unquestioning and unchallenging reports of the paper, attempting to lull and reassure public opinion, most clearly indicate how the coverage of the paper was skewed. To lend more legitimacy and ideological justification, the paper rejected progressive and revolutionary views put forward by some intellectuals, portraying their contributions as controversial, and criticising many aspects of their observations as unacceptable.

The rejection of progressive views and discourse put forward by the intellectuals is a further indication of *Le Monde's* position on the issue. By suggesting that Algerian independence was not the way forward, even if colonisation, as it had been since its early form, were to change, the paper showed the strength of its patriotic values.

Strong, even blinding, belief in the civilising mission of France, as expressed in the desire not to see international involvement in "French internal affairs" in Algeria, was demonstrated beyond a doubt by a hopeless attachment to the idea that only France should determine the fate of Algeria (refusal to accept the failure of the colonial system to bring about emancipation), and not the Algerians themselves.

14.2.3. "Soft" on civil liberties

This position was maintained whilst the most abject means were used to preserve the colonial order. The use of brute force, of the vilest methods of repression, the very anti-thesis of the civilising mission, made the "civiliser" sink below expected standards of civilisation. The recourse to wide-scale repression, including bombing, torture and mass executions, was so extensive that many Algerians, and indeed outsiders, called them crimes against humanity. Had Algeria been in 1962 in a similar position to the Allies after the Second World War, she would have been able to hold her own Nuremberg trials. When we consider the record of M Papon during the Second World War and during the massacre of Algerians in Paris in the early sixties, the links do not seem that tenuous.

Le Monde was made aware of the extensive use of violence by the security forces. Yet it played down the repressive measures as implemented legally (Chapter 11) and illegally (Chapter 12).

In so doing, it masked the realities of the situation for the readers. Far from objecting roundly to infringements of civil liberties, if not to their total suppression, it accepted them in many respects as legitimate. The paper was not brave enough, except on very few occasions, to confront the official discourse in this field. Indeed, there are at times clear indications that the paper failed to supply even clear, complete and accurate information. And at times it could be said that it betrayed hard evidence of collusion in not revealing that information sooner. Sometimes the information was "doctored," or omitted altogether, because of what seems to have been perceived as the "national interest" of France.

The inadequate efforts made by the paper to inform public opinion, the lukewarm support for freedom of the press, the lack of strong continuous protest against newspaper seizures, the ambivalent attitude towards freedom of investigation (Chapter 13) -all these provide an indication of the vacillation, if not the actual unwillingness, of the paper to take a stand which would have been more in conformity with its stated philosophy and policy, and the high moral grounds which it occasionally claimed.

14.3.A Disinformed and a Disinforming paper

14.3.1. The characteristics of brainwashing and disinformation

Indeed, it is well-known, however, that at times of conflicts like Indochina, Algeria, and many examples could be cited, newspaper coverage may not be as accurate or full as would be expected in other circumstances. There are also, of course, variables in political culture.

There is no doubt that many believe that the Algerian war

was *par excellence* the terrain and the ideal time for the implementation of brainwashing techniques (*intoxication*).² What is, perhaps, less well known is the part that *Le Monde* played in this misinformation. Indeed, the paper was no exception, and, in many respects, its everyday content revealed to what extent the "disease" was widespread.

As Freund (1991) pointed out, it was the time when laconic *communiqués* followed in rapid succession, in which the names of the places or people changed, but very little else.

The kind of coverage found in the pages of the paper throughout the Fourth Republic would have been expected from most of the French right-wing press, not in a newspaper like *Le Monde*. It is most unfortunate that, apart from the explicit position (as indicated by the themes listed under chapter headings), many of the techniques associated with the lack of objectivity, disinformation and misinformation (Chapter 1) could easily be identified in the paper.

14.3.2. Paucity and surfeit of information

Examples of both cases of partial information and information "overload" have been identified.

Economy of information entails paucity of details about various incidents ranging from torture (Chapter 12) to repression of the general strike (Chapter 7). This strategy deprived the reader of the ability to make informed judgments. This includes the paucity of comments, especially in the absence of strong criticisms or condemnations which could have shaped public opinion.

Partial information, superficial information, events covered only in part were justified by referring to the possible implications at the UN with reference to the 1957 strike (Chapter

7). The coverage of repression and torture (Chapter 11, 12 & 13) demonstrate a lack of a sound analysis. This approach could safely be construed as disinformation.

On the other hand, there was also a surfeit of information, which we can term information overload, in relation to the various protagonists. These included details of incidents, of acts of terrorism and information relating to the army (Chapter 5) which, given their cumulative effect, bred indifference.

At times, the excess detail may have confused the reader, who may have had little power of selection in the deluge of information or images provided -or even imposed.

Moreover, the construction and images provided to the readers were inaccurate and misleading.

14.3.3. A shifting of responsibility and sanitised information

Despite its alleged objectivity and the alleged bravery of its stances, we find no evidence of this outspokenness either before (Chapter 4) or after the start of the war. On the contrary, many of the techniques associated with disinformation and misinformation have been identified in this study. In some cases, inaccuracies of reports even constituted blatant lies. The blind use of some ambiguous concepts, such as *pacification*, the constant praise of the armed forces and the constant criticism of the opponent, clearly raise questions and doubts for the analyst.

The paper used loaded concepts often without discernment or warning. Terrorism was only present on the Algerian side. The mere evocation of "fellagas" would send shivers down the reader's spine, in view of the "horror" of their "crimes," and the "atrocities" of their deeds. In contradistinction, the Army

represented generally the "forces of order" and "justice" responsible for "protecting" the people. On the ground, not all Algerians benefited from that protection. In fact, most of them suffered -as for them, it acquired a different meaning altogether.³

The French Ministry of Defence was hardly used in a defensive role; and the "disorder" created made the activities of the police appear inevitable. Often these activities and excesses were openly defended, excused and justified by the paper.⁴

The shifting of responsibility and the perception of events as a tragedy with unfolding consequences, which could not be helped on one side, made the blame seem attributable to everybody and everything that was not French. This released the French of their undoubted responsibility for the source of the conflict and the state of affairs in the country.

Furthermore, just as other analyses have established a "class reflex," as exemplified by journalists covering the miners strike,⁵ a comparable "French reflex" could be identified in journalists working for *Le Monde* who stressed the inevitability of the conflict. However, the paper also diluted the blame, by failing to allocate the responsibility for the situation and for the oppression of the Algerian people on successive governments, the army, or the settlers -who were often accused.

There were also many cases of sanitised reporting of the war effort giving connotations of a surgical "cleaning up operation", to stop the "disease" from "spreading" and "infesting" or "infecting" other areas.

The frequent use of *séances*, *certaines faits*, represent an effort to deny or minimise current practices.⁶ We know that

even the use of the word "torture," very infrequently used in *Le Monde's* coverage, had very much the impact of defining downwards, or dismissing the concept of torture⁷ -all these represent a practical process of desemanticisation which is a significant feature and a characteristic of denial. The euphemism of pacification, derived from Pax, is but a further illustration.

14.3.4. Serious consequences: a victim of psychological warfare?

Psychological warfare in the hands of the authorities was a very useful strategy. It meant that the opponent could be beaten, the supporters rallied and the sympathy of public opinion swayed. Its conscious or unconscious use by the press would have had a determining effect.

Its use meant that public opinion in general, and readers in particular, would have confused the reality lived by Algerians and the fictionalised accounts of events. It is very likely that the usual forms of logic were stretched, and even subverted, in the coverage provided by *Le Monde*.

The same standards of comparison were not used. Even in *Le Monde*, the difference of treatment and the use of double standards are striking. On one side, we could see the condemnation of the terrorists' acts and their labelling as "crimes against humanity." On the other, the same concepts were used differently, when similar occurrences or actions were undertaken by the security forces for reason of state.

The problems of alliance in the 1950's presented the East West conflict as a real problem at a time when colonisation was really important. It may be suggested at this junction that *Le*

Monde was as much a victim of psychological warfare as any other newsmedium.⁸ And it could perhaps be said in *Le Monde's* defence that it had no part in this. But rather that it might have fallen victim to the sophisticated efforts of the authorities in their successful attempts to disinform public opinion.

However, available evidence does not point that way at all. The paper's knowledge and awareness of psychological warfare and its methods are only too clear in many of its pages. It is also clear that other news media succeeded where *Le Monde* failed. This excuse may not, therefore, be justifiably made on behalf of *Le Monde*.

Another hypothesis could be advanced for *Le Monde's* shortcomings in this respect. Indeed, the loss of prestige for France, perceived by the paper through the loss of a colony like Algeria, could quite conceivably be a strong motive behind the paper's silences and omissions. Its concern "not to rock the boat," or to ruin France's chances in the international arenas, seems quite plausible in view of the contents of some articles.

In fact, the reasons for *Le Monde's* "imperfections" were more to do with a certain conception of nationalism and fear of France losing her prestige as a major nation. From a nationalist perspective, this is understandable after the defeat of the Second World War as well as the loss of empire from Indochina to North Africa, and the "shameful" retreat over Suez.

Some⁹ have sought to explain the lack of radicalism of *Le Monde* by reference to imposed censorship, its fear of the authorities, or possible loss of income. But this study makes it clear that there was a deliberate policy of self-restraint in not publishing, and even opposing at times, views put for-

ward by intellectuals, and of more accurate and complete versions of events, for fear of damaging French prospects and interests.¹⁰

As we have demonstrated and summarised in the above subsections, Jean Planchais's statement¹¹ that *Le Monde* would have lost many readers, as a result of the paper adopting more radical views than it did, simply does not hold up for the Fourth Republic. Moreover, those publications that took a more radical position against the war, and ceaselessly denounced French Army atrocities, without fear of seizure or sanctions, and sought to inform their readers fully, actually increased their readership.¹²

14.3.5. *Le Monde*: a problematic historical source

The result is that the paper could not be compared to *L'Aurore* at the turn of the century over the Dreyfus affair, though some intellectuals tried to use it in that way. Nobody in the paper could even aspire to the mantle of Zola, even if one or two intellectuals did, indeed, suffer persecution as a result of expressing their views in the paper.

There was no comparable case of *Le Monde* returning journalists from Algeria, like Gloria Emerson,¹³ who went to Vietnam and came back a converted pacifist militant, and proceeded to rectify the onesidedness of the reports of colonial conflicts. Nor were there examples of journalists like those who went to Central America, and, upon their return, clearly spelled out, with the sanction of their paper, their conviction that Washington was backing up "unworthy regimes".¹⁴

However, despite its shortcomings, *Le Monde* did, indeed, contain some of the most outspoken criticism of the colonial order and of the methods used to preserve it.¹⁵

Some of the authors interviewed (Mandouze, Vidal-Naquet), active at the time, defend the paper. They even suggested that it took up positions that at the time were extremely outspoken. Such statements, however, seem to have been made by people whose links with the paper were not so strong¹⁶ and were, in any case, counterbalanced by opposite views.

It also true to say that the pages of the paper indirectly reveal a picture which, by counterbalancing contradictory reports of events, could be said to be quite realistic; and which in many respects could be seen as more realistic than has been suggested so far.¹⁷

This leads me to two further substantial, but more moderate conclusions in relation to the coverage of *Le Monde*.

The first is that a further study of *Le Monde* between 1958 and 1962 needs to be undertaken to assess the balance sheet of the newspaper over the whole period of the Algerian war. There are many indications that the position taken by the paper under the Fourth Republic changed in the early sixties, when the paper was victim of increased censorship and its journalists victims of extremists' attacks.

The findings of this research clearly suggest a general caveat for other researchers of the period: they should be very wary of using media sources, including *Le Monde*, as an objective source in their work. They should be extremely circumspect when this encompasses matters relating to the war and colonial conflict. The reports of *Le Monde* at the time should not be used without safeguards as incontrovertible evidence in historical research on account of the unconscious and, now revealed, bias. Indeed, the researcher will need more references to establish an accurate picture of France at the time when it was

"at war with itself" and "with the Algerians" (as most French historians like to portray that period of French history).

Part of the answer to today's debate about war memories¹⁸ is that few French media or individuals, and very few institutions, were able to confront the facts of a cruel colonial war. Although the position may have partially been corrected since, the paper should be used only with caution as an immediate source of history and not a mirror of society of the time.

Completely lifting the veil over this traumatic period of French history may prove to be a difficult process. France is now facing the difficult but essential task of reclaiming its memory and its past, which it seemed to have lost, but is slowly trying to bring to the surface with various publications. The tremendous efforts achieved in respect of the Second World War could, perhaps, be seen as an encouraging sign for a better acknowledgment and understanding of the Algerian war in the next decades.

Indeed, numerous people have helped: Jules Roy, Jean Lacouture, Benjamin Stora, Jean-Pierre Rioux, André Mandouze, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Jean-Luc Einaudi¹⁹ and others have done a great deal in this field. But is it not time that, instead of making unsubstantiated claims, a paper like *Le Monde* should admit in all realism, its modest, and somewhat controversial, contribution during this period at the time?

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CHAPTER ONE: NOTES

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Le sujet objectivant ne peut être indépendant de l'objet à objectiver in Michaux, Bernard, *Mass Media et Idéologie: avant propos*, pp. 86-100, in La Pensée, April 1981, p. 92.

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Le Nouvel Observateur, Monday 17 November 1980.

(71)

Combien de voix éminentes, comme celle de Raymond Aron, nous reprochaient d'avoir atteint, par nos informations, un <monopole> de qualité qui les contraignait à nous lire tout en pestant contre nos analyses et commentaires (...).

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(75)
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(76)
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(77)
This is Michaux's argument. Ibid.

(78)
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(79)
To remove explanations and comments is seen as equivalent to: (...) *amputer l'organe vital du texte* in Freund, A., op. cit., pp. 59 & 74.

(80)
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(85)
Misinformation is said to be less moralising and a more complete term also encompassing non intentional elements. See Freund, A., op. cit., p. 9 ff.

(86)
At the time of going to press, they are often short of space in which to develop arguments and may have to omit specific facts or elements of information. (See Freund, op. cit., pp.10 & 132.) One has to understand, of course, that journalists work under pressure of time and space, etc., and cannot, without the benefit of hindsight, produce completely accurate and absolutely objective accounts of the events they report, unless they occasionally produce books rectifying the records

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(88)

See Freund, A., *op. cit.*, p. 11.

(89)

Ibid., p. 17.

(90)

See Wolton, D., *War Games*, 1991, *op. cit.*, and, on an earlier conflict, Adams, V., *The Media and the Falklands Campaign*, London, MacMillan, 1986. On the military in general, see also Ferro, Marc, 1991, *op. cit.*, and Hooper, A., *The Military and the Media*, Gower, 1982.

(91)

In *Les problèmes du Monde, Le Débat*, No 24, March 1983, pp. 3-24.

(92)

(..) *anticipation légitime sur l'événement [c'est] un type de mésinformation*, in Freund, A., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

(93)

Ibid., p. 27.

(94)

Ibid., p. 24.

(95)

Ibid., p. 28.

(96)

(..) *absence d'éléments d'information "pertinents au contexte"*, in Freund, A., *op. cit.*, p. 33; see also the discussion of the notion of objectivity above.

(97)

Such as working for another paper, membership of a political party or links with a particular trade-union or corporate groups. Many more additional considerations can play a decisive role in this field. See Freund, A., *op. cit.*, p. 45.

(98)

Chatelain, A., *Le Monde et ses lecteurs*, 1962 and Lebrazi, E.H., *op. cit.*, (introductory chapters esp. p. 48) have illustrated the statistical value to *Le Monde's* coverage by examining the space devoted to editorials, the number and length of articles (Lebrazi *op. cit.* pp. 49-50). This gave an account of the Algerian war but did not instill in the readers the profound reality of the country where it was taking place. See Lebrazi, E.H., *op. cit.*, p. 52 and Thibau, J., (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 385.

(99)

These are illustrated in most of content analysis work outlined above and exemplified by the arithmetic formula put forward by some scholars, such as Kayser, J. (in *L'étude du contenu d'un journal: analyse et mise en valeur* in *Etudes de Presse*, 1959, vol. XI, No 20-21, Paris, pp. 6-20), to demonstrate to what extent news items are highlighted, partly because in this research the medium -*Le Monde*- is thought to be less inclined towards sensationalism and does not use photographs, and partly because Kayser himself accepted the limitations of these methods: "The implementation of ... methods is not sufficient to perfect a comprehensive system for content analysis." (Ibid., p. 18.)

(100)

Random sampling and the quantitative aspect of analysis seem to involve a "considerable effort to reveal a reality which can be perceived by, and is more or less visible to, the naked eye". in Lebrazi, E.H., op. cit., p. 56.

(101)

Freund, A., refers, for instance, to Reichman, W.J., "Use and Abuse of Statistics" in Freund, A., op.cit., p. 191 and p. 197 but he has much to say about the subject himself (pp. 211-219).

(102)

Using models provided by Berelson, B., *Content analysis in Communication Research*, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1952.

(103)

Over the short term, a revolutionary struggle of the type covered in this study (and hence the government response to it and policy towards it) develops in leaps and bounds and is not a constant and regular phenomenon. Random selection proved inefficient as more thorough and systematic checks revealed that very significant articles had been overlooked by this method.

(104)

Lebrazi, E.H., op. cit., p. 54.

(105)

An index of relevant articles has been established. Although the majority of news items could provide for easy codification, as they dealt with a particular topic, a great number of the articles and editorials studied tackled the subject from different angles and dealt with a multitude of topics. This necessitated a multiple classification because of the understandable links between the various questions and the interrelation of various aspects of policy and political life.

(106)

When he recommended that the researcher ought to be aware that one could not do everything (*vouloir tout défricher d'un seul coup*) and that modest but meticulous and careful realisations (*modestes mais soignées*) could find out much more than "a series of pseudo-scientific and pseudo-rigorous and mathematically precise analysis":

(...) *qu'une quantité de coups hasardeux donnés sans souci d'ensemble et oublieux du travail de la*

veille comme celui du lendemain.
In Voyenne, B., op. cit., pp. 44-56.

(107)

Unlike Lebrazi's work, op. cit., which did not include the *Libres Opinions* columns in his analysis.

(108)

These include the perceptions of protagonists, the socio-political context, views on colonialism, on the use of repressive means, including torture, on preserving the colonial status of Algeria and/or reform it under a French "umbrella," on the solutions proposed, the policies followed by the various governments, on the various governments themselves, on events, on the notions of Pacification, civil liberties, and so on.

(109)

Reference by Lebrazi, E.H., op. cit., p. 55, to M.Mouilaud's I.F.P. course, *L'Analyse des contenus devant les problèmes de langages*.

(110)

In *Débat à propos d'un monopole, Le Monde à coeur ouvert, Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, January-February 1977, pp. 62-85. The quote is from p. 81.

(111)

Claude Julien, *Les problèmes du <Monde>*, *Débat*, No 24, March 1983, p. 17.

See also Chapter 2.

(112)

Relying on an unsubstantiated reference in J.-N. Jeanneney & J. Julliard, *Le Monde de Beuve-Méry ou le métier d'Alceste*, 1979, pp. 232-233, J.P. Rioux, stated mistakenly that the paper favoured a negotiated solution and independence. See J.P. Rioux, *La France de la Quatrième République (1952-1958)* Vol. 2, (1983), p. 137.

(113)

See also below, p. 20 ff.

(114)

This was organised by La Ligue de l'Enseignement and l'Institut du Monde Arabe and took place 12-14 March 1992. See below.

(115)

Of the articles written at the time one finds the following count:

One letter to the Editor by Professor Marrou (April 1956) covering five pages, 3 articles written in 1955: one of 7 pages, one (written by Penchenier) 2 pages, and one (by Minay) 8 pages.

For 1957 there were two articles, respectively one and two pages. That is all there is for the whole of the Fourth Republic period covered by the present study: 25 pages out of 400, or just over 6%.

For 1959 there were two articles covering 19 pages, 2 page of an article of 1960 and 2 pages of an article written in 1961: a grand total of 10 articles covering 46 pages written

before the cease-fire day, 19 March 1962 (or 11.5 %). Most of this history is not a journalist's history, that is a history of the moment -but a history after the event. Arguably this should find a place in history books rather than in a newspaper.

Moreover, 23 pages (370-393) written on "Traumas after the War" were devoted to the October 1988 riots, events which had nothing to do with the war, as most of the youngsters involved in the riots were mostly born after the war. Ten pages (339-349) dealt with the power struggles after the war and nineteen pages (350-369) on the sequels in France were devoted to the "war veterans", "graves in peril" as well as the memory of *pieds noirs*, the immigrants and the reconciliation after the war.

(116)

Not only Eveno, P. and Planchais, J., (1989), *op. cit.*, discussed here, but also a commemorative issue of *Le Monde - Dossiers & Documents*, No 146, July-August 1977, but also Rioux, J.-P., *La France de la Quatrième République*, Vol. II 1952-1958, Seuil, Paris, 1983, p. 137, relying on an unsubstantiated reference in Jeanneney J.-N. & Julliard, J., *Le Monde de Beuve-Méry ou le métier d'Alceste*, Seuil, Paris, 1979, pp. 232-233, which stated that the paper favoured a negotiated solution and independence.

(117)

See *Actes du Colloque, La Ligue-IMA*, Paris, 1993, pp. 110-116.

Jean Planchais' reply (pp. 151-152) to my comments (pp. 149-151) seems to confirm, at least implicitly, the main thrust of the present work.

(118)

Touili, M. ed., in *Retentissement de la révolution algérienne dans le monde (1954-1962)*, Algiers, ENAL-GAM, p. 17.

(119)

With *Témoignage-Chrétien*, *France-Observateur*, and *L'Express*.

(120)

Owned and managed by its own staff, using serious reporters and academics to cover most topics reported.

(121)

Dès sa fondation, <Le Monde>, par la volonté de Beuve-Méry, s'est affirmé comme le <journal de références>; non sans humour, tel parlementaire remarquait que seuls ses discours mentionnés par le Monde avaient réellement été prononcés (...).

In Claude Julien, *Les problèmes du <Monde>*, *Debats*, No 24, March, 1983, p. 19.

(122)

ALBERT, Pierre, *La Presse*, P.U.F, Paris, 1982, p. 90.

(123)

See Kravetz, Marc, *Journalists faiseurs d'histoire in Le Magazine littéraire*, No 164, September 1980, p. 42.

(124)
In Claude Julien, *Les problèmes du <Monde>*, Débat, No 24, March 1983, p. 1.

(125)
In L'Express Magazine 13/01/1979.

(126)
The review Sondages, published by IFOP, carried out a number of surveys at the time.

(127)
There are very notable exceptions exemplified in the work of Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, *Torture dans la République*, Minuit, Paris, 1972; *Les crimes de l'armée française*, Maspéro, Paris, 1975; *L'Affaire Audin*, Minuit, Paris, 1958 and 1989, *Face à la raison d'Etat*, La Découverte, Paris, 1989; Paillat, Claude, *Dossier secret de l'Algérie*, 2 Vol., Presses de la Cité, 1962; Tournoux, J.-R., *Carnets secrets de la politique*, Plon, Paris, 1958; *Secrets d'Etat*, Plon, Paris, 1960.

(128)
See Stora, B., *La Gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, La Découverte, Paris, 1991 and Einaudi, J.L., *La Bataille de Paris: 17 Octobre 1961*. Le Seuil, Paris, 1991.

(129)
See historiography above.

(130)
For the media coverage of this episode see Ferro, Marc, *Le 13 mai 1958*, la Documentation française, Paris, 1985, (+ fac similé of newspaper headlines) and Debaty, A., *Le 13 Mai et la Presse*, Colin, Paris, 1960.

(131)
Williams, P.M., *Crisis and Compromise, Politics in the Fourth Republic*, Longmans, 1958 and 1964 is the main contribution, but there are others.

(132)
An analysis of de Gaulle and a list of articles written about/against him has already been published by the late Director and founder of *Le Monde* himself in 1958-1969: *Onze ans de règne*, Flammarion, 1974. Sainderichin, Pierre, *De Gaulle et Le Monde*, *Le Monde* ed., 1990, is also worth consulting.

CHAPTER TWO: NOTES

(1)

As pointed out earlier (end of Chapter 1), Pierre Albert wrote about it:

Le Monde est le journal français de référence par excellence. Le sérieux et la variété de ses informations, la qualité de ses enquêtes et de ses articles de commentaires, la valeur surtout de l'équipe de ses rédacteurs (...) en font de tout point de vue une exception dans la presse française.

In *La Presse*, P.U.F, Paris, 1982, p. 90.

(2)

See Chapter 1 and bibliography.

(3)

They were, therefore, resented by the Resistance and by official circles at the Liberation.

(4)

It continued to be printed until 29 November 1942. It had tremendous prestige and had been thought of, especially in diplomatic circles, as the "unofficial" organ of the "Quai d'Orsay" (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs), that is to say, the official voice of France and the most reliable mouthpiece of the French government. Its continued publication during the years of German occupation had discredited it in circles close to de Gaulle, whose views on the subject since June 1940 had been only too clear.

(5)

It is often asserted that the cut-off date (26 November 1942) was chosen deliberately to include *Le Temps* and that some papers, which continued to be published after the deadline, re-emerged unscathed, whereas *Le Temps* was not forgiven for its links with -indeed its subordination to- economic interests.

(6)

The first issue numbered 140,000 copies.

The newspaper comes out in the late afternoon and always bears the following day's date. This tradition was firmly established before the War in papers like *Le Temps*.

(7)

The format remained the same (500 by 665 mm) until it was changed on 16 January 1945 on account of paper rationing.

(8)

The new paper, which resembled *Le Temps*, was installed in the same premises in the *Rue des Italiens* which housed the presses of its predecessor (99,000 copies in 1939); it started with the same format, the same presentation (inheriting also the same typography and even the gothic characters of the title), but also the same signatures. Most of the articles were written by the same journalists, as thirty of the thirty-one journalists team were part of the pre-war team. In spite of rumours of collaboration, most of the journalists involved in *Le Temps* were innocent. Some had displayed as much patriotism under the Germans as anybody else. For example, Rémy Roure's son was killed in battle and he himself was deported; George Aymes died in deportation, while many others were active members of the Resistance. *Le Temps* had even received a note from Laval, head of the Vichy government, reproaching the paper for its opposition stance. See E. Sablier, *op cit.*, pp. 44-45. See also counter argument below.

(9)

Its philosophy was radically different in the sense that it adhered to the prevailing ideology of the Postwar, exhibiting respect and fidelity to the Resistance and a profound desire for reforms. It also enjoyed the backing of General de Gaulle. See Derieux, E. & Texier, J.C., *La Presse Quotidienne Française*, Colin, Paris, 1974, p. 99.

(10)

The shares were to be divided according to the following formula: three people got forty shares each. They were H. Beuve-Mery, a liberal Catholic who was to head the paper for 25 years (see also following pages), a Protestant professor of Law at Montpellier University, René Courtin, who was a former head and symbol of the Resistance there and another member of the Resistance in Morocco, whose allegiance to de Gaulle was quite open: Christian Charles Funck-Brentano. Son of famous historian of medieval and eighteenth-century France, he had a distinguished career in the French Army during the First World war, then later served in Morocco under Marshall Lyautey before joining de Gaulle's government in exile in Algiers.

This made a total of 120 shares. The remaining shares (80) were to be divided between important representatives (*personnalités représentatives*) designated by the Minister of Information, in other words by J. Dupraz himself. Courtin insisted that two shareholders be designated by him: these were Pierre Froment and Jean Vignol who were allocated five shares each. Twenty-five shares were given to J. Schloesing and fifteen to each of Gerard de Broisia, André Catrice and Suzanne Forfer who represented more or less the views of the MRP. (It was revealed much later by one of them that Dupraz had obtained from each of them a "contre-lettre" giving him back the shares which, in combination with any of the major shareholders, would have given him absolute majority, in case of a serious crisis such as the one later experienced by the paper in 1951. See E. Sablier, *op. cit.*, p. 50. Although he constantly denied it, it was suggested that his involvement in the setting up of the newspaper may have had something to do with conscious or sub-conscious desire to provide his party with an authoritative newspaper. Bellanger, C., *op. cit.*, p. 286.

(11)

Although the starting capital of 200.000 Fr was negligible,

the paper was said to have benefited from vast credits, in the form of tens of millions of francs worth of buildings, presses, stocks, paper, journalists, subscribers, readers and the use of *Le Temps's* facilities. But it has to be said the accusations levelled against *Le Monde* of having stolen the readers of *Le Temps* (the importance of subscribers and readers was said to have removed the need to launch a publicity campaign and to have provided the paper with a readily available readership) cannot be sustained. It could easily be shown that their number was around 50,000 whereas *Le Monde* within its first year was printing three times that number of copies. Moreover, *Le Monde* did not use the index of subscribers left by its predecessor. It also refused symbolically to deliver papers to subscribers of *Le Temps* whose subscriptions had not run out and who expected *Le Monde* to continue supplying them.

Finally, *Le Monde* paid back what it owed. It settled the indemnities of the workers of *Le Temps* as soon as the legal framework for that was established (Confirmed in Letter of recognition of Roger Fabre, Société du journal *Le Temps*, 8 July 1959).

(12)

He was born in Paris, on 5 January 1902, the son of a jeweller-watch maker and a cook-housekeeper from Brittany in a background of extreme poverty. He was of very poor health and was looked after by the Church for his schooling in the "Ecole des Frères Laicisée" outside Paris. He returned to Paris in 1918 to take a job as a cart delivery man at a furniture restorer's. He then became a desk clerk for Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée in the Gare de Lyon in 1920 before going into insurance in 1921. He started studying again with the help of religious organisations to gain his Baccalauréat, then studied Law and, in order to earn a living, started his career as a journalist. He later married Geneviève Deloye (1928), who was studying for a doctorate at the same time.

(13)

After his supervisor, M Lefur, informed him that the French Institute in Prague was looking for teachers, he went to Prague in October 1928 at the age of 26 to start a career as a teacher and a journalist. He taught both at the *French Institute*, where he was Director of the Department of Law and Economics 1932-1939, and at the Czechoslovakian Business High School.

During the time he spent in Czechoslovakia he mingled with leading members of society, like Foreign Minister, then President of the Republic, E. Benes, and his successor in Foreign Affairs, C. Krofka, as well as Benes' rival M. Hodza, President of the Council.

(14)

The assassination of President Paul Doumer (7 May 1932) on the eve of the French parliamentary elections by a man called Gorgulof (who had allegedly spent the three previous years in Czechoslovakia) led to a flood of enquiries and requests for information on the assassin. After making enquiries about the assassin, who, rumours claimed, was an active Communist militant, Beuve-Méry established that he was not a "red". However, the newspaper, even after receiving Beuve-Méry's report, highlighted a Communist connection. An inspector was sent to investigate and was assisted by Beuve-Méry. Beuve-Méry warned him that if Gorgulof were prosecuted on the basis of the Communist

link, he , H.Beuve-Méry, would publish what he knew to be true on the front page of the newspapers. Hence, Beuve-Méry showed, very early on in his journalist career, a commitment to the truth and an unwillingness to cooperate with people bent on tinkering with the facts.

(15)

It was in Lyon that Beuve-Méry met Monsignor Bruno de Solages, the Abbot of Nouvois, who, with a group of officers (including Captain P. Dunoyer de Segonzac and E. d'Audemard d'Alençon) had begun a school for "cadres" at Uriage to provide training courses which could be seen as collaborationists. Beuve-Méry was invited to give a lecture and remained on the staff of the School from March 1941.

The attitude of the School (Uriage) was equivocal to start with as it treated the *résistants* as a group of *exaltés*. It has at times been put into question and was often accused of *Pétainisme*. (See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 34-35 and also Bernard Henry-Lévy, *L'Idéologie française* and *Le Monde* 16/1/81. The counter-argument presented by P-H Chombart de Lauwe, *Ce que fut Uriage*, *Le Monde* 24/1/81.)

The root of the problem in France's collapse, according to the School's philosophy, was the failure of the ruling élite of the country. The aim was then to create and regenerate the new future élite which it did (a list of people who went through the school can be found in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 39) but, to start with, without asking itself the basic question of whether this would be for the service of the democratic order or the order of Pétain.

There were definite contacts with Vichy since Admiral Darlan visited the school on 3 June 1941 and made an anti-British speech outlining and defending the policy of collaboration. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 43, citing Bernard Comte's *L'expérience d'Uriage*, p. 258.

Beuve-Méry is said to have introduced a new ideological and political dimension which was to lead Segonzac to evolve from *l'indépendance loyale au non-conformisme, puis en 1942 à la dissidence de fait*. Beuve-Méry remained director of studies at the Ecole de l'Uriage in St Martin d'Uriage (Isère) until that establishment was dissolved by Laval on 27 December 1942. The educators joined the Resistance movement. Having done his "maquis", Beuve-Méry was editor-in-chief for *Temps Présent* after the War until he was called upon to take charge of *Le Monde*.

(16)

After studying law he completed a " licence de Lettres", attending the School of reserve officers of St Cyr and completing his military service in Germany, he wrote his doctorate in Law on Francisco de Vitoria, the theologian who defended the Indians against Spanish colonisation. In his way he helped to revive interest in one of the first critics of colonialism.

(17)

France was allied to Czechoslovakia at the time and Beuve-Méry, worried about the pre-war situation there, went to see C.Chautemp, President of the Council, E.Daladier, Minister for Defence, and René Massigli, Director of Political Affairs.

Unhappy with the result of his meetings, upon returning to Czechoslovakia, he went to see Benes. Benes was so convinced by his own propaganda campaign that he refused to heed H.Beuve-Méry's warning about the uncertainty of French help in case of trouble.

Austria was invaded by the German army and annexed to the Third Reich by the so-called Anschluss of 11-13 March 1938. This transformed Czechoslovakia into a front-line state confronting Hitlerian aggression. On 12 April, H.Beuve-Méry's fears were confirmed as J.Barthélémy proclaimed the Franco-Czechoslovakian treaty void (caducité juridique). H.Beuve-Méry sent a letter of protest to Barthélémy expressing his fears that Czechoslovakia would be next to fall along the same lines as Austria .

For a while Beuve-Méry had noticed that his articles to *Le Temps* had been edited prior to printing with all his praise for Czech democracy suppressed while all his criticisms were retained. He protested to the paper, was recalled to Paris by Chastenot, his director, who questioned this "minor personality's pretention to run the foreign policy of the paper". Strongly disapproving his paper's policy, Beuve-Méry resigned after Munich (September 1938) and returned to Czechoslovakia, which had to cede the Sudetenland to Germany (10 October 1938) and then suffered a total German occupation (15 March 1939). Beuve-Méry then returned (around 20 July 1939) to France, where he worked three to four days a week in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before being mobilised on 1 September 1939, after which he was transferred to the Intelligence Service (counter-espionage) in Nancy. On the eve of the German invasion, he was attached to a Czechoslovakian volunteer force. He was demobilised following the invasion in July 1940 and went to Lyon to print a sheet condemning nazism and communism, but also pointing out the negative features of capitalism and western democracy.

He wrote a chronicle of foreign policy in S.Fumet's *Temps Présent*, renamed *Temps Nouveau*, in which he signed as Sirius. This was for him a way "of suggesting to what extent what he was writing was different from what he would have liked to have been able to say".

(18)

Thibau, J., op./ cit., p. 9, commented that:

Ces deux personnages clefs de la France contemporaine plongent dans le passé par leurs origines, leurs mentalités, les valeurs qui les inspirent. Enracinés dans le sol de la tradition, ils ont eu pourtant la tâche, avec quelques autres, d'accoucher la France moderne, de 1940 à 1970.

The relation between Beuve-Méry and de Gaulle has also been compared to that between Chateaubriand and Napoléon.

(19)

See *L'Express* 13/4/56 and Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 100-101.

(20)

In *Le Monde* 23/12/69. See Texier, J.C., et al., op. cit., p. 101.

(21)

As outlined earlier, at the time of the launch, *Le Monde* was

to be run by a board of three directors, H.Beuve-Méry, R.Courtin and Funck-Brentano. The licence and responsibility for publication were given to Beuve-Méry. On the first day of publication a caption under the paper's heading read:

Director: HUBERT BEUVE-MERY

Board of directors :RENE COURTIN, FUNK-BRENTANO.

This annoyed Courtin who did not like Beuve-Méry setting himself above the two directors and who would have preferred the heading to read:

Board of directors:HUBERT BEUVE-MERY,director
RENE COURTIN,
FUNK-BRENTANO

From the very start there was going to be a rivalry which later would develop into an open battle. The consensus built up at the beginning of the paper was that Beuve-Méry would deal with foreign policy and Courtin with economic and financial affairs. The overlap and potentially dangerous area of possible conflict was domestic policy.

(22)

The paper shortage was to lead to government limiting the stock of paper that the newspapers could use and from 16 January 1945 all newspapers had to reduce their paper consumption by half.

Le Monde, in common with other papers, first cut its size by half to cope with the shortage, but deciding to put quality before quantity or, in its own words, "preferring to reduce its circulation" (the paper printed 140,000 on two pages on 19/12/1944, first day of publication.) "rather than its information", it cut the number of copies by half while and doubled the number of pages to four on the 22 January 1945. This attracted hostile reactions from other newspapers which, combined with the paper shortage, made its first year a difficult one.

(23)

At the beginning of January 1945 Courtin gave Beuve-Méry an article which he thought important, and whose printing Beuve-Méry delayed, in which he was suggesting a pause in the post-war reforms of the economic structures. Courtin waited and then, tired of waiting, went and confronted Beuve-Méry who told him that this article was in contradiction with the views that Courtin held during the war (which Courtin denied) and that the publication of the article would cause a scandal. Courtin, seeing his article not published, tried to secure Funck-Brentano's support and again confronted Beuve-Méry. Beuve-Méry replied that he was in sole charge of the paper and in case of disagreement it was up to him to decide.

When Courtin's attempt to enlist Teitgen's support failed, he told the minister he was resigning. He typed up a letter of resignation which he handed in to Beuve-Méry, who accepted the publication of the said article with some modifications. However, Beuve-Méry did not agree to future arbitration (suggested) by Funck-Brentano

There was also talk of a project of arbitration by François de Menthon, *garde des sceaux*, which never materialised (see Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 70-71).

This was thought to be by some (including Courtin) the vice *fondamental* of the edifice which was at the origin of insurmountable difficulties and which made *Le Monde* the personal newspaper of Beuve-Méry.

Courtin withdrew his resignation on 6 February 1945. Funck-Brentano, who did not have his own service to run, was completely put aside (écarté) and his visits to the paper grew shorter and less frequent. Legend has it that he left a raincoat which rotted away on a coatpeg. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p.73.

(24)

Courtin wrote hundreds of articles in his field which he gave to Beuve-Méry who, each time as a rule, made modifications (to strengthen his authority but) which Courtin himself found judicious. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 73.

De Gaulle retired from power on the 20 January 1946. He was hostile to the new constitution of the Fourth Republic adopted by referendum in October 1946. In April 1947 he created the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF) as a war machine against the system, creating an open break between Gaullism and the Christian Democratic Movement as for de Gaulle the MRP, the party of fidelity, had become the party of treason.

Had Funck-Brentano not been such an evanescent character in *Le Monde*, the paper would have had more problems to cope with as this would have transferred the tearful struggle that was beginning between the two political allies which emerged from the Resistance right to the very heart of the paper. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 83.

(25)

On the Left, the Communists for its alleged subordination to trusts, especially Cognot who saw it as *Le Temps ressuscité dans toute sa gloire* (National Assembly debates 7 March 1945.); and *L'Humanité* which saw it as *copie fidèle du Temps*. On the Right of the political spectrum, it was accused of being the assassin who stole the dead man's clothes and of having stolen from *Le Temps son immeuble, son matériel et sa clientèle* (François de Wendel). Attacks also came from *Combat* (Camus), *Franc-Tireur* (Olivier and Pia were against Courtin's articles) and *L'Aube* (through M. Schuman) which saw Courtin's articles as an aggression against de Gaulle.

(26)

The print Union did not spare the paper either and its president, A. Bayet, protested against the number of copies printed. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 74-77.

(27)

It was in dire need of the economic help provided by the Marshall plan and was becoming more and more involved in the Indo-Chinese conflict.

(28)

Meaning a non aligned policy. The concept used then was that of "neutrality" as the word non-alignment did not exist.

(29)

In 1941 he had expressed ideas showing his desire for the construction of a United States of Europe and the rationalisation and the organisation of the continent (see *Esprit*, March 1941.), some of which he advocated in his seminars and teach-

ings at Uriage, had little to do with Hitler's dream. Not wanting to opt for "Soviet totalitarianism" or for "American capitalism", he argued for the logic, the desirability of an organisation similar to that of the two countries, but politically and economically in between the two.

HBM deeply believed that it was possible for Europe to take most of the measures of the Pact without it, *l'essentiel des attitudes qu'ils auraient du prendre sans lui*. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op.cit., p.87.

(30)

A professor of medieval history, expert on St Thomas Aquinas and Member of the Academy.

(31)

Having accused the USA of sacrificing France during the First World War and Great-Britain during the Second, he threw doubt on the possible intervention of the US in the defence of Europe.

(32)

Beuve-Méry held similar views and so did journalists like M.Duverger and G.Penchenier.

(33)

He was also persuaded that Germany would be re-armed " *Qu'on en convienne ou non, le ré-armement de l'Allemagne est contenu dans le pacte de l'Atlantique comme le germe dans l'oeuf*". The logic of this philosophy was the inevitability of War. And that logic, pushed to its conclusion would lead to outlawing the Communists, and accepting "to become the 49th star on the Star and Stripes and sending two representatives to the American Senate".

If the above logic was to be rejected, then the adoption of a peace strategy, the refusal of the escalation of armament, the establishment of détente were seen as essential. Hence the defiance shown towards the US and the adoption of detente themes so dear to de Gaulle at a later date.

(34)

Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 93.

(35)

The Left accused the paper of cowardice. As for the Atlantist side, their indignation led to comparing neutralism with neo-vichysme. The neutralist campaign had many limitations because it was running against the tide and was limited to very few papers (*France-Observateur, Esprit, Quinzaine* and *Le Monde*).

(36)

Thibau, J., op. cit., p. 270.

(37)

The conflict between Courtin and Beuve-Méry was left in a state of "unstable status quo" after January 1945. Courtin was very active in his field. Although he only came to the paper in the morning, he wrote about 400 articles between 1945 and 1949. Peace was preserved only by the *relative incompétence de chacun des deux hommes dans le domaine de prédilection de l'autre*. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 103.

(38)

He thought that for Beuve-Méry the soul of France would be lost under the domination of American "individualism, egoism and mercantilism." On the other hand, Soviet totalitarian oppression, in his view, would not corrupt the soul of France which would struggle and strive to maintain itself under that system.

(39)

Such as Duverger, Vaussard, Penchenier, Fontaine etc.

(40)

He wrote only two articles from August 1949 to July 1950 as opposed to his 38 between 1 January and the end of July 1949.

(41)

And even threaten his possible resignation. He sought P.H. Teitgen's advice (25 October 1949), but the latter, appointed Minister of Information in G. Bidault's government, sent him to see J. Dupraz.

An exchange of correspondence between Beuve-Méry and Courtin and the visit to Dupraz did not solve anything. Although he was also unhappy with the various journalists' writings and with Beuve-Méry's position, Dupraz reminded Courtin that the paper's position was Beuve-Méry's responsibility and that the paper's success was largely due to him. This confirmed Courtin in his decision to leave the paper, and he asked for his name to be withdrawn from the newspaper's heading from the 1 January 1950. The paper obliged, but not without also removing the name of Funck-Brentano. The whole affair degenerated and an exchange of spiteful letters followed. See contents in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 111-112.

(42)

He retired from his French teaching post and accepted one at the University of Toronto.

(43)

An open letter (by Valdemar Gurian, who allegedly held conversations with him) highlighted his defeatist attitude, implying that France was incapable of defending herself and that it was at the mercy of the Soviet Union. He accused him of sabotaging efforts to resist the Soviets and causing a disservice to his country and to the U.S. This was published in the Catholic weekly Commonweal at the end of January 1951.

Gurian admitted later that it was only hearsay, but word had already got round in France and some papers had already published the letter in question. Gilson never secured his chair "honoris causa", supposedly because of his neglect of the Collège de France, but really because of his political stance, as the Right and various newspapers talked of leaks, treason etc.. In those days of the McCarthy era, people even asked for him to be stripped of his membership of the Academy.

(44)

On the 16 March 1951, Courtin, Funck-Brentano and Fromont sent a letter to Beuve-Méry proposing to submit a resolution to the General Meeting of the Company (Association) calling for the reconstitution of the Board of Directors which would be

given the power to decide the political orientation of the paper and the opportunity to publish or reject articles by majority vote .

After various meetings and dealings between Dupraz and Beuve-Méry on the 23 March, Dupraz sent Funck-Brentano a counter-proposal by Beuve-Méry suggesting monthly meetings of the associates to make a *posteriori* observations.

Beuve-Méry sent a memorandum to the associates (24 March) proposing to call a general meeting for 7 April without putting that question on the agenda. Funck-Brentano protested, but Beuve-Méry maintained that the Association had nothing to do with a question of that nature.

Dupraz intervened again and on 7 April raised the question against Beuve-Méry's will. He put forward a proposal for a resolution giving more powers to the Board to restrict Beuve-Méry's dominance. Beuve-Méry managed to gain time by accepting the adoption of a less restrictive measure agreeing to the reconstitution of the Board. In this way he postponed the final solution, but conceded that the Association be called upon to decide by majority in case of a disagreement between the members of the Board of Directors.

(45)

He did this through the Agence Parisienne d'Information and a letter (18-7-51, note p. 124 in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit.) sent to all MP's and newspaper editors in Paris. He alleged that *Le Monde* had failed to be faithful to its vocation, which was strictly to serve national policy, and stated that he was no longer responsible for the paper.

(46)

In the letter offering his resignation of 27 July 1951 addressed to the Associates, Beuve-Méry did not give details of the affair:

Je ne peux en effet étaler ces querelles intestines dans les colonnes du Monde, sans nuire à mon tour aux intérêts moraux et matériels dont vous m'avez chargé, faciliter le jeu de nos adversaires communs, provoquer la déception et peut-être le découragement parmi ceux qui, en France et hors de France, ont accordé leur estime à un journal qu'ils croyaient sans histoire.

(Especially when the paper was about to experience difficulties in terms of prices, paper, wages, services etc.)

The resignation was to take effect from 1 November. The letter and the possible dissolution of the company sent out shockwaves to the readership. It even surprised Courtin and Dupraz. Two extraordinary general Assembly meetings were set up for 2 and 7 August 1951. They decided, after expressing their gratitude to Beuve-Méry, not to dissolve the firm. Instead they sought to create a new structure which included A.Catrice as manager to deal with all administrative problems and a management committee (comité de gestion) grouping Schloesing, Vignal and Broisia. The problem here was to find a suitable director. The search was unsuccessful, despite numerous political manoeuvres and various people being approached, including Pierre Brisson and Raymond Aron mainly because of the incapability of Courtin to find a successor, or to succeed himself. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 134.

(47)

This initiative was launched by *Esprit* and *Témoignage Chrétien*, following an anonymous article in the latter which alleged that the loss of independence of the paper would lead to a reactionary policy and accused public opinion of being amorphous. This article's insertion led to numerous letters being to be sent to *Le Monde*.

(48)

Some of the journalists were quite faithful but others, like Rémy Roure, actually felt glad that he was leaving. The intervention of the journalists seemed to be due to a feeling of being left out (of behind the scene dealings determining the fate of the paper). They wanted to state that the success of the newspaper was due to the efforts of the team of journalists that contributed to it.

(49)

They included André Fontaine, Edouard Sablier and Maurice Duverger.

When he received the memo of resignation from Beuve-Méry, Duverger proposed legal expertise and services to Beuve-Méry in order to reverse the decision. He offered to help and said he would be prepared to come to Paris if called. He was called to Paris and approached Jean Monnet (architect of French Planning after the War, who was to become one of the Founding Fathers of the European Community) to make the Director change his mind (Monnet had already seen Beuve-Méry on 31 July).

A. Joly, specialist of public limited companies (SARL), was approached for advice and he found that Beuve-Méry, with the faithful support of Suzanne Forfer, had the legal *minorité de blocage* (55 shares) sufficient to prevent him from being dismissed from his job as manager (the legal requirement is 3/4) before 27 July 1951.

Using his expertise, legal texts and a thorough search of jurisprudence, he found that Beuve-Méry had received the authorisation to publish personally on 30 November 1944. The company was constituted afterwards by an act of 11 December 1944. His resignation and its subsequent acceptance by the assembly did not affect his right to publish. He could, if the conditions did not satisfy him, prevent the publication of the paper or veto anybody appointed as Director.

Moreover, he found that articles 7 and 8 of the 26 August 1944 decree obliged newspapers to be managed by one manager or Director, and prohibited any collective management. So in fact the decision of 7 August made by the assembly of the paper, installing a *comité de direction* with a president who was not manager and who was not the only director, was illegal; and this could result in fines and imprisonment.

(50)

On the first meeting there was a row in Beuve-Méry's office, and the session was suspended until the next day.

(51)

A campaign of signatures was organised in Caen, Lyon, Bordeaux and Strasbourg. In Strasbourg 63 signatures were collected from university lecturers, five of whom were deans and a declaration of support was obtained from 87 secondary school teachers. In Lyon the signatures of 25 university professors, 61 secondary school teachers and 488 students were gathered. Readers' committees were created as well as a federation of

those committees was set up, whose secretary was Jacques Narbonne, a well known and distinguished lecturer at the Sorbonne. He sent a letter to the Director in the name of the federation (2 December 51), claiming that the readers had a say and refused to be treated like merchandise. Informal meetings and gatherings were organised on 11 December 1951 in Paris which expressed emotional support (See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 150). The letter from Narbonne was never published, but it would have made a significant impact if Courtin had been in a position to win. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 151.

(52)
Ibid.

(53)
There are different versions on how this came into the hands of the paper. The role played by the C.I.A. and the American Ambassador against *Le Monde* has been stressed by some and it is even alleged that it was a trap set by the Secret Services. See Thibau, J., op. cit., p. 9.

(54)
It was preceded by some introductory lines by J. Bloch-Morhange stating that the report had been written between 10 and 17 January 1952, then sent to James Seldon, secretary to the National Security Council. It was alleged that it had been intercepted by the British Military Documentary Services in the United States and transmitted to the First Lord of the Admiralty on 24 January 1952. Bloch-Morhange added that he had made a copy but left out technical and military detail.

The reports made several points:

- The war against the Soviet Union is inevitable between then and 1960. 52 divisions would last three days in front of 112 Russian divisions, and 150.000 Russian paratroopers could cut England from Scotland. The analysis throws doubts on the political, economic and military steadfastness of the regimes against subversion and attack.

- The American counterattack would be difficult from the North pole to the Atlantic but possible from the south, ie. the Mediterranean, which would become the centre of operations and this would leave Western Europe temporarily under Soviet domination.

- The alignments of the oil-producing states around the Mediterranean were crucial and, because of the troubles caused by British and French policies in the area, it was up to the US to play the Arab card, to try and secure special agreements and to reconcile them with Great Britain and France.

(55)
It had been written by Commander Antoni Talerico in an American naval review, The US Naval Institute Proceedings, in September 1950.

(56)
There was also talk of a conspiracy, of a plot against *Le Monde*. Other reports, stating that it had also been proposed to *France-Soir* and other newspapers, undermine the plot theory.

(57)
For some the newspaper had lost its reputation of serious-

ness and had taken a light if not tendentious approach to its publications, and Fechteler was the proof.

After praising the quality of the paper, Edouard Helsey in *La France Indépendante* (21 June) commented that:

On ne rencontre pas dans le journal de mensonge formel-hormis peut-être dans la rubrique financière- mais tout est disposé de manière à égarer notre jugement. Avec de menus fragments d'information partiellement exacts, on compose une mosaïque fallacieuse bien faite pour tromper les yeux mal exercés.

For Raymond Aron, *Le Monde* was playing the "Communist game." There were many other comments. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 164. ff.

The affair remained a *pièce à conviction* and a reproach to the paper (to Viansson-Ponté) even in 1977. The error consisted in not admitting the mistake. However, on 20 May *Le Monde* admitted that the source of the report was unknown. There was even talk of involvement of the British secret service and of an attempt by the Gaullists to sabotage the paper.

(58)

Beuve-Méry said of him:

je l'ai désigné comme gardien de but, il a joué les avant-centres.

(59)

Rémy Roure resigned.

After this episode there were further squabbles within the paper and René Courtin, Pierre Froment and Jean Vignal found cause to express their disagreement with the policy of the paper.

(60)

Rumours to that effect had circulated all around Paris.

Bonis-Charancle had written to Courtin (on 20 July) during the crisis of 1951, after the publication of the communiqué (see above) but before his resignation. According to the letter, a group was being formed to set up a newspaper (by the *Algériens les plus excités*).

Robert Poulaine, journalist of *Le Temps* before the War, tried to gather some funds for this purpose, which involved North African, coal and milk interests. In April 1952, Claude Bourdet of *France-Observateur* published an article stating that *Le Temps* *renait dans la houille et le lait*. There was a link also with Paul Marchandau, former pre-war Radical minister.

P. Boegner, former director of *Paris Match*, received an invitation through A. Fabreluce to see Antoine Pinay in November 1954. Pinay wanted to know if it were possible and if he was interested in launching a new newspaper based on "Christian Occidentalism". Boegner did not say no. Pinay put him in touch with Robert André and Georges Morissot, who appeared to be heading the project.

(61)

Jean Noel Jeanneney covered this episode in his *Le Temps de Paris, histoire d'un fiasco (1956)*, in *L'Histoire*, No 4, September, 1978, pp. 41-49.

(62)

The episode is well documented in references (given above)

and in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 177ff) which give details of the paper's backers and shareholders.

(63)

He learnt for instance that North Africa was in for 160 million, and that the project was blessed by A. Pinay.

(64)

He had been lured away from *L'Aurore* by P. Boegner, D. Canavaggio (from Laval's entourage), La Peyronie (former head of cabinet for Philippe Henriot), but also people like A. Olliver, Gaullist and famous resistant, M. Pol Fouchet, P. Desgraupes, Joel le Tac (compagnon de la Libération), *Paris-Match's* special correspondent in Algeria (a pro American who worked with Vichy then the Resistance).

(65)

Le Temps c'est de l'argent (21/4/56).

(66)

They first of all wanted an *anti-Monde*, to lure away those members of *Le Monde* who had come from *Le Temps*. The paper also had to take away some of *Le Monde's* readers to survive. The possibility of not being successful led some to think that it might have to be a morning paper. Pinay's aim was to influence the thinking in favour of an evening paper despite P. Boegner's objections.

This strategy was launched on 10 December 1955. Discussions took place with *Paris-Presse* of Franpar (Marcel Dassault-Hachette). It was agreed that the best time to launch the paper was February or March, early enough to enable the paper to take off before the summer holiday. An agreement with *L'Aurore* secured the printing in the premises of Boussac's paper, 100 Rue de Richelieu. On 15 March the first stage was initiated but 80% of the personnel were not installed until 6 April.

(67)

At the meeting of the board on 3 April 56, it was decided to set aside 60 million from its total of 117 million francs to be devoted to a publicity launch. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 185-6.

A deficit of 1575 million was taken into account up to April 1957, after deduction of the first 175 m., around 115 m. a month. All other daily newspapers, except *Combat*, refused to advertise it on the eve of D Day.

(68)

The laboratory had not yet been installed when the paper folded up. It had a tabloid format and the quality of the writing was poor. Next to photographs one could find compact editorials to compete with *Le Monde*. It gave the impression of "improvisation, disorder and almost amateurism." See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 187.

(69)

For six hours in Paris in its first edition it mistook a photograph of a minor cardinal for that of the Archbishop of Paris.

(70)

See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 187.

(71)

From 350,000, on the first day to 285,000, on the second, to 251,000, on the third, 185,000 on the fifth and 142,000 at the end of April. On 16 June the number of copies sold in the whole of France was 107,385.

The average sales in Paris went down from 45,000 copies in May to 38,000 copies on 5 June (20 pages), 31,000 copies on the 16 June (16 pages).

(72)

See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 196.

(73)

These included *France-Soir* which put aside 700 million francs to deal with the situation. That sum represented roughly the same income as *Le Temps de Paris's* 800 million.

(74)

An important reporter of the paper, Jean Couvreur, was approached in 1950 by another journalist, Roger Lutignaux. Acting in the name of big financial groups attempting to end to the "crypto-communist campaign", he suggested that Jean Couvreur should take part in an internal coup against Beuve-Méry, telling him that there had already been inside contacts (See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 98-99). Couvreur asked for some time to find out who the insiders were and then refused to take part.

(75)

One of those journalists, E. Delaye, is said to have asked ritually every morning on arrival, referring to Beuve-Méry: *Alors quelles nouvelles de l'affameur?*

(76)

He was an important press baron, who approached him in November 1951 and told him of the group's desire to work with him or pension him off.

(77)

See Jeanneney, J.-N., op.cit., p. 95.

(78)

It is worth noting that G.Hostert, *Une campagne néo-colonialiste du Monde: Indochine 1945-46*, Les clés du monde, 1983, confirms this attitude in the paper. See p. 262 ff. by comparison to twenty years later in 1966.

(79)

On 17 January 1948 in *Une semaine dans le monde* (weekly publication which complemented the daily and subsequently stopped publication).

(80)

A personal report on the military situation in Indochina given by General Revers in 1947 to the Defence Minister, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, which was leaked and subsequently used by the Viet Minh in their radio broadcast.

(81)

Especially with reports from Charles Favrel, who is alleged to have made the paper an organ of struggle against the war in Indochina and to have suggested negotiations and disengagement.

(82)

This is dealt with in a forthcoming publication. "*Le Monde* and the Algerian war: international perspectives".

(83)

The case put forward by the paper was the following.

From 1 November 1951 (1951 was also a year of paper rationing: see *Esprit*, November 1951, pp. 659-661.) and for five successive years, *Le Monde* was sold at 18 francs, that was 3 francs more than most other papers but 2 francs less than two specialised newspapers, *L'Equipe* and *Information*, They had sold at 20 francs for a long time. It was stated that *Le Monde's* price was a little odd (some purchasers never waited for the change thereby always leaving/and always left 2 francs). It was fixed to suit (ménager) certain categories of readers with modest incomes, such as students and pensioners. The slightly higher price on average was due to a long established tradition. A memorandum addressed later to the Prime Minister by Beuve-méry highlighted the fact that *Le Temps* was sold at 15 centimes in 1914 whereas all other newspapers were sold at 5 centimes. Around the end of 1939 that gap had diminished (0.75 fr against 0.50 fr for the others). The authorisation of 30 November 1944 by the Minister of Information stipulated that the price of the paper *Le Monde* was 3 francs compared with only 2 francs for the others. The higher price was also said to be justified by its quality, by the numerous correspondents abroad and by the fact that it never resorted to commercial practices such as using photographs, competitions and cartoons.

(84)

Beuve-Méry informed the Government of the price increase planned for 1 October on 27 September 1956. Ramadier was not insensitive to the arguments presented, but on 19 July he had already signed an "arrêté" blocking any derogation to the rules imposed on prices and commercial margins. (See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 199.)

(85)

The Pinay government had previously established a mobile scale between the price index and the SMIG introduced by the law of 10 July 1952.

(86)

The argument on the side of *Le Monde* was that the 213 price index was based on 1949, that it did not really reflect prices as some paper products were not included in it nor were the bonuses given to workers, that *Le Monde* had negotiated an agreement with the Print Union, and that other papers would not use the excuse of *Le Monde* to increase their own prices.

(87)

Outlining the specificity of a commodity like a newspaper, which is of the same nature as the telephone or a television licence, *Le Monde* questioned whether there was strict interpretation of the law or abuse of powers in applying the price freeze to newspapers.

In 1947, time of price freezes and even forced price de-

creases, exceptions had been made for newspapers. *Le Monde* asked A. de Lambadère (Professor of Law at the University of Paris) for advice. His interpretation was that freedom of the press was being put at risk and that the government was using its authority to maintain the price of a newspaper at a level where it would not be possible for it to survive, without resorting to means which might alienate its independence.

(88)

The opposition to Social-Molletisme was resented even more when it came from moderate bourgeois circles. This was Beuve-Méry's viewpoint, and he did not hesitate to compare Guy Mollet's methods to those of Colonel Peron who had attempted to rid himself of the liberal Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*. (In *Quand la France est gouvernée*, 8/11/56, p. 1 ff., article dealt with later.)

(89)

Appellez-le *Le Monde de Paris* et augmentez les prix. Suggestion made to A. Fontaine, see Jeanneney, J.-N., op.cit., p. 202.

(90)

The accounts of the paper published in 1956 showed that *Le Monde* still had a surplus of 500, 000 Fr on an income of more than 1 milliard.

(91)

Many French newspapers criticised the government's position, including *Le Canard Enchaîné*, *Témoignage Chrétien*, *France-Observateur*, *Juvenal*, *Rivarol*.

There were also protests by the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* (18 November 1956); and the *The Economist* wondered if the government was going to succeed where money had failed (11 November 1956). See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 203.

(92)

Growing weary of the independence of the paper, and thinking that that kind of support might be too high a price to pay in terms of intellectual subjection (in a letter to Escarpit) and would provide a very shaky foundation on which to rest the financial stability of the paper, Beuve-Méry thanked the readers for their concern but did not encourage them.

(93)

This is very important given the high degree of centralisation of a country like France and the fact that most of the influential people, economically politically and in social and cultural terms, reside in that part of France.

(94)

"Executives, businessmen, industrialists, people of private or independent means, those retired and the professional classes".

(95)

See Chatelain, A., op. cit., p. 23.

(96)

Ibid., pp. 24-25.

(97)
(...) *l'Université, la Magistrature, l'Administration, l'Industrie et la Banque*, Ibid., p. 27.

(98)
Ibid., pp. 29-30.

(99)
Thibau, J., op. cit., p. 8, estimated that one or two hours a day were devoted to reading it to find out what to think of current affairs.

(100)
There were 22,082 copies distributed for sale in North Africa on top of the 1143 regular subscribers the paper had, making a total of 23,225. Some 19,803 went to the French Union. *Le Monde* sold about 19,803 abroad (about 1/10), 80% of which was destined to Europe.

(101)
See Chatelain, A., op. cit., pp. 9-18.

(102)
Ibid. pp. 23-4.

(103)
Mouvement de Libération du Peuple: Les Maitres de la Presse, 1956, pp. 53-54.

(104)
In terms of importance. In terms of circulation, it was the third of the evening papers and the seventh daily in 1956 in Paris behind *France-Soir* (1,380,141), *Le Parisien Libéré* (793,014), *Le Figaro* (491,338), *L'Aurore* (441,684), *L'Humanité* (204,513), *Paris Presse* 200,760, but ahead of *La Croix*, *Libération*, *Franc-Tireur*, *Combat*, *L'Information*, *Les Echos* and *Le Populaire*.

(105)
Chatelain, A., op. cit., p. 28.

(106)
See also Appendix.

(107)
Chatelain, A., op. cit., pp. 192-193.

(108)
Ibid. p. 194.

(109)
On one occasion these views caused problems for the paper. He was defended by the Director of the newspaper (see Chapter 12), but this could have more to do with Duverger's support for Hubert Beuve-Méry during the 1951 crisis.

(110)
Le Monde had no records of Jaeger J.A., J. Marey and J. Silvert, also occasional contributors who wrote for the paper earlier on in the Fourth Republic.

(111)

The allegiance of a paper can be political and not financial when this newspaper's aim is the defence of a particular ideology or a clearly defined conception of a party, the country or the world. In this case any deviation is seen as a betrayal of these accepted premises and tantamount to treason. This obedience of the paper can be directed at a party or a government or even a church.

(112)

But realistic about what is expected from its journalists, since the paper is ready to tolerate their cultural heritage, their moral values, their feelings and their passions.

(113)

Plaquette du Journal, Supplément aux Dossiers et Documents du Monde, Décembre 1977, p. 1.

(114)

The paper demands that its journalists free themselves of any prejudice: *s'émancipent de leurs préjugés, de leur apriorisme, non de l'héritage culturel....*

(115)

Durieux, E., et. al., op. cit., p. 100.

(116)

J.Fauvet, *Le Souci de l'Indépendance*, Editorial, 27/3/77, and , in *Plaquette du Journal* pp. 1-2.

(117)

Ibid. p. 2.

(118)

Ibid.

(119)

Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE: NOTES

(1)

See Paul Balta, *Vingt-trois siècles de rébellion*, In *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1992, op. cit., pp. 26-27, and the standard works spanning the whole colonial period, cited below.

(2)

Horne, A. covers this traumatic period of Algerian history in *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Macmillan, London, 1977.

(3)

The Arab invasion having the most impact, See C.A., Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, de la conquête arabe à 1830*, Payot, 1952, (SNED, 1978), pp. 7 & 303, about the indelebile Islamic cachet of North Africa.

(4)

Balta P., op. cit.

(5)

Even before modern interpretations of that concept, as we are talking of a time when the territorial limits of major European countries had not yet been defined.

This way of thinking is often questioned by French colonisers. They thought they had created Algeria and were therefore entitled to hold on to it, implementing what policies they saw fit. See Prochaska's discussion of the various interpretative trends of Algerian history in The Making of French Algeria, Colonialism in Bône 1870-1920, CUP, Cambridge, 1990, Chapter 1., especially pp. 1-6.

(6)

Julien retraced the history of North Africa from the early times to the Arab Conquest in Julien, C.A. op. cit.

(7)

It was integrated into Mediterranean civilisations for centuries even before the Arab and Turkish domination. Richard Brace, *Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia*, Prentice Hall, Englewoods, Cliffs New Jersey, 1964, pp. 20-21 & 32.

If we examined the history of the various indigenous dynasties which run the Maghrib in C.A. Julien, (1952) we find that on several occasions the three Maghrib countries came very close to achieving the status of cultural, social and political entities long before some of the modern nations of Europe, such as Italy and Germany, were formed. It may be useful to recall that France only emerged as a nation state in the 16th century, whereas Italian and German unifications were achieved much later in 1870-1871.

(8)

Julien, C.A., *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord: des origines à*

la conquête arabe, Payot, Paris, 1956, p. 31.

(9)

See Laroui, A., The History of the Maghrib, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977, pp. 27-90, and Le Tourneau, R., *Evolution de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane*, Colin, Paris, 1962, p. 15.

(10)

Charles André Julien, academic, historian and author of a number of books on the subject, was secretary general of "Haut Comité méditerranéen et de l'Afrique du Nord". Ageron, C.-R., has also had many contributions in the field. See below.

(11)

Julien, C.-A., (1956), op. cit., p. 49. There is, I think, a fundamental contradiction in this statement between the "ineptitude for independence" on the one hand and the steadfast "body and soul" and lack of impact of outside civilisations on the other, which could be explained by the fact that it is largely due to the resistance of this part of the world and its contemporaneous civilisations to outside ones. This illustrates its very desire, if not its capability for, independence.

(12)

Abun-Nasr, J., *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic period*, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1987. See also Chapter 6, in C.A. Julien, (1952), op. cit., p. 151 ff.

(13)

Two associate family businesses, Bacri and Busnach, had provided wheat for the Napoleonic armies but had not been paid in full. These two families persuaded the Dey that they could not pay their debts towards him because of the failure of the French government to pay them and asked him in a way to connect the two questions in his dealings with the French officials. See Julien, C.A., *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, PUF, Paris 1964, p. 21, and W.G. Andrews, *French politics and Algeria*, Appeton Century Crofts, New York, 1962, p. 1..

The French consul at that time was Deval, who was thought to be corrupt (the fact that he enjoyed a lower salary than other consuls in other parts of the world might be part of the explanation. See Contamine, H., *Diplomatie et Diplomates sous la Restauration: 1814-1830*, Hachette, Paris, 1970, pp. 258 and 281) and whose replacement the Dey had asked for, for the well-being of the relations between the two countries. On 27 April 1827 the Dey asked Deval about the long-awaited reply he had not received from the French government, to which Deval answered (in the words of the Dey) by "*des paroles outrageantes pour la religion musulmane, attentatoires à l'honneur de Sa Majesté protectrice du Monde*". The Dey then (in the words of Deval) "*se levant de son siège, il me porta avec le manche de son chasse-mouches trois coups violents sur le corps et me dit de me retirer.*" See Julien, C.A., (1964), op. cit., p. 27.

The Dey also declared that he would no longer tolerate the presence of a single French cannon on Algerian soil, that the French merchants would no longer benefit from any privileges and that they could enjoy from then on only the same rights as the other merchants. See Barbour, N., *A survey of North West Africa*, OUP, Oxford, 1962, p. 42.

(14)
Julien, C.A., *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord de la conquête arabe à 1830*, Payot, Paris, 1952, (and SNED Algiers, 1978), p. 298.

(15)
Lane-Poole, S., *The Barbary Corsairs*, Unwin, 1896, p. 301. The Dey, strongly convinced of his own right and encouraged by the discreet approbation of the British Consul, refused to make official apologies to satisfy the French demands.

(16)
Serval, Pierre, *La ténébreuse histoire de la prise d'Alger*, La Table Ronde, Paris, 1965 and 1980, provide a lengthy account in his Chapters 9-11, pp. 183-285.

(17)
Ageron, C.R., *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, PUF, Paris, 1964 (& 1990), p. 7, and Fetter, B., ed., *Colonial rule in Africa*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p. 53.

It is worth noting that, whereas the British Empire has been created in spite of rather than with the aid of the British government, France had a colonial tradition, inherited from the *Ancien Régime*, characterised by State intervention and by exclusive commercial monopolies. See Thomas-Stanford, C., *About Algeria*, John Lane, London, 1911, p. 125, and Scheffer, C., *L'Algérie et l'évolution de la colonisation française*, Paris, 1928, chapter 1.

In Algeria, France had the concessions of the *Bastion de France* (fortress town near La Calle) to protect her coral fisheries. See Contamine H., *Diplomatie et diplomates sous la Restauration (1814-1830)*, Hachette, Paris, 1970, p. 109.

(18)
See Contamine, H., *op. cit.*, p. 329.
The alleged pirates' activity was only an irritating survival from the past. See Barbour, N., *A Survey of North West Africa*, OUP, Oxford, 1962, p. 39.

Britain and France were nevertheless engaged in the same kind of activity, considered legal, until 1856.

(19)
Barbour, N., *op. cit.*, p. 43. In the official statement of grievances issued by the French government references to piracy were negligible. The major preoccupation was clearly the Dey's refusal to "continue to allow the French a privileged trading position base on the fortified (*enceinte* of the) Bastion, near Bône and the serious loss of trade which its loss might involve". (*Ibid.*, p. 42.)

Many reasons could be put forward. There is little doubt, however, that a basic motive behind the French action was to restore the "tottering credit of the regime by a military success" (after the losses of territory to Britain in India and North America, near a century earlier -by the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Seven Years' War [1763]), and to increase the prestige of the Restoration government by making up for the evacuation of Egypt. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

However, it can safely be assumed that the Polignac government was seeking to enhance its failing popularity at home by a success abroad.

(20)

See Scheffer, C., op. cit., pp. 27-28. The settlement of the Spanish and Greek problems as well as the improvement of the relations with Russia freed France's troops and ships to restore the fallen prestige and enabled the French government to take action against the rebels in Madagascar and to punish the Dey for his "outrageous attitude."

(21)

See Ganiage, J., *L'Expansion coloniale de la France*, Payot, Paris, 1968, p. 11.

(22)

See Scheffer, C., op. cit., pp. 32-33.

(23)

See Thomas-Stanford, C., op. cit., p. 126 and Contamine, H., op. cit., p. 6.

(24)

See Julien, C.A., *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, PUF, Paris, 1964, p. 21.

(25)

After the Revolution in France (which in fact was little more than a change of dynasty) General de Bourmont was recalled and replaced by General Clauzel. See S.Scheffer, op.cit., pp. 48-49.

It was also decided to send some of the unemployed workers of Paris to Algeria and the possible transfer of 3,000 of them (11 January 1831). See Scheffer, C., op. cit., p. 69, note 1.

(26)

C.A. Julien devoted 600 pages to the period 1827 to 1871 in his *histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, PUF, Paris, 1964, and CR Ageron, did the same for the period 1871 to 1954, in his *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, de l'insurrection de 1871 à la guerre de libération (1954)*, PUF, 1979, besides his 1200 pages on 1871-1919, in *Les Algériens musulmans et la France*, PUF, Paris, 1968, 2 Volumes. These constitute some of the standard works. There are many more books by other authors in the field, but the reader should be aware of the issues outlined in the introduction about the perspective from which history is being written. See Prochaska, D, op. cit., Chapter 1.

(27)

This was the case of the Tafna treaty, 20 May 1837 (on which there was a great deal of controversy), recognising the sovereignty of the Emir over two-thirds of the territory, but which was respected by neither side. See C.R. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, PUF, Paris, 1964 & 1990, p. 12-13.

(28)

Ageron., C.-R., *L'échec d'une nouvelle France* in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, No 9, Numéro Spécial: la Guerre d'Algérie 30 ans après, 1992, pp. 20-22.

(29)

Ibid.

(30)

Surprisingly, military rule was seen by the colonists as an obstacle to the progress of colonisation (Julien, C.-A., *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine* PUF, Paris, 1964, p. 453) because of its relative protection of the autochthonous population and their rights.

After the humiliating defeat of the Empire, Republican France, firmly convinced of its civilising mission abroad was dreaming of a nation 100 million strong on both sides of the Mediterranean. Prévost-Paradol in Girardet, R., *L'Idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962*, La Table Ronde, Paris, 1972, p. 21.

(31)

Girardet, Raoul, op. cit., p. 26.

(32)

See Leroy-Beaulieu, P-L., *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, Guillaumat, Paris, 1874, quote by Girardet, R., op. cit., p. 56.

(33)

Girardet, R., op. cit., p. 68.

(34)

As is illustrated by the story in school books of an ex-sergeant in the French army, disabled during the war and ruined after it, who finds prosperity in Algeria. His grandmother expresses her relief in the following sentences of the textbook:

Terre bénie, tu m'es devenue presque aussi chère que la mère patrie. Mes enfants, après tant d'efforts, tant de souffrances que nous avons tous endurées, te devront l'aisance, le bonheur et la santé. Quand mon heure sera venue, je m'endormirai sans regret de mon dernier sommeil sur le sein de ma nouvelle Alsace.

In Girardet, R., op. cit., p. 106.

(35)

Under the threat of Paris to subdue any resistance, they had to give in the end abandoning their desire of independence and accepting General Lallemand. See Ageron C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 38.

(36)

Ibid., p. 39.

(37)

See C.A. Julien, 1964, op. cit., and CR Ageron, 1979, op. cit., Ibid.

(38)

Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., pp. 41-43. and Julien, C.A., 1979, pp. 453-500.

In struggling to defeat this insurrection the French troops carried out "razzias" and applied the principle of "collective responsibility", condemning the local population to heavy fines and expropriations.

Julien, C.A., (1964), op. cit., p. 493, deals with some

aspects of the repression.

(39)

In 1841, de Tocqueville had already highlighted the cruelty of the repressive methods used by the French to "pacify" the indigenous population when he asserted that: " We are waging war in a manner much more barbarous than the Arabs themselves."

De Luna, F.A., *The French Republic under Cavaignac (1848)*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, p. 49.

The methods of colonization and repression were ruthless and were intensified at times of insurrection. Summary executions and "enfumades" were common-place (Ibid. p 52.); preventive destructive raids on innocent villages and similar methods were defended by Bugeaud, Cavaignac, Lamoricière and numerous other military chiefs as a "means of compelling submission", but they often "degenerated into mere theft of livestock for army supply or even simple pillage, sometimes involving the massacre of inhabitants." (Ibid., pp. 49-50.)

(40)

At least 100,000 hectares were reserved for the people from Alsace and Lorraine who would opt to stay with France. See Ganiage, J., *op. cit.*, p. 32.

(41)

See Martin, C., *Histoire de l'Algérie française (1830-1962)*, Les Quatre fils Aymon, Paris, 1963, p. 207, and A. Horne, *op. cit.*, p 31.

(42)

Ageron, C.R., *Les Algériens musulmans et la France: 1871-1919*, PUF, Paris, 1968, Volume 1, pp. 88-94.

(43)

This experiment was a failure, and by the beginning of the 20th century, administrative and technical services were under the authority of the *Gouverneur Général*.

(44)

Le Tourneau, R., *L' Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane (1920-1961)*, Colin Paris, 1962, p. 304.

The *Délégations financières*, which were an embryonic type of representative committees, were neither representative or democratic.

(45)

For the Muslim it is very difficult to distinguish between civil and religious traditions: see Ganiage, J, *op.cit.*, p. 280.

(46)

Horne. A., *op. cit.*, p. 36.

(47)

Le Tourneau, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304.

(48)

Ageron, C.R., (1964), *op. cit.*, p. 63.

(49)
Ibid., p. 65.

(50)
Commenting on the situation, Letourneau writes:
On voit en somme que, d'une part, les indigènes qui, dans la plupart des cas, conservaient un genre de vie très différent de celui des Européens, étaient soumis à des dispositions spéciales et autoritaires, et que, d'autre part, l'administration française et, dans une large mesure, les Français d'Algérie, avaient la direction des affaires du pays.

In Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 305.

(51)
Julien, C.A., *L'Afrique du Nord en marche*, Paris, 1972, p. 40.

De Tocqueville had declared to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1847 that "Moslem society in North Africa was not uncivilised: it only had a backward and imperfect civilisation... we have rendered Moslem society much more miserable than it was before it became acquainted with us". This "rudimentary civilisation" was also observed by generals of the French army, one of whom noticed that in 1834 "Nearly all the Arabs can read and write; in each village there were (two) schools". For these quotes see Horne, A., op. cit., p. 29.

(52)
Gilbert Meunier, *Les Occasions manquées de la colonisation française*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Numéro Spécial, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

(53)
It was reduced to *quelques voix clamant dans le désert*. See Ageron, C.R., *Anticolonialisme en France*, Paris, 1973, pp. 20-21.

(54)
In spite of the improvements in health care, infant mortality was around 16%, and there was only one hospital bed for 4,581 people. Population growth increased this imbalance. The Moslem population, which stood at around 4 million at the beginning of the 20th century, rose up to 5 million in 1921 and well over 6 million in 1936.

See Nouschi, A., *La Naissance du Nationalisme algérien*, Minuit, Paris, 1962, Chapter 2, especially pp. 31-32 ff.

Although this rapid population increase may not have been possible without improved living conditions (see note 118 below), it follows that the population increase in itself constituted a further strain on food resources.

(55)
Barbour, N., op. cit., pp. 217-218.

(56)
The cost of these fees was sometimes ten times the price of their land. See Ageron, C.R., Volume 1 (1968), op. cit., p. 100.

The land was acquired by big colonists and companies alike and large estates "passed into the hands of Europeans thanks to

legal proceedings of more or less debatable equity."

See Barbour, N., *op. cit.*, p. 242.

(57)

Ageron, C.R., Volume 1 (1968), *op. cit.*, Chapter 5, pp. 103-128.

(58)

Ibid. p. 256 ff.

(59)

Ibid., pp. 24-36.

(60)

Ibid., p. 51, and Chapter 4.

(61)

Ibid., Chapter 14.

(62)

Nouschi, A., *op. cit.*, p. 36.

(63)

Ibid., p. 37.

(64)

Ibid., p. 48.

(65)

C.R. Ageron, (1979), *op. cit.*, pp412-419, and Nouschi, A., *op. cit.*, p. 34.

(66)

Berque, J., French North Africa: The Maghrib between two world wars, Faber & Faber, London, 1967 (& Seuil 1962), p. 243.

(67)

Ibid., p. 245.

(68)

Nouschi, A., *op. cit.*, p. 42.

(69)

The tendency in most colonial writing was not to concede that there existed any nationhood, or proto-nation, within the states they colonised. This very Eurocentric conception of the nation state sought to deny nationalism any legitimate existence since, in the case of Algeria, it meant that no Algerian nation had any existence before colonisation. The convenience of such an argument for the defence of the colonial venture and the domination of other nations is evident.

See also the Intellectual debate in *Le Monde* about this very subject in Chapter 10, and a forthcoming article by the author, "Perceptions of Algerian identity in the 1950s: *Le Monde's* treatment of Intellectual views", in Bulletin of Francophone Africa, 4-1993.

(70)

See R. Letourneau, *op. cit.*, p. 311
Letourneau maintained that a national feeling was never

developed during the population by the Turks and that the people of Algeria "in spite of a few exceptions", never really resisted the French occupation.

(71)

And why could not a political movement at that time have had a religious base, especially in Algeria, where Islam had had a great influence since the 7th century, and especially when one is prepared to accept (as Letourneau is) the fact that Islam was the powerful force behind the insurrections of Abdel Kader, Boumaza, Bouahama etc. See Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 311.

(72)

There were no substantial effort to improve education nor increase the literacy rates of the indigenous population. The colonial authorities did not allow any indigenous political institutions nor did they integrate the Algerians into the French ones. This did not help in the development of an indigenous political culture.

(73)

A la longueur cet Islam qui avait peu de contacts avec le reste du monde musulman et entretenait en somme de bons rapports avec l'administration française s'est recroquevillé sur lui-même et, est comme entré en sommeil dominé par les agents du culte entièrement à la dévotion des autorités ainsi que par les marabouts et chefs de confréries pour la plupart, en bons termes avec les mêmes autorités.

In Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 311.

(74)

He denied that he was "simply a religious fanatic or motivated by a thirst for personal power". See F.A.De Luna, op.cit. p 53. He found his fight against oppression and for the liberation of the country similar to that of "Spartacus, Gracchi or Sertorius".

(75)

In the same way as Vercingétorix had been in Gallic France when he remarked, "He is an admirable personality and he will not have his historian. We will write his history as Caesar wrote that of Vercingétorix"

Ibid.

(76)

See Ageron, C.R., Volume 1 (1968), op. cit., pp. 3-4.

(77)

In 1865 Lapasset (colonel, later general), referring to the Algerian resistance, wrote:

Nous nous trouvons et nous trouverons encore pendant fort longtemps en face d'un peuple qui supporte avec peine notre domination et qui cherche par tous les moyens, toutes les occasions de s'en affranchir... .

Ageron, C.R., (1968), op. cit., p. 3.

(78)

Nouschi, A., op. cit., especially Chapter 4 & 5.

- (79)
Ganiage, J., op. cit., p. 228 ff.
As Babour remarked: "It is impossible to deny that an Algerian fatherland existed and that it was an ideal for which many thousand Algerians gave their lives."
Barbour, N., op. cit., pp. 216-220. The quote is from p. 219.
- (80)
Nouschi, A., op. cit., p. 35.
- (81)
Ageron, C.R., (1973), op. cit., p. 74.
- (82)
Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 219.
- (83)
Julien, C.A., (1972), op. cit., p. 24.
- (84)
Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 312ff.
- (85)
It became later on *L'Association des Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté*, AML. See Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 346.
- (86)
In Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 314. and Horne, A., op. cit., p. 40.
- (87)
Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 219.
- (88)
In *El Chihab*, April, 1936. See Horne, A., op. cit., pp. 40-41, Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 87. See also Martin, C., op. cit., p. 283.
- (89)
Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 88, and Martin, C., op. cit., p. 283.
- (90)
Letourneau, R., op. cit., p. 38.
- (91)
It is difficult to conceive that the rules of Islam would permit conformism to non-Muslim rules, particularly when they interfered with religion.
- (92)
Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., pp. 123-124.
- (93)
Ibid., pp. 326-327.
- (94)
This only satisfied a small elite anyway and allowed them:
l'exercice des droits politiques des citoyens

français sans qu'il en résulte aucune modification de leur statut ou de leurs droits civils.

See Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 329.

The proposals would have affected 20,000 to 25,000 subjects, more than half a century after the Jewish community had been granted that privilege.

(95)

La Fédération des Maires et des adjoints spéciaux. They were jealous of their status and worried about the consequences of such proposals if they were widely discussed (8 February 1938). Ibid., p. 231.

(96)

Nouschi, A., op. cit., p. 52.

(97)

Nouschi, A., op. cit., pp. 97-98.

72% of the population lived off agriculture. Ibid., p. 116.

(98)

In relation to the 1936 figures, in 1948 the population of the city of Algiers rose by 148%. In Oran it rose by 167%. The houses were overcrowded and their prices increased significantly.

Ibid., p. 101

(99)

From 27,7 million quintals in 1939 down to 9,3 million in 1940 and to 11,2 million in 1942. It rose to 15,5 million quintals in 1943 but went down to 10 million in 1944 and to 3,6 million in 1945.

(100)

Ibid., p. 108.

(101)

Ibid., p. 109.

(102)

Ibid., p. 110.

(103)

Ibid., p. 104.

(104)

Ibid., p. 102.

(105)

Ibid., p. 104.

(106)

Ibid., p. 106.

(107)

Ibid.

(108)

Ibid., p. 107.

- (109)
Danan, Y.M., *La vie politique à Alger de 1940 à 1944*, LGDJ, Paris, 1963, p. 26.
- (110)
Ibid., pp. 97-98 ff.
- (111)
Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 89.
- (112)
Julien, C.A., (1972), op. cit., p. 244.
- (113)
Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 338.
- (114)
Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 344, and Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., pp. 91-92.
- (115)
Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 92, Horne, A., op. cit., pp. 25-28 and also *Le Monde* 3/11/54.
- (116)
Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 360.
- (117)
The *Délégations Financières* took the name of "Assemblée Financière" and became now the Algerian Assembly, with a slight increase in its functions in financial and legislative matters. See Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 94.
- (118)
In Girardet, R., op. cit., p. 339
- (119)
Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 95, and Martin, C., op. cit., p. 357.
- (120)
Ageron, C.R., (1964), op. cit., p. 95.
- (121)
L'Algérie de 1954 n'était plus du tout celle de 1939. La guerre, le terrible soubresaut de 1945 et la détérioration progressive de l'économie et de la société musulmane avaient profondément bouleversé le pays. On s'en rendait mal compte du fait que les Musulmans ne s'exprimaient guère d'abord parce qu'on leur en laissait peu la possibilité, mais aussi parce qu'ils suivaient une très longue tradition d'action souterraine.
See Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 382.
- (122)
Paul Balta, *23 siècles de rébellion, Le Nouvel Observateur, Numéro Spécial, La Guerre d'Algérie trente ans après*, March 1992, pp. 26-27.

