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CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA

by

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*A Thesis Submitted to the University of Kent at Canterbury
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in International Relations*

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1993

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Abstract

This dissertation evolves a theoretical framework of the concept of Confidence Building Measures and applies it to the case-study of India-Pakistan relations in the South Asian region.

Part I examines the Confidence Building Measures in a global and regional perspective. It outlines a theoretical framework of Confidence Building Measures by putting forward an appropriate definition of this concept and conceptualising the confidence building process in a model. It explores the empirical universe of Confidence Building Measures on a global scale in a conflict and crisis framework, in terms of its functional dimensions and at different levels of analysis. This provides a conceptual and empirical backdrop for an examination of Confidence Building Measures in the South Asian region.

Part II studies the trends of conflict and cooperation in India-Pakistan relations in the first two decades after independence in 1947 and sets the stage for a more formal reconciliation process between the two countries in the post-Simla Agreement (1972) period. It also examines the operational variables given in the Indian and Pakistani political milieu that shape their bilateral confidence building process.

Part III presents a detailed analysis of the India-Pakistan confidence building process in its political, military, economic and socio-cultural dimensions in the last two decades. The core issues of India-Pakistan conflict, the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan's alleged involvement in supporting terrorism in the Indian states of Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir have also been discussed.

Part IV summarizes the major findings and conclusions of the study and puts forward some suggestions which may facilitate the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

The dissertation has relied on information gathered from the field work research carried out in India and Pakistan in Winter 1991-1992.

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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of Confidence Building Measures has been on the international agenda for nearly two decades. However most of conflict studies in international relations are still carried out under the broader rubrics of conflict resolution, conflict settlement and peace-making. The usual postulation is that a conflict between two or more parties exists and the task is to resolve the dispute and bring about an agreement through negotiation, mediation, third party intervention or some other conflict resolution techniques. Such traditional approaches to conflict research often do not investigate sufficiently the intermediary phase when the potential or actual adversaries undertake certain conciliatory measures that lay the foundation of a political atmosphere of some initial trust and confidence in which the conflict may be resolved. When locked in an adversarial relationship of mutual distrust and suspicion, one of the foremost and rather intractable problems faced by the decision-makers of a state is how to start improving relations with the adversary before they can arrive at any major agreement resolving the conflict.

It is in this context that a Confidence Building approach assumes importance as it provides an alternative by proposing to establish a working relationship between the adversaries as a starting point in this direction. The idea is that the policy-makers usually prefer to initiate the reconciliation process through small-steps - low key reciprocated moves that build confidence in the adversary's intentions - before bargaining about explicit and detailed treaties and agreements. This may be achieved by Confidence Building Measures as a strategy to promote detente - meaning relaxation of tensions between the adversaries - by mitigating mistrust and clarifying misperceptions and to that extent building bridges between them.

The debate on the Confidence Building Measures in the conflict and crisis literature, however, continues to be in its nascent stage. On the one hand, it has remained confined to studying the military dimension of inter-state conflicts and on the other hand, a few attempts have been made to study their role in different types of conflict and various phases of a crisis. This thesis presents an exploratory analysis of the scope and potential of Confidence Building Measures at three levels of analysis - inter-state, intra-state and inter-mestic - and in its varied functional dimensions, that is political, military, economic and socio-cultural. It also discusses the Confidence Building Measures in a conflict and crisis framework by examining their role in the case of protracted and non-protracted conflicts and in the pre-crisis and acute crisis phases of a crisis situation. Further, an attempt shall be made to explore the inter-relationships between these variables.

Another lacuna of the existing body of literature on Confidence Building Measures pertains to the lack of a well-defined theoretical perspective to structure an understanding of the confidence building process.

Most political analysts have tended to study the nature and specific features of Confidence Building Measures in its military dimension with reference to the European context especially as they have emerged from the Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna conferences. Scarcely any attempt has been made to spell out the theoretical underpinnings of this concept and to investigate the why and how, by means of which Confidence Building Measures are supposed to work. This study makes a modest attempt to fill this gap by evolving a theoretical framework for studying the Confidence Building Measures.

The utility and working of a confidence building approach will be studied in an empirical case study of India and Pakistan in the South Asian region. The conflict-ridden history of India and Pakistan relations presents a fertile ground for Confidence Building Measures especially since the traditional approaches of conflict resolution have not yielded much success. More significantly, despite the plethora of literature available on India-Pakistan relations few attempts have been made to bring out the cooperative dimension of their bilateral relationship. A substantial part of research on this subject continues to focus on the causes, processes and dynamics of the India-Pakistan conflicts. This study hopes to impart a fresh look on India-Pakistan relations by studying and analyzing their bilateral relations from a confidence building perspective.

The 1971 war marked a turning point in the history of India-Pakistan relations when Pakistan's eastern wing broke away with an Indian intervention and Bangladesh was created. In the aftermath of the war, the two countries initiated a reconciliation process as envisaged in the Simla Agreement. The focus of our study is on the post-Simla period although a brief attempt has been made to identify and juxtapose the conflictual and cooperative dimensions of India-Pakistan relations in the first two decades after independence.

The task of studying Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan is threefold. First an attempt has been made to understand and analyse the various operational variables and catalysts which shape the confidence building process between the two countries. Second, it takes into account all four dimensions of Confidence Building Measures - political, military, economic and socio-cultural. Finally, an attempt has been made to demonstrate the multi-pronged nature of the Indo-Pak confidence building process at the domestic, bilateral and extra-regional level of interactions. It may also be viewed from another perspective which studies the confidence building process at an official level between the respective governments of India and Pakistan and at a non-official level among significant elements of their policy-influencing elites and the general populace of the two countries.

The operational variables which shape the confidence building process between India and Pakistan may be broadly divided into the structural, situational and dispositional variables. The structural variables

are given in a situation thus delimiting the parameters within which the confidence building process essentially operates. In the context of India and Pakistan, we shall examine their ideological beliefs, the political structure of the state, the nature and composition of the ruling elites and the dynamics of domestic politics which impinge continuously on their bilateral relations. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the factors and forces which facilitate or inhibit the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. In particular, we would examine the veracity of two oft-repeated arguments that a democratic regime in Islamabad and a non-Congress government in New Delhi is more amenable to foster congenial and neighbourly relations between the two countries. Our study would attempt to answer the question whether a military regime in Pakistan or a Congress government in India constitute an in-built impediment in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

The situational variables are also given in a situation but they pertain to the immediate context of any particular Confidence Building Measure under consideration. In the case of India and Pakistan, they would be discussed in relation to a host of bilateral issues such as the Siachin glacier dispute, the nuclear issue, the Kashmir conflict, interference in other's internal affairs, trade, cultural cooperation and the like. The dispositional variables refer to the attitudes of the specific policy makers involved in the confidence building process at any given time. This acquires a special significance in the context of India-Pakistan relations where a good personal rapport between the top political leaders of the two countries or the lack of it, has often proved to be a critical variable in deciding the fate of their confidence building efforts. Often the personality factor of some key negotiators involved in this task has also played an important role.

Further, it shall be argued that the confidence building process between India and Pakistan operates at three levels of interaction - domestic, bilateral and extra-regional. At the domestic level, for instance, while the Islamic groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and the rising forces of Hindu nationalism in India have a largely negative impact on the bilateral confidence building process, the deep-rooted socio-cultural affinities between the peoples of the two countries provide the basic foundation for their confidence building efforts at the grassroots level.

At a bilateral level, a detailed analysis of the confidence building process between India and Pakistan will be presented. It examines the antecedents of this process by studying the opportunities of confidence building presented by the Simla Agreement and subsequently by the Pakistani proposal of a No War Pact and the Indian offer of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. It studies and analyses the military, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of the confidence building process by examining various Confidence Building Measures that have been undertaken or are under consideration by India and Pakistan. Finally, it makes an

attempt to understand and analyse the core issues of conflict between the two countries including the Kashmir conflict and mutual interference in each other's internal affairs and examines their implications for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

At an extra-regional level, an attempt has been made to study the role of the major powers such as the US, Russia (the former Soviet Union) and China and several international organizations in facilitating or inhibiting the confidence building process in the South Asian region.

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Chapter One defines the conceptual parameters of this study by outlining a theoretical framework of the Confidence Building Measures. This has five principal components. The first puts forth a stipulative definition of a Confidence Building Measure. Secondly operational variables that shape the decision to initiate a confidence building exercise are outlined. The third component identifies certain catalytic elements which may facilitate or inhibit the confidence building process. Fourthly, the model attempts to elucidate the dynamics of the confidence building process as such. And finally some criteria for evaluating the outcome of the confidence building process have been devised.

Chapter Two explores the empirical universe of Confidence Building Measures on a global scale in a comparative perspective. It identifies three levels of analysis for studying the Confidence Building Measures - inter-state, intra-state and inter-mestic and discusses their functional dimensions - political, military, economic and socio-cultural. It also studies Confidence Building Measures in a conflict and crisis framework by examining their role in protracted and non-protracted conflicts as well as in the pre-crisis and acute crisis phases of a particular crisis situation. Finally, it attempts to examine the inter-relationships between these variables.

Chapter Three presents a broad overview of Confidence Building Measures in the South Asian region. It examines the salient characteristics of this region and identifies some of the main sources of intra-regional conflicts. Keeping in mind the Indo-centric nature of this region, it discusses India's relations with its South Asian neighbours from a bilateral perspective. Eventually it will lead to the selection of our case study for further investigation.

Chapter Four attempts to bring out the conflictual and cooperative dimensions of India-Pakistan relations in the first two decades after independence. This exercise is undertaken at three levels - domestic, bilateral and extra-regional. The first examines the linkages between the internal political processes and the external conflictual behaviour of the two countries. The second studies some of the principal issues of bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan and various attempts and agreements undertaken by the policy

makers of the two countries for resolving these disputes. The final section discusses the role of extra-regional powers in facilitating or inhibiting the resolution of Indo-Pak conflicts.

Chapter Five studies various structural and dispositional variables given in the Indian political milieu which shape and influence the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. It examines the political structure of the Indian state, and makes an attempt to understand and analyse the role of various policy making bodies such as Parliament, the bureaucracy and the military in shaping the country's foreign policy especially towards Pakistan. It also discusses the leading political parties' ideologies and their implications for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

Chapter Six undertakes essentially the same exercise in the case of Pakistan. The focus of this chapter, however, remains on studying the civil-military relations within the Pakistani ruling establishment and its implications for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. It also debates the issue whether a military regime in Islamabad is by nature more hostile to India and hence, an in-built impediment in the two countries' bilateral confidence building process. Finally, it discusses the impact of Pakistan's Islamic ideology on Indo-Pak bilateral relations.

Chapter Seven examines the antecedents of the confidence building process between India and Pakistan by discussing the Simla Agreement and the debate on the Pakistani proposal of a No War Pact and the Indian offer of a Friendship Treaty as well as the Afghanistan crisis which presented opportunities for confidence guiding between the two countries. It analyses the Simla Agreement and its contribution to the reconciliation process between India and Pakistan by laying down an edifice for guiding their bilateral relations. While the opportunity presented at Simla was seized by both countries, the negotiations on the other two proposals came to nothing. It attempts to understand and analyse the causes of its failure and that of the abortive efforts made by the two countries for evolving a joint stance to meet the Afghanistan crisis.

The following four chapters examine the military dimension of India-Pakistan confidence building process.

Chapter Eight considers the fundamental military issues that have dominated the agenda of India-Pakistan talks from the early 1970's. It examines the arms procurement policies of the two countries and its impact on their bilateral confidence building process. This is followed by a discussion on the proposals for reducing the size of the armed forces and defence expenditures and the impediments being faced by India and Pakistan in reaching an agreement on these issues.

Chapter Nine focusses on various military Confidence Building Measures that have been undertaken or are under consideration between India and Pakistan. This involves an examination of the Confidence

Building proposals such as advance notification of military exercises, inviting the military teams of the other country to observe their military manoeuvres and maintaining the regular contacts between the two countries' military establishments. It also considers other confidence building proposals for the re-deployment of the armed forces to their peace-time locations or thinning out zones in the sensitive border areas.

Chapter Ten examines the Siachin glacier dispute which became an issue of contention between India and Pakistan from the mid 1980's. It considers the Indian and the Pakistani claims on the Siachin glacier before discussing the nature and genesis of the dispute. Finally, it examines the bilateral efforts undertaken by the two countries to resolve this dispute and makes an attempt to understand and analyse the causes of its failure.

Chapter Eleven considers the nuclear dimension of India-Pakistan relations. It examines the nuclear programme of the two countries in terms of their potential and capability to make nuclear weapons and the nuclear policies. This is followed by a discussion on the nuclear non-proliferation and a confidence building approach for addressing this issue. Finally, it considers some principal confidence building proposals put forward by both sides for lowering the tensions on the nuclear issue in the subcontinent and discusses their prospects.

Chapter Twelve analyses the core issue of the conflict between India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, this means the resolution of the Kashmir conflict in the sense that the Kashmiris in the valley must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination through a plebiscite. For India, the core problem in its relations with Pakistan pertains to the latter's support for the militants operating in the Indian state of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The first part of the chapter discusses the role of India and Pakistan's confidence building efforts from the point of view of avoiding another war over Kashmir and helping the two countries in resolving this conflict. The second part examines the mutual allegations of interference in each other's internal affairs and its implications for the confidence building process between the two countries.

Chapter Thirteen studies the confidence building process between India and Pakistan in a socio-cultural framework. It undertakes a detailed analysis of their bilateral attempts at economic and cultural cooperation. It also presents an alternative view of studying the confidence building process between India and Pakistan which operates at an official level, between the respective governments of the two countries and at a non-official level among the significant elements of their opinion-making elites and general populace of the two countries with no necessary or automatic correspondence between the two.

Chapter Fourteen presents a summary and conclusions of this study.

**PART I: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
PERSPECTIVE**

CHAPTER I: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES : A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of Confidence Building Measures introduced a new dimension into the conflict studies literature in the 1970's. But the debate on the theoretical underpinnings of the concept continues to be in its nascent stage. The existing body of literature on Confidence Building Measures has tended largely to study the nature and specific features of the military Confidence Building Measures in the European context. Some attempts to apply the same to the conflict situations in the Third World have also been made. However the conceptual parameters of the phenomenon of Confidence Building Measures remain undefined. The task of this chapter, therefore, is to evolve a theoretical framework for studying Confidence Building Measures.

We begin by critically examining the existing conceptions of Confidence Building Measures before putting forth a stipulative definition of Confidence Building Measures. Owing to the paucity of literature on Confidence Building Measures as such, the approaches related to confidence building such as the role of perceptions and misperceptions in international relations and various strategies devised to elicit cooperation from an adversary requires a study. An attempt shall be made to evolve a theoretical framework of the confidence building process. It outlines the operational variables that shape the decision to initiate a confidence building exercise and identifies certain catalytic elements which may facilitate or inhibit the confidence building process. The model also attempts to elucidate the dynamics of the confidence building process and defines some criteria for evaluating the outcome of such an exercise.

1 Existing Conceptions of Confidence Building Measures

Broadly speaking there are two schools of thought with regard to existing notions of Confidence Building Measures. Political analysts in the first category portray the role of Confidence Building Measures as primarily psychological in nature, correcting, altering and modifying the hostile perceptions of intentions of the adversaries. The underlying assumption is that for as much as mutual threat perceptions of the states are characterized and exacerbated by the perceived untrustworthiness and growing uncertainty of the other side, the Confidence Building exercise would involve communication and undertaking of certain credible measures to "convince each other of the absence of hostile intent be it outright aggressive designs or more subtle plans to compel a desired behaviour by the use or threat of use of force".¹ Confidence Building,

¹Karl E. Birnbaum, "Confidence Building Measures in East-West Relations", in his edited book, *Confidence Building and East-West Relations*, Laxenburg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1982, p. 14. Among other works, J. Holst's conception of Confidence Building Measures as "arrangements designed to produce an assurance of mind and a belief in the trustworthiness of states and the actions they undertake", is a particularly popular one. See, Johan Jørgen Holst, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", *Survival*, vol. 25, no. 1, January-February 1983, pp. 2-15; and Johan Jørgen Holst, "Confidence Building Measures and Security in Europe: A Long Term View", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1984, pp. 291-298.

therefore, involves an assurance of the truth and factual reality of a situation. Mutual reassurance of this kind clearly presupposes a steady flow of pertinent and truthful information and a continuous dialogue between the parties in conflict. However, too much emphasis on extracting information from the adversary may dilute the real objective of the Confidence Building which is the "correct interpretation" of the intentions of the other party by "eliminating the subjective factors and evaluations which are often due to prejudice and faulty understanding".² The fundamental task of Confidence Building Measures is to re-establish such communication channels that help in restoring a sense of trustworthiness and credibility in one's declarations of peaceful intent in the eyes of the adversary.

The second school of thought underscores the importance of the material dimension of Confidence Building Measures which concerns provable and verifiable facts about an adversary's capabilities rather than intentions that confirm or deny an observer's perceptions. It is argued that although the psychological dimension of the Confidence Building Measures is important in the sense that it is always the other side's confidence that each is primarily concerned to build. But while facing an adversary "what one wants is not to be confident but to be as confident, as the true state of affairs justifies, therefore, what is required is grounds for confidence, evidence that confidence is justified".³ Thus, in this approach stress is laid on the importance of requisite, authentic and verifiable information to build confidence in the adversary.

Some scholars have attempted to take both psychological and material dimensions of Confidence Building Measures into account. Hakan Wiberg, for instance, considers that confidence "depends on perceived capabilities of the other side, perceived intentions of the other side and residual factors".⁴ Perceived capabilities of the other side depend on "various data, habits of processing such data, the residual factors and in particular his perceived intentions", which in turn depend on the "record of behaviour of the other side, on patterns of interpreting such records and on residual factors, in particular his perceived capabilities".⁵

Within the realm of perception of intentions and capabilities, political analysts underline the military role of CBMs especially in the European context. They are intended to reduce or eliminate misperceptions

² Adam D. Rotfield, "European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims", in Birnbaum, *ibid.*, p. 106.

³ Thomas C. Schelling, "Confidence in Crisis", *International Security*, Spring 1984, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 56. Dieter Mahncke supports this argument that Confidence Building in international politics can be achieved "either by the expansion of knowledge justifying trustfulness or by verifiable constraints on the negative consequences of betrayed trust". Quoted by Birnbaum, *ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ Hakan Wiberg, "Social Scientists and Men of Practice: The Case of Confidence Building", *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1982, p. 178.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 179. Another such attempt is made by Raimo Vayrynen who considers Confidence Building as a "function of both communication and perception", where perceptions concern both capabilities and intentions. See, Raimo Vayrynen, "The European Co-operation and Security Process: Security Dilemmas and Confidence Building Measures", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1985, p. 349.

about specific military threats by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless. This objective may be achieved by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive, by providing early warning indicators to make it difficult to achieve surprise and by restricting the opportunities for the use of military force.⁶ The task of Confidence Building Measures is therefore one of establishing a code of conduct and an infrastructure consisting of procedures and constraints designed to enhance predictability concerning military activities. These measures should be open to verification either by the other side or by independent observers.⁷ Many political analysts regard Confidence Building Measures as closely associated with arms control measures. While some consider them to be paving the way for arms control measures by establishing some initial degree of trust sufficient to induce a climate for such negotiations,⁸ others identify them with Confidence Building Measures which are a variety of arms control agreements.⁹

Amidst this range of diverse viewpoints regarding the nature of Confidence Building Measures, one political analyst has attempted to accommodate both the scope and objectives of Confidence Building Measures and their causal explanation in his definition. James Mackintosh distinguishes Confidence Building as a "psychological process of perceptual transformation", and as a procedure, "the specific arms control measures that contribute to that process".¹⁰ However, his definitions of Confidence Building Measures as a procedure and as a process are at variance. The former is too narrow taking into account the role of Confidence Building Measures only as an arms control measures thereby overlooking their role in politico-economic, scientific, technological and cultural areas. And the latter part of the definition describes

⁶ Some of the references include, Abbott A. Brayton, "Confidence Building Measures in European Security", *World Today*, vol. 36, no. 10, October 1980, pp. 145-160; R.F. Byers, Stephen Larabee and Allen Lynch, eds., "Confidence Building Measures and International Security", *East-West Monograph Series*, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987, no. 4; Richard E. Darleik, "Building Confidence and Security in Europe", *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 1, Winter 1985, pp. 131-140; Guenter Buehring, "New Negotiations on Conventional forces and Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe", *Disarmament*, vol. 12, no. 2, Summer 1989, pp. 11-17; and Volker Rittberger et al., "Towards an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence and Security Building Measures", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no. 1, February 1990, pp. 55-74.

⁷ The importance of verification provisions has been particularly emphasized by Alford. See, Jonathan Alford, "The Confidence Building Measures in Europe; The Military Aspects", *Adelphi Papers*, London: IISS, no. 149; also, James Mackintosh, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Approach", *East-West Monograph Series*, (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies), 1987, no. 4

⁸ Brayton, *op.cit.*, p. 384.

⁹ James Mackintosh, "Confidence and Security Building Measures: a Sceptical Look", *Disarmament: Confidence and Security Building Measures in Asia*, New York: United Nations Document, 1990.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 88. According to this definition "(a) Confidence Building Measures are a variety of arms control provisions typically entailing state actions;

(b) undertaken by states with a reasonable expectation that fellow participating states do not currently have hostile intentions;

(c) that (Confidence Building Measures) can be (in principle) unilateral but that are typically bilateral or multilateral;

(d) that attempts to reduce or eliminate misperception of and concerns about potentially threatening military activities;

(e) by providing verifiable information about and advance notification of potentially threatening military activities, and/or ;

(f) by providing the opportunity for a prompt explanation of worrisome military activities, and/or ;

(g) by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces and their equipment by adopting verifiable restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them), frequently within sensitive areas".

Confidence Building Measures as a "psychological process involving the transformation of senior decision-makers beliefs about the nature of threat posed by the other formerly antagonistic states, primarily entailing a shift from a basic assumption of hostile intentions to an assumption of non-hostile intentions".¹¹

The foregoing discussion of the literature on Confidence Building Measures clearly establishes a lack of consensus on issues such as, 'what constitutes a Confidence Building Measure?' or 'what does Confidence Building involve?' It may be pertinent first to discuss various conceptual flaws in the existing notions of Confidence Building Measures before hypothesizing a composite definition of one's own.

Almost the entire literature on Confidence Building Measures lays exposed to a serious and noteworthy theoretical lacuna of drawing context-bound generalizations from European experiences. Political analysts have failed to extricate themselves from this original inductive bias of taking into account almost exclusively the European conventional military problems in evolving a generalized theory of Confidence Building Measures. At some risk of exaggeration, it is probably fair to say that most Confidence Building thinking in the present literature is atheoretical to the extent of being captive of these substantive fixations rather than any general conception of how Confidence Building works.

An unmistakable feature of many definitions is their special if not exclusive emphasis on the military concerns of Confidence Building Measures. Borawski puts it aptly that mostly Confidence Building Measures are conceived as the "management instruments that seek to control and communicate about how, when, where and why the military activities are employed in order to multiply the disincentives to the threat or use of force".¹² Postulating a theory of Confidence Building Measures on these lines is bound to be extremely narrow in its scope since it overlooks completely their role in a wide range of other areas such as politico-economic, scientific, technological and socio-cultural interactions. Furthermore, it equates Confidence Building Measures as a concept with certain substantive set of proposals which have been employed specifically in the European context.

Another notable flaw is in the implicit assumptions that Confidence Building Measures which ensure increased openness, transparency, predictability, control and exchange of adversary's military activities would somehow or other build confidence between the warring parties. It overlooks completely the point that the Confidence Building enterprise is much more than a mere adoption of certain specific proposals. In other words, signing an agreement containing some Confidence Building Measures will not automatically ensure a sense of confidence between the concerned parties. In fact more and more detailed information about the

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² John Borawski, ed., *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence Building Measures for Crisis Stability*, Colorado: Praeger Publishers, 1986, p. 4.

adversary's intentions and capabilities may easily breed suspicion if the underlying psychological process is not positive and accommodating. Hence it is important not to confuse the Confidence Building process with some specific measures which if employed in the correct context and successful may contribute to building confidence.

Finally there is the self-evident trend of laying stress either on the material or psychological dimension of Confidence Building but rarely both. Most of these definitions are either too narrow or too general in their nature. Some illustrations (Väyrynen, Wiberg, and Schelling) are better to the extent that they take into account both dimensions, yet they fail to distinguish between Confidence Building measures *per se* and the process of Confidence Building as such. James Mackintosh has attempted to differentiate between Confidence Building Measures as a procedure and Confidence Building as a psychological process. However his definition of Confidence Building Measures as a procedure is too narrow since it completely identifies Confidence Building Measures with arms control measures, but that of a process does touch upon the deeper meaning of the psychological and perceptual aspects of a Confidence Building exercise. It portrays a thorough picture of what it involves yet falls short of giving a convincing explanation of how this will happen.

2 Confidence Building Measures: Conceptualization

The task of devising a stipulative definition of CBMs that may be employed in this study is imperative. It should be exhaustive in capturing the essence of both the conceptual and functional aspects of CBMs. For the purposes of this study:-

Confidence Building Measures are acts undertaken unilaterally or multilaterally that are a result of a genuine and specific decision to attempt to modify and reshape the hostile perceptions of key decision-makers of some or all parties to a conflict regarding their actual or potential adversary's intentions and capabilities. Such measures are subject to independent verification. They may be of a military, political, economic, or socio-cultural in nature and are likely to vary from one situation to another.

This definition attempts to provide a general yet comprehensive assessment of the gist of what the confidence building is all about. It may be pertinent to explicate the essential features of this definition in detail in order to ascertain its operative value.

(i) The term 'genuine and specific decision' refers to the express initiatives and wishes of the parties involved in a Confidence Building exercise. Such a positive intention and active will on the behalf of the decision-makers to build confidence in each other must be clearly demonstrated in their dealings with the other party. For instance, it may be a decision to initiate talks on an earlier deadlocked issue or a tacit understanding to prevent an outbreak of active hostilities in an otherwise crisis-like situation.

(ii) Touching upon the role of modifying and reshaping perceptions underlines the psychological and political dimensions of the Confidence Building phenomenon. The modification in perceptions here only implies a shift from the hostile to the non-hostile and does not necessarily speak of an amicable state of affairs. The question of how these perceptions are to be altered will be addressed in a subsequent section illustrating how Confidence Building works ?

(iii) The meaning and implications of the phrase 'hostile perceptions' would vary from one area to another.

A wide range of acts by one side may be perceived as hostile by another. For instance:

(a) In military terms: acts such as amassing troops on the border, war games or military manoeuvres especially those changing the forces' posture to an offensive capability, mobilization activities, accumulation of huge stockpiles of offensive weaponry, adversary's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons capability particularly if the other party in question perceives itself not able to have one, border clashes, invasion of air space, and last but not least specific threats or use of force.

(b) In political terms: acts of aiding and abetting secessionist elements carrying out subversive activities on the other side's territory, severance of diplomatic ties, expulsion of diplomatic staff and violation of a treaty.

(c) In economic terms: acts of embargo or blockade, nationalization of property, withholding of economic aid, deliberate and unfavourable restrictions on the traffic of trade.

(d) In socio-cultural terms: acts of expression of solidarity by an ethnic community in one state with their counterparts in the other, media reports maligning the other side for the treatment of its minorities, ban on the exchange of the books, journals and newspapers and stringent visa restrictions on the movement of public traffic.

(iv) The definition takes into account both the intentions and capabilities of the other side. The term 'intention' here connotes not only what the other side's perceived aim or purpose is, but also an element of its *will* as reflected in the statements or actions undertaken by the respective decision-makers concerning any particular issue. The perception of intentions result from combining the incoming information with the record of the past behaviour of the other side, the patterns of interpreting such data and some residual factors. The term 'capability' denotes the possession of the requisite ability or the power necessary to carry out a set task or achieve an intended goal. The perception of the capability depends on various data, intelligence information and other past records, on ways of processing such data and the residual factors. The notion of

intention and capability though conceptually distinct are closely inter-twined as they operate in the real world. For instance, if a country is perceived to be ill-intentioned towards its neighbour, the latter may perceive even relatively defensive military concerns of the former as inimical to its own security interests. On the other hand evidence of capability is often equated with the evidence of the intent. It is commonly assumed that capability is developed in pursuit of a goal, for instance, if a state wants to invade its neighbour it is likely to build a war machine and knowing this, neighbours of a state that is arming will often be suspicious of its intentions. To sum up, perceptions of intentions and capabilities both provide an interactive feedback.

(v) The term ‘verification’ is understood as an act of demonstration or proof of truth by means of evidence or that of testing the correctness of a fact, theory, statement by means of special investigation or comparison of data (Oxford English Dictionary). Its purpose is to enable either side to ascertain whether the behaviour of the other is commensurate with its declaratory policy. On that account the results must be sufficiently convincing and considered as satisfactory by the other side. Thus, the verification process must be carried out either by the other side or some independent set of observers. The means of verification may vary from one situation to another.

(vi) This definition recognizes the role of Confidence Building Measures in the military, political, economic and socio-cultural domains of international relations. However, the specific features or characteristics of any particular set of Confidence Building Measures may be context-bound in nature and vary from one situation to another. Finally it is important to understand that Confidence Building Measures in themselves will not resolve the conflict but they are intended to create a climate in which the conflict may be resolved. Thus the major agreements resolving a conflict fully between the parties in question are not the subject of examination, but the road to that agreement is.




Figure 1.

As figure 1. illustrates, the scope of Confidence Building Measures, on the conflict spectrum is to promote detente, a relaxation of tensions between adversaries engaged in active hostilities or in a cold war situation. A Confidence Building exercise does not aim for an entente signifying a very friendly or amicable state of affairs, but only proposes to establish a *working relationship* between the states at loggerheads with each other

which if it is successful may lead to the forging of friendly ties between them.

Confidence Building Measures may also be distinguished from arms control measures especially due to the ambiguity emanating from their indiscriminate and overlapping use. The scope of Confidence Building Measures is much wider in that they can be of a military, political, economic or socio-cultural nature, whereas arms control measures are evidently very limited in scope. Specifically in the military sphere the crucial difference is that the arms control measures remain within the parameters of power politics whereas the Confidence Building Measures seek to change this. Secondly the classical arms control negotiations mostly deal with levels of forces while the Confidence Building Measures usually deal with the operations of military forces by regulating their use in such a way as to appear non-threatening to the adversaries.¹³ Finally the arms control measures typically try to establish long-term stability, for instance by providing greater predictability about types and levels of strategic forces over a given span of time. On the other hand Confidence Building Measures' foremost task is to promote short-term stability especially during the periods of intense and probably turbulent international relations.¹⁴

3 Approaches Related to Confidence Building

This brings us to the task of providing a plausible explanation of how the confidence building process actually works. Most of the explanations theorizing about such a rationale of how confidence is generated or what makes it work may be characterized as intuitively drawn judgements or causal speculations at best. They fail to explain how such a rationally guided process operates to overcome the fundamentally non-rational and heavily cognitive phenomenon of misperceptions, mistrust and misapprehensions. In fact hardly any attempt has been made seriously to question the logic of the apparently reasonable and straightforward assumption that obtaining more information about the adversary's military activities will allay fears and reduce mistrust and suspicion. As a result time and again Confidence Building Measures are designed to improve the quality and quantity of information available to senior decision-makers to help in correcting the interpretation of ambiguous actions and uncertain situations.

This underlying logic may be explained as a derivative of an indirect influence of the implicit assumptions of the Rational Actor Model.¹⁵ It demonstrates itself in the presumption that increased

¹³ Borawski, *op.cit.*, p. x; and Wiberg, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

¹⁴ Borawski, *ibid.*

¹⁵ James Mackintosh, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Approach", *East-West Monograph Series*, no. 4, 1987.

information and reduced uncertainty can yield improved understanding and control over events. This facilitates an optimal choice and yields reduced chances of misperception, distrust and unintended conflict. Resting on this premise the Confidence Building approach has been described as a "self-consciously rational approach to the correction of what is actually a collection of non-rational cognitive phenomenon".¹⁶ This approach also fails to put sufficient emphasis on bureaucratic politics and organizational processes. Most actors do not maximize most of the time and there are many rationalities. Moreover, it ignores totally any research on the operations of the non-rational elements such as misperceptions, misunderstandings and related subjects of information processing and decision-making that may prove to be of vital importance for understanding the Confidence Building process. An attempt will be made first to understand the psychological dynamics of such mechanisms and processes and then examine the task of a Confidence Building approach in this regard.

Two central forms of misperceptions may be identified as misperceptions of the adversary's intentions and capabilities.¹⁷ In the first case, it is misperceptions of the adversary's conception of his vital interests and his perceptions of one's own intentions and capabilities and the threats these pose to his interests.¹⁸ Jervis argues that one of the fundamental sources of misperceptions emanates from a somewhat irrational consistency that infiltrates all stages of the decision making process.¹⁹ The decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their pre-existing beliefs and images without being aware of any alternative interpretations. For instance, once the decision-makers have developed an image of the other side, especially a hostile one, then ambiguous and even discrepant information is assimilated into that image. New evidence

¹⁶ It is a rational intention to acquire an increased amount of better, more comprehensive, predictable and systematic knowledge in order to correct and control the conflict-inducing misperceptions. However the problem addressed by this rational intention which is the process and consequences of misperception and a host of related phenomenon is not at all rational in nature or operation. *ibid.*

¹⁷ Jack S. Levy, "Misperceptions and the Causes of War: Theoretical Images and Analytical Problems", *World Politics*, October 1983, no. 6, p. 80. For other classifications of the forms of misperceptions, see, Robert H. White, *Nobody Wanted War: Misperceptions in Vietnam and Other Wars*, rev. ed., New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1970; and John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 2nd ed., New York: St. Martin Press, 1974.

¹⁸ Levy identifies misperceptions pertaining to the perceived degree of hostility in the adversary's policies and the motivations behind specific actions as well as the perceived resolve of the adversary in a bargaining situation as the common ones because of the inherent difficulty of assessing intent. *ibid.*, pp. 88-90. Also see, Arthur A. Stein, "When Misperception Matters", *World Politics*, vol. 34, no. 4, July 1982, pp. 505-525.

¹⁹ Jervis points out that usually it is not only inevitable but often desirable for decision makers to rely upon prior expectations and beliefs in their interpretations of new evidence. However this pursuit of consistency becomes irrational as persistence and denial come to dominate the openness and flexibility in the decision-making process. See Robert Jervis, "Hypothesis on Misperception", *World Politics*, vol. 20, 1968, p. 457. Also see his book, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. In a similar vein, Stein holds that historical interpretations may be and indeed usually are correct. A problem arises only when the misperceived actor's preferences change from what they have been in the past and are not recognized as such. Also see, Martha L. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: the Influence of Cognition*, London: Westview Press, 1986.

is made to fit the decision-makers predispositions and initial hypothesis.²⁰ At times it also results in a self-fulfilling prophecy that is a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true. Jervis argues that the decision makers also fail to perceive any trade-off in relationships in the sense that one objective may be achieved through many alternatives or that the choice of one alternative may obtain a greater return to some values only at the cost of losses in some other aspects. Furthermore, once a decision has been made, previous reservations about the wisdom of that choice recede and any conceivable negative consequences are re-interpreted or discounted.²¹

Misperceptions also occur due to decision-makers' wrong assumptions about the reasons of the adversary's behaviour, its information processing and decision-making mechanisms. While analyzing the rationale of the other side's behaviour an actor usually identifies the adversary's intentions with the effects of their actions²² but reverses this procedure for their own behaviour. Thus he believes that even if he has damaged inadvertently the other's interests the other will realize that this was not the actor's intention.²³ An actor's failure to understand that he may not have communicated his non-hostile intention feeds spirals of misperceptions. For if the actor believes that the other is not only hostile but perceives the actor as peaceful, he will feel it is clear that the other is aggressive and must be met with firmness.

In this context the task of Confidence Building Measures is to create a climate in which explication can occur and to correct the unintended consequences of actions undertaken. This objective can be achieved in a two-pronged approach. Firstly the actor revises its own perceptions about the adversary by trying to see the world the way the latter sees it and secondly by helping the target review its perceptions about the actor by clarifying its intentions to the other. The sharing of ideas about the conflict with the target leads to a considerable amount of "self-disclosure".²⁴ Such an exercise is important because often the decision-makers not only have a limited understanding of the working of the target's arguments, they also do not know the

²⁰ He further hypothesizes a positive co-relation between the degree of confidence with which the actor holds the theory and the ambiguity of data with the impact of actor's pre-existing beliefs in his interpretation of the data. Jervis, *ibid.*

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 451.

²² For instance, if other's behaviour has the effect of injuring the actor, he is apt to believe that this was the other's purpose or intention. *ibid.*, p. 350.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 354. Jervis gives many reasons for such a failure such as lack of understanding of the context in which the other sees the actor's behaviour, the familiarity that the actor has with his own intentions which makes it harder for him to believe that others might not see them as he does, and the self-righteousness that inhibits the conclusion that the other's undesired behaviour was provoked, since such a conclusion may imply an unfavourable self-image.

²⁴ Ronald J. Fisher, "Pre-Negotiations, Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiations", *International Journal*, vol. XLIV, no. 2, Spring 1989, p. 450.

structure of their own belief systems. For instance, often the sub-goals come to be valued for their own sake and their original rationale is lost sight of. Consequently, the decision-makers fail to appreciate that any change in the circumstances may mean that the ultimate objective may be better reached through new sub-goals.²⁵

A Confidence Building exercise in this context would involve both sides examining critically their own as well as the other side's important beliefs and assumptions. A mutual decision to sit together and discuss openly each other's viewpoints contributes towards a greater degree of understanding and increased trust. It may bring about a larger awareness on both sides as to where the major misperceptions and distortions lie and what possibilities exist to remedy these erroneous conceptions and how to bridge the gap in perception and intention. A third party may have a crucial role in this context. The idea is to bring about a greater receptivity to each other's ideas. And to that end an increased flow of open and accurate communication and interaction may allow both sides to see each other's intentions more clearly and fully and thus to evaluate their own interpretations and reactions more critically. It may help the actor in understanding its own means-end chain better and enable it to conceive alternative ways to achieve its objective that are compatible with other side's interests. At the same time an accurate explanation of the other's behaviour can often bring mutual benefits. If a party understands the beliefs and goals that have produced the other side's unacceptable proposal, it may be able to find an arrangement that gains the other's objectives without sacrificing anything of high value for itself.

However, clarifying misperceptions and disproving unfounded apprehensions alone is not enough for building confidence between the adversaries. In fact it is important to note here that the concept of Confidence Building is not based on the notion that all international conflicts are only a result of misperceptions and misunderstandings. The idea is consistent with the view that most of such conflicts encompass basic differences of viewpoints and discrepant goals. The task of Confidence Building will vary according to the nature of the matter in dispute.

In the case of conflicts arising out of clear-cut incompatible goals or uncompromising stands on one or more issues between states, the task of Confidence Building is different. It involves conscious efforts to bring about a purposive transition from a stage when each perceives the other only as an enemy bound on

²⁵ Jervis, *op.cit.*.

undoing its opponent and untrustworthy and unwilling to initiate a reconciliation process (and behaves accordingly itself thus justifying a similar perception on the part of the adversary) to one when each is able to see the adversary who is nonetheless capable of some co-operative behaviour and trust (and to reflect such characteristics itself) and the two develop at least a 'working relationship'.²⁶ Since the existing literature on Confidence Building Measures does not illustrate the Confidence Building process, one may look into briefly the game theory literature in international relations that deals with a similar problem of inducing trust and eliciting co-operation from an adversary.²⁷ Basically a decision-maker may use either a pre-determined strategy towards its adversary or a contingent strategy in which he adjusts his actions in some consistent way to the actions of the other side. Both experimental and inter-state studies indicate that contingent strategies are more effective than non-contingent ones in securing the co-operation of an adversary.²⁸ As it is, leaders are more likely to adapt their actions according to an adversary's cooperative or belligerent attitude rather than pursuing a predetermined policy.

One such example is that of the Tit For Tat strategy which determines one's next move according to the adversary's previous move. It simply reciprocates the last move (cooperative or competitive) of an actor in kind. In the experimental studies on the Prisoner's Dilemma situation, a simple Tit For Tat matching strategy has proved to be more effective in eliciting cooperation from an adversary than a non-contingent strategy having the same level of cooperation²⁹ or a variety of more complex variations of the Tit For Tat theme.³⁰ At an inter-state level a simple Tit For Tat has been generally effective when used by national

²⁶ This comes close to William Zartman's concept of a pre-negotiation phase where each party starts with a search only for a unilateral advantage to a stage where they must have established some mutual trust to be able to start formal negotiations to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. See, William Zartman, "Pre-negotiations: Phases and Functions", *International Journal*, vol. XLIV, no. 2, 1989. However a Confidence Building exercise goes far beyond that as it involves both informal and formal negotiations to achieve its objective.

²⁷ Some of the major works include, Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York: Basic Books, 1980; A Rapoport and A.M. Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965. Also see, V.E. Bixenstine and J. Gaebelein, "Strategies of 'real' Opponents in Eliciting Cooperative Choice in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 15, 1971, pp. 157-166; M. Deutsch et al., "Strategies of Inducing Cooperation: An Experimental Study", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 11, 1967, pp. 345-360; and Martin Patchen, "Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 31, 1987, pp. 164-185.

²⁸ R.J. Leng and H.G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success and War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 23, 1979, pp. 681-684. Also see, S. Oskamp, "Effects of Programmed Strategies on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Mixed-Motive Games", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 15, 1971, pp. 225-259.

²⁹ Oskamp, *ibid.*, and Warner Wilson, "Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1971, pp. 167-195.

³⁰ Such variations may be in terms of the speed with which the other side's actions are reciprocated, consistency and strength of the reciprocation. The results show that an imbalance in responding to the quickness in responding to the cooperation and coercion has been found to be least effective in achieving its objective. Secondly an attempt to gain an occasional advantage by inconsistent reciprocation does not appear to pay off in the long run. Thirdly a mildly retaliatory strategy (rather than a strong or no retaliation one) is better to avoid the danger of retaliation and counter-retaliation that may cause the two sides to get locked into a continuing and possibly escalating series of mutually competitive actions. See, Robert Axelrod, "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's

leaders in disputes with states following a variety of strategies.³¹ The outcomes obtained were better than those obtained by the use of a consistently coercive or rewarding strategy. It also proved to be the most effective means of the avoiding a diplomatic defeat without going to war especially when employed against a bullying opponent.³² The rationale for this strategy's success lies in a combination of its 'niceness' that prevents it from getting into unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other side does, its 'provocability' that dissuades the other side from exploiting by retaliating to its competitive actions and its 'forgiveness' helps to restore mutual cooperation after it has retaliated.³³ However there are some pre-requisites for this strategy to be effective. Firstly the situation must be one in which the payoffs for each side are greater when they both cooperate than when they both compete. Secondly this strategy is more likely to be effective only when the relationship between the parties are frequent and durable and where the issue of today does not seem so vital to either side that it is willing to sacrifice future cooperation in order to win current advantage.

To recapitulate, the Tit For Tat strategy does provide some useful clues such as the importance of reciprocity and consistency in building confidence between two adversaries. Yet its relevance for the Confidence Building exercise is rather limited. This strategy is too mechanistic and simplistic even partially to explain the complex dynamics of the Confidence Building phenomenon. For instance, an initial or reciprocal move by either party made in the prevalent circumstances of ambiguity and mistrust that usually characterize real-world conflicts may simply not be acknowledged as one by the target³⁴ and this may be because the Tit For Tat strategy takes no note of the historical and other past experiences of the parties in conflict. Besides it overlooks completely the role played by the underlying motivational orientation of the decision-makers of both sides about their own as well as the other side's behaviour to cooperate or clash.

Some of the shortcomings of the Tit For Tat strategy, especially the difficulty in taking the initiative independent of the other party's actions, is presumed to be overcome in that of GRIT (Graduated

Dilemma", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 24, no. 1, March 1980, pp. 3-26; Axelrod, *op.cit.*; and C.L. Gruder and R.J. Dussak, "Elicitation of Cooperation by Retaliatory and Non-Retaliatory Strategies in a Mixed-Motive Game", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 17, 1973, pp. 162-174.

³¹ Leng and Wheeler, *op.cit.*

³² It should be noted however that the successful strategies used by the states that were studied by Leng and Wheeler were not strictly ones of reciprocity but included unilateral conciliatory initiatives as well. *ibid.*

³³ Axelrod, *op.cit.*

³⁴ C.R. Mitchell, "A Willingness to Talk", *Occasional Papers*, (Centre for Conflict Resolution, George Mason University) no. 4, 1990.

Reciprocation in Tension Reduction) put forth by Charles Osgood.³⁵ The basic aim of the GRIT strategy is also to encourage an eventual pattern of mutual cooperation. The initiator of the GRIT strategy first makes a general statement of intent to work towards conciliation. Then he carries out a series of unilateral conciliatory acts each clearly announced in advance. He does not expect immediate reciprocation of these acts because he understands that the target does not trust him and that his conciliation may be viewed as a ploy to induce the target to make himself vulnerable. However the initiator is not supposed to tolerate either exploitation of his initiatives or other escalatory acts by the target. When faced by such acts, he responds with retaliation which is carefully scaled to match the escalatory acts so as to restore the status quo existing just prior to the escalation without imposing any costs to the latter. Then the initiator must recommence with conciliatory initiatives because an over-retaliation to exploitation or unresponsiveness to conciliatory action by the target are counterproductive to its aims. The results of a large number of experimental game studies involving mixed-motive conflicts³⁶ and the so-called 'Kennedy Experiment'³⁷ with regard to the US-USSR relations during the early 1960's provide evidence that the various steps of GRIT strategy can be generally effective in fostering trust and bringing about a cooperative response from the target.

Although none of the strategies discussed above provides a comprehensive understanding of the Confidence Building phenomenon, put together they do spell out certain principal elements that may contribute towards a Confidence Building process. We will examine these elements subsequently in section 4.2.

4 Confidence Building: Towards a Theoretical Framework

Confidence Building Measures have a role to play in almost every situation where two or more parties are at loggerheads. They are needed in situations where differences, suspicion and even antagonism already exists. It may be in a cold war situation where parties involved are inimical towards each other and often

³⁵ See, Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender ?*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962; and his two articles, "The GRIT Strategy", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May 1980, pp. 58-60, and "Disarmament Demands GRIT", in B. H. Weston, ed., *Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security*, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1984.

³⁶ Mixed-motive conflict is characterized by the presence of the possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation, the temptation to compete so as to exploit the other person's cooperation, a lack of trust in the other person because of the possibility of his yielding to the temptation to exploit, the possibility of mutually harmful competition arising from both the temptation to compete and the requirement to compete to defend against the exploitation. See, Marc Pilisuk and Paul Skolnick, "Inducing Trust: A Test of Osgood Proposal", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1968, pp. 121-133; Svend Lindskold, "Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal and Effects of Conciliatory Acts on Conflict and Cooperation", *Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 85, no. 4, 1978, pp. 772-793; S. Lindskold, Pamela S. Walters and Helen Koutourais, "Cooperators, Competitors and Response to GRIT", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, no. 3, September 1983, pp. 521-532.

³⁷ A. Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment", *Western Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 20, 1967, pp. 316-380.

engaged in a war of words, under crisis circumstances when the adversaries may be pitched against each other in a battlefield or in a situation where a conflict has ended in a stalemate with both sides maintaining their hostile perceptions towards each other. In other words, the need for Confidence Building arises when two adversaries have a negative assessment of the perceived intentions and capabilities for each other which may be due their incompatibility of goals or misperceptions and mistrust and they still want to establish a better working relationship. A Confidence Building process commences when at least one or both the adversaries realize the need for it.

The theoretical framework of the Confidence Building as evolved in this chapter has four principal components. The first outlines the operational variables that shape the decision to initiate a Confidence building exercise. The second identifies certain catalytic elements which may facilitate or inhibit the Confidence Building process. Thirdly the model attempts to elucidate the dynamics of the Confidence Building process as such. And finally some criteria for evaluating the outcome of the Confidence Building process have been devised.

4.1 Operational Variables

The decision to initiate a Confidence Building exercise and the nature of a particular Confidence Building Measure is shaped by a number of variables. These may be divided broadly into the structural, situational and dispositional variables. The structural variables are 'given' in a situation thus delimiting the parameters within which the Confidence Building process essentially operates. The dynamics of domestic politics, the nature and composition of the ruling elites, the political structure of the state, and the socio-cultural milieu of the people may be some such factors that determine the nature, working and success of a Confidence Building exercise. For instance, in a state structure dominated by class-based political parties or non-elected institutions such as the military or the bureaucracy at the cost of its elected political institutions and processes, a country's external policy may actually be geared towards serving the interests of only those few sections in the decision-making apparatus of that country. An external threat often suits the interests of military rulers trying to perpetuate their rule. Under these circumstances they are neither likely to initiate Confidence Building nor probably will they respond positively to the other side's initiatives. Even in case of an apparently civilian form of government where the military is acting as a watchdog constantly scrutinizing the government's affairs over its shoulders, the task of the civilian government in initiating or sustaining a

Confidence Building process with an adversary may be a difficult one. For instance, the military may endorse some Confidence Building Measures in the politico-economic or socio-cultural areas of interaction but will probably suspect the government's efforts to undertake any commitments constraining the military's activities or compromising its capabilities.

In a democratic form of government the ethos and ideology of the party in power as well as its strength in the parliament may well prove to be a crucial factor in a Confidence Building process. Thus, a hardline ruling party may adopt at best a very cautious approach towards the confidence building process and probably jeopardize the whole exercise at worst. Further, a stable and majority party in power is usually in a position to deliver the goods especially when it comes to undertaking a Confidence Building initiative or a reciprocal gesture that involves a concession to the adversary. Whereas the manoeuvrability and leverage of a weak and unstable government is often rather limited since it may not be able to sell the idea to its domestic constituency.

In the socio-cultural sphere of interactions, contacts between opinion-making elites and the common people of the two adversaries as well as the religious factors, cultural traditions and linkages make crucial inputs into a Confidence Building process. The rationale behind the contacts at a people-to-people level is that in a conflictual relationship characterized by misperceptions, mistrust and suspicion between the adversaries, a detente at a grassroots level may be fostered by promising interdependence in areas such as cultural exchanges, scholarly interactions and improved communications. Such contacts may play an important role in laying the groundwork of a Confidence Building process by generating a momentum of their own favouring a reconciliation process that will ultimately help their respective governments in their task.

The situational variables, too, are given in any particular situation but they pertain to the immediate context of a particular Confidence Building Measure under consideration by the respective parties. For instance, what are the immediate incentives for either side to initiate a Confidence Building process? A hurting stalemate after a military conflict may induce one side to initiate a de-escalation process through Confidence Building or fears of a war arising out of miscalculation or an accident may prompt one or both sides to agree upon certain Confidence Building Measures adopting restrictions on the activities and deployment of their armed forces particularly within sensitive areas. Situational variables also concern the role of the third parties which may be an individual neighbouring country, a great power or perhaps a coalition

of countries in the form of a regional organization because a Confidence Building process is never a strictly a dyadic interaction between two adversaries. Third parties may play a supportive role by bringing the two adversaries together and by providing any necessary technical assistance. For instance, they make the services of their satellite facilities available for verification purposes of a military Confidence Building Measure undertaken by two sides. On the other hand, they can also impede a Confidence Building process. For example, when the two parties are negotiating some Confidence Building Measures for reduction in their military budgets or non-deployment of any new offensive weaponry, an announcement of military aid or the offer or sale of certain new weapon systems to either side by a third party at that time, and its acceptance by the former, may disrupt the whole Confidence Building process. The dispositional variables pertain to the attitudes of specific policy-makers involved in a Confidence Building exercise and often the personality factors of some key negotiators may also play an important role.

4.2 Catalysts

The success and effectiveness of a Confidence Building exercise in achieving its objective depends on the nature, presence and working of certain factors. An open, sustained and accurate flow of communication is an essential element in a Confidence Building process.³⁸ Their utility for signalling an intent of undertaking a reconciliation process, transmitting information about one's intentions and capabilities and for consolidating the gains of an initially successful Confidence Building exercise is evidently of critical importance. Political contacts between policy-makers of both sides at appropriate levels is likely to contribute in building confidence in each other. Permanent contacts provide opportunities for a better understanding of the respective positions and may help to settle controversies especially those which stem from misunderstandings and misperceptions. A Hotline between the heads of governments and military commanders of parties in conflict has proved to be one such very useful and effective mechanism to facilitate the flow of time-urgent information in crisis situations, thereby helping to clarify perceptions and defuse

³⁸ John Burton had used the technique of "controlled communication", for the first time in 1963 between actual adversaries to create a situation in which parties involved would expose their perceptions of each other, their motivations and goals, their internal political problems, their definition of the situation, their interpretation of the events that led up to a conflict and then to its escalation. His results were encouraging. The analysis enabled the parties to correct mutual perceptions, redefine their situation, re-assess the values of their objectives in relation to costs, consider the relevance of the means adopted to pursue them and to envisage new policy options. John Burton, *Conflict and Communication*, London: Macmillan, 1969. Also see, C.R. Mitchell, "Conflict Resolution and Controlled Communication: Some Further Comments", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 10, 1973, pp. 123-132; and Anthony de Reuck, "Controlled Communication: Rationale and Dynamics", *The Human Context*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1974, pp. 64-80.

potentially explosive situations that might otherwise spiral out of control.

The two parties can also make use of the existing channels of communication to convey the one's expectations about the other side's behaviour and suggesting ways and means of restoring co-operation if and when any violation occurs.³⁹ Burton points out that any such communication is effective to the extent it is "deliberately conveyed, correctly perceived and interpreted as intended and then fully utilized in the allocation and re-allocation of values, interests and goals".⁴⁰ However an emphasis on the free flow of communication must not be confused with incessant demands for more information from the adversary especially of a military nature, which as argued above may even impede the Confidence Building process. It is important that this network of communications does not remain confined to the government-to-government level contacts. It must percolate down to the opinion-making elites including academicians, advisors, ex-officials, retired or out-of-power politicians and journalists that have the potential of influencing a government's policies and further to contacts between the public at large. Such contacts may be of particular value in those situations where socio-cultural affinities cut across the boundaries of countries in question.

An increased and growing magnitude of mutually acceptable interactions will probably bolster a mutual Confidence Building process, provided both parties are favourably inclined towards the idea and it takes place on an approximately equal or symmetrical basis and does not result in a unilateral advantage to one especially at the cost of the other. The rationale behind such a postulation is the more that avenues of interaction are created, the more there are opportunities for either side to identify the areas of common interest. When the parties in conflict confine the Confidence Building process only to their central point of hostility which may be due to disputed territorial claims or a perceived military threat, it often results in a deadlock since both sides find it difficult to make a big concession.⁴¹ By diversifying the areas of interaction, the parties may not only develop mutually beneficial trade-off relationships but the confidence built in these situations may also increase their manoeuvrability and leverage to address and resolve the central dispute at

³⁹ With regard to handling the violation of expectations, each side can make information available about the penalties it will invoke if the other harms its interests and the techniques of absolution the other can use to rid itself of these penalties if they are evoked. See, Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1958, pp. 273-275. and Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action", in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behaviour: A Socio-Psychological Analysis*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 406.

⁴⁰ Burton, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

⁴¹ Roger Fisher proposed the idea of fractioning complex conflicts into distinct issues to be dealt with individually which can be an effective way of making such conflicts manageable. The assumption is that good performance on a single issue can oil a jammed relationship and facilitate the successful quest to resolve other issues, ultimately making the atmosphere of relationship generally co-operative. Roger Fisher, *Basic Negotiating Strategy*, London: Harper and Row, 1969.

a later stage. For instance, besides the politico-security issues, there is a wide spectrum of opportunities for broadening and strengthening a Confidence Building process in the economic field of interaction. The growth in number of contacts among the business community and a rise in the volume of industrial co-operation and ordinary trade may help in creating a net of mutually advantageous relations which can survive in spite of the deterioration of the political climate. Such a multiplication of economic ties tends to create and establish 'lobbies of peace' on both sides that are interested in maintaining peace in long-term political relations, to raise the price of disruption of these relations and provide mutual constraint.

An understanding of the underlying motives of either side's behaviour is likely to determine the other's sense of confidence in it. Perceived motives affect whether policy-makers consider a particular Confidence Building Measure is a sincerely motivated one or not and shape the formulation of their response.⁴² For instance, if a party is convinced that the other has no interest in a Confidence Building exercise beyond furthering its own objectives it is not likely to put any confidence in the other side without any regard to the latter's statements to this effect. However in most adversarial relationships characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion over a long time, decision-makers often fail to break out of their persisting habits of pre-judging hostility even with certain conciliatory moves by the other side or merely dismiss it as a propaganda exercise or a trick.⁴³ This can prove counterproductive particularly if the initiative was meant as a genuine gesture. On the plus side, the more one party's intentions are perceived to be positively inclined, genuinely credible and a matter of deliberate choice by its decision-makers rather than a result of compulsion or pressure from any third source, the more the other side will be inclined to place its confidence in the former. In this regard, the more consistently either side's behaviour is perceived as directed towards Confidence Building, the more it is unusual or 'out of role' keeping in mind their earlier conflictual relationship the more it is likely to be perceived as internally motivated rather than a result of external pressures.

If the initiative of Confidence Building comes from the stronger party, the likelihood of its intentions being perceived as genuine by the other are high. It is the possession of the relatively unused threat capability

⁴² Deborah Larson puts forth this argument forcefully that perceived motives are critical in determining whether states reciprocate concessions. See, Deborah Welsch Larson, "The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations", *Negotiation Journal*, July 1988, pp. 281-301.

⁴³ Jervis pointed out that a policy-maker with an 'inherent bad faith' image will ignore, reinterpret or discount an initially conciliatory gesture as a trick. Jervis, *op.cit.*, pp. 77-78, 117-202, 288-315.

and yet a decision to initiate the Confidence Building process by that party that enhances its credibility in terms of attribution of positive intentions by the other. However if one party's behaviour does not correspond with its stated intentions, it is likely to undermine the other side's confidence in itself. For instance, if one party repeatedly denies any intention to attack the other but amasses its troops on the common border, it is likely to lose its credibility in the eyes of the other side and cause more distrust and suspicion. When the potential outcome of a Confidence Building Measure is somewhat equitable for both, each is more inclined to perceive the other as genuinely building confidence rather than attempting to gain a unilateral advantage.

Consistency in either side's manifest attitude and behaviour (corresponding to intentions and capabilities) as perceived by the other modulates the rate and strength of the confidence being built. The more consistent the declarations and patterns of actual behaviour the more stable expectations are likely to be built. And the more stable the relations between declarations, policies and behaviour, the more confidence will be built.⁴⁴ In other words, the more the statements of intent of building confidence by either side are borne out in actions and are recognized as such by the other side over a period of time, the better the pace and lasting nature of a Confidence Building exercise.

The principle of reciprocity is another key factor in a Confidence Building exercise. The policy-makers tend to reciprocate to the Confidence Building initiatives which are perceived as both intentional and relatively costly to the side making them because these factors provide evidence of good intentions.⁴⁵ On the other hand, if a Confidence Building initiative is perceived to be made because of domestic political constraints or pressures from a third power or out of sheer weakness, the other side is not likely to reciprocate the gesture. However when a Confidence Building proposal is acknowledged as an intentional and genuine one, the more positive and quicker the reciprocation by the other side the more the probability for each to build confidence in the other. If the reciprocation to a Confidence Building initiative is ignored or delayed for too long, the other side is likely to draw the conclusion that it will not work. And the more strongly this pattern is established the harder it will be to break it.

It is important to note that none of the above-mentioned factors alone is sufficient to realize the objective of a Confidence Building process. On the contrary, all of them are at work simultaneously and tend

⁴⁴ Wiberg argues that the declarations and behaviour do not necessarily have to coincide but only that they are related in an identifiable manner. Wiberg, *op.cit.*, p. 180.

⁴⁵ Larson, *op.cit.*, p. 292.

to complement and reinforce each other. The purpose was only to render an account of all such forces that are at work in such an exercise before illustrating the Confidence Building process as such.

4.3 Dynamics of the Confidence Building Process

Fig 2. represents an attempt to capture the dynamics of the Confidence Building process. It must be clearly pointed out that the figure is **not** intended to describe a linear picture of the sequential stages of this process. The idea is not to present it as a succession of discrete stages each of which is complete before the next begins. Some of the variables discussed above permeate the whole process and there may be an occasional overlapping of any two stages particularly with regard to a positive recognition and reciprocation to a Confidence Building initiative.


A positive decision to undertake a Confidence Building exercise leads one side to propose a specific Confidence Building Measure.⁴⁶ If the Target does not recognize such a move as a genuine attempt to build confidence or perceives it as such but does not reciprocate the Initiator will have to make a fresh start.⁴⁷ On the other hand if the Target acknowledges the confidence building proposal as such and reciprocates positively, it is the Initiator's turn to confirm it so. At this stage the roles of the Initiator and the Target are reversed and the Initiator has actually become the target of the Target. If the Initiator does not recognize the Target's action as the desired reciprocation the Target will have to make yet another move in this direction or give up. But a positive recognition and reciprocation by the Initiator would imply that both have agreed on a particular Confidence Building Measure. That does not necessarily mean that the two have *confidence* in each other, although it does provide feedback to sustain this process. In the course of time both sides re-assess their perceptions of intentions and capabilities of each other. If it still remains to be negative it requires more Confidence Building efforts by both. On the other hand a positive re-assessment implies that now the two sides may have a better sense of confidence in each other. One may note that various domestic and exogenous factors shape continuously the nature and direction of the whole Confidence Building process.

Thus a Confidence Building process is a much more complex and broader phenomenon than a particular Confidence Building Measure, although both are inter-linked and reinforce each other. The

⁴⁶ For explanatory purposes the party taking the first step is referred to as the Initiator, and the other as the Target, which can be any of the two involved in a conflict.

⁴⁷ Mitchell provides a list of the key characteristics that substantially increase the likelihood of a signal being both communicated and perceived as a genuine conciliatory gesture. Mitchell, "A Willingness to Talk", *op.cit.*.

Figure 2



The Confidence Building Process

Confidence Building process as visualized here is a two-way process with both sides attempting to generate the other's confidence in itself. It addresses the question of how an Initiator can generate and increase the Target's confidence in itself as well as increase its own confidence in the Target. This helps each party in reviewing its habits of data processing and patterns of interpretation of the other side's behaviour so as to avoid arriving at exaggerated assessments of the other side's capabilities and an ascription of its intentions.

One shortcoming in this model is that it apparently delineates the Confidence Building process as being undertaken by two sets of policy makers who are putting forward specific Confidence Building proposals and reciprocating such moves. However, a Confidence Building exercise in a real-life situation is a multi-pronged process of continuous interaction in several domains (political, military, economic, socio-cultural) and takes place simultaneously at various levels among significant elements of policy-making and policy-influencing elites and people to people contacts between the parties in conflict.

4.4 Evaluation of the Outcome

It is important to differentiate and elucidate the inter-relationship between three similar concepts employed in this study, that of a Confidence Building Measure, a Confidence Building process and the term 'Confidence'. A CBM or a set of CBMs are a part of the Confidence Building process and if the two put together work in the sense of securing its desired effect it implies that the 'confidence' has been achieved. It is important to note that a distinction between these terms has been made only for the benefit of conceptual clarity since the operational criteria for ascertaining whether a Confidence Building Measure has been undertaken or in a broader sense a Confidence Building process is underway, is likely to be different from one intended for assessing whether it has succeeded in terms of attaining its end-product, that is 'confidence'.

With regard to the former set of criteria one may speak of:

(a) A statement by the key spokesman of the initiator party to the effect that a particular measure or set of measures is being undertaken with the specific intention of building confidence in the target. Such a measure may be only a verbal statement or a statement alluding to a proposed action by the initiator or the action itself. If the initiator does not demand a positive response from the target as a prior condition before undertaking such a measure, it may be referred to as a unilateral Confidence Building Measure may have the effect of setting a Confidence Building process in motion.

(b) A counter-statement either by the target or the presumed target or a third party that reflects the recognition

and reciprocation of initiator's intention is called for. This too can take the shape of a verbal statement or a statement alluding to an action in response proposed to be undertaken by the target or the action itself.

(c) A tacit understanding developed between the parties through signals meant for each other.

(d) A verification of a Confidence Building Measure is in principle possible, particularly where Confidence Building is a two-way process and at least one of the parties' statement implies a behavioural intent. For instance, if one party promises to initiate or undertake any particular measure intended to build confidence in the target but is found subsequently to be wanting by the target in that regard, not only will it fail to achieve its desired effect but this may also prove to be counter-productive.

What distinguishes the Confidence Building process from the end-product of confidence is that in the former it is only the intention of the parties involved that is taken into account but in the latter the desired effect of those intentions is the question at issue. And an assessment of such a desired effect, i.e. 'confidence' can be reached only by ascertaining the level and extent to which the Confidence Building process and various CBMs put together have attained the functional effect of creating confidence and are recognized as such either by the target or the presumed target or a third party. Certain indicators establishing and verifying such a claim need to be enunciated. The characteristics or attributes symbolizing this new mood of confidence must be reflected in a positive shift in attitudes and behaviour, corresponding to the intentions and capabilities of both sides towards each other.

The concept of attitude at an inter-state level may be illustrated as one state's typical tendency to evaluate and respond to the other's behaviour in a consistently favourable or unfavourable way and is often seen to be comprised of a cognitive, affective and behavioural component.⁴⁸ A Confidence Building exercise must bring about a positive shift in the attitudes of both sides in terms of a more realistic cognitive component, a more positive affective component and a more cooperative behavioural orientation towards each other. One authentic way of ascertaining such a shift comes from the categorical statements by the respective decision-makers to this effect. Therefore, if a number of key government officials especially the ones involved in a Confidence Building exercise between two states acknowledge and declare that each has been able to repose its confidence in the other owing to the efforts undertaken by both to this end, one may deduce that the Confidence Building Measures are working. Beyond government officials a change in the

⁴⁸ It draws an inference from Fisher's definition of attitude at an inter-personal level. Fisher, *op.cit.*.

attitude of the wider opinion-making elites towards the other may be discerned through extensive interviews with a sample of these elites and an analysis of their writings. Public opinion as reflected in the mass media is another way of assessing any change in their posture.

More important evidence of Confidence Building Measures working may be derived from certain observable and identifiable actions undertaken by both sides to this effect. It may be reflected in any agreement or tacit understanding on any point in dispute or a decision to initiate and sustain the Confidence Building process in some areas even if the party refuses to compromise on the central issue of hostility. Further, the policy-makers decision to raise and diversify the level, scope and intensity of official as well as unofficial interactions with the other side may be regarded as a positive sign of the Confidence Building process achieving its desired objective.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has made a modest attempt to fill the conceptual gap in the existing body of literature on Confidence Building Measures by evolving a theoretical framework for understanding and analysing the concept of Confidence Building Measures. It put forth an appropriate definition of a Confidence Building Measure and conceptualized the phenomenon of Confidence Building process in a model. Further, it elucidated the inter-relationship of three related concepts of a Confidence Building Measure, a Confidence Building process and confidence itself and outlined the criteria devised for judging the success or failure of such an exercise. Having defined the conceptual parameters of Confidence Building Measures, we need to examine the empirical universe of Confidence Building Measures, a task which would be undertaken in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The empirical universe of Confidence Building Measures is multi-dimensional and the task of this chapter is to explore and unravel its diversity and complexities with the help of certain conceptual categories. The world of Confidence Building Measures is examined on a global scale from a comparative perspective. A confidence building exercise can be undertaken at a macro or micro level of analysis. A macro approach focusses on the "dynamics of aggregate interactions and emergent patterns in a particular configuration of attributes or variables" and the micro approach on the "components of the pattern".¹ Since a focus on either level of analysis alone gives only a partial view of the reality, an attempt has been made to strike a balance between the two. This chapter adopts a macro level approach and tries to extract and compare the outstanding features from the universe of CBMs. The purpose is to provide a conceptual and empirical background of the subject by depicting a broad picture of CBMs in a comparative perspective. The following chapter considers the micro level of analysis and a case study in the South Asian region is selected for further examination.

A preliminary investigation shows that none of the available databases on conflict studies directly or indirectly takes into account the role of CBMs in international relations. Most of them concentrate only on crisis situations at an inter-state level and virtually ignore potentially conflictual situations that do not result in open conflict owing to certain conciliatory measures undertaken by the respective parties. This exercise would require us to analyse briefly the context, events and dynamics of the process of diffusing tension in a conflictual situation, a voluminous task if it is to prove exhaustive on a global scale. Besides it would be worthwhile only for making a statistical analysis of CBMs' role at different levels of analysis on a wide scale which is certainly not an objective of this thesis.

This chapter examines the empirical universe of Confidence Building Measures within certain conceptual categories. The first section studies Confidence Building Measures at different levels of analysis. It discusses briefly this problem in international relations and identifies three levels of analysis for studying Confidence Building Measures - inter-state, intra-state and inter-mestic - to be followed by an empirical discussion of Confidence Building Measures. The second section explores Confidence Building Measures in a conflict and crisis framework and examines their role in non-protracted and protracted conflicts as well as the pre-crisis and acute crisis phases. Finally it considers the Confidence Building Measures' functional dimensions - political, military, economic and socio-cultural. The rationale of this classification lies only in

Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, *Structure and Process in International Relations*, New York: Harper Row, 1973, pp. 122-23.

its analytical convenience and the need to bring out different ways of studying the concept of Confidence Building Measures. This is highlighted further in the last section which examines the inter-relationships between these variables. It is important to note, however, that this is essentially an exploratory exercise and that is where its significance lies.

1 Confidence Building Measures at Different Levels of Analysis

Defining a level of analysis for studying any phenomenon in international relations is an important conceptual and methodological consideration. The purpose and utility of designating one's level of analysis and its corresponding analytical model has been spelled out in terms of its descriptive, explanatory and predictive capability in reference to the subject under study.² The theoretical implication of concurrence of various levels of analysis, however, means that there can be competing explanations of the same phenomenon. The task of a researcher is only to specify one's own level of explanation which may not be either the best or the only one.

The most widely applied levels of analysis in international relations pertain to the state and the international system with the former stressing the foreign policy actions of the states and latter the pattern of interactions of two or more states. A third level of analysis, a regional subsystem is being utilized increasingly albeit in an exploratory manner. The focus of crisis literature also remains on two levels - unit and system.³ The political analysts employing a unit level of analysis study the state as a crisis actor and examine its actions from a decision-making perspective. The systemic level of analysis focusses on the interactions among the states in an international crisis.⁴ The literature on CBMs scarce though it is, does not even address the level of analysis problem. The present study will make a preliminary attempt to examine CBMs at three levels of analysis namely inter-state, intra-state and inter-mestic. The state is the primary unit of analysis for an inter-state level of analysis. The intra-state level of analysis focusses on the sub-national actors and the inter-mestic level of analysis takes into account both the state and the sub-national actor.

1.1 Confidence Building Measures at an Inter-State Level

The parties involved in a confidence building process at an inter-state level are state governments in a conventional sense. Here, one may distinguish between the bilateral and multilateral level with the former involving two parties and the latter more than two.

J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, ed., *The national System: Theoretical Essays*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1961, pp. 78-80.

Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Sheila Moser, *Crisis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. I*, New York: Pergamon, 1988; Patrick James and J. Wilkenfeld, "Structural Factors and International Crisis Behaviour", *Conflict Management Peace Science*, vol. 7, no. 2, Spring 1984; and J. Leng Russett and J. David Singer, "Militarized Inter-state Crisis: The W Typology and its Application", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 32, 1988.

Brecher, *ibid.*, p. 9.

1.1.1 Confidence Building Measures at the Bilateral Level

CBMs between the erstwhile superpowers provide a classic illustration of CBMs at the bilateral level. Initially they were proposed to enhance crisis stability by facilitating the flow of time-urgent information in order to defuse potentially explosive situations which might otherwise spiral out of control.⁵ The Hotline Agreement of 1963 establishing a direct telecommunication link between Washington and Moscow represents one such key CBM. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement between the US and Soviet Union provided for detailed 'rules of the road' when those two countries' vessels were sailing close to each other. It has proved to be quite effective in preventing both accidents and incidents between the US and Soviet Union. CBMs have also been designed to enhance compliance with arms control agreements by providing an adequate exchange of information to ensure verification of specific activities. The SALT-II agreement, for instance, provided for the notification of certain tests and prohibited the encryption of telemetry to ensure that each side is abiding by the treaty. The Standing Consultative Commission under the SALT-I agreement was established for airing and resolving questions concerning its implementation and, to that extent, was considered to be an in-built CBM in the US-Soviet strategic relationship.

In Latin America a confidence building process between two conflicting countries has often been initiated in the form of a declaratory undertaking or obligation. An excellent example is the joint Chilean-Argentinian statement of 23 January 1984 under the auspices of Vatican mediation promising that both countries would soon settle peacefully the dispute over the three Beagle Channel islands and the strip of South Atlantic waters which had brought them to the brink of war in 1978. It set a confidence building process in motion which culminated in a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries. In the Pacific and Far East the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came forward with various specific confidence building proposals for improving the Soviet-Japanese relations in July 1986, September 1988, May 1989 and during his visit to Japan in January 1991. The two countries agreed to lay the foundation of this process by exploring the areas of mutual cultural exchanges, economic assistance, investment and other bilateral matters concurrently with attempts to resolve the territorial dispute over some of the Kurile islands. Other CBMs such as establishing a hotline to avert any crisis, naval CBMs to prevent incidents at sea and reciprocal observation of military exercises are already under consideration.⁶

The Soviet Union and China have also been engaged in an all-embracing confidence building

F. Stephen Larrabee and Allen Lynch, "Confidence Building Measures and US-Soviet Relations", in R.B. Byers et al. *Confidence Building Measures and International Security*, East-West Monograph Series, no. 4, 1987, pp. 82-83.

Muthiah Alagappa, "Confidence and Security Building Measures in North-East Asia" in *Disarmament: Confidence and Security Building Measures in Asia*, New York: United Nations Document, 1990, pp. 161-162.

exercise addressing political, military, economic as well as socio-cultural issues. On the border issue the Soviet Union undertook several unilateral steps such as troop withdrawals from the border areas of Mongolia. In 1988 it proposed a set of specific CBMs including mutual notification of military exercises, the presence of observers at exercises, a ban on exercises in border areas and no military movements in the border areas without prior agreement. During Li Peng's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1990, the two countries signed an agreement on guiding principles for mutual troop reductions. They also established a joint working group to look into specific issues such as defining the components of a reduction of armed forces, types of armament subject to reduction, co-ordinating the procedures for data exchange, mapping out the geographical zones of reduction, creating the verification mechanisms and developing a range of other military CBMs.⁷

The South and North Korean border is already subject to a Confidence Building regime in the form of a demilitarized zone. The two countries have been engaged in an on-off dialogue (1972-1974; 1979-1980; 1984-1985) and the most recent phase commenced with the President Roh Tae Woo's initiative in July 1988. The bilateral talks have since been held in a number of fora such as the Red Cross, Inter-Parliamentary Meetings and Sports talks including the Summit meetings between the two Prime Ministers although without much progress in substantive terms. Confidence Building proposals on the non-military and relatively non-controversial issues such as cessation of propaganda against each other, free travel, joint development projects, cooperation in Antarctic/Marine scientific research and fisheries and environmental arrangements have also been put forth.

1.1.2 Confidence Building Measures at the Multilateral Level

During the cold war the European experience provided a classical example of CBMs at a multilateral level. Since the Second World War, a nuclear and conventional armament race between the Eastern and the Western blocs in Europe had resulted in a heightened risk of a war breaking out or escalating out of control owing to a misinterpretation or miscalculation of the other side's military activities. Moreover, arms control negotiations addressed only one part of the problem relating to the size of the armed forces and number of weapons but overlooked completely the second and more important aspect that is the configuration of forces and how they could be used - particularly their capacity for a surprise attack. Against this backdrop, CBMs were evolved to regulate the operations of military forces, to enhance transparency and to clarify the intentions underlying military activities for reducing the chances of a surprise attack or a conflict arising out of a miscalculation. In other words, Confidence Building Measures' significance in the European context lay

⁷ See, Trevor Findlay, "Confidence Building Measures for Asia-Pacific", Working Paper No. 55, Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, December 1988; and Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Mikhail Ivanov, "First Round of Soviet Talks on Arms Reduction Ends", TASS, 2 October 1990.

in its utility to "control and communicate about how, when, where and why the military activities are employed in order to multiply the disincentives to threat or use of force".⁸ Such a notion of CBMs has been gradually unfolding itself in successive conferences at Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna which were organized to debate these issues.

The first generation of CBMs were enshrined in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975. Basket I of that accord outlined the principles to guide the relations between the states. Basket II contained provisions on commerce, industrial cooperation, science and technology. Basket III dealt with human rights and Basket IV contained specific military measures to be undertaken by the parties which were officially characterized as CBMs.⁹ The *raison d'être* of these CBMs was to reduce "the dangers of an armed conflict and misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehensions particularly in a situation where the participating states lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities".¹⁰ The participating states committed themselves to give notification of military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops at least 21 days in advance.

The second generation of CBMs was outlined in the Stockholm document adopted by the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986. This document not only confirmed and reinforced the Helsinki Final Act but further presented an improved, expanded and enlarged version often referred to as 'Confidence and Security Building Measures' (CSBMs).¹¹ The exchange of information on military activities and the participation of observers was designed to provide all participating states with a great deal of information about the military concepts, structure and strength of the other states. This would contribute towards reducing the risks of miscalculation of another state's military capabilities and activities and in a situation of mistrust or fear, immediate on-site inspections were provided for clarifying and arriving at a realistic assessment of the situation.¹² With regard to the compliance with the Stockholm regulations it may be underlined that no violation of the regime has been revealed so far.¹³

The third generation of CBMs arrived with the initiation of two sets of negotiations to be conducted simultaneously on the CBMs and conventional forces in Europe in March 1989 at Vienna. While the first set

⁸ John Borawski, ed., *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence Building Measures for Crisis Stability*, Colorado: Praeger Publishers, 1986, p. 4.

⁹ Findlay, *op.cit.*

¹⁰ John Borawski et al., "The Stockholm Agreement of September 1986", *Orbis*, Winter 1987, p. 644.

¹¹ For details see, Victor-Yves Gheblali, "Confidence Building Measures within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes", UNIDIR Research Paper No.3, UNIDIR, New York, 1989.

¹² Peter Hohenfellner, "The Achievements and Drawbacks of Helsinki/Stockholm Confidence Security Building Measures Process", in *Disarmament, UN, op.cit.*, p. 26.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 27.

dealt with the issues of openness, predictability and Confidence Building Measures, the second set, often referred to as CFE talks, addressed the issues of asymmetries in conventional forces and their mutual reduction in Europe. The new measures envisaged an improvement on the Stockholm CSBMs including an exchange of static information, the establishment of Confidence Security Building Zones and periodic discussion of military strategies. They provided for annual exchanges of military information on the organizational structure of the armed forces, on their deployment and stationing in times of peace, on the armaments used by them and on the new systems of weapons introduced into the land, naval and the air forces. The document also provided for a mechanism for consultation and cooperation on unusual military activities and dangerous incidents of a non-military character.¹⁴

CBMs at a multilateral level have also been applied elsewhere. The Contadora Agreement of June 1986 among the Central American states, for instance, deals with a wide range of issues including human rights, elections, national reconciliation, refugees and the reduction of political tensions. The military-technical CBMs modelled after the European experience, however, remained the focal rallying point. The specific military CBMs comprised of the parties giving a minimum 30 days notice for the military manoeuvres taking place less than 30 kms from another state and such manoeuvres were to be observed by officers from the neighbouring states' armies.¹⁵ Further manoeuvres involving forces from outside Central America were to be limited in terms of duration, location, frequency, size, composition, and secrecy. It also conceived a subsequent process of troop and arms reductions in phases. The Contadora CBMs were, therefore, seen as a prelude to and a complementary part of arms control and a partial disarmament process for the states involved. Additional CBMs included the establishment of a Verification and Control Commission¹⁶ and a region-wide hotline ensuring direct communication links among the governments involved and the commission.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the Soviet President Gorbachev in July 1986 suggested initiating the peace and security process in the Asia and Pacific region on the Helsinki pattern.¹⁷ But he acknowledged that the European experience could not be transplanted automatically to the Asia-Pacific region and that the only reason he referred to the Helsinki process was because the world community had no other such experience

¹⁴ Anton Rossbach, "The Security Enhancing Role of Confidence and Security Building Measures", in *Disarmament, UN, op.cit.*, pp. 48-49.

¹⁵ Trevor Findlay, "The Non-European Experience of Confidence and Security Building Measures: Models for Asia-Pacific Region", in *Disarmament, UN, op.cit.*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁶ *ibid.* It also envisaged setting up of an International Verification and Follow-up Commission with representatives from a large number of interested parties including the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Contadora Support Group.

¹⁷ The text of this speech is reprinted in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A Thayer, eds., *The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power*, Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

so far. More specifically Gorbachev put forward a number of naval Confidence Building Measures including a proposal on the notification of large naval exercises or movements. As a unilateral gesture in this respect, the Soviet Union invited a number of Pacific countries to its Pacific Fleet Manoeuvres in 1989.¹⁸

The idea of multilateral CBMs in a global framework was first put forth in 1978 at the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) of the UN where the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called for a Confidence Building offensive and asserted that CBMs could "serve in all parts of the world and improve the political pre-conditions for disarmament and arms control".¹⁹ The close linkage between the regional and global level of multilateral CBMs is now universally recognized. On the FRG's initiative a comprehensive study on CBMs was carried out in 1980-1981 by a group of governmental experts appointed in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution 34/98B. It was the first attempt to clarify and develop the concept of CBMs in the global context. The report strongly recommended the regional approach to CBMs stressing that the measures leading to the creation and strengthening of confidence and promoting security and stability in one region would definitely have a stabilizing effect on a wider scale. Subsequently the UN Disarmament Commission considered the subject and in 1988 it arrived at a set of 'Guidelines for Appropriate Types of Confidence Building Measures and for the Implementation of such Measures at a Global or Regional Level'. The General Assembly by resolution of 43/78 H endorsed those guidelines and recommended them to all states for implementation. At the Fourth Session in December 1989 the General Assembly by a consensus resolution reaffirmed its invitation to all states to consider the possible introduction of CBMs in their particular regions. It recommended that the states should negotiate the CBMs keeping in mind the conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions and welcomed the consideration of this issue in the UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean.

1.2 Confidence Building Measures at an Intra-State Level

At an intra-state level of analysis, all the parties are from within the state and at least one of the parties is a sub-national actor. The status of two parties may, therefore, be unequal. Unlike the inter-state level when there is a clear-cut set of decision-makers embodied in a government on both sides this may be particularly missing on the part of the sub-national actors at an intra-state level. In fact the most common obstacle in initiating a confidence building process might just be one of deciding to whom to talk because

¹⁸ "Soviet Pacific Fleet Commander Calls for Naval CBMs", **BBC Summary of World Broadcasts**, 24 March 1990.

¹⁹ Falk Bomsdorf, "The Third World, Europe and Confidence Building Measures", in Hugh Hanning, ed., "Peace-Keeping and Confidence Building Measures in the Third World", **A Report by International Peace Academy**, Report no. 20, New York, 1985, p. 34.

there may be more than one group claiming to be the true representative of the party to a particular issue under dispute.

A succinct illustration of such difficulties may be made through the dilemma of the Indian government in initiating talks with various factions of the Akali Dal representing the Sikh separatists in Punjab. The late Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi signed an accord with Sant Longowal's moderate faction of Akali Dal which did not demand a separate state of Khalistan but he was assassinated by the extremists before long. Subsequently various factions led by Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala, Mr. Badal and Simerjeet Singh Mann among others made this issue all the more intractable. This problem was further aggravated by the inter-group rivalries between these factions. In the case of Cambodia, for instance, intra-factional fissures were a major factor in the initial failure of Paris summit's attempts to find a mutually acceptable agreement. The Sihanoukist faction (FUNCIPEC) was increasingly polarized over the perceived autocracy of Sihanouk's son Prince Ranaridh. Further divisions within Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) faction remained potentially problematic and the semblance of unity could only be enforced by barring the commander of the KPNLF armed forces General Sak Sutsakhan from attending the Paris conference. Despite the announced establishment of a High Council for National Defence in late March 1990 there was no sign of better unity in the resistance coalition between the non-communist groups and the Khmer Rouge.²⁰

The rationale for studying CBMs at an intra-state level of analysis relates partly to the fact that internal conflicts especially in the Third World have been assuming increasing salience over the past few years. Kende's study for the period 1945-1976 showed that out of a total of 120 local wars, 84 (70%) were internal wars.²¹ The literature on the role of subnational actors in internal conflicts, however, remains scarce.²² Butterworth's database concerns essentially inter-state conflicts between international actors and tends to impute value of internal actors to the state actors intervening on their behalf.²³ The International Conflict Behaviour (ICB) database also takes into account non-state (both sub-state and supra-state) actors

²⁰ Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1989: Still Talking but no Settlement", *Asian Survey*, vol. 30, no. 1, January 1990, p. 100.

²¹ Istvan Kende, "Local Wars 1945-1976", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. XV, no.3, 1978 and Istvan Kende, "Twenty-Five Years of Local Wars", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1971.

²² Some major works on the internal conflicts as such include, Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within Nations 1955-1960, Turmoil and Internal War" *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, vol. III, 1965, pp. 159-184; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations", *General System*, Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, vol. III, 1963, pp. 1-50.

²³ R.C Butterworth, *Managing Inter-state Conflicts 1945-1976: Data With Synopsis*, Pittsburg: Pittsburg University Press, 1976.

as at best a triggering mechanism for state actors.²⁴ Regarding CBMs no attempt has been made to explore their utility at an intra-state level.

The nature of a confidence building process at an intra-state level depends largely on the type of conflict, whether it is an insurgency, guerrilla warfare, revolution, agitation, secessionist movement or an ethnic conflict. It also depends on the nature of the issues in question such as discrimination on socio-economic, religious or ethnic grounds, distribution of resources or secession from the state.²⁵ It may be argued that Confidence Building Measures may only have a limited relevance in certain types of internal conflicts such as an insurgency or guerrilla warfare and none at all in others like a revolution or a secessionist movement. This is primarily because the ulterior motives of the two parties in such cases are mutually exclusive. The leaders of a secessionist movement totally committed to their goal of an independent state and the state government equally determined to preserve the unity of state, for instance, do not share any common ground that may render the initiation or undertaking of a confidence building process possible. Such a conflict often becomes a zero-sum game where the loss of one party is the gain of other. The basic problem is not one of hostile perceptions or rather misperceptions of the parties in conflict but their irreconcilable motives leaving no scope for CBMs. It does not mean, however, that CBMs are totally irrelevant in the case of internal conflicts. For example, if the leaders of an insurgency movement or an agitation demanding more autonomy express an intention to initiate talks for resolving the dispute, a confidence building exercise may prove to be a useful approach. A decision by the agitation leaders to suspend violence or the agitation itself for some time to hold talks with the government or a decision by the government to lift the ban on certain groups' activities or to accord legitimacy to its leaders are a few such confidence building examples.

For instance, when the Sri Lankan President Premadasa came to power, he offered an unconditional amnesty for the Tamil separatists and the Sinhala extremists if they would end violence and join the political process. The government promised to repeal the anti-terrorism laws, outlaw anti-guerrilla vigilante groups and provide seats for the representatives of the militants in the Parliament.²⁶ But owing to the irreconcilable

²⁴ The ICB 1929-1985 project undertaken by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *op.cit.*, ICB Codebook 2, System level dataset, June 1989.

²⁵ Several classifications of the types of internal conflicts have been put forward. Kende classifies them broadly in two categories -anti-regime and tribal wars. Kende, *op.cit.*, p. 11; Rummel identifies three dimensions of internal conflict behaviour -(a) turmoil, an unorganized form of internal unrest includes riots, demonstrations and crisis; (b) revolutionary, an overt organized conflict behaviour such as purges, revolutions and domestic killed; (c) subversion, a more covert form of organized conflict behaviour such as guerrilla war and assassinations. Rummel, *op.cit.*, p. 12; Tanter utilizes two categories to study internal conflict behaviour -turmoil and internal war representing a merger of the revolutionary and subversion dimensions. Tanter, *op.cit.*, p. 16. Soedjatmoko identifies issues that have commonly given rise to armed conflicts in the Third World into five categories being national borders, minority groups, self-determination, distribution of resources and systemic conflicts. See Soedjatmoko, "Patterns of Armed Conflict in the Third World", *Alternatives*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1985, pp. 477-495.

²⁶ "Sri Lankan Initiation of Talks With Tamils", *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, vol. 35, no. 4, 31 May 1989, p. 36589.

nature of the parties' goals in this case, such political initiatives had little effect.

Since 1947 India, too, has been a breeding ground for several secessionist, separatist and agitational movements. The Naga and the Mizo insurgencies of the 1950's, the Naxalite movement in Andhra Pradesh in late 1960's and 1970's and the present separatist movements by the Sikhs in Panjab and the Muslims in Kashmir are only a few examples. One crucial factor in bringing such diverse groups of insurgents, separatists and the Indian government on a common negotiating table has been former's undertaking to find a settlement within the Indian Constitution's framework. For instance, when Mr. Laldenga leader of the Mizo National Front (MNF) agreed to negotiate a settlement within this framework, talks between the Indian government and the MNF followed in 1987 resulting in an agreement leading to elections in Mizoram. Likewise, the Indian Government expressed its willingness to negotiate an agreement with the AGP (Assam Gana Parishad)²⁷ agitating on the issue of foreign settlement in Assam after a draft AGP resolution committed the party to the unity of India.

In Central America, one may find instances of unilateral Confidence Building Measures such as the Nicaraguan government's decision to release all political prisoners including 1151 Contra rebels and 39 members of the deposed Anastasio Somoza's National Guard as a goodwill gesture before the elections in February 1990.²⁸ In South Africa, President de Klerk's decision to legalize the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party, the Pan Africanist Congress and to lift restrictions on many other Black Nationalist Groups and individuals and release Nelson Mandela in February 1990 is another such example of a unilateral measure that may set the confidence building process between the conflicting parties in motion.

On the whole a confidence building exercise can be a useful approach for initiating a political dialogue between the parties in conflict. But it is difficult to ascertain the general value of a confidence building process in cases of internal conflict in any conclusive manner. This is partly because no prior attempt has been made to examine the theoretical and empirical utility of this concept at an intra-state level and partly because quite often the goals of sub-national actors, like the secessionists and that of the state governments, prove to be mutually exclusive with no room for compromise.

1.3 Confidence Building Measures at an Inter-Mestic Level

At an inter-mestic level at least one of the parties is a sub-national actor with significant political linkages cutting across the territorial boundaries of the states in question. This is a rough combination of an

²⁷ Although AGP's membership was largely drawn from AASU (All Assam Students Union) and the AAGSP (All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad), it did not represent a formal merger of these two groups.

²⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 February 1990.

inter-state and intra-state levels of analysis where the issues may be domestic as at an intra-state level but are peculiar owing to its spillover effect across the borders, thus, having an international dimension as well. By implication CBMs at this level would always involve a third party. An inter-mestic level as such has been employed scarcely in conflict reserach.²⁹

The internal conflicts in the Third World have been assuming increasingly an international dimension due to such a spillover effect across their borders. In the South Asian region, for instance, Chinese and Pakistani support to the Mizo and the Naga insurgency in 1950's and the Naxalite movement in 1960's and early 1970's and Afghanistan's support to the Pukhtoons demand for Pakhtunistan in 1950's and early 1960's was an established fact. In Central America, Costa Rica's support to anti-Somozo exiles in Nicaragua in 1960's and more recently Honduran support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua and Nicaragua's support to FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador may be mentioned in this respect.

The role of CBMs at an inter-mestic level of conflict, too, remains unexplored. Naturally the first question that arises is whether CBMs have any role to play at all in such conflicts and if so what is the nature of such a role. The answer depends on the nature of the issues at stake. For instance, if a separatist movement in state A receives political and military support from across the borders by state B their goal being to overthrow the regime in state A or carve out an independent state, it is well-nigh impossible to envisage a role for CBMs unless at least one party shows an inclination for compromise.

Various rounds of informal talks between the four warring factions of Cambodia - the Vietnamese backed government of Hun Sen and the opposition coalition consisting of supporters of Prince Norodin Sihanouk, non-communist Khmer People's Liberation Front and communist Khmer Rouge and representatives of Vietnam and other South-East Asian and Pacific countries at Paris and Jakarta - embodied such efforts to reconcile their differences through an incremental confidence building process. It resulted finally in an agreement between all the parties to abide by the UN plan to end the civil war, an immediate ceasefire and establishment of a twelve member Supreme Council to govern the country under UN supervision until free elections were held.

In Central America the Nicaraguan President Chomorro reached an agreement with the Contra leaders in March 1990 for dismantling their camps in Nicaragua and Honduras within a fixed duration and called for an immediate ceasefire to be supervised by the UN Observer Group in Central America and the International Commission for Support and Verification. Later the Honduras President Callegias stated that

²⁹ One piece of work that attempted to study the international dimension of subnational groups is by Alexis Heraclides, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*, London: Frankcass, 1991.

no Contras would be granted refugee status in that country, thus, implicitly forcing them to be re-absorbed into the Nicaraguan society. This step-by-step confidence building approach culminated in a ceasefire agreement signed by the representatives of the Contras, the Sandinista army and the Nicaraguan President on 19 April 1990.

In Africa various rounds of negotiations between South Africa and Mozambique were undertaken to ensure that each will not serve as a base for acts of subversion or aggression against the other nor use the territory of a third party for such acts. These talks were meant to indicate the end of South African support for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and the Mozambique's support to the ANC which had been using its territory for attacks against South Africa. They also agreed to prohibit the acts of propaganda inciting a war or aggression against the other and to prevent illegal crossings of the border by joint patrols. The positive results of such talks were reflected in the Nkomati Accord of Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness between the two countries.³⁰

In another situation where a revolutionary movement has its stronghold in two neighbouring states and is working against both of them, a Confidence Building approach could prove useful in the sense that both could join hands to tackle that problem. One such classic example is that of Thailand and Malaysia which faced a common problem of the communist insurgents. The joint efforts by the two states to solve this problem instead of accusing each other of the same is a remarkable illustration of the use of a Confidence Building approach by Third World countries. In fact mutual confidence enhanced by meeting the communist threat along the Thai-Malaysian border encouraged the latter to cooperate more positively with Thailand in resolving its problem of dissidence by the Thai Muslim minority in the southern border region.

The preceding discussion only provides a skeletal framework for a conceptual analysis of CBMs at different levels of analysis. But several empirical examples in each case do suggest that the idea of examining the concept of Confidence Building Measures from this perspective is worth exploring further and additional insights may be derived from such efforts. Since no such prior attempt has been made the value of the present study lies in it being the first of its kind. It does not claim to justify the above-mentioned levels of analysis as either the only or the best for studying CBMs but merely recognizes that there can be different levels of analysis for examining this phenomenon.

2 The Role of Confidence Building Measures in a Conflict and Crisis Framework

The term conflict generally connotes incompatibility of interests, objectives and values among two or more groups of human beings. More specifically Gurr states that "conflict phenomena are the overt

³⁰ "Some Observations Regarding Nkomati Accord", *ISSUUP Bulletin*, University of Pretoria, South Africa, 1984.

coercive interactions of contending collectivities".³¹ This definition is broad enough to encompass varied dimensions of conflict ranging from political riots and insurrections to a revolution and war. However, contrary to the conventional notion of war in conflict studies as behavioural, overt, inter-state violence, many of the Third World conflicts are characterized by structural violence as well as intra and inter-state violence described as a "protracted social conflict".³² A protracted conflict refers to "conflict situations of extended duration, fluctuating interactions in frequency and intensity, spill over of hostility into all aspects of relations, strong forces tending to restore equilibrium and no distinguishable point of termination".³³ The role of CBMs may be studied in the context of both non-protracted and protracted conflicts. One may note, however, that CBMs in themselves will not resolve the conflict but they are intended to create a climate in which the conflict may be resolved. A confidence building exercise only proposes to establish a *working relationship* between the conflicting parties which if successful may forge friendly ties between the

2.1 Confidence Building Measures in Non-Protracted Conflicts

The role of CBMs in non-protracted conflicts may be illustrated with certain empirical examples. In the aftermath of the Falklands war in 1982, Britain adopted a policy of seeking normalization in commercial, cultural and other links with Argentina. After a number of unilateral gestures by Britain including the lifting of financial sanctions and those on Argentine exports into Britain, it elicited a positive response from Argentina, setting a reconciliation process in motion. Following a number of informal exchanges, the two countries confirmed cessation of all hostilities and adopted a confidence building approach to develop their bilateral relations in the military sphere, trade and communication links and to enhance cultural, scientific and sporting ties. The positive results of this confidence building process are evident from the fact that Britain and Argentina have already re-established full diplomatic relations.³⁴

CBMs have also proved effective in modifying the hostile perceptions or misperceptions of the decision-makers in situations where they are not yet involved in open hostilities. Argentina and Brazil, for instance, have long shared mutual apprehensions about the military nature of their nuclear programmes.

³¹ Ted Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict*, New York: Free Press, 1980. Also see, George Summel, *Conflict: The Web of Group Affiliations*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1908; Anatol Rappaport, *Conflict in Man-Made Environment*, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974; Michael Haas, *International Conflict*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974; and C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of Conflict*, London: Macmillan, 1981.

³² Edward E. Azar and Chung in Moon, "Managing Protracted Social Conflict in the Third World: Facilitation and Development Diplomacy", *Millennium*, vol. 15, no. 3, 1986, pp. 394.

³³ *ibid.* Also see, Edward E. Azar, "The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situations", in Dina A. Zinnes, ed., *Conflict Process and Breakdown of International System*, Denver: Denver Univ. Press, 1980 and Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishers, 1990.

³⁴ A.J.R. Groom, "Britain and the South Atlantic: Politics and Strategy", in Pierre Maurice and Olivier Gohin, eds., *Geopolitique et geostrategie dans l'hemisphere Sud* Reunion: CERIGOI, 1991, p. 7.

Confidence building measures have played a vital role in this context. The two signed an agreement for the reciprocal visits of scientists to each other's nuclear installations in 1985 followed by another accord committing them to a regular exchange of information and technology to strengthen their mutual confidence through a growing, reciprocal and verifiable knowledge about the peaceful nature of each other's nuclear programmes. The Presidents of the two countries also signed an agreement renouncing the use and deployment of nuclear weapons and pledging themselves to begin negotiations with the IAEA to allow inspections in their nuclear facilities in November 1990.³⁵ In South-East Asia, Singapore has always been somewhat suspicious of a potential military threat from its two dominating Malay neighbours. However, an agreement between the armed forces of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia to hold joint military exercises had a positive effect in building Singapore's confidence in its neighbours. Although the military exercises in October 1989 were held mainly in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak rather than the militarily more sensitive peninsular Malaysia they were viewed as the first step towards confidence building among the three countries.

2.2 Confidence Building Measures in Protracted Conflicts

An essential feature of protracted conflicts is their long duration making them a "process" rather than "a specific event or even clusters of events at a point in time".³⁶ Obviously the first question that arises is whether CBMs play any role at all in a protracted conflict. An immediate answer may be in the negative because CBMs do not by definition resolve any conflict and thus can not possibly have any role to play in protracted conflicts involving hostile perceptions and interactions in all domains of relations over long periods of time. A closer scrutiny, however, suggests that two characteristics of protracted conflicts - the spillover effect to other issues and the fluctuating interactions - do create grounds for a confidence building process to prepare the climate in which conflict resolution proposals may stand a better chance of succeeding. The spillover effect in terms of issues implies that the parties are involved in a conflict over a number of issues at the same time. In this case one or both sides may show an inclination to reconcile their differences on some subordinate or simply different issues from the major one, thus, initiating a confidence building process. The second characteristic of fluctuating interactions refers to a 'turn hostile to a near-accommodation' continuum of relationship between the conflicting parties. A confidence building exercise in this context is precisely the kind of restraining mechanism that could be interposed between outbreaks of violence in protracted conflicts

³⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 November 1990.

³⁶ Brecher (1988), *op.cit.*, p. 127.

in order to break the cycle of action-reaction and to prevent the parties backsliding into conflict.³⁷ It does not however mean that CBMs always play a role in protracted conflicts let alone a positive one. If the non-compatibility of goals between the parties involved extends to all the issues in question or both sides are not interested in changing the status quo, CBMs have no role to play. Obviously any specific and genuine intention to build confidence is totally lacking in both parties, a confidence building process can never get off the ground both in practice and by definition. On the whole, one may examine the role of CBMs in the case of protracted conflicts in two ways. One is a contribution to the betterment of relations between the parties involved in general and the second relates to specific issues or incidents.

2.2.1 Confidence Building Measures for Improving the General Conflictual Environment

CBMs of a general nature usually refer to a resolve by the conflicting parties to engage in a confidence building exercise rather than opting for military means for settling their differences. Various statements by the key policy-makers of the United States and Soviet Union, North and South Korea, Israel and Arab countries - all locked in protracted conflicts - towards initiating and sustaining a political dialogue implies an exercise in confidence building. For instance, US President Reagan's statement at the Washington summit between the United States and the Soviet Union that they had proved that adversaries even with most basic philosophical differences could talk candidly and respectfully with one another and with perseverance find a common ground, illustrated succinctly the task of confidence building at a general level. The idea is first to establish a *working relationship* before they can move on to addressing the major issues in dispute. And that may be worked out through more intensified interactions at official and unofficial levels in diverse spheres. Summit meetings between the heads of states or high level government officials often provide an opportunity for the conflicting parties to understand and accommodate each other's point of view especially when misperceptions or misunderstandings have contributed towards embittering their relations. For instance, Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin's meetings at Camp David in 1974 and later Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977 had played a crucial role in changing the political calculus of their bilateral relations.

Various proposals or agreements between the conflicting parties on some subordinate or simply different issues from the major ones also constitute a confidence building exercise intended to ameliorate the general conflictual environment between them. In the case of superpowers, one may mention the agreement to establish a joint commercial commission, granting of most-favoured-nation status to the Soviet Union, an

³⁷ B.S. Mandell, "Anatomy of a Confidence Building Regime: Egyptian-Israeli Security Cooperation", *International Journal*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1990, p. 219.

agreement on civil aviation and on opening cultural information centres of the USSR and the USA in Washington and Moscow respectively in the socio-cultural sphere.

2.2.2 Confidence Building Measures Relating to Specific Issues

If all the disputed issues between the parties locked in a protracted conflict are substantive power and security related ones and both refuse to any compromise, the role of CBMs is likely to be minimal at best or they may be simply irrelevant. The two sides may, however, arrive at an agreement on certain specific issues despite the element of distrust in their overall relations. A classic illustration of this kind is the Sinai Agreements between Egypt and Israel that institutionalized several measures to reduce the possibility of an inadvertent war. Their forces in the Sinai were separated by a demilitarized buffer zone and the two agreed to establish an arms limitation regime involving limited forces zones and specific restrictions on armed forces and weapons within these zones. In order to create some linkage between confidence building at the military level and diplomatic progress at political level, Egypt and Israel agreed that disengagement would evolve as a process of phased withdrawal in which they would gradually establish a new set of norms and ground rules to guide future military behaviour and subsequent negotiations.³⁸ With US assistance the two countries implemented an elaborate verification system allowing them to pursue limited accommodation in face of continuing mistrust. Initially it served an important risk-reduction function by dampening incentives for surprise attack and thinning out forces near forward areas and clarifying ambiguous activities. Once the parties were reconciled to constraints associated with unambiguous compliance, confidence in the verification system itself strengthened the will to collaborate further.³⁹ During the cold war the two superpowers signed a number of agreements on specific issues despite the undercurrents of general hostility between the two. In START negotiations the two arrived at a mutual understanding on the specific points of not encrypting telemeter information during missile test flights and on non-deployed missiles. They had earlier signed an agreement on the notification of launches for Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) and on verification measures with regard to nuclear testing which would make it possible to ratify the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976.

Such confidence building initiatives are also under consideration in the Korean peninsula. South Korea, for instance, put forward the proposal of advance notification of large scale troop movements and military exercises and permanent deployment of observers at major military bases for on-site inspections. It

³⁸ For more details, see, Mandell, *op.cit.*, p. 207.

³⁹ *ibid.*

also envisages a withdrawal of offensive armaments from the demilitarized zone and a significant reduction of the troops stationed there. These CBMs are aimed at scaling down the military confrontation between North and South Korea to a level of "sufficient degree which would not allow either side to conduct offensive combat action".⁴⁰ North Korea too, has proposed formation of a joint military group to discuss border disputes and conduct on-site inspections to ensure implementation of all arms agreements on the Korean peninsula.

2.3 The Role of Confidence Building Measures in the Crisis Framework

The concept of an international crisis has been defined from a foreign policy and systemic perspective.⁴¹ The definitions of systemic crisis have been classified in two groups - process and combined interaction structure.⁴² The process definitions view systemic crisis as "a point at which there occurs an unusually intense period of conflictual interactions. These tend to emphasize various stages of conflictual behaviour among states, characterize different types of activity, measure the direction and speed of behavioural change and locate shifts that indicate changes in interaction processes".⁴³ Combined structural-interaction definitions view an international crisis "as a situation characterized by basic change in processes which might affect structural variables of a system".⁴⁴ On the whole, a systemic definition of crisis is based upon "behavioural data about conflictual interactions among states".⁴⁵ The International Conflict Behaviour (ICB) database defines systemic international crisis as a "structural change characterized by an increase in the intensity of *disruptive interactions* between two or more adversaries with a high probability of *military hostilities* in time of peace (and during a war an *adverse change in the military balance*). The higher-than-normal conflictual interactions destabilize the existing relationships of the adversaries and pose a *challenge* to the existing structure of an international system - global, dominant and/ or subsystem".⁴⁶

For the present study, however, a definition from a foreign policy perspective based upon perceptual

⁴⁰ Alexander Kopnov, "South Korea Working Out Confidence Building Measures", TASS, 20 April 1990.

⁴¹ For a discussion of these two approaches, see, James A. Robinson, "Crisis" in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, New York: Macmillan, 1968; Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968; and Charles F. Hermann, ed., *International Crisis: Insights From Behavioural Research*, New York: Free Press, 1972.

⁴² Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 20. Charles McClelland states that a crisis is "in some way a 'change of state' in the flow of international political action ...". See, Charles McClelland, "Access to Berlin: Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963", in J.D. Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence*, New York: Free Press, 1968, pp. 160-161. In Edward E. Azar's words "interaction above the upper critical threshold for more than a very short time implies that a crisis situation has set in," Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis, Suez, 1956", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1972, p. 184.

⁴⁴ Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *ibid.*. Oran Young identified crisis as a "process of interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and characterized by significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem ...". Young, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

⁴⁵ Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁶ *ibid.* (italics in original).

data is more relevant. The ICB database defines such a crisis as one "viewed from the perspective of an individual state ... [it] is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a state's external or internal environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest level decision-makers of the actor concerned - a *threat to basic values*, along with their awareness of *finite time for response* to the external value threat and a *high probability of involvement in military hostilities*".⁴⁷ One major shortcoming of this definition is that it considers only the military crisis and ignores other types of crisis especially economic. Although it acknowledges that at least some international crises reflect the prior and cumulative impact of economic interests it only examines them as a triggering entity.⁴⁸ It may be argued that the threats to economic interests as perceived by the decision-makers in the form of the integration of economies, control by another actor's economy, requisition of resources and blocked access to resources or markets recognized by the ICB database only as the basic values threatened, can very well lead to an economic crisis which may or may not involve military hostilities between the parties in question.

The role of CBMs in a crisis framework may be studied in two phases - pre-crisis and acute crisis

2.3.1 Confidence Building Measures in Pre-Crisis Phase

The pre-crisis period is characterized by a "change from no or low perceived threat to low or higher threat from an external adversary".⁴⁹ It refers to a qualitative change in the threat perception by at least one party. An example would be a verbal statement by A threatening to undertake an action against B unless it complies with some demand by A such as a politically hostile act like diplomatic sanctions or violation of a treaty or an economic boycott of B's exports by A.⁵⁰ A confidence building process at this stage may be initiated by one party undertaking a unilateral CBM such as a statement to the effect of withdrawing a threat issued earlier or showing an inclination to cooperate by proposing an action to be undertaken in concert with the other, for instance, by initiating talks on the issue under dispute. Since an increase in conflictual interactions in this phase is reversible by definition, the task of CBMs is to prevent it from becoming a serious crisis. For instance, military skirmishes between India and Pakistan over the Siachin glacier had been taking place since 1984. The two countries have been, however, engaged in regular negotiations to prevent it from

⁴⁷ *ibid.*. Also see, Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable", in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 414. The essential elements of Hermann's definition are: (a) threat to high priority goals of the decision-making unit (b) short time for response (c) the element of surprise. In his revised definition he accepts an "introduction of the expectation of military hostilities as particularly appropriate for delimiting crisis". Charles F. Hermann, "Enhancing Crisis Stability: Correcting the Trend Towards Increasing Instability", in Gilbert R. Winham, ed., *New Issues in International Crisis Management*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 148.

⁴⁸ M. Brecher and J. Wilkenfeld, "Crisis in World Politics", *World Politics*, 1982, p. 409.

⁴⁹ M. Brecher, "Toward a Theory of Crisis in World Politics", in M. Brecher and J. Wilkenfeld, *Crisis, Conflict and Instability*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1989, p. 210;

⁵⁰ *ibid.*.

developing into a full-blown war between them.

2.3.2 Confidence Building Measures in the Acute Crisis Phase

The second and the acute phase of a crisis period may be reached by "a trigger escalating the crisis in which perceptions of time pressure" and likelihood of hostile interactions are "added to more acute threat perception".⁵¹ A confidence building process at this stage may take the shape of urgent communication or consultations between the parties involved to control or prevent any further escalation. For instance, during October to December 1986 both India and Pakistan were conducting their military exercises close to the border but by the dawn of 1987, near war conditions had developed between the two countries when half a million troops were amassed on either side of the border.⁵² Both sides recognized that they had gone too far and set the diplomatic machinery in motion to rectify the situation. Consultations at the Foreign Secretary level began on 30 January 1987 for the de-escalation of the border tensions and after five days of hectic talks the two sides agreed not to attack each other, to exercise maximum restraint and adopt a sector by sector approach for the pullout of troops on the border.

Another such example is that of South African troop build-up precipitating a crisis for Angola in November 1978. On 7 November 1978 the Angolan Defence Minister reported a major build-up of South African forces along the border with Namibia and that South Africa planned a large incursion into Angola. The same day Angola responded with the general mobilization of its army and a curfew in the five largest urban centres. Next day the South African military command issued a statement denying any intention to invade Angola. But three days later a bomb explosion in one of Angola's largest cities re-activated the fear of an imminent South African attack. South African Prime Minister Botha's statements repeating its denial of any intentions of invading Angola finally helped in defusing the crisis.⁵³

3 Functional Dimensions of the Confidence Building Measures

Finally the functional dimensions of CBMs in terms of their political, military, economic and socio-cultural aspects needs to be looked into. Irrespective of the fact that most of the existing literature on CBMs brings their military dimension to the fore, their politico-economic and socio-cultural aspects also constitute a vital field of inquiry in international relations. These dimensions of CBMs do not form any clear-cut categories that are mutually exclusive. On the contrary they are so closely intertwined that one may find it difficult to argue that a particular CBM, for instance, has only economic or military implications. Thus

⁵¹ Brecher and Wilkeneld (1988), *op.cit.*, war" which has been replaced by this author with 'likelihood of hostile interactions' since this stands valid for every type of crisis-political, military and economic.

⁵² For details, see, Samina Yasmeen, "India and Pakistan: Why the Latest Exercise in Brinkmanship", *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, (Australia), vol. 34, no. 1, 1988, p.64.

⁵³ Brecher, *op.cit.*, p. 337.

despite the fact that a set of CBMs are designed exclusively to control and communicate where, how and why the military activities of states in question are employed to reduce the possibility of an accidental confrontation between them due to miscalculation or failure of communication, their political and psychological importance should be underscored because they can only be implemented on the express wishes and initiatives of states whose military activities are being observed.⁵⁴ At best one may speak of the predominant nature of a particular CBM's political, economic, military or socio-cultural effect in a confidence building process.

3.1 Political Dimension

One classic example of a CBM with a predominantly political effect was that of the famous Sadat and Begin handshake during the first ever Arab leader's visit to Israel in 1977 recognizing its right of existence as a sovereign independent state with legitimate security concerns. It is notable that although the Sinai agreements between Egypt and Israel already included several military CBMs, Sadat's visit to Israel proved to be the crucial factor in changing the political calculus of their bilateral relations from a state of war to that of mutual survival.⁵⁵ Such high level visits by top political leaders of a state after a long period of diplomatic break in their relations often has a political effect of setting a confidence building process in motion. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 after a gap of nearly 34 years and Soviet President Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 being the first after the Second World War, had a similar political effect on their countries' relations. Often the statements issued at such meetings have significant political impact for building confidence between the parties in question. For instance, statements by the leaders of the Warsaw Pact discarding their view of the West as an ideological enemy and a *communiqué* issued by the Foreign Ministers of NATO commending such a positive spirit of the Warsaw Pact had a tremendous political significance in building confidence between the two sides. Likewise, statements by Soviet and Chinese leaders recognizing that there were no universal laws of communism removed a critical stumbling block that had triggered Sino-Soviet conflict in the late 1950's. The political dialogue between the two countries as a result of such meetings expanded to various levels and contacts between their governments and parliamentary bodies, communist parties, unions and public organizations became wider. It also led to various agreements in the military, economic and technical sphere of their bilateral relations

3.2 Military Dimension

During the cold war CBMs between the Eastern and Western blocs and more specifically between

⁵⁴ J.J. Holst, "Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", *Survival*, vol. 20, no. 1, January-February 1983, p. 3.

⁵⁵ Mandell, *op.cit.*, p. 203.

the superpowers were intended to provide the first convincing means of establishing some degree of trust sufficient to induce a climate for arms control and arms reduction agreements. Their fundamental task was to ensure more predictability in their military relationship by obtaining more information and transparency about the other's military forces and activities. The underlying assumption was that obtaining more information about the adversary's military activities and policies would allay fears and reduce mistrust and suspicion. Thus most CBMs in the European context have been designed to improve the quality and quantity of information available to senior decision makers. CBMs involving exchange of information include advance notification of military exercises and force movements, inviting observers to military exercises and publication of defence budgets, force doctrines and location of major unit and command forces.⁵⁶ The constraint and so-called surprise attack CBMs pertain to the inspection measures such as special sensing devices and on-site inspections, and deployment constraint measures such as no threatening manoeuvres or deployments near sensitive border areas and prohibition of out-of-garrison and mobilization activities above a certain threshold. Finally there were equipment constraint activities such as manpower limits and the outloading of live ammunition at military exercises.⁵⁷

In the Pacific region Soviet President Gorbachev had put forward certain Confidence Building initiatives in this regard. They called for a freeze in the number of nuclear weapons in the region and the reduction or a freeze in naval force deployments especially nuclear-armed ships, guarantees of the security of the sea lanes and air communications and establishment of a regional negotiating machinery for CBMs and arms control measures. The proposals, however, failed to elicit a favourable response from the states concerned partly because of US reluctance to constrain its naval activities in the Pacific Ocean and partly due to Japan's persistence that the Soviets should first resolve the Kurile islands dispute.

