

ARAB INTELLECTUALS under the YOUNG TURKS:
A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS on MEMOIRS (1908-1918)

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
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ABSTRACT

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This comparative-historical research aims to explain how and on what basis the attitudes of the Arab intellectual elites changed towards the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces between 1908 and 1918. In order to do this I analyze memoirs of the five leading Arab intellectuals, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Amir Shakib Arslan, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, Salim Ali Selam, and Muhammad Kurd Ali by applying some concepts of Foucault's discourse analysis method. The memoirs, which shed light on the last decade of the Ottoman authority in the Arab provinces, show that as the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its power, Arab intellectual elites became much more concerned about the Peninsula's future.

The research reveals a number of "thresholds," crucial turning points based on the evaluations by the intellectuals in their memoirs, including the alteration of the CUP's policies from being relatively liberal and inclusive into more oppressive, centralist, and nationalist, the breakout of the World War I, Cemal Pasha's strict policies, and the 1916 Arab Revolt played a remarkable role in the transformation of the Arab intellectuals' ideological discourses from Ottomanism to different forms of Arab nationalism.

This thesis is significant not only because it is located at the intersection of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization literature and that of early Arab nationalism but also because it throws light on a very critical decade of the Arabian Peninsula given the fact that it was in this period that the major power configurations were crystallized leading to the emergence of the Modern Middle East.

Key Words: Arab intellectuals, the Committee of Union and Progress, Arab nationalism, World War I, Cemal Pasha, the Arab Revolt.

ÖZ

JÖN TÜRKLER DÖNEMİNDE ARAP ENTELEKTÜELLERİ:
HATIRATLAR ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI TARİHSEL BİR ANALİZ
(1908-1918)

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Arap entelektüel elitlerinin, 1908-1918 tarihleri arasında Arap vilayetlerindeki Osmanlı yönetimi hakkındaki tutumlarının nasıl ve hangi temellere dayanarak değiştiğini açıklamayı hedefleyen bu çalışmada karşılaştırmalı tarihsel araştırma yöntemi izlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda beş önemli Arap entelektüelinin, Muhammed Reşid Rıza, Emir Şekip Arslan, Muhammed İzzet Derveze, Selim Ali Selam ve Muhammed Kürd Ali, hatıraları Foucault'nun söylem analizi kavramlarından yararlanılarak analiz edilmiştir.

Arap vilayetlerindeki Osmanlı otoritesinin son on yılına ışık tutan hatıratlar göstermektedir ki Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun gücünü giderek yitirmesi Arap entellektüel elitlerinin yarımadanın geleceği konusunda kaygılarını arttırmıştır. Bu çalışmada sözü geçen entellektüellerin hatıratlarında yer alan şahsi değerlendirmelerinden yola çıkılarak Arab entellektüellerinin ideolojik söylemlerinin

Osmanlıcılıktan Arap milliyetçiliğine dönüşmesinde önemli rol oynayan dört ana “eşik”, dönüm noktası tanımlanmıştır: İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’nin görece liberal ve kapsayıcı politikalarının kısa zamanda baskıcı, merkeziyetçi ve milliyetçi hale gelmesi, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın patlak vermesi, Cemal Paşa’nın otoriter politikaları ve 1916 Arap İsyanı.

Bu tezin önemi yalnızca Osmanlı-Türk modernleşmesi ve erken dönem Arap milliyetçiliği literatürlerinin kesişiminde yer almasından değil aynı zamanda Modern Ortadoğu’nun oluşumuna yol açan güç konfigürasyonlarının oluşumunu içermesi dolayısıyla Arap Yarımadası’nın son derece kritik bir on yılına ışık tutmasından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap entellektüelleri, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Arap milliyetçiliği, Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Cemal Paşa, Arap İsyanı.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	v
Öz.....	vii
Acknowledgements.....	ix
Table of Contents.....	x

CHAPTER

1. The Young Turks and Arabs

1.1.Introduction.....	1
1.2.Literature Review.....	3
1.3.Sources & Methodology.....	9
1.4.Historical Background.....	15

2. Narrative Construction in the Memoirs

2.1.Introduction.....	29
2.2.Muhammad Izzat Darwaza.....	30
2.3.Muhammad Kurd Ali.....	35
2.4.Muhammad Rashid Rida ibn Hussein.....	39
2.5.Salim Ali Salam.....	44
2.6.Amir Shakib Arslan.....	53

3. Analyzing the Discursive Transformation

3.1.Introduction.....	63
3.2.The CUP's Policies and the Arab Intellectuals.....	72
3.3.The Impact of World War I and European Colonialism on the Arab Intellectuals.....	83

3.4.Cemal Pasha’s Policies and the Arab Intellectuals.....	96
3.5.The 1916 Arab Revolt and the Arab Intellectuals.....	109
4. Conclusion.....	126
 Bibliography.....	 133

CHAPTER 1

THE YOUNG TURKS and ARABS

1.1. Introduction

It is important for us that you understand our feelings and thoughts about affairs of our state. Although we demand decentralization and prerogatives we lost, we are strongly attached to the reign of the commander of believers (*amir al-mu'minin*) the glorious caliph. Refuting his sovereignty and asking you to come to our state and protect us never occurs to our minds (Selam, 2009: 22).

On June 18, 1913 committees from almost all Arab states gathered in Paris to discuss issues related to the Ottoman Arab provinces. After negotiations they set forth a list of reforms consisting of ten articles to be implemented by the empire in the provinces. The Arab committees submitted their demands through the Ottoman Embassy in Paris. As a representative of Beirut, Salim Ali Selam, once the mayor of Beirut, aiming to clarify their position stated the quotation above to the French officer who was responsible for the Eastern issues. The quotation expresses the position of many of the Arab intellectuals who identified themselves as both Ottoman and Arab until the end of the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces.

This position, however, changed in less than a decade from Ottomanism toward (different forms of) Arab nationalism. The main research question of this research is, “how did the attitudes of an influential group of Arab intellectuals change toward Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces in general and in geographical Syria in particular under the Committee of Union and Progress and why?” In order to respond to this umbrella question, primarily I analyze the memoirs of several Arab intellectuals who happened to experience both the Hamidian and the CUP

(Committee of Union and Progress) periods of the Ottoman Empire as well as the process of the Arab provinces becoming independent states after World War I. The subject matter is worth studying because today's nation-state-based Middle East emerged as a result of the disengagement of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire after World War I. In other words, the destiny of the Middle East was determined during the first decades of the 20th century. Therefore it is essential to look back at this formation period in order to comprehend the social and political conditions of the contemporary Middle Eastern nations, which are experiencing the 'Arab Spring' today. In order to do so I examine the attitudes and perspectives of Arab intellectual elites because they were the middlemen between their societies and the Ottoman authorities as well as the European powers. They were also pioneers who played a role in the creation of the modern Middle East. Furthermore, since the period and actors (the Young Turks as well the Arab intellectual elites) of this research are directly related to the Ottoman-Turkish modernization, this thesis will contribute to our understanding of the latter as well. Finally, I have decided to deal with this problem because I have always been interested in knowing more about the Ottoman modernization and the process of the separation of the Arab provinces (Syria, Hejaz, Beirut, Iraq, and Palestine) from the center.

In order to answer the main research question I also ask some additional questions including the following. "What were the attitudes of the Young Turks towards Arab elites and how did they change?", "What were the policies of the central government in Arab provinces?", "What were the turning points that affected the Arab intellectuals' political-ideological discourses?", "What was the impact of World War I on the crystallization of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces?", "How did European powers, particularly Britain and France, influence the vision of Arab intellectuals regarding Ottoman rule as well as post-Ottoman future?", "How was the ideology of Ottomanism rendered obsolete as Arab nationalism had flourished?", and "How did the notion of caliphate change in the perceptions of Arabs from 1908 to 1918?" I attempt to answer these questions by drawing on historical material and applying sociological methods.

1.2. Literature Review

This thesis is located at the intersection of three literatures: Ottoman Turkish modernization, early period of Arab nationalism, and the Ottoman-Arab relations. Within the first literature there are two main broad perspectives. One of these perspectives sees the modernization process in teleological and dichotomic ways under the influence of “modernization theories,” and the more recent perspective advanced by the scholars who are critical of the simplistic, reductionist, and positivistic explanations of the former paradigm.

The prominent representatives of the first perspective include Bernard Lewis (1961), Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1962), Niyazi Berkes (1957, 1964), and Feroz Ahmad (1993). They view the process of Ottoman Turkish modernization either as a conflict between the modernists and reactionaries or a struggle between the “forces of change” and those of “tradition” of which Islam is a segment. Lewis’s study on Turkish modernization (1961) is a narrative of an essential conflict between reformers who were pro-Western modernists and reactionaries who were anti-Western traditionalists. According to Lewis, it was Western-oriented ideas that “gave a new impetus and a new direction to the young officers and officials, and led to the successive constitutional and popular movements of 1876, 1908, and 1920” (p. 481). Thus, for Lewis Turkish modernization is a process of adopting Western institutions and life styles. According to Ardiç (2012, 16) Lewis’s reductionist account “labels the opposition to different modernizing ‘reforms’ as the ‘resistance by reactionary conservatives,’ paying little attention to their political and economic aspects”.

Tunaya (1962), too, considers Islam a reaction to modernizing reforms in the Turkish modernization process. Moreover according to Tunaya Ottoman modernization was a civilizational change because “Western civilization is the dominant one...it is a matter of survival to enter Western civilization” (Tunaya, 1981: 111). Berkes (1957, 1998) also sees the Ottoman Turkish secularization as a conflict between the “forces of tradition” and those of “change”. He asserts that the first steps of Ottoman modernization had been taken in the 17th century, but it accelerated and took on the new dimensions in the 19th and 20th centuries, which led to secularization and westernization. An age long changing process in Turkey has

culminated in the establishment of the principle of secularism in modern Turkey (Berkes, 1997). Moreover, he portrays the secularization process as a shift from backwardness of the Middle Ages to the modern world and as becoming part of the Western civilization, which is the final stage of human development. Similarly, Feroz Ahmad (1993) argues that Turkish modernization was a product of conflict between two opposing groups: reformers and reactionaries. Ahmad's simplistic binary opposition account is discernible in his recent work in which he argues that after the proclamation of the republic, "Republicanism and nationalism were adopted by everyone except reactionaries who still yearned for an Ottoman restoration" (Ahmad, 1993: 63).

Challenging this reductionist and dichotomous perspective, a number of recent studies (Kara 1998, 2001, 2003, Karpat 2000, 2001, Mardin 1962, 1994, 2003, Zürcher 1993) have approached to the Ottoman Turkish modernization as a very complex and dialectical process. While the former perspective focused on ruptures between the Ottoman and Republican periods, the latter emphasized the continuities as well as ruptures. My dissertation sides with the latter perspective. Opposing the idea of identifying conflicting groups in the modernization process Karpat (2000, 2001) argues that what Ottoman reformists had done was a reconciliation of Islam and reforms. Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks who brought about wide range of modernizing changes in the Ottoman territory adopted Islamist and Ottomanist policies as well as Turkist ones. In terms of bureaucratic tradition, statist mentality and educational policies of the Ottoman and Republican phases are compatible with one another. In a similar fashion Erik Jan Zürcher (1993) stresses on the continuity rather than the rupture between the Ottoman and Turkish Republic. Şerif Mardin (1962, 2003) also underlines the issue of continuity as well drawing attention to the similarity between the policies of reformers and of so-called reactionaries. According to Mardin (1994: 163), "in Sultan Abdulhamid II's (1876-1909) views, religion took the place of nationalism, but his main theme was the same as that of his liberal enemies: Adopt the technology, reject the mores". Moreover, Mardin strongly emphasizes the importance of Islam in the fabric of the Turkish society and the inability of the Kemalist secular culture to provide patterns as alternatives to the widely used Islamic idiom (Mardin, 1994). According to Mardin Islam is significant for Turkish society because it provides patterns for Turkish Muslims to follow in all

spheres, as seen below

Kemalist secular culture left these pockets of Turkish culture empty in the sense that it consisted only of general injunctions to take the West as an example. It provided no equivalent for the widely used Islamic idiom, it did not understand the degree to which existing space-time configurations were rooted and it had no strategies of the quotidian to offer the masses (Mardin, 1994: 164).

Similarly, İsmail Kara highlights the significance of Islam as a source of legitimation in the Ottoman Turkish modernization process in his work. Kara (1998, 2001) goes further and claims that modernization indeed increased the importance of Islam in Turkey. To him, in Turkey modernization and Islamization took place simultaneously (Kara, 2003). This second group of intellectuals have thus emphasized the chaotic and complex nature of Ottoman Turkish modernization.

The second body of literature I draw on is the study of early Arab nationalism. This literature, too, is mainly comprised of two phases. The first contains the writings of those who took part in the initial stages of the movement and their contemporaries including As'ad Dagher, Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Amin Sa'id, Sati-'al-Husri, and George Antonius. They either observed or took part in the events of the pre-1920 period. Among these authors George Antonius (1938) argued in his classic, *The Arab Awakening*, that Arab nationalism can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century: initially liberal Christian and Muslim Arab intellectuals who were exposed to the influence of missionaries expressed Arab national consciousness in Beirut.

The second phase “included the first scholarly attempts to revise, build upon, or contradict the thesis of these first chroniclers of the history of Arab nationalism” (Khalidi, 1991: 50). The revisionist historians wrote in the 1950s and 1960s re-evaluating the early historians' explanations of Arab nationalism. Scholars such as C. Ernest Dawn (1991), Albert Hourani (1981a), Abdel Latif Tibawi (1969), Elie Kedourie (1974), Zeine N. Zeine (1973), Sylvia Haim (1962), Rashid Khalidi (1991), and Philip Khoury (1983) conducted research on Arab intellectuals, diplomatic sources, local archives, and journals. This revisionist effort has led to the refinement of our view of Arab nationalism and also the reassessment of Antonius's account of the development of Arab nationalism.

The younger generation expressed considerable disagreement with Antonius's view of the nature of Arab nationalism in the early period. Challenging Antonius's notion of liberal and secular Arab awakening, Zeine Zeine (1973) emphasized the importance of Islam in the emergence of Arab political consciousness. For him the separation of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire was also a consequence of the Turkish nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which "was manifested in the press and in laws requiring the sole use of Turkish in the administration, the courts and the schools" (Dawn 1991, p. 12). Khalidi (1991), who takes Zionism into account as well, Sharabi (1970) and Tibawi (1969) also see Young Turk policy as a major cause of Arab nationalism.

Unlike other revisionist scholars, Elie Kedourie (1974) and Sylvia Haim (1962) depict Arab nationalism "as having been created by the spread of European theological and political doctrines that weakened the hold of Islam and Christianity" (Dawn 1991, p. 9). Moreover, they believe that Arab nationalism was imported from the West during World War I, and that there was no "serious attempt to define its meaning" until the 1930s. In the literature there is a debate on the role of Christians in the development of Arab nationalism in early period. Since there is no Christian Arab intellectual among my cases I do not touch upon this issue.

Albert Hourani (1981a) also questioned the allegations of Antonius underlining the role of the modernist Islam affected by the "Western" emphasis on "reason" in the development of Arab consciousness. For him Islamic modernist ideas contributed to the enhancement of Arab consciousness. Hourani argues that historically "there were no lines of exclusion which kept the Arabs out of the Ottoman state and society" before the 20th century (Hourani, 1981a: 10).

Like Hourani, Ernest Dawn argues that Islamic modernism, represented by such intellectuals as al-Afghani and Rida (the latter is among my primary sources), contributed substantially to the emergence of Arabism, which was indeed not a response to the CUP's Turkish-nationalist conducts (Dawn, 1991). Unlike Hourani, however, Dawn argues that the ideological foundations of Arabism were well established before 1908; nevertheless, it remained an ideology of the Arab elites rather than a popular one until the demise of the empire. According to Dawn emergence of Arab nationalism is a "result of intra-Arab elite conflict, specifically

being an opposition movement of Syrian notables directed primarily against rival Syrian notables who were satisfied with and occupied positions in the Ottoman government, an opposition that remained a minority until 1918” (Dawn, 1991: 11-12). Therefore, for Dawn the belief that Arab nationalism gained strength as a reaction to CUP’s nationalist policies is nothing but a tradition generated by European diplomats (particularly British) and Arab nationalists themselves.

Challenging Dawn’s “elitist” arguments, Rashid Khalidi claims that leading figures of Arab nationalism were from a growing middle class of merchants, intellectuals, and lower-level bureaucrats in Syrian cities during the second constitutional period (Khalidi, 1991). He also argues that the public sphere in the Mediterranean port cities such as Jerusalem and Beirut catalyzed the growth of popular Arabism. More recently, Khalidi et al. have examined various aspects of Arab nationalism from different angles (Khalidi et al, 1991). Khalidi is ambiguous but seems to believe that Arabism had become the majority movement by 1914. In a similar fashion, Sharabi and Tibi reject the idea that Arabism originated from Islamic modernism (Sharabi, 1970; Tibi, 1997).

As part of the Ottoman-Arab relations literature Hasan Kayalı, aiming to go beyond established paradigms of Arab nationalism, underscores the need to study Arab nationalism with an integrative approach that considers both the local perspective and the central government one (Kayalı, 1997). In his book, *The Young Turks and Arabs*, Kayalı’s main proposition is that because of strong religious linkages “among the chief Muslim groups of the Ottoman Empire, political nationalism was not a viable force until the end of World War I” (Kayalı, 1998: 13). Kayalı argues as well that the Young Turks’ so-called nationalist policies did not lead to Arab nationalism but it was possibly the introduction of mass politics, a liberal press, and greater educational opportunities that led to the rise of ethnic consciousness among certain groups. On the other hand, he indicates that the CUP policies were perceived to be Pan-Turkist even though they were not so.

Dealing with Cemal Pasha’s Syrian governorate years Talha Çiçek underscores that Cemal Pasha aimed to further the centralization by eliminating the “barriers” for a direct control of the state over its citizens in Syria (Çiçek, 2012). For this purpose Cemal Pasha first dealt with Arab nationalism and exiled some of the

Arabist notables and executed others in order to “prevent any demand of autonomy or independence during the peace negotiations after the War” (Çiçek, 2012: 405). He also intervened with his “iron fist” in the other autonomous groups such as Zionists, the Christian clergy and the autonomous Government of Lebanon. He tried to modernize the cities and also established new educational institutions to Ottomanize the minds of the people in Syria. To construct the Ottomans as the other atrocities of Cemal Pasha were utilized during the nationalization process in Syria after the WWI (Çiçek, 2012).

Like Kayalı and Çiçek, Özgür Kavak addresses in his study both Ottoman-Turkish modernization and Arab nationalism literatures. Kavak examines the emergence of modern Islamic thought particularly modern Islamic jurisprudence, focusing on the case of Rashid Rida (1865-1935), one of the leading modernist Muslim thinkers, whose ideas have been influential in the Muslim world including Turkey (Kavak, 2011). Kavak analyzes the transformation of Islamic jurisprudence from traditional to modern form in the modernization process in the Muslim world by examining how Rashid Rida redefined some key concepts in Islamic law and philosophy disturbing traditional hierarchies, and emphasizing the idea of ‘reform’ in these areas in his writings in *al-Manar* journal (Kavak, 2011).

On the other hand, aiming to study contemporary Arab intellectuals’ ontology and “the socio-cultural factors which determine their status, power, prestige and respectability” M’hammed Sabour, analyzes the social and intellectual status of Arab intellectuals in Arab society and the ways in which they reflexively conceptualize themselves (Sabour, 2001: ix). He thus examines Arab intellectuals’ own perception of changes in their status through Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, habitus and field. For his research he conducted interviews with fifty academics from Syria, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco (Sabour, 2001).

More recently, using a comparative-historical method Ardiç (2012) “examines the process of secularization in the Middle East in the early 20th century through an analysis of the debates over the transformation and abolition of Islamic Caliphate” (Ardiç, 2012: xi). Ardiç analyzes the discourses of “secularists”, “modernists” and “traditionalists” related to the notion of caliphate by using both primary and secondary sources. As part of this analysis he not only deals with the

secularization in the caliphal center, but also the colonization in the caliphal periphery during 1914-1920. The concept of Caliphate in the Middle East, India, north and northwest Africa was located at the center of international politics, domestic power relations and circumstances brought by World War I therefore it was vulnerable to manipulations of all sorts. Utilizing the concept of ‘accommodation’ to explain the attitudes of the Ottoman Islamists & secularists towards modernization, he also demonstrates the ways in which “Islamic discourse was secularized by both Islamists and secularists” (Ardıç, 2012: xi).

As we refer to some of the three literatures studies that deal with the Ottoman Arab relationship in the process of the modernization or the impact of the Ottoman modernization in the Arabian Peninsula are quite rare. While Ottoman modernization literature generally concentrates on the imperial center, Arab nationalism literature’s main concern is the origins and development of Arab nationalism. Thus, as explained above, some scholars emphasize the CUP’s Turkish nationalist attitudes towards the Arabian Peninsula. Except a few works (Kayalı, 1998; Sabour, 2001; Kavak, 2011; Ardıç, 2012; Çiçek, 2012) little has been said about the relationship between the Arab nationalism and Ottoman Turkish modernization. Thus, this thesis aims to help fill this gap in literature by analyzing the attitudes of a number of leading Arab intellectuals toward modernization strengthening centralization of the empire.

1.3. Sources & Methodology

In order to analyze the attitudes of the Arab intellectual elites towards the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces between 1908 and 1918, I analyze the memoirs of the five leading intellectuals, including, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Amir Shakib Arslan, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, Salim Ali Selam, and Muhammad Kurd Ali. These memoirs were recently translated from Arabic to Turkish and for my thesis I use their Turkish versions. Thus, in giving references I use Turkish versions of the authors’ names. Shakib Arslan’s memoir is an autobiography covering between 1869 and 1920. The Arabic version of his autobiography, *Siratu Zatiyya*, was published in Beirut in 1969. Likewise, Kurd Ali’s memoir is a kind of autobiography named as *al-Muzakkirat*, was published in Damascus in 1948. Salim Ali Selam’s memoir was

prepared by Dr. Hassan Ali Hallak based on Salam's manuscripts protected in the Beirut American University. The memoir includes the original text written by Salam as well as Hallak's comments, which include some explanations about Salam's activities between 1918 and 1938, as well as photographs and relevant documents. The Arabic version of his memoir, *Mudhakkiratu Salim Ali Salam*, was published in Beirut in 1982. Finally, Darwaza's memoir that was translated to Turkish is a compilation of the parts that were extracted from his voluminous memoir, *Mudhakkiratu Muhammad Izzat Darwaza*, published in Beirut in 1993. In the case of Rashid Rida I refer to Rashid Rida's writings that consist of travel notes taken during his trips to Syria, Istanbul, India, and the Hejaz between 1908 and 1918. These notes were published in his *al-Manar* journal while Rida was on the journey. Kavak, the translator of Rida's notes, compiled some parts of his journey notes that were published in *al-Manar*. Indeed, other than these notes Rida wrote a memoir, *al-Manâr ve'l-Ezher*, soon before his death but because this memoir has not been yet translated into Turkish and because the journey notes cover exactly the period I focus on in my thesis I refer to these notes to analyze Rida's ideological and political discourse. I utilize the secondary literature in order to fill the gaps that are left by his travel notes.

As I restricted my research to the Arabian Peninsula particularly Syria, Beirut, and the Hejaz and to the CUP period I selected these five intellectuals who were from the Arabian Peninsula focusing on this period in their memoirs. At this point it is necessary to highlight that in the context of this thesis "Arabian Peninsula" refers to the Hejaz and "Geographical Syria" – a term used by scholars such as Albert Hourani- which includes western part of the "Fertile Crescent" or the lands that became Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, and Jordan (and also some parts of Turkey) today.

Furthermore, studying these memoirs is important because these intellectuals took part either directly or indirectly in politics of the time as a member of Ottoman parliament, as a journalist or as an activist who had an influential status in the Arab provinces. First one of these intellectuals is Rashid Rida (1865-1835), a prominent disciple of Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who contributed to the modern Islamist political thought. In collaboration with M. Abduh he launched *al-Manar*, an influential journal in Istanbul as well as in the Arab provinces. The second

is Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), a Druze prince (*amir*), who was a politician, poet, writer, and historian who advocated that the survival of the Ottoman Empire was the only safeguard for the unity of Muslims and for resisting against the imperial powers. The third is Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984), a Palestinian writer, activist, and post officer who struggled for Arab nationalism during his lifetime. The fourth one, Salim Ali Salam (1908-1918) was a pro-Ottoman politician advocating decentralization and administrative reforms in the Arab world. He was a member of the Ottoman parliament as a representative of Beirut during World War I. Finally the fifth actor is Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953), Syrian-born linguist, historian, and of Kurdish origin. He wrote for *al-Muqtataf* journal, edited newspapers of *al-Mu'ayyad* and *al-Zaher* and established *al-Muqtabas*, a monthly magazine, in 1906. After 1909 Revolution he also established the first daily newspaper of Damascus, *al-Muqtabas*.

In terms of the method this dissertation is based on qualitative research adopting comparative historical analysis whose ultimate objective is to grasp “causal regularities across sets of historical cases” (Skocpol, 1979; 39). As Skocpol states “‘comparative history’ is commonly used rather loosely to refer to any and all studies in which two or more historical trajectories of nation-states, institutional complexes, or civilizations are juxtaposed” (Skocpol, 1979; 36). In my thesis having the memoirs of the five Arab intellectuals as unit of analysis I focus on micro-social phenomena, by trying to connect them to macro-level processes and locating them into the wider historical-sociological context from a comparative perspective. My micro-level analysis also provides clues for an understanding of more macro units. Indeed, providing considerable amount of details about the issues and events such as World War I, the Arab Revolt, and Arab nationalism, which had played momentous role in transforming the Ottoman Arab provinces into the Modern Middle East in the early 20th century, the memoirs I examine make significant references to the macro historical trajectories of the “nation-states” of today’s Middle East. Moreover, shedding light on the social and political processes in which Arab nationalism crystallized paving way for the ideological and actual separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the empire, the memoirs demonstrate how the dramatic power shifts at the macro level influenced the Arab intellectuals’ political discourse and vice versa. Though more historical than comparative, this study nevertheless examine in a

comparative fashion different points of view, political positions and ideological discourses as well as the different socio-historical context that produced these differences.

In my examination, I collect the data from the memoirs and then I analyze these first-hand accounts in order to comprehend how and on what basis the perceptions, views, and positions of Arab elites had transformed in accordance with the socio-political conditions between 1908 and 1918 and policies of the central government during the reign of the CUP. In this regard memoirs are valuable sources in understanding the past and today due to the wide range of details they give. Explaining events of the time from a micro level, memoirs provide us with an insight on the process through which Arab intellectuals' ideological discourses had transformed from Ottomanism to Arab nationalism.

I analyze the memoirs in two stages. In the first phase I employ narrative analysis focusing on the content of narratives told by authors in their memoirs. Descriptions of the contents give us an idea about the authors' backgrounds and experiences between 1908 and 1918 equipping us with necessary details both for examining and comparing their ideological discourses.

In the next phase I not only examine the memoirs through a discourse analysis based on Foucault's approach but also compare the five Arab intellectuals' discourses on the issues such as the Ottoman administration, Cemal Pasha's policies towards Syrians, the Arab Revolt, European campaigns, the notion of Arab caliphate, and the famine.

Comparing the intellectuals by referring to their discourses constructed in their memories is significant to appreciate the diversity of the approaches to the same issues and events that took place in the Arabian Peninsula between 1908 and 1918. Each of the five intellectuals came from diverse socio-economic backgrounds and had different occupations, thus holding different political and ideological positions in their respective communities. For instance, Salam, Arslan, and Kurd Ali had close links to the inner circle of the Ottoman administration in Istanbul due to the occupations and positions they held whereas the relationships of Rida and Darwaza, particularly the latter, with the government were not very strong. Moreover, except for Rashid Rida who was born in Syria but moved to Egypt in 1897, all the Arab

intellectuals I analyze in this thesis were from the Arabian Peninsula. However, each of them was from different regions living under different social, political, and economic conditions and dealing with varied issues. Furthermore, comparing these five intellectuals demonstrates how all these differentiations were influential in shaping their approaches towards the Ottoman rule as well as their general ideological discourses.

As the above description implies, my second main method is discourse analysis. Analyzing discourse is useful because discourses

both affect, and are affected by, social developments, thereby functioning as indicators of social change. That is, **they** both reflect changes in social reality and help shape them, by making sense of this very reality for individuals and groups, thereby informing their decisions, actions and reactions. For they provide cognitive and social lenses through which to perceive one's social environment which in turn influences the ranges and angles of these lenses. Furthermore, discourses not only affect actors' dispositions, but also justify their positions – and undermine their opponents' – in social struggles (Ardıç, 2012: 33).

Though I do not fully apply the Foucaultian discourse analysis, I use as methodological tools some concepts he provides, particularly those of “threshold”, “analysis of descent”, and the “analysis of historical emergence”. In his archeological approach Foucault identifies four types of threshold through which scientific discursive formation develop: positivity, epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization. In my study, I identify a number of crucial events, serving as thresholds that heavily affected the transformation of actors' discourses (see below).

In his analysis of genealogy, Foucault underscores ‘the analysis of descent’ that “dissolves unity and identity to reveal the multiplicity of events which lie behind historical beginnings. It rejects the lazy assumption of unbroken continuity linking phenomena and instead seeks to preserve the dispersion associated with events” (Smart, 2002: 49). As the second aspect of genealogy, Foucault considers ‘the analysis of historical emergence’, “conceptualized not as the culmination of events, or as the end of a process of development but rather as a particular momentary manifestation of ‘the hazardous play of dominations’” (Smart, 2002: 50). Moreover, the analysis of historical emergence

embraces the confrontation, the conflicts, and the systems of subjection of which emergent historical forms are but temporary manifestations, furthermore within this scheme of things there is no place for a constituting subject, for 'no one is responsible for an emergence', it is merely an effect of the play of dominations (Smart, 2002: 50).

Using the Foucaultian concept of 'threshold' I identify, as mentioned some turning points and thresholds, such as World War I and the Arab Revolt, which led to the ideological repositioning of Arab elites and transformation of their discourses from Ottomanism to Arab nationalism. Through an analysis of descent and that of historical emergence I show the multiplicity of the stands and ideological affiliations, various dimensions of the events, and finally a wide-ranging social, political and economic factors and key political developments which led to the transformation in the attitudes of Arab intellectuals in the first quarter of the 20th century.

Finally, I need to point out a methodological issue that arises out of the fact that the memoirs -with the exception of Rashid Rida's- were written after World War I years later than the events they discuss. Thus, these intellectuals might have changed their ideological stances due to the new positions they began to hold under the mandate administrations in the Arabian Peninsula. In other words, there is a possibility that the authors might have reevaluated the events they witnessed or participated during the period 1908-1918 in the light of the political developments in the region after the Great War. So the memoirs might reflect their attitudes towards the same issues differently than before. On the other hand, as the Arab intellectuals wrote their memoirs under no pressure after the Ottoman authority ended in the Arabian Peninsula, they might have been able to reflect their exact thoughts about the Ottoman rule in the region as well. For instance, Muhammad Kurd Ali, a Syrian journalist, wrote his memoirs *al-Muzakkirat* in 1948. If he wrote them in the first quarter of the 20th century, he might not have been able to reflect his thoughts freely due to the political oppression exerted by the CUP at the time. Thus, for instance Kurd Ali's writings in *al-Muqtabas* newspaper, which had been published with Cemal Pasha's financial support during the Great War, may not be as "genuine" as his memoirs.

A final note on the methodology of this thesis that needs to be made is about the technique with which I have examined the memoirs. Aiming to facilitate handling 1500 pages of data I have used a qualitative research software program, Nvivo. After downloading softcopies of the memoirs into this software, I have read each memoir carefully. While reading I have not only taken note of key points but I also come up with various codes revealing the intellectuals' views on any given issue or event. These tags (codes) have enabled me to reach any issue or topic easily while examining the narratives and the discourses of the Arab intellectuals. . Furthermore, the program helped me with grasping the relationship between the codes.

1.4. Historical Background

The rising industrialization, capitalism, economic and political imperialism led to the social, economic, and political changes of the agriculture-based societies including the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. In addition to territorial, social, and political transformations, the empire also faced a great deal of internal unrest caused by ethnic tensions and international pressures due to its Christian communities. Facing the rise of Europe the Ottoman government attempted to make wide range of reforms, which required it to become more centralized than ever. With centralization the number of civil servants increased and bureaucracy gradually turned into a power center.

The first reforms were made in military culminating in the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 by Mahmud II, whose “reforms paved the way for the Tanzimat (Reforms) period (1839-1876) that brought deeper and more lasting changes” (Ardıç, 2012: 42). This era began with the promulgation of Royal Decree of Gülhane on 3 November 1839, promising equal rights to Ottoman Christians to terminate the nationalist and separatist movements among non-Muslim communities of the empire. In the short term the edict realized this objective (Zürcher, 2003). With the edict new commercial laws, enabling foreign merchants to travel and trade freely, were also introduced. The Tanzimat was a period marked by the concentration “all political,

financial, and military power in a refurbished bureaucracy” (Kayalı, 1998: 19) as well as by “the direct political and economic impact of the West” (Ardıç, 2012: 42).