(123)

Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 206.

Relying on an argument developed by Dr Josué de Castro, "when the table is bare, the bed is fruitful", Barbour maintains that fecundity is no proof of prosperity and that the fact that living standards of Algerian Muslims had been depressed did not prevent the birth rate from raising even higher. See Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 206.

(124)

In 1871 there were 5 cwt of cereals available to every inhabitant of Algeria. The average figure in the middle of the twentieth century was down to 2 cwt.

Ibid., p. 244.

However, there were great disparities in the income distribution among the population. The situation benefited very few and was to the disadvantage of the majority.

(125)

See Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 241, and also Nouschi, A., op. cit., p. 124, who stated:

Le contraste entre les cultivateurs européens et les fellahs demeure aussi important en 1954 qu'en 1939, malgré les efforts de l'administration pour modifier les données de l'agriculture traditionnelle. L'augmentation de la population entre 1939 et 1954 a certes contribué à rendre la crise plus aigue mais, surtout, les solutions envisagées sont toujours restées sans commune mesure avec l'importance des problèmes.

(126)

Nouschi, A., op. cit., p. 114.

(127)

Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 381.

(128)

Commenting on that period in 1962, Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 382, wrote:

Personne ou presque ne consentait à prêter l'oreille à l'une des revendications essentielles des Musulmans, peut-être leur revendication essentielle: le respect de leur dignité d'hommes, la reconnaissance en fait de l'égalité qu'on leur reconnaissait [for less than ten years] en droit.

(129)

Montagne, R., in *Le Monde* quoted by Martin, C., op. cit., pp. 359-362.

(130)

Usually seen as an early sociologist of the area who described the inhabitants of the Central Maghrib (Algeria) as <assabyyun al Akl> (having a difficult character). See Paul Balta, op. cit., p. 26.

(131)

They were pushed onto poorer and poorer lands, having to eke out a difficult living, and able to work only a matter of months (if not days) in the year. Given the high birth rate and

the improvements in medical care, the survival rate of newly born was higher and the families were larger. However, the lack of industrialisation, the paucity of jobs and increased mechanisation of the traditional agricultural sector, all led to a very poor standard of living for the indigenous population. This was aggravated by the Second World War and its aftermath.

See Aron, R., *Les origines de la Guerre de l'Algérie*, Fayard, Paris, 1962.

(132)

Ageron, C-R, Modern Algeria, A history from 1830 to the Present, Translated by M. Brett, C. Hurst & Co, London, 1991, p. 105 ff.

(133)

La guerre n'a finalement surpris que ceux qui n'ont jamais voulu admettre que, depuis les origines, l'Algérie a toujours été une terre rebelle. Non à l'Envahisseur!, Paul Balta, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Numéro spécial, op. cit., p. 27.

(134)

With the PPA-MTLD divided into two clans (for and against Messali), a third force was created (CRUA) in Spring 1954 to unite the party, with the agreement of 22 former OS members. These included Boudiaf, Bitat and Didouche Mourad, members of the MTLD in Cairo (as well as Khider, Ait Ahmed and Ben Bella) and the Kabyle rebels led by Krim Belkacem.

See Opperman, T., *Le Problème algérien, données historiques, politiques et juridiques*, Maspéro, Paris, 1959 & 1961, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

(135)

Balta, P., op.cit., p. 27.

(136)

The first night of the war saw about 70 coordinated incidents (bomb attacks, assaults on police stations and government buildings as well as arson attacks and destruction across the breadth of the whole country). See Paillat, C., *"La liquidation" 20 ans qui déchirèrent la France*, T. 2, Laffont, Paris, 1972, pp. 142-147, for the full list.

(137)

They announced that their forces amounted to 25.000 men, though it is thought that this figure is excessive. See O'Balance, E., *The Algerian Insurrection (1954-1962)*, Faber & Faber, London, 1967, p. 109.

The FLN successfully divided its organisation to cover the 6 Wilayas which made up the whole of the territory. Ibid. pp. 53-55.

(138)

Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action set up to coordinate the fighting.

(139)

O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 39.

(140)

Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 108.

(141)

This did not mean that the Algerians were rejecting all forms of dialogue, as, indeed, they remained open to any offer coming from the French, as long as it was based on the acceptance of the principle of self-determination.

(142)

Indeed, throughout all French governments, from P. Mendès-France, to Pierre Pflimlin through to Edgar Faure, Guy Mollet, Bourges-Maunoury and Félix Gaillard, the uprising was considered by all of them to be an attack by French citizens (civilians) against their own government, citizens who, by their very rebellion, became outlaws. See Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 135 ff., and Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., pp. 108- 109.

(143)

Some were released after the appointment of Chevallier who had become Minister of Defence.

The result of that repression was that some left the country, while the Centralists joined the FLN and the staunch Messalists the MNA. See Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p. 108-109.

(144)

See Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 136.

(145)

The figure for French troops are given by Opperman, T., op. cit., pp. 136-137. He also stated that, when Ben boulaïd was captured by French troops in Tunisia, a report found on him indicated that the insurgents were less than 359. Ibid.

(146)

It did not make up for the shortage of teachers but that was a definite improvement. See O'Balance, op. cit., p. 53.

(147)

Soustelle's appointment was initially resented by the settlers. However, by the time his appointment ended, he was one of their most admired proponents.

(148)

These included the creation of Social centres to provide the more impoverished Muslim communities with basic technical assistance", and slightly wider access to junior administrative jobs for Muslims.

Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 109.

(149)

Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 137.

(150)

However, the military effort failed to put an end to the activities of small "terrorist groups". Instead, it managed to help swell their ranks, mainly through maltreatment of "suspects".

Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p.109.

(151)

Footnote 5 in Opperman, T, op. cit., p. 137

(152)

See Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 138.

(153)

See Chapter 5 and the illuminating study made by SCHLESSINGER, Philip, Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities, Sage Publications, London, 1991.

(154)

See Andoque, Nicolas d', *1955-1962, Guerre et Paix en Algérie, l'épopée silencieuse des SAS*, S.P.L, Paris, 1977.

These were reminiscent of the Bureaux arabes and local irregulars troops (Mobile Rural Police Groups GMPR) reminiscent of the old Goum. See Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 109.

(155)

Ibid.

(156)

Ibid., p. 111.

(157)

See O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 61.

(158)

Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p. 111.

(159)

O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 68.

(160)

The opposition between MNA and FLN culminated in the massacres of Melouza, which the French were able to exploit on two fronts. Internationally, they were able to draw world attention to the "horrendous crimes of the FLN"; and internally they were able to gain rebels such as Bellounis to turn their arms squarely against the FLN with the help and support of the French army.

Bellounis managed to hold the Djelfa region against the FLN for a short time. For this episode, see Montagnon, P., *La guerre d'Algérie, Génèse et engrenage d'une tragédie, 1954-1962*, Pygmalion, Paris, 1984, pp. 239-245.

(161)

This is partly due to the FLN's insistence that other groups had to disband prior to joining the movement (MTLD/MNA, PCA).

(162)

O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 57-59.

(163)

Evidently, when difficult decisions had to be taken to eliminate potential or actual collaborators, this was resorted to by the Resistance without much of the blame being pinned on it.

(164)

O'Ballance, T., op. cit., p. 62.

It is also stressed that ALN leaders were not interested in putting their ideology over to the Muslim people in order to enlist "their willing help" for the first 14 months (Ibid.). The plan was said to have been that there would first have to be terror combined with a little persuasion and re-education before that terror element would gradually be lessened.

The FLN was said to use preaching, persuading, threatening and reasoning to influence the people. See O'Ballance, T., op. cit., p. 63.

(165)

O'Ballance, T., op. cit., p. 62.

(166)

O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 62-3.

(167)

O'Ballance, T., op. cit., p. 63.

(168)

Ibid.

(169)

Opperman, T., Op. cit., p. 110.

(170)

Ibid., pp. 110-111.

If any further proof is needed, it could clearly be demonstrated that the movement was basically unaffected by the arrest of the top leaders in the hijacking operation of 22 October 1956. See below and Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 111.

(171)

See Harbi, M., *La Guerre commence en Algérie*, Editions Complexes, Paris, 1984, p. 24.

(172)

He does in Courrière, Y., *Les Fils de la Toussaint*, Fayard, Paris, 1968, p. 379. See Harbi, M., op. cit., p. 35.

Harbi argued that the FLN acquired a truly national dimension in relation to previous insurrectional movements.

Harbi, M., op. cit., pp. 20-21.

(173)

See Ageron, C-R, op. cit., p. 111.

(174)

In the motion of the "61" passed by the Muslim representatives on 26 September 1955. Ibid.

(175)
Ageron, C.-R., (1991) op. cit., p. 112.

(176)
Ibid., p. 112.

(177)
The number of *départements* increased and there was a move towards the integration of vast territories of the Sahara into the government of Algeria, despite plan being prepared for a French Sahara.

(178)
The new statute of Algeria was also to be devised according to initiatives taken by the army, playing upon ethnic divisions.

(179)
Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 113.

(180)
It was said that a message was sent too late for the external delegation to attend and that the external delegation of the FLN was deliberately kept in ignorance of the time and place of the Soumman conference. See O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 71.

(181)
Ibid.

(182)
The name of these members were not made public. Ibid., p. 72.

(183)
Relating to the standardisation, ranks, distribution of power at regional level with each colonel, head of willaya, having an advisory council to help him. It also decided on payment of salaries to soldiers, with women receiving the same rate of pay as men. See O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 72-74.

(184)
The combatants voted to retain collegial leadership and laid down the aim of the armed struggle as being a single, democratic, socialist Algerian Republic.

(185)
It was mistakenly stated that the plane was flying over Algeria, but this was not the case.

(186)
Another confusing element is that Mollet is alleged to have sent a representative to Tunis, for which the plane was bound, to discuss with Ben Bella.

(187)
Later, at his trial, Colonel Gardes disclosed that while serving in the Intelligence he had initiated and planned the kidnapping.

(188)

O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 76-77.

As a result of the arrest, the FLN announced on 25 October 1956 that Tewfik El Madani, Secretary General of the *Ulémas*, who joined the FLN in April 1956, was appointed leader of the external delegation in replacement of Ben Bella.

Ibid., p. 76.

(189)

Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p 114.

(190)

Ibid, p. 78 ff.

(191)

For instance, 105 insurgents on 27 September 1956 in a fight with their troops [O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 78-79] near Fort Mc Mahon and another 50 near Bou Saada on 18 November and 27 November, 23 killed near Tebessa and 70 killed and 56 taken prisoner on 9 December on the edge of the Sahara, 47 more killed on 22 December in Tebessa. The French casualties were said to have been comparatively light in these actions.

Due to a lack of arms and ammunition, some of the FLN troops began to surrender.

(192)

O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 79.

(193)

Droz, B. & Lever, E., *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, Seuil, Paris, 1982, op. cit., p. 129.

(194)

Amédée Froger was the symbol of French settlers' rule in Algeria and the defence of their interests. He was the head of the strong anti-reformist organisation of Algerian Mayors, which resisted the implementation of any liberal policy in the colony.

(195)

There was, for instance, a bomb left in a Muslim cinema in the Casbah and a bazooka shot was fired at the offices of the Commander-in-Chief, General Salan.

(196)

Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 80.

(197)

In June 1958, a copy of *El Moujahid* stated that he had died of wounds the previous month while inspecting troops, whereas he was deliberately eliminated by other members of the FLN leadership. See O'Ballance, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

(198)

Ageron, C. R., (1991) , p. 115.

(199)

Ibid.

(200)

The purpose behind the law was to break up Algeria into

autonomous territories and *départements*, killing Algerian nationalism by playing upon provincialism and ethnic loyalties (*divide et impere*). But since it was based on a single college, it angered the Europeans of Algeria and the French Right. It was thrown out on 30 September by the French parliament, and subsequently amended to enable the formation of a *Conseil des Communautés* for each community alongside the future federal institutions, which would function in parallel with the *Conseils des Territoires* (district assemblies).

CHAPTER FOUR: NOTES

(1)

A previous study was carried out on *Le Monde's* coverage of Algeria between 1944 and 1954 by T. Firchon, *La Question algérienne d'après Le Monde* (dissertation supervised by PA Martel (MH/26) and submitted to Montpellier University, 1970). Even if useful, his work has been, nonetheless, problematic in many respects. A critical assessment of his findings and methods will be undertaken in the examination of *Le Monde's* coverage of the period which follows below.

(2)

Naegelen is said to have progressively been given full support by *Le Monde*, with the paper becoming more aware of the problems of the indigenous population. Firchon claimed that the change was verified by A. Chatelain's study (Chatelain, A., op.cit., p.90), which identified a more neutralist approach by the paper around 1951 (a year in which the paper lived through one of its more traumatic crises. See Chapter 2).

*partisan très convaincu, sinon inconditionnel
de l'attitude des Européens en Algérie Le Monde
devient plus neutre*

He actually confuses the issue here because he tries to infer that the "neutralist" battle of *Le Monde* advocating an increasingly more independent stance from the US could have had as a result a more neutral attitude towards the Algerian problem, without advancing any proof. As illustrated earlier in Chapter 2, the "neutralist battle" had nothing to do with Algeria.

(3)

As Firchon pointed out, J. Silvert, *Le Monde's* reporter on North Africa, had seen the inevitability of some long-term developments in Algeria. The situation there was compared to that of Egypt, which rid itself from all foreign influence and any contact with France, and which had fuelled the fire of nationalism. See for instance *Le Monde* (16/2/1945).

(4)

The paper was aware that, though they might have known of the North African's aspirations, the Europeans did not always think that these were desirable and inevitable. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 2 and *Le Monde* 13/2/45.

(5)

However, the events of 16 May 1945 (see Chapter 3) led to hundreds of victims blamed on *fauteurs de trouble*, the "PPA", the "Amis du Manifeste". The number of victims in those events, 1500 according to the Ministry of Interior (*Le Monde* 20/7/1945), was the only substantial information given to the readers. After that, no mention of Algeria was made except for

the debates in the regular Consultative Assembly, of which large extracts were provided by *Le Monde*.

(6)

See *Le Monde* 3/11/1954.

It should be pointed out that Edouard Sablier had only recently been demobilised and been in France only for a few weeks and started working for the paper only six months later (15 November), when he was appointed as Middle East correspondent (See Sablier, E., op. cit., p. 11). It is very surprising, however, that in all those ten years he did not find the opportunity to write about Algeria.

(7)

Firchon pointed out that R. Pierron indicated later on (August 1945) that there was a concern not to furnish arguments to the agitators. What could be surmised as the main reason for this stand is more historical: it relates to the general mood at the Liberation, after the long years of defeat of France and of German rule. There was a concern not to give way to anything that might be conceived as a defeat that could undermine the strength and the prestige of France even further. As Firchon himself admitted, the paper was not insensitive to the possibility of internationalisation of the problem, and this led it to emphasise the necessity of a new policy. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 31.

(8)

At the beginning, playing down the causes, *Le Monde* did not see any "malaise" but simply a difficulty of osmosis between the two peoples. Most journalists gave a combination of reasons, including the nationalist rebels,

[Ils] qui ont voulu élever le débat sur le plan international et créer un conflit franco-arabe en exploitant la famine...[ne trompent personne par leur] escroquerie à l'humanisme. (J. Silvert)

We are not told, for instance, that the nationalists had been encouraged by the Allies' High Command and had already approached them for possible freedom of the country after the War, and that the problem, therefore, had already acquired an international dimension. The rebels in the view of the journalists were exploiting the French malaise -weakening of the French armature- and the indigenous malaise (blamed on an increase in Arab nationalism), compounded by an economic crisis .

Other reasons given included the military weakness of France, the strength and affluence of the allied forces, the political divisions of France, the exaltations of pan-arabism and the economic crisis (Driand); economic factors were given less emphasis by Pierron.

Silvert, Driand and Pierron blamed Arab nationalism. The latter journalist absolved the majority of "Muslims" on the grounds that they constituted a:

masse fidèle désorientée en proie aux intellectuels que nous avons instruits et mus par le fanatisme religieux.

In Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 22 and *Le Monde*, 10/7/45, p.1.

The administration was also made responsible for the economic and social malaise which was now more apparent. Other circumstances were: "population growth, decimated herds, the

critical situation of the wine sector, trade and industry in a free fall, increasing unemployment...leaving the masses idle, badly clothed and undernourished." In *Le Monde* 2/3/46.

We are also told of the Muslim (city-dweller in particular) "who once he has known the black market has got used to living off it and no longer works".

(9)

J. Silvert made it clear what he thought of the nationalists, and Driand followed suit:

La politique indigène se justifiera, réussira toujours si elle est menée d'une main qui ne tremble pas.

For Pierron, who was keen to get it right,

Dans ce pays il n'y a plus de faute à commettre,

it was imperative to:

conserver l'Union française, rien de ce qui peut diviser les Français ne doit être toléré.

See Firchon, *op. cit.*, p. 22 and *Le Monde* 10/7/45, p. 1.

(10)

When a "Muslim" viewpoint is expressed, requesting an equitable share, the statement of an indigenous inhabitant is presented in quotes:

La présence française ne se justifie que dans la mesure où elle apporte à chaque héritier d'une civilisation endormie la possibilité de retrouver l'initiative dans l'existence ... dans le temps même où le gouvernement français fait son possible pour encourager le développement d'entreprises ... qui s'opposent systématiquement à la libération économique et sociale du Musulman.

Le Monde, 12/3/46 and Firchon, T., *op.cit.*, p. 31.

(11)

The journalist J.Guérif indicated the limits of that liberation:

(...) libérer le Musulman d'une tutelle à caractère plus ou moins colonialiste ne donnera jamais le droit de mettre en infériorité ou de menacer d'asphyxie une population aussi vigoureuse que la population algérienne (the settlers). La France métropolitaine reste responsable d'un million de colons.

Ibid.

It could clearly be deduced from the above context that the paper believed that the manifest aspirations of the "Muslims" and their freedom could threaten one million settlers. Therefore, limits had to be set to their aspirations.

(12)

The majority are Muslim (8 million arabophones and berbérophones) who increased at the rate of between 130,000 and 150,000 a year, and one million non-Muslims (80-90% Christians and Jews). He refers to the latter as "Europeans but the majority of whom were born in Algeria, half of whom are of French origin (but) who all feel French."

(13)

His comments on their assimilation (their absorption into

French civilisation) are particularly revealing: "this pacific conquest of thousands of people" to be "... one of the miracles of this country." See *Le Monde*, 13 and 27 August 1946.

It is obvious that he was only referring to the European element of the population. His amazement did not extend to include the fact that the Arab and Berber majority was not integrated, quite the reverse.

Another puzzling question here would be to ask whether it was not the European minority which ought to have integrated into the life of the majority instead of the reverse.

(14)

What we are not told explicitly here is the factor preventing that integration: the impossible conditions imposed on the Muslims in view of their religion. Giving up that religion was the *sine qua non* for integration. As one might suspect, underlying that attitude was the inherent belief in the superiority of the Judeo-Christian faith (since the European community was described as well integrated). The Muslim attachment to their religion was very strong and had prevented them from qualifying for integration and French "civilisation". However, that was a mere pretext for preventing them from acquiring equality of treatment -as even the few who renounced their Muslim status saw no real improvement in their lot.

Pierron scratched the surface of the problem when looking at the crux of the problem: the possibility of giving citizenship to the Moslem inhabitants, without loss of their status (statut personnel) was acceptable in theory, but unworkable in practice. The example given is that of the absurd possibility of a polygamous Muslim magistrate condemning a French man for bigamy. See *Le Monde*, August 1945.

(15)

Le Monde, 13/8/46.

(16)

He stated that in most cases there had been no massive expropriations of local inhabitants while numerous historians would disagree (Bourdieu, P., et al., *Le déracinement: la crise de l'Agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie*, Minuit, Paris, 1964) that the production of cereals had increased covering 2.8M hectares in 1901 to 3.1M in 1939; the area covered by irrigated land to 20.000 hectares and that 20.000 fruit trees had been planted where there had been none. Messud also pointed out that the main wealth of the indigenous population came from raising cattle (in 1946 70% of the horses, 88% of the cattle and 94% of the sheep) and that half of it had been decimated by the drought in 1944-45. The Muslim production of cereals constituted most of the production: 15 million quintals in 1934-35, which had hardly changed. However, the European production went up from 5 to 9.5 million quintals between 1920 and 1939. That, stated the journalist, is what made it possible to feed the increasing indigenous population (see *Le Monde*, 14/8/1946).

The wine sector which employed 100.000 workers and around 400,000 Muslims (the paper added no comment about the contradiction between wine growing, Islam and the fact that Muslims had to produce a product which was proscribed by their religion) was described as the main element in the "prosperity" of economic life in Algeria, accounting for 40% of the exports in 1939, which manifestly did not go into the pockets of the "Muslim" population.

(17)

Some references were made to the impact of the War but very few. It was repeated that the economy was "bouleversée" and that the flow of capital from France stopped from 1942, that supplies were affected, that prices rose, and that the circulation of notes as a result of the inflationary measures of the Provisional Government went up from 393 to 4212 and then to 4443 Milliards.

(18)

Firchon pointed out that Silvers, who showed "generosity" (what generosity, exactly, we are not told) when writing for *Le Monde* (and was not to write thereafter), adopted a firmer stance when the issue of French "tutelle" was being called into question.

(19)

As Firchon pointed out, even when Planeau criticised the realities of colonial life in Algeria, producing alfalfa (a material used in paper manufacture) while not having its own paper industry, he still emphasised the need to ensure a degree of moral unity. See *Le Monde*, 6/10/1945.

(20)

The reader at that time knew nothing about them and there was a marked absence of comprehensive commentaries on Algerian political life. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 26.

(21)

See *Le Monde*, 15-16/8/1946.

(22)

See *Le Monde*, 20/8/1946. In fact, that was the first demand put forward after the creation of its forerunner *Etoile Nord Africaine* in the 1920s.

(23)

See *Le Monde*, 22/8/1946.

(24)

The two choices were summed up in the two phrases coined by R.Roure:

- *Se Maintenir ou renoncer* (25 July 1946)
- *Union ou séparatisme* (24 August 1946)

(25)

See *Le Monde*, 25/7/1946.

(26)

Of which the paper must have been aware, since it reported Abbas's *mise au point des revendications* published in *Combat*, at the top of which was the creation of an Algerian state. See *Le Monde*, 27/7/1946.

The two nationalists leaders were a little freer that year. Abbas was released from prison with the Assembly vote on 16 March 1946 and Messali's liberation followed in August 1946.

(27)

The paper recommended reforms and firmness. But firmness for the paper did not imply force:

Qu'on nous entende bien ce n'est pas une question de force, c'est une question d'intelligence, d'autorité, de compréhension des évolutions nécessaires et possibles.

(28)
See *Le Monde*, 24/8/1946.

(29)
Le séparatisme ne peut être traité autrement que le séparatisme niçois, catalan ou alsacien".
C'est un crime contre la sûreté de l'état.
See *Le Monde*, 27/8/1946.

(30)
See *Le Monde*, 27/8/46, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 41.

(31)
See Firchon, T., p. 41 and *Le Monde*, 18/5/1946.

(32)
When Rémy Roure asked the question, où veut-on en venir? (what's to be done?), Firchon reported that *Le Monde* was not in favour of "assimilation" (because it saw the two communities as irréductibles) but that it also rejected Articles 5 and 67 (of the Constitution) which gave full political rights to the indigenous population of overseas territories (See *Le Monde*, 29/8/1946 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 42) and printed large extracts of the debates in the Constituent Assembly rejecting the two articles. See *Le Monde*, 23/8/1946. Accepting Emile Herriot's premise that giving equal rights to dominions overseas would make France a colony of its colonies, *Le Monde's* journalist, A. Landry, recommended rejection of the above articles: the possibility of having 120 overseas deputies in the Palais Bourbon was combatted vigorously. See *Le Monde*, 17/9/1946, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 42.

(33)
Even though Edouard Sablier stressed the necessity of the *Union française (seules les grandes unités économiques et politiques sont viables)*, he shared the colonial attitude that was then widespread throughout the French Empire -an attitude which was hostile to integration or to the granting of equal rights to the indigenous populations.

(34)
When it wrote: *L'Angleterre s'en va ... les Anglais restent.*
See *Le Monde*, 23/9/1947, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 72.

(35)
According to Firchon, not a day passed in August 1947 without Algeria being mentioned on the front or last page of *Le Monde*. But it did not mention troubles when they occurred in Kabylia and remained preoccupied by the reactions of the French in Algeria. These were quoted at length, as opposed to those of the indigenous population, which were just mentioned. See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 47 and 52. At no stage was French sovereignty called into question.

(36)

The Statutes Of 1947; see also Chapter 3.

(37)

Le Monde of 20/12/1946. Firchon fails to make any comments on this important statement.

(38)

Tout plan de réformes doit être souple, prudent, progressif et ne pas s'imposer à la hâte... (See Le Monde, 17/7/1947).

La proclamation d'une prétendue indépendance ou sa sujétion à quelque puissance nouvelle viendra dans le monde qui se dessine sonner le glas de notre propre existence.

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 46, and *Le Monde*, 19/7/1947.

(39)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 57.

(40)

This came when de Gaulle's change of policy was seen as stepping back from his 1944 position, when he was proposing full citizenship. In 1947, he was adamant that:

Nous ne devons laisser mettre en question sous aucune forme le fait que l'Algérie est de notre domaine.

See *Le Monde*, 20/8/1947, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 59. Talking about French sovereignty but not mentioning Algeria, he also pointed out:

A ceux qui s'égarèrent dans le rêve de je ne sais quelle sécession, je dis aujourd'hui devant tous: vous vous trompez et vous trompez les autres.

See *Le Monde*, 14/10/1947, p. 3, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 69.

(41)

The 1947 Statutes were adopted on 27 August 1947, by 319 votes for, 89 votes against and 186 abstentions, by the Assembly and accepted by the Council of the Republic (Senate) on 3 September 1947. They constituted a series of liberal reforms which were designed to give more representation to the Muslims, but they fell far short of what would have constituted a democratisation of the system. Many points are worthy of attention such as the Executive power being left in the hands of the Governor General, who was also head of the Civil Service, and who established the budget, the Assembly with its 120 delegates (60 for each college) elected for six years, and the power of the Assembly to extend or adopt metropolitan laws applicable to Algeria or to decide on particular "règlementation" which would be "homologuée" by decree. A simple majority only was required for the adoption of decisions, except on request by the Governor General, the commission or one quarter of the members, when decisions had to be adopted by a two-thirds majority and only after 24 hours.

(42)

As Firchon pointed out, quoting Depreux and Rens, this illustrated the inevitability of the equation: one million

Europeans equals eight million Muslims:

Convenons loyalement que cela signifie que, selon que l'on vote dans le Premier ou le Second Collège l'influence sera huit fois plus grande ou huit fois plus petite. La promotion d'un Collège à l'autre, signifie donc mathématiquement le gain ou la perte par l'intéressé des 7/8ème de son influence démocratique et électorale.

Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 59 and RENS, I., *L'Assemblée Nationale*, Pedone, p. 83.

During the discussion of the statutes, as Firchon reminded us, the Muslim delegates left the Assembly after a statement by M Benchenouf outlining the reason as being:

Afin de ne pas donner par notre participation aux débats l'impression d'un acquiescement quelconque au projet gouvernemental.

(43)

Firchon had decided to give considerable importance to the elections because for him "The European was involved in politics only at the time of elections" and for that European "the only criterion that mattered was to remain French." (Firchon, T., op. cit., p. VI.) The criticisms that can be levelled against this kind of approach, apart from the obvious contradictions in the above statement, are that the European element constituted numerically a very small minority (8 to 10% of the population), which had disproportionate powers and whose influence on politics was disproportionately greater than that of the indigenous population for which the choice was already made by the authorities

It was well known, even by the paper, that these "fabricated elections" were a matter of fact.

Regarding the elections, Firchon was critical enough to state that the newspaper showed little concern for the colonial question, paying hardly any attention to equal representation of the two colleges. He noted, however, that space had been devoted to elections, especially to highlight the defeat of the nationalist PPA.

The French political authorities allowed some political activity in the sense that they permitted the formation of political parties. But as soon as these parties were involved in any kind of activity that was thought to be against the integrity of France, or showed any nationalistic ardour, they were banned or outlawed and their leaders arrested.

The rejection in Algeria by 62% of the voters of the referendum (when France accepted it by 53%) showed, Firchon noted, the disapproval of Algeria of the fate that seemed to be reserved to it by the new constitutional framework (representation in the French parliament by 15 deputies from each college and a future vote of Algerian Statutes).

When the indigenous population of Algeria abstained in great numbers in the 1946 election, *Le Monde* merely remarked that the new citizens were in no hurry to exercise their electoral duty.

(44)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 68.

(45)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 39, 46 and 70.

The imagination has to be stretched very far to believe in this biased portrayal and this attempt to try and make the readers believe that "not to vote was actually to approve of the system".

But what was more surprising was that Firchon expected more of it and he criticized the paper for not continuing its "a-contrario" reasoning, implying that if people did not bother to vote, it meant that they were consenting to France.

(46)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 46-7.

(47)

(Messali's party was for independence , Abbas's was for more integration.)

But in 1952, *Le Monde* reproached the government for letting Messali fight the elections against Abbas. The paper pointed out that if the authorities in Algeria (the Governor General) had freed Messali to counter-act Abbas' claims (Firchon finds every reason for believing so), it soon appeared that it was a miscalculation:

*lancer Messali dans les jambes d'Abbas c'était
lancer un prolétariat analphabète contre un Tiers-
Etat évolué.*

See *Le Monde*, 3/4/1952.

(48)

As Firchon himself makes clear, the Muslim side did not really interest the paper. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 71.

(49)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 74. For Naegelen, the nationalists, especially the MTLD, were separatists who had to be stopped.

(50)

Le Monde was not in the habit of giving substantial biographical details and did not have much information about him. The paper started giving biographical details with the appointment of the next Governor General, Mr R. Leonard (*Le Monde*, 12/4/1951).

(51)

The anti-separatist position of E. Naegelen, that Algeria should remain French, is highlighted, as it seemed to please *Le Monde*, for which French Algeria was important (see Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 76.). Hence the complimentary headlines: *Naegelen a conquis la sympathie de l'Algérie par ses premières paroles*. Satisfaction that now Algeria had a governor of note was also expressed by journalists like Messud.

(52)

See *Le Monde*, 23/8/1948.

(53)

Which, by then, had become more radical in its demands to keep up with Messali's group.

(54)

Nevertheless, it firmly asserted that:

(55)

What appeared clearly from the election table drawn up by the paper (*Le Monde*, 13/4/1948, p. 4.) was that only nine MTLD and eight UDMA had been elected. This gave only 18 out of 120 seats to the nationalists. Messud was more interested in referring to the exactions of the nationalist parties on the people "who had had enough".

(56)

See *Le Monde*, 7/3/1948 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 71.

(57)

Le Monde, wanting authority within legality (see Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 82 ff.), did not seem to want to listen to those who remain unsatisfied.

(58)

It argued that there were two communities, which could cooperate and fraternise, and not one different by its "race, religion and civilisation".

(59)

La France n'a pas de leçon électorale à recevoir de la Ligue Arabe. See *Le Monde*, 10/4/1948.

Similarly, *Le Monde* found the accusations of electoral fraud by some papers and some nationalist leaders *inadmissibles*. J. Guérif (*Le Monde*, 1/3/1948) insisted nevertheless on the need for central authority to check the allegations, suggesting complete disassociation if they were true. On the other hand, he recommended the most severe sanctions against those who initiated these accusations if they were false. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 83, who thought that the paper was not attempting to avoid a *politique de l'autruche*.

(60)

See *Le Monde*, 7/8/1948, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 82.

(61)

RENS, I., op. cit., p. 98; FAVROD, C-H., op. cit., p. 80, Julien, C.A., op. cit., p. 236 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 84.

(62)

What can clearly be inferred from the paper was that it was justifiable to rig elections to prevent those nationalists from getting into the Assembly. The pretext for that was that the current system allowed people "who did not reflect the profound aspirations of the masses" to be elected by means of physical pressure.

(63)

Using this pretext, *Le Monde* also raised doubts as to whether the Algerian electorate could have what is generally accepted to be an opinion which could be expressed through the ballot box:

A moins qu'il n'obéisse à des contraintes et à l'intimidation, l'électorat musulman a-t-il une opinion au sens où l'électeur français entend ce

mot.

Frederix, P., in *Le Monde*, 3/4/52, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 84.

(64)

One can imagine the outrage at a proclamation that the French Revolution should be stopped because the French people did not really know anything about public opinion or were not mature enough to express an opinion. This was, indeed, a very patronising and paternalist if not colonialist view. But then again, maybe this is not really surprising as more than half the adult male French population were disenfranchised by the constitution of 1791; and arguably the French revolution was "stopped" by Napoleon.

(65)

A convenient excuse was provided for accepting that the the development of the Algerian Muslims had not reached so-called electoral maturity. As opposed to the French system, where every "citizen" was more or less more informed than in Algeria, where

Il était très facile d'obtenir des élus qui ne reflétaient pas les désirs profonds de cette masse, par les moyens les plus grossiers du fanatisme aux pressions physiques.

Le Monde, 3/4/1952, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 84.

There was, however, no clear indication as to what parameters were used to find out and measure these profound aspirations of the masses. The paper was advocating on the one hand that the public must express themselves, and on the other that it was not mature enough to do so. Firchon did not resolve the contradiction in the paper's discourse.

(66)

Except for outlining the state of the different parties (see *Le Monde*, 26/10/48).

(67)

Si la loi s'intéresse aux affaires communes, il ne faudrait pas oublier les problèmes locaux, qui ne sont pas résolus et qui ne le seront pas tant que des gens auront faim ... seront malades de maladies que l'on peut soigner ... qui veulent s'instruire et ne le peuvent pas ... si ces problèmes se trouvaient délaissés ... renaîtrait des cendres ce qu'il fallait bien appeler voici deux trois ans le drame algérien.

See *Le Monde*, 23/10/1948 and also Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 86ff.

(68)

It was recognised that enormous efforts were needed in the economic sphere. The necessity of financing investment, especially by state and private financiers, was highlighted. Investment needed was estimated to be around thirty to forty milliard francs a year. The figure likely to be needed for 1948 was given as being twelve milliard, that of 1949 as eighteen (see *Le Monde*, 29/10/1945, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 88).

(69)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 88.

Politically, the paper saw a decline in the nationalist movements, and preferred Abbas's party's acceptance to work within the Statutes:

qu'il est nécessaire de servir les intérêts de la communauté musulmane plutôt que de lui réclamer un drapeau.

Economically, "new affluence succeeds a period of shortages... a will to work, some progress had been made, wheat production reaching 18 million quintals (the average ten years before the war), wine production at 12,6 million hectolitres (just over 8 million in 1947)". But Firchon also pointed out that exports were suffering from high costs (Firchon, T., op cit, p. 91). He also stated that the views of Messud were confused when he showed the pluses and minuses of this problem and that of capital flow between the two communities... .

Socially, *Le Monde* discerned progress in standards of nutrition, clothing and the general standard of living, but more so in the north than in the south (see *Le Monde* 31/5/49 and Firchon, T, op cit, p. 92).

(70)

Mandouze will come to the limelight later on in the Algerian war (see Chapter 13).

(71)

Mandouze argued that the south was under military rule and that in the north peace was only kept by the security forces, indicating explicitly that there was:

- an ongoing political war: "Life is organised around a handful of privileged people and elections give rise to shootings and imprisonment",

- as well as a religious, economic and social war: "the wine cartel can make prices double from one day to the next, strikes are defeated (*matées*) by imprisonment of strikers",

- and, finally, cultural war: "the refusal to give the Arabic language equal rank with French ... the so called civilisers have not managed to school all Muslim children".

See *Le Monde* 1/6/49 and Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 92-93.

(72)

Ce que ne nous dit pas Mandouze dans son émouvante et fumeuse charité de Chrétien progressiste, c'est comment s'y prendre pour tuer ce colonialisme abhoré.

Ibid.

(73)

The "proof" that things were not as Mandouze described them was supposedly to be found in the smiling faces (which had not been there three to four years previously) seen in towns and in the countryside, in Kabylia and in the South. If there were still some unhappy faces, he argued, this was not unique; unhappy faces could be found anywhere else in the world, even in Egypt, France and America.

Ibid.

(74)

When he asked if the journalist could be trusted (meaning both Messud and the paper), Firchon contented himself with

seeing the warm welcome received by President Auriol (and his measure of clemency for those who repent) as the "serum of truth".

Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 93, and *Le Monde*, 7/6/1949.

Firchon thought *Le Monde* to have been in favour of a constructive policy involving the implementation of the Statute and to have been incapable of contemplating anything destructive.

(75)

This point is also made about the 1954-1958 coverage throughout the following sections.

(76)

Firchon asked if there had not been *Une volonté de minimiser ces affaires?* The "pot was starting to boil slowly", with arms smuggling, occasional kidnapping, killings, hundreds of arrests and imprisonments, but it is true to say that, for the readers, the full significance of the May events would only come to light much later.

(77)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 95.

(78)

See *Le Monde*, 29/5/1949, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 97.

The paper also referred to promoting economic renewal. It highlighted the progress achieved and the need for investment and developments. It also paid attention to developments in the field of oil and the importance of the oil route through the Mediterranean (see Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 101).

(79)

Libya's independence was thought to be bad for France and Europe. *Le Monde* argued that if it were too late to change policy in Libya, this could still be a lesson for elsewhere:

L'octroi de l'indépendance à des populations arriérées, misérables, pulvérisées ne peut qu'exacerber les mouvements nationalistes africains.

See *Le Monde*, 27/12/51, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 119.

(80)

Described as the poorest country in the world. Ibid.

(81)

Le Monde addressed that fear, which became "a real problem" when there was talk of a UN debate on North Africa, by looking for a more realistic participation.

That was Firchon's conclusion on the basis of R. Letourneau's views in *Le Monde*, 6/10/1951.

(82)

As Firchon pointed out, *Le Monde* did not like Bourguiba's statement that "American soldiers liberated North Africa to give it a few months later to a handful of French nationalists and the French Military". Firchon wrote, manifestly in an attempt to smear the nationalist leader, that Bourguiba owed his freedom to German troops in November 1942 and that German archives revealed "dealings" between the leader of the Neo-Destour and the fascist authorities. See Firchon, T., op. cit.,

p. 119.

(83)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 120-121.

(84)

Events were beginning to become critical in the Maghreb. There was even a crisis in Morocco. (See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 102-3.) E. Sablier, the specialist of Middle Eastern affairs, accompanied a delegation of Egyptian journalists to investigate an alleged bombing of Fez by French artillery.

(85)

In *Le Monde*, 7 March 1951, and Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 103-105.

(86)

Arguably the paper fared no better.

(87)

This was achieved by way of speeches, press campaigns and congress resolutions, which threw a cloud over the legitimacy of the French presence. The journalist expressed pride in the balance sheet, while admitting that it could have been better, and declaring that, no matter how much progress was achieved, there would still be nationalist demands. Ibid.

(88)

Particularly as the Americans had their ear to the ground when it came to "nationalist noises" and in view of the multiplication of the number of consuls in Algeria, whose behaviour seemed strange enough for Sablier to question their "friendship" with France. Ibid.

(89)

An argument which is not taken seriously by Firchon, who pointed out that the Americans eliminated the North American Indians. This argument, it has to be said, was developed in the pages of *Le Monde* itself in the 1950's and Firchon might be using here an argument taken out of the paper against it.

Two more credible reasons are suggested, however, to explain American attitudes: the pursuit of economic interests in trying to substitute the U.S. for other powers, and the fight against Communism.

(90)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 105. But evidence shows, however, that of all French newspapers, *Le Monde* was the least likely to have an extremely favourable attitude towards the US. See the "neutralist" battle in Chapter 2.

(91)

Le Monde had continuously supported his policy of "firmness within legality" and his departure surprised the paper since his appointment had just been prolonged for six months.

See *Le Monde*, 21/2/51, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 107.

This departure took place in a "cloak and dagger" atmosphere, accusations of election rigging and transfer of officials refusing to implement directives, on which *Le Monde* chose

not to throw any light. Indeed, the readers would not have been aware of these events if their reading had been exclusively confined to *Le Monde*.

(92)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 109.

In the circumstances, the political side was neglected in favour of economic solutions, which were seen basically as an urgent need for large-scale investment (p. 110).

(93)

See *Le Monde*, 31 March and 10 June 1951.

(94)

See *Le Monde*, 13/2/51, p. 4.

(95)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 112.

The fact that there was hardly any nationalist representation in the Assembly, that the MTLD lost five seats, that the Communists lost two seats, that the UDMA (including its leader) had failed, were seen as positive:

Ce rapprochement entre les deux communautés algériennes dont les libéraux se réclament partisans dans le Premier Collège.

Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 113.

(96)

In *L'organisation des élections en Algérie*, *Le Monde*, 30/6/1951, p. 5.

(97)

This resulted in a situation where in certain areas candidates whose influence could not be questioned received no votes.

Vote rigging, the "Algerian fable", as it was known (*Le Monde*, 3/4/52, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 113) could easily be shown by some eloquent figures: in Algiers, where fraud was difficult to achieve, the official list received 142 votes out of 7,233. In a commune in Chelif, the official list received 10,285 votes out of 12,166 registered voters. In Djelfa there were no votes for any of the MTLD, UDMA or the Communists, but the official candidate obtained more votes than the total number of registered voters (respectively 800 votes and 500 voters); quoted by Firchon T., from ARON R., *Les Origines de la Guerre d'Algérie*. See also below.

(98)

However, the paper conceded that the problem should be dealt with and exposed (but, despite realising the danger, only at a local level):

Il faut avoir le courage de s'engager dans cette voie, celle qui risque le moins de se transformer en impasse tragique.

Le Monde, 30/6/1951, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 114.

(99)

In his article about the elections cantonales in the Constantine area (*Journée dans le bled constantinois: d'un bureau de vote à l'autre*), Blanchet stated that there was no serious irregularity anywhere. See *Le Monde*, 17/10/51, p. 5, and Fir-

chon, T., op. cit., p. 115.)

He went to great lengths to show that the country had to be understood in its particular context. The "cartesian" mind found it hardly surprising that a land-owner could get 434 of the 439 registered votes. Although not excluding the possibility of electoral fraud, he found it quite logical that his workers would vote for him. Using the example of latter-day-Corsica, and not wanting to give that characteristic exclusively to Algeria, Firchon recommended using, following Blanchet's argument, a *correctif sociologique*, a special magnifying glass similar to the *special spectacles* given to people watching three D films in order not to get too distorted a picture of Algeria.

Firchon did not consider the fact that elections were possible with only 53-54% or, on the other hand, percentages of 98 to 100% as extraordinary, but pointed out the disadvantage of these methods in that they lulled the Europeans into a false sense of security (seen as as the government's mistake).

This was also outlined by Oppermann, T., *Le Problème algérien*, op. cit., pp. 96 and 116.

(100)

This assumes, of course, that they did not have access to the facts, given the atmosphere of "peace" in Algeria described above.

(101)

These two problems were complicated in Firchon's view by religious factors and by the fact that one of the "religious leaders" was close to the elite, the other close to the proletariat or "lumpen-proletariat." See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 122-123.

(102)

And Firchon in his examination of Frederix's articles.

(103)

We are told that upon arriving in Algeria, the settlers coming from the mainland changed from being liberal to being conservative, adopting the "colonial complex". This, Firchon explained, was a mixture of feelings: superiority and more or less conscious fear, inversely proportional to social position.

(104)

Those who hide from reality (*[pratiquant la politique de l'autruche]*). See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 123.

This view was said to be quite widespread amongst settlers who claimed that they knew better than anyone and who (when this did not coincide with their point of view) thought that nobody could possibly understand anything about Algeria unless they lived there and had their experience of it (not unlike the Afrikaaners).

(105)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 123, quoting Frederix but not giving a precise reference.

It is amazing how self preservation (or the excuse for it)

seems to justify anything, even the oppression of the majority. One is entitled to ask how can the fear of a possible future of ill-treatment of a minority, the European one (based on examples taken centuries before), be said to have justified the current ill-treatment of a majority of Muslims on the land in which they had been born by a minority whose parents or themselves had settled there in the not so distant past, although, admittedly, some had been there for several generations and their fears were not totally groundless.

But there was worse to come for this majority. In trying to throw some light on the possible confusions and myths, on the brave type who lived in the countryside and the *mauvais meneur* who lived in the city and who had learnt French values in French schools, Frederix gave arguments to Firchon, who used *Le Monde's* views to back him up:

les massacreurs du Constantinois en 1945 n'ont pas tué parce nous leur avons enseigné la philosophie des Lumières. Ils avaient l'estomac creux et ils étaient analphabètes, he wrote, leur crédit (that of those who had been to school) deviendrait-il si nocif s'ils n'avaient devant eux une masse ignorante dont il est trop facile d'exciter les instincts primitifs.

Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 124.

(106)

Referring to Jacques Servier's *Adieu Djebels* and accepting the existence of famine, but stating that as far as the land taken over by the French:

... Une bonne partie des terres étaient des terres que les Algériens ne cultivaient pas ... l'exemple le plus connu étant la plaine de la Mitidja, plaine jadis marécageuse....

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 125.

(107)

Quoting *Le Monde* (5/4/1952) in approval, which stated that Algeria was no longer capable of feeding its inhabitants, Firchon also examined some palliative measures such as voluntary immigration of Algerians to France. This potentially affected about 50,000 Algerians a year, which was constantly denounced by *Le Monde: Un péril national ... l'immigration incontrôlée des travailleurs nord africains* (the following references were also given by T. Firchon: 7/12/1948, 7/6/1949, 16/9/1949, 12/12/1951, 16/7/1953, 21/7/1953 and 6/11/1953), notwithstanding the double benefit of immigration- expatriating an unemployed person and, most of the time, alleviating misery in so far as the immigrant sent a large part of his earnings back to North Africa. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 126.

(108)

Le Monde, 4/4/1952.

(109)

But this argument was used not for but against independence -because, it was claimed, given the state of its resources, Algeria was not self-sufficient.

(110)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 124.

(111)

25 milliards loaned by France to Algeria on her 130 milliards budget. Wine exports represented 51 out of 113 milliards in 1950 and 43 out of 135 milliards in 1951.

(112)

Le Monde was quoted but no reference was given.

(113)

The remedy, however, was not so much to find new land as to increase the yield of the land belonging to the Muslims:

Là, il y'a d'immenses progrès à faire ... c'est une extension limitée dans l'espace et dans le temps au lieu que la multiplication des naissances qui ne l'est pas ... le mal profond de l'Algérie ne se situe pourtant pas ailleurs.

See *Le Monde*, 5/4/1952, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 126.

(114)

To use deposits of coal, iron, copper, manganese, oil; and the need to exploit solar energy, to develop technology, to inject fresh capital and for the State to continue subsidising the means of communication (two railway lines) if the development of that town were to continue. See *Le Monde*, 15/4/1953, and 25/9/1953, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 129.

(115)

As Firchon pointed out:

Ce pays déficitaire de 80 milliards de son commerce extérieur [doit] exporter autre chose que des produits agricoles, ne peut se sauver que par un vigoureux effort d'industrialisation.

See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 130-131 and *Le Monde*, 25/9/53.

But it is doubtful whether the suggestion that proper industrialisation would not compete with metropolitan products was a serious proposition, unless industrialisation was used to mean only mineral exploitation, as seen above.

(116)

A difference of mentality, of civilisation, highlighted by *Le Monde* between the indigenous and the European populations, as well as an inertia that "countered all the efforts made" (Taillemagre).

Le Monde's Fabreluce had also attacked *les féodaux de la vigne* who reinvested their profit in an already "plethoric" production. It was because it felt that earlier opportunities had been wasted that *Le Monde* invited changes. See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 133-134.

(117)

This was especially in the field of taxation, where no special effort was made to make the economically strong pay more. See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 141-42.

(118)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 135.

(119)

This came in the form of request made by Maurice Duverger for a dialogue to agree on the aims to be achieved and on the stages of their implementation. See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 138-139.

(120)

(...) *l'influence perturbatrice de l'Orient ... la manoeuvre utilisée n'est pas sans analogie avec celle que le communisme adopte à l'égard du capitalisme.*

See *Le Monde*, 10/4/1954, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 148.

(121)

See *Le Monde*, 13/3/54.

(122)

As Firchon pointed out, there was even opposition of views between J.Taillemagre (*Le Monde*, 22/1/54/, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 132.), recommending closing the gap in yield, and R. Montagne, who advocated "a new Muslim colonisation of vacant land." (Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 148-49). He was concerned with black spots like *le prolétariat misérable des villes et des centres d'Algérie*. See *Le Monde*, 15/3/54.

(123)

See *Le Monde*, 8/5/54, for a letter by J. Madaule, who went on a fact-finding mission with a number of personalities, including F.Mitterrand, criticising health care, the lack of educational facilities and the inadequacy of efforts made towards improving the well-being of the security forces, and the baneful influence of economic interests on government policies in Algeria. Firchon argued against J.Madaule, pointing out that the proportion of Muslim children in schools went up from 11.5% in 1945 to 18% in 1955, that there were 409 policemen and 200 CRS for Mulhouse and only 210 policemen for the Algerian town of Bône (similar in population size, 100.000). Madaule's bias, Firchon tells us, coincided with a certain movement in *Le Monde* which was to criticise police activity in Morocco (not in Algeria because that was not the case yet), for instance when Jaeger referred to its repressive role.

The paper also published letters by the nationalist leader, Abbas, on the links between France and the Arab world (See *Le Monde*, 1/8/54.), and on Arab solidarity. (See *Le Monde*, 15/8/54 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 155.)

It also reported the in-fighting inside the MTLD between Messali and Lahouel and the possibility of these factions internationalising the problem, but did not think the impact on Algeria would be immediate.

(124)

See C. Julien, *Le Monde*, 20/7/54, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 154.

(125)

de croire qu'en réglant l'un on pouvait éliminer l'autre.

(126)

See end of Chapter 2.

(127)

He did not focus, for instance, on the events that led to an article or which were omitted, and the reasons for omission. Similarly, he paid no attention to elements of assessment, to the value of the information given, to the importance devoted to it, or any evolution -and it is these considerations and the theoretical principles from which they derive that should have directed his research. He did, however, provide some answers to these questions -but the work entirely lacks rigour.

(128)

This is quite untenable and unscientific given readers'different backgrounds, values, beliefs etc.

(129)

Nous n'avons pas le droit de ne pas comprendre que tout se tient: Indochine, Madagascar, Algérie, Tunisie, toute L'Union Française

Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 3, and *Le Monde*, 10/4/1947.

(130)

When he wrote, for instance, "if Algeria disappears (one dares assume from the pages of the paper) it remains ever present in the minds of the reader" - because of what is referred to as the "possible repercussions, rapprochements, contrasts and allusions".

Here one cannot help wondering if Firchon remains true to the basis on which he started his study. Either he is relying on what the reader sees and reads, or he is relying on his guesses or simply what the journalists tell him.

(131)

In concluding his description of the paper's evolution and its 1951 U-turn, Firchon wrote that the paper was in favour of the Statutes while attacking some of "landed interests" (*quelques coups de griffe aux féodaux*).

(132)

The proof he advances for showing the seriousness of the paper was his statement that *Le Monde* had informed the readers of the dangers of the nationalist developments.

(133)

No evidence was produced here either.

(134)

And he claims to have verified it in other dissertations on Morocco and Black Africa, but he did not make his case through *Le Monde*.

(135)

See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 163. This also could be seen as a contradiction in the thesis. How is that realisation to be assessed if the reader does not clearly see it.

(136)

He had to admit that the real "U-turn" (*virage*) would take place after the "tomato welcome" of Guy Mollet (6 February 1956), when the new Prime Minister was given a hostile reception in Algiers. His proof, even then, was not very tangible as he merely quoted the paper stating, on 7 February, *ne refuser-*

ait pas au président du conseil l'appui dû à la sincérité et au courage. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 163.

(137)

He probably meant seven as the period covered went up to 1954 and the Statutes had been voted since 1947.

(138)

Firchon had to concede that when the Algerian Assembly was dissolved in 1956 by Lacoste, it had not even started to tackle the basic problem of social security. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 162.

(139)

But it could be pointed out, as it will be later for other personalities, that these were two opinions expressed which did not involve the responsibility of the paper. Even if they did, these were in fact the only two opinions over a period of twenty years. So many opposing points of views were expressed and so many reports (similar to those referred to elsewhere) had denied them.

CHAPTER FIVE: NOTES

(1)

See Chapter 1 on objectivity and Chapter 2 on *Le Monde*, and the many statements by Fauvet and others in the paper on the subject.

(2)

See also Chapter 8.

(3)

See Chapter 11.

(4)

These were subsequently read and discussed in political circles. If the views and ideas expressed in these publications did not have a direct bearing on policy, they did at least form an integral part of the ongoing debate; and they would presumably have had some impact on the thinking of the time.

(5)

A great deal of importance was given by *Le Monde* to the writings of the Army and people associated with it, Marshalls Juin and Ely, for instance.

Le Monde reported the publication of books by important commanders of the French army and reviewed these books outlining the views of the different authors.

In its perception of the nature of the problem and its solution, the Army insisted essentially on maintaining Algeria under France and advocated methods for doing so. Some of these utterances, of course, were not in conformity with the government line.

(6)

Le Maghreb en feu, Plon, Paris, 1957, and *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, p. 2.

(7)

The paper also noted his doubts about the wisdom of the policies of the day when he thought the response of the government inadequate and the promises of elections three months after the restoration of order dangerous.

Nous finirons bien par tomber dans les pièges grossiers qu'on voit déjà se tendre derrière un <<cessez le feu>> obtenu sans garanties préalables, et bientôt suivi d'élections prétendues libres que nos adversaires, dans le vide administratif qui n'est pas encore comblé, auraient toute la liberté de préfabriquer.

Marshal Juin did not object to rigged elections as such but resented the "possibility of the other side doing it". The system of "One man one vote" (single College) was not accepted as this would ensure the domination of the Europeans by the "Muslims".

These ideas were in no way put to the test by the paper. Indeed, the paper found comfort in that the colonial venture was a "positive thing" and "in conformity with history".

The negative side of colonialism was brushed aside:

Pouvait-on nous faire grief de la stagnation des niveaux de vie alors qu'elle était due essentiellement à la surnatalité provoquée par notre action économique et sociale...?

Independence was obviously out of the question as it was a solution of "abandonment" which would lead to the demise and the slow death of France:

(...) résignée à la mort lente des peuples qui ne savent plus réagir ni se défendre, ne rejoigne sans plus attendre, le troupeau bêlant des neutralistes de l'Europe résiduelle.

(8)

The list included "innate taste for contradiction", for fighting and barbarism, "forgetfulness of good deeds", the lack of gratitude and the development of nationalist agitation.

(9)

The foreign factors included external conspiracy involving panarab, panislamic movements, religious fanaticism, intervention of the Asian nations, the US and the Soviet Union.

(10)

These views were in no way unique in the sense that it was the predominant thinking accepted by the paper which recognised in it and in others (Granval Ma mission au Maroc and Boyer de la Tour's Vérités sur l'Afrique du Nord) Lyautey's traditional thesis -rejecting any conception that the colonialist system was the source of the problem.

The paper did point out, however, that in Tunisia demands for independence preceded the emergence of the Soviets; that the creation of the Arab League came after the birth of Moroccan nationalism and that French schools, universities and even the army, with their revolutionary ideas, could have had a more important role (no direct reference or mention of Algeria was made here).

Le Monde wondered whether a large part in the troubles could not be attributed to the disillusionment of a disinherited "miserable" population to whom promises were made and never kept rather than the colonialist system, and whether by pushing systematically these nationalists towards Cairo, and Moscow, there was not a risk of actually finding them there.

Le Monde did not question the distinction he made between real and false nationalists, nor his severity towards the French in metropolitan France who consolidated and extended the agitators' hostile attitude to their country -this "strange mixture of people of good faith, conscientious objectors, defeatists and professional traitors".

(11)

Le Monde did not question either his belief that "Morocco and Tunisia could be integrated into an Eurafrika" and that "federalism was no panacea for Algeria."

Even more surprisingly, *Le Monde* never flinched at the suggestion that "our" democracy was not for export, and that a jurist may find an appropriate formula.

Juin declared that he was no jurist but he was legally minded enough not to recommend a single college and to speak about representation or the lack of it. And here, another contradiction, between the majority not being allowed to vote

in a single college ("democracy not for export") and the statement that these people "want France", is not explained.

(12)

With the added recommendation that the French military presence should be accompanied by a political action which would allow some indigenous participation.

Lyautey's book (see above) was said to be developing a traditional thesis developed by Soustelle in *Aimée et souffrante Algérie*, also published by Plon (Paris) in 1956. This theme was also developed by Marshal Juin.

(13)

On prendra connaissance avec fruit des réactions d'un grand administrateur à la naissance d'un nationalisme aujourd'hui exacerbé.

See *Le Monde*, 20/6/57, p. 7.

(14)

This new kind of struggle, to which the Western World was being confronted in the new atomic age, was repeatedly evoked by the army when dealing with the enemy in "North Africa". See *Le Monde*, 7/3/57, p. 4, and 15/3/57, p. 2.

One would have expected some discernment from the paper when the mould did not fit snugly around a predominantly peasant-based, illiterate and profoundly Islamic movement. The nationalists were more likely to carry a copy of the Coran than Mao's Red Book. See below.

(15)

The case of General Bollardière is well-known, see below.

(16)

A chaque échelon le commandement doit avoir défini nettement sa position... plus que jamais ...doit répondre à une vocation essentielle qui est de prendre à son compte les choix et les responsabilités, d'en décharger ses subordonnés et de leur donner des missions simples et sans équivoques.

Le Monde, 20/6/57, p. 7.

(17)

[Ils ne devraient pas être] décontenancés par des aspects qui leur semblent relever plus du pouvoir civil administratif ou judiciaire que du pouvoir militaire... certains peuvent être tentés de se replier sur des errements anciens ou de donner le change par de spectaculaires manifestations. Mais le fait est là: la guerre s'est élargie en même temps qu'elle s'est approfondie. La guerre révolutionnaire nécessite un changement d'optique et un changement de style...

Ibid.

(18)

L'implacable jugement de l'histoire [l'] excusera (l'armée) d'avoir connu un certain malaise et certains scrupules avant de s'adapter. Il ne l'absoudrait pas d'avoir, quand le sort de la civilisation est en jeu, essayé de se dérober.

Ibid.

(19)

Or any prior limit being established either:

(..) *il faut que le chef s'engage corps et âme, armé de ces trois vertus militaires fondamentales: l'autorité, l'obéissance, la discipline intellectuelle.*

Ibid.

(20)

For the fighter the task is a simple art of fighting and obedience and for Chiefs of Staff to take over, define their role and carry it out.

In *Le général Ely définit le rôle du chef dans la guerre révolutionnaire*, *Le Monde*, 20/6/57, p. 7.

(21)

When the paper reviewed, in its *Bonnes Feuilles* section, *Les vraies raisons de la démission du général de Bollardière*, R. Barberot's book *Malaventure en Algérie*. In *Le Monde*, 7-8/7/57, p. 3; see also *Army malaise* in the following pages.

(22)

He provided public opinion with the real reasons behind Bollardière's resignation.

(23)

Debates and letters of soldiers previously drafted to serve in Algeria. *Ceux d'Algérie* was published in 1957. It was based on a census which returned only 18 questionnaires expressing reservations on the activity of the French army in Algeria out of 3,200. The article was signed A.J. in *Le Monde*, 25/12/57, p. 3.

(24)

In order to counter the ever more frequent accusations of torture and misbehaviour by the Army. This book and debates were presented as being objective and as sincere as other testimonies which recounted a completely different experience.

(25)

His statements expressed the view that the army was not totally convinced that "pacification" had been properly thought out and that it needed some form of political continuity for the long term effort required. The need he felt to appeal for a new Lincoln (seen in de Gaulle) as the solution, not only for the Algerian problem but for the regime as a whole, was also echoed, and quite positively, by the paper which stated that his analyses and the conclusions he drew could not be read without interest. But the paper did not share his belief in the inevitability of his conclusions as to the outcome. Michelet, E., *Contre la guerre civile*, Plon, Paris, 1957, and *Le Monde*, 25/12/57, p. 3.

(26)

Planchais, J., *Le Malaise de l'Armée*, Plon, 1957.

Though a civilian, Planchais was presented as quite knowledgeable about army matters. His book was seen as an attempt

to understand the army before accusing it, or excusing it, in an effort to bridge the gap which was developing between a badly led nation and an army without directives, and to find the reasons for that.

(27)

Le Monde regularly published *communiqués* of the most senior appointments, news of draft and the various age groups concerned, measures of exemption, details of temporary exemptions and moratoria. See *Le Monde*, 11-12/8/57, p. 3.

There were also reports of Conferences of high-ranking officers (*Le Monde*, 24/6/57, p. 5.), restructuring measures (*Le Monde*, 23/4/57, p. 5.) etc.

(28)

Such as the reduction from 15 to 12 subdivisions, priorities being decided and decisions taken (*Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 4.), official ceremonies (decoration of a 12-year-old girl for bravery, in *Le Monde*, 12/7/57, p. 5).

The editorial team also found room in the paper for reporting various movements of troops (reinforcements) from France to Algeria (*Le Monde*, 19/5/55, p. 1), from Morocco to Algeria (*Le Monde*, 7/8/57), and inside Algeria itself (out of Algiers, *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, p. 2; back into Algiers *Le Monde*, 12/6/57, p. 2).

(29)

For instance, the advantages given to some categories and the financial bonuses offered, see *Le Monde* 10/5/57, p. 4, and 27-28/1/57, p. 3; low interest loans (1,5-3,5%) for those opting to settle in Algeria providing thus a continuation of the policy of *l'épée et la charrue*, the measures taken to encourage individual draftees to settle in Algeria after demobilisation (*Le Monde*, 8/8/57, p. 4) -these all found their way into the paper.

(30)

There was also a regular flow of information concerning the troops' budget and funds and military *communiqués* were commonplace. The example of the 1955/56 Army budget used here is but an example of confusion for the readers.

The article on 19/5/55 read as follows:

Le budget militaire pourrait être soumis au parlement cette semaine... Le Général Koenig s'efforce d'obtenir une "rallonge" de son budget en vue de financer les opérations militaires en Afrique du Nord et la réorganisation de la défense nationale (...) mais les crédits sont limités." In Le Monde, 5/5/55.

When the paper took the opportunity to report the adoption of a military budget for the year. It pointed out that the increase of 30 milliard from 970 in 1954 to 1,000 in 1955 was to include all defence expenditure in France and outside it and explained it in the following terms:

Une vingtaine de milliards ... relèvement de soldes ... enfin quelques milliards ont été réservés pour le financement des opérations militaires en Afrique du Nord ... Comme les dépenses en Indochine iront en diminuant les sommes disponibles pour la métropole, l'Afrique du Nord et les autres T.O.M.

progresseront.

See *Le Monde* 19/5/55, p. 4.

This apparently neutral report was trying to understate a major fact: since France was no longer involved in Indochina, as it had been, this would have meant that the increase in military investment would have to be channelled elsewhere (not in the near future, as the report stated, but there and then), and the main, if not the only, area requiring particular funds at the time was North Africa and Algeria in particular.

In that way, increased involvement and spending, representing a major shift in policy, were made to look inconspicuous in the terms of that report. It resembled any piece of news item that would be reported without requiring any particular comment. A quick look at the opposite page, page 5, which was full of military news and measures, would give the alert reader a clearer view of things to come. *Le Monde*, 19/5/55, p. 5.

A month later, the figures appearing on page 12 were the following: 996 milliard of military expenditure plus 35 milliard of American aid for the "*corps expéditionnaire d'Indochine*", 937 milliard would be for metropolitan France, 44 milliard for the overseas territories (T.O.M.) and 15 milliard in wage increases. In other words, the style and the position of the article made sure that the information was still there but hidden and confused -the increase was 61 milliard instead of the 30 milliard previously announced. The paper still did not account for the way 35 milliard would be spent. See *Le Monde*, 12/6/55, p. 12.

(31)

Such as announcements concerning leave (*Le Monde*, 27-28/1/57, p. 3, and 10-11/3/57) and liberation dates (*Le Monde*, 26/4/57, p. 5, and 30/8/57, p. 4).

(32)

See *Le Monde's* article by P. Herreman 11/7/57, pp. 2-3.

At times the paper even requested the opinion of army officers on particular issues. Premonitory statements about army rebellion (as will be illustrated by the discussion in the latter part of the chapter and as exemplified in the various coups of the Army in Algeria in the Fourth and Fifth Republics -May/June 1958 and February/April 1961-) could be found in *Le Monde's* reports. For instance, when the paper indicated the response of officers as to their possible attitude if it were thought that Algeria was about to be abandoned, there was a scent of revolt in the air.

Au point que lorsqu'on pose brutalement à des officiers la question: <<Que feriez-vous si la métropole adoptait en Algérie une solution que vous pourriez considérer comme un abandon?>>. Ils répondent:<<Nous serions pris dans un déchirant dilemme: ou bien accepter une nouvelle humiliation, ou bien nous allier ou nous compromettre avec ces colons que nous désavouons, parce qu'ils nous ont conduits à cette guerre>>. In Contre la propagande et les pressions du FLN, des officiers livrent bataille pour la <<conquête des coeurs>>

by P. Herreman in *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3.

Declarations of high-ranking hardliners in the officer corps who supported repression (Weygand salle Pleyel in *Le Monde* 31/5/57, p. 6) and various statements of policy, non-reduction of men and indication of the army's intention (as well as the

use of the right of pursuit in Tunisia in *Le Monde* 3/8/57, p. 5) were also among the items included.

Le Monde did not omit from its pages the various motions of active (St-Cyr, *Le Monde*, 17/4/57, p. 4) and reservist officers (*Le Monde* 29/5/57, p. 3) in praise and support for the army and its role.

(33)

At times *Le Monde* would resort to taking its information from interviews given to other newspapers (General Salan to *La Dépêche Quotidienne* on 20/3/57). These reports were used to give a balance sheet of military affairs (*Le Monde* 23/3/57, p. 2) and paint a very rosy picture.

The paper also showed more willingness to accept the official position on Algeria, especially when stating that partial and discontinued successes could only be maintained with the massive troops military presence which made these "successes" possible. See *Le Monde*, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(34)

From a mere 50,000 men on 1 November 1954, the number of troops rose steadily to over half a million men. See Horne, A. (1977), op cit. , pp. 96, 113, 124, 151.

Le Monde gave the figure of 450,000 men in each of Algeria and France (25/7/57, p. 1), but it was commonly known that that figure was a moderate estimate.

(35)

Le Monde, 20/5/55. Further prominent headings read *6 bataillons envoyés en renfort, gendarmerie* (1,700 sent or about to be), *Rappel des disponibles*.

In an article on the "recall of the reservists" (*disponibles*) published on the front page that day, *Le Monde* put the number of security forces in Algeria at 100,000 men. It is not clear whether this indicated a desire to reassure public opinion that the government was putting in the necessary numbers, or whether the increase was considered to be important enough to warrant headlines on the front page. There was even confusion in the figures given within the articles (100,000, 40,000 and 20,000), which may have been an error or could be construed as an attempt subsequently to play down the figures involved. In any case, it was evident that the number of troops in Algeria was on the increase despite the contradictory reinforcements figures given by the paper, 40,000 on 20/5/55 and 20,000 on 21/5/55.

(36)

When the army called for increased troops support, the reports of *Le Monde* did not differ from the official viewpoint. Indeed, it went deeper than that. For instance, in a section on the "gendarmerie" (*la gendarmerie et sa mission d'apaisement*), *Le Monde's* reports suggested that it was thought that bringing in the "mainland gendarmes", although not productive in the immediate future, would be very efficient in the long term.

"La gendarmerie coopère non seulement au maintien de l'ordre et à l'apaisement des esprits (whose might one ask?), mais, dans la mesure où elle <<colle au pays>> et à la vie locale elle constitue un réseau de renseignements <<bruts>> de grand intérêt.

(In *Le Monde*, 21/5/55)

It is difficult to distinguish between the journalist's thinking from that of the military strategist (or, indeed, from the intelligence officer who would also argue that a larger army deployed across the country would be useful in the long run) in search of information gathering, or what is even more appropriate, that of the paratroopers, involved in the war and trying to find answers to the questions being asked at the time: who are the troublemakers and how best to deal with them. The paper was cautious though and indicated acclimatisation of the troops would be a process running over some long years. See also various references above.

(37)

Even towards the end of 1957 it had referred to it as such only indirectly and only on a few occasions. See *Le Monde* 19/1/55, 27/10/55, December 1956 and 12/7/57, p. 5. This was symptomatic of many reporters and observers at the time and even in later conflicts ("the troubles" in Northern Ireland, for instance.)

A foreign observer of Algeria even used the "war without a name" as a title of his book. Talbot, J., The War without a name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962, Alfred A.Knopf, New York, 1980.

The title, "a Savage War of Peace," chosen by A.Horne (1977) is but another example of the ambivalence of the discourse.

(38)

les opérations ont débuté à sept heures ce matin précédées de bombardements et de mitraillages de l'aviation et par les tirs de l'artillerie,

See *Le Monde*, 21/1/55, and also *Le Monde*, 23/4/55.

(39)

The expression is found in many of *Le Monde's* reports. See, for instance, 19.1.55, 27.10.55 and 14/12/56, p. 5.

In tune with official ideology, it is significant that Jean Planchais, who joined *Le Monde's* team at an early stage and who became an army historian as well, travelled through Algeria with the army and described the fighting as being against terror, against the 250 *salopards* who were terrorising 700.000 inhabitants. See *Le Monde* 27 and 29/10/55 and subsequent reports.

(40)

The reader could be forgiven for asking the question that if the whole country had not taken up arms and a real war were not taking place, then why was an action on that scale required. Was it just 200 *salopards*, a few extremists as the official terminology would have us believe? As it was to be revealed later, operations of this kind were aimed at bombing civilian villages. These were mostly inhabited by peaceful civilians, possibly infiltrated by "rebels", that very same majority which was supposed to be opposed to the "extremists," according to the French propaganda machine.

(41)

Le Monde, 27 and 29/10/55.

(42)

Il apparut alors aux officiers que la longue négligence des pouvoirs publics, autant que le comportement de certains colons ou "petits blancs", suffisaient à expliquer la naissance d'une insurrection qu'on leur demandait soudain -après cent vingt-cinq ans de "présence française"- de réprimer.

On concevra l'amertume qui s'empara des meilleurs d'entre eux devant cette tâche ingrate.

In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5.

In another article exploring the countryside, Mannoni had previously explained that he had found a lack, an absence of administration which could be accounted for by the large size of the country since "civil servants disliked visiting the area or... did not have the means to react" and by the ease of the *contrôle exercé par les animateurs de la rébellion*. But he did not explain the reasons of this contradiction between the difficulty found by some (the French administration) and the ease found by others (the FLN) in administrating and controlling the territory -as that probably would have led him to conclude that one was "natural" and the other somewhat less so.

On the contrary, he developed the idea still further by stating that the army searching for *fellagas* ("bandits", see Chapter 6) *rencontra des administrés en quite d'administrateurs*. He also failed to explain the logic of his statements describing the area he was visiting as being one of those fitting the model. *In Le Monde, 11/12/56, p. 5.*

(43)

Les officiers qui condamnent la fallacieuse application de la <<politique d'assimilation>> -cause de la rébellion leur semble-t-il- ne voient dans le <<nationalisme algérien>> qu'une tentative, explicable mais injustifiable, de sécession. Ils se sont donc efforcés sans hésitation de la combattre. Parfois, pour eux, pour les soldats dont ils ont la charge, c'était aussi une question très simple de vie ou de mort.

In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5.

(44)

Ibid.

(45)

insensibles au dénuement de ceux qu'ils côtoyaient sans chercher à les connaître et -inconsciemment souvent-... de les avoir humiliés.

The other factor taken into account here, was the "surprising" *misère* of the Muslims that had been "discovered" by these soldiers who were the first Frenchmen from France to find themselves somewhere away from the main road in an "unknown Algeria."

Here the reader was gratified by a quote from Soustelle's *Armée et souffrante Algérie*, Plon, 1956.

En premier lieu j'avais été frappé, attristé, ému par misère profonde de ce pays et de son peuple.

In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5. See also Chapters 8 and 10.

(46)

Other Muslims were also blamed for the troubles. One of the articles of the series stated:

*D'autres maisons construites par l'armée s'éri-
gent encore au Khroubs où les hommes n'oublient pas
qu'un de leurs coreligionnaires policier -blamé et
déplacé- leur imprima sur la paume de la main ou sur
le front un cachet à encre pour pouvoir plus sûre-
ment procéder à une opération de contrôle d'iden-
tité...*

See *Le Monde*, 12/12/56, p. 5.

(47)

The picture of the army given by *Le Monde* illustrates the desire to show that the army had integrated itself into Algerian society and that it had become a fourth community in its midst.

It is worth noting also that to add the army as a fourth community to the Muslim, Jewish and Catholic ones within Algerian society was equivalent to playing down the polarisation between the people who saw themselves as being oppressed and those whom they saw as being the oppressor and its backers. *Le Monde*, 11/12/56.

Another idea conveyed through reports was that this army was making a lot of sacrifices, taking the initiative "at a price", and remaining present despite the danger, the "mines being planted" and the "blood being shed".

(48)

About the towns and cities where their influence could not (until later) be as important as it was in the *douars* (small groups of countryside dwellings inhabited by related people), and its contempt for some of the indigenous intelligentsia:

*(..) villes (..) pleines de demi-intellectuels,
de licenciés en droit, donc d'avocailleurs et de
politicards qui ne seront jamais ni rebelles ni
fidèles.*

The army's apprehension over the uncertainty of the *bouleversements gouvernementaux* and their consequences as well as the warm welcome that its members had given to the idea that the country should be placed in its hands for five years were also highlighted in the reports of that day. See *Le Monde*, 14/12/56, p. 5.

(49)

The paper also admired the taking of 500.000 aerial photographs (the photographic section of Toghma (sic.) producing between 80.000 and 100.000 photographs a day) which would enable the production of new maps, both more up to date and more appropriate, making knowledge of the terrain easier and more readily accessible. In *Le Monde*, 29/10/55.

It requested that the army be adapted to the fighting in Algeria. Some of its reports, suggested at times, especially at the beginning, that the forces used were inadequate.

*(...) Il ne fait aucun doute que l'action des
forces de l'ordre s'est révélée assez peu efficace
(..) opérations militaires menées avec des troupes
insuffisamment légères pour la guérilla.*

The report was by Blanchet in *Le Monde*, 8/6/55.

A year into the conflict, Planchais shared that view when he thought that the means used were not suitable for the prevailing conditions. He described the Fourth Motorised division, for example, as an "atomic age unit thrown into the medieval atmosphere of North Africa." He recounted what an officer had told

him:

Nous sommes un marteau pilon envoyé pour écraser une puce. Et bien entendu nous ne l'applatissons pas. Elle a toujours largement le temps de sauter de l'enclume.

Highlighting the need for American aid, Planchais stated that more was needed in terms of aircraft and helicopters. See *Le Monde*, 29/10/55.

(50)

That it was not just a question of terrain but also of the nature of the fighting -as the troops's role was to fight as well as protect a population scattered around a big and sparsely populated country.

He also argued that:

"opposer la guérilla à la guérilla" suppose la transformation complète des unités ou la reconstruction de cette armée d'Afrique dont le gouvernement déplorait la disparition dès novembre 1954.

In *Le Monde*, 5-6/2/56.

(51)

Reality proved otherwise; see Chapter 14.

(52)

There was an evident dismissal of the Indochinese parallel. At the end of twenty-five months of "a struggle," which was "for a long time undecided" (only then the reader was told), Eugène Mannoni asked if this was the end? Then referring to the definite "Yes" of the Minister-Resident, he wrote:

Peut-être songera-t-on malgré soi, devant cette assurance -à cause de cette assurance- à l'Indochine, et aux promesses d'une victoire qui ne cessera de reculer jusqu'à Dien-Bien-Phu?

The contents of this article and the title of this section *Des <<mauvais souvenirs>>* tended to suggest to other media and public opinion (in case they thought Algeria was another Indochina and that France was on the verge of another Dien Bien Phu) that that was not the case.

It would be wrong to think of Indochina and Dien Bien Phu, he replied to "those who despite themselves expressed that fear." He was also keen to state that the rebels did not control the field, that there was no area that was inaccessible to the army and its helicopters, and that to look for any area from which the rebels could launch any reconquest of Algeria would be in vain.

One can clearly see the length to which *Le Monde's* journalists went to promote that viewpoint as a mere glance at the map for 1956 given on p. 143 in Opperman, T., *Le Problème algérien*, Maspero, 1961, based on *Time Magazine* and *Deutsche Kommentare*, gives a very different picture with zones under total rebel control, zones under partial control and zones exposed to rebel attacks.

Le Monde dismissed as nonsense any analogy that could be made between "pacification in Algeria" and "the war in Indochina" on the grounds of proximity to France, outside help and the number of troops involved.

The paper stated that French troops had pushed back the rebels and eliminated any possibility of incursion by them or of any *déferlement populaire*. Then, describing the troops' other victory, the paper went on to emphasise the "psychological

results" achieved in certain areas through using the military as administrators, doctors and teachers. In this instance, the Indochinese model appeared to be useful for the journalist. Although he stated in the opening section that any analogy in this field was unfounded, he wrote:

L'expérience indochinoise avait enseigné ...certains officiers qu'au milieu du XXème siècle ... qu'on ne pouvait se borner à affronter un adversaire aux moyens d'une action extrêmement diversifiés sur le seul terrain des armes.

Le Monde 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

Despite the contradiction, and the failure to prove its case in trying to differentiate between the two conflicts, *Le Monde* did attempt to distinguish unjustifiably between the two very similar situations of colonial domination which were being eroded and progressively destroyed by a nationalist struggle. The parallel with Indochina was used when it suited the paper to attract the sympathy and support of the anti-communist sections of public opinion in the conduct of the war. It was rejected when the comparison could be seen to be detrimental as to the possible solution of the conflict.

(53)

As illustrated above.

One of the most articulate exposition of the theory on the Algerian episode was produced by Colonel Charles Lacheroy. See Scenario-type de Guerre révolutionnaire, *Revue des Forces terrestres*, October 1956, pp. 25-29, not applicable to Indochina, and also Kelly, G.A., Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in crisis 1947-1962, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1965, p. 107 ff.

(54)

General Zeller on the rapprochement between civilians and soldiers. See *Le Monde*, 4/4/57, p. 4.

(55)

These and other reports indicated that the forces of order should know that a Communist presence, alleged or otherwise, was not essential for that kind of war to take place. The military sources went on to reject poverty and economic deprivation as a secondary factor in the conflict. They even suggested that reforms were unadvisable as they would be turned down by the adversary because they would undermine the appeal of the war. It was further argued that if concessions were made, they would only increase opposition. Administrative, political, economic and psychological action was recommended as well as "intelligence gathering" and training. Democracy was not on the agenda when the question was addressed, but rather some "moral improvement" was thought to be desirable.

See *Le Monde*, 17/4/57, p. 5.

(56)

une des plus infestée d'Algérie. On ne circulait plus sans risques sur les routes, les fermes brûlaient toutes les nuits les attentats se multipliaient dans certaines rues, les fellagas se promenaient en uniforme en plein jour.

Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.

(57)

Through the big "poster campaign" requesting the population to rally to the French and asserting that France would never abandon them.

Then describing the methods used, and deliberately forgetting other military means, Herreman stated that propaganda was the main one ("even if some were reluctant to use it everybody recognised its efficacy"). This propaganda was said to be in written form -in newspapers, leaflets, posters. However, a major obstacle was the illiteracy of the people: the best tool remaining was to be oral propaganda -circulated through loud-speakers, films and so forth, "telling the people the "fell-agas want only their misery".

In *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3. *Contre la propagande et les pressions du FLN des officiers livrent bataille pour la <<conquête des coeurs>>*, by P.Herreman.

Quoting a colonel, Herreman reported :

If "we" convince the Algerian population that we are not going to abandon them, "Algeria would fall at the drop of a hat," (*d'un seul coup va basculer de notre côté*).

When the paratroopers came in February, he wrote, for one and a half months they "gathered information," and now:

(...) *the people in charge state that the rebels' infrastructure had been destroyed, that the rebels had been sent back to the caves and they only came out every now and again to cut down a few posts.*

(58)

Postulating along the lines of Clausewitz that war was but the continuation of politics by other means (and vice versa), and using Lenin's and Mao's thoughts and theories on the subject, *Le Monde* stated that the "rebels" had also learned about revolutionary warfare. See *Le Monde* 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

The paper alleged that the "rebels" were using various strategies: ambushes, strikes, distribution of leaflets, bomb attacks, "attentats", forbidding smoking, and "hiding" themselves amongst the Muslim mass to strike again when appropriate.

Although some of the "rebels" might have known and read about these theories, or might have been amongst French troops involved in Indochina, there was hardly any evidence to suggest that most of them could read -let alone have an understanding of revolutionary combat. Although the journalist knew that the only way for the nationalist to fight was to come out and organise ambushes (as none of the traditional rules of warfare applied in the sense that they could not afford to attack well-defended settlements, although they did on many occasions), he interpreted the confinement of the adversary to this kind of activity as a triumph for the French troops. *Ibid.*

(59)

See *Le Monde* 21/5/55.

Outlining the success of the psychological warfare, Herreman stated that the army was leading it, giving the best of itself (once it had understood that there could not be a military solution to the problem, and that the conquest of the population was at stake). The journalist stated that he had met a team of young officers who had spent several years as prisoners of the Viets, who learnt their methods. they had told him:

Là où les Viets ont réussi nous ne pouvons pas échouer.

In *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3.

(60)

Le Monde, 24/5/55, p. 9. There there were even reports of congratulatory telegrams being sent. See *Le Monde*, 19/1/55.

On a number of occasions, there was a certain pride expressed in reporting the activities of the military: *Les opérations dont nous nous sommes faits l'écho ont amené l'arrestation de plusieurs individus*. See *Le Monde*, 20-21/3/55.

(61)

See *Le Monde*, 19/5/55.

(62)

Le Monde, 11/1/55.

(63)

But if the FLN or their activities were said to have been audacious in some way, and this rarely happened, an amendment was put in to remove any positive connotations. See *Le Monde*, 10/5/57, p. 1, and the corrections entered at the request of the special envoy in *Le Monde*, 15/5/57, p. 4.

(64)

Le Monde 24/5/55.

(65)

The news took up very little space in the paper. As an illustration the news occupied only a quarter of two columns on page 7 in *Le Monde* of 23/4/55.

(66)

En Algérie reprise des attentats in *Le Monde* 19/3/57, p. 1. In *Le Monde*, 7/2/56, the army was described as doing its best, playing its role fully but was inadequate to deal with this kind of war. There were fears that the "officiers des Affaires Musulmanes", said to be doing a great deal of good work, ne soient emportés dans une débâcle généralisée comme la ligne Maginot en 1940.

(67)

On this occasion the paper depicted the military situation as critical with Algeria being unsafe apart from cities like Algiers or Oran (not that the regions were being constantly occupied by the "rebels" but "under pressure" only), the settlers were feeling insecure, under constant threat and leaving their land. See *Le Monde*, 7/2/56.

(68)

Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7, under the title of *Le dernier quart-d'heure*, which was a theme developed by official authorities and successive Governor-Generals implying that victory was almost complete.

(69)

The veterans described as being as French as the others sipping "Anis" at lunch time and wine at all hours of the day. In *Le Monde*, 13/12/56, p. 4. This denotes an attempt by the paper, in conformity with most of the official propaganda, to emphasise that Islam and the FLN were not as influential and not having much impact as one might have thought.

(70)
Ibid.

(71)
More thorough journalists included Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber (see below), Bromberger, S., (*Quarante ans de reportage*, Plon, Paris, 1986), Barrat, R., (*Les maquis de la liberté*, Edition du Témoignage Chrétien, Paris, 1987, -written during the war) went and interviewed the "rebels". See Chapter 13.

Reports of that type were only printed in reviews like *Temps Modernes* and confirmed in books and memoirs written by Army officers and soldiers recounting their experiences, which were published during the war (see Servan-Schreiber, J.-J., *Lieutenant en Algérie*, Julliard, Paris, 1957, Bonnaud, G., *La Paix des Némentchas*, *Esprit*, 1957 and Chapter 10) and also after Algerian independence (when the main actors as well as less significant personalities who took part published in book form memoirs of their own experience and novels relating their accounts of the war, which bore no resemblance whatsoever to the mild, sanitised and very often erroneous descriptions provided by patriotic newspapers including *Le Monde*).

(72)
It described army operations as having a double objective (*disloquer les noyaux de résistance et rassurer les populations autochtones*) which, as one would expect, was "fully achieved" (See *Le Monde* 20/1/55).

This enterprise of the army and the efforts made in their operations were not presented by the paper as being done with the aim of maintaining French domination, but as something desired and even expected by the majority of the population. Ibid.