3.3 Economic Dimension

The economic dimension of the confidence building approach may be best illustrated with the example of Thailand and its neighbours. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan's avowed policy of establishing peace through economic relations pointed at a new approach in building confidence between states. His policy of turning Indochina from a battleground into a market place led it to develop economic links with Vietnam despite their differences on Cambodia. In the case of Laos, in particular, their relations took a dramatic upward turn. Laos, a landlocked country, depends heavily on the Thai transit points for its international trade and the latter had banned the export of 273 strategic goods to Laos and frequently

⁵⁶ James Macintosh, "Confidence and Security Building Measures: A Sceptical Outlook", in *Disarmament, UN, op.cit.*, p. 85.

⁵⁷ For more details, see, Borawski (1986), *op.cit.*, p. 11.

prevented it from importing these items from other countries as well. Ever since the 1988 ceasefire agreement, however, the economic relations between the two countries have improved dramatically. The two states agreed to build a bridge over the Mekong river from the Thai Nong Khai province to landlocked Laos. Vientiane asked Bangkok to lower the price on goods transshipped across Thailand, reduce duty on Laotian exports and open more border crossing points. Thailand pressed Laos to lift its ban on the log exports and allow Thai banks to open branches in Vientiane. The two sides have reached an agreement on rearrangement of border transit transport services acceptable to both sides and shipment of agricultural goods into Thailand without import tax. Thailand opened more than a dozen new crossing points during the year and lifted a ban on the export of all strategic goods. The two also agreed on investment promotion and protection between Thailand and Laos.⁵⁸

Economic links between countries locked in a conflict also help in creating a common ground of interaction and offer invaluable underpinnings to a sound relationship encouraging a vested interest in both sides for peaceful exchanges. For instance, they can be witnessed in the case of the Soviet Union's relations with China and the United States. CBMs between the Soviet Union and China include a long term programme of economic, scientific and technical cooperation and specific accords on cooperation in the study of space and construction and reconstruction of industrial installations. China agreed to supply consumer goods to the Soviet Union on state credits, in return for which the latter would help in building a nuclear power station at China.⁵⁹ With regard to the Soviet Union and the United States, one may mention their inter-governmental agreements in the field of trade, mutual guarantees of capital investment, taxation, energy, arctic research and protection of rights of intellectual property and maritime shipping

3.4 Socio-Cultural Dimension

CBMs also play a positive role in the socio-cultural sphere of inter-state relations. For instance, relations between Japan and the governments of several South East Asian countries and China were severely strained in mid-1982 following a revision of the Japanese portrayal of twentieth century history in school text books. In this regard statements by high level Japanese government officials giving assurances that a suitable action would be taken, may be characterized as an exercise in confidence building. The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary affirmed that Japan had embarked upon the path of a nation of peace in pertinence and in the determination that such events (as the atrocities in Korea and China) must never be repeated and that Japan would fulfil its responsibility by making the necessary amendments. A similar case of India and

⁵⁸ "Laos Welcomes Improvement in Relations With Thailand", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 6 April 1991.

⁵⁹ "Ryzhkov's Talks with Li Peng", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 26 April 1990; "First Anniversary of Gorbachev's Visit to China", *TASS*, 15 May 1990.

Pakistan may also be mentioned. In December 1988 the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto signed an agreement on cultural exchanges that promised to examine freshly text books particularly relating to the history and geography to erase misperceptions of facts on either country thereby seeking to break down the barrier of stereotyped prejudices which had been reinforcing the public indifference to the quality of bilateral relations.

India and Pakistan have also made some progress in augmenting people-to-people contacts. New Delhi has always stressed the importance of such contacts in laying down the groundwork for negotiations so long as the two governments were unwilling or incapable of tackling outstanding disputes. The underlying assumption is that a detente between two neighbours can be fostered by promising interdependence in areas such as cultural exchanges, scholarly interactions and improved communication. Benazir Bhutto's government in Pakistan seemed to agree on the significance of such contacts. In 1989 she was quoted as saying, "If the people of two countries were allowed to get to know each other, quite a lot would be achieved in establishing good relations between the two countries".⁶⁰ Some steps in this direction include the easing of visa restrictions, tourist promotions like increasing the number of centres open to visitors in either country and allowing a larger number of pilgrims to visit shrines across the border. India has been suggesting a commercial exchange of newspapers and journals and the posting of a large number of correspondents on a reciprocal basis. An agreement signed in July 1984 for an exchange of newspapers and journals, although only at a government-to-government level, and in December 1988 for cultural exchanges provide an exchange of talent and material in artistic and literary fields, may be characterized as steps in a confidence building exercise that would in turn help in widening the social base of India-Pakistan relations.

The case of the two Koreas also provides a fertile ground for a confidence building approach in the socio-cultural sphere with the ultimate aim of societal integration of the two divided entities of a single nation. Confidence building proposals on the restoration of family contacts, free inter-Korean travel, exchange of sports and cultural groups have been put forth. A programme of family reunions under the auspice of the Red Cross in 1985, the first exchange of football teams between North and South Korea in October 1990, a joint sports team for the two Koreas for the Asian Games and participation by South Korean musicians at the Pyongyang music festival are some steps in this direction.

So far one has examined CBMs from different perspectives. For purely explanatory purposes, an attempt to encapsulate the flow and structure of such an analysis has been made in Fig 3. It is important to

⁶⁰ Benazir Bhutto's Responses to the Questions in the BBC Phone-in Programme of 5th March 1989, quoted in K.Subrahmanyam's article "Indo-Pak ties: How to Build Confidence", *Hindustan Times*, 24th March 1989.

note however, that it can be done in other ways as well. For instance, one may start by examining CBMs in a conflict framework and then consider their role at different levels-of-analysis or in its functional dimensions.

4 Inter-Relationship Between the Variables

This section would examine the inter-relationships between these variables with appropriate illustrations to test if there is any correspondence between them. The following matrixes are self-explanatory. The first matrix examines different levels-of-analysis for studying Confidence Building Measures in combination with their functional dimensions. In this, we have not been able to quote any empirical instance of a confidence building measure in its socio-cultural dimension at an inter-mestic level. Matrix two illustrates the inter-relationship between levels-of-analysis of CBMs with their role varying according to the nature of conflicts being non-protracted or protracted. Matrix three which attempts to relate the levels-of-analysis of CBMs with their role in different phases of crisis is a little problematic primarily because most conflicts at an intra-state level and often at an inter-mestic level do not go through clear-cut phases of pre-crisis and acute crisis. The role of CBMs in non-protracted and protracted conflicts and two phases of crisis is also examined in combination with different functional dimensions in matrix four and five respectively. The matrix five shows that we have not been able to elaborate the role of CBMs in its socio-cultural dimension in terms of pre-crisis and acute crisis phases.

On the whole, one may draw some general conclusions from this discussion. Clearly, it is difficult to categorize the role of CBMs in different phases of crisis and in accordance with the nature of a larger conflict (non-protracted or protracted conflicts) without some overlapping of their boundaries. The same is true for the functional dimensions of CBMs which do not form any clear-cut categories and thus overlap in their effect in a confidence building process. For instance, the case of joint socio-economic projects being undertaken by the Thai and Malaysian governments for resolving the problem of dissidence by the Thai Muslim minority may be explained both as an economic Confidence Building Measure at an inter-mestic level and as a socio-cultural one since it was due to ethnic affinity between the Thai and Malay Muslims cutting across the border that this problem arose in the first place. Further, CBMs role at an intra-state and inter-mestic level may be better explained in terms of a conflict rather than two distinct phases of crisis especially because most definitions of crisis itself are outlined in terms of an inter-state crisis. Last but not least, we found it difficult to envisage socio-cultural issues causing a crisis-like situation directly. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to examine them in general conflictual terms and accordingly the role of CBMs therein.

Matrix 1. CBMs at Three Levels of Analysis with its Functional Dimensions

	Inter-State	Intra-State	Inter-Mestic
Political	A high level visit by the political leaders of a state after a long diplomatic break in their relations. For instance, the Egyptian President Sadat visit to Israel in 1977 recognizing its right of existence.	A decision by the state government to accord political legitimacy to the organizational activities of a particular sub-national actor. For instance, Indian government's recognition of Mizo National Front as a political party in 1986 which subsequently initiated the electoral process in that state.	A proposal by either the state government, the sub-national actor or the third party involved to initiate and sustain a political dialogue for resolving their differences. For instance, the intermittent talks between the Tamil rebels, the Sri Lankan government and the Indian government's representatives during 1984-1987 to find a solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka.
Military	A proposal or an agreement to establish a hotline telecommunications link between the military commanders of two adversaries for defusing any potential crisis situation. For instance, a hotline between the USA and Soviet Union.	A declaration of cease-fire in an armed struggle either by the state government or the sub-national actor like a group of separatists to start the peace talks. For instance, the ANC's President Nelson Mandela's call for an immediate cease-fire to an armed struggle against the South African government to give a chance to peace talks with the President de Clark in 1990.	A tacit understanding or an agreement between two neighbouring states to help each other militarily in combating the sub-national actor like a group of insurgents operating on their territory. For instance, joint efforts by the Thai and the Malaysian military forces to fight against the communist insurgents operating in their common border area.
Economic	An agreement between a state and its landlocked neighbour to provide more transit points for the trading transactions of the latter. For instance, the agreement between Thailand and Laos for the rearrangement of the border transit and transport services acceptable to both sides.	A tacit understanding or an agreement between state government and sub-national actor on a disputed issue with significant economic implications. For instance, an agreement between Chomorro's government in Nicaragua and the Labour Union of Sandinistas Liberation Front that former will suspend its plans to privatize the land nationalized by the Sandinista regime and the latter would end its strike against the government.	Any joint ventures of two neighbouring states to undertake projects for trans-border economic development for redressing the grievances of a sub-national actor based on either state along their border. For instance, Thai-Malaysian agreement to spend M\$ 20 million each for socio-economic projects along their common border area to resolve the problem of dissidence by the Thai Muslim minority in the Southern border regions enjoying a close ethnic affinity with the Malay Muslims across the border.
Socio-Cultural	A proposal or an agreement to increase socio-cultural contacts at various levels between two parties locked in a conflict. For instance, North and South Korean family re-union meetings in 1985 and proposals for free inter-Korean travel and exchange of sports and cultural groups.	An agreement between the state government and sub-national actor on some socio-cultural demands. For instance, a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Sikh separatists' leader Sant Longowal whereby the Indian government agreed to consider legislation for establishing a national code for the management of the Gurudwaras.	A proposal or a tacit understanding arrived at the initiative of any of the parties involved.

Matrix 2: CBMs at Three Levels of Analysis in Case of Non-Protracted and Protracted Conflicts

	Inter-State	Intra-State	Inter-Mestic
Non-Protracted Conflict	A proposal by one part to re-establish diplomatic ties and a recognition and positive reciprocation of such an intention by the other side. For instance, the Argentinean President, Alfonsín's offer to re-establish diplomatic and commercial ties with the UK and a positive response by the latter initiated the confidence building process between the two countries.	An offer to hold talks by the either side or a decision by the state government to accept certain demands of the sub-national actor. For instance, the Nepalese King Birendra's acceptance of the political parties' demand for the dismissal of the Panchayat regime in favour of a multi-party democracy.	-
Protracted Conflict: CBMs for Improving General Environment	An agreement between the conflicting parties on issues different from the central one under dispute. For instance, North and South Korean governments' proposals on free travel, communication and trade links between the two countries.	A tacit understanding between the state government and the sub-national actor to keep the channels of communication open for a political dialogue. For instance, continuing dialogue between the South African President de Clark and the ANC leaders for dismantling the apartheid regime.	A proposal or an agreement between the conflicting parties for a cease-fire to military hostilities. For instance, an agreement between all the warring factions of Cambodia and representatives of Vietnam to accept a cease-fire under the UN peace plan and to continue Jakarta talks to reconcile their differences on specific modalities of the agreement.
Protracted Conflict: CBMs relating Specific Issues/Incidents	An agreement between the parties in conflict on any particular contentious issue. For instance, India and Pakistan's agreement on non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities.	An agreement between the state government and the sub-national actor on a specific disputed point. For instance, the Indian government's decision to grant Chandigarh to the state of Punjab for its capital.	A proposal or an agreement between any two parties to put an end to political or military support to the non-governmental actor such as a group of insurgents. For instance, An agreement between Chomorro's government in Nicaragua and Contra rebels to dismantle their training camps in Honduras and statement by Honduran President that no Contras will be granted refugee status in that country thus implicitly forcing them to be re-absorbed in Nicaragua itself.

Matrix 3: CBMs at Three Levels of Analysis in Phases of Crisis

	Inter-State	Intra-State	Inter-Mestic
Pre-Crisis	An offer to initiate talks on the disputed issue by one party and a positive reciprocation of such an intention by the other. For instance, the talks between India and Pakistan's Defence Secretaries on the Siachin glacier issue.	A government's decision to accord legitimacy to a sub-national actor such as a particular faction or factions of agitators as the true representative of people in question for the purposes of holding talks. For instance, Indian government's recognition of the Mizo National Front in 1987 which later resulted in Mizo accord leading to state elections.	A third party's offer to mediate either at its own initiative or at the behest of the sub-national actor such as a group of insurgents or the state government involved in the conflict. For instance, Indian government's role as a mediator between Tamil rebels and the Sri lankan government at Thimpu talks in 1985.
Acute Crisis	Urgent communication and consultations to control any further escalation initiated by either party. For instance, the talks between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan in January 1987 for de-escalating the border tensions.	A decision by the sub-national actor to suspend violence for a fixed duration to initiate or accept the government's decision to hold talks on the disputed issue. For instance, the ANC's decision to suspend its armed struggle against the South African government to give a chance to the peace talks with the President de Clark.	A proposal or an agreement to end political and military support to the sub-national actor by the state extending such a support. For instance, South Africa and Mozambique agreed in the negotiations preceding Nkomati accord that the former would end its support to Renamo and the latter to ANC operating against the other from its territory.

Matrix 4: CBMs in Case of Non-Protracted and Protracted Conflicts With its Functional Dimensions

	Non-Protracted Conflict	Protracted Conflict: CBMs for Improving General Conflict Environment	Protracted Conflict: CBMs Relating Specific Issues/Incidents
Political	A recognition of the disputed nature of an issue by either side. For instance, the Soviet recognition of the disputed status of the Kurile islands and an offer to hold talks with Japan on this issue.	A goodwill gesture by either party to generate a sense of confidence in one's political intentions. For instance, the Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977 which implicitly recognized its right of existence.	A proposal or a tacit understanding on the political aspects of a disputed issue by the parties involved. For instance, Indian proposal for joint patrolling to control the illegal border crossings.
Military	An agreement or a tacit understanding between the parties in conflict over some issues of military significance. For instance, the Sino-Soviet agreement on troops withdrawal and reduction in their armed forces deployed on the common border.	A proposal or an agreement for reducing the probability of a military confrontation arising out of misperceptions or a miscalculation. For instance, various agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the Helsinki, the Stockholm and the Vienna conferences are intended to minimize the possibility of a surprise attack occurring from either side.	An agreement to hold immediate talks for de-escalating any crisis-like situation between the parties in question. For instance, India-Pakistan talks on an immediate withdrawal of their troops in January 1987 after the two countries had a near show-down over holding military exercises.
Economic	A unilateral or negotiated withdrawal of embargo on certain strategic goods by one of the parties involved. For instance, Thailand's lifting of ban on all the strategic import items for the landlocked Laos.	A proposal by either side to remove any unfavourable restrictions on their economic interactions. For instance, an agreement between India and Pakistan in January 1986 for authorizing Pakistan's private traders to deal in 42 selected items after an eight years of deadlock on this issue.	An offer to hold talks on any specific disputed issue of economic importance for either side. For instance, the India-Pakistan negotiations on the Indus river water sharing culminating in the Indus Water Treaty
Socio-Cultural	A specific undertaking on an issue of cultural importance which may have given rise to hostile perceptions between the parties in question. For instance, a commitment by the Japanese government to modify their textbooks depicting the 20th century history which had strained its relations with China and a number of South-East Asian countries.	Any agreement promoting interdependence and cooperation in areas such as cultural exchanges, scholarly interactions and improved communication between the conflicting parties. For instance, an agreement between India and Pakistan to lift their ban on the exchange of literature and an agreement to exchange newspapers and journals at a government-to-government level.	An agreement to lift any unfavourable restrictions on the socio-cultural contacts between the parties in conflict. For instance, North and South Korea's agreement in September 1985 for family re-union meetings under the auspices of Red Cross.

Matrix 5: The Functional Dimensions of CBMs in Phases of Crisis

	Pre-Crisis	Acute Crisis
Political	A proposal to initiate a political dialogue for averting any crisis-like situation. For instance, the continuing political dialogue between India and Pakistan on mutual allegations of cross-border support to the militants and proposals to check such activities on the border.	Urgent communication and consultations to prevent any further escalation initiated by either party. For instance, talks between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan to de-escalate the border tension in January 1987.
Military	A proposal by either side to hold talks to defuse a potential crisis or to prevent it from escalating into a military confrontation. For instance, talks between India and Pakistan Defence Secretaries on the Siachin glacier.	A unilateral or mutually agreed upon 'rules-of-game' amidst the military hostilities. For instance, in the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, their Air Force Chiefs arrived at an understanding not to employ their forces in the desert skirmishes raging in the Ram of Kutch.
Economic	A proposal or an agreement to initiate immediate talks to defuse a potential crisis in terms of economic implications for either side.	A tacit understanding between the parties involved not to hit at each other's strategic economic targets or installations during a war. For instance, India and Pakistan have developed such a tacit understanding over the span of three wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971.
Socio-Cultural		

5 Conclusion

It may be argued that notwithstanding certain loopholes, this exercise of exploring the universe of Confidence Building Measures in a conflict and crisis framework, in terms of its functional dimensions and at different levels-of-analysis and establishing an inter-relationship between these variables has been a worthwhile attempt. A great deal of research needs to be done before one can ascertain the validity of this exercise in any conclusive manner. In any case, the task of this chapter was not to justify the utility of such attempts but only to examine its applicability. Its significance lies in the very exploratory nature of this exercise.

Having examined the universe of Confidence Building Measures from a global perspective, our task now is to focus on a particular region, that is South Asia, and select a case study for further investigation.

CHAPTER III: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asian history is marked by two opposing streams of conflict and cooperation among its member states. The debate on Confidence Building Measures, however, is still in its nascent stage. South Asia made its debut on the scene of world politics in 1947 when the subcontinent was partitioned into two independent and sovereign states of India and Pakistan and Ceylon and Burma got independence from their colonial rulers. The present political map of South Asia, however, acquired its shape in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh. It was a vital turning point in the South Asian history since it changed the political configuration and power structure of the South Asian region. Thus it marks the starting point of this study. The previous chapter explored CBMs at different levels of analysis and keeping in mind the difficulties in studying them at an intra-state and inter-mestic levels of analysis,¹ we would confine this exercise to inter-state conflicts.

To begin with it is useful to examine the salient characteristics of the South Asian region and identify some of the main sources of intra-regional conflicts and tensions. The geographical parameters of the South Asian region as employed in this study include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.² This excludes the two bordering states of Burma and Afghanistan which have generally been considered as a part of South-East and South-West Asia respectively.

1 South Asia: Characteristics

The most outstanding characteristic of the South Asian region is its Indo-centric character. India occupies a central place in terms of its size and resources as well as its political and military strength.³ It is also marked by an asymmetric and hierarchical power structure with India enjoying the predominant position. In population, economic infrastructure and power projection capabilities, it is far superior to any of its neighbours. These two characteristics put together make India the "proverbial Big Brother with all its negative connotations".⁴ It generates a sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the smaller countries of the region making them rather apprehensive about their giant neighbour. Moreover, divergences in their political systems, regime types, nation-building strategies and defence and security policies have often led to inter-state

¹ This point has already been discussed in Chapter Two.

² They are the members of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

³ India is several times larger than all the other countries of the region put together. India has 77% of the population and 72% of the total area of the region. It has 84% of the arable land and land under permanent crops, 81% of the forest and 69% of irrigated land. It has virtually 100% of the total resources of the region in respect of uranium and iron ore. It has more than 90% of the resources of coal, crude petroleum, chromium, magnetite and salt. See, M.L. Qureshi, *Survey of Economic Resources and Prospects of South Asia*, Colombo: Lotus Process Ltd., 1981, p. 13.

⁴ S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammad Ayoob, *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1980, p. 39.

tensions and conflicts within the subcontinent.

India's robust democratic traditions, for instance, are often perceived as a threat by the authoritarian regimes in Islamabad, Dhaka and Kathmandu lest India starts supporting democratic movements in these countries. Right from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's categorical denunciation of the first military take-over by General Ayub Khan in Pakistan to General Zia-ul-Haq's allegations of Mrs. Indira Gandhi supporting the MRD (Movement to Restore Democracy) in the 1980's, the military rulers in Islamabad have been rather suspicious of the Indian political leaders in this respect. The same is true for Bangladesh. In the case of Nepal too, Kathmandu's accusations of India supporting the democracy movement by its political parties in the 1960's and again in early 1990 caused friction between the two neighbours. Consequently a regime change in any of India's neighbouring capitals particularly a systemic one entails a marked shift in their policies *vis-à-vis* New Delhi. For instance, after the overthrow of the Ranas in Nepal King Tribhuvan cultivated most friendly ties with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi. Likewise, in Bangladesh Sheikh Mujib Rehman's democratic and secular government with a foreign policy largely in consonance with New Delhi's thinking enjoyed most cordial relations with Mrs. Gandhi. But following Mujib's assassination, General Zia-ur-Rehman's authoritarian and Islamic oriented regime did not find favour with the Indian policy makers resulting in a rapid deterioration of their bilateral relations.

With regard to the nation-building strategies of South Asian countries, Indian secularism runs counter to the Islamic ideology of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The latter two countries, however, not only perceive Islam as the most crucial if not the only distinctive element of their national identity which sets them apart from India but also scoff at Indian secularism as a 'phoney' one. India, on the other hand, feels that Pakistan and Bangladesh's constant harping on the Islamic ideology and a tendency to assume the guardianship of all the Muslims in the subcontinent makes the task of integrating its own Muslim population more difficult. Further, India being a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society emphasizes the principle of co-existence and assimilation of various heterogeneous elements in its political mainstream whereas the smaller neighbours stress the homogeneous factors of their population. Hence the conflict in their nation-building strategies.

The geographical configuration and socio-cultural continuities in the subcontinent have also created a web of inter-ethnic group interactions cutting across state boundaries. This has resulted in the ethnic violence spilling over the territorial confines of respective states and a regular exchange of mutual allegations

of the neighbouring states having fomented and supported the trouble in the first place.⁵ For instance, Sri Lanka blames India for fostering the demand of a Tamil Eelam (a separate homeland) on its soil while Bangladesh alleges Indian support for the Chakma insurgents operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Nepal, too, has been voicing fears regarding the influx of Indians in the Terai area. Indian intervention in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 is very well documented. India on its part, also has apprehensions of the neighbouring countries supporting the extremists operating on its territory. It alleges Pakistani support to the Sikh and Muslim militants in Punjab and Kashmir respectively and Bangladeshi connivance in supporting the the TNV (Tripura National Volunteers), the MNF (Mizo National Front) and the ULFA militants operating in the north-east states of Tripura, Mizoram and Assam respectively.

The extra-regional powers particularly the US, the erstwhile Soviet Union and Chinese involvement in South Asian regional politics have been another source of contention between India and its neighbours. Indian attempts to keep South Asia free of extra-regional powers' involvement and its smaller neighbours' inclination to involve them in order to counter-balance India at home has led to many bilateral differences between India and other South Asian countries. In the post cold war era, however, all major powers regard South Asia as coming under India's 'sphere of influence' and have desisted from supporting or encouraging the smaller countries against New Delhi's wishes. Indian action in the Maldives, the Indo-Sri Lankan accord of 1987 and the trade impasse between India and Nepal are a few cases in point.

To recapitulate, South Asia is essentially an Indo-centric region and the other countries in the subcontinent such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Bhutan have individually and separately more in common with India than with each other. Thus it is relevant to examine India's relations with its South Asian neighbours from a bilateral perspective.

2 India-Sri Lanka Relations

In the early years of independence Sri Lanka (the then Ceylon) nursed a love-hate kind of relationship with India. On the one hand it derived its religion, languages and a substantial segment of the Tamil population from India establishing close civilizational links between the two countries. On the other hand, it also feared its giant neighbour and that is why its first Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake insisted on retaining its defence links with Britain. Almost a decade later, Prime Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike introduced an alternative conception of Sri Lankan foreign and defence policy which no longer viewed India as a potential threat. This line of thinking continued to shape Sri Lanka's foreign policy for the next two

⁵ For an excellent discussion on this issue, see, Partha S. Ghosh, "India's Relations with its Neighbours: The Ethnic Factor", in K.M. de Silva and R.J. May, ed., *Internationalization of the Ethnic Conflicts*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, pp. 26-39.

decades during three SLFP (Sri Lankan Freedom Party) administrations including S.W.R.D Bandaranaike (1956-1959), Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike (1960-1965 and 1970-1977) as well as the UNP (United National Party) administration of Dudley Senanayake (1965-1970).⁶ The two countries enjoyed a very amicable relationship during this period although Sri Lanka's neutral stand on the Indo-China war in 1962 and the Indo-Pak war in 1965 and reports of it having provided refuelling facilities to Pakistani aircraft during the 1971 war did disturb the policy makers in Delhi. Subsequently Sri Lankan efforts to join ASEAN were perceived to be thwarting Indian strategic interests of trying to keep the subcontinent free of extra-regional powers' involvement. Although these events did not vitiate their bilateral ties, they did highlight Sri Lanka's strategic relevance for India's regional security interests.

In 1977 two new governments led by J.R. Jayewardene in Colombo and Morarji Desai in New Delhi came to power and they, too, enjoyed a close rapport. But in 1980, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's return to power in India marked the beginning of a downward trend in India-Sri Lanka relations. While President Jayewardene's pro-West stance was in tune with that of the Janata party's foreign policy in India, the same had put his government at loggerheads with the Congress regime. More specifically, some foreign policy decisions of Jayewardene's government such as giving tender of the Trincomalee in Sri Lanka's strategic harbour to a Western consortium of three countries, allowing the return of the US Peace Corps and the installation of powerful new transmitters for the Voice of America were perceived to be against India's geo-strategic interests in the region.⁷ Moreover India was seriously concerned about the prospects of the Sri Lankan government granting base facilities to the US in Trincomalee.

Closer home the Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was beginning to acquire serious proportions. The unprecedented anti-Tamil riots in 1983 triggered off an influx of Tamil refugees into the Tamilnadu state of South India. The Tamil population of the island looked to India for protection and the local political parties in Tamilnadu like the DMK and the AIDMK exerted tremendous pressure on Mrs. Gandhi to adopt an active and assertive policy towards Sri Lanka to ensure the security of Tamils there.⁸ The growing ethnic conflict also heightened India's regional security concerns because "the Sri Lankan government was increasingly relying upon extra-regional military support to suppress the Tamil militancy which in turn was being

⁶ S.U. Kodikara, "Geo-Strategic Perspectives of India-Sri Lanka Relations", in S.U. Kodikara, ed., *Dilemmas of Indo-Sri Lankan Relations*, Colombo: Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, 1991, p. 12.

⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 26-27. Also see, K.M. de Silva, "Indo-Sri Lankan Relations 1975-1989: A Study in the Internationalization of the Ethnic Conflict", in Silva and May, *op.cit.*.

⁸ Stanley Jayaweera, "The Ethnic Crisis and the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Process July 1983-July 1987", in Kodikara, *op.cit.*, p. 63. For more details on the role of Tamilnadu factor in the ethnic conflict, see, S.U. Kodikara, "Internationalization of Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Tamilnadu Factor", in K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-114; and A. Sivarajah, "India-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis: The Tamilnadu Factor", in S.U. Kodikara, ed., *South Asian Strategic Issues- Sri Lankan Perspectives*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1990, pp. 137-142.

exploited by the extra-regional powers such as the US, the British, the Chinese, the Israelis and the Pakistanis to consolidate their strategic presence in the island".⁹ Thus, while Mrs. Gandhi offered India's good offices to bring the rival parties together to find a political settlement of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, she also warned Colombo that "any external involvement would complicate matters for both countries".¹⁰ In the following year Mr. G. Parthasarthy, Mrs. Gandhi's representative in Sri Lanka, succeeded in bringing the Sri Lankan government and the TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) leaders together at the negotiating table but the proposals agreed by both sides¹¹ faced stiff opposition from the Sinhalese including some of Jayewardene's own government ministers¹² and eventually fell through.

It is important to understand that Jayewardene had accepted Mrs. Gandhi's offer of good offices mainly under duress both internal and external,¹³ otherwise Jayewardene envisaged "no role" for India in settling the Tamil problem.¹⁴ But at the same time the threat of Indian military intervention was quite real in his mind.¹⁵ He was also convinced that the Tamil militant struggle could not have been sustained without moral and material support from India.¹⁶ Moreover, Sri Lanka resented India's diplomatic offensive being waged through its foreign missions and embassies in the West and particularly in the UN Human Rights Commission meetings in Geneva and New York accusing the Sri Lankan government and its armed forces of violations of human rights in attacks on the Tamils.¹⁷ Last but not least, lack of personal rapport and political understanding between Indira Gandhi and J.R. Jayewardene further complicated the interactions between the two governments on the ethnic issue.¹⁸ As a result, Mrs. Gandhi's mediatory efforts in the initial years of Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka were more of a 'unilateral affair' than an exercise in mutual confidence building.

⁹ S.D. Muni, "The Gandhi-Jayewardene Peace Accord and Subsequent Trends in India-Sri Lanka Relations", in Kodikara (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 101. Also see, S.D. Muni, "Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict", in K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*, pp. 118-120; Partha S. Ghosh, *op.cit.*, pp. 154-213; P.V. Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception", *Asian Survey*, vol. 28, no. 4, April 1988, pp. 424-425; and Gurbachan Singh, "The Ethnic Problem in Sri Lanka and the Indian Attempt at Mediation", in Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1984-1985*, New Delhi, Sage Publishers, 1987.

¹⁰ P.V. Rao, *ibid.*, p. 420. Also see, RVR Chandrashekhar Rao, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia", *Round Table*, vol. 1, no. 293, January 1985, p. 63.

¹¹ Jayaweera, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-69; K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 81.

¹² A.J. Wilson, *The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict*, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1988, p. 176.

¹³ P.V. Rao, *op.cit.*, p. 422.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 421. Also see, M.G. Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Agra: Y.K. Publishers, 1985, p. 320.

¹⁵ James Manor and Gerald Segal, "Causes of Conflict: Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Strategy", *Asian survey*, vol. 25, no. 12, December 1985, p. 1174; Ratnatunga Sinha, *The Politics of Terrorism: the Sri Lankan Experience*, Canberra: International Fellowship for Social and Economic Development, 1988, p. 73.

¹⁶ There were numerous reports of training camps and safe bases for Tamil militants in Tamilnadu. See, "Sri Lankan rebels: An Ominous Presence in Tamilnadu", *India Today*, 31 March 1984, pp. 84-94. Also see, Jayaweera, *op.cit.*, pp. 56-57, 60-70; and K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*, pp. 82-83.

¹⁷ Jayaweera, *ibid.*, pp. 72-73; and K.M. de Silva, *ibid.*, p. 84.

¹⁸ Muni, in Silva and May, *ibid.*, p. 120. Other scholars also point out that a soured personal relationship between the top political leadership in New Delhi and Colombo was coming in the way of their arriving at a mutually acceptable solution of the ethnic conflict. See, Kodikara (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 25; Wilson, *op.cit.*, p. 203; and Jayaweera, *op.cit.*, pp. 63-64.

Subsequently Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's fresh initiative generated a better climate for talks between the two countries. His decision to replace G. Parthasarthy with Romesh Bhandari,¹⁹ curbs on Tamil militant activities in India and an open commitment to Sri Lankan unity and territorial integrity went a long way to convincing the Sri Lankan government of India's sincerity in helping to find a political solution of the ethnic conflict. The direct talks between J.R. Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi in June 1985 were followed by India's renewed mediatory efforts at the Thimpu talks in July-August 1985. As a result of these meetings and India's Minister of Internal Security, Mr. P. Chidambaram's diplomatic mission to Colombo in May 1986, the Sri Lankan government came forward with an improved version of the devolution plan with provinces as the basic unit of structure. While India welcomed this plan, the Sri Lankan Tamil groups rejected it outright. Subsequently the proposal of provincial councils following the talks between Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Tamilnadu's Chief Minister Mr. M.G. Ramachandaran and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) chief Prabhakaran in November 1986 on the occasion of SAARC in Bangalore also met the same fate.

By the dawn of 1987, ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka had taken a dangerous turn with both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE considering seriously the military option. Indian attempts to intervene were spurned and Colombo imposed an economic blockade of the Jaffna peninsula which was followed by a full-scale military offensive in May. By now New Delhi's stand, too, had hardened and it culminated in its decision to airdrop relief supplies in Jaffna. It was widely condemned by Sri Lanka as a blatant violation of its sovereignty and airspace. Jayewardene's government was enraged but perhaps having realized the bitter political reality of the politico-military strength of India and the refusal of any major powers to come to its rescue it acted with restraint.²⁰ Jayewardene suspended the military action and re-started the negotiations with India.

These resulted in the Indo-Sri Lankan accord of 1987 whereby the Sri Lankan side agreed to undertake measures to accommodate Tamil aspirations by providing constitutional guarantees and institutional mechanisms. The Indian side agreed to help Sri Lanka by ensuring the surrender of arms by the Tamil militants and bringing them into the mainstream of Sri Lankan political life.²¹ In the letters attached to the agreement, Sri Lanka offered to meet India's security concerns regarding the role of extra-regional powers

¹⁹ The importance of this move lay in the widely shared opinion in Sri Lanka that Parthasarthy, a Tamil himself, was biased in their favour and had, thus, failed to gain the confidence of the Sri Lankan government and officials. See, P.V. Rao, *op.cit.*, p. 426; and K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

²⁰ Rao notes that Colombo did not demand a Security Council meeting nor did it boycott the SAARC Foreign Ministers' conference in New Delhi in July where no attempt to rake up the issue was made. See, P.V. Rao, *op.cit.*, p. 433.

²¹ For text of the agreement, see the documents in *South Asia Journal*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 201-208.

particularly concerning the development of naval refuelling facilities on the strategic harbour of Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka, the setting up of a powerful broadcasting facility by the United States and the employment in Sri Lanka of foreign military and intelligence personnel prejudicial to India's perceived interests. In return India agreed to deport any Sri Lankan citizens engaged in terrorist activities or advocating separatism and secessionism. This provision was important in view of the earlier Indian support to the Tamil militant groups operating from Tamilnadu. India also agreed to provide training facilities and military supplies for the Sri Lankan security forces.²²

On the face of it, the accord appears to be a sincere attempt at confidence building by the two countries. But it is important to note that once again Jayewardene had signed the agreement perhaps out of the same compulsions. The political reaction in a wide section of the Sri Lankan masses including most opposition political parties and Sinhala Buddhist clergy especially the JVP was that of an unmitigated hostility. There were serious divisions even within Jayewardene's cabinet where his Prime Minister Premadasa and Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali were the most hostile and consistent critics of the accord. Silva writes that "most of the opposition was based on personal antagonism to Rajiv Gandhi ... and some of it stemmed from the foreign policy implications especially its infringement of Sri Lankan sovereignty beginning with the entry and use of Indian troops to supervise and enforce the ceasefire".²³ When Premadasa's government came to power in Colombo, the troop withdrawal became an issue of contention between the two countries which was only resolved by the new Indian government of V.P. Singh in New Delhi. Since then India and Sri Lanka have made a headway in improving their relations but the Tamil problem continues to dominate their relationship.

3 India-Bangladesh Relations

India and Bangladesh laid the foundation of their relations on a very amicable footing. Indian intervention had proved to be the decisive factor in the Bangladesh's birth and it was acknowledged and appreciated by Sheikh Mujib's government in Dhaka. Both the domestic and foreign policies of Bangladesh were in tune with that of Indian thinking. Mujib's nation-building strategy rested on the four pillars of nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy, the latter two being of special significance for Indian policy makers. In its external affairs two important tenets of India's regional policy - to be accepted by its neighbours as the predominant power in the subcontinent and to keep South Asia free from the extra-regional powers - were underwritten by the Mujib government in the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and

²² Muni in Kodikara, *op.cit.*, p. 102. For text of the letters, see, R.R Premdas and S.W.R de A. Samarasinghe, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord", *Asian Survey*, vol. 28, no. 6, June 1988, pp. 676-683.

²³ K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

Peace signed in March 1972. There were a few bilateral irritants like the Farakka barrage dispute and the cross-border operations of the Mizo and the Chakma insurgents. But the overall cordiality between Dhaka and New Delhi led the two governments to cooperate jointly in putting down the insurgencies²⁴ and they arrived at an understanding to resolve the Farakka issue through bilateral negotiations.

The relations between the two countries, however, deteriorated soon after Mujib's assassination and a military take over by General Zia-ur-Rehman. It may be noted that anti-Indian sentiments particularly in the left and Islam-oriented political parties had prevailed even during Mujib's regime.²⁵ But while Mujib managed to keep them under check later they flared into the open. Moreover, Mrs. Gandhi's government had identified itself closely with the Mujib government in Dhaka, hence, the new military establishment in Dhaka was not looked upon favourably in New Delhi. Zia's decision to drop secularism in favour of an Islamic ideology as one of the state policies which widened the breach between the two governments. Indian policy makers were concerned not only about the implications of another Islamic regime in its neighbourhood but also with the more specific and immediate prospects of another exodus of Bengali Hindus into India.²⁶ Both government and non-government sources voiced concern at the fate of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh.²⁷ In the realm of foreign policy too, the Zia regime's moves to forge closer ties with Pakistan, China and the United States while distancing itself from India were viewed with concern in Indian ruling circles.

By the late 1970's the Chakma insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts had also become a serious problem in Indo-Bangladesh relations.²⁸ Dhaka accused India of providing covert assistance to the Shanti Bahini, the militant wing of the Chakma insurgents. India countered with its own allegations that various insurgent groups like the MNF (Mizo National Front), TNV (Tripura National Volunteers) and more recently ULFA, operating in the north-east states of Mizoram, Tripura, and Assam respectively had their hide-outs across the border often with the connivance of Dhaka²⁹ and India was also forced to cope with the additional problem of an intermittent influx of refugees into its bordering states. Over the years the issue of cross-border support to insurgencies and the question of repatriation of the Chakma refugees to Bangladesh has become

²⁴ For more details on these issues, see, Partha S. Ghosh, *Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1989, p. 86.

²⁵ Ghosh writes that an immediate reason for such anti-Indian sentiments was Mujib's failure in the economic field coupled with his identification with India. His economic policies and the dominant position of Indian economy had led to large scale smuggling of Bangladeshi goods into India causing severe hardship to an already weak and war-torn economy. *ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁶ Partha S. Ghosh, "Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in South Asia", *Conflict Studies*, no. 178, 1985, pp. 5-6.

²⁷ Ghosh (1989), *op.cit.*, pp. 72-73.

²⁸ For an excellent discussion on the origins and evolution of Chakma problem, see, Syed Nazmul Islam, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh: Integrational Crisis Between Centre and Periphery", *Asian Survey*, vol. 21, no. 12, December 1981, pp. 1211-1222; M.Q. Zaman, "Crisis in Chittagong Hill Tracts: Ethnicity and Integration", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 16 January 1982, pp. 75-80.

²⁹ For details of the links between the MNF and the TNV on one hand and the Chakma insurgents on the other, see, Ghosh (1989), *op.cit.*, pp. 78-79.

a major point of contention between the two countries.

The problem of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, too, continues to be a thorny issue. Initially both the Congress and Janata governments in New Delhi tried to underplay the refugee problem for their own reasons.³⁰ But later in 1978 this triggered off an 'anti-foreigners' agitation in Assam focussing on the unabated infiltration of Bangladeshis which supposedly had reduced the Assamese people to a minority in their own state. Successive regimes in Dhaka denied consistently any large out-migration from Bangladesh and argued that it was a case of Indians returning to their own country. After May 1983, the Bangladeshi government categorically stated that it would not accept the "aliens" and if sent by India "we will return them back".³¹ Later serious differences arose between the two countries when the Ershad regime took exception to India's decision to fence the Indo-Bangla border to stop the inflow of immigrants. Even with Begum Khalida Zia's democratic government in power in Dhaka the problem evaded any solution.

Another major dispute between India and Bangladesh was over India's construction of the Farakka barrage on the Ganga river near the Indo-Bangla border in 1975.³² Bangladesh objected strongly on the grounds that the barrage would jeopardize many of its own water development projects in the lean season and affect adversely the navigational network of Bangladesh along with the agricultural production and industrial and domestic water supplies in the south-western region of the country.³³ After Mujib's fall the general deterioration in Indo-Bangladesh relations also cast its shadow on the Farakka talks and the two governments failed to arrive at any understanding in the bilateral talks. In the summer of 1976 Bangladesh took the matter to the United Nations but the Indian government was not forthcoming. It was only after the Janata party came to power in New Delhi, that the two signed a five year bilateral agreement on this issue.

On the whole India and Bangladesh continue to have several bilateral disagreements and misgivings. The question one needs to ask is that whether they have made any Confidence Building efforts to resolve these differences. The overall picture does not seem to be very encouraging. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Zia-ur-Rehman never enjoyed a good rapport. She did not trust him partly because of his role and involvement in Mujib's overthrow and partly because of his military and Islamic credentials. On his part Zia-ur-Rehman was equally suspicious of Mrs. Gandhi's government. It may be recalled that at the time of his take over, heavy troop mobilization by Indian security forces in certain sectors of the Indo-Bangla border

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 82.

³¹ *The Statesman*, 9 August 1983.

³² The barrage was made to divert 40,000 cusecs of water through a link canal to the Bhagirathi river. It was intended to flush the Hoogli river during the lean season so as to save the port of Calcutta where navigation was becoming increasingly difficult on account of excessive silting. Ghosh (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 86.

³³ For a more detailed account of Bangladeshi objections to the Farakka barrage, see, Nahid Islam, "The Ganges Water Dispute: Environmental and Related Impacts on Bangladesh", *BISS Journal*, vol. 12, no. 3, July 1991, pp. 276-290.

had generated fears in Dhaka that India might intervene on behalf of the pro-Mujib factions which had earlier fled to India. It may only have been speculation but its psychological impact on Zia was deep and long-lasting. During this period neither side made a genuine effort to resolve their differences.

When the Janata party came to power in New Delhi it professed its desire to improve relations with Bangladesh and by signing the Farakka agreement they removed one major irritant from Indo-Bangladesh relations at least for the time being. Towards the end of his rule Zia-ur-Rehman mooted the proposal of establishing a regional organization of South Asian states. This was based on the premise that notwithstanding various bilateral problems among the South Asian countries, they should try building a sense of confidence and goodwill by addressing the non-controversial areas such as regional economic cooperation. The initial Indian response was, however, rather lukewarm. Subsequently General Ershad's regime in Dhaka was perceived as a more pliable partner from the Indian viewpoint. His occasional anti-Indian outbursts were considered as basically an exercise in public posturing meant for the domestic audience. Bilateral differences on specific issues, however, persisted with both sides blaming the other for not being sincere in attempting to resolve them. The relations warmed a little when Begum Khalida Zia's democratically elected government came to power in Dhaka. During her visit to New Delhi in 1993 the two sides agreed on a package deal to resolve major issues such as Farakka, cross-border support to the insurgents and problem of illegal immigrants. The meeting also resulted in the transfer of the Tin Bigha enclave to Bangladesh which had been another sore issue for a long time. But on her return to Dhaka, Khalida Zia found herself under tremendous pressure from the opposition political parties and eventually the deal fell through. It may be argued, therefore, that although there have been brief periods of cooperation between India and Bangladesh, they can hardly be characterized as an exercise in confidence building by either India or Bangladesh.

4 India-Nepal Relations

Indo-Nepal ties draw upon their close links based on geography, history, kinship, religion, social values and commerce. The unique nature of their relationship is marked by a 1700 miles long open border. These impinge continuously upon the politico-strategic and socio-economic variables governing their relations where vast areas of cooperation and understanding are matched by equally powerful voices of conflict and divergences. The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship envisaged a 'special relationship' between India and Nepal.

The first cracks in this special bond occurred when King Mahendra's sudden dismissal of the first popularly elected Nepalese government of B.P Koirala was criticized by the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. This led to a growing schism between India and Nepal. The main threat to King Mahendra

emanated from domestic instability and Indian support for the democratic forces in Nepal made him perceive India more as an ally of his domestic foe and thus as an adversary.³⁴ At a regional level, he exploited deftly India's growing conflicts with China and Pakistan and initiated various political and economic moves to distance itself from India.³⁵ He undertook several measures for diversifying Nepal's trade and demanded continuously better transit facilities from India. In 1970 Nepal first demanded separate Treaties on Trade and Transit on the plea that while trade was a changing phenomenon subject to renewal periodically at short intervals, transit was a permanent right to be defined on a long term basis. But India insisted that due to its past experience with Nepal in trade and an open Indo-Nepalese border, the two aspects of trade and transit were closely linked which could be separated only to the detriment of India's economic and security interests. In foreign affairs King Mahendra pursued a policy of equidistance from India and China. China welcomed his overtures by offering political support for his domestic policies as well as generous economic assistance. Such tensions between India and Nepal dissipated not because of any new-found political understanding between the two countries but due to a cataclysmic change in the South Asian regional balance of power in 1971. India emerged as the predominant power in the region. And China's role in the Indo-Pak confrontation in 1971 and earlier in 1965 largely exposed the credibility gap of its assurances which severely constrained Nepal's bargaining position *vis-à-vis* India. This was reflected in Nepal's acceptance of a unified Treaty of Trade and Transit in 1971.

King Birendra came to power in 1972 and continued to follow his father's footsteps both in domestic and foreign policies. In 1975 he put forth the proposal of declaring Nepal as a Zone of Peace. Since then this proposal has received support from 115 countries with the vital exception of India. New Delhi viewed the proposal as a thin edge of the diplomatic wedge to upset the existing treaties and undermine the special relationship between India and Nepal. And it argued that the proposal was heavily pre-occupied with the security concerns of the monarchial regime as such and any such open and total commitment to the former at cost of alienating the democratic forces in Nepal would not be in India's interest.³⁶ Even the Janata government in New Delhi which conceded the Nepalese plea for separate Treaties on Trade and Transit abstained from supporting this proposal.

³⁴ S.D. Muni, *India-Nepal: A Changing Relationship*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1992, pp. 54-55.

³⁵ See, Leo E. Rose, "King Mahendra's China Policy", in S.D. Muni, ed., *Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy*, New Delhi: Chetana Publishers, 1977, pp. 219-239. Also see, S.K. Jha, "Nepal's India Policy: Quest for Independence", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. 25, no. 11, November 1976, pp. 185-190.

³⁶ For an excellent discussion on the Indian reservations on this proposal, see, Muni (1992), *op.cit.*, Chapter Four. For a Nepalese perspective on this issue, see, Dhurba Kumar, "Beyond 'Blockade': Some Long Term Policy Considerations for Nepal", in "Nepal-India Relations: Views from Kathmandu and New Delhi", *CNAS Forum (Current Issue Series)*, no. 10, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, October 1989, pp. 14-16, 20-21.

By the mid-1980's various irritants in Indo-Nepal relations were beginning to surface. Chinese participation in the projects in the Terai area close to the Indo-Nepalese border, discrimination against Indian tenders and subsequently Nepalese imports of Chinese arms and ammunition including anti-aircraft guns became a source of serious security concern for India.³⁷ Indian policy makers were perhaps not so worried about the anti-aircraft guns as such but the long term implications of this action especially if it was a harbinger of the changing pattern of Nepal's military supplies in favour of the Chinese. The Indian government also objected to the issuing of work permits for persons of Indian origin as it violated the 1950 Treaty which provides for an equal and reciprocal treatment of the two countries' nationals in this respect. Nepal, too, had its share of grievances against its bigger neighbour. India had refused consistently to support the Nepalese Zone of Peace proposal. On the question of work permits, Nepal pointed out that the Indian government also had introduced restricted area permits in 1976 to restrict the movement of foreign nationals including Nepalese in the north-east of India.³⁸

It was against this backdrop that in October 1988 a new Treaty of Trade and Agreement on Checking Unauthorized Trade was being finalized and initialled by India and Nepal. But in February 1989, one month before the expiry of the existing Treaty on Trade, India decided unilaterally to repudiate the draft treaty and proposed to initiate fresh negotiations for a single unified treaty of trade and transit. Nepal's failure to keep its commitment to issue notifications removing additional customs duties as undertaken by its Commerce Secretary in October 1988 was given as the specific and immediate reason for India's action.³⁹ Nepal also gave a 40% duty concession to Chinese exports to Nepal during January-February 1989 and subsequently withdrew further duty concessions from Indian goods in April 1989. These actions relating to commercial duties triggered India's displeasure with Nepal which was building up on other issues pertaining to the erosion of the 1950 Treaty.

As a result of the collapse of the trade regime in March 1989 trade between India and Nepal including that of essential commodities for Nepal came to a complete halt. India also closed all entry points except four (two on the Indo-Nepal border and one each for Nepal's trade with Bhutan and Bangladesh) on its borders for transit of goods from and to Nepal.⁴⁰ India's contention was that Nepal should re-negotiate

³⁷ S.K. Upadhyay, the Foreign Minister of Nepal, disclosed in his book that even before the delivery of Chinese weapons the Indian Ambassador had given him a friendly warning that this would have "serious consequences and would spoil [the India-Nepal relationship] as never before". See, S.K. Upadhyay, *Tryst With Diplomacy*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1991, pp. 75-76.

³⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

³⁹ Muni (1992), *op.cit.*, p. 129. Also see, his article, "India and Nepal: Erosion of a Relationship", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12, no. 4, July 1989, p. 357.

⁴⁰ This was strongly contested by the Nepalese side. See, Dhurba Kumar, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

a single Treaty on Trade and Transit and should not discriminate against Indian goods in matters of levying duties. And it should comply with the letter and spirit of the 1950 Treaty. Thus India wanted a comprehensive review of the entire gamut of India-Nepal relations. Nepal accused India of acting as a 'big brother' and described the trade impasse as India's economic blockade of Nepal. It refused to negotiate for a single Trade and Transit Treaty and insisted on trade relations based on the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) principle. It also accorded lower priority to Indian complaints about the erosion of the 1950 Treaty arguing that it did not want any 'special relationship' with India.⁴¹

Several rounds of negotiations between the Foreign Secretaries and other high level government officials of the two countries followed but without much success. The summit meeting between the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and King Birendra in late 1989, too, did not yield much results. Perhaps this had a lot to do with the internal political situation in both India and Nepal. The King was perhaps hoping that Rajiv Gandhi would lose power in the forthcoming general elections and a non-Congress regime would, as in 1977, offer Nepal a generous deal. The Indian government, on the other hand, was observing the "snowballing of anti-Panchayat and anti-monarchical democratic movement calculating accordingly that any concessions on India's part would go against the democratic forces in Nepal".⁴²

Both these assumptions were proved correct. The Janata Dal led by V.P. Singh came to power in New Delhi but there was no significant change in the new regime's policy towards Nepal. This was partly owing to the growing and broad-based strength of the democratic movement and increasing isolation of the King and his Panchayat system in Nepal. And partly it was due to the conflicting pulls and pressures within the ruling coalition of Janata Dal and presence of an influential section which stood for full support to the democracy movement in Nepal.⁴³ Before long the King-dominated Panchayat system also collapsed in April 1990 giving way to the emergence of a democratic coalition of the Nepali Congress and the United Left Front of the Communist parties.

In wake of these political changes, the Indo-Nepalese crisis was resolved almost overnight. The Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Bhattarai's visit to New Delhi in early June 1990 resulted in a joint

⁴¹ Muni, 'India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship', *op.cit.*, p. 130. Also see, "Himalayan Crisis", *India Today*, 15 May 1989, pp. 86-101.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Muni states that this included the former socialists and associates of the late B.P. Koirala, like Chandrashekhar and Surendra Mohan within the ruling party. And the CPM and the CPI as the outside supporters of the Janata Dal government favoured support to the anti-Panchayat movement because their close ideological affiliates in Nepal, the United Marxist-Leninist (UML) and other political parties in the United Left Front respectively were also in the forefront of the democracy movement. It is notable that the representatives of Janta Dal, CPM, CPI and Congress were all present at the Nepali Congress convention held in Kathmandu from 18-20 January 1990 to decide about the formal launching of the movement for restoring multi-party democracy. *ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

communiqué restoring all aspects of bilateral relations to the *status quo* on 1 April 1987.⁴⁴ This included normalization of trade relations under two separate Treaties of Trade and Transit as well as removal of irritants like the work permit system for persons of Indian origin in Nepal.⁴⁵

On the whole it is evident that this crisis between India and Nepal was not a product of trade and transit related issues alone. Muni states that

India's seemingly uncompromising stand on trade relations is a reaction to the steady erosion of the 1950 Treaty.... India's accommodating stance on trade and economic issues was based upon a certain expectation of reciprocity on Nepal's part in the matters related to mutual security perceptions and treatment of Indian nationals in Nepal.⁴⁶

And since in the Indian view Nepal was not keeping its side of the bargain it decided to take a tough stand.⁴⁷

In Nepal the hardliners and the anti-Indian lobby in the royal palace kept goading the government to take a very firm stand *vis-à-vis* New Delhi. It decided to bring international pressure to bear on India in every possible way⁴⁸ and at home blamed India for causing hardship to the Nepalese people. This tactic of arousing popular feelings against the Indian government, however, boomeranged on the Nepali authorities in as much as the intelligentsia and the common people began to hold their own government responsible for the stalemate in the treaty negotiations. Dhurba states that

a feeling grew in Nepal that the economic crisis had inspired the leadership to seek aid and public relations bonanzas instead of searching for solutions and developing a systemic response capability to meet ensuing challenges.⁴⁹

This proved to be a crucial factor in triggering the movement for restoring multi-party democracy in which the intelligentsia and different political parties joined hands with the common people to overthrow the Panchayat system. And that in turn, contributed significantly towards resolving the crisis and promoting a better understanding between India and Nepal.

⁴⁴ The significance of this date lay in the fact that it sought to annul some of the steps such as work permits for Indians, additional duties on Indian goods, trade preferences for imports from China and acquisition of Chinese weapons before that period. See, Lt. General S.K. Sinha (retd), "Reminiscences of an Ambassador", *USI Journal*, vol. CXXI, no. 506, December 1991, p. 433.

⁴⁵ For details of the specific steps undertaken by two countries, see, Masroor Ahmed Beg, "A Study of Indo-Nepal Trade Relations in Pre and Post Trade Impasse Period of 1989-1990", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. 39, no. 8 & 9, August-September 1990, pp. 25-26.

⁴⁶ Muni (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 358.

⁴⁷ Dhurba writes that India gave Nepal a clear choice that Kathmandu should choose either a 'special' or 'normal' relationship with New Delhi. Acceptance of a special relationship by Nepal would be met by India with preferential treatment in both trade and transit matters. But if Nepal desired a normal relationship with India as with other countries, policies in India would be tailored accordingly. See, Dhurba Kumar, "Managing Nepal's India Policy?", *Asian Survey*, vol. 30, no. 7, July 1990, p. 658.

⁴⁸ For more details on this issue, see, Rishikesh Shaha, *Three Decades and Two Kings (1960-1990)*, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1990, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁹ Dhurba Kumar (1990), *op.cit.*, p. 698.

Thus it may be argued that both India and Nepal's sense of mistrust and animosity for each other during this period resulted mainly from a conflict between the two particular regimes in Kathmandu and New Delhi and with a change in the Nepalese regime, the Indo-Nepal differences also disappeared. In other words, this crisis between the two countries was resolved not as a result of any kind of confidence building efforts undertaken by either side but mainly as a result of the internal political changes in the two countries. This was particularly true for Nepal since that involved a systemic change from a monarchical regime to a democratic one. Since then successive governments in Kathmandu and New Delhi have been enjoying very amicable relations.

5 India-Bhutan Relations

Bhutan is a tiny kingdom surrounded by India on its south and China on its northern side. According to the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty, Bhutan agreed to be "guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations".⁵⁰ India has continued to regard Bhutan as within its security parameters in the Himalayan region. This suited Bhutan because the Chinese annexation of Tibet and subsequent destruction of the Tibetan way of life and Buddhist institutions in the 1950's had made Bhutan very distrustful of China while cementing its trust in India.

Much as it is an unequal relationship between the biggest and perhaps the smallest country in the subcontinent, both India and Bhutan have shown a remarkable tendency to accommodate each other's sensitivities especially on the foreign and security policy issues. While Bhutan endorsed the Indian assessment of where the Indian defence parameters lie, India supported the Bhutanese drive to assert its independence in international affairs. India proposed Bhutanese membership in the United Nations in 1970 and reconciled itself to the latter's need for diversifying its sources of external economic aid. Most significantly, in the early 1980's India gave its consent to direct Sino-Bhutanese talks to settle their border issues. On the whole, Bhutan and India have never had serious differences on any significant issue.

6 India-Pakistan Relations

The key bilateral relationship in South Asia is that of India and Pakistan which share aspects of a common history, geography, religion, languages, customs, traditions and culture. Since independence their bilateral relations have been oscillating between the two ends of a conflict-cooperation continuum. On the one hand,

⁵⁰ Ghosh (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 139.

India and Pakistan have a long history of a conflictual past rooted in the legacies of partition, three India-Pakistan wars and an all-pervading sense of mutual mistrust and suspicion. On the other hand, they have engaged in a regular and continuing dialogue to reconcile their differences and undertaken various Confidence Building Measures to this end although until recently they have not been identified as such.

The dynamics of the internal politics of India and Pakistan has contributed significantly towards shaping their external conflictual behaviour. India's nation-building model based on the principles of democracy, secularism and a federal structure of government clashes with that of Pakistan resting on the Islamic nationalism, authoritarianism and a centrally controlled administration. In the realm of foreign affairs, self-images of their power status *vis-à-vis* each other and in the regional and global contexts have proved to be mutually incompatible. While India wanted to assert its natural preeminence in the South Asian region, Pakistan spared few efforts to achieve power-parity with India. Even after losing its eastern wing in 1971, Pakistan continues to nurture that dream and puts up a stiff resistance to any Indian attempts to establish its supremacy in the region. It also sought assistance from extra-regional quarters to counter-balance India in the subcontinent which came in conflict with India's perceived strategic interests of trying to keep the region free of extra-regional powers' involvement.

Such conflicting interests and perceptions of India and Pakistan have resulted in several bilateral disputes, Kashmir being the most protracted one. Lately the two countries have been fighting intermittently on the Siachin glacier because both claim it to be a part of its territory. They accuse each other of possessing a nuclear bomb and view the other's nuclear programme with distrust and suspicion. In the last decade, the two countries have also traded allegations of interference in each other's internal affairs. While India blames Pakistan for giving armed support to the Sikh and Muslim militants in Punjab and Kashmir respectively, Pakistan accuses India of fomenting trouble in its Sindh province.

Despite such a grim record India and Pakistan have been making numerous and continuing attempts to resolve their differences, reduce tensions and build confidence in each other. Keeping in mind the extensive nature of the political, military, economic and socio-cultural issues involved in their relations, one may touch upon only some aspects of the Indo-Pak confidence building process in this chapter. The most obvious and vital field relates to the military Confidence Building Measures. India and Pakistan have reached an agreement on advance notification of the military exercises and troop deployments, non violation of air space

by military aircraft and regular contacts at various levels of military commanders between the two countries. Further, proposals such as Mutual Balanced Reduction of Forces (MBFR), reduction of defence budgets and inviting observers to military exercises are under consideration. On the nuclear issue, the two agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. The Defence Secretaries of the two countries have had several rounds of bilateral talks on the Siachin glacier dispute and are believed to be very close to reaching an agreement.

The decade of the 1980's was also marked by a political debate on the Pakistani proposal of a No War Pact and the Indian offer of signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Although neither was translated into a formal agreement it signified the attempts the two countries were making in this respect. India and Pakistan also established a Joint Commission for promoting bilateral trade and socio-cultural interactions between the public at large. A non-official or supplemental dialogue between the two countries' opinion-making elites including political leaders, academicians, journalists, intellectuals, industrialists, bureaucrats and retired military officials has been another significant development in this direction. Its importance lies in the fact that such a dialogue between the elites does not remain a prisoner of the dynamics of the internal politics of respective governments in New Delhi and Islamabad. Clearly India and Pakistan have been engaged in a confidence building exercise over the past two decades. The question one needs to ask now is whether India and Pakistan's case study would make an appropriate choice for illustrating the use of a confidence building approach in the South Asian region. One may submit a number of reasons in favour of this proposition.

India and Pakistan are the most vital conflict actors in the subcontinent and the state of their relations have significant political implications for the entire South Asian region. SAARC's (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) success, for instance, largely depends on the dynamics of bilateral relations between these two countries and any future Indo-Pak conflict, particularly a nuclearised one, holds the potential of engulfing the whole of South Asia. Moreover, the extensive and all-encompassing nature of India and Pakistan's relationship would provide us with an opportunity to study Confidence Building Measures in all dimensions - political, military, economic and socio-cultural.

In addition the India-Pakistan relationship has been deeply affected by the extra-regional powers' involvement in the region. During the cold war the United States the Soviet Union and China often pulled these regional countries in different directions to suit their own global strategic interests. But with a new-found convergence of interests in the post cold war era, the same powers particularly the United States

have been involved actively in persuading both India and Pakistan to adopt various Confidence Building Measures and reconcile their differences through bilateral negotiations. A study of India-Pakistan relations would, thus, present an opportunity to examine the role of third parties in a given confidence building exercise.

Finally, a cursory review of the Confidence Building Measures' performance in the case of India-Pakistan relations would point towards its mixed outcome. While it has succeeded in averting another military confrontation between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute and mutual allegations of interference in their internal affairs continue to be as intractable problems as ever. A detailed analysis of the confidence building process between India and Pakistan, therefore, may help us in understanding both the conducive and inhibitive elements of various factors and forces which are at work while undertaking such an exercise.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that India has been involved in a bilateral conflict with nearly all its neighbours at some time. This raises the question of whether India is the main cause of the intra-regional conflicts in the South Asian region. It has been argued that India is a hegemonic power or the 'big bully' of the region and if only it did not behave as a 'big brother', several bilateral problems in the South Asian region would not have arisen at all. While there may be some element of truth in this argument, one important reason for India being the only common factor in the history of bilateral conflicts in the South Asian region is that India is the only country that shares borders with all other countries in the subcontinent. And as argued earlier, all other countries of the South Asian region have individually and separately more in common with India than with each other. Moreover to some extent, this problem is in-built in the hierarchical power structure of the subcontinent. Owing to its size, resources and power-projection capabilities, India looms large over South Asian affairs and whatever it does would be criticized by some. For instance, with regard to SARRC's efforts for regional economic cooperation, if India does not play an active and assertive role it would simply not work and if it does, other South Asian countries fear that India, being the most industrialized among them, would benefit the most from such cooperation.

While taking account of this factor, one must also examine other sources of conflict in the South Asian region. For instance, the systemic divergences between India and its neighbours on one hand and the shifts in the regional balance of power and role of extra-regional powers in South Asian affairs have often proved to be the vital factors in exacerbating as well as resolving bilateral disputes. India's bilateral problems

with countries like Nepal and Bangladesh, for instance, have been arising mainly out of their systemic divergences. Consequently the mistrust, suspicions and discord in their bilateral relations is not necessarily a product of the incompatibility of the two countries' national interests but perhaps of those particular regimes in power in the respective capitals. And it was often another systemic change in their regimes such as in Nepal which actually did the job of confidence building between the two countries. At times, a reluctance or refusal by the extra-regional powers to intervene on behalf of the smaller countries in South Asia has simply compelled them to settle their differences with India through bilateral negotiations. Although these two variables have played a significant role in the case of India-Pakistan relations as well, there is much more to the dynamics of their bilateral ties. The systemic divergences between General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime and the democratically elected Congress governments in New Delhi, for instance, did not come in the way of their undertaking a number of bilateral Confidence Building Measures. For this and the above-mentioned reasons, the case of India-Pakistan relations has been selected for a more detailed study in the following chapters.

PART II: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

CHAPTER IV: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The history of India-Pakistan relations has been that of a conflictual past, rooted in the colonial legacies of partition, intricacies of domestic politics, three wars since independence and often an active involvement of certain extra-regional powers. Nevertheless, the two countries have regularly engaged in negotiations for reducing tensions and resolving contentious issues. Beneath the upper current of distrust and discord, there flowed undoubtedly an undercurrent of amity and cordiality which has time and again manifested itself through a series of positive and concrete agreements.

The task of this chapter is twofold. The factors and forces responsible for generating and perpetuating the conflict between India and Pakistan at a domestic and bilateral level need to be examined as does the role of extra-regional powers in this respect. The importance of this exercise lies in the fact that unless we have an in-depth understanding of the factors causing mutual distrust and suspicion, we can not define the task of a Confidence Building exercise and take account of the odds it would have to work against. An attempt has been made to bring out the paradox in India-Pakistan relations where conflict has been as endemic to the situation as the mutual efforts by one or both sides to resolve their differences peacefully. Keeping in mind the multiple areas of disagreements between India and Pakistan in 1947, the fact that, apart from Kashmir, the two resolved various other bilateral disputes such as the division of assets, the minorities problem, the canal waters dispute and boundary demarcation difficulties through mutual negotiations or mediation shall not be simply overlooked. The term "fraternal enemies" perhaps comes closest to an apt description of India-Pakistan relations.¹ The underlying argument is that if the two can not become friends, they can not remain enemies either. This would set the stage for the adoption of a Confidence Building exercise in order to establish a *working* relationship as a middle course.

A brief discussion of the two-nation theory which became the dividing line for India's partition in 1947 and continues to be a principal cause of an ideological clash between Pakistan's Islamic nationalism and India's secularism sets the background. The main thrust however is on studying and analyzing the factors generating and sustaining the conflict between two countries. This exercise is undertaken at three levels - domestic, bilateral and extra-regional. Thereafter the linkages between internal political processes and the external conflictual behaviour of the two countries is examined. Then follows a brief discussion on the very process and aftermath of the partition that sowed the seeds of mutual suspicion and ill-will between two newly

¹ The term is coined by Dr. Ajay Saxsena in *India and Pakistan: Their Foreign Policies*, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987. Saxsena's work is an exceptional one to the extent that it is one among few writings that focus on the areas of co-operation between India and Pakistan despite their dismal conflictual record.

independent dominions. Consideration is given to the geographical and politico-strategic compulsions which prompted their ruling elites to take up various measures to bring them together by mitigating the mistrust and seeking active co-operation in defence and security related matters. This is juxtaposed with the conflictual and cooperative dimension of Indo-Pak relations with regard to various issues of conflict between them. Fourthly section investigates the role of extra-regional powers in accentuating or facilitating the resolution of the Indo-Pak conflict is investigated.

1 The Two-nation Theory

The two nation theory derived its origin in the rise of Muslim nationalism in the 1930's although the Muslim League had first demanded a separate Pakistan only in 1940.² Whether the roots of Muslim nationalism and ultimately that of the two nation theory lay in the theological distinctiveness of Muslims *vis-à-vis* Hindus as argued by the Muslim League or in the socio-economic factors exploited by the Muslim elite for its own vested interests as reasoned by the Congress has been a subject of much debate and controversy. While avoiding this debate one would only give a brief exposition of both viewpoints.

1.1 The Pakistani Viewpoint

The rationale of the two-nation theory was spelled out by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his famous Lahore Resolution in 1940

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality They belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions To yoke two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as majority must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.³

The essence of the two nation theory was that Islam and Hinduism are too different and too dominating in their own ways to seek a compromise formula which would allow both of them to govern as equal partners in an independent India. For the good of the people making up the two hostile communities it was necessary to divide them into two sovereign nations, a territorial *cordon sanitaire* had to be created around their

² Hardy argues that the feeling of being a distinct nation developed among Indian Muslims only in the 1940's when it became clear that the British would soon leave India. Prior to this the Muslim nobility had little in common with the Muslim peasantry and the artisan classes. P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 1-2. Others point out that the two 'nations' of Hindus and Muslims were in Indian society since the medieval era and the creation of Pakistan was, therefore, a logical culmination of their irreconcilable clash of values. Ishtiaq Hussain Quershi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi: University of Karachi, 1969, pp. 3-16.

³ Jamil-ud-Din-Ahmed, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol I*, Lahore: Mohammad Ashraf, 1952, pp. 160-161.

difference

1.2 Indian Viewpoint

The Congress party always regarded the Hindu-Muslim schism as a "superficial phenomenon, superficial because there could be no inherent clash of interests between them only because their religions differed".⁴ To Congress the real sources of conflict lay in the inequitable social structure of Indian society in the late 19th century. Pandit Nehru strongly believed that only radical economic measures would help to obscure the issue of communalism.⁵ Congress also blamed the British for having created communal and religious polarities in Indian society. It was the British policy of creating separate electorates for the minorities in the first place which had prepared the ground for Jinnah by creating a separate political category of Indian Muslims along communal lines. Later in his political struggle with the Congress party Jinnah not only exploited it skillfully but went beyond and aimed for a status of parity with Congress by repudiating the very minority status it (separate electorates) had served to institutionalize. Ayesha Jalal argues

the two-nation concept was used [by Jinnah] as a way of overcoming the constitutional problem of [Indian Muslims] having been cast into the category of a political minority ...by asserting that the Indian Muslims were not a minority but a 'nation' entitled to equal treatment with the Hindu nation in the distribution of power and patronage ...Jinnah used [religion] ...not as an ideology to which he was ever committed, or even a device to use against the rival communities ...but simply as a way of giving a semblance to unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents.⁶

It is important to note that the Muslim League leadership was never in the hands of orthodox elements. On the contrary it was criticized by the Muslim clergy for its "lack of religiousness".⁷ It was argued that the two-nation theory and Hindu-Muslim schism was being used by the Muslim League, especially its leader, Jinnah to further the limited interests of a section of the Muslim elite.⁸

In a nutshell, the ideological beliefs of Congress and Muslim League were essentially antithetical to each other. After independence these would become a cause for an ideological clash between Pakistan's

⁴ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A study in India-Pakistan Relations*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966, pp. 2, 4.

⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, New York: John Day Co., 1946 p. 399.

⁶ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: Political Economy of Defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 10-13.

⁷ The orthodox ulema like Maulana Abdul Ali Maudoodi and Allama Inayatullah Mashriq were implacably opposed to the League because of its irreligious leadership. The other religious groups which opposed the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan included Jamiat-i-Islam and Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Hind. Partha S. Ghosh, *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1989, p. 19. Also see, Saleem M. Quershi, "Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 1972-73, p. 557; Anwar Syed, *Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity*, New York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 39-40; and Jalal, *ibid.*, p. 278.

⁸ Paul Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Islamic nationalism and Indian beliefs in secular values. These political beliefs and ideologies of the two countries' ruling elites for building a nation-state become a source of bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan.

2 Sources of Conflict and Cooperation at the Domestic Level

The internal political processes in India and Pakistan have played a crucial role in shaping their external conflictual behaviour. The two countries pursued different strategies of nation-building. Indian principles of secularism, democracy and federalism clashed with Pakistan's Islamic ideology and authoritarian regimes.

2.1 Ideological Differences

Pakistan's Islamic ideology, in particular, generated problems both at home and in its relations with India. Pakistan faced a crisis of identity from the start because the partition had ended the unity of Indian Muslims and it was not easy to define who a Pakistani was. The identity that Pakistan had sought rested on twin foundation of its inhabitants being *Muslim* and *Indian*. It is the Indo-Muslim consciousness which had sustained the unity of Pakistan. India thus remained a major element in the separate nationhood of Pakistan. As a result, the Pakistani leaders constantly stressed the religious differences between India and Pakistan which only exacerbated their bilateral differences. The demand for Pakistan was based on the plea that a united India would result in Hindu domination of the Muslims. But the creation of Pakistan out of Muslim-majority provinces had still left a substantial number of Muslims in minority provinces behind. This led to Indian complaints that Pakistan's constant emphasis on Islamic ideology and its proclivity to assume a guardianship for all the Indian Muslims in the subcontinent stood in the way of its own Muslim community's political integration into the national stream and also encouraged the Hindus to remain communal-minded.⁹ The Hindu-Muslim riots in India were used by the respective elites of India and Pakistan to abuse each other. While Pakistan ridiculed India for its communal riots, India accused Pakistan of fanning the flames of communal hatred in the first place.

2.2 Interference in the Internal Affairs

⁹ Ghosh discusses the role of Hindu chauvinists who accused the secular-minded Indian leadership for having pampered the Indian Muslims which were their vote-banks. Ghosh, *op.cit.*, p. 38. The recent trends towards Hindu revivalism and militancy as evident from the ascendancy of Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) as the single largest opposition political party and its implications for the Indian Muslims, the secular traditions of India and the India-Pakistan relations shall be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

India and Pakistan also displayed a tendency to take an advantage of other's problems of political integration of various communities. India's sympathies for the North-West Frontier Province's demand for a separate Pakhtunistan and Pakistan's support for the Mizos and the Nagas in the north-east areas is well-known. Further, Indian intervention in the Bangladesh war in 1971 and Pakistan's intrusions into Kashmir in 1965 and that of both earlier in 1947-48 provide the most conclusive evidence in this respect.¹⁰

2.3 Using External Threats for Domestic Purposes

The ruling elites of the two countries used their bilateral conflict to suppress, avert or deal with a particular domestic crisis of integration.¹¹ Pakistan used the Indian threat for suppressing the rebellion in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in West Pakistan as well as dissidence in East Pakistan. Instead of accommodating these demands the Muslim League leadership from Jinnah downwards labelled most criticisms of the centre's policies as "Indian inspired".¹² These "insecurities of the state managers" as Jalal puts it "found a favourite outlet in theme of Pakistan being 'beset by enemies on every side and menaced by saboteurs within'".¹³ While it worked in West Pakistan it proved to be ineffective in its eastern wing.¹⁴ In a similar vein the 'foreign hand' theory dominated the Indian political scene which was portrayed by different political parties as the main rationale of India's nation-building problems.¹⁵ More specifically the agitation and self-immolation threat by the Sikh leaders in support of their demand for a separate state (Punjabi suba) was withdrawn because of the India-Pakistan conflict in 1965.¹⁶

2.4 Political Instability

Political instability in a country also has an important bearing on its external behaviour in the sense that often questions about the concerned party's legitimacy and ability to deliver goods generates an

¹⁰ This issue shall be taken up for further discussion in Chapter Nine.

¹¹ S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammad Ayoob, *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1980, p. 42. Also see, Mohammad Ayoob, "India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente", *Pacific Community*, vol. 8, no. 1, October 1976, pp. 150-154.

¹² Jalal, *op.cit.*, p. 280.

¹³ *ibid.*.

¹⁴ Khalid Sayeed argues that instruments of integration such as fear of India and Islam had proved to be counterproductive in East Pakistan. See, Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York: Praeger, 1980, p. 66. This was mainly because of the East Bengalis softer attitude towards India. For an excellent discussion on this issue, see, Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989, pp. 267-270.

¹⁵ Ghosh states that for the right wing political parties these forces are represented by Pakistan and the Muslim countries of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. For the left-oriented parties particularly the communist parties the same forces are represented by the West which operates both directly and indirectly through Pakistan. For the Congress party this foreign hand means Pakistan with or without its Western linkages. Ghosh, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁶ Muni, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

uncertainty about the entire negotiating process. Nehru's views as quoted by the former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan indicated this problem.

It was impossible to deal with the Pakistan government ... they never stayed in the office for more than a few months; they had no sound democratic system; there was nobody who could settle any agreement ... in fact he (Nehru) was not at all hopeful.¹⁷

This has been a persistent dilemma for the Indian government. Many Indian scholars have argued that if India negotiates with a military regime in Islamabad it would legitimize and entrench the military dictatorship and weaken the struggle of the democratic forces in Pakistan. But on the other hand historical evidence shows that a weak democratic government in Pakistan, with the military being the final arbiter, has never been able to make any allowance for improving India-Pakistan relations. The political instability also delays and inhibits the successful implementation of steps taken towards resolving a conflict by making it difficult for the political leadership to grant any concessions. This was clearly evident during India-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir between Z.A. Bhutto and Swaran Singh in 1963 because Nehru's position had been greatly weakened as a result of the military humiliation inflicted by China.¹⁸ Likewise on the Pakistani side, Bhutto was in no position to make any concessions on Kashmir at the Simla summit in 1972 because of Pakistan's devastating defeat in the 1971 war.

2.5 Socio-Cultural Affinities

On the positive side socio-cultural continuities and family links on both sides of the Indo-Pak border have cultivated and sustained trust and confidence between these two countries' at the grassroots level. Such people-to-people contacts have proved to be a valuable asset for confidence building between India-Pakistan.

3 Sources of Conflict and Cooperation at the Bilateral Level

India and Pakistan had got embroiled in a bilateral conflict right from their inception. This was mainly because the birth of India and Pakistan as two sovereign independent countries was attended by an unprecedented communal carnage which had a traumatic effect on the minds and emotions of the two countries' leaders and peoples. Gupta states

The problems of India and Pakistan arose out of the fact that their mutual relations did not

¹⁷ As quoted in Muni, *ibid.*

¹⁸ The White Paper on Kashmir brought out by Z.A. Bhutto government in January 1977 disclosed that Soviet Union in 1965 and the Western powers during 1962-1963 had impressed upon Pakistan that India on these occasions was not in a position to make territorial concessions in Kashmir and so should not be pressed to do so. *The White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, Islamabad, 1977.

pose the normal problems of relations between two separate nations. It has not been easy for the present generation of Indians and Pakistanis to forget the past and evolve a normal attitude to the neighbour. Each is involved with the other through facts of history, geography, culture, language and memories of recent past. It is against this background that India and Pakistan began to function as sovereign states and found themselves engaged in conflicts over many issues.¹⁹

Since the modalities of the partition and its aftermath had left such a lasting impression on the leaders and peoples of two countries, we need to examine their perceptions and images on this issue a little closely.

3.1 Indian and Pakistani Perceptions About Partition

The Muslim League had perceived the partition as an ultimate victory for its two-nation theory while Congress accepted it more as a territorial arrangement. Jalal points out that for Congress "partition did not entail a division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan as Jinnah had always maintained but would merely mean that some areas with Muslim majority were 'splitting from' the 'Union of India' which already existed".²⁰ Added to this were the openly expressed sentiments by Indian leaders on the non-viability of the Pakistani state.

In the early years of independence many Indian leaders particularly Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel believed that "Pakistan would collapse under the weight of what they saw as its own absurdities, inefficiencies and intellectual contradictions".²¹ Nehru was confident that "eventually India would have to become a single country and it could well be that Pakistan was but a stepping stone on the path towards that goal".²² The importance of this aspect lies in the fact that public debate in Pakistan still centres on the theory that Congress representing the Hindus had steadfastly opposed the partition until the very last and it was only the determination of Jinnah which succeeded in wresting Pakistan from the hands of an unwilling Hindu leadership acting in concert with the British.²³

¹⁹ Gupta, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

²⁰ Jalal states that in principle this notion was also accepted by the British. The Indian Independence Bill, as Mountbatten himself confessed, had been drafted on the assumption that there was a continuing government in India the "successor state" under Congress control with Pakistan in the position of a "seceding state". Jinnah strongly contested this interpretation since that would have destroyed the entire basis of the two-nation theory as propagated by him. Jalal, *op.cit.* pp. 23, 27.

²¹ Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*, Hertfordshire: Oxford Books, 1991, p. 216. Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad wrote that Sardar Patel was convinced that the new state of Pakistan was not viable and could not last. He thought that the acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson and Pakistan would collapse in a short time. See, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, Greenwood: Longman, 1960, p. 242.

²² This was written by Nehru to K.P.S Menon (later India's Ambassador to China) on 29 April 1947. As quoted later in M.J. Akbar, *Nehru: Making of India*, London: Viking, 1988, p. 405. For details of the All-India Congress Committee's (AICC) resolution on this issue, see, V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 384.

²³ This was the distinct impression gathered by the present author from various interviews in Pakistan conducted in October 1991.

The point one needs to make here is that while it is true that initially Indian leaders regarded partition as a transient phenomenon but after independence effective opinion in Congress had reconciled itself to the same. This may be deduced from a number of policy statements made by both Nehru and Patel on this issue.²⁴ Sardar Patel, for instance, said on 12 November 1947,

I bear Pakistan no ill-will. I wish them godspeed; let them only leave us alone, to pursue our salvation, and stop meddling with our affairs.... It is neither our business nor interest to force a re-union. We only wish to be left alone.²⁵

Nehru declared at the Aligarh Muslim University on 24 January 1948,

We have been charged with desiring to strangle or crush Pakistan and to force it into a re-union with India. That charge as many others is based on fear and misunderstanding of our attitude ... If today, by any chance, I was offered the re-union of India and Pakistan, I would decline it for the obvious reason. I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problems. I have enough of my own.²⁶

Indian leaders from Nehru onwards have gone to great lengths to assure Pakistan that partition is a settled fact and India is not interested in undoing the same. Nevertheless these perceptions by Pakistani leaders persisted and they continued to charge India of trying constantly to destroy Pakistan. Most Pakistani leaders were convinced that India, if given an opportunity, would re-establish *akhund Bharat* (undivided India) either by force of arms or "by allowing the hybrid Islamic state to wither away under its own contradictions".²⁷

An exercise to prove or disprove the factual content underlying these fears and suspicions of the Pakistani leaders may be futile partly due to the selectivity of the approach of both Indian and Pakistani scholars in quoting facts to corroborate their argument. Moreover, the history of India-Pakistan relations has demonstrated that most often the perceptions and images of their ruling elites count more than the actual facts. Such conflicting perceptions led the Indian and the Pakistani leaders to evolve self-images of their power status *vis-à-vis* each other in the regional and global contexts which were mutually incompatible.

3.2 Divergent Perceptions of the Power Status

²⁴ Azad points out that later Nehru and Patel had not only been reconciled to the idea of partition but in fact began to regard it as good riddance. It is interesting to note that while many Pakistani scholars frequently quote earlier statements of Nehru and Patel expressing their doubt about the permanence of partition, few, if any, take note of these statements that corroborated Indian acceptance of a sovereign and independent Pakistan.

²⁵ Sardar Patel, *On Indian Problem*, New Delhi: 1949, p. 8.

²⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speeches, September 1946 to May 1949*, New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Publications Division, 1958, ed. 2, p. 338.

²⁷ Douglas.C. Makeig, "War, No-War and India-Pakistan Negotiating Process", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 690, no. 2, Summer 1987, p. 282. For statements by various Pakistani leaders on this issue, see, Jinnah's remarks quoted in S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, New York: Oxford University press, 1990, p. 10; Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 615; and Z.A. Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 178-179.

The Indian ruling elites had inherited the perception that like British India, an independent India was also destined to play a major role in the Asian and world affairs commensurate with its geographical placement, historical experience and power potential. Nehru told the Constituent Assembly of India on 8 March 1949

the emergence of India in world affairs is something of a major consequence in world history ... it has been given to us at a time when India is growing into a great giant again.²⁸

Nehru's vision of India's role in the South Asian region envisaged very close and co-operative relations with its immediate neighbours on all vital matters. He had even contemplated a South Asian confederation of independent states with common defence and economic policies. While envisaging a central place for itself, India wanted Pakistan to be a friendly and co-operative member of this community as a sovereign and independent state. The underlying assumption of this foreign policy approach was that

India's natural place in the power-hierarchy of the sub-continent must be asserted by it and acknowledged by others, both within the region as well as outside, particularly by the great powers.²⁹

This was, however, at cross purposes with Pakistan's long-standing goal of achieving parity with India. Pakistan's foreign policy was shaped largely by the pre-partition Muslim League's psyche and ideology. The two nation theory had as its corollary an in-built assumption that after independence India and Pakistan would possess not only juridical equality but also equality in power terms and that this should be recognized by the world at large especially by the dominant powers.³⁰ The two nation theory was thus transformed into an independent Pakistan's drive to achieve and enjoy power-parity with India. To quote Keith Callard,

In large measures, Pakistan's feeling towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partition... Mr Jinnah had never agreed to any constitutional formula which would have denoted lesser status for the Muslim League. India contained two nations. One sovereign nation is equal to any other sovereign nation... Many political leaders and most of the articulate section of the population have reacted with emotional intensity to any suggestion of Indian superiority in any field.³¹

Since the existing power balance in the subcontinent was in India's favour, it wanted to preserve and protect the *status quo*. Pakistan, on the other hand, was as keen to disturb and change it by seeking diplomatic and

²⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After*, New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Publications Division, 1949, p. 232.

²⁹ Muni, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

³⁰ *ibid.*.

³¹ Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, London: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957, p. 304.

military succour from abroad in order to counter-balance India. New Delhi, in turn, viewed such attempts as a contravention of the 'natural' balance of power in the region and accused Pakistan of bringing the cold war to South Asia by joining the military alliances.

To recapitulate, Pakistani leaders considered an acceptance of a lower status *vis-à-vis* India in terms of the subcontinental balance of power as the very negation of Pakistan's independent existence. This constituted a source of threat and insecurity to them. The Indian leaders, on the other hand, viewed any disturbance of the regional power hierarchy by way of Pakistan's alliance with the Western bloc and later with China as a danger to the peace, security and stability of the subcontinent. The question of status-incongruence, thus, became a source of contention between the two countries.

At the same time, however, the geo-political realities emanating from their location and contiguous borders were driving the two countries to learn to live with each other. How then, did the Indian and Pakistani leaders attempt to allay their mutual fears, mitigate the mistrust and seek cooperation and on defence and security issues at that ?

3.3 India and Pakistan's Efforts at Bilateral Cooperation

Despite their conflicting positions on various issues, the political leadership in both India and Pakistan fully realized and appreciated the need for resolving their differences and made numerous efforts in this direction. Nehru articulated this perception in a speech made at The Indian Council of World Affairs in March 1949.

There is no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relations sometime or in the future. I can not state when will this take place but *situated as we are* with all our past, we can not be just indifferent neighbours ... Ultimately we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between because our interests are so closely inter-linked.³²

3.3.1 India's Proposal of a No War Declaration

In the early years of independence the two countries clashed on Kashmir and the continuing communal riots in East and West Bengal in 1949 had precipitated fears of another military confrontation. Against this backdrop of Pakistan's fears of a military attack from India, Nehru proposed a No War

³² Nehru, *op.cit.*, pp. 252-253.(italics added)

Declaration in December 1949.³³ Later on 6 February 1950, Nehru declared in a press conference,

We have offered Pakistan a joint declaration for the avoidance of war. I am prepared to say that whether Pakistan agrees to that declaration or not, we will not have an aggressive war. We will not have a war unless we are attacked.³⁴

Over a period of the next ten months (from January to November 1950 with an interval in March when the two countries were on the brink of war), the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan discussed the proposition of a No War declaration along with other proposals for allaying fears and mitigating mistrust between the two countries. Both agreed that all bilateral disputes should be settled peacefully but they differed on the definition of the 'peaceful means'. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru believed that a simple declaration that the two countries will not go to war was enough. Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, however, insisted that if they fail to resolve major disputes bilaterally they must accept arbitration and this was totally unacceptable to Nehru.³⁵ It is interesting to note that since then this proposal has been resurrected time and again by both sides. On the Indian side, it was renewed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1956, General Cariappa the former Chief of Army Staff in 1959, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1965, Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1969 and Prime Minister Desai in 1977.³⁶ On the Pakistani side it was first put forward by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali in 1956 and President Ayub Khan and President Yahya Khan in the General Assembly in December 1965 and October 1970 respectively.³⁷ Although their differences on the pre-conditions and the principle of arbitration resulted in its failure, the entire negotiating process of No War proposal indicates that both sides were making attempts to mitigate their mutual distrust and suspicion.

3.3.2 Pakistan's Offer of Joint Defence

At a higher level of co-operation we have already mentioned Nehru's vision of a confederation with a common defence policy. It may be noted that although the Pakistani leaders had rejected the idea of a

³³ Some scholars suggest that the proposal of No War declaration was first mooted in November 1949 when Shri Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of Ministry of External Affairs in India offered such a declaration to M. Ismail, the incumbent Pakistan's High Commissioner to India. Saxsena, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

³⁴ Nehru, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

³⁵ See Burke for the text of Indian and Pakistani drafts of the proposal. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 49. Apparently Nehru had come close to accepting a tribunal of two judges from India and Pakistan each for the settlement of canal waters dispute and evacuees property and offered that he was prepared to "extend the principle to any justifiable issue" in a letter to Liaquat dated 8 October 1950. But Liaquat rejected it on the grounds that such a tribunal will be hopelessly deadlocked (in a letter dated 21 November 1950). See, *India's Threat to Pakistan, Correspondence Between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India (15 July 1950-11 August 1951)*, Karachi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, 1951, p. 27.

³⁶ Makeig, *op.cit.*, p. 287.

³⁷ Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 51. It may be added that General Zia was to revive this debate by offering a No War Pact in 1981. This shall be taken up for further discussion in Chapter Seven.

confederation they shared Nehru's views on a common defence. Jinnah had envisaged a 'Monroe doctrine of India and Pakistan for the subcontinent's defence against the outsiders as early as in 1944.³⁸ Later he reiterated that

The Muslim India will guard so far as the frontier is concerned and I hope that the Hindus will guard so far as the South and Western India is concerned. (Cheers) We join together as good friends and neighbours and say to the world, 'hands off India'.³⁹

Subsequently the proposal of a joint defence scheme was repeated by many Pakistani leaders including the Governor-General Nazimuddin in April 1949, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra in April 1953, and Foreign Minister Feroz Khan Noon in September 1957 before President Ayub Khan proposed it formally in view of the Chinese threat to India's northern borders.⁴⁰ Ayub said

I, as a military man can foresee one danger and if we go on squabbling in this way and do not resolve our problems, we shall be defeated in detail. History tells us that is how invasions had always come to the subcontinent ...Wisdom demanded [that] India and Pakistan should begin to realize their positions could be defended only if they were united.⁴¹

Ayub's proposal received support in some sections of Indian public opinion,⁴² But Nehru rejected it as inappropriate on the grounds that the two countries did not share a common perception of external threats. He argued that India's policy of non-alignment prevented it from co-ordinating defence arrangements with a country bound by military alliance obligations to the US.

3.4 Accession of States and Kashmir Conflict

The accession of princely states to India or Pakistan after the transfer of power had proved to be the most thorny issue. By 15 August 1947 every one of the 600 princely states with the three exceptions of Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir had acceded to either India or Pakistan. Junagarh and Hyderabad were Hindu-majority states with Muslim rulers and Kashmir was a Muslim-majority state with a Hindu ruler. India integrated both Junagarh and Hyderabad in the teeth of opposition from Pakistan.⁴³ The latter failed to do

³⁸ See his speeches on 14 October 1944 and again on 15 November 1946, in Jamil-ul-din Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 225,474.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 234.

⁴⁰ Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-56; Saxena, *op.cit.*, p. 26; and Gupta, *op.cit.*, p. 258.

⁴¹ As quoted in Burke, *ibid.*, p. 233. Ayub's joint defence proposal indicates that it was a plan for disentanglement of Indian and Pakistani armies from the cease-fire line in Kashmir and their deployment in other border areas where they were needed. And it envisaged a common plan for any attack against the subcontinent. G.W. Choudhary, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, New York: Free Press, 1975, pp. 253-254.

⁴² Indian leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan, Rajagopalcharya and M.R. Masani had supported Ayub's proposal.

⁴³ Although Junagarh had acceded to Pakistan on 15 August 1947, the Indian forces had moved in after an initial blockade and occupied Junagarh. Hyderabad had always showed an inclination to remain independent and before it could actually accede to Pakistan, India had launched a police operation on 13 September 1948 and forced it to join the Indian Union.

anything in either case partly due to the very location of these states in the Indian heartland and partly because of the effectiveness of Indian moves. Since the Kashmir issue had certain similarities with Hyderabad and Junagarh. Pakistan believed that its claim on Kashmir was legitimate and natural because of its predominantly Muslim population.

Whether India or Pakistan resorted to the direct or indirect coercion of Kashmir in seeking its accession in their favour, and if so, at what point of time, are very much debatable issues. It is not our task to make a detailed inquiry into the events surrounding the accession of Kashmir and examine each side's role in this regard both for lack of space and relevance in the context of our argument. The point one is trying to make here is that partly due to the mutual distrust and suspicion colouring their thinking and partly because of their perceived national interests - strategic, political and economic - both developed very high stakes in the future of Kashmir. At the same time the two countries made several attempts to resolve the Kashmir conflict both through bilateral negotiations and the mediatory efforts by the UN as well as third countries.

3.4.1 Pakistan's Stakes in Kashmir

Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan explained its position on Kashmir

Geographically, economically, culturally and religiously, Kashmir is a part of Pakistan. The overwhelming Muslim character of its population, its strategic position in relation to Pakistan, the flow of its rivers, the direction of its roads, the channels of its trade, the continual and intimate association which binds it to the people of Pakistan from times immemorial link Kashmir indissolubly with Pakistan.⁴⁴

Strategically Kashmir's acquisition would enhance Pakistan's international status particularly as a leader of the Islamic countries in a great pan-Islamic association and a power-centre in the West Asian region. Kashmir was also important for its security against India in strategic and economic terms. Most significantly, its accession would impart a sense of completeness to Pakistan and lend a fuller meaning to Pakistani nationalism which aspired to become the 'homeland' for all the Indian Muslims. Bhutto's statement is revealing in this respect

If a Muslim-majority area can remain a part of India, then the *raison d'être* of Pakistan collapses ... Pakistan is 'incomplete' without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically. Recovering them she should recover her head and be made whole, stronger and more viable.⁴⁵

3.4.2 India's Stakes in Kashmir

⁴⁴ As quoted in Gupta, *ibid.*, p. 441.

⁴⁵ Bhutto, *op.cit.*, p. 180.

For India Kashmir's accession was an important gain in her pursuit of a strong and unified secular state. Indian leaders always held that it would be a fatal mistake to use religion as the only basis for nation-building. This had dangerous implications not only for the welfare of other religious minorities in India but would destroy the very basis of the state structure built on the principle of secularism. Moreover, Congress genuinely believed that under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership state politics in Kashmir had become secular. India's strategic and economic interests in Kashmir were briefly summed up by Nehru

We were of course, vitally interested in the decision the state would take. Kashmir because of her geographical position, with her frontiers marching into three countries, namely, Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also, Kashmir is intimately related with India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through Kashmir state.⁴⁶

The importance of Kashmir for India's security against its northern borders with China was also highlighted in the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. All this gave rise to an interplay of various factors at internal, bilateral and extra-regional level which accentuated the Kashmir conflict or facilitated the negotiating process on this issue.

3.4.3 The United Nations Mediatory Efforts

After initial bilateral negotiations on Kashmir in November-December 1947, the issue was taken to the United Nations in January 1948 by both India and Pakistan although with differing objectives.⁴⁷ The UN mediatory efforts lasted for good five years from 1948 to 1952 but only succeeded in securing a cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 while an understanding on specific issues such as withdrawal of forces and preliminary conditions of holding a plebiscite proved elusive.⁴⁸ The basic disagreement was on the nature of Kashmir's accession, Pakistan's role in the tribal invasion and modalities of holding a plebiscite. India held that Kashmir had legally acceded to India and, therefore, it alone had the moral right to hold a plebiscite to seek the verdict of people and Pakistan had no *locus standi* in the matter except that of clearing the occupied areas of Kashmir of the tribal raiders and Azad Kashmir forces. Pakistan on the other hand, stressed the disputed character of the accession and insisted on a plebiscite under UN auspices because it doubted the impartiality of Sheikh Abdullah's administration as far as the conduct and outcome of the plebiscite was

⁴⁶ A speech by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947. As quoted in Gupta, *op.cit.*, p. 442.

⁴⁷ India brought the matter to the UN not to seek its assistance in a negotiated settlement but to complain about Pakistan's role in tribal invasion which in the Indian view amounted to an aggression. Pakistan lodged counter-complaints against India and asked the UN to consider whole set of problems afflicting India-Pakistan relations. Gupta, *op.cit.*, pp. 140-147.

⁴⁸ A detailed account of the UN negotiations may be found in Gupta, *ibid.*, pp. 140-253; Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-38; Lamb, *op.cit.*, pp. 164-179.

concerned.

3.4.4 Bilateral Negotiations

The issue was taken up for bilateral negotiations in June 1953 and the first two rounds of negotiations augured well with the adoption of a "much more co-operative and friendly" approach that "greatly helped [them] in understanding each other's position and therefore helped towards the solution".⁴⁹ Lamb reveals that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Ali Bogra discussed the idea of a "regional plebiscite" in August 1953.⁵⁰ Although Sheikh Abdullah government's dismissal in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1953 elicited an extremely hostile response from the Pakistani media,⁵¹ a better sense prevailed upon the two Prime Ministers and they affirmed their resolve to settle the Kashmir problem peacefully and agreed to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator for Kashmir.⁵²

Subsequently Nehru's apparently innocuous statement that instead of Admiral Nimitz, the US general, a new plebiscite administrator from a small nation should be appointed, created a big furore in Pakistan and threatened to undermine the new and positive spirit of earlier meetings. It may be argued that probably the real cause of the trouble was not Nehru's statement but Bogra's weak position both inside and outside his government in Pakistan⁵³ and despite his best intentions he perhaps simply did not have the power to deliver the goods when it came to improving relations with India.⁵⁴ Bogra declared publicly that

⁴⁹ Nehru's public statements on two occasions, in June and July 1953. As quoted in Gupta, *op.cit.*, pp. 260, 263.

⁵⁰ This meant that the plebiscite would be organized in such a way so as to ensure that as a result of the poll no large scale shifting of population takes place from one side to the other. Lamb states that by September 1953 Nehru had doubts about the desirability of this approach because it revived the Indian fear that any emphasis upon communal nature of the question, such as could all too easily result from the regional plebiscite, might give rise to Hindu-Muslim conflict within India itself. Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 226. But Gupta argues that it was Bogra who first mentioned "several difficulties" in holding regional plebiscites in a letter to Nehru dated 27 August 1953. Gupta, *ibid.*

⁵¹ It is interesting to note that it was the same Sheikh Abdullah who had always been characterized as a 'traitor' by the Pakistani press for having supported Kashmir's accession to India. But now that he was against the Indian government, it was their turn to argue that since Sheikh Abdullah was the voice of Kashmiri people and "his removal had cast a doubt on the moral validity of 1947 accession". Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 224.

⁵² It may be noted that this joint statement was interpreted differently in India and Pakistan. While for Pakistan the major gains were that the principle of a plebiscite had been accepted and a deadline fixed for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. From the Indian viewpoint the most significant result was that the UN had been eliminated from the picture and that the new plebiscite administrator would not be from a big power but a small nation. Gupta, *op.cit.*, pp. 270-271.

⁵³ Jalal points out that there was "considerable opposition in [Bogra's] cabinet itself which met seven times to muse over Bogra-Nehru proposals". Outside the government, too, neither the Governor-General nor the Prime Minister himself had much influence on the Muslim League. In addition, the President of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry Mr. M.A. Rangoonwala led the businessmen's choir against the Delhi proposals. Jalal, *op.cit.*, p. 182.

⁵⁴ Jalal discloses that Pakistan's main motive behind re-opening the dialogue on Kashmir with India was only to take care of prospective Indian reactions to its joining Middle Eastern defence pact which the army and Washington were planning at that time. And "it was on Washington's advice and army headquarters approval [that] Pakistan was [only] to have another chance [of] shooting at India across the negotiating table". Their reasoning being that "whatever the outcome Bogra would incur the blame not the army" suggests that failure of the talks was almost a foregone conclusion as far as military was concerned. Jalal, *ibid.*

there was no question of taking the Kashmir issue out of the Security Council and he had not agreed to the choice of the Plebiscite Administrator. Nehru responded by saying that these developments indicated that Prime Minister of Pakistan "does not yet feel fully strong enough to stand up to the clamant pressure of the extremist section even while trying to carry on the negotiations" was perhaps correct.⁵⁵

Before the two governments could regain any lost ground an interjection by an extra-regional actor in the form of the United States's military assistance to Pakistan dealt it the most grievous blow.⁵⁶ This drove a serious wedge between India and Pakistan with a disastrous effect on the climate which their leaders were trying to build. Nehru made it clear that this had completely changed the context of Kashmir issue. New Delhi formally approved the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly to accede to India and reiterated that the "accession was legally and constitutionally complete from India's point of view and no plebiscite was possible under altered circumstances".⁵⁷ Pakistan's Prime Minister Bogra conceded to Nehru in July 1954 that the India-Pakistan relations had reversed back "to the position where it stood before you and I took it up for the settlement".⁵⁸

Another round of negotiations that started at the end of 1954 at New Delhi with a new Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali were to meet the same fate. After the talks Mohammad Ali disclosed that the two Prime Ministers had discussed the proposal for acceptance of the cease-fire line as a temporary frontier and having rejected the old UN approach the task of ascertaining the wishes of people might take many forms such as a 'referendum' or 'election'. However the political situation in Pakistan being less stable than ever before,⁵⁹ on his return to Karachi, he had a stupendous task of facing a hostile media and other organized groups. Finally he succumbed to the pressure and declared that there was no question of withdrawing the issue from the UN and admitted that "no government could exist for more than twenty four hours in Pakistan if it agreed to a settlement of the Kashmir problem which would not satisfy the people of Pakistan".⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Gupta, *op.cit.*, p.274.

⁵⁶ Nehru was convinced that bringing cold war politics in the subcontinent would create insuperable complications in India-Pakistan relations and add to India's security problems. Gupta gives an excellent account of Nehru's views on this issue. *ibid.*, p. 228.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 281.

⁵⁸ As quoted in Saxsena, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

⁵⁹ It is important to note that once again Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, the chief architect of the new and a more positive approach regarding India-Pakistan relations at Karachi had to leave immediately after Delhi talks never to resume his duties again. Prime Minister Bogra also had to resign in August in practice leaving the political field in Pakistan. Gupta, *op.cit.*, pp. 290-291.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 292.

Pakistan's decision to join SEATO increased India's anxieties further and in March 1956 Nehru finally sealed the fate of the plebiscite on the grounds of the changed context in Kashmir.⁶¹ Subsequently he offered an acceptance of *status quo as fait accompli*. What Nehru meant was the recognition of the *de facto* frontier along cease-fire line as the *de jure* frontier between India and Pakistan in the sense that each would keep what it held and India would renounce her legal claim to the whole state. Pakistan accused India of not honouring its international commitments and that it would never even consider such a 'preposterous' proposal. The failure of bilateral talks took the Kashmir issue back to the Security Council in 1958 and again in 1962 when a Soviet veto frustrated the Security Council resolution on Kashmir.

After the Sino-Indian war in 1962 the USA and the UK made a low-key attempt to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. A joint statement by Ayub and Nehru to hold bilateral talks was followed by six rounds of talks held between the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Z.A. Bhutto during 1962-1963. The two sides submitted various proposals envisaging a partition of the state and despite their differences, as Lamb puts it "the discussion was more realistic to the extent that Pakistan seriously considered a solution to the problem other than the plebiscite and India for the first time proposed to transfer to Pakistan *any* land what it actually held in the disputed state".⁶² A detailed analysis of these proposals, however, showed that "the minimum demands of Pakistan remained far above of the maximum that India had ever thought of conceding."⁶³ Both sides admitted that no agreement could be reached.

Here one may take note briefly of the new extra-regional element that is China's role in the Indo-Pak equation. Although Nehru had rejected Ayub's joint defence proposal, he was beginning to appreciate the possibility and probably the need for a joint stance by India and Pakistan *vis-à-vis* China after the 1962 war. But the news of Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement on the eve of Ministerial level talks between Swaran Singh and Z.A. Bhutto at once removed that possibility. A last attempt to resolve the Kashmir issue was made by Nehru in April 1964 after Sheikh Abdullah's release. At Nehru's behest Sheikh Abdullah went to meet Pakistan's President Ayub in Pakistan in May 1964 and it was announced that the Prime Ministers of the two

⁶¹ For more details on this argument, see, Gupta, *ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

⁶² Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 239. India had proposed a partition of the state, military disengagement of the two countries' armies and an adoption of the No War declaration. In the Indian view the determination of the line of partition should depend on administrative, technical and other considerations of 'peace and welfare' of the Kashmiris. Pakistan, on the other hand, emphasized factors like composition of the population, strategic requirements, the origin of rivers and 'wishes' of the Kashmiris.

⁶³ Gupta gives an excellent account of these proposals. See, Gupta, *op.cit.*, p. 254.

countries would meet in Delhi in June to discuss Kashmir. However with Nehru's sudden death on 27 May 1964 the hopes of an early summit meeting and solution of Kashmir also receded.

Notwithstanding the fact that Kashmir continues to be the main disputed issue between India and Pakistan and the proposals on a No War Declaration and Joint Defence failed to become a reality, they do testify to the serious attempts made by the leaders of both India and Pakistan to try bringing the two countries together. It may be argued that while discord and conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be termed as unrealistic, what needs to be underlined here is that both have also made numerous efforts to reconcile their differences. A close examination and analysis of the sheer magnitude, consistency and regularity of Indo-Pak negotiations on wide-ranging issues at various levels, particularly the Prime Minister and Ministerial level meetings in the first two and half decades after independence, speaks volumes for itself.⁶⁴

3.5 Bilateral Agreements

A careful reading of bilateral relations for this period shows that their record of frequent clashes, oft-repeated accusations and disagreements on various issues has been matched equally by the statements of good intent emanating from the highest political authorities and a series of positive and concrete agreements between the two countries.⁶⁵ One may substantiate this argument by a brief review of some disputed issues in the first two decades of India-Pakistan relations.

3.5.1 The Nehru-Liaquat Pact on the Minorities

In the aftermath of the communal carnage and mass migration of Hindu and Muslim communities at the partition, the Indian and Pakistani leaders' first and foremost priority was to safeguard the lives and properties of the minorities in their countries. Notwithstanding their fundamentally divergent positions on this issue before the partition both Indian and Pakistani leaders displayed a remarkable maturity and joined hands to address this problem. The two Prime Ministers Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan undertook a joint tour of the riot-affected areas which was followed by an agreement at an Inter-Dominion conference at Calcutta on 20 April 1948.

A resumption of communal rioting and large scale migration in the eastern areas in January 1950, however, led to heated exchanges between the two countries. It was against this backdrop that the

⁶⁴ Saxena, *op.cit.*, Chapter Four.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

Nehru-Liaquat pact on the minorities question was signed in April 1950. The agreement promised to the minorities in both countries complete equality of citizenship, a full sense of security and equal opportunity irrespective of the religion. It faced stiff opposition especially in the West Bengal state of India but Nehru stoutly defended it and stood by it.⁶⁶

3.5.2 Bilateral Agreements on the Division of Assets, Armed Forces and Evacuee Property

The division of assets and armed forces was a formidable job especially considering that they had only 72 days to dismantle a government structure which had been built by the British over a hundred years. Moreover settling who was to get what, an uphill task even in normal times, took place against the backdrop of an unprecedented communal carnage and mutual distrust colouring their thinking. Yet the two countries made laborious efforts to resolve all such issues either by a reference to the tribunal set up by Lord Mountbatten on 12 August 1947 or through bilateral negotiations.

Regarding the cash balances in spite of the claims and counter-claims made by both sides applying different logic to divide them, the two had mutually agreed on their respective shares by December 1947. Subsequently in the wake of fighting in Kashmir, Sardar Patel threatened to link the implementation of the agreement with the settlement of the Kashmir issue. It is important to note that this dispute was resolved not by Pakistan or the tribunal's intervention but by Mahatma Gandhi who had started an indefinite fast to stop the communal rioting and insisted that first priority be given to Pakistan's share of cash balances. The Indian government complied immediately and the Reserve Bank of India was authorized to pay Pakistan Rs. 500 million. With regard to the immovable items like railways, post and telegraph, defence and industrial installations, government buildings and workshops it was agreed that each Dominion would assume control of the property within its territory after 15 August 1947 and the Indian government would make financial compensation for certain categories of stores and 'unique' institutions which could not be duplicated.⁶⁷

The division of the armed forces and ordinance stores proved to be an equally arduous task. Until the very end Mountbatten persisted in his efforts to get the two sides to accept some sort of a common defence arrangement. Therefore no detailed plans were prepared for the actual division and on the date of transfer of power the two armies were given operational instead of full administrative control over units located in their

⁶⁶ Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

⁶⁷ Jalal, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

territories. The task of dividing the surplus ordinance stores posed formidable problems because Pakistan had accused India of withholding its share of military supplies. The matter was referred to the Arbitral tribunal but circumstances compelled Auchinleck to resign before it could arrive at a decision. Subsequently the two sides started bilateral negotiations and arrived at an agreement in 1948.

A related problem of evacuee property arose because of mass scale migration across the newly created frontiers. Both India and Pakistan were faced with the dual problem of having to rehabilitate the millions of refugees who had poured in and take care of the innumerable houses and millions of acres of land vacated by the evacuees who had streamed out.⁶⁸ Once again the two governments made concerted efforts to arrive at a settlement and negotiated successfully a series of agreements between 1947 and 1950 fully resolving the problem.⁶⁹ Undoubtedly it was a remarkable achievement for both India and Pakistan in having arrived at a mutually acceptable agreement on all these tricky issues. Commenting on this Sardar Patel told the Indian Constituent Assembly on 12 December 1947,

Rarely indeed matters of such complexity have been solved [in] so reasonable a way between two independent and sovereign states. Both India and Pakistan may justly take pride in the achievements.⁷⁰

3.5.3 The Indus Water Treaty

The question of sharing waters of the Indus Basin rivers was a vital issue of contention between India and Pakistan. David. E. Lilenthal wrote

No army with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land as thoroughly as [West] Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keeps the fields and people of [West] Pakistan alive.⁷¹

The problem arose from the fact that an area which had been developed as a single irrigation system became divided along political and not economic lines between the two sovereign states. And its concrete manifestation came to the fore on 1 April 1948 when India cut off the supply of water to the canals in Pakistan.⁷² Although the immediate supply was resumed on 4 May 1948 as a result of an agreement which

⁶⁸ Approximately nine million Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India from Pakistan. According to the Government of India, the immovable property of the Hindus in West Pakistan was valued at Rs. 5000 crores and the Muslim property in India at Rs. 100 crores. As quoted in Saxsena, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

⁶⁹ For details of these agreements, see, *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, vol. 6, (1946-1948), no. 890, 24-31 January, pp. 9066-9067; 17-24 April 1948, p. 9226; vol. 7, (1949-1950), no. 942, 22-29 January 1949, p. 9755.

⁷⁰ *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, vol. 6, (1946-1948), no. 890, 23-31 January 1948, p. 9066.

⁷¹ As quoted in Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

⁷² In 1947 India had agreed to a standstill agreement on maintaining a *status quo* which had expired on 31 March 1948 without a new agreement having replaced it.

was arrived during at an Inter-Dominion conference held in New Delhi. The dispute surfaced again when Pakistan refused any diminution of its share of supplies from its eastern rivers as provided under that agreement on the grounds that Pakistan was forced to accept it under duress.⁷³ Meanwhile Eugene Black the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development offered its good offices for the solution of water problem which was accepted by both governments in 1952. There were numerous differences and disagreements on this issue which lingered on for nearly six years. Finally after a green signal from Nehru and Ayub following their meeting at the Palam airport in New Delhi on 1 September 1959, a tripartite conference gradually made its headway towards a settlement. The two leaders signed the Indus Water Treaty on 19 September 1960.⁷⁴ Pakistani President Ayub Khan described the treaty as an "event of great historic significance" and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke about the "psychological and emotional benefits" that lay in the fact that it promised to usher in a new beginning of harmonious relations between India and Pakistan.⁷⁵

3.5.4 Agreements on Boundary Demarcation

The Redcliffe award that demarcated the boundaries for partitioning India had left a number of gaps which subsequently became the cause for boundary disputes between the two countries. It is remarkable to note that except Kashmir all such disputes were resolved peacefully through mutual negotiations.⁷⁶ The two Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Feroz Khan Noon met in New Delhi in September 1958 and agreed on a settlement concerning most of the border areas in the eastern region. The agreement was subjected to severe criticism in India particularly in the West Bengal but Nehru stood by it. Although they could not resolve any disputes in the western region, they agreed to ask their Foreign Secretaries to submit further proposals in that respect. Subsequently the issue was taken up at the meetings between the two countries' Cabinet Ministers Mr. Swaran Singh and General K.M. Sheikh, held at Dacca and New Delhi in October 1959. They reached an agreement on all disputes on the eastern border⁷⁷ and at their second meeting held

⁷³ Saxena, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-61. Also see, Turfail Javed, "The World Bank and the Indus Basin Dispute: Background", *Pakistan Horizon*, no. 18, 1965, pp. 231-235.

⁷⁴ Apart from the Canal Water Treaty, two other agreements were signed - an International Financial agreement to create an Indus Basin Development Fund to finance the irrigation works in Pakistan and a \$90 million loan by the World Bank to Pakistan. The Treaty also set up an Indo-Pak Permanent Indus Commission composed of one nominee from each country with a provision for reference to a neutral expert or court of arbitration to resolve any differences.

⁷⁵ Saxena, *op.cit.*, pp. 64-65.

⁷⁶ The Rann of Kutch may be another exception which was the arena of a short war between India and Pakistan in April 1965.

⁷⁷ For the text of the agreement, see, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 5, October 1959, pp. 337-338.

in January 1960, all but one border questions relating the western border were resolved.⁷⁸

3.5.5 The Tashkent Agreement

The seeds of the 1965 conflict were sown partly in the Kashmir dispute and partly in the internal political processes and Pakistan's quest for matching India's power status in the region. Since 1963 the Indian government had been undertaking various measures to integrate the state of Jammu and Kashmir further into the Indian Union.⁷⁹ Nehru confirmed in a speech in the Lok Sabha in November 1963 that a gradual erosion of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution granting a special status to Kashmir was in progress. India's Kashmiri policy in the early 1960's was regarded by Pakistan as one of annexation and a section of Pakistan's ruling elite led by the Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto prepared a working paper to argue that if India was to be tackled at all, now was the time.

Bhutto strongly believed that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir was 'ripe for rebellion'.... and all it needed was to apply the right pressures and give the appropriate stimuli and Kashmiris would rise up *en masse* against their Indian overlords.⁸⁰

Bhutto was also convinced that "for present at least [there was a] relative superiority of the military forces of Pakistan in terms of quality and equipment [*vis-à-vis* India]"⁸¹ and that in view of western arms assistance to India since 1962 this might not continue to remain so for long. Moreover, China played a crucial role by supporting publicly the Pakistani position for a plebiscite on Kashmir. Pakistan's President Ayub Khan also went to Soviet Union in April 1965 in a bid to normalize their relations and to undermine the Soviet special relations with India.⁸²

The initial fighting between India and Pakistan had broken out on the disputed Rann of Kutch border in April 1965. But the Kutch affair was probably only a "reconnaissance in force by both sides, each trying to feel the other's weaknesses".⁸³ The two accepted mediation by the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and signed an agreement on 30 June bringing an end to the Kutch crisis. The actual war broke out on 1

⁷⁸ For the text of the agreement, see, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 6, January 1960, pp. 15-16.

⁷⁹ For details of these measures, see, Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 319; and Lamb, *op.cit.*, pp. 247, 251.

⁸⁰ Bhutto regarded the communal disturbances in the Kashmir valley arising from the incident of disappearance of the Moe-i-Muqaddas Relic from the Hazratdal shrine as sufficient evidence that people were ready to rise in a revolt against the Indian government. The stimuli was to be the armed infiltrators to be sent across the cease-fire line who would provide inspiration as well as a professional nucleus for a general Kashmiri uprising. This would perhaps be later supported by the intervention of the armed forces of Pakistan. See Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 319 and Lamb, *op.cit.*, pp. 248-253, 258-259.