The impact of organization on Ottoman provinces was not immediate, as “many regions of the empire, including wide areas inhabited by Arabs, were not touched by Istanbul’s reform measures until the second half of the nineteenth century” (Kayalı, 1998: 23). Nevertheless we should not underestimate the achievements of the reforms. Although it was not immediate the impact of the reforms was appreciable.

If we compare the empire of 1870 with what it had been in 1820, there is no doubt that methods of administration and justice had changed; the non-Muslims were freer; provinces as far away as the Hijaz and Tripoli of Africa were once more controlled from Istanbul; the provincial administration had been reformed and the area of cultivation was growing; a certain idea of Ottoman ‘nationhood’ was spreading; the amenities of life at least in the larger cities and sea-ports had been improved (Hourani, 1981: 14).

Indeed, the Ottoman Arab provinces had been opened up to Western influences, which accelerated their modernization, via European merchants long before the Tanzimat. With the intellectual guidance of Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi and the political authority of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1837-1859), the governor of Egypt, who was originally assigned by the Ottoman government to strengthen its authority after the French occupation (1798), Egypt started its own version of the Tanzimat introducing wide range of reforms in education, bureaucracy, tax system, irrigation, manufacture, and trade (Kayalı 1997; Hourani, 1991). Tunis under the leadership of Khayr al-Din Pasha, a high-level bureaucrat, similarly issued various reforms including “security, civil liberty, regular taxation, and conscription, the right of Jews and foreigners to own land and carry out all kinds of economic activity” (Hourani, 1991: 274). There were also advocates of the Tanzimat under Istanbul’s control. Yusuf al-Khalidi, for instance, is considered “a Palestinian representative of the Tanzimat” whose family had a close relationship with the Tanzimat elites (Kayalı, 1998: 23). Khalil Ghanem, a Maronite Christian Arab from Beirut, who was working in Beirut’s provincial administration, also had close links with the Tanzimat reformers.

With the formation of modern institutions and the penetration of European states into the Ottoman economy, the social and economic structure of the empire

greatly altered. Beyond the ruling elites, who profited most from the new ways of government, the new policies favored merchants particularly that of Europeans, local Christians and Jews who had access to the European market and credit from banks. On the other hand, such groups as *ulema* who used to control the legal system before the formation of the new legal codes and notable families who had long been mediators between government and urban population were excluded from share of power. Furthermore, local industries suffered from the competition of goods imported from Europe particularly in the Arab provinces (Hourani, 1991).

The dislocation of the economy, the loss of power and influence, the sense of the political world of Islam being threatened from outside: all these expressed themselves in the middle of the century in a number of violent movements directed against the growing influence of Europe, and in some places against the local Christians who profited from it. In Syria, these came to a head in 1860. In the mountain valleys of Lebanon there was an ancient symbiosis between the main religious communities, the Maronite Christians and Druzes (Hourani, 1991: 277).

Due to these violent movements the Tanzimat period was characterized by political instability. Another characteristic of the Tanzimat period was the growing financial problems. To gain the support of the British against Muhammad Ali, Mahmud II had to sign the Ottoman-British Trade Agreement in 1838 completely opening the doors of the empire to the British traders, which was a fatal stroke to the local industry and trade (Karpas, 2012). Another deadly stroke to the Ottoman finance came from the Crimean War (1853-6), which brought nothing but suffering particularly for the Ottomans who for the first time in their history had to borrow a loan. The empire allied with European states again for the first time with the Paris Treaty (1856) after this war (Çakır, 2001). Moreover, foreign debt continuously increased during Sultan Abdulmecid's (1861-1876) reign whose ambition was to have a strong navy regardless of the cost. Enormous expenses of the Crimean War and constantly growing fiscal deficit culminated in Public Debt Administration (*Duyun-u Umumiye*), which was created in 1881 and "governed by a board on which sat representatives of the holders of Ottoman government bonds in Europe" (Zürcher, 2003: 88).

This era was also characterized by the development of ideological movements within the Ottoman society. Aiming to materialize the sense of Ottoman citizenship, which was officially declared in the Tanzimat, reformers in this period advocated the idea of Ottomanism to maintain the territorial integrity as well as stability of the multiethnic and multi-religious Ottoman society. Ottomanism became the Ottoman ‘official ideology’ during the Tanzimat. However, nationalist movements culminating in the disintegration of Balkans seriously damaged the notion of Ottomanism, which was later refurbished by Abdulhamid II and then by the Young Turks who “blended it with Turkish nationalism” (Hanioglu, 2006: 19).

In this era nationalist feelings aroused among the empire’s Christian communities.

Starting with the Serbian revolt of 1804-1817 under the influence of nationalistic trend occasioned by the French Revolution (1789), this process went on by the succeeding revolts in Greece (1821-29), Wallachia and Moldavia (1856-66), Serbia and Montenegro (1856-67), Crete (1866-69), Bulgaria (1867-76) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1875) (Yetim, 2011: 1).

In addition to the influence of the French Revolution nationalist movements were also a result of the European states’ intervention into the empire in favor of the Christian groups; e.g., the Paris Treaty between the Ottoman and the European powers proposed the Rescript of Reforms (*Islahat Fermanı*) in 1856 to ensure the equality for non-Muslim communities of the empire. As an unintended consequence, the Rescript of Reforms accelerated nationalist sentiments among these groups and widened the economic gap between the Muslims and the Christians of the empire (Karpat, 2012).

In this context an opposition group, called the Young Ottomans, emerged as a reaction to the interference of the European powers in the domestic affairs of the empire and the government’s superficial imitation of Europe. Among them Namık Kemal and his friends who endeavored to accommodate European liberalism and Islamic tradition believed that the solution “lay in the introduction of representative, constitutional and parliamentary government in the empire, thus instilling a true feeling of citizenship and loyalty to the state among all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslims” (Zürcher, 2003: 71). Meanwhile Russia’s Pan-Slavic feeling

reached its peak and once Istanbul Conference failed she declared war on 24 April 1877 on the Ottomans. As a result of the empire's disastrous defeat, Romania, Montenegro and Serbia gained their independence, Bulgaria became autonomous, and Cyprus was occupied by Britain, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria later in 1908 (Karpat, 2012).

Under these circumstances Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) came to power in 1876. He suspended the constitution and closed the parliament in 1878. Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the constitutional experiment of 1876-78 has a significant place in the late Ottoman history. The idea of constitution and parliament had become the basis of opposition to Abdulhamid II until 1908. The first parliament was a kind of realization of the Ottomanist ideal: provincial deputies from different parts of the empire including Arab world came together for the first time to deal with the wide range of issues including provincial reorganization, the official language of the empire, tax collection, Westernization, and freedom of press. Moreover "deputies of the Arab provinces were some of the most vocal, and often critical, in the Chamber of Deputies" (Kayalı, 1998: 24). Arab delegates such as Yusuf Ziya al-Khalidi, Khalil Ghanem, Nafi' al-Jabiri, Sa'di and Manuk of Aleppo, 'Abd al-Razzaq of Baghdad, and Nikula Naqqash, Nawfal, and 'Abd al-Rahim Badran of Syria were some of the active participants in the parliament. However these Arab deputies did not use ethnic or nationalist discourse in their critiques. According to Kayalı, "there were no clear common interests or an "Arab idea" that unified and distinguished the Arab deputies" (Kayalı, 1998: 31). They seemed to identify themselves as the representatives of the Ottoman Empire rather than merely perceiving themselves as representatives of the Arabian Peninsula.

Although the constitution and the parliament were suspended, the modernization process continued in the following 30 years of the Hamidian regime; in fact all the efforts of the Tanzimat period reached their fruition in the Hamidian era (Lewis, 1967: 179). In this period the most impressive improvements took place in military and education particularly in higher education. The *Mülkiye*, the *Harbiye* were established, the first university of Turkey, Darülfunun, was founded, modern elementary education was provided, the first *idadi* high schools as well as military schools were established in various provinces (Lewis, 1967; Eraslan, 1981). Moreover, reforms continued in judiciary bureaucracy, communication, press, and

transportation. Railway construction was also greatly extended in this period. Such technologies as telegraph, press and railway rendered administration more efficient as they were used as instruments of centralization by the sultan. The press of the Hamidian Era also contributed to the modernization yet the censorship was reinforced and extended to most of the printed media.

Abdulhamid II's centralization policies particularly targeted the Arab provinces. As Ardiç, in reference to Hourani, points out,

Sultan Abdülhamid was largely successful in his two-pronged policy of manipulating tensions between European powers and promoting Islamic unity through the Caliphate. In this way, he not only kept his empire out of large-scale military conflict with imperialist powers, but also mobilized Muslims as far away as India for the Caliphate's cause by successfully identifying Ottoman and Muslim interests, especially drawing on such symbols of Islam as the holy shrines in the Hijaz (Ardiç, 2012: 190; cited from Hourani, 1983: 106).

As part of his grand strategy of *İttihad-ı İslam*, Sultan Abdülhamid invested in the Arabian Peninsula exemplified by the project of Hejaz Railway from Istanbul to Mecca to improve the economic and political integration of the distant Arabian provinces into the Ottoman state, to centralize administration, and also to facilitate the transportation of pilgrims and military forces (Ardiç, 2012). He paid a special attention to the Arab provinces not only because of the idea of *İttihad-ı İslam* but also because, "the Ottoman government was interested in exercising direct control over the international commercial centers of Aleppo and Damascus and the port cities of the eastern Mediterranean" (Kayalı, 1998: 35). In order to provide a counterweight to the imperialist ambitions of the European states, Abdulhamid's another strategy was to improve the diplomatic relations with Germany (Eraslan, 1995; Karpas 2012).

The policy of *İttihad-ı İslam* was quite relevant in the increasingly Muslim populated Ottoman Empire. In addition to migrations from Crimea and Caucasia, around two million Muslims migrated from the Balkans to Anatolia in exchange of 120.000 Armenians and Greeks and 70.000 Bulgarian to the Balkans. Consequently the Ottoman population increased from 19.865.800 in 1875 to 27.299.500 in 1893, of

which 74,7 % was Muslim in 1897. While the state was trying to modernize its institutions and administration, radical demographic changes reinforced its Islamic characteristic (Karpas, 2012).

In general, though, Abdulhamid II was popular among the large majority of the Muslim population, he was not quite so with the Ottoman intellectuals, and new generations of bureaucrats and officers, who had graduated from the sultan's expanded educational institutions. Aiming to restore the constitution and parliament, the first organized opposition, *İttihad-i Osmanî Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Unity Society), emerged in 1889 in Military Medical College. Some members were arrested but others could escape to Paris. They collaborated with the Ottoman constitutionalist émigrés, including Ahmed Rıza, under whose leadership they “founded a small committee called *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) and published the newspaper *Meşveret* (Consultation), in both Ottoman and French, from 1895 onwards” (Zürcher, 2003: 91). The group named itself Jeunes Turks (Young Turks) in Paris, but it also “included Arabs among its membership, as well as Kurds, Albanians, Russian Turks, and members of other ethnic groups” (Kayalı, 1998: 51).

After his arrival in Paris, Mizancı Murat became president in 1896. But then Abdülhamid's agents convinced him and some other Young Turk leaders to come back to Istanbul to “help him in his reforms” (Zürcher, 2003, p. 92). So Ahmed Rıza again became the leader of the CUP until the arrival of Prince Sabahettin a liberal who believed in minimal government and the idea of free enterprise as a solution to regenerate the empire in 1899. Ahmed Rıza on the other hand became more of an Ottoman nationalist (Zürcher, 2003). This differentiation led to a split in the movement as the Prince founded the ‘Society of Ottoman Liberals’ and then the *Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* (Society for Private Initiative and Decentralization) in 1906.

The Young Turk movement expanded between 1902 and 1906 and branches appeared in Geneva, Cairo, Istanbul, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Macedonia, and Damascus. The committee that was formed by the officers of the Third Army Corps in Thessaloniki was the most significant of them. The Young Turk movement received a new impetus with defeat of the European but autocratic Russia by the Oriental but

constitutional Japan. Subsequently, Russia and Persia introduced constitutional regimes. Meanwhile there was an increasing discontent within the army because of the high inflation and unpaid salaries in the Ottoman Empire. In July 1908 the Unionist Officers of the Third (Macedonia) and Second (Thracian) Army decided to act and forced Sultan Abdülhamid to reinstate constitution on 23 July (Hanioglu, 2008). The common reaction of the public to the revolution was joy and relief. Restoration of the freedom of expression paved the way for the emergence of various publications, political demonstrations as well as labor unrest. After the revolution, the CUP members returned to Istanbul from exile but the committee in Salonika remained to be the center of political power. Interestingly, the CUP officially left politics with the present cabinet under Grand Vizier Sait Pasha. It chose to watch out the constitutional system and involve in politics whenever it felt necessary. The CUP's position as a secret society exercising political power with no formal structure would become a destabilizing factor in the coming years (Zürcher, 2003).

Meanwhile, Prince Sabahettin and his followers set a political party, the *Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası* (Party of Ottoman Liberals) and contested the first election, which ended with the victory of the CUP. Propagating against the CUP's secular policies conservative religious groups that organized themselves as the *İttihad-i Muhammedi* (Muhammadan Union) were also strongly opposing to the CUP. The CUP's position was weakened with the Bulgaria's declaration of independence; Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Crete's unification with Greece. Finally, on 12 April 1909 religious groups supported by the liberals revolted in the name of restoration of Islam and Şeriat. The Unionists were seriously shaken by this revolt but soon reinforced their authority under the indisputable leadership of the commander of the Third Army, Mahmut Şevket Pasha (Lewis, 1967). They replaced Abdulhamid II with a weak Sultan, Mehmed Reşad, who could only appoint the grand vizier and the Şeyhülislam. Central authority was strengthened with the declaration of the restrictive laws on associations, public meetings, brigandage, strikes, and press (Zürcher, 2003; Ardiç, 2012).

These restrictions could not prevent the formation of new political parties such as the *Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Fırkası* (Party of Moderate Liberals), the *Islahat-i Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası* (Party of Fundamental Ottoman Reforms), the *Ahali Fırkası* (People's Party), and the *Hizb-i Cedid* (New Party), which criticized

the CUP. The outbreak of a sweeping insurgence in Albania and the occupation of Tripolitania by Italy strengthened the opposition. The major opposition groups united under the *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası* (Freedom and Alliance Party) in November 1911, which won a by-election in Istanbul, defeating the CUP candidate (Zürcher, 2003). In January 1912 the CUP dissolved the parliament and with ‘the big-stick election’ it guaranteed its majority in the new parliament. But soon the new CUP government had to resign as it was threatened a military coup by the “Savior Officers” (*Halaskar Zabitan*). The new obedient chamber, which included representatives from all the opposing factions, was not sufficient to maintain order and stability in the empire. Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria allied and issued an ultimatum to the Porte and demanding wide-ranging reforms on 2 October 1912. These demands ended up in the Balkan War, which was of two sessions and in the end of its first phase Albania became an independent state Istanbul and the straits were left to the Ottomans. While the negotiations were held in London, the Unionists plotted a coup, and removed the exiting cabinet in Istanbul. In the second phase of the war the Ottoman army fought under the command of Enver Pasha who retook Edirne from Bulgaria. Although this relative achievement more or less restored the CUP’s prestige, the Balkan Wars were disastrous for the empire in terms of human, cultural and economic losses. The Ottomans lost most of their territories and inhabitants in Europe. Moreover, “the areas lost (Macedonia, Albania and Thrace) had been core areas of the empire for over 500 years. They were the richest and most developed provinces and disproportionate part of the Ottoman ruling elite hailed from them” (Zürcher, 2003: 113).

However, in domestic politics, the CUP became unchallengeable after the January 1913 coup d’état, as the multiethnic and multi-religious structure of the empire turned into a Turco-Arab core and it had to agree to make reforms, accommodating demands of decentralization in the Arab provinces (Kayalı, 1998). Accordingly, the size of Arab representation in the parliament dramatically increased in this period. Moreover, as a result of demographic transformation Ottomanism was redefined by underscoring Islam as a binding force. So, the Unionist government propelled an intensive Islamic propaganda emphasizing the anti-imperialist sentiments (Kayalı, 1998). On the other hand, small scale insurgencies in the Arabian Peninsula particularly in the tribal areas almost routinized because of high taxes.

Reform committees in Beirut and Damascus prepared reform proposals demanding the use of Arabic in government offices and assignment of provincial functionaries from the local populace. In April 1913 the central government approved the use of Arabic in law courts, in official communication and in schools as the medium language. The government's positive response stabilized the relations between Istanbul and Arab provinces for a while but the probability of the Ottoman's collapse was still present, which had kept the Arabs worried about their future. Moreover, the CUP's centralization policy included Turkish nationalist overtone rather than those of Islamic unity, which led to the alienation of Arab elites and the heightening of nationalist sentiments among the Arabs (Khalidi, 1991; Kayalı 1998). Meanwhile, some Arab intellectuals such as al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, and al-Afghani, revived the notion of Arab caliphate as binding force, which would organize the Arabs politically (Ardıç, 2012).

The doctrine of the Arab Caliphate was at the center of the intrigues of the European states, particularly Britain and France, modern Islamic thought, and Arab nationalism. Britain and France supported activities of the Arab nationalists as in the organization of the first Arab Congress in which the Arab nationalists "demanded greater autonomy for the Arab provinces, greater representation of Arabs in the Parliament, and restricting the deployment of Arab troops in the Ottoman army to Arab lands only" (Ardıç, 2012: 92). Since the late 1870s both British officials and press had been propagating the "illegitimacy" of the Ottoman Caliphate. This was one of the canons of the British foreign policy which determined its way of dealing with the 'Eastern Question (Ardıç, 2012). Furthermore, the idea of Arab Caliphate was an instrument for the British "divide and rule policy" in the Middle East. Therefore, as in the case of the Arab Revolt (1916-18) Britain was involved in all potential conflicts between the Arab provinces and the Ottoman government. The Treaty of Constantinople (March 4-April 10, 1915) ratified between France, Britain and Russia and the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain show that for the European powers creation of an Arab Caliphate under their control was necessary to destroy the Ottoman Caliphate (Ardıç, 2012).

The relationship between the Ottoman government and the Arab provinces took a new shape with the breakout of World War I. Aiming to regain the empire's political and economic independence, the Unionists allied with Germany, and

immediately proclaimed the Capitulations' abolition and the termination of the privileges given to the Western states (Çiçek, 2012). Aiming at instigating the uprisings of the Muslim, who were under the Entente's rule (Çiçek, 2012), the Unionist leaders, as part of Germany's plan, propagated the Muslims' liberation from the rule of Entente States and therefore the Ottoman caliph declared a jihad against the Entente.

In November 1914, the Ottoman Caliph declared the 'Great Jihad' (*Cihad-ı Ekber*). According to the fatwa it is a religious duty for the Muslims to join the war on the side of Ottoman and those fighting against the caliph's army and his allies would be punished in the hereafter. In the meantime, the CUP via Ottoman secret service (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*) organized 'revolutionary societies' to instigate insurgences in the Muslim territories colonized by the Allies (Ardıç, 2012). The jihad fatwa was spread all over the Muslim world and even in the end of the war Britain attempted to occupy Istanbul and destroy the Ottoman Caliphate but could not succeed because of the strong resistance by the Indian Muslims (Özcan 1997; Qureshi, 1999). "Already stirred to action by the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* and the caliph's *Jihad fatwa* during the war, Muslim and Hindu nationalists protested Britain both in India and London" (Ardıç, 2012: 245). As a result of these protests Britain had to withdraw from Istanbul.

In addition to these war strategies, the CUP sent Cemal Pasha to Syria as the Governor General and the Commander-in-chief of the 4th Army after the proclamation of the war. Before his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha was appointed to the sub-governorate of Üsküdar, the Governorate of Adana, and then Baghdad and finally as the military governor of Istanbul. He was an authoritarian and he considered all sorts of opposition as a threat for the Ottoman Empire (Çiçek, 2012). Management of the expedition against Egypt and maintaining peace and order in Syria were the major tasks of Cemal Pasha, who also made a notable contribution to the Syrian province's modernization in terms of education, public institutions and infrastructure.

Intending to pose a threat for the British in the Canal, to instigate an uprising in Egypt, and even to conquer Egypt, the Ottoman troops under the command of Cemal Pasha embarked the first but unsuccessful expedition (14-15 January 1915) to

the Canal. Cemal Pasha did not give up his aim of conquest of Egypt and for the second expedition he made a great deal of preparations as part of which the construction of railway and carriage roads was accelerated. However, a second larger expedition could not be actualized as the policies of the Ottoman government and Germany differed and the wartime conditions in Syria hardened.

As part of his second task, maintaining peace and stability in the region, Cemal Pasha prosecuted the Arabist party members based on the documents seized from the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut disclosing the negotiations between the French consuls and reformist Arabs (Çiçek, 2012). Deeming those documents as proof, he punished the party members harshly by sending some of them into exile to the Anatolian cities and executing others.

During his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha also tried to modernize the region by municipal developments and producing ideal citizens for the empire. Intending to regulate mass education he in co-ordination with Halide Edip Adıvar reorganized the educational system and established new institutions ranging from girls schools to the agricultural, industrial and commercial schools (Çiçek, 2012).

On the other hand, as World War I continued, the Hejaz, the holy place for the Muslims, had become a focal point both for the Ottoman Empire and Britain. In order to enhance central authority in the region, the Ottoman government modified Medina's administrative status from a *sancak* of the Hijaz *vilayet* to an autonomous sancak (Kayalı, 1998). As a powerful agent in the region, Sharif Hussein, *sharif* of Mecca, who was appointed after 1908 Revolution by the CUP, regarded this as a challenge. Thus, the conflict between Sharif Hussein and the governor of Medina was endemic. Meanwhile, ethnic insurgencies and separatist movements became widespread in the region while fiscal difficulties of the empire increased. Moreover, as the Ottomans began to be defeated in almost all fronts from the second half of 1916, the Entente powers started negotiating the Ottoman territories' future after the prospective demise of the empire. With the Constantinople Agreement in April 1915 Russia, Britain, and France agreed on the formation of independent Arab rule in the Arabian Peninsula.

This agreement provided the basis for the secret correspondence that took place between the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon,

and Sharif Husayn between July 1915 and January 1916. Deceptive and controversial as the terms offered to Sharif Husayn were, the McMahon-Husayn exchange resulted in an alliance of the sharif and Britain against the Ottoman government (Kayalı, 1998: 214).

Consequently, Cemal Pasha's relentless rule coupled with the constraints of the war, famine and the intrigues of France and Britain led to the alienation of the Arab population from the Ottoman government. Motivated by the ambition of strengthening his power in the Hejaz, Sharif Hussein and his sons attacked the positions of the empire in Mecca in June 1916. To justify his revolt Sharif praised all the Ottoman sultan-caliphs and condemned the Unionist government for decreeing secular reforms, restricting the sultan's authority and allowing the executions of Arab leaders in Syria (Kayalı, 1998; Ardiç, 2012). In his "Proclamation" of independence, which was published on June 27, 1916 in his media organ, the Qibla, Sharif Hussein stated:

It is well known that of all the Moslem Rulers and Emirs of Mecca, the favored City, were the first to recognize the Turkish Government. This they did in order to unite Moslem opinion and firmly establish their community, knowing that the great Ottoman Sultans (may the dust of their tombs be blessed and may Paradise be their abode) were acting accordance with the Book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet (prayers be unto him) and were zealous to enforce the ordinances of both these authorities. With this noble end in view the Emirs before mentioned observe those ordinances unceasingly. I myself, protecting the honor of the (Ottoman) State, caused Arabs to rise against their fellow Arabs in the year 1327 (1909) in order to raise the siege of Abha, and in the following year a similar movement was carried out under the leadership of one of my sons as is well known. The Emirs continued to support the Ottoman State until the Society of Union and Progress appeared in the State and proceeded to take over the administration thereof and all its affairs.

The result of this new administration was that the State suffered a loss of territory, which quite destroyed its prestige, as the whole world knows, was plunged into the horrors of war and brought to its present perilous position, as is patent to all. This was all done for certain well-known ends, which our feelings forbid to dilate upon. They caused Moslem hearts to ache with grief for the Empire of Islam, for the destruction of the remaining inhabitants of her provinces –Moslem as well as non-Moslem- some of them hanged or

otherwise done to death, others driven into exile. (Hussein, 1916: 234-235 quoted in Ardiç, 2012)

Accusing the CUP of destroying the Ottoman Caliph's power Sharif Hussein made a pledge to restore the sharia and protect the Holy Land:

We leave the whole Mohammedan world from East to West to pass judgment on this contempt and profanation of the Sacred House. But we are determined not to leave out religious and national rights as a plaything in the hands of the Union and Progress Party. (Hussein, 1916: 237 quoted in Ardiç, 2012)

Although Sharif's Revolt is deemed as the turning point for the development of Arab nationalism, other than the reference to the "land" and its independence, it is hard to find nationalist elements in the proclamation. As the Hejaz lacked secular education and professional groups, which enabled the spread of nationalist ideas, it was more appropriate to derive a justification from Islam (Osachsenwald, 1993; Ardiç 2012). Therefore, the ideological basis of Sharif's declaration was a combination of Islamism and tribalism. As an extremely influential actor in the region Britain played a key role in the Arab Revolt's success by propagating against the Ottoman Caliphate and arming the Sharif's forces (Ardiç, 2012). World War I ended with a disastrous defeat of the Central Powers including the Ottoman Empire. This meant the end of the Ottoman authority, which had begun in the 15th century, in the Arabian Peninsula.

CHAPTER 2

NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION in the MEMOIRS

2.1. Introduction

Aiming to introduce the five Arab intellectuals, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984), Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Salim Ali Salam (1868-1938), and Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), this chapter outlines the memoirs of these intellectuals by analyzing the narratives in them. The memoirs reveal that Arab intellectuals' attitudes were not uniform but varied towards Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula between 1908 and 1918. They differ from each other in terms of ideological and political stand. In this regard, while an Arab nationalist Izzat Darwaza and Ottomanist Amir Shakib Arslan represent two opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, the rest are located at different points across the spectrum. In this chapter the five Arab intellectuals are arranged according to their levels of affiliation to Arab nationalism and Ottomanism.

There are various factors that led to this differentiation. Holding a political position such as being representative in the Ottoman parliament or having close relationships with Ottoman elites plays a significant role in moderating the ideological stands of the Arab intellectuals. Furthermore, other than that of Rashid Rida, the memoirs were written after the disengagement of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the new positions of these Arab intellectuals after the disengagement may have been influential in the transformation of their standpoints.

For instance, Izzat Darwaza, who uses a strong nationalist discourse in his memoir, could not receive higher education, because of financial problems, in Istanbul or Beirut where students from well-to-do Arab families had access to schooling. He became a post-officer and worked in Nablus from 1903 to 1914 and then in Beirut. Thus he could not establish close relationships with the Ottoman elites

in Istanbul. He could only be able to receive information about the central government's operations through his friends who were studying in Istanbul. As he could not complete higher education and had to remain in Nablus as a post-officer he deeply felt alienated among his fellow friends who were studying law, political science or medicine in Istanbul (Darwaza, 2007: 203). Therefore, Darwaza could not get an opportunity to be involved in the multiethnic and multireligious circles of Ottoman elites. In contrast, Amir Shakib Arslan and Salim Ali Salam had strong ties with Ottoman elites, including the CUP members such as Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha, due to the political positions they held. Though these two demanded reforms in the Arab provinces they never thought of separating from the Empire. Unlike Izzat Darwaza these intellectuals were in positions that led them to nurture their Ottoman identity as much as the Arab one. Moreover, being both in the inner circle of the Central government and Arab communities provided an opportunity for them to view from both perspectives. In the meantime, they often had to reconcile these perspectives and even at times bargain with the representatives of them. Now, let us briefly examine these actors and their memoirs before embarking on an analysis of their narratives.

2.2. Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984)

Izzat Darwaza whose Arab nationalist sentiments are the strongest among the five Arab intellectuals analyzed in this research, was born in Nablus where he also spent most of his life. As an autodidact person he wrote around fifty pamphlets on Arab literature and history as well as Islamic sciences. He met with the idea of Arab nationalism in his early ages and kept dealing with issues related to the Arabian Peninsula particularly Palestine until the end of his life. Furthermore, during the reign of the CUP he was affiliated to *Hurriyet ve Itilaf Fırkası* (Freedom and Alliance Party) and *Hizb al-Lamarkaziyah al-Idariyah al-Uthmani* (The Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party) and joined some political movements including *Beirut Islahat Hareketi* (Beirut Reform Movement) and *Jam'iyat al-Arabiyah al-Fatat* (The Young Arab Society), known simply as *Al-Fatat*. Struggling against the Zionist settlements in Palestine and for the independence of Greater Syria

he kept being politically active after the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire as well.

As for Darwaza's memoir covering mostly the Palestinian issue until the establishment of Israel in 1948, it consists of six volumes some parts of which are devoted to his observations about daily life in Nablus in the first decades of the twentieth century, the CUP's practices as well as the development of Arab nationalism. This research takes into consideration these three parts of his memoirs in order to examine his approach towards the Ottoman Empire under CUP rule. In these specific parts he first gives a great deal of details about daily life and traditions in an Ottoman-Arab city, Nablus, and then explains political developments before and after 1908 Revolution; finally he elaborates on Cemal Pasha's policies and operations during World War I and Sharif Hussein's Revolt in 1916. As an Arab nationalist Darwaza highlighting Arab rights, constantly criticizes the CUP's policies in his memoirs. Reacting particularly against what he perceived as the CUP's "Turkification" policies he sometimes puts forward a distorted story of historical events such as famine in Lebanon during World War I. Moreover, as the editor (Mertoğlu, 2007: XI) of the memoirs underscores, the way of his justification of the 1916 Arab Revolt manifests the extent of the mixed feelings that he has. On the one hand, he acknowledges Sharif Hussein to be right and believing that the revolt can be deemed as a milestone in the development of Arab nationalism; on the other hand, he argues that it was indeed Britain that planned the Arab Revolt manipulating Sharif Hussein's network and political power to realize its plan.

Unlike the other four intellectuals who reflect both Istanbul's and the Arab provinces' social and political atmosphere, Darwaza's memories are generally restricted to the events and issues at the local level. Not only does he provide readers with an insight about the social structure in Nablus, but he also gives an idea about the organization of the CUP and the FAP in the countryside. Darwaza does not say much about Sultan Abdulhamid II, other than associating his reign with denouncement, bribery, and tyranny. Before the 1908 revolution he did not have any connection with the CUP, which was then an underground organization against Sultan Abdulhamid II (see Chapter 1 for details). Once the Constitution was reinstated in 1908, Darwaza like many others became a member of the CUP which launched branches in the countryside. At these branches people used to gather to sing

marches and listen to enlightening speeches in order to celebrate the promulgation of the constitution in the Ottoman Empire. Apparently restoration of the constitution caused rejoices in the Arab provinces. In the early years of the 1908 Revolution Darwaza was relatively satisfied with the freedom that offered by the new government. However, he (Derveze, 2007: 252) also noticed the growing of Turkish nationalism among the Turkish youth and statesmen as well as the Turkification of the government personnel with the 1908 Revolution (see also Kayalı, 1998).

As an Arab nationalist seeking decentralization, Darwaza was also close to be affiliated to the Freedom and Alliance Party, which was established in 1911 and he and his friends launched a club of this party in Nablus in early 1912. Darwaza was also influenced by renowned Arab nationalist Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi's book *Kitab Umm al-Qura* he even wrote a novel *Vüfudü'n-Nu'man ala Kisra Enuşirvan* through which run the theme of Arab nationalism. In his memoir Darwaza identifies himself as an Arab nationalist and often uses the term Arab Movement referring to the organization of Arabs to become independent. Regarding Arab nationalism, Darwaza (2007: 210) like many other Arab scholars argues that Turkish nationalism which gained strength with the proclamation of *Kanun-i Esasi* in 1908 that led to the development of Arab nationalism. In this connection, he underscores the nationalist policies of the CUP as well as the strong ties between Jews and members of the CUP both in Thessaloniki and Istanbul. Based on the information he received from Turkish and Arab newspapers as well as from his friends who were studying in Istanbul, he argued that Turks in Istanbul were insulting and looking down on the Arabs. Moreover they did not appoint anyone other than Turks to the critical administrative positions. Thus, in order to protect Arab rights some Arab students and representatives established organizations such as *Ihau'l-Usmani Cemiyeti* and *Munteda al-Edebi* in Istanbul. All these developments in Istanbul raised his and his friends' awareness about the necessity of defending Arab rights (Derveze, 2007: 263). They began to spread the idea of equal treatment of Arabs, who then constituted the fifty percent of the population in the empire, with Turks particularly in the parliament. Moreover, they demanded Arabic being the medium language in education and in government offices.