The aim of this policy, which consisted in sending the troops to stop the troubles, and of the measures taken were said to be:

[les dispositions] doivent permettre d'atteindre non seulement le renforcement des structures civiles et militaires mais le plein effet des mesures politiques économiques et sociales c'est opportunément rappeler que d'indispensables mesures d'ordre ne peuvent être pleinement efficaces qu'en s'inscrivant dans une politique d'ensemble de nature à restaurer la confiance (my emphasis).

See *Le Monde* 19/5/55, p. 1.

(73)
Le Monde, 29/3/57, p. 6 reported that "13 rebels" who admitted that they had put mines, one of which had blown up a military vehicle, were found amongst the nomads in Beni Bahdel area. They were then "requested to indicate the position of these mines and while discharging this duty" (*effectuant cette opération*) eleven were blown to pieces by one of the mines. One could legitimately ask how could these people be blown up if they knew where they had put the mines. The more likely story is that they were used to open the way up for a convoy.

(74)
See the cases of:

- Four suspects killed in *Le Monde*, 10/4/57, p. 5;
- Three muslims suspects killed in *le Monde* 18/4/57, p. 3;

- (...) suspect qui ne répondait pas aux sommations d'usage in *Le Monde*, 24/4/57, p. 4;
- And the report by AFP stating that two runaways (fuyards) were shot in the area of Guelma, in *Le Monde*, 30/3/57, p. 6.

(75)

See reports such as:

- Patrols which accidentally injured four passers-by, all Muslims when shooting at somebody running away, in *Le Monde*, 25/5/57, p. 3.

- Street battles which leave thirteen people dead three of whom were soldiers on one side and two children on the other side (previous day report stated that the latter were hit by rebels' bullets), in *Le Monde*, 5/6/57, p. 3

These leave the informed reader a bit weary as to the accuracy of the events being reported.

(76)

See *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 6 for the following report.

A Tlemcen un militaire européen a été tué de 3 balles de pistolet. Les témoins n'ayant pas voulu (my emphasis) fournir les renseignements que leur demandaient les enquêteurs ont été condamnés à une amende collective de 1 million de francs, payables dans les 24 heures.

(77)

Le Monde, 30/4/57, p. 4.

(78)

In Algiers 217 persons were arrested when only about twenty of them were under suspicion. In *Le Monde*, 2/8/57, p. 4.

(79)

The work carried out by these officers, who distinguished between the *salopards* and the *bons blédards*, who had stepped up the contacts with the local population and who were learning their administrative skills in very particular circumstances, was outlined. So was the fact that some of them *se sont toujours considérés en <<zône d'insécurité>> et non en <<territoire ennemi>>*. See *Le Monde* 14/12/56, p. 5.

(80)

In order to destroy violence, in *Le Monde*, 27/10/55 (*Pour les habitants tu dois être le soldat qui protège le droit*) and in *Le Monde*, 29/10/55 (*la bombe n'est pas l'instrument de la pacification*).

(81)

In his fourth article of the series, devoted to life amidst the *officiers d'active* (14/12/56), Mannoni insisted on the affinities between the Army and the Muslims. He evoked the battles that French officers had led in Europe with the people (who were then most reliable and fought bravely in their ranks) against whom they were now fighting (ten years later). He expressed his amazement at the attitude of some of these people

who fought on the side of France and dwelt on their bravery and citations (eg. the military medal won by Ben Bella). The journalist must have been oblivious to the conditions of discrimination that existed within the army against the indigenous members who had sacrificed themselves on the French frontlines all over the world. (See below and also Rahmani, A., *L'Affaire des Officiers algériens*, Le Seuil, Paris, 1959.

The paper tried to convey the idea that the army and, especially, the officers were at pains to fight them. Mannoni even quoted a general to illustrate the point that that was causing pain and that the French troops had not gone to war against their former soldiers for the hell of it, nor with any kind of enjoyment <<pour le plaisir>>. See *Le Monde* 14/12/56, p. 5. The footnote of the article referred to previous articles of 11, 12, 13 December 1956, but those references do not seem to relate to anything the paper was now writing about.

The officers "d'active", according to the journalist, did not have any of the racists sentiments found in the civilians. He even cast some doubt on their hatred of the people they were fighting against. There was even talk of an acquired deep physical sympathy for *l'adversaire inconnu, autre soi-même qui lui aussi risque sa vie*. In *Le Monde*, 14/12/56.

(82)

The way the soldiers set about the "reconquest of Algeria" was described by Mannoni as taking the initiatives instead of waiting for trouble to hit them. The journalist did not forget to mention that "scruples did not weaken their determination."

He described the soldier's resolve (a phrase of Marshal JUIN) not to be the generation which would abandon Algeria; their belief was that Algeria [was] French or, more precisely, that it [had] to become French to remain so. See *Le Monde* 14/12/56, p. 5.

(83)

It is worth noting that even when brutalities were mentioned they had nothing to do with the soldiers that the paper was visiting or talking to:

Dans la brutalité des rencontres les plus habiles d'entre eux, qui sont aussi les plus humains, se sont efforcés de garder leur sang-froid et d'obliger leurs hommes à le garder aussi. Ceux-là ont évité de se livrer à certaines représailles qui <<souillent, nous disait un capitaine, les yeux des jeunes soldats>> et rendent plus solidaires encore des fellagas les populations sur lesquelles elles s'abattent.

Le Monde, 19/3/57, p. 1. See also, for instance, previous references above when it was hinted at that the soldiers referred to were not the ones involved in harsh repression.

See also *Le Monde*, 13/12/56, p. 4, referred to below, when *Le Monde* gave an indication that coercive measures had been used, it revealed only part of the story and the account made it apparently innocuous. While at the same time conceding that some innocent people had suffered from the army's indiscriminate use of violence, the paper quickly pointed out that that happened elsewhere, not there, while the same report disguised a number of clues as to the nature of the suffering.

(84)

It is significant that most of the articles of *Le Monde*,

even towards the end of the Fourth Republic and even after the bombing of Sakiét, did not really blame the army. See M. Duverger *L'armée, la nation et le régime* in *Le Monde*, 26/02/58, pp. 1-2.

(85)

See also Chapters 10, 11 and 13.

(86)

See also Freund, *op. cit.*

(87)

Keramane, H., *La Pacification, La Cité*, Lausanne, 1960, provided a description of these operations seen from the Algerian side.

(88)

The bias in favour of the army could be illustrated in other ways. A careful reader could, with hindsight, detect the hidden truth in the reports. In one of them, dated 13 December 1956, we learn that the *ralliement* had taken place because the inhabitants of the villages were tired of their rough living conditions.

(...) las de dormir avec femmes et enfants à la belle étoile, d'avoir faim, d'affronter un troisième hiver dans des grottes, de subir aussi les exigences de certains chefs de groupes.

What were they running from, might one ask? Certainly not from the rebels because they too would be in the caves. The journalist conceded also that:

(...) les patrouilles qui ne quittaient les villages déserts que pour y revenir les auraient contraints sans trêve à des exodes harassants.

Les hommes de Bou-Hatem, the journalist continued, n'ont regagné leurs foyers que pour retrouver leurs femmes, emmenées et gardées par les chasseurs (Chasseurs alpins = soldats of a special mountain regiment).

Apparently, an old women had been left in the village to inform the husbands that:

(...) que leurs compagnes leur seraient rendues s'ils venaient les réclamer, qu'ils ne couraient, ce-faisant, aucun risque. Ils vinrent, repartirent avec leurs femmes -qui avaient été respectées .

See *Le Monde*, 13/12/56, p. 4.

The procedure was undertaken, one might guess, to get the men back to remedy the <<under administration>> in official and *Le Monde's* terminology, but it would have also meant (for any sensible observer, especially with hindsight) to record and establish a census of the faces, the names and the houses, so that the movements of these inhabitants and their future absences could be noticed.

The journalist was keen to add that the inhabitants of the villages who rallied to the troops could obtain

sans difficulté des laissez-passer qui tiennent malgré tout lieu de cartes d'alimentation.

One or two further inferences may be drawn from this article (although they were not explicitly stated by the paper and could only be gleaned by a thorough knowledge of the procedures used) of what exactly had been going on, despite the deliberate disguise by the official phraseology. One is the fact that

these people had been deprived of their land and hence of their livelihood and that is why they needed food supplies. The other was the reason why they were running away: the indiscriminate reprisals to which most Algerians were subjected. Since the outbreak of the war, many inhabitants of the countryside had been fleeing from the troops, sometimes with their families sometimes on their own, to escape the indiscriminate reprisals that were operated by the troops on the entire population. French opinion was becoming increasingly aware of this (mentioned by left wing press, returning soldiers, etc..) but it could not be found in the articles that the journalists of *Le Monde* prepared for their readers.

What followed gives credence to these conclusions. We learn in the penultimate paragraph that the *mot d'ordre* was to distinguish between

(...) les terroristes et les terroristes>> ... Cette distinction on ne l'a pas toujours sauvegardée ailleurs(...) lorsque sous le même vocable de <<suspects>>, notion intermédiaire souvent imprécise, toujours dangereuse, on a confondu les <<bons musulmans >> et les <<autres>>.

It is worth noting that in articles of this kind which give an inkling of what really went on, it is always stated that if anything untoward occurred, it took place elsewhere, never where *Le Monde's* reporters were with one exception to-date: that of Penchenier. See Chapter 12.

Here, the journalist was adamant when he stated that:
ici-même, on s'est efforcé d'éviter toute confusion.

He conceded, nevertheless, that:

Il n'est point pourtant de <<pacification>> sans coercition, si contrôlée soit-elle -comme l'illustre l'histoire des maris de Bou-hatem- sans surveillance, sans méfiance non plus. Bien qu'on ne la sente guère dans les rapports quotidiens que les militaires entretiennent avec les villageois, elle subsiste pourtant.

See *Le Monde*, 13/12/56, p. 4.

(89)

These are examined later in Chapters 11 and 12.

(90)

City dwellers were also moved through measures of *assignation en résidence surveillée*.

(91)

Very often it was alleged that these people had been moved because they had been taken advantage of and deceived (*abusé*) by their brothers in faith. *Le Monde* did not explicitly state that these people had been moved, according to the official policy, in order to deprive the "fish" (the terrorists) from the "water" (the population) in which it could thrive and prosper (see theory of revolutionary warfare and above).

The paper stated that divisions ran across families, that there was a fear of returning to the fields. But the paper omitted to mention that they were forced out of those fields, which were their only source of income and survival. The fields were, in the words of the paper "*délaissés*", but the paper itself announced news of the various regions declared "*zones*

interdites" in which nobody but the army could venture and where anybody seen was liable to be shot on sight (see below and Chapters 11 and 12).

(92)

Ils sont rassemblés -on les a rassemblés- wrote *Le Monde* It was the euphemism, used on that and on many occasions, for population being moved from their land and resettled around the rudimentary villages being created.

What seemed important to the journalist reporting was that they enjoyed, according to him, a relative security now that they were in a village which "will become prosperous." See *Le Monde*, 11/12/56, p. 5. See also 13/12/56, p. 5.

(93)

An illustration of this double aspect can be found when the paper referred to pacification .. as a *notion malaisément definissable* ... describing its double aspect as being:

(...) *les militaires qui ont détruit ailleurs des mechtas mauvaises (ou pourries ... [qui] servaient de relais aux rebelles ... construisent pour des musulmans misérables des maisons décentes, séduisantes ... une école dont on n'aperçoit que la base.*

Then came the gift of water, brought to these old *musulmans incrédules, ou ignorant tout simplement le principe des vases communicants*

The paper added that medicine and a more organised civilian life were introduced to them. See *Le Monde*, 11/12/56, p. 5.

The newspaper also stated that these peasants had abandoned their lands with their *mechtas* and that the Army was going to distribute "enclaves" of land belonging to the *Compagnie algérienne*. The help of the Army was described as being reminiscent of the soldiers clearing the land (*défricher*) for cultivation in the previous century, when the policy of pacification was known as consisting of the use of the sword and the plough (*l'épée et la charrue*). The slogan used now was: *la charrue qui succède à l'épée.*

(94)

See Chapter 12.

(95)

Reprisals and similar activities by the Army were only revealed much later in most cases. This is one example. The example of Edouard Sablier about the 1945 repression is also a case in point. See Chapter 4.

(96)

Robert Escarpit, who admitted he was not a Mendesist but nevertheless an admirer of his courage, in a sarcastic daily note (*Au jour le jour*) recommended using pacification methods in parliament (and then retracted for fear of being taken too literally). These methods seemed to have a specific meaning to him since he wrote that they were methods

qui ont fait leurs preuves pour obtenir la pacification de la France et la purger de quelques énergumènes qui empoisonnent son atmosphère politique.

(97)

Little, if anything at all, was said of any economic and social interventions despite the claims.

The army's rôle was said to go beyond its traditional function and articles explained the need to build new roads, pointing out the economic benefits of such developments. It is easy to see, however, that the immediate concern for that could have been only increased access for army trucks to improve the hold over, and better control of, the Muslim population. Instead, it was the social benefits that were highlighted

Il est certain que ces travaux présentent en même temps un intérêt économique et surtout social pour l'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre locale flottante. Dans les milieux militaires, on souligne d'ailleurs que des crédits sont nécessaires pour mener cette tâche à bonne fin .

See *Le Monde* 21/5/55.

(98)

Le Monde, 11/12/56, p. 5.

(99)

Section Administrative Spécialisée created in November 1955.

The work of this special group was dealt with by Nicolas D'Andoque in 1955-1962, *Guerre et Paix en Algérie, l'épopée silencieuse des SAS, Société de Production Littéraire*, Paris, 1977.

(100)

Et ils sont nombreux les anciens officiers des affaires indigènes, les jeunes lieutenants SAS, à s'attacher à leur mission avec un enthousiasme et une abnégation qui forcent l'admiration.

In various articles by P. Herreman, *Contre la propagande et les pressions du FLN*, 23/7/57, p.3, 24/7/57, p. 3, and following dates, it was emphasised that to rally the heart of the Algerian people (*ralliement des coeurs*) the main instruments were *mairie, bloc sanitaire, école (trois outils majeurs de la pacification)*, as well as the building of roads and the construction of houses and villages. All these amounted to a very peaceful rebuilding of the country with the SAS, the *Képis bleus*, and the *commando noir* heading up this task. The officer was the *tuteur*, helping the locals to get things organised, so as to get them out of their state of misery, and being so much in their confidence that these officers were said to be often guided out of danger by their *protégés*. The "brilliant work of these Samaritans" whose "patience and dedication were their glorious titles" was given a high profile by the paper throughout.

(101)

Two comments come to mind when treating this particular aspect of the war. The true nature of the conflict and the conditions under which it took place constituted an essential part of the propaganda campaign, which *Le Monde* could not possibly have not known about. Secondly, the optimism which radiated from some of the articles (this was also part of the propaganda campaign) could only have had the impact of provi-

ding further encouragement to a flagging and increasingly disillusioned public opinion. See also Chapter 9.

(102)

Their work was described as consisting of:

Irriguer des terres altérées, donner à ceux qui s'accroupissent devant leur maison, non <<par paresse>>, mais parce qu'ils sont réduits à un état de chômage endémique, un travail rémunérateur, les arracher à leurs gourbis pour les faire pénétrer dans des maisons décentes, construire des écoles plus modestes mais plus disséminées, leur confier le soin de gérer eux-mêmes leurs villages, négligés par certains maires du premier collège, trop soucieux d'améliorer les centres européens où résidaient <<comme par hasard >> leurs électeurs, plus simplement faire que les musulmans du <<bled>> deviennent <<semblables, malgré leurs coutumes et leur religion, aux paysans de France >>, tels sont les objectifs que se sont assignés ces officiers. Ils ont ainsi obligé certains colons à payer leurs ouvriers les salaires établis par les conventions syndicales, les menaçant de ne plus protéger leurs fermes s'ils n'observaient pas cette prescription. A la réalisation de ces tâches, ils apportent le plus souvent une passion de jeunes scouts.

In *Le Monde*, 14/12/56, p. 5.

"Perhaps, after all, that is what they are, he continued, in this community which is being built, to the defense of which they will contribute".

(103)

But more was to come. The aim of this action for these officers, according to the paper, was that they were thinking of creating the conditions for the day when a group of these Muslims could vote in the municipal elections, qualifying the statement, however, with the condescending comment that they were less interested in political than economic and social measures:

se préoccupant moins de <<grande politique>> -il est admis que les idées n'intéressent pas les fellahs- que de <<réformes économiques et sociales>>.

Voting as well as full and equal political participation were seen as a distant aim, and the work being done as laying the groundwork for it.

Echoing the official propaganda machine, the journalist wrote that *Vive la nouvelle Algérie française* seemed, according to him, the new motto where new was as important as French for rallying these rural communities. See *Le Monde* 14/12/56, p. 5.

On this occasion, the paper went as far as to suggest that they could even help set up a Muslim Party of the Military in the countryside through a new relationship:

<<parti musulman de militaires >> qui échapperait à la fois à l'influence d'un caïdat véreux, d'un grand colonnat discrédité et des nationalistes.

In *Le Monde*, 14/12/56, p. 5.

(104)

This attitude was indeed meant to be reminiscent of the

policies of the "Bureaux arabes" followed by Bugeaud and that of the "Arab Empire" on which Napoleon III was so keen. But these efforts were not exactly philanthropic. They were very often just what they appeared, a propaganda campaign which, at the same time, helped provide intelligence on the movements of the nationalists, and helped cut the nationalists off from the population which was supposed to provide them with logistic support.

(105)

In an article of 26/1/57 from its special correspondent, which explained that the black commandos would disappear in thin air, would live with and become part of the inhabitants of a *mechta*, and carry on a variety of work with the local population. *Le Monde* suggested that because of the success of these new methods, which were exactly adapted to the notion of "pacification", the Minister for Defence had created a whole battalion of them.

The article explained that Servan-Schreiber (see also Chapters 10 and 13), former director of *L'Express*, one of the officers recalled was one of the promoters with the lieutenant-colonel Barbereau (sic.) of these "black commandos."

Using a statement Servan-Schreiber had made to the *Journal d'Alger* on his experience of the "black commandos," *Le Monde* wrote that Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber *avait tiré un <<réconfort>> et <<beaucoup plus d'optimisme>> qu'il n'avait osé espérer* and quoted him talking about the "thaw," the confidence created and stating that no gesture was wasted, that the *mur de la méfiance* was less "thick" and looked like being "holed" everytime the indigenous inhabitant "becomes a man in your eyes and in his."

(106)

et l'on se prend alors à rêver de tout ce qui pourrait être ici sauvé, reconstruit, créé pour l'avenir, si tous les hommes de ce pays étaient considérés comme des hommes sur tous les plans, non pas dans des textes juridiques, mais dans le comportement quotidien... Oui, sincèrement, je suis plus optimiste qu'avant sur les chances qui existent. Seulement ces chances ne sont pas là où les slogans les situent.

In *De l'expérience des <<commandos noirs>>*, from the special correspondent, *Le Monde*, 26/1/57.

(107)

Servan-Schreiber, J.-J., *Lieutenant en Algérie*, collection of articles in *L'Express* and the book of the same name translated by Ronald Matthews, Hutchinson, 1958. See also Chapters 10 and 13.

(108)

See also Chapters 10 to 14.

(109)

There were clear cases of disrespect, if not outright disobedience vis-à-vis governmental policy, as epitomised by several cases, including Marshall Juin, Generals Salan, Faure and Bollardièrre. See also Planchais, J., *Une Histoire politique de l'Armée 1940-1967*, Seuil, Paris, 1967, pp. 245-253.

(110)

When an attempt was made to kill General Salan (16 January 1957) by the European "ultras" resulting in the death of commandant Rodier, *Le Monde* keenly pursued its own enquiries to find out who was involved, provided a substantial amount of information and made interesting conjectures about the links with Faure. See *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, p. 4.

These were subsequently confirmed (see below), as was the hostility of some army elements to Salan as a result of the Indochinese war. Very quickly after the arrest of those implicated, the paper came out with their code names (29/1/57, p.1) and then the real names of those involved in the attempt [(Kovacs (31/1/57), Mr and Mrs Ortiz, Scire who tried to commit suicide (*Le Monde* 1/2/57) and the remainder of the names when charges were brought (9/2/57, p. 2)].

Le Monde revealed that there was an interrelation between the various aspects of the affair, the plot to kill Salan, the Faure plot, and the attempt to overthrow the authorities in Algiers by Knecht, Sauvage and Griotteray (*Le Monde* 2/3/57, p. 4). These three were cleared of the charges relating to the incident above, more commonly known as the "bazooka affair."

(111)

While in the case of Salan the attack against the Army came from outside and from the right of the political spectrum, in the case of General Faure's "plot" (end of 1956) the problem came from the same shade of political opinion but from within the corps itself, in the shape of a serving general, Faure. Faure committed an indiscretion by telling a civil servant, Teitgen, brother of the ex minister, of the possibility of a revolt being organised by army staff and right-wing extremists.

(112)

Robert Gauthier, covering the case, gave the rank and position of the general as second in command of the Algiers division and stated that he was *mis aux arrêts* for thirty days about ten days previously by Defence Minister, Bourghès-Maunoury.

(113)

Which treated the matter very seriously. *Le Figaro's* Gabriel Robinet had asked three questions (Was it true that Army "elements" had thought of substituting themselves for "la légalité républicaine"? Was it true that a general with a high rank and a brilliant record was reprimanded? Was he in contact with the extremist group who were issuing orders?) when he wrote:

On peut affirmer, sans risquer d'être démenti, que l'armée, dans son immense majorité, se serait refusé à collaborer à une opération dont le résultat eût été de jeter de façon peut-être irréparable des Français les uns contre les autres, et de rendre infranchissable le fossé entre la métropole et l'Algérie. Sans vouloir exagérer la portée de cette affaire, on aurait tort d'en sous-estimer l'importance. De pareils mouvements peuvent, hélas! s'expliquer par la colère, la révolte, contre d'éventuelles positions d'abandon.

As reported by *Le Monde*, 7/1/57.

(114)

The official communiqué stated that the general had committed

certaines imprudences verbales ayant été exploitées dans un climat particulièrement délicat, le ministre a été amené à prononcer une sanction et à adresser diverses observations en vue d'arrêter toute interprétation particulièrement dommageable au moral de l'armée.

In *Le Monde*, 8/1/57, p. 1.

(115)

Il est toutefois établir que le général Faure avait cherché à recruter des adhérents en vue d'un projet qui tendait à rien de moins qu'à substituer en Algérie un pouvoir militaire à la légalité républicaine(sic.) Ibid.

Because there was either a superfluous "r" to établir or a missing "à" in front of it.

Because of the official silence surrounding the affair, *Le Monde* itself found it difficult to assess it but quoted *Le Figaro's* statements that the general had held *des conversations qualifiées d'imprudentes*.

Gauthier found it imprudent to speculate whether calls for action had emanated from a high-ranking reservist officer but thought Faure's attempt symptomatic. He wrote that it was revealed by an "indiscretion a few days after demonstrations following Froger's funeral when shouts of *l'armée au pouvoir* were uttered." For Faure, a tragedy had been unfolding for the last two years in Algeria. The indecision characterising government and country alike was said to have led to bitterness which incited sometimes some "less balanced minds" to envisage "desperate measures which were primarily harmful to the Europeans themselves".

(116)

Although it thought that it would be regrettable (*fâcheux*) if its delicate mission in Algeria were made even more difficult by some *initiatives aberrantes*, if the Army and its interest were "used as opposed to served", the paper found it understandable that, following on the defeat in Indochina, and the humiliation of Egypt, the Army might be forced to ask questions about itself, its future, and about France herself.

When confirming the contacts, *Le Monde* drew the attention of its readers to his frankness ("*franc-parler*"), writing that he had never hidden his feelings about what he called "deficiencies of the institutions," that he had openly expressed dissent and campaigned against the then Defense Minister during the debates on the European Defence Community, which subsequently resulted in his transfer to Vienna.

Le Monde described his brilliant career and sporting successes and his dispatches to North Africa, the fact that he was reluctantly resigned to "our" departure from Morocco and that he arrived in Algeria with the firm intention of opposing any "abandonment". It stated that he had made his views on the subject well known, and that provoked the minister's "displeasure".

(117)

Peut-on pour autant parler de complot, asked the paper? Backing its reports with similar views, *Le Monde* wrote that General Maricourt, whom it had not until then mentioned, had

conceded that "he had held conversations thought to be incompatible with military discipline" but that nothing indicated that he "had participated in any plot" and that in any case he had not been "sanctioned" but "simply warned".

(118)

Contradicting itself about the lack of information, *Le Monde* revealed that the news had been widely commented in military circles (as soon as it reached Algiers through the Parisian press), who were unhappy about the loss of some powers in certain areas (*L'armée a regretté que dans certaines zones - en Kabylie par exemple- des prérogatives qui lui avaient été un moment confiées aient été restituées à l'autorité civile. De nombreux officiers estiment au contraire que la proclamation de l'état de siège, qui transférerait automatiquement les pouvoirs à l'autorité militaire, serait dans les circonstances présentes la meilleure formule.*) and concluded that the military had reacted favourably to the General adding that some of the military, who met in *La Maison du Combattant*, even thought that the army was being made a scapegoat for the failures of the government.

See *Le Monde* 9/1/57, p. 2.

(119)

In his explanatory articles on *L'Armée s'inquiète*, Jean Planchais looked at the state of mind of the Army. He found anxiety in the institution. Some of its members were even talking of *juntas* and *pronunciamentos* (as seen above) and finding sympathetic support for their ideas.

His views of the Army and its role in Algeria did not differ from those of the officers recommending a strong but paternalistic posture. He described the Army as being experienced in battle and in the handling of the type of conflicts in which it was involved. As far as North Africa was concerned, the views of the Army were said to be: *la force commande le respect. Ce qui n'empêche pas qu'elle doive être tempérée par un <<paternalisme>> bien intentionné.* See *Le Monde*, 18/1/57.

(120)

Even though he accepted that a number of Frenchmen from North Africa had found former comrades in the army and the links developed between civilian and military had resulted in an attitude which was not favourable to the implementation of a liberal policy in Algeria. *Ibid.*

(121)

He stated that the role of the army was not felt to be appropriate by some. Pacifying the countryside, hunting rebels, protecting the means of communication were within its competence, he wrote, but urban terrorism was a role for the police, the army was not made for it:

Les soldats ne sont pas faits pour briser les grèves ou vider les poubelles. L'armée n'est pas une <<bonne à tout faire>>. Et de rappeler le vieux dicton <<Bon à tout, bon à rien>>.

This was especially seen to be the case here with this "Atomic army" being transformed into a "bad infantry", with the conscripts being inadequately trained, with several resignations of high-ranking officers, and with certain failures making bitterness more prevalent: *l'échec exclusivement politique de l'attaque contre Nasser... n'était pas fait pour dé-*

tendre l'atmosphère. In *Le Monde*, 18/1/57, p. 5.

(122)

(...)de faire les frais d'une politique ou d'une absence de politique. Surtout ils découvraient en face d'eux un idéal dont les fins étaient discutables mais incontestablement génératrices de courage et de sacrifices. Ibid.

Although he accepted that the Army did not obey under Vichy, Planchais maintained that the Army had been very proud of its rôle as the instrument of political power indicating, however, that its suspicion of politicians had been on the increase.

Après la Libération, les critiques suscitées par une conception excessive de la <<grandeur>>, les attaques dirigées contre les gaspillages ainsi qu'un certain antimilitarisme qui suit en général les conflits armés l'ont amenée peu à peu à se retirer dans sa tour d'ivoire.

Ibid.

(123)

Of late, the discussions of the C.E.D. gave many, he went on to say:

l'impression qu'une partie de l'opinion était prête à leur arracher la dernière raison qu'ils avaient de subsister: l'uniforme et le drapeau. Ibid.

(124)

He recalled General's Chassin statement:

*Il est temps que l'armée cesse d'être la grande muette. Le moment est venu pour le monde libre, s'il ne veut pas mourir de mort violente, d'appliquer certaines méthodes de l'adversaire. Or l'une de ces méthodes -et sans doute la plus importante- réside dans le rôle idéologique, qui est derrière le rideau de fer dévolu aux forces militaires. From 10/10/54 in *Revue militaire d'information* under the heading "pour ranimer la foi." Ibid.*

(125)

He quoted various sources in his examination of the Army's unease in its rôle and stated that its difficulties were illustrated by its ill-feeling, its effort to seek better understanding with various other groups and to educate tomorrow's generation. Ibid.

(126)

Sans doute, mais il est à craindre que dans sa lassitude l'armée, si elle n'éprouve nulle envie de renverser elle-même le régime, ne fasse rien non plus pour l'empêcher de disparaître brutalement s'il est attaqué.

In *Le Monde*, 19/1/57, pp. 1-8.

(127)

Especially by the paratroopers, in their dealings with Algerian nationalists (some of whom were not even involved in the troubles). See section four, Chapters 10, 11, 12 and 13.

This came to the attention of left-wing circles as well as large sections of public opinion and caused an enormous amount of unease.

(128)

See also Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.

(129)

Bollardière, who was concerned about the intensive use of repressive methods, including torture, refused to implement a decision to intensify the struggle against the terrorists and asked to be relieved of his duties. He returned the command of his area to his superiors and went back to France. *Le Monde* reported the news, giving biographic details (at the foot of the article in small print) of this holder of the *Légion d'honneur*, who had been companion of de Gaulle in the Liberation, veteran of Indochina, where he commanded all airborne troops, and, at that point, commander of a region in Algeria, outlining the reasons for his request. The paper also echoed the debate surrounding his resignation. See *Le Monde* 29/3/57 to 2/4/57, p. 3.

(130)

Although "S" (which stands for Sirius, a pen name that H.Beuve-Méry used prior to founding *Le Monde* and occasionally subsequently since.) did not think it was possible for Bollardière to have made his decision without weighing the full implications of his gesture, and saw in that gesture the proof that "one could be a war leader and still refuse to sacrifice the moral values of a civilisation to the concerns of immediate efficiency and expediency" (*Responsable du secteur est blidéen le général de Bollardière demande à être relevé de son commandement. L'ancien chef des troupes aéroportées d'Indochine entend protester contre l'emploi de méthodes qu'il estime contraires aux traditions de l'armée*, in *Le Monde*, 29/3/57, p. 1).

The paper was quite reserved in its comments.

In a carefully worded article, Beuve-Méry stated that for a while, and "out of good faith", public opinion might be a "little puzzled" by some revelations that had been presented to it officially as a <<campaign to demoralise the army>>.

Beaucoup de Français ont pu de très bonne foi s'étonner ou s'indigner de révélations qui leur étaient présentées officiellement comme une campagne d'intellectuels désincarnés ou de chrétiens émotifs, quand ce n'était pas comme une machination communiste. Dans tous les cas le résultat était le même : démoralisation de l'armée et de la nation au profit des entreprises criminelles du FLN.

In *Le Monde*, 29/3/57, p. 1.

(131)

It reported that the Minister of Defence had denied that it was for those reasons, and through rumours in the corridors of the Assembly implied that the general had wanted to come and see his ailing sister. The minister's statement was not considered by *Le Monde* as plausible, especially in view of the publication by *L'Express* of the text of a letter of support sent by the general to J.-J. Servan-Schreiber (see also Chapters 10, 11, 12 and 13).

For *Le Monde*, the meaning of the letter had no ambiguity

whatsoever, and through his support of J.J. Servan-Schreiber the general was outlining to public opinion the "dramatic aspect of the revolutionary warfare that the army faces in Algeria" and stressing his concern "not to lose sight, under the fallacious pretext of immediate efficacy, of moral values which alone have made the greatness of our civilisation and our army." See *Le Monde*, 29/3/57, p. 1.

At the same time as it was devoting coverage to the letter to Servan-Schreiber, *Le Monde* continued to publish official denials by the Ministry of Defence tending to play down the affair (stressing that Bollardièrè's command was, in any case, reduced to a minimum), to undermine his position or even to put the blame back on the general for not having spoken out previously and not having taken action while he was in command. See *Le Monde*, 30/3/57, p. 6.

The implication was that he had tolerated the incidents he was complaining about and that he had not done anything about them while he could have done. (What *Le Monde* did not tell its unaware readers was that in the Army even a general had to obey orders.)

The paper even echoed a debate that was starting between Colonel Bourgoïn and Clavel in *Combat*, and quoted a letter from Bourgoïn to that paper in which Bourgoïn expressed confidence in Bollardièrè as a man, but nevertheless reproached him for being taken in by a journalist (JJSS) "whose intentions were less to inform than create a movement of political opinion." In *Le cas du général Bollardièrè*, *Le Monde*, 2/4/57, p. 3.

(132)

The paper reported on the discussion of the Bollardièrè's case by the government, linking it to Professor Capitant (see *Le Monde*, 4/4/57, p. 1), to the Boumendjel episode (Chapters 12 and 13), and to General Faure and Dean Peyrega (see *Le Monde*, 5/4/57, p. 1 and Chapters 10 and 13).

Even though it discussed the question of the two generals (Faure and Bollardièrè) and the nature of their offences, it contented itself, in the end, by stating in conclusion (using statements made by the governmental team) that if there had been repressive actions that were more harmful to France than the uprising itself, then they should have been avoided, and that human rights and the dignity of man should be observed in future. See *Le Monde*, 5/4/57, p. 1.

(133)

Although Fauvet, in defence of those denouncing army excesses, rejected the accusations of treason since the 700,000 soldiers who served that year in Algeria were not presented as "700,000 torturers," stating that in fact it was thanks to those voices, which expressed their feeling, "feelings which the government understands", that the investigative commission (*Commission de sauvegarde* -see Chapter 13) had been set up. J.Fauvet in *Le Monde*, 7-8/4/57, p. 1.

He treated the sanctions against Bollardièrè very lightly. He stated that a middle of the road solution had been chosen to deal with Bollardièrè and that, because the administrative procedure had not been completed, sanctions had not yet been taken. Missing the point completely and confusing a systematic policy with individual acts and isolated incidents, he outlined that the breach of discipline levelled against Bollardièrè related probably to the letter he had sent without his superiors consent, but also his failure to make the facts known in

due time.

He even thought (although it was clearly not possible in the circumstances) that the enquiry would elucidate the various points. Adding to the confusion, Fauvet also pointed out that the communiqué published at the end of the Council of Ministers, which unusually constituted a sort of proclamation, had been interpreted differently by various groups. Some were said to have retained only the wish that: *que soit décelé et châtié tout manquement individuel*, others the protest against "the campaign organised by the enemies of France" (*Le Monde*, 7-8/4/57, p. 1).

(134)

The only matter that seemed to worry the paper was whether the general could be heard by the Commission of Enquiry. *Le Monde*, 17/4/57. See also Chapter 13.

It then reported that the sixty days were for the letter he had sent approving the publication of his testimony in *Témoignage Chrétien*. The paper added that, according to the Defence Minister, the letter had become a "piece of evidence in the J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's demoralisation of the army charge," and that those members of the government who approved his action on moral ground had condemned it on disciplinary grounds.

The general was subsequently posted to Equatorial Africa (banished by the government). When reminding the readers of the reasons for this measure, *Le Monde* now stated that he had protested against some methods of pacification and that he had in a letter signified his approval of the publication of his article in *L'Express*. In *Le général de Bollardière est affecté en Afrique équatoriale à compter du 15 juin*, in *Le Monde*, 27/4/57, p. 4.

The whole truth of the matter was not given to the readers until it was available in the form of a book published by Barberot (See also Chapter 10).

(135)

Algerians did serve in the French army, but not many of them reached officer rank. *Le Monde* (9/3/57, p. 2) gave the figure of about 250 Algerian officers out of a total of about 300 "North Africans", most of whom were posted in Germany. *Le Monde* 8/3/57, p. 2 gave news of a draft of 3,500 "young Muslims" and stated that they were to join troops on the mainland. The five-year lower age limit on maximum age was presented as one of the many advantages given to them.

Rahmani A. gave a dramatic account (in *L'Affaire des officiers algériens*, La Cité, Lausanne, 1960) of his own experience as an officer and painted a very different picture, in which he listed (pp. 10-20) the disadvantages and the discrimination encountered within the ranks. His version of the whole episode about to be examined was totally different from *Le Monde's*.

Despite the discrimination of the system and their inability to get redress within the disciplinary framework of the army some did succeed in reaching a relatively high rank. No doubt those officers and soldiers alike, with their experience of French wars, saw the writing on the wall when the "troubles" began in Algeria. Two years of "pacification," the accession of a Socialist Premier with the promise of peace, only to be followed by more repression and the arrest of Ben Bella (see

Chapter 6), and news from their relatives and what they saw during their own involvement -all this must have confirmed their worst fears.

(136)

In their letter, published by the paper, they stated that they did not wish "to break with their loyalty as soldiers or sever their links of friendship, camaraderie and traditions..." Yet they expressed their

hostility to a policy [they] would not be able to approve without transforming their attachment to France into treason towards the Algerian people.

They stated that they "had never failed France nor spoke against it but today, torn by the terrible dilemma that if French policy were not directed towards a more equitable solution, [they] would not find the means, nor would they have any valid reasons, for justifying [their] presence in the French army."

Le Monde wrote that the signatories of the letter included high-ranking officers, two of whom were colonels, and that most of them had been highly decorated.

Au nombre des signataires de cette lettre figurent plusieurs officiers supérieurs dont deux colonels. La plupart sont titulaires de décorations: Légion d'honneur ou croix de guerre.

In *Des officiers algériens exposent leur cas de conscience* à M. René Coty, *Le Monde*, 7/3/57, p. 4.

(137)

This supposedly had nothing to do with the letter they had written to President Coty. This was totally erroneous in that the measure was a deliberate infringement of those officers' right in an attempt to silence them. The paper also pointed out that there might be further prosecution of these officers over a matter relating to demoralisation of the Army. It denied that there were any official reports stating that any high (two) ranking officers had been heard by a court on this matter, let alone been interrogated.

Le Monde mentioned that the number of the signatories of the letter to Coty was fifty-two, and that five of those were sanctioned. It stated that the publication of the letter and the announcement of sanctions had confused the two issues:

Les <<punitions>> infligées à cinq officiers musulmans sanctionneraient un <<refus de déplacement>> et non la démarche faite auprès de M.Coty.

In *Le Monde*, 9/3/57, p. 2.

But there was only one affair, that which the paper was trying to deny. After many contacts with politicians and numerous attempts to see the Prime Minister, the officers had arranged for their letter to be given to, and then published by, newspapers in case they were arrested. See the full account in Rahmani, A., op. cit.

(138)

It also stated that Lieutenant Rahmani, the officer in question, had chosen Me F. Sarda for his defence. In fact, Rahmani was prevented from seeing anybody. The paper mistakenly reported that Rahmani was one of forty-two officers who were co-signatories of the letter to Coty. It stated that he was considered as the main instigator (the official line trying to find a scapegoat) and that he had been put under house arrest,

and under arrest since the beginning of March along with other officers.

Un des officiers algériens signataires de la lettre à M. René Coty est inculpé et interné à Fresnes.

In *Le Monde*, 4/4/57, p. 4.

The arrest had taken place on 3 February (see Rahmani, A., op. cit., p. 86) and Rahmani explains in his book that it was an agreed decision expressed through one single letter.

(139)

This time, *Le Monde*, dated 23/4/57, p. 2, indicated that the charge was "demoralisation of the army".

It tried to recall the facts and this time stated that he was one of fifty-two Algerian officers who wrote a letter to President Coty to protest about "the conduct of operations in Algeria".

(140)

Le lieutenant Rahmani en liberté provisoire, Le Monde 18/5/57, p. 5.

He was to read this article in prison -and in fact his bail was not on the cards. When he was eventually bailed, he was only given time (three quarters of an hour) to take the train and travel to his new posting in Castres (near Toulouse), where he was under constant surveillance and forbidden from communicating with anybody from outside the army.

(141)

Le Monde stated that it had received the letter which explained the <cas de conscience> of his "comrades", currently serving in Algeria. *Le Monde*, 12/7/57, p. 5.

(142)

And that troops, unlike officers could not refuse to go on assignment, that they were not allowed to speak out (under the pretext that they were "backward". *Le Monde* did seem in favour of extending that decree, but not necessarily for the sake of those protesting. It argued that the precedent set by the decree provided a strong case for the troops and thought the sending of these troops was a *grosse erreur psychologique* as it presented the soldiers with a *painful alternative*.

celle d'accepter de tuer leurs frères, de ratisser leur sol natal et de cautionner la politique de la répression, ce qui est inhumain, donc inadmissible, ou celle de "prendre congé" avec armes et bagages lorsqu'ils seront en face de l'horreur de cette guerre.

In *Le cas des tirailleurs algériens servant en Algérie*. (between 1/4 and 1/2 a column) *Le Monde*, 12/7/57, p. 5.

(143)

In his description of the town of Algiers as very peaceful thanks to the presence of the paratroopers, most visible section of the army, *Le Monde's* Herreman revealed the real concern for extending the decree - to avoid temptation. He wrote that the *tirailleurs algériens*, thought to be in France or Germany "away from temptation...".

Le Monde did not explain why they should fall victim to temptation seeing that the rebels were never presented as attracting anyone but terrorising everybody. Implicitly, it was

showing that the appeal of nationalism was far greater than the paper was willing to admit. Their presence, as part of the troops maintaining order in Algiers, was nevertheless presented as a symbol, a desire by a confident high command to prove that there was faith in these loyal Muslims to fight against the rebels, giving thereby a climate of bubbling confidence in the 10th Military region.

See *Les progrès de la pacification exigent de plus en plus de troupes estime l'Etat-Major d'Alger*, Philippe Herreman in *Le Monde*, 11/7/57, p. 2.

(144)

These took different forms: either in the form of refusal of conscription and enduring jail sentences for it, or, symbolically or physically, in preventing draftee trains and those carrying military material or personnel from leaving railway stations.

(145)

Article 76 of the Code pénal, completed by the Law of 11 March 1950, stating that in time of peace (...) *sera puni de la réclusion tout Français... qui se sera rendu coupable... d'entrave violente à la circulation de matériel destiné à la défense nationale ou utilisé pour elle*, was used in the prosecution, but sometimes common criminal law was substituted. *Le Monde*, 9/2/57, p. 2. Others were charged with inciting soldiers to disobedience. *Le Monde*, 29/5/57, p. 3.

(146)

While not explicitly condemning those being tried, it did not speak out against their trial, or make comments to the effect that those activities should or should not be praised/condemned. This reporting of the trials and sentences without comments could be said to illustrate the fact that *Le Monde's* first objective in this respect was to inform the public, and not to take a stand for or against.

(147)

At the trial of the Mourmelon draftees, *Le Monde's* version went as follows:

voulant manifester contre les affectations par bataillon qui les séparaient de leurs camarades et contre les officiers qui refusaient de leur donner des permissions,... enfoncèrent les portes des locaux disciplinaires. Au cours de l'échauffourée qui s'ensuivit des officiers supérieurs du camp furent molestés.

The paper named the people sentenced and the one acquitted for *outrages à supérieurs*.

A small article dealt with *Après la mutinerie de Mourmelon deux rappelés sont condamnés avec sursis, un autre est acquitté*, from the tribunal des forces armées de Metz in *Le Monde*, 9/2/57, p. 2.

There were some reports, although limited, of leaflets being distributed amongst the "contingent " which had been called up, inciting them to disobey, which were discovered on a ship in Marseille.

It also reported that the search of the Communist Party (PC) section in the *Boulevard des Dames* led to the recovery of similar leaflets and of the duplicating machine (ronéo). In *Le*

(148)

Le Monde (without precise reference apart from a statement that the journalist had been assured) tried to reassure public opinion. Discussing the conscripts' case in its articles, the paper stated that their morale was high (*un excellent état d'esprit*) and their desire to go home was the same as everybody else's who wanted to see the family after a while. The article even gave the recruits a sense of purpose and commitment to the cause and an understanding "exceeding all expectations".

Ils commencent à s'intéresser, à réfléchir .. ils comprennent fort bien l'importance de l'Algérie dans la balance française et que l'ordre doit être rétabli et maintenu.

Admittedly not to keep things as they were but to achieve future progress, in *Le Monde*, 27/10/55.

(149)

Worries were also expressed subsequently on the state of health and food supplies:

le ravitaillement des troupes est souvent très mauvais. Les accidents se multiplient chez les parachutistes en raison, paraît-il, d'une décalcification imputable à l'insuffisance de la nourriture. Faites une enquête et apportez les améliorations nécessaires.

In *Le Monde*, 9/2/57, p. 2.

As the need for the army in Algeria far outstretched the availability of troops and especially conscripts (*Le Monde* was aware that Algeria absorbed almost all the French army's resources as far as land troops were concerned). For Air and Sea forces only those with special exemptions or special qualifications for NATO or training duties would remain in Europe. It was also reported by *Le Monde* that the organisation of a rota system could not be implemented because it would lead to a reduction of personnel or an increase of time served (*amenuisement des effectifs, soit à l'augmentation de la durée, soit de nouveaux appelés*). In "Les besoins de l'Afrique du Nord absorbent la quasi-totalité du contingent", *Le Monde*, 9/2/57, p.2), revealed that the Ministry of Defence kept conscripts beyond the two-year prescribed length of time which they were supposed to serve.

In an "encadré" (24 mois) the paper stated that up to twelve extra months could be added to the 18 months legal limit spent by draftees in Algeria. From a report based on M.Laforest, Secretary of State for Air as a reply to M.Bichet (MRP). *Le Monde* stated that all those called up did 30 months (9/2/57, p. 2).

(150)

A couple of months later, it announced that the Prime Minister had confirmed that there would effectively be a return to 2 years maximum conscription from 1st July, given that some were maintained six, nine, and even twelve months after the legal length of service of 18 months. In future it stated no more than 6 months over the legal limit would be possible and the Council of Ministers meeting would ratify the decision. See *Le Monde*, 17/4/57, p. 5.

(151)

A few months later still, *Le Monde* requested fixing a definite date and a rapidly taken decision to remove the uncertainty which did not help the troops' morale. J.P. in *Le Monde*, 12/7/57, p. 4.

(152)

Normally, war is only fought against another country. Algeria, being part of France "legally", there could not be talk of a war for the authorities as they would thereby acknowledge the foreign nature of the territory.

(153)

See Chapter 13.

(154)

See Keramane, H., op. cit.

(155)

See Chapter 13.

CHAPTER SIX: NOTES

(1)

See also Chapter 13.

(2)

A fuller account can be found in Duchemin, J.C., *Histoire du FLN*, Paris, La Table Ronde, 1962, and especially his illustration on p. 10.

(3)

Despite the popularity of the movement when it became obvious that ordinary people were involved the combination fellahs-fellaghas (peasant-bandits) was used (*Le Monde*, 2/3/57, p. 1).

(4)

See Chapter 5.

(5)

Writing that the severe blows received seemed to have hardened the fanatics (equated with leaders) in their intransigence, P. Herreman wondered if the mass would not be discouraged by a fight, the end of which it could see itself winning. See Philippe Herreman, *Face aux positions du gouvernement le FLN maintient la reconnaissance du droit à l'indépendance comme condition préalable à une négociation*. In *Le Monde*, 8/3/57, p. 2.

Only on a couple of occasions did *Le Monde* use the word "moujahedines". The use of this term was more to do with the desire of the journalist, Jean François, to show that he was acquainted with Arabic denominations like "Moujahedine" and "roumis" than a desire to call them by their name. It did, nevertheless, combine these terms with other more current appellations of rebels and fellagas. See *Le Monde*, 23/4/57, p. 1. Serge Adour spelled it "moujadin" in *Le Monde*, 31/10/57, p. 3.

(6)

See *Le Monde*, 21/1/57, p. 3, 5/6/57, p. 3, 11/6/57, p. 1, 9/8/57, p. 4, 30/8/57, p. 4.

The "rebels" lacked any positive association.

This attempt to demonize the "rebels" occurred not only when it was perhaps justifiable, as in "terrorist" cases involving civilians, such as the case of Melouza when 300 people were massacred [see *Le Monde's* report of the incident (1/6/57, p. 3 ff & 2-3/6/57), and the outspoken attacks by Duverger (5/6/57, pp. 1-2), Chênebenoit and HBM (2-3/6/57, p. 1)], but also in numerous instances when evil characteristics were attributed to them.

This lack of positive association also happened even when their actions seemed to warrant some kind of praise for their humanity - as when they released prisoners.

When Sub-lieutenant Prax was released by the "rebels", the paper's report stated that the "rebels" did not have the time

to kill their prisoners but could only flee as the soldiers patrol was approaching (*Le Monde*, 8-9/1/56). It is hard to imagine that, if that had really been their aim, they could not have found the time or an "appropriate" way of "disposing" of their prisoners.

(7)

Le Monde reported "terrorist" acts in and around the cities when they came to its knowledge, identifying locations, giving the place where the incidents occurred, the number and, whenever possible the names and ages of the victims.

See for instance 16/1/57, p. 5. and 27-28/1/57, p. 3.

Le Monde reported the activity of the nationalists as consisting of attacks on the settlers, strategic positions and farms (4/4/57, p. 4), assassinations of Europeans (4 Européens assassinés 7/8/57, p. 4), teachers (11/5/57, p. 3 & 17/5/57, p. 4) and "collaborators" with the French authorities, kidnapping (kidnapping of families 15/5/57, p. 4), sabotage activity, arson (incendie de gourbis, musulmane et enfant 18 mois brûlés vifs, 24/4/57, p. 4 & 15/5/57, p. 4), attacks and harassment of troops (harcelements 11/1/56), criminal derailments, attack of coaches (28/1/56), convoys (7-8/4/57, p. 3), gendarmerie (24/4/57, p. 4); a large part of their activity was reported as including acts of indiscriminate terrorism killing Muslim civilians (27/4/57, p. 4), notables (31/5/57, p. 6), placing bombs (27/4/57, p. 4 & 17/5/57, p. 4, attentats individuels), sometimes resulting in the death of important people (ambush leading to the killing of a senators'son, Captain Portman, 3/8/57, p. 4; killing of reserve lieutenant-colonel 15/5/57, p. 4) to give but a few examples.

(8)

In *L'assassinat de neuf <<délégués>> musulmans confirme la volonté du FLN de faire échouer par tous les moyens la réforme municipale. Le Monde*, 25/4/57, p. 4.

If they did not resort to intimidation or assassination, the paper stated it was for selfish reasons, for instance, that they were letting Muslims work with the administration so that they could be trained whenever they wanted to use them as cadres at a later date, or because they did not want to draw particular attention to such and such a person who was already working with them.

(9)

Described as being from the area (*du pays*), not likely to go away (not staying in the villages but not too far away), black-maling the inhabitants, forcing the "fellahs" into paying contributions or sawing posts (*scier des poteaux*). In *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3 (Herremann).

(10)

Trying to obtain money by force from Algerians and Europeans alike. In *Un pharmacien algérien (qui ne payait plus le FLN) tué par une bombe, Le Monde*, 21-22/4/57, p. 2. The rebels were described as taxing people for crop and cattle in 23/4/57, p. 1 28-29/4/57, p. 2, and 24/4/57, p. 4, when the paper reported *Deux colons arrêtés dans l'Oranais pour avoir versé de l'argent aux rebelles*.

For this description, *Le Monde* relied very often on reports by the army, government and official sources, as well as

material from news agencies, especially government and official ones (AFP).

(11)

And to be causing them weariness (lassitude), in *Le FLN imposerait lourdement les populations musulmanes*, in *Le Monde*, 14/8/57, p. 4.

Their excessive demands were said to be much resented:

Quelques exigences rigoristes, comme l'interdiction de fumer (observée dans la rue, mais non dans les demeures), ou aberrantes, comme le mot d'ordre de désertion des écoles, sont depuis longtemps mal supportées(..).

See Eugène Mannoni, *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.

(12)

Which the paper reproduced stating that it did not have the time to check them. See *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3.

(13)

See *Le Monde*, 3/8/57, p. 4.

(14)

Independence or the renunciation of French Algeria by France would have amounted to the suppression of Article 1 of the loi-cadre, which was the most liberal statute adopted by France for Algeria over the period studied here.

(15)

The thesis advanced by the FLN (no negotiation without the recognition of the right of independence) was presented as having been maximalist. The journalist stated that even the "cercles officieux" who did not have this *rigueur d'expression* did not open the way for useful talks as they insisted that the first step to be taken by the French government should have been to have renounced the idea of Algeria as an integral part of France. So the journalist concluded that an outcome was very far off and even those speaking in those terms were under no illusion on the chances of negotiations at present.

(16)

Not keen on, or fearful of, cease fire proposals, Herreman wrote that, from what he could glean from them, the offer was a proposal for surrender (*amman*) with safeguards of life and property and would put a stronger imbalance between the 20,000 odd on the one side and the 400,000 well equipped and ubiquitous administration on the other. Furthermore, he stated that "our adversaries" add that all the strength of the "resistance", which is inherent to a clandestine movement, would collapse because the leaders will become known and this will decrease the weight of the "ALN" in the conflict.

(17)

This possibility was presented as a real one merely because:
certains hommes politiques l'ont présentée comme un risque grave qu'ils se refusent quant à eux d'assurer.

The paper wondered then why :

On peut alors se demander pourquoi le FLN, au risque d'être incompris, voire désapprouvé par les nations les plus favorables à sa cause, refuse de

s'engager dans cette voie et maintient obstinément une condition préalable contre laquelle viennent se briser tous les efforts de règlement que peuvent tenter même les hommes les plus libéraux.

(18)

Journalists often referred to a hardening of the FLN's attitude 26/12/57, 2/1/58 and in *Après l'échec des bons offices et la déception de l'ONU: La tendance intransigeante se renforce au sein du FLN*, *Le Monde*, 4/1/58, p. 1.

(19)

Such as Kiouane and Abbas who, for instance, on one occasion declared that if the French authorities wanted to negotiate they knew who they had to talk to: the Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR). See *En réponse au mémo du FLN les offres de cessez-le-feu ont été rejetées* declare-t-on de source officielle. In *Le Monde*, 17/8/57, p. 4.

(20)

A vrai dire, les thèses exposées par le dr Debaghine, si elles n'avaient pas été réaffirmées publiquement depuis quelque temps, constituent depuis fort longtemps la plate-forme politique du Front de libération. Proclamées <<officiellement>> par le FLN, au lendemain de son congrès du 20 août 1956, elles ont été confirmées depuis lors à plusieurs reprises -notamment par les émissaires nationalistes dans diverses capitales d'Europe et d'Amérique- et se retrouvent dans les mémoires déposés à l'ONU, par le Front à la veille des débats de février.

Le Monde, 24-25/3/57.

The paper was constantly reminded of their aim as when it reported (in quotes) Lamine Debaghine's statements at press conferences arguing that independence was a prerequisite (Dr Debaghine: *Le peuple algérien voit chaque jour augmenter sa détermination de se libérer de l'oppression*, in *Le Monde*, 23/3/57, p.2), and that there was nothing wrong in restituer le bien d'autrui.

(21)

Ferhat Abbas's statements were also echoed, but nationalists' response to the government proposals of cease fire were quoted extensively to highlight their intransigence and obstinacy. Debaghine's statements were described the next day in terms of:

(...) son ton, son acharnement à fermer toutes les issues... levé les doutes que l'on entretenait ici ou là sur l'intransigence du FLN.

In *Après la déclaration du Dr Debaghine la <<délégation extérieure>> du FLN s'est ralliée à l'extrémisme des combattants*, *Le Monde*, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.

(22)

(...) repousse aussi brutalement non seulement le <<cessez le feu>>, mais encore les élections libres, telles qu'elles sont proposées par

(23)
See below.

(24)
Debaghine was said to have repeated what was not acceptable for France (and to have even been rejected by the liberals of Algeria) that the French would have to chose between the statute of foreigners and Algerian citizenship. The paper drew attention to his credentials and stressed how observers remarked on the lack of flexibility, subtlety and nuance characteristic of somebody like Abbas, for instance, had. P.Herreman in *Après la déclaration du Dr Debaghine la <délégation extérieure> du FLN s'est ralliée à l'extrémisme des combattants. Le Monde, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.*

(25)
Bourguiba was said to be flabbergasted by their attitude (*Le Monde, 19/4/57*), not accepting a referendum unless it included not only autonomy but also independence. In P.Herreman *Le FLN n'accepterait de référendum que si les Algériens étaient en mesure de se prononcer ouvertement sur l'indépendance. Le Monde, 10/4/57, p. 5.*

(26)
It won the support of Jeanson but not of Mauriac and Barrat. See also below.

(27)
But *Le Monde* warned not to expect the FLN to offer a referendum because it described it as being disunited, and or as achieving unity only with a lot of difficulty:

Il ne faut pas s'attendre toutefois à voir le FLN prendre l'initiative de proposer un referendum. Il faudrait d'abord qu'un accord se réalise entre ses dirigeants, sinon au sein d'organismes directeurs qu'il est difficile de réunir.

Even if it were achievable, could they be capable of an opening which will be perceived as a concession in the maquis, the paper argued? This concession was seen as a major opening, as it would have led to making independence an electoral issue, as opposed to a prerequisite. See Philippe Herreman, *Le Monde, 10/4/57, p. 5.*

(28)
See Chapter 2.

(29)
According to *Le Monde*, the FLN saw the authorities' insistence on elections only as a confirmation of previous rigging and one more reason to be wary of them. They did not believe that the representatives of nations, called as observers, would be able to control every aspect of those elections in a very large country like Algeria.

(30)

Their insistence on elections without preconditions to an Algerian Assembly, which would be the only body competent to speak in the name of the Algerian population and, which, without preconditions, would be able to decide freely the future fate of Algeria.

In this respect, the paper reported that the nationalists had pointed out the contradictions between the commitment of the French government to negotiate with those freely elected and the unilateral setting by the French government of the main lines of this statute.

A ce propos les porte parole du Front n'ont pas manqué de relever la contradiction entre l'engagement de négocier le futur statut de l'Algérie avec des représentants librement élus et la détermination unilatérale par le gouvernement des grandes lignes de ce statut.

(31)

certaines de leurs écrits laissent entendre (without indicating which ones).

(32)

The FLN was also described as having been cornered (because they could not possibly win) and as caught up and forced, against any common sense, to prolong the struggle (for fear of losing members to Messali). Philippe Herreman, *Face aux positions du gouvernement le FLN maintient la reconnaissance du droit à l'indépendance comme condition préalable à une négociation*. In *Le Monde*, 8/3/57, p. 2.

(33)

See Après l'échec des bons offices et la déception de l'ONU, la tendance intransigeante se renforce au sein du FLN, in *Le Monde*, 4/1/58, p. 1.

(34)

Only Francis Jeanson was seen to be siding with them.

Basing its articles on *France-Observateur* and *El Moudjahid*, *Le Monde* presented the FLN as not willing to accept the views of French democrats as it considered them to be on the side of the "colonialists". See *Le Monde*, 2/1/58, p. 3.

(35)

See Chapters 10, 12, and 13.

(36)

When he got wind of the news that the MNA was presenting a dossier of atrocities to the US President, he wrote and protested that the *examen de conscience* by the French would inevitably be used by their adversaries -and this he was not prepared to permit.

Still convinced that he was right to speak out for France's honour, "as others did", he claimed that that gave him the right to protest when foreign propaganda was trying to use them to deform the meaning of their testimony. For him the refusal of certain methods in no way justified the terrorism of the FLN, as the latter's action was not compatible with humanity.

See Où le FLN se trompe by Pierre-Henri Simon in *Le Monde*, 19/4/57, p. 1.

(37)

Arguing for a moderate emancipation, he stated that it was certainly not to give the FLN leaders the opportunity to continue "using the same means to demand an absolute right which was not justified by history or the complexity of the present situation." It was not to enable them to opt for virulent nationalism but for a realistic policy instead.

He stated that neither side could win the war, and that if the movement of protest was gaining momentum, it was to show a will by a number of Frenchmen to recognise what is "valid in the desire for emancipation of Algerian Muslims and what is obsolete in structures handed down from the 19th century and the need to rethink the conditions of French presence in the Maghrib".

(38)

The right of self determination was in no way recognised -as it would have resulted in substituting one alienation by another, and the replacement of an inequity by another:

...le devoir de ne pas laisser se substituer une aliénation à une autre et une violence à une autre. Les iniquités d'hier doivent être balayées; les droits des communautés et des races doivent être équilibrés et garantis dans une synthèse neuve. Mais qu'il soit bien entendu que la protestation contre la cruauté et l'injustice n'implique nullement l'adhésion aux plans d'un racisme arabe ou berbère, qui ne ferait que les déplacer en les accentuant.

See *Le Monde* 19/4/57, p. 1.

(39)

See Chapter 5.

(40)

When it explained the relationship between the FLN and the Communist party, *Le Monde* did specify that the members of the Communist Party had joined the FLN as individuals, and not as a group, and that the Communist party had not succeeded in making the FLN a *red maquis*.

Because, unlike other movements such as the UDMA and Ulemas whose leaders can be seen at top jobs within the FLN, the latter accepted the rank and file and refused the leaders.

The FLN was said to have known that the Communists were not without *arrière-pensée* but not to have considered them as dangerous.

See Eugene Mannoni, *Le Monde*, 23/3/57, p. 3.

(41)

Ibid.

(42)

The community which was the *raison d'être* of the party - 81% of its members were Muslims.

Le Monde recalled that the CGT had been dissolved since its members were as involved as the Right in booing M.G.Mollet and the two component groups had fought each other ever since that event.

The split was said to be have been so significant that, at the end of the strike of 28 January 1957, the French workers themselves were requesting sanctions to be taken against the

Muslim strikers (and threatening to strike themselves if their demands were not met).

The paper provided a brief account of its most recent history, which it described as too close to the French model.

Ibid.

(43)

And fears were expressed when the activities of the USTA were extended to the field of agriculture. *Le Monde*, on this occasion, was keen to recall the remarks made by Europeans of Algeria that its platform (unification of the Maghreb) was similar to that of the FLN, and the paper's conclusion was that:

L'USTA est l'expression syndicale de ce front. On craint que l'engouement probable des travailleurs musulmans agricoles pour la nouvelle formation ne donne à cette dernière une puissance considérable qui s'emploiera à mettre en difficulté l'agriculture algérienne et que cette action complètera dans la légalité l'action terroriste des hors la loi. Le Monde, 22/2/56.

(44)

Le Monde, 4/1/58, p. 3.

(45)

According to the journalists, these were the objectives of the FLN as set out to him: "a curefew in Paris would make the French think".

(46)

The paper reported that they estimated that there would be other battles, that terrorism was more "rewarding" (payant) than ambushes or troops engagements and that Algiers will be "our Dien Bien Phu". In *Le Monde*, 4/1/58.

(47)

Their rejection of a liberal formula limiting independence institutionally such as autonomy or federalism with France reportedly found in *El Moujahid*.

See also above.

(48)

See also above.

(49)

And very critical of them, judging them very severely (semi-colonial status), although they distinguished between the people and the Palace.

(50)

Loin d'utiliser les divisions politiques dans la métropole, ou de justifier les partisans de la négociation en assouplissant leurs méthodes, ils ne veulent parler ni de droite ni de gauche: ils affrontent en bloc la <<puissance coloniale>>. Plus encore que la franche hostilité à la droite, la

<<trahison>> des socialistes, la <<pasivité>> des communistes, provoque leur méprisante amertume.

(51)

Ils n'acceptent le dialogue qu'avec la gauche non communiste, mais c'est pour lui demander de renoncer à ses <<restrictions>>, à ses <<étapes>>, à ses <<compromis>> et de soutenir <<sans réserves>> la lutte du peuple algérien pour son indépendance.

(52)

But, according to the journalist, no serious revision of policy was envisaged. These were only manoeuvres to alarm the Americans and convince them to put pressure on France.

(53)

One might have suggested from earlier reports by the paper on the thinking and activities of the Army (see Chapter 5) that the Cold War was already there from the paper's writings on psychological warfare, and with the fight against subversion coming from the South.

But if the FLN were to embark on this path, it would get closer to Egypt and would isolate itself in North Africa -that was why, it was suggested, they would hesitate to venture in that direction. See Philippe Herreman, *Le Monde*, 4/1/58, p. 3.

(54)

P. Herreman wrote that the thought that they could not fail where Morocco and Tunisia had succeeded led them to follow the reasoning that if the US and USSR refused to extend the Cold War to North Africa, they would force/push them to do so (One would have thought that Communism was already there according to some of *Le Monde's* reports and the reasons and the methods of the fighting]. Pushing one against the other would have led, in their view, to a rapid solution of conflict. If the FLN were to go on this path, he remarked, it would get closer to Cairo and would isolate itself in North Africa and that move was doubtful in his view. In *Le Monde*, 9/1/58, p. 3.

(55)

See *Le Monde* 8-9/1/56.

There were no signs of any abatement of the rebels' activity, which sometimes inflicted serious casualties (tens of deaths, many more injured) to French troops near Tebessa with organised "gangs" of 300 men who found it easy to take refuge in neighbouring countries, *Le Monde*, 30/11/56, p. 1.

Some of the attacks by these "rebels" were quite daring: they even went inside prisons to free other prisoners, and some of these remarkable attempts even succeeded. *Le Monde*, 20/12/56, p. 7.

The FLN were described as continuing the fight despite the severe reverses they suffered at the hands of the French troops and the failure of their insurrectional strike.

They were also described as having moved south and as having engaged in murderous "accrochages", acting in groups of some 200, and showing renewed aggressiveness. The journalist Jean Francois stated that the map of the rebellion had modified considerably in a year. Their number had doubled. He pointed out, nevertheless, that it was never a question of numbers but of arms. From official figures on the number of weapons seized,

he gave an approximation that about a 1000 were received every month in the last six. See *Le Monde*, 23/4/57, p. 1.

Even at the beginning of 1958 some of the reports saw them as very active and threatening (*petite ville de Saïda harcelée pendant 45 minutes*, see *Le Monde*, 3/1/58, p. 2).

(56)

See *Le Monde*, 3/1/56. In this instance, it was Libya and Egypt that were said to have done the pushing.

The journalist Jean Francois even declared that a number of Moroccans were involved with the rebels in the border fighting, or in propaganda, and urging for the departure of the *roumis*. He stated that these were positively identified amongst the dead after battles. See *Le Monde*, 23/4/57, p. 1.

(57)

The Algerian nationalists needed arms for their struggle. They tried to acquire them by different means. The most common way for arms procurement was from stocks left over from the Second World War and from arms brought in from abroad (either by land through Morocco, Tunisia, the Saharian borders or by sea).

Le Monde presented the FLN as having benefitted from substantial help from abroad and stated that it believed that the French government was compiling a "voluminous file" for the allies on the help provided by the Arab countries to the "rebels" of North Africa. It listed evidence of that help and emphasised less the arms traffic, quite important in itself, than the military training provided in camps in Arab countries.

Le Monde echoed ministerial concerns (Pineau) about new types of armaments obtained by the "rebels" which replaced the traditional acquisitions through contraband on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders, and through attacks of arms and ammunition depots in Algeria. This, it was argued, was revealed through the kind of targets hit, the nature of the damage caused, and the intensity of the fighting, as well as the aggressiveness of the "rebels." The latter were described, on that occasion, as no longer avoiding the fighting, or saving cartridges and ammunition, by the "sustained fire" (*feu nourri*) of their automatic weapons. The paper found it difficult to estimate the number of arms, but conceded occasionally that French ammunition depots seemed to have provided the bulk of these armaments. It reported that more and more war weapons were used by the rebels in the place of hunting rifles and that there was more concentration of automatic weapons to give them greater fire power - as well as the use of arms known, but not used, before. *Le Monde*, 28/2/56.

(58)

Le Monde, 21/2/56.

(59)

Usually when the "rebels" surrendered or were caught, they were described as having had a hard year or to have been working in extremely difficult conditions. See *Le Monde*, 17/1/56.

(60)

When the victims of "terrorists" fall the paper usually pointed out that the victim had a wife and a number of children. But this was obviously not the case when the nationalists

were affected. It was as though these people had no family or relatives to speak of. See *Le Monde*, 17/1/56.

(61)

For the FLN animators, he stated, can find satisfaction in their year's balance sheet (February 1956- February 1957):

Et c'est alors, assurément, que les animateurs du FLN peuvent trouver dans le bilan d'une année de sérieux motifs de satisfaction.

(62)

He listed the mountain and the sea as being forbidden areas so that in a sense "aucune région ne mérite désormais l'appellation de <<zone calme>>...La rébellion a tissé un <<quadrillage>> à sa manière. *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.

Le Monde occasionally established a map of the area where the "rebels" were active and that showed large areas at times which were declared unsafe. In an article on the climate of insecurity in the country, *Le Monde* drew a map showing small areas where the "rebels" were in total control, areas where occasional attacks occurred and other areas where the situation changed from day to day or from hour to hour. See *Le Monde* 21/2/56.

(63)

He did not say whom.

(64)

Apart from the general reporting indicating that the FLN was not winning, there was no delay for the paper in indentifying the weaknesses (faiblesses) of the movement.

(...) portée de son action militaire demeure réduite. Partout disséminés d'Oran à Constantine, les bandes de l'Armée de libération [his italics] n'ont pu arracher en effet, fût-ce aux confins de la Régence et de l'empire chérifien, la moindre zone, la plus petite ville, aux troupes françaises.

In *Force et faiblesses du FLN*, by Eugene Mannoni, *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5

(65)

Un seul fait suffirait à manifester cette emprise : si M.R. Lacoste a maintenu quelques relations avec des notables ou d'anciens élus il n'a pu trouver parmi eux aucun homme de quelque crédit qui consentirait à faire sien le programme gouvernemental.

Ibid.

The paper accepted here that that might be because no other means of democratic expression were available.

(66)

Eugène Mannoni presented the fact that "Il paraît que les rebelles bénéficient de l'appui, spontané ou non, d'une grande partie de la population" as a strength (puissance) of the FLN. In *Force et faiblesses du FLN*, *Le Monde* 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.

(67)

Quelle s'exerce par la terreur - moins que ne

l'affirment les autorités, plus que ne le disent certains <<libéraux>>- ou par la persuasion, leur influence s'est accrue de manière plus évidente encore que ne s'est ramifié leur <<quadrillage>>(....).

(...) Après l'adhésion de diverses personnalités, dont certaines appartenaient au propre parti du Ministre résident, et l'absorption <<à titre individuel>> des membres du parti communiste algérien, le <<Front>> a pu exercer une autorité que les <<Messalistes>> ne sauraient contester, du moins en Algérie.

(68)

Au siècle de Bandoung, le mot <<indépendance>> a un pouvoir de séduction que ne possèdent certainement pas l'exposé quelque peu rébarbatif de <<réformes>> qui paraissent mesquines aux foules et que le terrorisme et la répression empêchent au demeurant d'appliquer. La force des dirigeants du FLN c'est d'avoir hurlé ce mot-là.

The errors of the administration (the example of more severe sanctions taken against the Muslim strikers than the European looters -see chapter 7) were also said to have been a contributory factor in the strength of the FLN. In *Force et faiblesses du FLN*, Eugène Mannoni, *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.

(69)

(...) leur faiblesse, de n'avoir pas su convaincre l'opinion internationale qu'ils étaient capables d'assurer le sort d'un pays aussi complexe que l'Algérie <<sous-développée>> où vivent plus d'un million d'Européens.

In *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, p. 1.

But the paper took no census of international opinion on this matter and presented its own belief as a parameter.

(70)

As far as the rivalry between the two branches of the nationalist movement was concerned, the paper accurately described the nationalists as a movement divided between two groups, FLN and MNA, fighting each other. The nationalist movement was never presented as a united front and this portrayal continued until the end of the Fourth Republic. This will be illustrated by the coverage of the immigrant community in France in Chapter 7.

Le Monde, which had never been in favour of the MNA, seemed to express then a preference for it by echoing the views of the socialist *Demain*, which stated that talking to the MNA instead of giving a *de facto* recognition to the FLN might save the fate of France.

See *Demain: on a eu tort d'ignorer le MNA*. In *Le Monde*, 7/6/57, p. 4.

In fact, there were reports of real battles taking place with a considerable number of victims well into 1957 (see *Selon un rebelle rallié à Trezel Une sanglante bataille a mis au prises des bandes FLN et messalistes dans le Djebel Nador*, *Le Monde*, 28-29/4/57, p. 2) when it was nevertheless clear that the FLN was really in total control and there remained only small pockets of MNA forces.

Le Monde also echoed most of the mutual accusations by the two movements. e.g. *Le MNA accuse les leaders du FLN d'être <<des agents de l'administration>>* in January 1957.

(71)

Although on this occasion it advised caution, as it reported the news on the basis of a leaflet, the source of which could not be checked. See *Des tracts opposant le FLN et l'Armée de libération circulent à Alger* (from its special correspondent in Algiers), *Le Monde*, 13/3/57, p. 2.

(72)

Explosion au <<Club des Algériens>> à Tunis le <<Colonel>> FLN Ouamrane estime qu'il était personnellement visé. In *Le Monde*, 30/3/57, p. 1.

(73)

On this occasion rumour had it that Krim, because of his old rivalry with Ouamrane, had been deprived of his command and put under house arrest by the latter. *Le bruit court à Alger que Krim Belkacem aurait été privé de son commandement.* In *Le Monde*, 1/8/57, p. 4.

(74)

These distinctions between hardliners and softliners were always highlighted.

The most influential person in the Algerian movement was said to be Abane Ramdane: he was "l'homme fort" who mapped out the road ahead to collective leadership. The reason given for that was that he had always supported only one method of achieving Algerian independence - that was total war. Today again, wrote the journalist, the *politiques* "had to bow to him" as the steps hitherto taken (presumably the attempt to renounce the precondition of independence and the acceptance of the good offices of Morocco and Tunisia, suggested by the others) in an attempt to adopt a conciliatory attitude, by preferring a "Franco-Maghrebine dialogue to internationalisation, clearly did not pay." The paper explained the nationalists' view that the French government, not having replied and even having pretended to have ignored them in December 1957, in the same way it had been doing since 1954, as it had in 1956 after the failure of the contacts and the subsequent arrest of Ben Bella (see below), enabled the hard liners (*tendance dure*) to win the day over the softliners, the "military" over the *politiques*.

Ramdane was also said to have thought that the war was going to be long and that he could sustain it; his entourage asserted that there was no lack of men or arms and that the blows received would not affect their combativity. 4/1/58, p. 3.

(75)

Between Krim and Ouamrane, for instance, whereas they were both Kabyles. Ethnic conflict and differences amongst the various groups were highlighted for the readers. This insistence on conflict and differences obviously hid from the readership the realities of a common situation and the community of feeling and undermined in the eyes of this readership any notion of unity amongst the population. It seemed unlikely at times to conclude from *Le Monde*'s reports that these groups had anything in common. See *Le Monde*, 10/8/57, p. 4.

(76)

On the demotion of Krim see *Belkacem conserverait ses fonctions au FLN*, in *Le Monde*, 8/8/57, p. 4. Two days later *Le Monde* stated that one ought not to give too much credence to denials, and even if these denials were to be believed, the paper insisted that they were far from providing any convincing proof that harmony existed within the FLN ranks. 10/8/57, p. 4.

(77)

The tryptic, as conceived by the French authorities, was cease-fire, free elections then negotiations. It could be argued here that the independence prerequisite was established from day one of the war and the proposals put forward by the government were so formulated as to make their acceptance impossible. The report referred to here can be found in *Le Monde*, 26/4/57, p. 5.

(78)

An example was given of 250 men sent with their leader finding it difficult to establish his authority.

It is worth noting that most leaders were presented as being a product of the French army, soldiers and non commissioned officers who had their training and who fought within its ranks. See *Le Monde*, 10/8/57, p. 4.

(79)

This obviously was not true since the French authorities kept Ben Bella as well as other leaders in jail. See below.

The paper wrote that by instinct they had made Ben Bella the leader and now he was under arrest (see below) in the same way as most of the hardened fighters, and those abroad not having had the expected success, they were left with only low ranking leaders torn or compromised without any real influence.

In *Force et faiblesses du FLN*, by Eugene Mannoni, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.

(80)

Minor and fundamental dissensions and rivalries were seen as an inherent feature of a movement that was characterised by a collective leadership. In *Le Monde* 10/8/57, p. 4.

(81)

"Somewhere in the maquis, the paper stated, there was a five man committee (*comité de coordination et d'exécution*), which in spite of the absence or the arrest of its animators managed to lead an efficacious action.... which remains beneath the surface throughout Algeria (*d'un bout à l'autre de l'Algérie, à ras de quartier, à ras de douar*).

(82)

Le Monde was to make that known a few days after the arrest.

(83)

As reported by *Le Monde*, 27/10/56, p. 1 and 29/10/56.

(84)

Henri Pierre *Le Monde*, 27/10/57, p. 1.

(85)

N'ont pas abouti, in *Le Monde*, 28-29/10/56.

(86)

Le Monde followed this with a declaration by the PM that no guarantees were given (30/10/56).

(87)

Ligue des droits de l'homme, *Conscience Française*, the Republicans, Radical and Radical Socialists, the Independents, the Liberals, *Amitiés Marocaines*, *Club des jacobins*, the group *CERES*, *Jeunes Républicains* etc..

(88)

It was pointed out that talks between the Moroccans and the Algerian nationalist leaders did not lead to any disturbance or demonstration, and noted that:

Le désaveu brutal et imprévisible de l'initiative de sa Majesté le Sultan, la veille encore encouragée, sape le crédit de la France et remet en question la politique d'amitié et de coopération franco-marocaine (...).

Worries were also expressed about:

(...) immédiates réactions de l'opinion publique et de leur conséquences éventuelles sur la sécurité de tous les habitants du Maroc; adjurent le gouvernement français de reconsidérer sa position et de saisir l'occasion offerte par les deux états amis de trouver une solution pacifique.

See *Le Monde*, 24/10/56.

(89)

The protests of the liberal groups in Morocco were to a certain extent justified, as riots followed the same day in which a number of Europeans were killed in the main Moroccan towns. This was reported by *Le Monde*, 25/10/56.

(90)

Apart from the wave of violent demonstrations, the arrests also led to the protest resignation of French officials in charge of North African affairs; A Savary, French Secretary of State for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs, resigned on the grounds that he had not been informed. He thought, therefore, that he did not enjoy the necessary confidence to continue representing the government in the two newly independent countries. See *Le Monde*, 24/10/56.

Le Monde's comments on the resignations of the two other French representatives in Tunis, M. Leusse and M. Dubois were merely factual. The paper reported that *L'offre de démission de M. Leusse suscite une vive émotion à Tunis* and that of M. Dubois (in small print) *laisse toute la responsabilité à M. Lalouette, ministre plénipotentiaire et au général Cogny.*

(91)

"It is not the capture of FLN leaders", wrote the paper, "but circumstances, and, to a certain extent, the consequences that explain the resignation of M. Savary and M. Leusse" (Dubois was not mentioned in this article). "They were informed by the Sultan of the <dealings> between Algiers and the plane following the decision to divert the latter, but could not get any confirmation from M. Lacoste until later that evening". *Le Monde* told its readers that the Council of Ministers received

from M. Leusse a letter of resignation, in which the Ambassador was said to have strongly criticised the "reversal of policy" and "deplored the situation in which he [had been] placed". What this clearly amounted to was a condemnation of the arrests: the act itself, and not the circumstances nor the consequences that the paper referred to. The paper did not explain the evident contradiction.

As for M. Savary, *Le Monde* was to add that the latter felt that he did not have the authority nor the confidence required to fulfil his duties; and that he had stated that he could no longer: "guarantee the safety of the colonies, the status of the army and the fate of the civil service." See *Le Monde*, 28-29/10/56.

(92)

Le Monde reported, for instance, Pineau's statement to the press denying that the operation was directed against the Sultan or Bourguiba and describing the arrest of the nationalists as a mere police operation:

Il s'agit d'une action de police et non d'une action dirigée contre le Sultan et contre M. Bourguiba.

(93)

See *Le Monde*, 25/10/56, 28-29/10/56.

(94)

On the Algerian side the comments reported were that "France has dared.... reborn hope in Algeria.... shows audacity, energy, French will.... purifies the future (tomorrow) for the two communities" (*La Dépêche Quotidienne d'Alger*). There were also reactions which considered the event as "the most important operation since the Cicero affair, which fooled the Germans before the allies' landing in Normandy" (*Journal D'Alger*).

On the other side of the Mediterranean the reports were no less jubilant.

Most of the attitude of the mainland papers reported by *Le Monde* ranged from *L'Aurore's* "clean sweep which decapitated the H.Q. of the rebellion.... let French justice be implemented" (24/10/56), through *Le Parisien Libéré's* request for a "deserved punishment" (*châtiment qu'ils méritent*) (24/10/56) to *Le Figaro's* incomprehension of Bourguiba who was "indignant that France arrests its *ennemis acharnés* but found it perfectly normal to consider/treat the fellagas leaders as hosts of the Sultan and guests of the Tunisian government.... public opinion will decide" (24/10/56). The latter thought the *réaction salutaire... ne doit pas être contrariée par les intrigues du défaitisme* (25/10/56). The same day *L'Aurore* was said to be full of praise when it commented that: *..opération, si brillamment conduite... pleinement satisfait l'opinion publique française* and warned the two former protectorates: *de ne point nous contraindre à étendre sa portée. La France peut encore faire beaucoup pour eux, elle ne leur demande que d'être loyaux. Ce n'est pas une exigence excessive.*

(95)

Two papers seemed slightly unhappy. Whereas *Franc-Tireur* wanted to get out of the "police climate" and attacked both colonialist and anti-colonialist nationalism, warning that war was not a solution: *la guerre ne résout rien*, *Libération* was quite worried: *Où nous menez-vous M. Mollet? Vos paroles sont*

de paix, mais vos actes sont de guerre. Et la France n'en a déjà que trop saigné. It even went a step further and wondered how negotiations could be possible if possible negotiators "are being thrown in prison". See *Le Monde*, 25/10/56, p. 4.

(96)

Only *L'Humanité* appeared severe in its judgement describing the operation as "an act of extreme gravity which could exacerbate matters", which demonstrates "the opposition of G. Mollet's government to any peaceful solution of the conflict as these leaders, as socialist journalists have pointed out, were going to Tunis to propose a negotiated settlement". In *Le colonialisme en vieillissant se pourrait*. See *Le Monde*, 24/10/56 & 25/10/56.

(97)

Two Indian newspapers' opposition was noted by *Le Monde*, which reported that *The Hindustani Standard* had requested an immediate and satisfactory solution and stated that assurances given by the French government were no longer to be trusted. On the same line, drawing a parallel with broken assurances given in 1942 by British authorities in India and the consequences that ensued, *The Indian Express* was reported to have stated that this kidnapping (enlèvement) was the most deplorable mistake made by the French in North Africa. (26/10/56)

Le Monde also told its readers that the AFL-CIO considered the operation to be an act of sabotage of a conference designed to find a Franco-Algerian agreement, which had caused worldwide indignation and had asked for the UN to play a more "positive rôle" on: *la saisie récente par les Français d'un avion...* (27/10/56, p. 7).

(98)

The position of *The Times* was highlighted (*Le Monde*, 25/10/56 and 26/10/56). The paper wondered whether the decision had been wise as it "had insulted Arab hospitality which is unforgivable" and thought that the cost of the arrest would be dear. But *The Times* was said to have maintained that the French were within their rights, as these leaders were convicted by French justice.

Ces hommes étaient les instigateurs d'une guerre contre le gouvernement français en territoire français. De plus, c'est avec une irritation croissante que l'opinion française entendaient les deux voix dont parlaient les dirigeants marocains et tunisiens. Ceux-ci font d'un côté profession de désirer des relations étroites et amicales avec la France, en donnant d'un autre côté aide et encouragement à ses pires ennemis. (25/10/56)

The Times was reported to have thought France's moral position to be strong. It also stated that the French had strongly protested against these talks and that G. Mollet had personally warned the Sultan. For the paper the operation was justified and the capture of the nationalists would repress the uprising as:

"a show of force is likely to be efficient as it satisfies French public opinion and nothing is as much respected as force in the Arab world". (26/10/56)

(99)

The paper found the issue slightly complicated by the fact

that these people were considered to be "authentic spokesmen" by the governments of Tunisia and Morocco. This was thought to have been due to the insensitivity of the two governments and their inability to understand the reasons which conditioned the French government's action.

Accepting their key moderating role in relation to some extremists, *acharnés à attaquer la France et souhaiter son éviction totale...*, *Le Monde* argued that the two leaders knew that if they did not show some sort of understanding as to the reasons that motivated French activities in Algeria, they would be jeopardizing their own country's interests and willy-nilly the *de facto* solidarity which existed between France and the Maghreb. *Le Monde*, 24/10/56.

(100)

The former's definition in the *Larousse* is "examiner l'état sanitaire d'un navire, l'identité de son personnel, sa destination, sa provenance, la nature de sa cargaison" (all these were known before the flight took off). This obviously indicated that, (to a certain degree), that action was a legitimate one. The paper tried, however, to refine the analysis by asking: "bearing French identification numbers could the plane be legally forced to land by the French authorities"?

(101)

Assuming the authorities did not know to whom it belonged, could not a simple radio or telephone call have clarified the matter? But the authorities did know (the government in France was unaware) and stopped the plane for the very reason that it was carrying the leaders of the FLN, and the use of the word *arraisonnement* in this context was deliberate and biased.

(102)

See *Le Monde*, 24/10/56.

(103)

Having stated the sensitivity of the matter and pointed out that, in international law, no government could divert (*détourner*) a foreign aeroplane, the paper argued that even if the plane could not be considered French, it did nevertheless bear French identification numbers. Stating that it was basing itself on "expert opinion" (but not indicating whose), the paper argued that although it belonged to a Moroccan company, with regard to third parties and the authorities, with whom an appeal might be lodged, it was in fact within the right of the French authorities to divert the plane, as the Moroccan government failed to register it (it is worth remembering here, that the country had been independent for a few months only (2 March 1956), and that the logo of Moroccan airline did not have any importance or any legal signification (as the logo -sign- is even painted on chartered planes).