⁸¹ Muni, *op.cit.*, p. 54.

⁸² Choudhary argues that the purpose of this visit was to persuade the Russians to take a more neutral position in India-Pakistan affairs. Choudhary, *op.cit.*, p. 278.

⁸³ Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 256. Also see, Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: India-Pakistan Conflicts Since 1947*, London: Westview Press, 1986, p. 82.

September although Pakistani infiltration had started as early as the winter of 1964-65.⁸⁴ The war ended in a stalemate. The international community was unanimous in demanding peace in the subcontinent since the US, Soviet Union and the UK stood to gain nothing from an armed conflict in the region at that time.⁸⁵ The only exception was China which fully backed Pakistan from the outset through public pronouncements on Kashmir, arms supplies and its demands that India dismantle its military installations on the Sikkim frontier.

The Soviets offered to mediate and the two parties met at Tashkent in January 1966. The Tashkent declaration was not a peace treaty since it did not resolve the Kashmir issue but proposed it to be put on the back burner while other more urgent problems were being solved. The war had demonstrated in many ways the risk of allowing Indo-Pak relations to deteriorate beyond a certain limit and the need to maintain a measure of stability in their relations. Ayub and Shastri agreed to return their forces to *ante bellum* positions, observe the cease-fire, make efforts to reduce the hostile propaganda and restore trade and cultural relations. They also reaffirmed "their obligation under the UN charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means".⁸⁶

To recapitulate, the discussion in the preceding section has attempted to give a more balanced picture of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Their generally conflictual relationship interspersed with three wars has been somewhat matched by their regular and consistent attempts to reconcile their differences peacefully and a number of positive agreements successfully resolving many issues of dispute between them.

3.6 The Role of Extra-Regional Powers

The extra-regional powers have played a decisive role in shaping the conflictual course of subcontinental politics particularly during the cold war era. The impact of the cold war between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union and their first detente in the 1960's on India-Pakistan relations in the South Asian region bears examination as does the role of China.

3.6.1 Cold War Linkages: The US-Pak Alliance and the Indo-Soviet Links

Soon after independence the US sought India's co-operation in its military and strategic moves

⁸⁴ Lamb writes that the first infiltrators or mujahideen began to cross the cease-fire line in very small, experimental numbers during the winter of 1964-65. The tempo of infiltration increased during the first half of 1965 to reach a climax in July and August. *ibid.*, p. 259.

⁸⁵ The US feared that the result could be an increasing alignment of Pakistan and China which would give a serious blow to CENTO and the SEATO alliances. Likewise, the Soviet Union had no wish to see an increase in the Chinese strength in the subcontinent. The British were also much perturbed at the outbreak of war between the two Commonwealth countries.

⁸⁶ For more details of this agreement, see, Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 271; and Ganguly, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-92.

against the communist threat. But this did not hold much appeal for Nehru since he believed that colonialism and not communism was the primary concern of newly independent countries. More significantly, the US and India differed in "their respective perspectives on Asia and India's place in the new emerging order India wanted to be an active actor and not a passive follower in the central strategic balance and in the new co-relations of global forces that were emerging in the post Second World War era".⁸⁷ Nehru rejected totally the rationale and basis of military blocs and alliances and opted for a policy of non-alignment.

The US chose Pakistan as its ally since the latter was willing to play the US game in its plan against the communism and in the Middle Eastern defence organization. This is, however, not to diminish the importance of the fact that Pakistani rulers too had been wooing the US both for financial assistance to stabilize the internal political situation and in its search for modern arms and external military ties to counter-balance India right from its inception.⁸⁸ Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had broached the idea of a territorial guarantee by the US in June 1949 but it was the military-bureaucratic elite which had its highest stakes in a partnership with the US. Having closely monitored Pakistan's domestic political scene for a few years the US, too, had decided that its only hope in Pakistan was the army⁸⁹ and the two developed a close relationship.

Meanwhile a convergence of India and Soviet interests were coming to the fore because India's desire to play a major role in the new and resurgent Asia suited the Soviet Union's objectives in the region.⁹⁰ These linkages remained fairly consistent until China, a third actor, intervened in the Sino-Indian war in 1962 resulting in India's humiliating military defeat. It also happened at a time when Sino-Soviet rivalry was brewing and superpower detente was looming on the horizon. Let us, therefore, examine the impact of superpowers detente and China's role in the subcontinent politics, in particular, on Indo-Pak relations.

3.6.2 The Impact of China's Intervention and the Superpowers Detente

India's military defeat had heightened the Western powers concern about the Chinese threat to South

⁸⁷ Muni, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

⁸⁸ Jalal points out that Pakistan's representative in Washington had asserted as early as in October 1947 that "the government of Pakistan ... must naturally wish to line up its external and defence policy with the US". See, Jalal, *op.cit.*, p. 55.

⁸⁹ Jalal discloses that in July 1951 a US State Department policy brief had stated explicitly that "the kingpin of the US interests in Pakistan was its army". Jalal, *ibid.*, p. 181. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, was particularly delighted at the prospects of Pakistan's army helping to raise a security umbrella against communism in the Middle East and South-East Asia. It may be noted that it was the Pakistan's Army Chief General Ayub Khan who had negotiated the military package with the US authorities with a firm backing from Iskandar Mirza and Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor-General. For an excellent account of the development of this nexus, see chapter three and four in Jalal.

⁹⁰ Muni, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

Asia, hence, they started bolstering the Indian defences to meet this new challenge. The Soviet Union also found it desirable to woo both India and Pakistan simultaneously in order to keep Pakistan away from and India safe from China. The relaxation of superpower tensions at the global level and the emergence of a new and what was considered to be an aggressive great power in the vicinity of South Asia blurred the initially established linkages between the superpowers and the regional contestants. As a result both superpowers made efforts to bring about a rapprochement between India and Pakistan.⁹¹

But Pakistan's disillusionment with the US which had started taking place in the late 1950's was becoming more pronounced in the 1960's.⁹² Pakistan was most unhappy with the US's growing support to India since it meant that the latter had once again become the centre of attraction and was getting arms from both the USA and Soviet Union. This was clearly reflected in Ayub's statement

The US policy in this part of the world has changed in a fashion that has imperilled our security ...I know the US had its commitments and I do not blame the Americans in a sense for the global attitude, but arming India does not make a sense to me and I feel very strongly about that ...China is not going to attack India ...India will use these American weapons against smaller nations and continue try to intimidate us as she has for the past seventeen years.⁹³

Partly owing to the US policy's shift towards South Asia and partly because of a pro-China Z.A. Bhutto's entry into Ayub's cabinet as the Foreign Minister, Pakistan turned towards China. Ayub had cautioned even before the Sino-Indian war in 1962 that if India became too powerful for her smaller neighbours, they would have to seek China's protection.⁹⁴ China also started cultivating Pakistan in the wake of the intensification of Sino-Indian tensions.⁹⁵ Thus, while China wanted to win over Pakistan, the latter too was looking for a new protector to replace the US. This relationship was further strengthened with a convergence of the US-Soviet interests in the subcontinent in favour of India. Both China and Pakistan

⁹¹ It may be recalled that it was after the Sino-Indian war in 1962 that the US and the UK tried to mediate between India and Pakistan and impressed upon Nehru the need to arrive at a settlement with Pakistan on Kashmir. Subsequently the Soviet Union mediated between the two countries after the 1965 conflict at the Tashkent summit.

⁹² Burke argues that from 1957 onwards, Pakistani leaders were beginning to question the quantum of the US aid to India which was much more than to Pakistan and, more importantly, free of any conditions which was not the case of Pakistan. Moreover Indo-US relations were also showing signs of improvement after Nehru's visit to Washington in the wake of the Suez crisis. Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 257-258.

⁹³ As quoted in Muni, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

⁹⁴ In fact Pakistan's overtures to China go back to the early 1950's. When Pakistan signed the two pacts of SEATO and CENTO ostensibly to contain communism, its Prime Minister had personally explained to Chou En Lai in April 1953 that Pakistan was not against China and if the US took any aggressive action against China under the military pacts Pakistan would not be involved. Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 180, 269.

⁹⁵ There were important border differences between China and Pakistan. Although China had been dragging its feet on the border settlement it suddenly decided to start negotiations on 12 October 1962, one week before a large scale attack on India, and after escalation of fighting moved quickly towards a quick agreement.

resented this and wanted to halt if not reverse this direction of developments. This mutuality of interests was a vital factor in the Indo-Pak conflict in 1965. Bhutto's statement in June 1953 was revealing in this respect

An attack by India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest Asian state [China].⁹⁶

The Sino-Pak equation has been fairly consistent ever since. The only friction between the two, if at all, occurred during the 1965 conflict itself. China strongly disapproved of the Kutch cease-fire accord between India and Pakistan and later condemned the Tashkent accord as a manifestation of US-Soviet-Indian collusion against China. Pakistan's acceptance of Soviet mediation was naturally not liked by China.

This situation was radically altered by the dramatic development of Sino-American rapprochement in 1971. Although this occurred perhaps independent of developments in South Asia, its singular effect on the region was a restoration of the initial linkages between the superpowers and regional actors with China weighing on the side of the US and Pakistan. The major consequences of this shift were the Indo-Soviet Treaty and the subsequent emergence of Bangladesh following the India-Pakistan war in 1971.⁹⁷

4 Conclusion

To recapitulate, the history of India-Pakistan relations may be characterized as a classic example of a protracted conflict where a conflict situation persists over a long duration of time and spills over into all aspects of their relations. But at the same time in the case of India and Pakistan, their conflictual past has been interspersed with numerous attempts made by both countries to reconcile their differences and various bilateral agreements resolving several disputes. One may draw several conclusions from the foregoing discussion. First, the conflict between the two countries operates at three levels of interaction - domestic, bilateral and multilateral - so any exercise in conflict resolution or confidence building must also take account of all these factors and operate accordingly. Secondly, often the serious and rather well-meant efforts by the policy-makers to resolve their differences peacefully at a bilateral level have been obstructed or failed due to domestic pressures or involvement of an extra-regional power. Thirdly, if and when a rapprochement between India and Pakistan has suited the interests of the superpowers, they have made efforts to further it.

Having discussed and analysed the factors and forces at the domestic bilateral and extra-regional level that

⁹⁶ Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 289.

⁹⁷ This shall be taken up for further discussion in Chapter Seven.

have shaped the course of India-Pakistan relations in the past, our next task is to examine the role of the policy makers who decide their respective countries' foreign policies, especially the confidence building efforts towards each other.

CHAPTER V: THE INDIAN POLITICAL MILIEU

The fundamental objective of a confidence building exercise is to win the hearts and minds of the other country's policy and opinion making elites, a task which would vary according to the make-up of its political milieu. While the political structure of a state and dynamics of its domestic politics outline the parameters within which a confidence building process operates, an analysis of the nature and composition of its ruling elites may provide us with some valuable insights into the dispositional variables which often play a critical role in this process. More specifically, an understanding of the parties involved in the confidence building process may help us to understand the relative weight of individuals and factors within the policy-making system whose arguments, objections and interests count in the way problems are being defined and issues debated in either country. It is, therefore, important to understand the character of both the policy making bodies and specific policy makers in terms of their "sources of legitimacy, capacities for decision and action, leaders' ability to marshal and wield power, intentions and senses of identity".¹

With regard to India and Pakistan, we shall examine their institutional power structures in terms of the civil-military relations and the relationship between representative institutions such as Parliament and political parties and non-representative institutions like the military and bureaucracy on the civilian side. The implications of this relationship for the confidence building process between the two countries will be analysed. Within these political structures an attempt shall be made to examine the nature and role of policy making and opinion making elites involved in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

This chapter will focus on India and examine Parliament's role in foreign policy making both in theory and practice, particularly with regard to Pakistan. There follows a discussion of the leading political parties' ideologies and foreign policy perspectives and their implications for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. Then the role of Indian foreign policy bureaucracy in this respect will be examined before turning to civil-military relations in terms of the military's role in shaping the country's external and internal security policies. Finally, we would examine the factor of Indian Muslims in bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.

The hallmark of the Indian political system is its relatively well-established democratic traditions and a parliamentary system of government. The key characteristics of its institutional power structure include a civilian supremacy over the military and an important but not independent role for the bureaucracy with

¹ Harold H. Saunders, "International Relationships - It's Time We Go Beyond "We" and "They", *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1987, p. 259.

ultimate power resting in Parliament.

1 Parliament's Role in Foreign Policy Making

The supremacy of the Parliament in all matters is the cornerstone of the Indian political system. What then is the role of the Indian Parliament in shaping the country's foreign policy especially towards Pakistan ?

1.1 Constitutional Provisions

Parliament exercises its control through parliamentary debates which provide an opportunity for both the government and opposition leaders to explain their policy positions in public.² There are special standing investigative committees notably the Estimates Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings and the Consultative Committees for the Ministries of External Affairs, Defence, and Home Affairs where the opposition is able to influence the government's policies more directly and substantially than during the general debate in the Parliament³ However, an important feature of this system is that although Parliament is supreme, for the most part it exercises control *ex post facto*. In other words, Parliament reigns but does not rule.

1.2 The Working Practices of Parliament

A close examination of some motions discussed in Parliament over the past two decades reveals that the government's policies towards Pakistan have always been a subject of special interest and deliberation for members of the House. For instance, issues such as Kashmir,⁴ the No War Pact,⁵ troop build-ups on the borders,⁶ India and Pakistan's nuclear programme,⁷ and domestic issues such as the communal problem and

² The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution under Art 246, vests exclusive legislative jurisdiction over all aspects of defence, foreign affairs and the security of India in the Union Parliament. *The Constitution of India*, List I, Union Government, Seventh Schedule. For more details of the constitutional powers of the Parliament to legislate over external and internal security policies, see, A. Appadorai, *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy 1947-1972*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 64-68, and Raju. G.C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 97-105. Also see, Judithern Brown, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making and the Indian Parliament", *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2, April-June 1969, pp. 15-72; S.D. Muni, "Parliament and Foreign Policy in India", *Indian Journal of Politics*, vol. 10, pp. 1, 1976, pp. 48-60; and P. Ramam, "Policy-Making and Parliamentary Accountability With Particular Reference to India's Foreign Policy", *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, January-March 1975, pp. 73-78.

³ However there are limitations on the influence of these Committees. According to the Guidelines formulated in 1969, "the deliberation of these committees would remain informal and no reference to the discussions held in the meeting thereof would be made on the floor of the House". Moreover with regard to issues concerning security, defence, external affairs and atomic energy, the government is not bound to accept even a unanimous or majority recommendation of the committee, though it is expected to provide reasons for the rejection. Thomas, *ibid.*, pp. 94-96. Also see, S.R Maheshwari, "Informal Consultative Committees of Parliament", *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, January-March 1968, pp. 27-53.

⁴ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 14 November 1972, cols. 140-162; vol. CLIII, no. 3, 14 March 1990, cols. 341-413; vol. CLIII, no. 4, 15 March 1990, cols. 190-275; vol. CLIII, no. 12, 27 March 1990, pp. 354-418. Also, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th Series, vol. XXIV, no. 5, 25 February 1982, cols. 290-311; 9th Series, vol. II, no. 9, 22 March 1990, cols. 391-413.

⁵ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CXXI, no. 24, 24 March 1982, cols. 171-227.

⁶ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. LXXXIX, no. 1, 22 July 1974, pp. 126-189; vol. CIX, no. 3, 26 April 1979, cols. 101-124; vol. CXXX, no. 12, 8 May 1984, cols. 270-322. Also, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9th Series, vol. 6, no. 43, 17 May 1990, cols. 537-571.

⁷ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 31 July 1978, cols. 134-153; vol CXVI, no. 19, 12 December 1980, cols. 156-184, vol. CXXX, no. 12, 8 May 1984, cols. 270-322.



situation in Punjab and Kashmir with implications for relations with Pakistan have regularly been on the agenda of the House. Parliament's role in foreign policy making actually depends on the political climate and the strength and ideology of the leading political parties involved. Let us, therefore, examine Parliament's working in influencing the country's foreign policy under Congress and non-Congress governments over past four decades.

1.3 Congress Governments (1947-1977)

Under Congress's rule, the major foreign policy initiatives have consistently emanated from the Prime Minister, his advisors, or the senior civil servants. This took root during Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's government in the first decade after independence since almost single-handedly he designed India's foreign policy. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, too, masterminded most of the foreign policy initiatives during her regime especially concerning Pakistan. For instance, her handling of the Bangladesh crisis, the decision to conduct a nuclear explosion in 1974 and subsequently the Indian proposal of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Pakistan and the idea of establishing an Indo-Pak Joint Commission were largely of her own making.

Further, since Nehru's days, a broad consensus exists among all political parties over the main contours of the country's foreign policy and the opposition's ability to influence the government in this regard has been rather limited.⁸ The following comments by a member of Parliament put it very aptly,

None of us in this country have any quarrel ... on that [the principles of foreign policy]. Where we try to make suggestions even to criticize the foreign policy of the government, particularly the policies as enunciated by the Prime Minister, it is only with a view to emphasize certain aspects of our national needs which seem to have been forgotten in respect of the pursuit of foreign policy towards a country, A, B, or C.⁹

But Parliament's near consensual approach towards India's Pakistan policy was probably observed only until 1971-72 over the handling of the Bangladesh crisis, the military victory over Pakistan and the subsequent Simla agreement. All political parties except Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) shared the consensus on the fundamental objectives of India's policy towards Pakistan in terms of establishing friendly, harmonious and good neighbourly relations. Patagundi states

all parties [were] broadly in agreement ... on the objective of Simla agreement ... durable peace, but there were disagreements on the means [to achieve this objective].¹⁰

Some differences between the government and opposition were, however, already beginning to rear their

⁸ For a discussion of the one-party dominant model of India's party system and its implications for Parliament's influence and control over foreign policy making, see, S.S. Patagundi, *Political Parties, Party System and Foreign Policy of India*, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publishers, 1987, Chapter Two. and Thomas, *op.cit.*, pp. 92-94.

⁹ As quoted in Appodorai, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁰ S.S.Patagundi, *op.cit.*, p. 147.

head. For instance, all political parties except the Communist Party (CPI) objected that Mrs. Gandhi did not consult them before going to the Simla Conference. The Jana Sangh criticized the Simla agreement strongly for not having settled the Kashmir dispute once and for all.¹¹

1.4 The Janata Government's Rule (1977-1979)

The Janata government claimed to have made major changes in India's defence and foreign policy.¹² However, as Raju Thomas points out, the government's policy towards Pakistan only involved "a faster pace of normalization rather than any major change of direction".¹³ During Janata's rule the government also faced a strong opposition from the Congress party which at times even succeeded in compelling the Prime Minister to change his policy stance on certain crucial issues. For instance, in the case of India's nuclear policy, Prime Minister Morarji Desai had declared on 11 June 1978 that India would not engage in nuclear testing for military or peaceful purposes even if others did so.¹⁴ He came under strong attack both from Congress and his own party members and retracted his statement in July saying that nuclear testing for peaceful purposes was not excluded. Three days later, in yet another reversal, Desai reiterated that nuclear testing would not take place under his government even for peaceful purposes but he admitted that he could not bind his successors to this policy.¹⁵

1.5 The Congress Government's Second Regime (1980-1987)

Mrs. Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980 was marked by an intensified debate in and out of Parliament over India's policy towards Pakistan in the light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The opposition was divided on this issue. While the Bharatiya Janata Party (earlier the Jana Sangh) leaders like Subramanian Swamy and A.B. Vajpayee called for a common Pak-India-China strategy to meet the new

¹¹ See, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Presidential address by A.B. Vajpayee, Bhagalpur, 5-7 May 1972, p. 7; *Simla Surrender*, New Delhi, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, n.d., p. 1. Later the Jana Sangh's Central Working Committee (CWS) argued that the Simla agreement should be abandoned because Pakistan was not keeping its side of the bargain on the principle of bilateralism. Also see, *Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Resolutions, Central Working Committee*, Jaipur, 18-19 November 1972, p. 9.

¹² This included Janata's declaration of "genuine non-alignment", criticism of the earlier take-over of Sikkim by the Congress government, an expressed willingness to accept the *status quo* along the Sino-Indian border, greater efforts to reconcile relations with Pakistan and hesitant efforts to abandon India's nuclear option. For a detailed account of Janata's foreign policy particularly towards Pakistan, see, M.S. Rajan, "India's Foreign Policy: Problems and Perspectives", and S.C. Gangal, "Trends in India's Foreign Policy", in K.P. Mishra, ed., *Janata's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1979; A.B. Vajpayee, *New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Vision Books, 1979. Also see, A.G. Noorani, "Foreign Policy of the Janata Party Government", *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, March-April 1978, pp. 216-228.

¹³ Raju G.C. Thomas, "Indian Defence Policy: Continuity and Change Under the Janata Government", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 53, no. 2, Summer 1980, pp. 234.

¹⁴ *Lok Sabha Debates*, 6th Series, vol. XIII, no. 39, 18 April 1978, cols. 304-398.

¹⁵ The fluctuating statements by Prime Minister Morarji Desai on India's nuclear policy are reported in *Hindu*, 12 June 1978, *The Statesman*, 18 June 1978 and *Times of India*, 27 July 1978. The whole issue was debated in the Parliament on 31 July 1978. See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 31 July 1978, cols. 134-168.

Soviet threat,¹⁶ opposition parties such as the Janata-S (Socialist), the CPI, the CPM (Communist Party-Marxist) and the Congress-U did not endorse these proposals. Chandrajit Yadav of the Janata-S expressed fears that China and Pakistan were about to forge an alliance with the USA to the detriment of India.¹⁷

The Congress party responded by sending two delegations led by Foreign Secretary Sathe and the Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh to Pakistan in an attempt to evolve a common strategy in view of the situation in Afghanistan but at the same time accused the opposition of "pleading the American position in the regional situation ... by rapidly closing ranks among India, China and Pakistan".¹⁸ The government took the stand that Pakistan could not be heavily armed to fight the Soviet Union due to their apprehension that whenever Pakistan was armed it led to the destabilization of the regional balance of power.¹⁹

Subsequently from 1981 to 1984, the parliamentary debates were marked by the growing scepticism of the opposition about Mrs. Gandhi's claim that the danger of war loomed over the subcontinent. Most opposition leaders felt that the external threats to India, especially from Pakistan, were being exaggerated by the government in order to distract attention from its domestic problems.²⁰ The leaders of the Janata party and CPM criticized the government for its failure to improve relations with Pakistan.²¹ During Rajiv Gandhi's tenure, Congress enjoyed wide support for its moves to improve relations with Pakistan although most political parties shared its belief that Pakistan was extending covert armed support to the militants in Punjab and later in Kashmir.²²

¹⁶ Thomas (1986), *op.cit.*, p. 115. Also see, "Swamy for Indo-Pak Army Chief Talks", *Dawn*, 15 April 1980; "Janata Party Demands Pull Out of Alien Forces From Afghanistan", *Pakistan Times*, 12 March 1984.

¹⁷ See, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 6th Series, vol. 6, no. 21, 7 July 1980, cols. 416-419. Yadav also warned Parliament of future Chinese perfidy and demanded that China "demilitarize the Karakorum road area" linking Xinjiang with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Thomas (1986), *op.cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁸ *ibid.* Also see, Report of Rajya Sabha Debates in *Patriot*, 15 March 1980.

¹⁹ See, statements of Eduardo Falerio and Madhavarao Scindhia, both from Congress party, urging the government to warn Pakistan and China against escalating the Afghanistan crisis. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th Series, vol. 14, no. 30, 27 March 1981, cols. 310-323. Also see, Rajiv Gandhi's statement on this issue in, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th Series, vol. 64, no. 52, 9 May 1984, col. 454.

²⁰ Vajpayee said that talking of war was a "political necessity" for Mrs. Gandhi. *Indian Express*, 6 December 1983. Earlier Mr. Desai had said that there was no danger of war "unless she [Mrs. Gandhi] may make it". *Times of India*, 2 October 1983.

²¹ See, Subramanian Swamy's views in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th Series, vol. 14, no. 30, 27 March 1981, cols. 318-323; vol. 64, no. 52, 9 May 1984, cols. 398-418. For Biju Patnaik's statements, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th Series, vol. 65, no. 19, 20 March, 1984, cols. 465-471, and vol. 66, no. 22, 23 March 1984, cols. 380-387.

²² This impression is based on the interviews with some leaders of Congress-I, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and CPM political parties with the present author in Winter 1991-1992. Mr. George Fernandes, the Janata Dal leader who was formerly Minister of Kashmir Affairs, said in Lok Sabha that Pakistan's perfidy was responsible for creating disturbances not only in Kashmir but also in Punjab. Mr. Saifuddin Chaudhary (CPM) said that Pakistan had been aiding and abetting terrorism in Kashmir with impunity for some time. "Uproar in House Over Pakistan Threat", *Times of India*, 20 August 1991.

1.6 Minority Governments in Power (1988-1992)

A major change on the Indian political scene came about when the 1988 elections ushered in the era of a minority government in power with its inherent problems of weakness and instability.²³ V.P. Singh's National Front government was supported by the right wing BJP on one the hand and the left wing Communist party CPM on the other, thereby reducing considerably its leverage in undertaking any major initiative. In fact, it later resigned because of its differences with the BJP on the Babri Masjid issue.²⁴ However, the deterioration of India-Pakistan relations during V.P. Singh's rule probably had more to do with the political upheaval in Kashmir and Pakistan's perceived role in helping the Kashmiri militants, although the BJP's stand on abolishing article 370 and taking strong measures against Pakistan for its interference in helping the militants, did perhaps add fuel to the fire.²⁵ At present, Congress party under Narasimha Rao does not enjoy a majority in Parliament but Rao's policy of consulting opposition leaders on important policy issues and his attempts to revive the consensual approach in the Parliament seems to be working well.

1.7 Implications for the Confidence Building Process between India and Pakistan

This section shall examine briefly implications of Parliament's role in foreign policy making for confidence building between India and Pakistan. The working of Parliament over past two decades shows that although Parliament has debated extensively on issues relating India's Pakistan policy, it has hardly influenced this policy in any significant manner. With few exceptions it was always the government which undertook foreign policy initiatives and implemented them with little modification in the face of opposition pressure in Parliament. Important factors that have often influenced the government's foreign policy formulation are intra-elite differences and competition within the ruling elite itself.²⁶

²³ For more details, see, Atul Kohli, "From Majority to Minority Rule: Making Sense of the "New" Indian Politics", in Marshall M. Bouton and Phillip Oldenberg, ed., *India Briefing: 1990*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991. Also see, Mahendra Prasad Singh, "The Dilemma of New Indian Party System", *Asian Survey*, vol. 32, no. 4, April 1992, pp. 303-317.

²⁴ The Babri Masjid dispute arose because a section of the Hindu community led by the BJP and the RSS believes that this Masjid was built by Babar by demolishing the temple which was the birthplace of Lord Rama and now they must rebuild that temple at that very place.

²⁵ A number of scholars and politicians, however, share the opinion that the BJP's clout on the government's policies was more pronounced in the domestic sphere than external affairs. For instance, despite the BJP's pressure on the government to consider hot pursuit of the militants or an attack on their training camps, the Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral had ruled out categorically any such raids on the training camps. *Times of India*, 14 May 1990. Also see, Sandy Gordon, "Domestic Foundations of India's Security Policy", in Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon, eds., *India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power*, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 21. The BJP's policy with regard to Pakistan will be discussed separately in the following section.

²⁶ It may be noted that in the early years after independence, Sardar Patel had advocated a hard line policy towards Pakistan as against Pandit Nehru's approach of greater accommodation. Muni writes that the hawkish elements in Congress did not have their way under Nehru, but they did put pressure on Shastri particularly between April and September 1965 to deal firmly with Pakistan. See, S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammad Ayoob, *Conflict and Intervention in Third world*, New Delhi: Vikas,

In substantive terms there is a consensus among most political parties over the fundamental objective of establishing friendly ties with Pakistan. In fact in the first half of the 1980's, the opposition criticized the government strongly for its failure to evolve a joint Indo-Pak stance in view of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. But while Mrs. Indira Gandhi's fears of a Pakistani threat during this period were dismissed as a mere diversionary tactic, the opposition came around to accept Congress's belief in the late 1980's and early 1990's that Pakistan's covert assistance to the militants in Punjab and Kashmir was proving to be the biggest stumbling block in confidence building between India and Pakistan. At home, a series of minority governments in New Delhi, that of V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar and at present P.V Narasimha Rao, have also created difficulties for confidence building between the two countries by reducing considerably the government's leverage in undertaking any political initiative in this respect.

It is evident from this discussion that in a parliamentary form of government, the political party in power plays an important role in shaping the country's foreign policy. The following section will, therefore, look into the main Indian political parties' foreign policy perspectives.

2 Political Parties in India

This section will examine the ideology and external policy perspectives of the leading Indian political parties with regard to Pakistan. We shall also discuss the Pakistani perceptions of the same.

2.1 Congress's Foreign Policy Perspective

The Congress party has not only dominated the Indian political scene since independence but may also be credited with designing the fundamentals of India's foreign policy under Nehru's leadership building on a tradition of thought in foreign affairs going back to before the Second World War. The Congress party over the years has been basically an 'umbrella' party. Its members' ideologies range from the extreme left (strongly socialist) to the extreme right (wealthy landlords, advocates of private capitalistic entrepreneurs and hardline religious communalists) wing. Raju Thomas argues that before 1975 the left-oriented faction of Congress influenced its domestic and foreign policies and since then the centrist and right wing has had a greater say in this respect.²⁷

1980, p. 46. For an interesting debate on the conflict between the organizational and governmental wings of the Congress party under Nehru, Shastri and Mrs. Gandhi's first regime, see, Patagundi, *op.cit.*, pp. 149-154; and Michael Brecher, *Succession in India: A Study in Decision-Making*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

²⁷ Thomas (1986), *op.cit.*, p. 94.

Congress's policy towards Pakistan has been essentially a two-track policy. On the one hand, it was Congress governments under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal B. Shastri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi which signed the major bilateral agreements such as the Nehru-Liaquat pact, the Indus Water Treaty, the Tashkent and Simla agreements with Pakistan. They also undertook major initiatives to improve relations with Pakistan including that of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the Indo-Pak Joint Commission and the Agreement on Non-attack on Nuclear Facilities. On the other hand, Congress continues to emphasise the importance of adequate defence preparedness as an assurance against Pakistan's 'adventurism' and to be able to meet threats of domestic destabilization by elements drawing sustenance from the latter. Congress governments under Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, in particular, have often used the Pakistani threat for their domestic ends.²⁸

2.1.2 Pakistani Perceptions of Congress Party

In Pakistan, the Congress party has generally been viewed as the most hostile among all political elements in India.²⁹ A number of Pakistani scholars argue that historically Islamabad has felt more comfortable with non-Congress governments in New Delhi partly because of the pre-independence distrust between Congress and the Muslim League and partly due to the contrast between Pakistan's early pro-west and anti-communist policies with that of non-aligned and anti-imperialist stance of India.³⁰ The image of Congress presented before the Pakistani public not only holds Congress responsible for having resisted the demand for Pakistan but also for its inability to reconcile itself to the partition resulting in continuing Indian hostility towards Pakistan. It was under Congress leadership that India fought three wars with Pakistan and caused its dismemberment in the 1971 war. Moreover, a large section of Pakistanis believe that Congress's policies of secularism were basically a 'sham', something designed solely to negate Pakistan's ideology, to

²⁸ Sandy Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-16. Also see, R. Jeffrey, *What's Happening to India ?* London, Macmillan 1986, p. 157. Leo Rose, however, argues that Congress's use of external threats in domestic politics in terms of its oft-repeated references to the 'foreign hand' did not necessarily carry over into the formulation of actual foreign policy. Leo Rose, "India's Regional Policy: Non-Military Dimension", in S.P. Cohen, ed., *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987, p. 4.

²⁹ In a Gallup-Nation poll, 43% of the respondents from a representative sample of rural and urban households across the four provinces of Pakistan, believed that India-Pakistan relations might improve under the new National Front government of V.P. Singh as against only 6% who believed that the relations might deteriorate. Further, 51% said that they were pleased at the defeat of Rajiv Gandhi. This opinion was more pronounced among the IJI (Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad) supporters, 64% of them expressed this view. The comparable figure among the PPP supporters was 44%. It is also interesting to note that Pakistanis are generally of the view that the Muslims of India might benefit from Rajiv's defeat. 47% of respondents held that opinion, as against only 6% who suspect that Rajiv's defeat might hurt the Muslims of India. *NATION*, 11 January 1990.

³⁰ I.A. Rehman, "Joint at the Hip", *Frontier Post*, 25 June 1991. Also see, Mushahid Hussain, "Indian Politics: A Pakistani Perspective", *Muslim*, 9 December 1989; "Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan", *Frontier Post*, 24 May 1991; Maleeha Lodhi, "Dealing With Post-Election India", *The News*, 11 June 1991.

undermine the Indian Muslims religious and cultural identity and to justify the occupation of Kashmir.³¹

It is interesting to note, however, that after the 1971 war while other Indian political parties like the Jana Sangh talked of *akhnd Bharat* (pre-partition India), Socialists proposed a confederation of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with common defence and foreign policies and the Swatantra party stressed evolving a common market with Pakistan and Bangladesh, it was Congress which refused even to discuss the idea of a confederation. Sardar Swaran Singh argued in the Rajya Sabha that

nothing can cause a cloud on the friendly relations between us and our neighbours more than talks of a confederation. I will be very frank because the country has been divided. They are sovereign independent countries and *any suggestion* that there should be a confederation, whatever may be the intentions, means that you want their sovereignty ... [to be] partially compromised.... [any] reference to confederation would create confusion, leading to tension in the subcontinent.³²

More recently the rising political fortunes of the BJP,³³ and its stringent stand on Kashmir and the position of Indian Muslims is beginning to make the Pakistani public opinion appreciate the merit of Congress's secular values better.³⁴ Let us look into the BJP's policy towards Pakistan.

2.2 The BJP's Foreign Policy Perspective

As distinct from Congress's view of Indian nationalism as a 'composite' one, the BJP identifies it with a Hindu nationalism and it accuses Congress and other political parties of pursuing a 'pseudo-secularism' and pampering Muslims because they constitute their vote banks.³⁵ Broadly stated, the BJP's premise is that India's national identity is rooted in Hindu culture for the obvious reason that Hindus are the dominant majority in the country and nations are built on the basis of common culture and ideology. Thus in order to forge a strong sense of Indian national identity it must be culturally rooted in Hinduism and Hindu civilization.

³¹ M.B. Naqvi, "Secular India is Vital for Pakistan", *Times of India*, 17 December 1991.

³² See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. 81, no. 4, 3 August 1972, col. 267. (Italics added).

³³ The main developments in the 1980's that led to the rise of the Hindu revivalist forces were the Meenakshipuram conversions (1982), the Ekamata Yagna organized by Vishva Hindu Parishad (November 1983), the Shah Bano case and the Muslim Women's Bill and finally the controversy over the ownership of the Babri Masjid or the Ramjanambhoomi temple in Ayodhya that saw the doors of the Masjid unlocked (February 1986), the performance of the shilanyas as a disputed site (November 1989) and the dispute still continues. For reports on the rise of Hindu revivalism and specifically the BJP, see, "Hindus: Militant Revivalism", *India Today*, 31 May 1986, pp. 76-85; "The Senas: Militancy on the Move", *India Today*, 15 October 1986, pp. 82-84; N. Ram, "Hindutva Challenge: A Matter of 'Hard' Politics", *Frontline*, 26 October-8 November 1991, pp. 4-5; "BJP: A New Confidence", *India Today*, 15 February 1989, pp. 8-13; and "BJP: Stringent Change", *India Today*, 31 January 1991, pp. 29-31.

³⁴ Rehman, *op.cit.*, Naqvi, *op.cit.*, and Lodhi, *op.cit.*

³⁵ For L.K. Advani's views on these issues, see his interviews in *India Today*, 15 February 1989, pp. 10-11; with *Frontline* 20 July -2 August 1991, pp. 35-38; and in *Hindu*, 20 April 1991; and, "L.K. Advani: Saffron Seer", *India Today*, 31 March 1990, pp. 34-41.

The BJP's stand towards the minorities is that they must reconcile themselves to the political dominance of Hindus and the centrality of Hinduism in the national identity.³⁶ The BJP's demand to introduce a uniform civil code for all religious communities, and more specifically their uncompromising position on the Babri Masjid issue, has had its repercussions on Indo-Pak relations. It has often evoked strong reaction from the Pakistani leadership and public opinion raising the temperature on both sides of the border. For instance, in response to the Babri Masjid controversy, the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islam in Jacobabad in the Sindh province of Pakistan, organized demonstrations against the Indian court's decision in favour of the Hindus. They stoned and wrecked Hindu temples. It was the first case of such violence against a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan since 1948.³⁷ As Naqvi points out "promoting antagonistic passions in India are bound to spill over into Pakistan and Bangladesh" since the societies in South Asia are so intertwined that the "rise of communal legacy in one country generates its mirror images elsewhere, indeed everywhere".³⁸

On bilateral relations with Pakistan, the BJP's stand on Kashmir calling for the abolition of Article 370 and its full integration into the Indian Union, its resolve to give nuclear teeth to the Indian armed forces, oft-repeated statements of its leadership on *akhund Bharat*³⁹ and that of taking a strong action against Pakistan for helping the militants in Punjab and Kashmir⁴⁰ are some such factors which would have an important bearing on the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan.

³⁶ *ibid.* The BJP argues that the very concept of 'minorities' has worked against their interests and they demand "an abolition of the minorities commission which should be replaced by human rights commission". In an interview with a BJP leader by the present author. Also see, A.G. Noorani, "Minorityism and Minorities", *Indian Express*, 6 July 1991.

³⁷ Reported in Partha S. Ghosh, *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia*, New Delhi; Manohar, 1989, p. 53. Also see newspaper reports in Pakistan, "Wave of Indignation Sweeps Off Pakistan", *Dawn*, 3 November 1990; "Countrywide Condemnation of Babri Masjid Desecration", *Pakistan Times*, 4 November 1990; "Many Condemn Attack on Babri Mosque", *Frontier Post*, 4 November 1990; "Muslim Sarhad Assembly Condemns Masjid Desecration", *Muslim*, 8 November 1990; "Doing the Hindu Thing in Pakistan", *Frontier Post*, 18 November 1990; "Demand to Protect Indian Muslims", *Dawn*, 17 December 1990; "Ishaq Angry Over Muslims Killings in India, Kashmir", *Frontier Post*, 19 December 1990.

³⁸ M.B. Naqvi, "Significance of Indian Polls", *Dawn*, 20 December 1989.

³⁹ See, BJP's Manifesto, "Towards Ram Rajya", New Delhi, 1991. It is interesting to note that the BJP's concept of *akhund Bharat* has been undergoing change ever since partition. From 1947 until perhaps 1971, Jana Sangh's (now the BJP) goal of *akhund Bharat* implied the merger of Pakistan into India. But after the 1971 war, the party gave a new interpretation to the concept that it "only meant friendship among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the subcontinent and not merger of their polities". See, *Organiser*, vol. 26, no. 12, 28 October 1972.

⁴⁰ "BJP Seeks Review of Pakistan Policy", *Statesman*, 13 May 1987; "BJP's Call to Seal the Border", *Dawn*, 26 July 1990; "BJP Suggests Attack on Training Bases", *Pakistan Times*, 4 June 1990; "Indo-Pak Confederation is a Wayout: Advani", *Times of India*, 20 April 1990; "Destroy Pakistani Training Camps Demands Joshi", *Pioneer*, 28 December 1991; "BJP Clamours Again For a Nuclear India", *Pioneer*, 17 January 1992; and K.R. Malkani, "Partition: Artificial?", *Hindustan Times*, 14 June 1990.

2.2.1 Pakistani Perceptions of the BJP

The rise of the BJP has become a source of utmost concern for the Pakistani intelligentsia including the top leadership. One senior official in Islamabad admitted that "the BJP takes a very tough line against Pakistan".⁴¹ A noted Pakistani journalist reiterated that "public opinion in Pakistan is as afraid of the BJP, as probably people in India are that of Jamaat's policies in Pakistan".⁴² Other scholars argued that Jamaat in Pakistan only acts as a small committed circle in some sections of the society and to that extent it does have the potential for creating problems for the government but its popular appeal is very much in doubt. The BJP, however, is more virulent because of its support in the masses as is manifest in its rising share of the parliamentary seats.

At the same time however, it is important to take note of the BJP's leaders' explicit commitments to improve relations with Pakistan. After all as a BJP leader put it, even by "Pakistani standards the best period of Indo-Pak relations was during 1977-78 when Vajpayee was the Foreign Minister".⁴³ He is on record for having urged utmost constraints in dealing with Pakistan.⁴⁴

A number of Indian scholars and political analysts share the view that the BJP has rather softened its stance towards Pakistan. This is demonstrated in its shift from a policy of "war with Pakistan" to that of only "diplomatic pressure",⁴⁵ its dropping the idea of hot pursuit of terrorists (on the Indo-Pak border in Punjab and Kashmir) from its foreign policy resolutions,⁴⁶ its desisting in talking about the *akhund Bharat*⁴⁷ and its acceptance of the basic principle that "Muslims are there to stay in India and not to throw them out".⁴⁸ Another scholar argued that the BJP's use of the 'Hindu card' at home "does not necessarily

⁴¹ In an interview with the present author in October 1991. He gave a small example of Pakistan's cricket matches that were to be held in India when the Shiv Sena activists had dug up the pitches in the cricket ground as a protest at holding matches with a country which continues to support separatist elements in Punjab and Kashmir. Although the Cricket Board of India had shifted the venue from Bombay to Gwalior, the official said that the matches were canceled because they did not want to "risk our boys". Although a very minor incident, he said "it does not create a conducive environment for Confidence Building in the two countries".

⁴² In an interview by the present author in October 1991.

⁴³ In an interview with the present author in March 1992.

⁴⁴ As quoted by Dilip Mukerji, "Shared perspectives: Parties Define Foreign Agenda", *Times of India*, 29 April 1991. An Indian journalist, in an interview with the present author in December 1991, said that some of the "most accommodative" foreign policy statements with regard to Pakistan have come from Vajpayee.

⁴⁵ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ *ibid.* This view was confirmed by a BJP leader who reiterated that today the reality is that "we do not want them [the Pakistanis]" and that "it is not even in 'Hindus' interest [in general] to get [Pakistan]". In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁴⁸ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

have to be anti-Muslim in the sense of being anti-Pakistan".⁴⁹ This view was corroborated by a BJP leader who agreed that "the BJP's main attack is on 'pseudo-secularism' of Congress party and has nothing to do with Pakistan ... and that BJP is no [longer] as hawkish on Pakistan as [it] was before though it has been quite a gradual change".⁵⁰

Moreover, the BJP government may not be as hawkish towards Pakistan as it is in opposition. It may be recalled that although Jana Sangh had taken exception to the Simla agreement, it fully endorsed the policy of forging closer ties with Islamabad. This implies that the attitudes, perceptions and policy positions of the political parties may differ according to their seat in the government or on the opposition benches.

2.3 The Janata Party's Foreign Policy Perspective

The Janata Party that came to power in 1977 was essentially a loose amalgamation of various parties of different ideologies that had existed before the 1977 elections. It was formed by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Socialist party, the Bharatiya Lok Dal and two Congress factions led by Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram respectively. As argued earlier, the Janata Party basically continued Congress's policy of forging closer ties with Pakistan in the 1970's although at a faster pace and with a better political understanding with Islamabad.

In the mid 1980's, a new Janata Dal (later National Front) party emerged under the leadership of V.P. Singh's minority government. The National Front professed that it was willing to take two steps for every one taken by Pakistan to improve bilateral relations. But V.P. Singh's government spoke and acted as sternly as any other regime would have done when the political upheaval and the alleged Pakistani infiltration began in the Kashmir valley in early 1990.

2.4 The Communist Parties' Foreign Policy Perspective

The two Communist parties, CPI and CPM, continue to view the world strictly from their ideological perspective but both support fully the policy of forging closer ties with Pakistan.⁵¹

Overall nearly all the political parties share the view of the need and desire to improve relations with Pakistan. An ex-Indian Foreign Minister put it aptly that "India's policy of good neighbourliness is a reality

⁴⁹ *ibid.*. He added that the BJP is largely a party of petty and middle level traders which would be the largest section to benefit from an increase in trade and economic interaction with Pakistan. So even they would be in favour of reducing tensions and intensifying the economic interactions with Pakistan.

⁵⁰ In an interview with the present author in November 1991.

⁵¹ See, Ashis Kumar Majumdar, *Indian Foreign Policy and Marxist Opposition Parties in Parliament*, Calcutta: Naya Prakash Publishers, 1986; and Taufiq Ahmed Nizami, *The Communist Party and India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Associated Press House, 1971.

... Governments come and go".⁵² Such a consensus of opinion augurs well for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

3 The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy in India

The foreign policy bureaucracy in India has always been subject to the political leadership's control although senior civil servants do play an important role in foreign policy formulation and the more so in its implementation. The bureaucratic machinery is concentrated mainly in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Our task, however, is not to examine the structure of the MEA⁵³ but its working with an attempt to answer the question of who plays a leading role in Indian foreign policy formulation particularly towards Pakistan.

3.1 Major Players

The Prime Minister is the key foreign policy maker, who is usually assisted by senior civil servants such as the Foreign Secretary in the MEA and some close confidants or advisors in his own secretariat. The Foreign Minister is regarded more as a participant in a system of bureaucratic checks and balances keeping the bureaucracy within the bounds of political reality.⁵⁴ Their record over the past four decades also shows that the Foreign Ministers seldom undertook a major policy initiative on their own although during Janata period (1977-1980), the Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee had become quite powerful.

The Foreign Secretary plays a vital role in the MEA. But over years he has faced a very potent challenge from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) which has come to play an important informational as well as formulative role in the realm of foreign policy and also acts as Prime Minister's 'eyes and ears' within the bureaucracy.⁵⁵ Especially during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure, the PMO became instrumental in taking a number of foreign policy initiatives mostly at the expense of the MEA. One senior foreign official at the MEA

⁵² In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁵³ For a detailed account of the structure of MEA, see, Jeffrey Benner, *The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, Chapter Three and Four.

⁵⁴ Benner, *ibid.*, p. 74; and K.P. Mishra, "Foreign Policy Planning: Some Suggestions", *International Studies*, vol. 17, 1978, p. 829. Some scholars, however, believe that the Indian Foreign Minister is more or less a 'rubber stamp' for policies already decided by the Prime Minister and innermost circle of his advisors. See, K. Subrahmanyam, "Foreign Policy Planning in India", *Foreign Affairs Report*, January 1975, p. 3. Also, N. Parameswaran Nair, *The Administration of Foreign Affairs in India with Comparative Reference to Britain*, New Delhi: School of International Studies, 1963, p. 248.

⁵⁵ It may be noted that in 1965, the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, Mr. L.K. Jha had created a committee of the secretaries from the ministries of finance, commerce, defence, external affairs and the Cabinet Secretariat. It served both as an evaluative and control group in the realm of foreign affairs with himself acting as the *primus inter pares* of this committee. This had become a serious point of contention between the MEA and PMO. See, Brecher (1966), *op.cit.*, p. 120. For an excellent account of this office's evolution and its friction with MEA, see, Benner, *op.cit.*, pp. 208-213. Also see, "Foreign Office: Turbulent Times", *India Today*, 31 July 1986.

complained that

In no other ministry is there such a high level of intervention. [in this case] everybody else has the voice but not the responsibility. We have the responsibility but not the voice.⁵⁶

3.2 Working Practices

Different Prime Ministers particularly from Congress have been the principal decision makers of India's foreign policy especially towards Pakistan.⁵⁷ On that account the personality factor has become a crucial dispositional variable in confidence building between the two countries. A good personal rapport between the top political leadership of India and Pakistan, or the lack of it, has often played a crucial role in shaping the course of their confidence building efforts. For instance, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's distrust of General Zia-ul-Haq was a principal factor in her rejecting Pakistan's proposal of a No War Pact.⁵⁸ With regard to the Prime Minister's relationship with the MEA, the hallmark of Jawaharlal Nehru's administrative style was a monopolization of decision-making. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was different from her father in the sense that she did not seem to have any plans to turn the MEA into, as S. Nihal Singh puts it, "an Indiracracy".⁵⁹ She was interested mainly in the political content of the policy formulation and left the administrative details to the bureaucracy. One top official of the foreign office was quoted as saying

Mrs. Gandhi was heavily involved in foreign policy and knew exactly what the response would be from people like General Zia to any initiative from us and also what their limitations would be. There was a solid *political content* in our [foreign] policy then. Once they (the neighbours) know that you are giving top priority to better relations with them, it gives them the advantage. If you are going to play poker, you do not lay all your cards on the table.⁶⁰

While remaining in close overall touch with the bureaucracy, she did not view the MEA as an extension of her powers or of her responsibilities. Mrs. Gandhi gave a bigger share of early-stage policy formulation to the Foreign Secretary but at the same time continued to rely upon her political friends and close confidants especially in negotiations with third countries.

With regard to Pakistan, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was a firm believer that a democratic regime in Pakistan would go a long way towards facilitating the resolution of problems between the two countries. Perhaps that

⁵⁶ "Turbulent Times", *ibid.*, p. 89.

⁵⁷ This point has already been discussed in section 1.3 of this chapter.

⁵⁸ This point shall be taken up for further discussion in the following chapter.

⁵⁹ S. Nihal Singh, "The New Indiracracy", *India Today*, 1-15 April 1980, p. 10. Benner reiterates that Mrs. Gandhi tended to look at the MEA as a separate agency functioning independently of herself, a partner rather than servant. Benner, *op.cit.*, p. 216.

⁶⁰ "Turbulent Times", *op.cit.*, pp. 90-91.

is why she went out of her way to give concessions to Z.A. Bhutto at the Simla conference in order to enable him to strengthen democracy in Pakistan. For the same reasons she harboured suspicions about General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime.

The Foreign Ministers under her rule enjoyed a relative autonomy so long as they did not challenge her authority openly. Sardar Swaran Singh's main influence over India's Pakistan policy lay in urging a softer line on Soviet arms shipments to Pakistan and on the refugee influx from East Bengal. Another Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao (the present Prime Minister) practiced an effective brand of 'quiet diplomacy' of which the most visible success was shown in the progress made in Indo-Pak relations in the mid 1980's. Rao seemed to be more sensitive to the need for tact and caution in India's Pakistan policy than his predecessors. During the Janata's rule under Morarji Desai, external policy was left largely to A.B. Vajpayee and on a few occasions especially on the nuclear issue, he even contradicted Desai's judgement in foreign policy.

Finally the bureaucrats both in the MEA and the PMO have made a significant contribution in the negotiating process with a third country. In the case of India-Pakistan relations, for instance, the regular Foreign Secretaries talks on Confidence Building Measures over the past couple of years have placed a lot of opportunities in the Foreign Secretary's hands for shaping the country's foreign policy in this direction.

4 Civil-Military Relations

The democratic principle of civilian supremacy over the armed forces' role in national politics is firmly established in India. The civilian authorities control the military and limit its role in the security policy-making process mainly to the operational sphere. Although there are military inputs into the formulation and conduct of external defence policy, basic doctrines and policies are developed by the elected civilian government in power and ultimate authority rests with it.

Raju Thomas argues that the new higher decision-making system that developed in the mid-1970's reduced further the role and input of the armed services in the security policy-making process.⁶¹ For

⁶¹ Thomas identifies three levels of security decision-making that usually operate in a hierarchical order. The top or political level consists of interaction among politically elected representatives, civil servants in the bureaucracy and the military chiefs. At the middle or bureaucratic level, interaction between the relevant authorities of the civil service and the armed forces takes place. The bottom or military level involves interaction among the heads of the army, air force and the navy. The process of making and implementing security policies takes place at all three levels - political, bureaucratic and military, but remains the ultimate prerogative of the first level. Implementation is generally confined to the second and third levels. For a detailed account of the basic decision-making structure for the security policies, see, Thomas (1986), *op.cit.*, pp. 119-134. Also see, former Defence Secretary P.V.R. Rao's work, *Defence Without Drift*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970; and *India's Defence Policy*

instance, the service chiefs had little or no participation in the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet (PACC), which considered problems of defence in the broader context of political and economic stability. Their powers in the Defence Planning Committee were also inadequate owing to the dominant representation of the civil servants there.⁶² But since the mid 1980's, the military's role in shaping the country's external security policy has been growing. This must now be examined in detail.

4.1 The Military's Growing Role in Shaping India's External Security Policy

General K.S. Sundarji, the Chief of Army Staff (1986-1988) often called the "thinking man's general" made a significant contribution in this direction.⁶³ In view of the nuclear threat from Pakistan, for instance, while Sundarji acknowledged the government's role to "decide on policy regarding [India's] nuclear posture", he confidently asserted that "our armed forces will not be made to fight in a disadvantageous position".⁶⁴ He disclosed that the armed forces were gearing their organization, training and equipment in such a manner that it was not only effective in conventional use but in the unlikely event of nuclear weapons' use by an adversary in the combat zone, it would limit damage both psychological and physical. A confidential study on India's defence perspective stated that

At no other time, except possibly the period just before the India-Pakistan war in 1971, has the Indian military and political leadership been so closely associated ... The projection of India's power by political initiatives was enhanced by Sundarji's capability to translate these into military aims and objectives through the higher direction of war.⁶⁵

Its evidence came during Operation Brasstacks in the winter of 1986-1987 which were the largest land exercises ever conducted anywhere in the world. Brasstacks was ostensibly meant to test Sundarji's defence strategy of a "dissuasive posture and deterrent capability",⁶⁶ but what it led up to was a serious confrontation

and Organization Since Independence, New Delhi: United Services Institution of India, 1977.

⁶² Lt. General S.K. Sinha, *Higher Defence Organization in India*, New Delhi: United Services Institution of India, 1980, pp. 6-9. For the broader relationship between the military chiefs and civil servants in the Ministry of Defence, see, Air Chief Marshall P.C. Lal, *Some Problems of Defence*, New Delhi: United Services Institution in India, 1977; General J.N. Chaudhuri, *India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies*, New Delhi: United Services Institution of India, 1973; and Brig. J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder*, New Delhi: Hind Pocket Books and Orient Paperbacks, n.d. Also see, Jasjit Singh, "National Security Management: The Case for Reforms in India", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12, no. 11, February 1990, pp. 1113-1134.

⁶³ S.P. Cohen, an expert on Indian and Pakistani armies stated that "of all the generals I have met in South Asia and elsewhere, Sundarji stands out for his professional and intellectual ability to apply modern science to the art of warfare.... the rise of Sundarji coincided with the rise in Indian military activism, as evident from Punjab to Checker Board and Sri Lanka. *No other Indian General has had such an impact*". (italics added). "General Sundarji: Disputed Legacy", *India Today*, 15 May 1988, p. 85.

⁶⁴ General Sundarji's interview, "The Thinking Man's General", *India Today*, 15 February 1986, p. 78.

⁶⁵ This was quoted by *India Today*. See, "Disputed Legacy", *op.cit.*, pp. 84-85.

⁶⁶ Sundarji had redefined India's defence strategy as "dissuasive with a counter-offensive capability at a time and place of our choosing". Sundarji was confident that the "Indian army can take care of Pakistan *en passant*". Brasstacks had set out to demonstrate "from the evolution of political and military aims preceding a conflict to the conduct of a command level exercise with troops involving mechanized offensive operation by a strike corps deep into enemy territory in conjunction with the air

with Pakistan because of the huge forces involved so close to the border.

In fact one section in the Indian foreign and defence circles believe that it was Sundarji who "almost led them to war" and complained that "the Prime Minister was not fully briefed".⁶⁷ Others argue that Sundarji never intended to go to war and it was mainly due to the US pressure on India to pull back its forces that the Foreign Office made Sundarji a scapegoat. This section of opinion believes that it was due to Pakistan's decision not to withdraw its forces to their peacetime locations after their own winter exercises had finished which brought the two countries so close to war.⁶⁸

Further, the army has been playing an active role in negotiating and implementing a host of military Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan. Since 1991 the two countries' army delegations have been meeting separately to discuss military issues like advance notification of military exercises, maintaining regular contacts between the two countries' military establishments from the top level of the Directors-General-of-Military-Operations to the flag meetings between the local commanders on the Indo-Pak border. This reflects the growing clout of the Indian military in shaping the country's external security policy. However, in the past two decades, there has been an important shift in the concept of security from external enemies to an added concern of internal threats to national integrity. Let us, therefore, examine the military's role in this respect.

4.2 The Military's Role in Safeguarding the Internal Security

The armed forces have been involved increasingly in the maintenance of internal security of the country over the past two decades. The use of the military for this purpose, however, remains a double-edged sword. There is a growing feeling in the armed forces that in a free and democratic country the military should not be used against its own people. Over the past few years, the army has expressed its reluctance in curbing Sikh terrorism in Punjab, Muslim militants in Kashmir and the communal violence throughout the country.⁶⁹

force that clearly indicated to a belligerent and recalcitrant neighbour, the power and strength of India' armed forces". *ibid.*

⁶⁷ *ibid.* p. 84. In an interview conducted in New Delhi. A senior official in Islamabad corroborated that this was the picture conveyed to President Zia-ul-Haq by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In an interview with the present author.

⁶⁸ This issue shall be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine.

⁶⁹ For instance on the question of Blue Star Operation in the Golden Temple in 1984, **India Today** reported that a wide range of serving officers were of the opinion that it was a situation, where the army should have put its foot down. It quoted a serving general saying that "somebody should have had the moral courage to say 'not the army'. The political consequences will be unbearable for the country". But General Sunderji, who carried out this operation, held that while he asked himself the same question a number of times, he decided that it was a "legitimate mission". See, "Disputed Legacy", *op.cit.*, pp. 81-83. It is also well-known by now that the army had reservations about being deployed in Ayodhya in October 1990 and that Prime Minister V.P. Singh was informed about that. See, Seema Guha, "Pawar's Stock Goes up in the Army Circles", **Times of India**, 5 August 1991. Also see, Raju G.C. Thomas, "Achieving Security From Within and Without", in Marshall M. Bouton and Phillip

But while the growing politicisation of the military, increasing links between the retired military officers and the BJP⁷⁰ has led to fears of possible coups or military take-overs, the military in India has claimed that they have neither the interest nor the ability to take over the government. It is argued that the country as well as the composition of the armed forces is too vast and diverse for the military to plot, coordinate plans, seize and control all important cities and towns even if it so desired.⁷¹ In a similar vein, the choice of the retired military officers for the BJP has been mainly attributed to the clear image of the BJP's top leadership, greater discipline within the party and most significantly the party's resolute stand on defending the national interests. That, S.K. Sinha argues, is no reason for casting aspersions on the professional and apolitical status of the army.⁷²

To recapitulate, civil-military relations in India continue to be governed by the principle of civilian supremacy although recent developments do reflect a growing clout of the military in the decision-making process especially with regard to security issues. More specifically, the army has been playing an active role in negotiating and implementing several military Confidence Building Measures with Pakistan although within the parameters of broader policy outlined by the civilian government in New Delhi.

5 The Muslims in India

The Muslims in India have always been an important factor in shaping India-Pakistan relations. In the early years after the partition, the Muslims who remained in India went through a critical period partly because of the continuing communal riots and a considerable 'skimming off' from the professional classes and other significant sectors of the economy⁷³ and partly because they were left with no effective leadership

Oldenburg, *India Briefing*, 1988, Boulder and Colorado: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 106-107; Major General V.K. Madhok (Retd.), "Alternatives to Deploying the Army", *Indian Express*, 13 August 1991; and A.G. Noorani, "Army and Law and Order", *Indian Express*, 30 August 1991.

⁷⁰ In 1991, the BJP's 'prize catch' of 50 or so retired armed forces officers, raised alarm bells in political circles that the military men joining the political process in large numbers had dangerous portents because those they commanded while in service would continue to remain loyal to them. See, Satyindra Singh, "The 'brass band' and the BJP", *The Tribune*, 27 May 1991. Also see, Cecil Victor, "The Military Constituency", *Patriot*, 10 May 1991.

⁷¹ See, Thomas (1986), *op.cit.*, p. 286. Also see, Lt. General E.A. Vas (retd.), "The Armed Forces and Politics", *Indian Express*, 26 July 1991.

⁷² See, S.K. Sinha, "Army and Politics: Why They Join BJP", *The Statesman*, 15 June 1991; and Prem Bhatia, "March of Generals", *The Tribune*, 24 May 1991.

⁷³ During this period, there were hardly any Muslims left in the Defence services, in the police, in the universities, in the law courts and in the civil services. The Muslims in UP, Bihar and Delhi had suffered the worst fate. The UP Chief Minister, Govind Ballabh Pant, and his successors, with their anti-Muslim proclivities had almost made sure that "for all practical purposes, the doors of recruitment for minorities for all-India or state services are largely closed". See, G. Parthasarathi, ed., *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, vol. III, New Delhi, 1987, Letter dated 20 November 1953, p. 451 and 26 April 1954, p. 535. Likewise the Muslim landlords, the urban artisan and entrepreneurial class also suffered immensely. See, Syed Abid Hussain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, New Delhi, 1965.

since most of the Muslim League leaders had migrated to Pakistan.⁷⁴

More significantly Muslim loyalty to the Indian state was suspect in the eyes of a number of leading national and regional leaders.⁷⁵ But Pandit Nehru had an unequivocal faith in secularism and went a long way in infusing secular values in the country's polity as well as the Constitution. Because of partition the Muslim community could no longer function as a separate independent political entity grouped along communitarian lines, so they decided to take advantage of the wide ranging political options available in the multi-party system and the obvious choice was Congress, which under Nehru's leadership was the only national party with a secular orientation. Hasan states that "if there was ever a 'Muslim vote', it was cast for Congress by Nehru".⁷⁶ However in some scholars' view, it was Nehru's brand of secularism which did not separate religion from state but believed in the notion of 'sarva dharma sambhav' (a celebration of all kinds of religion and religiosity) that left the secular ideal of the state exposed to all kinds of communal forces.⁷⁷

The issue of Hindu-Muslim riots in India has been used continually by the ruling elites in India and Pakistan to abuse each other. Pakistani leaders argue that their concept of 'ummah' (universal Muslim Brotherhood) does not recognize territorial boundaries and enjoins them to sympathize with Muslims anywhere in the world. For instance on the Babri Masjid issue, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan said that

This is a matter which concerns not only the Indian Muslims, but the *entire Islamic Ummah*.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Hasan points out that in the first decade after independence, Congress Muslims, Jamiat-ul-ulema and the Jamaat-i-Islami symbolised the dominant ideological strands among Muslims and all clearly realised that a democratic and secular polity was their best bet. But at the same time they avoided an involvement in all such issues which were seen to be specifically Muslim lest it may leave them vulnerable to charges of promoting sectarian issues. See, Mushirul Hasan, "Adjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims After Partition", p. 68. Also see, Theodore P. Wright Jr. "The Effectiveness of Muslim Representation in India" and Zia-ul-Hasan Faruqi, "Indian Muslims and the Ideology of the Secular State", in D.E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

⁷⁵ Sardar Patel was rather vocal about it. He wrote to Nehru that while he subscribed to secular ideals, the same "... imposed a responsibility on our Muslim citizens in India a responsibility to remove the doubts and misgivings entertained by a large section of the people about their loyalty founded largely in their past association with the demand for Pakistan and the unfortunate activities of some of them". See, Durga Das, ed., *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-1950*, vol. X, Ahmedabad, 1974, a letter from Patel to Nehru dated 28 March 1950, p. 19. Among the leaders who shared his views were Acharya Kripalani, Govind Ballabh Pant, Mohanlal Saxena, and Purshotamdas Tandon. Hasan, *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁷⁶ Hasan, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

⁷⁷ See, Zoya Hasan, "Changing Orientation of the State: the Emergence of Majoritarianism in the 1980's", in 'India Briefing: 1990', *op.cit.*, p. 143; and Amil Nauriya, "Relationship Between State and Religion", in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25 February 1989, pp. 405-406.

⁷⁸ See, "Pakistan Urges India to End Massacre", *Nation*, 13 December 1990. This argument was also put forward by Zain Noorani, Minister of State for External Affairs under President Zia-ul-Haq. Zia himself expressed similar views in an interview with Rajpal Singh Choudhary in *President Zia-ul-Haq's Interviews to the Foreign Media*, Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, January-December 1983, p. 180.

Public opinion in Pakistan being very sensitive on this issue, the leadership is forced to express their solidarity with Indian Muslims.⁷⁹ On the other hand, while Indian leaders recognize that communal riots are a serious problem, they insist that they are strictly an internal matter in which Pakistan has no *locus standi*.⁸⁰ The recent developments in the aftermath of demolition of the Babri Masjid indicated its potential of casting a shadow over the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

6 Concluding Remarks

To recapitulate, in India's parliamentary form of government, the Prime Minister remains the key figure in foreign policy making who is usually assisted by his cabinet colleagues, senior civil servants in the MEA and advisors and close confidants in the Prime Minister's Office. While different political parties have made use of Parliament's floor for debating India's Pakistan policy, they have rarely exercised any control over the same. This is particularly true when the Congress governments were in power until the late 1980's. With an advent of the minority governments in power, however, this picture may soon undergo a change mainly because a weak government would be much more susceptible to the opposition's pressure in Parliament.

In terms of civil-military relations, the civilians continue to retain the ultimate decision-making power although there is a growing clout of the military in shaping the country's external security policy particularly in the regional context. This is partly because of their direct involvement in bilateral negotiations with Pakistan over the military Confidence Building Measures and on the Siachin issue and partly owing to their growing presence in maintaining and safeguarding the country's internal security especially in the border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

There is a broad consensus among all political parties regarding the need and importance of improving bilateral relations with Pakistan and they support the continuing confidence building process between the two countries although not without qualifications. More specifically, Congress pursues a two-track approach with regard to Pakistan. While it supports the confidence building process between the two countries, it continues to blame Pakistan for supporting terrorism in the Indian states of Punjab and

⁷⁹ *Frontier Post*, 15 November 1990.

⁸⁰ See, "India Reviews Ties With Pakistan", *The Tribune*, 4 April 1987; "India Terms Pakistan's Concern as Interference", *Nation*, 3 November 1989; "Bhutto's Statement Interference", *Muslim*, 13 November 1989; "Protest Note to Pakistan Government", *Times of India*, 14 November 1989.

Jammu and Kashmir and stresses the need to be on its guard against Pakistan's sense of adventurism. The BJP, too, favours an improvement in India-Pakistan relations but its domestic policies on the status of minorities, the Babri Mosque dispute and the Kashmir issue do not augur well for confidence building between India and Pakistan.

In Pakistan, there is a growing shift in its intelligentsia's thinking which earlier perceived Congress to be most hostile but now views the BJP's hardline posture towards Pakistan with grave concern. Further, our analysis shows that an oft-repeated Pakistani argument that a non-Congress government in New Delhi is more conducive to a betterment of India-Pakistan relations does not hold much ground. For instance, when the political upheaval in the Kashmir valley broke out in the early 1990, V.P. Singh's National Front government spoke and acted as sternly as perhaps a Congress government would have done.

Beyond the governmental policy making bodies, the opinion-making elites of the country have also been playing an important role in confidence building between India and Pakistan. In recent years, a non-official dialogue between this section of the two countries' societies comprising of the intellectuals, bureaucrats, businessmen, academicians, journalists and ex-military officers has been taking place. The purpose of this dialogue is to help their respective governments break away from the stereotyped and prejudiced images of each other and to that extent build bridges between the two countries.⁸¹

One may conclude by saying that there seems to be a broad consensus among different political segments of the Indian polity on the need to improve relations with Pakistan. Whether such sentiments are reciprocated in Pakistan or not remains to be seen. This is the task of the following chapter.

⁸¹ This issue shall be taken up for further discussion in Chapter Thirteen.

CHAPTER VI: THE PAKISTANI POLITICAL MILIEU

There is an intrinsic linkage between the internal political processes of a country and its external conflictual behaviour. This is especially true for Pakistan where ever since partition, the 'Indian factor' has dominated both its domestic and external policies. An analysis of the dynamics of Pakistan's internal politics may, therefore, help us to understand the structural variables of Pakistan's political milieu which shape the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan's institutional power structure is tilted heavily in favour of a military-bureaucratic axis. Although the democratic voices of representative institutions such as Parliament are beginning to assert their power, the military continues to be the final arbiter in Pakistan's political affairs. The main focus of this chapter will, thus, be on studying civil-military relations and their implications for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

The military-bureaucratic axis evolved in the first two decades after independence. The composition of these two forces is considered and the reasons for an anti-Indian sentiments in their policy making is examined. Civil-military relations under Z.A. Bhutto's democratic government and General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime and their implications for confidence building between India and Pakistan are discussed which suggests the emergence of the 'troika' in the ruling power structure of Pakistan and leads to an analysis of its working and impact on India-Pakistan relations under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's governments. Moreover, what importance should be given to the personality factor in the Indo-Pak negotiating process? Again, is a military or civilian government in Islamabad more conducive for confidence building between India and Pakistan? Finally, we shall examine the role of Pakistan's Islamic ideology, its orthodox and liberal interpretations within the Pakistani society and their implications for India-Pakistan relations.

1 The Evolution of the Military-Bureaucratic Axis

At the time of independence the newly created state of Pakistan lacked a central government apparatus as well as a political centre. Furthermore, the imminent external threats from India over Kashmir and Afghanistan over Pukhtunistan¹ and internal threats to the central authority posed by its constituent

¹ The movement for Pukhtunistan called for creating an independent state comprising the areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and certain parts of Baluchistan where the Pukhtoons or Pathans lived. Alternatively it was suggested that the Frontier province could join Afghanistan. In the initial years the demand for Pukhtunistan also had the blessings of the Indian and the Soviet leaders which only heightened the fears of the Pakistani government. See, Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military 1947-1986 and Politics in Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive, 1986, pp. 40-42.

provinces² exposed the vulnerability of the leadership of a newly born state. That is why in the early years the Pakistani leadership invested a large part of the state's meagre resources in building and modernizing its armed forces. Subsequently a brief war in Kashmir and differences over the division of the armed forces and the ordinance stores created an 'enemy' image of India in the minds of Pakistan's nascent defence establishment, which was to later become a structural feature of the Pakistani army's India policy.

The second major task for the leadership was to create a stable state structure and the choice lay in either building up the Muslim League or an administrative state structure.³ The Muslim League's organizational machinery at the grass root level was virtually non-existent because most of its leaders came from the Muslim-minority provinces of pre-independence India. Therefore it was difficult to transform the Muslim League into a popularly organized party without diverting financial resources into the provinces. But the early military hostilities with India forced the central government to do just the reverse, that is, to extract resources from the provinces to finance the defence and administrative needs of the state.

In any case the administrative bureaucracy had, for a number of reasons, a better chance of securing a strategic place in the emerging state structure. Starting from the top, Jinnah's decision to become the first Governor-General of Pakistan vested all powers in the hands of the top executive post which was not directly responsible to the Constituent Assembly.⁴ Besides a new post of Secretary-General of the Government of Pakistan was created who, as an overlord of the bureaucracy, was to bring about a unity of command and outlook in the top bureaucracy as well as to establish a chain of command by maintaining a line of contact with the chief secretaries in the provincial governments. There was no comparable hierarchy within the Pakistan Muslim League. "Therefore the administrative bureaucracy was able slowly but surely to diddle the political leaders out of their expected roles as the principal decision-makers"

² There was no consensus of opinion on the question of the division of powers between the centre and its provinces. In Sindh, the Muslim League feared the Punjabi dominance in any federated Pakistan and therefore moves were afoot to establish a sovereign state. In the North-West many Muslim League members had joined hands with the state's Congress government preparing for an independent Pukhtunistan. Baluchistan was under the sway of tribal sardars who were not at all amenable to accept any central authority. Punjab and Bengal were both divided and did not have the dominant voice in the Muslim League's top leadership which remained the preserve of Muslims from the Muslim-minority provinces of pre-independence India. See, Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 25-26.

³ Jalal argues that these two objectives, although not mutually irreconcilable proved to be so in case of Pakistan. The need to raise revenues to finance the defence forces' requirements needed an administrative state structure. In its absence, an administrative reorganization not only took precedence over real party building but also served to "thwart efforts" to give the state a democratic political system. *ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴ Sayeed uses the term 'viceregal' system to describe the centralization of all powers in the hands of Jinnah. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948*, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1960, pp. 253-279. Hamza Alvi argues, due to Jinnah's ill-health in the last few years of his life, the real power had drifted constantly towards his confidants among the higher bureaucracy who worked for establishing a highly centralized bureaucratic rule in the country. Hamza Alvi, "Constitutional Changes and the Dynamics of Political Development in Pakistan", *Seminar Paper, Institute for Commonwealth Studies*, University of London. Collection of Seminar Papers on Constitutional Changes in the Commonwealth Countries. pp. 72-73.

1.1 The Punjab Factor in the Composition of the Military-Bureaucratic Elite

The predominantly Punjabi character of both the bureaucracy and the military⁵ became an important factor in the Pakistani establishment's suspicions of India partly because Punjab was worst hit by the communal riots during the partition. And later it developed a somewhat vested interest in an enmity with India which became the *raison d'être* for maintaining large defence budgets and large armed forces. The Punjab also has the longest and most active border with India and its articulate sections have most to fear from an Indo-Pak embrace partly because they have gained the most from its opposite.⁶ It may be noted that a large part of the personnel of Pakistan's nascent bureaucracy came from the Muslim refugees from India. And their hatred for India also provided a support base for the anti-Indian stance of the government's foreign and defence policies at a national level.⁷

Over the next two decades the institutional balance of power not only shifted in favour of the military-bureaucratic forces but also became well-entrenched in the state apparatus of Pakistan. The powers of the state were concentrated mainly in the executive that is the President who enjoyed the backing of the military and bureaucracy and not the Prime Minister who was directly elected by the people. Any civilian government posing a threat to the military-bureaucratic interests was removed either through a constitutional coup or a direct military take over.⁸ The first potent challenge to the military regime came in the late 1960's partly owing to the "structural tensions caused by the non-compatibility between the bureaucratic and democratic institutions"⁹ under the political system devised by Ayub Khan. Partly it was due to the external factors such as an inconclusive war with India in September 1965, growing opposition to the post-war Tashkent accord led by Ayub Khan's own Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto and a cut-off in arms aid from the USA. His successor Yahya Khan planned to perpetuate the existing balance of power while allowing the facade of elections¹⁰ were foiled by the Awami League's outright victory in the 1970 general elections. This deepened a rift between Sheikh Mujib Rehman's Awami League and the military-bureaucratic axis of West

⁵ Stephen Cohen's study of the Pakistan's army gives an excellent analysis of the historical data on the social composition and geographical recruitment patterns of the army. See, Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1984. For a detailed analysis of the Punjabi domination in the civilian democracy, see, Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 3, 201.

⁶ Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive, 1989, p. 99. Also, Aziz Siddiqui, "The Onus is on India", *Pakistan Times*, 16 April 1989.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 115.

⁸ For an excellent analysis of the evolution of Pakistan's state structure during this period, see, Jalal, *op.cit.*, Chapter Three and Four.

⁹ Mohammad Waseem, *Pakistan Under the Martial Law 1977-1985*, Lahore: Progressive, 1987, p. 15.

¹⁰ Yahya Khan had designed a safety valve in its Legal Framework Order (LFO) passed in March 1970 which gave him a veto on any document produced by the elected National Assembly as an insurance against any shifts in the balance of power due to the election results. Jalal, *op.cit.*, p. 309. For a text of the LFO provisions, see, Rizvi, *op.cit.*, pp. 174-175.

Pakistan which existed even before the elections mainly due to former's pro-India¹¹ and anti-US stance¹² and its demand for maximum provincial autonomy as outlined in Mujib's six-points plan. And later the army's action in East Pakistan changed the political calculus entirely since it was followed by India's military intervention and resulted in the disintegration of Pakistan. The Pakistani military stood discredited and it ushered in a democratic regime under Z.A. Bhutto. What then were civil-military relations like under Bhutto's civilian government and were their impact on the India-Pakistan relations?

2 Civil-Military Relations Under Z.A. Bhutto

Z.A. Bhutto's rise in the state system of Pakistan was a major breakthrough not only because it was the first and most severe blow to the military-bureaucratic axis but because he tried to bring about a structural transformation of the state apparatus. The Pakistan Peoples Party's (PPP) support base was radically different from that of the traditional power-holders both in the establishment and the society at large but Bhutto's survival in the centre depended still on the deals he could strike with the civil bureaucracy and army. Bhutto was well aware that the military was the most powerful institution and, to that extent, the most potent challenge to his authority.

Bhutto condemned "bonapartism" among senior military generals¹³ and tried to cut the military down to size by reforming the command structure of the armed forces and by making relevant changes in the Constitution¹⁴ He attached special importance to strengthening the civilian regulatory apparatus by re-invigorating the existing special police establishments and creating a new Federal Security Force. Bhutto's efforts to establish civilian supremacy over the military, however, did not yield much success. This was partly because Bhutto never curtailed the army's massive defence budgets. In fact he left no stone unturned in rebuilding the army after Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war. The budgetary allocations for defence services continued to rise during 1971-1977 period.¹⁵ Then he opted for a military solution to the Baluchistan crisis in 1973 and subsequently took the fatal step of imposing a limited Martial Law in Karachi,

¹¹ East Bengalis had a relatively softer attitude towards India partly because of the close linguistic, literary and cultural affinity between two Bengals and partly because in 1965 India had unilaterally decided not to open hostilities against an apparently defenceless East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujbir Rehman was reported to have told a British journalist that he would like to see India and East Bengal live side by side like the USA and Canada. As quoted by Rizvi, *ibid.*, p. 179; and Waseem (1989), *op.cit.*, pp. 266-270.

¹² The Bengali leadership had opposed Pakistan's entry into military pacts with the Western countries as early as in 1954. After the 1970 elections, the Awami League's constitutional draft included a provision to withdraw Pakistan from CENTO and SEATO. Waseem, *ibid.*, pp. 270-271, 287.

¹³ For Bhutto's detailed comments on this issue, see his address to the nation on 4 March 1972 as quoted in Rizvi, *op.cit.*, pp. 287-306.

¹⁴ The 1973 Constitution defined high treason as any attempt aiming at subverting constitutional rule. It also laid down the oath for the personnel of the armed forces which forbade them specifically from taking part in political activities of any kind. In September 1973, Parliament had passed a law providing for the death sentence or life imprisonment for the subversion of the Constitution.

¹⁵ For a detailed account of defence budgetary allocations during this period, see, Rizvi, *op.cit.*, pp. 204-205.

Lahore and Islamabad in April 1977, which renewed the legitimacy of the army, which had been lost in the secession of the East Pakistan in the eyes of the Pakistani public.

Somewhat similar was the story of Bhutto's administrative reforms that included an abolition of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) cadre, its merger into a linear all-Pakistan unified grade structure and the removal of the constitutional safeguards for the civil servants making them subject to normal legislative enactments. More importantly, he introduced the system of lateral entry, a powerful weapon to penetrate the unilinear structure of the civil service which often he used for distributing political patronage. However, lateral entry apparently only had a marginal success in creating a pro-PPP constituency within the state apparatus.¹⁶ The real power not only stayed with the bureaucracy but was in fact further enhanced as a result of the rapid expansion of the public sector owing to the nationalization of big industries as well as the administrative centralization of economic decision-making.

Bhutto's attempts to widen his popular base of support by making overtures to the landed elite through distribution of state patronage cost him not only the support of the urban middle class but also alienated other loyal party workers anxious to capitalize on the support generated by the regime's land and labour reforms among the rural and urban underprivileged. Bhutto erred gravely in failing to build an independent political, institutional counterweight, he so clearly needed to check the civil bureaucracy and army's dominance of the state apparatus.¹⁷ Waseem argues that Bhutto's failure was rooted in the "weakness of his class support" in the sense his constituency lacked a "structural presence within the state and was thus destined to be outmanoeuvred by those [military and bureaucracy] who were structurally well-entrenched".¹⁸

2.1 Implications for India-Pakistan Relations

Bhutto had tried to recast Pakistan's regional defence imperatives by mending fences with India. His coming to power in Islamabad augured well for India-Pakistan relations partly because New Delhi was now prepared to give him the concessions it would not give to a military regime. Moreover, Bhutto's democratic government did not face the legitimacy problems which had often driven Pakistan's military rulers to portray the Indian threat as the *raison d'être* of their regimes. With a popular mandate behind him he

¹⁶ Bhutto was accused of installing inefficient individuals from the PPP as lateral entrants. See, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III (Misuse of the Instruments of the State Power)*, Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1979, Annexe 24, pp. 158-165. However, Kennedy argues that while political affiliations did play a role in selecting the lateral entrants, it affected less than one-third of those selected. Besides 91% of such officers were recruited into the Secretariat and Foreign Office Service Groups, both of which had only marginal policy-making importance in the country. See, Charles H. Kennedy, "Analysis of the Lateral Recruitment Programme to the Federal Bureaucracy in Pakistan 1973-1978", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 3, Summer 1980, pp. 46-47.

¹⁷ Jalal, *op.cit.*, pp. 314-317.

¹⁸ Waseem (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 361.

signed the Simla Agreement.

This initiated a reconciliation process between India and Pakistan which may be termed as the biggest contribution towards confidence building between the two countries. It does not mean, however, that anti-Indian sentiments were conspicuous by its absence during Bhutto's rule. On the contrary, he persisted in his efforts to counter-balance India in the regional context by rebuilding the Pakistani army and initiating a nuclear weapons programme. But it may be argued that he had accepted the basic principle of mutual co-existence and his reference to the Indian threat was meant more for his domestic audience than the policy makers in New Delhi. But Bhutto did not last in power for long. With the military coup in July 1977, the Pakistani army was once again back in the political arena.

3 Civil-Military Relations Under Zia-ul-Haq's Military Regime

General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime faced an acute legitimacy crisis and his strategy to meet this challenge included an introduction of an alternative source of legitimacy in the Islamic ideology of the state. Zia justified his mission by arguing that Pakistan and Islam were two sides of the same coin and the protection and integrity of both was a task which the military establishment alone was capable of performing.¹⁹ He had recourse to Islamic ideology to introduce changes in the political system as specified under the 1973 Constitution. He declared that elections on a party basis were against the Quran and Sunna, thus, repudiating the parliamentary form of government,²⁰ since they were all based on a Western and therefore non-Islamic model. In 1981 Zia decided to establish a federal advisory council, the Majlis-i-Shoora, wholly appointed by the President for a four years term.²¹ The second line of Zia's strategy was to co-opt certain Islamic political parties to boost his programme of Islamisation,²² and members of rural landed elite and commercial

¹⁹ Zia held that Pakistan's armed forces were responsible not only for safeguarding the country's territorial integrity but also its ideological basis. Rizvi, *op.cit.*, p. 242; *Muslim*, 14 March 1984. Similar views were expressed by General Rahimuddin, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General K.M. Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff and several other senior officers. This was clearly an undisguised attempt of the military to reserve their right to step into the domestic politics on the pretext of protecting the Islamic ideology of Pakistan.

²⁰ This was put forward by the 1983 Ansari Commission Report based on the recommendation of the Council of Islamic ideology. See, *Report of the Ansari Commission*, Islamabad, 4 August 1983. It is interesting to note however that the government had chosen to ignore the first report by the Council of Islamic Ideology submitted in April 1982 which did not favour elections on a non-party basis. The summary of this report was published in *Muslim*, 27 July 1982.

²¹ The Shoora had no effective powers over the executive. Its main purpose was to give the regime a semblance of legitimacy by inducting members of the top socio-economic strata into the ambit of state patronage so as to enable Zia safely to call for elections to the national and provincial councils. Jalal, *op.cit.*, p. 322.

²² The ulema emerged as a major political force during Zia's period. He courted the religious parties like Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan in Sindh and Jamiat-i-Islami along with other orthodox religious leaders who supported his moves for Islamisation. Jannaat derived benefits by enjoying a relative freedom to engage in low keyed political activity and also extended its influence in the bureaucracy, the military, the mass media and educational institutions. Thus for the military government the threat of political agitation by a party with a highly disciplined cadre was temporarily eliminated. It also helped the military regime to undercut the efforts of other political groups to launch political agitation against the government. Rizvi, *op.cit.*, pp. 236-237; and Jalal, *ibid.*, p. 321.

and trading groups belonging to migrant population of Punjabi middle and lower middle class.²³

General Zia adopted a softer approach in Pakistan's external policy towards India. Keeping in mind the Afghanistan crisis on Pakistan's western borders, he perhaps wanted to avoid any conflictual situation to arise on its eastern front. Zia, therefore, put forward the proposals of a Mutual Balanced Reduction in Forces and a No War Pact with India. But in view of Pakistan's acceptance of the US military aid and renewal of US-Pak military alliance, New Delhi became suspicious of Pakistan's underlying motives in this respect. Moreover, General Zia-ul-Haq being a military ruler could not win the trust of Mrs. Indira Gandhi²⁴ and the state of India-Pakistan relations during this period may be described as lukewarm at best.

3.1 A Quasi-Civilian Government Under M.K. Junejo

At home, General Zia decided to give a civilian face to the military regime and held a referendum in 1984 to get a popular mandate for another five years. Later he declared that he would be prepared to 'share power' with the elected representatives and therefore announced the holding of national and provincial elections on a non-party basis. Despite an opposition boycott by the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) led by the PPP,²⁵ the general public responded very favourably. Zia-ul-Haq appointed M.K. Junejo as his Prime Minister in what emerged as a 'quasi-civilian' government since Martial Law was still in place. The political system was still tilted heavily in favour of the President and the Prime Minister remained at his mercy.²⁶ Subsequently Junejo's and Benazir Bhutto's dismissal by the President demonstrated beyond doubt as to who was in a dominant position.

In civil-military relations, a new arrangement of power-sharing was emerging whereby the President backed by the army would lay down the 'rules of the game' and the Prime Minister would have to abide by them. An informal division of labour operated between the civilian and military wings under the Junejo government. Defence, foreign affairs and national security (including intelligence and the nuclear programme) were to remain in the exclusive domain of General Zia who exercised his power through his *protégé* Lt. General (retd) Yaqub Ali Khan as the Foreign Minister. The rest - managing the economy,

²³ For Zia's politics of co-optation, see, Rodney W. Jones, "The Military and Security in Pakistan", in Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1985, pp. 77-78. And for an analysis of the urban and rural groups support to Zia's regime, see, Robert LaPorte Jr., "Urban Groups and the Zia Regime", pp. 7-22; and Charles H. Kennedy, "Rural Groups and Stability of the Zia Regime", pp. 23-46, in the same book.

²⁴ This point shall be taken up for further discussion in section eight of this chapter.

²⁵ The MRD was a left-oriented political alliance which was dominated by the PPP and was set up in February 1981. It included nine political parties namely the PPP, the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Tehriq-i-Istiqlal, Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin-Qasim group), the Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi (QMA), the Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party (PMKP), the JUI, the Pakistan National Party (PNP), the Awami Tehriq and the NAP (Paktoonkhwah).

²⁶ This was accomplished through an executive order issued by Zia on 2 March 1985. The Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order (RCO) introduced amendments to 67 out of 280 articles of the Constitution. Thereby the top executive authority shifted to the President who could now declare an emergency, abrogate parliament, suspend fundamental rights, restrict the jurisdiction of the judiciary and most important of all could appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister.

running the administration and handling the political forces - remained the prerogative of the Prime Minister.²⁷

However it was the differences over control of foreign affairs that became one of the major issues eventually leading to Junejo's dismissal in 1988. The first serious problem surfaced in February 1986 over ties with India. President Zia, during his visit to Delhi in December 1985, had decided to initiate the process of normalization regardless of the resolution of the Kashmir issue.²⁸ An important component of this process were discussions on trade and economic cooperation which the incumbent Finance Minister, Dr. Mahbubul Haq pursued actively, perhaps directly under Presidential orders bypassing the Prime Minister. But Junejo's government managed to reverse the process by issuing a strongly worded statement at a time when the Indian Foreign Secretary was in Islamabad that there would be no normalization without a just settlement of Kashmir. Later Dr. Mahbubul Haq was divested of his finance portfolio in the cabinet.²⁹ Junejo's decision to remove Sahabzada Yaqub Khan from his cabinet in November 1987 and subsequently an explosion at an ammunition depot in 1988 acted as a catalyst in Zia's growing estrangement from the political system he himself had created.

Apparently Yaqub's exit was followed by an informal instruction by the Prime Minister that henceforth no file from the Foreign Office would be sent to the President. Now the President felt not only that he was losing control over his favourite area, foreign affairs, but that there was a deliberate design on part of Junejo to exclude him entirely from the domain of foreign policy.³⁰ The political arrangement designed by Zia was such that Junejo could become only as powerful as Zia wanted him to be. The moment Junejo, in the parliamentary framework, seemed to take the political initiative away from the hands of the President, the military-bureaucratic axis of the state structure bounced back with full vigour and this resulted in Junejo's dismissal.

General Zia's sudden death in August 1988 and the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Mirza Aslam Beg's declaration that the army was to stay out of politics had paved the way for party-based elections. But the legacies of the long span of military rule in terms of an unquestionable supremacy of the

²⁷ Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years*, Lahore: Progressive, 1990, pp. 172, 244; and Waseem (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 427.

²⁸ See, Zia's interview with Abdul Tawab Abdul Hai Al-Mussawar, *President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq's Interviews to the Foreign Media*, vol. VII, January-December 1985, Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, p. 192.

²⁹ Hussain, *op.cit.*, pp. 176, 245. Also see, Maleeha Lodhi, "Indo-Pak Deadlock Unlikely to be Resolved Soon", *Muslim*, 5 August 1986.

³⁰ Hussain, *ibid.*, p. 246. Also see, Rajendra Sareen, "Political Scuttle By Zia", *The Tribune*, 13 June 1988; "Zia Dismantles the Quasi-Democratic Set-Up", *India Today*, 30 June 1988, pp. 82-83; and Maleeha Lodhi, "Evaluating the Zia-ul-Haq Era", *The News*, 18 September 1991.

military-bureaucratic elite in the state apparatus were there to stay. This would result in a new system of power sharing in the form of a troika consisting of the Army Chief, the President and Prime Minister. How did this system emerge and work ?

4 The Emergence of The Troika: Benazir Bhutto's Regime

In the 1988 elections, the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the centre but it lost the crucial state of Punjab to IJI (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad)³¹ Benazir Bhutto was invited to form the government but not before she had accepted the requisite 'ground rules' including continuity in important foreign policy matters, support for Ghulam Ishaq Khan for the President's post, no reduction in the defence budget and retention of Sahabzada Yaqub Khan as the Foreign Minister.³² A military source reiterated that with these conditions, the army had seen to it that it continued to wield the real power in the country.³³ Benazir Bhutto was perhaps aware of it, as was evident from her statement

It is obvious that the civilian regime has no option but to permit the armed forces of Pakistan to retain an *autonomy, that is neither sanctioned by the constitution nor is in the larger interests of the state.*³⁴

Thus, a troika in the power structure of Pakistan had emerged with the President acting as the 'eyes, ears and hands' of the Army Chief and the Prime Minister wielding the least political influence among the three. P.L.

Bhola puts it aptly

the office of Prime Minister in Pakistan ... does not necessarily confer power on the incumbent of the office in an operational sense, unless he or she has the capacity to manoeuvre within the power structure [troika] of Pakistan.³⁵

Benazir Bhutto, too, was not going to last in power for long. Her mission to repeal the 8th amendment³⁶ alienated the President and she fell out with the bureaucracy because of her attempts to bypass them. Further,

³¹ IJI was comprised of Jamiat-i-Islami, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhasti group), the National People's Party, the Markazi Jamiat Ahla Hadith, the Jamiatul Mushaikh, the Hizbe Jihad and Fakhar Imam's Azad Group.

³² See, "Limited Options: Prime Minister Benazir Prepares for Real Problems", *India Today*, 15 November 1988; and "Pakistan Elections: Tasting Democracy", *India Today*, 15 November 1988, pp. 24-27.

³³ Zahid Hussain, "About Turn ?", *Newline*, February 1992, p. 26.

³⁴ See, *The Way Out: Interviews, Impressions, Statements and Messages, Benazir Bhutto*, Karachi: Mahmood Publishers, 1988, p. 150. (italics added).

³⁵ P.L. Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto: Opportunities and Challenges*, New Delhi: Yuvraj Publishers, 1989, p. 9.

³⁶ This amendment had shifted the balance of power clearly and decisively in favour of the President as opposed to the Prime Minister. It meant that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was elected indirectly, could overrule the decisions of Parliament which was elected directly by the country at large. Besides, under the changed law, the executive authority of the Federation was vested in the President and the Prime Minister's advice was no longer binding on him and the validity of the President's actions was not to be challenged. Above all, the supreme command of the armed forces was vested in the President. These changes made the Presidency the most powerful institution in the country. Parliament was a sovereign body only in name because the President could dissolve it with a stroke of pen. Waseem (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 457. Also see, Mushahid Hussain, "President Plays Key Political Role", *Times of India*, 18 July 1989; "Benazir Bhutto's Struggle for Survival", *India Today*, 15 October 1989, p. 109; Dilip Mukerji, "Ms Bhutto's Predicament: Sharing Power to Survive", *Times of India*, 4 May 1990; and Khurshid Hasan, "Why the System is Not Working ?", *The News*, 26 October 1991.

her half-hearted attempts to assert civilian supremacy over the army's role in domestic politics from an essentially weak position only confirmed army's worst suspicions about her and the PPP.³⁷ Furthermore Benazir Bhutto's limited electoral support resulting in a confrontation between the Centre and the provinces, particularly the Punjab, severely constrained her manoeuvrability. A divided parliament and continued confrontation between the ruling PPP and the opposition IJI strengthened the military's position as the final arbiter. General Mirza Aslam Beg emerged as the most powerful member of the ruling trioka. The army's effective veto over Pakistan's democracy was illustrated by Benazir Bhutto herself, who on being questioned about the possibility of cutting the defence budget responded

surely ... if you want to invite the Martial Law,... [and on another occasion commented that] ... realistically speaking, given the present situation, it would be very difficult for any government to survive without the critical backing of the armed forces.³⁸

4.1 Implications for India-Pakistan Relations

Benazir Bhutto also tried to overstep the military's mark in external affairs by giving a new direction to Pakistan's foreign policy particularly in its relations with India. Her attempts to improve relations with India without a full backing from the President and the Army Chief demonstrated yet again the powerful effect of the internal dynamics of politics on Pakistan's external policies. The SAARC summit in Islamabad in December 1988 had offered Benazir Bhutto an early opportunity to meet her Indian counterpart Rajiv Gandhi. Their interaction was marked both by a 'new generation element' and the popular perceptions of being the torch-bearers of the stalled process of India-Pakistan normalisation initiated by the 1972 Simla Agreement signed by their parents. The two Prime Ministers displayed a keen desire to put the strained Indo-Pak relations on a new and peaceful footing. Benazir Bhutto wrote in her autobiography,

I symbolise a new generation. I had never been an Indian. I had been born in an independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes, prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody traumas of partition. Perhaps the people were hoping that a *new generation could avoid the hostility* that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grand parents to live together as friends. And I certainly felt it was possible ...³⁹

One of Benazir Bhutto's advisors echoed such views and stated that "most of PPP members of the National

³⁷ For a discussion on her differences with the army, see, Mushahid Hussain, "Ms. Bhutto Again at Odds With General Beg", *Times of India*, 18 July 1990; Maleeha Lodhi, "Beg, Bhutto: Collusion Course ?", *Newsline*, August 1990, pp. 32-33; "Back to Brink", *Times of India*, 7 August 1990; and Maleeha Lodhi, "Why Benazir Bhutto Fell ?", *The News*, 6 August 1991.

³⁸ As quoted by Dilip Mukerji, "Zia's Military Legacy", *Round Table*, no. 310, 1989, pp. 179, 187. It may be noted that Benazir Bhutto maintained the defence expenditure, the 1989-1990 defence budget sanctioned Rs. 51.77 billion, 36.9% of the total government expenditure. See, M. Isphahani, "Pakistan's Dimensions of Insecurity", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 246, 1989-1990, p. 12-13.

³⁹ Benazir Bhutto, *The Daughter of the East*, London, Macmillan 1988, p. 55. (italics added).

Assembly are young and educated and understand the need to live together with India. We are free of the *jihad* syndrome".⁴⁰ Three accords were signed between India and Pakistan in line with this 'new thinking'.

Rajiv Gandhi's second visit to Pakistan in July 1989 raised the hopes that it would give a definite boost to the continuing process of confidence building between the two countries. However, since President Ghulam Ishaq Khan did not endorse fully this policy of promoting Indo-Pak detente, he chose to adopt a hard line posture. He told the visiting Indian Prime Minister that Pakistan viewed with concern the hegemonic designs of New Delhi and meaningful ties could only be developed if this irritant was removed. Later when Benazir Bhutto was questioned by an Indian journalist on this issue, she could only pretend ignorance and simply said that she had not read the President's statement.⁴¹ Benazir also came under strong attack from the opposition for being soft on India. They accused her of succumbing to Indian hegemony, of neglecting relations with other SAARC countries for the sake of cultivating India and, most provocatively of all, of abandoning the cause of Kashmir.⁴² Mushahid Hussain, however, argues that there was no real change in PPP's India policy from that of the Zia regime. On some key areas such as the establishment of the Joint Ministerial Commission (under the Joint Commission agreement signed in 1982 between Zia-ul-Haq and Indira Gandhi), the agreement on non-attack on nuclear facilities, where India and Pakistan tried to improve their relations under Benazir Bhutto's civilian regime, the groundwork was laid by the previous regime. Further on three core issues with India like Kashmir, Siachin and nuclear non-proliferation, Benazir Bhutto did not make any compromise contrary to the establishment's interests.⁴³

The most brazen attempt to scuttle the Indo-Pak rapprochement under Benazir Bhutto was made by

⁴⁰ "Benazir Bhutto: A New Challenge", *India Today*, 15 December 1988, p. 85. Also see, Parminder S. Bhogal, "Pakistan's India Policy: Shift From Zia to Benazir", *India Quarterly*, vol. XLV, no. 1, January-March 1989, pp. 40-42; Salim Durrani, "India-Pakistan Relations: The Benazir Factor", *Frontier Post*, 28 March 1989; and Mushahid Hussain, "Democratic Pakistan: Benazir Presides Over a Difficult Transition", in Kalim Bahadur and Uma Singh, eds., *Pakistan's Transition to Democracy*, New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1989, pp. 150-161.

⁴¹ It may be noted that a year after her dismissal, Benazir Bhutto disclosed that Ishaq Khan had tried to tape her conversations with Rajiv Gandhi during his first visit to Islamabad and then tried to throw her out on 'trumped-up charges' of having given away some state secrets to Rajiv Gandhi. See, Benazir Bhutto's interview in *India Today*, 15 December 1991, p. 55. This shows the President's distrust of Benazir Bhutto when it came to her India policy.

⁴² Syed Riffat Hussain looks at the causal role of foreign policy issues in the undoing of Benazir Bhutto's regime. He argues that Benazir Bhutto's efforts to normalize relations with India against the backdrop of the uprising in Kashmir and her potentially nuclear non-proliferationist stance were viewed with suspicion by the establishment. By the second half of 1989, Benazir Bhutto was declared a 'security risk' and sensitive matters of national security were handled by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg with the Prime Minister being taken into confidence only on perfunctory and routine matters. See, Syed Riffat Hussain, "Benazir's Downfall: The International Dimension", *The News*, 10 August 1991; and Anwar Iqbal, "Indo-Pak Relations: PPP Making Too Many Concessions", *Muslim*, 12 July 1989.

⁴³ Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan's India Policy: Has it Really Changed?", *Muslim*, 31 July 1989. Also see, "Why Should the PPP Continue With Zia's Foreign Policy", interview of Asghar Khan, leader of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal in *Viewpoint*, vol. 14, no. 38, 11 May 1989, p. 13.

none other than her own Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, who was perhaps acting on the Presidential orders. During his February 1990 'peace mission' to India, he actually delivered an ultimatum.⁴⁴ He reportedly told his Indian counterpart, Mr. I.K. Gujral that if New Delhi did not meet a certain deadline then the "subcontinent would be set on fire".⁴⁵ Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's tough talk in New Delhi produced the desired result. After an emergency meeting of cabinet, Prime Minister V.P. Singh declared that India would "retaliate even if it meant war" and after that there was no going back on the war of words and escalating tensions on the Kashmir border.⁴⁶

The experience of foreign policy decisions during the Junejo and Benazir Bhutto's regimes illustrates the difficulties that is becoming a permanent feature of Pakistan's power structure due to a lack of consensus in the establishment regarding its approach towards India. Earlier President Zia was in favour of normalization of relations with India but Junejo's government managed to subvert that process. Subsequently when the Benazir Bhutto government tried to mend fences with India, the President and the Army Chief became suspicious of her moves and that sealed the fate of her initiatives in this direction. From this point of view, Nawaz Sharif's IJI victory in the 1990 elections, provided for the first time a harmony between the entrenched elements of the establishment, that is the army and the President and the representative democratic forces in Pakistan. The IJI's excellent rapport with the two mighty pillars of the ruling establishment, President Ishaq Khan with his discretionary constitutional powers and the army, indisputably the final arbiter of things in Pakistan augured well for the new government.⁴⁷ We now turn to an examination of the working of troika during Nawaz Sharif's regime.

5 The Working of Troika Under Nawaz Sharif

Initially Sharif carefully avoided any major differences with the President and tried to keep the army

⁴⁴ It may be noted that on an earlier occasion too, a Pakistan Senate's resolution on Kashmir and the rights of minorities in India drafted by Sahabzada Yaqub Khan had evoked a sharp statement against Islamabad, the first from New Delhi after Benazir Bhutto had come to power. *Times of India*, 21 September 1989. Perhaps that is why, on an earlier occasion, Benazir Bhutto had chosen Aitzaz Hasan, Minister of Interior, who reflected her thinking, over Sahabzada Yaqub Khan as her personal emissary to New Delhi in March 1989 to carry forward the constructive dialogue with Rajiv Gandhi initiated in December 1988. See, Inder Malhotra, "Distant Neighbours Coming Closer", *Sunday Observer*, 16 March 1989.

⁴⁵ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

⁴⁶ "Benazir Bhutto: The Fading Glitter", *India Today*, 31 December 1989, pp. 139-141.

⁴⁷ It may be noted that the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) had played a key role in the formation of IJI, the nine party coalition which included both factions of Pakistan's Muslim League led by Junejo and Nawaz Sharif but also organized its election campaign in order to put up a joint front against Benazir Bhutto's PPP in the 1988 elections. There is clear evidence that the army did not want the PPP to return to power. Again in the 1990 elections, the ISI and other key members of the establishment, including the President, tried to play a peacemaking role aimed at binding the IJI into a unified force. Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, "General Elections?", *Newsline*, October 1990, p. 23.

generals happy by increasing the defence budget. But at the same time when he tried to increase his manoeuvrability within the troika he, too, had to learn the limits of his power. Idrees Bakhtiar puts it aptly,

Nawaz Sharif encountered the same problem that three successive Prime Ministers [Junejo, Benazir and Sharif himself], the caretaker one [Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi] excepted - ran into, perhaps as a natural corollary of their job. After being installed, they immediately became oblivious to the bitter realities of power politics in Pakistan and became convinced that they were actually in command. As a result, they began to break the rules that may not have been spelled out to them in clear terms, but unfortunately exist and have governed the political theatre for at least the last decade and a half.⁴⁸

Sharif's major differences with General Beg came to the fore at the time of the Gulf War. General Beg condemned the coalition attack on Iraq and adopted a stringently anti-American position, whereas Sharif's government opposed Iraq and stood by the USA and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁹ Moreover, Sharif's attempts to cut back some of the powers of the army, his removal of Sahabzada Yaqub Khan as the Foreign Minister and that of Ijlal Haider Zaidi from the Defence Advisor's post, both *protégés* of the army and the President, created a stir. He also annoyed the President by trying to repeal the 8th amendment.

Notwithstanding his differences with General Beg and the constant speculation about another military take-over, Sharif managed to establish his authority by playing a decisive role in choosing General Beg's successor.⁵⁰ The new Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Asif Nawaz Janjua, was known to be most amenable to civilian control over the army. He described himself as a "non-political officer" and stated categorically that "the army must have nothing to do with politics".⁵¹

5.1 Implications for India-Pakistan Relations

With regard to Pakistan's India policy, the IJI's pre-electoral antagonistic image of India was somewhat moderated in the IJI government's policies.⁵² There were many leaders in the IJI who realized

⁴⁸ Idrees Bakhtiar, "The PM Put in His Place", *The Herald*, August 1991, p. 23. Also see, Ayaz Amir, "The Taming of Nawaz Sharif", in the same issue, pp. 30-31.

⁴⁹ General Beg had predicted that the Gulf War would become another Vietnam for the US but the quick end of war put him in an embarrassing position. Iraq's crushing defeat meant a loss for General Beg and brought *ipso facto* credit to Sharif for not jeopardizing the vitally important relationship with the USA and Saudi Arabia. Inder Malhotra, "Pakistan's Troubled Troika", *Times of India*, 28 March 1991; "Beg to Differ", *The Statesman*, 18 April 1991; Dilip Mukerji, "Tensions Within the Troika: Sharif's Bid to Gain More Clout", *Times of India* 9 July 1991; and Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations Under General Beg", *Defence Journal*, no. 6 & 7, 1991, p. 20.

⁵⁰ See, Maleeha Lodhi, "Pakistan Military: Changing of Guard", *The News*, 12 March 1991; "Nawaz Sharif Delivers a Coup", *The Hindu*, 15 June 1991. Also see, Ahmed Rashid, "A Fundamental Shift", *Herald*, vol. 25, no. 5, February 1992, pp. 46-47.

⁵¹ Maleeha Lodhi, "COAS Describes Himself as a Non-Political Officer", *The News*, 26 September 1991.

⁵² S.D. Muni argued that the IJI was likely to follow Zia's India policy of trying to maintain normal state-to-state relations while extending full support to the militants in Punjab and Kashmir. See, S.D. Muni, "Return of Zia Legacy: What Does it Portend For Relations With India", *The Hindu*, 22 November 1990.

that while an anti-India stance was useful to fight elections, it could become a suicidal liability for a democratically elected government because growing tensions would mean an increased army control over its policies. Nawaz Sharif assured that "India should have no worries at all. We are friends of India and we want peace we stand for solid moves towards friendship".⁵³ This was underlined in his greetings to the new Indian Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar and also conveyed through his special envoy Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan to India.

However there were still no signs of a consensus within the troika with regard to Pakistan's relations with India. For instance, in April 1990 when General Beg issued a statement about the threats to the country's security and the possibility of an attack by India,⁵⁴ the Foreign Office issued a speedy contradiction saying there was no cause for alarm.⁵⁵ Again in February 1992, just before Prime Minister Sharif's meeting with his counterpart Narashima Rao in Davos in Switzerland, Pakistan's High Commissioner to India, Abdul Sattar, issued a strong statement in which he accused India with "unleashing repression on the people of Kashmir and bludgeoning them into submission".⁵⁶ The statement baffled most political observers in India. The official spokesman for the External Affairs Ministry in India said

*We are somewhat curious as to which body of opinion within Pakistan, the High Commissioner has sought to represent in making such statements. [He added that] ... given the inner contradictions in Pakistan's polity, there are several elements within the country who are vehemently opposed to normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.*⁵⁷

Inder Malhotra, a columnist who knew Abdul Sattar very closely remarked that "There are only two possibilities: either Sattar was part of a very well orchestrated Pakistani attempt to throw India off its feet by speaking in different voices or his performance was a result of internal warfare within Pakistan's ruling

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ General Beg stated that the freedom struggle of the people of Kashmir was gaining momentum and it was now impossible to suppress it and cautioned that "it is quite likely that in sheer desperation India would lead to a venture against Pakistan". See, "Beg Cautions Against Indian Aggression", *Pakistan Times*, 22 July 1991.

⁵⁵ The Foreign Office spokesman said that no threatening or abnormal troop movements has been reported on the borders and that the Directors-General of Military Operations of both the countries were in normal contact and there was no cause for any alarm. Regarding General Beg's statement, he said that "it was not directed at the immediate situation on the Indo-Pak borders. General Beg had mentioned the problems facing India which could lead to a certain course of action. He did not say that an Indian threat was imminent". The spokesman added that Prime Minister Sharif and his government were interested in establishing good neighbourly and tension-free relations with India. See, "No War Threat Says FO", *Nation*, 25 July 1991. It is interesting to note that Benazir Bhutto came out promptly with a statement criticizing severely the Foreign Office spokesman for contradicting the Army Chief's stand.

⁵⁶ Abdul Sattar's interview in *Pioneer*, 2 February 1992. This particular incident would be taken up for further discussion in Chapter Nine.

⁵⁷ *Pioneer*, 4 February 1992. (italics added).

establishment".⁵⁸

Notwithstanding the controversy generated by Sattar's interview, the two Prime Ministers, Sharif and Rao had a very warm meeting in Davos on 2 February and yet barely hours later Sharif called for a national general strike to express solidarity with Kashmiris. Although the Indian Foreign Office deplored Sharif's strike call, Narasimha Rao remarked that he was least surprised by Pakistan's moves. Two days later, the JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) insisted on crossing the Line of Actual Control on 11 February and Pakistan's National Assembly passed a resolution supporting the Kashmiri struggle. Subsequently, however, Sharif's government and the army undertook a number of efforts to stop the JKLF from crossing the border.

One may draw two conclusions from the entire episode. Firstly that the members of Pakistan's ruling troika were still pulling in different directions in relation to India. Secondly, India was beginning to appreciate better the domestic constraints of Pakistani Prime Minister. India's ex-Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh felt that Sharif must have told Rao in Davos that he would not allow the JKLF march into the Indian territory but he would have to do something else to placate public's feelings on Kashmir.⁵⁹

An analysis of the power structure of Pakistan from an historical-structural perspective shows an institutional dominance of the military-bureaucratic axis over democratic institutions like Parliament and more specifically the Prime Minister. Over years the centre of the decision-making in Pakistan has shifted to the army's headquarters and then to the President's office. The following section examines civil-military relations in Pakistan from a participant's perspective.

6 A View From Inside

The present author's interaction with members of the Pakistani ruling elites including the top military generals, Foreign Office officials and the intellectual community at large substantiated this proposition further. A senior ex-army general of Pakistan, for instance, affirmed that army has always played a *decisive* role in shaping the foreign and defence policies of the state.⁶⁰ Although he cautioned that "today the army has no role to play [in foreign policy-making] and the country is hundred percent under the civilian control",

⁵⁸ For S.K. Singh, India's former Foreign Secretary's views on this issue, see, Kuldip Kumar, "Matching Eyeballs Again", *Pioneer*, 14 February 1992. An Indian scholar believed that perhaps Sattar was acting on the Presidential orders because Ishaq Khan was not happy with Nawaz Sharif. This view was supported by another Indian journalist who saw an internal power struggle behind the renewed Pakistani attempts to raise the Kashmir issue. In interviews conducted in New Delhi in Winter 1991-1992.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ In an interview with the present author in October 1991. (*italics added*)

his thinking was perhaps revealed by the fact that he was an ardent supporter of the idea of a new political system for Pakistan in which the army is given a permanent constitutional role, originally a brainchild of General Zia.⁶¹ General Zia always wanted that

the army should have a permanent constitutional role ... in the running of the country ... [for it] to perform the role of a *watchdog* ... or [act as] a balancing force to maintain stability and to keep the [political] parties on the rails ...⁶²

Zia had amended the 1973 constitution that allowed him to retain the COAS's position and become the President as well, so that he would serve as a "bridge between the military and the civilian government", and to "ensure that there [would] never be another military coup".⁶³ His successor, General Mirza Aslam Beg, acknowledged that due to a "long period of Martial Law ... armed forces [do] get politicised and that despite his efforts to keep out of political matters of the state ... time and again [he has] been drawn into it grudgingly though".⁶⁴ With regard to the Army Chief's role in foreign policy making, General Beg stated that

the task of the army was to defend the country against external and internal threats and that is why, it often appeared that we were interfering in the matters of the state and stressed that we had to take certain decisions only to *ensure that the matters may not get out of hand*.⁶⁵

A clearer assessment of the role of the Army Chief in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy was outlined by a top official of Pakistan's Foreign Office who held that the "the army draws the wider parameters within which the civilian government has the leverage to formulate its own policies".⁶⁶ The army also lays down certain conditions such as no reduction in the defence budget and no interference in its internal affairs. It has a decisive control over the country's nuclear programme and perhaps also requires its prior assent on any agreement with a third country that would affect them directly, for instance, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction, a proposal earlier put forward by General Zia himself and lately by the Indian side.

These views are largely shared by the intellectual community in Pakistan comprising of

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² (*italics added*). This theme occurred constantly in General Zia's interviews over a period of nearly ten years from 1977 to 1986. For some of Zia's interviews in which he outlines his ideas on this issue, see, 'Interviews to the Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 2, January-December 1979, in an interview with Smith Hampstone, pp. 116-117; with Kuldip Nayar, pp. 131-133; and with Khuswant Singh, p. 220; in vol. 3, January-December 1980, in an interview with Kuldip Nayar, p. 69; in vol. 5, January-December 1982, in an interview with Rajendra Sareen, p. 31; in vol. 6, January-December 1983 and in an interview with Geoffrey Malone, pp. 48-49.

⁶³ *ibid.*, vol. 9, January-December 1986 in an interview with Anne Hoose, p. 74. He always held that the armed forces should be under the Head of the State and not the Chief Executive and that the COAS should be appointed by the President.

⁶⁴ "General Mirza Aslam Beg's Major Presentations, Excerpts from Press Briefings (13 September 1989)", *Defence Journal*, no. 6-7, 1991, pp. 47-48.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 50. (*italics added*).

⁶⁶ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

academicians, journalists, politicians, ex-government officials among others. A Pakistani expert on civil-military relations agreed that the army continues to play a very important role in Pakistani politics and foreign policy-making and "its contribution to the decision-making apparatus would be about 60%, while the rest is left for civilian politicians and others".⁶⁷

Further a continuous conflict between the political and military bureaucratic elite within Pakistani establishment has often affected adversely the evolution of mature foreign policy approach with India. In the early years, several well-meaning attempts to reduce the salience of India-Pakistan conflict were frustrated owing to this internal tug-of-war.⁶⁸ During the late 1960's, the undercurrents of rivalry between Bhutto and Ayub on one hand and their shared animosity towards Mujib Rehman was an important factor that drove Pakistan to its disintegration and a war with India in 1971. After Zia too, "multiple power centres" in the Pakistani decision-making apparatus,⁶⁹ symbolised in the troika, only increased the Indian government's confusion as regards the chain of command in the power structure of Pakistan. Mushahid Hussain points out that New Delhi became "uncomfortable" in dealing with the civilian regime under Junejo because India found it more perplexing to deal with a duality in Pakistan's power structure, in sharp contrast to the "clear chain of command" when Zia was running the administration under the Martial Law. He reports that during a meeting with Indian intellectuals in late 1986, Rajiv Gandhi had stated that he found it "more confusing now" to deal with Pakistan, given what he termed were the "three different forces influencing the policies which were President Zia and the military, PM Junejo and the Muslim League government and the political forces outside the system (MRD).⁷⁰ These views were substantiated by an eminent Indian official who agreed that the decision-making apparatus in Pakistan was very "complicated ... where Foreign Office *does not* take all decisions, particularly in relation to India".⁷¹

Some from this school of thought believe that notwithstanding the fact that Zia was a military ruler, he was in a good position to improve relations with India and that the Indian leadership missed a good

⁶⁷ In an interview with the present author in October 1991. This view was supported by a number of interviews conducted in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi by the present author.