In 1912 *Hizb'ul al-Lamarkaziyah* (The Party of Decentralization) was established under the leadership of Rafiq al-Azm and with support of Rashid Rida in

Egypt. This party was in solidarity with the FAP in Istanbul, which was a liberal party proposing decentralization in the empire. In 1914 Darwaza and his friends decided to launch a branch of the Party of al-Lamarkaziyah in Nablus but as World War I broke out and Cemal Pasha was appointed as governor in Syria they could not realize it. The program of the Party of Decentralization has sixteen articles, the three of which summarize its message.

Article I. The Ottoman State is a Constitutional State with a representative parliamentary Government. Every one of its provinces is an inseparable part of the Sultanate, which is itself indivisible under all circumstances. But the local administration of every province will be on the basis of decentralization, it being understood that the Sultan will appoint the Governor and the Chief Judge.

Article XIV. Every province will have two official languages. Turkish and the “local” language of its inhabitants.

Article XV. Education in every province will be in language of the inhabitants of that province (Zeine, 1958: 83).

As the articles above manifest Darwaza and his friends were asking for decentralization and the use of Arabic in the public domains. Though Darwaza was quite clear about his demand of decentralization in his memoir he does not clarify his position about the separation of the Arab provinces from the empire.

According to Darwaza, World War I and Sharif Hussein’s revolt were two major opportunities for the members of the Arab movement to realize the above objectives (Derweze, 2007: 327). As he underscores members of the Arab movement were deeply disappointed with the CUP’s attitudes who did not keep their promise of making reforms in the Arab provinces. Moreover, the CUP adopted moderate policies after the Arab Congress of 1913 but with the outbreak of World War I it began to rule with an iron fist in the Arabian Peninsula. Cemal Pasha’s appointment, as a governor of Syria in 1914 whose ruthless policies alienated Arabs from the Ottoman government was a significant event in the development of Arab movement. According to Darwaza, the CUP was aware of the fact that as World War I broke out members of Arab movement were out to act against the Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula. In order to prevent this they appointed Cemal Pasha who, on the basis of

the documents seized from the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut disclosing the negotiations between the French consuls and reformist Arabs, executed twenty one prominent Arab figures and also exiled hundreds of Arabs (Kayalı, 1998; Çiçek, 2012).

As the CUP and Cemal Pasha recognized the possible threat that could come from armed Arab youth, they sent the Arab troops who took part in the Canal Expedition to the Çanakkale front. Moreover, as mobilization (*seferberlik*) was declared, a troop consisting of more than two hundred educated young Arab soldiers most of whom were Arab nationalists gathered in Damascus. Once again seeing them as a threat to the central authority Cemal Pasha dissolved them. Thus, a possibility of a military movement against CUP authority was destroyed (Derveze, 2007: 327). According to him the second and maybe the most important attempt was the Arab Revolt, which started in Mecca on June 10, 1916, under the leadership of Sharif Hussein and with the military and financial support of Britain (Derveze, 2007: 404). Darwaza explains the whole process of the Revolt by referring to the memoirs of the King Abdullah, son of Sharif Hussein, who intermediated between the Sharif and British Lord Kitchener, General Storrs, and finally with Sir Henry MacMahon. Darwaza thinks that because of his lineage as well his characteristics Sharif Hussein was the strongest Arab leader in the region and therefore the British selected him to cooperate with against the Ottoman Empire, which had joined the Great War on the side of Germany (Derveze, 2007).

Supporting Sharif Hussein's Revolt fully Darwaza asserted that for Arabs rebelling against the CUP government was a historical imperative as well as a national responsibility. This is because, if the CUP gained a victory in the war, it would be more aggressive than ever towards Arabs and it would strike a blow to them in order to solve the so-called Arab issue. Moreover, by awakening the Arab nation the Revolt was an important instrument for reaching the national ideals of Arabs. As Sharif Hussein claims in his published declaration (Derveze, 2007: 410-411). Darwaza too argues that Cemal Pasha's execution of the second group of Arabs on May 6, 1916 was a significant factor that led to the Revolt against the CUP government. For him if the Arab nation were strong enough to get their rights after the war, the British had to keep its words that it promised to Sharif Hussein before the Revolt.

It is striking that Darwaza did not hold the Ottoman Sultan or the Caliphate responsible for Arabs' exiting problems but squarely blamed the CUP, Cemal Pasha in particular. Sharif Hussein too started his revolt against the CUP's "unIslamic policies" rather than the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph (Mehmed V), though he would later declare his own Caliphate in 1924, albeit with no success (see Ardiç 2012).

2.3. Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953)

Muhammad Kurd Ali who can be positioned in the middle of the ideological spectrum, was born in 1876 in Damascus to a family that consists of a Kurdish father from Sulaimaniyah and a Circassian mother and spent most of his life in Cairo and Damascus working as a journalist. He learned both Turkish and French other than his mother tongue. During his lifetime he witnessed a wide range of events including the political transformation of the Arabian Peninsula after World War I. His memoir consists of four volumes one of which is devoted to his childhood, his occupation, the development of Arab nationalism, and also his relationships with Cemal Pasha. In this volume, which this research focuses on, he provides readers with anecdotes about the social and political context in the Arab provinces during the first decades of the 20th century.

As oppression against the freedom of expression escalated during the last years of Sultan Abdulhamid II's reign, Kurd Ali, like some other Syrians, moved to Egypt where he got in touch with pro-reformists including Muhammad Abduh whom he admires, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tahir al-Jazairi, Salim al-Bukhari and Jamaledin al-Qasimi. Thus, in general he was close to the circles that were demanding reforms in the Arab provinces. He was also quite critical about the CUP's Turkification ("*Tatreek*") policies. However, his activities both in Damascus and Cairo were mainly concentrated on cultural realm rather than on politics. He supported the idea of Arabic as the medium language in schools and law courts in the Arab provinces and underscored the necessity of appointing governors who knew Arabic to the Arab provinces. According to Kurd Ali's testimony, the CUP government did not welcome these demands as they feared that other ethnic groups in the empire could demand the same for their communities.

As the 1908 Revolution was declared in Istanbul Kurd Ali moved back to his hometown where he began to publish the first daily newspaper of Damascus, *al-Muqtabas*, which was funded by Cemal Pasha during the war. Later in 1916-18 he published another daily newspaper, *al-Sharq*, in 1916-18 in Damascus with the financial assistance of Germany and the CUP. During the First World War he wrote only two books: one was about the travel that he had with a group of Arabs Çanakkale and Istanbul to propagate Cemal Pasha's policies and practices in Syria; the other book was on Enver Pasha's trip to Hejaz in 1916. As he (2006: 376) wrote in his memoirs he did not believe much of what he had written in these two propaganda books that were aiming to support the CUP's position in the war and to unite the region's Muslims.

Muhammad Kurd Ali found World War I period very much critical for the Arabian Peninsula thus he did not affiliate to any movement that could lead to a disintegration in the region. During the war adhering to the idea of *Ittihad-ı Uthmani* Kurd Ali did not support Sharif Hussein's revolt and even criticized it both in his own newspaper *al-Muqtabas* and Germans' *al-Sharq*. Furthermore, he was never involved in organizations or activities that could mean to destroy the unity of Ottoman. As far as political experience is concerned he thought that in that particular period Arabs were not mature enough to be independent. However, in terms of cultural issues his contribution to the development of Arab nationalism is substantial. During the Great War he supported nationalist Arab youth in Istanbul logistically by sending Arabic publications to them. After the war he wrote many books to raise awareness about Arabic among Arabs. Furthermore, aiming to save the Arabic heritage and to preserve the Arabic language he played a significant role in the establishment of Arab Academy of Sciences in Damascus and Academy of the Arabic Language in Cairo after 1918.

Regarding the Committee of Union and Progress, he never had good relations with it because of its nationalist, centralist, and oppressive policies. In his memoir he tells some anecdotes to demonstrate the extent of the CUP's hatred towards him because of his writings in *al-Muqtabas* against the Central government's policies. The CUP closed Kurd Ali's newspaper, *al-Muqtabas*, many times on the plea of simple reasons. Finally it closed it because of his article on women's headscarf. Kurd

Ali did not print *al-Muqtabas* until World War I when Cemal Pasha convinced and assisted him to publish it again.

During his governorate in Syria Cemal Pasha was quite kind to Kurd Ali because of a favorable evidence that was revealed during the inspection of French consulate in the early years of the war. In 1912 a French agent came to Kurd Ali and tried to induce him to take a more positive approach in *al-Muqtabas* towards the French policies in the Arabian Peninsula. Kurd Ali's response was negative. He told the agent that the relationship between Turks and Arabs could be traced back to the early years of Abbasid Empire when Turks converted to Islam. Moreover, only difference between them was language. He also said that Turks with Kurds made great sacrifices for Arabs during the middle age against the crusades. Thus, there is no way for Arabs to cooperate with French who were different from Arabs in terms of religion and ethnicity and also who have been assimilating and oppressing Muslims in Tunis and Algeria. He finalized his words by saying that "Arabs can only be with the Ottomans". This conversation was reported and preserved at the French Consulates which was seized during the Great War. Based on this report, which proved Kurd Ali's patriotism, Cemal Pasha respected and favored him until the end of his governorate of Syria. But for Kurd Ali, Cemal Pasha and even another CUP member Enver Pasha who was close to Amir Shakib Arslan (see below) indeed were nice to them because they needed them for propaganda.

Having lived under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the CUP, and finally the French occupation, Kurd Ali was quite pragmatist and favored by Cemal Pasha during the Great War and also by the French mandate under which he would serve as a minister of education for six years (1920- 1922 and 1928-1932). Although he was not satisfied with the CUP's policies towards the Arabian Peninsula particularly with the executions of prominent Arab leaders some of whom were Kurd Ali's close friends, he did not get involved in any reformist or separatist organization or political party other than the liberal FAP. Positioning himself on the side of the Ottoman Empire against the intrigues of British and French diplomats during the war, he did not champion the idea of disengagement from the empire. However he (2006: 31) thought that Turks never liked Arabs and gave their dues to them since they conquered the Arabian Peninsula. According to Kurd Ali (2006: 82), the Ottoman centralization like that of France was quite intolerant and oppressive. On the other

hand, he thinks that in terms of politics and military Turks are better than Arabs. In his memoir he (2006: 170-171 also mentions some Turkish intellectuals, Suleyman Nazif, Cenab Şehabettin and Ahmet Cevdet who happened to be friends of Kurd Ali. Based on his friendship with them Kurd Ali appreciates Turkish scholars because they were critical about the CUP and its nationalist policies. As an Arab intellectual Muhammad Kurd Ali's contradictory statements which are given above manifest the very fact that he, like many other his contemporaries, had mixed feelings and thoughts about their future and also the developments around them including the war, famine, intrigues of the Allies, policies of the CUP's as well as those of Cemal Pasha.

In his memoirs Kurd Ali identifies himself neither Arabist nor Ottomanist. Indeed he does not mention the term Arab movement throughout his memoir. He did not support the CUP but as he was against a mandate government in the region and also as he wanted to secure himself under the chaotic conditions of the Great War he preferred to maintain good relationship with the CUP in general and Cemal Pasha in particular. Furthermore, Kurd Ali has also an ambiguous stance towards 1916 Arab Revolt. Even though Sharif Hussein's son Amir Faisal, who after the war first became the king of Syria for a short period and then Iraq for twelve years, was Kurd Ali's best friend, he persistently avoids giving even a brief explanation of the emergence and aftermath of the revolt.

As earlier highlighted he is concerned about the Arab culture and civilization, however, he indeed does not overlook the political aspect of Arab nationalism. He does not openly defend the activities of Arab nationalists some of whom were Kurd Ali's close friends such as Abdulwahhab al-Inkilizi, Shukri al-Asali, and Salim al-Jazairi. These three outstanding Arab intellectuals were executed by Cemal Pasha in 1916 based on the evidences that were obtained during the inspection of foreign consulates early in the war. As if subscribing to their cause subtly Kurd Ali calls his friends as Arab freedom lovers (*Arap Hürriyetperverleri*) rather than Arab nationalists and but also blames them for being careless. He thinks that they had to be more prudent and cautious in their relationships with foreigners particularly with the European consuls.

Moreover, complaining about the Jewish settlements in Palestine, Kurd Ali (2006: 278) refers to a critical conversation he had with Amir Faisal ibn Hussein after the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire. In this dialog he says to Amir Faisal that,

You said that all the Arab provinces will be united under one state. We were pleased and delighted. Our youth served to your father Sharif Hussein in order to realize this objective. Then you said that Hejaz, Syria and Iraq will be respectively independent. We gave our consent to it involuntarily. Now we are collecting everyone in Syria and evacuating Palestine and you say that “you Syrians are equal to Palestine” (Kürd Ali, 2006: 278).

As it is clear in this conversation Kurd Ali did not take part in the Arab Revolt personally but was pleased with idea of uniting Arabs under an Arab state. In the meantime, apparently he was disappointed with the revolt’s unexpected outcomes such as the emergence of Jewish settlements in Palestine and a mandate system in the region. Indeed his social network reveals ideological stance of Muhammad Kurd Ali who had close relationships both with Amir Shakib Arslan and Rashid Rida. While Shakib Arslan is a pure Ottomanist the latter is more likely to be an Arab nationalist. Thus, as a cultural nationalist Kurd Ali was somewhere in the middle of the ideological spectrum mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.

2.4. Muhammad Rashid Rida ibn Hussein (1865-1935)

Syrian-born intellectual and journalist Rashid Rida’s memoirs consist of the notes taken during his visits to Syria, Istanbul, India, and the Hejaz after the 1908 Revolution. As travel books like memoirs provide readers with a great deal of information about their authors, Rashid Rida’s travel notes, which were published in his *al-Manar* (an influential periodical that he published for over 35 years; see Kavak, 2011) reveal impressions that he had in these four centers of the Muslim world and demonstrate his intellectual transformation as well as his social networks. His travel notes are selected by the editor to be compiled based on the period (1908-1918) they cover as well as the content they include.

A pupil of Jamaladdin Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, Rida is a pioneer of the modernist interpretation of Islam, which refers to a search for a reformed ("authentic") Islam cleansed of the "tradition" and an attempt to reconcile it with modern values (see Moaddel, 2002; Mertoğlu, 2012). Yearning the pure Islam of the early period of the Islamic history, Rashid Rida thinks that Muslims deviated from Islam throughout history therefore there is a need to make reforms in their understanding of Islam as well as political and social institutions. Referring to these necessary reforms he uses the concept of "*islah*" (reform, correction) which had been the main issue in his renowned journal, *al-Manar*. According to the statement that he made in his later life, in setting up his project of *islah* Rashid Rida was influenced by his master in Tripoli, Hussein al-Jisr who believed in the necessity synthesizing Islamic sciences with modern ones. As influential factors he also refers to Imam Ghazali's *Ihya'u Ulumuddin* as well as the journal of *Urvet'ul Vuska* published by Abduh, Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima*, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's History, and others.

Aiming to spread the notion of *islah* Rida wanted to establish institutions for religious education. In order to realize this objective he never kept approaching to political leaders to gain assistance. As the Ottoman Empire rapidly broke apart in the early 20th century, actors in the region shifted their political affiliations. Looking for a political patronage for his project of *islah* Rashid Rida also had to shift his stance promptly. Therefore, he first approached to Abdulhamid II, the Committee of Union and Progress then to the leader of 1916 Arab Revolt, Sharif Hussein, and once he was disappointed with Sharif Hussein he came close to Mustafa Kemal, then Shia Imam Yahya of Yemen, and finally to Wahhabi-Saudi administration (Mertoğlu, 2005). Furthermore, as the editor of Rashid Rida's memoir underscores in the introduction his relationships with the British, who had occupied Egypt since 1882, needs to be studied respectively.

Rashid Rida was born in Syrian province, near Tripoli in al-Qalamoun, in 1865. He was influenced by the ideas of Jamaladdin Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. He sent a letter to al-Afghani to become his disciple but as Afghani passed away in Istanbul in 1897 in Istanbul he moved to Cairo in the same year to benefit from the wisdom and experience of Muhammad Abduh with whom he worked until Abduh's death in 1905. In 1898 he founded a journal, titled *al-Manar*, with Abduh's support. From its establishment until the 1908 Revolution Rashid Rida did not

criticize Abdulhamid II openly in his journal. Rather he generally praised and complimented the sultan as the caliph of all Muslims in his writings. However, in this period he was influenced by the arguments of some proto-Arab nationalist Syrian intellectuals, namely Rafiq al-Azm, Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi and Muhibbuddin al-Khatib, according to whom increasing centralization of the Ottoman Empire meant to the ignorance of the Arab provinces (Kavak, 2007).

As the 1908 Revolution broke out Rashid Rida transformed into an advocator of the CUP as well as democracy. As the concept of *islah* was the basis of Rashid Rida's all intellectual and political activities his journeys were too for the same purpose. He stayed in the province of Syria from September 1908 to March 1909 and observed the positive impact of the *Kanun-i Esasi*'s promulgation in many cities, including Damascus and Beirut. People were celebrating the restoration of the parliament and the constitution. During his stay in Syria he met with CUP members as well as *salafi* scholars such as Abdurrazzak al-Baitar, Jamaladdin al-Qasimi, and Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi. In this period advocating the CUP he appears to be an Ottomanist who is against the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the empire. Moreover, according to Rashid Rida the idea of decentralization was not applicable in the Arabian Peninsula because Arabs lacked of political and intellectual experience to govern themselves. Therefore, they had to stick to the Ottoman Empire under CUP rule. In Syria, he advised the Arabs to maintain good relationship with Turks and cooperate with them. According to him, Arabs and Turks were bound by Islam thus they both have to do their best for the survival and wellbeing of the empire. Moreover, in order to spread the spirit of constitutionalism and democracy they have to assist to the CUP.

After Syria, having two major objectives in his mind Rashid Rida went to Istanbul where he stayed almost a year. His first objective was to mend fences between Turks and Arabs. Championing the idea of *Ittihad-i Uthmani* (Ottoman unity) he published articles in his friend Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi's Arabic newspaper *al-Haddra* and *Iqdam* in Istanbul. His second goal was to establish the School of Propagation and Teaching (*Dava ve Irşad Okulu*) in the capital city of the empire. In order to realize this goal he contacted many Ottoman bureaucrats including the grand vizier and the *shayk al-Islam* but as he did not accept the idea of establishing a school that is directly under the authority of the government his project came to

naught and he left Istanbul. During this visit he not only met with the CUP members but he was also in touch with the Ottoman intellectuals from *Sırat-ı Mustaqim*, an influential Islamist journal published in Istanbul (see Mertoğlu, 2001). Furthermore, Rashid Rida thought that Istanbul was not prosperous because of Abdulhamid's autocracy. Drawing attention to the inability of the government to extinguish the fires regularly erupting in Istanbul, Rashid Rida argued that if this incapability continues, the political leaders in the empire will not show great governance.

As he was not offered support by the Ottoman government for his projects, in 1912 looking for a political and financial assistance he took a trip to India where he got a significant financial support for his school of "*Davet ve İrsad*" which was started in Cairo as well as for his journal *al-Manar*. In India he also met with many outstanding Muslim scholars and administrators. On the way back to Cairo he stopped by at the Ottoman Empire's southeast frontiers, Oman and Kuwait. Finally he visited the Hejaz three months after the 1916 Arab Revolt had begun. In Mecca he came across with Turkish prisoners of war and there he also witnessed the formation of a new administration after the revolt. As Rashid Rida gave up hope from the CUP from 1913 onward, he first affiliated to the Party of *Lamerkeziyya* which basically demanded decentralization but in early World War I his thoughts gradually transformed into the Arabian Peninsula's separation from the Ottoman Empire. Thus once Sharif Hussein revolted in collaboration with the British against the empire, he presumed that the new "Arab King", Sharif Hussein, could help him with his project of *islah* and advocated that the Sharif be the caliph (see Ardiç, 2012, Ch. 5).

Therefore during his pilgrimage he declared his loyalty to Sharif Hussein and in order to justify the Sharif's revolt he propagated against members of the CUP by blaming them as violators of Islamic rules as well as Turkish nationalists who ill-treated Arabs, interfered the *Kanun-i Esasi* and who were also notoriously corrupt. In his propaganda for Sharif Hussein he cooperated with Muhibbuddin al-Khatib and Fuad al-Khatib who were journalists of the *al-Qibla* newspaper sponsored by the Sharif as well as with renowned Arab intellectuals as 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri and Kamil al-Qassab who were advocating Arab nationalism (Rıza, 2007: vii, 303). On 5th October 1916 Sharif Hussein issued the decree to form new Arab government in Mecca and soon after Rashid Rida arrived there and visited Sharif Hussein to talk about the form of the new government. According to the decree the Sharif's son

Abdullah was Foreign Minister and he was also acting Minister of Interior, Abdulaziz bin ‘Ali was Chief of the General Staff and also acting commander in-chief.

Aiming to support and justify the Sharif’s rebellion, Rashid Rida also gave a sermon in Mina near Mecca, which was published both in *al-Manar* and in the memoir. In this sermon he first praised Arabs as being a nation from which the prophet was selected and the Arabian Peninsula particularly the Hejaz as being the birth place of Islam. Then he gave very brief information about the sultans of Ottoman Empire in the last century. Accusing the CUP leaders as being corrupt he claimed that they came to power with the intrigues of Thessalonica’s Jews as well as with the help of Austria and Germany. He continued his speech with anecdotes to show the CUP’s failures in the Balkan Wars as well as in the Great War and its incapability to govern the empire since it captured the power in 1908. In a short period it brought the empire to the edge of abyss and since he was close to the inner circle of the central government Amir Hussein recognized it. As his power was limited he could only be able to rescue the Hejaz and its surrounding. According to Rashid Rida if Sharif did not rebel against the CUP, people of the Hejaz would die either because of poverty caused by the blockage or the relentless persecution made by Cemal Pasha. Most important of all protecting this region also means to protect the future of Islam. Therefore, Muslims have to be grateful to Sharif Hussein for what he did for Islam and for the Hejaz. Rashid Rida’s Hejaz notes end with appreciation and compliments to the new Arab king and support for his claim of the caliphate, which he announced in 1924. As the balance of power had changed in the Arabian Peninsula Rashid Rida who once an advocator of the CUP turned into an opponent of it. In brief, shifts in the positions of the political actors of the time led Rashid Rida to transform his attitudes towards them. Ironically, he would later call Sharif Hussein the “devil’s caliph”.

As Rashid Rida’s thoughts transformed promptly between 1908 and 1918 it is quite difficult to position him at a specific point on the ideological spectrum. According to his memoirs he was at the Ottomanist end of the spectrum in 1908 but unfolding events led him to slide towards Arab nationalism.

2.5. Salim Ali Salam (1868-1938)

Playing significant roles both in the Ottoman politics and later in that of Lebanon under the French mandate, Salim Ali Salam is an outstanding figure in the recent history of the Middle East. As a notable, Sunni Muslim, he held influential positions in various organizations. He served as mayor of Beirut, president of Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions (*al-Maqasid-i Khayriyya al-Islamiyya*) and as deputy of Beirut in the Ottoman Parliament before the disengagement of the Arabian Peninsula from the Empire. He was also an executive member of the 1913 Paris Arab Congress as well as the Syrian General Assembly and president of National Islamic Parliament (*Milli İslam Meclisi*). As the positions he held demonstrate, he was quite active both in politics and civil societal activities.

Covering the period between 1908 and 1918, Salim Ali Salam's memoirs shed light on a critical phase of the Ottoman history. In his memoir he provides valuable information on the last years of the Ottoman authority in Beirut, the Committee of Union and Progress' policies in the region, Cemal Pasha's attitudes towards the Arab nationalists, deliberations on the reforms and the issue of decentralization in Beirut as well as anecdotes about the Paris Arab Congress, the separatist trends appealing to the European powers, and also the relationships between Arabs and Turks in general. Furthermore, not only does the memoir consist of information about the political history of Beirut but also of the social and cultural atmosphere of it in early 20th century. Salim Ali Salam's memoir was prepared by Dr. Hassan Hallak based on Salam's manuscripts protected in the Beirut American University. The memoir includes the original text written by Salam as well as Hallak's comments, which include some explanations about Salam's activities between 1918 and 1938, as well as photographs and relevant documents.

Salim Ali Salam was born in 1868 to a Sunni notable family in Beirut. He could not get a regular education and once his father passed away he began to work. As he became a successful businessman he occupied certain administrative positions including being a representative at the Trade Court and also head of the Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*). Salam was not only engaged in trade and administration but also social issues particularly the activities to improve the education system in

Beirut. Thus, he made great contribution in the Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions (*al-Maqasid-i Khayriyya al-Islamiyya*) during his tenure as its president.

Salim Ali Salam begins his memoir by describing the unfavorable circumstances under which the Ottoman Empire was struggling to survive. For him due to the bad governance of Sultan Abdulhamid II who was concerned about nothing but his security, the empire lost its military and naval power. Moreover, for the same reason the empire was denigrated not only by the great powers but also by small states around it. While the sultan generously bestowed spies, the state was unable to pay the wages of soldiers and civil servant on time. According to Salam, it was due to these difficult conditions that people in different parts of the empire welcomed the 1908 Revolution with great joy (Selam, 2009: 82).

Soon after the 1908 Revolution Salam was appointed as mayor of Beirut. Though the municipality fell from grace due to great financial difficulties he made significant improvements in the water supply network and the road maintenance. Requesting appropriation for the establishment of sewage system in Beirut he contacted with the central government which was then under the grand vizierate of Kamil Pasha. Though the government first appeared interested in the project, it did not do anything to realize it (Selam, 2009: 87).

In addition to being mayor of Beirut Salam played significant role in the civil society. The Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions, which promoted education among the Muslims of Beirut, was founded in 1909, when the governor of Beirut, Nazim Pasha, appointed Salim Ali Salam as its president. During his presidency, he made reforms to improve the quality of education and teachers in this society's schools. He also increased revenues of the society, which used to suffer from the burden of financial deficit. The society's schools had gradually acquired reputation and in 1912 they became quite popular. Moreover, not only Muslims but also non-Muslims such as Butrus Dagir Efendi funded it. However, an unexpected event led Salim Ali Salam to resign from his post in the Society, which lost its prosperity during the First World War. After 1920 it regained its popularity with the assistance of King Faisal, Sharif Hussein's son, the king of Iraq.

As Salam exerted himself to progress in Beirut's education system Italians attacked Tripoli in 1911 and managed to occupy it despite a strong resistance. In the

meantime they occupied Rhodes and surrounding islands. As the Ottoman navy was not as strong as that of Italia, Ottomans could not fight directly with Italians rather they provided people of Tripoli with munitions and military officers to maintain resistance within the province. Soon, Egypt, which was then under the British occupation began to preclude the Ottomans sending assistance to Tripoli. This was when Salim Ali Salam was in Egypt and appealed Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, who did not have good relations with the CUP, to let the Ottoman Empire help Tripoli against Italians. In February 1912 Italia attacked the two army divisions at Beirut port with the pretext that they were helping Tripoli. Civilian deaths in the attack led to chaos and the governor, Ebu Bekr Hazim Bey, proclaimed martial law in Beirut. In the same year aiming to share the Ottoman territories in Europe some Balkan states including Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire (Arslan, 2009: 50). No one including the great powers of Europe presumed that the empire would be defeated but soon after the beginning of the war the Ottoman army was scattered and was heavily defeated. According to Salim Ali Salam these unexpected defeats led the Arab provinces to reconsider their situations. Beirut, in particular, was much more concerned about its existence due to its strategic geographical location. Regarding the future of Beirut some wished to joint Egypt which was under Britain, whereas others favored the French occupation (Selam, 2009: 94).

For Salam the empire was defeated because the CUP government had been replaced by that of the FAP, which had a profound impact even on the Arab provinces. Kamil Pasha, grand vizier of the new government, removed governor of Beirut Ebu Bekr Hazim from the office and reappointed the former governor Edhem Bey. People of Beirut were increasingly confused and some of them even began to look for alternatives to the Ottoman authority. In this critical period the French consul promised Nahle al-Tuveyni Bey, a friend of Salam, to support the people of Beirut with twenty thousand soldiers if they rebelled against the Ottoman Empire. According to Salam if the empire wanted to maintain its authority in the region it had to introduce extensive reforms. Insisting to form a committee in order to prepare a reform project the governor, Edhem Bey, sent a telegraph to the grand vizier Kamil Pasha. According to the grand vizier it was better to wait for the opening of the parliament under which they can plan the reforms. Nevertheless the governor and

Salim Ali Salam decided to embark on outlining broad reforms. A group that consisted of Kamil al-Sulh Bey, Ahmed Muhtar Beyhum, Ibrahim Sabit Efendi, and Petro Tarrad as well as Salam, outlined the reforms. In the meantime drawing attention to the indispensability of making reforms in Beirut, Salam sent a letter to *al-Ittihad-i Uthmani*, which was issued on December 22, 1912 (Selam, 2009: 96).

On 14 January 1913 representatives from all groups gathered at Provincial Council to set up a reform project. The representatives were made up of forty two Muslims and forty four non-Muslims who were constituted by sixteen Orthodox Greek, ten Maroni, six Catholic Greek, two Protestant, two Assyrian, two Catholic Armenian, two Orthodox Armenian, two Latin, and two Jewish. Among these twelve Muslims, twelve Christians, one Jewish were selected first to plan and execute the reform project. The Reform Committee came up with a reform project proposing decentralization according to which there will be two levels of administration: the national level that deals with foreign affairs, army, customs, postal and telegraph administrations, law making, and taxing; the local level on the other hand engages in the local issues and activities. The project includes details about the rights and responsibilities of the national and local officers and institutions. Moreover, according to the project Arabic like Turkish will be an official language of the Ottoman parliament. One of the most controversial articles of the project is the article that proposes the Provincial Council consisting of fifteen Muslims and fifteen non-Muslim members. Aiming to present the reform project to the Ottoman government the committee decided to send a group to Istanbul (Selam, 2009: 112).

As people of Beirut were dealing with making reforms to improve their relations with the Ottoman government, the conflict between the CUP and the FAP which was then governing the empire increased substantially in Istanbul. On 23 January 1913 a group of CUP officers entered the Sublime Porte (*Bab-i Ali*) during the Cabinet was in session, killed the Minister of War, Nazim Pasha, and forced the grand vizier Kamil Pasha to resign. With this coup d'état, known as the Babiali Baskini, Talat Bey became Minister of Interior, Cemal Pasha became the commander of Istanbul and while Mahmud Şevket Pasha was appointed both as the minister of war and as grand vizier of the new government under the CUP, and also Azmi Bey became chief police (Selam, 2009: 112). Soon after the coup the governor of Beirut Edhem Bey was replaced with the ex-governor Ebu Bekr Hazim Bey. The Reform

Committee first sent a telegraph to the new government to tell the process through which they set up a reform project then on 7th March 1913 they welcomed the new governor Ebu Bekr Hazim Bey. During the visit they reminded the fact that if the central government does not implement the reforms the enemies will interfere into the affairs of Beirut. They also remarked that their existence depends on the existence of the Ottoman Empire and they never wish to separate from it under any circumstances (Selam, 2009: 114).

In the following days representing the Party of Decentralization Abdulkarim al-Khalil came from Egypt for asking the Committee to join the party. On 8th April 1913 the new imperial decree was put in practice. In the meantime assuming that the Reform Committee's some demands are not in line with the *Kanun-i Esasi's* principles and the incentives that led to the formation of the Committee are no longer relevant, the Committee is rendered to be obsolete therefore the central government prohibited its members to gather henceforward. Members of the Committee and people of Beirut immediately responded to this memorandum and protested the governor by sending letters and telegraphs both to the governor and the central government and going for a general strike (Selam, 2009: 120). Some members of the Reform Committee were arrested after this telegraph but soon they were released.

In 1913 Beirut was not chaotic only because of the aforementioned crisis but also because of the demands of non-Muslim population, which constituted around twenty percent of the general population. Because of the reform project's article proposing the Provincial Council be composed of fifteen Muslims and fifteen non-Muslims heavily criticized Salim Ali Salam and his friends. Also non-Muslim groups' demand of occupying more than fifteen seats in the Council created disturbance among the Muslim population (Selam, 2009: 123).

Under these circumstances a delegation which included three Muslims and three Christians went to Paris for the First Arab Congress which was held on 18th June 1913 with the participation of representatives from different Arab countries (Selam, 2009). Salim Ali Salam, a delegate from Beirut delegation, was elected as a member of Executive Committee of Congress. After four sessions the delegates came up with ten reform articles which demanded administrative decentralization, making Arabic an official language in the Arab provinces, granting greater authority to the

Arab provincial governments, and letting Arabs to do their military service in their home provinces except in times of war. A copy of congressional resolutions was presented both to the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon and the Ottoman consul Mehmed Rifat Pasha in Paris. In early July 1913 the Beirut delegation including Salam visited Monsieur Margaret in Paris, the French officer who was responsible for the Eastern affairs, where Ahmed Muhtar Beyhum said to the officer that,

We thank to the French government for helping us holding our congress in Paris. As it has close relations with our government, we hope the French government to give an advice to our government for implementing the reforms. We have heard that in order to gain personal benefit an unauthorized person came to you expressing his or her wish to put Syria under the French authority. We want to enunciate that we chose Paris to hold our congress only because France provides freedom and it holds freedom demanders in high regard and also because there is an established relationship between France and our government. Absolutely we do not want to change our government". In response to Muhtar Beyhum's statement the French officer said that, "We do not have any ambitions on Syria and what we want most is you live in peace under your government". Muhtar Beyhum then asked him "Do you allow me to announce this on behalf of you?" The French officer's response was, "By all manner of means! Please announce this on behalf us (Selam, 2009: 129).