(104)

Le Monde's J. Fauvet justified the position. Even if the government had not been informed, he explained, the secret and swiftness of the capture of the "fellagua" leaders did not make it possible to inform members of the government or the President of the Republic in time. In *Le Monde*, 25/10/56.

(105)

See *Le Monde*, 25/10/56. Jean Planchais informed me that he was present at a civic reception and that the expression on G.Mollet's face upon on hearing the news was more akin to anger and embarrassment than anything else. By contrast his defence minister, Bourguès-Maunoury, was delighted.

(106)

Deliberations on the matter would not have changed anything, he wrote, but if immediate repercussions could have been softened (mitigated), what government, he asked, would have taken the responsibility of letting the two main leaders of the rebellion escape? In *Le Monde*, 26/10/56.

(107)

The paper stated that the mistake made by the Sultan, in having publicly received the five emissaries of the FLN, was not questioned by any member of the government.

Fauvet accepted that the events might have tragic consequences; he seemed to object to the publicity that was given to the talks. For him to make secret contacts through accredited intermediaries was one thing, but to accept that they were given a "dazzling reception" (*avec éclat*), that they participate in a conference with representatives of two friendly countries whose mediation the French government had refused in advance, was another. He thought that a misunderstanding had occurred from one side or the other.

(108)

See above.

(109)

He wrote that the "calm of 1955" had been broken that year by revolts, violence and massacres, but only to play down the significance of Algerian nationalism in favour of the events in Hungary.

He stated that nationalism was the common denominator for the major events, from the dramatic tension of North Africa to the Middle-East, and the Far-East, including the symbol of anticolonialism, Bandung. But, for him, all these events had no common measure with what was going on in Hungary where thousands of people had been cut down by Red Army bullets, or hanged on the lamp posts of the capital, and where, he thought, the situation was ripe for a UN intervention.

Tous les arguments sont donc réunis pour légitimer une démarche à l'ONU. Les arguments moraux sont d'encore plus de poids. L'Occident ne peut pas, en dépit de tous les griefs qu'il mérite pour lui-même, assister sans rien faire au massacre d'hommes qui se réclament des idéaux de la liberté auxquels ils s'affirment si passionément attachés.

(110)

He finished his article on a note of warning to the Soviet Union.

Mais que les Soviétiques ne s'avisent pas de venir dénoncer notre colonialisme. Les événements de ces derniers jours fournissent à la France une arme à employer sans hésitation le jour où l'URSS se

hasarderait à lui demander des comptes.
Editorial of H. Beuve-Méry: recours aux Nations Unies, *Le Monde*, 28-29/10/56.

(111)
See *Le Monde*, 27/10/56, p. 5.

(112)
The operation had one spectacular side which gave satisfaction to the French:

"Why should the French always cry while the others always laugh, why should the soldiers always be fooled... To receive with pomp and circumstance leaders of the Algerian insurrection... to send them... over Algeria in a situation of war (in actual fact around but morally over) is to go beyond preliminary contacts and to scoff at (*narguer*) the French before the negotiations." This is why, he thought: *Et l'on conçoit que ce cérémonial et cette promenade aient été ressenties comme une provocation par les autorités françaises.*

(113)
Domenach was ashamed of the other side of the operation. Pointing out that the operation was: *au point de la jonction de la légalité et de la mauvaise foi*, and speaking on behalf of others (*nous sommes un certain nombre*) he wrote that he was not exactly proud. Domenach was, of course, delighted to see the secret services working as they should do; the operation was considered by him as being technically impeccable, faultless, but the result as a political failure accompanied (*assortie*) by ridicule -which would not solve anything.

On y retrouve la marque de cet esprit irréfléchi qui pousse à des fantaisies dangereuses des hommes qui, détenant une puissance militaire ou politique, ne comprennent pas qu'on les empêche de s'en servir pour la bonne cause.

(114)
Domenach found that the operation which seduced, charmed keen readers of adventure books and distracted (*diverti*) big babies (*les grands enfants*) led to political void. He objected to the fact that this operation, organised by specialists without (*à l'insu*) the government's consent, was done without regard to the possible political consequences.

(115)
On aurait tort de présenter comme victoire politique un coup de main puéril, manigancé en dehors des autorités responsables. Une fois de plus, le gouvernement est obligé de couvrir les initiatives de ses services et de se laisser imposer par eux une ligne de conduite. Nouvelle étape dans la dégradation de l'Etat, qu'on fait acclamer un peu vite comme preuve de son autorité.
This show of strength would not solve anything, according to him, apart from increasing the unnecessary atrocities and lack of safety of French residents of Morocco and Tunisia.

Mais le manquement de parole qui vient d'être sollicité, exécuté et glorifié par les autorités françaises est plus grave et s'oubliera difficilement.

Depuis dix ans les coups de force finissent en

échecs retentissants parce qu'ils sont le masque de la faiblesse et la consolation de l'impuissance.

La vraie force consiste à subordonner les moyens à la fin et non se distraire de la fin par des interventions brutales et désordonnées.

La vraie force serait de regarder en face la situation de l'Algérie, de l'expliquer à l'opinion et de choisir la voie d'une solution.

See *Le Monde*, 27/10/56, p. 5.

(116)

"Un guépier dont il importe de sortir", written by A. Philip, University professor, delegate to the UN, member of the Secrétariat (Comité Directeur) of the SFIO, who pointed out the seriousness and the gravity of the legal and moral problem involved. First, the leaders were on a plane belonging to an independent country. Secondly, because in Algeria, the government had declared that there was no war but "pacification," this deprived the people arrested of the status of "belligerents". He argued that the Chicago Convention (1944) regarding free aircraft traffic forbade "us" from compelling a foreign aircraft to land on "our" soil, and this whatever the human or material nature of its cargo. Thirdly, the Franco-Moroccan Convention meant that staff of French nationality who remained in Morocco were responsible to the Moroccan government. Fourthly, the nationalists were guests of the Sultan; their arrest, in those conditions, subjected him to a loss of face in so far as his guests were lured into a trap *<attirés dans un traquenard>* which violated fundamentals and traditions of Islamic hospitality. Fifthly, morally, the ruse used could not be legitimised whatever the motives, even if the Sultan had broken a moral code.

(117)

Cela justifierait, de la part de la France, ni une rupture de ses engagements internationaux, ni un acte de tromperie. Une attitude morale ne se juge pas essentiellement par rapport à l'attitude d'autrui, mais d'abord par rapport aux valeurs que l'on professe soi-même publiquement et auxquelles on se doit de demeurer fidèle.

Que Maurras justifie le faux patriotisme, ou Lénine le mensonge de classe, c'est normal. Qu'un réactionnaire nationaliste proclame un réalisme immoraliste et ne se préoccupe que du résultat, en ridiculisant les préoccupations juridiques ou éthiques, c'est encore compréhensible, mais un socialiste ne peut pas s'abaisser<TRUNCATED>

(118)

Since for him, it was impossible politically to admit one's wrongs, the prisoners must be kept but, because of the irregularities of their capture, they should not be prosecuted. Some action ought also to be taken, it was thought, to implement more autonomy and decentralisation in order to avoid military action against the neighbouring countries (28-29/10/56).

(119)

Who wrote less than a fortnight after the arrest which had become "old news" that it was not too late to re-examine the event and its moral, legal and "honour" implications :

Il n'est cependant pas trop tard pour examiner, revenir en arrière car une campagne commence qui voudrait nous faire croire que cette action serait moralement injustifiée, juridiquement discutable et que la France s'honorerait en reconnaissant qu'elle n'a pas le droit de juger ses prisonniers.

See *Le Monde*, 4-5/11/56.

(120)

Morality, for him, did not preclude revolt, but demanded that revolt and changes of regime should lead to better things. This was not the case in Algeria according to him. If Algeria were to be in the hands of the "rebels," that is a country of divided communities, then the French community of European descent would have to leave since their existence there would be imperilled because "these fellagas leaders... adventurers ... on taking over power, will only sell out to any other power... will become so tyrannical and will reign on a country divided and dominated by xenophobia, anti-semitism and anarchy".

(121)

Turning his attention to legal matters, Debré argued that interference by other states in the internal affairs of Algeria was an interference in the internal matters of France. Seeing that there was no war in Algeria, the meeting organised was tantamount, in his view, to an act of aggression as it contributed to the multiplication of the number of murders.

(122)

He asked in this respect why should France (when attacks are permitted for other nations) not defend her work (*oeuvre colonisatrice*), her strategic and economic interests, while other countries were helping "trouble makers and fanatics"?

(123)

"It is France that keeps these countries' public services and maintains their prosperity: they must keep to the agreement signed with France; no morality could excuse their conduct."

"Morality, honour, and the legal concept of interdependence, he wrote, dictated a condemnation of their behaviour".

Amongst those attacked were Arab countries, Spain, ARAMCO (paying rebels to assassinate the French). He saw "no reason for France to always abdicate its authority and prestige, the life and freedom of its citizens and the Muslims that put their trust in it". "Shame, he scorned, on ideologies that see honour only in abdication."

(124)

In *Le Monde*, 4-5/11/56. P. Craingue, in a letter addressed to the editor a week later, examined the arguments offered by Debré only to conclude that what he really meant was: "the end justifie[d] the means" and hoped that the shame that some Frenchmen felt might still save their honour in the words of Bernanos: *Cette honte est peut-être seule capable de sauver <<l'honneur de l'honneur>>*. *Le Monde*, 13/11/56.

(125)

The word "war" in French was not used although an equivalent expression in French *A la guerre comme à la guerre* exists.

(126)
See *Le Monde*, 25/10/56.

(127)
Une commission internationale de juristes examinera le <déroutement> de l'avion de Ben Bella in *Le Monde*, 6/4/57/p5. The lawyers in question were: Abdellatif Fillali (Morocco), M. De Vischer, professor of International Law (Belgium), M.Arno (Italy), M.Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan), and a Frenchman whose name had not yet been communicated.

The paper reported its various meetings and adjournment see *Le Monde*, 18/7/57, p. 5, La <<commission de l'avion>> ajourne ses travaux.

(128)
See *Le Monde*, 14/8/57, p. 4, Ben Bella et ses collègues refusent toujours de répondre aux questions du magistrat instructeur.

This article reported that:

Commandant Giraud s'est transporté au quartier politique de la prison de la Santé pour y procéder à un nouvel interrogatoire des leaders du FLN, Mohammed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, Hocine Ait Ali et Mustapha Lacheraf, qu'assistaient Maitres Pierre et Renée Stibbe, du barreau de Paris, Cherif Mohammed el Hachimi, AEK El Katib et Abderahmane Abdennebi, des barreaux de Tanger, Casa et Tunis... inculpés ... adopté même attitude que lors du précédent interrogatoire (26 dec) ..., soutenant l'illégalité de leur arrestation... ils ont refusé de répondre aux questions du magistrat instructeur... .

Le Monde reported that when coming out of prison the lawyers had made a declaration to the Press which it quoted.

(...) objectant conditions illégales de leur arrestation qui équivaut à leurs yeux, à une séquestration arbitraire et faisant observer que le gouvernement français a lui même accepté de soumettre ce problème à l'examen d'une commission internationale qui poursuit actuellement ses travaux.

Ibid.

(129)
Ben Bella placé sous un régime spécial, in *Le Monde*, 26/4/57, p. 5.

CHAPTER SEVEN: NOTES

(1)

This would be best done through particular key episodes of the conflict involving either the Muslim majority or the Christian minority when coverage seemed more abundant than at other times.

We will look first at the general coverage of the Europeans, with special attention being devoted to the Church, the settlers and the students community at the time of the UNEF congress.

We will then look at the Algerian community in general at the time of the general strike in February 1957. Our examination of the Algerian community's coverage would not be complete without a special look at that part of the community which, either through choice or by necessity, opted to live on the French mainland.

(2)

See Chapter 3.

(3)

Ibid.

(4)

Ibid.

(5)

See Chapters 3 and 4.

(6)

See Serigny's statement in *Le Monde*, 16/12/54.

(7)

These included demands for banning the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), for the arrest and punishment of the "rebels", for maintaining the sentences pronounced by tribunals and for inviting parliamentarians to refuse to lend their confidence to the government if these measures were not implemented.

From the start, parliamentarians who took a firm stand against the rebellion were given more space. More of their statements (which obviously condemned "terrorism") dominated the pages of *Le Monde*. Several examples could be given.

M Quilici (Independent): *Mendès-France [qui] a proclamé la souveraineté de la Tunisie a démontré que le terrorisme payait*, Mr Colonna (Democratic Left): *étouffer à sa naissance le terrorisme algérien*, in *Le Monde*, 3/11/54.

Mr René Mayer: *Je n'accepte pas le dilemme de l'autonomie qui engendrerait la république algérienne ou de l'assimilation à laquelle je ne crois pas*. In *Le Monde*, 11/12/54 and Mr J. Chevallier: *Evénements ..plan concerté...vient de l'extérieur*, in *Le Monde*, 4/11/54.

(8)

They consisted essentially of a few Communists such as Mme

Sportisse and left-wing progressive members of the First College who sympathised with Algerian "Muslim" representatives (Second College).

Le Monde began progressively to include their protests against the policy of repression in its reports, but the main outlet for their views, protests and manifestos was *L'Humanité* and other sympathetic newspapers, not *Le Monde*.

(9)

With the Communist and Muslim delegates requesting the transformation of the system and condemning the inequities and differences at the economic, social and political levels, while the liberal European elected officials were making less pressing demands. But none of these, however, seemed to be calling into question the indivisibility of the Republic (France including the three departments of Algeria) or challenging the sovereignty of France.

(10)

The reforms proposed by Soustelle, including the *Collège unique* (Single College or one man one vote), were said by the newspaper not to lead to a more sincere implementation of the 1947 Statute which it seemed to favour. The paper further stated that it would be met by scepticism and resistance: the scepticism of the "Muslims" and the resistance amongst the European population, the administration, the police and the Assembly. See *Le Monde*, 8/6/55. When caught between two trends, Soustelle received no special treatment from the paper. He was said to be described as weak for some and extreme in his efforts at repression by others:

taxé de faiblesse par les uns, il est apparu aux autres comme l'homme d'une répression à outrance... Les premiers griefs sont assurément les plus fréquemment et les plus ouvertement formulés.

See PA. Martel, *Le Monde*, 8/6/55.

The latter point of view was that of the European minority and was being presented here as the one worthy of attention. Now if the readers were to ask questions they would need to guess or know who addresses this "most common and most open" reproaches and criticism to the Governor General. The subtle answer was not in the paper. It is clear that an implicit advantage in the text had been given to the European community. Although it could be argued that it was the most articulate in terms of expressing a viewpoint, it was still outnumbered by a ratio of one to ten. This illustrates once more the idea that making sweeping statements and not finding, or rather not telling the readers, who says what, who was making these "grievances" and how representative these views were, was an indication of serious bias. As explained earlier, the number of people who had the ability and the means to express themselves or, in other words, public opinion in general, was limited to the one group.

The views of the European circles and their hostility to the new Governor General's programme in 1955 found a favourable echo in the paper.

The settlers criticisms of the government's policies (and Soustelle's in particular) were voiced throughout the pages of the paper. The impression given was that his policies were not ruthless enough. *Le Monde* reported that the settlers milieu were accusing him of lack of firmness (*manque de fermeté*) and that some of the Europeans would be campaigning against him,



while others were even demanding his recall.

Cette campagne se fait d'autant plus vive qu'approchent les élections sénatoriales qui risquent fort de se faire pour ou contre le Gouverneur Général dont certains milieux demandent déjà le rappel. In Le Monde, 14/5/55.

Soustelle turned out to be one of the most fervent supporters of a French Algeria and amongst the staunchest advocates of European settlers' interests.

Other expressions of concern and worry of the settlers and their elected officials can be found when *Le Monde* revealed the hostility towards Soustelle's plans and demands that even more severe measures be taken.

(...) altère le principe même de la présence française en Algérie.. l'heure est venue de passer aux actes adaptés... demandent instamment que l' <l'Etat de siège> soit proclamé et la loi martiale ... appliquée aux criminels. In Le Monde, 21/6/55.

(11)

Apart from a small number of Muslim leaders who, by virtue of their being supporters of the system and its benefactors, favoured the status quo with the implementation of the moderate programme of reforms, most of Algerian Muslim opinion did not find a way of expressing itself.

(12)

The desire of the Constantinois region's settlers to organise themselves in "auto-défence groups" in order to defend both their property and their crops was highlighted in *Le Monde*, 27/4/55.

Reinforcing their views, *Le Monde* wrote that the measures taken by the authorities were not enough to reassure that community: *Les dispositions prises par les autorités ne semblent guère rassurer les Français d'origine métropolitaine* when the *Chambres de l'Agriculture* met in an ordinary session and declared that they could not carry out their work in the present situation. In *Le Monde*, 13/5/55.

(13)

When the State of Emergency was adopted (see Chapter 11) in a country where the Muslim majority hardly had any protection against the excesses of the "forces of order", *Le Monde* was still questioning the capability of these most ruthless powers to protect the European community.

(...) toutes ces mesures parviendront-elles à apaiser les inquiétudes et parfois les paniques que la situation a pu susciter dans certains milieux européens?....

Le Monde, 14/5/55.

On the release of some former members of the MTLD, charged with national security offences as part of the measures that Soustelle wanted to see implemented, *Le Monde* admitted that no doubt these measures would lead to a *regain d'espoir dans les milieux musulmans qui y reconnaîtront un acte de justice*, but highlighted the negative aspects of even this just measure in the eyes of the settlers minority: *On craindra cependant*, the paper went on to say,

(...) qu'elles ne soient mal accueillies dans les milieux français de l'agriculture surtout qui ne

cessent d'exprimer leur inquiétude en même temps que leur ressentiment à l'égard des autorités.

(14)

The opinions and protests of powerful European farmers' interests (such as those of the Association interdépartementale des Chambres de l'Agriculture of Constantine) were expressed by the paper in headlines (*devant la vague de terrorisme qui s'abat, ... contre l'insuffisance des mesures prises pour assurer la sécurité* and through the publication of their statements in full (...constatent eux aussi que les départements ... se trouvent dans une situation inquiétante et que l'émeute organisée [contradiction in words, besides a veritable piece of propaganda was being published here at no cost to the organisation], *gagnant chaque jour du terrain, met en danger la vie et les biens des honnêtes populations agricoles de toutes origines (Chambre de l'Agriculture of Algiers and Oran), as well as their appeal:*

(...) un ferme et solonnel appel aux pouvoirs publics pour qu'ils révisent particulièrement à l'échelon gouvernemental leur politique décevante d'atermoiements inefficaces en raison des errements suivis... pour le maintien de l'ordre et qui donnent aux populations l'impression d'abandon et... fait douter d'une ferme volonté de ramener le calme en Algérie in *Le Monde* 15-16/5/55.

The paper had a constant concern to reassure this European community. When new troop re-inforcements were sent, *Le Monde* thought it would calm down the anxiety of the European settlers "recently under new threats":

L'arrivée de nouveaux renforts contribuera sans doute à calmer la nervosité de la population européenne des nouveaux secteurs menacés par l'action des hors la loi

See *Le Monde*, 25/5/55.

The paper did side with the requests for protection expressed by the settlers and their protests against the "inefficiency of the measures" taken under the Law on the State of Emergency (see Chapter 11):

(...) Il reste que les agriculteurs d'Algérie ... ont le droit d'exiger une protection

But this was seen by the paper as the attribution and the rôle of the State. Thus *Le Monde's* support did not extend to the organisation of local militias for the purpose of the defense of the settlers' interests because the paper thought that it would be dangerous to substitute local and private initiative for public authority.

(...) c'est à celle-ci de contrôler les agissements des individus et des groupements. L'inverse ne saurait être toléré

P. A. Martel in *Le Monde*, 27/4/55.

(15)

See also Chapter 8.

(16)

During and after the events of 6 February "Muslims" were included in the reports by journalist who found maturity, responsibility and commitment to the idea of national identity and independence. (There was also concern expressed by Pignault for the increased tension in the Muslim population where the

word independence was on the lips of personalities who had not contemplated uttering it three days previously" (*Le Monde*, 9/2/56).

The news of that community was reported similarly to the period preceding the events. But despite the strength of feeling and its unanimity and maturity, it was given less emphasis. Minay wrote of the events of 6 February 1956, that the Muslim population observed these events in silence. This was broken only

(...) -et encore très faiblement - que par les <<61>> qui ont exprimé leur réprobation des incidents de la journée , réaffirment leur attachement au <<fait national>> (...), rappelé qu'ils n'étaient pas des <<interlocuteurs>> et indiquaient qu'ils considéraient leur mission terminée pour le moment. *Le Monde*, 8/2/56.

As far as this Muslim community was concerned, Minay was astonished by the expressed concern that the Muslim element seemed to be totally ignored in these demonstrations (*Le Monde*, 14/2/56), whereas C.Pignault, on the other hand, discerned some reservations in that community and from the explanations given by the "61" concluded that the Muslim community demonstrated that it was sufficiently mature by showing its determination to remain calm:

(...) la population musulmane a montré sa prise de conscience des réalités et prouvé que la maturité politique n'était pas un leurre.

Throughout various sectors of that Muslim community he said he had found the same language, from the masses to the more cultivated (*le même langage tenu partout...couches populairesmilieux cultivés*). He concluded that these demonstrations had a great deal to do with reinforcing the unity of the community.

Nier que le sens de la communauté et de l'aspiration collective ne se soit renforcé ces derniers jours, à la faveur précisément des manifestations de rue d'Alger serait nier l'évidence. Plus peut-être que ne l'auraient fait des propagandistes méthodiques, les manifestants ont aidé à faire progresser ce qu'ils contestent ou qu'ils combattent.

In *Le Monde*, 15/2/56.

(17)

For instance, amongst a coverage which included a speech by Mollet, declarations of Europeans and reports of Europeans' views, one notices that only the following two lines were devoted to nationalist aspirations:

"all this is fragile in front of the opposition of the majority of the Muslim delegates who are asking for national recognition". See *Le Monde*, 11/2/56.

(18)

Which *Le Monde* thought was an évitable rumeur injuste et ingrate before it highlighted it and went into the important

reasons behind it.

De plus, au moment où son destin se joue, elle se voit sans représentation parlementaire et s'estime ainsi désarmée pour apporter la réponse à maints propos tenus au Palais Bourbon qu'elle considère comme inspirés par une malveillance systématique à son encontre.

See the series of articles published by the paper, and *L'Algérie dans l'attente, I. Esquisse d'un désarroi général*, in *Le Monde*, 7/2/56, and also above.

(19)

See *Le Monde*, 7/2/56.

Pignault emphasised the concern (even if not openly admitted) for some aspects of the resolution of Mayors and the *Comité de Salut Public* which had been formed by war veterans to oppose

(...) vigoureusement au principe du collègue unique et même à faire de cette opposition leur cheval de bataille.

He reported the PM's reassurance

(...) qu'il y avait de nombreuses manières, dans le cadre de cette unicité, d'assurer une représentation équitable des deux collectivités et peut être même d'obtenir une parité de représentation.

Pignault in *Le Monde*, 9/2/56.

(20)

All these views, here, were given the same coverage as a motion passed by a single group of "war veterans", which, without wanting to exclude some form of social progress, came out heavily in favour of a rejection of the single college, a strengthening (reinforcing) of the army's powers and efficiency, updating it so as to fight against *égorgeurs, bandits de grands chemins dirigés de l'étranger*, for maintaining French sovereignty as the "only policy to be implemented" and even for the expulsion of the "61". See *Le Monde*, 10/2/56.

(21)

Le Monde, 11/2/56.

(22)

Pignault saw that, according to some reports, there was a divorce between the two communities since the Europeans' "events of Monday" (or, to put it more precisely, he stated that such a feeling was not rare).

(23)

See *Le Monde*, 9/2/56 & 15/2/56.

(24)

As observed above, *Le Monde* accurately remarked that the margin of manoeuvre was becoming very narrow for the government and described the latter as caught up by pressures on both sides.

(25)

The expression used was *<acharnés à revendiquer>*.

This is one of the rare occasions of admission of nationalist aspirations, but it is still at the request stage.

On this occasion Minay also reported the conflicting demands of the *Comité d'entente* representing the Europeans and those of the <<61>> requesting moves in the opposite direction. *Le Monde*, 8/2/56.

(26)

Because of the various antagonist slogans. In *Le Monde*, 14/2/56.

(27)

Fauvet, expressing approval of a government ban on future demonstrations, was ready to acknowledge the influence of the streets on Algerian politics, perceiving the threat of fascism as real (*Le Monde*, 11/2/56). Minay thought the appeasement superficial and did not exclude problems for the future (*Le Monde*, 14/2/56). But upon the PM's return to France, Fauvet was quick to note that his trip did not seem to have pacified the Europeans in Algeria nor to have reduced tension there (*Le Monde*, 14/2/56).

(28)

Chênebenoit described the circumstances of Mollet's arrival as a "scandal" and an "outrage" and put a certain amount of blame on the demonstrators, describing them in the words of St Mathew as "blind leading the blind", who had made the gratuitous and serious mistake of insulting the Republic:

proferé envers la République française une injure gratuite .. commis eux mêmes ... une lourde faute ...

Although a powerful indignation, this position was dwarfed by the accusations of European settlers' blackmail found in papers such as *L'Express*, for instance, which condemned *le nouveau chantage des féodaux* and the calls for Socialists and Radicals' unity against those wanting to "insult the Republic" (*bafouer la République*) or *Le Populaire's* stand against the ultimatum given to the Prime Minister (known to the paper itself) reported by *Le Monde*, 11/2/56.

(29)

Le Monde, 8/2/56.

(30)

See also Chapter 8.

(31)

See the second article of the series: *L'Algérie dans l'attente: II. les principes et les réalités*. In *Le Monde*, 8/2/56.

(32)

(..) débordée par une lame de fond spontanée, soit par l'action d'éléments mal déterminés(..).

Ibid.

(33)

In front of an "Army which remained impassible," the demonstrations, in which *mottes de terre, branches arrachées, projectiles* were thrown (*lancés*) were the work of twenty-year-old assailants (*ceux qui menaient l'assaut avaient en moyenne 20 ans d'âge et pour la plupart, des visages hilares de gamins*

rossant le commissaire). In *Le Monde*, 8/2/56.

(34)

See "Correspondence" section in *Le Monde*, 15/2/56.

(35)

Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 3 gave the increase as being from 29,377 in 1900 to 156,803 in 1955.

(36)

It reported that the struggle, latent for two years, over the links to be maintained with the UGEMA (Algerian Muslims Students Organisation) had resurfaced when the office of the Union published a communiqué. In this communiqué, it was stated that the conscripts gave evidence which threw serious doubts on the "means" used in Algeria and on whether there was a possibility of ending the "war" if "such methods" were to be continued. It was further stated that a letter of protest would be written to the French President.

(37)

Menaces de scission à l'union des étudiants in *Le Monde*, 10/4/57, p. 5.

(38)

After all the student community was also concerned, as most of its members were (if they had not been already) being regularly drafted and ordered to don soldiers uniforms and fight for France on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Le Monde provided a regular flow of information on this subject by publishing news of draft and liberation measures. See for instance *Mesures en faveur des étudiants de la classe 54/2*, 30/4/57, p. 4. See also Chapter 5.

(39)

Even if they had no power to dictate how Algerian policy should have been conducted, it should be pointed out, nevertheless, that they were in the forefront of the war and were used as cannon fodder. The UNEF was not some corporate concern or peaceful trade union that should have kept its nose out of politics.

(40)

On the side of the Union and not opposing its decisions, no matter what they were, the paper listed the support of the Paris University authorities who did not mind these students meeting and taking decisions which they saw fit in their congresses. The paper pointed out that in contrast to the President of the Municipal Council (See below M Ruais'attitude), the University authorities did not object to the Union's communiqué on the "methods of pacification" and that some quarters had even made encouraging noises. *Le Monde*, 25/4/57, p. 5.

(41)

From the start, the Mayor of Paris, M Ruais, was reported as having resented the statement made by the UNEF and as having declared that he would not meet the students during their Paris congress. *Le Monde* reported that it was informed by the decision and the reasons behind it. (The decision was said to have been motivated by a desire not to give support to the position *hasardée*" ... which implied that

(...) l'armée française se livre à une action sauvage et brutale plutôt que d'être le bouclier d'une population terrorisée, *Le Monde*, 21-22/4/57, p. 3.

Le Monde did, however, publish the Union's communiqué, issued in reply to the Mayor's statement, regretting that the decision taken by the Mayor "had thrown a shadow over the traditional hospitality of the people of Paris", expressing the Union's astonishment over this "outside interference" by him, and leaving it up to the delegates to appreciate

(...) à sa juste valeur le chaleureux accueil que leur a réservé M. Pierre Ruais. (Ibid.)

But three days later another communiqué of M. Ruais was published (in an encadré) by *Le Monde*, in which he explained that he had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the organisation and that he did not visit the congress because of

(...) légèreté coupable avec laquelle le bureau de l'Unef a mis en cause l'armée.

He further stated that an assurance that the words of the Association's communiqué had been overstated (*que ses paroles avaient dépassé sa pensée*) would have sufficed for him to have gladly revised his decision. The backing of the UNEF statement by *L'Humanité* was for him the best proof, if needed, of l'outrance préjudiciable de ce texte (in *Au congrès des Etudiants de France La scission semble inévitable*, *Le Monde*, 25/4/57, p. 5).

Then *Le Monde* reported (in an encadré) that M. Ruais had received the "Algerian students" (these were settlers of European origin) and, recalling the conditions of his refusal to meet UNEF delegates, gave the text of his declarations, justifying this discrepancy of attitudes:

J'ai l'habitude, depuis que j'occupe la présidence du conseil de recevoir tous les Algériens qui viennent à Paris pour leur manifester notre affectueuse sollicitude. Mon geste n'a donc rien à voir avec les débats qui se déroulent... et ne doit pas être interprété comme une prise de position du Conseil municipal dans les affaires de cette organisation.

Le Monde, 27/4/57, p. 16.

(42)

Le Monde also reported that the MP, Le Pen, ancien militant de l'UNEF, came to back the Algiers group, declaring in the corridors of the congress:

Si vous voulez dénoncez les "exactions" prêtées à l'armée, allez sur place et rapportez des preuves, lancait-il en substance aux majoritaires actuels mais si vous avez décidé d'aider les rebelles, il serait plus franc et plus courageux de prendre le maquis!

The paper accepted, however, that the views of the paratrooper lieutenant were not shared by other opponents of the "letter to the French President who only wanted to avoid such a move being interpreted as being in favour of a political campaign whatever its aim. *Le Monde*, 27/4/57, p. 16.

(43)

The paper regretted (*malheureusement*) the absence of some faces (ie. overseas delegates and European delegates from

Algeria).

(44)

For *Le Monde*, the congress of the UNEF was the time when the Union would ask itself about the limits of <<apolitisme>>.

(45)

Leading to antagonism amongst the "children" when it commented: *Il n'est pire que les brouilles de famille pour opposer les enfants.* In *Pour le congrès de son cinquantenaire, l'union des étudiants de France va s'interroger une fois de plus sur les limites de son <<apolitisme>>*, *Le Monde*, 21-22/4/57, p. 3.

(46)

Le Monde's Bertrand Poirot-Delpech wrote that the split which developed within the UNEF started as far back as 1950 between the partisans of an *apolitisme rigoureux* and those for whom there could not be a trade-union student movement divorced from the problems of the time. The "Algerian tragedy did the rest," with the former stating that no comments should be made on the draft of October 1955 and requesting that the Union break away from the *Union Générale des Etudiants Musulmans Algériens* (UGEMA), which held an "openly nationalist view" and "supported the FLN and independence."

(47)

(...) la majorité changeait de camp au profit des partisans d'un syndicalisme moins strictement corporatiste,

Ibid.

(48)

Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, *Le Monde*, 21-22/4/57, p. 3.

(49)

Le Monde 25/4/57, p. 5.

Le Monde saw the split within the Union as inevitable. It stated that some faculties of mainland France and the Algiers section would leave the main body of the Union. In actual fact, the Algiers section had left the Union the summer before and the paper was aware of that. See footnote 53 below.

(50)

Le congrès des étudiants s'achèvera vendredi après deux jours de discussion sur l'orientation du mouvement.

Le Monde, 26/4/57, p. 4.

(51)

Le Monde 27/4/57, p. 16. The expression was *la personne humaine*.

(52)

Even after the paper stated that a majority of members, confirmed by a 2/3 vote on Monday, intended to maintain the terms of the Union's protest against the exactions of the security forces and to send a new message to President Coty. *Ibid.*, *Le Monde*, 25/4/57, p. 5.

(53)

A considerable effort was made by *Le Monde* to put the case for the minority of Europeans from Algeria (...*De l'autre, l'association des étudiants d'Algérie, bien qu'elle ait quitté l'Union nationale depuis l'été dernier, s'oppose avec l'énergie du désespoir à ce qu'elle considère comme une des prises de position partisans et l'effort d'une campagne politique* -Ibid.), outlining how these young students from Algiers "explained" that they could not accept (*admettre*) que l'on dénonce des sévices qui sont l'exception et que l'on garde le silence sur les exactions systématiques des rebelles.

Le Monde also stressed the determination of the Algiers group and the reality of their threats to carry out more or less legal methods of pressure.

Les délégués d'Alger sont prêts aux démonstrations les moins régulières. La grève décidée à la suite du geste de M.Peyrega en est la preuve de même que l'affichage de tracts, aux abords du Palais-Bourbon qui a valu à certains de passer le nuit de lundi au poste.

Le Monde, 25/4/57, p. 5.

The paper outlined the Algiers group resolution to exert pressure (in fact it was blackmail and threat of resignation) on sympathetic university associations of mainland France (Montpellier, Bordeaux, and the Paris law faculty were all said to have been in their favour). This would have led to the creation of a new union distinct from the UNEF.

Using hearsay, *Le Monde* stated that other associations might follow suit:

D'autres pourraient suivre, dit-on, et la lutte s'amplifierait irrémédiablement au sein de la collectivité étudiante écartelée. Telle est en définitive l'enjeu du congrès. (25/4/57, p. 5.)

Then the paper wondered if they would succeed in getting the majority of the Union to take account of the understandable (*Le Monde's* judgement) demands and dilute its commitments on the humanitarian aspects of the Algerian tragedy, but thought nothing was less certain.

(54)

The next day the paper wrote that the coming hours were going to determine whether the delegates of some of the associations would leave with their Algiers comrades, in protest against the positions taken by the Bureau of the UNEF against the exactions of the security forces and in support of the gesture of Dean Peyrega (see Chapter 13). Now the paper stated that the delegates hostile to the position taken by l'UNEF (in this field seen as too political) were in fact less determined to leave the movement than expected (*le laissait supposer hier en coulisse l'Association d'Alger*). Here we learn that the basis on which *Le Monde* had announced that a split would occur (and that numerous associations would leave the Union causing a split) was a behind-the-scenes hint from a group that did not even belong to the Union. And that for these delegations to leave, the Union would need to issue more radical comments on "human aspects of the Algerian affair". The slight modification brought to the text was said to be proof of moderation.

Le Monde was then admitting that, apart from the initiative to contact the president (to which some delegations received instructions not to associate themselves and which they would like to have seen replaced by an apolitical stance of the

movement), none of the text adopted on the previous night seemed to be likely to provoke the resignations that were announced.

(55)

Putting the problem in terms of a choice between "Politics or Patriotism", *Le Monde* explained that M. Gautrot saw the Algerian problem "simply as a demographic one", that the "rebels" were "criminals in search of power" and that for the students of Algiers the "scruples" of Peyrega and the UNEF were "unfounded and tantamount to treason, in that they favour the psychological activities of the rebellion".

The paper also gave the main lines of a press conference given by the president of the Algiers section, in which he stated that:

nous ne demandons pas à l'Union nationale de prendre position sur une solution politique, nous voulons qu'elle renonce à justifier le doyen Peyrega, à salir l'armée et, plus généralement, à favoriser de quelque façon que ce soit la cause des fellagas.

He also stated that :

Nous ne sommes pas des excités. Nous aussi nous avons notre conscience. On nous accusera peut-être de faire de la politique, mais quand le sort de douze départements français est en jeu, nous appelons cela du patriotisme.

(56)

See above. And it was on the ground of patriotism that they justified support for general conscription and opposition to the Single college and the dispatch of the Radical Commission. (see Chapter 12).

(57)

When it later accepted that the demands of the Algiers group could hardly make any organisation leave the UNEF, and that the Algiers group had only just come to prominence. It also admitted that it was there more to air its views to the public (to whom they distributed leaflets) than to convince a congress which most of them thought was lost for them anyway.

(58)

The paper in the end was writing that the "serious and disciplined" debates of the congress, which showed a "high level of consciousness in the varied fields", were not entirely devoted to these burning issues. Even if they had been relegated to the background by the possible repercussions of the Algerian affair in the student world, "proper trade union activities" were the main reason for the movement and "would contribute, when the time comes, to the discord being forgotten."

Si ces travaux proprement <<syndicaux>> ont été quelque peu éclipsés par les répercussions dans le monde étudiant de l'affaire algérienne, ils n'en demeurent pas moins la raison d'être du mouvement et devraient contribuer, le moment venu, à faire oublier la discorde.

(59)

The rank and file members of the Student body were portrayed as being uncertain.

At the end of the month, *Le Monde* wrote that the rank and file of the student body returning from their Easter break were still hesitant and did not realise the full implications of the split. The paper reported that it had asked a few of them, who were said to have replied that <apolitisme> was unachievable on questions of national interests. Then the paper concluded that the split was serious and could end up weakening the student movement. According to the paper, this was feared even by Law students whose delegates opted to split up.

But the only quote the paper had was from a future doctor (medical students were said to be hesitant), who declared that:

Il n'y a que les extrémistes qui font de la politique. Nous les modérés, ce qui nous interesse c'est que notre association défende nos repas à 75 fr et arrive enfin à obtenir l'agrandissement de la bibliothèque, qui a actuellement 70 places pour 3000 étudiants; le reste ne regarde pas les étudiants, le gouvernement est là pour ça. See Après la scission de l'Unef hésitation des étudiants <de base>, in Le Monde, 30/4/57, p. 5.

The following week, *Le Monde* reported further statements by students keeping the controversy going, but also giving a statement of the UNEF putting unity before anything else. In *Le Monde*, 7/5/57, p. 7.

The bias in favour of the minority views continued when the voices of veteran organisations seemed to gain easy access to the paper at that particular time. These were combined with the minority students views (5/6/57, p. 3, from AFP).

A further statement by M.Gautrot who, "in the name of the people of Algiers" (this way of presenting him as speaking in the name of several students and veteran organisations could only be seen as an attempt to give him more credibility than his status allowed him in the circumstances), was reported to have demanded that France should wage war in the full sense of the term, stand against any "progressiveness", decree a state of siege, execute all those sentenced, ban the Communist Party in both Algeria and France, reinforce the security forces, refuse American interference in the Sahara and put pressure on Tunisia. See *Représentant des étudiants d'Alger M.Jean Gautrot demande à la métropole de <<faire la guerre>> dans toute l'acceptation du terme*, in *Le Monde*, 15/6/57, p. 2.

(60)

In *Au jour le jour : Question de confiance*, *Le Monde*, 11/7/57, p. 1. In the topical "comment of the day" which is usually written with sarcastic undertones. It was drafted on this occasion by a lecturer, who while expressing the hope, at the beginning of the summer holiday for thousands of students, that it would be a happy one, reminded the readers of the the less serene holiday that a few hundred students, "French by their culture by their hearts", were about to take. But while asking these students for their confidence, the note stigmatised the Algerian students' "imprudent call" for a strike.

(61)

See *Le Monde* 17/4/57, p. 4.

eg. example of a registered student who refused to attend classes in Strasbourg (Benhassine, now lecturer in Algiers) for carrying leaflets. *Ibid.*

Other news of arrests of students (Toulouse) can be found in *Le Monde*, 9/5/57, p. 6, 10/5/57, pp. 5-16.

(62)

However, the news of these arrests and the harassment that students were subjected to hit the headlines only when the mainland press (including *Le Monde* itself), as well as various religious and political leaders, received letters from (one of) those students, Tellidgi Mohammed Habib, who went into hiding after accusing the police of torture and giving a detailed account in the letter (bathtub, electricity). In this instance, the paper reported that the authorities considered it to be their duty to denounce what they considered to be an "odious calomny" and that everybody feared "deception" (*l'imposture*). The paper thought that the aim of the letter was to instill doubt in the country.

When it received its copy of the letter, *Le Monde* saw a choice between three possibilities: ignoring it, mentioning it without being concerned about its value, or investigating it, a course which it stated that it had taken with some justification.

Au reçu d'une lettre comme celle de Telidji trois attitudes étaient possibles pour un journal: ne tenir aucun compte du document, en faire état sans se soucier de sa valeur ou aller recueillir sur place les multiples témoignages qu'il appelle.

L'accueil réservé à notre collaborateur par les autorités comme par les accusateurs atteste que l'enquête privée sur un sujet aussi grave et aussi difficile à élucider mérite d'être tentée, même si elle doit se heurter à des obstacles insurmontables.

But on the day of the trial B. Poirot-Delpech thought he had various reasons not to give credence to the letter, reasons which were set out in a whole section: *Des raisons d'en douter*, in the main article, *Dénégations officielles* (11/5/57, p. 3). *Le Monde* informed its readers of the case against the students and the denials by the "commissaire" and the prosecutor (Juge d'instruction) that any force had been used. The conclusion was that these people must be members of the nationalist organisations, although they denied it (this conflicted with the request of the defence (5 lawyers) that these people (*Le Monde* wrote that this concerned the less heavily compromised) should be simply released. See *Le Monde*, 11/5/57, p. 3.

The verdict sentencing the students from 20 days to 18 months hardly corresponds to the the tone of what *Le Monde* was trying to make the readers believe earlier on. See *Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.

When the police issued a warrant for the arrest (*mandat d'amener*) of Tellidgi, *Le Monde* stated that this was only in order to clear up matters provoked by his disappearance and the accusations he had made against the police- the inexactitude and the contradictions of which, the paper proudly stated, it had indicated (*Le Monde* 22/5/57, p. 11). It was obvious to most

of the left-wing press at the time that if the security forces were looking for an Algerian who made that type of accusation it would certainly not be in order to clear his name.

(63)

Apart from when *Le Monde* reported the odd communiqué:

-eg the UGEMA's on the persecution of the groups studying in the CFA.

The heading of an article indicated that 10 students who had resigned from the CFA were interned in Algeria whereas the UGEMA's communiqué revealed that at least 20 of its members had been arrested, kidnapped or "imprisoned" in the last weeks. (9 from Toulon arrested for leaflet distribution; a *maître d'internat* in the *Lycée Bugeaud* <enlevé>, and recently, a law student in Algiers, *aurait été* <sequestré>. As for the 10 referred to in the headline, they were in custody in a detention centre and attempts were made to force them to go back on their resignations and to sit their exams. See *Dix élèves musulmans démissionnaires du CFA seraient internés en Algérie*, *Le Monde*, 22/2/57, p. 4.

-or during the trial of some of them in Toulouse. See *Le procès des étudiants musulmans de Toulouse. Un appel de l'UGEMA*, *Le Monde*, 10/5/57, p. 5.

Expressions of concern for that group of students were very scarce.

(64)

See *Le Monde*, 2/12/54.

(65)

The education of Hubert Beuve- Méry, founder and director of the paper, was completed thanks to the help of the Church and religion played a part in his upbringing. He even chose the life and works of a religious figurehead as the theme of his doctoral thesis. See Chapter 2.

The journalists of the paper were interested in the life of the Church and that of political organisations with religious leanings . See, for instance, Jacques Fauvet, who wondered about the future of Christian Democracy, in *Après le Congrès des Nouvelles Equipes internationales où va la démocratie chrétienne*, report from special correspondent J.Fauvet, 30/4/57, p. 5.

(66)

Four articles in *Le Monde* spread over the period 30/4/57, p. 1 to 7/5/57, p. 4.

(67)

In connection with Algeria, *Le Monde* published a number of appeals by religious organisations. It reported that the French Protestant Church's national synod had mentioned the problems of Algeria and the recent reforms in the Overseas territories. In *Le synode national de l'Eglise réformée évoque les problèmes algériens et les récentes réformes décidées dans les territoires d'outre-mer*, *Le Monde*, 14/5/57, p. 7.

Messages such as the one addressed to the Protestants of Algeria on the "fraternity between the Christians of France and those of Algeria", expressing concern over youth, giving spiritual help to *cas de conscience* of young draftees (*jeunes appelés*), thanking the *Fédération protestante de France* for its

declaration on the Algerian tragedy, and recommending it to the attention of its parishes, were echoed by the paper. See *Le Monde*, 15/5/57, p. 4.

Le Monde also reported appeals by religious groups or committees to protest peacefully against the War. The appeal for a fast for peace in Algeria by the *Comité d'Entente France-Islam* in response to the request by *Les amis de Ghandi* was a case in point. See *Le comité chrétien d'entente France-Islam, répondant à l'appel des amis de Ghandi <<pour une paix sereine en Algérie>> demande à tous ses sympathysants de jeûner en privé le 28 février*, *Le Monde*, 28/2/58, p. 2.

(68)

This stated that legal proceedings must exclude torture and that the instruction of cases must "exclude physical, psychological torture and the use of drugs (because they "undermine the natural right of the accused, even if guilty," and also because they very often lead to the "wrong results" and to "confessions that the courts want" - "not because the accused is guilty but because of the exhaustion of his soul and his body, he is bound to prefer prison to physical torture." See Mannoni, *Au 30ème mois de la lutte. L'Action Judiciaire doit exclure la torture déclarait Pie XII*, in *Le Monde*, 13/4/57, p. 4.

Le Monde, on that occasion also reminded the readers of a similar address to Interpol on 15 October 1954 when he asked
[L]a justice aujourd'hui n'est-elle pas retournée, en maints endroits et sous des apparences à peine déguisées, à une véritable torture, parfois beaucoup plus violente que les épreuves d'autrefois? Notre temps ne court-il pas le risque de voir s'élever un jour contre lui le reproche d'avoir, sans frein ni scrupule, poursuivi dans l'interrogatoire des fins utilitaires? (Ibid.)

(69)

Le Monde echoed the news of a letter of appeal to the Pope, couched in strong language, sent by Abbas and reported by the Tunisian papers, *Le Petit Matin* and *Al Amal*.

The letter denounced "the extermination methods" used against the Algerian people, ...atteinte aux droits les plus sacrés de la personne humaine.. sévices .. armée transformée en appareil policier... , accused the French administration of génocide, and called on the Pope to help put an end to the épreuve de force. While accepting that France had interests in Algeria, the letter maintained that the Algerian people had rights which can be safeguarded by "independence and free cooperation with Republican France" (M.F.Abbas: *Le Christianisme et l'Islam peuvent coopérer pacifiquement au progrès de la même communauté humaine*, in *Le Monde*, 28-29/4/57, p. 2.

(70)

The Church's responsibility in the emancipation of the colonial people was one of main features portrayed in *Le Monde*. The paper reported that Monsignor Chapoulie had insisted on the international responsibilities of Christians towards the emancipation movements of the colonies and the rejection of any judgement involving social superiority towards people of other

continents and other races. *Le Monde* also reported that he had asked for moderation and for the rejection of a certain form of pride:

N'ayons pas un tel orgueil de notre patrie, si grande soit-elle, que nous soyons plus capables d'imaginer chez des peuples conquis autrefois par les armes, le rêve d'une patrie, la leur, et pour eux, naturellement, plus belle que la France.

In *Le Monde*, 27/12/56, p. 5.

The paper also reported the Papal message to Catholic missions in Africa to help people aspiring to freedom. See *Dans un cyclique sur les missions d'Afrique la vie internationale n'a pas permis aux hommes les plus sages de ménager les étapes nécessaires au vrai bien des populations déclare Pie XII*. In *Le Monde*, 28-29/4/57, p. 2.

(71)

See statements above and the declaration of the symbolic group of Souk Ahras, for instance, on 29 January 1956 in Nozière, André, *Algérie: Les Chrétiens dans la guerre*, ed du Cana, Paris, 1979, p. 206.

(72)

The position of a priest like Beringuer, Curate for Montagnac (near Tlemcen), whose views were even expressed in *Oran Républicain* and clearly sided with the Algerian nationalists in the name of his faith, is a famous example. See Nozière, op. cit., pp. 216 ff.

Many churchmen and women, devout faithful or even secular French people, took unequivocal positions in favour of the Algerians despite their belonging to a different creed. See Chapter 11

(73)

From the reports of *Le Monde*, one could observe that the Church did not want to get involved in politics but it did have sympathy for the suffering of the Algerians. The newspaper reported (the very day P.-H. Simon was making his stand against torture -see Chapter 10) the statement issued by the Church Secretariat at the congress of Cardinals and Archbishops, expressing sympathy towards those suffering or bereaved, those deprived or anguished but no desire to get involved in the politics of Algeria.

The declaration restated the principles outlined in its previous letter (of Autumn 1955) on the principles "which must guide the judgment, and inspire conduct (in practise) of Christians". The Priests' declaration condemned terrorism and counter-terrorism and indicated that they had intervened with the authorities. Their appeal called on:

"all those whose mission is to protect people and property have the duty to respect human dignity and rigourously avoid excesses contrary to natural law and the law of God, sanctioned several times by the authorities. In the present crisis one and all must remember that it is never allowed to use for the service of cause, even a good one, means which are intrinsically bad".

This was an explicit condemnation of torture. But it was not given the weight it deserved at the time. See *Il n'est jamais permis de mettre au service d'une cause, même bonne, des moyens intrinsèquement mauvais*, *Le Monde*, 16/3/57, p. 2.

(74)

The team of Souk Ahras referred to above for instance in Nozière, A., op. cit., p. 210.

See also *Le Monde*, 27/4/57, p. 4, when the Church was often described as refusing to get involved in politics. *Le Monde's* Mannoni reported that Mgr Duval had, in order to keep the peace and not to get absorbed in political squabbles (*ne pas être lié aux querelles politiques*), refused to give audience to the commission of enquiry (see Chapter 12). In *Les catholiques algériens acteurs et témoins d'un drame qui les divise*.

(75)

See for instance Nozière, A., op. cit., p. 198.

(76)

See Nozière, A., op. cit., p. 207.

(77)

One of the most significant episodes of the Algerian people's involvement in the war occurred with this general strike organised at the time when the UN was due to discuss the Algerian question. The aim was to highlight the problem in the international arena, but also to try and establish publicly before international opinion the depth of the support for the Algerian cause and demonstrate to the UN and the world the legitimacy of its claim and the support of the general population for the independence movement in Algeria.

(78)

For *Le Monde*, the military's decision merely caused "an increase in tension" (15/1/57, p. 1).

(79)

It was futile (*vain*) to look for reasons in *Le Monde's* view. Sometimes, the paper just dismissed the concern for reasons behind the strike and declared it fruitless (*vain*) to determine whether the strikers acted out of fear or conviction (31/1/57, p. 1).

(80)

Although one of the headlines indicated that the strike was largely followed in Algiers (less so in France) and that, "as expected", shops were opened "by force", *Le Monde* presented it as une *épreuve de force* not only against the French government but also against the "Muslims" who "had refused to rally the propaganda and the policy of the nationalist groups" (29/1/57).

(81)

For the paper, these events (*mouvement*) were inopportune, "untimely" 2 days after particularly bloody "attacks" -*attentats*- which, <<undoubtedly>> for the paper, were aimed at provoking outbursts by the European population which would then be exploited by the UN.

In linking incidents, the general strike and the possibility of *explosions de colère aveugle* before any incident occurred, *Le Monde* was obviously trying to present the general strike as a provocation likely to anger the Europeans, to make them explode in "violent actions which then would be exploited before the UN." (29/1/57, p. 1.)

(82)

The strike in France was fairly widespread according to inside page articles, but the front page asserted the opposite. Also, the inside page contained a different title covering the strike in France itself: it was, *l'ordre de grève est assez largement suivi dans la métropole*, while the first page had stated, *moins largement suivi*. See *Le Monde*, 29/1/57, p. 2.

The proportion of strikers in France was reported to have been between 35 and 45%. but a close look at the figures given could easily have told the alert reader a different story, as the average seemed to have ranged between 46% and 81% (29/1/57, p. 2).

The paper reported the number of *départements* not being affected by the strike (23) as opposed to those affected (29/1/57, p. 2).

The strike was reported to be occurring under duress (30/1/57, p. 1).

Official figures (including those of the Ministry of Interior) were used to give the number of strikers. See *Le Monde*, 31/1/57, p. 1, 2/2/57, p. 2, 6/2/57, p. 2.

(83)

Though admitting at the same time that these cases were rare, the paper claimed that, every now and then, there was a Mozabyte's shop half closed, whose owner was ready to make peace with the FLN and the Army (31/1/57).

(84)

Au troisième jour de la grève en Algérie: Spontanément ou sur injonctions, des ouvriers et des employés se rendent à leur travail. In *Le Monde*, 31/1/57, p. 1.

The paper was still stating that it was without spontaneity ("perhaps because they don't want to appear to be breaking the strike or because this strike is difficult") that the workers and shopkeepers obeyed the soldiers's requests. But all those requisitioned, the paper conceded, did not always go to their place of work: some of them spent the day "in the sun", some were subjected to checks, or followed soldiers to the docks in groups of two.

(85)

For the paper's journalist this gave an impression of normalcy and reassurance in a town, which despite the absence of the

nuées de petits cireurs qui guettent d'ordinaire avec vivacité les souliers ternes, had an aspect factice sans doute, mais rassurant de ville où il n'y aurait rien à signaler. See *Le Monde*, 31/1/57, p. 2.

(86)

The paper reported that civil servants and employees were continuing the strike and the threat of legal sanctions, which could go as far as sackings, seemed to have shaken the resolve of a minority only (see sanctions below). It is unclear, though, from this content, how the paper could conclude that the strike was weakening.

(87)

It reported that Massu had managed to avoid a <<pénible et fâcheux>> clash between the "Muslims" and the military (whereas the FLN had recommended that no violence should take place in this form of protest, and it is very unclear here what happened to the "angry Europeans") and that he had also managed to prevent "irresponsible Europeans from poisoning the event".

See *Le Monde*, 1/2/57.

(88)

Totale (sic.) le premier jour, le mouvement a perdu dès mardi soir l'aspect de quasi-unanime protestation qu'il revêtait au début de la semaine. L'évolution que l'on discernait hier s'est aujourd'hui accentuée.

Ibid.

(89)

It merely indicated that some of the reasons were: the injunctions of the patrols, prison sentences for some workers, some teachers, some civil servants, and what transpired in the confessions (*confidences*) of some youths of Belcourt (1/2/57, p. 1).

(90)

By presenting the strike in this way, the paper gave the impression that the return to work which was taking place had not always been spontaneous, instead of stating that it rarely was the case. With this method the paper described the event as an exception rather than the rule when the reality was otherwise, as it itself admitted:

Et le nombre des grévistes demeure nettement supérieur, malgré les mesures prises, à celui des musulmans qui se trouvent au travail.

(91)

Its description of the "tirailleurs sénégalais" checking everybody's papers and searching every one without discrimination gave an aura of fairness and impartiality which was not there, as Europeans were hardly bothered by these checks. In *Le Monde*, 1/2/57, p. 1.

(92)

No indication was given, however, as to how these views were obtained. Nor was this statement derived logically from what had been previously stated. The concern here seemed to be how the events were perceived by the UN. The paper was not concerned by the events themselves but whether the coercive measures would be denounced.

(93)

"And would have had a brilliant success if they had contented themselves with a 24 hour strike".

(94)

Why the paper seemed keen to put forward the authorities' version seems quite evident if one wants to play down the impact of the strike.

(95)

Le Monde, 3-4/2/57, p. 1.

(96)

"That Massu found before him on Monday." Second admission of the unanimity of the strike which means that previous reports of that day (Monday) must be have been inaccurate.

(97)

Obstinate strikers, constrained/forced workers, satisfied employees happy to get back to work, which of course gave the reader the impression that there was a lack of unanimity and a division of the population into several groups.

(98)

No mention of them being taken there by force.

(99)

Not a single jury reported on duty that day.

(100)

The reports remained confusing because they stated that the strike was over while indicating at the same time that a number of people were still on strike. See E.Mannoni, *Le Monde*, 5/2/57, p. 1.

(101)

Le Monde commented that the strike started on 28 January and that it seemed to have finished the same day (6/2/57, p. 2) while some of its other factual articles were still giving the previous day's strike figures as being 50% in the trade/commerce, 80% in the railways and 100% (total) for the personnel in the hotel and catering (cafés) sector of Algiers region.

(102)

An assessment of the strike was made by *Le Monde* according to two sources: one official, through AFP, according to which the strike was a defeat for the FLN, and the other by the liberals of Algeria referring to the multiple authoritarian measures used by the security forces. This information was combined with other more "comical items, " like distribution of sweets, early alarm calls as well as music and cinema sessions.

(103)

Superficially, it looked as if the paper was using two sources to give a fair and balanced view, but this was not the case as the contents of the two articles were not necessarily reporting two conflicting version of the same event. See, for instance, *Le Monde*, 7/2/57, p. 2.

(104)

Although it was unsure of the starting date and thought 19 January likely (as *la veille , jour de prière, les musulmans affluent dans les mosquées, où il est aisé de diffuser les mots d'ordre* -*Le Monde*, 15/1/57, p. 1), *Le Monde* was aware that the strike was not a decisive issue for the FLN, when it reported that they did not seek salvation from the UN, but were only motivated by the feeling that it would be wrong to seem indifferent when "our" fate was being discussed. (1/1/57, p. 4.) It was only later that the special envoy, Mannoni, considered that, in the mind of the initiators, the movement was intended to influence the UN debate which was then postponed in favour of a discussion of the Middle East. But even then, when turning to the specific objectives of the strikes for the FLN, the

paper thought it less a matter of depriving the capital of water, gas, electricity and transport than, more simply and importantly, demonstrating the hold they had on the Muslim population of Algeria:

leur objectif était à la fois plus simple et plus important: démontrer qu'ils exercent sans conteste une influence déterminante sur la population musulmane de l'Algérie.

The paper wrote that the FLN wanted to concentrate on Algiers but was not sure whether the nationalists would succeed, conceding (*incontestable*) however, that they had managed to attract the attention of the UN:

Les observateurs étrangers ont constaté cette adhésion que les autorités attribuent à la terreur exercées par les cellules du FLN.

In *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 1.

(105)

The paper conceded that the "European" population was pleasantly surprised (the paper itself noted that fact as though it was not expecting it) by the lack of "attentats" (*Le Monde*, 31/1/57, pp. 1-2). It seems somewhat surprising that the strike, which consisted of the assertion of the right to protest peacefully, to refuse to work or open up shop and accept the loss of income incurred, and which represented one of the few peaceful initiatives of the FLN to make a political statement without using force, was not seen in a favourable light. Even France of the 1950s was far remote from the anti-union legislation of the Le Chapelier laws, and the right to strike had for a long time been recognised as a basic right in any civilised society. It seems odd, therefore, that *Le Monde* should resent that political statement being made, and miss a rare chance of recognising a non violent initiative by the FLN, and of giving support to a peaceful form of protest against an unjust order.

(106)

Le Monde wrote that it had learned (not indicating any source) that there were important gatherings of "rebels" at the border (29/1/57, p. 1).

(107)

In full knowledge that it was initiated for a week, *Le Monde* described the strike as a show of strength (*épreuve de force*) and made the time factor essential (*une épreuve de durée*). Having made the time factor look essential, the paper started to wonder how long it would last and whether it would progressively lose its "testimony" aspect. See *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 1, 31/1/57, p. 2.

(108)

"On whose deaf ears, the calls of the army loudspeakers, in French and Arabic, to rejoin the place of work" fell, it was conceded in this article (*sourde hier matin aux appels lancés en français et en arabe par les hauts-parleurs de l'armée*).

In *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 1.

(109)

Le Monde, 2/2/57, p. 2, see also above.

(110)

Although the streets, shops and workplaces were deserted (there were few workers about) and, despite the fact that some workers started the strike the day before, *Le Monde* felt unable to determine precisely the number of the strikers. It only reported some defections here and there (29/1/57, p. 2).

Although it was stated that the overall activity was "artificial and precarious", and meaningful examples were cited [where for instance buyers and sellers stayed away with only a small group of 5 or 6 (instead of the usual 200) had gone when "invited" by the military (30/1/57, p. 1)], the paper did not feel sufficiently confident to give any prognosis (because it was using AFP releases); and it expected figures to vary from region to region, from day to day, or even hour to hour. (Ibid.)

The journalist, Eugène Mannoni, even managed to find an "amusing" side to the events when he saw a notice on a shop door stating that the owner/trader had died and that "he had his shop closed until further notice": (*Une inscription relevée sur une boutique: <<Moustapha Abdelkader, décédé, ferme sa boutique jusqu'à nouvel ordre>>*), which he described as the only funny event of the day.

(111)

The "European" population was said to be unaffected in terms of supplies and transport as that had been remedied by the army. The paper gave the impression that the impact of the strike had not been very important, reminding the readers, according to the Resident-Minister's circles, that most of the services had been carried out especially by the soldiers who "remembered what they had been before: workers". See *Le Monde* 30/1/57, p. 1. The military role in breaking the strike was also very much played down by the paper.

(112)

First, when *Le Monde* reported statements like those of Préfet Lambert declaring that the strike had been a failure (31/1/57, p. 2), then on 2 February, the paper was already stating that the FLN had not managed to succeed in making the Muslims strike for eight days.

(113)

See *Le Monde*, 2/2/57, p. 1.

(114)

These revealed that some nineteen people appeared before magistrates (flagrants délits) for the offence of stealing goods from shops. Some of these people were well-to-do, and one even owned a hotel in the town centre. But their case was adjourned to the next day (*Le Monde*, 31/1/57, p. 2) when the number fell unexplicably to only six people on trial: a woman who was discharged, and the remaining people who were convicted of theft and receiving stolen property (*vol et recel*) and sentenced to between 10,000 fr to a fortnight in jail. *Le Monde*, 1/2/57, p. 1 (about a dozen lines).

Later, *Le Monde* also reported that one "recidivist" (he must have done it at least twice to deserve the label, perhaps warned but did it again), Fiorelli Nicoles, received a 10-day prison sentence; 5 people received suspended sentences with fines of between 10 and 50,000 fr; a woman shopkeeper, 2 months suspended and 50,000 fr fine, and two more people were

acquitted. [Des pillards condamnés à Alger. *Le Monde*, 3-4/2/57, p. 3.]

(115)

The journalist reporting stated that he was impressed by the correct attitude of the Europeans before the spectacle of opened shops exhibiting all their goods to the passers-by.

Rien n'est plus impressionnant dans cette ville frappée de torpeur que la vision de boutiques ouvertes de force et abandonnées au bon plaisir des passants.

Ici les tissus multicolores s'entassent. Ailleurs des boites de conserves, des sacs de pois chiches, des corbeilles d'osier remplies de semoule sont délaissées...

Mannoni knew that the nationalists had given orders not to loot and that an official notice had warned that there would be no protection of merchandise from looting. When he reported that some looting had taken place, he implied that it was done by Algerian since he had stated that the attitude of Europeans "had been exceptionally correct".

(116)

Quite the reverse, *Le Monde* included a comment in favour of the "Europeans" tried for looting. The paper published an *encadré* with the title *Nuances* (middle pages) outlining the distribution in Algiers of a leaflet of protest against a "denial of (*déni de*) justice" from an underground group (one of many), objecting to the fact that:

On a, est-il précisé, trainé sur le banc de l'infamie des Français dont le seul crime est de s'être ravitaillé dans leur magasin habituel fermé ce jour-là dans un but de provocation antifrançaise.

Ce qui ne justifie évidemment aucune poursuite judiciaire....

(117)

The exceptional measures of surveillance and control (5,000 people were checked in Sidi Bel Abes and more in other areas), the road blocks were seen as a necessity.

(118)

Le Monde, 29/1/57, p. 2.

In the same way, *Le Monde* stated that General Massu "had to forcibly open the shops only on the first day (there was no need to do so the second day if the doors had been pulled down) and send (*déléguer*) the soldiers to the strikers since Monday" (1/2/57, p. 1).

Stating that no incident against the "Europeans" had taken place, *Le Monde* was not sure whether it was because of the FLN instructions or whether it was due to army efforts which through exceptional surveillance measures had managed to prevent such actions.

(119)

Le Monde, 3-4/2/57, p. 1.

(120)

To diminish the impact of the measures, *Le Monde* reported that "Muslims" had been warned by cars driving around the city with loudhailers that shops would be opened. It did also point

out that "Europeans and Israelites" did not participate in the strike.

(121)

Read chisels and hammers, shutters being pulled torn by army trucks etc.. see below.

(122)

Horne, A., op. cit., pp. 191-193.

(123)

Le Monde used expressions such as *fonctionnaires ont été l'objet de requisitions*, and stated that loudhailers and patrols were "inviting people to go to work" (garages, worksites and docks). In *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 1.

It conjured up images of soldiers making efforts to persuade strikers by knocking on doors, inviting people to go to work or leave their home and driving them there (31/1/57, p. 2).

The communiqué of Massu was said to have "requested" people not to join the movement. "Leaflets inciting people to go to work" were also reported as having been distributed. See *Le Monde*, 29/1/57, p. 2.

(124)

Horne, A., op. cit., pp. 191-193.

(125)

Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 1.

(126)

In the appeals to the UN and to French public opinion, like that of the Liberals Federation, which offered a more realistic picture. In *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 2.

(127)

When it pointed out that more than the distribution of sweets to the kids of the Casbah, the arrest of one or two European looters (trouble makers), "demonstrated" the desire of the authorities to restore *détente*.

(128)

Le Monde offered advice to the authorities when it wrote that nothing could be gained if the shops remained abandoned by their owners or if force was the only means used to reopen them. This is why, the paper added, after the show of strength by the army, General Massu was trying to "re-establish confidence, without which it would be in vain to believe in the success of an enterprise that the world observes". Ibid.

(129)

Le Monde 30/1/57, p. 1.

Two days later, Mannoni confirmed the impression that no violence had been used and that people were even ready to obey the "injunctions" of the Army and had even prepared themselves (washed and shaved) before they were taken by lorries. *Le Monde* wrote that these scenes would be repeated until Saturday, the last day of the strike. *Le Monde*, 1/2/57, p. 1.

(130)

These were known mainly through admissions, like those of the Préfet Lambert, who admitted that he personally ordered the forced opening of the shops against the wishes of their owners and the arrest of a number of civil servants "because they had no reason to go on strike since they owed their jobs to France". It was also clear to *Le Monde*, through the press releases published (AFP stating that 125 shopkeepers or employees, a number of whom described as FLN local leaders, had been arrested), that the sanctions went far beyond M.Lambert's statements. See *Le Monde*, 31/1/57, p. 2.

On 1 February, the injunctions and prison sentences against some teachers, railwaymen and civil servants (1/2/57, p. 1), then 53 civil servants were reported (AFP press release) as appearing before the courts for refusing to obey requisition orders in Algiers, and five in Medea. See *Le Monde*, 2/2/57, p. 2.

Le Monde then gave details of sanctions which now were said to be administrative and legal (administratives et judiciaires) affecting 13 tramway workers and hospital employees. Five were sentenced to between 15 days to 2 months in prison, one fined 20,000 Fr and 7 others had their cases adjourned. Seven hospital employees were arrested in Oran, taxi and driving licences were withdrawn from 34 taxi drivers and six shopkeepers were sentenced to between 3 and 6 months' jail and fines of over 100,000 Fr. In *Le Monde*, 3-4/2/57, p. 3. One can see clearly the discrepancy of sanctions between strikers and the looters (above).

(131)

Le Monde reported, however, that trade unions had authorised the bosses to sack strikers, but to soften the blow, pointed out that several would not resort to that measure in order not "to poison the situation" and that unless calls for strike were renewed, things should be back to normal the next day. E. Mannoni, in *Le Monde*, 5/2/57, p. 1.

Then the paper reported that the strike should be over that day but informed its readers that, paradoxically, the sanctions taken against the strikers were slowing down the return to work, stating now that the number of sanctions was important but that some workers had been warned by letter.

(132)

It further reported that shops were closed by decision of the administration for up to a month and extremely rigorous measures had been taken against some strikers. At the Hospital, 240 staff were suspended, 64 sacked, 30 moved and 63 taken to court. Not to mention the fact that the conditions to which the Algerians were subjected were to be even tougher as police powers were being devolved (7 January 1957) to General Massu, who was reported as intending to destroy the FLN cells. *Le Monde*, 6/2/57, p. 2.

The picture was as harsh for the strikers on the other side of the Mediterranean. *Le Monde* reported that a plant in Moselle had sacked all its workers striking for the last four days, stating that they came to see the bosses after receiving a letter, but in vain. In *Une usine de la Moselle licencie tous ses grévistes*, the paper stated that 160 workers of the *Société minière Terres Rouges*, still on strike during the last four days, came to see their bosses after they had received their notice, but in vain. *Le Monde*, 6/2/57, p. 2.

Most of the harsh measures taken against Algerian strikers

were fully implemented and those sentenced remained in prison, despite appeals made in their favour. In *Amnistie pour les grévistes du 2 janvier, Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.

Some of the shopkeepers were made to sign and put up posters indicating that they had acted under pressure and had been forced (*Le Monde* used *amenés*) to go on strike by the FLN. *Le Monde*, 10-11/2/57, p. 3.

(133)

This was an unfair coverage compared to that of the Spanish strike (predominant in the transport sector reported in a very different way by J.Grignon-Dumoulin).

In the Spanish case, the movement was described as spontaneous, despite various references to a multitude of groups campaigning. The nationalist strike in Algeria and France by contrast was seen as being ordered, and the strikers were seen as pressurised, under threat, willing to open but scared of the FLN. The paper seemed more in sympathy with the strikers in Spain. The parameters that made the strike so significant were reported to be the refusal by the Catalans, who were following instructions, to go to the theatre and to renounce their <God-football>.

The fact that a whole community shut down every shop did not seem to be significant. The movement in Spain was described as unanimous. The contrasts are stark.

The paper stated that it was not a general strike in both the Spanish and Algerian cases, that there was popular non participation in the strike in both (from the start) Spain and (later) Algeria. In the latter case it was because they wanted to, because they obeyed the injunctions of the army and because of "lassitude." In the Spanish case more sympathetic reasons were given: *Mais l'appel par certains à la grève générale n'a manifestement pas été entendu des milieux ouvriers et cela pour plusieurs raisons... manque de réserves, rigueurs de l'hiver, crainte d'utilisation d'un décret* (allowing dismissal of workers which would break any attempt of general strike)... . Not so in the Algeria despite the same factors and even more severe repression.

This could be illustrated further when the paper went into the political and economic ramifications of the strike. In the Algerian case it was conceived as a threat and as provocation to provoke some of the irate Europeans to do something that could be "exploited against France before the UN." The Spanish strike was motivated, according to the paper, by social and political demands. When the motives of the Algerian strike were reported in quotes from "FLN sources," these were analysed as provocations and a test of strength (30/1/57, p. 4).

When noting the end of the boycott of the transport system in Spain (*Après la fin du boycottage des transports, un calme complet est revenu à Madrid*), the journalist stated that tube, trams and buses seemed bulging in the rush hour but, from the few controllers that he spoke to, he did not seem convinced that everything was normal. In the Algerian case, things were reported as normal virtually from the start of the strike.

Dumoulin found it difficult to give an idea of the success of the movement but stated that the strike was nearly total in Barcelona, if not in Madrid. There were nuances in the Spanish case, but not in the Algerian one. In the Spanish case, the journalist did not rush into making a judgment and thought it better to wait to know what would happen in the future.

See *Le Monde*, 12/2/57, p. 2.

(134)

It was nearly a fortnight later that the paper published an article on the disapproval expressed by some of its readers of European origin of some of the excesses committed during the general strike. In *Des témoins européens désapprouvent les abus commis pendant la grève générale*, *Le Monde*, 21/2/57, p. 4.

The paper stated that it had received several letters "during the last weeks" from European residents in various towns of Algeria, who had witnessed *la grève générale ordonnée par le FLN, et des mesures décidées par les autorités pour la briser, puis pour la sanctionner.*

(135)

Admitting self self-censorship rather than a lack of awareness, the paper stated that a sense of national discipline had prevented it from making the facts known while the UN debate was taking place.

Un sentiment de discipline nationale nous a amenés à ne pas faire état pendant le débat aux Nations-unies de faits qui aurait pu servir la propagande de nos adversaires. Cette discrétion, aujourd'hui, ne s'impose pas, et il nous paraît impossible de continuer à garder le silence sur des récits de témoins dont nous avons pu contrôler l'identité, même lorsque pour des raisons de prudence élémentaire ils nous ont demandé de ne pas la révéler. Alors que dans tous les discours officiels il n'est question que de coopération franco-musulmane, les abus rapportés nous éloignent à coup sûr du but recherché.

(136)

The paper stated that, from what was recounted to it, scènes de pillage followed *ouverture de force des magasins musulmans*, which had remained closed, with the Army and the police not intervening to protect the property of those striking, or at least during the first days, as in Bône, where shops, *éventrés ... par ... soldats et policiers armés de pioches et de pinces carriers*, ended up being ransacked and with every item being taken away:

En quelques heures, produits alimentaires, cigarettes, montres, bijoux, postes de radio, vélos et même ... scooters ont disparu.

The owners were said to have very often watched without a move (*blêmes de rage*). One shopkeeper, who had remained closed, was victim of pillage; another opened his shop which had the same fate.

In Oran a report was said to have even pointed the finger at the territorials who, themselves, incited passers by to take part in looting. And in Algiers, Relizane, "rideaux de fer arrachés par half tracks" and "vitrines brisées" were reported as common occurrences.

Most of the people were said not to have wanted to be associated with the pillage, and some were said to have even asked the army to intervene without success. A professor was accused of being a *fellagha* when he defended a Muslim's shop.

Other letters were said to report sanctions, *brimades*, trials, fines and prison sentences. Hundreds were held in Oran for two days with a bit of bread and a sardine to eat; strikers, including teachers, were forced to sweep the streets and to replace dock workers.

Ce n'est pas par ces mesures humiliantes ... qui atteignent les éléments les plus conscients et les plus valables de la population musulmane que l'on arrivera à concilier les deux communautés algériennes.

Other people, who wrote to the paper, were said by *Le Monde* to have drawn a parallel between this strike and that decided for 6 February 1956, which greeted the arrival of Guy Mollet in Algeria, and to have remarked that no sanctions were taken against the strikers then. The paper was asked whether this was

égalité complète de tous les Algériens dont la France faisait état dernièrement à la tribune des Nations unies

In *Le Monde*, 21/2/57, p. 4.

(137)

The subsequent report of these repressive measures further illustrates the humanist side and the concern for the severity of sanctions, which, earlier, did not carry much weight, as, according to the paper, reporting them would have resulted in damaging the national interest of France in the UN.

Other strike movements took place but *Le Monde's* coverage did not improve with time. See *Le Monde*, 6/7/57, p. 5.

(138)

This dichotomy European/North African and European/Muslim served to mask another distinction: French/Algerian in the minds of the readers between the status of the two communities. The use of the vague concept of North African, or that of the religious label, denied any national legitimacy in the written word of *Le Monde* and that of the press of the time.

(139)

Many of the rights and economic and social conditions did not apply to them in the same way as did their duties. *Le Monde* also widely used this term, which in fact was a misnomer.

This is confirmed by the fact that *Le Monde*, echoing a report by Jean-Jacques Roger of the Governor General's office, estimated the number to be near 300,000 at the end of 1956 compared to only 16,000 Moroccans and 3,000 Tunisians. On average this constituted one in seven adults in Algeria. See *Un adulte musulman sur sept travaille dans la métropole, Le Monde*, 25/12/56, p. 4. In this article the paper discussed a new study (Rapport documentaire) of Algerian immigration in France by Jean-jacques Roger, a civil servant in the Governor General's office.

(140)

Poor conditions and increased pauperization throughout led to that immigration. A number of Algerians were called up to fight in the two World Wars, in particular, and French wars in general. Some of them remained in France afterwards. A number of Algerians were also encouraged to replace Frenchmen in the factories during the wars. The major economic development on which France embarked after the Second World War required an important supply of cheap labour, which the deteriorating economic conditions in Algeria helped provide for mainland France. The life of immigrants in general, and of Algerians in particular, in France was characterised by poor housing and low wages. One could add to these problems the alien culture and language, poor education as well as the lack of family life.

(141)

Higher wages and the social security system were also put forward. See *Le Monde*, 25/12/56.

More importantly, Algerians in Algeria lived off the products of immigration. *Le Monde* itself admitted that about a quarter of the "Algerian Muslims" lived off the wages sent by immigrants from France. The paper had even pointed out that in certain areas, the funds sent/sums transferred to Algeria, which in total were estimated between 11 to 13 billion fr in 1950, increasing to 37 billion fr in 1955, were the only source of family income. See *Le Monde*, 25/12/56, p. 4.

At other times, the endemic unemployment and sometimes the urge to seek a peaceful atmosphere which had disappeared from Algeria, were given as causes for departure to France. See *Le Monde*, 24/5/57, p. 3.

(142)

When some merchants established themselves and were followed by steel workers, then by the contingent of war veterans after 1914, "seduced by the resources of France". The Liberation and the trafficking which went on after the War were added as reasons for the increase in numbers. See *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

The paper reported that the average stay for those immigrants was about two to four years, and rarely exceeded five years. This article reviewed the geographical origin and the distribution by employment sector of this work force.

(25/12/56)

Six months later, the paper noted the lower proportion of landworkers and gave areas of origin, distribution and settlement of those arriving. In *Les travailleurs algériens reprennent le chemin de la métropole*, *Le Monde*, 24/5/57, p. 3.

(143)

The general pattern used to report immigrant affairs was clearly illustrated when the paper reported on the Paris community. Occasionally, the paper thought it opportune to examine the state of mind of the immigrants of the Goutte d'Or, nicknamed "The Medina of Paris", one of the areas where the immigrant community was highly concentrated. See *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

(144)

The paper remarked, though, that not all the North Africans lived in the Goutte d'Or but that they were spread "in douars", over Argenteuil, Boulogne, Grenelle, St Severin, with most of them settled around a square formed by the rues Barbes (chef-lieu) with 6,000 residents and 25,000 on Sunday, when the area became a market, a meeting place where "bloody taxations" took place, a real town in the town with all the looks of a state within the state. In *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

Describing the living conditions of the Muslims in Paris, *Le Monde* estimated that 500 lived in houses or apartments (*logements*), others lived in groups of four and five in a hotel room for 3,000 fr a month in about a hundred hotels, two-thirds 2/3 of which belonged to other Muslims.

They were said to have instinctively grouped themselves by region of origin, affinity or race. Those who had been established for a long time, the paper wrote, had a way of life in workshops and in the factories comparable to their European comrades. Some had brought their wives, others married Eur-

opeans, 300 to 400 women were said to have some sort of household life (*qui mènent dans le quartier une manière de ménage*).

The journalist, Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, wrote that there were no signs of misery in the Goutte d'or and stated that 90% of them had more or less fixed jobs. In *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

(145)

Although the description generalised above applied to some, it no doubt excluded many as in fact they were left to take the poorest housing. Sometimes not being able to afford the rent, they resorted to living in insalubrious buildings which were often destroyed without alternative housing being made available to them. *Le Monde* had given the news of the destruction by bulldozers of a building in the Montparnasse area of Paris where the Algerians had sought shelter from the cold (7/1/55).

On this occasion, the paper wrote that the search for causes of unemployment and the lack of housing should be looked into but, because of the relative low priority given to this item of news, the last edition of the day squeezed that piece of information out of the newspaper altogether.

(146)

Even if they were said to be similar in income and not living miserably, for the journalist, there were no signs of life resembling that of the Europeans. At times of rest, streets and pavements were said to be animated with *concilia-bules* and *trafic indiscernable* (the German Occupation and the Liberation, which increased the trafficking, were said, though, not to have created any special worry then -implying that there was one now), with packets of <kif> circulating. As if these derogatory images were not enough, a touch of the exotic was combined with unconscious criminality to describe them. "Trousers or coat in hand, a vendor who ignores the meaning of handling stolen property (*recel*) satisfies his passion for slow bargaining." In *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

The paper wrote that in the cafés the smell of mint and the melancholy *aigrelette* evoked the country of birth for "diners happy to have a meal for 100 Fr and for fanatics of dominos playing despite the prohibition of the game by the nationalists (who were said to have banned games and betting as well as alcohol). This implied that the immigrants were ignoring the nationalists' "orders".

(147)

Moreover, the three hundred prostitutes (most of them, European), who offered their services for less than 500 francs, were said to be protected by North Africans.

The fact that they stayed indoors, in places reserved for them to "prevent huge gatherings" in the streets, in clear violation (*entorse*) of the law of 1946, was said to represent very little compared to the *repliement sur eux* which "had to be tolerated in other fields". See *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

(148)

Algerian immigrants were described as sheltering behind a language that almost no European understands, drawn towards each other (*poussés les uns vers les autres par le désarroi de l'exil*), standing with their backs against the wall, or invading the streets. The paper commented that they did not need

nationalist propaganda to discover nationalist aspirations that "nobody around them will ever share". In *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

There was already an idea of "them and us" and that a civilised French way of life could not take place. The paper commented: "How can the rule of French law impose itself where our language, our customs and the French themselves have lost right of abode"?

(149)

See *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7, *Heures chaudes dans la Medina de Paris. I. Une ville dans la ville* by Bertrand Poirot-Delpech.

(150)

The increase of their number was perceived as a worrying aspect, especially at night and at the weekends when the population of the area was multiplied by 4 or 5, as people from the suburbs descended on the place and when others used it as a stopover, "to see the cousin, to do their shopping, buy commodities, get news or simply go to the Arab cinema".

(151)

The reports conveyed the idea that "North Africans" were taking over everything. *Le Monde* wrote that, although there were 45,000 Parisians (*de souche*) as opposed to 6,000 North African in the area, the former had seen their rights eroded, and restrained progressively.

For the paper the square formed by the streets of Doudeauville and Max Dormoy and the Boulevards Barbes and La Chapelle belonged as much to the Muslims as the Casbah of Algiers and would "solely be inhabited" by them if the housing crisis "had not forced the Europeans to put up (*supporter*) with the Muslims and with "a cohabitation that frightens them". Every time they can, the paper stated, the Europeans flee to other areas with shopkeepers more inclined to sell their shops as the population of origin "was getting weary" (*clientelle d'autrefois se lasse*).

More than 100 cafés were reported as having been sold in the last year to North Africans, 30 grocery shops, tens of hair salons, several butcheries, and a bakery, not to mention clothes shops (*confection*). See *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

(152)

The Messalist organisation with its changing names and fortunes, from ENA and PPA to MTLD and MNA (see Chapters 3 and 5), had had a stronghold on the immigrants there since the emergence of the movement in the early 1920's. But since 1954 the FLN, which created the Federation de France du FLN as a seventh Military region to carry on the struggle, was gaining grounds and slowly displacing the Messalist organisation. These nationalists were said to travel from area to area, to have cars, to be well organised and well equipped with arms. See *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4.

There were struggles of influence between the two organisations over the observance of Islamic rule, obedience to one or the other movement and over contributions to this or the other nationalist organisation coffers.

(153)

The activities of the nationalists took place in various regions in France where the Algerian community was established, but they also affected the Algerian community living in Belgium. See, for instance, *Le Monde*, 23-24/6/57, p. 6, 7/8/57, p. 1.

(154)

For the paper the 30 months of fighting in Algeria was echoed on the other side of the Mediterranean, where the propaganda campaign was followed by *réglements de comptes*.

The "terrorist activities" in France did not take the form of attacks on French civilians (reports of deliberate attacks on civilians, such as *trois Européens ont été fortuitement atteints par balles* -see *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4- were very rare) but on members of the police force (policemen and inspectors).

Despite that, the paper commented that some have attributed (a été prêté) to the HQ of the rebellion the temptation of talking of "mainland terrorism".

Given the disproportion in numbers, *Le Monde* could only see their activities being carried out in "suicide operations", which were made easy by the concentration of North Africans in the capital but which would result in "repression which could largely be exploited before world opinion". See *Le Monde*, 21/6/57, p. 7.

(155)

Le Monde also gave regular information about the victims of the attacks (see *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4, 21-22/4/57, p. 2, for instance), providing sometimes graphs to help the reader obtain a better picture.

From January 1956 to February 1957, for instance, it found that there was a "worrying increase". There were as many dead in two and half months as there had been in the previous twelve, with an ephemeral decrease, which it stated, "according to some" (*certain attribuent*), was due to the "disarray" (*désarroi*) caused by the capture of the five FLN leaders. See *Depuis le premier janvier 1957 dans la métropole 436 musulmans ont été blessés par des co-religionnaires adversaires politiques*, in *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4.

(156)

And members of the police force.

(157)

On this occasion *Le Monde* did not see these attacks, and thought it would be erroneous to perceive them as *réglements de comptes*. See *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4.

(158)

It carried on treating them and headlining them as such: *Des règlements de comptes entre Nord Africains*. See *Le Monde*, 13/3/57, p. 2 (also describing them as killers and racketeers), 9/4/57, p. 4, 17/4/57, p. 4, 23/4/57, p. 2, 15/5/57, p. 4 (implying they were acting as gangsters), 24/5/57, p. 3, 9-10/6/57, p. 3, 13/6/57, p. 2, 7/8/57, p. 1 -(describing them as also irritating the Belgian population), 7/8/57, pp. 1 & 13, 14/8/57, etc...

(159)

Le Monde, 16/6/55.

(160)

Since very often licences of the premises where the attacks took place did not call the police and searches of the "assailants"'s premises did not reveal anything.