⁶⁸ This point has already been discussed in Chapter Four.

⁶⁹ This term was used by a noted Pakistani journalist in an interview with the present author in October 1991.

⁷⁰ Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 250. We have already discussed the divergent policies of Benazir Bhutto and President Ishaq Khan towards India.

⁷¹ He felt that the senior diplomats in Pakistan had a little leverage in negotiating and they generally adhered to their brief. For instance if the Indian side were to put forward a new proposal, their usual response was that they would "consult their leadership" before giving an answer. This often "took a very long time" and at times "proved to frustrate the purpose itself". In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

opportunity by refusing to do a deal with him. It is interesting to know that this view is shared by some in Pakistan as well. M.H. Askari, for instance, agreed that "Mrs. Gandhi made a mistake by not holding a meaningful dialogue with Zia India had nothing to lose, it should have accepted the Martial Law in Pakistan".⁷²

7 The Personality Factor

It is important to note that the 'personality factor' of the Army Chief position was also emphasized. For instance, it was pointed out that a liberal-minded person at the top gives the civilians a lot of room for manoeuvring which may otherwise be quite constrained if the Army Chief wants to keep a tight leash on the country's foreign affairs.⁷³ General Zia had kept a complete and tight control over Pakistan's foreign affairs, thus, limiting severely the manoeuvrability of the civilian government. His successor, General Beg, in M.B. Naqvi's words, was "not only a member of the ruling Troika [but also] appeared to enjoy it".⁷⁴ His political role in the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government was unmistakable as it was in establishing the functional supremacy of the Presidency. He frequently issued foreign policy statements such as Pakistan's nuclear programme,⁷⁵ Indian threats of war, a new military doctrine of 'offensive-defence' and his concept of a strategic alliance with Iran and Afghanistan to gain a 'depth' *vis-à-vis* India. In contrast, most observers agree that General Asif Nawaz Janjua has steered the army towards moderation and pragmatism on both domestic and international issues. He made it clear that the army would not carry the ideological burden of the Zia era. On foreign policy issues General Asif Nawaz played a key role in retracting Pakistan's policy of seeking a military solution to the Afghanistan crisis, favoured soft pedalling on the nuclear issue and mending fences with the US as well as India.

Finally the personality factor for the top civilian leadership of the two countries is also very important. A Foreign Office official in Islamabad stated that the "vibes they produce ...[at the top level] count

⁷² It may be noted that M.H. Askari shared the Indian scholars' view that Zia was interested in improving relations with India only because he felt that it would help him in "staying in power for a longer time". But his argument was that India should have taken advantage of the opportunity anyway and agreed to strike a deal with the man, who for once could deliver the goods. Kuldip Nayar writes that with regard to India-Pakistan relations, General Ayub had told him in an interview that "I was in a position to deliver the goods and so was Nehru, but he never took me seriously". And similar views were expressed by General Zia. See, Nayar, *op.cit.*. Also see, Ghani Jafar, "Delhi's Prescription of Sovereignty", *Pakistan Times*, 13 July 1985.

⁷³ In an interview with a top official of Pakistan's Foreign Office with the present author in October 1991.

⁷⁴ M.B. Naqvi, "General Beg: A Critical Appreciation", *Defence Journal*, no. 6-7, 1991, p. 12.

⁷⁵ It may be noted that it was during Beg's regime that the nuclear lobby in Pakistan became very strong finally leading to the crossing of the nuclear threshold in 1990 and subsequently the cut-off of all US military and economic aid to Pakistan.

a lot".⁷⁶ For instance the first meeting between Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Chandra Shekhar had set a very positive tone. Similarly the good rapport between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto established in their first meeting at Islamabad is well-publicised. It was pointed out that a good rapport at the top level helps set a very positive tone for the other officials at the Foreign Office actually involved in the negotiations. An Indian Foreign Office official also stressed that the 'personality factor' in the bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan "counts a lot".⁷⁷ It was pointed out that if the other person had a positive orientation, then one could talk and continue the dialogue forward but if he was always full of rhetoric and accusation, it was tantamount to putting off the whole dialogue.⁷⁸ It may be noted, however, that although subjective considerations like the personality factor are important, this is mostly in short-term dealings and not in the ultimate analysis.

8 Indian Perceptions of the Military *vis-à-vis* Democratic Regime in Pakistan

In India there is a continuing debate on whether a military or democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan is more amenable to foster congenial and neighbourly relations⁷⁹ between India and Pakistan. There are two schools of thought in this respect. The first remains fully convinced that the very *raison d'être* of the military-bureaucratic elite in Pakistan lies in a continuing antagonistic posture *vis-à-vis* India. They argue that the militarization of politics in Pakistan has led to continuous emphasis on an external and more specifically Indian threat. It reflects the military regime's ethos and its search for legitimacy. President Ayub Khan thus stressed the 'threat from India' theme in his 1965 election campaign. Later in 1971, Yahya Khan saw 'an Indian hand' behind every move made in the name of Bengali nationalism. Muni argues that the military's vested interest in its own expansion and strength and its socialization process also kept alive the hostility towards India and on occasions precipitated armed conflicts with that country.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁷⁷ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁷⁸ In an interview with the present author in March 1992.

⁷⁹ This has been a subject of much debate in international relations. A number of scholars have arrived at an empirical generalization that democratically governed states rarely go to war with each other and are also less likely than one would expect by chance to engage in conflict short of war against other democracies. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?", *International Interactions*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1992, pp. 242-267. Also see, Carol Ember and others, "Peace Between Participatory Politics: A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Do not Fight Each Other' Hypothesis", *World Politics*, vol. 44, 1991; Juergen Klaus Gantzel, "Is Democracy a Guarantee Against War-Making Policy", *Working Paper No. 14*, Hamberg Centre for Study of Wars, Armaments, Development; and Bruce Russett and William Antholis, *Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other? Evidence From the Peloponnesian War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

⁸⁰ S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammad Ayoob, *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* New Delhi: Vikas, 1980, pp. 44-45.

The reason why India never had an armed conflict with Pakistan under General Zia, the longest serving military ruler, was attributed by some scholars to Pakistan's perceived threat from Afghanistan. It has been argued that partly due to the Soviet Union's friendly relations with India and the US pressure on Pakistan (not to antagonize India), and partly owing to the considerations of Pakistani military's ability to fight a two-front war, Zia did not want to open both the eastern and western borders to conflict. An Indian scholar argued that Zia's main objective was to perpetuate his rule and gain legitimacy. He had only two routes to that end, the first being elections which he was afraid to lose and the second was through India. Since he could not afford to take any chance with the first option, he pursued the latter.⁸¹ However, he doubted the sincerity of Zia's intentions really to improve relations with India. Zia wanted to avoid war but for him it was a tactical line and not a part of his strategic thinking.⁸² These views are shared by another scholar who argued that although Zia took a number of diplomatic initiatives to maintain normal state-to-state relations, he also pursued relentlessly the drive for parity with India in the military field (including the nuclear programme) fuelling an arms race in the region. More significantly, Zia continued to provide assistance to the extremist elements in Punjab and Kashmir.⁸³

Among the top policy makers in India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was perhaps the most significant proponent of this line of thinking. A number of interviews both in India and Pakistan divulged that deep down Mrs. Indira Gandhi never trusted General Zia-ul-Haq. Her independent stance of criticizing strongly Zia-ul-Haq's decision to hang Z.A. Bhutto and later her open vocal support to the MRD (Movement to Restore Democracy) reveals her distrust of a military ruler. A noted Pakistani journalist stated that Indira Gandhi believed that Zia was going to fail. And the political leadership of the MRD pleaded with her that if India were to hold a dialogue with the Zia regime, it would bestow upon him the legitimacy he was looking for and would not serve the cause of democracy in Pakistan. Kuldip Nayar argues, in a similar vein, that it was not because of ideological reasons that Mrs. Gandhi's government did not hold a serious dialogue with the military rulers but because it did not want the advantages of achieving an accord accrue to the military

⁸¹ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁸² *ibid.*

⁸³ S.D. Muni, "Return of Zia Legacy", *The Hindu*, 22 November 1990. In addition some newspaper reports disclosed that General Zia was the mastermind behind Operation Topac devised in April 1988 to support a low intensity conflict situation in Punjab and Kashmir by giving armed support to the militants. The validity of this report however remains disputed. See, "Zia's Assault Strategy", *Blitz*, 10 February 1990. Also see, IDR Research Team, "OpTopac: The Kashmir Imbroglio", *Indian Defence Review Digest*, vol. 7, pp. 40-53.

regime. The policy makers have been of the view that opposition parties and the democratic process in Pakistan would have been weakened and the military rulers strengthened if there had been a settlement. Such thinking prevented India from making an offer which Pakistan might find difficult to reject.⁸⁴

It is important to note that earlier in 1978 during a visit to Pakistan, even the Janata Party's Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee had commented that "Pakistan was under the Martial Law and it was not much use to talk to a government which was of transitory nature".⁸⁵ And recently Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar was quoted saying that "ten years of dictatorship under General Zia froze all progress between India and Pakistan".⁸⁶ Subsequently when Benazir Bhutto came to power in the 1989 elections, Rajiv Gandhi's government emphasized that India can talk with a democratically elected government, although it would take time for relations frozen for four decades to thaw. He pointed out

I feel with Prime Minister Bhutto, we have, for the first time in 11-12 years, an opportunity to solve the problems. We found it very difficult to deal with the military dictatorship. I feel that we can talk with a democratically elected government. We have made some progress. We understand her problems at home. We are also going ahead for elections. I believe she understands our constraints. But in spite of this, I believe that we are moving ahead.⁸⁷

In fact, Benazir Bhutto's victory in the 1988 elections was regarded as "the finest investment in improving Indo-Pak relations made by the people of Pakistan through the process of 16 November [elections]".⁸⁸

The underlying logic of this argument is that a democratically elected government with a strong domestic political base, in the long run need not depend so abjectly upon the vicious circles of domestic repression, external dependence and foreign threat - all, in a relative sense, a syndrome in which India as the historically perceived adversary becomes the easily identifiable bogey.⁸⁹ Benazir Bhutto herself echoed such thoughts

a democratically elected government would not, unlike the military regime it replaced, need to use an external threat to deflect the public's attention.⁹⁰

Overall, the attitude of this school of opinion towards a military regime in Pakistan may be characterized as

⁸⁴ Kuldip Nayar, "Time for Indo-Pak Accord", *The Tribune*, 16 February 1989.

⁸⁵ Mir Abdul Aziz, "Summit Talks: India's Negative Stance", *Morning News*, 31 August 1986.

⁸⁶ Salman Taseer, "Face to Face with India", *Frontier Post*, 14 June 1991.

⁸⁷ *The Telegraph*, 14 July 1989. Also see, Ayaz Amir, "Mending Relations With India", *Dawn*, 4 January 1989; M.K. Dhar, "Thaw in Relations With Pakistan Likely", *Hindustan Times*, 19 July 1989.

⁸⁸ V.R. Krishna Iyer, "Pakistan: General not General's", *Mainstream*, vol. 27, no. 14, p. 35. Also see, J. Bray, "Pakistan in 1989: Benazir's Balancing Act", *Round Table*, no. 310, 1989, p. 192.

⁸⁹ Ashwini K. Ray, "Pakistan's Post-Colonial Democracy: Implications for India-Pakistan Relations", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 22 April 1989, p. 867.

⁹⁰ As quoted by Bhola, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

that 'there is no point talking to them', or 'you can not trust them'. They share the belief that a civilian regime in Pakistan preferably with democratic credentials is an important pre-condition to peace and stability in India-Pakistan relations.

The second school of opinion criticizes the above proposition as a myth and argues that a weak and unstable civilian Pakistani regime with the military pulling the strings from behind has never been able to deliver the goods, when it came to improving relations between India and Pakistan.⁹¹ It is argued that the civilian regimes in Pakistan have been more susceptible to the accusations of being soft on India or selling out or giving in to Indian hegemony and therefore usually adopt a far more 'hard line' posture. It is now known, for instance, that Z.A. Bhutto since 1962, had been advocating a war with India as against a much more cautious approach by Ayub Khan. Z.A. Bhutto was also not happy with the cease-fire of 1965 war and the Tashkent agreement of 1966.⁹² and probably he also had a vested interest in the 1971 war with India and the eventual separation of East Pakistan from the West Pakistan.⁹³ It is argued that civilian leaders rather than military men are more bellicose in talking about war. The most famous slogan of Z.A. Bhutto, a popularly elected leader of Pakistan, was that of fighting a thousand years war with India over Kashmir.

Subsequently his daughter, Benazir Bhutto too belied hopes of the Indian political leadership for introducing a new era of friendship between India and Pakistan. She found her hands tied on two issues of central importance to India - the nuclear issue which was zealously guarded by the army and Pakistan's campaign in Indian Punjab which was run by the powerful ISI, often called as a 'state within a state'. Later when the political upheaval in Kashmir started in early 1990, she was repeating her father's rhetoric of fighting India for a thousand years, announcing a war chest for the Kashmiri militants in India and was seen to be visiting various capitals of Arab world berating India in relation to Kashmir.⁹⁴ The question that was

⁹¹ It is argued that ever since early 1950's, every civilian government in Pakistan that has tried to improve relations with India, has been moved out publicly or diplomatically. See, Ray, *op.cit.*, p. 867. S.P. Cohen argues that it would be wrong to believe that a democratic regime in Pakistan would be less militant than an army ruled one, for the simple reason that any politician has to pacify army. *Hindustan Times*, 9 March 1990. Also see, S. Nihal Singh, "Bhutto Sack Blow Indian Myth", *Newsline*, 14 August 1990.

⁹² Muni points out that even the British attempts at mediation during the Kutch conflict in April-May 1965 were delayed and complicated by Bhutto's intransigence. Muni (1980), *op.cit.*, p. 45. Also see, Z.A. Bhutto, *Myth of Independence*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969; *White Paper on Kashmir*, Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, January 1977; and G.W. Choudhary, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, New York: Free Press, 1975.

⁹³ *ibid.* Also see, Mohammad Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, *The Liberation War*, New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972.

⁹⁴ Pran Chopra, "Four Threats to Indo-Pak Amity", *Indian Express*, 7 February 1989; M.J. Akbar, "The Power and the Pressure", *The Telegraph*, 22 April 1990; M.V. Kamath, "Benazir Has Frittered Away a Great Opportunity", *The Telegraph*, 29 August 1990.

asked by a number of observers was that, how is this in any way different from what the military backed Junejo government says?⁹⁵ In fact, later in her election campaign, Benazir Bhutto admitted that

while General Zia had fawned over India, ironically it is the democratic governments that have taken a hard line against New Delhi.⁹⁶

9 Pakistan's Islamic Ideology

Pakistan's Islamic ideology has played a crucial role in shaping India-Pakistan relations over the past four decades. Before discussing its implications for their bilateral relations, it may be noted that right from the beginning, there has been a debate between the modernist and orthodox interpretation of Islam within Pakistan. The modernist view rejected the notion of an Islamic state as a theocracy and identified Islamic ideals and principles as democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice for all including the minorities.⁹⁷ The orthodox school of opinion, most notably the Jamaat-e-Islami, believed in Islam as Pakistan's ideology and regarded it as the guiding principle in all matters - legal, constitutional and political.⁹⁸ Most Pakistani rulers with an exception of General Zia have adhered to the modernist version.

While both used Islam for domestic political purposes, this debate is important in respect of Pakistan's search of identity in terms of a Pakistani nationalism and an Islamic or Muslim nationalism as propounded by the modernist and orthodox school of thought respectively.⁹⁹ A number of political observers argue that it is partly because of Pakistan's constant harping on its Muslim nationalism *vis-à-vis* the Hindu nationalism of India and partly because of its failure to evolve a national identity on something more than anti-Indianism, that the Indo-Pak disputes have seemed so intractable.¹⁰⁰ Further, while both used Islam to emphasize Pakistan's distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* India, the modernists stressed the political threat of India in terms of not being reconciled to Pakistan's existence as an independent political entity and trying to impose its hegemony on Pakistan. On the other hand, the orthodox ulema continues to view the totality of Indo-Pak

⁹⁵ Nayar, *op.cit.*.

⁹⁶ *Times of India*, 14 June 1989.

⁹⁷ Anwar Hussain Syed, *Pakistan: Islam Politics and National Solidarity*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, pp. 186-188.

⁹⁸ For a good account of the Islamic intelligentsia and the factional divisions within, see, Waseem (1985), *op.cit.*.

⁹⁹ For an excellent discussion on the Constituent Assembly debates on this issue, see Anwar Hussain, *op.cit.*, pp. 86-92. Also see, Waseem (1989), *op.cit.*, pp. 129-132.

¹⁰⁰ Jha points out that Islam's failure to create an effective and enduring national identity has led Pakistan to resolve its problems of nationhood in terms of its conflict with India. Further, Pakistan's creation was hinged upon acceptance of the two-nation theory, yet the continued presence of Muslims in India brings the theory into question. The common geographical and cultural heritage of two countries also makes the creation of a separate Pakistani national identity a difficult task, hence, the necessity for an ideology of national survival in which hatred for India has played a major part. See, D.C. Jha, "The Basic Foundations and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Chopra, *op.cit.*, pp. 9-10, 16-17.

relations in rigid ideological terms of irreconcilable Hindu-Muslim differences. Such an "anachronistic world view"¹⁰¹ gives a little ground for any bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

Having outlined their views on Indo-Pak relations, we need to examine the influence of these groups in the policy making apparatus of Pakistan. Unlike the BJP's growing clout in India, Jamaat-e-Islami's electoral support in Pakistan continues to be very limited,¹⁰² although Jamaat-i-Islami, for the first time, formed a constituent element of the ruling IJI in the 1990 elections. However it would be a mistake to judge the strength of the Islamic parties in Pakistan only through their electoral support. Their real power lies in their nuisance value and in their strong and committed cadre which they have used frequently to bring several governments in power to ransom on issues like building an Islamic society in Pakistan, the status of Muslims in India, the establishment of normal trade relations, cultural exchanges, joint economic ventures and most significantly the cause of Kashmir.¹⁰³

Further, Jamaat-i-Islami has penetrated the educational institutions, professional associations and the media in general to transform the outlook of people and to bring about ideological uniformity. It has a subsidiary organization, Islami Jamaat Tuleba which tries to capture the imagination of students in colleges and universities. The most important aspect of this campaign has been the rewriting of history and other text books from an Islamic point of view¹⁰⁴ which is colouring the perceptions of the future generations of Pakistan by teaching them the history of India-Pakistan relations in an all encompassing ideological

¹⁰¹ Mohammad Waseem, "Anachronistic World View", *Muslim*, 11 February 1984. Also see, Khalid Ahmed, "Things I Have Never Been Able to Understand", *Frontier Post*, 18 July 1991.

¹⁰² In the 1970 elections, out of 138 National Assembly seats allocated to West Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami won only 4 as compared to the PPP's 81. The three major Islamic parties, JI, JUL, JUP, together won 18 seats. In the provincial elections, of the total of 300 seats, together they won 23 seats. See, Anwar Hussain, *op.cit.*, pp. 122-123. In the 1988 National Assembly elections, Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman group) won 7 seats and Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhasti group) one seat, in total 8 seats out of 205 seats.

¹⁰³ For instance, after the political upheaval in the Kashmir valley broke out in early 1990, Jamaat-i-Islami played an active role in calling for nation-wide strikes expressing solidarity with their Kashmiri brethren, organized marches to cross the Line of Control into Indian territory and started fund raising programmes to support the Kashmiri 'freedom fighters'.

¹⁰⁴ The task of rewriting the history text books started in earnest in 1981 under General Zia's regime. The University Grants Commission issued a directive to the prospective text book writers as a result of which modern textbooks of history are centered around the following themes: the ideology of Pakistan both as a historical force which motivated the movement for Pakistan as well as its very *raison d'être*, the depiction of Jinnah as a man of orthodox religious views who sought the creation of a theocratic state, a move to establish ulema as the genuine heroes of the Pakistan movement and finally an emphasis on ritualistic Islam together with a rejection of liberal interpretation of the religion and generation of communal antagonism. For a detailed account of these themes in the text books, see, Pervaiz Amirali Hoodbhoy and Abdul Hameed Nayyar, "Rewriting the History of Pakistan", in Mohammad Asghar Khan, ed., *Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience*, New Delhi: Selectbook, 1986, pp. 164-173. Also see the textbook series of *Pakistan Studies*, for the school as well as the degree students.

framework of Hindu-Muslim relations and painting a demonic picture of the Hindu.¹⁰⁵ Waseem writes that it has even penetrated the civil and military apparatus of the state and has "somewhat oriented the thinking of many officers towards this anachronistic and ethno-centric approach to global politics".¹⁰⁶ Therefore even though Jamaat-i-Islami has no direct input into the policy making process of Pakistan with regard to its relations with India, its propaganda of Islamic ideology as being antithetical to Hindu India certainly has long term implications for shaping the bilateral relations between the two countries.

10 Concluding Remarks

To recapitulate, the institutional power structure of Pakistan is clearly dominated by a military-bureaucratic axis. The ruling troika consists of the Army Chief, President and Prime Minister in that order of authority. The army continues to be the chief arbiter. On the civilian side, the executive post of the President is much more powerful than that of the Prime Minister despite his being elected directly by the country at large. The Presidents' dismissal of three successive Prime Ministers, M.K. Junejo, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif proves this point beyond doubt. The Prime Minister obviously wields the least political influence in the ruling troika. This causes problems in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan to the extent that it creates an imbalance between the negotiating teams of the two sides. While the Indian Prime Minister enjoys the ultimate decision-making power with regard to the bilateral issues between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani Prime Minister simply does not have that kind of power which severely constrains his flexibility in negotiating with his Indian counterpart.

This problem is complicated further by the fact that there is no consensus among the three members of the ruling troika on Pakistan's external policy *vis-à-vis* India. Often they are perceived to be pulling in different directions and at times they are even working at cross-purposes with each other. For instance, when General Zia-ul-Haq endorsed the policy of expanding economic relations with India, Prime Minister M.K. Junejo managed to scuttle his efforts by ousting Mahbubul Haq, who was believed to be acting on Presidential orders, from his cabinet. Subsequently when Benazir Bhutto was trying to improve relations with India,

¹⁰⁵ As Hoodbhoy points out, the Hindu is portrayed as monolithically cunning and treacherous, obsessively seeking to settle old scores with his erstwhile masters. This Hindu is responsible for the break-up of Pakistan. He quotes from Azar Hamid's book that "the same Bengali Hindu was responsible for the backwardness of East Pakistan. But hiding the story of his two century old sins, atrocities and pillage, he used 'Bengali nationalism' to punish innocent West Pakistanis for sins they had not committed". Justice Shameem Hussain Kadir, ex-Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, writes of the "diabolical Hindus" and the "Hindu conspiracies" in his officially circulated book, *The Creation of Pakistan*, Lahore: Army Book Club, 1983. There are countless similar examples.

¹⁰⁶ Waseem, 'Anachronistic World View', *op.cit.*.

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan came out frequently with public statements about the hegemonic designs of India. Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's ability to deliver the goods on improving relations with India were also constrained severely by her weak position in the National Assembly. While she started with an accommodative policy towards India, she was forced to adopt a hardline posture under pressure from the opposition both in and out of the National Assembly. It is interesting to note that while Nawaz Sharif's IJI from the opposition benches accused Benazir Bhutto of not being able to stand up to India, it softened its own stance on India after coming to power in Islamabad.

In Pakistani military circles, there are growing signs of a willingness to discuss and negotiate several Confidence building Measures such as advance notification of military exercises, inviting military teams from the other country to observe the military manoeuvres and the like which would help avoid a war by accident or miscalculation. However, the army jealously guards its defence budget and is likely to be very reluctant to agree to any Confidence Building Measures which may constrain their fighting capability in any way.

On the debate of a military or civilian regime in Islamabad being more conducive for confidence building between India and Pakistan, it may be argued that it is important to understand the implications of both for this purpose. But this should not be used as an excuse for either postponing the confidence building dialogue or justifying its failure. It is important to note that after General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, three successive civilian governments of M.K. Junejo, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have also failed to make any significant contribution towards improving India-Pakistan relations. Some scholars would argue, and perhaps rightly so, that that is mainly because of the internal power struggle within the ruling troika. But that is precisely the point one is trying to make here in the sense that the Indian policy makers can not simply wait to hold a confidence building dialogue with Pakistan until a genuinely democratic government comes to power in Islamabad. Therefore our task is only to understand the implications of the existing decision-making apparatus in Islamabad for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

Finally, the Islamic ideology of Pakistan, particularly its orthodox interpretation, has a decisively adverse impact on the confidence building process between the two countries. Notwithstanding their negligible presence in the National Assembly, the importance of Islamic groups lies in their ability to influence the perceptions of the present and future generations of Pakistan by interpreting Indo-Pak relations in a rigid ideological framework of Hindu-Muslim relations.

So far, we have discussed the role of various actors and parties involved in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. Our next task is to examine the dynamics of the confidence building exercise over past two decades which would be undertaken in the following chapters.

**PART III: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN INDIA AND
PAKISTAN**

CHAPTER VII: THE ANTECEDENTS : OPPORTUNITIES SEIZED AND LOST

Confidence building between India and Pakistan in its generic sense had perhaps started before the term was invented in the West. The Simla Agreement, for instance, was conceived with an intention to change the political calculus of their bilateral relations. It was an important milestone in imparting a new direction to India-Pakistan relations in the 1970's. But with the return of a military regime in Islamabad and renewal of the US-Pak military alliance, in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and India's reluctance to condemn it publicly, the conflictual dimension of India and Pakistan's relations was again coming to the forefront. While the two governments continued to make overtures towards each other as was evident in the Pakistani proposal of a No War Pact and the Indian offer of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship along with their attempt to evolve a joint stance on the situation in Afghanistan, this time their suspicion of each other's intentions had got the better of them. To some extent, they also became a victim of the superpowers rivalry during the cold war which were pulling these two regional neighbours in different directions largely to suit the superpowers' own global interests.

The Simla Agreement and its contribution in initiating a reconciliation process between India and Pakistan bears examination. Differing interpretations of this agreement by the two countries and its ramifications for their bilateral confidence building process requires analysis. The reasons for the failure of the Pakistani proposal of a No War Pact and the Indian offer of a Friendship Treaty needs to be understood as do the abortive attempts of India and Pakistan to evolve a joint stance in face of the Afghanistan crisis. Finally the role of the superpowers is a factor to be borne in mind.

1 The Simla Agreement

The Simla Agreement, signed in July 1972 after the 1971 war, was an epoch-making event in the politics of the sub-continent. The war had altered decisively the power configuration of the sub-continent. Pakistan had lost its eastern wing and further disintegration had only been averted by India's unilateral cease-fire.¹ India had acquired a predominant position in the sub-continent which was recognized by all the major powers- the USA, the USSR and China- giving a mortal blow to Pakistan's long standing ambition of achieving parity with India. More significantly, the emergence of Bangladesh had disproved and discredited the two-nation theory. Islamabad could no longer justify its position in South Asia as a consequence of two distinct religious communities. Bangladesh had shown that a religious identity was, in this instance, not nearly

¹ Gowhar Rizvi and Barry Buzan, ed., *South Asia Insecurity and Great Powers*, London: Macmillan, 1986, p. 116.

as important as regional, ethnic and secular forces.²

Although the general public opinion in Pakistan viewed the defeat as the result of the incompetence of the generals,³ the more sober opinion in the new democratic government in Pakistan was reconciled to the need to bury the hatchet and co-exist peacefully with India and Bangladesh. In India the victory was largely perceived as a long awaited opportunity to settle all the disputes once and for all. However, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi realized very perceptively that for the first time since 1958, there was a democratic government in Pakistan as well as in Bangladesh and therefore India would have to be magnanimous if she were to prevent the initiative from slipping back to the military. This was Z.A. Bhutto's plea as well. He said at a press conference on 27 March 1972 at Rawalpindi, that India had never utilized opportunities for friendship in the past, this was the last one.

I may not stay for long but I do think that Pakistan and India would never be friends, if India did not wake up to the chance now.⁴

This attitude was manifest in the Indian government's expressed readiness to hold direct talks with Pakistan at any time, any level, and without pre-conditions.⁵ Once Z.A. Bhutto had reinforced his position as President of Pakistan with a vote of confidence from the National Assembly, Mrs. Gandhi wrote to him suggesting bilateral talks and a summit meeting. Senior officials of India and Pakistan met at Muree in Pakistan, at the end of April 1972⁶ and continued their negotiations in Simla, where Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto finally arrived at an agreement on 2 July 1972. Let us examine briefly the provisions of the Simla Agreement.

1.1 Provisions of the Simla Agreement

Under the Simla Agreement, Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her Pakistani counterpart

Z.A. Bhutto agreed that

the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and establishment of a durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their

² See, S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 420-421 and B.G. Verghese, *An End to Confrontation: (Bhutto's Pakistan) Restructuring the Sub-Continent*, New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972, p. 64.

³ Verghese wrote from Pakistan in May 1972, that there was a feeling that the army had failed politically and, worse, militarily and was in no position to call the tune unless the politicians bungled again. He found shock and anguish in Pakistan at the loss of the Bangladesh and an incomplete awareness of all that had happened there. B.G. Verghese, "The Other Side of the Hill", a series of articles on Pakistan that appeared in *Hindustan Times*, 18-27 May 1972.

⁴ Kuldip Nayar writes of his conversation with Bhutto, when he said that, if he (Bhutto) failed, the military would come back. "Do you want another Ayub or Yahya in Pakistan?", he asked, "if not, why don't you help me?" See, Kuldip Nayar, *Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1974, p. 204.

⁵ *United Nations, Report of the Security Council*, June 1971-June 1972, New York, 1972, p. 80.

⁶ For more details of the talks at Muree, see, Nayar, *op.cit.*, pp. 222-223.

people.

Both sides pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other committing themselves to settle all their disputes by peaceful means. The two countries agreed to conceive their relations essentially within a bilateral framework. The accord provided for troop withdrawals and upgraded the cease-fire line in Kashmir into a Line of Actual Control (LOC) as existing on 17 December 1971.⁷ Finally India and Pakistan agreed to promote friendly relations to the best of their ability as well as to try and prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. More specific steps towards normalization were also enumerated.⁸ The accord was welcomed both in India, Pakistan and the world at large.⁹ Z.A. Bhutto said

Simla Agreement is not my victory or a victory for Pakistan. It is not a victory for India either. It is a victory for sanity, principles and justice. No body has won and none lost.¹⁰

In a debate in National Assembly on the Simla Agreement he said

It is for the people of Pakistan and India to decide what kind of relationship they want between themselves. For too long their leaders have spoken for the people. It's time that people speak for themselves..... We live in the same geography, we can not change this geography. But since we live here, let us find some method of a *modus vivendi*. It means live and let live.¹¹

On the Indian side, Mrs. Indira Gandhi said in the Lok Sabha

I think that President Bhutto is making a sincere effort to take his people towards a new future...it is in our interest that his effort to turn the face of Pakistan from its past hatred and bitterness to new future of peace and friendship, is very much worth supporting.

1.2 The Significance of Simla Agreement

The significance of the agreement lay in its breaking the ice which had frozen India-Pakistan relations and steering it away from a posture of confrontation to cooperation. It laid the foundation of the

⁷ The new Line of Control was considerably advantageous to India giving it the strategically important areas of Tithwal and Kargil thereby making any further attempts by Pakistan to dislodge India from Kashmir extremely difficult. The troop withdrawals were completed on 20 December 1972 after a new Line of Control was officially demarcated. For a detailed account of the talks on the delineation of LOC and withdrawal of troops to the international borders, see, *Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1972-1973*, New Delhi: Government of India Publication, 1974, pp. 12-14. For the text of the agreement regarding delineation of the LOC, see, Surendra Chopra, *Post-Simla Indo-Pak Relations*, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publishers, 1988, pp. 269-270.

⁸ This included steps to resume communications, post & telegraph, sea, land including border posts and air links including overflights, to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country, to resume trade and cooperation in economic and other fields and to promote exchange in the fields of science and culture. For a full text of the agreement, see Appendix. One.

⁹ Bindra gives a detailed account of the reactions in Indian, Pakistani and world press, S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Simla Agreement*, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publishers, 1981, pp. 222-226.

¹⁰ *Pakistan Times*, 5 July 1972.

¹¹ (italics added). For details see, Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly, *Pakistan National Assembly Debates*, vol. 11, no. 5, 14 July, pp. 681-724.

confidence building process between India and Pakistan and continues to provide an over-arching framework for governing their bilateral relationship. Under the Simla Agreement, India and Pakistan undertook various measures both at the government-to-government and people-to-people level imparting a new direction to their bilateral relations. While the two governments took a conscious decision at the highest political level to work towards a more cooperative and friendly relationship, they also agreed to open the gates of their national frontiers for interaction between the peoples of the two countries which had been frozen after the 1965 war. One may further argue that the confidence building framework outlined at Simla was most comprehensive in the sense that it touched all dimensions - political, military, economic and socio-cultural - of the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan. While the agreement in itself was a statement of political understanding between the two countries, the troop withdrawals and the delineation of the Line of Control at the military level was no less significant. It also entailed several important agreements in the realm of economic and socio-cultural relations regarding the establishment of postal services, travel facilities, telecommunications, trade, shipping and civil aviation.¹²

Simla witnessed a reversal of approaches employed by the two countries to address their bilateral disputes. Previously India stressed the step by step approach and Pakistan wanted a comprehensive settlement of all the disputes, most notably Kashmir. But now Pakistan took the position that it was impossible to seek solutions to all problems in one sweep. Bhutto admitted in an interview

you would like to proceed on the basis that we have been wanting for the last twenty-five years. And we would like to proceed the way you have wanted it for past twenty-five years.¹³

Bhutto argued that by solving "other problems first" both India and Pakistan could "set the time and pace of negotiations on Kashmir".¹⁴ He said "I am sure that she [Mrs. Gandhi] will accept the position that we can not swallow one big sweet, one that is difficult to swallow. For her it is easy, for her it will be sweet meats. But here it will be more difficult. The people see these problems [the Prisoners of War and the trials], tangibly in a concrete way; if nothing is done about them, we will be pushed back like in the past".¹⁵ Another important element of the Simla Agreement is its position on Kashmir and the differing interpretations of the

¹² This will be taken up for further discussion in Chapter Thirteen.

¹³ Verghese, *op.cit.*, p. 112.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Bhutto's interview with Kuldeep Nayar, *op.cit.*, p. 211. Also see, Bhutto's interview with Verghese on this issue, *ibid.*; and Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan*, New Delhi: Vikas, 1978, pp. 359-360.

same by India and Pakistan.

1.3 Differing Interpretations of the Simla Agreement

There is a continuing debate in both India and Pakistan about the interpretations of the Simla Agreement especially with regard to the question of Kashmir and the principle of bilateralism. Let us first look into the Indian views in this respect.

1.3.1 The Indian Viewpoint

With respect to the status of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the agreement stipulated that

the line-of-control resulting from the cease-fire line of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

A number of Indian scholars share the opinion that while it did not terminate the Kashmir dispute explicitly, Mrs. Gandhi and her advisors were led to believe that Mr. Bhutto was reconciled to the *status quo* and would not unilaterally change it. What Mr. Bhutto had in mind was perhaps the idea of a soft frontier between the two parts of J&K, allowing easy movement of the people on both sides of Kashmir for purposes of travel, trade, cultural exchanges and pilgrimage. Mr. Bhutto said, "We can make the cease-fire line a line of peace. Let the people of Kashmir move between two countries freely".¹⁶ For instance Kuldeep Nayar writes of his interview with Mr. Bhutto when he asked Mr. Bhutto, if he would accept a Trieste¹⁷ type solution for Kashmir. Mr. Bhutto replied "I was thinking partly of Trieste".¹⁸ He refused to say more except,

I have given you a peep into my mind. If I say too much on it, or if we go too much into it, here also we have our Jana Sanghites who will start saying 'betrayal' and such things. But what I am telling you, in essence, is that taking into account this and other world precedents, we can start moving and I believe that there is a great room for it.¹⁹

Later when Mr. Bhutto divulged his conversation with Mrs. Gandhi at the farewell meeting at Simla, he said

I remember asking her how history would judge us.... How much longer is this world going to be patient with us going dingdong at each other, *a world which has seen the Trieste issue settled* and also some aspects of the Berlin problem....²⁰

¹⁶ Verghese, *ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁷ The Trieste agreement of 20 October 1954 provided for the partitioning of the Free Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia along the existing demarcation line between the two with minor changes. The agreement also guaranteed facilities of free travel between the two sides.

¹⁸ Nayar, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ (*italics added*). Z.A. Bhutto's interview with Mr. Moti Ram, reprinted in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1976, pp. 226-227.

This is significant because it was essentially this meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto that had led to the Simla Agreement since the talks between the two countries' delegations had failed in arriving at any understanding. It does give an impression that perhaps Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto had a tacit understanding on maintaining the *status quo* in Kashmir.

However at Simla both sides could not formalize any such understanding on Kashmir without endangering ratification of that agreement by Pakistan's National Assembly. Mr. Bhutto insisted that he had to take into account Pakistan's public position on Kashmir and that he should not be asked to "negotiate Kashmir here and now".²¹ He would not be able to sell any formula that might be found and that the whole peace agreement would become suspect in the eyes of Pakistan who would imagine some secret clause on Kashmir. He pleaded "my back is to the wall, I can not make any concessions".²² India also believes that Pakistan had agreed to the principle of bilateralism with regard to Kashmir as well, since the Simla Agreement specifically excluded any reference whatsoever to the UN resolutions of 1947-49 on this issue. As Mrs. Gandhi said in her press conference at New Delhi on 12 July 1972 "we have agreed to bilateralism as far as any question is concerned".²³ On another occasion she said

the substantial political gains [of the Simla Agreement] are that misapprehensions which had been entertained, rightly or wrongly by certain sections in the state, have been removed and the *plebiscite becomes a non-issue*.²⁴

Even Mr. Bhutto said "we are not going to activate the UN, because what has the UN done? The UN has not done much".²⁵ With regard to the role of the third parties in resolving the Kashmir dispute, Mr. Bhutto had clearly said that he was not "going to rush around the chanceries of the world, because twenty five years of rushing around the chanceries of the world has not helped".²⁶

On the whole the Indian side believed that although Mr. Bhutto's domestic constraints had not allowed him to sign a formal agreement to terminate the Kashmir dispute at Simla, he had accepted implicitly the partition of Kashmir as a *fait accompli*.²⁷ Therefore India did not protest very much when the Gilgit

²¹ Nayar, *op.cit.*, p. 234.

²² *ibid.*

²³ (italics added). Mrs. Indira Gandhi, *Years of Endeavour*, New Delhi: Government of India, 1975, p. 638.

²⁴ (italics added). See, Mrs. Gandhi's statement in *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 13 March 1975, col. 162.

²⁵ Nayar, *op.cit.*, p. 240.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 235.

²⁷ A.G. Noorani, "Was There a Secret Bhutto-Indira Pact", in his book, *India: The Superpowers and the Neighbours*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985, pp. 200-204.

Agency (part of Kashmir under Pakistan's control) was given representation in Pakistan's National Assembly in 1974. Mrs. Gandhi also held a series of talks with Sheikh Abdullah and by 1975, he was a popularly elected leader of Kashmir. Pakistan did not raise the subject of Kashmir's status in ensuing bilateral talks with India and calibrated its references to the matter in international fora with other factors.²⁸

1.3.2 The Pakistani Viewpoint

The Pakistani side, on the other hand, stresses the pending "final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir"²⁹ specified in the Simla Agreement which also protects explicitly "the recognized position of either side". This in their view lies in the UN resolutions and in the principle of self-determination.³⁰ Although Mr. Bhutto said "let the people of Kashmir decide their own destiny.... and that Pakistan would not export revolution", he also gave a "solemn pledge" on behalf of the people of Pakistan that as soon as the "the people of Kashmir launched their freedom struggle" the people of Pakistan would "go all out in support and assistance, they would not hesitate to shed their blood for the people of Kashmir".³¹ On the principle of bilateralism, while Mr. Bhutto listed its benefits and criticized the UN for its failure to resolve the Kashmir issue, he insisted that it did not preclude Pakistan's right to go to the UN under any circumstances.³² Bhutto declared categorically in the National Assembly that he would not withdraw the issue from the UN.

The importance of these divergent interpretations of the Simla Agreement lies in the fact that the Pakistani authorities as well as its scholarly opinion continue to argue, particularly in the wake of political upheaval in Kashmir in the early 1990's, that Pakistan is not bound by the bilateral framework of negotiations on the Kashmir issue and it is not precluded from seeking recourse to avenues open to it under the aegis of

²⁸ Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search For Power: Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policies 1966-1982*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1984, p. 230.

²⁹ See, para 6 of the Simla Agreement in Appendix One.

³⁰ Z.A. Bhutto's speech at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 31 July 1972, published in the article form, "The Context of the Simla Agreement in the Struggle for Kashmir - II", *Frontier Post*, 11 March 1990. Also see, *Simla Agreement: Pakistan's Interpretation*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.d, pp. 3-5. It may be noted that even Zia-ul-Haq's government in the early 1980's had insisted that both India and Pakistan should stick to the "two UN resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949" and asserted that the Simla Agreement "did not change" the respective positions of two countries. See, V.D. Chopra, "Barriers to India-Pakistan Normalization", *Patriot*, 11 June 1990. Also see, Mehrunnissa Ali, "The Simla and Tashkent Agreement", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1972, p. 72; and Zubeida Mustafa, "The Kashmir Dispute and the Simla Agreement", in the same issue, pp. 45-49.

³¹ As quoted in Nayar, *op.cit.*, p. 216.

³² Mr. Bhutto argued that he, too, had been pleading for bilateralism for a very long time and it was not India which compelled Pakistan to accept the same. See, Z.A. Bhutto, "Bilateralism: New Directions", in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1976, pp. 3-26. He argued that bilateralism has its benefits but it certainly did not close the doors to the UN. However the UN had not yet really been able to deal with the Kashmir problem effectively. In fact Pakistan has in some respects, he said lost by its over-emphasis to the UN. Also see, "Simla Agreement", in *Frontier Post*, *op.cit.*.

the UN.³³ This also forebodes the difficulties in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan in the sense that often agreements arrived at after laborious negotiations between these two countries have fallen prey to their differing interpretations and have thus never been implemented. But the Simla Agreement notwithstanding these differences of opinion has ensured nearly two decades of peace and stability between India and Pakistan. The agreement also enjoyed popular sanction at home in India as well as in Pakistan. Successive governments in both countries including the military regime of General Zia in Pakistan, have never made any attempt to repudiate the agreement. It also enjoyed the support of major extra-regional powers such as the USA, the Soviet Union and China. Before concluding our discussion on the Simla agreement, let us examine the linkages between India and Pakistan with these three powers which had been re-modelled just before the 1971 war.

1.4 The Role of Extra-Regional Powers

With the Sino-American rapprochement in 1971, the initial pattern of linkages with the superpowers and the regional actors was restored with China weighing on the side of the US and Pakistan. President Nixon's visit to China signified a palpable shift in the US policy from one of strengthening India as a counterpoise to China, to one of trying to cultivate better relations with China to counter the Soviet Union. Thus, the emergence of a US-China-Pakistan axis was confirmed by the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who after returning from his first visit to Beijing in 1971 is reported to have informed the Indian Ambassador to US, Mr. L.K. Jha, that if India and Pakistan went to a war over East Pakistan and China intervened on the side of Pakistan, India should not expect the US to come to its help.³⁴ This might have been interpreted by India, in S.P. Varma's words, as being "a clear notice to India that both the USA and China were going to help Pakistan and that India would ignore the warning at its own peril".³⁵

³³ See, Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti, "Simla Agreement: UN Has a Role to Play in Kashmir", *Nation*, 9 March 1990. One may take note briefly of the debate on this issue in the Pakistani press. In an article, "Simla Accord: Spider and the Web", *Muslim*, 3 April 1990, Tarik argues that Simla localizes the Kashmir issue and deprives it of its international character. That is why Bhutto during his 6 years rule never revitalized the Kashmir issue in the UN nor did he raise the issue in any bilateral forum between India and Pakistan about its final solution. However in response to this, Mr. Sikandar Hayat wrote that there is nothing in the Simla Agreement that prevents Pakistan from taking the issue to the UN. See, Sikandar M. Hayat, "Simla is No 'Web' for Pakistan", *Muslim*, 5 April 1990. Also see, Mustafa Jafferri, "The Poisoned Apple of Bilateralism With India", *Frontier Post*, 27 July 1990; Zahurul Haq, "The Failure of Bilateralism with India", *Muslim*, 28 July 1990; Altaf A. Sheikh, "Simla Agreement and Its Implications", *Nation*, 9 March 1990.

³⁴ Shelton Kodikara, "Role of Extra-Regional Powers and South Asian Security", in Sridhar K. Khatri, ed., *Regional Security in South Asia*, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, 1987, p. 44.

³⁵ S.P. Varma, "Bangladesh and Role of Major Powers", in S.P. Varma and Virendra Narain, eds., *Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh*, Jaipur, 1972, p. 227.

The major consequence of this shift was a rather swift conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, which the Soviets had been pressing with little success since 1969.³⁶ More significantly, article nine of the Treaty which referred to the mutual military assistance was not there in the original draft and for India, it clearly had relevance only in the context of deteriorating Indo-Pak relations after mid-1971.³⁷

However after the outbreak of war US President Nixon could only give moral support to Pakistan in the UN Security Council and at best, deployed a nuclear-armed Task Force of the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Indian Ocean ostensibly to evacuate US citizens if it became necessary but in fact, to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered Pakistani forces in East Pakistan.³⁸ But even this sole gesture made by the US as Kissinger abundantly made clear in his memoirs, was motivated by "considerations far removed from South Asia".³⁹ Kissinger rightly said that Bangladesh was not merely a local conflict, but an expression of a particular correlation of global forces and rationalized the Nixon administration's 'tilt' towards Pakistan as a signal to China of the US reliability and a deterrence against aggressive Indo-Soviet collaboration.⁴⁰ China too gave Pakistan strong verbal support but did not intervene because of the Soviet threat to open another front against China.⁴¹

In contrast, the Soviet Union stood by India in every respect. The Soviet delegate to the UN twice vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for a halt to the war before India announced a completed operation and unilateral cease-fire on 16 December 1971. The Soviet Ambassador to India assured his hosts that the

³⁶ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 402; Kodikara, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-45.

³⁷ Article Nine stated, "Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in an armed conflict with the Other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat, therefore, the High Contracting Parties shall *immediately enter into mutual consultations*, in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries" (italics added). For the text of the Treaty, see, Mansingh, *op.cit.*, Appendix C.

³⁸ This was revealed in Anderson's disclosures based on secret White House papers in *New York Times*, 15 January 1972.

³⁹ Henry Kissinger puts forth his views in, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little Brown, 1979, pp. 842-918. A telling criticism is provided by Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geo-Politics and South Asia", *Asian Survey*, vol. 20, no. 4, April 1980, pp. 339-361.

⁴⁰ Thornton writes that on the one hand, Washington was anxious to demonstrate to Beijing that it was ready and willing to stand by friends and the tattered friendship with Pakistan provided a useful case for the demonstration. On the other hand, since India had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, a stand would demonstrate that the US was prepared to be firm with Moscow and its presumed clients. In both cases the aim was credibility and in both cases the underlying objective was building the triangular power relationship at the global level that was so vital to Kissinger's plans. He adds that the US policy in South Asia in 1971 was the ultimate globalization of regional affairs, where the regional states were virtual abstractions. See, Thomas Perry Thornton, "US-Indian Relations and South Asian Regional Issues", in Leo.E. Rose and Noor.A. Hussain, *US-Pakistan Forum: Relations With Major Powers*, Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1987, p. 262. It is also interesting to take note of Nixon and Kissinger's claims that the war had been ended by the Soviet pressure on New Delhi, activated by the US threats to re-examine detente.

⁴¹ Nixon disclosed that the Soviet Union was "willing ...to make military moves to deter China on India's behalf". See, Richard M. Nixon, "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The Emerging Structure of Peace", *A Report to the Congress*, 9 February 1972, p. 150. It may be noted that this was denied by the Indian Foreign Secretary Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra. See his comments in, Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 227.

Soviet Union would not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene.⁴² India's ties with the Soviet Union and Pakistan's with that of China passed the test of 1971 war. The Soviets moved still closer to India, while circulating the idea of a collective security system in Asia built around India, Iraq, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Besides becoming India's largest arms supplier and leading trade partner, the Soviet Union committed as it was to nuclear non-proliferation, nevertheless praised India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Moscow took pains to cultivate Mrs. Gandhi. However Mrs. Gandhi had succeeded in maintaining a distance from the Soviet Union by not acquiescing to Soviet security proposals.⁴³ Regarding Pakistan's relations with China, Mr. Bhutto's overall view was that

within the limitations China did what she could a series of successive blunders were committed by the Yahya regime you have to take all these factors into consideration but whatever China's participation, *we have not lost confidence in China's friendship or China's words.*⁴⁴

Mushahid Hussain puts it aptly that the Pakistan-China friendship is essentially a strategic relationship and has endured because of the perceived compatibility of each other's interests.⁴⁵ Pakistan-US relationship, a tactical one, was the only casualty of the 1971 war. The overwhelming opinion in Pakistan was that despite all the services rendered and all the agreements and alliances with the USA, the American connection could not prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan. Some argued and perhaps rightly so that on the question of India, the US and Pakistan can never see eye to eye. They would always be apart. Mr. Bhutto announced Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO (South-East Asian Treaty Organization) and although he retained reluctantly the country's role in CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), its continuing presence was seen more as an expression of friendship towards Iran and Turkey rather than a commitment to the US's anti-Soviet policy. Later Pakistan withdrew from CENTO as well in order to join the Non-aligned movement.

On the whole the significance of the Simla Agreement lay in the fact that it was the first significant contribution towards confidence building between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1971 war. The two countries undertook several measures both at the government-to-government and people-to-people level for normalising their bilateral relations. Further, the Simla Agreement enjoyed the support of the major

⁴² *New York Times*, 11 January 1972. Also see Nixon's report, *op.cit.*

⁴³ It may be noted that Mrs. Gandhi had also circumvented effectively Soviet requests for special port facilities in India and ruled out the stationing of any Soviet advisors in India except for specific short-term pre-approved technical tasks.

⁴⁴ (italics added). *Dawn*, 20 February 1972.

⁴⁵ See, Mushahid Hussain's comments in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 67. Also see, G.W. Choudhary, "Pakistan and the Communist World", *Pacific Community*, October 1974, pp. 132-136.

extra-regional powers that is the US, the Soviet Union and China. On the minus side, the continuing differing interpretations of this accord proved to be the harbinger of difficulties in the Indo-Pak confidence building process where several agreements have fallen through because of this problem.

While the Simla Agreement was a centre of discussion in the 1970's, the next decade was marked by the debate on the No War Pact offer made by Pakistan and a Treaty of Peace and Friendship proposed by India.

2 The Debate on the Proposals for a No War Pact and the Friendship Treaty

A No War Pact proposal has been on the agenda of Indo-Pak bilateral negotiations since the early years of independence when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru offered it to remove the Pakistani leadership's misgivings of an attack from India. Ever since it has been resurrected time and again by *both sides*, yet never became an agreement.⁴⁶ The following section examines Pakistan's offer of a No War Pact as proposed by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1981.

2.1 Pakistan's Proposal of No War Pact

Pakistan offer to sign a No War Pact with India came as a part of the statement announcing Pakistan's formal acceptance of the six-year US economic assistance and military sales package in September 1981. It stated that Pakistan wanted to build a "minimum defence capability" for its security "in context of the regional situation which [was] far from reassuring" and the concluding section said

If India is inclined to banish its unfounded fears [of Pakistan's arms procurement plans] and is ready to grasp the hand of friendship which we extend, it shall not find us wanting in fully reciprocating any gesture on its part for establishing good-neighbourly relations ...On our part we are ready to enter into immediate consultations with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantees of Non-Aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of Simla Agreement.⁴⁷

Subsequently the Government of Pakistan projected this proposal as a major peace initiative *vis-à-vis* India. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in his address to the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1981 mentioned that Pakistan had proposed the signing of a Non-Aggression pact with India. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Riaz Piracha stated in New Delhi on 31 October that his country had conveyed formally to India its proposal for a No War Pact and was now awaiting India's formal response to it. The Pakistani Embassy in New Delhi issued a statement to the press on 11 November which referred to the constructive idea of a

⁴⁶ The debate on No War Pact proposal during the 1950's has already been discussed in Chapter Four.

⁴⁷ For the text of statement, see, *Muslim*, 16 September 1981.

Non-Aggression Pact and lamented that it had unfortunately not been appreciated in India in the proper context. General Zia mentioned publicly the proposal on at least four occasions during the second half of November 1981 and regretted that there had been no progress on this issue.⁴⁸

As a matter of fact, however, the Indian government had only been handed a copy of the original statement to its Ambassador in Islamabad on 15 September 1981. A few days later the Indian Foreign Secretary received the same statement by Pakistani Ambassador Abdul Sattar in New Delhi since General Zia had promised that he would keep the Indian government informed of the state of the US-Pakistan arms deal. It was as late as 22 November 1981 that the Pakistani government forwarded an official note to the Government of India suggesting consultations on this subject.⁴⁹ Let us consider the Indian response to this proposal.

2.1.2 The Indian Response

India's External Affairs Minister Mr. P. V. Narashima Rao made a statement to the both Houses of Parliament on 25 November 1981 and described the Pakistani offer of a No War Pact as positive on the basis that it constituted an acceptance of the Indian offer made in 1949 and repeated several times since then. Rao recalled chronologically the repeated offers made by India which had invariably and all along drawn a negative response from Pakistan. He declared that India stood by its original offer "with no exceptions, no conditions and no variations" which meant that the two countries should settle all mutual problems by bilateral discussions without involving third parties.⁵⁰

In reality, the Indian Government was stunned by Pakistan's sudden *volte face*. Initially it suspected the proposal as a propaganda ploy. Mrs. Gandhi told Parliament that Pakistan had made a proposal to ease tensions between the two countries but India should be careful to avoid getting "caught in a trap".⁵¹ That was mainly because only three months prior to making this proposal, General Zia had told an Indian journalist that the Simla Agreement provided adequate security assurances for permanent peace and friendship as long as both sides adhered to the letter and spirit of the Simla Agreement. He said that there was no need for the conclusion of a No War Pact between the two countries as the Simla Agreement itself was virtually a No War

⁴⁸ Satish Kumar, ed., *Year Book on India's Foreign Policy: 1982-83*, New Delhi, Sage Publishers, 1985, p. 13.

⁴⁹ Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Quarterly Survey", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 34, no. 4, 1981, pp. 3-13.

⁵⁰ See, Narasimha Rao's statement in *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CXX, no. 3, 25 November 1981, cols. 322-325. Also see, *Annual Report: Ministry of External Affairs 1981-1982*, New Delhi: Government of India, Publications Division, p. 3.

⁵¹ *Pakistan Times*, 22 August 1981.

Pact.⁵² On another occasion, General Zia had told **India Today** that a No War Pact was "not worth the paper it was written on".⁵³

India's suspicions were further aroused by the context of this offer and the manner in which it was made since this expression of willingness on the part of Pakistan to enter into consultation with India on the subject of a Non-Aggression Pact was made only as an incidental part of a document which basically dealt with Pakistan's relations with the US. It gave an impression that the underlying motives of this proposal were actually to gain a favourable hearing for Pakistan's arms deal that was then under consideration in the US Congress.⁵⁴ This was reflected in Indira Gandhi's statement that the Pakistani offer for a Non-Aggression Pact had come after acquiring arms in a big way. Later at a press conference, she repeated her objection tersely "you cannot prepare for a war yet talk of a No War Pact".⁵⁵ It was widely believed that Pakistan had made this move at the behest of the US which believed that the former would be able to serve as an instrument of US strategy in this region effectively only if it eliminated or diluted the traditional threat to its security from India.⁵⁶ Some also felt that although the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had helped General Zia in perpetuating his rule, he was trying to acquire further legitimacy by making a major move of detente with India.⁵⁷ But the Pakistani side argued that its leadership changed its views on a No War Pact mainly because of persisting Indian opposition to their efforts to procure arms from the USA in the backdrop of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi explained that the offer was made precisely to allay India's disquiet and "if they still think it [the US arms] is a threat to their security, we are

⁵² Rajendra Sareen's interview with General Zia-ul-Haq, in **Sunday**, 14 June 1981. Also see, General Zia's interview with Lohfeldt, reprinted in *President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq: Interviews to Foreign Media*, Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, vol. 3, January-December 1980, p. 92.

⁵³ Zia's argument was that formal No War Pacts were no guarantee of a good relationship. What India and Pakistan needed most was the promotion of a good understanding between themselves. See, **India Today**, 16-29 February 1980. Also see, General Zia's interviews with Kuldip Nayar on 18 March 1979, reprinted in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', vol. 2, January-December 1979, p. 159; and vol. 3, January-December 1980, p. 39. Also, his interview with **India Today**, 15 May 1982, p. 28.

⁵⁴ Baral writes that Zia probably wanted to impress the US Congress and American public in general that India, the Soviet Union's ally, was not interested in peace and Pakistan, thus, was in danger of being squeezed by two strong enemies on two flanks, the Soviet Union which was in occupation of Afghanistan and India on the eastern side. See, J.K. Baral, "India-Pakistan Diplomacy Since 1981: Motivations, Strategies and Prospects", **Foreign Affairs Reports**, vol. 35, no. 4 & 5, April-May 1986, p. 32. Also see, Robert L. Hardgrave, *India Under Pressure: Prospects For Political Stability*, London: Westview Press, 1984, p. 158.

⁵⁵ As quoted by A.G. Noorani, "Diplomacy of a No War Pact", **Indian Express**, 2 November 1981.

⁵⁶ Kapur argues that the logic and timing of this proposal can be explained by the linkages between the Reagan administration and Pakistan that came into being after the Afghanistan crisis in 1979. The linkage was that Pakistan would develop its nuclear weapon programme secretly but the outward posture would be that it is ready to do a nuclear deal with India (with significant Indian concessions). Zia's friendly gestures to India in form of a No War Pact proposal was probably the first step in this direction. See, Ashok Kapur, *Pakistan's Nuclear Development*, London: Croomhelm Publishers, 1987, p. 218.

⁵⁷ In an interview with an Indian scholar and a Congress leader with the present author in December 1991.

ready to enter into a No War Pact with them".⁵⁸

2.2 Bilateral Negotiations on the No War Pact Proposal

In December 1981 the Indian Ambassador Natwar Singh handed over a comprehensive response to Pakistan seeking assurances from Islamabad about its nuclear programme and a consensus on the security compulsions of the two countries. It indicated that a No War Pact should not be a mere exchange of pious declarations but should provide a definite framework of concrete proposals to reduce tensions and promote stability in the region. It proposed to set up some machinery to make continuing assessments of the implications of introducing foreign arms into the region and that neither country should provide military bases to any foreign powers.⁵⁹ An Indian *aide memoire* of 24 December 1981 had proposed seven points namely a reaffirmation of the Simla Agreement, provision for recognizing the need for a better life for the people of the two countries by creating a tension-free atmosphere, non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, renunciation of the use of force, settlement of disputes through peaceful means and direct negotiations and discouragement of great power influence in the affairs of the region specifically a ban on grant of bases. In its *aide memoire* of 12 January 1982, Pakistan endorsed some points, qualified some and added a provision stressing the relevance of the UN Charter.⁶⁰

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi's visit to New Delhi in January 1982 was the first positive step towards opening a dialogue on this issue. Although the talks were of a preliminary nature, they helped to create an atmosphere of cordiality and marked the beginning of their attempts to bridge the communication gap between the two countries on this issue. In view of the scepticism and doubts which were expressed in India and Pakistan on the eve of Shahi's visit, it was no small achievement that the two governments declared jointly that "the conclusion of such an agreement [Non-Aggression Pact] would make a positive contribution to peace and stability in the region".⁶¹ In fact Mrs. Gandhi went further and in her talks with the visiting Pakistani journalists, she declared "No War Pact or not, I can assure you that India will never attack Pakistan".⁶²

⁵⁸ As quoted by Noorani, *op.cit.*. Also see, General Zia's interview with Kuldip Nayar on 11 April 1982, reprinted in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 5, January-December 1982, p. 25.

⁵⁹ Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Quarterly Survey", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1982, p. 4.

⁶⁰ *Indian Express*, 14 February 1982.

⁶¹ See Indo-Pak joint statement in *Dawn*, 2 February 1982.

⁶² *Muslim*, 31 January 1982. Also see, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 February 1982, pp. 10-11.

The bilateral negotiations on a Non-Aggression Pact were, however, thwarted for a while when the Indian government postponed indefinitely the visit of India's Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe to Pakistan because of Pakistan's reference to the Kashmir issue at the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva in February 1982⁶³

The Pakistani government took an exception to the outgoing Indian Ambassador to Pakistan, Natwar Singh's statement that the "size of Pakistani armed forces should be reduced by half because the establishment of Bangladesh had diminished its security requirements".⁶⁴ This led to polemical exchanges between India and Pakistan with both accusing each other of subverting the normalization process. The impasse was broken in May 1982 when the Indian Foreign Secretary delivered Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's letter to General Zia-ul-Haq in Islamabad reiterating India's commitment not to attack Pakistan and expressing willingness to resume a dialogue on the No War Pact offer. Indian motives for resurrecting the dialogue were perceived to be meant for creating goodwill for Mrs. Indira Gandhi's visit to the US in July 1982.⁶⁵ Mrs. Indira Gandhi suggested the need for greater bilateral cooperation in various fields including the setting up of a joint commission and that the two countries should sign a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.⁶⁶ Let us examine the Indian offer of signing a Friendship Treaty with Pakistan in more detail.

2.3 India's Offer of a Peace and Friendship Treaty

Mrs. Indira Gandhi had first mentioned this offer during Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi's visit to New Delhi in January 1982. This came in reply to a question that pertained to the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971. She responded "our treaty with the Soviet Union is just what it says. It is a friendship treaty. We are willing to have a friendship treaty with you".⁶⁷ But now it was Pakistan's turn to

⁶³ Pakistan's chief delegate Agha Hilaly and the Indian delegate B.R. Bhagat had exchanged sharp words and accusations at a meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission. Bhagat accused Hilaly of going back on his word not to raise the Kashmir issue at the meeting and strongly objected to Hilaly's drawing a parallel between the Kashmir dispute and the situation in Palestine and Namibia. See, *The Statesman*, 26 February 1982. The Pakistani side denied totally having given any assurance to Bhagat that bilateral issues could not be raised in the Human Rights Commission. They argued that the Pakistani delegate had made a statement on Kashmir in context of Pakistan's known position along the lines of what the Pakistani Foreign Minister had said in the previous session of the UN General Assembly and it drew no parallel with the situation in Palestine. Besides they took a strong objection to the Indian delegate's remarks that "surely the delegation of Pakistan does not believe that the right of self-determination and self-expression can best be exercised under Martial Law", as a clear interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. See, Riaz Khokhar's views in a symposium organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi on 26 February 1982 in "Peace and Indo-Pak Relations", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. 31, no. 4, April 1982, pp. 74-75.

⁶⁴ *Muslim*, 24 March 1982. It may be noted that the Indian sources insisted that Natwar Singh's statement was distorted by the newspaper, a clarification that did not satisfy the Government of Pakistan.

⁶⁵ "Pakistan-India Relations in 1980's", *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 6, June 1990, p. 9.

⁶⁶ See, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Caught in a Web", *India Today*, 30 June 1982, pp. 32-33.

⁶⁷ *Muslim*, 31 January 1982.

disregard this proposal since the remarks were made, according to Agha Shahi, because "the Indo-Soviet treaty was always being flung in her face".⁶⁸ Since this proposal was neither made to Agha Shahi when he called on Mrs. Indira Gandhi nor offered in the course of talks between the two Foreign Ministers, the joint communique was silent on it.

The discussions on this subject were resumed after the Pakistani draft of a Non-Aggression Pact was received by India in May and Indian draft of a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was handed over to Pakistan in August 1982. The next round of talks on the two drafts was held in New Delhi at the Foreign Secretaries level on 23-24 December 1982. The talks were only a preliminary exchange of views on the two draft documents and further discussions on the basic concepts and formulations were to follow. India's official spokesman disclosed that there were some areas of convergence and divergence in the two drafts without however revealing what those areas were. Let us, therefore, look into the Pakistani response to this proposal.

2.3.1 The Pakistani Response

Pakistan had rejected two provisions of the proposed Indian agreement for including an undertaking by the two sides to resolve mutual disputes only bilaterally and not to provide military bases or facilities on its soil to any foreign power. The other two provisions of the proposed Treaty included an undertaking that the *status quo* in Kashmir would not to be altered by either side through the use of force, that is, reiteration of the Simla spirit and the setting up of a mechanism for periodic mutual consultations on security matters.⁶⁹ India feared that Pakistan's new security relationship with the US might drag it into allowing foreign bases on its soil, thus, endangering the South Asian security. B.R. Bhagat expressed such apprehensions in a statement in the Lok Sabha that despite Pakistani denials, they suspected a *quid pro quo* between the US and Pakistan regarding bases and facilities for the former in return for the arms supplies.⁷⁰ N.D. Tiwari, the

⁶⁸ See excerpts from Agha Shahi's press conference, reprinted in, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, vol. 9, no. 1-2, January-February 1982, p. 72. Also see, *Dawn*, 2 February 1982.

⁶⁹ *Indian Express*, 17 December 1982. Also, *News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean*, January 1983, p. 1359.

⁷⁰ See, Satish Kumar, ed., *Year Book on India's Foreign Policy: 1985-86*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1987, p. 117. US help to improve facilities in Karachi, Gwadar, Ormara, Jiwani and Pani sea ports along the Makran coast were viewed in this perspective. A Baluchi leader Ataullah Mengal disclosed that the US had been allowed to build sophisticated base structures in Ormara and Jiwani. *Indian Express*, 4 September 1983. Besides, Jack Anderson an American journalist, on the basis of his knowledge of "secret and top-secret documents of White House" disclosed in January 1984 that General Zia had promised to allow US planes to use Pakistani airfields should Soviet bombers threaten the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan. *Washington Post*, 17 January 1984. Other press reports quoting a House of Representatives sub-committee sources said that facilities for the US ships had been granted by Pakistan at its recently improved Ormara and Pasni sea ports. *The Telegraph*, 1 September 1983; *Indian Express*, 4 September 1983.

Minister of External Affairs told the Lok Sabha on 5 December that both the US and Pakistan had confirmed that US military aircraft periodically transited through Pakistan with the approval of the Government of Pakistan, however, denied giving bases to the US. It was also argued that the US military aid would add to Pakistan's elbow the might of a great military power which in the past had not always been very friendly towards India nor always neutral in Indo-Pak disputes and in the 1971 war had indulged in gunboat diplomacy which was widely perceived as a very threatening move.

While insisting that Pakistan had "granted no bases to any foreign power on its soil nor will it do so",⁷¹ the Pakistani side argued that such an undertaking would "infringe on its sovereign right to determine its own defence arrangements".⁷² Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi pointed out that being a member of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), Pakistan has already given such a commitment and the refusal to grant bases to a foreign power was "a question of policy, entirely voluntary and not an imposed disability".

Zia-ul-Haq said that

by insisting on this clause in the agreement that no bases will be offered to a foreign power, a serious aspersion has been cast on the sincerity of Pakistan in respect of its non-aligned character.⁷⁴

Agha Shahi also argued that the Indian Friendship Treaty was highly selective in terms of principles of the NAM. While the draft spoke of the prohibition of bases, it did not contain other more relevant principles such as non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality of states and eschewal of hegemony.

Another sticking point was the provision for strict bilateralism that is neither party would raise bilateral issues especially Kashmir in international fora. Although the Simla agreement had already laid down the principle of bilateralism, Pakistan as earlier pointed out, always argued that it did not preclude the option of raising bilateral issues in international fora. Agha Shahi argued that by seeking to enlarge its controversial interpretation of bilateralism in the Friendship Treaty from the specific case of Kashmir to a universal

⁷¹ Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shabazada Yaqub Khan's speech on the foreign policy debate in the *Majlis-e-Shoora* on 24 December 1985. See, *Majlis-e-Shoora Debates*, vol. 3, no. 1, 24 December 1985, p. 18; and vol. 5, no. 4, 22 April 1987, p. 355. Also see, General Zia's interview to Los Angeles Times, reprinted in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 7, January-December 1984, p. 9.

⁷² Agha Shahi, *Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988, pp. 186-189.

⁷³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴ See, General Zia's interview to Kuldeep Nayar, reprinted in *President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq: Interviews to Foreign Media*, vol. 6, January-December 1983, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

principle to govern the entire range of Indo-Pak relations, India was seeking to acquire the capacity to resolve any future differences with Pakistan on its own terms depriving the aggrieved party from recourse to other means of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The basic reason was that without the backing of its powerful friends abroad (especially the US and the Islamic countries), Pakistan felt itself to be at a disadvantage when dealing with its giant neighbour. So it vehemently defended its sovereign right to take up these issues in the international fora.⁷⁵ General Zia described these two clauses as "unnecessary, unwarranted and tantamount to undermining Pakistan's sovereignty" and that "no independent sovereign state can be expected to agree to such clauses".⁷⁶ On Kashmir, in particular, General Zia was willing to postpone that issue for a later date in the process of normalization of relations with India although he was not inclined to accept a solution on the basis of the Line of Control which he considered to be the result of the 1971 war.⁷⁷ Agha Shahi had declared categorically that a No War Pact with reference to Kashmir "would neither add to nor subtract from the provisions of the Simla Agreement".⁷⁸ However the Indian stand on this point was firm that a treaty relationship must enable the two countries to leave the Kashmir issue behind them. A simple No War Pact would only rule out war on Kashmir but keep the dispute alive as well as Pakistan's right to raise it in the international fora. Bhabani Sen Gupta disclosed that India had told Pakistan in February 1982 that if Pakistan could produce a treaty that would enable the two to leave the Kashmir issue behind them then India would sign it.⁷⁹ The deadlock on this issue was resolved by the two governments' decision to merge the drafts of these two proposals.

2.4 Indo-Pak Attempts to Merge the Drafts of the Two Proposals

It was at the summit meeting between General Zia-ul-Haq and Mrs. Indira Gandhi at New Delhi in November 1983 that the two leaders asked their officials to try to blend the Pakistani draft of a No War Pact and the Indian draft of Treaty of Peace and Friendship into a single document. Subsequently the two Foreign Secretaries, Mr. M.K. Rasgotra and Mr. Niaz Naik held two rounds of talks in March and May 1984 and had detailed discussions on the conceptual aspects of the two drafts. The joint statement issued at the end of the

⁷⁵ Indranil Banerjee, "The Zia Legacy", *Sunday*, 11-17 September 1988.

⁷⁶ See, General Zia's interview to the US correspondents reprinted in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 7, January-December 1984, p. 131.

⁷⁷ *Patriot*, 15 February 1983; *Times of India*, 12 May 1983; *The Telegraph*, 6 & 19 May 1983.

⁷⁸ *Dawn* 19 January 1982.

⁷⁹ Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Crucial Round of Talks Between India and Pakistan", *Times of India*, 16 May 1984.

May 1984 talks said that "a considerable measure of convergence of the viewpoints of two sides had been achieved".⁸⁰ India's insistence on the above-mentioned two clauses, however, proved to be a stumbling block. Apart from that the text of Indian and Pakistani drafts were nearly identical. The meeting of Foreign Secretaries Mr. Romesh Bhandari and Mr. Niaz Naik in New Delhi in April 1985 had marked a new development in this regard. Pakistan's No War Pact offer and India's offer of a Friendship Treaty were no longer considered to be a *sine qua non* of normalization. The emphasis was now on step by step cooperation in diverse fields and the Pact and Treaty could be a "culmination of this partnership effort of widening and strengthening areas of cooperation to generate harmony and trust".⁸¹ The Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi made it clear in a statement in Lok Sabha that

the talks we are referring today are not on the no war pact or on peace agreement or at that level. We are talking of improving relationships, improving exchanges between our two peoples, improving the cordiality between the two countries because that is what will then lead to an improvement in atmosphere which can lead to a basis for a proper understanding between the two countries.⁸²

The talks continued and in January 1986, Pakistan put forward a revised draft giving a new formulation regarding no foreign bases and bilateralism. It proposed that the treaty should contain a provision that neither countries should not allow their territory to be used by a third power against the other. It mentioned the crisis on its western border as the reason for its reluctance to agree to the condition of no foreign bases.⁸³ However just when it looked that the two countries were nearing an agreement, the ruling Muslim League under Mr. Junejo in Pakistan passed a stringently critical resolution opposing normalization of relations with India. This time the normalisation process became a casualty of the internal power struggle between President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo in Pakistan.⁸⁴

The debate on the No War Pact and the Peace Treaty was in any case losing its significance and the curtain was finally drawn when Benazir Bhutto came to power in Pakistan in 1988 and dismissed the No War Pact proposal. She said

⁸⁰ Muslim, 24 May 1984.

⁸¹ P.M. Pasricha, "Relations with Pakistan", in Year Book 1984-85, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

⁸² Lok Sabha Debates, 8th Series, vol. 3, no. 20, 10 April 1985, cols. 425-426.

⁸³ Yearbook 1985-86, *op.cit.*, p. 116. Bhabani Sen Gupta writes that even the Indian side had told Pakistan that it was very much possible to find mutually acceptable language and define an agreed position with regard to lending bases and facilities to a superpower in the context of the cold war. And if in spite of concluding a treaty, Pakistan was found to have placed bases or other facilities at the United States' disposal, India would be free to denounce the Treaty on that account. Bhabani Sen Gupta, *op.cit.*.

⁸⁴ This point has already been discussed in Chapter Five.

We could not understand its logic that how a simple No War Pact could resolve the different issues between the two countries. We felt that the Simla Agreement had a legitimacy and we must approach step by step the problem of resolving the issue to help build the confidence as we emerge from one day to another.⁸⁵

Benazir was echoing her father's views that she had no faith in a No War Pact. After the 1971 war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had gone to a great length arguing that the Simla Agreement was *not* a No War Pact.⁸⁶ And perhaps she wanted to indicate a change from the policies of a military regime to a democratically elected government in Islamabad.⁸⁷

2.6 A Critical Analysis of the No War Pact and Friendship Treaty Debate

An overall analysis of the debate shows it to be a classic example of being a victim of the distrust and suspicion between India and Pakistan. The offer of a No War Pact, in principle, had been made by *both sides* yet it was caught in a vicious circle of proposal-rejection. Mrs. Indira Gandhi perceived the underlying motives of Zia-ul-Haq's No War Pact offer as insincere and suspect partly because of the renewed strategic linkages between the US and Pakistan and partly because of her distrust of General Zia's military regime. Further, one may argue that the negative logic, 'if they have rejected our proposal, why should we accept theirs', was also at work on both sides.

A deeper analysis shows that their differences on the two provisions of bilateralism and military bases to foreign powers were not insoluble. Perhaps the real question was the nature and quality of the relationship each wanted which was reflected in the underlying approach of the two proposals although each struck a point of mutual interest in common security. India argued that the No War Pact offer was essentially negative in its approach which would not be of much use unless the basic factors with high potential for tensions and conflict were attended to. India wanted the Friendship Treaty to reflect a structural change in the Indo-Pak relationship lifting it to a level that was distinctly higher than the one framed in the Simla Agreement.⁸⁸ Accordingly, the Treaty provided for an all-round expansion of relations between the two countries. Muni argued that India was trying to explore the basis for a lasting peace and understanding with Pakistan which would not be vitiated by extra-regional powers and which could contribute significantly

⁸⁵ Benazir Bhutto's interview with M.J. Akbar in *The Telegraph*, 14 December 1988.

⁸⁶ See, Bhutto's speech, "The Context of Simla Agreement in Struggle for Kashmir -II", in *Frontier Post*, 11 March 1990.

⁸⁷ Kuldip Nayar, "Well Begun, But Not Half Done", *The Telegraph*, 2 January 1989. Also see, Pran Chopra, "Benazir Buries No War Pact", *Times of India*, 28 December 1988.

⁸⁸ Bhabani Sen Gupta, *op.cit.*.

towards greater harmony within the subcontinent. As against this Pakistan appeared to be trying to secure its back-door to India by obtaining assurances and guarantees on an adhoc basis in the limited context of Afghanistan.⁸⁹

Pakistan, on the other hand, wanted to pursue a very cautious approach as its press commented "India wanted to have too much too soon in a great leap forward".⁹⁰ A.I. Akram put it aptly that "a no war pact was like a handshake while the friendship treaty was more of a love affair".⁹¹ Pakistan also did not favour liberal cultural exchanges and wanted carefully to regulate such interactions.⁹²

It is interesting to note however that both sides had loopholes in their arguments. India did not favour a negative approach yet it itself had proposed a simple No war Declaration in the past. Some Indian scholars argued that since the Simla Agreement was more or less equivalent of a No War Pact, India had never repeated this offer after 1972. But this argument is not borne out by facts. Even after the Simla Agreement in 1972, this proposal was certainly contemplated in unofficial circles. The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. A.B. Vajpayee revived this proposal on 4 April 1977 in an address to the Rajya Sabha and subsequently when Mrs. Gandhi was asked by a journalist in 1980, if she would propose a No War Pact to Pakistan she responded "what is the use, they have already rejected it".⁹³ It is important to note that she did not argue that after the Simla Agreement the two countries did not need a No War Pact.

On the other hand, General Zia had made a right about turn on his position regarding the role of a No War Pact in a confidence building process. While in 1979-80 he believed that

*no war would be ideal but the foundations must first be laid, the mistrust and lack of confidence must first be removed. There must be genuine confidence on both two sides and the irritants removed. Once that is done, you can sign ten no-war pacts.*⁹⁴

and barely two years later, he had reversed his position and said

a friendship treaty ...[comes in] the field of political relationship. I thought if you want to create confidence, then you have to have a very solid ground and the solidity of the base

⁸⁹ S.D. Muni, "India and the Emerging Trends in South Asia", in Satish Kumar, *Year Book on India's Foreign Policy: 1982-83*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1985, p. 80.

⁹⁰ As quoted in *The Hindu*, 18 August 1982.

⁹¹ Lt. General A.I. Akram, "India Revisited: Normalization Talks", a series of articles in *Muslim*, 11-18 April 1983.

⁹² Zia was especially opposed to the visits of Indian female performers (dancers and singers) to Pakistan even though Chinese female performers were allowed to visit Pakistan. See, *Pakistan-India Relations in 1980's, Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 6, June 1990, p. 11.

⁹³ "No War Pact Offer by India Likely", *Muslim*, 17 January 1980; "Mrs. Gandhi Proposes No War Pact", *Pakistan Times*, 20 January 1980.

⁹⁴ (italics added). General Zia's interview to Kuldeep Nayar, reprinted in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 3, January-December 1983, p. 159.

could be better protected by a no-war pact. *Start off by saying we are not going to have war.... now on this base build as many structures as you like.... have a treaty of friendship, joint commission ...*⁹⁵

Further, Pakistan rejected India's comprehensive approach to their bilateral relationship as outlined in the friendship treaty, yet General Zia showed no hesitation in accepting the Indian proposal of instituting a Joint Commission which served essentially the same purpose. This suggests that the two proposals had merely become a tool in the game of one-upmanship between New Delhi and Islamabad and neither side made a really sincere effort to accommodate other's position.

Last but not least one must also look at the popular response to these proposals in India and Pakistan. In India an opinion poll conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in the four metropolitan cities in 1984 showed that nearly 73% Indians wanted normal and friendly relations with Pakistan although on the specific issue of a No War Pact there were clearly two schools of thought. One supported the proposal and criticized the Indian government for not responding positively to Pakistan's gesture. Among the opposition political parties, the Janata party in particular, took exception to the government's decision of having rejected it without giving it a due consideration.⁹⁶ They stressed the symbolic value of accepting Pakistan's proposal even if it meant a duplication of the Simla Agreement. This was argued by Sahabzada Yaqub Khan as well who suggested that

The no war pact endorses and reaffirms the position stated in the Simla agreement The question could be asked, what would be the disadvantage of signing such a pact even if it is a reinforcement of the position that already exists?⁹⁷

An eminent Pakistani official reiterated in a similar vein that India should have "just signed" the No War Pact even if it meant a re-affirmation of the Simla agreement in the sense "what is wrong in renewing your vows?"⁹⁸ He argued that the such an offer from a military regime should have made it all the more attractive since "India would never get such a deal from the [Pakistani] political leaders".⁹⁹ A large section of the Indian press had also welcomed this proposal. Kuldeep Nayar wrote that the No War Pact was clear and categorical

⁹⁵ (italics added). See, General Zia's interview with M.J. Akbar, reprinted in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 5, January-December 1982, p. 65.

⁹⁶ For Atal Bihari Vajpayee's statement on this issue, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 26, no. 29, 30 March 1982, cols. 387-390; for Ram Jethmalani's statement, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 22, no. 14, 10 December 1981, cols. 622-623. Also see, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CXXI, no. 24, 24 March 1984, cols. 171-225; vol. CXX, no. 19, 17 December 1981, cols. 191-192, 297-298.

⁹⁷ As quoted by R.G. Sawhney, *Zia's Pakistan: Implications for India's Security*, New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1985, p. 99.

⁹⁸ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*

and also applied to Kashmir. The pact could have led to some reduction in the large military establishments of the two countries or else they may choose to be in a perpetual posture of confrontation if only to justify the amount of money spent on their armed forces.¹⁰⁰ Another noted Indian columnist said that "India made a mistake of not accepting No War Pact. By doing so we let Pakistan have its own strategy of aggravating tensions in Punjab".¹⁰¹

The other school of thought was in line with the government's viewpoint and perceived the offer of a No War Pact as a trap or a propaganda ploy by the military dictator General Zia who was not to be trusted. It was argued that General Zia's motive to propose a No War Pact was "to slowly destroy the Simla Agreement" because it was associated with Z.A. Bhutto.¹⁰² Keeping in mind the fact there was a persistently dangerous contradiction between the views held by the government and the people of Pakistan as far as their domestic political situation was concerned, they wondered if the military regime and the people were on the same wavelength as far as the future relations with India were concerned. A Nation-Gallup opinion poll held in Pakistan, however, showed that General Zia's No War Pact proposal enjoyed wide public support. In 1984-85, as high as 71% of a national urban sample supported the idea of signing a No War Pact with India although it had declined to 50% (with 39% opposing the idea) in 1990.¹⁰³ The Pakistani intelligentsia generally welcomed General Zia's proposal and wanted India to respond to it warmly.

Nevertheless there was a strong lobby in Pakistan led by the PPP which did not oppose the No War Pact as such but pleaded with the Indian government that it should not sign this Pact with the Zia regime which would accord it the legitimacy, Zia had been seeking to achieve.¹⁰⁴ The debate on the No War Pact and Peace Treaty also draws attention to the impact of a change in regime in either country on a particular confidence building initiative. For instance, while a No War Pact was the cornerstone of the military regime's India policy, a democratic government led by the PPP repudiated it in one stroke.

3 The Afghanistan Crisis

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 created a new regional situation in the subcontinent. On the one hand it provided a rare opportunity for India and Pakistan to join hands

¹⁰⁰ Nayar, "Well Begun But Not Half Done", *op.cit.*.

¹⁰¹ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

¹⁰² An Indian scholar in an interview with the present author in December 1991.

¹⁰³ *Nation*, 2 March 1990.

¹⁰⁴ In an interview with an Indian scholar in December 1991.

against a common threat. On the other, it opened the door to an increased and somewhat intrusive input from both the superpowers into the dynamics of South Asian politics. Such an interference from the USA and Soviet Union had an essentially negative impact in the sense that it pulled both India and Pakistan into different directions. And before long the Afghanistan crisis instead of bringing these two neighbours together on a common platform was contributing towards widening the regional divide between them.

Since the superpowers' involvement in this case was a crucial factor in shaping India-Pakistan responses to the Afghanistan crisis, let us first examine briefly the perceptions of all the parties involved that is India, Pakistan, the USA and the Soviet Union on this issue.¹⁰⁵

3.1 Perceptions of the Parties Involved on the Afghanistan Crisis

3.1.1 The Soviet Rationale

The Soviets argued that they had vital stakes in the revolution which had taken place in Afghanistan in April 1978. It was argued that right from the beginning it encountered external aggression and interference from outside forces. In these circumstances the Afghan leadership from President Taraki onwards had repeatedly appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance under the provisions of the December 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between Soviet Union and Afghanistan. And the Soviets merely responded to this appeal in December 1979.¹⁰⁶

3.1.2 The Pakistani Viewpoint

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was perceived by Pakistan as having exacerbated its security dilemma on its western border in addition to its traditional preoccupation with India on the eastern side, thus, creating a double bind situation for its security.¹⁰⁷ More specifically, three possible dimensions of the threat to Pakistan from the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan were identified:

- (a) a direct attack to gain access to the Arabian Sea's warm waters in the traditional framework of the Soviet 'grand design'.
- (b) destabilization and disintegration of Pakistan through active support to Baluchi and Pathan tribal separatist

¹⁰⁵ We are not looking into the Chinese response here since it did not play a major role in this particular situation.

¹⁰⁶ Other Soviet versions squarely accused the CIA of attempting to subvert Hafizullah Azim's regime in Afghanistan and that military hardware from the US and China was pouring into Pakistan destined for use by the Afghan rebels. Shelton U. Kodikara, "The Role of Extra-Regional Powers and South Asian Security", in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 106.

¹⁰⁷ Sultan Mohammad Khan, "Pakistan Geopolitics: The Diplomatic Perspective", *International Security*, vol. 5, no. 1, Summer 1980, p. 26.

movements.¹⁰⁸

(c) consequences of the presence of nearly three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Muni writes that the fourth dimension of threat of the border raids and violations by the Soviet and Afghan air and ground forces in hot pursuit of the mujahideens came into being only after Pakistan had agreed to act as a conduit of the US arms to the latter and allowed them to operate from its soil.¹⁰⁹ While there was a general consensus on the issue of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan among all segments of the bureaucratic and political elites in Pakistan, the perception of the Soviet threat varied considerably along the ideological preferences within Pakistan.¹¹⁰ The mainstream view in Pakistan, however, considered the Soviet Union as a dynamic and expansionist power whose intervention in Afghanistan had brought the Soviets far too close to Pakistan's dangerously exposed western borders where sub-nationalism had remained rather strong until the late 1970's. Besides, an end to the Afghan buffer to Soviet military activism across the Hindukush and growing Indo-Soviet military cooperation were perceived to have resulted in a geo-political isolation of Pakistan. As it was the fall of the Shah in Iran and the Gulf conflict had neutralized Iran's traditionally supportive role of Pakistan's quest for security against a perceived Indo-Soviet collusion.

3.1.3 The US Viewpoint

In the US view, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not intended merely to prop up a weakening left-wing regime in the country but was directed towards realizing an historic Russian ambition of seeking a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean.¹¹¹ It viewed the Soviet Union and its continuing presence in Afghanistan as a part of its game plan in the second cold war between the two. Earlier the collapse of Shah in Iran and Khomeini's revolution had dismantled the US security edifice in the Gulf. The Soviet action in

¹⁰⁸ For a detailed account of the implications of this threat to Pakistan, see, Selig Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, New York, 1981, and an article by the same author, "US Policy in South Asia", in M.K. Rasgotra, V.D. Chopra and K.P. Misra, eds., *The Security of South Asia*, New Delhi: Continental Publishers, 1992, p. 139.

¹⁰⁹ S.D. Muni, "Insecurity: Impact of the Second Cold War", in Jasjit Singh, ed., *Asian Security: Old Paradigms and New Challenges*, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991, p. 122.

¹¹⁰ Rasul Rias writes that the Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan tended to combine an expansionist perspective of the Soviet Union with an ideological threat to Pakistan's national integrity. They used the fact of Soviet colonization of the Muslim states in Central Asia in the past, the pro-Indian Soviet policies and a traditionally hostile attitude towards Pakistan for projecting a grave Soviet threat. The regionalist-leftist groups perceived a natural collusion between the military-bureaucratic elites and the Islamic fundamentalists led by Jammāt-i-Islami who had exaggerated the Soviet threat to Pakistan because of their identical interests in shaping a new political order leaning towards the West. They had supported the 1978 Afghanistan revolution and blamed the Pakistani authorities for collaborating with the Afghan feudals for destabilizing the revolution which led to the Soviet intervention. From this perspective Soviet intervention was largely defensive against Pakistan-backed interference. Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan's Relations With the Soviet Union", in Rose and Hussain, *op.cit.*, pp. 132-135.

¹¹¹ This was outlined in Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US Ambassador's speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1984. See, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Afghanistan: Five Years of Tragedy", *Current Policy No. 636*, 14 November 1984.

Afghanistan had posed a very serious threat to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf which was considered to be in the vital interest of the US.¹¹² At a global level the US reaction consisted of the deployment of the aircraft carrier Nimitz and two nuclear cruisers to the Indian Ocean and setting up of a Rapid Deployment Force. At a regional level, it looked upon Pakistan as a frontline state and decided to bolster Pakistan against a possible southward push by the Soviets. The Reagan administration offered \$3.2 billion in economic and military assistance to Pakistan which was accepted in 1981, thus, reactivating a US-Pakistan alliance.

3.1.4 The Indian Viewpoint

India stopped short of condemning outright the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as Pakistan and her other South Asian neighbours did. Initially Mrs. Gandhi's government chose to accept Soviet assurances that its army entered into Afghanistan by invitation and would withdraw when asked to do so by the Afghan government.¹¹³ However slowly it moved away to a more critical position and Mrs. Gandhi declared that "foreign troops from Afghanistan should be withdrawn".¹¹⁴ For instance, while the Indo-Soviet joint statement issued in February 1980, on the occasion of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to New Delhi was conspicuously silent in making any direct reference to the Afghanistan situation. On his second visit to New Delhi, only four months later in June 1980, the Indian External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao told the Lok Sabha on 18 June that he had impressed upon the Soviet Union the importance of seeking a political solution to pave the way for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.¹¹⁵ The sum and total of the Indian response was that Mrs. Gandhi's government did not condemn publicly the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan but a number of statements by her and Foreign Minister Rao made it clear that India viewed the Soviet action with grave concern. For instance, on 9 December 1980, while welcoming

¹¹² The USA imported 44% of its oil requirements from the Gulf for Japan. Although an interruption of oil supplies would hurt US less and later than it would hurt most others, it was agreed that oil is the only economic interest for which the US would have to fight for. See, Kenneth H. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force", *International Security*, Spring 1981, pp. 52-54. It is interesting to take note of the Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi's observations in this regard. On the basis of his conversations with Mr. Clark Clifford and Dr. Brezezinski of the Carter administration, he disclosed that in US perceptions if the Soviets threatened the US vital interests of oil supplies in the Persian gulf "there would be a war" but if the Soviets moved against Pakistan "it would only create a serious situation". See, Agha Shahi's comments in Khatri, *op.cit.*, pp. 279-280.

¹¹³ This was outlined in the Indian delegate's speech at the UN General Assembly session in January 1980. See, Mansingh, *op.cit.*, p. 144.

¹¹⁴ *Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi*, Vol. 5, 1 January 1982-30 October 1984, New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, p. 368.

¹¹⁵ Rajendra Sareen, *Pakistan: The India Factor*, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984. Also see, P.V. Narasimha Rao's speech made at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in 1981, reprinted in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 34, no. 2, 1981, pp. 17-18; and Robert G. Wirsing, "Soviet Relations With Pakistan and India: Prospects for Change", *Strategic Studies*, vol. 13, no. 2, Winter 1990, p. 62.

Mr. Brezhnev on his visit to New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi said,

just and durable conditions must be found and found quickly to prevent misunderstanding from hardening into distrust and animosity.... many of the new tensions and conflicts are in our vicinity [Afghanistan]. It is natural for us to feel concerned. We sincerely hope that the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of the countries in the region [including Afghanistan] will not come under strain or jeopardy through conflict and interference [from the superpowers].¹¹⁶

In a Lok Sabha debate, she even went further and said

events in Afghanistan which include the induction of Soviet forces, have created serious instability too close for our comfort.¹¹⁷

Moreover, Indian officials expressed privately strong misgivings about the Soviet military action and there are numerous indications that these were communicated discreetly to Moscow.¹¹⁸ Many argued that the Soviet action posed unique dangers for India threatening to undermine its hard won dominance in its own region as well as to provoke great power rivalry in the subcontinent. "The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan wrote S. Nihal Singh, "has been the greatest blow to India's regional and long term interests. Implicitly Moscow is now claiming to be a South Asian power".¹¹⁹

More significantly the opposition Janata party criticized strongly Mrs. Gandhi's Afghanistan policy.¹²⁰ It may be recalled that Prime Minister Charan Singh at the time of Soviet intervention in December 1979 had called in the Soviet Ambassador and given him "a strong demarche that Soviet troops should withdraw from Afghanistan".¹²¹ India also viewed the US moves in the region, particularly that of rearming Pakistan, with suspicion. It is important to note that the US attempts to revive its strategic ties with Pakistan predated Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and had much to do with the emerging needs of the U.

¹¹⁶ Sareen, *ibid.*

¹¹⁷ See, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 7, no. 31, July 1980, col. 36.

¹¹⁸ Wirsing, *op.cit.*, p. 61. Also see, Surjeet Mansingh, "US-India Relations: Problems and Prospects", *India Quarterly*, vol. 36, July-December 1980, pp. 268-270.

¹¹⁹ S. Nihal Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of Indo-Soviet Relations*, Riverdale Md.: The Riverdale Company, 1986, p. 237.

¹²⁰ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CXVII, no. 9, 30 April 1981, cols. 263-264, 319-321; *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 22, no. 14, 10 December 1981, cols. 683-685. One may also note that the other opposition parties like the Socialist (S), CPI and CPM more or less supported the Congress view that Pakistan and China were about to forge an alliance with the USA to the detriment of India. For this viewpoint see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 6th series, vol. 6, no. 21, 7 July 1980, cols. 416-419. This point has also been discussed in Chapter Five.

¹²¹ This was revealed by Agha Shahi. See his comments, in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 279. Agha Shahi also disclosed that during Morarji Desai's regime, when the Soviet Premier A. Kosygin urged him to teach Pakistan a lesson because of the border crossings by the Afghan mujahideens fighting against the communist regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, the Soviet leader was rebuffed by the Indian Prime Minister. See, Agha Shahi, "Indo-Pak Relations: Conflict and Confrontation", *Nation*, 5 December 1986.

force projection in the Gulf particularly after the political turmoil and collapse of the Shah in Iran,¹²² S.D.

Muni writes of inherent contradictions in the US moves in the region

while pleading for a regional response, the US wanted such response to be dove-tailed to its overall strategic approach in the region Further and more importantly, ... while asking for a regional rapprochement particularly between India and Pakistan, the US also wanted to make subtle use of Indo-Pakistani cleavages, so as to enlist a willing Pakistan in its new strategic thrust in South-West Asia and consequently build it up militarily against India.¹²³

US leaders spoke in terms of an "arc of crisis", "strategic consensus" and "South-West Asia" as the relevant policy framework.¹²⁴ India felt that the US sale of sophisticated military technology to Pakistan would fuel an arms race in the subcontinent. Further, India was very concerned about US plans for seeking new facilities in the South-West Asian (including Pakistan) region which were outlined by General David Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs Of Staff, in a Senate subcommittee meeting on 17 March 1981,

we are particularly interested in improving certain facilities in a number of places in South-West Asia, that we could use as a transit and/or staying and support areas rather quickly, if a conflict were to erupt. We would prefer to maintain multiple facilities arrangements than to have a few large fixed bases for operation primarily because of the size of the area and the uncertainty of where the conflict might occur. We would also like to increase participation by our South-West Asian friends in regional security and exercises.¹²⁵

India also took note of the fact that the US was creating trouble in Afghanistan even before the Soviets had moved in¹²⁶ and subsequently by supporting the Afghan mujahideen. That is why they urged a political solution which clearly spelt out all other concomitants (the US interference) including of course withdrawal of foreign (Soviet) forces.¹²⁷

Although India and Pakistan's perceptions of the Afghanistan crisis diverged, it is important to note that initially efforts were made by both sides to evolve a common strategy.

¹²² Muni in "Asian Security", *op.cit.*, p. 119. Mushahid Hussain points out that the date of the Rapid Deployment Force is quite significant since it was announced in June 1979, a full six months before the Soviet Red army had entered Afghanistan in December 1979. He adds that the US had been viewing the Iranian revolution as an ideological and political threat to Muslim countries and the RDF had been set up and based in the region essentially to prevent another Iran. See, Hussain's comments in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 68-69.

¹²³ S.D. Muni, "Geo-Strategic Importance of SAARC", in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 247.

¹²⁴ Thomas P. Thornton writes that for the US, the idea of South Asia had faded and Pakistan was conceptually moved again into South-West Asia and the new Central Command boundaries were drawn to include Pakistan but not India. Thornton, *op.cit.*, p. 265.

¹²⁵ As quoted by Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan in the Changing Regional Scenario*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988, p. 41.

¹²⁶ Mushahid Hussain quotes Dr. Brezezinski's memoirs which testify that the US started the covert funding of the Afghan mujahideen in May 1979, a full three months after the victory of communist revolution in February 1979 and long before the Soviets actually sent troops into Afghanistan. See Hussain in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

¹²⁷ Narasimha Rao, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

3.2 India and Pakistan's Attempts to Evolve a Joint Strategy on the Afghanistan Crisis

Immediately after Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan Pakistan approached India to explore the prospects of adopting a joint posture. But as the Indian government was passing through a transitional period of general elections with a very high possibility of Congress coming back to the power, its Foreign Secretary expressed his inability to visit Pakistan until the last week of January.¹²⁸ This missed opportunity proved to be crucial because in the UN debate on Afghanistan in January 1980, the two governments had already taken divergent positions when India abstained on the motion asking the Soviets to withdraw and Pakistan voted in its favour.

Subsequently however, Mrs. Gandhi's government made a number of efforts to re-start consultations with Pakistan on this subject by sending India's Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe in February 1980 and the External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh as her special emissary in April 1980. She also wrote a letter to General Zia saying that Pakistan could move its forces to its western border without jeopardizing its security on its eastern front. General Zia-ul-Haq, however, asked Mrs. Indira Gandhi first to withdraw some of the Indian forces from that border and made a counter proposal of Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) which for several other reasons never materialized.¹²⁹ Subsequently the two leaders discussed this issue in their meeting at Salisbury where they participated in Zimbabwe's independence celebrations. The two Foreign Ministers also dwelled on this subject during Agha Shahi's visit to New Delhi in July 1980.¹³⁰ India's Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao during his visit to Pakistan in July 1981 reaffirmed India's desire to continue the normalization process with Pakistan and declared that India had "an abiding interest, even a vested interest in the territorial integrity and stability of Pakistan".¹³¹ He added that

in view of the geographical situation in which both of our countries find ourselves ... we should develop an individual and if necessary, *a joint capacity to resist the negative impact on us* by external trends and external elements.¹³²

Commenting on Pakistan's fears of India's sinister designs on that country, he said that India should at least be credited with the perspicacity to know that there is not a single problem of hers which will come anywhere near solution by the undoing of Pakistan. And as for the fantastic fear that India wants to gobble up Pakistan

¹²⁸ Agha Shahi, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

¹²⁹ It will be discussed separately in Chapter Eight.

¹³⁰ See, 'Pakistan-India Relations in 1980's', *op.cit.*, p. 3.

¹³¹ Narasimha Rao, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

¹³² (*italics added*), *ibid.* and, **Muslim**, 12 June 1981.

"I can only say that those who are plugging this line are doing injustice to Pakistan and India both".¹³³ Although their differences on the Afghanistan crisis remained, the joint *communiqué* reiterated their support for the non-aligned resolution on Afghanistan issued earlier which was based on a consensus and stressed the need of making continuous efforts for a "comprehensive and just solution" of the Afghanistan problem.¹³⁴

3.3 A Critical Analysis

What were the reasons for India and Pakistan's failure to evolve a joint stance on the Afghanistan crisis? India blamed Pakistan's decision to accept US military aid which had delivered a mortal blow to any such attempts. "Pakistan then" writes S.D. Muni, "became uninterested in working with India".¹³⁵ Pakistan, on the other hand, described India's Afghanistan policy as "negative and far from reassuring".¹³⁶ It criticized severely India, the then Chairman of the Non-aligned movement for not having taken an unequivocal stand on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It felt that India was not as forthcoming as it should have been perhaps because the Indians did not want to come to Pakistan's aid at the cost of alienating the Soviets. India on the other hand, believed that Pakistan was all too willing to act as a conduit of US arms and renew its strategic alliance with the US. Each perceived the other's ties with a superpower as a bigger source of threat than the situation in Afghanistan *per se* and at the same time failed to appreciate the other's concerns about its own connection with either superpower.

Pakistan suspected that development of a broad strategic consensus between India and the Soviet Union would render it more vulnerable to a continuation of threats aimed at its acquiescing to Indo-Soviet regional interests.¹³⁷ On the other hand, it questioned India's concerns about the inflow of US weaponry on the grounds that it was infringing on Pakistan's sovereign right to determine its defence requirements and that India was more disturbed about Pakistan getting a few arms than about the dangers to its security. While India was apprehensive that a substantial re-arming of Pakistan with sophisticated US weapons would fuel an arms race in the region, at the same time, it believed that the Soviet Union would never attack Pakistan directly¹³⁸ and in any case Pakistan could not be sufficiently heavily armed to take on the military might

¹³³ *ibid.*

¹³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 18. 'Pakistan-India Relations in 1980's', *op.cit.*, p. 4.

¹³⁵ Muni, in *Asian Security*, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

¹³⁶ *New York Times*, 23 January 1980.

¹³⁷ Rais, *op.cit.*, p. 132.

¹³⁸ This impression is based on the present author's interviews with some Congress leaders conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

of Soviet Union. India also argued that despite the Soviet threat on Pakistan's western borders the bulk of the Pakistani forces continued to be deployed on its eastern border.¹³⁹ And finally that the US and Pakistan's continuing help to Afghan mujahideens had made a political dialogue between the parties concerned and the withdrawal of Soviet forces more difficult to achieve. This position was expressed succinctly by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his address to a joint session of Congress during his visit to the USA in June 1985,

outside interference and intervention have put in jeopardy the stability, security and progress of the region. We stand for a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures sovereignty, integrity, independence and non-aligned status and enables the refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour. Such a settlement can only come through dialogue and realistic consensus among the parties directly concerned.¹⁴⁰

The Pakistani military regime's domestic considerations and compulsions also had a lot to do with General Zia's acquiescence to play the US game in the region. This is significant because it was Islamabad's decision to accept US military aid that had finally put cold water on the continuing India-Pakistan attempts to evolve a common strategy to meet the Afghanistan crisis. While India stopped short of demanding publicly the withdrawal of Soviet troops, there were indications that Mrs. Gandhi agreed with Islamabad in principle about the gravity of developments in Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ Zia admitted that

in private, Indian leaders have told me that they are against what is happening in Afghanistan and that Soviet troops should not have moved into Afghanistan but do not say that in public.¹⁴²

Without entering the realm of speculation whether a democratic regime in Pakistan would have adopted a different policy, one can safely argue that the military regime had its own axe to grind when it accepted US military aid. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was even described as Brezhnev's Christmas gift for General Zia. This took the form of international attention and support, a flow of generous military and economic aid from the USA and its allies and spill-over and under-the-table benefits such as a more than 30% leakage in the arms and economic assistance meant for Afghan mujahideen) cornered by a small but influential and

¹³⁹ It may be noted that out of 21 army divisions of Pakistan, 19 were positioned on its eastern border with only one division facing the Afghan border and one held in reserve.

¹⁴⁰ As quoted by Kodikara, *op.cit.*, p. 50. Kathleen Healy quotes a number of statements made by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the effect that both the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and interference from across the Pakistani border must be stopped. See, Kathleen Healy, *Rajiv Gandhi: Years of Power*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, pp. 66-67.

¹⁴¹ See, 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 8, January-December 1985, p. 224.

¹⁴² *ibid.*, vol. 6, p. 40.

politically well-entrenched upper strata of the Pakistani elite.¹⁴³ General Zia used it for legitimizing his military regime which was facing a stiff opposition from the democratic forces within Pakistan.

The US administration went out of its way to describe General Zia as a great dynamic leader and endorsed his political programme. It is interesting to note that some American sources identified the CIA's involvement in attempts to subvert the MRD and prop up Zia's regime.¹⁴⁴ US Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger debunked the Sindh agitation of the MRD as the handiwork of a handful of pro-Soviet elements. Subsequently the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan equated the US commitment to Pakistan's security with the stability of the Zia regime.¹⁴⁵

Moreover, General Zia had agreed to play the US game in order to realize his own regional ambitions. For instance, while Pakistan's Islamic identity, intimate security ties with the Gulf regimes and deep economic stakes in the peace and stability in the Gulf region were viewed as positive factors by the US, General Zia used the same for establishing and strengthening Pakistan's links with the West Asia. It may be recalled that since the mid 1970's Pakistan under Mr. Bhutto and subsequently under General Zia-ul-Haq was seeking a separate identity *vis-à-vis* India and South Asia, which accounted for its Middle Eastern connection. As In Mushahid Hussain's words "it was not just a tactical manoeuvre, but something much more than that".¹⁴⁶ General Zia's total determination to provide all possible assistance to the Afghan mujahideen, ostensibly on humanitarian grounds and in the spirit of Islamic Brotherhood, was actually furnished with an ultimate intent of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic regime in Afghanistan.

Zia wanted to bring about an Islamic bloc between the Arabian Sea and the Urals including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey¹⁴⁷ essentially to give Pakistan a 'strategic depth' *vis-à-vis* India. He had conceived of such a federation as a part of his strategic Islamic consensus for the region. He hoped that by an alliance with an Islamic (mujahideen) government in Kabul, Pakistan would avoid the traditional insecurity

¹⁴³ Muni in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 122. Many Pakistani political analysts have also underlined repeatedly the close nexus between the Afghan mujahideen, the flow of arms (among various political, ethnic and terrorist groups), the phenomenal increase in drug trafficking and intensification of ethnic conflicts, political violence and terrorism in Pakistan.

¹⁴⁴ *Newsweek*, 10 October 1983, pp. 23-25, 32.

¹⁴⁵ *Newsweek*, 12 December 1983, p. 60.

¹⁴⁶ Hussain in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 231.

¹⁴⁷ After the Soviet collapse, General Mirza Aslam Beg included the Central Asian Republics as well in this plan.

on its western tribal border and would also provide itself with territorial depth *vis-à-vis* India.¹⁴⁸ And similar understandings with Iran and possibly Turkey held the promise of a new offensive capability against India through broad military co-ordination.¹⁴⁹ Partly due to these reasons, India and Pakistan failed to evolve a common position when the UN sponsored negotiations for the settlement of the Afghan problem reached their final stage.

Pakistan insisted that the withdrawal of Soviet troops should be accompanied by the removal of the communist regime and the setting up of an interim government acceptable to the mujahideens. India on the other hand, supported the Afghan government's plans for national reconciliation and to this end sought to strengthen the position of the government led by Najibullah. Early in 1988 in a dramatic move apparently aimed at establishing Indian bonafides with Afghan moderate groups, India's Minister of External Affairs, Natwar Singh reportedly met with ex-King Zahir Shah in Rome and in May Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi hosted President Najibullah's visit to New Delhi.¹⁵⁰

Rajiv Gandhi also invited Zia-ul-Haq for talks on the Afghan issue was rebuffed by Pakistan which accused New Delhi of trying to get a late entry into the negotiating process with the purpose of influencing the final outcome.¹⁵¹ At the official level, however, Zia expressed his inability to come because he had called a special session of Parliament, as part of his bid to evolve a national consensus on Afghanistan. He asked Rajiv Gandhi to send his special emissary for this purpose. Subsequently the Indian Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon went to Islamabad on 1 March 1989 for consultations with Pakistani leaders on the Afghan issue. India's view was that in the wake of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it could not remain indifferent to the possibility of a collaboration of fundamentalist forces in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan which would threaten the political stability of the states in South and West Asia.¹⁵² Viewed in these terms, the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan also seemed to have "at best a neutral, at worst, a negative impact"

¹⁴⁸ Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship", *Asian Survey*, vol. 37, no. 6, July 1991, pp. 498-499, 504. Also see, Dmitry Borisov and Nikolai Vladimirov, "Zia-ul-Haq: Will His Dream Come True?", *Moscow News*, 19 January 1992; "Afghanistan: The Soldiers of Vision", *The Economist*, 1 February 1992; "Pakistan Looking North", *The Economist*, 22 February 1992.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ See, Arun Kumar Banerjee, "India-Pakistan Relations: The Game of One-Upmanship", in *YearBook of India's Foreign Policy: 1989-1990*, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁵¹ See, Pakistani Prime Minister M.K. Junejo's interview with Raminder Singh in *India Today*, 15 June 1988, p. 10. Also see, General Zia's interview in *Pakistan Times*, 13 August 1988.

¹⁵² See, Eiaine Sciolino, "Gandhi Faults Islamic Rule for Kabul", *New York Times*, 11 June 1988.

on India-Pakistan relations,¹⁵³

To conclude, one may argue that the Afghanistan crisis had provided an unique opportunity to initiate steps towards Indo-Pak rapprochement and for the two to make a common cause in face of an external threat. Rodney Jones even wrote that "this is a situation far more promising for diminished rivalry than any other, since India and Pakistan became independent".¹⁵⁴ Yet it became hostage partly to the cold war rivalry between the superpowers and their intervention in the dynamics of the regional politics largely to serve their own ends and partly due to India's reluctance to condemn it publicly and the domestic compulsions of a military regime in Islamabad. Both put together scuttled whatever attempts were being made at the bilateral level between India and Pakistan to evolve a joint strategy to face the Afghanistan crisis.

4 Conclusion

We have analysed three issues which from a definitional point of view may not be characterized in the terms of confidence building between India and Pakistan but were nevertheless important milestones in their reconciliation process that was initiated after the 1971 war. The significance of the Simla Agreement lies in the fact that it laid the foundation of the confidence building process to be undertaken by the two countries throughout the 1970's and early 1980's. It continues to provide an overarching framework for guiding their bilateral relations. Especially in view of the recent political upheaval in the Kashmir valley, nearly all the major powers consider the Simla Agreement to be the key mechanism for resolving India-Pakistan differences on this issue. Notwithstanding the differing interpretations by both countries, neither has made any attempt to repudiate this agreement.

The proposals of a No War Pact and Treaty of Peace and Friendship by India and Pakistan respectively present an excellent example of how a well-meant opportunity for confidence building was lost in the vicious circle of distrust between the two countries. Neither was translated into a formal agreement despite laborious negotiations over these issues lasting for nearly seven years. This highlights the most common yet important difficulties of the confidence building process between India and Pakistan in the sense that often a proposal intended to remove the other side's mistrust and suspicion itself falls prey to the same.

¹⁵³ Wirsing, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

¹⁵⁴ See, Rodney W. Jones, "India: Defence Policy, Modern Weapons and Regional Power", in Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth, eds., *Emerging Powers: Defence and Security in the Third World*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986, pp. 208-209.

The No War Pact offer has been proposed by both countries at different points of time but was rejected each time partly because the other side had also done the same previously. More specifically with regard to Pakistan's offer made in 1981, it was partly due to Mrs. Indira Gandhi's distrust of the military regime in Islamabad and partly owing to the renewal of the US-Pak military alliance that New Delhi continued to harbour suspicions of the underlying motives of the Zia regime in making such a proposal. In brief, the two proposals of a No War Pact and Treaty of Friendship were locked in a vicious circle of proposal-rejection where both sides were mainly thinking of why if they have not accepted our proposal, should we accept theirs?

On the Afghanistan issue, too, each perceived the other's ties with a superpower as a threat to its own security but failed to appreciate the other's concerns in the same light. The two superpowers also pulled their respective regional allies in different directions largely to suit their own global interests. And before long, the Afghanistan crisis instead of bringing the two neighbours together on a common platform was contributing towards widening the regional divide.

CHAPTER VIII: THE MILITARY ISSUES

With a history of three wars on the subcontinent, the military dimension of India-Pakistan relations is of paramount importance. While the debate on the military Confidence Building Measures started in the mid 1980's, the two countries had been considering military issues such as reducing the size of the armed forces and the defence expenditures from the early 1970's. The proposal of Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR), for instance, throws light on the difficulties of the confidence building process between India and Pakistan as it had been put forward by both sides at an official and unofficial level at some time and yet never became an agreement.

This chapter addresses the more fundamental military issues which dominated the agenda of Indo-Pak talks in the 1970's and early 1980's. We begin by examining the arms procurement policies of India and Pakistan which had become a serious source of contention between the two in the early 1980's. This involves an analysis of India and Pakistan's military ties with the Soviet Union and the USA respectively and its impact on their bilateral confidence building process. The proposal of reducing their defence expenditures bears an examination as does the proposal of reducing the size of their armed forces. Finally, it examines the impediments being faced by the two countries in reaching an agreement on these proposals and discusses their prospects. The following three chapters shall continue to discuss the military dimension of confidence building process between India and Pakistan.

1 Arms Procurement Policies

The arms procurement policy of a country *per se* may not be an important issue for shaping its bilateral relations with another country. But often it assumes significance in light of its underlying political overtones and the linkages it generates between the regional and the super powers, the more so if it comes in the form of military assistance from the superpowers to their regional allies.¹ In the context of South Asia, the Soviet Union being India's main military supplier and the US along with China being that of Pakistan, arms procurement policies of India and Pakistan have often become an issue of contention between the two. From the early 1950's when Nehru expressed openly his displeasure at the formation of a US-Pakistan military alliance, India has often held Pakistan's military ties with the USA responsible for bringing the cold

¹ Sylvan has attempted statistically to prove that a sharp increase in military assistance tends to change the recipient nation's behaviour resulting in increased conflict and decreased co-operation. He points out that a two year moratorium on the military assistance again results in a behavioural change of the recipient nation. See, Donald A. Sylvan, "Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance, Increase for Information: Conflict and Cooperation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 20, no. 4, December 1976, p. 609.

war to the subcontinent.² Pakistan on the other hand, interpreted the military supply relationship between India and Soviet Union in the same light. This debate on the arms procurement policies of the two countries once again came to the forefront of their bilateral discussions in the early 1980's when in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, there was a renewal of the US-Pak military alliance. Thus we turn to examination of the US-Pak military supply relationship during 1980's and the Indian perceptions of the same.

1.2 The Military Supply Relationship of the US and Pakistan

In wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the USA had announced a \$3.02 billion package of military and economic assistance to Pakistan for a six year period from 1981-1986, to be followed later by \$4.02 billion for the 1987-1993 period. Earlier General Zia had spurned President Carter's offer of \$4 million worth of military aid to Pakistan as peanuts partly perhaps because he was playing for higher stakes to obtain a larger quantity of aid from the US and partly because of what he saw as the US administration's "excessive sensitivity" to the Indian concerns in making the offer.³

While recognizing that Pakistan as a sovereign country has to make its own assessment of its security needs and weapons requirements and determine the sources from which it acquires these, India argued that it must also be recognized that this also affected India and the region. It was argued that acquisition of sophisticated US military technology by Pakistan brought the cold war to the subcontinent and militarized the area by spurring an arms race between the two countries. Speaking in Lok Sabha in 1981, India's External Affairs Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao said that this does not merely involve giving a few weapons to Pakistan. This goes much farther. This means creation of tensions. This means a new arms race in this region.⁴ It was argued that India's socio-economic development was impeded by requiring the diversion of resources to match Pakistan's weapons acquisitions,⁵ challenges its rightful (meaning pre-eminent) position in the subcontinent by interfering with the natural balance of power and poses a threat to its security by strengthening its rival, Pakistan.⁶ It is important to note here that beyond the question of an arms race in the

² While discussing the question in the Lok Sabha in February 1954, Nehru had said that India's concern over US arms to Pakistan was not due to any ill-feelings against Pakistan or the USA, but that such steps add to the tensions and fears of the world especially in Asia. See, *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. XL, no. L, 1987, p. 24.