As Hallak specifies, during the same visit Salim Ali Salam also tried to clarify their position by stating that,

It is important for us you understand our feelings and thoughts about affairs of our state. Although we demand decentralization and the prerogatives that we lost, we are strongly attached to the reign of the commander of believers (*amir al-mu'minin*) the glorious caliph. Refuting his sovereignty and asking you to come to our state and protect us never occurs to our minds (Selam, 2009: 22).

As they left the French office, Dr. Eyyub and Halil Zeyniyye, Christian members of both the Reform Committee and Beirut delegation, expressed their annoyance at Muhtar Beyhum's statement during the conversation. Indeed their reaction was understandable because according to the revealed documents during the inspection of the French consulate after World War I these two Christian members with four others namely Michel Tuveyni, Yusuf al-Hani, Petro Tarrad, Rizkullah Arkash gave a note to the French consul Monsieur Couget on 12 March 1913. In the note, which is

quoted in Salim Ali Salam's memoir, they first listed their complaints about the Ottoman Empire's policies towards Christians in Syria and then their ambitions and demands. According to the note, Syrian Christians are strongly attached to France, which is admired the most by them. In the end of their letter they explicitly state that Syrian Christians' overwhelming desire is the France's conquest of Syria. This appeal led to a deep disappointment among Muslim members of the Reform Committee.

A group including Salim Ali Salam, Muhtar Beyhum, Sheik Ahmed, and Halil Zeyniyye was selected to go to Istanbul in order to negotiate the congressional resolutions with the Ottoman government and the government promised implementing all the articles that they agreed upon. As he was elected deputy from Beirut to the Ottoman parliament on 9th April 1914 Salim Ali Salam's activities to make progress in the conditions of the Arab provinces gained momentum. The first thing he did in the parliament was trying to find a solution for the inefficiency of the railway between Beirut and Damascus but World War I interrupted all the works. Moreover, he strived to form an Arab Bloc to defend Arab rights in the parliament. He even intended to use the lower floor of his house in Istanbul for the meeting of the Arab deputies. As he writes in his memoir (2009: 142) the outbreak of the war disrupted everything. In the last pre-war session of parliament he gave a long speech about endemic problems of public education in the Arab provinces.

As the Ottoman parliament was closed due to the outbreak of World War I the government had to suspend all its plans and projects. In the beginning of the war Ottoman government declared neutrality but soon it entered the war on the side of Central Powers composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. Some deputies including Salim Ali Salam did not welcome this unexpected decision and decided to make a motion in the parliament. Salam then had a private talk with Talat Pasha on the factors that led them to come close to Germany. In this dialog Talat Pasha informed Salam that,

Great powers many times promised to protect our state's territorial integrity but whenever they get an opportunity they took some parts from it. They promised Iran to ensure its independence. But indeed they divided it into two: Russian Iran and British Iran. For so long Russia's ambition is to occupy Istanbul, Britain's target is Iraq and France's is Syria. There is no way to

deter them from these ambitions. Under these circumstances how can we trust their promises? If we stay out of the war, they will share these places inter se in the end of the war. Therefore we are obliged to share Germany's fate (Selam, 2009: 148).

Satisfied with the explanation above Salim Ali Salam withdrew the motion. As the Ottoman parliament was shut down one and a half month after its opening Salam returned to Beirut.

The outbreak of the war led to a significant development in the Arabian Peninsula: appointment of Cemal Pasha who was then Commander of Naval Forces, as governor of Syria in the meantime as the Commander of Fourth Army. Cemal Pasha came to Syria with the mission of managing an expedition against Egypt. Soon after his assignment he ordered the arrest of Nahle al-Mutran Pasha and Esad Haidar Bey for cooperating with France against the empire. Salam requested their release but Cemal Pasha was quite determined to deal with separatist trends one of which Abdulkarim al-Khalil's plan in collaboration with Britain to rebel against the government in summer of 1915. Abdulkarim informed Salam about this plan and Salam's response was: "O! Abdulkarim! I recommend you to not get involved in these things. On my own behalf I never approve these activities". Soon a group including Abdulkarim al-Halil and Riza Bey was arrested for planning an insurgence against the government and they were trialed at Aley Martial Court. On the other hand, Sharif Hussein and his sons were planning a revolt against the empire in order to establish an Arab state in the region. In August 1915 Salam was informed by Abdulgani al-Uraysi about it and soon on the basis of the documented evidences Salam was detained for questioning about his relationship with Party of Decentralization, which began to engage with French officers to form an Arab government. Cemal Pasha also asked Salam about his relationships with some of the reformists including Reşid Rida, Refik al-Azm, Riza al-Sulh, Abdulkarim and Abdulgani al-Uveysi. When he was in detention nine Arab reformists were executed at the martial court. Salim Ali Salam took the executions hard and thought that what Cemal Pasha wanted was to get rid of thoughtful Arabs to make them helpless. Having these feelings he decided to struggle against the Cemal Pasha's ruthlessness. While in Istanbul Salam was planning to call all Arab deputies for exchanging their views on the Cemal Pasha's policies, Abdulwahhab al-Inklizi and Abdulhamid al-

Zahrawi were arrested in Syria. As Salam achieved no result in Istanbul due to the limited participation of Arab deputies, he returned to Beirut.

After all these upsetting events Cemal Pasha was deposed from his governorate of Syria in 1918 and for the Commander of Fourth Army German Von Sanders Pasha replaced him. After Cemal Pasha's deposition Salam went to Istanbul and in cooperation with Amir Shakib Arslan exerted himself to let the exiled Arabs return to their homeland. After a long lobbying process in the Ottoman parliament all Arabs who were exiled to Anatolia returned to the Arabian Peninsula.

Based on the information in his memoirs, Salim Ali Salam appears to be neither close to the CUP nor to France and Britain, which were then playing fundamental role in the Arab provinces. Though he was an advocator of radical reforms in the Arabian Peninsula, as he stated in his conversation with the French officer Monsieur Margaret, he never appealed to the idea of separating from the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, as aforementioned anecdotes from his memoir demonstrate he never supported Cemal Pasha's practices but he did prefer not to be involved in the revolt projects about which his reformist friends informed him. However, as the note written by the editor of the memoir (p. 198), asserts Salam took part in a Christian-Muslim movement, which advocated Syria's being superadded to Egypt. Moreover, though in the original text Salam did not clarify his position towards the Arab Revolt, according to Hallak's notes, as both Cemal Pasha and the Ottoman government kept being indifferent to the Arabs' reform demands, Salam, who was indeed a strong pro-Ottomanist, did not appeal to the separatist ideas but supported the 1916 Arab Revolt.

To conclude, it is safe to say that considering Arabs and the Ottoman Empire almost inseparable Salim Ali Salam was interestingly both pro-Ottomanist and Arab nationalist who advocated reforms in the Arab provinces to maintain the integrity between the empire and the Arabian Peninsula. Thus he can be positioned equidistantly to Arab nationalism and Ottomanism at the ideological spectrum.

2.6. Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946)

A Druze origin Arab thinker, politician, journalist and poet, Amir Shakib Arslan played a significant role in the history of the modern Middle East. Having strong connections with the Ottoman rulers including Sultan Abdulhamid II, Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha and Cemal Pasha, he was a pro-Ottomanist actor. Furthermore, he was quite active in Egyptian Red Crescent sustaining close ties with high-ranking German officers between the two World Wars. Covering between 1869 and 1920, Shakib Arslan's memoirs, include a wide range of details about the events that took place in this period. Bearing witness to the late 19th and early 20th century he provides readers with profound insight into the crucial years of the Ottoman Empire under the CUP rule. He was a member of the CUP's administrative board, and together with some other Arabs including Abdulaziz Jawish, Salih Şerif el-Tunisi and Ali Başhamba, was also a prominent member of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*.

As a dedicated advocator of *Ittihad-ı Uthmani* Shakib Arslan sided against the Arab nationalist trends, some of which were aiming to separate from the Ottoman Empire, considering nationalist movements as the Western imperialism's tricks to disintegrate the empire. Yet, Arslan fiercely criticized Cemal Pasha on the grounds that his violent policies towards Arabs were going to create hatred between Arabs and Turks (Arslan, 2009: vi). However, many Arab nationalists until today blame him for being a CUP member and betraying Arabs. Shakib Arslan was not disenchanted with the idea of *Ittihad-i Uthmani* until 1923, and thus continued working with prominent CUP members in Germany after World War I. But as the new Turkish government broke all the links with the Muslim world particularly with Arabs he understood that he would no longer be able to maintain this ideal. Thus he began to struggle for the unity of Arab world against the Western states' imperialist policies towards Arabs. In order to make Arabs' voice heard he constantly wrote articles in newspapers and journals leaving approximately twenty books covering wide range of issues. Moreover, he supported all the movements in the Muslim world against Western imperialism. Due to his political stance he was exiled to Switzerland by the French Mandate in Lebanon spending interwar years in Geneva.

Amir Shakib Arslan's memoirs consist of six chapters, in the first of which he gave brief information about his early life in Beirut and described social and political circumstances in the Ottoman Empire under the reign of Abdulhamid II and the CUP. In the following chapters he shared anecdotes about the Turco-Italian War,

Balkan War, Paris Arab Congress, World War I, Cemal Pasha's ruthless policies in Syria, famine in the Arab provinces during the World War I, and finally about aftermath of the war. Overall, he devoted a large segment of his autobiography to his relationship with Cemal Pasha, governor of Syria between 1914 and 1916.

Shakib Arslan was born in Al Shouifat in Southeast Beirut to an influential Druze family. He studied Arabic Language and Literature with Sheikh Abdullah Bustani at Maronite Hekma School in Beirut. Then in 1866 he attended the imperial school in Beirut where he met with Sheikh Muhammad Abduh who was teaching Islamic law, Islamic doctrines and logic. Like Rashid Rida and others Shakib Arslan was profoundly influenced by modernist and reformist teachings of both Muhammad Abduh and his teacher Jamaladdin Afghani. After the death of his father in 1887 he was appointed as governor of Al Shouifat, and remained at this post for two years. In 1908 he became Deputy Governor of the Shouf region in Lebanon and in 1913 deputy of Horan in the Ottoman parliament remaining at his post until the end of World War I.

Depicting the situation of the Ottoman Empire in early 20th century Arslan accused Sultan Abdulhamid II, who was "indeed merciful and generous" (Arslan, 2009; 28), of thinking of himself while the situation in Macedonia was getting worse. His bad governance was deemed by the public to be the source of all the problems in the empire. According to Arslan (2009: 29), even this assertion was correct to some extent the truth of the matter was that there were internal and external factors that led to troubles for the Ottoman Empire. First of all due to poor education people were overwhelmed by ignorance. Furthermore, having desire to form an independent state some ethnic and religious communities of the empire were included in activities that were to disintegrate the empire. On the other hand, European states' ambition to share the Ottoman territories was the primary external factor that caused inextricable problems. The empire was carved into numerous pieces but its Muslim population believed in the necessity of restoring *Kanun-i Esasi* which was suspended by Abdulhamid II in 1878. After describing the empire's situation during the last years of Abdulhamid's administration, Arslan explained the process through which the CUP was formed and came to power. He also put emphasis on different desires of the empire's non-Muslim communities.

When it comes to the Muslim groups in the empire, they have been bound by Islam for centuries but due to the bad governance and external pressure Arabs and Albanians, in particular, began to think of separating from the empire. Arslan (2009; 35) asserted that tension between Arabs and Turks caused by various arguments put forward by both sides. Arabs thought that they were lack of the privileges that Turks enjoyed. On the other hand Turks asserted that Arabs were exempted from the responsibilities that they undertook particularly the military service. As the Ottoman government had weakened, the conflict between Arabs and Turks increased. Pledging them to form an Arab state in the Arabian Peninsula, Britain even before World War I succeeded to induce some Arab youth. However, as stated by Arslan (2009; 36), those who were convinced by the British did not definitely constitute the majority of the public in the Arab provinces. According to him (Arslan, 2009: 36), Arab intellectuals were indeed aware of the Europeans' plans to share the Arab lands.

The CUP government was not only opposed by the Arab separatists but also by those in Istanbul who were against its secularist and nationalist policies. In a short period the CUP's opponents increased dramatically and attempting to kill prominent CUP members the opponents attacked the Ottoman parliament but as most of the CUP members escaped from Istanbul they could not achieve their goal. During this event called "the 31 March Incident" Shakib Arslan's cousin Amir Muhammad Arslan who was deputy of Latakia was killed. Soon after the insurgence, commanding both the armies of Edirne and Thessaloniki Mahmud Shawkat Pasha came to Istanbul to take revenge. Consequently, the CUP regained the power and the first thing it did was to replace Abdulhamid II with Sultan Mehmed Reşad. As they lost a family member, Arslan family were deeply affected by the 31 March Incident.

Providing details of the process through which Turco-Italian war broke out Arslan (2009; 45) disclosed France, Britain, and Italy's plans of sharing the Ottoman territories. France and Britain consented Italy's invasion of Tripoli in return Italy let them to invade Syria and Palestine. As soon as Italy got an opportunity it attacked Tripoli and Shakib Arslan, who thought that there was a close connection between the integrity of the empire and the unity of Muslims, rendered full assistance to the people of Tripoli. Arslan, together with Enver Pasha stayed in Tripoli for eight months, until August 1912. Moreover, he organized Druze volunteers and also

actively lobbied for assisting people of Tripoli. Thus he contacted with ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha and Egyptian Red Crescent. Having the same purpose he also intermediated between the Senussi leaders and the Ottoman government.

During Shakib Arslan's visit to Egypt, ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha asked him to remain in Egypt. According to the Khedive, as the Ottoman Empire was not promising anymore hence, aiming to draw their future, Arabs particularly intellectuals and leaders had to be organized. Acknowledging Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Rafik al-Azm told Arslan that, "We are not in the position of striving for Tripoli's deserts". Shakib Arslan's response was "Those who cannot protect Tripoli's deserts, can never protect Damascus's gardens" (Arslan, 2009: 48). In his memoir (Arslan, 2009; 45) he says that "I said many times that the Turco-Italian War will lead to new wars and each of these wars will be greater than the previous." During the war, Arslan together with Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal joined some clashes of arms in Derne. In the meantime, aiming to motivate Muslims to assist the empire for the Tripoli War, he regularly sent articles to *al-Mueyyed* newspaper. As reflected in his memoir (Arslan, 2009: 48) he thought that consequences of neglecting Tripoli would be worse than what Muslims particularly Arabs thought. While Shakib Arslan was in Tripoli, Albanians rebelled against the Ottoman government and occupied with the insurgency in the Balkans the government made a treaty with Italians and submitted Tripoli to them. Shakib Arslan did not give up; he first contacted with the Senussi sheiks as well as the Egyptian Khedive and then went to Istanbul where he met with the officials to continue supporting Tripoli. But as the empire lacked of power to fight with both Italia and four Balkan states at the same time Tripoli was left to Italians (Arslan, 2009: 50).

Similarly, when four Balkan states including Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, all motivated by Russia, declared war on the empire and more than hundred thousand of Balkan Muslims escaped to Istanbul from the oppression. Arslan not only organized aid to the war wearies through the Egyptian Red Crescent but also to the Ottoman garrison in Edirne which was occupied by the Balkan states. Soon, around two thousand Ottoman soldiers in San Stefano died because of epidemic cholera. The empire was disunited and not well prepared for the war. According to Shakib Arslan, though the troubles came one after another, it was

indeed the Ottoman government's inefficiency that led to the disastrous defeat of the empire in the Balkan War (Arslan, 2009: 54).

Soon after the war, Shakib Arslan together with several Turk and Arab intellectuals founded an organization, *al-Cem'iyyetu'l Khayriyyatu'l Islamiyya*, for the purpose of uniting all the communities of the empire under one roof. Arslan (2009, 60) claimed that if World War I did not break out they would contribute to the Ottoman's unity through this organization. As Arslan traveled to Egypt, on 23 January 1913 protesting the government's conceding to a demand by the European powers that Edirne should be handed over to Bulgaria, a group of CUP members entered the Sublime Port while the Cabinet was in session, killed the Minister of War, Nazım Pasha, and forced the grand vizier, Kamil Pasha, to resign. With this the empire began to be governed by Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas.

Not long after the *Babiali Baskını*, Shakib Arslan traveled from Egypt to Palestine and then to Gaza, Jerusalem, Nablus, and finally to Damascus. During his visits he tried to solidify the Turkish and Arab unity by bringing counter arguments to the separatist ideas among the Arabs. He constantly warned them about the French and the British who intended to occupy the Arabian Peninsula. According to Arslan (2009, 63) despotic administrations in India, Sudan, Egypt and other places, which were colonized either by Britain or France, indeed demonstrated their exact intention. In some cases Shakib Arslan's arguments were well received by the Arabs, in some others he was accused of being a CUP member and making its propaganda. Arslan (2009, 63) swears in his memoir that he broke off relations with the CUP before the Turco-Italian War. During his visit to Lebanon and Beirut Arslan observed a strong anti-government movement and because of his pro-Ottomanist stance he was heavily criticized by his friends. In response to them he told that soon they will see days that would be darker than tar and then they will yearn for the Turkish administration about which they were complaining (Arslan, 2009: 64).

As he left Beirut, a group of Arabs some of whom were Shakib Arslan's friends such as Salim Ali Salam and Muhtar Beyhum organized the Arab Congress in Paris. According to Arslan (2009, 65) while the Ottoman government was striving against the Balkan states it was not appropriate to organize a congress in France whose aim was to capture Syria. Furthermore, he thought that anything detracting the

empire will ultimately detract all Muslims because in the eyes of Europeans all Muslims indeed were one nation. Thus, in collaboration with Mardinizade Arif Bey, the governor of Damascus, intellectuals, leaders of sects, patriarchs and bishops, he telegraphed to the central government declaring that they were not recognizing the Congress. As stated by Arslan (2009, 65) many people from all Syrian cities sent similar telegrams to Istanbul.

As stated earlier, after negotiating with deputies of the Arab Congress one of whom was Salim Ali Salam, the Ottoman government invited a group constituted by Shakib Arslan, Muhammad al-Azm, Abdurrahman al-Yusuf Pasha, Abdul Muhsin al-Ustuvani, Amin al-Tarzi, Sheikh Asad al-Shokairi, Muhammad al-Mahzumi Pasha, and Dr. Hassan al-Asir in order to discuss the Arab issue and the demands of Syrians. During the Istanbul Congress Arab guests pointed out the need of giving greater authority to the Arab provinces as well as of putting more emphasis on Arabic. They also asked the government to establish a university in the Arabian Peninsula. Assigned by the government Shakib Arslan and Abdulaziz Jawish spent almost three months in Medina to establish a university (Arslan, 2009: 67). In addition to laying foundation of the university he also launched a branch of *Cem'iyetu'l Hayriyyatu'l al-Islamiyya* in Medina. Surprisingly, the other four Arab intellectuals analyzed in this research, mentioned neither the Istanbul Congress nor the project of establishing a university in Medina. Nor do they get enough attention in the historiography of the modern Middle East, particularly by those influenced by Arab nationalism, for these events seem inconclusive due to the secession of Arab provinces from the Empire, and thus largely ignored by modern historians. In 1914 Arslan was elected as a deputy of Horan and selected as the only Arab to the commission, of *Kalem-i Umumi*, which was functioning as a mediator between the parliament and the government. Headed by Talat Pasha, Minister of Interior, the commission performed quite well for a few months and the government gradually began to recover but World War I disrupted the government's projects.

When the Ottoman government was involved in the war, Shakib Arslan was in Beirut and gave speeches to calm the public down. Soon the commander of the Damascus Army attempted to seize the arms of Mount Lebanon's Christians but Arslan thought that this would cause fear and chaos among the Christians and persuaded him not do so. He (Arslan, 2009; 85) continued mediating between the

government and the Christians of Lebanon in order to avoid potential conflicts during the war. On the same days, aiming to gain information about the Arabs' connections with the foreigners in the Arab provinces the Ottoman government inspected the foreign consulates in the region. As discussed earlier, Cemal Pasha, based on the documents seized from the French Consulate exiled and executed some Arabs. Arslan indeed opposed seizure of the consulates for the reason that this would cause the Arabs' alienation. However, he underscored the fact that documents recovered from the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut disclosed significant information for the government (Arslan, 2009: 83).

When in the early days of World War I Cemal Pasha was appointed as a governor of Syria and soon he embarked the first Canal Expedition. Shakib Arslan together with a hundred volunteer soldiers joined the expedition which was to no avail. On the way back to Beirut Cemal Pasha appreciated Arslan and telling him that, "the government will not forget the services you rendered to the state" (Arslan 2009; 92). Arslan was on good terms with him until Cemal Pasha appealed to the oppressive policies in Syria. As Shakib Arslan stated, almost two thousand Arabs were exiled to Anatolia in this period and the government carefully recorded the exiled Arabs' real estates. According to the rumors this was because of the government's plan to give same amount of property in Anatolia to the dislocated Arabs and to locate Turk families in place of the exiled Arabs. It was believed that the government aimed to break the aristocratic structure of the Arabian Peninsula thus it had exiled prominent Arab families (Arslan, 2009: 98).

Shakib Arslan asserted that the reason behind the large scale expulsion and exile was Turkey's victory in the Dardanelles War (2009, 99). For him the euphoria of victory led the CUP taking hasty decisions such as discharging the women's obligation of veiling, making the *Meşihat-ı İslamiyye* a dysfunctional institution by taking the *Shari'ah* court from its supervision and putting under the judiciary. The CUP's another impulsive action was killing the Arab spirit in Syria and it did this through Cemal Pasha who was then quite popular due to his military achievements. He attempted to Turkify the Syrian Arabs and eradicate Arab nationalism in the region. After beating the great armies in Dardanelles the Ottoman leaders thought that they could do everything they wished. Arslan (2009: 99) claimed that apparently Cemal Pasha promised them to overcome the Arab spirit in Syria and in return he

was allowed to have his druthers. Consequently, he adopted unprecedented policies in Syria.

Shakib Arslan (2009; 99) associated not only the exiles with the Dardanelles victory but also the Cemal Pasha's executions. According to him, Cemal Pasha would never be able to execute Arabs if Turkey did not pull off a victory in the Dardanelles War. Cemal Pasha's despotism would be justifiable if the circumstances of the war were considered but his practices were not correct as far as politics was concerned. Giving full authority to Cemal Pasha in the region as well as trying of political offenders by court-martial was by no means a good politics to follow. For Arslan, Cemal Pasha's ruthless policy was one of the most dreadful disasters that happened to the Muslim world and the Ottoman Empire throughout history. As stated by Arslan (2009, 101), the central government was not informed about the executions before they were carried out. Nevertheless as they let him have a free hand Talat and Enver Pasha were also accountable for what happened in Syria during Cemal Pasha's reign (Arslan, 2009: 101). Regarding Cemal Pasha's personality Arslan thought that with his ability of making quick and sharp decisions as well as his uncompromising and arrogant attitudes he might be a good commander but not a good politician.

Shakib Arslan used every means possible to help the Arab detainees as well as exiled ones during Cemal Pasha's governorate and afterwards. He not only appealed to him personally but also managed to meet with Enver Pasha during his trip to Syria so as to appeal to him for the release of Arab detainees in Aley. But it was clear that Enver Pasha was unable to help. This was because, to be secured from the evils of the Turanist group, which supported Cemal Pasha, Enver and Talat were tolerating Cemal's way of handling things in Syria. Furthermore, as the Ottoman army commanded by Cemal Pasha defeated the British army twice in Gaza during the war, the central government became more tolerant and simply sent Midhat Şükrü Bleda to negotiate with him for the exiled Arabs to return to their homeland. As another step the government sent a committee to Syria to propitiate the Syrian Arabs in 1916. Thus, Shakib Arslan's efforts remained inconclusive until the discharge of Cemal Pasha from Syrian governorate toward the end of World War I. As the Ottoman army was defeated by the British in Palestine in 1917, Cemal Pasha lost his

popularity and resigned from his post both as Commander of 4th Army and Syrian governor.

In the same year Arslan who was still deputy of Horan went to Istanbul and together with some other Arab deputies including Salim Ali Salam lobbied in the Ottoman Parliament for the exiled Arabs in Anatolia who were then put on regular salary by the Ottoman government (Arslan, 2009: 125). In the summer of 1917 he visited Germany at the request of Enver Pasha, where he met with high-ranking officials in the ministry of foreign affairs. In Munich he gave a lecture on the famine in Syria explaining how the Allies blocked all the sea roads going to Syria, which was not self-sustained in terms of food production (Arslan, 2009: 146). In his speech, he referred to the Ottoman government's appeals for humanitarian aid in the wake of the famine in Syria. Arslan and Enver Pasha sent a letter to the Pope stating that if the Papacy managed to bring food and aid materials to Syria, the Ottoman government would pay for it and if the Papacy had a suspicion that the Ottoman government using up the aid materials, it would give a pledge not to touch the aid. But they could not get any response from the Pope. Moreover, the food aid sent by Syrians in America failed to reach the Syrians as the British forces laid siege to Beirut and the Jew American consul in Beirut alleged poor excuses. Based on these evidences, Shakib Arslan (2009, 148) asserted in his memoirs that, it was indeed the Entente Powers that caused the death of tens of thousands of Syrians during the famine. Furthermore, emphasizing the pathetic situation of the Syrians Arslan sent a report to the Pope demanding food aid for the Syrians at least for the Christians in Syria and Lebanon.

When the war ended, Shakib Arslan was in Germany and soon Talat, Enver, and Cemal Pashas left the empire and came to there. In a few years of time they all were assassinated by Armenian assassins. Arslan only referred to Enver Pasha as martyr among them. Shakib Arslan, still believing in the *Ittihad-ı Uthmani*, was in touch with both Talat and Enver Pashas before they were assassinated.

Arslan did not mention the Arab Revolt until the very end of his memoir. He referred to it in examining the consequences of the Cemal Pasha's practices. He did not agree with the argument that if Cemal Pasha did not carry out the executions, Sharif Hussein would not rebel against the Ottoman government. He opposed this

argument because he asserted that Sharif Hussein had connection with the British even before the CUP rule and his idea of revolting against the government could be traced back to the Sultan Abdulhamid's period and the sultan was aware of it. Thus, as the CUP members replaced Sharif Ali, then Amir of Makka, with Sharif Hussein in 1908, Sultan Abdulhamid said that, "I know this man very well and I do not accept responsibility for what he will do" (Arslan, 2009: 192). Arslan's memoirs also contain information on, Sharif Hussein's negotiations with the British before World War I.

Referring to Cemal Pasha Arslan (2009, 194) asserted that even if Cemal Pasha's oppression did not lead to the Arab Revolt, it gave an excuse to those who preferred European administration to the Ottoman one in the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, Arslan (2009, 194) admitted that among Arabs there were definitely some who disregarded Muslim unity and considered the British's victory as the victory of Arabs. However, he disapproved the Cemal Pasha's justifications for his policies arguing that, those who were purely Turkish nationalists like Cemal Pasha had no right to punish the Arab nationalists. Overall, during his life time Shakib Arslan played multilateral role in attempting to unite the Muslims to stand against foreign colonialism. Associating the Muslims' unity with the Ottoman Empire he, in spite of the aforementioned critiques he made, supported the empire until the very end of it thus he is positioned on the pro-Ottomanist edge of the spectrum.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYZING the DISCURSIVE TRANSFORMATION

3.1. Introduction

In this part of the research I compare the five Arab intellectuals and their memoirs in terms of the themes they covered and issues they prioritized. As the description in the previous chapter demonstrates, the Arab intellectuals' attitudes were not uniform towards Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula between 1908 and 1918. Even though these intellectuals, namely Izzat Darwaza, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Rashid Rida, Salim Ali Salam, and Amir Shakib Arslan, wrote about the same period in their memoirs, they not only concentrated on the different events but also evaluated the same issue differently. However, there are certain points upon which all of them agreed as well.

As it was pointed out earlier, discrepancies among the Arab intellectuals' attitudes may be explained with reference to the differences in the ideologies and the positions they held and the perspectives they adopted, the regional contexts they grew up, the social networks they engaged in, as well as the age group they belonged. Holding a political position such as being representative in the Ottoman parliament (Dawn, 1998) or having close relationships with Ottoman elites plays a significant role in articulation of their ideological positions. According to Ernest Dawn, in the case of Syria Arabs who benefitted from the Ottoman Empire tended to be pro-Ottomanist whereas those who did not were more likely to be nationalist. Moreover, he indicated that Arab nationalists more likely to be younger than pro-Ottomanists (Dawn, 1998; 178). Accordingly, the youngest among the five Arab intellectuals that I analyze in this research, is Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984) who could not get an opportunity to acquire a bureaucratic or political position. He was

positioned on the Arab nationalist edge of the ideological spectrum that I illustrated to classify the Arab intellectuals.

The main point on which all the Arab intellectuals agreed is Cemal Pasha's policies towards the Arabs. Although they all had different views on the CUP, without any exceptions all the Arab intellectuals were severely critical of Cemal Pasha's policies, which were deemed to be ruthless. Shakib Arslan and Salim Ali Salam, in particular, who had close connections with the Ottoman elites, tried every possible means to prevent the exiles and executions. With the exception of Shakib Arslan all the intellectuals many times underscored the need of substantial reforms for the improvement of the Arab provinces. Though he was very much concerned about the empire's unity and progress, Arslan did not use the term "reform" in his memoirs. Moreover, in general they all stood against the foreign (referring to France and Britain) administrations in the Arabian Peninsula. Even, Darwaza and Arslan, due to their opposition to the mandate regimes, had to live for a period outside the Arabian Peninsula after 1918. Among the five only Rashid Rida appreciated the European states particularly Britain on all occasions and referred to British soldiers as kind (Rıza, 2007: 253), the British people as perfectly decent (Rıza, 2007: 190), and Britain as the best political model to follow (Rıza, 2007: 125).

Furthermore, as it was described earlier in this chapter they all severely criticized the CUP's nationalist policies towards the Arabs. Except Salim Ali Salam and Rashid Rida, all the intellectuals referred to the CUP's so-called Turkification policies towards the Arabs as well. Among the three Arslan argued that Cemal Pasha's exiles and executions were part of the CUP's Turkification project (Arslan, 2009: 119). Moreover, regarding the use of Turkish in public domains Darwaza (2007, 186) emphasized that before the reinstatement of *Kanun-i Esasi* in 1908, all the primary school books were published in Turkish for all communities in the empire. According to Darwaza unlike the CUP administration the government did not aim to Turkify the other nationalities by imposing Turkish as a medium language. In contrast, with the proclamation of *Kanun-i Esasi* in 1908, Turkish nationalism and Turanism rapidly flourished among the Ottoman leaders, according to whom other groups needed to be assimilated.

Regarding the issue of Turkification Hasan Kayalı argues that,

The question of Turkification was an extension of the centralization-decentralization debate and became an issue when Hamidian autocracy crumbled and the social groups dominating the revolutionary government prepared to establish a centralized government buttressed by a national economy.....Those Arabs who found the centralizing policies of the CUP unpalatable for political, socioeconomic, or cultural reasons increasingly identified with the decentralist camp and found in the charges of Turkification a weapon to fight Unionist centralization and to produce a shift in the pro-CUP Arab public opinion (Kayalı, 1998: 126).

Contrary to what Kayalı asserted, in the account of both Hanioglu and Zürcher, who indeed did not refer to the term of Turkification, Young Turks were committed to Turkish nationalism even before 1908 (Zürcher 1992, Hanioglu, 2008).

Another common feature they all shared is that in the memoirs none of the intellectuals referred to the concept of the (failed) Arab caliphate, which was a hotly debated issue in the first quarter of the 20th century among the Arabs. As explained in Chapter 1, Arab intellectuals such as Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, and Afghani revived the notion of the Arab caliphate not only as a means for the Arabs to get organized politically but also as an inherently religious and historical right. Since the late 1870s both British officials and press had been propagating the “illegitimacy” of the Ottoman Caliphate. This was one of the principles that shaped the British foreign policy towards the ‘Eastern Question (Ardıç, 2012). Moreover, as the Treaty of Constantinople and Sykes-Picot Agreement demonstrate, for Britain, France and Russia formation of an Arab Caliphate under their control was necessary to abolish the Ottoman Caliphate (Ardıç, 2012). It is striking how none of the five Arab intellectuals overlooked such an important issue. This silence might be due to the fact that successive attempts to create an Arab Caliphate by Sharif Hussein and others (such as King Fuad of Egypt) all failed and consequently strengthened European rule (instead of Arabs) in the Middle East while helping weaken the Ottoman Empire. Izzat Darwaza (2007, 424) once referred to the Ottoman Caliphate as “so-called”. Furthermore, except Salim Ali Salam and Shakib Arslan none of them recalled the Ottoman Caliph with reverence.