(161)

The reasons given here must be doubted, when the attacks continued after the fast and the victims were still unwilling to help provide them. See *Le Monde* 18/5/55. On this occasion the report also indicated the arrest of seven aggressors.

(162)

Le Monde, 1/6/55.

(163)

Only in March 1957 *Le Monde* had explained that the deaths and injuries of Algerians in France were due to the two rival political organisations fighting one another without mercy (*qui se livrent une lutte sans merci*) [the paper also gave 16-17/10/56 as a further reference]. The number of assaults was enough for *Le Monde* to indicate the vigour of the Messalist movement (*que le FLN a, sans conteste, supplanté en Algérie*) in mainland France.

In *Depuis le premier janvier 1957 dans la métropole 436 musulmans ont été blessés et 63 tués par des co-religionnaires adversaires politiques*, *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4.

(164)

Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.

It is a little surprising to see such reasons put forward without explanation as to how the information was obtained -because, as stated previously, the Algerians did not involve the French authorities in what was going on and hardly complained to the police. The paper would have had no idea unless it had been able to ask the dead.

(165)

Most of the Algerians in France were peaceful and no more involved in crime than any other section of the population. It is probable that, in some cases, deprivation might have led to theft or similar crime to satisfy the survival needs of individuals. But mostly, the Algerians were not particularly noted for any criminal activities except for attacks (for political reasons) on members of their own community (on each other), and the police.

(166)

Le Monde reported (giving, for instance, the official version from the Préfet's Bulletin municipal) that surveillance measures had been decided and undertaken, giving the readers the feeling that the community was made up of criminals with its members at the throat of one another with the police watching over them, trying to contain the troubles, and MPs asking questions about these killers and racketeers. See *La surveillance des Nord-Africains dans la région parisienne*, *Le Monde* 13/3/57, p. 2.

(167)

Though accepting that most of it remained unseen since with the closure of Charbonnerie Market in 1955, the immigrants were said to be less and less likely to solve their conflicts in the

streets. See *Le Monde*, 22/6/57, p. 6.

(168)

It seemed to the paper that a great number of Algerians wanted independence and that even older immigrants felt betrayed, humiliated and did not hide it to the few Europeans with whom they kept links. After the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, they were described as obsessed with <istiglal> (independence in Arabic) which, in their mind, by "some sort of magical powers", would improve their fate.

B.Poirot-Delpech wrote that because this fight was for independence and because it was being conducted in their name, as a cousin or a brother was involved and as these immigrants contributed willingly or not, they were said to see it as being theirs. Some sympathy for the rebel cause was said to have been shown by the most francophile of them.

The fighting (still called *règlements de comptes*) was said to prove the opposition of some of them to the contributions imposed, if not to the ideal for which they were taxed.

They were said to have no sympathy for the present French policy and a general feeling of living in the margins, under the influence of news and rumours (true or false) which were a source for passion and nationalist fervour. See *Le Monde*, 22/6/57, p. 6.

(169)

The MNA-FLN rivalry was thought to dominate everything as the MNA, which used to control everything, was now being rivalled by the FLN who wanted to play an equal role. *Le Monde* (BPD) thought it probable that, at that time, a show of force by the FLN would certainly be successful, like the MNA's before because of "the terror that a minority can cause in the circumstances." See *Le Monde*, 22/6/57, p. 6.

(170)

The journalist wrote that a handful of collectors came at regular intervals and used two methods of collection: one directly from the workers, the other from their landlords. Contributions were put at about 2,000 Fr to each organisation. This, he thought, made a big dent in the budget of a "manoeuvre". Shopkeepers were said to be asked to contribute more, between 30,000 and 40,000 fr, depending on turnover. The methods were said to be the same for both organisations, starting with a warning, escalating to beatings and ending with the use of bullet rounds. *Le Monde*, 22/6/57, p. 6.

The traders were said to be grateful to French policemen for their protection, yet to ask them at the same time not to speak to them in public. *Ibid.*

Despite these categorical statements, the paper was willing to concede that threats on their own were not enough to explain the worrying evolution noticed lately in the whole of the population. The atmosphere had never been as tense, wrote B.Poirot-Delpech, and people kept quiet when Europeans went past, while their looks became arrogant. *Ibid.*

(171)

The action of the "rebels" was said to be trying, through these "repeated attacks" (*attentats*), to provoke the repression of the armed forces which would then be used in international propaganda by the nationalists. See *Heures chaudes dans la médina de Paris. II. De gré ou de force tous les Algériens*

"contribuant" à la "lutte pour l'indépendance" by B. Poirot-Delpech , in *Le Monde* 22/6/57, p. 6.

(172)

See *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4.

(173)

See *Les règlements de comptes entre Nord Africains se multiplient en province* in *Le Monde*, 17/4/57, p. 4.

(174)

Le Monde, 22/6/57, p. 6.

(175)

Ibid.

(176)

They were invariably said to be collecting the money for a "rebel" organisation. See for instance *Le Monde*, 27/5/55.

(177)

See *Le Monde*, 22/1/57, p. 4, 13/8/57, p. 7.

(178)

See *Le Monde*, 17/1/57, p. 6.

(179)

Vaste opération de contrôle dans le quartier de la Goutte d'Or à Paris. 23 Algériens arrêtés, armes and tracts saisis, in *Le Monde*, 21-22/4/57, p. 1.

(180)

See *Le Monde*, 23/4/57, p. 2, 13/8/57, p. 7.

(181)

News of arrests of Algerians in Belgium were also reported by the paper. See *Le Monde*, 23-24/6/57, p. 6.

(182)

Several hundreds, if not thousands, of people were stopped and searched merely because of their appearance. Their hotels were invaded by the security forces and searched at the most awkward times. These operations led to a small number of people being actually taken to the police station, but an even smaller number of arrests being maintained because of lack of evidence.

Similarly to operations inside Algeria, *Le Monde* did not make a case against the extreme form of harassment to which the Algerians were subjected in France.

The activities of the police forces in France usually involved an inordinate number of checks where thousands of people could be woken up at night and their premises searched, their cafés closed down, and other similar indiscriminate repressive measures used against them.

Algerians were also stopped and searched in the streets in their hundreds and their thousands, although the number of people thought to be warranting arrest was relatively small. One can clearly see that the number of people affected (thousands) by these checks was considerable in relation to the number of those arrested (sometimes less than a dozen). See *Le Monde*, 8/2/57, p. 2, 23/4/57., p. 2, 27/4/57, p. 5, 30/4/57, p.

(183)

This was not the case when the European community in Algeria (examined earlier when reporting the settlers' views) seemed to be threatened. The paper, in this case, went to great lengths to express their fears and worries, prompting the authorities to be concerned and to take action.

When it reported arrests and control measures it did so only with small title and in a very few lines.

See, for example, *à la suite d'une agression*" more than 500 "North Africans" were checked (*interpelés*), 60 of them taken to police stations for further examination of their situation, and 17 landlords were "done" for not registering their lodgers. In *Le Monde*, 17/1/57, p. 6.

(184)

Twenty-six other cafés were reported as having been closed down (after the 26 closed on 24 June), the owners of which were accused of having allowed their establishments to have been used for propaganda and anti-colonial activities.

On that occasion, *Le Monde* stated that enquiries showed that they had been used as such and revealed that about 1,500 cafés were owned by "North Africans", 700 of which were in Paris. See *Le Monde*, 12/7/57, p. 4. The publication of that communiqué, though informative of sanctions taken by the security forces, could not but be seen as a warning to others if they were tempted to allow their establishments be used for "propaganda" and "anti-colonial" actions.

The measures taken in the Place Maubert in Paris, for instance, following the assassination of Chekkal at the end of May 1957, provide a good illustration of the case. See *Après l'assassinat de M. Chekkal Vaste opération de police autour de la place Maubert. Treize suspects retenus* (30/5/57, p. 2).

The vast police operations concerned 30 *commissaires* and involved extensive searches of 60 hotels, stop and search activities, and resulted in 1,300 North Africans being checked (*interpelés*) and 80 taken to the centre of Goujon for the "habitual verifications".

500 were apprehended in Lille, although they might have had nothing to do with the incident.

(185)

The meetings of their unions were banned and the workers themselves dispersed by force as soon as they gathered. In Paris, the police arrested 246 people for having resisted their attempt to disperse them, holding 4 of them. *Le Monde*, (3/5/57, p. 4). Outside Paris, the figures were much higher: it was 250 in Lyon, 500 in Lille where no transport ran on that day, 2000 in Roubaix. *Le Monde*, 3/5/57, p. 4. This was only the subject of factual reports of the paper, sometimes with the most misleading descriptions. Despite reporting those events of Paris, the tone of the article was that this was a peaceful May Day. *Le 1er Mai a pris l'aspect d'un paisible dimanche printanier (...)* calme absolu (...).

(186)

It is significant that Gilbert-Jules, Interior Minister, was seen as having shared public anxiety about increasing criminality/crime and justified in taking new measures to deal with it, as the measures that had been taken hitherto were

thought to have been insufficient.

The four kinds of measures were aimed at intensifying preventive initiatives, giving priority to information gathering for the whole of police services, reinforcing services dealing with repression of banditism in the most sensitive centres (giving centres affected), and developing the means of identifying the weapons used in attacks (establishing a central file/fichier).

It is clear that, although the measures were thought to be efficient against general crime and hold-ups, they were introduced mainly to deal with political crimes (à caractère politique).

(...) il n'est pas douteux que les tragiques règlements de compte qui se déroulent dans les milieux nord africains de la métropole ont décidé le ministre à édicter ces importantes instructions.

On ne saurait nier en effet, que ces agressions sont infiniment plus nombreuses que les divers actes criminels visés par les instructions du ministre de la défense.

Pour lutter contre la criminalité de caractère politique, Le Ministre de l'Intérieur a pris une série d'importantes mesures. (Le Monde 21-22/4/57, p. 2).

For *Le Monde* these measures were not exclusively directed against the Algerians, but against other extremist groups (UDCA, PC, hold-ups, attacks of tax collectors, and the like), though it seems to have hardly been the case.

The measures used were also described as not having been without efficacy. In the *Goutte d'or* area alone, *Le Monde* stated that 4 killers had been arrested as well as "money collectors who, no doubt, had no less than 15 règlements de compte under their belt" (à leur actif).

House and personal searches were said to hamper the leaders, and the carrying of arms. The silence, "connivence if not complicity of the masses", were said to have been such that the action undertaken could not be relaxed (*se relacher*) for one moment (22/6/57, p. 6).

Sometimes, it was claimed that the police, despite reinforcements and reorganisation, was not having much success in view of their mediocre results (20/3/57, p. 4) and that more men were needed.

Preventive measures (essentially surveillance) were said to be notoriously inefficient and the paper stated that it was about time that people in charge of the safety of citizens (Muslims or otherwise) and of maintaining order fully understood the gravity of the situation. See *Les règlements de comptes entre Nord Africains se multiplient en province*, in *Le Monde*, 17/4/57, p. 4.

(187)

The measures were described as instructions given by the official authorities, Gilbert Jules, Minister of the Interior, to put a stop to "political crimes" and to the settlement of accounts (*règlements de comptes*), racketeering. See *Vaste opération de contrôle dans le quartier de la Goutte d'Or à Paris. 23 Algériens arrêtés, armes and tracts saisis*, *Le Monde*, 21-22/4/57, p. 1.

Nationalist activities seem inevitably to have been followed by vast measures of repression, added to the special powers used (1/8/57, p. 4).

(188)

Le Monde highlighted the fact that the police thought that the sentences were too lenient. February 1957 saw 75 sentences for a month in prison and "only two sentences for over two years". See *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 4.

(189)

Very occasionally, the paper judged the increased number of searches as having exasperated some, without reassuring the others. See *Le Monde*, 22/6/57, p. 6. The rare protests occasionally heard in the National Assembly were echoed by the paper.

The indignant protest of M.Dronne (Social Republican, *Le Mans*) in a Parliamentary question to the Interior Minister was echoed by the paper (8/2/57, p. 2). But the paper did not see itself either as an exponent of the immigrants' aspirations nor as the champion of their cause. It did not see fit to air views condemning the treatment to which this community was being subjected.

(190)

It was only in May 1957, fourteen months after their imposition (22 March 1956), that restrictions on the return of immigrants to Algeria were mentioned. *Le Monde* stated that this measure had been taken to prevent massive numbers of people leaving (as all immigrants were receiving "suspect" telegrams asking them to return to their sick mothers). The paper also admitted that the fear that normal relations and travel would be interrupted between France and Algeria, and the fear of being separated from their relatives for a long time, were said to have played a role in hastening the numbers of departures to Algeria and prevented some from coming to France. Now the trend was said to have been reversed. See *Le Monde*, 24/5/57, p. 3.

Whereas the readers were hardly informed of the reluctance of Algerians to go to France in 1956, their return was being hailed as an important event. *Le Monde* reported that Algerian immigrants were now returning to France and gave the numbers of those arriving in the different stations and airports and the groups in charge of helping them.

Now that the Algerians were said to be convinced that the transport links would not be cut off between the two countries, they no longer hesitated to come to France. *Ibid.*

Most of the departures to France were described as a return, with a few going to France for the first time to see relatives. The paper noticed the presence of fewer landworkers and that of a small, but not insignificant, number of wives and children.

In *Les travailleurs algériens reprennent le chemin de la métropole*, *Le Monde*, 24/5/57, p. 3.

(191)

See *Le Monde*, 25/12/56, p. 4.

(192)

The way that this statement was formulated was more likely to instill a sense of pride and complacency about what was being done for immigration.

CHAPTER EIGHT: NOTES

(1)

See Chapter 2 and Jeanneney, J.-N., op cit., p. 198.

(2)

Jean Planchais was categorical in an interview with the author (29/12/89). J.Fauvet is also convinced that the paper held the most advanced views and claims that it was at the forefront of the battle against colonialism. See earlier references in Chapter 2 and *Débat à propos d'un monopole, Le Monde à coeur ouvert*, in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, No 866, January-February 1977, p. 81.

(3)

See Chapter 2.

(4)

A large part of *Le Monde's* coverage dealt specifically with the views on the French mainland, and most of the paper's columns were devoted to its social and economic life and, of course, to its politics. This included the rise and fall of different governments, the debates in the National Assembly, and the subsequent motions of censure or confidence and investiture speeches which accompanied them.

(5)

The major problems in the colonies seemed to arise not from Algeria but from the situation in the two protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, which were going through a very turbulent period, and especially Indochina, in which a complete reversal of the situation occurred with the *débâcle* of the French troops at Dien Bien Phu (May 1954).

(6)

It did so when an earthquake shook the town of El Asnam (then Orléanville) in early September 1954. A number of articles were devoted throughout that month to the situation in that area, regarding the number of deaths, casualties, destruction of property and sending of help, medicines, blankets, tents, etc, and the visit of Mitterrand there from 11 to 17 October 1954.

(7)

Different requests, especially by "Muslim" deputies for administrative reforms and the implementation of the recommendations of the 1947 Statutes in that field and in that of religious and educational matters, could be found in the pages of the paper.

News of financial matters and budget debates 27/2/54 was also brought to the attention of the reader. See also *Le Monde*, 3-4/1/54, p. 4.

(8)

Which emphasised the will of the Governor-General to solve

the vital problems in Algeria (See *Le Monde*, 12/5/54, p. 11), his desire to avoid serious problems in the colony and never permit that *ne s'ouvre en Algérie le jeu de sérieuses représailles*. In *Le Monde*, 15/6/54, p. 5.

(9)

See Chapter 4.

(10)

They were thought to be very important because they ensured the representation of the colony to its own legislative chamber, the *Assemblée algérienne*, and in the French Assembly where a number of parliamentarians from the colonies were to sit. The Algerian Assembly was made up of two colleges, the First College representing under a million inhabitants of European extraction, and the Second College, representing the approximately eight million Algerians of Muslim confession.

(11)

The paper, for instance, found a 62% abstention rate in the election very high, if "inexplicable", in the First College but the fact that abstention in the Second College was recommended by the MTLD did not necessitate for the paper any further analysis or explanation as to, for instance, why such a measure was recommended and why it proved successful. See *Le Monde* 2/2/54, p. 1. The changes in the party structure of the two colleges were, however, noted in terms of their respective composition.

(12)

News of the State Council's decision to reinforce the shared authority of the Algerian Assembly (with the French parliament) to modify legislative texts introduced by the decrees in Algeria did not lead to any comment by the journalist on the composition and effective powers of the Assembly nor on the way in which these decrees might be changed, thus failing to put that power (or the lack of it) into perspective. See *Le Monde*, 23-24/5/54, p. 5.

(13)

It is worth noting that as *Le Monde* is printed in the afternoon (and early evening) and bears next day's date, it would not have been possible to find news of the uprising that day.

(14)

This early part of *Le Monde's* coverage of the Algerian war has also been dealt with by Chentouf, Taïeb, *Le journal Le Monde et le premier novembre*, in *Retentissement de la révolution algérienne*, ENAL/GAM, Algiers, 1985, pp. 59-64.

(15)

The economic measures were, to start with, not to be implemented until order had been restored, since the official discourse saw no relation between the deeds of the terrorists and the economic measures that would be taken; then later on, when order proved difficult to restore, and was not likely to be, these reforms were to be applied simultaneously.

(16)

The reader could get a good idea for this period by glancing at the pages of the paper on the following dates, for instance:

4/11/54, 27/11/54/, 28-29/11/54.

(17)

See, for instance, *Le Monde*, 20/11/54, 5-6/12/54 and 11/12/54.

(18)

These sources would be that of the Government, Governor-General's office, military sources and the *Agence France-Presse*, the latter being a French government press agency.

(19)

See *Le Monde*, 17/11/54.

(20)

See reports in *Le Monde*, 4/11/54 (*Il faudra beaucoup d'hommes et de temps pour débarasser la région des bandes armées*) or the statements by the Minister of Interior in *Le Monde* (11/11/54) : *la situation évolue vite et favorablement en Algérie, je suis optimiste.*

(21)

Then Minister of Interior.

(22)

Pas de négociations avec les ennemis de la patrie... La seule négociation c'est la guerre, Le Monde 6/11/54, p. 1.

L'Algérie c'est la France et la France ne reconnaîtra chez elle pas d'autre autorité que la sienne, Mitterrand in Le Monde, 9/11/54.

*Les départements d'Algérie font partie de la République. Ils sont français depuis longtemps, leur population jouit de la citoyenneté française et est représentée au Parlement, ... a donné assez de preuves de son attachement à la France pour que la France ne laisse pas mettre en cause son unité. Entre elle et la métropole il n'est pas de sécession concevable. Cela doit être clair pour toujours et pour tout le monde en Algérie, dans la métropole et à l'étranger....Jamais la France, jamais aucun Parlement, jamais aucun gouvernement ne cédera sur ce principe fondamental (National Assembly speech by Mitterrand in *Le Monde*, 14-15/11/54).*

*Si trop d'Algériens ont connu la tentation de se séparer et de combattre, c'est trop souvent certes parce que des conseillers étrangers et lointains les y invitaient, parce qu'une passion absurde les éloignait de la France, mais c'est aussi parce qu'ils n'avaient pas le sentiment que leur espérance de citoyens pouvait s'identifier à une espérance française (see also Mitterrand, in *Le Monde*, 9/12/54.*

(23)

Denying, for instance, that reports from Radio Cairo could have any relation with reality. *Le Monde*, 6/11/54.

(24)

When the Governor-General appealed to the inhabitants of the border between Algeria and Tunisia, where he was inspecting the frontier, he declared (see *Le Monde*, 21/12/54):

Nous avons besoin de vous pour rétablir la paix

qui vous permettra de travailler. Nous avons besoin de renseignements qui permettront à l'armée et à nos forces de police d'agir efficacement. Je vous donne ici l'assurance que vous serez protégés contre d'éventuelles représailles. Des mesures ont été prises pour que ne soient pas inquiétés par les hors-la-loi les amis de la France.

(25)

Le Monde's P.A. Martel recommended that: les animateurs de cette oeuvre de destruction doivent être combattus; ses exécutants doivent être poursuivis et châtiés. See *Le Monde*, 3/11/54.

But he soon (by the end of the year) came to realise that force alone would not solve the problem.

(26)

It had to be lucide et loyale si l'on ne veut pas pousser les populations dans les rangs des hors-la-loi. Il faut refuser de se laisser engager dans un cycle infernal où les ennemis de la France algérienne eux-mêmes voudraient nous enfermer.

See *Le Monde*, 3/11/54.

A year later, remembering the victims of the 1945 massacres, E. Sablier stated: La repression ne fut en aucun cas plus raisonnée. Implying that repression should be selective, Sablier gave 120 Europeans and a possible 1,200 dead on the "Muslims" side which was quite a modest estimate.

(27)

The paper followed along these lines by publishing the opinions expressed by the Fédération de la Seine de l'Union Progressiste (*Douloureusement émue par les dramatiques événements d'Afrique du Nord, adjure le gouvernement de ne pas s'engager dans la voie de la répression qui entraînerait des réactions en chaîne sans retour en arrière possible* -in *Le Monde*, 9-10/11/54, p. 5) and those of the Bachagha of Khenchela, who thought that persuasion and forgiveness (*indulgence*) could lead to the rebels' surrender, and added that his actions had led to the surrender of six of them of their own free will. In *Le Monde* 18/11/54, p. 1.

(28)

A. Leveuf had categorically stated that the army's repressive action was very selective. See *Le Monde*, 16/11/54, p. 1.

(29)

The paper seemed to convey the view that part of public opinion was asking for reforms and a vigorous social and economic policy. See *Le Monde*, 6/10/54, 9/11/54 and 19/11/54.

(30)

The various groups included trades unions, the Church and elected European and Muslim officials: Augarde (Centre Républicain Constantine), Muscatelli (ARS, Algiers), Fonlupt-Esperaber (MRP), Naegelen (Socialist, former Governor-General), Mostefai (Indépendant, Constantine), Sportisse and Giraud (Communists), Benhabilles and Tamzali, etc. See *Le Monde* 24/11/54, 26/11/54, 28-29/11/54 and 12-13/12/54.

(31)

The only article of that kind in this early period is a

general one about the colonies by A.Blanchet in *Le Monde*,
24/12/54.

(32)

Mitterrand was Minister of the Interior. The Statutes adopted by the Assembly in 1947 proposed to give equal rights to the indigenous population. They were never enacted because of the opposition at official and parliamentary levels as a result of pressure from the settlers.

(33)

In the rich agricultural regions, and areas of big land ownership, the paper stated that people were very pessimistic and when contacted they declared *La France perdra en quelques années la partie en Algérie*.

(34)

The measures that raised more protests were the merger of police forces on the two sides of the Mediterranean and the modification of the *communes mixtes* (overdue since 1947). The first one was considered to be for the settlers: *un désaveu à l'état-major policier... telle est l'opinion que nous avons enregistrée à plusieurs reprises*, and the second: *une mise en minorité des colons*.

(35)

See *Le Monde*, 7/1/55.

(36)

As no other paper had "published any comment".

(37)

The predominant views were those of the officials, rich settlers, politicians and the newspapers owned predominantly by the same interests. These included, for the most part, people of European origin but also some people (officials and politicians) of Muslim origin. It is clear from the above analysis that the newspapers reserved more space to the reactions of an infinitely small number of people which could express themselves. See also Chapter 7.

(38)

Here it is worth noting that the use of expressions such as *beaucoup* in the above quote would lead the reader to believe that the opinion of the majority was expressed when it was clearly not. Henceforth one finds a deliberate attempt (in spite of a superficial appearance of neutrality) by the paper to convince its readers that what it perceived was fact, thus blurring the distinction between fact and reality. See *Le Monde*, 7/1/55.

(39)

See *Le Monde*, 7 and 9-10/1/55, and also above.

(40)

See *Le Monde*, 7/1/55.

(41)

After the weekend the tone changed. Leveuf started wondering

whether it was too late for the Muslims leaders: " It is not known, he went on to write, what the reactions of the rank and file militants, towards whom several promises have not been kept, would be".

(42)

One can conclude from this part that the only opinion worth the consideration of the newspaper was that of the establishment. This assumed, therefore, that the colony, with its economic problems, high degree of illiteracy, non-involvement in political matters, was as politically developed and articulate as France.

A total disregard of the "Muslims" (who constituted the majority of the population) and their views leads to a somewhat apparent bias in favour of the Europeans.

(43)

Le Monde, 2/2/55.

(44)

See *Le Monde*, 3/2/55, p. 1.

(45)

(..) et le conduirait nécessairement à la reprise d'une politique de force qui aboutirait à long terme à la perte de ces territoires essentiels à notre rayonnement dans le monde".

Ibid.

(46)

The motive seemed to be fear of what he might do and not a search for justice.

(47)

Le Monde was shrewd enough to point out (in February 1955), that the Assembly was not opposed to the *réalisation rapide et complète de l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, et de l'urgente nécessité d'appliquer toutes les dispositions du Statut*, but to the implementation of that policy by the Mendès-France government. See *Le Monde*, 4/2/55.

Often the bone of contention in much of Fourth Republic politics was a problem of personalities not a problem of policy. And this was a fairly typical illustration of politics under the Fourth Republic where, at times, actual policies were not really as much the substance of the debate as were rhetoric and personalities. And in this case *Le Monde* was giving a fairly accurate description of parliamentary debate in the "House without windows" during the Fourth Republic.

NB. On this occasion, the stance adopted by *Le Monde* also seemed to be opposed to the attitudes of the Radicals, with Martinaud-Deplat and others who were also against Mendès-France.

(48)

Early 1955 brought political changes in France, where Pierre Mendès-France was succeeded by Edgard Faure, and in Algeria, where on 1 February Jacques Soustelle replaced Roger Léonard, Governor-General there since April 1951. See also Chapter 3 on historical developments in Algeria and Chapter 4 on Algerian reports. It is worth noting that changes in the governmental team in France did not necessarily lead to political change in

Algeria.

(49)

From the nomination of Soustelle arose some controversy in France as to whether he should keep his seat as a local councillor in the département of the Rhône (Lyon). *Le Monde* echoed much of the controversy, reporting news of a letter written by Pierre Montel, former minister, leader of the Independants, to the Prefect of the Rhône asking for the resignation of Soustelle from his position as local councillor but also publishing a reply by Roger Frey, Councillor of the Union Française and Municipal Councillor in Lyon, which referred to the wrong interpretation of Art. 34 of the Law of 1884 and emphasised that there was no incompatibility between the functions of Governor-General of Algiers and a mandate as a local councillor. See *Le Monde*, 12/3/55 and 9/5/55.

After the ruling by the Conseil d'Etat, *Le Monde* wrote that *Mr Soustelle n'a pas à se démettre de ses fonctions de conseiller municipal* (title) and that according to Art. 34 of the Law of 5 April 1954, the functions of Governor-General were not included in the list of functions incompatible with the rôle of Municipal Councillor.

(50)

See *Le Monde*, 27/1/55.

(51)

See *Le Monde*, 28/1/55.

(52)

See *Le Monde*, 16/2/55, p. 3.

(53)

(...) *ne traverse qu'une crise de croissance*, in *Le Monde*, 17/2/55.

(54)

See *Le Monde* 25/2/55.

(55)

([se] *félicite de la nomination de Soustelle*). See *Le Monde*, 23/2/55.

(56)

See *Le Monde*, 25-26/2/55, 17/3/55, 8/6/55, etc.

(57)

See *Le Monde*, 17/3/55.

(58)

Le Monde 23/3/55, 2/4/55. See also below.

(59)

See *Le Monde*, 7/5/57. See also below the views expressed by journalists as to the solutions.

(60)

Les six mois de contradiction et d'hésitation n'auront pas été tout à fait perdus, s'il s'en est dégagé comme on l'espère une conception ferme de la pacification à mener dans l'Aurès, inquiétant foyer

de contamination. In *Le Monde*, 11/5/55.

(61)

Which always seem to appear with some delay. See *Le Monde*, 8/6/55, about counter-productivity of repression.

(62)

S'il est pour l'Aurès une politique en laquelle on puisse raisonnablement croire, encore que certains l'estiment déjà dépassée, c'est bien celle qui, en éveillant les populations à la conscience de leur force et de leurs intérêts véritables, rompra leur solidarité avec les hors la loi, in Le Monde, 11/5/55.

(63)

It was not a desire identified amongst the population to maintain the system, or any evidence of its acceptance and legitimacy, it was the fact that he found that criticism of the administration by the "Muslim" population excepted this or that administrator as a justification for the continuity of French presence.

J'ai toujours relevé une exception faite sur le nom de tel ou tel administrateur favorablement connu d'eux. Le mécontentement n'étant pas né de l'excès de son poids mais au contraire de son trop d'éloignement et des abus tolérés de ce fait.

Ibid.

(64)

See for instance *Le Monde*, 7/1/55 & 26/1/55.

(65)

It looked a bit lukewarm though, since the paper indicated that the time-table might be too full, or that it was not yet clear to say whether Mendès-France's programme would be implemented or not by the incoming administration.

(66)

Leading to an incremental implementation of the 1947 Statutes without delay. In *Le Monde*, 1/3/55.

(67)

Through the provision of help to families and the accession to the rights deriving from French citizenship. See *Le Monde*, 19/2/55.

Le Monde gave extensive coverage to the official discourse. It echoed all the statements made by Soustelle, as well as the declarations of the Prime Minister and those of Parliamentarians on the subject. Further examples could be found; for instance, Soustelle's requests for funds to subsidise particular products in order to provide them free of charge for the needy in *Le Monde*, 4/6/55, Prime Minister Faure's (décédé 30/3/88) intentions de ne pas subordonner les réformes au rétablissement de l'ordre, *Le Monde*, 23/6/55, parliamentary support for reforms in Algeria and for ending "shocking inequalities" as well as statements and moves by political groupings, such as the constitution of a liberal left to combat inequality in Algerian society. In *Le Monde*, 11/6/55.

(68)

Such as the the statement by Henri Jouy (President of the *Conseil général* of the Seine) who after his fact finding trip to Algeria attacked "immobilism" stating: *L'ennemi en Algérie ce n'est pas le maquisard, c'est l'immobilisme*. In *Le Monde*, 2/5/55.

See also other reports, 7/1/55 and 26/1/55.

(69)

See *Le Monde*, 2/4/55.

(70)

(...) *Construction de routes, aménagement des points d'eau, édification d'écoles dans les campagnes, créations de nouveaux Secteurs d'Amélioration Rurale, modernisation des régions surpeuplées et des régions désertiques.*

(71)

This was also pointed out by a subsequent *Libres Opinions* (letter to the Editor).

(72)

(seront affectés à la construction de locaux administratifs et de logements pour la gendarmerie) which bore no relation with the first part of the statement.

(73)

See *Le Monde*, 2/4/55.

(74)

This version, for instance, was reported unchallenged by the paper until over a month later when, insisting on the need for real reforms (*Et l'on est assuré de l'effet bénéfique d'aucune réforme qui ne s'attaque résolument à un mal très profond*), when some of its criticism was made pertinent (*Les réformes économiques et sociales ne se retrouvent-elles pas reléguées à l'arrière plan lorsqu'il faut prévoir 6 milliards de francs de travaux pour héberger les gendarmes envoyés de la métropole*). See *Le Monde*, 16/5/55.

(75)

Hence the reformist discourse constituted much of the coverage of the paper.

(76)

When the measures were criticised, the paper helped air that criticism, it did not take it up. In this case, the measures were opposed by the Algerians, who thought they did not go far enough, and by the Europeans, who thought they went too far. This kind of critical assessment in the reports could be found more frequently in the reports a year into the governorship.

(77)

See *Le Monde*, 13/1/56.

(78)

They included the suppression of the Governor-General post and of the Algerian Assembly, the creation of three groups of "départements" and the suppression of "communes mixtes" with the establishment of some sort of parity between the represen-

tation of the two populations in some of the "communes" when a certain percentage was reached.

(79)

In *Le Monde*, 13/1/56. In the following day's report P. Albin-Martel stated that integration was no longer acceptable for the "Muslims" in *Le Monde*, 14/1/56, p. 1.

(80)

See, for instance, *Le Monde*, 15-16/1/56. One of them took the form of an interview of a minister, General Billotte, by R.Gauthier, who pointed out that people who criticised the reforms did not even know them and that only extremists on both sides would oppose them, to which was added the minister's statement that the army in Algeria was not involved in a war but in the "protection of civilians". To that effect, the number of soldiers involved was judged satisfactory, whereas material was thought to be needed. In *Le Monde*, 18/1/56.

(81)

Stating that his appointment had in fact been renewed by that date (*Le Monde*, 15-16/1/56).

(82)

Si la conviction absolue que la France restera en Algérie n'est pas inculquée à chacun, aucun musulman, si proche de nous soit-il, par le coeur ou par l'intérêt, ne restera à nos cotés. Il redoutera de payer de sa vie et des vies de sa famille après notre départ, auquel nos hésitations le font certainement penser. Tout geste politique, toute déclaration, tout article de presse donnant à croire que nous traiterons avec le terrorisme, autrement dit que les terroristes seront un jour en mesure de demander des comptes, détache de nous les musulmans algériens.

In *Le Monde*, 22-23/1/56.

(83)

- La France ne quittera pas plus l'Algérie que la Provence ou la Bretagne ... Quoiqu'il arrive le destin de l'Algérie est français (Soustelle in *Le Monde*, 25/2/55),

- ...répression impitoyable des responsables d'actes de terrorisme... au nom du gouvernement je dois dire qu'il n'y a pas et qu'il ne peut être question d'interlocuteurs ni à l'intérieur ni à l'extérieur de l'Algérie (Bourgès-Maunoury in *Le Monde*, 15-16/5/55),

- Pas question de chercher des interlocuteurs valables (Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister for Interior in *Le Monde*, 28/5/55,

- Rigueur impitoyable ... ceux qui défient la loi et se dressent contre notre autorité, in *Le Monde*, 22-23/5/55.

(84)

When he declared in a speech to the *Fédération des Radicaux*, in the Alpes-Maritimes: *Nous ne pouvons pas nous laisser faire en Algérie*, in *Le Monde*, 24/5/55.

(85)

La France doit rester en Afrique du Nord envers et contre

tous (Mitterrand in *Le Monde*, 24/5/55).

Le gouvernement manifeste ainsi une nouvelle fois sa volonté de mettre ... le plus possible de moyens pour lutter contre la rébellion et traduit l'engagement de la nation. (Minister of the Interior in *Le Monde*, 4/6/55, and also 7/6/55).

(86)

Such as the former Governor-General of Algeria, R.Naegelen, who declared: *Seule une omniprésence de nos troupes peut rendre la confiance aux populations* (published in the *Nouvelle République* of Bordeaux and reported in *Le Monde*, 27/5/55).

(87)

La séparation de l'Algérie et de la France serait la pire des catastrophes (This was an article's headline in *Le Monde*, 14/1/56).

La séparation de l'Algérie de la France serait pour l'Algérie et spécialement pour le peuple musulman de ce pays la pire des catastrophes. La secession c'est la ruine ...

Cela signifie que doit être solennellement reconnue et garantie au sein de la République Française, la personnalité originale de cette province dans le respect de sa tradition, de sa religion, de sa culture

With this emphasis on equality between all Frenchmen (*L'égalité des droits et des devoirs, des avantages et des sacrifices, depuis Dunkerque jusqu'à Tamanrasset*) came the insistence that the rebels could not win (*le déchainement de la violence ne peut donner à la rébellion une victoire impossible*). See *Le Monde*, 14/1/56.

(88)

It was not, however for him, the territory that was important but the people. For him the Algerians were French in the same way as the Savoyards, and "if they are not, then is it not because while proclaiming that they were, through our deeds, we did not want -we could not or we did not know how- to make them so French that they themselves would not doubt it?"

(89)

In *Le Monde*, 16/10/55, p. 5.

(90)

Le drame algérien vous prend à la gorge, l'Etat se décompose, un citoyen sur trois vote contre le régime (...). In *Le Monde*, 31/1/56.

(91)

The paper saw in the majority obtained by Mollet (420 votes against 71) *Une manière d'hommage rendu à la personne du secrétaire général de la SFIO. Mais elle s'explique surtout par la gravité et l'urgence des affaires d'Algérie.*

(92)

Politiquement le problème de l'Algérie reste au coeur du débat. Le Président du Conseil étant résolu à l'affronter tant sur place qu'à l'Assemblée.

In *Le Monde*, 1/2/56, p. 1.

(93)

Duverger, outlining the problems facing the new Assembly,

listed them in the following order: Algeria, economic expansion, international detente and the clerical issue in schools. *Le Monde*, 1/2/56, pp. 1-2.

(94)

He wrote that it was to be Algerian and not Muslim, different from integration, would exclude federalism and, above all, a national Algerian state, since, according to General Catroux, *l'histoire n'offre aucune base solide puisque l'Algérie n'a jamais constitué un état unifié*. He stated that, because the French settled in Algeria feel that they belong to both the Algerian and French community, it would be then a Franco-Muslim personality. He also felt that Algeria's fate would not be determined unilaterally, would involve the implementation of equality of rights and duties, but by a different method from Soustelle's, and would confirm a *particularisme* accepted by the 1947 Statutes, maintaining the post of Governor-General and the Assembly with wider powers and also representation in the French National Assembly.

(95)

Collège unique that would be equivalent to a system of one person one vote.

(96)

See *Le Monde*, 2/2/56.

(97)

Des interlocuteurs suffisamment valables.

(98)

In *Le Monde*, 2/2/56.

(99)

3/2/56 and 4/2/56.

(100)

See *Le Monde*, 4/2/56.

(101)

Amongst the variety of the reactions to the replacement of Soustelle by Catroux reported, those of the Europeans in Algeria were predominant through the voices of their various representatives present in the French capital. The paper also gave room for the declarations of Laquière about not being in a real hurry to go and meet the new Resident Minister (The appellation changed from Governor General to Resident Minister). Reports included the Europeans' concern about the planned release of political prisoners as well as the institution of a Single College. However, a statement from the European delegation from Oran about this state of affairs was somewhat different. See *Le Monde*, 3/2/56.

While mentioning the MRP's request for confidence in the "new man who, as a military man or a diplomat, had always worked for the greatness of his country", most of *Le Monde's* reports told the reader of the European settlers opposition in Algeria (*Le Monde*, 2/2/56).

The paper also reported the "numerous telegrammes" sent by "patriotic associations", stating that according to the views of their members they were intending to demonstrate upon the arrival of the General (and that the "Muslims" would organise a

counter-demonstration). It also quoted a telegramme from the rich settlers, Froger, Borgeaud, Schiaffino and Laquière influential European representatives in Algeria: *Les maires du département d'Alger, indignés par la possibilité de voir le Général Catroux, spécialiste de l'abandon de l'Empire d'Outre-Mer, devenir chef de l'Algérie, vous demandent d'insister pour relever le défi* (*Le Monde*, 2/2/56) before reporting a few days later their detailed objections, their statements and their requests. In *Le Monde*, 5-6/2/56.

(102)

See *Le Monde*, 1/2/56.

(103)

See *Le Monde*, 4/2/56.

(104)

Author of the sharp daily comment "billet" au jour le jour.

(105)

After expressing his sympathies for the departing Governor-General, he hoped that he would be able to distinguish in:

cet enthousiasme délirant qui a marqué son départ... ce qui s'adresse à ce qu'il est de ce qui s'adresse à ce qu'il n'est pas, ce qui est confiance de ce qui est peur. In *Le Monde*, 5-6/2/56.

(106)

Chênebenoît in *Le Monde*, 8/2/56.

(107)

See *Le Monde*, 11/2/56. Lacoste had spent ten years in Trade and Industry.

(108)

Mais tout cela est bien fragile devant l'opposition de la plupart des délégués musulmans, qui réclament une reconnaissance nationale refusée lors de l'investiture et celle du Comité de Salut Public qui crie à la trahison (...).

The government gave the paper the impression of

(...) de prêcher dans le désert. Aucune position n'a été amendée et l'avenir demeure gros de menaces. M. Lacoste n'aura ni trop d'habileté, ni trop d'énergie, pour assumer sa tâche.

See *Le Monde*, 11/2/56.

(109)

Stating that he had announced "appeasement" measures, which would distinguish between terrorists and political prisoners, the paper concluded that: *En marquant sa volonté d'améliorer le sort de la population musulmane et de mettre fin à des discriminations, le gouvernement espère ramener la paix et faire vivre en bon accord deux communautés dont aucune ne dictera ses conceptions ou n'imposera par la force ses solutions.* In *Le Monde*, 2/2/56.

(110)

See Droz, B. & Lever E, *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, Seuil, 1982, pp. 88-92.

(111)

Stating:

On ne refusera pas à G.Mollet l'appui dû à la sincérité et au courage... valeurs qui permettent encore de retourner une situation à cette heure où le destin est en équilibre.

Le Monde, 8/2/56.

(112)

Since the future was at stake: [il] balance entre la raison et la démençe. M.G.Mollet est allé à Alger pour faire prévaloir la raison. Avec lui nous sommes pour la raison. La situation est telle qu'il faut lui faire confiance. *Le Monde, 8/2/56.*

The previous day the paper was confident that extremist movements (Poujadists etc..) would not alter the resolution of the PM: *Sa bonne volonté, peut être son idéalisme, est dans la tradition socialiste. Mais sans doute ne pourra-t-il obtenir sur le champ de résultats spectaculaires. L'apaisement des esprits qu'il recherchera en premier lieu constituerait déjà un succès. (J.Fauvet in Le Monde, 7/2/56).*

(113)

Le Monde, 10/2/56.

(114)

Here and above in Gauthier, *Le Monde, 2/2/56*, confirming, for instance, that he was discerning between the "criminals" who would be executed and the "suspect," because:

On ne peut garder en prison de simples suspects qui ont eu seulement un jour le malheur de déplaire et qui ne sont ni des bandits, ni des bandits en puissance.

(115)

In *Le Monde, 11/2/56*. Besides his optimistic statements (in Annaba before his return to Paris) indicating that there was no need for army reinforcements and expressing confidence in the future, he was reported as stating:

Je quitte l'Algérie avec la conviction profonde que la communauté franco-musulmane deviendra une réalité vivante, fraternelle et indestructible. Je suis venu avec un message de paix. Je pars avec la conviction qu'il a été entendu et compris. (my emphasis) La route sera longue et dure avant que soit arrêté le statut futur définitif de l'Algérie. Je la parcourrai avec vous. Mon premier voyage sera suivi d'autres dans les diverses parties de l'Algérie.

In Le Monde, 12-13/2/56.

(116)

When it stated that Lacoste, for instance, would need all the skill and energy available to face the situation (*Le Monde, 11/2/56*), well before the publication of the official decree of his appointment as Governor-General in the *Journal Officiel* of 16 February and that of a number of other decrees completing the separation of Algeria from the Ministry of Interior. See *Le Monde, 17/2/56*.

(117)
Le Monde, 13/2/56.

(118)
This obviously was to lead to favourable, and very often uncritical, reports as far as the government was concerned.

(119)
Le dernier quart d'heure. This gave the impression that the army and the government in Algeria were adopting a very conciliatory attitude, trying to forgive and bury the hatchet. In his series of articles *Le dernier quart d'heure* (last of the series 15/12/56, pp. 1-7), Mannoni described how an aircraft was circling around dropping leaflets inviting those who took up arms first, to lay them down, at the request of G.Mollet and R.Lacoste. He also mentioned that the generals were signing vouchers of rally/surrender (*bons de ralliement*) to be handed in by the rebels surrendering to the soldiers.

(120)
In *Le Monde*, 26-27/2/56. The reports of official statements continued in earnest including council of ministers statements and decisions revolving around the necessity of organising elections and the equitable representation of ethnic groups. The emphasis was on the *sui generis* case of Algeria, the need to "pacify" without exclusive reliance on a military solution, and the better use of military forces. There was also some insistence on the implementation of "French serene (*sereine*) justice" and going ahead with the planned executions. In *Le Monde*, 24/2/56.

(121)
The birth and the development of "urban terrorism", which "no police force in the world could annihilate" (*anéantir*), a "conflict internal to nationalism which threw some doubts on the precise relationship between the maquis and the FLN", and the "recently increasing influence of the Communist Party on the nationalist movement", were all listed as the reasons for the inability of the government to act. J.Fauvet writing in *Le Monde*, 16/11/56, p. 1.

It should be born in mind that in actual fact it was the opposition of the European settlers and their representatives to any reforms which had led to the government's failure, and J.Fauvet was merely providing excuses for the government and doing so better than any of its own officials.

(122)
He further stated, in defence of the government, that the government had made long studies and that, as a result, it did not think that it was under any obligation to take any immediate decision as it doubted that the liberal measures advocated would have any effect on the "Muslim" population. He did not think either that redefining an Algerian Statute, which its opponents would find difficult and would oppose anyway, would be enough to disarm the FLN.

An examination of *Le Monde's* coverage of Algeria and the international arena (USA, UN, Arab world etc.) has been made and will be the subject of a forthcoming publication. It was not possible to include it here.

(123)

There was a report to that effect about a year later in *Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.

(124)

Pignault reporting on Goeau Brissonnière's *témoignage d'un médecin français: l'avenir économique et social de l'Algérie*, in *Le Monde*, 14/2/56; or P. Minay's articles in *Le Monde*, 24 & 25/11/55.

(125)

See *Le Monde*, 12/11/56, p. 5.

(126)

Le Monde, 16/11/56, p. 1.

(127)

When a mild form of criticism or suggestions were put forward, they were not always disinterested. For instance, when Fauvet was trying to persuade the government to fix a date for the elections, no matter how remote, or to settle their practical details, the motives were not so pure: it was in order to keep the UN out of Algeria and put pressure on countries not to take positions which could be detrimental to France. *Le Monde*, 30-31/12/56, p. 1.

(128)

The reassurances about the situation in Algeria that *Le Monde* gave its readers did not totally obscure the political question: *Seule une décision de caractère politique peut combler un <<vide>> que des officiers ont essayé ici et là de colmater*. There was also a need to bridge the communication gap with the "Muslims" (no longer interested in compromise).

If there were genuinely free elections, asked Mannoni, "would we not meet under a different name those very people who were with FLN, MTLD or UDMA?" If it were not a question of dealing with forces which could not achieve important military success, then, he concluded: *il faudra bien composer avec elles sur un autre plan, celui de la vie politique*.

(129)

Especially when talking about what institution would give the full expression to this Algerian identity (*Un très haut fonctionnaire, évoquant après G.Mollet, l'institution qui donnerait <<à la personnalité algérienne sa pleine expression>>*), there were fears that this might lead to another *Jeu de Paume*. In *Le Monde*, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(130)

Paul Reynaud, *Faites l'Europe*, Pierre Mendes-France, *faites l'Afrique*, and M Schumman and R.Pleven, *Faites l'Eurafrique*.

(131)

(..) toutes exigent aussi un règlement de l'affaire d'Algérie. Ce sera tôt ou tard la tâche d'un autre gouvernement, si l'actuel n'y satisfait pas.

L'Assemblée l'attend encore de M. Guy Mollet, mais elle mesure déjà sa patience et sa confiance.

In J.Fauvet, *De l'échec de Suez à la construction de l'Europe*, M.G.Mollet tire la conclusion du débat de l'Assemblée

nationale, *Le Monde*, 21/12/56, p. 1.

(132)

See also Chatelain, A., op. cit., p. 177.

(133)

He stated that the decision, or rather that the lack of decision, of the French government over Algeria, was deplored by "many" for whom "it was not a minor tragedy", and the more people were convinced of the necessity of "finding a way out" (*s'en sortir*), the more the hesitation of the French government was seen as "torturante". This need for evolution was perceived with an acute awareness combined with an understanding of the contradictions facing the government:

Sentiment patriotique qui se révolte devant <<l'abandon>> d'une population française et d'une terre qui l'est devenue, souci d'une position stratégique, volonté de ne pas renier l'entreprise poursuivie depuis plus d'un siècle, désir de l'adapter à l'évolution des populations et des idées, autant d'éléments contradictoires qui se débattent entre le coeur et l'esprit.

See *Le Monde*, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(134)

The previous month, after two years of insurrection, only Robert Gauthier clearly expressed his frustration at (what he saw but did not explicitly call) the delaying tactics of the government. He was one of the more audacious journalists (such as Minay), who levelled the blame squarely at the door of the government for not arriving at a decision that could be adhered to and implemented.

For the two years or more of fighting in Algeria, the advice given by the most enlightened (<<lucides>>, not necessarily left-wing) minds ought to have led to something in his view. But, despite numerous official promises, meetings, colloquia, and deadlines, nothing practical had been achieved.

What "exasperated" Gauthier, however, was that:

Or voici qu'aujourd'hui encore, à la veille d'un nouveau débat devant l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, on se borne à nous annoncer qu'un nouveau conseil des ministres va procéder à un nouvel examen de la situation.

He found no lack of pretexts in the previous Moroccan and Tunisian questions, but thought that they abounded in that of Algeria. Without leaning too hard on the government, he accepted "the desire not to appear to give in to force, the weakening of the adversaries, the unfavourable international contexts" as being true. But could one reasonably expect that there would be an ideal day, when all the circumstances would be favourable, he asked?

Time, he continued, was running against "us". And although he accepted that the "weakening rebels" were in no position to enforce their will, he did not think that the Muslim mass would be content with promises or partial reforms. Gauthier, in *Le Monde*, 21/11/56, pp. 1-3.

(135)

Julien le Moyne in *Le Monde*, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(136)

Ibid.

(137)

And that the struggle was continuing, despite the fact that people hoped he would put an end to the "war to end all wars". In fact: *La France ... poursuit en Algérie une lutte interminable, qui menace à tous moments... de dégénérer en guerre de race....*

Editorial in *Le Monde*, 1/1/57, p. 1.

(138)

Le Monde was only now beginning to put things into perspective, but if one looked at other articles, especially those soon to deal with the debates in the UN, it would be easy to see that this was a more ephemeral stance, as the main themes were to put a good case for France and the incumbent government.

(139)

See *Le Monde*, 1/1/57, p. 1.

(140)

With the arrival of reinforcements and with security maintained in the cities to "stabilise relations with Morocco and Tunisia", *Le Monde*, 8/1/57, p. 1.

The same observation of failure was made by Gauthier, keener than ever to explain the actions of some Europeans:

Depuis deux ans se développe en Algérie un drame devenu le plus angoissant des drames nationaux. Devant l'irrésolution, les altermoiements et l'incapacité de choisir des gouvernements et des parlements, du pays lui-même, des aigreurs, des rancunes se forment, qui amènent parfois à des esprits mal équilibrés, à des solutions de désespoir, qui seraient au premier chef néfastes pour les Européens d'Algérie eux-mêmes.

R. Gauthier in *Le Monde*, 8/1/57.

(141)

We have already seen one or two journalists such as Fauvet show signs of irritation at the delay taken in defining a new policy for Algeria.

(142)

The declaration of intentions was being prepared in Paris for the attention of the UN where the debate of the Algerian question was about to resume.

The French government came out with its declaration of intentions which, in actual fact, brought nothing new to the scene that had not been stated before. It announced its decision to abolish thirty *communes mixtes* and replace them with 1,120 *communes de plein exercice*, and also to organise elections three months after the cessation of hostilities.

(143)

In Algeria a general strike was called for, inviting all Algerians to show through their protest their desire to back the FLN's case at the UN.

(144)

But the settlers' opposition ever since meant that it had not

been implemented and that it was not likely to be either.

(145)

The measures taken did not significantly change Algerian realities and were merely taken to please the UN and help France diplomatically rather than the people on the ground, let alone solve the Algerian problem as a whole. They amounted to nothing more significant than a rejigging of the structure of regional authorities. The paper accepted that they had long lost their appeal and that the nationalists did not even see fit to denounce them. But despite this awareness of the issues, the paper did not show many more signs of being frustrated or disappointed by the French government.

(146)

They were really insignificant in terms of solving the problems. The programme to be introduced included, for instance, measures such as the accession of 1,000 "Muslim" candidates (official sources) to positions within the civil service (little more than clerical and very petty bureaucratic jobs) according to the 17 March 1956 decree and subsequent decisions seen as being in the implementation stage. See *Le Monde*, 23/1/57, p. 5.

Similarly, the paper gave extensive coverage to the creation of new administrative subdivisions and installing people to run them. In actual fact (and that was not coherently stated by the paper at all) the special delegations were being established and formed with appointees chosen by the Governor-General's Office. See *Le Monde*, 29/1/57, p. 3.

This was done because, on the one hand, the government was unwilling to implement the single college system and, on the other, most "Muslim" representatives, or rather those who traditionally collaborated with the authorities and represented the Algerians, were now unwilling to stand for election anyway, or to continue to legitimise the policies of the government, by continuing to play a role in the system. Even the most "faithful Muslims" were in no real hurry to join the special delegations. See *Le Monde*, 12/1/57.

(147)

Stating that no government worth its salt could possibly contemplate independence. In *Le Monde*, 11/1/57.

(148)

The paper's coverage of the story looked objective enough on the surface describing the government statement (*declaration*) as having no effect on either community. It pointed out the objections made to the declaration and the perceived contradictions between the elections promised and the new statutes. The views of the two communities were highlighted: Muslims and Europeans were reported as sceptical (in *Le Monde*, 11/1/57, p. 6). There was a "malaise" within the European community caused by their disappointment; those "Muslim delegates", who could be approached (they had stopped coming to the Assembly), had remained with unfulfilled expectations (in *Le Monde*, 12/1/57) and saw no hope in a statute which was already set by Paris since they thought that by posing pre-conditions to the ceasefire, Paris was putting the freedom of elections itself into question.

Le Monde reported that even people who used to be for the reforms and elections (like Khidder and Abbas) were now think-

ing that no candidate would stand in the elections (planned three months after the cease-fire) without the confidence and backing of the FLN. To ignore that was, according to them, a sign of naivety and even duplicity. Their criticism stated that the imprecision of the text over the subject of the cease-fire made it appear like a capitulation, a surrender without condition; that the equality advocated was an equality of community, not an equality of individuals (despite the 1 to 9 imbalance); that there was no point saying free elections would determine a future statute when the people possibly invited to oversee the elections would be "favourable to the French case"; and, more importantly, there was no point saying that free elections would determine who the French government will talk to, when the declaration of intention defined one-sidedly the line to be followed in details. This, of course, meant for most liberal Algerian personalities (and this included A.Fares) that nothing had changed (*Le Monde*, 16/1/57, p. 5).

(149)

When reporting further criticism by the Algerian nationalists who were stating that the FLN was the only representative, *Le Monde* stated that it was reporting their statements for information purposes only.

(150)

See *Le Monde*, 16/1/57, p. 5.

(151)

A full paragraph with the main theme as a heading. The heading on settlers views was in heavy print and had no quotation marks.

(152)

See *Le Monde*, 13-14/1/57, pp. 1-4.

(153)

The paper also questioned whether all the previous PMs had been mailed (Felix Gouin, André Marie and General de Gaulle-29/1/57). It then explained that Marie's error had been corrected, that de Gaulle had been head of a Provisional government, not Prime minister and but that Felix Gouin still had not received the letter (30/1/57).

(154)

Le Monde reported the approvals (29/1/57), the reservations (30/1/57) as well as the oppositions and their motives.

(155)

Le Monde, 26/1/57, p. 1.

(156)

Le Monde, 31/1/57, p. 2.

(157)

Le Monde, for instance, reported P. Mendès-France as having stated that the situation would have been different if his recommendations had been implemented. He was also reported as scathing in his criticism of the government and the press when he declared:

Ceux que nous aurions dû soutenir continuent

d'être brimés chaque jour par une administration, des municipalités, une presse, trop souvent animés d'un esprit qui nous cause un terrible préjudice.

The paper put into question, however, according to observers, whether the recommendations were applicable today and whether they would reverse the course of events even if applied. See *Le Monde*, 9/3/57, p. 1.

(158)

This was being done despite an awareness of the unlikely success of the reforms and the *délégations spéciales*. Indeed, *Le Monde* was aware that the *délégations spéciales* and the *communes'* reforms had very little chance of succeeding. Discussing Soustelle's ideas, it was accepted that it was difficult to find any Muslim representatives to participate. See *Le Monde*, 21/2/57, p. 4, 25/2/57, p. 4, and 10-11/3/57, p. 2.

The financial difficulties of the government were very rarely evoked in connection with Algeria except in rare instances like 22/2/57 when a sarcastic comment was made about the government battling hard to get a few billions from the European neighbours when the "Algerian tragedy" was absorbing ten times more or when Soustelle's reply to a related question (23/3/57, p. 1) indicated that it represented 4% of National Revenue and could be considered as an investment if the riches of the Sahara were taken into account.

(159)

Mollet had proved that the government was not willing to accept the UN interference and had given evidence of wanting the FLN to understand that there would be no change of French policy. In *Le Monde*, 3-4/2/57, p. 1.

(160)

Presenting him as increasing the pace of reforms, as not withdrawing the offer of a cease-fire (*Le Monde*, 8/3/57, p. 1) even without the cease-fire conditions being met (*Le Monde*, 10-11/3/57) and as wanting to increase real participation in local affairs (*Le Monde*, 8/3/57).

(161)

As it was persuaded that the solution *ne peut comporter en aucun cas la poursuite pure et simple d'une politique qui about d'un an est à bout de souffle*.

(162)

See *Le Monde*, 15/2/57.

However, a big deal was made out of 2 billion fr given to the new *communes* (2,214M) created by the 26/6/56 decree (250 *communes* so 9 million fr each), in order to enable the provisional institutions created to prepare the infrastructure needed: schools, roads, etc.. (see also *Le Monde*, 22/2/57, p. 4).

(163)

Le Monde, 23/2/57.

(164)

A discerning reader would have spotted in the paper two days previously a different report from Mannoni on the Kabyle region, the overall deliberately reassuring tone of which revealed some of the methods used to implement those reforms.

In it one could read that areas had been deprived of supplies (zones d'isolement), where people accused of helping the rebels, or "worst still", not opposing them, were excluded from the "French community" and deprived of the "privileges of our administration." Mannoni, in *Le Monde*, 21/2/57.

(165)

Although the abolition of the communes mixtes constituted a step forward, their replacement by yet another form of appointed body did not necessarily constitute a great advance. No journalist questioned the way that this so called democratisation was implemented, nor put in doubt the "democratic direction" in which it was heading, least of all Mannoni, who, questioning the seductive power of reforms, because of the measures used "to compel thousands of people to learn about free elections," went as far as to suggest that after being late in coming, given the circumstances, the measures might now be premature prior to peace being restored (and to state that the conditions of their implementation had made them unattractive). See *Le Monde*, 25/2/57, p. 4.

(166)

à condition que notre politique algérienne ne se borne plus à claironner tous les quinze jours l'annonce d'un <<dernier quart d'heure>> qui est en passe de rejoindre <<la route du fer>> dans le Panthéon des mots historiques.

In *Le Monde*, 22/2/57, pp. 1-5.

(167)

Le Monde, 20/3/57.

(168)

Le Monde, 30/3/57, pp. 4-5.

Though acknowledging that it was not the first time that the end of the troubles had been promised by a government, the paper argued that members of the government and political leaders can "only bow when a Minister is so affirmative." *Le Monde*, 10-11/3/57, p. 1.

(169)

Which it survived with 221 votes against 188 and 110 abstentions. See *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 3, 22/3/57, p. 3, 23/3/57, p. 1 and 25/3/57, p. 6.

(170)

On that occasion, Duverger still thought it better in the long run if the government had survived. See *Le Monde*, 21/5/57, p. 1.

(171)

G.Mollet's promise to end the war in Algeria had been made on the eve of his election (*L'Express*, 19 December 1955, promising no more bloodshed).

(172)

Le Monde, 23/5/57, p. 3.

(173)

Gauthier and Duverger.

(174)

In two editorial articles: *Ambitions et réalités* in *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 1, and *15 mois et 21 jours* in *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 4.

(175)

The paper thought that, in order to have any chance of succeeding, the next government would have to define an Algerian policy and gain the approval of the two Common Market and Euratom treaties as well as the support of the Socialists.

In *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 1.

(176)

The paper saw frictions between its desired orthodox Atlanticist reputation and its rapprochement with the neutralists and the USSR. In *Des ambitions aux réalités*. *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 1.

(177)

Still highlighting the worries of the Europeans at the expense of the "Muslim" community, the paper that day, insisted that they were more apprehensive about the possible departure of Lacoste than they were about that of Mollet. (*Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 1).

(178)

This will be confirmed further by the fact (see below) that, very early on, the paper did not use kid gloves with the new man (Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury) at Matignon.

(179)

Le Monde, of course, reported the various efforts to form a new government (23,26,28,29,30 and 31/5/57), with the failure of Pflimlin, Pinay and Pleven (end of May beginning of June), before announcing the successful attempt of Bourges-Maunoury in gathering enough support around a government committed to Europe and the continuation of Lacoste's policies in Algeria. See also J.Fauvet in *Le Monde*, 12/6/57, p. 1.

(180)

Il est tout neuf, un peu raide aux entournures, mais encore presque intact. Il n'a rien d'archaïque, ni de démodé. Bien au contraire. L'X qui marque son certificat d'origine montre qu'il a été fabriqué en série, mais par une maison sérieuse.

En bref, nous étrennons un président du conseil. On devrait en principe espérer qu'il dure un peu plus longtemps que les autres. Non que je tiens à voir celui-ci s'éterniser au pouvoir. Mais je voudrais qu'il puisse resservir par la suite. Songez aux pantins informes que sont devenus les autres après quelques mois de service: peinture électorale déteinte, crâne vide, bedaine de paille ouverte à tous les vents.

Le Monde, 12/6/57, p. 1.

(181)

Au jour le jour: Homo Novus, by Robert Escarpit in *Le Monde*, 12/6/57, p. 1.

(182)

Le Monde, 14/6/57 p. 1.

(183)

La crise continue by André Chênebenoit, in *Le Monde*, 14/6/57, p. 1.

(184)

Le Monde, 14/6/57, p. 1.

(185)

Participation sans soutien, in *Le Monde*, 14/6/57, p. 1.

(186)

See *Le Monde*, 1/1/58, pp. 1-2.

(187)

Le Monde, 1/1/58.

(188)

Le Monde, 2/8/57.

(189)

The only reproach the paper hazarded was that he did not use the assets at his disposal to go further in every field, to get to the truth. See Fauvet in *Le Monde*, 1/1/58, p. 1.

(190)

R. Lacoste: *si des difficultés nous menacent encore, nous avons parcouru la plus grande et la plus pénible partie du chemin.* See *Le Monde*, 2/1/58, p. 4.

(191)

Création de nouvelles communes, in *Le Monde*, 4/1/58, p. 3, the prefects themselves were asking for political measures to be speeded up in *Le Monde*, 5-6/1/58, p. 4.

(192)

The favourable coverage extended to Lacoste being hailed as a saviour in the streets and being triumphantly applauded by the "people" of Algiers. See *Le Monde*, 3/1/58, p. 2.

(193)

By R. Gauthier see *Le Monde*, 15/6/57.

(194)

André Morice: *nous casserions tout gouvernement prêt à une politique d'abandon.* In *Le Monde*, 7/1/58, p. 5.

(195)

L'Echo d'Alger, for instance, *une réduction d'effectifs serait criminelle.* Ibid.

(196)

See *Mesures de détente à Alger. 325 mesures d'assignation à résidence reportées du 13 au 30 décembre.* About 20 lines in *Le Monde*, 1/1/58, p. 4, while the news of imprisonment and house arrests had been given negligible coverage, when it was not omitted or even justified by the paper.

(197)

Seen over the pricing policy of the paper (Chapter 2).

CHAPTER NINE: NOTES

(1)

L'entente doit régner entre Français et musulmans restés dans la grande majorité fidèles à la France. In Le Monde, 1/1/55.

Pierre Mendès-France's emphasis on the importance of the number of Europeans in Algeria was outlined as well as the concern to: *dissiper les inquiétudes ... [et de montrer l'] attachement à la France des populations musulmanes. See Le Monde, 1/2/55.*

(2)

Le terrorisme et la rébellion posent un problème sérieux dont la gravité ne doit pas être exagérée ..., despite the fact that it was admitted by the paper that: *observateurs ont souligné <<un glissement>> de la population*, it was still stating categorically, nearly one year into the uprising, that the country had not slipped into generalised insurrection: *Le pays n'est pas en état d'insurrection. See Pierre Albin-Martel, in Le Monde, 8/6/55.*

(3)

See Le Monde, 1/1/55.

(4)

See Le Monde, 4/1/55.

(5)

With very few exceptions such as Chênebenoît who, although he did not see himself as an alarmist, feared the worst, possibly to justify recommending primarily a military effort. *Le Monde 28/2/56.*

(6)

Le dernier quart d'heure in Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(7)

This theme could clearly be identified in this series of articles written at the end of 1956 by one of *Le Monde's* special correspondents, Eugene Mannoni. The latter wrote a series of articles under the title, *A travers l'Algérie en état d'urgence*, the first of which dealt with *D'Alger à Constantine*. Mannoni travelled to near Constantine by train and reported from an army perspective. He brushed aside the troubles of the area and a derailed goods train which preceded the convoy was for him a "banale misadventure"; finishing the journey by road with two hours delay was tantamount to *nos ennemis sont légers*. A few lines later, he revealed that that was the only daily train which used this "threatened track", whereas what he should have really stated was that communication by rail with a

major city had been severed. *Le Monde*, 11/12/56, pp. 1 & 5.

(8)

As in the following passage, for instance: *les blés ont été coupés, les défections n'ont pas empêché les vendanges (...)* quelques trains déraillent mais la plupart roule (...) si toutes les routes ne sont pas sûres (...) aucune n'est interdite (...).

Previously he had stated that: *la vie s'écoule, normale, dans un cadre qui ne l'est plus. La foule où les "communautés" se côtoient sans se fondre, apparaissait, placide ce dimanche-là.*

Le Monde, 11/12/56, p 1 & 5.

(9)

See relevant section in Chapter 12.

(10)

Le Monde was now admitting that severe repression took place then *bouleversés par d'atroces massacres d'Européens et de non moins sévères représailles.*

(11)

Le Monde, 12/11/56, p. 5.

(12)

Le Monde, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(13)

See also Chapter 6.

(14)

See *Le Monde*, 13/5/55.

(15)

(..) à exagérer l'étendue du terrorisme et la gravité de la situation. Maunoury in *Le Monde*, 15-16/5/55.

(16)

(..) tous ceux qui émettent ou colportent de fausses nouvelles se font involontairement les complices des hors la loi. Je demande à chacun de conserver la tête froide et de réagir avec vigueur contre les campagnes de démoralisation injustifiée et singulièrement dangereuse.

This statement issued by Soustelle after he visited a few places in Algeria was faithfully echoed by the paper. It also tended to reassure public opinion. See *Le Monde*, 14/5/55.

(17)

See *Le Monde*, 22-23/5/55.

(18)

The contents of Chapters 11 & 12 are very are very relevant for our consideration here.

(19)

The philosophy of the paper was indeed based on this princi-

ple that the readers were assumed to be mature people who could make up their own minds about what was being reported. The Fechteler episode (see Chapter 2) serves to further dispell any doubts the reader might have about caution when the paper believes in a particular philosophy. (Ibid.)

(20)

See also Chapter 5.

(21)

It was an attempt to avoid panicking public opinion and to reassure it that things were not as bad as they could be. The theme could clearly be identified in this series of articles written at the end of 1956 by Eugene Mannoni (referred to earlier, footnote 7).

(22)

Le dernier quart d'heure in *Le Monde*, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(23)

A mere glance at the 1956 map given p. 143 in Opperman, Thomas, *Le problème algérien*, Maspero, Paris, 1961, based on *Time Magazine* and *Deutsche Kommentare*, gives a very different picture with zones under total rebel control, zones under partial control and zones exposed to rebel attacks.

(24)

See *Le Monde*, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(25)

See also supra p. 107ff.

P. Herreman was trying to propagate the same ideas when he reported from the area of Orleansville which at the beginning of 1957 was one of the most "terrorist-infested areas" in the country.

(..)une des plus infestée d'Algérie. On ne circulait plus sans risques sur les routes, les fermes brûlaient toutes les nuits, les attentats se multipliaient dans certaines rues, les fellagas se promenaient en uniforme en plein jour.

This was a recognition and an accurate description of the seriousness of events, not at the time but six months to a year previously.

These events were now said to have been remedied by successful "psychological action", through the big campaign of signs requesting the population to rally the French and asserting that France would never abandon them.

Quoting a colonel, Herreman reported:

if "we" convince the Algerian population that we are not going to abandon them then it " *d'un seul coup va basculer de notre côté*". See also Chapter 5.

When the paratroopers came in February, he wrote, for a month and half, *[ils] firent du renseignement* and now "the people in charge state that the rebels' infrastructure had been destroyed, that the rebels had been sent back to the grottos from which they only came out every now and again to cut down a few posts." *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3.

(26)

And it was stated that the army was leading it, giving the best of itself, once it understood that there could not be a military solution to the problem and that the conquest of the population was at stake. The journalist stated that he had met a team of young officers who spent several years as prisoners of the Viets, who learned their methods, and who had told him: *Là où les Viets ont réussi nous ne pouvons pas échouer.*

(27)

Describing the methods used, and deliberately forgetting other military means, Herreman stated that propaganda was the main one ("even if some were reluctant to use it, everybody recognised its efficacy"). This propaganda was said to be in written form -in newspapers, leaflets, posters-, but since a major obstacle was the illiteracy of the people, the best tool remaining was to be oral propaganda through loudspeakers, films and so forth, "telling the people the fellagas want only their misery. In P. Herreman, *Contre la propagande et les pressions du FLN des officiers livrent bataille pour la <<conquête des coeurs>>*, *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 3.

Similarly, over six months previously articles had drawn much from the theory of revolutionary warfare. Postulating along the lines of Clausewitz that war was but the continuation of politics by other means (and vice versa), and using Lenine's and Mao's thoughts and theories on the subject, *Le Monde* (15/12/56, pp. 1-7) stated that the "rebels" had also learned about revolutionary warfare, without providing any proof apart from describing their activities as being similar (ambush, strike, distribution of leaflets, attentats, forbidding smoking and "diluting" themselves amongst the "Muslim" mass to strike again when appropriate).

(28)

The most critical opinions stigmatising the colonial system came from intellectuals like Henri Marrou, André Mandouze and François Mauriac, and are dealt with in Chapters 10 and 13.

(29)

It is, however, worth noting that the opinions expressed in the "Libres Opinions" column only carry the weight of the person writing to the paper, and sometimes do not get enough credibility as they do not benefit from the official backing of the paper. If *Le Monde* published such opinions it did not necessarily give them its seal of approval, nor was the paper answerable for the content of the articles.

(30)

Whereby:

Un candidat si qualifié soit-il ne peut affronter le combat dans des conditions aussi inégales, Le Monde, 9/2/54.

(31)

For A.Meharra the choice in the Second College was decided in advance:

Il n'est ni celui des électeurs, ni celui des élus locaux. Il vient d'en haut, pas même d'Alger qui est dépassé, il part de Paris, dicté par un ministre ou un homme politique influent, le plus souvent représentant de l'Algérie. L'électeur dit "Amen". Il obtempère. L'abstention reste dans ces

conditions sa seule arme de défense.

Mais alors....il y a une masse faite souvent de mécontents qui n'est pas représentée. C'est une infime minorité qui dispose de ce privilège et ses représentants, par le fait d'un manque de liberté de l'électeur, se succèdent toujours à eux-mêmes dans le Premier comme dans le Second Collège. See *Le Monde*, *Libres Opinions*, 9/2/54.

(32)

Bien que minoritaire, le courant oppositionnel au sein du parti socialiste rejoint la tendance qui, sans porter une condamnation sur le fond de la politique gouvernementale, estime qu'un congrès extraordinaire doit être appelé à se prononcer en particulier sur les raisons qui ont empêché le gouvernement d'appliquer la motion du congrès de Lille.

In *Le Monde*, 22/11/56, p. 5.

(33)

Ibid.

(34)

In *La France devant ses périls et ses chances* by Pierre-Henri Simon, *Le Monde*, 4/1/58, pp. 1-7.

(35)

In *Le Monde*, 3/11/54.

Needless to say, the official reaction echoed in *Le Monde's* reports was to treat the uprising as a "terrorist" movement started by "bandits", "fellaguas" (Chapter 5) who should be punished "without mercy" but also, with time, given the state of poverty and destitution of the country (Chapter 3), the rapid population growth, by some measure of economic reform. To start with, the economic reforms were not to be implemented until order had been restored.

(36)

Even if it were thought conceivable that the instigators of the uprising could be disciples of Messali, the only well known radical nationalist supremo at the time, this was said to be unlikely as the paper stated that the actions did not have the Messali touch (*le tour messaliste*) in that they did not move the masses.

Ibid.

(37)

Ibid.

(38)

Le Monde, 4/11/54.

(39)

Mocking the *chiffres fantaisistes* of Cairo, spurred on by an "Arab conspiracy" led by Nasser.

(40)

Perhaps it is not quite so surprising from a French colonial perspective. Algeria had been a colony for longer than Morocco and Tunisia; Algeria, unlike Tunisia and Morocco had a more

important French population; and many French people claimed that Algeria was part of France and not a colony.

(41)

Henri Laugier, *Droit des peuples et souverainetés abusives*, *Le Monde*, 31/3/57 & 1/4/57, p. 1.

(42)

Qui ne sent l'absurdité, l'offense à l'esprit d'une telle doctrine, brandie par tous les chauvinismes, par tous les nationalismes exaspérés, par toutes les réactions du monde, y compris par la réaction communiste lorsque cette doctrine sert ses desseins?

Ibid.

(43)

It was argued that, though, the "perfectionnement explosif des techniques des échanges matériels et spirituels" there has been a development of solidarity and interdependence between states and nations similar to that found in a single city. As a consequence of that, "individual freedoms", equated with a "discretionary and unconditional right to install in any house a reserve of explosives, a depot for poisons, a factory for the manufacture of asphyxiating gases, a centre for contagious disease" (*fabrique de gas asphyxiants, un centre contagieux de maladies*) could not be legitimised since universal opinion has recognised nationally that:

Le maximum de liberté pour chacun n'est assuré que par le respect d'un nombre important de restrictions à la liberté de réglementations acceptées par tous, et si nécessaires imposées aux réfractaires par la loi de la cité..., *Le Monde*, 31/4/57, p. 1.

(44)

Exceptionally, for economic reasons a shorter delay was accepted by the Cartiéristes (trend of thought inspired by J. Cartier of *Paris-Match*).

(45)

France's record in Algeria, it could be argued, was no better with an illiteracy rate of over 90% for 1954, with only 9% being able to write. See E.O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954- 1962*, London, Faber & Faber, 1967, p. 24.

(46)

Ces populations deshéritées qui parviennent à l'indépendance sont menacées de sombrer dans le désordre et l'anarchie, et, de ce fait exposées à subir la dictature d'un homme ou d'une minorité.

This he called a troublante et cruelle vérité.

(47)

The moral order he called *le sens des valeurs* and this pseudo-democracy was described as *confusion démagogique ... par une égalité aveugle des droits, sous prétexte de démocratie.*

(48)

[acquérir] la maturité et l'expérience indispensable à l'exercice de la liberté, mais il faut

qu'ils sentent que le chemin passe par la culture. Il appartient aux peuples évolués de les aider avec passion et désintéressement à acquérir cette culture, en même temps qu'à améliorer leurs conditions de vie et à brûler les étapes qu'eux-mêmes ont mis des siècles à parcourir. Il appartient aux peuples attardés dans leur développement de comprendre que cette aide extérieure n'a rien d'humiliant, qu'elle n'est pas une aumône, mais un droit, et qu'elle nécessite de leur part un effort continu, réfléchi et tenace.

Paul Rivet, *Indépendance et liberté*, in *Le Monde*, 1/2/57, pp. 1-3.

(49)

Les deux styles by P-H Simon in *Le Monde*, 21/2/57, pp. 1-5.

(50)

He praised also the work and attitude of Pineau and Soustelle [qui] se sont montrés courtois et persuasifs... parlé droit et morale; ils ont plaidé, dans le passé, l'action civilisatrice de la France; pour l'avenir, ses intentions humaines et libérales.

(51)

rodomontades du colonel égyptien dont le monde se fatigue, excès rhétoriques et fantaisies historiques des avocats du bloc Afrique-Asie, que le prurit nationaliste égara à leur tour.

Ibid.

(52)

Against those other papers arguing that negotiation was a betrayal, that talks with Bourguiba and the Sultan should be broken, that the government should act in a virile way which, in his view, would only lead to la guerre plus dure, l'impasse plus évidente, to broken promises and the return of the Algerian question back to the U.N. and the failure of France.

(53)

où le découpage d'un territoire en départements a moins d'importance que son intégration économique et politique à son ensemble.

Ibid.

(54)

Une France qui parle de culture, de justice, de liberté, d'hôpitaux, d'universités, de routes, de canaux, de chemins de fer, le monde ne demande qu'à le croire; et même à une heure où il sait qu'elle cache derrière ce haut prestige séculaire la réalité d'une guerre cruelle et horrible, il lui accorde un délai de crédit, il lui fait confiance pour rentrer le plus tôt et le mieux possible dans la ligne de sa vocation de faiseuse d'ordre et de paix.

Simon's wish (Ibid.) was to see the "good style" triumph:

le bon style, le bon sens, le vrai patriotisme, le sentiment de la grandeur solide et durable de la France! Une hypothèque redoutable est levée. Un

délai nous est donné pour sortir d'une guerre qui épuise notre substance et ne grandit pas notre prestige.

(55)
Pierre-Henri Simon, *Les deux styles*, in *Le Monde*, 21/2/57, p. 5.

(56)
Urging a peaceful effort with the idea of associating France and its partners and colonies in a "Eurafrican idea", the paper thought that would ease the difficulties of the Algerian problem since that was:

plus sensible encore à la nécessité d'aboutir vite à un nouvel équilibre Outre-mer et de déboucher sur les sentiers de la paix en Algérie

In *Un point de départ*, *Le Monde*, 22/2/57.

(57)
Le Monde included the views of the Independents who had elaborated a project of *statut octroyé* with four regions, some decentralised powers, new elections on the basis of one Frenchman for two Muslims and equality between the two communities. See *Le Monde*, 7/3/57, p. 4.

(58)
This was seen earlier when dealing with the army (Chapter 5). Juin had suggested conquering the hearts but also a pitiless repression. See *Impitoyable dans la répression du terrorisme, nous devons en Algérie retrouver le chemin des coeurs* (published in *Revue de la Défense nationale*). See *Le Monde*, 7/3/57, p. 4. On that occasion, outlining the means of restoring peace in a "territory which could not be parted from France", *Le Monde* recalled that the causes of the tragedy were: *URSS, fanatisme pan-arabe, xénophobie, ... expose moyens de ramener la paix dans un territoire qui ne peut être séparé de la France.*

(59)
Who suggested dual sovereignty. The paper echoed his desire to see his proposal of two sovereignties superimposed on the Algerian territory, outlining and defending his principle of *souverainetés superposées*. In *Le Monde*, 16/7/57 and 24/7/57.

(60)
Mais il ne suffit pas d'affirmer aujourd'hui que ces nationalismes et leur corollaire, l'indépendance sont périmés pour y faire renoncer des communautés subjuguées, ou qui se croient telles. Refuser l'indépendance au nom de l'évolution revient à pratiquer la politique de l'autruche. C'est nager à contre-courant et s'exposer à de sanglantes désillusions.

Because the problem of conciliating two contradictory aspirations remained.

D'où qu'on l'aborde le problème demeure: comment accorder aux uns la liberté à laquelle ils aspirent sans l'enlever à d'autres vivant sur le même sol? (his italics).

(61)

le principe des souverainetés superposées permet, au prix certes de quelques complications, la coexistence sur un même sol de deux communautés, libres, régies chacune par ses lois propres, sans amputation pour aucun des droits essentiels. (his italics)

Trying to find support for his new technique of co-existence, he wrote that if the government had the courage to go along that path when preparing the loi-cadre everything could be saved in North Africa with (...) *la coexistence assurée dans la liberté, l'hostilité de la majorité des Nations unies évitée.*

If they did not, then, his fear was that if France remained prisoner of outdated formulae, pacification would not progress as fast as the pressures of other nations and free elections would not be possible for for a long time and it would then be too late.

In *Une technique nouvelle de la coexistence: deux souverainetés superposées sur le même territoire.* by Jules Moch in *Le Monde*, 24/7/57, p. 1.

(62)

There was a conviction that if Algeria were to get out of the French umbrella there would be no doubt on the Republican form of government that the nationalists would adopt, which was said to be nearer the Tunisian model than the Moroccan one. But it was thought that this system would be *populaire révolutionnaire*, and not *<bourgeois>*.

(63)

Les Répercussions internationales, in *Le Monde*, 26/7/57, p. 1.

(64)

P. Minay in his series of articles at the end of November 1955. See *Le Monde*, 24/11/55 to 30/11/55.

(65)

In a series of articles *Au sud rien de nouveau* by Alfred Sauvy, the first of which was I. *Quelques données réalistes du problème algérien.* *Le Monde*, 11/5/57, pp. 1-4 ff.

(66)

Le Monde, 11/5/57, pp. 1-4.

(67)

For him, France was bound to make progress along those lines. See his second article in the series *Au sud Rien de nouveau*, by A.Sauvy II. *La France condamnée au progrès.* *Le Monde*, 14/5/57, p. 4.

(68)

If genuinely implemented, this was thought to lead in the not so distant future, given the Muslim population growth, to French institutions, and Parliament in particular, being "swamped" by Muslim representatives who would "grossly deform" their very nature.

- (69)
Pierre Albin Martel in *Le Monde*, 8/6/55.
- (70)
Le Monde, 11/10/55, p. 1.
- (71)
And that is clearly why *Le Monde* was for it.
- (72)
J.Fauvet, in *Le Monde*, 11/10/55, p. 1.
- (73)
Acknowledging finally that the Algerian had a wish to express.
- (74)
Le Monde, 11/10/55, p. 1.
- (75)
Le Monde, 12/10/55, pp. 1-2.
- (76)
M.Duverger in *Le Monde*, 12/10/55. pp. 1 & 2.
- (77)
In *Les mots et les faits*, *Le Monde*, 24/1/56.
- (78)
Le Monde, 24/1/56.
- (79)
Described as impossible: parce qu'il n'existe pas en Algérie l'équivalent de S.M. le Sultan ou de M. H.Bourguiba [et parce que] la nation algérienne est moins différenciée que la nation marocaine et tunisienne.
- (80)
In his view, if federalism were to be adopted it should not entail separating Algeria progressively from France but giving to Algeria an appropriate statute within the French framework:
[Le fédéralisme] ne doit pas consister à détacher progressivement l'Algérie de la France, mais à donner à l'Algérie, à l'intérieur de l'ensemble français, un statut propre qui corresponde à l'originalité de sa structure et de sa situation.
- (81)
It was a mistake in his eyes (a flaw in Soustelle's arguments) to believe that total integration was possible. He did agree, though, with the removal of the two Colleges and with an increased representation of Algerians through specific measures to ensure freedom of elections. See *Le Monde*, 24/1/56.
- (82)
Le fait que ces derniers [les Européens] sont concentrés dans certaines régions leur permettrait d'ailleurs de conserver des représentants en cas de scrutin d'arrondissement. That

should be followed even in the case of parliamentary elections: *en lui conservant, peut-être pendant une période transitoire, son caractère paritaire, lequel permettrait d'atténuer le choc provoqué dans les milieux français par la réforme précédente* (by increasing in the number of Algerian representatives). In *Le Monde*, 24/1/56.

(83)

See *Le Monde*, 23/2/56.

(84)

See *Le Monde*, 24/11/56, p. 1.

(85)

Ibid.

(86)

Examiner la situation ne suffit plus, il est grand temps d'agir, de poser clairement les conditions et de mettre en oeuvre les moyens de l'indispensable réconciliation.

See *Le Monde*, 21/11/56, pp. 1-3.

(87)

He was advising a bizarre operation of bribery, from which it was difficult to perceive how a set of presents for the birthday of the Sultan's son could solve the Algerian problem. Gauthier in *Le Monde*, 21/11/56, pp. 1-3.

(88)

Ibid.

(89)

J. Le Moyne in *Le Monde*, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.

(90)

Julien Le Moyne in *Le Monde*, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7. Anticipating government action the next day, Fauvet also expected the PM to act within a French framework. See *Le Monde*, 21/12/56, p. 1.

(91)

Meeting of the Mouvement pour l'Union atlantique succinctly reported by *Le Monde*. See *Le Monde*, 18-19/11/56, p. 5.

(92)

Speaking in his own name and not in the name of the institution, *Le Monde* hastened to add. Ibid., see also Chapter 10.

(93)

Le Monde, 18-19/11/56, p. 5

Le Monde also reported that M. Allais had taken part and had made statements to the effect that the cost of French involvement overseas was too high and that the benefits withdrawn could be compensated by the establishment of an Atlantic market.

It is worth noting that General Weygand protested against *Le Monde* (in a letter), writing that the statements did not provoke a "public outcry" (*tollé*). He mentioned the different protests by various personalities and also the fact that a statement prepared in advance, to be issued at the end of the

meeting, did not meet with the approval of everybody. *Le Monde*, 22/11/56, p. 5.

When it published the letter the paper stood by what it had printed and denied that there was any inaccuracy.

(94)

The treaty referred to ended the Seven Years' War. France lost to Britain Acadia, Canada, St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, Senegal and Minorca, and to Spain, Louisiana (France in 1763 regained Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies as well as the French settlements in India).

(95)

Le Monde, 18-19/11/56, p. 5.

(96)

Le Monde, 3-4/3/57.

(97)

Some decentralisation leading to one of three directions: a federal system with France and its colonies, a *de facto* Franco-African union or a recognition of the right of independence in stages, which would lead to a solution of a confederal type.