³ See, General Zia's interview in, *President of Pakistan General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq: Interviews to Foreign Media*, Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, vol. 3, January-December 1980, pp. 137, 189. Also see, Satu Limaye, "The Changing Place of Pakistan in US-Indian Relations", *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1992, p. 115; and Jasjit Singh, "Pakistan Army: Growing Offensive Capability", *Mainstream*, vol. 25, no. 15, 26 January 1988, p. 25.

⁴ See, Rao's statement in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 15, no. 32, 31 March 1981, col. 360.

⁵ Lt. General Vohra cites two examples of India being forced to match the weapon systems supplied by the US to Pakistan. He points out that the order of the Mirage 2000 were contracted as an answer to the F-16's supplied by the US to Pakistan and the Sea-king helicopters with third generation Sea-eagle, sea-skimming missiles were being acquired in response to the Harpoons that Pakistan was getting. See, Lt. General A.M. Vohra *The Tribune*, 14 December 1985.

⁶ Limaye, *op.cit.*, p. 113. Also see, Satish Kumar, *Yearbook of India's Foreign Policy 1985-1986*, New Delhi, Sage Publishers, 1988, pp. 200-201.

South Asian region, Delhi was more concerned about the implications of the US supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan particularly in view of the renewal of the strategic alliance between the two. Mrs. Indira Gandhi said

in the last ten years, Pakistan has doubled its defence strength. Yet we did not protest then. But the present moves introduce a *qualitative difference*. Now Pakistan's defence seems once again to be becoming a part of a larger strategic alignment stretching from the Atlantic ocean to the Pacific ocean, to say nothing of the Indian ocean in between. This is what worries us.⁷

On another occasion she said,

we are not afraid of Pakistan having arms, or Pakistan attacking us. We can deal with it. But when once Pakistan becomes a part of these [the US] strategies, then I think it becomes much more dangerous.⁸

India also argued that past experience had proved that US arms acquired by Pakistan ostensibly to meet the communist threat of Soviet Union, were always used against India. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi underlined this aspect, when he said that "we see these weapons ultimately being used against us".⁹ Over the years India's *Annual Reports of Ministry of External Affairs and Defence* constantly described the US supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan as the biggest stumbling block to the normalisation of relations between the two countries. Let us now examine the Pakistani perceptions of the Indo-Soviet military supply relationship.

1.3 The Military Supply Relationship of India and Soviet Union

Pakistan referred constantly to the disturbing security climate in the region as a result of the crisis in Afghanistan, which had deepened its concerns for the defence of its frontiers. It questioned India's right to pass judgement on such vital matters falling exclusively in their sovereign domain. As General Zia pointed out

it is the will of a state how it boosts its territorial defence and every nation has the full right to increase its military strength according to her needs and abilities.¹⁰

Pakistan took note of India's defence deals with the Soviet Union.¹¹ It was argued that considering India is

⁷ Mrs. Gandhi's reply to a debate in the Lok Sabha, reprinted in *Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi*, vol. 4, January 1980-December 1981, New Delhi: Government of India Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Publication, p. 204.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 557.

⁹ *Los Angeles Times*, 21 February 1985. Also see, Kalim Bahadur, "India-Pakistan Relations", in Satish Kumar, *Yearbook of India's Foreign Policy 1987-1988*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1989, p. 87.

¹⁰ As quoted in Satish Kumar, *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1983-1984*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1986, p. 20.

¹¹ See, Pakistan Yearbook 1985-1986, *op.cit.*, p. 210. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Soviet arms sent to India between 1983 and 1987 had a cumulative value (\$ at 1990 rate) of \$7.06 billion. The Soviet transfer to India included Mig-29s, the lease of a nuclear-powered submarine, tanks and guided missile systems. See, M.

a much larger country with overwhelming military superiority, what fears could she have from her neighbours? As the Pakistani Prime Minister M.K. Junejo questioned

why is India going in for a massive production of arms and ammunition and highly sophisticated weapons? Why did India acquire such a large number of Mig-29's? Why did they acquire a nuclear-powered submarine? What is India up to? We do not find any justification for India arming itself.¹²

This is the nub of the problem. Neither India nor Pakistan find any justification for the other's attempts to acquire new weapons. As a result every move by one side to increase its military capabilities by acquiring new weapons is sought to be matched by the other. The following section considers the attempts made by India and Pakistan to arrive at a mutual understanding on this issue.

1.4 Bilateral Talks

The Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao and his Pakistani counterpart Agha Shahi arrived at an agreement in June 1981 that each had the sovereign right to acquire arms for self-defence. The two sides also explained to each other the parameters of their defence acquisitions and decided to remain in touch on this matter on a continuing basis. The joint statement issued on 10 June 1981 was a vital step forward in promoting better understanding between the two countries. By recognizing Pakistan's right to acquire arms and accepting its adherence to the principles of non-alignment, India was believed to have removed a major irritant from its relations with Pakistan.¹³

Subsequent events, however, belied the hopes generated by this meeting. Both India and Pakistan continued to express their serious concern about the arms procurement policies of the other side. As argued earlier, it was not the arms procurement policies of India and Pakistan as such but the concomitant linkages of these arms supply relationships established mainly with the US and the Soviet Union that were the root-cause of their concern. It is important to note that the USA and Soviet Union are not the only military suppliers to India and Pakistan. Since the 1960's, China had become a major source of arms supplies to

pahani, "Pakistan's Dimensions of Insecurity", *Adelphi Papers*, no. 246, 1989-90, p. 31; "Pakistan's Security Needs and India", *awn*, 21 September 1981; "Pakistan Rejects India's Charge", *Pakistan Times*, 19 November 1981; "Indian Outcry Against Pakistan's Defensive Build-up", *Dawn*, 17 December 1981.

¹² See, Pakistan's Prime Minister M.K. Junejo's interview with Raminder Singh, *India Today*, 15 June 1988, p. 10.

¹³ See, *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 34, no. 2, 1981, p. 7.

Pakistan¹⁴ India and Pakistan also buy arms from France, the UK and Germany among others. Therefore in order to understand and analyse the impact of the military supplies from the super powers to their regional allies we need to examine what India and Pakistan on the one hand and the super powers on the other were trying to achieve. How did they handle or arrange their relationship with each other and why and to what an extent did it hinder the confidence building process between India and Pakistan ?

1.5 The US Viewpoint

Initially the Reagan administration showed little sympathy for the Indian complaints that arming Pakistan would alter the regional military balance and impede India's economic development by requiring the diversion of resources to weapons acquisition. The US refused to provide any assurance that arms supplied by the US were not to be used against India¹⁵ and that it would either start an arms race in the subcontinent or tilt the military balance to India's disadvantage. The US Under-Secretary Mr. Buckley told a Congressional committee in September 1981,

These fears simply do not stand up under analysis. India possesses a very large, well-equipped and well trained military establishment that provides it with a decisive superiority over Pakistan in the air as well as on the ground. Given the large number of advanced aircraft which the Indians already have or will receive from the Soviets and the UK, they will emerge six years from now with an even greater edge over Pakistan notwithstanding the addition of 40 F-16's to the latter's inventory. In fact they should then have an advantage over Pakistan in terms of modern fighter aircraft from about six to one.¹⁶

Jeann Kirkpatrick, during her visit to India dismissed the argument that US arms to Pakistan were either an actual or intended threat to India. Limaye argues that the Reagan administration also hesitated to show too much concern to Indian sensitivities because it did not want to do anything that could be interpreted by

¹⁴ See, Aabha Dixit, "Sino-Pak Military Relationship Enters New Phase", *The Telegraph*, 29 June 1991; Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan-China Security Relations", *Nation*, 31 October 1991; "China's Arms Exports to Neighbours Raised", *Hindustan Times*, 13 November 1991; "Missile Transfers to Pakistan: China Feigns Ignorance of Threat to India", *Pioneer*, 23 December 1991.

¹⁵ See, S.D Muni, "Reagan's South Asia Policy", in Hans Kochlu, ed., *The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy: Facts and Judgements of the International Tribunal*, Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1984, p. 334; Limaye, *op.cit.*, p. 114. Also see George Bush's press conference in New Delhi in *Times of India*, 15 May 1984.

¹⁶ Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. 81, no. 2056, November 1981, p. 84. S.P. Cohen supports this view that after an examination of the relative balance of forces between India and Pakistan and a survey of the terrain and tactics of the Soviets along the Durand line, it shows that US arms have made a marginal difference to the Indo-Pak military balance. S.P. Cohen, "US-Pakistan Security Relations", in Leo. Rose and Noor. Hussain, *US-Pakistan Forum: Relations with Major Powers*, Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1987, pp. 22-23. In a similar vein, Hussain argued that the overall increase in Pakistan's combat capability even after including all the weapons (under the US's first aid package) would be less than 5%. Noor A. Hussain, "Pakistan-US Security Relations: Arms, Sales, Bases and Nuclear Issues", in the same book, p. 8.

Pakistan as the US hesitancy about a renewed security relationship.¹⁷

At the same time, however, the US made a significant gesture in offering to sell arms to India as well. This issue first came up during the US Defense Secretary Clifford's visit to New Delhi in January 1980. A few days later the US National Security Advisor Mr. Brezezinski stated in Islamabad that the US was willing to consider transfer of weapons to India if that reduced its dependence on other suppliers and enhanced its security.¹⁸ Nothing however came out of these statements until the end of Jimmy Carter's term. The issue was revived again under the Reagan administration and some discussions on this subject took place during US Secretary of State Shultz's visit to India in June-July 1983. He disclosed

the question was discussed and whether there would be actual sales is an open question. Certainly the US is prepared to make such sales and from the standpoint of India, of course, they will speak for themselves. But the question was discussed and to the extent there have been any misunderstandings about the conditions under which the US makes these sales, I have tried to clear those up.¹⁹

This indicated that perhaps the US conditions for sales (such as not allowing co-production, controlling spares) were not acceptable to India.²⁰ Broadly speaking the US efforts to accommodate Indian sensitivities and improve ties with India were partly seen as potentially beneficial to reducing its Soviet connection and partly aimed at building regional amicability between India and Pakistan. Limaye writes that every post-war US administration has eventually realized that subcontinental detente ultimately offers the best guarantee of minimizing Soviet influence there. He quotes a secret State Department paper alluding to this strategy

It is our hope that closer US-Indian ties will facilitate our efforts to promote improved relations between India and Pakistan".²¹

Now let us consider the Indian views on the US-Pak military relationship.

1.6 The Indian Viewpoint

India had maintained its reservations about the Washington's policy of providing arms to Pakistan

¹⁷ Limaye, *op.cit.*, p. 115. Some circles in the US administration had even openly argued in favour of rearming Pakistan not only to improve its defence against Afghanistan but India as well. See, Francis Fukuyama, *Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report*, California, 1980.

¹⁸ *Times of India*, 5 February 1980.

¹⁹ As cited by S.D. Muni in H. Kochlu, ed., *The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy: Facts and Judgements of the International Tribunal*", Vienna: International Progress Organization, p.334.

²⁰ See, PKS Namboodiri, "Supply Terms Bog US Arms Deal", *The Tribune*, 12 January 1981. Also see, Raju G.C. Thomas, "Prospects for Indo-US Security Ties", *Orbis*, vol. 27, no. 2, Summer 1983, pp. 371-392.

²¹ Limaye, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

but changed both the tone and substance of its criticism in this respect. By mid-1982, India was no longer demanding that there be should no further weapons sales to Pakistan. On her return from the US in 1982, when Mrs. Gandhi was asked whether there was any assurance from US President Reagan, that there would be no further arms aid to Pakistan, she said "we did not seek any such assurance".²² This change in stance was appreciated in the US, too, as became evident from a State Department official's statement "the fact that the issue of arms to Pakistan played a relatively minor role in the July-August 1982 visit [of Mrs. Gandhi] indicated the attempts of India to downplay the differences on this issue. The trend was taken further under Rajiv".²³ India let Washington and Islamabad know that it no longer objected to weapons transfers to Pakistan, in principle, although it continued to object to their quantity, quality²⁴ and type.²⁵ This led to a debate regarding 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons and secondly the sale of certain weapons which were totally irrelevant against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan like the Seahawk Harpoon SSM missiles. India used similar arguments in the case of the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), the radar planes which Pakistan had been seeking for long and which would have jeopardized seriously India's own defence system.²⁶ Pakistan had sought top-of-the-line Boeing E3A Sentry AEW aircraft which it finally did

²² *The Hindu*, 7 August 1982.

²³ As cited by Limaye, *op.cit.*, p.121.

²⁴ This argument has been put forth by Jasjit Singh who points out that the first US aid package was especially used by Pakistan to improve the 'quality' of its military machine. The emphasis was on growth and enhancement of combat capabilities although selective modernization in the army was also given due attention. This was especially so in areas contributing to enhanced mobility and firepower. It included acquisition of 155mm guns, Cobra gunships, TOW anti-tank missiles, upgrading of M-48 tanks to A3-A5 standards, artillery fire locating radars, electronic warfare equipment and so on. See, Jasjit Singh, 'Pakistan Army', *op.cit.*, p. 25.

²⁵ This may be explained with the example of the US decision to sell the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. In the mid-1970's, Pakistan had asked for the A-7, a slow flying attack bomber of limited capabilities (in exchange for the dismantling of the Pakistan's nuclear programme). The US, however wanted to sell the F-5E, a simple but effective short range multipurpose fighter. As Cohen writes, the debate was less about the military qualities than symbolic imagery. The A-7 could be used to attack and bomb Indian targets and that is why the Americans wanted to sell a purely 'defensive' aircraft, implying (especially to India) that it would not encourage an aggressive or offensive Pakistani strategy. Two different aircraft filled exactly the same symbolic value in 1980-81, only in this case, without a nuclear *quid pro quo*. The Pakistani air force dismissed the A-7 as a flying junk heap and even rejected the offer of F-5Es much improved successor, F-5Gs, an excellent and much cheaper aircraft and requested the F-16, a clearly offensive weapon. Once again, the overall military virtues of the F-16s were only marginally better than F-5Gs but their symbolic and political value was quite different especially in view of the stringent Indian criticism of this deal. More than anything, it demonstrated vividly the change in Pakistan's political leverage before and after Afghanistan, by their failure in 1977 and success in 1981 in getting the aircraft of their choice. See, Cohen in Rose and Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 5. It is only ironical that a decade later in 1991, the US was again refusing to sell any more F-16s to Pakistan and it was now India which was asking for them. See, "Indo-US Relations: A Positive Phase", *India Today (International Edition)*, 28 February 1991, p. 18. For more details on this debate concerning particular weapon 'types' such as F-16s, AWACS, M-48 tanks and Harpoon missiles, see Dilip Mukerji, "India's Relations with US: A New Phase for Accommodation", in *Yearbook 1985-86*, *op.cit.*, pp. 200-203.

²⁶ Some Indian experts argued that AWACS would be ineffective in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan but it would be of tremendous value in monitoring the North Indian plains. See, Jasjit Singh, "AWACS for Pakistan: Part of Larger US strategy", *Times of India*, 10 November 1986; "AWACS: Advantage Pakistan", in *India Today*, 31 May 1987. One may also take note of Mr. Anthony H. Lordesmen, a US military expert's testimony at the hearing of the Asian and Pacific Affairs congressional sub-committee, who argued that the AWACS given to Pakistan can be programmed to make them ineffective against India and usable only for looking into Afghanistan. See, Shahnaz Anklesaria Aiyar, "AWACS Can be Made Useless

not get, although Indian objections had in all probability played only a minor role in this particular US decision²⁷ A number of American scholars argued that the US should not accept Pakistani requests for systems that could not conceivably be used against anybody but India²⁸ and that are of very high symbolic value or introduce a significant qualitative escalation into the South Asian arms race like the F-16 aircraft or AWACS.²⁹ But these were precisely the kind of arguments that made the US's reliability and commitment suspect in Pakistan's eyes. Hence what were the Pakistani views in this respect.

1.7 The Pakistani Viewpoint

Pakistan pointed to the US failure to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and US military assistance to India following the Chinese incursion into the Indian territory in 1962, as instances where Pakistan's willingness to assist the US by serving as a intermediary for Sino-American *rapprochement* in 1971 and being the most allied ally of the US in Asia until the 1960's was not rewarded.³⁰ More significantly, the US has refused consistently Pakistani requests that the Mutual Security Agreement with the US, signed in 1959, should be extended to cover not only communist aggression but also that from India.³¹

Mushahid Hussain puts it aptly that

when it comes to the question of India, the US and Pakistan can never see eye to eye. They will always be apart. And that problem still persists.³²

Moreover, Pakistan's military government also had important ideological interests in maintaining cordial ties with the Islamic community and non-aligned countries of the Third World, neither of which could be said to be fond of USA.³³ Finally, Zia may have hesitated about too close ties with the US due to domestic

Against India", *Indian Express*, 13 June 1988.

²⁷ Limaye points out a host of other consideration which proved more crucial than Indian concerns, including cost, suitability, Pakistan's nuclear activities, General Zia's death and election of a new government in Islamabad, the imminent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and US Congressional reticence (perhaps partly influenced by the Israeli lobby) which were responsible for the non-sale. Limaye, *op.cit.*, p.117.

²⁸ Thornton points out the Harpoon missiles supplied by the Reagan administration as a case in point. See, Thomas P. Thornton, "The New Phase in US-Pakistan Relations", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 3. Summer 1989, p. 153.

²⁹ *ibid.* Thornton argues that the AWACS fails both the tests. Although AWACS is in itself, a non-lethal weapon, it is a powerful force-multiplier and in the post-Afghanistan environment it would be in appropriate to give it to Pakistan.

³⁰ The US had also suspended arms sales to Pakistan after the 1965 war which had hit Pakistan more than India, then a renewed embargo in 1971 and another in 1979. This means, as Cohen points out, that the US had pre-emptorily cut off arms to Pakistan three times. See, Cohen in 'US-Pakistan Forum', *op.cit.*, p. 27. The dispatch of US arms to India by the Kennedy administration was another such blow.

³¹ See, Dilip Mukerji, "Contradictions Amid Improvements in Recent Indo-American Relations", in Jasjit Singh, ed., *Asian Security: Old Paradigms and New Challenges*, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991, p. 183. Also see, Dilip Mukerji, "India's Relations With US", in 'Yearbook 1985-86', *op.cit.*, p. 203.

³² Mushahid Hussain in Sridhar K. Khatri, ed., *Regional Security in South Asia*, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribubhavan University, 1987, p. 233.

³³ See, Limaye, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

considerations. It is important to note here that despite strong ties between Pakistan and the US at the government level, there has always been a strong current of anti-Americanism at the popular level in Pakistan.³⁴ In any case, General Zia was shrewd enough to emphasize that Pakistan's new relationship with Washington was an aid-cum-sales relationship and no more, and he also extracted a number of concessions from the US administration. Agha Shahi epitomized the relationship with the US as "a handshake and not an embrace".³⁵ Cohen argued that there was a core of truth in Senator Cranston and others' charge that Pakistan was blackmailing the US. But perhaps it was Zia's persistent expressions of a 'stand-offish' attitude towards some of Washington's most-hoped-for aspects of their relationship, which contributed to the latter's evolving realization of the importance of a parallel improvement in its ties with India.³⁶

1.8 The Reversal of Military Ties Between India, Pakistan and the Superpowers

This proved to be a harbinger of events and trends that started taking shape at the end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's. A number of developments such as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and finally the collapse of the Soviet Union had reduced dramatically Pakistan's strategic importance in the US's eyes. Instead issues like Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme came to the forefront in 1990, when the Bush administration could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device resulting in the cut off of US aid to Pakistan which has not been resumed since.³⁷

At the other end, India and the Soviet Union's military supply relationship also came under severe strain after the latter's disintegration. And now it was India which was looking towards the US for new defence linkages.³⁸ The US also expressed its new-found enthusiasm to acknowledge Delhi's pre-eminent position in the Indian Ocean region. The US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proclaimed during his

³⁴ For instance, during the Gulf War in 1990-1991 there was a huge groundswell of public sympathy for the Iraqi President Saddam Hussain, coupled with a stringent criticism of US policies in the Gulf by no other than General Beg, the incumbent Army Chief of Pakistan.

³⁵ As quoted by Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy After Afghanistan", in S.P. Cohen, *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987, p. 72.

³⁶ Limaye, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

³⁷ See, "Factors Behind US Decision on Aid", *Hindustan Times*, 3 February 1991. I. Haque writes that the US had not only cut off its own economic and military aid programme to Pakistan but had also asked its allies to do the same. International agencies like the IMF and World Bank were also urged not to commit anything to Pakistan so as to ensure the full implementation of the US conditions on its nuclear programme. See, "Bilateral Blues", *The Herald*, October 1991, p. 75. Also see, M.H. Askari, "Indo-Pak Relations and American Aid", *Dawn*, 2 November 1988; Dilip Mukerji, "Pakistan and its Patrons: Old Security Ties Come Under Strain", *Times of India*, 9 February 1991; M.H. Askari, "The New US Strategy", *Dawn*, 9 October 1991; and Hasan M. Jafri, "Irreconcilable Differences", *The Herald*, December 1991, pp. 67-70.

³⁸ See, Ashok Kapur, "Need to Improve Ties With US", *Indian Express*, 27 June 1991.

visit to New Delhi in 1986 that

India is an *enormously important country* and one of the major dominant states in the whole region. So, as such, it is hoped generally that India will assist, as I think they are trying to do, in moderating various tensions in that area".³⁹

Washington now viewed India as one of the six regional power centres of the world in the post cold war era. The most significant manifestation of this new convergence of interests between Washington and New Delhi came in the form of the Kicklighter proposals that envisaged extensive military cooperation between the two countries.⁴⁰ The sheer scope and nature of these proposals surpassed the US-Pakistan security links even during their hey-day. Although it does not envisage any massive transfer of US defence equipment to India, it has been argued that it is only a question of time before the two start sharing at least the military technology, if not the transfer of weapons.⁴¹ In fact the Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar, in an address to Lok Sabha on 5 October 1991, did hint at the likelihood of better cooperation in the defence field between India and the US. He mentioned that Army Chief General S.E. Rodrigues's visit to the US in August 1991 could prove to be a watershed for Indo-US relations. It was now Islamabad's turn to express its serious concern and anxiety at the new defence linkages between the US and India.

Overall by the end of cold war, there was almost a reversal of military ties between the superpowers and the regional powers in the subcontinent. India had replaced Pakistan as the US's strategic ally in the region. The same had not happened in case of Pakistan and the former Soviet Union, now Russia, although

³⁹ (italics added). Nayan Chandra, "Arms for Friendship", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, no. 36. Also see, K.K. Katyal, "South Asia: US Shifting Stand", *The Hindu*, 4 November 1991.

⁴⁰ The Kicklighter proposals were named after their author, the US Lt. Geeraln Claude Kicklighter who visited India in April 1991. The objective of these proposals was to pursue a common policy of gradually strengthening ties towards extended cooperation and particularly by the end of 1990's through high level visits, exchanges, periodic policy reviews, Indian and the US army staff talks and cooperative work in selected areas of common interest. Some of the specific suggestions include visits by Chiefs of Staff on an annual basis to alternating countries, setting up of an Indian-US army executive steering council, holding regular strategic meetings, regular staff talks between the two armies, reciprocal visits by other senior commanders, staff information exchanges, reciprocal training and individual training programmes, unit training exchanges and observation of training exercises, US and Indian army participation in the US-led Pacific Command's joint committee level meeting programmes, attendance and participation in regional conferences, US and Indian armies co-hosting of the Pacific armies management seminar in 1993 and collective training information, exchange and cooperation and personnel exchange programme. See, *The News International*, 28 October 1991.

⁴¹ It may be noted that defence related US technology transfer to India had started with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's first visit to the US in 1985. Indian requests for technology rather than actual weapon systems suited both countries because while weapons had a high visibility and symbolic value and might get mired in political controversy on both sides, technology transfer was slow and incremental in character and was in line with the Indian policy of self-reliance in this respect. Rajiv Gandhi's visit was followed by the first ever visit of a US Defense Secretary (Casper Weinberger) to New Delhi in October 1986 and since then both sides have not looked back. See, Mukerji (1991) *op.cit.*, pp. 189-192.

there were some indications that Russia was prepared to sell weapons to Pakistan.⁴² However it would take another major reversal of Russian policy before it starts cultivating Pakistan instead of India in the subcontinent.

1.9 The Impact on the Confidence Building Process

It is evident from the foregoing analysis that the arms procurement policies of India and Pakistan had an essentially negative impact on the confidence building process between the two countries. One must address two issues in this respect. The first is the question of the arms procurement policy of either country fuelling an arms race in the region. The fact of the matter was that the more one side amassed weapons the more the other perceived hostility in the former's actions. It was a classic chicken-and-egg argument that whether a country was acquiring weapons because it felt threatened or it was arming itself to become a threat to the other. India argued that Pakistan was using the Soviet threat only as an excuse to acquire massive US weaponry which would be used ultimately against India. Pakistan counter-argued that since it was the smaller country in the subcontinent, India could not possibly feel threatened by it and so, what was India arming itself against? Strictly speaking, there was no confidence building here. In fact once again both failed to appreciate and understand that to a great extent it was their own actions which were exacerbating the threat perceptions of the other side. Both had simply got locked in an action-reaction syndrome.

Further, it is important to understand that it was not simply a question of arms supplies but that of one or both regional powers' attempts to 'pull in' one or both superpowers in order to counter-balance the other. India has always tried to preserve the natural balance of power weighing heavily in its favour by keeping the subcontinent free from the superpowers rivalry. Pakistan, on the other hand, has equally vigorously attempted to disturb and change the *status quo* by seeking diplomatic and military succour from abroad. Therefore, India perceived a renewal of Pakistan's strategic alliance with the US in light of its persisting attempts to change the existing military balance between the two countries which would threaten Indian security interests in the South Asian region. On the other hand, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Indian reluctance publicly to condemn the Soviets for the same was perceived in Pakistan as an Indo-Soviet

⁴² It was reported that Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, during a visit to Pakistan in December 1991 offered the latest weapon systems to Pakistan and media reports from Pakistan quoting official sources said that all three services of armed forces had already sent list of items required from Moscow. Inder Malhotra, "Arms for Pakistan from Both Sides", *Times of India*, 5 July 1990; "Pakistan on Arms Buying Spree", *Times of India*, 4 January 1992.

collusion exacerbating its own security dilemmas. Therefore when the US agreed to treat Pakistan as a frontline state and grant a huge amount of military and economic aid, Pakistan's military regime was all too willing to comply. As a result, there could not be any meeting of minds between India and Pakistan on this issue.

It is interesting to take note of the effect of a near reversal of India and Pakistan's relations *vis-à-vis* USA. In the post cold war era, India had no inhibitions in courting the US and now it was the Pakistanis who argued that a convergence between the US and Indian security concerns had left them out in the cold, the more so because the same had not happened in case of their relations *vis-à-vis* Russia. But since Indo-Pak rivalry no longer suited the US interests in this region, the US was now making efforts actively to help these two neighbouring countries resolve their differences. Its impact on the confidence building process between India and Pakistan, therefore, is likely to be more positive than it had been throughout 1980's.

There is an intrinsic linkage between arms acquisition programmes, an arms race and the resulting rise in defence expenditures. Let us, therefore, examine the question of a reduction of defence expenditures in the South Asian context.

2 Reduction of Defence Expenditures

In 1972 at Simla, a senior member of the Indian team had broached the subject of reducing defence expenditures but this evoked a sharp reply that under the prevailing circumstances in Pakistan the civilians were in no position to discuss this issue. In fact throughout Z.A. Bhutto's regime, there was a continuous rise in the defence expenditure of Pakistan.⁴³ During Zia-ul-Haq's military regime and subsequently under the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's civilian governments, the Pakistani army continued to determine its defence budget. The civilian governments did not have much say in this respect.⁴⁴

Against this background, Benazir Bhutto's proposal for a reduction in the defence budgets in her talks with Rajiv Gandhi in July 1989,⁴⁵ came as a surprise to the Indian side. She did not put forward any concrete proposal for reducing the defence expenditures but only expressed a general desire to that end.⁴⁶ Rajiv Gandhi's government responded positively and made a unilateral gesture of freezing its defence budget

⁴³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military 1947-1986 and Politics in Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986, pp. 204-205.

⁴⁴ This point has already been discussed in Chapter Six.

⁴⁵ *Nation*, 9 July 1989. Also see, Altaf A. Shaikh, "Indo-Pak Relations: The Defence Cut Proposal", *Nation*, 14 July 1989.

⁴⁶ In an interview conducted at New Delhi in January 1992.

for 1989-1990 and making a token reduction of Rs. 2 billion.⁴⁷

Benazir Bhutto's government, however, failed to reciprocate this gesture due to domestic pressures. By all accounts, she was fighting a losing battle in an internal power struggle within the ruling troika and perhaps could not take the risk of earning the Pakistani army's wrath by curtailing defence expenditure.⁴⁸ Somewhat similar was the story of her successor, Nawaz Sharif's government. Notwithstanding his better relations with the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi he, too, lacked the leverage to determine defence expenditure independently.

Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan had begun to feel the pressure of high expenditure on arms and armaments and were subject to international and domestic pressure in this respect.

2.1 Growing Pressures: International

Both India and Pakistan had been undergoing a severe economic crisis and the pressure from the international monetary institutions like the IMF and the World Bank⁴⁹ and donor countries like the US and Germany⁵⁰ asking them to cut their defence budgets, was mounting. Subsequently Michel Camdessus the Managing Director of the IMF disclosed that he had held talks with the Indian authorities on this subject and they had been seeking ways to bring about a reduction in their defence expenditure.⁵¹ Furthermore, both governments have been facing new difficulties in funding their arms procurement programmes owing to the discontinuity in the ties with their respective military suppliers. As argued earlier, India could no longer rely on cheap Soviet arms and its ability to acquire new weaponry would be severely constrained by a switch to payments in hard currency and the end of credits on highly concessional terms.⁵² In case of Pakistan, too, after the US cut off of economic and military aid in 1990, it was facing increasing difficulties in financing

⁴⁷ It may be noted that if the inflation (10%) and devaluation of the Indian rupee (19%) was taken into account, it worked out to be an effective reduction of approximately 20%. M.H. Askari, "The Challenge of India", *Dawn*, 7 May 1989.

⁴⁸ This point has already been discussed in Chapter Six.

⁴⁹ Dilip Mukerji, "Defence: World Bank Raps Pakistan", *Times of India*, 26 February 1989. In October 1991, Pakistan's Federal Minister of Finance, Sartaj Aziz admitted at a press conference that both the IMF and the World Bank have been pressing in recent months for substantial cuts in military spending. In the case of both India and Pakistan, the IMF and the World Bank had said that they would like to see a cut of at least 20% in military spending next year and more cuts in subsequent years. *The News*, 21 October 1991. Also see, M.V. Desai, "Arms: What the New Prime Minister Should Do?", *Hindustan Times*, 28 May 1991; and S.R.K. Rao, "Defence Spending and Development", *The Hindu*, 30 May 1991; *The Telegraph*, 13 August 1991.

⁵⁰ *Nation*, 21 September 1991; and *Hindustan Times*, 10 November 1991.

⁵¹ *The News*, 28 November 1991.

⁵² *Times of India*, 27 June 1991; *Indian Express*, 8 June 1991. Also see, Jaswant Singh, "Highest Defence Budget: Cost of Foreign Policy", *Times of India*, 10 March 1987; and Lt. General A.M. Vohra, "Need for Halting Arms Race", *Hindustan Times*, 29 March 1989; and "Mounting Burden of Defence Spending", *Times of India*, 13 April 1990; Amar Zutshi, "Agenda for Defence: Focus on the 1990's", *The Statesmen*, 17 July 1991.

its arms purchases.

2.2 Domestic Compulsions

The issue of defence expenditure reduction was also being debated at a domestic level, particularly in India. In 1988, criticism on this score was voiced in Parliament, while the press debated the budget at length. It was argued that in the changed international environment when the Chinese threat had reduced considerably and a war with Pakistan was no longer a viable option, India should build its forces only for deterrent purposes. Defence expenditure should be geared more towards meeting the threat of a low intensity conflict being waged in Punjab and Kashmir which did not demand a very high defence budget.⁵³ It is important to note that since 1988, Indian defence expenditure has not risen in real terms because of rupee's rapid fall against major Western currencies and high domestic inflation. The defence budget for 1991 at \$6.3 billion as against \$8.8 billion spent in 1990 had a sharp cut of 28% in real terms.⁵⁴ The defence cut was widely supported in Parliament. In fact even the right-wing BJP leader A.B. Vajpayee took the view that the allocation should have been much smaller in view of the unprecedented economic crisis in the country.⁵⁵

The Pakistan government is also coming under tremendous pressure to cut its defence budget which takes as high as 40% of the overall national budget, The average proportion of its defence expenditure to its GDP is 6%, while that of India is 3%. "People are beginning to ask questions" as a Pakistani observer put it "if all this military spending is buying us security ?".⁵⁶ A noted Pakistani journalst also hinted at the continuing internal debate in the country on the question of defence expenditures that "it can not sustain it... particularly after the suspension of the US aid".⁵⁷

2.3 Prospects

Let us now examine briefly the prospects of the two countries arriving at a understanding in this

⁵³ This issue was debated at length in the press and media reports. See, Dilip Mukerji, "An Agenda For Defence: Feasibility of Lower Cost Posture", *Times of India*, 18 June 1991; and "Sufficient Defence: Need for a National Consensus", *Times of India*, 24 July 1991. Also see, Amar Zutshi, "Agenda for Defence: Focus on the 1990's", *The Statesman*, 17 July 1991; Lt. General A.M. Vohra, "Mounting Burden of Defence Spending", *Times of India*, 13 April 1990; Brahma Chellaney, "More Bang for the Rupee", *Indian Express*, 10 August 1991. Others have argued against any cuts in the defence expenditure. See, Vice Admiral K.K. Nayar (ret'd), "Pitfalls of Pruning", *Hindustan Times*, 14 November 1991; Jasjit Singh, "Defending India: Some Reflections", *Hindustan Times*, 15 August 1991; C. Uday Bhaskar, "Matter of Defence: No Cuts in Funding Advisable", *The Statesman*, 14 August 1991.

⁵⁴ Chellaney, *ibid.*; Dilip Mukerji, "Defence Squeeze", *The Economic Times*, 31 July 1991.

⁵⁵ Mukerji, *ibid.*

⁵⁶ This assessment is based on the present author's interviews with a number of Pakistani scholars and journalists in October 1991.

⁵⁷ In a interview conducted in Rawalpindi in October 1991.

respect. Neither side wants to make any unilateral cuts in this direction. Pakistan's Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Sardar Arif Ahmed Ali declared in a press conference in the winter of 1991 that despite the IMF and World Bank's pressure "Pakistan can not unilaterally cut its defence expenditure keeping in view the massive Indian build-up, which is a great threat to our security".⁵⁸ On the Indian side, General K. Sunderji, the former Chief of Army Staff warned that India could not reduce its defence budget unilaterally. However he favoured defence cuts by India "as a part of an overall agreement on force reduction arrived at trilaterally" between India, Pakistan and China.⁵⁹ Since both governments are facing a serious economic crunch, this is one area where the two could arrive at a mutual understanding of freezing their defence budgets by making a virtue of the necessity. Subsequently they may negotiate more meaningful cuts in their defence expenditure. There are indications that this proposal is under consideration by the two governments but unless their respective military establishments give it a green signal, it would in all probability remain a non-starter. Finally let us examine the proposal of 'Mutual Balanced Force Reduction' that has surfaced periodically on the agenda of India-Pakistan talks for nearly three decades.

3 Proposal of Mutual Balanced Reduction of Forces (MBFR)

Before 1971 Pakistan had refused consistently to enter into any talks with India for reducing forces as long as the Kashmir question was not resolved. According to Z.A. Bhutto

bilateral disarmament between India and Pakistan would mean victory of the state possessing the disputed territory and the defeat of the dispossessed.⁶⁰

The new geo-political realities that emerged after this war probably induced Pakistan to reassess its position on the mutual reduction concept, especially because it became apparent that Pakistan could no longer take Kashmir by military means. Subsequently when the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 created a 'two-front security bind' as perceived by Pakistan, the Zia regime expressed its willingness to enter into an agreement on MBFR with India. Neither government had publicly put forward a formula for maintaining a fixed ratio of Indian and Pakistani forces although diplomatic overtures were being made in this direction.

⁵⁸ Dawn, 4 November 1991.

⁵⁹ General K. Sunderji, "Cut With Caution", *India Today*, 31 July 1991, p. 86. Also see his article, "Cost Cutting Manoeuvres", *India Today* 31 January 1991.

⁶⁰ Z.A. Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 185.

3.1 Indian Overtures

Mrs. Indira Gandhi had sent a special envoy Sardar Swaran Singh to Pakistan in 1980, to reassure General Zia-ul-Haq that Pakistan could shift its military forces westwards without jeopardizing its security on the border with India.⁶¹ Zia, however, was conditioned to believe that India could not be trusted. Pakistan let up its guard in the East. Besides, he argued that Pakistan could not shift its forces to the west border due to lack of infrastructure in that area.⁶² So he proposed instead that India should take the lead in ordering a partial withdrawal of its forces arrayed against Pakistan. But mutual suspicion had already sealed the fate of this proposal. As an Indian observer put it

Zia-ul-Haq did not consider Mrs. Indira Gandhi's offer of removing the Pakistani forces from east to west as 'genuine' perhaps just as much as Mrs. Indira Gandhi did not trust enough Zia-ul-Haq to withdraw the Indian forces first.⁶³

The following section would examine Pakistan's proposal of Mutual Forces Balanced Reduction first proposed by General Zia-ul-Haq and subsequently by Benazir Bhutto.

3.2 Pakistan's Proposal of Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction

General Zia proposed to enter into a jointly acceptable Mutual Reduction of Forces agreement with India. He said that the military experts of two countries should make a joint and comparative study of their military strength and then suggest what reductions in their troops and equipment were needed.⁶⁴ The proposal was discussed again when Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited India in July 1980 and proposed that India and Pakistan should explore the prospects of evolving a mutually acceptable formula for adjustment of the level of their military forces.

However the Indian Foreign Minister P. V Narasimha Rao told Parliament on 18 July 1980 that India had rejected Pakistan's suggestion for a meeting of military commanders to consider Mutual Reduction of Forces. Any such talks, he argued, should be preceded by a "requisite amount of mutual trust and

⁶¹ Douglas C. Makeig, "War, No-War and India-Pakistan Negotiating Strategies", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 2, Summer 1987, p. 287. Also see, K. Subrahmanyam, "Dialogue with Benazir-I", *Hindustan Times*, 12 January 1989.

⁶² See, General Zia's interview with *New York Times* reprinted in 'Interviews to the Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, January-December 1980, p. 298.

⁶³ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in September 1991.

⁶⁴ See, General Zia's press conference, in *Muslim*, 3 September 1981. Also see, Satish Kumar, *Yearbook of India's Foreign Policy 1984-85*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1987, p. 238.

confidence".⁶⁵ While a reduction of forces is a very desirable objective, he continued, it must be clearly understood that the force levels actually flow out of threat perceptions. If there was any genuine desire for mutual reduction of forces, what needs to be reduced first is the mutual suspicion. A more viable and effective path towards mutual force reduction should, therefore, start from confidence building and exploiting the areas of agreement between the two countries. When the issue was raised by Agha Shahi during his discussions in New Delhi, Rao told him that the question of force reductions could not be treated as a purely military exercise since it should reflect a "shared political perception and understanding of each other's security needs by the other".⁶⁶ At an unofficial level, however, the press criticized Mrs. Gandhi's government for having rejected the proposal without giving it a due consideration. The *Indian Express* wrote that the Pakistani proposal might come to nothing in the end, but

we owe it to ourselves to examine it dispassionately just in case Islamabad does mean business. If that proves to be the case, it is just the kind of opening which can conceivably lead to other positive adjustments including a step back from an arms race which we have too easily concluded to be inevitable.... To refuse to examine what the other side wants to say is the mark of a closed mind worst it awakens suspicion that Indian government has little interest in creating a set of conditions which could enable both India and Pakistan to scale down their ambitious plans for the acquisition of new arms.⁶⁷

Nevertheless the proposal of Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction was never considered seriously or negotiated by the two countries at that time. A Congress leader argued that India had very good reasons for not doing so because India would have had to withdraw its forces to its cantonments which were far away from the border while the Pakistani forces would have only withdrawn to their cantonments which were very close to the frontier anyway.⁶⁸

A decade later, the Benazir Bhutto's government again offered to negotiate mutual arms reductions after the European precedent. She offered to "adopt measures aimed at a mutual and balanced reduction of forces consistent with the principle of equal and undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments".⁶⁹ The Indian government's response was very muted perhaps because it was widely believed that without the

⁶⁵ See Rao's statement in *Asian Recorder*, 12-18 August 1980, p. 15596. Also see, R.G. Sawhney, *Zia's Pakistan: Implications for India's Security*, New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1985, p. 91.

⁶⁶ See Rao's statement in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 6, no. 30, 18 July 1980, cols. 258-259.

⁶⁷ *Indian Express*, 23 August 1981.

⁶⁸ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

⁶⁹ *Times of India*, 3 March 1989; *Frontier Post*, 21 October 1989. Also see, "Akhund for Military Balance in the Region", *Pakistan Times*, 28 June 1990.

Pakistani army's sanction to a major initiative like MBFR which affected their interests directly and adversely. Benazir Bhutto was in no position to deliver the goods in this respect. The proposal, however, received a favourable response in unofficial circles in India and some scholars even came forward with other variants of this idea. Let us consider some of these proposals in a little detail.

3.3 Unofficial Indian Proposals for Reduction of Forces

Lt. General A.M. Vohra suggested that a percentage reduction of all major weapon systems, that is combat aircraft, armed helicopters, tanks, artillery pieces and so on held by the two countries, should be agreed upon and verification procedures should form an integral part of such an agreement. More specifically, he proposed a reduction of 20% over the next five years.⁷⁰ Another proposal was for the two countries to come to an informal agreement not to introduce destabilizing weapon systems or force multipliers like AWACS by Pakistan or nuclear-powered submarines by India afresh.⁷¹ Jasjit Singh put forward a more concrete and specific proposal that over a five year period, each state would reduce its land forces by 1000 tanks, 400 armored infantry fighting vehicles and 400 pieces of heavy artillery. The air force could be cut by 4 squadrons or 70 multi-role combat strike aircraft and armed helicopters reduced down to 8 each. As for maritime forces, he suggested that an agreed limit may be set at 8 aircraft equipped with air-launched anti-ship missiles. And each country's reserves should not exceed 25% of active duty personnel. Jasjit stressed however, that these measures should be accompanied by a host of other military-related Confidence Building Measures, such as prior notification of large scale military exercises and troop deployments and that both India and Pakistan's armoured divisions and formation should be re-deployed at peace time locations in a manner to increase the time gap required for forward deployment.⁷² This proposal found favour in the unofficial political circles of Pakistan. An eminent Pakistani politician said that the Pakistani armed forces would welcome the proposal.⁷³ A retired army general also said that "the biggest confidence building measure in the Indo-Pak context would be to agree to a reciprocal reduction of armed forces of two countries to the minimum level, meaning that the two retain a defensive capability but do not maintain an offensive

⁷⁰ See, Lt. General A.M. Vohra (retd.), "Begin Dialogue on Arms Cut With Pakistan", *Times of India*, 6 August 1991; and "India Pakistan Must Reduce Forces", *Times of India*, 22 November 1991.

⁷¹ In an interview with Mr. Dilip Mukerji with the present author in December 1991. Also see, Dilip Mukerji, "Validity of Two-Track Approach", *Times of India*, 16 August 1991.

⁷² Jasjit Singh, "India and Pakistan: Security for Both at Lower Costs", *Frontier Post*, 30 October 1991.

⁷³ In an interview with the present author in February 1992.

posture".⁷⁴

3.4 Difficulties in the MBFR Proposal

The MBFR process in the South Asian context is riddled with difficulties. To start with, neither is likely to accept the other's estimates of their security requirements.

3.4.1 Differing Assessments of Threat Perceptions

Pakistan argued that India's military capability was several times greater than that of Pakistan. The Indian army was more than twice the size of the Pakistani army (1.01 million to 450,000 men in uniform), the Indian air force had almost twice as many combat aircraft (701 to 381), and the Indian navy with its three fleets, two aircraft carriers and one submarine command was more than three times the strength of the Pakistani navy with its single navy command at Karachi.⁷⁵ India claimed that such an analysis was misleading because India is eight times the size of Pakistan with land frontiers and a coastline several times longer than that of Pakistan and ultimately faced a dual threat from Pakistan and China.⁷⁶ Moreover, it was argued that India needed to maintain a qualitative military balance with Pakistan and China based on the nature of weapons available,⁷⁷ the terrain on which they are deployed and the fact that the wars on the subcontinent have usually been short. The criteria for obtaining naval armaments was based on India's long coastline and its growing seaborne trade rather than on countering Pakistan's naval strength alone. Besides India had always shown serious concern at the major powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean, especially after the US had indulged in gunboat diplomacy during the 1971 war.

Pakistan, on the other hand, argued that the military balance depended on factors like military vulnerability and degree of threat and it could not be reduced to a simple equation of size. They argued that although India was much bigger than Pakistan in terms of geographical mass (four times as big) and

⁷⁴ In an interview conducted in Lahore in October 1991.

⁷⁵ For differing interpretations of Indo-Pak military balance as put forward by the Indian and Pakistani scholars, see, S. Srinivasan, "Battle Lines", *The Telegraph*, 22 April 1990; Jasjit Singh, 'Pakistan Army', *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30; Major General M.L. Popli (retd.), "India and Pakistan: Military Balance and Options", *Indian Express*, 22 May 1990. For Pakistani accounts, see, Ali Khan, "Pakistan, Indian Armed Forces Comparison", *Nation*, 11 November 1987; Munir Ahmed Suleri, "Rising Tensions Between India and Pakistan", *Pakistan Times*, 12 October 1990; and E.A.S. Bokhari, "Military Edge Between India and Pakistan", *Pakistan Times*, 1 March 1991.

⁷⁶ See, Raju G.C. Thomas, "Achieving Security From Within and Without", in Marshall A. Bouton and Phillip Oldenbury, eds., *India Briefing: 1988*, London: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 88-89.

⁷⁷ *ibid.* For instance India points out the qualitative superiority of F-16 *Falcon* fighters delivered to Pakistan by the US, over the *Mirage-2000* which India finally purchased from France to offset the F-16s. Subsequently India's decision to purchase 44 of the Soviet advanced Mig-29 *Falcum* fighters gave India superiority in the air although India claims that F-16s are still technically superior and that the qualitative leap forward with the Mig-29s was intended to offset the Pakistani moves to obtain Boeing EC-3 AWACS that would neutralize the effectiveness of much of the Indian air force.

population (eight times as big), half of that country, the Southern peninsula, could be excluded from the comparison because it was totally free of any military threat.⁷⁸ Indian threat perceptions from China were also regarded as "more psychological than real" since the Himalayas just could not become a great battlefield.⁷⁹ This was strongly contested by Indian military planners who had not forgotten India's humiliating military defeat at the hands of China in 1962 a battle fought on the Himalayas itself. Overall from a Pakistani point of view the only military threat India could face was from the west, that is Pakistan itself. Akram insisted that "however ridiculous this might seem in view of Pakistan's considerably smaller size, this is the main threat and this is what we must bear in mind when we speak of military balance between the two countries".⁸⁰ Besides it was Pakistan which faced a two-front situation, from India on its eastern side and during the 1980's from the Soviet forces present in Afghanistan on the western side. And the two countries should look into the question of military balance in the context of "who is threatened by whom, from which direction, by how much force and with what combination of hostile forces?"⁸¹

3.4.2 Technical Difficulties

Besides the differences in assessments of each other's threat perceptions, the task of force reduction in itself is a very complicated one as proved by the experience of the MBFR and CFE talks between the NATO and Warsaw Pact in Europe.⁸² There are various technical difficulties in comparing the military balance between India and Pakistan. Firstly, the weapons acquired by the two sides were from different sources and had different performance characteristics. For instance, in procuring aircraft, India emphasized the qualitative superiority of Pakistan's combat aircraft F-16 fighters as compared to the Mirage-2000s and not the total number of combat aircraft. And as pointed out earlier, there was an asymmetry with regard to the deployment of forces since Pakistani forces were stationed far closer to the border than Indian forces. Pakistan could, for instance, mobilize its forces and put them on the battle stations within 72 hours, while it

⁷⁸ A.I Akram argues that there has never been an invasion of India across the east or west coast of the peninsula and since Pakistan has no means, whatsoever, of landing its forces there, it can be safely argued that half of India is entirely safe from any military attack. See, A. I. Akram, "India Revisited: The Arms Race and the Military Balance -IV", *Dawn*, 7 April 1983.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁸⁰ See, Akram's comments in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁸² For an excellent discussion on this issue, see, Kalevi Ruhala, "Prospects for Conventional Arms Reduction: Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe", *Disarmament*, vol. 12, no. 2, Summer 1989, p. 63.

would take India three to four times as long to do that.⁸³

There were other issues like re-supply availability and reserves on both sides since Pakistan has very large reserve forces, 500,000 against India's 240,000. The question of potential supplies during a war also needs to be taken into account. For example, although in the past the US had cut off its arms supplies to both India and Pakistan at the time of a war, it had hurt Pakistan more than India. But at the same time, India's only source of military supplies had been the Soviet Union but Pakistan got military supplies from China and a number of Islamic countries like Iran, Turkey and Jordan. Further, with Pakistan's strengthening of relations with the Saudi Arabia and considering that around 20,000 Pakistani soldiers served there as palace guards and trainers particularly after the Gulf War in 1990-91, the possibility of Saudi Arabia funneling over some of its sophisticated weapons including F-16s and AWACS to Pakistan could not be ruled out.⁸⁴

As a result, any mutual arms reduction talks between India and Pakistan without an agreed database, equal transparencies on both sides, different configurations in force deployments and most significantly lack of trust in each other's intentions would prove to be an extremely complicated and a very prolonged exercise. Even if they succeed in reaching an agreement on the ratio of force levels, verifying it would be an enormously difficult task. Jonathan Dean, a former US Ambassador to the MBFR negotiations observed rightly that verifying conventional forces reduction could well prove to be even more difficult than negotiating mutually acceptable reductions.⁸⁵ The verification arrangements and data exchange had proved to be a major stumbling block in the MBFR talks in Europe. The Stockholm document, which the Benazir Bhutto's government had been referring to, provides for all the 35 CSCE countries to conduct short-notice on-site inspections on the territories of other participating states, if compliance with the agreed Confidence and Security Building Measures is in doubt. Even at the CFE talks, the participating states agreed that the verification regime would include among other things, both exchanges of information and on-site inspections as a matter of right.

In the South Asian context, however, it was highly unlikely for India and Pakistan to agree on such intensive verification methods as on-site inspections of each other's defence installations or military personnel

⁸³ K. Subrahmanyam, "Pakistan's Armed Forces: Astute Modernization Strategy", *Times of India*, 27 February 1989.

⁸⁴ Jasjit, 'Pakistan Army', *op.cit.*, pp. 27-28; and J.K. Baral, "India-Pakistan Diplomacy Since 1981: Motivations, Strategies and Prospects", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. 35, no. 4 & 5, April-May 1986, p. 33.

⁸⁵ As quoted in Andreas Chapman, "Verification of Arms Control", in Stan Wondass, ed., *Common Security in Europe*, Oxfordshire: Foundation of International Security, 1988, p. 1.

owing to the mutual suspicion between the two countries. The political relations between the two parties is a major factor in influencing the negotiations of a verification regime. It has been argued that the MBFR talks without any accompanying military Confidence Building Measures in the case of India and Pakistan would imply putting the cart before the horse. Moreover, often it was not simply arms but the armaments enveloped in adversarial political relations which produced tensions.

It was obvious that the mutual security perceptions of India and Pakistan were not determined merely by levels of forces but by state of their political relations and perceptions. For instance, when Z.A. Bhutto expanded the armed forces by nearly 60% between 1972 and 1977, there were no adverse perceptions on the Indian side. With the military regime in Islamabad, however, the Indian perceptions underwent a change even though this was the period of the Janata government in Delhi which most Pakistanis regarded as more amenable than its successor Congress government. It is important to note that it was the Janata government which had initiated the \$1.08 billion arms deal with the Soviet Union. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the renewal of the US-Pakistan strategic alliance exacerbated further both India and Pakistan's security concerns. Therefore a strict arms control approach, unless accompanied by a more important confidence building approach in the military sphere, might not yield much dividends.

3.5 Prospects

The prospects of India and Pakistan coming to an agreement on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction does not seem to be very bright. The tragedy of this proposal has been that when it was offered by the military regime in Pakistan which could sign such a deal with India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government rejected it essentially because of her distrust of General Zia's military regime. And a civilian and democratic government like that of Benazir Bhutto, who proposed it for the second time, was unlikely to be in a position to deliver the goods anyway. In the present context, too, it is extremely doubtful whether Pakistan's civilian government of Nawaz Sharif is considering such a proposal or in a position to sell such an idea to its military. Pakistan's army guards its interests jealously and is highly unlikely to agree to any major cuts in its size. The Indian army, too, is reported to be very reluctant to discuss any major reduction in its size.

Overall the general principle of India and Pakistan reducing their armed forces to a level where each retains a defensive capability but not an offensive one, enjoys political support on both sides of the border especially in the non-official circles. However, translating such a desire into a mutually acceptable and

technically verifiable agreement may well prove to be an arduous task.

4 Conclusion

On the whole, India and Pakistan have not made much headway with regard to the proposals for reducing the size of the armed forces or the defence expenditures which may constrain their respective armed forces' military capabilities in a significant manner. The two countries are coming under growing pressure both from the international and domestic sources for reducing their defence expenditures. In real terms, India's defence expenditure has not risen for the past three consecutive years but the same is not true for Pakistan. Moreover, the military establishments of both countries continue to express their reservations in this regard. It has been argued that the political leaders should first alleviate the threat perceptions and then address more fundamental issues like reducing the size of the armed forces. But at the same time both consider the other's build-up as the main source of their threat perceptions. It may be argued that while such an agreement would be a vital ingredient in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan, perhaps it needs to be accompanied or preceded by other military Confidence Building Measures which would address the operations rather than level of the armed forces, as a starting point. These would be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IX: THE MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

Military Confidence Building Measures are the most salient in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. Since the mid 1980's the threat of another Indo-Pak war by accident or miscalculation has loomed large over South Asia. This was particularly the case on two occasions. In the winter 1986-87 and in the spring 1990, the two countries' armed forces were facing each other in an eyeball-to-eyeball position. Whether there was a political intention on either side to start a military confrontation continues to be a debatable issue but the fact remains that the situation on the ground caused ripples in both countries. The need for some measures to avoid such dangerous flare-ups on the border was all too obvious. This ushered in a debate on undertaking some Confidence Building Measures in the military sphere between India and Pakistan.

The various military Confidence Building Measures that have been undertaken or are under consideration between India and Pakistan requires detailed analysis. It focusses on military Confidence Building Measures which usually deal with the operations of the two countries' armed forces and regulate their use in such a way as to appear non-threatening to both sides. This relates to Confidence Building Measures such as prior notification of military exercises, inviting the military teams of other country to observe their military manoeuvres and maintaining regular contacts between the two countries' military establishments. It also considers other confidence building proposals such as the re-deployment of the armed forces to their peace-time locations or thinning out zones in sensitive border areas.

Confidence Building Measures usually do not restrict the military options of either side in any significant manner but are intended to reduce or eliminate misperceptions of concerns about potentially threatening military activities. This may be achieved by providing the opportunity for a prompt explanation of worrisome military activities or furnishing verifiable information about them to the other side.

1 Advance Notification of Military Exercises and Military Manoeuvres

This measure acquires a special significance in the case of India and Pakistan for avoiding tensions on the border which might otherwise arise in the absence of adequate information about the nature of the military exercises being undertaken by either side. Such a situation had arisen in the winter of 1986-87 during the Indian military exercise Brasstacks when half a million troops were amassed on either side of the border facing each other eyeball-to-eyeball. Since it was this incident which made the two countries realize the significance of military CBMs and largely brought home the need for military Confidence Building Measures in the context of India and Pakistan and ultimately led to their agreement on advance notification of the

military exercises and military manoeuvres, we shall examine it in detail.

1.1 Brasstacks

In October 1986 the Indian army had launched its biggest military exercise ever, code named Brasstacks. These multi-corps level exercises involved close to 200,000 men at a reported cost of Rs. 200 crores.¹ The entire Western Air Command was activated and limited amphibious exercises by the navy were also scheduled to take place in the Saurashtra region.² In effect, therefore, it was more or less an inter services exercise with a dominant role for the army. The location of this exercise was just over 60 kms from the Pakistani border. The brainchild of the then Army Chief, General K. Sunderji, it was designed to test many of his strategic concepts and the new defence strategy of dissuasive posture and deterrent capability. He said that this defence strategy was

dissuasive with a second component of counter-offensive capability at a time and place of our choosing. This riposte capability acts as a deterrent... [it is telling the enemy]... do not start anything or you will get hurt and the important thing is that it must be credible.³

India Today quoting a confidential report prepared for the army headquarters, wrote that Brasstacks had set out to demonstrate

from the evolution of political and military arms preceding a conflict to the conduct of a command level exercise with troops involving mechanized offensive operations by a strike corps deep into the enemy territory in conjunction with the air force that clearly indicated to a belligerent and recalcitrant neighbour, the power and strength of India's armed forces.⁴

Brasstacks was divided into four phases over nearly five months with the first two phases restricted to a paper exercise which crystallized the ideas and worked out the logistics of men and *matériel* that would be needed along with optimum deployment profiles.⁵ The actual deployment of troops did not get underway until early November 1986.

In keeping with convention, the Indian Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) was believed to have informed his Pakistani counterpart in early November about the nature, direction, size and location of Operation Brasstacks.⁶ Dharmendra, however, writes that this contention is disputed by Lt. General Jagjit Singh Arora, MP (Rajya Sabha) who stated that "while being briefed on the border issue as part

¹ The Telegraph, 8 February 1987.

² India Today, 15 February 1987, p. 26.

³ See, "General K. Sunderji: Disputed Legacy", India Today, 15 May 1988, p. 84

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ The Telegraph, 8 February 1987.

⁶ India Today, 15 February 1987, p. 16.

of the opposition, the Minister of State for Defence Arun Singh had said that there was no need to inform Pakistan since Brasstacks was well over 60 kms from the border with Pakistan. But once Pakistan began to voice its concerns, India did inform them".⁷

1.1.1 Pakistani Concerns

Pakistan felt alarmed at the size of the troops being amassed on its borders. Its perceptions of the Indian troop movements are best outlined by General K.M. Arif, the then Vice-Chief of Army Staff. He pointed out that the entire Indian army other than some formations of the Eastern Command had been fully mobilized and concentrated in the Indian part of Kashmir and Punjab and in an exercise area which was close to the border of Pakistan.⁸ A more significant step from the Pakistani point of view was the carriage of artillery and tank ammunition to the manoeuvre area. Moreover, the Indian air force was fully mobilized and put on red alert. All bases of the air force including the satellite bases were activated and made operational. The Indian navy apart from carrying out its normal manoeuvres participated in a brigade size amphibious operation in the Gujrat sector. Such extraordinary arrangements, Arif said, aroused Pakistan's doubts.⁹ Pakistan's Prime Minister M.K. Junejo brought up the matter during the SAARC summit in Bangalore in November 1986. He discussed it with the India's Minister of External Affairs N.D. Tiwari and later with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.¹⁰ In his speech at the inaugural session he came up with the proposal that a formal convention should be drawn up making it obligatory for the member states to inform each other of any significant troop movements and that observers should be allowed to watch all the major military exercises.¹¹ These remarks were an obvious reference to Indian troop movements. However Pakistan seemed convinced by the Indian explanations as General Zia himself ruled out any immediate threat of attack on the eastern front.¹²

Despite being assured that the massing of troops on the Indian side was in relation to the military exercise, Pakistan continued to express concern over the unprecedented concentration of Indian troops on its

⁷ See, Gaddam Dharmendra, "Operation Brasstacks: A Politico-Strategic Analysis", *Unpublished M.Phil Dissertation* submitted to the JNU, New Delhi 1989, p. 73.

⁸ See, General K.M. Arif (ret'd), "A War Game or Plan for War?", *Dawn*, 26 March 1989.

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ *India Today*, 15 December 1986, p. 127.

¹¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 November 1986, p. 30.

¹² General Zia made this statement while addressing the National Assembly members from Baluchistan and NWFP on 7 December 1986. See, *Frontline*, 7-20 February 1987, p. 9.

borders.¹³ On 17 November and 2 December 1986 Pakistan's DGMO sought and received assurances from his Indian counterpart about the Brasstacks exercise.¹⁴ He was informed by the Indian DGMO that they were routine multi-corps level exercises and were in keeping with India's triennial military exercises which invariably tend to be on a much larger scale. This was, however, disputed by General Arif who argued that when the Indian DGMO was asked about the necessity of troops carrying first and second line of ammunition with them, he expressed his ignorance about it. The Indian DGMO was also told that the Indian army had moved a mountain division north of the Ravi river which had no apparent relevance to the exercise. But he called it a mere relief movement ignoring what that term meant in military parlance.¹⁵ An ex-senior official of Pakistan's Foreign Office also insisted that "India had not given a correct picture of the nature, size, location and direction of the Brasstacks exercise....at the last minute its direction was changed....[which] raised our suspicions...".¹⁶

1.1.2 Escalation

Meanwhile Pakistan too was conducting its own military manoeuvres Saf-e-Shikan and Flying Horse. These exercises had begun in October and were scheduled to finish in November and mid-December respectively. The exercises centred around two strike corps of the Pakistan army. Saf-e-Shikan was headed by the First Armoured and 37th Infantry Division of the Army Reserve South located in the Bhawalpur-Merot sector.¹⁷ The 6th Armoured and 10th Infantry Division of the Army Reserve North were involved in the exercise Flying Horse which was scheduled to take place further north in the Jhelum-Chenab corridor.¹⁸ The Pakistan air force was also conducting its own manoeuvres codenamed Highmark.¹⁹ Since Pakistan perceived danger from the Brasstacks exercise, it continued its own exercises after they were due to end and at a later point moved part of its forces to the Punjab sector.²⁰ These movements were picked up by the Indian intelligence towards the end of December 1986. In their view likewise, the two Pakistani military exercises Saf-e-Shikan and Flying Horse were not proceeding as scheduled. The troops belonging to the Ist

¹³ Public Opinion Trends and Analysis (POT), Pakistan, 1987, Part I, p. 299.

¹⁴ India Today, 28 February 1987.

¹⁵ See, General Arif, "A War Game", *op.cit.*

¹⁶ In an interview conducted in Karachi in October 1991.

¹⁷ Frontline, 7-20 February 1987, p. 9.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ India Today, 15 February 1987.

²⁰ *ibid.*

Armoured and 30th Infantry Divisions which headed Saf-e-Shikan continued to remain in position near Rahimyar Khan even after the conclusion of their manoeuvres. Initially Indian intelligence concluded that they were probably monitoring Brasstacks. The adoption of such defensive postures while monitoring the military exercises of another country are normal practices. But the Flying Horse exercise scheduled to be held in the Jhelum-Chenab corridor shifted its venue to the Ravi-Chenab sector so that its Pakistan's Northern strike corps was felt to be dangerously close to the Indian border near the Shakargarh bridge.²¹

The changes in location were not informed to the Indian DGMO although it was conveyed that Pakistan had decided to extend the exercises because of Brasstacks.²² Meanwhile Pakistan's air force exercise Highmark had come to an end, but satellite bases were kept operational with detachments flying regular sorties. Here too a more significant development from the Indian point of view was that Pakistani forces in the forward areas were issued with extra ammunition and all new positions and transfers suspended and service leave was cancelled.²³ The Pakistani side argued that despite the assurances given by the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to his counterpart M.K. Junejo at the SAARC meeting, the size of the Brasstacks exercise was not curtailed.²⁴

What ultimately brought matters to a head was an extremely provocative move from an Indian point of view when Pakistan's two main strike forces crossed Suttlej and moved opposite the Abohar-Fazilka in the Ferozpur area, barely 16 kms away from the Indian border.²⁵ There were also reports that some elements of Pakistan's 11th corps from Peshawar and 12th corps from Quetta had been grouped with the two strike formations.²⁶ They were thus poised offensively near the strategic border state of Punjab and against the backdrop of Sikh separatist elements in Punjab demanding an independent Khalistan and Pakistan's alleged support for the same, the impression gained by New Delhi was that Pakistan intended to fish in India's

²¹ *Times of India*, 19 January 1987.

²² Dharmendra, *op.cit.*, p. 78.

²³ See the statement by the Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. Eduardo Falerio in reply to an oral question in Parliament on the border situation, in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 25, no. 131, 13 March 1987.

²⁴ General Arif discloses that Rajiv Gandhi had confided in M.K. Junejo that after scrutinizing the cost-effectiveness of the exercise Brasstacks, it was assessed to be prohibitive and on his orders its scale and scope had been reduced. He adds that when on the following day the Pakistani DGMO telephoned his Indian counterpart, he hesitated to debate the subject on the plea that the two Prime Ministers had already discussed it. General Arif, "A War Game", *op.cit.*.

²⁵ Actually the 1st Armoured and 37th Infantry Divisions had left Rahimyar Khan and crossed the Lodhran bridge across Suttlej near Bhawalpur and headed in the direction of Multan, their peace time location. But instead of proceeding to Multan they bypassed it and took up position near the Sulemanki Headwork, 16 kms away from the Indian border in Fazilka. See, *India Today*, 15 February 1987.

²⁶ *Times of India*, 19 January 1987.

troubled waters.

But until the 15th January 1987 when the three Indian Army Chiefs briefed the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) and advised manning of forward defences, no Indian counter reaction had yet taken place.²⁷ At a press conference on 20 January, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi expressed tremendous concern over the massing of Pakistani troops along the Indian border and said "we are trying to figure out why Pakistan is keeping the forces there and what is the problem...".²⁸ He also briefed the opposition leaders on developments across the border.²⁹ It is argued it was only the confirmation of Pakistan's two strike formations movements by the Indian Defence Ministry on 21 January which triggered off an Indian reaction and on 23 January following an emergency meeting of the CCPA, a red alert was sounded and the army was directed to man its forward defences. The Border Security Force along the international border was put under the army's control with the navy being directed to keep the eyes and ears open.³⁰ Replying to an oral question in the Lok Sabha, Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. Eduardo Falerio stated that

India had exercised maximum restraint...[but].. the threat posed by the Pakistani moves could no longer be ignored and left us with no other alternative but [to]... institute essential defensive measures involving preventive deployment of the army.³¹

1.1.3 The De-escalation

Both sides recognised that they had gone dangerously far and set the diplomatic machinery in motion to rectify the situation. India proposed a speedy and mutual de-escalation to Pakistan by withdrawing their troops to the original positions. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reportedly told Pakistan's High Commissioner Mr. Humayun Khan that the two countries must cooperate in reducing the temperature on the border. At the same time Mr. Khan was told that if Pakistan did not move its troops to the pre-October positions, India would be forced to move its troops to the border.³² The Pakistan government expressed its readiness to enter

²⁷ *India Today*, 15 February 1987.

²⁸ As quoted in Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1987-1988*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1989, p. 20.

²⁹ *Patriot*, 18 January 1987.

³⁰ *Hindustan Times*, 24 January 1987.

³¹ See, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 25, no. 151, 13 March 1987, p. 7.

³² For a detailed account of these troop movements, see, Dharmendra, *op.cit.*, pp. 88-90. He concludes that by 19 January, Pakistan's two strike formations were already in their launch pads that is the strategic points from where to launch a strike. But by 27 January the Indian army after occupying its forward defence had gained an upper hand in the crucial sectors of Jammu and Punjab. By this time, tactically, the Pakistani position had been rendered strategically suicidal since both its strike formations in the event of carrying out an offensive were in danger of having their rear cut off by an Indian counter-offensive. Also see, *India Today*, 15 February 1987.

into immediate consultations with India for de-escalation of tensions on 23 January. The Indian high Commissioner Mr. S.K. Singh was summoned to Pakistan's Foreign Office and told that it was ready to have talks with India at any level and in any form to de-escalate the crisis. It also repeated its charge that the present tension had been brought about by an Indian decision to hold its triennial military exercise on an unprecedented scale this time.³³

This meeting was followed by a detailed discussion on the 'hotline' between the two DGMOs. It was also reported that Pakistan's President General Zia-ul-Haq had sent a message to Rajiv Gandhi that he would be happy to visit India to attend the India-Pakistan cricket match.³⁴ On 24 January the two Prime Ministers Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Junejo had a telephone conversation which by many political observers in two countries has been attributed as being decisive in de-escalating the tensions. The next day M.K. Junejo addressed a special session of Parliament and said

an unusual situation has built up on our borders... we have *exercised great care* not to exacerbate tensions but we do need to take precautions... [but] the situation does not permit complacency...³⁵

Only a few hours later, he had an extraordinary meeting with the Indian Ambassador Mr. S.K. Singh in Parliament House in Islamabad. Tensions relaxed considerably on the same day as by this time India had also followed up its offer to hold talks with Pakistan to defuse the border situation by extending a formal invitation for the Foreign Secretary level talks at the earliest opportunity.

On 26 January, Pakistan responded by announcing officially that its Foreign Secretary Mr. Abdul Sattar would soon visit New Delhi to defuse the current border tensions. General Zia, while visiting Kuwait, expressed optimism that the tensions on the Indo-Pak border would be soon defused following the initiative of two Prime Ministers. The Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi also reassured President Hoshni Mubarak of Egypt who had telephoned him and requested him to convey to all the leaders (including General Zia) attending the Islamic Conference in Kuwait that India had no offensive intentions against Pakistan. Meanwhile on 30 January an invitation was extended to General Zia to visit a cricket match between India and Pakistan. This was immediately accepted by General Zia who felt that in view of the prevailing tensions

³³ General Arif, "A War Game", *op.cit.*.

³⁴ See, Yearbook 1987-88, *op.cit.*.

³⁵ *Pakistan Times*, 26 January 1987.

on the border, it was necessary to create an atmosphere of confidence between the two countries.

The first round of the Foreign Secretary level talks between Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Mr. Abdul Sattar and his Indian counterpart Mr. A.S. Gonslaves on the de-escalation of border tensions opened in New Delhi on 31 January. Substantive differences over the purpose and scope of discussions especially the definition of disengagement and de-escalation relating to the prevailing border situation were reported to have cropped up. India insisted that there was no question of curtailing or canceling its military exercise Brasstacks as a part of the proposed withdrawal from the forward positions along the border by both sides. The Indian objective was to focus attention on Pakistani troop movements north of Fazilka and secondly to ensure the withdrawal of the two armies to their peace time locations.³⁶ Pakistan, on the other hand, wanted India to curtail the size of Brasstacks and also negotiate procedures for preventing any future misunderstandings arising out of the military manoeuvres.³⁷

After formal and informal discussions and intensive internal consultations, India and Pakistan came up with two sets of proposals regarding the phased withdrawal of the troops on both sides and guidelines for further deployment of the troops on 1 February 1987. As the talks continued, efforts were made to roll the Indian and Pakistani proposals into one mutually acceptable formula. The Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was reported to have kept the progress of the talks constantly under review.³⁸ After marathon negotiations on 4 February India and Pakistan reached a limited understanding along with a firm commitment "not to attack each other or engage in any provocative action, to exercise maximum restraint and adopt a sector-by-sector approach for the pullout of troops from the border".³⁹ As a first step in this direction both sides agreed to withdraw both offensive and defensive forces to their peace time locations in the Ravi and Chenab corridor extending from the Shakargarh sector to Akhnoor within fifteen days. The withdrawal of the forces was to be monitored by the DGMOs of India and Pakistan. They also agreed to lift all the mines already laid along the common border, to lay no more mines in that area, to de-activate all satellite airfields and to bring their respective navies and air forces to a lower level of operational readiness.⁴⁰

³⁶ *The Hindu*, 1 February 1987.

³⁷ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 February 1987, p. 17.

³⁸ See, *Yearbook 1987-88, op.cit.*, p. 22.

³⁹ For a text of the agreement arrived on 4 February 1987, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 24, no. 4, 27 February 1987, col. 142.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

At a press conference on 5 February, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that the Indo-Pak agreement to de-escalate the border tensions was a step towards normalization. "It is good that it is moving forward", he said.⁴¹ In Pakistan too, the agreement was acclaimed by the people as well as in official and diplomatic circles. The implementation of the accord began on 11 February and the disengagement of forces along the Ravi-Chenab sector was completed by 15 February 1987.⁴²

A week later, President General Zia arrived in New Delhi on 21 February on his 'cricket-for-peace' mission. He told the journalists at the airport that the recent developments were due to some communication gap between the two countries and maintained that the two countries were making efforts to prevent such situations in future. At the dinner hosted by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the two leaders met separately for 45 minutes to discuss bilateral ties. They agreed to carry forward the process by promoting cultural and trade ties between the two countries. Later General Zia-ul-Haq praised Rajiv Gandhi for his positive response to his peace overtures and disclosed that Rajiv Gandhi had offered to invite the military *attachés* of foreign missions including that of Pakistan to observe the army exercise Brasstacks.⁴³ He welcomed this offer as a good Confidence Building Measure. On 27 February 1987 India and Pakistan began the second round of the Foreign Secretary talks on further concrete measures to ease tensions on their borders. By 2 March, they had reached a comprehensive agreement that fully restored the *status quo* and even provided for some safeguards to prevent such dangerous flare-ups in the future.⁴⁴

There is no doubt that the two countries had got locked into a dangerous game of brinkmanship. But the speed with which the crisis was defused despite the massive mobilization by both sides raises the question that whether India or Pakistan really intended to go to a war and it could have started by accident. For instance, General Zia, the Chief of Pakistan's Army Staff had summoned the joint session of Parliament to discuss the issue but even before the session was convened, he had left the country to attend the fifth Islamic summit in Kuwait.⁴⁵ The Indian government did not seem very concerned about the possibility of a war either. It took two days to determine the level at which the talks were to be held because Rajiv Gandhi and

⁴¹ See Yearbook 1987-88, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

⁴² *Pakistan Times*, 22 February 1987.

⁴³ See, Yearbook 1987-88, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Muslim*, 26 January 1987. Also see, *Asiaweek*, 15 February 1987, p. 11.

his colleagues were pre-occupied with the Africa fund summit.⁴⁶ Such a cool and calm attitude towards solving an imminent crisis prompts one to look into their underlying motivations for the same.

1.1.3.1 Domestic Motivations

At a domestic level both Rajiv Gandhi and M.K. Junejo's governments were facing enormous problems. In India, the Congress government's plans to liberalize the economy were being opposed by the leftist unions and the country was in a grip of a severe drought. Moreover, successive failures in elections of various legislatures had rendered Rajiv Gandhi's position within the ruling Congress government somewhat weakened. The situation in the Indian states was not very promising either.⁴⁷ In Punjab the demand for an independent Khalistan and accompanying terrorist activities continued unabated. In Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the coalition of Rajiv Gandhi's Congress-I and Farooq Abdullah's National Conference were coming under increasing strain and pro-Pakistan religious groups were also becoming more assertive, increasing the possibility of communal violence in the state. In the north-east, the Tripura National Volunteer Force had been fighting for independence and in West Bengal the Gorkha National Liberation Front was spearheading the movement for a separate Gorkhaland. In the south, the language issue was coming to the forefront with clashes between the Marathi and Konkani speaking communities in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and in Tamilnadu opposition to the imposition of the Hindi language by New Delhi was mounting.

The Pakistan government had also been facing problems in all the four provinces.⁴⁸ The presence of three million Afghan refugees was resented strongly by the local population in the North-West-Frontier-Province and Baluchistan with a growing criticism of Pakistan's Afghan policy. A few Baluch and Sindhi leaders were openly advocating independence for their respective provinces. Sindh was also rocked with ethnic riots and communal violence between the Mohajirs, Pathans and the local Sindhis. In Punjab too factional fighting within the Muslim League had held the provincial government to ransom.

More significantly, increasing tensions between President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo, owing to the internal power struggle between the civilian and military centres of decision-making in the Pakistani

⁴⁶ *The Hindu* (International edition), 31 January 1987.

⁴⁷ Sameena Yasmeen presents a good account of various dimensions of this problem. See, Sameena Yasmeen, "India and Pakistan: Why the Latest Exercise in Brinkmanship", *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1988, pp. 66-67.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

establishment were beginning to surface.⁴⁹ Although President Zia, who continued to remain the Chief of the Army Staff, wielded the real power, nevertheless the formation of a civilian government had created a diffused political environment and a certain flexibility in alignments.⁵⁰ Junejo was emerging as an independent power centre which must have alarmed the military establishment.⁵¹ Zia needed to check Junejo's power and increasing popularity and probably Brasstacks presented a convenient excuse and a suitable opportunity to create a war scenario with the traditional enemy India. By highlighting the dangers posed by such a concentration of Indian troops, the army could succeed in pushing aside Junejo who symbolized a civilian regime and restore its own infallibility in the eyes of the people.⁵²

Some Indian scholars point out that to a great extent it was the Pakistani army's move to deploy its two strike corps in an offensive position only 16 kms away from the Indian border that had triggered the Indian retaliation. And despite the fact that Prime Minister Junejo held the defence portfolio, it was General Zia the Chief of the Army Staff who would be in control as far as the army's manoeuvres were concerned. If Zia's gambit succeeded it would have been a case of knocking out two rivals with one stone. If Junejo failed to control the conflagration the army (read Zia) could step in and ease him out. At the same time a diplomatic coup over India would be an added bonus.⁵³ However General Zia probably did not foresee a swift Indian reaction in mobilizing the troops and their forward deployment. And Junejo too managed successfully to tide over the crisis by taking the lead in defusing a volatile situation. The possibility that either or both governments in Delhi and Islamabad were trying to divert public attention from the pressing problems at home by creating a war scenario, therefore, can not be totally ruled out.

1.1.3.2 External Compulsions

With regard to external compulsions, Pakistan's motivations were perhaps not related to the exercise Brasstacks as such. K. Subrahmanyam argues that while a war with India was definitely not the intention

⁴⁹ This point has already been discussed in Chapter Six.

⁵⁰ Omar Noman, "Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy", *Third World Quarterly*, January 1989, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 39. Also see, Rasul A. Rais, "Transition to Democracy", *Asian Survey*, vol. 28, no. 8, February 1988, p. 126.

⁵¹ Rasul Rais writes that Junejo's actions reflected that while he may have been "trapped in the system" his administration was not a "show-piece of the military". See, Rasul, *ibid.*

⁵² Dharmendra particularly hints at the link between the *en masse* resignation of Junejo's cabinet on 20 December 1986 which probably confirmed Zia's suspicions of Junejo's growing clout and Pakistan army's change of mind from the benign nature of the Brasstacks to the one of it threatening Pakistan's security. It is important to recall here that it was only in early December when General Zia himself had expressed the view that the concentration of Indian troops was only for the purpose of carrying out training manoeuvres and hence posed no threat to Pakistan's security. Dharmendra, *op.cit.*, pp. 100-101.

⁵³ *ibid.*

of Pakistan, a war-scenario would serve the purpose just as well especially *vis-à-vis* its patron state, the US.⁵⁴ The US Congress was going to discuss the second tranche of arms supplies to Pakistan including AWACS at that point of time. Perhaps Pakistan wanted to give the US Congress an impression of a beleaguered nation facing the Soviet threat in the west and the massive Indian armed forces in the east. It was trying to convince the US legislature of its interests in maintaining peace in the region despite Indian provocation and thereby justifying the continuation of US military aid to Pakistan.⁵⁵ On the other hand, India too was keen to de-escalate rapidly to demonstrate the routine nature of the Brasstacks exercise and that there was no hostile intention behind it. The Indian government had been against the US decision to sell AWACS to Pakistan and was probably trying to convince the world in general and the US Congress in particular of the dangers involved in supplying the state-of-the-art weapons to Pakistan which had fought three wars with India in past four decades.⁵⁶

1.1.3.3 Military Motives

Some scholars even suspected outright military objectives behind the two countries' moves. For Pakistan, while its two strike corps were positioned within the striking range of Indian Punjab as such their position was tactically weak, susceptible as it was to an Indian counter-offensive unless of course Pakistan was encountering a friendly Sikh population who would view them as liberators which would restrict severely Indian defence options. It is important to note that a *Sarbar Khalsa* (a political convention of Sikhs) had been convened by the Sikh militants with an intention to declare the state of Khalistan on 26 January.⁵⁷ The coincidence in the Pakistani moves and the declaration of the Sikh extremists makes such a contention plausible.⁵⁸ If such a strategic objective was non-existent then Pakistan moves may indeed have been only to counter that of India.

On the other hand if Brasstacks was only a military exercise, why was India proving so elusive in giving details to Pakistan whenever asked for the same? And if it was to remain an exercise then the deployment of 6th Mountain Division from Bareilly into the Jammu sector also raises more questions than it

⁵⁴ K. Subrahmanyam, "Pakistan's Troops on India's Border: A Way Out of Dilemma", *Times of India*, 24 January 1987.

⁵⁵ Yasmeen, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

⁵⁶ Yasmeen, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

⁵⁷ *Frontline*, 7-20 February 1987.

⁵⁸ Dharmendra, *op.cit.*, pp. 105-106.

answers.⁵⁹ Further, what remains unexplained is the plan for another exercise, named Operation Trident. According to one analyst, Operation Trident called for "an attack on 8 February 1987 at 04.30 hrs on Skardu in Pakistani part of Kashmir as the first objective and Gilgit as the second".⁶⁰ If this was true then Pakistan's suspicions of Brasstacks stand confirmed. Such a plan was attributed to General Sunderji, by a *India Today* report quoting the Defence Ministry sources that the idea was to provoke Pakistan into some kind of action which would then give the Indian army an excuse to launch its own offensive.⁶¹ But at the same time the speed with which India de-escalated the situation particularly after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself took an initiative, again raises some doubts about this line of argument.

Whatever the underlying motives for both India and Pakistan were, the dangerous uncertainties arising from this experience only highlighted all the more the importance of a Confidence Building Measure like prior notification of military exercises. Subsequently Pakistan's military exercise Zarb-i-Momin which was held in December 1989 showed that they had learned their lessons from this experience.

1.2 Zarb-i-Momin Exercise

Zarb-i-Momin was a multi corps exercise⁶² with some 200,000 men which also involved manoeuvres by the Pakistani air force and the navy. It was designed to test the then Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg's defence doctrine of offensive-defence.... by carrying the war into the enemy's territory. By selecting an area well away from the border with India, keeping the direction of its manoeuvres from north to south as well as east to west, inviting a number of foreign delegations including the defence *attaché* of the Indian embassy and most of all by being open about its manoeuvres, Pakistan ensured that there were no misgivings about its military exercise.⁶³ General Beg said "we have kept them [Indians] informed all the time".⁶⁴ The two countries Directors-General-of-Military-Operations (DGMO) also maintained contact with each other. Clearly, the military establishments of the two countries had developed a tacit understanding on this issue. Subsequently India and Pakistan signed a formal accord on this issue.

⁵⁹ *India Today*, 28 February 1987.

⁶⁰ Ravi Rikhye, *The War That Never Was: The Story of India's Strategic Failures*, New Delhi: Chanakaya Publishers, 1988, pp. 11, 192-195.

⁶¹ *India Today*, 15 May 1988, p. 84.

⁶² It involved four army corps, seven infantry divisions, one armoured division, three independent and armoured brigades, Pakistan army aviation, Pakistan army air defence formations and SSG- Special Service Group of the Pakistani army. See, Major Khawar Habib, "Zarb-i-Momin and Security Perceptions", *Muslim*, 28 October 1989; Brig. Abdul Rehman Siddiqui (ret'd), "Zarb-i-Momin: A Preview and Appreciation", reprinted in *Strategic Digest*, vol. 20, no. 3, March 1990, p. 1999.

⁶³ Abbas Nasir, "Back to the Front", reprinted in *Strategic Digest*, vol. 20, no. 3, March 1990, p. 2008.

⁶⁴ See General Beg's press briefing in *Defence Journal*, no. 6-7, 1991, p. 40.

1.3 The Accord on Advance Notification of Military Exercises, Military Manoeuvres and Troop Deployments

The negotiations for a formal agreement on advance notification of military exercises and significant military movements started in the Foreign Secretaries talks in August 1990. Earlier the Indian proposal to extend such an understanding to sharing information about the military movements on a sector-to-sector and point-to-point basis was rejected by Pakistan. Pakistan argued that since the DGMOs of the two countries already informed each other about this, the need to inform about troop movements on several points was superfluous. However the real reason behind the rejection of this proposal, as a high level Pakistani defence expert argued, was that if the two countries were to share such information on a point-to-point basis "it will be a virtual sabotage of the freedom movement in Kashmir with Pakistan becoming a party to informing the Indians about the movements along the Line of Control in Kashmir".⁶⁵ And to that extent, the proposal had dangerous implications for Pakistan. However the negotiations on the original proposal of advance notification of military exercises continued. After several rounds of talks between the military delegations of the two countries on this issue, they finalized a draft agreement in March 1991. Subsequently in April 1991, the two Foreign Secretaries signed a formal accord on advance notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop deployments.

2 Hotline and Other Contacts Between the Indian and Pakistani Military Establishments

As the tensions on the Line-of-Control in Kashmir heightened due to the political upheaval in the valley, it highlighted the importance of regular contacts between the two countries military establishments. In January 1990, at a meeting in New Delhi, the Indian Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Sahabzada Yaqub Khan agreed to keep the 'hotline' between the army headquarters in Rawalpindi and New Delhi open.⁶⁶ Later at their meeting in New York in April 1990, they reiterated that the DGMOs of the two countries should remain in constant touch with each other.⁶⁷ Later in July the Indian Foreign Secretary proposed further contacts between the local commanders which were intended to supplement the existing 'hotline' between the DGMOs of the two countries.⁶⁸ But progress on this issue was

⁶⁵ *Nation*, 13 June 1990.

⁶⁶ *Times of India*, 29 January 1990.

⁶⁷ Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1990-91*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1991, p. 170.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p. 171.

reported only in the third round of Foreign Secretary talks in December 1990. The two sides agreed that the 'hotline' contacts between the DGMOs of the two countries which had so far proceeded on an adhoc basis would henceforth take place on a weekly basis.⁶⁹

Subsequently the issue was taken up for further discussion by the two countries' military delegations. In their second round of talks held in Islamabad on 25 September 1991,⁷⁰ the military delegations discussed recent armed clashes in the Poonch and Neelam valley sectors and considered measures to prevent a reoccurrence of such incidents in future. They agreed on the need to undertake further Confidence Building Measures to defuse tension along the border and arrived at an understanding to have more frequent contacts between the DGMOs on the 'hotline'. It may be noted that they already had weekly exchanges with regard to the situation on the border and also communicated in the event of flare-ups.

Further, it was decided that the specific sector commanders of the two armies and air forces would maintain lines of communication with their respective counterpart along the Line-of-Control as well as the international border from Jammu to Kutch. Unlike the contacts at the DGMO level which are both regular as well as on an as-required basis, these sector commander-level contacts were envisaged as being solely on an as-required basis.⁷¹ The sector-to-sector contacts would be at the divisional level. And for the two air forces such contacts would be maintained at the level of forward base commanders. Additionally, the air forces and the navies of the two countries would establish communication channels at the highest level on the pattern set for the DGMOs.⁷² Both agreed that an exchange of military delegations between the two countries was in itself a useful Confidence Building Measure and that such exchanges should continue as they constituted an important contributory factor to the overall confidence building efforts being undertaken by their respective governments.⁷³

3 Re-deployment of Forces to the Peace-Time Locations

In early 1990 the presence of the Indian security forces in the state of Jammu and Kashmir had

⁶⁹ Dawn, 21 December 1990.

⁷⁰ The Indian team was led by the DGMO, Lt. General S. Nambiar and included a five-member inter-services team consisting of one representative each from the army, air force and navy and one from the Foreign Office. The Pakistani delegation was headed by Major General Pir Dad Khan of Joint Staff Headquarters, the DGMO, Major General Jamsheed Mali and representatives from three services and the Foreign Office. Muslim, 26 September 1991.

⁷¹ Kesava Menon, "A Meeting Ground: Some Progress in Indo-Pakistan Talks", Frontline, 12-25 October 1991, p. 17-18. Also see, Nation, 27 September 1991; Pakistan Times, 28 September 1991; Hindustan Times, 27 September 1991.

⁷² Menon, *ibid.*

⁷³ Pakistan Times, 28 September 1991.

increased substantially mainly because of the militants violence in the valley. Pakistan, however, perceived such a concentration of the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir as a threat to its own security. It was against this background that Pakistan had been stressing the re-deployment of forces to their peacetime locations. In the first round of Foreign Secretaries talks, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan had insisted that the pullback of troops should be the beginning of an exercise in confidence building and it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to inspire any confidence if the troops did not get back to their peacetime locations.⁷⁴

The Pakistani team initially focussed on India's Third Army Corps of three divisions formerly stationed in India's far-east, but now positioned in Pathankot opposite Pakistan's northern border. India argued that the Corps were widely spread out in Punjab and Kashmir and was there only to control the separatists violence and thus refused to withdraw them. Some officials pointed out that withdrawal of the Third Corps from the Kashmir and Punjab belt was a sensitive issue for India because withdrawing them might send a wrong signal to the militants encouraging them to step up their resistance.⁷⁵ Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey, however, assured Pakistan that India did not have any aggressive intentions towards Pakistan and there was no threat of war.⁷⁶

There was no progress on this issue since Dubey maintained that the militants' infiltration which had led to the then level of troops deployment, had not changed.⁷⁷ The two sides developed a better understanding on this issue in the third round of the Foreign Secretaries talks held in Islamabad in December 1990. They were now considering the proposal to map out certain thinning out zones for the two armies facing each other on the borders.⁷⁸ But while Pakistan sought a complete withdrawal of the forces to the peacetime locations, Dubey pointed out that the suggestion could not be met fully because of the problems in Punjab and J&K. He, however, repeated his assurances that the Indian forces were not aimed at Pakistan.⁷⁹

4 Other Confidence Building Measures

India and Pakistan have also signed a Confidence Building Measure on non-violation of each other's

⁷⁴ *Pakistan Times*, 21 July 1990; *Nation*, 22 July 1990.

⁷⁵ *Nation*, 19 July 1990.

⁷⁶ *Frontier Post*, 21 July 1990.

⁷⁷ *Nation*, 9 August 1990.

⁷⁸ In an interview with a senior Indian Foreign Office official with the present author in January 1992.

⁷⁹ *Dawn*, 21 December 1990.

air space and sea waters by the military aircraft. In the fifth round of Foreign Secretary talks in October 1991, they also agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on chemical weapons based on an agreement to ban the development, production, deployment and use of chemical weapons. Both would agree not to acquire any chemical weapons and that if either or both have any they would be destroyed.⁸⁰ They agreed to convene a meeting of the two countries' experts for an exchange of views in this respect. Subsequently, in August 1992 the Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit and his Pakistani counterpart Shahrayar Khan signed an agreement on banning the use of chemical weapons.⁸¹

A number of other military Confidence Building Measures have also been put forward and are under consideration by the two countries. One such measure pertains to the question of the limitation of military exercises by area. It has a number of variations, for instance, no exercises close to the borders, no exercises above a certain size anywhere and only limited exercises within border zones. In the Indo-Pak context, the removal of the major exercises from the sensitive border areas would certainly do a lot to lessen the fear of a surprise attack from troops deployed under the guise of a military exercise, a fear expressed by Pakistan at the time of the Brasstacks exercise. Having learned from this experience, the Pakistan army had chosen an area for its military exercise Zarb-i-Momin, about 200-250 kms away from the Indo-Pak borders.

India and Pakistan may also consider giving a formal shape to their present tacit understanding for inviting the observers from the other country to their military exercises. Some Pakistanis have even suggested establishing a joint military commission to discuss limits on peace time troop deployments and other Confidence Building Measures in order to reduce or eliminate the possibility of surprise attack and to limit potentially provocative deployments in certain zones.

5 Conclusion

On the whole India and Pakistan have made considerable progress in the field of military Confidence Building Measures. Both recognize that a war can not bring the solution on Kashmir any nearer and, thus, the idea behind such a confidence building process is to seek to arrive at certain specific measures to defuse the tension on the border and lessen, if not eliminate the danger of a full-scale war between them. Often, however, their somewhat characteristic suspicion of each other's proposals and a tendency to view it as a propaganda

⁸⁰ The Hindu, 8 November 1991.

⁸¹ Keatings Record of World Events, vol. 38, no. 7&8. p. 39054.

ploy or a public relations exercise does get the better of them. For instance the Indian package of civil and military Confidence Building Measures put forward in June 1990 were dismissed by some sections of the Pakistani intelligentsia as "an exercise in public-relating"⁸² or as a "rehash of what India and Pakistan have been talking during the past nine years".⁸³ Maleeha Lodhi wrote

since these moves are carefully timed to coincide with the start of the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Washington, this raises the question of whether they are essentially an exercise in public-relating or a genuine effort to de-escalate the tensions. Are they, in other words, real or simply a ruse ?⁸⁴

In a similar vein, on the eve of the Indian military delegation's visit to Islamabad to discuss various Confidence Building Measures, the Pakistani press gave the impression that Indian troops had taken a thrashing in Siachin and the military delegation was coming to Islamabad on a humble mission of peace.

Menon writes that

a rather excessive emphasis on the Siachin issue, coupled with the suggestion that Indian troops had got the worst of exchanges in the area and all along the LOC, tended to fuel Indian suspicion that Pakistani intentions were not altogether above board. It was felt that the issues which could not be taken up at the present stage were being pushed into prominence in such a way as to make it impossible for the Indian team to sit honourably across the table. An attempt seemed to be underway to make India refuse to attend the talks so that it could be projected in the international arena as obdurate.⁸⁵

In both these instances, however, wisdom had prevailed upon both sides. While Pakistan did not reject the Indian confidence building proposals outright in June 1990, the Indian military delegation too did not cancel or postpone its visit to Islamabad and also recorded good progress on various Confidence Building Measures particularly in the realm of institutionalizing the military links between the two countries.

To sum up, India and Pakistan have agreed on several Confidence Building Measures such as advance notification of military exercises, military manoeuvres and troop deployments, non-violation of the air space by the military aircraft and banning the use of the chemical weapons. More significantly, the two countries' military establishments are maintaining regular contacts from the top level of the Directors-General-of-Military-Operations and Chiefs of all three services - army, air force and navy - to the local commanders level. This assumes a special significance in the case of India and Pakistan where even minor

⁸² Maleeha Lodhi, "Delhi's Latest Move: Ruse or Real", *The News*, 5 June 1990.

⁸³ Arif Nizami, "Pakistan Seeks Clarification About the Indian Proposals", *Nation*, 6 June 1990.

⁸⁴ Lodhi, "Delhi's Latest Move", *op.cit.*.

⁸⁵ Menon, *op.cit.*.

incidents like that of civilians crossing the Line-of-Control in Kashmir has the potential of escalating into major border clashes between the two armies. Further, past experience shows that the hotline between the DGMOs of the two countries has served as an excellent mechanism for both sides to explain potentially worrisome military activities. It has also helped tremendously in de-escalating a number of crisis-like situations and defusing the tensions on the border. Moreover the military officials in both India and Pakistan reiterated that military Confidence Building Measures like prior notification of military exercises, 'hotline' between the DGMOs, frequent contacts at the military commanders level and flag meetings have all been "working very well".⁸⁶

⁸⁶ This assessment is based on the present author's interviews with a number of Indian and Pakistani army generals, Foreign Office officials and scholars in Winter 1991-1992.

CHAPTER X: SIACHIN GLACIER DISPUTE

Siachin glacier became another issue of contention in India-Pakistan relations from the mid 1980's. Both sides claim the Siachin glacier and continue to fight to secure or retain its control at a great cost to their respective national exchequers. This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the Siachin glacier dispute and discusses India and Pakistan's confidence building efforts to resolve the same. It shall also throw light on the difficulties in their bilateral confidence building process because despite their serious efforts to resolve this issue and having come close to reaching an agreement, they have nevertheless failed to achieve this objective.

We begin by examining India and Pakistan's claims on the Siachin glacier before considering the domestic, political, strategic and territorial significance of this area for the both countries. This is followed by a discussion on the nature and genesis of the dispute. Finally, it examines the bilateral efforts undertaken by the two countries to resolve this dispute and makes an attempt to understand and analyse the causes of its failure.

1 Siachin Glacier: Basic Facts

Siachin glacier, the second largest in Asia, is about 74 km long and located at the altitude of 20,000 feet where the minimum temperature often slumps to below -40 c. The dispute over Siachin stems from the fact that no demarcation of Kashmir's north-eastern most reaches was ever made. The original cease-fire line (CFL) agreed to by India and Pakistan in July 1949 Karachi agreement is a rough arc running 800 kms north and then north-eastward to a point NJ 9842, 20 kms north of the Shyok river at the foot of the Saltoro range.

Since neither side had ever employed any troops in the territory north of the grid point NJ 9842, it was considered to be an unaccessible no-man's land and no attempt was made to delineate the CFL as far as the Chinese border.¹ Beyond the delineated grid point, the Karachi agreement said that the line continues "thence northwards to the glaciers".² Siachin glacier lies well east of that line. Subsequently the Tashkent Agreement only reaffirmed the CFL without attempting to extend it. When the cease-fire line was changed into a mutually accepted Line of Control in October 1972 after the Simla Agreement, the wording used to describe the north-easternmost extremity of that line was left as vague as ever. From Chorbitla in the Turtok sector, it said "the line of control runs north eastward to Thang (inclusive India) thence eastward joining the glaciers".³ Since neither side at that time attributed any economic or military value to the area, perhaps no one thought that this would later become a contentious issue.

¹ Robert G. Wirsing, "The Siachin Glacier Dispute-I: The Territorial Dimension", *Strategic Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2, Winter 1988, p. 51.

² *ibid.*

³ A.G. Noorani, "Fire on the Mountains", *Illustrated Weekly of India*, 30 June 1985, pp. 40-41.

Only a decade later, for both India and Pakistan these perceptions had undergone a fundamental change on all accounts. Before studying the nature of this dispute, let us first run over the grounds for India and Pakistan's territorial claims over the Siachin glacier.

2 Indian Claims on the Siachin Glacier

Wirsing sums up the Indian claims for Siachin glacier as being:⁴

(a) by virtue of the act of accession in 1947, all of Jammu and Kashmir including the Northern Areas is an integral part of India;

(b) the Siachin glacier lies outside the formally agreed Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir state, hence outside the territory falling under Pakistan's administrative control by terms of the 1972 Simla Agreement. Neither the formally agreed wording of the 1949 and 1972 agreements nor any informal interpretations of those agreements made subsequent to them warrants the arbitrary extension of the Line of Control by any one party to those agreements in any direction. (c) Pakistan's claim to permanent administrative control of Siachin area since independence is without any foundation in reality. Pakistan's sponsorship of the foreign expeditions to the area since 1974 was a deliberate tactic involving promotional advertisements, eased application procedures and waiver of royalties on some peaks to gain international acceptance of its administrative authority of that area and hence of its unilateral and arbitrary extension of the Line of Control. This policy was described as one of "cartographic aggression".⁵ India therefore, has a right to use force to defend itself against Pakistan's efforts to annex that territory by resort to spurious claims of customary practice.

(d) Pakistan's reluctance to make an open official acknowledgement of its unilateral extension of the Line of Control is tacit admission of its illegality.

(e) Since the line beyond NJ 9842 remains unmarked and in the absence of any other basis, a fair and just approach is to go by the international norms of high crests parting the watersheds. The continuation of the CFL (already on a northerly heading when it reaches point NJ9842) further would take it to the high crests marking a watershed of the Nubra and Shyok river systems, that is along the Saltoro range. If the line is to extend north to glaciers, (and not to any particular glacier as is generally assumed), then there are two main groups of glaciers - the Siachin glacier system and Baltoro glacier system separated by the crests of the

⁴ Wirsing, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-60.

⁵ In an interview with a senior Indian army general with the present author in December 1991. Sarkar writes that the Siachin conflict began when India became aware towards the end of 1983, that Pakistan intended to support a big international mountaineering expedition into the Siachin area in 1984 and was preparing to man permanent outposts through out the winter of 1983-84 to ensure non-interference by the Indians. Joydeep Sarkar, "Who is on Thin Ice ?", *The Telegraph*, 23 June 1985. Kuldip Nayar also writes that New Delhi first became suspicious in 1983 when an American map showed the Siachin glacier and places like Lyogme, Lagonma as a part of Pakistan. Kuldip Nayar, "Pakistan's No to Joint Survey", *The Tribune*, 15 December 1985. Also see Lt. General M.L. Chibber, PVSM, AVSM (retd), "Siachin :The Untold Story (A Personal Account)", *Indian Defence Review Digest*, vol. 3, 1989, pp. 89-90; Manoj Joshi, "Blood On Throne Room of Gods", *Frontline*, 20 April-3 May 1985, p. 81.

Saltoro range. An extension of the old CFL, therefore, can only be along the Saltoro ridge.⁶

(f) In accord with the Simla Agreement, the question of the administrative control of the Siachin area must be settled bilaterally through negotiations between India and Pakistan.

3 Pakistani Claims to the Siachin Glacier

Pakistan's official territorial claim on the Siachin area can be on the following grounds:⁷

(a) The act of accession in 1947 was illegal, a fact given tacit acknowledgement by India in its formal acceptance of the UN resolutions stipulating the right of self-determination of Kashmiris. An adherence of the state of J&K proper and of the disputed sector of the Northern Areas (Gilgit, Baltistan including the Siachin glaciers) to either India or Pakistan is thus a matter to be settled by internationally supervised plebiscite.

(b) The Siachin glacier lies outside the formally agreed Line of Control in J&K state but it is an integral part of Pakistan's Northern Areas and is situated in an area over which Pakistan has asserted continuous administrative control since independence. There is abundant evidence to that effect. The international mountaineering expeditions seek Pakistani permission routinely to enter the Siachin area⁸ and prestigious international atlases virtually all concede the area to Pakistan.⁹ Until recently even India acquiesced to Pakistan's claim.

(c) The formally agreed wording in regard to the northern terminus of the Line of Control in the 1949 and 1972 agreements is ambiguous but Pakistan's long-established and widely recognized administrative control over the area argues for an extension of the Line of Control running in a north-easterly direction to the vicinity of the Karakorum pass. The logic of Pakistan's position in this regard is reinforced by the fact that the Karakorum pass was also the terminus point of the boundary delimitation agreed between Pakistan and China in 1963.¹⁰

⁶ Jasjit Singh, "Siachin Glaciers: Facts and Fiction", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12, no. 7, October 1989, pp. 703-704.

⁷ Wirsing, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-61.

⁸ The ex-Vice Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan General K.M. Arif cites six expeditions between 1957 and 1961 to support the argument. He points out that Pakistan had been permitting foreign mountaineering expeditions to visit the Siachin area until the early 1980's. See, General K.M. Arif (ret'd), "Siachin: A Glacier on Fire-II", *Dawn*, 22 May 1989. Hussain reported that there were 20 Pakistan authorized foreign trekking and climbing expeditions mainly from Japan and Western Europe to the Siachin area between 1974 and 1981. Shabbir Hussain, "Siachin Glacier: Fact and Fiction", *Pakistan Times*, 6 September 1985.

⁹ See, *National Geographic Society-Atlas of the World*, fifth edition, Washington DC: National Geographic Society, 1981, pp. 184-185; Joseph E. Schwartzberger, ed., *A Historical Atlas of South Asia*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 87-88; and *The Times Atlas of the World*, sixth edition, London: Times Books, 1980, plate 31. They show the CFL and LOC extending beyond map grid point NJ 9842 in a clear north easterly direction right up to the Karakorum pass on the Chinese border. Also see, General Arif, *ibid.*. One may note that the Times Atlas of 1967 edition had showed an extension of the CFL line along the Saltoro bridge which favors Indian position. Wirsing points out that this had never been done even in Pakistan's own maps. Wirsing, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

¹⁰ General Arif argues that Indian protest notes on the signing of Sino-Pak border agreement establish the fact that the terminus on the Sino-Pak border was at the Karakorum pass and also shows that the area between the CFL terminus NJ 9842 up to the Karakorum pass had always remained under the de facto control of Pakistan. See, General Arif, "Siachin", *op.cit.*. India, however, points out that the Sino-Pak agreement in itself was rejected by Nehru on the grounds that Pakistan had no right to barter away the territory belonging to India. And even the joint declaration issued after the Sino-Pak agreement had conceded its provisional status pending Pakistan's final settlement of Kashmir dispute with India.

(d) Indian military intrusion into the Siachin area in 1984 was in flagrant violation of the 1949 agreement and 1972 Simla Agreement requiring the two sides to refrain from the use of force in bilateral relations.

(e) In accord with the Simla Agreement of 1972, India and Pakistan should negotiate a force withdrawal from the Siachin area. Pakistan's administrative control over the area should be respected.

Having examined all the relevant facts regarding the territorial claims of both India and Pakistan over the Siachin glacier, one point stands out clearly that both sides admit that the area beyond the point NJ 9842, where Siachin is located has never been clearly demarcated and there were no military troops in Siachin in 1972. Therefore, notwithstanding their differing interpretation of the 1949 agreement in a way most advantageous to their own position, each side's territorial claims to that area remains open to question. Before studying the genesis of the dispute over Siachin in the early 1980's, let us briefly examine the strategic and domestic political significance of that area for India and Pakistan.

4 Significance: Strategic and Domestic

Geo-strategically, the Siachin area is virtually the roof of Eurasia and is surrounded by Azad Kashmir, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, China and Tibet. To the west of this region lie the towns of Gilgit and Skardu of Azad Kashmir and to its east is Aksai Chin which is the Chinese occupied area of Ladakh. The Siachin area is thus virtually the wedge which keeps Pakistan and China apart.¹¹ Owing to India's adversarial perceptions *vis-à-vis* Pakistan and China, they also have strong military links.¹² One may also take note of China's close collaboration with Pakistan in the construction of a network of strategic highways (particularly the 800 kms long Karakorum Highway) linking Pakistan's Northern Areas with China's Xinjiang province.¹³ New Delhi is concerned about the road's long-run strategic significance, in particular its potential as a conduit for the movement of military equipment or personnel between Pakistan and China.¹⁴ Taking a worst case analysis of the situation, some defence analysts in India have expressed fears that the two can weld together a strategic noose around Indian Ladakh. So, in order to keep China and Pakistan apart, India must hold on to the Siachin area.

Pakistan on the other hand, suspects a collusion between India's occupation of Siachin in 1984 and the Soviet annexation of Afghanistan's Wakhan corridor, the buffer territory that separates the Soviet Union

¹¹ Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 89.

¹² O.P. Sabherwal, "Siachin: Snow-bound Frontier", *Mainstream*, 22 June 1985; Yusuf Jameel, "India Ready Even for Sino-Pak Offensive", *The Telegraph*, 23 June 1985; Shekhar Gupta, "Gunfire on The Glacier", *India Today*, 31 July 1985, pp. 132-135; S. Vohra, "Siachin: Strategic Location", *Mainstream*, 28 November 1987; Jasjit Singh, "Siachin: The Himalayan Battlefield", *Hindustan Times*, 18 October 1987.

¹³ Wirsing also hints at the speculation that Beijing and Islamabad had signed a secret agreement in 1987 to begin planning a new strategic highway running parallel to the Siachin glaciers and Mount K-2 on the Chinese side of the border and connecting up with the Karakorum highway within Pakistani territory. The proposed road would have improved the ground transport link between the Karakorum highway and Aksai-Chin. Wirsing, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 44.

from Pakistan in 1980.¹⁵ The distance between the eastern most edge of the Wakhan and the western most edge of the glacier is about 250 kms. But from Wakhan to the nearest point on the strategically vital Karakorum highway is hardly 33 kms. Therefore taking a worst case analysis again, some Pakistanis perceived Indian moves into Siachin and the Soviets into Wakhan corridor as being meant "to pave the way towards a future cutting off of Pakistan's strategic lifeline to China".¹⁶ However General Arif tends to disregard such a possibility. He points out that the Karakorum highway is nearly 120 kms away from the Siachin glacier area and considering the extremely rugged and difficult nature of the intervening terrain, the existing low grade communication infrastructure in the region and other operational realities, such an objective is currently beyond India's military capability.¹⁷ Pakistan's other military generals have also tried to detract from Siachin's strategic importance. General Zia had once said about Siachin that "not a blade of grass grows there" implying it had little value.¹⁸ Later when General Beg was asked whether by occupying Siachin, India enjoyed a strategic advantage over Pakistan, he replied

I wish India continues to be there for this so-called advantage. They have no strategic advantage. They have only political advantage, in the sense that they deny us the advantage of a common border about 70 kms that we have with China. Any effort, any military adventure by them deeper into that area will be a folly This is not the area where we can win battles.¹⁹

In the domestic realm, however, Siachin had been a political problem for Pakistan's military regime in the sense that it pointed the finger at the Pakistan army's weakness and incompetence and its lack of commitment to the defence of the country's existing boundaries.²⁰ To that end during Zia's regime, was a *cause célèbre* with the opposition, which lost no opportunity to use the issue to embarrass the government. When the problem first arose, Benazir Bhutto charged the government with a cover up of what she insisted had been a military setback. This was also a recurring theme of her public statements on her return to Pakistan in 1986.²¹ Wirsing argues that India's decision to take military action in the vicinity of Siachin glacier at a time when both Punjab and J&K were amidst serious domestic political turmoil compels one to consider the

¹⁵ *ibid.* Wirsing writes that both Moscow and Kabul refuse to acknowledge the Soviet annexation of the Wakhan corridor, which occurred de facto in May 1980 and was confirmed by a secret treaty in June 1981. Also see, Rosanne Kless, "Afghanistan: The Accords", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 66, no.5, Summer 1988, p. 938.

¹⁶ Robert G. Wirsing, "The Siachin Glacier Dispute-III: The Strategic Dimension", *Strategic Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, Autumn 1988, p. 47. For Pakistani views on the strategic significance of Siachin, see, Brig (ret'd) M. Shafi Khan, "Siachin: The Indian Designs", *Nation*, 25 December 1987; Zulfikar Ali Khan, "Geo-politics of Siachin Glacier", *Asian Defence Journal*, November 1985, pp. 49-50.

¹⁷ General Arif, "Siachin", *op.cit.*

¹⁸ Maleeha Lodhi, "Siachin: Who Backed out of the Deal?", *The News*, 6 July 1991.

¹⁹ See, excerpts from General Beg's Press Briefing on 13 September 1989, in *Defence Journal*, no. 6-7, 1991, p. 44.

²⁰ Robert G. Wirsing, "Siachin Glacier Dispute-II: The Domestic Political Dimension", *Strategic Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3, Spring 1988, p. 94.

²¹ M.H. Askari, "Can Defence Secretaries Unfreeze Siachin", *Dawn*, 18 November 1987; Also, "Pakistan's Adventurism", *Times of India*, 29 January 1985.

possibility that the action was intended at least in part as a warning to Pakistan not to meddle in India's internal affairs. By exposing Pakistan's own vulnerability in this area, he adds, New Delhi may have hoped to lessen its own in Punjab and J&K.²²

5 The Dispute: Genesis and Development

As we pointed out earlier, both India and Pakistan agree that there was no military presence in the Siachin area at the time of Simla Agreement in 1972. In the mid-1970's, Pakistan opened up the area to the mountaineers, allowing international expeditions to visit the peaks of the glacier's north and south. Pakistan's presence in that area came to India's notice for the first time in 1978 through an international mountaineering map which had extended the area beyond NJ 9842 in a straight line to the north-east to join the Indo-Chinese border at the Karakorum pass, thus, showing all the area west of that line including the Siachin glaciers under Pakistan's control.²³

India sent its first operational reconnaissance patrol to Siachin in 1978. Between 1981 and 1983, military personnel of both India and Pakistan had been patrolling the Siachin area and also noticed each other's presence there, although there were no clashes between the two.²⁴ On the Pakistani side, the then Chief of Army Staff, General Beg said that it was in 1982 that they came to know about Indian movements in Siachin as a part of an expedition through Siachin to Indira Koli and it was the same year in January 1982 that they asked the local corps commander to send the troops in that area on a probing mission.²⁵ One may take note of the Pakistani argument here that although it had always had administrative control over that area, it had established no permanent post there because of the harsh climatic conditions.²⁶

It was in 1983 that Pakistan for the first time projected its claim to all the area north-west of the line joining the terminus point of the Line of Control at NJ 9842 with the Karakorum pass. This became evident from the wording of the protest note sent by Pakistan's Northern Sector Command on 21 August 1983, to its counterpart in India.²⁷ This, Chibber states, was followed by another protest note on 29 August 1983 which

²² Wirsing, 'Siachin-II', *op.cit.*, p. 94.

²³ Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 89

²⁴ On the Indian side, Lt. General Chibber, the GOC-in-C, Northern Command, who had carried out the Indian operation in Siachin, discloses that two strong army patrols had visited Siachin between June and September 1983, who like the earlier team detected a lot of air activity by the Pakistani side. He adds that these two patrols met no Pakistani troops or any Pakistan-based expedition. However Pakistani helicopters did fly over and buzzed Indian patrols on these occasions. *ibid.*, p. 92.

²⁵ General Beg's press briefing, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

²⁶ Maleeha Lodhi, "Siachin: A Chilly History", *The News*, 6 July 1991.

²⁷ It read: "Instruct your troops to withdraw beyond Line of Control south of line joining point NJ 9842, Karakorum pass ne 7410 immediately.... any delay in vacating *our territory* will create a serious situation". (italics added). Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

clearly spelt out Pakistan's claim to that area.²⁸ For India this was the first indication of Pakistan's unilateral extension of the Line of Control which it refused to accept. By 1983, it became obvious that the Pakistani side was getting ready physically to come into the Siachin glacier area. Chibber cites intelligence reports that a column of about two companies supported by mortars was on the move in September/October 1983 to occupy passes on the Salto range.²⁹ Perhaps due to bad weather and possibly inadequate logistic support, the column could not reach its objective. But the intention of the Pakistani side across the Line of Control was quite clear in that they were "determined" to support some "unilateral cartographic claim by physical occupation of that area".³⁰ Pakistani resolve and movements were confirmed by General Beg. To quote him,

In 1983, GHQ decided to send a Special Service Group team into the Siachin glacier. A SSG company was moved in August 1983. This company crossed the Sia la and went into Siachin and as they moved east they reached the glacier ... and spotted some troops camped ... [which were] Ladakh scouts. We told them to move forward and eliminate them [but they] bolted ... [and] left the place without making contact with our troops. Our troops remained there till 10 September and when the weather started worsening, we told them to fall back.³¹

Zulfikar Ali Khan also states that "to protect what it regards as its territory and prevent violation by Indian troops, Pakistan decided to establish a permanent picket at Siachin".³² To pre-empt the move, the Indians air-lifted a Kumaon battalion by helicopters.