As emphasized earlier, the five Arab intellectuals concentrated on different issues in their memoirs. For instance, among the five only Shakib Arslan stressed the

significance of the issue of famine. Arslan (2009, 147-152) allocated seven pages of his memoirs to explain its causes. In 1917 he gave a lecture to the high-ranking German officers on the famine in Syria and Lebanon. He strongly argued that the major factor that led to it was the Allies blocking of all the coasts of Syria during the Great War. Interestingly, the other four did not pay much attention to it. While Salam did not even mention of it in their memories, Rashid Rida, during his sermon in Mina, claimed that as the CUP's armies were located in the Hejaz the Allies had to subdue the coasts, which led to the destitution of the people in the region (Rıza, 2007: 327). In this regard standing exact opposite of Arslan, Rashid Rida blamed the CUP rather than the Allies who blocked the coasts to prevent Syrians receive the humanitarian aid. Similarly, Darwaza put the blame on Cemal Pasha and claimed that Cemal Pasha blockaded Lebanon, which was mostly populated by Christians, and prevented them to get food from outside. Consequently, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon had faced starvation for two years (Derveze, 2007: 401). In contrast, Kurd Ali (2006, 246) stated, in his memoirs, that as Lebanon began to suffer from lack of food during World War I Cemal Pasha provided sufficient amount of wheat to Lebanese. Some archbishops together with prominent religious (Christian) functionaries held half of the wheat for their own account and sold it and they mixed the remaining half with soil to distribute. The poor who consumed the wheat mixed with soil perished. Even though the Maronite Patriarch was aware of the whole process, Christians spread the rumor that Cemal Pasha intentionally let Christians die of starvation. Kurd Ali also underlined that the Patriarch, which owned one fourth of all residential properties in Lebanon, could help Christian community but it did not. These two contrasting attitudes and Salam's silence on famine are an indication of how ideological positions shape the intellectuals' reading of recent history.

The five intellectuals had also different views on Sultan Abdulhamid II. Interestingly, those who are positioned on the pro-Ottoman edge of the spectrum did not have a positive view on Abdulhamid's reign. Arslan depicted not only the unfavorable conditions under the Hamidian rule but also the Sultan's generosity and kindness towards people (Arslan, 208: 28). Salim Ali Salam as the second most pro-Ottomanist after Shakib Arslan among the five, presented Abdulhamid's administration as corrupt (Selam, 2009: 81, 164). In contrast, Izzat Darwaza, who had a strong nationalist discourse, tempted to regard Abdulhamid II neutrally. He

even appreciated both his policies towards the European powers (Derveze, 2007: 171) and his efforts to prevent a Jewish settlement in Palestine (Derveze, 2007: 273). Likewise, anti-CUP Kurd Ali did not say anything negative about the sultan in his memories. This differentiation implies that their view of the “Ottoman rule” was heavily conditioned by their experiences and views of the CUP administrations during 1908-1918.

By the same token, these intellectuals differed in how they saw the CUP. Arslan, the most pro-Ottomanist among the five, had close ties with the CUP leadership and even was a member of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, the secret organization directly attached to the CUP. Even though he was quite critical of the CUP due to Cemal Pasha’s oppressive policies in the Arab Provinces, Arslan, in general, had a positive view of the former. Unlike Arslan, Darwaza was always critical about the CUP in spite of the fact that he affiliated to its Nablus branch soon after it came to power (Derveze, 2007: 244). On the other hand, Rashid Rida initially supported the CUP and even hoping to establish his dream project, Islamic Institute, in the imperial capital, he paid a visit to Istanbul after the 1908 Revolution. As he was not satisfied with its policies he soon lost his faith in the CUP administration and finally in collaboration with Sharif Hussein he totally turned against it. Having a relatively moderate position, Salim Ali Salam and Kurd Ali had hopes in the CUP but the pressure exerted by it gradually alienated them. Kurd Ali particularly had hard times with the CUP due to his critiques in *al-Muqtabas* newspaper towards it.

Therefore, there is also a discrepancy among the Arab intellectuals in their views of the Ottoman Empire in general. For Shakib Arslan Muslims could only be united under the Ottoman rule thus he persistently pinned his hopes on the empire until mid-1920s. According to Arslan, survival of the empire was the only way to stand against the European colonialism in the Muslim world. Hence, he supported the empire through every possible means. Similarly, politician and bureaucrat Salim Ali Salam was also deeply bound up with the Ottoman Empire thus he struggled for bringing structural reforms particularly administrative decentralization across the Arabian Peninsula rather than allying with the foreign powers to separate from the empire. Thus, Salam’s Arab nationalist sentiments did not hinder him being pro-Ottomanist. On the other hand, considering the possibility of more than one caliph at the same time, Darwaza (2007, 425) justified to collaborate with the opponent groups

such as Britain against the Ottoman Empire so that the Arabs could gain their independence. Darwaza prioritized the Arab rights over everything else and thus took part in separatist organizations such as *al-Fatat* to struggle against the CUP's nationalist practices in the Arab provinces. Adopting a kind of cultural nationalism, Kurd Ali thought that the Ottoman Empire had assimilated the Arabs for centuries therefore he strived for the revival of Arabic as the dominant language in the region. Even though he wished that Arabs would have an independent state in the region he was not involved in organizations championing the Arabs' separation from the empire. On the other hand, Rashid Rida, once declared his loyalty to Sultan Abdulhamid II and then to the CUP, did not openly argue against the Ottoman authority until Sharif Hussein's revolt in 1916. Though, appreciating the previous Ottoman sultans in his sermon in Mina Rashid Rida justified the Sharif's rebellion on the grounds that the CUP was incompetent and secularist, as well as nationalist. It was indeed the CUP administration that was fiercely criticized by the Arab intellectuals rather than the Ottoman Empire in general.

When it comes to the 1916 Arab Revolt that supposedly led to the Peninsula's independence, the Arab intellectuals also adopted different attitudes. Standing against it, Arslan devoted the issue only one and a half page of his 198 page of memoirs. In contrast, Rida and Darwaza fully supported the revolt putting forward various factors to justify the Sharif's rebellion against the empire. Although Salam did not openly support the revolt in his memoirs, its editor Hassan Ali Hallak argues (Salam, 2009: 198) that he lent his support to the Arab Revolt. On the other hand, Muhammad Kurd Ali, who indeed had a desire of having an independent Arab state in the region, did not reflect himself as a supportive of the revolt.

Furthermore, out of the five intellectuals only Shakib Arslan was against the 1913 Paris Arab Congress. He together with many other prominent Syrians even declared that they did not recognize the congress and attended instead the alternative, pro-Ottoman congress held in Istanbul. Furthermore, Arslan also attributed great importance to the Tripolitan War, thus he not only organized volunteers from Lebanon to fight against Italians in Tripoli but also spent eight months in Derne. Salam, Darwaza, and Rida also devoted parts of their memoirs to the Tripolitan War. On the other hand, it is hard to find any reference to this war in Kurd Ali's memories which mainly focused on the press and cultural issues.

Overall, the five intellectuals put an emphasis on specific issues implicitly or explicitly considered particular events as turning points in the relationships between Arabs and the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1918. According to Shakib Arslan, for instance the Tripolitian War, Balkan War, and the First World War, which broke out one after another, were to be deemed as milestones in the determination of the Arabs' attitudes towards the empire. Moreover, Cemal Pasha's policies increased the Arabs' hatred of Turks. Arslan also referred to France's and Britain's ambitions to occupy the Arabian Peninsula as well as their tendencies to construct plots against the empire. On the other hand, Darwaza, the only intellectual among the five to use the terms of "Arab movement" and "Arab rights" in his memories, considered both the Great War and the Sharif's revolt as the milestones for the Arab movement. Unlike the previous two, Kurd Ali did not specify any watershed event for the relationships of Arabs and Turks in the first quarter of the 20th century but he persistently referred to the CUP's and Cemal Pasha's nationalist and oppressive attitudes particularly in terms of freedom of speech as a factor that increased the Arabs' alienation from Turks. On the other hand, according to Salim Ali Salam, the most important factor that led Arabs to look for alternative future projects by excluding the empire was the Ottoman government's unreliability as well as reluctance to carry out structural reforms due to overwhelmed political instability during the CUP rule. Like the other Arab intellectuals, he also called attention to the Cemal Pasha's exiles and executions. As Arslan did, Salam too stressed upon the secret plans of the foreign powers, in collaboration with Syrian Christians, to capture the political power in the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, Rashid Rida, based on the observations during his trip to Istanbul, remarked the CUP's political incapability. Furthermore, aiming to justify the Arab Revolt he severely criticized the CUP's policies. It can be said that he took World War I and the Arab Revolt as watershed though he did not specify it in his travel notes I examine in my thesis.

As the analysis of the memoirs in the previous chapter revealed, each of the five Arab intellectuals located in different regions mainly in the Arabian Peninsula and exposed to issues that were not similar. Furthermore, having different social background, occupation, and ideological standpoint each of them had a different experience. Yet they all somehow went through an ideological transformation during the CUP administration. The variables that led to the "emergence", referring to the

Foucaultian concept, of Arab nationalism as a viable alternative to Ottomanism, which increasingly became obsolete, for the Arab intellectuals were varied. Thus, it is difficult to identify a specific threshold, utilizing the Foucaultian concept, after which they all shifted their postures. Rather, as the above comparison of the discourses demonstrates each of the five was deeply influenced by different developments. However, based on the analysis of the five Arab intellectuals' own evaluations, it is safe to say that there were four major historical turning points between 1908 and 1918 in determining the Arab intellectuals' attitudes towards the Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula. The first was the transformation of the CUP's policies from being relatively libertarian to oppressive in ten years of time; the second was the outbreak of World War I and the impact of European colonialism; the third turning point was Cemal Pasha's policies during his governorate in Syria; last - but not least- breaking point was the 1916 Arab Revolt.

Before examining these four major factors, it is necessary to shed light on a few issues to prevent any misconception. We should not forget that national or ethnic identities such as Turk and Arab did not exist as we understand them today, Arabness and Turkishness were still becoming in this era. Moreover, this study does not make any claim on the intellectuals rather it aims to demonstrate the changes took place in their ideological discourses. Except Darwaza none of the Arab intellectuals I examine in this research identify themselves as Arabist or Arab nationalist in their memoirs thus I also prefer not to call them so.

The period between 1908 and 1918 was right before the beginning of nation-state building process both in the Arab provinces and Ottoman center, Turkey. As the Arab intellectuals I analyze lived in this transition period their political discourses were extremely complex and hybrid. Thus, they involved different elements some of which were in conflict. On the other hand, the main characteristic of their discourses in this period was that they had gradually gained Arab nationalist tones.

In order to explain the transformation of the attitudes of Arabs towards the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1918, Rashid Khalidi (1991) utilizes the terms Ottomanism, Arabism, and Arab nationalism. For him, before 1914 Arabism referred to emphasizing Arab elements of identity although it included Islamic, Ottoman, and regional loyalties (Khalidi, 1991: 61). Thus, he argues, "for most of its adherents

before 1914, Arabism did not mean Arab separatism, nor did it conflict with loyalty to the Ottoman Empire or its religious legitimizing principle” (Khalidi, 1991: 62). He (1991) also argues that between 1908 and 1914 Arabism referred to some measure of local autonomy and administrative decentralization; it also implied opposing the CUP’s nationalist and repressive policies and strong centralization, as well as manipulation of all sorts of means for its own benefit (see also Kayalı, 1998). Same goes true for the five Arab intellectuals I analyze in this research, as highlighted earlier in this chapter and Chapter 2, whether the Arabs should remain part of the empire was not an issue until 1914.

Even though, Ottomanists and Arabists had ideological differences, which basically involved concrete political matters including the issue of centralization versus decentralization, the primary objective of the both was “preservation of the region from external encroachment under the Ottoman umbrella” (Khalidi, 1991; 63) but they contradicted on how to realize this goal, which led to most of the conflicts between them. According to Khalidi, Arabists turned into Arab nationalists after the CUP shuttered the Arab opposition in 1913-1914 and World War I broke out (Khalidi, 1991: 63).

Likewise, Ernest Dawn (1998, 167) underscored that the Arab movement, which spread through reform associations in Basra and Beirut until 1912-1913, reached its peak at 1913 Arab Congress and finally, with World War Arab nationalist leaders adopted armed resistance against the empire. The revolt organized by Sharif Hussein, who indeed was a conservative Ottomanist (Wilson, 1991), was part of this process. Dawn also argues that between 1919 and 1920 82% of the prominent Arab nationalists in Syria were not nationalist before 1918 basically because as the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I Arab elite did not have any option except Arab nationalism (Dawn, 1998; 176-192).

3. 2. The CUP’s Policies and the Arab Intellectuals

All of the Arab intellectuals I analyze, like most of the groups in the empire, pinned their hopes on the constitution reinstated by Abdulhamid II after the 1908 Revolution. But, as the CUP gained the power, the government encountered multiple internal and external challenges including international complications, plots, revolts, and wars. As a reaction to these challenges, the CUP government adopted restricting policies after the 31 March Incident, the first internal threat against its authority. Soon, it cracked down on the dissidents some of whom were Arabs demanding comprehensive reforms in the Arab provinces. According to the narratives in the memoirs, transformation of the CUP's policies from being relatively liberal and inclusive into oppressive, centralist, and nationalist led to the alienation of the Arabs from the Ottoman government. In the meantime, political instability caused by internal political turmoil and heavy defeats in Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars created an unreliable image of the empire in the eyes of the Arabs, which led them to search for administrative alternatives to the empire. In this part of the thesis I examine the process through which the relationship between the CUP government and Arabs deteriorated and how the five Arab intellectuals' discourses were transformed accordingly.

Relationship between the Young Turks and Arabs particularly Arab intellectuals can be traced back as early as the late 1870s (Hanioğlu, 1991). Prominent Arab leaders such as Amir Amin Arslan and Khalil Ghanim, founders of the Turkish-Syrian Committee, which joined the CUP in 1896, had close ties with the Young Turks in early on (Hanioğlu, 1991). As the CUP was quite popular among the personnel of the 5th Army based in Syria, between 1895 and 1897 most of its activities concentrated in Syria between 1895 and 1897. It was supported by the Sufi leaders such as Sheikh Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi, civil servants, and notables and representatives of the leading families in Syria. As these groups, who were in contact with Armenian organizations and British representatives as well, had revolutionary plans, the Palace took their activities in Syria seriously. Consequently, the CUP's largest local organization was dismantled but it was not totally uprooted from the region (Hanioğlu, 1991). Thus, the CUP was not alien to the Arab intellectuals except for Darwaza who was around 12 year old living in Nablus when the CUP was popular in Syria.

After a decade championing “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice” the Young Turks, whose primary objective was to maintain the integrity of the empire (Zürcher, 1992; Zeine, 1966), overthrew the Hamidian administration in 1908. Celebrating the sultan’s reinstatement of the constitution, people including Arabs participated in demonstration in the empire’s cities. The ten years of the CUP rule can be divided into three major phases: 1908-1909, 1909-1913, and 1913-1918 (Karpat, 2012). In these three phases the CUP gradually hardened its measures to defend the empire in the face of internal and external threats and consequently turning into authoritarian, centralist and nationalist.

In the first stage, the CUP decided not to take over the government but to influence it behind the scene. The new government introduced a program of wide range of individual rights guaranteeing equality and justice for all Ottomans regardless of religion and ethnicity. Consequently, numerous political parties, ethnic-based cultural and political clubs as well as newspapers and periodicals blossomed (Shaw, 1977), but soon the CUP’s vision of Ottoman unity of Ottoman came into conflict with the propagandas of these organizations.

The first external blow to the constitutional government came from Austria, which annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, then Bulgaria proclaiming its independence, and finally Greece annexing Crete in 1908-1909. As the territories were rapidly lost, the old divisions and conflicts replaced the euphoria and hope. The Muslim citizens, who presumed that Constitution would prevent the European intervention, turned to the sultan again. On the other hand, “the minority nationalists saw in the government’s anguish at the loss of these territories a denial of their own hopes for autonomy or even independence” (Shaw, 1977: 277). Following the order of the government the Arab provinces boycotted the Austrian goods (Derveze, 2007).¹

In November-December 1908 the first (and last) fair elections of this period were held and resulting in a contention between the ethnonational communities and the CUP over the method of representation (Hanioglu, 2008). The CUP comprised the majority in the first Chamber of Deputies in which the Turks gained 147 seats,

¹ Rashid Rida, during his sermon in Mina after the 1916 Arab Revolt, would interestingly claim that the empire lost Bosnia-Herzegovina because the CUP cooperated with Austria.

while 60 seats won by the Arabs, 27 by Albanians, 26 by Greeks, 14 by Armenians, 10 by Slavs, and 4 by Jews (Shaw, 1977; 278). Regarding the Arab deputies' attitudes in the parliament Kayalı claims that they did not raise any issues particularly related to the Arab provinces rather they were quite concerned about the empire in general (Kayalı, 1998). Indeed, Arab deputies' speeches on Jewish settlement in Palestine (Kayalı; 1998) as well as Salim Ali Salam's long speech on the inefficiency of education in the empire given in 1914 (Selam, 2009) support this argument.

By 1909 the number of CUP branches multiplied from 83 to 360, while membership increased approximately from 2,250 to 850,000 across the empire (Hanioglu, 2008: 160). Izzat Darwaza indicated in his memories that CUP branches were launched even in countryside such as Nablus. Apparently, there was a remarkable appeal to the CUP among the people from all walks of life (Derveze, 2007). All of the five Arab intellectuals had hopes from the 1908 revolution thus Darwaza affiliated to the CUP's Nablus branch while Kurd Ali returned to Syria and began to publish the first daily newspaper in Damascus which severely criticized the new government's practices as being incompatible with the *Kanun-i Esasi*. Similarly, hoping to realize his dream of *islah* project in Istanbul, Rashid Rida took trips to Syria and Istanbul and propagated the CUP policies in his journal *al-Manar*. Salim Ali Salam and Shakib Arslan too saw the revolution as the beginning of a new phase, which would improve the conditions both in the center and the periphery. For instance, calling the CUP leaders the best ever in the Ottoman politics, Salam published an open letter in the *Ittihad-i Uthmani* journal on December 22, 1912, in which he underscored the necessity of undertaking radical reforms in the Arab provinces if the central government wanted to maintain the integrity of the empire (Selam, 2009: 97). Likewise, influenced by the 1908 Revolution, Arslan and a group of eighty prominent leaders of Mount Lebanon representing all sects and groups gathered and demonstrated pressuring on Yusuf Franko Pasha, the governor, to declare Constitutionalism in Mount Lebanon, which was a semi-autonomous governorate in the empire (Arslan, 2009).

Having little chance to succeed the new regime got easily shattered soon after the elections as the CUP began to be criticized by almost all groups who pinned hope on the revolution to realize their ambitions. While liberals were complaining of its

heavy-handedness, bureaucrats had plans to refurbish the Sublime Porte. On the other hand, nationalist and protonationalist societies disliked the CUP's narrow understanding of Ottomanism while Islamists were disappointed with the secularist tendencies of the government. In the meantime, increased centralization and withdrawal of the privileges given by the old regime caused the frustration of some local groups including the Arabs. The old elites including the Armenian *Amira* class, the Kurdish, Albanian, and Arab notables had been given imperial privileges by Abdulhamid II in return for their loyalty to the empire. The CUP regime abolished the privileges of not only these groups but also the religious establishments. Supporting Hanioglu's argument, Rashid Rida (2007) underscored in his memories that a conflict emerged in Syria between the CUP and the Arab elites who could not gain immediate rewards in the new regime. Furthermore as Hanioglu observes,

The new elites empowered by the installation of a parliamentary system in a multinational empire were, for the most part, secular nationalists. It was mostly Turkish members of the CUP who rose to positions of prominence in the army and bureaucracy, while non-Turkish nationalists came to the fore as parliamentary deputies or regional leaders of separatist movements (Hanioglu, 2008: 200).

The second phase of the CUP administration began with the 31 March Incident, which was said to be organized by the CUP's opponents demanding restoration of the sultan-caliph's authority. As a response to the incident the CUP leaders cracked down on the opposing groups and imposing a series of restraining measures to curb the fundamental liberties. As Ardic puts, "the suppression of the counter-revolution not only crushed the opposition, but also initiated the period of "Unionism" (*İttihatçılık*), characterized by the oligarchic rule of the military and its allies in the civil bureaucracy" (Ardic, 2012; 150). Furthermore, the Unionists used the abovementioned incident to justify their secular reforms (Ardic, 2012).

As the opposition reemerged around the Freedom and Alliance Party, winning a by-election in Istanbul in late 1911, the CUP took strict measures to win the 1912 "elections with the stick". Threatened a military coup by the "Savior Officers" (*Halaskar Zabitan*) the new CUP government had to resign and was replaced by the Great Cabinet, which included representatives from all the opposing factions. The opportunity for the CUP to regain the power came with the First Balkan War that

resulted in the loss of the empire's all European territories in 1912. On January 23, 1913, a group of Unionist officers raided the cabinet meeting, shot the war minister and compelled the government to resign. Marking the beginning of the third phase the incident, known as the "Bab-ı Ali Coup", restored the CUP to power until the end of World War I, led by Unionist trio of Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha, who were behind the scenes until then. As the CUP government began to impose strict censorship particularly after 1913, the opposition, which challenged the CUP in the early period, was silenced (Shaw, 1977).

In order to realize the aim of preserving the multinational empire, the CUP leaders adopted a policy of inclusiveness. But, as Hanioglu indicates, "the inclusion of diverse population groups with little in common within the ranks of a single party inevitably led to ideological incoherence" (Hanioglu, 2008: 161). As a vague and varying interpretation of Ottomanism was not strong enough to bind all segments of the empire, the CUP eventually depended on the army to control the opposition with a strong belief that it was the only way of preserving the empire (Hanioglu, 2008). The CUP did not only become authoritarian but in the meantime centralist and nationalist throughout its rule. The CUP's centralization and nationalism were two major conflicting points on which the Arabs and the Young Turks disagreed. Indeed, CUP leaders were aware of the complications of the Arab provinces, but believed that "the parliamentary regime would enable fair regional representation in government and thus protect regional interests within the framework of a unified government whose primary aim was the preservation of a united Ottoman state" (Kayalı, 1998: 88). Consequently, Arab intellectuals, like Darwaza, were affiliated with the FAP, established in November 1911, promoting decentralization. Furthermore, the very name of the Party of Decentralization with which some Arab intellectuals including Darwaza were affiliated, demonstrates how the issue of centralization turned into a serious bone of contention between the CUP and the Arab intellectuals.

As part of the issue of centralization, the use of Arabic as a medium language in the public domains in the Arab provinces became a highly politicized matter of conflict between them. The enforcement of Ottoman Turkish as the state language in all spheres of public life was an essential aspect of the Unionist program of centralization (Kayalı, 1997). According to the Arab intellectuals the imposition of

Turkish as a state language was a nationalist (Turkist) measure rather than a centralist one. Thus, in the 1913 Paris Arab Congress as well as in the Beirut Arab Committee the prominent Arab leaders demanded from the Ottoman government making Arabic the official language in the Arab provinces. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, even though before 1908 all the primary school books were in Turkish, the communities including the Arabs did not consider this practice as a means of Turkification. The imposition of Ottoman Turkish as the state language began to be considered as an aspect of nationalism after the *Kanun-i Esasi* was reinstated (Derveze, 2007). Thus, the intellectuals particularly Kurd Ali (2006: 121) Darwaza (2007: 263), and Salam (2009: 127) were very much concerned about the recognition of Arabic as the medium language in the public domains particularly in schools, courts, and the parliament.

At this point it is necessary to underscore the fact that policy of centralization was not unique to the CUP government. Modernization efforts strengthened the centralization and bureaucratization of the Ottoman government which had a strong desire of centralization as early as the late 20th century. As Hanioglu states “in 1795, the government launched a major reorganization of Ottoman provincial administration designed to strengthen central control over the periphery...But lacking adequate military and fiscal powers of enforcement, that goal remained an unattainable ideal” (Hanioglu, 2008: 50). For the government, centralization remained to be one of the top issues throughout the 19 century. Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) embarked certain institutional changes to maintain integrity of the empire. Reforms known as the Tanzimat “accelerated the processes of centralization and Westernization in the empire” (Kayali, 1998: 19). Reform-minded group of officials of the Tanzimat hoped that “centralization would arrest the demands for autonomy and bring all imperial possessions under Istanbul’s direct rule for firmer political and economic control” (Kayali, 1998: 19). Abdulhamid II maintained the same policy and as earlier stated his centralist policies targeted particularly the Arab provinces. Except for a brief period after 1908 Revolution the CUP government continued adopting centralist policies toward the Arab provinces and this became the very contention point between the Ottoman government and Arab intellectuals including the ones that I examine in this research. Indeed, this contention is not something unique rather such conflicts have become part of nation-building processes in

multiethnic societies such as Turkey.

Complaining of the CUP's nationalist policies soon after the revolution, Darwaza claimed that as the CUP government increasingly became nationalist after 1909 the Arab rights came to be an issue among the Arab deputies and students in Istanbul. As they were informed about the Unionists' "Turanist" attitudes in Istanbul, Darwaza and his friends in Nablus were disappointed and thus they formed the Arab Science Association aiming to improve the education in the region (Derveze, 2007: 265). Darwaza also underlined that soon after it captured the power in 1908, the CUP government removed the governor of Nablus Amin al-Tarzi who was from Damascus and appointed a Turkish Unionist (Derveze, 2007: 247). Furthermore, as the CUP government lost its tolerance of criticisms, Muhammad Kurd Ali, tired of its strict censorship, had serious troubles with the government, which closed his newspaper *al-Muqtabas* on the pretext of simple reasons. Constantly threatened by the CUP agents he escaped to Egypt a few times. Later when he gained Cemal Pasha's trust as he refused to cooperate with French foreign officers, Kurd Ali had a relatively easy time during World War I. But, still both *al-Muqtabas* and *al-Sharq*, his German-sponsored newspaper in Syria, were rigorously monitored (Kürd Ali, 2006). As will be explained in following sections, even the pro-Ottomanist Arab intellectuals such as Salim Ali Salam and Shakib Arslan were alienated due to Cemal Pasha's draconian and "Turkist" policies.

Indeed the Ottoman government attempted to make reforms in the Arab provinces as the empire dramatically enshrined and came to be a Turco-Arab state after the two Balkan Wars. The Kamil Pasha government advised the general council of the provinces to meet and discuss measures for reform but, as underlined by Kayalı,

Such vague encouragement for reform proposals did little to excite the proponents of change at a time when the outbreak of the Balkan War and swift Ottoman defeats shook the confidence of Arabs in the capability of the Ottoman state to survive the military, economic, and political crisis aggravated by the war or to protect its Arab-populated provinces against external threats. Advances by the armies of the Balkan states toward the capital created the fear that the seat of the caliphate might fall (Kayalı, 1998: 140).

Even though they were disenchanted with the government, the reform committees in Beirut and Damascus still issued their projects immediately after Bab-ı Ali Coup to the Mahmud Şevket Pasha Government. The government change in Istanbul had substantial implications for the reform movement and the unfolding events in Syria. Instead of giving its assent to the reform projects proposed by the provinces, the new government promulgated the Provincial Law in March 1913 that involved decentralizing measures. Although these measures were in line with their general tendency, the Arab reformists particularly those of Beirut not wanting to compromise their specific demands, spread their campaign across Syria and Cairo (Kayalı 1998, cf. Selam 2009). The decision of Hazim Bey, the governor of Beirut, to close the Reform Committee triggered strong reactions. People of Beirut protested the decision by going on strike and appealing to the central government. On March 20, 1913, Mahmud Şevket Pasha sent a threatening telegraph in which he ordered those, who “opposed to the law”, to be court-martialed. The government’s uncompromising attitude precipitated the protests and many Arab notables, including Salim Ali Salam, a member of provincial administrative council, resigned from their positions (Selam, 2009).

The closure of the Reform Committee caused a bitter disappointment for the Arab intellectuals particularly for Salam and Darwaza. The strong reactions led the government to respond to the reform demands, however: in April 1913 Istanbul issued an Imperial Decree approved the use of Arabic in law courts as well in schools as medium language. Interestingly, except for Rashid Rida (2007: 158), none of the five Arab intellectuals mentioned this decree in their memories. This might be because of the fact that they were not satisfied with what the government offered in Provincial Law, which was planned to be an alternative to the reform projects of the Arab provinces. Regarding the Provincial Law, which would have had to settle the conflict between the decentralist trend in the Arab provinces and the CUP, Kayalı argued that the government indeed took the welfare of the Arab provinces serious albeit “its efforts were haphazard and rarely backed by legislation” (Khalidi, 1980: 204).

In addition to the CUP government’s autocratic, centralist, and nationalist policies the empire’s loss of credibility in the eyes of the Arab intellectuals played a significant role in transforming the Arab intellectuals’ attitudes towards the Ottoman

rule. The empire lost vast territories first in the Tripolitanian War and then Balkan Wars after which the Arab periphery all of a sudden came to be the only significant extension of the empire outside its Anatolian core. Since the empire was not able to defend itself even against the second-tier European states, some Arabs thought that independence from it might rescue them from perishing (Kayalı, 1998). As emphasized in Chapter 2, according to Salim Ali Salam, the losses in the aforementioned wars led some provinces to reconsider their situations. Due to its strategic geographical location Beirut was much more concerned about its existence and this led some prominent leaders to search for alternatives such as French occupation and joining Egypt, which was under Britain (Selam, 2009: 94).

Moreover, rapid changes in the government and political turmoil caused by such events as 31 March Incident and Bab-ı Ali Coup caused insecurity and confusion among the Arabs particularly the Arab intellectuals. For instance, after the 1912 election Kamil Pasha, grand vizier of the new government, removed governor of Beirut Hazim Bey from the office and reappointed the former governor Edhem Bey. But soon after the Bab-ı Ali Coup, Edhem Bey was replaced with the ex-governor Hazim Bey. People of Beirut were increasingly confused due to these changes took place in a short period of time in the local administration and consequently becoming much concerned of their future (Selam, 2009).

Furthermore, because they upset the government's priorities, political turmoil and disastrous wars disrupted the ongoing reform projects in the Arab provinces. For instance, when he was the mayor of Beirut, Salim Ali Salam insistently telegraphed to the central government under Kamil Pasha requesting appropriation for the establishment of a sewage system in Beirut. Soon after he got a response, the Bab-ı Ali Coup broke out and the Kamil Pasha government was replaced by that of Mahmud Şevket Pasha Government. Subsequently, the sewage project together was put aside with many other projects. Similarly, when he was deputy of Beirut after the 1914 elections Salam made all the bureaucratic and technical preparations to solve the inefficiency of the railway between Damascus and Beirut but the outbreak of World War I interrupted all reform projects (Selam, 2009). Consequently, the intellectuals like Salam, who tried to maintain the Ottoman authority in the Arabian Peninsula by advocating reforms in the Arab provinces, got tired of the administrative discontinuity and the state of deadlock due to the abovementioned

disruptions.

The Arab intellectuals were not frustrated only by the CUP government's oppression and their inconclusive reform efforts but also by the government's inconsistency in terms of its attitudes towards the Arabs in general Arab nationalists in particular. Shakib Arslan, who in spite of its shortcomings supported the Ottoman government until the mid-1920s, complained of its incoherent practices, which disappointed him several times. For instance, in 1910 the Ottoman government sent a brigade under the command of Sami al-Faruqi Pasha against Havran's Druzes. After a brief conflict Pasha announced that anyone who surrendered would be released; then some of the prominent Druze leaders surrendered trusting him. The leaders were released on bond but soon they were court-martialed and unexpectedly executed by command of Sami Pasha disappointing Druze tribes and Shakib Arslan who trusted Pasha's promise. The Ottoman government in general and Pasha in particular lost credibility in the eyes of both the local people and Arslan considering the unprecedented event as the government's betrayal to them (Arslan, 2009).

The second issue that disappointed Arslan with the government was the wavy relationship between the CUP and Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi (1855-1916), an Arab journalist, who was born in Homs and lived in Istanbul and Cairo. As he was bitterly critical of Abdulhamid's regime as well as Ottoman caliphate he had to escape to Egypt where he regularly wrote for *al-Mu'ayyad*, *al-Jarida*, and *al-Manar*. During the CUP administration he was the deputy of Hama for four years and also headed the 1913 Arab Congress in Paris. After the congress he was called by the government to Istanbul to negotiate the reforms. The Imperial Decree on the use of Arabic in the local courts relatively satisfied him; nevertheless, he had to wait for the execution of the other demands "swaying between 'despair and hope'" (Tarabein, 1991). On January 4, 1914 Zahrawi together with six other Arabs was appointed as a member of the Senate (*majlis al-ayan*). The reason his acceptance of the post offered by the government was his belief that it was better for the Arabs to cooperate with the Unionists who had a strong will to regenerate the strength empire. This was because the Arabs lacked a well-organized association except for the Decentralization party and the Reform Committee of Beirut to defend Arab rights. At this juncture it is necessary to take note of the fact that some Arab reformists such as al-Zahrawi

hoped regeneration of the strength of the empire as late as 1914. But by the end of 1913 he left Istanbul for Cairo as it became clear that it was almost impossible to reach compromise with the CUP. According to Tarabein, he was disillusioned with the government because of its half-hearted attempts at enforcing the reforms. Hence, edging toward the idea of separation from the empire he affiliated to the Party of Decentralization 1913 onward (Tarabein, 1991). Tarabein also claims that, the deadlock between the Arab leaders and the CUP was caused by the CUP because it reached an agreement with the Arab leaders to carry out the demands issued in the Arab Congress yet “its evasive conduct after this agreement was concluded provoked suspicion and skepticism among the Arabs in general” (Tarabein, 1991: 108).