Georges Chaffard, *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 3.

(98)

Ibid.

From *La révision du titre VIII de la constitution devrait être l'occasion de réexaminer l'ensemble des structures de l'Union française.*

(99)

Blanchet, *Savoir perdre une colonie pour gagner un dominion* in *Le Monde*, 6/3/57, p. 5.

(100)

He thought that if they had accepted the offer of elections and if those elections had been free, that would have led the movement to victory in the political field, "giving it a far superior weapon than those of the military field where it is now outclassed by France (us)".

(101)

Duverger in *Le Monde*, 22/2/57.

(102)

Sans le dire, par peur des mots, on est en train de transformer la République française d'Etat unitaire en Etat fédéral; on est en train de faire des territoires d'outre-mer de véritables Républiques fédérées. Il reste à savoir s'il n'y aurait pas un intérêt capital à le dire; si ces mots qui font peur ne sont pas chargés de prestige et de signification; s'ils ne peuvent pas créer un choc psychologique et développer cette confiance populaire sans laquelle rien de durable ne peut être construit.

In M. Duverger, *La peur des mots*, in *Le Monde*, 6/2/57, p. 1.

(103)

A distinction was clearly established between Soviet repression in Hungary and French repression in Algeria.

(104)

It may be useful to point out that the reader would find out by deduction only that the "Muslims" were not treated equally. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that such a recommendation would transform the atmosphere.

(105)

M. Duverger, *Impasse en Algérie?*, 22/2/57, pp. 1-5.

(106)

Ibid.

One stage, expressing the will of a people for emancipation and freedom such as in Europe and 19th century America (*qui gagne aujourd'hui l'Asie et l'Afrique*), which was seen as *libérateur* and *progressiste* and which he approved, despite the risk of a temporary regression, lowering standards of living and even a reduction of civil liberties, as even generous paternalism constituted an alienation. The negative side to this damaging growth crisis (*crise d'originalité juvénile entraîne de grands dommages ...*) was, nevertheless, preferable to the *maintien dans l'enfance*.

The other stage likely to follow betrayed, in his view, the egoism of a nation which refuses to accept that the boundaries of its independence are constituted by other countries' independence. Its main expression was said to be xenophobia, racism and imperialism, when one formerly oppressed country refuses to submit to demands of collective international life, wants others to respect reciprocal arrangements which it does not itself. This was the other type of nationalism, which, he thought, was regressive and reactionary.

This could be found even within one country, he argued, to fight the aspirations of oppressed classes or groups and maintain the privileges of a particular category, the myth of national unity establishes common interests between the <<exploiters>> and <<exploited>> benefiting the former (oppressors). Instead of helping to suppress forms of alienation, this nationalism, he argued, helps maintain them and usually this is accompanied by a shift from the Left to the Right.

(107)

Le Monde, 16/3/57, p. 1.

(108)

Looking at the violence mechanism between Europeans and "Muslims" in Algeria and the mainland, Duverger wrote that not all the liberals of Algeria were in prison and that there were a lot of "ultras" in the corridors of power.

(109)

In a shrewd analysis of the status quo against reform, Duverger wrote that the paradoxical situation was such that the mainland's help was used to impose a policy opposed by the mainland. There was a mechanism whereby public opinion was pulled in a direction contrary to its wishes with the confusion of the idea of reforms (wanted by the mainland) with the idea of "abandon" (which is rejected by it).

CHAPTER TEN: NOTES

(1)

See *La Guerre d'Algérie et les Intellectuels Français*, Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, November 1988, and Vidal-Naquet, P., *Une fidélité têtue: la résistance française à la guerre d'Algérie*, 20ème Siècle: Revue d'histoire, April-June 1986, pp. 3-18.

(2)

Even politicians on the Left like G.Mollet and F.Mitterrand preferred war to negotiations. See also Chapter 8.

(3)

See Chapter 11.

(4)

See also Chapter 12.

(5)

See Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, op. cit., pp.14 & 18.

(6)

Even when politicians mockingly refer to them as "chers professeurs."

(7)

Mauriac's article *La Question* in L'Express, 15/1/1955; see Fouilloux, Etienne, *Intellectuels catholiques et la guerre d'Algérie (1954-1962)*, p. 64, in Cahiers de l'IHTP, op. cit., pp. 53-78.

(8)

Winock, M., *L'âge d'or des intellectuels*, in L'Histoire, 83, November 1985, pp. 20-34, quoted by J-P Rioux, *La guerre d'Algérie dans l'histoire des intellectuels français*, Cahiers de l'IHTP op. cit., p.21; See also M. Crouzet, *La bataille des intellectuels français*, in La Nef, No 12-13, October 1962-January 1963, p. 50 ff.

(9)

The exceptional stands taken by Mandouze and Marrou are dealt with in Chapter 13.

(10)

See especially Domenach, J.M., *Un souvenir triste* in Cahiers de l'IHTP, op. cit., No 10, p. 241.

(11)

See Mauriac's views as reported by *Le Monde*, 23/2/57, p. 5 and 2/3/57, p. 4 (from *L'Express*).

(12)

The war was referred to in the official terminology and in most of the media only as the "troubles". This is well illustrated by the title of John Talbott's book, A.A. Knopf (1980), op. cit.

(13)

Mauriac wrote articles in *L'Express* including a regular *Bloc-notes* (Flammarion, Paris, 1958).

(14)

See *Le Monde*, 2/3/57, p. 4.

(15)

See *Le Monde*, 11/1/58, p. 4. All relevant quotes below are from the same article.

(16)

See *Le Monde*, 17/1/58, p. 4.

(17)

Le Monde's article (19/6/57, pp. 1-6) which bore the same title as Aron's book (*La tragédie algérienne*, Plon, Paris, 1957) was surrounded by official and army statements on saving Algeria and discouraging the rebels.

(18)

Devoted to the "Algerian impasse".

(19)

Trend of thought (referred to in Chapter 9) which owed its name to J.Cartier of *Paris Match*, and which favoured granting independence to the colonies, seen as a burden hampering the growth and development of colonial powers.

(20)

Soustelle, J., *Le Drame algérien et la décadence française: Réponse à R.Aron*, Plon, Paris, 1957.

(21)

(...) le Servan-Schreiber des riches, le Mauriac de la sidérurgie et le Claude Bourdet de la finance, ni les hommes auxquels il a donné l'occasion d'une <<relance>>: adversaires de la France, communistes, progressistes ou autres intellectuels fiers de leur cerveau, mais qui ne pensent peut-être pas assez à leur crâne (...).

In *Le Monde*, 28/8/57, p. 5.

(22)

Ibid. Here, R.Gauthier seems to follow Soustelle's advice (reading Tillion, G., *L'Algérie en 1957*, Minuit, Paris, 1957).

(23)

Ibid.

(24)

See for instance *Le Monde*, 17/9/57, p. 4.

(25)

M de Maisonseul; see for instance *Gouverner*, *Le Monde*, 3-4/6/56.

(26)

Apart from a few lines written in *L'Express*, picked up by *Le Monde*, 18/10/57, p. 7, in which he stated his firm belief in the "association of the free and equal peoples of Algeria and France" but also his hesitations about the ways of achieving it.

(27)

Le Monde called him a representative of the FLN, 14/12/57, p. 6.

(28)

Une lettre de M. Albert Camus, in *Le Monde* 19/12/57, p. 4.

(29)

L'Express, *France-Observateur*, and *France-Nouvelle*; see S. de Beauvoir: *La force des choses*, Gallimard, Paris, 1963, p. 406.

(30)

Peau noire, Masques blancs, Seuil, Paris, 1952.

(31)

Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 2.

(32)

Portrait du colonisé, Buchet-Chastel, Paris, 1957. See M. Vaussard in *Le Monde*, 2/8/57, p. 4.

(33)

Signed D.P. in *Le Monde*, 14/8/57, p. 7.

(34)

Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 13.

(35)

Domenach was opposed to any active support of the FLN anyway. See E. Fouilloux, *Intellectuels catholiques et la guerre l'Algérie*, in *Cahiers de l'IHTP* No 10, November 1988, pp. 53-78, p. 68.

(36)

J'ose ici proclamer les vœux solennels que je forme pour que les Arabes expulsent énergiquement

les Français de l'Algérie si ceux-ci ne savent pas
la leur restituer dignement.

In *Le Monde*, 19-20/5/57, p. 13.

(37)

quelqu'un se lève aussitôt pour mettre en doute
-plus qu'en doute- la capacité des Arabes dans les
conditions actuelles "à user dignement" de l'Algérie
et d'eux-mêmes.

Ibid.

(38)

Yves Florenne, *Revue des Revues: Algérie et socialismes*, *Le Monde*, 19-20/5/57, p. 13.

(39)

See also Chapter 12.

(40)

See Simon, P.-H., *Contre la Torture*, Paris, Seuil, 1957,
and *Le Monde*, 13/3/57, p. 2. It is worth pointing out that he
was not pro-FLN (see Chapter 6 and his article *Où le FLN se trompe*
in *Le Monde*, 19/4/57, p. 1).

(41)

Servan-Schreiber, J.-J., *Lieutenant en Algérie*, Julliard,
1957, published at the same time as P.-H.Simon's book and only
reviewed by *Le Monde* on 29/6/57, p. 9.

(42)

Le Monde gave considerably more attention to books by Army
chiefs of staff and publications praising the conduct of the
army. See Chapter 5.

(43)

At a time when it became obvious to many that the army and
the police were resorting to systematic use of torture and
severe, indiscriminate and collective reprisals very often on
innocent civilians.

(44)

Le Monde, 13/3/57, p. 1.

(45)

Ibid.

(46)

Le Monde, 16/3/57, p. 2.

(47)

Ibid.

(48)

See *Le Monde*, 7/6/57, p. 3. The author's declared objective was to silence the intellectuals and the campaign against torture. The book, *Contrepoison ou la morale en Algérie*, Grass-
et, Paris, 1957, had incidently been secretly subsidised and annotated by G.Mollet. See Vidal-Naquet, P., *Torture dans la République*, Maspéro, 1972, p. 68. Selected pages were published side by side with Mollet's statements in the the official *Revue Militaire d'Information*.

(49)

See *Le Monde*, 8/6/57, p. 3.

(50)

Cahiers de Témoignage chrétien, 1957.

(51)

Which preferred to give its own "balanced" views (through Serge Adour , October-November 1957) and was not that critical of "Ceux d'Algérie" debates and book in Plon, presenting the war effort and the conduct of the war under an extremely good light. *Le Monde* 25/2/57, p. 3. There was a brief reference stating that *Témoignage Chrétien* had published, and was subsequently in trouble for publishing, the *Dossier Jean Muller*. See *Le Monde* 23/2/57, p. 5.

(52)

Simonin, A., *Les Editions de Minuit et les Editions du Seuil(...)*, *Cahiers de l'IHTP*, No 10, op. cit., pp. 147-166.

(53)

When he reviewed the article, without mentioning *Le Monde* by name, Y.Florenne stated that he was not without any knowledge of the reasons behind this major daily's refusal to publish Sartre's article but denied that it was because of the position taken on the repression in Algeria.

(54)

Vous êtes formidables, in *Les Temps Modernes*, No 135, May 1957, pp. 1641-1647 and *Situations, V*, Gallimard, Paris, 1964, pp. 57-67.

(55)

Revue des revues by Yves Florenne : *Nous ne sommes pas formidables*, in *Le Monde*, 1/7/57, p. 13. The delay since May is worth noting. All quotes below are from the same article.

(56)

Accepted by the late Beuve-Méry in his article on P-H.Simon above.

(57)

One wonders how, if one of the major papers was not helping.

(58)

Sartre in that very article *Temps Modernes*, No 135, op.cit., admitted as legitimate the condemnation of the events of Hungary (p. 1646) as he had done publicly in November 1956. It was also over Hungary that he broke away from F. Jeanson. See Jeanson, F., *Sartre dans sa vie*, Seuil, Paris, 1974, p. 213.

(59)

J.P. Sartre donc, de la Hongrie, remonte à Buchenwald: Alger serait notre Budapest; et nous aurions déjà rejoint le peuple allemand dans la complicité et la culpabilité collectives totales.

In *Le Monde*, 1/7/57, p. 13.

(60)

Regardons la vérité, elle mettra chacun de nous en demeure, ou de condamner publiquement les crimes accomplis, ou de les endosser en pleine connaissance de cause. C'est pour cela que j'ai cru nécessaire de signaler au public la brochure des rappelés. Voilà l'évidence, voilà l'horreur, la nôtre: nous ne pouvons pas la voir sans l'arracher de nous et l'écraser.

In *Temps Modernes*, op. cit., p. 1647.

(61)

See *Le Monde*, 1/7/57, p. 13.

(62)

See also Chapter 13.

(63)

Jean Planchais in his interviews with the author, for instance, but he is by no means the only one.

(64)

H. Beuve-Méry (recalling his meeting 18/9/58 with de Gaulle), revealed in his book, *Onze ans de règne*, Flammarion, Paris, 1974, pp. 10-11, the extent to which he was prepared to go to preserve the "interests of the nation."

(65)

Hostert G., *Une campagne néo-colonialiste du Monde: Indochine 1945-1946*, Clés du Monde, Paris, 1983.

(66)

It would be wrong to believe, as J.-P. Rioux did, in *La France de la Quatrième République*, Vol.2, 1952-1958, Seuil, Paris, 1983, p. 137, relying on an unsubstantiated reference in J.-N. Jeanneney and J. Julliard, *Le Monde de Beuve-Méry ou le*

métier d'Alceste, Seuil, Paris, 1979, pp. 232-3, that the paper favoured a negotiated solution and independence.

(67)

Schalk's reference to J.Talbott, op. cit., is in D.L.Schalk, *Algérie et Vietnam*, p. 247, in Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, op. cit., pp. 245-252.

(68)

Chatelain, A., Le Monde et ses lecteurs sous la Quatrième République, A. Colin, Paris, 1962.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: NOTES

(1)
In 1848, 1871 and recently during the Second World War.

(2)
The erosion of civil liberties has already been extensively documented by Arlette Heyman, in *Les libertés publiques et la guerre d'Algérie*, LGDJ, Paris, 1972.

(3)
5/2/1955.

(4)
Le Monde prepared its readers for the introduction of the measures proposed for this piece of legislation and the reasons behind them. On 20-21/3/55 it was announced that the Government was putting the final touches to a text instituting a "state of emergency" in Algeria, to be discussed in the near future.

(5)
See *Le Monde*, 20-21/3/55.
Le Monde claimed that legal and administrative "studies" were insufficient to deal with the criminal activities of the outlaws and put forward a long list of motives. These included:
désordre...quelques bandes de hors la loi
numériquement peu importantes, zones propices... hors la loi soutenus par.. propagande et éléments en provenance de l'étranger... assassinats, insécurité...agitateurs accréditent ... notion d'impuissance de la France, ...troubles sporadiques risquent de se transformer en insurrection générale....
See *Le Monde*, 24/3/55.

(6)
The paper also put forward the positive aspects of the measures.

Le dispositif juridique et administratif ... insuffisant à assurer la sécurité de la masse de la population contre les exactions des rebelles La population court de grands risques à ne pas se plier aux exigences des hors la loi qui sévissent dans certaines régions difficiles de l'Algérie ... deviendrait inévitablement complice ou victime... finirait par se détourner de nous par peur de représailles.

See *Le Monde*, 20-21/3/55

But since the paper presented the measures as if devised to slow down if not eradicate rebel activity in the Aures area, it

seemed ironical that *Le Monde* expressed the hope that the job might be completed by the month of Ramadhan instead. See *Le Monde*, 10/4/55.

(7)

An article reported, for instance, the arrest of 70 people including an area leader, R. Bitat, and stated that terrorism in Algeria had received a "serious blow": *l'opération déclare-t-on ...de nature à porter un coup sérieux à l'organisation du terrorisme en Algérie.*

Ibid.

(8)

See *Le Monde*, 24/3/55.

(9)

See *Le Monde*, 20-21/3/55.

(10)

André Chênebenoît, shareholder, co-director and journalist, gave his views in a leading article. He saw the law as an intermediary solution between *Le Droit commun* and a *législation de péril national*, applicable to the entire French territory; as an intermediate form of legislation between *l'Etat de siège*, equivalent to giving full authority to the Military and which would "hold back the economic development" on the one hand, and a normal state of affairs on the other hand, which did not enable the authorities to deal with the situation in Algeria. See *Le Monde*, 24/3/55.

(11)

Some of which were reported by *Le Monde* (see below).

A.Chênebenoît had a leading article dealing, once more, with the measures and their justification, and which still presented them as a middle of the road solution.

Il n'en reste pas moins que voici la Quatrième République qui s'était tant rêvée plus humaine et plus pure que sa devancière dotée en un tournemain d'un nouveau statut juridique qui n'est ni le respect sacré des libertés convenant à une démocratie sûre d'elle même, ni la suspension des garanties civiques nécessaires à la discipline d'une nation en péril de guerre.

Although this could have constituted a reasonably critical introduction to a discussion of the measures, Chênebenoît did not intend to take the analysis any further. Instead, he adopted the official phraseology:

Bref, selon l'expression officielle un état intermédiaire entre le Droit Commun et l'Etat de siège répondant à une situation intermédiaire entre le calme et l'insurrection

See *Le Monde*, 2/4/55.

(12)

or *dispositif juridique*

(...) laissant aux autorités civiles l'exercice des pouvoirs traditionnels... les renforce et les concentre de façon à les rendre plus adaptés aux événements ayant caractère de calamité publique, susceptibles de mettre en danger l'ordre public ou de porter atteinte à la souveraineté nationale.

(13)
Le Monde, 20-21/3/55.

(14)
Despite the various claims and the prominent titles that le *Parlement reste souverain*, the provision (as well as the discussion thereof) that outside parliamentary session, the Council of Ministers could decide on the application and implementation of the law, was not commented on . See *Le Monde*, 2/4/55.

(15)
(..)possibilité de soumettre dans certains cas... délits et crimes à la juridiction des tribunaux militaires, in *Le Monde*, 23/3/55.

(16)
It was clear that Chênebenoît suggested that these measures should be taken seriously and that these texts were, in some respects, "worrying" (*des textes inquiétants*), in spite of the "justifications" presented. He looked at Article 11 which implemented the general "disposition" of "a nation at war" (*la nation en temps de guerre 11-6-1938*), Article 13 about military tribunals' competence and the suspension of rights of appeal (*recours en cassation*) and commented in *Le Monde*, 24/3/55:

Voilà on l'avouera qui est bien gros s'il ne s'agit que de réprimer les coups de main des fellaguas de l'Aurès. On réfléchira en tout cas sur l'usage que pourraient faire en temps de guerre de pareils textes un gouvernement et une Assemblée dans une situation actuellement hors de prévision.

His worries were twofold: these measures might be too excessive (*On peut précisément se demander si l'on ne braque pas le canon pour écraser une mouche.*), and they could be "subject of reflection" in hitherto unforeseen circumstances. The overall concern, however, was clearly not about the measures themselves but about their possible use by a government and an assembly in some unforeseen circumstances. Chênebenoît was satisfied by the way the legislation had been enacted and thought that the new law did not seem to bring any restriction to civil liberties (*libertés individuelles*). He was even proud that democracies could take similar measures:

C'est une source louable que doivent avoir les démocraties de s'appuyer sur des textes légaux d'autant plus que les garanties républicaines sont assurées aux citoyens

(17)
See, for instance, text of the law and articles, 23/3/55, p. 5.

(18)
See *Le Monde*, 24/3/55.

Mais elles [les démocraties] doivent aussi se garder si elles veulent vraiment mériter leur nom de tout ce qui dans la recherche de l'efficacité peut prêter à l'arbitraire.

(19)

In this instance, *Le Monde* did not behave differently from any other newspaper trying to sell and justify a government's legislation to public opinion.

(20)

See *Le Monde*, 2/4/55:

Mais le citoyen a-t-il lieu de s'inquiéter puisque tout repose sur la sagesse et sur la foi de l'Assemblée, des assemblées que l'on espère inombra- bles dans la longue suite républicaine.

(21)

L'hémisphère au trois quarts vide ... [l']absentéisme sévissait particulièrement sur les bancs des Radicaux et des Modérés... A la fin vingt-cinq députés restaient en séance et les huissiers votaient pour certains groupes.

(22)

Les communistes, relayés par quelques socia- listes et un député musulman de droite, M. Bendjel- loul ont multiplié les interventions mais en pure perte. Tous les amendements se sont heurtés à un bloc sans fissures, qui n'a jamais été inférieur à 360 voix qui les a rejetés sans mot dire, pas plus d'ailleurs que le gouvernement. En réalité il n'y a pas eu de débat.

In dark print in *Le Monde*, 2/4/55.

(23)

It gave it a favourable coverage as it included a number of reassuring statements from prominent personalities such as: *La mesure ne sera pas étendue à tout le territoire algérien ... le Parlement reste souverain (Bourges Maunoury), L'Etat d'Ur- gence ne heurte ni ne gêne l'immense majorité de la population (Papillon, delegate to the Algerian Assembly from Kabylia) and finally, from Soustelle: Seuls les criminels peuvent redouter la loi sur l'<Etat d'Urgence >.*

Le simple devoir de toute autorité démocratique est de mettre fin aux meurtres, aux attentats, aux actes de pillage et de vandalisme.

Personne n'a rien à craindre sinon ceux qui se rendent coupables de ces crimes... C'est la pacifi- cation et non une répression que le gouvernement de la République entend mener à bien. Tous les Algéri- ens exigent que ces désordres cessent avec tous les maux qui les accompagnent. (2/4/55)

No position was taken by the paper against the disorders, the irregularities, the traumas (interdictions de séjour, résidence forcée, contrôle de presse, compétence des tribunaux militaires) which could and did follow.

(24)

Chênebenoît in *Le Monde*, /3/55. But the only area where it was subsequently applied was Algeria.

(25)

In so doing the paper maintained that Algeria was an "inte- gral part of France" and that there was no question of régime d'exception, claiming that the present situation was not the

only justification as these new measures would operate at times of grave circumstances - fire, flood, earthquakes - when the judicial and administrative system had proved inefficient in the past. See *Le Monde*, 24/3/55.

(26)

See *Le Monde*, 24/3/55, and the discussion of the *Libre Opinion* article to follow.

(27)

(*Limiter le champ d'application*). P.A.Martel, summing up the spirit of the legislation, did so in terms that Soustelle had used:

L'Etat d'Urgence n'empêcherait pas la consultation d'être absolument libre...pacifier les régions sous administrées, implanter l'administration... forces de protection plus proches de l'habitant ... organisations sanitaires et sociales qui font défaut...

In *Le Monde* 8/4/55.

(28)

As late as 8 April, as one could read that :

Le Gouverneur Général ne pouvait en effet ignorer que, saluée avec faveur dans certains milieux européens et dans la presse algéroise (sauf le journal communiste), la nouvelle législation a été accueillie avec inquiétude dans la population musulmane... les élus du Deuxième Collège eux-mêmes ont été nombreux à s'en émouvoir.

(29)

"May reassure the European community." See *Le Monde*, 20-21/3/55.

Apart from the explicit justifications for the law, there was also an implicit bias in the presentation and the discussion of the law and the explanation of the circumstances which had brought it to the fore. Most of the readers of the mainland would identify with the European community favourable to their introduction, as opposed to the predominantly "Muslim" community opposed to these measures. See *Le Monde*, 23/5/55/, 24/3/55, 1/4/56.

(30)

(...) l'implantation des Tabors marocains, de légionnaires, de méharistes, de tirailleurs, le retour du 18ème régiment de chasseurs-parachutistes, le renforcement des autorités locales par l'installation d'administrateurs détachés et d'officiers des <affaires indigènes> (vocation civile), la coordination plus rationnelle des forces de l'ordre, l'intensification de l'effort militaire (...)

See *Le Monde*, 10-11/4/55.

(31)

Aussi l'action des rebelles a-t-elle marqué un net ralentissement.

See *Le Monde*, 10-11/4/55.

(32)

Even *Le Monde* itself had to admit it by adding:

On n'en déplore pas moins dans la région aurasienne la recrudescence d'attentats individuels contre notables, goumiers, gardes informateurs musulmans dont on a retrouvé les corps, la gorge tranchée, forme rituelle d'assassinat ayant un sens religieux affirment un grand nombre de gens du pays, musulmans ou non.

In *Le Monde*, 10-11/4/55.

(33)

Papillon: Elections complètement libres. C'est le seul moyen d'éviter les abstentions massives souhaitées par les séparatistes.

Soustelle's statements to the radio:.... calme sécurité... l'Etat d'Urgence, loin de constituer un obstacle ... permettra de faire prévaloir partout le respect de la loi... Toutes les dispositions seront prises, toutes les garanties seront données pour assurer à la volonté des électeurs sa libre expression. In *L'Etat d'Urgence* permettra de faire prévaloir le respect de la loi (13/4/55, p. 3).

(34)

Encore que la population et certains musulmans réclament avec impatience l'application de l'Etat d'Urgence. On peut se demander si ces mesures suffiront à les rassurer.

In *Le Monde*, 22/4/55.

(35)

La situation en Algérie ne laisse pas d'être préoccupante. L'amélioration constatée dans l'Aurès à la suite de l'installation d'un dispositif administratif et militaire semble malheureusement avoir été comme compensée par une aggravation sur le pourtour et par l'extension des activités des hors la loi dans le Nord Constantinois. L'implantation des dispositifs adéquats est autrement plus lente que les mouvements des rebelles, qui sans délaisser le terrorisme, en reviennent, à la faveur des beaux jours, à une action guerrière par groupes atteignant la centaine.

In *Le Monde*, 16/5/55.

(36)

(..)fait appel à des officiers d'active ou de réserve dont la qualité humaine et la compétence politique ne le cèdent en rien à leur valeur militaire. Il faut évidemment faire face. Mais ni l'action ainsi conduite, ni la loi sur l'Etat d'urgence...ne paraissent avoir abouti au moins à l'échelle suffisante à "l'apprivoisement" recherché.

After *L'Etat d'Urgence* above *Le Monde* added in brackets: qui va être étendu à tout le département de Constantine. This was a very laconic and subtle way of introducing, without commenting in any way, an extension of restrictions and suspen-

sion of civil liberties. Ibid.

(37)

It was illustrated earlier and seemed very important for the paper: *Les Européens, surtout les colons ne sentent pas leur sécurité assurée.* Were the Europeans the only people whose security was at risk? What about the others that might be affected? What about the negative impact which was appearing clearly? The paper asked no questions. It therefore sought no replies. See *Le Monde*, 16/5/55.

(38)

There were even echoes of Ministers being proud of having voted for the measure. When *Le Monde* reported that the "Conseil général" of the Haute-Garonne had asked for the abrogation of the state of emergency, against the wishes of Mr Bourguès-Maunoury, it stated that when the SFIO delegate asked for the abrogation of the state of emergency in the Toulouse congress:

Le ministre s'est félicité d'avoir fait voter cette loi ... se déclare décidé à renforcer l'application .. "c'est mon devoir, bons amis ... recours à la fermeté jacobine si la situation en Garonne .. semblable ... Constantinois... Contre le terrorisme destructeur... méthodes militaires: pas de manifestation de faiblesse vis à vis de la population. Les Français musulmans d'Algérie sont d'accord avec moi... sollicitent une action vigoureuse. Nous ne fallirons pas à cette tâche.

In *Le Monde*, 4/6/55.

(39)

When a "North African" student was arrested (*mis en secret*) and transferred to Algeria, *Le Monde* stated that it questioned the Interior Minister, who declared that he knew nothing of the affair.

The paper did not fail to publish the event through the communiqué of the *Union des Etudiants Algériens de Paris*, parts of which included

... On transfère ... camps d'hébergement... extension loi sur l'Etat d'Urgence aux Algériens résidant en France juridiquement en dehors de la zone d'application ... quiconque pourrait être arrêté en France, transféré en Algérie ... soumis à exactions.

See *Le Monde*, 15/6/55.

After some legal abuses had occurred and the expulsion of 26 people from the département of Oran, *Le Monde* also echoed the appeal by 120 teachers and lawyers to public opinion by publishing some extracts:

font appel à l'opinion publique .. dénoncer la loi dont la gravité est dissimulée à l'opinion et au Parlement ... considèrent que l'expulsion des 26 personnes résulte de l'interprétation excessive de la loi... dangereux précédent que constituent les mesures d'expulsion fondées sur des intentions présumées <<d'entraves à l'action des pouvoirs publics >>.

It declared that they considered

que l'ensemble des mesures prises à ce jour ... expulsions, zones de résidence forcée, contrôle de la presse, par leur caractère répressif

et négatif ne sont pas de nature à instaurer un climat d'apaisement et de détente. Ils en demandent l'annulation pure et simple.

See *Le Monde*, 15/6/55, p. 5.

(40)

Libres Opinions did not involve the responsibility of the paper because they did not bear the signature of any of *Le Monde's* personnel, but that of somebody writing to the paper.

(41)

In the article *Dans l'avant port du fascisme* (see *Le Monde*, 28/4/55), which is worth quoting at length.

For Di Borgo, the 361 deputies, without debate, rewrote the words of Mussolini:

Nous avons piétiné le cadavre pourri de la déesse liberté ... état de siège masqué.. état de siège ... non-existence d'un recours, ... pouvoir de l'autorité administrative sans contrôle ni recours: c'est l'arbitraire légalisé.

The author was not criticising the implementation of the measures, but their very nature:

contre l'audace et l'habileté des malfaiteurs, une démocratie ne lutte pas en supprimant le droit des citoyens mais en définissant mieux les délits et les crimes en y attachant des peines plus sévères et en appliquant implacablement les lois.

He dismissed the widespread rumours that only criminals should fear the emergency measures (Soustelle: *seuls les criminels peuvent redouter la loi sur l'état d'urgence.*) as these powers epitomised:

Le pouvoir royal tel que Louis XIV ou Bossuet l'ont dépeint ... en théorie le méchant seul tremble, en fait c'est aux opprimés, aux faibles qu'on cherche des torts.

For him many Algerians thought that, as far as France was concerned, "repression was always in the present and freedom in the future." Identifying with the Algerians, he went on to say:

La cause des Algériens est notre propre cause(title)... Les Français se consolent parce que nous n'irons pas en Kabylie.

Quoting Lincoln: (*La moitié d'une nation étant esclave l'autre ne peut demeurer libre*), he commented:

Pour atteindre 600-800 personnes ... on a mis hors de droit 1,2 million d'habitants.

And even here it seems that there was concern for the European population only (slip of the pen?).

He attacked the Assembly which he saw as acting against the principle of liberty :

L'avènement de la tyrannie sera toujours physiquement possible mais l'Assemblée par son vote la rendu légal... aberration... c'est une folie.

La démocratie doit s'élever plus haut, ou cédant au vertige du racisme et du fascisme descendre aux abîmes où s'évanouissent parlement, députés et citoyens.

La cause de ceux que des gens <comme il faut> nomment <bicots> ou <ratons>, c'est notre propre cause; le même glas sonne pour eux et pour nous.

He finished by quoting Condorcet (1789)

N'oubliez pas que si vous tolérez à l'égard d'autres hommes la violation des droits naturels, vous vous soumettez à reconnaître, comme justes, les principes de politique par lesquels, on cherche à justifier cette violence... vous légitimez d'avance les attentats que la tyrannie peut un jour jouer contre vous... .

L'intérêt de notre sûreté comme la voix de l'humanité vous prescrit de demander l'abrogation de toutes les lois qui dans le pays soumis à l'Empire français violent le droit de l'étranger, du nègre, du serf, de la glèbe. (Lettre à Messieurs du Tiers Etat)

He aptly wondered whether his words (from letters to the Third-Estate, quoted above) could not be rewritten in an Algiers newspaper in 1955. See *Le Monde*, 28/4/55.

(42)

See *Le Monde*, 12/3/56 & 13/3/56.

(43)

As it did in the case of the "Law of Emergency", a year earlier, (see above in footnote), *Le Monde* hinted (17/2/56) prior to their adoption, that the government would later request "Special Powers" to implement "social and economic measures." No reference was made then to police or repressive measures.

(44)

For some newspapers and many political scientists (including outside contributors to *Le Monde* like Maurice Duverger) who had a clear view of the Arab world, especially on the other side of the Mediterranean, there was an awareness of the negative impact of most measures introduced by the special powers. See *Le Monde*, 13/3/56.

(45)

(...) user des droits de contrôle et de police les plus étendus. Ces mêmes pouvoirs pourront être remis, le cas échéant, à l'autorité militaire. In *Le Monde*, 20/3/56.

(46)

As it did so in the form of official terminology and slogans:

Aussi le Ministre Résident va-t-il disposer de pouvoirs et moyens fortement accrus dont il entend se servir pour le rétablissement de la sécurité et pour la réconciliation des deux communautés.

Ibid.

(47)

Some went further. R.Barillon thought the new law left out only what had a purely political aspect, all the rest (social economic, military and administrative) was covered.

But the examination of the content of articles covering special powers revealed, however, that they were mainly related to increasing the ability of the government to deal with the Algerian situation, through legitimizing the use of military measures and calling up reinforcements.

(48)

The worst thing being for him a majority without a clearly defined policy, a government with full powers unable to make a decision (*Le Monde*, 9/3/56).

(49)

See *Le Monde*, 2/3/56, for the text of the project on Algeria.

(50)

For Fauvet, it was beyond doubt that these measures were needed to increase the powers of the government and the Resident Minister:

(...) mais nul ne contestera que ni les déclarations du gouvernement ni celles de ses contradicteurs n'ont d'intérêt que s'ils confèrent une autorité accrue au gouvernement, spécialement au Ministre Resident.

See *Le Monde*, 10/3/56.

Despite the fact, however, that he knew that government policy had been the same for the previous three governments since 1 November 1954 (this was always claimed to be the restoration of security and the implementation of some sort of economic and social reforms), he argued that these special powers would give the government means that the previous government did not have:

donneront a l'actuel gouvernement des moyens d'action que ses prédécesseurs n'avaient pas, notamment dans le domaine de la sécurité, depuis la fin de l'état d'urgence

The state of emergency was linked to the life of the previous government and had legally ceased to exist, but it is doubtful whether that made any difference to the activities of the security forces.

(51)

Having admitted that "many of the measures announced could no doubt have been implemented without the need for special powers by the government", Fauvet argued that the vote of special powers would "at least break the resistance encountered so far in some quarters." The resistance referred to seemed to be that of the Europeans. One could not believe that they had in any way presented any opposition to the restoration of order before. Perhaps the statement was used merely to back up the argument in favour of these means, with the hope that the successor of Lacoste would not have to say like him: *ce qui est dépassé, c'est le temps des promesses, ce qui est arrivé c'est le temps d'une action ferme et rapide en tous domaines.* See Fauvet in *Le Monde*, 10/3/56.

(52)

It was made clear by official sources through Lacoste that military measures did not depend on special powers. See *Le Monde*, 18-19/3/56. This had been illustrated by one of *Le Monde's* headlines which read: "*sans attendre les pouvoirs spéciaux le gouvernement envoie de nouvelles troupes en Algérie*". 11-12/3/56 (by Gilbert Mathieu).

(53)

A quick reading of the article reveals that the action

consisted essentially in military-related practical decisions and repressive measures being taken (including press censorship -see Chapter 13).

(54)

Le Monde reported that the use of the powers conferred by article 5 (which clearly destroyed the remaining figments of civil liberties) was designed to prevent "irresponsible acts" which could widen the gap between the communities. Nothing about the reforms or the social and economic measures was said in this article, but only matters relating to the constitution of a "task force", characterised by statements such as *résolu à un effort militaire important*, the government will continue to send re-inforcements which would increase the size of French forces, or *on ne s'étonnera donc pas de l'ampleur des mesures annoncées par M. Bourguès-Maunoury* (to acquire, for instance, amongst other equipments, helicopters from Sikorsky and Westland. See *Le Monde*, 17/3/56, p. 1).

A day or two later the paper enumerated the measures that the government had to approve. These included some dealing with social security and nominations by the Minister Resident of a number of "Muslims" to lower echelons of the civil service, new requests made to Prefects to ensure that the administration (especially clerks [*petits fonctionnaires*] since *les humiliations dont se plaignent les Musulmans proviennent souvent des petits fonctionnaires*) should work towards reconciliation -all meaningless measures in social and economic terms.

Other measures involving the security forces were prominent here as well. It was stated that there was no intention of establishing a state of siege in the measures dealing with the restoration of order but there were, however, references to the increased means at the disposal of the military, to troops re-inforcements, a statement that press censorship would not be imposed if there were voluntary discipline. Other items, such as judicial decisions dealing with speeding up judicial procedures and the implementation of sentences (European pressure to carry out death sentences pronounced on Algerians and Algerians' appeals for clemency in the hands of the President) were all put under the heading of *situation générale*.

See *Le Monde*, 18-19/3/56.

The few items relating to social and economic reforms, which were included later, constituted limited and inflated official statements and slogans. See *Le Monde*, 28/3/56.

(55)

Mais, outre que les meilleures réformes risquent, dans le climat actuel de perdre de leurs effets auprès des musulmans... il faudra autant de volonté pour, une fois la sécurité rétablie, faire prévaloir les réformes politiques ou institutionnelles amorcées par le gouvernement.

The fact that there was nothing concrete on the political or institutional front announced in order for the Prime Minister's statement to be implemented was a further indication that these articles could have little importance except for propaganda purposes. See *Le Monde*, 18-19/3/56.

(56)

Such as removing some of the limitations imposed on "Muslims'" access to secondary positions and schools (assuming they were in a position to benefit), and introducing training cen-

tres for civil servants.

(57)

They emphatically did not lead to any sense of equality within society, and would not, in any sense, produce immediate results. Most powers were of a repressive or a military nature and were accompanied by the resignation of the "Muslim" president of the Assembly, amongst others, who had been involved with government policy since 1923. This led the paper to wonder quite justifiably whether more would follow. And more did later on.

(58)

These powers of repression which were quite extensive included the authority to suspend local councillors, to delegate powers to the military, to create military zones and to detain people or assign them to particular areas restricting their movements. With few exceptions, referred to above, all remaining articles dealt with military and police measures increasing the authority of the Governor-General's office and their justification. There was no answer provided to the question framed by the large headlines (were the powers likely to resolve the situation?), but perhaps it was simply a rhetorical one. See *Le Monde*, 20/3/56, pp. 6-7.

(59)

Le Monde, 10/3/56.

(60)

Previously given as being 380,000. See *Le Monde*, 1/3/56, p. 2.

(61)

Le Monde, 10/3/56, p. 2.

(62)

Some were of the opinion that the increase was too much of an effort and a better use of the "fire extinguisher" was needed, while others favoured a better "disposition" of the troops already in the field. *Ibid*.

(63)

He established the need to be around 200,000 men, when the number of those available for recall, the *disponibles* (up to three years after the release of the draftee, recalled by decree by opposition to the draft, which is done by act of Parliament.) could be about 295,000.

The French armed forces were reportedly the third largest in the non-Communist bloc at about 900,000 strong, with North Africa absorbing 38,000 out of 150,000 in the Air force, 14,000 out of 70,000 in the Navy. The land forces had 207,000 men in the mainland, 86,000 in Germany, 61,000 in the T.O.M. and Indochina, 334,000 in North Africa, with 190,000 in Algeria, 100,000 in Morocco and 44,000 in Tunisia. See *Le Monde*, 14/3/56.

(64)

Le Monde, 25-26/3/56.

(65)

After the vote of special powers, there were almost daily articles dealing with increases in the number of troops and recall of reservists. They gave various figures (See *Le Monde*, 30/3/56, 3/4/56, 5/4/56, 6/4/56, 7/4/56, 12/4/56, 13/4/56, 14/4/56 etc.) estimating the number who would be in Algeria before the end of May at over 150,000 men, suggesting the recall would take place the following month on 5 May. See *Le Monde*, 21/4/56.

(66)

Le Monde, 18-19/3/56, p. 1.

(67)

See *Le Monde*, 24/3/56. Lacoste stated that there was "relative détente since the vote", as well as articles by Fauvet and others such as Penchenier in *la chaudière algérienne n'a pas sauté*, *Le Monde*, 23/3/56, pp. 1-5.

The notion of success is only relative, and has to be seen in the light of earlier comments as a morale boosting, patriotic exercise which would undermine hopes of victory by the other side (see also Chapters 4 and 5).

(68)

These included collective sanctions against groups of people and communities to punishment for "crimes" committed by persons unknown, or for a refusal, or sometimes even inability, to "cooperate" with the security forces by giving the names of guilty parties. The authorities also declared designated areas to be prohibited zones, and moved numerous people from area to area, establishing what amounted to detention and concentration camps.

(69)

See below as well as publications such as C. Paillat, *Deuxième Dossier Secret de l'Algérie*, Presses de la Cité, Paris, 1962, P. Vidal-Naquet, *Torture dans la République*, Minuit, Paris, 1972, *L'Affaire Audin*, Minuit, Paris, 1989, *La Raison d'Etat*, Minuit, Paris, 1962, and Arlette Heyman, *Les libertés publiques et la Guerre d'Algérie*, LGDJ, Paris, 1972.

(70)

Although very obvious at an early stage (see Emergency and Special Powers above), this became manifest during the battle of Algiers and generally throughout the country in 1957.

See, for instance, the article of *Le Monde*, 22/1/57, p. 4, which stated that: *Les mesures exceptionnelles ont été maintenues, et les Algérois se sont pliés avec discipline à l'ordre préfectoral de fermer les portes donnant sur la voie publique, pour éviter que des terroristes puissent se réfugier à l'intérieur des immeubles.*

(71)

Reporting that the *Journal Officiel* of 9 February 1957 contained a ministerial decree relating to public transport authorising exceptional measures "necessary for the restoration of order and the safeguard of the territory." See *Le Monde*, 10-11/2/57, p. 3.

(72)

When, for instance, two Algerians were kidnapped and another

one killed in the company of a European (Pierre Chambon), *Le Monde* had no comment to make except for simply reporting that:

A Tlemcen un militaire européen a été tué de 3 balles de pistolet. Les témoins n'ayant pas pu ou voulu fournir les renseignements que leur demandaient les enquêteurs ont été condamnés à une amende collective de 1 million de francs, payables dans les 24 heures.

A pretty harsh measure, considering the circumstances, for punishing silence, let alone sympathies towards the nationalist cause. See *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 6.

(73)

This was part of the policy of anti guerrilla struggle designed to deprive the terrorist ("fish" in revolutionary warfare terminology) from the physical, geographical and social environment, as well as logistic support (the "water") in which they thrive (see also Chapter 5).

(74)

When reporting a new extension of these measures, the paper would explain that the decision taken "prohibits stay or circulation of any person in the area and implies its evacuation within eight days from all persons living therein", recalling occasionally that "the setting up of such zones authorises the forces of order and the air force, in particular, to shoot on sight any person found in the area". See *Le Monde*, 23-24/6/57, p. 6.

(75)

In this kind of reports *Le Monde* shied away from making any assessment of the impact of these measures. In this particular case it stated that:

Il est malaisé de préciser la portée exacte de l'interdiction de circuler dans l'arrondissement de Sidi Bel Abbes.

See *Le Monde*, 23-24/6/57, p. 6.

(76)

It could even be argued at this juncture that *Le Monde* was helping to echo official views and denials against different versions propagated by other sources.

In an article based on "précisions" given by the General Headquarters of General Salan, *Le Monde* stated that a spokesman.

(...) apporte certaines précisions sur les zones interdites du Nord Constantinois en particulier du massif de Collo (East of Algeria), à propos desquels des informations considérées comme inex-actes ont été publiées.

The report obviously elaborated on the fact that some of the area (Djebels south El Milia) had already been a zone interdite, that it had been bombed ten days previously and that the people had already been warned by leaflet.

This and other flimsy reports took no account of illiteracy rates in Algeria and the lack of efficiency of such means in advising and warning the population. They illustrate *Le Monde's* lack of touch, not to say ignorance on the matter, or perhaps complicity in justifying that warnings had been given.

The report further stated that most of the people affected by the evacuation (about 10,000) had been rehoused in surround-

ing villages and in a camp at Ain Kercha. *Le Monde*, 29/6/57, p. 4.

(77)

It commented in small print that it was "known" (*On sait...*, whereas the readers could not possibly know from the paper as there had only been one or two previous references, that of Sidi Bel Abbes above being a case in point) that numerous areas of the kind had been created here and there in Algeria (*un peu partout*) but that, except near the borders, their size was generally small and that:

...leur relief tourmenté empêche de surveiller efficacement, et qui sont pour les fellagas des lieux de passage et de séjour.

As far as that particular area was concerned the paper explained that it was the theatre for several "more or less important" operations, the last of which, conducted exclusively by air, had a <*certain retentissement*>. For the paper, the operations reported the last few days *s'inscrivent donc dans un plan d'ensemble s'échelonnant sur plusieurs mois et visant l'assainissement de cette région difficile* (my emphasis).

(78)

The displacement of about 10,000 people in *Les déplacements de population dans le massif de Collo touchent environ 10.000 personnes*, was given well under half a column of coverage in a report dated 28 June from Algiers. In *Le Monde*, 29/6/57, p. 4.

(79)

This did lead to many cases of human rights abuses by order of the Prime Minister, the Resident-Minister (Lacoste), the prefects and the most subordinate authorities, as well as the military in the field, who were granted the authority to detain suspects indefinitely or to send them to civilian or military tribunals and to commit many other atrocities outlined in this section.

(80)

In *A l'intention des autorités civiles et militaires M. R. Lacoste précise l'application des procédures exceptionnelles en Algérie*. *Le Monde*, 18/4/57, p. 3.

(81)

See *Le Monde*, 23/5/57, p. 1

It must be pointed out that in the discussions that preceded the voting of special powers, *Le Monde's* journalists enquired about the duration of their implementation. They had then established that these powers would automatically lapse eight days after the election of a new administration. See *Le Monde*, 8/3/56. On that occasion the report implied that it was not optional, but compulsory, to request the prolongation of the powers.

For those who had assumed, perhaps on the basis of information previously given in the paper, that these powers would be terminated after the fall of Mollet, *Le Monde* had a surprise. The paper was now stating that this was only a possibility, if the government felt so inclined. But for Algeria, the paper stated that (as far as the prerogatives pertaining to maintaining law and order were concerned) there was no need for a vote in the Assembly to have these powers renewed -a simple request

from the new government, not necessarily followed by a vote, no later than ten days after the investiture was enough. See *Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 7.

Thereafter, the paper reported that Lacoste was returning to Algeria (after a visit to the mainland) to ensure the continuity of the task and echoed most of his statements.

(82)

A number of Frenchmen, aware that the methods used by the forces of order frequently if not invariably led to torture of nationalists involved in the struggle and sometimes of innocent Algerians merely suspected of having nationalist links or sympathies, intervened to help those under threat in the name of religion and that of the teachings of Christ. See Chapters 12 and 13 and various works which have been devoted to the subject: *Cahiers de l'IHTP*, No 9, October 1988, No 10, November 1988, and Hammon, Hervé & Rotman, Patrick, *Les Porteurs de valises: la Résistance française à la guerre d'Algérie*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1979.

(83)

See Hamon, Hervé and Rotman, Patrick, (1979), op. cit.

(84)

Prosecutions were successfully brought against civilians under offences such as threats to the internal or external security of France, demoralisation of the Army as well as membership of banned organisations. Apart from the arsenal of legal measures given to the security forces by the Emergency Law and Special Powers outlined earlier, offences were also dealt with by a law of 29/7/1939 which, with few exceptions, put them under military jurisdiction. Previous to the implementation of those measures in Algeria, such offences were dealt with by the military, as in the Dreyfus Affair (1894), or by civilian authorities according to the 1928 code. See also the State of Emergency and Special Powers already examined above as well as Heymann, Arlette, *Les libertés publiques et la guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, LGDJ, 1972, pp. 67-140.

(85)

Algerian "terrorists" were not the only ones to be tried by the courts in Algeria. Europeans from both sides of the political spectrum were involved as well. There was at least one case of right-wing terrorism with Europeans involved in pushing the army reprisals and position further to the right and even extreme right of the political spectrum. They were known as the *ultras*. The only legal or disciplinary actions taken against them and worth mentioning here were those of the Kovacs group, who tried to assassinate Massu and missed, and the so-called plot by General Faure. See also Chapter 5.

More importantly, a number of left-wing politicians, a number of groups on the left of the political spectrum, were arrested, both in France and Algeria, for their political positions. They were dealt with by the military authorities under the charge of *atteinte à la sûreté extérieure de l'Etat*.

(86)

When it was not dispensed with altogether in the process, the books by military commanders and soldiers, such as Argoud, A., *La décadence, l'imposture et le tragédie*, Fayard, 1974;

Paul Henissart's *Wolves in the City; the death of French Algeria*, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1970; Massu's *Ma bataille d'Alger....* Salan, R., *Mémoires d'Empire*, Presses de la Cité, 1972; Hovette, P., *Capitaine en Algérie*, Presses de la Cité, 1978; Lartéguy, J., *Les Centurions*, and *Les Prétoriens*, Presses de la Cité, 1961, illustrate through recounting their experiences, the reality of the war.

(87)

Professor at the University of Algiers accused of collaborating with the terrorists after writing an article in the "Free Opinion" column of *Le Monde*. See *Le Monde*, 11-12/11/56. He was arrested on 26 November 1956.

(88)

The same thing happened to Marrou. See Chapters 10 and 13.

(89)

He asked those in the press who had an influence on public opinion in Algiers to weigh their responsibilities and, like him, not to interfere with the course of justice by developing "their propaganda and hatred campaigns." He reminded people that an essential condition of the solution of the Algerian problem was a sincere effort of rapprochement between the spiritual families that make up Algeria.

L'Archevêque d'Alger: une condition essentielle de la solution est un effort sincère de rapprochement entre les familles spirituelles qui composent l'Algérie, in *Le Monde*, 1/8/57, p. 4.

A programme of peace and cooperation, it was stated, had been demonstrated by the various religious authorities in September 1955, the Pope, on 13 February 1956 and 21 April 1957, and was more essential now than ever before. *Le Monde* did not feel that it ought to take the defence of those being tried, in the same way as the highest Church authority in Algeria, because of his "respect for Justice" and for the consciences of those standing trial before military tribunals in Algeria, was refusing to commit himself as to whether "errors or imprudences" had been committed. Ibid.

(90)

The comments of the editorial of *L'Echo d'Alger* on the mandement of Monsignor Duval could be found in *Le Monde*, 3/8/57, p. 4.

The Algiers newspaper asked whether it was possible for some "masters of thought" to serve God without working against the motherland and the human ideal that it protects, and pointed out that, as far as rebuilding the country, nobody had said that it could be done without actually basing this reconstruction on the mutual friendship and respect of the communities which "make up its soul". Sarcastically, *L'Echo d'Alger* commented that a "curious ideal" was being served and advised that in order to rebuild the friendship between the two communities the progressive Christians could choose better partners than the "killers and executioners of the FLN."

In *L'Echo d'Alger commente le mandement de Mgr Duval* in *Le Monde*, 3/8/57, p. 4.

(91)

When reproducing news of the arrest of Europeans, *Le Monde* very often used AFP press releases, which invariably described

those arrested as communists and/or terrorists (One report of *Le Monde* referred the readers back to the AFP release dated 27 March; 6 militants ou sympathisants communistes. In fact that day the paper had headed the article, Arrestations à Alger pour recel, malfaiteurs et atteinte sûreté Etat (sic.), 27/3/57, p. 2) and generally gave them labels which would not raise any suspicion for the reader. It was only after receiving letters of protest that the content of the protests was made known to the readers, although the misrepresentation was not rectified. For instance, a letter of RP Pierre de Bosville, protesting against the use of the communist label applied to an "exemplary Christian", the teacher, Robert Malan (Professor at the lycée Ben Aknoun). *Le Monde* wrote that day that M. Jolivet (professeur agrégé de Philosophie) had requested the same correction for Malan and another teacher arrested with him, Lucien Hergot. See *Le Monde*, 28/3/57, p. 2.

Le Monde learned nothing from this and continued to reproduce the same kind of reports (in *Des communistes ou sympathisants et des trafiquants d'explosifs sont arrêtés en Algérie*, *Le Monde*, 14-15/4/57, p. 2.) when the paper wrote that about twenty Europeans belonging to the communist or a progressive milieu were accused of *s'être consultés et organisés afin de diffuser des brochures et des tracts portant atteinte au moral de l'armée*. As we see clearly here, *Le Monde* more readily took the version given by the official authorities as a reliable source, and was thus jumping the gun in being quick to judge by writing in its reports that the author of such an incident had been arrested. "The author of the attack" (attentat) of Ain Témouchent arrested", in *Le Monde*, 14-15/4/57, p. 2.

(92)

The flimsy and flawed sources and terminology could easily be illustrated. News of the arrests, when made public, were given to the readers by *Le Monde*, using the official terminology and versions through the publication of official statements, AFP press releases and information given by military sources.

Le Monde would, for instance, publish an AFP press release stating that "twenty-nine Communists" and a soldier had been arrested under the euphemism of: *se sont vu notifier des mesures d'ordre administratif*, adding, however, that the communiqué stated that "they would be detained in the centres of Lodi and Berrouaghia. See *Le Monde*, 28/11/56, p. 5.

It would not be until the next day, sometimes much later on, that further information was given, revealing that amongst the thirty people arrested there was only one communist, the delegate to the Algerian Assembly, M. Justrabo, as well as two journalists of *Alger Républicain*. See *Le Monde*, 29/11/56, p. 5.

(93)

This was illustrated by the fact that in its reports of military activities, *Le Monde* lost no time in describing the various people arrested as guilty of whatever they were accused of. When the army declared that a network of terrorists had been destroyed, the paper used the same register and words without putting into question the veracity or the accuracy of the incidents described. See, for instance, *Le Monde* 30/1/57, p. 2.

Another example could be found at the time of the arrest by the military authorities of Badèche for being the assassin of A. Froger. *Le Monde* referred to him as such when it reported

that he was under interrogation lasting all night when he had not even been charged. It continued to refer to him as such well into his trial, when it was revealed that his confessions were obtained under duress while in detention and were now being retracted. See *Le Monde* 11/4/57, p. 4 and 29/5/57, p. 3.

A further example of those being convicted in the paper's reports prior to their trial could be found in *Le procès des 37 accusés d'Oran*, in *Le Monde* 28-29/7/57, p. 2, which became that of the 37 *communistes*, with the added information that the accused women had praised Algerian resistance in the next day's headline. *Une inculpée fait l'apologie de la <<résistance algérienne>>* in *Le Monde* 30/7/57, p. 4.

The same applied in many trials in which *Le Monde* itself wrote that the people concerned had actually committed what they were accused of (the Gauthron couple for sheltering Ben Khedda and Melle Nelly Forget for sheltering Raymonde Peschard) in *Le Monde*, 4/4/57, p. 4 -before the people even appeared before the courts and were charged. *Le Monde* 5/4/57, p. 2.

But when the accusation fell apart in the courts, *Le Monde* readjusted its coverage. When reporting on the trial of *Chrétiens progressistes* (see *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 2, 24/7/57, p. 2), the paper ended up by stating that the affair was reduced to more modest proportions, occupying a reduced media coverage, having been exaggerated from the start through a "clumsy journalistic montage" (not of its own making, of course). The paper wrote that the accusations and suspicions against the young Europeans and Muslims had evaporated. It expressed satisfaction that the proceedings had been conducted in an orderly fashion, in contrast with those of the trials of Bouhired and Bouazza. The paper allowed itself to express concern about the fact that *des faits, des accusations, dont l'inconsistance est aujourd'hui officiellement reconnue aient pu trouver crédit*. If some had been cleared of the crimes they were accused of having committed, uncertainty remained as to the fate of some Europeans and "Muslims" denounced as guilty, before any trial had taken place.

(94)

Corrections often only came with hindsight. See *Le Monde*, 23 & 24/7/57, p. 2, 25/7/57 p. 1, 12/7/57, p. 4 and 2/3/58/p. 2.

(95)

A different page arrangement "Faits divers", for instance, for if these were really considered as criminals why shouldn't they be there?

(96)

The combination of attentats and arrests could be found in various articles of *Le Monde*, 23/3/57, p. 2, terrorism, death sentences and further trials 30/3/57, p. 6, terrorist acts, arrests and death sentences executions, 24/5/57, p. 3, 3/8/57, p. 4, 4-5/8/57, p. 3, 8/8/57, p. 4, 11-12/8/57, p. 3, 13/8/57, p. 7, 8/1/58, p. 5, 9/1/58, p. 4. Other combinations included high rebel losses and arrests, *Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 3, and higher rebel numbers and Moroccan help. *Le Monde*, 24/5/57, p. 1.

(97)

It was argued that if these had been available in France in the past, they would have avoided "deplorable errors", that the presence of three civilian judges was enough to safeguard the freedom of the individuals and their liberties.

In its article, signed M.O., *Le Monde* wondered with M Patin, whether it would not be better if the trial of offenders guilty of crimes against the state were dealt with entirely by military tribunals. Agreeing with M Patin, the paper seemed to think that the system was safe enough to protect the interests of the individual, even though the opposite could be argued as the neutrality of the military judges was taken for granted when in fact they were trying their enemies.

The proposals to get civilian judges involved at the investigative stage, put forward here, was only designed to fulfill the military's expectations for their burden to be made lighter and their desire not to become too involved as well as to prevent inconsistencies. The arguments developed by Patin, in *Recueil de Droit Pénal*, arguing in favour of putting the military in charge of the procedure relating to offences against the security of the state, were shared by *Le Monde*. The paper echoed his ideas and concluded that his comments would be "attentively examined". In *La répression des atteintes à la sûreté extérieure de l'Etat doit-elle être confiée intégralement aux tribunaux militaires?*. See *Le Monde*, 25/10/56.

The paper never questioned in any way whether the action fitted the crime, whether this was a criminal or a political matter, the expression of a political opinion or an actual crime committed against the state.

It was also obvious in the case discussed that, given the court's composition, the system allowed for conviction and sentencing which could be easily achieved by the six military judges over the three civilian ones. All were valid arguments which could be easily used to undermine the idea that the system was safe enough to protect the interests of the individual.

(98)

Some of the trials reported involved some of the most "faithful friends" of France and staunchest allies of the system which ended in convictions that were very tenuous indeed; the Bachagha Boutaleb was accused of hiding bombs (hidden in the wall in his absence) and for having had contacts with FLN leaders, which, he claimed, were made with the full knowledge of the authorities. Although it did not seem contested at all, by the authorities in Algeria as well as several personalities, that this was indeed the case, *Le Monde* did not seem to think it worthwhile offering a comment, let alone arguing his case. See *Le Monde*, 28/6/57, p. 7.

But despite being cleared of "possession of explosives", the bachagha was sent down for 10 years (*Le Monde*, 5/7/57, p. 4) for holding contacts with an "association of miscreants." *Le Monde's* assessment was that this showed an "attempt to discourage even those who, under the cover of high authorities (Lacoste), would interpose themselves for negotiation". The only comment the paper made was to ask whether the Minister-Resident had indeed authorised the contact. *Le Monde*, 5/7/57, p. 4.

(99)

Le Monde never saw fit to ask questions about the number of arrests concerning women (5/4/57, p. 2 & 27/4/57), doctors (26/3/57, p. 6), intellectuals (24-25/3/57, p. 3), professors (17/4/57, p. 4), lawyers (19/4/57 & 24/4/57), Communists (19/4/57, p. 4), and even former army officers (19/4/57, p. 4 & 23/4/57, p. 2) which, perhaps, should have led the paper to express concern for the measures being implemented. If the

measures and the arrests were not being questioned, one would have expected the paper to wonder at least about what was leading to the arrest of so many people, who are usually not associated with the criminal layer of society but more with its most respectable few.

(100)

See the case outlined above, footnote 93.

(101)

Only one European, M.Coudre, was given a non-suspended sentence of two years and all the others were acquitted or received suspended sentences, while most of the Algerians received between one and ten years' jail sentences. See below.

(102)

This was done despite the acknowledged violent criticism of the lawyers and their pleas to the judges, describing the image of solidarity between the members of two different communities as "tomorrow's Algeria", being reported.

Discussing the trials and the subsequent sentences, *Le Monde* wrote that the accused would have liked the serene atmosphere of the proceedings and the efforts made to clear the Catholics of the accusations against them to have benefitted their Muslim friends, but the difference, the paper commented, was that:

Mais, alors que les uns avaient seulement obéi à leur souci de préserver la fraternité scellée dans les bidonvilles. Les autres avaient choisi délibérément de porter atteinte à l'intégrité du territoire. Ils ont d'ailleurs, en fin d'audience, fait de solennelles professions de foi FLN.

Bernard Poirot-Delpech in *Le Monde*, 25/7/57, p. 2.

(103)

Le Monde, 25/7/57, p. 2. Many of the trials reported were to end with very heavy sentences including many death penalties. But they received far less significant coverage than, for instance, the death sentences in Hungary which were highlighted. When reporting the news of the death sentence of Moseff Petrus, rebellion leader in the Pecs uprising (South West of Hungary) the previous March, *Le Monde* added that, according to Dunantuli Naplo, 21 accomplices were sentenced to up to 15 years. In *Les condamnations à mort continuent en Hongrie*, *Le Monde*, 1/7/57, p. 6.

The latter article was in bold characters (dark ink) and spread over two columns, while reports of "Algerian" executions and death sentences were given a few lines. See, for instance, news of the sentence to death of "five terrorists" in *Le Monde*, 20-21/1/57, p. 4, and news of two sentenced to death in Algiers, *Le Monde*, 8/5/57, p. 4.

(104)

With very much a low profile (*Le Monde*, 27/4/57, p. 4). Badeche's lawyer, Me Gisele Halimi, was not acceptable to the court and not acknowledged as a registered lawyer by the presiding magistrate despite being registered (it was pointed out in a footnote that she had been registered). See *Le Monde*,

27/4/57. The paper did publish, however, the subsequent complaint by William Thorp against the procedure. See *Le Monde*, 9/5/57, p. 6.

(105)

Les droits de la défense en Algérie, in *Le Monde*, 28/6/57, p. 7. There were also protests by a M.Thorp (*Le bâtonnier Thorp proteste auprès de M.Coty contre l'internement des avocats d'Algérie*, stating that he was "against measures -l'internement administratif- taken against lawyers practising in Algeria), and by left-wing organisations (*ainsi que la Nouvelle Gauche contre ...inculpations de plus en plus nombreuses dont font l'objet les démocrates français qui préconisent une solution pacifique du problème algérien par la négociation et la reconnaissance du fait national algérien... proteste contre ... multiples entraves apportées au droits de la défense en Algérie et notamment contre l'arrestation systématique des avocats défenseurs des militants algériens*). In *Le Monde*, 28/2/57.

More technical difficulties were also put in the way of those being tried, and *Le Monde* reported complaints sent to it about lawyers unable to see their clients (*Trois avocats se plaignent de ne pouvoir défendre leurs clients -including J.Verges- in Le Monde, 8/8/57, p. 4*) or irregularities of the trials themselves. There were some complaints of irregularity by defence lawyers dating from the previous year, 26/11/56.

The number of similar incidents reported was also high at other times but there was hardly any comment. See *Le Monde*, 13/7/57, p. 5, 2/3/58, p. 2.

(106)

See *Le Monde*, 14/2/57 and 27/4/57, p. 4.

(107)

This was the time when people such as J.Verges became known for standing up and criticising the judicial system. This no doubt sowed the seeds to the most controversial career which led to this lawyer's fame/notoriety. The paper reported that J.Verges had written to Capitant to protest that his client, Djemila Bouhired, had been kidnapped by the paratroopers and neither he, nor her family, were able to contact her. This was reported by *Le Monde* (23/4/57, p. 2).

(108)

Except in statements of politicians or outsiders to the paper.

(109)

See *Le Monde*, 8/2/57, p. 2 and also below (Chapter 13).

(110)

See *Le Monde*, 5/4/57, p. 2.

(111)

34 européens et 12 musulmans devant le tribunal militaire à Alger et à Oran, in *Le Monde*, 27/7/57, p. 2. But the paper chose to headline on the themes or statement of the Prosecution (*Au procès des 37 accusés d'Oran il ne s'agit pas de savoir s'il y a eu ou non des sévices mais si les procès verbaux sont vrais ou faux affirme le commissaire du gouvernement - report from special correspondent*) and not on the prosecutors' methods, such as his use of a photograph out of a newspaper showing a

terrorists' victim (with no relation to the case). The paper did not exhibit a strong interest in finding out whether detainees had indeed been subjected to inhuman treatment. *Le Monde*, 28-29/7/57, p. 2.

In a similar case, on the basis of reports of trials from its correspondent, *Le Monde* chose to headline items such as the remarks made by the Substitut Bosquet *Nous ne sommes pas ici pour juger Sainte Evelyne, martyre, mais Evelyne Lavalette, complice des rebelles*. When the defendant maintained her accusations of mistreatment against the police, the paper highlighted the response of the President of the court to another defendant's complaints of injustices she had always suffered from, which was that the injustices that she seemed to have suffered from did not prevent her from gaining her Baccalauréat and access to the University. In *Le Monde*, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.

(112)

Le Monde, 22/2/57, p. 4.

(113)

There were even clear cases of miscarriages of justice when death sentences were pronounced and carried out on people who later appeared to be innocent. *Le Monde* reported, on the basis of an AFP release, the trial and death sentence (11/4/57 and 13/4/57) of M. Amédée Froger's "assassin", stating that he had claimed that he was innocent and that the statement of his previous admission had been extracted under duress, adding that no witness for the prosecution had recognised him but that two witnesses presented for the defence had clearly identified him.

The paper reported later on the submission of his appeal and its rejection in *Le Monde*, 13/4/57, 23/4/57, 27/4/57, p. 4.

(114)

Fernand Iveton believed in the struggle (with the "Muslims") of Algeria to free the country from the colonialist domination. He was arrested (13/11/56) for putting an explosive device in the gas plant where he worked and he was tried by a military tribunal, which sentenced him to death despite his repeated claims that the device was not designed to maim anybody as it was set to go off at a time when it could only result in damage to the installations. Despite the defence's claim that it did not have time to study the case properly and that the atmosphere of that time could not be conducive to a fair trial, *Le Monde's* comments was that the death verdict (25/11/56) had been warmly applauded by the large audience (report cabled from Algiers on 26 November 1956 by special correspondent, in *Le Monde* 27/11/56). Further information was given about the devices used in *Le Monde*, 30/1/57, p. 2.

When he was executed, with two other "terrorists", the paper seemed to have forgotten it was an attempt to blow up an uninhabited gas plant as it stated that he had been sentenced to death for *tentative de destruction, à l'aide d'explosifs, d'édifices servant à usage d'habitation*. The report was dated 9 February and published by *Le Monde*, 12/2/57, p. 3.

See also Jean-Luc Einaudi, *Pour l'Exemple: l'affaire Fernand Iveton*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1986,

(115)

However *Le Monde* did echo some protests and appeals by third parties, such as the one made by the *Comité pour l'amnistie des condamnés politiques d'Outre-Mer*. This was done through its president, Louis Massignon, who addressed a letter to the President of the Republic: *adjurant devant la menace de la recrudescence d'exécutions capitales en Algérie <de ne prendre conseil que des exemples de noblesse et de grandeur que la France a donné au monde>*. This request was said to have been then passed on by M. Coty to the *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature*. See *Le Monde*, 21-22/7/57, p. 2. There was another very small article of about 12 lines, including the title in small print: *Un appel contre les exécutions capitales*.

(116)

For instance, Me Yves Dechezelles wrote to *France-Observateur* wondering whether appeals for clemency had any point at all when executions were being carried out despite a considerable element of doubt remaining with some of the convictions. The lawyer also explained that executions were carried out even if the intended victims of the "terrorists" were not killed. Expressing the view that political motives were not at all taken into consideration, he also wondered whether he should not turn down requests for defence from clients because he was not able to ensure that they would be properly defended. Although *Le Monde* was not the paper in which these requests were made, it has to be pointed out that the paper did include them in its coverage, thereby informing its readers of their existence. See *Le recours en grâce a-t-il encore une signification pour les condamnés à mort algériens? demande un avocat parisien dans France-Observateur* (2/8/57, p. 4).

The paper reproduced leaflets from the FLN for the attention of the same readers threatening reprisals if the French authorities went ahead with the executions. See *Le Monde*, 2/8/57, p. 4.

(117)

Changes in the justice system in Algeria giving powers to Army officers were hardly commented upon. See *Les pouvoirs de justice militaire sont modifiés en Algérie* (Modification of 22/12/53 decree). In *Le Monde*, 3/4/57/3, p. 3.

(118)

See *Le Monde*, 2/3/57.

(119)

Le Monde published a supportive article (2/4/57, p. 1) in which Maurice Garçon (de l'Académie) concluded overall that: *La réforme proposée est heureuse. Il faut souhaiter qu'elle intervienne vite.*

But he insisted on the sanctity of individual civil liberties.

Si la détention préventive se justifie parfois, la liberté d'un inculpé qui n'a pas été condamné doit être la règle. Jamais on ne doit avoir plus de scrupules que lorsqu'il s'agit du respect de la liberté individuelle. Il faut, pour prendre une décision aussi importante qu'une détention, avant qu'une décision judiciaire ait prononcé une condamnation, avoir lu les pièces du dossier, avoir estimé la valeur des présomptions ou des preuves, n'avoir

rien négligé pour éviter l'arbitraire. Quand on sait le nombre d'affaires qui sont souvent expédiées en une journée il est évident que l'examen ne peut être que superficiel. Du moins la présence d'un défenseur portant contradiction au ministère public permettrait d'avoir la certitude que la cour n'aura pas ignoré l'essentiel des arguments.

When the deputies started debating the project, *Le Monde* echoed the various arguments put forward which depicted the proposals as a vast improvement of the system (in *Les députés ont entrepris la réforme du code d'instruction pénale*, *Le Monde*, 22/6/57, p. 7) and some (noticeably fewer though) even opposing them and putting arguments against.

(120)

In an article, in which he contended that for seventy years, the Third Republic resisted *aux assauts conjugués de ceux qui voulaient l'entraîner dans les chemins de l'arbitraire et qui ont enfin réussi dans leur entreprise... cette nuit-là, on était pressé.*

He also objected to the rush with which things were expedited:

La discussion portait sur un sujet de maigre importance: il ne s'agissait que de porter atteinte à nos libertés publiques et privées, comme l'a fort bien fait observer le président de l'Assemblée. (JO. P2993)

The latter was quoted as saying:

<<Nous n'avons aucune raison de nous éterniser sur eux [certains articles], sinon nous serons encore là demain matin >>

Maurice Garçon then mocked the self-satisfied mood of the deputies who made torture and arbitrary measures legal, putting the clock back a hundred years.

On déblayait.. les congratulations de nos élus se comprennent si l'on peut tirer un sujet d'orgueil d'avoir, en quelques heures, consacré l'arbitraire et réglementé la torture. C'est plus d'un siècle de recul....

See *Une mauvaise loi* by Maurice Garçon, de l'Académie, in *Le Monde*, 4/7/57, pp. 1-4.

For him the text legalised a practice, hitherto irregular and dangerous, as nobody could be arrested without a judge's warrant. Now, he argued unjust presumptions sufficed, especially with the notion of *flagrante delicto* being loosely interpreted, and abuse of the law becoming a matter of fact, thus legitimised (with the deformation of article 307 of the law of 20 May 1904, which enables detention to allow for appearance before a judge within twenty-four hours when distance does not allow a swift presentation to the judge).

He seemed quite upset by the fact that the deadline of 24 hours could then be extended and in fact the suspect, presumed but not necessarily guilty, was then subject to arbitrary rules, tacitly abrogating thereby the 1897 Law.

(121)

By important people like R. Schumann.

(122)

On croit rêver...gouvernements font l'éloge de la contrainte dans les interrogatoires des justiciables. On n'en est pas à la reconnaissance de la question de l'eau ou des brodequins, mais on rétablit officiellement ce qu'au XVI siècle on appelait la torture insomniæ prônée en particulier par l'inquisiteur Boguet, qui prescrivait d'interroger <<sans discontinuation.>>

On pouvait espérer ne plus revoir ces horreurs et voilà qu'elles acquièrent force de loi. A ceux qui disent, pour excuser ce retour à une procédure depuis longtemps abolie, que la gravité de certains crimes justifie tous les moyens de coercition.

He found it hard and painful to go that far back to remind the IV Republic of fundamental principles that the IIIrd had respected. If what he was attempting to say had little chance of changing the outcome on the text passed on to the Second Chamber, he would have at least done his duty of reminding the French of their principles which, in his view, they were not intent on renouncing (he could not accept that they were).
M.Garçon (Académie française) in *Le Monde*, 4/7/57.

(123)

See the case of Iveton above.

(124)

Equivalent to thought of the day, *La balance et le couteau*, in *Le Monde* (7/2/58, p. 1), in which he stated:

Eh bien, non; si le jugement de Nancy a provoqué un malaise salutaire, ce n'est pas parce qu'un misérable a échappé à la mort judiciaire, c'est parce que d'autres misérables, moins coupables peut-être, risquent toujours d'être légalement tués.....

His criticism was directed against French civilisation itself but also the French nation's attachment to an idea of justice equated with a "pint of bad blood", the "nauseating" thought of which, he remarked, most of the other people of the world had shied away from.

Sans doute ce peuple français dont le fameux sens exige, paraît-il, sa pinte de mauvais sang des mains du bourreau, sans doute notre peuple est-il un des derniers au monde à boire de cette justice-là. La plupart des autres s'en sont détournés avec la nausée.. [parce que non tenu] par la rigueur de la logique nationale, non moins fameuse de bon sens, et dont la belle, noble et décisive formule de nous être donnée en plein prétoire: <<un cadavre contre un autre: c'est la logique.>>.

(125)

Yves Florenne in *Le Monde*, 7/2/58, p. 1.

(126)

For instance, those sent to the Lodi and Berrouaghia camps. See *Le Monde*, 22/1/57, p. 4.

(127)

Le Monde never stopped to think and ask the question of why

so many people, including those of European origin, were being arrested by the Army and these included lawyers as well as male and female doctors. See *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 6, 30/3/57, p. 6, and various arguments developed and cases cited throughout.

(128)

Pour la première fois dans l'histoire de la République, un gouvernement a demandé au Parlement, hormis le temps de guerre étrangère, le droit d'ouvrir des camps de concentration en France pour y enfermer des Français.

Les Camps by M. Duverger, *Le Monde*, 20/7/57, p. 1.

(129)

He thought at first glance that there was a justification put before the Assembly when he evoked the precedents of the decrees of August and October 1944, but pointed out that France had not been liberated then.

(130)

The instigators and their accomplices were a job for the police and the judges, he argued, and if they were too few, let their number be increased; if the sanctions pronounced by judges, bound by the penal code, were not sufficient then let the code be changed.

(131)

The latter, without control or guarantees, would then lock him up in a concentration camp where it would be very easy to maintain an efficient repression, removed from under the supervision of the law, basis of democracy and civilised society.

On peut assez facilement imaginer une répression efficace qui maintienne le contrôle des magistrats, la garantie de la procédure judiciaire et tout cet ensemble de règles qui sont à la base même de la démocratie et de la civilisation de l'Occident.

(132)

Concluding that the average citizen would feel very strongly the impact of that decision, and quite rightly so. "The vote of Parliament might well seal its own fate" (*Le vote de chaque député engage aussi le sien et celui de tous les Français*, in *Les Camps*, *Le Monde*, 20/7/57, p. 1), Duverger stated:

Qu'on ne s'y trompe pas; les camps de concentration ne sont pas seulement une institution matérielle. Comme la bombe, comme les tortures, ils ont pris une signification symbolique. On ne peut pas transiger avec eux. Accepter leur principe même en l'entourant de restrictions aussi précises que possible, même en limitant son application, c'est, en un certain sens, franchir la ligne de démarcation qui sépare la démocratie de la dictature.

(133)

A year after the adoption of special powers in Algeria,

while the Governor-General remained in post, France had a new Prime Minister, M. Bourguès-Maunoury -yet nothing had been resolved in Algeria. On the contrary, "terrorism" had become commonplace in the cities (the best example being the battle of Algiers) and the countryside, and was spilling over onto the mainland (where the targeted victims consisted only of security forces and rival nationalist groups and their sympathisers). Under the spread of the terrorist threat, there was talk of extending special powers and many restrictions (previously taken against Algerians in Algeria) to mainland France. See also above.

(134)

The paper pointed out the "unusual character" of this measure. While highlighting the contradiction with article 2 (no distinction of race, creed, religion, thought) and article 7 (equal protection under the law) of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the paper pointed out that discrimination based on the place of birth, even if one conceded the need for repression of terrorist activities, would give rise to serious difficulties as far as the Europeans were concerned. In Algeria the "renewal" was done as a matter of course. In *La reconduction des pouvoirs spéciaux de police en Algérie n'exige pas un nouveau vote du parlement*, *Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 7.

It was obviously not a matter of wanting to extend these measures to "Algerian" inhabitants of European origin. Even if it were applicable, their number was negligible, as only a few were involved if any at all (a few left-wingers and intellectuals). The modification was blatantly designed to get at Algerians in France, who had the knowledge, the money or the friends that could help them safely claim protection (under the law in France) against breaches of human rights when possible and escape French "emergency" justice. See *Le Monde*, 23-24/6/57, p. 1.

(135)

And it was very much people such as Léon Lyon-Caen, premier président honoraire de la Cour de cassation, who hammered the nail in when he saw the attempt of extending the powers to France as an open door to abuse and arbitrary powers by the administration. In *L'extension des pouvoirs spéciaux: voie ouverte à l'arbitraire administratif*, *Le Monde*, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3. See also below.

(136)

Which requested that the "assigned" persons should be able to see their lawyer within five days. *Le Monde*, 15/5/57, p. 4.

This was followed by further protests by the League for Human Rights against the extension of the powers to France, violation of the citizens' constitutional right of equality against a form of racism which might be different from Vichy's but "as odious in its spirit", arguing that anybody voting for the measure would accept to substitute *la règle du bon plaisir policier* to the Rights of Man and liberties proclaimed by the Universal Declaration and to the republican regime. In *La Ligue des droits de l'homme proteste contre l'extension des pouvoirs spéciaux*, *Le Monde*, 28/6/57, p. 7.

The organisation also made a case against phone tapping, in *Le Monde*, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3.

Other protests reported included some newspapers which did not accept the introduction of the system to France:

- *Franc-Tireur* which found the measure unjustifiable, contrary to the declaration of the Rights of Man and the preamble to the 1946 Constitution and asked Parliamentarians to oppose it (*Le Monde*, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3).

- *La Croix* expressed concern for Maunoury's policy of "blancs-seings" (lettres de cachet), especially at times of Parliamentary recess, which provided for the arrest of any Algerians, be they a "Maréchal de France", and concluded that either a normal regime be introduced in Algeria or an abnormal system be more and more implemented to the mass of Frenchmen who would find, *faute de mieux*, equality in submission (Reported by *Le Monde*, 26/6/57, p. 6).

(137)

A lawyer, who argued against the measures the day before. See *Le Monde*, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3.

(138)

For Léon Lyon-Caen, the measure was incompatible with the principle of equality before the law for the Muslims, made French citizens since the Statutes of 1947, contrary to article 3 (section 1) of the Civil Code and articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. He also dealt (point 3) with different discriminations based on the place of birth and their contradictions, adding (point 4) that the consequences of the project should not be hidden as all the measures taken in Algeria (*assignations à résidence, internement administratif dans des camps de concentration, interdiction de séjour prononcée par l'autorité préfectorale, perquisitions à domicile de jour et de nuit, réquisitions de personnes en vue d'un travail forcé, interdiction de réunion*), "denounced for years" as being in breach of fundamental civil liberties, justified by Parliament and government claiming exceptional circumstances, would cause serious troubles if extended to France.

(139)

Like the "comical" round-about way (*détour*) used in September 1955, when hundreds of Algerians who had jobs and families in France were arrested under fictitious charges and transferred to Algiers where they were freed, only to be arrested again and put in camps at Lodi and Berrouaghia.

NB. It is worth noting here that *Le Monde's* readers always seemed to find out about events a long time after the event.

(140)

Léon Lyon-Caen on *L'Extension des pouvoirs spéciaux*, in *Le Monde*, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3. The same day Duverger was giving the government a hundred days to act.

(141)

A lawyer and member of the French Académie. in *De L'Arbitraire*, article published by *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, pp. 1-6.

(142)

Which then become relevant only for the purpose of critical history to illustrate that:

il est rare qu'on ne constate pas que non seulement elles n'ont été que d'assez misérables expédients, mais encore -ce qui est plus grave-

qu'elles ont été inefficaces et n'ont servi, en faisant des martyrs, qu'à renforcer le développement des opinions ou des doctrines subversives qu'on avait pour dessein d'étouffer.

Drawing from examples in Roman history and accepting the notion of "defence of the country in danger", he argued that when coercive arbitrary measures were taken they were used to deal with offences that had more to do with freedom of conscience (of someone) seen as subversive; they could lead to abuse and constituted an easy way of getting rid of "contradictors" by interning them without having to give a motive or provide safeguards.

Garçon showed his dislike of the Ancien Régime's system of "lettres de cachet", which, people thought, were only quite "useful innocent vexations for maintaining good spirits and often peace between families", which even Louis XVI, "who did not know much about anything", thought needed changing. The Constitution of September 1791 solved the problem by declaring *que nul homme ne pourrait être arrêté ou détenu que dans les cas déterminés par la loi et dans les formes qu'elles a prescrites. Un principe essentiel était posé, et le problème était tel qu'on pouvait penser la question définitivement liquidée. On ne faisait d'ailleurs qu'imiter l'Angleterre, où, depuis Charles II les citoyens étaient protégés par l'habeas corpus.*

He then looked at various other times of French history when, despite the abolition of arbitrary measures, infringements of civil liberties were committed until 1st June 1946, after the end of the War when this practice was abandoned.

Dwelling so much on the past was for Garçon only a way "to sound the alarm against the present return of vicious practices likely to discredit our regime."

Ibid.

(143)

Ibid.

The nature of the repressive measures adopted could clearly be seen through the reading of the article:

La loi du 3 avril 1955 instituant l'état d'urgence en Algérie a permis au gouvernement général de prononcer <<l'assignation à résidence>>, dans une localité déterminée, des personnes dont l'activité s'avère dangereuse pour la sécurité et l'ordre publics, mais en précisant qu'en aucun cas l'assignation à résidence ne pourrait avoir pour effet la création de camps de détention. Il était d'ailleurs institué en même temps une commission de contrôle et la possibilité d'un recours pour excès de pouvoir. Un an plus tard, le 16 mars 1956, une loi complémentaire a permis au gouverneur de prendre toute mesure exceptionnelle en vue du rétablissement de l'ordre en précisant toutefois que, si les mesures envisagées devaient avoir pour effet de modifier la législation, elles seraient prises par décret en conseil des ministres. Il est évident que les détentions arbitraires modifient la législation. C'est pourquoi un décret pris en conseil des ministres le lendemain, 17 mars 1956, autorisa le gouverneur général à assigner à résidence, surveillée ou non, toute personne dont l'activité s'avère

dangereuse, avec l'obligation pour le gouvernement d'assurer sa subsistance et son hébergement. Un dernier décret du 19 janvier 1957 a enfin permis de suspendre le paiement des arrérages de toutes pensions civiles ou militaires dues par l'Etat aux individus réputés arbitrairement dangereux pour la sécurité ou l'ordre public.

On remarquera que la formule <<assignation à résidence>> veut dire qu'il s'agit d'une mesure d'éloignement, mais comme le gouvernement doit pourvoir à l'hébergement il a été immédiatement créé des camps de concentration où on a entassé de prétendus suspects en leur imposant des conditions de vie particulièrement rigoureuses. L'astreinte à résidence surveillée s'est transformée en détention sur simple arrêté non motivé. Ceux qui sont ainsi frappés ne sont pas seulement privés de liberté mais encore ils ne peuvent recevoir les visites de leurs familles que très parcimonieusement. La pension des mutilés de guerre est supprimée et il ne leur est permis, d'ailleurs rarement, de se confier à un défenseur, qu'en présence d'un surveillant, ce qui n'est pas imaginable, même lorsqu'il s'agit des pires criminels de droit commun.

(144)

See *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, pp. 1-6.

The various protest led to a major rethink by government policy makers with considerable changes and modifications brought to the policies.

Le gouvernement prépare une lettre rectificative des Pouvoirs spéciaux. In *Le Monde*, 7-8/7/57, p. 2.

(145)

In *Le projet sur l'extension des pouvoirs spéciaux rencontre une sérieuse opposition à l'Assemblée*. J. Fauvet, *Le Monde*, 11/7/57, p. 1.

(146)

It seemed highly unlikely that anybody convicted on those charges would be freed before their sentence had been served and the measures on preventive detention would have given the authorities unlimited powers. Yet, once again, we see legislation, which was very harsh and exceptional, which made a mockery of civil liberty and individual freedom, disguised under the cloak of necessity.

The measure also suspended section 2 of article 113 of the Criminal Instruction Code limiting to 5 days' detention those likely to be sentenced for less than two years, and allowing for the possibility of searching the premises of people considered dangerous at any time of the day or night.

The measures being introduced were being put forward as normal, legitimate and justified, even if the criticisms levelled by other personalities and political parties were reported. See *Le Monde*, 11/7/57, p. 4.

(147)

At the time of the renewal of the Special powers and their extension, with modification to the mainland, *Le Monde* was explaining the *volonté de modération* was appreciated by deputies and reporting that Maunoury was applauded when he promised

1
to table the *loi cadre* project in the near future. One could tell from the speeches reported on the "Muslims" side that the discourse of *Le Monde* did not reflect the real story. It was still giving an optimistic picture when there were dire negative signs. Almost every Algerian, even the least revolutionary, was in favour of independence.