One may safely argue, therefore, that by end of 1983, both India and Pakistan had taken the political decision to occupy the Siachin area militarily and were making full preparations to that end. General Beg acknowledges that in 1983, "we carried out the planning and put up a proposal to the government to move into that area next year".³³ It may be noted that the government General Beg was referring to was the military regime itself which was in power at that time. On the Indian side, too, the government is believed to have asked the army to prevent the occupation of Siachin by Pakistani troops. Chibber argues that the strategic importance of that area was not a major consideration nor was the purpose to capture any territory but it was

²⁸ This note said, " your troops have carried out intrusion across LOC, north of Point NJ 98042 - Karakorum pass - ne 7410. They intruded approximately 25 miles inside our territory in Siachin glacier NJ 9797 Nk 0689 ... Last year also your troops had intruded into the same area ... therefore please instruct your troops to remain south of the line - Point NJ 9842 - Karakorum pass ne 7410". As quoted by Chibber, *ibid.*, p. 93.

²⁹ From Azad Kashmir, Siachin can be reached only by crossing the Salto range which is an offshoot of the Karakorum range. And the two main passes are Sia la and Bilafond la.

³⁰ Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 93. He adds that this assessment was reinforced by further intelligence reports that the Pakistani army was trying to procure large quantities of special snow and ski equipment from the UK and Europe to be available to the troops by January 1984. They also launched an intensive training programme for a force named 'Burzil force' to occupy the Siachin glacier.

³¹ General Beg's press briefing, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

³² Zulfikar A. Khan, "Geo-Politics of Siachin Glacier", *Asian Defence Journal*, November 1985, p. 48.

³³ General Beg's press briefing, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

simply to ensure that India was not presented with a *fait accompli* like that in Aksai-Chin in the early 1950's.³⁴

The Indian army realized that at such a high altitude of the Siachin glacier, anyone who was holding reasonably well-prepared defensive positions could not be dislodged and that was possible only if they could achieve complete surprise. Therefore, in an *Operation Meghdoot* launched on 13 April 1984 at least two months before the regular mountaineering season in Siachin, two platoons were airlifted each at Sia la and Bilafond la. Meanwhile the Pakistani side was also getting ready to launch the 'Burzil force' in *Operation Abadeel* to enter the Siachin glacier and first reached Bilafond la on 24 April 1984 but late, by only twelve days. The first shots were fired on 25 April 1984 and with that the Siachin conflict had set in.³⁵

It is important to note that Indian and not Pakistani forces moved in Siachin first only because of better military calculations on their part. This is admitted by General Beg himself

we all thought that in the period between the month of December and April nobody could stay in Siachin because of extreme weather this was a *wrong judgement* on which we based our plan and presented it to the DCC.³⁶

The Pakistani side also mentioned a number of other Indian advantages such as India's better experience in mountain warfare because of the 1962 war with China and training in Antarctica, its ten fully equipped mountain divisions, its possession of Lama helicopters which lifted their troops and positioned them on those heights and finally that India has had a long established fully operative airfield at Leh, the capital of Ladakh, and a well-stocked supply base at the road terminal of Dzingrulma, not too far from the scene of operations.³⁷ This is an important point because ever since the Siachin dispute flared up in 1984, the Pakistani position has been that the Indians violated the Simla Agreement by sneaking into and militarily occupying an area that had been undemarcated. Benazir Bhutto had accused that Siachin was the first and only violation of the Simla Agreement. General Arif went further and said that

the Indian occupation of the Siachin area could give a fatal blow to the Simla Agreement ... If India wishes it to sustain and flourish, she has to vacate her aggression. Otherwise Pakistan could be justified in concluding that its provisions are no longer binding on her as well.³⁸

³⁴ Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 93. Also see, Lt. General M.L. Chibber, "Siachin Solution Will Help India and Pakistan", *Times of India*, 13 July 1988.

³⁵ For varying accounts of the origin and development of the dispute, see, Joydeep Sarkar, *op.cit.*; "The Meghdoot Operation", *The Hindu*, 29 October 1985; Shekhar Gupta, "Mountain Marauders", *India Today*, 30 September 1984, p. 140; Z.A. Khan, *op.cit.*.

³⁶ (italics added). General Beg's press briefing, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

³⁷ *ibid.*.

³⁸ General Arif, "Siachin", *op.cit.*. Also see, Maleeha Lodhi, "Icy Impasse on Siachin", *Muslim*, 2 September 1989.

Our analysis however shows that there is clear evidence of Pakistani intentions to occupy the glacier militarily. To that extent, some in India argue that its breach of Simla Agreement was only a technical violation.³⁹

Ever since 1984, fighting has continued intermittently. In the same year in June, August and October, Pakistan made determined bids to capture the passes but failed to achieve its objective.⁴⁰ Major hostilities broke out in February 1985 and later in September-October 1987⁴¹ although intermittent fighting continued throughout. Both sides presented varying accounts of the then current position. Pakistan argued that India had not won any territory beyond what she occupied when she first went in. Pakistan had bottled the Indians within the Siachin *cul de sac*, the only way they could get out was by backtracking into Ladakh. The Pakistani army had sealed off all avenues of advance. Moreover, among the five passes on the Saltoro range, India controlled two, Bilafond la and Sia la but Pakistan controlled the other three southern passes, Gyong la, Yarma la, Chulung la, the last two being very important because their location was only 20 kms away from the Indian road of Dzingrulma which enabled them to threaten Indian supplies to her Siachin glacier garrisons.⁴² General Beg also argued that the situation was very much in their favour in terms of logistics and monetary expenditure.

India on the other hand, maintained consistently that the Indian army was holding demanding positions on the Saltoro range and over years had repulsed successfully any Pakistani attempts to capture that area. The Indian army presence over Siachin glacier consisted of almost two battalions stretched over a length of almost 80 kms of the Saltoro range.⁴³ Moreover, in June 1987, sixty volunteers from the battalion of 8th J&K Light Infantry had captured the Qaid post which was re-named as Beg Bana post after Subedar Bana Singh who had led the attack.⁴⁴ Overall India controlled almost two-thirds of the Siachin glacier area. This was substantiated by the fact that in 1988 when India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their forces and

³⁹ *The Hindu*, 13 February 1989.

⁴⁰ P.M. Pasricha, "Relations With Pakistan", in Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1984-85*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1987, p. 108. Chibber writes that having observed that the proven routes to Siachin glacier via Bilafond la and Sia la were blocked, a number of Pakistani task forces including Hyder force, Babar force, Shahbaz force, Asghar force, Hafeez force, Kalandar force, Sher force and Rashid force were spread out all along the Saltoro range. Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

⁴¹ *The Hindu*, 1 October 1987; *Nation*, 7 October 1987; *Indian Express*, 9 October 1987.

⁴² M.A. Niazi, "Siachin; Situation in Pakistan's Favour", *Pakistan Times*, 2 March 1989.

⁴³ *Yearbook 1984-85, op.cit.*, p. 26; and Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1987-88*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1989, p. 91; Chibber, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

⁴⁴ For the details of this operation, see, Kapil Kaul, "The Cold War in Siachin", *The Tribune*, 21 November 1988.

re-deploy them, it amounted basically to a total Indian withdrawal, since it controlled almost the entire area. Some Pakistani reports too supported this position.⁴⁵ Having examined the genesis and the nature of this conflict, we need to now consider the bilateral attempts made by India and Pakistan for resolving this dispute.

6 Bilateral Negotiations

India and Pakistan have made a number of efforts to resolve the problem through bilateral negotiations. A succession of flag meetings between the local Indian and Pakistani commanders in 1984 and 1985 proved abortive.⁴⁶ And it was at the summit meeting between Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi in December 1985 at Delhi, that a decision was taken to make a determined diplomatic bid to resolve the Siachin conflict. This reflected a desire on both sides to find a way out of a costly war fought in some of the most treacherous climatic conditions in the world. They agreed that the Defence Secretaries of the two countries would discuss the problem to find a settlement.

On 16-21 January 1986 and later in June that year, high level delegations led by the Defence Secretaries of the two countries met first in Islamabad and then in New Delhi to explore avenues for a peaceful resolution of the Siachin dispute. The content of these discussions was never made public, but as General Arif puts it, the two "invariably agreed to disagree with each other".⁴⁷ Pakistan insisted that the military forces deployed in the Siachin glacier should first be withdrawn to the positions held by India and Pakistan at the time of the Simla Agreement, in other words, no military presence should remain there. Thereafter steps can be taken to demarcate the Line of Control up to the Chinese border as envisaged in the Karachi Agreement of 1949. However since it would mean in effect an Indian withdrawal, India proposed a cease-fire on the present line to be followed by the demarcation of the boundary. Pakistan argued that the *status quo* was not acceptable because it implies "perpetuation of a wilful and unlawful act".⁴⁸ The Indian delegation however felt that unless the two sides recorded the positions on the ground at the glacier, there was little to prevent the other side from making unverifiable claims later when the question of defining a mutually acceptable Line of Control in the area came up. The talks had reached an impasse.

This was broken after a lapse of almost two years, in the third round of negotiations between the

⁴⁵ Salim Bokhari, "Situation in Siachin-I", *Muslim*, 28 January 1986; and A.J. Singh, "From Glacier to Wasteland", *The News*, 27 September 1991.

⁴⁶ Kuldip Nayar reported in December 1985 that Pakistan had turned down a proposal supposedly drafted by the Indian and Pakistani field commanders to conduct a joint survey of the glacier to find out which side was the aggressor. Nayar, *op.cit.*

⁴⁷ General Arif, "Siachin", *op.cit.*

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

Indian and Pakistani Defence Secretaries in Islamabad on 19-20 May 1988. While the joint statement issued at the conclusion of this session, noted only their acceptance of the need to pursue a negotiated settlement, they agreed to meet again in New Delhi later that year. It may be noted that the steps taken had the blessings of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who had in fact pushed sceptical officials to sit down with their Pakistani counterparts and work out an agreement on these contentious issues.⁴⁹ There were some indications that the hardline positions that had characterized the earlier discussions had been abandoned and that Pakistan, in particular, had come around to the Indian view that the latter's withdrawal from the military positions currently held in the glacier should not be a pre-condition to any further talks. The talks continued in September 1988 but without making any more headway.⁵⁰

6.1 The 1989 Agreement

The breakthrough in the Siachin negotiations came in June 1989 when there was a new upswing in the India-Pakistan relations in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's advent to power. It was in the fifth round of talks in June 1989 that the two sides achieved substantive progress in resolving their differences and arriving at an understanding on this issue. This reflected the impetus that both Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi wished their respective negotiators to impart to their talks. A Pakistani diplomat was quoted as saying,

it is a tremendous breakthrough Once the politicians signal that it would not be a flashpoint; the rest can be a protracted process. We have removed one of the major issues of recent times.⁵¹

The agreement also seemed to be prompted by certain realistic considerations of a non-political nature. Both countries realized that continued clashes in Siachin would prove counter-productive in the face of logistical realities. More casualties have been claimed on both sides by the inhospitable terrain and weather than by actual combat. As one Defence Secretary put it,

we both realize that in a war between the two countries, it would take only a few minutes for soldiers on either side of Siachin glacier to be wiped out with neither side winning or losing. The ultimate winner will be biting cold at mountain tops and extreme hardships involved in scaling them.⁵²

⁴⁹ The Hindu, 23 May 1988.

⁵⁰ The Hindu, 22 September 1988.

⁵¹ International Herald Tribune, 21 June 1989.

⁵² As quoted by S. Wiswam, "Relations with India", *World Focus*, no. 115, July 1989, pp. 27-28. Also see, "Frostbite Claims More Lives Than Combat", *Muslim*, 28 January 1986; N.V. Subramanian, "Cold Facts", *Sunday*, 28 April 1991.

The joint statement at the end of Foreign Secretaries' talks stated

there was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement based on re-deployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachin area. The army authorities of both sides will determine these positions.⁵³

It is significant to note, as Manoj Joshi points out, that terms such as "re-deployment", "avoidance of the use of force", "Simla Agreement" and "durable peace" have been used, instead of "withdrawal", "cease-fire", or "extension of the Line of Control".⁵⁴ This somewhat vague language of the joint statement was perhaps forced by the political exigencies on both sides. Islamabad perceived it as a gesture towards Delhi, for making it easier for Rajiv Gandhi to sell the agreement to his military and to the Indian public in an election year.⁵⁵ The expression re-deployment of forces was, for example, politically more palatable to Delhi than withdrawal. New Delhi, on the other hand, by agreeing to pull back to the 1972 positions had conceded one very important point of the Pakistani position. However, almost as if it was too good to be true, the very vague nature of the statement led to differing interpretations by India and Pakistan, once again resulting in an impasse.

6.2 Differing Interpretations

The Pakistani position was that the two sides had reached an agreement on three points. First, the two could leave the area beyond NJ 9842 undemarcated as it originally was, leaving it in a 'grey' area. Second, since Pakistan always had a civilian post there, it wanted to maintain that. It was agreed that India can also maintain such a post there. Third, the two agreed to move back their forces to the pre-Simla position.⁵⁶ However the Indian position as disclosed by an highly placed Foreign Office official was that there was never an agreement as such. At the press conference of the two Foreign Secretaries, Mr. Humanyun Khan had pre-empted the move and given an impression as if an agreement had been reached and Mr. S.K. Singh went along with it to keep the good image.⁵⁷ This was reflected in the statements made by the two Foreign Secretaries. In a joint press conference, Khan had said

⁵³ Muslim, 18 June 1989.

⁵⁴ Manoj Joshi, "Siachin: Frosty Still", *Frontline*, 2-15 September 1988.

⁵⁵ Maleeha Lodhi, "Who Backed Out of the Deal?", *The News*, 6 July 1991.

⁵⁶ In an interview conducted in Islamabad in October 1991.

⁵⁷ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in January 1991.

Defence Secretaries meeting on Siachin has led to what I would call a significant advance, in the sense that both sides have committed to an observance of Simla Agreement and the exact location of these positions will be worked out in detail by the military authorities of the two countries.⁵⁸

Mr. S.K. Singh said "I ...endorse everything he [Humayun Khan] has said".⁵⁹ Thus, nuances of differences were visible immediately after the June agreement in Islamabad. Soon after the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries and subsequently in July during his visit to Pakistan, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had ruled out an instant solution to the Siachin issue. He remarked that "a number of steps have to be taken involving the disengagement of the troops and civilian positioning prior to the solution of this issue".⁶⁰ However the two Prime Ministers acknowledged that some progress had been made during the talks they held.

Pakistan had perceived the agreement as a real gain because for the first time Indians had agreed to pull back their forces to where they had been at the time of the Simla Agreement since that, for Pakistanis, meant going back to a situation where Pakistan had administrative control. Therefore Pakistan's answer to Indian question about ground rules for the area during and after the pullout was simply that those existing in 1972 would apply.⁶¹ The Indian side, on the other hand contended that the June agreement was to be implemented as a package meaning that re-deployment to positions conforming to those held at the time of Simla Agreement (which essentially meant demilitarization) had to take place following a clear-cut agreement over the extension of Line of Control northwards from NJ 9842. For Indians, this was the unambiguous meaning of a comprehensive settlement.⁶² The Indian authorities argued that by insisting on focussing only on the issue of withdrawal since India occupied the whole of glacier and its surrounding heights, Pakistan was trying to snatch a diplomatic victory from the jaws of a military defeat.

It is important to note that there is no quarrel over the fact that the agreement stipulated a withdrawal of forces, the differences were over the steps prior to the withdrawal as to whether re-deployment should come first or the determination of future positions and the safeguards against unilateral alteration of the *status*

⁵⁸ For full text of the statement, see, *Nation*, 26 June 1989.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*.

⁶⁰ *Pakistan Times*, 18 July 1989.

⁶¹ Lodhi, "Who Backed Out", *op.cit.*.

⁶² Manoj Joshi, *op.cit.*. Also see, "Agreement on Re-deployment Stands: Says Dixit", *Muslim*, 25 August 1989.

quo by either.⁶³ The Indian side also argued that the notion of boundary it had in mind was not acceptable to Pakistan and India did not want to permit the mountaineering expeditions from the Pakistani side to be sent to the Siachin glacier area. These were the issues on which the talks became deadlocked.

Once it was clear that the talks between the two military delegations would not proceed, India agreed to concede the Pakistani request of first discussing the withdrawal of forces presuming that the final settlement would in any case involve a simultaneously implemented package.⁶⁴ But the second round of talks between the military delegations got bogged down because of varying interpretations of the agreement. The question in dispute was whether the agreement only meant withdrawal which in essence meant an Indian withdrawal or whether it meant a package involving a recording of the Indian and Pakistani positions on mutually exchanged maps and a working out of the extension of Line of Control to be followed by a withdrawal to pre-1972 positions which de facto would demilitarize the glacier.⁶⁵

Pakistan blamed Rajiv Gandhi, who in an election year had succumbed to pressure from his defence and foreign affairs establishment and backtracked.⁶⁶ There were indications that the Indian army had very strong views against making any compromise with Pakistan on Siachin.⁶⁷ This was evident in the remarks made by a senior Indian Army general that

Pakistan tried to grab Siachin militarily and failed... now why should it be given it [Siachin] on the platter...⁶⁸

The Indian side, however, put it down to Benazir Bhutto's difficulties at home with the pro-Zia elements in the army and Nawaz Sharif's government in Punjab.⁶⁹

For the next two years Siachin was discussed at various meetings between defence officials⁷⁰ and in the Foreign Secretary talks⁷¹ but with little success. The deadlock continued for nearly two years until mid-1991. Let us now examine the renewed efforts by India and Pakistan to resolve their differences on this issue.

⁶³ Dilip Mukerji, "Defusing Siachin", *The Economic Times*, 17 July 1991.

⁶⁴ *The Hindu*, 27 June 1989; 23 August 1989.

⁶⁵ *The Hindu*, 18 & 19 August 1989.

⁶⁶ In an interview conducted in Rawalpindi in October 1991. Also see, *Nation*, 1 September 1989.

⁶⁷ Chibber, "Siachin Solution Will Help", *op.cit.*.

⁶⁸ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁶⁹ This assessment is based on present author's interviews conducted in New Delhi in Winter 1991-1992. Also see, T.V. Ramachandaran, "The Glacier's Edge", *Frontier Post*, 17 May 1989.

⁷⁰ *The News*, 25 September 1991; *Muslim*, 26 September 1991.

⁷¹ *Nation*, 11 November 1991.

6.3 Renewed Negotiations

The issue was unfrozen at the Foreign Secretary talks between Mr. Shahrayar Khan and Mr. Muchkund Dubey in the summer 1991. This in itself was perceived as a breakthrough. While the two agreed that both sides must resume negotiations on this issue, they could not agree on whether it should be done at the Defence Secretary level or the military commanders' level. India insisted on opening the talks at the Defence Secretaries' level but Pakistan objected that it would mean re-opening the whole issue and instead the military commanders of the two countries should meet and implement the agreement.

Subsequently, India's new Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit and his Pakistani counterpart Shahrayar Khan held bilateral talks on Siachin, at New Delhi in August 1992. They resolved their differences on this point that the Defence Secretaries would soon meet to implement it and agreed in principle to pull back their troops from Siachin. This agreement on disengagement in Siachin appeared to be a reaffirmation of the one worked out in June 1989, but was never signed, hence not implemented. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan reiterated that "the 1989 accord has never been denied by India or by us. Both sides say that they stand by it. There is no move back from that.... And we are definitely trying moving ahead in trying to implement it".⁷² He said that the Defence Secretaries who were to meet in October, had been given the mandate of working out the details of troop disengagement and that "some elements in the disengagement require mopping up and some loose ends [which] need to be tied".⁷³ For instance, how far would the troops be pulled back and where would the observation posts be located to monitor the demilitarized zone to ensure neither side rushed back in. These observation posts would be civilian and not military. Khan was optimistic that it would not take the Defence Secretaries and their military teams more than one day to work out the details and added "I see no problem of details which will stop us from finalizing in October and demilitarizing almost immediately afterwards".⁷⁴

6 Conclusion

The negotiations on the Siachin issue highlight the difficulties in the confidence building process between India and Pakistan. It shows that even after laborious negotiations to reach an agreement between the two countries, it might still fall through owing to their differing interpretations of the same. Often despite

⁷² Pioneer, 22 August 1992.

⁷³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

sincere intentions and efforts by the two sides, their mutual distrust or domestic compulsions have resulted in scuttling the negotiating process. As Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema put it

Siachin dispute is a classic example of fighting over nothing.... [it is] only a product of distrust... and when the two countries arrived at an agreement in 1989, it became a *victim of domestic politics*.⁷⁵

In a similar vein, a senior official of Pakistan's Foreign Office put it

Siachin dispute is simple madness.... when we meet [foreign secretaries]... we agree that let us get our men back... but still it does not work...⁷⁶

On the brighter side, however, it bears witness to their persistent efforts in finding a solution of this dispute. Both sides realize that in the changed international environment Siachin has lost whatever strategic significance it had for both countries. Besides the fighting in Siachin is costing heavily the national exchequer of both India and Pakistan. Both agree that implementing the 1989 agreement on Siachin would be a vital confidence building measure but a solution continues to prove elusive.

⁷⁵ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

⁷⁶ In an interview conducted in Islamabad in October 1991.

CHAPTER XI: NUCLEAR ISSUE

The scenario of a nuclear war in the subcontinent has become a subject of household discussion on both sides of the Indo-Pak border. It was India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 that introduced the nuclear element into the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government reiterated that the experiment was conducted only as a part of the research and development work carried out in pursuance of the national objective of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused to accept this explanation and it reinforced further his resolve to acquire a nuclear bomb for Pakistan.¹ Since then both have never looked back. At present both India and Pakistan have the capability to make nuclear weapons. Neither is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and they are keeping their nuclear options open.

This chapter considers the nuclear dimension of India-Pakistan confidence building process. Before discussing various nuclear non-proliferation and confidence building proposals put forward for lowering the tensions on the nuclear issue in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan's potential and capability to undertake a nuclear weapons programme needs to be examined, because the military application of this technology only waits a political decision.

1 India's Nuclear Programme

Let us first consider India's technical nuclear capabilities.

1.1 Nuclear Capability

India's research reactors are its prime source of weapon grade plutonium (Pu 239) and its supplies of unsafeguarded plutonium are said to be around 200-300 kgs. India has an unsafeguarded Canadian supplied 40 mw CIRUS heavy water natural uranium reactor, that can produce about 9 kgs of plutonium a year and its 100 mw Dhurva reactor is capable of providing about 50 kgs of plutonium a year.² India has two reprocessing plants for separating plutonium from the spent fuel.³ India's reprocessing facilities are developed and constructed indigenously and none is subject to international safeguards. India has a continuing

¹ It may be noted that Z.A. Bhutto's decision to acquire nuclear weapons for Pakistan pre-dates the 1974 nuclear explosion of India. He had initiated the policy to lead Pakistan towards a plutonium bomb option at the famous Multan meeting in January 1972 although he may have known of the Indian nuclear programme at that stage. For details of the Multan meeting, see, S. Weismann and H. Krossney, *The Islamic Bomb*, London: Times Books, 1981, pp. 44-45.

² S.P. Seth, "The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and the USA", *Asian Survey*, vol. 28, no. 7, July 1988, p. 717; Richard Cromin, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 37, no. 4, 1983, p. 598; David Albright and Tom Zamora, "India-Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: All the Pieces in Place", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1989, vol. 45, no. 6, p. 25.

³ These facilities are the BARC plant at Trombay with an annual capacity of reprocessing 30 metric tons of spent fuel and the Power Reactor Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) at Tarapur with an annual capacity of reprocessing 100 metric tons. See, "India's Supply of Unsafeguarded Plutonium Grows as Reprocessing of MAPP Fuel Begins", *Nuclear Fuel*, 11 August 1986.

fast breeder reactor programme and is also building a series of heavy water plants.⁴ At present, India can produce indigenously all the fissile material it needs for developing nuclear weapons if it so desires. It has mastered the entire fuel cycle from uranium mining to fabricating fuel and building reactors to reprocessing plants.

There has been much speculation about India's capacity to fabricate nuclear weapons. Such estimates have rated India's annual capacity to make nuclear weapons close to 15-18 bombs and its stockpile of unsafeguarded plutonium in the range of 100-250 kgs, enough for approximately 30-50 nuclear weapons.⁵

As a delivery system, India has several aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons against both Pakistan and China. The most capable are Anglo-French supplied Jaguars with a nominal combat radius of 450-710 miles and Soviet supplied MIG-27s with a nominal combat radius of 350-500 miles besides other advanced fighter interceptors such as the MIG-23, MIG-29 and the French supplied Mirage-2000. India's space programme, the most advanced outside the developed world could provide the expertise for the rapid development of long range nuclear capable missiles. India's space, earth observation and communications satellites could also serve military objectives by improving reconnaissance, command and control arrangements.⁶ In 1986 India's Remote Sensing Programme (IRS) became operational. Later it initiated its programme for an Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), which if adopted for military use could extend considerably India's reach.⁷

Although there is no evidence that India has developed a nuclear warhead for missile delivery, it is developing ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying such payloads. In February 1988, India announced the initial successful test of its first dedicated military ballistic missile, Prithvi which is capable of carrying a 100 kg warhead about 150 miles and lesser payloads for longer distances.⁸ In April 1989, India test-fired

⁴ The plant at Nangal producing (15 metric tons a year), Talcher (65 metric tons), Baroda (100 metric tons), Tuticorin (70 metric tons), and Kota (100 metric tons) are now operational and some others are under construction. See, **Annual Report 1988-89**, Department of Atomic Energy, New Delhi: Government of India Publication, 1989, pp. 1-2. For a map of heavy water reactors see, Judith Perera, "India's Nuclear Fall Out", *South*, no. 93, July 1988, p. 111.

⁵ See, "Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containing the Threat", **A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Senate**, August 1988, Washington, 1988, p. 4; "Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security", **A Report of Carnegie Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation and South Asian Security**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988, p. 9; and Rid Nordland, "The Nuclear Club", *Newsweek*, 12 July 1988, pp. 22-23; David Albright, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

⁶ P.R. Chari, "How to Prevent a Nuclear Arms Race Between India and Pakistan", in Bhabani Sen Gupta, ed., *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia: Perceptual, Military and Nuclear Arms Race Problems*, vol. 1, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986, p. 129.

⁷ Radha Krishna Rao, "India's Launch Vehicle Programme Moves Ahead", *Space World*, 1983. The ASLV is to be followed by a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) which can be modified and developed into an IRBM. Mohan Ram, "Options in Outer Space", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 September 1986.

⁸ "India Succeeds in Launching", *The Washington Post*, 26 January 1988, p. A-24; "Shooting Ahead: Prithvi Flight Trial is Successful", *India Today*, 31 March 1988, p. 170. Moreover, India's Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) has also tested Akash a medium range surface-to-air missile, Nag a short range third generation, anti-tank missile and Trishul a short range anti-aircraft missile. See, "Indigenous Missile Programme: India Ranks With Advanced Nations", *Pioneer*, 31 December 1991.

successfully its first Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. Agni can carry payloads of 1000 kg as far as 2500 km and heavier payloads up to 1500 km. It can also act as a delivery system for a nuclear warhead, thereby multiplying enormously India's deterrent capabilities. Let us now examine the political orientation of India's nuclear programme.

1.2 Nuclear Policy

In terms of its nuclear policy, Indian policy makers have been pursuing consistently a global approach on the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament issues. It has been argued that this issue can not be resolved either through a discriminatory treaty like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a piecemeal regional approach. India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, yet did not go for an overt nuclearisation for military purposes. It insists however on keeping its nuclear options open especially considering the nuclear threat from China and lately that of Pakistan. This policy is based on a national consensus and enjoys widespread popular support. All political parties uphold Indian policy of maintaining its nuclear option⁹ with the sole exception of the BJP which favours an overt nuclearization. Although India had decided against exercising its nuclear option to meet the Chinese nuclear threat, Indian government leaders have warned repeatedly that any evidence of Pakistan's overt nuclear weaponization will spur a major shift in India's nuclear policy. At a news conference on 24 March 1987, Rajiv Gandhi asserted that, "India would meet Pakistan's nuclear threat and the Indian people [would] not be found wanting".¹⁰ Later in 1988, K.C.Pant, the then Defence Minister made a statement in Parliament that,

The emerging nuclear threat to us from Pakistan is forcing us to review our option [and assured the House that] ... we shall take all necessary steps to ensure that our soldiers are not put at a disadvantage. The House does not expect me to spell it out in detail what our response would be, suffice it to state that it would be decisive and adequate.¹¹

Consequently there seems to be little doubt that at minimum, India could manufacture and deploy a number of nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks or months.

A further important development is that Indian military organisation and training is slowly being geared to face up to the remote possibility of a nuclear war. In 1986 General K.Sunderji, the then Chief of Army Staff disclosed that

⁹ For instance, see some parliamentary debates on this issue, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 5, no. 31, 25 April 1985, 261-287; 8th series, vol. 8, no. 13, 8 August 1985; and 8th series, vol. 34, no. 22, 7 December 1987, cols. 382-463. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CXXXV, no. 12, 7 August 1985, cols. 147-206; and vol. CXLIV, no. 22, 7 December 1987, cols. 324-359.

¹⁰ For Rajiv Gandhi's statement in Parliament on this issue, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 15, no. 30, 8 April 1986, cols. 381-382.

¹¹ *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th Series, vol. 38, no. 39, 25 April 1988.

we in armed forces are gearing our organization, training and equipment in such a manner that in the unlikely event of use of nuclear weapons by the adversary in the combat zone, we limit the damage both technical and physical.¹²

This is a vital change in Indian military thinking although there still is no discernible conceptual development of an official nuclear doctrine.

2 Pakistan's Nuclear Programme

This section examines Pakistan's nuclear capability and its nuclear policy.

2.1 Nuclear Capability

Pakistan's current nuclear infrastructure includes a Canadian supplied 125 MW power reactor, KANUPP at Karachi which is under international safeguards. There are two small scale reprocessing facilities at Rawalpindi, an experimental reprocessing plant located at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and the New Laboratories (New Labs). At present Pakistan's nuclear strategy is based on production of highly enriched uranium U-235. It has indigenous uranium mining and refining capabilities and a facility for transforming natural uranium into uranium hexafluoride, necessary for the enrichment process. It also has two uranium enrichment facilities, a pilot plant at Sihala near Islamabad and a larger centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta near Rawalpindi. It is this Kahuta plant which is most crucial to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

There is no doubt that Pakistan has mastered enrichment technology. As early as December 1981, General Zia admitted that Pakistan belonged to the five countries of the world which know and practice enrichment technology. Despite an earlier promise to the Reagan administration not to enrich uranium above 5%, Pakistan is widely believed to have been producing weapons grade uranium (enriched uranium above 90%) at Kahuta since 1986.¹³ As regards Pakistan's estimated capacity to make nuclear weapons, David Albright and Tom Zamora reported in 1987 that at the then annual production rate of weapons grade uranium at Kahuta, it would have accumulated enough material to make 6-8 nuclear bombs by the end of 1988 and through the 1990's Pakistan could have 8-16 weapons.¹⁴ A Carnegie report estimates Pakistan's output at 21 to 63 kgs of uranium enough annually for 4 devices. There are many other reports to substantiate these

¹² "The Indian Army", Special Supplement, *Times of India*, 1 February 1986.

¹³ *Economist's Foreign Report*, 17 March 1986. Later Bob Woodward reported that Pakistan had crossed the 93% level. *Washington Post*, 4 November 1986.

¹⁴ Albright, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-22.

conclusions.¹⁵

Pakistan also has a number of aircraft well suited for the delivery of an early generation bomb. These include US supplied F-16's with a nominal range of 330-530 miles and French supplied Mirage V with a nominal range of 390-720 miles. In January 1989 it was reported that Pakistan has an aerial fission bomb that can be carried beneath its US supplied F-16 attack aircraft.¹⁶ In early February 1988, Pakistan also test-fired successfully two short range surface-to-surface missiles with ranges of 48 and 150 miles and with payloads of about 500 kgs each, large enough for a nuclear warhead.¹⁷

2.2 Nuclear Policy

Pakistan's Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto took the political decision to acquire a nuclear bomb in 1972 and made vigorous efforts to achieve that objective. General Zia sustained Bhutto's policy of developing nuclear weapons but decided against a bomb demonstration.¹⁸ Instead he adopted the policy of a calculated ambiguity in this respect. While denying officially that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, gradually his regime revealed Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, first acknowledging the construction of a uranium enrichment plant, then announcing that it had acquired the technology to enrich uranium and finally that Pakistan had the capability to make nuclear weapons, if it wished to do so.

As early as 1984, Dr. A.Q. Khan had stated openly that Pakistan possessed the necessary skills to build nuclear weapons, if called upon to do so.¹⁹ Later in March 1987 in an interview with Kuldip Nayar, he admitted that Pakistan already had an atomic bomb and would be prepared to use it if its existence was threatened.²⁰ This was subsequently confirmed by General Zia who said

you can virtually write today that Pakistan can build a [nuclear] bomb, whenever it wishes ... once you have acquired the technology, which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you feel like. You can use it for peaceful purposes, you can also utilize it for military purposes We have never said that we are incapable of doing this. We have said that we have neither the

¹⁵ A Newsweek report quoted Western intelligence sources that Pakistan has developed four complete atomic devices and that both the CIA and State Department officials are convinced that Pakistan has a complete bomb. Rid Nordland, "The Nuclear Club", *Newsweek*, 12 July 1988, p. 23. Also see, "Reflections on Nuclear Issue in South Asia", speech by the US Ambassador Mr. Deane Hinton on 16 February 1987, made at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, published in *Strategic Digest*, May 1987; and "Cat is in the Bag", Zia-ul-Haq's interview in the *Time* 30 March 1988; Hedrick Smith, "A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan", *New York Times Magazine*, 6 March 1988.

¹⁶ *Foreign Report* January 1989. It also stated that the detonation mechanism has been perfected and the bomb casing is suitable for high speed flight.

¹⁷ Nirmal Mitra, "Fly by Might", *Sunday*, 19-25 February 1989, pp. 12-14.

¹⁸ Ashok Kapur, *Pakistan's Nuclear Development*, London; Croom Helm Publishers, 1987, p. 220.

¹⁹ "Pakistan's Bomb Controversy", A series of reports in *Strategic Digest*, vol. 17, no. 5, May 1987.

²⁰ Kuldip Nayar, "Pakistan Has the Bomb", *The Tribune*, 1 March 1987.

intention nor the desire to do so.²¹

In a similar vein, Benazir Bhutto said in 1989,

We do not have a nuclear bomb, that is one which is constructed, assembled ready to be used and positioned on the table What we have is a peaceful programme which would enable us to acquire the know-how. We have acquired the know-how which can never be obliterated or removed by a decision ... We will not wilfully make the decision to manufacture or assemble the atomic bomb.²²

However Pakistan is believed to have crossed this threshold in Spring 1990.²³ In October 1990, the US President could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device and US aid to Pakistan was cut off.²⁴ Since then the US has been insisting that Pakistan must "rollback" and even "dismantle certain aspects of its nuclear programme" which is unacceptable to the Pakistani establishment.²⁵ Pakistan's nuclear programme is regarded as a security landmark and Islamabad argues that it "will not accept dictation" from US on "a question of national sovereignty".²⁶

There is a very strong lobby both within the establishment and outside it, which believes that time has come for Pakistan to shed the ambiguity regarding its nuclear capability. A senior Pakistani army general said emphatically,

Pakistan should have a nuclear weapon and if we have it, we should demonstrate it at the right time.²⁷

Within the troika, General Beg was a major advocate of this policy maintaining that Pakistan should develop a viable nuclear option as a part of its defence strategy. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, an important linchpin

²¹ *Time*, 30 March 1987, p. 42.

²² *Foreign Broadcasting Information Services (FBIS)*, Near East and South Asia, 20 July 1989, pp. 26-27.

²³ According to the US envoy in Pakistan, Mr. Robert Oakley, Pakistan had failed to meet three American conditions formulated by the US State Department. These conditions were: no production of enriched uranium beyond a certain level or highly enriched uranium metal and no manufacturing of highly enriched uranium metal into nuclear components called nuclear cores regarded as vital in the production of a nuclear device. Oakley said that in 1990, Pakistan "went past the stop points and the assurances were therefore no longer valid". See, Maleeha Lodhi, "Pakistan and the US: Nuclear Fallout", *Newline*, January 1991. For a detailed list of US non-proliferation restrictions on aid to Pakistan, see, Leonard S. Spector, "Producing Nuclear Weapons Material: A Primer", *Defence Journal*, vol. 12, December 1990-January 1991, pp. 23-25.

²⁴ *ibid.* Also see, Maleeha Lodhi, "Signs of Pak-US Warming but Nuclear Deadlock Persists", *The News*, 23 February 1991; Maleeha Lodhi, "Why Pakistan Won't be Let Off the Hook", *The News*, 11 May 1991; Maleeha Lodhi, "Wasim Sajjid Mission: Getting Relations Back on Track", *The News*, 6 June 1991.

²⁵ *ibid.* Also see, Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb Controversy", *Newline*, November 1991, pp.22-29; Mushahid Hussain, "A Bomb for Security", in the same issue, pp. 30-32; and M.B. Naqvi, "Kahuta Means More to Pakistan than US Goodwill", *Indian Express*, 1 July 1991.

²⁶ Lodhi, *ibid.* Zahid Hussain wrote that both the President and the Prime Minister had asked Abida Hussain, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington to convey to the US administration that there would be no rolling back of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Hussain, *ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁷ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

of the nuclear programme, also resisted firmly the US pressure on this issue. But two successive Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and later Nawaz Sharif have been soft-peddalling on this issue. In an interview with *Independent*, Benazir Bhutto stated

there is a powerful lobby in Pakistan today that says we should detonate a nuclear device and we should not be coy about it. I feel it is better to act coy because you can have your cake and eat it too.²⁸

Nawaz Sharif declared that he wanted to take a more flexible position on this issue but was constrained by certain factors.²⁹ To recapitulate, Pakistan is highly unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons programme under US pressure in the foreseeable future although it may not go for an overt nuclearisation either.

It is against this background, that one must discuss various proposals put forward by both India and Pakistan to address the nuclear issue in the subcontinent.

3 Debate on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Confidence Building Approach

A nuclear non-proliferation approach drives at nuclear disarmament in the region through an explicit, formal and verifiable commitment by the concerned parties not to make nuclear weapons. The basic assumption of nuclear non-proliferation proposals is that proliferation has not yet taken place. There may be a capability to make nuclear weapons but there are no bombs yet and the objective is to foreclose the nuclear option for good. On the other hand, Confidence Building Measures are postulated on the assumption that the parties in question have the capabilities to make nuclear weapons and refuse to give up their nuclear option or that they have already crossed the threshold of proliferation and the genie can not be put back into the bottle. The objective of this exercise is only to have more confidence in each other and bring about more transparency and stability in an otherwise dangerously ambiguous situation. Let us first examine the nuclear non-proliferation proposals in the context of the South Asian region.

3.1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Proposals

Since the early 1980's Pakistan has put forward a number of nuclear non-proliferation proposals such as jointly to sign the NPT, or opt for a bilateral NPT, to accept full-scope IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, to declare South Asia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) and declare jointly a renunciation of nuclear weapons.

²⁸ As quoted by Aabha Dixit, "Benazir's N-Bombshell", *Hindustan Times*, 30 May 1991.

²⁹ Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

3.1.1 Proposal to Sign the NPT or Accept Full-Scope IAEA Safeguards

The only commonality in Indian and Pakistani attitudes towards the NPT is that both have refused to sign it. India rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on several grounds of principle. It is discriminatory in that it divides the world into two types of countries *viz* nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non nuclear weapon states (NNWS). It legalizes the possession of nuclear weapons by allocating special rights to nuclear weapon states. It is one-sided because there is no acceptable balance of obligations between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Moreover, it does not address itself to the control of vertical proliferation which is a greater danger to world peace.³⁰ India's response to the NPT thus has been shaped largely by its view of its inherent flaws and is quite independent of Pakistan's nuclear programme in a regional context.

To a great extent, the same argument is valid for the second proposal of accepting jointly full-scope IAEA safeguards. The objective of these safeguards is to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from the civilian facilities for developing nuclear weapons. But it has been argued that due to a number of inherent limitations in their structure and working, the safeguards have proved ineffective in achieving their objective.³¹ The Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix's judgement that nuclear proliferation can not be stopped by safeguards alone seems to have been vindicated in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Iraq was not only a signatory of the NPT but also had a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Despite the IAEA's regular checks, dramatic revelations that Iraq had been trying three different methods to build nuclear weapons, has brought severely into question the efficacy of IAEA safeguards. Iraq's nuclear infrastructure even survived massive bombing by the allied forces that claimed to have destroyed it completely. And were it not for Iraq's defeat and the disclosures of an Iraqi defector scientist, the IAEA would still have been reporting nothing amiss.³²

Nevertheless, certain international developments in the past few years have given a new edge to the NPT and brought it to the limelight yet again. The only two remaining 'official' nuclear powers, China and

³⁰ Ashok Kapur, *op.cit.*, pp. 214-215.

³¹ C. Rajamohan, "India's Nuclear Policy: The Need for Clarity", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 11, February 1986; Jed C. Snyder, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Managing the Impending Crisis", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4, December 1985.

³² "NPT: It's Broke, So Fix It", *The Economist*, 27 July 1991, p. 5; Brian Beeham, "Nuclear Proliferation Had Better Interest You", *International Herald Tribune*, 16 March 1992.

France and South Africa among the threshold nuclear states, have signed the NPT. Brazil and Argentina also joined the non-proliferation regime by becoming a party to the NWFZ in Latin America. And Iraq's nearly successful attempt to acquire nuclear weapons has only highlighted the dangers of proliferation resulting in a consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council of the UN in favour of more stringent preventive measures as brought out by their guidelines adopted on 18 October 1991 after a meeting in London. Therefore it may not be fanciful to speculate that in future, the concept of national sovereignty may not stand in the way of the UN's mandatory intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities in suspect states.³³

These developments have brought an unprecedented international pressure on India, Pakistan and Israel, the principal recalcitrant threshold nuclear states and the Soviet successor states to follow suit and sign the NPT. In the context of South Asia, both the USA and Russia (former Soviet Union) are urging India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT. The USA is trying to achieve this goal by putting enormous pressure on each government and by playing as a broker between India and Pakistan. It has already cut off its military and economic aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear programme and its pressure on India is evident from the recent attempts of the US Congress to equate India's nuclear programme with that of Pakistan by applying the Pressler law to India as well.³⁴ The Soviet Union's first public criticism of India in the summer of 1991 for not signing the NPT and for not agreeing to turn South Asia into a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone is also significant in this regard.

India's response so far has been primarily to resist such pressures by arguing that nuclear proliferation can not be contained in bilateral or regional agreements and it must be viewed in a global context. It is worth recalling that an anti-NPT position is widely supported by Indian public opinion. As a senior official of India's Foreign Office put it

the option of a signing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or declaring South Asia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone is *non-saleable* in India.³⁵

In a similar vein, a noted Indian journalist said "the NPT is a non-starter in India..it will never have the

³³ Dilip Mukerji, "The Unclear Nuclear Equation", *Times of India*, 28 October 1991.

³⁴ R. Chakrapani, "Pressuring India: The Pressler Law", *Frontline*, 20 July-2 August 1991, p. 53; Manoj Joshi, "NPT Pressures: India Bracing For a Response", *Frontline*, 6 December 1991; "US Calls India and Pakistan for NPT Talks", *Pioneer*, 29 January 1992.

³⁵ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

political sanction".³⁶ Another reiterated that "no Indian government can survive surrendering the nuclear option".³⁷

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the resultant four nuclear states, its criticism of India's nuclear policy has somewhat lost ground because it has been overtaken by the developments within that country. China's ratification of the NPT is not unlikely to make any real difference to India's position since it will be signing the treaty as a nuclear weapon state, thereby only legitimizing its nuclear status. Secondly China's pledge of not using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state is available even now and is not enough for India's security concerns. As far as the USA is concerned, it is beginning to adopt a more flexible approach towards the nuclear issue in South Asia. Lately the US approach has been that although it wants both India and Pakistan to sign the NPT or create a NWFZ in South Asia, it is open to any alternative pragmatic and practical suggestions that would achieve the goal of stopping the incipient nuclear arms race in the subcontinent and reducing the risk of war.³⁸ Indian defence analysts stressed this point and argued that once the US is aware of the fact that

there already are bombs in basement, forcing India and Pakistan to sign the NPT would only make a nonsense of the treaty.³⁹

Overall there has been no evident change in India's official stand on the NPT as was affirmed by Prime Minister P.V. Narashima Rao in his speech to the UN Security Council summit in February 1992. He drew a distinction between the NPT (to which India was opposed) and non-proliferation (to which India was committed) and reiterated India's stand that proliferation had taken on a global dimension and required a global approach.⁴⁰

It is interesting to take note of the dissenting voice of the pro-bomb lobbies in both India and Pakistan. In India its been suggested that India should agree to sign the NPT under Article I ... "as a nuclear weapon power" implying that India be accepted as a full-fledged nuclear weapon power on the strength of

³⁶ In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

³⁷ In an interview conducted in London in March 1992. Also see, K. Subrahmanyam, "Rajiv Must Resist US Plea on NPT", *Times of India*, 10 October 1987; "Saying No to Coercion", *Times of India*, 31 August 1991; "Signing NPT will be Detrimental: Experts", *Indian Express*, 7 November 1991.

³⁸ Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Questions: The Bartholomew Visit", *Frontline*, 20 December 1991; Joseph Fitchett, "How Proliferation Might Make the World More Secure", *International Herald Tribune*, 10 March 1992.

³⁹ This was disclosed by two noted Indian journalists in interviews with the present author.

⁴⁰ Ajay Kumar, "PM at the UN Security Council", *Economic Times*, 2 February 1992; K.K. Katyal, "India Sticks to Its Guns on NPT", *The Hindu*, 17 March 1992.

its Pokhran nuclear test explosion in May 1974.⁴¹ In a similar vein in Pakistan, General Arif argues

India is preparing to sign NPT. Pakistan should also try to achieve nuclear status. Thus, Pakistan should also be subject to the same treatment as India as a member of the nuclear club.⁴²

Agha Shahi goes even further and declares that Pakistan should not sign the NPT even if India signs it. He argues

A case might be made for India to do so by acknowledging it as a nuclear power on the basis of its nuclear explosion in 1974.... Pakistan does not meet the criterion of a test explosion, so it can not be accorded a nuclear status. In other words, signing the NPT would be tantamount to a unilateral renunciation of the nuclear option.⁴³

3.1.2 Declare South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Pakistan has also proposed a declaration of South Asia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) which involves a renunciation of nuclear weapons and acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards by the countries of the region. An added feature of this proposal is that nuclear weapon states agree neither to deploy nuclear weapons in a NWFZ nor to use or threaten to use them against countries of such a zone. Hence, the argument runs ? that NWFZs are useful in preventing a ruinous regional arms race and enhance the security of non-nuclear weapon states *vis-à-vis* nuclear weapon states. But there are several loopholes that allow nuclear weapon states to install nuclear weapons in bases on the territory of a NWFZ and reserve their right of transit of nuclear weapons through such a region. This along with other caveats introduced by the USA and the UK in their declaration of supporting NWFZ have cast doubts on their assurances of non use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.⁴⁴ Besides in conformity with India's global approach, it has been argued that the creation of NWFZs only in selected regions does not isolate it from the other nuclear powers' arsenal and only amounts to legitimizing nuclear weapons elsewhere. With reference to the subcontinent, a specific objection has been that a South Asia NWFZ without China is an artificial and untenable geographical concept because of the triangular chain of proliferation in the region with India having responded to China's nuclear programme and Pakistan to that of India's.

⁴¹ In an interview conducted in New Delhi. Also see, "India Preparing to Sign NPT ?", *The News*, 27 October 1991; Manoj Joshi, *op.cit.*; Inder Malhotra, "The NPT Whirligig Gathering Speed", *Frontier Post*, 27 October 1991.

⁴² Zahid Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

⁴³ As quoted in Hussain, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ C. Rajamohan, "India's Nuclear Diplomacy: The Need for Clarity", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 11, February 1986, p. 1086; Ashok Kapur, *op.cit.*, p. 165.

While taking account of this factor, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif renewed this proposal in June 1991 suggesting that there should be "multilateral consultations between the US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan in a five nation conference to discuss and resolve the issue of non-proliferation in South Asia".⁴⁵ It envisaged an agreement under which Pakistan and India have no nuclear weapons and agree to the requisite verification measures and required the USA, Russia and China to agree not to use nuclear weapons against South Asian countries and to come to the aid of victim should one of them do so, although without having to give up their own nuclear weapons. A senior Foreign Office official in Islamabad stated that the five-nation proposal is "most sensible so far" because it also brings China to the negotiating table.⁴⁶

For a number of reasons, India's initial official response was that of an outright rejection. This proposal neither requires an elimination of Chinese nuclear weapons nor contains any additional safeguards for India *vis-à-vis* China as the latter is already committed to the principles of not attacking non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons and of non-first use of nuclear weapons. A number of Pakistani scholars, however, argued that at least India should have accepted the offer of multilateral talks and then made this point that the Chinese position should be changed from that of a guarantor to a participant.⁴⁷ It was argued that by rejecting it straight away India missed a very good opportunity.⁴⁸

India, however, insisted that it would only be a futile exercise because China would never accept such a proposition. As an American observer put it, China finds the idea of reducing its own nuclear weapons to bring about a denuclearization of the subcontinent as "contemptuous".⁴⁹ Owing to deep-rooted suspicions between India and Pakistan for already having bombs in the basement, highly intrusive verification measures would be required. US President Bush's refusal to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device since it crossed the threshold in February 1990 and the US Congress' recognition of India as already being a possessor of a nuclear device only confirms this assessment.⁵⁰ Such being the position, it would first have

⁴⁵ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Address to the National Defence College, (Rawalpindi), 6 June 1991, p. 12.

⁴⁶ In an interview with the present author.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ This impression is based on the present author's interviews with a number of Pakistani scholars and Foreign Office officials conducted in Pakistan in October 1991.

⁴⁹ In an interview conducted in London in April 1992.

⁵⁰ The wording of the legal instrument which had extended the Pressler amendment to cover India, says that aid to India should be suspended, if India was to be found in possession of "additional" weapons. See, Richard P. Cronin, "Pakistan Aid Cut-Off: US Nuclear proliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations", *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief*, 8 December 1991. Also see, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, "Pakistan and US: The Nuclear Fallout", *op.cit.* Mushahid Hussain, 'A Bomb for Security', *op.cit.* and Zahid Hussain, 'The Bomb Controversy', *op.cit.*

to be verified that neither side possesses nuclear weapons and the existing crude devices are detected and dismantled before entering into a NWFZ. However verification of previous production by checking the records of just opened facilities is considered unfeasible. Experts feel that given the proximity of India and Pakistan, no sophisticated launchers are necessary, thus, making detection difficult until almost at the point of delivery.

Finally the underlying motives of Nawaz Sharif's proposal have been questioned since it was put forward just on the eve of the departure of a high power Pakistani delegation to the USA. This created an impression in Indian circles that the proposal was seeking to improve the chances of resumption of aid more than it was seeking to prevent a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent. Moreover, while the proposal was addressed to four states (USA, Russia, China and India), only China and the USA had been informed well before the announcement.⁵¹ But India, perhaps the most crucial party for its viability was informed a couple of days before it was made public. Whether it was only a diplomatic mistake or a well-calculated move, decidedly it had a negative impact on Indian decision-makers.

Nevertheless non-official circles in India including the press and various defence analysts, army generals and scholars had responded positively to Sharif's proposal and criticized the Indian government for having rejected it outright.⁵² Lately the Indian government seems to have modified its stand to the extent that the proposed five nation conference could serve as a suitable multilateral platform to discuss the nuclear issue in South Asia although its ultimate objective of creating a NWFZ in South Asia was still unacceptable probably because *it was already too late for that*.⁵³ This brings us to the question of whether there is a shift taking place from the non-proliferation issues to a Confidence Building approach. The following section would examine the principal assumptions of a Confidence Building approach and discuss various proposals put forward in the Indo-Pak context.

⁵¹ Diplomatic sources maintain that the US knew at least a year previously and had often discussed it. Some non-Indian sources go further and imply that the proposal was in fact US inspired. China was sounded in April 1991. See, Krishna Menon, "Proposal Ploys: Behind Pakistan's Move", *Frontline*, 20 July-2 August 1991, p. 50.

⁵² This assessment was gathered from a number of interviews conducted in New Delhi. Also see, "Sharif Merits Answer", *Times of India*, 23 August 1991; A.K. Damodaran, "Sharif's Nuclear Move: Need for a Considered Response", *Times of India*, 29 June 1991; Jasjit Singh, "Managing the Nuclear Challenge", *Indian Express*, 14 June 1991; Praful Bidwai, "A Nuclear-Free South Asia: New Initiative, Yes; NPT, No", *Times of India*, 13 June 1991; "A Welcome Move", *Indian Express*, 8 June 1991.

⁵³ India's former Foreign Secretary, Mr. Muchkund Dubey's interview with Dr. Maleeha Lodhi in *The News*, 2 November 1991.

3.2 Confidence Building Proposals

The principal assumption of the confidence building debate on the nuclear issue in the South Asian region is that both India and Pakistan have already crossed the threshold of proliferation. This is evident from their leaders' statements as well as US pronouncements on this issue. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a policy of calculated nuclear ambiguity towards each other and, more significantly, towards third countries, especially the NPT sponsors. And it is likely to continue for sometime primarily because both believe that such a posture enhances their security by preserving the nuclear option and by allowing the political and strategic exploitation of the advantages of being a nuclear power without incurring the costs and risks of actually deploying nuclear forces.

Both believe that a situation of nuclear deterrence already exists in South Asia. In fact the value of deterrence in military calculations is now debated publicly, for instance, India's former Chief of Army, General K. Sunderji has said,

I am telling you in straightforward terms, an Indian planner should assume that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons capability and similarly any prudent Pakistani military planner ought to assume that India has got a certain nuclear weapon capability. And plan on that basis.⁵⁴

Evidently he has come as close as he can without actually abandoning the threshold status in favour of an openly declared nuclear weapon status. President Zia stated in June 1988,

With reference to their [India and Pakistan's] nuclear capabilities, if they create ambiguity, that ambiguity is the essence of deterrence. The present programmes of India and Pakistan have a lot of ambiguities, and therefore in the eyes of each other, they have reached a particular level, and that level is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.⁵⁵

According to Pakistan's former Chief of Army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg "both the nuclear option and the missiles act as a deterrent and these in turn contribute to the total fighting ability of the Army, which then [further] acts as a deterrent to the enemy".⁵⁶

This presumption is strengthened further by the belief of a number of defence analysts that on two occasions in recent years India and Pakistan almost went to war, in 1987 during exercise Brasstacks and in

⁵⁴ General Sunderji's interview in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 September 1990, p. 26.

⁵⁵ As quoted by Agha Shahi, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Pakistan", *Strategic Digest*, vol. 22, no. 1, January 1992, p. 22.

⁵⁶ See, General Beg's interview by Mushahid Hussain in, "Pakistan Responding to Change", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 14 October 1989, p. 779.

the early stages of Kashmiri uprising in 1990. An important reason that these eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations between the two countries were not converted into a military conflict was the nuclear factor.⁵⁷ Both countries also enjoy a domestic political consensus in favour of their respective nuclear programmes. But at the same time, there is little probability of either adopting a policy of declared nuclear status precipitating a subcontinental nuclear arms race, in the foreseeable future. Both realize that a nuclear war across the Indo-Pak border is bound to assume enormous proportions and has to be avoided at all costs.⁵⁸

Presuming both have made nuclear weapons but have not yet integrated them into their security doctrines, the objective now is to prevent the development and deployment and possible use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Nuclear armament is not only a matter of possessing a few bombs but also requires a command and control system and delivery vehicles. A senior Indian army general (ret'd) stressed this point that means of delivery are very important in terms of modifying aircraft, training pilots for flying these aircraft, developing a system of controlling its launch for it to hit the target precisely and the like.⁵⁹

India and Pakistan can ill-afford to divert their scarce economic resources to a costly nuclear arms race. Both have their compulsions for not opting for a declared nuclear status. For Pakistan the most serious repercussion would be a likelihood of a reactive Indian deployment of a nuclear force which could easily overshadow any that Pakistan might muster. India will find itself on a dual track nuclear arms race with China and Pakistan. The other costs include the uncertainties and vulnerabilities of a regional security system based on a nuclear balance of terror with an increased risk of nuclear weapons use. It may mean an increased involvement by the extra-regional powers in the regional affairs along with the military and diplomatic penalties that would accompany overt nuclearisation. Further, there may be pressures for an open-ended expansion and diversification of nuclear armouries.

To recapitulate, both India and Pakistan agree that a nuclear option is necessary and each assumes that the other has crossed the threshold of proliferation. However both have shared post-proliferation interests in avoiding a nuclear crisis in the subcontinent. The emerging focus therefore is on containment rather than

⁵⁷ Zahid Hussain, *The Bomb Controversy*, *op.cit.*; and Mushahid Hussain, 'The Bomb for Security', *op.cit.*.

⁵⁸ Rashid Naim has presented various scenarios of material damage and human costs resulting from a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. Rashid Naim, "Aadhi Raat ke Baad (After Midnight)", in S.P Cohen, ed., *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control*, Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991. Also, Major General Sitender Singh, "Nuclear War in South Asia: The Worst Case", *Indian Defence Review*, vol. 3, 1991.

⁵⁹ In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

prevention of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It is in this context that a Confidence Building approach has assumed significance. At the present stage a Confidence Building approach would permit each country to retain nuclear weapons covertly while attempting to bring about greater transparency in the nuclear programmes of the two countries with an ulterior objective of eliminating the motives for their possible use in a conflict. Moreover, this approach is likely to be more acceptable to both since it allows India to retain its nuclear option to counter a Chinese nuclear threat and also accommodates Pakistani concerns that a nuclear deal with India must be based on the fundamental principles of sovereign equality and non-discrimination. A Confidence Building approach may also serve as a meeting point between Pakistan's regional approach and India's global approach. On the lines of our distinction between non-proliferation and the confidence building dimensions of a nuclear issue, India could continue to pursue its global approach with regard to non-proliferation matters while simultaneously opting for a confidence building approach to strengthen the peace process in the specific context of the South Asian region. What future is there for a Confidence Building Measure on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities?

3.2.1 Non-Attack on Nuclear Facilities

The Indo-Pak agreement on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities remains the only Confidence Building Measure adopted by them so far. The need for this agreement arose in the context of speculation in the Western media that India either alone or in collaboration with Israel was planning to attack Pakistan's uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta.⁶⁰ Since 1981 Israel is believed repeatedly to have approached India for launching a joint attack on Kahuta but the Indians refused to cooperate.⁶¹ Such apprehensions took another twist in December 1985 when Zia suspected the Soviet Union and Afghanistan's assistance to India in attacking Kahuta. Pakistan accused India of having sent planes disguised with Afghan markings, though

⁶⁰ "Zia Fears Attack on Nuclear Plants", *The Telegraph*, 18 September 1984; "Reported Indo-Israeli Plan to Attack Kahuta", *IDSANews Review*, vol. 19, no. 19, September 1986, p. 1034; "India Planned to Attack Kahuta", *Indian Express*, 15 September 1986; Bharat Kanad, "Knocking Out Kahuta", *Observer*, 17 January 1988. Bharat supported such an attack and thus has been quoted frequently in the Pakistani press in favour of their argument. *POT*, vol. 16, no. 5, 29 March 1988, p. 1072.

⁶¹ The Israelis feel concerned about the Islamic dimension of the Pakistani nuclear bomb and they fear that if this bomb finds its way through to any Middle Eastern country, it would jeopardize their own security. They had inquired supposedly about refueling facilities at Jamanagar, an Indian Air Force base near Pakistan's border. In 1985 secret meetings between Israeli diplomats and the personal envoy of the Indian Prime Minister were reported to have taken place, when Israelis offered to sell Levi fighter-bombers, sophisticated electronic equipment and cooperation in anti-terrorist operations including plans to ensure the personal safety of the Indian Prime Minister. See, "Israel Seeking Indian Help to Destroy Pakistan's Nuclear Plant", *POT*, vol. 14, no. 145, 11 August 1986, p. 3041; "Israelis Asked Indian Help to Hit Plant in Pakistan", *Bangkok Post*, 28 March 1988, Narendra Gupta, "Israeli Collusion: A Motivated Canard", *Hindustan Times*, 16 April 1988.

it was refuted by the Indian government.⁶² Above all the USA created a panic in Pakistani military circles by reporting that its spy-in-sky satellite had not picked up the Indian Jaguar squadron at its usual location. Subsequently it had retracted its statement on the basis of an accident of spy satellite photography due to cloud intervention. It was implied that India had positioned its deep-strike Jaguar aircraft for a pre-emptive strike against Kahuta.⁶³ Such a continuous barrage of disinformation on the issue had generated enormous fears and apprehension in Pakistan about India's intentions. The Pakistan Government undertook considerable security measures to protect Kahuta and declared that any attack on Kahuta would be considered as an act of aggression and would be dealt with appropriately.⁶⁴ The publicly articulated Indian concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability reinforced Pakistani fears. It became essential for India to reassure Islamabad that notwithstanding its reservations about Pakistan's quest for a bomb, it had no desire to attack Kahuta.

India has always considered such an attack to be an absolutely foolish and suicidal attempt. A senior Indian Foreign Office official said that the very idea of an attack on Pakistan's nuclear facility was "unthinkable" firstly because the entire zone of nuclear facilities in Pakistan is so close to the Indian border, to the extent that if India were to drop a bomb there, the radiation effects would definitely be felt on Indian side as well.⁶⁵ Secondly, Indian experts argued that the Indian Air Force simply did not have the equipment to destroy Kahuta which is not only wedged deeply in protective rocks but is also extremely well protected against an anticipated aerial destruction. Thirdly, India knows that by attacking Kahuta it would be inviting a Pakistani retaliation on Indian nuclear facilities in Rajasthan and Bombay with devastating consequences for itself.

Further, if Pakistan has already made some nuclear bombs, it is not necessary that all of them would have been kept at Kahuta. Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan's statement of Pakistan not having kept all its eggs in one basket is pertinent in this regard. In any case the level of technology attained by Pakistan to rebuild its nuclear facilities in a relatively short time could not be eliminated. Neil Joeck argues that India would also be wary

⁶² See, *Hindustan Times*, 17 October 1985; *Dawn*, 7 November 1985; *IDSANews Review*, vol. 78, no. 12, December 1985, p. 991.

⁶³ See, P.M. Pasricha, "Indo-Pak Nuclear Accord", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 12, March 1986, p. 1221.

⁶⁴ "Zia Taking Steps to Guard Nuclear Facility", *National Herald*, 4 July 1983; "Pakistan Warned Against Attack on Kahuta", *Times of India*, 16 September 1985; "War if Kahuta Attacked: Junejo", *Times of India*, 12 March 1987; "Security Tightened at Pakistan's Plant", *POT*, vol. 16, no. 70, 21 April 1988.

⁶⁵ In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

of launching such an attack since it would bring death and destruction to the Muslim community in India and draw international sanctions and possibly the embargo of Middle East oil and perhaps the expulsion of Indian workers from the Gulf. More significantly, it would alienate the Arab states of Middle East whose amity India has cultivated assiduously.

It was specifically in the context of Pakistani apprehension of an Indian attack on Kahuta facility, that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed to General Zia a non-attack agreement on each other's nuclear facilities to lessen such mistrust at their meeting at Dhaka in December 1985 for the first SAARC summit. Both Rajiv and Zia appreciated that there was a need for confidence building and removing suspicions on the nuclear issue and later announced their understanding on non-attack on nuclear facilities as a first step in this direction. This agreement went a long way towards allaying Pakistan's fears about an attack on Kahuta. But an Indian Foreign Office official said that it was only a "self-created problem" of Pakistan, so the agreement only had a "cosmetic value".⁶⁶ In January 1986, the two Foreign Secretaries arrived at a common draft on the substantive aspects of the proposal, with only a few technical details to be worked out. However a strongly anti-India resolution passed by the ruling Muslim League at that time retarded the whole process. Later a democratic government under Benazir Bhutto showed a positive attitude towards Indo-Pak relations and the principle got transformed into a formal agreement on 31 December 1988 in Islamabad, signed by the two Foreign Secretaries K.P.S. Menon and Dr. Humanyun Khan.⁶⁷ Both countries have ratified the agreement and after a gap of four years, exchanged the lists of nuclear installations finally bringing the agreement into effect.⁶⁸

The agreement was a landmark because it is the first step the two countries have taken to address the nuclear issue in South Asia. It signified a continuation of the *status quo* and an apparent recognition of each other's right to retain its nuclear option although without any guarantee against production, procurement or escalation of nuclear systems. Several other Confidence Building Measures have been put forth through both official and non-official channels in India and Pakistan, and the US among the extra-regional actors, which need to be considered. The whole gamut of these proposals will be examined on a graduated scale of political

⁶⁶ In an interview with a Foreign Office official with the present author in January 1992.

⁶⁷ "Pakistan India Sign Three Accords", *Muslim*, 1 January 1989; Shahid-ur-Rehman, "India and Pakistan Pledge no Harm to Nuclear Facilities", *Nucleonics Week*, vol. 30, no. 30, 5 January 1989, p. 8.

⁶⁸ "India and Pakistan Ratify Non-Attack Pact", *Times of India*, 7 December 1989.

costs at stake for the parties and technical requirements pertaining to the verification measures. First let us consider Confidence Building Measures (CBM) that are least demanding politically but may bring about stability in the present situation of tacit nuclear deterrence with its inherent ambiguities and promote a better understanding about each other's nuclear programme in a long term perspective. The key element in these proposals is greater transparency.

3.2.2 Nuclear Transparency Measures

It is argued that a mutual acknowledgement of each other's military nuclear capabilities may serve as a good starting point. This would enable each side to communicate clearly the circumstances under which it would resort to the use of nuclear weapons and the will and capability to do so or retaliate in response to a nuclear first use. General Sunderji points out that

being in state of ambiguity is a bigger danger than in a transparent situation. The chances of miscalculation are smaller.⁶⁹

Sunderji, along with other Indian defence experts has emphasised the need for holding discussions and debate on nuclear doctrine within each country to be followed by mutual discussions between experts of the two countries. The rationale of this exercise would be to arrive at a clear understanding of what would be the core vital interests of each, a threat to which would very probably escalate into a nuclear exchange. Given a tacit understanding of basic ground rules, more Confidence Building Measures may follow. On the other hand, however, this may also divulge the threshold short of which they may get away with the conventional attacks. This would acquire a special significance for the India because of its perception of Pakistan waging a low intensity conflict by supporting the militants in the Indian states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

The two countries could come to an understanding on several other information-exchange measures on the nuclear issue. For instance, as a sequel to the exchange of lists of nuclear installations under the non-attack agreement, the two countries could raise the level and frequency of such reciprocal data exchanges with or without accompanying technical data. A more advanced version of these measures may take the shape of establishing a Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC) linking the Indian and Pakistani capitals that might serve as a clearing house for exchange of CBM notifications and data.⁷⁰ They could be staffed by military

⁶⁹ Edward D. Desmond, "South Asia: The Nuclear Shadow", *Time*, 27 January 1992, p. 21.

⁷⁰ Susan M. Burns, "Preventing Nuclear War: Arms Management", in S.P. Cohen (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 110.

and civilian liaison officers having direct access to their highest civilian authorities. Specifically in the context of South Asia, they could provide a forum for:-⁷¹

1. Discussion and establishment of procedures for coping with incidents such as unexplained nuclear explosions or potentially threatening moves of the delivery vehicles presumably loaded with nuclear weapons. One such incident took place in May 1990 when reports quoting the US intelligence satellite images revealed that Pakistan had sent a heavily armed convoy from its nuclear facility Kahuta to a local air base and was refitting its F-16 planes with special racks to enable them to carry nuclear weapons, thereby, indicating its preparations for a possible use of nuclear weapons. This heightened the tensions on Indo-Pak border seriously especially when the troops of both sides were already facing each other in an eyeball-to-eyeball position.
2. An exchange of information about military nuclear activities that could be subject to misinterpretation by the other side. Provision of such information would be voluntary and procedures must be implemented to avoid the use of NRRCs for transmitting deliberately deceptive information;
3. Discussion on nuclear doctrines and strategic practices that elicit suspicions or anxiety;
4. Additional communication links between policy makers at various levels, in the absence of a crisis and conduits for relaying concerns about nuclear weapons or civilian nuclear activities that could be potential sources of conflict.⁷²

3.2.3 Mutual Exchange of Visits to Nuclear Facilities

It has been proposed that the two countries should exchange regular visits by scientists to each other's nuclear facilities. Regular meetings or exchanges involving technical or administrative personnel could be useful in facilitating technical discussions on other CBMs and creating a climate of cooperation between the nuclear establishments of the two countries.⁷³ The two can probably draw lessons from the experience of Argentina and Brazil who signed an agreement on the reciprocal visits of scientists to each other's nuclear installations in 1985. The accord not only helped in dissolving the tensions between the two states in the nuclear field but also led to the conclusion of more agreements to widen their nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes. Some visits of this kind have also taken place in South Asia such as that of Dr. Munir

⁷¹ *ibid.*

⁷² *ibid.*

⁷³ Carnegie Report, *op.cit.*, p. 85; Jon Neuhoff & Clifford Singer, "The Verification and Control of Fissile Material in South Asia", in Cohen (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 215.

Khan, former head of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission to the commissioning of India's experimental fast breeder reactor in 1985. Moreover, Rajiv Gandhi was invited to visit Kahuta and General Zia-ul-Haq to the opening of the Kalpakkam plant in India.⁷⁴

Although these visits did not materialize, implementing these measures would have been relatively straightforward and carried out at little political cost.

3.2.4 Non-Use of Nuclear Capabilities

K. Subrahmanyam has proposed a Confidence Building Measure on non use of the nuclear capability against each other, for stabilizing the existing tacit nuclear deterrence between the two countries. No precedent of any such agreement exists which only signifies the unique nature of Indo-Pak nuclear stand-off. The other five acknowledged nuclear weapon powers have based their strategy of nuclear deterrence on an openly declared nuclear status. Israel practices ambiguity about its nuclear status but has the advantage of doing so against non-nuclear adversaries. The world has no parallel of two potentially hostile nations having nuclear capabilities, yet denying them publicly and still hoping to deter each other with the strategic ambiguity.⁷⁵

More significantly, the case of India and Pakistan presents the first nuclear deterrence system outside the ambit of the That is why such special rules have to be devised in the South Asian context to build confidence in each other's peaceful intentions and to avoid accidents and miscalculations. More than that the intention is to reduce tensions and mitigate fears of a pre-emptive strike which is believed to be a special danger to the newly nuclearised countries in an adversarial situation.

This proposal seems to have earned the support of the Indian government as indicated by a senior Foreign Office official in New Delhi. He suggested that the proposed five nation conference by Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif "may discuss an agreement on non-use which can later be universalised".⁷⁶ It stands a fair chance of being negotiated and agreed by both countries, because it requires neither a renunciation of the nuclear option nor a declared nuclear status as a nuclear weapon power, thereby avoiding international sanctions which they may otherwise have to face. India should have no objections since it does

⁷⁴ See, Indian Foreign Minister Mr. B.R. Bhagat's statement in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 11, no. 15, 9 December 1985, col. 425.

⁷⁵ K. Subrahmanyam, "Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand-Off: A Challenge and Opportunity", *Times of India*, 6 June 1988.

⁷⁶ In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

not have the effect of legitimizing the nuclear weapons of other powers and it need not involve the intrusive inspection requirements with intricate verification problems attached. However, Pakistan may have reservations about this proposal because given India's conventional superiority, it would not be in a position to forego the option of using nuclear weapons.⁷⁷

A logical corollary of this step may be a ban on the use and threat to use nuclear weapons in a broader context such as a treaty among India, Pakistan, China, and Russia to begin with on banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. The principle has already figured in the Rajiv Gandhi-Gorbachev Delhi Declaration of November 1986. Both India and Pakistan have been voting consistently in favour of this agreement at the UN and China already adheres to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev had repeatedly called for a global commitment to a no-first use policy. So all of them together would initiate the transition of this proposal into a convention which may form the foundation of an alternative path to the NPT and more states may join it at the UN. At present there are more than 132 countries (only the 15 countries of NATO and two of their allies are opposed to it) which subscribe to such a proposal. The US is also coming under increasing pressure to commit itself to this principle.

There are other confidence building proposals that impose some kind of a constraint on the nuclear option of two countries although they stop short of entailing its renunciation. Evidently, they involve higher political costs and require comprehensive verification measures.

3.2.5 Mutual Inspection of Nuclear Facilities

Pakistan has proposed the mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. The mutual monitoring is designed to ensure that the fissionable material at the unsafeguarded facilities is not diverted to make bombs. The Indian experts have, however, criticized this proposal owing to several procedural difficulties and verification problems. To begin with, one must define what is meant by a nuclear facility. Would the definition include a whole range of nuclear activities from mining to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor operations, waste disposal, reprocessing and finally to weapons manufacture? Since these various activities may not all be in one place and since concealment and clandestine operations are within the bounds

⁷⁷ Akhtar Ali, "A Framework for Nuclear Agreement and Verification", in Cohen (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 285-286; K. Menon, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

of possibility, the scope of inspection would be truly formidable.⁷⁸

Besides, in India all the nuclear activities may be monitored by inspecting the nuclear installations under the supervision of the Atomic Energy Department. But in the case of Pakistan, the entire range of activities in the Kahuta plant is not under the control of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission.⁷⁹ How does then one determine the installations to be inspected? Further, on-site inspections are crucial for verifying data and conditions are not ideal in either country for checking design information or material when it arrives. Thirdly the surprise inspections and accessibility of enough strategic points in the facilities are required for the inspectors to ensure that the production processes of plant can not be changed quickly to make nuclear weapons grade material. This in itself would require a conducive climate and should not be used to create one. Fourthly, it is argued that after putting Kahuta under bilateral safeguards, Pakistan may set out to use its expertise to build a second undeclared centrifuge plant. Indian inspectors would have no way of knowing about the existence of such a facility or plant. Pakistan too in turn, can argue the same for India with regard to its fast breeder and reprocessing facilities. There is another possibility that relates to the gaseous maximum hexafluoride (UF₆) being enriched to the reactor grade level at Kahuta and then its being transported to gaseous diffusion plant at Canchow in China. It may then be upgraded to the weapons grade level. India would have no way of monitoring this, unless the entire output was placed under lock and seal verifiable to the satisfaction of Indian inspectors.

Finally, either side may attempt to blur the issue by taking steps to ensure that the safeguards do not function effectively and impose impediments on the inspections. This can be done by delaying the granting of visas to inspectors that it considers hostile, along with other kinds of bureaucratic delays. These might be coupled with lengthy delays, in making details available about the processes, destroying records and reports of material accounting and the like. Moreover mutual inspections can not prevent a state from producing plutonium or highly enriched uranium that could be used both for weapons and peaceful purposes.

K. Subrahmanyam further distinguishes between mutual inspection and mutual verification procedures.⁸⁰ While the former entitles one party to inspect the plants designated by the other for that

⁷⁸ Rikhi Jaipal, "Mutual Nuclear Inspection", *Indian Express*, 8 August 1985. Also see, R.R. Subramanian, *India, Pakistan and China: Defence and Nuclear Tangle in South Asia*, New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1989, p. 144.

⁷⁹ K. Subrahmanyam, "Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 6, September 1985, p. 552.

⁸⁰ R.R. Subramanian and K. Subrahmanyam, "Mutual Inspection and Verification", in K. Subrahmanyam, ed., *India and the Nuclear Challenge*, New Delhi: IDSA and Lancer Publishers, 1986, p. 171.

purpose it does not guarantee that a government can not indulge in clandestine effort. In cases where there is a suspicion, what is required is mutual verification implying the total surveillance of the other country's nuclear installations. This makes it an intrusive Confidence Building Measure necessitating a very elaborate satellite monitoring system to operate.

The only successful precedent of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities is that of the INF treaty between the US and the former Soviet Union which eliminated the intermediate range missiles and set up verification procedures for monitoring their destruction. However these provisions are not applicable in the Indo-Pak context mainly because both lack the technical means of verification such as photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft based systems (such as radar and optical system) as well as sea and ground based systems (such as radar and antennae for collecting telemetry) for monitoring compliance with the provisions of the agreement. The nature of the inspections involved is also totally different. The INF treaty involved inspections of destruction of all missiles of a given type, relatively a much simpler task than the inspections ensuring against any diversion of the fissile material from any nuclear plant for weapons purposes. The INF allowed inspectors only on the plants earlier producing these missiles and the destruction sites but the latter would require inspectors to cover all nuclear plants, necessitating intrusive verification provisions, a formidable task by any standards in the Indo-Pak context.

Nonetheless for the first time in 1989, the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries reportedly discussed the possibility of opening up their nuclear facilities to each other's inspections under a bilateral treaty.⁸¹ But owing to the reasons discussed above, the chances of this proposal being accepted by the Indian government are at best bleak.

3.2.6 Test Ban on Nuclear Explosions

It has been proposed that the two countries should agree to a total ban on nuclear test explosions. This would limit the development of small, boosted or thermonuclear weapons, thereby preventing them from acquiring a sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons. Pakistan should not have any objection since it does not foreclose its nuclear option because the development of crude nuclear devices does not necessarily require a test explosion. This assessment is endorsed by Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan who stated that the testing of a bomb

⁸¹ Nuclear Week, vol. 30, no. 27, 6 July 1989.

could be done in a lab through a simulator.⁸² It should be acceptable to India as well because it has been advocating the principle of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for nearly four decades now and with specific reference to Pakistan it would establish India's permanent lead in this field. But precisely due to this reason, Pakistan may not support this proposal. At a global level too, there are indications that an overwhelming majority of the NPT signatories are demanding a CTBT, before the NPT is extended in the 1995 Review Conference.⁸³ India and Pakistan can always join hands with other non-nuclear countries in persuading the USA and its NATO allies to agree to a CTBT.

Regarding its verification measures, underground nuclear explosions can be detected and verified with seismic monitoring systems. Pakistan has four known seismic stations and India has 19 known seismic stations.⁸⁴ One Pakistani station and two Indian stations are part of the World Wide Standardised Seismograph Network (WWSSN). Seismic stations worldwide are very well networked and they exchange data routinely with each other. Therefore some experts believe that "a basic infrastructure to monitor a ban on underground tests in South Asia currently exists".⁸⁵ The two countries could agree, as a part of a South Asian Open Skies model, on an aerial surveillance that could be performed throughout Indian and Pakistani territory. However this should not minimize the numerous technical and political difficulties involved in an actual operation of the requisite verification measures. For example, the effectiveness of airborne monitoring depends primarily on the degree of airborne intrusion that is politically legitimized. Further, mutually satisfactory agreements on issues such as inspection quotas, method of transit to sites, aircraft maintenance while in the host nation, notification times, permissible sensors and the like would be very difficult to arrive at and may become more complicated because of the deep-rooted suspicion about each other's intentions.

3.2.7 Fixed Limits on Production of the Fissile Material

It has been proposed that the two countries could agree on fixed limits on production of fissile material relevant for making nuclear weapons which would be kept in completely verifiable depots. However there are serious technical difficulties in verifying the control of fissile material production as well. The main problems specific to the South Asian context would be the special difficulties associated with continuous

⁸² Dr. A.Q. Khan's interview with Kuldip Nayar, "Pakistan Has the Bomb", *The Tribune*, 1 March 1987.

⁸³ "An End to All Nuclear Explosions: The Long Overdue Test Ban", *The Defence Monitor*, Centre for Defence Information, vol. 20, no. 3, 1991, pp. 4-8.

⁸⁴ Vipin Gupta, "Sensing the Threat: Remote Monitoring Technologies", in Cohen (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 257.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

refueling of CANDU reactors and the challenge of devising a system for monitoring a previously uninspected gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.⁸⁶ Furthermore access to centrifuge areas could reveal information about the extent and possibly the enrichment levels aimed for in previous work. And any mismatch between enrichment levels deduced from centrifuge arrangements and previous public statements could also entail a perceived political cost.⁸⁷ An equally vexing question is how to control the existing stockpiles of fissile material in quantities potentially adequate to produce many nuclear weapons. So far the question of fissile material stockpiles has not been addressed elsewhere. In the case of US and Russian delivery vehicles are a more important limitation than the fissile material stockpiles. Since a remote detection of well-shielded uranium or plutonium metal (which might in principle be anywhere in an entire country) is totally out of question, no verification method howsoever intrusive will serve its purpose in the context of South Asia where even a small amount of fissile material sufficient for making a few bombs would make all the difference.

4 Conclusion

The most significant development on the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan has been the gradual shift of the entire debate from a non-proliferation perspective to that of a confidence building framework. This is based on the premise that South Asia has already crossed the threshold of nuclear proliferation and the focus now is on managing rather than controlling proliferation. In this context, the US has been playing a key role in bringing the two countries together to come to an agreement on a nuclear confidence building regime. In the foreseeable future both are highly unlikely to surrender their nuclear option. This line of thinking enjoys a near unanimous support in Indian defence circles as well as its enlightened public opinion.

In Pakistan, however, there are two schools of thought in this respect. The official view is still sticking to the NPT/NWFZ framework of discussions and insists that both countries must give up their nuclear option.⁸⁸ But Pakistan's pro-bomb lobby outside governmental corridors argues strongly that Pakistan should declare its nuclear-weapon status or at least maintain the present situation of an 'undeclared

⁸⁶ Jon Neuhoff, *op.cit.*, p. 216.

⁸⁷ *ibid*, p. 218.

⁸⁸ Interviews conducted in Islamabad and Rawalpindi in October 1991.

deterrence' between India and Pakistan.⁸⁹ The meeting point between these two positions is suggested by a senior official of Pakistan's Foreign Office who told the present author that

Pakistan is prepared to discuss the nuclear issue with India both within a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone framework and a Confidence Building framework of talks.⁹⁰

The Confidence Building Measure on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities was specifically devised in view of Pakistan's apprehensions of an imminent Indian attack on its Kahuta facility. It succeeded in allaying those fears.⁹¹ Beyond that, however, there has not been much progress. It has been argued that the next logical step could be either a unilateral declaration of no-first strike⁹² or an agreement on non-use of the nuclear capability between the two countries. A number of other confidence building proposals stressing the technical aspects of the nuclear issue have also been put forth. In the context of the Indo-Pak situation, however, a confidence building approach should emphasize the political aspects rather than technical solutions. Confidence Building Measures requiring intrusive inspections and comprehensive verification measures may not only prove to be difficult in being accepted but they may well prove to be self-defeating in their purpose.

Since mid-1991 the two countries' Foreign Secretaries have been discussing informally the nuclear issue. The most encouraging development in this respect seems to be the talk of marrying Nawaz Sharif's proposal of holding a multilateral dialogue on the nuclear issue and the Indian proposal of no-first strike. It has been argued that India's main objection to holding five-nation talks was that China would be present only in the capacity of a guarantor along with the US and Russia and not as a participant. The framework of the five-nation talks may be changed from that of 3 guarantors and 2 parties, 3+2, to 5+0, that is all become participants and each agrees not to attack the others.⁹³ Whether this would find support in India or not remains to be seen. On the whole, the confidence building dialogue between India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue is certainly on an upward movement with intermittently encouraging signals.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ In an interview conducted in Islamabad.

⁹¹ This assessment is based on the interviews conducted in Islamabad in October 1991.

⁹² Some Pakistani scholars also supported this idea. In interviews with the present author in conducted October 1991.

⁹³ In an interview with a senior Pakistani Foreign Office official with the present author in October 1991.

CHAPTER XII: THE HEART OF THE MATTER

The fate of the India-Pakistan confidence building process will perhaps be decided not in the power corridors of New Delhi and Islamabad but on their borders in Kashmir and Punjab because there lies the *casus belli* of their bilateral conflict. The fact that after the Simla Agreement these issues, for the first time, revived the fears of another war in the subcontinent points in this direction. The fundamental problem about the core issues of India-Pakistan conflict is that the two countries do not even agree on the nature of the conflict. For Pakistan, the *raison d'être* of the Kashmir conflict lies in India's renegeing on its long-standing promise of holding a plebiscite for deciding the future status of Kashmir. For India, the heart of the problem lies in Pakistan's waging of a low intensity conflict against India by supporting terrorism in the Indian states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Our task therefore is to examine their confidence building efforts for creating a suitable political climate for bridging the gap between their positions and more significantly, for avoiding another war on the Kashmir conflict. Moreover, we must seek to understand and analyse the impact of these continuing core issues of conflict on the overall confidence building process.

We begin by examining the genesis of the Kashmir conflict in its recent phase and its internal dynamics in the case of both India and Pakistan before presenting a detailed analysis of the Indo-Pak efforts for avoiding another war on this issue. The role played by the major powers and some international organizations in this context requires study as does the India-Pakistan confidence building process on this issue for creating a suitable climate for resolving this conflict. This involves the contribution made by the continuing non-official dialogue between the two countries in this respect as well as certain specific proposals put forward by Indian and Pakistani political analysts for resolving the Kashmir conflict. Crucial is the problem of mutual interference in internal affairs in India-Pakistan relations such as the Indian allegations of Pakistan's involvement in supporting terrorism in its state of Punjab and the bilateral attempts made by the two countries to address this issue. Likewise Pakistani allegations of Indian interference in its Sindh province and that of India supporting the anti-regime (that is democratic) forces in Pakistan bears consideration.

1 The Kashmir Conflict

1.1 Background

Since partition India and Pakistan have fought two wars over Kashmir, taken the issue to the UN and also made a number of bilateral attempts to resolve this dispute.¹ By far the Simla Agreement was the most

¹ This has already been discussed in Chapter Four.

significant accord on the Kashmir issue. Irrespective of the fact that whether Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto arrived at a tacit understanding to convert the Line of Control into an international border or not, the two countries did agree not to change the Line of Control by use of force but to resolve the Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations. Subsequently both leaders undertook a number of measures to integrate the Kashmir valley and the Azad Kashmir respectively within India and Pakistan and until 1989 neither side particularly Pakistan had raised seriously the question of a final settlement of Kashmir at their bilateral talks. This is important because the Pakistani side has often argued that the bilateral framework outlined in the Simla Agreement had not paid any dividends on Kashmir for two decades.² But the fact is that the bilateral fora provided under the Simla Agreement were never utilized for serious negotiations on Kashmir even by the Pakistani side. Z.A. Bhutto never raised the issue in bilateral negotiations and made several attempts to integrate Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas fully into Pakistan.³ General Zia also suggested to put Kashmir on the back-burner while the two countries tackled other issues. In an interview with B.G. Verghese in 1983, he said

if we involve Kashmir in our [bilateral] dialogue, we will never be able to proceed further. Let us leave Kashmir for the time being. Let there be a *status quo* for the time being.⁴

On another occasion he said,

we have suggested to India for the time being, let us keep Kashmir issue aside and settle other issues first. Let us create a better atmosphere, build up more confidence between each other; and once there is an environment of mutual trust then we will take up the Kashmir dispute⁵

By all accounts the Kashmir issue had lost the heat it generated in both countries particularly Pakistan during the 1950's and the 1960's.

Initially even Benazir Bhutto did not so much as mention the right of self-determination of Kashmiris in both her meetings with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in January 1988 and July 1989. After their July meeting, Rajiv Gandhi had made it clear in a press conference that the plebiscite was a dead issue as the Indian government had held a number of elections in the state of J&K and therefore Kashmir was a closed issue. And the only response Benazir Bhutto gave was that the Simla Agreement records the recognized

² This assessment is based on the present author's interviews conducted in Pakistan in October 1991.

³ For an excellent account of these measures, see, Robert G. Wirsing, "The Siachin Glacier Dispute-I: The Territorial Dimension", *Strategic Studies* vol. 1, no. 2, Winter 1988, pp. 54-55.

⁴ *President of Pakistan General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq: Interviews to the Foreign Media*, Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, vol. 6, January-December 1983, p. 167. Also see his interview with Partha Chatterjee in the same volume, p. 40

⁵ *ibid.*, vol. 7, January-December 1984, p. 110.

position of both sides. Significantly there was still no mention of the Pakistani demand that India must hold a plebiscite and grant the right of self-determination to Kashmiris which was to become the central plank of the Pakistani government by the following year.

The Kashmir issue resurfaced only at the end of 1989 and early 1990, when the Kashmiri militants started demanding secession from India. In a way, both India and Pakistan were taken by surprise. The central government in New Delhi suddenly woke up to realize the gravity of the situation and started taking measures to win over the alienated masses of the valley and crush the terrorism with a heavy hand. And Pakistan too suddenly remembered that India had never honoured its pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir as laid down in the UN resolutions. Benazir Bhutto who had been describing the Simla Agreement as the only viable framework to govern the bilateral relations between the two countries changed her tune suddenly and declared that a plebiscite granting the right of self-determination to Kashmiris was the only acceptable solution to the Kashmir problem. Before examining the bilateral dimension of this conflict, let us discuss briefly the internal dynamics of this problem in India and Pakistan and its implications for their bilateral confidence building process.

1.2 Internal Dynamics: Jammu and Kashmir

In India Kashmir has always enjoyed a special status as enumerated in the Article 370 of the Indian constitution.⁶ However over the past four decades the Central government in New Delhi has progressively and substantively curtailed the powers and scope of the Article 370 by extending most of the provisions of the Indian constitution to the state. Successive Congress governments in Delhi, right from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to P.V. Narashima Rao, have been inclined to go along with an emasculated Article 370 as long as the state governments in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) were loyal to the Indian Union and did not question the legitimacy of its accession to India. Often the centre adopted both fair and foul methods to this end including the rigging of elections, dismissal of duly elected governments and appointing the state governors of its own

⁶ This article incorporates the Instrument of Accession and is the basis of the constitutional relationship between India and the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). For J&K, the provision limited the powers of the Indian Parliament "to those matters in the Union list and the Concurrent list, which, in consultation with the government of the state, are decided by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession, governing the accession of the state to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion legislature may make laws for that state; and such other matters in the said lists, as with the concurrence of the government of the state, the President may by order specify". The state of J&K also has a separate flag and a separate constitution promulgated in 1954. For the text of Article 370, see, Appendix F, in Balraj Puri, *Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalization*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1981, pp. 213-214.

choice even against the state government's wishes.⁷

It was against this background, that Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah had arrived at an electoral agreement in 1986, whereby an alliance of National Conference and Congress-I was formed to fight the 1987 elections. But the rigging of the 1987 elections is believed to be the turning point because for the first time the newly constituted Muslim United Front, an umbrella organization of several fundamentalist groups and parties, had made a serious bid to capture the power through a popular vote.⁸ Having lost its faith in the democratic political process, the disgruntled elements soon took to the path of militancy.

Almost a parallel development in the state of Kashmir since the early 1980's has been the Islamic component of Kashmiri policies previously to some extent was kept under control by Sheikh Abdullah's secular policies. It has lately become a force to reckon with. Although Jamaat-is-Islami was banned by Sheikh Abdullah, it remained closely linked with similar Muslim fundamentalist organizations in Pakistan. And by second half of the 1960's, a number of small political organizations had sprung up.⁹

By the end of 1989 and early 1990, the militants were already holding sway in the valley and increasingly the politicians were getting marginalized. In December 1989, Dr. Rubiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was kidnapped by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) militants¹⁰ and was freed only after the government gave in to their demand of releasing five JKLF men in exchange for her safe return. This victory of the militants which was celebrated widely in the valley, proved to be the trigger that unleashed a wave of militant violence in the valley and the strong retaliatory measures undertaken by the Indian security forces.

1.3 The Militant Groups

Broadly, there are two strands of militants. One is led by the JKLF and propounds the ideology of Kashmiri nationalism or Kashmiriyat as distinct from Islamic nationalism. It is secular in its outlook and aims at carving out an independent Kashmir. Ammanullah Khan is the leader of this group based in Azad Kashmir.

⁷ For details, see, Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*, Hertfordshire: Roxford books, 1991, Chapter XV.

⁸ M.K. Tikku, "Kashmir: Genesis of the Problem", *Hindustan Times*, 13 August 1991.

⁹ Besides Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Tulba, there were a number of political organizations with an Islamic orientation such as The People's League, Mahaz-e-Azadi which formed an alliance of Muslim United Front with other like-minded parties in 1987 elections and in March 1990. Another 11-party alliance of Tehrik-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir was formed which comprised of the Muslim Conference, The People's League, Mahaz-i-Azadi, Jamaat-i-Islami, Islamic Student League, Islamic Study Circle, Jamiat-i-Tulba, Tahaffuz Nifaz-i- Shariyat, Jamiat Ahle Hadith, Dukhtaran-i-Millat and J&K Bar Association.

¹⁰ Ammanullah Khan from Rawalpindi had claimed the responsibility on behalf of the JKLF. See, Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 337.

He states that

we basically stand for re-unification of our motherland which has now been divided into four parts: Indian-occupied Kashmir, Azad Kashmir and Baltistan which are currently with Pakistan and Aksai Chin under the Chinese control. We want these parts to be re-unified and made a completely independent state. *What we are struggling for is independence from both Pakistan and India.*¹¹

Javed Mir, the commander of JKLF in Srinagar says, "whether we are Muslims, Christians or Hindus, we are first Kashmiris and we believe in secularism".¹² On the other hand, fundamentalist groups¹³ led by Hizbul Mujahideen are totally committed to Islam and *jehad* (holy war) and stand for Kashmir's incorporation into Pakistan. Hizbuls are believed to enjoy the complete support of Pakistan with the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) providing them with arms and training. The following examines briefly the politics of the Pakistani part of Kashmir that is Azad Kashmir.

1.4 Azad Kashmir

In Azad Kashmir, too, the real power is wielded by the federal government in Islamabad and no regime in Muzaffarabad can hope to function once it has fallen into disharmony with former. The state's interim constitution, drawn up in 1974, empowers the federal government under article 56, to dismiss the Prime Minister if the circumstances so warrant. The federal government also exercises its authority through the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, the Kashmir council¹⁴ and key civil servants like the Chief Secretary and Inspector-General of police who are appointed by the federal government and are accountable to it alone.

The rigging of elections for installing more pliable governments in Azad Kashmir is as common a feature as it is in the Kashmir valley. In the January 1991 Assembly elections of Azad Kashmir, its incumbent Prime Minister Mumtaz Hussain Rathore of the People's Party accused the federal government of rigging the polls in favour of the rival Muslim conference and threatened to declare Azad Kashmir as independent saying that it refused to be treated like a "colony" and be dictated to by federal government functionaries.¹⁵ Not surprisingly he was soon dismissed by the federal government.

¹¹ See, Ammanullah Khan's interview in *Newsline*, February 1990.

¹² Shiraz Sidva, "How Green is the Valley", *Sunday*, 11 November 1990. Also see Javed Mir's interview, "We are not pro-Pak", in *Indian Express*, 25 August 1991.

¹³ They are the Jamaat-i-Islami, Hizbul-Islami, Allah Tigers, Zia Tiger Force, Al-Jehad, The Muslim Janbaz Force. See, "Who's Who of Militant Groups", *Indian Express*, 25 August 1991. Also see, "Uprising in the Indian-Held J&K", *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, vol. X, no. 3 & 4, March-April 1991, pp. 26-31.

¹⁴ The council comprises of the representatives of the state government and the federal government and is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

¹⁵ M.H. Askari, "Kashmir Through the Looking Glass", *The Herald*, August 1991, p. 85.

These election results were significant since it then became difficult for Pakistan to convince international opinion that the bulk of Kashmiri militants were keen to join Pakistan because they have been disenchanted with the Indian democratic experience. One diplomat said, "if Pakistanis claim that all the governments in Srinagar were puppets, now they have their own stooge in POK".¹⁶ A Pakistani general wrote that the

Pakistan government should desist from interfering in the internal politics of Azad Kashmir, as it did in the recent past. When a bureaucrat from Pakistan can arrest the Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, how does one expect the world to attach any importance to the pronouncements of Azad Kashmir government.¹⁷

The Kashmir militants particularly JKLF became all the more convinced in rejecting the idea of an accession to Pakistan. This became evident when the JKLF along with the Pakistan's People Party (PPP) and the Muslim League formed a 'New Democratic Alliance' to campaign against the Islamabad supported government of Sardar Abdul Qayyum of the Muslim Conference.¹⁸

1.5 Implications for Bilateral Confidence Building Process

A disparity in the ultimate goals of the JKLF demanding independence, and the Hizbuls that of accession to Pakistan, is a very significant development because a mutual understanding between New Delhi and Islamabad alone is not enough for a resolution of the Kashmir problem since it must also correspond to the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan's demand for holding a plebiscite, for instance, allows only two options, that of joining India or Pakistan. But clearly the JKLF's goal is independent from both India and Pakistan. It may be argued, therefore, that even if the Kashmir valley was to secede away from India, it may be highly unlikely that they would give up their hard-won freedom only to come under the umbrella of Pakistan. Therefore when the Pakistani side speaks of the Kashmiris right of self-determination, a number of questions arise. In the present context, who is to decide the parameters of their right of self-determination ? Why should they not be given the option of an independent Kashmir as well ? Why should the right of self-determination be given to the Kashmiris in the valley alone ? Why not in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas as well ?

¹⁶ See, V.K. Detha, "Weakening its Own Case", *Times of India*, July 1991 ??

¹⁷ Brig.(ret'd) Saleem Zia, "What's Wrong with our Kashmir Cause", *Pakistan Times*, 11 August 1991.

¹⁸ *Pioneer*, 12 February 1991.

This is important because while India rules out completely the plebiscite option,¹⁹ most Pakistanis also fight shy of taking the right of self-determination to its logical conclusion, that is, giving them an option of an independent Kashmir as well. In a Pakistani journalist's words the "Pakistani establishment feels 'nervous' about the notion of an independent Kashmir",²⁰ perhaps because it would also have to give up Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. Such views were echoed by some highly placed Pakistani army generals, particularly General Mirza Aslam Beg who admitted that there are "difficulties with [the idea of] an independent Kashmir... [we] must stick to the original plebiscite option ...join India or Pakistan".²¹

The Indian side, on the other hand argues that raising the very question of self-determination of ethnic and religious minorities for breaking up the existing state structures can set a very dangerous precedent in the subcontinent especially considering the recent developments in former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and more specifically other secessionist demands in Punjab and Assam in India and Sindh and Baluchistan in Pakistan. Indians argue that the talk of self-determination will re-open the whole question of Indian nationhood²² or would amount to "opening a Pandora's box" in India in the sense that if Kashmiris are granted the right of self-determination others will demand the same, so, where do you put an end to this process?²³ Others rejected it on the grounds that the secession of Kashmir would deal a mortal blow to the secular foundations of India's nation building strategy. India's ex-Prime Minister, Mr. Chandra Shekhar put it aptly,

anybody trying to secede Kashmir [away] from India will be totally disappointed. This is not a question of majority/minority; this is not a question of territory, this is a question of the *secular values of the country* and India is committed to that ... Kashmir will remain with India at all costs.²⁴

Pakistan uses the same argument in reverse that the composition of Pakistan will remain incomplete without Kashmir, a Muslim-majority area. Undoubtedly both India and Pakistan have vital stakes in attaining their goals which almost makes it a zero-sum situation where one's gain is the other's loss. In other words,

¹⁹ For a parliamentary debate on this issue, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9th series, vol. 14, no. 5, 27 February 1991, cols. 639-726; *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CLIII, no. 3, 14 March 1990, cols. 345-478; and vol. CLIII, no. 4, 15 March 1990, cols. 189-275.

²⁰ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

²¹ Interviews conducted in Pakistan in October 1991.

²² This opinion is based upon the present author's interviews with a number of Indian scholars and intellectuals in Winter 1991-1992.

²³ In an interview with Mr. I.K. Gujral and Rajendra Sareen with the present author in December 1991.

²⁴ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CLIII, no. 3, 14 March 1990, col. 725.

the problem here is not due to lack of confidence between the two parties in question. Therefore it may be argued that the resolution of these fundamentally political questions within the domestic framework of each country, largely falls beyond the scope of a confidence building process between these two countries in a bilateral relationship. But at the same time it will have a significant bearing on that process.

1.6 Bilateral Conflict

Pakistan's stand on Kashmir had three major planks. First and foremost, India had never granted the long overdue right of self-determination, to which it had been pledged, by holding a plebiscite as laid out in the 1948-49 UN resolutions. Nothing short of holding a plebiscite would, in the Pakistani view, really solve the problem. Secondly, while recognizing that the Simla Agreement had provided for a bilateral framework to resolve the Kashmir dispute, it insisted that the Simla Agreement did not override the UN resolutions and further it did not preclude them from raising the issue in international fora. Hence it undertook a major diplomatic effort to internationalise the Kashmir issue by raising it in various international fora such as the UN, NAM, CHOGM, and OIC to this end. And finally Pakistan emphasized that the political upheaval in the Kashmir valley, characterised as an uprising, or a freedom-struggle, was a totally indigenous movement and Pakistan provided no armed support to the militants although it was morally bound to provide diplomatic and political support to the Kashmiri cause.

India's official position was that Kashmir is an integral and inalienable part of India and its future political status was non-negotiable. It made it clear that four decades after the partition, holding a plebiscite on religious grounds under any circumstances was totally out of question. It was also pointed out that Pakistan had no right to ask India to hold a plebiscite since Pakistan itself had never complied to the first two parts of the UN resolutions, which asked for the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the areas of Kashmir under its occupation.²⁵ Finally the Indian government maintained that the political unrest in the valley was an internal affair and accused the Pakistani government of extending armed support and training to the Kashmiri militants. India's Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed stated in Parliament in March 1990 that

our neighbouring country's continued assistance to the secessionist elements in the valley in a vigorous manner is a cause of grave concern. We have concrete evidence regarding assistance in the shape of arms, inspiration and guidance being received by the militants

²⁵ For the text of this resolution, see, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 13, no. 2, May 1990, pp. 142-146.

from across the border. We also have information regarding the large number of training camps being run on the other side of the border to train the militants.²⁶

The Pakistani government insisted that they were providing only political and moral support to their Kashmiri brethren and that the Kashmiri uprising against the Indian rule was a totally indigenous movement. At an unofficial level, however, the Pakistani intelligentsia admitted more openly that the armed support was being extended to the Kashmiri militants, treated as 'freedom-fighters'. Ammanullah Khan and Javed Mir had acknowledged without any equivocation that weapons were smuggled across the Pakistani border to their forces in Indian Kashmir.²⁷ Sardar Abdul Qayyum called publicly upon Kashmiris to fulfil their obligations towards the liberation of the valley and stated that Azad Kashmir was the "base camp of the Kashmiri freedom struggle".²⁸

There were continuing clashes between the militants and the Indian security forces in the valley and the gulf between the two countries positions was widening. Against the backdrop of increasingly vociferous Indian accusations of Pakistan providing armed support to the militants and heated exchanges of bellicose statements and war rhetoric between the two countries, India and Pakistan came dangerously close to another war over Kashmir in the spring of 1990. The only redeeming feature of this period was that despite all the rhetoric the two countries sustained continuously a confidence building dialogue at a high political as well as military level in order to avoid a war which neither country could afford or win. Now let us examine briefly the major developments during this period and the specific Confidence Building Measures undertaken by the two sides to keep tempers in check and the extent to which they succeeded.

1.7 Bilateral Confidence Building Measures: Avoiding a War

Although the tensions had started building up by late 1989 no major initiative was undertaken by either side perhaps in view of the Indian general elections and the growing prospects of Congress-I losing them. The Congress did lose the elections and a new government of V.P. Singh's National Conference came to power in New Delhi. Pakistani policy makers' hopes were raised partly because a Congress government

²⁶ See, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CLIII, no. 3, 14 March 1990, col. 342; and vol. CLIII, no. 12, 27 March 1990, cols. 355, 404-406. Also see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9th series, vol. 3, no. 13, 28 March 1990, cols. 698-702.

²⁷ An *Asiawatch* report in 1991 stated that the Kashmiri militants do not deny that they receive support from Pakistan. See, *The Tribune*, 3 August 1991. The report added that other Pakistani government officials have acknowledged the existence of training camps inside Pakistan for Kashmiri guerrillas. By 1988, Pakistan's ISI had begun to establish the training camps inside Azad Kashmir manned by retired army officers. In addition, Pakistan had reportedly trained cadres of militant leaders and smuggled hundreds of weapons into the Kashmir valley including rocket launchers and Kalashnikov rifles from US supplies for the Afghan mujahideens. *The Tribune*, 1 August 1991.

²⁸ *Nation*, 1 November 1991; *Pakistan Times*, 31 October 1991.

in New Delhi is traditionally perceived as more hostile and partly because they had in mind the golden era of Indo-Pak relations during the Janata regime from 1977-79. But being a minority government, it was supported from outside by the BJP, not a very good augury for Indo-Pak relations particularly for resolving the Kashmir issue considering the BJP's position on this issue.²⁹

1.7.1 Benazir Bhutto-V.P Singh Period

The Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took the initiative of sending Mr. Abdul Sattar as a special envoy on a goodwill mission to New Delhi. The "limited objective" of this mission was to "act as a channel for the first contact at the highest level between Islamabad and the new government at Delhi in order to make the opening and set the mood for future exchanges".³⁰ The two sides agreed to start a confidence building dialogue between senior officials to remove the bilateral tensions and announced that a joint committee of the Secretaries of Defence, External Affairs, Home Affairs and Water Resources Ministries should soon meet paving the way for a Joint Ministerial Commission meeting at the earliest opportunity.³¹ The two also agreed for a liberalization of the trade, travel and consular restrictions besides fostering a greater degree of people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges. However, it was the issue of Pakistani involvement in supporting the militants in Punjab and J&K which dominated the discussions. Prime Minister V.P. Singh apparently told Abdul Sattar that Pakistan must "demonstrate that it wishes to stop assistance to the Kashmiri terrorist, if it wants better ties with India".³² Overall Sattar described his mission as successful to the extent that he had accomplished the task of rejuvenating the normalization process between the two countries.

The second major contact between New Delhi and Islamabad took place when Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan visited India later on 21 January. The meeting between two Foreign Ministers was described as "fruitful, cordial and frank"³³ but by all accounts, the talks had failed to resolve any differences on the Kashmir issue. The two admitted having done some 'plain talking' in this regard. Mr. Gujral provided "irrefutable evidence" of Pakistani involvement in supporting the Muslim militants³⁴ and

²⁹ As noted in Chapter Five, BJP is the only political party in India that demands removal of Article 370 altogether and a complete merger of the state of J&K into the Indian Union.

³⁰ See the editorial in *Pakistan Times*, 16 January 1990.

³¹ *Dawn*, 10 January 1990.

³² Satish Kumar, *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1990-91*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1992, p. 169.

³³ *Muslim*, 25 January 1990.

³⁴ In an interview with an Indian Foreign Office official with the present author in January 1992.

cautioned that it would be a grave miscalculation to view the situation in J&K as an "internal uprising against injustice"³⁵ Yaqub Khan rejected categorically the Indian accusations and insisted it was "purely indigenous and resulted from the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir" on which there would be "no compromise".³⁶ Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was believed to have told Mr. I.K. Gujral that

Kashmir was up in flames and if India expected that Pakistan's stand *will not change*, or if at all, only a minor change, it could not be possible.³⁷

In other words, if India expected Pakistan "to bail it out by not extending political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris, then Pakistan can not do it".³⁸ Mr. Gujral, however, described Mr. Khan's talk of "perilous circumstances and dark clouds of war" as "belligerent rhetoric" and clearly a "threat and ultimatum of war".³⁹ He said that he was "taken aback" by Mr. Khan's talk and was initially under the impression that "may be I did not perceive it correctly or I did not register it correctly" but when Mr. Khan met the Prime Minister V.P. Singh and delivered the same message "it was obvious".⁴⁰ He added that his suspicions were further confirmed by "the ground reality moving in that direction also" which meant that "by January 1990, the terrorist activities and the support to terrorism from across the border had been stepped up greatly".⁴¹

A highly placed Pakistani Foreign Office official described this meeting between Mr. Khan and Mr. Gujral as a "classic case of misperception" where Mr. Khan thought that Mr. Gujral was underestimating the situation in Kashmir and Mr. Gujral felt that Mr. Khan was threatening a war.⁴² He added that the meeting had ended on a less than cordial note. This was further exacerbated by the press which led to a virtual deadlock. The two had failed to arrive at any understanding on Kashmir and later Mr. Khan also declared that Pakistan would not agree to hold meetings of various Joint Commissions on defence, interior ministries, culture and trade, until things improved in the Kashmir valley.⁴³ Barely two days later, however, a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman dispelled the impression that serious developments in Kashmir had affected the normal process of talks between two countries and clarified that "consultations are going on to decide the

³⁵ *Times of India*, 24 January 1990.

³⁶ *Frontier Post*, 24 January 1990; and *Nation*, 25 January 1990.

³⁷ In an interview conducted in Islamabad in October 1991.

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ See, I.K. Gujral's interview with Nasim Zehra in *Frontier Post*, 15 June 1990. This view was corroborated by an eminent Indian political leader in an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² In an interview conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

⁴³ *Nation*, 24 January 1990.

dates for these meetings".⁴⁴

The bilateral differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the overall situation deteriorated very quickly in the subsequent months. Both governments matched each other's bellicose statements. Benazir Bhutto renewed the calls of her father for a thousand years war with India over Kashmir.

In her address to a special joint session of the National Assembly on 10 February 1990, she said that

Pakistan will not compromise on the right of self-determination of the people of J&K.... the present uprising is a popular and mass uprising by the Kashmiris [which] can not be induced by foreign agents....⁴⁵

She insisted that India had occupied Kashmir against the wishes of the people of Kashmir and that Kashmiris had never accepted Indian occupation and struggled against it with determination. Benazir Bhutto added that the 'solidarity week' Pakistan had observed from February 2-9 in support of the Kashmiri struggle had proved that the whole of the Pakistani nation was united on the question of Kashmir. She also spoke of the implementation of the UN resolutions through a fair and free plebiscite. Significantly, by now there was no mention of the Simla Agreement. The Army Chief General Beg stated that

the threatening statements from across the border are really serious and call for a high state of preparedness and vigilance...⁴⁶

He described the political climate as "depressing".⁴⁷ Senator Qazi Hussain Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami said that "any aggression by India against Pakistan was bound to result in an Indian defeat".⁴⁸ Sardar Abdul Qayyum of Azad Kashmir had earlier declared that more than 10,000 persons would soon cross the border to help the JKLF activists.⁴⁹ These statements were actually followed by about 4000 Pakistani civilians' attempts to cross over the Line of Control.⁵⁰

On the Indian side, the Prime Minister V.P. Singh, in a speech to Lok Sabha on 13 March 1990 warned Pakistan

if there is any misadventure, we will react not only swiftly but also decisively. We have the will and the capacity.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Muslim, 26 January 1990.

⁴⁵ Times of India, 11 February 1990.

⁴⁶ Frontier Post, 12 April 1990.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Pakistan Times, 16 April 1990.

⁴⁹ The Tribune, 7 February 1990.

⁵⁰ Muslim, 13 February 1990.

⁵¹ See V.P. Singh's statement made in Lok Sabha Debates, 9th series, vol. 6, no. 43, 17 March 1990, cols. 567-569.

He added that "Pakistan should understand that military miscalculations arising from political support to secessionists would prove costly to the country".⁵² Congress in opposition and the BJP both called on the government to give a fitting reply to Pakistan for its open provocation of expressing full support to the people of Kashmir in their secessionist demands.⁵³

While India continued to accuse Pakistan of giving armed support to the Muslim separatists, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. S.K. Singh summoned Pakistan's High Commissioner Mr. Bashir Babar twice in twelve hours on 12 February 1990 and furnished him with up to date detailed documentary evidence of Pakistan's interference in India's domestic affairs including a detailed map showing 46 training camps.⁵⁴ Benazir Bhutto, however, denied totally Pakistan's involvement in the violence in valley and described the charges about the training camps in Pakistan as "preposterous".⁵⁵

It is important, however, to note that despite all the belligerent rhetoric the political leaders of the two countries made it very clear that they did not want war and were taking all the necessary steps to avoid any such eventuality. On the Indian side, both V.P. Singh and I.K. Gujral made a number of statements to the effect that "the last thing which India desires is a war with Pakistan".⁵⁶ Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan also said that "Pakistan does not want war and we believe that India also wants to avoid a war".⁵⁷ Both sides offered bilateral talks under the Simla Agreement and stressed the need for a "negotiated settlement" of the problem.⁵⁸

On the ground too, the two sides kept all the channels of communication open. For instance, after the incidents of Pakistani civilians crossing the Line of Control, the Foreign Secretaries, S.K. Singh and Tanvir Ahmed Khan discussed it over the 'hotline' and agreed upon the need to maintain calm and restraint. Senior military officials of India and Pakistan also established contact.⁵⁹ International opinion also favoured

⁵² *ibid.* Also see, Yearbook 1990-91, *op.cit.*, p. 170. Also see his statements as quoted in *The Tribune*, 12 April 1990; and *Pakistan Times*, 14 April 1990.

⁵³ *Daily News*, 2 February 1990.

⁵⁴ Yearbook 1990-91, *op.cit.*, p. 170. Also see, *Hindustan Times*, 25 April 1990.

⁵⁵ *ibid.* Also see, *Frontier Post*, 16 April 1990.

⁵⁶ *The Tribune*, 7 February 1990.

⁵⁷ *Muslim*, 5 February 1990.

⁵⁸ On the Indian side, see Rajiv Gandhi's statement not to create a war psychosis in *Times of India*, 15 April 1990. India's Army Chief General Sunderji said that chances of a war with Pakistan were pretty low. *Hindustan Times*, 24 April 1990. India's High Commissioner to Pakistan Mr. J.N. Dixit stressed the need for bilateral talks to solve the Kashmir issue. *Frontier Post*, 7 February 1992. On the Pakistani side, see statements by its Foreign Secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan in, *Muslim*, 16 February 1990; Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's in, *Dawn*, 12 March 1990; and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's in, *Frontier Post*, 5 April 1990.

⁵⁹ *Muslim*, 13 April 1990.

avoidance of another conflict between India and Pakistan. Both the USA and the Soviet Union stressed the need for a political dialogue between the two countries and a peaceful solution of the problem. Benazir Bhutto's appeal to the Muslim World for supporting the cause of self-determination for Kashmiris also did not yield much result.

It was against this backdrop that Mr. Gujral and Mr. Khan had a second meeting in New York on 25 April 1990, on the occasion of the Special Session of UN General Assembly on International Economic Cooperation. Although they failed to resolve any basic differences on the Kashmir issue, they agreed that the small confidence building steps of maintaining regular contacts between the two countries' Director-General-of-Military-Operations (DGMOs) among other official channels of communication between New Delhi and Islamabad should be kept open at all levels.⁶⁰ After the meeting, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan said in a press conference,

I can not pretend that our meeting has been a breakthrough nevertheless it is an advance, particularly because both sides spoke of seeking a peaceful settlement and of avoiding the possibility of a confrontation and conflict.⁶¹

He also disclosed his proposal that "a neutral mechanism under the UN or under a group of neutral countries be constituted to monitor Indian allegations of Islamabad's complicity and interference in the Kashmir valley".⁶² But I.K. Gujral rejected the suggestion saying that "we walked away from third-party mediation many years ago when the Simla Agreement was signed".⁶³ Gujral reiterated that Islamabad must take "credible steps" to convince New Delhi that the Pakistanis were not supporting terrorism and that the UN resolutions on Kashmir had "died" when the Simla Agreement was signed in 1972.⁶⁴

Later in a press conference on 3 May 1990, Benazir Bhutto offered to meet V.P. Singh for bilateral talks on the Kashmir issue "in the light of the unanimous resolutions of the UN".⁶⁵ She also suggested re-deployment of troops on either side of the border to their peacetime locations and the setting up of a neutral international mechanism to testify on the veracity of allegations and counter-allegations in regard to the

⁶⁰ *Indian Express*, 27 April 1990.

⁶¹ Alaf A. Sheikh, "Yaqub and Gujral Meeting", *Nation*, 4 May 1990.