In 1916, Zahrawi was prosecuted, then court-martialed and finally executed in public on May 6, 1916. Finding the government’s policies incoherent and confusing, Arslan argued that the government’s first mistake was to nominate Zahrawi to the Senate in spite of his pro-Arabist attitudes which was a kind of encouragement for the idea of Arab independence. Its second fault was executing him and then exiling his father three years after this appointment (Arslan, 2009). The radical changes in the government’s attitudes towards Zahrawi as a prominent Arab politician and intellectual demonstrated the CUP’s inconsistency and unsteadiness due to the rapidly transformed internal and external circumstances.

To make an overall evaluation, although it consisted of only ten years, the Second Constitutional Period witnessed several political crises, three major wars, and constant domestic insurgencies. While all communities including Arabs were demanding radical solutions for their complications in the face of nationalism and European colonialism, the CUP government, having little experience, was trying to maintain its authority both in the center and periphery while also developing strategies to deal with the three disastrous wars. As Shakib Arslan indicated in his memories, while the government was fighting for survival in the Balkan War, the prominent Arab leaders including Salam and Zahrawi, held a congress in France demanding reforms from the government. That is to say, there was a great difference between the priorities of the CUP government and those of the Arab intellectuals. Moreover, while the latter were demanding radical administrative reforms, the central government, having a hectic schedule due to the aforementioned reasons and

also lacking a desire for real change (Tarabein, 1991), could only be able to come up with palliative measures.

Furthermore, in the Second Constitutional Period the government under the CUP changed its way of dealing with the empire's religious and ethnic communities. Unexpectedly, the existing tensions intensified with the relative liberty of the first years after the 1908 revolution. The CUP received a strong reaction as it introduced an aggressive centralization and withdrew all privileges of non-Turkish Muslim groups. Furthermore, as the CUP increasingly accommodated Turkist ideas, "Ottoman" and "Turkish" became increasingly indistinct. This led non-Turks, particularly Arabs, to feel less comfortable and to gradually appeal to alternatives proposed by ethno-nationalist organizations (Hanioğlu, 2008). Hanioğlu also underlines the fact that "this was primarily a struggle among overrepresented intelligentsias; it did not yet infect the more established classes within many of the non-Turkish communities" (Hanioğlu, 2008: 167). The five Arab intellectuals, Darwaza, Salam, Kurd Ali, Arslan, and Rida, were among the intelligentsia, who as Hanioğlu indicated, reacted to the CUP's policies. As explained above, having different positions and backgrounds each of the five had a different relationship with the CUP government and thus each had a different experience between 1908 and 1918. Yet, all were somehow alienated from the government as it changed its policies under the dramatically changing internal and external circumstances.

3.3. The Impact of World War I and European Colonialism on the Arab Intellectuals

All of the Arab intellectuals attributed great importance to World War I (1914-1918) in their memories, as it became the turning point for the emergence of the modern Middle East (Tauber, 1993a). The war involved various significant events and secret treaties that determined the people's future in the Arab provinces drawing new borders and creating new states in the former Ottoman territories. In the context of the Arabian Peninsula there were three major actors, including the Arab

nationalists, the CUP government, and the Allies, all of whom did not only influence the course of events but were also influenced by them during the war. The developments that took place in the realms of these three actors had a profound impact on the Arab intellectuals, some of whom ideologically repositioned as a result of the radical power shifts in the region. In this part of the thesis I survey these developments with an emphasis on several themes: Arab nationalists' revolt attempts, the CUP's Islamicized discourse and secular policies, the Allies' secret agreements to divide up the empire and their propaganda against it to heighten the tension between the Ottoman government and the Arabs, and finally the fatal famine caused by number of political, economic and natural factors.

The outbreak of World War I triggered the rebellious activities against the empire in the Arabian Peninsula because many Arab nationalists in the region considered the war as an opportunity to form an independent Arab state (Derveze 2007; Selam 2009). In addition to Sharif Hussein's revolt, which was the only attempt that resulted in success, there were various attempts to rebel that were planned in the Arab provinces during the war. According to Tauber, "the war rebellions were planned throughout Syria, Mount Lebanon, and also in Iraq. But their common denominator was their failure, either because they failed to reach the stage of execution at all or because they expired soon after they began" (Tauber, 1993a: 244). For instance in the early period of the war some Arab nationalists including Abdulgani al-Uraysi (1891-1916), one of the founders of al-Fatat and a Beirut member of the Decentralization Party, collaborated with the French to rebel against the empire (Derveze, 2007; Selam, 2009). The French officers in Cairo promised the members of Decentralization Party "20.000 rifles, three warships to cover the rebels, and French officers to direct the action" (Tauber, 1993a: 15).

Al-Uraysi shared his plan with Salim Ali Salam who did not approve any of such attempts in the beginning of the war. The circumstances that emerged following the outbreak of the war changed Salam's ideological position. While his discourse included elements of both Ottomanism and Arabism, he shifted to the latter after 1915. Following their French partner the British administration in Cairo was also involved in negotiations with the Arabs who needed financial and military support to revolt against the Ottoman government. For instance, it provided 1,000 Egyptian pounds to Rashid Rida and Rafiq al-'Azam to send emissaries to the Arab provinces

in order to instigate a revolt (Tauber, 1993a). In addition to these revolt attempts, Syrian officer Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz, the former president of the Literary Club Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, and sons of Nuri al-Sha'lan, the chief of the Ruwalla tribes also took part in different revolt attempts in the Levant (Tauber, 1993a). In the meantime, as the war continued the secret correspondence between Sharif Hussein and MacMahon began and culminated in the 1916 Arab Revolt.

The war was a watershed not only for the Arabs but also for the CUP administration, which signed a secret treaty with Germany after its appeals to ally with the Entente Powers were denied. The secret decision that was taken by a small group of the CUP leaders “signified the beginning of the monopolization of political power by a narrow circle within the CUP” (Kayalı, 1998: 204). The Unionists had four major expectations to realize during the war. They thought that Germany would protect the empire against European and Balkan powers. They also hoped to reestablish full control over the autonomous regions such as Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Najd. They even expected to recover the losses caused by both Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars. Finally, at the outset of World War I they wanted to denounce the foreign capitulations and of all the four only the final hope was fulfilled (Hanioğlu, 2008).

The war years, which also the last years of the CUP administration as well as the Ottoman authority in the region, included major changes in the CUP's policies towards the Arab provinces on account of wide-ranging internal and external factors. The compromises made by the government after the widespread public reactions against the government's decision to close the Beirut Reform Committee failed due to Cemal Pasha's strict policies in Syria particularly after the failed Canal Expedition (Kayalı, 1998). As earlier highlighted, the CUP government introduced the Provincial Law involving a measure of decentralization. Its attempts to reform the provincial administration continued during the war. Moreover, it intensified its secularizing policies (Zürcher, 2003), which disturbed both Shakib Arslan and Rashid Rida. Complaining the CUP's secular policies Arslan told that “Dardanelles victory caused euphoria among the Unionists. Due to this euphoria they took extraordinary decisions. Discharging the women's obligation of veiling was one of them” (Arslan, 2009: 118). He was also displeased by their making the *Meşihat-ı İslamiyye* a dysfunctional institution by withdrawing the *Shari'ah* court from its

authority and locating under the judiciary (Arslan, 2009: 98). As the judicial and education systems were increasingly secularized the position of the ulema was further undermined (Zürcher, 2003; Ardiç, 2012). Between 1913 and 1917 radical secularizing changes took place in the Civil Code (Zürcher, 2003). Associating the government's hasty decisions with the euphoria of the Dardanelles victory, Arslan complained of the Unionists secularizing measures. Similarly, for the first time in his memories he, mainly because of Cemal Pasha's executions and exiles, he accused them of Turkifying the Arabian Peninsula (Arslan, 2009: 119). Furthermore, as quoted in his memories during his sermon in Mina in the end of 1916 Rida used the CUP's secular practices to justify the 1916 Arab Revolt. Complaining about the Unionists' attitudes towards Islam Rida stated that "they are the ones who go against the religion and also undermine the religion (Rıza, 2007: 326).

On the other hand declaring a holy war against the Allies, it heavily utilized Islamic discourse aiming to stir up trouble for the Allies among the colonized Muslims and also to gain the loyalty of the Ottoman subjects, the majority of whom were Muslims (Kayalı, 1997). Confirming Hanioglu's argument that "the CUP tended to appeal to Islam when it was convenient to do so" (Hanioglu, 2008: 187) at the end of 1913, the Unionists began to promote Islam as the most important aspect of its ideology appreciating the fact that their loosely defined Ottomanism was not strong enough to maintain the empire's territorial integrity. After the Istanbul Congress, which was to be an alternative to the Paris Arab Congress, the first thing the government did was assigning Shakib Arslan and Abdulaziz Jawish, who worked for the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, to propagate in the Arab provinces particularly in the Hejaz. They wrote a report after the celebrations of the groundbreaking for an Islamic University (Kayalı, 1998; Arslan, 2009). As earlier emphasized, except for Arslan none of the Arab intellectuals mentioned these efforts of the CUP to refresh its authority in the region.

Reinforcing the official Islamic outlook Enver Pasha took a trip to Syria during the war to strengthen the ties between the Arabs and the government (Kürd Ali, 2006: 199). Kurd Ali was asked to write a propaganda book about this trip (Kürd Ali, 2006). Moreover, the CUP heavily used the press in the Arab provinces 1914 onward. As Abdulhamid had done before, the government subsidized a number of newspapers in Syria including *al-Muqtabas*, Muhammad Kurd Ali's daily

newspaper, which was closed several times before the war by the CUP (Kayalı, 1998; Kürd Ali, 2006).

As part of the CUP's inclusive policies towards Arabs, in the 1914 elections there was a significant increase in representation of the Arab provinces. Salim Ali Salam became the deputy of Beirut while Amir Shakib Arslan continued to be the deputy of Horan. Amir 'Ali 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri was elected as the vice president of the new parliament. Prominent reformists such as Shukri al-'Asali and 'Abd al-Wahhab al- Inkilizi, who were executed together with al-Zahrawi by Cemal Pasha during the war, were appointed as provincial civil inspectors. Furthermore, as Kayalı underscores, "the CUP adopted in 1914 a noticeably lenient attitude toward its former Arab opponents" (Kayalı, 1998: 199). Kurd Ali was among those Arabists who received pardon after 1914. As described in the previous chapter, his loyalty to the empire was highly appreciated by Cemal Pasha, thus he had relatively easy time during the war supporting the CUP's Islamic propaganda. After the outbreak of the war the CUP government did not renew its efforts to befriend only the Arab intellectuals but also Arab tribal sheikhs, particularly Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid. It also strengthened its relations with Sharif Hussein maintaining his prerogatives while on the other hand trying to increase centralization in the Hijaz through the governor of Medina (Kayalı, 1998).

The last but most important actor was the European powers for whom World War I was a great opportunity to expand into the Ottoman Middle East, which was the only Muslim region that effectively retained its independence (Fromkin, 2001). On the eve of World War I, European nations were looking for new regions to expand as they already divided up much of the world including the African continent, Western hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and Subcontinent among themselves (Fromkin, 2001). Because World War I was directly related to the Ottoman territories, it dramatically changed the empire's destiny bringing the end of its authority in the Arabian Peninsula, which was the only extension it had outside Anatolia, and finally causing its collapse. Though some Arab intellectuals particularly Salam and Arslan did not support the idea of joining the war mainly because it would cause great losses, they believed that the Ottoman Empire did not have many options to maintain its existence as the European powers already made agreements dividing up its territories among themselves (Arslan, 2009: 74, 171).

While Kurd Ali and Rida did not make any point on the issue, Darwaza, Salam, and Arslan agreed upon the fact that the empire had to join on the side of Germany as the Allies led by Britain, France, and Russia either attacked or occupied the Ottoman frontiers long before the war and they also had longstanding ambitions over the Ottoman territories including the Arabian Peninsula. It is striking that, being critical of the policies of the empire in general and the CUP government in particular towards the Arabs did not hinder the Arab intellectuals, except Rida who deemed Britain “as the ‘protector’ of freedom in its colonies” (Ryad, 2010: 280) before and during the World War I, recognizing the European powers’ longstanding ambitions over the Ottoman territories.

During the Britain and France, the two major Entente powers that had been present in the region for so long for the purpose of trade and missionary activities (Derveze, 2007), did not only render their financial and military support to the revolt attempts but also intensified their anti-Ottoman propaganda weakening the empire’s authority among the Arabs. In this period France strengthened its links with those who were not satisfied with the existing conditions intensifying its missionary activities in Syria (Kayalı, 1998). On the other hand, aiming to inhibit Egyptian nationalism, British newspapers published articles to instigate animosity between Turks and Arabs pretending to be supportive of Arab unity (Kayalı, 1998).

Most importantly, in this period the European powers particularly Britain, which “since the late 18th century had been involved in discussions of the Caliphate” (Ardıç, 2012: 197), intensively used the notion of the Arab caliphate as part of “its approach to the ‘Eastern Question’” (Ardıç, 2012: 198) to propagate the “illegitimacy” of the Ottoman Caliphate. The idea of an Arab caliphate, which was a strong blow to the empire that refreshed its Islamic discourse during the war, strengthened Britain’s hand because as the empire seemed to be close to collapse due to disastrous defeats, and political and economic crisis, some Arabs including Sharif Hussein, Rashid Rida, Salim Ali Salam, and Izzat Darwaza entertained the idea of forming an Arab state led by an Arab caliph under British supervision. In this regard, they considered the concept of Arab caliphate as the only viable political arrangement that diverse Arab populations could agree on (Kayalı, 1998: 142). The Arab Caliphate project, which was soon aborted, was closely connected with Al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya (Arab League), a secret organization founded by Rashid Rida in

Cairo with the purpose of uniting the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Tauber, 1993b). As part of this mission Rida financially supported by the British administration in Cairo, and sent his representative, ‘Izzat al-Jundi, to Ibn Saud, Imam Idrisi and Imam Yahya (Kayalı, 1998).

Even though, they did not mention of it in their memoirs the Arab intellectuals except Shakib Arslan seem to have been somehow influenced by Britain’s propaganda of the Arab caliphate. Seeing the war as an opportunity for the Arabs to form an independent Arab state by rebelling against the empire (Tauber, 1993), Rashid Rida did not only think that an Anglo-Arab alliance could assure Arab independence but he also “worked for the re-establishment of an Arab caliphate to replace the Ottoman one” (Ryad, 2010: 270). Moreover, he “informed the British authorities that he was ready to mediate between Britain and Arab rulers when the war spread to the Middle East” (Ryad, 2010: 270). Considering Rida a ‘visionary’, “British officials in Egypt (probably except Mitchell-Innes) did not hold his political ambitions in high esteem” (Ryad, 2010: 280). Consequently, he could not get the support from the British that he expected in the long run. Rida was disappointed not only with the British but also with Sharif Hussein (Arslan 2009, Kurd Ali 2006). Therefore, after the war he radically changed his discourse and began to refer to Britain as a greedy colonial power (Ryad, 2010) while Sharif Hussein as ‘caliph of devil’ (Kürd Ali, 2006; see also Mertoğlu 2005).

During the war, the Allies did not only launch a campaign weakening the ties between the Ottoman Empire and Arabs but also entered into negotiations to determine the future of the territories of the empire, which was about to collapse. Consequently, they reached secret agreements including the famous Sykes-Picot agreement, to divide up the empire among themselves. Some of these agreements, particularly those involving the Zionists and the Arab nationalists were conflicting; thus, “the promises were successful in securing effective wartime support, but they gave rise to new conflicts and bitterness in the postwar world” (Shaw, 1977: 320). During the war, in addition to the MacMahon-Hussein correspondence promising an Arab state in the Arabian Peninsula and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 pledging a Jewish homeland in Palestine, they signed three major agreements for the postwar partition of the Ottoman Empire: the Constantinople Agreement, the Treaty of London, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Ardıç, 2012: 193-197).

The Constantinople Agreement settling the issue of controlling Istanbul reached by Britain, Russia, and France on March 18, 1915. Leaving Istanbul as a free port for the Allies the agreement satisfied Russia's desires of capturing the Straits. Furthermore, "Mecca and Medina and the rest of Arabia and the Arab world would be detached from the Ottoman Empire and placed under independent Arab rule. The division of Iran between Russia and Britain, as agreed on originally in 1907, would be continued" (Shaw, 1977: 320). Based on this provision the secret correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt and Sharif Hussein took place from July 1915 to January 1916 (Kayalı, 1998).

The Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) signed between the Allies and Italy consenting the latter to be full sovereign in the Dodecanese Islands. Finally, the most important agreement among the three was reached on May 16, 1916, between Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot representing Britain and France "adjusting their claims to the Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire" (Shaw, 1977: 321). As underlined earlier, during the war aiming to gain their support against the empire Britain negotiated with the Zionists assuring a homeland in Palestine and also with Sharif Hussein of Mecca promising to recognize Arab national aspirations. While Britain made contradictory provisions, France assured that its plans over the Levant were not sacrificed. Moreover, embarrassing the Allies Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution revealed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (November-December 1917) that was made to divide up the Ottoman Empire.

While the war led to the rearrangement of the realm of politics, people both in Syria and Lebanon faced disastrous famine and other calamities stemmed from it such as epidemics, inflation, and devaluation of currency. According to Çiçek, "neither Cemal Pasha's rule of terror nor the rigors of the battles that took place in the Sinai front became as influential in the change of the attitude of the Syrians against the Ottoman Empire as that of famine and its consequences" (Çiçek, 2012: 337). This is mainly due to the fact that almost 500.000 Syrians died of starvation and epidemics during the war.

There are conflicting arguments in the literature as well as among the Arab intellectuals' discourses on Syrian famine. While some, including George Antonius (1979), Darwaza, and Rida accused the empire of "trading grains at high prices on

the black market” (Çiçek, 2012: 337), others like Cemal Pasha and Shakib Arslan hold the Allies responsible as they blockaded all the costs in the region and did not allow entry of any food aid. In his memories Cemal Pasha asserts that even though the locust plague damaged the harvest in 1915 he managed to secure sufficient grain for the Arab provinces. But as Arab Revolt broke out he had to distribute the grain to the Bedouins in order to assure their loyalty to the Ottoman government. In addition to the food scarcity within the peninsula, Syrians could not receive any aid from outside during the war on account of the Allies’ blockade on the costs and all these led to the deadly starvation, which lasted for years (Cemal, Paşa 2001; Arslan, 2009).

On the other hand, providing considerable amount of detailed information Schilcher (1992) holds three actors, the empire, the Allies’ blockade, and Sharif Hussein, as responsible from the famine. According to Schilcher, the empire had problems with handling the famine. The Allies blockaded not only the costs but also even the interior parts of Syria preventing the flow of grain from the Persian Gulf and Baghdad (Schilcher, 1992).

Agreeing with Schilcher, Çiçek (2012) asserts that the famine occurred as a result of intertwined factors including the Canal expedition, the Allies’ blockade, natural disasters, bad governance, inflation and devaluation. Unlike Schilcher, however, Çiçek draws attention to the expedition against Egypt as an important factor influencing the famine. Both the Ottoman government and Cemal Pasha gave great importance to Egypt’s conquest and both thought that the war would not last long therefore they mobilized Syria’s all material and human sources. Because this goal kept being the very first priority of Cemal Pasha during 1915 all foodstuffs were dispatched to the troops and the civilians were not taken into consideration (Çiçek, 2012).

How the issue of famine reflected in the Arab intellectuals’ discourses deserves to be examined. With the exception of Salam all my primary sources discuss it, though they have contradictory views on the issue. First of all, the famine had a significant place in Arslan’s pro-Ottomanist discourse. Utilizing this topic as discursive material to solidify his criticism against the European states’ policies towards the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular Arslan put the blame on the Allies, which did not only blockade the Syrian costs but also precluded people in

Syria and Lebanon from receiving food aids. Arslan argued that “it was indeed the British who prevented the aids by besieging Syria. They thought, in this way people (Syrians) were going to be desperate and so shift to the Britain’s side” (Arslan, 2009: 148).

Likewise, having an Ottomanist discourse during the war, Kurd Ali drew attention to the Maronite Patriarchs’ intrigues to make profit out of the grain that were given by Cemal Pasha to be distributed to the Christian public. The Christians in Lebanon died of the grain mixed with soil that was distributed by the Maronite Patriarchs (Kürd Ali, 2006: 246). On the contrary, having an Arab nationalist view Darwaza argued that the Christians starved because Cemal Pasha had blockaded Lebanon and prevented entry of food aid. Likewise, Rashid Rida, who was at Sharif Hussein’s service, manipulated the issue and came up with an interesting argument: “because the CUP’s troops were deployed in the Hejaz the Allies had to subdue the coasts, which in turn led to the extreme poverty” (Rıza, 2007: 327). To put it more precisely, Rida used the issue of famine to justify the Arab Revolt holding the CUP responsible for the people’s destitution in the region.

It is clear that the Arab intellectuals’ politico-ideological positions influenced their discourses on the famine. On the other hand, the process of famine was influential in shaping their discourses too. For instance, European states’ ruthless blockade to win the war at the expense of 500.000 Syrians’ death strengthened Arslan’s pro-Ottomanist and Islamist discourse. Similarly, Kurd Ali’s pro-Ottomanist stance during the war seems to be strengthened by the anecdote regarding the famine he told in his memoirs (Kürd Ali, 2006: 246).

If we make a general evaluation, the five Arab intellectuals’ discourses somehow were influenced by the outbreak of World War I mainly because it involved various significant developments such as Cemal Pasha’s appointment, the famine, the Arab Revolt, and European powers’ anti-Ottoman campaigns that directly affected the Arab provinces. Even though it is hard to trace in his travel notes the process through which he transformed his ideological discourse, it is quite clear that Rashid Rida’s pro-CUP discourse radically changed and turned into a separatist one in the early stages of the war. Championing the idea of organizing all the Arabs around the notion of an Arab Caliphate, Rashid Rida, who was once a

strong supporter of the Young Turks, negotiated with the British officers in Cairo to receive support. Thus, Rida was one of the Arab intellectuals who made radical changes in their ideological discourses after the outbreak of the war. We can observe this change if we compare his pre-war and post-war discourses. In his notes taken during his trip to Damascus in 1909 Rida told that,

I expressed to the people that having hatred towards Turks is the one of the most damaging evils for the Arabs given the fact that they live in a period when they are in need of being sincerely loyal to the Turks....Arabs should not forget their attachment to the Turks and they should never trust the others...In these days we are supposed to help the Committee of Union and Progress with spreading the spirit of constitutionalism (Rıza, 92-93).

World War I broke out and as Tauber observes, “Rashid Rida saw this as an opportunity for Arabs to launch a revolt against the Ottomans and to liberate their countries from the empire’s yoke” (Tauber, 1995: 107). He wrote in his periodical *al-Manar* that, “the interest of the Arabs is that they will have an independent state (Tauber, 1995: 112). Accordingly, during the sermon he gave supporting the Arab Revolt he asserted that, “the destruction and corruption happened since the beginning of the empire’s weakening is more insignificant than those happened after the Unionists came to power” (Rıza, 2007: 325). As it is quite obvious in the quotations there is dramatic change between Rida’s pre-war and post-war discourses. In early World War I he negotiated with the British administration in Cairo and by its financial help he took part in a revolt attempt against the empire (Tauber, 1993a). He also supported the Arab Revolt by all means, e.g. when he took a trip to the Hejaz in 1916 to demonstrate his submission to the “king of Hejaz” (Rıza, 2007: VII-VIII).

Likewise, the war had a considerable impact also on Darwaza’s ideological discourse. If we recall, he was a member of the CUP’s Nablus branch in 1909 and as he was disappointed with the CUP’s restrictive and nationalist measures, he and his friends launched the branch of the FAP, which promoted decentralization, in Nablus in early 1912. Accordingly, he supported the articles of Paris Arab Congress that demanded decentralization. He was then affiliated to *al-Fatat*, a secret association established in Paris in 1911, which like the FAP promoted decentralization, and after 1913 to the Decentralization Party led by Rafiq al-Azm, Haqqi al-Azm, and Rashid

Rida based in Cairo. With the outbreak of World War I he supported the revolt attempts aiming to separate from the empire to form an independent Arab state in the region. Thus it is safe to say that in less than a decade Darwaza's discourse radically changed toward nationalism like that of Rashid Rida. While he was close to the idea of decentralization before the war, he began to advocate separation of the Arab provinces from the empire after it. For instance regarding the political atmosphere in the Arab provinces after the 1908 Revolution Darwaza said that "I and many other people from different ethnic backgrounds and walks of life were affiliated to the CUP club and we joined the excitement and joy" (Derveze, 2007: 244). In the beginning of 1910 the FAP promoting decentralization was established and Darwaza with his friends launched its branch in 1912. His thoughts about the FAP, which is quoted below, clearly demonstrate his political stance as well as his expectations from the empire:

The FAP promoted administrative decentralization. That is to say, the local authorities rather than the central government would deal with the issues including education, trade, industry, agriculture, and maintenance of roads. The medium of instruction in education in the provinces would be local languages and also civil servants had to be from the local people. Moreover, the proportional representation of the provinces in the Ottoman Parliament would be ensured. As all these provisions matched with the demands of the Arabs we decided to launch the party's branch in Nablus and we did do in 1912 (Derveze, 2007: 269-270).

Not long after the war broke out he said to his friend that, "there will be an Arab military power consisting of not less than a hundred thousand soldiers and a thousand officers and I see this as an opportunity for the Arabs to realize their independence" (Derveze, 2007: 318). If we compare the two quotations revealing Darwaza's discourses, we can see the how he was deeply affected by the socio-political context.

Similarly, Salim Ali Salam's attitudes towards the Ottoman rule were influenced by the events unfolded during the war. Even though he refused to take part in a revolt organized by Abdulgani al-Urayisi in cooperation with the French in 1915, he supported the 1916 Arab Revolt. Having a close friendship with Faisal ibn Hussein, Salam was informed by Amir Faisal about the secret correspondence between Sharif and MacMahon before the revolt broke out. Though he was not

comfortable with Britain's role in the process (Selam, 2009: 32), he rendered his support to the revolt. This was most probably because he was in the deep despair about the empire's future and found this attempt more viable than the others such as the one that organized by Abdulgani al-Uraysi and the members of the Decentralization Party. Before the war, he had promoted the idea of decentralization as an administrative solution in the Arab provinces (Selam, 2009). But after 1915, as he was convinced to the possibility of forming an independent Arab state in the region with the help of Britain, he began to advocate the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, Muhammad Kurd Ali, a cultural Arab nationalist having a critical attitude towards the CUP, preferred to adopt a pro-Ottomanist discourse or at least to appear so during the war. Gaining the CUP's trust by refusing to propagate the French policies in his newspaper, *al-Muqtabas*, Kurd Ali began to receive financial assistance from Cemal Pasha to continue publishing, which spread the Islamist and Ottomanist propaganda during World War I. He also wrote in the German supported newspaper *al-Sharq* promoting similar views. Muhammad Kurd Ali, like the other four Arab intellectuals had a connection with those who organized revolt attempts including that of Sharif Hussein but according to his memories he was not involved in any of them. This might be because Cemal Pasha's spies closely monitored him and as he many times underscored he did not want to cooperate with the Europeans against the empire although he heartily wished that the Arabs having an independent state of their own. Moreover, he might have also preferred to support the revolt attempts intellectually rather than logistically.

As emphasized earlier, Arslan was highly critical of the CUP government's secular policies, particularly those related to judicial system and family, its incoherent treatment of Arab nationalists such as al-Zahrawi, and most importantly "Turkification" of the Arab provinces by executing and exiling prominent Arabs. These were the only critiques he directed to the Ottoman government in his memoir and most of these developments took place during World War I. It seems therefore that even though Arslan never gave up hope of uniting under the Ottoman umbrella considering the European colonization as the greatest threat for the Muslims' unity, his positive thoughts about the Ottoman government got damaged due to the unfolding events during the war. Thus, having a significant impact on Arslan's

thoughts, World War I changed the tone of his discourse even if it did not transform it completely.

To conclude, World War I was a turning point for the Arabian Peninsula by virtue of the fact that it determined the destiny of the region bringing about sweeping administrative changes. The war created opportunities for three actors, namely the Arab nationalists, the Ottoman Empire, and the Allies, to realize their projects in the region. However, only the Allies or more specifically Britain and France, reached their goals in the end of the war disappointing the other two particularly the Arabs who were promised an independent Arab state. The five Arab intellectuals' ideological discourses and their attitudes towards the Ottoman rule underwent profound changes during the war. Factors influencing these changes include Cemal Pasha's rule with an iron fist, the disastrous famine in Syria and Lebanon, the revolt attempts supported either by the British or the French, the 1916 Arab Revolt as well as the European states' propaganda damaging the empire's legitimacy and their false promises to the Arabs.

3.4. Cemal Pasha's Policies and the Arab Intellectuals

Appointment of Cemal Pasha, one of the CUP's trio, both as the commander of 4th Army and the governor of Syria immediately after the proclamation of World War I was a turning point for many Syrians including the five Arab intellectuals I analyze in this thesis. He was sent to Syria in December 1914 for two main goals: the first was to organize the attack on the Suez Canal against the British and the second was to maintain peace and internal order in Syria" (Cemal Paşa 2001, 112; Çiçek 2012, 3). In order to realize these goals he was given full authority in military and civilian affairs that is why Ali Fuad Bey, his chief of staff, called him the "uncrowned king" of Syria (Erden, 2006: 107).

The very first thing he did was to make preparations for the Canal expedition, which was critical for Germany, the CUP, and Cemal Pasha himself. A few days after he arrived Damascus, he organized a public meeting at Umayyad Mosque where he gave a speech ushering in the re-conquest of Egypt (Derzeze, 2007: 357).

The attack on Egypt was not only intended a threat for the British in the Canal but also to incite an uprising, and perhaps conquer, Egypt. The expedition severely influenced the Arabian Peninsula mainly because it led to conscription, famine, desertions, and epidemics in the region (Çiçek, 2012). More specifically, the heavy price of the expedition was paid by the Syrians who were already facing a wide range of difficulties. The first expedition failed as the Ottoman troops constituted by 80.000 soldiers could not get through the British defense at the Canal during the two days (2-3 February 1915) of the attack. As Shaw underlines, “the British had successfully suppressed Arab movements in Egypt through a combination of force and promises for some kind of Arab independence in the future. So Cemal was not greeted with the expected Egyptian uprising, and strong British resistance forced him back from the Suez Canal without any success” (Shaw, 1977: 320).

Cemal persisted with his ambition and organized a second attack on Egypt. Therefore, Meissner Pasha who was appointed by the government, accelerated the construction of the Egyptian Branch of the railway that connected Egypt, Syria, and Hejaz, so that a greater number of Ottoman troops could be deployed to the Canal. In addition to the railway, chausseed roads and carriage roads were constructed in the desert. But the second expedition could not be completed due to the toughening conditions in Syria and to the movement of the British troops from Egypt towards Syria (Çiçek, 2012). Cemal Pasha’s dream of being the second conqueror of Egypt thus came to naught.

As he could not actualize the first one he concentrated on his second goal maintaining “peace and internal order in Syria”. According to Çiçek, these two are the “key concepts to comprehend Cemal’s rule in Syria” (Çiçek, 2012: 4). From Cemal’s point of view, this meant the eradication of all sorts of “‘barriers’ between the State and its different peoples in Syria preventing the creation of the ideal citizen” (Çiçek, 2012; 80); thus, he took action in order to remove these “barriers”. As Çiçek indicates, “in terms of its social impact, undoubtedly, the most drastic “measures” were taken against the Arabist movement, which demanded certain autonomy for the Arab provinces” (*Ibid*). He did not only crack down on the Arab reformists but also took certain measures to control Zionism and increasing foreign influence in the region.

Deeming the Arab nationalists as the major threat in the region against the integration of the empire, Cemal Pasha believed that the Arabist movement had to be abolished (Çiçek, 2012: 88). Indeed, he had quite good relations with the prominent Arab nationalists in the early period of his governorate, particularly with Abdulkarim al-Khalil, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Amir Shakib Arslan, and Abdulgani al-Uraysi. As Darwaza underscored soon after his arrival to Syria he invited renowned Arab nationalists to a ceremony in which Arab youth groups read poems praising Arabs. During this ceremony he gave a speech underlining the brotherhood between Turks and Arabs (Derveze, 2007: 326). As observed by Çiçek, moreover, principally he was not against the Arabs' cultural demands but never trusted the Arabists who had close ties with foreign powers. Therefore, he did not punish the Arab nationalists who had no "intriguing" relations with the European powers. As discussed above, his attitudes towards journalist Muhammad Kurd Ali, a cultural nationalist, demonstrates how Cemal appreciated those who refused to collaborate with the foreign powers (Kürd Ali, 2006: 119).