From the other report of the speech by Ben Habyles (one of the rare Muslims still seen at the Senate -Luxembourg-, who was merely reported as having made a "curious" appeal to de Gaulle and "provoked some emotion with his request for independence", thus rejoining the line defended by F.Abbas), it can be clearly stated that even the elected representatives, who were most "helpful" to the French authorities and institutions, had, by that time, given up on French politicians in power and were condemning French policy and asking for independence. These people, often promoted to office/"elected" with the help of the authorities, who were the least revolutionary and who had always collaborated, had seen fit by then to state that nothing short of independence would do; and considered government policy as an *engrenage fatal*.

Les baillons et les menottes, dit-il, ne peuvent rien donner sur cette terre de liberté qu'est la France. Les mesures militaires les plus draconiennes -même assorties de promesses- sont incapables de venir à bout d'une insurrection nationale. Pour rétablir la paix, il faut d'autres méthodes. "Si je suis à cette tribune -et c'est peut-être la dernière fois- ce n'est pas pour y semer la haine, ajoute l'orateur,; mais comment croire qu'une solution de sagesse pourra prévaloir tant que régnera cet infernal colonialisme?"

The senator of Constantine continued, referring to the views expressed by F.Abbas:

c'est de la France que l'Algérie voudrait tenir son indépendance, bienfait suprême. Il n'est pas d'Algérien pour désirer l'abaissement de la France... il n'est plus qu'un homme en France qui puisse engager la négociation à laquelle je songe c'est le général de Gaulle.

See *Le Monde*, 27/7/57, p. 2.

But his proposals were presented as not being accepted from the replies given in the debate (for instance, "a priori independence refused", "suggestion coming from abroad", "the man had sat long enough on the Senate benches not to think seriously that his reproaches had any basis", as well as various other contributions indicating that these measures were the minimum, and were quite legitimate (see report by Bernard Faucogney in *Le Monde*, 27/7/57, p. 2). The measures he was opposing were passed by a clear majority. *Le Monde* reported that the project (Special powers) was adopted by 269 votes against 25.

It was obvious that even when echoing these views of the odd remaining Algerian parliamentarian, *Le Monde* was also highlighting the views and responses of the French Premier Bourgès-Maunoury, and denying that any spirit of colonialism had motivated government policy:

aucun esprit de colonialisme n'a jamais animé les gouvernements français et la présence de M.Benhabyles ici-même fait justice de ses accusations de racisme.

See *Le Monde*, 27/7/57, p. 2.

Other politicians made declarations stating that anti-ter-

rorist forces had been successful and would not be diverted from their purpose, that the measures would only affect individuals previously convicted, explaining the government's attachment to traditional liberties and that "our scruples" did not prevent the task ahead, the promise of the "loi cadre" and a "new Algeria". Ibid.

(148)

From the reports of the police in Paris, terrorist activities were not as serious as one might have expected. These reports did not totally square with the requests for the extension of the special powers in France and made the official claims here, like they had been in Algeria, rather dubious.

The activities of the police were defended by a Commissioner, given the opportunity to have his letter printed in the Correspondence section (there appeared an article under the title of *Un commissaire de la sûreté répond aux attaques dont la police fait l'objet*, in *Le Monde*, 20/7/57, p. 3.)

(149)

Le Monde published the statements of the Police prefect of the Seine:

Faisant le bilan de l'action répressive de ses services: Il est excessif de parler de terrorisme nord africain à Paris déclare le préfet de police. Le Monde, 26/7/57, p. 2.

(150)

He listed 174 attacks in the first 6 months of 1957, in which 173 "Français musulmans" had been killed, and stated that there were only 8 to 10 revolvers available. Some were handed in to the authorities, some hidden in caches which had been discovered.

Génébrier also stated that the 8.000 Moroccans and 3.000 Tunisians were not involved in agitation and gave the number of "Muslims" of Algeria as being 120.000, almost all men, making Paris the highest male populated city, when Algiers had only 180,000 inhabitants, including women and children.

(151)

The préfet, M. Génébrier, denied any Arab pogrom in police activities which he said:

tend à faire, pour séparer le bon grain de l'ivraie, non pas la <<chasse aux faciès>>, comme on l'a affirmé, mais à protéger les travailleurs honnêtes contre des agitateurs politiques.

M. Génébrier also stated that night squads (called *brigades de nuit dite des agressions et violences*), created in 1953 and put in charge of repressing attacks on "French Muslims", had seen their number increase. He added that there was a system of surveillance criss-crossing (quadrillage) the capital with important means at its disposal, over the whole of the Seine department. These had given positive results: 14,894 people taken to police stations for identity verifications, 4,600 arrests for crimes (*délit droit commun*), 574 for politically motivated crimes (*délit et crimes à motif politique*) including 47 murders and attempted murders, 117 for *atteinte à la sûreté de l'état et reconstitution de ligue dissoute*, 410 for arms offences. To that, he added, that hotels were systematically visited and 48 cafés had been closed down.

He stated that the "brigades" were said to be doing a reasonable job, that their numbers had been doubled but he did not

reject the idea that the extension of special powers could be helpful. See *Le Monde*, 26/7/57, p. 2.

A further question to be asked would be why were these people still being called North Africans when most, if not all, of them were Algerians, since Morocco and Tunisia had been independent since 1956. See also Chapter 7.

CHAPTER TWELVE: NOTES

(1)

The uprising, which seemed to have been timed to coincide with the second commemoration of the deposition of the Sultan in Morocco, resulted in the deaths of European civilians and subsequent reprisals, similar in their intensity only to those of 1945, and to those previous attempts by the colonising nation to subdue uprisings and revolts, that marked over a hundred years' history of French occupation. See also Chapter 3.

(2)

123 people in total were killed amongst whom there were 71 Europeans. See Guérin, Daniel, *Ci-git le colonialisme*, Mouton, Paris, 1973, pp. 69-70.

(3)

Several possible explanations could be ventured for the delay. Most of the journalists could have been on holiday as it was near the end of August and the paper could not cope with the journalists at hand. Or, perhaps less inclined towards sensationalism, the paper may have waited for a while, reserving its reports and judgements until it obtained a fuller account (version of the facts) of the events. It could also be that the paper was taking a very cautious approach in order not to appear too alarmist.

(4)

There could have been a natural delay at the time as the means of communication which, though significant, were not that advanced in the mid-1950's. This seems a more plausible explanation than the holiday theory, as most papers keep a skeleton staff capable of dealing with emergencies, and could recall journalists at very short notice. There may have been other reasons; *Le Monde* could have been hesitant, if not reluctant, to publish news that made French troops look bad or presented them in a bad light. One cannot say with certainty.

(5)

Au moins 162 de nos compatriotes y ont trouvé une mort horrible, quant aux Musulmans tombés victimes de leur fanatisme, il est encore impossible de les dénombrer avec exactitude.

(6)

He felt it quite necessary, nevertheless, to think, in a second phase, about implementing without delay "the 1947 Statutes to the French citizens of Algeria" and "to imagine" the most suitable form of "French Union" (*Union française*).

(7)

En effet, dans la plupart des attaques les véritables hors la loi avaient enrolé de force des <occasionnels> qu'ils avaient placés en rideau devant eux et qui subirent les premiers les feux de la riposte. Beaucoup furent tués alors qu'ils n'avaient pas d'armes en main.

See *Le Monde*, 23/8/55, p. 1.

(8)

When it wrote:

Nos forces armées ... ont entrepris le ratis-sage des zones où la population paysanne apporte un concours actif aux hors la loi; elles ont détruit en particulier plusieurs hameaux < reconnus > (my emphasis) comme <foyers d'insurrection>.

In *Le Monde*, 23/8/55, p. 1, under the title: *Nos troupes pourchassent les rebelles au Maroc et détruisent en Algérie les foyers d'insurrection.*

In G. Penchenier's article, *L'heure de la répression dans le Constantinois*, the reader finds a flowery style. If it had not been for the soldiers accompanying the journalist, the reader would have thought it was a Sunday excursion. But the reader is quickly brought back to the reality of burning hamlets, houses riddled with bullets, guns behind the rubble of a wall. But also:

(...) automitrailleuses qui tout à l'heure vont faire payer si rudement à certains villages les exploits des fellaghas.

See *Le Monde*, 24/8/55, p. 1.

(9)

Describing the repression, Penchenier wrote :

considérant que dix mechtas ont servi de <foyers de rebellion>, les commandos ont été chargés de les détruire... Le procédé est simple. Les femmes et les enfants sont autorisés à sortir des gourbis, puis la mechta est anéantie.

Does that mean that the men were not allowed to come out before the hamlet was destroyed? *Le Monde* did not say, but Penchenier stated that, in the villages that had been attacked, no Arab could be found as they feared being held responsible for the troubles (this perhaps suggests that they were not responsible) and that most of them had joined the <maquis>. *Ibid*, 24/8/55.

(10)

This time the paper stated that almost everybody participated or joined in:

Rares sont ceux qui n'ont pas suivi le mouvement.

See *Le Monde*, 24/8/55, p. 1.

(11)

Après les massacres du Constantinois une guerre impitoyable de race et de religion, in *Le Monde*, 25/8/55, pp. 1 & 2.

(12)

The energetic declaration made by Soustelle was said to have been appreciated by the Europeans, who saw the Government as committed to arming farmers. (p. 1) In this respect Penchenier stated clearly that what was going on in Algeria, as a

result of those events, was exactly the opposite of what was going on in Morocco.

Ici l'heure a sonné et nul ne s'aviserait plus de rappeler les promesses faites en 1932, 1936 ou en 1947.

See *Le Monde*, 24/8/55.

The report (under the title of <la guerre impitoyable>) intimated that militia groups had been constituted and were engaged in a "frenetic hunt for the rebels". It evoked at least one example of a rebel leader's cruel execution.

Je ne peux qu'évoquer car on ne saurait préciser d'affreux détails, l'exécution à l'aérodrome de Philippeville d'un chef fellaga qui resta mourant pendant trois heures.

(13)

Je puis au moins porter témoignage de celle qui a eu pour objectif la mechta de Carrière Romaine à cinq kilomètres de Philippeville. Une cinquantaine de vieillards, de femmes et d'enfants ont été tués à défaut des mâles qui s'étaient enfuis la nuit précédente.

Je ne connais pas de spectacle plus tragique que celui que j'ai vécu après le départ des commandos en circulant entre les murs calcinés, salué par les hurlements plaintifs des chiens enchaînés, seuls survivants du massacre.

(14)

La guerre passe par là : une guerre impitoyable de race et de religion dont on sait mal comment on pourrait l'arrêter, si tant est que les uns et les autres en aient seulement l'intention.

G.Penchenier, *Le Monde*, 25/8/55, p. 2.

(15)

An article the next day pointed out that, according to officers on the ground, precautions had been taken to evacuate women and children, unlike the "unique" case he had seen and reported (this was designed obviously to diminish the seriousness of the repression and the kind of criminal activities and massacres perpetrated by the security forces. The reliance on officers on the ground does not seem justified since even what he saw was being denied by the authorities).

(16)

This article was very significant and was echoed in the international press and in Parliament. See below.

(17)

There was, thus, a contradiction between the official version and that of the journalist. The paper itself tried to keep itself out of the controversy by passing the content of the denial onto Penchenier, who had a chance to give more details and be more specific in his contradiction of the official version. This was printed below the communiqué of the Minister of the Interior.

So, having reported accurately what he had seen, Penchenier seemed to have stepped back a little, and to have given credence to the official and military versions of the events, as

opposed to what he had actually seen, and what he thought plausible.

(18)

He probably had no choice but to respond, in the absence of a collective response by the paper.

(19)

He wrote that:

- 1) shots and the sound of automatic rifles were heard in the late morning (*matinée*) of Tuesday 23 August;
- 2) when he went at 14.30, he stopped before the *fosse commune* when he saw the hamlet on the left-hand side of the road;
- 3) he had heard/seen dogs howling, several children under the age of ten dead, that he had no recollection of seeing dead adult men, that he "can/could still see" clearly enough to give specific examples -a little girl on her knees (dead), an old man and a group of three women with their babies still in their arms all dead, not to mention all the other inhabitants scattered all over the place;
- 4) he was struck by the fact that no smell could be noticed, even if the little valley was in the shade. He wrote that he would have been very surprised if the incident had taken place on Saturday, since the coagulated blood was still red, (he implied, of course, that the official version was not plausible);
- 5) the hamlet had not been mowed down, the gourbis were still intact and standing, but the scene showed signs of visible general disorder, which had resulted from the event, and which looked as though the inhabitants had been running in all directions during the shooting;
- 6) he could safely say that, if this operation had not taken place on Tuesday morning, as what he had seen made him believe, it certainly did not take place Saturday noon. See *Le Monde*, 30/8/55, p. 2.

(20)

During the session of 12 October 1955, the Communist deputies, Fayet and Duclos, evoked the events witnessed by Penchenier, and sought an explanation from the government.

The government denied the statements of Penchenier, and stated that the journalist had, himself, admitted not having been there.

(21)

In a footnote and in very small print.

(22)

"I leave it up to the readers, he continued, to formulate their own opinion on the consequences of such methods. The newspaper gave, however, further coverage to more "official" communiqués of reprisals in nine more hamlets where, it was said, this time, that women and children had been evacuated".

See *Le Monde*, 13/10/55, p. 3.

(23)

From the rare indigenous person that he met, Penchenier concluded that the Algerians saw no reward except indiscriminate (*aveugle*) repression for most Algerians. He thought that the effect of the repression was not a *<terreur salutaire>*, but

a way of "only inciting the Arabs to flee and join the rebels in the mountains". He also stated that, despite the claims of Army HQ, the heads of the rebellion had not been eliminated, that terrorism went on, and was even likely to spread". See *Le Monde*, 24/8/55, p. 1.

(24)

The use of the "nous" in this context was very significant.

(25)

See *Le Monde*, 24/8/55, p. 1.

(26)

He thought, instead, that rumours of repression would result in psychological gains for the rebels. Only a few rebels managed to create havoc in the area and the forces of order were unable to do anything but take it out on the community by and large. In his view, it was David and Goliath, where the community suffers and nobody gains ("and that was no triumph"). Penchenier stated categorically that the leaders of the movement had practically not been affected and that only "a few thousand peasants" ("expendable by definition") had paid with their lives.

(27)

He also saw the government in danger of being faced with a permanent crisis because of the intransigent demands of the proponents of outdated forms of colonialism. He saw two schools of thought, *répression à outrance* and *répression spectaculaire avec une recherche du contact* both being practised at the same time. He still wondered, however, if it was not too late (*si on ne néglige pas l'implacable évolution du temps*). See *Le Monde*, 30/8/55, pp. 1-2.

(28)

See *Le Monde*, 31/8/55, pp. 1-3.

(29)

The paper thought it hardly possible that a revolt in two main areas should succeed, but quite likely that these areas should be seen as a theatre of experimentation by rebels who could be thinking of another *coup de force* in a "fertile ground", where the "fanatics of Islam and the Arab world would find the best elements of a Holy War or a War of Liberation".

(30)

If they were very interested in reading them, but only if they looked in the right sections (see various groups and organisations' declarations and appeals, outlined above and below), and very often, only if echoed by other newspapers.

(31)

Sometimes this was done in the form of quotes, for example when reporting *Les élus musulmans protestent auprès de M. Faure contre la répression dans la Constantinis*.

See *Le Monde*, 3/9/55, p. 2.

In quotes we learn that collective repression followed the events of 20 August, *impitoyable, démesurée*, in which not only "the forces of order" but also *éléments civils irresponsables* took part. There were instances of events to which there had

been witnesses, notamment l'exécution d'un propriétaire musulman et six jeunes gens membres de sa famille. We also learn about requests, asking for charges to be brought against the mayor of Philippeville, Crevaux, and of protests against the seizure of *Le Monde*, as well as censorship, which was preventing replies to *appels à la haine de certains journaux d'Alger* (see below).

There were also condemnations such as:

(..) tient à condamner formellement la répression aveugle qui frappe un nombre considérable d'innocents, appliquant le principe de la responsabilité collective à des populations sans défense, demande la cessation de cette répression et le retour à une conception plus saine et normale des règles de la justice (*Le Monde*, 28/9/55, p. 3).

or

Le comité de coordination du groupe des 61, conscient de la gravité de l'heure, dénonce solennellement à la conscience, tant métropolitaine qu'algérienne, le caractère aveugle de la répression qui continue de s'exercer (*Le Monde*, 17/12/55, p. 4).

But all were reported only in quotes.

(32)

Similarly, *Le Monde* reported their statements in quotes.

(...) exprime sa profonde émotion et son indignation devant les récents massacres des musulmans, et notamment ceux de Philippeville, Ain Abid et réclament l'arrêt immédiat de cette odieuse répression sous toutes ses formes civiles et militaires, l'arrestation des éléments civils européens, instigateurs ou exécuteurs d'assassinats sur des habitants désarmés et innocents.

See *Le Monde*, 4-5/9/55, p. 2.

One of the most vocal protestors against the means was the group of 61 Algerian MPs, who listed a series of arbitrary measures taken against Algerians:

1) Exécutions sommaires. 2) Arrestations arbitraires de personnes dont les familles ne peuvent avoir de nouvelles. 3) Perquisitions illégales suivies de violences de toutes natures. 4) Destructures d'habitations et de leur contenu. 5) Vexations, humiliations répétées sur des populations paisibles. 6) Appropriation par la violence de biens privés.

All were reported in quotes by the paper. The "61" Group was also reported as stating:

Le Comité constate, une fois de plus, que ces méthodes indignes, employées par des agents de la population, considérés comme agissant au nom de la nation française, aboutissent à développer de plus en plus le mécontentement et à créer la haine.

In *Le Comité des 61 dénonce la répression aveugle qui s'exerce en Algérie*, *Le Monde*, 17/12/55, p. 4.

(33)

See *Le Monde*, 4-5/9/55, p. 2 and the previous section on Penchenier.

(34)

See, for instance, *Le Monde*, 22/12/55, p. 7:

(...) portés à la connaissance du gou-

vernement....pour que des éléments innocents du mouvement insurrectionnel n'aient pas à supporter le contrecoup de l'émotion provoquée par le caractère atroce des crimes des hors-la-loi.

(35)

In other words, facts about these negative aspects of the repression and the developments in Algeria were not being reported as often as they should have been, and when they were reported, they were put next to reports of rebel activity or their capture. The effects of that seemed to mean that there was a conscious or subconscious effort to tone down the excesses of the repression, or that this repression, because of the rebels' activity, seemed to be warranted (see also Chapters 4 and 5).

(36)

See *Le Monde*, 23/12/55.

(37)

As, for instance, when the paper reported news that a group of "Muslims" (the Muslim community were reported as being divided anyway) were condemning collective repression and the killing of innocents:

(...) *Si l'on a d'autres procédés pour la contenir que la répression collective et des sanctions au hasard, telle qu'on les pratique ... donne l'alarme, rupture désastreuse ... l'Algérie et la France ... protestons de toutes nos forces contre la cruauté d'une répression qui ne pouvait atteindre, la plupart du temps, les auteurs véritables des attaques... substitue aux résultats des statistiques de cadavres, en frappant bien souvent des innocents.*
(pl)

This kind of view was often balanced by somebody else's, saying how unlikely this was, as in this declaration by Bartolletti:

On a beaucoup parlé à ce propos de répression collective. Si elle était pratiquée, je n'hésiterai pas à la condamner. Mais je ne peux pas supposer un seul instant que l'armée ait commis des actes que lui prêtent ses accusateurs.

See *Le Monde*, 7/12/55, p. 4.

(38)

Despite admitting that the events had caused "embarrassment" to the authorities and "emotion" among the Muslims, when *Le Monde* reported a shooting which resulted in the death of up to forty Algerians in Lamy market, the correspondent of the paper claimed that it was still impossible to give perfectly "incontestable versions" of the causes.

To justify why the truth had not been established, when so many people were involved and so much panic was caused by the shooting, the journalist wrote that telephone and telegraph lines were down for a few hours, that there was control of information in Algeria and a deliberate delay imposed on broadcasting news; all this made enquiries difficult. See *Le Monde*, 7/12/55, p. 6. In another incident reported (19-20/5/57), *Le Monde* was able to state that the paratroopers had reacted "violently", while at the same time claiming that it was having difficulty establishing what exactly went on during a shoot-

out, which lasted half an hour and left about thirty victims.

Reporting another incident, *Le Monde* had been imprecise about the nature of the reprisals, when it announced that security operations, curfews and searches were being undertaken in Algiers, and that a similar operation in Médéa (...) *a donné lieu, dans des circonstances encore mal définies, à des incidents qui semblent devoir comporter de graves répercussions.* Nothing was very clear as to what had happened, according to the report of the correspondent dated the 18 December and published in the paper of the following day. See *Le Monde*, 19/12/56, p. 5.

(39)

Le Monde (28/2/57, p. 1), and also *Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 1. This lack of information, or slowness in providing complete information, took place frequently. In this instance, it was illustrated when the paper's correspondent gave the figure of six dead, according to the official toll, but indicated that there were higher estimates, without being able to give further details. See *Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 1.

(40)

This, as argued earlier, could have been because some papers were more ready to report immediately, while others preferred to wait. It may be that some, which had the information, might have thought (or been aware) that the information available could be damaging nationally for the government of the day, or internationally, for the nation as a whole, if it were reported straight away. This could indeed provide an explanation as to why they waited. See *Le Monde*, 28/2/57, p. 1 and 19-20/5/57, p. 1, where the report indicated that:

Autant que l'on peut reconstituer les faits en l'absence d'informations précises, il apparaît qu'au cours d'une fusillade qui se prolongea pendant une demi-heure une trentaine de musulmans ont été tués.

(41)

Reporting about a "certain effervescence" in several of the streets of Marseille, after a gathering of a hundred people in front of the Communist *La Marseillaise*, *Le Monde* indicated that about twenty North Africans had received hospital treatment as a result of injuries sustained, but *Le Monde* stated that it did not know whether this was the result of a "punch up" with the paratroopers.

En quelques quartiers, des bagarres ont éclaté et une vingtaine de nord africains ont reçu des soins à l'hôpital. Toutefois leur état indique-t-on, est sans gravité. On signalait ce matin qu'un nord africain avait succombé à des blessures graves qu'ils avaient reçues, sans que l'on sache encore si cette mort est la conséquence d'une rixe avec des parachutistes.

See *Le Monde*, 18/7/57, p. 5.

(42)

See *Le Monde*, 3/5/57, p. 6.

(43)

The proximity of news was a major feature. News of these excesses by the army were often put near news of terrorist attacks, which gave the impression that these excesses were, to

a certain extent, less one-sided, and even perhaps justified. See *Le Monde*, 19-20/5/57, p. 1.

Another article reported incidents *qui semblent devoir comporter de graves conséquences*, which was combined with other reports announcing various terrorist attacks. See *Le Monde*, 19/12/56, p. 5.

There was a combination of news of excesses of repression committed by the army with news of efficient work done by the troops in terms of defeating the enemies and arresting them.

Under the front page headline of *3 chefs rebelles arrêtés en Algérie et plusieurs membres du FLN appréhendés à Paris, importants documents saisis*, in *Le Monde*, 28/2/57, p. 1, the reader would find in small print at the end of the summary-article:

Signalons enfin de regrettables incidents survenus la nuit dans la Casbah d'Alger. Les circonstances sont encore mal connues, mais les premières dépêches d'agences portent à croire que des militaires exaspérés par un attentat commis contre un des leurs, ont ouvert le feu sans discernement sur tous les musulmans qui s'enfuyaient.

(44)

There were also some reports with inaccuracies.

Serious incidents took place a hundred metres from the Ruisseau barracks, paratroopers came to help their colleagues and disturbances spread to the neighbouring cafés where the paratroopers got people out and shot them, the official toll being put at 26 killed and 11 injured, all Muslims. A higher toll was claimed by other sources.

If the front page article gave the impression that repressive measures were taken after terrorist acts made three victims amongst the security forces, page six of the same paper stated that only one of the paratroopers of the Second Regiments of Chasseurs was affected, the second was only injured and the third was unscathed. See *Le Monde*, 19-20/5/57, p. 6.

(45)

When there were reports of incidents, they seemed to have been "deliberately provoked" by the "rebels" most of the time. This was highlighted, for instance, in the official *communiqué* of the Minister Resident, stating that sanctions were envisaged against certain *événements profondément regrettables* in which six Muslim civilians were killed and twelve injured, which happened after *deux assassinats particulièrement odieux*. See *Le Monde*, 21/12/56, p. 6.

(46)

Like the one dated 19-20/5/57, p. 1.

(47)

This did not square with the article below stating that flexibility was being urged by Bourguiba in discussions attempting trying to break the deadlock about elections and independence preconditions.

(48)

Commis à peu de distance de l'un de leurs campements, l'attentat aurait eu pour but de susciter leur riposte.

Le Monde was, in my view, making too much of the proximity of the barracks as being a provocation.

That was very much the official view when the troops or the

Europeans committed such acts since it was in the interest of the authorities that the incident be seen as a deliberate provocation to get them to react in that way.

It would be difficult to argue that there was an easier place (except in the barracks themselves) for the nationalists to find soldiers to target, nor an easier way of identifying them (because of the uniform worn by soldiers coming in and out).

Further justifications were provided in the shape of a reported directive, also said to explain why there had been a recent increase in the violence and in the number of attacks: *De fait, le nombre des attentats et la violence des engagements se sont accrus depuis quelque temps. In Violente réaction de parachutistes à un attentat commis à Alger contre 3 de leurs camarades. 26 musulmans tués 11 blessés. See Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 1.*

(49)

The next day, claiming that it had not yet obtained more information about the event (indicating, though, that four of the injured had died), *Le Monde* still put forward, according to non official sources <informateur officieux> and a press agency, the view that it was really the "Muslims" fault and that the soldiers could not have done much about it.

Dans la soirée du samedi un informateur officieux avançait l'hypothèse selon laquelle le quartier ayant été occupé par la troupe, les musulmans se seraient précipités vers les barrages. Craignant d'être débordés, les militaires auraient alors ouvert le feu.

It was further stated:

Selon (...) Associated Press, de nombreux suspects ayant été rassemblés un certain nombre d'entre eux auraient tentés de s'enfuir avant que soient arrivés les camions qui allaient les amener aux fins d'interrogatoire. Ce fut alors la fusillade.

In *L'enquête se poursuit sur les incidents d'Alger*, see *Le Monde*, 21/5/57, p. 5 (small article). A further comment that could be made here is the brevity of this kind of report, next to which there was another article, twice as long, on *La Fédération des Anciens de la Résistance* salue "avec respect et ferveur" les forces de l'ordre. *Ibid.*, 21/5/57, p. 5.

(50)

As an illustration, the number of victims of incidents on the army or civilian sides was given according to army sources, despite indications that there might have been much higher casualty figures.

See *Le Monde*, 19/12/56, p. 5, where the number of soldier victims was given, and so was the statement of the Governor General, which was the following:

Des incidents se sont produits hier soir à Médéa, au cours d'une opération de contrôle montée à la suite de l'attentat perpétré contre deux militaires, et qui avait fait un blessé et un tué.

Les forces de sécurité, qui suivaient la piste des agresseurs, ont abattu six musulmans qui ne répondaient pas aux sommations d'usage et s'enfuyaient dans les vignes aux abords de la ville.

A Médéa même, une panique naquit au sein de la

population musulmane. Il s'en suivit une échauffourée, au cours de laquelle douze musulmans furent plus ou moins blessés.

The correspondent wrote that:

Selon d'autres bruits difficilement vérifiables, l'échauffourée aurait été plus sérieuse, le nombre de victimes -tués ou blessés- serait plus élevé que ne l'indique le communiqué officiel.

Another killing of three Algerians by the paratroopers was reported on the basis of an AFP press release, stating that two "Muslim" brothers had been killed after an altercation with the paratroopers and that another Muslim had been shot as he ignored warnings to stop -*interpelé en vain* (by a patrol) (...) *abattu...* (and no papers were found on him). See *Le Monde*, 3/5/57, p. 6.

(51)

See Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and Dean Peyrega in Chapter 13.

(52)

In the case of parliamentarians, an example of the paper's indirect reports could also be found through the complaints of deputies, when *Le Monde* reported that two former delegates to the Algerian Assembly had addressed open letters to the Minister Resident about "des faits de répression" (*Le Monde's* terms). One stated that as a result of an ambush, in which eight soldiers died and nine were injured, eight young Muslims were shot in similar conditions to those in two areas of the Tablat commune. The other letter stated that the town of Cherchell had been *le théâtre d'exactions*, that territorial guards had executed eight Muslims, three of whom had been members of the Sadoun family, a municipal employee, holder of the military medal. The last letter asked for an enquiry to be opened, in the same way as the one ordered by the Minister Resident, after the incidents of Mouzaïaville on the 2/11/56. See *Le Monde* 16-17/11/56, p. 6.

(53)

This was the case for a number of these incidents which were first reported by other media before being echoed by *Le Monde*. An incident which saw the shooting in cold blood of two Algerian "suspects" received an international airing through newsreels of *Fox Movietone* and *L'Express*, which published pictures of the event, or other more vocal newspapers which had a more objective approach, less respectful of authority, and were more informative vis-à-vis their readers.

(54)

In the incident at Lamy market, for instance (see *Le Monde* 7/12/55, p. 6) when different versions giving the number of victims between 17 and 40 were put forward.

After the *Movietone* incident, *Le Monde* included reports from both sides accusing each other (some with pictures at hand) of atrocities, issuing denials, and presenting respective arguments in their defence (see *Le Monde*, 30, 31/12/55, pp. 1-2, 3, and 5/1/56, for instance), even finding inconsistencies and questioning the versions put forward by the authorities.

(55)

One by one, it published the version of *l'Express*, called the version *incriminée* (six cases of abuse), and the government's counter-claim, termed denial (*démenti*), *réponse officielle*, against these allegations, which tended to discredit the activities of the security forces.

Timzit, 29 November 1955, the French Foreign Legion which opened fire on ten villagers, 7 of whom were war veterans (*anciens combattants*) and of whom eight were killed and two badly wounded.

1) Then more people came out to see, including a seven year old girl, all of whom were shot down .

Official denial version :

Rebels who had attacked security elements trying to flee had some losses, no girl involved; "this denial stated that the version of events above was pure invention".

2.) Four brothers, brought in for confrontation with Muslim victims of the "attentat", were not recognized and were put into internment camp.

official version: none of them interned .

3.) Shooting of twelve notables of Guendouz, considered as suspects. Protest in the National Assembly, Official authorities admit disappearance but cannot explain it .

Official version: enquiries revealed no execution.

4.) Bombing, three days before Christmas, hamlet bombed, shelled and burned out.

Official version: two incidents of fighting against a convoy of rebels in a grotto, no raid.

5.) Hamlet burned down, sixty-five houses burned down, following assassination of a caïd (local magistrate).

Official version: enquiries still going on, cannot give precision, village far away, difficulty of communication .

6.) Further details (*Précisions*) "camp d'hébergement" de Djorf inspected by Wagner parliamentary commission: no observation on this place.

(56)

When reporting events, even if a special correspondent was present, such as the shooting resulting in 40 dead counted in Lamy market, it was very often a version of the facts that gave the benefit of the doubt to the troops, when no official statements had been made. See *Le Monde*, 7/12/55, pp. 1-p6.

Naturally, State official sources did not want to give the impression that security forces were trigger-happy or that the "rebels" could hit anywhere or any place, despite the protection provided by the army.

In the Lamy market incident, no matter what the difference in the number of victims was (depending on various versions of the incident), as far as the case in hand was concerned, one fact could be easily established. There were no victims amongst Europeans, no victims on the side of the security forces (except, one Muslim "supplétif", who was hit by a revolver shot).

From what one can judge, the incident in both versions provided, the authorised official (officers') version and the "Muslim" witnesses version, the injury of the "supplétif" seemed to have sparked off the event. The first version stated that the rebels positioned around the village started firing into the crowd, while the witnesses said that a fight broke out before the "supplétif" was slightly injured, and alleged that the security forces surrounding the village started shooting at

people in the market.

Apart from the fact that the supplétif was curiously not considered as being part of the forces of order in this report, one starts wondering if it was not the case, indeed, of trigger-happy security forces, firing into the crowd, at the slightest thing happening. Had that not been the case, it would be difficult to see how, given the claimed number of "rebels" positioned around the village, no members of the security forces, nor Europeans, had been hit. And if, as the first version leads one to believe, the security forces were only reacting to something they were not expecting, and even conceding that the assailants had missed their targets, how could the security forces have killed so many "rebels", who would obviously have tried to preempt any reaction?

(57)

See *Le Monde*, 7/12/55, pp. 1-6.

(58)

The article, *Un gendarme convaincu d'avoir exécuté un rebelle algérien a été traduit en Conseil de Guerre*, stated that *L'Express*, in an article by Jean Daniel, commented on how the gendarme, who was in charge of watching over a group of suspects, was seen shooting one of them in the back.

(59)

For this, *Le Monde* advanced the very authoritative "précisions" (*Nous avons obtenu à ce sujet, dans les milieux les plus autorisés les précisions suivantes sur cette affaire*).

(60)

See also Chapter 7.

(61)

Aux abus de la répression on oppose les atrocités incontestables commises par les hors la loi,
See *Le Monde*, 30/12/55, p. 1.

In the Marseille incident, referred to above, *Le Monde* used the term "punch-up" to describe typical beatings. If these had really been punch-ups (*rixes, bagarres*), as the paper described them, should there not have been victims on both sides or were the Algerians inherently weaker and incapable of defending themselves? And how could a poor immigrant fight with a uniformed French paratrooper in the mainland? It seems more plausible that this was yet another "ratonnade", or systematic beating of Algerians, disguised by the paper to look like a fight. Most of the content of the article suggested the latter, even for a not very perceptive reader. It would then not be exaggerated to suggest that, despite having a correspondent on the spot, the paper was deliberately trying to give a different construction of the events, thereby encouraging the readers into thinking something completely different from what they ought to have thought. See *Le Monde*, 18/7/57, p. 5.

(62)

An event which seemed to have escaped the attention of the paper until then. Even here, *Le Monde* stated that a European, "mistaken for a Muslim", had been beaten up and saved only by an officer firing in the air.

(63)

It revealed that some Muslims had been molested in markets and a few cars overturned (some damaged) and a motorcycle set alight, without mentioning who was driving them at the time. The demonstrators were said to have belonged to several organizations, but especially youngsters, aged between 16 and 22, who were then said to have violently attacked Muslims in cars (with one requiring hospital treatment).

Ambulances were said to have ferried the injured to hospital while army helicopters were hovering overhead.

Le Monde, 12/6/57, pp. 1-2.

(64)

il ressort des récits parvenus d'Alger que les émeutiers étaient comme par le passé, de tout jeunes gens, prompts à traduire leur légitime indignation à la suite des récents attentats par des manifestations de violence aveugle qui ne desservent pas, au contraire, la cause des terroristes.

Some part of the report saw this as no more than a group of people losing "their cool".

On aurait pu penser que le maintien de M.Lacoste, le retour des parachutistes et en général l'assurance que le nouveau gouvernement allait poursuivre une politique de fermeté à l'égard de la rébellion, étaient de nature à les inciter à garder leur sang-froid. See Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 1.

(65)

Between *Le Monde* and other reports.

After an incident involving four people in a car, *Le Monde* wrote that an Algerian woman and a child had been taken out of the vehicle and the occupants beaten up, one to death.

When the official toll by the authorities gave six deaths (*Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 2), *Le Monde* wrote: *promptement assommé et tué à coups de pied et de poing* (presumably implying that he did not suffer because he was knocked out first). Then the car was pushed over the ten metre-high stone parapet, with the other Algerian still inside being picked up "half dead" from the water under the "boos" of the crowd. Other Algerians were lynched, but that gave a lower number of victims on the Algerian side.

Reports of the French and international press revealed that there was a discrepancy between the report in *Le Monde* and that of *France Soir*, which indicated that the two individuals were in the car when it was flattened on the rocks.

Le Monde's report had indicated that only one person had remained in the car (13/6/57). Most of the other newspapers reported versions of the events which were not dissimilar, except for a more pronounced insistence from the right-wing *L'Aurore* on the injustice of the violence and the plight of innocent lives, paying the price of the law of the jungle (*loi du talion*). In general more objective papers, except the Algerian press run by pro-settlers interests, were more daring in their condemnation of the deeds.

Here it would be worthwhile asking why reports of *L'Humanité* were not included.

(66)

Foreign publications (*Life Magazine* published successively photos of two summary executions), Newsreel, Nort and South America and French publications such as *L'Express* (December)

and *Noir et Blanc* (which also published a photo of a summary execution), and even publications in Algeria, *République Algérienne* (UDMA publication), reported news of repressive measures and summary executions, very often of innocent people, illustrated with pictures. These were published in France in 1955.

(67)

In the concluding paragraph of a very small article (about a quarter of a column) reporting some atrocities, *Le Monde's* attitude seemed somewhat more understanding, since the source of most incidents was considered to be provocation by *Le Monde*:

Les circonstances excusent parfois, si elles ne les justifient, des actes éminemment douloureux. Les services officiels s'emploient à les limiter ou à les prévenir.

In *Le Monde*, 21/12/56, p. 6.

(68)

Lorsque malgré ces efforts, ils se produisent, ne vaut-il pas mieux, dans l'intérêt même des relations franco-musulmanes, les reconnaître et les sanctionner ouvertement?

See *Le Monde*, 21/12/56, p. 6.

Le Monde even reported that the authorities themselves were considering sanctions against the offenders (because they were determined to stop anything from getting to extremes).

Ce sont ces circonstances qui ont déterminé, semble-t-il, les autorités à réagir avec détermination. Alors que par le passé les forces de l'ordre faisaient même à l'égard des éléments européens d'une certaine neutralité, elles se sont opposées cette fois au manifestants. Détail qui peut apparaître symbolique, des parachutistes ont été mis en ligne contre les émeutiers.

Le Monde, 21/12/56, p. 6.

It can clearly be seen here, that *Le Monde* was making a positive statement about the security forces doing their job properly, this time. By implication one can guess that they had not done so previously.

When, as in this instance, the fairness of the army was reported by the paper, it was implicit in the statement that this was not always the case. We can clearly conclude that the fairness of the army was reported when it took place. But its unfairness was kept unreported. Another sentence in the article might even say it all. The paper stated that there was no complicity: *La bienveillance ou la complicité qui prévalaient jusqu'ici dans de pareils cas ont fait place à la réprobation générale.* See *Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 1.

(69)

No comments were made (*Le Monde*, 7/5/57, p. 7) for instance, when a group of Europeans and Jews (*Européens et Israélites prennent à partie tous les musulmans qui se trouvaient aux abords immédiats*) attacked Algerian "Muslims" on sight (with about forty people needing hospital treatment) "after a grenade [had] exploded".

(70)

Le Monde's weak challenge was manifest. Paratroopers engaged

in a frenzy of beatings in Algiers (according to the article sent by the Algiers correspondent, these paratroopers wrecked shops along the streets, battered "Algerian Muslims", stabbed several times an Algerian officer who was trying to calm them down, and assaulted Muslim workers in tramway works) were but "recurrent incidents" and merely described by *Le Monde* as "regrettable". A deliberate mass retaliation by paratroopers on innocent by-standers was thought by the paper to be a mere *geste maladroit [qui] aggrave les malentendus et retarde les solutions.*

Writing about the incident proper, the paper commented in an interrogative but understanding manner:

Que dire des excès commis à Alger, dans le quartier Beclourt, par des parachutistes contre des Arabes? Quel rapport avec la pacification, les mesures de justice, la vraie mission de l'armée? Les blessures reçues par deux de leurs camarades, l'humiliation que des hommes récemment ramenés d'Egypte ont l'impression d'y avoir subie, peuvent servir d'excuse, non de justification.

Le Monde, 6-7/1/57, p. 1.

(71)

Sometimes condemnations originated in the official sources without any comment by *Le Monde* before the paper followed suit.

The Resident Minister's *communiqué* was calling the events, in which six "Muslim" civilians were killed and twelve injured, *profondément regrettables*. See *Le Monde*, 19/12/56, p. 5.

The way in which the newspaper reported other scenes of Algerians being lynched (some people being beaten up and shop being damaged) above was very significant. But if the paper was only showing slight unease, the official press agency itself was calling the incidents "regrettable".

The events were said to have been over quickly and to have been started by the attack on the forces of order. See *Le Monde* 3/5/57, p. 6.

(72)

Les incidents.... soulèvent même à Alger de vives réprobations...

C'est peut-être qu'entre-temps il y a eu Melouza. Le massacre de Melouza a révélé à ceux que des attentats individuels ne suffisaient plus à convaincre que les musulmans étaient, comme les Européens et davantage encore, victimes d'un terrorisme aveugle. Comment alors admettre aujourd'hui qu'au hasard d'une émeute des musulmans, en tant que tels, continuent à payer pour des crimes dont ils sont plus souvent les victimes que les complices?

See P. Herreman, in *Le Monde*, 13/6/57, p. 1.

The plight of the innocent Algerian victims received an airing:

des voix officieuses ont fait observer que les victimes musulmanes de la manifestation étaient aussi innocentes que celles du casino de la Corniche. La presse métropolitaine et aussi la presse algéroise sont unanimes ce matin et désapprouvent les excès.

(73)

Le Monde attacked the authorities' "unjustifiable silence"

(for months) as "inexplicable" while it was, at the same time, deploring the timing of the revelations (*sur les faits qui ont ému et scandalisé l'opinion en Afrique du Nord et à l'étranger*) and their use for electioneering purposes.

(74)

Le silence qui tend à couvrir des actes criminels ou arbitraires ne peut qu'alimenter les propagandes hostiles à notre pays.

Le Monde, 31/12/55.

(75)

Ibid.

(76)

Le Monde did not doubt that similar incidents had happened before elsewhere and enquiries were opened, but the results of those enquiries were never made public and the sanctions, if any, were taken without public opinion being informed.

In *La discipline de feu*, "whatever the circumstances" (still to be established, lack of precise information), Alain Jacob could not see that the shooting of about thirty "Muslims" as the result of a "lucid command."

Jacob blamed the "emotional and spontaneous reaction of inexperienced soldiers freshly arrived from the mainland ... to the murder of some of their comrades". So, in other words, the benefit of the doubt was given immediately to the paratroopers, even before any information had been made available. *Le Monde* was putting the view forward that the most likely hypothesis was that the soldiers could not help their reaction and that the need for discipline must be backed by the high command.

The paper was hereby confirming that the "murder" which "triggered the reaction" was a "provocation" and suggesting that "uncontrolled reprisals would help serve the cause of the adversaries who threaten dozens of innocents". To state it more clearly, one action was murder, the other, reprisals and merely calling for sanctions, not trial for murder. The life of an Algerian must have been cheap for the paper.

The resolution of discipline or "command" (*commandement*) problem was seen as the solution. *La discipline de feu*, Alain Jacob, in *Le Monde*, 21/5/57, p. 5.

(77)

In an incident in Algiers, *Le Monde* reported:

Ce n'est pas la première fois que des faits semblables sont constatés. Jamais les réactions n'avaient atteint, à Alger du moins, ce degré de violence. See Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 1.

It would be legitimate to ask why *Le Monde* chose the "violence" aspect here instead of the "guilt" and "murder" aspect of the event. Had these deeds been the act of Algerians, they would not have been described as merely violent.

(78)

Le Monde, 31/12/55.

(79)

The themes and expressions used revealed a different kind of perspective:

Bien d'autres illustrations ont scandalisé les spectateurs américains, wrote the correspondent, explaining how shocked

American public opinion was after seeing those pictures (and many more) and headlines with the caption: "shoot first, ask questions later" in publications such as *Life*, *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post*". Ibid.

(80)
Ibid.

(81)
See also footnote 77 above.

(82)
Moreover, *Le Monde* published on the same pages that day declarations from France and Algiers. It is surprising to see that these would have been more convincing. It seems to have given them considerable importance as it devoted more than half a page to them. Ibid.

(83)
As for *Le Monde* itself, the paper mentioned two statements by C.Bourdet and F.Mauriac not involving the responsibility of the paper. See *Intellectuals* (Chapter 10), Bourdet's article was *Votre gestapo algérienne* (*France-Observateur*, January, 1955) and Mauriac's was *La Question* (*L'Express*, 15/1/1955)
Having quoted from these two articles giving names, examples and types of torture, *Le Monde* published statements denying them since it wrote, in this respect, that the Ministry of Interior had replied to its enquiries:

Enquête ouverte, inspecteur spécialement chargé ... faits sur lesquels enquêtés jusqu'à présent ... avérés inexacts... quoiqu'il en soit... ministre ... décidé de sanctionner avec sévérité... agents dont la culpabilité viendrait à être établie.

See *Le Monde*, 15/1/55.

(84)
Later on the word "torture" appeared only in *Le Monde's* reports of speeches, such as those by the Communist deputy Guyot:

*En Algérie le sang coule journellement, de véritables opérations militaires se déroulent dans l'Aurès et la Kabylie. Les prisons regorgent de "terroristes", les policiers torturent, les tribunaux condamnent, les militants communistes sont traqués, les journaux progressistes sont saisis, le peuple est dans la misère, mais les gros colons et les grandes sociétés réalisent des bénéfices énormes. See *Le Monde*, 4/2/55.*

Other examples are the reports of speeches by Algerian representatives, such as Dr Bendjelloul or Benbahmed (SFIO), giving details ... *supplices ont cours en Algérie touchent... innocents, the use of "bathtubs, funnels" on people who were denounced by an unknown person, the use of "electricity, bottlenecks...a 55-year-old man made to dance naked in front of his family, his children and grand children". See *Le Monde*, 5/2/55.*

(85)
The ill-treatment of Melle Lavalette was described by *Le*

Monde in the following terms:

Or transférée d'Alger à Oran par des inspecteurs de la P.J. d'Alger, Melle Lavalette a été injuriée, malmenée, violemment giflée, et brutalement frappée à la tête. On lui a également lié à plusieurs reprises les pieds et les mains tandis qu'un baillon lui était appliqué jusqu'à étouffement puis évanouissement. Elle a été laissée pendant quatre jours sans nourriture et plus longtemps encore sans soins.

The paper stated that traces of ill-treatment were said to have faded and that she was still being refused bail on health grounds. See *Le Monde*, 23/1/57, p. 5.

In the case of Evelyn Lavalette, the paper stated that it had evidence that the person in question had been ill-treated while in police custody. *Le Monde* wrote that it had received information which it had cross-checked, evidence in other words, that the young 28-year-old practising Catholic, Evelyne Lavalette, had been ill-treated by the police because of actions she had admitted to them (acting as a letter box for the rebels).

The paper categorically stated that, by informing about her sévice, it did not seek to justify in any way her attitude, which *Le Monde* summed up in her reply, according to those who knew her, to anybody questioning her attitude:

A qui lui demanderait les raisons de sa conduite, déclarent ceux qui la connaissent bien, elle répondrait sans doute qu'elle a été déterminée par un sentiment de révolte devant les exactions commises en Algérie. Considérant la France comme la patrie de l'égalité et de la justice, elle n'a pas cru pouvoir tolérer des excès commis en son nom. Elle a donc rejoint ceux qu'elle tenait pour opprimés. Ancienne cheftaine du Mouvement <<Guide de France>> en Algérie, elle avait d'ailleurs donné sa démission en termes assez vifs il y a deux ans.

See *Le Monde*, 23/1/57, p. 5.

But the paper could not accept her ill-treatment, especially since this woman, having heard of her brother's arrest and having learnt that she was wanted by the police, went to them admitting what she was being accused of.

(86)

It published a note by Michel Gorlin, chargé de mission in the cabinet of the Minister-Resident, denying of course the alleged offences through various arguments that were included. At the bottom of the note, *Le Monde* wrote that it was publishing it at the request of its author, but that the information that the paper itself had published was also from reputable sources. Defending itself against the assertions of the note and maintaining its story, *Le Monde* wrote:

Nous enregistrons <la note> de Mr Gorlin, sans pour autant qu'elle nous amène à tenir pour inexacts des renseignements dont nous nous sommes faits l'écho, sur la foi de témoignages émanants, eux aussi, de personnalités fort honorables et dont la sincérité et même l'absence de passions partisans sont indiscutables ...

Destinée à jeter la suspicion sur les informations que nous avons publiées, la <note> qui nous est communiquée aurait gagné à ne pas demeurer, sur

des points essentiels, dans le vague. Elle ne donne ni la date à laquelle le Dr Barrière s'est rendu auprès de Melle Lavalette ni à quelle période se rapportent les menus dont le détail nous est produit.

See *Le Monde*, 29/1/57, p. 3.

(87)

See Simon, P.-H., and Servan-Schreiber, J.J. (Chapter 13).

(88)

This debate was opened by a series of articles run by by the paper around the theme "for or against torture". See below and also Chapters 10 and 13.

(89)

The paper recalled that Le Pen had stated publicly le bien-fondé, voire même la nécessité, in some case to resort to torture. See *Le Monde*, 26-27 and 30/5/57.

(90)

The same line of argument as Le Pen's was defended and justified in an "Information Bulletin of the Air force" (*Le Monde*, 26-27, 30/5/1957) and in a note de service recommending "a study" by an army priest of the parachute regiment to the soldiers facing problems of conscience in Algeria, which was circulating underground (*sous le manteau*), published by the June issue of *Alger-Université* and reproduced in parts by *Témoignage chrétien* (21/7/57), which had commented:

(...) cette bonne parole, écrit *Alger-Université* nous est aujourd'hui prêchée par un aumônier catholique de la Xème région militaire s'adressant aux soldats pacificateurs. Gageons que ses réflexions profondes et humaines, solidement étayées par des références à la Bible et aux textes pontificaux, sauront nous conduire à une méditation profitable....

Indicating that the news had been denied, *Le Monde* wrote that it would be impossible to publish the long sermon in question, but gave some extracts, and reported that there were reactions and even reproaches made to *Témoignage chrétien* which had initially reproduced extracts. It also stated the arguments presented by *Témoignage chrétien* in its own defense. In *Pour ou contre la torture. Un prêtre, aumônier parachutiste, préconise en certaines circonstances <un interrogatoire sans sadisme mais efficace>*. *Le Monde*, 1/7/57, p. 4.

(91)

A further article first gave the impression that the RP Delarue had been somewhat sanctioned, because of his own statement and his support for torture as the title might have suggested, but in reality, as close reading of the article revealed, the sanction was for giving his views to a third party, even in confidence.

The paper stated that some information according to which R.P. Delarue des oblats de Marie might have been relieved of his duties by Cardinal Feltin, as he "seemed" to justify in

some case the recourse to torture in the interrogation of rebels in Algeria in a "study" where he had written:

(...) *Entre deux maux -faire souffrir passagèrement un bandit pris sur le fait et qui d'ailleurs mérite la mort, et d'autre part laisser massacrer des innocents que l'on sauverait si, par les révélations de ce criminel, on parvenait à anéantir le gang- il faut sans hésiter choisir le moindre: un interrogatoire sans sadisme mais efficace.*

Le Monde wrote that, according to information it had gathered, no administrative sanction had been taken against RF Delarue (who remains at his post) by his superiors as they had decided that he could not be held responsible for the diffusion in the press of a document, destined exclusively for the internal consumption of a military group (and therefore it was ill-advised/inopportune to take a disciplinary measure against him which could be erroneously interpreted politically), but that he had been reprimanded for making his thoughts on the moral aspects of the operations in Algeria public without the prior consent of his superiors. The paper pointed out that that had taken place and that the file on the matter had been closed for a long time before the document gained wider diffusion.

See *Le Monde*, 6-7/7/57 and 17/7/57, p. 12.

In *Auteur d'une <<étude>> sur les méthodes d'interrogatoire en Algérie* le RP delarue a été blâmé par ses supérieurs ecclésiastiques mais il demeure aumônier de la 10ème division de parachutistes, *Le Monde*, 17/7/57, p. 12.

(92)

Le Monde reminded the readers that it was following its *sommation respectueuse* that RF d'Ouince had discussed the topic at length in the religious paper *La Croix*, and *Le Monde* echoed the theme and content of the published article in its own pages.

(93)

The article was said to have been written with the consent of the hierarchical authorities.

(94)

Which had three simultaneous aims:

protéger les amis de la France, gagner la confiance des neutres, maîtriser des adversaires.

(95)

Ces hommes, clercs ou laïcs, sont imparfaits et il y a des bavures. Mais le sens de cette action n'est pas douteux...[elle tend] incontestablement à humaniser cette guerre, que sa nature même porte à dégénérer en luttes inhumaines. Elle tend à empêcher que ne s'instaure une morale pratique qui serait une démission des consciences.

In the remainder of the article, RF d'Ouince saw two groups: some see the necessity to protect lives and of immediate efficacy, others, more "lucides", think more of the dangers of going down the road of violence and arbitrary measures and towards the deformation of consciences and the psychological repercussions of an injustice committed by an army fighting in the name of a superior civilisation:

Si vraiment nous sommes capables d'un réflexe moral que n'a pas l'adversaire, c'est la meilleure

justification de notre cause et de notre victoire.

The Priest also argued that the campaigns against "excesses", which were often exploited for "un-pure" motives, had had a beneficial effect.

(96)

Some acts were said to be obviously inadmissible for a Christian conscience and from the list given in the directives issued by the religious authorities of the army. These were:

Certains actes sont, d'évidence, inadmissibles pour une conscience chrétienne, j'en relève une grande liste dans les directives données par l'aumônerie militaire: les représailles collectives, les exécutions d'otages, la justice expéditive livrée à l'arbitraire, les sévices exercés sur des suspects au sujet desquels on ne sait rien de précis, l'interrogatoire poussé jusqu'à la torture abolissant la liberté..

On these points, the article continued, "excesses/abuses" exist or, at least, the Church position is not ambiguous it does not approve them. It does not have to do more, as an army priest has no more power on the men in his unit than the curate on the people in his parish.

(97)

Under its own paragraph heading (*Les méthodes les plus humaines sont à la longue, les plus payantes*).

(98)

La hiérarchie qui impose une règle ne peut le faire en matière douteuse. Dans ce cas, le silence est de sa part non pas une dérobade mais un acte de prudence et d'honnêteté...

(99)

As if providing the perfect answer for *Le Monde's* previous request, the article ended on the following note:

La parole est à l'Eglise. Mais la parole de l'Eglise n'est pas seulement une sentence arbitrale; elle est un témoignage et un appel: <<Que celui qui a des oreilles pour entendre entende!>>.

In *Un article du RP D'ouince sur le conflit algérien. L'action de L'Eglise <<Va incontestablement à humaniser cette guerre que sa nature même porte à dégénérer en luttes inhumaines>>*, *Le Monde*, 1/8/57, p. 4.

(100)

The article concluded that the Christian was not a robot in the hands of the Church; the initiative and the responsibility was in the hands of each individual.

(101)

See *Le Monde*, 25/7/57, p. 1.

(102)

Like that of Mme Alleg. See, for instance, the letter to the press from the wife of the former director of *Alger-Républicain* with a complaint sent by her husband to the Public prosecutor, published in *L'Humanité*, which was seized. *Le Monde*, 3/8/57, p. 4.

(103)

That, for her, was a euphemism which meant that he was dead) in See *Le Monde*, 3/8/57, p. 4 .

The lawyers also protested, especially Alleg's (as Audin was never seen by anybody). *Le Monde* published statements by the lawyers complaining that they had not managed to get in touch with their client. Here, *Le Monde* explained the technical reason for the visit's refusal and published a "statement to the paper" itself by these lawyers, declaring that they were still being refused a visit to their client because his detention was claimed to be under an administrative measure and, therefore, he could not have a lawyer to represent him. See *Le Monde*, 7/8/57, p. 4.

There were then rumours of a complaint Alleg had made against the State through Serge Barret, préfet of Algiers, transmitted to the Public Prosecutor, who had decided to start an enquiry.

Then, the paper published the content of letters sent by the two wives to the authorities (the letter of Alleg's wife was sent to M. Beteille, member of the investigative commission sent to Algeria. See relevant section on civil liberties) and to the press.

See *Le Monde*, 7-8/7/57, for the letter relating to the disappearance of both a month after the so-called escape of Audin. See also 13/8/57 for the letter of Mme Audin sent to the authorities and the press complaining about the arrest of her husband on 11 June 1957 and the declaration by the authorities that he had escaped on 21 June. Mme Audin also stated on that occasion that she had absolute/incontrovertible proof that her husband had been tortured and could not have escaped and that, according to rumours, he was in a bad shape in one of the camps.

(104)

See *Le Monde*, 11-12/8/57.

(105)

After the news of the "suicide", René Capitant, former law lecturer of the victim, suspended his courses at the University of Paris for a while.

(106)

See also Chapters 10 and 13.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: NOTES

(1)

The atrocities that took place in Algeria had to be reported. If the job was not done very well by *Le Monde*, were other newspapers and journalists any different, and with what consequences? When different and courageous positions were adopted and sanctions taken, what defence were they afforded by the paper?

(2)

His bold and conscientious approach to his job and his knowledge of the realities of the war gave him a real understanding of the situation in Algeria, on which he came to hold very strong views.

(3)

He also stated that the authorities were inflicting punishment on communities, which were not really responsible for the troubles, and forcibly moving these communities to areas controlled by soldiers. Calling these places *camps d'hébergement*, he declared, did not hide their "concentration camp aspects".

There were also in his article accusations of giving in to supporters of collective repression against ten to twenty thousand Muslims, only to get ten to twenty years of peace, as the French authorities in Algeria had done so often in the past: for instance, the scorched earth policy of the period 1845-1850 under generals Cavaignac, Canrobert and Pélissier; the crushing of the Kabyle uprising of 1871; and in 1945, when the riots of Sétif were drowned in blood. He also stated that this policy of repression carried the risk of producing opposite results to those intended, and that the measures adopted did not deal with the economic and political roots of the problem, but only made the population more hostile. See *Le Monde*, 15/9/55.

(4)

One wonders what the readers made of this opinion when more or less at the same time, *Le Monde* was seeking the opinions of people such as J. Servier and publishing them in a proper article (for Servier, the real root of the problem was sheer fanaticism against France caused by Ulémas, amongst the Berbers in the Aures area).

(5)

See *Le Monde*, 15/9/55 and Barrat's article *Un journaliste français chez les hors la loi*, in *France Observateur*, September 1955.

(6)

And the incident was reported in the most neutral way by *Le Monde*, which gave the news of his arrest, the charges and a brief biography. See *Le Monde*, 26-27/9/55, p. 4.

(7)

Captain Michel sent a telegram to Paris, cancelling the warrant requesting transfer of Barrat to Algeria, stating that the case could be heard in Paris (*sur commission rogatoire*) and allowing his release on bail. No mention was made by *Le Monde* on how exceptional this procedure was.

(8)

When explaining the delay in his release, *Le Monde* stated that it was due to the problem of finding out who had the authority to free him since the DST, which had issued the warrant for his arrest, subsequently declared that it had no authority to free him.

(9)

There were protests by journalists from various papers, including some working for *Le Monde* itself, who published a statement "communicated" to the paper with the list of its signatories, which seems to indicate that the journalists as individuals signed the protest note. It was signed by C.Sarraute, A.Fontaine, R.Barrillon, G.Meny, G.Penchenier, E.Sablrier, C.Julien, C.Ezraty, A.Pierre, J.Planchais, A.Mercier, G.Mathieu... amongst others.

This declaration stated what had happened and requested the immediate release of R.Barrat. See *Le Monde*, 14/5/57, p. 4.

(10)

See *Le Monde*, 28/9/55, p. 1

(11)

He asked a series of questions:

Did he have the right (in order to find out the truth about the fellaguas) to go to those who declare themselves to be "ennemis et non révoltés", to talk specifically with a deserter who has become their leader and as such "responsable d'assassinats"? The paper's answer was that he must have thought so because he went beyond (*passé outre*) scruples that he himself felt, as expressed by the editorial board of *France-Observateur*, and which, in publishing the article, gave priority to the right to inform: *de ne pas laisser ignorer des aspects d'une vérité qui se manifesterait tôt ou tard*.

(12)

Although Chênebenoit accepted that after the Indochinese nightmare (*la pénible expérience du drame indochinois*), it looked as though those who, "in despair of a policy they thought stupid, entertained the idea and practicality of contacts with Ho Chi Minh" (considered then as a criminal act), could be justified afterwards.

(13)

Here, *Le Monde* denied any similarity between this article and that written by any of its journalists. For instance Blan-

(14)

For Chênebenoit, in the absence of a professional conscience (code of conduct), the duties of which, as far as individual conscience is concerned, had never been defined by law, it was up to the individual to weigh up <peser> his responsibilities.

To each his freedom to decide and to act, but if they decide "to go above the other citizens" and break the law, he thought, they must be held responsible :

Et chacun, lorsque ses scrupules cèdent à la conception qu'il a de la liberté de la presse, doit accepter les risques qui font la grandeur de cette profession. Car, si le journaliste doit être totalement assuré de sa liberté d'opinion ou d'expression, il ne saurait être tenu pour irresponsable de ses actes de citoyen sans se mettre au dessus des citoyens.

Having understood the position of Barrat, and accepted his conception of the right to inform, the paper thought that he had neglected to weigh up this right against what it saw as the duty of every citizen: not to give the enemy grounds for hope or victory.

(15)

Outlining why he got in touch with the "outlaws", he reported what he had said in a meeting of the *Mouvement de libération du peuple*:

Il nous faudrait bien, tôt ou tard, (...) prendre contact avec ceux qui sont actuellement les adversaires de la politique française et représentent l'opinion d'une large fraction de la population algérienne. J'ai pensé qu'il était urgent de connaître et de faire connaître leur point de vue. Si nous avons dialogué plus tôt avec le Vietminh, il est vraisemblable que l'effusion de sang en Indochine eût pu être arrêtée avant Dien-Bien-Phu.

See *Le Monde*, 1/10/55, p. 2.

(16)

See *Le Monde* 1/10/55, p. 2 and 28/11/55, p. 3. Barrat's article was a reportage from the Algerian maquis (see footnote 5 above). The position of the paper was expressed by A.Chênebenoit.

(17)

And outlining the duty of French people to respect the necessities of public order, and that the measures taken

ont été inspirées uniquement par le souci de l'intérêt national et la nécessité absolue de ne pas laisser compromettre par une représentation éronnée ou exagérée des faits en Afrique du Nord dont vous connaissez la gravité.

Je suis convaincu qu'il vous apparaîtra que le gouvernement, en l'occurrence, a usé de son autorité sans abuser aucunement de la confiance qu'il a reçue du pays et du Parlement.

See *Le Monde*, 11/10/55, p. 5.

(18)

When it reported news of the interrogation of Barrat by the authorities (military tribunal of Paris) a year later, over the article (published in 31/8/56 in *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Bilan de la Pacification in France Observateur*), the paper stated that he was accused of attempting to demoralise the army, a criminal matter, and that he was rejecting the allegations, claiming he only wanted to "relate true facts" which they could not reproach him.

The reaction of *Le Monde* here was simply a statement of fact. The paper did not commit itself in favour of the journalist whose freedom of expression was being threatened, whose duty was being restricted, even stifled; it simply stated:

On sait que M. Barrat, ancien secrétaire du Centre catholique des intellectuels français, fut déjà inculpé en septembre 1955 de non-dénonciation de faits constituant des crimes d'atteinte à la sûreté extérieure et intérieure de l'Etat, pour un reportage au sein du maquis algérien, publié à l'époque dans France-Observateur.

The problem is trying to identify what this last reminder is there for. It does certainly inform the reader of what went on before as it did state that Barrat had been charged (See *Le Monde*, 7-8/10/56, p. 6.), but it could also give the impression that the person had already been up for that kind of "offence" before, in which case, he was less likely to draw a sympathetic response from the reader. See also *Le Monde*, 27/10/56.

(19)

Le Monde indicated to its readers that Servan-Schreiber had participated in a debate on press freedom, organised by the Radical Party, and that he was advising a long information campaign about Algeria.

Quoting his comments about the first article in *L'Express*, recounting his experience in Algeria, *Le Monde* observed:

Sa qualité de <<rappelé>> a dit le directeur de l'Express, lui a permis de voir pendant six mois l'autre <<côté du décor>> et de prendre conscience du <<décalage>> entre les vérités officielles et la réalité.

The intention of his paper was said to reveal:

dans quel état de <<mensonges généralisés>> nous vivons et dans quel <<engrenage absurde >> nous nous sommes engagés.

Le Monde explained that for Servan-Schreiber the Algerian problem was not simply at the political level, which could be solved by a change of government, as in the case of Indochina, but that it was more serious and more deep than that, "it affects the very fabric of the nation."

Le Monde's report, headlining on *M. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber: Nous nous sommes engagés dans un engrenage absurde*, was dated 9/3/57, p. 2.

With the publication of the article, *Le Monde* reported that there were questions asked by M. Dides about the Servan-Schreiber's article, wondering why his "odious" article in *L'Express* had not been seized and asking why a former officer had not been immediately prosecuted over accusing: *ses anciens camarades de combat encore mobilisés et se trouvant dans l'im-*

possibilité de lui répondre, de crimes graves et de tortures. See *Le Monde*, 10-11/3/57.

Servan-Schreiber also wrote a book recounting his experience. See Chapter 11.

(20)

Mais il convient de distinguer l'accessoire de l'essentiel. Or le ministre n'a pas contesté jusqu'ici l'essentiel, c'est à dire la véracité des faits.

See *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, p. 2.

(21)

The reporting of the protestations of Servan-Schreiber were accompanied with his acceptance that it might be irritating (*génant*) for the military authorities that, as a consccript with the army in Algeria for six months and a first-hand witness, he should be allowed, after his return, to speak freely about what he saw.

To be silent for him was to be an accomplice in the discredit of the whole army over the use of "certain methods" which would lead to the loss of Algeria. Servan-Schreiber stated that he was firm about continuing his articles in *L'Express* for as long as he was able to. Moreover, continued Servan-Schreiber, "too many serving men had asked me to speak out for me to be intimidated".

(22)

See *Le Monde*, 19/3/57, p. 4 and 20/3/57, p. 1.

(23)

Une nouvelle déclaration du directeur de L'Express, in which Servan-Schreiber declared that he was being sued for having published photographs which he never stated were taken there, that he never took a photo while in service, and that this diversion indicated:

[la faiblesse] des arguments que la propagande officielle est en mesure d'opposer à un texte qui traduit fidèlement la réalité algérienne.

(24)

The first group included the former Socialist Governor of Algeria, Naegelen, the MLP, *Nouvelle Gauche*, the party of *Jeune République*, as well as the League of Human Rights, which protested against the attempts to hide the truth from public opinion, likening the attempt to the Dreyfus affair, an "undignified attempt" made by a Republican government, which, as in the Dreyfus affair, would be in vain anyway. See *Le Monde*, 24-25/3/57, p. 3 *Une protestation de la ligue des droits de l'homme*.

There were also a group of fifty journalists from Nancy who denounced this breach of freedom of the press, "best guarantee of integrity of the democratic process" (*Ibid.*), and General Bollardiere's letter of support sent to Servan-Schreiber.

The paper gave the text of the letter sent by the general to Servan-Schreiber about his *Lieutenant en Algérie* story, published in *L'Express* 29 mars, approving Servan-Schreiber's publication.

Je pense qu'il était hautement souhaitable

qu'après avoir vécu notre action et partagé nos efforts, vous fassiez votre métier de journaliste en soulignant à l'opinion publique les aspects dramatiques de la guerre révolutionnaire à laquelle nous faisons face, et à l'effroyable danger qu'il y aurait pour nous à perdre de vue, sous le prétexte fallacieux de l'efficacité immédiate, les valeurs morales qui, seules, ont fait jusqu'à maintenant la grandeur de notre civilisation et de notre armée.

Je vous envoie l'assurance de mon estime et mes souvenirs amicaux.

Signed Général Paris de Bollardière, grand chevalier de la Légion d'honneur, compagnon de la Libération, in *Le Monde*, 30/3/57, p. 6.

The letter had initially been published in *L'Express* on 29 March and reproduced by *Le Monde* the same day (dated 30 March).

With a seemingly supportive current in favour of Servan-Schreiber, there was also in a second group, a host of denials and official or governmental pronouncements arguing the opposite point of view. Most of these official statements tended to run against the support of Servan-Schreiber. See also *Le Monde*, 21/3/57, p. 2.

The reports showed the Defence and Resident Ministers attacking his articles and putting the blame on him for not having spoken previously when he was serving on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Servan-Schreiber remarking that the measures taken against him and other serving officers were "unfair and inelegant", stating that he was speaking of his own free will and denying that he was trying to score political points. He was also reported as asserting that his main concern was that if public opinion did not take stock of the situation in Algeria, his generation would have to pay a cruel price and that his belief, shared by many of his comrades, led him to start his récit which he stated would continue.

See *Le Monde*, 23/3/57, p. 2 and 30/3/57, p. 6 which contained a further declaration by the Defence Minister

(25)

Le Monde reported that Servan-Schreiber had been charged with demoralisation of the army, that he had chosen Me Georges Izard for his defence, and that he left the court on bail, making a declaration to the effect that the Ministry of Defence knew the veracity of the statements, claiming that Servan-Schreiber received daily testimonies confirming his own, and outlining his intention to publish five more articles on the subject. See *Le Monde*, 22/3/57, p. 2.

A further appearance of Servan-Schreiber before the judge was reported, together with protest of the Press Federation against further seizures of *L'Express*. See *Le Monde*, 5/4/57, p. 2.

The paper laconically reported later that copies of *L'Express* sent to Algeria did not contain the articles of Servan-Schreiber and that, eventually, he had interrupted the publication of his articles because of "health reasons", without going into any details, promising, though, that publication would resume the following month. See *Le Monde*, 6/4/57, p. 4.

Thereafter, *Le Monde* continued to channel the replies given by the military in Algeria in defence of their action. See *Le Monde*, 13/4/57, p. 4.

(26)

Lieutenant en Algérie, Julliard, Paris, 1957.

(27)

For *France-Observateur*, see *Le Monde*, 14-15/10/56, p. 3, and 26/4/57, p. 5, for further charges brought against him.

(28)

Le Monde, 18/1/57, p. 5.

Le Monde also reported charges against C. Bourdet (*Le Monde*, 26/4/57, p. 5.), against *L'Humanité's* editorialist, M. Courtade, who was reported to have appeared in a criminal court for *atteinte à l'intégrité du territoire*, to have manifested a "secessionist opinion" while the defence was reported as having stated that numerous "personalities" were aware of existence of an "Algerian national identity". See *Le Monde*, 16/3/57, p. 2.

Ten days later, in about fourteen lines, came the conviction of *L'Humanité* for defamation by the president of Batna's Tribunal over the article *Halte aux forfaits colonialistes*, 4/7/55.

On this occasion both the director, Firmin Pelissier, and the author of the article were each fined 100,000 francs by the tribunal of the Seine presided over by judge Peyronie. See *Le Monde*, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.

A few days after the event Georges Montaron, director of *Témoignage chrétien*, was charged with the offence of defamation of the army after a complaint by M. Bourgès-Maunoury, the Defence Minister. Montaron was reported as having come out of the Tribunal stating that he thought the action was over Jean Muller's publication [*Le Monde's* footnote simply stated the Notebook (*Cahier d'écriture*) of the time spent by a reservist in Algeria], but in reality it was the name of the reader's letter, which he would not reveal to the court, that was being sought of him.

Le Monde, on this occasion, while reporting Montaron's statement to the press in quotes, gave the sentences applicable, explaining that the sentences for defamation were eight days to a year in jail or a fine of between 20,000 to 20 million francs, or both according to article 30 of the Law of 29 July 1881. See *Le Monde*, 30/3/57, p. 6.

(29)

Firmin Pelissier, Director, and Lyzow Mittelbeg, cartoonist both were fined 100,000 francs. See *Le Monde*, 14/5/57, p. 4.

(30)

See *Le Monde*, 25/5/57, p. 3

(31)

See *Le Monde*, 20/6/57, p. 6, 5/7/57, p. 4 and 7-8/7/57, p. 3.

(32)

Le Monde, 5/4/56, p. 5.

(33)

Dean of the Law Faculty, Algiers University.

(34)

Le Monde 10/4/57, p. 3.

(35)

A. Frossard, *Ce Mandouze dont nous vient tout le mal*, *Le*

Monde, 28/11/55, p. 5 and G.Suffert, *Un récidiviste*, *Le Monde*, 5/12/55, p. 5.

(36)

La Question, Minuit, Lausanne, 1958 & 1961.

The book, banned in France, clearly exposed for the first time detailed use of torture at the hand of the French security forces by somebody giving a first hand account of it.

(37)

Le Monde, 20/2/58, p. 9 and 14/5/58, p. 3.

(38)

If some of the international press warned of North Africa going back to the dark ages (*Morgen Post*) if France were to withdraw, some others accepted the aims of freedom which animated the masses in that area, but found it too soon to liberate the colonies (*Philadelphia Enquirer*). Others went further; the *<General Anzeiger>*, probably with fresh memories of the plight of Germany during the last war, issued a strong condemnation of the reprisals, and likened the destruction of Algerian villages to the Czech village of Lidice and the massacres of Oradour, arguing that, if only one innocent can be found amongst the thousand victims, the instigators of the reprisals should be charged with crimes against humanity.

The *New York Daily Mirror* likened the North African struggle to the American War of Independence and wrote that the Moors were not French in history, religion, or customs, and that the revolution taking place over there, taking advantage of French weakness, had the same characteristics as that which had resulted in the creation of the US. The fact that American colonists were mostly British by history, religion, customs, etc. and they, unlike the Algerian FLN, received massive foreign aid, suggests that the parallel was not close; it helps illustrate, however, that there was even less common ground between the French and the Moors, and therefore the links between Algeria and France were even less justified historically. This paper saw no interest in backing French colonialism in the area, which it saw as destined to perish.

There were echoes of all these positions in *Le Monde's* press review.

(39)

A shrewd *Libération* found that a *disguised* war was taking place: *Une guerre qui n'ose pas dire son nom*. For this paper, the terminology used (such as: general assault, cleaning up operations, villages mowed down to the ground) was reminiscent of a previously troubled period, *où la France se glissa insensiblement dans la guerre d'Indochine* against the wishes of the people who would have to face a *fait accompli*.

Even *Le Figaro* was a hint critical. For this paper punishment did not solve anything at all: *Le châtement ne règle rien*. This paper, however, similarly to *Le Monde*, did not agree with *L'Humanité's* characterisation of the rebels as patriots. *Le Monde's* reaction (as seen above) was a confused and unclear statement of what had happened, justifying some actions and not others, and condemning the odious assassination of Europeans.

Very few newspapers printed strong condemnations of the reprisals by the troops. The reaction of the government was simple when they did: the authorities resorted to legal measures or administrative procedures which resulted in blatant

seizures of these newspapers. As a result of this policy, the article, *Faites cesser la terreur*, by Pierre Courtade was to make *L'Humanité* suffer. It was seized (from the presses, dépôts, transport vehicles, stations and mailbags).

Le Monde was no exception, it was seized for reprinting what the others had printed.

(40)

There has not been an in-depth study of the seizures except for Harrisson M., *Government and the Press during the Algerian war*, The American Political Science Review, June 1964, pp. 273-285.

(41)

Or, put another way, how did *Le Monde* react to this infringement of press freedom and attack on the freedom of expression? What characteristics do we find in articles and reports dealing with that particular aspect of *Le Monde's* coverage?

(42)

Sometimes playing down the importance (as when *Le Monde* gave the number of seizures since a particular date). The impact of giving the total number of seizures would have been far greater.

Le Monde, for instance, pointed out that it was the third time in a short period that the Catholic paper, *La Croix* (3 and 4 February 1957) had fallen victim to such a measure. On this occasion *Le Monde* also gave the article incriminated as being: *Algérie, la grève s'étend*.

A number of other examples can be given relating to: *Esprit* (third seizure over *Maladies infantiles de l'Indépendance* in *Le Monde*, 29/6/57, p. 4, 1/8/57/and 8/8/57, p. 4, and over Captain Louis Fournier's article commenting on the battle of Melouza. See *Le Monde*, 10/8/57, p. 4.

Exceptionally, the account was complete in the case of *L'Economie Algérienne*, mouthpiece of the Union of Traders *UGCA* (it was the second time). See *Le Monde* 22/12/56.

When *Le Monde* reported that *L'Espoir* was about to be wound up, it quoted the statements of the paper, outlining the total number of publications and seizures. See *Le Monde*, 23/2/57, p. 5.

(43)

Le Monde (30/1/57) indicating that: *La Croix saisi à Alger en raison d'information relatives au mot d'ordre de grève*.

(44)

The seizure of *L'Esprit* over the *maladies infantiles* article in *Le Monde*, 29/6/57, p. 4 (seven lines).

(45)

Le Monde headlined that five other weeklies had been seized (5 autres hebdomadaires saisis) when an actual reading of the article revealed that, besides those five weeklies, two more dailies were also seized, making the total seven publications altogether. See *Le Monde*, 23/1/57, p. 5.

Another instance could be found when the contents of another article of *Le Monde*, headlining that three weeklies had been seized, revealed that many more publications had suffered the same fate. See *Le Monde*, 7/3/58, p. 3.

(46)

The sort of neutral way of reporting applied through September 1955, for instance, despite the paper's knowledge of its own journalist's first-hand experience (Penchenier), and despite other papers' publication of cases of vivid description of torture.

Je rencontre un Algérien, citoyen français comme vous et moi, de par notre volonté. Il fut arrêté en novembre, conduit à Alger, interrogé sur ses activités politiques. N'en ayant pas, ses réponses déçurent ceux qui croyaient la prise bonne. On le dévêtit, on lui lia aussi les mains sur une barre passant derrière les genoux, on le jeta à terre. A chaque dénégation un tuyeau était placé sur sa bouche et sur son nez jusqu'à suffocation. Il s'évanouit plusieurs fois pendant ce supplice complet de coups de bâton dans les reins. Le régime changea: éclairage violent dans les yeux pendant des heures, coups de poing à la nuque, au creux de l'estomac, l'électrocution. Cela dura trois jours comme la descente aux enfers. Un tel traitement n'est pas habituel bien sûr, ni en Algérie, ni ailleurs. Mais on le pratique parfois dans tous les pays du monde. Vraiment il ne faudrait pas gratter beaucoup pour libérer dans l'homme la bestialité la plus avilissante! -enfin la justice!- [il fut accusé] d'atteinte à la sûreté de l'Etat, et fut conduit pour trois mois en prison. Il ne fut pas jugé, pour la seule raison qu'il bénéficia d'un non-lieu: bénéficia, la formule est d'une ironie cruelle. Sans réparation, sans excuses ou regrets, il rentra dans la vie. Il aurait quelques raisons d'être revolté, de nous haïr. Il a dominé sa rancœur, car il a appris que la haine ne rapporte qu'une haine plus grande...

This letter, printed by Claudius Petit in his St-Etienne weekly and echoed in *Le Monde*, 21/9/55, p. 5, gave detailed "excesses" and crimes committed against the civilian Algerian population.

(47)

This simple way of reporting the event was carried out through most of the paper's reports throughout.

Similarly when, for instance, as a result of various seizures of their publications, the presses used by Ferhat Abbas (A nationalist liberal who collaborated with the French authorities until the mid 1950's) were being auctioned off, *Le Monde* made no comments and simply carried the news. See *Le Monde*, 3/1/58.

(48)

See *Le Monde*, 19/11/56, p. 7, about *L'Espoir*,

When the fortnightly publication, *L'Espoir* (see also below) distributed by the *Fédération des Libéraux d'Algérie* was seized, *Le Monde* stated that the newspaper had been seized in the kiosks and the Post Office in Algiers by prefectural decree of 10 November. See *Le Monde*, 19/11/56, p. 7.

(49)

Les Nouvelles de Bordeaux et du Sud Ouest a été saisi en vertu de l'article 10 du Code d'Instruction Criminelle. This

seizure related to police operations against Algerians belonging to banned organisations and included reports of interrogation and summary executions. 22/1/57, p. 4.

(50)

Le Monde resorted to using statements made by official state sources or news agencies. As in the case of the UDMA's *République Algérienne*. See *Le Monde*, 15/9/55, p. 5.

... Publication de nouvelles de nature à troubler l'ordre public. Au sommaire de ce numéro, qui devait être mis en vente le vendredi 16 septembre figurait un document photographique sur les exécutions sommaires au stade de Philippeville, document déjà publié en France, notamment par le magazine *Noir et Blanc*; une étude de synthèse sur la situation en Algérie et la responsabilité du colonialisme, et surtout un article accusant le contre-terrorisme d'avoir fait assassiner le pharmacien Abbas Alaoua, neveu de Ferhat Abbas, le 20 août à Constantine.

Most of the articles referring to seizure were based on official sources, especially the Governor General and the governmental press agency, AFP. See *Le Monde*, 23-24/12/56. See also, for instance, the report referring to the seizure by the Préfet of the Garonne 20-12-56, on his Interior Minister's instruction, of the *Bulletin* of Black African students, expressing disagreement with their elders over the way to solve the problem of the day.

(51)

This was the case of many articles by Socialists opposed to government policy such as André Philip. When reporting the seizure of *L'Espoir*, *Le Monde* indicated that the article which had motivated the seizure was the article of André Philip, former minister and socialist deputy, taking up ideas expressed in *Le Monde* (in reply to the Prime Minister's declaration outlining the programme to be followed in Algeria -cease-fire, elections-negotiations), and stating that a cease-fire could not be achieved without a political agreement. See *Le Monde*, 22/1/57, p. 4.

André Philip's other article (*Le Monde*, 7/3/58, p. 3) criticising the suicidal policy of France, given the officially accepted view that victory was impossible, arguing that the conflict was internationalised, was given by *Le Monde* as the motive for the seizure of *France Observateur*.

Motives were also given for the seizure of many left-wing publications.

(52)

See *Le Monde*, 30-31/4/57, p. 4. It is worth noting that despite self-censorship, *L'Express* and a few others were under heavy pressure throughout the period in question.

(53)

On pense que c'est la façon dont le journal *L'Espoir* relatait la grève des 8 jours, déclenchée par le FLN qui a provoqué cette mesure.

Le Monde, 12/2/57, p. 3.

It must be pointed out, especially on this occasion, that *Le Monde* reported this seizure without contrasting it to its own

innocuous articles on the topic (See Chapter 12 on this subject).

Sometimes, the reports were based on other papers' guesses. Comments indicating that, despite the voluntary self-imposed *censure préalable*, *L'Express's* editorial team:

est réduite à supposer que seul le Bloc-Notes de M François Mauriac peut être la cause de cette mesure discrétionnaire.

Le Monde, 1/3/58, p. 1.

(54)

Comments referring to the repeated seizures of the Algerian liberals' newspaper, *L'Espoir*, "which showed independence from political power and financial groups", *Le Monde* stated that with the threat of this paper's disappearance:

disparaitrait en Algérie l'une des rares tribunes où Européens et musulmans peuvent encore s'exprimer en faveur de la cohabitation des deux communautés et d'une solution pacifique du problème algérien.

Le Monde, 22/12/56.

With a later seizure, *Le Monde* (23-24/12/56) wrote that this further seizure could increase the financial difficulties and speed up the decision to liquidate the paper.

Le Monde also reported that the contributors to the paper had stated that they had kept quiet for six months to enable Lacoste to implement his policies but that, since nothing had been done, they had decided to speak out. It reported also that they did so with moderation, in order not to increase tension between the two communities. It was also revealed that they had kept some information, received from their correspondents in the countryside, quiet, that they had doctored (*édulcorer*) some articles and delayed the publication of information until verifications were made. It was also stated that they reaffirmed that they did not encourage Algerian rebellion, but that the truth about it could not be silenced.

Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas condamner les méthodes dangereuses pour la France, pour l'Algérie et pour cette amitié franco-maghrébine sans laquelle la France ne serait plus la France, sans laquelle le Maghreb s'engagerait dans une aventure dont on ne peut prévoir les conséquences ...

Le pays crève de mensonges et de faux semblants. Si l'on veut que les choses ne soient pas dites, il faut qu'elles ne soient pas faites. Si l'on prétend défendre la démocratie et la liberté, il faut laisser librement parler ceux qui ne pensent pas comme nous. Si l'on est si sensible qu'on ne supporte pas la contradiction, eh bien! Qu'on prenne des mesures dictatoriales. La censure en est une. Elle aurait au moins le mérite de la franchise.

Le Monde, 23-24/12/56. All this defense of the paper was in quotes. Although it is informing its readers about the issue, *Le Monde*, in a sense, is only reporting what the others are saying and not really getting involved itself.

(55)

Reporting the seizure of the Catholic paper, *La Croix* (3-4 February 1957), over the article, *La grève s'étend, le terrorisme se rallume*, and stating that *L'Echo d'Alger's* last page had been devoted to the same event, *Le Monde* pointedly commen-

ted (but in very small print):

(...) la saisie du journal parisien constitue une mesure à la fois inutile et arbitraire. Elle n'empêchera personne à l'étranger comme en France de connaître la vérité sur l'Algérie en dehors des versions et déclarations officielles trop souvent démenties par les faits depuis un an.

Le Monde, 7/2/57, p. 10.

(56)

This can even be seen as duplicitous when we know that the paper at the same time was withholding information from its readers about the very strike itself (See Chapter 7).

(57)

When we know that *Le Monde's* journalists and director were so quick off the mark to see the Melouza incidents and "fell-agas atrocities" as crimes against humanity. See Melouza reference in Chapter 6.