⁶² Air Marshall (retd) Ayaz Amir Khan, "Yaqub-Gujral Meeting and After", *Frontier Post*, 6 May 1990.

⁶³ *Indian Express*, 27 April 1990.

⁶⁴ *Indian Express*, 26 April 1990. Also see, Mr. I.K. Gujral's statement in Rajya Sabha on his talks with Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CLIV, no. 2, 2 May 1990, cols. 217-220.

⁶⁵ *Pakistan Times*, 3 May 1990.

situation in the Kashmir valley.⁶⁶ I.K. Gujral responded that India was ready to hold unconditional talks with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue but rejected Benazir Bhutto's offer due to the Pakistani conditions applied to such a dialogue.⁶⁷

The Indo-Pak situation in May 1990 had virtually reached a deadlock when the US Gates mission visited the subcontinent and persuaded both sides to make a fresh start by undertaking certain specific Confidence Building Measures to restore confidence and prevent a war by accident. While a senior Pakistani official believed that Islamabad had broached the idea of initiating a confidence building process between the two countries at that stage,⁶⁸ the Indian Foreign Office stated that it was originally Mr. Robert Gates's idea who had persuaded Delhi to propose a set of civil and military related Confidence Building Measures.⁶⁹

Later on 28 May 1990, the Indian government proposed a set of military and non-military Confidence Building Measures. The Pakistani response came on 7 June when a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman hinted at an early meeting between the two countries' Foreign Secretaries. Meanwhile New Delhi announced that it had withdrawn some armoured formations from the Indo-Pak border as a unilateral gesture to Islamabad.⁷⁰

India's Foreign Secretary Mr. Muchkund Dubey had talks with his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Tanvir Ahmed Khan on 18-19 July, on the 7-point package of Confidence Building Measures earlier proposed by India. The proposals envisaged continual contacts between the local commanders and sharing information about the military movements on a sector-to-sector and point-to-point basis.⁷¹ The Indian side also proposed joint patrolling along the Line of Control and hot pursuit of the terrorists to stop them from flowing across the border.⁷² Mr. Khan expressed his reservations that it would compromise Pakistan's sovereignty and that while the principle of hot pursuit may be acceptable in international law, it did not fit in the context of the India-Pakistan situation.⁷³ Mr. Dubey also handed over a dossier containing "fresh evidence of Pakistan's

⁶⁶ Daily News, 6 May 1990.

⁶⁷ Times of India, 4 May 1990. Also see, I.K. Gujral's statement in *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CLIV, no. 3, 3 May 1990, cols. 97-98.

⁶⁸ In an interview conducted in Islamabad in October 1991.

⁶⁹ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in January 1992.

⁷⁰ Nation, 15 June 1990.

⁷¹ These proposals have already been discussed in Chapter Nine.

⁷² Pakistan Times, 22 July 1990.

⁷³ Dawn, 22 July 1990.

involvement in subversive activities in Punjab and J&K".⁷⁴ and Mr. Khan promised to look into it "most carefully".⁷⁵ Pakistan, on its side, put pressure to discuss the political future of Kashmir which it insisted was the central issue of Indo-Pak tensions. The two however, failed to resolve any differences on the Kashmir issue since Mr. Dubey rejected totally Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir and reiterated that Kashmir was an integral part of India and Pakistan had no business to interfere in its internal affairs.⁷⁶

The Pakistani side raised the issue of the re-deployment of forces to their peacetime locations but Mr. Dubey insisted that they were there only to control the separatists' violence and there was no aggressive intentions towards Pakistan.⁷⁷ On the whole there was no concrete outcome of the meeting except it was a useful exercise. As a Foreign Office spokesman said "the greatest progress was that we sat together and were able to understand each other's position, brushing aside the cobwebs".⁷⁸

Just before the second round of Foreign Secretaries' talks in August 1990, Benazir Bhutto's government in Pakistan was dismissed by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi became the caretaker Prime Minister. In India, even V.P. Singh was facing severe problems to hold his government together and his Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral had already handed in his resignation. Before examining the effect of a change in government in Pakistan on the second round of foreign secretary talks, let us review briefly the confidence building process between India and Pakistan during the Benazir Bhutto-V.P. Singh period when their relations dipped to a very low ebb.

1.6.2 A Critical Analysis

The developments during this period seemed to give a blow to an oft-repeated theme that a democratic government in Islamabad and a non-Congress government in New Delhi is more conducive to better Indo-Pak relations. But it may be argued that the nature and dynamics of events in Kashmir during early 1990 were such that irrespective of the nature of the political party in power, the national position of any other government in Delhi or Islamabad on Kashmir would have been much the same. Another important reason of the deterioration of their bilateral relations during this period may have been because of weak governments

⁷⁴ The dossier gave details of the terrorist camps in Pakistan, confessions by persons arrested for having received arms and training in that country and types of weapons seized from persons while crossing the border from Pakistan over to India. See, *Times of India*, 21 July 1991.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

⁷⁶ Yearbook 1990-91, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

⁷⁷ These proposals have already been discussed in Chapter Nine.

⁷⁸ *Frontier Post*, 20 July 1990.

both in Islamabad and New Delhi.

In Pakistan, a 'troika' of the President, the Army Chief and the Prime Minister was operating and Benazir Bhutto wielded the least political influence among the three. By all accounts, her hands were tied right from the beginning in the realm of foreign policy. Since Benazir Bhutto was not the only one deciding the country's foreign policy, one often witnessed diverging or contradictory foreign policy statements being issued from the 'multiple power centres' in Islamabad. For instance, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan first re-introduced the "unfinished agenda of partition" of completing the accession of Kashmir as early as 1989,⁷⁹ while Benazir Bhutto's government, until February 1990, was talking of resolving the Kashmir issue in light of the Simla Agreement with no mention of the plebiscite option which was to come later.⁸⁰ At a press conference in February 1990, she also said that Pakistan was not interested in internationalizing the issue and was prepared to settle it through bilateral negotiations. But it was not before long when her government had adopted a policy of internationalizing the issue vigorously in the UN as well as in other international fora such as the NAM, OIC and the Commonwealth.

Bearing in mind that Foreign Minister Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was the establishment's choice within Benazir Bhutto's government, often one could hear widely divergent views on important foreign policy issues. For instance, on 3 February 1990 Pakistan's Defence Ministry officials issued a statement of fresh deployment of Indian troops along the Line of Control⁸¹ but only two days later, the Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan contradicted this by saying that Pakistan had received no alarming reports of Indian troop movements that would be of any cause of concern.⁸² One may also take note of the marked difference between the visit to Delhi of Abdul Sattar, a close confidant of Benazir Bhutto as her special envoy on 11 January 1990 and that of her Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan later in the same month on 24-25 January. While the first succeeded in rejuvenating the normalization process between two countries at the highest political level, the latter's visit not only brought a halt to the confidence building process but in fact set the pace for a very fast deterioration in bilateral relations. This qualitative difference between the tone and content of messages of two very senior officials of the Pakistani foreign policy establishment

⁷⁹ See, Yearbook 1990-91, *op.cit.*, p. 169.

⁸⁰ See her statement at the joint press conference with the French President Mitterand in Islamabad on 21 February 1990, as quoted in Yearbook 1990-91, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

⁸¹ Daily News, 3 February 1990.

⁸² Muslim, 5 February 1990.

reflected the difficulties in policy making in Islamabad during that period.

Within Pakistan's Foreign Office too, rival power centres were emerging. The Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan although close to establishment and therefore with a separate power base was being by-passed effectively within the Ministry while the Foreign Secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan was believed to be ruling the roost with "direct access to the Prime Minister".⁸³ The situation was aptly summed up by a Pakistani observer that "we have a four-and-half Foreign Ministers running our foreign policy, no wonder the nation does not know, what is the direction of our foreign policy".⁸⁴

Moreover, Benazir Bhutto was coming increasingly under attack from the opposition for not being able to stand up to India or being soft on India, a charge no political leader in Islamabad can withstand. From then onwards, it was a game of one-upmanship in accusing India for its brutal repression of the freedom-fighters in the valley and stoking the fires of anti-Indian hysteria. So it was not surprising that gradually her tone too became far more shrill and she revived the rhetoric of a thousand years war with India.

She failed willingly or unwillingly even to exercise any control on the actions of Sardar Abdul Qayyum's government of Azad Kashmir. For instance, when Qayyum announced that his government would soon send 10,000 Kashmiris across the border into the valley to assist the freedom-fighters in their struggle against the Indian government, no statement was issued by the federal government in Islamabad either condemning or rebutting Qayyum's remarks. Later when Qayyum announced a fund for supporting the cause of freedom-fighters, all Benazir Bhutto could say was that

if the Chief Minister of a particular province or the opposition party chief says that we are going to raise funds for freedom-fighters, what does a democratic government do?...we have counselled restraint.... but it can not just arrest the opposition...⁸⁵

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan in his talks with I.K. Gujral in January 1990 had also tried to make a distinction between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, arguing that Islamabad was not necessarily responsible for what happened in that area.⁸⁶ However our analysis suggests that Islamabad exercises full control on the Azad

⁸³ Nizami writes that another primary counter-weight to Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was perhaps the Advisor for National Security, Mr. Iqbal Akhund and Mr. Naseer Sheikh and Mr. Happy Mianwala were other close confidants of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Apparently Naseer Sheikh did not even hold his earlier official position as Advisor for Overseas Pakistanis, but attended all important meetings of the foreign office. And Mr. Mianwala, the ambassador-at-large handled all sensitive assignments including liaising with the US Ambassador, Mr. Robert Oakley. See, Arif Nizami, "As Confusion Prevails, Diarchy Inhibits Foreign Policy", *Nation*, 13 June 1990.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

⁸⁵ In an interview with *Time*, 16 April 1990.

⁸⁶ *Times of India*, 20 January 1990.

Kashmir government's actions. It is interesting to note that when Nawaz Sharif's government decided to make a major contribution to that fund, Benazir Bhutto herself joined the fray and announced the federal government's contribution on the plea of humanitarian grounds. On the whole, one may argue that irrespective of its democratic credentials a weak and divided government like that of Benazir Bhutto was quite likely to adopt a uncompromising position on a central and emotive issue such as that of Kashmir.

Somewhat similar was the story of V.P. Singh's government in Delhi which came under mounting pressure from Congress in opposition and the BJP to adopt a tough line against Pakistan. The BJP even advocated selective military strikes against the suspected training camp sites in Azad Kashmir. It may be argued that although Singh's government did adopt a hardline policy towards Pakistan and indulged increasingly in the rhetoric of war, there is little evidence to show that the BJP had much effect on changing the content of the country's foreign policy towards Pakistan. V.P. Singh's government perhaps did not even contemplate the idea of carrying out any military strikes against the suspected training camps in Pakistan as suggested by the BJP.⁸⁷ In fact, V.P. Singh's government was to soon resign after falling out with the BJP on the Babri Mosque dispute, an issue which otherwise had all the potential of adversely affecting Indo-Pak relations. While the Congress party demanded a stern action against Pakistan for supporting terrorism openly in Punjab and J&K, its leader, Rajiv Gandhi, also suggested that the two Prime Ministers should hold a summit meeting to defuse the tensions and resolve the Kashmir issue.⁸⁸ But there is no doubt that V.P. Singh's minority government was in no position to take any major initiative on this issue.

The more immediate effects of Benazir Bhutto's dismissal in Islamabad could only be described as positive in the sense that a change of government in Pakistan had not even led to cancellation or postponement of the Foreign Secretaries talks. This reflected a growing realization on behalf of Pakistan's ruling establishment which perhaps knew that the Foreign Secretary talks might lead no where on the Kashmir issue. But it saw the wisdom in sustaining the confidence building process in order to defuse the tensions and continue the dialogue on other military Confidence Building Measures. The Indian government too did not postpone the talks despite the fact that Pakistan had raised the Kashmir issue at the OIC.⁸⁹ It may be noted

⁸⁷ This point has also been discussed in Chapter Five.

⁸⁸ Also see Eduardo Falerio's statement in the Lok Sabha arguing that war was not a viable option and pleading for a dialogue with the Pakistani leadership within the parameters of the Simla Agreement. See, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9th series, vol.3, no. 17, 5 April 1990, col. 612.

⁸⁹ *Pakistan Times*, 8 August 1990.

that during Mrs. Indira Gandhi's regime, bilateral talks between India and Pakistan had been postponed on a number of occasions when Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the international fora.

1.6.3 V.P. Singh - G.M. Jatoi Period

The second round of Foreign Secretary talks was held in New Delhi on 10 August 1990. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan, carried the mandate of the caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who expressed his full desire "to establish cooperative, mutually beneficial and good neighbourly relations with India".⁹⁰ While the two sides made substantive progress on military Confidence Building Measures,⁹¹ they merely reiterated their positions on Kashmir and the deadlock continued. Dubey described the talks as "candid, fruitful with detailed discussions, specific in nature".⁹² Khan, however, issued contradictory statements regarding the outcome of the talks. While in Delhi, on 11 August, he spoke of "good progress" and "fruitful talks"⁹³ but on his return to Islamabad, he changed his tune and said "no progress was achieved ... for India continued its negative attitude towards touching the core issues involved - Kashmir".⁹⁴

In the following months some skirmishes between the two armies along the Line of Control were reported⁹⁵ and accusations of interference in each other's internal affairs persisted. However the political leaders of the two countries also issued a number of statements ruling out the possibility of a war.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, V.P. Singh did not accept G.M. Jatoi's offer of upgrading the Indo-Pak talks to the summit or ministerial level "since it will not serve any purpose" he argued ".. until Pakistan spelt out the long-term objectives of its ties with India".⁹⁷ By November 1990, there were new governments both in Delhi and Islamabad.

1.6.4 Chandra Shekhar-Nawaz Sharif Period

Nawaz Sharif had come to power in Islamabad and in Delhi Chandra Shekhar was at the helm of

⁹⁰ Pakistan Times, 10 August 1990.

⁹¹ They have already been discussed in Chapter Nine.

⁹² Yearbook 1990-91, *op.cit.*, p. 172.

⁹³ Dawn, 11 August 1990.

⁹⁴ Dawn, 13 August 1990. K.K. Katyal, an Indian journalist wrote that even while Khan was in Delhi on 12 August, in public he spoke of "excellent progress" of his talks with Dubey, but in private, he painted a gloomy picture. In public, he commended Dubey's "patience, understanding and forbearance" but in private, conveyed the contrary impression. *The Hindu*, 13 August 1990.

⁹⁵ For the Pakistani account of the fighting, see, *Pakistan Times*, 14 September 1990; *Muslim*, 20 September 1990, 23 September 1990; *Nation*, 8 October 1990. For an Indian account, see, *The Hindu*, 22 August 1990; *The Tribune*, 20 September 1990; *Times of India*, 23 September 1990.

⁹⁶ *Muslim*, 24 September 1990; *Times of India*, 8 October 1990; *Dawn*, 11 October 1990.

⁹⁷ *Dawn*, 19 August 1990; *Pakistan Times*, 21 August 1990.

affairs. And the ice was broken when the two Prime Ministers met in Male on 22-23 November 1990, on the occasion of the SAARC summit and expressed a keen desire to improve bilateral relations. The two agreed to remain in touch through the hotline and decided that the Foreign Secretary talks which had been stalled for a while would take place on 18-20 December 1990. Subsequently Prime Minister Shekhar disclosed that Sharif had called on him twice on the hotline and the two had discussed various matters.⁹⁸

In light of these developments, Pakistan's new Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan and his Indian counterpart Muchkund Dubey had a third round of talks on 18-22 December in Islamabad. Both Khan and Dubey agreed that "the constructive exchange of views between the two Prime Ministers at Male had provided them with positive clues" to carry the dialogue forward. The two agreed on a number of military Confidence Building Measures⁹⁹ and discussed other issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, boundary demarcation, Siachin and the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project. Although no tangible progress could be made on the Kashmir issue, Khan disclosed that after a very long time, the two countries at least discussed the issue in considerable detail.

Dubey described the talks as a "different meeting" from the previous two.¹⁰⁰ perhaps in the sense that it lacked the acrimony which had marked the earlier talks. The spirit was no longer that of simply meeting to record their respective official positions but a true beginning in actually thrashing out various problems was made. Perhaps it had something to do with the 'personality factor' since the two Foreign Secretaries had developed a good rapport. This was particularly appreciated in India because Pakistan's previous Foreign Secretary, Mr. Tanvir Ahmed Khan's style was often described as somewhat rigid.¹⁰¹ Muchkund Dubey also had talks with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and praised latter's constructive approach towards the confidence building process between the two countries.¹⁰²

The fourth round of Foreign Secretary talks took place in New Delhi on 4-6 April 1991. Once again there was not much progress on the Kashmir issue although the two signed two military Confidence Building Measures and agreed to resume the dialogue on Siachin and the demarcation of boundaries in the Sir Creek

⁹⁸ Pakistan Times, 30 November 1990; Dawn, 23 December 1990.

⁹⁹ These have been discussed in Chapter Nine.

¹⁰⁰ Times of India, 22 December 1990.

¹⁰¹ This is the present author's assessment from interviews with a number of senior Foreign Office officials in New Delhi in Winter 1991-1992.

¹⁰² Dawn, 20 December 1990.

area.¹⁰³ The situation on the ground at the Line of Control, however, deteriorated in early May when India reported the killing of 66 militants by the Indian security forces while they were trying to cross over the Line of Control to the Indian side. While Pakistan "strongly condemned the killings", the Indian Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar, warned that Pakistan would pay a "heavy price", if it did not refrain from sending the infiltrators and saboteurs into J&K.¹⁰⁴ The tension was however defused when Nawaz Sharif visited New Delhi in May 1991 on the occasion of Rajiv Gandhi's funeral and held talks with Chandra Shekhar and other political leaders of the leading opposition parties of Congress and the BJP. However, since Shekhar was now only continuing as a caretaker Prime Minister, a meaningful dialogue between the two countries had to wait until a new Indian Prime Minister had taken his seat in New Delhi. Nevertheless Sharif returned home "confident" as he said that "there is a basis" for moving forward in the relationship between the two countries no matter which political party came to power in New Delhi.¹⁰⁵

1.6.5 Nawaz-Sharif-P.V. Narasimha Rao Period

Congress under P.V. Narasimha Rao had come back to power in New Delhi in June 1991 although it had lost its majority in Parliament. On the occasion of the SAARC Foreign Ministers meeting at Male on 1 July 1991, Indian Foreign Minister Madhav Singh Solanki met Pakistani Planning Minister, Hamid Nasir Chatta and the two Foreign Secretaries Muchkund Dubey and Shaharyar Khan also discussed various bilateral issues. The two agreed to hold a fifth round of their talks in September and fixed the dates for various experts' meetings to discuss issues of demarcation in the Sir Creek area, the Wullar Barrage and the prevention of drug-trafficking.¹⁰⁶

Later the two Prime Ministers Rao and Sharif twice used the 'hotline' for telephone conversations,¹⁰⁷ which was followed by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan's visit to New Delhi as a special envoy of Nawaz Sharif on 18 August 1991. The visit was seen as yet another attempt at confidence building and the thrust of Sharif's message was that the two must get rid of the stereotyped approaches to each other and focus on positive rather than negative areas of interaction.¹⁰⁸ Indian leaders

¹⁰³ *Keesings Record of World Events*, vol. 37, no. 4, April 1991, pp. 38152-53.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, vol. 37, no. 5, May 1991, p. 38192.

¹⁰⁵ *Times of India*, 29 May 1991.

¹⁰⁶ *Hindustan Times*, 5 July 1991; *Muslim*, 10 July 1991.

¹⁰⁷ See, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Shaharyar's Visit: Kashmir Key Issue", *Hindustan Times*, 16 August 1991.

¹⁰⁸ See, the editorial in *Nation*, 21 August 1991; M.B. Naqvi, "Shaharyar's Mission and After", *Dawn*, 31 August 1991.

said that Pakistan's sincerity to improve relations with India should be "reflected on ground" in terms of its involvement in Punjab and J&K and promised that India's response to any "substantive move" by Pakistan would be "positive and constructive".¹⁰⁹ Mr. Khan promised such a difference on the ground level in coming weeks.¹¹⁰

A senior official of the Indian Foreign Office disclosed that Pakistani officials had given 'assurances' in private that once General Asif Nawaz Janjua became the Army Chief and got control of the ISI, Pakistan would stop material assistance to the Sikh and perhaps Kashmiri militants as well.¹¹¹ Shaharyar Khan also explained Pakistan's compulsions behind their stance at the OIC and found the Indian attitude to be understanding. His mission, however came under a cloud because of a statement made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an interview to *Newsweek* magazine that the tensions over the Kashmir issue could lead to a war between Pakistan and India which provoked an uproar in the Lok Sabha in New Delhi.¹¹² Shaharyar Khan argued that Sharif was quoted out of context and assured the Indian leadership that Pakistan wanted to move away from the possibility of a conflict. It is interesting to note that even a month previously, the Pakistani Army Chief General Beg had created a war scare by issuing a statement that "it is quite likely that in sheer desperation, India could undertake an adventure against Pakistan".¹¹³ But Pakistan's Foreign Office was quick to rebut General Beg's assertion by stating that "there have been no threatening moves to suggest any new or imminent threat".¹¹⁴

This was perhaps another indication that tensions within Pakistan's ruling troika were still continuing. On the whole, however, Shaharyar Khan described his mission as successful. In an interview to the BBC, he stressed that a political will was the most important factor in making a new start in Indo-Pak relations, and the message he carried from Prime Minister Sharif was that of such a political commitment, a will of change. On the question of India's political will in this respect, he felt that he was very encouraged by Indian political leaders' statements and described them as a favourable response. However these hopes of a definite improvement of relations on the ground were belied when Narashima Rao told Parliament that

¹⁰⁹ *Times of India*,

¹¹⁰ See, Narasimhao Rao's interview in *Hindustan Times*, 23 August 1991. Also see, *Times of India*, 20 August 1991; *Frontier Post*, 23 August 1991.

¹¹¹ In an interview with an Indian Foreign Office official with the present author in January 1992.

¹¹² *Times of India*, 20 August 1991.

¹¹³ *Dawn*, 22 July 1991.

¹¹⁴ *Dawn*, 28 July 1991. This point has also been discussed in Chapter Five.

Pakistan had failed to take any concrete steps in this direction as promised by Nawaz Sharif and Shaharyar Khan earlier. He said that while Pakistan had been professing its intentions to improve relations with India for sometime, all it had actually done was to step up its support and training to the terrorists in India.¹¹⁵

It was against this backdrop that the Foreign Secretary talks scheduled to be held in September were postponed by India perhaps as a message to Pakistan that it had to prove its bonafides before India could take its peace overtures seriously.¹¹⁶ However the talks between the high-powered military delegations of the two countries in Islamabad were held on 25 September 1991, as scheduled, and they discussed various military Confidence Building Measures.¹¹⁷ This was followed by meetings between the two countries delegations to discuss the Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage issues in September,¹¹⁸ and a meeting of the two Prime Ministers at Harare on 17 October where the two were attending a Commonwealth summit.¹¹⁹ Sharif disclosed that the two sides had agreed to establish closer communication links to avoid a future crisis. But Rao did not accept the offer of mediation by some friendly countries and told a news conference that India and Pakistan would like to overcome their differences bilaterally.¹²⁰

The fifth round of Foreign Secretary talks were held on 30-31 October 1991 at Islamabad and the agenda included Kashmir, allegations of cross-border interference and terrorism besides other issues such as Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, Siachin and the nuclear question. Although the two made substantial progress on military Confidence Building Measures and the Wullar Barrage issue but they remained at odds over Kashmir. Both sides, however, recognized that a war could not bring the solution on Kashmir any nearer, so, the idea behind this confidence building process at the Foreign Secretary as well as higher political level between the two countries, was to seek to arrive at certain specific Confidence Building Measures to defuse the tension on the border and lessen, if not eliminate, the danger of a full-scale war between them. There were other small straws in the wind. Pakistani President Ishaq Khan did not raise the issue of Kashmir and the question of a plebiscite when Mr. Dubey called on him and indicated his support for the confidence building process between India and Pakistan.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ *Times of India*, 19 September 1991.

¹¹⁶ *Indian Express*, 10 September 1991.

¹¹⁷ These have already been discussed in Chapter Nine.

¹¹⁸ *Keesings Record of World Events*, vol. 37, no. 10, 1991, p. 38533.

¹¹⁹ *Hindustan Times*, 21 October 1991.

¹²⁰ *Times of India*, 20 October 1991; *Dawn*, 23 October 1991.

¹²¹ Manoj Joshi, "An Indian Dilemma: Question of War and Peace", *Frontline*, 10 December 1991, p. 115.

The developments in Kashmir and bilateral contacts between the two countries during February 1992 brought out the 'blow hot, blow cold' nature of Indo-Pak diplomacy. Prime Ministers Sharif and Rao met briefly on 2 February, during the World Eco forum at Davos in Switzerland. The two discussed Indo-Pak relations and the situation in Kashmir. Later Sharif told reporters that 1992 was the "year of reconciliation between India and Pakistan".¹²² On the same day, however, an Indian daily *Pioneer*, published an interview with Pakistan's High Commissioner to New Delhi, Mr. Abdul Satta, who charged India with "bludgeoning Kashmiris into submission" and strongly criticized Indian army action in the valley. This double-speak on behalf of Pakistan baffled most of the Indian political analysts and those who knew Sattar personally could not fathom why Sattar made these uncharacteristic remarks on Indian soil.¹²³

It was argued that an internal strife within the ruling troika of Pakistan might be behind this move. Since Sharif and Ishaq Khan were falling out, Sattar might have acted directly on Presidential orders despite the fact that the Prime Minister of the government he represented was talking of conciliation with India on the Kashmir issue. Even while Indian diplomats were trying to gauge the import of Sattar's unexpected outburst, on 3 February, Sharif himself sprang a surprise by ordering, within hours of a very cordial session with Rao, a national general strike on 5 February to express solidarity with the Kashmiris. Rao's statement on Sharif's action, on the following day was still more unexpected as he commented that he was not in the least surprised by Pakistani moves and the bilateral dialogue must continue. Pakistan observed the strike on 5 February and Sharif along with other important political leaders made provocative speeches in Azad Kashmir, while in Delhi, Sattar was reprimanded by the Indian government for his comments.¹²⁴

The situation was complicated further by Ammanullah Khan's announcement on the same day, that the JKLF would organize a mass march across the Line of Control into the Indian side on 11 February¹²⁵ and later the Pakistani National Assembly also passed a resolution supporting the freedom-struggle of Kashmiris. But on 6 February, the Indian government warned that the march could have unforeseen consequences. The march was, however, banned by the Pakistani authorities on 6 February itself and subsequently the Pakistani army prevented the marchers from reaching the actual Line of Control and even

¹²² Keesings Record of World Events, vol. 38, no. 2, 1992, p. 38763.

¹²³ This point also has been discussed in Chapter Five.

¹²⁴ *Pioneer*, 6 February 1992.

¹²⁵ *Frontier Post*, 6 February 1992.

killed some demonstrators in the process.¹²⁶ On 9 February, Pakistan made public its nuclear capability and as the tension was mounting on the borders with both countries strengthening their border deployments, the DGMOs established contact on the 'hotline' and agreed to defuse tensions along the Line of Control.

This rapid turn of events in less than a week reflected the volatile state of Indo-Pak relations. Commenting on these events, India's ex-Foreign Secretary Mr. S.K. Singh said "war is improbable ... but India-Pakistan relations will improve only if the situation in Kashmir does so".¹²⁷ He added that whosoever wants to look patriotic in Pakistan has to be anti-Indian. "I am not surprised at what Sharif is doing [calling a national strike]. He is a businessman. I am sure he does not want a confrontation with India and is actually in favour of more amicable relations. He must have told Rao in Davos that he would not allow the JKLF march into the Indian territory but he would have to do something else to placate public feelings on Kashmir".¹²⁸ Perhaps this also explains why Rao was least surprised at Sharif's action of calling the strike. Clearly India-Pakistan relations, particularly on the Kashmir issue are somewhat accident-prone and potentially even a minor incident can enflame the situation. This highlights the need and importance of sustaining the bilateral dialogue at all levels and keeping the channels of communication open between the two countries.

The two Prime Ministers met again briefly in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, on the occasion of the Earth summit. They announced the resumption of Foreign Secretary talks which had earlier been postponed. Considering that a continuing dialogue between India and Pakistan is in itself a Confidence Building Measure, a meeting at the highest political level between the two countries was significant to the extent that it led to the resumption of official talks.¹²⁹ The sixth round of Foreign Secretary talks were held in New Delhi on 17-18 August 1992. This meeting was described by Shaharyar Khan as the most productive so far. Shaharyar Khan and the new Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit signed two agreements.¹³⁰ But an agreed statement issued by the Indian government at the end of talks made no mention of Kashmir.¹³¹

¹²⁶ The Pakistani army had deployed 40,000 security personnel along the border and blockaded roads in and out of Azad Kashmir's capital Muzfarrabad. Nevertheless 7000 JKLF supporters started off from the city on 11 February but as they approached the border the following day, they came under fire from the security forces. Independent sources estimated that 16 demonstrators and 2 policemen had been killed and 350 demonstrators injured. See, *Keesings Record of World Events*, vol. 38, no. 2, 1992, p. 38763.

¹²⁷ As quoted by Kuldeep Kumar, "Meeting Eyeballs Again", *Pioneer*, 14 February 1992.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Hindustan Times*, 16 June 1992.

¹³⁰ It was on banning the use of chemical weapons and establishing a code of conduct for diplomats in the two countries.

¹³¹ *Keesings Record of World Events*, vol. 38, no. 7&8, p. 39054.

On the whole, while the two countries failed to make any substantial progress on the Kashmir issue, they sustained the bilateral confidence building process and undertook several military Confidence Building Measures for allaying the fears of another war and reducing the tensions on the border. The extra-regional powers also played a crucial and positive role in this respect. It may be pertinent therefore to examine briefly the positions of these extra-regional powers on the Kashmir issue as such and the possibility of another war between India and Pakistan in this regard.

1.6.6 The Role of the Extra-Regional Powers

The US recognized Kashmir as an issue in dispute between India and Pakistan but stressed that the plebiscite mechanism outlined in the UN resolutions were overtaken by the Simla Agreement and the two countries should resolve the question through bilateral negotiations.¹³² While the US indicted India for its human rights violations in the Kashmir valley, the main pressure was, however, on Pakistan against supporting the subversive elements in the J&K as well as Punjab.¹³³ The US government believed that Pakistan was aiding the separatist movements in J&K and Punjab and was believed to have often warned Pakistan against doing so.¹³⁴

In March 1991, the US Ambassador to India Mr. William Clark, for instance, disclosed that the USA had "talked to Islamabad about the possibility of people being trained in Pakistan and the arms flow to India. Pakistan has been advised to ensure that does not happen".¹³⁵ Subsequently it was reported that Senator Stephen Solarz and Edward Feighan along with 269 other members of the US Congress, belonging to the Republican and Democratic parties had "urged President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other concerned Pakistani officials *not to provide arms or training to militants in Punjab or Kashmir*".¹³⁶

¹³² In June 1991, the US House of Representatives rejected an amendment calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir. See, *Times of India*, 21 June 1991. Also see, the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Thomas Pickering's statement on this issue. *The Statesman*, 28 August 1991.

¹³³ This was clearly outlined in a Congressional Report issued in August 1991. It said that while some Americans may be sympathetic to regionalist aspirations for greater autonomy, self-determination was generally viewed as a code word for separation and "hence violates the US norms regarding respect for the territorial integrity of the recognized states". For details of this report entitled, "India's Regional Dissidence and Human Rights Problem", see, *Times of India*, 11 August 1991. On another occasion while explaining the US administration's stand on separatist movements in Kashmir and Punjab, a spokesman of the US State Department, criticised the tendency to divide and sub-divide a country and reiterated US support for India's unity and territorial integrity. *Times of India*, 7 June 1991.

¹³⁴ In an interview conducted in New Delhi in December 1991.

¹³⁵ (italics added). See, *The Statesman*, 4 March 1991.

¹³⁶ A report by *Frontier Post*, as quoted in *Pioneer*, 25 December 1991.

Robert Gates, too, had carried a similar message during his visit to the subcontinent in May 1990 when he was reported to have told President Ishaq Khan that the US might link the cut-off of US aid to a change in Pakistan's Kashmir policy.¹³⁷ He was told by the Pakistanis that they had "already closed down 31 training camps" for Kashmiri militants - Pakistan's first admission of having trained militants on its soil.¹³⁸ The strongest US indictment came during the visit of the US Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholomew, who raised the spectre of invoking the US anti-terrorist laws, if Pakistan did not discontinue supporting the Kashmir militants. This law prohibits US support to governments supporting terrorists and if invoked, it would have equated Pakistan with countries like Libya and Syria.¹³⁹ In June 1992, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, was reported to have written to the Pakistani government that the country could be listed with Libya for state support to international terrorism.¹⁴⁰

With US aid already cut-off, this created a new fear in the Pakistani establishment that by invoking the anti-terrorist legislation, Washington could attempt to produce at the economic level, a Gulf war like international coalition against Pakistan. The US could organize economic sanctions against Pakistan through international aid institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the Aid-to-Pakistan consortium.¹⁴¹ Pakistanis were deeply stung by an American *volte face* on its policy towards the subcontinent in general and its change in stand over Kashmir for ruling out a plebiscite, and worse, its assertions that Islamabad has been backing the terrorism in the valley and the Punjab in India. Ghani Erabie, a Pakistani columnist, lamented that instead of condemning India's reign of terror in Kashmir or its refusal to let in Amnesty International, Washington was said to be getting ready to hurl at Pakistan the accusation of aiding terrorism in Kashmir.¹⁴² Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a well-known scholar, warned the Americans "not to push Pakistan too much and too hard".¹⁴³ Overall, there was a strong opinion in Pakistan, both at the popular and intellectual level that the United States had never really stood behind Pakistan in its times of crisis and once again they had been let down by an old and trusted friend and ally.

¹³⁷ In an interview conducted in Islamabad in October 1991.

¹³⁸ Inder Malhotra, "Gates Mission and After", *Times of India*, 24 May 1990. Malhotra added that the US already had in its possession ample evidence of dangerous Pakistani interference in Kashmir. And the Bush administration had in fact shared a part of this evidence, on a top-secret basis, with the US Congress.

¹³⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Hindustan Times*, 22 June 1992.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

¹⁴² As quoted in *Pioneer*, 25 December 1991.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*

Yet President Bush described both India and Pakistan as friends of the US and reiterated that "we will continue to encourage India-Pakistan *rapprochement* and the adoption of Confidence Building Measures".¹⁴⁴ US officials stressed persistently upon both India and Pakistan the need to step back from the brink and avoid military provocation and Robert Gates offered direct American assistance including the use of satellites and other measures developed in cooperation with the Soviets to monitor the disposition of troops and Confidence Building Measures (as in NATO exercises) to this end. The pressure on both sides was to go beyond the 'hotline' level.

While supporting military Confidence Building Measures at the government-to-government level between India and Pakistan, the US was also promoting a non-official dialogue between the intellectuals of the two countries to explore a solution to the Kashmir dispute. The USIS held two such 'dialogues' through satellites in a Worldnet Programme on the television between the Indian and Pakistani intellectuals with the US facilitator sitting in Washington. After two sessions held in June and September 1991, the US continued to bring them together by holding various sessions of a confidence building nature. This low level and quiet US diplomacy was appreciated both in Delhi and Islamabad who for their own reasons were somewhat wary of the US's high-profile mediatory role, perhaps because India wanted to stick to the bilateral framework of negotiations and Pakistan was terribly upset with the change of US policy towards India-Pakistan issues.

Another very important aspect of US diplomacy in the subcontinent was its new-found understanding with the Soviets in this respect. Senator Stephen Solarz floated the idea of a joint US-Soviet effort to reduce tensions in the subcontinent and suggested that US Secretary of State Mr. James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Edward Shevardnadze should invite the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan for a meeting to discuss the Kashmir issue.¹⁴⁵ Although this proposal did not materialize, Baker and Shevardnadze did discuss the Kashmir issue at their meeting in Moscow in April 1990 and the two were in complete unison regarding their approach to the problems in the subcontinent.¹⁴⁶ Both wanted India and Pakistan to settle their problems through bilateral talks and were concerned over the current drift in their relations over Kashmir

¹⁴⁴ *Times of India*, 16 August 1991. Also see, Bush's report on the "US National Security Strategy for the 1990's", in *Dawn*, 22 March 1990. Even earlier, Bush is reported privately to have urged both Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi to begin active talks to lessen tensions over their respective nuclear programmes. *The Hindu*, 10 July 1989.

¹⁴⁵ *Indian Express*, 23 April 1990. On 24 April *The New York Times* urged both the USA and the Soviet Union to attempt preventive diplomacy to avert an Indo-Pak war. See, *The New York Times*, 24 April 1990.

¹⁴⁶ K.K. Katyal, "Will Sense Dawn Upon Pakistan?", *The Hindu*, 22 April 1990.

and counselled restraint.

India's relations with the Soviet Union were also undergoing changes and it could no longer rely on a favourable Soviet veto in the Security Council in case of a war. Although the Soviets agreed with India against internationalizing the issue, they impressed upon India and Pakistan the need "to avoid an armed conflict and strive for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem".¹⁴⁷ Some observers even suggested that if a war broke out, the USA and the Soviet Union along with other permanent members of the Security Council would make a joint *démarche* asking both Delhi and Islamabad to end the war forthwith, perhaps through a UN resolution itself or by independently associating some other powers. An operative part of the resolution might go to the length of demanding from the two combatants, an immediate cessation of hostilities on pain of the economic sanctions to be recommended by the Security Council.¹⁴⁸

Similar views were expressed by China which had abandoned its support for the Kashmiris right of self-determination and the UN resolutions on holding the plebiscite and instead urged India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue through bilateral negotiations, as envisaged in the Simla Agreement.¹⁴⁹ Likewise, the British Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd, argued that there were obvious difficulties in holding a plebiscite in Kashmir since it was spilt into different parts between India, Pakistan and China. He counselled that the issue be settled bilaterally under the Simla Agreement.¹⁵⁰ In fact, when the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Britain in June 1992, the British Prime Minister John Major asked him to prevent Kashmiri militants from operating from the safe territory of Azad Kashmir.¹⁵¹

1.6.7 The Role of International Organisations

All the members of the EC and the Group of Seven Industrialized Countries also expressed their concern over the situation in Kashmir and appealed to India and Pakistan to "practise restraint and moderation".¹⁵² The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Sir Sonny Ramphal said that the developing countries and the Western friends of this region did not want any eruption of hostilities between the two

¹⁴⁷ As quoted in Altaf A. Sheikh, "Gujral-Yaqub Meeting", *Nation*, 4 May 1990.

¹⁴⁸ M.B. Naqvi, "What Will the World Powers Do?", *Indian Express*, 21 May 1990.

¹⁴⁹ Dilip Mukerji, "Across the Great Divide", *Times of India*, 27 October 1991.

¹⁵⁰ *Indian Express*, 27 July 1991.

¹⁵¹ *Hindustan Times*, 22 June 1992.

¹⁵² *Pakistan Times*, 19 April 1990; *Pakistan Times*, 12 July 1990.

countries.¹⁵³ The Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) also played an important role considering it was the only international organisation (which in its Istanbul resolution of 1991) supported the right of self-determination of Kashmiris and referred to the UN resolutions for solving the dispute.¹⁵⁴ Delhi described the resolution as "totally one-sided and wholly unacceptable" and reiterated that OIC had *no locus standi* in the matter.¹⁵⁵ In Pakistan, this was considered as something of a diplomatic victory for Pakistan and its position on the Kashmir issue.¹⁵⁶ But beyond that the Islamic countries have not shown much keenness to take up the Pakistani cause of Kashmir. Pakistan's own official sources admitted privately that Algeria, the PLO, Iraq and Kuwait were not supportive of the Pakistani position on Kashmir.¹⁵⁷

To recapitulate, international opinion was (and remains) unanimously and solidly behind any moves by India and Pakistan to avoid a war on the Kashmir issue and encouraged a reconciliation between these two countries. It undoubtedly played a crucial and positive role in the continuing confidence building process between India and Pakistan. On the Kashmir issue, in particular, the Simla Agreement was the key word used in all the major capitals of the world and the Pakistani position on holding a plebiscite and right of self-determination of Kashmiris became increasingly isolated. While India was criticised for its human rights violations in the valley, the major pressure, particularly from the US, seemed to be on Pakistan to stop aiding the separatist elements operating in the Kashmir valley and Punjab in India.

1.6.8 A Critical Review of the Bilateral Confidence Building Process

On the whole, India-Pakistan relations during the early 1990's oscillated between periods of serious tension along the borders with their political leaders indulging in a belligerent rhetoric of war to a growing realization in both countries that war was no longer a viable option and of the need and importance of sustaining a dialogue at a political and military level to defuse tension. The confidence building process initiated by the two sides seems likely to have helped in averting another war in the subcontinent. Both countries kept open their channels of communication at various levels. The sheer traffic of government

¹⁵³ *Pakistan Times*, 24 April 1990.

¹⁵⁴ *Hindustan Times*, 18 August 1991. It may be noted that the OIC, in its Cairo meeting in 1990, had also adopted a Pakistani resolution expressing its concern at the violence against the people of Kashmir and called for the respect of their human rights.

¹⁵⁵ *Hindustan Times*, 10 August 1991, 18 August 1991.

¹⁵⁶ *The News*, 11 August 1991.

¹⁵⁷ *Muslim*, 6 May 1991. In fact PLO's Chief Yaseer Arafat snubbed Pakistan by refusing to equate the Kashmiris struggle with the *infatida* in Palestine as often attempted by Pakistani officials. It was only with Saudi Arabia and Iran's support that Pakistan managed to get a favourable resolution adopted at the OIC.

officials such as the Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries, the Defence Secretaries, the Home Secretaries, the Secretaries of Water and Resources Ministries, the Directors-General of Military Operations and the like was remarkable. Right from the Prime Ministers' to the local commanders' level, the 'hotline' was in frequent use.

The Foreign Secretary talks did not yield much result in terms of arriving at any political understanding on the Kashmir issue but, in the Indo-Pak context, sustaining the dialogue between two countries was in itself a significant Confidence Building Measure. One reason why they failed to make any breakthrough was perhaps because both sides had differing expectations from these talks. India seemed to be hoping to buy more time for its security forces to gain control over the situation in J&K without undue outside interference.¹⁵⁸ Pakistan was hoping to persuade India at least to start talking about the question of the political status of Kashmir, which an Indian Foreign Office official said, would have been a "diplomatic triumph" by itself.¹⁵⁹ On the Line of Control, despite periodic flare-ups of tension, small skirmishes between the two armies and certain potentially explosive incidents of civilians crossing over the border, the military commanders almost always succeeded in defusing the tensions well in time.

One may even argue that notwithstanding certain acts of brinkmanship and oft-repeated war cries by both sides, perhaps for their domestic audience, war was never really on the agenda. To begin with, neither side was confident of achieving all its objectives by resorting to a war. The Pakistani military was well aware that it could not wrest Kashmir in an open military confrontation with India. At the same time, the Indians knew that they might not be able to repeat 1971 and defeat Pakistan conclusively.¹⁶⁰ Secondly neither country could simply afford a war in pure financial terms. The economies of both India and Pakistan were in dire straits and the two were becoming dependent increasingly on the IMF and the World Bank which would have certainly denied them any funds, if they got locked into a war.

Further, there was a danger of escalation of the conflict to a nuclear exchange at some point. It was these reports from several military intelligence sources that the two countries were on the brink of a war in which the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons was being considered that prompted the USA to send a

¹⁵⁸ In an interview with a top official of Indian Foreign Office, with the present author in March 1992.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ For an imaginative account of India-Pakistan war and its inconclusive outcome, see, "War", *Sunday*, 26 August-15 September 1990, pp. 78-84.

high level delegation led by CIA Chief Robert Gates to dissuade both Delhi and Islamabad from following a path towards collusion. Finally, and most significantly, a dramatically changed international climate was simply not in favour of another war on the subcontinent. The changing alignments of the USA, Russia and China with India and Pakistan and a growing and increasingly pacifying influence of the SAARC, the EC, Japan and even Islamic countries had a significant impact on avoiding another war between the two protagonists. While the Confidence Building Measures seem likely to have been a positive factor in this situation were they able to bring these two countries any nearer to the actual resolution of this dispute ?

1.7 The Confidence Building Process : Towards the Resolution of Conflict ?

Both India and Pakistan have vital stakes respectively in maintaining or disturbing the *status quo* in Kashmir and it is not simply a question of territory. While India believes that Kashmir has been a foundation pillar of the secular structure of the Indian nation-state over the past four decades. Pakistan regards itself incomplete without the inclusion of Kashmir, a Muslim-majority area. In other words, both want and believe that they need Kashmir. After the political upheaval in the Kashmir valley from 1989, one must also take into account the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiris themselves, who perhaps do not want to have anything to do with either India or Pakistan and want an independent Kashmir, as is evident from the JKLF's stand.

The intricacy and critical nature of the task may be judged from the fact that the parties in question here do not even agree on most basic issues such as defining the problem. Pakistan insists that the Kashmir valley must be granted its right of self-determination through a plebiscite with only two options of joining India or Pakistan. India argues that the future political status of the J&K state is non-negotiable and the only issue at stake is Pakistan's involvement in supporting the Kashmiri separatists with arms and training. And the JKLF in Kashmir itself, demands complete independence from both India and Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, a confidence building dialogue would involve a multilateral and multidimensional dialogue between the Government of India and the people of the J&K state on the one hand, and the Government of Pakistan and the people of Azad Kashmir on the other as well as an across-the-border dialogue among themselves - any standard. Here one must keep in mind that the task of confidence building on a core issue like Kashmir between India and Pakistan is not to resolve the dispute itself but only to help in creating a political atmosphere where the two parties can bring it about. Bearing in mind the wide gulf between their positions, the role of bridge-building, in this context, has been played by the non-official

dialogue between the intellectuals of two countries.

1.7.1 The Non-Official Dialogue

Government officials in both Delhi and Islamabad agreed that both were stuck and unable to break through the deadlock and that the intelligentsia of the two countries might help in creating a climate where at least several options about Kashmir could be discussed and debated. Such a dialogue is being held between several groups of academicians, journalists, politicians, judges, civil servants, ex-army officers and other prominent public figures of India and Pakistan.¹⁶¹ It is argued that it is easier to bridge the gap between the official positions of two countries at a non-official level. And once an agreement is reached on certain aspects, each side may then be in a position to influence its own government as well as help build a favourable public opinion in this direction. The purpose of this dialogue, therefore, is to break with the old mind-sets. With respect to Kashmir, for instance, one such group is making attempts to re-define the goals that are not cast in a conflictual mould but marks out the areas of common interest in cooperative terms. The underlying approach is to devise new concepts or idioms. For instance, both sides should avoid using the terms of 'occupied Kashmir' to each other. The Indian description of Azad Kashmir as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and Pakistan's that of J&K state as the Indian-occupied Kashmir (IOK) has not only distorted perceptions of the general populace of two countries but also sustained such distortions.

Indian scholars suggested that Pakistanis should not evince an interest in the political unrest in the valley only because it is a Muslim-populated area and talk of the human right abuses against Kashmiri Muslims alone as Kashmiri Pandits are also suffering. Instead both should treat it as a human problem. Pakistani scholars suggested that Indians should stop harping on their position that Kashmir is an integral part of India and therefore that Pakistan has no *locus standi* on the issue because even the Simla Agreement recognizes that Pakistan has a role to play in the final solution of the Kashmir problem. Although the two sides have made small inroads in this respect, differences remain. Besides some individual proposals regarding a solution of the Kashmir problem by both Indian and Pakistani scholars have also been put forward. Let us examine some of them.

1.7.2 Indian Proposals

Mr. B.G. Verghese of the CPR (Centre for Policy Research), in New Delhi has suggested that "a soft

¹⁶¹ This point shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter Thirteen.

frontier across an adjusted Line of Control" should become "the international border", between India and Pakistan.¹⁶² And being a soft border, it should allow for easy movement and commerce both ways. Furthermore, each of the two parts of the state (J&K and Azad Kashmir) should negotiate "greater autonomy" respectively from the governments of India and Pakistan and both parts should then be allowed to federate around the devolved subjects while each gives regional autonomy to its own regions. India and Pakistan respectively, should then "confederate" with its side of the state (of Kashmir) which would then emerge in "an autonomous J&K with further regional devolution within an Indo-Pak condominium".

Another proposal has been put forward by a noted Indian columnist, Kuldip Nayar. He urges talks between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and rejects the idea of holding a plebiscite on religious grounds. While taking note of the JKLF's demands for independence for a reunified state, he rejects the idea of a tiny, landlocked independent Kashmir as impracticable.¹⁶³ He puts forth a proposal modelled after the Trieste type of agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia signed in 1954 about the disputed territory of Trieste. Following that, he recommends that the present Line of Control should become the international border but they should "soften it in the valley" and "bonafide Kashmiris" would traverse it at will with "identity cards" but "Indians and Pakistanis" crossing it would have to get visas from the governments of India and Pakistan respectively.¹⁶⁴

Going forward from the Trieste type status, both India and Pakistan will be able to integrate permanently the Kashmir territory on their side. Nayar reports that according to some top advisors of Benazir Bhutto who met him when he was the Indian High Commissioner in London, a Trieste type solution was the unwritten part of the Simla Agreement. Earlier even Z.A. Bhutto had told him that he was also "thinking partly of Trieste".¹⁶⁵ Nayar also believes that a formula along these lines was on the anvil when General Zia was killed. This was mentioned by Rajiv Gandhi, in his last interview to *The New York Times*, and *Gulf News*. He had said that "we were close to finishing an agreement on Kashmir, we had the maps and

¹⁶² In an interview with the present author in December 1991. Also see, B.G. Verghese, "New Mood in Kashmir", *Indian Express*, 12 July 1991.

¹⁶³ Kuldip Nayar, "Kashmir: A Way Out", *Hindustan Times*, 15 July 1991.

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.* Also see, Kuldip Nayar, "Trieste Type Formula for Kashmir?", *The Statesman*, 5 June 1991.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.* This point has also been discussed in Chapter Seven.

everything ready to sign and then he [General Zia] was killed".¹⁶⁶

The 'pro' element of these two proposals, as outlined by Pran Chopra, is that both stress more interaction and openness between the two divided parts of Kashmir and that an Indian government is likely to accept it. However they also have a corresponding 'con' in that the Pakistan government may not accept any division of the state which would leave the whole valley with India. Moreover, from the Pakistani point of view, they make no mention of the UN's role and do not support the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris and reject a plebiscite. Internally, with respect to the state of J&K, both accept that Pakistan is not the cause but the consequence of the political upheaval in Kashmir but share a belief that Pakistan is taking full advantage of the situation and is supporting the separatist elements with arms and training. Verghese points out that the "tide has turned" because no one now expects that "azadi ...is round the corner".¹⁶⁷ There is a sense of betrayal and disillusionment with Pakistan and there is now "reverse alienation" that is from Pakistan and the militants.¹⁶⁸ Both B.G. Verghese and Kuldip Nayar stress that the central government in Delhi should take a political initiative and give maximum regional political autonomy to Kashmir for protecting their distinct identity.

In this context, Pran Chopra argues in favour of a process as against a formula approach in Kashmir with full participation of Kashmiris. He points out that the normal conditions must be created in Kashmir where the Kashmiris can debate what they want and be able to choose their representatives in free and fair elections and for that terrorism must be given up by Pakistan or stamped out by India. Once a government is formed by the "authentic representatives of the people", New Delhi must hold frank discussions with it to discuss what status, if any within the Indian Union, would be acceptable to them.¹⁶⁹ In other words, what mix of "azadi" and "facilities" would satisfy the needs and aspirations of the Kashmiris and if there is no such mix then what the alternatives should be?¹⁷⁰

One important reality recognized by all three scholars is that there are three parties to the Kashmir problem and not two, that is India, Pakistan, and more important than both, the people of that state which

¹⁶⁶ There are, however varying interpretations of Rajiv's last remarks. Some point out that it was only in respect of Siachin and not the future status of Kashmir as such. No clear explanation of General Zia's death has emerged and so it is highly speculative to link it to any particular set of political events or likely policies.

¹⁶⁷ Verghese, *op.cit.*,

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ Pran Chopra, "Kashmir: A Process for Peace", *Hindustan Times*, 15 August 1991.

¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*

means not only the people of the valley but the people of all the regions of the state on both sides of the Line of Control. As Pran Chopra points out, "a deal between any two of the three which ignores the third will only be an invitation to continuing trouble".¹⁷¹ Further all three sides must realize that no solution could satisfy completely any one of the three parties because that may mean that it would give no satisfaction to one or both of the other two. But at the same time, each party must arrive at a maximum optimum obtainable position, that is "each party's share of the satisfaction which must come close to what it can hope to get, in a realistic view" otherwise it would have no incentive for giving them up.¹⁷² Now let us examine some of the unofficial proposals coming from the Pakistani side.

1.7.3 Pakistani Proposals

Dr. Mubashir Hasan, an eminent public figure, holds that "India has lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir ...the writ of the Indian government has ceased to run there" and the situation is as "irreversible" as in "Vietnam and Algeria".¹⁷³ Therefore he appeals to both India and Pakistan to let "the people of former state of J&K put into practice their right of self-determination" and have freedom of social, commercial and cultural relations with both India and Pakistan, with their own currency and membership of the UN.¹⁷⁴ Pakistan and India should "agree among themselves for the joint defence of Kashmir under the direction of a Joint Defence Council of India, Pakistan and Kashmir against an aggression by a third power" in violation of "their existing positions on the border" and Kashmir may surrender its sovereignty to the extent of its defence being looked after by India and Pakistan. And after India and Pakistan have agreed among themselves, the solution may be presented to the representatives of the people of Kashmir.¹⁷⁵

Another proposal has been put forward by Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema that "Azad Kashmir and Baltistan should remain with Pakistan, Jammu and Ladakh with India and the valley should be put under the UN control for a short while and later given a plebiscite with three options - India, Pakistan or

¹⁷¹ *ibid.*.

¹⁷² *ibid.*.

¹⁷³ *Nation*, 15 June 1991.

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*.

¹⁷⁵ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

independence.¹⁷⁶ He also proposes an alternative partition with India giving to Pakistan "the district of Baramullah and Sopore inclusive of Wullar to make the partition attractive to Pakistan".¹⁷⁷

The 'pro' elements of these two proposals are that while Dr. Hasan speaks of more interaction between the two divided parts of Kashmir, Cheema's idea of partitioning the state may strike a favourable chord in Indian circles. But at the same time, Cheema's plan of partitioning the state along religious lines with the Hindu Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh staying with India and the Muslim valley going to Pakistan will have no takers in India primarily because of the religious basis of the proposed partition. Further while the Pakistan government may welcome the UN's role in this context, it remains an anathema to most of Indians.

Nevertheless one may argue that all these proposals are certainly moving away from the rigid official positions of their respective governments. Both sides recognize that the people of Kashmir have a crucial role to play in aiming at any solution to the Kashmir problem whether it is couched in terms of the right of self-determination, greater autonomy or an independent Kashmir. Pakistan's Ambassador to India, Mr. Abdul Sattar said in an interview,

You can not find a solution in isolation to the aspirations of the people of Kashmir. Even if Pakistan and India were to join in imposing a settlement on the people of Kashmir, it is a folly to assume that it would be acceptable to the people of Kashmir. You can not determine their future by negotiations between Islamabad and Delhi.¹⁷⁸

To recapitulate, confidence building efforts undertaken by the two countries for avoiding a war have largely borne fruit but they have not made much headway in bridging the gap between their somewhat inflexible positions mainly due to the vital stakes of both sides involved on this issue. The only redeeming feature is the efforts being made in non-official circles of the two countries in this direction. Now let us examine the other core issue of conflict between India and Pakistan.

2 Mutual Interference in Internal Affairs

Since independence the problem of cross-border interference in internal affairs has consistently been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. And "yet their mutual vulnerability to ethnic, sectarian and religious conflicts and to the dangerous links between domestic schisms and external security has not

¹⁷⁶ As cited by Pran Chopra, "Kashmir: A Bunch of Good Ideas", *Hindustan Times*, 14 August 1991. Ghani Erabie, a popular Pakistani columnist also supported this proposal that the valley should be put under the "UN trusteeship", in an interview with the present author in October 1991.

¹⁷⁷ Chopra, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ As quoted by K.R. Sunderajan, "Third Option for Kashmir Can Open New Initiatives", *Pioneer*, 19 February 1992.

tempered the predilection of either state for involvement in the domestic affairs of the other and the permeability of borders is no less troubling than the placement of the borders".¹⁷⁹ The problem resurfaced in the 1980's when India faced a separatist movement in Punjab and it accused Pakistan of supporting the Sikh militants. Our task here is not to study the history and anatomy of the Punjab problem. Suffice it to say that the early Sikh demands for regional autonomy¹⁸⁰ had gradually taken the shape of secessionist demand for an independent and sovereign state of Khalistan. This gave rise to Indian allegations of Pakistan's involvement in supporting the terrorism in Punjab.

2.1 The Indian Allegations

From the early 1980's India accused constantly Pakistan of actively aiding and abetting Sikh extremists in Punjab by giving them arms and training and a sanctuary across the border.¹⁸¹ In May 1988, Indian sources asserted that Sikh extremists visited Pakistan frequently, armed intrusions occurred across the border, modern weaponry flowed across the border (including AK-47's, Kalashnikovs, RPG-7 anti-tank rockets and rocket launchers) and that Pakistani intelligence agencies, particularly the ISI had been assisting the extremists since 1985.¹⁸² Over the years the Indian government was reported to have given many detailed reports containing documented evidence of Pakistani involvement to Islamabad.¹⁸³ Some have listed from 10 to 78 training camps meant for the Sikh and subsequently the Kashmiri militants.¹⁸⁴ India

¹⁷⁹ See, M. Ispahani, "Pakistan's Dimensions of Insecurity", *Adelphi Papers*, no. 246, 1989-90, p. 38.

¹⁸⁰ These were outlined in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution adopted in April 1973. For the text of Anandpur Resolution, see, Appendix II in Dr. Abida Samiuddin, ed., *The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response*, New Delhi; Mittal Publications, 1985, pp. 664-678.

¹⁸¹ See, *Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs 1984-1985*, New Delhi: Government of India, pp. vi, 2; *Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs 1985-1986*, New Delhi: Government of India, p. 8; *Annual Report 1988-1989*, p. 7. For some parliamentary debates on these issues, see, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 25, no. 26, 2 April 1986, cols. 355-356; 8th series, vol. 38, no. 35, 19 April 1988, cols. 396-400; 9th series, vol. 8, no. 3, 9 August 1990, cols. 443-454. And for some important statements by the Indian political leaders on this issue, see, *Asian Recorder*, 18-24 March 1988, p. 19927; *The Statesman* 15 April 1988; *Newstime*, 22 April 1990; and *Hindustan Times*, 11 August 1991.

¹⁸² In 1986, an investigative report by the India Today revealed the alleged moral and material assistance that the Sikh militants were receiving from the Pakistani officials. See, *India Today*, 15 May 1986. Also see, *The Telegraph*, 17 March 1988; *The Economist*, 7 May 1988, p. 27.

¹⁸³ One such document included: (a) Records based on interrogation of some top terrorists then in custody; (b) Various instances of visits to Pakistan by the leaders taking an active part in the terrorism from third countries like the USA, Canada and Britain; (c) Evidence of how Indian jathas (pilgrims) to Pakistan were being used to join extremist activities; (d) A list of training camps organized for the Sikh extremists; (e) Lists and photographs of sophisticated arms seized in Punjab; (f) 'Telling' instances of the encounters in the border areas near the Pakistani outposts, where the Pakistani forces had failed to respond or assist in anyway.

The present author has consulted this document.

¹⁸⁴ See, P.M. Pasricha, "Relations With India", in Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook of India's Foreign Policy 1984-85*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1987, p. 108; and Surendra Chopra, "Pakistan: Conflict and Cooperation", in Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook of India's Foreign Policy 1983-84*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1986, p. 69.

also charged Pakistan with facilitating extremists links with the pro-Khalistani Sikhs living in the USA, Canada and Europe. India's Minister of Home Affairs Mr. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed stated in Parliament

it is well known that extremist leaders ...[from] overseas hold consultations in Pakistan and with the blessings of the Pakistan agencies, set targets and organize fresh supplies of arms and ammunitioninto [Punjab]...¹⁸⁵

The tone and substance of Indian criticism of Pakistan's alleged complicity in supporting Sikh extremists has intensified over the years. While in the early 1980's, the Indian government cited circumstantial evidence in support of its claims, by the late 1980's and the early 1990's it spoke in terms of having conclusive and foolproof evidence of Pakistan's involvement.¹⁸⁶ This was reflected in statements made by successive Indian Prime Ministers on this issue. While Mrs. Gandhi only referred to a foreign hand behind the disturbances in the Punjab, Rajiv Gandhi directly asked Pakistan to stop assisting terrorists in Punjab and on one occasion even warned Pakistan "not to test Indian's patience on the issue of support to terrorists".¹⁸⁷ He indicated that the real test of President Zia-ul-Haq's good intentions lay in total stoppage of the help Pakistan was providing to the extremists.¹⁸⁸ The present Prime Minister P.V Narasimhao Rao went even further and accused Pakistan of waging a proxy war against India by supporting the militants in Punjab and J&K.

It is also important to note that political parties of all hues and shades in India share the widely held conviction that Pakistan is supporting terrorism in Punjab and J&K. This is evident from the fact that a Congress government in the 1980's, Janata Dal's government led by V.P. Singh in 1988-89 and later even the short-lived government of Chandra Shekhar consistently maintained this stand. The main opposition party the BJP is probably most stringent in its criticism of Pakistan for inciting insurgency in India. What then is Pakistan's response to the Indian allegations.

2.2 Pakistan's Response

Pakistan has denied consistently any such charges of interference in Punjab. Initially Zia-ul-Haq said that the Indian statements were due to its "internal compulsions or otherwise"¹⁸⁹ and were only meant for

¹⁸⁵ See, *Lok Sabha Debates*, vol. 2, no. 9, 22 March 1990, col. 392. Also see, Pasricha in *Yearbook 1984-85*, *op.cit.*, p. 108;

¹⁸⁶ See, India's Minister of External Affairs, Mr. B.R. Bhagat's statement to this effect. *Frontier Post*, 20 March 1986.

¹⁸⁷ Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook of India's Foreign Policy 1989*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1990, p. 23.

¹⁸⁸ *Times of India*, 14 September 1987.

¹⁸⁹ General Zia's interview with M.J. Akbar in 'Interviews to the Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, January-December 1985, p. 271.

"domestic consumption".¹⁹⁰ He later described them as "totally false, without any foundation and highly irresponsible".¹⁹¹ On the question of smuggling of arms to the Sikh extremists from Pakistan, Zia insisted

it is not possible to smuggle weapons from Pakistan into India in such large quantities so as to enable India to level a categorical allegation against Pakistan that we are directly or indirectly helping somebody to create disturbances inside India. *It is not possible.*¹⁹²

By the second half of the 1980's, however, the Pakistani government had shifted its stance and argued that it was not a government policy to aid the Sikhs and that the government machinery was in no way involved in offering any assistance to the extremists. But it agreed that arms were being smuggled into Indian Punjab.¹⁹³ In an interview to **India Today**, Pakistan's Ambassador to India, Mr. Humayun Khan said

we have never said that there is no illegal activity going on across the border. We wish to control the border activity. You may challenge the failure of Pakistan's security agencies to track down illegal entrants but this should not be interpreted as bad faith.¹⁹⁴

He argued that after Afghanistan, the illicit arms trade and the arms bazaar in Pakistan were flourishing and anybody with money could go and buy arms from there. So it was difficult to prevent the arms flowing into India from across the border.¹⁹⁵

It was Benazir Bhutto who for the first time in July 1986 accused General Zia of having "mishandled the Sikh issue" and said that "let me also add that had a democratic government been in power in Pakistan, we would certainly not have tried playing a Sikh card."¹⁹⁶ She cautioned that such a policy could prove counter-productive in as much as Pakistan was vulnerable to ethnic tensions and because "today if Pakistan has the Sikh card, then tomorrow India can have the Baluch card".¹⁹⁷ When Benazir became an opposition leader in 1990, she accused even Sharif's government of training Sikhs and providing arms and ammunition to them.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁰ **Dawn**, 20 November 1983. This sentiment was echoed by the Pakistani press as well. **The Pakistan Times** wrote that the purpose of Mrs. Gandhi's devious statements, veiled threats and wild charges against Pakistan was domestic political need to down the opposition by raising the bogey of external threat. It characterised such reports as ridiculous and a crude attempt to divert attention from the internal crisis and a ploy which would sour the climate of talks then going on to improve subcontinental relations. See, **Pakistan Times**, 27 November 1983; 12 June 1984. **Dawn** called the Indian charges as wild and unfounded and an attempt to externalize the domestic crisis. See, **Dawn Overseas Weekly**, 28 June 1984.

¹⁹¹ **Dawn**, 20 June 1984.

¹⁹² General Zia's interview in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, January-December 1984, p. 147.

¹⁹³ **The Telegraph**, 17 May 1988.

¹⁹⁴ See, **India Today**, 31 July 1988, p. 123. Also see, his interview in **Sunday**, 24-31 April 1988, pp. 15-17. Similar views were also echoed by an eminent Pakistani official in an interview with the present author in December 1991.

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ As quoted by A.G. Noorani, "Agenda for Indo-Pak Dialogue", **Times of India**, ?

¹⁹⁷ **Dawn**, 9 April 1984.

¹⁹⁸ **Nation**, 18 January 1990.

This view is substantiated by the present author's interviews as well. A number of Pakistani journalists, intellectuals and some retired army officials too admitted 'off-the-record' that Pakistan was providing arms and training to the militants in Punjab from the early 1980's.¹⁹⁹ Some argued that after what India had done in Bangladesh, it just served it right while others admitted that there was a degree of vicarious pleasure in Pakistan over India's problem in Punjab.²⁰⁰

2.3 Bilateral Talks (Confidence Building Efforts ?)

This issue has since dominated the agenda of India-Pakistan bilateral negotiations from the top political level of Prime Ministers to the Home Secretaries' talks throughout the 1980's and the early 1990's. In order to check the movements of extremists across the Indo-Pak border, the Indian Government proposed in 1985 that a 500 meter stretch along the Indo-Pak border in Punjab be declared as no-man's land.²⁰¹ Pakistan on the other hand offered to send neutral observers or joint inspectors to the alleged training camps.²⁰² But India dismissed this as a diplomatic sham and rejected it on the grounds that such camps could be shifted easily.²⁰³ An alternate plan by India was put forward to seal Punjab's border or the entire border with Pakistan to prevent extremists from infiltrating on to the Indian side.²⁰⁴ K. Subrahmanyam proposed that the Indian government should strip half to five kms of the border area of all the vegetation and then mine and fence the border.²⁰⁵

Sealing the border with Pakistan which passes through a number of Indian states, however, is by no means an easy task. It is argued that the 544 kms long Punjab-Pakistan border, in particular, is so porous that it could never be sealed completely. Movement can be contained significantly but as a senior BSF officer put it "the word sealing is a gimmick as if you could pick up a lump of wax and do it".²⁰⁶ By April 1988, however, the Indian government had announced its decision to erect a barbed wire fence along Punjab's border with Pakistan.²⁰⁷ By mid-1990 it was reported that the project of erecting a barbed wire fence with

¹⁹⁹ An assessment of the author gathered from various interviews conducted in Pakistan in October 1991.

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*

²⁰¹ *The Statesman*, 14 February 1985.

²⁰² See, Humanyun Khan's interview in *Sunday*, 24-31 April 1988, p. 14.

²⁰³ Isaphani, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

²⁰⁴ See the parliamentary debates on this issue in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 22, no. 11, 18 November 1986, cols. 381-382; 8th series, vol. 38, no. 38, 18 April 1988, cols. 833-903; 9th series, vol. 3, no. 20, 10 April 1990, cols. 419-420. Also see, *Hindustan Times*, 20 April 1986; 30 August 1986; *Financial Times*, (London), 6 August 1986.

²⁰⁵ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

²⁰⁶ Tarun J. Tajpai, "Route of Terrorism", *The Telegraph*, 17 April 1988.

²⁰⁷ It was reported that in its first stage, a 170 kms border stretch was outlined for fencing. It covered three districts in Punjab - Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozpur. *Nation*, 5 May 1988.

flood light watch towers along 150 kms of the Punjab border had been completed and India proposed to build a similar fence along an additional 200 kms.²⁰⁸ In May 1990, V.P. Singh's government announced its decision to seal even Kashmir's border with Pakistan.²⁰⁹

The question of tackling terrorism and illegal border crossings jointly figured during the Rajiv Gandhi - M.K. Junejo talks at the time of SAARC summit in Bangalore in November 1986. As a result, Pakistan's Secretary in the Interior Ministry, Mr. S.K. Mahmud and Indian Home Secretary Mr. C.G. Somiah met in Lahore on 20-21 November 1986 and discussed the whole range of issues of controlling illegal crossings, drug trafficking, smuggling and terrorism along the border. Mr. Mahmud assured Mr. Somiah that the Pakistani government was opposed to "all forms of terrorism in Punjab and elsewhere".²¹⁰ It was significant because it was the first time that Pakistan had expressed its opposition to Sikh terrorism in India. The Pakistani side reiterated that "it does not and will not provide any support to terrorist activities directed against India".²¹¹ According to the joint statement,

the two sides discussed the entire range of illegal cross border movements and specific remedial measures such as joint surveillance of the border and a joint mechanism against allowing the use of their respective territories for any acts or activities directed against the stability, internal peace and territorial integrity of the other nation.²¹²

The two sides agreed to formulate new ground rules covering illegal border crossings and as a first step in this direction, they decided to strengthen the cooperation between their border security forces. They also decided to set up two committees. One consisted of the representatives of the Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs and India's Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers which would re-formulate the ground rules evolved in 1960-61 and study the two proposals which had been exchanged in 1981-82 relating to the border crisis, illegal crossings of the border and related matters. The other committee would have representatives from the Narcotics Control Commission, Revenue Intelligence, Border Security Forces and the Finance and External Affairs Ministries of both sides which would take steps to combat narcotics trafficking and smuggling. It would meet twice a year to undertake concerted action to counter and eliminate these nefarious

²⁰⁸ Indian Home Minister Mr. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's statement in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9th series, vol. 2, no. 9, 22 March 1990, col. 409.

²⁰⁹ *ibid.*

²¹⁰ For the text of declaration, see *Times of India*, 22 December 1986. For a detailed discussion on the problem of tackling terrorism in South Asian region, see, Partha S. Ghosh, "Terrorism and SAARC", *India Quarterly*, vol. 43, no. 2, April-June 1987, pp. 121-137.

²¹¹ *Times of India*, 22 December 1986.

²¹² *ibid.*

activities and exchange information in this regard.

The joint press release also reaffirmed the two countries' commitment to the Simla Agreement. The Indian Home Secretary Mr. C.G. Somiah said that the Pakistani officials were receptive and a little more positive this time and described the talks as satisfactory if everything agreed to was implemented in good faith. The Pakistani delegation had apparently shown interest in formulating an extradition treaty but when Mr. Somiah pointed out that India wanted suspected Sikh militants returned who had taken sanctuary in Pakistan, it dropped the idea.²¹³

This process however received a minor setback, when only a week later General Zia accused India and the Soviet Union of trying to weaken Pakistan internally.²¹⁴ In February 1987, however, General Zia-ul-Haq offered to Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi, a declaration on non-interference in each other's internal affairs, which could come through a package under which India should also declare that it had no links with the so-called Sindhudesh and Pahtoonistan.²¹⁵ In May 1987, the ruling Muslim League in a party resolution reiterated this proposal.²¹⁶ This however never materialized.

In May 1988, the Home Secretaries met for the second time to discuss issues concerning cross-border terrorism. The Indian delegation presented a 21-page statement entitled 'Involvement of Pakistan in Terrorism', containing details of training camps, and arms and ammunition supplied to the extremists in India.²¹⁷ Mr. Somiah told the Pakistani side that

we have passed the stage of mere assurances. It is necessary for Pakistan to translate their professed good intentions into action.²¹⁸

Pakistan however denied the charges and dismissed them as something intended to play to the gallery. Eventually the delegates of both sides agreed to undertake joint patrols in the sensitive areas of the Punjab sector of the Indo-Pak border.²¹⁹ The joint patrolling would include sending out patrols during day and night and laying ambushes. They agreed on certain broad guidelines to optimize the effectiveness of joint

²¹³ *Hindustan Times*, 22 December 1986.

²¹⁴ This came as an explanation of the Pathan-Mohajir riots that took place in Karachi during November-December 1986. Samuel Baid, "Stalemate in South Asia", in Satish Kumar, ed., *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1985-86*, New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1988, p. 120.

²¹⁵ See, *Pakistan Affairs*, (Washington D.C), vol. 40, 1 March 1987, p. 1.

²¹⁶ *Times of India*, 21 May 1987.

²¹⁷ *Hindustan Times*, 15 May 1988.

²¹⁸ *India Today*, 15 June 1988, p. 96.

²¹⁹ *Pakistan Times*, 17 May 1988.

patrolling.²²⁰ The Indian side also hoped that Pakistan would arrest some of the top extremists who were believed to be across the border and hand them over to India. India would send quickly a detailed list of such persons with identification marks to Pakistan. The joint statement said that both sides agreed that it was essential to take immediate concrete measures against terrorism, drug-trafficking, smuggling and illegal border crossings along the Indo-Pak border.

It was decided that an India-Pakistan Committee on Border Ground Rules should meet within the following three months in order to finalize the Indo-Pak border ground rules taking into account the new realities. Meanwhile the following interim measures were agreed to:

(i) regular meetings between the two border security forces at wing commander/battalion commander level in order to deal effectively with illegal trans-border movement.

(ii) flag meetings may be held between the two border security forces at post/company commander level to pass on any information of immediate importance. Whenever a contact was requested, the other side shall respond immediately.

(iii) the border security forces of the two countries should arrest not only trans-border criminals, drug-traffickers and smugglers of any nationality but also infiltrators who deliberately crossed the border whether armed or unarmed and deal with them under the law of the land.²²¹

The two border security forces were to work in close cooperation in order to ensure the eradication of trans-border crimes such as drug-trafficking, smuggling of arms and ammunition and illegal border crossings. For this purpose, there would be mutual and timely exchanges of information, intelligence and coordination at battalion commander level.²²² The concerned authorities on each side should also ensure

²²⁰ These included: (a) while the overall co-ordination of the arrangements would be at the DIG, BSF/DDG, Pakistan Rangers level, the detailed planning of the programme, the composition and the conduct of the joint patrol parties and the like would be planned jointly at battalion/wing commander level. To maintain a certain element of surprise, the timing and execution of the joint patrolling would be organized and co-ordinated at the company commander level; (b) the joint patrol would be headed by officers of equal rank from both sides; (c) proper procedure for briefing of the parties jointly by senior officers and providing of proper communication link at the various levels where co-ordination is required, would be established. The special arrangements for joint patrolling would be tried initially for a period of three months from its introduction and procedures would be renewed thereafter. For text of the joint statement, see, *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 61, no. 3, July 1988, pp. 184-186.

²²¹ See, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8th series, vol. 50, no. 1, 27 July 1988, cols. 161-162.

²²² The statement added that should any instance of smuggling of arms and ammunition and also other contraband commodities including currency and drugs from one country to the other come to notice, a flag meeting at the company commander level would be called for facilitating a deterrent action against the concerned persons. Further the border security forces would send names with other personal particulars of all persons crossing the border illegally to either side along with the dates and places of crossing. The information would thereafter be expeditiously processed to ascertain if these persons were wanted in any criminal case of terrorism or smuggling. In cases where such linkages are established, the concerned persons would be handed over to the border security of the other country after due process of law. See, *Pakistan Times*, 17 May 1988.

that the illegal possession of arms and ammunition and their trans-border sale and movement was strictly and effectively prevented in the border villages. They should also prevent the carrying of arms by civilians (other than public servants) within 150 yards of either side of the border.

Although the Home Secretaries agreed on joint patrolling of the border, there was no agreement on the Indian proposal that the joint patrols undertake hot pursuit of terrorists to their bases.²²³ It was mainly due to this reason that their understanding on the joint patrolling was never implemented. Pakistan opposed it on the ground that allowing hot pursuit would infringe upon its sovereignty and India felt that joint patrolling without hot pursuit would be futile and meaningless. But the real obstacle was the suspicions about the underlying intentions of each other. The Indian side argued that given the scale of the allegations with regard to Pakistan's involvement in the Punjab, the idea that Pakistan would collaborate with India to check its 'alleged *protégés*' did not quite make sense. As an ex-Foreign Secretary of India Mr. K.P.S. Menon put it "the difficulty is that if the Pakistanis are involved, then the terrorists will know about and avoid the areas patrolled".²²⁴

The third round of Home Secretary talks took place a year later, in May 1989 after the Benazir Bhutto - Rajiv Gandhi meeting in December 1988 had given a boost to the improvement of their bilateral relations. At this meeting between the new Indian Home Secretary Mr. J.A. Kalyana Krishnan and Pakistan's Interior Secretary Mr. S.K. Mahmud, a major obstacle to undertaking joint patrolling of the border was removed. It was decided that the two border security forces should undertake "simultaneous co-ordinated patrolling along the Indo-Pak border and the patrols would be briefed and de-briefed jointly".²²⁵ The new arrangement extended significantly to the entire international border between the two countries (outside of course the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir) showing that both sides were more appreciative and responsive to each other's problems.²²⁶ Additionally the Director-General of the Pakistan Rangers and the Inspector-General of Punjab and Rajasthan were to meet twice a year to review implementation of various arrangements and agreed measures. In addition, there would be meetings at the lower levels where necessary for effective cooperation between the two border security forces. The Indian side also noted some

²²³ *Times of India*, 17 May 1988. Also see, *India Today*, 15 June 1988, p. 96.

²²⁴ *ibid.*

²²⁵ *Nation*, 25 May 1989. For full text of the joint statement issued, see, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, vol. 16, no. 5-6, May-June 1989, pp. 208-212.

²²⁶ *Times of India*, 29 May 1989.

encouraging signs like Pakistan's refusal to grant visas to Sikh extremists living abroad.²²⁷

The two Home Secretaries also agreed that the coverage of information to be exchanged between the two countries should be widened to include the organization, powers, functions and addresses of different enforcement agencies, training material, equipment, dates regarding seizures and other related matters including the *modus operandi* and the routes followed. They reviewed the working of the Indo-Pak committee earlier set up for this purpose and fully endorsed its decisions.²²⁸ Further detailed procedures were worked out to tackle the drug menace indicating the determination of the two governments to cooperate through the exchange of information, apprehension of fugitives, harmonization of laws and punishment of traffickers.²²⁹ The agreement was welcomed in both India and Pakistan and was taken as an indication of the two government's resolve to carry forward the long stalled normalization process.²³⁰

In December 1989 at a bi-annual meeting between the Inspector-General of the Indian Border Security Force, Mr. Amitabh Gupta and the Director-General of the Pakistan Rangers, Major General Naseer Ahmed Khan, the two countries undertook a first detailed review of the simultaneous coordinated patrolling agreed earlier. Mr. Gupta pointed out the disruptions that occurred in this exercise due to the Pakistan Rangers not adhering to the policy framework. The Indian side's contention was that several times Pakistan's patrolmen either did not turn up at the agreed places for this exercise or were much behind the scheduled timings chalked out by the commanders of the two sides every month. He also drew attention to the occasions when the Rangers patrol party was not available for the necessary briefing before the exercise which was being conducted for six hours during the day on selected days in areas identified by the two sides as vulnerable to trans-border crime.²³¹

The Indian officials brought to the knowledge of their counterparts that there had been several cases in the recent months in which the firing between the BSF and infiltrators took place very close to the

²²⁷ *ibid.*

²²⁸ The Indo-Pak committee that was set up in the pursuance of decisions taken at the meeting of the two Home Secretaries in 1986 had held three meetings, the last one held in New Delhi on 10-11 May 1988. See, **Pakistan Times**, 25 May 1989.

²²⁹ The two had agreed that the Interpol Chiefs and their representatives in both countries should have greater interaction at the personal level including fresh periodic meetings. And the FIA in Pakistan and the CBI in India acting as the model agencies and in concert with other appropriate agencies in their respective countries should take appropriate action in tracing out and arranging to hand over the other country's wanted and absconding criminals. The modalities of action in this regard were to be worked out by the FIA and CBI representatives through discussions within the following three months. See, **Pakistan Times**, 25 May 1989.

²³⁰ **Indian Express**, 26 May 1989; **Dawn**, 27 May 1989.

²³¹ **Patriot**, 21 December 1989.

international border and the Rangers border outposts. They pointed out that in such instances, the Rangers neither reacted to the situation nor did they respond to the protests of BSF officials to hold flag meetings later on. In some cases the requests for holding flag meetings to discuss the matter were turned down outright.

On the other hand, Pakistani officials lodged a protest over the incidents wherein the firing took place between the BSF and the intruders within their effective range in the Pakistani territory which could provoke the Pakistani Rangers. The Indian side argued that it had no intentions of provoking the other side and this was only in reaction to the firing resorted to by the intruders to push their way through and that the Rangers should in fact try and check the infiltrators.²³² The issue of holding flag meetings more frequently and giving prompt replies to protests lodged by the border security men of the two sides was also discussed. The officials on both sides agreed that necessary and firm instructions to adhere to the schedule be given at the lower level. They also agreed to extend the simultaneous coordinated patrolling from the six sectors in Punjab and Rajasthan²³³ to the Rann of Kutch sector in Gujrat as well.²³⁴ On the whole both agreed to take necessary steps to make the simultaneous coordinated patrolling on the India-Pakistan border more effective and result-oriented.

Despite all these measures the level of tensions on the Indo-Pak border remained high throughout 1990 mainly because by this time the political upheaval in the Kashmir valley had also surfaced. And India now believed that Pakistan was almost waging a low intensity conflict in the Punjab and J&K by arming, training and infiltrating the militants in these areas.²³⁵

2.4 A Critical Analysis

The Punjab problem continues to be a major irritant in India-Pakistan relations. On India's domestic front, while a number of political leaders, intellectuals and significant sections of enlightened public opinion blamed the central government in Delhi for its failure to undertake a political initiative to redress the Sikhs' grievances and bring the alienated Sikh population of Punjab back into the political mainstream, nearly all of them believe that Pakistan was extending armed support to the militants which in itself was a major obstacle to initiating the political process in Punjab. A Congress leader summed up these views succinctly

²³² *ibid.*

²³³ These sectors were Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Ferozpur and Abohar in Punjab and Bikaner and Jaisalmer in Rajasthan.

²³⁴ *The Tribune*, 29 December 1989.

²³⁵ This has already been discussed in first part of this chapter.

while it would be a grave misperception on our behalf to attribute to Pakistan the fundamental cause of the problem in Punjab and Kashmir but [there is] no doubt that without Pakistan's sustenance of terrorism in Punjab would have been encountered far more effectively and far more sooner than in last thirteen years ...²³⁶

Further, while it is a widely shared opinion that a war with Pakistan in order to teach it a lesson for its underhand activities in Punjab and J&K was not the answer to the problem, several voices could be heard otherwise to take tough measures against Pakistan for the same reason. The BJP argued in favour of the Indian military undertaking hot pursuit of the terrorists or destroying the training camps on Pakistan's territory. Others took note of India's potential to create trouble in Pakistan's Sindh and Baluchistan provinces, more or less in a tit-for-tat fashion. General Sunderji, for instance wrote

Pakistan seems to think that India would not decide to pay her back in the same coin and foster and support dissidents in, say, Sindh or Baluchistan ... India has behaved with a restraint thus far. But Pakistan can not assume that India will continue to hold back in spite of the excesses...²³⁷

It is argued that Pakistan's plans to balkanize India can also backfire and if India breaks up, its spill-over effect on Pakistan is bound to have grave consequences for its own fledgling national and territorial integrity bearing in mind its Sindh and Baluch problems. It is interesting to note that this opinion is now shared by some Pakistani scholars as well. Burki writes that

to wish India to fall into pieces would be tantamount to unconsciously encouraging the nascent tendencies of regionalism in our own country, a heightened sense of expression of which may seriously endanger Pakistan's territorial integrity as it did in 1971.²³⁸

Naqvi wrote that

Indians are right in saying that should such movements succeed in East Punjab and Kashmir, it will only be a matter of time before they acquire a momentum of their own and the present state structures in the rest of South Asia would break down....²³⁹

The continuing Punjab problem also presents a classic example of India and Pakistan's suspicions of the underlying intentions of each other and the perceived gap between the professed intentions and subsequent actions of either side vitiating the confidence building process between the two countries. India regards Pakistan's cessation of aid to the Sikh militants, as Rajiv Gandhi put it, as the "litmus test of Pakistan's sincerity".²⁴⁰

²³⁶ In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

²³⁷ See, General K. Sunderji, "Courting Catastrophe", *India Today*, 30 November 1991, p. 12.

²³⁸ See, S. Burki, "Instability in India Augurs Ill for Pakistan", *Nation*, 17 June 1991.

²³⁹ M.B. Naqvi, "Well Armed but Clueless", *Dawn*, 18 September 1990.

²⁴⁰ *Ceylon Daily News*, 20 January 1989.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has denied consistently any involvement in supporting the Sikh separatists. General Zia, on his part, offered to send neutral observers or joint inspecting teams of India and Pakistan to the alleged training camps on its territory. These were, however, dismissed by the Indian government as only an exercise in public relations. This should also be seen and understood in the wider context of the Indian government's distrust of Zia's military regime. It became evident when the Indian government accepted Benazir Bhutto's democratically elected government's stated intentions of not using the Sikh card at its face value. At the same time it must be noted that it was the Benazir Bhutto government's initial efforts of disallowing pro-Khalistan foreign Sikhs to visit Pakistan and handing over of certain dreaded extremists to India which proved crucial in substantiating Indian government's faith in her. A top Indian Foreign Office official disclosed that Benazir Bhutto had reportedly told Mr. Robert Gates that Pakistan had 69 training camps which were wound up by her government. But he said that the question remained, 69 out of how many and where were the people who were trained in these camps?²⁴¹

This too did not last for long as the Indian government soon felt that Pakistan's operation in Punjab was perhaps being masterminded by the ISI over which Benazir Bhutto's otherwise weak civilian government did not exercise much control. Once again the internal dynamics of a country's polity had come in the way of building bridges between India and Pakistan.

To recapitulate, India did not regard Pakistan's proposals to control cross-border terrorism as sincere. They cite the proposal of joint patrolling which was accepted by the Indian government without the provision for a hot pursuit only to test Pakistan's intentions and as argued earlier, the initial agreement on joint patrolling signed in 1986 was never implemented and the subsequent idea of simultaneous coordinated joint patrolling also encountered numerous problems. Thus India's perceived gap between Pakistan's professed intentions and actions on the ground only confirmed its suspicions of Pakistan in this respect. The confidence building process failed to yield much dividend on this issue. Now let us examine the Pakistani allegations of Indian interference in Sindh.

2.5 Sindh Issue

Since the early 1980's Pakistan too has been accusing India of interfering in its Sindh province. Pakistan's Sindh crisis emanates primarily from a sense of alienation or deprivation whereby the Sindhis in

²⁴¹ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

that province perceive themselves to have become a minority in their own state while the other communities particularly the Mohajirs, Punjabis and Pathans dominate the political and economic system of the province.²⁴² There has been a growing strength of Sindhi sub-nationalism which pits the Sindhis against the central government in Islamabad. One may also take note of the Jeeye-Sindh movement demanding a sovereign and independent Sindhudesh led by the veteran political leader G.M. Syed.²⁴³

India first came into the picture when an Indian Member of Parliament (MP) sponsored a World Sindhi Conference in New Delhi in 1983 where some speakers hinted that the time was ripe for this part [Sindh] of Pakistan to become a part of India. Pakistan objected strongly not only to these comments but to the very rationale of holding an international Sindhi conference outside the Sindh province of Pakistan where the majority of Sindhi speaking people lived.²⁴⁴ India defended its right to hold the Sindhi conference since Sindhi enjoys the status of a national language in India.²⁴⁵ Regarding the views expressed at the conference, the Indian Ambassador to Pakistan said that it was a private conference and it had nothing to do with the government's policy.²⁴⁶

Since then Pakistani leaders have been accusing India of interfering in the Sindh by instigating dissidence, supporting opposition groups and even housing some training camps in neighbouring Rajasthan.²⁴⁷ In 1987 when a bomb blast killed and injured a number of people in Karachi, the Prime Minister Mr. Junejo insinuated Indian involvement. He asked the reporters, "Why do you talk of Afghanistan alone ? Why ignore India ?".²⁴⁸ In an interview General Zia accused India of interfering in the affairs of Sindh and of trying to isolate it from the rest of Pakistan and that his government had evidence that India was involved in subversive activities there.²⁴⁹ It is interesting to note that General Zia also thought that the Indian government and its intelligence might be working independently of each other. He said "it is possible that the Indian government might not be involved directly in the activities in Sindh and its intelligence is

²⁴² According to one estimate, the Mohajirs alone make up about 35% of the Sindh population. See, Eqbal Ahmed, "Causes of Ethnic Conflict in Sindh", *Times of India*, 31 July 1990. For a detailed analysis of the Sindh problem, see, Uma Singh, "Ethnic Conflicts in Pakistan: Sindh as a Factor in Pakistan's Politics", in Urmila Phadnis, S.D. Muni et al, eds., *Domestic Conflicts in South Asia: Economic and Ethnic Dimensions*, Vol. II, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986, pp. 149-164.

²⁴³ For a profile of G.M. Syed and his demand for the Sindhudesh, see, Zafar Abbas, "G.M. Syed: Saint or Sinner", and other articles on this issue in *The Herald*, vol. 23, no. 5, February 1992, pp. 23-38.

²⁴⁴ *Pakistan Times*, 20 October 1983.

²⁴⁵ In 1967 the Sindhi language was incorporated in the 8th schedule of the Indian constitution.

²⁴⁶ *Dawn*, 23 October 1983.

²⁴⁷ *Nation*, 29 September 1986; *Dawn*, 13 May 1988; *Nation*, 7 August 1988; *Pakistan Times*, 5 November 1988.

²⁴⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 March 1987, p. 36.

²⁴⁹ As quoted in *Yearbook 1989, op.cit.*, p. 23.

handling the affair".²⁵⁰ Overall, a substantial section of Pakistani analysts widely share this opinion that India is fomenting trouble in the Sindh province but it is mostly in the form of declaratory accusations without any concrete documented evidence. The Indian government has consistently denied any such involvement.

2.6 Pakistani Allegations of Indian Support for Anti-Regime Forces (during the military regime)

In the early 1980's Gen Zia-ul-Haq's regime had also accused India of supporting the MRD (Movement to Restore Democracy) led by the Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) against its military rule. During the MRD agitation in Sindh in 1983, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government expressed its sympathy for the democratic movement in Pakistan. In an address to a Congress party meeting, she described the MRD as a struggle for democracy by the people of Pakistan and that "we are for democracy and shall ever be so".²⁵¹ Her Foreign Minister echoed these views. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, P.V. Narasimha Rao said that "India was carefully watching the situation in Pakistan and expressed his government's concern and grief over the incidents occurring there".²⁵²

These statements were widely condemned by the Pakistani leaders. Zia described Indira Gandhi's statements as "a deliberate interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan".²⁵³ Subsequently Zia charged that the MRD worked in cooperation with a so-called foreign power (read India) and that it was so planned that as soon as the MRD began its agitation a foreign power as agreed earlier came out with its support.²⁵⁴ He continued to allege Indian complicity in Benazir Bhutto's actions. In 1986 he hinted at the flow of foreign money into Pakistan to swell the crowds at PPP's public meetings and insisted that

I have no proof but I insist on it... I am at pains to normalize our relations with India but I can not ignore [it] for any Machiavellian attempt that [it] might undertake willingly, unwillingly, officially or unofficially... there are many agencies which would be only willing to offer that much money to Benazir Bhutto apart from the Soviet Union.²⁵⁵

While these accusations naturally stopped after Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1988, Pakistan has continued to blame India for causing trouble in Sindh. Islamabad has, however, failed to provide any concrete and detailed evidence to this effect which raises the question if it is using the 'Indian involvement' for its

²⁵⁰ *The Telegraph*, 17 August 1988.

²⁵¹ See, Salamat Ali, "A Nettlesome Neighbour", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 October 1983, p. 25.

²⁵² As quoted in *Pakistan's Yearbook 1983, op.cit.*, p. 206.

²⁵³ *Los Angeles Times*, 26 January 1984.

²⁵⁴ *Asian Recorder*, vol. 29, 1983, p. 17498.

²⁵⁵ Zia's interview with *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 June 1986, pp. 28-29. Also see his interview with *Newsweek*, 7 July 1986, p. 52.

domestic ends only. In a similar vein, most Pakistanis believe that India's interference in Sindh is largely a product of its attempts to divert attention from its problems in Punjab. And as in the case of Punjab the two sides have not made much headway in allaying each other's suspicions in this respect.

3 Conclusion

On the whole, it may be argued that the confidence building process between India and Pakistan for avoiding another war over Kashmir has largely paid dividends. But its contribution towards bringing about a political atmosphere where the parties in question can sit together and resolve the dispute may be described as modest at best. Let us now discuss the impact of these continuing core issues of conflict between India and Pakistan on their confidence building process. In Pakistan, there were clearly two schools of thought in this regard. One held that the whole gamut of Indo-Pak relations hinged on the solution of the Kashmir issue and for this group nothing short of a plebiscite and a merger of J&K into Pakistan would be acceptable. They argued that Kashmir since 1947 has constantly released slow poison into the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan²⁵⁶ and considered themselves to be the aggrieved party since India never fulfilled its promise of holding a plebiscite. This group mainly consists of hardline Islamic parties like Jamaat-i-Islami along with its committed cadre and some retired army generals. It also finds full support in the vernacular (urdu) press in Pakistan.

The mainstream view, however, is more encouraging that while continuing to uphold the cause of Kashmir, the Pakistan government should also sustain the confidence building dialogue with India on several other issues. However they too are very careful to point out that unless there is a simultaneous progress on resolving the Kashmir issue, it alone has the potential of sabotaging the entire confidence building process between two countries on other issues, particularly in the economic and socio-cultural field.

The point one is trying to make here is that a successful confidence building exercise between India and Pakistan in say, the economic and socio-cultural field and a reconciliation of differences on other issues like Siachin and nuclearisation or denuclearisation of the subcontinent may not bring a solution to the Kashmir dispute any nearer perhaps because no trade-offs on other issues are likely to grant sufficient leverage to either side to make justify any major concession on the Kashmir issue. Yet a non-resolution of the Kashmir issue, by itself, has an incredibly negative impact on the overall confidence building process

²⁵⁶ In an interview with ex-Pakistani diplomat with the present author in October 1991.

between the two countries.

Most Indians described Kashmir as a core issue between India and Pakistan but not in terms of determining its future status. While they acknowledge that the recent political unrest in the valley and the Sikh problem in Punjab was created by the mismanagement of centre, it was the Pakistani interference in terms of aiding and abetting the terrorism in the valley and in Punjab that was the main issue of contention. There is a unanimous opinion that a solution for Kashmir is as necessary as desirable for confidence building between the two countries. It is argued, however, that to regard it as a pre-condition to holding the overall confidence building dialogue would be following a suicidal course that is bound to result in a deadlock.

CHAPTER XIII: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

Friendships between neighbours such as ourselves can not be built by governments alone. Our friendship has to be built, most of all, by our peoples, among ourselves. Nothing is more important than removing the roadblocks that have been placed in the way of our peoples getting to know each other.¹

These remarks by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sum up the task of confidence building in the socio-cultural framework of India-Pakistan relations. This chapter examines the India-Pakistan confidence building efforts in the realm of economic and socio-cultural interactions. It also presents an alternative view of studying the confidence building process between India and Pakistan which operates at two levels - the official level between their respective governments and at a non-official level among the significant elements of their opinion-making elites and the people of the two countries.

Such attempts involve India-Pakistan efforts to expand bilateral economic cooperation and the impediments being faced by the two countries in this task. They also concern essentially the same exercise in their socio-cultural relations. Finally an analysis of the continuing non-official dialogue between the opinion-making elites of the two countries and its implications for their bilateral confidence building process is in order.

1 Economic Cooperation

Economic cooperation and trade is an important component of the confidence building process between India and Pakistan in the sense that they offer valuable underpinnings to a sound relationship, encouraging a vested interest in both countries for peaceful exchanges. The Simla Agreement had put both India and Pakistan on a path of gradual normalization of their relations and subsequently they signed a trade protocol in New Delhi on 30 November 1974 lifting the embargo on trade between the two countries from 7 December 1974. Trade was actually resumed in January 1975 after an agreement was signed in Islamabad. Both countries agreed to grant the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment to each other and develop and strengthen commercial relations between them on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The level of trade between the two countries, however, remained very low.² Subsequently private trading was introduced in July 1976 and remained in force for two years. The composition of exports and

¹ The Telegraph, 18 July 1989.

² During 1975-76, the total trade was in the order of 23 crores rupees but it dwindled to a mere Rs. 9 crores in the next year, showing a very bleak picture. For more details, see, Sucha Singh Gill and R.S. Ghuman, "Indo-Pak Trade: Prospects and Constraints", in V.D. Chopra, ed., *Studies in Indo-Pak Relations*, New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1985, pp. 199-204.

imports for this duration showed that the Indian export list was relatively more diversified and a significant proportion consisted of the manufactured goods as compared with that of Pakistan which mainly exported raw cotton.³ The trade agreement signed in 1975 expired in 1978. Since Pakistan argued that the prevailing regulatory mechanisms governing the bilateral trade were not suited and inadequate, both sides considered various other regulatory mechanisms in two rounds of talks in May and October 1978 but failed to arrive at any agreement.⁴

Thereafter trade between the two countries was handled by the Trading Corporation of Pakistan, a public sector agency, while in India, both the public and private sectors conducted trade with Pakistan. This action enabled the Pakistani government effectively to supervise its trade with India, reduce its trade deficit and control the tempo of total trade between two countries. Thus, the trade balance swung continuously in favour of Pakistan. In response the Indian government made several efforts to reach a new trade agreement but without much success. Finally, in October 1982, the Government of Pakistan approved 40 specified items for imports by its private sector from India. But at the same time imports of these items were to be channelled through the Trading Corporation of Pakistan.⁵

1.1 Non-Governmental Organisations' Efforts

The two sides kept up their efforts to re-activate private sector trade between them. High-level trade delegations discussed the problems and prospects of trade at official and non-official levels. The Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India and Pakistan, exchanged their trade delegations and held fruitful discussions regarding promotion of mutually beneficial trade between the two countries.⁶ A Pakistani delegation of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry visited India in November 1981.⁷ The FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) delegations visited Pakistan in November 1982 and in February 1983 and made several suggestions to dispel the Pakistani business

³ Indian exports to Pakistan consisted mainly of iron ore, coal, agriculture machinery, machine tools, electrical goods, scooters, timber, bamboo, bidi leaves and betel nuts. Pakistan exported mainly raw cotton, cotton seeds, oil-cake, cement, limestone rock, salt and red chillies. For a detailed discussion on Indo-Pak trade relations during this period, see, Sreedhar, "Indo-Pak Trade: Problems and Prospects", *India Quarterly*, vol. 31, no. 3, July-September 1975, pp. 233-41; T. Bhat, "India and Pakistan: See-Saw Economic Relations", in Chopra, *ibid.*, "Trade With India, *Pakistan Economist*, vol. 18, no. 18, 6 May 1978, p. 5.

⁴ See the joint press statements issued at the conclusion of India-Pakistan trade talks on 6-9 May 1978 and 9 October 1978, in Riaz Ahmed Syed, ed., *Government of Pakistan Ministry of External Affairs: Joint Communiques*, January 1977-December 1988, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan publication, pp. 29, 38.

⁵ For a list of these 40 items, see, Bhat, *op.cit.*, pp. 228-229.

⁶ Ghuman, *op.cit.*, p. 193.

⁷ Dawn, 22 November 1981.

community's apprehensions that imports of some of the items from India would affect their local industry adversely.

The Indian delegates tried to impress upon their Pakistani counterparts that India was interested in exporting only those goods to Pakistan which were then being imported from the Western countries at much higher prices. They pointed out that such an arrangement would save considerable freight charges to Pakistan.⁸ Mr. Virendra Punj, the leader of the first delegation, said that businessmen of the two countries should make recommendations to their respective governments to incorporate necessary safeguards for nascent industries in the trade agreement itself.

The other suggestions put forward by the Indian team were that trade centres should be established in a number of cities by both countries which should help to provide information about potential trade and joint venture avenues. India and Pakistan could possibly join hands in areas where they enjoyed a monopoly while trading with a third country. For instance, such a course could be profitably adopted in exports of basmati rice. Further, there could be a mutually beneficial transfer of technology between India and Pakistan and avenues for joint ventures and third country tendering could be explored seriously to mutual advantage. Punj also called for devising easy procedures for facilitating visits of businessmen from both sides and suggested that the Chambers of Commerce could be given a role in facilitating the granting of visas to the nationals of the country concerned.⁹

One tangible result of this meeting was that a Memorandum of Understanding on Promotion of Trade and Industrial Cooperation was signed between the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the PHDCCI. The two sides established a Standing Committee consisting of five members from each of the two Chambers to facilitate the functioning and implementation of the memorandum. It was agreed that the joint committee would meet once every three months to review trade between the two countries and seek to identify further areas of mutual cooperation and trade.¹⁰

The FICCI delegation led by Mr. Ashok Jain also assured the Pakistani businessmen that "India has no intention of exporting goods to Pakistan which would hurt Pakistan".¹¹ He suggested that in place of a

⁸ FICCI Delegation to Pakistan, *FICCI Report*, New Delhi, 1983.

⁹ *Pakistan Times*, 8 November 1982; *Dawn*, 13 November 1982. Also see, PHDCCI (Punjab, Haryana, Delhi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 6-15 November 1982.

¹⁰ *Dawn*, 13 November 1982. For text of the Memorandum of Understanding, see appendix.

¹¹ *Dawn*, 24 February 1983.

list of 40 items permissible for imports from India, they could prepare a negative list spelling out those items which could be banned for exports from India. And that India should import more and more goods from Pakistan aside from its capacity to export to Pakistan. He stressed that India and Pakistan were in a position to set up joint ventures in third countries, particularly in the Middle East. Jain added that such cooperation was possible not only in manufacturing lines but also in engineering and construction. The Pakistani team too appreciated Jain's efforts but nothing much came out of this meeting.¹²

1.2 Joint Commission

The India-Pakistan Joint Commission signed on 10 March 1983 was a significant step in this direction. The first meeting of the Joint Commission agreed to expand bilateral trade and the two sides decided to conclude a new trade agreement on the basis of mutuality of advantage by taking care of the major concerns of each side. It agreed to hold negotiations to arrive at a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and to explore the possibility of cooperation between institutions of agricultural research. They also agreed to improve the existing telecommunications facilities between the two countries and to augment it by adding more channels and to exchange delegations between the two countries in the field of science and technology and to suggest concrete measures for cooperation in areas such as oil, energy, metallurgy, marine sciences, genetic engineering, biotechnology and the medical research environment. Finally, in the shipping sector, it was felt mutually that the scope of the protocol should be expanded and that the carriage of all third country cargo should be included in the scope of the protocol.¹³

The first meeting of the sub-commission on trade was held in Islamabad in January 1984, when representatives of the two countries identified the items for bulk trading between the two countries in order to increase further the level and volume of trade between them.¹⁴ The subcommission on economic matters also agreed to increase the exchange of visits of businessmen and industrialists and considered further the matters relating to technological cooperation in the supply of machinery, the possibility of joint ventures in third countries and exchange of information in industrial programmes. The issue of setting up a joint business council under the auspices of the two National Chambers of Commerce was also examined in depth. Both

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ Bhat, *op.cit.*, pp. 224-225.

¹⁴ The ten items identified for export to India were: fertilizer (urea), low grade coal, pig iron, soda ash, fresh and dried fruits, petroleum products, fish, rock salt and industrial alcohol. The nine items identified for exports to Pakistan were: iron ore, steel mill rolls, stainless steel sheets, mice and mice products, selected chemicals, jute and jute products, tea, coffee and bidi leaves.

India and Pakistan had set up export processing zones for promoting export-oriented units. The subcommission decided that the investors of the two countries would be encouraged to set up units in each other's export processing zones in accordance with the respective regulations.¹⁵ But yet again they failed to put these suggestions into practice.

A breakthrough came in January 1986 at a meeting between the then Indian Finance Minister, V.P. Singh with his Pakistani counterpart Dr. Mahbubul Haq in Islamabad. The two signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Trade. Despite protracted discussions on this question Pakistan allowed only 42 items to be imported from India by its private sector, while India continued to keep its doors open. The accord also stipulated a doubling of public sector trade, the introduction of direct telephone dialling by the end of December 1986 and an increase in the frequency of air services between the two countries on the existing routes. Addressing a joint press conference with Dr. Haq after the agreement was signed, Mr. Singh said that his visit had yielded positive results as the economic field was chosen to be the first step in an overall normalization of bilateral relations. He announced that telex facilities would be further extended on the Lahore-Amritsar route and a shipping agreement was also being finalized. Dr. Haq said,

I believe that as a result of our talks, the economic relations between the two countries have entered a new and more promising phase. More than any specifics, it is the spirit behind these agreements, a spirit to normalize relations between the two countries, a spirit to build on the foundation laid by our leaders in December 1985.¹⁶

Dr. Haq also gave a list of items to be imported from India both in public sector¹⁷ and private sector of Pakistan.¹⁸ V.P. Singh stated

I do not think we have reached the end of the journey, it is a start.

Dr. Haq agreed with this assessment and hinted that the list of commodities open to private traders could be expanded to over 300.¹⁹ This progress however again received a setback when Dr. Haq was dropped from the Pakistani cabinet in March 1986. Subsequently however the list of import items from India for the private sector was expanded up to 571.

¹⁵ Bhat, *op.cit.*, p. 226.

¹⁶ As quoted in Yearbook 1985-86, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁷ These included wheat, iron ore, manganese ore and pesticides.

¹⁸ These included tea, wood and timber, betel leaves, betel nut, ginger, tamarind seeds, vegetables, fruits, flowers, vegetable dyes, essential oils, books (technical, religious and professional only), spices excluding chillies, turmeric and cumin seeds, calculators and calculating machines, lifts and escalators, drilling rigs, postal franking machines, carbon-electrodes and compressor units for air-conditioning plants.

¹⁹ Douglas C. Makeig, "War, No-War, India-Pakistan Negotiating Strategies", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 2, Summer 1987, p. 290.

The Commerce Secretaries of the two countries met in October 1987 and discussed trade as well as other issues relating to agriculture, telecommunications, industry, railways and science and technology, with a view to widening the scope of bilateral cooperation. They also exchanged views on the planning process in the two countries and agreed on the need to set up institutional mechanisms for the exchange of information. A breakthrough came in 1989 after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad. The two Prime Ministers set the pace for the meeting of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission. Both sides agreed to set up a joint business council and to participate in each other's trade fairs. The Joint Commission agreed on certain concrete measures to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in other areas such as planning,²⁰ industry,²¹ and agriculture.²²

1.3 Regional Economic Cooperation

At the same time attempts were being made to promote economic cooperation and trade between India and Pakistan at the regional level, both in an inter-governmental (SAARC) and a non-governmental (CSCD) framework. The initial endeavours of regional economic cooperation took the shape in a Committee on Studies for Cooperation in Development (CSCD), set up in September 1978 by a group of South Asian scholars led by Dr. Tarlok Singh from the Indian Council of World Affairs.²³ The idea behind these efforts was that since there were formidable geo-political constraints to regional cooperation, the intellectuals could help break the ice by throwing light on the opportunities and benefits from regional cooperation, particularly in the economic field.²⁴ Initially the CSCD proposed to undertake research on 14 areas of vital importance for regional cooperation which included import-export structure and trade expansion among regional countries and cooperation in relation to the rest of the world. They also proposed two important strategies of putting forth a united voice in North-South negotiations and undertaking collective self-reliance measures.

These initial efforts were taken over by the establishment of the first inter-governmental regional organization, SAARC, that came into existence in 1983. But SAARC, too, has been unable to make any

²⁰ The two sides agreed to exchange documents and data relevant to furthering the process of development and to hold a seminar on mobilization of savings, population, local planning, irrigation programmes and policies to be held during 1989.

²¹ Both agreed to exchange delegations of businessmen in order to increase bilateral industrial cooperation.

²² They agreed that a revised schedule of visits would be implemented and a seminar would be held on already identified subjects in Pakistan in September 1989 and in India in November 1989. *Pakistan Times*, 20 July 1989.

²³ Madhukar Shumsher Rana, "Economic Dimensions of Regional Cooperation", in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 81. Also see, Tarlok Singh, "Cooperation and Complementarity in South Asia", *South Asian Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 26-32.

²⁴ *ibid.*. Also see, G.R. Aggrawal, *South Asian Regional Cooperation and Non-Governmental Organizations*, Kathmandu, July 1983.

breakthrough in the economic field primarily because the political wheel has been out of alignment. Because of the nature of asymmetry in size and capability of the countries in the region, with the Indian economy being more than three times as large as the economies of all the other countries put together and at a much higher stage of industrial development than the others, it has created a sense of insecurity due to the fear that the predominant Indian position might work to the detriment of the other weaker states.²⁵ This kind of outlook has encouraged extreme caution instead of the confidence essential for engaging in credible economic activities. Pakistan, in particular, has opposed consistently India and other regional leaders demands to include core areas like trade, industry, investment and joint ventures for economic cooperation.²⁶

The Islamabad summit of 1989 succeeded in making a breakthrough of sorts on this issue due to a budding *rapprochement* between India and Pakistan under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto respectively. This was reflected in a certain softening of both countries' stands on this issue. India sought to allay its neighbours' fears of economic dominance, with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stating that
India has no hesitancy in declaring that it is fully conscious of its special responsibilities.
We will not seek to secure any unfair advantage at the expense of any of our partners.²⁷

Earlier in an interview, the Indian Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh had suggested that if Pakistan was "nervous about being swamped, [let them] identify the trade areas, impose restrictions, but let us start at least".²⁸ The Pakistani response proved to be cautious but far more positive than previously. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stressed that since SAARC states were at different levels of development, they were apprehensive lest their industries or economies be undermined by regional cooperation. At the same time, however, she expressed her desire to strengthen bilateral trade links with India, pointing out that the Indo-Pak trade items had been increased from 40 to more than 500. In the context of SAARC, Bhutto expressed the hope that the study being carried out in the area of trade, manufacturing and services would "lend itself to enhanced economic exchanges" and would lead to "a harmonization of our economic efforts towards the socio-economic progress of our people".²⁹

²⁵ For a discussion on both the positive and negative aspects of India's central position in South Asia and its implications for the growth of intra-regional trade under SAARC, see R.L. Varshney and R. Kumar, "India and Economic Cooperation in South Asia", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. 39, no. 1&2, January-February 1990, pp. 4-7.

²⁶ Sridhar K. Khatri, "A Decade of South Asian Regionalism: Retrospect and Prospect", *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1992, p. 9.

²⁷ *Times of India*, 30 December 1988.

²⁸ *Nation*, 29 December 1988.

²⁹ *Pakistan Times*, 1 January 1989.

Finally, all the leaders agreed that the planners should examine the possibility of cooperation in agreed areas of trade, manufacturing and services and then make specific recommendations to their leaders at the next summit. The Colombo summit established the SAARC regional fund to finance the identification of joint projects in core areas such as industry and agriculture and to expand institutional cooperation with intra-regional groupings such as the EC and ASEAN. A decision was also taken to work towards establishing a South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA) by 1997 and ultimately the creation of a South Asian Economic Community.³⁰ It is in this field of planning and coordination that SAARC has made headway. This is vital because it is going to shape the dimensions and direction of development strategy and any success in these areas would "definitely bring out very vital and almost revolutionary results".³¹ Further, all the SAARC countries have agreed and taken action to co-ordinate their position on international economic issues like the IDA replenishment.³²

1.4 India-Pakistan Cooperation in International Fora

There is also a great deal of cooperation between India and Pakistan in the international fora. Their voting pattern in the UN Specialized Agencies, World Bank and IMF, as well as UNCTAD have been the same.³³ It has been suggested that India and Pakistan could also cooperate effectively in their trade transactions in the world market. For instance, the textile trade of the two countries at the global level is governed by the Multi-fibre arrangement and in their textile exports, both encounter quota restrictions. The past record has shown that both the countries fail to fulfil the allotted quota for particular textiles in the EC, the US and other major markets. As textile exporters, both countries could cooperate with each other and ask for inter-changeable quotas in the international markets.³⁴

This suggestion has already been mooted by the Asian Textile Council which operates under the Asian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CACCI) for the countries of Asia as a whole. Such an arrangement could work out beneficially for all the supporting countries. The Pakistani authorities, however, have not expressed any opinion on this matter. The two may also cooperate in joint ventures in third countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. This suggestion is supported in many quarters in Pakistan which

³⁰ Samina Ahmed, "Summit of Discord", *Newsline*, January 1992, p. 140.

³¹ S.D. Muni's comments in Khatri, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

³² *ibid.*

³³ *The Nation*, 27 August 1987.

³⁴ Bhat, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

point out that "with joint capital and a sincere desire to share each other's technological achievements, an atmosphere of trust and goodwill would be created which will contribute to good and prosperous relations between two countries".³⁵

A critical evaluation of the Indo-Pak efforts in economic cooperation both at the bilateral and regional level may just dismiss them altogether as mere talk without any substance. Yet a sympathetic view may be able better to appreciate such attempts. Before discussing its contribution to the overall confidence building process between India and Pakistan, let us first examine the political and economic impediments that have inhibited this process.

1.5 Impediments

Indo-Pak trade is essentially a political issue and the lack of a political will particularly on behalf of Pakistani leaders to encourage bilateral trade is the foremost stumbling block. India views trade relations with Pakistan not in terms of the arithmetic of balance, but as a medium of strengthening relations. It considers an increased trade and more intensified economic cooperation with Pakistan as an important vehicle of the overall confidence building process. While the Indian approach is more spirited, Pakistan's is that of extreme caution if not real reluctance. This is primarily owing to Pakistani perceptions of India as an 'economic Leviathan' and its fears that an increased trade with India would swamp the Pakistani markets with Indian goods adversely affecting local industries as they would work in favour of India's more developed industrial infrastructure.³⁶

At a regional level too, Pakistan fears that economic cooperation and increased trade with India could result in a gradual and one-sided dependence of Pakistan and other smaller SAARC nations on India which could in turn lead to political dependence.³⁷ That is why Pakistan constantly harps on the need to develop balanced inter-dependence in trade and monitors its private sector bilateral trade with India through the Trading Corporation of Pakistan for avoiding a trade deficit.

One must also examine the nexus between Pakistani industrialists and businessmen with the ruling troika on the one hand and the linkages between the multilateral agencies, multi-national companies (MNC)

³⁵ See the editorial in, *Muslim*, 27 August 1987.

³⁶ This argument was put forward by a number of people in Pakistan in interviews with the present author in October 1991.

³⁷ M.B. Naqvi, "Opportunities at Dhaka", *Dawn*, 4 December 1985.

and other trading partners like the US and Japan with Pakistan, on the other. This is important because economic vested interests are often created by policies like diversification or the invitation to the multilateral agencies which encourage certain linkages with one particular business sector or another.³⁸ These are essentially economic decisions which flow from political considerations in the sense that few regimes will allow any kind of political decision to be taken if it is going to benefit the political adversaries of the regime.