If we take an overall look at Cemal Pasha's Syrian governorate with an emphasis on the relationship between the Arabs and the government, we see that Cemal came to Syria at a time when the CUP government made some compromises to satisfy the Arab leaders who organized the Paris Arab Congress. The government issued a decree in April 1913 approving the use of Arabic in law courts and as the medium of instruction in schools except the higher *sultaniye* schools and official correspondence in Arabic. Although schools had to wait for the Arabic textbooks, court officials who did not know Arabic were replaced in Damascus immediately after the decree (Kayalı, 1998). As earlier stated, representation of the Arab provinces substantially increased after the 1914 election and as part of its inclusive policies the government included prominent Arab reformists such as Amir 'Ali 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, Shukri al-'Asali, 'Abd al-Wahhab al- Inkilizi, and Salim Ali Salam. But World War I came with its own schedule and power relations.

As explained in the previous section, with the outbreak of the war Arab nationalists' revolt attempts dramatically increased collaterally European involvement into the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, as the Unionists believed that the Ottoman Empire could regain its power if they could conquer Egypt, they together with Germany decided to attack it appointing Cemal for this

critical task. Thus, the government did not only change its priorities radically after the war broke out, but it also reinforced centralization due to the internal and external threats that might have disintegrated the empire. Because the very aim of Cemal Pasha was to integrate Syria to the Ottoman Empire emphasizing the central authority (Çiçek, 2012: 134), the measures he implemented were in conflict with the promises given to the Arab reformists about the use of Arabic and the employment of Arab civilians and military personnel in the Arab provinces. He did not only send Arab troops to distant theaters of war but also enforced a new law, promulgated in March 1916, enforcing the use of Turkish in all companies. Similar changes took place in schools too (Kayalı, 1998; 219). According to Darwaza, “the deployment of Arab troops to such as Dardanelles by locating the Turkish ones in their places after the failure of the Suez Canal Expedition was part of Cemal Pasha’s plan to crack down the Arab movement” (Derveze, 2007: 359-360).

All these regulations, which were in contradiction with the promises that were given to the Arab nationalists after the Paris Arab Congress, could also be considered as part of Cemal’s ambition to “modernize” Syria. The CUP, specifically Cemal Pasha, was committed to “produce physically and mentally ideal citizens for the Ottoman Empire” (Çiçek, 2012: 251) in Syria, decreasing the foreign influence in the region. As Çiçek observes, without by-passing the Arab cultural and intellectual legacy “he concentrated his main interest on the increase of the loyalties of the Syrians giving them a consciousness of Ottomanness. In the same context, he made essential interventions to the urban space to create visible modern cities” (Çiçek, 2012: 252).

As an important requirement of modern citizenship almost three-fourths of Muslim and Christian Syrian men aged 17 to 55 were conscripted during the war (Thompson, 2000: 22), which was happening for the first time in their history under the Ottoman rule. The failure of the Canal Expedition and the resulting transformation of Cemal’s policies from inclusive to oppressive did not only cause a loss of motivation among the Arab soldiers but also desertion and banditry of Arab soldiers (Çiçek, 2012: 262).

Cemal also made significant regulations in the Syrian cities particularly in Damascus, where he enlarged the old streets, opened a new great boulevard, and as

well as gardens and parks, restored the historical monuments, launched the ferry traffic across the Dead Sea (Tamari, 2000: 23), tried to improve agricultural productivity and the efficiency of transportation with the help of German engineers (Çiçek, 2012: 290-294).

In order to indoctrinate the sense of Ottomanism among the Arabs Cemal also took considerable steps in the realm of education in Syria by Ottomanizing religious and non-religious schools. In addition to repairing the buildings of schools, during his governorate he established 29 new primary schools in various villages of Jerusalem, Halilurrahman, Gaza and Jaffa. Consequently, the number of students in the public schools was dramatically increased in this period (Çiçek, 2012: 273). Moreover, as part of his activities aiming at educating new scholars for the reinforcement of the Ottoman Caliph's authority in the region "immediately after his arrival in Syria, the Pasha pioneered the establishment of a religious university in Jerusalem called *Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi*, and the building of St. Anna Church, which was controlled by the French Jesuits, was confiscated for the *Külliye*" (Çiçek, 2012: 274).

Even though Cemal Pasha's contribution to the modernization of Syria was substantial, he is known for his oppression particularly by the Arabs. Cemal began to punish the Arab nationalists immediately after discovering that Abdulkarim al-Khalil and Rida al-Sulh were preparing a revolt against the empire in collaboration with the British. Al-Khalil and al-Sulh met in Tyre and Sidon planning to rebel in the case of an Ottoman defeat (Kurd Ali 2006: 134, 183, cf. Çiçek 2012). As Cemal Pasha was informed of the above-mentioned meetings he began to arrest the members of the Decentralization Party and also those Arabs who had connection with the French consuls in July 1915 (Kurd Ali, 2006). According to Darwaza, the CUP government was aware of the "Arab Movement", thus it appointed Cemal Pasha because he was the only person who could crack down such a strong movement. Confirming Cemal Pasha's explanation on the issue Darwaza, in his memories, told that soon after he came to Syria Cemal received a bunch of incriminating documents seized from the French consulates, revealing the connection between some Muslim and Christian Arabs and the French foreign officers. Abdulkadir al-Jazairi, his brother Omer, Shafiq al-Muayyad, Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi, Yahya al-Atrash, Abdulwahab al-Inkilizi, Shukri al-Asali, and Rushdi al-

Sham'a were among those Arab nationalists whose connections with the French were revealed (Derveze, 2007). Cemal Pasha did not punish these Arabists on the ground that this would put the unity of Muslims at risk in the context of the war. Moreover, he involved some Arab reformists such as Dr. Abdurrahman al-Shahbandar, Abdulkarim al-Khalil, Abdulghani al-Uraisi, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Amir Shakib Arslan, and As'ad al-Shukairi in his administration. Darwaza claimed that Cemal Pasha was planning to be either Khedive of Egypt or sultan of Syria thus he tried to establish good relations with the prominent Arab leaders who could help him with realizing his ambitions. But as his dream of conquering Egypt came to naught, he immediately attacked the Arab nationalists and after the investigation the Court Martial decided to execute 11 of Beirut leaders on August 21, 1916 in the town square (Derveze, 2007; 364). Likewise, according to such historians as George Antonius and Sulayman Mousa, Cemal cracked down on the Arab nationalists because of the humiliation he felt after the failed Egyptian campaign (Kayalı, 1998; 217). Mousa states that "Failing in his attempt he returned to Damascus and began to seek a pretext for his failure. It dawned upon him that his best chance lay in leveling accusations against Arab political and cultural leaders" (Mousa, 1966: 14). Salam, Arslan, Rida, and Kurd Ali, however, neither implied Cemal's dream of being khedive or sultan in the region nor clearly associated his failed Canal Expedition with his oppression in Syria.

After the executions of the first group, the investigations turned into a process of elimination of the Arabist movement in Syria for, as Çiçek explains,

this time, the accusations were more ambiguous. In the light of documents seized from the French consulate, all the members of the Arab opposition parties were interrogated, regardless of the degree of their active operation to provoke people against the Government after the proclamation of the war. They were accused to separate the Arab lands from the Ottoman Government, and by this way, to cooperate with the greatest enemies of Islam....Besides the hangings, Cemal sent plenty of the members of the notable families into exile. Most of the exiles were the relatives of the hanged notables (Çiçek, 2012: 97).

As all of the five intellectuals stated in their memories the second wave of executions created fear, panic, and animosity among the Arabs. May be the most tragic part of this process was the ambiguity of the accusations and the equal treatment of the

“reformists” and “separatists” (Çiçek, 2012). The analyses of the intellectuals’ discourses indicate that there was a significant difference between these two groups. While the former demanded reforms, particularly decentralization of the Arab provinces, the latter’s aim was, as their name suggests, the complete separation of the Arab provinces from the empire. The difference is clearly seen in the statement made by Salim Ali Salam who was both Ottomanist and reformist, during the meeting with Monsieur Margaret in Paris, the French officer who was responsible for the Eastern affairs, after the Paris Arab Congress (Selam, 2009: 22). In this meeting Salam stated that,

It is important for us you understand our feelings and thoughts about affairs of our state. Although we demand decentralization and the prerogatives that we lost, we are strongly attached to the reign of the commander of believers (*amir al-mu’minin*) the glorious caliph. Refuting his sovereignty and asking you to come to our state and protect us never occurs to our minds (Selam, 2009: 22).

Salam’s reformist attitudes did not change until the Arab Revolt broke out. Cemal Pasha’s executions and exiles were not well received at all by any of the five Arab intellectuals due to this equal treatment; all of them thought that those who were hanged did not deserve such a heavy punishment. Thus, while Arslan, Salam, and Kurd Ali requested many times from Cemal pardon of those who were convicted, Darwaza and Rida could not do so mainly because they did not have a direct and close connection with him.

Having close relations with Cemal, Arslan did not only meet with him in person many times to change his mind about the executions and exiles but also talked to Enver Pasha and some others in the inner circle of the CUP in order to prevent the penalties. Hence, Cemal grew away from him and even had a polemic about him with Enver Pasha who was Arslan’s close friend (Arslan, 2009: 134). As earlier stated in different occasions, even Shakib Arslan, the most pro-Ottomanist among the five, who joined Cemal in the first expedition with a hundred Druze volunteers and played significant role in mediating between Cemal Pasha and Druze and Maronite groups in Beirut, lashed out at Cemal because of the executions and exiles. Arslan says that he had good relationships with him until the latter decided to carry out the

cruel punishments (Arslan, 2009: 94). Arslan's discourse was thus deeply influenced by Cemal's hardening measures. Indeed, from the very beginning Arslan was against the idea of confiscating the foreign consulates because he thought that there were many Arab notables who had connections with the foreign officers for different reasons before World War I but most of these notables already cut their ties with them. During the conversation with Bekir Sami Bey expressing his displeasure with the Ottoman government's decision to investigate the foreign consulates Arslan stated that,

I am against the removal of these documents from their places because this would worry those who are working to please the government. If they come to know that the government is aware of their past contacts with the foreigners, they may get involved in activities causing harm to the government (Arslan, 2009: 92).

He asserted that the documents would not only mislead the government but also lead to killing of the outstanding Arab leaders based on the ambiguous accusations which would widen the gap between the government and the Arabs (Arslan, 2009: 82).

Regarding the idea of exiling noble Arab families to Anatolia Arslan thought that it was Cemal's attempt to Turkify the region. Drawing attention to the effect of the victory in the Dardanelles War both on the CUP's secularizing policies and Cemal's bold decisions Arslan asserted that,

Dardanelles victory caused euphoria among the Unionists. Due to this euphoria they took extraordinary decisions. Discharging the women's obligation of veiling was one of them. Similarly, Turkification of Syria and elimination of Arab nationalism are of these decisions. The first technique they adopted for implementation of this decision was exiling prominent Arab families. They assumed that this would weaken the strong families and so they could be able to realize the Turkification of the region (Arslan, 2009: 119).

Even though Talat and Enver Pashas did not assent to Cemal's practices, they did not intervene in the process. This is because according to Arslan, "Cemal was backed by the Turanist group in Istanbul and Talat and Enver could not touch him in order to be secured from the evils of this group" (Arslan, 2012: 113).

Arslan did not criticize only Cemal but also the CUP government granting

him full authority in Syria. This was the first time he fiercely criticized the CUP government in his memories (Arslan, 2009; 119). He argued that Cemal's policies stirred up hatred among the Arabs towards Turks and his harsh policies were one of the most drastic events that occurred both in the Islamic history and that of Ottoman (Arslan, 2009: 101). Furthermore, unlike the other four Arab intellectuals Arslan saw a connection between the euphoria and high self-esteem led by the victory of the empire in Dardanelles and Cemal Pasha's radical policies in Syria. He drew attention to the fact that the exiles dramatically increased after the victory (Arslan, 2009: 119). For him the empire was still under threat and its enemies were as strong as before the Dardanelles War thus it was not appropriate to terrorize the region. Arslan's discourse was thus deeply influenced by Cemal's policies.

Like Arslan, Salim Ali Salam was also profoundly influenced by Cemal's ruthless practices. According to him, the very aim of Cemal Pasha was to eliminate thoughtful Arab leaders to render the Arabs defenseless (Selam, 2009: 166). As explained in early sections of this chapter he advocated the idea of decentralization rather than separation of the Arab provinces until he got involved in the Arab Revolt in 1916. Aiming to soften the relations between the Arabs and Cemal Pasha, he mediated between them but the latter was not open to Salam's attempts, he claims (Selam, 2009: 30). Cemal took a hard line with Salam as he asked him to release some of the detainees. After a long process of demanding reforms from the Ottoman government through forming Beirut Reform Committee, organizing the Arab Congress, and representing Beirut in the Ottoman parliament, Salam devoted a great deal of his efforts to maintain both the Ottoman authority in the region and the local autonomy. Cemal's uncompromising attitudes and despotic policies in addition to wartime difficulties, the CUP's unwillingness to make administrative reforms demanded for the Arab provinces, and European states' wide-ranging anti-Ottoman campaign all alienated Salam. In such a critical moment his close friend Amir Faisal came to discuss his father's plan to rebel against Istanbul with the help of the British to form an independent Arab state that would be led by his father, Sharif Hussein. Though he was not comfortable with the idea of cooperating with the British, he supported Sharif's plan and, as will be explained in the following section, he took certain responsibilities in the deportation of the Ottoman officers from Beirut to form the Arab state (Selam, 2009: 34).

Salam was not informed only of the preparations of the Arab Revolt but also of some other revolt attempts during the war. In the summer of 1915 Abdulkarim al-Khalil visited him and telling him that he and his friends had negotiated with the British to get financial and military assistance for the revolt (Selam, 2009: 151). Salam was brought to Aley court martial for a few days to bear testimony because of his strong relations with the convicted Arab nationalists. According to Cemil Beyhum, one of the close friends of Salam, Cemal Pasha did not hang Salim Ali Salam and his friend Ahmad Mukhtar Beyhum because during the Paris Arab Congress they opposed to the idea of a French mandate, which was proposed by some members, and insisted on the decentralization of the Arab provinces provided that the provinces would be under the Ottoman authority (Selam, 2009; 31). Furthermore, according to the reports, which were written by French officers in Beirut, Salam engaged in activities against the French (Salam, 2009: 76). Thus, he was able to escape from Cemal's punishment while many of his friends were either hanged or exiled.

On the other hand, Kurd Ali, who could be identified as a pragmatist, managed to win Cemal's trust and remain close to him until Cemal's resignation though he was a reformist and even launched a branch of the FAP in Syria with his friends (Kürd Ali, 2006: 132). Considering the wartime as an extraordinary period that required caution Kurd Ali thought that a pro-government stance was most appropriate during such a critical phase (Kürd Ali, 2006: 132). Thus, he wrote two books propagating the government's Ottomanist and Islamic discourse. Accompanied by a group of Syrian ulema including Sheikh As'ad al-Shukairi, the mufti of 4th Army, took a trip to Dardanelles and then Istanbul glorifying Cemal's policies. He was never involved in any activity that would annoy Cemal. Due to these attitudes Kurd Ali was fiercely criticized by some Arab nationalists including Izzat Darwaza. As a moment of an inter-textual dialogue, where one of my primary sources speaks to another, this passage is worth of quoting: "Muhammad Kurd Ali kept being two-faced until the end of the war gaining the friendship of Cemal Pasha. He successfully benefitted from Cemal's trusting him. We had read his articles in *al-Muqtabas* written for the purpose of deceiving and convincing Cemal and his friends" (Derveze, 2007: 365).

When it comes to the executions, Kurd Ali recognized after a few attempts that if he wanted to maintain good relations with Cemal he should not bring up the issue again; thus, he decided to keep silent. Having said that, Kurd Ali quitted from his position in al-Sharq newspaper, which was a mouthpiece of government propaganda, immediately after Cemal left Syria, and refused to continue being the editor in chief of it even though Mersinli Cemal Pasha who was the second commander of 4th Army and known as Cemal Junior, asked him to do so. He responded that “I do not want to be enslaved a second time. Cemal Pasha captured me because after he came to Syria he protected me from possible plots of the plotters. But I do not want to be recaptured anymore by anyone for any reason” (Kurd Ali, 2006: 197). Keep in mind that his words were written way after this historical episode has gone, and that this anti-Cemal attitude could very well be a post-facto rationalization after the winners and losers of the struggle between Cemal/CUP on the one hand, and Arab nationalists and European powers, on the other. His response thus claims that this reflects Kurd Ali’s real feeling of his relations with Cemal Pasha. He also claimed that Cemal and Enver lacked a loving heart and that they were kind to some Arab leaders including Kurd Ali himself and Shakib Arslan only because they wanted to attract Arab supporters.

Unlike the other four Arab intellectuals, Rashid Rida did not deal in his memories with Cemal Pasha’s attitudes towards the Arabs during his governorate in Syria. Rather he attacked the CUP in general blaming the Unionists as being Turkish nationalists who mistreated Arabs and disrespected both Islam and the *Kanun-i Esasi* (Rıza, 2007: 12). During his sermon in Mina, for example, Rida said that,

Anyone who is foresighted can understand the Unionists bad intention in gathering thousands of soldiers in the Hejaz. Because they, like us, know that the enemy states would never attack the Hejaz. It is more appropriate to dispatch the soldiers that are located here to the fronts for fighting with Russians who occupied Turkish provinces. But for the Unionists punishing the Arabs is more important than repelling the Russians from their (Turkish) houses. If they were able to complete their plans we would see in the Hejaz the similar or the worse oppression they undertook in Syria (Rıza, 2007: 327).

Besides claiming that if Sharif Hussein did not rebel against the government, the CUP would implement ruthless policies, most probably referred to Cemal’s practices, in the Hejaz as it carried out in Syria, Rida also emphasized the poverty

and famine caused by the blockade. According to Rida, “because the CUP’s troops were deployed in the Hejaz the Allies had to subdue the coasts, which in turn led to the extreme poverty...If this continued one more year, people would die either of starvation or epidemics” (Rıza, 2007: 327). As it is obvious in the above quotations in his sermon Rida tried to convince the people of the appropriateness of the revolt by illustrating the disastrous scenarios that would possibly happen if Sharif did not revolt against the empire.

Furthermore, during the war the court martial in Aley condemned Rida to death sentence because of his activities in favor of an Arab caliphate based in Egypt paving way for the British occupation (Rıza, 2007: 52). It is obvious from his support for the Arab Revolt and his project of forming an Arab caliphate that Rida was not satisfied with CUP rule in general, and Cemal Pasha’s governorate in particular. Though he did not make any statement in his memories that manifested that Rida’s ideological discourse or attitudes towards the Ottoman rule was influenced by Cemal’s policies, as stated earlier Rida emphasized “the CUP’s oppression in Syria” to justify Sharif Hussein’s rebel and his own support for it.

Regarding the connection between Cemal’s oppression and the Arab Revolt, Darwaza (2007: 398) argued that Cemal Pasha’s executions were the last straw that led to the Arab Revolt. Salam did not make such a statement but apparently he was convinced by his friend Amir Faisal ibn Hussein justifying their revolt plans by referring to Cemal’s despotic rule (Selam, 2009: 32). Influenced by his close friend’s explanations Salam was convinced of the necessity of acting against the imperial authority for the wellbeing of Arabs. So, even Salam did not associate clearly Cemal’s despotism with the Arab Revolt in his memories, the sequence of the events that led him to shift his ideological stance indicate that Cemal’s uncompromising attitudes and heavy punishments played a significant role in transforming his ideological discourse which became Arab nationalist.

While Kurd Ali did not give a view on the issue, Arslan opposed the argument that Cemal Pasha’s ruthless policies led to the Arab Revolt. He thought that there was no connection between the Arab Revolt and the executions and having contacts with the British Hussein had plans to rebel against the empire earlier than Cemal’s appointment. Thus, in any case Sharif would rebel Istanbul due to his

ambitions (Arslan, 2009: 192-193). On the other hand, Kayalı observes that “the executions signified in the eyes of the Syrians the government’s resolve to revoke whatever concessions that it had agreed to give to the Arabs. Cemal’s actions may have expedited the revolt in the Hijaz” (Kayalı, 1998: 221).

Before ending it is necessary to emphasize on the striking fact that none of the five Arab intellectuals mentioned in their memories any of the endeavors Cemal Pasha made under the wartime circumstances to modernize Syria. Even Arslan who described Cemal as clever, practical, determined, and receptive therefore a perfect commander but not a good politician (Arslan, 2009: 190) did not refer to his efforts for improving Syria. Absence of such a large scale of modernization effort made by the Pasha in the memories of the five Arab intellectuals needs to be examined. The parts devoted to Cemal Pasha in the memoirs include the Canal Expedition or the issues of exiles and executions. Though at times the authors gave minute details of various issues it is definitely interesting that they overlooked all the developments, at least some of which they witnessed. Apparently in their minds Cemal’s oppressive policies overshadowed his remarkable efforts to “make Syria as developed as Egypt in the eyes of the Syrians” (Çiçek, 2012: 290). In other words, their anger and resentment to his cruelty particularly to the executions prevented them to discuss Cemal Pasha a positive manner in their memories even though they wrote them decades after his rule. This might be because they wanted to reflect only one -oppressive- aspect of Cemal’s administration to justify the present conditions in which they wrote their memoirs. For they wrote them in a context in which Cemal Pasha and the Empire had been defeated, Arabs had their own ‘independent’ states (though in fact colonialism was in full force in the Middle East), and more importantly, Arab nationalism seemed to be a useful, progressive and desirable ideology that helped the Arabs won their independence from centuries-old Ottoman domination. As with every ideology, Arab nationalism, too, had its own ‘others’, the most important of which was the Ottoman rule, which was to be described as the ‘dark ages’ of authentic Arab history. (The discourse of ‘Ottoman colonialism’ in the Arab world that still persists today is also -at least partly- affected by this ideology.) Thus, speaking from within Arab nationalism, the five intellectuals’ discourses were heavily shaped by this ideology’s presentation of recent past, in which the Ottoman rule was completely associated with oppression and backwardness. Accordingly,

Cemal Pasha the Villain's fruitless efforts to save Syria from economic and social 'backwardness' and to modernize the Arab cities were overshadowed by his negative image in the intellectuals' discourses as presented in their memoirs. Therefore, we see one more time how ideological positions influence the way of reading and reflecting recent history. Similarly, we may recall that none of the five Arab intellectuals made any reference in their memoirs to the concept and movement of (failed) Arab caliphate, which was one of the most popular issues in the early decades of the 20th century among the Arabs. Thus, the act of "selective reading of recent history" that is prevalent in the discourses of these memoirs confirms the fact that history writing is as much about forgetting (voluntary or otherwise) as remembering past event.

3.5. The 1916 Arab Revolt and the Arab Intellectuals

The Arab Revolt is the last but not the least turning point that played a key role in the transformation of the Arab intellectuals' ideological discourses. Among the five Darwaza, Rida, and Salam were deeply influenced by the revolt whereas Kurd Ali and Arslan did not change their attitudes towards the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces after the outbreak of it. While Darwaza and Rida openly supported it in their memories, Salam, as discussed earlier, did not spell out his thoughts about the Sharif's rebel against the imperial authority in his memoir. Hassan Ali Hallak, the editor of Salam's memoir, underscored Salam's support to the revolt depending on the some other primary sources.

Among the five only Darwaza who supported the revolt wholeheartedly and considered it as a great responsibility that one had to take on the eve of the empire's demise, provided details about the process of the revolt in his memories. Taking King Abdullah's memories as the main reference Darwaza interpreted the course of events that led to the Arab Revolt entirely from the perspective of the Sharif and his sons. Accordingly, and as usual he adopted an Arab nationalist tone in explaining the revolt. Therefore there are discrepancies between what he told and the narratives of

some modern historians such as E. Dawn, H. Kayalı, M. T. Çiçek, E. Tauber, W. Ochsenswald, and M. C. Wilson who have written on the Arab Revolt.

As for Rashid Rida, according to the travel notes, which constituted his memoir, he took a trip to the Hejaz after the 1916 Arab Revolt for pilgrimage. During this trip he visited Sharif Hussein and gave a sermon in Mina to render full support to the revolt. In the meantime, during a private talk with the Sharif he expressed his opinion about the form of the government of the prospective Arab state which was going to be ruled by Sharif Hussein with the title of the “King of the Arab countries” that was modified to the “King of Hejaz” afterwards causing discontent among the British and French officials (Tauber, 1993).

On the other hand, Kurd Ali who promised himself not to get involved in politics after World War I (Kürd Ali, 2006: 362) insistently avoided talking about the revolt and its consequences in his memories. Except for a few cases it is hard to come across any names or issues related to the Arab Revolt. Likewise, it was clear that Shakib Arslan neither took part in the revolt nor supported it but until the very end of his memoir he did not mention the revolt. As underscored in the previous section he concentrated on Cemal Pasha’s policies and referred to Sharif Hussein’s plans of revolting against the empire since the time of Abdulhamid II just to clarify the assumed connection between Cemal’s oppression and the Sharif’s revolt.

Before proceeding to the analysis of the intellectuals’ discourses on it, it might be useful to give some background information, derived from both my primary and secondary sources, about the revolt and its leader. Appointed as the “Sharif” (religious dignitary) of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali returned from Istanbul where he had been since 1893, to Hejaz after the 1908 Revolution (Çiçek, 2007, see also Kral Abdullah, 2007). The CUP government relied on Sharif Hussein as a proxy to protect its interests in the Hejaz (Kayalı, 1998: 175). Accordingly, in order to maintain his prestige, power, and prerogatives Hussein preferred to cooperate with the Ottoman government until the outbreak of World War I when imperial and international political circumstances provided him with new opportunities to improve his personal power and prestige. The relationship between the Sharif and the Ottoman government had deteriorated as the latter increased centralization, which restricted the Sharif’s local authority in the Hejaz in favor of the governor appointed

by Istanbul. Moreover, the government separated Medina's administration from the Hejaz in 1910 from the *sancak* of Hejaz to an independent *sancak*. This administrative change and the extension of the Hejaz Railway to Medina signified the CUP's aim at a direct control of the town. This led to a chronic tension between the *muhafiz* of Medina and Sharif Hussein (Kayalı, 1998: 185).

According to Kayalı the relationship between the government and the Sharif had radically changed with the "reorientation of Istanbul's imperial policy toward an Ottomanism with greater emphasis on Islam and crystallization of international factors that ultimately precipitated the world war" (Kayalı, 1998: 192). Kayalı also observes that,

Istanbul's espousal of an Islamic ideology not only threatened to overshadow his religious standing but also directed government's attention to the holy places as bases for propaganda. In the meantime, the growing international tensions prompted Britain to renew contacts with the sharif regarding a prospective alliance against the Ottoman government (Kayalı, 1998: 192).

As Shakib Arslan also argued, although the contacts between the British and Sharif Hussein can be traced back earlier than this (Arslan, 2009: 192) the Sharif's son Abdullah met first time with Lord Kitchener in Egypt on the way back from Istanbul in 1913. Abdullah asked him if Britain could help them to defend the holy cities in the case of the CUP's attempt to make radical administrative changes in the Hejaz. Lord responded that the longstanding friendship between the empire and Britain would prevent the latter to interfere in the empire's internal affairs (Derveze, 2007: 334). The empire's entry into World War I on the side of Germany changed Britain's stance and General Storrs sent a letter to Abdullah promising to support his father if he revolts against Istanbul (Derveze, 2007: 337).

On the other hand, aiming to limit the Sharif's authority the CUP government appointed Vehib Pasha both as governor and commander of the forces in the Hejaz as the CUP came to power again after a short-lived FAP government. Soon after this appointment a crisis between the Sharif and the Pasha arose as the latter attempted to carry out the Provincial Law and construct the railway from Mecca to Medina (Derveze, 2006: 329, 331). Relations between them came to a point where Vehib

Pasha “in July 1914 advised ‘for the sake of Ottomanism’ that Sharif Husayn should be dismissed and replaced by his frail predecessor, Ali, for Husayn desired the downfall of the state” (Kayalı, 1998: 208). After a while Sharif Hussein was given a document revealing plans by the government and Vehib to depose himself. The government deposed Vehib to calm the Sharif (Derveze, 2007: 333).

According to Darwaza another development that conduced him and many other Arabs toward the Arab Revolt was the executions carried out under the rule of Cemal Pasha (see above). Faisal ibn Hussein demanded from Cemal Pasha on behalf of his father the release of the detainees but he could not accomplish a result. The second wave of executions on May 6, 1916 accelerated the Sharif’s revolt preparation in collaboration with the British who took the responsibility of finance and replenishment of the revolt (Derveze, 2007: 398, 419). After the series of secret correspondence with Sir Henry MacMahon, the British dignitary the Foreign Office’s Cairo Bureau, negotiating the terms and conditions of the revolt and an independent Arab state (see Teitelbaum 2001, Tauber 1993), Sharif Hussein announced the revolt against the Ottoman Empire on June 10, 1916 (Teitelbaum 1998; see also Kral Abdullah, 2007). Indeed, the Arab Revolt was the only revolt attempt among many others, against the empire that became successful in the Arabian Peninsula (Tauber, 1993).

Except for some details provided by Salam the five Arab intellectuals did not inform us about the military aspect of the revolt or the process through which the revolt was carried out at the administrative level. Before moving to Salam’s description of the course of events in Beirut after the revolt broke out, it is necessary to underline a few points discussed by Tauber (1993a), which were mentioned by none of the five Arab intellectuals including particularly the identities of the participants in the revolt. The revolt, led by the Sharif and his sons, was carried out by volunteers, former prisoners of war, deserters, escapees, and others including British and French officers. As “the largest potential reservoir of skilled manpower for the army of the Arab revolt, that is, officers and men, was in the prisoner-of-war camps in India and Egypt” (Tauber, 1993a: 102) Sharif Hussein planned to set up a regular army of 30.000 men who would be based on the Arabs from the Hejaz and war prisoners in India, Iraq, and Egypt. However, as Tauber states,

not all the Arab officers and enlisted men who had fought on the Ottoman side and had been taken prisoner by the British were prepared to join the Arab revolt. There were those who felt a religious bond with the caliph and the Muslim empire, and therefore, refused to fight against them in cooperation with the Christian Allies. Others refused to join the revolt, not out of the political-religious reasons, but out of fear of harming their families who remained within the Empire, or even of injuring themselves on the battlefield. These latter preferred the safety of prison camps (Tauber, 1993a: 102).

In spite of all the efforts put by the representatives from army and ulema appointed by the Sharif for persuading those who were in Egypt and India, “the greatest attempt to enlist Arab prisoners of war prisoners the army of the revolt failed miserably” (Tauber, 1993a: 107-8).

The second reservoir of trained manpower for the revolt was deserters. The vast majority of the Arab deserters preferred not to join the Sharif’s army too (Tauber, 1993a: 111). According to Tauber, “the regular soldiers of the revolt army were for the most part Hijazis, though most of the officers were Iraqis and Syrians” (Tauber, 1993a: 114). The problem of forming a regular revolt army of Arab soldiers and officers was not mentioned by any of the five Arab intellectuals. As the following paragraphs make clear, Salam and Darwaza reflected the revolt as a smooth process.

After a brief note on the profile of the revolt army that would help us to comprehend the conditions under which the revolt was carried out now let us analyze how Salim Ali Salam reflected the revolt in his memories. Salam is the only source Among the five intellectuals that provides details about the aftermath of the Arab revolt, it might be useful to summarize his narrative of the formation of new Arab governments in Lebanon, which will also give us clues about his view of the Sharif’s revolt and the notion of ‘Arab independence’ after World War I. According to Salam’s memories, on September 28, 1918 an Arab government was formed under the leadership of Amir Said al-Jazairi in Damascus before Faisal entered the city. On September 30, 1918 Al-Jazairi sent a telegraph to Omar Daouk, the mayor of Beirut, informing him of the new Arab government in Damascus and asking him to form an Arab government in Beirut too. Daouk negotiated the issue with Salim Ali Salam

who was then with Ahmad Mukhtar Beyhum² and Alfred Sursock³. At night they all went to the Ottoman governor of Beirut, Ismail Hakkı (1870-1922), asking from him to leave the city together with all the Turkish officers so that they could form an Arab government. After negotiating all night governor Ismail Hakkı conceded and left Beirut in the morning. Then, Salam, Daouk, and Sursock together with Salim al-Tayyare, and Muhammad Fahuri came to Salam's house in *al-Musaytaba*, held a meeting and finally announced the formation of the Beirut Arab government under the leadership of Mayor Omar Daouk (Selam, 2009: 34). Salam even said that, "I was given the full authority of administering the government". Moreover, his two sons, Muhammad Salam and Salah Osman took the task of governing the Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*) (Selam, 2009: 35). Again as Salam stated in his memoirs on 6 October, 1918 the Beirut government decided to raise the Arab flag at the government office which was located in the great palace; thus, a ceremony was held to which prominent religious and political leaders and civil servants attended and over which Salam presided. On the very same day Brigadier General Shukru al-Ayyubi Pasha who was appointed by Amir Faisal as the governor of both Lebanon and Beirut came to Beirut and Salim Ali Salam together with a big crowd welcomed him in the desert (Selam, 2009: 36). The next day Shukru al-Ayyubi and prominent Beiruti leaders met at Salam's house to distribute the tasks in the new government (Selam, 2009: 37).