(58)

Stating that *France-Observateur* had been seized for the second time in three weeks, *Le Monde* reproduced excerpts from another article written in *France-Observateur* outlining the seized paper's insistence on the danger of financial threats, the freedom of journalists and their intention to refuse to be silenced, as well as the right of the public to be informed, and reported that a later edition of *France Observateur* was published without the incriminating article. See *Le Monde*, 3/5/57, pp. 5-6 *Nouvelle saisie de France-Observateur*

The few comments ventured by *Le Monde* in small print included assertions such as: the press had to inform public opinion of facts that the authorities "preferred to ignore", and that "random seizures" (à tout bout de champ) would only lead to a further degradation of our institutions and a perpetuation of excesses".

(59)

Le Monde was now urging that the *Commission de Sauvegarde* (see below) be quickly set up to "fulfil conscientiously and courageously its task" (see *Nouvelle saisie de France-Observateur*, in *Le Monde*, 3/5/57, p. 6) so that:

La presse, au moins dans un premier stade, n'aura plus alors qu'à lui adresser témoignages et témoignages.

So the role of the press, in this field, was to inform the Commission. There clearly appears a difference of attitude and conception of the role of the newspaper between *Le Monde* and *France-Observateur* as seen above.

(60)

Referred to as early as 1955 in independent reports.

The seizure of *France Observateur* in May 1957 (discussed above) was based specifically on a reference to torture in a soldier's letter to his father (*Jeunes soldats devant la torture*). See *Le Monde*, 3/5/57, p. 6.

(61)

However, the the paper did report third-party protests over his treatment. *Le Monde* reported, for instance, occasionally (in quotes) that *L'Humanité* had been seized for publishing

Alleg's complaint, that M. Still had pointed out that the commission of former deportees (See *Commission de sauvegarde* below) had, after enquiry, recognised the existence of torture, and that the government had agreed to send a commission of enquiry.

(62)

Le Monde reported its position in its review of the press column. The report of *Franc-Tireur* on this occasion read as follows: *Franc-Tireur* publie de son côté le commentaire suivant:

<<Nous n'avons pas les moyens de vérifier l'exactitude des assertions de M. Alleg, dont le parti a trop souvent couvert les tortures et les crimes perpétrés à l'Est. Mais si une partie seulement de ces faits sont exacts, une enquête et des sanctions s'imposent, non contre le journal, fût-il communiste, qui les a publiés, mais contre les tortionnaires, fussent-ils des officiers.

Dans ses conclusions, publiées la semaine dernière, la délégation de la commission internationale contre le régime concentrationnaire avait déjà relevé en Algérie des cas de véritables tortures par l'électricité, le tuyau d'eau, la baignoire, la pendaison pour extorquer déclarations ou aveux.

Ces cas sont sans doute exceptionnels et ne sauraient donc porter atteinte à l'honneur de la France, pas plus que des officiers isolés ne sauraient attenter à l'honneur de l'armée, surtout s'il est exact, comme l'affirme M. Alleg, qu'ils ont couvert d'injures la République qu'ils ont mission de servir.

Mais ce devrait être une raison de plus pour établir la vérité et faire triompher la justice.>>

Le Monde, 1/8/57, p. 4.

In small print *Le Monde* commented that the government could not afford to do nothing, but that it had to establish whether the statements were correct and act accordingly:

Les précisions sur les noms, les dates et les lieux et, hélas! les procédés de tortures données à M. Alleg dans sa plainte ne permettent pas en effet de considérer que la saisie du journal communiste constitue pour la conscience une réponse suffisante. Ou ces faits sont inexacts et des poursuites doivent être engagées, ou ils sont vrais et des sanctions doivent être prises. *L'Humanité* a d'ailleurs été saisi trop tard pour que la presse étrangère n'ait pas eu connaissance d'une affaire qui, parmi d'autres, risque, si elle est simplement étouffée, de porter un grave préjudice à la cause française.

See *Le Monde*, 1/8/57, p. 4.

(63)

Very often these protests emanated from sources other than *Le Monde*, but as a rule, the paper included them in its coverage.

It reported the protests by Camille Val, general-secretary of *Jeune République*, about the seizure of *Espoir-Algérie* drawing a parallel between the attitude adopted by the government towards the "proponents of a real pacification and dialo-

que" and those "responsible for the dramatic situation in Algeria, for promoting colonialism and racism" (*Le Monde*, 27/12/56.), before stating that the paper had interrupted its publication.

In *Après une nouvelle saisie <<L'Espoir>> organe des libéraux d'Algérie interrompt sa parution. Le Monde*, 23/2/57, p. 5.

The paper reported that the paper had sent a circular to its subscribers after this fifth seizure explaining that readers and friends understood that it could not take the futile risk of printing a newspaper which was immediately taken away by the police. The paper was also reported as criticising:

(...) *la propagande officielle qui masque la vérité et déclare qu'il a <<dénoncé les erreurs et les injustices de la politique de pacification quand il était temps encore de redresser une action malheureuse...*

Nous sommes ... au terme d'un enchaînement fatal où le recours à la force conduit au règne de la force seule.

It hoped that it would be able to appear in the future without the need to be in the opposition.

Le Monde recalled that that paper [which was at its 16th publication, authorised to publish by Lacoste in June 56] was the only paper of the opposition in Algeria to be tolerated by the Governor-General and that this tolerance had become more and more fictitious as the number of seizures increased:

Les dirigeants du bimensuel avaient même demandé que la censure leur soit appliquée plutôt que des méthodes indirectes qui avaient pour effet de leur imposer le silence. 23/2/57, p. 5.

(64)

When the same *L'Espoir* stopped publication, *Le Monde's* reports dealt with that (23/2/57, p. 5, and above). Later Jean Gonnet, director, was given the opportunity to argue the case for his paper in two half-columns of the "free opinion" rubric. See *Un journal qui disparaît, Le Monde*, 14/3/57, p. 2.

He also stressed the need for a coherence between the ends and the means:

N'importe quels moyens ne conduisent pas à n'importe quelle fin. Des moyens injustes perpétuent l'injustice. Des solutions emportées par la force ne tiennent qu'autant que la force est suffisamment forte pour les imposer.

Ibid.

(65)

One could find in *Le Monde* the protests of André Still, editor of *L'Humanité* (*Le Monde*, 18/1/57, p. 5); that of Françoise Giroud, co-editor (with Servan-Schreiber) of *L'Express*, complaining that *France Soir*, *Paris Presse*, *Le Monde*, *L'Express*, *La Croix*, *Témoignage Chrétien* and others all had been seized during that year in Algeria, arguing that there were "lies" by omission and requesting, either, that these measures be stopped, or for censorship to be clearly envisaged like in Spain Hungary and Egypt. See *Le Monde*, 4/5/57, p. 3.

There were also protests by Claude Bourdet in the paper, complaining against the seizure of *France-Observateur* over *Le silence est de sang*, article dealing with repression in Algeria

(this was a play with word mocking the well-known expression *le silence est d'or*) in the communiqué of *France-Observateur*, published in *Le Monde*, 12/4/57, which also reported on this occasion the frustration of the editorial team for not having been informed of the reasons of the seizure and their defiant statement (in quotes) that information will eventually get out to public opinion. It was also pointed out that M. Bourguès-Maunoury had declared (on 4 April) that there was no question of censorship a week (8 days) before and indicated that there were financial implications for the paper, which had asserted its will to fight on to inform public opinion.

Other examples of protests included the Federation of the Press (in a communiqué issued by its president Albert Bayet) against the seizure of *L'Express* in Algeria (despite the articles concerning Algeria being edited from copies of the papers sent there). All these protests were given room in the paper and could clearly be seen. But the paper was not orchestrating a campaign against the state, it was simply reproducing these protests in quotes; it was merely reporting them factually. *Le Monde*, 5/4/57, p. 2.

Organisations' protests were also reported when *Le Monde* published the complaint of the Bureau of the radical Party against *procédé arbitraire, anti-démocratique et plus hypocrite que la censure avouée [qui] porte un préjudice intolérable à la liberté de la presse.*

See *Le Monde*, 4/5/57, p. 3, *Le Bureau du parti radical proteste contre la saisie de France Observateur.*

Le Monde reported that personalities and groups protested against censorship measures. The paper gave news of thirty-five personalities writing to the president of the Republic, M Coty, to complain against the seizure of *France Observateur*, the breach of the French people's right to be informed of what was going on in Algeria, and requesting information on whether "the action demanded of the sons of France was in conformity with the honour of the flag".

Le Monde gave the names of some of the signatories: Jean Cassou, R.Capitant, J.Kayser, Pierre Le Brun, Henry Marrou, Louis Martin-Chauffier, Louis Massignon, François Mauriac, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Léon Pierre-Quint, Claude Roy, JP Sartre, Alfred Sauvy, Jean Wahl, Mmes Clara Malraux, Andrée Viennot, in *35 personnalités protestent auprès de M.Coty contre la saisie de France-Observateur.* *Le Monde*, 7/5/57, p. 7.

The same day the paper reported a protest by the print union against the "second seizure in two weeks". 7/5/57, p. 7.

(66)

On the seizure of *France-Observateur* and Alleg's book, see *Le Monde*, 28/2/58, when occasionally *Le Monde* gave a fuller explanation as to what actually was involved, but only much later.

(67)

When the article of Jean Daniel was omitted from *L'Express*, *Le Monde* reported the event and the comments made by the censored paper in its following issue. In *Le Monde*, 26/1/57. *L'Express paraît à Alger avec une page blanche.*

"Qu'une censure soit instituée si la situation est telle qu'elle l'exige, soit. Mais la saisie n'est pas la censure. Mentionnons pour mémoire l'hémorragie financière qu'elle entraîne et qui

suffirait à conseiller aux directeurs de journaux la prudence , la timidité, la lâcheté...

Nous refusons, pour notre part, de nous suicider en subissant, pour chaque numéro saisi, des pertes qui sont lourdes pour nous. C'est un luxe que nous ne pouvons pas nous offrir toutes les semaines. Mais nous ne céderons pas davantage à la tentative de <<l'information émasculée>>.

Le Monde concluded:

L'article de Jean Daniel, que contient ce numéro et qui pourrait donner prétexte à la sollicitude du gouvernement général, sera donc purement et simplement remplacé par une page blanche, dans les exemplaires expédiés en Algérie.

L'Express was particularly hit and seizures took place even when it had censored its articles. This also occurred in August 1957. See *Le Monde*, 10/8/57, p. 4 and 14/8/57, p. 4. The latter edition announced that *Le Monde* had also been seized for reporting the content of the censored version of *L'Express*.

(68)

Le Monde, for instance, reported that it had been requested to publish the protest of *Temps Modernes*.

On nous prie d'insérer le communiqué suivant; and in quotes one finds the editorial communiqué stating that the seizure of *Temps Modernes* had been motivated by an editorial of J.P. Sartre on torture in Algeria and Jean Rous' article on the last chances for negotiation. See *Le Monde*, 5/6/57, p. 3. Many of the articles mentioned above were also published in communiqué form.

(69)

Attention to legal requirements, as far as freedom of the press was concerned, though reported (second hand) by *Le Monde*, was usually put forward by other organisations. It was *France Observateur*, for instance, which pointed out (to the Public Prosecutor) that article 51 of the law of 21 July 1881 stated that seizure could only be decided by a judge (d'instruction) and should only relate to 4 copies of the item in question while all other copies should be restituted. *Le Monde*, 7/5/57, p. 7.

Similarly, it was *L'Humanité's* André Still (reported by *Le Monde*) who pointed out that the charges brought against him were in violation of the same law, which excluded the editor of a newspaper from criminal charges (*responsabilité juridique*) and responsibility over articles not written by him.

See *Le Monde*, 18/1/57, p. 5.

(70)

In its comments, the paper wrote: *Comme il était à prévoir, les autorités font usage des droits que leur confère la loi sur l'Etat d'Urgence*. See *Le Monde*, 24-25/4/55.

Since most of its previous reports indicated that press censorship would not be adopted. Then, when it occurred, the first measure should have led to a strong protest from any paper committed to freedom of the press. Instead, the article simply read:

L'arrêté publié au Journal Officiel... importantes mesures dans le cadre de la loi d'urgence. Le premier établit la censure sur la presse et stipule que

les directeurs et responsables de journaux et de publications doivent soumettre avant tirage au préfets du département dans lequel ils sont publiés des morasses ou preuves des numéros à paraître .. la durée de cette mesure est limitée à la durée d'application de l'Etat d'Urgence.

Instead of strongly criticising special powers and their consequences, in anticipation of what might later happen, the paper commented in a small note and in a small print:

(..) C'est aujourd'hui la liberté d'information & de commentaire qui se voit restreindre en Algérie alors que les dispositions légales antérieures mettaient déjà une arme redoutable, on a pu le constater en France, aux mains des pouvoirs publics.

See *Le Monde*, 24-25/4/55.

(71)

The paper was seized in Algeria over the Penchenier story. See Chapter 10 (footnotes) and Chapter 12.

(72)

Very similar to those referred to in Chapter 12.

(73)

Vraisemblablement par des balles perdues. See *Le Monde*, 6-7/1/57, ff.

(74)

Hubert Beuve-Méry (HBM), wanting to be judged by what his paper had actually printed rather than by what the government was accusing it of having printed, tried to put the record straight by republishing the description of the incident (See *Pièces en main* in *Le Monde*, 8/1/57, p. 1), stating that steps had been taken to contact the Ministry of Defence to check the details of the story; and he maintained that the paper did refer to the "fatal injury" of the girl as an "accident" and that it was not accusing anybody of murder. He also asked what the "exigences de l'heure", on which the seizure was motivated, were and what they meant.

(75)

Quand il n'y a plus de liberté digne de ce nom, l'établissement de la censure préalable devient une question de stricte honnêteté. Elle seule peut dégager devant le public les journaux et les journalistes de responsabilités qui ne leur appartiennent plus.

See Beuve-Méry, in *Le Monde*, 8/1/57, p. 1.

(76)

The story published by *Le Monde* did not contradict the Ministry of Defence sources in any case.

(77)

The next day, see *Le Monde*, 9/1/57, p. 2.

(78)

The indirect emergence of the Federation's agreement in the protestations of the Federation, was quite revealing in the

sense that it was not used to provide a caution to the readers to help in their assessment of the nature of what was being printed under the cover of objective reporting, but as a mitigating circumstance to strengthen and help defend the paper in its position.

(79)

See *Le Monde*, 11/1/57, p. 7.

(80)

In small print the paper pointed out that it was not only in the Lodi camp, but in all internment camps, that the paper had been banned. See *Le Monde*, 26/3/57, p. 6.

(81)

See Chapter 5 and various reports throughout.

(82)

See Chapter 2.

(83)

Outside contributor to the paper, see *Le Monde*, 22/3/57, mainly written to criticise the report of the Hovnanian Commission (see below).

(84)

(...) constatation en quelque sorte clinique d'un des grands phénomènes sociaux du XX ième siècle.

In the article, Beuve-Méry reiterated that the patriotism and the efficacy of the paratroopers were never in question and that, indeed, his paper had on countless occasions praised them. He stated the "game" of a few politicians was to give the army responsibilities alien to it, so that it could be better used as a shield to prevent any attempt to discuss or draw the consequences of this role, and thereby, interpret any political discussion on the subject as a crime. See *Le Procès*, leader signed by Hubert Beuve-Méry in *Le Monde*, 20/7/57, p. 1.

(85)

Il fallait s'y attendre. Les assauts spectaculaires à coups de centaines de millions et les savantes machinations ourdies dans l'ombre n'ayant pas abouti à quoi que ce fût, sinon à renforcer le gêneur qu'on s'était juré de supprimer, on devait imaginer autre chose.

Ibid.

(86)

By declaring that other papers had showed the "same degree of temerity" when they clearly used to do much more in this field, Beuve-Méry continued:

Mais c'est Le Monde qu'il faut à tout prix frapper et mettre, si possible, hors de combat.

La preuve est ainsi faite, une fois de plus du bien fondé des avertissements prodigués ici ... de ce qui attend le pays au terme de la route dans laquelle il se trouve chaque jour un peu plus engagé.

Ibid.

(87)

For *Tribune de Lausanne*, see *La Tribune de Lausanne consacre un éditorial au procès intenté au Monde*, in *Le Monde*, 23/7/57, p. 2; for *The Economist*, see "Squeezing the Press: *L'Economiste se préoccupe des atteintes à la liberté de la presse française et du procès intenté au Monde*", in *Le Monde*, 30/7/57, p. 5 and for *The Washington Post*, see *Le Washington Post (1/8) s'inquiète à son tour des poursuites engagées contre Le Monde*, see *Le Monde*, 2/8/57, p. 4.

(88)

It would be useful to recall that *Le Monde* was also seized for reproducing stories published in other papers such as the article published by Captain Luis Fournier (seized itself) in *L'Express*, extracts of which were reproduced in *Le Monde*, without the paper showing the slightest signs of having been annoyed. There was no protest in this case, but information outlining that both its Saturday editions for 10 August had been seized for reproducing extracts of the article in question.

See *Le Monde*, 11-12/8/57, p. 3 and 14/8/57, p. 4.

(89)

See Chapter 2 or one of its articles *Quand la France est gouvernée*.

(90)

See section relating to press censorship above and the persecution of journalists in the earlier part of this Chapter.

(91)

Harrisson, M., op. cit.

(92)

See *Le Monde*, 26/1/57, p. 3, reporting publication of *L'Express* with blank pages.

(93)

Penchenier's articles at the end of August 1955 (24 to 30/8/55) were examined in Chapter 12.

(94)

Which only implied that potentially those Algerians, dissatisfied with government policy, might be the future leaders of the nationalists. See *Le Monde*, 24/12/56.

(95)

Jean Planchais told me that this did not mean that the positions of the paper pleased everybody as he, and his own apartment, were a bomb target after 1958.

(96)

From the start, in spite of the fact that a number of Communists were allegedly and actually victims of ill-treatment by the security forces, parliament voted to exclude them from taking part in the seven-man expedition.

This was reported by *Le Monde*, 28-29/10/56, without any

objections being raised by the paper as to why this group, whose associated members were the main victims besides intellectuals and the Algerians themselves, could not take part.

(97)

The dissenter was a member of the Radical party, M. Hovnanian. The six other members were Mr Provo and Mr Mérigonde (both Socialists), M. Isorni (Independent), M Bricout (from the Républicains Sociaux), M. Cayeux (MRP) and Quinson (GRG).

(98)

The paper covered both the content of the conclusions and the objections of Hovnanian.

(99)

Which, the paper admitted, was the only case which it had directly reported. See earlier report of Lavallette, January 1957, in Chapter 12.

(100)

See *Le Monde*, 17-18/3/57, p. 1.

(101)

Though surprised by the use of the conditional (*l'imposture serait évidente*), the paper concluded along the lines of the report that *à propos du pal, des ongles arrachés, l'imposture serait évidente* ... *cas de sévices aussi graves doivent laisser longtemps des stigmates évidents.*

(102)

See *Le Monde*, 17-18/3/57, p. 1.

(103)

Which consisted in summarising, quoting, mainly going through the main points of the report without being in any sense critical. Ibid p. 2.

(104)

With the conclusion that nothing in the completed enquiry enabled it to conclude that torture had been practised:

après un examen approfondi du dossier, la délégation a estimé, à l'unanimité moins une voix, que rien dans l'enquête qu'elle a effectuée ne pouvait l'amener à conclure à des tortures subies.

Ibid.

(105)

See footnote 112 below.

Also the last two headings (and the contents of the paragraphs) indicated respectively that the implementation of justice under normal conditions would make it impossible to effect any arrest, and that doubt and suspicion regarding the security forces had to be avoided (*l'écueil à éviter*). Ibid.

(106)

Who thought that, although it would be difficult to check for traces of torture three months afterwards, the traces that he found were inconsistent with illness. He also stated that he did not share the conclusion that "doubt had to be avoided".

He, nevertheless, appreciated the difficulty of police work and put the blame on the politicians in charge, in the first instance, "who justify or even encourage by their silence the continuation of these methods".

(107)

By not doing so, it made the report look more plausible and likely to be given more credibility. See *Le Monde*, 17-18/3/57, p. 2.

(108)

This was reported by *Le Monde* in quotes, 23/3/57, p. 2. The seven lawyers involved in the case were Michel Bruguière, Roger Cavaer, Henri Douzon, Jérôme Ferruci, Léon Mataraso, Paul Viennay and Maurice Zavao.

(109)

See *Le Monde*, 23/3/57, p. 2.

(110)

First, the contributor to the paper, M. Duverger, found the report *accablant*, not for the policemen involved but for the authors of the report themselves.

Il y a des textes qui respirent la sincérité; celui-là éclate de mauvaise foi. Aucun des Jésuites stigmatisés par Pascal n'avait poussé si loin l'emploi du conditionnel, le maniement de la restriction mentale, l'usage de la prétérition inconsciente. Aucun non plus n'écrivait un français aussi approximatif où l'impropriété des termes et les fautes de syntaxe épousent si bien la médiocrité et le flou de la pensée. La phrase terminale est un morceau d'anthologie...

Maurice Duverger in, *Absence Française*, *Le Monde*, 22/3/57, pp. 1-2.

(111)

Turning to one of the statements in the report with which he disapproved ("*Dans la recherche de la vérité, on se heurte souvent aux arguments des parties en cause. L'écueil à éviter, c'est de ne pas se laisser envahir par le doute faute de quoi on ne peut pas conclure.*") and quoting extensively, he stated that the only merit he found was that it posed the problem of France in Algeria squarely:

"Il pose clairement le problème de la France en Algérie dans ses termes actuels: <<Il est impossible, par des moyens considérés habituellement comme normaux, de détecter les organisations clandestines et paramilitaires, de pourchasser les agitateurs, les meneurs de jeu, les conspirateurs contre la présence française en Algérie.

Ibid.

(112)

Si les droits de la défense sont imprescriptibles, ceux de la nation ne le sont pas moins.

Mieux, on ne saurait affaiblir ceux-ci sans que, par répercussion, ceux-là diminuent progressivement. Or personne n'a réclamé ni demandé au Parlement le départ de la France de l'Algérie. Le gouvernement a donc le devoir de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires et appropriées pour ramener le calme, assurer la protection des vies et préserver nos droits.

Ibid.

(113)

A report which, he thought, by-passed the problem of torture, which became a single element of a vaste ensemble, which consisted of finding out whether a totalitarian system was being established in Algeria.

(114)

He argued that only a proper investigation by people whose independence and loyalty could not be questioned would enable one to know whether there had been an exaggeration in the témoignages souvent bouleversants qu'on commence à recueillir sur ces méthodes de la part d'hommes pondérés et sérieux.

Although he was not sure that some of the suicides (that of Boumendjel, for instance,) described were in fact similar to that of Brossolette, he was certain that the enlèvement pour interrogatoire from internment camp, the conditions of deportation, the lack of knowledge of people's whereabouts after their arrest by "this super-police", were only too reminiscent of Hitler's Germany.

Though he found it difficult from Paris to put these facts into perspective, and to know whether these were isolated cases or examples of widespread practices, he thought excesses possible, but his conclusion was that Algeria had not really become a totalitarian regime. One thing was sure however "if things carried on we would be forced to go to the bitter end (jusqu'au bout)".

(115)

He considered his thoughts more realistic and concrete than they seemed, and measuring the path followed during the previous fourteen months, he concluded that the threat of fascism was serious since France was halfway down the road to a totalitarian state.

Ces réflexions sont plus concrètes, plus réalistes, plus proches de nous qu'elles n'en ont l'air. Pour la première fois depuis dix ans le danger de fascisme devient réellement sérieux. Mesurez le chemin parcouru depuis quatorze mois; nous sommes à peu près à la moitié de la route qui mène à l'Etat totalitaire... Et la marche s'accélère depuis quelques semaines.

See M. Duverger in *Le Monde*, 22/3/57, p. 2. This is the article which landed the paper in a law suit (examined above).

(116)

It was, in his view, possible to subdue the rebellion in Algeria by force (as was proved by the results of army activity) in the same way as the Russians did in Hungary. This would be for a long time, but not forever. And the logic of it would be to impose, in his view, similar measures in France which would spell the end of civil liberties.

(117)

In a pertinent but moderate attack against those, including "self-professed socialists and republicans", calling themselves "enemies of fascism", who developed ultra-nationalist and totalitarian views (argument), who consider reason of state as the the supreme value in the defence of the French presence in Algeria, he asked them to examine the meaning of that presence, and whether it was advisable for it to consist of "soldiers, policemen, militiamen, judges and civil servants who implemented methods that were evidently contrary to civilised principles which France has considered as being hers throughout history."

Une Algérie juridiquement incorporée au territoire français serait-elle encore <<française>> si rien n'y subsistait plus de ces principes en quoi tant de Français ont vu et continuent de voir l'essence même de leur pays? Ne voit-on pas enfin que pour maintenir cette apparence d'Algérie française on risque d'anéantir sur notre hexagone même tout ce qui fait la nature propre de la France, de sorte que la France deviendrait absente d'elle-même?

Ibid.

(118)

He stated that public opinion had been alerted by some report of "sevices" on some people arrested, and that on 6 October the Minister-Resident sent a telegramme to the Interior Commission of the Assembly, requesting the sending of a parliamentary commission, to which investigative powers were given on 26 October. The deputies were so overworked, he added, that they could not free themselves for the task before 27 December by which date they had arrived, and had been very active there from 27/12 at 16.30h to 30/12/ at 12.30, heard 52 people, tabled and annexed their report to the papers of the 6 March session, concluding "unanimously less one voice" that nothing could lead to the conclusion that people had been tortured.

In *De la légalité*, by Maurice Garçon, *Le Monde*, 26/3/57, pp. 1-6.

(119)

Without explaining the position of Hovnanian. Referring to separate revelations, he thought it exaggerated to sue, or to commit to trial, those who had made them as "nobody had wanted to insult the army as a whole, and that everybody knew its courage, bravery and devotion (...), shown in the field against cruel and pitiless insurgents." The spirit of sacrifice of the army was admired by the whole country, he added, and if "excesses" had been committed, these would be isolated (he had never even been there to see) and, if true, would be condemned by the army as a whole.

Ibid.

(120)

One of which being that the Law was above all other considerations since it ensures punishment of the guilty and its strict rules protect the innocent,

S'il [le Droit] assure le châtime[n]t du coupable, ses règles strictes protègent l'innocent. Ibid.

(121)

Since Right and emergency legislation had never been compatible in exceptional circumstances, of which Algeria was an example (*Or jamais le droit et les lois d'exception n'ont cheminé de concert*).

(122)

He was aware of the need for powers of search and arrest at short notice around the clock before the suspects "harden", but also of where, despite the best intentions, a "keen" search for information could lead. He urged that these powers be used for finding evidence and not extracting confessions. Since, he pointed out, those arrested spent months before seeing a judge/being tried, he suggested that from the time of publication of the communiqué of arrest, there should not be arbitrary sequestration and non-involvement of the courts.

His conclusion was that:

C'est en revenant très vite à légalité qu'on justifie des mesures arbitraires auxquelles il faut peut être se résoudre à regret et dont la durée et la clandestinité inquiète l'opinion qui les juge de mauvais aloi.

In *De la Légalité* by Maurice Garçon, *Le Monde*, 26/3/57, pp. 1-6.

(123)

In *L'inadmissible équivoque*, *Le Monde*, 26/3/57.

(124)

This difference was said to diminish, however, if the authorities were to continue condoning such inhuman practices or if, had they known about them, they were to hesitate in taking sanctions against them. He concluded that:

Si la loi du talion doit devenir la loi des nations, la civilisation est frappée de mort et la France ne serait plus la France si elle acceptait de hurler avec les loups et de contribuer, si peu que ce soit, à faire de la loi de la jungle la règle des rapports humains.

Ibid.

(125)

See *Le Monde*, 4/4/57.

The article was slightly misleading in the sense that it absolved the civilian authorities of torture on a massive scale, which was quite possible since it was the military who were in charge (decree 17 March 1956).

Even when the government was admitting that atrocities had taken place in Algeria, headlines on the number of acknowledged cases of ill-treatment at the hands of the security forces in general would have seemed more appropriate if the desire of the paper had not been, like that of the government, to reassure public opinion that things had not got out of hand. The publication (and a headline on the figure) of the number of those ill-treated in their hands would have been very significant. Conversely, the effect of the actual statements and headline would have had the immediate impact of denying or contradicting the awareness campaign being led by other media in France about widespread incidents of torture.

(126)

About exactions by the army.

A fortnight before, *Le Monde* published a communiqué by the Minister of Defence, which only incidentally revealed that there had been a few cases of exactions and which insisted more on the fact that they had been punished by the authorities.

It insisted on the "peace-keeping" aspect and the "tightly controlled activity" of the army which "never tolerated exactions". It also emphasised that the Ministry had ordered an investigation every time an incident was directly or indirectly reported, and that the enquiries had revealed that these incidents were non-existent or highly exaggerated. Thus conscious of its duty to defend the army against any "odious defamation", which "repulsed" those serving in Algeria, the Minister's communiqué also stated that those associating themselves with this campaign, especially amongst those who had served in Algeria (reference to Bollardière and others), would be considered to be, and were in actual fact, accomplices because they did not inform their superiors. See *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, p. 2.

Two days after Mitterrand's statement (4/4/57) came a similar declaration by M. Bourgès-Maunoury himself (at a Republican circle in front of other personalities), covered by *Le Monde* in a similar fashion. The headline was that cases of "exactions" were exceptional. In the same statement the Defence Minister declared that war was bound to be dirty, that it was impossible to guarantee that there would not be excesses. He also insisted on how unjust it was to bring about the dishonour of those fighting for France. See *Le Monde*, 6/4/57.

(127)

See *Le Monde*, 6/4/57.

The reasons put forward for the creation of the Commission (over the setting of which, Jacques Fauvet thought the government had no choice with new testimonies - *Le Monde*, 6/4/57, p. 1) were the "attachment of France to the rights of the individual" and the "sincere emotion of all democrats". Its aims were to deal with press reports, complaints and rumours of excesses in order to establish the truth about the facts "real or alleged", but also to take position on the "calumnious nature or systematic exaggeration of some information".

(128)

Three types were outlined in Fauvet's article, *Le Monde*, 6/4/57, p. 1. The article was nevertheless surrounded with a host of reservations and statements qualifying denunciation of excesses, by stating that those denouncing the use of "some methods were in no way seeking to undermine the army or the government". Though the journalist argued that the best way of preserving the honour of the army, and guaranteeing the efficiency of the policy followed, was through putting an end to the admitted excesses and not by denying them or keeping quiet about them, he believed it to be only fair to allow the prosecution of journalists, while stating at the same time that there was not going to be press censorship, nor seizure of any newspaper.

(129)

Threat of resignation by Salan and others.

(130)

The headline read as follows: "the role of the Commission

will depend on its composition."

This was despite the criticism of the Radical Ministers, amongst others, stating that "it would not even meet because the witnesses would never materialise in such circumstances", that of the extreme Left, stating that it will "fail to reveal everything".

In spite of its belief that it was possible to create, in the middle ground between a "ghost commission" (*fantome*) and a whitewash commission (*éteignoir*), a commission which, by its competence and composition, would fulfil its objectives, *Le Monde* showed more than an understanding attitude towards the complex problems of legality of such a Commission.

(131)

In a pleading tone, *Le Monde's* argument did not seem to be too incongruous in relation to that of the government when it argued that all the voices:

qui se sont élevées, au moins en France, ont simplement exprimé devant tant de témoignages une émotion que le gouvernement déclare lui-même comprendre et partager. Si cette émotion ne s'était pas exprimée publiquement, la Commission de sauvegarde des droits et des libertés n'aurait jamais vu le jour.

See *Le Monde*, 7-8/4/57, p. 1.

(132)

See *Le Monde*, 15/3/57, p. 2.

(133)

If we looked at the statements made by people like Pierre Mendès-France, for instance, one would find that they revealed a very strong position indeed.

For Mendès-France, hitting at those who were trying to give evidence made matters worse. In his speech to the Comité Radical of the Arrondissement of Pont-Audemer (reported by *Le Monde*, 9/4/57, p. 5), he argued in favour of creating the conditions for a solution. He stated that, while being ignored by the authorities, the evidence was overwhelming. Quoting the Fédération protestante de France (*les témoignages reçus sont trop nombreux et de trop sûre qualité, les sévices exercés trop attestés et trop graves, l'émotion de beaucoup de soldats et d'officiers trop douloureuse*), he described the reality of Algeria as being

(...) des brutalités et des excès qui nous blessent dans notre conception même du rôle de la France outre-mer, et qui ne peuvent qu'opposer haineusement les deux communautés raciales et ruiner les dernières chances de l'Afrique française que nous voulons sauver.

For him the real culprits were not mediocre "agents d'exécution" but those responsible, those who authorised, those who "for a long time hid deeds that were prejudicial to the French cause in Africa."

He denounced the policy being implemented as being on the wrong track when spectacular measures could change the outlook on things and reverse the process before it was too late.

On prétend parfois gagner les populations musulmanes en améliorant leurs conditions économiques et sociales, en relevant leur niveau de vie, oeuvre indispensable dont les intéressés ne recon-

naitront toutefois les résultats qu'à lointaine échéance. Mais mettre fin au mauvais traitement, aux injustices, aux humiliations, comme je n'ai cessé de demander, cela pouvait se faire dans l'immédiat de façon spectaculaire, par quelques mesures retentissantes. Ainsi on ramènerait à nous les sympathies et la confiance de la masse des indécis qu'on a maintenant rejetés de l'autre côté ...

(..) Il faut renverser la vapeur. Il est tard. Mais il n'est jamais trop tard.

In A propos de la Commission de Sauvegarde: P. Mendès-France: frapper ceux qui témoignent ne peut qu'aggraver le mal, *Le Monde*, 9/4/57, p. 5.

(134)

Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 5.

He was more concerned with taking the defence of the morale of the army, as he tried to explain the "vives réactions" created in the ranks of army officers by certain testimonies, as well as the revelations in the Pierre-Henri Simon book (see Chapter 10) and in part of the press, on some methods practised by some soldiers.

(135)

He put the trouble down to young "cadres" having taken initiatives very much because everybody else could not do their job (*basse besogne*). *Ibid.*

(136)

Which the FLN had "forced" it to take, against revolutionary warfare, a role which it had assumed, against its will.

(137)

No matter where the blame came from.

Quant à faire griefs aux témoins qui se dévoilent aujourd'hui de n'avoir pas fait connaître par la voie hiérarchique, puisqu'il n'en est pas d'autres, les faits regrettables auxquels ils ont assisté, le reproche, de si haut qu'il vienne, n'en est pas moins dérisoire. On ne saurait demander à des militaires qui n'ont pas participé à une action qu'ils réprouvent de dénoncer leurs camarades et de renier leur solidarité. En cas contraire, il faudrait une candeur rare ou un courage plus rare encore pour faire transmettre par les hommes mis directement ou indirectement en cause le rapport qui les accuse.

Ibid.

(138)

On sait d'autre part combien il est facile, lorsqu'une enquête est effectivement ouverte, de camoufler les faits et de noyer les responsabilités. C'est au manque d'autorité et de prestige du gouvernement et du commandement qu'il faut s'en prendre. Le maréchal de Lattre avait fait nettement connaître en Indochine comment il concevait la pacification. Il avait convaincu; il y avait aussi dans un petit nombre de cas fait de sévères exemples. Au moment où il quitte l'Extrême-Orient pour

n'y plus revenir, le climat avait changé dans ce domaine comme dans bien d'autres....

Ibid.

(139)

La simple efficacité dans l'oeuvre que l'on veut pacificatrice n'est pas seule à exiger qu'on en finisse rapidement avec des pratiques condamnables. Il en va aussi de l'unité du pays. Entre les <<intellectuels>>, ceux que M. Bourguès-Maunoury appelle <<les chers professeurs>>, accusés de trancher des cas de conscience <<au nom des grands principes>>, et les chefs qui doivent les résoudre auprès des cadavres des Français égorgés ou des camarades tombés sous les balles, un fossé se creuse. Mais sans les <<grands principes>>, quel sens aurait le sacrifice du soldat, quel contenu son patriotisme?.

Ibid.

(140)

He argued that "morale" should not be confused with "morality" within the army in its educational role, and that the former was not conceivable without the latter.

S'il ne faut pas confondre <<le moral>> avec <<la morale>>, il n'en reste pas moins que, dans une armée digne de sa tradition et chargée, qu'elle le veuille ou non, de parachever l'éducation de centaines de milliers de jeunes hommes, le premier ne peut se concevoir sans le respect total de la seconde.

He concluded that:

Les véritables <<atteintes au moral de l'armée>> ne sont pas le fait des hommes qui dénoncent les erreurs commises, mais de ceux qui les tolèrent ou sont incapables de les empêcher.

Jean Planchais in *Le Monde*, 20/3/57, p. 5.

(141)

See *Le Monde*, 28-29/4/57, p. 2.

(142)

That is to say establishing the truth and the need for enquiries to be held soon after the event to prevent the removal of evidence, and so forth (see above).

(143)

The membership (most of the members had a Resistance background) included 2 military men, 3 lawyers, 2 doctors, one teacher, one former Governor-General, a former ambassador and a former préfet as given in *Le Monde*, 4/5/57, p. 3 with a statement that it would set its own powers the following week, in *Le Monde*, 7/5/57, p. 1. Its departure for Algeria was announced for the week after in *Le Monde*, 11/5/57, p. 3. Reports of subsequent changes are to be found in *Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.

(144)

See *Le Monde*, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.

(145)

Transferring the arena of debate back to public opinion and the courts, see *Le Monde*, 25/5/57, p. 3. See also an article by William Thorp expressing his thoughts on the Commission. *Ibid*.

(146)

Which was given to the paper by a former Governor of Algeria, Robert de la Vignette, member of the commission who resigned in despair at the governments refusal to act.

(147)

There were eight *rapports annexes beaucoup plus accablants*, especially those of Delavignette and Me Garcon. See Jean Noël Jeaneney and J.Julliard, *op cit.*, p. 231. Informed of *Le Monde's* intention to publish, the government was said to have pre-empted the move by publishing itself the same day while, at the same time, planning to seize *Le Monde*. See Planchais, Jean, *L'Empire embrasé*, Denoël, Paris, 1990, p. 270.

(148)

Thibau, J., *op cit*, p. 334.

(149)

Thibau, J., *op cit*, p. 334 and author's interview with J. Planchais.

(150)

It is clear that *Le Monde* was a bit reluctant when it came to denouncing these methods. Beuve-Méry, in a reply to a reader who complained to the paper, wrote that he had waited six months *et multiplié les démarches avant d'entrouvrir une première fois le dossier des détenus en Algérie*. Letter to General Reboul, 28 January 1959, in Jeanneney, J.-N. and Julliard, J., *op. cit.*, p. 232.

(151)

The appointment of its president came about a month after the idea was first floated. See *Le Monde*, 15/5/57, p. 4.

(152)

Le Monde reported that the vice-president of the organisation, David Rousset, had made his feelings known to the authorities (President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Minister Resident) and that formal authorisation was being sought from the government. He also declared that the Commission was willing to intervene on behalf of four non-communist French organisations of deportees or internees, who requested an investigation of human rights, of conditions of arrest and detention of Algerians, and of the handling of cases by the Police and the authorities.

See *Le Monde*, 12/4/57, p. 2.

(153)

In a plenary session on 18 May in Brussels, see *Le Monde*, 26-27/5/57, p. 11.

(154)

From the vice-president of the Commission, Georges André and the Norwegian delegate, Mrs Lise Borsum.

(155)

See *Le Monde*, 28-29/7/57, p. 2.

(156)
Ibid.

(157)
He declared having interviewed 92 detainees, having found that 33 complained of torture, and that 12 effectively bore marks. In 3 of the cases, the marks were very likely as a result of the use of electrodes.

(158)
Stating instead, that the Algerian rebels numbered 100.000 and were terrorising 9 million people. Ibid.

(159)
See *Le Monde*, 12/4/57, p. 2.

(160)
See above, but also further criticism found in *Le Monde*, 20/4/57, p. 4.

(161)
At the same time as Peyrega protests (see earlier part of this Chapter). Other groups protesting included the Grenoble congress of the *Syndicat de l'enseignement secondaire*.

(162)
Even a few months later, at the time of the CICR, there had been no tangible results. See *Le Monde*, 10/8/57, p. 4.

(163)
Said to be opposed to it. Later, *Le Monde* reported that he was not opposed to its creation. See *Le Monde*, 20/4/57, p. 4.

(164)
See *Le Monde*, 12/4/57, p. 2.

(165)
The paper also reported Charles Hernu's intention (having made a proposal of resolution on this subject the previous October) to put before it the cases of several serving officers whose command had been withdrawn. See *Le Monde*, 13/4/57.

(166)
See *Le Monde*, 20/4/57, p. 4.

(167)
Ibid.

(168)
Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 2

(169)
As a result of the opposition met. See *Le Monde*, 23/4/57.

(170)
See *Le Monde*, 23/4/57, p. 1.

(171)
Ibid.

(172)

When it evoked the "Algerian tradition of eating a kind of Easter bread (*manger la Mouna sur l'herbe*), *Le Monde* displayed here a very European-centered point of view as most of the Algerian population, being Muslims, were fasting for Ramadhan. *Le Monde*, 24/4/57, p. 5.

(173)

The Resident-Minister had stated, amongst other things, that the protection of the Commission would involve the withdrawal from essential duties of thousands of troops to ensure the safety of its members. The reply by the Commission clearly indicated that, by declaring himself unable to ensure their protection, and by refusing them any means (and even refusing to see them), the Resident-Minister was putting the members of the Commission in the impossibility of carrying out their task. The Commission's telegramme also reminded the Resident-Minister of the objectives of the mission and that no one could, in good faith, declare this to be against the interests of France. Ibid.

(174)

By C. Fuzier in *Le Populaire*, Robert Bony of *L'Aurore* and Gabriel Robinet of *Le Figaro*. Echoes of G. Altman's incomprehension in *Franc-Tireur*, of Marcel Fourrier's disappointment in *Libération*, could also be found in *Le Monde*. Both Yves Morreau of *L'Humanité* and the Radical MP for the Loire, Michel Soulié, were said to be wondering who was in charge. Only *Jeune République* was reported to be indignant and to have denounced the "conspiracy of silence and tragic impasse in which France finds herself." See *Le Monde*, 24/4/57, p. 5.

(175)

Despite the precedent of Boutbien's Mission in Indochina in 1950, which went ahead despite Boutbien's known support for a cease-fire and Vietnamese independence.

(176)

For instance the paper asked whether the truth of December (as far as Lacoste was concerned) was no longer valid in April; other pertinent questions referred to the potential blackmailing power of the street and were: how many amongst those gathered in the grass of the Airport would demand a say in the future composition of any commission, including a Commission de Sauvegarde? whether the kind of reception planned for the Commission would not lead to the reservation or refusal of participation (through deterrence) of future participants to any such commission?

(177)

See *Le Monde*, 24/4/57, p. 1.

(178)

Le temps presse pourtant encore plus depuis les événements (...).

(179)

Une large fraction de l'opinion française souhaiterait avoir d'autres éléments d'information que ceux rapportés il y a cinq semaines par la

commission parlementaire dont le rapporteur écrivait: <<l'écueil à éviter c'est de ne pas se laisser envahir par le doute, faute de quoi on ne peut pas conclure>>.

R. Barrillon in *Le Monde*, 24/4/57, p. 11.

(180)

The letter of resignation from the SFIO in protest against Lacoste's policy by A. Doumenc, former Senator for Algeria, was published in *Le Monde*, 25/4/57, p. 5.

(181)

See *L'affaire de la commission d'information Le bureau du Parti radical condamne sévèrement l'attitude de Mr Lacoste*, in *Le Monde*, 26/4/57, p. 4.

(182)

See *Le Monde*, 26/4/57, p. 4.

(183)

See *Le Monde*, 27/4/57, p. 5.

(184)

See the section on Penchenier's controversy (August 1955) in Chapter 12.

(185)

The paper reported the denial of his story by the authorities and gave him a chance to restate his evidence, which he did. However, in that article, he appeared not as a direct witness of the events themselves, but as somebody who arrived on the scene afterwards. Moreover, when he was restating the evidence, it was clear that he was doing so on his own steam. Ibid.

(186)

In other words, as a journalist given a chance to comment on his version, which the government was denying without the paper's responsibility being at stake.

(187)

It was clear that, in most cases, it was not so much the expression of an opinion, a point of view, as the simple reporting of facts (itself or those reported by other papers) that led to the seizures referred to.

Le Monde had no reply to give as a reaction to its seizures in Algeria for reporting exactly what had been stated in *L'Express*. After seizure, the paper simply mentioned the fact that it had been seized.

(188)

Le Bled, No 11, May 1957, which estimated that from October 1956 to March 1957, there had been 36 legal suits, 28 decisions taken over previous complaints (*délit en cause ... fausse information, information diffamatoire, injures envers l'armée, provocation à la désobéissance*). See *Le Monde*, 18/5/57, p. 5.

(189)

Claiming that it was thought desirable that, by and large, the public should have been informed of the aims and neutrality of the report, *Le Monde* was not "surprised by the discretion of the RTF and other media with large circulation."

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: NOTES

(1)

See various quotes in Chapter 1 especially
See Debats op. cit. and RPP and chap 1?

(2)

Freund, A., op. cit., p. 30.

(3)

See Freund, A., op. cit., pp. 161-164.

(4)

Ibid. p. 170.

(5)

Freund, A., op. cit., pp. 179-180, refers to this reflex in the study of the BBC journalists reporting on the miners shown by Glasgow University Media group. This reflex may also be due to institutional reasons *tenant au recrutement des collaborateurs et de leurs <<réflexes de classe>>*.

(6)

Especially when victims are killed in cold blood and it is simply reported that they had been running away as though they were guilty, or had something to hide. The use of the word "suspects" also clearly casts some suspicion on these group, on people killed by the armed forces who might have been just too frightened to remain when bullets were flying around. To these one must add the numerous cases of *corvée de bois* revealed during and after the war.

(7)

As it does not evoke all the significance of the actions that the term encompasses, as it only summarises the reality of moral torture, the conditions of detention etc... See Freund, op. cit., p. 172.

(8)

The aim of the authorities being to reverse the tide, which could not have been achieved without the tacit support of public opinion. The role of the press, in this respect, would have been crucial, as it would have constituted the main instrument in this strategy.

(9)

Jean Planchais in his interviews with the author, for instance, but he is by no means the only one.

(10)

Beuve-Méry H., (recalling his meeting 18/9/58 with de Gaulle), revealed in his book, *Onze ans de règne*, Flammarion,

1974, pp. 10-11, the extent to which he was prepared to go to preserve the "interests of the nation."

(11)

See *Le Monde*, 8/8/89, p. 8.

(12)

The circulation of *L'Express* went up from 60,000 copies in 1953 to 500,000 copies in 1967. For *France-Observateur* (renamed *Le Nouvel-Observateur* in 1964) the figures were 20,000 in 1950 to 100,000 in 1960. See Ory, P., & Sirinelli, J.-F., *Les Intellectuels français de l'Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1986, pp. 206-207.

(13)

Author of Winners and Losers, Harcourt Brace Janovich, New York, 1976.

(14)

See further examples of journalists who were supported by their paper. (eg. Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator Timesbooks, New York, 1984) referred to by Freund, A., op. cit., pp. 47-48.

(15)

This was penned by outsiders to the paper, usually in the form of a *Libre Opinion* or "Letter to the Editor".

(16)

Except perhaps André Mandouze who "religiously" had lunch with Hubert Beuve-Méry every Tuesday.

(17)

If one included *Le Monde's* reports, *Libres Opinions*, the various declarations made by various political groups and quoted *verbatim*.

(18)

Paris Colloquium on "memories of the Algerian War" (13-15 March, 1992) organised by the *Institut du Monde Arabe* and the *Ligue de l'Enseignement en France*. This colloquium led to the following publications:

* *Actes du Colloque, Mémoire et Enseignement de la Guerre d'Algérie*, La Ligue/IMA, Paris, 1993, 2 Volumes.

* Gilles Manceron et al., *Documents, Actes et Rapports pour l'Education, La Guerre d'Algérie dans l'Enseignements en France et en Algérie*, La Ligue/IMA/CNDP, Paris, 1993, Volumes.

* Gilles Manceron & Hassan Remaoun, *D'une rive à l'autre, la guerre d'Algérie de la mémoire à l'histoire*, Syros, Paris, 1993.

(19)

As well as the organisation of seminars and colloquia (by the *Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent*, 1988, 1989, and by the *Ligue* and *IMA* -above), which may be a painful but the only way of reclaiming a history which is an integral part of France.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF THE MAIN EVENTS

1830

14 June
Ferruch. - French expeditionary forces landed in Sidi

5 July
Bourmont. - Algiers taken by the French under General de

1832

* Abdel Kader regrouped the tribes around Mascara and organised the province along national lines into a national entity, recognised at first by the French.

1834

July
* Algeria proclaimed a French possession.

1837

30 May
- Tafna Treaty signed by General Bugeaud and Abdel Kader. The latter was recognised as being sovereign over two-thirds of the territory by France.

24 October
- Capture of Constantine by the French.

1845

* Bou Maa'za's uprising in the Dahra, Cheliff and Ouarsenis.

1846

* Introduction of a system of Expropriation of non-cultivated land.

1847

* Surrender of Emir Abdelkader to the French, who exiled him to Damascus until his death. His remains were brought back to Algeria in the 1970s.

1848

* Northern Algeria subdivided into three *départements*.

1848

* French settlers represented in French Natio-

nal Assembly.

1851

- * Policy of *cantonnement* imposed on tribes.
- * Introduction of Customs and Duty system which ruined traditional crafts.

1852

* Following Louis Napoléon Bonaparte's *coup d'état* and dissolution of French National Assembly, representation of French settlers in Algeria in French Parliament abolished.

1863

* *Senatus Consulta*: introduction of French legal principles in Algerian land transactions.

1870

24 October 1870
- Crémieux decree grants French citizenship to all Algerian Jews.

1871

* France loses Alsace Lorraine: colonisation of Algeria intensified.

1873

* *Loi Warnier* complementing the *Senatus Consulta* of 1863 subjected Algerians to French law and increased the dislocation of lands and tribes.

1881

- * Algerian affairs attached to relevant French ministries.
- * *Bardot Treaty*: Tunisia a French Protectorate.
- * *Code de l'Indigénat*: discriminatory legislation imposed on the Algerians.

1881-1883

* Insurrection south of the Oran *département*.

1889

20 June
- Decree allowing French citizenship to be given to children born in Algeria of foreign parents.

1898

16 May
- Birth of Messali Hadj.

1899

- * Birth of Ferhat Abbas.

1900

- * Financial Autonomy of Algerian *départements*

1912

- * Morocco proclaimed a French Protectorate.

1914-1918

- * 173.000 Algerians fight in the Great War, of whom 25.000 killed.

1916

- * Massive revolt in the Aures Mountains.

1926

- * The *Etoile Nord Africaine* (ENA) founded in France.

1930

- * Celebration of the centenary of the French colonisation of Algeria.

1931

- * The "*Ulémas* Association" founded.

1934

- * The *Fédération des Elus* of the Constantine *département* established.

1936

- * The Blum-Violette Bill offering French citizenship to 25.000 Muslims rejected by the French Parliament.

1937

26 January

- ENA Banned.

11 March

- The *Parti du Peuple Algérien* founded.

1940

- * France invaded and defeated by Nazi Germany,

in alliance with Italy.

1939-1945

* 134.000 Algerians fight in the Second World War of whom 12.000 killed.

1942

8 November

- Allied landings in North Africa

1943

31 March

- *Les Amis du Manifeste* founded by Ferhat Abbas.

1944

* Exceptional measures applicable to "Muslims only" abolished by Ordinance (7 March).

* Speech by de Gaulle in Brazzaville promises equal rights to Muslims.

1945

8 May

- V.E. Day.
- Insurrection in the Constantine *département* (Sétif): thousands of victims of French Repression .

1946

* The *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA) founded by Ferhat Abbas and the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés démocratiques* (MTLD) by Messali Hadj.

1947

February

* The *Organisation Spéciale* formed within the MTLD and entrusted with preparing the insurrection.

20 September

- Algerian Statute adopted.

1948

11 & 14 April

- Election rigging on a massive scale.

1950

* Hold up of the Oran Post Office (Ben Bella involved).

1951

April

* Edmond Naegelen replaced as Governor General by Roger Léonard.

1952

* Formation of Pinay government.

1953

* René Coty elected President.

* The MTLD split into Messalists and Centralists.

1954

- March** * *Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action* (CRUA) formed.
- 7 May** - French surrender Dien Bien Phu (Indochina).
- 18 June** - Pierre Mendès-France comes to power.
- July** * Indochinese settlement
- 1 August** - Proclamation of Internal Autonomy for Tunisia.
- August** * Hornu Congress MTLD.
- October** * The *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) founded together with the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN).
- 1 November** - All Saints' day: a series of "terrorist" attacks mark the beginning of the insurrection. The FLN publish a statement demanding independence.
- 5 November** - The MTLD dissolved by the French Government.
- December** * Messali Hadj founded the *Mouvement National Algérien* (MNA). MTLD members arrested in great numbers in Algeria.

1955

- 13 January
- Articles by Claude Bourdet (*France-Observateur*) and François Mauriac (*L'Express*) denounced the use of torture in Algeria.
- 25-6 January
- Jacques Soustelle appointed Governor General of Algeria.
- 1 February
- Roger Léonard replaced by Jacques Soustelle as Governor General.
- 6 February
- Fall of Mendes-France Government.
- 18 February
- Death of Didouche Mourad.
- 23-25 February
- Appointment and investiture of Edgar Faure as Prime minister.
- 2 March
- *Rapport Guillaume* on torture submitted to Soustelle.
- 20 March
- First *Rapport Mairey* on the behaviour of the security forces in Algeria.
- 25 March
- Arrest of Rabah Bitat.
- 31 March
- Emergency Powers Bill immediately implemented in Algeria (especially in the Kabylie region).
- 3 April
- Emergency Law promulgated.
- 18-24 April
- FLN attended the Bandung Conference.
- 26 April
- General Parlange arrived in the Constantinois.
- 20 August
- Riot in the Constantine *département* resulted in 123 deaths (of whom 71 were Europeans). Repression led to the deaths of 1273 Muslims.
- 24-28th August
- Decrees recalling demobilised draftees.

- 30 August** - Emergency powers extended to the whole of Algeria.
- 6 September** - Claude Bourdet's article *Ne jetez pas le contingent dans la guerre* published in France-Observateur
- 11 September** - Draftees demonstrated against their posting to North Africa in the Gare de Lyon.
- 12 September** - Algerian Communist Party banned.
- 15 September** - Robert Barrat's reportage on the Algerian *maquis* appeared in France-Observateur.
- 19 September** - Saint Severin Church (Paris) organised Mass for 300 draftees.
- 26 September** - Motion of the 61 Elected representatives.
- 30 September** - Algerian Question put before the United Nations.
- October**
- * Autumn reinforcements sent to Algeria.
 - * A *Comité Contre l'envoi du contingent en Afrique du Nord* set up.
- 7 October** - Draftees' demonstration in Rouen caused serious incidents.
- November**
- * A *Comité d'Action des Intellectuels contre la poursuite de la guerre en Afrique du Nord* formed.
 - * Creation of the SAS.
- 2 December** - Dissolution of the Assembly.
- 12 December** - General Elections adjourned in Algeria.
- 13 December** - Second *Rapport Mairey*.

- 2 January** - Victory of the Popular Front in French parliamentary elections.
- 22 January** - In Algiers, Albert Camus called for a truce in Algeria.
- 26 January** - Mollet succeeded Edgard Faure as Prime Minister.
- 27 January** - Secret meeting between Pierre Mendès-France and André Mandouze (mandated by the FLN).
- 31 January** - Formation of Guy Mollet government.
- General Catroux appointed Minister-Resident.
- 1 February** - Investiture of G.Mollet and his government.
- 2 February** - Soustelle replaced by Lacoste.
- 5 February** - National Day of Action against the War (Montreuil).
- 6 February** - Hostile demonstrations against G. Mollet's visit to Algeria.
- 9 February** - Robert Lacoste appointed Minister Resident.
- 14 February** - Oil strike in the Sahara
- 7 March** - Independence of Morocco.
- 12 March** - French Assembly grants Mollet special powers.
- 20 March** - Independence of Tunisia .
- 31 March** - Claude Bourdet arrested for <demoralising the Army>.
- 5 April** - Professor Henri Marrou published his *Libres Opinions: France. ma Patrie* in *Le Monde*.

- 10 April - Police search of Henri Marrou's house as a result of his *Libres Opinion* in Le Monde.
- 11 April - Length of military service extended to 27 months.
- 12 April - Dissolution of the Algerian Assembly and recall of Reservists (*Disponibles*).
- 12-20 April - Meeting of G. Gorse and J. Begarra with Mohammed Khider.
- 22 April - Ferhat ABBAS joins the FLN in Cairo.
- 3 May - Demonstrations against Draftees's departure in Lézignan.
- 18 May - Violent demonstrations in Grenoble.
- 18 French soldiers massacred in an ambush near Palestro.
- 23 May - Resignation of Pierre Mendès-France.
- 2 June - PCF abstains on the vote of confidence on the policy followed by Guy Mollet's government.
- 19 June - First execution in Algiers of Muslim members of the FLN.
- July * Contacts between French and Algerians in Belgrade.
- 2 July - A conscientious objector, Alban Liechti (Communist), refused to serve in Algeria.
- 18 July - 14th Congress of the PCF in Le Havre.
- August * Contacts between French and Algerians in Rome.
- 10 August - French terrorist (ORAF) bomb exploded *Rue de Thèbes* in the Casbah (Algiers), killing 15 people according to the police and 70 according to the FLN.

20 August

- Soummam conference: FLN policy defined.
- Formation of CNRA and CCE.

1 September

- Contacts between French and Algerians in Belgrade with the participation of Pierre Comin, Mohammed Khider and Mhamed Yazid.

30 September

- Bombs in cafeteria and milk bar in Algiers.
- Battle of Algiers begins.

16 October

- Interception of *Athos*, loaded with arms for FLN.

22 October

- Hijacking of the Moroccan plane carrying Ahmed Ben Bella and other leaders, who are arrested in Algiers.

1 November

- Beginning of Suez operations.

5 November

- Anglo-French Landings in Suez.

9 November

- André Mandouze, Cécile de Verdurand and Anne-Marie Chaulet arrested.

15 November

- Salan appointed Commander-in-Chief in Algeria.

14 december

- Salan takes over command of Algiers.

19 December

- André Mandouze, Cécile de Verdurand and Anne-Marie Chaulet freed.

27 December

- Amédée Froger, President of the Mayors Association, assassinated.

1957

- 2 January - Third *Rapport Mairey*.
- 6 January - Tenth D.P. entrusted with maintaining order in Algiers.
- 7 January - All Police powers delegated to Massu in Algiers. Paratroopers take over the city.
- 16 January - Bazooka attempt to kill Salan.
- 26 January - Bombs in the Otomatik and Coq Hardi Brasseries in Algiers.
- 28 January - General strikes begin in Algiers but forcibly broken by paratroopers.
- 10 February - Bombs in Algiers Stadia: Ruisseau and El Biar.
- 26 February - FLN chiefs in France arrested.
- February - Dossier Jean Muller published by Cahiers de Témoignage Chrétien.
- 23 March - Ali Boumendjel's "Suicide".
- 28 March - General de Bollardière asked to be relieved of his command.
* Publication of the brochure *Des rappelés témoignent*.
* Publication of *Contre la Torture* by Pierre-Henri Simon.
* Secondary School teachers set up a *Comité de défense des libertés et pour la paix en Algérie*.
- 5 April - *Commission de sauvegarde des droits et des libertés individuelles* established.
* Esprit published *La Paix des Nementchas* by Robert Bonnaud.
- 21 May - Fall of Mollet: France without government for 22 days.

- 28 -29 May - Massacres of Melouza. The FLN massacred all the men of the village of Melouza suspected of belonging to the MNA.
- 11 June - Maurice Audin arrested.
- 12 June - Henri Alleg arrested.
- 17 June - Bourgès-Maunoury becomes Prime Minister.
- 21 June - Death of Maurice Audin.
- July
* Georges Mattei published *Jours Kabyles* in Temps Modernes.
- 2 July - Senator Kennedy's speech in support of Algerian independence.
- 11-15 July - Trial of Djamila Bouhired.
- 13 August - Louis Martin-Chauffier published the *Rapport de la Commission internationale d'enquête* in Le Figaro
- 12 September - Paul Teitgen, General Secretary of the Police in Algiers, resigned in protest against the methods used by General Massu.
- 24 September - Arrest of Yacef Saadi, head of the FLN squads in Algiers. The Battle of Algiers won by Massu and his troops.
- 30 September - Fall of the Bourgès-Maunoury government over the *Loi-cadre*.
- October
* The *Centre d'Information et de Coordination pour la Défense des Libertés et de la Paix* by Robert Barrat and Maurice Pagat.
- 8 October - Death of Ali La Pointe and end of the Battle of Algiers.
- 5-6 November - Gaillard succeeded Bourgès-Maunoury as Prime Minister.
- November

* Pour *Djamila Bouhired* published by J. Vergès
and Georges Arnaud.

* *Comité Maurice Audin* formed.

29 November

- The *Loi-Cadre* adopted.

Throughout December 1957

* Violent battles in the Constantinois.

2 December

- Maurice Audin's thesis submitted in absentia.

14 December

- *Le Monde* published *Le Rapport de synthèse de la Commission de Sauvegarde*.

26 December

- Abane Ramdane liquidated.

- January - May**
 * Battle of the barrage in the East Constantine areas.
- 7 January**
 - Oil begins to flow from the Sahara.
- 8 January**
 - UGEMA dissolved.
- 31 Janvier**
 - The *Loi-Cadre* defining "Algerian personality" adopted by the French Parliament.
- 8 February**
 - Sakiét Sidi Youssef (Tunisia) bombed by French aircraft in response to "terrorist" attacks. 69 dead, 130 injured, including women and children.
- 17 February**
 - Offer of Anglo-American "good offices".
- 25 February**
 - Robert Murphy arrived in Paris for his "good offices" mission.
- 27 March**
 - *La Question* seized.
- 15 April**
 - Fall of Gaillard's government. France remains without government for 37 days.
- 26 April**
 - Demonstration in Algiers in favour of *Algérie française*.
- 29 April-1 May**
 * Battle of Souk Ahras (south).
- 12 May**
 - *L'Affaire Audin* published
- 13 May**
 - Algiers rebels against Paris. Settlers take over the Governor General's Office.
 - Massu forms the *Comité de Salut Public*.
 - Appeal made to de Gaulle and the Army takes power in ALgeria
- 14 May**
 - Pflimlin's investiture. Massu appeals to de Gaulle.
- 15 May**
 - *Vive de Gaulle* shouted by Salan. General de

Gaule declared himself "ready to assume power".

19 May

- First press conference by de Gaule.

28 May

- Demonstration by the Left (République).

28 May

- Resignation of Pflimlin.

1 June

- De Gaule becomes Prime Minister.

APPENDIX B

INDEX OF *LE MONDE'S* JOURNALISTS UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

BALLET André

Born in 1903, worked for the newspaper *Le Temps* as assistant-head of the political section (Parliamentary reports). Joined *Le Monde* in December 1944, in charge of the section dealing with Parliamentary reports. Became Assistant to the Head of the political Section. Reported on the major post-Libération trials, including those of Pétain and Laval. He worked for *Le Monde* until his retirement in 1972. He died in 1982.

BARRILLON Raymond

Born in 1921, joined *Le Monde* in 1950 as editor (*rédacteur*) in the politics section. Became head of the section from 1969 to 1983. He died on 8 July 1983.

BEUVE-MERY Hubert

Former correspondent of *Le Temps* from 1935 till 12 April 1938, when he offered his resignation. Founder and Director of *Le Monde* from 19 December 1944 to 29 December 1969. The major force behind the paper. He died on 6 August 1989.

BIRMANN Dominik

French correspondent of *Le Monde* from 1957 to 1964. He wrote many articles on the Scandinavian countries.

*** BLANCHET André**

External contributor to *Le Monde* from 1946 to 1965. Was also special correspondent. Specialist on Africa and also a Professor at the IEP, Paris.

BONIS_CHARANCLE Martial

Born in 1892, former General-Secretary of *Le Temps*, he became Secretary General of *Le Monde*. He left the paper in 1949. He died in 1963.

CATRICE André

Associate-founder of SARL/*Le Monde* in 1944. Appointed co-Manager in 1951. He assumed the functions of Administrative Director until his retirement in 1969. He died in 1972.

CHAFFARD Georges

Editor in the Overseas service of *Le Monde*, responsible for the Indochinese and African questions from 1956 to 1958. Worked for *Le Monde* again between 1963 and 1965. Regular contributor to *Le Monde Diplomatique* subsequently. He died in 1969.

CHENEBOIT André

Born in 1895, joined *Le Temps* as *secrétaire de rédaction*, became *secrétaire général de la rédaction* until the paper's

disappearance in November 1942. He helped H. Beuve-Méry in the setting up of *Le Monde*. Editor-in-Chief of *Le Monde* from its inception until his retirement in 1966. He played an important role in the 1951 crisis of *Le Monde* when he refused to replace Beuve-Méry, who had submitted his resignation. He died in 1974.

COURTIN René

Born in 1900, member of Board of Directors of *Le Monde* from 1946 to 1950, played a major role in the 1951 crisis.

Le Monde recorded him as having opposed H. Beuve-Méry in the crisis of the paper between 1949 and 1951 and as resigning from the board in December 1949. He died in 1964.

COUVREUR Jean

Born in 1903. He joined *Le Monde* in 1947 as "Grand reporter" attached to the *service informations générales*. Target of a corruption attempt, he was encouraged by Roger Lutignaux to organise a coup d'état against H. Beuve-Méry. He left but returned in 1952. He retired at the end of 1968.

DELAGE Edmond

Head of the National Defence section. He left the paper in 1953.

DOMENACH Jean-Marie

Writer, Director of the review *Esprit* for 20 years from 1957 to 1977. Listed as outside contributor to *Le Monde*, writer of various articles and *Libre Opinions* in the paper.

*** DRIAND Jaques**

Wrote two articles in *Le Monde* as an outside contributor.

DUPRAZ Joannès

Born 1907, journalist, a Secretary of the Ministry of Information during the founding of *Le Monde* in 1944. He was appointed Chairman of the Board of *Le Monde* from July to December 1951, during the 1951 crisis and the resignation of H. Beuve-Méry.

DUVERGER Maurice

Born in 1917. A Professor of Law in Bordeaux and then Paris. Director of Study and Research in the FNSP. An important academic contributor who had frequent articles in *Le Monde* since 1946 as outside contributor, taking a stance/position regularly on the major questions (politics/constitution) of the day.

EMMANUEL Pierre

Born in 1916, member of the *Académie*, journalist, writer, and poet, he wrote many articles in many reviews and newspapers, including *Le Monde*. He died in 1984.

ESCARPIT Robert

Born in 1918, Agrégé in English, Professor of literature. A contributor to *Le Monde*, he wrote a daily column (billet quotidien) *Au Jour le Jour* from 1949 to 1974.

EZRATY Claude

Born in 1925, wrote under the name of Claude Estier in *France-Observateur* and *Libération*. He joined the editorial team in 1955 and left the paper during the 1958 crisis.

FABRE-LUCE André

Essayist, outside contributor, he wrote a few *Libres Opinions* (Letter to the Editor) on the major problems of the day (politics, history). He died in 1983.

FAUVET Jacques

Born in 1914, studied Law and joined *Le Monde* in 1945 as editor. He became head of the political section from 1948 to 1958, then Assistant Editor-In-Chief from 1958 to 1963. From 1963 to 1969 he was Editor-in-Chief. He succeeded H. Beuve-Méry as Director in December 1989 where he remained until he left the paper in 1982. From 1968 to 1982 he was also joint-manager of the paper (*co-gérant*).

FAVREL Charles

Special envoy in Asia from 1950 to 1954, especially during the Korean War. He is also alleged to have strongly opposed the war in Indochina.

FLORENNE Yves

Writer, contributor to *Le Monde's* cultural section. After the *Libération* he contributed to the *Au jour le jour* column (*billet*) and was put in charge of drafting the serial (*feuilleton*) *Revue des Revues* from September 1949. He died in 1992.

FONTAINE André

Born in 1921, head of the foreign section and *secrétaire de rédaction* of *Temps Présent* in 1946-1947. He studied Law, joined *Le Monde* in 1947 as Editor and then assistant head of general news. From 1951 to 1959 he was head of the foreign desk. From January 1985 to February 1991 he was Director of the paper.

FRANCOIS Jean

Wrote one article in 1947 on Algeria.

*** FREDERIX Pierre**

Contributed to *Le Monde*, especially articles about the French Union in 1951. *Le Monde* records also state that he wrote articles on Latin America from 1945 to 1953.

FROMENT Pierre

Born in 1896, an associate of the *Sarl/Le Monde*, a Professor in various Institutes and a specialist on questions of Agriculture. He wrote in *Le Monde* from its first appearance in December 1944 to 1947. He died in 1959.

FROSSARD André

Author of a *Libre Opinion* in *Le Monde* in defense of Mandouze: *Ce Mandouze dont nous vient tout le mal*, 28/11/55/p5.

FUNCK-BRENTANO Christian-Charles

Born in 1894, son of the well known historian Franz Funck-Brentano, associate of the company SARL/Le Monde from its foundation in December 1944. He left it in December 1949 in disagreement with the external/foreign policy of the paper. He died in 1966.

GAUTHIER Robert

Born in 1901, former contributor to *Le Temps*, where he was Assistant to the Head of the general section from 1928 until the War. A philosophy Graduate, he joined *Le Monde* where he was put in charge of the general section. In 1951 he became Assistant editor-in-chief, which he remained until 1963. He died in 1966.

GILSON Etienne

Born in 1884, Professor at the *Collège de France*, then a teacher in Toronto, Canada. Member of the *Académie*, specialist in mediaeval Philosophy. He was an outside contributor to the paper from 1945 to 1950. He played a major role in the elaboration of the newspaper's policy and led the campaign of armed neutralism for Europe, 1949-1951. His articles were said to have caused *des remous d'une incroyable violence*.

GRIGNON-DUMOULIN Jacques

Born in 1929, joined the paper in 1956, Editor of the foreign section, specialist on Iberia and Latin America. In the foreign section until 1964. He wrote the articles dealing with the Spanish strike.

*** GUERIF Jacques**

Editor in the foreign section from 1945 to 1952, a specialist on Asia and the French Union.

HERREMAN Philippe

Born in 1928, joined the paper in 1956 as overseas editor, became Editor-in-Chief from 1990 to June 1993, when he retired.

HOULDIN Georges

Born in 1899, Doctor in Law, journalist from 1928 (*Vie Catholique*), he wrote a number of articles from 1945 onwards.

JACOB Alain,

Born in 1932, joined the paper in 1957 (overseas service especially, North Africa), then Then foreign correspondent in London, Moscow and Peking. Assistant Head to the foreign section from 1984 to 1991. Assistant head in the Literary section since 1991.

JULIEN Claude

Born in 1925, studied political science in the USA, author of a number of books on America, joined the paper in 1951 in the foreign section, worked in the *rédaction: service étranger*, then Assistant-head of the service, especially problems of North and Central America. Editor-in-chief of *Le Monde Diplomatique* from 1973, then Director in 1982. He retired on 31 December 1990.

*** KAYSER Jacques**

Born in 1900, a long term member of the Radical Party, Assistant Director of the IFP, wrote many articles on the press, Editor for *Le Monde* between 1951 and 1956, specialist of the Cold War. He died in 1963.

KNECHT Jean

Born in 1912, a graduate in Literature, joined the paper in 1951, Editor foreign section, then *Le Monde's* permanent correspondent in Washington. He left the paper in 1972.

*** LACOUTURE Jean**

Born in 1921, graduate in Literature, Law and Political Science, joined the paper in 1951, in charge of overseas questions. In 1953, he left the paper to become Cairo Correspondent for *France Soir*. He came back to *Le Monde* between 1957 and 1962, when he was in charge of the overseas service, especially North Africa. He was a *Grand reporter* from 1962 to 1972.

LEGRIS Michel

Born in 1931, joined the paper in 1956 as Editor, working in the general news section, left the paper in 1972.

LE MOYNE Julien

Editor in the overseas service from 1956 to 1967. Author of many articles on North Africa and Turkey. *Le Monde's* correspondent in Istanbul. He died in 1967.

LEVEUF André

Editor of *Le Monde* from 1951 to 1955 in the general news section. He died in a terrorist ambush in Morocco in 1955.

MAMY Georges

Born in 1921, joined the paper in 1951, editor in the politics section then assistant head of the section. Specialist in Parliamentary affairs (*transactions de couloirs*), he remained with the paper until 1961.

MANDOUZE André

A Lecturer at the University of Algiers. He made a speech at an International congress , Algeria in a state of War. A sympathiser of the Algerian cause, he contributed occasional articles to the paper. One led to his arrest on 26/11/56/ and to his house being searched.

MANNONI Eugène

Born in 1921, worked for *Le Monde* from 1954 to 1961 as editor in the general news section, then as chief reporter (*Grands reportages*) on the Algerian War and Trials.

MARROU Henri

Born in 1904, a Professor at the Sorbonne, a specialist in the History of Christianity, wrote occasional articles for *Le*

Monde and *Esprit*, under the pseudonym of Henri Davenson.

MARTEL Pierre-Albin

Overseas Departement editor from 1953 to 1956.

MATHIEU Gilbert

Born in 1928, joined *Le Monde* in 1952, worked in the economics section (specialist on housing), then second in command and finally head of the section, which he directed until his death in 1980.

*** MESSUD Gaston**

Outside contributor to *Le Monde* from 1946 to 1950. He wrote many articles on Algeria.

MINAY Philippe

Wrote articles on Algeria from 1955 to 1958.

PENCHENIER Georges

Born in 1919, joined *Le Monde* in 1945 in the foreign section. He became successively special correspondent of the paper in Prague, then Vienna until 1953. From 1953 to 1956 he was *Grand Reporter* of the paper. He left the paper in 1956 in the *Temps de Paris* affair and joined French Radio and Television.

PIERRE André

Born in 1887, graduate in Literature (*agregé*), author of numerous books, Secretary of *Le Temps* from 1933 to 1943, he joined *Le Monde* at its inception in December 1944. Worked in the foreign section, then second in command of the section, a specialist in Slav and Sovietic affairs. He retired in 1957 and died in 1966.

PIERRE Henri

Son of André PIERRE (above), born in 1918, joined the paper in December 1944 as editor in the foreign section. From 1950 to 1953 he was second in command of the foreign section. Various posts thereafter, Washington's Permanent Correspondent 1953 to 1960, then London and Moscow. He retired in 1981.

*** PIERRON R.**

Outside contributor of *Le Monde*, wrote a series of three articles on Algeria in 1945.

PIGNEAU Charles

Le Monde's reporter on Algeria and Morocco between 1955 and 1956.

PLANCHAIS Jean

Son of doctor and member of the Resistance, who died in a concentration camp. Joined the paper on 1 November 1945, as trainee editor in charge of the Defence section, then editor-in-chief of that section, then head of the general news section

(1979-to 1987). When he retired in 1987 he was Assistant Editor-in-chief of *Le Monde*.

POIROT-DELPECH Bertrand

Born in 1929, Philosophy graduate, joined the paper in 1951 as editor in general news section, worked in the Judiciary section, became theatre critic after the death of R. KEMP.

*** ROURE Rémy**

Born 1885, former journalist of *Le Temps*, a deportee to Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Joined the paper upon his return to France in 1945, when H.Beuve-Méry asked him to manage the paper. Wrote articles on domestic policy. Left the paper in 1952 because of his disagreement with the policy orientation of the paper (Atlantic Pact and Fechteler report). Author of a number of books under the name of Pierre Fervacque, he also contributed to *Le Figaro*.

*** SABLIER Edouard,**

Born 1920 in Baghdad, son of a Consular Attaché, a Law and Oriental Languages graduate, joined the paper in 1945 as editor in the foreign section, then *Grand reporter* and editorialist on the Middle East/Orient, also *chroniqueur* BBC RTF. He wrote a number of books on the Middle East under the pseudonym Chamard.

SCHWOEBEL Jean

Born 1912, Literature graduate with a doctorate in Law, began his journalistic career in 1932. Joined *Le Monde* in 1945 as editor in the *service étranger*, then became head of the diplomatic section.

President and founder of the Société des Rédacteurs of *Le Monde* in 1952. He also wrote for *Témoignage Chrétien*. He retired in 1977.

SERVAN-SCHREIBER Jean-Jacques

Born in 1924, a graduate of the Polytechnique, Editor in the foreign policy section of *Le Monde* from 1948 to 1953. He later joined *L'Express* as co-Director with Françoise Giroud in 1953.

SIMON Pierre-Henri

Born in 1903, a graduate of ENS, with a degree in Literature (Agrégé), Dean of the Fribourg Faculty of Letters (Switzerland), a Professor since 1949, wrote important articles (*réflexions philosophiques et littérature*). After the death of E. Herriot in 1961, he succeeded him as head of *La Vie littéraire* in the paper. He died in 1972.

*** TAILLEMAGRE Jean,**

Born 1907, Farmer and prize-winning author. Wrote from 1947 a monthly article/column, *La vie au champs*, until 1981. Used the pseudonym Comte Arnaud de Pesquidoux.

THEOLLEYRE Jean-Marc,

Born in 1924, member of the Resistance, deported to Buchen-

wald, where he met Rémy Roure. Joined the paper's *rédaction* in the general news section. Left the paper in 1957 to work for *Paris Journal*, came back to *Le Monde* in 1959 where he dealt with the judiciary section (trials and reports).

VAUSSARD Maurice,

Born in 1888, degree in Italian, a former Director of the French Institute in Milan. He wrote a number of articles on Italian history, civilisation and political life from 1945 to 1964.

VIANSSON-PONTE Pierre

Born in 1920, doctorate in Law, first worked for AFP, then head of the political section from 1948 to 1952. Editor-in-Chief of *L'Express* from 1953 to 1958. He joined *Le Monde* (again) in 1958 as head of the politics section. Succeeded Jacques Fauvet in *Le Monde*.

From 1974 he wrote a regular article/column "*Au fil de la Semaine*". He died in 1979.

VIGNAL Jean

Professor, then Director, of Studies at the Polytechnique, One of the associate founders of *Le Monde* since December 1944.

WETZ Jean Joined *Le Monde* in 1949 in the foreign section. He was special correspondent in London until 1969, then Belgrade, Warsaw, New Delhi and Brussels. He retired in 1982.

APPENDIX C

GOVERNMENTS OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

FIRST LEGISLATURE November 1946 - June 1951

18/12/46- 16/01/47	LEON BLUM
22/01/47- 19/11/47	PAUL RAMADIER
24/11/47- 19/07/48	ROBERT SCHUMAN
26/07/48- 28/08/48	ANDRE MARIE
05/09/48- 07/09/48	ROBERT SCHUMAN
11/09/48- 06/10/49	HENRI QUEUILLE
28/10/49- 20/06/50	GEORGES BIDAULT
26/06/50- 04/07/50	RENE PLEVEN
10/03/51- 10/07/51	HENRI QUEUILLE

SECOND LEGISLATURE June 1951 - December 1955

10/08/51- 07/01/52	RENE PLEVEN
20/01/52- 29/02/52	EDGAR FAURE
08/03/52- 23/12/52	ANTOINE PINAY
07/01/53- 21/05/53	RENE MAYER
27/06/53- 12/06/54	JOSEPH LANIEL
19/06/54- 05/02/55	PIERRE MENDES-FRANCE
23/02/55- 24/01/56	EDGAR FAURE

THIRD LEGISLATURE 1 February 1956 - 8 January 1958

01/02/56- 21/05/57	GUY MOLLET
12/06/57- 30/09/57	MAURICE BOURGES-MAUNOURY
05/11/57- 19/04/58	FELIX GAILLARD
14/05/58- 28/05/58	PIERRE PFLIMLIN
01/06/58- 08/01/59	CHARLES DE GAULLE

Le Monde

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ML

Paris, le 13 février 1978

DIRECTION

Monsieur Mohammed Khane
Rutherford College
The University
Canterbury
Kent CT2 - 7 NX


Monsieur,

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre du 6 février. A ma connaissance il n'existe pas d'ouvrage publié sur Le Monde et l'Algérie.

Il me paraît difficile d'entreprendre une thèse sur ce sujet sans un séjour à Paris. Nous vous faciliterions la consultation de nos collections et de nos archives classées. Votre bibliographie me paraît un peu courte. Il est vrai que des centaines d'ouvrages ont été publiés en France sur le conflit.

Pour en revenir à notre journal, son attitude a évolué au cours des longues années de guerre. Il a sur le plan politique préconisé depuis 1947 et son statut non appliqué, les solutions les plus libérales et a mené un dur combat pour les droits de l'homme et contre la répression, qui lui a valu de nombreuses attaques des gouvernements et des partisans de l'Algérie Française : saisies continuelles en Algérie et, à la fin, attentats contre les journalistes. Il a pris ensuite nettement parti pour l'indépendance.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus distingués.



Jean Planchais

24 LANSDOWNE ROAD

LONDON W11 3LL

Tel 01-727 6573

14th February, 1978

Mr. Moharred Khane
Rutherford College
The University
Canterbury
Kent, CT2 7NX

Dear Mr. Khan,

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of the 6th February, which I was most interested to receive.

I think your idea of writing a thesis on "The attitudes of Le Monde towards Algeria between 1954 and 1962" is an extremely interesting, and worthwhile project. However I have also checked this with the Warden of my College, St. Antony's, Oxford, and he shares my view. As far as I know nothing of this sort has been attempted, and indeed such a paper would have been a great help to me while I was writing "A Savage War".

Regarding your bibliography, this is of course a little more difficult. Without wishing to press my own book, I would think that you might find the bibliography at the back there of use to you. In addition to this, I should recommend to you a book that I have recently come across by an American, entitled "Lost Soldiers - the French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962" by George Armstrong Kelly (Published by MIT, in 1965). I would also suggest you might get in touch with some of the leading writers of Le Monde on the Algerian scene; notably Jacques Fauvet and Jean Lacouture; the latter wrote a great deal about the Algerian War for Le Monde, and in fact criticised me (indirectly) for not having quoted him sufficiently in my book, in a review he wrote in the Sunday Times!

Incidentally, for which University are you doing your thesis?

As I have had very little reaction so far from any Algerian on my book I should be indeed grateful to hear your own views once you have got to grips with your subject.

I hope that this may be of some help to you, please don't hesitate to come back to me if I can be of any further assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Alister Horne
(Alister Horne)

26

P.S. I am assuming you are in touch with your excellent Ambassador here in London, Mr. Brahimi?



THE UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM

26 February 1980

Mohammed Khane
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Department of Modern Languages

Professor of Modern Languages and Head of Department DE Ager BA PhD
Professor of Language F Knowles MA, MSc
Reader in General Linguistics J O Ellis, BA PhD
Reader in the History of European Universities J M Fletcher MA, DPhil

ML/MP/LJM

Dear Mohammed Khane

Following your letter of 19th February, I would first advise you that the most useful books on the history of the newspaper "Le Monde" are:

Jacques THIBAU - Le Monde; histoire d'un journal; un journal dans l'histoire
(Paris, Grasset, 1978)

J-N JEANNENNEY + J GULLIARD - Le Monde de Beuve-Méry
(Le Seuil, Paris, 1979)

On Algeria as such I hope you have seen the work of Charles-Robert AGERON of Tours University. Last year he published a history of the Maghreb and he has produced many other works on the three North African francophone countries which complement the works of Charles-André GULLIEN.

Your letter suggests that you do not have any specific angles that you wish to pursue at this stage. I think the best thing is for you to start the reading: use also Claude BELLANGER et ALII - Histoire générale de la presse française (P.U.F., Paris, 1976), Tomes iv, v. Then write to me indicating angles you particularly want to follow. One of the persons whom it would be advisable to consult as early as possible is Charles GULLIEN, Editor of Le Monde Diplomatique, but it is not wise to approach him until you have made some way with your initial research.

Yours sincerely

Dr Michael Palmer

NUFFIELD COLLEGE

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15th February 1978

Dear Mr. Khane,

I am afraid I have not been working on French politics for 10 years, so I am not really the right person to ask. But I have asked my colleagues who are working on it and they think the subject is quite a good one, and that no one is working on it as far as they know. If you really want to make sure, you could write to M. Alfred Grosser, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 27 rue St Guillaume, 75007 Paris; or, I understand there is a professor called Miège at the university at Aix-en-Provence where he runs a Centre d'Etudes Nord Africain, and he would certainly know.

Your list of books includes most of those which I would have suggested, but you might add the following:


The Memoirs of Soustelle, Michelet and Buron
J. Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria
E. Behr, The Algerian Problem
C.H. Favrod, La Révolution Algérienne
Joan Gillespie, Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution
P.M. de la Gorce, La République et Son Armée
T. Oppermann, Le Problème Algérien

These are good books on Algeria, but I am not sure that they are any use to you on Le Monde. Clark should be M.K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil. Paillat's initial is C. and he wrote another book called Dossier de l'Algérie Secret, two volumes, which may or may not overlap the one you have given. There is rather more about Algeria in my collection of essays Wars, Plots and Scandals in Post-war France, than in Crisis and Compromise.

Secret
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I hope this will be of use to you.

Yours sincerely,



P.M. Williams

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
31st May 1984

Dear Mr. Khane,

Thank you for your letter of March 27 which has only just been forwarded to me from Macmillans.

I do just remember the letter you wrote to me about Le Monde some two years ago. I am afraid I am very much out of touch with matters concerning the Algerian war, as you will appreciate I have not been back to Algeria since 1973 and my book was published already some six years ago. Therefore I do not really feel that I can offer anything new, or helpful at this stage, but obviously I wish you well with your thesis.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Neil - ...'.