In the case of Pakistan, since as early as the 1950's its military-bureaucratic axis had found "natural allies" among big business groups and the nascent industrialist class of Karachi which were able "jointly and severally to keep effective checks on the government's import ... policies".³⁹ With continued government support and high cost of production, it is this industrialist class of Pakistan which is very wary of competing with their Indian counterpart, which owing to the large size of the Indian market keep the profit margins very low.

Further, the business community in Pakistan is divided along regional lines on the issue of liberalizing trade with India. The businessmen from Karachi are favourable to open trade because business in this area is dominated by large firms.⁴⁰ On the other hand in Punjab most of the businesses are small and medium scale where the production cost is very high and the goods imported from other countries like Japan or the US, although of better quality and highly priced as such, allow a little part of the market to be shared by the goods produced by the small scale industries.⁴¹ The importance of the 'Punjab factor' in Islamabad's decision making apparatus means that their interests are better represented in the formulation of the government's trade policies.

At an international level, a substantial amount of Pakistan's trade with countries like the USA and Japan is financed on tied loans and credits from these countries.⁴² In other words, the principal form in which foreign capital has come to Pakistan is in the form of tied credits, which have been used to capture the local markets.⁴³ Some argue that the main opposition to the development of Indo-Pak trade comes from those powerful groups which are connected with Western based MNC's. Due to many advantages like cheap labour,

³⁸ Muni's comments in Khatri, *op.cit.*, pp. 97-98.

³⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, Karachi: Vanguard Publishers, 1990, pp. 246-247.

⁴⁰ In an interview conducted in Karachi in October 1991.

⁴¹ Bhat, *op.cit.*, p. 224.

⁴² This argument was put forward by a Pakistani scholar in an interview with the present author in October 1991.

⁴³ Ghuman, *op.cit.*, p. 197.

physical proximity and lower freight charges, better quality Indian goods *vis-à-vis* goods marketed by the MNC's from Japan, the USA and other far-off countries are likely to be cheaper in Pakistan.⁴⁴ Consequently Indian entry in to Pakistani markets can pose a serious threat to the interests of these MNC's.

In 1976, for instance, when talks for improving Indo-Pak trade were at their peak, the People's Democratic Front stated that the leading MNC's were apprehensive that an improved commercial relationship between India and Pakistan would affect their exports to Pakistan adversely and

with this fear in mind, some of the top executives of leading MNC's operating in Pakistan met and devised a strategy to fight the so-called danger of 'Indian economic domination'.⁴⁵

People's Pakistan, the official organ of the People's Democratic Front also alleged all that huge sums were earmarked by the MNC's for financing a campaign against close commercial links with India and newspapers advocating non-cooperation with India were promised massive advertisements by them. Besides some of the important politicians belonging both to the ruling party and opposition were also lured into the campaign.⁴⁶ Saini thus, describes their role in Indo-Pak trade as "positively harmful".⁴⁷

Some Pakistani scholars also point out some purely economic constraints to an expansion of trade with India. They complain about the low quality of Indian goods and therefore their inability to meet the required specifications of an importer in Pakistan.⁴⁸ This, however, is somewhat inconsistent with Pakistan's argument that if free trade with India is allowed, its markets would be swamped by the Indian goods. If they are of low quality and do not meet the demands of the Pakistani importer, how would they flood its markets, asked an Indian economist. Secondly, they accuse India of a strictly controlled import policy which leaves very little room for Pakistani exports particularly that of manufactured consumer goods. Pakistanis argue that they have asked consistently India to liberalize its import policy or at least to "come forward with some sort of a special arrangement with Pakistan".⁴⁹ General Zia, in this context, once told A.B. Vajpayee that

even if you have to import something from us and dump it in the sea, for god's sake do that...⁵⁰

⁴⁴ "Curbs on Indo-Pak Trade and the MNC's Pressure", *Patriot*, 29 July 1978.

⁴⁵ As cited by Mahendra Kumar Saini, "Role of MNC's in Indo-Pak Relations", in V.D. Chopra, *op.cit.*, p. 212.

⁴⁶ *Patriot*, 24 October 1976.

⁴⁷ Saini, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

⁴⁸ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

⁴⁹ *Dawn*, 24 May 1983.

⁵⁰ Zia's interview with Khuswant Singh, in 'Interview to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 2, January-December 1979, pp. 209-210.

The Indian side, on the other hand, argues that while it can trade with the Pakistani private sector only for the 571 items as specified in the list, while the Indian OGL list offers about 40,000 items for trade. Mr. S.K. Singh pointed out that Pakistan was free to compete in the Indian market without any restrictions and could reduce its trade imbalance by increasing trade with India, a large market of 800 million for Pakistani goods.⁵¹ Moreover, with the liberalization of the Indian economy in the latter half of 1980's and early 1990's, Pakistan's grievances in this respect have been redressed to a great extent.

India is aggrieved by Pakistan's failure to accord Most-Favoured Nation treatment⁵² to India even though the latter has been according this status to Pakistan for many years past. As earlier pointed out, Pakistan's policy of routing all its private trade with India through the Trading Corporation of Pakistan is viewed as a 'discriminatory' one since this sort of stipulation is not applied to imports from other countries. India's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Muchkund Dubey said that India has been giving this treatment to Pakistan unilaterally for many years with the results that Pakistan's balance of payments is around 10 to 20 crores in their favour.

Last but not least, the issue of trade and economic cooperation between India and Pakistan has also become a casualty of an internal power struggle within the ruling troika of Pakistan. For instance, after the expiry of the Indo-Pak trade agreement in 1978, Dr. Mahbubul Haq was the first and perhaps the only Finance Minister of Pakistan who advocated openly the policy of expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. He held the view that

the future of Indo-Pak relations lies in their economic cooperation which can expand to other fields.⁵³

Just when he was making a headway in this direction, he was relieved of his finance portfolio in July 1986. Prime Minister Junejo's decision to drop Dr. Haq probably had more to do with his attempts to assert authority *vis-à-vis* President Zia, than with Dr. Haq's innovative trade policies as such. Dr. Haq was following Zia's directives to improve the commercial relations between India and Pakistan, perhaps even without consulting Junejo, whose decision to remove Haq was his way to demonstrate his strength in the Pakistani establishment. It was a different story when, less than a year later, Junejo's government itself was dismissed

⁵¹ Pakistan Times, 5 September 1987.

⁵² By virtue of being members of GATT, both India and Pakistan are bound by the 'MFN' clause. All this implies is that the contracting parties are bound to grant to each other, treatment as favourable as they give to any other country.

⁵³ Nation, 15 October 1986.

by Gen. Zia, but a unique opportunity for improving Indo-Pak trade relations had by then been lost.

1.6 Concluding Remarks

Economic cooperation and trade between India and Pakistan has played only a modest role in the larger perspective of a confidence building process between the two countries. That is largely because of differing political perceptions of two countries with India placing a very high value in their ability to strengthen their bilateral relations and Pakistan being somewhat wary of Indian enthusiasm in this respect. However the intellectuals in Pakistan are coming forward with different strategies to increase economic cooperation in areas that do not affect adversely the interests of the Pakistani industrialist and trader class. For instance, Mubashir Hasan suggested that instead of having trade of 300 items worth 100 crore rupees which may affect a number of private sector industries, the two countries should have trade over one public sector item such as power generation plants, locomotives and the like worth 300 crore rupees.⁵⁴ Bashir Ahmed also suggests that there should be a high degree of collaboration in new technologies in the public sectors of the two countries which would benefit both. But the extent to which they would actually be translated into the Pakistan government's policies would ultimately depend on the political will of the policy makers in Islamabad to pursue this line of action.

2 The Socio-Cultural Field

With countries as closely tied by the links of history and culture as India and Pakistan, the Confidence Building Measures have to be evolved in context of the civilizational affinity between the two. A confidence building process between India and Pakistan must, therefore, encompass all facets of human interaction. Restricting it to the military sphere of their bilateral relations is likely to yield only limited dividends because confidence building between the two countries can not succeed in a political vacuum. In order to achieve its real objective, it must be a part of the larger political process designed to stabilize and improve relations between them.

Moreover, the importance of studying the confidence building process between India and Pakistan in the socio-cultural field lies in the fact that it is in this area that this process does not remain a prisoner of the politics of the respective governments in Delhi and Islamabad. Keeping this in mind, one may identify three broad levels of the confidence building process in the socio-cultural field. At the

⁵⁴ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

government-to-government level, the process acts in terms of the particular official measures undertaken by the two in this respect. There is a formal as well as an informal non-official dialogue between the opinion-making and policy-influencing elites of two countries and last but certainly not least between the common people of the two countries.

2.1 The Confidence Building Process at the Official Level

At the government-to-government level, the Simla Agreement outlined the measures agreed to be undertaken by the two countries⁵⁵ and despite several delays, they did take a number of steps to normalize and strengthen bilateral relations and fourteen important agreements and protocols were signed between 1972 and 1976 dealing with the establishment of postal services, travel facilities, telecommunications, trade, shipping and civil aviation.⁵⁶ The overall objective of these agreements was to facilitate and increase interaction between the people of the two countries. By the summer of 1976 the final steps mentioned in the paragraph three of the Simla Agreement were implemented. Pakistan withdrew its case before the International Civil Aviation Organization against Indian suspension of overflight rights and India also dropped its demand for compensation. Rail and air links were reopened. India assuaged Pakistani fears about the effects of the Salal hydro-electric project on the Chenab river through bilateral talks held in May, bypassing the multilateral forum specified by the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.⁵⁷ Diplomatic relations were resumed in 1976.

The Janata regime in New Delhi in March 1977 re-invigorated efforts to expand and improve relations with Pakistan. After Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in February 1978, various cultural and intellectual exchange programmes were initiated and the terms under which residents of one country could visit another were greatly liberalized. Vajpayee announced exchange programmes for artists, scholars and sportsmen between the two countries.⁵⁸ By the end of 1978, an Indian Consulate was opened in Karachi.

The process continued during the early 1980's. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited New Delhi in July 1980 and the two sides acknowledged the need to increase cultural exchanges. Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao disclosed that talks would soon be held to finalize the arrangements enabling

⁵⁵ For the text of the Simla Agreement, see Appendix I.

⁵⁶ For the list of agreements signed between India and Pakistan in the period after July 1972, see, Appendix II.

⁵⁷ Mansingh, *op.cit.*, p. 234.

⁵⁸ See Vajpayee's statement in *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CIV, no. 7, 28 February 1978, pp. 141-143.

tourists to visit the other country and improving the travel facilities between the two countries. The Pakistani government agreed to open two more shrines, Kapas Raj in Punjab and Hayat Pitaji in Sindh.⁵⁹ Moreover, there was a distinct possibility of more places of pilgrimage in each other's country being thrown open for visits by the people of the other country and for an exchange of India and Pakistan prisoners under detention on both sides. Rao described the attitude and response of the Pakistani government as "positive" in this regard.⁶⁰

Subsequently Pakistan's President General Zia-ul-Haq met the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi at New Delhi in November 1982 and agreed to establish an Indo-Pak Joint Commission. An agreement to this effect was signed on 10 March 1983.⁶¹ The Commission is designed to institutionalize this process by providing a forum for bilateral co-operation in diverse areas. The first meeting of the Joint Commission was held in Islamabad from 1 to 4 June 1983. At the inaugural session, the two Foreign Ministers exchanged the Instruments of Ratification of the Agreement. The Commission decided to appoint four sub-commissions to deal with the following subjects: (a) economic, health, scientific and technological (including agriculture, communication and industry) questions; (b) trade; (c) information, education, social sciences, culture and sports; and (d) travel, tourism and consular matters. The sub-commissions held a number of working sessions during which both sides put forward concrete proposals for cooperation in various areas.

Sub-commission - I held discussions on improving telecommunications facilities and, on Pakistan's suggestion, agreed to enlarge the scope of the shipping protocol to include the carriage of third country cargo which had been until then confined to bilateral trade. Both sides also reduced their postal rates.⁶² Sub-commission - III prepared an agreed programme of cooperation relating to exchange in information, school education, higher education, archaeology, museums, archives, libraries, exhibitions and sports. The Indian side presented a draft agreement on cultural cooperation between the two countries and Pakistan presented one regarding exchange of archival materials.⁶³ Sub-commission - IV held detailed discussions on travel, tourism and consular matters. A number of measures to facilitate travel between the two countries

⁵⁹ See, Rao's statement in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7th series, vol. 6, no. 30, 18 July 1980, cols. 257-259; and in *Rajya Sabha Debates*, vol. CXV, no. 12, 12 July 1980, cols. 206-208.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ For the text of the agreement, see, *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 36, no.2, 2nd Quarter, 1983, pp. 184-185.

⁶² See, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, vol. 10, no. 6-7, June-July 1983, pp. 275-276.

⁶³ *ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

including visits of businessmen and organized groups of academics and professionals were agreed to. An agreement was also reached on the need to promote group tourism between the two countries.⁶⁴ The second meeting of the sub-commissions took place in January 1984. Sub-commission - III took measures to facilitate the visits of artists, poets, writers, performing artists and experts in various fields between the two countries. They considered further steps to implement decisions taken at the previous meeting with regard to cooperation among national libraries, national archives and exchanges of paintings, photographs, handicrafts and folkcraft during 1984.⁶⁵ Sub-commission - IV focussed on the steps to streamline modalities in respect of the return of civilian detainees who had completed their sentence. They agreed to consider increasing the number of shrines open for the visit of pilgrims of both sides and that in future double entry transit visas would be issued by both countries. The two sides also finalized the text of a protocol on the promotion of group tourism.⁶⁶

Subsequently a four-day dialogue between Foreign Secretaries, M.K. Rasgotra and Niaz A. Niak on 20 May 1984 produced a two part agreement dealing with travel facilities and the exchange of journalists. They also exchanged letters containing amendments to the 1974 bilateral visa agreement. According to the amendments, only one member of the family would be required to report to the police station for registration as against the existing rule which stipulated that all members of the family had to report to a police station. Tourists travelling in groups would also no longer be required to report to a police station. Diplomatic staff would be given visas for the entire duration of their assignment. Non-diplomatic staff whose visas were renewed periodically would also get them for the duration of their assignment. A visitor's visa, issued for three months, could be extended for up to one year. For businessmen who were required to travel frequently between the two countries triple entry visas would be issued for up to a maximum of six months.

The modalities of group tourism were to be worked out jointly by the Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) and the Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (PTDC).⁶⁷ The two parties also agreed that the mass media must play a positive part in ending mutual suspicion and distrust. The second part of the agreement suggested that the two countries should exchange journalists to cover events in their

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 86.

⁶⁵ For the joint statement issued at the conclusion of sub-commissions meetings, see, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, vol. 9, no. 1-2, January-February 1984, pp. 101-102.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Yearbook 1983-84, op.cit.*, p. 22.

respective countries and that each other's newspapers and magazines should be available to the people because there was a great deal of ignorance in each country about what was going on in the other.⁶⁸ In July 1984 the two countries agreed to exchange newspapers and journals at the government-to-government level. The Indian Information and Broadcasting Minister, Mr. H.K.L. Bhagat said at a news conference in Karachi that India had suggested a commercial exchange but the Pakistani government preferred official channels. Nevertheless he felt it was a good beginning and, referring particularly to cooperation in films, while he confirmed that Pakistan had not agreed to India's proposal for exchange, co-production and free trade in films, the two sides had, however, agreed to hold film festivals in each other's country.⁶⁹

The Joint Commission negotiations which had been suspended for a year were resumed as a result of the Zia-Rajiv Gandhi contacts. The next Commission meeting was led by the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. Khurshid Alam Khan and Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan in New Delhi from 2 to 4 July 1985. Among the positive results of this meeting were the signing of an agreement on cooperation in agricultural research, finalization of a cultural agreement, formulation of a cultural exchange programme and a decision to make travel easier for businessmen and transit holders.⁷⁰ It was also decided to introduce an extensive reservation system for rail travellers between India and Pakistan. This decision was implemented on 18 October 1985.⁷¹

The Commission also agreed that a correspondent of All India Radio would be posted in Pakistan and that of Radio Pakistan in India. This decision was also implemented. Another decision concerned health and family welfare. An agreement was signed on 19 October 1985 under which the two countries were to exchange information in the field of biochemical research, medical education, hold training programmes and seminars at the national level and collaborate in the control of communicable diseases.⁷² In a meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries Mr. Niaz A. Niaz and Mr. Romesh Bhandari in January 1986, they agreed to sign the Cultural Agreement, which had already been initialled and discussed exchange of books,

⁶⁸ The Tribune, 22 May 1984.

⁶⁹ Yearbook 1984-85, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

⁷⁰ See, *Agreed Minutes of the Meeting of the Sub-Commission-IV -Travel, Tourism and Consular Matters*, held in New Delhi on 2-4 July 1985 and *Agreed Minutes of the Meeting of Sub-Commission-III- on Information, Education (including Social Sciences), Culture, Sports*, held on 2-4 July 1985.

⁷¹ Samuel Baid, "Stalemate in South Asia", in Yearbook 1985-86, *op.cit.*, p. 115. Also see excerpts from Pakistan's Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's speech at Joint Ministerial Commission meeting at New Delhi in *Pakistan Times*, 3 July 1985.

⁷² Baid, *ibid.*

periodicals and newspapers during the next meeting of the Joint Commission.⁷³ They also agreed that a concerted attempt would be made, out of humanitarian considerations, to locate defence personnel missing since 1971 and civilian detainees who had completed their sentences would be repatriated on a reciprocal basis by their countries by 31 March 1986.⁷⁴

Subsequently the Sub-commission met again in February 1986 and reviewed the implementation of various measures undertaken in previous meetings, to liberalize visa restrictions, ease the travel facilities and the working of the protocol on group tourism. They also agreed to open more shrines for pilgrimage purposes and discussed the question of opening the Khokrapar Munabao rail route between two countries. A number of guidelines to check the smuggling of narcotic products on the Indo-Pak border were also agreed upon.⁷⁵

Such efforts got a fillip when the two Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto signed a comprehensive agreement on cultural exchanges in December 1988 in order to facilitate exchanges of artists, poets, writers and musicians, exchange of art and other exhibitions and participate in each other's film festivals.⁷⁶ The agreement envisaged translation and exchange of books, periodicals and other educational, cultural and sports publications and whenever possible exchange of copies of art objects. The two countries also agreed to examine freshly the text books prescribed in educational institutions, particularly relating to history and geography to erase misperceptions of facts on either country, promising to break down the barrier of stereotype prejudices which were reinforcing the public indifference to the quality of bilateral relations and poisoning the minds of younger generations.

Subsequently, in May 1989 the Indian Minister of State for Civil Aviation and Tourism, Mr. Shivraj Patil and his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Yusuf Raza Gilani announced further steps to ease restrictions on travel between the two countries. They were attending a joint convention of the Indian Association of the Tour Operators (IATO) and the Travel Agents Association of Pakistan (TAAP) at New Delhi. The demands of the industry were spelt out by the IATO president Mr. Ram Kohtu and the former president of the TAAP,

⁷³ See, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, vol. 13, no. 1-2, January-February 1986, p. 355.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁵ See, *Agreed Minutes of the Meeting of Sub-Commission-IV on Travel, Tourism and Consular Matters*, held in Islamabad on 4-5 February 1986.

⁷⁶ For the text of the agreement, see, *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. XLII, no. 1, January 1989, pp. 140-142.

Mr. Jaffar Ali.⁷⁷ Later in June 1989, Sub-commission - IV had informal consultations in New Delhi on issues such as visa restrictions, tourism, pilgrimage and the detainees.⁷⁸ The full Joint Commission meeting took place in July 1989 at Islamabad. The two sides adopted a three-year Cultural Exchange Programme for 1989-91⁷⁹ and undertook further measures to ease the travel restrictions between the two countries.⁸⁰

2.2 A Critical Analysis

Having taken note of various measures undertaken by the two governments over the previous two decades to enhance people-to-people contacts by easing travel facilities and increasing bilateral cultural exchanges, it seems that both sides have made some serious efforts in this direction. However, a deeper scrutiny of the implementation and working of these measures does not present such an optimistic picture. Quite often these agreements have only remained on paper and at other times the bureaucratic delays in either country, particularly in Pakistan, have prevented them from being implemented in their true spirit. For instance, with regard to the exchange of journalists, often Pakistani authorities have taken as long as six to eight months in granting visas to the Indian journalists wanting to go to Pakistan.⁸¹ Mr. S.K. Singh pointed out that it took two years for two correspondents of *The Hindu* and *Hindustan Times*, to go to Pakistan.

Further, despite protracted negotiations and measures undertaken by the two governments to ease the travel and visa restrictions for common people of the two countries, the formidable difficulties in seeking a visa, the limited number of cities that a person can visit and the most annoying practice of police reporting still remain intact. The protocol on group tourism, for instance, although a welcome step, was beset with serious drawbacks. First, the tours have to be arranged by the tourist development corporations of both countries. This displays the traditional distrust of individual sight-seeing tours. Second, the groups would have to comprise between 30 and 100 members, meaning thereby that smaller groups can not organize trips for sight-seeing and tourism. Third, the difficulties which individuals encounter while obtaining visas will continue. Fourth, the groups can only travel by air. This stipulation naturally discourages tourists on a shoe-string budget.⁸² An important part of the cultural agreement signed in December 1988, pertaining to

⁷⁷ Yearbook 90-91, *op.cit.*, p. 165.

⁷⁸ See, *Agreed Minutes of the Informal Consultations held between the Indian and Pakistani Delegations relating to the Sub-Commission-IV*, held in New Delhi from 20-25 June 1989.

⁷⁹ For more details of this agreement, see, Appendix II.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*

⁸¹ An assessment based on the interviews with the Indian journalists conducted in December 1991.

⁸² Chopra in Yearbook 1983-84, *ibid.*, p. 73.

the revision of text books has also not been implemented over past three years. The working and progress of the Joint Commission too has been dependent on the nature of political relations between two countries.

However the principal reason of most of these measures running aground in the process of implementation, does not lie in bureaucratic delays alone. A deeper analysis shows that the Indian and Pakistani governments' approach towards enhancing the socio-cultural links between two countries and its significance for the continuing process has been at variance. New Delhi has always stressed the importance of the people-to-people contacts and believes that a detente between two neighbours, closely tied by the links of history and culture, can be fostered by promoting interdependence and cooperation in areas such as cultural exchanges, scholarly interactions and improved communications. But this enthusiasm has not been shared by most Pakistani governments. The Islamic lobby, in particular, is most vocal against any kind of cultural cooperation with India. For instance, when Benazir Bhutto came to power, she shared the Indian view that

if the people of two countries are allowed to get to know each other quite a lot would be achieved in establishing good relations between two countries.⁸³

But when she signed a cultural agreement with India the opposition created a lot of hue and cry. A prominent opposition leader Ghulam Hyder Wyne, for example, asserted in the National Assembly that the signing of the agreement for increasing cultural activities between the two countries would "ultimately bring Pakistan under complete hegemony of India".⁸⁴ He said that the agreement would "destroy all kinds of Islamic and Pakistani values and traditions", and that he is convinced, canceling the agreement would save the new generation of Pakistan from "cultural aggression".⁸⁵ This line of thinking rests on General Zia's convictions who always held that

after creation its [Pakistan] existence depends only on one thing that the state should remain an ideological Islamic state. If that ideology goes, then there is no longer any justification for Pakistan's existence...⁸⁶

Such views were echoed even on the Indian side. A noted Indian journalist argued that

by having too many cultural exchanges with India, Pakistan's *raison d'être* vanishes. They have failed to create a Pakistani identity separate from an Islamic identity and perhaps lack

⁸³ Benazir Bhutto's response to a question in the BBC's phone-in Programme of 5 March 1989, as cited by K. Subrahmanyam, "Indo-Pak Ties: How to Build Confidence", *Hindustan Times*, 24 March 1989.

⁸⁴ For a satirical criticism of his views, see, Sultan Ahmed, "This Uproar Over a Non-Issue", *Dawn*, 9 February 1989.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ See General Zia's interview to Atul Dev in, 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 7, January-December 1984, p. 64.

the cultural confidence.⁸⁷

Due mainly to these reasons, the fundamentalist lobby in Pakistan believes that opening the doors of cultural interaction with India will somehow dilute Pakistan's ideology or Pakistan will lose its religious identity.⁸⁸

Some expressed fears of a cultural invasion from India.⁸⁹ Maleeha Lodhi spoke of the psyche of the Pakistani people being frightened of being culturally swamped by India. She argued that such fears emanate from the fact that "Pakistan had not yet built a nation butonly a large state where the process of functional integration is still underway".⁹⁰

At the same time, however, it was argued that such fears are largely confined to the conservative religious lobby and that Pakistan had nothing to fear from a cultural onslaught from India.⁹¹ As Sahabzada Yaqub Khan put it

I do not think that it is a judicious statement to say that the Indian Government or any responsible Indian opinion demands that Pakistan should give up its Islamic character and should become a secular state. We must be mindful of feelings of insecurity and inferiority complex eating our identity...⁹²

Another member of the *Majlis-e-Shoora* argued

*let us not feel insecure about being swamped culturally, economically and politically by a larger neighbour. In extending our hand to India, we need to make sure that we respond to the aspirations of the people of Pakistan... let there be ease of travel and people-to-people contacts....*⁹³

This is especially true for the new generation of Pakistan which did not go through the trauma of partition but have their roots in an independent Pakistan. They feel more secure and confident in dealing with India, just as another country with whom they share a cultural heritage in terms of enjoying Indian music, films and other art forms without any fears of losing their identity as a Pakistani national. To put it simply, let us say that a young Pakistani would not feel defensive when an Indian insists on the sameness of their culture, while an elderly person may immediately get into a debate of pointing out the differences between them.

An important point to consider here is the extent to which the Islamic or fundamentalist lobby in

⁸⁷ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

⁸⁸ This assessment is based on the present author's interviews conducted in Pakistan in October 1991.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ In an interview with an ex-Pakistani diplomat with the present author in October 1991.

⁹² See his statement in *Senate of Pakistan Debates*, 12 February 1986, p. 863.

⁹³ (italics added). See, Begum Salima Ahmed's statement in *Majlis-e-Shoora Debates*, vol. 3, no. 1, 24 December 1985, pp. 50-51.

Pakistan has been able to influence its government's decision-making in this respect. The answer seems to be in the affirmative. For instance, although Benazir Bhutto's government did not renege on the cultural agreement under the Islamic lobby's pressure, at the same time it did not implement the most important part of that agreement about the revision of text books. It may be noted that this part of the agreement was not implemented by the India side either. Moreover, while Delhi considers socio-cultural links between the peoples of the two countries as the most trusted path of bridge-building between the two, cultural exchanges are the last item on Pakistan government's priorities while dealing with India and has often been the first casualty of an increase of tensions between India and Pakistan. As an eminent Indian official put it

one gets the impression that they want to 'delink' their public from India because such links can have a deleterious effect on their ideology. So every time we want to expand the scope of these relations, they insist 'let's go down the road bit by bit'.⁹⁴

In Pakistan a senior official also conceded that

our public will not accept complete normalcy of relations [in the socio-cultural field] with India....when let's say Kashmir is on boil.⁹⁵

On the Indian side, the rising forces of Hindu nationalism also raise a hue and cry about the socio-cultural interactions with Pakistan, a country which is believed to be waging a proxy war against India by supporting terrorism there. Shiv Sena's demands of banning films involving Pakistani actors or actresses and its activists attempts to tear up the pitch just before an India-Pakistan cricket match was due to be held are cases in point.

2.3 Non-Official Dialogue

A non-official dialogue between the policy-influencing elites of India and Pakistan has been a recent but perhaps the most significantly positive phenomenon in the context of India-Pakistan relations. This dialogue refers to a process of "public diplomacy" or a "supplemental dialogue".⁹⁶ between significant elements of the body politic in the two countries who are holding confidence building discussions at their own levels about whether government policies and positions in both countries are serving their real interests. The participants who are not part of the government but can influence the process of decision making, include political leaders, academicians, journalists, intellectuals, industrialists, bureaucrats and retired military

⁹⁴ In an interview with the present author in January 1992.

⁹⁵ In an interview with the present author.

⁹⁶ The term was used by Dr. Harold Saunders, the Director of International Programmes at Kettering Foundation in the USA, who co-ordinated one of the first such 'unofficial dialogues' on Confidence Building in South Asia on the Worldnet held in January 1990. Also see, Khalid Ahmed, "A Supplemental Dialogue With India", *Frontier Post*, 5 June 1991.

officials. The premise of such dialogues is that the elites of the two countries still need to know about each other.

In India there are two schools of opinion in this regard. The first believes that Indo-Pak problems are not because they do not know how a Pakistani mind works. So, holding these non-official dialogues designed after the US-Soviet experience are largely irrelevant in the Indo-Pak context. On the other hand, it is argued that unless both sides talk to each other the perceptions will remain old-fashioned. They suppose that our presumptions of knowing other's mind are often misplaced. For the past two decades the people of the two countries have not talked openly to each other and discussed these issues presuming that they already knew everything and in the process a lot of myths have been built. And the idea of holding non-official dialogues is precisely to break through that communication gap between the two countries. So, the idea behind such efforts is that, since the official positions on both sides on most issues are more or less frozen and are based on a distortion of realities, non-official dialogues are regarded as vital for building public opinion in favour of narrowing differences and resolving issues.⁹⁷ The underlying perspective is that

the Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan should not be confined only to military and security fields. They must be comprehensive. They must be supplemented by Confidence Building Measures in non-military fields, in culture, in travel and people-to-people contacts....⁹⁸

And the ultimate objective, as an Indian scholar points out, is that

the essence of the question with regard to supplemental diplomacy is that a stage must come when a significant number of influential non-official people in both countries must recognize the fact that what their governments are doing is not enough. And then they must agree among themselves that there is a need to put pressure on the respective governments to hasten the pace of dialogue, to enlarge the participation of people participating in the dialogue on both sides at the non-official level and to listen to the voice of the people of their respective countries.⁹⁹

The dialogue is being held at several levels, such as attempts to bring together a selective group of people from the two countries under one forum. For instance, the USIS in India and Pakistan held two sessions of the Worldnet dialogue in June 1991, between the intellectuals of two countries on the subject of confidence building in South Asia. Subsequently it continued this process and is regularly holding closed group meetings

⁹⁷ Dr. Saunders pointed that the idea behind such an exercise is to understand and analyze the nature of how one builds relationships, how one changes relationships to make them more constructive and how to build relationships to solve problems that the two parties in a relationship have in common.

⁹⁸ Pakistan's ex-Foreign Secretary Mr. Niaz A. Niaz's statement in the *Worldnet Dialogue*, held in June 1990.

⁹⁹ Professor Satish Kumar's statement in the *Worldnet dialogue*.

between them with a very positive outcome. The ground rules of such meetings include no repetition of history partly because both sides are presumably well aware of each other's public positions and partly for the fear of getting bogged down with it. The composition of this group is being kept largely the same so that everybody is aware of the style of working and the progress made and press publicity is eschewed.

The basic approach employed is to use new concepts or idioms, redefining the problem as well as the goals so that it is not cast in a conflictual mould but marks out areas of common interest in cooperative terms. For instance, in the context of the Kashmir conflict, both sides should avoid using terms like Pakistani-Occupied-Kashmir (POK) or Indian-Occupied-Kashmir (IOK), which has not only distorted perceptions but also sustained such distortions.¹⁰⁰ One such meeting held in Neemrana in Rajasthan in November 1991 emphasized that "the two countries must change their political language for each other".¹⁰¹ India must not reject any proposal coming from Pakistan without serious consideration. Each must treat the other with respect and empathy and on the basis of equality.

It was suggested that the two countries should add to their present modest basket of Confidence Building Measures so that not only could they build a joint fence against an accidental drift towards war but could also gradually construct bridges of mutual trust and confidence without which no serious cooperation between the two countries was possible.¹⁰²

The biggest gain of this dialogue as one of the organizers disclosed was that "stereotype images of India and Pakistan *vis-à-vis* each other were broken everybody felt that this was different ... unexpected and unanticipated... a new kind of psychology was emerging".¹⁰³ Equally important was the fact that both the governments had supported it by allowing it to happen without creating any obstacles. The Pakistani side was briefing its government on these developments while the Indian government was also aware of it and welcomed such moves. I.K. Gujral said that several efforts were being made at the non-official levels, "these are encouraging signs... they should help discovering commonality of interests".¹⁰⁴

Another such dialogue was organized by the Centre for Policy Research at New Delhi in November 1991. Although this was a South Asian Dialogue, on the lines of the Pugwash experience and about 50 people were invited from all five countries of SAARC, Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan

¹⁰⁰ This has already been discussed in Chapter Nine.

¹⁰¹ See, "Indo-Pak Seminar Calls for Amity", *Frontier Post*, 12 November 1991.

¹⁰² *ibid.*

¹⁰³ In an interview with a participant of that seminar conducted in New Delhi in January 1992.

¹⁰⁴ In an interview with the present author in December 1991.

were at centre of discussion,¹⁰⁵ Moreover, some other moves of this kind have occurred, for instance those being sponsored by the Sunday newspaper group in India, by an industrialist based in Calcutta and in Pakistan by the Institute of Strategic Studies. Several intellectuals in India had also taken the initiative of establishing an India-Pakistan Friendship Society, composed of very eminent people from various walks of life, which often organizes such meetings between the elites of the two countries.

Further, the human traffic between India and Pakistan in the past few years has increased tremendously. More Indians have been going to Pakistan, while more Pakistanis are going across to India and there has been some kind of an informal dialogue in this fashion. For instance, the interaction between the journalists of the two countries has multiplied recently. Khalid Ahmed also admits that while earlier this dialogue was skewed, when the press was not free in Pakistan, and Indian journalists would narrate what was wrong inside Pakistan and Pakistani journalists would counter with an anti-Indian blast, after 1986 this dialogue changed somewhat. Now the journalists of two countries sit down and debunk their respective countries and reach a common ground of mutual deflation. There is a tendency to question the 'truths' handed down by the elder statesmen from their handling of early India-Pakistan relations.¹⁰⁶

There is a growing dissent within India and Pakistan with their respective official policies *vis-à-vis* each other.¹⁰⁷ Human right activists on both sides are the other category that has introduced a new strain of critical self-contemplation. On both sides they undermine the stance of righteousness and grievance through indictments that are widely noted.¹⁰⁸

One concrete positive manifestation of this non-official dialogue can be observed by the fact that in early 1990, when the two countries came very close to a war, 54 eminent personalities of both countries issued

¹⁰⁵ The present author was present at this dialogue.

¹⁰⁶ Khalid however differentiates between the older and well-established generation of journalists and the younger ones. He thinks that there is a loose consensus among the well-established columnists that inclines the Pakistani observer to think that there is an anti-Pakistani journalistic consensus in India. In India as well as in Pakistan, he argues that the newspapers as well as governments are forced by the public mindset not to approach the relationship in an innovative and radical manner. But he points out that it is among the younger journalists who do investigative stories and visit Pakistan often that some scepticism about the way India handles its affairs with Pakistan is detected. In Pakistan too, the tightening of the ideological noose around the people's lives through discriminatory laws is giving rise gradually to a view critical of opportunistic politicians. He points out that in Pakistan pragmatism still has to break out of the tyranny of definitions but it is in evidence in the benign double-facedness of the leadership in Islamabad. See, Khalid Ahmed, "Varieties of Fear and Loathing", *Frontier Post*, 28 December 1990.

¹⁰⁷ In the Worldnet dialogue, on the Indian side, Bhabani Sen Gupta made the point that there are many problems with India's behaviour with regard to its neighbours and the behaviour had not always been very friendly. He added that many Indians had criticized the government of India sharply for its attitude towards its neighbours. This was agreed by Maleeha Lodhi and Khalid Ahmed on the Pakistani side.

¹⁰⁸ Ahmed, *op.cit.*.

an unofficial joint statement pleading for peace and a more quiet approach to the problems. The joint statement urged India and Pakistan to take immediate steps to avert the risks of the war by miscalculation.

It said that

our people earnestly desire lasting peace, therefore both governments and responsible leaders on either side must avoid what can only be a mutually destructive conflictEach country must satisfy the other that it was not interfering in its internal affairs. [They said] ... the assurance of stable and secure boundaries was essential to the ongoing process of nation-building in all of South Asia and for regional cooperation ..¹⁰⁹

The significance of this non-official dialogue lies first in the very fact that it is taking place at all. It means that officials on both sides are either no longer frightened to allow or dare not prohibit private citizens from meeting to talk about things they thought were too sensitive to be handled outside the Foreign Office. That this confidence is in evidence, is a good augury itself.¹¹⁰

Finally, the reservoir of goodwill among the peoples of the two countries is a valuable asset for the India-Pakistan relationship. There is a kind of chemistry between the people of India and Pakistan. It is interesting to observe a human encounter between an Indian and Pakistani in differing situations. In the words of Rajiv Gandhi,

when an Indian and Pakistani meet as human beings in a human encounter in places like Europe, North America ... there is an instant mutual recognition, an affection that wells from an inner core of our existence, an embrace that transcends the passing passions of politics
...¹¹¹

The point one is trying to make here is not that they do not have any differences, disagreements or arguments but that there is no distrust either. Khalid Ahmed makes the point lucidly. He identifies a dual level dialogue between an Indian and a Pakistani who may be businessmen, traders or the family members across the border,

when they talk about their business, trade, family matters [or any other subject] they talk to each other positively. It is only when they get on to the official dialogue [about India-Pakistan relations], that they feel obliged to subscribe to the policies of their government. Then some kind of conflict takes place. Despite the fact that they may not be well-acquainted with the problems, they argue. And one can see that when they are quarreling it is just the sense of backing up the government or responding to the nation-building activities or 'indoctrination' that has happened on both sides for 40 years. So they are responding to some kind of psychological state within themselves. Because, the moment they get off the dialogue, their points of view relate to each other, they are friendly with each other...¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ See, "54 Indo-Pak Personalities Joint Appeal: Reaffirm Commitment to Peaceful Solution", *Pakistan Times*, 27 June 1990; "Indo-Pak Intellectuals for Avoiding War", *Nation*, 28 June 1990.

¹¹⁰ Ahmed, *op.cit.*.

¹¹¹ *The Telegraph*, 18 July 1989.

¹¹² Khalid Ahmed's comments in *Worldnet Dialogue*, telecast on 3 June 1991.

At a general level, despite all the restrictions on visa and travel facilities, about a million people travel each year between the two countries and they come back with generally happy impressions of either country. Especially in Pakistan, not all its people are comfortable with their government's self-conscious search for roots in Arabia, its proclaimed identification as a West Asian state or its Nizam-i-Mustafa reversion to medieval Islamic practices.¹¹³ An eminent official in Islamabad said

after 1000 years of cultural interaction [in the subcontinent]... Pakistan's attempts to create a sense of identity away from India... looking towards West Asia... [is a] forced exercise...[which] creates an illusion as if you are a part of West Asia which you are not...¹¹⁴

Most Pakistanis acknowledge the deep-rooted cultural ties of Pakistan with India in the subcontinent. But in order to understand these links, one must study what has really been happening by the way of cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, totally outside the official agreements. While Indian films have been banned in Pakistan, millions of video-cassettes of Indian films are doing a roaring business in Pakistan. Trade in such cassettes have become a major service industry in Pakistan. While Indian TV is seen in Pakistan, particularly the films telecast by it, PTV's plays have become very popular in India and their video-cassettes are having an enormous sale in India. There is flourishing piracy of Indian books in Pakistan and Pakistani books in India, particularly of their poets. Singers of the two countries have been making private visits to each other and performing privately.¹¹⁵ Even General Zia, despite his publicly postulated aversion to Indian artists performing in Pakistan, invited Indian singers Jagjit Singh and Chitra Singh and actor Shatrugun Sinha on the marriage of his children.¹¹⁶ One may even argue that you do not need confidence building here simply because it is already there.

This brings us to the central argument of this chapter that in the context of India-Pakistan there is no necessary or automatic correspondence between the confidence building at the official level and non-official level. At the people-to-people level there is no need for confidence building even if it is nearly non-existent at the government-to-government level. General Zia conceded this point

there is confidence among the common people but it is not there at the higher level and

¹¹³ See, Liqat Adeel, "Cultural Isolation: Myth and Reality", *Muslim*, 20 September 1991; "Reaching Out to Our Neighbour", *Viewpoint*, 10 October 1991, p. 22; and *Dawn*, 23 March 1983.

¹¹⁴ In an interview with the present author in October 1991.

¹¹⁵ Sultan Ahmad, "While Officials Differ, Artists Perform", *Muslim*, 17 August 1984.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*

perhaps none at the top level.¹¹⁷

An argument most commonly put forward by both Indians and Pakistanis is that while the governments keep quarreling to their heart's content, let them also make visits among friends and relations less irksome. The relations between the two countries will then take care of themselves. Thus, it may be argued that both in India and Pakistan the masses want normal good neighbourly relations between the two countries and some argue the mistrustful and conflictual relationship between India and Pakistan is an essentially "state-managed" one.¹¹⁸ It may not be entirely true but certainly there is more than a grain of truth here. What builds up at the government-to-government level does not always reflect people's genuine wishes. Most often it is meant to serve the narrow interests of the ruling elites on both sides of the border or a "way to manage their domestic political contradictions".¹¹⁹ To a great extent, this is true even for the media within each country. As Pakistan's Ambassador to India, Dr. Humayun Khan said in an interview,

popular feelings is reflected in several forums like media. But the temper of the people of India that I have judged through my extensive personal contacts is at variance with the temper that gets generally reflected in the press. The reservoir of goodwill among the people of two countries is our greatest asset...¹²⁰

To recapitulate, a study of confidence building process between India and Pakistan must take into consideration the fact that it is not merely confined to the bilateral negotiations between the two governments on different issues. In fact the biggest contribution of the confidence building process may well be outside this somewhat narrowly defined framework of bilateral negotiation between their respective governments.

¹¹⁷ General Zia's interview with Mr. M.J. Akbar in 'Interviews to Foreign Media', *op.cit.*, vol. 8, January-December 1985, p. 242.

¹¹⁸ In an interview with some Indian scholars in December 1991.

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*

¹²⁰ See, Dr. Humayun Khan's interview in **India Today**, 31 July 1988.

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XIV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan have paid dividends largely to avert another war in the subcontinent, yet they have a long way to go before achieving real confidence between the two countries. This raises the question whether Confidence Building Measures really do build confidence or is it only a cosmetic device adopted by the adversaries to agree upon some rules of the game while the conflict persists? It will be argued that while there is a danger of the confidence building exercise being considered as an end in itself by one or both parties in conflict, this does not discount the validity of the confidence building approach as such. In the case of India-Pakistan relations, for instance, owing to mainly a sustained and one-sided negative spillover effect of the core issues of conflict such as Kashmir on their continuing confidence building process, they may have to adopt a two-track confidence building approach. While maintaining a working relationship between the two countries, the policy makers in Delhi and Islamabad may also need to simultaneously work towards creating a suitable political environment for addressing the core issues of conflict. Further, the rationale of the slow pace of their confidence building process may well lie in the protracted nature of India-Pakistan conflict which makes the task of confidence building between the two countries more difficult rather than in the failure of the confidence building exercise as such.

This chapter presents a summary and analysis of the major findings and conclusions of the case study of India-Pakistan confidence building process and reflects briefly upon the theoretical relevance of the Confidence Building model devised at the outset of this study. We begin by examining the implications of the operational variables for the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan before considering its achievements and failures. It discusses the problems in carrying out such an exercise and puts forth some suggestions which may facilitate the Confidence Building process between the two countries. Finally, in the light of the results of this case study, it tests our hypotheses, reviews the theoretical framework of the Confidence Building model as outlined in Chapter One and also considers its relevance in theoretical terms for studying and analysing similar cases.

The central task of the thesis was to evolve a theoretical framework of Confidence Building Measures and apply it to the case study of India-Pakistan relations in the South Asian region. In conceptual terms, this framework had five principal components. It put forth an appropriate definition of a Confidence Building Measure and conceptualised the phenomenon of a confidence building process in a model. Further, it outlined the operational variables which shape the confidence building process and identified certain catalytic elements that may facilitate or inhibit the confidence building process. Finally some criteria for

evaluating the outcome of the confidence building process were devised.

Before employing it in the case of India-Pakistan relations in the post-Simla period, we made a brief attempt to bring out the conflictual and cooperative dimensions of their bilateral relations in the first two decades after independence. This set the stage for a more formal reconciliation process between the two countries which was initiated by the Simla Agreement in 1972. Further, we identified the operational variables given in the Indian and Pakistani political milieu in terms of structural, situational and dispositional variables which shape their confidence building process. Finally, we presented a detailed analysis of the India-Pakistan confidence building process in its political, military, economic and socio-cultural dimensions. The core issues of India-Pakistan conflict, the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan's alleged involvement in supporting terrorism in the Indian states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, were also discussed. We made an attempt to understand them both from the point of view of Indo-Pak confidence building efforts on these issues with a special focus on their attempts to avoid another war on Kashmir and latter's impact on the overall confidence building process. The entire exercise was undertaken at three levels of analysis - domestic, bilateral and extra-regional. In other words, it studied and analysed the bilateral confidence building process with constant inputs from the domestic and extra-regional sources. Now let us review the major findings of our case study.

The structural variables are given in a situation, thus delimiting the parameters within which the Confidence Building process essentially operates. With regard to India and Pakistan, the most significant structural element is that the conflict is embedded in the history and politics of the two countries. Despite Indian assurances over the past four decades, many Pakistanis still believe that India has not been reconciled to Pakistan's independent existence. On the other hand, we also find Indians who still view Pakistan only as a recalcitrant neighbour against which India must be on its guard. Ever since the partition, the political and military leaders on both sides of the border have, thus, found it convenient to use and exploit this bilateral conflict to serve their own domestic ends. Pakistan's military always made use of Big Brother India's threats to Pakistan's security and independence for justifying its massive defence budget. Similarly Delhi often takes refuge in the 'omnipresent Pakistani hand' for its failure to bring about a political solution to the secessionist problems in Punjab and Kashmir. As a result, to some extent the Indo-Pak conflict has become a part of the political game to be played internally in each country. In fact one may even argue that having done it for over last four decades, the dynamics of this reality created by the leaders seems to have taken over rendering them the prisoners of their own game.

Secondly, a military regime in Pakistan is traditionally perceived as more hostile in India. It is argued

that the very *raison d' être* of the military-bureaucratic ruling elite of Pakistan lies in a continuing antagonistic posture *vis-à-vis* India. It was largely due to Mrs. Indira Gandhi's distrust of the military rulers that her government did not hold a serious dialogue with General Zia-ul-Haq since she did not want the advantages of achieving an accord to accrue to the military regime. Mrs. Gandhi never considered General Zia's proposal of a No War Pact or that of a Mutual Balanced Reduction of Forces as a sincere or a genuine offer. Her statements supporting the MRD (Movement to Restore Democracy) in Pakistan also caused friction between Delhi and Islamabad. On the other hand, for several historical reasons Islamabad has always been distrustful of the Congress governments in New Delhi and claimed to strike a much better rapport with a non-Congress government. The golden era of the Janata government's rule in New Delhi from 1977-1980 is often cited in this context.

This raises the question whether a Congress government in New Delhi or a military regime in Islamabad constitutes an in-built impediment to the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan ? The answer to this question is in the negative. A weak civilian government in Islamabad with the military pulling the strings from behind-the-scenes has also often failed to achieve an improvement in the relations between India and Pakistan. At the other end, it was during the non-Congress government of Mr. V.P. Singh in New Delhi in 1990-91 that India-Pakistan relations dipped to their lowest ebb ever since the Simla Agreement in 1972. In fact, compared with Congress most Pakistanis are far more apprehensive and nervous about the BJP, the main political rival of Congress in India. Further, the fact that a Congress government under Rajiv Gandhi and a military regime under General Zia-ul-Haq struck a reasonable working rapport as was evident from their efforts for defusing the tensions arising out of Brasstacks affairs and a tacit understanding on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities, also shows the fallacy of this argument. So, given the political will of the rulers, the nature of the regime or a government need not necessarily constitute a structurally negative input into the Confidence Building process between the two countries.

The Indo-Pak conflict also has an ideological dimension to it. The Islamic lobby in Pakistan perceives India as an embodiment of Hindu values, being intrinsically antithetical to the Islamic faith. The paradox is that while there is little electoral support for the Islamic lobby within Pakistan, it has an enormous nuisance value for thwarting the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan. By raising the spectre of a cultural aggression from a Hindu India diluting its Islamic ideology, it has often used its street power to raise a hue and cry against Islamabad's efforts to open the doors of socio-cultural links with India. In India too, the rise of the political fortunes of the BJP with an increasing support for its ideology of Hindu nationalism and its stand towards the Muslim minority, in particular, is not only a subject-matter of India's

domestic politics but a significant factor in India-Pakistan relations. But the societies of India and Pakistan are so inter-twined that domestic tensions over any communal issue concerning the Indian Muslims is bound to spill over across the border, as was recently demonstrated by the furore caused in Pakistan over the destruction of the Babri Mosque in India. Moreover, the BJP's stringent position on Kashmir in terms of an abolition of Article 370 and Kashmir's full amalgamation into the Indian Union and that of taking a strong action against Pakistan for helping the militants in Punjab and Kashmir are bound to have an important bearing on the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan.

Further, ever since independence India and Pakistan's self-images of their power status *vis-à-vis* each other in the regional context have been at variance. India believed that its predominant place in the natural power-hierarchy of the subcontinent must be asserted by it and acknowledged by the others, while Pakistan always sought to achieve and enjoy an equal standing with India. After Bangladesh's creation in 1971, Pakistan changed its position to that of being a counter-vailing power to an hegemonic India. Pakistan's fears of Indian hegemony emanate partly from the latter's military might and are partly rooted in the history of three wars between the two countries. Such fears of hegemony extend to the realm of economic interactions and trade between the two countries where India is viewed as an 'economic Leviathan' and as argued earlier, to the socio-cultural field as well. Indian threat perceptions *vis-à-vis* Pakistan, on the other hand, derive their origin from the latter being an anti-*status quo* power in the subcontinent. From an Indian point of view, Pakistan has time and again attempted to change the *status quo* by annexing Kashmir forcibly in 1947-48 and twice again in 1965. And since the early 1980's, Pakistan has been stoking the fires of secession in India's two very important border states of Punjab and Kashmir by giving armed support and training to the Sikh and Muslim militants respectively.

At a regional and global level too, Pakistan has been equally keen to disturb the existing balance of power by seeking diplomatic and military succour abroad. Pakistan's military alliance with the USA in 1950's, its efforts to develop a strategic relationship with China since the late 1960's and its renewal of the military ties with the USA in 1980's may be seen in that light. New Delhi viewed such attempts as a contravention of the natural balance of power in the region and accused Pakistan of bringing the cold war to the subcontinent. Here we may take note briefly of the role played by the significant third parties in the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan. During the cold war period, US linkages with Pakistan often caused friction between the two regional powers and at times even scuttled their attempts towards arriving at a rapprochement. Afghanistan may be quoted as a prime example in this context, where an increased and somewhat intrusive input from the two superpowers into the dynamics of the regional

politics had an essentially negative impact to the extent it pulled both India and Pakistan in different directions and thus contributed towards widening the regional divide between them even though it had a potentiality to bring them together.

In the post-cold war era, the Soviet Union disappeared and India no longer enjoys that special relationship with Russia. The US's ties with India and Pakistan have also been undergoing a change and since early 1990, the USA has been trying to play an active but low-key role to bring about a rapprochement between the two countries by making efforts both at the official and non-official levels. China too has been playing a supportive role by urging both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through bilateral negotiations as envisaged in the Simla agreement.

Various international organizations have, however, only played a marginal role which is primarily due to the differing outlooks of the parties in this regard. Pakistan has often preferred using the international fora whether it is for internationalizing the Kashmir issue, placing the nuclear installations of two countries under the IAEA safeguards or sending neutral observers for verifying India's claims of Pakistan housing training camps on its territory and giving armed support to the militants operating in India. With regard to Kashmir, in particular, Pakistan insists that the Simla Agreement neither precludes its right to take the issue to the United Nations nor overrules UN resolutions. It argues further that implementation of UN resolutions on holding a plebiscite is the only acceptable solution of this dispute and has also been raising the Kashmir issue in international fora like that of the United Nations, Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and the meetings of the Commonwealth and the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India, however, believes in the principle of bilateralism in all its dealings with Pakistan. Any role for the UN with regard to the Kashmir issue, in particular, remains an anathema to the Indian policy makers. Perhaps that is why the UN Secretary-General declined Pakistan's request to intervene during the latest political upheaval in the Kashmir valley in 1990. Much for the same reasons, India has never used the NAM's forum to this end and has consistently turned down any offer by the Commonwealth countries to play a mediatory role between India and Pakistan. SAARC's Charter too, precludes any reference or discussion of bilateral disputes. The only international organization which has tried to intervene, albeit unsuccessfully, is that of the OIC. In its Istanbul resolution of 1991, it supported the right of self-determination of Kashmiris and referred to solutions for resolving the dispute. However New Delhi dismissed the resolution as being totally one-sided and wholly unacceptable.

Last but not least, we need to take into account the socio-cultural milieu of the people of India and Pakistan and the cross-border links between them. For decades they have shared a common culture, common

languages, common customs and traditions. There is a kind of chemistry between the peoples of these two countries and the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan must evolve in view of this civilizational affinity between them. However there are some paradoxes here. For instance, in an human encounter between an Indian and a Pakistani, the two are usually able to relate to each other and talk positively about various issues without harbouring any sense of distrust or recrimination. But as soon as the same persons start discussing the official relations between their countries, they feel somewhat obliged to subscribe to their respective governments' positions and then some kind of an argument takes place. Secondly with regard to public opinion in India and Pakistan, the political leaders hold its somewhat volatile nature responsible for constraining their efforts to normalize fully relations with the other country. Yet, it is a result of their own policies of indoctrination over the past four decades that has given rise to such an obduracy in the public mind, if there is any at all. In India, its relations with Pakistan is an issue of consequence mainly in the north-west region. The people in south India are far more involved with the developments in Sri Lanka and those in the north-east region with the events in Bangladesh. Within the north-west region too, along with certain hardline elements which view Pakistan only as a troublesome neighbour to be watched carefully, there is a very strong constituency of the intelligentsia favouring an improvement of relations between the two countries.

Bearing in mind these broad parameters, we need to evaluate the results of the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan. The most significant outcome of such a Confidence Building exercise between the two countries has been that the two have successfully avoided yet another war in the last two decades despite having come very close to it, at least twice in the winter of 1986-87 and in the spring of 1990. Notwithstanding the oft-repeated rhetoric of Indian warnings of teaching a lesson to Pakistan unless it stops supporting terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir and Pakistan's espousing the cause of the Kashmiris' freedom-struggle, the fundamental reality is that the two countries have undertaken a number of positive measures to avoid a military confrontation. There are, of course, objective constraints as well. Neither country can afford a war in pure financial terms. Neither is certain of achieving all its objectives by fighting a war.¹ Moreover, the weak governments both in Delhi and Islamabad and internal chaos in either country are a deterrent to any military adventure. Both recognize the dangers of an escalation of conflict to a nuclear exchange at some time. Both are facing difficulties in acquiring military hardware due to uncertain defence supplies. Finally, both have lost their allies in the superpowers and an aggressor would be hard put to find any

¹ For Pakistan this may be wresting Kashmir by force and for India it may mean successfully dissuading Pakistan from giving armed support to the Sikh and Kashmiri militants.

international support for its action. It is important to take note of US pressures, in particular, on both India and Pakistan to act with restraint and avoid a war by accident or as a pre-mediated move. Still more important is the psychological deterrence which emanates from a conscious strategic political decision taken by the policy makers of having ruled out war as a viable option. Even the Islamic lobby in Pakistan or the BJP in India which otherwise advocate a tough line of action against each other, no longer speak of war as a realistic possibility.

Beyond a situation of 'no war', one must appreciate the importance of India and Pakistan sustaining a Confidence Building dialogue in the first place, because both in India and especially in Pakistan, there is a strong lobby which insists that the two countries should adopt an approach of catching the bull by its horn, in other words, solving the core issues of conflict *first* before discussing other issues. However, there is a growing realization in both governments about the dangers involved in pursuing an all or nothing approach which is likely to result in a straight deadlock and have, therefore, withstood such pressures and been determined to sustain the Confidence Building dialogue.

In this respect, the most impressive development in the past two decades has been a manifold increase in the dialogue taking place between the two countries both at the official and non-official levels. At the official level, there is an increased magnitude of interaction between the top political and military leaders of the two countries. General Zia-ul-Haq's visited India eight times. Then after a gap of nearly two decades an Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, went to Pakistan twice in December 1988 and in July 1989, within a period of six months. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif came to New Delhi to attend Rajiv Gandhi's funeral in May 1990 and also had talks with the Indian leaders on that occasion. Lately the two incumbent Prime Ministers, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao and Mr. Nawaz Sharif of India and Pakistan respectively, have often made use of the opportunities presented by their visits to common international fora like the annual SAARC summit meeting in December 1991, the World Eco forum in February 1992 and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 for having bilateral talks. The singular importance of such meetings lie in their according a political backing to the overall Confidence Building process and often generating a momentum for the government officials to carry the dialogue forward.

The government officials' visits to each other's country and the range of issues discussed and negotiated by them both in number and scope has also expanded considerably. During the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's, most of the bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan was being carried out by their Foreign Offices' through their respective Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. The picture began to undergo a change in the latter half of the 1980's when bilateral negotiations were increasingly diversified.

It now witnessed regular bilateral talks between the Home Secretaries, the Defence Secretaries and the Finance Secretaries as well. Another milestone in this direction was achieved in the early 1990's when the military delegations of the two countries started talking about specific military Confidence Building Measures. This dialogue at the government officials' level is crucial not only to keep the temperature on both sides of the border in check but also to sustain the overall Confidence Building process, because historically a break in the Indo-Pak dialogue by itself often takes the two countries on a downward slope in their bilateral relations.

India and Pakistan also devised an institutionalised forum of the Joint Commission in 1981 for discussing various bilateral issues. A fruitful exercise although not a total success in the sense that instead of keeping the channels of communication open at the times of crisis, the Joint Commission meetings themselves often became a casualty of any serious escalation of tensions between the two countries. This purpose has been served more successfully by the regional forum of SAARC. For instance, the two Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and M.K. Junejo made use of the opportunity presented by the SAARC's summit meeting in December 1986 to allay each other's fears about the escalating tensions on the border during the Indian military exercise Brasstacks. Besides often the new Prime Ministers' of either country have met their counterpart at the SAARC meetings. For instance, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto's meeting in December 1988 and Nawaz Sharif and Chandra Shekhar's meeting in November 1990 were their first encounters with each other.

More specifically the two have agreed on a number of Confidence Building Measures such as advance notification of military exercises, troop movements or military manoeuvres, non-violation of air space, a hotline between their Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi and New Delhi and the Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMOs), the weekly meetings between the DGMOs and regular flag meetings at the specific commanders' level in order to control the periodic escalation of tensions on the border. Both sides have attested to the satisfactory working of these measures. Furthermore, the proposals for 'Mutual Balanced Force Reduction' and reduction of defence expenditures remain under consideration. With regard to the nuclear tensions on the subcontinent, the two have already agreed to a Confidence Building Measure on non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities and a more significant development pertains to a gradual shift of the entire debate from a non-proliferation perspective to a confidence building perspective. The two countries have also made substantial progress on resolving their differences on other contentious issues such as the Wullar Barrage and Tulbul Navigation Project and the boundary demarcation problem of the Sir Creek area. Although the Siachin glacier dispute has evaded any solution so far, both sides are continuing in their

efforts to arrive at an understanding on this issue. Moreover, they have made a number of efforts to curb and control cross-border crimes such as illegal border crossings, narcotics trafficking and smuggling of arms and ammunition. These include joint patrolling of the border, re-formulation of Indo-Pak Border Ground Rules, exchange of intelligence information, apprehension of fugitives and harmonisation of laws and punishment of drug traffickers. With regard to the issue of trade and economic cooperation, Pakistan is beginning to shed its fears and although progress continues at a somewhat slow pace, the two are certainly moving forward in this direction.

On the socio-cultural front, a non-official dialogue between significant elements of the body politic of the two countries consisting of the journalists, intellectuals, industrialists, academics, bureaucrats, political leaders and retired military officials and civil servants has been the most remarkable phenomenon in context of India-Pakistan relations in recent years. The idea behind such a supplemental diplomacy, initially conceived under US patronage, is to help the breaking with the past stereotype images of each other and building up some lobbies of peace in each country to put pressure on their respective governments for hastening the bilateral dialogue and taking positive measures to resolve their differences. It has also opened more channels of communication between the two countries and given an opportunity to their opinion-making elites to break out of the strait-jacket of their respective governments' somewhat frozen official positions on the core issues of conflict and discuss other important bilateral issues in a more open and candid manner.

Finally, despite the travel restrictions between the two countries, the sheer human traffic across the Indo-Pak border over the past few years has increased tremendously. The resulting informal dialogue taking place at the people-to-people level goes to the heart of the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan. In fact the distrust and suspicion between the two governments in New Delhi and Islamabad, to a great extent, has not percolated down to the common peoples' level. In other words, increased tension at the government-to-government level may not always reflect the peoples' genuine wishes. Therefore, in the context of Indo-Pak relations, there is no necessary or automatic correspondence between the confidence building exercise at the government-to-government level and people-to-people level. One may even argue that the real confidence building between India and Pakistan is taking place outside the conventional and somewhat narrowly defined framework of bilateral negotiations between the two parties in question. But at the same time, absence of spill over between the two levels limits the effectiveness of Confidence Building Measures.

A singular failure of the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan, however, has been that its success in the above-mentioned issues has fallen short of bringing the two parties any closer to

resolving their differences on the core issues of conflict. For India, the core issue, in the present context, remains as Pakistan's interference in terms of aiding and abetting terrorism in the Indian Punjab and Kashmir. Pakistan's offer of inspections either by joint Indo-Pak teams or neutral observers has been rejected by India on the grounds that it is well nigh impossible to inspect and expose any such covert activities with authenticity. Other measures like joint patrolling and the exchange of intelligence information have run aground owing to a number of technical loopholes and more importantly a lack of political will on Pakistan's part. In fact the Confidence Building Measures in their conventional sense become somewhat irrelevant in this kind of a situation, because the problem is that for Pakistan India's Muslim insurgents or terrorists are Pakistan's freedom-fighters and no Pakistani political leader can take any action which may be seen as helping India against the militants fighting for Kashmir's independence. They simply can not withstand such accusations by their domestic opponents of not supporting the Kashmiri cause. Indians, on the other hand, question how can they have real confidence in a Pakistan which is waging a proxy war on their territory.

From a Pakistani viewpoint, there can be no real trust between India and Pakistan without a final solution of the Kashmir issue. While the Confidence Building exercise in this respect has helped in avoiding another war on Kashmir, the official positions of the two countries on this issue continue to be as inflexible as ever.² A small dent has been made by the respective elites of two countries by coming forward with alternative solutions to this dispute but one must not underestimate the intractability of this issue.³ Over the past four decades, the Kashmir problem has almost become a zero sum game in which both India and Pakistan want Kashmir for their own reasons and Kashmiris themselves perhaps want complete independence with none of the three parties prepared to make any compromise whatsoever. Moreover, Kashmir's negative spill over effect on the overall Confidence Building process between the two countries is not only considerable but also unidirectional in its nature. The paradox here is that unless India and Pakistan diversify their talks to other issues without hinging everything on Kashmir, the Confidence Building process may come unstuck altogether. But if they were to leave it aside totally, it would yield only limited results.

Perhaps that is why the two countries need to adopt a two track approach whereby they sustain the continuing Confidence Building process but at the same time start preparing the ground for addressing the core issues of the conflict as well. The point is that while a Confidence Building exercise may be the right approach to create a suitable political atmosphere for the two sides to address the principal dispute, if they

² India's official position is that the Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and its future political status is non-negotiable. And Pakistan's position is that the Kashmiris must be granted their right of self-determination through a plebiscite at least and the merger of the Kashmir valley into Pakistan at best.

³ For a detailed analysis of this point, see, Abdur Rob Khan, "Protracted International Conflicts in South Asia: A Study of Persistence and Diffusion", *Ph.D Thesis in progress*, at the University of Kent at Canterbury.

were to leave it for too long, the entire exercise might become counter-productive. Then one or both parties may start thinking that the whole idea of Confidence Building Measures is becoming a tool or an excuse for not addressing the fundamental issues at stake.

In our theoretical framework outlined in Chapter One, we had discussed the idea of freezing the core issue of conflict between the concerned parties engaged in a Confidence Building exercise. But we find a paradox here that often they may be able to do so only if it continues to be in a somewhat dormant state and once it becomes active, in other words, comes to a head, its acutely negative spill over effect into the overall Confidence Building process may make it very difficult for the two sides to sustain the process beyond a point. And yet freezing the principal issue of conflict may help in stabilizing the conflict and thus facilitating the Confidence Building process. For instance, India and China as well as the Soviet Union and Japan's mutual understanding of setting aside their basic dispute over the territorial question of Aksai Chin and the Northern territories respectively for the time being, has certainly helped in stabilizing their bilateral ties and paving the way for the respective parties to undertake a Confidence Building exercise. In the subcontinent, India consistently has maintained its stand on retaining the *status quo* in Kashmir. After the 1971 war and initially the Pakistani Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto had acquiesced to that proposition and the two countries could pursue normalization of their relations without any immediate obtrusive input from that disputed issue. But after the latest political upheaval in the Kashmir valley in 1989 the Pakistani leaders reverted back to their original position that a *status quo* in Kashmir was not acceptable and yet again the issue had come to the forefront of the Indo-Pak relations.

Keeping in mind the accident-prone nature of their relationship, India and Pakistan need to develop a certain degree of tenacity and steadfastness in the Confidence Building exercise. Often incidents such as the beating up of an Indian diplomat in Islamabad, forced attempts by the Pakistani civilians to cross the Line of Actual Control *en masse*, or Hindu-Muslim riots in India have raised the temperature on both sides of the border and caused setbacks in their Confidence Building process. And their ability to absorb these kind of small shocks and bring about some kind of resilience in their relationship depends largely on the stability of governments in Delhi and Islamabad. There is no denying the fact that hardliners are present on both sides of the border and any move of reconciliation by the two sides is likely to be opposed by some sections of the press, opposition political parties and the army. Both governments, therefore, need to be very strong-willed and resolute to be able to withstand such pressures and sustain the Confidence Building process. In fact in the Indian view, a principal problem with the Confidence Building process between the two countries actually lies in the fragmented nature of Pakistan's policy making apparatus with the civilians, more specifically, the

Prime Minister enjoying only a limited leverage in shaping its foreign relations *vis-à-vis* India. At times the ruling troika consisting of the President, Prime Minister and the Army Chief is even working at cross purposes with each other in this respect. It is argued therefore, that unless and until there is a positive consensus within the Pakistani establishment on its policy towards India, the two countries can not go very far in their Confidence Building process.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, there is a unanimous opinion that Big Brother India lacks generosity and if only the Indian leaders were to show statesmanship, they could change the political calculus of India-Pakistan relations. A wide cross-section of the policy makers and the elites believe that the onus of building confidence in Pakistan, or at least that of taking an initiative, clearly lies with India. They put particular stress upon the importance of unilateral gestures coming from the stronger neighbour for the success of the Confidence Building process between the two countries. This opinion was shared by some in India as well, who argued that India should adopt the principle of non-reciprocity or not insist on its every gesture or concession being reciprocated by Pakistan. It could even make a string of unilateral gestures, perhaps in Gorbachev's style, such as reducing the size of its armed forces, removing all travel and visa restrictions on Pakistanis visiting India, lifting any restrictions on imports of Pakistani goods, withdrawing its forces from the Siachin area and the like. However, others in India believe that it is a fallacy to argue that it is India's responsibility to generate confidence in the Pakistani mind just because it is the bigger party, especially considering the havoc Pakistan is creating in the Indian Punjab and Kashmir valley despite its smaller size.

Further, both India and Pakistan need to make much more conscious efforts to cast aside their long-standing habits of pre-judging hostility in each other's moves, smelling a rat in the underlying motives of the proposals put forward by the other side and a tendency to dismiss them as a trick or a propaganda exercise often without even giving it a due consideration. For instance, Mrs. Gandhi made no bones about the fact that she perceived Pakistan's proposal of a No War Pact only as a trap. At times, both India and Pakistan have even rejected measures proposed by the other side only because their own proposals had earlier met the same fate at the latter's hands, thus getting locked into a vicious circle of proposal-rejection-proposal-rejection. For example, there is no doubt that an important reason behind India's rebuff of Pakistan's proposal of a No War Pact was that earlier India had put forth the same proposal a number of times only to be rejected by Pakistan. In a similar vein, to some extent, the logic behind Pakistan's rebuff to the Indian proposal for a Peace and Friendship Treaty was on the lines that, if they have not accepted our No War proposal, why should we accept theirs? Such thinking inevitably leads to a deadlock.

Last but not least a Confidence Building exercise needs to adopt a broad approach embracing political, military, economic or socio-cultural dimensions. By confining it to the military sphere alone, it would yield very limited results. The Helsinki Final Act with its four baskets, for instance, had a comprehensive outlook touching upon issues like industrial cooperation, commerce and human rights besides the specific military measures. Before that German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik too, had followed a similar approach. The two Koreas are another such case in point. Along with the military Confidence Building Measures of prior notification of military manoeuvres, and troop movements, inviting observers to military exercises, agreeing to a demilitarized zone between the two countries, the two Koreas have also undertaken a number of other measures like free inter-Korean travel, exchange of sports and cultural troupes, joint development projects, cooperation in Antarctic and Marine scientific research and the like. The point is that while the military Confidence Building Measures are crucial and often essential to be taken as the first step to ward off a military confrontation by accident or otherwise, there are dangers in pursuing this approach in isolation in the sense that avoiding war may then become the only objective and a Confidence Building exercise clearly must go beyond that.

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In the light of our study and analysis of the India and Pakistan's relations, we may now review the theoretical framework of the Confidence Building process devised at the outset of this study. Our hypothesis that the success and effectiveness of a Confidence Building process depends on the nature, presence and working of certain factors such as open channels of communication, increased magnitude of interaction, consistency in attitude and behaviour, the principle of reciprocity and perceptions of underlying motives of each other's side has been substantiated. However, the model of the Confidence Building process does need certain modifications. Although we reflected upon the role of the structural, situational and dispositional variables in shaping the concerned parties decisions' to initiate a Confidence Building exercise, we did not realize fully their importance in permeating and affecting the entire process of confidence building in itself. The structural variables, in particular, lay down the parameters or the constraints within which the whole Confidence Building exercise takes place. So, we need to take note of these factors fully into the Confidence Building model itself.

Similarly, although we did take into account the general influence of both the domestic and the international factors on the overall Confidence Building process in our model, we somewhat underrated their significance in steering and shaping practically each and every move made by the two parties at the bilateral level in the course of the Confidence Building process. In other words, we need to bring out and highlight the

constant interaction between the internal, bilateral and international factors at every stage of the Confidence Building process between the parties in question.

Finally, the model gave an impression as if a Confidence Building exercise is essentially carried out between two clearly defined sets of policy makers in the two countries. In reality, however, the Confidence Building process takes place simultaneously at various levels and often the non-official dialogue between the elites and the common people outside the governmental framework constitutes the most vital input into this process. Further, there may not be an automatic or compulsory correspondence between confidence building at the government-to-government and people-to-people level. One may possibly exist independently of the other.

Having revised the Confidence Building model, we may now try to ascertain its relevance in terms of its transferability to other such cases. It will be argued that the Confidence Building model outlined in this study does provide a theoretical framework which may be applied for studying and analysing similar cases. Its conceptualization of structural, situational and dispositional variables which shape the Confidence Building process and its postulation of a constant interaction between these variables at the internal, bilateral and international levels of analysis devises a kind of *modus operandi* which may be used for understanding and analysing a Confidence Building process in any situation. For instance, one may study the Confidence Building process between North Korea and South Korea along these lines. The ideological conflict between the North Korean communist regime and South Korea's capitalistic and democratic government along with their external ties with the former Soviet Union and the USA respectively. At the same time considering that the two Koreas are actually a 'divided nation', the socio-cultural ties at the common peoples level remain very strong, thus, providing a strong foundation for the Confidence Building exercise to be undertaken at the grass-root level between the two countries. Bearing this in mind, a constant interaction between internal factors such as public opinion's pressure for normalization of their relations especially allowing inter-Korean travel for the divided families and their bilateral mutual understanding in this regard on one hand, and their negotiations on military Confidence Building Measures such as notification of military maneuvers and inviting observers to the military exercises and international factors like South Korea's military ties with the US, particularly in connection with their joint military exercises, contribute towards shaping the Confidence Building process between the two countries. Further, the Confidence Building model theorizes that presence and working of some factors like open channels of communication, reciprocal gestures, and increased magnitude of interaction among others are likely to facilitate a Confidence Building exercise. With regard to the Confidence Building process between India and China, for instance, ever since the Indian Prime

Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1987, the interaction between the policy makers and the government officials of two countries has increased manifold. A number of Joint Working Groups to discuss trade and economic cooperation, travel and cultural exchanges and last but not least the military issues for ensuring the 'peace and tranquility' on the border have gone a long way in facilitating the Confidence Building Process between the two countries. A theoretical distinction between a Confidence Building Measure, the Confidence Building process and the resulting 'Confidence', and an outline of the conceptual evolution of the Confidence Building process itself are the other 'general' elements of this theoretical framework. Therefore, it is believed that this Confidence Building model will prove to be useful in serving as a research tool or instrument for studying and analysing a Confidence Building process in different situations. Of course considering that it is the first of such attempts in the present literature on Confidence Building Measures, it may still need to be refined further.

To recapitulate, the Confidence Building process between India and Pakistan has yielded somewhat mixed results. It has helped in avoiding another war in the subcontinent, resolving their differences on various other issues and most of all widening the network of interaction between the two countries from the top level of the policy makers to the grass-root level of common peoples. But at the same time, it has only made a marginal progress in bringing the two countries closer to arriving at any understanding on the core issues of conflict. Keeping in mind the chequered history of Indo-Pak relations, however, the best way to derive a final picture is perhaps by having an eye for the overall upward movement of the graph of their bilateral ties notwithstanding the ups and downs in between. Finally, the Confidence Building model outlined in this study does provide a general framework and has a theoretical relevance that goes beyond the specific case study of India and Pakistan.

APPENDICES

**APPENDIX ONE: AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN**

1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marked their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

2. In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:-

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries;

(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations;

(iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;

(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means;

(v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality;

(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

2. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

3. In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:-

(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights.

(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

(iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both Governments agree that:-

(i) Indian and pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line.

(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

5. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

6. Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

(Indira Gandhi)

Prime Minister

Republic of India

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)

President

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Simla, the 2nd July 1972

APPENDIX TWO: A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENTS

Senior military commanders of India and Pakistan met in Suchetgarh on 11 December 1972 to sign and exchange maps delineating the 800-km Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir extending from the Chhamb sector to the Partapur sector. The maps were initialled by Lt.

General P.S. Bhagat and Lt. General Abdul Hamid Khan.

India and Pakistan announced on 20 December 1972 completion of the withdrawal of their troops to the international border.

India and Pakistan signed an agreement on 28 August 1973 in New Delhi regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civil internees, Bengalis and non-Bengalis.

India and Pakistan signed an agreement on 9 April 1974 for the release and repatriation of persons detained in either country prior to the 1971 conflict.

India and Pakistan signed an agreement on Postal Services on 14 September 1984.

The two countries signed an agreement on restoring telecommunication links on 14 September 1974.

India and Pakistan signed a Visa Agreement for establishing travel facilities between the two countries on 14 September 1974.

India and Pakistan signed a Pilgrimage Protocol on 14 September 1974.

India and Pakistan signed an Agreement for stopping hostile propaganda over the Radio on 14 September 1974.

India and Pakistan signed a Protocol on the resumption of Shipping Services on 15 January 1975.

India and Pakistan signed a Trade Agreement on 23 January 1975.

India and Pakistan signed an Agreement to restore Civil Aviation links between the two countries on 14 May 1976.

The diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan were re-established on 14 May 1976.

India and Pakistan signed a Rail Agreement on 28 June 1976.

India released 108 Pakistani detainees in exchange for 70 Indians on 2 February 1977.

India unilaterally released 120 Pakistani detainees on 25 June 1977.

India and Pakistan signed a telecommunications agreement on 1 October 1977.

India and Pakistan released 39 Pakistani detainees and 41 Indians respectively on 27 October 1977.

Indian Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi agreed to facilitate exchanges, simplify and liberalize the visa procedures, station press correspondents in each other's country and develop trade on a two-way basis

on 8 February 1978 at Islamabad. They also agreed to resume talks on the Salal Dam Project.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi and the Indian Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee signed an agreement on the design of the Salal Dam Project on 14 April 1978 in New Delhi.

India announced its decision to release all Pakistanis held under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, on 28 April 1978.

India and Pakistan agreed to open an Indian consulate in Karachi and a Pakistani consulate in Bombay on 27 September 1978.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi announced on 2 February 1982 that in addition to the shrines covered by the 1974 Indo-Pakistan Protocol, the Pakistan Government would open two more shrines at

Kapasraj in Punjab and Hayat Pitafi in Sindh to pilgrims from India.

The two countries signed an agreement establishing an Indo-Pak Joint Commission on 10 March 1983 at New Delhi. Four Sub-Commissions were set up by the Joint Commission to deal with

- (a) economic matters relating to industry, agriculture, communication, health and scientific cooperation;
- (b) trade;
- (c) social sciences, education, culture, sports and information; and
- (d) travel and tourism.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Paksitan met on 2 August 1983, at the meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers.

The two Sub-Commissions on Trade and Economic Matters of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission met in Islamabad on 7 January 1984 for a 3-day meeting. They agreed on several cooperative measures in the spheres of planning, agriculture, railways, health, industry, science and technology and telecommunications. They also introduced a system of through booking of railway tickets by July 1984 under which passengers travelling between India and Pakistan would be able to buy through tickets in their own country to seven designated railway stations in the other country.

Indian Foreign Secretary, M. Rasgotra and Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik signed a two part agreement in Islamabad on 20 May 1984 on exchanging journalists and a protocol on group tourism and exchanged letters on amending visa rules. It was agreed that group tourism would be for a maximum of fifteen days. The protocol allowed the movement of up to 8,000 nationals of each country, 2,000 in each quarter. According to the amendments to the 1974 visa agreement, only one member of the family would be required to report to a police station for registration as against the existing rule which stipulated that all members of a family had to report to a police station. Tourists travelling in groups would also no longer be required to report personally to a police station. Diplomatic staff would be given visas for the entire duration of their assignment. Non-diplomatic staff whose visas were periodically renewed would also get them for the duration of their assignment. A visitor's visa issued for three months could be extended for up to one year. For businessmen who were required to travel frequently between the two countries', triple entry visas would be issued to a maximum of six months. The modalities of group

tourism were to be worked out jointly by the Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) and Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (PTDC).

Indian Minister of Information and Broadcasting, H.K.L. Bhagat and his Pakistani counterpart Raja Mohammed Zafarul Haq signed an agreement on 12 July 1984 to exchange newspapers and journals at the government to government level. They also agreed to a programme of film festivals to be held by each side in the other country.

The Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission met in New Delhi from 2-4 July 1985. Agreements were reached on cooperation in agricultural research, formulation of a cultural exchange programme, relaxation of travel regulations including exemption of police reporting in respect of businessmen and transit visitors, finalisation of facilities for through railway bookings between designated railway stations and the decision to facilitate the exchange of visits by various groups and organisations like women's organisations, lawyers' associations and old boys associations. It was also agreed to hold an exhibition of Urdu books in Pakistan by India later in 1985 and to stage a seminar on long-term planning. A co-axial cable linking the two countries would provide additional telecommunications facilities. And there would be an exchange of Radio and TV programmes, an AIR correspondent would be stationed in Pakistan and a Radio Pakistan correspondent would be stationed in New Delhi. They also agreed to explore ways to stop the smuggling of narcotics across their common border.

India and Pakistan signed an agreement for cooperation in the field of health and family welfare in New Delhi on 19 October 1985. The two sides agreed that there would be an exchange of information in biomedical research, medical education and training and seminars and workshops at national levels; collaboration in communicable diseases control particularly malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy and control of goitre; research collaboration in health fields through the two respective national research councils; exchange of information and experience in the fields of family planning and welfare; and exchange of experts in specialised fields of health and family welfare.

Pakistan's Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs, Dr. Mahbubul Haq and the Indian Minister of Finance, V.P. Singh announced on 17 November 1985 in New Delhi, their agreement to increase total India-Pakistan trade beyond the current level of US\$ 50,000,000 a year.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq announced their understanding on not attacking each other's nuclear installations on 17 December 1985 in New Delhi.

Indian Finance Minister, V.P. Singh and Pakistani Finance Minister Mahbubul Haq signed an agreement under which the Pakistani private sector trade would be able to import 42 special items from India in Islamabad on 10 January 1986. The accord also stipulated a doubling of the public sector trade, the introduction of direct dialling by telephone by the end of that year and an increase in the frequency of air services between the two countries on existing routes.

Indian and Pakistani delegations of agricultural experts signed an agreement on 4 July 1986 on a wide ranging programme of agricultural research. The areas identified included horticulture, rice, cotton and pulse production, livestock production and health, farm water management, agriculture, biological control of pests and disease and plant genetic resources.

India and Pakistan reached an agreement in Lahore on 30 July 1986, to re-open the rail route between the two countries through Khokrapar from October after a closure of about 21 years.

Indian Home Secretary, C.G. Somiah and his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. S.K. Mahmud agreed on 21 December 1986 in Islamabad, to evolve a joint strategy to combat narcotics trafficking and smuggling and assured that their countries would not provide support to terrorist activities against each other. They agreed to formulate new ground rules covering illegal border crossings and as a first step in this direction, they decided to strengthen the cooperation between their border security forces. They also decided to set up two committees. One consisted of the representatives of the Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs and India's Border Security Force and the Pakistan Rangers which would re-formulate the ground rules evolved in 1960-61 and study the two proposals which had been exchanged in 1981-82 relating to border crisis, illegal crossings of border and related matters. The other committee would have representatives from the Narcotics Control Commission, Revenue Intelligence, Border Security Forces and the Finance and External Affairs Ministries of both sides which would take steps to combat narcotics trafficking and smuggling. It would meet twice a year to undertake concerted action to counter and eliminate these nefarious activities and exchange information in this regard.

On 12 January 1987, a fully automatic telex service was introduced between India and Pakistan via high capacity terrestrial underground coaxial cable between Lahore and Amritsar, commissioned in 1985.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar and the India's Foreign Secretary, Alfred Gonslaves signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 4 February in New Delhi under which the parties undertake

- (a) not to attack each other;
- (b) to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid all provocative actions along the border;
- (c) to adopt a sector-by-sector approach for the pull-out of troops deployed on the border by both sides;
- (d) to withdraw all offensive and defensive forces of both sides in the Ravi and Chenab corridor, to peace-time locations over next 15 days.

They further agreed that

- (i) the Directors-General-of-Military-Operations shall maintain regular contact;
- (ii) the ACAS (operations) of both countries shall maintain contact to clear apprehensions about aircraft movements;
- (iii) regular contacts shall be maintained through diplomatic channels;
- (iv) all satellite airfields shall be deactivated immediately;
- (v) the navies of both sides will be brought to a lower state of operational readiness; and
- (vi) all mines already laid will be lifted and no further mines will be laid.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Alfred Gonslaves and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar established a schedule on 1 March 1987 at Islamabad for further phased troop withdrawals from Rajasthan, Sindh and the Rann of Kutch sectors.

The first meeting of the Indo-Pakistan Committee on drug trafficking and smuggling was concluded on 27 March 1987 and the two sides arrived at an understanding on a number of issues including the identification of nodal agencies through which information would be exchanged, steps to neutralise the activities of the drug traffickers and smugglers, new means used for the activities and exchange of information in a variety of areas related to such activities.

India's Director-General of the Narcotics Control Bureau, B.V. Kumar reached an agreement with the Chairman of the Pakistan Narcotics Board, D. Nazeemuddin, to exchange operational intelligence and

material for dossiers on individuals on either side of the border in the last week of March 1987.

India and Pakistan were reported to have decided to settle, at the governmental level, the construction of certain structures in the Wullar lake in Kashmir with a view to augmenting the river flow during the lean season on 24 May 1987. Another significant decision relating to the Pakistani request for issuing flood warnings from 10 July 1987 had been taken. The forecast for River Tawi would be provided at Jammu, for River Ravi at Madhopur and for Chenab at Salal.

India and Pakistan reached an agreement in Islamabad on 12 February 1988 to release large contingents of fishermen held in each other's custody after they had strayed across the undemarcated maritime boundary at various periods in the past eighteen months.

India and Pakistan reached an agreement to allow the train service between the two countries on all seven days of the week in March 1988.

Pakistan Railways and the Northern Railway India agreed on 8 April 1988 to introduce the facility of return-journey tickets for passengers between certain pairs of cities in India and Pakistan from 1 October 1988.

Indian Foreign Secretary, K.P.S. Menon and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar were reported to have agreed to restore with immediate effect hotlines between themselves for personal communications on 21 April 1988.

Indian Home Secretary, C.G. Somiah and Pakistani Home Secretary, S.K. Mahmud met on 16 May 1988 to discuss issues about the cross-border terrorism and agreed to undertake joint patrols in the sensitive areas of the Punjab sector of the Indo-Pak border. The joint patrolling would include sending out patrols during day and night and laying ambushes. They agreed on certain broad guidelines to optimize the effectiveness of joint patrolling which included:

(a) while the overall co-ordination of the arrangements would be at the DIG, BSF/DDG, Pakistan Rangers level, the detailed planning of the programme, the composition and the conduct of the joint patrol parties and the like would be planned jointly at battalion/wing commander level. To maintain a certain element

of surprise, the timing and execution of the joint patrolling would be organized and co-ordinated at the company commander level;

(b) the joint patrol would be headed by officers of equal rank from both sides;

(c) proper procedure for briefing of the parties jointly by senior officers and providing a proper communication link at the various levels where co-ordination is required, shall be established. The special arrangements for joint patrolling would be tried initially for a period of three months from its introduction and procedures would be reviewed thereafter. It was also decided that an India-Pakistan Committee on Border Ground Rules should meet within the next three months in order to finalize the Indo-Pak border ground rules taking into account the new realities. Meanwhile the following interim measures were agreed to:

(i) regular meetings between the two border security forces at wing commander/battalion commander level in order to deal effectively with illegal trans-border movement.

(ii) flag meetings may be held between the two border security forces at post/company commander level to pass on any information of immediate importance. Whenever a contact is requested, the other side shall respond immediately.

(iii) the border security forces of the two countries should arrest not only trans-border criminals, drug-traffickers and smugglers of any nationality but also infiltrators who deliberately cross the border whether armed or unarmed and deal with them under the law of the land. The two border security forces were to work in close cooperation in order to ensure the eradication of trans-border crimes such as drug-trafficking, smuggling of arms and ammunition and illegal border crossings. For this purpose, there would be mutual and timely exchanges of information, intelligence and coordination at battalion commander level.

They also agreed that should any instance of smuggling of arms and ammunition and also other contraband commodities including currency and drugs from one country to the other come to notice, a flag meeting at the company commander level shall be called for facilitating a deterrent action against the concerned persons. Further the border security forces shall send names with other personal particulars of all persons crossing the border illegally to the other side along with the dates and places of crossing. The information would thereafter be expeditiously processed to ascertain if these persons were wanted in any criminal case of terrorism or smuggling. In cases where such linkages were established, the concerned persons would be handed over to the border security of the other country after due process of law. The concerned authorities on each side should also ensure that

the illegal possession of arms and ammunition and their trans-border sale and movement was strictly and effectively prevented in the border villages. They should also prevent the carrying of arms by civilians (other than public servants) within 150 yards of either side of the border.

An India-Pakistan Friendship Society was inaugurated in New Delhi on 3 June 1988.

India's Commerce Minister, Dinesh Singh announced on 6 October 1988 that India and Pakistan had agreed to set up a joint committee of the Chambers of Commerce and Industries of the two countries to give a fillip to bilateral trade.

India and Pakistan were directly linked through International Subscriber Dialling (ISD) and goodwill messages were exchanged between officials of the two countries.

India and Pakistan signed an agreement to increase the number of flights on the Indo-Pak routes.

India made a unilateral gesture to Pakistan by calling off the annual military exercises by the armed forces in Rajasthan. This was announced on 28 December 1988.

India's Home Secretary Mr. J.A. Kalyana Krishnan and Pakistan's Interior Secretary Mr. S.K. Mahmud had talks on 24 May 1989 and agreed that the two border security forces should undertake "simultaneous co-ordinated patrolling along the Indo-Pak border and the patrols would be briefed and de-briefed jointly. The new arrangement extended to the entire international border between the two countries (outside of course the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir). In addition, the Director-General of the Pakistan Rangers and Inspector-General of Punjab and Rajasthan were to meet twice a year to review implementation of various arrangements and agreed measures and there would be meetings at the lower levels where necessary for effective cooperation between the two border security forces. The two Home Secretaries also agreed that the coverage of information to be exchanged between the two countries should be widened to include the organization, powers, functions and addresses of different enforcement agencies, training material, equipment, dates regarding the seizures and other related matters including *modus operandi* and the routes followed. Further detailed procedures were worked out to tackle the drug menace

through the exchange of information, apprehension of fugitives, harmonization of laws and punishment of traffickers. The two agreed that the Interpol Chiefs and their representatives in both countries should have greater interaction at the personal level including periodic meetings. And the FIA in Pakistan and the CBI in India acting as the model agencies and in concert with other appropriate agencies in their respective countries should take appropriate action in tracing and arranging to hand over the other country's wanted and absconding criminals. The modalities of action in this regard were to be worked out by the FIA and CBI representatives through discussions within the following three months.

In May 1989, the Indian Minister of State for Civil Aviation and Tourism, Mr. Shivraj Patil and his Pakistani counterpart, Yusuf Raza Gilani announced further steps to ease restrictions on travel between the two countries.

The Heads of Pakistan Rangers and India's Border Security Force agreed for joint patrolling of their common border on 7 June 1989.

The Defence Secretaries' of India and Pakistan agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement of the Siachin glacier dispute based on the re-deployment of forces to reduce the chances of conflict and to avoid the use of force in conformity with Simla Agreement, on 17 June 1989 at Rawalpindi.

Indian Foreign Secretary, S.K. Singh and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Dr. Humayun Khan agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement of the Siachin glacier dispute on 18 June 1989 at Islamabad.

India and Pakistan signed three agreements on 16 July 1989 on the eve of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad.

(a) Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. It committed each party to 'refrain from undertaking, encouraging and participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country';

(b) Agreement on Cultural Cooperation. It envisaged cooperation in art, culture, archaeology, education, sports and media, with a provision that cultural centres of either country may be set up in the other. It also provided for encouraging and facilitating reciprocal visits of academics, educational administrators, academic, literary and journalistic associations for study or lecture tours or for participation in seminars

and conferences. It also envisaged translation and exchange of books, periodicals and other educational, cultural and sports publications and copies of art objects. They also agreed to examine freshly the text books prescribed in educational institutions.

(c) Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income derived from International Air Transport on 12 July 1989.

The four Sub-Commissions of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission had their third meeting in Islamabad from 17-19 July 1989. The two countries adopted a three-year Cultural Exchange Programme for 1989-91.

It provided for cooperation in the field of:

(a) Education including providing fellowships/scholarships to students in either country; exchange of educationists, historians, scientists, academicians and other experts in the field of education and;

(b) Art and culture including exchange of musicians, artists, folk dance and theatre groups, exhibitions of arts and crafts, writers, poets, painters and sculptors;

(c) Both sides agreed to exchange exhibitions on miniature paintings and contemporary art. The two sides further agreed to participate in painting exhibitions, folk festivals, seminars etc., organized by each other.

The two sides also agreed to send delegations of children/youth;

(d) Sports: Both sides agreed to encourage exchange of sportsmen, athletes, coaches etc., in various sports;

(e) Radio, TV, Press and Films: Both sides agreed to exchange radio and TV programmes and delegations of radio and TV professionals.

(f) Both sides agreed to permit commercial exchange of newspapers and periodicals;

(g) Both sides agreed to allow the posting of more newspapers and agency correspondents in each other's country on a reciprocal basis;

(h) Both sides agreed to participate in each other's film festivals and exchange film delegations.

Trade: Pakistan announced an enlargement of the list of items to be imported from India in the private sector by another 322 items. Both sides agreed to the setting up of a Joint Business Council. It was also agreed to participate in Trade Fairs in each other's countries.

Economic Matters:

(a) Planning: the two sides would exchange documents and data relevant to furthering the process of development;

(b) Industry: both agreed to exchange delegations of businessmen in order to increase bilateral industrial cooperation;

(c) Agriculture: revised schedules of visits would be implemented and seminars would be held on already identified subjects in Pakistan (September 1989) and India (November 1989);

(d) Postal Service: philatelic exhibitions would be organized on a reciprocal basis in India and Pakistan;

(e) Health: both sides agreed to an exchange of medical research delegations in the field of Oncology and Coronary Heart diseases;

(f) Double Taxation: both sides agreed to initiate negotiations for a comprehensive convention for the avoidance of double taxation.

Travel and Tourism:

(a) both sides agreed to increase the number of places that could be visited by nationals of either country from 4 to 8;

(b) both agreed that persons with visas valid up to 14 days would be exempted from police reporting on a reciprocal basis. This visa would be non-extendable;

(c) both sides agreed that visitors travelling by air could enter at one point and exit at another point provided that the visa is so endorsed;

(d) both sides agreed to introduce a new category of tourist visa to cover group tours by approved tour operators valid up to 14 days. Private tour operators/travel agents approved by the respective governments would be permitted to operate group tours. Such groups must consist of 10 or more persons who would be granted non-extendable visas valid for 14 days and for a maximum of eight places. Individual members of the group would not be required to register with the police. The tour operators would inform the registration authorities at various places in advance.

(e) both sides agreed to increase the number of pilgrims and places of pilgrimage.

Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Sahabzada Yaqub Khan met in New Delhi on 21 January 1990 and agreed to keep the hotline between the army headquarters in Rawalpindi and New Delhi alive.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey and Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shaukat Khan agreed to exchange information on a weekly basis between senior military commanders on troop deployments and movements on 20 December 1990.

The India-Pakistan Agreement on Non-Attack on Nuclear Facilities came into effect on 27 January 1991.

Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan in New Delhi signed two Confidence Building Measures on advance notification of military exercises, military manoeuvres and troop movements and on the prevention of violation of air space by military aircraft on 6 April 1991.

The military delegations of India and Pakistan had talks in Islamabad on 25 September 1991. They agreed that the specific sector commanders of the two armies and the air forces' would maintain lines of communication with their respective counterparts' along the Line-of-Control as well as the international border from Jammu to Kutch. For the armies, these contacts would be at the divisional level and for the air force, they would be maintained at the level of forward base commanders. In addition, air force and navies of the two countries would establish communication channels at the highest level on the pattern set for the DGMOs.

Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan agreed in Muree on 31 October 1991 to exchange information about nuclear installations before 1 January 1992.

Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan signed two agreements on banning the use of chemical weapons and establishing a code of conduct for diplomats in the two countries on 19 August 1992 in New Delhi.

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives, Annual Register, Asian Recorder, IDSA News Review, POT (Pakistan Opinion Trends) Series, Pakistan Horizon, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, BBC Summary of Broadcasts, Yearbooks on India's Foreign Policy (1982-1991), and various Indian and Pakistani newspapers.

**APPENDIX III: A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF SUMMIT LEVEL MEETINGS/INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN INDIA & PAKISTAN**

Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai had talks with Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq on 31 August 1978 at Nairobi, Kenya where the two were attending the funeral of late President Kenyatta.

Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had talks with General Zia-ul-Haq on 17 April 1980 at Salisbury where the two were attending Zimbabwe's independence celebrations.

Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had talks with General Zia-ul-Haq on 1 November 1982 in New Delhi.

Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had talks with General Zia-ul-Haq on 10 March 1983 in New Delhi when he had come to attend the NAM summit meeting.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq visited New Delhi on 3 November 1984 to attend Indian Prime Minister late Mrs. Indira Gandhi's funeral.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi had talks with Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq on 14 March 1985 at Moscow where the two were attending the funeral of late Soviet President Chernenko.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq had talks with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 5 September 1985 on the occasion of the NAM summit meeting.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq had talks with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 26 or 27 October 1985 in New York, where the two were attending United Nations' General Assembly session.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq met the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 18 November 1985 in Muscat, Oman.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq had talks with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Dhaka on 8

December 1985, where the two were attending SAARC summit meeting.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq had talks with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his visit to New Delhi on 17 December 1985.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi met the Pakistani Prime Minister, M.K. Junejo on 15 March 1986 at Stockholm.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister, M.K. Junejo on 17 November 1986 at Bangalore where the two were attending SAARC summit meeting.

Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq had talks with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his visit to New Delhi on 21-23 February 1987 to watch an Indo-Pak cricket match.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister, M.K. Junejo on 4 November 1987 at Kathmandu where the two were attending SAARC summit meeting.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi went to Peshawar, Pakistan on 20 January 1988 on a private visit to attend Frontier Gandhi, late Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's funeral.

Indian President R. Venkataraman went to Islamabad on 20 August 1988 to attend late General Zia-ul-Haq's funeral.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto on 29-31 December 1988 in Islamabad on the occasion of the SAARC summit meeting.

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto on 16-17 July 1989 on his visit to Islamabad.

Indian Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar and Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met on 22-23 November in Male where the two were attending SAARC summit meeting.

Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 17 October 1991 at Harare, Zimbabwe where the two were attending the Commonwealth summit.

Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 2 February 1992 at Davos, Switzerland where the two were participating in the World Economic Forum.

Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro on the occasion of the Earth summit.

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives, Annual Register, Asian Recorder, IDSA News Review, POT (Pakistan Opinion Trends) Series, Pakistan Horizon, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, BBC Summary of Broadcasts, Yearbooks on India's Foreign Policy (1982-1991), and various Indian and Pakistani newspapers.

APPENDIX IV: A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF SENIOR LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Special Emissaries of the Prime Minister of India, D.P. Dhar and the President of Pakistan, Aziz Ahmed, had talks in Muree and Rawalpindi from 26 April-29 April 1972.

Representatives of the two countries' led by P.N. Haksar and Aziz Ahmed had talks from 25-27 August 1972.

Indian Army Chief, General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw and Pakistani Army Chief, General Tikka Khan met in Lahore on 1 December 1972 for talks on the delineation of the Line of Control.

Indian Army Chief, General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw and Pakistani Army Chief, General Tikka Khan again met in Lahore on 7 December 1972 to overcome the Thako Chak dispute in the delineation of the Line of Control.

The two countries' senior military commanders, Lt. General P.S. Bhagat and Lt. General Abdul Hamid Khan met in Suchetgarh on 11 December 1972 to finalize the delineation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.

Indian and Pakistani emissaries had talks on 24-31 July 1973 for settling the humanitarian problems left over by the 1971 conflict. The Indian team was led by P.N Haksar, former Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Pakistani team was led by Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Indian and Pakistani emissaries had second round of talks on 18-28 August 1973 in New Delhi regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civil internees, Bengalis and non-Bengalis. Indian team was led by P.N Haksar, Special Representative of the Prime Minister and Pakistani team was led by Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence.

India's Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh and Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Aziz Ahmed had talks on 5-9 April 1974 in New Delhi to discuss the humanitarian issues resulting from

the 1971 war.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 14 September 1974 on several bilateral issues.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks from 11-15 January 1975 in New Delhi on the resumption of shipping services between the two countries.

The Indian Commerce Secretary Y.T. Shah led his trade delegation to have talks with his Pakistani counterpart Ejaz Ahmed Naik from 20-23 January 1975.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi had talks with India's Foreign Minister, Kewal Singh on 15-20 May 1975 at New Delhi on the resumption of overflights.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 12-14 May 1976 to restore diplomatic relations and civil aviation links between the two countries.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 28 June 1976 to restore the rail links between the two countries.

India's Foreign Secretary, J.S. Mehta and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi had talks on 3-6 October 1976 on the design of the Salal Hydro-electric project to be built by India on the river Chenab.

India's Foreign Secretary, J.S. Mehta and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi had a second round of talks on 19-21 October 1976 on the design of the Salal Hydro-electric project.

Indian Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi and General Zia-ul-Haq from 6-8 February 1978 at Islamabad.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi had talks with Indian Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee from 10-14 April 1978 at New Delhi.

The Commerce Secretaries' of India and Pakistan had talks from 6-8 May 1978, to review the trade relations between the two countries.

Indian Commerce Secretary, C.R. Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib and Pakistani Commerce Secretary, Izharul Haque had a second round of trade talks from 7-9 October 1978 at Islamabad.

Indian Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathe had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, S. Shahnawaz on 5-7 February 1980 in Islamabad.

Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh had talks with his Pakistani counterpart from 10-14 April 1980 in Islamabad.

Pakistani Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi had talks with the Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao from 15-17 July 1980 in New Delhi on several issues.

The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met in Colombo on 21-24 April 1981 at the meeting of South Asian States discussing the proposal of SARC.

Indian Foreign Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao had talks with Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in Islamabad on 8-12 June 1981 on the arms procurement policies of the two countries.

The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met in Kathmandu on 2-4 November 1981 at the SARC meeting.

Pakistani Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi had talks with Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao on 29 January-2 February 1982 in New Delhi on several issues.

A senior official of India's Ministry of External Affairs, Natwar Singh visited Pakistan from 29 May-1 June 1982 as a special emissary of Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

Indian Foreign Secretary, M. Rasgotra had talks with his Pakistani counterpart and Foreign Minister,

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan on 11-12 August 1982 in Islamabad.

Indian Foreign Secretary, M. Rasgotra had talks with his Pakistani counterpart on 24 December 1982 in New Delhi on the two draft proposals of No War Pact and Friendship Treaty.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Natwar Singh had talks with the Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq on 18 January 1983 during his visit to Islamabad.

The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met in Dhaka in March 1983 at a SARC meeting.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 10 March 1983 in New Delhi.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad on 1-4 June 1983.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met on 1-3 August 1983 at the meeting of SAARC's Foreign Ministers in New Delhi.

The two Sub-Commissions on Trade and Economic Matters of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission met at Islamabad from 7-10 January 1984.

Indian Foreign Secretary, M. Rasgotra had talks with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik in New Delhi in March 1984.

Indian Foreign Secretary, M. Rasgotra had talks with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik in Islamabad from 19-23 May 1984.

Indian Minister of Information and Broadcasting, H.K.L. Bhagat had talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Raja Mohammed Zafarul Haq in Islamabad from 7-11 July 1984.

India's Foreign Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan on 10-11 July 1984, where the two were attending the meeting of SAARC Foreign

Ministers.

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met at Malé from 7-9 February 1985 at the third meeting of the SAARC Standing Committee.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari had talks with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz A. Naik in Islamabad from 4-6 April 1985.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan had talks with the Indian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Khurshid Alam Khan at New Delhi from 17-22 April 1985, on the occasion of the NAM Ministerial Conference.

The two countries' Foreign Secretaries met at Thimpu from 10-14 May 1985 at the SARC Standing Committee meeting.

The two countries' Foreign Ministers met in Thimpu from 13-14 May 1985 at the SARC Foreign Ministers meeting.

The Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission met in New Delhi from 2-4 July 1985.

The Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik had talks with the Indian Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari from 30 July-1 August 1985 at New Delhi, to resume their talks on the No War Pact and Friendship Treaty proposals.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 19 October 1985 on the health and family welfare issues in New Delhi.

Indian Foreign Secretary I.S. Teja called on Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq on 3 December 1985.

An 18-member Indian women entrepreneurs' delegation called on President Zia-ul-Haq on 3 December 1985.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met at Dhaka on 7-8 December 1985, at the SAARC Foreign Ministers meeting.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 17 December 1985 in New Delhi.

Pakistan's Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs, Dr. Mahbubul Haq had talks with the Indian Minister of Finance, V.P. Singh and Indian Minister of Commerce, Arjun Singh on 10 January 1986 in New Delhi to discuss the possibility of setting up joint ventures with India in free trade zones and increase the Indo-Pak trade.

Indian Defence Secretary, S.K. Bhatnagar led a five-member team to Rawalpindi on 10-12 January 1986 for talks on the Siachin glacier issue.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari came to Lahore on 16-21 January 1986 to resume dialogue on Pakistan's proposal of a Non-Aggression Pact and the Indian Proposal of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

Meetings of Sub-Commission III and IV, set up under the India-Pakistan Joint Commission were held on 4-5 February 1986 in Islamabad.

Indian Secretary of Agricultural Research held talks with the Agricultural Research Centre, Islamabad on 5 February 1986, on the likely areas of collaboration between the two countries in the field of agricultural research.

A four-member Pakistani team came to India on 9 February 1986 for taking part in a four week workshop on regional planning being held in Aurangabad from 28 February.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad on 2-4 April 1986 at the Ministerial meeting of SAARC countries.

The Foreign Ministers of the two countries met in New Delhi on 18 April 1986.

The Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz A. Naik had talks with his Indian counterpart on 19 April 1986 in New Delhi.

The Defence Secretaries' of India and Pakistan had talks on the Siachin glacier issue on 11-12 June 1986 in New Delhi.

The delegations of agricultural experts of India and Pakistan had one week-long talks concluding on 4 July 1986 in New Delhi.

Indian Foreign Minister, Shiv Shankar had an informal meeting with Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq on 3 September 1986 at Harare where they were attending 8th NAM summit meeting.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan met the Indian Foreign Minister, N.D. Tiwari on 14 November 1986.

The Directors-General-of-Military-Operations' of India and Pakistan talked to each other on the hotline on 17 November 1986 about the Indian military exercise Brasstacks.

The Directors-General-of-Military-Operations of India and Pakistan again talked to each other on the hotline on 2 December 1986 about the Indian military exercise Brasstacks.

Indian Home Secretary, C.G. Somiah had talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. S.K. Mahmud in Islamabad from 19-21 December 1986.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar had talks with the Indian Foreign Secretary, A.P. Venkateshwaran in Islamabad on 27 December 1986.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan met the Indian Foreign Minister, N.D. Tiwari in New Delhi on 14 January 1987.

The Directors-General-of-Military-Operations' of India and Pakistan established contact over the hotline

in the last week of January about the Indian military exercise Brasstacks.

A three-member Pakistani delegation came to New Delhi on 19 January to participate in the International Congress of Public Enterprises, commencing on 20 February 1987.

Indian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Natwar Singh met Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Dr. Humanyun Khan met on 30 January 1987 to discuss matters relating to de-escalation of the current border tension between the two countries.

The five-member Pakistani team led by the Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar had talks with the Indian Foreign Secretary, Alfred Gonslaves from 1-4 February in New Delhi, on de-escalation of the border tensions and pull-out of both sides' troops.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Alfred Gonslaves had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar on 26 February-1 March at Islamabad to discuss concrete measures further de-escalation of situation on common border stretching from Shakargarh to Rann of Kutch.

A three member delegation of Urban Development Organization of Pakistan led by KDA Director, Z.A. Nizami, met the Indian Minister of State for Urban Development on 27 March 1987 in New Delhi.

The Indo-Pakistan Committee on drug trafficking and smuggling was held its first meeting in New Delhi, concluding on 27 March 1987.

India's Director-general of the Narcotics Control Bureau, B.V. Kumar had its first meeting with the Chairman of the Pakistan Narcotics Board, D. Nazeemuddin in the last week of March 1987.

The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met on 16 June in New Delhi at the meeting of the SAARC Standing committee.

India's Foreign Minister, N.D. Tiwari met his Pakistani counterpart, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan on 18-19 June 1987 in New Delhi at the meeting of the SAARC Foreign Ministers.

The Civil Aviation authorities of the two countries met in August 1987 to discuss the possibility of strengthening air routes between various destinations in the subcontinent.

The Indian and Pakistani delegations met in Lahore on 8 September 1987 to frame the new border guidelines to deal with problems relating to smuggling, illegal border crossing and illicit arms trade between the two countries.

Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan on 1 October in New York where the two were attending UN General Assembly session. They discussed bilateral trade and the Afghanistan issue.

India's Planning Secretary, J.S. Baijal had talks with Pakistan's Commerce Secretary Rafique A. Akhund on 10 December 1987 at New Delhi.

Pakistani delegation led by Anis Ahmed, Joint Secretary (Maritime) Ministry of Defence had talks with the Indian delegation led by Indira Mishra, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs at Islamabad on 12 February 1988.

A three-member Indian team led by the former Minister of State for External Affairs, Samrandra Kundu visited Pakistan on a eight days visit concluding on 22 February 1988.

The third round of Indo-Pakistan inter-governmental talks on Tulbul navigation project were held in Islamabad from 23-24 February 1988.

Indian Foreign Secretary, K.P.S. Menon went to Pakistan on 1 March 1988 as a special emissary of India's Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and had talks with Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq on the Afghanistan issue.

The railway delegations of the two countries' had talks on 8 April 1988.

Indian Foreign Secretary, K.P.S. Menon had talks with his Pakistani counterpart on 2 May 1988 in

Islamabad.

Indian Home Secretary, C.G. Somiah and Pakistani Home Secretary, S.K. Mahmud had talks on 14-16 May 1988 to prevent cross-border terrorism, illegal border crossings and smuggling of arms and narcotics.

Indian Defence Secretary, S.K. Bhatnagar and Pakistani Defence Secretary, Syed Ijlal Haider Zaidi had talks from 18-20 May 1988 in Islamabad on the Siachin glacier dispute.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met on 26-30 May 1988 in Havana where the two were attending the NAM Foreign Ministers meeting.

Indian Foreign Secretary, K.P.S. Menon and Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar had talks from 31 May-2 June 1988 in New Delhi on a wide range of bilateral issues

Indian Defence Secretary, S.K. Bhatnagar and Pakistani Defence Secretary, Syed Ijlal Haider Zaidi had talks from 20-24 September 1988 in New Delhi on the Siachin glacier dispute.

Two day talks between India and Pakistan took place on 4-5 October 1988 in Islamabad on the Wullar Barrage Tulbul Navigation Project.

Indian Commerce Minister, Dinesh Singh had talks with his Pakistani counterpart on 6 October 1988 in Islamabad.

Three-day talks between India and Pakistan took place on 28-31 March in New Delhi on the Wullar Barrage Tulbul Navigation Project.

Pakistan's Interior Minister Aitzaz Hasan visited New Delhi in April 1989 and had talks with his Indian counterpart on cross-border terrorism.

Indian Home Secretary, J.A. Kalyana Krishnan had talks with Pakistan's Interior Secretary, S.K. Mahmud on 24 May 1989 in Islamabad on measures preventing smuggling of arms and narcotics and illegal border

crossings.

Indian Minister of State for Civil Aviation and Tourism, Shivraj Patil and his Pakistani counterpart, Yusuf Raza Gilani had talks in New Delhi in May 1989.

India and Pakistan had five-day boundary talks in New Delhi, concluding on 4 June 1989.

The Heads of Pakistan Rangers and India's Border Security Force had talks on 7 June 1989 on joint patrolling of the border.

The Defence Secretaries' of India and Pakistan had talks on 14-17 June 1989 in Rawalpindi on the Siachin glacier dispute.

Indian Foreign Secretary, S.K. Singh had talks with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Dr. Humayun Khan on 18 June 1989 in Islamabad.

The army delegations of the two countries (The Indian delegation led by the Director-General-of-Military-Operations, Lt. General V.K. Singh and Pakistani delegation led by the Director-General Joint Staffs (Hq) Lt. general Imtiaz Warrich) met in New Delhi from 11-13 July 1989 for discussions on establishing a joint military committee to determine the ground positions in the Siachin glacier area.

The delegations of India and Pakistan had talks in Islamabad on 16 July 1989.

The four Sub-Commissions of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission had their third meeting in Islamabad from 17-19 July 1989.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan had talks with Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao on 23-24 July 1989 in New Delhi.

Indian Foreign Secretary, S.K. Singh met Pakistani Foreign Secretary Dr. Humayun Khan on 7 November 1989 in Islamabad at the meeting of the SAARC Standing Committee.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad on 8-9 November 1989, at the meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers.

Indian military delegation was invited to observe Pakistan's military exercise Zarb-i-Momin in December 1989.

A bi-annual meeting between the Inspector-General of the Indian Border Security Force, Amitabh Gupta and the Director-General of the Pakistani Rangers, Major General Naseer Ahmed Khan took place in December 1989.

Abdul Sattar came to New Delhi on 8-10 January 1990, as a special envoy of Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto and had his Indian counterpart, S.K. Singh, India's External Affairs Minister, I.K. Gujral and the Prime Minister, V.P. Singh.

India-Pakistan telecommunications talks took place on 18 January 1990 in Karachi. The Indian side was represented by M.G. Kulkarni, General Manager Ministry of Communication and Pakistan team was led by A.R. Quershi, Chief Engineer (Overseas) Telegraph and Telephone Department. The talks were on expanding co-operation co-ordination in technical and financial matters.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan came to New Delhi on a 3-day visit on 21 January 1990 and had talks with his Indian counterpart, I.K. Gujral and Prime Minister, V.P. Singh.

Indian Foreign Secretary, S.K. Singh talked to his Pakistani counterpart, Tanvir Ahmed Khan over the hotline in the second week of April 1990 about the Pakistani civilians' attempts to cross the Line of Control in Kashmir.

India's Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan on 24 April 1990 in New York on the occasion of the special session of UN General Assembly on international economic cooperation.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey had first round of talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary,

Tanvir Ahmed Khan in Islamabad on 18-19 July 1990, on the seven-point package of Confidence Building Measures proposed by India earlier.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey had second round of talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Tanvir Ahmed Khan in New Delhi on 10-11 August 1990, to discuss further the military Confidence Building Measures.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey had third round of talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan on 20 December 1990 in Islamabad.

The boundary officials of the two countries had talks on 26 March 1991 on the demarcation of the Sir Creek area in the Great Rann of Kutch.

Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey had fourth round of talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan in New Delhi from 4-6 April 1991 on Confidence Building Measures between the two countries.

Indian Foreign Minister, Madhav Singh Solanki met the Pakistani Planning Minister, Hamid Nasir Chatta in Male on 1 July 1991 at the meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers.

Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey had talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan in Male on 1 July 1991 where the two were attending the meeting of the SAARC Standing Committee.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Shahrayar Khan came to New Delhi on 18 August 1991 as a special envoy of the new Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and had talks with senior government leaders in India.

Military delegations of India and Pakistan had talks on 25 September 1991 in Islamabad.

Senior boundary officials of India and Pakistan had talks on 27-28 October 1991, on demarcation of the Sir Creek area in the Great Rann of Kutch.

Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey had fifth round of talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan in Muree from 30-31 October 1991 on Confidence Building Measures between the two countries.

The DGMOs of India and Pakistan established contact on the hotline in the second week of February 1992 and agreed to defuse the tension arising out of JKLF's threats to organize a mass march across the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit had sixth round of talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan from 17-19 August 1992 in New Delhi.

The Defence Secretaries of India and Pakistan had sixth round of talks on 2-4 November 1992 at New Delhi, on the Siachin glacier issue.

Senior boundary officials of India and Pakistan had fifth round of talks on 5-6 November 1992 at New Delhi on the demarcation of Sir Creek area and maritime boundaries in the Great Rann of Kutch.

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives, Annual Register, Asian Recorder, IDSA News Review, POT (Pakistan Opinion Trends) Series, Pakistan Horizon, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, BBC Summary of Broadcasts, Yearbooks on India's Foreign Policy (1982-1991), and various Indian and Pakistani newspapers.

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