Even though it is hard to come across any clear pro-Arab Revolt statement in Salam's memoirs this narrative implies that after defending Ottoman-Arab unity for years Salam did not only support the Arab Revolt but bore great responsibility in the formation of the Arab government in Beirut after deposing the Ottoman officials. It is significant to quote a passage from Salam's memoir to recognize how the Sharif's revolt led him to make a radical ideological shift.

In summer of 1915, Abdulkarim al-Khalil who was close to Cemal Pasha, came and told me that, "We are planning a revolt together with the British against the government...so and so people will join us". In response I said to him that, "O! Abdulkarim, I recommend you not to get involved in these

² Mukhtar Beyhum (1876-1920), a prominent Arab personality, was a close friend of Salim Ali Salam. He was a member of Beirut Reform Committee. He also attended the 1913 Paris Arab Congress and had a conversation with Monsier Margaret clarifying their pro-Ottomanist stance.

³ Alfred Sursock, a close friend of Salam, is one of the Christian Beiruties who attended the 1913 Paris Arab Congress. He took part in the formation of modern Lebanon too.

activities. On my behalf I never give consent to these attempts”. We both tried to convince each other but could not reach an agreement (Selam, 2009: 151).

We can comprehend the impact of the Arab Revolt on Salam’s political discourse if we compare the above conversation, which took place before the revolt, with the fact that he fully supported the revolt. Apparently, among the three Arab intellectuals namely Salam, Darwaza, and Rida whose ideological discourses were shaped by the revolt, it was Salim Ali Salam who was influenced by it the most in spite of the fact that Rida and Darwaza adopted more supportive discourses regarding the revolt in their memories. This is because, as he became disillusioned with the CUP government Darwaza began to look for alternatives for the benefit of Arabs when he got affiliated with both the FAP and *al-Fatat*. Identifying himself as an Arab nationalist he never appeared to be pro-Ottomanist, at least in his memories. Thus it was not surprising that he supported the revolt and associated it with the Arab nationalism which was indeed not the exact motivation for Hussein’s revolt (Ochsenwald, 1991). The Sharif’s discourse on the revolt included Islamic and tribalist elements rather than nationalist in early period of the revolt (Ardıç 2012; Ochsenwald, 1991).

On the other hand, as stated earlier, Rashid Rida updated his political discourse according to the power shifts that had been taking place in the region in order to realize his *islah* project. As he lost hope from the CUP government he focused on the project of an Arab Caliphate aiming to form an independent Arab state that to be led by an Arab caliph. Therefore, even before the outbreak of the Arab Revolt he negotiated with the British to get their assistance in organizing a rebellion against the empire (Ryad, 2010). Thus, the Arab Revolt was a great opportunity for Rida to actualize his goals even though he was not satisfied with the terms of the agreement between MacMahon and Sharif Hussein (Tauber, 1995).

Likewise, considering the revolt as “an indispensable initiation and a national obligation” (Derveze, 2007: 415) for the Arab movement Darwaza appreciated Sharif Hussein due to his courage and determination. He even asserted that, “

in terms of principle, action, and consequence Sharif Hussein's cooperation with the British and the Arabists' support this collaboration was quite appropriate. With this step Sharif Hussein undertook a great responsibility of leading to the modern awakening of the Arab nation...thus he deserves to be thanked (Derveze, 2007: 414).

In order to appreciate the Arab Revolt in spite of its unexpected political consequences Darwaza illustrated a number of cases as a response to the question "what if the revolt had not happened". According to him, the revolt had various benefits to the Arab issue. First of all if the revolt had not happened, the Allies would still have won the war but the Ottoman Empire might not have given up on Arabs and the Arab issue would not have been a recognized and openly discussed worldwide. Therefore, the Arabs would have been destitute of a significant instrument that they used to reach their national goals. The second is if the Arab Revolt had not broken out colonialism over the Arabs would not have been worse than present condition because the Arabs would not be able to propound the promises, which they were given, against the colonial powers. Likewise, absence of the Arab Revolt would have signified the insufficiency of the Arab movement after the Unionists oppressed the members of the movement. The third benefit of the revolt for the Arab issue was if the CUP had won the war, it would have attempted to deal the Arab movement a deathblow as it did to the Armenians taking advantage of the war (Derveze, 2007: 415-416).

Furthermore, according to Darwaza, Sharif Hussein did not deserve all the fierce critiques he got because he believed that he rebelled against those despots who deviated from Islam and oppressed the Arabs (Derveze, 2007: 417). He also said that,

it is true that Hussein got involved in a colonial intrigue but no one can claim that he did it consciously. It can only be said that both Sharif Hussein and the leaders of Arab movements wanted to make use of an opportunity. Even I believe that if the Arabs were experienced and well-organized, they would render this opportunity into an instrument for realizing their goals (Derveze, 2007: 420).

In order to support this argument he stated that the promises made to the Zionists were more ambiguous than those given to the Arabs. However, because the Zionist leaders were so determined they could fulfill their ambitions (Derveze, 2007: 415). Merely emphasizing the revolt's significance for the modern "awakening" of the Arabs, Darwaza preferred not to refer to Hussein's personal motivations that led him to revolt against the empire by collaborating with the British and Arabists particularly the members of *al-Fatat* and *al-Ahd* societies. Though the Arabist tone always dominated his memoir, Darwaza's Arabist discourse appeared to reach its summit in the parts related to the Arab Revolt. It is interesting that even though he wrote his memories decades after the revolt Darwaza merely focused on the positive aspect of the revolt overlooking its unexpected consequences such as the French mandate in Syria.

Unlike Darwaza, Rashid Rida who also rendered full support to the Arab Revolt did not use Arab nationalist elements in his discourse on the revolt. He did not make reference to the "Arab movement" or the "Arab issue" to underline the importance of the revolt. Rather he utilized fully Islamic discourse to justify the Sharif's revolt. The difference between them is quite clear in how they defined the Sharif's action. Darwaza argued that Hussein rescued the Hejaz (Derveze, 2007: 404) whereas according to Rida what Hussein did was a conquest (Rıza, 2007: 284, 334). Furthermore, neither Rida nor Darwaza discussed Hussein's claim of his caliphate in 1924 (soon after the Turkish government abolished the Caliphate in March), which was a very significant development at the time. This might be because this claim turned into a complete failure soon after its declaration. The Sharif was defeated by Ibn Saud of Najd in the same year, who then founded Saudi Arabia in 1925 (Ardıç, 2012). On the other hand while Rida several times addressed Hussein as "his-majesty", "glorious king", and "his serene highness", Darwaza did not use any of these complimentary words for the Sharif.

After comparing discourses of Rida and Darwaza on the Arab Revolt let us now examine Rashid Rida's attitudes towards the revolt. As mentioned early in this section Rida took a trip to the Hejaz for *Hajj* in 1916 after the Arab Revolt broke out and he visited Hussein. On October, 5, 1916 Sharif Hussein issued the decree to form a new Arab state in Mecca just before Rida arrived there. During his visit he gave a long sermon before Hussein in Mina, a town near Mecca, which was also published

in *al-Manar* supporting and Islamically justifying the revolt. In his sermon after a brief introduction praising the Arabs and the Arabian Peninsula he summarized the last century of the Ottoman history and he then began to attack the Unionists holding them responsible for the empire's disastrous situation. He did not only underline the CUP's bad governance that brought the empire to the edge of abyss but also stressed its deviation from the Islamic principles:

As I provided you with the evidences from the official history the government is indeed quite weak and it is feared that because of the troubles caused by this evil committee it will collapse....Most of the Muslims struggle for the government's existence and also for its independence. But only a few Muslims are aware of the seriousness of the threats which pervade the government....I have not seen anyone except Amir and Sharif of Mecca among the prominent leaders of Muslims who thoroughly recognized seriousness of the threat that has been posed to Islam and acted to deal with it. Because, knowing the Ottoman government and its leaders the Amir was aware that the empire was at the edge of abyss and the Unionists were using the law and military power to punish the Arab people by killing those who were thoughtful and qualified and confiscating the properties of those who were wealthy (Rıza, 2007: 326).

Distinguishing the CUP and the empire Rida targeted the CUP rather than the empire or Turks in his speech and in one occasion he appreciated Sharif Hussein because he aimed at the Unionists rather than Turkish people and the Ottoman Empire (Rıza, 2007: 322). Moreover, Rida's emphasis on Islamic principles was very similar to the Sharif's own discourse in his declaration of the revolt, where he, too, blamed the CUP leadership for disobeying Allah, and claimed that his revolt aimed only at the restoration of the *Sharia* in the region, rather than an act against the Caliphate (Ardıç, 2012: 200-204). According to Rida, the Arab Revolt was undertaken for the purpose of protecting the House of God's neighbors from the starvation and the CUP's oppression just as happened in Syria. Moreover, he claimed that the revolt was a precautionary act considering the possibility of the empire's demise (Rıza, 2007: 322). For Rida, Muslims had to be thankful to Sharif Hussein as he attempted to "protect the Hejaz", which also meant the "protection of Islam". Rida finalized his speech by complementing Sharif Hussein who evaluated the sermon saying that "the essence of the speech was the Ottoman Empire's being under threat. I agree with this

idea. I used to think so before carrying out the revolt. But most people or the Muslims do not comprehend this” (Rıza, 2007: 330).

After this supportive speech Rida shared with the Sharif his opinions, which were not explained in his memories, on the form of the new Arab government. Sharif Hussein did not comment on what Rida proposed (Rıza, 2007: 320). The memoirs do not say much about this exchange between the two –nor about Rida’s purpose in his visit. For this we need to resort to the secondary literature: Explaining the background of Rida’s trip to the Hejaz Tauber argues that,

the main purpose of Rida’s visit to Mecca was to convince Husayn to join the program of his “Society of the Arab Association”, of which he had already informed Abdullah, Husayn’s son, in 1914. The basic idea of his society was to form an alliance (*hilf*) between the rulers of the Hijaz, Asir, Yemen and Najd, each ruler retaining full autonomy in internal administrative affairs, while they would join forces in defending the Arabian Peninsula from foreign aggression or influence...The headquarters of the council would be in Mecca, with Husayn being considered the president of the alliance. When Rida presented this program to Husayn, however, the latter refused to discuss it on grounds that it was premature to talk about a political alliance until the Arabs had reconquered Medina from Ottoman control. It would appear, however, that Husayn feared a weakening of his own political status if he agreed to the idea of an alliance with other Arab chieftains (Tauber, 1995: 115).

Since Rida’s memoirs are composed of notes taken during his four trips between 1908 and 1918, it is not possible to trace the developments that took place between the Sharif and Rida after his trip to the Hejaz. Even though Rida appeared to be fully supportive of the revolt, his project was not in harmony with that of Hussein as the above quotation clarifies. Moreover, Rida’s anti-colonialist discourse bothered Hussein who did not want to disturb his British and French collaborators (Tauber, 1995). Thus, soon after his visit he came to be at odds with Sharif and as Kavak, the translator of Rida’s memoirs, underscored “Rida did not only state that he disapproved Sharif’s piracy of the caliphate but also asserted that Hussein who became *tağut* and the caliph of evil” (Rıza, 2007: 13). The animosity between them increased and Sharif prohibited Rida’s periodical *al-Manar*’s entry into the Hejaz (Tauber, 1995). As we have observed in the previous sections of the thesis such a radical shift in Rida’s ideological and political discourse was neither the first nor the

last (see Mertoğlu 2005). On the other hand, Rida highlighted that there was a disagreement on the Hussein's revolt: while some thought that revolting against the Ottoman Empire might not be a good idea considering the fact that it would lead the empire to fall into a decline and that Muslims lacked of means to form a new Islamic state. Others had a positive view on the revolt hoping that an independent Arab state would conduce to refurbish the splendid Arab civilization (Rıza, 2007: 329). This note of Rida remarkably demonstrates the diversity of the opinions on the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz.

In this context, Kurd Ali and Arslan could be positioned in the first group who had negative view on the revolt. Thus we do not observe a major change in their attitudes towards the Ottoman rule after the breakout of the Arab Revolt. As Tauber stated, Muhammad Kurd Ali refused to join the revolt even though he was personally asked by Faisal who was a close friend of his to take part in it. Rather, he propagated against the British and Sharif Hussein as well as their alliance against the empire during World War I in his articles in *al-Sharq* (Tauber, 1993: 117).

Having close relations with Faisal ibn Hussein, Kurd Ali was most likely aware of the course of events that led to the Arab Revolt. However, he did not give any explanation on the process of the revolt in his memoir. As explained in his memoir, Amir Faisal was in Damascus not long before the revolt and he wanted to return to the Hejaz worrying of being court-martialed on the eve of the second wave of executions. Sharif Hussein sent a message to Kurd Ali through a member of Bekri family requesting him to accompany Faisal for his safety on the way back Mecca. Refusing the Hussein's demand Kurd Ali replied that, "if I escape from here, they will inflict trouble upon my family. Moreover, my health is not fit for travelling in desert" (Kürd Ali, 2006: 154). Apparently, he carefully avoided taking side of Sharif Hussein however as underlined in the previous chapter, on the narrative analysis of the memoirs, he was indeed contented with idea of uniting Arabs under an independent Arab state, but he seems to have a problem with Sharif Hussein's leadership. Kurd Ali's feelings on this issue can be observed in the statement he made during his conversation with Amir Faisal after 1918. In this conversation he stated that,

You said that all the Arab provinces will be united under one state. We were pleased and delighted. Our youth served to your father Sharif Hussein in order to realize this objective. Then you said that the Hejaz, Syria and Iraq will be respectively independent. We gave our consent to it involuntarily. Now we are collecting everyone in Syria and evacuating Palestine and you say that “you Syrians are equal to Palestine” (Kürd Ali, 2006: 278).

It is, thus, safe to say that even though Kurd Ali did not support the Sharif’s revolt logistically, he hoped that it would lead to the unity of Arabs under an Arab state. His main problem with the Sharif seems to be the fact that the latter collaborated with the British whereas Kurd Ali was strictly against the idea of colonization and even cooperation with European powers (Kürd Ali, 2006: 151).

According to his memories, after 1918 Amir Faisal went to London to discuss Syria’s future as the idea(l) of independent Arab state in Syria turned out to be hot air. He sent a letter to Kurd Ali from there asking him to propagate for the British mandate in Syria. Kurd Ali neither promoted the British mandate nor that the French. Expressing his disappointment with the British Kurd Ali said;

I like the British people individually but I am not content with their administration. I feel deep sorrow when I remember that they let down the three attempts of the Arabs who were then under the Ottoman Empire that could lead an independent Arab union (Kürd Ali, 2006: 152).

He also emphasized how the British challenged the Arabs’ attempts at repairing the Hejaz Railway mainly for two reasons: the first was they did not want the pilgrims use transportation other than British ships. The second was that they did not desire the unity of emirates in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Kurd Ali trade between Syria and the Hejaz went down due to the disconnectedness of different Arab groups (Kürd Ali, 2006: 153). Thus, we see that his view of the Sharif’s revolt was closely related with his perspective on European colonialism in the Arabian Peninsula: despite his (cultural) nationalist inclinations, his animosity toward foreign intrusion into the Arab-Muslim lands seem to have led Kurd Ali to withdraw his support from Sharif Hussein’s independence project due to the latter’s cooperation with the British. Note also that Kurd Ali did not consider the Ottomans as a ‘foreign’ power

that occupied the Arab homeland, even though he wrote his memoirs during the 1940 when Arab nationalism was rather popular in the Arab world.

As for Amir Shakib Arslan, as in the case of Kurd Ali, he did not devote a substantial part in his memories to the Hussein's revolt. He avoided giving any information about it even though he discussed various issues and events that might indeed be related to the Arab Revolt. For instance not long before the breakout of World War I he took a trip together with A. Jawish to the Hejaz particularly to Medina propagating the government's Islamist-Ottomanist campaign and establishing an Islamic university (Arslan, 2009: 67). In his narrative on this trip Arslan did not even mention the name of Sharif Hussein who was then the most active and influential figure in the region. This absence by itself shows his pro-Ottoman and anti-secessionist attitude in general and his dislike of the Sharif in particular. But he also explicitly talked about the Sharif emphasizing his intrigues with the British officers against the Ottoman rule.

As mentioned earlier, Arslan dealt with the issue of the Arab Revolt in the very end of his memoir in order to clarify the assumed relationship between the revolt and Cemal Pasha's executions in Syria. Arslan disagreed with those (e.g. Darwaza) who assumed a cause-and-effect relationship between them. According to Arslan, Sharif Hussein did not only have connection with the British but he also had the idea of revolting against the empire even before CUP rule. As he explained in his memories, an Egyptian administrator, representing Sharif Hussein went to London in 1912 trying to forge an agreement between Arabs and the British. According to this agreement, the British would provide Arabs with arms so that Arabs would revolt against the Ottoman government and consequently they would be allied with the British in the future. The British foreign ministry refused this project on account of the fact that Britain too wanted to capture the Arab territories. So indeed, Britain had years ago prohibited the British tradesmen selling guns to Arabs in Yemen, Oman, and Iraq. On top of it, Britain bought the Arabs' machine guns by paying over the odds gradually disarming people of the Arabian Peninsula as it planned to occupy the region (Arslan, 2009: 192). Sharif Hussein once again attempted to ally with the British in early months of World War I but the British did not feel the need of cooperating with him. As the First World War escalated the British realized that they were in need of Arabs' assistance and this time accepted Sharif's proposal (See also

Kayalı, 1998: 192). In any case according to Arslan, Cemal Pasha's oppressive administration or executions was not the primary cause of Sharif Hussein's revolt at all. For him, even if Cemal Pasha did not oppress the Arabs, the revolt would be broken out.

Before ending this section it is necessary to make a few points on the relationship between the Arab Revolt and Arabism/Arab nationalism just to clarify the arguments made by Darwaza who deemed the revolt as the turning point for the Arab movement and Arabism. According to Wilson,

the ideology of Arabism was not espoused by the Hashemites until it became of particular use to them with particular audiences. It became useful insofar as they began to take political action in areas outside of the bounds of their traditional sphere in Arabia. It also became useful when they began a dialogue with a European power whose political frame of reference was ethnic nationalism (Wilson, 1991: 214).

Supporting this argument Wilson also underlined the fact that "the nationalism that became reigning ideology in the Arab world after the demise of the Ottoman Empire owed its spread less perhaps to the Arab revolt than to the end of the Ottoman empire" (Wilson, 1991: 205). As explained further by Ochsenwald, taking the revolt, which occurred in the Hejaz, as an origin of Arab nationalism is indeed quite ironic considering two major facts: first the very basis of the social and political structure of the Hejaz was Islam and the second fact is that the Hejaz lacked of social and economic dynamics such as middle class, secularism, and the press that contributed to the emergence of Arab nationalism (Ochsenwald, 1991). Based on Wilson's and Ochsenwald's observations, it is safe to argue that assuming Arab nationalism as the main driving force behind the Arab Revolt is a farfetched argument. Therefore, Darwaza's discourse on the revolt seems to be heavily influenced by the developments that unfolded in the region after World War I. Apparently, he reconsidered the revolt in the light of the ideological transformation that took place in the Arabian Peninsula after the empire disintegrated. Arab nationalism became the only feasible ideology in the Arabian Peninsula as the region's administration was reformed by the mandate powers after the empire's withdrawal from the Arab provinces. Being in need of new symbols for attaching to the concept of "Arab

nation”, many Arab nationalists including Darwaza imposed a national value to the Arab Revolt which would be deemed as the first successful step bringing the Arabs out of the Ottoman authority after centuries.

Unlike Darwaza, Rida adopted an Islamist discourse to justify the revolt just like Sharif Hussein himself did. As Wilson underscores, “the language of nationalism suited Husayn’s needs in some ways, but in Mecca itself and in other important forums, the language of Islam was an equally important tool” (Wilson, 1991: 213-214). As quoted in the first chapter, in his “Proclamation” of independence, which was published on June 27, 1916 in *al-Qibla*, the Meccan newspaper that was “founded to propagate and justify the Arab revolt” (Wilson, 1991: 214), Sharif Hussein pledged to protect the Holy Land and to restore the *sharia* (Ardıç, 2012). As stated by Cleveland, *al-Qibla* did not only accuse the CUP as being Turkish nationalist but also argued that,

the Ottoman Empire has been taken over by reckless party which has launched an attack on Islam, an attack which is *fitna* (sedition) in every sense of the term. The leaders of the state do not care about religion or the *shari’a* ...and have begun to live under the signs of apostasy and unbelief (quoted in Cleveland, 1986: 89).

These statements of Sharif overlap with Rida’s Islamist discourse that he used for legitimizing the revolt against the empire. As Ochsenswald observes Islam was the single most important social force shaping people’s mindset as well as the politics in the Hejaz (Ochsenswal, 1991) indeed Kara (2003) and Ardıç (2012) have argued that this was the case for the entire Ottoman cultural milieu at the time. Therefore, it was not reasonable to put forward another (secular) form of justification in that particular context. Moreover, it can be said that Darwaza used a nationalist discourse to explain the Arab Revolt not only because he was an Arabist when the revolt took place but also because he wrote his memories in 1980s when Arab nationalism was dominant in the region. On the other hand, Rida’s memoir consists of the travel notes that were taken when the revolt was still underway. Given the fact that Islam was the only reference point in the Hejaz at that time Rida’s discourse appeared to be quite feasible.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Analyzing the discourses of the five prominent Arab intellectuals (Rida, Darwaza, Kurd Ali, Arslan, and Salam), this thesis has aimed at making a modest contribution to the understanding of the relations between the Ottoman government and the Arab intellectual elites during the Second Constitutional Period which began with the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and continued through World War I. This study is located at the intersection of the literatures on the emergence of Arab nationalism and on Arab-Ottoman relations in the early 20th century. The data I have analyzed come from the memoirs written by the above-mentioned five leading intellectuals of the Arab world at the time. In addition to these primary sources, I have also utilized the secondary literature in order to locate the primary data (the narratives and discourses of these intellectuals) in their proper historical context. In examining their memoirs I have adopted the comparative-historical method in addition to Foucaultian discourse analysis, particularly his concepts of ‘threshold’, ‘historical emergence’, and ‘analysis of decent’. In order to analyze the intellectuals’ ideological discourses I have utilized an ideological spectrum ranging from Ottomanism to Arab nationalism, the two major ideologies that influenced many Arab intellectuals in this period. After presenting a narrative analysis of their memoirs in Chapter 2, I have positioned their authors on the aforementioned spectrum. In the third chapter I have discussed the major socio-political factors that might have led to the transformation of their ideological discourses and indicated how their ideological and political stances played a significant role in determining their views and explanations of the events and issues of the time. Rather than dealing with each intellectual individually, I have constantly compared their attitudes towards the unfolding events within the framework of the Ottoman-Arab relations.

The period between 1908 and 1918 is quite significant not only because it included various political developments in the region that terminated the Ottoman rule in Arab lands, but it also signified the culmination of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process that had been going on through the 19th century. As Kayalı observes, “though only a brief episode when viewed against the vast span of

Ottoman history, the second constitutional period (1908-18) was marked by extraordinary social and political transformations” (Kayalı, 1998: 2). As the empire lost its European territories in the Balkan Wars in 1913, its Arab provinces “became the only significant extension of the empire outside its new Anatolian heartland” (Hanioglu, 2008: 173). Therefore, the relationship between the Ottoman government and the Arabs became more significant than ever. The CUP attempted to maintain the territorial and cultural integration of the empire through the idea(l) of Ottomanism, which included both Islamic and Turkic elements, against the major threat of nationalism rapidly spreading throughout the empire, particularly among its non-Muslim subjects. Ottomanism worked very well in the context of the Arab provinces of the empire during critical times, such as the Tripolitanian War uniting all the groups involved. However, Arab intellectuals, definitely not the majority of the Arab public as one of them admits (Derveze, 2007: 421), appealed to Arab nationalism as the disastrous wars signified the empire’s weakness and the European powers dramatically increased their anti-Ottomanist propaganda aiming to realize their imperialist ambitions in the region. Each of the five Arab intellectuals came from different social backgrounds and region as well as ideological and political orientations. Yet they all somehow went through a discursive transformation during the CUP administration. The main direction of this transformation was from Ottomanism to -different forms of- Arab nationalism. This thesis has attempted to explain that transformation in the discourses of five leading Arab intellectuals and in reference to various sociological factors and with due sensitivity for the historical context.

For the examination of this discursive change, I have chosen a number of crucial events (“turning points”) that I argue, affected this change crucially the most during 1908-1918. Clearly, it is difficult to identify a specific turning point after which all the five intellectuals’ attitudes towards the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces were transformed. Historical events are more complex, fragile, and contingent than they are assumed (Smart, 2002). Therefore, in order to comprehend the factors that played a role in shaping ideological discourses of the Arab intellectuals, it is necessary to take into consideration the multiple processes through in which the intellectuals became involved. In spite of the complexity of the relations and processes that Arslan, Darwaza, Kurd Ali, Salam, and Rida were associated with,

I have identified, based on an analysis of their own evaluations, I have identified four major historical turning points between 1908 and 1918 that appeared to be influential in determining the Arab intellectuals' attitudes towards Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces. The first was the transformation of the CUP's policies from being relatively libertarian to oppressive. The second was the outbreak of World War I and the impact of European colonialism on the Peninsula. The third turning point was Cemal Pasha's policies during his governorate in Syria. The last -but not least-breaking point was the 1916 Arab Revolt.

In Ottoman political center, following the three decades of Abdulhamid II' autocratic reign the Young Turks had initially introduced wide ranging civil liberties but soon they adopted oppressive policies as the empire faced internal and external troubles and political turmoil caused by failed wars and separatist nationalism threatening its very existence. The CUP's authoritarian and, according to many Arabs; nationalist policies expedited the alienation of all the five Arab intellectual discussed here from the Ottoman government. In the political realm, the issue of decentralization was the very basis of their conflict with the government. This issue was particularly important for Salam, Darwaza, and Kurd Ali. Therefore, Salam and his reformist friends in Beirut formed the Beirut Reform Committee. Moreover, Arab intellectual elites from different regions organized the 1913 Paris Arab Congress, where they declared a set of reformist goals, including above all the decentralization of the Ottoman government. As the Unionists began to recognize the exigency of making comprehensive reforms in the administration of the Arab provinces they issued a Provincial Law in March 1913, "which would have had to address the main points of contention between the CUP and its decentralist opposition" (Kayalı, 1998: 86).

The breakout of World War I, which was a watershed for the Arab-Ottoman relations, upset the projects and plans that would improve the relations between the Arab provinces and the imperial center. In the context of the Arab Provinces the war years involved far-reaching developments including the appointment of Cemal Pasha as the military-governor of Syria with extraordinary powers, his failed Suez Canal Expedition, the European powers' wide ranging anti-Ottoman campaigns, the famine that spread through geographical Syria, and the 1916 Arab Revolt. Causing radical power shifts in the Arab provinces, all these developments led the Arab intellectuals

to review their political discourses. It is thus possible to observe in their pre-war and post-war statements how their political stances had shifted. While Salam, Rida, and Darwaza advocated administrative decentralization before the war they slid towards the idea of separation of the Arab provinces from the empire after the war. In spite of his fierce criticism of the executions and exiles, Arslan remained an Ottomanist until the elimination of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 because he saw the Ottoman Empire as the only independent Muslim state and hence the only political umbrella under which Muslims could unite against European imperialism. Interestingly, Kurd Ali, a cultural nationalist, who used to heavily criticize the CUP government in the pre-war period, appealed to Ottomanism propagating the government's Islamic campaigns to unite Muslims around the Ottoman caliph in the wartime.

One of the most significant developments that took place after the breakout of the war was the appointment of Cemal Pasha as the commander of the 4th Army and the governor of Syria. When the CUP's, or more specifically Cemal's ambition to reconquer Egypt (which was under British invasion at the time) ended up in bitter disappointment, he turned his attention to the task of "maintaining peace and order" in Syria. In the light of the incriminating documents seized from the French consulates in the beginning of the war, Cemal Pasha cracked down on Arab nationalists who were affiliated with such secret Arabist societies and parties as *al-Fatat* and the Decentralization Party and had "intriguing" relations with the European powers. Cemal's interrogation resulted in the execution of a group of renowned Arab(ist) notables and the exile of a great number of Arabs to Anatolia. Cemal's oppressive policies alienated all the Arab intellectuals discussed in this thesis, including Salam and Arslan who were politically and ideologically closest to the Ottoman center among them.

As the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War on the side of Germany, the Allies, particularly Britain and France, further intensified their anti-Ottoman campaign in the Arab lands on which they had ambitions. In addition to spreading their propaganda against the Ottomans through Egypt-based journals and newspapers, the British heavily utilized the notion/movement of an "Arab Caliphate" triggering the conflict between the Arabs and the imperial government. Though they did not openly stated in their memoirs, this movement might have influenced our five Arab intellectuals. Among the five it was Rida who advocated the notion of Arab

Caliphate the most. The reason for the absence in their narratives of this notion in their memoirs, which were all (but Rida's) written after the war, was perhaps because it was a failed project, as the British gave up on their plans to install Sharif Hussein as an alternative, "loyal" caliph when it became clear that the Ottomans had already lost the war. During the war Britain did not only reach secret agreements with France and Russia to divide up the Ottoman territories (e.g. the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement) as well as promises to both the Arabs and the Zionists. Thus, the secret correspondence between MacMahon and Sharif Hussein of Mecca led to the latter's revolt against the Unionist Ottoman government in 1916 with the military support of the British.

Indeed attempts at revolt against the Ottoman government became prevalent among some Arab elites during the war seeing it as an opportunity to actualize their dreams to form an independent Arab state in the region with the help of either Britain or France. Rida, Darwaza, and, in the later stages of the war, Salam supported the revolt organized by Sharif Hussein who justified his rebellion on the ground that the Unionists had disobeyed Allah, and claimed that the very aim of the revolt was the restoration of the *Sharia* in the Hijaz. Rida, too, accused the CUP leadership of bringing the empire to the edge of collapse by deviating from Islamic principles. Salam and Darwaza also supported the Arab Revolt while the latter used an Arabist discourse to justify it. On the contrary, having a strong anti-colonialist stance Arslan and Kurd Ali neither supported Sharif's revolt when it was underway nor they discussed it in their memories decades after it broke out.

In less than a decade, the attitudes of Darwaza, Rida, Arslan, Salam, and Kurd Ali towards the Ottoman authority in the Arabian Peninsula had undergone a profound transformation owing to the dramatic socio-political changes both in the Ottoman capital and the region between 1908 and 1918. Sliding from the Ottomanist edge of the ideological spectrum towards the Arabist one, Rida once a vigorous advocator of the CUP became a bitter enemy of it as forming an Arab state led by an Arab caliph became possible after World War I broke out. (He would later cut his relations with Sharif Hussein, too, however.) Likewise, Darwaza who was previously affiliated to the CUP and the FAP promoting decentralization began to advocate the secession of the Arab Provinces from the empire after the war. Until the breakout of the 1916 Arab Revolt, Salam as an Ottomanist and reformist was always against the

separatist ideas advocating no more than administrative decentralization. Unlike the previous three, Kurd Ali as a cultural nationalist moved to the Ottomanist side of the spectrum as he had good personal relations with Cemal Pasha due to his anti-European posture. Finally, Shakib Arslan whose main objective was striving for the unity of Muslims regardless of their ethnicities did not appeal to Arab nationalism until the mid-1920s.

Although this thesis has attempted at a comprehensive examination of a number of primary sources, it has its limits. Focusing on merely a decade (1908-1918), a specific region (the Arab provinces and particularly geographical Syria), and a small number of Arab intellectuals whose memories have reached us, this thesis has left out a great deal of issues, groups of people, and vast territories that were part of the late Ottoman context. The relationship between the Ottoman government and the Arabs who had four hundred years of continued political, social, and economic engagement deserves to be examined not only from the perspective of intellectual elites, but also those who belonged to different social strata such as merchants, diplomats, and if possible, the ordinary people.

Controlling much of Western Asia, Southeastern Europe, and North Africa at the height of its power during the 16th and 17th centuries and influencing some oversea regions such as Aceh, the Ottoman Sultanate enjoyed strong relationships with a variety of communities with different ethnic and religious identities. There is a considerable need to uncover the attitudes of people from these communities towards the Ottoman rule in different periods of its existence in these regions. In addition to the Arab provinces, Iran and North Africa, particularly Egypt are significant geographical areas that might be made subject to such an examination. Also, it would be quite enlightening to demonstrate the views of those from the Balkan countries some of which were parts of the empire until the early twentieth century. Examining attitudes and ideological and political discourses of individuals from various communities, which constituted the Ottoman population, would fill the gaps in understanding of Ottoman political, social, and cultural history and shed light on controversial debates such as the ‘Ottoman colonialism’ in the literature. This thesis might, in this context, be read as a small contribution to the understanding of the late-Ottoman history of the Middle East.

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